The Sultan’s Fleet: Seafarers of the Ottoman Empire 9781848859791, 9780755641758, 9780755641741, 9780755641734

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The Sultan’s Fleet

The Sultan’s Fleet Seafarers of the Ottoman Empire Christine Isom-Verhaaren

I.B. TAURIS Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA 29 Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin 2, Ireland BLOOMSBURY, I.B. TAURIS and the I.B. Tauris logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2022 Copyright © Christine Isom-Verhaaren, 2022 Christine Isom-Verhaaren has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. For legal purposes the Acknowledgments on p. viii constitute an extension of this copyright page. Cover design by ianrossdesigner.com Cover image: Matrakçi, Tarih-i Sultan Bayezid, folio 24a, illustration of Barak’s galleon at the Battle of Barak Island (Proti), August 12, 1499 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-1-8488-5979-1 PB: 978-0-7556-4175-8 ePDF: 978-0-7556-4173-4 eBook: 978-0-7556-4172-7 Typeset by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India To find out more about our authors and books visit www​.bloomsbury​.com and sign up for our newsletters.



To my grandchildren Jack, Juliet, Tabitha, Astrid, Avalyn, Avery, Caspian, and Owen

vi

Contents Acknowledgments

viii

Introduction: Turks, Byzantines, and Latins: Competing for Maritime Prizes 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Turks Invade the Aegean: The Feats of Umur of Aydın Retrospective Ottoman Hero 9 Gallipoli: Ottoman Key to Securing the Straits 29 The Conqueror’s Fleet: Becoming Lord of the Two Seas 59 Ottoman Seafarers: Sea Gazis Serve the Sultans: Kemal Reis and Piri Reis 87 Ottoman Seafarers: Hayreddin Barbarossa: The Gazi Pasha 107 A Tale of Corsairs: Kılıç Ali Pasha, Uluç Hasan Pasha (Il Veneziano), Cigalazade Pasha 133 The Cretan War: Seventeenth Century: Technology, Finances, and Factions: The Trials of Admiral Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha 157 Mezemorta: Half-Dead?: The Revival of the Ottoman Navy 189

Conclusion: Identifying Ottoman Seafarers 209 Seafarers Chronology Notes Bibliography Index

217 221 250 261

Acknowledgments When several years ago I first contemplated writing a history of the Ottoman navy covering multiple centuries, I had no concept of how difficult this project would be to complete. I blithely left my comfort zone of researching naval topics during the sixteenth century and dove into exploring a very different empire both in the fourteenth and in the seventeenth centuries. Additionally, while studying Ottoman seafarers, I have also pursued interconnected topics; consequently, I have benefited from many contacts with a variety of people. I fondly remember talking with many of the following at the ARIT hostel in Istanbul, or at conferences in a variety of locations. I thank the following for providing assistance: Virginia Aksan, Nabil al-Takriti, Palmira Brummett, Mark Choate, John Curry, Eric Dursteler, Suraiya Faroqhi, Dan Goffman, Emrah Safa Gurkan, Jane Hathaway, Julia Landweber, Jonathan McCollum, Murat Cem Menguc, Ramazan Hakki Oztan, Leslie Peirce, Kent Schull, Amy Singer, Will Smiley, Michael Talbot, Malissa Taylor, Joshua White, Gillian Weiss, and Fariba Zarinebaf. I thank Teresa Gomez of the Harold B. Lee Library at Brigham Young University who produced the maps for this book. I also want to thank Amaia Kennedy and David Patton, two student assistants at BYU who completed valuable tasks for me. In addition, I wish to thank my editors at IB Tauris and Bloomsbury, Joanna Godfrey and Rory Gormley. Special thanks are due to Svat Soucek who encouraged me to continue writing about the Ottoman navy because he believed many more studies were needed on naval history, and Linda Darling who has been a willing listener to many discussions about the navy over the years. I especially wish to thank my family, especially my husband Bruce, who recently traveled to Rhodes and Kos with me, and to my children Catharine, Christopher, and Nathaniel who have heard a great deal about this project for many years.

 ix

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Introduction Turks, Byzantines, and Latins: Competing for Maritime Prizes

The Ottoman navy provided an essential component in facilitating Ottoman expansion from the reign of Orhan in the fourteenth through the early eighteenth centuries. Nothing concerning naval forces is known from the period of Osman; however, for every succeeding Ottoman ruler, the status of their fleet impacted all their other activities, especially including expansion by their territorial forces. This being the case, it is remarkable that most general histories of the Ottoman Empire devote little attention to naval affairs and then usually as a brief passing mention. A paucity of sources for the earliest period is a possible explanation, but that has not deterred historians from writing about land-based military expansion during all periods. The few historical surveys of Ottoman naval forces that have been written by Ottoman historians omit the fourteenth century and ignore the Ottoman’s Turkish rivals who excelled in seafaring before the Ottomans expanded navally.1 However, it is essential to begin with the fourteenth century if the full transition from Byzantine and Latin political rule of maritime locations to Ottoman rule is to be studied in its entirety. This history is an account of Turkish naval expansion, which eliminated the political control of maritime territories by both Byzantines and Latins in the region of the Aegean Sea and the straits that lead to the Black Sea. There were many battles fought on a variety of ships; however, the focus of this account is to study the accomplishments and challenges of the men who brought about Ottoman naval expansion and their relations with the sultan and his elite administrators. The geographical setting of this expansion is also a theme, as the desirability of these locations has led to conflict over the centuries. The sultans’ fleets were an integral component to Ottoman expansion during the first four centuries of the empire’s existence. Turks arrived in Anatolia after the battle of Manzikert in 1071 soon expanding to the west until their leaders established their capital at Iznik (Nicea) on the doorstep of the Byzantine fabled capital, Istanbul (Constantinople). Their impact was great, leading to this region eventually becoming Turkish speaking and ruled by a Turkish dynasty, the Seljuks of Rum. The Byzantine emperor begged assistance from his Christian coreligionists in the west under the Pope of Rome to remove the Turks from his vicinity and requested some mercenary soldiers to enter his service to defeat them. Instead this proposal led to the crusades, bringing Latins (Roman Catholics from Europe) in greater numbers into his domains. The Turks became a permanent fixture in Anatolia and the Latins eventually conquered Constantinople in 1204 during

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The Sultan’s Fleet

the Fourth Crusade and established a Latin Empire there, and their Byzantine rivals retreated to Iznik. In 1261, the Byzantines regained Constantinople putting an end to the Latin Empire, but not to the many Latin lordships in the Balkans, Anatolia, and on Aegean islands. In the eleventh through thirteenth centuries, the descendants of the original Turks who had spread throughout Anatolia made little headway in establishing a presence in coastal cities of the Aegean, Black, or Mediterranean Seas. However, during the period that the Byzantines regained Constantinople new waves of  Turkish migration swept across Anatolia and these Turkish beys (lords) founded petty states (beyliks) throughout Anatolia, including in maritime regions. These Turks began to challenge Byzantines and Latins for control of the surrounding seas. This book traces the contest between Turks, Byzantines, and Latins for rule of maritime lands and seas that eventually became core territories and seas of the Ottoman Empire (see Table 1). For unlike the previous Turkish rulers of Anatolia, most notably the Seljuks, the Ottoman sultans considered themselves rulers of lands and seas: Mehmed II (d. 1481) after he became known as the Conqueror because he had conquered Istanbul claimed to rule the two lands and the two seas: Anatolia and the Balkans and the Aegean and the Black Seas. This conquest demanded naval power to secure because without at least partial control of the Aegean and Black Seas his prize would always be endangered. Thus, whenever Ottoman naval power weakened over the centuries the security of Istanbul was threatened. This contest for control of especially the Aegean is seen through the exploits of the many Turkish, then solely Ottoman seafarers who served Ottoman sultans in the process of transforming these valuable maritime locations into possessions of the Ottoman dynasty. The Turkish Straits, as they are officially known, consist of the Dardanelles to the South, and the Bosporus to the north, which the city of Istanbul straddles today. The book traces the exploits of the seafarers during the middle centuries of Turkish naval expansion, from approximately 1300, when several Turkish beyliks were established on the Aegean coast, until 1718 when the Ottomans defeated Venice in a final war between them and regained key Ottoman maritime territories. The contest is viewed primarily through narrative sources produced by Ottoman authors who celebrated the victories and mourned the defeats of Turkish seafarers. Ottoman naval encounters with their competitors have given rise to sources written by authors sympathetic to the Ottomans and those who favored their opponents and each type of source has its strength and weaknesses depending on the interests of the historian. Byzantine and Latin sources are valuable, but they only present the nonTurkish, then non-Ottoman, perspective on the naval conflicts described in this book. These sources are often of crucial importance in delineating events, but they frequently obscure an Ottoman understanding of the conflict. Sometimes sources produced by outsiders include factual errors, such as claiming that Mezemorta led the Ottoman fleet in the Mediterranean in 1690, when in fact he was leading naval forces on the Danube that year. Of greater significance, because they are more difficult to counter, are biased views of the motivations of Ottoman seafarers. For example, during the Morean War, each side claimed that the other fled from battles and was unwilling to fight. Sources written from the perspective of Ottoman participants might explain why they fought in some instances and not in others, without it appearing that they were

 Introduction 3 Table 1  Naval Conflicts between Turks, Byzantines, and Western Europeans with territorial outcomes Name

Opponents

Outcome in terms of territory

Fourth Crusade

1202–04

Date

Crusaders vs. Byzantines

Rhodes Attack by Menteşe on Rhodes Naval battle near Chios Crusade

1306–10 1312

Knights vs. Byzantines Knights vs. Menteşe

Latin Empire of Constantinople, Byzantines at Nicea Knights occupy Rhodes Knights retain Rhodes

1319

Genoese retain Chios

Crusade of Smyrna Crusade of Amadeo of Savoy Battle at Gallipoli

1343–52 1366

Knights, Genoese vs. Aydın Venice vs. Karası, Aydın, Saruhan Venice, Knights, Papacy, Cyprus vs. Aydın Savoy vs. Ottomans

1416

Venice vs. Ottomans

Salonica Istanbul

1430 1453

OttomanVenetian war Black Sea Rhodes Otranto Venetian War

1463–79

Venice vs. Ottomans Byzantines, Venice vs. Ottomans Venice vs. Ottomans

Venetian naval victory, no territory changes Ottomans retake Salonica Ottomans conquer Istanbul

1475 1480 1480 1499–1502

Genoese vs. Ottomans Knights vs. Ottomans Naples vs. Ottomans Venice vs. Ottomans

Rhodes Corfu Venetian islands

1522 1537 1537

Knights vs. Ottomans Venice vs. Ottomans Venice vs. Ottomans

Preveza

1538

Venice, Doria vs. Ottomans Venice vs. Ottomans

1333–4

1538 Chios

1565

Cyprus War Crete Mora Morea

1570 1645–69 1684–99 1714–18

Genoese of Chios vs. Ottomans Venice vs. Ottomans Venice vs. Ottomans Venice vs. Ottomans Venice and Habsburgs vs. Ottomans

Weakened Karası Port of Izmir taken from Aydın Crusaders occupy Gallipoli, then given to Byzantines

Eğriboz conquered, Lemnos, Cyclades islands Ottomans annex Kaffa Knights retain Rhodes Ottomans occupy Otranto for a year Ottomans conquer Modon, Anavarin, and Koron Ottomans conquer Rhodes Venice retains Corfu Ottomans conquer Kythera, Aegina, Kea, Paros, Naxos Ottomans retain territory of Preveza Ottomans conquer Tinos, Andros, Karpathos, Skyros Ottomans annex Chios Ottomans conquer Cyprus Ottomans conquer Crete Venice conquers Morea Ottomans regain Morea

inherently cowardly rather than making rational decisions based on their ability to defeat the enemy in a given encounter. Reasonable caution by one’s own forces can be portrayed as cowardice in an enemy; however, such judgments should be questioned. There were instances of Ottoman cowardice, but they should not be confused with occasions of reasonable choices to retreat until a more favorable opportunity to defeat

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the enemy presented itself. Thus, understanding the motivations of the Ottoman actors to the extent possible requires favoring Ottoman sources.

Organization of the Book Chapter 1 highlights the accomplishments of Umur of Aydın (d. 1348), a seafarer from a rival Turkish beylik, who sailed forth from Izmir (Smyrna) to challenge Byzantines and Latins for control of the surrounding seas. Umur was the greatest gazi (warrior of the faith) that the Turks of Anatolia produced in the first half of the fourteenth century. He began his career by conquering a key location, the fortress of the harbor at Izmir, recruited a ship builder who was also an expert in naval warfare, and began his first attack on a galleon near the straits. The ship ultimately escaped, but he discovered his vocation, naval warfare, and proceeded to increase the size of his fleet and the scope of his conquests. Eventually, he became such a thorn in the side of Venice that the leaders of the city incited a crusade against him in 1344, which succeeded in conquering the harbor fortress of Izmir. Umur died attempting to regain this fortress, which controlled the harbor of Izmir, without which his days as a sea gazi were essentially over. Umur was the hero of an account written by one Hoca Selman, which was incorporated into the Ottoman author Enveri’s fifteenth-century epic. Somewhat later, the Ottoman historian Oruç during the reign of Bayezid II (d. 1512) included Sufi-inspired episodes linking Umur to Süleyman Pasha, the son of the Ottoman ruler Orhan (r. 1326?–62). Both Umur and Süleyman son of Orhan died relatively young after expanding the lands ruled by Turks in the fourteenth century, by sea and by land. Chapter 2 reviews the accomplishments of many individuals none of whom reached the stature of Umur Bey in terms of exploits against Latins and Byzantines. The chapter considers the centrality of Gallipoli, a fortress town on the Dardanelles already important under the Byzantines as a naval base. The Ottomans gained control of this location in 1354, during the reign of Orhan after an earthquake destroyed its defenses and they occupied it without opposition from the inhabitants who fled. This port became the Ottoman base for controlling the straits and for expanding across them into the Balkans. Until the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, Gallipoli was the most important crossing for Ottoman forces moving from Anatolia to the Balkans. The Ottomans began to incorporate their Turkish neighbors’ territories into their own lands, beginning with Karası, which had an ideal location controlling the southern shore of the Dardanelles. Bayezid I (d. 1403) annexed the beyliks of Menteşe, Aydın, and Saruhan with their access to the Aegean Sea. During this period, the Ottomans endured succession crises and Gallipoli played a role in Ottoman princes’ battles for sovereignty. The Ottomans attracted two major crusades against their expanding power, the crusade of Nicopolis in 1396 and the crusade of Varna in 1444, as well as the minor crusade of Amadeo of Savoy in 1366. Amadeo briefly returned Gallipoli to Byzantine control, while the crusades of Nicopolis and Varna resulted in resounding Ottoman victories by their land armies. However, during the crusade of Varna, the transporting of Murad II (d. 1451) and his Ottoman troops across the Bosporus on Genoese ships was key to Ottoman victory.

 Introduction 5 Chapter 3 recounts the naval accomplishments of the Ottomans during the reign of Mehmed the Conqueror. The conquest of Constantinople in 1453 would have been impossible without the effective use of naval forces during the siege. Although the Byzantine Empire came to an end with the conquest, the Venetians had designs on the city and their rivalry with the Ottomans for key bases continued throughout the reign of Mehmed II. Moreover, Mehmed did not rest on his laurels after this amazing feat; he proceeded to conquer maritime districts to secure his victory. Mehmed demanded success from his admirals and, if they did not deliver, they were demoted or executed. During his reign he established Ottoman rule on several Aegean islands, including Lesbos, Lemnos, Bozcaada (Tenedos), Gökçeada (Imroz, Imbros), and Eğriboz (Negroponte), and along the coasts of the Black Sea. He attempted to conquer Rhodes and to establish a base in southern Italy at Otranto. His naval vision was most clearly recounted in the writings of Kritovoulos of Imbros, who keenly appreciated Mehmed’s naval accomplishments. Chapter 4 pivots to the naval accomplishments of a pair of seafarers whose family originated in the rival beylik of Karaman, Kemal Reis and his nephew Piri Reis. Kemal fought in the Eğriboz campaign of 1470; however, he spent much of his career as a freelance corsair sailing to the western reaches of the Mediterranean as well as becoming a thorn in the side of Venice in the east. With the rise in power of the Habsburgs of Spain, Muslim territories in North Africa were threatened and welcomed gazis from the Ottoman lands. Eventually Kemal and Piri were recruited by Bayezid II (d. 1512) into his service and Kemal became an adviser to the sultan on naval matters earning the enmity of the sultan’s elite associates. Kemal died while in Bayezid’s service in 1510, and Piri became more notable as a cartographer than as a seafarer. He attempted to earn the sultan’s favor in 1513 with a world map that he presented to Selim I (d. 1520) in Egypt after he conquered the Mamluks. When Süleyman (d. 1566) became sultan, Piri Reis attempted to earn his favor with another world map and with a portolan, a written guide to the Mediterranean Sea accompanied by many small-scale maps. His accomplishments were many but failed to win him the recognition he desired. He recorded his uncle’s exploits and his own in his Book of the Sea, which, beyond recording the location of dangerous shoals, also recorded the changing status of many lands along the Mediterranean both east and west. This work provides a snapshot of Ottoman expansion up to the early years of Süleyman. Chapter 5 recounts the exploits of the greatest Ottoman seafarer of them all, Hayreddin Pasha known in the west as Barbarossa. He originated from a mixed marriage on the island of Lesbos, but he fled to North Africa, where he gained control of Algiers. He was recruited by Süleyman, in the midst of his naval rivalry with Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor and king of Spain. Hayreddin deserved the sultan’s favor as he defeated his rivals at the battle of Preveza in 1538, including both the fleets of Venice and of Andrea Doria of Genoa. Hayreddin conquered additional islands in the Aegean, including Andros, and was given a province created for him, that of the islands, meaning the islands of the Aegean. His impact was great and through his clients, such as Turgud Reis’ influence, Ottoman naval prowess was exerted through most of the remaining years of the sixteenth century. When his clients were excluded in favor of palace favorites, Ottoman naval power suffered leading to a major defeat at

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Lepanto in 1571 under Müezzinzade Ali Pasha during the reign of Selim II (d. 1574) after the conquest of Cyprus from Venice. Hayreddin’s exploits were reported in a Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa (History of the Holy Wars of Hayreddin Pasha) consulted by the historian Katib Çelebi in his naval history. Chapter 6 reviews the adventures of three admirals of Italian heritage: Kılıç Ali of Calabria, the survivor of Lepanto, his client Uluç Hasan of Venice, and an admiral of Genoese heritage Cigalazade Sinan Pasha. Kılıç Ali had been a client of Hayreddin’s client Turgud Reis. Kılıç Ali was talented and led the fleet after Lepanto and at the conquest of Tunis in 1574 completing the Ottoman waterfront from Algiers in the west around the eastern Mediterranean to the Adriatic Sea. He is given favorable treatment in the naval history of Katib Çelebi, who barely mentions Uluç Hasan. Katib Çelebi praised Cigalazade, whose background he briefly mentioned, since his father was a Genoese corsair, while his mother was the daughter of the dizdar (castle warden) of Herceg Novi and thus an Ottoman woman. After his capture, Cigalazade combined an elite education at the palace school at Topkapı with a corsair background through his father and served as admiral twice. Although he had no notable victories leading to the conquest of new territories, Katib Çelebi considered him to have been a competent admiral. The inclusive nature of Ottoman recruitment is exemplified by the careers of these admirals. Chapter 7 focuses on the seventeenth century, especially the period of the war against Venice to conquer Crete, the final major outpost of Venice in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Many admirals had brief stints in this position, and few of them were naval experts. A few naval specialists encountered elite opposition when they failed to pay the expected amount to obtain their position. Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha’s accomplishments during the war to conquer Crete are recorded by Katib Çelebi in his naval history, but his conflicts with the elite are expounded by Mustafa Naima in his history. Ultimately the Ottomans conquered Crete, under the leadership of the Köprülü dynasty of grand viziers, completing their possession of most of the important bases in the eastern Mediterranean. Chapter 8 recounts the Ottoman loss and then regaining of the Mora (Peloponnesus) in two final wars with the Venetians that ensured Ottoman control of the waters of the eastern Mediterranean. The outstanding naval figure during the Morean War was the admiral Mezemorta Hüseyn Pasha, a corsair originating in the Ottoman territories of North Africa who was recruited to the position of admiral in 1695. Mezemorta desired to reform the navy and make it a competently administered organization with key leadership posts filled by men who possessed naval expertise, a dramatic departure from the lackluster performance by palace favorites that characterized most of the seventeenth century. His reforms likely aided the Ottomans to regain the Mora, key for the safety of their capital and of the Aegean. The peace of Passarowitz in 1718 during the reign of Ahmed III (r. 1703–30) restored Ottoman possession of the Mora, key to their control of the core waters of the Empire in the Aegean Sea. Several Ottoman historians, especially Silahdar Findiklili Mehmed Ağa, provide evidence confirming Ottoman naval exploits during these final wars with Venice.

 Introduction 7

Place Names Many of the places that are significant in this book have at least three names, Turkish, Greek, and Italian. If there is a well-known English version of a name, I have preferred that; otherwise, I privilege the Turkish names while also providing the Greek and/or Italian name of the place when it is first introduced in the text. The Ottoman capital after 1453, Istanbul, is referred to using this name throughout the book, except for in primary source quotations. This city was referred to as Istanbul in a fifteenthcentury Ottoman epic that incorporated a fourteenth-century Turkish text. Clearly, among some Turks and Byzantines the name Istanbul was in common usage at the beginning of the period studied here. The Ottomans used several names for this city, but the simplest for our purpose here is Istanbul. Also using the name Istanbul reflects the view from the seafarer periphery rather than the administrative center that often referred to the capital as Kostantiniyye, for example, on coins, or Ku(n)stantiniyya on some Ottoman documents.2

8

1

Turks Invade the Aegean The Feats of Umur of Aydın Retrospective Ottoman Hero

That fortunate man [Umur Bey] said to Hoca Selman, “Build a large kadırga [war galley] for me.” He built a large kadırga for him, the pasha [Umur] was joyous and he named the ship “Gazi.” He [Hoca Selman] made seven kayıks [small galleys] also. . . . When the eight ships were equipped he [Umur] left on a raid. . . . When they arrived at Bozcaada [Tenedos] they saw five round ships, they looked at them. . . . The ship of the pasha attacked the round ships in the blink of an eye, . . . Who could describe that battle? . . . The battle lasted two entire days and nights. . . . The surface of the sea was red with blood. The pasha himself fought intensely. Enveri, The Destan of Umur Pasha1 The Ottoman poet Enveri produced this first detailed account of a naval battle during which Turks of the fourteenth century attacked ships heading for Istanbul at the mouth of the Dardanelles, in a recounting of the exploits of Umur Bey of Aydın. This account was included in an epic written with the patronage of the most powerful grand vizier of Mehmed the Conqueror, Mahmud Pasha, which Enveri dedicated to him. The epic is divided into three parts, the second of which recounts Umur’s naval career, which is the primary basis for our knowledge of his feats at sea. The section on Umur extends over a third of the work, which appears rather extensive for a book recounting Ottoman history. However, Umur’s exploits became significant for Ottoman expansion, since as a seafaring gazi he became the focus of a “cult, which remained alive for several generations among the sailors of the Aegean.”2 The work was completed in 1464 or 1465 when Mehmed was in the process of fashioning his own effective naval forces to combat the Venetians during a war which continued until 1479 and Mahmud Pasha might have believed that Ottoman sailors would be inspired by this seafaring bey of the previous century. Apparently, Ottoman seafarers revered Umur’s memory since they swore “for the sake of Umur Gazi” into the seventeenth century.3 Thus Ottoman historiography offered a prominent place for the exploits of this bey of Aydın due to his influence on the seafarers of the Ottoman sultan, some of whom later equaled his exploits.

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Umur, the second son of Mehmed, Bey of Aydın (d. 1334), had recently conquered the lower fortress of Izmir (Smyrna) in 1329 giving him access to the Aegean Sea, when he requested Hoca Selman build ships for him. According to Enveri, Mehmed Bey had assigned Umur this territory because of his courage, which he needed as he faced challenges to his control of Izmir both from the Genoese Zaccaria family and later from crusaders.4 Immediately on gaining access to the port, Umur prepared to begin sea gazas (raids supposedly in the name of religion). After the ships were filled with weapons, Umur and his Turcoman warriors left on a gaza to gain booty. As they headed to sea, near Bozcaada they encountered five round ships (köke).5 To Umur, who had no known previous experience on the sea, these ships appeared as enormous mountains with fortresses, which held many men. When the wind fell, the ships could not sail; then Umur prayed to God for help before he commenced his attack. The Turks rowed toward the round ships, collided with them, attempted to board, and began to fight. According to the epic, the battle lasted for two days and nights before a wind arose and the ships sailed to Istanbul. The surface of the sea was red with blood and many men had fallen into the water, whom Umur and his men captured and took to Izmir, probably the only source of profit from the encounter. Enveri considered this battle to have been a victory, although the round ships escaped and arrived in Istanbul. According to Enveri, the infidels (he does not indicate the provenance of the ships) became fearful and the fame of Umur reached the Franks. Tangible profits from this expedition may have been limited, but Umur apparently discovered sea raiding to be his passion, for after he returned to Izmir, he planned his next gaza. “He prepared night and day for combat. . . . he wanted to make the sea bubble again. . . . His intention was to attack the lands of Rum [Roman/Byzantine].”6 For the next twenty years, Umur desired to employ his rapidly increasing naval power in fighting infidels until they became his vassals or subjects; thus he terrorized the Aegean capturing and enslaving many inhabitants of the region. One result of his actions and those of other beys who also engaged in sea gaza was to change the geopolitical outcome of the region eventually leading to the rise of a new imperial power, the Ottoman Empire. But Umur was no Ottoman; he was from the House of Aydın, and his beylik (principality) became the center of sea gaza during the fourth decade of the fourteenth century.

Fragmentation in the Aegean At what date should one begin an account of the Ottoman navy? Should it be with the earliest Turks to reach Anatolia in the eleventh century, the Seljuks of Rum, who had migrated to the region after the battle of Manzikert in 1071? Perhaps, for between 1080 and 1097 Turkish maritime beyliks arose with shipyards and fleets on the Aegean and Marmara coasts. These beyliks, though ephemeral, still posed a threat to the Byzantines of Istanbul. One, that of Chaka, was based at Izmir, foreshadowing the rise of Umur at Izmir 200 years later. Chaka invaded Chios, Lesbos, Samos, and threatened Istanbul with his fleet in 1090–1. The Byzantine princess and historian Anna Comnena claimed that a local naval expert of Izmir aided Chaka (Tzachas) in the construction of his fleet and the recruitment of crews. Another bey, Ebulkasim, had captured the

 Turks Invade the Aegean 11 western shores of Anatolia, built a fleet, and engaged in naval raids slightly earlier. The First Crusade, which impelled the Seljuks of Rum to relocate their capital from Iznik (Nicea) to Konya (Iconium), also enabled the Byzantines to destroy these maritime beyliks.7 The Seljuks of Rum had often lacked access to the sea; thus, they were rarely known for naval power. Conditions in Anatolia at the beginning of the fourteenth century were shaped by the Fourth Crusade, during which French crusaders united with Venice, conquered Istanbul, and established a Latin empire whose capital was at that city from 1204 until 1261. After the conquest of the metropolis, Venetians conquered surrounding territories establishing bases for a commercial maritime empire. The Venetians’ chief rival, Genoa, attempted to increase its power in the Black Sea; thus, rivalry between these two Italian maritime states characterized the fourteenth century. The Turkish Seljuks ruling in Anatolia since 1071 benefited from Byzantine weakness after the Fourth Crusade and expanded to the Mediterranean Sea conquering the ports of Antalya and Alanya, between 1207 and 1226, creating a navy and arsenal at Alanya.8 Events in Eastern Eurasia also impacted the region for in 1243, when a Mongol army defeated the Seljuks of Rum at the battle of Köse Dağ, thereafter the Seljuks lost effective power in Anatolia. In addition, Oghuz Turkmen migrated west from Central Asia hoping to escape Mongol rule arriving in Anatolia and moving west to reach the uc regions (frontiers), beyond effective Mongol control in western Anatolia.9 In 1261 the Byzantines reconquered Istanbul from the Latin Empire, but neglected to protect Anatolia as they fought the Latins for control of the Balkans. The Mamluks of Egypt and Syria conquered the final crusader base at Acre removing a crusader presence in Syria in 1291. Because of the changing geopolitical circumstances stretching from China through the eastern Mediterranean, the scene was set for dramatic changes in the lands that would later become part of the greatest Islamic Empire of Late Medieval and Early Modern times, the Ottoman Empire. Political fragmentation in Anatolia and the Balkans was extreme due to the events of the thirteenth century. Clearly the Byzantines had ceased to be an effective political power, Latin territories were governed by competing states, the Seljuks were fading from the scene, and the Mongols were unable to control the western edges of their territory. Crusaders such as the Knights of St. John were desperate for a new base after the fall of Acre, while the other main crusading order, the Templars, was soon to be disbanded by the king of France. Turkish migration through Anatolia was only one of many factors changing the political landscape in western Eurasia. This chapter traces the changing geopolitical circumstances of the lands of the eastern Mediterranean by following the careers of several Turcoman beys, especially but not limited to those of the beylik of Aydın. Turcoman beys, who a generation earlier had been confined to the interior of Anatolia, penetrated coastal regions, conquered strategic port cities, and created naval forces. Then, despite an initial lack of seafaring experience, they challenged the existing rulers of the Aegean, the Byzantines, and the Latins of various origins, who dominated the seas at the beginning of the fourteenth century, for control of these waters. Turkish expansion on land was then complemented by gaza on the sea. One measure of the impact of these raids was that Turkish naval gazas provoked two crusades in 1333–4 and 1343–52 initiated by the Venetians, but

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The Sultan’s Fleet

involving other participants, which territorial gains on land had failed to ignite.10 The tense relations between the Byzantines and the Latins in Romania (here used to refer to the lands which had been ruled by the Byzantines before 1204) were complicated by the insertion of Turkish naval power into the equation. The Byzantines and their Christian rivals from the Latin west had dominated the seas for some time, although earlier, Arab fleets had been a major presence in the Mediterranean.11 But that was well before the First Crusade and, despite losing crusader strongholds in Syria, Western shipping dominated the Mediterranean, east and west. The fourteenth century is the “black hole” of Ottoman history,12 yet there are sources that shed light on this remarkable transition from an Aegean dominated by the Latin powers, especially Venice, to one within which Turks and later specifically Ottomans had a large share of power. Sources for the fourteenth century describing this process are limited, but analyzing them creates a picture of how this process developed. The most important source for events in the first half of the fourteenth century is the Destan of Umur Pasha. The section on Umur Bey was based on a contemporary source by a Hoca Selman, presumably the same individual who constructed Umur’s ships, who was very well informed not merely concerning Umur but also about the other Turkish beys, Byzantine leaders, and Western lords.13 Thus, writing a biography of Umur based on the Destan of Umur Pasha by Enveri is both possible and enlightening. This source has been the subject of repeated analyses, and the general assessment is that it reflects the events and ethos of the fourteenth century quite accurately, although the epic was written in the fifteenth century. Enveri claims to have followed his source word for word,14 although this appears to be an exaggeration because there are sections in which the facts appear to be confused. Nevertheless, although Umur was not the first or only Turcoman bey to engage in sea gaza, we know more about his actions than any other single individual who could claim to be a gazi in the fourteenth century. Assuming his contemporaries had similar goals and methods of achieving them, analyzing his exploits reveals how Turkish sea power increased in the first half of the fourteenth century. Ibn Battuta wrote another valuable source after he traveled through Anatolia in 1331 or 1333 and visited many of the beys when they were reaping the rewards of their naval power.15 Ibn Battuta and Enveri are supplemented by various chronicles and documents.16 However, relying too heavily on Byzantine or Western sources sometimes leads to an assumption that the Turks were mainly motivated by religion and booty, and that they were manipulated by Byzantine leaders such as John VI Kantakouzenos (r. 1347–54), who appear in Byzantine or Western sources to be directing events. In contrast a source such as Enveri’s epic reveals that Turkish beys possessed a vision to expand to control the Aegean region by conquering strategic locations and they desired to become the leading powers there.17 While our understanding of this period remains incomplete, evidence indicates the vital role of naval power in the expansion of the beyliks of Anatolia. One of them, the Ottomans, began absorbing the others in the mid-fourteenth century and became the beneficiary of the naval expertise that their rival beyliks had developed. With this naval expertise, the Ottomans eventually dominated the eastern Mediterranean Sea, after they conquered not merely the mainland coastal areas, but most of the

 Turks Invade the Aegean 13 islands as well. Sea power, while often slighted by historians who study specifically Ottoman expansion, was vital to it. Although the islands long escaped conquest by the Turks, despite attempts at raiding and conquering them, control of the Anatolian coasts was the determining factor in the rise of Turkish sea power. Until the beyliks of the fourteenth century conquered the ports of the coasts they had little chance of competing at sea. However, once they controlled certain key ports, such as Izmir and Ephesus in the beylik of Aydın, expanding on the sea became possible. While Turkish attacks on the Aegean islands have been viewed as mere raids, the early battles between the fleets of Turkish beys and their opponents, in 1312, 1319, and 1320, should be considered as attempts to conquer the islands. Divining the motivations of the beys with our limited sources is futile, but it is simplistic to believe that their only motivation was booty. The islands concerned, Rhodes and Chios, were wrested from Byzantine rule by Latin powers during the early fourteenth century, and the neighboring Turkish beys challenged Latin rule. The beylik of Menteşe’s naval power would have been enhanced with possession of Rhodes,18 and controlling Chios would have benefited Aydın. Both beyliks’ recent advances to conquer coastal areas indicate that they aimed to continue conquests of key maritime bases rather than merely amass booty. Enveri’s depictions of Umur’s attacks as successes despite the only gains being booty and tribute highlight tributary relationships as another means of achieving expansion despite not gaining direct control of territory. Tribute in the form of the haraç (a poll tax paid by non-Muslims) indicates that the beyliks viewed tributary relationships as incorporating these lands into Muslim ruled territory.19 Direct rule of most of the islands was achieved by the Ottomans in the second half of the fifteenth century or the sixteenth century, but it was probably the aim of the maritime beyliks much earlier. Sea power based on galleys, as was the case in the fourteenth-century Aegean, required possession of naval bases and the beyliks attempted to expand the bases they controlled. Umur’s raid on Gallipoli in the early 1330s probably reflects an understanding of the key strategic value of this location, which the Ottomans occupied two decades later contributing to additional Byzantine dismay at the erosion of their territory and power.20

Byzantine Naval Policy and the Rise of the Maritime Beyliks In the thirteenth century during the period the Byzantine capital was at Iznik while the Latins ruled from Istanbul, Byzantine shipbuilding and naval forces had been located along the Aegean, Marmara, and Black Sea coasts, where forests provided resources and sailors and shipbuilders were located. Unsurprisingly, the Turkish fleets were assembled in the same locations: Ania (near Kuşadası), Ephesus, Izmir, Edremit (Adramyttion) on the Aegean coasts, and Biga (Pegae) on the sea of Marmara. When the Byzantines decided to dismantle their navy leaving Greek sailors and craftsmen without employment, these men were willing to find new employers among the Turkish beys.21 The Greek and the Turkish human contribution to these fleets might have divided along ethnic lines during this period, with Greeks initially providing the

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The Sultan’s Fleet

professional sailors on Turkish gazi ships while the warriors were Turcoman. Especially when attacking Latin targets in the Aegean, the Mora, and elsewhere in Greece, the Byzantine Greeks were often willing to assist the Turks against the Latins.22 Thus, the rise of several maritime beyliks at the beginning of the fourteenth century appears to be a logical result of the disruptive events of the thirteenth century. The decision by Byzantine emperor Andronicus II (r. 1282–1328) in 1285 to disband Byzantine naval forces was due to his advisers persuading him that a temporary detente with Western Christians meant maritime defenses were no longer necessary and the savings realized from relying on the Genoese for naval assistance could allow scarce financial resources to be used elsewhere. When his advisers suggested that the fleet was expensive but unnecessary, they were partially correct. Fleets were expensive to maintain, but if a state’s capital city was Istanbul an effective fleet was essential. As Angeliki Laoiou wrote, “the fate of Constantinople [Istanbul] itself depended on control of the Black Sea and the Straits. This basic element of Byzantine and, later Ottoman history sounds like a truism; yet it must be emphasized: the Byzantines simply could not afford to destroy their sea defense.”23 Later the Ottomans would divert resources by neglecting the navy always with disastrous results, but the temptation was powerful for rulers to economize when for a brief period it seemed that a navy was not essential.24 A quote from the historian Gregoras provides a striking contemporary view of the folly of Andronicus II’s policy: The Romans [Byzantines] threw the imperial office into bondage voluntarily . . . by emptying the seas of their ships, for hope of profit, a profit so small but pregnant with long and expensive and shameful loss. For if the Romans had remained masters of the seas, as they had been, the Latins would not have grown so arrogant toward the Romans, nor would the Turks ever have gazed upon the sands of the sea, nor would the Romans have been driven to such extremities that they fear their neighboring nations, and those who live a great distance away . . . Nor would we have had to pay to everyone tribute every year.25

The Byzantines had believed that the Turkish threat would remain one to be repulsed on land, but early in the fourteenth century they found that the Turks also threatened them on the seas. Gregoras identified both the Latin and the Turkish threats to the Byzantines and that lack of effective Byzantine naval power allowed both groups to dominate Byzantine territories. Andronicus II made another poor policy decision when he recruited Catalan mercenaries to counter Turkish expansion. The Catalan company, a group of mercenaries who became unemployed after peace was reached in Sicily between the houses of Anjou and Aragon, arrived in Anatolia to serve Andronicus II.26 They protected Erdek (Kapıdağ Peninsula/Artake) from the Turks in the winter of 1303–4, also protecting Chios and winning a victory near the Byzantine city of Philadelphia. After the elimination of their leader, Roger de Flor, in 1305, they controlled the Gallipoli peninsula until 1307, when they moved west eventually being employed by the duke of Athens, Walter of Brienne. After he refused to pay all their wages, he was killed in a battle against them and they began to rule his lands in Greece, becoming a

 Turks Invade the Aegean 15 scourge of the region rather than a protector and wielding considerable power there through much of the fourteenth century.27 However, the earliest Turkish expansion to the Aegean Sea occurred a few decades earlier, far to the south and was initiated by Menteşe. The beylik of Menteşe engaged in naval warfare against the Byzantines and Franks controlling the southwest corner of Anatolia with lands on the Aegean and the Mediterranean. Its founder Menteşe received the title sahil-Begi, lord of the coasts, a Seljukid title.28 By 1269 Menteşe appears to have gained control of the entire coast of Caria (ancient name of the region then still used by the Byzantines), including the ports of Strobilos (near Bodrum), Stadia (near Datça), and Trachia. The Byzantine historian Pachymeres stated that Menteşe used the Carian ports for sea raids. Menteşe might have been a seafarer himself because he created a maritime principality, but his source of manpower was the Turcoman gazis from the interior. To the north, near Ephesus Turkish corsairs had a base by 1278.29 Menteşe was the first maritime beylik to be noticed by the Latins and Byzantines of the Aegean. While Western sources often do not differentiate which Turks were involved in gazi raids in the fourteenth century, the Turks of Menteşe were the default Turks in many instances. They also appear to have been the first of the maritime beyliks to switch from conquest to commerce in the fourteenth century. Menteşe became the source of many desirable commodities, such as horses and grain, for which the powers that controlled the islands traded, despite papal bans on commerce with infidels.30 The Knights of St. John, also newcomers to the Aegean at the beginning of the fourteenth century, conquered Rhodes from the Byzantines with the assistance of a Genoese corsair, Vignolo de Vignoli, in 1308, claiming that they would better protect it from Turkish expansion, although they were not yet proficient at naval warfare. This quickly led to conflict with Menteşe and in 1312 the Knights defeated the bey of Menteşe at Amorgos, in the Cyclades. When the Turks landed, the Knights burnt their ships and killed or captured most of the men. In 1319 the Knights again defeated a Turkish fleet, this time near Chios, with the help of the Genoese lord of Chios, Martino Zaccaria. This Turkish fleet was from Aydın and of its twenty-eight ships only six escaped. The following year, 1320, the Knights, with Genoese assistance, defeated a Turkish fleet from Menteşe of eighty ships that was preparing to attack Rhodes. The Knights were in a stage of transition, as most of them were from the petty landed nobility and not originally interested in naval affairs. Over time, the Knights developed into a formidable naval force at Rhodes, until the island’s conquest by the Ottoman sultan, Süleyman, in 1522.31 Before focusing on Aydın, which bordered Menteşe to the north, a brief account of two other maritime beyliks, Karası and Saruhan, will complete the picture of the Aegean coast during the first half of the fourteenth century. The history of Karası is the most obscure of the maritime beyliks of the early fourteenth century. Since the beylik was not mentioned at the time of the Catalan expedition, or by other early sources, most probably it was established slightly later than the other beyliks.32 Nevertheless, Karası’s prominence led the new Byzantine emperor, Andronicus III (r. 1328–41), to conclude a treaty with Timur Khan, bey of Karası in 1328.33 Ibn Battuta’s travel account provides evidence that the Karası were an independent beylik in the 1330s, when he

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The Sultan’s Fleet

visited Anatolia, although Ibn Battuta was critical of the bey, Demir (Timur) Khan, who he judged “worthless.”34Although details are lacking, this beylik during its brief history created an extensive naval force, but Karası’s naval defeat by the crusaders in 1334 at the battle of Adramyttion possibly weakened the beylik, contributing to its annexation by the Ottomans in the 1340s. According to Western sources, 100 ships were destroyed, and 3,000 Turks were killed.35 The beylik of Saruhan, whose history is slightly better known than Karası’s, reached the height of its power during the reign of its founder, Saruhan, who lived until about 1348 and was succeeded by his son Fahr al-Din Ilyas.36 Another son, Süleyman, participated in several raids with Umur of Aydın. Andronicus III made a treaty with the bey of Saruhan in 1329, which indicates that Byzantine and Latin lords viewed the lords of the maritime beyliks not merely as pirates but as legitimate rulers with whom they conducted diplomatic relations. Also, when Ibn Battuta visited Saruhan in 1333, he stated that the bey received tribute from Foça.37 The beylik remained independent until 1389–90, when it was annexed by the Ottomans. Enveri’s epic account of Umur frequently highlights his relations with the bey of Saruhan.

Aydın Enveri relates how Turks came to control the Aegean coast of Ionia, which became the beylik of Aydın during the first decade of the fourteenth century. Various sources, including Enveri, indicate that Sasa Bey, a vassal of Menteşe, was the first Turcoman bey to make conquests in the lands that would become part of Aydın beylik. He arrived in these territories before 1304 and with the Aydınoğlu conquered Ephesus on October 24, 1304. Between 1305 and 1307 the Byzantines vainly attempted to combat Turkish expansion into Ionia. During this first decade of the fourteenth century, Latins also expanded into Byzantine territory in this region. After a Turkish raid on Chios late in 1304, Benedetto Zaccaria used this as a pretext to take the island under his protection and Andronicus II was forced to accept the fait accompli. Although the Turks rapidly acquired more territory, some cities remained in the hands of their rivals for extended periods. By the end of 1317 Mehmed had conquered the upper citadel in Izmir, while the fortress of the port of Izmir was in the hands of Benedetto II Zaccaria. Thus, he faced challenges to his authority in the region from the Genoese at Izmir and Chios. Eventually, he built a fleet at Ephesus, but in 1319 Mehmed’s naval forces were defeated by the Knights of St. John and the Genoese in an attack on Chios from Ephesus. One can conclude that with possession of Ephesus he attempted expanding his raiding to the sea, but with the Zaccaria family on Chios and at Izmir and the Knights on Rhodes, sea gazas were difficult to achieve. Aydın became wealthy, mainly from the booty obtained from raiding by sea. The beylik’s capital city was not on the coast but inland at Birgi, although for the purposes of gaza and trade the most important cities in the beylik were Izmir and Ephesus. In about 1326 Mehmed divided his territory among his sons.38

 Turks Invade the Aegean 17 Mehmed gave Umur the region of Izmir, while Hızır had already received Ephesus and Sultan Hisar. Umur immediately besieged the fortress of the port of Izmir. Thus, when his eldest two sons reached adulthood, Mehmed gave them control of the two main ports of Aydın, but Umur received the more challenging grant as he needed to besiege Zaccaria at Izmir for two and a half years before gaining control of the port. By the summer of 1329, Umur possessed a small flotilla, which he used to attack a Christian convoy near Tenedos. Not long after losing Izmir, the Zaccaria family lost Chios when Andronicus III attacked the island, regaining it for the Byzantines.39 With the new Byzantine emperor controlling Chios, in the fall of 1329 Mehmed decided to conclude a truce with him, as did the bey of Saruhan. Mehmed was the ulu beg or head bey of Aydın over his sons with their appanages, who were expected to respect the truce and Hızır appears to have followed his father’s policy of peace with the Byzantines. But Umur, once he had experienced sea gaza, was not easily persuaded to support his father’s policy, and in late 1329 or early 1330 he raided Byzantine Chios. According to Enveri, Umur had twenty-eight ships rapidly constructed at Izmir including seven kadırga (galley), and seven grippe (small ship for commerce), as well as  fourteen kayıks (very small galley). His brother Hızır also contributed ships and men from Ephesus but Hızır’s ships did not join the actual attack on Chios as Hızır followed his father’s counsel and respected the treaty with Andronicus III. Umur’s subaşı Ehad attacked a ship from Lesbos, after which the ruler of Lesbos agreed to pay tribute to Umur. The attack on Chios appears to have been an attempt at conquest because they subjugated all of Chios except one fortress. As Enveri states, “On Chios only one of its fortresses remained.” But that sufficed for the Byzantines to retain the island.40 One can surmise that Umur hoped to conquer Chios as possessing that island would have facilitated launching naval expeditions from the harbor at Izmir. Despite failing to conquer Chios, Umur obtained a great deal of booty of slaves and gold and silver. According to Islamic custom, Umur kept one-fifth and distributed the rest, including many prisoners to Hızır.41 Mehmed may have been more aware than Umur of the need to ally with the Byzantines to prevent them from uniting with the Latin Christian lords of the region. Mehmed’s response to this flagrant disobedience of Umur’s attacks on Byzantine possessions was to send two men to Umur: “he prohibited him [from going on gaza] but he [Umur] desired it greatly.” Again, instead of obeying his father, he departed on gaza with a growing fleet of thirty-five ships. He sailed north to Saruhan, where he met many gazis assembled there, as well as two sons of Saruhan, Atmaz and Orhan. They entertained him lavishly; “some drank wine, and the others ate kebab and sweetmeats.”42 But Umur soon sailed on, after he had filled his ships with gazis.43 As Umur attracted more Turcoman warriors to his fleet and expanded the number of his ships, he sailed to more distant targets such as Eğriboz (Negroponte), which became tributary to Umur. Then he raided Bodonitsa (near Athens), the Mora, and perhaps Salamis.44 Attacking Latins did not interfere with his father’s accord with Andronicus III, but when he targeted Byzantine possessions, he was disregarding his father’s policy. Umur’s fleet and his power expanded; however, opposition to his father’s policy had to be justified in terms of a commitment to gaza. Enveri includes an episode in his account in which a preacher sought Umur and rebuked him for disobeying his father.

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Umur responded that to forbid gaza was a sin and gaza was God’s way of punishing unbelievers. Immediately after this statement, Enveri recounts that Umur embarked on his ships accompanied by Timur Khan.45 In 1332 when Umur decided to raid Gallipoli, then a Byzantine possession, Mehmed attempted to convince Umur to relinquish this plan, but Umur rejected his father’s advice. The raid was a failure in terms of conquering or even obtaining tribute from Gallipoli.46 Despite this setback, Umur’s threat to Latin Christians in the region prompted them to form a “Holy League” against him.47 Mehmed’s disobedient sons included Süleyman, who was married to the daughter of Orhan, bey of Menteşe. In the spring of 1333 Süleyman left his father’s territories and fled to his father-in-law in Menteşe. The Moroccan traveler Ibn Battuta, who passed through Aydın during the summer of 1333, described Aydın and mentioned Mehmed’s concern over Süleyman’s flight but fails to explain Süleyman’s motivation for going to Menteşe. He is the sultan Muhammad [Mehmed], son of Aydın, one of the best, most generous, and worthiest of sultans. We arrived at the sultan’s place just after noon, . . . and found the sultan agitated and preoccupied on account of the flight from him of his younger son Sulaiman to his father-in-law, the sultan Urkhan Bak [Orhan Bey]. On hearing of our arrival, he sent his two sons Khidr Bak [Hızır Bey] and Omar Bak [Umur Bey] to us. . . .48 He [Mehmed] asked me to write down for him a number of hadiths, . . . and when I had written them for him . . . he commanded the latter [legal specialist] to write an exposition of them for him in the Turkish language.49 Next morning, he sent a fine horse from his own stud, and went down to the city, and we with him. . . . On our arrival at the vestibule of the palace, we found about twenty of his servants, of surpassingly beautiful appearance, wearing robes of silk, . . . I said to the doctor “what are these beautiful figures?” and he replied “These are Greek pages.” We climbed a long flight of stairs with the sultan and came eventually into a fine audience-hall, with an ornamental pool of water in the centre and the figure of a lion in bronze at each corner of it, spouting water from its mouth. Round this hall there was a succession of benches covered with rugs, on one of which was the sultan’s cushion. . . . There are always Qur’an readers in attendance on him in his audiences, wherever he may be. The servants then brought in gold and silver bowls filled with sherbet [of raisins] steeped in water, into which citron juice had been squeezed, with small pieces of biscuit in it, along with gold and silver spoons. At the same time, they brought some porcelain bowls containing the same beverage and with wooden spoons.50 Every night he used to send food, fruit, sweetmeats and candles, and finally sent to me a hundred mithqals of gold, a thousand dirhams, a complete set of garments, a horse, and a Greek slave called Mikhai’il.51

Ibn Battuta described Mehmed as a wealthy ruler, who was an excellent host, ensuring that his guests were well treated. His wealth was displayed with horses, slaves, fine fabrics, bowls and utensils of gold, silver and porcelain, furnishings of rugs and cushions, a palace with fine rooms and ornamental fountains. Additionally, Mehmed

 Turks Invade the Aegean 19 gave Ibn Battuta the equivalent of 100 gold dinars, 1000 silver coins, as well as clothing, a horse, and a slave. It is doubtful if he could have been this generous, if his son, Umur, had not been bringing a supply of booty, especially in slaves to Aydın. He had the trappings of any ambitious ruler, a fine palace, slaves, furnishings, and a retinue of scholars. However, his sons did not always respect his wishes, and one suspects that a major dispute with his son Süleyman had led to his flight to his father-in-law in Menteşe. Hints such as this and indications in Enveri reveal tension characterizing relations between rival beyliks as well as within the bey’s family. Mehmed desired to be well informed about other rulers and requested information about other lands from his guest. Also, this petty ruler wanted to impress his visitor, and Ibn Battuta gained a great deal of wealth during his travels through Anatolia as most of the beys were generous, but few could afford generosity on the scale of Mehmed of Aydın. Although Mehmed had discouraged Umur raiding Byzantine territory, the inhabitants of Latin territories were also Greek, providing a source for Greek slaves who did not necessarily come from regions under Byzantine rule.52 Ibn Battuta also traveled to Ephesus and Izmir, and he praised Umur, who was then under his father’s suzerainty, even more extravagantly than Mehmed. This account is also colored by Ibn Battuta’s knowledge of later events, which he learned only by hearsay. The amir of this city is Omar Bak, son of the sultan Mehmed b. Aydın mentioned above, and his residence is in the citadel. . . . He sent an immense hospitality gift, and in addition gave me a Greek slave, a dwarf named Niqula, and two robes of kamkha, which are silken fabrics manufactured at Baghdad, Tabriz, Naisabur, and in China. The jurist who acts as his imam told me that the amir had no other slave left than the slave that he gave me, on account of his generosity. . . .”53 The amir was a generous and pious prince, and continually engaged in jihad against the Christians. He had war-galleys with which he used to make raids on the environs of Constantinople the Great and to seize prisoners and booty, then after spending it all in gifts and largesse he would go out again to the jihad. Eventually his pressure became so galling to the Greeks that they appealed to the Pope, who ordered the Christians of Genoa and France to attack him, and attack him they did. The Pope sent an army from Rome, and the combined forces made an assault on the city by night with a large number of galleys, capturing the harbor and the town. The amir Omar came down from the citadel to engage them, but died a martyr’s death together with a great number of his men. The Christians established themselves in the town, but could not capture the citadel because of its impregnability.54

Ibn Battuta included information that he had learned about later events, but he remains useful for understanding Umur’s actions in 1333 and generally reinforces information in Enveri. Umur engaged in gaza especially by sea, becoming an ideal leader who gave generously to his followers, and to others such as Ibn Battuta. In 1333 Umur had not become the target of crusades yet, but expeditions were already in the planning stage. In contrast to his father, Umur did not build a fine palace, but lived in the citadel.

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Umur’s passion was not the trappings of ruling but preparing for his next expedition to gain more booty that he could distribute. Personal enrichment did not influence Umur, but he engaged in gaza for fame and the desire for increasing the territory tributary to him. Ibn Battuta mentioned his piety, which Enveri also emphasized, because religious motivation was important to the authors. Although Mehmed expressly ordered Umur not to attack Gallipoli, which was under Byzantine rule, he forgave him on his return. Soon after, Mehmed died on January 9, 1334, and was buried in a tomb at Birgi.55 Sources provide conflicting evidence as to whether Umur or Hızır became ulu beg of Aydın. Elizabeth Zachariadou states that according to a treaty made in 1337 between Hızır and the Duke of Candia, Hızır became ulu beg while Umur continued to rule Izmir, now under the suzerainty of his brother. But Enveri portrays Umur as succeeding his father directly. This may be correct or may be propaganda for Umur, for as Zachariadou says, a contemporary document is a more reliable source than a later epic.56 Also considering Umur’s character as described in the epic and by Ibn Battuta, Umur likely preferred freedom to engage in sea gaza to any other activity. From this perspective Hızır was better suited to perform the duties of administering the lands of Aydın, so Umur might continue his passion of attacking infidels on the sea. Mehmed bequeathed a flourishing beylik to his sons, for Aydın in 1334 appeared to be the wealthiest and most successful of all the maritime beyliks. However, the next ten years were to see the beylik reach its pinnacle of success under Hızır in conjunction with Umur forming an alliance with the Byzantines based on his naval power. The geographic extent of Umur’s raids increased when Umur led an expedition to the shores of the Aegean that today are part of mainland Greece. Before the raid Umur had “innumerable galleys” built, his fleet consisted of 150 ships under him directly, and another 100 under his subaşı, Ehad.57 This great increase in ships, from eight to 150 in five years, must also reflect a similar increase in available men who wished to participate in the gaza. Although Umur had been unable to conquer all the places he raided, he gained enough wealth that his ventures still attracted many warriors. In addition, Umur had access to the resources needed to build ships, the timber and the expertise. According to Enveri, the raid against Mumdunicaya (Bodonitsa) occurred after the raid against Gallipoli but the date is uncertain.58 This territory was near Eğriboz on the coast of Greece near Athens on the Euboean gulf. While raiding and trying to conquer the area, Umur attacked the fortress of Bodonitsa whose ruler, the widow Guglielma Pallavicini,59 was a “lord [who] was a lady.”60 This episode requires analysis to explain why Umur acted as Enveri claims he did. According to Enveri, the lady opened the doors of the fortress and gave Umur silver and gold. She invited him to a celebration and came to him showing her face, informing him of her possessions, then she asked him to marry her and offered him her lands.61 For a man determined to gain territory, his response seems puzzling. He declined the offer saying that if he married her and then left her there, he would be judged as without honor.62 How should one understand this response? One possibility is that Umur wanted territory but not at the cost of loss of freedom of movement. He had already disobeyed his father in attacking the Byzantines when his father had an accord with them because his highest priority was gaza. If he

 Turks Invade the Aegean 21 married a woman who expected him to remain with her and protect her lands, then he would also be constrained by her needs for protection of her territory, which had been threatened by the Catalan company. Umur desired to increase the territory he controlled, but not at the cost of restricting his ability to sail whenever and wherever he wished in pursuit of his objectives. Umur and his comrades returned to their ships to continue their gaza, although according to Enveri, the lady followed them on foot to the ships. In 1335 Guglielma Pallavicini married into the Venetian family of Giorgi or Zorzi, and her new husband, Nicolo Giorgio, was responsible for the protection of her territory.63 This incident provides a fascinating example of the competition between Turks, Latins, and Byzantines for territory near the sea in northern Greece. Umur mainly targeted the islands on the western shores of the Aegean, whose possession was essential for naval power. Umur departed from Bodonitsa heading to Eğriboz, whose leader agreed to give him substantial booty. Umur and his forces left Eğriboz and sailed to Monemvasia, a town on a small island off the east coast of the Mora, which was an important strategic location, whose possession contributed to naval power in the region. The Venetians used it as a base from 1464 until 1540, when they ceded it to the Ottomans as the price of peace. Umur realized its value as a base and successfully raided the small island, before returning to Eğriboz, where the leader agreed to pay tribute to Umur.64 Umur only raided Monemvasia but bringing Eğriboz to tributary status was a significant accomplishment in his effort to wrest control of the Aegean from Latin naval power. Umur with his forces reembarked proceeding on their way and encountered a ship coming from the Crimea filled with pearls, rubies, silver, and gold. The gazis seized all the merchandize, but one of them, named Ibrahim Beg, incurred Umur’s wrath by burning the ship “without pity.” Umur condemned this action saying, “They [the crew] will remain on the island, the unfortunate ones, they will wander as vagabonds since you burnt their ship.”65 This episode provides insight into Umur’s policies. Frequently Enveri recounts the booty that Umur gained from the lands he raided, including the many slaves he obtained from these raids. But we see in this episode that Umur disliked wanton destruction, as in burning a ship from which all the merchandise had already been taken. This caused needless suffering for the crew, who presumably Umur would have allowed to sail away, for even after the ship was burnt, they did not enslave the crew, but left them to wander on Eğriboz. Umur clearly had a strict code of honor in how he conducted his gaza: burning ships for no reason was unacceptable and some men, the crews of some ships, were not subject to enslavement. On this same expedition, Umur had encountered 500 azeps, Turkish warriors, who were stranded near Monemvasia because their ships had perished. Umur placed these men in his own ships.66 Umur’s empathy for stranded sailors and naval warriors reveals his appreciation of the dangers these individuals faced. Umur’s accomplishments had become famous throughout the Islamic world, if Enveri can be believed. When Umur and his fleet returned to Izmir and in the beylik of Aydin, Umur gave money to the rich and the poor, no doubt contributing to his popularity. However, local adulation was only the beginning of his renown, for the fame of his accomplishments extended from east to west: because he had struck the unbelievers on all the surface of the sea, Egypt and Syria sang his praises, Syria and

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India praised him and even in India they sang his praises, and finally Hoca Selman composed his account.67 It is difficult to know how much Enveri exaggerated, but certainly Umur gained fame in the Aegean and the Latins had decided to oppose the Turkish naval threat. They understood the strategic value of the locations Umur had attacked and they knew that they must prevent Umur and the other beys from conquering any additional strategic bases. Umur’s fame rested on the extent of his fleet, which he continued to increase to 170 ships that he divided into two groups: one under the command of Ehad Bey and the other under his personal command. During an encounter in the Mora, when their opponents met them in battle and asked who they were, Umur’s men answered, “We are Umur’s young men who are famous.” Realizing that his troops expected Umur to arrive soon, his opponents reconsidered their policy. When Umur himself approached they asked him to halt the battle, promising to give him homage the following day, but during the night the enemy army disappeared. Because they had not submitted, Umur’s men pillaged the island and returned to Izmir with a great deal of booty, but the aim was to encourage local leaders to become Umur’s vassals.68

The Naval League and Karası Despite Ibn Battuta’s disparaging comments concerning the bey of Karası, the fleet of his relative Yahşi became the first victim of a crusading naval league, which included Venice, the Knights of Rhodes, Cyprus, Philip VI of France, Pope John XXII, and, theoretically, Andronicus III.69 In September 1334 the league attacked Yahşi’s fleet in the Gulf of Edremit and destroyed it over several days from the 8th through the 17th. Christian sources considered this battle to have been a major victory.70 According to Enveri, the Christian fleet attempted to attack Izmir with thirty galleys but Umur repulsed it.71 Andronicus III’s failure to actually contribute ships to the league’s fleet in 1334 suggests that for the Byzantines, making an alliance with the Turks was frequently viewed as a more attractive option than allying with the Latin crusaders. The results of the first league were impressive, the destruction of the fleet of one Turkish bey, and the protection of the Aegean from raids from other beys’ fleets such as that of Umur of Aydın, who did not risk his fleet in 1334 during the period the fleet of the league patrolled the seas.72 But these results were temporary as Umur’s activities the following year indicate. An unintended outcome of the league might have been that the destruction of Karası’s fleet in 1334 led to the decline of the power of this beylik contributing to Ottoman annexation approximately ten years later, after which the Ottomans became a greater threat to the Christian powers in the region than Karası had ever been. After the League’s fleet disbanded, Umur led a naval expedition against the Byzantine territories of the Mora: Monemvasia, Ispen, and Mistra in the spring of 1335. Enveri claimed that Umur had 276 ships, including galleys and kayıks. The lord of Monemvasia approached Umur, rendered homage, and said, “This country is yours, we will not fight against you.” He also paid the annual haraç and agreed to send another tax to Izmir; in contrast lords who did not submit to Umur had

 Turks Invade the Aegean 23 their lands pillaged.73 Gaza was clearly an effective method of encouraging rulers to submit to Umur’s protection and increased the territories that he could use as bases for his fleet. Later in 1335, Umur raided Philadelphia, an inland Byzantine city located between the lands of Aydın, Saruhan, and Germiyan,74 but failed to conquer the city, although it agreed to pay tribute. According to Enveri, Philadelphia sent a courier to inform Andronicus III of the attack, which led the Byzantine emperor to arrange an interview with Umur on an imperial galley near Karaburun, during which Umur also probably met Kantacuzenous, beginning a close relationship between them lasting until Umur’s death.75 Kantacuzenous was Andronicus III’s close friend and chief administrator, and later became regent for his son, John V Palaiologos (r. 1341–76, 1379–91). To tempt Umur to agree to an alliance, Andronicus III offered Umur 100,000 gold pieces, as well as jewels, but it was not until he offered Chios, or an annual tribute for Chios and Philadelphia, that Umur agreed to the alliance. If Andronicus III paid tribute for Chios, Umur would be obligated to protect it from Latin attacks. This episode supports the argument that booty was secondary, while securing additional strategic locations was a primary objective and for Umur, Chios was an important prize due to its location west of the Karaburun Peninsula, near the entrance to the gulf of Izmir. When he returned to Izmir, Enveri states, “He inspected his ships his sword remained in the service of religion.”76 Despite the Byzantine alliance, Umur’s gazi credentials remained untarnished. Umur preferred Andronicus III as his ally or client rather than in league with the Latins.77 The alliance appears to have mutually benefited the Byzantines and Umur, who both found Latin occupation of key bases impacted their power negatively. The Genoese continued to threaten Chios, and Lesbos had recently been occupied by Domenico Cattaneo, who was the lord of Foça.78 Umur guaranteed peace with the Byzantines and promised to provide military assistance to them against their enemies, meaning the Latins. The Byzantines viewed tribute as a means to eliminate gazi raids, but Umur viewed the payment of the haraç as submission to Muslim rule and becoming part of the Dar al-Islam. Due to his Byzantine alliance, Umur’s raiding expanded to new regions since he had access to additional locations where he could leave his ships safely while conducting raids into the interior.79 Umur’s motivations for forming a Byzantine alliance are not stated by Enveri, but possibly Umur believed Andronicus III had become his vassal or due to the success of the crusade of 1334, Umur found he needed an ally against the Latins.80 He may have known that Andronicus III had considered participating in the crusade and by accepting Andronicus as a client, this ensured that Andronicus would not form an alliance with the Latins. Umur desired to increase his fleet and his strategic bases, and an alliance with the Byzantines furthered Umur’s goals. The Genoese had become the main threat in the eastern Mediterranean for Umur and Andronicus, as their control of Foça was an annoyance for Umur and the Byzantines wished to reclaim Lesbos. Seen in this light and that of recent events of the crusade in 1334, Umur had many reasons for forming a Byzantine alliance. Moreover, Umur continued to view this policy as beneficial even after the death of Andronicus in 1341 and during the Byzantine civil war that followed.81

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Umur’s Alliance with Kantakouzenos, 1335–44 In 1335 Umur continued to increase the number of lords willing to become his vassals to escape from raids, although he failed to conquer islands from their Latin rulers. Even though Umur could no longer attack Byzantine territory, much of the Aegean under Latin rule remained open to gaza. An envoy from the ruler of the Catalans of Athens pleaded with Umur to save him from his enemies. In response, Umur sailed to Athens with sixty ships and Ehad Bey with fifty, but when they arrived, the lord of the Catalans informed Umur that when his enemy had learned that Umur was coming he had made peace and the lord no longer needed Umur’s assistance. Umur became angry at this disrespectful treatment of his forces, refused the Catalan leader’s homage, and proceeded to ravage his territory. During his voyage, his forces attacked the islands of the duke of Naxos, and then the lands of the Serbs and Albanians.82 Later when Umur’s ship was destroyed in a storm and with his shipmates he disembarked on a rock near Lesbos, the island’s lord sent a ship to rescue them, gave Umur presents, and kissed his hand. Umur departed alone for Izmir, where they had believed he was dead and they rejoiced at his return.83 The lord of Lesbos, who had previously agreed to give Umur homage, remained loyal to this agreement. By the late 1330s or early 1340s Umur’s policy of alliance with the Byzantines seems to have led to even more success. When Umur next prepared a gaza expedition he possessed 350 ships; to man them he sent letters to invite gazis to participate and many came to Izmir, where they embarked on the ships with their horses.84 Andronicus III had died in 1341 and Umur became the ally of the regent, Kantakouzenos. Because he was threatened by the Bulgarians, he decided to direct Umur’s gaza into the Black Sea through the straits and past Istanbul, which required sailing for nineteen days from Izmir. The Byzantine historian Gregoras said of Umur: he is the most powerful of the beys of Asia (Anatolia), He covers the sea with his ships and his thalassocracy (dominion over the seas) made him in a short time fearsome not only in the islands of the Aegean Sea, but also to the inhabitants of Negroponte, the Mora, Crete and those of Rhodes and all the coast from Thessaly to Byzantium [Istanbul]. Sending his fleet where he believes good and levying crushing annual tributes.85

Gregoras’s opinion of the nature of Umur’s power in 1341 indicates that Umur was probably the dominant partner in the alliance with Kantakouzenos. Umur’s power rested on his naval forces and without his large fleet filled with gazis his power in the region would have been modest, but with a great fleet he had become among the most powerful regional rulers. Thus, Kantakouzenos’s statement in 1341 that Turks lacked experience on the sea, but that they had captured much of the population of the Aegean Islands, does not adequately depict the extent of Turkish naval power in the 1340s.86 In contrast, in 1342 the Venetian Senate claimed Umur had 200 to 300 galleys and in that year Enveri claimed Umur had become the lord of the whole Mora and the country of the Franks.87

 Turks Invade the Aegean 25 Umur became Kantakouzenos’s greatest ally when a Byzantine civil war, 1341–7, erupted soon after Andronicus III’s death, as his widow, Anna of Savoy, contested control of the empire with Kantakouzenos during the minority of John V.88 She led a pro-Latin faction that supported increased Latin power in the Aegean.89 Naturally Umur supported Kantakouzenos against her as they both opposed Latin influence in the region. Umur assisted Kantakouzenos at Dimetoka (Didymoteichon), sailing to the vicinity with 300 ships during the winter 1342–3. In the summer of 1343, Kantakouzenos again requested aid from Umur, who helped Kantakouzenos in Thrace the following autumn continuing into the winter of 1343–4. Together they attacked Selanik (Salonica) and other cities in Thrace. Enveri states that Kantakouzenos and the son of the tekfur (lord but here means emperor) submitted like slaves, meaning that Umur had become the suzerain and the Byzantine rulers his vassals. Umur traveled to Serres and imposed the haraç, then at Mumcila in Bulgaria the people demanded grace, and, finally, an unnamed city near the sea also submitted to Umur. Umur gave permission for the son of the tekfur to go to Istanbul. When Umur planned to leave Thrace due to the coming winter, Kantakouzenos pled with him to remain or to allow him to accompany Umur to Izmir. “If you do not remain here this winter, the infidels [Latin faction] will attack me. If you wish to leave, take me with you, I will go to Izmir with my house. Give me your protection.” At least in the eyes of Enveri, Umur set the terms of the alliance and Kantakouzenos begged for his assistance. Most of Umur’s men returned to Izmir; however, he remained in Thrace with Kantakouzenos.90 Assessing who was the most influential party to the alliance needs to be considered from the Turkish perspective. Umur supported Kantakouzenos in the civil war against a faction led by Anna of Savoy, which was pro-Latin because it was to his advantage to keep the Byzantines and Latins divided.91 Umur was at greater risk when Kantakouzenos negotiated with the pope and even agreed to attack Umur who had been faithful to the alliance. Enveri often stressed the dependent position of the Byzantines, and that is reflected in the quotes from Gregoras as well.92 Umur visited Kantakouzenos at his palace in Edirne (Adrianople) in the spring of 1344, and Kantakouzenos offered to give him one of his daughters in marriage. Kantakouzenos said, “O Lord of the world, I am your poor slave, you are my ruler. My property, my head, my son, my daughter, all are yours; take then for yourself one of my three daughters.” Umur refused the offer of the daughter, even when the woman begged him to marry her. She said, “Take me, I will be your slave.” The reason given by Enveri for Umur’s refusal was his commitment to holy war. “This was his desire and his passion.”93 For Umur, who held a superior position in the relationship with Kantakouzenos, a marriage alliance had no benefits. He retained his freedom of action by not submitting to a formal marriage alliance. However, Umur soon after the awkward interview with Kantakouzenos and his daughter returned to Izmir, where he faced the combined forces of Western Christendom, which Kantakouzenos was powerless to prevent from attacking Izmir. According to Enveri, the reason for the crusade of Izmir was that Umur had made all the unbelievers pay haraç and other taxes, and “he had left in their hands neither throne nor crown.”94 Once again Enveri emphasizes Umur’s suzerainty over the lords of the Aegean: He had won victories in the Mediterranean and Black Seas and he

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destroyed those who refused to recognize his authority. Umur’s imposing his authority over the coastal areas of the Mediterranean and his entry into the Black Sea led to the crusade, not mere raids that gained booty. This caused the Latins under papal leadership to decide to organize a fleet to oppose him. Some of his old opponents were involved as they wanted to neutralize the threat of Umur, including Venice, Genoa, Cyprus, Rhodes, and Naxos. These opponents included any state with pretensions to naval power in the eastern Mediterranean. “They constructed many galleys. . . . they prepared for three years and eleven months. . . . The number of their ships was without number.”95 This expedition was well planned in advance and enjoyed widespread support. Kantakouzenos learned of the crusade’s imminent arrival and sent a warning but no assistance to Umur; however, by the time Umur received the information, the crusader fleet was already nearing Izmir. One of Umur’s supporters, the emir Dundar, suggested that Umur send to Tire and Ephesus to request assistance from his brothers, but Umur refused. As a result, the crusaders captured the fortress and the port of Izmir on October 28, 1344. The crusader forces also burnt many ships that were in the harbor at Izmir, but the upper city with its fortress remained in Umur’s possession. When Hızır and Süleyman arrived, it was too late to prevent the crusader conquest of the port fortress.96 Umur attempted to regain the port and its fortress, even receiving help from an expert in siege warfare from the Maghrib, but the effort to recapture the lower fortress failed. Umur’s desperation can be imagined, for without access to the port his power was severely diminished, especially if his own pride had led to the crusader conquest of Izmir. Umur refused to abandon attempts to reconquer the port fortress and on January 17, 1345, three leaders of the crusade—Martino Zaccaria, Pietro Zeno, and Henry of Asti—were killed in a battle defending the citadel; nevertheless, the crusaders retained possession of it.97 The pope sent another crusade leader, Humbert of Viennois, to attempt to end the siege of Umur against the crusaders in Izmir. When the crusaders captured the port of Izmir, they seriously impeded Umur’s sea gaza activities. Eventually Umur was approached by Saruhan, who suggested that they travel by land from Aydın through Saruhan territory and through Karası territory to the straits where they could launch raids. Kantakouzenos needed their assistance and they could reach him by traveling overland, despite the port of Izmir remaining in crusader hands. Süleyman, son of Saruhan, accompanied Umur, while Süleyman of Karası met them and traveled with them to the straits. They raided in Bulgaria and perhaps went to Edirne, where Enveri claims Kantakouzenos’s son came and gave homage. Then they went to Dimetoka, where Kantakouzenos received them with honor.98 On receiving word of the assassination of Aopkaukos, an opponent of Kantakouzenos, in Istanbul, they all intended to travel there, but Süleyman of Saruhan fell ill on the journey and, despite all Umur’s efforts, died. Concerned how Saruhan, Süleyman’s father, might receive the news and fearing that he would use this as an excuse to attack Aydın, Umur personally delivered Süleyman’s body to Saruhan. Then he proceeded to Izmir and besieged the fortress of the port, again unsuccessfully. Traveling to Birgi to his father’s tomb, he beheld a vision of his death as a martyr and was warned that his victories had ended. When he informed his brothers, they were sorrowful, but he was pleased

 Turks Invade the Aegean 27 with the knowledge he had received of his coming martyrdom. Umur died besieging the lower fortress in 1348. Enveri finished his account of Umur’s exploits with the information that he died at the age of thirty-nine years having fought for twenty-one years since he was eighteen. During this time, he had achieved twenty-six victories.

Conclusion Umur’s death did not end Turkish expansion into the Aegean and Black Seas; in fact, it marked the end of the beginning. The Ottomans were already poised to expand navally as we will explore in the following chapter when we turn to Ottoman annexation of Karası, Ottoman conquest of Gallipoli, Ottoman expansion into the Balkans and how that was implemented as the Ottomans slowly increased their naval power during the reign of Murad I. In contrast, Ottoman naval power increased rapidly during the reign of Murad’s son Bayezid I, who upon his accession quickly annexed the remaining beyliks on the Aegean and Mediterranean coasts, Saruhan, Aydın, and Menteşe. By the time Timur destroyed Bayezid’s fragile empire built on vassals, the Ottomans had become a regional naval power with possession of the Anatolian coast. Timur finally dislodged the crusaders who had taken Izmir, but he soon turned his back on Anatolia and Bayezid’s sons fought over the territories that Bayezid had annexed. By the time Mehmed I emerged as the victor, the Ottomans were on their path to creating an effective navy ready to cross swords with the fleets of the Latins. There are several conclusions we can draw from Enveri’s account of Umur’s exploits. First and foremost, the Turkish beys with possessions on the coast had strategic plans to expand beyond the eastern shores of the Aegean. That they did not fully implement these plans does not mean that they did not exist. They desired to expand to the islands of the Aegean, which were essential to possess if one wanted to wield naval power in the region. Without their possession any beylik with lands on the coast knew that their competitors would have bases from which to attack them. Merely controlling the coast did not place the beyliks in a secure position, and they were aware of the strategic implications of possession of naval bases on the Aegean islands. Second, Turkish naval power was far from fully developed in the early fourteenth century and remained ineffective in major naval battles. The Turkish naval leaders may have lacked experience in naval warfare, and it appears they also lacked many of the large war galleys that were essential for winning naval battles. But the Turkish beys possessed fleets of many smaller galleys, which were effective at raiding. Thus, the beys launched many raids since they had ships, many warriors, and resources. Although they lost naval battles, they still managed to increase the territories that paid them tribute; thus, they increased their vassals, if not direct control of some coastal areas. Turkish beys surprised the rulers of the fragmented political landscape of the Balkans and Anatolia, when they reached the Aegean coast, took to the sea, and became a huge threat to European dominance of the islands and coasts. It is more remarkable that of several naval battles fought during the fourteenth century, the Turkish fleets lost all of them.99 Nevertheless, they won the war, for by the end of the fourteenth century, Byzantine sea power had evaporated and Western dominance was seriously

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challenged. The Venetians and the Genoese continued as the major naval powers in the Mediterranean and the Black Seas, but they did not monopolize seafaring. The Turkish beys altered geopolitical conditions by controlling key ports on the mainland of Anatolia. Third, through the exercise of their naval power, the Turkish beys became a significant threat to Byzantine and Latin territories. Umur was not the pawn of Kantakouzenos to do with as he desired; from the perspective of Enveri, Kantakouzenos was dependent on Umur and Umur decided when to become a Byzantine ally, at the time it suited his needs, and he was wise to support the Byzantines to keep them from joining the Latins. Umur was most threatened when Kantakouzenos negotiated with the pope to launch an attack on Umur. It was in Umur’s interests to support Kantakouzenos against Anna of Savoy, who used her influence to bring the Byzantine Empire to favor the Latins. Umur had to prevent Anna’s victory if at all possible; thus, his and Kantakouzenos’s interests were similar and thus he supported Kantakouzenos. Fourth, the beys needed to prevent Latins or crusaders from taking possession of strategic bases on the Anatolian coast. When Umur lost Izmir’s port his activities were curtailed. He could still engage in gaza by traveling across the territories of his rival beys, but that meant engaging in diplomacy with them and ensuring that his actions did not threaten them in such a way that they decided to attack him instead of the Latins or Byzantines. Latin outposts at Foça were annoying but not threatening the survival of the beylik, as their main goal was to mine alum. The loss of Izmir’s port was decisive for Umur; when he first conquered the fortress at the port, he launched his gazi career and when he lost the port, the failure to regain it cost his life. Umur’s impact was considerable in the fourteenth century but it did not end at his death as his exploits inspired sea gazis for centuries to come. As Umur and the other beys of the maritime beyliks continued to launch naval attacks against the Latins and Byzantines in the Aegean their naval expertise and ambitions continued to increase. But with the annexation of Karası, the Ottomans became a maritime beylik, and by the end of the fourteenth century they would control the Aegean coast.

2

Gallipoli Ottoman Key to Securing the Straits

Gallipoli was conquered 758/[1356/57]. After the conquest of Gallipoli . . . Orhan Gazi’s son Suleyman crossed to Rumeli and when he conquered Gelibolu and Bolayir, at that time Gazi Umur Bey, the grandson of Aydin bey, was the bey of Aydin. He conducted gaza with gazis and ships on the face of the sea. When Süleyman Pasha conquered Bolayir and captured it, Gazi Umur Bey came on the face of the sea and met with Süleyman Pasha at Bolayir. Gazi Umur Bey had said to Süleyman Pasha: “Pasha Sultan! From now on you don’t have permission to go back that you should cross back to Anatolia. You do not have permission to cross to Anatolia,” he said. Gazi Umur Bey and the deceased Süleyman Pasha, their souls reached the side of God and they were not missing from the gaza. . . . It was true that in every gaza they were found together. . . . let their auspicious influence not lack for the Rumeli gazis, God willing. Oruç Beğ, Ottoman History 1288–15021 Oruç Beğ, an Ottoman historian who wrote during the reign of Bayezid II, includes few details concerning the Ottoman conquest of Gallipoli, which occurred in 1354. For details on this crucial event, one must rely on Byzantine sources. However, Oruç provides evidence of the Ottoman view of the importance of Gallipoli by connecting it to both Süleyman, son of Orhan’s continued conquests in Rumeli (the Balkans), and Umur of Aydın’s gazas at sea. Clearly, Umur did not meet Süleyman in 1354 or 1356/7 since he died in 1348. Nevertheless, the implications of his importance as a role model for Ottoman gazis in the late fifteenth or early sixteenth century are illustrated in this fanciful anecdote. In the eyes of historians, in the fifteenth century during the reigns of Mehmed II and of his son Bayezid II, Umur was an exemplar of gazi exploits who provided inspiration for the Ottoman sultans’ seafarers and warriors.2 Umur is explicitly coupled with Süleyman Pasha, who led Ottoman expansion into Europe until his death in a hunting accident in 1357. While both men died within a decade of each other at the middle of the fourteenth century, their actions had promoted the expansion of the Turks on the sea and provided a permanent foothold across the straits in Rumeli. Later

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Ottoman authors celebrated them as great gazis. Much later in his history, Oruç wrote about events of his own time, when Ottoman seafarers who thought of themselves as gazis conquered Lepanto for the Ottomans in 905/1499. Umur of Aydin again makes an appearance in Oruç’s history at this point.3 The Ottomans seized Gallipoli from the Byzantines in the mid-fourteenth century. From that date until the conquest of Istanbul ninety-nine years later Gallipoli was the key strategic location in the Ottoman domains, for the port controlled the crossing between Anatolia and the Balkans and, as the Ottomans soon conquered extensive lands in the Balkans, being able to cross at Gallipoli was of the utmost importance for the fledgling state. During the period from 1354 to 1453 the Ottomans endured two major succession disputes. The first was after the defeat and death of Bayezid I during the interregnum; the other was at the beginning of the reign of Murad II. During both disputes Gallipoli played a major role and was the frequent subject of negotiations between one of the contenders and possible allies, as the Byzantines and the Venetians sought to gain control of Gallipoli and thus the Dardanelles, the straits at the southern end of the narrow seas that lead from the Aegean to the Black Seas. Thus, this city with its fortress and the straits are the focus of this chapter, which covers the period from the “conquest” of Gallipoli, 1354, until the conquest of Istanbul, 1453. During this period, no outstanding seafarer dominated the naval scene. But many sources constantly record that Ottoman forces crossed the straits at Gallipoli to go to battle during these years until the Ottomans gained control of the other end of the straits, the Bosporus, when they conquered Istanbul. The Bosporus and the Ottomans’ first maritime possessions on the Sea of Marmara are also analyzed for their strategic value. But, the principal aspect of Ottoman naval power during this almost century was controlling the Dardanelles straits that the Ottomans gained with possession of Gallipoli. Holding this strategic location meant that even with a weak navy access to Istanbul and the Black Sea could be impeded by Ottoman forces. The rise to greatness of the Ottomans began with control of Gallipoli. Ottoman seafarers during the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth centuries are mainly unknown to us by name. The few names that were recorded are accompanied with even fewer bits of information as we trace the history of Ottoman naval forces until the mid-fifteenth century. There was no epic written about any of these naval leaders similar to the one in Chapter 1 about Umur Bey of Aydın. Thus, this chapter focuses on Ottoman seafarers when possible, but it highlights the importance of strategic locations, especially Gallipoli. Without a major piece of contemporary literary “history” other possible sources that provide information about Ottoman naval forces are Venetian documents, Byzantine histories, and the accounts of early Ottoman history written by Ottoman authors of the later fifteenth century, such as Oruç Beğ. These sources are far from satisfactory; nevertheless, they provide evidence that the Ottomans had naval forces, including the names and sometimes the accomplishments of a few of the leaders of these forces, and we know that Ottoman expansion on land had its counterpart on the sea.4 Gallipoli’s history as an Ottoman naval base is worth exploring because naval power for the Ottoman Empire was tied to controlling key strategic locations. Seizing Gallipoli was a turning point for the empire because possession of Gallipoli led to

 Gallipoli 31 control of the Dardanelles and hence access to Istanbul and to the Black Sea from the Mediterranean and the Aegean. This allowed the Ottomans to expand into Europe, which truly distinguished them from their rival beyliks during the fourteenth century. The Ottoman’s first access to the sea was on the Sea of Marmara followed within twenty years by control of the entire southern shores of this sea, making the acquisition of Gallipoli on the opposite shore of supreme importance for both naval power and expansion into the Balkans. Control of both sides of the Dardanelles increased Ottoman attacks on the shipping that passed through the straits. The Ottomans also expanded to the east and attacked Üsküdar (Scutari) across from Istanbul in 1338, although they did not fully control the Bosporus until the conquest of Istanbul in 1453.5 Thus the Ottomans gained early possession of the eastern or Anatolian shore of the Dardanelles, giving them some control over the straits at the other end of the Sea of Marmara.

Ottoman Seizing of Gallipoli and Its Significance The Straits, the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, have had strategic value for millennia and, with their capital at Istanbul, the Byzantines had recognized the importance of controlling the straits. Byzantine Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos stated, “it is impossible for the Byzantines to hold Constantinople securely without being masters of the seas.”6 And Gallipoli was one of the first locations that the Byzantine emperors at Iznik (Nicea) reconquered from the crusaders after the Fourth Crusade.7 By the late thirteenth century, the site of Gallipoli held one of the strongest Byzantine fortresses in Thrace and when the Byzantines tried to revive their fleet it was the base for the men of the Byzantine fleet.8 Thus Gallipoli’s importance was recognized and its possession was fought over during the fourteenth century. Gallipoli was attacked and occupied by various groups until 1376, after which it remained in Ottoman possession almost exclusively. During the fourteenth century it was held by the Byzantines, Catalans, crusaders, and Ottomans while being attacked by others who desired its possession. The Catalans had been located here during their brief period of Byzantine service in the winter of 1304–5. When their leader Roger de Flor was killed in 1305, they captured and then fortified Gallipoli. The Catalans were joined by 500 Turks from Karası who later found it difficult to return across the straits. They were attacked by the Byzantines in 1309, indicating that the Byzantines had regained control of the base, after the Catalans abandoned it in 1307, and it remained in Byzantine possession as a naval base for all the crews of the Byzantine fleet in 1320.9

Kara Mürsel Even before the Ottomans advanced to Gallipoli, they had begun to take a first few faltering steps to establish a naval presence on the sea of Marmara. This was the moment when the Ottomans decided to expand using naval forces as well as land forces requiring strategic locations on the closest sea. Probably early in Orhan’s (1326–62)

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reign he recruited Mürsel Alp, later given the name of Kara Mürsel, from the beylik of Karası to his service. This was probably in the late 1320s well before the Ottoman annexation of Karası in 1346. Ibn Battuta, who traveled through the beyliks of Anatolia in the 1330s, had great praise for Orhan: This sultan is the greatest of the kings of the Turkmens and the richest in wealth, lands, and military forces. Of fortresses he possesses nearly a hundred, and for most of his time he is continually engaged in making the round of them, staying in each fortress for some days to put it into good order and examine its condition. It is said that he has never stayed for a whole month in any one town. He also fights with the infidels continually and keeps them under siege.10

In contrast, Ibn Battuta had little positive to say about one of Karası’s leaders, who ruled from Balıkesir. “He is named Dumur Khan, and is a worthless person. It was his father who built this city, and during the reign of this son of his it acquired a large population of good-for-nothings, for ‘Like king like people.’”11 Lack of effective leadership in Karası may have influenced Mürsel to leave Karası to join Orhan’s expanding beylik. Mürsel’s talents included seafaring and he may have found more opportunities under Orhan, who did not personally engage in seafaring than in Karası, where the beys themselves led naval expeditions. It was characteristic of the Ottoman navy from its earliest beginnings until the end of the empire that the ruler of Ottoman territories did not personally lead naval expeditions except during rare and relatively brief forays. While Ottoman rivals along the Aegean, Karası, Saruhan, Aydın, and Menteşe, had rulers who themselves engaged in naval enterprises, the Ottomans did not. Thus, seafaring men might have had a wider scope for their expertise under Ottoman rule than in the maritime beyliks. While sources do not indicate a precise date for Kara Mürsel’s activities, three early Ottoman historians whose accounts cover the period that Kara Mürsel was a leader under Orhan state that he was given an ulu timar, essentially a province, and then distributed land to his followers. He was placed in charge of naval defense against the Byzantines on the southern shore of the Sea of Marmara.12 He founded a naval base at Karamürsel near Izmit (Nicomedia) on the bay of Izmit, which was the first Ottoman coastal possession, on the sea of Marmara, the nearest large body of water to the original Ottoman land locked territory near Söğüt. The sea of Marmara lacked the presence of Venetian and Genoese possessions that were found in the Aegean, a definite advantage for the Ottomans, who merely had to confront Byzantine responses to their expansion along the southern coast. Also, this location placed the Ottomans very near Istanbul. Kara Mürsel constructed ships that were named after him, small galleys whose chief purpose was to protect the Ottoman shore and attack Byzantine shipping in the sea of Marmara.13 Kara Mürsel seems to have been the founder of the Ottoman navy, although our knowledge about him is limited. He defended the coast, built an arsenal, and was the first admiral of the tiny fleet.14 When he died, his tomb was at Karamürsel, which has the following quote: “When I die, bury me in such a place that I rest on the ridge of the mountains, give me the embrace of the sea, that I may always see the fleet.”15

 Gallipoli 33 From this toehold, the Ottomans determined to expand their lands to include the southeastern shore of the Sea of Marmara, which became their first major maritime possession, while the Byzantines defended this strategic location for a few years before the Ottomans conquered it. Orhan besieged Nicomedia (Izmit) in about 1331 after he conquered Iznik. Andronicus III sailed toward Nicomedia in August 1333 trying to relieve the city; however, before he arrived, he received ambassadors from Orhan and agreed to pay 12,000 hyperpera for the fortified places between Nicomedia and Istanbul. However, this only delayed the Ottoman conquest for a few years, for Orhan conquered Izmit in 1337; according to the Byzantine author Gregoras, “Nikomedia, the chief city of Bithynia, was captured, reduced by great famine brought on by the obstinate siege of the enemy.”16 Thus control of the eastern portion of the southern coast of the sea of Marmara was secured when Izmit became an Ottoman naval base. Moreover, in the following decade Orhan took advantage of a succession dispute in Karası to annex that beylik giving him control of the entire southern coast of the sea of Marmara.

Ottoman Annexation of Karası The Ottoman annexation of Karası is the earliest and the most significant Ottoman expansion at the expense of its neighboring beyliks and is generally dated to the mid1340s. This aligns with the information found in Enveri’s epic about Umur, in which he stated that Süleyman of Karası accompanied Umur on his expedition to assist John Kantakouzenos, a usurper of the Byzantine throne, in 1345, indicating that the beylik remained independent into that year.17 Supposedly the Ottomans exploited an opportunity to intervene in a succession dispute that allowed them to annex Karası.18 But more importantly, Karası’s geographical position blocked Ottoman access to the Dardanelles and the Aegean Sea. This gave Karası a strategic advantage that the Ottomans lacked, with their limited access to the Sea of Marmara at Karamürsel. Although the history of Karası is the most obscure of the beyliks that bordered the Aegean coast in the first half of the fourteenth century, sources about the Catalan company indicate that Karası was founded slightly later than the other beyliks. The beys of Karası first conquered Pergamon and then reached the coast of the sea of Marmara, which they did not conquer until after 1330. Until the 1320s parts of this region remained under Byzantine control, for in 1328 Andronicus III crossed from Istanbul to the Kapıdağ peninsula (peninsula of Cyzicus) to visit the church of Artake and to meet Demir Khan, son of Karası Bey, after which they concluded a treaty.19 At Karası Bey’s death his lands were divided between his sons Demir and Yahşi; however, the senior lord was probably Demir, who ruled from Balıkesir, while Yahşi ruled from Pergamon. The Mamluk historian Al-Umari claims that the brothers had impressive fleets and they were devoted to holy war and he described Yahşi as Lord of Marmara.20 This contrasts with Ibn Battuta’s negative assessment quoted earlier. According to Kantakouzenos, in the 1330s Turks transporting horses on their ships crossed the Dardanelles and raided Thrace and we can assume that these Turks were from Karası as they were the only beylik with access to the Dardanelles. At that point,

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Karası was as strong and prestigious as any of its contemporaries, possibly excepting Aydın, which was gaining in significance with every passing year due to Umur’s exploits, which no one else could equal. Karası’s significance was due to its strategic location and fleet, which allowed it to attack the Byzantines in their European territories because of its control of the southern shores of the Dardanelles. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, Yahşi’s fleet was destroyed in 1334 during the first crusading naval league, and this impeded Karası’s expansion. But the beylik recovered, although conflict within the family might have begun in the 1330s. According to the Ottoman historian Aşıkpaşazade, a brother called Tursun incited Orhan to annex his brother’s territory but then Tursun himself was killed and the brother was taken captive. Since Aşıkpaşazade wrote many years after these events he is hardly a reliable source for the 1340s and the succession dispute seems to have been a mere pretext for the Ottoman annexation of Karası. Gregoras recorded that Turks often crossed the Dardanelles to ravage Thrace and in 1337 the Turks of Karası crossed with ships and horses for a major raid but were unsuccessful and were forced to make a treaty with the Byzantines. The Ottomans also tried to cross into Thrace and raid, but their position was weaker than that of Karası and Orhan captured Izmit instead. In 1341 after the death of Andronicus III, Yahşi, son of Karası, and the neighboring bey of Saruhan attempted new raids into Thrace, which were again unsuccessful and led to a new treaty with the Byzantines. According to Aşıkpaşazade, the bey of Karası, whom the Ottomans had captured, died of plague two years after the conquest of the beylik. If this is correct, then his death would probably have been in 1347/8 during the Black Death and the beylik was annexed by the Ottomans in 1345/6.21 Before this Karası as well as Aydın and the Ottomans was embroiled in a Byzantine civil war. A Byzantine lord, John Batantzes or Vatantzes, had a daughter married to Süleyman of Karası, brother of Tursun. Because of this relationship Batantzes with the support of the lords of Karası could intervene in the civil war and he changed sides twice during it. When he was supporting Kantakouzenos, Batantzes’ son-in-law Süleyman supported Umur of Aydın when he went to help Kantakouzenos in 1345. But when the Ottoman ruler Orhan married Kantakouzenos’s daughter, Orhan was clearly going to support Kantakouzenos and there was already conflict between the Ottomans and Karası over raiding in Thrace, which was important for their economic wellbeing. Whoever raided earlier obtained the best booty and could collect tribute first. Orhan probably searched for an opportunity to eliminate Karası in order to possess its strategic location, which remained superior to that of the Ottomans.22 Once the Ottomans annexed Karası they gained its strategic location and sailors, who were much more experienced in naval warfare and had a long tradition of it. Karası Turks initiated the conquest of Thrace and their experienced sailors helped Süleyman, son of Orhan, cross the Dardanelles.23 Although the annexation of Karası by the Ottomans is poorly documented, its strategic significance is apparent. Once the Ottomans controlled all the coast that had belonged to the beys of Karası, together with what they had already conquered from the Byzantines, they were positioned to expand into the Balkans and become the leaders in gaza. A few years later in 1348, Umur died besieging the lower fortress of Izmir; Aydın’s seafaring exploits were not over; however, they were impeded by the crusader occupation of Izmir’s port. The Ottomans were

 Gallipoli 35 then prepared to become the most powerful beylik in western Anatolia since they had access to the Dardanelles and through them to the Aegean.

The Ottoman Seizure of Gallipoli and the Byzantine Alliance with Orhan The straits, the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, had great value for commerce in the late medieval period when Genoa and Venice both established trading bases in the Black Sea to access the merchandize that was available there; travel by sea through the straits was preferable. The Venetians gained a great advantage when they conquered Istanbul with crusading forces during the Fourth Crusade. However, the Genoese established a colony at Pera/Galata on the opposite shore of the Golden Horn from Istanbul. Competition between Venice and Genoa over trade led to wars between them in the fourteenth century, first 1350–5 and later 1377–81. The Ottoman seizure of Gallipoli occurred in 1354, when conflicts provided the opportunity for the Ottomans to occupy Gallipoli. These conflicts included the Byzantine civil war between John Kantakouzenos and John V Palaiologus lasting from 1352 to 1357 and the War of the Straits between Genoa and Venice lasting from 1350 to 1355. During the previous Byzantine civil war, 1341–7, Kantakouzenos had married his daughter Theodora to Orhan, who could provide military support for Kantakouzenos. Orhan already had the beginnings of a naval force; for the ceremony he sent thirty galleys to Silivri (Selybria), west of Istanbul, some of which ships he might have gained with his annexation of Karası. In February 1347 Kantakouzenos entered Istanbul as emperor and Orhan came to Üsküdar to congratulate him, after which Kantakouzenos crossed the Bosporus to entertain Orhan. As emperor Kantakouzenos called on Orhan to provide troops in his campaigns against the Serbs and rebellious Byzantines in 1348 and 1350.24 During the Byzantine civil wars, the rivals for the throne recruited troops, Serbian, Bulgarian, or Turks, from various beyliks. In this context Turks were simply one of the local pools of military men and their religion or ethnicity was not of primary importance.25 Kantakouzenos himself wrote one of the foremost sources on the alliance with Orhan, which he later sought to justify, while the other contemporary Byzantine source by Gregoras vilifies this action by Kantakouzenos. From the perspective that Orhan had married Theodora in 1346, the same year that he annexed Karası, Kantakouzenos should have realized that Orhan could be a valuable ally, but also a dangerous one, because the Ottomans were expansionist and willing to annex neighbors’ territories if a reasonable pretext presented itself. In 1351, when the Venetians attacked Galata during their war with Genoa, Kantakouzenos supported the Genoese, who had sent a delegation to Orhan requesting assistance, which Orhan agreed to because he was hostile to the Venetians. According to Kantakouzenos “he [Orhan] sent to the mainland opposite Byzantium a large force of cavalry and infantry, telling them to travel through Galata to aid the Genoese, to whom this Turkish force was the greatest help.”26 In the following century,

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the Ottomans and Genoese aided each other frequently as they were often united by enmity toward Venice. The Ottomans’ opportunity to seize the city and fortress of the strategic port of Gallipoli arose because during the Byzantine civil war, when the Turkish military forces were employed by Kantakouzenos, he gave them permission to camp at Tzympe on the peninsula north of Gallipoli. Initially the Turks, who were given Tzympe as a feudal holding, were not under the command of Süleyman Pasha, son of the Ottoman ruler, Orhan.27 Kantakouzenos recruited these soldiers of fortune when the civil war between John V Palaiologos and Kantakouzenos’s son Matthew erupted in 1352. While John V Palaiologos made use of Serbian and Bulgar allies, according to Kantakouzenos’s account, John V Palaiologos also hired these Turkish soldiers of fortune for a time before they changed sides to support Kantakouzenos again. During the period 1352–4 Süleyman, son of Orhan, began to lead the Turks of Tzympe and, when Kantakouzenos tried to regain control of the fortress, he asked for Orhan to intervene. Orhan replied that Süleyman would need to be compensated if he returned Tzympe. Kantakouzenos sent 1,000 gold pieces to Bursa, because Süleyman had returned to Anatolia. But on March 1–2, 1354, an earthquake occurred on the Gallipoli peninsula.28 Kantakouzenos’s account of the earthquake vividly portrays the dire conditions on the peninsula that led to the Ottoman seizure of Gallipoli. An extraordinary earthquake occurred at the beginning of spring. . . . Not only did houses fall on their occupants and kill many of them, but the earthquake also tore out the cities’ walls from their foundations. Those of the citizens who had not been killed by the earthquake, seeing that they could not easily put back up the walls which had been knocked down, and that they would not be able to fight or defend themselves against the barbarians [Turks], if the latter attacked; and fearing also lest they be led away into slavery, they took their wives and children and left by night for such of the other cities, as they believed had not fallen in the earthquake. . . . The latter seeing that the walls of the city had collapsed, and surmising that in such circumstances they could defeat [the Greeks/Byzantines], either if they fled, or if they remained [in the cities] . . . so they marched on the Greeks, vanquished them and made of all the cities stores for their booty. Callipolis [Gallipoli], the most illustrious of all the Thracian coastal cities occupied by the barbarians suffered worse damage than the others, all its people fled to safety in boats, which were very numerous there . . . Suleyman the son of Orchanes [Orhan], when he heard of what had happened in Thrace [for he was staying at Pegae [Biga], a city of the Hellespont [Dardanelles]], sailed over to Thrace, and, according to a pact which he had made with the emperor [Kantakouzenos], installed in these cities many of his race whom he had taken with him, and rebuilt the cities which had been destroyed. He expended great labour on Callipolis, re-erecting the walls and building them better than they had been before, and compelled many of his noblemen to live there along with a great army.29

Kantakouzenos’s explanation of the impact of the earthquake on later events highlights how the Ottoman forces under Süleyman were able to seize Gallipoli. By 1354, as the

 Gallipoli 37 Ottomans controlled the entire southern shore of the Dardanelles, they were aware of the strategic value of the Gallipoli peninsula and were unwilling to relinquish control of what an act of God and their own readiness had placed in their hands. Because the local inhabitants had been subject to raids by the Turks of Tzympe, they feared to remain in cities that could no longer be defended since their walls had collapsed. Süleyman was at Biga, in former Karası territory across from Gallipoli, where he organized a huge transport of Turks from Anatolia to the Gallipoli peninsula to occupy the cities and fortresses that had been abandoned. Süleyman then repaired the fortresses and installed garrisons in the cities, especially Gallipoli. When Kantakouzenos offered additional money for the entire peninsula, the Ottomans replied that they had not taken the cities by force but had merely occupied abandoned cities. Negotiations continued during 1354, but when Kantakouzenos fell from power in November, the Ottomans had no alliance with John V Palaiologos regarding occupying Byzantine territory and they remained in the port.30 While later Ottoman sources, such as Oruç, minimize or simply ignore the alliance with Kantakouzenos and the earthquake, the Byzantine sources reveal that Ottoman expansion into the Gallipoli peninsula and then permanent settlement there were contingent on both the Kantakouzenos alliance and the earthquake. Accounts of another incident that occurred three years later provide a glimpse of an Ottoman navy during this period. Orhan’s son Halil, governor of the lands around the gulfs of Izmit and Gemlik, was captured in 1357 by a Greek pirate ship when he went to sea in a fishing boat. The pirates carried him off to Phocaia/Foça, and the Greek lord, Kalothetos, retained him in hopes of a ransom. The reason Orhan did not attempt to release him, according to Kantakouzenos, was that Orhan’s navy was not powerful enough to go by sea, and he would have had to cross the territory of Saruhan if he went by land. Because he was unable to rescue his son, Orhan had to request the assistance of the Byzantine emperor John V, who demanded that Orhan cease assisting Matthew Kantakouzenos. In the spring of 1358 John V attacked Foça with the assistance of his brother-in-law, Francesco Gattilusio, who provided ships and men and led the attack, but he was unsuccessful in retrieving Halil. Eventually John V paid a ransom of 60,000 hyperpera, but he did not immediately return Halil to Orhan but brought him to Istanbul and betrothed him to his daughter Irene, before taking him to Orhan at Izmit.31 The conclusions to be drawn from this incident are that Orhan’s fleet must have been effective merely for attacking shipping in the Dardanelles and that the Byzantine fleet by the late 1350s was also of minimal use in naval warfare.

Crusaders and Byzantines at Gallipoli, 1366–76 Ottoman expansion across the straits not only led to the creation of the core lands of the Ottomans, both in the Balkans and in Anatolia, it also impacted Byzantine perceptions of the Ottoman threat to the remaining Byzantine possessions, located in Thrace. The Ottomans under the leadership of Süleyman Pasha used Gallipoli as a base for conquests in Thrace as their forces could be transported across the straits at this location. When Süleyman died in 1357, his brother, Prince Murad, became the leader

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at Gallipoli, and raids in Thrace continued after Murad I became sultan in 1362. John V Palaiologos contacted local rulers in attempts to form an alliance against the Turks. During one journey in search of allies, he was captured by Tsar Shishman of Tarnovo in 1365 as he attempted to return from negotiations in Buda.32 John V received help from an unexpected source; his cousin, Amadeo of Savoy, departed Venice in June 1366 with a crusader army, which Francesco Gattilusio, John’s brother-in-law, also joined when it reached the Aegean. The initial goal of the crusade was to regain Gallipoli for the Byzantine emperor, after which the expedition planned to sail to Bulgaria to release John V from captivity.33 Amadeo’s army included contingents from Savoy, Marseilles, Genoa, and Venice. The crusaders arrived at Gallipoli on August 21 and launched an attack that was repulsed. Amadeo then began to besiege Gallipoli, “both by land and by sea, so that no one could go in or out,” and “the count ordered three assaults in order the better to hem in the city,”34 one by sea and the others by land. The fighting continued until nightfall and attacks resumed the following day. Francesco Gattilusio led the attack on Gallipoli from the sea. This day the fighting also continued until nightfall, although Amadeo believed that he had almost defeated the Ottoman garrison. The crusaders planned to continue attacking the following day. However, during the night the Ottoman garrison abandoned the fortress, and the gates were opened to the crusaders. Why the garrison abandoned the fortress is unclear, since the strategic value of Gallipoli was well known. Perhaps the garrison was too small to defend the fortress against a large force. By August 26 the city and fortress were controlled by Amadeo of Savoy and his forces. He left a garrison there and sailed on to Istanbul before he departed for the Black Sea to rescue John V.35 After eventually arranging for the Byzantine emperor’s release, Amadeo returned with his fleet to Gallipoli, June 13, 1367. He paid the salaries of the garrison and then gave Gallipoli to his Byzantine cousin, John V. He paid at Gallipoli, by order of the lord [Amadeo], the garrison of the said place for the wages which milord owed the men of the garrison, settlement of the account having been made with them on 14 June [1367], on which day he turned over the castle and city of Gallipoli to the forces of the lord emperor of Constantinople. First, he paid the said Michally, captain of the castle of Gallipoli, . . . which milord owed him for his wages for nine months and 22 days, beginning on 23 August, 1366, and ending on 13 June, 1367.36

Thus, Amadeo’s subordinates administered the fortress and city of Gallipoli for almost ten months, at which time the city and fortress were placed in the control of the emperor, John V. Recovery of Gallipoli was a great prize for John V because of its strategic value, but his circumstances prevented him from making significant use of the city, although Ottoman forces in Thrace were somewhat isolated from Anatolia during the years of Byzantine control. John V was short of funds and endured three revolts by his son Andronicus IV, in 1373, 1376, and 1385.37 In 1376, with Genoese and Ottoman assistance, Andronicus gained control of Istanbul and began to reign. The price for Ottoman assistance was the return of Gallipoli, which Andronicus gave to Murad I in

 Gallipoli 39 1376 or 1377. Byzantine authors critiqued the surrender of this strategic location to the Ottomans. Our ancient scourge, the Turks, have become more dangerous to us, made more arrogant by the alliance signed with the Emperor [Andronikos IV] against his father [John V]. Although they have taken Gallipoli as the price for this aid, and although, besides this, they have taken many other things which belong to us, and have taken more tribute than can easily be counted, they have not, they say, been paid enough for their assistance. They give orders as absolute masters, and we have to obey in everything.38

The Ottoman initial occupation of Gallipoli and then their recovery of the port both occurred in the context of Byzantine struggles for the throne and civil war. This would also be characteristic of later negotiations over Gallipoli during Ottoman succession struggles. Potential allies of the contenders negotiated to gain Gallipoli, although generally the Ottomans were reluctant to relinquish control of the port. Until they conquered Istanbul, the best crossing from Anatolia to the Balkans was at Gallipoli. After 1453 the strategic value of Gallipoli for the Ottomans diminished slightly. The Ottoman recovery of Gallipoli in 1376 allowed Murad I to cross the straits in 1377 and proceed to Edirne that had been conquered earlier in the 1360s.39 While Gallipoli remained the principal base for the Ottoman fleet during the reign of Murad I, in 1374 according to a report from the Venetian Senate to Pietro Mocenigo, the captain of the Gulf was sent to Bozcaada (Tenedos) to obtain information about a fleet that Murad I had created.40 At this time the Ottomans had not regained Gallipoli; thus, the fleet must have been based at another location, presumably on the southern coast of the Dardanelles. It is generally believed that Ottoman forces in the Balkans remained isolated from Anatolia during Byzantine control of Gallipoli between 1366 and 1376, but this report indicates that the Ottomans had a fleet. It is probable that the fleet was small and would have been unable to transport more than a fraction of Ottoman military forces. Although the Ottomans did not control Gallipoli for approximately ten years, both Byzantine and Ottoman sources indicate that Murad crossed from Anatolia to the Balkans during this period, perhaps three separate times. Some of his subordinates, such as Evrenos, Haci Ilbey, and Lala Şahin, were active in the Balkans together with forces directly under Murad I. The pope had proposed in 1367 that twelve galleys be stationed in the straits to prevent the Ottomans from crossing between Rumeli and Anatolia, indicating that it continued despite Byzantine occupation of Gallipoli. Despite some difficulties in crossing between the two parts of the empire, in 1371 Murad besieged Biga (Pegae) in Anatolia, for the final time using naval and land forces, in addition to facilitating conquests in the Balkans during these years.41 During this period Ottoman diplomacy’s highest priority was to regain Gallipoli, which explains Ottoman support of Andronicus IV as he restored Gallipoli to Murad I.42 However despite limited information concerning conquests in both Anatolia and the Balkans, sometimes with the assistance of the fleet, the sources on Ottoman naval forces during Murad’s reign are so fragmentary that it is only possible to conclude that

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a fleet of some sort existed, which was created by the Ottoman state and was not merely Turkish pirates, although presumably they existed as well. According to the Ottoman historian Neşri, in 1389 when Murad prepared to respond to an Ottoman defeat the previous year in the Balkans, he arranged for the defense of Anatolia and Gallipoli. In 1388 the Venetians had sent a fleet to threaten Gallipoli; thus, Murad’s instructions to his governor at Gallipoli, Yanc Bey, reflected his fear of becoming isolated in the Balkans.43 Sultan Murad Gazi made arrangements when it became Spring undertaking to pass from Gallipoli placing five reliable brave men in Anatolia . . . All of them were to strengthen Anatolia, with the great army he advanced and came to Gallipoli. By chance at that moment it became violently cold, opposing winds blew, the sovereign remained a few days, at last the bey of Gallipoli, Yanc Bey prepared ships, the sovereign [Murad I] with the great army, . . ., again crossed to Rumeli, he said to Yanc Bey: “You remain here with ship recruits, so that if a nonbeliever comes with a ship, he will not cause harm, thus be a precaution.” At that point, Bayezid Sultan also came, he crossed from Gallipoli, he met the sovereign. Then the sovereign marched to the vicinity of Edirne.44

Clearly, Gallipoli was the base from which the army crossed from Anatolia to the Balkans and the crossing could be difficult due to the weather. The ships that were used were under the command of the bey of Gallipoli, Yanc Bey, who was assigned to defend the straits at Gallipoli and prevent any enemy ships from passing through. It appears that Yanc Bey was acting as an Ottoman admiral; he prepared ships to transport the army and then commanded seamen to defend the straits. As the bey of Gallipoli, this was an important assignment, and he was one of the officials who served under Murad as a governor. By 1389 under Murad I, the empire had official naval forces, commanded by the bey of Gallipoli, and transport was arranged on Ottoman ships, not on ships borrowed from Ottoman allies. The bey of Gallipoli remained the Ottoman official with primary naval responsibilities into the following century.

Bayezid I’s Naval Policies Bayezid I became sultan after Murad I’s death at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. While Bayezid I continued Ottoman expansion on land, his naval policies transformed Ottoman naval contingents into a more effective force, and his plans at Gallipoli transformed the port into a naval base. Moreover, Bayezid soon conquered the remaining independent Turkish beyliks on the Aegean coast. Thus, during and after his reign, reports of Turkish naval activity generally concern the Ottomans because their Turkish Aegean rivals had been incorporated into the expanding Ottoman state. With the reign of Bayezid, one can speak of Ottoman naval policy, which became integrated with military forces on land to produce rapid expansion. Bayezid would have used his combined naval and land forces to conquer Istanbul, if Timur (Tamerlane) of Samarkand (d. 1405) had not invaded Anatolia.

 Gallipoli 41 At his accession, Bayezid immediately planned to annex several beyliks in Anatolia, especially the strategically valuable ones on the Aegean coast. By March 1390 it appears from Venetian sources that Bayezid had annexed the maritime beyliks of Aydın and Menteşe and he had previously annexed Saruhan.45 These conquests remained insecure and lords of these beyliks continued to engage in diplomacy with the Venetians. However, expansion into the Aegean beyliks gave the Ottomans at least tentative control of the Aegean coastline of Anatolia, which enhanced their ability to create a viable navy. However, conquests on land were Bayezid’s main interest as was typical for Ottoman rulers. But, since Bayezid had lands in the Balkans and in Anatolia, he continually crossed the straits as he dashed from one location to another to put down unrest. He was known as Thunderbolt because of his lightening campaigns against his enemies. Thus, Bayezid knew that for his policy of expansion to create an empire, Gallipoli was the key strategic location and he devoted extensive resources in pursuit of this policy. In 1390 Bayezid reconstructed the ruined citadel and constructed a tower in the harbor that he rebuilt to house large galleys. “Crossing the straits, he erected a new fortress at Gallipoli on the foundation of the old fortress which had been destroyed long ago and completely razed by both the Catalans and Turks. He constructed a naval station to protect the triremes [galleys] and a tower of great size which stood over the harbor to ward off hostile attacks.”46 Bayezid’s aim was to control the straits and the fortifications at Gallipoli would enable this to be implemented. If Bayezid desired a powerful navy, he would need to ensure that there was a naval base for large galleys. For as long as the Ottoman fleet was only composed of small galleys, it would never successfully confront the war fleets of the Venetians or the Genoese, although smaller vessels could be effective at attacking merchant ships. Thus, these constructions at Gallipoli indicate that Bayezid had greater plans beyond continuing to attack the commerce that passed through the straits. These fortifications of Bayezid were so substantial that they were not significantly updated until the mid-sixteenth century in 1565.47 Clearly, the sultan planned to challenge the naval power of the Latins in the Aegean, although he was unsuccessful because his fleet remained small,48 with only seventeen galleys.49 Venice considered plans to attack Gallipoli and the Ottoman fleet in 1395 to counter this new Ottoman naval threat.50 The broader context for the events in the 1390s was the Ottoman siege of Istanbul that began in 1394 and continued until 1402. At times, Bayezid prosecuted the siege in person, but he was often occupied elsewhere in the Balkans or Anatolia. In 1395 Bayezid had the Anadolu Hisarı fortress constructed on the Bosporus to prevent supplies reaching Istanbul from the Black Sea. Thus, along with Ottoman control of the Dardanelles, control of the Bosporus was deemed necessary to bring the siege to a successful conclusion.

Saruca Pasha An Ottoman military leader, Saruca Pasha (d. before 1415), who had a well-established record as a leader of foot soldiers on land, laid the foundation for Ottoman naval power

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during the reign of Bayezid I.51 Saruca Pasha was active from the early years of Murad I’s reign in military operations in extending Ottoman rule in Rumeli. He led foot soldiers in campaigns in the Maritsa valley and became a famous border lord. In 1371 after the battle of Cirmen he became the first sancak bey (governor) in the newly created sancak (district), where soldiers were given (land grants for military service). In 1386 he fought in a war against the bey of Karaman being assigned to the right wing of Prince Yakub Çelebi’s forces. Moreover, he fought in Rumeli in expeditions against Macedonia and Albania. When the grand vizier Çandarlı Ali Pasha was ordered to lead an expedition against Bulgaria in 1388, Saruca was a great bey leader in the forces under him. In 1389 he fought at Kosovo on one of the wings of the Ottoman forces.52 This period witnessed the establishment of Ottoman administration in these newly conquered lands in the Balkans when the roots of Ottoman administrative practice were being created. Saruca Pasha participated in early provincial administration when the positions he held were signs of great power and trust. He might even have been given the title of Beylerbey of Anatolia.53 But during the reign of Murad I, no sources indicate that he participated in any type of naval campaign. Sources for this period range greatly in their reliability; thus, accounts of his naval accomplishments combine the unlikely with the more believable. According to the latesixteenth-century Ottoman historian Mustafa Ali, during the reign of Murad I, Saruca captured a Frankish ship that was passing through the straits at Gallipoli carrying the daughter of the Byzantine emperor; the sultan’s son Bayezid was given the princess, but Saruca Pasha was allowed to keep the remainder of the booty.54 More plausibly, early in the reign of Bayezid I, Saruca Pasha was given the assignment of guarding the Dardanelles in 1390. He radically altered the fortifications at Gallipoli that had suffered repeatedly during the fourteenth century. To make Gallipoli become capable of guarding the Dardanelles, he strengthened an inner castle on top of a hill. He demolished the outer castle, cleared an artificial harbor, and then had two castles constructed at the mouth of the harbor. At the harbor’s entrance he created a three-layered chain to close access to it. He was zealous in strengthening Gallipoli’s defenses.55 While Gallipoli had been important for Ottoman expansion on land and sea since 1354, with these fortifications Gallipoli was prepared to play a larger role in naval affairs as controlling maritime traffic in the straits would be greatly enhanced with the stronger fortifications. This demonstrated that the Ottomans were not merely exploiting what was already available at Gallipoli; on the contrary they were implementing plans for a greatly enlarged role for Gallipoli and the navy. Saruca’s assignments and activities demonstrate that in addition to controlling the Dardanelles, Bayezid planned to challenge the Venetian presence in the Aegean by raiding the islands. After renovating the port, Saruca Pasha began to organize a fleet, whose number of ships varied from eighteen to sixty. With the fortifications and the fleet, he increased Ottoman control of the Dardanelles. With sixty ships he raided the coasts of the Aegean, including Chios and Eğriboz and the shores of present-day Greece. Due to this, the Venetians began to reinforce the garrisons and fortifications on the islands.56 The Ottoman naval force appeared at Salonica April 1392, and in 1394 Crispi, the duke of Naxos requested a galley to defend against Ottoman attacks

 Gallipoli 43 on Aegean islands. But raids increased, as well as attacks on shipping through the Dardanelles.57 Strengthening the small Ottoman fleet and renewing the fortification at Gallipoli were vital for Bayezid’s siege of Istanbul, which began in 1394. The most effective way to besiege the city was to place a blockade to prevent supplies from reaching the city. Pleas for assistance to the pope from the Byzantine emperor, Manuel II, eventually resulted in a crusade against the Ottomans, known as the crusade of Nicopolis, where a battle was fought in 1396, which ended in disaster for the crusading forces. Survivors of the crusade were sent to Gallipoli and then to Bursa if they were worth being ransomed.58 The siege of Istanbul continued with famine conditions in the city by 1397. Without the fleet and the strongly fortified naval base at Gallipoli this blockade would have been far less effective.59 A blockade of some degree remained in place until 1402, after which the Ottomans struggled for their own survival after Bayezid’s defeat at the battle of Ankara. Earlier in 1399 when due to the Ottoman siege of Istanbul, the French sent admiral Boucicaut to aid the Byzantines, Saruca Pasha attempted to prevent his reaching the city. A French fleet of four ships and two galleys left Aigues-Mortes in June 1399, which eventually was joined by eight galleys from Genoa, and eight galleys from Venice. The initial attempt to reach Istanbul resulted in a clash with the Ottoman naval force and they had to withdraw to Bozaada (Tenedos).60 According to the anonymous biography of Boucicaut, As the two messenger galleys were departing the port of Negroponte, the marshal escorted them until they were within sight of Gallipoli, and he anchored there to offer assistance if it should be needed: . . . And indeed the two galleys had much need of his assistance, for the Turks, knowing that the marshal was close, had set up two ambushes with seventeen fully armed galleys: one ambush, with several ships, was within the port of Gallipoli, the other was beyond the town on the route to Constantinople. Now it happened that as soon as our two galleys went past Gallipoli, the Turks sprang the first ambush, of seven galleys, and at the same time, approaching off the bow, the men on our galleys saw the second ambush, this time of another ten galleys—so that they were surrounded by the enemy. . . . They soon found themselves in the midst of the enemy fleet which attacked chaotically from all sides. . . . He [Boucicaut] sailed out as quickly as possible to engage the enemy, looking so determined on combat that when the enemy saw him coming, they abandoned the two galleys and made off at full speed—at such speed in fact that the flagship of the Turkish fleet ran aground so unexpectedly and so violently that many of the crew were killed or injured. In this way the marshal saved his two galleys; that night the Christian fleet anchored in the port of Tenedos. . . . The following morning the Venetian galleys arrived, as did two galleys from Rhodes and a galiot from Mytilene; soon thereafter there came the whole fleet intending to go to the aid of Constantinople.61

This chivalric biography may exhibit exaggeration, but the account of this naval encounter is instructive.62 Boucicaut’s force needed the addition of other ships to be strong enough to pass the Ottoman blockade, and it was notoriously difficult to assemble

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an allied fleet despite promises by various states. Nevertheless, Boucicaut attempted to force the Dardanelles with a smaller force that had to retreat to Bozcaada. The Ottoman forces had a well-planned ambush to prevent the French fleet from reaching Istanbul. All seemed to be going according to the Ottoman plan when a determined attack by Boucicaut led to chaos, retreat, and the grounding of the commander’s ship. We can surmise that Saruca Pasha’s naval skills remained adequate for blockading the Dardanelles, but in actual naval combat he lacked the expertise to lead his small force as effectively as necessary to defeat the French fleet. When the French fleet was joined by the other promised contingents then Saruca Pasha had to allow them to proceed to Istanbul, to the temporary relief of the city. Saruca Pasha’s brief biography reveals roots of trends in Ottoman naval policy. The sancak bey of Gallipoli became admiral of the navy with responsibilities of naval construction, including fortifications and ships, as well as leading the naval forces in battle. Admirals were mostly drawn from the administrative elite whether they had any previous naval experience or not. Saruca Pasha had a great deal of experience in land warfare during campaigns in the Balkans; he had been the sancak bey of Cirmen before being assigned to Gallipoli. There is no indication that he had previous experience in leading ships in battle before being assigned to Gallipoli. By the time Saruca Pasha became governor of Gallipoli, Bayezid had annexed Saruhan, Aydın, and Menteşe and thus would have had access to their experienced naval personnel as well as the men who had naval experience from Karası and the original Ottoman lands. In the future if the leader of naval forces was an individual without personal naval experience this was often a disadvantage for the Ottomans in naval warfare. However, such men usually had formed close relationships with the sultan, and therefore had proven loyalty, probably a greater factor in their selection than naval expertise. Thus, admirals without naval experience were adequate for most naval tasks, patrolling the Dardanelles and raids of coasts, but when it came to naval battles between fleets they were often defeated. Policies that the Ottomans followed in later centuries had their roots as early as Bayezid I’s reign. Saruca Pasha probably fought at the battle of Ankara and possibly returned to Rumeli after the defeat. He may have fought against Prince Musa at the battle of Yanbolu in 1410. He died in 1415 and founded a waqf at Cirmen,63 which indicates that his interests remained at the town of Cirmen rather than at Gallipoli. As the end of the fourteenth century approached, it appeared that the Ottomans would soon conquer Istanbul and continue to expand the empire under Bayezid I. Crusaders and Byzantines and other lords of the Balkans, as well as lords of Turkish beyliks in Anatolia, appeared unable to halt Ottoman expansion. However, in 1400 Timur first invaded Anatolia and conquered Sivas, where he buried some of the citizens alive, “after swearing to the troops of the garrison, that he would not shed their blood and would protect them and preserve their families and goods; nevertheless when the storming was ended, when he had the soldiers in his power, he cast them all in chains and ordered a crypt under the earth to be dug for them, and ordered them to be hurled alive into those pits.” Timur left Sivas “overturned and its people scattered hither and thither . . . utterly destroyed and laid waste.”64 In 1401 Timur invaded Syria and after plundering Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Baalbek, and Damascus, he

 Gallipoli 45 headed for Baghdad, which he sacked in August. In the summer of 1402 after having returned to Anatolia, Timur defeated Bayezid at the Battle of Ankara July 28, 1402, for many of Bayezid’s forces deserted during the battle since their former lords were in Timur’s army. Bayezid and two of his sons were captured; the other princes, including Süleyman and Mehmed, fled the battlefield.65

Gallipoli’s Importance during the Succession Struggles, 1402–13 Gallipoli’s importance increased, not diminished, in the years of the interregnum, after Bayezid died in 1403 in captivity and his sons fought among themselves to determine who would succeed him. Gallipoli immediately became the focus of negotiations, voyages across the straits, and conflict. The history of this period is very confused as first one son and then another became dominant before Mehmed finally defeated his rivals and became recognized as sultan in 1413. After the defeat at Ankara and as Timur headed west Ottomans fled to the straits, where they crossed on whatever ships they could purchase passage. Timur stayed in Anatolia for almost a year, pillaging towns especially in western Anatolia. Timur’s son, Muhammad Sultan, was sent to Bursa, where he plundered the fortress and burned the city as early as August 3, 1402. People fled into the Balkans to escape Timur’s force, where some found refuge with the Byzantines in Istanbul, but many others crossed at Gallipoli. According to Ibn Arabshah when they heard that Amir Suliman, drawing men to himself, had resolved to cross the sea and go over to the mainland of Adrianople [Edirne], men flowed to him out of the valleys and passes, hoping through him to emerge from that swelling calamity. Therefore he made peace with the people of Stamboul [Istanbul] and conciliated them and making a pact with them lest they should deceive each other, he allowed them time, then requested them to bring him help from the two straits of Gallipoli and Stamboul, since these two seas have no nearer way or crossing between the two continents than these two straits.66

Where exactly Süleyman crossed is unclear, but it must have been in the vicinity of Istanbul or Gallipoli.67 All available ships ferried not merely Turks but Byzantine Christians as well, who attempted to escape the devastation in Anatolia. Wherever he had crossed from Anatolia, by August 20 Süleyman had sought refuge in Gallipoli. This was logical because it was across the straits from Timur’s forces, it had recently been refortified by Saruca Pasha, and it was the location of the Ottoman fleet, which could transport the ruler and his supporters back to Anatolia. Although Edirne was the capital, Gallipoli had the more strategically valuable location from which to gain advantage over his rivals, whether his brothers or other regional powers. Some contemporary sources indicate that as early as September 1402, Süleyman Çelebi had offered a peace treaty to the Byzantines proposing to give them his fleet, Gallipoli, and

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a large section of territory in Rumeli.68 This indicates the desperation of his situation, that he would offer to relinquish his most valuable asset, if he could obtain peace in which to solidify his position as Bayezid’s successor. Later in September, Süleyman traveled to Istanbul where he repeated his offer, as well as in Pera. Multiple factors from Manuel II’s absence in Venice, to conflict between the Venetians and Genoese, to opposition from the border lords who had conquered territory in the Balkans, prevented these negotiations from progressing quickly.69 The Ottomans’ rivals immediately considered how they could profit from the Ottoman disaster and the Venetian Senate on September 22, 1402, discussed the possibility of acquiring Gallipoli with its naval base. Although they decided not to attempt it at that time, by the end of October they were claiming that the occupation of Gallipoli was “indispensable for the safety of the Christians,” and assigned Toma Mocenigo to assess the possibility of taking the port.70 Although Süleyman appeared to be the prince in the strongest position, he was threatened by his brothers, the Venetians, the Genoese, Timur, and the Byzantines. He needed to negotiate a peace with the Byzantines, Venetians, Genoese, and the Knights of St. John. Süleyman sent an envoy to Venice, where Manuel was, stating that he wished “to be Manuel’s son, and not to deviate from his will . . . since he desires that he [Manuel] should dispose of his [Süleyman’s] lands and places, just as he does his own.”71 This envoy initiated negotiations leading to the Treaty of Gallipoli, January or February 1403.

Treaty of Gallipoli, 1403 In October 1403, the Castilian ambassador to Timur, Roy Gonzalez de Clavijo, passed Gallipoli, and his description of the Ottoman naval base provides evidence for conditions there one year after Timur defeated Bayezid at the Battle of Ankara and a few months after the signing of the Treaty of Gallipoli.72 The next day Saturday we had come to the city called Gallipoli, where there is a castle, and though the city stands on the Grecian bank of the straits none the less it is in the hands of the Turks and belongs now to the eldest son of the late Sultan Bayazid who is known as Sulayman Chelebi. Here the Turks station their fleet of galleys and other ships where also they have made a great arsenal and dockyard. There were upwards of forty galleys lying here, and the castle of Gallipoli is very strongly garrisoned with troops, to be held in force. This city of Gallipoli was the first place that the Turks took possession of on the European side of the straits, and at the date of its capture it was in the hands of the Genoese. From Gallipoli the Turk country is but ten miles distant, which is the same as three leagues, across the water, and it was through taking Gallipoli that it came about that the Turks subsequently conquered all the Greek lands that they now hold in Thrace: and should they ever come to lose Gallipoli, they would indeed lose all the lands they have conquered in Greece. Since they have come to possess this port, where they station their fleet of galleys, this for them is the passage across from the Turkish

 Gallipoli 47 home lands both for their troops, and for supplies; and this fortress of Gallipoli is the base by which the Turks hold the Empire of the Greeks in thrall.73

Clavijo’s account includes information that is well known, for example, that this was the first place occupied by the Ottomans in the Balkans across the Dardanelles from Anatolia, as well as some factual errors, for example, that it was in the hands of the Genoese at its occupation. By taking this port, the Ottomans had been able to expand into the Balkans. Clavijo emphasized that this is where the Ottoman fleet had its base and it was essential for Ottoman expansion into the Balkans because reinforcements could be transported across the Dardanelles. Clavijo continued to believe that “the Turk country” only included land in Anatolia, although the Ottomans had controlled lands in the Balkans for decades. After Timur’s invasion of Anatolia, the rebirth of the empire developed from the Balkans. Clavijo emphasized that if the Ottomans lost Gallipoli their expansion into the Balkans would be at risk. Consequently, any Ottoman prince was reluctant to agree to relinquishing the port. The year before Clavijo’s embassy to Timur had seen negotiations over Gallipoli initiated by Süleyman Çelebi, whose immediate concern was to conclude a treaty with those powers who had interests on the Balkan side of the straits. Thus, he began negotiations with Byzantines, Venice, Genoa, and Rhodes. Although Venice was anxious to stabilize conditions so that trade could resume, the Venetians did not want Süleyman to conclude an agreement with John VII, Manuel’s nephew, because he was tied to the Genoese, their trade rivals with whom they had recently been at war, 1377–81, but which conflict left many issues unresolved. However, a treaty was signed with John VII as Manuel II had not yet returned from western Europe and none of the concerned parties could afford to wait until his arrival in Istanbul, which did not occur until June 9, 1403. The probable date of the treaty is January or February 1403.74 Manuel later met with John VII at Gallipoli in May or early June 1403 and at some date met with Süleyman at Gallipoli or Istanbul and ratified the treaty signed by John VII. Thus several treaties were made in 1403, but a copy of the first is the only one that has survived, which is an Italian version of a Turkish original.75 The treaty gave major concessions to the Byzantines, Rhodes, Venice, Genoa, Chios, and Naxos, but among the lands that were promised to the various powers, Gallipoli was not included. The most important city that Süleyman relinquished was Salonica, and he also promised that his ships would not enter or leave the Dardanelles without the approval of the Byzantine emperor and the Christian league. The league included the Christian powers of Romania (former Byzantine territories under Latin rule), the Knights of Rhodes, Venice, Genoa with Chios, and the duke of Naxos. He promised to provide galleys and sailors to aid Istanbul against Timur. Pietro Zeno who represented Venice during the negotiations recorded that “Evrenos Bey and others were greatly displeased at the concessions made to the empire.”76 Land opposite Eğriboz (Negroponte) had been promised to the Venetians who ruled the island. Zeno recorded that “In Gallipoli we learned that many Turks dwelt along Negroponte and did not wish to give up any of their land, and the Greeks there supported them. By bribery I was able to obtain five miles inland on the mainland opposite Negroponte, for which I promised the Turks two thousand ducats.”77 This statement by Zeno indicates

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that not merely the Turks who had settled in the area near Eğriboz but the Byzantines who lived there preferred Ottoman to Venetian rule. Süleyman made many offers and signed treaties; however, when he lacked support by the great Ottoman border lords, such as Evrenos Bey, or by the local inhabitants, Turkish or Byzantine, he found it difficult to fulfill the terms of the treaty. Due to the volatile situation in Ottoman lands both in Rumeli and in Anatolia, subsequent treaties were necessary to clarify terms. Another treaty between Venice and Süleyman was signed in 1409, which was confirmed by his brother Musa in 1411.78 After Timur left Anatolia in 1403, the conflict between the brothers for rule of all the Ottoman lands truly commenced; thus, in 1404 Süleyman crossed the straits to Anatolia to attempt to regain his control of Ottoman territory. During the period of chaos in Anatolia as Timur’s forces devastated Ottoman lands, Süleyman retained most of Bayezid’s army and administration in Rumeli, including apparently, Saruca Pasha.79 Although the Ottomans retained Gallipoli, they had lost control of the straits leaving Süleyman dependent on the Byzantines and the other Christian powers for crossing them.80 This condition was extremely unpopular with the uc begleri (border lords) and with the akinci (raiders) as indicated in Zeno’s comments concerning Evrenos Bey.81 Arranging to cross the straits was a major concern for the rival princes. When one of Bayezid’s sons, Isa Bey, crossed from Gallipoli to Karası in the spring of 1403,82 Süleyman aimed to allow Isa and Mehmed to fight in order to eliminate one of the contenders, and then he could regain Anatolia more easily. Isa was eliminated by September of 1403 and Süleyman then crossed the straits, captured Bursa, and the following years Mehmed and Süleyman fought for control of Anatolia. Süleyman crossed to Anatolia by spring 1404 with a large army that was probably transported on Byzantine ships since Süleyman possessed only a few vessels. The Byzantines hoped that renewed conflict between the Ottoman princes would weaken the Ottomans and strengthen the Byzantine position.83 “As [Mehmed] was feasting in Bursa, news came that ‘your brother Emir Suleyman has gathered an endless (bi-hadd) army and is crossing the sea to this side.’”84 Crossing the straits is highlighted in this quote, without providing information concerning how the armies of the contenders were transported from Gallipoli to Anatolia. That Süleyman had some ships by 1407 is known from a Venetian document that indicates that he had gathered a fleet near Gallipoli and intended to use it to attack Selçuk (Theologo), Palatia, and Izmir, cities that had belonged to the beylik of Aydın. Süleyman planned to repair the fortress at Izmir that Timur had destroyed.85 Because Süleyman was preoccupied with affairs in Anatolia, he mainly refrained from military activities against Christians in the Balkans, which increased the dissatisfaction of the powerful uc beys as well as more generally of the akıncı based in the Balkans. Another brother, Musa, favored a more confrontational approach to relations with Christian polities in the Balkans and gained the support of many Ottoman groups there. Conflict between Musa and Süleyman soon centered on Gallipoli. Musa captured Saruca Pasha, who after the death of Bayezid had become a follower of Süleyman, in February 1410 at Diampolis (Yambol in Bulgaria). With control of Saruca, Musa entered Edirne and then captured Gallipoli, where he killed Saruca, after which he wrote to Süleyman’s other administrators to encourage them to recognize his rule. This

 Gallipoli 49 policy was effective and Musa quickly seized Rumeli from Süleyman and occupied Gallipoli, where the small Ottoman navy was located, which effectively prevented Süleyman from crossing the straits at the port.86 Süleyman had to eliminate the threat of Musa and his first step was to pay a Genoese nobleman, Salagruzo de Negro, to build a fortress at Lampsakos across from Gallipoli. If Süleyman had hoped to secure the straits by means of this fortress, he failed as Musa had already captured Gallipoli and Süleyman was forced to cross the straits near Istanbul on Byzantine ships. Manuel II had also tried to interest Venice in operations against the Ottomans in the straits in January 1410, but they had refused unless he obtained help from other local powers first.87 A report from Ragusa (Dubrovnik), written May 30, 1410, indicates that the Byzantines may have briefly regained control of Gallipoli. Now a certain ship captain sailing near those coasts . . . reported to us that an ambassador of lord Mirchxe [Mircea] disembarked at Avlona from Constantinople on the 15th, saying that the emperor of Constantinople captured Gallipoli with its fortifications, with the exception of the citadel, and surrounded [the city] by land as well as by sea with eight ships, and that a truce has been declared, and [the city] is thought to have been secured. And that Celopia [Suleyman] has appeared with many men on the coast and has been diverted, asking the emperor and the Genoese to ferry him across, which was honorably denied to him, and has had to go back on account of the trouble of his brother Crespia [Kyritzes, i.e. Mehmed]. Avarnas [Evrenos] and six barons of Celopia [Suleyman] who had come to the Gallipoli area plotting [lit. “murmuring”] were captured by Musacelopia [Musa Çelebi].88

No other source mentions this incident and, if the Byzantines briefly regained control of Gallipoli, their possession was short. Cities where the fortress was not captured could easily be retaken from the citadel as was probably the case here if the Byzantines did capture the city. The fortunes of individual princes waxed and waned dramatically during the years of the interregnum, and Gallipoli remained key to the plans of all the contenders. In mid-June 1410, Manuel provided transport for Süleyman’s army to cross at Istanbul and helped him at the Battle of Kosmidion (just outside the land walls of Istanbul) against Musa. The conditions both at the Dardanelles and at the Bosporus remained complex during these conflicts.89 At times Manuel and other local rulers supported one or the other of the princes as they all attempted to weaken Ottoman power and increase their own against their Orthodox Christian rivals.90 Fighting between Süleyman and Musa continued in the Balkans until Süleyman lost supporters and was killed by Musa’s men on February 17, 1411, while he was fleeing toward Istanbul. With Musa then in control of the Balkans the Venetians again considered trying to occupy Gallipoli.91 Musa soon became unpopular with Ottoman lords and Balkan princes alike. In the spring of 1412, Manuel II assisted Mehmed to cross the Bosporus after reaching an agreement with Mehmed that he would maintain peace with the Byzantines if he succeeded in defeating Musa.92 In the first clash with Musa,

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Mehmed was defeated and fled back to Istanbul, where Manuel arranged to have him transported across the Bosporus and Mehmed returned to Bursa. Later in 1412 with Manuel’s help Mehmed crossed the Bosporus again, but weather prevented a successful campaign.93 In 1413 with a growing number of supporters, Mehmed prepared to attack Musa again, with Manuel transporting his army from Yalova (on the eastern coast of the Sea of Marmara) to Istanbul. Mehmed led his troops from Istanbul into Bulgaria, where he defeated Musa’s army, and Musa was captured and killed by Mehmed’s supporters. Finally, Mehmed reunited the Ottoman territories.94 The final years of the interregnum had seen Mehmed crossing the straits at Istanbul presumably because crossing at Gallipoli was impossible. Without the support of Manuel, who helped him cross the straits, Mehmed would have been unable to defeat Musa in the Balkans. Even with Mehmed reigning over all Ottoman lands, Gallipoli retained its great importance.

Mehmed I’s Reign Although Mehmed became the sole ruler of Ottoman territories in 1413 after defeating Musa, dynastic strife continued as well as many challenges to his rule while both Latins and Byzantines attempted to conclude agreements with him. The treaty concluded between Mehmed I and Manuel in 1413 closely resembled the Treaty of Gallipoli of 1403. Mehmed relinquished “all the fortresses along the Black Sea, the villages and fortresses of Thessaly, and everything along the Sea of Marmara.”95 But Mehmed retained control of Gallipoli and again created a naval base at the port. In June 1414, after a Turkish fleet raided Eğriboz and landed troops on the mainland opposite the island, the Venetians issued orders to protect their possessions and those of their vassals from Turkish raids. In 1415 the Captain of the Gulf was ordered to protect the Aegean by cruising with his galleys. Most of the danger appears to have been from Mehmed’s fleet at Gallipoli and not merely from pirate ships.96 Although Manuel had assisted Mehmed against Musa, once Mehmed was the victor Manuel attempted to undermine his rule by releasing Süleyman’s son. Mustafa, a probable son of Bayezid, who Mehmed’s supporters claimed was an imposter, was also a source of potential rivalry to Mehmed.97 In 1415 Mehmed campaigned along the Aegean coast, where he besieged Izmir and destroyed the citadel and the harbor tower that the Knights of St. John of Rhodes were constructing.98 Mehmed’s navy also increased in numbers and effectiveness. In January 1416 Ottoman raiders captured 1,500 prisoners on Eğriboz, and these attacks provoked the Byzantines as well as the Venetians. In April 1416 the Venetians sent both an ambassador, Dolfin Venier, to negotiate a treaty with Mehmed and a small fleet under the command of Pietro Loredan, both headed to Gallipoli. Venier failed in negotiating a peace, but Loredan defeated the Ottoman navy. Loredan arrived at Gallipoli and perhaps as the result of a misunderstanding a battle ensued between the Venetian fleet and the Ottoman fleet. Doukas’s colorful account of the battle is instructive.99 Mehmed returned to the West after establishing order in the East. When he came to Gallipoli, he fitted out a naval force against the duke of Naxos. . . . A fleet of

 Gallipoli 51 thirty triremes and biremes set sail from Gallipoli under Admiral Cali Beg. The Turks took captive many of the inhabitants of the islands of Andros, Paros and Melos; after inflicting great damage, the fleet returned home. When the Venetians learned what had happened, they were determined to retaliate. . . . When spring arrived, they fitted out ten triremes to patrol the Adriatic Sea, Euboea, Crete, and the Cyclades islands. Seven of the triremes, arriving at Tenedos, decided to engage the enemy by sailing into the Hellespont and crossing to Lampsakos. The Turkish triremes were standing in the harbor of Gallipoli ready to move out. Spying a small sailing vessel coming from Constantinople, the Venetians, who thought it was a Turkish ship, sent one of their triremes to seize it. The Turks observed this action and, assuming that the pursued ship was one of theirs, dispatched one of their own triremes to defend it. . . . When the Venetians saw the Turkish triremes moving out like the links of a chain, strung out, they bore down upon them, and sounding the attack joined battle. Ramming first the trireme of Admiral Cali Beg, they hacked him to pieces and slaughtered mercilessly everyone on board. Then they boarded one trireme after the other, overpowering all the ships, and proceeded to cut down the Turks before the eyes of their wives and children who were watching the battle taking place about a mile from the shore of Gallipoli.100

These incidents from 1416 indicate that the Ottomans had rebuilt their fleet, which was effective for patrolling the Dardanelles and raiding in the Aegean. While the Venetians had not succeeded in signing a treaty with Mehmed, they still attempted to do so, but they were also determined to protect their own and their vassals’ possessions from raiding by Ottoman naval forces. A small Venetian squadron appeared in the straits to prevent the Ottoman fleet from emerging, but they did not intend to begin a battle with the somewhat larger Ottoman fleet. But when the chance arrival of a ship led to confusion about who owned it, the Venetian attack was devastatingly effective against an incompetently led Ottoman fleet. The Venetians knew how to engage the enemy in sea battles; thus, they quickly killed the Ottoman admiral and his crew; then they rapidly captured the remaining ships. According to Doukas account, the Venetian victory was complete. Assessing the effectiveness of Mehmed’s fleet, one must conclude that although the fleet could raid successfully, when it came to actual naval battles, the more experienced Venetian commander was able to defeat the larger Ottoman force with his smaller fleet. While the destruction of his fleet must have been a blow to Mehmed, he also had to contend with a revolt by his subjects as well as planned attacks from regional rivals. The final years of Mehmed’s reign were characterized by continuing low-level hostilities with Venice in the Aegean. In 1417 the Venetians again sent Loredan to patrol the seas from Eğriboz to Gallipoli and to seize Ottoman ships if they ventured out of the Dardanelles. Salonica was under siege and the Byzantines tried to interest the Venetians in joining a naval league with the Knights of St. John, the Genoese of Chios and Lesbos, and themselves against the Ottomans. The Venetians were not tempted as they had already protected their interests. But by September 1418 the Senate learned that the Ottomans were engaged in major naval construction and sent fifteen galleys to

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protect Eğriboz and the Aegean.101 When the Ottomans attacked Albania, the Venetians sent a ship to protect the Adriatic Sea but there are no reports of Ottoman ships in the Adriatic, although the Ottomans gained control of substantial territory in Albania by advancing overland. When Mehmed died in 1421, he was succeeded by his seventeenyear-old son, Murad II, and Gallipoli again became the center of negotiations.102

Murad II Although Mehmed and his viziers had tried to prevent succession disputes at the death of Mehmed I, they were unsuccessful because there were several rivals for Murad II to contend against, including his brothers and his uncle Mustafa. Mehmed died at Edirne and his death was kept secret until Murad could arrive from Amasya (city in northern Turkey). When Murad approached Bursa then he directed the vizier Bayezid to transport Mehmed’s body to that city for burial. They crossed with Mehmed’s body at Gallipoli, and Mehmed was buried and Murad was proclaimed sultan at Bursa.103 If anything, Gallipoli became even more important in the years 1421–2, when Murad struggled to defeat his uncle, Mustafa, than it had been during the interregnum. Manuel had placed Mehmed’s brother, Mustafa, and Cuneyd of Aydın, in captivity on Lemnos with his Gattilusio relatives, and at Mehmed’s death he decided to send them to Gallipoli, after Mustafa promised to give Gallipoli to Manuel as well as the coast of the Black Sea in Bulgaria, Mount Athos, some of Thessaly and some fortresses. Manuel put Demetrios Leontarios in charge of a fleet of ten galleys to transport Mustafa and Cuneyd to Gallipoli, where they arrived August 15, 1421. They landed with a Byzantine force and the garrison troops were unable to defend the port but fled; thus, the population welcomed Mustafa as sultan; however, the fortress remained in the hands of Murad’s supporters.104 According to Doukas, Manuel justified this action because Murad had failed to send two of his younger brothers to Istanbul to remain under Manuel’s protection. Murad II learned of Mustafa’s actions while he was mourning Mehmed I at Bursa and quickly sent his vizier Bayezid, who gathered troops in the Balkans and met Mustafa in battle near Edirne. Before the battle Bayezid encouraged the troops by proclaiming: He [Mustafa] delivers to the Romans [Byzantines] the best lands before he has conquered them—lands acquired by our ruler’s [Murad II] ancestors with much sweat and toil. Are you not aware that Gallipoli and its straits are the key to both East and West, the Aegean Sea and the Black Sea? If the Romans are given control over them, rest assured that no longer will the Turks transport Roman captives across the straits to the East, but the Romans will take many Turks captive.105

A battle ensued between the supporters of Murad II led by Bayezid Pasha, and the supporters of Mustafa, including Byzantine forces. When Bayezid Pasha’s troops deserted him, he was defeated in battle and beheaded, but this was merely the beginning of the fight between Murad II and his putative uncle, Mustafa. It is clear from Doukas’s

 Gallipoli 53 account that the price of Byzantine assistance for an Ottoman prince in succession struggles for the throne during the fifteenth century was the key port of Gallipoli. This continued a pattern established earlier during the succession battles after the death of Bayezid I in 1402. Here a Byzantine historian placed these words into the mouth of an Ottoman vizier, but they reflect what would have been the reality for both Byzantines and Ottomans: possession of Gallipoli changed the power relations between the two groups. With Gallipoli the Ottomans could be the ones taking the captives, but without the port the Byzantines might gain the upper hand. Whether from the genuine Ottoman perspective or from the Byzantine perspective, but expressed by an Ottoman official, possession of Gallipoli in the first half of the fifteenth century was the key to their relationship. When the news of Bayezid’s defeat reached Gallipoli, the fortress surrendered, but according to Doukas, the inhabitants of Gallipoli objected to being placed under Byzantine rule; thus, Cuneyd refused to surrender Gallipoli to Demetrios. As for Mustafa he said: O esteemed friend of my protector, I know full well the promises sworn by me before God and His Prophet and that among them was the surrender of the fortress of Gallipoli. Rightfully, I must answer on that fearful day of judgment if I renounce the agreement. As for the fortress, however, it is better to transgress an oath than to contend with God by delivering the pious into the hands of the impious, by making a free people slaves, and by putting the nation which is consecrated to God into the hands of the infidels who do not know the One God of heaven and earth. . . . As for surrendering this city, that is, Gallipoli, the Muslim throat that gulps down every Christian nation, that chokes and destroys the Christians, never could such an absurdity enter my mind nor could I ever bring such an action to fulfillment.106

According to Doukas, Mustafa was willing to risk displeasing God by not fulfilling his oath rather than lose control of Gallipoli. Also, Doukas’s characterization of a “Muslim throat that gulps down every Christian nation” seems unlikely to have originated with Mustafa. Murad and Manuel exchanged ambassadors attempting to reach an agreement, but Murad refused to promise that he would relinquish Gallipoli and his brothers into Manuel’s control; thus, Manuel refused to assist Murad. But Murad had other options, and Doukas knew this well as he worked for Giovanni Adorno, the Genoese podestà and alum concession holder of New Foça (Phokaia), by writing letters to Murad offering to transport him across the straits in Adorno’s galleys and warships. Murad accepted sending 50,000 gold coins to pay to prepare a fleet. When Cuneyd and Mustafa learned of this fleet, they decided to attack Murad first; thus, they crossed from Gallipoli to Lampsakos, but Cuneyd deserted Mustafa, who fled back across the straits to Gallipoli. When Murad sent to Adorno to come immediately, Adorno arrived with the ships at the moment that Murad arrived on the shore. Mustafa, who saw them approach, attempted to bribe Adorno, but Murad had no fear of Adorno deserting him. When Mustafa’s troops prevented them from entering the harbor, they disembarked outside

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the city, and Adorno’s troops led the attack that allowed Murad’s forces to capture Gallipoli and the fortress. Then Murad proceeded to Edirne, where he held a banquet for Adorno and his captains; then he gave Adorno the customs duties of New Foça and rewarded all the ship captains.107 Adorno’s offer and Murad’s acceptance reveal how closely connected were all the rival groups in the territories that were to become the Ottoman Empire. Religious differences existed but religious solidarity was not the main motivating factor in relationships among Latins, Byzantines, and Ottomans during this period. While Doukas criticized Adorno’s actions, Doukas wrote the letters; thus, his actions were crucial to the success of this initiative. Adorno was motivated to assist Murad because he needed to have a debt to the Ottomans forgiven and because of conflict he had been unable to sell alum in western Europe. Murad needed ships because whoever controlled Gallipoli also controlled the Ottoman fleet, such as it was in 1421 after the loss of the fleet in 1416. Loyalties in this region were based on personal interest and were fluid. Manuel II supported one Ottoman prince after another depending on how he could weaken the strongest. Ottoman princes frequently spent years in Istanbul or in the case of Mustafa with Manuel’s Gattilusio relatives on Lemnos.

Murad II: 1422 Murad immediately decided to attack Istanbul in retaliation for the actions of Manuel in releasing Mustafa and transporting him to Gallipoli. He sent one army under the frontier lord Mihaloğlu to attack Istanbul and another under the frontier lord Evrenosoğlu Barak to besiege Salonica. The siege of Istanbul was brief because Murad had to contend with his brother Mustafa, who Manuel assisted to rule in Iznik from October 1422 until January 1423. The siege of Salonica continued for eight years before Murad finally succeeded in conquering the city. When the Byzantine ruler of Salonica, despot Andronicus Palaiologos, decided he could no longer defend Salonica, he offered the city to Venice, which accepted the responsibility in September 1423 to protect the city and to provision it by sea. Venetian sea power allowed them to resist the Ottomans more effectively. In 1424 the Venetian Senate instructed Admiral Pietro Loredan to negotiate with Murad but also to attack Ottoman ships between Gallipoli and Bozcaada (Tenedos) if the negotiations were unsuccessful. This policy was meant to impress the governor of Gallipoli that if the Ottomans abandoned the siege of Salonica then the Venetians would cease attacking ships in the Dardanelles.108 Murad moved to reconquer Aydın and Menteşe to regain control of the Aegean coast, which brought him into conflict with Cuneyd once again, who resisted the Ottoman advance at the coastal fortress of Ipsili (Doğanbey). Cuneyd turned to Venice for assistance, but the Venetians remained committed to their attack on Ottoman ships in the Dardanelles. Cuneyd offered to pay 1,000 ducats each for four or five galleys to transport him to Salonica, after which he appears to have planned to seize Gallipoli, since he offered the Venetians half of the customs-revenues of Gallipoli and the shore between Gallipoli and Salonica. He also possessed the son of Mustafa, another contender for the Ottoman throne as a threat to Murad. The Ottoman siege of Ipsili

 Gallipoli 55 by Hamza, brother of the vizier Bayezid, stalled due to lack of naval support since the Ottoman fleet was blockaded in the straits. Hamza requested help from the current Genoese governor of New Foça, Pallavicini, who sent three ships from Chios. The Venetians then sent their fleet to counter the Genoese ships, but Hamza had already lured Cuneyd and his family to their deaths in revenge for his brother, Bayezid. Soon after the Ottomans also conquered Menteşe and restored their rule to all the western coast of Anatolia.109 In 1425 Venice made an alliance with Hungary in which they promised to assist a Hungarian invasion of Ottoman territories by disrupting Ottoman communications at the straits.110 This indicates that Ottoman naval weakness made this seem a viable option and control of the straits was key to Ottoman military effectiveness and thus survival. The Ottomans continued to besiege Venetian-ruled Salonica and, after they had conquered Wallachia and Serbia, the possibility of Hungarian intervention diminished. The Venetians were forced to defend Salonica and provide food by sea. The Venetian Captain-General of the Sea, Andrea Mocenigo, was ordered to attack Ottoman ships both inside and outside the straits and also Murad’s Genoese allies if they had attacked Venetian ships.111 By 1427 the Venetians hoped to conclude a peace with Murad after Mocenigo had negotiated a draft treaty with Saruca, the governor of Gallipoli.112 As governor of Gallipoli, Saruca sought to end the Venetian blockade of the straits. In the preliminary treaty he stated: “These are the clauses which I, Saruca, governor of Gallipoli, have made and concluded at the command of my lord, Murad Bey, with the magnificent and powerful man, Andrea Mocenigo, Captain-General of the Sea.”113 This was negotiated in November 1426 but Murad still had not ratified it in April 1428 when the Venetian Senate learned that Murad had dispatched a war fleet into the Aegean that had evaded the Venetian blockade. This fleet does not seem to have damaged Venetian possessions, but the harm the fleet could possibly inflict concerned Venice because funding more ships to counter it was expensive. The Venetians desired to make peace, but Murad could accept an ongoing war with Venice as Venetian power did not impede his conquests on land and his fleet at Gallipoli was powerful enough to keep the straits open.114 By 1428, the Ottoman war with Venice included attacks in Albania, but the primary focus was on Salonica and the Venetian blockade of the straits. In May 1429, when the Venetians learned that Murad was attacking Salonica with a large army, they responded by ordering their admirals in the vicinity to prevent Ottoman ships from transporting men from Anatolia to the Balkans. The Ottoman blockade of Salonica continued through the end of 1429. In 1430 the Venetians planned not merely to attack Ottoman ships in the straits but also to destroy Gallipoli.115 The Venetians also considered sabotage in February 1430 as they contemplated an offer to burn Ottoman buildings at Gallipoli when the Venetian fleet arrived. The Venetians continued the blockade of Gallipoli in 1430, and the Senate sent approximately eight galleys and two round ships with the Captain-General, who was told to destroy the fort at Gallipoli. Despite the blockade Murad conquered Salonica on March 29, 1430, and Venice continued to blockade the straits until a peace treaty was signed on September 7, 1430.116

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Conclusion The straits at Gallipoli remained of great importance during Murad II’s reign but with increased Ottoman control of the Bosporus, when Murad needed to cross from Anatolia to the Balkans, he had another option. This is displayed in the events that occurred in 1444 during the crusade of Varna when crusading forces blocked the crossing at the Dardanelles, but Murad succeeded in crossing the Bosporus. The origin of the crusade began with events in 1442 when the Venetians learned of a naval attack on the Byzantine island of Limni (Lemnos). In September of 1442 a fleet of sixty light galleys left the Dardanelles and attacked Lemnos, although this attack was unsuccessful. The pope agreed to assist the Byzantines since the act of Union had been accepted by the Byzantine emperor at the Council of Florence. The Venetians were expected to provide the ships for this fleet, for they hoped that if the Ottomans were defeated that they would have safe passage through the straits and perhaps gain Gallipoli. Thus in 1443 a fleet was prepared at Venice with ten galleys being built there for the papal squadron and ten galleys for the Duke of Burgundy. In 1444 the ships were completed, Alvise Loredan was captain of the Venetian galleys, and they proceeded to the Dardanelles with the papal galleys where they were to join with the Burgundian ships when they arrived. In August when the fleet assembled the plan was for it to prevent Murad II from crossing from Anatolia, where he had gone to respond to an attack by Karaman (Turkish beylik in south central Anatolia). Murad, who had negotiated peace treaties with Karaman and Hungary, believed that he could abdicate the throne as his realm seemed secure and he wished to retire to Manisa (near Izmir). When he received news that a crusader army was attacking, he agreed to return to rule rather than leave his young son Mehmed to face this threat. Murad needed to cross the straits with his Anatolian troops to attack the crusaders, but the Dardanelles were blockaded by the papal, Venetian, and some Burgundian ships. Murad gathered a large army and decided to cross at the Bosporus, where there were only a few ships as compared to the twenty in the Dardanelles. The Ottomans lacked the necessary ships for the crossing but due to Murad’s agreements with the Genoese they supplied thirty ships to the Ottomans at Anadolu Hisarı, the fortress on the Asian shore of the Bosporus that Bayezid I had built in 1394. Halil, the grand vizier, arrived on the European shore opposite with 7,000 or 8,000 men and bombarded the galleys that were blocking the Ottoman crossing. When Murad arrived on October 16, he cast cannon on the shore and the next day his cannon began bombarding the fleet, while Murad and his army crossed on Genoese ships under the protection of the bombardment. De Wavrin, who commanded the Burgundian galleys, left a vivid account of the response to the news of the sultan’s plan to cross the Bosporus and then the crossing. When the Lord of Wavrin and the captain of the Hungarian galleys heard this news, they inspected the straits, from Constantinople up to the Black Sea, with all their ships, to work out what they could to do prevent the Turk from crossing. They noticed that the sea there was so narrow that a culverin could fire from one side to the other, that is from Turkey to Greece or from Greece to Turkey, and that

 Gallipoli 57 by day the Turks were discharging cannon whose shots passed over the galleys. Taking all this into consideration, they jointly came to the conclusion that if the Turk came to the Turkish shore in force and his captain Chailly the Pasha was on the opposite side, with all his cannon and artillery, it would be impossible either to stand firm in the strait or to block his passage. Our men soon noticed that the Turks were boarding the boats which they had received from the Genoese. . . . during the night many Turks were able to board the boats upstream, which carried them to the Greek shore. . . . So the Turks crossed in two days and two nights, something which they could not have done in a fortnight if the galleys had been able to go upstream against the current. . . . In truth, it is impossible for galleys to guard the straits unless they control one of the two shores.117

When Murad and his army succeeded in crossing from Anatolia and then combined with the Ottoman forces in the Balkans, the Ottomans defeated the crusader army at Varna (a city in Bulgaria on the Black Sea) on November 10, 1444. The crusaders still retained their fleet, but when Venice made peace with the Ottomans then it was no longer possible to block the straits. Murad II died on February 3, 1451, and when his son Mehmed II came to the throne the Ottomans moved to control the Bosporus with the conquest of Istanbul. The events of 1444 merely confirmed the importance of Gallipoli for the Ottomans; for almost a century they had crossed the straits at Gallipoli. Their enemies understood this and therefore strongly guarded the Dardanelles to prevent this. The reason the crusaders failed was that by 1444 the Ottomans controlled the entire shores of the Bosporus except for Istanbul itself. They were able to position their troops on both shores and fire their cannon on the ships that attempted to prevent the troops crossing. The crusaders failed, but within ten years even this remote possibility of blocking the straits above Istanbul ended with the Ottoman conquest of the city giving them complete control of the Bosporus. Gallipoli’s importance declined, but it remained essential for Ottoman sea power until the end of the empire.

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3

The Conqueror’s Fleet Becoming Lord of the Two Seas

He [Mehmed II] also learned by diligent search and consideration of the history of kings who had had the greatest power, that operations by sea had the greatest chance of success and brought the most fame, and that it was on the sea that those kings had accomplished the greatest things. For this reason he decided to secure control of the sea for himself, because when land and sea are both under one control, they quickly bring that control to its highest pitch. Kritovoulos, History of Mehmed the Conqueror1 Kritovoulos of Imbros (Imroz, Gökçeada) was writing concerning events of the year 1459 when through his influence the island of Limni’s (Lemnos) inhabitants expelled the Italians who were occupying the island and submitted to Mehmed II. This operation was very cloak and dagger in nature. Kritovoulos spoke to the influential men of the island about surrendering the island to Mehmed, while later he arrived by night to orchestrate the coup. Accordingly they sent secretly, saying they wished to be freed from the burden of the Italians . . . Kritovoulos . . . also sent letters with all speed to the Despot Demetrius, telling him it was just the time for him to request the Sultan to grant him the islands of Imbros and Lemnos. [Kritovoulos] embarked the next day in a dispatch-boat and, evading the Italian scouting ships which were anchored or cruising around the island, he sailed across by night to Lemnos.2

This coup on Lemnos was in the context of Mehmed’s conquest of the Byzantine capital, Istanbul, in 1453. Control of nearby territories, especially islands near the Ottoman coast, was in a state of flux as a few Byzantine rulers held on to small territories, Latin rulers of various locations also attempted to retain possession of their families’ territories, and Mehmed realized that only with control of the seas near his new capital, could he feel secure in his current possessions and hope to continue Ottoman expansion east and west. Control of the seas was based on possession of coasts and islands that could serve as bases for naval forces. In these early years of Mehmed’s reign, when after the explosive conquest of Istanbul he appeared to be frittering away

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his time on insignificant places nobody had ever heard of, he was actually ensuring his possession of strategic locations that protected his first major conquest and that formed stepping-stones to the following ones. Lemnos, through the intervention of Kritovoulos, had been granted to Dorino Gattilusio, from a Genoese family based on Lesbos, in 1453, when he died it went to his son Domenico; then the island’s population revolted against his brother who was administering the island and it came under the administration of Hamza Bey of Gallipoli; then in 1457 a papal fleet captured the island. In 1459 Kritovoulos arranged for the Italian occupation to be replaced by the rule of Byzantine Despot Demetrius, brother of Constantine XI, last emperor of Byzantium, as a vassal under Ottoman rule. However, in 1464 the Venetians captured the island and it returned to Ottoman control in 1479, when a peace treaty ended a war between the Ottomans and the Venetians.3 In the years from 1453 to 1479, the islands of Lemnos and Imbros bounced around between Byzantines, Latins, and Ottomans as Mehmed competed with his rivals for this prime strategic territory. Mehmed II is known as the Conqueror because he conquered Constantinople and made it into his capital city, Istanbul. With the acquisition of this city, the natural capital of an empire that included territories in both the Balkans and Anatolia, naval power became even more of a necessity than it had been for his ancestors. Mehmed was certainly aware that in 1444 when his father, Murad II, was recalled from his retirement in Manisa that he had turned to the Genoese for assistance in crossing the Bosporus. The Ottomans had a fleet, but it remained an only moderately effective tool for imperial expansion. Mehmed realized that if he desired great power, he would need to “secure control of the sea for himself ” and that required making the navy of greater importance than it had been in the past. However, during Mehmed’s reign the navy was primarily used in amphibious operations, as a support for land campaigns. Mehmed himself spent almost no time aboard ships; he simply used them to gain access to land that he had to reach across water. Moreover, the men who he chose to lead his naval forces were rarely experts on naval warfare, while many of the men who manned the navy on lower levels were similarly not naval specialists either. Mehmed employed many admirals during his reign and several of them were replaced quickly for if they failed during a battle or campaign, they were dismissed whether the failure was due to their incompetence or not. The names of these eleven men who served as admiral are known: Baltaoğlu Süleyman Bey (dismissed 1453), Hamza Pasha, Has Yunus Pasha, Halim Ismail Bey, Zaganos Mehmed Pasha, Kazım Bey, Yakup Bey, Yavaşça Şahin Mehmed Pasha, Mahmud Pasha (executed 1474), Gedik Ahmed Pasha (executed 1483), and Mesih Ahmed Pasha (d. 1501), but for most of them we have relatively little information.4 However, for three of them, Mahmud Pasha, Gedik Ahmed Pasha, and Mesih Pasha, we possess some information about their background, their careers, and their naval service. These three men were also prominent in campaigns that attempted to conquer strategic locations that increased the power of the navy, because galley naval warfare required bases from which to supply the fleet. Mahmud Pasha was instrumental in gaining Eğriboz (Negroponte), Gedik Ahmed Pasha gained a foothold at Otranto on the Italian peninsula, and Mesih Pasha almost succeeded in conquering Rhodes. This chapter on Mehmed’s fleet presents an overview of how the fleet was instrumental in several important conquests, beginning with the most famous one of all, Istanbul. I

 The Conqueror’s Fleet 61 analyze topics related to the growth of Mehmed’s understanding of the importance of the navy and how to use it. Mehmed’s vision of the necessity of a navy greatly expanded, although his implementation of how to best employ it remained limited. He obtained naval success because of the size of his fleets, not necessarily because of the naval expertise of the men who led or manned them. His fleet could defeat the Ottomans’ longtime naval rival, Venice, because of its size, but not because of the ability to vanquish the Venetian fleet in major sea battles. It would not be until his son Bayezid II’s reign that a sultan would turn to naval experts to lead the empire’s fleet.5 By Mehmed II’s reign, more ample histories written by contemporaries are available on which to base a history of the navy. Although they are not without bias, their narratives provide the basis of this chapter since few documents survive from this period. Kritovoulos, whose quote began this chapter, wrote one of the main sources about the navy until the end of his history in 1467. As a man from an island, who became one of Mehmed’s governors of an island, Imbros, for almost ten years, he was more aware of the importance of naval matters than others who wrote about this period. He wrote in a knowledgeable manner about Mehmed’s creation of an Ottoman fleet. He was not an eyewitness of many of the events; however, he consulted with eyewitnesses and provided an account more from the Ottoman perspective than those written by Venetians, for example. While his account was not written in Turkish, one can still consider it as an Ottoman account since he wrote it for Mehmed himself. Thus, his perspective, that of a prominent Byzantine inhabitant of an island at the entrance to the Dardanelles, makes his account fascinating. In addition, he included far more information on naval matters than authors such as Tursun Beg, who also wrote a biography of Mehmed.6 The little we know about Kritovoulos aids in understanding his biography of Mehmed. His work dates from 1465 to 1467 and is an autograph of Kritovoulos and was unknown until 1859, when a German philologist discovered it at Topkapı Sarayı library. Kritovoulos belonged to the circle of Gerogios-Gannadios Scholarios, the first Greek Orthodox Patriarch under Ottoman rule. His family must have been among the leading notables on Imbros, and he was extremely well educated in traditional Byzantine learning. Kritovoulos probably left Imbros in 1466, when the Venetians conquered the island. His central theme was the transition of power from the Byzantines to the Ottomans. He followed Byzantine literary conventions in the Greek language he used and in his emulation of Thucydides. The campaign speeches given to Mehmed are adapted from Thucydides, but in such a way as to “convey Mehmed’s abilities as a soldier and strategist.” His use of subtexts adds to the meaning of his work as the reader presumably would connect his adaptations to their appearance in the writings of authors such as Thucydides, Arrianos on Alexander the Great, and Flavius Josephus.7 Kritovoulos’s account of the conquest of Istanbul provides the first insights into Mehmed’s naval vision as it developed from the beginning of his reign.

The Conquest of Istanbul Mehmed began his reign with the goal of completing what Bayezid I had begun more than fifty years earlier, making Istanbul into the Ottoman capital. Mehmed as a young

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prince had seen how the straits at Gallipoli were blockaded by a Venetian fleet with the assistance of ships of the pope and Burgundy. One way to counter this was to blockade Istanbul itself but from the Bosporus, not the Dardanelles. He built a new castle, Rumeli Hisarı, opposite to Anadolu Hisarı on the western shore of the Bosporus at its narrowest point where Murad II had crossed in 1444. Mehmed was determined to implement his plans quickly, so he instructed his viziers to help construct the fortress. Halil Çandarlı, Saruca, and Zaganos completed their sections by September 1452. The cannons in this fortress could sink ships that attempted to pass between Rumeli Hisarı and Anadolu Hisarı without the permission of the sultan. The first ship, Venetian, whose captain was Antonio Rizzo was sunk on November 26, 1452, when it refused to lower its sails.8 Kritovolous did thorough research and claimed to “use the utmost care to tell the truth.”9 The first part of his history of Mehmed covers from the beginning of his reign to the conquest of Constantinople. He emphasized the importance of the navy for the conquest of the city. The building of Rumeli Hisarı was intended to unite both continents and to establish that Mehmed controlled the passage between them. He stated “especially the Venetians, . . . often cruised in long triremes [galleys] through the Bosporus and the Hellespont [Dardanelles], preventing the crossing of these straits.”10 When the Byzantines objected to Mehmed building another fortress on the Bosporus, he replied that Italian ships had often caused the Ottomans difficulties in the time of Murad II. Mehmed stated that he considered these straits to be Ottoman waters and he intended to guard them. The concept of Ottomans owning a body of water and guarding it from others was newly expressed, at least in the words that Kritovoulos put in Mehmed’s mouth. Thus, in 1452 Mehmed sent thirty galleys armed for naval warfare and other ships to carry equipment and they sailed from Gallipoli to the Bosporus. The castle that he built had the thicker parts of the wall toward the sea, so that he could use his artillery to close the straits to shipping. With the construction of Rumeli Hisarı, he had taken the first step to placing the crossing under his control. He left a garrison and a trustworthy commander in the fortress.11 Mehmed knew the conquest of Istanbul would be difficult and that his forebearers had failed more than once to take Constantinople. Kritovoulos included a speech supposedly by Mehmed inciting his followers to attempt the conquest. Whether Mehmed actually said any of this is debatable, but Kritovoulos certainly expressed at the very least his own views on the conquest. He began with the earliest Ottoman history and stated that the Ottomans were held back from moving into the Balkans because “they were held in check by the sea, because the Romans [Byzantines] had control of it.”12 But once they had taken Gallipoli then the conquest of Europe was possible. But Istanbul remained a threat to Ottoman lands since it was located in their midst. “If these people hold the City and are hard pressed by us, they will secure some stronger alliance and will hold the seas that are rightfully ours, and we shall be constantly at war and in danger and put to ruinous expenses, and the result of the war will be uncertain.”13 While a remnant of the Byzantine Empire existed, a possibility remained that a force from western Europe, such as from Venice, would be sent to try to save it from the Ottomans. By building Rumeli Hisarı, Mehmed had isolated

 The Conqueror’s Fleet 63 Istanbul from support by sea, which had been the chief method of sending Western aid to the city. With the existence of this new fortress, Mehmed believed he had changed the circumstances that had impacted sieges of the city in the past. The Byzantine emperor Constantine XI quickly realized that this siege would be different because now the Ottomans had control of the seas both with fortresses and with a large fleet. In order to protect the city from attack from the Golden Horn, the Byzantines placed a huge chain across the harbor and stationed ships there. The boom (navigational barrier) had one end inside the walls of Istanbul and the other inside the walls of Pera.14 They then sent asking for help of all kinds, supplies, men, and ships. The Venetian Nicolo Barbaro included an interesting observation made by Constantine regarding the Venetian presence in Istanbul. Whether this reflects Constantine’s actual views, or rather that of Venetians such as Barbaro, who remained in the city to defend it, it exhibits a Venetian sense of ownership of Byzantine lands that were threatened by Ottoman expansion When it [the boom] had been stretched across the harbor there arose the question of making arrangements for the landward defences, and so all the nobles of Venice went to the Emperor. . . .The Most Serene Emperor answered kindly that Constantinople had come to belong more to the Venetians than to the Greeks, and because he wished the Venetians well, he was willing to give the four gates of the city with all their keys into their charge, and so he did, and four nobles of Venice held them.15

Barbaro clearly reflected Venetian attitudes and aims that Istanbul belonged to them, and inadvertently that Constantine resented their dominance. Mehmed knew that to conquer Istanbul from the Byzantines with their Venetian supporters who had significant sea power, he had to respond with different strategies than had been used in the past. Thus, he had to defeat not merely the Byzantines who lived and ruled there, but the Venetians who also desired the city, which they had once helped French crusaders to rule after the Fourth Crusade. Allowing the Venetians a major role in the defense of the city alienated the locals, who resented Venetian privileges. From the account by Kritovoulos we learn a great deal concerning the composition of Ottoman naval forces in 1453. Above all, he prepared the fleet, building some new triremes, repairing others that were damaged by time, and drying out and caulking those that leaked. In addition, he built long ships, heavily armed and swift, with thirty to fifty rowers, and he prepared and arranged everything else necessary for the equipment of these as quickly as possible, sparing nothing that would serve this end. Furthermore, he chose crews from all his coast-towns, Asiatic and European: rowers, overseers, pilots, and those who should serve on the decks, also captains and boatswains, trireme commanders, commanders of the sailing ships, and admirals, and the rest of the crews for the ships. He accomplished this with great care and speed, for he attached greater importance, for the siege and for fighting, to the fleet than to the army. He therefore gave more of his attention to it, and used

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From Kritovoulos’s description, it appears that Mehmed possessed some large galleys but also many light galleys. There was a great deal of equipment that the ships needed, and many also needed to be repaired. Fleets were expensive to maintain because without constant care ships would become useless. The composition of the men who provided the crews as depicted here is revealing. Mehmed knew that he was more likely to find men who were knowledgeable about maritime matters from the coastal areas of his possessions. By the time of the conquest, the Ottomans controlled a great deal of coastline, especially in the Aegean. While many of the inhabitants of these areas were “Greek,” Turkish lords had expanded to the Anatolian coasts in the early fourteenth century.17 It seems unlikely that he would have relied on Greeks whose loyalties to the Byzantine emperor might make their commitment to Mehmed suspect. However, some of the formerly Greek inhabitants of coastal areas might have changed their loyalties to the Ottomans due to dislike of the union with Rome.18 Whatever their ethnic background, Mehmed found along his coasts men who could man all aspects of ships, including oarsmen, sailors, pilots, captains, and even admirals. Although the seafaring abilities of his men were sometimes in question, their loyalty does not appear to have been. The fleet was prepared at Gallipoli and set out early in the spring under the command of Baltaoğlu, who was the sancak bey of Gallipoli and thus admiral of the Ottoman fleet. The fleet numbered 350 ships in addition to transport vessels, and its size dismayed the Byzantines because it made the chances of receiving reinforcements or supplies by sea unlikely. When the ships anchored along the shore of Istanbul, the Byzantine response was to anchor large galleons near the chain at the mouth of the harbor and place galleys around them to ensure that Mehmed’s ships could not enter the Golden Horn. The Venetians had merchant ships at Istanbul, and they were persuaded to remain to assist the Byzantines if Constantine paid them 400 ducats per month.19 Giovanni Longo Di Giustinianni, of Genoa, also arrived with two large galleons, including many men that he had recruited at Rhodes and Chios. According to Kritovoulos, it was rumored that he had been promised the island of Lemnos in exchange for his assistance.20 Kritovoulos’s assessment that Giustinianni came in hopes of obtaining Byzantine territory is indicative of the attitudes of some Byzantines that assistance from the Latins had a steep price attached. However, Giustinianni’s expertise in wall fighting proved invaluable during the siege. Mehmed II assigned his officials to various locations for the siege, including those men with naval responsibilities. Zaganos and his men and other captains were placed to besiege Galata, including the Golden Horn and the entire harbor. He was required to build a bridge across part of the Golden Horn so that the city could be attacked from that direction. Kritovoulos described the admiral, Baltaoğlu, as “a brave man, experienced in all sorts of maritime enterprises, and a skilled commander, who he appointed Admiral of the whole fleet, and of all the shore, both Asiatic and European. He was the governor of Gallipoli.”21 He blockaded the sea-wall with his ships, including the entrance to the Golden Horn. Daily he attacked the chain, since if the Ottoman

 The Conqueror’s Fleet 65 fleet entered the harbor, then Ottoman forces would be able to attack the wall that faced the Golden Horn that was not well defended. While the sultan was attacking the fortresses near Istanbul, Baltaoğlu, left most of his ships attacking the chain and sailed with the rest against Prinkipo Island (Büyükada) since Mehmed commanded this. It was a difficult siege, but he succeeded in finally capturing the fortress on the island, after which Baltaoğlu sailed back to the harbor where the galleys were stationed. He was ordered by Mehmed to prepare and then fight the galleons and galleys that were guarding the mouth of the harbor. Baltaoğlu prepared carefully and then attacked with great force. But the Byzantines were well prepared and after fighting and trying every tactic to enter the harbor the “crews of the galleons, fighting magnificently, turned the flank of the attackers and drove them off.”22 Since this attempt at breaking through failed, Mehmed instructed the artillery to fire in such a way that the stones fell straight down from a great height onto the center of the galleons. The defenders then moved the ships until they were out of range of the cannon.23 A few days later, April 20, three large galleons arrived at Istanbul that the pope had sent full of supplies while he prepared a fleet of thirty galleys to assist the Byzantines. Mehmed ordered Baltaoğlu to employ the entire fleet to capture these ships. According to Kritovoulos, he ordered them to “capture the galleons and bring them to him or else never to come back safe themselves.”24 Baltaoğlu assumed he would be successful, but because the galleons were higher, they had some advantages in the fighting. But the battle continued for two to three hours, and the men in the galleons believed they would lose through the numerical superiority of the Ottoman fleet. Just when an Ottoman victory seemed assured a south wind arose, and it quickly allowed the galleons to flee and reach the galleons at the entrance of the harbor. Mehmed, who was riding a horse on the shore and watching the battle, was furious that the galleons had escaped. He accused Baltaoğlu of cowardice, but since he had been wounded in the eye with a stone, he escaped execution, but he was relieved of his command immediately and Hamza, the son of the Ottoman admiral at the time of Piero Loredan, was given the governorship of Gallipoli and the position of admiral of the fleet. Piero Loredan had led the Venetian fleet that defeated Çali Beg at the Battle of Gallipoli in 1416. Mehmed feared that this failure to capture the galleons would appear to be an omen against Ottoman success regarding the entire attempt on Istanbul. According to Tursun Beg, “After this naval defeat the Muslims were distressed and lost hope.” Clearly, something had to be done to reestablish Ottoman morale.25 The effectiveness of the fleet during the beginning of the siege confirms certain aspects of Ottoman naval power. The Ottomans constructed large fleets, but the admirals possessed more expertise in land rather than naval warfare and, thus, understanding the various possibilities that might arise during a battle and compensating for that in strategy was often beyond their abilities. Perhaps if Baltaoğlu had been more experienced, he would have had contingency plans for what to do if a wind from any direction allowed the galleons to more away from the galleys. As was often the case during the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, the Turkish naval forces could lose naval battles, but still win the war.

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Moving the Fleet into the Golden Horn Mehmed knew he needed to gain access to the harbor and the Golden Horn for his own ships, but since naval attacks at the harbor had not succeeded, he devised a brilliant plan. He ordered the commanders of the ships to construct a glide way from the Bosporus to the Golden Horn, whose length was approximately 1.5 kilometers. The main problem was not the length but the steepness of the shores in question. He brought up the ships and placed large cradles under them, with stays against each of their sides to hold them up. And having under-girded them well with ropes, he fastened long cables to the corners and gave them to the soldiers to drag, some of them by hand, and others by certain machines and capstans. So the ships were dragged along very swiftly. And their crews, as they followed them, rejoiced at the event and boasted of it. Then they manned the ships on the land as if they were on the sea . . . The ships, borne along over the land as if on the sea, were some of them being pulled up the ascent to the top of the hill while others were being hauled down the slope into the harbor, lowering the sails with shouting and great noise. It was a strange spectacle . . . the sight of ships borne along on the mainland as if sailing on the sea, with their crews and their sails and all their equipment.26

Mehmed was able to assemble a fleet of sixty-seven ships in the Golden Horn, which had a great impact on the siege, for the Byzantines then had to man the unguarded wall along the Golden Horn. Also, with the threat of the fleet, men on the walls and on the Venetian ships had to “stand to our arms both day and night in great fear of the Turks.”27 The Byzantines lacked enough men to man all the walls sufficiently. Also, the ships in the harbor now had to fear attacks by the Ottoman fleet in the Golden Horn. The response by Giustinianni was to move a galleon and three galleys to the end of the Golden Horn, where the Ottoman fleet was anchored to prevent the Ottoman ships from being able to attack the harbor and shipping. Mehmed responded by transferring cannon into the Golden Horn to fire on these ships and they sank one of the galleys. After this, there were daily encounters between the ships in the Golden Horn and the Byzantine and Venetian ships at the mouth of the harbor firing on each other from long range.28 But Mehmed knew that the longer the siege continued, the more likely it would be that help would arrive especially by sea, for he had heard that a convoy of ships had arrived in Chios and he felt that he could wait no longer. He gathered all his forces, including all his naval leaders, and gave another speech to inspire his troops to succeed in the battle for Istanbul. Then he gave his orders for the assault, including to the naval leaders Hamza and Zaganos. You, then, Hamza, sail with your ships along the sea-walls, have some of the ships lie to within shooting range, and order the archers and those who have crossbows in their hands, and muskets, to fire from the decks against the battlements so continuously that no one may lean out at all, nor have a chance to attack in the

 The Conqueror’s Fleet 67 battle. And run some of the ships aground, if it seems advantageous, by the wall. Then have the men in charge bring out the ladders, and let the infantry try to scale the wall . . . And you yourself, Zaganos, cross the bridge quickly and attack the Golden Horn wall very vigorously. Take with you the ships inside the harbor, which are assigned to you for this purpose, and be a hero!29

All his officers fought vigorously, but particularly the admiral of the fleet, for Hamza had seen that failure by the admiral had devasting consequences for the individual concerned. Zaganos also used the ships inside the harbor to fire on the fortifications as they sailed by. It was a hard-fought battle, but when the leader of the defenders, Giustinianni, was wounded they placed him on one of the galleons and sailed away. Soon after this the first Ottoman troops entered the city. When Hamza saw that the city was being plundered, he sailed up to the chain, cut it, and entered the harbor, where he only found the Byzantine ships because the Venetian ships had fled. After Hamza sank some of the Byzantine ships, captured others, and ran them aground, he then entered the city with his marines. Thus, the naval forces entered the city through the shore gates and the whole naval force joined in plundering the city. This abandonment of the ships by their crews to join in the conquest of the city allowed the Venetian ships to escape.30 Barbaro said, “When we set sail for Constantinople, the whole of the Turkish fleet was unarmed and all the captains and crews had gone into the city to sack it. You can be sure that if their fleet had been in action, not a single vessel could have escaped.”31 This quote indicates that if the men who led the fleet had thought in naval terms, they would not have allowed the men to abandon the Ottoman ships to join in the plundering of the city. Barbaro who did think in naval terms realized this was an error on the part of the naval forces. Zaganos and his forces entered Galata after it surrendered to Mehmed and they harmed nothing, but the looting of Istanbul continued and some of the booty was placed on the ships. When Mehmed entered Istanbul one of his first acts was reviewing the harbor and arsenals. Mehmed already knew how favorably Istanbul was situated in terms of its access to the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea. He settled many of the captives he had taken along the shores of the city harbor since “they were sea-faring men.”32 The lesson that Mehmed learned in 1453 concerning his fleet was the value of simultaneous sea and land attacks on conquering territory that lay on the coast. While land forces initially entered Istanbul, they were only able to do so because the fleet had prepared the way. The fleet might have lost in most naval conflicts during the siege, but they were present in the straits, and they usually prevented assistance from reaching the besieged city. In the case of Istanbul, the defenders were few and divided and manning all the walls in adequate numbers proved to be impossible once the Ottoman fleet entered the Golden Horn. Another lesson Mehmed learned was if an expected tactic failed, such as attacking the boom, then try something radically different, transporting galleys overland. Also the fleet must be available for all campaigns to conquer coastal territories and those coastal locations were the basis of sea power. Mehmed set about conquering as many of them as possible as he also began to rebuild his prize, Istanbul, a fitting capital for his expanding empire.

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Postconquest Naval Policy Shortly after the conquest, Kritovoulos sent an embassy to Mehmed offering to give him the islands of Imbros, Lemnos, and Thasos located near the entrance to the Dardanelles and along the northern coast of the Aegean, which had been subject to the Byzantine ruler, but where the chief men had fled when they heard of the conquest of Istanbul. The people who remained on the islands were afraid that Mehmed’s fleet would attack them since the fleet had returned to Gallipoli. When Kritovoulos learned this, he sent an embassy to Hamza, governor of Gallipoli and admiral of the fleet, and made an agreement with him to not attack the islands. Then he sent another embassy to Mehmed through Hamza and they surrendered the islands to him. They promised to pay taxes if they could remain as they were on the islands. The islands were given to Palamede and Dorino Gattilusio of Ainos (Enoz) and Lesbos, respectively, who had requested them from Mehmed. Because of this action, the islands were not attacked, although they were threatened by the return of the fleet to Gallipoli.33 The episode of Imbros reveals that immediately after the conquest of Istanbul, the Aegean had entered a state of transition, which continued throughout Mehmed’s reign as he attempted to gain additional strategic locations such as islands and coastal ports. While Mehmed’s fleet was only moderately effective in sea battles against skilled Venetian fleets, his naval forces were adequate to promote his expansion into the Aegean to gain possession of islands and the remaining few enclaves of independent rulers on the Aegean coast. Thus, while the Gattilusio gained some islands to administer as vassals, they soon lost New Foça (Phocaea), a Genoese enclave, to Ottoman control after the conquest. This would not have been possible without a moderately effective navy.34 Mehmed certainly viewed the Aegean coast and the nearby islands as necessary Ottoman territory and moved to expand into these areas as soon as his new capital had been won. Mehmed made many changes in the personnel of government in the year after the conquest; among these Hamza was made Beylerbey of Anatolia and Yunus became governor of Gallipoli and the admiral of the fleet. Mehmed ordered him to prepare the fleet and to sail to Naxos and other islands near Rhodes, Paros, Rhenia, and Kos. Although some islands became vassals of Mehmed, other islands that did not, such as Rhodes, became havens for pirates who ravaged the coastlines of Mehmed’s empire. Thus, Mehmed sent his fleet against the islands that harbored individuals who preyed on Ottoman domains. Yunus equipped eighty galleys and many cargo ships and ships that carried cannon. After, he sailed from Gallipoli through the straits and arrived at Bozcaada (Tenedos), where he obtained water for his ships. More ships joined him there because they had been delayed in order to collect oarsmen from the coasts. He sailed into the Aegean by night, but a sudden storm sank some ships and scattered many of the others. Due to ships colliding with one another, Yunus’ flagship was almost sunk. Yunus arrived at Chios with only six ships, although later more surviving ships eventually reached the island. Then he sailed for Kos and raided the island but failed to conquer it. He filled his ships with booty and sailed for Foça (in this case New Foça), which belonged to Chios, which he captured and garrisoned. He sailed back to Gallipoli, but he had lost twenty-five ships in the storm, including

 The Conqueror’s Fleet 69 all the cargo ships. Mehmed was angry at his failure to protect the fleet and had him executed in 1457.35 The Aegean islands continued to be fiercely contested between the Ottomans and their naval rivals. In 1456, a dispute among the heirs of Palamede Gattilusio, one of whom, Dorino II, was lord of Ainos (Enoz), on the Aegean coast at the mouth of the Maritsa river, near Salonica, and who had also been given Imbros and Samothrace, led to Mehmed’s intervention and eventual takeover. One reason for this conquest is that Dorino II was accused of harboring pirates: “and, when an Ottoman village was subjected to one of the frequent attacks from the sea, he would absolve himself of any responsibility, saying: ‘These attackers are from corsair ships; we have no authority over them.’ ”36 Since Mehmed intended to protect his coasts, he began a campaign to conquer Ainos in January 1456 moving overland with an army in person and sending his fleet of ten galleys under Yunus from Gallipoli. When the inhabitants saw the fleet in their harbor and Mehmed and his land army nearby, even though Dorino was absent on Samothrace, they sent ambassadors to Mehmed to surrender the city. Thus Mehmed eliminated one Gattilusio enclave on his coast near the Dardanelles.37 This worked out very well for Kritovoulos because the Ottoman fleet under Yunus sailed to Imbros where Yunus “summoned Kritovoulos, and gave over to him the entire island and its fortresses to rule and to guard.”38 However, the Ottoman control of Lemnos and Imbros was brought to an end in 1457 when a papal fleet attacked the Aegean islands of Lemnos, Thasos, and Imbros. Lemnos surrendered immediately; Thasos held out for a short time and then surrendered. The papal admiral, Trevisan, sent ten galleys to Imbros and Kritovoulos negotiated with its leader, “Konto.” Kritovoulos is vague in his account, but essentially he surrendered the island to papal control, although he managed to avoid a papal garrison on the island. Thus, at the end of 1457 the Aegean islands remained fiercely contested between the Ottomans and their rivals.39 Naval power continued to be a guiding principle in Mehmed’s conquests, leading to the conquest for strategic reasons of the coastal cities of Epidaurus, Monemvasia, Patras, Vostitsa, and Corinth. Among Mehmed’s major offensives during this period, he attacked the Mora (Peloponnesus, Morea) in 1458, which resulted in the conquest of several cities on the coast. According to Kritovoulos, among the reasons for this expedition Mehmed was “afraid that this internal discord and fighting might bring the Italians, or some other western nation into the Peloponnesus, and he wanted to get hold of the region first, . . . and the country could well be used to launch an expedition . . . against Italy.” Also, the Mora had “safe harbors that could be bases for large armies and navies during the war.”40 Mehmed’s reasons were thus strategic; he needed to control this area before the weak Byzantine rulers were replaced by a more threatening enemy, the Venetians with their powerful navy. Also, he planned to cross the Adriatic and attack the Italian peninsula itself and control of this region was essential for those plans. He also viewed Athens before traveling to Eğriboz (Negroponte, Euboea), where he observed what would be necessary to conquer the island.41 Mehmed’s response to the papal incursion was to use his fleet to raid if conquest was not possible in order to convince the vassal rulers that paying their tribute and discouraging pirates that attacked the Ottomans were in their best interests. After Mehmed returned from the campaign to the Mora, he sent for Ismail, governor of

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Gallipoli and admiral of the fleet. He ordered him to attack Lesbos with a fleet of 150 ships as soon as possible. The Gattilusio rulers of Lesbos had quarreled with each other, submitted to the papal fleet, and stopped paying tribute and allowed pirate ships to use their harbors. These pirates attacked Mehmed’s coasts and shipping. These were ample reasons to attack Lesbos. Mehmed wanted to remove the Latin families that remained, for he feared the establishment of more effective Latin power in the Aegean and piracy was to be a long-standing problem in Ottoman waters due to the many islands, even after firm Ottoman control was established on the coasts and islands. Ismail attacked Lesbos and devastated the island, but failed to conquer the city Mitylene. But the papal squadron failed to protect the island and the people of Mitylene approached Mehmed to make peace and they paid their tribute.42 Many of Mehmed’s policies supported increasing the effectiveness of his naval forces. Gradually, Ottoman control of coastlines and islands increased, providing the ability to employ the fleet for new conquests in the future. By 1459 Mehmed was rebuilding and repopulating Istanbul so it could become a fitting capital for his empire. He began to build Topkapı palace, but he also began to construct many arsenals to shelter ships and their rigging. While Gallipoli remained the main Ottoman arsenal until Selim I’s reign, Mehmed began to create an arsenal at Istanbul. He also ordered galleys to be built not just in arsenals but all along his shores, “knowing that the domination of the sea was essential to him and his rule, especially for expeditions to far countries. For he knew that in his approaching undertakings naval operations would be of the first importance.”43 As noted at the beginning of the chapter, Mehmed also made use of individuals like Kritovoulos who engaged in negotiations that led to the surrender of territories without having to employ the fleet to raid them first. In addition, Mehmed sent Zaganos, now governor of Gallipoli and admiral of the fleet, to Thasos and Samothrace to obtain people to forcibly settle in Istanbul. People from these areas would presumably possess some maritime skills that could be usefully employed in Istanbul.44 In addition to ships, Mehmed needed to obtain men who could effectively use them. Mehmed led another expedition to the Mora conquering more territory, but some Venetian-controlled cities remained on the coast, including Koron and Modon. One of the Byzantine despots, Thomas, fled to the west; the other Demetrius became the sultan’s vassal relinquishing his territories in the Mora for rights in Imbros, Lemnos, Thasos, Samothrace, and Ainos. Demetrius thus gained control of strategic islands with their harbors, and the harbor Ainos near Salonica.45 By the end of the year 1460, Mehmed was ready to turn his attention to the east and to the Black Sea.

Expeditions to the Black Sea and the Aegean As Kritovoulos explained, when Mehmed gained control of the straits then he had total access to the Black Sea and its cities. In 1461, Mehmed planned to conquer two polities that prevented his control of the coast to the east of Istanbul and the straits. Two cities were important in these polities: Sinope belonged to the Isfendiyaroğlu, and Trebizond to the Byzantine Komnenos family. Preparations began with the fleet that

 The Conqueror’s Fleet 71 included 300 warships, including galleys, other oared ships, and transport ships for carrying cannon. The transport ships also carried all sorts of military equipment as well as many men. Mehmed appointed two admirals: Kasim, the governor of Gallipoli, and Yakub, “a man of great experience in naval warfare and a very fine admiral.”46 Instead of sailing from the Bosporus to Gallipoli, this fleet sailed into the Black Sea. Mehmed also gathered a large land army, but the march was difficult overland; thus, sending as many men as possible by sea made excellent sense. By the time Mehmed arrived marching overland, the fleet was already at Sinope attacking the harbors, which they then held, and encircling the city. The ruler Ismail surrendered and received other lands in compensation. Mehmed desired Sinope because in addition to being an important port on the Black Sea, it possessed copper mines. With the harbors of Sinope, Mehmed could next proceed to Trebizond.47 Trebizond was an even more important strategic prize than Sinope, because it was ruled independently by a powerful Byzantine family allied with Ottoman opponents in eastern Anatolia, the Akkoyunlu. Mehmed ordered Kasim and Yakub to sail with the fleet to Trebizond, seize the harbors, and invest the city by land and sea. The admirals sailed to Trebizond, anchored in the harbors, and attacked the city, which they entirely surrounded on land and with the fleet on the sea. They besieged the city for twenty-eight days before the grand vizier Mahmud Pasha arrived with the land army and Mehmed arrived a day later. Mahmud arranged the surrender and allowed the notables of the city to leave with their families and wealth by ship. The sultan chose his own captives and placed them on the galleys. He rewarded the admirals, captains, helmsmen, and overseers of the rowers and then ordered them to sail away, for the fleet had been responsible for the success of the expedition before the land army even arrived. However, Kasim, one of the admirals, was assigned to be governor of Trebizond instead of Gallipoli. The sultan then marched back to Istanbul being assisted by the fleet on the return journey. In Istanbul, Mehmed continued to improve the naval arsenals. Although there were no naval engagements on this expedition to the Black Sea, the fleet was essential to the successful outcome of the expedition, since it arrived more quickly and ensured that the sieges effectively prevented assistance reaching these cities by sea.48 The Aegean remained contested territory and a high priority for Mehmed’s strategic plans. In 1462, he again sent the fleet against an island in the Aegean, Lesbos, under the control of Niccolo Gattilusio, who neglected to pay the specified tribute to Mehmed. According to Kritovoulos, most importantly he tolerated pirate ships using the harbors of the island and attacking the coasts of Anatolia opposite Lesbos, the Gallipoli peninsula, and the coasts of Thrace. Despite Mehmed warning him that he must comply with his treaty obligations or he would face an Ottoman attack, Niccolo continued to expect aid from some Western sources. The expedition of 1462 was commanded on the sea by Grand Vizier Mahmud Pasha and on land by Mehmed. Mahmud sailed from Gallipoli with 200 ships and three days later arrived at Lesbos. Mehmed camped on the mainland opposite the island. When Mehmed had arranged everything for an attack, he and the army crossed from the mainland to the island. Mehmed embarked in a galley to be ferried to the island, one of the few times he traveled by sea. The galleys were armed to attack by sea from the harbor. At this point

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rather than fight, the people of the city surrendered. Mehmed spent four days on the island and then was ferried back to his camp on the mainland while Mahmud Pasha supervised the administration of the island. The admirals of the fleet took Niccolo Gattilusio and his family and people from the island to be settled in Istanbul and then sailed to Gallipoli and Istanbul and then disbanded the fleet. Lesbos was an important conquest because under the Gattilusio family it had possessed a navy, arsenal, and a great deal of influence during the late Byzantine period.49 Within a few years, the greatest Ottoman seafarer of all time, Hayreddin Barbarossa, would be born on the island, to an Ottoman soldier and his Greek wife.50

War with Venice: 1463–70: First Phase Mehmed’s vision of what ruling from Istanbul meant expanded his maritime horizons. Mehmed had extended his sea power greatly from the time when he became sultan in 1451; however, he faced a major obstacle, Venice, which possessed the most powerful navy in the Mediterranean. Although conflicts with Venice had occurred earlier, from this time forward through the early eighteenth century, the Ottomans and Venice battled frequently over strategic locations that both needed for their naval power. Kritovoulos’s analysis of Mehmed’s motives in 1462, for he puts these paragraphs directly after his account of the conquest of Lesbos, reveals Mehmed’s maturing vision of sea power and his understanding that Venice, with its powerful fleet and dreams of possessing former Byzantine territory, remained an obstacle because of its strategic naval bases. Showing how the Sultan wished to build a great navy, and have control of the sea Then he gave orders that, in addition to the existing ships, a large number of others should speedily be built and many sailors selected from all his domains for this purpose and set aside for this work alone. He did this because he saw that sea-power was a great thing, that the navy of the Italians was large and that they dominated the sea and ruled all the islands in the Aegean, and that to no small extent they injured his own coastlands, both Asiatic and European—especially the navy of the Venetians. Hence he determined to prevent this by every means and to be the powerful master of the entire sea if he could, or at least to prevent them from harming his possessions. For this purpose he got together as quickly as possible a great fleet, and began to gain control of the sea. After this, on thinking it over, he concluded that it would be very wise and indeed of the utmost necessity to ensure his possession of the Strait of the Hellespont and of the Chersonese [Dardanelles] by very strongly built fortresses on both shores in order to connect the continents of Asia and Europe and to make an enclosed sea out of all the upper sea, that is, the Euxine [Black Sea] and the Hellespont, and also to secure this firmly by closing the Strait, so that if enemies attacked, its coasts should not be ravaged—as indeed he had earlier done for the Bosporus.51

 The Conqueror’s Fleet 73 Kritovoulos explained Mehmed’s expanding concept of naval power. A key point in this passage is that sailors were to be specialists and not merely any man who was randomly enrolled in the military. He needed men who had naval expertise. This is the first time that Kritovoulos states this explicitly, and it indicates that Mehmed had observed the differences in the performance of his navy in sea battles, even with numerical superiority, to the performance of the Venetian fleets under skilled commanders. But this naval expertise could not be built immediately in contrast to building ships, and Mehmed continued to rely on non-naval specialists to lead his fleet. In addition, Kritovoulos, no lover of the Latins, including the Venetians, emphasized how Mehmed’s naval power was limited by not possessing the islands of the Aegean. If Mehmed desired to be a great conqueror, his highest priority had to be gaining control of the Aegean Sea that bordered his own lands. Mehmed also understood that his lands could not be secure unless he controlled the surrounding seas. Control of the sea was never absolute, even when the Ottomans had the most powerful navy in the Mediterranean in the mid-sixteenth century. However, when the Ottomans allowed their naval power to decline, then their capital was threatened.52 Also, sea power when it was maintained by galley fleets required possessing key locations to provide food and water for the large human complements that these ships required. Moreover, controlling the straits between the Black Sea and the Aegean was important militarily and economically. Mehmed decided to build two forts on the Dardanelles, where it is at its narrowest and the current is the swiftest. The builders found the ruins of an earlier tower, demonstrating that other rulers had implemented similar plans. Mehmed presented Yakub, governor of Gallipoli and the admiral, with the task of building two forts on either side of the Dardanelles, which he wanted done promptly. Yakub assembled a large work force and spent a substantial sum of money building the fortresses.53 Scarcely had Yakub begun to construct the fortresses, when war erupted with Venice in 1463. Tensions with Venice had been rising for years as Venice observed its possessions in the Aegean threatened and its hopes to gain additional Byzantine territory dashed. Especially when the Ottomans expanded into the Mora, this threatened the remaining Venetian ports there. As Kritovoulos states, “they had been aching for war with the Sultan ever since he had conquered the Peloponnesus, for they had always counted on having it for themselves. Therefore, believing they had lost what was really their own, they waited for the suitable time and pretext for declaring war on the Sultan and for marching against his country.”54 This quote is significant as it expresses a Byzantine perspective as many former subjects of the Byzantine Empire transitioned to becoming Ottoman subjects. Their distrust of Venice predated the conquest of Istanbul, and it continued as they viewed the Venetians as the aggressor in the war between Mehmed and the Venetians, who declared war in July 1463. The war began with Venice assembling a fleet of seventy galleys and large galleons filled with men and materiel. In addition, the admiral was one of their most experienced men. In response to the Venetian attack on the Mora, Mehmed sent Mahmud Pasha with an army to counter this threat. The Mora was a large territory, but more important was its strategic value for naval warfare. Mehmed could not fulfill his ambitions for conquest unless he regained the Mora from the Venetians. The Ottomans counterattacked in 1464 near

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the Isthmus of Corinth and forced the Venetians to retreat “till they reached the sea and their ships.”55 The Ottomans regained many territories and conquered some new fortresses such as Argos. At this time, Yakub completed the forts on the Dardanelles, ensuring that ships could be halted from sailing up or down the Dardanelles. Thus was brought to completion a great and complicated task, worthy of all praise and admiration, a task which no one of the ancient Greeks nor of the great kings and generals of old—that is, among Romans and Persians—had ever thought of or could have thought of: namely, to separate the upper sea [Black] from the lower [Aegean], and to prevent completely and make entirely impossible the navigation up or down for any who might wish it, except for those whom he himself was willing to allow to pass. He did this by placing the fortresses like gates on either side and by planting stone-shooting cannon. For fear of these triremes and the largest galleons alike kept at a respectful distance, as did everything else, even large or small rowboats. For as soon as ships approached they were immediately sunk and demolished by the immense stone balls fired from the cannon, as if they were caught between Scylla and Charybdis.56

Although it was clear that attempts had been made in the past to control this waterway, until the advent of cannon that could fire across the straits, this was impossible. But with these forts, the Ottomans could often control the Dardanelles. Before the end of the empire there would be many more battles in the straits and the Ottomans’ fortresses, including fortresses built in the seventeenth century by Turhan Sultan, would be instrumental in defending access to Istanbul until the final days of the empire after the First World War. In addition to the Mora, strategic islands in the Aegean that had come under Ottoman rule faced Venetian attacks. In 1464 the Venetians occupied the island of Lemnos, which they had long desired. Then they sent their fleet of seventy galleys to Lesbos, which they hoped would surrender for they wished to occupy it intact. They began to besiege Mitylene and conquered two other towns, but the garrison held out long enough for Mehmed to dispatch the fleet under Mahmud Pasha. Mahmud departed from Istanbul immediately and arrived in Gallipoli the second day. He had learned that Venetian scouting galleys were at Bozcaada; thus, he sailed by night from Gallipoli to try to capture the scouting ships. He captured two of the four, but the others had already sailed, and they informed the admirals that the Ottoman fleet was coming. The Venetians surprised at his arrival, embarked in disorder, and fled. Mahmud attempted to give chase when he reached Lesbos, but the Venetian fleet had too great of a lead; thus, he fortified Mitylene and returned to Istanbul, where he disbanded the fleet.57 War with Venice continued in the fall of 1466, for the Venetians attacked Old Patras with forty ships, but the Ottoman governor of the Mora, Omer, attacked and drove them to the ships. An embassy came from Venice to negotiate peace terms, but Venice wanted to retain the islands of Imbros and Lemnos at the mouth of the Dardanelles and Mehmed demanded their return for he needed them to control the straits.58 In 1465 the Venetians had made an alliance with Uzun Hasan of the Akkoyunlu, Ottoman rivals in eastern Anatolia. Uzun Hasan promised to be on the shores of the Dardanelles

 The Conqueror’s Fleet 75 in March 1465 so the Venetian fleet could pass to Istanbul.59 Since their capital was in the city of present-day Diyarbakir and their territories did not extend very far west of this city, the thought that they could manage to penetrate the Ottoman Empire to the Dardanelles was a preposterous idea.

Mahmud Pasha as Admiral, 1469–72 Mehmed’s long-serving grand vizier, Mahmud Pasha, was dismissed from this office in 1468, but he was appointed admiral and sancak bey of Gallipoli in 1469. This was a demotion, but the most important Ottoman conquest of 1470 was the Venetian island of Eğriboz, which was an amphibious operation with a significant role for the fleet. Thus, Mahmud’s leadership was essential in the campaign that resulted in the acquisition of the strategic island of Eğriboz, the second largest island in Greece after Crete, located to the east of mainland Greece, and separated from the mainland by a very narrow strait, only forty meters wide at its narrowest point. Previously, Mahmud Pasha had been involved in campaigns that had a naval aspect, such as the campaign to Trebizond, and he led the naval campaigns to Amasra in 1460 and Lesbos in 1462, and the defense of Lesbos against the Venetians in 1464, but he had not had naval responsibilities to the same degree as when he became sancak bey of Gallipoli. Mahmud was a successful commander and negotiator, but he was not a seafarer.60 Mahmud Pasha, grand vizier from 1456 to 1468 and again from 1472 to 1474, was the most illustrious Ottoman administrator during the reign of Mehmed II. Mahmud, who was a member of the Angelović family of Serbia, was captured in about 1427 and educated at the palace school of Murad II. Thus, Mahmud was a kul (slave) who was dependent on the sultan’s favor, although he was from the Serbian elite. After Mehmed II became sultan in 1451, Mahmud rapidly advanced, becoming a vizier in 1454 and grand vizier in 1456.61 He held this post until 1468, when Mehmed II dismissed him, probably as a result of the efforts of a rival, Rum Mehmed Pasha. Despite this dismissal, Mehmed II soon appointed Mahmud to the position of kapudan and sancak beyi of Gallipoli.62 Contemporary Ottoman and Byzantine authors praised Mahmud for his contributions to the success of Mehmed’s reign.63 He was also the patron of authors, such as Enveri, whose account of Ottoman history included the epic history of Umur of Aydin, which was completed by 1465. Due to the ongoing war with Venice, naval exploits were of interest to the Ottoman elite, including Mahmud Pasha. Mahmud maintained close ties with his relatives, who held significant positions in Serbia; thus, his family connections remained valuable, facilitating his diplomatic success in incorporating territories into the Ottoman Empire. His diplomatic endeavors, accompanied by the threat of Ottoman conquest, led to the surrender of Smederevo, Trabzon, Mitylene, and the Mora.64 Diplomacy as well as conquest contributed to Ottoman expansion in the mid-fifteenth century, including locations with strategic value for the navy.65 As admiral Mahmud began to prepare the fleet months before the expedition to Eğriboz took place in June. Mehmed II requisitioned flour for ships’ biscuit and sent sixty caulkers to Gallipoli, where the fleet would gather. To man the fleet, one in five

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men was registered to serve as marines. By January 1470, the fleet was being constructed in Galata and 100,000 marines had been registered. However, there is no indication that the men who served as marines were specialized in naval warfare. In addition, news came to Venice that Mahmud Pasha had ordered galleys to be constructed along the shores of the sea as far east as Trabzon.66 Tributary lands such as Chios were also required to contribute to the fleet, including the galleys located in the area.67 The Ottoman fleet would exceed the Venetian fleet in size, but not in quality and expertise. The fleet sailed through the Dardanelles and entered the Aegean on June 3, 1470, where it soon attacked two Aegean islands that in 1470 were under Venetian rule. A Venetian galley captain, Geronimo Longo, said the Ottoman fleet “looked like a forest . . . I assure you that from head to tail, in a row all the galleys were six miles, a little more.” Longo estimated that it included 400 ships, of which 100 were galleys, 150 light galleys, two heavy galleys, a round ship, and transports. The fleet sailed first to Imbros and conquered a citadel; however, it failed to conquer the Old Citadel.68 Then it raided Skyros, near Eğriboz, but did not conquer the inner defenses. The Venetian CaptainGeneral followed the Ottoman fleet, but he did not engage it in battle because of its size. The Venetians were increasing their navy, but they did not finish their preparations soon enough to delay the fall of Eğriboz. On June 14 the Ottoman fleet entered the Strait of Negroponte (Eğriboz), from the south and the next day arrived at Chalkis, the largest city on the island of Eğriboz, opposite the mainland where the strait was at its narrowest. The Ottoman forces built a bridge to the mainland with forty-five galleys and seven round ships. Mehmed had come overland and he crossed to the island with half of the army on June 20. The Ottomans feared being trapped on the island; thus, they protected their bridge by dragging ships overland to block the Venetian fleet attacking from the northern end of the Strait. The island was first pillaged while the attacks on Chalkis continued. According to an eyewitness account by a Brother Giacomo, during the second battle the Ottoman fleet lost thirty galleys. After another unsuccessful assault on July 5, some of the viziers believed that Chalkis could not be conquered; however, Mahmud requested that Mehmed make a final assault. On July 11 the fleet sailed to Chalkis, where the wall was destroyed. On July 12 Ottoman troops entered the city, although more fighting continued into July 14, when Mehmed entered and took possession of the city.69 Many Ottoman sources indicate that Mahmud’s determination was key to the successful conquest of Chalkis and thus of the island of Eğriboz. After the conquest, Mahmud sailed back to Gallipoli with the fleet, pursued by the Venetian fleet.70 As admiral Mahmud helped conquer Eğriboz for the Ottoman Empire. This expedition revealed his meticulous planning, and his determination to bring expeditions to successful conclusions. It was an amphibious operation that required attention to detail at which Mahmud excelled. There were no actual naval actions during the conquest; thus, his skill as a seafarer was never tested

War with Venice, 1470–79: Second Phase Both the Ottoman and the Venetians desired to make peace at various points during this long war, but they also wished to retain or regain strategic locations that they

 The Conqueror’s Fleet 77 viewed as essential for their states’ commercial and military interests. The Venetians considered peace terms in 1470, but they would have been required to return the island of Lemnos, at the entrance to the Dardanelles, to the Ottomans, and they refused to consider this. They hoped to weaken the Ottomans through an alliance with Uzun Hasan. The Ottomans had the advantage in that they could coordinate land and sea campaigns so that the fleet could support the forces that traveled overland. The Venetians knew their fleet was superior to the Ottomans in expertise, if not in size, but what they lacked was a large land army. Therefore, forming an alliance with a leader who opposed the Ottomans and could attack them by land was highly desirable for their military plans. As a result of a campaign overland led by Gedik Ahmed Pasha combined with an attack by an Ottoman fleet, the Ottomans gained control of Alanya in 1471, which gave Mehmed control of the Mediterranean coast as far east as Silifke. In 1472 Gedik Ahmed gained the city of Silifke, on the Mediterranean coast, from its Karamanid ruler.71 Supposedly with the instigation of a Karamanid prince, Uzun Hasan informed the Venetians that he intended to attack the Ottomans in Anatolia. In the late summer of 1472, Uzun Hasan’s Turcoman allies plundered towns and villages in Anatolia until they almost reached Bursa. This invasion was probably meant to be coordinated with a Venetian attack on the Ottoman’s Aegean and Mediterranean coasts. The Venetians organized a fleet with components from Naples, the pope, and the Knights of Rhodes, and they decided to attack Antalya, a prominent port on the Mediterranean coast. Although the Venetian fleet raided the town, they were unable to conquer the city. However, the fleet then attacked Izmir and, according to their report, “burned it to cinders.”72 These attacks led Uzun Hasan and Venice to hope for great success in the future. While the Venetians and Uzun Hasan planned for the coming campaign season, the Venetians received an offer of sabotage in February 1473 from a Sicilian, who proposed to burn the Ottoman arsenal and fleet at Gallipoli. He landed at Gallipoli on February 20, broke into the artillery depot, and prepared to blow it up. Although his powder failed to ignite, he set fire to a depot that housed rope, rigging, and pitch and tallow. While the Ottomans fought this fire, he attempted to burn their fleet. This act of sabotage proved quite effective, while the fleet survived unscathed, the depot burned for ten days and the supplies destroyed were worth 100,000 ducats.73 The year 1473 proved decisive for the Venetian alliance with Uzun Hasan, because in two battles with the Ottomans, Uzun Hasan’s forces defeated an army under the command of Mahmud Pasha and Hass Murad Pasha, but the Ottomans under Mehmed crushed the Akkoyunlu forces at the battle of Otlukbeli. The Venetian fleet damaged Ottoman coasts; for example, it attacked the coast near Silifke, but the Venetians failed to rendezvous with Uzun Hasan. Thus, the Akkoyunlu forces had no artillery. Neşri stated concerning Uzun Hasan, “having never seen a battle with hand-guns and cannon, he was powerless before the Ottomans.”74 The difficulties of coordinating the forces of two states proved to be insurmountable and allowed the Ottomans with more reliable means of communication between their fleet and their armies to be victorious. After inconclusive peace negotiations with Venice in 1474 and 1475, the Ottomans returned to the Black Sea and their goal was the conquest of the Genoese colony of Kaffa in 1475. The fleet under the command of Gedik Ahmed Pasha left Istanbul on

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May 20, 1475. It consisted of 350 ships and arrived at Kaffa and unloaded horses, tents, and artillery, and began bombarding the town. After five days, the local leaders hoped for a truce, but it was at the cost of many of the population being enslaved. Gedik Ahmed Pasha then moved on to Tana, Sudak, and Mangop. The result of this campaign was that strategically Mehmed gained control of the Black Sea and economically he gained the revenues from trade through the Black Sea.75 The war with Venice continued in 1477 after Mehmed had made conquests in the Black Sea and had fought in Moldavia and Hungary in 1475 and 1476. Eventually Venice decided that peace with Mehmed was more important than certain strategic locations. In 1477 Süleyman Pasha attempted to conquer Nafpaktos (Lepanto), but when he arrived there with a land army, the Venetians had already come with a fleet. Süleyman informed Mehmed that he was besieging the port, but that he could not capture the fortress unless he had the support of the fleet on the seaward side; as there were no ships available, he was instructed to abandon the siege. The same year, an Ottoman force besieged Kruje in Albania, and Ottoman raiders attacked the Venetian mainland to within forty miles of Venice itself. These Ottoman actions against Lepanto, Kruje, and the Friuli convinced the Venetians in 1478 that they should seriously attempt to make peace with the Ottomans. Since the Ottomans had decided to besiege Shkoder, initially these peace initiatives made no progress. Finally, at the beginning of 1479 the Venetian Senate decided that the war must end, even if they lost Shkoder, Lemnos, and Mani. In January 1479, the Venetians concluded a peace with Mehmed relinquishing Lemnos in the Aegean, Shkoder in Albania, and Mani, the middle peninsula in the Mora.76 While Venice retained other territories, these vital strategic locations increased Ottoman naval power. A tentative peace with Venice allowed Mehmed to implement additional plans to conquer strategic territories. First, Mehmed ordered an attack on the Ionian islands ruled by Leonardo Tocco, Despot of Cephalonia. Gedik Ahmed Pasha as admiral led a fleet from the straits of forty light and two heavy galleys to join another Ottoman fleet that then seized Vonitsa, Tocco’s possession on mainland Greece. Next, they captured Levkada (Santa Maura), an island off the west coast of Greece, and settled its people in Istanbul, and on August 26 Gedik Ahmed took Cephalonia. Then he sailed to Zante, where he conquered the island after allowing the Venetian residents to leave, since the treaty with Venice was now in force. Mehmed also acquired some territory near the Black Sea. These conquests set the stage for the final naval campaigns of Mehmed’s reign, to Rhodes and to Otranto.77

Rhodes and Otranto Mehmed felt capable of launching two amphibious expeditions in the year 1480, while at the beginning of his reign, having a fleet that could be divided to support two major expeditions would have been unthinkable. In hindsight, this remained beyond the capabilities of Ottoman naval forces or land forces. While one operation under Gedik Ahmed Pasha initially met with success, the other under Mesih Pasha failed. Some believed that if Gedik Ahmed Pasha had been in charge at Rhodes this

 The Conqueror’s Fleet 79 operation would have been successful.78 While attacking the Italian peninsula was no doubt very appealing to Mehmed, and preparations for this had begun much earlier, the more logical conquest was that of Rhodes. Perhaps if a more effective commander had led the operations, the conquest would have succeeded and this island, which was vital strategically for the Ottomans, would have been added to Ottoman domains in 1480 itself instead of in 1522. In retrospect, a more realistic goal was to conquer Rhodes in 1480 and then turn to Otranto in 1481. However, the expedition against Otranto was thoroughly planned to follow up on the conquests of 1479 against Tocco. Conquering Rhodes would have been beneficial to the Ottoman Empire in 1480 in two aspects. First the Knights of Rhodes engaged in corsairing against the Ottomans, attacking merchant ships that sailed in the area. Rhodes was also important strategically for sailing to Alexandria in Egypt for it controlled the shipping lanes from the Aegean into the Mediterranean. The Vice Chancellor of the Knights of St. John, Guillaume Caoursin, who wrote an eyewitness account of the siege, stated, The power of the Great Turk was immense; he had subjugated two empires, twelve kingdoms, and many provinces and cities. Also, the location of the city of Rhodes, which was most suited for fitting out fleets, equally inspired the enemy. The fame of the island was proclaimed in antiquity with great praise for the magnificence of its location, the salubrity of its air, and its convenience for subjugating the eastern provinces. . . . Mehmet reckoned if he could win this island, along with neighboring lands, his power would easily extend through the Aegean to the Ionian Sea.79

Clearly Mehmed understood the value of Rhodes, in terms of naval power in the eastern Mediterranean. Rhodes was famed from ancient times, and its value had been realized by the Turks of Menteşe in the fourteenth century, and they had hoped to prevent the Knights from gaining control of the island in 1306. Despite conflicts with their Turkish neighbors, initially the Beys of Menteşe and later the Ottomans, the Knights were well established on Rhodes and several of the surrounding islands, as well as in their fortress at Bodrum on the Anatolian coast. The Knights had been attacked on Kos in 1455, and had been expecting an attack on Rhodes for years, ever since they refused to pay tribute to Mehmed in 1454.80 The papal fleet that Calixtus III raised in 1456 was based at Rhodes and the pope considered Rhodes as an outpost against the Ottomans.81 The grand master, D’Aubusson, would become notorious in the years after Mehmed’s death, due to his imprisonment of Mehmed’s son Cem, against his wishes, despite issuing a safe conduct.82 But that disgraceful episode was in the future, and in 1480 D’Aubusson had prepared thoroughly for the Ottoman attack that he knew would come, because the Ottomans needed the strategic island of Rhodes. Since an Ottoman attack was expected, D’Aubusson had been preparing by gathering men, raising money, and repairing the walls. Particularly in the year 1477, the grand master believed that an Ottoman attack was imminent, but the Ottomans attacked Lepanto instead of Rhodes.83 The commander of the Ottoman expedition dispatched by Mehmed II to conquer Rhodes was Mesih Pasha, who belonged to the extensive Palaiologos family, the final

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imperial dynasty of the Byzantine Empire. After the conquest of Istanbul, he had been educated in the sultan’s palace and in 1470 he had gained his first significant administrative appointment during the Eğriboz campaign. Mesih rose to the position of vizier in 1476/7, becoming second vizier in 1477. In 1480, he became admiral, although he possessed no significant naval expertise as became apparent during the campaign.84 In 1480, the fleet that sailed from Gallipoli under the command of Mesih Pasha included 104 ships, with forty-six galleys and thirty-four transports, and possessed sixteen large cannon that shot great stones.85 The fleet arrived at Marmaris on May 23, 1480, and then carried the troops to Rhodes. The first assault, near the beginning of June, attacked the Tower of St. Nicholas that protected the harbor, which was closed with a chain. The offensive began with an attack by the Ottoman galleys on the tower, but it was repulsed with 700 Ottoman soldiers killed.86 A second assault in June employed a bridge to carry the troops from the fleet to the breakwater. However, according to Caoursin, vice chancellor of the Knights, “a certain sailor, experienced in maritime matters, swam at night under the water, and removed the cable from the anchor, tying it to the jagged boulders so that a slight force would loosen it.”87 Later, again according to Caoursin, during a night attack on June 16 The bridge was hauled across so the enemy [Ottomans] could go over. Then our guns on the wall began firing stone balls. They broke up the floating bridge: The Turks were plunged [into the sea]; the heavy artillery fire shattered four of the galleys and transports, and they sank under the waves. The large number of Turks who had landed on the mole from the skiffs and galleys were cut to pieces, and slaughtered by our men. Burning boats were allowed to float into the enemy fleet. Nevertheless, the diligent Turks returned fire with their bombards . . . The fighting continued bitterly from midnight until ten in the morning. The battle was broken off after the enemy forces were driven back and defeated.88

The Knights’ perspective, recorded in this eyewitness account, indicates that the fighting was intense, and the key to the Ottoman defeat during this attack was the failure of the bridge to transport the troops. The Ottoman perspective recorded by Katib Çelebi, in his naval history written in the seventeenth century while similar, presents a slightly different picture. “Mesih Pasha had a bridge made from the sea up to that castle and surrounded the castle from the seaside as well. The Muslim fighters marched from this bridge to the gate of the castle and raced with each other in doing that, so the bridge collapsed from the crowds. More than one thousand men drowned in the sea.”89 The reason for the bridge’s collapse differs in the accounts, but not the devastation that occurred for the men who were caught on it. Another assault on July 28 almost succeeded; however, during the attack, Mesih stated that the men would not be allowed to take spoil from the city.90 Then they made an effort again. The soldiers were greedy for war booty and so they started looting. Mesih Pasha had some public criers announce that the treasury of

 The Conqueror’s Fleet 81 Rhodes belonged to Hassa-i Sultaniye and that nobody should attempt to plunder so that the goods collected in a port city like Rhodes would not be seized by the army. When this unwelcome announcement reached the ears of the warriors, those warriors who were outside the castle stopped striving for the campaign. Those soldiers who were inside the castle lacked support for that reason. The infidels attacked from one point and defeated most of the soldiers inside. . . . The stinginess of Mesih Pasha and the greed of the soldiers caused them to be left empty-handed and later they withdrew from the castle.91

The debacle of this attack due to Mesih’s mismanagement marked the failure of the entire campaign. In August ships arrived from Naples, promising that a fleet was on the way to save Rhodes. According to Caoursin, “For three hours, a naval battle was fought with guns. At last, our men emerged victorious. In this fight the commander of the galleys had been killed.”92 Clearly Ottoman commanders remained inexpert in naval battles despite having larger numbers of ships, and naval expertise remained unexploited in Mehmed’s navy. Shortly after this Mesih and his troops embarked and returned to Gallipoli. Mehmed deprived Mesih of his position of vizier because of his failure at Rhodes. Another forty years would pass before the Ottomans attempted the conquest of Rhodes, after which this island became an important base for a squadron of the Ottoman navy. Mesih Pasha’s career as admiral had achieved little. He commanded the amphibious operation that attempted to conquer Rhodes; however, he did not engage in significant naval warfare. His failure at Rhodes was not because he made poor decisions at sea, but because he made a poor decision on land. After being stripped of the vizierate, Mehmed left Mesih as the sancak bey of Gallipoli. While the events at Rhodes appeared threatening to Christendom, the Ottoman expedition to Otranto led by Gedik Ahmed caused even greater alarm.

Otranto Attacking Rhodes made excellent strategic sense in 1480: it was located merely a few miles south of the Anatolian mainland and the island could be used to control the sea lanes to Egypt. Why did Mehmed attack Otranto? The usual explanation is that having conquered Istanbul, he now wanted to conquer the original Rome. While Mehmed certainly saw himself as a conqueror like Alexander, from reviewing the lands that he conquered after Istanbul, it is clear that he had a strategic vision and he did not engage in conquest for conquest’s sake whatever his opponents might choose to believe. Thus, the question arises, what was the strategic value of Otranto itself? Otranto is located on the eastern tip of the Italian peninsula, where the crossing to Ottoman controlled Albania was less than 50 miles wide. If Mehmed controlled both sides of the passage from the Adriatic Sea into the Mediterranean, then he would have had the possibility of impeding Venetian fleets leaving the Adriatic. While the strait is too wide for the same sort of control that Mehmed was able to impose at the Dardanelles and at the

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Bosporus, nevertheless with a naval base at Otranto and one at Avlonya (Valona, Vlorë), harassing his main naval opponents, the Venetians, would have been feasible. Given the fragmentation in the Italian peninsula in 1480, the ability for the Ottomans to establish a base at Otranto would have been probable. Other outposts, by Venice, for example in the Mora, survived in hostile territory for long periods of time. This conquest was planned well in advance, beginning with the conquest of Albania, then the lands of Leonardo Tocco, before the expedition for Italy. Once again, the individual Mehmed appointed to lead this expedition lacked naval expertise. Gedik Ahmed Pasha appears to have been born in Serbia, from the minor nobility, although he was also possibly part of the Palaiologos family.93 He was a page at the court of Murad II and, during the reign of Mehmed, he first served as governor of Rum, then of Anatolia until 1470, when he became a vizier. He participated in many campaigns and several had naval or at least amphibious components, including the conquests of Eğriboz, Alanya, and Silifke. He was made grand vizier in 1474, after the execution of Mahmud Pasha. In 1475, he was the commander in charge of the conquest of Genoese possessions in the Black Sea, Kaffa, Sudak, and Azov. He earned Mehmed’s wrath when he declined to participate in the conquest of Shkoder in Albania, which he believed was impregnable. Mehmed gained this fortress only through negotiations at the end of the war with Venice, not through conquest, so perhaps Gedik Ahmed was correct. He was imprisoned in Rumeli Hisarı in 1477 and released in 1478 to become admiral and sancak bey of Avlonya, which was unusual for generally the sancak bey of Gallipoli was admiral. It appears that Mehmed planned to attack Italy at least as early as 1478, because otherwise he had no reason to assign Gedik Ahmed to both the position of sancak bey of Avlonya and admiral in 1478. Gedik Ahmed Pasha prepared for the expedition of 1480 through his activities in 1479 as the sancak bey of Avlonya. Avlonya was a remote outpost of Ottoman lands, but it was also the key to attacks into the western Mediterranean, which made it strategically valuable.94 In 1479, according to Venetian reports, the Ottomans had a great naval armament at Valona.95 In the summer of 1479 this fleet was employed against the possessions of Leonardo Tocco, one of the remaining Latin lords in the Mora and of the islands off the western coast of Greece. As recounted above, Gedik Ahmed captured Tocco’s lands and Tocco fled to King Ferrante in Naples, his relative by marriage. This provided the excuse for Gedik Ahmed to attack King Ferrante’s territories in Italy. As early as February 1480, Mehmed had written to the doge of Venice asking him to provide Gedik Ahmed whatever assistance he required. The Senate replied that Italy was at peace and they were unable to attack anyone, but they did not intervene to assist Naples either. The Venetians, whose peace with Mehmed was recent, were anxious to know how the naval forces in Valona would be employed. They learned in June 1480 of the departure of the fleet and its division into two parts: the larger part sailing to Rhodes and the smaller to the Adriatic. The Ottoman fleet sailed toward Cephalonia, through the Corfu channel and joined ships at Avlonya on the Albanian coast. On July 26, a fleet of twenty-eight galleys, 104 light galleys, and transports left Vlore with 4,000 horses and sailed toward Brindisi. Earlier, they had contacted the Venetians at Modon, requesting safe passage and supplies, both of which were granted by the Venetian admiral.

 The Conqueror’s Fleet 83 In a frantic letter of July 27, the pope wrote to the princes of Italy including the Marquis of Mantua: “We have the enemy before our very eyes. He has already been sighted, poised to strike at the province of Apulia with a large fleet.”96 Nicolo Sadoleto, Ferrarese envoy to Naples and Valona, wrote a few days later to the duke of Ferrara, “This morning four horsemen have come . . . to find the lord king . . . and they have brought him the news of how the Turks have landed at Otranto with 150 sail.”97 Other reports claimed there were eighteen galleys, 120 other ships, and some transports, but it is more likely that the fleet was approximately seventy ships with Twenty-two light galleys. Since the expeditions to Rhodes and to Otranto occurred at the same time, the extent of Ottoman naval forces was great even if leaders and men lacked the expertise of the maritime cities of Venice and Genoa.98 The fleet had almost reached Brindisi when, due to the wind, they changed direction and landed at Otranto on July 28. Gedik Ahmed sent his troops to raid the vicinity and then bombarded Otranto, which was taken by assault on August 11. Gedik Ahmed then garrisoned the fortress and continued to raid the countryside. Most of the information recorded about this expedition focuses on events on land, and we know little about the fleet’s activities apart from transporting the army to Otranto. King Ferrante sent his son, Duke Alfonso of Calabria, to recapture Otranto, but his force was routed. Then Ottoman forces conquered another town in the vicinity. Gedik Ahmed left a garrison at Otranto and returned to Avlonya, to prepare for another offensive against Italy in the spring.99 Part of the Ottoman fleet was stationed at Avlonya in 1480–1, but it was threatened by uprisings in Albania in 1481.100 Pope Sixtus’ response to the Ottoman conquest of Otranto was to organize a fleet recruited from Italian states to which the pope would contribute twenty-five ships; Ferrante of Naples forty; Genoa five; Ferrara and Siena each four; Bologna two; and  Lucca, Manta, and Montferrat each one, which meant a total of eighty-three ships, a fleet probably greater than the Ottoman fleet that had landed at Otranto. No contribution from Venice could be expected, for Venice intended to remain at peace with Mehmed, and Venice was the Italian state with the largest fleet. In March the fleet of Naples defeated the Ottoman fleet, although how much of the fleet remained at Otranto is unclear. Plans were in the making for a crusade, when Mehmed died on May 3, 1481. A papal fleet with that of Ferrante of Naples reoccupied Otranto on September 10, 1481. The pope hoped with the fleet to cross the Adriatic and attack Avlonya, but lack of money to pay the sailors and the appearance of plague at Otranto halted these plans.101 Clues about the naval aspect of this expedition are few and can mostly be gleaned from analyzing sources recounting the role of Albania in the Ottoman invasion of Otranto, since Albania was the base for the invasion of Italy in 1480. First under Mehmed, Albania had been “pacified”; Mehmed had besieged the fortress of Kruje, Iskender Beg’s capital, which surrendered in June 1478. Then the Ottomans concluded a peace with Venice on January 25, 1479. The following summer Gedik Ahmed captured the islands of Santa Maura and Zante from Leonardo Tocco by September 1, 1479. At this point, Gedik Ahmed could prepare for the invasion of Italy by gathering troops at Avlonya, which was both a seaport and located less than Fifty miles from Italy. Since this was an amphibious operation, the shorter the distance to transport

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men and materiel, the better. Reports from Ragusa to Naples underline the extent of these preparations. “Near Apollonia [Vlore] very great must be the preparations of the infantry and cavalry armies of the Turks which have gathered there; bringing there a multitude of ammunition that is used for war and with insistence the fleet is being strengthened; through the various roads from Constantinople, as well as from other places is being expected a not small fleet.”102 Because Ferrante found it difficult to believe that Mehmed would invade Rhodes and Italy at the same time, thus he was caught unprepared. After conquering Otranto, Gedik Ahmed installed approximately 8,000 troops to garrison the city, while most of his forces returned with him to Albania. Where exactly the Ottoman fleet was stationed is unclear, although reports state that it raided the coast of Apulia during the winter. Much of the fleet would have been needed to transport the army back to Avlonya across the Adriatic Sea, but it could easily have returned to raid the coasts of Italy. Not merely the death of Mehmed in 1481, but revolts in Albania prevented Gedik Ahmed from returning to Otranto. These revolts threatened the supply line between Avlonya and Istanbul. In February, Albanian rebels attacked Ottoman positions in Albania and during this period defeated a force sent against them by Gedik Ahmed Pasha.103 When Gedik Ahmed was summoned to Istanbul at the death of Mehmed II, he had to fight to leave the territory and left supplies behind. Süleyman Pasha was sent to replace Gedik Ahmed and arrived at Avlonya, in early June 1481. The city had a small garrison and this force was not large enough to protect the unmanned Ottoman fleet if it were attacked. The rector of Ragusa wrote to Ferrante that the Ottoman fleet at Avlonya “could easily be burned.”104 This report indicates that many of the ships were left at Avlonya, because it was faster to take the troops overland from this location. Eventually the rulers of Naples realized it would be more effective to threaten the Ottomans in Albania than in Otranto. An aid to Duke Alfonso wrote on June 19 that naval reinforcements should be sent to the Albanian coast rather than adding them to the force blockading Otranto.105 The fleet of the Christians at Otranto failed to control the sea, but if they had destroyed the Ottoman naval bases in Albania, they could have strategically incapacitated the Ottoman navy. When Ferrante supported Iskender Beg’s son, John, in his revolt against the Ottomans, he gave him four galleys for his use in Albania. Eventually both Ottomans and the rulers of Naples faced great difficulties. The Ottomans lost some fortresses to the rebels in Albania, which impacted their control of the coast and the fleets of Ferrante and the pope at Otranto were unpaid and suffered from plague. The papal fleet almost abandoned the blockade on September 1, 1481; however, ten days later the Ottoman forces at Otranto surrendered when they realized that there was no possibility of reinforcements and supplies arriving from Albania. The pope hoped to employ his fleet to attack the Ottomans in Albania, but the fleet had been fortunate to achieve the surrender of the Ottoman forces at Otranto. The Ottomans had damaged the fleets of Naples and the pope at Otranto and those fleets needed 40,000 ducats for repairs.106 From these clues, we can conclude that the Ottoman fleet remained active at Otranto, although many of the ships were unmanned at Avlonya. This Italian adventure of Mehmed’s would have been impossible without naval participation, which went beyond transport and which continued through

 The Conqueror’s Fleet 85 September 1481. Mehmed’s fleet at Otranto continued to support his ambitions even after Mehmed himself was no more and its leader, Gedik Ahmed Pasha, had been recalled to Istanbul. After conquering a foothold at Otranto, Gedik Ahmed prepared to return the next year to expand Ottoman territories in Italy. However, with the death of Mehmed II in 1481, Gedik Ahmed’s support was needed to place Bayezid II on the throne. Observing similarities with Mahmud Pasha, one notes his Serbian background, possible elite status, service as a page at the court of Murad II, service as grand vizier, excellence as a military commander, and service as admiral, although the expeditions he led were once again amphibious, so his naval abilities were never tested.107

Conclusion After analyzing the naval expeditions of Mehmed II’s reign, and reviewing contemporaries’ assessments of his naval priorities, clearly the Ottoman navy expanded greatly during the thirty years from 1451 to 1481 and became a relatively effective tool in his ambition to become a great conqueror. Given the territory that Mehmed inherited, land forces alone would not allow him to become known as “the conqueror.” He was not a Timur or Genghis Khan to rely on tribal levies and to expand overland. He inherited an empire that demanded to be connected by sea power. Too many times in the past, Ottoman forces had needed to cross from Anatolia to the Balkans or vice versa and they had been forced to rely on others to provide the transport. This was unacceptable for a world conqueror. Thus, from his first major conquest, Istanbul in 1453, until his last two naval expeditions to Rhodes and Otranto in 1480, the navy played an increasingly important role. While the navy increased in importance, Mehmed’s strategic sense led him to select carefully which locations to conquer and he was determined to gain control of them. For example, as Kritovoulos stated about Mehmed’s determination in 1458 to conquer the Mora: “He considered the conquest of the Peloponnesus of the first importance, because of the war against the Italians which he was planning for the near future. This was because the Peloponnesus was well situated on the voyage to Italy and had safe harbors that could be bases for large armies and navies during the war.”108 It was not until twenty-two years later that Mehmed sent an expedition to Italy, but by then he controlled not just the Mora but also Albania; thus, he could expect that the expedition would have a reasonable chance of success. Both a large fleet and bases for that fleet were necessary for naval power to contribute to making him a great conqueror. Ultimately the role of his navy was limited because of the men that Mehmed chose to lead his fleet. They were talented in many cases and experienced in land warfare; both Mahmud and Gedik Ahmed Pashas were noted for their military skills. But what they were not was experienced seafarers. It is difficult to know what kind of pool of seafarers Mehmed might have been able to draw from. We gain hints from authors such as Kritovoulos that experienced seaman existed, but we do not know what experience they may have had leading fleets in battle.

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Many of Mehmed’s highest-ranking officials emerged from the Balkan and Byzantine elite, but by the fifteenth century neither of these groups were noted for much involvement on the sea. The Byzantines had possessed a powerful navy, but that had been disbanded in the thirteenth century for financial reasons, and had never regained its power, and the Byzantines relied on the Venetians and Genoese for their naval expertise. The Ottomans inherited a lack of naval expertise from the Byzantines as well as much else. Despite having extensive coastlines and gradually islands and ports, the Ottomans needed to develop methods to train individuals to develop expertise on the sea. Those men who may have possessed this were not those who were the men surrounding Mehmed. The men around Mehmed had learned how to succeed in warfare on land and many of them excelled at this. When put in the position where they needed to lead the navy, they usually successfully managed amphibious operations. From Baltaoğlu’s failure at Istanbul in 1453 to Mesih’s miscalculations at Rhodes in 1480, Mehmed’s admirals did not have the experience to adapt to unforeseen circumstances. Mesih’s bridge at Rhodes was made useless by a Christian sailor, who seized an opportunity to sabotage it. Baltaoğlu did not foresee how to cope with changes in the wind. Small adjustments might have made major changes in outcomes. But at this time, from the lands of Mehmed’s long-standing rivals in Anatolia, Karaman, was to come an individual, Kemal Reis, who would gain this knowledge and then pass it to his nephew, who would share it with all who read his Book of the Sea. Changes were in the making and by the middle of Bayezid II’s reign, the sultan would recruit individuals who would understand the sea and how to fight on it. Mehmed initiated the process by establishing the navy as a priority such as it had never been before. Bayezid II would place seafarers in positions of responsibility and power, and the results would be magnificent by the time of Bayezid’s grandson, Süleyman.

4

Ottoman Seafarers Sea Gazis Serve the Sultans: Kemal Reis and Piri Reis

Once Kemal and I came to Bijayah [Bougie in Algeria], . . . As we approached Bijayah, boats manned by inhabitants of the city came ten miles out towards us. They asked who we were and came right up to us and climbed on our ship. The late Kemal Reis asked them, “Why are you not wary of us? After all, no Turk has come here as yet.” They answered, “Three days ago Sidi Muhammad Tuwati informed us that a gazi [warrior for the faith] was coming from Rum [Ottoman lands] and told us to go and meet him. When we saw you today, we went and told the Shaykh. . . . No sooner had we said this than the Shaykh exclaimed, ‘Go forth, it is the Gazi!’ So we have come to you.” . . . first of all, we went with several of our companions to the Zaviye of Sidi Muhammad Tuwati. . . . He placed his hand on Kemal Reis’s head, . . . and said, “God willing, the Rum Padişah [Ottoman sultan] will bestow his favor on you.” . . . Out of love for this saint, we spent two winters at Bijayah, sailing out each summer on our raids. Piri Reis, Kitab-i Bahriye 1 Three ships approached the harbor of Bijayah (Bougie) in the year 14902 carrying among their crews two men, nephew and uncle, Piri Reis3 and Kemal Reis, whose fame would eventually reach distant shores. Some men of Bijayah sailed out to greet them because their arrival had been foretold by the local holy man, Sidi Muhammad Tuwati. Piri, Kemal, and their crews were greeted joyously by the firing of cannon. Piri and Kemal as gazis were carrying on the tradition of naval warfare prosecuted in the name of religion that the inhabitants of Rum, the lands of Anatolia, had been engaging in for nearly 200 years in the waters of the eastern Mediterranean. Umur of Aydın’s exploits fighting against Latins in the Aegean continued to inspire later Turkish sea gazis, who defended against Spanish incursions into North Africa. At the end of the fifteenth century these Ottoman seafarers offered support to their beleaguered coreligionists living on the shores of the western Mediterranean Sea, because Ottoman expansion in the eastern end of the Sea was matched by Spanish expansion in western waters. The Habsburgs of Spain, led after 1516 by Charles V, whose maternal grandparents, Ferdinand and Isabella, had eliminated the last Muslim kingdom on the Iberian Peninsula, Granada, in 1492, also had ambitions to expand their power along the North African coast.

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Beginning in 1497 they continued the reconquista by attacking cities along that coast and creating a string of Spanish fortresses known as presidios, establishing the ones at Bougie and Tripoli in 1510.4 Kemal Reis had already gained fame for his activities in the eastern Mediterranean, where Venetian ships were frequently his targets. Kemal’s nephew, Piri Reis, would achieve only moderate recognition during his lifetime, although in the twentieth century his world map showing the Americas brought him belated fame. But at the beginning of the last decade of the fifteenth century, Kemal Reis and Piri’s most notable adventures lay in their future. Kemal and his nephew remained for two winters at Bijayah raiding as gazis from their North African base, before returning to serve the Ottoman sultan. The shaykh had predicted this as well when he said to Kemal, “God willing, the Ottoman ruler [Rum Padishah] will bestow his favor upon you.”5 Piri Reis’s works, especially the Kitab-ı Bahriye, offer a snapshot of the status of the lands surrounding the Mediterranean Sea near the conclusion of this period of transition when the eastern Mediterranean became Ottoman and the western Mediterranean became the site of a contest at sea between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs of Spain. Both the Ottoman and Habsburg rise to the status of great powers were recent phenomena that upset the traditional power relations around the Mediterranean. Although the change was to a certain degree gradual, as the Ottomans’ longtime opponent Venice was joined by the new naval forces of the Habsburgs, the expansion of both the Ottomans and the Iberian powers had profound immediate and long-term impacts. In the western Mediterranean, the Ottomans competed for bases with the Habsburgs on the coast of North Africa and the formerly independent dynasties along the coast had to navigate this new geopolitical situation. Kemal Reis and especially Piri Reis lived through these dramatic changes, including the end of a Muslim polity in Spain, the discovery of the Americas, the Ottoman elimination of the Mamluks in Syria and Egypt, the Ottoman conquest of Rhodes, and the establishment of Ottoman footholds on the coast of North Africa at Algiers, and Tripoli in Libya, and slightly later at Tunis. Ottoman expansion had a significant political impact on these lands; as did Iberian expansion occurring at the western end of the Mediterranean Sea, where Portuguese and Spanish monarchs extended their rule to new possessions. Piri Reis himself witnessed the transition in the lands or heard it described by those personally affected. In the Kitab-ı Bahriye, Piri Reis provided information about the lands surrounding the Mediterranean beyond that needed for navigation: the name or names of places; who ruled it and how that had changed; and the religion and language of the inhabitants. The beginnings of Ottoman domination of the Mediterranean Sea in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were laid by Ottoman corsairs. Ottoman seafarers, whether sailing with a few ships or leading mighty armadas, were supporting the Ottoman sultans in their quest for domination over imperial rivals. Much of their rivalry occurred at sea and the sultans’ chances for naval dominance depended not only on powerful fleets financed by the immense resources of the empire, but on the skilled leadership of their commanders, the most successful of whom gained experience as corsairs with tenuous links to the state. These corsair commanders with great seafaring skills were viewed as rivals by the sultans’ closest associates, administrators who were recruited

 Ottoman Seafarers: Sea Gazis 89 by means of the devşirme. The devşirme was a levy of boys, generally Christian, from peasant families, who after training and conversion to Islam served the sultan in the military or administration. The most promising recruits were sent to the palace to be trained for the empire’s highest administrative and military positions. This training and service in the palace encouraged these men to develop loyalty to the ruler. Thus these devşirme recruits dominated the highest administrative and military positions of the empire, the viziers, due to their connections to each other but especially to the sultan, beginning in the reign of Bayezid II.6 Although they monopolized these positions, they were not necessarily the most qualified to fill them, and their lack of maritime experience undermined the naval potential of the Ottomans. During the sixteenthcentury Ottoman naval power achieved its greatest successes in the Mediterranean, making it almost an “Ottoman lake,” but one battle that the Ottomans lost, Lepanto in 1571, revealed that this potential power could be squandered if leadership were placed in the hands of incompetent devşirme recruited commanders. Moreover, power at sea in the sixteenth century meant control of locations that could provide naval bases. Men such as Kemal Reis, who understood naval warfare well, knew the value of key locations and encouraged the sultans to acquire them by conquest. The degree to which the advice of naval experts was followed varied by ruler and the priority he gave to naval matters. While sultans led armies on land, they rarely boarded ships themselves. Knowing which locations to acquire required the insight of those who had vast naval experience, especially if the naval bases were located at a great distance from Istanbul.

Kemal Reis 1440?–70: Early Naval Experience The most notable seafarer at the turn of the century was Kemal Reis, a corsair from Anatolia, whose family originated from a region, Karaman, whose rulers had challenged earlier Ottoman rulers for dominance. Karaman was the last independent Turkish principality in Anatolia that the Ottomans finally incorporated into their territory. Although Karaman’s lords had been defeated repeatedly by Ottoman forces since the time of Bayezid I in 1390, it was not until 1474 that final resistance in Karaman was virtually eliminated and its lands and inhabitants became definitively part of the possessions of the Ottoman sultan. Therefore, a young Kemal (c. 1440–1511) might have grown up with Karamanid sympathies and his eventual employment by an Ottoman ruler could not have been predicted at his birth. However, Kemal appears to have entered Ottoman service by 1470 since Kemal sailed with the Ottoman fleet as a seaman during the Eğriboz campaign of Mehmed II in 1470.7 The Eğriboz campaign, led by Mahmud Pasha, was only one of Mehmed’s many campaigns that led to Ottoman control of key naval bases in the Aegean. In 1470 Kemal Pasha was a low-ranking azap (seaman) who may have lacked extensive naval experience at this point. This soon changed, as either in the employ of the state or often as a freelance corsair, he left the waters of the Aegean to eventually begin the foundation of Ottoman sea power in the western Mediterranean as he established bases at places such as Bougie.

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Bases were essential for official fleets and for freelance corsairs. Kemal gained additional experience in loose connections to state employment during the reign of Bayezid II (1481–1512), whose policies led to a greater role for the Ottoman fleet through naval war with Venice, and the conquest of key locations in the Aegean, Black Sea, and also farther west in the Adriatic and through the activities of corsairs in the Maghrib. Kemal advised the sultan in naval matters and Bayezid heeded his advice.8

Bayezid II: Naval Policies during His Early Reign, 1481–95 Conquests in the Black Sea Mehmed’s death was somewhat unexpected as he was preparing to lead another campaign when he died, and moreover his death led to another succession dispute, between his sons Bayezid II and Cem. For a variety of reasons, Bayezid gained the support of key administrators such as Gedik Ahmed Pasha and he defeated Cem in 1481, after which Cem fled to Mamluk territories. When Cem returned with Karamanid support, he fought another battle against Bayezid in 1482, in which he was again defeated and fled to the island of Rhodes. His decision to seek support at Rhodes had a major impact on the first fourteen years of Bayezid’s reign. Although the Knights gave Cem a safe conduct promising to allow him to leave the island as he wished, they essentially imprisoned him on Rhodes and then sent him to their fortresses in France for safe keeping. Then by exploiting the threat of Cem reappearing in Ottoman territories at the head of a crusader army, they obtained an annual sum from Bayezid to keep Cem imprisoned and prevent his attacking Bayezid.9 With this threat, Bayezid generally refrained from attacking Latin Christians until after Cem’s death in 1495. Bayezid instead continued Mehmed’s policy of gaining control of the Black Sea. In 1484 Bayezid began a campaign to conquer two important ports on the western shore of the Black Sea, Kilia and Akkerman, where the Danube and the Dniester entered the Black Sea respectively. This expedition extended Ottoman territory farther north along the western shore of the Black Sea to connect with the territory of the Crimean Khans, who were their vassals. This allowed the Ottomans to completely control the Black Sea and the goods that were available there. Thus, this conquest had economic as well as strategic value, increasing the importance of Istanbul as goods from the Black Sea necessarily flowed through the Ottoman capital.10 Resembling many campaigns during the time of Mehmed II, this campaign was a joint land and naval operation. Bayezid advanced from Edirne to the Danube, where he was joined by a vassal, Vlad Calugarul (brother of Vlad the Impaler or Dracula). Bayezid besieged Kilia for nine days before it surrendered on July 15, 1484. At Akkerman, Bayezid was joined by the forces of another vassal, the Crimean Khan, Mengli Giray. Akkerman surrendered after twelve days on August 11, 1484. The Ottoman fleet had sailed only to provide logistical support for their land forces as their opponents lacked naval forces to challenge Ottoman expansion by sea.11 While the conquests along the shore of the Black Sea were essential strategically to provide additional bases on the Black Sea and deny these bases to opponents, they

 Ottoman Seafarers: Sea Gazis 91 followed policy that had been initiated by Mehmed II. Bayezid then began to initiate expansion into new areas, when changing geopolitical circumstances in other regions opened new opportunities far from the waters that the Ottomans had fought to control during his father’s reign. The Ottomans also continued to challenge Venice for control of the waters of the Levant. But before the death of Cem allowed Bayezid to continue to expand into Venetian territories, an appeal from the Western Mediterranean led to the first forays of Ottoman seafarers into that region of the sea. This would have major consequences in the reign of Bayezid’s grandson, Süleyman, when the Ottomans sent naval expeditions under the command of the former corsair, Hayreddin Pasha, to the western Mediterranean to assist their ally, France, against the Spanish Habsburgs. This appeal from Muslims in Spain who faced the Reconquista led to a naval mission being sent by Bayezid II to assist these coreligionists. This provided Kemal Reis the opportunity to sail to the western Mediterranean and that changed the course of his life as well as that of Ottoman naval power.

Kemal Reis and Piri Reis’s Early Years: Forays to North Africa We know virtually nothing about Kemal Reis before he appears as a participant in the 1470 Eğriboz campaign. Although the family may have originated in Karaman, Kemal Reis appears in the 1475 Gallipoli Tahrir Register (survey of a province) as a galley captain earning eight akçe daily. In the five years between the Eğriboz campaign and the register, he appears to have engaged in corsairing against Venetian targets in the vicinity of Eğriboz.12 By 1487, when Bayezid had ruled for six years, the fame of Ottoman sultans as being capable of defeating Christian armies in the lands of the eastern Mediterranean and of the Black Sea had reached the rulers of Granada in Spain, who were facing the successful armies of Ferdinand and Isabella. They appealed to Bayezid for assistance against their enemies by sending an ambassador with a poem in Arabic hoping to appeal to Bayezid who was known for his piety. As a result, Bayezid sent several ships to assist the rulers of Granada. Kemal Reis was included in this venture, but whether he was the admiral of the expedition or merely one of the captains is unclear.13 This is the first evidence of Turkish sailors, especially associated with the Ottoman Empire, sailing to the western Mediterranean, although this token assistance could not prevent the defeat of Granada in 1492. Approximately three years after his participation in the naval mission to assist Granada, in 1490 Kemal Reis sailed with Piri to Bougie and they remained in that location for two years as a base of operations against the Spanish. While nothing could be done for the Muslims of Spain beyond transporting some of them to North Africa, the quote from Piri Reis’s Kitab-ı Bahriye about Kemal’s arrival at Bougie indicates that by 1490 Turks were not a totally unknown factor in the Maghrib and they were welcomed as a possible defense against Spanish aggression. Without the freelance activities of Kemal Reis and Piri and perhaps others, Spanish expansion into North Africa would have been more successful.

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Piri, who was born about 1465–70 probably at Gallipoli, went to sea with his uncle in about 1481 and for the next fourteen years they sailed the Mediterranean as corsairs. It was from his uncle that Piri learned navigation as they sailed throughout the Aegean and then to the west as far as the modern Algerian coast. In 1495, Bayezid II recruited both Kemal Reis and Piri into his service as part of official Ottoman naval forces.14 While Piri Reis indicates that this is when their service to the Ottoman sultan began, Kemal Reis had attained some official status in Ottoman naval forces before 1495.15 Venetian reports considered Kemal Reis a corsaro nephandissimo (a very wicked privateer) and hoped that Bayezid intended to punish Kemal Reis in 1495; instead, he placed Kemal Reis under his protection.16 Kemal Reis’s significant contribution to Ottoman naval power during the reign of Bayezid II included battling the Venetians in the Mediterranean and challenging the Iberian powers of Spain and Portugal’s maritime expansion. Kemal performed crucial service during the Ottoman war with Venice from 1499 through 1503, initially supervising the building of the fleet. Kemal was instrumental in the capture of Lepanto (Naupaktos) in 1499, of Coron (Koroni) and Modon (Methoni) and Anavarin (Pylos) in 1500. His capture in 1500 of a Venetian ship wright and a Venetian galley helped improve Ottoman ship design as they constructed new galleys.

Ottoman War with Venice, 1499–1503 Mehmed II’s long war with Venice that had ended in 1479 had brought the Ottomans control of most of the Mora (Peloponnesus). When Cem’s death in 1495 freed Bayezid from the fear of an attack on Ottoman territories with Cem at the head of the armies, he turned to acquiring more Venetian territories with strategic value. The first step was to construct additional ships and the Venetian bailo noted shipbuilding in the Ottoman arsenals of Galata and Gallipoli during the winter of 1498–9. The Senate hoped that the ships were being built to be used against Rhodes, but the Ottoman’s immediate target was Venetian territories.17 The Ottoman naval commander, Küçük Davud Pasha, led a fleet of 270 ships, which sailed from the straits on May 6, 1499. Many corsairs, including Kemal Reis, Piri Reis, Barak Reis, Kara Hasan Reis, and Hersek Reis, accompanied the fleet. Shortly thereafter, Bayezid II departed from Istanbul with the land army on June 1, 1499. The fleet included, in addition to many galleys, two large kökes, or round ships, that were seventy cubits long and thirty cubits wide. The shipbuilder was named Yani, who had seen shipbuilding at Venice and learned to construct ships there. The ships had two decks, and on the side of each of these, according to custom, were two port-holes, in which immense cannon were placed. Along the upper deck was a netting, under which on both sides were twenty-four oars, each pulled by nine men. The sterns were like those of a galleon, and from them boats were suspended. Each of these ships contained two thousand soldiers and sailors. The command of one was given to Kemal Reis, and that of the other to Barak Reis.18

 Ottoman Seafarers: Sea Gazis 93 The siege of Lepanto was begun by Koca Mustafa Pasha, beylerbey of Rumeli; however, the Venetian governor informed him that the port would not surrender until an Ottoman fleet entered the gulf of Lepanto. Unfortunately, the fleet was delayed by contrary winds for three months and did not arrive near Lepanto until August. This delay began to have serious consequences, as Katib Çelebi explained: “After this they began to be pressed by the failure of their provisions and water: when they attempted to go on shore the infidels prevented them, and on the other side they were continually harassed by the enemy’s ships.”19 The fleet finally arrived at Barak Island (Proti). A battle commenced on August 12, 1499, near this island. Previously the enemy had been greatly harmed by Kemal Reis, and now their enmity was boundless. The bey of Yeni şehir, Kemal Beg, being on board the ship of Barak Reis, they thought it was Kemal Reis, attacked it furiously, and many on both sides fell into the sea and drowned. Two kökes, each containing a thousand men, and a galleasse and bargia with five hundred men, succeeded in placing the ship of Barak Reis in the center; but in this position, the two smaller ships could not withstand the fire of Barak Reis, they both sank, and most of the infidels on board were drowned; a few were however taken up by hooks into the other boats and made prisoners. The two kökes then bore down on Barak Reis, and the engagement being extended, Barak Reis threw burning pitch into them, and set their ships on fire. But all his exertions to detach his own ship were fruitless and at last that also caught fire. Kemal Beg, Barak Reis, and Kara Hasan, with about five hundred brave men died. . . . The two kökes were also burnt, . . . The island near which this battle occurred was thereafter called Barak adası.20

Piri Reis noted in his Kitab-ı Bahriye that an island, Proti, is called Barak Island because Barak Reis’s ship was burnt there during the battle leading to the conquest of Lepanto.21 This battle remained in the memory of Ottoman seafarers into the sixteenth century. While the battle during which Barak’s ship was burnt was the most memorable, it was not the only opposition the navy faced before conquering Lepanto. They discovered that 150 Venetian ships blocked the entrance to the gulf of Lepanto, and cannon were placed at the mouth of the entrance, so the leaders prepared for a battle. As the Ottoman ships sailed through, they were shelled and sustained heavy casualties. But since the fleet did enter the gulf, the governor surrendered the fortress. The army returned home, but the fleet wintered at a port associated with Umur Bey near Lepanto.22 The contemporary Ottoman historian Oruç Beğ recounted the conquest of Lepanto by Kemal Reis, stating that “there had been many sea gazas.” He continued: And also Gazi Umur Bey, who was the grandson of Aydın’s bey, Gazi Umur Bey, who is among the saintly gazis of Rum and is known and famous for miracles and valor and gazas, [he was] Süleyman Pasha Gazi, the son of Orhan Han’s, true friend and favorable helper in gaza, [he] had come in the year 755 [1354]. He was famous for holiness and for saintly miracles. They performed gaza at sea. And without exception, battle and gaza have not occurred like this. Since at that time there were

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The Sultan’s Fleet no cannon and muskets, there were only arrows with a sharp head, arrows, bows, sabers, and swords. . . . In the end, that fortress fell to their lot.23

The exploits of the sea gazis connected to the conquest of Lepanto reminded Oruç Beğ of the contributions in naval warfare of Umur of Aydın and Süleyman Pasha, and in his account of the conquest he coupled the two fourteenth-century gazis together and included their accomplishments with that of his contemporaries. Piri Reis and his uncle, Kemal Reis, were sea gazis of another era, when conquests by Turkish sea gazis led to Ottoman expansion. The first year of the war had gained a valuable prize, the strategic port of Lepanto near which the most famous naval battle of the sixteenth century would be fought between the Ottomans and a “holy league.” The second year of the war, 1500, brought the conquest of three more strategic ports: Modon, Anavarin and Koron. With the loss of Lepanto, Venice had suggested peace terms, offering to pay an annual tribute of 10,000 ducats if the Ottomans returned Lepanto to Venice. Bayezid responded, “If you want peace, you must surrender also Modon and Koron. Venice has until now married the sea: this privilege will henceforth belong to us, for we are stronger at sea than you.”24 This response reveals Bayezid’s understanding of the strategic value of ports on the western coast of the Mora and that with a navy that could defeat Venice, these locations were necessary for continuing Ottoman naval expansion. The quote also reveals the influence of Kemal Reis on Bayezid’s policy. Piri Reis wrote about another strategic location: “Concerning this island (Corfu), the late Kemal Reis always used to say that Venice had two eyes: the left being the castle of Modon and the right being the island of Corfu. He offered this opinion to the late Sultan Bayezid.”25 For the conquest of Modon and Koron, Bayezid ordered Mustafa Bey, the governor of Preveza, to prepare forty ships before the spring of 1500, to add to the Ottoman fleet. Mustafa Bey had constructed twenty ships, but they were destroyed in a raid by the Venetians. Mustafa Bey then attempted to complete the remaining ships and sent reinforcements to help repair the ships wintering at Lepanto. Bayezid led the land army that besieged Modon in 1500, indicating the priority that this conquest had attained that the sultan again commanded the land forces. The fleet arrived first and then the land army began the siege. The Ottoman forces were on the point of conquering Modon when the Venetian fleet arrived and fighting commenced leading to the Ottoman fleet’s capture of two ships and the sinking of one and the burning of several. However, four galleys arrived from Venice that evaded the Ottoman fleet and landed supplies at Modon. Bayezid was angry at this and ordered an assault, which after fierce fighting succeeded in capturing the fortress on August 10, 1500. The fleet and the army then headed to Anavarin, which surrendered, and then to Koron, which also surrendered. Bayezid returned to Istanbul and Ali Pasha prepared to attack Istefe (Thebes), when he was informed that the Venetians had recaptured Anavarin. Ali Pasha returned to the fortress and Bayezid sent Kemal Reis with thirty ships, which attacked the fleet in the harbor and captured eight ships, after which the fortress was retaken by the Ottomans.26

 Ottoman Seafarers: Sea Gazis 95 Piri Reis provides more detail about the second capture of Anavarin under the leadership of Kemal Reis, which reveals Piri Reis’s satisfaction when he and Kemal received appropriate recognition of their contributions to Ottoman naval success. When the castle of Anavarin was captured a second time it was a blessed hour. This fortress had first submitted [to us] together with that of Modon. Janissaries were stationed there, and the fleet departed. After this however, the Venetians returned and by a stratagem recaptured the castle, placing it again under their rule. For this reason, Sultan Bayezid Han gave Kemal Reis twenty-two ships, including five galliots, and the rest kayıks, for the conquest of the fortress. The fortress was conquered and three galleys, a galleon, and a gripar were seized. When we arrived in Istanbul fourteen days later our faces shining, we were received at a session of the Imperial Divan and he kissed the sultan’s hands and received as his reward three thousand akçe, and a crimson patterned kaftan. And I received a raise of five akçe per day.27

This quote provides evidence that Piri Reis participated at Kemal’s side in the battles of the Ottoman and Venetian war and was proud of his uncle’s success in naval warfare and their recognition by the sultan. That Piri Reis emphasized their grand reception at the imperial divan indicates that as seafarers, they continued to struggle against the indifference or worse of the administrative elite. Since the beginning of the war, the Venetians had searched for allies and they finally received naval assistance from the king of France, Louis XII, who dispatched a fleet under Philippe de Ravenstein, which attacked Lesbos in October 1501. When Bayezid’s son, Prince Korkud, was informed of the attack, he gathered forces and then confronted the French fleet. This action was moderately successful, but Bayezid then sent the imperial fleet under Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha, which with the assistance of the men of the province of Anatolia defeated the French and Venetian expedition.28 Despite the accomplishments of Kemal Reis during the war with Venice, supreme naval command remained with devşirme favorites without naval expertise. By winning the war against Venice, the Ottomans gained three important strategic locations that provided bases for the Ottoman fleet on the western coast of the Mora and Lepanto on the mainland. Venice, which had been the foremost naval power in the Mediterranean, had been defeated through a combination of Ottoman resources and expert naval leadership with the inclusion of corsairs such as Kemal Reis in Ottoman naval forces. With peace secured in 1503, the Ottomans were free to intervene in the Mediterranean beyond the Aegean. A French poem by Joachim du Bellay, published in 1558, mocks the ceremony of the Venetian doge marrying the sea: “But what we must estimate the best, is when these old cuckolds marry the sea, they are the husbands and the Turk is the adulterer.”29 It was widely recognized that the Ottomans had supplanted Venice as the foremost naval power in the eastern Mediterranean. However, this naval success remained contingent on utilizing men with naval expertise.

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Kemal Reis, 1503–11: Sultanic Favor and Elite Opposition An incident that may have occurred shortly after the conclusion of the war with Venice was a raid by Kemal Reis near Sicily that captured many prisoners, some of whom were sent to Istanbul for the sultan’s court. As a result, Kemal Reis’s salary was increased from twenty to fifty akçe per day.30 Raids near Sicily would have impacted Spanish shipping, but missions to Egypt were meant to assist the Mamluks in confronting the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean. The Mamluk historian Ibn Iyas wrote concerning Kemal Reis’s arrival in Egypt. On 19 Jumada I 913 [27 September 1507], an individual named Kemal one of the special retainers of the Ottoman Sultan, arrived at the royal palace. This Kemal has a great reputation as a man who tirelessly wages Holy War on the Franks day and night, to the point where the latter have despaired of ever getting rid of him. In short, he is chief of the dedicated warriors of Islam. When he arrived, the sultan [Qansuh al-Ghawri, r. 1502-16] gave him a lavish reception and placed a robe of honor on his shoulders. [Kemal] stayed a short time in Cairo and then returned to his country.31

From the perspective of the Mamluk historian Ibn Iyas, Kemal Reis had gained great favor with Bayezid and was thus honored by the Mamluk sultan, Qansuh al-Ghawri. Although the Ottomans had recently fought a war with the Mamluks, 1485–91, Bayezid realized the greater threat of the Portuguese and sent supplies and personnel to assist the Mamluks to defeat the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean. For example, Selman Reis (d. 1527) entered Mamluk service during Bayezid’s reign. Selman Reis challenged the Portuguese forces in the Red Sea, serving the Mamluks until the Ottoman conquest of Cairo in 1517 and eventually he became governor of Yemen during the reign of Süleyman (r. 1520–66).32 In 1510 an incident occurred in Tripoli that indicates the clash of competing Ottoman and Spanish expansion in North Africa. In the first version of the Kitab-ı Bahriye Piri recounted the following: “Kemal and I arrived at Tripoli with three ships. The citizens said to Kemal “Come and be our ruler.” Kemal did not consent but said, ‘I have not consulted the sultan and fear his disapproval.’”33 The second version of the Kitab-ı Bahriye provides a longer account: “The late Kemal Reis and I having set out from Istanbul with three of our own galleys in compliance with an imperial order; arrived in the port of Tripoli. The citizens sent a letter with Kemal Reis to the sultan requesting an Ottoman governor. As we returned to Rum, the Spanish ruler sent sixty barcas with troops against Tripoli and took possession of it.”34 Piri Reis perceived a missed opportunity, for the Spanish arrived in force at Tripoli before the Ottomans, and the Ottoman conquest of Tripoli was delayed for forty years. In 1510, the Ottomans had greater concerns than Spanish expansion into North Africa as they faced the rise of Safavid power in eastern Anatolia and the prospect of another succession dispute between Bayezid’s sons as the aging sultan’s death appeared imminent. However, in the reign of Bayezid’s grandson, Süleyman, gaining control of Tripoli became a priority when the Ottomans possessed Egypt and Algiers.

 Ottoman Seafarers: Sea Gazis 97 During the period between the end of the war with Venice and Kemal’s death in 1510, Kemal continued to sail to western Mediterranean waters to aid Muslims of that region, who were threatened by Spanish expansion. When in 1507 Bayezid had sent Kemal with materials to assist the Mamluks of Egypt in constructing a fleet to halt Portuguese expansion in the Indian Ocean, this aid included fifty artillery pieces, in addition to copper and skilled gun founders to produce more artillery at Suez. The uncle and his nephew divided their time between sailing the Mediterranean and shorebased activities in Gallipoli, which was the chief Ottoman naval arsenal until 1518.35 Gallipoli, at the turn of the sixteenth century, attracted young men whose ambition was to pursue a career at sea. These possibilities included sailing with official Ottoman naval forces, engaging in maritime trade, or becoming a privateer. These activities were not mutually exclusive and the most successful Ottoman seafarers engaged in more than one option. Privateers or corsairs or, as Piri Reis identified himself and his uncle, sea gazis were warriors for the faith, who acquired wealth and fame as well as religious merit. While sea gazis had not originated with the Ottomans, the Turkish sea gazi tradition begun in the fourteenth century in the Turkish principalities of Aydın and Menteşe remained a potent symbol in the early sixteenth century.36 Just as Ottoman sea gazis maintained a legacy of naval warfare in the Aegean that spread westward in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the concept of privateering was not limited to Muslims. An example of a Christian privateer was Sir Francis Drake (1540–96), an Englishman who acquired wealth and prestige due to his activities against the Catholic Spanish enemy in the service of his monarch, Elizabeth I of England. The exploits of seafarers only loosely tied to a state had significant impacts globally during the sixteenth century. Despite sea gazis continuing a long-established enterprise, the Ottoman administrative elite viewed these freelance corsairs with misgiving. Corsairs had more independence than most officials and were viewed as rivals by those who were solely dependent on the sultan’s favor. Bayezid’s reliance on Kemal Reis during the war with Venice was criticized by Faik Ağa, who called Kemal a robber and criticized his independence.37 But Bayezid II had publicly rewarded the achievements of Kemal Reis and Piri Reis after the victory at Anavarin (Navarino) in 1501; they had been invited to a meeting of the imperial divan, where Kemal kissed Bayezid’s hand and Kemal received 3000 akçes (silver coins) and a sable robe of honor. Piri also noted that earlier Bayezid II had taken the advice of Kemal regarding the most important goals for a sea campaign against the Venetians. As an adviser and as a successful naval commander Kemal had the sultan’s favor and aroused the jealousy of those officials who desired to monopolize positions of power in the empire. The more Bayezid publicly displayed his favor to these outsiders, the greater the opposition to them from his devşirme officials grew. Many reports by Venetian authors, who feared Kemal Reis because of his success against their ships, record that the palace-educated Ottoman officials regarded this corsair with disfavor both because of his independence and because they feared him as a rival. While Bayezid deliberated over whether he should promote Kemal to the office of vizier, Bayezid’s administrators endeavored to block this by any means possible. Enjoying the sultan’s favor meant that Kemal was viewed with more jealousy

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by his rivals who were in the Ottoman administration. This opposition to a rival may even have reached the point of plotting to kill Kemal. A Venetian report claimed that Iskender Ağa who was admiral in 1511, had caused Kemal’s death by sending him to sail in an unsound ship, which sank in a storm.38 While a Venetian report cannot be accepted as proof, the Venetians followed Kemal’s career closely, as seafarers such as Kemal led the greatest challenge that they had faced from the Ottomans, who could finally compete with them effectively in naval battles.39 Kemal Reis’s death was a blow to Piri Reis, Bayezid II, and the Mamluks. The Mamluk historian Ibn Iyas recorded how the news of Kemal’s death came to be known in Cairo. On 16 Dhu l-qa’da 916 [14 February 1511] there came an ambassador from Ibn ‘Uthman, king of Rum [Bayezid II]. He brought a message, which the sultan kissed and placed on his eyes before passing it on to the chancellor. The latter read it aloud in the sultan’s presence and that of his officers. Its style was forceful, with daring metaphors, and it contained glorious titles in honor of the sultan. The dispatch announced that ships bringing military equipment had been sent to the sultan, and that he would be happy to find out if they had reached their destination. The letter brought news about the death of the mujahid Kemal Reis, drowned at sea, of whom there had been no news. The ambassador stayed in Egypt a few days; a response was written to the letter which he had brought, and he was then allowed to depart for his country.40

Whatever the truth of the reason for Kemal’s death, because of it Piri Reis lost his uncle, mentor, and influence at court. Piri wrote in the Kitab-ı Bahriye the following about Kemal’s death, which is a melancholy assessment of a seafarer’s reward. Many men go off thinking they will return: those who do not are those who knew little about where they were going. Behold Kemal Reis: he left intending to return but failed and sank at sea. Though his fame was once spoken of by all, now even his name is lost and gone. This world is vanity; it is every man’s lot to live and die. While in the service of Sultan Bayezid, the angel of death caught him upon the sea. May God grant peace to those who remember the late Kemal Reis with a prayer. For Kemal Reis’ life came to an end. When he went to the hereafter, we found ourselves alone in this world. He had served the sultan fully seventeen years and died in 907 [1511].41

Piri Reis had fought in the Ottoman fleet as a captain during the Ottoman-Venetian war of 1499–1502, but as a subordinate of his uncle. Although he had commanded his own ship, Piri served in the navy under Kemal until his death.42 While Piri’s prominence faded after 1511, two brothers from Lesbos soon surpassed Piri and even Kemal Reis in their deeds and reputation, which they established during the reign of Selim I. The following period of Piri Reis life intersects with that of Hayreddin Pasha, who established an Ottoman outpost in Algiers.43

 Ottoman Seafarers: Sea Gazis 99

Piri Reis, 1511–28: Cartographic Accomplishments Piri Reis spent part of the decade after his uncle’s death in the western Mediterranean, where he sailed under Hayreddin’s leadership, but his activities back home in Rum at Gallipoli are of the greatest interest during this period. Piri’s fame in the twentieth century occurred not because of his gazi activities at sea but because of his cartographic activities on land. In 1513, approximately two years after his uncle’s death, Piri produced his famous map of the Americas, which is now considered the most renowned Ottoman map in existence. This world map, of which only about a third survives, reveals that Kemal had left his greatest legacy to his nephew, a map of Columbus that they had captured, which showed the coast of South America. Piri learned navigation from his uncle, but he learned to create maps by using Ottoman or Muslim sources together with maps being drawn in western Europe at the time of the great discoveries. Piri Reis’s text on the 1513 map explains the importance of the legacy of the map for the creation of his cartographic masterpiece. It begins with Piri Reis recounting his understanding of how Columbus came to sail to the Americas. Finally, the King of Spain gave him two well-equipped ships and, with the words “Columbus, if it turns out as you say, I shall make you governor of those parts!”, sent this Columbus out on the Western Sea. The late Gazi Kemal had a Spanish slave who recounted for him how he had gone three times to those countries with Columbus. . . . Now Columbus did not know the idiom of those people but traded with them through sign language. . . . By now these parts have been conquered and explored in full. The place-names [you see] next to the above-mentioned islands and coasts have been devised for the latter by Columbus—who, incidentally, is said to have been a great astronomer. The coasts and islands that you can see on [my] map have all been copied from that of Columbus.44

Piri Reis explained that he created his map by combining information from approximately thirty maps, including one made by Columbus. He obtained this map after he and Kemal Reis had captured seven ships off the coast of Valencia because Kemal captured a Spanish slave who claimed to have sailed with Columbus three times to the Americas. Since Piri Reis and other Ottoman seafarers spoke the lingua franca of the Mediterranean, he could converse with the Spaniard. The nature of the information that Piri included about Columbus on his own map indicates that Piri empathized with Columbus’s desire to have his successful voyages suitably rewarded. Piri stated on the map that Columbus was promised by the Spanish rulers that if he were successful in discovering lands with riches, he would be made governor of the lands he reached.45 Piri Reis realized the extent of his cartographic accomplishment: he claimed that his map was reliable and “worthy of recognition” and referred to it in his next masterpiece, a portolan, the Kitab-i Bahriye, or Book of Seafaring. He believed that the map was superior to any other Ottoman map because it showed more, since he had consulted maps previously unknown in the Ottoman Empire. Piri Reis presented his map to Selim at Cairo in the summer of 1517 after the Ottoman conquest of Egypt.

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Before this, I your humble servant, made a map in which I was able to show twice the number of things contained in the maps of our day. Having made use of new maps of the seas of China and India which no one in the lands of Rum had previously seen or known, I presented it to the late Sultan Selim Khan, may he rest in peace, while he was in Cairo and he accepted it with pleasure.46

Besides recording his presentation of his 1513 map to Selim in 1517 Piri Reis wrote little more about his time in Egypt beyond stating that as he sailed up the Nile River, he took compass readings and recorded them stage by stage and then produced several pages of detailed maps of the Nile River, which were included in the Kitab-i Bahriye.47 When reconstructing Piri’s life it appears that Piri created his map at Gallipoli in 1513; then he sailed to North Africa because Hayreddin sent him to Selim in 1515. Subsequently he accompanied Ottoman naval forces to Cairo in 1517. Thus, Piri continued to sail the length and breadth of the Mediterranean participating in some of the most important conflicts of the period. But he found the opportunity to study maps and create his own masterpieces. Piri exhibited pride in his map and viewed it as a means to achieve recognition by the sultan. Selim accepted the map and presumably took it back to Istanbul because it was preserved in the library at Topkapı palace. But it appears not to have been valued highly, because at some date the map was torn and only the western third has survived. Perhaps the other two-thirds of the map, which presumably recorded the eastern hemisphere, were of more immediate practical value and that is why that portion did not remain in the palace library. Piri Reis presenting his masterpiece to Selim in Cairo intersects with one of the major events of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman conquest of Mamluk lands, Syria and Egypt, in 1516 and 1517 respectively. While Katib Çelebi records nothing in his history of the navy concerning the conquest, it had enormous strategic importance for Ottoman naval power. The Ottomans then controlled the coast of the eastern Mediterranean from their possessions in Albania in the north west all around the eastern half of the Mediterranean up to the coast of Libya. In addition, they also gained access to the Indian Ocean through the Red Sea. Selim also expanded the naval arsenal in Istanbul; thus, it appears that he intended to make greater use of the navy when he planned to redirect his conquests west after having defeated the Safavids in 1515 and the Mamluks in 1516 and 1517. However, Selim died in 1520 and was succeeded by his son Süleyman, who quickly demonstrated a commitment to conquest when he conquered Belgrade in 1521. The second major conquest of Süleyman’s reign was the conquest of Rhodes in 1522. Once the Ottomans controlled the coast of the mainland in the eastern third of the Mediterranean, conquering Rhodes became a strategic priority. As long as this island remained in the hands of the Knights of St. John, Ottoman shipping would always be threatened by their raids. In the first version of the Kitab-ı Bahriye, completed in 1521, the chapter on Rhodes included instructions from Kemal Reis on how to conquer the island fortress, But experienced seafarers had some ideas about the conquest of the fortress of Rodos. The late Kemal Reis stated his idea. Near the fortress across in Anatolia there is a

 Ottoman Seafarers: Sea Gazis 101 low cape called Kumburnu.48 There is a hill by the sea near the castle two miles from the cape. It is possible to cast an anchor on the side of the hill and take cannon from the ship to a suitable place. [193b] If the sultan resolves to conquer the island, on an appointed night let him command military forces that everyone no matter who he is each prepares a bag of dirt, to pile by bag on top of Kumburnu to construct a fortress. Going out quickly to put this up behind the fortress placing the bags in this manner, infidel ships from the sea will not be able to enter the fortress to come to help. Because if ships come to the castle from infidel lands, intending to cast anchor in the sea opposite the castle, they must enter the port from the northeast, in the summer wind blows over the castle, it is not suitable for ships to sail in front of the fortress because of the cannon on Kumburnu. Infidels from abroad will abandon hope of coming this way. If infidel ships come from below to go around from the southeast from the direction of Mecca, certainly if they come they will pass within one or two miles of the ships that wait by the castle, it will be impossible for them to escape. They cannot bring them in front of the castle supposing there will be a wind for escaping. They will turn again to cruise about to Anatolia, they will come in front of the fortress, and if they pass from Rodos to Anatolia, they will pass close to Kumburnu. From the cannon on Kumburnu the castle will be imprisoned and will find it difficult to endure. If it is suitable for our ships to wait at the sea. If it is suitable to be heard.49

These suggestions were not included in the second version of Kitab-ı Bahriye, completed after the conquest, which gives little information about the operation, beyond that the fleet watered at Karabağ, on the Bodrum peninsula opposite Kos, before the conquest.50 Kemal Reis’s advice is clearly the plan of a seafarer, noting the direction of the winds, distances between the mainland and the island and where capes and islands are located and how to use these factors to their advantage. Also, Kemal Reis or, in actuality, Piri Reis offered this advice to the sultan clearly noting that any plans would be contingent on the sultan’s approval. No plan of conquest would be followed unless the sultan was convinced of its feasibility or benefit to the empire. Kemal or Piri also advised against allowing some individuals to consider themselves too important to be required to bring a bag of dirt to help construct a fortress on Kumburnu. Kemal and/ or Piri warned against the pretensions of the elite, who considered themselves superior to the men who would be recruited to implement this plan. The conflict between the administrative elite and seafarers echoes throughout this advice. Katib Çelebi provides an account of the conquest of Rhodes in his history of Ottoman naval wars. After the conquest of Belgrade, the conquest of Rhodes was considered most important, the sultan returned from there to Istanbul. The preparation of a large fleet, the necessary weaponry and the supplies were ordered by the sultan in the winter. When forty thousand oarsmen and twenty thousand mariners arrived, the second vizier Mustafa Pasha became a commander on the sea and on an auspicious day he set sail towards Rhodes together with seven hundred ships comprised of galleons, galleasses, galleys, galliots and boats. The Admiral Yaylak Mustafa Pasha joined him with the ships he had prepared at Gallipoli. . . . The navy had arrived

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in an area near Rhodes and Mustafa Pasha had sent Captain Kara Mahmud to the island of Harke with several galleys and had him conquer its castle. Afterwards they had arrived in front of the Cem Garden on the island of Rhodes. After some consultation, they left the heavy ships to guard the strait and the above-mentioned pasha moved to the area in front of the Castle of Rhodes with a galliot. They arrived at the Cape of Okuz and prepared the cannons on the ships for attack. They besieged the castle from land and from sea on the fifth day of the month of Ramazan [July 29, 1522] . . . upon the approval of the viziers, they started to bring soil from the surrounding area and fighting lasted for five months. Finally, the Muslim soldiers piled up the soil they brought and made a high heap. They made it as high as the walls of the castle and got in. The infidels despaired of defending the castle successfully and surrendered the castle on the fifth of Safer of nine hundred twenty-nine [December 24, 1522].51

With the conquest of Rhodes, the voyage from Istanbul to Egypt became much more secure for Ottoman shipping, because from this island the Ottoman fleet protected the sea lanes that intersected between the capital and the immensely profitable province of Egypt. When a maritime province was created for Hayreddin Pasha in the 1530s, Rhodes became one of the principal districts within that province and one of the main naval bases of the Ottoman Empire. The governor of the district, the derya bey in a maritime district, had naval responsibilities as well as administrative ones. At Rhodes he prepared a small squadron, which he led in battle. The derya bey of Rhodes was considered the most prestigious of the derya beys, and once became a candidate to be promoted to become admiral.52 Although details concerning Piri’s life are sketchy and personal anecdotes mainly record experiences with his uncle, the Kitab-i Bahriye recounts that Piri was selected to act as pilot for the grand vizier Ibrahim Pasha, due to his skill as a navigator. Süleyman sent Ibrahim to Egypt in 1524 to reform its administration after a revolt had been suppressed there. Piri’s record of his encounter with Ibrahim indicates how much he sought recognition for his accomplishments and reveals his awareness of the necessity of obeying the sultan’s orders at all costs, even if it was the wrong time of year for a sea voyage in the Mediterranean. It was in the year nine hundred and thirty that my fate was written. Worldsovereign Süleyman, the sultan of sultans then reigned. “It is my command” he said, “Let my benign justice reach Egypt.” His decree was written and Ibrahim Pasha went to Egypt. For when sultans issue orders not a moment of delay can be allowed. Hearing his sovereign’s command, the pasha valued it more than his life. . . . It was fall and the winds in that sea always blow contrarily. . . . We all feared drowning. . . . In short, it was God who brought us our deliverance.53

However, the decision to employ Piri Reis as a pilot was a wise one, as Ibrahim observed his expertise during the voyage. Whenever I fell into distress at sea, I always consulted a book. The [sailing] directions that I had written down in [this] book of mine amply demonstrated the

 Ottoman Seafarers: Sea Gazis 103 excellence of my expertise. His excellency the great Pasha saw how my book was used all the time. He understood that there was something valuable there, and he [expressed] a wish to examine it. When it was brought to him, he looked at its every detail and [realized] how I was plotting the course with it. He thus grasped its gist, perfect knowledge [of the mariner’s craft]; he knew there was accuracy, mastery in the art of navigation [contained in my book]. When his mind reached perception of it[s merits], he showed esteem for this slave of his as a result. He wished to bestow patronage upon this dust (i.e. me), so that I might be elevated, like the sun, by it. . . . He said, “You are a very able man, and there is much excellence in your character. The entire configuration of the sea has become known [to you]: none of its spots are hidden from you. I wish that you make all of it manifest, that you be remembered by it until doomsday. You should polish up this book well, all of it, so that it may be much used, [wherever] there are those who will listen. . . . Polish it up and bring it without fail, so that we may present it to the sovereign of the world.”54

This encouragement inspired Piri to revise his first version of the Kitab-ı Bahriye, and he produced a more elegant version that was given to the sultan in 1526. Piri’s final cartographic achievement that has survived is a world map that was completed in 1528. Only approximately one-sixth of the 1528 map survives, but Piri Reis’s signature is on the map stating: “Drawn by the lowly Piri Reis, son of el-Hac Mehmed, known as the paternal nephew of the late Reis Gazi Kemal, from the city of Gallipoli, in the year of 935.” The portion that survives depicts the northwest Atlantic and the coasts and islands, including Cuba, Jamaica, and Hispaniola, although Puerto Rico is missing. The fragment appears to be a very accurate representation of this portion of the globe.55

Piri Reis, 1548–53/4: Out of the Mediterranean and into the Indian Ocean The Ottomans had invested considerable resources trying to prevent Portuguese expansion into the Indian Ocean, even before they conquered Egypt in 1517. Bayezid had sent Kemal Reis to Egypt to assist the Mamluks in 1507 and again in 1511, with supplies of iron, wood, oars, arrows, firearms, gunpowder, copper, and artillery.56 Once Egypt was incorporated into the empire it became more imperative to stop Portuguese monopolizing trade with India that had formerly passed through Egypt. While the Ottomans were able to prevent total Portuguese domination of trade in the Indian Ocean, the long-term contest with the Portuguese continued into the 1550s. Piri Reis disappears from Ottoman records between the time he completed his second map in 1528 and the time when he was appointed admiral for the fleet at Suez that sailed the Indian Ocean in 1547.57 Some of Piri Reis’s activities appear in the reports collected by Marino Sanuto. In September 1532, Piri sailed in the Adriatic Sea with five galleys and three fuste attacking Dalmatian pirates.58 In June 1533, he sailed to the gulf of Koron with ten galleys and five fuste and bombarded the fortress. The Venetians returned fire and damaged Piri Reis’s galley.59 The fleet of Andrea Doria had conquered Koron from the Ottomans in 1532 and the Ottomans regained the port in

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1534. Piri Reis used his squadron to attack the fortress during the brief period that Venice regained this strategic location. In 1536, according to Venetian demands for reimbursement for damages and punishment of Piri Reis, he had seized a Venetian ship, the Contarina, near Cyprus.60 According to Venetian reports, Piri Reis regularly attacked their ships and the Venetian bailo in Istanbul began to plot against him. The Venetians were pleased when he was given a naval command that would remove him from Mediterranean waters.61 While Piri had an unrivaled knowledge of the Mediterranean as evidenced by his Kitab-ı Bahriye, he did not have extensive knowledge of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean; thus, his cartographic abilities do not explain why he was given this appointment. In contrast to the position of admiral over the Mediterranean naval forces that the then grand vizier Rüstem Pasha obtained for his brother Sinan in 1548, the Suez command was probably not seen by the administrative elite as a desirable or significant position. The Mediterranean was the sea where the major actions of Hayreddin’s admiralship had been fought and all other naval conflicts were of secondary importance. If Piri Reis had been involved in the naval exploits in the Mediterranean from 1534 to 1546 there is no Ottoman record of it. But in 1547 Mehmed Sokollu was grand admiral, since Hayreddin had died in 1546, and if Mehmed Sokollu was consulted regarding this appointment, he would have considered it of little importance that a former corsair was given this command to a remote naval field of operations. Piri Reis’s first assignment was to reconquer Aden, former Ottoman territory in Portuguese and then local Arab hands, from 1538. By February 1549, this important emporium was again subject to the Ottoman sultan. Piri was rewarded with a substantial timar or zeamat worth 100,000 silver coins. In 1552, Piri sailed from Suez with a small fleet of thirty ships, to attack Hormuz, another strategic port, held by the Portuguese. This attack was unsuccessful and Piri sailed for Basra in the summer of 1553 and then returned to Suez, leaving most of the fleet at Basra. From Suez he proceeded to Cairo, where he was soon met with a death sentence sent from Istanbul. He was executed in 1554. Piri Reis’s execution either for failure to achieve his objectives or, as Katib Çelebi hints, for some financial indiscretion is chiefly understandable as the fate of an individual who had never managed to create connections with the palace elite. From the days when he sailed with his uncle Kemal Reis, they were outsiders among the sultan’s administrators who viewed them with suspicion and envy. While Ibrahim Pasha recognized the value of Piri’s cartographical endeavors, he had been executed in 1536 and thus his support as a patron was eliminated. After the rise of Rüstem Pasha, grand vizier 1544–53, 1555–61, and his brother as admiral, 1548–54, relations with former corsair seafarers became more strained. Sinan owed his position to his powerful connections and his inability to work with another former corsair, Turgud Reis, demonstrated how seafarers with a corsair background were viewed as rivals whose advancement was discouraged. While Piri Reis’s works are viewed with admiration at the present, his worth in his own time was based on his ability to wage war at sea. Since he had been unsuccessful, even if he had been provided with an inadequate force of ships with which to confront the Portuguese and conquer Hormuz, then his death was deemed the natural reward for failure.62

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Conclusion The final chapter in Kitab-ı Bahriye expresses Piri Reis’s thoughts about the sea and his attempts to increase the knowledge of it for those who would follow him. Hearken to the secrets I reveal and from them know and discern my aim. . . . It was with God’s guidance that it became my habit to roam the seas. And so it was: and were I to live forever I would always be at sea. . . . My heart was the captive of this science on which I have written so much. I have described the Mediterranean Sea in all its details and at great length. . . . For I have always been an eager and willing lover of the sea. . . . For knowledge is infinite. By no effort can its end be found.63

Piri Reis’s love of the Mediterranean Sea and his commitment to the study of cartography are evident in the care with which he sailed, researched, and then produced his detailed and beautiful cartographic works. The maps remained in the Topkapı palace library, and only portions of them have survived. In contrast the Kitab-ı Bahriye exists in multiple manuscripts and, although it did not win him favor or fame during his lifetime, it was used by seafarers. The contrast between Piri Reis’s fate and that of his contemporary Hayreddin Pasha is stark. Hayreddin overcame all elite opposition and, due to outstanding success as a naval leader in battle, he came to be regarded as the model Ottoman seafarer and his tomb became the launching site for all future naval endeavors. Piri found a grave in Cairo far from the location of his greatest triumphs as a cartographer at Gallipoli. While Hayreddin was venerated from the time of his death in the Ottoman Empire and Europe as a great admiral, Piri had to wait until the twentieth century to achieve posthumous recognition and widespread fame. Piri’s fame did not come during the era of the Ottoman Empire, but later he was venerated by the leader of the Turkish Republic, Atatürk, as a man in whom Turks could take pride. In 2013 UNESCO declared this the year of Piri Reis celebrating the 500th anniversary of the creation of his world map showing the coast of South America. “As a rare world map from the 15th and 16th centuries, Piri Reis World Map is an invaluable piece of the world’s documentary heritage as it provides insight on the history of its time. It is therefore part of the Memory of the World and should be made better known,” stated UNESCO. Piri Reis’s contribution to cartography has finally been recognized by his map’s inclusion in the Memory of the World Register. In contrast, the names of his rivals are rarely remembered and their petty triumphs seldom recalled.

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5

Ottoman Seafarers Hayreddin Barbarossa: The Gazi Pasha

You are my useful and trusted servant. I rely on your piety and sound judgment in all matters. In the past you attacked those areas in the course of holy war. You know everything about the infidels and their lands. Because I rely on you completely, I placed you in command over all aspects of the imperial fleet. Order from Süleyman to Hayreddin Pasha, Hüküm 1, sent summer of 1543 while Hayreddin commanded the Ottoman fleet off the coast of France.1 In the summer of 1543, a great Ottoman fleet of over 100 galleys sailed into the French harbor of Toulon, with its banners flying, greeted joyously by the French, whose king, Francis I, had requested its assistance against his rival Charles V, king of Spain and Holy Roman Emperor. This fleet was commanded by the Ottoman admiral Hayreddin Pasha, known to the French and their Habsburg enemies as Barbarossa (Redbeard). Hayreddin, like his fellow seafarer Piri Reis, had gained experience as a corsair in North Africa, where he and his brother Oruç carved out their own mini state at Algiers before Oruç’s death in battle fighting the Spanish in 1518. Hayreddin and Oruç, like Kemal Reis and Piri, traced their origins to the heartlands of the Ottoman Empire, coming from Lesbos, where their father had served as a sipahi (cavalryman) on the island. In 1520 Hayreddin had placed Algiers under Ottoman rule and in 1533 he had been summoned by Süleyman to serve as his admiral, returning to the center of Ottoman power. By 1543, Hayreddin’s fame was already immense since in 1538 he had led the Ottoman naval forces to victory at the battle of Prevesa against the combined fleets of Venice and Spain under his chief naval rival, Andrea Doria. Süleyman’s admiral, Hayreddin Pasha, was able to display Ottoman naval superiority against Süleyman’s imperial rival, Charles V. Each of these two sovereigns, who ruled mighty empires, battled to be recognized as the most powerful emperor and the true heir of Roman glory. Much of their rivalry occurred at sea and Süleyman’s chances for naval dominance depended not only on his powerful fleet financed by the immense resources of his empire, but on the skilled leadership of his commanders, the most successful of whom, Hayreddin Pasha, had gained experience as a corsair. During the sixteenth century, through his leadership Ottoman naval power achieved its greatest

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successes in the Mediterranean making it almost an “Ottoman lake,” but his legacy was threatened by the position of admiral being given to incompetent devşirme recruits at his death. Despite Süleyman’s claim to rely on Hayreddin completely, in earlier campaigns he had disregarded Hayreddin’s advice and even sent him to Egypt while a naval campaign was ongoing. Even more telling, at Hayreddin’s death, he was not replaced with a former corsair with similar expertise, but Süleyman reverted to appointing a nonnaval favorite as admiral. Thus, while Hayreddin is viewed as the Ottoman seafarer par excellence, he was actually an anomaly in the history of Ottoman grand admirals.

Hayreddin and Oruç, 1500–20 The origins and early years of Hayreddin are obscured by tales concerning him that originated in the sixteenth century but were sensationalized by Europeans in the seventeenth. Fortunately, more reliable information from Hayreddin himself corrects these inaccuracies that misrepresent his background and early activities.2 Hayreddin’s father, Yakub, the son of a sipahi from the Balkans in the vicinity of Vardar Yenice (present-day Giannitsa in Greece), volunteered to participate in the conquest of Lesbos in 1462. Vardar Yenice had been the center of “gazi” expansion in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. But Yakub must have found greater opportunities on Lesbos because he remained on the island and married a local woman, the daughter of a Christian. Yakub and his wife had four sons—Ishak, Oruç, Hızır, and Ilyas—two of whom, Oruç and Hızır (known as Hayreddin to Muslims and Barbarossa to Europeans), became famous seafarers.3 Although Hayreddin’s father’s ethnicity is debatable, on the mosque that Hayreddin built in Algiers in 1520, he identified his father as a Turk. As the son of a cavalryman in the Balkans, his father might have been a descendant of either the earlier Turkish raiders who were centered on Vardar Yenice under Gazi Evrenos or of the local inhabitants who lived there. What is most likely for the later fifteenth century was that he had ancestry from both groups. That Hayreddin emphasized on the mosque that he built in Algiers that his father was “Turkish” made sense in the context of the spread of Turkish-speaking seafarers into the waters of the western Mediterranean that had begun under Kemal Reis and Piri Reis. In light of the developing conflict in the western Mediterranean where Muslim Turkish-speaking seafarers from the eastern Ottoman lands were beginning to lead resistance to Habsburg expansion in North Africa, this aspect of his identity would have merited emphasis.4 Of Yakub’s four sons, Oruç’s early adventures were the most notable and his encounter with the Knights of Rhodes, a crusading religious order that engaged in privateering against Muslim shipping, set him on a complementary path as a Muslim seafaring gazi attacking Christian shipping. The Knights justified their piracy, occasionally attacking Christian shipping but mostly raiding Muslim targets, as continuing crusading against Muslims after the loss of the Holy Land. Ottoman involvement with the Knights intensified in the late fifteenth century as Cem Sultan, the loser in the succession struggle between Mehmed the Conqueror’s sons, fled to Rhodes after failing when he challenged Bayezid’s right to rule. The Knights tricked Cem, imprisoned him in their

 Ottoman Seafarers: Hayreddin 109 grand master’s relatives’ castles in France, and then extorted money and immunity from Ottoman attacks from Bayezid.5 The Knights of Rhodes’s depredations in the eastern Mediterranean were finally halted by the conquest of the island by Süleyman in 1522. He allowed the Knights to depart, and in 1530 they were given the island of Malta by Charles V, where they resumed their piratical activities and Süleyman lived to regret his earlier merciful actions. Oruç had a life-altering encounter with the Knights of Rhodes. While on a trading voyage to Tripoli in Syria accompanied by his youngest brother, Ilyas, as a result of an attack by the Knights, Ilyas was killed and Oruç was imprisoned on Rhodes. Oruç eventually escaped and was authorized by Korkud Sultan, one of Bayezid II’s sons, to engage in privateering, which he did near Rhodes.6 Unfortunately for Oruç, his royal protector was the loser in the next Ottoman succession struggle, which occurred between the sons of Bayezid, and when Selim became sultan, Oruç and soon thereafter Hızır headed for North Africa, where they reunited at Djerba near Tunis in 1513. The ruler of Tunis allowed them to operate from a base in his territory on condition that they paid him one-fifth of the booty that they captured in their privateering raids. For the next five years, they attacked Christian shipping taking prizes of ships filled with wheat or cloth, while also attempting to set up an independent base in a North African city. This goal led to their attack on the Spanish presidio at Bijaya (Bougie), where Oruç was severely wounded. While Oruç was incapacitated Hayreddin made raids during which he captured 3,800 people, captives comprising a significant portion of the booty of raids. Hayreddin also captured a ship filled with wood, which he sent under the command of Piri Reis to Istanbul. As a reward Selim gave Piri two galleys and a robe of honor. This episode indicates that Hayreddin was reforging connections with the Ottoman ruler and that Piri Reis continued to operate as a sea gazi in North African waters after his uncle’s death. The Barbarossa brothers continued their attacks on the Spanish at Bijaya, where they were forced to burn their ships to escape a large Spanish force. Despite this setback, their successful raiding attracted the support of other corsairs such as the famous Kurdoğlu, who Selim later recruited to assist in naval logistics when he conquered Egypt.7 The Barbarossa brothers’ growing fame led to their being solicited by the local North African population to assist them against the Spanish threat. Soon Oruç was invited to Algiers, because the inhabitants wanted to eliminate Spanish control of the small islet near the harbor, known as the Penon of Algiers. At this time their brother Ishak arrived from Lesbos and Hayreddin sent him to Algiers to assist Oruç. Oruç and Hayreddin felt secure enough at Algiers that they divided the ten castles on either side of the city between themselves and enumerated the population, recording their occupations and the taxes they owed. But their opposition to Spanish expansion was impeded by the fact that many of the local rulers in North Africa had become allies of the Spanish rulers. For example, the ruler of Tlemcen allied with Spain, although the local population opposed this policy. Hayreddin sent Ishak to help attack Tlemcen with the support of the local inhabitants, but he was killed in the fighting, which continued for months. Oruç was killed in 1518 when the Spanish attacked him at Tlemcen. Consequently by 1518, Hayreddin had lost all his brothers to warfare with Christians, either the Knights of Rhodes or the Spanish, who claimed that their raiding or political expansion was undertaken in defense of Christendom.8

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Hayreddin’s base at Algiers was continually threatened by the Spanish or their local Muslim allies at Tunis or Tlemcen; thus, in 1519 he dispatched a petition to Selim requesting Ottoman support in exchange for recognizing Selim as the ruler of Algiers. This petition was accompanied by gifts for the sultan. Selim responded by sending an envoy with a robe of honor, a sword, and a flag, and, more importantly, fighting men. After Hayreddin received this aid and the gifts that signified his official status as an Ottoman governor, he proclaimed that Algiers was an Ottoman province.9 The western Mediterranean was opened to Ottoman seafarers by Kemal Reis and Piri Reis, but after Kemal’s death, the gazis in the western Mediterranean were led by Hayreddin and Oruç. Their forces sometimes included corsairs from the eastern Mediterranean such as Kurtoğlu and Piri. While never severing their ties with the sultan, the Barbarossa brothers spent the beginning of Selim’s reign pursuing their ambitions independently in the west. After Oruç’s death, Hayreddin led resistance to Spanish expansion by himself, until he submitted rule of Algiers to Selim in exchange for Ottoman assistance against his enemies. This extension of Ottoman suzerainty over Algiers fit perfectly with Selim’s expansion of Ottoman rule to Egypt after he defeated the Mamluks in 1517. It made strategic sense to control a base on the North African coast of the western Mediterranean to support domination of the eastern Mediterranean. With the succession of Süleyman in 1520, who desired to challenge Charles V, his imperial rival, extending the naval contest to the western Mediterranean where the Spanish were expanding their rule over fortresses on the coast of North Africa became a higher priority. While Hayreddin continued the fight against Spanish expansion into North Africa, the only way this was successful was with the control of naval bases on the coasts.10

Hayreddin, 1520–34: Ottoman Governor in Algiers Although by 1520 Hayreddin had gained the official support of the sultan in Istanbul, his position in North Africa remained precarious as he struggled for power against the Spanish and their local allies. Eventually Hayreddin’s position in Algiers became so desperate that he transferred his base to Cicelye, where he ensured his popularity by bringing ships filled with wheat as booty to the city. Much of the shipping that he attacked while based in North Africa dealt in everyday necessities such as grain, cloth, and wood. After three years, Hayreddin returned to Algiers, which he secured by defeating the lord of Tlemcen, capturing the island in front of Algiers in 1529. He destroyed the Spanish castle on the island, then used the stone to build a breakwater connecting the island to the mainland, thus creating a harbor at Algiers that could be used for substantial fleets, which made Algiers their base. Charles V’s expansion into North Africa was impeded by Hayreddin’s activities adding impetus to his plans to recruit Andrea Doria to his service so he could assault Hayreddin. Thus, Doria became Charles V’s admiral and the Habsburg ruler acquired a powerful fleet with a competent commander. Doria soon assailed Algiers, but Hayreddin defeated this thrust and even raided the coast of France, capturing a ship loaded with cheese. Prisoners who were captured during raids became galley slaves. During this period,

 Ottoman Seafarers: Hayreddin 111 Hayreddin maintained contact with Süleyman sending him information regarding a French peace with Spain.11 In 1531/2 Andrea Doria commanded an expedition to the eastern Mediterranean that captured Koron, and Ahmed Pasha, the Ottoman admiral even with eighty ships, lacked the expertise to defeat him. Koron, which had been captured by the Ottomans in 1500, was an important naval base on the western coast of the Mora. Doria’s absence in eastern waters provided an opportunity for Hayreddin to raid Spanish targets, which were unprotected. The Muslims in Spain were facing increased persecution under Charles V. The seventeenth-century Ottoman author Katib Çelebi claimed that Charles V began to burn Muslims who continued to practice their religion. Consequently, they requested assistance from Hayreddin, who arrived with a fleet of thirty-six ships that made seven trips to transfer the Muslims of Spain to North Africa. Katib Çelebi claimed that Hayreddin rescued 70,000 Muslims, who then settled in and near Algiers.12 When Süleyman returned from a campaign against Austria, he assessed the naval situation and sent an order to Hayreddin to appoint a subordinate to oversee affairs in the western Mediterranean and to sail to Istanbul. Hayreddin first resolved a delicate situation regarding captives and then sailed east. After Hayreddin’s eventful voyage to Istanbul, he was greeted with respect by the Ottoman elite since they agreed that the sultan needed a competent admiral.13

Hayreddin Pasha, 1534–46: Victorious Admiral Hayreddin returned to the heartlands of the Ottoman Empire in late 1533 and anchored his ships at Galata, then the main arsenal. Next, he was received at the imperial divan with eighteen of his captains where he kissed the hand of the sultan. Hayreddin and his captains were all given robes of honor and salaries from the sultan; in other words they became official servants of the state. Hayreddin’s responsibilities included supervising the arsenal and ship construction and determining ship design. He was given the former admiral’s residence in Istanbul, which signified that Hayreddin had been promoted from the governor of a remote Ottoman outpost engaged in privateering, to the head of the Ottoman naval forces with responsibilities that included all aspects of naval matters. Since Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha was at Aleppo preparing for a campaign to Iraq, he invited Hayreddin to visit him there. At Aleppo, Hayreddin was officially given the rank of beylerbey of the islands, a governorship created for him so he could fulfill his new duties as admiral. Later in the sixteenth century the head of the Ottoman navy was given the title of kapudan pasha. Although Hayreddin did not bear this title, he was head of the empire’s naval forces and he answered to no superior in naval matters.14 Hayreddin then returned to Istanbul to fulfill his duties, where his first task was to construct sixty-one galleys. To create a fleet, he also requisitioned ships from Algiers and recruited a few “volunteer” (corsair) ships. He assembled a fleet of eighty-four ships and launched an expedition to raid Messina in Sicily and Reggio opposite to it on the Italian coast. This first major expedition in 1534 captured a huge prize, the conquest of Tunis in August 1534 from the Hafsid dynasty under Mulay Hasan. This city provided

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an important naval base on the coast of North Africa east of Algiers. Mulay Hasan then fled to Spain, where he enlisted the aid of Charles V. The following year, an expedition led by Charles V himself recaptured Tunis and the Ottomans did not regain the city until 1574. In the meantime, the Hafsids were restored under the suzerainty of Charles V, who was exceedingly proud of this victory over his rival Süleyman and his admiral Hayreddin. To record his triumph, he commissioned a series of tapestries at enormous expense that vividly represented his views of his conflict with his most powerful rival.15 Hayreddin’s talents included the ability to administer cities and provinces as well as the arsenal. In the brief period that Hayreddin ruled Tunis, he recorded the population as he had done earlier at Algiers. After the defeat at Tunis, Hayreddin sailed to Algiers before returning to Istanbul to meet with Süleyman after his return from the Iraq campaign. Already Hayreddin became known as the Gazi Pasha.16 Naval warfare rose to new prominence following the formation of an alliance between Süleyman and Francis I of France, recognized in a treaty of 1536 whose terms were agreed between Jean de la Forest, the French ambassador, and Ibrahim Pasha. This treaty later evolved into the Capitulations that were ultimately to cause so much grief for the Ottomans. As a result of this commercial agreement, which masked a military alliance, Süleyman and Francis agreed to fight Charles V in concert in Italy. Hayreddin was ordered to construct 200 ships for a campaign to southern Italy. In 1536, Hayreddin commanded thirty new ships during a brief expedition, but then he returned to await the construction of the additional ships. The campaign season of 1537 began with great expectations of substantial conquests to be made by a joint Ottoman-French effort in Italy. In May 1537, Süleyman advanced with a land army toward Avlonya in Albania from whence he was to be transported by the fleet across the narrow Adriatic to Italy. In May the Ottoman fleet began raiding the coasts of Italy. The French fleet also sailed toward Italy, but they were delayed; thus, by the time they finally arrived, Süleyman had decided to attack Corfu and the French could not persuade the Ottomans to resume raiding the coasts of Italy. Corfu was an island with great strategic significance that Kemal Reis had encouraged Bayezid II to attack previously.17 Although Hayreddin was admiral, Lutfi Pasha, with the rank of vizier, was placed in charge of the fleet for this expedition. The fleet included 135 galleys and with assorted other ships totaled 280 vessels. During the campaign, Hayreddin was assigned to escort grain ships from Egypt; however, he returned while the campaign was still proceeding. The siege of Corfu began in August 1537; however, after forty-three days Süleyman decided to abandon it, despite both Hayreddin and Lutfi Pasha attempting to persuade him to continue as they had made breaches in the fortifications. However, after four soldiers were killed Süleyman claimed that the life of one soldier was worth more than a thousand such fortresses and the siege was abandoned. Thus, Süleyman abandoned a prize of great strategic significance when the conquest was approaching success. Thus, not even the conquest of Corfu rewarded the combined efforts of the Ottomans and the French in 1537. While the fleet was returning home, Hayreddin attacked several Aegean islands with sixty galleys instead of proceeding directly to Istanbul. On one island he captured 4,800 prisoners, causing other islands to capitulate rather than fight. The leaders on the island of Naxos decided to negotiate and agreed to pay the land

 Ottoman Seafarers: Hayreddin 113 tax, signifying that they were submitting to Ottoman administration. In all, Hayreddin caused six islands to become subject to Ottoman rule before he returned with prisoners and gold to Istanbul. In contrast to the lack of accomplishments during the planned campaign in 1537, Hayreddin’s successes were substantial and he was praised because no other seafarer had performed so well.18 By expanding Ottoman rule to these islands, Hayreddin increased Ottoman naval power as he acquired bases that could then be denied to Ottoman rivals.

Preveza The battle of Preveza has been viewed as a turning point in Mediterranean naval history, because it signified the rise to power of the Ottoman navy in the eastern Mediterranean. This battle must be viewed from the perspective of Mediterranean naval warfare in which fighting was not purely naval but amphibious. Of crucial significance in determining who would win and who would lose such battles was “the configuration of the nearest shoreline, who occupied it and in what strength.”19 A large portion of Hayreddin’s fame rests on his victory in the summer of 1538 when he defeated the fleet of the Holy League under the command of Doria. The Holy League had been formed February 1538, after the Ottoman attack on Venetian-held Corfu inclined Venice to agree to an alliance to fight the Ottomans. This battle was fought between fleets of galleys, although the Holy League fleet included galleons. The fleet included fifty-two galleys belonging to Doria, seventy to Venice, thirty to the pope, ten to the Knights of Malta, as well as many other assorted ships. The Holy League fleets planned to rendezvous at Corfu, the site of the previous summer’s battle. In the spring of 1538, Hayreddin departed with a small squadron as most of the fleet was unprepared and later he was joined by additional ships under the command of his captains such as Salih Reis. Before he departed the viziers had attempted to detain him, but Hayreddin ignored their suggestions and sailed to fulfill Süleyman’s wishes. Hayreddin raided islands, including Crete, with his fleet of 150 ships before he learned from informers that the Holy League fleet had attacked Preveza, an Ottoman naval base gained by Mehmed II on the Ionian Sea. Timing was essential for combined operations as seen the previous summer with the ineffective Ottoman-French attempt at joint operations. Doria arrived with Genoese and Spanish ships on September 7, three months later than the arrival of the papal fleet, to support the Venetians. Earlier Hayreddin had sailed around Mora, southern Greece, with the support of corsairs from North Africa as well as the official Ottoman fleet totaling 120 galleys. While the Holy League fleet had to contend with contested overall leadership, Hayreddin’s command was undisputed and he overruled the beys when they suggested a strategy that he did not consider feasible. Earlier he had refused to attack the Venetian fleet or besiege any minor location because he comprehended that it was essential to keep his forces together in case of attack by a larger fleet. Moreover, the previous summer’s experiences at Corfu had demonstrated the futility of briefly besieging ports with adequate fortifications. Once Doria arrived, the fleet of the Holy League had a numerical superiority over the Ottoman fleet, but Hayreddin had already

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moved his fleet inside the gulf of Preveza, which gave him a great strategic advantage because galley fleets were most effective when they could deploy in a line because their guns were in the bow, pointing forward, not along the sides. Since the entrance to the gulf was only 800 yards wide at the narrowest point, galleys had to sail into the gulf in a column. In addition, Ottoman artillery defended both sides of the entrance to the gulf. Most crucial, since the Ottomans controlled the region they could afford to wait because they could easily supply their forces. Galleys had scant storage space, and with a large number of oarsmen as well as sailors and soldiers, providing supplies for their complement of men impacted all naval campaigns. As their supplies diminished, the Holy League fleet attempted to destroy the artillery guarding the harbor, but the Ottomans were able to deploy forces from the ships to reinforce the fortifications. Doria understood that eventually he would be forced to withdraw from guarding the entrance to the gulf of Preveza and at that time he would be vulnerable to attack by Hayreddin. Hayreddin attempted a sortie on about September 25, probably to test whether the Holy League fleet was in logistical difficulties due to lack of supplies. Approximately two days later, Doria decided to withdraw secretly by night, with the advantage of a wind from the north, but the wind failed and Hayreddin had chosen this moment to sail forth from the bay to attack his opponents. At first, he proceeded cautiously, because he could not know whether he would encounter a line of galleys prepared for battle. By calculating the risk correctly, he revealed his greatness as a naval commander. As Katib Çelebi recounted Hayreddin’s wisdom and the ensuing Ottoman victory: On 27 September 1538 Andrea Dora was preparing to enter the Gulf of Lepanto. Hayreddin sailed to Bahşılar. And having reached that place he sent men to climb the masts. They observed masts in the vicinity of Santa Maura and Incir harbor. He immediately prepared for a battle. The infidels observing them, came out to meet them; and the wind being in their favor the Muslims were afraid, for galleys could not draw up but would be run down by the bargias. [Hayreddin prayed for divine assistance and the wind dropped.] The infidels began to fire their cannon, but their shots did not reach their target. A kalyon came out first and fired its cannon but the imperial fleet stopped the cannon and made the ship turn back. They succeeded in capturing several of the barcas by attacking them from a distance and gradually exhausted them. Andrea Doria and the General having come up with their galleys and attempted to resist, the gazi pasha bore down on them and began firing and encircled the barcas. Shells were falling like rain from the barcas. The two fleets were enveloped with smoke and could not see each other. . . . The pasha who attacked like a lion suddenly fired the cannon, he sank several barcas and passed through them to the galleys. He had ordered the soldiers not to plunder the bargias. The attack of the gazis astonished and terrified the infidels, then they could not remain in place any longer and began to flee. . . . From late morning until sunset of that day such wonderful battles on the sea occurred that similar ones had never been seen.20

The victory was complete. However, Hayreddin had a contingency strategy, which indicates that beyond winning any given battle, he understood what components of

 Ottoman Seafarers: Hayreddin 115 his fleet must be preserved for the future. His strategy indicates that in his estimation ships were expendable and could be replaced, but men and cannon were valuable and should be preserved for future battles: the craftie Turke [Hayreddin], misdoubting his owne strength, held of purpose, that if he should chance to be overmatched by the Christians, hee might turn the prow of his gallies upon them, and running the poupes aground, so to land his men and great ordinance, and from land as he might to defend his fleet; accounting it a lesse losse (if the worst should chance) to lose the gallies than the Men.21

In the event, the Holy League fleet was spread out and in no position to offer battle; nevertheless, the fleets finally had come to blows on September 27. Because the wind dropped, the round ships were becalmed, making them vulnerable to attacks by the galleys, which were propelled by oars. Hayreddin sank two round ships with a total of 700 Spanish soldiers as well as some galleys. The Holy League fleet was defeated, and its most serious losses were of men, not of ships. This battle spelled the end of the Holy League and in 1540 Venice agreed to a separate peace.22 Katib Çelebi portrayed this engagement as a holy war and perhaps since Hayreddin was fighting the fleet of the Holy League, it is possible to see this conflict as having a religious dimension in addition to the political one between the forces of the two greatest powers in the Mediterranean: Süleyman and Charles V. The Venetians severely criticized Doria’s actions, and they blamed the defeat on his supposed treachery. Hayreddin’s victory established Ottoman control of the eastern portion of the Mediterranean Sea, and in recognition of his services the sultan increased his salary and ordered celebrations in Ottoman cities.23

Expedition to France, 1543–4 Hayreddin launched his last major expedition in 1543 in response to a request by Francis I to Süleyman for assistance against Charles V. Francis had desired support from the Ottoman fleet in 1542 and had sent his ambassador, Captain Polin, to obtain it. But arrangements for such a campaign could not be completed quickly, and the fleet did not sail until the campaign season of 1543. The Ottoman fleet led by Hayreddin sailed from Istanbul, picked up additional forces in southern Greece, and sailed peacefully by Venetian possessions in the Aegean, but attacked Habsburg supporters in southern Italy. Eventually, the fleet arrived on the Mediterranean shores of France at the beginning of July 1543. After delays caused by French disorganization, the combined French and Ottoman forces attacked Nice, then a possession of the Duke of Savoy, a vassal of Charles V. The siege was ultimately unsuccessful due to French lack of will to prosecute it with full vigor. The Ottoman fleet under the direction of Hayreddin wintered at the French port of Toulon with the understanding that they would be available to assist the French in 1544. Once again French vacillation due to Francis’s inability to focus on a suitable target and provide adequate French support led to limited employment of the fleet. Eventually Süleyman replied favorably to Hayreddin’s request to return home,

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and the fleet sailed east accompanied by Captain Polin. The Ottoman forces attacked only those locations that the French ambassador authorized to be suitable targets, because they were not ruled by French allies. Although the expedition failed to achieve any major successes, later it became notorious as an example of France allying with the Ottoman infidel. While propaganda originating from the supporters of Charles V served to create a lasting impact on historiography, alliances between Muslims and Christians were not infrequent, as evidenced by Charles V’s Muslim vassals in North Africa.24 Süleyman’s correspondence with Hayreddin during the campaign to assist France indicates his absolute trust and reliance on this great admiral. Whereas most of Süleyman’s most trusted officials had risen through the palace system and he had developed close ties to them while they were pages in the palace and then he promoted them to the highest positions of the empire, Hayreddin’s background was exceptional. He did hail from a family that was part of the military forces of the empire, but at a non-elite status. Ties to the dynasty before he and Oruç left for North Africa were not those of a close personal nature. Nevertheless, once Hayreddin obeyed the sultan’s summons and returned to the center of Ottoman power, he had proven his loyalty and capability to the sultan. Orders from Süleyman to Hayreddin repeat the sultan’s assurance of his confidence in Hayreddin’s abilities as an admiral and as an individual who had knowledge of distant lands and the conditions there.25 However, Suleyman’s supposed reliance on Hayreddin’s abilities was not expressed until after the great victory at Preveza. Hayreddin spent his final years after 1544 in Istanbul, preparing for another campaign and suppressing piracy in Ottoman waters. His administrative expertise dating from his years in Algiers was put to good use by the sultan. He organized ship construction, naval supplies, and ordered his captains to eliminate piracy. He was tireless in promoting Süleyman’s interests through the increase of Ottoman naval power and he prepared for future campaigns. His activities recorded in the Mühimme Registers (Registers of Important Affairs) demonstrate that the Ottoman bureaucracy understood the necessity of maintaining naval power and that Hayreddin remained occupied with administering naval affairs whether on campaign or residing in Istanbul.26 When he died in 1546 he was buried in a small türbe (tomb) constructed at Beşiktaş in Istanbul. Within a few years, a mosque constructed near his tomb in honor of Sinan Pasha, a later incompetent admiral, would become the location from which all naval campaigns were launched.27

Political Intrigue and the Navy: Hurrem, Mihrimah and Rüstem, 1520–66 At Hayreddin’s death, the question of who would succeed him as leader of the naval forces of the empire presented two main alternatives: one option was to place another corsair-trained seafarer in this key position so that Ottoman sea power could continue to increase under the direction of an admiral who understood all aspects of

 Ottoman Seafarers: Hayreddin 117 maintaining a powerful navy, including how to win naval battles. The other option was to place an individual with palace connections in this key post. Two trends ensured that the second option prevailed. First, opposition by the administrative elite noted in the case of Kemal Reis during the reign of Bayezid II had not diminished during that of Süleyman as evidenced by Lutfi Pasha’s criticism of Hayreddin Pasha. Lutfi described Hayreddin’s ambition, which led to his defeat at Tunis in 1535, as follows: “he became puffed up to the bursting point with self-regard, prematurely priding himself with selfappointed status as ‘Emperor of the Maghrib.’ But God punished him for his unseemly vanity.”28 In addition, the elite could enlist the influence of the sultan’s own family, his wife, Hurrem, and his daughter, Mihrimah. The power of these two women had been enhanced when another favorite of the sultan, Rüstem Pasha, married Mihrimah in 1539. As would be revealed later in the struggle among Süleyman’s sons to succeed him, this faction wielded enormous power. Evidence indicates that not only did these three individuals work to promote the interests of Mihrimah’s full brothers, they also advanced the career of Rüstem’s brother, Sinan, who became admiral in 1548.29 Once Rüstem had married Mihrimah, it was in the interests of Rüstem, Mihrimah, and Hurrem to promote the succession of one of Hurrem’s sons, because their future prosperity, if not their lives, depended on it.30 When Rüstem became grand vizier in 1544 he was in an ideal position to assist Hurrem’s sons and thus Mihrimah’s full brothers against her half-brother, Mustafa. As grand vizier and thus the deputy of the ruler, he influenced the selection of individuals for significant appointments in the administration. But he was not merely the sultan’s grand vizier; he was also the sultan’s son-in-law and the appointments he made benefited his brother as well as Mihrimah’s.

Sinan Pasha as Admiral: Turgud as Adviser In 1548 the post of admiral was given to Sinan Pasha, the brother of Rüstem Pasha, who had previously been the governor of a district (sancak bey) of the Herzegovina sancak. When he became admiral, he was immediately made governor of a province (beylerbey) of the islands with a salary of 700,000 silver coins. Although Sokollu Mehmed, his predecessor, and Piyale Pasha, his successor as admiral, were not immediately promoted to the full governorship of the province of the Islands, but at first were only made governor of the sancak of Gallipoli, Sinan’s more rapid promotion was due to his powerful connections.31 Sinan owed his elevation to admiral to the influence of Rüstem, Mihrimah, and Hurrem. His appointment not only advanced his career, it was vital for the plans that Mihrimah and Hurrem had to prevent Mustafa from inheriting the throne. That Sinan’s abilities were not the reason for his appointment is clear from both Ottoman and Venetian sources, for Mustafa Ali claimed that Sinan had been “viciously contentious, impetuous with words, dreadful, and tyrannical!” Bernardo Navagero described the situation in more detail in 1553. The Grand Signore’s present Captain of the Sea has little experience with maritime affairs, since he has not had any duty or practice related to the army: he is obeyed

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and esteemed more than any other captain on account of his brother. There is nothing he commands that is not carried out and he wants to be recognized by all as a leader. He has little courtesy and speaks with no reservation. He is irascible, or better said furious. . . . His brother, the Pasha, loves him extremely and favours him excessively, and cannot support any talk against him. He therefore does all that enters his head without any fear whatsoever, and everyone stays quiet even if greatly abused. . . . There is no securer way to prevent Mustafa’s succession than to prohibit with the armada his passage [to the capital].32

Thus, the influence of Süleyman’s grand vizier on the appointment of Sinan as admiral was not solely based on the desire of the administrative elite, who had been recruited through the levy of boys and trained in the palace to exclude outsiders from positions of power. It also intersected with the influence of the sultan’s own family and connected to the most important issue of the last fifteen years of his reign: which of his sons would succeed Süleyman.33 From the perspective of Ottoman military might, Sinan’s appointment reduced Ottoman power due to its negative impact on the effectiveness of the empire’s naval forces. The empire had immense resources; thus, providing ships and naval supplies was not difficult, but a powerful navy required experienced seafarers at all levels of the forces. When the admiral was appointed because of political factors, and, as was frequently the case, was unfamiliar with naval matters then the effectiveness of the fleet suffered. In contrast, Hayreddin Pasha had been appointed admiral in 1534 because Süleyman realized after serious naval defeats in 1532 that he must have an effective leader in charge of the empire’s naval forces. Hayreddin owed his position not to palace connections but to his abilities as a corsair who had previously conquered Algiers and begun to govern there before he sought official recognition by submitting the province to Selim I. Until his death in 1546 he led the Ottoman fleet to many victories. One of his corsair associates, Turgud, would have made an effective admiral after Hayreddin’s death. However, several palace favorites in succession were appointed to the position of admiral until the next major naval disaster, Lepanto. Katib Çelebi’s history of the Ottoman navy written in the seventeenth century stated that Süleyman had considered appointing Turgud admiral. Rüstem dissuaded him and warned the sultan that Turgud had received his training “outside,” presumably outside palace circles and therefore was suspect.34 Certainly, it was contrary to Rüstem’s interests to have an independently minded corsair placed in charge of this crucial aspect of the logistics of ensuring the succession of one of Mihrimah’s brothers. A slightly different version of the situation is found in the history of the seventeenthcentury historian Peçevi: Turgud was offered the position of admiral but refused it for fear that Rüstem Pasha would harm him if he accepted, since Rüstem wanted his brother Sinan to receive the admiralship.35 Although Turgud was originally from the Aegean coast of Anatolia, he had sailed with Hayreddin both in the Aegean and in the western Mediterranean. He had been captured in 1540 while oiling his ships at Corsica and spent some years as a galley slave. In 1544 Hayreddin had demanded his release for a ransom when he sailed past Genoa on his return from the Ottoman expedition to aid France. After Hayreddin’s death

 Ottoman Seafarers: Hayreddin 119 Turgud’s base of operations was at Djerba for a time. He had raided ports on Sicily in 1548, and the following year he captured the port of Mahedia, located between Djerba and Tunis. Andrea Doria was able to regain control of Mahedia in 1550 and almost trapped Turgud at Djerba in 1550.36 When Sinan became admiral and naval expeditions were undertaken, Turgud was ordered to assist Sinan, but Sinan’s inability to work effectively with him led to only limited success in the naval expedition of 1551. The Ottoman fleet unsuccessfully attacked Malta, headquarters of the Knights of St. John, whom Süleyman had defeated in 1522 at Rhodes, although the Ottoman fleet conquered Tripoli on the coast of Libya. Despite the mediocrity of his performance, Sinan retained the post of admiral even in 1553 when his brother was dismissed from office after the execution of Süleyman’s eldest son, Mustafa. When Sinan died in December 1554, Piyale Pasha, a palace-trained administrator, became admiral. According to Katib Çelebi, Piyale was informed that he must work effectively with Turgud and that he must rely on Turgud’s judgment in military matters. Piyale followed the advice and formed a satisfactory partnership with Turgud, which resulted in successful naval operations in the Mediterranean. Thus, the sultan placed a devşirme favorite in the position of admiral but also ensured that he had competent naval leadership by requiring that Piyale follow the advice of Turgud. But what might have seemed an ideal solution, devşirme favorite as admiral with a lower-ranking naval expert as adviser to ensure that the inexperienced favorite did not make any disastrous mistakes, could go terribly wrong, as at Lepanto when the admiral refused to follow sound advice.37 The involvement of the women of Süleyman’s family, Hurrem and Mihrimah, in matters of policy that impacted naval matters illustrates that Ottoman naval history must not be studied in isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the most important trends that affected the history of the empire as an entirety. Certainly, rivalry among the princes to succeed Süleyman dominated the period from the 1550s to the beginning of the 1560s. Mustafa was eliminated in 1553 but then princes Selim and Bayezid became rivals until Bayezid’s execution in 1561. Mihrimah’s involvement in the final phase of succession struggles is revealed in the letters that she wrote to Süleyman. In one letter, Mihrimah expressed great anxiety regarding Süleyman having been informed that she had deliberately not forwarded correspondence between the sultan and his son Selim. I sent the note that came from Selim Han to you as decreed in your letter, you did not send your answer. My felicitous sultan, my Padishah, I, your female slave, am the dust under your foot, excuse my defect forgive my insolence. . . . When your letter came, I was, God forbid, at the bath . . . I swear it is so, my prosperous sultan, that when I had read Sultan Selim’s note, I made a fair copy. That is to say, I sent the note, I swear it is so . . . God knows my sultan, I swear this night I never slept because of this disturbing matter, also has it ever in this world occurred other than as soon as my felicitous sultan’s noble order is issued, I send news.

Mihrimah stressed both her reliability, and her obedience to the sultan’s orders. She apparently forwarded letters between Süleyman and her brothers, Selim and Bayezid, during the final bitter struggle between them that ended with Bayezid’s execution.38

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Mihrimah’s influence and power increased with the death of her mother in 1558 when she assumed Hurrem’s role as the sultan’s adviser. Mihrimah’s involvement in the succession controversy is revealed in her letters. Her involvement in naval matters is revealed in her architectural patronage during the 1550s due to her overseeing the construction of a mosque built in honor of her deceased brother-in-law, Sinan Pasha. He owed his promotion to admiral, governor of a province, and finally lieutenant governor of Istanbul in 1553, when Süleyman and Rüstem left on campaign against the Safavids, to the influence of his brother and by extension his brother’s wife. The importance of Mihrimah’s influence for the advancement of Rüstem and Sinan’s careers was recorded by a Spanish source, which stated “that the two brothers ‘would be reduced to nothing’ if she were to die.”39 This claim is supported by Sinan Pasha’s designating Mihrimah as the executor of his will and entrusting his possessions to her, although he had at least one surviving daughter. Sinan (d. 1554) was buried in the cemetery of Mihrimah’s mosque complex in Üsküdar, near her palace where Rüstem Pasha resided during his exile from 1553 to 1555 after the execution of Mustafa brought his temporary loss of office.40 Mimar Sinan was commissioned to build a mosque for Sinan at Beşiktaş, which was completed in 1555–6. Although Sinan Pasha planned to arrange the charitable donation (waqf) for this mosque before his death, he appointed his brother to oversee its construction. A detailed account of the allocation of his assets for this project was reviewed by the representatives of Mihrimah and Sinan’s daughter. The mosque’s construction was delayed until 1555, when Rüstem Pasha was reinstated as grand vizier. This mosque was built near the tomb of Hayreddin Pasha, and linked Sinan’s identity as admiral to that of the great admiral Hayreddin. The form of the mosque reflected earlier Ottoman mosques built in the period of the “gazis.” It was designed to allow huge numbers of men to perform prayers there prior to the departure of the fleet from Beşiktaş, where Hayreddin had become the “patron saint” of all subsequent admirals. It became the model for other mosques that Mimar Sinan built for grand admirals.41 Mihrimah’s later promotion of an expedition to attack the Knights at Malta indicates that she continued to desire to exert her influence in naval matters. In 1562 she attempted to persuade Süleyman to send an expedition against the Knights of Malta and even offered to pay for 400 ships.42 In 1565 her influence may have led to the second Ottoman naval campaign against Malta. But warfare with the Spanish and their proxies, the Knights of Malta, was not the only conflict that the Ottomans pursued with the rulers of the Iberian Peninsula and their navies. The Ottomans fought the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean, but this theater of naval operations was given a lower priority than increasing power in the Mediterranean.

Piyale Pasha and Turgud Reis, 1554–68 While strained relations between devşirme recruited officials and corsair experienced seafarers were frequent, at times these individuals formed effective working relationships that allowed Ottoman naval power to flourish. An example of this was

 Ottoman Seafarers: Hayreddin 121 the partnership between Turgud Reis and Piyale Pasha, a devşirme-recruited official who became a favorite of Süleyman and was appointed admiral at the death of Sinan in 1554. After observing the incompetence of Sinan, Süleyman informed Piyale that he must rely on Turgud’s advice regarding naval matters and Piyale did so. In 1555 together they conquered the castle of Reggio in southern Italy and Oran in Algeria. In 1556 they conquered Bizerta in Tunisia. Piyale was promoted to beylerbey of the islands in 1558, after a successful campaign against the Baleric Islands. He commanded the Ottoman fleet, which defeated the Spanish fleet at Djerba in 1560, where Ottoman forces captured forty ships, 4,000 slaves, and additional booty. The Habsburg ambassador Busbecq described the experiences of the Ottoman fleet at Djerba in 1560: Süleyman had appointed Piali Pasha as admiral in command of the expedition. The ships were manned with a large number of picked men, who, however, were not free from anxiety and alarm at the distance of the journey. . . . The fleet, however, enjoyed favouring winds and came upon our men unawares; and its unexpected arrival caused such a panic that they had neither the courage to fight nor the presence of mind to escape. A few galleys, it is true, which were cleared for action, sought safety in flight; the rest stuck fast, or broke up in the shallow water, or were surrounded by the enemy and sunk.43

As a result of his successes as admiral, Piyale was married to one of Selim II’s daughters, Gevherhan, during the reign of her grandfather in 1562. As a result of this wedding Mihrimah’s proposed expedition to attack Malta was postponed so that the bride and groom could spend time together. Apparently, this was a happy marriage, because on subsequent campaigns Gevherhan mourned greatly at separations from her husband.44 The Venetian Marcantonio Donini did not judge Piyale’s abilities very highly in his report of 1562. He stated Piyale “neither has the experience nor the intelligence required of a grand admiral, being very timid. Yet he has excellent advisers, who alleviate the weight of most things expected from his post. He is of the Hungarian nation . . . with a pleasant and human nature and a mediocre intellect.”45 Despite his supposed personal mediocrity, his willingness to follow the direction of a seafarer who had learned his craft from the great Hayreddin, Turgud, ensured that Ottoman sea power did not suffer under his command. In 1565 a final expedition was launched against Malta, this time under the leadership of Piyale Pasha, but once again with the participation of Turgud Reis. The expedition to Malta generated many archival records, which, unlike those of earlier expeditions, have survived. These records provide rare insight regarding the men who served in the fleet besides the admirals. While the admirals if they were talented were a crucial aspect of Ottoman naval power, skilled seaman at all levels were an essential component to an effective fleet. When these men were lost after a major battle such as at Lepanto in 1571, they were the most difficult component of the navy to replace. Because there was no educational system to produce seafarers, they, like Piri Reis, learned by experience sailing with a master seafarer. If too many of the masters were lost before they could

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train their successors, then these less experienced successors in turn had less expertise to pass on in the short term.46 The expedition to Malta provides a perfect case study with which to understand the logistics of galley warfare. Galleys were low-lying narrow vessels that were propelled by oars with a few cannon mounted in the prow. This method of propulsion was both their strength and their weakness for by means of rowing, if there was no wind the vessel was still capable of movement. For example, at the battle of Preveza, Hayreddin’s fleet of galleys was able to sink round ships when the wind dropped, and the sailing ships were becalmed when they tried to retreat from guarding the entrance to the gulf at Preveza. However, this advantage was outweighed by the disadvantage that the oars were manned by many men and these men and oars took up most of the space on the galley. Therefore, space for storing supplies was limited and, due to the large number of men, the need for supplies was enormous. Galleys were most useful in amphibious operations, and their main purpose was to attack fortified ports. Possession of strategic ports was essential to controlling the Mediterranean Sea, and Ottoman naval bases had expanded in number during the sixteenth century. Conquering strategic ports generally required more than an assault by sea; an attack by a land-based force was necessary as well. Hayreddin’s conquest of several Aegean islands shortly after he became admiral in 1534 demonstrated that he recognized the necessity of controlling many bases in order to become a naval power in the Mediterranean, where warfare was prosecuted by fleets of galleys. The importance of naval bases explains why the Ottomans invested enormous effort and resources trying to capture Malta, first in 1551 under Sinan Pasha and then again in 1565 under Piyale Pasha. The Knights, a crusading order established in 1119, had moved their headquarters several times, most recently in the sixteenth century when, after their defeat by Süleyman in 1522 at Rhodes, they were homeless until Charles V gave them Malta and Tripoli to guard. Malta, although a small island, was a base from which the Knights were able to sail into the eastern Mediterranean and continue to harass Ottoman shipping. Likewise, if the Ottomans had gained control of the island it would have provided a base for them to attack Spanish-held territories in the western Mediterranean. Therefore, it was not merely that the Knights were a crusading order or that they were a scourge to Ottoman commerce; possession of this strategic island by the Ottomans was vital to attempts to extend their naval power more effectively into the western Mediterranean. Earlier experiences had demonstrated that besieging island fortresses with strong fortifications was a perilous enterprise for a fleet of galleys. Especially if the target was located as far away as Malta and defended by forces as skilled and determined as the Knights, it was a gamble. In both the 1551 and 1565 campaigns the Ottomans conquered portions of the island, but final victory eluded them. Logistically a fleet of galleys needed too much time to sail to Malta; supplies for an enormous fleet had to be maintained during the outbound voyage, during a siege and during the return voyage. Süleyman’s campaign to Vienna in 1529 demonstrated the limits of Ottoman land warfare and Malta in 1565 demonstrated the limits of Ottoman naval power. Perhaps if Mihrimah’s proposed expedition had occurred in 1562 victory would have been achieved as the Knights might have been less prepared than they were in

 Ottoman Seafarers: Hayreddin 123 1565. But by that time adequate fortifications prevented the Ottomans from conquering the island in the short time that a galley expedition had at its disposal. Timing was everything and just as at Preveza Hayreddin knew when to launch his attack on the retreating Holy League fleet because logistically they would have reached the end of their tether, so the relieving force for the siege at Malta knew that if the Knights could hold on long enough that eventually the Ottomans would have to retreat due to the threat of a relieving fleet. The Ottomans withdrew when they had reached the limits of doing so without risking disaster. Because they retreated safely the expedition was a defeat, but not a catastrophe. Preparations for the campaign began months before the fleet departed from Istanbul. The decision to attack Malta was made at least as early as October 6, 1564. Süleyman sent an order to Turgud Reis about December 1564 in which he stated, “I am relying on you because of your military experience. You should help Mustafa Pasha at sea and you should protect our navy against the enemy’s navy, which could set out from other countries to help Malta.”47 Mustafa was the vizier in command of the expedition. The Ottoman fleet departed from Istanbul on March 29, 1565. Its route and schedule reveal the logistical difficulties of a long-distance venture by a fleet of galleys. The first day they sailed as far as Yedikule (still Istanbul), and the following day they sailed to Gallipoli, where due to a storm the fleet was detained for three days. On April 6 the fleet anchored at the Dardanelles castles, where it remained until April 11. The fleet sailed to Bozcaada (Tenedos) on April 12, then sailed past Lesbos, and on April 14 arrived at Chios, where it remained for two days. On April 16 it sailed ten miles and then they greased the galleys at Koyun Islands until April 19. Thus, the fleet did not leave the vicinity of Chios until April 21. The next day it arrived at Kizilhisar. The fleet arrived at Athens on April 23, where it remained for about five days. The fleet sailed around the islands until on May 1 it arrived at Cape Benefshe. On May 5 it was near Koron, on May 6 near Modon, and on May 7 near Anavarin, where it remained for a week until May 15. While at Anavarin, the Bey of Rhodes and the Bey of Salonica joined the fleet. Finally, the fleet set out on the final leg of its journey to Malta. On May  20 they sighted the island and on May 21 they began their landing. Thus, the fleet  took almost two months to travel to Malta from Istanbul. Small wonder then that when Hayreddin sailed to France in 1543, he did not arrive on the French coast until the beginning of July. Galleys moved relatively slowly under oars when they had to cover great distances. Sails were used if possible, to put less strain on the oarsmen. Cruising speed over twenty-four hours would probably have averaged about 1.5 nautical miles per hour. A crew of oarsmen could reach a speed of seven nautical miles per hour in a battle and maintain it for twenty minutes, but after this they would need several hours of rest to recover.48 The siege began on May 25, when the Ottoman forces unloaded cannon and the following day, they established entrenchments. The Ottomans attacked the St. Elmo fortress that they captured on June 23, but this victory cost the life of many men, including Turgud Pasha, who had recently arrived from Tripoli. The delay in capturing this fortress meant that time was very short for achieving the total conquest of Malta. It was not until July 12 that the governor of Algiers, Hasan Pasha (son of Hayreddin), finally arrived at Malta. The following two months were marked by intense fighting as

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the Ottoman forces attempted to capture the main harbor defenses at Malta and the Knights stubbornly defended them. On September 11 with the Spanish and Genoese relief fleet approaching Malta, the Ottomans finished their embarkation preparations and withdrew in good order.49 During the campaign, Süleyman had dispatched messages to Mustafa Pasha inquiring how the siege was proceeding and especially demanding information regarding Turgud Reis, whether he had arrived and if he had assisted Mustafa. These inquiries indicate Süleyman’s concern as to whether a naval expert was present to direct this crucial campaign that otherwise was led by Piyale, who had been successful with Turgud’s advice but without Turgud, Piyale and Mustafa might lack the expertise to make wise naval decisions.50 Süleyman’s messages to Mustafa resemble those sent to Hayreddin in 1543, in that he demanded details regarding events, but differ in that he did not express total confidence in his admiral’s expertise. Perhaps Süleyman felt particularly anxious concerning naval expeditions to distant shores, because their fate was controlled by individuals who were too distant to direct personally and who might not possess adequate expertise to handle difficult situations. Hayreddin had brought the fleet back safely in 1544, but after the death of Turgud, Süleyman must have wondered if his commanders were up to the task and he demanded more news concerning events.51

The Men of the Sultan’s Fleet The records of the Malta expedition not only present evidence regarding how Süleyman viewed his commanders, they also provide rare insight into the identities of the thousands of men who served in the Ottoman navy, even those of the lowest rank. The forces at Malta resembled those employed in most naval campaigns of Süleyman’s reign. From the campaign register we glean a few details concerning individual men who composed the forces who attacked Malta, most of whom were sipahis, cavalrymen who held a timar, a land grant from which they got their living. In addition, Janissaries joined the expeditionary force and these land-based forces were transported by galleys. The galleys were manned by oarsmen, a few of whom were galley slaves; however, most of them were peasants recruited from rural areas in the empire without any naval background. Free oarsmen had the advantage over slaves since they supplemented the fighting strength of the army when it was engaged in a siege. They also worked as laborers when on land. In the coastal provinces twenty to thirty households were required to provide one oarsman while the other families paid his expenses until his return. Most men on galleys were oarsmen, because on average 150 oarsmen were required per galley. The remainder of the crew was made up of six to ten sailors of various ranks, who were led by a captain, and under him by a yelkenci (sailor) or oda başı (chamber head). The common sailors were known as azab, a seaman. Azabs were recruited from any available young men, and they were not necessarily familiar with seafaring before they served in the naval forces. They bore arms; thus when the galleys were not at sea, azabs contributed to the fighting forces of expeditions.52 Captains generally rose through the ranks of azabs,

 Ottoman Seafarers: Hayreddin 125 achieving the rank of hassa reis if they led a detachment of sailors and captained a state-owned galley. The average captain thus had seafaring experience by the time he was promoted to command a galley. In addition, craftsmen, such as carpenters, who usually were employed at the arsenal, served on campaign so that ships could be repaired. Each ship was required to carry two carpenters, two caulkers, and two oars makers to maintain the ships. Thus, most men on a galley were unskilled oarsmen, but many specialists were required, including the fighting men who were most important after the naval forces arrived at their destination and prepared to besiege a fortress. In addition to men, ships carried artillery, swivel guns that were fired just before galleys met in battle. The higher command of the naval forces included after the admiral the kethüda (executive officer) of the captains stationed at Galata who represented them in meetings with the admiral and who commanded a squadron of galleys when the fleet was at sea. The admiral who commanded the Mediterranean fleet of the Ottoman navy issued orders in his own name, but many of his decisions had to be referred to the divan or grand vizier. Even naval appointments had to be approved by his superiors, although he could recommend men who had served during naval campaigns to receive timars and zeamets (a large land assignment). Recommendations for advancement were usually the result of exceptional bravery in combat. The archival register of the Malta campaign records some of the individuals who comprised the naval forces when their deaths or promotions were noted. A few quotes from the registers bring to life the men who served on this campaign. In some cases, the records note outstanding feats performed in battle. “Since many individuals . . . bore witness that the son of Omer, Halil, an oarsman from the kaza of Kochisar, had rendered outstanding services by holing the wall of the Santarma fortress during its siege, it has been decreed that a timar of 3,000 akçe should be given to him.”53 To be promoted from an oarsman to a sipahi with a decent-sized timar was quite an accomplishment. In contrast, another oarsman was making six akçe per day (annually 2100 akçe [350 times 6]); Halil would now make considerably more. “Since Ali, the son of Pir Nazar who himself was a head sailor, has performed brave actions during the conquest of the Santarma fortress . . . it has been decreed that he should be appointed to the headship of a galley, with a daily wage of 20 akçe.”54 Bravery was rewarded with promotion and a substantial salary. Piyale Pasha sent many recommendations for promotions for the men who served in the navy. “Kapdan-ı Derya Piyale Pasha has sent a memorandum requesting that Mustafa should be appointed bolukbaşı [squadron leader] in place of Hüseyin, and that  Hüseyin should be appointed as in place of Murad, while Murad should be appointed as sailor in place of Mehmed.”55 It appears that Murad is being demoted unless there is more than one Murad indicated. Many promotions occurred because the former holder of the post had died during the campaign. Piyale Pasha Hazretleri has sent a letter stating that Mustafa b. Kasım, a hassa captain at Galata who served in the 157th squadron with a daily wage of 8 akçe, fell martyr . . . and that his post has therefore become vacant. Since Mehmed b. Abdullah, a sailor who served in the 123rd squadron with a daily wage of 7 akçe, is

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well versed in naval science, it has been decreed that he should be appointed to the above-mentioned vacant post with a daily wage of 8 akçe.56

This is an unsurprising promotion that a skilled sailor was promoted to become a captain. Not all deaths occurred as a result of battle, but any death provided an opportunity for another deserving man. “Piyale Pasha has sent a memorandum stating that Yusuf, from the corps of caulkers at Galata, had died. He therefore requested that Mehmed, an oarsman who was in charge of cutting oars, should be appointed to Yusuf ’s post, and that to Mehmed’s post another Mehmed be appointed.” But deaths in battle did provide the most opportunities for advancement during a campaign. Piyale Pasha has sent a letter stating that Süleyman, a hassa captain at Galata who served in the 107th squadron with a daily wage of 20 akçe, had fallen martyr, and that Hüseyin b. Hıdır, a senior sailor who served in the 6th squadron with a daily wage of 7 akçe, was a suitable person for his post. It has been decreed that Hüseyin should be appointed to the above-mentioned post with a daily wage of 12 akçe.57

Captains’ pay rates varied greatly. The experienced Süleyman had been paid better than many a sipahi. The military forces that served on campaign included many diverse positions that all contributed to the sultan’s fleet. The son of Abdullah, Murad, who served in the mehter takımı [band of musicians] with a daily wage of 6.5 akçe, died in the island of Malta. Since the son of Abdullah, Ibrahim, who served in the corps of oarsmen with a daily wage of 6 akçe, was a suitable person for his post, it has been so decreed that he should be so appointed. It has been decreed that Ibrahim’s above-mentioned post should go to his son, Mehmed, who served in the corps of tent pitchers with a daily wage of 2.5 akçe.58

Musicians, oarsmen, and tent pitchers seem to have been easily shifted from one post to another. While all these contributions were valued to a degree, naval expertise was most essential and, if a man exhibited it, he could expect a substantial reward for his feats. “Since Ahmed Reis of Tunis, a hassa galley captain who served with a daily wage of 56 akçe, has rendered outstanding services by capturing one of the frigates of the infidels, together with its commander, . . . it has been decreed that a rise of 5 akçe should be given in his daily wage.”59 Naval expertise could be found in a wide range of men. Piyale Pasha has sent a letter stating that Rus Hamza, a captain at Galata who served in the 119th squadron with a daily wage of 15 akçe, fell martyr in the war of Malta and that Mustafa, a katip [clerk] at the Imperial Arsenal, was well versed in naval science and captaincy. It has therefore been decreed that he should be appointed to Rus Hamza’s post with a daily wage of 10 akçe.60

 Ottoman Seafarers: Hayreddin 127 Not only seamen. but also scribes. were considered eligible if they demonstrated that they had the skills for the position. “Piyale Pasha Hazretleri has sent a memorandum requesting that to the post of Hasan, from the azaps of Galata, who has been promoted to the captaincy, the oarsman Yusuf should be appointed, to the latter’s post the gumi [overseer of galley slaves] Mustafa should be appointed and to the latter’s post Mehmed should be appointed.”61 Here we see a shuffle of men to fill positions as vacancies occurred due to deaths or promotions. Men in naval service were compensated at widely different rates depending on their value to the force. Some men were promoted to be oarsmen from other positions. Men could make surprising career shifts from oarsman to musician and from clerk to captain of a galley. The fluidity of these appointments reveals that there were few specialists in the navy and that men learned their naval skills on the job. Ahmed of Tunis might have been a corsair before joining the imperial navy, and he was certainly well compensated for his service. His salary appears to have been amply deserved as he was skillful and daring enough to capture a galley with its commander. Although the campaign did not achieve the goal of conquering Malta, Süleyman liberally rewarded those men who participated in the venture. This was the final naval campaign of the reign of Süleyman, and it was already apparent that the great days of Hayreddin were only a memory. With the death of Turgud, this adviser of admirals was no longer able to assist the palace appointees. While advice from naval experts was not lacking, commanders who were willing to follow it were.

Selim II, 1566–74: Cyprus and Lepanto The most memorable naval event of the reign of Selim II was the battle of Lepanto on October 7, 1571. This battle’s fame, in contrast to most Ottoman naval battles that are forgotten by all but a few historians, is because it was a resounding victory for the unified fleets of the Holy League of Venice, Spain, and the papacy under the leadership of Don Juan of Austria. The long-term impact of the battle continues to be debated: it did not prevent the Ottomans from conquering Cyprus, and they reconstructed a fleet by the following spring. In retrospect, the battle retains its claim to being a turning point of history not because of the Christian victory, but because it intersects with other trends in Ottoman history.62 But trends in Mediterranean naval warfare that impacted the Ottomans as well as other participants deserve consideration first. Over the course of the sixteenth century while the Ottomans and their Habsburg opponents battled for supremacy in the Mediterranean, the nature of galley warfare evolved. Both the Ottomans and the Habsburgs continued to use galleys but because they were altered to make them more effective in battles, that is tactically, they became less effective strategically, their range diminished. Also, galleys began to carry more artillery and they were slightly larger. Guilmartin stated in Gunpowder and Galleys, “An increase in a galley’s size with a proportionate increase in fighting manpower resulted in an obvious and direct increase in combat power. But unless speed under oars were to be sacrificed, each increase in size had to be accompanied by increasingly

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disproportionate increase in the size of the number of oarsmen.”63 In other words, you needed more oarsmen to propel this larger ship. This meant that galleys increased slightly in size, but the number of men on them increased greatly. This impacted galley fleets’ ranges because there was less storage space per man for water and other provisions. Thus fleets could not travel as far as they had in the past because there was simply less room for their necessary supplies. This had always been a disadvantage of galley fleets; affecting even the great Hayreddin when he sailed to France in 1543. Before 1550 the average number of oarsmen per galley was 144, but by the battle of Lepanto, Spanish galleys had 200 oarsmen per galley. The flagships of fleets carried enormous numbers of men; Don Juan’s ship had 420 oarsmen and 400 arquebusiers. The Ottoman admiral Müezzinzade Ali, who had been promoted to this position due to palace influence rather than expertise, in his ship had 300 Janissaries and 100 arquebusiers. More men on naval campaigns meant more biscuit to feed them. Biscuit had previously been an issue in 1543 and 1565. More men, more supplies, more cannon meant more money. Ultimately galleys would be replaced by sailing ships, not because they were necessarily better in battle but because sailing ships that did not rely on human muscle to propel them could sail to more distant places, while the range of galleys kept shrinking. Also sailing ships could carry far more artillery and they provided a more stable platform on which to mount it. The battle of Lepanto was a disaster for the Ottomans. Not because they lost the war; they did not, they conquered Cyprus. Not because they lost many ships, 127 captured and sixty sunk, at least, but because they lost many men, perhaps 30,000 out of a total of 32,400.64 The scope of the disaster can be understood when the casualties among the leadership are compared with that of Malta just seven years earlier. Malta in 1565 cost the life of one sanjak bey, Suheyl Bey of Kocaeli, and one beylerbey, Turgud Pasha of Tripoli.65 Lepanto cost the lives of eleven sanjak beys, as well as the lives of the admiral and other high-ranking individuals in the navy. Demetrie Cantemir claimed that Lepanto was “the greatest blow the Ottomans received since the defeat of Ildirim Bayezid.”66 The battle to which Cantemir referred was the defeat of Bayezid I by Timur at Ankara in 1402 when it seemed the empire would be permanently wiped off the map. Thus the extent of the disaster at Lepanto was truly unprecedented as far as a naval defeat was concerned or any military encounter since the beginning of the fifteenth century. The only glimmer of hope after the disaster was that Kılıç Ali, a client of Turgud Reis, who after attempting to turn the tide of the battle saw that all was lost, escaped with twelve galleys. The question of whether Müezzinzade Ali was a competent commander remains debatable. Guilmartin states his only “questionable decision” was whether to fight at all. Because he had been directed to engage the enemy it would have been difficult to explain why he did not do so; however, Hayreddin never allowed himself to be pressured into involvement in what he considered risky endeavors despite enduring accusations of treason or cowardice. Ottoman sources indicate that Müezzinzade Ali’s decisions regarding the battle were questioned by his more competent but lowerranking comrades. Katib Çelebi vividly described the discussion among the commanders before the battle. Kılıç Ali claimed that the fleet was deficient because it had been sailing all

 Ottoman Seafarers: Hayreddin 129 season and many of the sipahis and Janissaries who were supposed to be with the fleet had left, some without leave. Müezzinzade Ali responded that he did not think that five or ten fewer soldiers per ship would be a deciding factor. Kılıç Ali then advised fighting away from the coast so that the crews of damaged ships would not attempt to save themselves but instead continue to fight but Müezzinzade Ali overruled him. Kılıç Ali called on men who had fought in the past with Hayreddin and Turgud to support him in his attempt to influence the admiral, but he was unable to convince Müezzinzade Ali to follow his advice. According to Katib Çelebi, Müezzinzade Ali mocked Kılıç Ali and his attempts to persuade the commanders to be less obvious in proclaiming their status. Katib Çelebi’s assessment is damning: “But he [Müezzinzade Ali] had not witnessed naval battles and did not know the science of corsairing.”67 Hindsight such as that of Katib Çelebi vindicated Kılıç Ali in regard to every suggestion that he made, but Kılıç Ali did not command the fleet and ultimately he had to fight in circumstances that he knew risked defeat. During the battle Kılıç Ali Pasha recommended flanking the enemy fleet but Müezzinzade Ali objected that he did not want it said that the sultan’s fleet had fled. Because his ship was clearly marked as that of the admiral it was attacked on both sides. After he was killed in action despite fierce resistance, the Ottomans were defeated. Kılıç Ali attacked the Holy League fleet on its flank and almost turned the tide of the battle. When he saw that defeat was certain he saved the ships of his command and fled the battle. Katib Çelebi lists the most prominent men who died that day, including eleven sancak beys. Katib Çelebi advised future commanders to understand that naval battles were different from land battles.68

Conclusion News of the defeat traveled relatively slowly to the sultan, who learned on October 23 of the disaster that had befallen his fleet. Within days, on October 29, he promoted Kılıç Ali to admiral and his honorific was changed to Kılıç (sword) Ali from Uluç Ali. His immediate task was to gather any remnants of the fleet and to patrol the Aegean coasts to prevent a possible enemy attack. According to documents in the Ottoman archives, Grand Vizier Mehmed Sokollu realized the importance of rebuilding the fleet immediately and made arrangements for galleys to be built in every possible location over the winter so that the Ottomans would have a fleet with which to challenge the Holy League fleet in 1572. Kılıç Ali feared that the anchors and rigging could not be produced in time, but Mehmed Sokollu advised him not to be concerned; nevertheless, a great effort was required to meet the needs for all these supplies. The biggest challenge was finding the manpower to row, sail, and fight. If in fact 30,000–35,000 men died at Lepanto this was a huge number to replace, especially with qualified individuals. Since the fleet did not employ many specialists any military man was eligible for service, but sipahis were reluctant to show up for naval campaigns. Sailing with the fleet had been unpopular even in the 1540s, because a sipahi might be gone longer than a typical campaigning season. However, never before had it seemed like the chances of returning from a naval campaign were virtually nil. To meet the

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need for men, pressure was put on sipahis to report for military service. Realizing that this might not be adequate to man the fleet, the government issued orders to recruit volunteers who were skilled with using a bow or handgun and, if they performed well, they were promised a timar.69 Orders were sent in February to recruit oarsmen for the fleet, 20,000 recruits were necessary, but any male reayya was eligible for this job. In addition, although 20,000 troops were needed, only 4,396 sipahis could be found along with 3,000 Janissaries who were assigned to the galleys. This meant an additional 12,000 men were needed to man the fleet in 1572. Even before Lepanto, the number of volunteers serving in the navy had been increasing. For expeditions such as Malta in 1565, volunteers had been recruited because of the size of the force needed. But the crisis of 1571 surely speeded up a process that had already begun of recruiting men with the knowledge of how to use a handgun or a bow to serve in the empire’s military forces on land or sea. The goal for 1572 was to have each galley manned with 150 soldiers, with three placed between each thwart, two musketeers and one bowman. Thus, a preference for men who could use handguns was already marked at this period.70 Sipahis and their retainers were commanded to bring muskets in addition to bows. They were threatened that if they did not bring a musket or a bow then they could lose their timar. If they did not already know how to use a gun they were commanded to learn before they appeared for service.71 Clearly the central government wanted sipahis to learn how to use firearms and to arrive on campaign armed with them and prepared to use them. What began in the fleet soon spread to the remaining military forces of the empire. This policy of recruiting men into the military forces of the empire who did not come from the traditional military elite background, sipahis holding timars, aligns with trends that were impacting the empire more generally. In the 1580s, this apparent aberration became more standard practice as governors began to recruit volunteers into their own private forces, and these recruits were expected to be armed with handguns. The Ottoman Empire had formal institutions to train men and commanders for the land-based military forces of the empire. The army organization was incorporated into the ruling class of the empire; thus, there was a structural fit. When this system worked without interference, that is, favorites who were incompetent did not manage to block the success of their rivals out in the field, then the land-based military forces of the empire were generally successful. However, the training of seaman, while it existed within the official forces of the empire, rarely produced the leadership of the naval forces.72 Admirals were either former corsairs such as Hayreddin or palace favorites such as Piyale Pasha. Palace favorites could be successful if they listened to their corsair-trained assistants, such as Turgud. However, if like Müezzinzade Ali they ignored their advice then they doomed themselves and their forces to a watery grave. Mehmed Sokollu’s claim that the Ottoman Empire had sufficient resources to rebuild the fleet was no exaggeration. Kılıç Ali’s fear about supplying all the other necessities could reflect his awareness of how difficult it would be to staff the fleet with competent seamen. The fleet of 1572 was built of green wood and staffed by inexperienced men, but it was led by an expert. Kılıç Ali met the Holy League fleet at Modon, but remained within the protection of the port’s guns and did not attempt to engage forces that he knew he could not defeat. However, the mere presence of the unexpected fleet deterred

 Ottoman Seafarers: Hayreddin 131 the Holy League forces and they soon sailed away. Kılıç Ali knew when to fight and when to wait. The responsibility for Lepanto can be placed ultimately on the shoulders of the grand vizier Mehmed Sokollu and the fact that the Ottoman elite was riven by factions. Mehmed Sokollu considered Piyale a rival; they were both sons-in-law of Sultan Selim II, and in 1568 he had convinced Selim that one person should not be both a vizier and the admiral at the same time as it gave that individual too much power. Since Piyale was promoted to third vizier in 1568 he was replaced as admiral. Piyale hated Mehmed Sokollu as a result of this action; since he had been admiral for fourteen years it had become an essential aspect of his identity and he continued to be known as Kapudan Piyale Pasha. Indeed, as admiral he had been very conscientious at fulfilling his duties.73 Mehmed Sokollu replaced Piyale with the then Ağa of Janissaries, Müezzinzade Ali. Piyale Pasha might not have been more talented as an admiral than Müezzinzade Ali, but he had one redeeming quality: he knew when to listen and follow the advice of those who were more expert at fighting naval battles than he was. Müezzinzade Ali refused to follow any of the suggestions of Kılıç Ali. He paid for it with his life, but unfortunately with the lives of thousands of Ottoman soldiers and sailors as well. While the battle of Lepanto’s principal lesson that the Ottoman Empire needed a navy to be led by an experienced admiral was accepted and followed briefly, ultimately it failed to have a lasting impact on policy. Soon palace favorites were appointed to the position of admiral lacking the experience necessary to perform the required duties. When the post mainly required defense against pirates without the necessity of knowing how and when to fight major naval battles, then the navy was able to perform adequately, if not superbly. The final years of the sixteenth century and the early years of the seventeenth century were characterized by Ottoman admirals performing at this level, although a few—Kılıç Ali Pasha, Uluç Hasan Pasha, and Cigalazade Sinan Pasha—were notable for their Italian backgrounds and their corsair credentials.

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6

A Tale of Corsairs Kılıç Ali Pasha, Uluç Hasan Pasha (Il Veneziano), Cigalazade Pasha

Kılıç Ali Pasha: He was from among Hayreddin Pasha’s men and he had learned naval affairs from him. He had been an admiral in Algiers before he came to Istanbul and he became [grand] admiral, which position he held for sixteen years. He died in 995 [1587] and was buried at his mosque in Tophane. Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar1 Katib Çelebi’s biographical notice concerning Kılıç Ali conceals as much crucial information as it reveals. The essential information that he recorded here was Kılıç Ali’s origin as a man who had learned seafaring from Hayreddin, the great Gazi Pasha. This in fact was inaccurate, as Kılıç Ali’s residence in Algiers and then Istanbul did not correspond to the years that Hayreddin resided in those cities. He also recorded accurately that Kılıç Ali had been the admiral or governor of Algiers before he became the grand admiral in Istanbul. This supports the popular view that the Ottomans relied on corsairs for their naval expertise. And indeed, Kemal Reis and Hayreddin had come to prominence through corsairing in North African waters, although their origins were in the heartlands of the Ottoman Empire. The information that Katib Çelebi failed to include in this notice, or in any of the other sections where he discussed Ali’s career, was that Kılıç Ali originated from Calabria in Italy. While Katib Çelebi did not find this worthy of note, it had a major impact on Kılıç Ali’s actions throughout the time he was admiral. While one man reaching the pinnacle of the Ottoman naval establishment who originated in Italy might have been deemed remarkable, in this chapter I review the careers of three admirals at the end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth century, who had Italian origins and each had their own remarkable path from capture by Ottoman corsairs to grand admiral. However, Kılıç Ali was the only individual who could claim a tie through patronage with Hayreddin or more accurately with Turgud Reis/Pasha. Kılıç Ali’s life, together with the careers of Ottoman Admirals Uluç2 Hasan and Cigalazade Sinan, demonstrates the intersection between the personal and the political in relation to religious affiliation, public office, and personal family ties. The actions

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of these Ottoman seafarers reveal continuing attachments to their families and places of origin. They also indicate that viewing naval history during this period as a simple Muslim-versus-Christian divide fails to account for the presence of many individuals who for varying reasons moved from one religion/political affiliation to another due to capture in naval warfare. These three admirals who were born in Italy dominated the post-Lepanto Ottoman naval leadership from 1571 until 1605, and each of their biographies highlights an astonishing range of possibilities for this segment of Ottoman naval personnel. Investigating the lives of these admirals with Italian backgrounds necessitates relying to a large extent on non-Ottoman sources to fully explore their impact on the sultans’ fleets. One author, whose contribution is of great value for information concerning Kılıç Ali and Uluç Hasan, is Antonio de Sosa, prisoner in Algiers 1577–81. He wrote a work, Epitome de los reyes de Argel, part of Topographia, e historia general de Argel, which has been falsely attributed to Diego de Haedo. Sosa was an eyewitness to many of the events he recorded, whereas if Haedo had been the author as claimed by his nephew, he would have relied on prisoners’ accounts that he had collected in Palermo. Sosa also knew Cervantes in Algiers, who may have read Sosa’s accounts during his own captivity.3 Also valuable are documents included in the Calendar of State Papers, preserved in the English Public Records office of the reign of Elizabeth I and James I. The collections include many Venetian reports sent from their representatives in Istanbul. While Katib Çelebi provides the Ottoman perspective on these admirals, many aspects of their lives are known only from consulting sources written by their allies or enemies.

Ottoman Naval History, 1571–1605: Lepanto: Turning Point? Historians continue to debate whether the battle of Lepanto was a major turning point in Ottoman naval history and evidence is marshaled to support both positions. Whether or not the battle itself had a major impact on the subsequent history of the Ottoman navy, it provides a convenient marker to indicate the end of one era and the beginning of another, although much continuity exists between the two periods. First, the issue of which type of ship was best suited for naval warfare in the Mediterranean would not be resolved for many years, but it became increasingly clear that naval warfare as known in the past between great fleets of galleys was unsustainable due to the increasing size of ships and crews, especially in regard to the number of oarsmen required on the increasingly large vessels.4 The debate about ships and men led to the issue of finances; because naval warfare, always expensive, became even more so with larger galleys and their larger crews and it led, among other factors, to an inability to keep financing the fleets that had been common previously.5 Earlier in the sixteenth century, Mediterranean waters were dominated by the fleets of the Ottomans, the Venetians, and the Genoese serving Charles V. Intruders from the Atlantic states of England, the Netherlands, and France became gradually more dominant in the Mediterranean with their sailing ships in the final decades of

 A Tale of Corsairs 135 the sixteenth century. Both the Ottomans and the Habsburgs withdrew their attention from the Mediterranean after 1571: Philip II to the revolt against Spanish rule in the Netherlands and his conflict with England, the Ottomans to land wars against the Habsburgs of Austria and the Safavids of Iran. The Mediterranean became the location of increasing corsair activity as the absence of the great imperial fleets of the Ottomans and the Habsburgs left the sea open to corsairs who had already created a formidable presence earlier. For the Ottomans, naval leadership especially at the highest levels continued to exhibit competition between corsairs and palace-educated elite, the difference being that now many of the corsairs originated as Christian captives, whereas previously they had been independent Muslim seafarers from Ottoman territories, such as Kemal Reis, Piri Reis, Hayreddin Pasha, and Turgud Pasha. Three of the Ottoman admirals after the battle of Lepanto, Ali, Hasan, and Sinan were all captured in their youth and then converted to Islam. Corsairs captured Ali, from Calabria, in 1536; Hasan, from Venice, was probably captured in the late 1550s; Sinan from Sicily was captured in 1561. During this period, Italy was the focus of many Ottoman attacks; consequently, many of the captives in North Africa had originated among the Christian population of Italy. Whether they were inhabitants of coastal villages, or traveling by sea, capture by corsairs was a possibility for both Muslims and Christians.6 Christian captives often were sold in North Africa and became slaves of corsairs. Some individuals through talent and conversion attracted patrons who used their services; however, they also allowed the captives opportunities to become corsairs themselves. Ali and Hasan converted and became corsairs while in North Africa; however, Sinan was sent to Istanbul, where his career followed a different path.

Kılıç Ali Pasha, Kapudan Pasha 1571–87: Giovanni Dionigi Galeni Ali’s original name was Giovan Dionigi Galeni and sources from the period when he was a famous admiral provide information of questionable accuracy about his early life. Ali received the honorific Kılıç after the battle of Lepanto, but to avoid confusion, I will refer to him as Kılıç Ali throughout this account of his life. Ali may have planned to become a priest; however, he was captured around 1536 from a village on the Calabrian coast of Italy by a corsair from Algiers known as Ali Ahmed and made to serve as a galley slave.7 Various stories suggest reasons for his conversion, but all mention that he was afflicted with ringworm and either because of an insult that led to his killing a man or because he wanted to hide this condition under a turban he converted to Islam. He continued to row in a galley until his master learning that he was a skilled sailor promoted him. Ali rapidly made ample money so that together with other corsairs he armed a frigate (a very small galley) and continued privateering.8 He then obtained a galiot (small galley larger than a frigate) and became one of the principal captains of Algiers. By 1547 Ali had joined Turgud Reis with his galiot and they formed a mutually beneficial patron-client relationship. Because Ali accompanied Turgud on many of his expeditions, he received command of an imperial galley in

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1551. Katib Çelebi recorded that Turgud brought his client captains to receive official appointments from the government: “When he came with eight ships and presented his homage, he brought his famous companions Gazi Mustafa, Uluç [Kılıç] Ali, Hasan Gülle, Mehmed Reis, Sancaktar Reis, Deli Cafer and Kara Kadi. [Turgud] was given the Karlıili sancak and each of his men was given seventy or eighty akçe as a salary and a lantern.”9 The salary and lantern indicated that these men were now employed by the Ottoman state as captains in official Ottoman naval forces. Throughout the 1550s, Ali led galleys in corsair attacks against Habsburg targets. For example, in 1558 he attacked Visconte Cicala, who served the kings of Spain, near the Greek archipelago. One of the major naval battles of the century, the Spanish attack on Djerba resulted in a major Ottoman victory owing in some measure to the actions of Kılıç Ali. In 1559 when the king of France signed a treaty with the king of Spain, Philip II decided this was an opportune moment to attack the Ottomans in North Africa. A fleet began to assemble that wintered at Syracuse on Sicily and at Malta, sailing in winter 1560 for North Africa under the command of the new Spanish admiral, the Genoese Gian Andrea Doria, great-nephew of Andrea Doria. After an initial landing at Djerba, they considered goals for their expedition, eventually deciding to establish a base at Djerba. On February 13 or 14 part of the Spanish fleet encountered Kılıç Ali and he sent word to Piyale Pasha, the admiral of the Ottoman fleet, informing him of the Spanish fleet’s location.10 According to Sosa, when Turgud learned of the Spanish fleet, he sent Ali to Istanbul requesting the support of the Ottoman navy. The Ottoman fleet arrived far more quickly than the Spanish fleet expected and created panic among the Spanish forces. When the Ottoman fleet arrived near Djerba, according to Sosa, Piyale Pasha hesitated to attack the Spanish fleet and Ali performed a crucial service for Turgud Reis by persuading Piyale to attack, thus leading to a stunning Ottoman victory in which they captured the majority of the Spanish galleys.11 The result was beneficial for all the Ottoman naval leaders at Djerba: Piyale Pasha could claim a great victory as admiral and was soon promoted to vizier, Turgud Reis remained firmly in control in Tripoli, and Kılıç Ali began to form a patronage relationship with Piyale Pasha, which eventually led to his becoming a client of Piyale. According to Sosa, Kılıç Ali’s reputation increased and Piyale particularly had a great affection for him.12 In the following years, Kılıç Ali combined corsair exploits with duties as an official in the sultan’s fleet. Kılıç Ali may have commanded the corsair squadron of three galleys that captured Visconte Cicala with his son, Scipione, in 1561 and then towed their ship to Tripoli. In 1562 Süleyman appointed Kılıç Ali chief of the squadron that guarded the convoy that sailed from Alexandra to Istanbul. While sailing near the shores of Calabria he anchored by Le Castella, his birthplace, where he promised to spare the fishermen if they allowed him to embrace his mother. But “according to legend” she refused both his gifts and denied any relationship to him because he had become a renegade.13 If the legend is accurate, Ali’s mother’s response to his conversion to Islam differs from that of the female relatives of Uluç Hasan and Cigalazade Sinan. Hasan’s relatives sought to benefit from his powerful position in the Ottoman Empire and Cigalazade’s mother willingly visited her son when he arrived near Messina with the Ottoman fleet.

 A Tale of Corsairs 137 In 1565, Ali benefited from the patronage of both Turgud who brought him with his forces to Malta and Piyale Pasha who commanded the Ottoman fleet there. When Turgud was killed during the siege of Saint-Elmo, Piyale due to his position as admiral recommended that Ali be promoted to become governor of Tripoli to replace Turgud. Piyale probably hoped to benefit from Ali’s expertise as he had from Turgud’s. Ali took possession of the ships, munitions, merchandize, treasure, slaves, and the goods of Turgud. He also became wealthier by continuing privateering along the coasts of Sicily, Calabria, and Naples. Ali remembered that he owed his position to Piyale Pasha and he continually sent him rich presents. This acknowledgment of Piyale’s patronage by sending him gifts led to increased patronage by Piyale Pasha. He persuaded the sultan to replace the current governor of Algiers, Mehmed Pasha, with Ali, who became governor of Algiers in 1568.14 Because of Piyale’s patronage, Ali experienced little dislocation to his career when Turgud, his former patron, died. The year 1571 is remembered by naval historians as the year the Ottoman fleet was defeated at the battle of Lepanto by the Holy League. Due to his performance during the battle, and his survival, Ali’s expertise was rewarded with the highest position in the Ottoman navy. Earlier in 1571, Ali had joined the Ottoman fleet that supported the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus, leading twenty ships from Algiers.15 Piyale, now a vizier, persuaded the sultan to appoint Ali as the next admiral. Ali, now renamed Kılıç Ali, achieved the pinnacle of naval rank.16 Kapudan Pasha Kılıç Ali supervised the reconstruction of the Ottoman fleet, which he commanded in 1572 and 1573 demonstrating that the loss of ships could be replaced easily. However, in 1574 Kılıç Ali made his most noteworthy contribution as admiral when he led the Ottoman fleet in the conquest of Tunis. Hayreddin Pasha had gained Tunis in 1534, but Charles V reconquered it in 1535 and reinstated its Hafsid ruler as his puppet. In 1569 while he was the governor of Algiers, Kılıç Ali had seized Tunis from its Hafsid puppet ruler, but in 1573 after the Venetians made peace with the Ottomans, the Spanish fleet under Don Juan of Austria captured Tunis and fortified the island fortress, which Charles V had built earlier, with materiel, provisions, and soldiers.17 When Selim II heard of this loss, he immediately issued an edict to prepare a fleet to reconquer the city, which was essential to Ottoman control of North Africa. Under the direction of Grand Vizier Mehmed Sokullu, the Ottomans prepared a fleet of 268 galleys and galliots, fifteen galleasses, and fifteen galleons with guns. As immediately after Lepanto, preparing the ships was less difficult than collecting men; but 48,000 oarsmen were gathered from Ottoman territories, soldiers and Janissaries came from the provinces of Anatolia, Karaman, and Maraş, and navy officers and all these men boarded the ships. The commander in chief was Koca Sinan Pasha, a vizier, while Kılıç Ali Pasha commanded the fleet. They sailed from Istanbul on May 15, 1574, reached Calabria in June attacking Messina, and then crossed to Tunis, where they landed on July 22, 1574. The fortress was besieged by Haydar Pasha, governor of Tunis, and Mustafa Pasha, governor of Tripoli, while Kılıç Ali guarded the seacoast. After thirty-three days of fighting the Ottoman troops assaulted the fortress on August 24, 1574, when, despite many casualties on both sides, the Ottomans captured the fortress with 2,000 prisoners who were distributed among the ships and also 500 unusual cannon that were brought to Istanbul.18 After moving the fleet to a safe location they destroyed the fortress by the sea. Then, Sinan

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Pasha and Kılıç Ali conquered two fortresses near Tunis, supplied the province with the necessary weapons, and returned to Istanbul in October.19 Kılıç Ali remained admiral until his death in 1587, but after 1574 he found few opportunities to display his seafaring expertise due to the Ottomans’ preoccupation with their war against Persia (1578–90). The idleness of the fleet in naval warfare was not due to Kılıç Ali, who wished to be more actively employed. Despite limited fleet activity, during the 1570s and 1580s Ottoman allies and enemies alike viewed the Ottoman fleet as a potential threat in the power struggles that were developing in western Europe involving England, France, and the Habsburgs. The conquest of Tunis by Kılıç Ali had demonstrated that even after the disaster of Lepanto the Ottomans were able to rebuild and man a fleet that remained capable of supporting Ottoman policies of conquest when strategic interests were at stake. While Katib Çelebi writing in the mid-seventeenth century knew that few naval campaigns occurred following the conquest of Tunis until the war to conquer Crete, this was only apparent as a result of hindsight.

International Diplomacy: Late 1580s to Early 1590s International diplomacy involving the Ottoman Empire centered on the fleet in the 1580s and 1590s because European rulers continued to view the Ottoman fleet as a powerful threat against their enemies or themselves. Evidence that the fleet was viewed as the highest priority in international relations is found in a secret agreement between Philip II and Murad III in 1578 pledging that the Ottoman fleet would not leave port if the Spanish agreed to the same restriction.20 This truce was renewed and broadened in 1581 to restrict conflict on land as well as sea until December 1583 between the Ottomans and Philip II. However, the navies and armies of both sides were not prevented from attempting other enterprises.21 While Mehmed Sokollu negotiated the truce in 1578, he claimed that Kılıç Ali was advising Sultan Murad III that even with an imperfect fleet he could defeat Spain because its forces were overstretched.22 Kılıç Ali, who opposed the truce, informed the Spanish ambassador Margliani that the peace negotiations had been broken off in 1580 and that he had orders to prepare 200 galleys and 100 mavnas (large transport galleys) for a naval expedition. Fernand Braudel claimed that Kılıç Ali’s verbal abuse of Margliani was a sign of the admiral’s frustration and anger at his failure to prevent the truce. Margliani’s reports indicate that Grand Vizier Mehmed Sokullu desired peace but that the admiral desired to employ the arsenal’s men in warfare in the Mediterranean rather than building projects in Istanbul.23 Kılıç Ali sailed in 1581 to Algiers to restore order and then planned to attack the ruler of Fez because he desired to assist his client Uluç Hasan, who had been the governor of Algiers until he became so unpopular that the Janissaries petitioned Istanbul to remove him.24

Morocco Events in Morocco involved the Ottoman navy and particularly the Ottoman admirals Kılıç Ali and his client Uluç Hasan, who became admiral in 1588, one year after Kılıç

 A Tale of Corsairs 139 Ali’s death. In 1576, Murad III attempted to extend Ottoman control of the North African coast to Morocco, building on the Ottoman success at Tunis in 1574. He supported a coup d’état by providing Ottoman troops and weapons to an exiled member of the ruling Saadi family, who came to power in Morocco in 1549 when Muhammad al-Shaykh defeated the Wattasids and conquered Fez. Muhammad was killed in 1557 and his son, Abd Allah al-Ghalib, became the ruler while eliminating most of his brothers. But one of the two remaining brothers, Abd al-Malik, conspired with the Ottomans hoping to obtain military and financial support from them in exchange for acknowledging Ottoman suzerainty in order to rule instead of his brother. Abd Allah died in 1574 and his son, Muhammad, succeeded him. In 1576 with Ottoman backing, Abd al-Malik defeated his nephew and began to rule from Fez. His nephew, Muhammad, turned to the Portuguese for assistance, which resulted in the battle of the Three Kings or Alcazar in 1578, during which Abd al-Malik, Muhammad, and the king of Portugal, Sebastian, all died. Consequently a brother of Abd al-Malik, Ahmad, became the ruler of Morocco and preserved its independence from the Ottomans and the Portuguese.25 Abd al-Malik had assembled a strong army of 4,000 arquebusiers and thirty-four cannon and some of the munitions had been supplied by Elizabeth of England.26 Before Abd al-Malik’s brief reign he had married the daughter of a powerful official of Algiers, Haci Murad, and this union produced a son, Ismail, in 1575. After her husband’s death, his widow married Uluç Hasan, who attempted to regain Morocco for his stepson. Ismail met the Venetian ambassador in Istanbul in 1587, who described him as speaking a little Italian but understanding it very well.27 Thus the Battle of the Three Kings had a significant impact on the future of Morocco and Ottoman power in North Africa involving the Ottoman admirals Kılıç Ali and Uluç Hasan. During his time as admiral Kılıç Ali supported Uluç Hasan’s ambitions in Morocco to the degree possible, constrained by the Ottoman fleet’s shrinking through disuse. When Uluç Hasan became admiral, his efforts to revive the fleet were tied to his desire to use it to regain control of Morocco for his stepson, who would have become an Ottoman puppet. Additionally, because of the death of Sebastian of Portugal, Philip II inherited Portugal, which aided his plans to attack England allowing the Spanish Armada to sail from Lisbon in 1588.

Naval Conflict between England and Spain International relations surrounding the Anglo-Spanish naval war that culminated in the Spanish Armada of 1588 entangled Ottomans and other potential enemies of Philip II. Elizabeth of England and Philip II of Spain had been fighting intermittently since Elizabeth supported the Dutch revolt with troops in 1585. In 1587, Sir Francis Drake burned thirty-seven Spanish ships in the harbor of Cadiz. As noted earlier Philip II and the Ottoman sultans had been negotiating a truce since soon after Lepanto. Haci Murad, father-in-law of Abd al-Malik and later Uluç Hasan, had participated in these negotiations, which eventually resulted in the truce of 1578 followed by that of 1581, which was in force until 1583. With conflict between England and Spain increasing,

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the Spanish were anxious to renew the truce again and the English attempted to persuade the Ottomans to attack Philip II with their fleet. The English believed that the threat of an Ottoman naval attack on Spanish Mediterranean possessions would cause Philip II to keep some Spanish naval forces to protect these territories when he attacked England. Consequently, Elizabeth and the English Levant Company sent the merchant William Harborne as their agent to the Ottoman Empire in 1578, where he remained until 1580 with the goal of establishing both trade and diplomatic relations.28 He returned to Istanbul in 1583 as the first English ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, but despite his efforts he had to report in 1584 that the Ottoman truce with Spain had been renewed for one year. But Harborne claimed that he had received a promise that if Spain went to war with England the Ottoman Empire would also declare war. In 1585 Harborne was instructed to incite the Ottoman Empire to war with Spain and Harborne endeavored to prevent another renewal of the truce. He also wished the Ottomans to provide a fleet to attack Spanish possessions in the Mediterranean at the same time that England attacked from the Atlantic.29 Although Harborne failed to obtain the support of the Ottoman fleet against Spain, he was successful in preventing the renewal of the truce after 1584. Harborne’s diplomatic endeavors and the reactions by other ambassadors are preserved in news reports from Istanbul; for example, he sent the following petition to the sultan in early 1586 hoping to influence Murad III to use his fleet against Spain. If . . . your Highness, in concert with my mistress, will wisely and bravely, without delay, send a warfleet to sea—to which course you are surely urged by God Almighty, your own pledged faith, the opportuneness of the occasion, the reputation of the glorious Ottoman race, and consideration for the safety of your Empire—then will the proud Spaniard and the false Pope, with all their followers be not only hurled down from their hope of victory, but will receive full punishment for their temerity. God only protects his own, and by your means he will so punish these idolators that the survivors will be converted to worship the true God with us. And upon us, who fight for his glory, he will heap victory and all other good things.30

Philip II feared a potential Ottoman naval attack when the Ottomans refused to renew the truce and he wrote to his commander in the Netherlands, Parma, on September 14, 1587: “next year we might find ourselves with a Turkish fleet attacking Italy, should the sultan make peace with the Persians.”31 Contemporaries were surprised that the admiral, Kılıç Ali, did not support Harborne’s attempts to persuade the sultan and the grand vizier to allow the Ottoman fleet to sail against Spain. Harborne’s successor, Edward Barton, stated in a letter from the end of August 1588 that it was known by everyone that “a mortall enmitie betweene the deceased Admirall [Kılıç Ali] and my predecessor [Harborne]” had existed.32 Two factors may have influenced Kılıç Ali’s dislike of Harborne and the English. When Harborne first sailed to Istanbul in 1578, the captain of his ship attacked two Ottoman vessels whose crews complained to Kılıç Ali. In addition, according to the French ambassador de Germigny, in 1580 Harborne had angered Kılıç Ali when as a result of his negotiations English slaves on the galleys were freed and most of these had

 A Tale of Corsairs 141 belonged to Kılıç Ali.33 This enmity may have affected Kılıç Ali’s judgment concerning English sea power because according to a Venetian report in 1586, he had stated that “The King [of Spain] is very strong, and can easily capture that island [England].”34 A report from the Venetian Lorenzo Bernardo from February 1586 displays the enigma of relations between Kılıç Ali Pasha and Harborne. Bernardo began by quoting Kılıç Ali and continued with his own questions as to his actions, which seemed inexplicable. I [Kılıç Ali] declared that I could not abide their Ambassador nor the whole race; for they are a pack of thieves and pirates, and ruin this country. . . . Finally, the Queen is a very distant Sovereign, and can be of no use, only harm. I therefore intend to exert all my power to expel this rascal of an Ambassador, and these lutherans . . . Although these remarks of the Capadun were nothing new to me, for I [Bernardo] was aware of his detestation of the English, still they gave one pause, for I know that the policy of the English Ambassador and of the Capadun must be identical, as both desire in some way or other to harrass [sic] his Catholic Majesty. And so I did not believe that between these two, who have one and the same object, there could exist such violent opposition; for between persons of influence love and hate is only a question of interest.35

The Venetian ambassador in Rome added the news that he had heard in June 1586 regarding Harborne’s negotiations for the Ottoman fleet. “Then came the Turk’s reply; that he was very ready to help the Queen; that for this year he wished to fortify the territory he had acquired in Persia; but next year he would send out a powerful fleet of three hundred sail under the command of Ibrahim Pasha.”36 In 1586 the Venetian ambassador in Spain reported back to Venice that he had been questioned concerning a rumor in Spain that Murad III intended to make Ibrahim Pasha, his new son-in-law, admiral and demote Kılıç Ali to commanding the fleet in North Africa.37 However, Ali had made himself invaluable to the sultan and to the elite surrounding the ruler by employing his numerous slaves at the arsenal in their building projects.38 Because he provided valuable services to his patrons, he retained the post of admiral until his death in 1587. Kılıç Ali knew his ultimate patron was the sultan, but also that it was advisable to cultivate patronage ties with other powerful members of the elite who would advise the sultan on appointments to positions in the government. Also, in 1586 the Venetian ambassador in Istanbul reported the following incident. Perhaps Kılıç Ali’s fury partially originated from fear that he might be replaced by Ibrahim Pasha, as admiral. Some days ago the English Ambassador had an audience of the Grand Vizir. The Capadun Pasha was present; as I have already informed you he hates the English Ambassador. The latter made most vigorous complaints that owing to secret orders from here (by which he meant from the Capadun Pasha), the Turkish officials in Barbary not only refuse obedience to the Sultans orders for the liberation of English

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vessels and subjects captured by those galleys, but have actually committed fresh depredations. The Capadun answered that, on the contrary, English ships, while feigning amity, seized Turkish ships on the plea that they were common pirates, and that they deserved to be chastised. This quarrel came to such a pitch that from abuse they passed to blows, the Ambassador and the Capadun, to the disgust of the Grand Vizir. When the Vizir had quieted them, he replied to a letter addressed by the Queen of England to the Sultan. It is clear from this answer that the Turks are pleased at this English alliance as a counterpoise to Spain while they are occupied with Persian affairs.39

How much influence Kılıç Ali had on Ottoman diplomacy is unclear since he was unsuccessful in blocking the Spanish truce in 1580 or eliminating Harborne’s residence in Istanbul in 1586. But Kılıç Ali’s sudden death in July 1587 must have seemed hopeful for English plans; however, Murad III immediately promoted Ibrahim Pasha to become admiral, although he lacked any naval expertise. For the following few months in his negotiations with Harborne’s replacement, Edward Barton, he could claim that not possessing a suitable admiral to lead the fleet prevented the Ottoman sultan from supporting Elizabeth against Philip II.40 After a few months, Murad III replaced Ibrahim with Uluç Hasan, the second Italian captive who converted to Islam and through the patronage of an outstanding seafarer achieved the rank of admiral.

Uluç Hasan Pasha (Il Veneziano), Kapudan Pasha 1588–91: Andretta Celesti41 Uluç Hasan, originally Andrea or Andretta Celeste or Celesti, is unusual for the admirals of this period because no Encyclopaedia of Islam or Islam Ansiklopedesi articles have been written about him. Even in the seventeenth century, all Katib Çelebi recorded about Uluç Hasan was that in 1588 he came from North Africa and became admiral.42 Information about Hasan can be found in sources written by contemporary Europeans such as Sosa (Haedo), Cervantes, and Venetian ambassadors in Istanbul and elsewhere. Some brief modern accounts of Hasan are also available in secondary literature, but not by Ottoman historians.43 Explaining this lack of attention to the career of Hasan by Ottomanists, either in early modern sources or in modern historical analysis, might be because he was admiral for a short period or because he failed to lead any notable naval expeditions during his admiralship. Another explanation could be his personality; he appears to have been brutal, ambitious, and bitter. Several aspects of Uluç Hasan’s life may account for these characteristics. First, he was from a poor family in Venice and appears to have resented his lowly origins in Venice even after he became admiral in Istanbul. Second, he was captured as a young man, enslaved, and thrust into the corsair society of North Africa. Third, when he eventually became the property of Kılıç Ali, he may have found it necessary to have a sexual relationship with him to become one of his favored clients. There are many innuendos about their relationship; for example, the Ottoman historian Selaniki

 A Tale of Corsairs 143 recorded their quarrel over a young man.44 Selaniki also recorded that Kılıç Ali died at the age of eighty in the arms of one of his female concubines.45 In 1579 or 1580, Uluç Hasan married a famous beauty who was the widow of Abd al-Malik of Morocco (1576–8).46 Andrea/Hasan, born in 1544 in Venice to a poor citizen family, was captured in his youth from a Ragusan ship by Turgud Reis. When Turgud was killed at Malta in 1565, Kılıç Ali inherited Uluç Hasan, who was by this time apparently a convert to Islam. Sosa, who was a captive in Algiers while Uluç Hasan was governor, claimed that it was because of his audacity and cleverness and because he engaged in homosexual relations with Kılıç Ali that he earned his favor.47 Cervantes, who was a captive in Algiers from 1575 until 1580 and encountered Uluç Hasan at least three times, stated in Don Quixote that Uluç Hasan “was so much beloved by him that he became one of his most favored youths.”48 Whatever the truth of why Uluç Hasan benefited to such a degree from Ali’s patronage, he unquestionably did so, for Ali told the sultan that Uluç Hasan was one of two candidates who deserved to become grand admiral after him.49 As stated earlier, Kılıç Ali had become governor of Tripoli when Turgud died in 1565, but in 1568 he was promoted to governor of Algiers. When he visited Istanbul, he brought his lieutenant or treasurer, Uluç Hasan. After Kılıç Ali became admiral, Uluç Hasan eventually became governor of Algiers 1577–80 and again 1582–5 because of the influence of Kılıç Ali.50 Uluç Hasan was unpopular in Algiers because he raised taxes, the percentage that corsairs had to pay, and treated slaves with cruelty.51 During his first term as governor of Algiers, the Janissaries in the province complained directly to Istanbul about his actions. The sultan promised to punish him severely, but Kılıç Ali intervened bribing both the Valide Sultan, Nurbanu, and the new governor of Algiers so that Uluç Hasan would be treated leniently. Hasan lost the governorship, but he was not punished. Kılıç Ali then led an expedition to conquer Morocco that paused at Algiers. The conquest of Morocco would have benefited Uluç Hasan because his stepson was a claimant to the throne of Morocco. The Janissaries again approached the sultan complaining about the expedition and, when Murad III forbade it, Kılıç Ali returned to Istanbul, where he used his influence to ensure that Uluç Hasan was reappointed governor of Algiers.52 However, during the period that Kılıç Ali was admiral and Uluç Hasan held various posts in North Africa their patron-client relationship was strained by the actions of both men. In 1586 Lorenzo Bernardo, Venetian ambassador in Istanbul, wrote that “The Capudan Pasha [Kılıç Ali], although he is indignant with Hassan because he has never sent him any presents, cannot do less than defend him . . . , as Hassan is a creature of his.”53 Patrons expected clients to acknowledge their patronage by offering gifts and Kılıç Ali had never forgotten this requirement of clients in his relations with his patrons. Later that same year another incident occurred that indicated that their relationship was in difficulties. According to Selaniki, Kılıç Ali was active in recruiting talented youths to the Ottoman navy. He offered a youth named Ali, who was beloved of Uluç Hasan, a salary of 100 akçe per day plus a ship with a lantern to leave Hasan’s service and work for him and the sultan. “For his own selfish ends,” Uluç Hasan petitioned the sultan complaining of Kılıç Ali’s recruitment of a new client.54 Kılıç Ali continually increased his patronage network both to please his own patrons and to

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recruit additional talented clients. Due to Kılıç Ali’s generosity, he was successful at this endeavor. On the other hand, Uluç Hasan, known as a miser, as well as for cruel treatment of his subordinates, likely found it difficult to establish a network of his own clients. Perhaps Uluç Hasan’s lenient treatment of Cervantes after his escape attempts, while Hasan was Beylerbey of Algiers, can best be understood as an effort to recruit a brave and talented individual as a client, rather than as an attempt to seduce Cervantes to become his lover, which has also been proposed as one explanation.55 When Kılıç Ali died in June 1587, Murad III made his son-in-law Ibrahim admiral, although in July 1587 Uluç Hasan arrived in Istanbul with many slaves. In November 1587, Uluç Hasan attacked the competence of Ibrahim and a few months later left the capital.56 Apparently Ibrahim was so incompetent even at the arsenal that in 1588 Hasan was summoned back to Istanbul to become grand admiral. Hasan returned to Istanbul as admiral in August 1588, amid rumors that he used bribery to secure this position.57 In August 1588, the Spanish Armada reached England and was defeated at the battle of Gravelines. Before the news arrived in Istanbul, Edward Barton, who had replaced Harborne as the English ambassador, continued to press for Ottoman assistance against Spain. With Uluç Hasan Pasha as admiral they agreed on the goal of preparing an Ottoman fleet to launch an attack in the waters of the western Mediterranean; Uluç Hasan with the aim of regaining Morocco for his stepson, Barton, to deflect Spanish naval forces from England. Because of the enormous costs of maintaining a fleet and the war in Iran having higher priority, the navy had been neglected. Another factor was that Uluç Hasan was not known for his outstanding naval accomplishments. He was fortunate during 1588 and successfully captured a galleon from Malta.58 But his voyage in the latter part of 1588 was considered a failure when an attack on Sicily only captured thirty prisoners, twenty of whom were killed. Uluç Hasan’s highest priority was to improve the arsenal’s efficiency, and his main skills lay in financial management. In 1589, Uluç Hasan petitioned Murad III arguing that an increase in Spanish power injured the Ottoman Empire, but there was time to counter this threat by rebuilding the navy. Murad III agreed in principle, but he did not wish to burden the state treasury and refused to pay for naval expenses from his personal treasury. Grand Vizier Koca Sinan Pasha supported Hasan’s proposal; however, Sinan suggested financing reconstructing the navy quickly by taxing provincial governors.59 However, the navy remained small and naval expeditions were limited in scope and effectiveness. An expedition in 1589 had frightened coastal inhabitants of Sicily, but it had sailed directly to Tripoli and had returned to Istanbul in the fall after losing a significant number of oarsmen and soldiers. For financial reasons it was difficult to construct the galleys necessary to arm the fleet and, despite a large population in Anatolia, finding skilled seamen was difficult.60 In 1590 with difficulty Hasan suppressed a revolt in Tripoli with a force of fifty galleys and with the assistance of troops from Egypt.61 Although the revolt was crushed, Uluç Hasan was responsible for the loss of two galleons transporting tribute from the king of Fez to the sultan, resulting in a loss of 40,000 sequins (zecchino or gold ducat). Uluç Hasan’s slaves had mutinied and escaped to Christian territory with the treasure in the hold of the ship. The sultan blamed Hasan because he had placed too few soldiers on board. Since Uluç Hasan was known as a miser, he may have tried to minimize expenses by employing fewer soldiers, but large numbers of slaves required

 A Tale of Corsairs 145 adequate loyal military forces. Although in 1589 he had felt obligated to try to prove himself as a naval commander, later in 1590 he preferred to remain in Istanbul.62 Leaving the city posed risks since rivals could move against Uluç Hasan in their efforts to replace him.

Uluç Hasan and His Venetian Relatives That Hasan was known among Ottomans as Uluç Hasan clearly reflects that he retained an identity of having originated outside of Ottoman domains, despite his long absence from his birthplace. While Uluç Hasan was admiral, he established contact with several relatives in Venice. He had earlier convinced a cousin, Livio Celeste, to join him in North Africa. The Viceroy of Naples captured Livio in 1590 and he risked being killed; Uluç Hasan threatened to roast alive all the Neapolitans and Spaniards who fell into his hands. Given Uluç Hasan’s reputation for cruel executions while governor of Algiers, this was a threat that had to be taken seriously. As a result, Livio eventually returned to North Africa dying and being buried in Algiers.63 Uluç Hasan’s sister Camilla resided in Venice and he corresponded with Venetian authorities requesting offices and money for Camilla and her husband, Marcantonio Vedova. In a letter to the doge of Venice, Uluç Hasan claimed that he “worked ceaselessly on Venice’s behalf ” in his unsuccessful attempt to persuade him to give Vedova the position of secretary to the Venetian Senate. His brother-in-law even traveled to Istanbul in hopes of receiving 1,000 ducats from Uluç Hasan, but Camilla never met Hasan again.64 Despite desiring to maintain contact with relatives in Venice, Uluç Hasan resented his lowly social status in the Venetian hierarchy. The Venetian ambassador in Istanbul, Giovanni Moro, reported that Uluç Hasan desired an aristocratic slave “so as to be able to glory in possessing a slave who was born by nature a lord.”65 Thus Hasan’s relations with Venice were complicated by a sense of loyalty to Venice but also resentment regarding his family’s status in the city. In July 1591, Uluç Hasan was preparing a fleet to sail to the western Mediterranean hoping to attack Morocco, Spain, or Malta. On July 12 Uluç Hasan visited the arsenal to oversee ship construction, but upon returning home he experienced a severe headache and died soon after. Much of his property was confiscated by the sultan, although a portion was left to his two minor children. Uluç Hasan was buried in the turbe (tomb) of Kılıç Ali in Istanbul.66 At Uluç Hasan’s death in 1591, he possessed no clients of adequate stature to compete for the post of admiral. Cigalazade Sinan with the support of his wealthy mother-in-law, who was also the cousin of Murad III, had the funds necessary to obtain consideration of his candidacy, or perhaps the sultan truly believed that since Sinan’s father had been a famous Genoese corsair and Sinan had sailed with him in his youth that this qualified him to become admiral.67 The sultan stated to the grand vizier: “for the post of the kapudan a corsair is needed who is expert in maritime affairs.”68 In any event, Sinan became admiral, and, in contrast to Uluç Hasan, Katib Çelebi praised his exploits as admiral, a post that Cigalazade Sinan filled twice for a total of approximately ten years.

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Cigalazade Sinan Pasha, Kapudan Pasha 1591–5, 1598–1605: Scipione Cicala Cigalazade’s family background necessitates a return to the events of the great days of the Ottoman navy during the reign of Süleyman. His father, Visconte, from a noble Genoese family prominent in the Levant residing in Sicily, was born in 1504, the eldest son of Carlo. He joined Genoese naval forces led by the famous Genoese admiral Andrea Doria, fighting for France until Doria changed sides and then fighting for Spain, but he clashed with Doria’s less competent relations. Visconte participated in many campaigns, for example, Tunis in 1535. Of greater importance for Visconte, in the year 1538 as the battle for control of the Mediterranean between Süleyman the Magnificent and Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor, continued with intense fury, Charles’s admiral Andrea Doria, suffering from his recent defeat at Preveza by Hayreddin Pasha, led what remained of the Holy League’s fleet to attack one of the sultan’s strongholds on the Adriatic coast. One of the most talented participants in the conquest was Visconte Cicala, who made his fortune as a corsair with a galley or two. A veteran of many naval campaigns, he probably did not expect to find a wife who was the daughter of the warden of an Ottoman fortress, marry her, and, even more improbably, have their son become on Ottoman admiral. A successful siege brought booty to the victors and in this case Visconte gained a wife, the daughter of the dizdar (warden of the fortress) of Herceg Novi in Montenegro (Nova, Castelnuovo). The dizdar’s daughter converted to Christianity with the name Lucrezia and married the Genoese nobleman, who probably agreed to the marriage in order to avoid a lengthy siege by Andrea Doria of the fortress of Herceg Novi.69 The dizdar’s daughter became the mother of three sons and two daughters. Her second son, Scipione, eventually became admiral of the Ottoman navy and was known as Cigalazade, son of Cigala.70 Thus, the Ottoman admiral and statesman Cigalazade Sinan Pasha was born about 1543 or 1544 as the son of a Genoese noble corsair Visconte Cicala. His mother Lucrezia’s home, Herceg Novi, was reconquered by the Ottomans in 1539 because of its strategic importance, but Lucrezia never returned to Ottoman territories after her “capture.” However, her son Cigalazade eventually rose to the pinnacle of the Ottoman elite. Cigalazade’s mixed ancestry is reflected in his name, since after his own capture and conversion he chose an Ottoman name that recognized his father’s family. Marriage did not interfere with Visconte’s career as a corsair and he was active in expeditions against Ottoman targets until his own capture in 1561. One of Visconte’s exploits was an attempt to capture Turgud Reis at Djerba in 1551, which was to have unforeseen consequences for Visconte because Turgud was responsible for the capture of Cicala and his son in 1561. Turgud had ample reason to regard the Genoese as enemies of the Ottoman Empire in general and of himself personally. Turgud had been captured by Gianettino Doria in 1540 while greasing his ships on Corsica and spent four years as a galley slave. He was freed in 1544 by Hayreddin, who threatened to sack Genoa if Turgud was not released. In addition, Katib Çelebi specified Cigala as one of the leaders of the attack on Turgud at Djerba in

 A Tale of Corsairs 147 1551, when Turgud barely escaped by taking his ships to the other side of Djerba by digging a deeper channel in the causeway separating the island from the mainland.71 In addition to his naval expertise, Visconte possessed powerful relations and negotiated personally with the rulers of Spain. His brother, Giambattista Cicala, was created cardinal of San Clemente by Pope Julius III on December 20, 1551.72 In 1556, Visconte demanded that Philip II pay 28,000 crowns that was owed to Visconte for his service to Spain with his two galleys. He threatened that if he were not paid he would take service with another ruler because he could not afford to arm his galleys otherwise.73 Presumably the debt was paid, because when a ship that Visconte owned that was engaged in piracy was wrecked, Cicala tried to buy another at Messina. When Antonio Doria persuaded the viceroy of Sicily to block the sale, Cicala accompanied by his son Scipione, sailed from Messina March 18, 1561, heading toward Spain to protest directly to Philip II. Turgud sent corsairs to capture Cicala, whose ship was then towed to Tripoli. Thus, this was no accidental encounter. While the grand master of the Knights of Malta soon arranged the release of many prisoners, Turgud demanded an enormous ransom of 10,000 crowns for Cicala. Visconte’s brother, the cardinal of San Clemente, believing it would ruin the family if they paid that sum, asked for the assistance of the pope who requested the Venetian ambassador to intervene. But without the ransom quickly forthcoming, Turgud sent Cicala and his son to Süleyman and they arrived in Istanbul in September 1561.74 In Istanbul, the fates of the father and son were radically different, for Visconte was sent to the Yedikule Fortress, where after three years he died in prison despite numerous attempts to ransom him. According to Venetian reports, when Scipione was first approached with the suggestion that he “become a Turk, he desired rather to have his head cut off than forsake his religion.” Süleyman refused to apply force, but again according to Venetian reports, Scipione was promised that if he entered the palace school he would see his mother, who was in the harem because she also had been captured.75 Venetian reports from Istanbul recorded rumors as well as facts; Lucrezia was not in Istanbul and continued to live in Sicily despite her husband’s and son’s capture. Given unverified rumors in the reports, it is impossible to determine if Scipione truly claimed that he would rather die than forsake Christianity. His Ottoman mother had chosen conversion from Islam to Christianity when Herceg Novi was occupied by Habsburg forces, perhaps because marriage to Visconte seemed preferable to becoming a slave. In the light of later events, it is intriguing that the supposed promise of seeing his mother influenced Scipione to convert and enter the palace school. It would indicate a powerful bond between mother and son that remained in force despite a separation of many years. Whatever his reasons, the teenage Scipione converted, entered the palace school, thus training to become a member of the Ottoman elite.76 As expressed by Rüstem Pasha, those who did not go through this training and enculturation were outsiders.77 While we know little about Lucrezia, since she was the daughter of an Ottoman official, the dizdar of Herceg Novi, she would have experienced life in an elite Ottoman household. Although her father’s rank was such that he probably did not attend the palace school or marry a woman who had received training in the imperial harem,

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nonetheless, Lucrezia was the daughter of the most prominent Ottoman official in the vicinity. However, according to Katib Çelebi, the dizdar failed to take adequate measures to defend Herceg Novi, leading to the conquest of the fortress in 1538, which resulted in the capture of his daughter.78 This appears to be an ambiguous way of indicating that he surrendered the fortress without much of a fight. After her capture, conversion, and marriage, Lucrezia might have reminisced about her own family and home to her children. Cigalazade always claimed his Genoese identity; however, he may also have felt affinity for his mother’s people and becoming Ottoman surely seemed a reasonable alternative after his own capture. Cigalazade entered the palace school as a page in the seraglio, where he began forging connections that were essential for success as a member of the Ottoman elite. For example, Cigalazade met a Venetian eunuch, Gazanfer, who after his capture chose castration as the path to position and power.79 Cigalazade eventually became the sultan’s sword bearer before he emerged from the palace with his first outside appointment as the Ağa of Janissaries in 1573 or 1575, and, while by this date Kılıç Ali was grand admiral, Cigalazade’s career did not include a naval appointment for almost twenty years. Cigalazade’s palace education provided the opportunity to rise to the highest levels of the Ottoman elite, and he achieved the highest rank, grand vizier, for forty days in 1596. Twenty years earlier his status as a member of the Ottoman elite was confirmed by marriage in 1576 to Saliha, a granddaughter of Mihrimah Sultan. After his first wife died, he married her younger sister in 1581. On the path to grand vizier, he served as governor of the provinces of Van and Baghdad, while becoming a vizier in 1583. Sinan Cigalazade served four sultans: Selim II (1566–74), Murad III (1574–95), Mehmed III (1595–1603), and finally Ahmed I (1603–17). Cigalazade served with distinction during the Ottoman-Safavid war 1578–90 and at the conclusion he became governor of Erzurum, but he aimed to become admiral, a position then held by Uluç Hasan. According to Venetian reports Cigalazade spent 200,000 sequins (zecchino or gold ducat) trying to obtain the position. Cigalazade had access to large sums of money through his wife. Sultan Süleyman’s daughter, Mihrimah, had possessed a huge fortune and her only heir was her daughter, Hümashah Ayshe, whose husband had served briefly as grand vizier. Hümashah’s daughters certainly brought access to this fortune to their marriages with Cigalazade. When Uluç Hasan Pasha died in 1591, after barely a week the sultan appointed Cigalazade to the post of admiral. Selaniki claimed that Cigalazade had been chosen for his potential seafaring abilities as his father had been a noted corsair, while the Venetian reports state he was chosen for financial reasons.80 Both factors may have influenced Murad III. We can only speculate regarding Cigalazade’s motivation to obtain the position given the state of the navy in 1591. The admiralship was potentially lucrative because it included control of the arsenal, as well as being governor of the islands in the Aegean. The admiral also led the fleet if the sultan and his advisers decided to launch an expedition to the western Mediterranean. Either making a profit or leading a naval expedition to the western Mediterranean to visit his family appeared improbable given the fleet’s neglect and consequent weakness.

 A Tale of Corsairs 149 The condition of the Ottoman navy in the three years of Uluç Hasan’s admiralship when Cigalazade attempted to become admiral is explained through the reports the grand vizier Koca Sinan Pasha prepared for the sultan, Murad III, in 1589–91. Because of political conditions in Europe where France endured the chaos of religious civil war and England had recently survived an attack by the Spanish Armada, possessing an effective navy reemerged as a priority for the sultan and his advisors. However, Ottoman finances were unequal to an extensive reconstruction of the Ottoman navy. Whereas constructing many ships rapidly was easily accomplished after Lepanto in the 1570s, the financial situation in the 1590s had changed radically. The fleet in 1589 was in a terrible condition, although Uluç Hasan had been advocating reconstruction of the fleet for some time, but this was partly based on his own financial situation as he saw this as a way to obtain the arrears in his own income. Uluç Hasan sent a petition to the sultan in which he recommended reinforcing the navy due to the Spanish threat. The sultan agreed in theory providing it did not burden the state treasury. Grand Vizier Koca Sinan proposed rapidly reconstructing the fleet at Murad III’s personal treasury expense, but the sultan refused. Then grand vizier Sinan proposed “to bring about a huge fleet without removing a single coin from the treasury.”81 He suggested a policy similar to that used following Lepanto; that the provincial governors provide either the ships or the money to build them. About December 29, 1590, Sinan and Uluç Hasan and other high-ranking dignitaries began to implement this strategy by sending orders to the governors of the provinces. The governors had to provide funds from their private wealth, until the back taxes could be collected, Provincial officials were ordered to provide funds to build 137 galleys, while central officials were expected to contribute eighty-six galleys and fifty of these were to be built at the sultan’s expense. Thus a heavy burden was placed on all the governors of provinces, but an especially large contribution was demanded from the province of Erzurum, where Cigalazade was governor. It appears no accident that the grand vizier and the admiral placed an unusual burden on Cigalazade, whom at least Uluç Hasan had reason to view as a dangerous rival. The governor of Erzurum was ordered to provide eight galleys, one for every two sancaks in his province. A note was included “That much was considered reasonable. One galley per two sancaks in his province.”82 This assessment was far higher than that of any other governor; even the governor of Egypt was assessed for only six galleys. Fodor states regarding the requirements for Erzurum: “Even more puzzling are the eight galleys imposed on the beylerbeyi of Erzurum, and the important payment levied on both the vilayets of Erzurum and Diyarbekir, Erzurum was the only province in which all the sanjakbeyis were supposed to contribute to the costs of the navy . . . this requirement was later cancelled.”83 It is less puzzling when considering that the governor of Erzurum was Cigalazade. In addition, Cigalazade, as every vizier, was expected to provide four galleys. Thus, Cigalazade was ordered to pay for twelve ships from his own wealth. Since the grand vizier was proposing to pay only for six, twelve would have exceeded the resources of most governors. These orders no doubt reflect Uluç Hasan’s treatment of a rival. Possibly these figures also reflect the expenses Cigalazade paid to secure the appointment to kapudan pasha. As admiral

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he might recoup the money and, if Cigalazade envisioned leading a great fleet into the western Mediterranean, this would contribute to its construction. Despite these plans, by 1591 there was no sign of a new fleet, and by 1592 it was clear that the initiative had failed. Money remained lacking. And this was exacerbated by “the unscrupulous handling of the relevant funds by the officials in charge.”84 However, in the summer of 1594, Cigalazade led an Ottoman fleet to Messina. While preparations for the fleet were proceeding at the arsenal, Cigalazade’s younger brother Carlo had been visiting him in Istanbul since the previous fall, perhaps as an unofficial envoy of Spain. Cigalazade had many responsibilities at the arsenal and Carlo often accompanied him there. The Venetian ambassador Marco Venier wrote to Venice information from his informants concerning relations between Carlo and Cigalazade. He stated, “The Capudan has frequently told his brother that their house has no enemies in the world like the Venetians.”85 Thus although one brother was a Christian employed by the king of Spain and another was a Muslim employed by the sultan, they viewed the fortunes of their family as united. Loyalty to one’s family dominated other ties and for Cigalazade concern for his family survived captivity, conversion, and enculturation. But Cigalazade’s intimacy with his brother also elicited criticism, as recorded by Marco Venier in May 1594. Cigalazade’s accusation of spying in the arsenal was turned against him because of Carlo’s suspected political loyalties. On another occasion the Capudan Pasha finding himself in the arsenal, seated among a number of seamen and captains, he turned round on them and said with a loud voice, “There are a lot of spies among you.” They all looked at each other and then, in the midst of a great uproar, some voices were heard to say, “You are the real spy, for you keep your brother here, a Christian and paid subject and spy of the King of Spain.” The Capudan bowed his head and presently withdrew into an inner chamber.86

In 1594 a fleet composed of papal galleys, Tuscan galleys, and Maltese galleys gathered at Messina to join Gian Andrea Doria, the commander in chief of the combined fleet, who was leading the Spanish portion of the fleet to a rendezvous. However, while Doria did not appear with the Spanish galleys, Cigalazade who had sailed from Istanbul on July 3, 1594, arrived with a fleet of approximately seventy Ottoman galleys at the end of August, proceeding to sack Reggio at the beginning of September. He was expected to attack Malta, but he sailed east instead. Two weeks later Doria arrived.87 Cigalazade had attempted to arrange a meeting with his mother, but his request to the authorities in Messina was refused. He wrote later to his mother explaining that refusal was the reason he then sacked Reggio in revenge.88 This was his sole chance to lead an Ottoman fleet to the western Mediterranean during his first term as admiral, because he was replaced as kapudan pasha in 1595 by Halil Pasha, who was a son-in-law of the new sultan, Mehmed III. Halil remained admiral until 1598, when Cigalazade again became kapudan pasha. In 1596 Cigalazade had briefly been promoted to be grand vezir after the battle of Mezö-Keresztes, October 26, in Hungary where his actions helped transform a defeat

 A Tale of Corsairs 151 into a victory against the combined troops of the Holy Roman Empire and Transylvania. But due to the opposition of the Valide Sultan Safiye, he was soon dismissed from office and replaced by Safiye’s son-in-law Ibrahim Pasha.89 Later Ottoman chroniclers such as Naima, who described Cigalazade’s military exploits at the battle of MezöKeresztes and his subsequent short-lived elevation to the grand vizierate, claimed that his harsh treatment of the sipahis who did not participate in the campaign led to the Celali rebellions that broke out soon thereafter. Thus, even his very short term in office elicited severe criticism. Cigalazade was then appointed as governor of Damascus; however, in April 1598 messengers were sent to recall him to Istanbul. He proceeded slowly, but shortly after his arrival in the capital he sailed first to Messina, although the official reason for the expedition was to enforce Ottoman control of North Africa.90 In 1598 Cigalazade sent a letter to the viceroy of Sicily, requesting permission to visit his mother, whom he had not seen for nearly forty years. Unlike in 1594, Cigalazade quickly received permission with the condition that he send his son, Mahmud, with two galleys to Messina as security. Another stipulation was that he listen to two monks preach against his attacking Italian coasts and for his return to Christianity. He had also written to his mother, “I long to . . . see you before I die. . . . If you love me, as much as I love you, try to obtain permission.”91 Finally, the long-awaited reunion proceeded when Lucrezia and some additional family members sailed on Spanish ships to the Ottoman fleet, which was anchored off Pellaro. After Lucrezia was welcomed with cannon fire, Cigalazade and his family embraced and exchanged gifts. Then Cigalazade escorted Lucrezia to his private quarters. Although no records indicate the substance of their conversation or what Cigalazade said to any of his family, speculation claimed that he tried to convert his family to Islam or on the other hand that he considered returning to Christianity.92 This meeting was the final one between Cigalazade and his mother, but Carlo visited his brother in 1600 and he also was known to pass information to Cigalazade; for example Carlo sent letters to Cigalazade concerning a French landing in Dalmatia.93 Carlo hoped his brother would persuade the sultan to make him ruler of a territory such as Naxos without “turning Turk.”94 After the reunion with his mother, Cigalazade proceeded to engage in naval warfare; for example, he sailed to Gozo near Malta, landed 2,000 troops but after a failed attack on the fortress, the Ottoman fleet departed. Cigalazade returned to Istanbul with the fleet in January 1599. The next summer he voyaged to Calabria to support a revolt against Spanish rule led by the heterodox philosopher Tommaso Campanella, but the conspirators were betrayed and already in prison by the time he arrived with the Ottoman fleet; thus, the revolt never materialized.95 During the years of his second term as kapudan pasha, Cigalazade employed the fleet to suppress a revolt in Tunis, to punish the inhabitants of Chios for not resisting an enemy attack, and to protect the convoy from Egypt to Istanbul from attacks by the Knights of Malta. He frequently sailed the waters of the eastern Mediterranean; for example, dispatches from the Venetian representatives at Istanbul and Zante and their spies report him with the fleet at Eğriboz in December 1601 and Rhodes in November 1603. But when war with the Safavids resumed in 1603 he was given command of the army in 1604 and sent to Iran, where he led an unsuccessful campaign against Tabriz in 1605 and died while retreating from Van to Diyarbakir.96

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While few Ottoman chroniclers apart from Katib Çelebi recount his achievements as kapudan pasha, from the perspective of Western Christendom, his activities as admiral of the fleet were of consuming interest. Not only did he lead major Ottoman naval expeditions to the shores of Sicily in the 1590s, he also received and paid visits to his relatives in both Istanbul and in Sicilian waters. Venetian bailos and others speculated as to whether he was a committed Muslim or whether he would return to the Christian faith. Rumor went both ways that he was about to return to the Christian fold or that he was trying to convert his relatives to Islam. Italian, mainly Venetian, sources thus provide a different perspective than the Ottoman narratives. Cigalazade appears as an individual who desired to become admiral greatly, not merely because of the prestige and wealth that went with the position but also because as admiral he could lead a fleet to his birthplace and arrange a reunion with his mother. Cigalazade’s life is a tale that centers on two incidents during which an individual was captured and then converted to a different religion for reasons that historians speculate had little to do with religious conviction but everything to do with circumstances.

Conclusion The issue of captives and conversions reverberates through the biographies of these three admirals. The captures of the three admirals themselves are only a fraction of the many accounts of captives and converts that surround them. Turning first to Cigalazade, his mother was also captured or a pawn in a negotiated surrender, but she converted to Christianity and is known only as Lucrezia Cicala. For Uluç Hasan, the number of captives and conversions surrounding him is far greater. Uluç Hasan married Zahra (her probable name), who was the inspiration for a character in Cervantes’s Don Quixote, Zoraida. Both the historical woman and the literary character were the daughter of Haci Murad, who was also a historical figure as well as a literary character and Cervantes embellished the historical facts in both cases.97 The historical Haci Murad was a “renegade” from Ragusa (Dubrovnik) who thus converted from Christianity to Islam. He served the sultan as a çavuş (messenger) and participated in diplomacy. Probably he was the same Haci Murad who traveled to France in 1565 on a diplomatic mission to King Charles IX of France concerning two captive Ottoman women who had converted to Christianity whose mother desired their return.98 His activities in the 1570s connect him to Uluç Hasan, Algiers, and diplomacy with Spain. Haci Murad had married a woman whose mother was captured by Hayreddin, when he conquered the Penon of Algiers in 1529. According to Sosa, who was a captive in Algiers 1577–81, she was living at the time of Sosa’s captivity, and she was originally Spanish from Majorca.99 Presumably the woman captured in 1529 married a corsair of Algiers and she may have remained Christian. The multitalented Haci Murad was also a reis (ship captain) and a local caid or governor of a fortress.100 Haci Murad engaged in diplomacy between the Ottoman Empire and Spain in the 1570s in conjunction with his son-in-law, Abd al-Malik of Morocco, who was described as a man who was “at ease in various cultures.”101 Haci Murad acted as an unofficial representative of Murad III in dealing with Philip II’s envoys. When Uluç

 A Tale of Corsairs 153 Hasan became governor of Algiers in 1577, appointing him to this position supported the negotiations.102 Haci Murad, while conducting diplomacy in Istanbul and Algiers on behalf of the sultan, claimed to have a great deal of influence with Murad III.103 Abd al-Malik, who resided some years in Ottoman Algiers, would have deemed marriage to the daughter of such an influential man an asset to his aspirations to oust his brother and then his nephew and rule Morocco himself. Zahra was also considered a great beauty and they married in 1574 and had a son in 1575.104 So Uluç Hasan, a captive and a convert, married a woman whose father was a convert and whose maternal grandmother was a captive and perhaps a convert. In Cervantes’s tales, Haci Murad’s daughter flees Algiers with a captive captain and converts to Christianity in Spain. With both the real and the fictional characters movement from one religion or culture to another was a recurring event during this period of rivalry in the Mediterranean. Kılıç Ali’s capture and conversion due to a murder over an insult because of his ringworm seem rather mundane by comparison. In conclusion, we can assess the significance of each of these Italian-born admirals. First, Kılıç Ali was a talented seafarer who had the ability to lead the fleet successfully as evidenced by his conquest of Tunis as well as his desire to command the fleet in battle. But multiple factors led to periods of inactivity in naval warfare during most of his admiralship. Grand Vizier Mehmed Sokollu desired peace in the Mediterranean, the Ottomans were embroiled in a war with the Safavids from 1578 until 1588, and naval warfare was viewed as a low priority due to Ottoman knowledge that the Spanish had commitments elsewhere and desired a truce. However, when an opportunity arose to assist Harborne’s attempts to persuade the sultan to employ the fleet to support England against Spain, which would have led to his commanding the fleet in a naval expedition, he appears to have allowed his personal feelings to override his judgment. Kılıç Ali allowed his anger at the behavior of the captain who brought Harborne to the Ottoman Empire to influence his attitude not just to Harborne, but to the English as a whole. Also, his Catholic religious education continued to influence his attitudes to the states of Europe, although he was a Muslim Ottoman. He judged that Philip II would easily defeat England, but he did not comprehend the changes that were occurring in terms of maritime technology and organization that would lead to northern Europeans, especially the English and the Dutch becoming the most powerful forces in the Mediterranean even in North Africa. English and Dutch renegades such as John Ward and Simon Danser later came to dominate the Barbary coast. Lepanto had reinforced Kılıç Ali’s respect for Venetian and Spanish naval forces, but northern European shipping would dominate the Mediterranean in the seventeenth century. Thus, Kılıç Ali allowed his personal opinions regarding Harborne and the English to override necessities of state, which would have advocated supporting Elizabeth against Philip II. Of more importance for the Ottomans, he promoted the interests of Uluç Hasan beyond what his talents seem to have merited. Because of his personal relationship with Uluç Hasan, he used his influence to obtain the governorship of Algiers for him twice and recommended that he be promoted to kapudan pasha after Kılıç Ali’s death. Uluç Hasan was no Kılıç Ali in terms of naval warfare; Uluç Hasan’s successes at sea were limited and his treatment of subordinates was brutal; thus, he achieved limited success as a governor or admiral.

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While the state of the Ottoman fleet when Uluç Hasan was admiral cannot be considered chiefly to have been a result of his deficiency of leadership, he lacked the abilities to overcome the tremendous difficulties of the early 1590s, when the financial condition of the empire deteriorated. Hasan’s past also impacted his decisions while in Ottoman service. His bitterness due to his family’s low social status in Venice influenced both his personal and professional lives. He married the widow of the ruler of Morocco to gain control of that land. He did not hesitate to employ the Ottoman navy to further his own ambitions, for if his stepson had become ruler of Morocco, Uluç Hasan would have wielded the power. Attempting to compensate for his low status in Venice, he treated his subordinates with brutality. But Uluç Hasan ultimately achieved little as kapudan pasha, thereby failing to gain fame in Ottoman history, although he achieved infamy in European literature both historical by Sosa and fictional by Cervantes, both of whom generally portrayed him as a brutal monster.105 While Katib Çelebi recounted the careers of Kılıç Ali and Cigalazade in considerable detail, he included almost nothing about Uluç Hasan beyond the bare facts that he had come from North Africa in 1588 to become admiral and suppressed a revolt in Tripoli in 1590.106 Uluç Hasan’s championship of his stepson, Ismail, impacted Ottoman policy many years after his death. Ismail’s uncle, Ahmad, died in 1603, and a fratricidal struggle for the throne among his sons erupted immediately. The Venetian governor of Zante, Maffio Michiel, recorded the following incident in November 1604. On the 18th of this month an English ship arrived in port. She hailed last from Chios, and had on board Ismail, a son of the late King of Morocco, the King, I mean, who fell in battle against Don Sebastian. This son is now twenty-eight years old. After his father’s death he fled to Constantinople, where he lived till the present time; the throne of Morocco going to his uncle. He has now been secretly invited back to Morocco by the chiefs, who are sick of the bad government and disunion among the four sons of the late King, cousins of Ismail. To Ismail they promise the throne, and assure him that there are ten thousand outlaws in the mountains, all of whom will be for him. He is to have the support of the Viceroy of Algiers, who is also a passenger by the same ship, and holds a commission from the Sultan to place Ismail on the throne. He has no more money than will suffice for this journey. The ship sailed to-day.107

This report, although not accurately reporting that Ismail came to Istanbul by way of Algiers with Uluç Hasan, reveals the shape of events to come. The situation in Morocco had descended into anarchy and, although Ismail did not gain the throne, the entire dynasty lost power in the following decades.108 The Ottomans continued their attempts to dominate Morocco by supporting a contender to the throne who they believed they could control. They did not provide significant financial support, because the Ottoman treasury was depleted. Ismail had the support of the governor of Algiers, who governed neighboring Algiers essential for Ismail’s attempt to come to power in Morocco. Finally, and this is of the utmost importance, the governor and Ismail traveled on an English ship. The English that Kılıç Ali had disdained twenty years previously had so deeply penetrated the waters of the eastern Mediterranean by the beginning of the

 A Tale of Corsairs 155 seventeenth century that the governor of Algiers and the pretender to the throne of Morocco traveled together on an English ship. Although Cigalazade remained admiral in 1604, he was commanding the Ottoman army against the Safavids in Iran and had previously led his final naval expeditions in the Mediterranean. He was not replaced, although he could not lead the fleet while campaigning in Iran. Finally, Cigalazade achieved greater success and fame as an Ottoman admiral than Uluç Hasan, but he was not equal to Hayreddin Pasha, Turgud, or Kılıç Ali, in terms of naval ability. He simply did not possess their years of experience gained sailing and leading fleets in battle. However, beyond becoming admiral he had greater ambitions based on his palace education. He briefly achieved the rank of grand vizier, but illjudged policies contributing to the Celali revolts, in addition to opposition from the Valide Sultan Safiye, who had resented her treatment by Mihrimah Sultan, put an abrupt end to his days as grand vizier. His tenure as kapudan pasha was substantial and successful, yet he also used the fleet for his own ends. Both the 1594 and 1598 expeditions primarily aimed at facilitating a reunion with his mother and family in Sicily. Once again, the personal outweighed state policy; clearly the interaction of personalities with historical trends impacted events. In many instances from 1571 until 1605, neither the kapudan pashas nor the sultans and grand viziers formulated naval plans based on strategic interests. Short-term policy and personal agendas often dictated naval priorities, and this proved dangerous for an empire that often forgot how essential a powerful navy was not only for conquest but also for Ottoman survival. The Ottomans and many of their opponents such as the Habsburgs of Spain neglected naval forces after 1571 due to financial difficulties, but, unlike the rulers of Spain whose capital was not accessible by sea, the Ottoman sultans’ capital remained vulnerable to assaults by sea. In the next major naval conflict, the war to conquer Crete from Venice in the mid-seventeenth century, the dangers of these trends were made painfully apparent.

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The Cretan War: Seventeenth Century: Technology, Finances, and Factions The Trials of Admiral Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha

After the sultan [Mehmed IV] acceded to the throne in . . . [1648], Grand Vizier Koca Mehmed Pasha began to endeavor to improve the condition of the fleet. Some people were saying that, “the infidels go to sea with their galleons and use them with the wind to defeat galleys in battle. Since they must avoid the imperial [Ottoman] fleet, they anchor at the Dardanelles and block the way. It is impossible to resist them with galleys. We need galleons so that we can attack galleons with galleons, thus we must build galleons.” At that time Sheyhu’l-Islam Abdurrahim Efendi called me and consulted me on this topic . . . I said . . . “Hayreddin Pasha confronted a lot of galleons and galliots of the infidels with one hundred four galleys and prevailed against them. One should say that what matters most is not producing ships but preparing expert sailors and cannoneers after completing their cannon and other military necessities.” Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar1 Katib Çelebi through his encounters with figures such as the Sheyhu’l-Islam (head of  the Ottoman religious establishment) recognized and recorded in his history of the Ottoman navy, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, the concerns that were uppermost in the minds of the Ottoman elite in the 1640s and 1650s. Katib Çelebi was both an eyewitness to the impact of the war to conquer Crete on life in Istanbul, and an Ottoman intellectual and historian with wide-ranging interests. He believed that to compete with Europeans, such as the Venetians, the Ottomans must understand the world beyond the borders of the empire.2 He analyzed the successes and defeats of the Ottoman navy and especially evaluated the actions of the admirals who led the fleets. However, despite Katib Çelebi’s scholarship, it is ironic that while the grand vizier had listened to “some people,” the Sheyhu’l-Islam consulted Katib Çelebi, a scholar who possessed no firsthand naval expertise. Moreover, 1648 was no ordinary year, for Mehmed IV (r. 1648–87) acceding to the throne occurred because his father, Ibrahim (r. 1640–48), had been deposed due to his mental instability. Elite factionalism had reached new levels of intensity, which

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impacted the navy directly. Katib Çelebi failed to mention any consultation with leaders of the fleet, highlighting that such individuals were not necessarily possessed of naval expertise. The quote reveals that the elite had become so out of touch with naval realities that they struggled to understand how to protect the empire effectively. Katib Çelebi’s history is useful for the entire period he covers, from the conquest of Istanbul in 1453 until the third battle of the Dardanelles in 1656. However, it is especially valuable for the period of the seventeenth century, when he was either impacted personally by naval weakness when the Ottoman fleet failed to prevent the Venetian fleet’s blockade of the straits, or he gained access to informants or sources that were close to the events. Moreover, this period has been neglected as up until the outbreak of the Cretan War (1645–69) few major naval encounters occurred. A view of Ottoman naval history from the perspective of an individual who lived from the first decade of the seventeenth century until 1657 provides an opportunity to observe that far more than naval affairs impacted the ability of the Ottoman fleet to perform effectively. Katib Çelebi’s career combined a period of accompanying military campaigns as a member of the finance bureaucracy with a period of study when due to inheritances he could afford to purchase many books. Thus, his scholarship is exemplary, but his understanding of military history benefits from his experiences in his youth on military campaigns. Katib Çelebi also experienced conflicts within the bureaucracy, which he overcame through patronage to obtain the position of second scribe to the Office for the Calculation of the Expenses Related to the Cavalrymen. Through his position in scholarship and finance and his personal experience of campaigns, although not naval ones, he was prepared to write this history, which he presented to Mehmed IV. He completed the work in February 1657, including the disastrous third battle of the Dardanelles in 1656 in his final chapter of the narrative history. Thus, his views on the battles and admirals of this period are essential for understanding the difficulties the Ottomans faced during these years.3 Naval affairs had sunk to a low priority between 1604 and 1644, but during an only moderately successful war against Venice, the fleet became of crucial importance. While the Ottomans were ill prepared for a naval war, conquering Crete, the final major Venetian stronghold in the eastern Mediterranean, made strategic sense. But the strains of fighting this war, which required naval power, in addition to the other challenges facing the empire, led to several extreme political events such as the deposition of Ibrahim and the murder of his mother, Valide Sultan Kösem. Katib Çelebi’s account, in addition to providing an unparalleled source for the naval history of the first twelve years, 1645–57, of the Cretan War as well as the fifty-year period of naval neglect which preceded it, includes hints of the systemic issues of factionalism that plagued the empire during this period. Between 1648 and the end of his history in 1656, the Ottoman fleet fought several naval battles, and, while some of these could be classed as victories, many of them were unquestionably major defeats. The leaders of the empire needed to find a solution to naval incompetence especially in the Dardanelles, but the answer was a great deal more complex than merely building galleons. In addition, an analysis of the experiences of the many admirals of the seventeenth century provides evidence as to why the Ottomans lost many naval battles before they won the war and

 The Cretan War 159 conquered Crete in 1669. A prosopographical approach reveals that naval expertise was available; however, elite factionalism often prevented it from being utilized. Katib Çelebi’s analysis of naval affairs provides insight into the main factors that impacted Ottoman naval forces during the seventeenth century. But additional sources, such as the history of the empire by the author Mustafa Naima, reveal that naval difficulties were closely connected with the most important phenomena that influenced the empire during this period.4 Thus understanding the trends that impacted the naval forces during the mid-seventeenth century requires analyzing how financial troubles, changing technology, and elite turmoil combined to impact the manpower that led, sailed, and for many years propelled the ships that made up the Ottoman fleet. For one of the main issues that the empire faced was financing the war on Crete and especially the navy, which required more financial resources than were available. As Ottoman elites attempted to devise solutions to the empire’s challenges, their highest priority was the struggle for power against their rivals.

Introduction: Ottoman Empire Seventeenth Century The Ottoman Empire altered greatly during the seventeenth century, including the transformation from an empire ruled by a powerful sultan to one in which the sultan became a figurehead and the grand vizier and other members of the ruling elite more often governed. In addition, the ruling class of administrators of the empire expanded to include men whose social origins spanned a wider range than the devşirme recruits who had dominated the highest echelons of the ruling class during much of the sixteenth century. However, the roots of these changes began earlier and a sharp dividing line between an Ottoman “golden age” under Süleyman and a supposed “decline” under his successors does not accurately represent either the sixteenth or the seventeenth century. The challenges that the empire faced beginning in the late sixteenth century affected more than the navy, but their impact on the naval power of the empire was unique since the relationship between the administrative elite and the naval leaders generally diverged from that between the elite and the land-based military; the elite had minimal naval expertise or understanding of it and consequently undervalued and neglected it. However, costly, long wars with little to show for the conflicts also greatly impacted naval forces. Indeed, conquests of islands, for example, Cyprus, ruled by Venice were among the few territories that were added to the empire after the reign of Süleyman. In the seventeenth century, the conquest of Crete and the naval battles associated with it exemplify naval challenges dramatically. The final decades of the sixteenth century revealed that the geopolitical situation had evolved considerably from conditions during the reign of Süleyman when Ottoman naval power was at its height and its chief competitors were the Venetians and the Genoese subordinates of the kings of Spain. After 1580 Spain’s priorities switched from fighting Muslims in the Mediterranean to fighting Protestants in the Low Countries.5 Increasingly, France, England, and the Netherlands dominated Mediterranean commerce with their superior maritime technology based on the bertone, a small sailing ship that was highly maneuverable especially on the open

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sea. As northern European shipping flooded into the Mediterranean many northern Europeans became captives in the Ottoman North African Provinces of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. Many joined with the local corsairs bringing their Atlantic sailing expertise to the seafarers of these provinces. Since no major sea battles of the scope of Lepanto were ever fought in the Mediterranean during the late sixteenth century or the seventeenth century, many sailors were no longer employed by the maritime states as auxiliary forces. Consequently, they turned to corsairing, leading to a rise in raiding and corsair activity.6 In the 1590s, the Ottomans became embroiled in two land wars: the first against the Habsburgs, which began in 1593, lasted until 1606 draining the finances of Ottomans and Habsburgs alike. A war with Safavid Iran 1578–90, during which the Ottomans had conquered Safavid territory, was reignited in 1603 when Shah Abbas regained Tabriz from the Ottomans and continued until 1618. Due to these military engagements on land, naval preparations were given a low priority.7 At the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries, men given the post of admiral were occasionally seafarers, but more often they were highly placed members of the administrative elite. This had occurred earlier during the sixteenth century, but what became characteristic of the seventeenth century was the short period of time that admirals usually held their position.8 This meant that any admiral (kapudan pasha) had limited experience as the admiral, whatever seafaring experience he may have brought with him to the position, which was often minimal. Katib Çelebi provides a great deal of information about the admirals as a collective group.

Katib Çelebi: Insights into the Seventeenth Century The first part of Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar is a historical survey of naval history beginning with introductory geographical information that highlights Venetian territories or lands that the Ottomans had won from the Venetians. This reveals the context of his writing this work, the war with Venice to conquer Crete, which brought naval matters to a higher priority in the Empire. Part One includes a narrative history of the navy beginning with the reign of Mehmed the Conqueror. Chapter One of Part One covers naval history until the time of Hayreddin Pasha. Chapters Two and Three cover Hayreddin, Chapter four covers Turgud Reis, Chapter Five Piyale Pasha, and Chapter Six Kılıç Ali. Chapter Seven begins during the admiralship of Kılıç Ali, but after the Ottoman conquest of Tunis in 1574 and continues until the war to conquer Crete, approximately seventy years. Comparing the information included in this chapter with the section providing brief biographies of the admirals during this period in Part Two, not all men who were admirals accomplished enough to be mentioned in the historical survey. Chapter Seven includes information concerning fifteen men who served as admiral and a few others who were active in naval warfare even if they did not achieve the rank of admiral. Part Two of the work includes short biographical notices of admirals beginning with Baltaoğlu, who served as admiral during the conquest of Istanbul in 1453. For

 The Cretan War 161 the period 1574–1644, Katib Çelebi included twenty-six individuals beginning with Kılıç Ali and ending with Yusuf Pasha. Of these twenty-six admirals few had naval qualifications at the time they were appointed as the highest naval official. Of the twenty-six admirals, only a few individuals’ careers are highlighted here, for these men were connected to later events that reveal insights into how factional infighting impacted naval affairs. In the second decade of the seventeenth century, the rise to admiral and then grand vizier of an Ali Pasha reveals that a few admirals with some naval expertise achieved the highest rank in the Ottoman elite. Katib Çelebi wrote the following concerning the early career of Ali Pasha: Ali Pasha: He was the son of Ahmed Pasha of Kos who was martyred by the Celali Yaya in 996 [1588] while he was the governor general of Tunisia. He [Ali] was the bey of Damietta for fifteen years. He became the governor general of Yemen in 1011 [1602/03] and he was the governor of Tunisia for two years. He also served at the sancaks of Mora and Cyprus. Then he became a council vizier and then the admiral. He was dismissed from his job when Sultan Mustafa acceded to the throne.9

This is Katib Çelebi’s biographical notice concerning Ali Pasha; the first time he was appointed to be admiral indicates that he had previously served at locations that ensured involvement with naval affairs since they were districts with ports. His father had been a corsair from Kos (Istanköy) who became a naval captain and then governor of Tunis, where he married the daughter of a Kaya Pasha. At his father’s death, Ali became governor of Damietta despite his youth. In this position Ali traveled to Istanbul frequently, to deliver the yearly taxes of Egypt. Ali met Sultan Ahmed (r. 1603–17) in 1605 when Ahmed moved his court to Bursa and the ruler traveled on Ali’s ship.10 Ali Pasha became admiral in 1617. While Katib Çelebi only briefly alludes to this, when Sultan Mustafa became sultan for the first time, and only for three months, a different faction came to power and thus Ali was dismissed from being admiral and replaced by a supporter of a different faction in the palace, Davud Pasha. As this was during the winter, when Mustafa was replaced by Osman II, then Ali Pasha regained the admiralship and campaigned in 1618. Ali Pasha may have been one of the instigators of the palace coup because of his loss of the admiralship.11 In the main narrative, Katib Çelebi provides an account of the activities of Ali Pasha during the summer of 1617. He departed on campaign immediately despite the ships being in a damaged condition. He claimed expertise, “I was born and raised in a galley,” and headed toward Anavarin (Navarino, Pylos, Greece). The fleet was struck by a storm, which sank eleven ships, and seven lost their entire crew. Ali managed to reach Tripoli in North Africa, repair the remaining ships, and return to Anavarin. He reached the arsenal in Istanbul in time to be replaced by the candidate of the other faction. Katib Çelebi concluded this account of the campaign of 1617: “the moral to the story: is that it is wrong to go to sea with weak and worn out ships and to act haughtily. It is necessary to go to sea with sound ships because if a storm occurs, then weak and unsound ships will most likely sink.”12 Katib Çelebi’s assessment of Ali Pasha concluded that he was motivated by ambition to sail without adequate preparations.

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By the next campaign season, Ali Pasha regained the position of admiral, and Katib Çelebi assessed the remainder of his career. “Ali Pasha: He took this post for the second time and he set sail for the Mediterranean in 1027 [1618] and 1028 [1619] and protected [the shores]. He was given the rank of grand vizier on the sixteenth of Muharrem 1029 [23 December 1619] and he passed away in 1030 [1621].”13 These campaigns are covered in slightly more detail in the narrative section of the book. Ali sailed as far as Corfu in 1618 and captured six ships in 1619. Katib Çelebi’s account of Ali Pasha’s actions with the booty that he obtained is enlightening for understanding rivalry among elite factions. He came to the divan with many gifts and gave them away saying that they were from the booty. However with the incitement of [former] Grand Vizier Mehmed Pasha, who was the son-in-law of the sultan, the Venetian ambassador made a claim stating that “half of the property taken from us was not given to the sultan and the ships are not war ships, they are protecting [ships].” This was no use, and the Captain Pasha prevailed and shortly became Grand Vizier.14

Katib Çelebi only hints at the factional fighting. Ali Pasha may have joined with Mustafa Ağa, the chief black eunuch, to engineer the deposition of Mustafa (r. 1617– 18, 1622–3), and then to discredit him with the claim that he was mentally unstable. It was rumored that Ahmed’s chief black Eunuch, Mustafa Ağa, had adopted Ali as a son. Through Mustafa Ağa’s influence Ahmed gave Ali Pasha governorships. In 1609, Ali assisted in the construction of the Sultan Ahmed mosque with his own galley slaves. Three years later, he became governor of Tunis and a vizier, and then with the patronage of Mustafa Ağa, he was given the post of admiral in 1617, replacing Halil Pasha, who had become grand vizier.15 According to the French ambassador Baron de Sancy’s report, Ali Pasha found an opportunity to gain the support of key individuals who would support deposing Sultan Mustafa. Davud Pasha, who was given the post of admiral, learned that he would be made deputy grand vizier and offered the admiralship to Ali for 50,000 ducats. A faction including the current deputy grand vizier, the grand mufti, the former grand admiral, and the chief black eunuch locked Mustafa in the harem and enthroned Ahmed’s son Osman. A hint of this coup appears in Katib Çelebi when he recorded that “The new sultan [Mustafa] ascended to the throne. When Davud Pasha became the admiral, he left that pasha [Ali] in his post.” The information is cryptic, but it supports the account by Baron de Sacy.16 Ali Pasha combined some seafaring credentials with palace connections to become admiral and finally grand vizier. He also had proved his worth as a commander by capturing ships with booty, which he distributed to the sultan to ensure his favor. Passing over the following assignments of admiral, during which some men occupied the post multiple times, Katib Çelebi provided brief biographical notices for four men from the period 1636–44, which provide examples of the type of men who became admiral and the events associated with their time in that position. Kara Mustafa Pasha: He was the ağa [commander] of the Janissaries but after he returned from Revan [Yerevan, with Murad IV, r. 1623-40] he was appointed

 The Cretan War 163 admiral. He came to the state office and he set out for the Mediterranean in one thousand forty-six [1636 CE]. He put the arsenal affairs in order, and he allocated an annual tax income for forty galleys.17

Kara Mustafa Pasha was given the post of admiral with no prior naval experience, before he departed for the Mediterranean in 1636. However, regarding his efforts at the arsenal, if his policies had been implemented, the Ottoman navy would have been better prepared to protect the empire’s waters, capital city, and commerce in the event of war with Venice. Two other men served as admiral before Siyavuş Pasha received this position. Siyavuş Pasha: He was a silahdar [sword-bearer/guard in the palace] and then he left the harem [private area of the palace not merely for women but for the sultan’s closest associates], and he became the admiral after the above-mentioned pasha [Hüseyn Pasha]. He led the fleet to Azov in one thousand fifty-one [1641 CE] but failed to conquer it and therefore was dismissed from his post. He died in one thousand sixty-five [1655] while he was serving as grand vizier.18

Siyavuş Pasha lacked naval experience when he was chosen to be the admiral, but he possessed palace connections. Despite an unsuccessful campaign to the Black Sea in 1641, he remained in important governmental positions serving as a vizier in 1651 and dying in 1656 while serving as grand vizier. He clashed with another grand vizier, Melek Ahmed Pasha, in 1651 over naval policy concerning the appointment of Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha as admiral. Siyavuş Pasha was followed as admiral by Piyale Pasha. Piyale Pasha: He was the tersane kethüdasi [arsenal chamberlain] Uzun [tall] Piyale. He was appointed as the admiral in one thousand fifty-two [1642] and he set sail for the Mediterranean. He headed towards the shores of the infidels and captured a galleon carrying timber on his way. On his return, somebody gave the false news that he had gotten goods from Tunisia. Therefore, he was killed on the fifth day of Muharrem of one thousand fifty-three [March 26, 1643].

In the narrative section, Katib Çelebi includes several campaigns of Piyale, most of them undertaken while he was the tersane kethüdasi rather than the admiral, while the individual who was technically admiral (Silahdar Mustafa Pasha) was on campaign with sultan Murad IV. Piyale won a resounding victory against the Cossacks near Azov in 1638. The following year, the admiral again sent Piyale in his place to fight against the Cossacks in the Black Sea. In 1642 Piyale became the admiral with the rank of governor of the islands. He sailed in the Mediterranean Sea capturing a galleon whose cargo was timber. When he returned to Istanbul, his own apprentice, Ammaroğlu, with a false memorandum caused his execution on March 26, 1643. He was a famous admiral in the arsenal who was skillful in fulfilling his responsibilities. He was sold for nothing. “The person who caused his death was also killed.”19

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“Bekir Pasha: While he was the bey of Rhodes he was appointed as admiral in the place of the above-mentioned pasha [Piyale Pasha, d. 1643] and led the fleet to the Mediterranean. He arrived at the shores of Kalavri [Calabria] but after he returned, he died at the beginning of Muharrem of one thousand fifty-four [March 10, 1644].” Bekir Pasha came to the position of admiral with some naval experience as formerly he had been the governor of Rhodes. However, he probably served as admiral for less than one year before his death.20 The following admiral, Yusuf Pasha, is discussed herein in connection with the war to conquer Crete. These four men—Kara Mustafa Pasha, Siyavuş Pasha, Piyale Pasha, and Bekir Pasha—came to the position of admiral from various backgrounds: one as a commander of the Janissaries, one as a member of the palace staff, one as the Arsenal Chamberlain, and one as a derya bey at Rhodes. None of these three served as admiral for long, either being replaced, sometimes for maritime failures, or dying while in that position. Certainly, some of the admirals tried to improve the navy by their actions; for example, Kara Mustafa put the arsenal in order and designated taxes for the purpose of funding ship construction. However, the navy was hardly prepared for the war with Crete that began in 1645. But assessing naval deficiencies in isolation, such as the employment of inexperienced men in the position of admiral, sheds little light on the roots of these troubles, which relate to the more general crises of the seventeenth century from an Ottoman perspective.21 The lack of effective naval leadership was directly connected to the political factions that beset the empire. Also, during this period the fiscal underpinnings of the empire changed from the timar system to that of tax farming and finances were often in a state of crisis, which also impacted naval policy. While the resources of the empire remained adequate to construct and maintain an effective fleet, these resources were repeatedly squandered and employed ineffectively. New fleets were continually being rebuilt after previous fleets were defeated or destroyed, often due to incompetent naval leadership. Not only were admirals often inexperienced, so were the sultans. It was a century when a sultan was more likely to be deposed than not, since between 1603 and 1703 there were ten reigns of nine sultans, and six times a sultan was deposed.22 Clearly the authority of sultans in the seventeenth century was limited, but others among the Ottoman elite exerted more power, notably mothers of sultans (Valide Sultans), and others in the palace. After 1656 a series of grand viziers from the Köprülü family were often the de facto rulers of the empire.23 The Ulema (religious establishment) also exerted a significant force in Ottoman politics as evidenced earlier. Men with a variety of backgrounds, some in finance and trade, replaced military slaves in the leadership of the empire.24 As the size of the Janissaries increased and they evolved from an effective fighting force to a political factor internally in the empire, they and the military forces created to replace them in warfare received most of the funds available for military expenditures. Naval warfare, seen as a lower priority, had become increasingly expensive during the sixteenth century and the ruling elite decided to economize there. However, an effective navy remained necessary for the survival and well-being of the empire not merely militarily but also economically. A fleet also required considerable time to

 The Cretan War 165 prepare as anyone who had witnessed the Ottoman fleet’s rebuilding after Lepanto realized. The grand vizier Sinan wrote in 1589: “One can launch a campaign on land by a mere command: everybody mounts his horse and sets off. A naval expedition is not like that . . . however great the material investment and human efforts made, it can only be realized in seven to eight months.”25 In addition, learning the art of war at sea required a long apprenticeship as shown by Piri Reis’s claims that he learned seafaring from years of sailing with his uncle, Kemal Reis. The administrative elite rarely acquired this experience and so were out of their depth when it came to naval warfare. It is scarcely surprising then that the elite preferred to invest in land warfare, which they understood more fully and felt more qualified to undertake, rather than in naval warfare, in which the outsiders who excelled at it often came from North Africa. Thus, shortage of money and differing priorities had already made an impact on the navy as early as the 1590s and during the 1600s these issues only became more pervasive.26 Katib Çelebi recorded the following about the incident that led to the decision to go to war with Venice over the island of Crete. The endemic piracy, including the depredations of the Knights of Malta, is clearly shown, as well as why individuals chose to sail in risky conditions, due to factors of timing of such events as the annual pilgrimage to Mecca: The captain had been unable to gather sufficient weapons beforehand, so there were only four cannon in the ship. Nevertheless, the ship set sail, and it was heard that this ship had set off with insufficient cannon and rifles and many goods. The corsairs of Malta used to sail around the islands with six galliots. They arrived at the island of Karpathos, which was on the way to Egypt, and they anchored at a hidden place. The above-mentioned ağa reached Rhodes with a favorable wind. Since some passengers informed him that the ships mentioned above were waiting for him at Karpathos, the people of Rhodes suggested that he stay at the port for several days. . . . They did not listen to the advice and left saying “we need to leave in time for the pilgrimage.” They set off from the port of Rhodes on an unfortunate day and reached the islands of Karpathos. Then the infidels, who were in the habit of blocking the way, appeared suddenly like a calamity and caught up with them immediately. The Ağa and the sailors fought without hesitation and bravely. The Ağa and the captain were martyred in the battle and most of the rest of the warriors died while fighting with the cannon and the rifles. The rest were captured by the infidels.27

From the perspective of Katib Çelebi, the act of piracy by the Knights of Malta that led to their halting at the island of Crete was the catalyst for the war. The Venetians, who ruled Crete, protested that this was an unreasonable pretext for an attack on Crete instead of an attack on Malta. But attacks on Malta had been unsuccessful in the past, and the island of Crete was the final remaining major Venetian possession in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. With the conquest of this island, the Ottomans continued to eliminate Venetian bases in the Levant.

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The Naval War to Conquer Crete, 1645–56 The conquest of Crete led to land and sea warfare, which featured blockades and major sea battles. On land, the siege of Kandiye (Candia/Heraklion) lasted for twentytwo years.28 To conquer Crete the first task was to transport an army to the island, necessitating naval involvement. Silahdar Yusuf Pasha had been given the position of admiral in 1644. Yusuf was another admiral who was chosen for his palace connections rather than for his naval expertise. Katib Çelebi said about him, “When Silahdar Yusuf Aga who was close to the sultan in the Royal Harem was appointed outside the palace he became the admiral.”29 As the campaign began, he was promoted to pasha and put in charge of the combined land and sea operation, which included transporting the invading forces to Crete. The fleet that was assembled was numerically impressive with seventy-two galleys, two mavnas, a great galleon, and ten Dutch and English ships that were hired for the occasion.30 In addition, the fleet included 250 ships to transport the army. While the Ottomans prepared the fleet and sailed in April, the Venetians engaged in wishfully thinking that the signs of mobilization that they had observed indicated that the Ottomans were preparing to attack Malta, whose Knights were the guilty party in the attack on Ottoman shipping in 1644. Thus the Venetians at Istendil (Tenos) welcomed the Ottoman fleet when it paused there on its way to Anavarin, not yet realizing that it was headed for Crete.31 The initial landing on the island in June was successful and Hanya (Chania) was captured by August 22, 1645. Conquering an island, Crete, meant naval support was crucial for both sides and impacted the subsequent events of the war whether fought on land or sea. When the war began in June 1645, the Venetians only had limited naval forces stationed at Crete; thus, they achieved little in the way of defense until reinforcements arrived from Venice and from Venice’s allies Consequently, five papal galleys, five from Naples, five from Tuscany, and some galleys from Malta assembled to assist the Venetians on Crete. However, by the time these contingents finally arrived at Crete, the Ottomans had already taken Hanya and added the twelve galleys stationed there to their own fleet.32 Lack of a unified command hampered the ability of the Venetians and their allies to agree on any effective plan of attack. Also, because galleys could carry only limited supplies, on October 3 the Venetian allies sailed away from Crete. The Venetian galleys that remained at Crete attacked Ottoman supply vessels, including seven galleys from North Africa. The kapudan pasha employed galleys to transfer supplies from the Mora to Crete and then led the fleet back to the Dardanelles.33 Although the admiral Yusuf Pasha led a successful invasion, the immediate returns on the expedition did not meet the expectations of Sultan Ibrahim. In January 1646, he insisted that the admiral return to Crete with a fleet of thirty vessels to complete the conquest of the island, although it was winter and dangerous for galleys to sail. The nineteenth-century historian von Hammer sensationalized the confrontation between Sultan Ibrahim and the admiral. Yusuf responded to the order to sail by replying that the ships were not ready. When Ibrahim criticized his performance at Hanya and told him to leave or he would kill him, Yusuf replied, “My padişah, you know nothing about seafaring. We have no oarsmen and without oarsmen galleys cannot move.” “Accursed one,” cried Ibrahim, “do you intend to teach me seafaring?” Although Ibrahim ordered

 The Cretan War 167 his immediate execution, Yusuf was imprisoned and the grand vizier and the defterdar begged for his life. Yusuf wrote from prison to the sultan asking for mercy, pleading in the name of his wife, the sultan’s daughter, and sons, Ibrahim’s grandsons; nevertheless, he was executed January 21, 1646.34 Thus, the naval war was bound up with politics and, as Ibrahim became increasingly unstable, the difficulties of fighting the war increased. Katib Çelebi wrote the following concerning Yusuf Pasha: While he was a silahdar he was appointed as the admiral on the third day of Rebiulahir of one thousand fifty-four [June 9, 1644]. He arrived at Crete with the fleet in one thousand fifty-five [1645] and he seized the fortress of Hanya. When he returned from there, he became a son-in-law of the sultan. He was killed for no reason on the fifth day of Zilhicce of that year [January 22, 1646].35

Despite having no prior experience in naval affairs, Yusuf Pasha safely transported the army by sea to Crete and began the conquest of the island. However, the mentally unstable sultan demanded immediate results and would not listen to reason when Yusuf explained why he could not sail back to Crete immediately. In Katib Çelebi’s detailed account of the first year of the war, a few incidents demand emphasis. First soon after the initial conquest of Hanya, the fleet of Venice and the city’s allies arrived at the port of Suda with “eighty galleys, four galleasses and a lot of bertones.” They planned an attack on the Ottoman fleet; however, a storm scattered the allied fleet. In October another storm sank an Ottoman vessel that was a “wondrous ship that could hold forty-two cannon.”36 It is no surprise therefore that Yusuf Pasha feared sailing to Crete in the winter since he had witnessed the destructive power of storms and, in the case of the Ottoman ship, the destruction of not just a low-lying galley but a major sailing ship that carried many cannon. The events of the first campaigning season of this war that would drag on for nearly a quarter of a century indicated the importance of the naval aspect of the war. The Ottomans needed to transport reinforcements of men and materiel to conquer the island, but they had little interest in engaging in a major naval encounter. For the Venetians, reinforcements were not their main priority; rather, they wanted to prevent at any cost the Ottomans from successfully reinforcing their forces on Crete. To do this, they sought to destroy the Ottoman navy. These aims dictated Venetian and Ottoman strategy throughout the war. The Venetians brought the conflict to the Dardanelles, and the Ottomans endeavored to evade the Venetian blockade there. Ultimately this war strained Ottoman resources in money, men, and military supplies.37 Because the Ottomans were trying to conquer an island, naval power was an integral part of the conflict. However, despite many naval battles of varying importance, all of them were related to the Ottoman transport of men and materiel for the war. Because most reinforcements departed from Istanbul whenever possible, the straits became a natural target for the Venetian blockade.38 In the spring of 1646, the Ottoman fleet had to fight at sea as well as transport the army to Crete because the Venetians implemented what became their primary strategy during the war: blockading the Dardanelles. A Venetian fleet of sailing ships left Crete in March and sailed northeast for the Dardanelles. In March a small squadron of

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approximately twenty-three Ottoman galleys avoided the Venetian sailing ships and sailed for Crete with reinforcements. When the Venetian fleet then sailed to Tenedos (Bozcaada) attempting to establish a base there, galleys from Gallipoli landed and drove the Venetians back to their ships. After sailing to Chios for supplies and water the Venetians returned to the Dardanelles. On May 26 a new kapudan pasha, Musa, and a new commander in chief, Mehmed Sultanzade, grandson of Cigalazade Sinan Pasha, commanded an Ottoman fleet of seventy-five galleys and five mahons. The fleets engaged at the Dardanelles, where, according to Katib Çelebi, “A great war of cannon and rifles ensued and lasted until mid-afternoon. When a shell from a cannon hit the bastarda of the infidel captain, its flag and main mast fell and it started to leak, but they were quick to respond and managed to avoid sinking. Several more ships of theirs were damaged and they had great losses.”39 When the battle ended, the Ottomans retreated back into the Dardanelles, although a few galleys slipped through and headed for Chios. On June 4, the Ottoman fleet took advantage of calm seas and rowed past the immobile sailing ships and headed for Chios, where they were joined by ships from North Africa, as well as many transports with 20,000 soldiers.40 They sailed safely to Hanya and in the fall of 1646 the Ottomans captured the city of Rethymnon and besieged the town of Suda. The commander in chief Mehmed Sultanzade died while encamped before Suda in August.41 The year 1646 thus revealed what would become the typical Venetian naval policy for the following years, with the Venetians attempting and often succeeding in blockading the Dardanelles. Despite mediocre performance in battle, the Ottoman fleet often evaded the Venetian blockade and transported men and supplies to reinforce the army on Crete. Although during the winter naval warfare usually came to a halt, 1647 began with a Venetian attack on January 3, 1647, on two sailing ships from North Africa that were heading from Chios to Algiers. When the kapudan pasha Musa sailed near the location of the skirmish toward the end of January, he learned of the earlier engagement. On January 27, he attacked and captured a Venetian ship, and the Ottomans were taking down the banner of the Venetians and putting up their own, when they were attacked by Venetian galleys. When Admiral Musa and one of the Venetian commanders were killed, the Ottomans lost four galleys from fire from the Venetian ship’s cannon.42 Naval action continued in 1647 in the waters of the Aegean near Chios and Lesbos, when in June the Ottoman fleet embarked reinforcements at Lesbos. The Venetians then attacked the Anatolian mainland at Çeşme opposite Chios, capturing some Ottoman transports. The Venetians fled when the larger Ottoman fleet approached, and the Ottomans succeeded in transporting reinforcements to Crete. Thus, the Venetian fleet in 1647 tried to blockade the Ottoman fleet and prevent their transporting reinforcements to Crete, but the Ottoman fleet evaded them and in the fall of 1647 Ottoman forces began to besiege Kandiye (Candia, Heraklion). Ottoman forces had captured Rethymnon and Hanya in a few months, but they besieged Kandiye unsuccessfully until they conquered it in 1669.43 At the end of 1647, Ammaroğlu “who had been the tersane kethüdası [Arsenal Chamberlain] had become the admiral by getting close to the tutor of the sultan.”44 He might have had some naval experience because he served at the arsenal, but that was not why he was promoted to admiral, which was because of palace influence.

 The Cretan War 169 However, he was blockaded in the straits and as a result he was executed. He was the man who had caused the death of Piyale Pasha shortly before the war began. Thus, he had deprived the Ottoman fleet of an experienced and skilled naval commander. Katib Çelebi included an observation at this point, which highlighted the dangers of having untrained men in positions of responsibility by contrasting Ottoman with Venetian policy. Since the Christian nations live mostly by the sea, they are interested in the science of geography. They do not consider it appropriate to be indifferent to learning navigation. In addition, the Venetians used to engage in this area of study quite a lot because they were near Ottoman territory, and they thought that it was necessary to know this. They used to have men who could guide them. This time, all their galleons and galleasses came to the Dardanelles and anchored in order to block the passage of the Imperial Fleet.45

Katib Çelebi made the connection that naval and geographical knowledge led to the ability of the Venetians to attack the Ottoman’s most strategically vulnerable location. The result was that the Ottomans failed to transport reinforcements and supplies to Crete and to make matters worse, the Ottomans “did not have a navy at sea to prevent” military assistance from reaching the enemy in Crete. For this reason, Ammaroğlu’s dismal performance resulted in his execution and a new admiral, Ahmed Pasha, was appointed.46 The events of 1648 would have repercussions far beyond the naval arena. The Venetians succeeded in establishing a blockade in April and strengthened it by June; thus, they had a large force in place preventing the Ottoman fleet from emerging from the straits. The new admiral Ahmed Pasha decided to transport supplies overland to Chios and assembled galleys from the beys of the islands to form a squadron to transport supplies to Crete.47 From the perspective of fighting the war on Crete, this seemed an acceptable solution to the blockade. From the perspective of the people of Istanbul who depended on supplies brought by ship from Egypt and Syria to survive, this was not. The blockade of the Dardanelles varied in the strength of the Venetian forces maintaining it, but it continued from April 24, 1648, to May 21, 1649. This blockade led directly to Sultan Ibrahim’s deposition in 1648.

Blockades, Deposition, and Murder Before Ibrahim was placed on the throne in 1640 it was known that he was mentally unstable, and this instability increased with time. However, in 1640 he was the only surviving male member of the Ottoman dynasty, through the male line. While sultan, he fathered several sons; thus, the extinction of the dynasty was averted, but to replace him the only choices were his own very young sons. The power behind the throne was Ibrahim’s mother, Kösem Sultan, who had been a major force in the harem and in Ottoman politics since her days as Ahmed I’s favorite. She feared her loss of power if Ibrahim were deposed, but eventually she came to fear for her own life as he arbitrarily

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executed those who displeased him as had occurred with the admiral, Yusuf Pasha. Eventually Kösem felt she had to agree to Ibrahim’s deposition because her own life was in danger. Thus, she wrote to the grand vizier, “In the end he will leave neither you nor me alive. We will lose control of the government. The whole society is in ruins. Have him removed from the throne immediately.”48 Ibrahim was deposed on August 8, 1648, and replaced by his eldest son, Mehmed IV, aged seven, whose mother Turhan Sultan became a rival of Kösem. Although Ibrahim’s deposition eliminated the problem of fighting a war with a mad sultan interfering in policy decisions, due to ongoing factional conflict in Istanbul effectively fighting the war remained difficult. The blockade continued through the winter, although the Venetian force had diminished by the spring of 1649. The Ottoman fleet emerged from the Dardanelles May 1, 1649, with a force of seventy galleys, ten mahons, and three ships with more galleys and ships in neighboring ports ready to join it. The kapudan pasha placed a battery on the European shore of the straits and under its cover he sailed on May 6, when a calm prevented most of the Venetian ships from opposing his fleet. However, the Venetians followed the Ottomans to Foça near Izmir, where they engaged the Ottoman fleet in battle, during which, despite the difference in numbers, the Venetians caused substantial damage to the Ottoman fleet.49 According to Katib Çelebi, the problem was the admiral’s unwillingness to listen to good advice: The fleet arrived at the port of Karaca-Foca on the Anatolian coast. The right side of the fortress was protected and was favorable for shelter and the dizdar of the fortress said “it is not wise to anchor in front of the cannons,” yet the Kapudan Pasha was the kind of person who did not listen to anybody and always did what he thought was right. So he waited on the left side, in front of the fortress.50

Once again, the decisions of an admiral who was inexperienced in naval warfare and who was unwilling to listen to wise advice led to a dismal performance by the naval forces of the empire. Afterward, the Ottomans sailed to Rhodes, where they received reinforcements from Egypt and North Africa. Finally, the fleet sailed for Crete transporting the necessary reinforcements and supplies allowing the siege of Kandiye to resume.51 After delivering the reinforcements the admiral then took the offensive and defeated the Venetians in a minor engagement. This was followed by another minor battle where first one side and then the other prevailed depending on the wind. Environmental aspects, winds, currents, and storms often played a key role in determining the outcome of any encounter. In August, Ahmed Pasha was killed in an attack on Suda.52 The Venetians blockaded the Dardanelles for most of 1650, preventing the Ottoman fleet from sailing from the straits. Ottoman admirals faced additional difficulties in evading the blockade, because finding adequate forces of fighting men, sailors, captains, or oarsmen constituted a problem since there were few Ottoman military forces that specialized in naval warfare. For example, the Janissaries could be assigned to naval duties and their dislike of fighting at sea increased the challenges that the admiral faced.53 The war and the blockade contributed to popular discontent that eventually brought the disgrace or death of the powerful. Although the Venetian blockade of the

 The Cretan War 171 Dardanelles could often be evaded by military forces, allowing troops and provisions for the war to be transported overland, the blockade limited the food supply of Istanbul, which was interrupted for much of the period March 1650 to May 1654.54 This failure of the government to remove the blockade, thus allowing the inhabitants of Istanbul to feel its effects, contributed to the increased unrest that factional politics had already caused since the deposition of Ibrahim in 1648. According to the Ottoman historian Naima, “The inhabitants of the city began to complain about the high cost of bread, meat, and other basic provisions, but when they submitted petitions to the authorities, their complaints went unheard.” The problems with supply were exacerbated by profiteering perpetrated by government officials.55 Consequently the leaders in 1651, the grand vizier Melek Ahmed Pasha and the Valide Sultan Kösem, were committed to finding a solution to Ottoman naval weakness.

Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha and the Struggle for Naval Leadership As the problem of naval weakness impacting both the prosecution of the war against Venice and daily life in Istanbul became increasingly clear to Ottoman leadership, attempts were made to remedy the situation. After decidedly poor performances by admirals with no naval experience, Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha, the derya bey of Rhodes, was appointed admiral in 1650. Moreover, changes in naval technology required including sailing ships in the fleet in addition to the traditional galleys. Thus, the Ottoman Empire attempted to regain naval strength through new naval technology and appointing men with seafaring skills. The results were mixed. Katib Çelebi illustrated how the changes in technology and leadership were attempted at the same time. He explained that after the failure of the inexperienced Admiral Haydar Ağazade Mehmed Pasha to break the Venetian blockade of the Dardanelles major changes were instituted by the government. “An imperial edict was issued on 23 Receb/22 July 1650 for the construction of 23 galleons and bertones. . . . 11 Sevval/7 October, 1650 Captain Haydar Ağazade was dismissed from his job and his post was given to Ali Pasha, the son of Hüsam Bey, who was the bey of Rhodes.”56 The derya bey of Rhodes was a naval professional who had learned seafaring during his long career as a member of Ottoman naval forces. Because of his father Hüsam Bey’s naval success, Ali Pasha had the opportunity to pursue a naval career from an early age.57 As the derya bey of Rhodes, he had experience commanding a squadron of ships stationed at Rhodes to protect the convoy between Alexandria and Istanbul.58 Derya beys were the equivalent of sancak beys (district governors) in districts that were included in the admiral’s province. The sancaks of maritime districts that were included in the admiral’s province increased over time. Gallipoli was the district directly administered by the admiral; Eğriboz, Lepanto, Lesbos, Sığacık (near Izmir), Kocaeli, Karliili, Rhodes, Biga, Mezistire (Mora), Chios, and Naxos were all eventually included in the admiral’s province. Derya beys supplied galleys to the imperial fleet according to the importance of their sancaks. The derya bey of Rhodes was required to lead the largest squadron of derya bey ships.59

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Katib Çelebi wrote the following concerning Ali Pasha after his first assignment as admiral: “While he was the bey of Rhodes he was appointed as the admiral instead of the above-mentioned pasha (Haydar Ağazade Mehmed Pasha). He helped Crete. In his second military campaign he captured several ships in the battle of Naxos. He was dismissed from his job after a year.”60 This brief biographical notice does not reveal the elite infighting that surrounded him while admiral. Because Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha’s predecessor had been unsuccessful in leading the Ottoman fleet out of the Dardanelles in 1650 due to the Venetian blockade, it was vital to transport reinforcements to Crete. Five thousand soldiers were recruited in early November and on November 12, 1650, Ali Pasha set sail with eighteen galleys, although sailing in winter was dangerous and for this reason the Venetians had not continued to blockade the Dardanelles. Ali Pasha emerged with his fleet and joined with additional ships provided by the derya beys. They arrived at Crete on January 2, 1651, and disembarked the soldiers, after which Ali Pasha returned safely to Istanbul. Katib Çelebi described Ali Pasha’s success in taking reinforcements to Crete in the winter so quickly as unprecedented.61

Paying for Positions Katib Çelebi’s naval history of the Ottoman Empire fails to hint at the factional fighting that surrounded Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha’s appointment as admiral. The historian Mustafa Naima, who relished expounding about court intrigue in his chronicle, explained how Hüsambeyzade’s appointment led to a dispute between the grand vizier, Melek Ahmed Pasha, and another vizier, Siyavuş Pasha. This dispute chiefly concerned policies for an individual to acquire a high rank in the government. Purchase of offices was standard practice in the Ottoman Empire, as well as many other states during this period.62 However, while the Ottoman Empire was in severe financial straits, individuals such as the Grand Vizier Melek Ahmed Pasha were profiting from the sale of offices. Moreover, this procedure was leading to the appointment of incompetent men to lead the navy. As a result of incompetence, Ottoman naval weakness allowed the Venetians to blockade the straits with their fleet, causing great distress in Istanbul as well as impeding fighting in Crete. Naima’s history described a dispute concerning Hüsambeyzade’s appointment as admiral due to his failure to pay the expected “gift.” This account of the dispute, which includes Siyavuş’s spirited condemnation of the results of such policies, not only helps explain the Ottoman Empire’s severe difficulties in 1651, but also provides insight into how policies of sale of office affected the Ottoman navy during the entire period of the Cretan War and in much of the rest of the seventeenth century. Thus it is worth analyzing in detail Naima’s account of Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha’s contested appointment.63 When Ali Pasha arrived in Istanbul to take up the position of admiral, the original plan was also to promote him to vizier, but in order to gain the vizierate an individual needed to pay the sum of 40,000 kuruş (large silver coin). Ali Pasha refused the vizierate and requested to be allowed to retain his previous post. Nevertheless, he

 The Cretan War 173 was sent with the troops that had been recruited in late 1650, transported them safely to Crete, where they disembarked at the beginning of January 1651, and then returned quickly to Istanbul.64 Naima states that Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha had been made admiral with the rank of pasha, rather than vizier, on condition that he gave the expected amount, but he had not paid anything to become a pasha. This lack of payment appears to have led to some individuals slandering him: claiming that he was not diligent in performing his duties and had stopped at Rhodes to celebrate his son’s wedding.65 But Naima recounted how Ali Pasha brought the latest naval news to court in February 1651 and was diligent in both Istanbul and Chios preparing to meet the threat of the arrival of the Venetian fleet.66 Siyavuş Pasha, who recognized Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha’s merit, refused to accept that Hüsambeyzade was not receiving an appropriate rank as admiral because he had not paid an acceptable amount of money. He pestered the grand vizier concerning this until Melek Ahmed Pasha sent a messenger informing him that Hüsambeyzade should be admiral for the good of the state, but it was unnecessary for him to be made a pasha or vizier. Siyavuş Pasha, who had known the grand vizier for many years and was from the same ethnic group, felt confident in confronting him about what he considered to be a shameful situation. He critiqued the influence or patronage that controlled appointments to positions and especially challenged the grand vizier’s insistence on payment when the grand vizier himself, as a son-in-law of a former sultan (Murad IV), enjoyed all the financial privileges of his position. He referred to the state’s concerns that winter, which principally stemmed from the blockade, and how necessary it was for a competent naval commander to remedy the situation. He considered Melek Ahmed’s placing his own enrichment before the good of the state as shameful. Siyavuş also gained the support of the powerful senior Valide Sultan Kösem and so Melek Ahmed was forced to treat Siyavuş with respect and try to placate him.67 Shortly after this, news came from Hüsambeyzade concerning the Venetian fleet and the government attempted to provide the necessary funds to equip the fleet.68 Due to the success of Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha’s winter expedition to Crete, he retained the post of admiral despite having paid nothing. Clearly some of the highestranking officials of the Ottoman Empire, for example, Siyavuş Pasha, recognized the value of naval expertise and were willing to reward it, but others clung to the current policies of advancement that enriched them personally. During this period, it was standard practice for individuals to pay to obtain offices and, although performance mattered, it was not the most important factor in obtaining a position. The empire’s finances were in disarray and leaders were desperate to find funds to continue the war. One can speculate that Hüsambeyzade Ali would have wished to become a vizier and that he would have paid the 40,000 kuruş if he had access to such a sum. But it was probably beyond what as a derya bey he had been able to amass through his many years of service. Financial records from the period indicate that individuals of such a rank submitted taxes from their district that exceeded that sum, but they would not have retained such an amount.69 The issue of candidates paying to obtain positions also impacted the problem of appointing qualified admirals, because if a substantial payment became an essential

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requirement then those with money were quite unlikely to possess expertise in naval matters. In the case of Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha, the issue of paying for the position of admiral had led to a dispute between Grand Vizier Melek Ahmed and Vizier Siyavuş Pasha. Siyavuş Pasha’s explanation of why the system was detrimental to the well-being of the empire, especially in regard to obtaining an effective leader of the navy who had experience as a derya bey, but was not able to pay a huge sum to obtain the position, is key to understanding both the length of the Cretan War, and in general Ottoman naval weakness during this period. When he explained that this demanding of “gifts” was shameful Melek Ahmed was forced to accept his argument.70 After Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha’s successful winter expedition to Crete, Grand Vizier Melek Ahmed attempted to facilitate more naval success by having a huge galleon built in Istanbul. The results show that not lack of effort but lack of skill led to failure on this front. Grand Vizier Melek Ahmed Pasha had started the construction of a big galleon in Bahçekapı. . . . It was completed 25 Cumadelula/16 May 1651. While the notables and high-ranking officials were launching it . . ., it rolled on its two sides since there were some defects in it. At least half of it leaked. The ships there tried to tie ropes on its sides and to lift it, but in the end, they could not manage to do that. Finally, they left only the hull of the ship and the rest of it was broken into pieces. People spread a great many rumors about this incident and considered it an evil omen.71

Despite this setback, when the other materiel and men were ready in the summer of 1651, Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha led another expedition to transport them to Crete. He commanded a fleet composed of galleons, galleys, and galleasses, which without opposition sailed to Chios, where they were joined by the squadrons of derya beys bringing the total ships to 150. They then sailed toward Crete.72

The Battle of Naxos During this second expedition in 1651 to supply the forces in Crete, the first major battle between the naval forces of Venice and those of the Ottoman Empire occurred near Naxos. Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha, who commanded the Ottoman fleet, probably lacked experience commanding galleons during a naval battle. Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha encountered a portion of the Venetian fleet on July 8, 1651, at Santorini and attacked it successfully. Two days later the Venetians attacked the Ottoman fleet while they were obtaining water at the island of Paros near Naxos. Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha then attacked the Venetian left wing with the Ottoman center of six galleasses and some galleys. The Venetian counterattack broke the Ottoman line because the center was not in place. Then the Ottoman galleys abandoned their sailing ships, which allowed the Venetian galleys to attack them, capturing ten and burning five. In addition, the Venetians captured a large galley and 965 prisoners.73 After the battle Hüsambeyzade

 The Cretan War 175 Ali sailed to Rhodes, where he obtained galleys that he used to sail to Crete unopposed by the Venetians. Thus, the Venetians won the battle of Naxos, but the Ottomans succeeded in transporting reinforcements to Crete. However, this naval defeat revealed that despite incurring large expenses to construct sailing ships, the admiral Hüsambeyzade when leading the forces in battle did not use them effectively. Accounts of this battle relying on Western sources fail to provide an adequate explanation to understand the Ottoman defeat. Ottoman authors provide varying views of the event, which explain why the Ottomans were defeated and why this defeat had significance. The seventeenth-century Ottoman authors Evliya Çelebi and Katib Çelebi provide contrasting views of the battle of Naxos and blame different factors for the defeat. Evliya blamed the troops for the defeat of 1651, accusing them of careless behavior when they went on shore for water, not their lack of seamanship: The following year he [the grand vizier Melek Ahmed] appointed Husam-oglu Ali Pasha chief admiral, outfitting another imperial fleet. It consisted of 300 galleons and galleys, recalling the fleet of Kilic Ali Pasha. In the evening after the first engagement, when the infidels put to flight, the imperial fleet anchored in the harbor of Karafochalar, and the troops all disembarked to carouse in the gardens and the vineyards. At dawn, while most of the troops were on leave and those who were on board were fast asleep, the infidels made a surprise attack and set fire to the entire fleet. Those troops that had remained on board now disembarked, taking forty of the galleys and eleven of the galleons in tow. Our other galleons continued to do battle and managed to destroy twenty of the infidel ships. When word arrived that the fleet had been routed, each ship fleeing in a different direction, the pasha [Melek Ahmed] offered to surrender the seal, but he was . . . confirmed in his office.74

Katib Çelebi’s analysis of the battle of Naxos contrasts with that of Evliya Çelebi, not blaming the actions of the men of the fleet, except stating that the “galleys abandoned the galleons.” When the Ottoman fleet reached Santorini near Crete it encountered that of the Venetians. They fought a lot with cannons and muskets that day. Muslim soldiers appeared to prevail and the infidels were about to be defeated, but when the evening arrived they stopped fighting. Crete was a hundred miles away from that place. The Muslims went to Naxos in the morning thinking “if there is a battle, we do not have sufficient water, so we should get water.” Then the infidels followed them and when the ships of the Muslims entered the port, the infidels approached the shore outside. The men of the fleet got water and started to get out one by one or in small groups and then the infidels . . . attacked the ships of the Muslims. Captain Pasha fought a lot with his bastarda, the beys and the galliots had to watch this because it was difficult to come to his aid. So the galleys abandoned the galleons that were with them, and left the port. Some of them stayed and fought. Captain Pasha was surrounded by the infidels and just as he became exhausted from fighting, his son came to help him. He took the bastarda with him and got him out of there. So

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he was defeated there and left the area. Since there was no wind, the remaining galleons stayed there and the infidels surrounded them. Ahmed Pasha, who was the governor of Anatolia, was in one of these ships and he fought in his galleon and became a martyr there. The galleon was burned. The infidels defeated the soldiers of six galleons and a galleasse and took over the ships. A few other galleons were close to the shore, so the people in them disembarked and the ships were burned.75

According to Katib Çelebi this battle was significant because the Venetians had been at the point of surrendering Kandiye. However, after defeating the Ottomans at Naxos, the Venetian fleet sailed to Crete, where the Venetians captured enough cannon and ammunition that they decided to continue to defend Kandiye. Meanwhile, Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha sailed to Rhodes and Crete, before returning to Istanbul, where he “presented his apologies.”76 Hüsambeyzade apologized to a new grand vizier as well as a new valide sultan, as Melek Ahmed had been replaced as grand vizier and the elderly Valide Sultan Kösem had been murdered in the aftermath of this defeat. Mustafa Naima provides yet another version of the events of this battle, which in typical Naima fashion focuses on the intrigue that occurred during the battle, which according to Naima was crucial in the outcome of this Ottoman defeat. Evidence leads to the inference that the infighting in Istanbul impacted the decisions of the participants of the battle to behave as they did. Naima relied on Katib Çelebi for much of his information about this battle, but his account of the behavior of various participants must originate with another source.77 Evliya Çelebi’s partisan defense of his kinsman Melek Ahmed is not a credible source of the actual events of the battle. For one thing, he grossly exaggerated the size of the fleet. Naima began his account of this expedition by recounting all the festivities in Istanbul surrounding the departure of the fleet in June 1651. The fleet sailed easily to Chios and incorporated the squadrons of the derya beys gathered there. Naima’s account of the initial battle follows Katib Çelebi, but his version of the defeat after the ships stopped for water adds important details. According to Naima, Hüsambeyzade Ali ordered the fleet to attack; one wing was under his personal command, but the other was under the tersane kethüdası (chamberlain of the arsenal), but Hüsambeyzade’s son also commanded a ship in this wing. The tersane kethüdası, who by virtue of his position was the second-in-command of the fleet or rear admiral of the navy, was supposedly promoted through the naval ranks to achieve this position. The other main naval commander, the tersane ağası, was appointed by the court factions, the grand vizier, or other factions. In either case, the loyalties of these naval leaders were not to the kapudan pasha but to their patrons. The tersane kethüdası’s actions during the battle can be understood only by realizing that he felt no personal loyalty to the kapudan pasha, but must have been aware of the intrigues at court surrounding Hüsambeyzade’s appointment since he would have spent most of his career in service in Istanbul. Thus, the intrigues surrounding Hüsambeyzade’s appointment continued to impact his ability to function as the admiral, since his subordinates believed that they could disobey his orders with impunity. Initially the fleet remained in formation, but Hüsambeyzade Ali moved to engage with the Venetian fleet’s right wing, and he was soon surrounded by enemy ships.

 The Cretan War 177 However, rather than coming to his aid, the other ships fled the battlefield. At this point Hüsambeyzade’s son rescued him by towing his bastarda. Under the command of the kethüda of the arsenal much of the fleet refrained from fighting despite Hüsambeyzade ordering them to do so. They refused and, in the admiral’s opinion, behaved in a cowardly fashion by claiming that they could not approach the battle for fear of being burned. Because of the actions of the men who refused to engage in battle and the wind being unfavorable, Ali Pasha had to accept defeat. Naima recounts that those who fled the battle, abandoned their ships, and went on land were “vile” and were all made captives by the Venetians. Hüsambeyzade wisely decided to sail to Rhodes, where he held a council to punish those who had behaved in a cowardly manner during the battle; he specifically shamed the tersane kethüdası. He informed the government of the behavior of those who disobeyed orders and they lost their positions.78 From Naima’s perspective the cause of the defeat was the refusal of naval personnel to obey the orders of the admiral during a battle. In Katib Çelebi’s opinion this defeat had longterm consequences, prolonging the war, and thus leading to a terrible naval defeat in 1656. For the first few weeks after the battle, the admiral, the grand vizier, and the Valide Sultan had retained their positions, but this stability was short-lived for within a few weeks, on August 21, 1651, Melek Ahmed fell from power as the result of a revolt by the tradesmen of Istanbul over his attempt to debase the coinage. Although the replacement of a grand vizier was hardly an unusual event in the seventeenth century, more dramatic was the murder of Kösem, the senior valide sultan who had been at the center of political power for almost a half century. Just twelve days after Melek Ahmed was replaced as grand vizier, the conflict between the two Valide Sultans, Kösem and Turhan, resulted in the murder of Kösem in the harem. Then Turhan became the regent for her son, Mehmed IV, who was only nine years old. The following five years brought elite turnover to extreme levels while Venetian blockades of the Dardanelles exacerbated factional unrest. This chaos at the center severely impacted the ability of the Ottoman navy to perform as an effective military force.

1652: Evading the Venetian Blockade Probably due to disruption in the highest positions in the empire, the murder of Valide Sultan Kösem and the rapid turnover in the position of grand vizier, Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha was not replaced as admiral until October 1652. Naima’s account of the events of May 1652 again reveals the impact of factional fighting. In May 1652 the Venetians blockaded the Dardanelles and the challenge was to find a way for the fleet to leave from the straits and sail to Crete. Admiral Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha went about his duties by sailing to Gallipoli and obtaining information about the size and location of the Venetian fleet by capturing an informant. He arranged to protect Ottoman territory by stationing Janissaries in one of the fortresses of the straits. However, at this point a false report arose that he had fled to the Maghrib and another man was assigned to the fleet. Meanwhile, Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha received an order to sail from the straits.

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Supposedly he wrote a letter to the grand vizier, in which he stated that if the vizier wanted to appoint someone else as admiral to go ahead and do so. The letter continued stating that Ali Pasha did not need the admiralship, he had not been paid, and he was being slandered. Since he owned eight ships, he could make a living as a corsair. The previous year there had been serious losses and the galleons had not been replaced. Moreover, the Janissaries and their officers did not obey him and fight; thus, he wanted to be excused from attacking the infidels. When the grand vizier was informed about the admiral’s letter, he was furious and said he would find a replacement admiral. However, another genuine letter came from the admiral explaining plans to allow some ships to evade the Venetians and supply Crete.79 Both Naima and Katib Çelebi describe this successful night evasion of the blockade during which Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha sent eight galleys that slipped through at night. The admiral traveled by land to the shore near Lesbos, where he embarked troops and sailed toward Chios. Between Tenedos (Bozcaada near the mouth of the Dardanelles) and Lesbos the Ottoman galleys encountered an English ship in Venetian service, the Relief of London. After defeating this ship in action, Hüsambeyzade Ali and his twenty-six galleys attacked the Venetian island of Istendil in the Cyclades Archipelago. The Venetians counterattacked but the Ottoman fleet sailed safely to Crete. As winter approached Hüsambeyzade returned to Istanbul, although he left most of the fleet at Chios. Hüsambeyzade was replaced as admiral in October 1652 by Dervish Mehmed Pasha, who had previously been the governor of Anatolia and who six months later was promoted to the position of grand vizier. Hüsambeyzade’s failure to conquer Istendil is one reason given for his dismissal.80 However, given the conflict over his appointment that continued into the summer of 1652, the true reasons must be more complicated than one naval failure of limited importance. He was imprisoned in Istanbul and fined 100 purses before he was liberated and given the sancak of Mora.81 This confiscation of 100 purses appears to connect to the original demand for payment for his position. One way or another, the men of the government, that is the ruling elite, obtained the money that they had been demanding from the beginning. His replacement was not a naval expert and only held the post of admiral during the winter when he was not required to perform significant naval service. While Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha had been admiral, Ottoman leaders had considered a plan to build two additional fortresses on the Dardanelles to prevent the Venetian fleet from entering the straits, but they decided that the cannon fire would not reach the ships and thus would be unable to accomplish this.82 His term as admiral was characterized by searching for ways to solve the naval problems of the empire, which primarily were due to the Venetian blockade of the straits. Evaluating Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha’s first term as admiral we can reach several conclusions. First Hüsambeyzade was a talented seafarer for he commanded a fleet of galleys that sailed from Istanbul to Crete in the dead of winter, safely transporting a large army and their supplies in January 1651 and then he led the fleet safely to Istanbul. Because of this success the Venetians did not blockade the Dardanelles early in 1651 since the Ottomans had already supplied their forces on Crete. This provided relief for the city as the blockade had impacted daily life in Istanbul. In the following

 The Cretan War 179 months galleons were added to the Ottoman fleet, although the attempt to build a giant galleon had ended in disaster. Whether responsibility for that ship can be laid at Hüsambeyzade’s door is a question that cannot be answered from Katib Çelebi’s account, but it appears that the huge galleon had been the idea of Grand Vizier Melek Ahmed Pasha. However, in the summer of 1651 the fleet included at least thirty galleons. At this point, Hüsambeyzade’s inexperience as a commander of galleons appeared. Although he commanded a sizable fleet, due to the lack of wind, the galleons were destroyed in the battle, but more importantly the galleys failed to support them and instead fled. The responsibility for this defeat partially rests with Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha, for his lack of experience commanding a large fleet including galleons led to chaos during the battle, when he had to be rescued by his son, who towed his father’s large galley out from among the surrounding Venetian vessels. But the greater responsibility for the defeat rests with the men who refused to obey his orders, as their subsequent punishment and shaming for cowardice support the conclusion that they were responsible. Hüsambeyzade wisely sailed to Rhodes, where he gathered support before heading for Crete. According to Katib Çelebi this first major naval defeat of the war was significant in its outcomes. If the Ottoman fleet under the command of Hüsambeyzade had won the battle, the war might have ended in 1651 instead of dragging on for another eighteen years. Hüsambeyzade did not lack courage or the ability to sail in bad weather with galleys. But he was not able to effectively command a fleet of galleys and galleons in a naval battle due to the disobedience of the fleet under his second-in-command. Evidence suggests that he had never been in command of such a large fleet before, nor had much experience with galleons. As a derya bey he commanded galleys and usually the squadron was small. With sailing ships, lack of wind could change the outcome of the battle in a manner that was not the case with oar propelled galleys. The Ottoman leadership under the Valide Sultan Turhan attempted to find a solution to the naval problems of the Cretan War, which impacted all aspects of Ottoman life. But in the following years, more blockades and naval disasters occurred. Political infighting was an important factor in naval failures, leading to the promoting to positions of authority of inexperienced seafarers. The following five years brought elite turnover to extreme levels while Venetian blockades of the Dardanelles exacerbated factional unrest. This chaos at the center severely impacted the ability of the Ottoman fleet to be an effective military force.

Turhan Sultan, Finances, Officials, and Building Fortresses on the Dardanelles The rivalry between Kösem and Turhan, both Valide Sultans, led to the triumph of Turhan when her faction fearing that Kösem would assassinate both Turhan and Mehmed IV instead murdered Kösem. Turhan was now in position to become the ruler of the empire in all but name as her son Mehmed was still a young child, but after

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1656 she did this with the assistance of grand viziers often from the Köprülü family. However, during her first years in power she struggled to find reliable officials and money to finance the empire. Her correspondence, although undated and lacking an addressee, provides insight into the troubles of the period especially regarding finding money to defend the empire while fighting the war with Venice. Since the navy was crucial many of her letters indicate her concern with naval matters and her attempts to find competent officials to carry out her responsibilities to provide for the defense of the empire. Early in this period, Turhan and Mehmed visited Tophane to inspect the cannon foundry there at the grand vizier’s request and at his suggestion observed the return of the fleet.83 The grand vizier, the Valide Sultan, and the child sultan, all realized that the fleet was key to the empire’s survival.

Blockades and Battles of the Dardanelles After the battles of 1651 and the factional fighting that ensued after Kösem’s murder, Turhan and her faction sought a grand vizier who could solve the empire’s problems. Hocazade Mesud Efendi, the chief justice of Anatolia and a prominent power in the palace faction, pushed for Tarhoncu Ahmed Pasha to be appointed as grand vizier. Hocazade Mesud Efendi identified three critical issues facing the empire: the condition of the fleet, the war in Crete, and obtaining money to finance the war. Tarhoncu was required to promise to solve these problems as a condition for his appointment as grand vizier and, if he failed, he faced execution. However, two of these goals were contradictory: trying to put the empire’s finances in order conflicted with financing the war to conquer Crete. Scarce resources led to factional fighting over their distribution. The grand vizier disputed with the admiral, Dervish Mehmed Pasha, over providing funds needed to prepare the fleet.84 The grand vizier Tarhoncu Ahmed Pasha’s priority was paying rebellious sipahis. One day when the admiral, grand vizier, and the defterdar (treasurer) met at the arsenal, the admiral Dervish demanded money, but the defterdar observed that they could not get money from stones, which led to a quarrel between the admiral and the defterdar. When the grand vizier tried to intervene, Dervish turned on Tarhoncu Ahmed Pasha, claiming that he would no longer accept drafts on the treasury that were always postponed, he needed cash. When the sultan learned of the argument, he summoned the grand vizier and the admiral to explain. The admiral informed the sultan that he had received very little money for the navy, but the grand vizier responded that if Dervish Mehmed could not wait for the money he could pay the forces out of his own pocket, since he was wealthy, and be reimbursed later. This did not appease the sultan, and Tarhoncu was executed soon thereafter, on March 21, 1653, and Dervish was promoted to become grand vizier.85 However, when Dervish Mehmed Pasha became grand vizier, he altered his priorities, although finances remained controversial. At the arsenal money intended for naval supplies and salaries was diverted by a corrupt finance official. Also, Dervish Mehmed Pasha found it difficult to work with the new admiral, Kara Murad Pasha, who had once served as grand vizier. The impasse at the arsenal was finally resolved

 The Cretan War 181 when corsairs from Tunis and Tripoli arrived in Istanbul, who were received at the palace where they obtained the necessary equipment and funds due to them.86 Turhan wrote several letters during this period, 1652–6 when she was learning to rule the empire and the Venetian blockade of the Dardanelles led to yearly naval battles in the straits in 1654, 1655, 1656, and 1657. In a letter that Turhan wrote perhaps in 1655 regarding naval finance, she castigated an official who was not keeping her informed of conditions. It is the custom that some of the sultan’s property is spent to cover the cost of munitions for the navy. . . . Now what has become of the royal property which was allocated to the imperial shipyard? . . . An investigation must be undertaken to determine where the revenues are and why the navy is still unprepared. What is the truth? It is essential to know how much money the superintendent of the shipyard has in his possession and on which tasks he spends this money. We need to be informed about these matters. Where did all the allocated revenues disappear to thereby leaving the navy still so poorly prepared? A thorough investigation should be undertaken. How much does it cost each time it [the navy] departs? They [the Venetians] have repeatedly destroyed it. What is the truth in this matter? Each time it [the navy] is made ready to depart this costs money, doesn’t it? Everyone is doing as he wishes. It is astounding that the officials have no fear. From this point on, do what I have instructed you to do and report to me the result. What is the value of the income from the properties whose income is allocated to the shipyard? Record those properties and send the information to me. From what I have heard there is even a law about the cloth and sails; you should know all about this. Let me see you pay attention to these matters. We relied on you and assigned you these duties because you are very experienced.87

In another letter probably addressed to the admiral she threatened him if he did not improve his performance. Why are you not paying attention to the navy? You come before us and you deceive us; you say that everything is ready and that you are doing everything perfectly. But I sent a man over to the shipyards to check and apparently you are doing nothing. You say that this navy needs 1200 oarsmen and I have checked this; the navy needs more than 3000 oarsmen. You say that we have made the payment for the munitions. If you had really done this, things wouldn’t have gotten into this state. The navy was supposed to be ready by now, yet you come before me, tell me things and leave. I am aware of these things. Do not fool yourself and think that I do not know. If you don’t get the navy ready and in perfect condition in 10 to 15 days you are going to be responsible for the consequences. . . . We have given you this responsibility because you are experienced and you have been handling these affairs competently. Let us not have cause to warn you again! Why do you sit idle in the shipyard? Tell the captain to let us know what the navy needs.88

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This letter explains some of the reasons why the Ottoman fleet was frequently delayed in its departure from Istanbul allowing the Venetians to be more than ready for it in the Dardanelles, leading to disastrous naval encounters. Other letters between Turhan and the grand vizier and the admiral reflect the difficult financial situation of the period. The admiral claimed that they were desperate for copper and in order to produce cannons for the navy they had been melting down broken cannon in order to cast new ones.89 These letters provide evidence for the condition of state finances and administration at the time of the four battles of the Dardanelles. In the first battle in 1654, the admiral had the option to consult with the North African corsairs as they made plans to run the Venetian blockade in the Dardanelles. The Ottoman fleet with the support of the seafarers of Tunis and Tripoli sailed from Hayreddin Pasha’s tomb in Istanbul. On May 16, 1654, as the Ottoman fleet faced the Venetian blockade, Kara Murad Pasha led the fleet of approximately forty-five galleys, six mahons, and twenty-two brigantines, while another supporting fleet of fourteen ships from North Africa and twenty-two galleys from the Archipelago threatened the Venetian retreat. Previously Hüsambeyzade Ali had taken three galleys and broken the chain of Venetian ships in the Dardanelles. The Ottoman fleet had the wind as well as the current in their favor. Also since the Venetian ships failed to follow the commands of their admiral, the Ottomans successfully attacked several Venetian vessels. The Venetians lost two ships and two galleys and were driven from their station. The Ottoman fleet also suffered similar losses but succeeded in sailing from the Dardanelles, adding ships and roaming freely around the waters of Crete. The admiral returned to the Dardanelles in August and permitted the North African ships to return to their bases. Due to English attacks on Tunis the following year, the Ottoman fleet operated without North African support during a crucial period.90 The Ottomans encountered a more effective Venetian fleet in the second battle of the Dardanelles in 1655. Kara Murad Pasha was promoted to grand vizier in May and finally the fleet sailed under Admiral Zurnazan Mustafa Pasha arriving in the Dardanelles June 19.91 Katib Çelebi described the hard-fought battle, which became chaotic: they started to move with a favorable wind before noon. According to tradition, the galleons were in the front, followed by eight galleasses and some galliots in orderly lines. . . . A great war ensued and the surface of the sea was covered with blood. Yards, masts and some pieces of rope fell on the surface. . . . Seven ships of the infidels attacked the galleon of Katircizade and they fought until well after sunset. The yard, the rudder and other tools were lost. Thirty men were left from about four hundred eighty Muslim fighters. Since the galliot that had been towing this ship had left after cutting its ropes and the infidels could not tow it, it was left there. When the wind pushed the ship to the Anatolian shore, the survivors in it disembarked and burned the ship . . . the funeral prayer was prayed for one hundred and twenty people. The infidels lost a lot of people as well. Six [or] seven galleons of theirs were lost and a lot of their people were injured.92

 The Cretan War 183 During the battle nine Ottoman sailing ships were destroyed, while the Venetians claimed to have lost only one ship. Nevertheless, Mustafa Pasha led over ninety vessels from the Dardanelles sailing to Foça for repairs. Later in the summer he dispatched twelve galleys to Crete.93 The most serious Ottoman defeat was the third battle of the Dardanelles, June 25 [26], 1656, which began well for the Ottoman fleet as they sailed toward the mouth of the Dardanelles in order to transport men and supplies needed in the ongoing siege of Kandiye. The various ships of the fleet proceeded in the usual order, galleons in front, then galleasses, and finally the galliots in an orderly line. Waiting for their appearance was a Venetian fleet, which had been blockading the entrance to the Dardanelles since May 23, 1656. At first the wind blew from the north favoring the progress of the Ottoman fleet, but the wind backed to the south and the ships of the fleet with their men found themselves caught on a lee shore on the Anatolian side of the straits vulnerable to the attacking Venetian ships. As the Ottoman ships ran aground, some “people of the ships fell into the sea;” others made it to land. Out of nearly 100 vessels the Ottoman admiral Sari Kenan Pasha saved only fourteen galleys; the remaining galleons and galleasses were burned, captured, or sunk. Thousands of galley slaves fled to the enemy. According to Katib Çelebi, “it was such a big defeat and loss that it was unprecedented.”94 Certainly nothing like it had occurred since the battle of Lepanto more than eighty years earlier. Katib Çelebi ended his chronological account of the history of the Ottoman navy with this battle. Katib Çelebi’s account of the third battle of the Dardanelles underscored the points made when the Sheyhu’l-Islam had consulted him in 1648. Changing naval technology meant that the Ottoman navy needed to adapt if it was to be effective in conquering new territories and protecting the sea lanes that supplied the capital, Istanbul. However, it was easier to learn how to build the latest in sailing ships, than to find men who knew how to effectively employ such ships in battle. Winds were fickle and admirals and captains needed to know how to meet any eventuality, as Hayreddin Pasha had demonstrated so brilliantly. The Ottoman navy required consistent effective leadership at all levels if it wished to avoid disasters such as this battle, and the empire could not afford naval weakness if it wished to continue as a powerful player on the Mediterranean stage. The fact that this battle occurred in the Dardanelles reinforces the argument regarding the vulnerability of the Ottoman capital, Istanbul, if the fleet could not protect even such a vital maritime location as the straits that lead directly to the city. Various factors had led to the defeat and Kapudan Pasha Sari Kenan identified one cause of the disaster. Before the battle he understood that he lacked men, but the sultan’s military forces had refused to serve in the fleet and consequently he had employed men of dubious value. During the battle men deserted, since they jumped overboard and swam to land. He could not control this as the wind blew the ships into the shore. Apparently, his views were accepted since he was not executed, although he was soon replaced as admiral.95 Katib Çelebi vividly described the chaotic defeat. However, he did not dwell on the disaster but proceeded to describe the immediate reconstruction that the sultan

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ordered undertaken to rebuild a new and improved fleet. Just as after Lepanto, the empire marshaled its resources to restore its naval forces. Then on Monday, the third day of Ramazan they set off in the morning. . . . The ships moved closer to each other due to the cannon fire . . . and the harshness of the wind. Thus, the order of ships that was thought of at the beginning could not be implemented. Some of them anchored, and some of them went to the land, and it became impossible to move and defend after that. The people of the ships fell into the sea and land, and since these were shallow waters, most of the ships ran aground. This became an embarrassing defeat. The galley slaves took this opportunity and left and joined the side of the infidels. The infidels set the ships that were anchored on fire. . . . Out of a thousand men, some drowned in the sea, some became prisoners and four thousand galley slaves joined the infidels. It was such a big defeat and loss that it was unprecedented. . . . On the other side, an imperial edict was issued for the construction of ships and the organizing of a perfect fleet. The work has been started as necessary. They will prevail over them and defeat them, God willing.

Thus, ends Katib Çelebi’s chronological account of the naval campaigns of the Ottoman Empire.96 Despite Valide Sultan Turhan’s efforts to find competent administrators including admirals as shown in her correspondence, her early attempts to defend the empire had achieved limited success, as during these years the battles of the Dardanelles occurred ending in the disastrous third battle in 1656. After this battle, Turhan appointed Köprülü grand vizier and in 1658 she built two fortresses at the mouth of the Dardanelles to provide defense against the Venetian fleet, which had been threatening not only the Ottoman navy but the prosperity of Istanbul through the blockades. A poem written in 1659 after they were completed praised the Valide Sultan and demonstrates how important this threat had been: Sometimes the Godforsaken [Venetian fleet] come [sic] all the way to the inner part of the Straits [the entrance to the Dardanelles]. They committed such damnable acts that seemed to never cease. ... She [Turhan] built the foundations for a new strait which has no equals. On either side they mount such cannons, Each looks like a gigantic dragon. As each scatters its fire with fury, Hell will be raised for the enemy, they will cry in agony. Now can the eyes of the unfaithful unbelievers Dare to come and look this way? Repeatedly those [Muslims] who lived along the shores of the Straits, Had suffered because of the terror bought [sic] by the [Venetian] infidels.97

In the years leading up to the successful completion of the fortresses, Turhan had been struggling to find money and leadership in the years when Venetian victories in the

 The Cretan War 185 Dardanelles had brought disaster to the Ottoman navy and hardship to the inhabitants of Istanbul. The finances of the empire were in disarray. When she decided to follow in Mehmed II’s footsteps and built fortresses at the Dardanelles this was a difficult undertaking and Turhan used her own financial resources to construct them. Given the shortage of money, more expensive innovations were not attempted, but cheaper traditional fortresses were constructed. Both the content and the tone of Turhan’s correspondence reveal the desperation of the circumstances in the period 1651–6. With money in short supply and being squandered or stolen by inept or corrupt officials preparing an effective navy seemed a bleak prospect. When the third disastrous battle of the Dardanelles led to the destruction of the Ottoman fleet it is understandable at this desperate point that some major change was needed as the first five years that Turhan had been in power had not been very successful. This reveals why Turhan was willing to appoint the elderly Mehmed Köprülü as grand vizier and try his policies in the hope that stability and an effective navy could be restored. After Köprülü became grand vizier, Turhan continued to be active in working for the success of the empire.

Conclusion: Köprülü: Naval Turning Point? While the decision to appoint Mehmed Köprülü as grand vizier leading to members of his family holding significant power in the empire for the next fifty years is often seen as a turning point in Ottoman history, it is questionable if this claim holds true for Ottoman naval history.98 Certainly during the period that Mehmed Köprülü was grand vizier, from his appointment in September 1656 until his death in October 1661, admirals were replaced with alarming frequency. Six different men became admiral during this period, including a repeat performance by Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha.99 Mehmed Köprülü did take decisive action in 1657 to break the blockade in the Dardanelles and to recover Bozcaada (Tenedos) and Lemnos. That this should have been the highest priority of the new government is not surprising as it was the disastrous third battle of the Dardanelles and the loss of the two islands that led to appointing Köprülü to solve the situation that was threatening the survival of the empire. In December 1656, Köprülü appointed a new admiral, Topal Mehmed Pasha, who had previously been the governor of Timeşvar (western Romania near the Serbian and Hungarian borders), who lacked naval experience. Thus, Topal Mehmed Pasha led the fleet in 1657, although Mehmed Köprülü was the commander-in-chief for the reconquest of the islands. When on July 19 the Venetian fleet under Mocenigo attempted to enter the straits and came within range of the cannon of Kumburnu, a cannon ball from one of the fort’s cannon struck the powder magazine of the commander’s ship and it exploded. More cannon fire aimed at the fleet forced it to withdraw. This ended the fourth battle of the Dardanelles and the Venetian blockade of the straits.100 The Ottomans regained Bozcaada on August 31 and Mehmed Köprülü was ordered to remain with the troops until Lemnos was conquered, which after a joint land and sea operation occurred on November 15. With the Venetian blockade

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broken and the strategic islands recovered, Köprülü was then assigned to deal with other crises beginning with Transylvania.101 The Venetians attempted to maintain a blockade of the Dardanelles after the summer of 1657, but this proved less effective in the following years. With the removal of the Venetian blockade of the straits the war for Crete receded in importance to the back burner as Mehmed Köprülü had to deal with multiple crises around the empire. Although Turhan built fortresses on the Dardanelles, naval affairs sank into obscurity and instability continued to characterize appointments to the position of admiral. Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha briefly regained this position, only to die of plague in 1661. His son Abdulkadir Pasha became acting admiral in the Aegean and he delivered supplies to Crete that summer but appeared to fear punishment by Mehmed Köprülü for loss of ships at sea due to a storm.102 When Mehmed Köprülü died later that same year, he was replaced as grand vizier by his son, Fazil Ahmed Köprülü, who remained grand vizier until his death in 1676. Fazil Ahmed Köprülü became a very different sort of grand vizier than his father; for example, while he remained grand vizier for fifteen years only four men served as admiral, the first being his brother-in-law Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha, who held the position from December 1661 until February 1666.103 While admirals served for longer periods of time under Fazil Ahmed, they were chosen for their connections to the Köprülü family, not for their seafaring abilities. Under Fazil Ahmed, after stabilizing the frontier in central Europe, in 1666 the Ottomans decided to concentrate on Crete once more and bring the war to completion. He appointed a new admiral in 1666, Kaplan Mustafa Pasha, who employed forty-seven galleys to transport troops and war materiel to Crete. On October 30, 1666, Fazil Ahmed boarded the admiral’s flagship in the Mora to sail to the island.104 Fazil Ahmed was directly involved and remained with the troops during the final years of the war. The Ottomans continued to add to their strength on Crete despite the necessity of evading Venetian blockades sometimes in the Dardanelles, but later near Kandiye.105 Kaplan Mustafa Pasha raided the Cyclades in 1667 and continued to command the fleet during the remainder of the war. On March 8, 1668, the Ottoman fleet began a surprise naval attack by their galleys against Venetian galleys at Kandiye Bay on Crete that were blocking Ottoman efforts to reinforce their forces, but this was unsuccessful. This was the final Venetian victory of the war.106 In May 1668, Kaplan Mustafa Pasha sailed to Crete with fifty galleys from Chios. Later in the year he was rumored to be transporting 8,000 men including sappers from Monemvasia for Crete. In 1668 corsairs from North Africa actively attacked Christian shipping, actions that assisted the official Ottoman fleet under Kaplan Mustafa Pasha. In Istanbul preparations were in progress to provide many men and materiel for the war the following spring.107 But by 1669 it was evident that Venice would have to surrender Crete unless the Venetians received massive amounts of aid. A fleet mainly composed of Venetian ships with French support on July 25 bombarded the Ottoman forces at Kandiye, and the French fired 11,000 shots from their ships’ cannon. After four hours, the wind forced the fleet to withdraw and, despite the fierce bombardment, the Ottoman forces had sustained little damage and Ottoman guns then severely hurt the French fleet when a French ship of fifty-eight guns exploded. This was the final attempt by the joint fleet to

 The Cretan War 187 accomplish anything significant and on August 31 the French, papal, and Maltese fleets sailed toward home. On September 26 the Venetians surrendered Kandiye and on September 27 the Ottomans under Fazil Ahmed Köprülü entered the city. The war was finally over, although peace negotiations continued for months and Venice retained three fortresses on the coast of Crete: Spinalonga, Suda, and Gramvuosa.108 The Venetians resented the loss of Crete, but fifteen years passed before they found an opportunity to challenge the Ottomans for possession of strategic locations in the eastern Mediterranean when they gained allies as part of a Holy League. During the Morean War, which began in 1684, the Köprülü family provided another admiral when a nephew of Mehmed Köprülü, Amcazade Hüseyn Pasha, gained that position. This war pitted the Ottomans and the Venetians in battle for strategic naval locations once again. When the Ottoman insiders failed to defeat the Venetians in battle, then a talented admiral from Algiers with expertise in fighting battles with sailing ships came to the rescue and turned the tide in the naval arena. Katib Çelebi’s assessment that the most important factor in Ottoman success was preparing competent naval leaders was amply demonstrated with the career of Mezemorta Hüseyn Pasha.109

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Mezemorta: Half-Dead? The Revival of the Ottoman Navy

When Hasan Pasha’s [governor of Chios] appeal came, the kaptanpaşa [Helvacı Yusuf] summoned all the derya beyleri and miri kalyon kaptanlari for consultation, and, concluding that “Our fleet lacks the necessary supplies, and with inadequate ammunition and soldiers it would be a great mistake to confront such a strong enemy” he declined [to sail out against the Venetians]. The commander of the galleons Mezemorta Hüseyn Pasha, [however], saying that “Whatever happens, by all means we must hurry to help [Chios],” stood up, left the meeting and sailed with his ships toward Bozcaada [Tenedos]. The kaptanpasa thus had no choice but to follow [with his galleys]. At that point news came that the [fortress of] Chios had fallen to the enemy, and that the Venetians, having been told by the island’s Christian population that “A Turkish fleet without [adequate] soldiers and ammunition is coming,” had immediately sailed out against the imperial fleet with eighteen galleons, four galleasses and twenty galleys, all filled with soldiers. The kaptanpasa fled toward Midillu [Lesbos], while the galleons entered the Gulf of Izmir followed by the infidel who blocked it at the entrance. Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, Tarih1 The quote from Silahdar Findiklili Mehmed Ağa described the series of events in September 1694, when the Venetians attempted to conquer Chios after successfully conquering the Mora during the previous early years of the War of the Holy League, 1684–90. The Ottoman naval leaders at the time were Helvacı Yusuf as grand admiral, over the entire fleet, and Mezemorta Hüseyn as kapudane, admiral over the galleon contingent of the fleet. Their nicknames tell the story of how they acted; Helvacı means a maker of halva, a candy made from tahini, and he was the husband of Gevherhan, daughter of Sultan Ibrahim (r. 1640–8), and thus a damad, royal son-in-law.2 The name Mezemorta, meaning half-dead, had been given to Hüseyn as a young man after he was seriously wounded in a battle with the Spanish. When faced with a major crisis, the unexpected Venetian attack on Chios, Helvacı Yusuf did not know how to proceed, consulted with others, and then decided the risk was too great to confront the Venetians, even though they were far from their bases, and Chios was a short distance from the Anatolian coast. In contrast, Mezemorta realized the seriousness of the loss

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of Chios, which controlled the sea lanes from Istanbul south into the Mediterranean, and did not hesitate to confront the Venetian naval forces. He also had confidence in his ability to accurately assess his chances to defeat the enemy and was neither overly reckless, nor too timid when facing the prospect of a naval battle. Silahdar Findiklili Mehmed Ağa wrote two major historical works, which, due to his education and palace service, are prime insider’s views of the events of the years when the Ottomans fought their final two wars with Venice. The first historical account covering the period 1655–95, he envisioned as a continuation of a history by Katib Çelebi; the second includes detailed information for the period 1695–1703, and then a less detailed account 1703–21. He provides a firsthand account, especially for 1683– 1703, when he served in the palace attending the sultans Mehmed IV (r. 1648–87), Süleyman II (r. 1687–91), Ahmed II (r. 1691–5), and Mustafa II (r. 1695–1703). He had been educated in the palace and had served in many positions before gaining the post of silahdar ağa.3 This official was the second-in-command of the privy chamber of the sultan, who handled communications with the sultan and accompanied the ruler in processions and on campaign. Many silahdar ağas were promoted to become viziers.4 In 1704 another man was promoted to this office and Silahdar Findiklili Mehmed Ağa was offered a provincial governorship with the rank of vizier. He refused this and retired from palace service.5 While his histories were not exclusively focused on the navy, they include pertinent information about Mezemorta, whose career in the home waters of the empire revived the empire’s naval forces during this period. The naval crisis of 1694 was one event in the extremely colorful life of Mezemorta Hüseyn Pasha. His rise to ultimately command the Ottoman fleet and then reform the Ottoman navy began many years earlier in the waters of the North African coast. His career exemplifies yet again the contrast between the admirals with naval expertise and those who owed their advancement merely to palace connections. One naval leader was helpless to confront the Venetians, while the other was determined to find a solution to Venetian aggression into Ottoman home waters. Mezemorta had survived many dangerous situations giving him confidence to advance rather than retreat.

Mezemorta Hüseyn Pasha: The North African Years Mezemorta’s origins are in the realm of speculation: for he may have originated in Majorca or Mauritania, and he may have been a Christian convert. He first appears in 1674 as a well-known corsair, who seems to have received his nickname after being severely wounded in a battle with Spaniards as a young man. After 1674 he became one of the most prominent men in Algiers.6 Although Mezemorta’s background remains obscure, Idris Bostan states that evidence has established that Mezemorta was the stepson of a galleon captain, Seyyid Mustafa,7 which may have provided the opportunity for him to learn how to sail a galleon. This might have been instrumental in his later success, for he knew the worth of sailing ships in naval warfare. The earliest sources regarding Mezemorta’s origins are all non-Ottoman, unless one considers the Moldavian voivode Demetrie Cantemir, who defected to the Russians, as an Ottoman source. The other two sources are by two Frenchmen. None of the sources

 The Sultan’s Fleet 191 originate from local North African authors, in which location Mezemorta first became prominent and so potentially could appear in local accounts. Cantemir, who resided in Istanbul during the period that Mezemorta lived in the capital, may have had accurate information. He stated that Mezemorta was “an African, born of Moorish parents, who in his youth exercised piracy in the Mediterranean from the Port of Tunis, and by that rendered himself very famous.” It was Cantemir who claimed that Mezemorta was wounded during an engagement with Spanish ships, then captured and imprisoned for seventeen years before he was “redeemed by his countrymen, returned to his old trade, and did great damage to the Christians.” Cantemir then skipped to the events of 1694 at Chios.8 The Frenchman Aubry de la Motraye stated that he had heard while he was in Istanbul that Mezemorta was originally from Majorca and had converted to Islam from Christianity.9 A contemporary French account from 1674 by Laurent d’Arvieux, a French consul to the dey of Algiers, dated November 21, 1674, states that “Mezamorto was born at Istanbul, and was a more polite, more moderate, more honest man that one would find among the men of this profession.”10 All these reports are contradictory and none of the authors were in a position to have definitive information about the origins of Mezemorta. In contrast, Ottoman authors did not display interest in his origins; they recorded his accomplishments when he came from North Africa to serve in the home waters of the Empire. D’Arvieux mentioned Mezemorta again in 1676, when he recorded that Mezemorta and another corsair, Samson Memi, had escorted two French ships carrying cargo from Syria to Marseilles. Mezemorta and Samson Memi had agreed to protect the French ships from a Spanish attack. For this service, the corsairs received pay and provisions for their return voyage to Algiers. Because of their favorable treatment by the French, D’Arvieux believed it brought honor to France to have this information made widely known.11 However, corsair captains such as Mezemorta had to contend with Janissary leaders who began to oversee the activities of the corsairs in Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers by the 1670s. A Frenchman, later resident at the consulate of Algiers, Laugier de Tassy, recorded an incident during which Mezemorta was accused of acting inappropriately by the Janissary representative on board his ship, which led to the dey of Algiers punishing him with 500 blows on his feet before releasing him to return to corsairing.12 Tassy provides no date for this incident, but it might have influenced Mezemorta’s actions when the French attacked Algiers in the 1680s. Mezemorta’s prominence and hence some definite information concerning him began in the 1680s, when he became known during French attacks on Algiers in 1683. The French admiral Duquesne commanded a French fleet that bombarded Algiers that summer. The dey of Algiers, Baba Hasan, delivered Mezemorta Hüseyn and other corsair captains as hostages to the French, but Mezemorta persuaded Duquesne to allow him to return to Algiers, claiming he could raise money faster than the dey to pay off the French.13 Then Mezemorta led a revolt against Baba Hasan, which resulted in the dey’s death, after which Mezemorta became dey in his place and then beylerbey. As the leader of Algiers, he fired on the French fleet, forcing the French admiral to lift the blockade of Algiers. The following year, in 1684, Mezemorta made peace with France.14

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In 1686 Mezemorta was summoned to Istanbul to provide ships for the navy to use against the Venetians’ Morean campaign; however, Mezemorta remained committed to affairs in Algiers until a revolt against him in 1689 forced him to flee to Istanbul. An ongoing intervention by military forces from Algiers in a dispute in Tunis had brought an order from Istanbul in 1686 to Mezemorta ordering him to withdraw any forces from Algiers from attacking Tunis.15 Renewed hostilities with France kept Mezemorta occupied in Algiers. In 1688, the new Ottoman sultan, Süleyman II, attempted to appoint Mezemorta as admiral in Istanbul and replace him in Algiers, but since local military forces wished Mezemorta to remain in Algiers, Süleyman agreed to this. However, during this period, Mezemorta found it difficult to convince the corsair captains in Algiers to accept peace with England, the Netherlands, and France because this policy limited their raiding opportunities. Then an unsuccessful intervention in the civil strife in Tunis brought about an uprising against Mezemorta in Algiers. He was forced to escape to Tunis by ship, leaving his wife and family behind in Algiers, and it is unclear if he was ever reunited with them. However, he remained in danger in Tunis; thus, he departed for Istanbul in late 1689.16 By the time Mezemorta arrived in Istanbul, a war with Venice had been ongoing for several years.

The Holy League and Venice Venice had surrendered most of Crete in 1669; however, after the Ottoman disastrous defeat at the second siege of Vienna in 1683, the Venetians sensed an opportunity with international support to attack the Ottomans and regain some of their lost territories or other strategic Ottoman lands to bolster their naval power. As usual, the Venetians lacked land armies, but with a Holy League this aspect of operations would be the responsibility of their allies and need not concern them. Their charge was to attack the Ottomans by sea. Venice joined the Holy League in April 1684 and in July declared war on the Ottoman Empire. This naval war between the Ottomans and the Venetians was fought with both galleys and sailing ships in the fleets of both states. In August 1684 Venice began attacking Ottoman territories with its fleet that included sailing ships produced in Venice. However, to increase the size of their sailing ship squadron, the Venetians also hired sailing ships from other powers. The Ottoman fleet already included six sailing ships, but they began constructing an additional ten. Also, the Venetians relied on some allied support including galleys from the pope, Tuscany, and Malta.17 Venice began the war employing galleys in amphibious operations that the Ottoman fleet failed to block and quickly conquered Santa Maura and Preveza in the Adriatic in 1684 in August and September, respectively.18 Meanwhile, the Venetian sailing ships attacked the Ottomans in the Aegean and prevented them from sailing to the assistance of Santa Maura and Preveza. The Ottomans attacked the Venetian possession of Istendil in the Cyclades, indicating that their activities were not solely defensive. Nevertheless, in 1685 an Ottoman fleet under the command of Musahip (gentlemanin-waiting) Mustafa failed to prevent Venetian acquisition of several strategic locations in the Mora. Musahip left the Dardanelles in April, sailed from Chios to Rhodes to

 The Sultan’s Fleet 193 meet the caravan of ships from Alexandria, and went into action near Rhodes against a corsair galleon. The Venetians landed near Koron, on a southern peninsula of the Mora at the end of June, which they captured in August,19 because the Ottoman fleet was too weak to challenge the Venetians there. Part of the Ottoman fleet, which had made a base in Nauplia on the southeast coast of the Mora, sailed toward Kalamata slightly northeast of Koron; however, a false Venetian report sent to the commander of the fortress claiming that the admiral could not relieve the fortress led to the Ottoman surrender in September.20 The Ottomans appointed a new admiral, Mısırlızade Ibrahim Pasha, promoted from kapudane of sailing ships, in December 1685. The Ottoman fleet provided valuable assistance to the war effort in 1686; a competent admiral willingly engaged the Venetian fleet in battle if conditions favored an Ottoman victory. The Ottoman sailing ships required repair in Alexandria in March, after which the fleet departed Alexandria with troops from Egypt needed for the land war in Hungary in June and then united with the Derya Bey Ali Pashazade Abdulkadir Pasha (grandson of Hüsambey and son of Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha). They engaged the Venetians in battle; however, their highest priority was protecting the caravan of grain ships from Alexandria. The Battle of Icaria was the first fleet engagement of the new Ottoman sailing squadron. On July 12 according to Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa’s account, the men wished each other luck, loaded their cannon, and prepared for battle.21 The battle lasted for six hours and neither the Ottomans nor the Venetians were adept at line of battle tactics. According to Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, the Ottoman second-in-command, Benefseli Ali fired a broadside that struck the Venetian ship, Patrona, at the waterline. The Venetians expressed surprise at the aggressive actions of the Ottoman fleet in this and subsequent engagements, but the Ottomans willingly fought if they believed they could defeat the enemy. Although the battle appears to have ended in a draw, the Ottoman fleet escorted the caravan of grain ships to Istanbul without any losses of their vital supplies for the capital.22 However, the fleet failed to prevent the Venetian conquest of Anavarin and Modon by July 7 and their attack on Nauplia on July 30.23 Unfortunately, Mısırlızade lacked sufficient forces to attack the Venetians in the Mora; thus, he landed troops in Eğriboz and then retreated to Chios. Nauplia fell to the Venetians on August 30.24 The Ottoman fleet intended to bring the Venetians to battle on October 3, but unfavorable weather conditions prevented a successful Ottoman attack. The fleet then returned to Istanbul deciding to purchase a Tunisian sailing ship to increase their sailing squadron as they realized Venetian sailing ships outnumbered Ottoman vessels, which prevented Ottoman victories.25 The Venetians continued to conquer parts of the Mora in 1687, where their success was assisted by events on the Hungarian front. An Ottoman defeat in Hungary near Mohacs, followed by a botched crossing of the Danube near Petrovaradin, led to a military mutiny that caused chaos in the empire for six months and led to the deposition of Mehmed IV.26 Venetian conquests in the Mora included Patras and Lepanto in July 1687 and Corinth in August, and a temporary occupation of Athens in September 1687. Ottoman fleet activities were limited to transporting reinforcements to the Mora with twenty-five galleys under Mısırlızade, while the sailing squadron was assigned to protect trade in the Aegean. The Venetians intended to surprise the galleys at Eğriboz, but the admiral escaped to Chios. Marginal success in the Mora was contrasted with

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disasters in Hungary, which resulted in the Ottomans losing this province, leading to Mehmed IV, being replaced by his brother Süleyman II (r. 1687–91).27 As the war continued, the Ottomans with fewer sailing ships continued to lose territory to Venice. The Venetians, lured by their easy victories up to this point, decided to attack Eğriboz in 1688. The Ottoman garrison resisted, and an outbreak of plague killed the talented Swedish commander Konigsmarck, who had fought for Venice on land. In October, the Venetians abandoned the siege and embarked the remnants of their forces on their galleys. Due to Eğriboz’s great importance, the admiral Mısırlızade was assigned to govern the island, and Kalaylikoz Ahmed Pasha, whose experience was in land warfare, was appointed admiral.28 The Venetians attacked Malvasia, the only remaining important Ottoman port in the Mora, in 1689. The admiral was unable to assist Malvasia because the commander of the state galleons, Memi Kapudan, refused to attack in the circumstances of superior Venetian naval strength. Memi Kapudan stated, “The infidel has stout galleons, galleasses and fireships which we fear to attack. It we enter to battle with them, they can set all of us afire. By no way is it possible to match Venetians’ deceit.” The admiral was furious; however, Memi refused to fight if they would be defeated. Only experienced seafarers could judge correctly when it was prudent to engage the enemy and when due to circumstances retreat was the wiser policy. Nevertheless, the garrison did not surrender.29 Kalaylikoz Ahmed Pasha was dismissed and Mısırlızade was again appointed admiral in February 1690, as a competent admiral was deemed essential at this point in the war. The focus of naval conflict in 1690 was Malvasia, which the Ottomans reinforced by sea despite two Venetian blockading squadrons. In March, near Malvasia, in a sea battle that lasted approximately six hours, Frenk Murad Kapudan’s ship boarded a Venetian ship and, according to Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, the Venetians blew up the vessel to prevent its capture by the Ottomans. Another Venetian ship, whose commander died in the battle, was sunk by gunfire. Although Venetian sources inaccurately indicate that Mezemorta was the Ottoman commander during this sea battle, in 1690 he commanded operations on the Danube. Despite the assistance brought in by sea, the garrison of Malvasia surrendered on August 10. A final naval battle occurred near Lesbos on September 8, which ended in a draw. At this juncture, the Ottomans retreated from the interior of the Mora, leaving the Venetians in control of the peninsula, although they failed to expand beyond it to Athens and Eğriboz.30 In 1690, Mezemorta Hüseyn Pasha began to make an impact on Ottoman naval forces, leading to their revival. Because he had created enemies among the Janissaries of the Maghrib and they opposed his appointment, the sultan had appointed Mısırlızade to become admiral instead of Mezemorta. The sultan had sent an order to the leaders in Algiers asking for their assistance; thus, he could not very well appoint an admiral that they might refuse to serve under.31 Mezemorta was ordered instead to lead the Ottoman naval forces on the Danube.32 At the end of the campaign season, Sultan Süleyman II requested that Mezemorta participate in an imperial divan to provide expertise concerning sailing ships. The previous several years had shown that the Ottomans needed to improve their naval forces in this sector. Mezemorta stated what was already obvious; during the war since 1684 most fleet engagements

 The Sultan’s Fleet 195 had been fought by the sailing ship squadron, but the Ottomans maintained only ten ships, meaning their squadron was almost always outnumbered by the Venetians and their allies. Consequently, all the sailing ships had been truly able to accomplish was to protect the trade route between Alexandria and Istanbul. Mezemorta stated that it was vital to construct ten additional sailing ships if the sultan desired to move from defensive to offensive warfare. Mezemorta convinced the sultan, who decided to build ten more ships, which were all completed by 1694.33 According to a Venetian report of 1691, “Wherever I went by sea, I saw warships under construction in proportions undoubtedly as accurate as any of the most experienced Christian maritime nations.”34 As well as constructing more ships, the issue of naval expertise came to the fore in this period. Unfortunately, in 1691 a palace favorite, Helvacı Yusuf, was appointed admiral, instead of the talented Mısırlızade, although Mezemorta was given command of the sailing warships. While this meant that a naval expert led the sailing ship squadron, he was outranked by the admiral who knew nothing about fighting naval battles. As in the past, this produced deleterious results. Mezemorta was appointed derya bey of Rhodes in 1691 and was given command of the imperial kalyons.35 After the conquest of the Mora, the Venetians attempted invasions of Albania in 1691 and Crete in 1692, both of which failed. In 1692 Ahmed II, the new sultan, had appointed Mezemorta to oversee all the galleons in the Ottoman fleet. He brought men and supplies to Crete from Alexandria and prevented the Venetians from reoccupying Crete. In 1693 the Venetians considered blockading the Dardanelles itself, but decided to strengthen their grip on the Mora instead. Although significant changes in Ottoman naval command occurred during this period, tensions arose between Mezemorta and Yusuf Pasha, the admiral.36 This tension led to the explosive exchange at the council held to determine what action, if any, to take after the Venetian conquest of Chios. The strait of Chios “functioned as a maritime highway linking Istanbul with Alexandria and other ports of the eastern Mediterranean.”37 As well as possessing commercial importance, it was also of great military value, in connection with Foça and Çeşme, which could function as naval bases in the event of war in the Aegean. Piri Reis had stated regarding the strait of Chios, Chios itself, and three small islands between Chios and the Anatolian coast, known as Koyun Adaları: “This strait [between the Koyun island closest to the Anatolian shore and the Anatolian shore] is a great sea and the way followed by military ships.”38 With the Venetians controlling one side of the strait, the ability of the Ottoman fleet to sail to protect shipping in the eastern Mediterranean could be blocked, and Chios provided a base for the Venetians to attack the Ottomans, only eight miles from the Anatolian shore. This was not a location that the Ottomans could afford to allow to remain in enemy hands for it threatened the very life blood of the empire. During the final days of 1694, Sultan Ahmed II made his intentions clear regarding the immediate recovery of Chios, although it was winter. On Sunday 24 Rebiulahir 1106 (2 December 1694) all the viziers and ulema were invited to the tent of the grand vizier [Surmeli Ali Pasha] who addressed them in the following manner: “It is customary for the participants in [military] campaigns

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to rest at home in winter, and to be present at the post of duty in summer. The island of Chios, however, has by God’s decree fallen into enemy hands. As long as [we] have not spent all our efforts, with the Creator’s help, toward its recovery, we could not possibly dwell with a composed spirit and rest in the comforts of well-being. The noble sovereign demands [the recovery of] Chios. There is no avoidance of this [task]—If you agree, we shall all set out with the army of Islam for Chios!” The assembly listened and accepted this proposal. . . . And Mısırlızade Ibrahim Paşa, beylerbeyi of Anadolu, was appointed serdar of the Chios enterprise. The next day, Monday, the grand vizier arranged an audience for the paşa with the sovereign in the imperial pavilion. The sultan said: “The grand vizier has praised your qualities, and my [other] ministers have concurred, so that I have appointed you serasker of operations which I hope will lead to the reconquest of Chios. This also means that if you fail in your duty, I shall behead you!” and bestowed upon him a bejeweled fur coat, and upon the grand vizier a simple one.39

Two weeks after informing the commander in chief of his expectations regarding the recovery of Chios, the sultan issued an order to Mezemorta and the other naval leaders who were now under the command of a new admiral, Amcazade Hüseyn Pasha, a member of the Köprülü family. The official response by the government recognized the seriousness of the situation. Order (hukum) to the kapudane Mezemorta Hüseyn, may his good luck last, to the captain of the patrona40 Murad, may his greatness last, to the captain of the riyale and to other captains of kalyons and other officers: . . . This year the supplies and equipment of the galleys and warship of the imperial fleet appeared to be more plentiful than in other years . . .; and my noble orders were repeatedly sent both to you and to the former kaptanpasa Yusuf Pasa with my imperial admonitions demanding from you . . . a fully vigilant service, zeal and enthusiasm. Yet because of the dissension, timidity, dissolution and discord among you, you have fallen short of the hoped-for performance. The result was that while the galleys and battleships of my imperial fleet . . . were standing at the ready nearby, the enemy of the religion seized the island of Chios without any trouble . . . I have been informed that you yourself [i.e. Mezemorta Hüseyn] are not the one to fully blame in this matter, so that for now you are the object of my royal mercy of forgiveness, whereas an imperial rescript has been issued to dismiss the kaptanpasha [Yusuf Pasha] . . . Meanwhile the former governor of Seddulbahir, my vizier [Amcazade] Hüseyn Pasha, has been appointed to the office of supreme naval commander (kaptanlik) and [now] you have all been entrusted with the task of attacking the nefarious ships of the accursed ones, destroying them with God’s help, and by all possible means rescuing the island of Chios from the hands of the unbelievers . . . When it comes to battle, God willing do not abandon each other but lend one another mutual help and support, . . . I thus want to see you serving without concern for your persons and lives, especially avoiding any dissensions. My august order has been issued to this effect. Fi evaili cemazieyelevvel 1106 [18 December 1694]41

 The Sultan’s Fleet 197 The sultan had spoken, the Venetian occupation of Chios was unacceptable, and the resources of the empire were to be concentrated on the island’s recovery. Thus, the pusillanimous actions of Helvacı Yusuf resulted in his dismissal, and the appointment of a new admiral, Amcazade Hüseyn Pasha, who, although not a seafarer himself, was a talented statesman and military man who was willing to be guided by expert seafarers. Amcazade Hüseyn and Mezemorta Hüseyn became a formidable team. Although winter storms made naval campaigns in the Mediterranean dangerous, the Ottomans would not delay this reconquest. Preparations were made and soon the campaign began.

1695: A Turning Point At the beginning of February, the imperial fleet assembled at Izmir, with twenty battleships and twenty-four galleys, and its leaders, the serasker Mısırlızade Ibrahim Pasha, the admiral Amcazade Hüseyn Pasha, and the kapudane Mezemorta Hüseyn Pasha. They possessed determination and experience, two of them in naval warfare. The fleet sailed toward the northern end of the strait of Chios, where they were sighted by the Venetians, who informed the Venetian admiral Zeno, who departed from Chios on February 8. Mezemorta held a council of war with his captains and with his superior officers, Mısırlızade and Amcazade. They decided that four inferior sailing ships under Osman Kapudan would confront the galleasses, the galley contingent under Mısırlızade would attack the Venetian galleys, and the sixteen remaining battleships under Mezemorta would engage the Venetian battleships. Although Amcazade was the admiral, he gave his authority to Mezemorta for naval operations. Even though Mezemorta’s forces were outnumbered by the Venetian sailing ships, he devised a plan to overcome this obstacle by concentrating his ships on the Venetian center. On February 9, 1695, the Ottomans won a victory over the Venetians described by the Ottoman historian Raşid: Against twenty battleships of the [Venetians] sixteen [Ottoman] battleships, and against their six galleasses four [Ottoman] battleships were ranged, while the twenty-four [Venetian] galleys were faced by an equal number of galleys. The Turkish commanders received their instructions and were assigned according to the need, and the fleet bore down on the enemy from windward. The kapudane of the imperial fleet [Mezemorta] attacked its [Venetian] counterpart with a singlefuse broadside, as a result of which the latter’s commander [Priuli] and 150 warriors departed for the abode of perdition. Meanwhile a cannon ball shot from the riyale of Fettah kapudan hit the rear of the enemy kapudane [this is the ship not the officer], igniting a fire: as the unbelievers rushed to extinguish it, the brave gazis sprayed them with musket fire. Their wailing voices appealed for help from other [Venetian] battleships, and a sixty-gun battleship accosted her hoping to put out the conflagration, but she herself had her topsail flare up and in the end these great ships were devoured by fire and sank together with countless unbelievers, except for those who saved themselves by jumping into the water and falling prisoner into the hands of the gazis.42

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You sense the excitement in Raşid’s account; not only is it an Ottoman victory, it is an Ottoman naval victory, which had been seriously in short supply for some time. Here against the usual enemy, Venice, and their traditionally superior ships and admirals, the Ottomans had shown that given adequate leadership and numbers of sailing ships, they too could exult in a well-earned victory in battle. Everyone played their part, no one abandoned their fellows, none of the leaders held back, and they reaped the rewards of their united effort. Ten days later another naval battle between the Venetians and the Ottomans in the strait of Chios, a little to the south of the first battle, had the same result, an unquestioned Ottoman victory. At this point, the Venetians at Chios accepted that their occupation was doomed and two days later they abruptly abandoned Chios. As Raşid described this turn of events: The unbelievers, defeated and frightened, reached the Chios harbor. They stayed there only two nights, after which on the 7th of Recep [21 February] they fled, leaving behind five hundred cavalry with the presumption of defending [the island]. While they were sailing out of the harbor, full of fear and alarm, they saw one of their kalyons, loaded with military equipment, run aground. As the imperial fleet in its pursuit of the enemy cast anchor in the harbor the next day, it found there this ship filled with sixteen balyemez bronze cannon capable of shooting cannon balls weighing twenty-four okkas, six mortars, over 5000 muskets and other weapons, besides 280 infidel soldiers, who were made prisoner. In addition, four galleys and four large firkates [frigates] with their contents were captured.43

This marked the end of the Venetian occupation of Chios. Mezemorta finally became grand admiral in May with the rank of vizier, and he did not hesitate to engage the Venetian fleet in battle. The Ottoman strategy in 1695 was to patrol the Aegean, which, with the Venetians in possession of the Mora, was now vulnerable to their attack. The Ottomans under Mezemorta and the Venetians fought a battle, September 14–18, with sailing ships firing on each other. The engagement began in the vicinity of Chios and continued off and on for several days, until the Venetians headed for the Mora and Mezemorta for Izmir.44 Venetian and Ottoman sources vary in how they recorded the outcome of these encounters; the Venetians claimed to have seriously damaged several Ottoman ships, but the Ottoman sources counter this. Both sources record the blowing up of the San Giovanni Battista Piccolo, which, according to Ottoman sources, was the accomplishment of Asci Mehmed Kapudan’s ship. The Ottoman objective was to prevent the Venetians from occupying the islands of the Aegean, which they achieved in 1695 under Mezemorta’s skilled and determined leadership.45

Final Years of the Morean War The following years, 1696–7, exhibited indecisive fleet actions between the Venetians and the Ottoman fleet under Mezemorta, who chose to fight when he was in a position to defeat the Venetians, but if not, he withdrew to battle another day. Because the

 The Sultan’s Fleet 199 Venetians now possessed the Mora, this allowed them to send their fleet into Aegean waters and search for the Ottoman fleet or raid Ottoman territory. Because the Ottoman fleet now had adequate numbers of sailing ships, naval battles with the Venetians did not result in Ottoman defeats, although usually the results were indecisive, with few ships or men lost on either side. Thus, although Mezemorta won no outstanding victories in these years, he protected Ottoman waters from Venetian attacks and the Venetians gained no new territories in the final years of the Morean War. In 1696, the Ottoman navy was ordered to support a land army under Çelebi Ibrahim Pasha, who had defended Eğriboz in 1688, whose goal was to retake the Mora. Mezemorta needed to prevent the Venetian fleet from threatening the seaward side of Ibrahim Pasha’s army. The naval engagements that occurred near Eğriboz were an unusual instance of galleys playing an important role in a battle between two sailing fleets employing line of battle tactics and planning on succeeding through the effectiveness of their cannon fire.46 The Venetians had the support of their galleys, while many of the Ottoman galleys had been assigned to the Black Sea to challenge Russian attacks there.47 When the Ottoman fleet became becalmed without galley support, although it was unfavorable for the Ottomans they prepared to fight. According to Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, “Benefitting from the calm which they since so long sought out, [Venetians] moved for combat by encircling the imperial fleet with galleasses and galleys from one side and with galleons from the other.”48 But the wind arose and the Ottomans improved their battle position, and each side claimed that the other withdrew when the battle ended as darkness fell. In the following month, neither side wished to engage in battle unless they had the advantage of the weather gage, and both sides accused the other of refusing to fight. In June 1697, the Ottoman fleet emerged from the Dardanelles and arrived near Izmir. The Venetian fleet encountered the Ottoman fleet in early July, and they fought a battle south of Lemnos on July 6 that continued for fifteen hours. Both sides suffered damage to their ships and casualties; thus, after the battle Mezemorta led his fleet to Bozcaada (Tenedos) and then Foça for repairs. Another battle occurred on September 1, which lasted three hours, and again Ottoman and Venetian reports vary on the severity of the damage to the two fleets. However, since reports agree that a Venetian ship exploded either during the battle or shortly afterward, the Venetians had suffered significant casualties.49 A third naval battle in 1697 occurred on September 20 south of Eğriboz, during which the Venetians unsuccessfully used a fireship. The Venetian fleet continued to roam the Aegean until October 14, when it returned to Nauplia.50 Although Mezemorta failed to prevent the Venetian fleet from entering Aegean waters from their bases on the Mora, he did avert their conquest of any additional territories, protecting what could be viewed as Ottoman waters from Venetian incursions. The final naval campaign of the war occurred in 1698 under dire conditions for the sultan’s fleet. The Ottoman fleet lacked ammunition and the troops had not been paid. Eventually, Mezemorta was forced to borrow 30,000 piasters from the governors of the provinces bordering the Aegean to partially pay his men to avert a mutiny. He remained guarding the Dardanelles because he lacked ammunition and his unpaid troops were rebellious. However, Venetian depredations in the Aegean resulted in frantic appeals being sent to Istanbul, and the sultan issued an order to defeat the Venetians in the

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Aegean. Mezemorta sailed to Bozcaada in July and the fleets sighted each other on August 1 but did not engage until September 20 near Zeytin Burnu on Lesbos. According to Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, Mezemorta’s flagship “luffed up and fired a broadside, with huge forty-four okka marble balls entering from [the Venetian’s] one side and exiting from the other, devastating her hull. Until she decreased sail and retired, she lost most of her crew to gun and musket fire.”51 According to Silahdar, the violent battle left the sea covered with flotsam, with heavy casualties on both sides, including some Ottoman fleet leaders. Nevertheless, the Ottoman fleet patrolled the Aegean until November and then returned to Istanbul. If the Ottomans had been as successful on land during the later years of the war of the Holy League as they were on the sea, the final outcome of the peace settlement might have been different, but the Ottomans lost the Battle of Zenta in September 1697 and then nine days later the Habsburgs made peace with the French allowing them to concentrate their forces against the Ottomans. The peace conference in Karlowitz during 1698 resulted in a treaty in January 1699 that allowed Venice to retain the Mora and some conquests in Dalmatia, although Lepanto and Preveza returned to Ottoman control.52 The treaty of Karlowitz, significant not only for its impact on Ottoman land holdings but also with the loss of the Mora to Venice, became crucial in terms of Ottoman naval power. Although a shift had occurred from naval power fought exclusively with galleys to sailing ships becoming an essential component of naval forces, bases on land from which naval power could be exerted continued to be vital. The loss of the Mora delivered a blow to Ottoman naval power and, until this region was restored after the final war with Venice, the Ottomans realized that not only had they lost land but they had also lost control of waters that they considered to be Ottoman.53 This concept of territorial waters existed from the time of Mehmed II, noted in such works as Piri Reis’s Kitab-i Bahriye. Thus, the losses inscribed in Karlowitz had an impact on the sea as well. With the war concluded, the most powerful Ottoman leaders—the sultan Mustafa II, the grand vizier, and the admiral—all prioritized naval reform. Amcazade Hüseyn Pasha, grand vizier since 1697, attempted to reform the Ottoman state, reorganizing the army, and increasing state income. Mezemorta also tried to reform the Ottoman navy by issuing his naval kanunname in 1701. With the united efforts of these three leaders the revival of the Ottoman navy entered a promising period.

Mezemorta as Admiral Mezemorta excelled as a seafarer whose daring and skill were unquestioned; however, assimilating into the Ottoman elite was challenging for him. The Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi states that he was the adopted son of Maltız Abdurrahman Pasha, who was described as one of the derya beys who was “useful and excellent in seamanship.” The Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi does not provide any dates for when this occurred; in fact, the author includes this information in his history in the section after the death of Mezemorta, calling him “the former Kapudan Pasha.”54 But even with this meager information, we

 The Sultan’s Fleet 201 can infer that becoming the adopted son of a derya bey gave Mezemorta some prestige when he came to the Aegean from Algiers and also some connections to the state naval bureaucracy to supplement his already established connections to the elite of Algiers. Two sources shed light on Mezemorta’s personality while he was admiral. The first from Cantemir indicates that Mezemorta was uninterested in the trappings of his elevated rank, but was passionate about reforming the sultan’s fleet to increase its effectiveness. When the Sultan was going to confer upon him the honour of admiral . . . he particularly desired to have leave to instruct the sailors and marine forces in the art of fighting at sea, and bind them to some certain regulations; and, not to be obliged, on account of the honour of Vizir conferred upon him, to quit his sailor’s habit: both which requests he obtained. The Vizirs often tried to prevail upon him to change his dress, telling him, that so mean a habit was unsuitable to his dignity: but he always remained immoveable, and when they pressed him, used to tell them, that he thought it much more unsuitable for the fleet of so great an Empire to be left a prey to a few fishermen; which disgrace was owing to nothing but this, that the latter minded arms, and the ministers of the other nothing but dress and finery; that, for his part, he made the honour of Vizir, bestowed upon him by the Sultan, to consist not in dress, but in bravery; and would show how much the most slovenly men excel the best dressed ladies.55

What mattered was performance, on all levels, and not rank or clothing. Ultimately Mezemorta obtained his wish, to reform the fleet with regulations. The second source regarding this period is a hagiography concerning Mezemorta’s relations with a Sufi sheykh of the Nasuhiyye, the Nasuhi branch of the Halveti Sufi order. According to this source, at the time of the victory of the battle for Chios “both the late Mezemorta and numerous others witnessed the noble [Nasuhi Efendi] on the galleon.”56 Also Mezemorta reportedly said to Nasuhi Efendi, “Esteemed Efendi, why are you acting like a stranger to us? It must have been your presence that gave good tidings in the battle before Chios.”57 In other words, Mezemorta asserted that his victory was due to the intervention of the saintly Nasuhi Efendi. He then paid the Sufi leader’s debts and endowed a Sufi lodge for him.58 Genuine spiritual belief may have motivated Mezemorta as well as searching for a way to invest his new wealth and build personal support in the capital and perhaps find a means to be reunited with his family.59 Mezemorta had only recently achieved the rank of admiral and found it challenging to adjust to being a vizier. He respected a Sufi sheykh who he admired for his religious life in contrast to the viziers whose concern for dress he found frivolous and irritating. Mezemorta succeeded in providing opportunities for his descendants in the naval hierarchy. Some hints exist concerning his children both natural and adopted. At a battle in 1697, Silahdar indicates that Mezemorta’s foster son, Seyyid Mustafa Kapudan, attacked the San Lorenzo Zustinian with his small galleon and captured the firkate that accompanied the flagship as a prize.60 Mezemorta also had two natural sons, Said Bey and Ali Pasha, who became derya beys, and a grandson through his daughter,

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Mehmed Said Bey, who became the kethüda of the arsenal.61 However, his greatest long-term impact resulted from his desire to reform the sultan’s fleet. Reforming the navy and other aspects of Ottoman society were priorities for Mezemorta and his patron, Amcazade Hüseyn Pasha.

Seafaring Regulations Mezemorta had desired to reform the Ottoman navy from the moment of his appointment as admiral when he negotiated with the sultan “to instruct the sailors and marine forces in the art of fighting at sea.” New naval regulations, recorded shortly before the death of Mezemorta in 1701 appear rather straightforward, but given previous naval history, they attempted to ensure that future naval practice followed the pattern seen under Mezemorta and not under someone like Helvacı Yusuf Pasha. And the Full admiral and the Vice admiral and the Rear admiral should be officers of high merit. . . . When it becomes necessary for another to be given the position of high admiral, let it be given to someone who is an expert on the sea, possessing knowledge of conditions and personnel of the fleet, let it by no means be given to land pashas.62

The individual with supreme command was to be the kapudan pasha; all other officers were his subordinates and had to obey his commands. The kapudan pasha was responsible to organize each unit of the navy. Under the kapudan pasha, three admirals had limited commands: first, the kapudane-i humayun, was to be head of naval operations. He would be supported by two admirals: the kapudane-i patrona (fleet admiral), and the kapudane-i riyale (rear admiral). The statement that all maritime posts were only to be given to experienced seafarers was the most significant. Individuals needed to demonstrate competence and then they would be promoted based on the naval hierarchy. If the Ottomans had followed this policy, kapudan pashas would have been appointed only from men who had previously held one of the subordinate admiral positions. For subordinate ranks, an aylakci could become a reis who could become a reis-i evvel, after demonstrating competence.63 At least forty kalyons were to be stationed at the imperial naval arsenal in Istanbul. This was a substantial increase from the previous number and did not include kalyons of the corsairs of North Africa, but state ships that would always be available in the Aegean. Of great importance was the provision that sailors would also be stationed at the arsenal; no longer would inexperienced individuals be used to man the ships. Ağas who were responsible to manage the crews had to be devout Muslims. Ship’s officers were responsible to inform their sailors of possible disciplinary action if they misbehaved when at the arsenal. Instead of patronage being all important, ability and talent would be the principal requirements to obtain all naval appointments and promotions. Thus, land forces leaders would not be given naval positions, because they would lack the necessary experience. Kalyon captains would be elected to their posts by other captains who had the same rank.64

 The Sultan’s Fleet 203 The revival of the Ottoman navy through reforms had become vital, as seen by the results of lack of naval leadership in the case of Helvacı Yusuf, who gained the post because he was a palace insider. Not only did he lack naval experience, he lacked the ability to rely on those who possessed it. If a seafarer was fulfilling his responsibilities, he did not spend most of his time at the court in Istanbul, but instead sailed at the head of the fleet protecting the capital city and Ottoman waters. These changes also necessitated expenditures on ships and on ensuring qualified men were able to sail them. In other words, the naval forces of the empire, both ships and men, needed to become a higher priority to the leaders of the empire. It remained to be seen how fully these regulations would be implemented. Mezemorta could not be the one to implement them since he died shortly after they were issued.

Impact of Mezemorta Mezemorta’s contribution to Ottoman naval power was multifaceted. First, because of Mezemorta’s activities as admiral, he prevented the Venetians from increasing their territories in the Aegean beyond those bases they had already conquered in the early years of the war. This was crucial for with their conquest of the Mora, the Ottoman Aegean was threatened by Venetian naval forces. With his regulations, Mezemorta initiated the reform of the Ottoman navy in terms of numbers of kalyons and employment of competent seamen. Observing the men who followed him as admiral, we can assess the degree to which his regulations were implemented. His immediate successor was Abdulfettah Pasha, in contrast to his immediate predecessor Amcazade. Abdulfettah Pasha had been prominent in the fleet as the Riyale kapudan with a five-ship squadron at the battle where the Venetians were defeated, on February 9, 1695. According to Raşid his ship fired a cannon ball that sank a Venetian ship, the 74-gun Stella Maris. Thus, he had shown skill, bravery, initiative, and the ability to fight effectively from a sailing ship.65 He was a logical choice for admiral having been in command of sailing ships, moreover demonstrating his skill in actual naval combat. But Abdulfettah Pasha was kapudan pasha for only approximately two years. When the men who followed him are examined a variable pattern emerges. Discovering the names and the dates of service of the kapudan pashas is in and of itself a challenging task.66 Mehmed Pasha remained in office only one day, December 14, 1703. He had been the head of the kalyons. Next was Küçük Osman Pasha, a palace man who lasted a year. He was replaced by another palace man, Baltaci Mehmed Pasha, who held the position for six weeks. Then on December 27, 1704, Frenk Abdurrahman Pasha, who had been the head of the kalyons, became admiral.67 Thus of the first five kapudan pashas after Mezemorta, two were men from the palace and three were men with naval experience. However, when a new war with Venice occurred a naval expert became admiral.

Ottoman Reconquest of the Mora The Ottomans defeated Venice during a final war recovering the Mora, essential for control of the Aegean waters of the empire. The timing of this war reflected Ottoman

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understanding of the geopolitical situation in Europe. The Habsburgs had been weakened by a long war with France, the War of the Spanish Succession, that ended in 1713. The Ottomans had recovered Azov in 1711 from a temporarily contained Russia. With careful military and diplomatic preparations in place, the Ottomans declared war on Venice, on December 9, 1714, although naval operations did not begin until the summer of the following year. After at least partial implementation of Mezemorta’s naval regulations, the Ottomans had an effective navy composed of sailing ships. One large three-decker galleon and another smaller galleon had been built shortly after the naval regulations were issued, and many ships had been completed by 1704.68 By the time the war began the sultan’s fleet was composed of forty-one sailing ships, including ten armed merchant ships, twenty-two galleys, twenty galliots, ten firkates, thirty-two kancabas (landing boats), two bomb ships, and two fireships. The kapudan pasha was Canim Hoca Mehmed Pasha, from Algiers, who had been a lieutenant of Mezemorta Pasha and was promoted from the position of kapudane-i humayun. Thus, according to the regulations, he was the prescribed choice to become the next kapudan pasha. He would serve for less than three years from December 23, 1714, until February 14, 1717.69 Clearly, he was promoted to kapudan pasha with the expectation that he could lead the fleet effectively against Venice when the new war commenced. However, this expectation was only partially realized in the ensuing conflict. The Ottoman fleet went on the offensive at the beginning of the summer, leaving Istanbul on June 1 and on June 6 capturing the island of Istendil in the Cyclades, which had been a Venetian possession since the Fourth Crusade. There the fleet landed heavy artillery to be used by the army in the reconquest of the Mora. The fleet then sailed to Nauplia by June 15, which port was under siege by the army, after which the fleet sailed around the southern coast of the Mora to support the army besieging Modon in August. The weaker Venetian fleet fled on August 14 after sighting the Ottoman fleet. On September 3 Malvasia and on September 25 Suda on Crete surrendered to the Ottoman fleet. For the most part, the fleet and army campaigns were well coordinated.70 The land forces were under the command of Damad Ali Pasha, the grand vizier, who led an effective army through the Mora in 1715 and reconquered the entire peninsula in less than three months. In addition, the Venetians lost Suda and Spinalonga, their remaining outposts on Crete. During these operations, the two fleets only engaged at Sapienza on August 14. Although Damad Ali Pasha ordered Canim Hoca Mehmed Pasha to follow the Venetians, he refused stating his main duty was to ensure the safety of the supply ships for the army. In October, the Ottoman fleet returned to Istanbul.71 Because of the ease with which the Mora was reconquered, the Ottomans decided to attempt to conquer the strategic island of Corfu in the Adriatic. The Ottomans had attempted this conquest in 1537, but they had withdrawn when victory was almost at hand. In 1715 this was a more difficult proposition than almost 200 years earlier, when the Ottomans were at the height of their naval power under Hayreddin Pasha. Nevertheless, the island of Corfu, if taken, would have contributed to Ottoman naval power, because Corfu controlled access from the Adriatic into the Mediterranean. Since the island was extremely strategic in terms of the Adriatic, this campaign alarmed the Habsburgs of Austria and they declared war on the Ottoman Empire on May 25, 1716.

 The Sultan’s Fleet 205 Because much of their trade flowed through Venice, they would not allow Venetian interests in the Adriatic to be threatened. With Venice assured of a land army attacking the Ottomans in the vicinity of the Danube, the threat to Corfu lessened. Therefore, the Ottomans were prevented from mounting an extended siege of the island.72 For this ambitious naval expedition, the Ottomans formed a large force of sailing ships under the command of the admiral Canım Hoca Mehmed Pasha. The fleet included thirty-four battleships, ten armed merchantmen, fifteen galleys, four fireships, and two bomb ships and eleven transports to ferry soldiers from Butrint in Albania, the Ottoman base on the mainland, to Corfu. Also ten ships from the corsairs of North Africa joined the fleet. Unfortunately, Canim Hoca commanded only the naval forces, while land forces remained under the command of the governor of the Mora, Kara Mustafa Pasha. The fleet departed Istanbul in May and sailed first to Eğriboz and then around the Mora in June toward Corfu. It anchored in the northern channel of Corfu and ferried 8,000 troops to the island by July 8, 1716. The only naval battle of the campaign occurred on this day.73 The Venetians attacked the Ottoman fleet while it was at anchor, meaning that the fleet was unprepared for battle. Canim Hoca attempted to form a line of battle with his ships, and the battle lasted for some five hours. The Ottoman ships suffered damage and, after being towed from combat by the Ottoman galleys, left the Venetians in control of the approaches to the Corfu harbor.74 Although the fleet resumed landing troops after two days and ultimately 30,000 Ottoman troops landed on the island, Corfu was extremely well fortified, besides which the Ottoman commanders disagreed with each other regarding priorities. Moreover, while the Ottomans besieged Corfu, they observed the Venetian fleet being reinforced by contingents from their allies and the Venetians reinforced the fortress. The Ottoman land forces needed more men for their assaults and requested marines from the fleet. Canim Hoca responded, “I cannot dare to land any marines, as long as the enemy fleet remains anchored in front of us. The hour when . . . [they] hear about our ships being emptied of men, they will take the opportunity to assault us. Then what will we do?”75 The Ottoman forces managed to capture some bastions west of Corfu’s harbor on August 3. It was all for naught, for when the Habsburgs defeated an Ottoman army at the Battle of Petrovaradin on the Danube on August 5 and the Ottomans lost an entire field army then the Ottoman forces at Corfu were summoned to abandon the siege of Corfu. They made a final assault on August 18/19, which was unsuccessful, and then evacuated troops to the mainland. Canim Hoca retreated to Nauplia and then to Istanbul. The Venetians seized Butrint and Santa Maura Island in September and October.76 Canim Hoca’s court-martial found him guilty of negligence, especially for the failure on July 8, when he was surprised at anchor because he had neglected to establish a patrol. He was criticized for lethargy and irresponsible behavior. He was relieved of command, his property was sequestered, and he was imprisoned. He escaped with his life only because some of the elite intervened in his favor and reminded others of his past successes. However, despite his failings the defeat was not solely his fault. The Corfu expedition had been opposed by many Ottoman leaders because Corfu possessed strong defenses and the attack on Corfu had led to the intervention of the Habsburgs of Austria.77

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The Final Years of the Final War with Venice Although the war had begun with the Ottoman reconquest of the Mora, with the attack on Corfu, the Habsburgs of Austria had entered the conflict, which meant that the overall outcome of the war was not determined by fleet battles between the Ottomans and the Venetians, but by land battles on the Danubian front. Nevertheless, the Venetians resorted to the strategy frequently employed during the Cretan War, threatening the straits leading to Istanbul. The Ottomans sought for a naval solution; thus, Morali Ibrahim Pasha became admiral after Canim Hoca was removed from command. The Ottoman fleet left the Dardanelles on June 10, 1717, with the intention of driving the Venetians out of the Aegean. The Ottoman fleet possessed approximately twenty-three battleships including a ship with a gun that could fire a 3-kantar stone. In the battle that occurred June 12–16, this gun almost sank a Venetian ship with two hits. The Venetians stationed near Imbros (Gökçeada), after two days’ attempting to gain the best position, began the battle. The Venetians then retreated pursued by the Ottoman fleet. After a second battle was fought between the fleets on July 19, near Nauplia, with little damage inflicted on either fleet, the Ottomans continued pursuing the Venetian fleet. However, the Ottoman defeat at Belgrade in August caused the naval war to be abandoned. According to Raşid, “a general lethargy gripped all operations [of the fleet] upon the arrival of perilous news; also, as the winter was approaching, the august firman ordering to set sail and retire [to winter quarters] arrived, thus they ceased warlike actions and prepared to return from Mora.”78 The fleet returned but suffered several accidents while sailing near Kumkapi and later in the arsenal where a fire consumed vital naval supplies, leading to a smaller fleet being available for the following campaign season in 1718. Ibrahim was dismissed and Hoca Süleyman from the North African corsairs was appointed admiral.79 The final year of the war, 1718, included a naval battle, July 20–22, near the Mani Peninsula in the southern Mora. Because the Venetians had besieged Ulcinj in Montenegro the Ottoman fleet was sent west to protect this strategically important maritime base from surrendering to the Venetians. The Venetians claimed victory, but the Ottomans sank a Venetian ship and damaged much of the rest of the Venetian fleet; thus, this claim appears dubious. Once again, a 3-kantar stone severely damaged a Venetian ship. However, the peace of Passarowtiz was signed on July 21; thus, much of the battle was fought after the war was officially over, although news had not yet reached the fleet.80 In terms of the contest with Venice, the Ottomans had regained the Mora, but Venice retained Corfu and several Ionian islands; Cerigo, Zenta, Cephalonia, Leucada, Paxos, and Santa Maura, as well as the harbors of Preveza and Arta. However, the Ottomans lost substantial territories in the Balkans that had been part of the empire for centuries. Thus, in terms of naval strategy the war could be deemed a success as the Ottomans now controlled the Aegean, but in terms of land warfare, it had been another disaster.

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Conclusion The revival of the Ottoman navy dates from 1695, when Ottoman leadership united in fighting naval battles effectively and then a few years later in producing regulations meant to ensure that competent leaders emerged from the state naval forces. Three powerful figures initiated the revival: Mezemorta Hüseyn Pasha, the admiral; Amcazade Hüseyn Pasha, the grand vizier; and Mustafa II. This revival was one of the final accomplishments of these men, Mezemorta died in 1701 shortly after the naval regulations were issued. Amcazade died in 1702, and Mustafa II was deposed and then died in 1703. These three individuals, who soon faced removal from office or death, issued the naval regulations to meet the needs of a fleet that had been in the process of transformation for some time due to the necessity of changing from a galley fleet to a combination of galleys and galleons. While the 1701 naval regulations may not seem startling, implementation would have been a radical departure from Ottoman practice in most times. The regulations were issued between two naval wars, 1684–99 and 1714–18, that pitted the Ottomans against their usual naval opponent, the Venetians. But the war with Venice, 1714–18, was the final conflict between the two powers. Both naval wars occurred in a larger geopolitical context of new players on the international scene, especially with the rise of Russian power threatening Ottoman control of the Black Sea. The first war with Venice, 1684–99, ended with the treaty of Karlowitz in 1699; the second with the treaty of Passarowitz, 1718. Thus, the naval regulations issued in 1701 emerged from the experiences of the conflict that had recently ended and the disastrous consequences of the treaty of Karlowitz, where for the first time the Ottomans lost substantial territory. However, the 1684–99 naval war with Venice had been fought when the Ottomans faced numerous foes on multiple fronts. Nevertheless, the naval lessons became clear, the empire needed a more effective naval force, and this force required men on all levels who were naval experts. Although this concept had been noted but not implemented during Mehmed II’s reign, the Ottomans continued to face difficulties in making this adjustment to a professional navy. The debacle at sea in 1694 revealed once again that the Ottomans needed a talented, experienced seafarer to lead their naval forces, and, when such a vital position went to a palace favorite such as Helvacı Yusuf, the results were potentially disastrous. The Ottomans issued naval regulations, but the key question would be to what extent would the regulations be followed. Would years of relying on palace favorites be overturned in favor of admirals who were naval experts, often originating from North African training in the conflicts in those waters? Mezemorta began as an outsider but he became an insider by the time of his death with his contribution to naval reform at the highest level, not merely through his skill in battle but through issuing laws to govern the navy in the future. He understood the strategic challenges that the Ottomans faced as new naval players entered Ottoman waters while the Ottomans’ traditional opponent remained a threat in the eastern Mediterranean. While the Ottoman navy might have been “half dead” at the beginning of the Morean War, clearly by the end of the final war with Venice it had been revived through the efforts of men such as Mezemorta and Amcazade Hüseyn Pasha. The Ottomans

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adopted up-to-date technology, the sailing ship, and not only could they produce the ships, they trained the men to effectively employ the ships in battle. While many of the most renowned admirals had learned their skills in North African waters, the official forces underwent a transformation, at least on paper; thus, only men who had passed certain levels of proficiency would be eligible to be promoted to higher ranks in the navy. If the Ottomans had fully implemented the naval regulations of Mezemorta, exemplary leadership would have become the standard throughout all ranks of the navy. Clearly, the post of admiral continued to be given to some individuals who were not expert seafarers, but that appears to have diminished at least to some degree. Certainly, the men who generally achieved naval leadership were individuals of some experience at sea. What might have happened next with the revival of the navy had naval warfare continued uninterrupted is a question that cannot be answered. Following the war with Venice, Ottoman naval warfare almost ceased except for protection against piracy until the appearance of Russia on the scene in the Mediterranean in the 1770s. A new era in Ottoman naval history was about to commence. Turks had finally defeated Venetians in the Aegean; however, the final two centuries of the empire’s existence brought novel naval challenges.

Conclusion Identifying Ottoman Seafarers

By the end of the final Ottoman-Venetian war in 1718, Turks and Franks had been fighting for control of the Aegean Sea for approximately 600 years; more specifically Ottomans and Venetians had competed for nearly 350 years from the date that the Ottomans occupied Gallipoli and began to exert significant naval pressure in the straits. Assessing the larger geopolitical context, the transformation from a medieval to an early modern world resulted in great changes from conditions that had existed when Turks first arrived in Anatolia and by 1100 had reached the Aegean coast. What remained constant was the great commercial and strategic importance of the straits and the seas, Aegean and Black, which they connected, which certainly did not diminish with the rise of Russian power in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Venice no longer wielded the naval power that had been hers in the medieval period, replaced to a large degree by the Ottomans in eastern Mediterranean waters. While the seas remained subject to pressure from many competitors for naval power, Ottoman control of the surrounding lands remained in place, at least theoretically from Algiers to Albania. This territorial control had been accomplished by military forces on land and on the sea. Most of the men who contributed to this outcome are unknown, for their deeds are unrecorded or found in archival records that remain to be tapped for their information. However, the lives of a few surveyed here show the complexity of categorizing the men who founded Ottoman rule in maritime districts. Their backgrounds, their accomplishments, and their interactions with the Ottoman elite show enormous variation.

Who Were the Seafarers Who Made Ottoman Expansion a Reality? Scrolling through the centuries beginning when the Turks arrived at the Aegean coast and began a contest for a permanent presence in the area, a few individuals are remembered for their outstanding contributions to Ottoman naval power. They can be considered Ottomans in terms of how they have been portrayed in Ottoman historiography, even if during their lifetimes they would never have accepted an Ottoman identity.1 The first is Umur of Aydın. While this Turk from the house of Aydin may seem an odd choice to consider an Ottoman seafarer, later Ottoman authors such as Enveri and Oruç considered him as an adopted ancestor. Umur in the fourteenth

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century was emblematic of Turkish engagement with the sea. In the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, Turks arrived at the coast and began to engage in naval warfare with their neighbors, some of whom were also relative newcomers to the area such as the Knights of St. John on Rhodes. Some Turks made little effort or progress in expanding their maritime possessions especially to the neighboring islands. Umur was the Turkish bey who both developed his own abilities at leading naval warfare and created a sizable fleet. With a naval base at Izmir, he began his exploits and the base was key to his success. When through his hubris he lost access to the harbor, although he still had men, he lost the ability to use them in naval warfare with any great success. From his biography one can conclude that naval power required a good port as a naval base, resources to build ships, expertise both in ship construction and in the ability to wage naval warfare, and a source of military forces. If any of these factors was lacking, the fragile ability to engage in naval warfare was greatly diminished. Umur, from his first naval battle, loved fighting at sea and became expert at it. In contrast to Ottoman rulers, whether beys or sultans, he led naval warfare in person and did not delegate naval warfare to subordinates. If Umur had not lost Izmir’s port to the crusaders, he might have created an empire based on sea power. Then the beylik of Aydın might have challenged the Ottomans for control of Anatolia and the Balkans. This did not occur, but it might have if naval power had become the highest priority for an expanding Turkish state. Kara Mürsel of Karası, who was employed by Orhan, can be considered the founder of Ottoman naval power. He accomplished this by gaining control of the first Ottoman toehold on the Sea of Marmara at Karamürsel near Izmit. He emerged from the rival beylik of Karası; however, he entered Ottoman service, perhaps because Ottoman rulers did not themselves lead naval warfare in contrast to the beys of Karası or Umur of Aydın. However, Ottoman rulers succeeded in attracting qualified men to their service from the fourteenth through the seventeenth centuries. Kara Mürsel also aided in ship construction. The Ottoman sultan Orhan recruited Kara Mürsel of Karası probably in the 1320s, some twenty years before the Ottomans annexed Karası, which included the southern shore of the Dardanelles. Then the Ottomans began to have an impact on one of the most strategic waterways in the world. This access to the Dardanelles prompted the Ottoman occupation of Gallipoli, which led to expansion in the Balkans. The possession of strategic locations combined with access to expertise in naval construction and warfare led to the genesis of the Ottoman fleet. Annexing Karası meant that more seafarers with maritime skills were an integral part of the Ottoman Empire. Although Kara Mürsel was from Karası, he became the founder of Ottoman naval forces and hence an Ottoman seafarer. The most prominent naval strategist of Mehmed the Conqueror’s reign was Mehmed himself. He discarded admirals right and left if they failed to succeed at the task that he had appointed to them. Hamza, son of Çalı Bey, was admiral for less than a year according to the historian Kritovoulos. Hamza had become admiral after Baltaoğlu failed to prevent the reinforcement by sea of Constantinople during the Ottoman siege in 1453. Hamza led the fleet at the conquest, although he failed to prevent the escape of the Latin ships that had been stationed in the Golden Horn. Hamza was soon promoted to become beylerbey of Anatolia. Hamza was unusual in that we can trace

 Conclusion 211 a family of seafarers at this early period since his father had commanded the Ottoman fleet under Mehmed I at a naval battle in 1416 against the Venetians almost forty years earlier. Thus men with naval expertise emerged in Ottoman domains, although Mehmed primarily employed his close associates as admiral rather than those who possessed maritime skills. In contrast, Mehmed’s most prominent admirals in terms of rank all originated from a non-Muslim background. For example, Mahmud Pasha was from the Serbian-Byzantine elite, and Mesih Pasha was from the Palaiologos family. Although their backgrounds were not Turkish, they were Ottoman admirals, possessing an Ottoman palace education and enculturation. During the reign of Mehmed II’s son Bayezid II, Kemal Reis became the first Ottoman seafarer who suffered from the jealousy of the sultan’s elite servitors to such a degree that this envy was recorded in sources. Kemal Reis’s family background was from Karaman; thus, he was from a rival Turkish beylik, although he joined Ottoman naval forces during the reign of Mehmed II. Kemal Reis spent much of his career as a freelance seafarer, gaining notoriety in the western Mediterranean as a gazi from Rum (Anatolia). The term gazi was used for seafarers from the eastern Mediterranean who combated Habsburg expansion in the western Mediterranean waters and lands. The Ottoman author Oruç, his contemporary, tied Kemal’s victory at Anavarin in present-day Greece to the exploits of Umur of Aydın. Kemal’s significance is difficult to overstate, since Bayezid recruited Kemal Reis into the official naval forces of the empire even if he never obtained the position of admiral. Kemal also helped with ship design. He exerted great influence on his nephew, Piri Reis’s career, both teaching him seafaring and obtaining a map of Columbus as booty. When Kemal died in 1510, the Ottomans would not employ a greatly talented seafarer again until the recruitment of Hayreddin to sultanic service in 1533. For some twenty years the seafaring skills of the empire were squandered. Kemal’s loyalties were to the sultan of Rum, who happened to be the Ottoman ruler, although until the final defeat of the Karamanids, Ottoman sultans still encountered Turkish rivals for power. Hayreddin Pasha was the greatest of Ottoman seafarers. His background from Lesbos, the son of an Ottoman former cavalryman from the Balkans and his Greek wife, meant he is not easy to categorize ethnically, although he claimed his father was “Turkish” on the mosque he built in Algiers. Hayreddin likely learned seafaring from an early age; however, it may have seemed that there was no major outlet for these skills. But eventually due to backing the wrong prince in the succession struggles at the end of Bayezid II’s reign and his brother Oruç’s conflicts with the Knights of Rhodes, they headed for North Africa, a few years after Kemal had forged the way. While Kemal and Piri had been welcomed as gazis by the local inhabitants in the 1490s, by the 1510s the local rulers were uncertain how much of a threat these Rumis from the eastern Mediterranean might be to their own sovereignty. They wondered if they should welcome these sea gazis as a tool against Spanish encroachment or view them as a challenge to the politically fragmented states along the coast of North Africa at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Eventually Hayreddin gained control of Algiers, which he maintained with support from Sultan Selim in Istanbul. Thus, Hayreddin became an Ottoman governor, insecurely in control of Algiers. This might have been the extent of his Ottomanness were it not for the rivalry in the Mediterranean

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between Charles V and Süleyman. When Charles V’s admiral conquered ports that had been become Ottoman during the reign of Bayezid II, then Süleyman recruited Hayreddin to his service as admiral. Hayreddin possessed such stature that the sultan could not demand his service without giving him exalted rank and a new province was created for him. For a mere twelve years of Süleyman’s forty-six-year reign he placed an unquestioned naval expert in command of the Ottoman fleet. These were years of Ottoman naval glory characterized by expansion into the Aegean where Hayreddin conquered islands. He also defeated the combined Habsburg-Venetian fleet at the battle of Preveza. He led the Ottoman fleet to the western Mediterranean to challenge the Habsburgs by allying with France and wintering in a French port. But at Hayreddin’s death in 1546 the pattern of relying on devşirme elites returned. Although he had been subjected to their criticism and jealousy, he had nothing to fear from them and ignored their criticisms. But his client Turgud Reis was not so fortunate and preferred to serve the sultan from the safe harbor of Tripoli in North Africa. Süleyman’s son Selim II continued to favor appointing favorites to the position of admiral until the naval disaster of Lepanto, which occurred due to the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus from Venice. The Ottomans might have had difficulty in retaining this strategic conquest if their fleet had not been rebuilt enough in 1572 to discourage the Holy League fleet from attempting conquests in the eastern Mediterranean. Kılıç Ali, survivor of Lepanto, an associate of Turgud Reis, who had years of experience in naval warfare, was appointed admiral. Kılıç Ali originated from a novel background, hailing from Calabria, then learning his trade in Algiers before rising to become admiral of the sultan’s fleet in 1571. While both Kemal Reis and Hayreddin Pasha honed their seafaring skills on the North African shores of the Mediterranean, they had originated in lands with a dominant Turkish presence. Kılıç Ali revealed the possibility of a nonTurk, captive of corsairs, rising through the ranks to become admiral, if the times were desperate and he had the appropriate patronage. He succeeded in permanently adding Tunis to the Ottoman possessions in North Africa in 1574. However skilled he was at the patronage game and as a seafarer, he was not a statesman. He retained his Italian prejudices against the English, which he never overcame, and he promoted his client Uluç Hasan far beyond his merits. At his death, as the empire retreated from prioritizing naval warfare in the Mediterranean, naval talent was not employed effectively. Kılıç Ali had excelled as both a client and a patron, which allowed him to retain the position of admiral despite the threat of being replaced by a son-in-law of the sultan. One could not imagine him being included in such a select group, lacking the refinement of a palace education. He was unquestionably an Ottoman seafarer, but not due to an Ottoman education and enculturation process in the palace. Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha, derya bey of Rhodes, came to the office of admiral during another period of crisis in 1651 after Venetian blockades caused both hardship in Istanbul and impeded the war against Venice to conquer the final major Venetian possession in the eastern Mediterranean, the island of Crete. Hüsambeyzade, as his name indicates, was the son of Hüsam Bey, a talented seafarer who might have gained the position of admiral with the influence of the grand vizier except that the sultan chose his own cousin’s husband, Cigalazade, instead. Hüsam Bey originally had been recruited through the devşirme into the Janissaries before he gained naval expertise

 Conclusion 213 as a corsair and then as a captain in official Ottoman naval forces. Thus, he seems to have been a genuine Ottoman, although his ancestors were probably non-Muslim and non-Turkish. Hüsambeyzade had the advantages of learning seafaring from his father and being born into the official seafaring elite, the derya beys of the empire. However, this advantage could never outweigh the advantages of his rivals of being intimates in the palace and gaining influence, wealth, and power through these means. Thus, he faced enormous challenges as admiral, more from the elite than the Venetians. He succeeded in reinforcing troops on Crete through sailing there in the winter, a true accomplishment. He might have won the battle of Naxos if his own second-incommand had not sabotaged the battle by refusing to support the admiral with his contingent. This battle became an extreme example of conflict between naval expertise and elite influence. Despite the desperate situation of the empire, naval expertise rarely managed to overcome elite opposition. Thus, he can be viewed as one of the many admirals through whose efforts the island of Crete was finally won and added to Ottoman domains, increasing Ottoman security in the eastern Mediterranean. He was an Ottoman but struggled against elite opposition from sultans’ sons-in-law. Mezemorta Hüseyn Pasha appears to have come from a genuine North African background, although since his actual origins are unclear this is not certain. But he did rise to prominence through his exploits in Algiers and appears to have lacked any direct link to the eastern Mediterranean before he arrived there in 1690 during the Morean War. This conflict had proceeded poorly for the Ottomans, as gradually and inexorably the Venetians pushed them out of one naval base after another until the Ottomans lost the entire Mora. By the time Mezemorta arrived in the eastern Mediterranean, it was too late to change the course of the war, especially as the outcome was determined more by events in Hungary than by battles in the Mora. Mezemorta brought skill with sailing ships and this enabled him to halt any additional Venetian advances to gain bases even closer to Ottoman shores, such as their brief occupation of Chios in 1694. Thus, Mezemorta cannot be credited with adding territory to the empire, but merely with halting its disintegration. He also faced the disdain of the elite, who objected to his lack of concern for court dress, which they found so vital to displaying imperial favor. He ignored them, won naval battles, and issued regulations that reformed the navy, setting the Ottomans on the path to fighting effectively with sailing ships, the technological innovation of the period. For the six years he was admiral, the fleet fought well and prevented Ottoman naval possessions from eroding farther, although the challenge of unqualified admirals remained. He can be credited with reviving the navy sufficiently that in the next war with Venice and the final one in 1715–17, the Ottomans quickly regained the Mora in a matter of months, ending Venetian pretentions there. Despite the mystery of his background, he was one of the greatest Ottoman seafarers.

Epilogue One result of the final war with Venice and the attempt at a peace settlement between the Venetians, the Habsburgs, and the Ottomans was that a diplomat was sent from England to Istanbul to mediate between them, Edward Wortley Montagu. Although

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he was very ineffective at diplomacy, his wife wrote letters home full of fresh and enlightening observations concerning the Ottoman Empire in 1717–18. Mary Wortley Montagu wrote a letter in May 1718 describing a woman she had met who had been captured by an Ottoman admiral and then decided to marry him rather than return to her family in Spain. Which admiral this was is uncertain, but the incident provides an unusual view of Ottoman admirals at the end of this war.2 This brief mention of the family affairs of an Ottoman admiral underscores how little we actually know about most aspects of the lives of the men who served in Ottoman naval forces. Even admiral’s lives are mostly shrouded in mystery due to lack of sources. This account provides a glimpse into how one of them lived among the elite of Istanbul. I am well acquainted with a Christian woman of quality who made it her choice to live with a Turkish husband, and is a very agreeable sensible lady. Her story is so extraordinary I cannot forbear relating it, but I promise you it shall be in as few words as I can possibly express it. Coming from [Naples to Spain] . . . they were attacked by the Turkish Admiral. . . . The admiral was so much charmed with the beauty and long suffering of the fair captive that as his first compliment he gave immediate liberty to her brother and attendants, who made haste to Spain and in a few months sent the sum of £4000 sterling as a ransom for his sister. The Turk took the money, which he presented to her, and told her she was at liberty, but the lady very discreetly weighed the different treatment she was likely to find in her native country. Her Catholic relations, as the kindest thing they could do for her in her present circumstances, would certainly confine her to a nunnery for the rest of her days. Her infidel lover was very handsome, very tender, fond of her and lavished at her feet all the Turkish magnificence. She answered him very resolutely that her liberty was not so precious to her as her honour, that he could no way restore that but by marrying her. She desired him to accept the ransom as her portion and give her the satisfaction of knowing no man could boast of her favours without being her husband. The admiral was transported at this kind offer and sent back the money to her relatives. . . . He married her and never took any other wife, and (as she says herself) she never had any reason to repent the choice she made. He left her some years after one of the richest widows in Constantinople, but there is no remaining honourably a single woman, and that consideration has obliged her to marry the present Captain Pasha (ie Admiral), his successor. . . . I am willing to take her word for it that she acted wholly on principles of honour, though I think she might be reasonably touched at his generosity, which is very often found amongst the Turks of Rank.3

Whether Lady Mary is very accurate concerning Ottoman naval personnel is, of course, a valid question. But assuming some factual basis to this information, we learn that the admiral had been active as far to the west in the Mediterranean as to be able to interfere with shipping between Naples and Spain. He was also skillful enough to be able to capture the ship with its passengers intact. This indicates he possessed enough naval ability to venture far outside Ottoman home waters. The admiral was also a man of wealth since he had no need of the ransom and left his widow very wealthy in a city

 Conclusion 215 where the widows of the elite had extravagant amounts of jewelry. Then “the Christian woman of quality” married another admiral as though she was expected to remain at an equivalent rank. For Lady Mary to have been well acquainted with this woman, she must have been of a very high rank for Lady Mary emphasizes the exalted rank of the women she met during her sojourn in Istanbul. One infers that the admiral concerned was no Mezemorta who wished to wear his sailor’s uniform, but a man who easily associated with the elite and was accepted by them as one whom they were willing to consider a proper companion. Perhaps this individual was a rarely fortunate man who combined both naval expertise with ease in high society. The admiral was a wealthy man, but we do not know if that was through his state service or if his wealth had contributed to his appointment by the elite. The tale provides supporting evidence of individuals crossing the religious divide and living in the cosmopolitan city of Istanbul. Lady Mary loved learning the life histories of the elite women she visited as an elite woman herself. She depicted the wife of the admiral, not as a victim but as a rational woman who decided life in Istanbul with her loving husband, was preferable to probable isolation and disdain in Spain. Lady Mary’s delight in demolishing stereotypes remains as charming and insightful as when she penned these words 300 years ago. One of the points of this anecdote is that knowledge concerning the men of the Ottoman navy may be found in unusual places. Sources vary in their value, and those that offer a fresh perspective have great worth. Historians might find unexpected treasures in surprising sources. Nevertheless, the most valuable sources on Ottoman naval history will continue to be those produced by Ottoman authors. They should certainly be supplemented; however, they must never be ignored, for they provide a window into understanding how Ottoman rulers and their seafarers triumphed for a time to displace Byzantines and Latins to reasonably claim to rule the two lands and the two seas. The Ottomans may have imagined that their triumph was secure; however, the future brought new challengers to the eastern Mediterranean and ultimately the Ottomans struggled to retain their greatest prize, Istanbul and the Turkish Straits, before the demise of the empire.

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1071 1080–97 1090–1 1099 1204 1243 1261 1261–1310 1285 1291 1301 1306–8 1326 1329 1330s 1331 1333–4 1337 1341–7 1343–52 1344 1345 1348 1350–5 1352–7 1354 1361 1366 1376 1377–81 1387

Battle of Manzikert, Turks entered Anatolia; Seljuk Turks began to rule in Anatolia Turkish maritime beyliks established on the Aegean and Marmara coasts Çaka Bey of Izmir threatened Istanbul First Crusade, Franks conquered Jerusalem Fourth Crusade, Franks and Venetians conquered Istanbul and established Latin Empire Seljuk Turks defeated by Mongols at the Battle of Köse Dağ Istanbul regained by Byzantine emperors Foundation of the beyliks of Menteşe, Aydın, Saruhan, Karesı, and Osmanlı Byzantines dismantled their navy for financial reasons Crusaders lost Acre last possession in Palestine Battle of Bapheus, Osman defeated Byzantine army Knights Hospitaller established base on Rhodes Ottomans conquered Bursa Umur of Aydın gained control of Izmir’s port Karası Turks crossed Dardanelles into Thrace Ottomans conquered Iznik Crusade against Turkish maritime beyliks, crusaders defeated fleet of Karası Ottomans conquered Izmit Byzantine civil war at the death of Andronicus III Crusade against Turkish maritime beyliks, targeted Izmir Crusaders captured port and lower fortress in Izmir Ottomans annexed Karesı Umur of Aydın died besieging harbor fortress at Izmir War of the Straits between Genoa and Venice Byzantine civil war between John V Palaiologos and John VI Kantakouzenos Ottomans occupied Gallipoli Ottomans captured Edirne Amadeo of Savoy captured Gallipoli, given to Byzantines in 1367 Gallipoli regained by Ottomans War of Chioggia between Genoa and Venice Salonica accepted Ottoman rule

218 1389 1390 1390s 1394–1402 1396 1402 1402–13 1413 1416 1421 1425 1430 1444 1451 1452 1453 1457 1458–60 1461 1463–79 1464 1469–72 1470 1475 1480 1480 1481 1482 1481–1512 1490 1495 1499–1502 1500 1510 1511 1512 1513 1517 1518 1520

Seafarers Chronology Battle of Kosovo, Murad I killed, Bayezid I became sultan Gallipoli fortifications strengthened Ottomans annexed Saruhan, Aydın, and Menteşe Ottoman siege of Istanbul Ottomans defeated crusaders at Nicopolis Battle of Ankara, Timur defeated and captured Bayezid I Interregnum, civil war among Ottoman princes Mehmed I united Ottoman territories Venetian fleet defeated Ottoman fleet at the battle of Gallipoli Death of Mehmed I, Murad II became sultan, revolt of Mustafa, possible son of Bayezid I Murad II reannexed Aydın and Menteşe Ottoman conquest of Salonica Crusade of Varna, Murad II crossed the Bosporus with Genoese assistance Death of Murad II, Mehmed II became sultan Construction of Rumeli Hisarı Conquest of Istanbul by Mehmed II Aegean islands of Lemnos, Thasos, and Imbros surrendered to papal fleet Ottoman conquest of Mora Sinope and Trabzon conquered Ottoman and Venetian war Ottoman forts completed on the Dardanelles Mahmud Pasha served as admiral Ottoman conquest of Eğriboz Genoese colony of Kaffa annexed by Ottomans Ottoman siege of Rhodes failed Ottoman conquest of Otranto Death of Mehmed II, civil war between Bayezid II and his brother, Cem Cem Sultan sailed to Rhodes, then imprisoned and sent to France Reign of Bayezid II Kemal Reis and Piri Reis based at Bijayah Kemal and Piri recruited by Bayezid II Ottoman war with Venice Ottoman Conquest of Modon, Anavarin, and Koron Ottomans provided naval assistance to Mamluks Kemal Reis drowned Ottoman succession conflict, Selim I became sultan; Hayreddin and Oruç fled to North Africa Piri Reis completed world map Piri Reis gave world map to Selim I, conquest of Egypt Oruç killed Hayreddin placed Algiers under Ottoman suzerainty; Süleyman became sultan

 Seafarers Chronology 219 1521 1522 1526 1528 1529 1529–47 1531 1534 1535 1537 1538 1543–4 1546 1548 1548 1551 1552 1553/4 1554 1560 1562 1565 1566 1568 1570 1571 1574 1587 1588 1591 1594 1595 1598 1603 1617 1618 1622 1623–40

Piri Reis’s original version of Kitab-ı Bahriye, presented to Ibrahim Pasha Ottoman conquest of Rhodes Piri Reis’s revised version of Kitab-ı Bahriye given to Süleyman Piri Reis’s second world map completed Hayreddin conquered Penon of Algiers Piri Reis not found in Ottoman records Algiers attacked by Andrea Doria, Charles V’s admiral Hayreddin became Ottoman grand admiral, conquered Tunis Tunis conquered by Charles V Ottoman joint naval campaign with France, Ottomans failed to conquer Corfu Hayreddin victory at Preveza, Doria captured Herceg Novi; the Dizdar of Herceg Novi’s daughter married to Visconte Cicala Hayreddin led expedition to France Hayreddin died; Sokullu Mehmed appointed admiral Piri Reis as admiral of fleet at Suez, reconquered Aden Sinan Pasha, brother of the grand vizier Rüstem, appointed admiral Ottoman attack on Malta and Tripoli led by Sinan Pasha and Turgud Reis Piri Reis defeated at Hormuz Piri Reis executed at Cairo Sinan Pasha died; Piyale appointed admiral Ottoman victory at Djerba under Piyale Pasha and Turgud Reis Mihrimah Sultan, daughter of Süleyman, offered to pay for 400 ships to attack Malta Turgud killed at Malta; Piyale led forces that failed to conquer the island Süleyman died on campaign; Selim II became sultan Piyale became a vizier; Müezzinzade Ali Pasha became admiral Ottoman conquest of Cyprus Ottomans defeated at Battle of Lepanto; Kılıç Ali became admiral Ottoman conquest of Tunis, death of Selim II Death of Kılıç Ali Uluç Hasan Pasha became admiral Cigalazade Sinan became admiral Cigalazade Sinan, as admiral, led Ottoman fleet to raid Sicily and Calabria Death of Murad III Cigalazade reunited in Sicily with his mother, Lucrezia, daughter of the Dizdar of Herceg Novi Death of Mehmed III Death of Ahmed I Deposition of Mustafa I Deposition and murder of Osman II Reign of Murad IV

220 1640–8 1641 1644 1644–6 1645 1645 1648 1648–87 1650–2 1650–1 1651 1651 1656 1659 1669 1683 1684–99 1687–91 1690 1691–5 1695 1695–1703 1695–1701 1699 1701 1703–30 1714–18 1718

Seafarers Chronology Reign of Ibrahim, Valide Sultan Kösem regent for her son Siyavuş Pasha admiral, failed expedition to Azov Knights of Malta captured ship heading for Alexandria, September 28 Silahdar Yusuf Pasha admiral Ottoman Attack on Crete Ottomans conquer Hanya, which surrendered August 22 Venetian blockade of Dardanelles, deposition of Ibrahim Reign of Mehmed IV Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha admiral for the first time Melek Ahmed Pasha, grand vizier, replaced after revolt of Istanbul tradesmen Battle of Naxos, Siyavuş Pasha became grand vizier Kösem Sultan murdered, Valide Sultan Turhan’s faction in power Third Battle of the Dardanelles, worst Ottoman naval defeat since Lepanto, Mehmed Köprülü became grand vizier Turhan Sultan built fortresses on the Dardanelles Venetians forced to surrender Crete to the Ottomans Ottoman second siege of Vienna failed War with Venice resulted in the loss of the Mora Reign of Süleyman II Mezemorta appointed to command the Ottoman fleet on the Danube Reign of Ahmed II Ottoman naval victory against Venice leading to the recovery of Chios Reign of Mustafa II Mezemorta Hüseyn Pasha served as grand admiral Treaty of Karlowitz between Ottomans and Venice and their allies the Austrian Habsburgs Ottoman Naval reforms issued Reign of Ahmed III War with Venice and Austrian Habsburgs Treaty of Passarowitz

Notes Introduction 1 I refer here to the works by Svat Soucek, Ottoman Maritime Wars, 1416-1700 (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2015); Svat Soucek, Ottoman Maritime Wars 1700-1914 (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2013), and Daniel Panzac, La Marine ottomane: De l’apogée à la chute de l’Empire (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2012). Both Soucek and Panzac have written valuable contributions to Ottoman naval history, and I have benefited from their studies. 2 Halil İnalcık, “Istanbul,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs (Brill).

Chapter 1 1 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, trans. Irène Mélikoff-Sayar, Le Destan D’Umur Pacha (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1954), 52–4. This edition contains a Turkish original and a French translation. All translations from Enveri are mine from the Turkish with reference to Mélikoff ’s French translation. 2 Theoharis Stavrides, Sultan of Vezirs: The Life and Times of the Ottoman Grand Vezir Mahmud Pasha Angelović (1453-1474) (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 294–6. 3 Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 170, note 22. 4 Christopher Wright, The Gattilusio Lordships and the Aegean World 1355-1462 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 35, 36, 88. The Zaccaria family gained Foça (Phokaia) in the 1270s and Chios in 1304. They lost Chios in 1329; Foça was transferred to another Genoese family, the Cattaneo. 5 An obsolete Turkish name for a hybrid ship, Henry Kahane, Renee Kahane, and Andreas Tietze, The Lingua Franca in the Levant: Turkish Nautical Terms of Italian and Greek Origin (Istanbul: ABC Kitabevi, 1988), 171. 6 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 55. 7 Inalcik, “Rise of the Turcoman Maritime Principalities in Anatolia, Byzantium, and the Crusades,” Byzantinische Forschungen 9 (1985): 179–217, reprint The Middle East the Balkans Under the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy Society, Indiana University Turkish Studies Department, 310, Elizabeth Zachariadou, “Holy War in the Aegean during the Fourteenth Century,” in Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204, ed. Benjamin Arbel, Bernard Hamilton and David Jacoby (London: Routledge, 1989), 212. See Speros Vyronis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 115–17, 146–7, 149–51, 181, 211, 481. 8 Inalcik, “Rise of the Turcoman,” 310; Zachariadou, “Holy War in the Aegean,” 213.

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9 See Linda Darling, “Contested Territory: Ottoman Holy War in Comparative Context,” Studia Islamica 91 (2000): 133–63, for an analysis of Gaza in the context of the crusades. Rudi Lindner, “Stimulus and Justification in Early Ottoman History,” Greek Orthodox Theological Review 27 (1982): 207–24. 10 Mike Carr, Merchant Crusaders in the Aegean 1291-1352 (Woodbridge, England: Boydell Press, 2015), 20, 63–78. 11 John H. Pryor, Geography, Technology, and War: Studies in the Maritime History of the Mediterranean 649-1571 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 102–11. 12 Colin Imber, “The Legend of Osman Gazi,” in The Ottoman Emirate (1300-1389), ed. Elizabeth Zachariadou (Rethymnon: Crete University Press, 1991), 75. 13 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri; Paul Lemerle, L’émirate d’Aydin, Byzance et l’Occident; recherches sur La geste d’Umur Pacha (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957), has analyzed this epic in detail supplementing it with information found in many other sources. His work is invaluable in making use of the epic. 14 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 32; Lemerle, L’émirate d’Aydin, 9; Zachariadou, “Holy War,” 215; Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, 69–70; Inalcik, “Rise of Turcoman Maritime,” 309. 15 Ibn Battuta, The Travels of Ibn Battuta, AD 1325-1354, ed. H.A.R. Gibb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958). 16 Lemerle and Zachariadou have incorporated many of these sources in their studies. See especially Elizabeth Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade: Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and Aydin (1300-1415) (Venice: Library of the Hellenic Institute of Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Studies, 1983), and Lemerle, L’émirate d’Aydin. 17 Inalcik, “Rise of the Maritime,” critiques Lemerle’s analysis of Enveri’s epic, which tends to portray Umur as the pawn of Kantakouzenos. This is similar to Western portrayals of the Ottoman and French alliance in the sixteenth century, which depict François I as directing events, when Süleyman was clearly the ruler with the greater power and strategic vision; see Christine Isom-Verhaaren, Allies with the Infidel: The Ottoman and French Alliance in the Sixteenth Century (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011). 18 Zachariadou refers to several sources when stating that the Turks of Menteşe “made a serious attempt to conquer Rhodes.” Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 13. 19 Cengiz Orhonlu, “Kharadj,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2, section on Ottoman Empire. 20 See Chapter 2 for more on the Ottoman conquest of Gallipoli. 21 Inalcik, “Rise of the Turcoman,” 311. 22 Inalcik, “Rise of the Turcoman,” 312. 23 Angeliki E. Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins; The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II 1282-1328 (Cambridge: Harvard, 1972), 75. 24 Christine Isom-Verhaaren, “Istanbul as a Military Target,” Osmanli Istanbulu IV (Istanbul: Istanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2016), 719–31. 25 Gregoras, I, 208–9, in Laiou, Constantinople, 115. 26 Kenneth M. Setton, “The Catalans in Greece, 1311-1380,” in A History of the Crusades, vol. 3, ed. Harry W. Hazard (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1975), 168–9. 27 Lemerle, L’émirate d’Aydin, 16. Nicolas Oikonomides, “The Turks in Europe (1305-13) and the Serbs in Asia Minor (1313),” in Ottoman Emirate 1300-1389 (Heraklion: Crete University Press, 1993), 159–60; Setton, “Catalans,” 170–1; Ramon Muntaner, The Chronicle of Muntaner, trans. Lady Goodenough (London: Hakluyt society, 1920–21), vol. 2, 510–53. 28 Inalcik, “Rise of the Turcoman,” 311.

 Notes 223 29 Inalcik, “Rise of the Turcoman,” 311, Paul Wittek, Menteşe Beyliği (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999), 25–6. 30 Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 28. 31 Anthony Luttrell, “The Hospitallers at Rhodes, 1306-1421,” in A History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 283–9; Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 10, 14. 32 Ismail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Anadolu Beylikleri (Ankara: TTK, 1984), 97. He states that it was founded in 1296. 33 Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 16. Andronicus III made treaties with Saruhan and Aydın in 1329; Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 17. 34 Ibn Battuta, Travels, 449. 35 Carr, Merchant Crusaders, 73; Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 32. 36 Elizabeth Zachariadou, “Ṣarūk̲ h̲ ān,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. 37 Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 17; Ibn Battuta, Travels, 448; Wright, Gattilusio, 36–8; Foça was under Genoese control. William Miller, “The Zaccaria of Phocaea and Chios, 1275-1329,” The Journal of Hellenic Studies 31 (1911): 42–55. 38 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 39–40; Miller, “Zaccaria,” 283–98. 39 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 55; Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 16; Miller, “Zaccaria,” 291–2. 40 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 59. 41 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 56–60. 42 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 60. 43 In this case, the warriors could have come from Saruhan, Zachariadou notes that Pachymeres states an army of the Ottoman bey Orhan included men from many beyliks, Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 118. 44 Lemerle, L’émirate d’Aydin, 249. Lemerle rearranged the order of events found in Enveri. 45 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 61. Enveri states this Timur Khan was from Saruhan, but it is known that one of the beys of Karası was Timur or Demir Khan. The title khan was first used by beys in Karası. Andronicus III concluded a treaty with “Timurkhan” of Karası, Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 16. 46 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 62–3. 47 Leagues of naval powers as crusades were a new concept; see Carr, Merchant Crusaders, 64, 94–100. The Venetians had long been considering a league; Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 15, 21. 48 Ibn Battuta, Travels, 439–40. 49 Ibn Battuta, Travels, 441. 50 Ibn Battuta, Travels, 442. 51 Ibn Battuta, Travels, 444. 52 Greek designated language and religion but not political affiliation. 53 Ibn Battuta, Travels, 445–6. 54 Ibn Battuta, Travels, 446–7. 55 This tomb where Umur is also buried is still visible in Birgi, Hakkı Önkal, “Aydınoğlu Mehmed Bey Türbesi Hakkında Bazı Düşünceler,” in Aydınoğullari Tarihi (Ankara: TTK, 2013), 203–32. 56 Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 113 (Doc. 1337A), 190–4. 57 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 64. 58 Enveri rarely includes dates in his account. 59 Lemerle puts it earlier, see Lemerle, L’émirate d’Aydin, 78.

224

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60 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 66. Her family received this territory after the Fourth Crusade. 61 She had previously been married to Bartolomeo Zaccaria, who died in 1334. 62 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 66–7. 63 Lemerle, L’émirate d’Aydin, 78. 64 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 71. 65 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 72. 66 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 71. 67 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 73. 68 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 74–6. 69 Lemerle, L’émirate d’Aydin, 101; Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 32. 70 Lemerle, L’émirate d’Aydin, 98, 100. Enveri places this episode before Mehmed’s death, but Lemerle’s analysis seems sound to place it after his death, during the crusade of 1334. Carr, Merchant Crusaders, 73. 71 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 76–8. 72 Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 32–3; Carr, Merchant Crusaders, 74; Lemerle, L’émirate d’Aydin, 98. 73 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 78–81. The Venetians continued to patrol the seas; Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 34–5. 74 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 81; Lemerle, L’émirate d’Aydin, 106. 75 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 83. Hızır was also involved in the negotiations. Inalcik, “Rise of the Turcoman,” 316–17. 76 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 84–5. 77 Only Enveri records that Andronicus III gave Chios to Umur. See Lemerle, L’émirate d’Aydin, 114–15. 78 Inalcik, “Rise of the Turcoman,” 316–17. 79 Inalcik, “Rise of the Turcoman,” 318. Also, Nevra Necipoğlu, Byzantium Between the Ottomans and the Latins: Politics and Society in the Late Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 20. 80 Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 39. 81 Inalcik, “Rise of the Turcoman,” 317–18. 82 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 85–7; Lemerle, L’émirate d’Aydin 122. 83 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 88–9. 84 Naval raids were led by one bey, but gazis from many beyliks joined them; Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 118. 85 Gregoras, in Lemerle, L’émirate d’Aydin, 142. 86 Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 37, 41. 87 Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 42–3; Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 96. 88 Lemerle, L’émirate d’Aydin, 158. 89 Inalcik, “Rise of the Turcoman,” 318. 90 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 99–103. 91 Inalcik, “Rise of the Turcoman,” 318. 92 Inalcik, “Rise of the Turcoman,” 317–18. 93 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 106–8. 94 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 110. 95 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 110. 96 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 112–13; Lemerle, L’émirate d’Aydin, 181, 190. 97 Lemerle, L’émirate d’Aydin, 191; Carr, Merchant Crusaders, 105. 98 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 123–34. 99 Pryor, Geography, 166.

 Notes 225

Chapter 2 1 Oruç Beğ, Tarihi, ed. Necdet Öztürk (Istanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat, 2014), folios 15a-16a, 21–2. 2 See Chapter 1 on Umur, which utilizes the Ottoman author Enveri’s history. 3 See Chapter 4. 4 Kate Fleet, “Early Turkish Naval Activities,” Orient Moderno, 81 (2001): 129–38. 5 St. Yerasimos, “Üsküdār,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs; Jonathan Simon Christopher Riley-Smith, The Crusades: A History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 270; Douglas E. Streusand, Islamic Gunpowder Empires: Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals (Boulder: Westview Press, 2011), 36. 6 Laiou, Constantinople, 114. 7 Hélène Ahrweiler, Byzance et la Mer: La Marine de guerre la politique et les institutions maritimes de byzance aux vii-xv siècles (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966), 315, 318–20. 8 Ahrweiler, Byzance et la Mer, 167, 323–5, 380; Halil Inalcik, “Gelibolu,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs; Lemerle, L’emirat d’Aydin, Byzance et l’Occident, 69–71. 9 Inalcik, “Gelibolu.” See Muntaner, Chronicle, 460–1. See Laiou, Constantinople, 127–99. 10 Ibn Battuta, Travels, 451–2. 11 Ibn Battuta, Travels, 449. 12 Mehmed Neşri, Cihannüma ed. Necdet Öztürk (Istanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat, 2013), 66; Oruç Beğ, Tarihi, 18, Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanlı Tarihi (1285-1502), ed. Necdet Öztürk (Istanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat, 2013), 54–5. Although each of these historians writes about Kara Mürsel, they all appear to be relying on the same earlier source that is no longer extant, so they are not independent sources on Kara Mürsel. For a recent study of Aşıkpaşazade, see Lale Ozdemir, Ottoman History through the Eyes of Aşıkpaşazade (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2013). For the ulu timars, see Linda Darling, “The Development of Ottoman Governmental Institutions in the Fourteenth Century: A Reconstruction,” in Living in the Ottoman Ecumenical Community: Essays in Honour of Suraiya Faroqhi, ed. Markus Koller and Vera Costantini (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 24–5. 13 Later ships with this name were of a different design; Kahane, Kahane, and Tietze, The Lingua Franca in the Levant, 333–4. 14 Joseph Von Hammer, Histoire de l’empire ottoman (Paris: Parent-Desbarres, 1840), vol. 1, 42. 15 Karamürsel Bey Anıt Mezarı-Karamürsel – Kocaeli https​:/​/ww​​w​.kul​​turpo​​rtali​​.gov.​​tr​/ tu​​rkiye​​/koca​​eli​/g​​ezile​​cekye​​r​/kar​​amurs​​el​-be​​y​-ani​​​t​-mez​​ari​-k​​aramu​​rsel 16 Gregoras in Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1481, 21. 17 Enveri, Düsturname-i Enveri, 123–34, Lemerle, L’émirate d’Aydin, 204, 212–13. 18 Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanlı Tarihi 61–3. 19 Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, “The Emirate of Karasi and that of the Ottomans: Two Rival States,” in The Ottoman Emirate (1300-1389), ed. Elizabeth Zachariadou (Rethymnon: Crete University Press, 1993), 225–36, 235. 20 Zachariadou, “Emirate of Karasi,” 225–9. 21 Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanlı Tarihi, 63; Zachariadou, “Emirate of Karasi,” 230; Gisele Marien, “The Black Death in Early Ottoman Territories,” Masters thesis, Bilkent, MA 2009. 22 Zachariadou, “Emirate of Karasi,” 230–3. 23 Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanlı Tarihi, 65–8; Zachariadou, “Emirate of Karasi,” 234.

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Notes

24 Imber, Ottoman Empire, 23 relying on Kantakouzenos. 25 Ian Almond, Two Faiths, One Banner: When Muslims Marched with Christians across Europe’s Battlegrounds (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 123–9. 26 Kantakouzenos in Imber, Ottoman Empire, 24. 27 Nicolas Oikonomides, “From Soldiers of Fortune to Gazi Warriors: The Tzympe Affair,” 242–6, in Studies in Ottoman History in Honour of Professor V.L. Ménage, ed. C. Heywood and C. Imber (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1994), 239–47. He argues in this article that the Turks who initially were installed at Tzympe by Kantakouzenos were “soldiers of fortune” who later were led by Süleyman Pasha. 28 Oikonomides, “Soldiers,” 243–4; Imber, Ottoman Empire, 24. 29 Kantakouzenos in Nicholas Ambraseys, Earthquakes in the Mediterranean and Middle East: A Multidisciplinary Study of Seismicity up to 1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 374. I have added explanatory terms. 30 The source does not indicate how they crossed the Dardanelles. Oikonomides, “Soldiers,” 244–5. 31 Imber, Ottoman Empire, 25–6; Wright, Gattilusio, 40. 32 Imber, Ottoman Empire, 28. 33 Imber, Ottoman Empire, 28. 34 Jean Servion in Kenneth M. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571) (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1976), vol. 1, 298–9. 35 Eugene L. Cox, The Green Count of Savoy: Amadeus VI and Transalpine Savoy in the Fourteenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 208–13, 215, 218–21, 230–5. Imber, Ottoman Empire, 28–9; Wright, Gattilusio, 41; Setton, Papacy, vol. 1, 287. 36 Antoine Barbier, in Setton, Papacy, vol. 1, 299. 37 Setton, Papacy, vol. 1, 321. 38 Kydones in Imber, Ottoman Empire, 32–3. 39 Imber, Ottoman Empire, 29. 40 Fleet, “Early Turkish,” 133; Freddy Thiriet, Régestes des délibérations du Sénat de Venise concernant la Romanie (Paris: Mouton, 1958-61), vol. 1, no. 541, 135. 41 Halil Inalcik, “Murad I,” TDV Islam Ansiklopedisi. While some sources state that Biga was conquered in 1364 or 1365, Inalcik claims that these dates are incorrect and the final siege was in 1371. Inalcik is using a variety of sources, including Idris Bitlisi. 42 Inalcik, “Murad I.” 43 Inalcik, “Gelibolu.” 44 Neşri, Cihannüma, 105; Inalcik, “Gelibolu.” 45 Thiriet, Régestes, vol. 1, 184–5; Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 77; Imber, Ottoman Empire, 38. 46 Doukas, Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks: An Annotated Translation of “Historia Turco-Byzantina, trans. Harry J. Magoulias (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1975), 63 47 Mühimme Defter 5:183. 48 Doukas, Decline, 63. 49 Inalcik, “Gelibolu.” 50 Thiriet, Régestes, vol. 1, 208–10; Inalcik, “Gelibolu.” 51 He has sometimes been confused with another Saruca Pasha, who died about 1454. Idris Bostan, “Saruca Paşa,” Islam Ansiklopedesi. 52 The left wing according to Neşri or the right wing with Prince Bayezid according to Sadeddin Bostan, “Saruca Paşa.”

 Notes 227 53 Bostan, reference to Feridun Bey. 54 Mustafa Ali, Kunhu’l-ahbar, Bostan, “Saruca Paşa.” See Christine Isom-Verhaaren, “Royal French Women in the Ottoman Empire: The Political Uses of Fabricated Accounts from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-First Century,” Journal of World History 17 (2006): 159–96. 55 Bostan, “Saruca Paşa,” 168. 56 Bostan, “Saruca Paşa,” 168. 57 Imber, Ottoman Empire, 50. 58 The Chivalric Biography of Boucicaut, Jean II Le Meingre, trans. Craig Taylor and Jane H.M. Taylor (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2016), 70, note 145. 59 Imber, Ottoman Empire, 44–6, 51. 60 Boucicaut, 78–81; Bostan, “Saruca Paşa,” 168; Setton, Papacy, I, 370–1. 61 Boucicaut, 80–1. 62 Boucicaut, Introduction, 7–12. 63 Bostan, “Saruca Paşa,” 169. 64 Ahmed Ibn Arabshah, Tamerlane or Timur the Great Amir, trans. J. H. Sanders (London: Luzac Co., 1936), 116–17; Imber, Ottoman Empire, 53. 65 Imber, Ottoman Empire, 54. 66 Ibn Arabshah, Tamerlane, 184–5; Imber, Ottoman Empire, 56. 67 Imber, Ottoman Empire, 56; Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, “Süleyman çelebi in Rumili and the Ottoman chronicles,” Der Islam 60, no. 2 (1983): 268–96. 68 Zachariadou, “Süleyman,” 270. 69 Zachariadou, “Süleyman,” 271. 70 Thiriet, Régestes, vol. 2, 30, no. 1070; Imber, Ottoman Empire, 56–7. 71 Nicolae Iorga, Notes et Extraits pour server à l’histoire des Croisades au xve siècle (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1899), vol. 1, 125–6. Imber, Ottoman Empire, 57. 72 George. T. Dennis, “The Byzantine-Turkish Treaty of 1403,” Orientalia Christiana Periodica 33 (1967): 72–88. 73 Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo, Embassy to Tamerlane, 1403-1406, trans. Guy Le Strange (London: Routledge, 1928), 58–9. Compare the earlier translation by Markham: “On Saturday they were off Gallipoli, a castle and town on the Grecian side, but it is occupied by the Mussulman Ahalali, eldest surviving son of the Turk. In the said port of Gallipoli, the Turk has all his fleet of ships and galleys, forty in number; and the castle is strongly fortified, with a large garrison. Gallipoli was the first place occupied by the Turks, in the land of Greece; and it is not more than ten miles from this castle to the land of Turkey. By taking this castle the Turks have gained all the places which they occupy in Greece, and if they should lose it, they would lose all their other conquests; as they have their fleet here, and can thus quickly bring over succor form the land of Turkey, which is so near. From the entrance of the strait to Gallipoli it is very narrow, but from this place forward, the sea is a little broader. Above Gallipoli there are two castles, called Satorado and Examilli. The Turkish side appeared to consist of high hills, while the Grecian side was more level, and covered with corn fields.” Clavijo, 27–8. 74 See Dennis, “Byzantine-Turkish Treaty,” 72–5, for a discussion of dating the treaty. 75 Dennis, “Byzantine-Turkish Treaty,” 74–7. 76 Treaty, Zeno report in Dennis, “Byzantine-Turkish Treaty,” 81–2, 85–6. Also see Zachariadou, “Süleyman,” 274–83. 77 Zeno report, in Dennis, “Byzantine-Turkish Treaty,” 86. 78 Zachariadou, “Suleyman,” 294.

228

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79 Dimitris J. Kastritsis, Sons of Bayezid: Empire Building and Representation in the Ottoman Civil War of 1402-1413 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 41–2; Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanlı Tarihi, 109–14; Ibn Arabshah, Tamerlane, 186. 80 Halil Inalcik, “Mehemmed I,” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, EI2; Zachariadou, “Suleyman,” 277–9; Kastritsis, Sons of Bayezid, 55. 81 Kastritsis, Sons of Bayezid, 56. 82 Ahval in Kastritsis, Sons of Bayezid, 79, 93–5, 101; Zachariadou, “Suleyman,” 285; Imber, Ottoman Empire, 65. 83 Kastritsis, Sons of Bayezid, 114. 84 Ahval in Kastritsis, Sons of Bayezid, 113. 85 Kastritsis, Sons of Bayezid, 120. 86 Kastritsis, Sons of Bayezid, 143–4; Imber, Ottoman Empire, 67 87 Kastritsis, Sons of Bayezid, 145, Iorga, Notes, 179–80. 88 Kastritsis, Sons of Bayezid, 146. Also see Imber, Ottoman Empire, 67–8. 89 Kastritsis, Sons of Bayezid, 147. 90 Kastritsis, Sons of Bayezid, 149. 91 Thiriet, Régestes, vol. 2, 98–9; Iorga, Notes, I, 194–5; Imber, Ottoman Empire, 69; Kastritsis, Sons of Bayezid. 92 Imber, Ottoman Empire, 70. 93 Imber, Ottoman Empire, 71. 94 Imber, Ottoman Empire, 72–3. 95 Imber, Ottoman Empire, 76. 96 Thiriet, Régestes, vol. 2, 124, no. 1534, 134, no. 1573; Imber, Ottoman Empire, 77. 97 Aşıkpaşazade, Osmanlı Tarihi, 116, 122; Imber, Ottoman Empire, 77. 98 Imber, Ottoman Empire, 79. 99 Imber, Ottoman Empire, 81; Soucek, Ottoman Maritime Wars 1416-1700, 20–1; Doukas, Decline, 118–19. 100 Doukas, Decline, 118–19. 101 Imber, Ottoman Empire, 88–9. 102 Imber, Ottoman Empire, 90. 103 Doukas, Decline, 130–2. 104 Doukas, Decline, 132–6; Imber, Ottoman Empire, 91. 105 Doukas, Decline, 139–40. 106 Doukas, Decline, 144–5. 107 Doukas, Decline, 150–60; Wright, Gattilusio, 59. 108 Thiriet, Régestes, vol. 2, 215; Imber, Ottoman Empire, 94–5, 97–8. 109 Imber, Ottoman Empire, 99–100; Thiriet, Régestes, vol. 2, 218, 219–20. 110 Imber, Ottoman Empire, 101. 111 Thiriet, Régestes, vol. 2, 236–9; Imber, Ottoman Empire, 102. 112 Although both men served as governor of Gallipoli, this Saruca should not be confused with the Saruca who was killed during the interregnum, see Bostan, “Saruca Paşa,” Thiriet, Régestes, vol. 2, 245. 113 Imber, Ottoman Empire, 103, from C. N. Sathas, Documents Inédits Relatifs à l’Historie de la Grèce au Moyen Age, Vol. 1 (Paris: J. Maisonneuve, 1880), documents 117, 182–6. 114 Imber, Ottoman Empire, 104; Thiriet, Régestes, vol. 2, 248, no. 2084. 115 Imber, Ottoman Empire, 109; Thiriet, Régestes, vol. 2, 259, no. 2136. 116 Thiriet, Régestes, vol. 2, 270, no. 2181.

 Notes 229 117 De Wavrin, in Colin Imber, The Crusade of Varna, 1443-45 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2006), 99–101.

Chapter 3 1 Kritovoulos, History of Mehmed the Conqueror, trans. Charles T. Riggs (Westport: Greenwood, 1954), 142. 2 Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 142–3. 3 A. H. de Groot, “Limni,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. 4 Bülent Işın, Osmanlı Bahriyesi kronolojisi: XIV-XX yüzyıl, 1299-1922 (Ankara: Dz. K. K. Mrk D. B. Ş. K. Basımevi, 2004), EK-3. 5 See Chapter 4 Kemal Reis and Piri Reis. 6 Tursun Beg, The History of Mehmed the Conqueror, ed. and trans. Halil Inalcik and Rhoads Murphey (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1978). 7 Diether Roderich Reinsch, “Kritobulos of Imbros—Learned Historian, Ottoman Raya and Byzantine Patriot,” Zbornik Radova Vizantološkog Instituta, 40 (2003): 297–311. 8 Nicolo Barbaro, Diary of the Siege of Constantinople 1453 (New York: Exposition Press, 1969), 10; George Sphrantzes, The Fall of the Byzantine Empire: A Chronicle by George Sphrantzes 1401-1477, trans. Marios Philippides (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1980), 62; Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 15–17. 9 Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 10. 10 Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 16. 11 Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 20–2. 12 Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 24. 13 Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 29 14 Barbaro, Diary, 24. 15 Barbaro, Diary, 25. 16 Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 37. 17 See Chapter 1 on Umur of Aydın. 18 Barbaro, Diary, 12, describes the ceremony that took place on December 13, 1452, at Aya Sofya celebrating the union. See also Jonathan Harris, The End of Byzantium (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 127–54. 19 Barbaro, Diary, 12–15. 20 Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 37–9; Barbaro, Diary, 22. 21 Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 41–2. 22 Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 47–8, 50–1. 23 Barbaro, Diary, 45. 24 Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 53. 25 Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 54–5; Tursun Beg, History, 35; Barbaro, Diary, 33–5. His account provides some additional information about Hamza, although how he gained this information is questionable. Soucek, Ottoman Maritime Wars, 1416-1700, 20; Halil Inalcik, “Review of Mehmed the Conqueror (1432-1481) and His Time,” in Essays in Ottoman History (Istanbul: Eren, 1998), 91. 26 Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 56; Barbaro, Diary, 37, said the distance was 3 miles and they made the way level. Marios Philippides and Walter K. Hanak, The Siege and the Fall of

230

27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64

Notes Constantinople in 1453 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 439–40, believe that the ships were taken on a longer but less steep route. Barbaro, Diary, 38; Barbaro, Diary, 37, claims seventy-two ships. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 57–8; Barbaro, Diary, 50–1. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 64–5; Barbaro, Diary, 53, stated that the bridge was constructed but never used. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 68, 75; Philippides and Hanak, Siege, 464, using Venetian sources state that the Venetians destroyed the chain so they could escape. Barbaro, Diary, 69. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 76–7, 83. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 86–7; Wright, Gattilusio, 66–8. Wright, Gattilusio, 386–98. Doukas and Kritovoulos disagree about the exact year, 1454 or 1455, and who the admiral was for this campaign; Doukas states Hamza while Kritovoulos says Yunus. See Doukas, Decline, 245–50; Kritovoulos, Mehmed; Imber, Ottoman Empire, 164–5. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 95–8. Tursun Beg, History, 38. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 105–10; Wright, Gattilusio, 69. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 111. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 120; Wright, Gattilusio, 71. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 125–6. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 130–6. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 138–9. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 140–1. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 148. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 158–9. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 163–5. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 166–8. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 173–7; Tursun Beg, History, 46–7. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 180–5; Tursun Beg, History, 49; Wright, Gattilusio, entire book. See Chapter 5 Hayreddin. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 185–6. Isom-Verhaaren, “Istanbul as a Military Target,” 2016. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 186. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 190. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 195. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 197–8. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 204–6; Tursun Beg, History, 53. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 216–17. Imber, Ottoman Empire, 193. Stavrides, The Sultan of Vezirs, 167. Neşri, Kitab-i Cihan-nüma, ed. Faik Reşit Unat and Mehmed. A. Köymen, vol. 2 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1987), 717; Ibn Kemal, Tevârîh-i Al-i Osmân VII. Defter, ed. Serafettin Turan (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), 113. Ibn Kemal, Tevârîh, 284–5; Neşri, Cihan-nüma, 785. See Tursun Beg, Mehmed the Conqueror, 13, 128a–131a; Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 88–89. Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 152, 174, 182, 196; Tursun Beg, History, 44. The Ottoman historians Neşri and Aşıkpaşazade, as referenced by Saadeddin, refer to negotiations

 Notes 231

65

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77

78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

91 92

between Mahmud and his brother that led to Ottoman control of Smederevo; Stavrides, Sultan of Vezirs, 104. For the most complete assessment of Mahmud Pasha, see Stavrides, Sultan of Vezirs. See also Christine Isom-Verhaaren, “Constructing Ottoman Identity in the Reigns of Mehmed II and Bayezid II,” Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association 1 (2014): 111–28. Tursun Beg, History, 57; Imber, Ottoman Empire, 201 Stavrides, Sultan of Vezirs, 196. Ibn Kemal, Tevarih, 285; Stavrides, Sultan of Vezirs, 194; Imber, Ottoman Empire, 201. Tursun Beg, History, 57–8; Imber, Ottoman Empire, 201–3. Stavrides, Sultan of Vezirs, 171–2. Imber, Ottoman Empire, 207. Tursun Beg, History, 58; Imber, Ottoman Empire, 210. Tursun Beg, History, 61; Imber, Ottoman Empire, 211. Neşri, Cihannüma, 324–7; Imber, Ottoman Empire, 217. Imber, Ottoman Empire, 225–8. Imber, Ottoman Empire, 241. Imber, Ottoman Empire, 242–4; Konstantinos Giakoumis, “The Ottoman campaign to Otranto and Apulia (1480-1481),” in The Turks, ed. Hasan C. Güzel, C. Cem Oğuz and Osman Karatay (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2002), vol. 3, 192–3; Kurt Treptow, “Albania and the Ottoman Invasion of Italy, 1480-1481,” Studia Albania 27 (1990): 85–6. Imber, Ottoman Empire, 249. Caoursin, in Theresa M. Vann and Donald J. Kagay, Hospitaller Piety and Crusader Propaganda: Guillaume Caoursin’s Description of the Ottoman Siege of Rhodes, 1480 (London: Routledge, 2015), 97. Vann and Kagay, Hospitaller, 12. See also Robert Douglas Smith and Kelly DeVries, Rhodes Besieged: A New History (Stroud, Gloucestershire: The History Press, 2011) for an account of the sieges of 1480 and 1522 from a European perspective. Vann and Kagay, Hospitaller, 16–17; Norman Housley, The Later Crusades, 12741580: From Lyons to Alcazar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 103. See Isom-Verhaaren, Allies. Vann and Kagay, Hospitaller, 34–6. Christine Isom-Verhaaren, “Constructing Ottoman Identity in the Reigns of Mehmed II and Bayezid II,” Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association 1 (2014): 111–128. Imber, Ottoman Empire, 248; Tursun Beg, History, 63. Caoursin, in Vann and Kagay, Hospitaller, 109. Caoursin, in Vann and Kagay, Hospitaller, 117. Caoursin, in Vann and Kagay, Hospitaller, 121. Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, The Gift to the Great Ones on Naval Campaigns, ed. Idris Bostan (Ankara: Prime Ministry Secretariat for Maritime Affairs, 2008), 14a, 67. There are differences of opinion about this. Caoursin, 135–7, said they were promised booty, but Katib Çelebi includes this announcement. Babinger states that this changed during the attack and led to its failure, Franz Babinger, Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time, trans. Ralph Manheim (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 399. Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 14b, 67. Caoursin, in Vann and Kagay, Hospitaller, 145.

232

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93 Heath Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State (Albany: State University of New York, 2003), 116. 94 Giakoumis, “Ottoman Campaign;” Treptow, “Albania.” 95 Setton, Papacy, 2:340. 96 Setton, Papacy, 2: 343. 97 Setton, Papacy, 2:343. 98 Setton, Papacy, 2:344. Many reports exist about the size of the Ottoman fleet; they vary from 350, early report from Naples, 150, another report from Naples, 132 ships, in a letter from Naples, to 70 ships, in a report from Ragusa, but the higher numbers are probably an exaggeration. 99 Imber, Ottoman Empire, 250–1. 100 Giakoumis, “Ottoman Campaign,” 195. 101 Setton, Papacy, 2: 368, 372–3. 102 Rector of Ragusa, January 9, 1480 report to king of Naples, in Treptow, “Albania,” 88. 103 Ibn Kemal, Tevarih, 518–20; Treptow, “Albania,” 95. 104 Treptow, “Albania,” 97. 105 Treptow, “Albania,” 98. 106 Treptow, “Albania,” 103. 107 Halil Inalcik, “Aḥmad Pas̲ h̲ a Gedik,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs; Hedda Reindl-Kiel, “Ahmed Paşa, Gedik,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE, ed. Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, Everett Rowson. 108 Kritovoulos, Mehmed, 126.

Chapter 4 1 Piri Reis, Kitab-i Bahriye; Yeni Cami 790 Süleymaniye Library, folios 138b–9a; Svat Soucek, Piri Reis and Turkish Mapmaking after Columbus: The Khalili Portolan Atlas (London: Nour Foundation, 1996), 48–9. 2 The date is debated but it is plausible that this occurred in the context of the final defeat of the Muslims of Granada in Spain that impacted North Africa. 3 Reis means captain; thus, there are many Ottoman seafarers with this title. 4 Andrew C. Hess, The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century IberoAfrican Frontier (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 37–42. 5 This incident probably took place about 1490–1. Kitab-ı Bahriye, Yeni Cami 790, 138b–9a. Soucek, Piri Reis and Turkish Mapmaking after Columbus; Svat Soucek, Piri Reis and Turkish Mapmaking after Columbus (Istanbul: Boyut, 2013), are not identical and are the best secondary sources on Piri Reis and his uncle Kemal. See also Svat Soucek, “Tunisia in the Kitab-ı Bahriye by Piri Reis,” Archivum Ottomanicum 5 (1973): 129–296. 6 Isom-Verhaaren, “Constructing Ottoman Identity in the Reigns of Mehmed II and Bayezid II,” 111–28. 7 See Chapter 3. 8 About Modon and Corfu, Piri Reis, Kitab-ı Bahriye (Istanbul: Historical Research Foundation, 1988), vol. 2, 709. 9 Isom-Verhaaren, Allies, 82–113. 10 Soucek, Ottoman Maritime Wars, 1416-1700, 32.

 Notes 233 11 Soucek, Ottoman Maritime Wars, 1416-1700, 31. 12 Idris Bostan, “Kemal Reis,” Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Islam Ansiklopedisi, 226. 13 Soucek, Ottoman Maritime Wars, 33; Soucek, Piri Reis (2013), 62; Büyük Türk Denizcisi Kemal Reis (Istanbul: Piri Reis Araştırma Merkezi, 2007), 44–6; Von Hammer, Histoire de l’Empire Ottoman depuis son origine jusqu’à nos jours, vol. 4, 20–1. Von Hammer claims Kemal Reis had been a page of Bayezid earlier, but this appears to be an error. 14 Piri Reis, Kitab-ı Bahriye, 1: 54–5. The family background of Kemal and Piri is disputed but the evidence in Piri’s works points to origins in Karaman with the family migrating to Gallipoli. See Büyük Türk Denizcisi Kemal Reis and Piri Reis’in Yaşamı, Yapıtları ve Bahriyesinden Seçmeler (Istanbul: Piri Reis Araştırma Merkezi, 2007). 15 Soucek, Piri Reis (2013), 52. 16 Marino Sanuto, I Diarii, vol. 1, col. 10, Orhan Koloğlu, Türk Korsanları (Istanbul: Tarihçi Kitabevi, 2012), 29–37; Maria Pia Pedani, “Piri Reis in Venetian Documents,” Mediterranea ricerche storiche 12 (August 2015), 319. 17 Soucek, Ottoman Maritime Wars, 1416-1700, 35. 18 Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 14b–15a; The Gift to the Great Ones on Naval Campaigns, ed. Idris Bostan (Ankara: Prime Ministry Secretariat for Maritime Affairs, 2008), 67; History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks, trans. James Mitchell (London: Oriental Translation Fund, 1831), 20. 19 Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 15b; Bostan, Gift, 68; Mitchell, History, 20. 20 Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 18a; Bostan, Gift, 68; Mitchell, History, 20–1. 21 Piri Reis, Kitab-ı Bahriye, vol. 2, 665. 22 Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 18b; Bostan, Gift, 68; Mitchell, History, 21; Soucek, Ottoman Maritime Wars, 36. 23 Oruç Beğ, Tarihi, 166. 24 Soucek, Ottoman Maritime Wars, 36; Kenneth M. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1978–85), vol. 2, 519. 25 Piri Reis, Kitab-ı Bahriye, 165b, 709. 26 Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 18b–19b; Bostan, Gift, 69; Mitchell, History, 22–3. 27 Piri Reis, Kitab-ı Bahriye, 153b, 661; Soucek, Piri Reis (2013), 58. I have followed Soucek’s interpretation of this quote. 28 Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 19b–20a; Bostan, Gift, 69, 74; Mitchell, History, 23; Soucek, Ottoman Maritime Wars, 37; Setton, Papacy, vol. 2, 538 n 134; Isom-Verhaaren, Allies, 29. 29 Setton, Papacy, vol. 2, 519; Joachim du Bellay, Les Regrets, no. cxxxiii. 30 Mustafa Ali, Kunh al-akhbar, in Soucek, Piri Reis (2013), 56. 31 Ibn Iyas, in Soucek, Piri Reis (2013), 56. 32 Svat Soucek, “Selmān Reʾīs,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. 33 Piri Reis, first version of Kitab-ı Bahriye, Soucek, Piri Reis (2013), 57. 34 Piri Reis, Kitab-ı Bahriye, 336a–6b, vol. 4, 1426–9. 35 Peter Mario Luciano Sebastian, “Turkish Prosopography in the Diarii of Marino Sanuto 1496-1517/902-923,” PhD diss., University of London, 1988. Ibn Iyas; Palmira Brummett, Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 69, 114. 36 See Chapter 1.

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37 “solum Camalli governa”; see Marino Sanuto, I diarii di Marino Sanuto (Venice: F. Visentini, 1879–1903), vol. 2, column 1128, August 1499. 38 Sanuto, Diarii, VI, 519, 554, VII, 52. See Christine Isom-Verhaaren, “Was there Room in Rum for Corsairs?: Who Was an Ottoman in the Naval Forces of the Ottoman Empire in the 15th and 16th Centuries?” Journal of Ottoman Studies 14 (2014): 235–64. for a discussion of the jealousy of the devşirme administrators. 39 See Christine Isom-Verhaaren, “An Ottoman Report about Martin Luther and the Emperor: New Evidence of the Ottoman Interest in the Protestant Challenge to the Power of Charles V,” Turcica, 28 (1996): 299–318, for the dangers of relying on spy reports as evidence. 40 Ibn Iyas, vol. 4, 202–3, in Soucek, Ottoman Maritime Wars, 42. 41 Piri Reis, Kitab-ı Bahriye, vol. 1, 9a, 67. 42 Piri Reis, Kitab-ı Bahriye, 1: 9a, 66–7. 43 See Chapter 5 for details on his career. 44 Piri Reis, 1513 map, in Soucek, Piri Reis (2013), 75. 45 Soucek, Piri Reis (1996), 49–79. 46 Piri Reis, Kitab-ı Bahriye, 3a, 43. 47 Piri Reis, Kitab-ı Bahriye, 355b–358a, 1503–9. 48 Piri Reis, Kitab-ı Bahriye, vol. 2, 487, 109b; Kumburnu means sand point. 49 Piri Reis, Kitab-ı Bahriye, Deniz Müzesi 990 193a–4a in Piri Reis’in Yaşamı, Yapıtları ve Bahriyesinden Seçmeler, 159. 50 Soucek, Piri Reis (2013), 109; Piri Reis, Kitab-ı Bahriye, vol. 2, 110a, 489. 51 Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 21b–22b; Bostan, Gift, 73; Mitchell, History, 25–6. 52 Soucek, Ottoman Maritime Wars, 48; Christine Isom-Verhaaren, “Tracing the Life of Hüsam Bey: Career Paths in the Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Navy,” in Ottoman War and Peace: Studies in Honor of Virginia H. Aksan, ed. Frank Castiglione, Ethan L. Menchinger, and Veysel Simsek (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 308–9. 53 Piri Reis, Kitab-ı Bahriye, 4215a–28a. 54 Piri Reis, Kitab-ı Bahriye, 4215a–428a. See Soucek, Piri Reis (1996) 89, (2013), 108. 55 Soucek, Piri Reis (2013), 96–9. 56 Brummet, Ottoman Seapower, 117. 57 He does appear in Venetian documents, Maria Pia Pedani, “Piri Reis in Venetian Documents,” 319–24. 58 Sanuto, Diarii, vol. 57, column 19. 59 Sanuto, Diarii, vol. 58, col. 548, 552–3. 60 Setton, Papacy, vol. 3, 409–10. 61 Pedani, “Piri Reis,” 323. 62 Soucek, Piri Reis (1996), 102–3. 63 Piri Reis, Kitab-ı Bahriye, 425a, 427b, 1775, 1785.

Chapter 5 1 Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Pasha, Bibliothèque Nationale, Manuscript, Supplement Turc 1186, folios 7b–11a. 2 This misrepresentation continues today. For example, see Molly Greene, The Edinburgh History of the Greeks, 1453 to 1768: The Ottoman Empire (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 63, where she states, “When we consider the fact

 Notes 235

3

4 5 6

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

22 23 24 25

that Hayreddin was himself a Greek convert to Islam,” a claim that is not supported by any evidence originating with Hayreddin himself. He claims a Turkish identity for his father and all the sons of this mixed marriage were given Muslim names, such as Oruç, Hızır, Ilyas, and Ishak. See Isom-Verhaaren, Allies; Christine Isom-Verhaaren, and Kent F. Schull, Living in the Ottoman Realm: Empire and Identity, 13th to 20th Centuries (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 5–6, Isom-Verhaaren, “Shifting Identities: Foreign States Servants in France and the Ottoman Empire,” Journal of Early Modern History, 8 (2004): 109–34. Hayreddin with the help of Muradi produced a gazavat-name, which recorded his activities as a participant in gaza. Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa, Topkapı Revan 1291. Katib Çelebi summarized this account in his Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Library, Revan No. 1192, folio 23a. This has been edited by Idris Bostan and published in facsimile with an English translation. Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar. See Chapter 4 on Kemal Reis and Piri Reis for the beginning of Ottoman expeditions to the shores of North Africa. Isom-Verhaaren, Allies. Nabil al Takriti, “Hall Ishkal al-afkar: An Ottoman Royal’s Shari’a Argument for Imperial Control over Sea Ghazi Plunder,” 127–44, in La Frontière Méditerranéenne du XVe au XVIIe Siècle: Échanges, circulations et affrontements (Turnhout, Belgium: Prepols, 2013). Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 23a–25a, 74–6. Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 26b, 77. Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 28b, 78. Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 24b, 75. Katib Celebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 30b, 79–80. Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 34b, 82. Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 35a–36b, 83–4. Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 36b, 84. Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 37a–38b, 84–5; See Isom-Verhaaren, Allies, 180–5. Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 39a–40a, 86. See Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 41a, 87, also see Piri Reis, Kitab-i Bahriye, 165b, 709. Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 42b–44a, 88. John Francis Guilmartin, Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the 16th Century (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 56. Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 45a–46b, 90. Richard Knolles, The Generall Historie of the Turkes, from The First Beginning of that Nation to the Rising of the Othoman Familie: With All the Notable Expeditions of the Christian Princes against them (London: Adam Islip, 1603), 688, Guilmartin, Gunpowder, 53. Guilmartin, Gunpowder, 42–56. Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 44b–45a, 90. For a full account of this expedition, see Isom-Verhaaren, Allies, 114–79. BN MS Turk, 1186, see Allies for an English translation of one order (hüküm) sent from Süleyman to Hayreddin, 186–9.

236

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26 Gilles Veinstein, “La Derniere Flotte de Barberousse,” in The Kapudan Pasha, His Office and His Domain, ed. Elizabeth Zachariadou (Rethymnon: Crete University Press, 2002), 181–200. 27 Phillipe du Fresne-Canaye, Le Voyage du Levant, trans. M.H. Hauser (Paris: E. Leroux, 1897), 139–40. 28 Lutfi Pasha, Tevarih-i Al-i Osman, 356; translation by Rhodes Murphey, “Seyyid Muradi’s Prose Biography of Hizir ibn Yakub, Alias Hayreddin Barbarossa,” Acta Orientalia Academiae Sceintarium Hungarian 54 (2001): 520. 29 Christine Isom-Verhaaren, “Süleyman and Mihrimah: The Favorite’s Daughter,” Journal of Persianate Societies 4:1 (2011): 64–85; and Isom-Verhaaren, “Mihrimah Sultan: A Princess Constructs Ottoman Dynastic Identity,” in Living in the Ottoman Realm (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 150–65; Leslie P. Peirce, The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 58–9. 30 Peirce, The Imperial Harem, 80–1; Gülru Necipoğlu, The Age of Sinan: Architectural Culture in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 191–207. 31 Idris Bostan, “The Establishment of the Province of Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid,” in The Kapudan Pasha: His Office and His Domain (Rethymnon: Crete University Press, 2002), 250. 32 Bernardo Navagero in Eugenio Alberi, Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato (Series 3, vol. I) (Florence: Società editrice fiorentina, 1840), 70–1, 78–9. Navagero remarks on the issue of relations between Sinan and Dragut (Turgud) in his report, 142. This translation is from Necipoğlu, The Age of Sinan, 418. 33 Leslie Peirce, “The Family as Faction: Dynastic Politics in the Reign of Süleyman,” in Soliman le magnifique et son temps, ed. G. Veinstein (Paris: Documentation française, 1992), 114. 34 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetu’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar 57a, 98. 35 Colin Imber, “The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificent,” Archivum Ottomanicum 6 (1980): 211–82, 226; Ibrahim Peçevi, Tarih-i Peçevi (Istanbul: Matabaa-i Amire, 1866–67), I, 347; Mehmet Hemdemi Solakzade, Tarih-i Solakzade (Istanbul: Mahmut Bey Matbaasi, 1298 [1880 or 1881]), 540. 36 Svat Soucek, “Torghud Re’is,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. 37 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar 57a–58a, 98–9. 38 Mihrimah, c. 1558–61, Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi, E. 5859. See M. Çağatay Uluçay, Haremden Mektuplar (Istanbul: Vakit Matbassi, 1956), 90–3, and M. Çağatay Uluçay, Osmanlı Sultanlarına Aşk Mektupları (Istanbul: Saka Matbaası, 1950), 45–7, for a partial transcription of this letter. For a longer excerpt from this letter see IsomVerhaaren, “Süleyman and Mihrimah,” 64–85; and Isom-Verhaaren, “Mihrimah Sultan: A Princess Constructs Ottoman Dynastic Identity,” 150–65. 39 Necipoğlu, Age of Sinan, 297, Necipoğlu makes frequent use of European traveler’s reports who often provide information that is absent from Ottoman sources. While traveler’s reports must be used with caution as their ability to know some information is questionable, they help fill gaps left by Ottoman sources. For an analysis of French traveler’s reports to the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Süleyman, see IsomVerhaaren, Allies, 2011. The Fugger correspondent Hans Dernschwam traveled to the Ottoman Empire on business between 1553 and 1555. Another source Necipoğlu uses frequently is Viaje de Turquia, a Spanish source written in the 1550s. This is a

 Notes 237 problematic source as modern scholars who have studied it attribute it to various authors, Cristobal de Villalon, Andres Laguna, or Juan de Ulloa Pereira, and believe it to be a fictional dialogue not the record of actual experiences of a Spanish slave physician. See Stephane Yerasimos, Les Voyageurs dans l’empire ottoman (XIVe-XVIe siecles): Bibliographie, itinéraries et inventaire des lieux habités (Ankara: Société Turque d’histoire, 1991), 226–7, 230–3; T. R. Hart, “Renaissance Dialogue and Narrative Fiction: The Viaje de Turquia,” Modern Language Review 95:1 (2000): 107–13; J.J. Kincaid, Cristóbal de Villalon (New York: Twayne, 1973), 58–112. Nevertheless, it contains specific information that describes relations between Rüstem, Mihrimah, and Rüstem’s brother, the admiral Sinan, which seem to have some basis in actual observations. Ogier Ghislain de Busbecq, Turkish Letters, trans. Edward Seymour Foster (London: Sickle Moon Books, 2001), 98–100, mentions encountering a Spanish-speaking female friend of Mihrimah. Thus, the author may have had contacts who provided some of the details he claimed to have observed while working for Sinan. 40 Necipoğlu, Age of Sinan, 418–19. 41 Necipoğlu, Age of Sinan, 416–21. 42 Peirce, Imperial Harem, 68–9; Hammer, Histoire de l’Empire Ottoman depuis son origine jusqu’à nos jours 6:154. Hammer refers to Venetian ambassador reports for his evidence. 43 Busbecq, Turkish Letters, 115–16. 44 Fresne-Canaye, Voyage, 139–40. 45 Marcantonio Donini in Alberi, Relazioni, Series 3, vol. 3: 188–9. 46 Arnold Cassola, The 1565 Ottoman Malta Campaign Register (Malta: Publishers Enterprises Group, 1998), 67. 47 Mühimme Defter 6, 562, see Cassola, 1565 Ottoman, 96. 48 Cassola, 1565 Ottoman, 65, 112–14. 49 Guilmartin, Gunpowder, 187–91. 50 MD 6 1423. See Cassola, 1565 Ottoman, 101. 51 Cassola, 1565 Ottoman, 104. 52 Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 303; Imber, “Navy,” 251–3; Cassola, 1565 Ottoman, 67. 53 Cassola, 1565 Ottoman, 175, Kamil Kepeci Divan-ı Hümayun Tahvil Kalemi Genel Sayı 7501 Özel Sayı 358. 54 Cassola, 1565 Ottoman, 185, Kamil Kepeci. 55 Cassola, 1565 Ottoman, 201, Kamil Kepeci. 56 Cassola, 1565 Ottoman, 261, Kamil Kepeci. 57 Cassola, 1565 Ottoman, 267, Kamil Kepeci. 58 Cassola, 1565 Ottoman, 271, Kamil Kepeci. 59 Cassola, 1565 Ottoman, 273, Kamil Kepeci. This captain was well compensated. Rasul Reis, who also captured a frigate, earned eight akçe and got a raise to ten. A hassa surgeon made eight akçe and he got a raise to ten, 275. 60 Cassola, 1565 Ottoman, 275, Kamil Kepeci. 61 Cassola, 1565 Ottoman, 305, Kamil Kepeci. 62 Guilmartin, Gunpowder, 234; Rifa’at Abou-El-Haj, Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries (Albany, New York: SUNY, 1991). 63 Guilmartin, Gunpowder, 223. 64 Von Hammer, Histoire, 6: 429; Niccolo Capponi, Victory of the West: The Great Christian-Muslim Clash at the Battle of Lepanto (Cambridge, MA: DaCapo, 2007),

238

65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73

Notes

289, gives a figure of at least 35,000 dead, captured, or missing. Sources on Lepanto often provide figures for the number of ships but not for the total number of men. See R. C. Anderson, Naval Wars in the Levant, 1559-1853 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952). I calculated that Kılıç Ali saved 2,400 men, since he saved twelve galleys. Some men may have escaped on shore. Cassola, 1565 Ottoman, 379 Kamil Kepeci and Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar 307, 76b–77a. Demetrie Cantemir, The History of the Growth and Decay of the Othman Empire (London: J.J. and P. Knapton, 1734), 223–4. Cantemir was an Ottoman vassal until he betrayed them to the Russians in 1711. Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 75b, 111. Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 76b–77a, 112. Mühimme Defter, 18, see Imber, “The Reconstruction of the Ottoman Fleet after the Battle of Lepanto,” in Studies in Ottoman History and Law, ed. Colin Imber, 85–101 (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1996), 97. Imber, “Lepanto,” 98, Mühimme Defter 18. Imber, “Lepanto,” 98, Mühimme 16. See Isom-Verhaaren, “Tracing the Life of Hüsam,” 291–314. Alberi, 3: 189; Alberi, 2:159; for more on the Venetian assessment of Piyale Pasha in 1576, see Alberi, 2: 157.

Chapter 6 1 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 112a–112b. 2 Uluç has the meaning of foreign origin; see Tobias Graf, The Sultan’s Renegades: Christian-European Converts to Islam and the Making of the Ottoman Elite 1575-1610 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 130. 3 A French translation exists, Diego de Haedo, Histoire des Rois d’Alger, trans. H.-D. de Grammont (Algiers: Adolphe Jourdan, 1881). On this source see María Antonia Garcés, Cervantes in Algiers: A Captive’s Tale (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002), 33–4. 4 Guilmartin, Gunpowder, 221–6. 5 Joel Shinder, “Ottoman Bureaucracy in the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century: The Central and Naval Administrations,” dissertation, Princeton University, 1971. 6 Joshua M. White, Piracy and Law in the Ottoman Mediterranean (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017); Daniel Hershenzon, The Captive Sea: Slavery, Communication and Commerce in Early Modern Spain and the Mediterranean (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), 33. 7 Haedo, Histoire des Rois d’Alger, translation of Epitome de los reyes de Argel part of Topographia, e historia general de Argel. On this source see Garcés, Cervantes, 34. 8 Haedo, Topographia e historia general de Argel, in Henry and Renee Kahane, Lingua Franca in the Levant, 232. 9 Kâtib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 55a, 97. 10 Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 60a–60b, 100, 340; Guilmartin, Gunpowder, 128. 11 Haedo, Histoire des Rois d’Alger, 137; Guilmartin, Gunpowder, 129; Katib Çelebi, Tufetu’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar 60a, 100–102.

 Notes 239 12 Haedo, Histoire des Rois d’Alger, 138. 13 cor​sari​delm​edit​erraneo​.it​/oc​chiali, website, based on Salvatore Bono, Corsari nel Mediterraneo: cristiani e musulmani fra guerra, schiavitu e commercio (Milan: A. Mondadori 1993). 14 Haedo, Histoire des Rois d’Alger, 138. 15 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 74b, 110–11. 16 Haedo, Histoire des Rois d’Alger, 139–47; Capponi, Victory of the West, 283. 17 Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 78b–79a, 113–14. 18 Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 79a–79b, 114. 19 Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar 79b–80a, 114–15. 20 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, trans. Sian Reynolds, 2 vols. (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), 2: 1154. 21 Susan A. Skilliter, “The Hispano-Ottoman Armistice of 1581,” 494 in Iran and Islam: A Volume in Memory of Vladimir Minorsky, ed. C. E. Bosworth (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1971), 494. 22 Braudel, Mediterranean, 1155. 23 Braudel, Mediterranean, 1160; Necipoğlu, Age of Sinan, 429. 24 Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar 80a, 114–15. 25 Chantal de la Véronne, “Saʿdids,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. P. Heinrichs. 26 Housley, The Later Crusades from Lyons to Alcazar 1274-1580, 144–5. 27 We return to Ismail’s fate at the end of the chapter. Antonio Fabris, “Hasan “Il Veneziano” tra Algeri e Costantinopoli,” Quaderni di Studi Arabi (1997): 51–66, 54–5. 28 Arthur Leon Horniker, “William Harborne and the Beginning of Anglo-Turkish Diplomatic and Commercial Relations,” Journal of Modern History 14 (1942): 289–316. 29 Skilliter, “Hispano-Ottoman,” 503. 30 William Harborne, Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth, 1586–8, 508–9. 31 Colin Martin and Geoffrey Parker, The Spanish Armada (London: Hamilton, 1988), 120. 32 Edwin Pears, “The Spanish Armada and the Ottoman Porte,” English Historical Review 8 (1893): 439–66, 455. 33 E. Charrière, Négociations de la France dans le Levant, 4 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Imperiale, 1848–60), 3: 885. 34 Lorenzo Bernardo, September 30, 1586, Istanbul, in Calendar of State Papers, Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice, Volume 8: 1581–1591 (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1894), 201–9. 35 Lorenzo Bernardo, Venetian Ambassador in Istanbul to the Doge and Senate, February 18, 1586, Istanbul, Calendar of State Papers, Venice 8: #318. 36 Giovanni Gritti, Venetian Ambassador in Rome, to the Doge and Senate, June 14, 1586, Calendar of State Papers, Venice 8: #365. 37 Hieronimo Lippomano, Venetian Ambassador in Spain, to the Doge and Senate, Madrid, August 24, 1586, #402, Calendar of State Papers, Venice, 8:186–201. 38 Necipoğlu, Age of Sinan, 429. 39 Lorenzo Bernardo, Venetian Ambassador at Istanbul, to the Doge and Senate, June 23, 1586, Calendar of State Papers, Venice, 8: #368. 40 Horniker, William Harborne, 312. 41 He is also sometimes referred to by modern historians as Venedikli Hasan, but he does not have that nickname in the Ottoman sources; Graf, Sultan’s Renegades, 1.

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42 Kâtib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 80a, 114. 43 Fabris, “Hasan,” 51–66; Eric Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2008); Braudel, Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, 2: 1189–93; Garcés, Cervantes, 44–60. A recent work by Graf, The Sultan’s Renegades, is an exception. 44 Selaniki Mustafa Efendi, Tarih-i Selaniki, ed. Mehmet İpşirli (Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1989), 1: 172. However, homosexuality was not a defining aspect of their sexual life; see Walter Andrews and Mehmet Kalpaklı, The Age of Beloveds: Love and the Beloved in Early-Modern Ottoman and European Culture and Society (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 143. 45 Selaniki, Tarih-i Selaniki, 1: 186. 46 Garcés, Cervantes, 51, 54. 47 Haedo, Histoire des Rois d’Alger, 168. 48 Miguel de Cervantes, Don Quixote, trans. Walter Starkie (New York: Signet, 1957), 403. The original Spanish word “garzone” indicates the relationship. 49 Fabris, “Hasan,” 55–6. 50 Haedo, Histoire des Rois d’Alger, 190. 51 Haedo, Histoire des Rois d’Alger, 170–2. 52 Haedo, Histoire des Rois d’Alger, 168–81. 53 Lorenzo Bernardo, January 8, 1586, Calendar of State Papers, Venice (No. 303), 8: 128–36. 54 Selaniki, Tarih-i Selaniki, 1:172. 55 Garcés, Cervantes, 106–15. 56 Lorenzo Bernardo, Venetian Ambassador in Istanbul, to the Doge and Senate, July 24, 1587, no. 558, Calendar of State Papers, Venice, 8: 290–302, Lorenzo Bernardo and Giovanni Moro, Venetian Ambassadors in Istanbul, November 11, 1587, no. 598, Calendar of State Papers, Venice, 318–27. 57 Fabris, “Hasan,” 58–9. 58 Fabris, “Hasan,” 59. 59 Pal Fodor, “Between Two Continental Wars: The Ottoman Naval Preparations in 1590-1592,” in Armağan: Festschrift für Andreas Tietze, ed. Ingeborg Baldauf, Suraiya Faroqhi (Prague: Enigma Corp., 1994), 97–8, TSMK, Revan 1943, 3b, 39b. 60 Braudel, Mediterranean, 2:1190–1. 61 Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 80a; Fodor, “Between Two,” 96. 62 Calendar of State Papers Foreign: Elizabeth, July 1589. 63 Fabris, “Hasan,” 60. 64 Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople, 124–5. 65 Relazione di Giovanni Moro, Alberi 3:3, 360; Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople, 228. 66 Selaniki Tarih-i Selaniki, 1: 246; Fabris, “Hasan,” 63–6. 67 Selaniki, Tarih-i Selaniki, 1: 246. Another candidate was the bey of Rhodes, Hüsam Bey, see Christine Isom-Verhaaren, “Tracing the Life of Hüsam: Career Paths in the Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Navy,” 291–314. 68 Fodor, “Between Two,” 94. Quoting TSMK, Revan 1943, 2b, Sinan Pasha, Koca, Koca Sinan Paşa’nin Telhisleri, ed. Halil Sahillioglu (Istanbul: Islam Tarih, Sanat ve Kültür Araştırma Merkezi—IRCICA, 2004), 2. 69 After viewing both the fifteenth-century fortress and the sixteenth-century fortress at Herceg Novi, it appears that the dizdar realized he could not defend the original

 Notes 241

70 71 72 73 74 75 76

77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96

fortress and made an agreement with the commanders of the fleet that preserved the safety of his daughter. Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 46b, 91. Isom-Verhaaren, Allies, 239, n. 22; Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 97, 55b. Calendar of State Papers, Venice, 5:441–6, note 2. Federico Badoer, Venetian Ambassador at Ghent, to the Doge and Senate, November 8, 1556, Calendar of State Papers, Venice, 6: no. 696, 763–82. Gino Benzoni, “Cicala, Visconte,” in Dizionario biografiico degli italiani, ed. A.M. Ghisalberti and M. Pavan (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1960), 344. Intelligences from Italy, 1 November 1561, CSP, Foreign, Elizabeth, 4:643, 387. Gino Benzoni, “Scipione Cicala,” in Dizionario biografiico degli italiani, ed. A.M. Ghisalberti and M. Pavan, 320–40 (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1960); Graf, Sultan’s Renegades, 123; Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 80a, 115; Levant Kaya Ocakaçan, “Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha (c. 1545-1606),” Mediterranea—ricerche storiche 12 (2015): 325–40. Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 57a, 98. Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 91. Maria Pia Pedani, “Safiye’s Household and Venetian Diplomacy,” Turcica 32 (2000): 14; Ocakaçan, “Cigalazade,” 328–30; Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople, 120, 122–3. Selaniki Tarih-i Selaniki 1:246; Alberi, 3:3, 428 Relazione di Matteo Zane; Benzoni, “Scipione,” 323; Pedani, “Safiye,” 28. Fodor, “Between Two,” 89–111, 97, using TKS Revan 1943 2a–2b. Fodor, “Between Two,” 101, ft. 39, MD 67. Fodor, “Between Two,” 105. Fodor, “Between Two,” 110. Marco Venier, Venetian Ambassador in Istanbul, to the Doge and Senate, May 3, 1594, no. 273, Calendar of State Papers, Venice, 9: #273. Marco Venier, Venetian Ambassador in Istanbul, to the Doge and Senate, May 3, 1594, no. 273, Calendar of State Papers, Venice, #273. Anderson, Naval Wars of the Levant, 63. Benzoni, “Scipione.” Pedani, “Safiye,” 30; Benzoni, “Scipione,” 329–30; Peirce, Imperial Harem, 240; Hammer, Histoire, 7: 171–3. Benzoni, “Scipione,” 330. Benzoni, “Cicala, Scipione;” Graf, Sultan’s Renegades, 165. Graf, Sultan’s Renegades, 201; Benzoni, “Scipione,” 330. Girolamo Capello, Venetian Ambassador in Istanbul, to the Doge and Senate, February 22, 1599 [1600], no. 856, Calendar of State Papers, Venice 9: 856. Benzoni, “Scipione.” Noel Malcolm, “The Crescent and the City of the Sun: Islam and the Renaissance Utopia of Tommaso Campanella,” Proceedings of the British Academy 125 (2003): 45–9. Benzoni, “Scipione.” V. J. Parry, “Čig̲ h̲ āla-Zāde (d̲ j̲ ig̲ h̲ āla-zāde) Yūsuf Sinān Pās̲ h̲ ā,” in: Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. P. Heinrichs. Confidential Report of an Agent on Board the Kapudan Pasha’s fleet, Sailed on July 5 [1601], no. 1038, Calendar of State

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97 98 99 100

101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108

Notes Papers, Venice, 9: #1038, Maffio Michiel, Governor in Zante, to the Doge and Senate, 6 November 1603, no. 152, CSP Venice 10: #152. Güneş Işıksel, “Hacı Murad (Agi Morato): An Elusive Dignitary Active in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century,” The Journal of Ottoman Studies 47 (2016): 249–63. Setton, Papacy 4: 838, Charriere, Négociations II: 763, 774, Braudel, 2: 1024–5; Skilliter, “Catherine de’Medici’s Turkish Ladies-in-Waiting: A Dilemma in FrancoOttoman Diplomatic Relations,” Turcica 7 (1975): 188–204, especially 198. Haedo, Histoire des Rois d’Alger, 42–3. Güneş Işiksel, “Ottoman Suzerainty over Morocco during Abdulmelik’s Reign (15761578): A reassessment,” in New Trends in Ottoman Studies: Papers presented at the 20th CIEPO Symposium, ed. Marinos Sariyannis et al. (Rethymno: University of Crete, 2014), 568–77. Garcés, Cervantes in Algiers, 92. Isiksel, “Ottoman,” 5. Garcés, Cervantes in Algiers, 51–2. Garcés, Cervantes in Algiers, 209–11, 293; Pedani, “Safiye,” 30. Haedo, Histoire des Rois d’Alger; Cervantes, Don Quixote. Katib Çelebi, Tufetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bi har, 80a. Mafio Michiel, Governor in Zante, to the Doge and Senate, November 25, 1604, no. 297, Calendar of State Papers, Venice, 10, #297. Chantal de la Veronne, “Sa’dids.”

Chapter 7 1 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Revan 1192, 99b–100a. Katib Çelebi, The Gift to the Great Ones on Naval Campaigns, 129. 2 Svat Soucek, Preface, History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks, trans. James Mitchell, expanded, edited, and annotated by Svat Soucek (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 2012), 1–5. 3 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 19–35. 4 Mustafa Naima, Tarih-i Naima, ed. Mehmet İpşirli (Ankara: TTK, 2007), vol. 3. 5 The Dutch Revolt began in 1568 and the rebellion spread until by the 1580s it became a higher priority of Philip II than conflict with the Ottomans. 6 Daniel Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 192–4. 7 Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1923 (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 173–88. 8 Daniel Panzac, La Marine ottomane: de l’apogée à la chute de l’Empire (1572-1923) (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2009), 58. 9 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 139. 10 Baki Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), provides substantial information about Ali Pasha in connection with Mustafa’s deposition, 110. 11 Tezcan, Second Ottoman Empire, 110. 12 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 84b–85a, 118. 13 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 113b.

 Notes 243 14 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 85b, 118. 15 Tezcan, Second Ottoman Empire, 110–11. 16 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 84b, 118; Tezcan, Second Ottoman Empire, 112. 17 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 114b, 140. 18 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 114b, 140. 19 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 91b. 20 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 114b, 140. 21 Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). 22 Tezcan, Second Ottoman Empire, 1. 23 See Tezcan, Second Ottoman Empire, for an extended analysis of the Janissaries in the seventeenth century, 191–226. 24 Tezcan, Second Ottoman Empire, 10. 25 Fodor, “Between Two,” 89–111. quoting from TSMK, Revan 1943, 3a. Fodor uses this source extensively in this article. This has been published as Koca Sinan Paşa, Koca Sinan Paşa’nin Telhisleri. 26 Despite the grand vizier’s claims in 1589 in fact land campaigns also required elaborate preparations; see Rhoads Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700 (London: Routledge, 1999). 27 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 92a, 123. 28 For the siege of Kandiye, see Kenneth M. Setton, Venice, Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1991) for the western European perspective on events. 29 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 92b–93a, 124. 30 Panzac, Marine ottomane, 144; Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 226; Osmanlı Bahriyesi Kronolojisi, Ek 3–8, 31 Anderson, Naval Wars, 121. 32 Anderson, Naval Wars, 122–3. 33 Anderson, Naval Wars, 124–5. 34 Joseph Freiherr von Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de l’Empire ottoman, depuis son origine jusqu’à nos jours (Paris: Bellizard, Barthès, Dufour Lowell, 1835–43), 18 v. trans. Hellert, vol. 10, 58–9; compare Setton, Venice, 130. According to Alderson, this marriage took place when Fatma was very young. A. D. Alderson, The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty (Westport, CT, 1982), lists her date of birth as 1642; certainly it could not have been before Ibrahim came to the throne in 1640 as princes in the harem were not allowed to have children before they became sultan. Alderson does not record any children from Fatma’s marriage to Yusuf, which was probably not an actual marriage between a very young princess and a mature official. Von Hammer’s account is obviously highly embellished. 35 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 114b–115a, 140. 36 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 94b–95a, 125–6. 37 Panzac, Marine ottomane, 145. 38 Panzac, Marine ottomane, 154. 39 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 96a–96b, 126–7. 40 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 96a–96b, 126–7; Anderson, Naval Wars, 125–7. 41 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 127; Setton, Venice, 141. Mehmed Sultanzade traced his genealogy to Mihrimah through his father and his mother. Mihrimah’s male descendants or the husbands of female descendants continued to

244

42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54

55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62

63

Notes hold powerful positions in the administration and in the fleet into the middle of the seventeenth century. A. H. de Groot, “Meḥmed Pas̲ h̲ a, Sulṭān-Zāde,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. P. Heinrichs. Alderson, The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty, Table XXX. See chapter 5 for more details about Mihrimah. See also Isom-Verhaaren, “Süleyman and Mihrimah: The Favorite’s Daughter,” 64–85; and Isom-Verhaaren, “Mihrimah Sultan: A Princess Constructs Ottoman Dynastic Identity,” 150–65. Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 97a, 127. Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 97b–98a, 127–8; Anderson, Naval Wars, 130–3; Setton, Venice, 145–8. Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 98b–99a, 114a, 128, 140. Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 99a, 128. Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 99b, 129. Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 99b–100a, 129–30. Peirce, The Imperial Harem, 264; Naima, Tarih-i Naima, vol. 3, 1155. Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 100a–100b, 129–30; Anderson, Naval Wars, 136–7. Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 100b, 129. Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 101a–101b, 129–30; Anderson, Naval Wars, 137; Setton, Venice, 154–5. Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 101a–101b, 130; Anderson, Naval Wars, 140; Setton, Venice, 158. Anderson, Naval Wars, 141–2; Setton, Venice, 158–9; Panzac, Marine, 156. See Baki Tezcan for a discussion of the political role as opposed to the military role of the Janissaries. Rhoads Murphey, Introduction, in Evliya Çelebi, The Intimate Life of an Ottoman Statesman: Melek Ahmed Pasha (1588-1662): As Portrayed in Evliya Çelebi’s Book of Travels (Seyahat-name), trans. Robert Dankoff (Albany: State University of New York, 1991), 24. Murphey (Naima), 29 of Introduction. Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 102b, 130. Isom-Verhaaren, “Tracing the Life of Hüsam Bey: Career Paths in the SixteenthCentury Ottoman Navy,” 291–314. Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 116b, 142. Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 116a–117a; Idris Bostan, “Derya Beyi,” Islam Ansiklopedisi, v. 9 (1994): 200–201. Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 115b, 141; Katib Çelebi died before Ali Pasha became admiral a second time in 1660–1. Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 103a, 130–1. Lewis Thomas, Study of Naima (New York: New York University Press, 1972), 11; Mark Burkholder and D S Chandler, From Impotence to Authority: The Spanish Crown and the American Audiencias, 1787-1808 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1977); Suraiya Faroqhi, “Purchasing Guild- and Craft-Based Offices in the Ottoman Central Lands, Unpublished Paper;” Halil Inalcik, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 74. Naima was not an eyewitness of this period; he relied on other authors, especially Katib Çelebi, but this incident is not included in Katib Çelebi’s naval history. Although the basic information must have come from a contemporary source, Naima

 Notes 245

64 65 66 67

68 69 70 71 72 73 74

75 76 77 78 79 80

81 82 83 84 85 86 87

88 89 90

may have used Siyavuş’s response as an opportunity to express his own perspectives on Ottoman government; see Thomas, A Study of Naima. Naima, Tarih-i Naima, vol. 3, 1276, 1278–9, 1284. Or possibly circumcision, Naima, Tarih-i Naima, vol. 3, 1285. Naima, Tarih-i Naima, vol. 3, 1287. Naima, Tarih-i Naima, vol. 3 1278, 1279, 1284–6. Compare Von Hammer, trans. Hellert, vol. 10, 253. Von Hammer, an Austrian historian of the nineteenth century, wrote a famous history of the Ottoman Empire based on Ottoman chronicles. However, he often does not provide specific references in the text of where he has acquired information. Naima, Tarih-i Naima, vol. 3, 1286. Maliyeden Müdevver Defter 199, 4b, 9a. Naima, Tarih-i Naima, vol. 3, 1279, 1285–6. Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 103a, 131. Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 103a–b, 131. Naima, Tarih-i Naima, vol. 3, 1307–8; Setton, Venice, 163–4; Von Hammer, Histoire, vol. 10 trans. Hellert; Anderson, Naval Wars, 142–5. Evilya Dankoff, 49–51. Evliya Çelebi, Narrative of Travels in Europe, Asia, and Africa in the Seventeenth Century, trans. Joseph Von Hammer (London: Oriental Translation Fund, 1834), vol. 1, 152. Von Hammer has the name as Hasam Oghli Ali Pasha. Von Hammer’s translation is less negative than Dankoff ’s concerning the actions of the troops. He describes their actions as “careless.” Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 103a–103b, 131. Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 103b–104a, 130–1. See Thomas, Study, for a discussion of Naima’s sources, 132–56. Naima, Tarih-i Naima, vol. 3, 1307–1308. Naima, Tarih-i Naima, vol. 3, 1393–4. According to Von Hammer, trans. Hellert, vol. 10, 305 (see also pages 332 and 340), Hüsambeyzade had been brought back in chains to Istanbul. See also Setton, Venice, 168; Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 132, 104b; Anderson, Naval Wars, 144–6; Naima, Tarih-i Naima, vol. 3, 1393–4. Naima, Tarih-i Naima, vol. 3, 1394. Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 103b–104a, 132, Later this was done by Turhan Sultan. TSMA E7002/69, TSMA E7002/49, in Lucienne Thys-Senocak, Ottoman Women Builders: The Architectural Patronage of Hadice Turhan Sultan (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 41, 47, 48. These documents are undated but appear to be early in Turhan’s rule. Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 244–5. Von Hammer, Histoire, 10: 161–3. Von Hammer, Histoire, 10: 170. TSMA E. 7001/37 in Thys-Senocak, Ottoman Women, 117, 182. If this letter was written in 1655 or 1656 this was a particularly severe period of upheaval in naval matters as seven different men held the position of admiral during these years. No doubt naval finances were in disarray. TSMA E 7001/29 in Thys-Senocak, Ottoman Women, 133, 183. TSMA E. 7001/42 and regarding the cannon TSMA E 7002/45, in Thys-Senocak, Ottoman Women, 175–6, 184–5. Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 104b, 132; Setton, Venice, 168–71; Von Hammer, Histoire, 10: 170–1; Anderson, Naval, 148–51.

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91 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 115b–116a, 141; Anderson, Naval Wars, 153–6. 92 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 106a–107b, 133–4. 93 Anderson, Naval Wars, 153–6; Setton, Venice, 181. 94 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 107b–108a; Bostan, “Derya Beyi,” 134; Anderson, Naval Wars in the Levant, 158–61. 95 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 107b, 134; Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 248. 96 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 107b–108a, 134. 97 TSMA E. 2477, in Thys-Senocak, Ottoman Women, 112–13, 181. 98 See for example, Finkel, Osman’s Dream. 99 Osmanli Bahriyesi Kronolojisi, Ek 3–8. 100 Soucek, Ottoman Maritime Wars, 1416-1700, 124. 101 M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, and R. C. Repp, “Köprülü,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. P. Heinrichs. 102 Panzac, Marine ottomane, 158. 103 Colin Heywood, “Ḳarā Muṣṭafā Pas̲ h̲ a,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. P. Heinrichs.. 104 A. H. de Groot, “Kaplan Mustafa Pasha,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. P. Heinrichs 105 Setton, Venice, 189–95; Anderson, Naval Wars, 168–79. 106 Setton, Venice, 196–7; Anderson, Naval Wars, 179–80. 107 Setton, Venice, 198–205, 212. 108 Anderson, Naval Wars, 181–4; Setton, Venice, 220–38; Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 271. 109 Katib Çelebi, Tuhfetü’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar, 99b–100a.

Chapter 8 1 Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, Tarih (Istanbul, 1928), 2: 790. See also Soucek, Ottoman Maritime Wars, 1416-1700, 126–7. Soucek’s translation with my modifications. 2 Alderson, The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty, Table 37. 3 Christine Woodhead, “Silāḥdār, Fi̊ ndi̊ ḳli̊ li̊ Meḥmed Ag̲ h̲ a,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. 4 Shai Har-El, “Silāḥdār,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. 5 Woodhead, “Silahdar.” 6 Bostan, “Mezemorta,” 281–91, 281. See also Gillian Weiss, Captives and Corsairs: France and Slavery in the Early Modern Mediterranean (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 66, 73, 80–2, for Mezemorta’s relations with the French after he rose to prominence in Algiers. 7 Bostan, “Mezemorta,” TDVIA, 525. 8 Cantemir, History of the Growth and Decay of the Othman Empire, v. 2, 399–400, n. 9. Reference found in John Curry, “Working the Global Mediterranean: Mezemorta Hüseyin Paşa as Corsair, Captive, Dey, and Admiral in the Late Seventeenth Century,” Unpublished manuscript, 3.

 Notes 247 9 Aubry de la Mottraye, Voyages du Sr. A de la Motraye en Europe, Asie Afrique (The Hague: T. Johnson J. Van Duren, 1727), v. 1, 206. In Curry, “Working,” 3. 10 Laurent d’Arvieux, Memoires du Chevalier d’Arvieux (Paris: Charles-Jean-Baptiste Delespine, 1735), v. 5, 126–34. 11 D’Arvieux, Memoires, v.5, 159. 12 This incident would have predated when de Tassy was in Algiers, 1717–18. Laugier de Tassy, Histoire du royaume d’Alger, avec l’état présent de son gouvernement, de ses forces de terre de mer, de ses revenus, police, justice politique commerce (Amsterdam: Henri du Sauzet, 1725), 267–8. 13 Curry, “Working,” 7–8. 14 Bostan, “Mezemorta,” 281. 15 Safvet Bey, Kapudan Mezemorta Hüseyin Paşa: Divan-ı Hümayun Kayıtlarından Cıkarılmıştır (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Bahriye, 1327/1911), 120–1, and in modern Turkish, Yavuz Senemoğlu, Mezemorta Hüseyin Paşa (Istanbul: Deniz Kuvvetleri Komuntanligi Basimevi, 1994), 92–3; Curry, “Working,” 15–16. 16 Curry, “Working,” 17–19; Safvet Bey, Kapudan Mezemorta Hüseyin Paşa, 90–2; Robert Lambert Playfair, Scourge of Christendom: Annals of British Relations with Algiers prior to the French Conquest (London: Smith, Elder Co., 1884), 159. 17 The numbers of ships varied according to statistics found in Anderson, Naval Wars, 194–5; Emir Yener, “The Last Struggle against Venice 1684–1718,” Unpublished paper, 3. 18 Anderson, Naval Wars, 197; Eric Pinzelli, “Venise et la Morée: du triomphe à la désillusion (1684–1718). Histoire,” PhD diss., Université de Provence, 2003, 83–97. 19 Pinzelli, “Venise,” 97–109. See Anderson, Naval Wars, 198–9; Emir Yener, “Last Struggle,” 4. 20 Pinzelli, “Venise,” 109–14. 21 Silahdar, Nazire Karaçay Türkal, Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa Zeyl-i Fezleke (1065–22 Ca. 1106/1654-7 Şubat 1695), Marmara University, 2012, 1050; Yener, “Last Struggle,” 4. 22 Silahdar, 1051–2; Yener, “Last Struggle,” 5. 23 Pinzelli, “Venise,” 121–32. 24 Silahdar, 1097; Pinzelli, “Venise,” 132–43. 25 Silahdar, 1060; Yener, “Last Struggle,” 5. 26 Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 292–300. 27 Pinzelli, “Venise,” 144–51; Yener, “Last Struggle,” 6. The Venetians also conquered Herceg Novi on September 30, 1687. 28 Pinzelli, “Venise,” 171–84. 29 Pinzelli, “Venise,” 188–92; Yener, “Last Struggle,” 7. 30 Anderson, Naval Wars, 208–10; Yener, “Last Struggle,” 8. 31 Safvet, modern version: Senemoğlu, Mezemorta Hüseyin Paşa, 88. 32 Bostan, “Mezemorta,” 282. MD 99: 29/137, 103/338 Silahdar, Tarih, II 485–7, 489, 553–4. 33 Yener, “Last Struggle,” 9. 34 Luigi Ferdinando Marsili, L’etat Militaire de l’Empire Ottoman, ses progrès et sa décadence (Amsterdam: H. Uytwerf, F. Changuion, 1732), II, 164; Panzac, Marine ottomane, 173. 35 Silhadar, Tarihi, 1281; Bostan, “Mezemorta,” TDVIA, 525, Safvet 87. 36 Curry, “Working,” 22, using Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri, Cevdet Bahriye 55-25971105 Za 29.

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37 Svat Soucek, “The Strait of Chios and the Kaptanpasa’s Navy,” in Studies in Ottoman Naval History and Maritime Geography (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2008), 147. 38 Piri Reis, Kitab-i Bahriye (Istanbul: Historical Research Foundation, 1988), vol. 1, 348–9. 39 Silahdar, Tarihi, 795–6. See also Soucek, “The Strait of Chios,” 154. His translation with modifications. 40 The titles of the officers commanding and the ships themselves, patrona and riyale, were called by the same names. The officers were in top command posts under the admiral of the galleons. Soucek, “Strait of Chios,” 149. 41 Ahmed II (1691–5), Perhaps Mühimme Defter 106, Safvet, Tarihi-i Osmani Encumeni M, Soucek, “Strait of Chios,” 156. 42 Mehmed Raşid, Tarih-i Raşid (Istanbul: Klasik kitaplar, 2013), 488–91, especially 489. Soucek, “Strait of Chios,” 157. 43 Raşid, Tarih-i Raşid, 490; Soucek, “Strait of Chios,” 159. 44 Raşid, Tarih-i Raşid, 496; Bostan, “Mezemorta,” 283; Anderson, Naval Wars, 221–2. 45 Yener, “Last Struggle,” 13. 46 Yener, “Last Struggle,” 14. 47 Anderson, Naval Wars, 223. 48 Silahdar Mehmed Ağa, Nusretname, 1106-1133/1695-1721 (Ankara: Turkiye Bilimler Akademisi, 2018), 195–5; Yener, “Last Struggle,” 14. 49 Yener, “Last Struggle,” 16. 50 Silahdar, Nusretname, 341–5; Anderson, Naval Wars, 235. 51 Silahdar, Nusretname, 534–5; Yener, “Last Struggle,” 17. 52 Anderson, Naval Wars, 236. 53 Michael Talbot, “Separating the Waters from the Sea: The Place of Islands in Ottoman Maritime Territoriality during the Eighteenth Century,” Princeton Papers: Interdisciplinary Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 18 (2017): 61–85. 54 We have no additional information about Maltız Abdurrahman Pasha, Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi (1099-1116/1688-1704), ed. Abdulkadir Ozcan (Ankara: TTK, 2000), 262. 55 Cantemir, vol. 2, 399–400, note 9. 56 Hasan Efendizade Senayi, Menakib-i Nasuhi (Istanbul: Suleymaniye Ktp. MS Ali Emin Sry. 1104), 15b–16a in John Curry, “Working,” 39. 57 Hasan Efendizade Senayi, Menakib, 6b–7a. 58 John Curry, “Working,” 39–40, 43. 59 John Curry, “Working,” 44–5. 60 Silahdar, Nusretname, 541–2; Yener, “The Last Struggle,” 15; Bostan, “Mezemorta,” 283 says 1698. 61 Bostan, “Mezemorta,” 525, 284. 62 Mezemorta, Kanunname, 1701, Mühimme Defter 112, 1–6 in Ismail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988) 525; Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi (1099-1116/1688-1704), 167–71. My translation. See also Idris Bostan, Osmanlilar ve Deniz: Deniz Politiklari, Teskilar, ve Gemiler (Istanbul: Kure Yayinlari, 2007), 185–9, and Bostan, “Mezemorta,” for another transcription. 63 Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi, 1099-1116/1688-1704, 168–9. 64 Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi, 1099-1116/1688-1704, 170–1; Tuncay Zorlu, “Mezzomorto Hüseyin Paşa,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE, ed. Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, Everett Rowson. Cengiz Orhonlu, “Ḥād̲ j ̲ d ̲ j ̲ ī Ḥusayn

 Notes 249

65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

Pas̲ h̲ a, known as Mezzomorto,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. P. Heinrichs. Idris Bostan, “Mezemorta,” TDVIA 29:524-6. İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurum Basimevi, 1988), 523–7; Bostan, Osmanlılar ve Deniz, 187. Yener, “The Last Struggle,” 11; Zorlu, “Mezemorto,” for the name of the new admiral. The best source I have found, Osmanli Bahriye, contains many obvious errors. For example, it has Mezemorta as admiral when he had been dead for over a year and it skips Abdulfettah Pasha. Osmanli Bahriye, EK3-xi-xii Bostan, “Mezemorta,” 285; Emir Yener, “Ottoman Warships,” Conference presentation, Third International Congress of Eurasian Maritime History, Istanbul, 2018. Yener, “The Last Struggle,” 18–19. Panzac, Marine ottomane, 184–6. Yener, “The Last Struggle,” 19. Yener, “The Last Struggle,” 19–20. Yener, “The Last Struggle,” 20. Raşid, Tarih-i Raşid, 1010, 1012; Yener, “The Last Struggle,” 20. Raşid, Tarih-i Raşid, 1053; Yener, “The Last Struggle,” 21. Raşid, Tarih-i Raşid, 1054; Yener, “The Last Struggle,” 21. Raşid, Tarih-i Raşid, 1056; Yener, “The Last Struggle,” 22. Raşid, Tarih-i Raşid, 1079; Yener, “The Last Struggle,” 24. Raşid, Tarih-i Raşid, 1079; Yener, “The Last Struggle,” 24. Raşid, Tarih-i Raşid, 1138, 1142; Yener, “The Last Struggle,” 25.

Conclusion 1 See Isom-Verhaaren, Living in the Ottoman Realm, for an analysis of Ottoman identity. 2 Perhaps Ibrahim Pasha (admiral 1713 and 1717) and Süleyman Koca (Hoca) (1714, 1718–21), Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, The Turkish Embassy Letters, 180. Osmanli Bahriye, EK3-xii-xiii. Ibrahim Pasha served briefly as grand vizier. 3 Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, Letters, 136–7.

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260

Index Abd al-Malik of Morocco  139, 142, 152–3 Abdulfettah Pasha  203 Abdulkadir Pasha, acting admiral replacing Hüsambeyzade  186, 193 Acre  11 Aden  104 Adorno, Giovanni  53–4 Adriatic Sea  6, 51–2, 69, 81–2, 84, 103, 112, 146, 192, 204–5 Aegean Islands  24, 43, 71, 73–4, 76, 198 contested  69 governor of  148 Latin rule  2 Ottoman rule  5 Turkish attacks on  13, 21, 112, 122 Aegean Sea  9, 14, 22, 25, 30–3, 35, 38, 40, 51–2, 55, 64, 74, 76, 78–9, 87, 92, 95, 97, 186, 192, 195, 201, 206, 208–9 access to  4, 10, 31, 67 coast of  2, 10, 13, 15–16, 20–1, 27, 33, 40–2, 50, 68–9, 77, 209 conquest of  90, 122 contested territory  71 control of  2, 16, 21, 27–8, 41, 54, 64, 73, 203, 209 core Ottoman maritime territory  6 Latin rule in  1, 11–12, 14, 21, 24, 25, 28, 32, 41, 42 naval power of Latins in  41, 70 Ottoman naval bases in  89 Patrol of  129, 198, 200 protection of  22, 193 transition in  12, 15, 68 Turkish expansion to  15, 27, 41, 212 Venetian depredations in  199 Venetian possessions in  73, 115, 203 Venetian presence in  42 waters of  89, 168, 199 Aegina  3

Ahmed I (d. 1617)  148, 161–2, 169 Ahmed II (d. 1695)  190, 195 Ahmed III (d. 1736)  6 Ahmed Pasha  161, 169–70 Ahmed Pasha, admiral 1531  111 Ahmed Pasha, governor of Anatolia  176 Aigues-Mortes  43 Akıncı  48, 50, 78, 108 Akkerman  90 Akkoyunlu  71, 74, 77 Alanya  11, 77, 82 Albania  42, 52, 55, 78, 81, 84–5, 100, 112, 195, 205, 209 conquest of  82 uprisings in  83–4 Aleppo  44, 111 Alexander  61, 81 Alexandria  79, 136, 171, 193, 195 Alfonso, duke of Calabria  83–4 Algiers  118, 135, 137–8, 160, 168, 194, 204, 209 captives  134, 152–3 Hasan Pasha, governor of  123 Hayreddin at  5, 107–12, 116, 211 Kılıç Ali at  133, 137, 143, 212 Mezemorta at  187, 190–2, 201, 213 Ottoman foothold at  88, 96, 98 Ottoman province  110 Uluç Hasan at  143–5, 153 Ali Ahmed  135 Ali Pasha (admiral, grand vizier, d. 1621)  161–2 alum  28, 53–4 Amadeo of Savoy  3–4, 38 Amasra  75 Amcazade Hüseyn Pasha (Köprülü)  187, 196–7, 200, 202–3, 207 Ammaroğlu, admiral (d. 1647)  163, 168–9 Amorgos  15 Anadolu Hisarı  41, 56, 62

262 Anatolia  4, 14–16, 19, 24, 29–30, 36–9, 41, 47–8, 55–6, 60, 77, 85, 89, 96, 100–1 beylerbey of  42, 68, 210 beyliks of  32 coasts of  12–13, 27–8, 41, 55, 64, 71, 118, 170, 189, 195 control of  48, 210 defense of  40 governor of  82 lands of  87 province of  95, 137 shores of  182–3, 195 Timur invasion of  40–1, 44–5, 47 Turkish migration  1–2, 10–11, 209 Anavarin  3, 92, 94–5, 97, 123, 161, 166, 193, 211 second capture of  95 Andronicus II (d. 1332)  14, 16 Andronicus III (d. 1341)  15–17, 22–5, 33–4, 224 n.77 Andronicus IV (d. 1385)  38–9 Andros  3, 5, 51 Angelovic  75 Ania  13 Anjou  14 Ankara, battle of  43–6, 128 Anna of Savoy  25, 28 Antalya  11, 77 Apulia  83–4 Aragon  14 Argos  74 Arrianos  61 arsenal chamberlain  163, 164, 168, 176–7, 202, see also tersane kethüdasi Cigalazade and  148, 150 Galata, at  67, 70, 92, 100, 111, 112, 126, 148, 161, 163 Gallipoli, at  46, 70, 77, 92, 97 Kara Mürsel, founded by  32 Lesbos, at  72 Ottoman  70, 71, 125, 138, 141, 144–5, 148, 180, 206 Seljuk  11 Aşıkpaşazade  34, 221 n.12 Athens  14, 17, 20, 24, 69, 123, 193–4 Atlantic states  134 Atmaz  17

Index Avlona  49 Avlonya  82–4, 112 Ottoman fleet at  84 Avlonya, sancak bey  82 Aydın annexation of  4, 27, 41, 44, 54 beylik of  11, 13, 16, 20, 21, 26, 34, 41, 48, 97, 210 fleet  15, 22, 32 house of  10, 209 port of  17 Azov  82, 163, 204 Baalbek  44 Baghdad  19, 45, 148 Baleric Islands  121 Balıkesir  32–3 Balkans  41, 46–9, 55–6, 60, 85, 108, 206, 210–11 Latins in  2 Ottoman expansion into  4, 11, 27, 29–31, 34, 37, 39, 42, 47, 210 Baltaoğlu Süleyman Bey  60, 64–5, 86, 160, 210 Barak Reis  92–3 Barbaro, Nicolo  63, 67 Barton, Edward  140, 142, 144 Basra  104 Batantzes or Vatantzes, John  34 Bayezid, son of Süleyman the Magnificent  119 Bayezid, vizier of Murad II  52, 55 Bayezid I (d. 1403)  4, 27, 40–1, 43–4, 56, 61, 89 death of  30, 52 defeat of  128 naval policy  40 reign of  4, 40, 42 Bayezid II (d. 1512)  4–5, 85, 91–2, 94–8, 103, 108–9, 112, 211 naval policies of  90, 94 reign of  4, 29, 61, 86, 89–90, 92, 96, 117, 212 succession dispute  90, 108 Bekir Pasha, (d. 1644)  164 Belgrade  100–1, 206 Bellay, Joachim du  95 Bernardo, Lorenzo  141, 143 bertone  159, 167, 171

 Index 263 Beşiktaş  116, 120 Biga  13, 36–7, 39, 171 conquest of  226 n.41 Bijayah  87–8, 109, see also Bougie Birgi  16, 20, 26 Bithynia  33 Bizerta  121 Black Sea  1–2, 5, 11, 13, 24–8, 35, 38, 41, 56–7, 70–3, 77–8, 91, 163, 199, 209 access to  30, 67 coast of  52, 90 conquest of  82, 90 control of  78, 207 Blockade of straits  55–6, 62, 64, 84, 158, 166–72, 177–9, 181, 184–6, 212 Bodonitsa  17, 20–1 Bodrum  15, 79, 101 Bologna  83 Book of the Sea  5, 86–8, 91, 93, 96, 98–105, 200 booty  10, 20–2, 26, 34, 36, 42, 67, 68, 80, 109, 110, 121, 146, 211, 231 n.90 motivation  12, 13, 23 source of wealth for Aydin  16, 17, 19 used for bribes  162 Bosporus  2, 4, 49–50, 60, 66, 71–2, 81 control of  30–1, 41, 56–7 fortresses  41, 62 importance of  31, 35 Boucicaut  43–4 Bougie  87–9, 91, 109, see also Bijayah Bozcaada  5, 9–10, 17, 39, 43–4, 51, 54, 68, 123, 168, 178, 185, 189, 199–200 Braudel, Fernand  138 bribery  47, 53, 144 Brindisi  82–3 Buda  38 Bulgarians  24, 35, 42 Burgundy, duke of  56 Bursa  36, 43, 45, 48, 50, 52, 77, 161 Busbecq, Ogier Ghiselin de  121 Büyükada  65 Byzantines  1–2, 4, 10–13, 15–18, 21–3, 28, 30–3, 43, 45–6, 48, 50, 52–3, 56, 86, 215 civil wars  23, 25, 34–6 distrust of Venice  73, 145

fleet  31, 37 naval policy of  14 sources  29–30, 75 Cadiz  139 Cairo  96, 98–100, 104–5 Calabria  6, 83, 133, 135–7, 151, 164, 212 Calendar of State Papers  134 Çali Beg  51, 65 Calixtus III, pope (d. 1458)  79 Campanella, Thomas  151 Çandarlı Ali Pasha  42 Çandarlı, Halil  62 Candia, duke of  20 Canım Hoca  204–6 Cantemir, Demetrie  128, 190–1, 201 Caoursin, Guillaume  79–81 Cape Benefshe  123 capture  54, 78, 94–5, 122, 124, 127, 133–5, 141, 146–8, 152–3, 205 map of Columbus  99 people  6, 10, 24, 34, 37, 38, 45, 48–50, 75, 92, 96, 118, 214 places  10–11, 19, 26, 29 ships  51, 65, 67, 74, 94, 99, 109, 121, 127, 128, 136, 144, 162, 163, 168, 172, 174, 183, 194, 198, 201, 237 n.59 Caria  15 cartography  2, 105 Catalan company  14, 21, 31, 33 Cattaneo, Domenico  23, 221 n.4 Celali rebellions  151, 155 Celeste, Livio, cousin of Uluç Hasan  145 Celesti, Andretta  142–3, see also Uluç Hasan Celesti, Camilla, sister of Uluç Hasan  145 Cem  79, 90–2, 108 Cervantes, Miguel de  134, 142–4, 152–4 Çesme  168, 195 Chaka, bey  10 Chalkis  76 Charles V (Holy Roman Emperor)  5, 87, 107, 109–12, 115–16, 122, 134, 137, 146, 212 suzerainty of  112 Charles IX of France  152 China  11, 19, 100

264

Index

Chios  10, 13–17, 42, 64, 66, 76, 123, 151, 154, 168–9, 171, 173–4, 176, 178, 186, 189–93 battle for  201 Genoese and  23, 47, 51, 55, 221 n.4 recovery of  196 strait of  195, 197–8 Umur of Aydın and  17, 23 Venetian attack on  189, 195–8, 213 Zaccaria family and  15–16 Cicala, Carlo, brother of Cigalazade  150–1 Cicala, Giambattista, brother of Visconte  147 Cicala, Lucrezia, mother of Cigalazade  146–8, 151–2 Cicala, Scipione  136, 146–7, see also Cigalazade Cicala, Visconte  136, 146–7 Cicelye  110 Cigalazade Sinan Pasha  6, 131, 133, 135, 145–6, 148–52, 154–5, 168, 212, see also Cicala, Scipione governor of Damascus  151 governor of Erzurum  148–9 origin of  146 Cirmen  42, 44 Clavijo, Roy Gonzalez de  46–7, 223 n.73 Columbus, Christopher  99, 211 Comnena, Anna  10 Constantine XI  60, 63 Constantinople, see Istanbul conversion  89, 135–6, 146–8, 150, 152–3, 191 Corfu  82, 94, 112–13, 204–6 siege of  112, 205 Corinth  69, 193 isthmus of  74 corruption  180, 185 corsairs  69, 90, 147, 212 Malta  165 North African  113, 135, 143, 160, 181–2, 186, 191, 202, 205–6 Ottoman  88, 92, 95, 97, 109–10, 130, 133 Turkish  15 Corsica  118, 146 Cretan War (1645–69)  6, 138, 155, 158, 159, 172, 174, 179, 186, 206

Crete  24, 51, 75, 113, 157, 164–70, 172–3, 175–80, 182–3, 192, 195, 212–13 conquest of  159–60, 166 Venetian bases on  187, 204 Crimea  21 Crimean Khans  90 Crusade of Smyrna  3, 25–6 crusades  4, 19, 23 First  11–12 Fourth  2, 11, 31, 35, 63, 204 Cuba  103 Cüneyd of Aydın  52–5 Cyclades Islands  3, 15, 51, 178, 186, 192, 204 Cyprus  3, 22, 26, 104, 127, 159, 161 conquest of  6, 137, 212 Damascus  44 Damietta  161 Danube  2, 90, 193–4, 205 Dardanelles  2, 4, 9, 33–6, 43–4, 47, 49, 51, 54, 61–2, 69, 76–7, 81, 166–9, 182–3, 192, 194–5, 199, 206 access, to  33, 35 blockade of  56, 157, 169–72, 177–9, 181–3, 185–6 control of  30–1, 37, 39, 41–2, 74 entrance to  61, 68, 77, 183–4 importance of  31, 35 mouth of  9, 74, 178, 183–4 shores of  74, 210 Dardanelles, battles of  158, 168, 182–5 Dardanelles, fortresses  72–4, 123, 178–9, 184–6 D’Arvieux, Laurent  191 Davud Pasha, admiral (d. 1623)  161–2 D’Aubusson, Pierre  79 deposition of sultans  158, 162, 171, 193 Dervish Mehmed Pasha, admiral  178, 180 derya bey  102, 164, 171–4, 176, 179, 189, 193, 195, 200–1, 212–13 devşirme  89, 95, 97, 108, 119–21, 159, 212 Dimetoka  25–6 diplomacy  16, 28, 41, 138, 140, 142, 214 Ottoman  39, 75, 142, 152–3

 Index 265 Diyarbakir  75, 149, 151 Dizdar of Herceg Novi  6, 146–7 Djerba  109, 119, 121, 136, 146–7 Dniester  90 Doge of Venice  82, 95, 145 Donini, Marcantonio  121 Don Juan of Austria  127–8, 137 Doria, Andrea  5, 103, 107, 110–11, 113–15, 119, 136, 146–7 Doria, Gian Andrea  136, 150 Doukas  50–4 Dundar  26 Dutch revolt  139 Ebulkasim  10 Edirne  25–6, 39, 45, 52–3, 90 Edremit  13, 22 Eğriboz  17, 20–1, 24, 42–3, 47–8, 50–1, 60, 69, 80, 91, 151, 171, 193–4, 199, 205 Ottoman conquest of 1470  5, 75–6, 82, 89 Egypt  11, 21, 79, 88, 96, 98, 102, 108, 112, 144, 149, 151, 161, 165, 169–70, 193 conquest of  5, 99–100, 103, 109–10 governor of  149 sea lanes  81 Ehad  17, 20, 22, 24 Elizabeth I of England  97, 139–40, 142, 153 reign of  134 Enoz (Ainos)  68–70 Enveri  4, 9–10, 12–13, 16–17, 19–28, 33, 75, 209 Ephesus  13, 15–17, 19, 26 Epidaurus  69 Erdek  14 Evliya Çelebi  175–6 Evrenos  39, 47–9, 108 Evrenosoğlu Barak  54 factionalism  157–9 factional conflict in Istanbul  170 factional infighting  161, 172, 177, 180 factional politics  164, 171, 176 Fahr al-Din Ilyas  16 Faik Ağa  97

Fatma, daughter of Ibrahim  239 n.34 Fazıl Ahmed Pasha Köprülü  186–7 Ferdinand of Aragon  87, 91 Ferrante of Naples  82–4 Ferrara, duke of  83 Fez  138–9, 144 financing fleet  14, 64, 86, 88, 117, 134, 144, 159, 180–1 Fındıklılı Mehmed (Silahdar) Ağa  6, 189–90, 193–4, 199–201 Flor, Roger de  14, 31 Florence, Council of  56 Foça  16, 23, 28, 37, 170, 183, 195, 199 control of  23 under Genoese  219 n.37 Latin outposts at  28 lord of  23 New Foça  53–5, 68 Francis I  107, 115 alliance with Süleyman  112, 222 n.17 Franks  10, 15, 24, 95, 209 frigate, very small galley  135, 198 Friuli  78 Galata  35, 64, 67, 111, 125–7, see also arsenal construction of Ottoman fleet  76 Ottoman arsenals of  92 Galeni, Giovanni Dionigi  135, see also Kılıç Ali Galiot, small galley  43, 95, 101–2, 135, 137, 157, 165, 175, 182–3, 204 galleasses  93, 101, 137, 167, 169, 174, 176, 182–3, 189, 194, 197, 199 galleons  64, 65, 67, 73–4, 101, 113, 137, 144, 157–8, 169, 171, 174–6, 178–9, 182–3, 189, 193–5, 199, 207 galleys  19, 24, 26–7, 32, 35, 39, 43, 46, 47, 50–2, 54–5, 57, 64–71, 76, 78, 81–4, 94, 96, 102, 111, 121, 123–7, 129–30, 134, 136, 142, 147, 151, 157, 161, 163, 167, 171–2, 174, 178–9, 189, 196, 204, 207 Adornos’  53 alteration of  127–8 biremes  51

266

Index

building of  129, 138, 144, 149 Burgundian  56 description of  114, 122–3, 166 Hayreddin’s  115, 122 Holy League  113–15 Hungarian  56 kayiks, small galley  9, 22 Malta  150, 192 mavnas  138, 166 numbers of  20 Ottoman  76, 80, 82–3, 92, 101, 107, 112–13, 123, 137, 149–50, 166, 168–70, 174–5, 178, 182–3, 186, 192–3, 197–9, 205 papal  56, 150, 166, 192 Piri Reis  103 sea power based on  13 Spanish  136, 150 triremes  41, 51, 62–3, 74 Tuscan  150, 192 Venetian  43, 56, 74, 92, 94, 166, 168, 174, 182, 186, 192, 194, 197, 199 galley slaves  110, 118, 124, 127, 135, 140, 146, 162, 183–4 Gallipoli  13, 18, 20, 27, 36–9, 41, 43–4, 47, 52–3, 62, 64, 68, 71, 74–6, 80–1, 92, 97, 99–101, 103, 105, 123, 168, 171, 177, 209 battle of  65 blockade of  55 conquest of  29–30 control of  49–50, 53 crusaders attack on  38 defense of  40 earthquake (1354)  4, 36, 37 fortification  42–3, 47 governor of  54–5, 64, 73 harbor of  51 importance of  31, 45, 57 negotiations  39, 45–7, 52 occupation of  210 Ottoman arsenals of  92 port of  35, 39, 43, 52 possession of  30–1, 53 seizure of  35–6 Straits of  30, 40, 42, 45, 53, 56–7, 62 strategic value of  30, 37–9 Tahrir register  91

Gallipoli, sancak bey  44, 64, 75, 81–2, 117 Gallipoli, treaty of  46–7, 50 Gallipoli peninsula  14, 36–7, 71 Gattilusio, Domenico  60 Gattilusio, Dorino  60, 68 Gattilusio, Dorino II  69 Gattilusio, Francesco  37–8 Gattilusio, Niccolo  71–2 Gattilusio, Palamede  68–9 Gazanfer Ağa (chief white eunuch)  148 Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Pasha  6 gazi  5, 14–15, 21, 40, 107–10, 120, 136, 197, 224 n.84 Hayreddin as  112, 114, 133 Kemal as  87–8, 94, 97, 99, 103, 211 Umur as  4, 9, 12, 17, 23–4, 28–30, 93–4 Gedik Ahmed Pasha  60, 77–8, 81–5, 90 Genghis Khan  85 Genoa  11, 19, 26, 35, 38, 43, 47, 83, 118, 146 Germigny, Jacques de, French ambassador  140 Germiyan  23 Gerogios-Gannadios Scholarios  61 Gevherhan, daughter of Ibrahim  189 Gevherhan, daughter of Selim II  121 Giorgio, Nicolo  21 Giovanni Longo Di Giustinianni  64, 66–7 Gökçeada  5, 59–61, 68–70, 74, 76, 206 Golden Horn  35, 63–7, 210 Granada  87, 91 grand admiral  104, 108, 120–1, 133, 143–4, 148, 162, 189, 198 Gregoras  14, 24–5, 33–5 Habsburgs  110, 115, 121, 127, 135–6, 138, 147, 200, 211, 213 Austria  135, 160, 204–6 Spain  5, 87–8, 91, 155 Haci Ilbey  39 Haci Murad  139, 152–3 Haci Murad, daughter of  152 Haedo, Diego de  134, 142 Hafsid dynasty  111–12, 137 Halil, grand vizier of Murad II  56 Halil, son of Orhan  37

 Index 267 Halil Pasha, admiral for Mehmed III  150 Halim Ismail Bey  60 Hamza, brother of Bayezid, vizier of Murad II  55 Hamza Bey of Gallipoli  60, 65–8, 210 Hanya, Crete  166–8 Harborne, William  140–1, 144, 153 harem, imperial  147, 148, 162, 166, 169 Hasan Pasha, son of Hayreddin  123 Hass Murad Pasha  77 Has Yunus Pasha  60, 68 Haydar Ağazade Mehmed Pasha  171–2 Haydar Pasha, governor of Tunis  137 Hayreddin Barbarossa  6, 91, 98–100, 104–5, 111–17, 120–4, 127–30, 133, 135, 137, 146, 152, 155, 157, 160, 183, 204, 211–12 admiral of the Ottoman navy  111– 12, 116, 118, 122 capture of Tlemcen  110 death of  108, 116, 118, 212 expedition in 1543  115–16, 123 Gazi Pasha  110, 112, 114, 133 governor of Algiers  107, 109–10, 118 origins  5, 72, 108 province of the islands  102 talents  112 tomb of  120, 182 Helvacı Yusuf  189, 195, 197, 202–3, 207 Henry of Asti  26 Herceg Novi  146–8 Herceg Novi, Dizdar  240 n.69 Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha  95 Herzegovina  117 Hispaniola  103 Hizir of Aydin  17–18, 20, 26 Hoca Selman  4, 9–10, 12, 22 Holy League, 1538  113–15, 123, 146 Holy League, 1571  127, 137, 212 Holy League  94, 129–31, 187 Holy League, War of 1684  189, 192, 200 homosexual relations among corsairs  142–3, 240 n.44 Hormuz  104 Humashah Ayshe  148 Humbert of Viennois  26 Hungary  55, 78, 150, 193–4, 213 Hurrem  117, 119, 120

Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha  6, 163, 179, 182, 185–6, 212–13, 245 n.80 admiralship  171–8 sancak of Mora  178 Ibn Arabshah  45 Ibn Battuta  12, 15–16, 18–20, 22, 32–3 Ibn Iyas  96, 98 Ibrahim, sultan  157, 166, 169–71, 189 Ibrahim Beg  21 Ibrahim Pasha, admiral under Murad III  141–2, 144, 151 Ibrahim Pasha, grand vizier of Süleyman I (d. 1536)  102, 104, 111–12 identity  108, 120, 131, 145, 148, 209, 219 n.52, 234 n.2 Il Veneziano, see Uluç Hasan Imbros, see Gökçeada India  22, 100, 103 Indian Ocean  96–7, 100, 103–4, 120 Ionia  16 Islands  78, 206 Sea  79, 113 Ipsili  54 Isa, son of Bayezid I  48 Isabella of Castile  87, 91 Isfendiyaroğlu  70 Iskender Ağa, admiral 1511  98 Iskender Beg of Albania  83 Ismail, governor of Gallipoli under Mehmed II  69–70 Ismail, son of Abd al-Malik  139, 154–5 Ismail Isfendiyaroğlu  71 Ispen  22 Istanbul  3, 9, 13–14, 24–6, 32–3, 37, 44–7, 49–50, 52, 54, 63–7, 71–2, 75, 77–8, 84, 86, 89, 92, 94–6, 101–2, 104, 109–13, 115–16, 123, 133–8, 140, 144, 147, 150, 152–4, 157, 163, 167, 172–4, 178, 181, 186, 191–3, 199–200, 203–6, 211–15 access to  31, 74 Bayezid I siege of  40, 41, 43, 54 Byzantine capital  1, 31 Byzantines reconquered  11 conquest of  2, 5, 11, 30–1, 35, 39–40, 57, 59, 61–3, 68, 73, 80–1, 85, 158, 160

268

Index

control of  38 convoy from Egypt to  151 cosmopolitan city  215 crusader conquest  11, 13, 35 factional conflict in  170 food supply of  171 Hayreddin Pasha’s tomb in  182 importance of  90 infighting in  176 lieutenant governor of  120 maritime highway  195 Murad II siege of  54 name  7 Ottoman capital  7, 60–1, 183 Ottoman conquest  30, 59–63, 68, 73, 81, 85, 158, 160 people of  169, 171, 185 prosperity of  184 rebuilding and repopulating  70 revolt by the tradesmen of  177 sea lanes from  190 security of  2, 14 shore of  64 straits of  45 threat to the Byzantines of  10 Venetian ambassadors in  139, 141–3, 145, 151 vulnerability from the sea  14, 169, 171, 178, 183–5, 193, 212 Istefe  94 Istendil  166, 178, 192, 204 Izmir  13, 16–17, 19, 21–8, 56, 77, 170, 189, 197–9, 210 conquest of  26 fortress of  4, 10, 34, 48 Izmit  32–4, 37, 210 Iznik  1–2, 11, 13, 31, 33, 54 Jamaica  103 jihad  19 John V Palaiologos  23, 25, 35–8 John VII  47 Josephus  61 Kaffa  77, 82 Kandiye  166, 168, 170, 176, 183, 186–7 Kantakouzenos, John VI  12, 24–6, 28, 33–7

alliance with Umur of Aydın  222 n.17 Kantakouzenos, Matthew  36–7 Kanunname  200 Kapıdağ peninsula  33 Karaburun  23 Kara Mahmud, captain 1522  102 Karaman  5, 42, 56, 86, 89–91, 137, 211 Kara Murad Pasha  180, 182 Kara Mürsel, person  32–3, 210 Karamürsel, place  32, 210 Karamürsel, ships  225 n.13 Kara Mustafa Pasha  162–4 Karası  3–4, 16, 26, 31, 37, 44, 48 annexation of  27–8, 32–5, 210 beylik of  32, 210 bey of  15, 22, 32–4, 210 history of  33 leadership in  32 significance  34 treaty with Byzantines  33–4 Turks of  34 Karliili sancak  136 Karlowitz, peace  200, 207 Karpathos  165 Kasim, governor of Gallipoli  71 Katib Çelebi  93, 104, 111, 128–9, 133–4, 136, 142, 145–6, 148, 152, 154, 165–72, 177–9, 190 on the battle of Naxos  175–7, 179 on the battles of Dardanelles  182–3 Tuhfetu’l-kibar fi esfari’l-bihar  6, 80, 100–1, 114–15, 118–19, 138, 157–63, 184, 187 Kazim Bey  60 Kea  3 Kemal Reis  5, 86–96, 98–101, 103–4, 107, 112, 117, 135, 165 Bayezid II’s reliance on  97 corsair  89, 92 death of  97–8, 110, 211 gazi  87, 94 influence of  94, 95 North Africa  91, 108, 110, 133, 212 origins  86, 91, 211 Kethüda  125, 171, 202 Kilia  90 Kılıç Ali  6, 128–34, 142–4, 148, 153–5, 160–1, 175, 212

 Index 269 admiralship of  160 client of Piyale Pasha  136 client of Turgud Reis  128 conquest of Tunis  137–8, 153 death of  138–9, 141–4, 153 governor of Algiers  137, 143 governor of Tripoli  137, 143 Harborne, relations with  140–1 origins of  133, 135, 212 türbe (tomb) of  145 Knights of St. John  11, 15–16, 46, 51 Malta  113, 119–20, 122–4, 147, 151, 165–6 Rhodes  22, 47, 50, 77, 79, 80, 90, 100, 108–9, 210, 211 Koca Sinan Pasha  137–8, 144, 149, 165 Komnenos  70 Konigsmarck, Otto Wilhelm  194 Konya  11 Köprülü  6, 164, 180, 184, 186–7 Korkud, prince  95, 109 Koron  70, 92, 103, 111, 123, 193 conquest of  94 Kos  68, 79, 161 Köse Dağ, battle of  11 Kösem, Valide sultan  158, 169–71, 173, 176, 179 murder of  177, 180 Kosmidion, battle of  49 Kosovo, battle of  40, 42 Koyun Islands  123, 195 Kritovoulos  5, 59–65, 69, 71–3, 85, 210 embassy to Mehmed  68 Kruje  78, 83 Küçük Davud Pasha  92 Kurdoglu or Kurtoglu  109–10 Kythera  3 La Forest, Jean de  112 Lala Şahin  39 La Motraye, Aubrey de  191 Lampsakos  49, 51, 53 Latin Empire  2, 11 Lemnos  3, 56, 59, 68, 70, 78, 199 Gattilusio family rule  52, 54, 60 Ottoman control of  5, 69 papal occupation  69 promised to Giovanni Longo Di Giustinianni  64

Venetian occupation of  74, 77, 185 Leontarios, Demetrios  52–3 Lepanto  78, 79, 88, 95, 118–19, 121, 129–30, 134, 137–9, 149, 171, 193, 200 gulf of  93, 114 Ottoman Conquest of  30, 92–4 Lepanto, battle of  5, 127–8, 131, 135, 137, 153, 160, 165, 183–4, 212 total Ottoman casualties  233 n.64 turning point  127, 134 Lesbos  23–4, 74–5, 123, 168, 171, 178, 189 attacked by Umur  17 attacked by Venice  74–5, 95 battle of  194, 200 conquest of  72, 108 French attack of  95 Hayreddin from  5, 98, 107–9, 211 invaded by Seljuks  10 Mahmud Pasha’s defense of  75 occupied by Genoese  23, 51, 60, 68, 70–2 Ottoman rule  5 Levant Company  140 Levkada  78, see also Santa Maura Libya  88, 100, 119 Longo, Geronimo  76 Loredan, Alvise  56 Loredan, Pietro  50–1, 54, 65 Louis XII of France  95 Lucca  83 Lutfi Pasha, grand vizier  112, 117 Macedonia  42 Maghrib  26, 90–1, 117, 177 Mahedia  119 Mahmud Pasha  9, 60, 71–7, 85, 89, 211 admiral  75–7 execution of  82 Malta  109, 119–28, 137, 143–5, 150–1, 165–6 expedition to  121–2, 130 siege of  123 Malvasia  194, 204 Mamluks  5, 11, 90, 96–8, 100, 103 elimination of  88 Mangop  78 Mani  78, 206

270 Manisa  56, 60 Mantua, Marquis of  83 Manuel II (Byzantine emperor)  43, 46–7, 49–50, 52–4 Manzikert, battle of  1, 10 maps  5, 88, 99–100, 103, 105, 128, 211 Margliani, Spanish ambassador  138 Maritsa  42, 69 Marmara, sea of  13, 30–3, 50, 210 Marmaris  80 Marseilles  38 Mecca  101, 165 Mediterranean Sea  2, 5–6, 15, 25–6, 72– 3, 81, 91–2, 99–100, 102, 104–5, 108, 115, 135, 153, 159–60, 162–4, 183, 190–1, 208, 214 access to  31 coasts, Ottoman control of  77 control of  122, 146 Eastern region  11–12, 26, 87–8, 91, 95, 100, 109–11, 151, 165, 187, 195, 207, 209, 211–13 expedition in  155 gazis in  87, 97 Genoese domination in eastern region  23, 28 naval warfare  97, 113, 122, 127, 134, 138, 197, 212 Northern Europeans in  153–4, 159–60, 215 Ottoman and Habsburg battle for supremacy in  88, 127, 146, 153, 211–12 Ottoman control of eastern portion of  6, 115 Ottoman domination eastern  12, 88 “Ottoman lake”  89, 108 Piri Reis and  92, 99–100, 102, 104, 105, 108, 110 Russians in  208 shipping lanes in  79 Spanish possessions in  140 Venetian domination in  28, 72, 95 Western region  82, 87–9, 91, 97, 99, 108, 110–11, 118, 122, 144–5, 148, 150, 211–12 Mehmed I  27, 45, 48–51, 211 death of  52 fleet  50–1

Index Mehmed II, sultan  2, 5, 9, 29, 56, 59–60, 63–7, 69, 71–5, 79, 82–6, 90–2, 108, 113, 185, 200, 207, 210–11 conquest of Istanbul  59, 61–2, 80 construction of fortresses  62, 185 control of Black sea  78, 90 death of  79, 83–5, 90 Eğriboz campaign  89, 91 expedition to Black Sea  70–1 expedition to Lesbos  71 fleet  60–1, 68, 71, 85 naval campaigns of  78, 85, 89 naval vision  61, 72 navy  50, 81 peace with Venice  83 policies  70 reign of  5, 50, 60–1, 68, 75, 82, 160, 211 war with Venice  76–8, 82 Mehmed III  148 Mehmed IV, sultan  157, 170, 177, 179–80, 190 deposition of  193–4 Mehmed Bey of Aydın  10, 16–18, 20 Mehmed Köprülü, grand vizier  185–7 Mehmed Pasha, governor of Algiers, 1565  137 Mehmed Sokollu, grand vizier  104, 117, 129–31, 137–8, 153 Mehmed Sultanzade  168, 243 n.41 Melek Ahmed Pasha, grand vizier  163, 171–7, 179 Melos  51 Mengli Giray  90 Menteşe  15–16, 18–19, 27, 32, 54–5, 97 annexation of  41, 44 Turks of  79 mercenaries  14, 17, 31, 36, 54, 146, 147, 178, 191, 226 n.27 Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Pasha  186 Mesih Ahmed Pasha  60, 78–81, 86, 211 failure at Rhodes  81 Messina  111, 136–7, 147, 150–1 Mezemorta Hüseyn Pasha  2, 6, 187, 189–92, 194–201, 203, 207–8, 213, 215 admiralship  203 children, of  201 death of  200, 202, 207

 Index 271 derya bey of Rhodes  195 origins of  190 prominence  191 reforming the navy  202–3, 207 Mezo-Keresztes, battle of  150–1 Michael VIII Palaiologos  31 Mihaloğlu  54 Mihrimah  117–22, 148, 155, 236 n.38 Mimar Sinan  120 Mircea  49 Misirlizade Ibrahim Pasha  193–7 Mistra  22 Mocenigo, Andrea  55 Mocenigo, Pietro  39 Mocenigo, Toma  46 Modon  70, 82, 92, 94–5, 123, 130, 193, 204 conquest of  94 Moldavia  78 Monemvasia  21–2, 69, 186 Mongols  11 Montferrat  83 Mora  6, 14, 17, 21–2, 73–4, 78, 85, 92, 113, 161, 166, 171, 178, 186, 205–6 Latin rule  82 Mehmed II’s conquest  69–70, 73, 92 Ottoman reconquest of  203–4, 206, 213 strategic importance  69, 198–200, 203 surrender of  75 Umur lord of  24 Venetian conquest  189, 192–5 Western coast of  94, 95, 111 Moralı Ibrahim Pasha  206 Morean War  2, 6, 187, 192, 199, 207, 213 Moro, Giovanni, Venetian ambassador  145 Morocco  138–9, 143–5, 152–4 Müezzinzade Ali Pasha, admiral  5, 128–31 Muhammad Sultan, son of Timur  45 Mulay Hasan  111–12 Mumcila  25 Murad I  27, 37–40, 42 death of  40 reign of  39, 42

Murad II  4, 52–4, 57, 60, 62, 82, 85 abdication  56 palace school of  75 reign of  30, 56 Murad III  138–45, 148–50, 152–3 Murad IV  162–3, 173 Musa, admiral, d. 1647  168 Musa, Ottoman prince  44, 48–50 Mustafa, son of Bayezid I  52–4 Mustafa, son of Süleyman  117–18 execution of  119–20 Mustafa Ağa (Ahmed I’s chief black eunuch)  162 Mustafa Ali  42, 117 Mustafa Bey of Preveza  94 Mustafa I, sultan  161, 162 Mustafa II, sultan  190, 200, 207 Mustafa Pasha, 1565 Malta  123–4 Mustafa Pasha, governor of Tripoli  137 Mustafa Pasha, second vizier 1522  101 Mytilene  43 Naima, Mustafa  6, 151, 159, 171–3, 176–8 Naples  77, 81–4, 137, 214 viceroy of  145 Nasuhi Efendi, sufi shaykh  201 Nauplia  193, 199, 204–6 Navagero, Bernardo  117 navigation, study of  88, 92, 99, 103, 169 Naxos  24, 26, 42, 47, 50, 68, 112, 151, 171, 174–6 Naxos, battle of  172, 174–5, 180, 213 Negro, Salagruzo de  49 Negroponte, see Eğriboz Neşri, Mehmed  40, 77, 221 n.12 Nice  115 Nicopolis, crusade of  4, 43 Nile River  100 Nurbanu, Valide sultan  143 Omer, Ottoman governor of the Mora  74 Oran  121 Orhan, Ottoman ruler  1, 31–4, 37, 210 alliance with Kantakouzenos  35, 37 praise of  32 Orhan of Menteşe  18 Orhan of Saruhan  17

272

Index

Oruç, brother of Hayreddin  107–10, 116, 211 Oruç Beg  4, 29–30, 37, 93–4, 209, 211, 225 n.12 Osman  1 Osman II  161–2 Otlukbeli, battle of  77 Otranto  5, 60, 78–9, 83–5 Ottoman conquest of  83 Ottoman expedition to  81 strategic value of  81–2

Polin, Captain  115 Pope John XXII  22 popes  1, 19, 25–6, 28, 39, 43, 56, 61, 64, 77, 83–4, 140, 147 Portugal  92, 139 Preveza  113, 123, 146, 192, 200, 206 gulf of  114, 122 Preveza, battle of  5, 113, 122, 212 purchase of offices  172

Pachymeres  15, 219 n.43 Palailogos, Demetrius, despot  59–60, 70 Palailogos, Irene  37 Palailogos, Thomas, despot  70 Palaiologos, Andronicus, despot  54 Palatia  48 Palermo  134 Pallavicini  55 Pallavincini, Guglielma  20–1, 224 nn.60–1 Parma, duke of  140 Paros  51, 68, 174 Passarowitz, peace of  6, 206–7 Patras  74, 193 patronage  9, 103, 120, 133, 136–7, 141–3, 158, 162, 173, 202, 212 Peçevi  118 Pera  35, 46, 63 Pergamon  33 Petrovaradin  193, 205 Philadelphia  14, 23 Philip II of Spain  135–6, 138–40, 142, 147, 152–3 Philip VI of France  22 piracy  70, 108, 116, 147, 165, 191, 208 Piri Reis  5, 87–8, 91–8, 100–5, 107, 109–10, 121, 135, 165, 195, 211 cartographic accomplishments  99, 103 execution of  104 origins of  233 n.14 training of  92, 95 Piyale Pasha  117, 119, 121–2, 124–7, 130–1, 136–7, 160 patronage of Kılıç Ali  137 Piyale Pasha, Uzun, d. 1643  163–4, 169

Ragusa  49, 84, 152 Raşid, Ottoman historian  197–8, 203, 206 Ravenstein, Philippe de  95 Red Sea  104 regency  23–4, 177 Reggio  111, 121, 150 regulations, naval  202, 204, 207–8 renegades  136, 152–3 Rethymnon  168 Rhenia  68 Rhodes  5, 13, 24, 26, 43, 47, 60, 64, 68, 80–6, 92, 101, 164–5, 170, 173, 175–7, 179, 192–3 Cem at  90 conquest of Mehmed II  78–9, 80–1,88 conquest of Suleyman  100–2, 119, 122 derya bey of  102, 164, 171–2, 195, 212 Islands of  79, 90, 102 Knights of St. John and  15–16, 22, 50, 108, 210–11 value of  79 ringworm  135, 153 Rizzo, Antonio  62 Romania  12, 47 Rum, name of former Byzantine territories  10, 87, 96, 99–100, 211 governor of  82 Rumeli  29, 39, 42, 44, 46, 48–9 beylerbey of  93 Rumeli Hisarı  62, 82 construction of  62 Rum Mehmed Pasha  75 Rustem Pasha  104, 117–18, 120, 147

Qansuh al-Ghawri  96

 Index 273 Saadi family, ruled Morocco  139 Sadoleto, Nicolo  83 Safavids  96, 120, 135, 151, 153, 155, 160 Safiye, Valide sultan  151, 155 Salamis  17 Salih Reis  113 Salonica  25, 42, 47, 51, 69–70, 123 Ottoman blockade of  55 siege of  54–5 Samos  10 Samothrace  69–70 Sancy, Baron de, French ambassador  162 Santa Maura  78, 114, 192, 205–6 Santorini  174–5 Saruca, governor of Gallipoli reign of Murad II  55, 62, 228 n.112 Saruca Pasha, d. before 1415  41–5, 48 Saruhan  15–17, 23, 26, 27, 32, 34, 37 annexation of  41, 44 Sasa Bey  16 Selaniki  142–3, 148 Selçuk  48 Selim I  5, 70, 99–100, 109–10, 117, 211 death of  100 reign of  98 Selim II  6, 119, 121, 131, 137, 148, 212 reign of  127 Seljuks of Rum  1, 10–11 Selman Reis  96 Serbs  24, 35 Serres  25 Seyyid Mustafa, galleon captain, stepfather of Mezemorta  190 Shishman of Tarnovo  38 Shkoder  78, 82 Sicily  14, 95, 111, 119, 135–6, 144, 146–7, 152, 155 coasts of  137 viceroy of  147, 151 Sidi Muhammad Tuwati  87 Siena  83 Silifke  77, 82 Silivri  35 Sinan Pasha, admiral  104, 116–20, 122 death of  121 lieutenant governor of Istanbul  120 Sinope  70–1 Sivas  44 Sixtus IV, Pope  83

Siyavuş Pasha, (d. 1656)  163–4, 172–4 Skyros  76 slaves  135, 143–5, 147 Smederevo  75 Soğut  32 Sosa, Antonio de, author, prisoner  134, 136, 142–3, 152, 154 Sources non-Ottoman  134, 175, 190, 194 Ottoman  1–2, 4, 7, 12, 30, 39, 42, 45, 75–6, 99, 104, 124–6, 128–9, 142, 175, 190, 198–9, 211, 215 Spanish Armada  139, 144, 149 Stadia  15 Strobilos  15 Suda  167–8, 170, 187, 204 Sudak  78, 82 Suez  97, 103–4 Süleyman II  190, 192, 194 Süleyman, son of Mehmed Bey of Aydın  18–19, 26 Süleyman, sultan, (d. 1566)  5, 15, 86, 91, 96, 100, 102, 107–8, 110–13, 115–21, 123, 127, 136, 146–8, 159, 212 alliance with Francis I of France  112 campaign in Iraq  111–12 campaign in Italy  112 campaign to Malta  124, 127 campaign to Vienna  122 conquest of Rhodes  108–9, 119, 122 reign of  91, 96, 100, 124, 127, 159 Süleyman Çelebi, son of Bayezid I  45–9 Süleyman of Karası  26, 33–4 Süleyman of Saruhan  16, 26 Süleyman Pasha, Mehmed II’s reign  78, 84 Süleyman Pasha, son of Orhan  4, 29, 34, 36–7, 93–4 Sultan Hisar  17 Syria  11–12, 21, 44, 88, 169 conquest of  100 Tabriz  19, 151, 160 Tana  78 Tarhoncu Ahmed Pasha  180 Tassy, Laugier de  191 Templars  11 tersane kethüdasi  163, 176–7

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Thasos  68–70 Theodora, daughter of Kantakouzenos  34–5 Thessaly  24, 50, 52 Thrace  25, 33–4, 36–8, 46 coasts of  71 Three Kings, battle of  139 Thucydides  61 Timur  27, 40, 44–8, 85, 128 Timur Khan, bey of Karası  15, 18, 32–3, 223 n.45 Tinos  3 Tire  26 Tlemcen  109–10 Tocco, Leonardo, despot of Cephalonia  78–9, 82–3 Tophane  133, 180 Topkapı  6, 70, 100, 105 Toulon  107, 115 Trachia  15 Trebizond  70–1, 75 Trevisan, Ludovico  69 tributary relations  13, 17, 20–1, 76 Tripoli  87, 96, 119, 122–3, 128, 136–7, 144, 147, 160–1, 181–2, 191 conquest of  96 establishment of Ottoman foothold at  88 revolt in  144, 154 Tripoli, Syria  109 Tunis  109–10, 112, 117, 119, 137, 139, 146, 151, 160, 181–2, 191–2, 212 conquest of  6, 111, 137, 160 establishment of Ottoman foothold at  88 Turcoman  10, 14, 16–17 allies of Uzun Hasan  77 beys  11 Turgud Reis  5–6, 128–30, 135–7, 143, 155, 160, 212 capture of Cicala  146–7 death of  123–4, 127, 137, 143 patron of Kılıç Ali  6, 133, 136–7 Piyale Pasha, relations with  119–21, 123–4 Sinan Pasha, relations with  104, 117–19 Turhan, Valide sultan  74, 170, 177, 179–82, 184–6

Turkish Straits  2, 215 Tursun Beg  61, 65 Tursun of Karası  34 Tzympe  36–7 Uç beys  48 Uluç Ali  129, 136, see also Kılıç Ali Uluç Hasan  6, 131, 133–6, 138–9, 144–5, 152–5, 212 admiralship  149, 154 death of  145, 148 governor of Algiers  138, 143, 145, 153–5 homosexual relations with Kılıç Ali  143, 240 n.44, 240 n.48 origins of  142–3 ulu timars  225 n.12 Umur of Aydın  9, 13, 16–20, 23–30, 33–4, 75, 87, 93–4, 209–11 alliance with Byzantines  23–4 death of  4, 27, 34 fame of  21–2 motivation of  20 raiding policy of  21 sea gazas  10, 12, 17, 19–21, 26 tomb of  219 n.55 Union, Act of  56 Uskudar  31, 35, 120 Uzun Hasan  74, 77 alliance with Venice  74, 77 Valencia  99 Vardar Yenice  108 Varna, crusade of  4, 56–7 Vedova, Marcantonio, brother-in-law of Uluç Hasan  145 Venedikli Hasan  235 n.41, see also Uluç Hasan Venice  4–6, 11–12, 38, 41, 43, 45, 47, 49, 54–5, 61, 88, 90–2, 97, 103, 113, 115, 127, 135, 141–3, 145, 150, 159, 163, 190 alliance with Uzun Hasan  74, 77 Byzantine relations  63 competition with Genoa  35–6 fleet of  167 fourth crusade  11 Lepanto  127 naval leagues  22

 Index 275 outposts of  82 peace with Mehmed II  74, 77–8, 82–3 Prevesa, battle of  107 Uluç Hasan, from  6, 135, 142–3, 145, 154 Umur  4, 26 war of 1428  55 war with Ottomans, 1463–79  72–6 war with Ottomans, 1499–1503  92, 94–5 war with Ottomans, 1684–99  192, 194, 198, 200 war with Ottomans, 1718  203–9, 213 war with Ottomans for Crete  155, 158, 160, 165–7, 171, 174, 180, 186–7, 212 Venier, Dolfin  50 Venier, Marco, Venetian ambassador  150 Vienna  122, 192 Vignoli, Vignolo de  15 Vlad Calugarul  90 von Hammer, Joseph  166 Vonitsa  69, 78 Wallachia  55 Walter of Brienne  14

Wavrin, Jean de  56 Wortley Montagu, Lady Mary  214–15 Yahsi  22, 33–4 Yakub Bey, admiral  60, 71, 73–4 Yalova  50 Yambol  48 Yanbolu, battle of  44 Yanc Bey  40 Yavasca Şahin Mehmed Pasha  60 Yaylak Mustafa Pasha, admiral 1522  101–2 Yemen  96, 161 Yusuf Pasha, Silahdar, (d. 1646)  161, 164, 166–7, 170 Zaccaria, Benedetto  16 Zaccaria, Martino  15, 26 Zaccaria family  10, 16–17, 221 n.4 Zachariadou, Elizabeth  20 Zaganos Mehmed Pasha  60, 62, 64, 66–7 governor of Gallipoli  70 Zante  78, 83, 151, 154 Zeno, Antonio, Venetian admiral 1695  197 Zeno, Pietro (d. 1345)  26 Zeno, Pietro (d. 1427)  47

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