The State of Post-conflict Reconstruction: Land, Urban Development and State-building in Juba, Southern Sudan (Eastern Africa Series, 22) 1847010946, 9781847010940

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While donors and aid agency officials anticipated clashes between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in Southern Sudan, they did not anticipate that internal divisions might stymie reconstruction, raising serious questions about the viability of an independent Southern state. Naseem Badiey is Assistant Professor of International Development and Humanitarian Action at California State University Monterey Bay Cover photograph: Looking north to Jebel Lado from a settlement on the periphery of Juba (© Naseem Badiey, 2008)

JAMES CURREY an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk IP12 3DF (GB) and 668 Mt Hope Ave, Rochester NY 14620-2731 (US) www.boydellandbrewer.com www.jamescurrey.com

The State of Post-conflict Reconstruction

Naseem Badiey examines the local dynamics of the emerging capital city of Juba, Southern Sudan, during the historically pivotal transition period following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Focusing on the intersections of land tenure reform and urban development, she challenges the dominant paradigm of ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ and re-conceptualizes state-building as a social process underpinned by negotiation. Badiey explores local resistance to reconstruction programmes, debates over the interpretation of peace settlements, and competing claims to land and resources, not as problems to be solved through interventions but as negotiations of authority which were fundamental to shaping the character of the ‘state’.

LAND, URBAN DEVELOPMENT, AND STATE-BUILDING IN JUBA, SOUTHERN SUDAN

‘an important contribution to the field of South Sudanese studies, and to the literature on state formation and post-conflict reconstruction in Africa. ... By grounding the analysis in the local struggles over land in a capital city, the author is able to demonstrate the multi-layered relations and dynamics on which national and international initiatives are ultimately contingent.’ – Dr Cherry Leonardi, University of Durham

BADIEY

‘a timely and important contribution to and on Sudanese Studies’ – Professor Guma Komey, University of Bahri, Khartoum

Naseem Badiey

The State of Post-conflict Reconstruction LAND, URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND STATE-BUILDING IN JUBA SOUTHERN SUDAN

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Eastern Africa Series THE STATE OF POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

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Eastern Africa Series Women’s Land Rights & Privatization in Eastern Africa BIRGIT ENGLERT & ELIZABETH DALEY (EDS)

War & the Politics of Identity in Ethiopia KJETIL TRONVOLL Moving People in Ethiopia ALULA PANKHURST & FRANÇOIS PIGUET (EDS)

Living Terraces in Ethiopia ELIZABETH E. WATSON Eritrea GAIM KIBREAB Borders & Borderlands as Resources in the Horn of Africa DEREJE FEYISSA & MARKUS VIRGIL HOEHNE (EDS)

After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan ELKE GRAWERT (ED.)

Land, Governance, Conflict & the Nuba of Sudan GUMA KUNDA KOMEY

Ethiopia JOHN MARKAKIS Resurrecting Cannibals HEIKE BEHREND Pastoralism & Politics in Northern Kenya & Southern Ethiopia GŰNTHER SCHLEE & ABDULLAHI A. SHONGOLO

Islam & Ethnicity in Northern Kenya & Southern Ethiopia GŰNTHER SCHLEE with ABDULLAHI A. SHONGOLO

Foundations of an African Civilisation DAVID W. PHILLIPSON Regional Integration, Identity & Citizenship in the Greater Horn of Africa KIDANE MENGISTEAB & REDIE BEREKETEAB (EDS)

Dealing with the Government in South Sudan CHERRY LEONARDI The Quest for Socialist Utopia BAHRU ZEWDE Disrupting Territories JÖRG GERTEL, RICHARD ROTTENBURG & SANDRA CALKINS (EDS)

The African Garrison State KJETIL TRONVOLL & DANIEL R. MEKONNEN

The State of Post-conflict Reconstruction NASEEM BADIEY

Gender, Home & Identity: Nuer Repatriation to Southern Sudan* KATARZYNA GRABSKA *forthcoming

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The State of Post-conflict Reconstruction Land, Urban Development & State-building in Juba, Southern Sudan NASEEM BADIEY Assistant Professor of International Development & Humanitarian Action, California State University Monterey Bay

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James Currey is an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk IP12 3DF (GB) www.jamescurrey.com and of Boydell & Brewer Inc. 668 Mt Hope Avenue, Rochester, NY 14620-2731 (US) www.boydellandbrewer.com © Naseem Badiey 2014 First published 2014 The right of Naseem Badiey to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 All Rights Reserved. Except as permitted under current legislation no part of this work may be photocopied, stored in a retrieval system, published, performed in public, adapted, broadcast, transmitted, recorded or reproduced in any form or by any means, without the prior permission of the copyright owner The publisher has no responsibility for the continued existence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-1-84701-094-0 (James Currey Cloth) This publication is printed on acid-free paper

Typeset in 10 on 12pt Cordale by Avocet Typeset, Somerton, Somerset

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Dedication

To my parents, Ozi and Mansour Badiey And for my Shrimp, with love * In memory of Jina 2006–2008

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Contents

List of Photographs and Tables

viii

Acknowledgements

ix

Acronyms

xii

Map A – Southern Sudan during the colonial period Map B – Southern Sudan, 2011 Map C – Juba, 2006

xiii xiv xv

Introduction: The Dilemma of ‘Post-conflict Reconstruction’ in South Sudan

1

1.

The Momentum of History

28

2.

‘Rebels’ and ‘Collaborators’: Integration and Reconciliation

74

3.

‘Land Belongs to the Community’: Competing Interpretations of the CPA

101

4.

The Unseeing State: Corruption, Evasion, and other Responses to Urban Planning

126

5.

Local Land Disputes: Informality, Autochthony, and Competing Ideas of Citizenship

153

Conclusion: All State-building is Local

172

Interviews

180 186 201

Bibliography Index

vii

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Photographs and Tables Photographs 1 Typical housing construction (tukls) in Juba, 2006

6

2 Juba’s single paved road, 2006

6

3 Construction materials on the bank of the Nile River, during Juba’s foundation, 1928

39

4 Tokiman B Court, 2007

62

5 Central Equatoria State Survey Department, 2006

131

6 Tent hotel in Juba, 2006

155

7 New building construction in Tongping, 2008

158

8 Informal Settlement in Gudele Block 9, 2008

165

Tables

viii

A Southern Regional Government Executives (1972–2005)

49

B Equatoria Region/Bahr el Jebel State Governors (1985–2004)

70

C Pre-Interim Period Caretaker Governors for the Ten Southern States (2005)

78

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Acknowledgements

This project reflects the incredible generosity and trust of many Southern Sudanese individuals in Khartoum and Juba who interrupted their schedules in order to answer my questions. They included senior political leaders, scholars, ex-combatants, chiefs, elders, church leaders, civil servants, administrators, refugees, aid workers, businessmen, and residents from all walks of life. Their viewpoints, reflections, and personal experiences of war and post-conflict transition are the basis for the analysis in the book. There is not enough space to thank them individually, but I am immensely grateful for their graciousness, openness, and time. I hope my interpretation of their words does justice to their struggle. I owe many thanks to Professor Wendy James, who sparked my interest in Southern Sudan during my first year at the University of Oxford. From our initial meeting in 2005, and in every encounter since, she has generously offered her immense knowledge and personal insights whenever I have asked her for help. I would not have had the confidence to undertake this endeavour, or to persist during the challenges it presented, without the support and guidance of Professor Jocelyn Alexander at the Department of International Development, Oxford University. I feel blessed to have had the benefit of her intellectual insight, her inspiring example in a field that can seem daunting, and above all her friendship. I was very lucky to also have the guidance of Dr Abdul Raufu Mustapha during my time at Queen Elizabeth House. The insights and encouragement of Dr Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, Dr Oystein Rolandsen, Professor Catherine Boone, and the late Professor Robert Collins contributed greatly to my analysis of this recent period of reconstruction in Southern Sudan. I am particularly grateful to Dr Christian Lund, who planted the seeds of this book and whose advice and help made it a possibility. His intellectual insights serve as the framework for my own theoretical inquiry. I owe a great debt of gratitude to Dr Ahmad Al-Shahi, head of the Sudan Programme at St Antony’s College, Oxford, and to Mr Bona Malwal for helping me get to Sudan, and get on my feet once I was there. Fieldwork in the most expensive town in Africa, during a time when US Government sanctions meant there was no research funding for a project

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on Sudan, was made possible by funds pieced together from Oxford Research in the Scholarship and Humanities of Africa (ORISHA), the Department of International Development (Queen Elizabeth House), the Department of Politics and International Relations, and Pembroke College, Oxford. I was fortunate to spend a year writing at the Institute of International Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. I am thankful to Professors Steve Weber and John Zysman and to Dr Martha Saavedra for their advice and support, and also to the staff and graduate students at the institute for making it such a positive experience. I am thankful to the Center for African Studies at UC Berkeley, the Oxford Transitional Justice Research Group, the Sudan Programme at St Antony’s College, the Sudan Studies Association, the African Studies Association, and the International Studies Association for the opportunity to present and develop this work. Many thanks to Zoe Marks, Matthew Wilhelm-Solomon, Katharine Marsh, and Richard Stanley whose comments on early drafts helped shape this project. I am very grateful to Dr Cherry Leonardi and Dr Guma Komey whose detailed comments helped make the final draft a polished manuscript. Their own work has been a great resource. Christian Doll appeared at the last minute to offer a much-needed proofread, and his insights on the planning process in Ramciel. I am extremely thankful to Douglas Johnson who in various capacities has helped propel this project forward to fruition. I have had the good fortune of being able to draw on his extensive knowledge of the history and politics of Sudan, and of being subjected to his high standards as an editor and a reviewer. I would also like to express my gratitude to Jaqueline Mitchell, Lynn Taylor, and Frances Kennett at James Currey for their patience and support through the process. It truly was an enjoyable experience. Many thanks to the Sudan Archive at the University of Durham Library for permission to use maps and photographs for this book. I am grateful to Jane Hogan and Mike Harkness for their generous help during the final months of my work. Likewise, to Darin Jensen of the UC Berkeley Cartography and GIS Education (CAGE) lab for helping me find Chippie Kislik, who drew the beautiful maps in this book. I am blessed with a family that has grown over the course of writing this book. My parents provided support in so many different ways over the years. Thank you to my brother Nima Badiey for doing all the things older brothers do. Also to Christian Helmers, who has lived with this book manuscript almost as long as I have. And a special thank you to my daughter, Summer Helmers, who came into our lives eight months before the book was finished, and who has filled every day since with joy. I would not have been able to conduct research in Juba without the support of friends whose paths coincided with mine during the summers of 2006 and 2008: Tom Rhodes, Peter Baumann, Michael Honigstein, Maluak Atem, Jimmy Makuach, and Bol Madut. I am especially thankful

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Acknowledgements

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to Oumar Sylla, Veronica Champion, Andrew Pendleton, and David Gressley, without whose help early one morning in August 2008, I might not have made it home. Some of my dearest friends in Juba cannot be named, but this work is a testament to their lives and unflagging will during a generation of loss. Lastly, I am eternally grateful to my host family in Juba for welcoming me into their home, for nursing me while I was sick, and for teaching me that love and understanding know no cultural, economic, or political bounds. Mama Bianca, Teresa, Marline, Josphine, Lucky, Leili, and all the uncles and aunts: I miss you. My brother William, you are a great research assistant, and a true friend.

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Acronyms

BCA CANS CCSS CES CPA GoS GoSS HEC ICC ICRC ICSS IDP IGAD JAM LRA MDTF-SS NCP NIF NGO OLS SANU SAF SPLA SPLM SPLM/A SSDF SSU UNDP UNHCR UNOCHA USAID

xii

Bari Community Association Civil Authority for the New Sudan Coordinating Council for the Southern State Central Equatoria State Comprehensive Peace Agreement Government of Sudan Government of Southern Sudan High Executive Council International Criminal Court International Committee for the Red Cross Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan Internally Displaced Person Inter-Governmental Authority on Development Joint Assessment Mission Lord’s Resistance Army Multi Donor Trust Fund – Southern Sudan National Congress Party National Islamic Front Non-Governmental Organization Operation Lifeline Sudan Sudan African National Union Sudan Armed Forces Sudan People’s Liberation Army Sudan People’s Liberation Movement Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army South Sudan Defence Forces Sudan Socialist Union United Nations Development Program United Nations High Commission for Refugees United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs United States Agency for International Development

60

140 mi

220 km

BELGIAN C ON GO

(Based on maps used with permission of the University of Durham Library (SAD/PF 25/2/5–6, and SAD/PF 34/1 – 1951))

Map A Southern Sudan during colonial period

La d o En clave

I n te r na tio n a l bo u n d a ries

19 48 p rovid en ce b oun d a ries

100

0

Yambio

UGA N DA P ROTEC TOR AT E

Terakeka Lado Mongalla JUBA Gondokoro Rejaf Torit Yei

Bor

K EN YA C OLON Y

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0

Ba

Equatoria

ile ite N Wh

Rumbek

AB YS SIN IA

ea

FREN CH EQUATOR IAL AFR IC A

Upper Nile

SU DA N

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zal Gha el r h

Malakal

EGYP T dS Re

Bahr el Ghazal

Arab Bahr el

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Ba

(Based on map used with permission of the United Nations (No. 4450 Rev.1))

Map B Southern Sudan, 2011

Western Equatoria

Yei

Kapoeta

Eastern Equatoria

Nasir

UGA N DA

Kajo Keji

Torit

Terakeka Mongalla JUBA Gondokoro

Bor

Jonglei

Malakal

Central Rejaf Equatoria

Lainya

Rumbek

Lakes

ile ite N Wh

DEM OC RAT IC RE P UBLI C OF THE CON GO

C EN TRAL AFRI C AN RE P UBLIC

Western Bahr el Ghazal

Bentiu

60

K E N YA

ET H I OP IA

100

0 0

140 mi

220 km

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Warrap

zal Gha el hr

Abyei

Upper Nile

ea

Unity

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Arab Bahr el

SU DA N

dS Re

So u th e rn S ud a n s t a te b o u nd a ries Bo rd e r o f t h e s e mi-a ut o no mo u s re g io n o f So u th e rn Su d a n Jo n g le i Ca na l Dis pu te d A bye i re g io n

I nt er na t io na l b o u n d a rie s

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Juba-Terakeka-Bor R oad

dS Re

ea

New Customs Market

Rejaf

LOLOGO

White House Prison

KATOR

Juba Airport

-T or

it- N

imule R oad

Gumba

MTC

JUBA TOWN (city center)

HAI MALAKAL

Juba Teaching Hospital

ATLABARA ‘B’

Juba University

UNOCHA Camp

TONGPING

Old Customs Market

GoSS Secretariat/ Ministries

MUNUKI

(Based on a map used with permission of the Regional Centre for Mapping of Resource for Development)

Map C Juba, 2006

Juba-Yei Roa d

SUDAN

E G YPT

GUDELE

0 0

1 1 mi

2 km

NEIGHB OURH OODS

Main Roads Points of Interest

0.5

Gondokoro Island

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Juba na Bari

e

N il

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a Jub

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Introduction: The Dilemma of ‘Post-conflict Reconstruction’ in South Sudan

‘It is in local struggles over power and authority that states must take root’. Jocelyn Alexander, The Unsettled Land Local teacher, Paul Nuduru, waited outside his polling place in Juba all night so that he would be at the head of the line to cast his vote in the January 9, 2011 referendum on the independence of Southern Sudan. He explained to a BBC reporter: We watched the light of the sun rise up this morning – the dawn of a new chapter for the south. We are happy to wait for this day of history, because we have waited for more than fifty years for the right to choose our own destiny.1

For Paul and millions of other citizens of the semi-autonomous territory of Southern Sudan,2 the referendum offered the rare opportunity to create a new state, one that after years of conflict and underdevelopment would finally be responsive to the needs of the peoples who inhabit the region. The outcome proved momentous. The result was a near unanimous call for the creation of an independent country, the Republic of South Sudan.3 The significance of this event to Sudan, the region, and indeed the international community, cannot be overstated. After a two-decade civil war that killed nearly two million people and displaced another four million civilians,4 after a deadly conflict in the western province of Darfur that resulted in the indictment of President Bashir on seven counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes, and three counts of genocide by the International Criminal Court, the prospect of peace through separation has monumental implications.5 The creation of an independent, demo1 Peter Martell, ‘Sudan referendum: Carnival in south, concern in north’, BBC, 9 January 2011. 2 A note on nomenclature: ‘southern Sudan’ refers to the region prior to the CPA; ‘Southern Sudan’ refers to the semi-autonomous region during the Interim Period; ‘South Sudan’ refers to the independent state following the 2011 referendum. 3 98.8% voted for independence in a 97.58% voter turnout. South Sudan Referendum Commission. 4 ‘Sudan: Nearly 2 million dead as a result of the world’s longest running civil war’, U.S. Committee for Refugees, 2001. 5 Marlise Simons, ‘International Court Adds Genocide to Charges Against Sudan Leader’, New York Times, 12 July 2010; Mike Pflanz, ‘Sudanese president may face

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Introduction

cratic South Sudanese state, allied with the United States and Western European nations, could help transform a region characterized by extreme underdevelopment, trans-border militia activity, and unceasing conflict. Furthermore, how the new South Sudanese government goes about the process of state-building will inform countless international interventions in post-conflict settings across the world. The referendum was provided for by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which ended two decades of civil war between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A).6 The Sudanese government, an authoritarian regime headed by President Omar al-Bashir, had come to power in a 1989 military coup, and thereafter pursued an Islamist agenda. The SPLM/A, a guerrilla army comprised of predominantly southern fighters, had been fighting to replace the central government with a democratic and secular regime that would distribute resources and development to the southern region and other marginalized peripheries of the country. The CPA at last resolved the state-building agendas of the two sides: it provided for a powersharing Government of National Unity based in Khartoum, and it established the semi-autonomous region of Southern Sudan, which would be governed by a new regional government based on a decentralized framework of ten southern states (see Map B). The SPLM/A was given a mandate to establish the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) headquartered in the town of Juba (see Map C). During a six-year ‘Interim Period’ between the CPA and the referendum, both sides resolved to ‘make unity attractive’, while building the institutions necessary for a possible future separation.7 Donor governments pledged $4.5 billion to support reconstruction efforts.8 In the period following the CPA, the question of state-building in Southern Sudan was largely framed as a matter of north–south relations by western policy experts. Amidst continued distrust between Bashir’s National Congress Party (NCP) and SPLM leaders, delays in CPA implementation, sporadic fighting between Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and militias aligned with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF),9 and (cont.) genocide charges’, The Telegraph, 3 February 2010; Mariette le Roux, ‘ICC to review absence of genocide on Beshir warrant’, Agence France Presse, 3 February 2010; International Criminal Court, ‘Pre-Trial Chamber I issues a second warrant of arrest against Omar Al Bashir for counts of genocide’, 12 July 2010. 6 Hereafter I use ‘SPLM/A’ to refer to the rebel organization prior to the CPA, and ‘SPLM’ to refer to the organization after the CPA when its transformation into a regional government, regional army, and national political party had begun. ‘SPLA’ refers only to the military arm of the movement. 7 The Agreed Principles of the Machakos Protocol bind both parties to: ‘Design and implement the Peace Agreement so as to make the unity of the Sudan an attractive option especially to the people of South Sudan’, Part A, 15.5.5 Machakos Protocol. 8 See: ‘Oslo Donors’ Conference on Sudan 2005 – Chair’s Conclusions’, 12 April 2005. Available from: www.issafrica.org/AF/profiles/sudan/darfur/oslodonor. pdf. [Accessed on: 31 July 2009] 9 Among the various militia operating throughout southern Sudan during this period were the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) operating in Eastern, Central and

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The Dilemma of ‘Post-conflict Reconstruction’ in South Sudan

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international focus on the conflict in Darfur, the development community’s attention was focused on whether agreements on border demarcation, citizenship and nationality, oil-sharing, and security arrangements between the leaders of GoS and those of the new GoSS could provide the necessary environment for peace-building. There was no disputing the fact that establishing the foundations of constructive relations between the north and south would be critical to building an independent and secure southern state. Positive north-south relations were not, however, sufficient to build a viable and stable state in Southern Sudan. The state being established in South Sudan and the obstacles it faced during the Interim Period were not merely a matter of legal agreements brokered between government leaders. Rather, the premise of this book is that national-level initiatives are interpreted, contested, and adapted at the local level; they are contingent on local dynamics. The incredible amount of resources that have been poured into reconstruction since the CPA is a testament to the fact that the success of statebuilding is a priority for the international community. However, in the dawn of South Sudan’s independence still little is known about the local actors who are charged with building Africa’s newest independent state.10 Their interests, their differences, and the multiple strategies that are shaping their interactions with the new government, remain poorly understood. In addressing this gap, this book undertakes an analysis of the local dynamics of ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ in Juba, Southern Sudan, during the Interim Period (2005–2011). The insights gained from analysing the post-conflict reconstruction process in the initial period following the CPA will be relevant to analyses of the state-building process in South Sudan in the years to come.

JUBA, SOUTH SUDAN: THE CAPITAL OF AN UNCONSOLIDATED STATE Nowhere in South Sudan is the contingent nature of state-building more evident than in the capital, Juba. A sprawling town nestled in the valley between the Jaral Marata mountain range and the Bahr el Jebel River (Map C), Juba and its surrounding areas are considered to be within the ancestral homeland of the Bari, a people that number approximately 60–70,000. As an administrative and commercial centre, however, the town has been home to Sudanese from all over the country, as well as communities of foreigners, since its formation in the Anglo-Egyptian colonial period. Since Western Equatoria States, remnants of the Southern Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) led by Gabriel Tang Ginya in Upper Nile, and Lou Nuer gunmen in Jonglei state. 10 Total foreign aid to southern Sudan during the Interim Period amounted to approximately $4 billion. The US, the UK, and Norway were the largest donors (source: www.ifdc.org). US aid to Sudan in 2008 amounted to $666.8 million; $934.1 million in 2009; $427.7 million in 2010; and in 2011 it was $400.2 million (source: Ted Dagne, ‘US Foreign Assistance Issues’, Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress,’ 15 September 2011. (cont.)

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Introduction

then Juba has been at the centre of complex, and at times competing, forces of social, political, and institutional change that have accompanied the construction of the state in southern Sudan. As a result, the town’s identity has been a source of contention, a question around which debates about land rights, community membership and political jurisdiction continue to orbit. Juba was the capital of the first Southern Regional Government in the period following the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which ended Sudan’s first civil war (1963–1972). In the eleven years of southern self-government, divisions amongst southern political leaders paved the way for the dissolution of the Southern Regional Government by President Jaafar Nimeiri in 1981, and the re-division of the region into three new states by presidential order in 1983. The subsequent destruction of southern autonomy, in combination with a series of other grievances, including redrawing of the border to incorporate newly-discovered southern oil fields in the north, the Jonglei Canal project, and the imposition of Sharia law throughout the country, led to the emergence of the SPLM/A and the outbreak of the second civil war. During this period (1983–2004), Juba became the key strategic government-controlled garrison town in the south, an isolated northern outpost encircled by rebel-held territory. Many local Equatorian elites became members of the NCP and worked in the institutions of the northern civil service or SAF in the town. As a result, the local question of southern identity was further shaped by Khartoum’s counterinsurgency war and the ambivalent position of local elites in opposition to the SPLM/A’s ‘freedom fighters’. Due to the complex history of the town, in the period leading up to the CPA the question of whether to locate the southern capital in Juba engendered great debate. As a result of its history as a colonial administrative centre and as a focus of northern government in southern Sudan, the town had the most developed infrastructure and the largest number of trained civil service personnel in the region. The SPLM/A leadership was eager to demonstrate that GoSS was the government of all of Southern Sudan – not just of the areas that had already been under SPLM/A control during the war. Yet SPLM/A leaders had reservations about the choice of Juba because of its divided history, concerned that there would be a repeat of the political rivalries of the Addis Ababa period. They considered locating the capital in Ramciel, at the convergence of Upper Nile, Central Equatoria and Jonglei states in the geographic centre of Southern Sudan. Ultimately, however, under pressure from international partners, it was decided that Juba was the optimal choice for the location of the southern capital due to its infrastructure and population.11 The challenges of building the southern government in a town with a strong regional identity, whose population had lived and worked within the institutions of the northern government, were anticipated, although perhaps not as seriously as they might have been. The focus, rather, was on the massive reconstruction effort that would be required to turn the war-torn town into a capital city. 11 Both the CPA and the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan declared Juba to be the capital of Southern Sudan.

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At the time of the CPA, most of the town’s inhabitants had no access to running water, electricity, or sanitation facilities. The available health centres, supported by churches and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), were inadequate for the town’s population. Due to the unavailability and high cost of building materials, most residents lived in tukls made of mud brick and grass roofs (Photograph 1).12 The few permanent structures dated from the colonial period and were in serious disrepair. The town’s underdevelopment was the basis for an ambitious reconstruction agenda, one that envisioned the creation of a ‘modern’ multiethnic and inclusive capital city, which could absorb in-migrants from all areas of Southern Sudan and propel the development of the entire region. By the summer of 2006 the town was on the cusp of dramatic change. The last of the SAF had left, the military curfew had been lifted, and roads had been opened to Uganda and Kenya, allowing new, more affordable produce and manufactured goods into the town for the first time in years. An influx of aid workers, GoSS bureaucrats, former SPLA soldiers, migrant workers and returnees from bordering countries had begun. At the time, estimates of the town’s population ranged from 250,000 to 500,000 inhabitants.13 Despite the rapid demographic changes, there were few signs of urban development. There were no major utilities or road works. The town’s single paved road was clogged with new automobile traffic, but it was still filled with large pot-holes (Photograph 2). By 2008, the population had doubled, with some NGOs estimating that it had reached 1 million.14 The existing housing stock and infrastructure could barely accommodate the burgeoning population. Most of the town’s residents still had no electricity, sanitation facilities, or clean water, and continued to use the river to get water for bathing, cooking, and drinking. In all, little progress had been made in realizing the vision of Juba as a ‘modern’ capital. A Sudan Tribune article at the time criticized the delays in urban development in Southern Sudan: Those who visited [the] southern Sudan capital Juba…during the period between January 2006 and March 2007, would notice that Juba and most capitals of the southern Sudan states… have not changed in terms of development…there seems to be no interest among the stakeholders that things should move ahead…. why is [it] that despite the availability of funds in billions since the first budget was approved in 2005, roads are not paved in the main towns, hospitals are not built, 12 Tukls are traditional mud huts. They are the predominant housing structure in southern Sudan. Building tukls is comparatively inexpensive, as many of the materials, such as twigs, teak wood, grass, and clay, can be gathered from forests and riverbeds. 13 The Juba Assessment Report’s 2005 estimate of Juba’s population is 250,000, of which 163,000 are categorized as ‘residents’ and the remainder as IDPs. The 2006 JICA Study Team estimate range is far higher at 417,800–520,000. The 2009 Census calculated Juba’s population to be 372,413, but the results were challenged by the SPLM. See: Isaac Vuni, ‘South Sudan parliament throw outs census results’, Sudan Tribune, 8 July 2009. 14 ‘JICA President Visits Africa’s Fastest Growing City to Study Its Problems,’ 19 February 2008. Available from JICA website: http://www.jica.go.jp/english/ news/field/archive/2008/080219.html [Accessed on: 5 May 2011].

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1 Typical housing construction (tukls) in Juba, 2006 (© Naseem Badiey)

2 Juba’s single paved road, 2006 (© Naseem Badiey)

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clean water and sewerage systems are not in place, thousands of police and civil servants from the SPLM liberated areas and those from the NCP controlled towns are not yet integrated, and schools are not built?15

The slow progress of urban development frustrated SPLM leaders, baffled their international partners, and called into question the capacity and authority of the new southern government. The influx of foreign aid and technical assistance immediately after the CPA was a testament to the fact that Southern Sudan was high on the agenda of the international community. What then explains the slow pace of urban reconstruction in the town in the first years of the Interim Period? The answer lies in the competing visions of urban development and political authority between SPLM planners and GoSS leaders on the one hand and CES and the local elites on the other. While many Jubans came out to celebrate the CPA, beneath the surface of the initial jubilation that accompanied a peace that appeared to favour the south lay a growing uncertainty at what the future would bring for the town’s inhabitants. A 2005 news article describes the celebrations accompanying the arrival of the SPLA into the town: After the parade, the crowd – consisting of all kinds of Sudanese communities – broke up and started dancing, wearing traditional dress and waving banners and flags…They were soon joined by the soldiers and everybody was shouting with relief, excitement and joy.16

Just one year later, local anxieties about change had turned into outright opposition to the SPLM’s urban reconstruction agenda. Weary of the influx of non-Equatorian returnees into the town, Bari elites and their representatives in the Central Equatoria State (CES) Government allied in opposition to the SPLM-led urban development plans for the town. Bari traditional and civic leaders, and their non-Bari Equatorian representatives in the CES Government, invoked the CPA’s recognition of ‘community’ rights to land in order to claim authority over land in the peri-urban areas surrounding the town, impeding large-scale housing development that would enable the permanent settlement of thousands of returning refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Bari youth vandalized housing development projects that were already under way. CES Government leaders challenged GoSS’ jurisdiction over Juba and its role in the land allocation process within the town’s boundaries. CES bureaucrats evaded capacity building, hoarded land and allocated plots outside the official system, making it difficult for new residents – many of them working for GoSS – to find affordable housing. Resistance to the allocation of land held under customary law by Bari leaders, and battles over jurisdiction between GoSS and CES Government leaders impeded urban planning initiatives. The acute housing shortage fuelled land disputes throughout the town’s neighbourhoods as the paths of 15 J. G. Nyuot Yoh, ‘Who is responsible for delays of development in New Sudan regions?’ Sudan Tribune. 16 March 2007. 16 ‘Sudan: Southern Constitution Signed As SPLA Forces Enter Juba’, IRIN, 6 December 2005.

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long-time residents crossed with returning refugees, IDPs, and ex-combatants – all of them desperate for plots of land which would enable them to build new lives in the capital. Clearly, the local Equatorian elites blocking urban development stood to gain from a peaceful transition and a successful period of local autonomy, which might lead to an independent southern state. What, then, explains the resistance to urban reconstruction amongst local elites in Juba? Before attempting to answer that question, it is necessary to interrogate the notion of a ‘local elite’. Given the formation of the town as a specifically multi-ethnic centre during the colonial period, and the various stages of in-migration in the post-independence period, the attribution of the label ‘local elite’ to a particular group or groups in the town warrants a degree of circumspection. Indeed, the criteria for being ‘local’ or even ‘indigenous’ vary among the various residents of the town, and the labels often mean different things in different contexts. In this book, ‘local elite’ refers to control of the institutions of the local state (comprised not only of all the different levels of government in Juba, but also of traditional leaders such as chiefs, as well as the leadership of civic organizations and religious institutions), insofar as the state is constituted continually through the interactions of these various groups. But it could just as easily refer to the merchant elite, the foreign NGO community, or the growing bureaucracy of GoSS officials. Moreover, membership in the ‘local elite’ does not preclude international ties or multiple memberships in such organizations as national political parties, for example, the NCP, membership in the Diaspora, or religious organizations, all of which transcend the local arena. Yet for the purpose of this analysis, such relationships and connections, and the multiple ways in which ‘elite’ status are experienced and conceived, are excluded from the discussion. They are not, however, denied.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND KEY ARGUMENTS In analysing state-building from the unique vantage point of one town, this work is motivated equally by methodological and theoretical aims. Firstly, it seeks to reveal the importance of the much-neglected domain of local state-building, where, it is argued, much of the business of state construction takes place. It contends that the challenges of reconstruction in South Sudan can only be understood within a historically-rooted analysis of local state-building, rather than in the policies and actions of aid organizations and NGOs. As such, this case study builds upon the conceptualizations of the state and of ‘stateness’, and correspondingly, of investigations into how post-conflict reconstruction and state-building operate, unfold, and are realized on a daily basis. What becomes evident is that outside interventions are only part of the story, and local actors have considerably more influence over outcomes than is warranted by their representation in academic research or programmatic priorities. The second aim of the book is to interrogate the role of land dynamics – debates, disputes, and processes of claim-making – in local state-building.

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Given the centrality of land tenure to the history of state construction in Africa, the question of the role that it plays in the multi-faceted process of ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ is of great interest. This is not only in terms of how state actors apply land tenure rules, through legal frameworks and judicial processes, but also how a variety of actors at the local level – excombatants, religious leaders, returning refugees, and leaders of particular communities – have employed narratives that reveal a variety of understandings of land tenure to influence local state-building processes. A historically-rooted local analysis reveals how the policies of indirect rule, which emphasised ethnicity and authochthony, have shaped contemporary land dynamics in Africa. It demonstrates the importance of land to the strategies of groups; and it increases our understanding of how land tenure can be instrumentalized in local state-building. The central argument put forth in this regard is that various local actors in Juba used land tenure strategically in order to promote particular interests in the process of local state-building. Through their attempts to claim rights to, authority over, and interests in land, they articulated a particular set of interests in reconstruction, ultimately seeking to fashion a version of citizenship that favoured themselves. In making the link between local state-building and debates over land, this book also naturally engages with ongoing debates about the nature of local politics in South Sudan, in particular whether the disputes over land and political jurisdiction that were observed in Juba during the Interim Period were the result of ethnic competition, or whether they were related to more complex political associations and strategies. The perception that the land debate in Juba was foremost about ethnic group identity was widespread amongst political leaders and aid agency officials, confirming popular interpretations of local politics in South Sudan as ‘tribalistic’. In the news media, in the speeches of public officials, and in interviews with Sudanese and international informants in the Interim Period, the divisive politics of the post-Addis Ababa period was held up as an example of the fierce parochialism and ethnic rivalry that marked Juba’s political landscape. It was also offered as evidence by critics of the south’s inability to govern itself. The questions of so-called ‘tribalism’ and related practices of nepotism and corruption are relevant to concerns regarding South Sudan’s ability to function as a stable multi-ethnic state in the future. In detailing the complex priorities and strategies of the local actors involved in Juba’s land debates, this volume offers a different reading of local political history and recent events than one framed within an ethnic lens. The identities of ‘Dinka’ and ‘Equatorian’, which are so often employed as natural and opposed – in the South Sudanese news media, in policy reports, and in the daily discourses of the aid industry – are deconstructed and revealed to be spurious categorizations. Indeed, such labels obscure not just the diverse array of groups that are contained within each category, but also internal divisions along a number of axes. Claims to land in the capital, based on autochthony, are examined alongside the multi-ethnic history of the town, and analysed as strategies used to further the complex and over-

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lapping interests of Juba’s local actors. Local resistance to SPLM-led urban development during the Interim Period, by local elites – both Bari and nonBari Equatorian – reflected an ambivalence towards the state, which was the product of a history of contact with exploitative, violent, and external military states beginning in the nineteenth century and continuing through the second civil war. Seen within the frame of this legacy, resistance to the SPLM urban reconstruction agenda in Juba, claims to autochthony, and a desire for ethnic privilege in the local sphere, all of which appeared as ‘tribal’ competition over land, reflect anxiety about the expansion of the state and the negative impact of its policies on local institutions.17 Therefore, while identity has admittedly played a large role in the politics of state-building in the post-independence period, it is argued here that ethnic rivalry alone does not explain the destructive political divisions of the post-Addis Ababa period, or the struggles of GoSS in Juba during the Interim Period. The relationship between land, group identity, and political jurisdiction was, and remains, more complex than a simple ethnic reading might suggest.

The state of post-conflict reconstruction Since the end of the Cold War, ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ remains a central component in the international development agenda. Amidst increased intervention in developing world conflicts in the early 1990s, the UN retreated from its traditional role as neutral arbiter, outlined in the 1945 Charter, and embraced a more active role in creating structures that would aid in the institutionalization of peace.18 By the first decade of the 2000s, donor governments had embraced the new interventionist paradigm, establishing inter-agency bureaus for reconstruction and stabilization.19 This indicated a convergence between peace-building and ‘state-building’, defined as ‘efforts to reconstruct, or in some cases to establish for the first time, an effective indigenous government in a state or territory where no such capacity exists or where the capacity has been seriously eroded’.20 At its core, this is an ideological project: the desire to create liberal democratic states in the developing world. It is premised in This argument builds on Cherry Leonardi’s recent article, ‘Paying “buckets of blood” for the land: moral debates over economy, war and state in Southern Sudan’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 49:2 (2011), pp. 216–218. 18 United Nations, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992’, A/47/277– S/24111, 17 June 1992, para. 15; United Nations, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace. Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations’, A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995. 19 The US and UK governments each reorganized their post-conflict activities into inter-agency bureaus for reconstruction and stabilization in 2004. The governments of Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, and Australia followed suit. 20 Richard Caplan, ‘International Authority and State Building: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Global Governance, 10, (2004), p. 53. In the United States ‘statebuilding’ is often referred to as ‘nation-building’; see for example: James Dobbins et al., The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building (Rand Corporation, 2007). 17

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part on the Kantian belief that liberal democracies are less prone to conflict, and therefore that democratization is an effective tool of peacemaking.21 Although predictions of the ‘universalization of western liberal democracy as the final form of human government’ have proved premature,22 the idea that liberal democracy offers the surest path to peace, both within and between states, has become the orthodoxy amongst western governments and international agencies. As the mandate of external interventions in developing world conflicts have expanded, the challenge of building liberal democratic states in the aftermath of conflict has become the focus of a nascent subset of literature within international relations on ‘post-conflict reconstruction’.23 Some of this work takes a critical approach to the new interventionist paradigm, challenging the means with which these goals are pursued, in particular with respect to the authoritarian nature and military aspects of reconstruction interventions, and the poor understanding of the societies undergoing transformation.24 International relations scholars in this realm acknowledge that policy is not derived from local concerns and needs, but rather from formulaic ‘one-size-fits-all’ approaches devised by western experts. They maintain that the search for a single model of reconstruction that is focused on improving the approaches of international actors and agencies comes at the expense of a deeper engagement with the political dynamics on the ground, decrying what they see as the erroneous characterization of post-conflict settings as devoid of local politics through the use of terms such as ‘blank slate’, ‘institutional vacuum’, and ‘ground zero’ by reconstruction officials and in aid agency reports.25 This correlates to the spurious notion of war as ‘development in 21 Michael Doyle, ‘Liberalism and World Politics’, American Political Science Review 80:4 (1986), pp.1151–69; Michael Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12:4 (1983), pp. 323–53; Kenneth Waltz, ‘Kant, Liberalism and War’, American Political Science Review, 56 (1962), pp. 331–40. For critiques of the liberal peace thesis, see: Sebastian Rosato, ‘The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory’, American Political Science Review 97:4 (2003), pp.585– 602; David Kinsella, ‘No Rest for the Democratic Peace’, Michael Doyle, ‘Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace’, and Sebastian Rosato, ‘Explaining the Democratic Peace’, all in a special issue of the American Political Science Review 99:3 (2005). 22 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books, 1993). 23 See for example: Charles Call and Vanessa Wyeth, Building States to Build Peace (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008); Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: democratization and nationalist conflict (New York: Norton, 2000). 24 This literature review builds on a report by Abdul Raufu Mustapha: ‘Peace and State Building in Africa: Regime types, Political institutions, Leadership styles, & Civic engagement’, prepared for the African Development Bank, Tunis, Tunisia, February 2010. 25 Christopher Cramer, Civil War is not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for Violence in Developing Countries (London: Hurst & Co, 2006), p. 255–256. Cramer cites Chopra, who discusses the international community’s assumption of a terra nullius in East Timor. See: Jarat Chopra, ‘Building State Failure in East Timor’, Development and Change, 33:5 (2002), pp. 979–1000.

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reverse’, which has served as the basis for a standard model of reconstruction based on an institutional overhaul in the self-image of the western liberal state. Taking these criticisms further, a small minority of scholars question the premise of externally-led liberal democratic state-building altogether, seeing it as a neo-colonialist enterprise predicated on an unequal power relationship across the north-south divide.26 This challenges the self-perception of reconstruction as the result of a normative shift in international relations towards a greater humanitarian impulse, and exposes its ideological and realpolitik underpinnings. It becomes clear then that reconstruction is motivated not by the benevolent aim of promoting development and democracy, but by the security interests of western states, and on a global regime of governance based on unequal relations between international actors and local populations.27 Aside from the dark shadow this casts across all international interventions, the problem with such an approach to humanitarianism, it is argued, is the ‘pathologization’ of the developing world, whereby local peoples are cast as victims, perceived to be incapable of solving their own problems, and in need of enlightened outside intervention. It is part of an exercise of power, an effort to manage and normalize global relations that are at their core based on domination and subordination.28 Chandler casts this as an ‘empire in denial’, arguing that rather than empowering developing world citizens, interventions based on discourses of ‘the responsibility to protect’, ‘good governance’, the ‘rule of law’, and ‘human rights’ entail a righteous process of regulation and control.29 Situating the problematic of externally-led intervention within unequal global power structures raises the question of whether international actors can, in alliance, transform developing countries at all. Some scholars go as far as dismissing the project of post-conflict reconstruction as futile social and political engineering based on misguided faith in institutional universalism and technical solutions.30 Ottoway, for example, argues that while outsiders can create ‘organizational structures that bear a resemblance to the functioning, legitimate institutions of stable 26 Michael Barnett et al., ‘Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name?’ Global Governance 13 (2007), p. 52; Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000). 27 Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars; The Merging of Development and Security (London and New York: Zed Books, 2001). In his study of a development project in Lesotho, James Ferguson offers a detailed illustration of how external interventions misread local situations and result in unexpected political effects. See: James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine; Development, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 28 Caroline Hughes and Vanessa Pupavac, ‘Framing Post-conflict Societies: International Pathologisation of Cambodia and the Post-Yugoslav States’, Third World Quarterly 26:1 (2005), pp. 873–89. 29 David Chandler, ‘Back to the future? The limits of neo-Wilsonian ideals of exporting democracy’, Review of International Studies, 32:03 (2006), p. 483. 30 Catherine Goetze and Dejan Guzina, ‘Peacebuilding, Statebuilding, Nationbuilding – Turtles All the Way Down?’ Civil Wars, 10:4 (2008), pp. 320–321; Cramer, Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing, p. 277.

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states’,31 for organizations to become real institutions requires more than financial and technical assistance, but rather ‘domestic political processes that take time and can only be marginally affected by donors’.32 Cramer maintains that creating a legitimate government capable of overcoming the consequences of war requires an understanding of the local politics that emerge out of wartime dynamics. Challenging the ‘new wars’ thesis, he contends that conflict is not an aberration, an absence of normal relations, but can become a source of meaning, as well as serve a variety of ‘functions’, enable the pursuit of various agendas of political and social conflict, and provide employment and/or material sustenance to a large number of people, many of them far from elite.33

These critiques challenge the pervasive view that local dynamics are irrelevant to reconstruction outcomes, and that solutions come from outside the polities undergoing transformation. They point to the fact that the most likely place in which meaningful and workable solutions can be found is within the communities undergoing transformation. Yet just as the discussion in this literature is about to shift the disciplinary paradigm and open up a new avenue of research, it abruptly stops, exposing a glaring gap. Scholars of reconstruction do not continue their investigation at the level of the societies being reconstructed. Few, if any, case studies of reconstruction from a local perspective are attempted. Despite their provocative challenges to the self-image of the reconstruction industry, and despite acknowledging the fact that new stable and legitimate institutions must emerge out of existing social forces, or that they must reflect the interests, pressures, and demands of the local actors,34 even the most critical branches of the reconstruction literature persist in focusing mainly on international state-builders. In so doing, they perpetuate the presumption that it is the actions and interventions of international actors that determine the course of reconstruction. Local actors, who are the clients of reconstruction, remain shadows in the background, passive recipients of foreign help. In the end, the question of what local actors want out of reconstruction, what their interests and aspirations are, and how they would choose to prioritize their needs, is left unanswered. Consequently, while we are offered important insights into the challenges of foreign intervention, as a result of its disciplinary focus on international actors, organizations, and norms, the international relations approach engenders significant methodological and theoretical gaps in 31 Marina Ottoway, ‘Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States,’ Development and Change, 33:5 (2002), p. 1004. 32 Ibid., p. 1016. 33 Cramer, Civil War Is Not a Stupid Thing, p. 282. For critiques of the ‘New Wars’ thesis, see: Morton Boas, ‘The Liberian Civil War: New War/Old War?’ Global Society 19:1 (2005), pp.73–88; Stathis Kalyvas, ‘“New” and “Old” Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?’ World Politics 54:1 (2001), pp.99–118; Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars. 34 Chandler, ‘Back to the future?’ p. 478 with reference to Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 11; Goetze and Guzina, ‘Peacebuilding, State-building, Nationbuilding’, p. 341.

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the areas of the domestic and local dynamics that shape processes of reconstruction. The ways in which reconstruction interventions are subverted, appropriated and resisted by those in whose name they are being propagated, are missed. Local interests and confrontations, and their role in shaping remain obscured. What is left is at best a partial answer to questions regarding reconstruction outcomes. The case of Juba stands as an example of how local dynamics can shape and even drive reconstruction. At the time of the CPA, Juba was in many ways an archetype of a war-torn town. Physically isolated for much of the civil war, the town’s inhabitants had suffered untold hardships from military occupation, militia activity, economic suffocation, and lack of social services. The infrastructure was devastated; the local economy in shambles; locals were traumatized; social networks were fractured; political institutions were in disarray. Yet despite all these consequences of decades of war, the town was not a ‘blank slate’ upon which to implement even the most well-intentioned vision of statehood. Contrary to the expectations of reconstruction planners – both SPLM leaders and their international partners – civil war had not halted political, economic, and social relations in the town. On the contrary: people took opportunities for power and accumulation where they could find them, social relations evolved, alliances formed, and institutional culture developed. In the face of hardships and extraordinary constraints, local political identities took on strong and somewhat parochial trajectories. Although the town’s bureaucrats, politicians, traditional leaders, and long-time residents were supportive of the CPA and committed to the cause of an autonomous Southern Sudan, many feared retribution for their cooperation with the northern government, and were sceptical about the prospect of an SPLM-led state. As the deadline for the referendum approached, it became increasingly clear that the attitudes and actions of local stakeholders were having a significant and sustained impact on the reconstruction of the town. Indeed, local actors were successful curbing the power of the agents of reconstruction: the SPLM-led GoSS and their international partners The ability of local actors to impede the urban reconstruction agenda of the SPLM leaders of GoSS presents a challenge to the premise of externally-led, top-down humanitarian interventions. Underpinning approaches to externally-led state-building, it is argued here, is a misconceptualization of the post-conflict state as a discrete, neutral, regulating entity. In this view the state is comprised of a unified set of structures that can be ‘built’ or rebuilt through an accumulation of laws, policies and programmes, or ‘right ways of doing things’ based on western experiences in other post-conflict settings. This model is rooted in the ideal of a Weberian bureaucratic state: cohesive and distinct from society, and in possession of the legitimacy, authority, and monopoly on violence to secure and regulate populations within its territory. In this model, the state defines the rules of the game for other institutions.35 35

Ottoway, ‘Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States’, p. 2004.

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However, many developing countries, particularly ones emerging from conflict, contend with realities that are neither reflective of, nor conducive to the Weberian ideal. In some African countries, like Sudan, armed rebel groups control swathes of territory, and internal fighting continues after peace settlements have been signed.36 In such settings, and in many others that are less obviously examples of ‘state failure’, power and authority are not contained within a single entity, ‘the state’, but are diffused, existing on a variety of contested planes, which can disrupt, constrain, and collaborate with state institutions and policies.37 Instead of acknowledging this complex reality, the dominant model of post-conflict reconstruction simplifies it, identifying ‘levels’ or ‘spheres’ of the state, and postulating the institutionally structured relations between them. Yet empirical evidence demonstrates that social relations rarely fit into such tidy structuralist models. The dichotomies that are typical of these models underplay the fact that political and social actors often inhabit ‘state’ and ‘society’ simultaneously and move between them continuously, inhabiting multiple roles and espousing different, sometimes conflicting interests. Moreover, the view of the state as a unity, and the top-down and teleological view of post-conflict reconstruction that emerges from this conceptualization have led to misunderstandings of, and therefore a failure to address, the inherently contested nature of statebuilding. The result has been a pathologization of the processes of negotiation and struggle through which local actors make and remake states in order to reflect their identities and interests. Within this framework, the local dynamics in Juba during the Interim Period, and in the years since, are presented as an example of failure rather than indications of success in state-building. The approach of anthropologists, based on ethnographies of the state, employs a more subtle understanding of the state, conceptualizing a series of situated practices and discursive constructs as composing Much of the literature on civil war acknowledges conflict that continues after ‘peace’ is declared, although fighting which falls below a certain benchmark – such as, for example, one thousand battle deaths per year in five consecutive years – is typically dismissed. See: Norma Kriger, Guerrilla veterans in post-war Zimbabwe: symbolic and violent politics, 1980–1987. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 7, citing Pierre Atlas and Roy Licklider, ‘Conflict among Former Allies after Civil War Settlement: Sudan, Zimbabwe, Chad, and Lebanon’, Journal of Peace Research, 36:1 (1999), p. 26 footnote 1; Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, ‘International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis’, American Political Science Review, 94:4 (2000), p. 3; and Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, ‘Armed Conflict, 1989–98’, Journal of Peace Research 36:5 (1999), p. 595. For analyses of the African state that challenge the Weberian model, see also: William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999); and Francois Bayart, The State in Africa; the politics of the belly (London and New York: Longman, 1993). 37 John Heathershaw and Daniel Lambach, ‘Introduction: Post-Conflict Spaces and Approaches to Statebuilding’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 2:3 (2008), pp. 278–279; Christian Lund, Local Politics and the Dynamics of Property in Africa. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 6. 36

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‘stateness’.38 In his examination of corruption in local government in India, Akhil Gupta highlights how the state can be moulded by a variety of sources, from the pretensions of local bureaucrats, to daily chatter about official corruption among rural dwellers.39 In this view, the state is much more than a sphere of political–institutional power, a discrete, neutral entity that can be configured in such a way that will ensure the efficient implementation of reconstruction policies and programmes; it is a social process comprised of all the interactions, discussions, and evasions that shape political ideas and outcomes. This approach highlights local variations of public authority and stateness, and brings into focus their implications for state-building. This is what Hagmann and Péclard propose in their framework of ‘negotiating statehood’ – the arenas of contestation through which non-state and sub-national actors shape the state.40 Throughout this book, I employ the more fluid and nuanced conceptualization of the state as a social process – of negotiation, dispute, and even conflict, operating simultaneously at multiple levels. The state of reconstruction is presented as at once a stage for social action and the actions themselves. This allows local resistance to reconstruction programmes, debate over the interpretation of peace settlements, and disputes over the legitimacy of claims to resources to be understood not as pathologies – failures of policy design and implementation – but rather as processes of negotiation that are constitutive of the ‘state’.

Land tenure, identity, and state-building It is in local negotiations that understandings of and relationships to land become powerful tools of state-building. Struggles over who owns, has the authority to allocate, and the right to use land, speak to the scope, authority, and legitimacy of the state.41 They are also an avenue by which local groups set the boundaries that define access to economic and political resources, and thus structure the nature of citizenship.42 In Sudan, as in much of post-colonial Africa, local debates over land hinge on the 38 See for example: Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta, The Anthropology of the State: a reader (Malden: Blackwell, 2006); Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State, Politics, History, and Culture (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001). 39 Akhil Gupta, ‘Blurred Boundaries: the discourse of corruption, the culture of politics, and the imagined state’, American Ethnologist 22:2 (2005), pp. 375–402. 40 Tobias Hagmann and Didier Péclard, ‘Negotiating Statehood: Dynamics of Power and Domination in Africa’, Development and Change, 41 (2010), p. 557. 41 Sarah Berry, ‘Debating the Land Question in Africa’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 44:4 (2002), pp. 638–668; Catherine Boone, ‘Property and Constitutional Order: Land tenure reform and the future of the African state’, African Affairs, 106:425 (2007), p. 558. See also: Pauline Peters, Dividing the Commons: Politics, Policy, and Culture in Botswana (Charlottesville; London: University Press of Virginia, 1994); Parker Shipton and Mitzi Goheen, ‘Understanding African Land-Holding: Power, Wealth and. Meaning’, Africa 62:3 (1992), pp. 307– 325. 42 See Boone, ‘Property and Constitutional Order’ for a typology of different land claims and their implications for state-community relations and citizenship.

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complex intersection between identity, territory, and historical narratives of arrival and acquisition. The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Government, like other African governments, categorized people into discrete ‘ethnic’ communities, and linked them, along with designated ‘traditional’ leadership structures to bounded territories in an effort to build administrative control and consolidate the colonial state. In the process, control over land became linked to membership in ‘communities’, the boundaries of which became more rigid than they had been before. Colonial policies thus fashioned an ethnic prism out of fluid, contested, and dynamic pre-colonial boundaries, one through which local politics and competition over land and other resources would henceforth be perceived. Locals were not passive bystanders in this process. In detailing how colonial and post-colonial governments in Africa ‘defined, manipulated, codified, and adjudicated land tenure rules and relations in attempts to project the authority of the modern state’, Catherine Boone and other scholars have been careful to point out that state formation was not an exclusively ‘top-down’ process.43 Colonial policies had a lasting effect on the nature of African statehood, but local actors were involved in shaping new institutions and endowing them with legitimacy.44 Local debates over land validated, curtailed, and gave meaning to government policy to reflect the agendas of a range of actors.45 Jocelyn Alexander illustrates this point in her historical account of the politics of land in Rhodesia. She shows how the Rhodesian state did not enjoy unbridled power over policies and institutions, but rather contended with multiple sites of authority: Law, ethnicity, land tenure, and religion – cloaked as unchanging and primordial – were constantly reshaped, often in ways colonial officials were helpless to control…Africans played a central role in what was an ongoing process. Colonial inventions did not so much determine the social order as provoke debates which themselves shaped struggles over authority and resources, remaking the state in the process.46

Africans made sense of the processes of change, reappropriated colonial institutions, assimilated labels such as ‘tribe’ and ‘chief’, and adapted their roles to fit local requirements, often ending up with eclectic composites of both old and new elements.47 For example, in the early colonial period Boone, ‘Property and Constitutional Order’, p. 561. Jocelyn Alexander, The Unsettled Land: state-making & the politics of land in Zimbabwe, 1893–2003. (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006), p. 5; Terence Ranger, ‘The Invention of Tradition Revisited’, in Preben Kaarsholm and Jan Hultin (eds) Inventions and Boundaries: Historical and Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism (Denmark: Roskilde University, 1994). 45 Lund, Local Politics and the Dynamics of Property in Africa, p. 4–5; Alexander, The Unsettled Land, p. 174. 46 Alexander, The Unsettled Land, p. 5. 47 Berman, ‘Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State’, pp. 332 & 306, the former citing Bayart, ‘Finishing with the idea of the Third World’, p. 52; Alexander, The Unsettled Land; Ranger, ‘The Invention of Tradition Revisited’. 43 44

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in southern Sudan, resourceful Bari individuals positioned themselves as trade brokers, accepting, if not embracing, the new reality of commerce imposed on them by early Turco-Egyptian government expeditions.48 These ‘cargo chiefs’, as Simonse characterizes them, not only protected their communities from foreign armies and mediated the violence of the ivory trade, but profited from the trade themselves.49 Their unique roles demonstrated the ambivalence towards the state, and the straddling of multiple positionalities, that characterize ‘traditional’ institutions in South Sudan to the present day. The efforts of post-independence African governments to project the authority of the state were likewise curbed and adapted by local dynamics. Examining the process of land reform initiated by the 1979 Ghanaian Constitution, Christian Lund presents the relationship between rules and behaviour as mutually constitutive and contingent: ‘No government policy is implemented in its entirety unscathed by the contingency of local circumstances and political negotiations’.50 Indeed, not only do rules issued and enforced by institutions of public authority condition behaviour, but behaviour validates rules and legitimizes institutions. Employing the insights of the anthropological literature on the state, Lund argues that public authority, which is comprised of a range of parallel and alternative authorities that interact with local politics – not only the idea of the state, but also its language and its ‘props’ such as documents, declarations, and symbols – is employed by a variety of competing actors and institutions towards varying ends.51 It is this ‘unstately stateliness’ that characterizes local debates over land. Local land relations in Sudan are infused with the institutional legacies of colonial administration, the political struggles of the post-independence period, the differential effects of wartime dynamics, and the complex negotiations of identity and belonging that weave through all of it. After independence, the Sudanese government enacted statutory land legislation that encroached upon the customary land rights of communities in order to explore for minerals, promote mechanized agricultural development schemes, or embark on large infrastructure projects like the Jonglei Canal. As a result, certain groups were permanently displaced from their lands while new groups were created out of migrant labour communities.52 Tensions over government appropriation of land held by margin48 Simon Simonse, Kings of Disaster; Dualism, Centralism, and the Scapegoat King in Southeastern Sudan (The Netherlands: Centre of Non-Western Studies, Leiden University, 1992). 49 Ibid. 50 Lund, Local Politics and the Dynamics of Property in Africa, p. 4. 51 Ibid., p. 6. 52 Catherine Miller’s chapter in her edited book on the Kessala-Gedaref area of northern Sudan reveals the fluidity of ethnic boundaries in northern Sudan, and indeed even the creation of identity categories from sometimes disparate groups, showing how the process of identity formation, the ‘ethnicization’, continued after independence. See Miller, ‘Power, Land and Ethnicity in the Kassala-Gedaref States: An Introduction’, in Land, Ethnicity, and Political Legitimacy in Eastern Sudan; Kassala & Gedaref States (Le Caire: CEDEJ, 2005). See also: Gaim Kibreab,

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alized communities led to the second civil war.53 During this period, new chiefs emerged who used their resourcefulness and communication skills to mitigate the violence of government and rebel forces.54 For these leaders, as for their colonial era predecessors, control over territory amounted to authority over people. In a wider sense, control over southern territory by southern Sudan’s ‘communities’ equated to keeping the northern state and its negative effects at bay. It was in this context that the land rights of southern Sudan’s ‘communities’, understood to be ethnic groups if not ‘tribes’, emerged as an important issue during peace negotiations between the SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan. There was also a particularly local aspect to this history. In the period following the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which ended the first civil war, infighting amongst southern leaders weakened the southern government vis-à-vis the northern-led state, leading ultimately to the re-division of the south and with it the dissolution of southern autonomy. Importantly, debates over jurisdiction between southern groups involved attempts to carve out provincial boundaries in southern Sudan and delimit political representation in provincial governments to the groups who lived within these areas. In other words, control over territory structured access to the state. By the time of the CPA, authority over land had become the primary vehicle of political action in Southern Sudan, and ‘ethnic’ identity the main avenue through which to assert and/or exercise land rights. It was not surprising then that when local Equatorian elites in Juba confronted the forces of rapid change in the period following the CPA, they immediately invoked their rights to ‘Bariland’. Claiming the territory in and around the town as an ancestral ‘homeland’ was critical to asserting ‘community’ rights and privileged status vis-à-vis other groups, and also to mitigating the potentially negative impact of the state – even if it was led by a southern-controlled government. Their assertion of autochthony, of being a member of the first group to inhabit the area, ‘sons of the soil’ so to speak, was premised on the conviction that ancestral links to the territory that encompassed Greater Juba warranted preferential rights to economic and political resources at the local level, whether land in the town, employment opportunities in the branches of public service, or political positions in the various levels of government in Juba. Narratives of autochthony affirm the view that certain people and places belong to each other; they present the link as natural, primordial, (cont.) State Intervention and the Environment in Sudan, 1889–1989; The Demise of Communal Resources Management. Studies in African Economic and Social Development, Volume 18 (Lewiston, Queenston, Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2002). 53 Sara Pantuliano, The Land Question: Sudan’s Peace Nemesis. London: Overseas Development Institute, 2007. African Rights, Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan (London: African Rights, 1995); Douglas Johnson, ‘Decolonising the Borders in Sudan; Ethnic Territories and National Development’, in Mark Duffield and Vernon Hewitt (eds), Empire, Development and Colonialism: The Past in the Present (Oxford: James Currey, 2009). 54 Cherry Leonardi, ‘Violence, Sacrifice and Chiefship in Central Equatoria, Southern Sudan’, Africa 77:4 (2007), pp. 535–558.

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and unbreakable. But this denies the processes of disruption and change – migration, integration, and fragmentation – which shape the boundaries of identity and ‘community’ in the first place. Irrespective of the merit of claims to ‘first-comer’ status, the invocation of exclusive land rights by Bari leaders, and the continued salience of autochthony in general, reveal much about contemporary processes of state-making in South Sudan, and in Africa more broadly. The picture that emerges is of competition between groups for the scarce resources offered by a violent post-colonial state amidst economic and political instability and internecine conflict. In Leonardi’s view, ‘ethnically divisive discourse’ employed in the course of land disputes in Southern Sudan, pitting narratives of autochthony against narratives of occupancy and wartime sacrifice, masks a deeper process of moral concern over the disruptive effects of state construction, in particular the commodification and monetization of rural and kinship resources.55 This concern, which stems from a history of local contact with successive extractive, violent and external states, as well as recurring conflict, reflects an attempt to retain control of key productive resources in the local sphere, an aim that is observed across ethnic boundaries.56 Leonardi argues, ‘Beneath the apparently “tribal” conflicts over land, there are shared fears about the disrupting effects of these trends on social relations and productive economies, and a continuing desire to preserve a distance from the state’.57 In a wider analysis, which compares African and European cases, Geschiere frames autochthony claims as responses to anxieties produced by the disruptions of development, democratization, and globalization.58 Certainly, a process of externally-derived and funded ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ threatens to disrupt the status quo. These broader understandings of the purpose of claims centred on ‘community’ rights and ‘first-comer’ status make sense considering that it was not only the Bari, and not only those Bari from land-owning clans (who would technically be the ‘custodians’, if no longer official ‘owners’ of the land) that invoked autochthony and ‘community’ rights in resisting SPLM-led urban reconstruction in Juba. But it also helps to examine these local dynamics against the broader pattern of state-community relations in Sudan’s tumultuous history. Just as southerners had sought to get a better deal for themselves from the northern government, so too did Juba’s local elites seek to protect themselves, and gain advantage if they could, in the shadow of a powerful state. Viewing identity discourses and autochthony narratives employed in struggles over resources as strategies to cope with political change presents the local dynamics in Juba in a new light. It suggests that the activiLeonardi, ‘Paying “buckets of blood” for the land’, pp. 228–229. Ibid. 57 Ibid., p. 218. 58 Peter Geschiere, ‘Autochthony, Citizenship, and Exclusion; Paradoxes in the Politics of Belonging in Africa and Europe’, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 18:1 (2011). See also Tanya Murray Li, ‘Articulating indigenous identity in Indonesia: resource politics and the tribal slot’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 42 (2000), pp. 149–179. 55 56

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ties of these various local stake-holders were not merely destructive and obstructionist. They were not simply ‘spoilers’. Autochthony narratives, therefore, can be grouped with other narratives that referred to varying versions of the history of land acquisition, of migrations into the town, and drew on different sources of legitimization, whether government-allocated leases, informal ‘registrations’, of earning rights to land through wartime sacrifice and suffering, or through contributions to development. Such narratives must be viewed in terms of what they aimed to protect and what they sought to gain in the new paradigm of post-CPA Southern Sudan. The question of whether South Sudan can build meaningful citizenship if certain groups feel compelled to protect themselves from the detrimental forces of the state, is a central dilemma of post-conflict reconstruction. Without processes to legitimize the state, to make it more inclusive and responsive to a variety of groups and interests, and to distinguish it from the legacies of violent, extractive states of the past, South Sudanese nationhood remains in jeopardy. Rights based on ethnicity and kinship, those which typically govern the rural sphere in Africa, are particularly tenuous in urban settings, where the link between identity and territory is challenged by ongoing processes of in-migration and the daunting presence of the state. It is therefore in towns and cities that autochthony narratives are especially important in asserting rights to political and economic resources – above all rights to land. The ‘urban frontier’ has been a site of interface between ‘traditional’ institutions and the state since the formation of the first towns in southern Sudan.59 In towns like Juba, chiefs straddled two evolving worlds: they maintained their roles as leaders of rural villages alongside new positions as merchants, businessmen, and civil servants.60 In so doing, they took advantage of the opportunities offered by the state while retaining all the resources of rural life that protected them from the state’s unpredictability. Authority over land was crucial. Much of the theoretical literature on land tenure and state formation in Africa, however, as well as the empirical work on Sudan, is focused on rural land. Land relations in urban settings raise a different set of economic, political, and social issues that have important consequences for state-building. These include a shift in focus from agricultural production to housing, attention to the plight of those living in informal settlements and other landless poor, and debates over who may claim legitimate residency and access to state power. Cities and towns are the centres of aid distribution networks, which include NGOs, international agencies, advisors, and knowledge systems. They are the primary destination of returning refugees and IDPs and must meet the needs of these groups. Economic, political, and social processes in cities can have impacts beyond the urban setting through social networks and remittances; and the challenge of extending state-making processes throughout a national 59 Cherry Leonardi, Dealing with Government in South Sudan; Histories of Chiefship, Community, and State (Oxford: James Currey, 2013); Richard Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan: 1839–1889 (London: Oxford University Press, 1961). 60 Leonardi, Dealing with Government in South Sudan.

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territory is crucial to the long-term viability of reconstruction.61 Urban settings not only have important administrative roles in reconstruction, but cities, and capital cities in particular, are symbolic expressions of the state, its ideologies, and development goals. Cities are home to multiple groups from diverse political, economic and social backgrounds, each with their own agendas and approaches. Here new interests collide with identities formed during wartime. In the post-conflict city, as in rural areas, therefore, right to land is not only a matter of survival and status, but of identity and belonging. Contrary to simplistic explanations that posit ethnic competition or ‘tribal’ rivalry as the key factors underlying disputes over land, authority, and jurisdiction in Juba, throughout this book I argue that amidst the political and institutional change inaugurated by the CPA, competing interpretations of rights to land operated as a strategy of state-building – as a tool towards promoting particular visions of the state and of citizenship. Each of the groups analysed in this book had different understandings of land tenure which were employed towards various competing urban reconstruction agenda. The Bari people viewed the CPA’s recognition of ‘community’ rights to land as vindication of their long-held practices of communal land tenure, which had survived successive waves of de jure land alienation by the central government. They made claims based on autochthony, invoking what they saw to be the ancestral rights of their community to land in Juba and surrounding areas, in order to preserve ethnic privilege and promote ‘traditional’ institutions such as custom and chieftaincy. In so doing, they sought to keep the state at bay, for the time being at least, to preserve a local sphere of political and institutional life from the political and developmental activities of the state. Yet this was not simply an effort to preserve the moral world of kinship. It was an overt strategy enacted by seasoned political actors to shape the state in a way that preserved existing advantages and offered new opportunities and possibilities. The non-Bari Equatorian leaders of the CES Government looked to the CPA’s acknowledgement of ‘community’ rights to promote Bari land rights in their attempt to resist the SPLM’s integrative urban development agenda, carve out political jurisdiction over the town, and to maintain their power vis-à-vis GoSS within the decentralized system.62 They insisted that non-Bari and non-Equatorians should not be settled permanently in Juba, but must return to their villages of origin. Equatorian notions of autochthony stood in stark contrast to the integrative and Ben Moxham, ‘State-Making and the Post-Conflict City: Integration in Dili, Disintegration in Timor-Leste’, Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2008, p. 5. 62 Interview 28: Cornelious Goja Lado Kulang, Director-General of Lands, CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 27 August 2008; Interview 26: Emmanuel Waga Elia, CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 22 July 2008; Interview 21: Clement Wani Konga, Governor of Central Equatoria State / Juba / 6 September 2006. Interviews are referenced in short form in the footnotes and listed with expanded, and where appropriate, anonymized descriptions in the bibliography. 61

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conciliatory discourse of reconstruction from SPLM leaders who employed the language of development to justify their claims to land in the capital, and to facilitate their aim of establishing a strong regional state in Juba, thus building a national identity in place of regional identities. The instrumentalization of land tenure in state-building was not limited to political elites in Juba or to larger debates on authority over territory and jurisdiction. As Juba’s diverse residents disputed plots of land in the town’s peri-urban settlements, they invoked their plight as victims of the war, their role as vanguard of the liberation movement, their superior education and skills, or their residency in Juba during the difficult war years. They articulated claims to land that reflected their distinct experiences of the war, and they sought to carve out an advantageous position in the new state, whether through emphasizing citizenship rights, ethnic privilege, elite status, or contributions to the liberation struggle. Returning refugees and IDPs spoke of their long suffering during the war, of their experiences in refugee camps in neighbouring states, and of their comparative poverty. Feeling their new citizenship entitled them to do so, they demanded access to affordable housing and by extension to social services and employment opportunities provided by the new Southern Sudanese state. Ex-combatants drew on their contribution to the liberation of Southern Sudan in pursuit of a privileged citizenship. Those who had lived in Juba during the war, and held titles to multiple plots of land in Juba’s peri-urban neighbourhoods, demanded privileged rights to the land in the town, and protection of their existing titles. They insisted on a citizenship that would prevent them from losing existing rights and status, while newcomers equally insisted on a citizenship that would afford them new rights and status. The former advanced a narrow, local citizenship, while the latter sought a Southern Sudanese citizenship that guaranteed all groups equal rights to land, regardless of their area of origin. Acknowledging the agency of local actors to negotiate for power within their changing environments is an important starting point for theorizing state-building. Lund argues that the power to define property and citizenship, what he terms ‘sovereignty’, is divided, contested, and unstable.63 Control over land, he maintains, both reflects existing sovereignty and produces new sovereignties. That is precisely why debates on authority over land are so central to state-building. The local dynamics of land and urban reconstruction in Juba demonstrate that many of the challenges that confronted the SPLM as it endeavoured to build a new state in the politically and institutionally fragmented region had little to do with the machinations of national-level politics, with Khartoum’s intransigence, or with the nuances of international aid policies. Neither can the local challenges in Juba be explained simply as examples of irrational and destructive ‘tribalism’ or ethnic competition. If conflict over land and other political resources involves an attempt to negotiate for an advantageous position in a new political environment, then it is not necessarily a 63 Christian Lund, ‘Fragmented sovereignty: land reform and dispossession in Laos’, The Journal of Peasant Studies, 38:4 (2011), pp. 885–905.

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pathology, but an indication that state-building is happening in a robust, potentially positive manner. In their attempts to get the most out of their current situation, each of these local groups were doing their part to fashion a new state, one that reflected a variety of interests and concerns. Struggles over control of land in the town; over which level of government had jurisdiction within its boundaries; and who was a legitimate resident, were intimately tied to the outcome of post-conflict reconstruction: who would control it, who would benefit from it, and ultimately what kind of state would emerge from it.

METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK The arguments developed in this book evolved over the course of five years of research beginning in 2005, which included two periods of fieldwork in Sudan, the first in 2006 and the second in 2008. The research project initially focused on the transformation of the SPLM/A and the establishment of GoSS in the immediate aftermath of the CPA. During my first period of fieldwork in 2006, I quickly dispelled the premise and understanding of state-building that underlay that initial investigation – that it entailed the design and creation of western-style liberal democratic institutions. During that time, I lived in an informal settlement in the MTC area of Juba with a local family that had been displaced from Torit during the first civil war. MTC is an acronym for Multi Training Compound, a training centre from which the neighbourhood acquired its name (Map C). Our abode was modest – a tin-roofed shack with no running water or electricity – but I was fortunate to be able to engage in the daily routine of family life and was welcomed into the community. In those early days, before a functional mobile phone network or readily available internet access, my research assistant and I rode out to the homes of prominent local leaders on his motorcycle and knocked on doors until we were granted interviews with senior SPLA commanders, GoSS leaders, CES politicians, chiefs, and civil society representatives. During the course of these interviews and in my interactions with the local residents, I became aware of a unique local politics of land, which overshadowed much of the aid community discourse of ‘institution-building’ and ‘state-building’ in the local reality. Indeed, land seemed to stand in for many of the issues that concerned Southern Sudanese most: identity, economic opportunity, political access and influence, and status within the new society. The question of jurisdiction and allocation of land was already causing tensions. When I returned to Juba for a second period of fieldwork in 2008, my host family had been evicted from their home and forced to relocate to another part of the town. I rented a tent in a camp run by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). In my comparatively comfortable surroundings within the walled compound, I enjoyed warm showers and catered food, 24-hour Internet access, and a CNN news feed. The experience gave me a much different vantage point on the town’s transformation. It exposed me to the frus-

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trations and critical discourses of the aid community, the members of which decried the slow progress of change within the town and lay the blame squarely on Southern Sudanese stakeholders – who were characterized as ‘corrupt’, ‘tribalistic’, inefficient, and lacking in the skills, training, and political will to bring about meaningful change. By then the land issue in Juba had taken centre stage in local politics. It was covered widely in local newspapers, and was the topic of many conversations in Juba’s marketplaces, offices, and neighbourhoods. Yet the subtleties of the role of land were still lost on most of the foreign ‘experts’ tasked with aiding urban reconstruction. In their secluded compounds, these agents of reconstruction were sheltered from the local politics of land, and continued implementing programming devised with little regard to local realities. This not only resulted in the use of funding and resources in ways that did not help resolve the land issue, but it also reinforced the negative attitudes of aid workers towards Juba’s politics and the scepticism about the ability of the nascent Southern Sudanese state to overcome the challenges it faced. It also confirmed local perceptions that the various offices and institutions of GoSS were doing little to deliver ‘peace dividends’. In all, I conducted over 100 semi-structured interviews with a variety of respondents: SPLM leaders, GoSS officials, CES Government officials and bureaucrats, church leaders, chiefs, aid workers, long-time residents, university professors, ex-combatants, and returning refugees and IDPs.64 I also had many informal conversations with local residents from a variety of backgrounds and professions, both long-time residents and those who arrived after the CPA. As I investigated the local dynamics of land, I began to see that the countless daily negotiations over authority and rights, as well as disputes over particular plots of land, served a purpose beyond their initial and individual outcomes. They represented the enactment of a newfound political voice, a say in how state-building unfolded, offered by the new post-CPA order. These negotiations showed that state-building was operating on a variety of levels, and it consisted of the activities of diverse individuals with often-competing interests. There was very little that was top-down about it. In the years since, I followed the land politics in Juba as it became more heated. Each time it threatened to derail the urban reconstruction process, and in the end did not, I became more convinced that land politics were not as counterproductive as they appeared, but were in fact indicative of the tumultuous business of state-building itself. Amongst all the towns of South Sudan, Juba has achieved the most administrative, political, and symbolic importance. It has been the site where the ‘divided sovereignties’ – the multiple and competing loci of public authority – have been most apparent.65 As such, Juba is an ideal place to search for solutions to the problems of post-conflict state-building in South Sudan. At the same time, the distinctive position that Juba occupies in the political history of the region, a history that embodies the legacies of colonialism, the complex terrain of war, and the difficult processes 64 65

A complete list of interviews cited in the text is included before the Bibliography. The concept of ‘divided sovereignties’ is borrowed from Christian Lund.

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of state construction, makes it a questionable case from which to generalize to other towns in the region, or to make claims about the wider statebuilding process in South Sudan. The process of state-building is occurring simultaneously all over South Sudan, and making the case for the study of post-conflict reconstruction from the vantage point of one town is challenging. The onus is to show that while Juba is unique, its local dynamics are not exceptional, that while the particular configuration of actors and events are not replicable elsewhere, the relationships and interactions are understandable, if not expected. That is not to say, however, that there are not important theoretical and political lessons to be learned from studying this case, merely that generalizing from the case of Juba to other towns in South Sudan, or further afield, must be attempted with caution. As the centre of the aid community and the most convenient location in South Sudan to conduct research, Juba offers the most material for analysis of any South Sudanese town. Still, despite its importance to the history of the region, there is limited available historical material on the formation and development of the town. Therefore, though the premise of this book rests on a conviction that contemporary state-building dynamics are historically rooted, it must proceed with the acknowledgement that the historical material on the local politics of the town is uneven and incomplete. Early information on the formation of the town comes mainly from colonial ethnographic literature, which often approaches events from a bureaucratic record-keeping agenda, and offers little in the way of the perspective of locals. There is also very little available historical information on Juba during the two civil wars, when few journalists or researchers were able to visit the town. The voice of locals from these periods is available only through oral histories collected in later years when recollections may have dimmed or become imprecise, or been shaped by contemporary viewpoints and dynamics. Much of what can be gleaned is taken from the reports of aid agencies and news articles, and supplemented by the recollections of residents. My hope is that future research can build on this work and fill the many gaps with more nuanced and locally-rooted perspectives. In the chapters of this book, I examine the debates over land and urban development between a set of key local stakeholders in Juba whose interests collided in the Interim Period: the SPLM leadership of GoSS, the Equatorian bureaucrats and political leaders of the CES Government, the leaders of the Bari community (civic and ‘traditional’), and disputants in the peri-urban settlements of Juba – returning refugees and IDPs, excombatants, diaspora members, and long-time residents of Juba. Chapter One begins with an examination of the early history of state construction in Equatoria, and the formation of Juba, and continues through the years of the second civil war up to the CPA. It provides an overview of the institutions that structured the interface between local communities and the state, and which made land and identity the focus of struggles over access to political and state resources. It also demonstrates the legacies of violence, predation, and instability that sowed the seeds of local ambivalence towards the state. Chapter Two establishes the institutional setting

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of Juba during the initial transition period, and details the difficult process of integrating the institutions of the former Bahr el Jebel State Government into the decentralized framework of GoSS. It shows that the clash of different identity groups was not about ethnicity but rather bureaucratic culture and different experiences of war. This perspective exposes the vulnerability of local groups and the fragile basis of their alliance vis-à-vis GoSS amidst rapid change in the town. Chapter Three examines competing interpretations of the CPA’s articles on land by members of the Bari community, the CES Government, and GoSS. It demonstrates that the idea of ‘community’ operated as a category that defined inclusion and exclusion, and both justified and shaped agendas for urban reconstruction. We see that autochthony narratives were used by different groups, not only the Bari, in attempts to further specific political agendas and to protect local groups from the unknown effects of state-led urban reconstruction. Chapter Four analyses the failures of urban planning in the town in the context of the differing reconstruction agendas of the various local stakeholders. Here we begin to see why nothing moved forward in urban reconstruction despite widespread desire for change. The uninformed urban plans that took no notice of what was at stake in local land politics corroborate critiques of externally-led reconstruction as blind to the local dynamics and interests of those on whose behalf it is pursued. Chapter Five details two micro case studies of land disputes in the town’s peri-urban settlements that took place in 2008 – at the midway point of the Interim Period. These demonstrate how different conceptions of land tenure were used by a variety of local actors to promote particular visions of the post-conflict state. While theirs may not have been overt or even conscious state-building strategies, in the midst of disputing plots of land, the town’s diverse residents articulated their own visions of the South Sudanese state and of citizenship. By voicing their unique claims on the state, they were participating in building the state from the ground up. Their daily negotiations set the parameters of the wider regional conversations about citizenship rights, the nature of decentralization, and the role of communities vis-à-vis the new southern government. The Conclusion examines the implications of the case of Juba for reconstruction theory and considers potential future outcomes for the state-building process.

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On January 9, 2005, SPLM/A Chairman John Garang, and Ali Osman Taha, Sudan’s Vice President and head of the government delegation to the peace talks, signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Nairobi, Kenya.1 In his speech to the crowd gathered at Nyayo Stadium, Garang referred to the tumultuous history of the country: Sudanese history is familiar to all of us, from the Islamic kingdoms of Sennar to the Turco-Egyptian occupation, to the first Islamic Mahdist state, to the AngloEgyptian Condominium to independence in 1956 and the Anyanya movement, to the SPLM/SPLA, to the second Islamic state in the Sudan, with which we negotiated from 1989, and to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement which we signed today. This is the history of the Sudan and this is how we got here. It has been a long journey of more than five thousand years to reach Naivasha and Nyayo Stadium today. It is important to know and appreciate where we came from in order to better be able to chart the way forward with the momentum of historical force.2

As he spoke to the crowd, Garang alluded to the major changes the CPA promised for the people of Sudan, implying that the lessons of the tumultuous history of the past century would be an important resource for Southern Sudan’s erstwhile state-builders. Although he perhaps did not think of the southern leaders of his own party within the lineage of the violent and extractive states that had ruled over southern Sudan since the Turco-Egyptian period, his call to heed the lessons of history foreshadowed the challenges that the new southern government would face as it attempted to implement its vision for urban reconstruction in Juba. Garang’s speech highlights the fact that the process of state construction in southern Sudan has been continuous since the nineteenth century. It began with the Turco-Egyptian invasion of Sudan in the 1820s, which heralded the initial expeditions into the area of Equatoria in the 1840s. It continued with the incorporation of the southern region into the frame-

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1 This brought into effect the six Protocols and two annexures that had been signed between 2002 and 2004, agreements on the principles of government and governance, power-sharing, wealth-sharing, security arrangements, resolution of conflict and demarcation of borders in Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile states, and finally implementation modalities. 2 ‘John Garang’s speech at the signing ceremony of S. Sudan peace deal’, Sudan Tribune, 9 January 2005.

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work of the Sudanese state following the 1899 Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement. During that period, towns such as Juba were established as commercial and administrative centres. With independence in 1956 came a violent struggle over southern economic and political rights vis-à-vis the northern-dominated central government, which ushered in a brief period of southern self-government following the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. The struggle culminated in a prolonged second civil war that ended with the signing of the 2005 CPA. The agreement established the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) whose institutions laid the foundation of what would become the Republic of South Sudan. But it is not history’s broad sweeps that provide the most useful information to apply to an analysis of current approaches to state-building. Rather, local history offers a more pertinent set of insights to present dynamics. Examining the past at the local level brings the analysis of state construction in South Sudan into a new light. It is in Juba’s local history that we can find the roots of the contentious relationship between the town’s Equatorian elites and the SPLM-led state in the initial post-CPA period. During a century of violent upheaval and transformation, the town of Juba and the areas surrounding it have stood as a site of local negotiation and adaptation to the violence and depredation of a succession of states. Institutions such as chiefship not only withstood the impact of colonial intervention and civil war, but they changed in order to to confront these new realities.3 As local people interacted with missionaries, traders, government forces, and rebel soldiers, they negotiated relationships and formed new identities to survive and succeed. In so doing, they shaped the policies and institutions of the state. Local political institutions were responsible, at times above all other concerns, for the protection of communities vis-à-vis government and rebel forces. This was achieved through negotiation – over conscription, food provision, and land access. This historical relationship between local communities and successive states was the motivation for attempts to carve out a local sphere for political life in post-CPA Southern Sudan, and it reflected the desire to protect local institutions from the disruptive forces of the state.4 Whether or not this was a sphere governed according to the moral framework of kinship, and resistant to the processes of monetization and commodification introduced by the development of the state, as Leonardi argues, or whether it was simply a matter of maintaining a bounded ‘community’ where the benefits of development accrued more immediately, and visibly, to community members, it is clear that the aim was to keep the state and its priorities out of local life, and to mitigate its adverse impact on local institutions. The local experience of the successive states – each of them 3 Simon Simonse, Kings of Disaster; Dualism, Centralism, and the Scapegoat King in Southeastern Sudan (The Netherlands: Center of Non-Western Studies, Leiden University, 1992); Cherry Leonardi, Dealing with Government in South Sudan; Histories of Chiefship, Community, and State (Oxford: James Currey, 2013). 4 Cherry Leonardi, ‘Paying “buckets of blood” for the land: moral debates over economy, war and state in Southern Sudan’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 49:2 (2011), pp. 215–240.

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violent and extractive in their own ways, if espousing different ideologies, approaches, and aims – planted a deep-rooted ambivalence towards the ‘state’ amongst local communities. This ambivalence towards the state persisted through the post-independence period and remains to the present. It is reflected in the complex negotiations of cooperation and noncooperation during the wartime in Juba when the town was occupied by the northern government and its various military arms. In the Interim Period in Juba it was manifested in attempts to keep the negative effects of urban reconstruction and state-building for local elites at bay. It was evident when, even as they welcomed the new SPLM-led GoSS and embraced the possibility of independence, local Equatorian leaders remained skeptical about the various SPLM-led urban plans and government policies, and were intent on retaining a local sphere of autonomy where they could control the effects of urban reconstruction. Although they were keen to participate in state-building and to benefit from the economic and political resources it offered, in the transition period Juba’s elites were aware that their oppositional role during the first Southern Regional Government, and their cooperation with the Government of Sudan (GoS) during the two decades of war, put them at odds with the new southern government. The complex relationship between Jubans and the state would continue to define the local politics of the town in the Interim Period, presenting a paradox that was at the root of the complex dynamics of reconstruction and state-building. In establishing the roots and nature of local ambivalence towards the state, this chapter traces three periods in the history of the construction of the southern Sudanese state. The first period begins with the initial contact of local communities in the vicinity of Juba with the forces of the Turco-Egyptian government in 1840. It continues through the brief Mahdist interlude (1888–1897), and ends with the establishment of ‘Native Administration’ during the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium period. The second period begins at Sudan’s independence in 1956, and continues until 1983 and the demise of the first Southern Regional Government. The third period covers the years of the second civil war, during which Juba was controlled by the northern government and served as a garrison for the Sudan Armed forces (SAF). In examining southern Sudan’s complex history, this chapter maintains, as much as possible, a perspective on the local dynamics in Juba. However, given the dearth of information on local history, at times a broader focus on events in Equatoria is necessary. Nevertheless, the picture that emerges is one of local perseverance, ingenuity, adaptation, and negotiation amidst stark and extremely difficult circumstances.

THE BEGINNING OF STATE CONSTRUCTION IN EQUATORIA: COMMERCE, TOWNS, AND ‘NATIVE ADMINISTRATION’ The southern region of Sudan was still unexplored by Europeans when in 1820 Turco-Egyptian forces under Muhammad Ali Pasha, an Albanian

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commander in the Ottoman army, defeated the last Funj Sultan of Sennar and conquered Sudan for the Ottoman Sultan.5 The Bari people who lived on the banks of the White Nile River in the southernmost reaches of Equatoria had not had any previous contact with foreign armies when in January 1841 a government expedition in search of the source of the Nile reached a Bari village just north of Gondokoro in the vicinity of what is now Juba (Map A).6 The following century was a period of upheaval. Four foreign states came through Equatoria: the Turco-Egyptians, the Mahdists, the Belgian forces of the Congo Free State, and the Anglo-Egyptians. Each of them left their mark on local life. Insofar as they planted a deep-seated distrust of external states, the legacy of this history can still be felt in the present-day land politics of Juba.

Turco-Egyptian rule (1840–1888) For the inhabitants of the Equatoria region, Turco-Egyptian rule, or the ‘Turkiyya’ as it was called, ushered in a period of intense commercial activity, which brought with it an extraordinary degree of violence. A succession of missionaries and trading expeditions came through the area in the next decades. Lured by ivory, the traders – European, Egyptian, Levantine, and northern Sudanese – penetrated the interior of the region with their armed Arab servants. They collected ivory, seized slaves, and established fortified camps called ‘zara’ib’.7 As Gray puts it, ‘The Nile was becoming a highway into Africa’.8 Contact with these early expeditions brought both opportunity and danger. Some individuals were able to develop positive relations with foreign forces and negotiate ‘relations of exchange and interaction’.9 In Equatoria, a new cohort of Bari chiefs emerged who spoke Arabic and acted as intermediaries with the trading companies, zara’ib leaders, missionaries, and government officials. These ‘cargo chiefs’, as Simonse characterizes them, offered their subjects protection against the violence and depredation of the foreigners by negotiating relationships of exchange.10 They not only participated in the lucrative trade, but also benefited from it.11 As Leonardi argues, ‘The linguistic knowledge, entreThe conquered areas became a province of Egypt, itself a province of the Ottoman Empire, and Muhammad Ali became Khedive of Sudan. Richard Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan 1839–1889 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 3. 6 L.F. Nalder, Equatorial Province Handbook: Volume 1 Equatoria. Sudan Government Memoranda No 4, 1936, p. 16; Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan, p. 18; L.F. Nalder, A Tribal Survey of Mongalla Province (New York: Negro University Press, 1937), p. 13. 7 Robert O. Collins. The Southern Sudan in Historical Perspective (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2006), pp.14–15; Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan, p. 46. Ivory was used to manufacture various middle-class luxury products such as knife-handles, combs, billiard balls, and piano keys. Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan 1839–1889, p. 28. 8 Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan, p. 19. 9 Leonardi, Dealing with Government in South Sudan, p. 21. 10 Simonse, Kings of Disaster. 11 Ibid., pp. 87–109. 5

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preneurial brokerage and diplomatic abilities of these men (and sometimes women) represent the foundations of later government chiefship’.12 Indeed, their role as trade brokers would foreshadow the activities of contemporary Bari chiefs and civic leaders, who positioned themselves as land brokers in the post-CPA period.13 Their efforts in protecting their communities would set the precedence for the evolving role of chiefship through successive civil wars in the post-independence period. Between 1863 and 1867 Muhammad Ali’s grandson, Ismail Pasha, the new Viceroy of Egypt, pushed the European traders out of the commercial life in Sudan, leaving the control of the region’s commerce in the hands of Egyptians, Syrians, and northern Sudanese, all known to the southern Sudanese as ‘Turks’. As imperial interest grew in the Nile River and its potential for opening central Africa to commercial exploitation was realized, Ismail Pasha sent the British explorer, Samuel Baker, whom he had appointed Governor-General of the new Equatorial Province, to formally annexe the southern territory to Egypt. Baker reached Gondokoro in 1871. His tasks were to secure the Equatorial Nile Basin for Egypt, establish a chain of trading stations, and install a functional government administration. However, Baker’s time in the region was short and unfruitful. Not only was he unable to suppress the slave trade, but he was forced to resort to raiding the Bari to provision his troops.14 In the end, he established control over only a few government posts along the Nile. By the time Charles Gordon succeeded Baker as Governor-General of the province in 1874, the traders were firmly established in southern Sudan. Under Gordon, the network of government stations increased, many of them built on the sites of the zara’ib, where a new frontier society was developing.15 The Arab servants of ivory traders acquired slaves and settled in the zara’ib, where they obtained wives and built new lives, establishing themselves ‘as a ruling caste transcending the barriers of tribal society’.16 In addition to the existing stations at Gondokoro and Rejaf, Gordon opened four more stations, including one at Lado in the north, which he designated as the capital of Equatorial Province in 1875.17 Gordon’s successor, Emin Pasha, a German doctor who had converted to Islam, achieved similarly poor results. His efforts to establish the government’s rule in the region were hindered by the blockage of Sudd with a barrier of floating vegetation, which, from 1878, prevented steamers from getting through to Equatoria.18 The diminishment of trade denied Emin Leonardi, Dealing with Government in South Sudan, p. 22. I am thankful to Douglas H. Johnson for this comparison. 14 Simonse, Kings of Disaster, p. 94–97; Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan, pp. 89 & 96. 15 Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan, p. 46; Leonardi, Dealing with Government in South Sudan, p. 35; Douglas H. Johnson, ‘Tribe or nationality? The Sudanese diaspora and the Kenyan Nubis’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 3:1 (2009), p. 116. 16 Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan, pp. 46 and 50–51. 17 Simonse, Kings of Disaster, pp. 41 & 96. Lado was named after Chief Lado-loMori (whose name was also given to the nearby mountain). 18 The Sudd is a vast swampland that obstructs the White Nile River between Mongalla in the south and Malakal in the north. It is one of the world’s largest 12 13

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Pasha the goods – cotton cloth, glass beads, and alcohol – that were essential for maintaining patronage relations with Bari chiefs.19 Without the trade cargo, Emin became vulnerable to a rebellion led by Bari chiefs which, in combination with the advancing Mahdist forces, led him to retreat from Gondokoro in 1884, and subsequently from Lado in 1885. With Emin’s departure, the structure of Egyptian authority in Equatoria was dismantled.20 This paved the way for a rebellion brewing in the north that subsequently seized control over the region. In 1881, Muhammad Ahmad, a religious leader who proclaimed himself the ‘Mahdi’ (the expected one) waged a religious revolt against the TurcoEgyptian rulers of Sudan. By 1885, the ‘Mahdiyya’ had brought an end to Turco-Egyptian rule. Mahdist rule in Equatoria was established in 1888 when a force of ‘Ansar’ (followers) arrived in Rejaf.21 The conflict was short-lived and violent. The Mahdists raided local villages for slaves, food, cattle, and women. Nine years later, in 1897, the Belgian forces of the Congo Free State defeated the Ansar at the Battle of Bedden and took control of a fifteen thousand square mile territory centred on the station at Lado. Originally part of the Equatoria Province of the OttomanEgyptian Sudan, the territory which came to be known as the ‘Lado Enclave’, (see Map A), was leased to King Leopold II of Belgium in the 1894 Anglo-Congolese Agreement. As sovereign of the Congo Free State, Leopold agreed to recognize the British sphere of influence in the Nile valley. Belgian administrators were installed at Lado, which would serve as the capital of the Lado Enclave until 1906, and at Rejaf on the west bank of the Nile. During this period, from about 1883 to 1899, Equatoria saw the emergence of new ‘warlord chiefs’, who, having acquired guns, were able to impose rule over the territory on the eastern bank of the river.22 This was a phenomenon that foreshadowed the rebel militias that would rule over large areas of southern territory following independence. The advent of the Turco-Egyptian and Mahdist states in Equatoria had an enormous impact on the lives of local people, particularly the violence wrought by the slave trade. But the defeat of the Mahdists in Equatoria offered no respite; the process of state construction was just beginning.

The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium period (1889–1956) In 1898 General Kitchener’s forces defeated Muhammad Ahmad’s successor, Abdullah Ibn-Mohammed (‘the Khalifa’), in the Battle of (cont.) wetlands; during the wet season it can extend over a 130,000 square kilometre area. At times, large blocks of floating vegetation form, which block navigable channels, preventing passage by boat. See: ‘The Impenetrable Wetlands of Sudd in South Sudan’, Amusing Planet. Available from: http://www.amusingplanet. com/2012/08/the-impenetrable-wetland-of-sudd-in.html [Accessed on 16 October 2013] 19 Mark Leopold, ‘Legacies of Slavery in North-West Uganda: The Story of the “One-Elevens”’, AFRICA, 76:2 (2006), p. 185; Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan, p. 139. 20 Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan, p. 161. 21 Simonse, Kings of Disaster, p.101; Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan, p. 163. 22 Simonse, Kings of Disaster, p. 101–103.

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Omdurman. The British had effectively occupied Egypt since 1882, when British forces defeated Egyptian sections of the Army which had mutinied against the Ottoman Government.23 The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement gave effective power over Sudan to the British Government and its foreign officers in Sudan. A British Governor-General was given military and civil command of Sudan, and designated as commander-inchief of the Egyptian army. 24 The Governor-General reported to the British Foreign Office through its resident agent in Cairo.25 Control over the country enabled British officials to promote their regional imperial agenda, which at the turn of the century entailed maintaining control of the Nile River and fending off France and Belgium, each of which had designs on territory in the region. The British endeavoured to establish a permanent presence in the southern region of Sudan. By 1903 a government post was established at Mongalla, about 120 kilometres northeast of Juba, which became the base of British operations and the capital of the new Mongalla Province of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.26 In the 1906 Anglo-Congolese Agreement, King Leopold gave up his claims to the southern Sudan in return for a railway concession from the Congo to the Nile, and the retention of the Lado Enclave for the duration of his reign.27 When King Leopold died in December 1909, the Lado Enclave was returned to the British who incorporated it into Mongalla Province in 1910.28 Having declared a protectorate over Uganda in 1896, successfully warded off the claims of France to the Upper Nile in 1898, and ended the prospect of Belgian control in the area, the British affirmed their dominance over the territory of southern Sudan.29 Finally the AngloEgyptian Government had consolidated its jurisdiction over southern Sudan, and turned its focus on establishing a functioning administration in the region. The British had bold aims. They sought to build an entirely new system of governance in the vast southern region, one that was independent of northern influence. But their state-building aims from the start were Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan, p. 152. Robert Collins, Shadows in the Grass: Britain in the Southern Sudan, 1918- 1956 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 12–13. 25 This was an arrangement unique to the Sudan; other British territories were administered under the Colonial Office. 26 Simonse, Kings of Disaster, p. 125. 27 Robert Collins and Richard Herzog, ‘Early British Administration in the Southern Sudan’, The Journal of African History, 2:1 (1961), p. 119. 28 In 1912, its southern part, which later became the West Nile area of Uganda, was ceded to the Uganda Protectorate in return for land to the east occupied by Bari speakers. See: Leopold, ‘Legacies of Slavery in North-West Uganda’, p. 187; Nalder, A Tribal Survey of Mongalla Province, p. 13. 29 Leopold, ‘Legacies of Slavery in North-West Uganda’, p. 187 citing Robert Collins, ‘Anglo-Congolese negotiations, 1900–1906’, Zaire 12:6 (1958) pp. 479–512. In 1893, the Imperial British East Africa Company transferred its rights to administer the territory to the British Government. In 1894, the British Government declared a protectorate over the Kingdom of Buganda, and two years later extended its control to the western kingdoms of Ankole, Toro and Bunyoro, which together with Buganda, formed the Uganda Protectorate. 23 24

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shaped by the imperative of efficiency and cost-effectiveness.30 The consequence of this was a reliance on a system of ‘indirect rule’, which served to broaden the reach of the resource-constrained Anglo-Egyptian state, and would remain the foundation of the decentralized institutional structure of the state to the present day. In the first decades of British rule, the Anglo-Egyptian Government established a cursory administration in southern Sudan. A British Governor-General was appointed to serve as military commander and senior civil administrator for each of the three southern provinces: Mongalla, Bahr el Ghazal, and Upper Nile. These were divided into districts headed by District Commissioners, initially northern Sudanese and Egyptian officers known as ‘mamur’. Despite their best intentions, AngloEgyptian officials continued the legacies of their predecessors, under harsh conditions resorting to the practices of raiding local populations for provisions and recruits into the police and military.31 Faced with limited resources and manpower, and the rising tide of Egyptian nationalism in northern cities and towns, British officials gradually replaced mamurs in southern provinces with local chiefs and other leaders.32 The incorporation of chiefs into the government was already a widespread practice in Equatoria when the system of Native Administration was promoted as a policy for ruling the south in the 1920s.33 In a 1922 memorandum, Harold MacMichael, then Assistant Civil Secretary of Sudan, articulated his concept of Native Administration: Its method is to leave administration, as far as possible, in the hands of native authorities, wherever they exist, under British supervision, starting from things as it finds them, putting its veto on what is dangerous and unjust and supporting what is fair and equitable in the usage of the natives. Much obviously depends on the existence and efficacy of any local or tribal organization. When such does exist the aim of the Govt. is to foster and guide it along right channels. Where it has ceased to exist it may still be possible to recreate it.34

In practice, the system of Native Administration rested on changing notions of identity and territoriality, and on a particular relationship Gaim Kibreab, State Intervention and the Environment in Sudan, 1889–1989; The Demise of Communal Resources Management. Studies in African Economic and Social Development, Volume 18 (Lewiston, Queenston, Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2002), p. 183. 31 Simonse, Kings of Disaster, p. 94–97; Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan, p. 89; Leonardi, Dealing with Government in South Sudan, p. 35. As Johnson argues, despite any qualms they may have had, the practice of military slavery was indispensable to the Anglo-Egyptians in their attempts to establish control over the territory of southern Sudan. Douglas H. Johnson, ‘The Structure of a Legacy; Military Slavery in Northeast Africa’, Ethnohistory 36:1 (Winter, 1989), pp. 72–88. 32 In 1919 there were only 17 British administrators in the Bahr el Ghazal and Mongalla. Collins, Shadows in the Grass, p. 12. 33 M. W. Daly, Empire on the Nile; The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898–1934 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 361. 34 Harold MacMichael, ‘General Statement of the Policy in the Southern Sudan with regards to Administration, Religion and Education’, March 14, 1922, CIVSEC 1/9/31 quoted in Robert Collins, Shadows in the Grass, p. 58. 30

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between chiefs and their communities. As they implemented Native Administration, colonial officials mapped the boundaries of what they saw to be distinct and homogenous ‘tribal’ territories, delimited chiefly jurisdictions over these territories, and identified the local leaders – chiefs, sub-chiefs, kings, and headman of various types – to rule over them. Contrary to British conceptions of static territorialized identity, southern Sudanese identity was fluid, shaped by continuous processes of migration, intermarriage and interaction between diverse peoples. Prior to contact with the British, the Bari had no concept of a single, supreme, ‘paramount’ chief who had jurisdiction over all of a bounded territory. Bari village affairs were settled by the clan and a council of elders. The closest institution was the Chief of Rain or Rainmaker, matat lo piong, who possessed a spiritual power to communicate with the divine and produce rain, but who was considered above daily political matters.35 The Chief of Land, monye lo kak, was responsible for allocating clan land (to both clansmen and strangers); he was the person who first cleared a portion of bush, determined its use, and possessed the necessary ‘magico-religious’ knowledge to ensure successful cultivation on that land.36 His authority did not extend beyond these specific matters, nor did it extend beyond the relatively small confines of the clan. Anglo-Egyptian officials appointed new Executive or Government Chiefs, matat lo gela, who served a variety of functions – cultural, administrative, and juridical. Native Administration quickly became the hallmark of the ‘Southern Policy’, whereby the colonial government pursued a distinctly ‘African’ path for the southern territory, in tandem with other British East African colonies. Together with policies such as the 1922 Passports and Permits Ordinance, which prohibited Sudanese or foreign nationals from entering southern provinces without permits and effectively blocked the commercial expansion of northerners in the southern region, Native Administration set the south on a different path of economic and political development from the north, with significant implications for the trajectory of state construction in southern Sudan.37 A key institution of Native Administration was the chiefs’ court, where southern chiefs applied the respective customary laws of their communities in adjudicating disputes and determining appropriate punishments for crimes. The 1931 Chiefs’ Court Ordinance provided for the division of the ‘native’ courts system into ‘A’ courts, which had jurisdiction over each sub-chieftaincy, and ‘B’ courts, which presided over each district and had jurisdiction over several villages.38 Individual chiefs were selected based G. Seligman and B.Z. Seligman, ‘The Bari’, The Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland. 58 (1928), pp. 425 & 469; A.C. Beaton, ‘Bari: Clans and Age-class system’, Sudan Notes and Records, Vol. 19 (1936) pp. 107–124. 36 Nalder, A Tribal Survey of Mongalla Province, p. 125. 37 The Passports and Permits Ordinance also aimed to reduce the presence of northern Sudanese merchants in the south, known popularly as ‘jallaba’. 38 Section 7 of the Chiefs’ Courts Ordinance, 1931 states: ‘The Chiefs’ Court shall administer the Native Law and Customs prevailing in the area over which Court exercises its jurisdiction provided that such Native Law and Custom is not contrary to justice, morality or order’. The Civil Justice Ordinance of 1900, Sudan’s first code 35

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on who colonial officials found most amenable. The authority of these new Government Chiefs – to adjudicate disputes, collect taxes, and allocate land – was thus a direct extension of the modern state. These were not always the individuals who had the most authority or legitimacy in the eyes of local people. Later, however, Government Chiefs were selected by communities on the basis of their ability to mediate between local communities and the government, to develop ‘strategies for coping with its demands, and in the related sense of brokering deals with it’,39 as Leonardi argues: The most consistent basis for chiefship has been the capacity to render the government more predictable, the claim that a chief knows how to turn the arbitrary forces of state power into a source of protection for persons and property. In the process, chiefs have helped to broker new regulatory orders, new rights and resources, and ultimately the making of the state itself.40

This was the basis for the continued authority and legitimacy of chiefship in southern Sudan. Colonial policies thus transformed this role, and the relationship between chiefs and their communities. As Leonardi argues, chiefship produced ‘chiefdom’, which was ‘a loosely territorial basis for definitions of community, and one which had little basis in genealogical political discourse’, but rather was ‘defined principally by its relationship to the state’.41 Indeed, the fixing of identity to a particular territory laid the foundation for claims to land based on autochthony, and it entrenched a narrow ethnic conceptualization of ‘community’. By the time of the CPA, chiefship was a thoroughly modern institution, shaped by decades of change and adapted to harsh circumstances. It embodied indigenous history as much as ‘colonial innovation’.42 As Sundnes and Shanmugaratnam put it, over time the system became so embedded that ‘local residents regard it as indigenous and believe in its efficacy to regulate their access to land and to adjudicate social conflicts’.43 And as post-CPA dynamics in Juba reveal, the Bari embraced the idea that the land on which their ancestors had lived would be theirs for the indefinite future, irrespective of the fact that others had lived there alongside them for long periods. The lasting legacy of British rule therefore would be a patchwork of territorialized identity and the entrenchment of ‘traditional’ political structures in the governance of local level affairs. of civil procedure, provided for the recognition of customary law. The Civil Justice Ordinance of 1929 defined the powers of chiefs and ‘native authorities’ to allocate access to and use of communal lands, and to settle disputes according to customs. By 1948 there were 304 Chiefs courts in southern Sudan: Kibreab, State Intervention and the Environment in Sudan, p. 186. 39 Leonardi, Dealing with Government in South Sudan, p. 2. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid., p. 9. 42 Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars (Oxford: James Currey, 2003), p. 12. 43 Frode Sundnes and N. Shanmugaratnam, ‘Socio-economic Revival and Emerging Issues Related to Land in Yirol, Southern Sudan’, in N. Shanmugaratnam (ed), Between War and Peace: Deprivation and Livelihood Revival in Sudan and Sri Lanka (Oxford: James Currey Publishers, 2008), p. 72. (cont.)

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The formation and development of Juba: land, town planning, and administrative boundaries In the first decades of Anglo-Egyptian rule, British officials established outposts throughout southern Sudan. These were often built on the sites of the zara’ib, the armed camps of ivory and slave traders, and the Egyptian army garrisons of the nineteenth century.44 As British administration evolved, these military stations became district offices and province headquarters, and eventually towns that served as administrative and commercial centres.45 Their inhabitants were initially soldiers and police (many of whom were forcibly recruited from local populations), then grew to include other government employees and southerners from nearby areas who came in search of protection, patronage, and opportunity.46 Juba, on the west bank of the Bahr el Jebel, across from the station at Gondokoro, was one such site. The exact details of the formation of the town are unclear. A permanent mission station had been established there, on the site of a Bari village, in 1920.47 In a 1933 article, Richardson describes the land of the village called ‘Juba’, which extended from Khor Lerekwot to the north, Khor La’Buliet to the south, Korok hill Korok to the west, and the Nile River to the east, including the three islands of Lueh, Kuru’Nago, and Tindu.48 According to his account, the village had previously belonged to the Nyori clan of the Bari, who had sold it to the Bekat Monabur clan. At some point in the late 1920s, Anglo-Egyptian officials ordered the village inhabitants to move off the land to make way for the establishment of a new town, also called ‘Juba’, which would serve as the new capital of Mongalla Province (Photograph 3). No compensation was paid to the occupants of the 36 homes that were evacuated; they migrated to the villages surrounding the new town.49 Bari elder and Community Association Chairman, Tongung Lado Rombe, offers a different version of the founding of Juba: it was built on the site of a Bari village called Tindu, he argues, and gained its name from the village chief who was called Jubé.50 Regardless of which interpretation is favoured, it is generally agreed amongst Bari informants that the original residents of the site moved north and reestablished their village in an area called Juba na Bari, which means ‘Juba for the Bari’ (as opposed to the Juba which had been ceded to the colonial government).

Leonardi, Dealing with Government in South Sudan, p. 35. Ibid., passim. 46 Ibid., pp. 44–45. See also: Douglas H. Johnson, ‘Tribe or nationality? The Sudanese diaspora and the Kenyan Nubis’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 3:1, (2009), pp. 112–131. 47 Nalder, Equatorial Province Handbook, p. 98. 48 J. N. Richardson, ‘Bari Notes; Juba’, Sudan Notes and Records. 16 (2), 1933, p. 185. 49 Ibid., pp.183–184. 50 An alternate spelling is ‘Jubek’. Interview 40b: Tongun Lado Rombe, Chairman of the Bari Community Association / Juba / 25 August 2008. 44 45

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3 Construction materials on the bank of the Nile River, during Juba’s foundation, 1928

(Source: Durham Archives (reproduced by permission of the University of Durham Library SAD.508/23/37))

From its birth as a regional administrative and commercial centre, Juba served a diverse population. At the heart of the town was the ‘malakiya’, a civilian quarter originally composed of ‘Nubi’ communities, that is, former slave soldiers and their families who had settled in southern Sudanese towns at the beginning of the 20th century. The Nubi identity, characterized by the practice of Islam and a distinct dialect of Arabic, reflected the ‘de-tribalization’ that was the result of the system of military slavery, whereby southern Sudanese were forcibly conscripted into the Turco-Egyptian and Mahdist armies. It eventually became an urban identity, adopted by rural people as needed.51 In addition to the Nubi, there were southerners of various ethnic groups, social classes, and religious affiliations in Juba. Living alongside the town’s Nubi and Bari residents were administrators of non-Bari or nonEquatorian origin (British, northern Sudanese, or people from other parts of the southern Sudan), foreign merchants (Greek, Armenian, and Syrian-Lebanese, and later Congolese, Kenyan and Ugandan), and The customs of Nubi communities included the practice of pharaonic circumcision, arranged marriages, and dowries paid in cash rather than cattle. See: Leopold, ‘Legacies of Slavery in North-West Uganda’, p. 181, citing Kokole, O. H., ‘Idi Amin, “the Nubi” and Islam in Ugandan politics 1970–1979’, in H. B. Hansen and M. Twaddle (eds), Religion and Politics in East Africa (London: James Currey, 1995), p. 48; Johnson, ‘Tribe or nationality?’ p. 117, citing Meldon, J. A., ‘Notes on the Sudanese in Uganda’, Journal of the Africa Society 7:26 (1908), pp. 133–35. Johnson notes that in southern Sudan and northern Uganda the expression ‘becoming Nubi’ described the temporary adoption of Arabic names, Muslim dress, Islamic forms of worship, and the Arabic language as ‘a protective camouflage’ by rural people fleeing to the towns for protection. Douglas H. Johnson, personal communication, August 2012; Johnson, ‘The Structure of a Legacy’, pp. 83–84. 51

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southern Sudanese civilians of varying origins. A new urban life was emerging of which southerners from various backgrounds were taking advantage. But as Leonardi argues, although people came to towns in search of the opportunity and resources offered by the state, they did not necessarily buy into ‘notions of centralized or hierarchical power’: …local political cultures have remained…vociferously critical of governments. But such people have nevertheless discerned opportunity as well as risk on the urban frontier, or decided that the state could not be avoided and that they might better obtain protection from it by appropriating its own regulatory resources.52

Initially the Bari were hesitant to move their villages nearer to Juba or to live in the town and sell their goods in the market.53 However, over time Bari political institutions and social life became increasingly intertwined with the economic and social patterns of town life. Bari chiefs interfaced in various ways with the government: their sons were educated in town schools, they engaged in commercial activities, and developed trades alongside their roles as rural leaders.54 Thus, the question of Juba being a ‘Bari’ or ‘Equatorian’ town, was from this early period not a straightforward matter, and being ‘local’ was, even then, not synonymous with being Bari. The diversity of Juba was reflected in colonial town planning. Initially, British officials defined the area of the town as within a given radius of the flagpole outside their headquarters.55 In this area, the colonial government controlled the allocation and management of land. Beyond it, land was administered under the Bari customary legal system. As the town grew, land was ‘gazetted’, that is, acquired from villages on the peripheries of the town and brought under the purview of the government. A town plan determined the division of urban land into spatially organized residential areas, which were sized and laid out according to a classification system that reflected the hierarchies of Sudanese and non-Sudanese staff. Different classes of plots were established in different neighbourhoods and used to segregate ethnic groups based on their status. This was outlined in the 1947 Disposal of Town Lands Scheme Act, which established a system of leasehold with the requisite lease terms, fees, building standards, and allotment procedures for four classes of residential plots: Class 1, Class 2, Class 3, and Class 4. These were separated geographically by a town plan that was based on a grid. Areas of Class 1 plots were allocated to nonSudanese working with the colonial government. These were the areas where town services were concentrated. Plots were large in size and high construction standards were required. Class 2 plots were allocated to Leonardi, Dealing with Government in South Sudan, p. 14. Richardson, ‘Bari Notes; Juba’; Leonardi, ‘Paying “buckets of blood” for the land’, p.230. 54 Leonardi, Dealing with Government in South Sudan, pp. 79–83. 55 Gabriella MacMichael, ‘Land Tenure and Property Rights in Southern Sudan: A Case Study of Informal Settlements in Juba’, in Land Tenure Issues in Southern Sudan; Key Findings and Recommendations for Southern Sudan Land Policy (USAID and Tetra Tech ARD, December 2010), p. C–11. 52 53

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northern Sudanese and Egyptian officials; Class 3 plots to educated Southerners employed in the government; Class 4 plots to ‘temporary’ migrant workers who were not given leases for their plots and not permitted to build with permanent materials. As the boundaries of Mongalla Province expanded over the decades, so did Juba’s administrative and political importance. In 1935, the Zande District, formerly the Southern District of Bahr el Ghazal, was added to the six districts of Mongalla Province.56 The following year, in 1936, in an attempt to increase the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the colonial administration, Governor-General Symes combined Mongalla and Bahr el Ghazal Provinces to form Equatorial Province.57 The jurisdiction of the new larger province, and with it Juba as the province capital, now included the Dinka of Bahr el Ghazal. In 1948, Bahr el Ghazal separated to become its own province (Map A). Equatorial Province became Equatoria Province and retained the Zande District. On the eve of independence, Juba was the capital of the new Equatoria Province. Having been a multi-ethnic town that was the centre of colonial administration for decades, Juba increasingly became a site of southern political mobilization.

The changing framework of land laws: the colonial period Towns such as Juba were built with a mandate introduced by colonial land legislation. Colonial laws beginning with the 1899 Titles to Land Ordinance paved the way for the Anglo-Egyptian government to acquire land for public purposes. In the south, this legislation justified the seizure of village lands for the development of towns. The 1903 Land Acquisition Ordinance, for example, gave the government the power to acquire land for irrigation schemes and other public purposes. The 1905 Land Settlement Ordinance declared waste, forest or unoccupied land to be the property of government unless claims to the contrary were proven. The 1925 Land Settlement and Registration Ordinance established rules for the gazetting of village lands for urban development and settlement, including procedures for surveying and demarcating plots, and registering leasehold plots. The 1930 Land Acquisition Ordinance further elaborated procedures for land acquisition for public purposes, outlining compensation mechanisms. Land legislation enacted during the AngloEgyptian Condominium period gave the government the prerogative to seize village lands but it upheld communal rights throughout the country, including the south, provided there was no ‘public interest’ in the land.

Nalder, Equatorial Province Handbook, p. 30. The six districts of Mongalla Province were: the Central District, which included all the Bari; the Yei River District; the Moru District; the Latuka District; the Opari District, and the Eastern District. 57 Nalder, Equatorial Province Handbook, p. 30; G.S. Symes, Political Memorandum on the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan encl. to High Commissioner for Egypt and Sudan, 9 June 1935, FO 371/19095 cited in Kibreab, State Intervention and the Environment in Sudan, pp.183–184. 56

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When the British gained control over Sudan, most groups in the north had their own exclusive territories, known as ‘dar’, which dated back to the advent of the Funj Sultanate in 1504. Dar rights bestowed exclusive rights to specific territories; and within the dars, land was owned and used communally.58 While colonial laws paved the way for government acquisition of land from villages for ‘public purposes’, in practice the Condominium government recognized dar rights in northern Sudan and communal rights to ‘tribal’ lands held under customary law in southern Sudan.59 The 1899 Titles to Land Ordinance, for example, acknowledged that some ‘unsettled’ land was subject to rights vested in a community such as tribe, section, or village. The Land Settlement and Registration Ordinance of 1925, the Prescription and Limitations Ordinance of 1928, and the Pre-emption Ordinance of 1929 codified some customary laws. Moreover, under the system of Native Administration, southern chiefs were given power to allocate and manage communal land, and to settle land disputes according their respective customary laws. These powers were defined by the Civil Justice Ordinance of 1929. Therefore, even as statutory laws gave the colonial government increasing right to acquire land for public purposes, chiefs’ courts and the adjudication of land disputes upheld the existing land tenure framework in much of southern Sudan. As we will see in the next section, this state of things changed in the post-independence period with the promulgation of the 1970 Unregistered Land Act, which eliminated the customary land rights regime, and dispensed with the long-standing principle that a right to property could be acquired by uninterrupted possession for a prescribed period.60

THE SOUTH AFTER INDEPENDENCE: REBELLION, CIVIL WAR, AND REGIONAL AUTONOMY The dualistic model of imperial governance pursued by the AngloEgyptian Government, whereby the northern and southern regions of Sudan were administered according to separate systems, exacerbated the differences in culture and patterns of socio-economic and political development between the northern and southern regions of Sudan. While in the south, Native Administration promoted ‘tradition’ and ‘custom’ as modes of power and paths to political development, the north had political parties, trade unions and commercial enterprises. Foreign and northern merchants, popularly referred to as ‘jallaba’, dominated the south’s limited commercial activities. Christian missionaries operated the few schools and medical clinics. The concentration of power in the north, amidst stark disparities in education and development between the north and the south, caused southern leaders to fear that the south would remain a Kibreab, State Intervention and the Environment in Sudan, p. 29. Ibid., pp. 12 & 36; Catherine Miller (ed), Land, Ethnicity, and Political Legitimacy in Eastern Sudan; Kassala and Gedaref States (Le Caire: CEDEJ, 2005), pp. 25–26. 60 Kibreab, State Intervention and the Environment in Sudan, pp. 279–280. 58 59

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dependent periphery after independence, vulnerable to exploitation for its human and natural resources and without hope of political and economic advancement.61 Despite assurances that the Government of Sudan would safeguard southern political and cultural rights after independence, southern leaders – a small cohort of mission-educated elites – were largely excluded from the civil service and political positions. The prospect of northern rule mobilized a nascent southern intelligentsia that sought greater access to political power and resources. While southern politicians pursued the goal of southern ‘self-determination’ through political negotiation, southern soldiers and rebels took to the bush. In 1955, southern Non-Commissioned Officers in a regiment of the Sudanese Army based in the southern town of Torit mutinied. The government suppressed the revolt, but some of the mutineers escaped to remote areas of the south and formed loosely coordinated groups of southern rebels called ‘Anyanya’. The seeds of the southern rebellion were sown.

The first civil war (1963–1972) Following the withdrawal of the British from the country in 1956, Sudan was granted its independence in an arrangement that brought the entire territory, including the south, under the control of a central government in Khartoum. From the outset, the Sudanese government was controlled by an Arab-speaking and Islamic elite dominated by three ethnic groups from the central Nile River valley: the Shaigiyah, Jaileyin, and Danagla. In Johnson’s view, the independence arrangement amounted to ‘the transfer of the colonial structure intact from Britain to the northern Sudanese nationalists’.62 As southern leaders had feared, during the first decades of independence the concentration of power paved the way for a period of Arabization and Islamization in the south. The incongruence between southern leaders’ aspirations, and the interests which drove the north’s political and religious agenda, created an irresolvable dilemma at the core of the state-building project. Many on both sides espoused the view that the north and south were at odds culturally, religiously, and politically. In a speech in Khartoum, Aggrey Jaden, the leader of the exile faction of the Sudan African National Union expressed such a view: The Sudan falls sharply into two distinct areas, both in geographical area, ethnic group, and cultural systems. The northern Sudan is occupied by a hybrid Arab race who are united by their common language, common culture, and common religion; and they look to the Arab world for their cultural and political inspiration. The people of the southern Sudan, on the other hand, belong to the African ethnic group of East Africa. They do not only differ from the hybrid Arab race in origin, arrangement and basic systems, but in all conceivable purposes.63 61 George Shepherd, ‘National integration and the southern Sudan’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 4:2 (1966), p. 202; Shepherd cites a pamphlet by Bona M. Ring, a leader of the Southern Front: The Causes of Southern Dissension; Khartoum Conference on the South, March 1965. 62 Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, p. 22. 63 Khartoum Conference on the South, March 1965 documents; speech by Aggrey

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Southern resistance was based on the belief that unity with the north was not in the region’s interests, and that a united Sudan built upon the north’s Arab-Islamic state-building project would amount to permanent inferior economic and political status for the ethnically and politically pluralistic south. The only viable alternatives in the view of southern leaders were a federal system, regional autonomy within a united Sudan, or independence. As rebels engaged in periodic actions, government military crackdowns forced southern political leaders and administrators into exile in Uganda, Kenya, and Congo. In 1962, these exiled leaders formed the Sudan African Closed Districts National Union, later renamed the Sudan African National Union (SANU). The next year, in Uganda, the rebel forces were formally organized as the ‘Anyanya’ and a declaration of war was prepared.64 The first civil war had begun.

The Addis Ababa Agreement and southern self-government (1972–1983) As the southern rebellion grew, the north went through a succession of military coups and failed attempts at multiparty democracy. From 1956 to 1969, Sudan experienced seven coalition governments and six military regimes. In a May 1969 coup, Colonel Jaafar Nimeiri and the ‘Free Officers’ of the Sudanese armed forces took over the Government of Sudan and established a Revolutionary Command Council. Following an abortive coup attempt in 1971, however, Nimeiri ditched his radical socialist agenda in favour of a more pro-western policy, and refocused his efforts on finding a solution to the ‘southern problem’. The solution came in the form of the Addis Ababa Agreement, negotiated in Ethiopia and ratified in 1972 in Khartoum by Sudanese President Nimeiri and Joseph Lagu, a southern rebel leader who had united a large number of Anyanya under the leadership of his Southern Sudan Independence Movement. The Addis Ababa Agreement brought the three southern provinces together as a single region within the Republic of Sudan and established the Southern Regional Government, made up of a High Executive Council and the People’s Regional Assembly based in Juba.65 Although this arrangement gave the southern region some measure of autonomy, Khartoum remained in control of the funds needed by the southern government; and it retained control over defence, foreign policy, trade, transport and communications for the whole region. Nimeiri, as President of the Republic of Sudan, retained the power to appoint the president of the High Executive Council. He chose veteran southern politician Abel Alier, Jaden (mimeo.), p. 4. The excerpt is taken from George W. Shepherd Jr., ‘National Integration and the Southern Sudan’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 4:2 (1966), p. 195. Shepherd points out that this view did not represent all Southern elites, and quotes William Deng, leader of SANU-Inside as calling the speech ‘unsuitable’: Khartoum News Service, 31 March 1965, p. 9. 64 Leonardi, Dealing with Government in South Sudan, p. 167 citing Oystein Rolandsen, ‘Civil War Society? Political processes, social groups and conflict intensity in the Southern Sudan, 1955–2005’, doctoral dissertation: University of Oslo, 2010, pp. 159–62. 65 There were also administrations at the provincial and district levels. (cont.)

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Minister for Southern Affairs in Khartoum and the leader of the government’s negotiation team at the Addis Ababa talks.66 Lagu, who was expecting the presidency, was appointed Inspector-General in the People’s Armed Forces, a post that was based in Khartoum.67 Therefore, rather than securing meaningful regional autonomy for the south, the agreement institutionalized Khartoum’s political and economic control over the southern government, and made the fragile entity vulnerable to the meddling by Nimeiri’s government. This vulnerability would prove devastating to the southern government, which was quickly beset by divisions amongst its leaders. The south was united in terms of geographic, economic, and social differences with the north, but it was not a homogenous, consolidated political entity. On the contrary, the diverse people who lived within the territory of the southern region had very different economic realities, cultural practices, and political leanings, all of which were amplified by varied experiences of colonialism. One main axis of division was between the various ethnic groups in Equatoria, a region that had received the bulk of development during the Anglo-Egyptian period as the centre of administration, and ethnic groups from the more remote areas of Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile, which had evaded colonial rule for longer.68 The weak framework of the Addis Ababa Agreement allowed Nimeiri to aggravate these divisions and to manipulate personal rivalries between southern politicians. Nimeiri’s political appointments to the Southern Regional Government fuelled a rivalry between leaders from various Equatorian ethnic groups, and leaders from various sections of the Dinka. Joseph Lagu was a Madi from Central Equatoria and Abel Alier was a Bor Dinka. Following the 1978 elections to the Regional Assembly Lagu was elected President of the High Executive Council, initially with the support of prominent Dinka (Table A). However, he lost this support as his constituency narrowed to an Equatorian contingent.69 Following Lagu’s dismissal by Nimeiri, Alier returned to power in the 1980 elections, at which time he appointed Dinka to half the ministerial posts in the HEC.70 Amidst the public rivalry between Lagu and Alier’s factions, accusations of ‘Dinka domination’ of the new government, including the civil service, the police force and the military, abounded. This was in the context of an influx of southerners into the town from other regions that accompanied the establishment of the first Southern Regional Government. Local elites hailing from various Equatorian ethnic groups – a cohort Presidential Decree No. 40 in 1972, which established provisional arrangements for the 18-month transitional period preceding elections to the Regional Assembly, gave Nimeiri the power to appoint the President of Provisional High Executive Council without requiring him to have the recommendation from Southerners. 67 Arop Madut-Arop. Sudan’s Painful Road to Peace: A Full Story of the Founding and Development of SPLM/SPLA (Charleston: BookSurge, 2006). 68 Douglas H. Johnson, ‘The Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the Problem of Factionalism’, in Christopher Clapham (ed), African Guerrillas (Oxford: James Currey, 1998). 69 Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, p. 52. 70 Ibid., p. 53. 66

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comprised of individuals who claimed membership across various identity categories, including ‘intellectuals’, politicians, chiefs, church leaders, and military officials – feared the effect of the demographic changes on their political and economic status within the town.71 A particular concern was competition for public sector jobs in the town. A Juba University lecturer from Equatoria recalled, ‘the Dinka were all over the place in Juba, in the police, the judiciary, the ministries,’ and ‘were very open about [their] tribalism’.72 He explained that the resentment felt by Equatorians towards the newcomers to the town, particularly the Dinka, was in part due to competition over public sector jobs: When Addis Ababa came, we had refugees returning from neighboring countries. Juba was the main transit town when people were brought by UNHCR. They were supposed to spend some time here and then proceed to their places of origin. But most people stayed, because this was the Regional Government and there were many job opportunities. This was the best place to look for well-paid government job. After the end of the first war many of them were looking to the civil service for clerical jobs or even manual jobs. This is what created animosities, because there was one dominant tribe trying to monopolize everything…the police the civil service jobs. It led to resentment….73

However, contrary to such perceptions, an analysis of the employment records of the Southern Regional Government found that the majority of government employees actually hailed from Equatoria, the residents of which had greater access to education, both in southern Sudan and as refugees in East Africa.74 Furthermore, as Johnson argues, while the increased representation of the Dinka in the southern civil service following the Addis Ababa Agreement gave the impression of ethnic favouritism, in fact the large numbers of Dinka may have merely reflected their disproportionately large share of the population of southern Sudan.75 The Dinka remain the largest ethnic group in South Sudan with a population of approximately 2.5 – 3 million. They speak an Eastern Sudanic language, of the Nilo-Saharan language family. Within the Dinka people there exist many groups and subgroups, or ‘tribes’, some of which have historically been or are presently in conflict with one another. Therefore, while it may be true that a majority of executive and security posts in the Southern Regional Government were held by Dinka,76 this did not indicate a pan-Dinka alliance, as is implied by notions of ‘Dinka domination’. On the contrary, there were many political rivalries and divisions within the Dinka, including significant opposition to Abel Alier among some of the 71 These ‘elites’ had privileged access to political and military power. While some ‘intellectuals’ in this group have university degrees, some also have very limited education. 72 Interview 85b: Duncan, Juba University Lecturer / Juba / August 2008. 73 Ibid. 74 Douglas H. Johnson, personal communication, 12 September 2012. 75 Douglas H. Johnson, The Southern Sudan, Minority Rights Group Report (London: The Minority Rights Group, 1988). 76 Paul Wani Gore et al, ‘Analysis of Nine Conflicts in Sudan’, UNICEF, May 2003, p. 9

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Dinka of Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal. Johnson suggests that Alier was not furthering an ethnic agenda, but in fact was trying to win over Dinka opponents.77 There is no cohesive group of people who refer to themselves as ‘Equatorians’, but rather a series of ethnic groups, referred to popularly as ‘tribes’, hailing from the Equatoria region and grouped together when a regional identity is appropriate. Many of these, such as the Mundari, Kakwa, Kuku, Nyangwara, and Pojelu, speak variants of the Bari language that belong to the Eastern Nilotic branch of the Eastern Sudanic sub-family. Other groups, such as the Moru, Madi, Luluba, and Baka, speak languages from the Central Sudanic sub-family.78 The Zande, who are primarily inhabitants of Western Equatoria State, speak a language from the Adamawa Eastern sub-family.79 Although these groups differentiate themselves culturally from the peoples of Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile, they are not themselves one people. Some of them have been in conflict both historically and in the contemporary period. Therefore, while the political conflicts of the Addis Ababa period are often characterized as stemming from a longstanding ethnic rivalry between the whole of the Dinka, and an alliance of all Equatorian groups, such sweeping and encompassing categorizations misrepresent the subtleties of both identity groups and the relationships of their various segments with one another. Nevertheless, Alier’s actions took place during a period when Equatorian elites were troubled by what they considered to be the overrepresentation of the Dinka in regional institutions, and therefore, the appointments were interpreted as indicative of ethnic favouritism. Thus, it was the perception of such favouritism and of political dominance that was operative, if not the reality. Whether or not the continuing fears were warranted, perceptions of ‘Dinka domination’ reflected anxieties produced by rapid demographic and political change amongst Equatorians who were faced with the prospect of sharing the town with other southern groups. More broadly, at the root of Equatorian xenophobia in the period following the Addis Ababa Agreement was a clash of political cultures. Kasfir categorizes those who had remained in Sudan during the first civil war and worked within the system as ‘insiders’, and those who had left the country – whether as political exiles, fighters, or for further education – as ‘outsiders’. ‘Insiders’ were on the whole more educated and had relationships with officials of Nimeiri’s government. ‘Outsiders’ were less educated, and more willing to take up arms. Kasfir argues, Outsiders bitterly point out that the educational qualifications and expertise that many insiders gained during the war enabled them to obtain higher administrative positions on the basis of merit in competition with outsiders who actually fought the war. Some insiders, on the other hand, especially at junior levels,

77 78 79

Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, p. 53. Leonardi, Dealing with Government in South Sudan, p. 12. Ibid.

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complain that outsiders have been given better jobs despite inferior qualifications.80

According to Johnson, Alier was thought to represent the ‘insiders’ – those who had remained in Sudan during the first civil war – while Lagu was seen to represent ‘outsiders’ – those who had been in exile or fought in the bush during the war.81 However, he points out that the distinction is problematic, as many ‘insiders’ supported rebel groups, while many ‘outsiders’ had no active role in guerrilla activities. Nevertheless, the two categories were important during the post-Addis Ababa period, and continued to be significant in differentiating the residents of Juba in the post-CPA period. Indeed, the distinct difference in positionality and perspectives of the Addis Ababa period, in particular the way in which notions of identity and legitimate residency fed into competition over public sector jobs, would be remarkably similar to those which were to recur in the Interim period.

The Kokora Policy and the redivision debate In response to what they perceived as ‘Dinka domination’ of the southern government, Equatorian leaders in Juba began to advocate devolution of power and local autonomy through ‘decentralization’.82 In 1981 a group of predominantly Bari Equatorian leaders in Juba, among them Joseph Lagu, Severino Wani, Luka Manoja, Joseph Tombora, and Eliaba Suru, drafted a policy called ‘Kokora’.83 The Kokora policy recommended the redivision of the southern region along the 1948 province boundaries (see Map A), so that the members of each region could govern their own areas. It was believed that this would improve the political position of Equatorian groups vis-à-vis larger southern ethnic groups, especially the Dinka. While support for dividing the south was not strictly along ethnic lines, it was mainly backed by Equatorians in and around Juba and in Western Equatoria Province.84 However, there was opposition to decentralization in Eastern Equatoria Province, particularly in Kapoeta district, which had a large number of anti-redivision candidates in the 1982 Regional Assembly elections and the 1982/1983 Sudan Socialist Union elections.85 The socio-political and demographic changes in Juba during the transition after 1972 interacted with a specific local history of conflict. From 1965–1968, the Dinka from Bor and Yirol fought a war against an alliance of Bari, Nyangwara, and Mundari.86 Following repeated episodes of Nelson Kasfir, ‘Southern Sudanese Politics Since the Addis Ababa Agreement’, African Affairs 76:303 (1977), p. 158. 81 Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, p. 52. 82 The term ‘redivision’, largely used by opponents of the policy, is thought to have negative connotations by proponents, who prefer ‘decentralization’ or ‘Kokora’. 83 All but two of these men were Bari: Eliaba Suru is a Pojulu, and Joseph Lagu is a Madi. 84 In 1976, Equatoria Province had been divided into Eastern and Western Equatoria Provinces, leaving Juba as part of Eastern Equatoria. 85 Douglas H. Johnson, personal communication, 12 September 2012. 86 Gore et al, ‘Analysis of Nine Conflicts in Sudan’, p. 10. 80

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Table A Southern Regional Government Executives, 1972–2005 Dates

Southern Regional Government Executive

President

Political Party

Ethnicity

27 Feb 1972

Addis Ababa Agreement, ending first civil war and establishing Southern Regional Government

April 1972 – Oct 1973

Provisional High Executive Council

Abel Alier

Sudanese Socialist Dinka-Bor Union (SSU)

Oct 1973 – Feb 1978

High Executive Council

Abel Alier

SSU

Dinka-Bor

Feb 1978 – July 1979

High Executive Council

Joseph Lagu

SSU

Madi

1979–1980

High Executive Council

Peter Gatkuoth

SSU

Lou-Nuer

May 1980 – Oct 1981

High Executive Council

Abel Alier

SSU

Dinka-Bor

5 Oct 1981

Dissolution of Southern Regional Government

Oct 1981 – June 1982

Interim Administration

Gismalla Abdalla Rassas

SSU

Fartit/Nuba

June 1982 – June 1983

Interim Administration

Joseph James Tombura

SSU

Zande

5 June 1983

Redivision of Southern region into three new states: Bahr el Jebel, Upper Nile, and Bahr el Ghazal

5 June 1983 – 25 May 1985

Post abolished

–

–

–

25 May 1985 – May 1986

Interim Administration

James Loro

SSU

Bari

May 1986 – May 1987

Post abolished

–

–

–

Jan 1987 – Jan 1988

Council for the South

Matthew Abor Ayang

SANU

Shilluk

Jan 1988 – Jun 1989

Council for the South

Angelo Beda

National Congress Party (NCP)

Zande

July 1989 – Aug 1997

Post abolished

–

–

27 April 1997

Khartoum Peace Agreement

Aug 1997 – Jan 2000

Coordinating Council for the Southern State

Riek Machar

Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM)

Dok-Nuer

Feb 2000 – Dec 2002

Coordinating Council for the Southern State

Galuak Deng

NCP

Lou-Nuer

Dec 2002 – 2005 Coordinating Council for the Southern State

Riek Gai Kok

NCP

JikanyNuer

9 Jan 2005

Comprehensive Peace Agreement, ending second civil war and establishing Government of Southern Sudan

July 2005

Government of Southern Sudan

John Garang

SPLM

DinkaTwic

Aug 2005

July 2005

Salva Kiir

SPLM

Dinka-Rek

(Source: author’s fieldwork and research)

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flooding in Bor, and southward migration of Bor Dinka into Mundari and Bari areas with their cattle, the local government authorities in Juba organized a peace conference between the Bari, Bor-Dinka, and Mundari in 1973. Despite the meeting, relations between Dinka and Mundari deteriorated following the Addis Ababa Agreement due to the increased number of Dinka cattle in the area, and competition over cattle and meat markets in Juba, which were controlled by the Dinka. Gore suggests that some Bor and Aliab Dinka used their power in the Southern Regional Government to renege on grazing agreements with Mundari.87 This dynamic fed Bari and Mundari support for the redivision of the south. Decentralization was seen by its supporters as a remedy for the ‘domination’ of southern politics by the majority Dinka, a way to protect local access to power and resources, especially land, while ensuring equitable access to government and civil service jobs. Although many Equatorians regarded redivision as an essential step to break Dinka hegemony, southerners from other areas saw it as a cynical manipulation by self-serving southern politicians who were unwittingly giving the north ammunition with which to weaken chances for meaningful southern autonomy.88 A Bari CES Minister explained his interpretation of the history of the Kokora policy: Kokora came from Equatorians, because they were deprived of their rights. There was a debate taking place [amongst Equatorians], but immediately that debate was supported by Nimeiri, for political reasons. The northerners found it a chance to make the southerners divided, to separate them, to [make them] hate each other.89

Indeed, faced with economic and political turmoil throughout the country, the northern government was looking for signs of internal conflict in the south.90 Following the resurgence of the traditional sectarian movements – the Ansar, the Khatmiyya, and the Muslim Brotherhood – Sadiq alMahdi, head of the Umma Party, and Hassan al-Turabi, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood,91 were appointed to the Politburo of the Sudan Gore et al, ‘Analysis of Nine Conflicts in Sudan’, p. 9. Raphael Badal, ‘Political Cleavages within the Southern Sudan. An Empirical Analysis of the Re-Division Debate’, in Harir and Tvedt (eds), Short-cut to Decay. The Case of the Sudan Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1994), p. 109; Peter Nyaba, Politics of liberation in South Sudan: An Insider’s View (Kampala, Uganda: Fountain Publishers, 1997), p. 23. 89 Interview 26: Emmanuel Waga Elia, CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 22 July 2008. 90 During the 1970s, the Sudan’s economy had fallen into a spiral of budget deficits and debt amidst the loss of Arab developmental aid, soaring oil prices, and rising inflation and interest rates. Following failed coup attempts in 1975 and 1976 by exiled northern opposition groups, Nimeiri retreated from his socialist agenda and adopted a more conservative approach, which included a policy of ‘National Reconciliation’ with the northern opposition. 91 The Muslim Brotherhood, which originated in Egypt, has been active in Sudan since its formation there in 1949. Its objective in Sudan has been to institutionalize Islamic law throughout the country. Hassan al-Turabi, former dean of the School of Law at the University of Khartoum, had been the Muslim Brotherhood’s secretary general since 1964. 87 88

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Socialist Union in 1977. With their ascent, Nimeiri’s agenda of reconciliation with the south was dead. In March 1981 the Southern Regional Assembly rejected the Kokora proposal. Nimeiri dissolved the Southern Regional Government, and established a transitional government under Gismalla Abdalla Rassas, which took power on October 5, 1981. On June 5, 1983 Nimeiri unilaterally redivided the south into three new southern regions based on the old colonial provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile. As its opponents had feared, the redivision of the south broke up the strongest regional block in the country. The three new regional governments had little of the power that the Southern Regional Government had enjoyed; their governors were appointed by Khartoum, and their tax revenues were remitted to GoS for redistribution.92 The weakening of the south gave the government in Khartoum the ability to enact troubling and restrictive policies, such as the series of ‘September laws’ that imposed a strict interpretation of Sharia law on both the Muslim north, and the non-Muslim south.

The changing framework of land laws: the decades after independence The abrogation of southern autonomy took place in the context of a successive encroachment on community lands held under customary law. Successive land legislation in the post-independence period enabled the northern government to extend its authority over both towns and rural areas in southern Sudan, eventually giving it sweeping powers over the natural resources of the south. Building on colonial precedent, statutory land laws were based on the principle that all land belonged to the state unless evidence was provided to prove otherwise. In the 1960s, the government expanded public sector investment, emphasising the agricultural sectors. This eventually led to the wholesale loss of de jure rights over communal lands with the 1970 Unregistered Land Act,93 which gave the government full ownership of all land that were not registered, including land that was occupied and held under customary law. Most of Sudan’s rural population, and almost all southerners, had no knowledge of this legislation, and were unable to travel to the central registry in Khartoum within the prescribed period. Consequently, most rural residents were dispossessed of de jure rights to the lands on which they lived, farmed, and grazed their livestock. The Act in effect shifted southern Sudan from a communal land rights regime towards state ownership of land rights; and it eliminated the principle, a cornerstone of colonial legislation, that registration should not affect the acquisition of a right to property by uninterrupted possession for a prescribed period.94 It thus took away the rights of the people who lived on a particular piece of land for generations, without guarantee of compensation. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, p. 55. Later, the 1984 Civil Transaction Act and its amendment in 1990 strengthened the privileges of the state with further negative consequences for customary rights holders. 94 Kibreab, State Intervention and the Environment in Sudan, pp. 279–280. 92 93

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In the north, this paved the way for large-scale land alienation in resource-rich areas where wealthy businessmen and companies with close ties to government were able to acquire land from illiterate farmers and pastoralists for development and agricultural schemes. The result was dispossession, displacement, and the destruction of the livelihoods of the local occupants, leading to chronic food insecurity in places such as the Nuba Mountains and the Red Sea Hills. The application of these laws in southern Sudan was, however, patchy. Statutory land legislation was meaningfully applied mainly in towns, although the Unregistered Land Act was used by the government to move forward with the Jonglei Canal scheme and oil exploration projects in Upper Nile. The Jonglei Canal was a joint Sudanese-Egyptian project in collaboration with a French company, to divert the water of the White Nile in Upper Nile state away from the Sudd, a wetland area covering approximately 1.7 million hectares.95 The canal would in effect drain the marshes at Jonglei and convert them to farmland, thus increasing the supply of water for commercial farming in northern Sudan and Egypt, but at the same time threatening the livelihoods of local populations who lived, fished, and grazed their cattle in the diverse ecosystem of the Sudd. Construction began in 1978. Meanwhile, in 1979, Chevron discovered oil in Bentiu in Western Upper Nile, which was in the territory of southern Sudan.96 That year, Nimeiri created Unity State in an attempt to move the territory of the oil fields out of southern Sudan and bring it under the control of the government. The latter also decided to construct a 1400 kilometre pipeline to a refinery near Port Sudan, rather than have the oil processed in the south.97 The discovery of oil led to massive displacement of local populations in the 1980s.98 In response, SPLA forces attacked Chevron’s oilfields, forcing the company to suspend operations in 1984. The SPLM/A attacked the Jonglei canal site the same year, destroying the giant excavating machine and effectively stopping the project. The exploitation of southern lands, and the dire consequences for the people who were displaced, fuelled opposition to the central government. 95 N. Shanmugaratnam, ‘Post-War Development and the Land Question in South Sudan’, paper presented at the International Symposium on Resources Under Stress, organised by the Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development, Ryukoku University, Kyoto Japan, 23–24 February 2008, p. 5. Plans for the Jonglei Canal Project were first developed in 1954–59 with Egyptian support. See also: Adil Mustafa Ahmad, ‘Post-Jonglei planning in southern Sudan: combining environment with development’, Environment and Urbanization 20:2 (2008), pp. 575–586; Ashok Swain, Managing Water Conflict: Asia, Africa and the Middle East (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 99; and John Garang de Mabior, ‘Identifying, Selecting and Implementing Rural Development Strategies for Socio-economic Development in the Jonglei Projects Area, Southern Region, Sudan’, (Doctoral dissertation, Iowa State University, 1986). 96 Oil exploration began in Sudan in 1959, when the government granted the Italian oil company Agip concessions in the Red Sea area. ‘Raising the stakes: Oil and conflict in Sudan’, Sudan Update, Available from: http://www.sudanupdate. org/REPORTS/Oil/08cn.html [Accessed 10 October 2013] 97 The pipeline was completed in 1999. 98 ‘Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights’, Human Rights Watch, 25 November 2003.

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Although in much of the predominantly rural southern Sudan, including the peripheries of towns, land allocation and management remained a de facto power of traditional authorities, the loss of legal rights over the lands on which southerners lived, farmed, and grazed their cattle, exacerbated political enmity towards the north among southern elites. It became a rallying cry for the SPLM/A leadership who pointed to displacements in Upper Nile and the Nuba Mountains as examples of what the south was fighting for. For many southerners, the central government’s encroachment on southern land rights brought home the point that the south was vulnerable to the government’s arbitrary exercise of power, and that the region was experiencing a second period of ‘internal’ colonization, not true independence. Amidst the tense and acrimonious atmosphere created by the redivision of the south and the harsh September laws, the country returned to civil war.

The emergence of the SPLM/A and the start of the second civil war In July 1983 John Garang de Mabior, Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, Salva Kiir Mayardit, and William Nyuon Bany joined together in Bilpam in the Gambella District of Ethiopia. There, with the backing of Ethiopian President Mengistu Haile Mariam, they formed a new rebel army, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A).99 Joining them were members of various underground movements organized by Anyanya rebels who had been integrated in the SAF, and the active remnants of the Anyanya, now called Anyanya–2. As one SPLA Commander recalled, in the early days of planning the rebellion, ‘We [believed] that there was no way for us really to be free, unless we fought [the northern government] again, but in a better way than Anyanya’.100 The second civil war was in many ways a continuation of the first, but it was different in that the SPLM/A’s struggle was fought, at least officially, on the premise of introducing a new framework for the Sudanese state, rather than achieving independence for the south. Believing that southern interests could no longer be served by regional autonomy, SPLM/A founders, led by John Garang, advocated a united secular ‘New Sudan’. A Dinka from Wongolei village in what is now Twic East (or Kongor) County, Garang was an Anyanya rebel who had been integrated into the SAF following the Addis Ababa Agreement. As an SAF soldier he rose to the rank of colonel and was serving as an instructor at the military academy in Wadi Sayedna when he defected to join the other founders of the SPLM/A in Ethiopia. The ideology of a ‘New Sudan’ rejected Arabism and Islamism and favoured secularism, socialism, and, after the end of the Cold War, liberal democracy. Garang realized that the movement could go further than previous southern insurgencies if it could tap into the discontent that existed throughout the country’s northern, eastern, and western peripheries. At the same time, he knew that Ethiopian leader, Mengistu Haile Mariam, would not support a separatist movement in Sudan while 99 For a detailed account of the events of this period, see: Madut-Arop, Sudan’s Painful Road to Peace. 100 Interview 81: Gerald, SPLA commander / Juba / September 2008.

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contending with the Eritrea war of independence. Despite the acceptance of the ‘New Sudan’ vision amongst the movement’s leadership, however, many SPLM/A leaders and their southern followers never abandoned the goal of an independent southern Sudan. While many of those close to Garang, such as Pagan Amum, saw the SPLM/A as an African liberation movement representing all of the marginalized ‘Africans’ of Sudan, there were also pragmatists who regarded the ideology in terms of how it could help achieve the SPLM/A’s military objectives in the war. Among this group, Johnson maintains, ascribing to the goal of unity was a tactic either to elicit concessions from the central government or to achieving the unspoken but underlying goal of separation.101 For a period, military victory seemed within the SPLM/A’s grasp. From 1985 to 1989 Sudan was beset by political and economic turmoil, including large-scale protests against the government in Khartoum and factional party politics. Then, on June 30, 1989, Omar al-Bashir came to power in a military coup that was backed by the National Islamic Front, a prominent Islamist political organization founded by Hassan al-Turabi, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood.102 His ascendance coincided with regional political events to turn the course of the civil war in a new direction. In 1991, the SPLA controlled Upper Nile, Equatoria (except Juba and Yei), and much of Bahr el Ghazal. However, in May of that year, Mengistu was ousted, forcing the SPLM/A to evacuate its military bases and refugee camps inside Ethiopia. This turn of events brought the movement’s internal ideological and political divisions to a head. In August 1991, Commanders Riek Machar and Lam Akol, supported by Gordon Kuong Cuol, a Nuer Anyanya– 2 commander, formed the rival SPLM-Nasir faction in Upper Nile.103 They publicly declared that the goal of a unified, multi-religious Sudan was unrealistic and that the SPLM/A should negotiate to gain the south’s independence. Although they advocated independence for the south, they made strategic alliances with the northern government in pursuit of their goals, compromising their credentials as southern nationalists. In the end, the SPLA-United (renamed the South Sudan Independence Movement) lost credibility and support amongst many southerners, both as a result of its role in the devastation of southern villages, and its acceptance of logistical support and weapons from the north. The SPLA-United was added to the plethora of militias which littered the southern region, most of which came under the tutelage of the northern government. The end of war was becoming a fading prospect. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, p. 65. Bashir suspended the 1986 Transitional constitution, dissolved the Constituent Assembly, the Council of Ministers, and the Head of State Council, and established the Revolution Command Council for National Salvation in the place of Sadiq alMahdi’s coalition government. Upon declaring a state of emergency, he abolished all political parties, trade unions and professional organizations, and assumed sweeping powers over the country, becoming the new Head of State, Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, and Commander-in-Chief of SAF. 103 Nasir Declaration, 28 August 1991, quoted in Susan Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 157. See also: Lam Akol, SPLM/SPLA: The Nasir Declaration (Lincoln: iUniverse, 2003). 101 102

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Civil administration in SPLM/A-held territories Having signalled the reality of protracted war, the split in the SPLM/A provided an impetus for a new phase of state-building in southern Sudan, focused on rebel-held territories. During a meeting in Torit of the SPLM/A High Command in September 1991, the first such meeting since the movement’s formation, the movement’s political goals were modified. Four options were proposed: ‘a united secular democratic Sudan, confederation, association of sovereign states, or self-determination’.104 For the first time, the SPLM/A hinted that the south would secede if the government maintained its centralized Arab-Islamic system. Having acknowledged the desire for independence amongst the populations of southern Sudan, the movement’s leadership turned its attention to building civil administration in the territories under its control. During the SPLM/A’s first National Convention in 1994, 22 resolutions were passed, among them a commitment to separate civil from military administration in SPLM/A territories within a decentralized regional system.105 Two years later, in 1996, the SPLM/A established the Civil Authority for the New Sudan (CANS), which was intended to be the highest political and administrative authority in the New Sudan. The movement had begun to refashion itself as a government. In the following years, the SPLM/A installed governors, commissioners, payam administrators, and boma administrators to govern the states, counties, payams (districts), and bomas (villages) in the territory under its control.106 A payam was led by an administrator, who oversaw legislative, executive and judicial bodies. Authority at the boma level was split between traditional leaders – chiefs, kings, and headmen of various kinds – usually chosen by the village community, and an SPLM/A-appointed Boma administrator. The main role of the chief, along with a council of elders, was to resolve disputes between community members. ‘Tradition’ and ‘custom’ were useful tools in the SPLM/A’s alternative state-building endeavour, an efficient way to administer territories with limited resources, and in keeping with the movement’s political and cultural ideologies. While the goals propounded by the SPLM/A in public declarations and official documents were lofty, limited resources and continuous warfare left SPLM/A leaders with a great deal of leeway to govern, and their approaches and relationships with local communities in southern Sudan 104 Lesch, The Sudan, p. 158, citing the Torit Declaration issued by the SPLM PMHC. See also: Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, p. 106. 105 Civil Administration in New Sudan, Resolutions of the SPLM/SPLA First National Convention. 12 April 1994, Chukudum, New Sudan. A detailed analysis of the SPLM/A’s 1994 Convention is presented in Oystein Rolandsen, Guerrilla Government: Political Changes in the Southern Sudan in the 1990s (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2005). 106 The boma was envisioned as the ‘basic administrative unit of the New Sudan around which social, political, economic and commercial activities evolve’. See: ‘Establishment and Consolidation of the Civil Authority for New Sudan (CANS)’, The Fifteen-Point Programme of the SPLM (Yei and New Cush, New Sudan: SPLM Political Secretariat, March 1998).

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varied significantly. Abuses committed by the SPLM/A against the population during that time, such as forced recruitment, including that of children, diversion of aid intended for civilian populations, cattle raiding, seizure of civilian assets, and even summary executions, have been documented.107 In many areas, locals saw the rebel movement as a continuation of the violence and depredation of successive external states. In fact, the varying experiences of the war meant that in some places in Equatoria, the SPLM/A was perceived as an army of occupation rather than a liberation movement.108 This was a legacy that did not change overnight when the CPA was signed. And it was a reality that would take a great deal of effort to change. Even in places that were sympathetic to the cause of the rebel movement, the SPLM/A was distinguished from the Khartoum government, but it was still referred to as ‘the government of the bush’ with the characteristics of externality and violence that the term ‘government’ connotes.109 Leonardi draws parallels with nineteenth and early twentieth century dynamics when she claims that during the second civil war ‘the primary role of chiefs reverted to provisioning armies with food and recruits in order to deflect worse depredations…’110 The failures of CANS notwithstanding, the SPLM/A did achieve a functioning civil authority in southern Sudan. Even if it was not able to deliver on its promise of transformative institutional development during wartime, CANS was an important first step in the SPLM/A’s state-building efforts. In the 2004 Strategic Framework for War-to-Peace Transition, the SPLM/A leadership acknowledged the incomplete realization of its goals with respect to CANS, attributing it to the challenges of institutionbuilding during wartime.111 The implication was that SPLM-led goverHuman Rights Watch has an extensive library of reports documenting abuses on both sides of the civil war. See for example: Human Rights Watch, ‘War in South Sudan: the Civilian Toll. African Watch Condemns Abuses by all Sides in the Conflict in South Sudan’, 5:14 (1993). See also: African Rights, Food and Power in Sudan; A critique of humanitarianism (London: African Rights, 1997); Jok Madut Jok and Sharon Hutchinson, ‘Sudan’s prolonged second civil war and the militarization of Nuer and Dinka ethnic identities’, African Studies Review 42:2 (1999). 108 Adam Branch and Zachariah Mampilly, ‘Winning the war, but losing the peace?’ The dilemma of SPLM/A civil administration and the tasks ahead’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 43:1 (2005), p. 4; John Young, ‘John Garang’s legacy to the peace process, the SPLM/A & the south’, Review of African Political Economy, 32:106 (2005), pp. 535–548; Johnson, ‘The Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the Problem of Factionalism;’ Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, p. 67–70; Douglas H. Johnson and Gérard Prunier, ‘The foundation and expansion of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army,’ in M.W. Daly and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga (eds), Civil War in the Sudan (London: British Academy Press, 1993), p. 127. 109 Cherry Leonardi ‘Paying “buckets of blood” for the land: moral debates over economy, war and state in Southern Sudan’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 49: 2 (2011), p. 230; Cherry Leonardi, ‘Violence, sacrifice and chiefship in Central Equatoria, Southern Sudan’, Africa 77:4 (2007), pp. 535–58. 110 Leonardi, ‘Paying “buckets of blood” for the land,’ p. 231. 111 SPLM Strategic Framework for War-to-Peace Transition, SPLM Economic Commission, 2004. 107

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nance in the post-CPA period would be based on the same principles but would be better able to implement them. While that proved more difficult to achieve than the initial optimism of the transition had suggested, the intentions were at least built into the framework of SPLM state-building. Clearly, after two decades of controlling large swathes of territory, the SPLM/A came to Juba with its own history of state-building and institutionalized systems of governance.

Occupation and isolation in Juba during the second civil war While the SPLM/A was fighting for territory in southern Sudan, Juba had become a SAF garrison town under the control of the central government. Rather than achieving control over the Equatorian regional government, therefore, Kokora proponents traded a ‘Dinka-dominated’ southern government for northern military occupation. The difficulties of the local experience of war went far beyond lack of access to political positions and public sector jobs. Local leaders, civic and traditional, found themselves in a precarious position as the town was overrun by government forces and government-funded militias. Despite the hardships, political activity continued, such as competition between Bari and Mundari over the institutions of the Equatoria Region/Bahr el Jebel State Government. The experiences of this period reinforced the ambivalence towards the state among locals, and cultivated complex strategies of collaboration and resistance. As the civil war progressed, and the SPLM/A gained more territory in Equatoria, Juba became increasingly closed off. By 1985, the boundaries of the town were sealed by government forces and security services. To the south in Lologo were the main SAF barracks. Forces were also stationed along the riverbanks, on Gondokoro Island to the east, and in the areas surrounding the mountains to the west. A SAF battalion was also stationed to the north of Juba airport (see Map C), which, with the support of the Mundari militia, guarded the northern border of the town. In 1988 the roads between Juba and Torit to the south-east and between Juba and Bor to the north were closed, leaving one open road between Juba and Yei to the southwest, which residents could only travel on with permission from SAF headquarters and a military convoy. By 1990 the Juba-Yei road was closed due to rebel activity, and the town was completely sealed off. The only way out was through Juba airport, the use of which was limited to military airplanes. The militarization of the town’s borders served a dual purpose: it guarded against SPLA attacks, but it also prevented the town’s residents from communicating with or escaping to join the rebels. As Juba grew increasingly isolated, commerce all but ceased. Consumer goods were only brought into the town on military aircraft from Khartoum, and the town’s markets, which sold a limited number of goods at exorbitant prices, were controlled by SAF. The effect of isolation on economic and social activities was harsh; life became extremely difficult for the inhabitants. GoS army patrols and extensive minefields on the perimeter of the town reduced the land area available to residents for cultivation.

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Meanwhile, the lack of government services in rural areas, SPLA activity, and economic devastation caused by disruption of trade routes drove waves of peoples from surrounding areas such as Torit, Terakeka, Kajo Keji and Yei into Juba (see Map A) exacerbating the food supply situation.112 The continuous stream of displaced peoples into the town and the lack of any exit drove up the town’s population, with estimates reaching to 291,000 in 1991,113 a massive jump from the 84,000 figure listed in the 1983 Census. The local population became increasingly dependent on airlifted food aid from either foreign aid operations or SAF aircraft.114 The Lutheran World Federation/Sudan Emergency Operations Consortium operated a large airlift to Juba between 1988 and 1995; in 1989 the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) established a programme in southern Sudan, and the UN’s Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) was initiated.115 Despite these efforts, little aid reached Juba. SPLA blockades limited the amount that could be sent through to the town.116 Also, the food aid that did reach Juba was controlled by the central government. Given restrictions on the access of aid workers and representatives of major donors to the town, it is difficult to determine how much of the aid reached its most needy residents.117 Food shortages led to famine. According to African Rights, between August and October 1988 the town had become ‘an enclave, fed by what can be produced within the secure perimeter and what can be flown in by the government and (mostly) international agencies’.118 A 1988 Time Magazine article stated, ‘some 250,000 are wasting away in Juba, the besieged southern capital, which has been virtually shut off from outside relief…’119 The article described Juba as a ‘city of wanderers roaming hopelessly through muddy streets in a desperate search for food’. It concluded 112 Mark Duffield, et al., ‘Sudan Emergency Operations Committee Consortium (SEOC): A Review’, February 1995, p.146 113 This figure included approximately 145,000 displaced. Ministry of Finance, 1992, cited in Duffield, et al., ‘Sudan Emergency Operations Committee Consortium’, p. 146. 114 Duffield, et al., Ibid., pp.145–146; African Rights, Food and Power in Sudan, pp. 85, 236 & 238; Marv Koop, ‘Grass Roots Regional Assessments – Government Controlled Areas of Sudan’, IGAD, 1 May 2001, p. 59. 115 OLS was a consortium of UN agencies and NGOs operating in southern Sudan during the war, which aimed to deliver humanitarian assistance to all areas, including rebel-held territories. For details on OLS see: Joanna Macrae et al., ‘Conflict, the continuum and chronic emergencies: a critical analysis of the scope for linking relief, rehabilitation and development planning in Sudan’, Disasters 21:3 (1997), pp. 223–43; Ataul Karim et al., Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS): A Review (Geneva: Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1996); Larry Minear and Tabyiegen Agnes Abuom, Humanitarianism Under Siege; a critical review of Operation Lifeline Sudan (Trenton: The Red Sea Press, Inc., 1990). 116 Duffield, et al., ‘Sudan Emergency Operations Committee Consortium’, pp.144– 145. 117 African Rights, Food and Power in Sudan, p. 243. 118 Ibid., p. 238. 119 James Wilde, ‘Sudan Starvation in a Fruitful Land’, Time Magazine, Monday, Dec. 05, 1988.

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with the ominous statement: ‘The city is dying, slowly and inexorably’.120 During this period, local residents had few employment options except working within the various institutions of the government and military in the town. Employment opportunities in the public sector were extremely scarce, and salaries were not paid regularly.121 The main institution of government in the town was the Equatoria Region Government, which in 1996 was divided into three new states: Eastern Equatoria, Bahr el Jebel (renamed Central Equatoria once the CPA was signed), and Western Equatoria. The Bahr el Jebel State Government, based in Juba, consisted of an executive branch, headed by a Governor, a DeputyGovernor, and a Council of Ministers. Below the Bahr el Jebel State Government was the Juba County Government, which was headed by a Commissioner; and below that level were the Juba Town Council and the three sub-councils of Munuki, Kator and Rejaf. These had various responsibilities in local affairs, such as tax collection, road works, land allocation, and maintenance of markets. The locals who worked in the Equatoria Region Government/Bahr el Jebel State Government had little real power, and like their predecessors in the colonial period, they balanced a complex set of priorities. They aimed to protect themselves and their families, but they also sought profit, power, and personal advancement where they could find it. The central government controlled the town through the SAF, Military Intelligence, National Security Forces, and government-supported militias such as the Mujahedeen and the Popular Defence Forces.122 At every level of government there were ‘security committees’, comprising representatives from the Police, Military Intelligence, National Security, as well as political leaders, and they enabled the central government’s agents to monitor any potential support for the rebels.123 The Juba County Commissioner was responsible for approving candidates to stand for election as chiefs, and sanctioning the elected chiefs. Yet his limited power was further curtailed by the Commissioner’s subordinate status vis-à-vis northern leaders and officers in the Equatoria Region Government/Bahr el Jebel State Government, National Security, and the SAF. The Commissioner of Juba County during 1994–2001 described his responsibilities: At that time our main job was security in the town. I was always engaged in security issues. I had my own security committee; I was the Chairman, and we were able to contain the situation within my province. When there was a serious case, I would involve the army. I would go to the Major General; he was the commander of the armed forces in Equatoria.124

Wilde, ‘Sudan Starvation in a Fruitful Land’. Koop, ‘Grass Roots Regional Assessments’, p. 59; Jonah Fisher, ‘Southern Sudan’s frontline town’, BBC, 20 April 2005. 122 Interview 41b: Alfred Keri Yokwe, Professor, Juba University / Juba / 21 August 2008; Interview 35: Peter Jerkins Jaden, former Juba County Commissioner (2004– 2006) / Juba / 18 August 2008. 123 Interview 34: Omar Pitya Wusong, former Juba County Commissioner (2001– 2003) / Juba / 2 September 2008. 124 Interview 32: Alfred Keri Loko, Former Juba County Commissioner (1995–1998). CES Legislative Assembly / Juba / August 2008. 120 121

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The limited power of the Commissioner was apparent to local residents. A Bari resident of Gondokoro Island recalled this role during the war years: The Commissioner doesn’t have powers…Only the name is Commissioner, but the power is not in the hand of the Commissioner. The power is in the hands of the military…If you are sick you are going to die, you have to get a permit from the barracks so they can take you to Khartoum…The civilians know the orders are coming from Khartoum; the orders are coming from the army barracks here.125

In the desperate circumstances of wartime occupation, the residents of Juba made the best of their situation. Like their predecessors, they worked with the institutions of the state, although they continued to perceive it as external. Some even managed to prosper, but not without compromise and cooperation. Chiefs in particular underwent a process of reckoning. As representatives of the local arms of the state, Bari chiefs had to balance a complex set of priorities. They were required by law to be elected by the men and women in their sub-chieftaincies, although elections, especially during wartime, were unevenly and inconsistently conducted. As salaried officials of the state, Bari chiefs were expected to toe the line with GoS policies.126 Elected chiefs had limited power to challenge the authority of higher officials, and were less likely to govern according to their own ‘wisdom’, if this contradicted government policy or the directives of state officials, compared to their predecessors who had succeeded to chiefships through heredity. According to a former Juba County commissioner, ‘The Chiefs are part of the state. They are not competing with the state. It is only that they have the role of traditional rulers’.127 By the Interim Period, education, and political connections to the government had become the most important criteria for being chosen as a chief, although ancestry and family lines continued to carry authority and prestige, and remained important in acquiring chieftaincies as well as positions in local government. For example, both Monsignor Constantino Pitya, a prominent priest in the Juba Catholic Diocese, and Albert Pitya Redentore, the Juba County commissioner were descended from Pitya Lugar, a famous Bari Rainmaker. In these brothers, and in countless others, family, civil society, government, traditional authority combined, and structured a host of complex negotiations which shaped political and social life. Although they were representatives of the state, Bari chiefs retained their colonial roles as cultural, administrative, and juridical leaders. They continued to be responsible for performing traditional rites such as marriage ceremonies and funerals. The juridical role of chiefs was still Interview 77: Sylvester, Gondokoro resident / Juba / August 2008. Where elections did occur in Bari areas, a general procedure was followed: the Commissioner first approved three candidates to stand, chosen by members of a particular chieftaincy or sub-chieftaincy. This individual was selected on the basis of education, pedigree, status in the community, and amenability to the Government. Once the chief was elected, he was given the government’s approval through a formal letter of appointment. 127 Interview 35: Peter Jerkins Jaden, former Juba County Commissioner (2004– 2006) / Juba / 18 August 2008. 125 126

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exercised through the chiefs’ courts. Their responsibilities in this respect included dispute resolution, and the determination of compensation for offences.128 Housed in an open-air colonial brick structure in the southern suburb of Kator, the Tokiman B Court was considered to be the urban chiefs’ court in Juba (Photograph 4). It combined five A courts from Juba and surrounding villages, and was presided over by a panel of Bari chiefs. Typically the most senior of these chiefs was selected as the president of the court, and commonly referred to as the ‘Paramount Chief’ of Juba. In 2009, the president was Denis Daramolo, an example of what the Bari chieftaincy had become. The eighth president since the Tokiman B Court’s creation in 1935, Chief Daramolo began his career as a civil servant and an NCP member.129 He had no connection to lines of hereditary chiefs, and he was not the most senior chief in the B Court. His presidency was explained by his superior education, his knowledge of Arabic and English, and his cooperative stance towards government policies. Although villagers had an independence that townspeople did not, security forces also penetrated the villages on the periphery of the town. Bari chiefs in Juba na Bari, Gumbo and Gondokoro Island were forced to comply with GoS’ security strategy, and some chiefs reported potential ‘collaborators’ to the government. In the view of some residents, Bari chiefs in and around Juba were deeply compromised by their relationship with the government during the war. The Chairman of the Bari Community Association explained, ‘During the wartime, almost all these people were employed by the security, every chief’. According to him, chiefs were required to report SPLA sympathisers, and were rewarded with army clothes and food items.130 A Juba University professor described the difficult position in which many Bari chiefs found themselves: All the chiefs and the Commissioner are sitting on very hot chairs, because [they] are expected to stand for their community on issues, but they are also expected to cooperate with the state government…. This can be very difficult.131

The expectation of cooperating with the government on security issues was sometimes used by chiefs for personal gain. The professor explained, ‘Anybody who does not toe his line, he can just say this man is a collaborator with the SPLA, [and] send the security to get him’.132 Despite their close relationship with the central government and security forces, however, and despite the questionable actions of some individuals, Bari chiefs were nevertheless accountable to their communities and expected to promote community interests. They had to attempt to The recognition of customary law in Southern Sudan was reaffirmed by the People’s Local Courts Act, 1977. 129 Interview 64: Denis Daramalo, Bari Chief of Tokiman; Paramount Chief of Juba / Juba / August 2008. 130 Interview 40b: Tongun Lado Rombe, Chairman of the Bari Community Association / Juba / 25 August 2008. 131 Interview 41b: Alfred Keri Lokuji, Professor, Juba University / Juba / 21 August 2008. 132 Ibid. 128

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4 Tokiman B Court, 2007 (© Cherry Leonardi)

satisfy at least some of their constituents, not only in order to retain their support, but also because in many cases the interests of the community were their own. They could not govern, or indeed live within their communities, without the support of their people. A former commissioner explained the attributes desired of a chief: [The Chief must be] acceptable to the people and acceptable to the government. He must be educated, and somebody who may comprehend well the community issues. Somebody who is development oriented…because we need now someone who can present services to the people133

If a chief was extremely unpopular, he was considered less desirable as a representative of the government and removed from office. It was not in the interest of the government to retain unpopular chiefs, because this would, as the Commissioner described it, ‘drive a wedge between the government and the people’. The people within a community had the power to make a request to the Commissioner to remove an unpopular chief. The Commissioner explained, ‘The chief is somebody who works for the people. Once the people decide they don’t want him, then he has to be removed’. Yet it was not easy to do it. Community members had to present a request in writing to the County Commissioner, who would then determine whether their concerns were warranted. While unpopular chiefs could be removed, their power to coordinate with security forces made it 133 Interview 32: Alfred Keri Loko, Former Juba County Commissioner (1995–1998). CES Legislative Assembly / Juba / August 2008.

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a risky option in practice. Another former Juba County Commissioner explained, ‘Yes, administratively the Commissioner can remove the chief, but only on well-established facts’.134 In her examination of Kakwa chiefs in Yei, Cherry Leonardi conceptualizes the link between southern Sudanese chiefs and their communities as a ‘bargain’: ‘[people] gave their chiefs a mandate to execute government demands provided that the chiefs acted as the tool whereby such control could be exerted, to ameliorate the worst government depredations’.135 In her view, insofar as chiefs were linked to government violence, it was as ‘mediators and shields’.136 However, the effectiveness of chiefs in mitigating violence and acting as protectors varied greatly. Some residents in Juba were cynical about the ability of Bari chiefs to help them. One resident expressed little faith: ‘What is the chief? They are going to put the chief inside [the prison] if they do anything. Prison for the chief!’137 Bari chiefs claimed power partly via custom and partly via their role in government. They were clearly part of the state, and in their negotiations on behalf of the people, they were part of the state as process.

Underground resistance in Juba: the SPLM/A’s ‘Fifth Column’ To the degree that they worked in the lower echelons of the government and military institutions in the town, Juba’s elites cooperated with the political agenda of the central government and were thereby complicit in its rule during the war. Yet working in the public sector was not necessarily a straightforward matter of ‘collaboration’. Some Southern Sudanese who were not in Juba during the war maintain a somewhat uncompromising attitude towards the cooperation of Juba’s elites during this period. Others, who escaped Juba to join the SPLM/A share the sentiment that those who remained in the town were forced into submission. In the words of a one SPLA commander, ‘For those who want to keep their dignity they go out of Juba. For those who want to live at whatever price, they say, “yes sir.” [The government says] “Kill your brother!” They kill, to survive’.138 While local inhabitants were under immense pressure, not everyone was willing to kill in order to survive. Not everyone chose between the two extreme options of fleeing the town to join the rebels or cooperating with the most grievous demands of central government leaders in Juba. Cooperation did not necessarily entail ‘collaboration’; there were different agendas motivating the varying degrees of cooperation with northern government agents in the town. The existence of an SPLM/A underground attests to the fact that many of those who worked in the political and military institutions in Juba Interview 35: Peter Jerkins Jaden, former Juba County Commissioner (2004– 2006) / Juba / 18 August 2008. Respondent’s emphasis. 135 Leonardi, ‘Violence, Sacrifice and Chiefship in Central Equatoria, Southern Sudan’, p. 547. 136 Ibid., p. 554. 137 Interview 71: Elliot, Juba resident; former White House prisoner / Juba / 8 September 2008. 138 Interview 81: SPLA commander / Juba / September 2008. 134

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actively sought to thwart GoS’ hold on the town. Known variously as ‘Tabur Kemis’, ‘the SPLM/A’s Fifth Column’, or the ‘struggle on the inside’, the underground resistance against GoS included southern officers in the prison, police, and wildlife services, local officers in SAF, chiefs from surrounding areas, and ordinary civilians. Despite GoS’ restrictive security measures, such as the prohibition of free assembly and the imposition of curfews, which limited opportunities for communication, the underground movement had a high degree of organization. In order not to be discovered, members met secretly at community gatherings, sometimes at weddings and funerals. They communicated in the Bari language to avoid being understood by the northern security forces. Details of the opposition’s organization are scarce, but members maintain that there was reliable communication between SPLM/A forces in the bush, even with Garang himself, during much of the civil war.139 Through such activities, members of the underground movement in Juba coordinated two major attempts by the SPLM/A to take Juba in 1992, the first on June 6 and the second on July 7. Many in the SPLM/A leadership believed that capturing Juba would turn the tide of the war. Taking control of Juba airport would block a key SAF supply line and enable the SPLM/A to transport troops and machinery more easily. The capture of Juba would also be an important symbolic victory for the SPLM/A. According to an African Rights report, it ‘might create a political momentum leading to Southern secession, the fall of the government in Khartoum, or both’.140 These attacks and their aftermath had severe consequences for the inhabitants of Juba. Before dawn on June 6, 1992, SPLA forces entered Juba through Lologo on its southern edge and occupied the SAF military barracks for several hours (see Map C). SPLM/A underground forces were stationed at the airport and in government buildings, from where they aided both the coordination of the attack and the fighting against SAF, until they were discovered. SPLA reinforcements that were expected did not arrive, and once the plan was discovered, SAF forces with National Security and militia partners quickly retaliated. What had been a highly organized plan ended in disarray and chaos. Underground forces dispersed into small groups, each left to their own devices. On July 7 the SPLA attacked again, this time with greater force from several directions. command operations were led by Oyai Deng. The second attack also failed to capture the town due in part to steady reinforcements sent in from Khartoum via Juba airport. Following the attacks, a SAF military offensive forced the SPLA to retreat from the area around Juba.141 The government retaliated in full force, destroying part of the town, and displacing scores of residents.142 Thousands of southern officers in the Prison and Wildlife services who were suspected of being involved in or supporting the underground movement simply disappeared. Many of those who went missing are thought to have Interview 81: SPLA commander / Juba / September 2008. African Rights, Food and Power in Sudan p. 238. 141 Duffield, et al, ‘Sudan Emergency Operations Committee Consortium’, p. 93. 142 African Rights, Food and Power in Sudan, p. 241. 139 140

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been killed by SAF and National Security forces, their bodies dumped in the river or in mass graves in Lologo.143 Many others were taken to one of several prisons in the town, the most notorious of which was the White House Prison within the SAF military compound in Lologo. In the aftermath of the attacks, the effects of the northern government’s retribution spared few Jubans. The local government was powerless to protect individuals from arbitrary arrest by the various arms of the military and security organizations of the central government. Searching for SPLM/A sympathizers became a pretence for excesses and abuse of power. A former Juba County Commissioner explained, ‘They can decide to arrest somebody without any reason. The intelligence officer, whatever the rank he has, if he…sees somebody that he suspects to be SPLM/A, he can arrest him’.144 An atmosphere of fear prevailed in Juba. Any southerner could be suspected of being a supporter of the SPLM/A. A resident described the experience of terror: All the time we just stay in the house. They come and knock on the door. Tak tak tak. Should you open the door, should you come out? What can you do? They can do anything to you. Anything they want from your house, they can take it…They say, “I need your sister”. You give. What do you do? What do you have? Nothing. You keep quiet. You pray to God.145

Government reprisals were not only directed at individuals suspected of coordinating with the SPLM/A; they were directed at the community as a whole. Funding for social services, including education, was reduced or eliminated. Travel became increasingly restricted. Curfews were put in place, preventing people from leaving their homes after sunset and before sunrise. Permits were required for all travel. Even the school curricula were closely scrutinized. All of this had the stated aim of preventing the capture of the town by SPLM/A rebels.146 A resident recalled, ‘The punishment they gave us here was no food, no medicine, no transport. They don’t let you leave. Juba at that time was a prison, a very big prison. We were inside here with no communication, without anything’.147 Settlers in the squatter camps on the town’s peripheries were forced to relocate into overcrowded settlements closer to the town’s centre where they became dependent on food distribution.148 Human Rights Watch reports attest to the acute suffering of local residents during this period.149 For almost a decade the The CPA did not include a transitional justice process and thus far no truth and reconciliation process has been initiated. However, senior SPLA commanders are aware of the location of mass graves in Lologo near the White House Prison and a process is under way to account for the missing. 144 Interview 35: Peter Jerkins Jaden, former Juba County Commissioner (2004– 2006) / Juba / 18 August 2008. 145 Interview 77: Sylvester, Gondokoro resident / Juba / August 2008. 146 Interview 44c: Caleb, Kator resident / Juba / 2 September 2006; Interview 77: Sylvester, Gondokoro resident / Juba / August 2008. 147 Interview 77: Sylvester, Gondokoro resident / Juba / August 2008. 148 Koop, ‘Grass Roots Regional Assessments’, p. 59. 149 ‘Civilian Devastation. Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan’, Human Rights Watch report, June 1, 1994; ‘War in Sudan; the civilian death toll’, Human Rights Watch report, October 1, 1993; African Rights, Food and Power in 143

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residents of the town suffered from lack of food and services.150 A resident explained the motivation to cooperate with the central government, stating, ‘We are hungry; if you give me the food I can hear anything you say to me. If you say kill, I can kill! Because I have a small child there who doesn’t have anything to eat’.151 The size of the resistance in the town is unclear, but the near success of the two battles and the extent of the reprisals following their failure points to the significance of the underground resistance movement. While there is little information with which to corroborate claims, it is clear that the pursuit of suspected SPLM/A sympathizers effectively ended the organized resistance in the town. It does not necessarily mean that the postCPA local leaders in the town were unsympathetic to the political aims of the SPLM/A, or that they did not espouse aspirations for southern independence, but it does mean that those who were in the Bahr el Jebel State Government and SAF in Juba at the time of the CPA had in all likelihood not been active SPLM/A supporters during the war. While terms ‘collaboration’ and ‘resistance’ may be prevalent in public discourse, and although they figure prominently in retrospective war narratives, they simplify the complex identities, roles, motivations, and interests of Juba’s inhabitants. It is clear that the relationship between locals and GoS and its security forces did not necessarily indicate allegiance and political support for the central government or its local agents. Local politicians and bureaucrats cooperated with central government actors in many ways and for many reasons, sometimes to protect themselves and their families, other times in an attempt to acquire political and economic resources. For some, cooperating with GoS provided opportunities to aid the SPLM/A in their attempt to capture the town. Thus, the military occupation of Juba during the war created a situation in which acts of ‘collaboration’ may have been both unavoidable, and part of a broader strategy of resistance. At the same time, ‘resistance’ did not imply a wholesale rejection of the central government’s institutions, but in fact arose from its echelons.

The Khartoum Peace Agreement and the Coordinating Council for the Southern State (1997–2005) The years following the 1992 attacks were difficult years in Juba, but a reprieve arrived in April 1997 when former SPLM/A leader Riek Machar’s breakaway faction signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement. The agreement established a new southern regional government in Juba, the Coordinating Council for Southern Sudan (CCSS), to which Machar was appointed President. Dr Theopholis Ochang, head of the Equatorian Sudan. In The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, Douglas H. Johnson also points to the SPLA’s action of diverting aid meant for civilians. 150 Mohammed Osman, ‘Hungry: War Brings Starvation’, Milwaukee Sentinel, 19 September 1992; Kim Murphy, ‘A Silent Famine Spreads Death in Southern Sudan’, Los Angeles Times, 10 April 1993; Nhial Bol, ‘Hunger Stalks Southern Town’, Inter Press Service English News Wire, 13 October 1995. 151 Interview 77: Sylvester, Gondokoro resident / Juba / August 2008. (cont.)

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Defence Forces, was appointed to be his deputy. The CCSS served as the intermediary regional government structure between the state government and GoS, but its jurisdiction was limited to the areas under government control. The Khartoum Peace Agreement also brought Riek’s new faction, the Southern Sudan Independence Movement/Army, together with various Khartoum-aligned armed groups under one political body, the United Democratic Salvation Front, and into one umbrella military organization, the Southern Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF). The SSDF was ultimately made up of over 30 militias led by local militia commanders and with an estimated 10,000–30,000 fighters at the time of the CPA.152 While the split in the SPLM/A ushered in a new phase in the governance of Juba, the civil war continued unabated. The Khartoum Agreement was more of an alliance between anti-SPLA factions than a comprehensive peace settlement between the north and south: therefore, it did little to secure ‘peace’. Minimal improvements were made in Juba after the CCSS was established, such as the expansion of markets, health services, and transport.153 One change of note was the closure of the White House Prison in Lologo.154 However, it was clear to many residents that the agreement did not bring peace to the town. One resident recalled, That peace agreement with Riek Machar…that one was not really a peace agreement…They told us everything is good; nobody is going to be in prison, but the change was small…one percent.155

Another Juba native explained, ‘Those of Riek were a militia inside here. They were not given any role; they were just used to fight the SPLA’.156 While he conceded that their presence reduced the killing in Juba, he maintained that the change was minimal. While having the CCSS as an intermediary government between local government institutions and GoS improved the situation for residents somewhat, the gathering of so many armed groups brought new axes of It included the forces of Riek Machar and Paulino Matip, the forces of Peter Dor in Western Upper Nile, Gordon Kong in Eastern Upper Nile, Gabriel Tang and Thomas Mabior in Central Upper Nile, Benson Kwany in the Doleib Hill area, and Chayout in Longochok, Ismael Konye of the Murle, Clement Wani of the Mundari, Martin Kenyi in Eastern Equatoria, Abdel Bagi from the Dinka of northern Bahr el Ghazal, and Atom al-Nour, who led the Fertit militia. Added to these were the Popular Defence Forces and the Mujahedeen, a government-funded volunteer force recruited mainly from universities and secondary schools in the north. See: ‘Armed groups in Sudan: the South Sudan Defence Forces in the aftermath of the Juba Declaration’, Sudan Issue Brief. Human Security Baseline Assessment. Small Arms Survey. Number 2, October 2006, p. 3; John Young, ‘Sudan: Liberation Movements, Regional Armies, Ethnic Militias & Peace’, Review of African Political Economy, 30:97 (2003), pp. 423–434. 153 Interview 34: Omar Pitya Wusong, former Juba County Commissioner (2001– 2003) / Juba / 2 September 2008. 154 Interview 16b: Riek Machar, Vice President of Government of Southern Sudan / Juba / 28 August 2008. See also: Peter Martell, ‘South Sudan’s “White House”: a house of horrors’, BBC, 4 July 2011. 155 Interview 77: Sylvester, Gondokoro resident / Juba / August 2008. 156 Interview 81: SPLA commander, Juba. September 2008. 152

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tension and violence to the town. Following the establishment of the CCSS, a rivalry between Kerubino Kuanyin and Riek Machar surfaced, followed by one between Riek Machar and Paulino Matip. These rivalries erupted into factional fighting, leading the military to intervene. A 1999 news report states: The government has ordered all pro-government armed factions to leave Juba after six militiamen were killed and several were wounded in a weekend grenade attack… Bahr al-Jebel Governor Henry Jada said that a shootout on 11 January between two rival factions also contributed to the government’s decision… Jada said the government had not arrested anyone but it suspected members of a rival faction headed by Riek Machar… Machar’s group had terrified residents in Juba when it exchanged fire with another SSDF faction on 11 January.157

Although Riek Machar brought in his own Nuer forces to the town, they were not the only militia present there. They joined northern, regional, and local militias, all of which were coordinated by the SAF command. As a former Juba County Commissioner explained, at the height of the civil war, many ethnic groups in the region had their own militias: At that time each tribal group formed a militia and got support from Khartoum. Of course, the government has to support the militias. [Otherwise] they can get arms from the SPLA. We had our own militia also, the Bari. The Mundari had their own militia. And in Yei also there were militias. Everywhere there were militias. They were getting support from the army, and they were coordinated through the army.158

The creation and support of local militias were part of the government’s counterinsurgency strategy in southern Sudan. These were coordinated through the military command to fight the SPLA. A key local militia in Juba was the Mundari Militia. Headed by Major General Clement Wani, a Mundari Anyanya veteran who was integrated into SAF as a Second Lieutenant following the Addis Ababa Agreement, the Mundari Militia was comprised exclusively Mundari fighters. The origins of the Mundari Militia are unclear. Some claim it was established in the mid–1980s as an area selfdefence organization; others claim it was initially a breakaway faction of Mundari commandos who defected from the SPLA and returned to protect Terakeka; still others insisted it was created by Khartoum. According to a former Juba County Commissioner, GoS had created the Mundari Militia in order to prevent the SPLM/A from taking the airport through Mundari land. He stated, ‘The Mundari militia were actually the creation of the Government of Sudan. They were the ones who funded them, who supplied them with ammunition and guns’.159 There may be some truth to all of these claims. The Mundari militia was an important component of GoS’ security strategy in Juba during the war. It was headquartered in Terakeka to the north of Juba from where the Mundari fighters could repel attacks on the airport. The CCSS presided over the town as the regional government, and Sudan Update, 10:3 (21 February 1999). Interview 32: Alfred Keri Loko, Former Juba County Commissioner (1995–1998) / Juba / August 2008. September 2008. 159 Ibid. 157 158

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the Mundari gradually became prominent at the level of the Bahr el Jebel State Government. Bari support for redivision had cemented an alliance with the central government, and led to the ascendance of Bari leaders in the Equatoria Region Government/Bahr el Jebel State Government. The central government’s military alliance with Wani, coupled with the Mundari militia’s increasing role in the defence of the town led Mundari leaders to demand a greater leadership role in the Bahr el Jebel State Government. The expectation of a greater political role was based on the fact that Juba was a regional and provincial capital which housed the political institutions that represented all the other groups in Equatoria. In the decades following redivision, there was a perception amongst Mundari and other non-Bari locals that Bari elites were favoured for the governorship and other key positions in the Equatoria Region Government, gaining such posts as Minister of Finance, Director-General of Finance, Minister of Engineering Affairs, and Director-General of Lands. This led other groups in the region to feel excluded from power.160 However, while the Bari may have been dominant in the Equatoria Region Government and the subsequent Bahr el Jebel State Government, other groups were not excluded from the highest levels of power. As Table B shows, only five out of the nine governors from 1985– 2004 were Bari. Political competition between Bari and Mundari culminated in 1999 when a Mundari candidate lost the position of governor to Henry Jada, a Bari, in an election that many non-Bari Jubans believed was rigged. In 2003, as peace negotiations between the SPLM/A and the NCP progressed in Naivasha, Kenya, Clement Wani was appointed Governor of Bahr el Jebel State, as some believe, in order to prevent him from joining the SPLM/A who were actively courting him.161 A Juba University professor explained, ‘The SPLM/SPLA, the government wanted [Clement] to fight with them. The government tried their best to see that he did not go to the SPLA’.162 The appointment of Clement Wani represented a break in a line of Bari Governors reaching back to Agnes Lokudu in 1994. In his speech upon taking his position, Wani alluded to the perception of the dominance of the Bari in local politics when he cautioned that no southern ethnic group should set itself above others: Fellow southerners and countrymen, Juba town is the capital of Southern Sudan. This means that anybody from the south, or northern Sudan – north, east and west has the right to live in Juba. Their living in Juba is conditional to good conduct, discipline and full respect and adherence to the norms of life of the people of Equatoria. If they abide by this, then we can all live in peace and tranquility with them. This is the only option to avoid Kokora again. Nobody should come to Juba and claim that he is a champion to impose things on Equatorians or deprive them of their land, properties and cultures. Nobody should come to Equatoria with the illusion that he is the liberator. Nobody, no group or tribe should make itself superior to others. We are all equals.163

Gore et al, ‘Analysis of Nine Conflicts in Sudan’, p. 12. Interview 82: Local UN employee / Juba / 17 August 2008. 162 Interview 85b: Duncan, Juba University Professor / Juba / 15 August 2008. 163 ‘This is the time for Equatorians to wake up from this anesthetic sleep’, Sudan Tribune, 5 December 2003. 160 161

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Table B Equatoria Region/Bahr el Jebel State Governors (1985–2004) Dates

Governor

Party

Ethnicity

1985–1988

Peter Cirillo

PPP

Bari

1988–1989

Morris Lawiya

SAPCO

Kakwa

4 March 1989–29 June 1989

Lawrence Modi Tombe

NCP

Bari

30 June 1989- 1991

Alison Manani Magaya

NCP

Zande

1991–1993

Saturnino Ariha

NCP

Lokoya

1993–1994

Angelo Beda

NCP

Zande

1994–1997

Agnes Lokudu

NCP

Bari

1997–2001

Henry Jada

NCP

Bari

2001–2004

James Loro Ciricio

NCP

Bari

(Source: Government of Southern Sudan Secretariat, 2010)

Non-Bari Equatorians saw Wani’s ascent to political power as a triumph. A 2003 Sudan Tribune article describes the sentiment amongst non-Bari Equatorians on having a Mundari governor in Bahr el Jebel state: The appointment of Major General Clement Wani Konga to the post of Governor of Bahr el-Jebel State a week ago marked a turning point in the history of the people of the state in relation to their concept of understanding of the current central government headed by Field Marshal Omer Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir with his ruling Islamists National Congress Party. The governorship of Bahr el-Jebel State has been tribalistically tied to the Bari tribe from Agnes Lukudu to Late Henry Jada then to Rtd. Lt. General James Loro Ciricio. While it was a credit to the Bari leaders, proving worthy and more loyal committed to the NCP principles during the war period, these appointments from a single tribe had not been taken well by the other fourteen major communities in Bahr el-Jebel. Among the points of public discontent were the appointments of two or three Ministers from the tribe in a cabinet of six headed by the same tribe… The appointment of General Wani was greeted with jubilation as thousands of people turned out to receive him at Juba airport and at the public rally in Freedom Square in Juba. Many of them believed that the central government was now genuinely moving towards peace if the governorship could now be shifted to others.164

The ascendance of the Mundari would prove important to the politics of land in the post-CPA period. Clement Wani remained governor of Bahr el Jebel state following the CPA, at which time it was renamed Central Equatoria State. In private, Bari leaders insisted that because the CES Government was headquartered in Bari territory, the positions of the Governor, the Minister of Physical infrastructure, and Director-General of Land, among others, should be reserved for Bari leaders. In the Interim Period all of these positions were held by non-Bari Equatorians. Although Governor Wani embraced the cause of the autonomy of the local state visà-vis GoSS in the post-conflict transition period, he battled against the dominance of the Bari. The support of the CES Government and its non-Bari Equatorian leaders ‘This is the time for Equatorians to wake up from this anesthetic sleep’, Sudan Tribune, 05 December 2003.

164

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for Bari rights to land in the town and surrounding areas must be interpreted in this context. It was not a straightforward matter of allegiance between Equatorian ethnic groups, but a tactic to retain control over land for the CES Government which was headed by a Mundari governor. At the very least, Mundari perceptions of Bari dominance speaks to the fact that even local Equatorians were not totally united and that the politics of the town were complex. The SPLM policies of post-conflict reconstruction would interact with these complexities in unpredictable ways. As locals confronted the changes brought by the transition from war to peace, they developed sophisticated strategies for protecting their positions amidst rapid change.

The changing framework of land laws: the second civil war As noted earlier, the land question played a large part in fomenting the civil war.165 During the second civil war, the question of southerners’ rights to their ancestral lands was an important political issue for the SPLM/A. It influenced the movement’s public rhetoric and it also shaped the ways in which it administered the territories it controlled. Indeed, communal tenure was effectively practised without interruption in SPLM/A territories. Rather than introducing a distinct body of land laws to provide guidance for land issues or town planning in the territories under its control, SPLM/A judges relied on local chiefs and customary laws for regulating access to and managing land.166 The SPLM/A judiciary comprised a set of criminal courts operated by SPLM/A judges, and customary or ‘tribal’ courts at the Boma to County levels, which were overseen by a body of elders and other ‘traditional leaders’ who adjudicated various types of cases, including land disputes. At the SPLA’s 1994 convention, the movement recognized customary law as the basis of local law, and customary land rights. As a result of these policies, the SPLM/A upheld the de facto rights to land on which southerners lived, farmed, and grazed their livestock. By 2004 the notion that land belonged to the ‘communities’ that lived on it had become a central issue in peace negotiations. The result was the acknowledgement of ‘community’ rights to land in the CPA and the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan (ICSS), and the provision of a Southern Sudan Land Commission (SSLC) to resolve conflicts and develop policies that addressed the different interests in land at various levels of governments and among communities in Southern Sudan. Within government-occupied towns such as Juba, customary law Sara Pantuliano, The Land Question: Sudan’s Peace Nemesis. London: Overseas Development Institute, 2007; African Rights, Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan. London: African Rights, 1995; Douglas H. Johnson, ‘Decolonising the Borders in Sudan; Ethnic Territories and National Development’, in Mark Duffield and Vernon Hewitt (eds), Empire, Development and Colonialism: The Past in the Present (Oxford: James Currey, 2009). 166 Paul V. De Witt, ‘Land and Property Study in Sudan’, Report jointly funded by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), United Nations High Commission For Refugees (UNHCR), and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NCR), December 2004, p. 10. See also Paul V. De Wit, 2004: ‘Land and Property Study in Sudan: Scoping of issues and questions to be addressed’, Interim Report. 165

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continued despite clear divisions between land that had been gazetted and therefore belonged to the government, and village land. Yet chiefs still continued to exercise a degree of control over land in the peripheries of the towns. This was the case in Juba. Within the boundaries of Juba, the land had been gazetted by previous governments and considered to be ‘government land’, but land on the peri-urban perimeter of the town and the surrounding villages remained under the jurisdiction of Bari chiefs, who worked together with village elders. The Equatoria Region/Bahr el Jebel State Governments were able to acquire land in Bari villages easily and without compensation, but the process of consultation that took place acknowledged the authority of chiefs and the rights of ethnic communities to their lands.167 The latter had the power to refuse access to their villages, and within the constraints of their customary laws, they had leeway to interpret and adjudicate on matters regarding inheritance and land use. The Bari community’s relationship to the land in and around Juba would become an important political asset in the post-conflict period, and would eventually be a factor in debates over land and urban reconstruction.

CONCLUSION Understanding the local dynamics of post-conflict reconstruction in Juba during the initial transition period requires grappling with the long and difficult history of state construction in southern Sudan. Each phase of Juba’s history had an impact on post-CPA dynamics. The colonial experience shaped the relationship between locals and the state. The violence of the ivory and slave trades, and the predation of successive states in Equatoria planted the seeds of a deep-rooted ambivalence towards the state. Unable to avoid the state altogether, locals balanced a desire for what it had to offer with attempts to ameliorate and manage its negative effects. The administrative policies of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Government, such as Native Administration, structured the interface between local institutions and the state. In the process, they shaped southern identity and established the boundaries of ‘community’ which would be central to debates over land and authority until the present day. At the same time, Juba’s early history shows that town life encompassed a far larger and more diverse set of identities and inhabitants than just the Bari. The multi-ethnic nature of the town, and the territorially rooted identity of Bari were to be major causes of dispute in the politics of statebuilding in the post-CPA period. The fragmented landscape of war cemented a unique local position for the inhabitants of Juba. The evolving dynamics of the war, and the development of the SPLM/A amidst regional political changes, determined the priorities for the institutional foundations of the future semi-autonomous Southern Sudanese state, and the independent Republic of South Sudan. Living in a government-controlled garrison town in an area surrounded by rebel-held territory, Juba’s resi167

Interview 63: Henry Wani, Bari Chief of Lobonok / Juba / August 2008.

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dents had to contend with the harsh challenges of occupation while working within the institutions of the northern regime. The local experience of war in Juba cemented the town’s unique position as a site of opposition to the SPLM/A’s state-building agenda, setting the stage for the conflictual local dynamics surrounding the questions of land allocation and the jurisdiction over it in the post-CPA period. During the various periods of violence and upheaval, local inhabitants were not passive bystanders in the face of change. They negotiated the changes they confronted – in their roles, their social and economic positions, and their relationship to the state and its various local arms – often benefiting from the forces of economic and social transformation. At times this looked like resistance; at other times it looked like collaboration. Yet it always reflected the adaptation to change that has been a constant in local history. There were, as Garang proclaimed in his speech in Nyayo Stadium, important lessons to be gleaned from a close understanding of southern Sudan’s tumultuous history. These were not only related to the complex and ambivalent relationship of locals to external states, but they had to do with southerners’ relationship with other southerners. The limitations of the Addis Ababa Agreement, and Khartoum’s lack of regard for the commitments it made, demonstrate that in order to achieve successful regional autonomy southerners had to come to terms with their own divisions. In the transition period, Jubans not only had to make sense of and acknowledge their role during the first Southern Regional Government, but also their cooperation with GoS during the two decades of war and their own internal divisions. The complex negotiations of cooperation and uncooperation during wartime, as well as the shared fear of retribution in the transition period, underpinned the retention of strong local identities, and the struggle for local autonomy vis-à-vis GoSS. Local identity, shaped by war, united Juba’s long-time residents in a common identity as ‘insiders’. This was in contrast to ‘outsiders’ who had not lived in Juba during the war, and who had not been confronted with the same difficult decisions. Always, there was a persistent distrust of the state, which even in the post-CPA period was perceived by many locals as external to the local community and a danger to its interests. The complex relationship between Jubans and the state would continue to define the local politics of the town in the Interim Period, contributing to the complex dynamics of reconstruction and state-building. The local history of state construction in Juba offers insights to theorizations of ‘post-conflict reconstruction’. It demonstrates that the state – whether Turco-Egyptian, Mahdist, Anglo-Egyptian, northern, or SPLM-led – is not an all-powerful entity in the face of social forces. At no point in southern Sudan’s history has the state been able to establish a powerful presence without contending with local dynamics, and adapting – at least in part – to local concerns and contingencies. What this suggests is that resistance is an expectable, and perhaps even functional part of the construction and consolidation of the state. In its absence, the state cannot become locally rooted.

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‘Rebels’ and ‘Collaborators’: Integration and Reconciliation

The complex local history of Juba, some of which I recounted in the previous chapter, is what the leaders of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) confronted when they took over the town and began building the institutions of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) contained both the framework of a united state, and a state-building blueprint for Southern Sudan. Unlike the first Southern Regional Government, GoSS was given a significant degree of political and financial autonomy. It would have its own constitution – the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan; its own regional army – the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA); its own currency – the Sudanese Pound (SDG); its own language of operation – English; and crucially, a 50% share of oil revenues.1 These measures were a clear improvement on the Addis Ababa Agreement, and reflected the fact that the new government served as a template for a possible future southern state. Although it provided the framework for a nested southern state, the CPA did not resolve all the issues and challenges that faced the new southern government. It was essentially an agreement between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM, and focused primarily on resolving the conflict along the north-south axis. Despite its detailed provisions for the new southern state, the CPA did not address the polit-

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1 As a result of the Wealth-sharing Protocol of the CPA, GoSS was entitled to share in revenues from oil and other natural resources. The Sudanese Pound was the currency of Sudan at the time of independence in 1956. It was replaced by the Sudanese Dinar (SDD) in 1992. While the dinar circulated in northern Sudan, in much of Southern Sudan, prices were still negotiated in pounds. In certain Southern towns, such as Rumbek and Yei, the Kenyan shilling was also used. According to the CPA, the Central Bank of Sudan (CBOS) was to issue a new currency in the Interim Period. The second Sudanese Pound (SDG) was introduced in January 2007, and became the only legal tender as of July 1, 2007. It replaced the Sudanese Dinar, which was redenominated in October 2007 at a rate of 1 Pound (SDG) = 10 Dinar. Sudanese pounds (SDG) per US dollar = 2.1 (2008 est.), 2.06 (2007), 2.172 (2006), 2.4361 (2005), 2.5791 (2004). More information can be found at the Central Bank of Sudan website: http://www.cbos.gov.sd/currency/ en/index.html/. The circulation of the Sudanese Dinar currency was ended on June 29, 2007. See: ‘South Sudan ends circulation of old currency’, Sudan Tribune, 30 June 2007.

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ical fragmentation of the south, or the internal conflicts that had plagued the first Southern Regional Government. It articulated some rights of Southern Sudan’s communities, and provided for the inclusion of the NCP as the main opposition party in the south, which in effect gave southerners who had become NCP members a role in the southern government. The CPA acknowledged the proliferation of armed groups only insofar as it required their disarmament and demobilization, and provided for their integration either into the SPLA, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), or the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs), a hybrid force consisting of equal numbers from the SAF and SPLA that was established in order to integrate the northern and southern armies.2 These measures, although important, were not sufficient to ensure a peaceful transition to democratic government in the south. The fact that a significant number of critical issues were left undetermined had major implications for state-building. For the SPLM it meant that state-building was not merely a matter of building institutions outlined in the CPA and implementing formal programmes devised by reconstruction planners; it was an ongoing process that required difficult choices, negotiations, and compromises as the transition unfolded. These were highly political tasks for which there was no blueprint, no ‘toolkit’, and no clear plan, but which set the course of reconstruction in the town. In order to emerge as a viable state, the SPLM leaders of GoSS had to reconcile the multiples identities, political systems, and spheres of law, which had been the product of years of war and multiple failed efforts at peace-making. They had to reckon with the destructive rivalry of the first Southern Regional Government, and the intra-south divisions that had prolonged the war. They had to address the proliferation of militias that had resulted from Khartoum’s proxy war tactics, and come up with strategies for incorporating militia leaders into the new institutions of the southern state. To do this the leaders of GoSS had to go beyond the framework of the CPA and make political compromises in the interests of statebuilding. The indeterminate nature of the state-building process was particularly evident in Juba, where multiple institutions with sometimes competing interests met SPLM leaders as they confronted the task of integrating Juba’s institutions into the decentralized framework of GoSS. In the town the process of integration was fraught with tensions and challenges. SPLM leaders were eager to implement the reconstruction programmes as outlined in the CPA and the Joint-Assessment Mission (JAM) Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication. However, local Equatorians working in the new Central Equatoria State (CES) Government were resistant to rapid transformation via the modernizing vision of the SPLM and its international partners, which they feared would take away their position and influence. 2 The JIUs were expected to constitute the nucleus of a post referendum army of Sudan if the result of the referendum confirmed unity, otherwise they would be dissolved and the component parts integrated into their respective forces.

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This chapter establishes the complex institutional landscape of Juba and examines the difficulties faced by the SPLM as it began setting up the decentralized institutions of GoSS in Juba and integrating them with the existing institutions of the Bahr el Jebel State Government (renamed the Central Equatoria State Government upon the CPA). This multi-faceted process, which began before the signing of the CPA, can be separated into formal and informal aspects. The former entailed the transformation of the SPLM/A and the establishment of GoSS institutions; the latter consisted of a process of ‘south-south reconciliation’, whereby southern militia leaders and southerner bureaucrats from government garrison towns were incorporated into the decentralized institutions of GoSS.

THE FORMAL PROCESS OF STATE-BUILDING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SPLM/A AND THE CREATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTHERN SUDAN (GOSS) The formal process of state-building stemming from the CPA framework entailed the transformation of the SPLM/A into three separate formal institutions, each with their own structure, leadership and resources: a national political party, the SPLM; a decentralized regional government, GoSS; and a professional regional army for the south, the SPLA. It was supported by the international donor community, and thus reflected its priorities in terms of creating liberal democratic institutions. While the SPLM and GoSS were explicitly not to be the same institution, initially the leadership of the rebel movement was the southern government, and its transformation shaped the character of governance significantly.3 For the two decades of civil war the SPLM/A had been a centralized, hierarchical military organization, run by a small circle of military leaders in the Political Military High Command. As I have argued, although CANS was established in 1996, due to the limited resources and security concerns of wartime, political aims continued to be subordinated to military objectives. The literature on rebel movements that have become opposition parties in existing states is vast. A selection includes: Jeroen De Zeeuw, From Soldiers to Politicians. Transforming Rebel Movements After Civil War (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008); Michael Allison, ‘The Transition from Armed Opposition to Electoral Opposition in Central America’, Latin American Politics and Society, 48:4 (2003), pp. 137– 162; Carrie Manning, ‘Armed Opposition Groups into Political Parties: Comparing Bosnia, Kosovo, and Mozambique’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 39:1 (2004), pp. 54–77; Oystein Rolandsen, ‘From Guerrilla Movement to Political Party. The Restructuring of Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Three Southern States’, report written for the Center for the Study of Civil War (International Peace Research Institute: Oslo, 2007). Studies on rebel movements that have become ruling parties in post-war governments include: David Pool, From Guerrillas to Government: the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (Oxford: James Currey, 2001); John Young, Peasant revolution in Ethiopia: the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, 1975–1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Norma Kriger, Guerrilla veterans in post-war Zimbabwe: symbolic and violent politics, 1980– 1987 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

3

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The preparations for transforming the SPLM/A and building GoSS began simultaneously during the latter stages of CPA negotiations. From December 2003 through to April 2004, the SPLM leadership held a series of planning meetings in New Site, Kapoeta. They formulated detailed plans for the transfer of the military, political and administrative organs of the movement into the various new institutions and levels of GoSS, the SPLM, and the SPLA, and they outlined how the transition process would be managed.4 Following the signing of the June 2004 Protocols, a joint Government of Sudan-SPLM workshop was held in Nairobi with representatives of the World Bank, the United Nations, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the IGAD Partners’ Forum (a group of donor states who were working closely with the IGAD Secretariat) to plan the reconstruction process. The workshop resulted in the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), an assessment exercise carried out jointly by the World Bank and the United Nations, working in collaboration with GoS and GoSS and the IGAD Partners’ Forum, in 2004–2005. The JAM process intended to produce a ‘conceptual framework’ for Sudan’s reconstruction priorities and to help to raise external aid. Specifically, it provided an assessment of rehabilitation and transitional recovery needs for 2006–2007 and outlined a further framework for reconstruction and recovery, 2006- 2010.5 In August 2004, the SPLM published its Strategic framework for War-to-Peace Transition, in which it identified the ‘strategic actions’ for the post-conflict reconstruction of the south.6 Upon the signing of the CPA, the governors of the southern regions were removed, and the SPLM appointed caretaker governors for the ten new southern states (Table C).7 The caretakers would guide the transition process until more permanent Governors were appointed. During the 6-month ‘Pre-Interim Period’ from January to July 2005, the SPLM established a provisional capital in the Southern Sudanese town of Rumbek, giving the SAF time to withdraw from Juba.8 Working from the Strategic Framework, the SPLM leadership finalized and implemented the plan for the reorganization of its military hierarchy into the various instiThe process was supported by the International Republican Institute (IRI), a USAID-funded American NGO that continued to work with GoSS on Partybuilding after the CPA. See: SPLM Strategic Framework for War-to-Peace Transition, SPLM Economic Commission, 2004. 5 Taj es-Sir Mahjoub, ‘Planning for reconstruction: the Joint Assessment Mission (2006)’, Conciliation Resources. Available from: http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/ sudan/joint-assessment-mission.php. [Accessed on: 31 July 2009]. See: ‘A Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication’, presented at the Oslo Donors’ Conference on Sudan in April 2005. Available from: http://pcna.undg. org/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=25 [Accessed on: 31 July 2009] 6 SPLM Strategic Framework for War-to-Peace Transition, pp. 47–48. 7 ‘Dr. Garang Issues Decrees Appointing Top Aides for South Sudan Govt’, Sudan Vision Daily News, 20 July 2005. 8 Rumbek was a SAF garrison that was captured by the SPLM/A in 1997. At the time of the CPA it had a population of several thousand inhabitants and was already the headquarters of several humanitarian groups and United Nations agencies. ‘Sudan ex-rebels prepare to set up provisional capital’, Agence France Presse, 10 January 2005. 4

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Table C Pre-Interim Period Caretaker Governors for the Ten Southern States (2005) SPLM leader

Home state

Caretaker for state

Pagan Amum

Upper Nile

Lakes

James Wani Igga

Central Equatoria

Upper Nile

Riek Machar

Upper Nile

Western Equatoria

Daniel Awet

Lakes

Eastern Equatoria

Kuol Manyang

Jonglei

Northern Bahr Al-Ghazal

Deng Alor Kuol

Abyei

Jonglei

John Kong

Jonglei

Warap

Lam Akol

Upper Nile

Western Bahr Al-Ghazal

Theopholis Ochang

Central Equatoria

Unity State

Clement Wani

Central Equatoria

Central Equatoria

(Sources: author’s fieldwork interviews and research, 2008–2009)

tutions of the new semi-autonomous southern state, made preparations for the transformation of the SPLA into a professional military, and began to establish a national political party. Meanwhile, the JAM process, originally intended to take 11 weeks, had expanded into a 15-month exercise of field visits and assessments of the reconstruction priorities of Southern Sudan. Finally, in March 2005 the JAM team produced a report entitled A Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication, which outlined the various programmes for the national and southern governments, as well as the three areas of Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan, and Abyei. The report gave a picture of what needed to be done to rebuild the region and estimated the funding required for the initial reconstruction phase. It was presented at a donor’s conference in Oslo, Norway on 11–12 April 2005.9 With representatives from 60 countries and international organizations, $4.5 billion of pledges were raised for the reconstruction of Sudan. These funds were to be disbursed through two Multi-Donor Trust Funds administered by the World Bank, one for the north and one for the south.10 On July 9, 2005, SPLM Chairman Dr John Garang was sworn in as the new President of Southern Sudan in Khartoum while unprecedented crowds of southerners celebrated in the streets.11 This marked the beginning of the Interim Period, after which GoSS was relocated to Juba from 9 See: ‘Oslo Donors’ Conference on Sudan 2005 – Chair’s Conclusions’, 12 April 2005. 10 The Wealth-sharing Protocol of the CPA called for the establishment of two Multi-Donor Trust Funds as a financing mechanism to coordinate donor money and to set up adequate fiduciary controls to provide assurance to donors regarding use of funds for the reconstruction and development needs of both northern and southern Sudan. 11 ‘Sudanese rebel welcomed in Khartoum’, Associate Press, 10 July 2005.

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its temporary headquarters in Rumbek.12 However, just three weeks later, Garang died in a helicopter crash over Uganda.13 To the surprise of many, the SPLM leadership remained united and negotiated the transfer of power through the party’s ranks without incident. Lt General Salva Kiir – the only remaining founder of the movement – succeeded Garang as President of GoSS, Chairman of the SPLM and Commander-in-Chief of the SPLA.14 Following him, Lt General Riek Machar assumed the post of Vice President, and Lt General James Wani Igga, the third highest-ranking SPLM member at the time, became the Speaker of the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly. While at the time Wani Igga was higher ranking than Machar, the latter was appointed to the senior post. Some saw this move as a deal made to accommodate Machar, although Wani Igga himself explained it as resulting simply from the fact that prior to Garang’s death he had been prepared for the post of Speaker of the Assembly, thus it made most sense for him to assume that position.15 Once the top three posts were filled, Kiir then appointed the rest of the positions in GoSS in consultation with senior SPLM leaders. The death of the movement’s founder shifted leadership within the SPLM away from Garang’s inner circle towards Kiir’s more southernfocused power base.16 Sometimes referred to as ‘Garang’s boys’, a term allegedly coined by the NCP state-controlled media, Garang’s inner circle of SPLM leaders included Pagan Amum, Abdalaziz al-Hilu, Malik Aggar, Deng Alor, Yasser Ahman, Nhial Deng, and others from the old Leadership Council who remained committed to the agenda of achieving a united ‘New Sudan’ and challenging the NCP’s hold on power at the national level. In public, Kiir remained committed to the official agenda of unity, but reportedly preferred the separation of the south.17 As Vice President of GoSS, Riek became a key political player in Southern Sudan, especially given that Salva Kiir’s dual role as First Vice President of Sudan and President of Southern Sudan required him to travel back and forth between Khartoum and Juba. While Kiir contended with the myriad aspects of CPA implementation and the tense national politics of peacebuilding in Sudan, Machar often represented the face of GoSS in public ‘Sudan ex-rebels prepare to set up provisional capital’, Agence France Presse, 10 January 2005. 13 ‘Riots break out after Vice-President’s death’, Agence France Presse/ABC, 1 August 2005. 14 Emily Wax, ‘In Sudan, Deputy Rises To Tend a Fragile Peace Garang’s Successor Confronts a Heavy Burden’, Washington Post, 14 August 2005; Andrew England, ‘Sudan’s new vice president is sworn in’, Financial Times, 11 August 2005. 15 The ranking was later adjusted to reflect the movement’s new leadership hierarchy. Interview 8: James Wani Igga, Speaker of the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, Lt General, SPLA (Retd) / Juba / 2 September 2006. 16 International Crisis Group. Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis. International Crisis Group Policy Briefing. Africa Briefing N°50, Nairobi/Brussels, 13 March 2008; International Crisis Group. Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock. Africa Briefing N°47, Nairobi/Brussels, 12 October 2007. 17 John Young, ‘Sudan: The Incomplete Transition from the SPLA to the SPLM’, in De Zeeuw, Jeroen (ed). From Soldiers to Politicians. Transforming Rebel Movements After Civil War (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008). 12

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appearances, news reports, and in dealings with the aid community in Juba.18 From that point forward, Juba was the focus of state-building activities. Establishing a functional government and filling political and bureaucratic positions across the various institutions of government was extremely challenging. Aside from a small circle of highly educated leaders at the top, SPLM members were inexperienced with the practice of politics and with budget and payroll systems, technology, and public affairs – in general, all the skills required for managing a bureaucracy. The March 2005 JAM report described the existing institutions in SPLM/Acontrolled territories: Most staff are military personnel and still hold military rank. Some have been trained as administrators, but under the previous GOS regime some twenty years ago. All are unwaged, other than contributions they are able to raise from the local communities. Their role has been largely limited to helping mobilize resources for the war, keeping local security and resolving disputes, and overseeing aid distribution (particularly through the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission)… There have been no formal financial, planning or administrative systems in place, and most authorities lack even the most basic office infrastructure. Now, with the Power Sharing Protocol in place, the SPLM needs to turn this administration into a proper GOSS, in which each tier of government is able to fulfill its responsibilities.19

A 2005 Crisis Group report similarly emphasised the SPLM’s lack of capacity: ‘The SPLM has strong political will to implement the CPA but it lacks the resources and institutional capacity to react quickly to the multiple demands it faces. Many members admit they greatly underestimated the work and difficulty involved’.20 It took a considerable amount of time to fill all 170 seats in the GoSS Assembly and the judiciary remained incomplete at the state and local level through 2007. SPLM leaders themselves acknowledged their lack of preparation and skills for running a government. Supreme Court Justice Ruben Madol, a former SPLM judge, was forthright: We have just come out of the woods. We were fighters. We had no exposure to current legal trends, like common law systems. We don’t have access to materials to see other examples of common law.21

James Wani Igga was similarly forthcoming: We have no files, no records, we are beginning from zero…leading a movement in the bush is not the same as running a government…22 18 Interview 53: David Gressley, Resident Coordinator, UN Office of Humanitarian Affairs, UNOCHA / Juba / 5 September 2006. 19 JAM Sudan, A Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication. p. 27. 20 International Crisis Group, The Khartoum-SPLA Peace Agreement, p. 15 21 Interview 3: Ruben Madol, Justice, Supreme Court of Southern Sudan, Juba. 31 August 2006. 22 Interview 8: James Wani Igga, Speaker of the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, Lt General, SPLA (Retd), Juba. 2 September 2006.

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THE INFORMAL PROCESS OF STATE-BUILDING: INTEGRATION AND ‘SOUTH-SOUTH RECONCILIATION’ Establishing a new state in Southern Sudan was not simply a matter of setting up GoSS institutions, transforming the SPLM/A, and managing the internal dynamics of the movement’s leadership. Securing the territory in the short timeframe of the Interim Period had to go beyond the stipulations of the peace agreement to confront the institutional and political fragmentation that decades of internecine conflict had created. Accordingly, as it built the institutions of GoSS, the SPLM pursued a series of informal initiatives under the rubric of ‘south-south reconciliation’ aimed at resolving the intra-southern divisions that had characterized the war by integrating various actors that had been excluded from the formal peace process into the new southern state, including southern militias, southern NCP members, southern SAF officers, southern opposition parties, and southerners living in towns that had been under control of the northern government. The central place of reconciliation in the SPLM’s state-building agenda can be traced to the movement’s first National Convention in 1994. At that time, the SPLM leadership passed a resolution identifying reconciliation with the Nasir group – Riek Machar’s faction which had split from the movement in 1991 – as a key aim. The resolution granted a ‘general amnesty and pardon to all those who have committed crimes against the Movement’.23 Building on the sentiments of the National Convention were agreements such as the 1999 Wunlit Covenant and the 2002 Nairobi Declaration. The Wunlit meetings led to a cessation of conflict between the Nuer of the area that is now Unity State and the Dinka of what are now the Warrap and Lakes states. The 2002 Nairobi Declaration resulted in the reintegration of Riek Machar and his forces into the SPLM. As the CPA neared, and the prospect of a southern state became increasingly real, the agenda of reconciliation became more urgent. In his speech at the 2004 Nairobi Declaration on the Final Phase of Peace in the Sudan,24 John Garang identified reconciliation as a priority for the entire reconstruction process: Within the south and the war-affected regions, the real test in the post-conflict phase is how to devote our efforts to address the centrifugal forces that have fostered conflict. This is one of the primary commitments that we have set for ourselves during the liberation struggle and which we shall relentlessly pursue during the Interim Period and beyond.25 23 ‘ Resolution 13.2: On reconciliation with Nasir and other Splinter groups’, Resolutions of the SPLM/SPLA First National Convention. April 12, 1994. Chukudum, New Sudan. 24 This agreement was one of the milestones in the peace process sponsored by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which involved continuous negotiations between May 2002 and May 2004, in Machakos, Karen, Nairobi, Nakuru, Nanyuki, and Naivasha, Kenya. It should not be confused with the 2002 Nairobi Declaration between Riek Machar and the SPLM/A. See: ‘The Nairobi Declaration on the Final Phase of Peace in the Sudan, signed in the State House’, Nairobi: Saturday 5th June, 2004. 25 ‘Speech by Dr John Garang de Mabior on the occasion of the signing of the Nairobi Declaration on launching the final phase of the peace in Sudan’, 5 June 2004.

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In his speech in Nairobi following the signing of the 2005 CPA, Garang reiterated the SPLM’s commitment to reconciliation, promising all southerners, even those who had fought against the SPLM/A, a place in the new southern government: On building national consensus, the SPLM will also spearhead the south-south dialogue. This dialogue, above all, is to heal wounds and restore fraternity and mutual respect so as to create a healthier political environment that is accommodative of all Southern Sudanese political forces, both at the level of Southern Sudan and at the national level. But south-south dialogue is not only about power. It is above all a democratic exercise based on mature and selfless political discourse among Southern Sudanese with a view of galvanizing all our human material resources for the service of our people…. In terms of power-sharing in southern Sudan, I want to assure all that there will be enough room for everybody, including those who have not been associated with the SPLM/SPLA. Even those who for one reason or another were opposed or against the SPLM, there will room for everybody.26

In principle, all southern groups excluded from the peace process were invited to join the effort to build the southern state. The view was that as long as southern militias were excluded from the process of reconstruction in Southern Sudan there remained opportunities for Khartoum to divide southerners amongst themselves. To that effect, the SPLM conducted several high-level initiatives aimed at integrating militia leaders into the SPLM and SPLA. Three notable leaders integrated into the SPLM and SPLA in this way were Theopholis Ochang, Chairman of the Equatorian Defence Force; Paulino Matip, Chief of Staff of the Southern Sudan Defence Force (SSDF); and Clement Wani, head of the Mundari Militia. Ochang, a medical doctor, who had served for a time as Riek’s deputy in the Coordinating Council for Southern Sudan, signed the Nairobi Declaration of Unity with the SPLM in March 2004, making an alliance between the Equatorian Defence Force and the SPLM/A.27 Following various meetings throughout 2005 and 2006, Matip signed the Juba Declaration with the SPLM/A in January 2006.28 Heralded as one the most significant achievements of post-CPA peace-building in southern Sudan, the Juba Declaration officially disbanded Matip’s branch of the SSDF and provided for the integration of its command structures with that of the SPLA.29 It also made Paulino Matip Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the 26 ‘Speech by Dr John Garang de Mabior on the occasion of the signing of the Nairobi Declaration’ on launching the final phase of the peace in Sudan, 5 June 2004. 27 The Equatorian Defence Force was established in the 1980s as a local selfdefence force operating in the area around Juba and Torit. It was made up predominantly of Latuka and Lokoya soldiers, with smaller numbers of Acholi, Madi, Loluba, Bari and Zande fighters. It joined Riek Machar’s Nasir faction in 1991 and later was a signatory to the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement. 28 Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration Between the Sudan People’s Liberation the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), 6 January 2008. By this time the SSDF was mainly operating in Upper Nile, and parts of Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Eastern Equatoria. See: ‘South Sudan Unity is Crucial to Protect Peace’, Sudan Tribune, 14 January 2007. 29 A breakaway faction of the SSDF, under the command of Gabriel Tang,

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SPLA, second in rank to Salva Kiir himself, and brought the majority of SSDF commanders to the SPLA. In early 2005, private meetings between John Garang and Bahr el Jebel State Governor Clement Wani resulted in an agreement that would permit Wani to remain Governor of CES as an NCP member, and to cooperate with the SPLM in its reconstruction initiatives in Juba.30 This was an unusual arrangement, as the CPA Powersharing Protocol permitted the NCP to have a single governorship in Southern Sudan, and the NCP had already chosen the governorship of Upper Nile. Allowing Wani to remain in his post reflected both the SPLM’s commitment to reconciliation and the fact that securing the town required his Mundari forces to be allied with GoSS. According to Wani, the agreement between the two men rested on an understanding of shared interests and ideological aims, specifically as to the future of Southern Sudan.31 He remained an NCP member for the first year following the CPA, and then joined the SPLM in mid–2006. Rather than achieving reconciliation, these processes forged a practical integration. In the short term many of these individuals and groups retained their forces as well as their links to Khartoum. Various creative arrangements and enticements were employed to provide leaders of southern armed groups adequate assurances and incentives to join the SPLM. Residents and aid workers in the town pointed to the fortified compounds of Paulino Matip and Riek Machar, which housed entire battalions of their private forces. When asked, GoSS Interior Minister, Daniel Awet, dismissed this as a short-term ‘anomaly’, a tactic to protect ‘VIPs’, arguing that the arrangement would be changed once a Presidential Guard was established.32 The commitment to reconciliation indicated the SPLM’s resolve in overcoming obstacles to building a unified state. Reconciliation processes also demonstrated, at least initially, the willingness on the part of southern opposition groups to join the southern government. Yet in the optimistic movement of change ushered in by the CPA, SPLM leaders did not anticipate the ways in which reconciliation, decentralization, and integration would empower local elites, or how difficult they would make it for transforming the town and realizing their vision for state-building. The process of south-south reconciliation was not limited to elites. Once Juba was chosen as the capital of the new semi-autonomous region, the garrison town had to be prepared for the arrival of the SPLM and SPLA. In late 2004 and early 2005, while it was still held by SAF, the SPLM/A sent two ‘Advance Teams’ to Juba. The teams met with Governor Clement continued to operate in Upper Nile, allegedly with the support of Khartoum. International Crisis Group. ‘Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement; Small Arms Survey, ‘Armed groups in Sudan. The South Sudan Defence Forces in the aftermath of the Juba Declaration’, Sudan Issue Brief. Human Security Baseline Assessment. Number 2, October 2006. 30 Interview 21: Clement Wani Konga, Governor of Central Equatoria State / Juba / 6 September 2006. 31 Ibid. 32 Interview 12: Daniel Awet, GoSS Minister of the Interior, SPLA Lt General (Retd) / Juba / 1 September 2006. (cont.)

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Wani and other NCP leaders in the Bahr el Jebel State Government. They also held public rallies with the various communities in residential areas of the town, during which they explained the CPA, the motivations behind the struggle, and the future goals of the SPLM as a political party.33 The agenda was to assuage local fears of retribution and to prepare the various politicians, bureaucrats and residents in the town for the new GoSS, in order to facilitate the SPLM’s reconstruction and state-building plans in the capital. A 2005 BBC article referring to the Advance Teams quotes James Wani Igga: ‘After the fight you are reconciled and you become friends again. We are here for reconciliation and here for forgiveness’.34 A Juba resident described the community meeting he attended: In all these public rallies [the SPLM/A Advance Team] made some references to the objective of the SPLM/SPLA for fighting, for going to the bush. They explained why the SPLM/SPLA had to rebel against the government. They said that it was for the liberation of the people of southern Sudan, for democratic change, [that] it had to do with the development of the country. They called upon the citizens of southern Sudan…they said the first thing is to forgive, to forgive them in case they have committed some atrocities against their will; and also to reconcile now, not only with southerners, but also with the northerners, with their brothers who were in the NCP. They said that people should forget the past, and people should think of the future.35

As he recalled, residents were, for the most part, overjoyed at the arrival of the SPLM: When the Advance Team came, people could not believe it! People were so happy! In fact the SPLM was, I can say, the only hope to southerners. Because there has never been any party which stood for the rights of southerners – even southerners who are in the NCP!36

Indeed, the arrival of the SPLM marked a change in social life in the town. During the war, curfews prevented many from leaving their homes after dark. Public gatherings of any kind, including funerals, were prohibited out of fear that locals were coordinating with the SPLM/A rebels. When the CPA was signed, the curfew was lifted, arbitrary arrests by National Security forces ceased, and the borders of the town were opened, allowing residents free access in and out of Juba for the first time in years. By mid– 2006 it had become common for many to sit outside on the sides of the streets at night by candlelight, playing music, socializing and sharing drinks, all activities previously forbidden. Yet as Leonardi points out, ‘…however hopeful they [were] of a potential independent state, Southern Sudanese also perceive their current government in the context of the historical patterns from which it has emerged’.37 Indeed, the jubilation Interview 44e: Caleb, Kator resident / Juba / 14 August 2008. Jonah Fisher, ‘Southern Sudan’s frontline town’, BBC, 20 April 2005. 35 Interview 44e: Caleb, Kator resident / Juba / 14 August 2008. 36 Ibid. 37 Cherry Leonardi, ‘Paying “buckets of blood” for the land: moral debates over economy, war and state in Southern Sudan’, Journal of Modern African Studies 49:2 (2011) p. 236. 33 34

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belied growing tensions between the town’s political elites and the incoming SPLM members.

THE CHALLENGES POSED BY INTEGRATION AND DECENTRALIZATION Integrating Juba’s existing institutions into the framework of GoSS proved extremely challenging in the initial Interim Period. The CPA provided the institutional framework for a new decentralized state structure in Southern Sudan, based on ten new states: Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warap, Unity, Lakes, Upper Nile, Western Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Central Equatoria, and Jonglei. The states were further separated into counties, payams (districts), and bomas (villages), each with its own executive, legislative, and judicial branches.38 This was in keeping with the wider trend towards decentralization, ‘the assignment of fiscal, political, and administrative responsibilities to lower levels of government’, which in recent years has become a mainstay of donor strategies in post-conflict reconstruction.39 In Mali, for example, the new democratic regime used decentralization policies in an attempt to co-opt its Tuareg rebels into the political system. In Uganda decentralization was designed as a strategy to appease the proponents of federalism, particularly the Buganda.40 The thinking behind the implementation of decentralization as a conflict management strategy is that it can be a mechanism to increase the representative character of the political system in heterogeneous societies with territorially concentrated minorities, and may foster political stability and national unity by granting greater autonomy to conflicting groups, thereby compelling sub-state and local groups to enter into a formal bargaining process with the government.41 A USAID report summarizes the potential of decentralization to mitigate conflict: Decentralization can be a mechanism for limiting conflict in ethnically diverse, post-conflict countries. The intent is to develop an overall government structure that more effectively protects minority rights, allows minority groups an appro-

Chapter 1 of the Power-sharing Protocol of the CPA proclaims: ‘There shall be a decentralized system of government with significant devolution of powers, having regard to the National, Southern Sudan, State, and Local levels of government.’ Chapter 1, Article 1.5.1.1 Protocol Between The Government of Sudan (GoS) and The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) on Power Sharing Naivasha, Kenya. May 26, 2004. 39 This definition is from Jennie Litvack, Junaid Ahmad and Richard Bird, Rethinking Decentralization in Developing Countries (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998), p. 4. 40 See: Jennifer Seely, ‘A Political Analysis of Decentralisation: Co-opting the Tuareg Threat in Mali’, The Journal of Modern African Studies 39:3 (2001), pp. 499– 524; and Pierre Englebert, ‘Born-again Buganda or the limits of traditional resurgence in Africa’, The Journal of Modern African Studies 40:3 (2002), pp. 345–368. 41 Gordon Crawford and Cristof Hartmann, Decentralization in Africa: pathway out of poverty and conflict? (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), p. 23. 38

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priate voice in policy, and reduces the areas for disagreement between groups by allowing each to make its own decisions on public service delivery.42

Siegle and O’Mahoney put it simply: ‘If citizens believe government is concerned and responsive to their needs – and citizens have recourse when grievances have occurred – then there is little cause for armed struggle’.43 However, it is generally acknowledged that decentralization is not a panacea, and that creating a workable decentralized government requires a great deal of negotiation, which may or may not be conducive to peace-building.44 In Southern Sudan, decentralization was not simply a donor-driven initiative, nor did it emerge solely as a result of the SPLM’s ideological platform. It was also a pragmatic strategy that responded to the political and institutional fragmentation of the south. In his speech following the signing of the Power-sharing Protocol in Nairobi in 2004, John Garang referred to the factionalism that had plagued the south and presented the ideological motivations for decentralization: [It was the SPLM’s] intention to devolve power to the maximum so that decisions shall be taken at the lowest possible level of governance….We have not wrested power from a hegemonizing national centre to allocate it to another centre that is based on the political elites of the south. Power shall be exercised by the states, and indeed by local governments within the states. Armed with the necessary powers and equipped with the needed resources, this style of governance shall ensure a more efficient delivery system of development and services. The principle of decentralization of power is a time-honored principle since it responds to local social and economic situations, not least amongst which is the neutralization of the centrifugal forces to which I have just alluded and which are generally the consequence of failure by central authority to address local problems and concerns. Such local problems and concerns cannot be effectively addressed from the centre since such authorities are far away from the people; they can only be effectively addressed by empowered local authorities that have both the necessary power of decision-making and the necessary resources to implement such decisions.45

Allowing ethnic groups and their constituent communities a degree of self-governance under the new southern government would, it was hoped, William F. Fox, Fiscal Decentralization in Post-conflict Countries. Best Practice Paper, Fiscal Reform and Economic Governance Project, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), December 2007, p. 111. 43 Joseph Siegle and Patrick O’Mahony, ‘Assessing the Merits of Decentralization as a Conflict Mitigation Strategy’, Consultancy Report, Development Alternatives, p. 1. 44 Siegle and O’Mahony acknowledge that decentralization may aggravate conflict by exacerbating existing ethnic or political cleavages, by giving political space to forces who are not interesting in peace, or by empowering local leaders – some of whom may be armed – against the interests of the central government: Siegle and O’Mahony, Ibid., p. 9; Crawford and Hartmann caution that in the long run, decentralization may work as an incentive for secession and disintegration: Decentralization in Africa, p. 22. 45 ‘Speech by Dr John Garang de Mabior on the occasion of the signing of the Nairobi Declaration’ on launching the final phase of the peace in Sudan, 5 June 2004. 42

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alleviate existing animosities and divisions among southerners, and thereby reduce the likelihood that the NCP ‘divide-and-rule’ strategies would destabilize the south as it had during the first Southern Regional Government. On the one hand the CPA was explicit about the goal of devolution. The Wealth-sharing Protocol states, ‘The wealth of Sudan shall be shared equitably so as to enable each level of government to discharge its legal and constitutional responsibilities and duties’.46 Yet the agreement provided no outline for how the revenues would be shared between levels of government. Given the limited tax base in poverty-stricken war-torn areas, this left the states at the mercy of GoSS disbursements. The decentralized framework for state-building outlined in the CPA was an important factor in how the dynamics of urban reconstruction unfolded in Juba between 2005 and 2008. The implementation of decentralization engendered disputes over political jurisdiction, and brought to the fore fundamental questions about Southern Sudanese statehood. The new system of decentralization outlined in the CPA retained the three Equatorian states that had been created as a result of the division of the Equatoria Region Government in 1996: Western Equatoria State, Eastern Equatoria State, and Bahr el Jebel State (renamed Central Equatoria State after the CPA). The challenge for the SPLM-led GoSS was to transform the existing decentralized institutions of CES Government, which were headquartered in Juba, and to incorporate them into the new GoSS framework. Cognizant of the divisive history of the first Southern Regional Government, and in the spirit of ‘south-south reconciliation’, the SPLM transferred the civil service personnel and political leaders of the former Bahr el Jebel State Government to the new CES Government, allowing NCP members to retain their positions in the civil service. While the names of ministries in the Bahr el Jebel State Government were changed to reflect the structure of decentralization outlined in the CPA, most personnel and institutions remained intact. Aside from ministerial positions, which were appointed by GoSS President Salva Kiir, most personnel and procedures within ministries remained unchanged.47 Some civil servants left for jobs in the capitals of Eastern and Western Equatoria States, but most of the civil service staff of the former Bahr el Jebel State Government stayed in their positions in the new CES Government, and the day-to-day work continued as before.

The challenges of integration: ‘rebels’ v. ‘jallaba’ Despite the SPLM’s conciliatory rhetoric, the integration of two institutional systems with very different bureaucratic cultures was fraught with tension. As a CES Director-General explained, ‘Before the CPA there was a system here and the SPLA had a system outside. When the CPA was CPA Chapter 3, Section 1.2. However, further appointments to state level positions were frozen as the SPLM began building GoSS institutions in Juba. Interview 29: Lewis Gore George, Director-General of Housing and Construction, CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 21 July 2008. 46 47

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signed these two workplaces were put together’.48 Most of the bureaucrats in the CES Government who had been living in Juba under the northern government were former NCP members. They had been educated in Juba or Khartoum, trained in the legal and bureaucratic systems of the north, and spoke only Arabic or Juba-Arabic.49 Incoming SPLM members had been living outside of Sudan or in SPLM/A territories. Most had undergone military training and were accustomed to a strict, ranked system of hierarchy. While many SPLM leaders spoke Arabic, most rank-and-file SPLM members spoke only their own southern Sudanese language and English. Differences in training and education led to different managerial approaches and skill levels, which led to competition over appointments. Arguments centred on who was most qualified for civil service positions. SPLM managers believed that the experience of managing soldiers and coordinating the various administrative, legal and political aspects of the SPLM/A-controlled territories during wartime qualified them for managerial positions in GoSS and the CES Government. Above all, they felt that their contribution to the liberation of southern Sudan entitled them to leadership positions in the new Southern Sudanese government CES Government bureaucrats believed that their superior education, technical training and work experience made them more qualified than rebels for roles in the new government. They argued that technical experience, not a military pedigree, was what was needed to run a functioning government bureaucracy.51 A Director-General in the CES Government, referring to the new SPLM managers, stated: ‘Now you get somebody who has no experience, who even may not have the qualifications you have, and that person is just brought to be your boss! Now how could people work under those circumstances?’52 The division between civil servants from the two systems took on an 48 Interview 25: Wani Buyu Dyori, Director-General, CES Ministry of Finance, Economics and Manpower / Juba /15 September 2008. 49 Juba Arabic is a colloquial form of Arabic spoken in Equatoria, which contains simplified Arabic grammar and vocabulary from the Bari language. See: M. Tosco, ‘The Case of Juba Arabic’, Anthropological Linguistics 37:4 (1995), pp. 423–459; E.M. Yokwe, ‘The Diversity of Juba Arabic’, Studies in African Linguistics 9 (1985), pp. 323–328. 50 These views were presented during several informal group interviews with SPLM members working in the various branches of GoSS and the CES Government, including controllers, office managers, and assistants, most of whom were also ex-combatants. Interview 96: group interview with GoSS managers / Juba / 5 September 2008; Interview 96b: group interview with GoSS managers / Juba / 7 September 2008; Interview 96c: group interview with GoSS managers / Juba / 11 September 2008. 51 Interview 28: Cornelious Goja Lado Kulang, Director-General of Lands, CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 27 August 2008; Interview 25: Wani Buyu Dyori, Director-General, CES Ministry of Finance, Economics and Manpower / Juba /15 September 2008; Interview 26: Emmanuel Waga Elia, CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 22 July 2008; Albert Pitya Redentore, Juba County Commissioner / Juba / 16 July 2008. 52 Interview 88: Clarence, Director-General, CES Government / Juba / 21 July 2008.

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insider-outsider divide reminiscent of what Kasfir observed in the period of the first Southern Regional Government.53 SPLM officials viewed CES Government bureaucrats as either collaborators who had ridden out the war in the relative comfort of Juba, or as victims who had been unwilling to fight. They expressed dismay that Equatorians who had been ‘inside’ Juba during the war did not appreciate what the SPLM had accomplished and effectively delivered to them through many years of difficult struggle. One GoSS manager argued, ‘The resources which [are] in the south, in Central Equatoria today, did not come because of the efforts of the Central Equatoria State Government. It came because of the efforts of the Government of Southern Sudan’.54 This sentiment was echoed by various mid-level SPLM officials in GoSS, including office managers, and assistants, many of who were ex-combatants and had spent time as refugees abroad.55 There were similar comments that CES Government bureaucrats should be ‘grateful’ for what the SPLM had ‘delivered’ to the people of the garrison towns.56 They argued that SPLM/A commanders were more skilled than in CES Government bureaucrats, who they maintained, had advanced through political alliances and cronyism rather than on merit.57 They accused CES Government bureaucrats of having grown accustomed to a culture of corruption under the NCP.58 One SPLM member referred specifically to the Bari, indicating the persistence of intra-Equatorian competition: [The Bari] built their strength during the war, when Khartoum went on favouring them. And of course money is a source of power. They go on paying themselves, enrolling themselves on the list. If you have seen the over-employment in Central Equatoria now you will find that 70% of the working force is the Bari. They get a salary, and they don’t come to work.59

Although it is impossible to corroborate the figure of 70%, what is more important is the perception of Bari power and generalized corruption within the CES Government amongst SPLM members. Another SPLM member claimed that CES Government bureaucrats were concerned first with their own economic interests, and as a result were making the reconstruction process difficult.60 A former SPLM lawyer had an even more negative view. He believed the many local elites remained secretly aligned with the NCP and were working from within Southern Sudan to jeopardize the state-building process.61 His opinion is echoed in a 2007 news article Kasfir, ‘Southern Sudanese Politics Since the Addis Ababa Agreement’, p. 158. Interview 84: Stuart, SPLM member, Juba. 11 August 2008. 55 Interview 96: group interview with GoSS managers, Juba. 5 September 2008; Interview 96b: group interview with GoSS managers, Juba. 7 September 2008; Interview 96c: group interview with GoSS managers, Juba. 11 September 2008. 56 Ibid. 57 Interview 84c: Stuart, SPLM member / Juba / 12 September 2008. 58 Interview 96: group interview with GoSS managers, Juba. 5 September 2008; Interview 96b: group interview with GoSS managers, Juba. 7 September 2008; Interview 96c: group interview with GoSS managers, Juba. 11 September 2008. 59 Interview 84b: Stuart, SPLM member / Juba / 17 August 2008. 60 Ibid. 61 Interview 87: Josiah, SPLM member / Juba / 7 August 2008. 53 54

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which suggests that the integration of NCP members into the SPLM and SPLA had given GoS the opportunity to sabotage the new southern government from within: …soon after GoSS was formed it became clear that the NCP has decided to either penetrate the SPLM through some of its cadres, compromise some SPLM cadres, use local militias to destabilize the region or delay the release of oil revenue funds on time to GoSS.62

Indeed, the leaders of southern armed groups and former NCP members who were brought into the SPLM and SPLA continued to maintain an identity and interests apart from the core of the SPLM leadership. However, although SPLM members and other ‘outsiders’ believed that those who had stayed in the town had an easier time during the war, and had been in varying degrees complicit in the policies of the northern government, long-time residents of Juba felt they had been imprisoned in the town by the NCP and suffered at the hands of the SAF and SAFaligned militias. One resident recalled the powerlessness of local elites working for the NCP: Even southerners who are in the NCP, they do not have voice. Those positions were given to them only to please them. But even if you are the minister in the National Assembly, if you speak about the problems of southern Sudan you will be eliminated, killed. You have to speak with the policy of the NIF, which later became the NCP…if you are the minister, if you are the governor, if you are the commissioner. You have only a plan in front of you to execute.63

In the view of CES Government bureaucrats, life under the northern government in Juba represented the larger sacrifice: We are the people who suffered most, because the people who were inside, most of us have been taken to jail, taken to maximum [security] prison. While we were languishing there most of them have never even heard a bullet. They were in the other capitals, in East Africa, or abroad. Now they have just come because an agreement has been reached, but the people inside suffered.64

Accusations of ‘collaboration’ coloured interactions between SPLM officials and CES Government bureaucrats. Reports of SPLM leaders referring to CES Government bureaucrats as ‘jallaba’, a pejorative term for northerners, inflamed tensions between SPLM members and Equatorian civil servants. A Director-General in the CES Government recalled the experience in his ministry: When the Government of Southern Sudan was conceived the start was not really good, because they came in and immediately classified those of us who were working inside as ‘jallabas’, collaborators…In the beginning they were actually

‘Who is responsible for delays of development in New Sudan regions?’ Sudan Tribune. 16 March 2007. 63 Interview 44e: Caleb, Kator resident / Juba / 14 August 2008. 64 Interview 88: Clarence, Director-General, CES Government / Juba / July 2008. 62

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saying ‘jallaba’ in the office! They said, ‘you are collaborators and now that we have come we shall teach you a lesson,’….Our people spoke out, [and said] ‘now who is better? Is it the jallaba or you? We thought you were our brothers.65

Stories spread among local residents that SPLM members were intimidating Equatorian civil service personnel, sparking negative memories of perceived ‘Dinka domination’ during the Addis Ababa period, and raising concerns about the marginalization of Bari-speaking groups and other Equatorians under the SPLM-led GoSS.66 Senior SPLM leaders were resigned about the problems, indicating that they had anticipated the difficulties of trying to integrate these two systems. Reflecting on the challenges of integration, an SPLM Minister in GoNU pointed out that there were divisions within the SPLM as well: ‘Freedom fighters never accept people who did not join in the fighting. Even if you are SPLM, if you did not take up arms, they may not recognize you’.67 Clearly, integration was a much more complicated task than anticipated. Reflecting on the process, an SPLM member explained, ‘First of all you are battling with the integration of the two civil service systems, from the SPLA controlled, and then from inside here. This took us a long time, and brought a lot of quarrels, and was not healthy’.68 SPLM leaders were frank about the significant amount of change that was required, and the challenges that some of these changes posed: We were a military organization and ranked as one body of soldiers. We were accustomed to that system. This has changed; now we have to share power with other people. We have to adopt a civil approach, order and procedures. We are dealing with highly dedicated non-military people. There is no way out of these changes; we have to cope and adapt. It is a new situation.69

Although SPLM leaders were determined to overcome the challenges of integration, as leaders of GoSS they became embroiled in disputes over decentralization.

The challenges of decentralization: GoSS v. CES Integration not only provoked tensions between mid-level managers, but it also shaped a political debate between levels of government over the nature of decentralization. At the root of debates over responsibilities was a concern over resources. The CPA had promoted a commitment to devolution but had not identified mechanisms for the funding of lower levels of government or processes for the resolution of disputes. All the funds from the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Sudan, and the oil wealthsharing revenues were channelled through the GoSS Ministry of Finance. Ibid. Interview 97: group interview with residents of MTC / Juba / 16 August 2006. 67 Interview 2b: Deng Alor Kuol, GoNU Minister for Cabinet Affairs, SPLA Lt General (Retd) / Khartoum / 31 July 2006. 68 Interview 84b: Stuart, SPLM member / Juba / 17 August 2008. 69 Interview 12: Daniel Awet, GoSS Minister of the Interior, SPLA Lt General (Retd) / Juba / 1 September 2006. 65 66

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All of the coordination with aid agencies, whose assistance was essential to reconstruction, was conducted at the GoSS level. This meant essentially that it was up to GoSS to allocate to the CES Government what it determined the state needed for reconstruction and day-to-day operations. The result was various questionable practices and subsequent accusations of ‘corruption’, and jurisdictional disputes that culminated in a contest over control of the town. In 2008 GoSS had a budget of 3.4 billion Sudanese Pounds (SDG), which was 97% dependent on oil revenues.70 Beyond oil, the other revenue sources were Value Added Tax (VAT), Corporate Tax, airports, immigration, traffic dues, and other collections by GoSS institutions, as well as personal income tax instituted in 2008. GoSS also received part of funds pledged to the World Bank Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Sudan, as well as bilateral funding from donor countries through agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The CES Government, unlike GoSS, did not have direct access to oil revenues or foreign aid.71 Its revenue base was generated from taxes on incomes and business profits, duties, licenses – including market, vehicle, and professional licenses – and a variety of goods and services.72 Expected revenues for 2008 were SDG 73 million.73 According to a CES Government Ministry of Finance official, this was not sufficient to support the CES Government’s budgetary needs: The tax base is too low. We have just come out from the war…it is not feasible for us to collect enough funds to meet our needs. Right now we depend entirely on foreign goods [imported items]. There are no regular vehicles coming from Uganda, because that road is very rough. And therefore we haven’t collected enough [import duties]. The funds that we collect from the local markets here is so minimal, that it cannot accrue to something of a help. So it is only Juba and Yei that maybe we can get money from. As for the rest of the counties, the markets are not developed.74

CES Government officials claimed that Central Equatoria had payroll needs of SDG 324 million in 2007, but was only able to meet SDG 64 million of it from state revenues. According to one official in the CES Ministry of Finance, over 80% of CES Government funds went towards payroll costs.75 ‘Budget Speech for Financial Year 2008, Presented to the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly by H.E. Kuol Athian Mawein Minister of Finance & Economic Planning’, 10 December 2007. 71 In 2008 the budget of GoSS was 3.4 billion Sudanese Pounds (SDG) and it was 97% dependent on oil revenues. ‘Budget Speech for Financial Year 2008, Presented to the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly by H.E. Kuol Athian Mawein Minister of Finance & Economic Planning’, 10 December 2007. GoSS also received funding from World Bank administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Sudan, as well as bilateral funding from donor countries 72 Central Equatoria State, State Taxes and Fees Act, 2008. 73 Central Equatoria State Government budget, 2008. CES Ministry of Finance, Economics and Manpower. 74 Interview 25: Wani Buyu Dyori, Director-General, CES Ministry of Finance, Economics and Manpower / Juba / 15 September 2008. 75 Ibid. 70

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Although GoSS covered at least a portion of the shortfall through direct grants, CES Government officials complained that the GoSS disbursements were not adequate, especially to cover development projects in the state.76 The GoSS disbursements to the states were based on a cap of 5000 civil service personnel for each of the ten states. CES Government leaders complained that this figure was arbitrary, and did not account for population differences between a state like Central Equatoria, which had experienced waves of immigration and which had inherited the bureaucracy of the Bahr el Jebel State Government, and that of a comparatively unpopulated state like Warrap. A CES Director-General argued, They did not want to take the trouble of seeing whether somebody is working with the government or not, because in some of these states like Warrap, I think they could hardly get 1000 employees. Now you give Warrap 5000 when they cannot have even 1000. Is it really fair?77

The issue was brought up at a Governor’s Forum meeting in mid-2008 where the figure for civil servants was raised to 10,000 for Central Equatoria state. But CES Government officials complained that this new figure included integrated SPLM staff.78 SPLM officials, on the other hand, claimed that the workforce of the CES Government was grossly inflated, with many ‘ghost employees’ on the payroll. In April 2005 BearingPoint Advisors working with the SPLM Secretariat of Finance prepared a budget for manpower and expenditure requirements for GoSS.79 They projected a civil service of approximately 40,000 personnel for Southern Sudan (excluding civil servants in garrison towns). The budget of the CCSS prepared concurrently by bureaucrats from Juba, proposed a figure of over 140,000 civil service personnel for Southern Sudan (including garrison towns). The BearingPoint team discovered that the larger CCSS figure arose from the fact that ‘most of the manpower included in the Coordinating Council’s proposal consisted of persons no longer working in the south (i.e. ghost workers)’.80 An SPLM official argued that the bloated CES Government should be reduced to a proportionate size.81 In a news article in March 2008, Albino Mior Aguer, Director-General of the GoSS Ministry of Labour and Public Service, cited wide scale graft, incorrect payroll records, and misdirected salaries in all of the ten states in Southern Sudan.82 He stated, ‘Most of the states spend their money on Interview 29: Lewis Gore George, Director-General of Housing and Construction, CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 21 July 2008; Interview 25: Wani Buyu Dyori, Director-General, CES Ministry of Finance, Economics and Manpower / Juba /15 September 2008. 77 Interview 88: Clarence, Director-General, CES Government / Juba / July 2008. 78 Ibid. 79 BearingPoint is a private consulting firm contracted by USAID to do reconstruction work in Southern Sudan. 80 USAID, ‘Preparation of the First Budget of the Government of Southern Sudan’, Sudan. Economic Growth, 2006. 81 Interview 84b: Stuart, SPLM member, Juba. 17 August 2008. 82 ‘South Sudan targets costly “ghost” jobs’, Sudan Tribune, 20 March 2008. 76

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salaries. It leads to redundancy at work, no services and no development’. The article blamed this on the northern system; ‘Southern officials say many of the names were inherited from the region’s civil service system run by the north during the country’s ruinous north-south civil war’.83 In the same article, Leonard Logo Mulukwat, head of finance for the Central Equatoria region, claimed that a third of the CES Assembly payroll there had been going to people who were not working.84 In an interview in September 2008, an official from the CES Ministry of Finance acknowledged the ghost employees, but argued that measures had been taken to combat the practice, specifically an anti-corruption commission at the CES level: Unfortunately the practice has been that sometimes some individuals give names of people who are deceased [for the payroll]! But last year in September [2007], the government came up with a list to exclude all these false names. I was a member of that committee. So we did a reasonable job and we discovered a number of people. The consequence was that some officials were suspended.85

He claimed that while the result had not yet been released, the CES Government Anti-corruption Committee had delivered a report to the Governors, and the CES Government was handling the matter.86 Responding to complaints that the states were not receiving enough money from GoSS in a 2007 speech at the GoSS Assembly, the GoSS Minister of Finance offered technical help for budgeting to the CES Government in the form of budgeting workshops and UNDP planning and budgeting advisors. He stated: Like every other institution in Southern Sudan, the states must budget according to the funds available to them….If the states believe they need an increase in funds they should concentrate on their own resource mobilisation, so they are not dependent solely on funding from GoSS.87

The problem of funding underlay various jurisdictional disputes that emerged in the transition period. The confusing listing of competencies meant that the activities of GoSS and CES overlapped in critical revenuegenerating areas. One rather petty dispute was over vehicle registration, a key source of revenue for the CES Government in the rapidly growing town. Following the CPA, both GoSS and the CES Government issued vehicle license plates and collected registration fees for automobiles. As the number of vehicles in the town grew, CES Government leaders began to complain that GoSS was diverting a significant amount of much-needed revenues from the local state. A CES bureaucrat argued, ‘The revenue sources which the [local] state actually budgeted for, plate numbers for cars and so on, which actually according to the CPA is the jurisdiction of ‘South Sudan targets costly “ghost” jobs’, Sudan Tribune, 20 March 2008. Ibid. 85 Interview 25: Wani Buyu Dyori, Director-General, CES Ministry of Finance, Economics and Manpower / Juba / 15 September 2008. 86 Ibid. 87 Budget Speech for Financial Year 2008. 83 84

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the state, these ones they also come in to take the money for themselves. Imagine!’88 As the dispute went on without resolution, CES police officers began issuing fines to cars with New Sudan license plates. In retaliation SPLA soldiers stopped cars with Central Equatoria State license plates.89 Motorists were left uncertain whether they would be stopped by CES police or SPLA soldiers. CES Government leaders believed that GoSS was overstepping its role and interfering in areas that were the state’s jurisdiction under the CPA. A CES Director-General argued, I think the underlying things which have caused all of this confusion is that some of the Ministers in the Government of Southern Sudan wanted all authority to be in their hands… They are supposed to be policymakers, but some of them now want also to implement, you see?90

This echoed earlier statements made by Governor Wani: GoSS has a tendency of usurping powers of the states….The government of the south is a decentralized system. There are certain [GoSS] ministers who have got a tendency of centralizing the system, and that is where we have got problems. They want the government to be like Addis Ababa in 1972. Let them consult the CPA.91

The references to the negative experience of the first Southern Regional Government demonstrated that the process of reconciliation and integration had not resolved the divisions amongst southerners that characterized the town’s history, but had ironically given a platform to the CES Government to assert its jurisdiction over the town and to contest the SPLM’s agenda for urban reconstruction.

The status of Juba and the location of the GoSS and CES capitals The competition over political jurisdiction evolved into a dispute over territorial jurisdiction, culminating in claims to the capital.92 In 2006, GoSS Ministerial Committee was tasked with examining the status of Juba as capital of Southern Sudan. A report issued by the Committee invoked Article 53(4) of the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, arguing that Juba was the capital of Southern Sudan and the seat of GoSS, therefore CES ‘cannot claim to have sole authority over a city declared to be Capital City of Southern Sudan’: Interview 88: Clarence, Director-General, CES Government / Juba / July 2008. ‘CES insists on its right to issue vehicle plate numbers.’ Miraya Radio FM, 27 November 2007. Available from: http://www.mirayafm.org/htmlarchive/ index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2133&Itemid=71 [Accessed on: 4 May 2011]; Interview 30b: Alikaya Aligo Samson, Former CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 17 August 2008. 90 Interview 88: Clarence, Director-General, CES Government / Juba / July 2008. 91 Interview 21: Clement Wani Konga, Governor of Central Equatoria State / Juba / 6 September 2006. 92 ‘GoSS Pushes for State Capital to Relocate’, Juba Post, July 27, 2006; ‘The Governor rejects the detention of the state constitution over the insistence by the GOSS that the state capital be re-located to Yei’, Juba Post, August 10, 2006; ‘Minister Refutes Holding Sate Constitution Hostage,‘ Juba Post, October 12, 2006; ‘The Land Question In Juba: GoSS Motives Against The Bari’, South Sudan Nation, September 2, 2006. 88 89

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This constitutional provision must be understood to have located the City of Juba outside local government structure and not otherwise. The intention of this article is clearly to carve out Juba out of [Central Equatoria State] and accord it a different constitutional status that is distinct from its present status, which the Government of the state would like to maintain. The implementation of Article 53 (4) makes Juba the Capital for the whole of Southern Sudan and makes its administration to be open to all its residents and not necessary people of [Central Equatoria State]. Such an arrangement cannot be under a state law. It must be organized under a Southern Sudan law as provided in the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan.93

In a meeting on June 15, 2006, the GoSS Ministerial Committee argued that once GoSS implemented Article 53(4) of the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, the CES Government could no longer exercise authority over the city, and thereafter it would be the ‘responsibility of the GOSS to address any community land rights’ or interests in land that might be affected by the delimitation of the territorial boundaries of the capital.94 SPLM leaders argued that the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan would necessarily prevail in the case of a jurisdictional conflict. Officials pointed out that this potential for jurisdictional conflict needed to be correctly addressed and resolved by the two levels of government. GoSS Minister John Luk argued, All the states are under the Government of South Sudan. The Government of South Sudan has responsibility over the states. GoSS still has overall authority over the states. And their constitutions must conform; what they do under their constitutions must conform to the Constitution of Southern Sudan, which is operated by GoSS institutions.95

The history of shifting boundaries and administrative jurisdictions in southern Sudan, outlined in Chapter One, had important implications for the debates over political authority and jurisdiction in Juba in the transition period, as well as for claims to the ownership of public lands and buildings in the town. The Equatoria Region Government, which had been created as a result of redivision in 1983, had inherited the property of the former Southern Regional Government in the town. The Bahr el Jebel State Government, which together with Eastern Equatoria State, and Western Equatoria State was carved from the Equatoria Region Government in the 1996 National Congress Party (NCP) federal constitution, claimed to inherit these properties and the buildings on them from the Equatoria Region Government. As will be shown in subsequent chapters, the issue of space to house the staff of the two levels of government grew particularly critical as the prospect of acquiring new land for development on the outskirts of the town became dim. In addition to a general disagreement over which level of government had jurisdiction over the territory Report of the Ministerial Committee of the Government of Southern Sudan on the Status of Juba as the Capital City of Southern Sudan and the Seat of Government of Southern Sudan. Meeting No. 9, 4 May 2006. 94 Ibid. 95 Interview 17: John Luk Jok, GoSS Minister of Energy and Mining / Juba / 10 September 2008. 93

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of Juba, was a dispute over specific structures, which in the war-torn town were few and highly sought after. CES Government leaders insisted that all government buildings in Juba, including those occupied by GoSS, were the property of the CES Government. These included houses and buildings that were previously owned by the first Southern Regional Government. The confusion was rooted in the separation of resources after redivision. CES Government leaders stated that Upper Nile Province and Bahr el Ghazal Province had been compensated by GoS after the division of the south in 1983, while Equatoria Region and its successor the Bahr el Jebel State Government were left with the physical assets (office buildings and furniture) of the Southern Regional Government. SPLM leaders disputed this. They claimed that the Equatoria Region Government had indeed been allocated funds, and they argued that the buildings left behind by the previous administrations of the south in Juba were the common property of the south and not of the Bahr el Jebel State Government. A resident explained, When GoSS came they suppressed the state government. They took the former assets of Bahr el Jebel state. This brought tension. During the first Regional Government all the land was government land so GoSS assumed that it was their assets, although during the war it was Bahr el Jebel. All buildings belonged then to the state government. Certain officials who are working for the state government were evacuated from their buildings. It was in the newspapers.96

The option of making Juba a municipality under the authority of a mayor failed due to disagreements over which level of government would be in charge of it. The Commissioner of Juba County argued that the city of Juba should be a ‘municipal city’ reporting to and controlled by a mayor. He explained that both GoSS and the CES Government agreed on that, but they were unable to decide which level of government the mayor himself would be accountable to.97 SPLM leaders preferred making Juba a federal municipality directly under GoSS. CES Government leaders wanted the city administration to be under the CES Government as a structure of local government.98 The Chairman of the CES Assembly Land Committee was adamant: ‘Juba will never be a federal municipality. And it shouldn’t happen really, because it’s a form of local government. So it cannot come under GoSS’.99 In other words, CES Government leaders wanted their authority to be acknowledged, ostensibly as a safeguard for future negotiations. The Chairman clarified that the phrase ‘under the local government’ meant under the Governor of Central Equatoria State.100 Interview 44d: Caleb, Kator resident / Juba / 16 July 2008. Interview 35: Peter Jenkins Jaden, former Juba County Commissioner (2004– 2007) / Juba / 18 August 2008. 98 Report of the Ministerial Committee of the Government of Southern Sudan on the Status of Juba… 99 Interview 23b: Simon Lumori Philip, Chairman of CES Land Commission / Juba / August 2008. 100 Interview 35: Peter Jenkins Jaden, former Juba County Commissioner (2004– 2007) / Juba / 18 August 2008. 96 97

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GoSS wanted the mayor to be directly under [their jurisdiction]. This is what has created a problem up to now. The [CES] Government also wanted the mayor to be under them. So the status of Juba has not been settled. Although in the Constitution of Southern Sudan it says the capital of the Government of South Sudan is Juba, and that its boundaries shall be determined by law, it also states [in the] Constitution of Central Equatoria that the capital of the state of Central Equatoria shall be Juba. So here are these contradictions.101

The competition over political jurisdiction culminated in competing claims to the town, and was waged publicly in the news media.102 SPLM leaders suggested that the CES Government move its capital to Yei or another town in Central Equatoria State in order to avoid jurisdictional conflicts with GoSS, and to free up buildings for the growing GoSS bureaucracy in Juba.103 SPLM leaders pointed out that this would develop two southern towns and stimulate two local economies rather than one. They made the commitment that if CES opted to relocate its capital to another town in the state, GoSS would provide funds for the construction of a new state capital. It was argued, ‘[CES] and its people would lose nothing. In fact any option that results in the development of two major cities within [CES] should be to the great advantage of the people of the state’.104 The CES Government firmly resisted moving its headquarters, claiming that in the atmosphere of uncertainty and poor communication, moving the state capital farther away from GoSS would leave the local communities exposed to the potentially negative consequences of urban planning and even a possible ‘land grab’ without a local advocate.105 Governor Wani argued, [If the CES capital is moved], the Bari will be subject to [the] whims of GoSS in terms of land….GoSS may take much of the land away from the Bari, and the state government will be far away from the Bari. The state is protecting the interests of our people in Juba. We need to be here to protect the Bari from GoSS.106

He maintained that there was no reason why CES Government and GoSS could not coexist, pointing out that many international cities serve as municipal, county, and national capitals.107 The CES Government offered a 25 square kilometre area of Bari land two kilometres west of Juba for the relocation of GoSS headquarters. GoSS leaders rejected this offer on the grounds that it was too far away from Juba, and due to lack of access to Interview 23: Simon Lumori Philip, Chairman of CES Land Commission / Juba / September 2008. 102 ‘GoSS Pushes for State Capital to Relocate’, Juba Post, July 27, 2006; ‘Minister Refutes Holding State Constitution Hostage’, Juba Post, October 12, 2006; ‘The Land Question In Juba: GoSS Motives Against The Bari’, South Sudan Nation, September 2, 2006. 103 Report of the Ministerial Committee of the Government of Southern Sudan on the Status of Juba…. 104 Ibid. 105 ‘The Governor rejects the detention of the state constitution over the insistence by the GOSS that the state capital be re-located to Yei’, Juba Post, August 10, 2006. 106 Interview 21: Clement Wani Konga, Governor of Central Equatoria State / Juba / 6 September 2006. 107 Ibid. 101

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water and electricity, it would be too costly to build the government headquarters there.108 SPLM leaders argued that a decision to move GoSS elsewhere would have ‘grave political ramifications’. The report produced by the committee stated that such a decision could ‘possibly be understood by the ordinary citizens that the Government of Southern Sudan has been chased away from Juba by the [CES Government] and the Bari community’, Whereas if it is the state relocating, it could be normally understood that the state is giving way to the GoSS which is the national government of the south since Juba is the popularly acknowledged historical Capital; or even as a normal implementation of the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan.109

Various proposals for cohabitation were offered and rejected. The option of dividing Juba along a north-south axis and giving GoSS the northern part of the town was rejected by Bari leaders. Another option was offered by SPLM leaders: using the White Nile as a dividing line, giving GoSS the east bank, and CES the west bank. However, the Bari community did not want to release the fertile riverbanks which they used for agriculture.

CONCLUSION The CPA’s framework of decentralization did not resolve the question of how authority would be distributed in the capital. In the view of SPLM leaders, limiting the role of GoSS to policymaking in the initial transition period impeded the monumental task of reconstructing the town and the region. SPLM leaders argued that GoSS needed to be sufficiently empowered to plan, coordinate, and manage the various aspects and actors involved in the reconstruction process. In the view of CES Government leaders, the SPLM talked about decentralization but they acted like centralizers. The growing frustration at what appeared to be the foot dragging, obstruction, evasion, and lack of cooperation of CES Government bureaucrats and leaders impelled some in the SPLM to advocate forging ahead unilaterally with an agenda of transformative change. Midway through the Interim Period there was still no resolution over the status of Juba. SPLM leaders and Equatorian politicians alike acknowledged the difficulties of this process. In a speech to the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, Speaker James Wani Igga, a senior SPLM commander, and himself a Bari from south of Juba, stated: There is gossip in streets of Juba about the coexistence of GoSS and CES Government. It is damaging, it is not good for the unity of our people. Is it true that these two institutions cannot coexist in Juba? It is what is unsaid that divides people. Our unity must come before everything else, because this is our Achilles heel.110 108 Interview 30: Alikaya Aligo Samson, Former CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 11 August 2008. 109 Report of the Ministerial Committee of the Government of Southern Sudan on the Status of Juba… 110 Speaker James Wani Igga, ‘Speech at inauguration of 2nd session of GoSS Assembly’, Juba, 6 September 2006.

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In his speech at the opening ceremony of the SPLM’s Second National Convention in 2008, President Salva Kiir reflected on the accomplishments of the past three years and summed up the challenges of transformation, integration, and reconstruction: …our new government in Southern Sudan lacked adequate, competent, and trained personnel in key civil service positions. It lacked necessary laws, regulations and systems for good governance and prudent public financial management. It inherited from the liberation era a system, dictated by the logic and priorities of armed struggle, and whose lines of demarcation between military and civilian responsibilities were blurred. It also inherited from the previous administration a bloated civil service that was only a civil service by name. It was merely a congregation of cronies whose only service to government was to receive salaries by the end of the month. Though we had started before the establishment of GoSS, with comprehensive capacity building programmes, with assistance from our international partners, the process still needs time to realize the results.111

Kiir expressed the view that the cultures and systems of the previous government were an impediment to progress, and therefore by implication they would have to be trained and their ‘capacity built’ or replaced with new regulations, competent personnel and ‘good governance’. In other words, they would have to comply with the SPLM vision of urban reconstruction if they were serious about ‘development’. What was not acknowledged, at least publicly, was the ways in which the systems of the previous government protected certain interests, and that these would have to be recognized and even reconciled with the SPLM’s reconstruction agenda. More broadly, the conflicts over decentralization and integration show that the CPA alone could not build a state and make it legitimate. The peace agreement was, if anything, a template for engaging in a conversation about the process of state-building, a conversation that, as we will see in the next chapter, involved several key groups with diverse interests in Juba. ‘Opening Statement by Salva Kiir Mayardit at 2nd National Convention’, Juba, 15–20 May 2008.

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‘Land Belongs to the Community’: Competing Interpretations of the CPA

The divisions that stymied the integration process in the early transition period in Juba were the result of multiple, intersecting factors, including competition over public sector jobs, political rivalries, and different experiences of the war. Overlaying divisions were competing understandings of the implications of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) for the framework of land rights in Southern Sudan, and for authority over land in Juba and surrounding areas. These understandings were not inherent to particular ethnic or ‘tribal’ identities, but were employed by key local stakeholders in Juba to promote particular interests in local reconstruction. To the degree that they furthered distinct understandings of citizenship, they were strategies of local statebuilding. During the difficult process of integrating local institutions into the decentralized framework of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), a tense politics of land was emerging in Juba, which would block the SPLM’s vision for urban development in the town, and further complicate debates over authority and political jurisdiction. At the time of the CPA, there was no unified legal framework for governing land tenure in Sudan. While successive legislation had given the northern government far-reaching powers over ‘unregistered’ lands outside of the towns, in practice the application of land law in southern Sudan was uneven and inconsistent. In much of the region, traditional authorities – chiefs and kings, sub-chiefs and headman – continued to exercise authority over land allocation and management on a de facto basis.1 In an attempt to promote the rights of southerners to lands in the region and to safeguard southern autonomy against future encroachment by the north, the SPLM/A team in Naivasha negotiated for an acknowledgement of ‘community’ rights to land in the CPA. Given the history of land alienation by the central government in communities throughout southern Paul V. De Witt, ‘Land and Property Study in Sudan’, Report jointly funded by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), United Nations High Commission For Refugees (UNHCR), and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NCR), December 2004, p. 10. See also: Paul V. De Wit, ‘Land and Property Study in Sudan: Scoping of issues and questions to be addressed’, Interim Report, 2004. 1

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Sudan, the SPLM/A leadership believed that institutionalizing land rights held under customary law would give southerners legal protection against being forced off their land. Providing legal protections for southern resources would be especially crucial if the south voted to remain within a united Sudan in the referendum.2 The recognition of communal land rights was not only a mechanism to protect the south from the northern government; it was also a strategy of state-building. During the war, control over the territory of southern Sudan was divided between the SPLM/A; a plethora of southern militias that had been under the tutelage of Khartoum; traditional authorities – chiefs, kings, and headmen of various sorts; and the Sudanese government. Having arrived in a position of power through a negotiated settlement that was the result of intense international pressure, the SPLM was in a precarious position as a state-builder. Securing the territory and building the institutions of the new southern state in a vast and underdeveloped region marked by political and institutional fragmentation, depended on reconciling the various southern groups that had been excluded from the peace process and bringing them into the framework of the southern state. These were southern militias, southern NCP members and SAF officers, and residents living in towns that had been under the control of the northern government. Acknowledging the rights of Southern Sudan’s communities to lands held under customary law was also pragmatic in terms of managing intra-south conflict. By linking rights to community lands to the CPA, and thereby to its mandate to rule, the SPLM was making a strategic calculation aimed at establishing authority and convincing diverse southern groups to accept its state-building programme. This new state-building framework interacted with local politics in Juba in particular ways. The CPA’s articles on land rights awakened dormant debates about the rights of Southern Sudan’s communities as political entities. Throughout the town the belief that the CPA had institutionalized ‘community’ rights to land created a sense of ownership of it in terms of ethnic identities. As early as 2006, local residents, politicians, chiefs, ‘intellectuals’, and military leaders proclaimed that the CPA stated that ‘land belongs to the community’. The phrase was ubiquitous, in local newspapers, in schools, in the offices of political officials, in markets, and in Juba’s many neighbourhoods. There was actually no guarantee of such rights, or elaboration thereof, in the CPA or the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan. Both documents contained only the promise of a ‘process’ whereby rights stemming from ‘customary laws and practices’ might be negotiated. The Wealth-sharing Protocol of the CPA states that the agreement was not intended to address the ownership of land and natural resources, but rather to provide mechanisms by which the parties may resolve such issues in the Interim Period: …this Agreement is not intended to address the ownership of those resources….The Parties agree that a process be instituted to progressively develop 2 Interview 17: John Luk Jok, GoSS Minister of Energy and Mining, Juba, 10 September 2008.

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and amend the relevant laws to incorporate customary laws and practices, local heritage and international trends and practices.3

The Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan made a more explicit mention of ‘community’ land rights, but it was also open to interpretation, leaving a significant, although unclear role for the Land Commission, the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly and the Judiciary of Southern Sudan to interpret the CPA and to draft laws. Nevertheless, the debate took on a life of its own and became central to the local politics of state-building in Juba. Debates over land became a key component of the local state-building process, one that operated outside formal reconstruction programmes. It seemed to escape the attention of aid agencies, which were less focused on the daily interactions that comprised the reconstruction process in the town and more on drafting legislation, which they believed would clarify rights and thus resolve local level disputes. The subtle differences in the interpretations held by members of the Bari community, the CES Government, and GoSS demonstrate that the idea of ‘community’ operated at once as a political discourse as well as a category that defined inclusion and exclusion. In terms of land rights, a ‘community’ member was a member of a particular group, whether defined as a ‘tribe’ or kingdom, and even more specifically of a particular sub-chieftaincy or clan. In terms of political discourse, it evoked common interests, shared history, and political alliance. These competing interpretations of the CPA underlay very different visions of the post-conflict state, and became important political tools used by various actors in pursuit of different reconstruction agendas. In the hands of local elites the refrain became a means to shore up local power and privileged status vis-à-vis GoSS. Bari leaders used the CPA’s protection of ‘community’ land rights to claim collective rights to the land in Juba for the Bari community, and in doing so to preserve the authority of Bari traditional institutions. Bari leaders – chiefs, civil society representatives, and political leaders in the county and state governments – interpreted the CPA to mean that the land surrounding Juba belonged to the Bari community and was to be exclusively under the control of their traditional political institutions. They acknowledged that land within the town’s centre was gazetted by successive governments from the colonial period onwards, meaning that it was transferred from customary control and released to the government for the development of residential, commercial, and military sites. However, they insisted that lands in the villages on the outskirts of the town were still held under customary law and off-limits to urban expansion. Their aim was to protect the Bari identity of the town and surrounding areas, to maintain privileged access to the resources within the territory considered to be ‘Bariland’, for the narrowly defined community, and to prevent the loss of lands held by Bari villages surrounding the town. Yet this was equally a grab for power by modern politicians and businessmen. For 3 CPA Chapter 3, Article 2.1 & 2.5; Interim Constitution of Southern of Southern Sudan, Article 180, Sections 5–6.

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many Bari leaders, an elite group who had benefited from privileged access to the local state under the northern government, retaining control over a politically valuable resource was an attempt to preserve political and economic status amidst rapid change. The CES Government’s involvement in the land debate was motivated by the desire to carve out political jurisdiction within the decentralized regional state of Southern Sudan. Contrary to notions of a ‘blank slate’ prevailing in development community approaches to reconstruction, Juba had a complex political and institutional context. As the successor to the Bahr el Jebel State Government, and before that the Equatoria Region Government, the CES Government claimed to have inherited the land and physical assets of the Southern Regional Government in Juba following re-division. This complex institutional history was the stage for a battle between the CES Government and GoSS over government buildings and jurisdiction over the town. Having no direct access to oil revenues or foreign aid, the CES Government was beholden to GoSS for the funds it needed for infrastructure development, social services, and day-to-day operations.4 To improve their leverage vis-à-vis GoSS, CES leaders invoked the CPA in trying to position themselves as intermediaries between the Bari community and GoSS in all land related matters.5 The spirit of ‘community’ land rights was in line with the SPLM’s aims of preserving the cultural values of the south against the north’s Islamizing agenda, and of building a state that recognized the political systems that had existed in southern Sudan for centuries. This approach reflected the SPLM/A’s rhetoric of cultural preservation and community rights as outlined in the SPLM/A Manifesto, expressed through various speeches and radio broadcasts during the decades of war, and reinforced in the 1994 National Convention and in the SPLM War to Peace Framework.6 Yet the inflexible interpretations of the CPA in the initial transition period complicated the SPLM’s urban reconstruction agenda for Juba. To SPLM leaders and their international partners, the tension between the local desire to retain control over land and maintain privileged rights, and GoSS’s need for land to promote urban development projects became a central dilemma in reconstruction and state-building. Setting aside the In 2008, the budget of GoSS was 3.4 billion Sudanese Pounds (of which 97% came from oil revenues). GoSS also received funding from a World Bankadministered Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Sudan, and bilateral funding from donor countries through agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the European Commission. ‘Budget Speech for Financial Year 2008, Presented to the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly by H.E. Kuol Athian Mawein Minister of Finance & Economic Planning’, 10 December 2007. 5 Interview 28: Cornelious Goja Lado Kulang, Director-General of Lands, CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 27 August 2008; Interview 26: Emmanuel Waga Elia, CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 22 July 2008; Interview 21: Clement Wani Konga, Governor of Central Equatoria State / Juba / 6 September 2006. 6 SPLM Strategic Framework for War-to-Peace Transition. For an overview of the movement’s ideological principles, see: Mansour Khalid, John Garang Speaks (London: KPI, 1987). 4

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operational challenges of integrating customary law and traditional institutions with the new Southern Sudanese state, empowering local groups vis-à-vis GoSS made urban development in Juba extremely challenging.

THE LOCAL DIMENSION OF RECONSTRUCTION: THE NEXUS BETWEEN IDENTITIES, INTERESTS, AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CPA In the initial transition period three main groups were involved directly in the politics of land in Juba: the civic and traditional leaders of the Bari community, the leaders of the CES Government, and the SPLM leadership of GoSS. The leaders of the Bari community represented a small group, numbering approximately 60–70,000, which considered Juba to be within its ancestral homeland. The CES Government was comprised largely of Equatorian bureaucrats and political leaders – not all of whom were Bari – who had worked in the former Bahr el Jebel State Government under the National Congress Party (NCP). The SPLM leadership of GoSS was undergoing a difficult transformation from a guerrilla army into a national political party, a professional regional army, and a decentralized regional government. These three groupings represented discrete if not always consistent interests in the local dynamics of land. To a degree, each category is vague and obfuscates the complexities and nuances in local political competition. To be sure, these categories were not bounded or fixed, and their membership overlapped. Many Bari were political leaders or bureaucrats in the CES Government, and some were church leaders, university professors, NGO representatives, GoSS officials, and SPLM leaders. Chiefs, BCA leaders, and CES Government officials were often members of the same extended family. The entities were not homogenous, but internally differentiated and conflicted. Nevertheless, for the purpose of linking political interests to the various competing interpretations of the CPA, one can discern distinct interests among these loosely conceived groups, especially in terms of how they interpreted the CPA and the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan with respect to their rights to and authority over land in the town.

The Bari Community In popular discourse ‘Bari community’ is used to refer to the entire population of the Bari, both those members who live in the territory considered to be Bariland, encompassing Juba and much of Central Equatoria State, as well as those Bari people who live elsewhere and abroad. The term ‘community’ is also used in a narrower sense to refer to members of a particular sub-group of the Bari, for example, the Tokiman sub-chieftaincy. This is how the term ‘community’ in the CPA was most widely interpreted, because it referred to a grouping that claimed rights to and use of the land within a particular geographic territory. In this conceptualization – a legacy of the colonial policy of fixing groups to a particular territory – the institutions of the chieftaincy and of customary law are of

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primary importance, because these determine who is a member of the ‘community’ narrowly defined (i.e. sub-chieftaincy), and who is not. The importance of the sub-chieftaincy does not rest on the question of a single chiefship, but also to some degree corresponds to the internal politics of the Bari. The Bari have a class-based society with a complex system of clans spread throughout Bariland.7 They have no subdivisions but refer to themselves as Bari ti lobot (Northern Bari) and Bari ti loki (Southern Bari) with the River Kit as the dividing line. The Bari Tokiman are considered to be the ‘town’ Bari, while the northern Bari and those living in Gondokoro Island across the riverbank of Juba Town are a rural society. Berman points out that intra-group relations are not necessarily harmonious, but ‘most large ethnic communities in Africa continue also to contain local sub-group identities whose relations are often problematic.’8 He raises the question of class differentiation, and potential for fragmentation ‘as aggrieved sections demand their turn to “eat”’.9 Certainly, the Bari are no exception to this characterization. The Bari Tokiman had for a long time had greater access to political power and education relative to the northern Bari due to their proximity to the town. As a result, there was competition during the Interim period between the Tokiman Bari, who had historically been more politically-connected in Juba’s government, and the more rural northern Bari who felt it was their turn to share power.10 This points to the broader point that within Bari traditional structures, no single person or leadership cohort can claim to speak on behalf of all Bari villages. Moreover, when the ‘Bari community’ is used in reference to a particular sub-chieftaincy or chieftaincy, it evokes a false image of a cohesive group of people led by benevolent ‘traditional’ leaders who work exclusively in the interests of their constituencies. The actions of Bari traditional leaders have not always served their community’s best interests. Indeed, in the transition period, Bari ‘intellectuals’ – civil society representatives, educators, and CES Government bureaucrats – criticized the activities of some Bari chiefs, claiming that they had made land deals with GoSS and investors in return for gifts or cash. A Juba University professor remarked, ‘If you go to the Tongping area, or beyond it, the Chief apparently has become A partial list includes: Panigilo, Mifii, Bekat, Nyori, Bonuk, DuA, Kabidu, Biajin, Lodare, Kamyak, Lumbari, Gubatulu, Karyak, Logare, Kin, Kanan, Rito, Sera, Poran, Lobajoka, Gela, Moije, Kwersak, Poko, Reli, Karuma, Sali, Kuli, Miano, Rongat, Lokuamiro, Jam, Tiali, Dakgelen, and Le. The Bekat Limat is considered to be the most important of the clans due to the fact that many rainmakers have belonged to it. See: C. G. Seligman and B. Z. Seligman, ‘The Bari’, The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, 58 (1928), p. 417–419. 8 Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh, and Will Kymlicka, ‘Ethncity & the Politics of Democratic Nation-Building in Africa’, in Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh, and Will Kymlicka, Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa (Oxford: James Currey, 2004), p. 4 citing Toyin Falola, ‘Ethnicity & Nigerian Politics: The Past in the Yoruba Present’, and A. Raufu Mustapha, ‘Ethnicity & the Politics of Democratization in Nigeria’, in the same volume. 9 Bruce Berman,‘Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: the Politics of Uncivil Nationalism’, African Affairs 97 (1998), p. 338. 10 Interview 85b: Duncan, Juba University Professor / Juba / August 2008. 7

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a personal real estate agent, doing a lot of deals for himself. For the first time in his life he was able to take a vacation to Kampala’.11 The implication was that chiefs were becoming rich by selling Bari lands for personal gain. In her research in Equatoria, Leonardi also observes: …as pressure for and the value of land has increased in recent years, members of the land-owning clans complain that they are increasingly disregarded in land transactions, and variously blame local government officials, chiefs or other community leaders for allocating land to organizations or businesses without consulting them.12

Therefore, although the institutions of chieftaincy and associated ‘traditional’ roles enjoy a significant degree of legitimacy among the Bari people, the claim of specific Bari chiefs to speak on behalf of the whole Bari population should be treated with a degree of scepticism. Further complicating notions of ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ division is the fact that dividing lines often ran across education levels, experiences of the war, and political affiliation, among other factors, not across ethnic identity or tribal affiliation. Traditional leaders were not the only group who claimed to represent the ‘Bari community’. This term was also used in reference to the Bari Community Association (BCA). Comprising 135 elected councillors, the BCA was led by an executive committee of 28 members, elected biannually. All Bari, including women, were invited to participate. The BCA was formed in the period after the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, but after the onset of the second civil war, when public meetings in Juba ran the risk of appearing to be coordinating with the SPLM/A rebels, the BCA went underground, holding meetings in Khartoum and in the diaspora as a cultural association. With the signing of the CPA, it reemerged as a political organization. In the early Interim Period the BCA leadership represented a cohort of elite Bari drawn from the ranks of the former Bahr el Jebel State Government. They were largely NCP members who had been officers in the SAF, police, and prison services, and were universityeducated ‘intellectuals’ with links to the Bari diaspora in Khartoum and abroad. Tongun Lado Rombe, the Chairman of the BCA, described it as an inclusive organization that served as a link between the Bari chiefs and the CES Government. He explained, ‘Sometimes the chiefs they don’t coordinate. In the Bari Community Association we coordinate the issues between the community and the government’.13 To avoid confusion, in terms of analysing competing interpretations of the CPA, I use ‘Bari community’ to refer to the entire membership of the Bari in Juba, and when possible, I refer to a specific chieftaincy when the term ‘community’ is used to invoke a specific claim to land. I use ‘Bari Interview 85: Duncan, Juba University Professor / Juba / August 2008. Cherry Leonardi, ‘Paying “buckets of blood” for the land: moral debates over economy, war and state in Southern Sudan’, Journal of Modern African Studies 49:2 (2011), p. 224. 13 Interview 40b: Tongun Lado Rombe, Chairman of the Bari Community Association / Juba / 25 August 2008. 11 12

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Community Association’ or ‘BCA’ to refer to claims made on behalf of the wider Bari community by BCA leaders.

The CES Government The CES Government was composed of bureaucrats and political leaders – Bari and non-Bari – who had worked in the former Bahr el Jebel State Government. Many of these individuals were former NCP members. They had been educated in Juba or Khartoum, and trained in the legal and bureaucratic systems of the north. Some were former members of SAF, the police or prisons system. What is more, given the sustained backlash against SPLM supporters in Juba following the 1992 attempts to take the town, it is likely that most of the CES Government leaders who were in power at the time of the CPA had not been SPLM/A, or at least not part of an active resistance against Khartoum’s representatives in the town. Despite perceptions among some non-Bari Equatorians that the Bahr el Jebel State Government, and its predecessor the Equatoria Region Government, had historically been dominated by Bari, the CES Government was populated by officials from various Equatorian groups. Notably, it was led by Governor Clement Wani, and several members of his cabinet were Mundari. It is important to note that political differences existed between Bari and non-Bari leaders, especially with respect to land issues in Juba. The SPLM-led Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) The CPA stipulated a power-sharing quota not only for GoNU, but also for GoSS, mandating the inclusion of opposition parties – southern parties as well as the NCP – in the new southern government. However, in the early transition period, the SPLM dominated both government and governance in Southern Sudan. Therefore, in the discussions surrounding land, the position of GoSS was largely synonymous with that of the SPLM leadership. Within this cohort there is some significant internal differentiation. Firstly, there are several prominent Equatorian and Bari SPLM leaders, the highest ranking being Lt General James Wani Igga, a Southern Bari and Speaker of the Southern Sudan legislative Assembly. Other senior leaders include General Thomas Cirillo, a Bari from Rejaf and Commander of the Joint Integrated Units in Juba; and GoSS leaders GoSS leaders Theopholis Ochang, Samuel Abujohn, George Kinga, Festo Kumba, Luka Manoja, and Jemma Nunu Kumba. These individuals had to balance the desire to protect the rights and traditions of their Equatorian communities and to aid the SPLM in its state-building efforts. Moreover, the SPLM’s reconciliation efforts resulted in former NCP members being integrated into the institutions of GoSS. The most prominent Equatorian who was integrated into the SPLM just before the CPA was CES Governor Clement Wani. He and other integrated NCP members did not necessarily share the SPLM agenda in terms of rights to and authority over land in Juba. They had to balance the SPLM agenda against their individual personal views on land in Juba.

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COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CPA WITH RESPECT TO LAND IN JUBA The Bari community, the leaders of the CES Government, and the SPLM leaders of GoSS interpreted the CPA’s acknowledgements of community rights to land in distinct ways that promoted their respective agendas. These competing views exposed distinct aspirations for the decentralized post-conflict state, reflecting the dividing lines of the war as well as new dynamics engendered by the transition process. To the Bari, the CPA’s reference to ‘community’ in conversations and public statements regarding land in and around Juba referred exclusively to the Bari peoples and their traditional and civic associations. However, in the view of nonBari CES Government leaders, ‘community’ meant the Bari people as represented by the CES Government. Governor Wani and other state leaders maintained that the appropriate and legal way for land to be allocated was for the CES Government to act as an intermediary throughout the state, surveying land, demarcating plots, and allocating them on a leasehold basis.14 In this interpretation, land belonged to the Bari community but was controlled by the CES Government, whose constituency also included the other groups and communities of Central Equatoria State, such as the Mundari, Kakwa, and Lotuko, many of whom were significantly represented in the town’s population. Thus, Bari chiefs did not have the authority to allocate and manage land without the state’s involvement.15 Amidst an influx of newcomers, CES Government leaders had little political leverage with the new SPLM-led GoSS except for the Bari people’s claim to community rights over land in the peri-urban areas surrounding Juba. SPLM leaders acknowledged the rights of Southern Sudan’s communities to lands held under customary law, and in that respect they also espoused a somewhat narrow conceptualization of ‘community’, but they argued that the interests of communities had to be balanced with the interests of Southern Sudanese citizens as a whole. In Juba, that meant that GoSS needed access to land in order to build a capital city that was available to all of the citizens of Southern Sudan. In making this case, their conceptualization of ‘community’ rights increasingly encompassed the needs and interests of all Southern Sudanese.

The views of the Bari leaders For the Bari, as for many other groups in Southern Sudan, land holds important spiritual and political value. Authority over communally-held land reinforces political structures, maintains social institutions, and contributes to community cohesion. On an ideological level, it embodies 14 Interview 21: Clement Wani Konga, Governor of Central Equatoria State / Juba / 6 September 2006; Interview 26: Emmanuel Waga Elia, CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 22 July 2008. 15 Interview 28: Cornelious Goja Lado Kulang, Director-General of Lands, CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 27 August 2008; Interview 31: Robert Lado Loki, Chairman of the Southern Sudan Land Commission / Juba / 7 August 2008.

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the identity of communities. Control over land also offers political and economic protection during periods of change. This is particularly important in cases where the state is not a reliable source of protection. In such contexts, autochthony discourses employed in legitimating land claims reflect communities’ attempts to survive in precarious situations. Indeed, land debates may mask concerns over the destabilizing processes unleashed by the expanding presence of the state.16 In the context of a history of extractive, violent, and external states, they demonstrate rational strategies on the part of local community leaders. Over the years, the colonial territorialization of identity had become so ingrained among the Bari that it was viewed as natural. Chief Denis Daramolo put it matter-of-factly: ‘That land which is around Juba here is Bari land. It belongs to the Bari community’.17 A Bari Catholic priest articulated a similar view, implying a primordial link: This land in Juba belongs to the tribe of the Bari; the land is ours. The land has always belonged to the Bari. The land of Dinka belongs to the Dinka. The land of the Nuer belongs to Nuer. Whosoever is in that place, that is their land.18

The institution that was the focus of collective rights to land in the postCPA period was the chieftaincy. Chief Denis had a more reasoned justification for Bari claims to land, one which acknowledged the colonial roots of Bari land rights, but nevertheless maintained that these rights in some sense pre-dated the colonial demarcation of boundaries, and therefore were beyond question. He argued, ‘Me being a chief of course I am responsible for the land, because I cannot control the people without the land. The land is under me’.19 He linked conceptualizations of ‘community’ rights to land in Southern Sudan, and by extension his authority, to ‘government’, and acknowledged that this linkage was rooted in colonial history: All the land in Southern Sudan is under the community… During the time of [the] British these borders were made, but these things have been there before. You cannot be a chief without knowing your border with the other chief. [In fact] the land which somebody may say is ‘no man’s land’, this land belongs to the community. The borders are sometimes mountains, sometimes big trees, or even the hills. This is how the borders are known by our people…20

Taken together, such statements implied that the Bari’s rights to the lands surrounding Juba were an ancient, primordial entitlement, one that was beyond challenge. Among Bari elites the dominant view was that the CPA vindicated the long-held practices of communal land tenure in Bari villages. In Chief Denis’ view, insofar as the CPA was acknowledging the Leonardi, ‘Paying “buckets of blood” for the land’. Interview 64: Denis Daramalo, Bari Chief of Tokiman; Paramount Chief of Juba / Juba / August 2008. 18 Interview 39: Monsignor Constantino Pitya Aguata / Juba / 5 August 2008. 19 Interview 64: Denis Daramalo, Bari Chief of Tokiman; Paramount Chief of Juba / Juba / August 2008. 20 Ibid. 16 17

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existing reality and practice of land tenure, something which had been in operation since the colonial period, and before. He explained, ‘The land since that time [the colonial period] was under the community up to today’.21 The Bari chiefs and elders interpreted the CPA to mean that land in Juba and the surrounding area was exclusively the domain of their customary laws and community structures: ‘the CPA came out with the system of our ancestors…that we in the Southern Sudan our land is under our communities’. What had been changed by the CPA, in his view, was that these rights were now acknowledged by law, and could be protected. The views of Bari elites were not homogenous, however. While some Bari leaders believed that ‘community’ ownership of land extended to all areas of the town, including those already gazetted by the government, most held a more moderate view that the CPA affirmed the rights of the Bari to lands only outside these areas.22 For example, BCA Chairman Tongun claimed that various areas that had been gazetted by the previous government without consultation or compensation should be returned to the ‘communities’ – in this case meaning the sub-chieftaincies that originally resided on the land.25 It is important to note that historically the territories of the Bari, as other groups in Equatoria, were under the control of clans. Thus, neither chiefs nor civic associations can make the claim of having authority over land based on historical precedent.24 Chief Denis viewed the CES Government as facilitating the process of land management, but also saw the leaders of the particular sub-chieftaincy as the ultimate decision-makers in land allocations. He stated, ‘Our government always wants land, but now they have to ask. We will give them the land, so that they can build their institutions’.25 Positioning the Bari as distinct from, if not overtly opposed to, the northern government, he added, ‘During the time when our brothers in the northern Sudan were with us here, still we did not let them to take over our land’.26 The Chairman of the BCA similarly viewed the power of the CES Government over land allocation as limited to providing documentation and maintaining land transactions records. The ‘community’ would decide whether to give land, and the CES Government would validate the allocation with paperwork. He explained, The land belongs to the state [CES] administratively. Administratively the land is theirs. [What that means] is that, first of all if an investor comes to me and I take him to Rejaf or to Luri or Jebel Lado, automatically after our agreement he will

Ibid. There are clear boundaries of the gazetted areas of Juba, but as yet extend the town’s borders roughly north to Tonpging, East to Gumbo, West to Munuki and Gudele, and south to Kator. 23 Interview 40b: Tongun Lado Rombe, Chairman of the Bari Community Association / Juba / 25 August 2008. 24 Clans in South Sudan continue to maintain a spiritual role as guardians of the land even when the land is no longer in their possession. Leonardi, ‘Paying “buckets of blood” for the land’, p. 224. 25 Interview 40b: Tongun Lado Rombe, Chairman of the Bari Community Association / Juba / 25 August 2008. 26 Ibid. 21 22

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come and do the lease with the government. It is not the community who will give the lease….They [the CES Government] control the lease.27

A Bari Catholic priest argued, ‘The government cannot just take land [as it pleases]. The government must come out with a programme, and then [after discussing it] the people will say, “OK we give you land wherever you want”’.30 Chief Denis described the process by which he envisioned that customary control over land would operate: If someone wants land, then they will come to me. And then I will go to the community and say, “OK, these investors want [a piece of] land,” and then [the community has to] agree. And then I will ask the Development Committee to go show them a place that has been agreed by the community. From there they will come and make a Memorandum of Understanding about that particular area. Then when the area has been promised to them, they process the documents for handling that land with the state government [CES]. Because they need to be registered also so that the investors will [be] satisfied that really this land given to them is registered in a legal way.29

In speaking about GoSS and rights to land, Bari leaders referred to ‘government’. Implicit in the term was a specific attitude towards the state, rooted in the history of successive external, violent, and extractive states. Given the experiences of violence and predation under both colonial and post-colonial governments, and in particular that of wartime occupation in Juba, it is not surprising that Bari leaders had little expectation of different treatment from the SPLM-led state. On the contrary, few Bari leaders believed that GoSS would look out for the specific interests of the Bari community, or to protect their rights to land in the area. Bari leaders insisted that leaving land allocation under the control of Bari community institutions would not jeopardize the development needs of Southern Sudan. According to the BCA Chairman, the Bari were happy to release land for urban development, provided that ‘good policies’ were put in place to protect the people who had surrendered it.30 The CES Government would have to compensate the Bari community financially and politically for their contribution of land to the various levels of government in Central Equatoria State. In mid–2008 the Bari Community Association delivered a list of conditions for land allocation to the CES Government. These included a guarantee that the community would be given one-third of all plots created out of land acquired from Bari subchieftaincies, ten per cent of revenues from the lease of land (as well as annual tax proceeds from leased land), and assurances that at the end of the lease, and provided the lessee did not want to extend his arrangeInterview 40b: Tongun Lado Rombe, Chairman of the Bari Community Association / Juba / 25 August 2008. 28 Interview 39: Monsignor Constantino Pitya Aguata / Juba / 5 August 2008. 29 Interview 64: Denis Daramalo, Bari Chief of Tokiman; Paramount Chief of Juba / Juba / August 2008. 30 Interview 40b: Tongun Lado Rombe, Chairman of the Bari Community Association / Juba / 25 August 2008. 27

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ments, the land and its fixed assets would revert to Bari community ownership.31 Asking the community for land was important because it acknowledged the authority of the community’s political structures. Beyond outlining their requirements for land allocation, the BCA lobbied the CES Government, both the Governor’s office and the CES Assembly, to have the CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure and the CES Director-General of Land be exclusively chosen from the Bari community. The Chairman of the BCA accused individual members of the CES Government of handling the allocations for their personal benefit. The land is Bariland. We, the Bari community, have given the Minister [of Physical Infrastructure] our conditions as to how we are to give land. First, yes the land is ours, we must be consulted. Number two, after consultation we must be represented in land administration, in land allocation, and in land surveying [in the Ministry of Physical Infrastructure of the CES Government]. So that our people, our villages are not affected [by detrimental land practices]….Because other people here are playing with land. They don’t consult, they get a big chunk of land and they divide it illegally, without notification. Other people, they take investors into the villages and they get that big money without the community’s knowledge, without the community benefiting. This government of ours! The [CES] government. This is what we rejected [in 2007].32

While Bari leaders – chiefs, civil society representatives, and members of the CES Government – acknowledged that the central part of Juba town had been gazetted by previous governments dating back to the colonial period, they insisted that the lands in the peri-urban areas of Juba and in the outskirts of the town were still held under customary law. They conceded that Sudanese citizens had the right to live anywhere in Southern Sudan, but they emphasized that non-Bari who settled in the surrounding areas were considered guests who would have to abide by the customs and norms of the Bari. This last point was directed specifically at the Dinka and other pastoralist groups, and it referred to the practice of ‘land grabbing’ by ex-SPLM/A officers.33 The Bari priest explained, ‘If I have to go to another tribe I cannot build as I want. I will have to go to the chief and the elders of that place and ask if I can have a piece of land’.34 He added that Bari communities had given and would continue to give land to both the CES Government and GoSS, but he insisted that some areas were off limits to development, including sacred mountains, village sites, and areas essential for agriculture, such as fertile riverbanks.35

The views of CES Government leaders Equatorian leaders of the CES Government, whose constituency also included the many other groups and communities of Central Equatoria State, had a much broader view than the chiefs of the CES Government’s responInterview 40b: Tongun Lado Rombe, Chairman of the Bari Community Association / Juba / 25 August 2008. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Interview 39: Monsignor Constantino Pitya Aguata / Juba / 5 August 2008. 35 Ibid. 31

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sibilities regarding land. In interviews, public speeches, and news media statements, CES Government officials maintained that the CPA deemed land management to be the purview of the state government.36 They invoked the CPA to position themselves as intermediaries between the Bari community and the GoSS in all land matters. Robert Lado, Chairman of the Southern Sudan Land Commission, stated, ‘GoSS got the land it has now by going through the CES Government, and the CES Government had to speak to the community, the chiefs’.37 He and other CES Government leaders maintained that if GoSS or any organization required land for development, they would have to request it from the CES Government.38 The latter would then negotiate with the Bari community for the land, survey it, demarcate plots, and finally allocate them on a leasehold basis. As long as GoSS rights to acquire land compulsorily were tied up in debates over interpretations of the CPA, the SPLM-led GoSS was beholden to the CES Government and Bari leaders to provide it with land for its projects. While acknowledging that the lack of land laws meant the process was somewhat ad hoc, Governor Wani maintained that until land legislation stating otherwise was passed through the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, the appropriate and legal way for land to be allocated was for the CES Government to act as an intermediary in all matters related to land throughout Central Equatoria State.39 Although non-Bari Equatorian leaders and Bari leaders were in agreement on the need to stem the influx of outsiders and to retain the cultural character of the town, they did not have a shared view of the CES Government’s role in land allocation. Governor Clement Wani and other non-Bari CES Government leaders rejected the idea that role of the CES Government in land allocation and management should be limited to administrative duties and record keeping. Non-Bari CES Government leaders argued that the role of Bari chiefs was simply to give consent to CES Government officials acting as go-betweens with GoSS and investors; they could not allocate or register land. Southern Sudan Land Commission Chairman Robert Lado emphasized the community’s dependence on the CES Government for services: A community cannot live in isolation, a community needs security from the government whether GoSS or the [state] government. The community needs service, fresh water; they need schools; they need hospitals. All this – hospitals, schools and roads, are run by the government, so the government should impress on the community the importance of this service.40

CPA Chapter 2, Part 5, Schedule C. Interview 31: Robert Lado Loki, Chairman of the Southern Sudan Land Commission / Juba / 7 August 2008. 38 Ibid. and Interview 26: Emmanuel Waga Elia, CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 22 July 2008; Interview 28: Cornelious Goja Lado Kulang, Director-General of Lands, CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 27 August 2008. 39 Interview 21: Clement Wani Konga, Governor of Central Equatoria State / Juba / 6 September 2006. 40 Interview 31: Robert Lado Loki, Chairman of the Southern Sudan Land Commission / Juba / 7 August 2008. 36 37

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While the BCA Chairman accused individual CES Government members of illegally allocating land in the areas surrounding Juba for their personal benefit, CES leaders in turn accused Bari chiefs of the same practice. Cornelious Goja Lado Kulang, the CES Director-General of Land, and a Mundari, acknowledged that there had been instances of Bari chiefs leasing land to ‘investors’ seeking to set up restaurants, hotels, housing developments, breweries, or other businesses without going through the CES Government.41 He characterized this and all other instances of Bari chieftaincies and sub-chieftaincies directly allocating land as a form of ‘land grabbing’, which the CES Government would not condone. The message was clear: only the CES Government had the authority to allocate and manage land in Central Equatoria State and CES Government leaders would challenge any ‘irregular’ allocations.42 Furthermore, while some Bari elites wanted to renegotiate the land that had been gazetted by the previous government without the consent of the community or with any compensation for the land, CES Government leaders made a clear distinction between land within the town boundaries and land in the periphery of Juba that had not been gazetted. The Director-General of Land maintained that all land within the town’s borders was ‘owned’ by the CES Government, and was therefore not subject to Bari customary laws: ‘The gazetted area belongs to the [CES] government, no one has the right to say this is my land, because once a piece of land has been gazetted, you have no rights [over it anymore], you have to apply to the [CES] government so that you are given a plot’.43 In his view, the Bari had misunderstood the CPA as having changed the extant system of land management. He argued, ‘In fact what triggered problems on land is the misunderstanding of the CPA. Even areas that were planned and distributed in the early 1990s are being claimed by the Bari community now. So it is a problem’.44 A local government official stated, People in Juba know there is a stipulation in the CPA that lands belong to the community. Now the Bari community have decided to hold land that was released long ago… they won’t release land to GoSS. There is lots of politicking. [Perhaps] CES will move its capital to Yei. If not, then the GoSS will move to Ramceil or away from Juba. Or one government goes east of river, and one stays here [in Juba].45

The CES involvement in the land debate was closely related to the issue of decentralization and the special status of Juba as the capital of both levels of government. The debate about land rights provided an opportunity for advocating for regional rights, and of promoting a genuine devolution of 41 Interview 28: Cornelious Goja Lado Kulang, Director-General of Lands, CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 27 August 2008. 42 Ibid., and Interview 26: Emmanuel Waga Elia, CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 22 July 2008. 43 Interview 28: Cornelious Goja Lado Kulang, Director-General of Lands, CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 27 August 2008. 44 Ibid. 45 Interview 86: Elijah, Land Commissioner, Juba Payam / Juba / 2 September 2006.

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authority under the decentralized system. The Chairman of the Southern Sudan Land Commission explained: You know, sometimes the different levels of government don’t look at the schedule [of powers in the Constitution]. Land allocation according to the CPA falls under the [CES Government]. The level of government that is close to the Bari community and the Government of Southern Sudan is the Central Equatoria State Government. The Government of Southern Sudan is not involved in implementation. The Central Equatoria State Government is the one that is supposed to open dialogue with the communities.46

Claiming authority over land in Juba gave the CES Government a prominent role in urban reconstruction, and access to an economically and politically lucrative resource that would shape not only the future of the town, but of the Southern Sudanese regional state.

The views of SPLM leaders The views of SPLM leaders stood in stark contrast to those of both the Bari and the CES Government. SPLM leaders were keenly aware of GoSS’ needs for land in urban reconstruction, and concerned about the challenges of embarking on complex state-building that was hampered by a land allocation process that had to contend with customary laws and traditional institutions. They argued that the priorities of communities should be balanced with the requirements of state-building, and that the intended articles on land had not been to empower one community in Southern Sudan vis-à-vis the state, but rather it was a strategy to protect Southern Sudanese citizens as a whole. During negotiations on the Wealth-sharing Protocol in Naivaisha, Kenya in 2004, SPLM leaders had attempted to incorporate specific protections of lands held under customary law in order to reverse the de jure land alienation that had occurred in the previous decades, and also to protect the south from the central government in the future. GoSS Minister of Energy and Mining Jon Luk, a senior SPLM negotiator during talks in Naivaisha explained, ‘We went for the negotiations with this background in mind… the fear of northern encroachment on southern lands, and the alteration of borders that had [already] been done’.47 The aim of giving southern Sudan’s communities rights to their communal lands, he argued, was to give them a basis for economic survival: Land is the most important asset that communities have. Once you have the land then you cannot be totally impoverished. A community cannot be totally impoverished. It can survive on the land.48

Chief Justice of the Southern Sudan Supreme Court, Ruben Madol, a former SPLM lawyer, insisted that the protection of community rights was based on the SPLM’s wartime ideology: 46 Interview 31: Robert Lado Loki, Chairman of the Southern Sudan Land Commission / Juba / 7 August 2008. 47 Interview 17: John Luk Jok, GoSS Minister of Energy and Mining / Juba / 10 September 2008. 48 Ibid.

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Issues of land ownership, of customary rules on land, these were at the heart of the SPLM political manifesto…That had been the position of the SPLM throughout the struggle, and this defined the ownership of land according to the SPLM. And therefore from that position, there followed the principle that customary rules would be the most appropriate legal tools to regulate land.49

Yet SPLM leaders made a distinction between the land in towns and throughout the rest of Southern Sudan. GoSS Minister John Luk pointed out that statutory legislation had ‘never really operated in the south (save for a few towns)’: When we went for the negotiations, our position was that the land belongs to the communities that occupy those lands. This has been the pattern of settlement even during the colonial period…that each tribal group has its own lands. There was little interference by the government except the towns where you have the government administration. But beyond the towns, the communities had freedom to exercise their rights on those lands…either for fishing, for grazing, for cultivation, or agriculture. These lands were communally held by the respective communities.50

The NCP wanted to preserve statutory land laws that ensured the central government’s rights over all land in the country except those areas that were leased to individuals by the government.51 In the end, the SPLM and the NCP were unable to come to an agreement. According to an advisor at the GoSS Ministry of Constitutional and Legal Affairs, ‘The compromise was to leave the issue of land to various levels of government’.52 Rather than addressing disputes regarding the ownership of land and natural resources, the CPA provided for the establishment of Land Commissions at the national and Southern Sudan levels, which would, in concert with legislators, address the need for land tenure reform. Although they stopped short of the guarantee of rights that the SPLM had sought, the CPA and the subsequent Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan recognized the legitimacy of ‘traditional’ authorities and customary laws, acknowledged the rights of Southern Sudan’s ‘communities’ to land, and promised a ‘process’ whereby rights stemming from ‘customary laws and practices’ could be negotiated.53 This was enough to engender vibrant debates about authority over land in Juba. Although the divided local history of the first Southern Regional Government was a concern for the SPLM leadership in the run-up to the CPA, they had not given much thought to how the new framework of land rights would affect urban development in Juba. According to SPLM Lawyer and GoSS Minister of Energy and Mining, during CPA negotiations, discussions as to how community rights to land would work in practice, and the impact of such tenurial arrangements on the state-building process, were 49 Interview 3b: Ruben Madol, Justice, Supreme Court of Southern Sudan / Juba / August 2008. 50 Interview 17: John Luk Jok, GoSS Minister of Energy and Mining / Juba / 10 September 2008. 51 Even in urban centers land titles were based on a leasehold system. 52 Interview 20: Deng Biong, Legal Advisor, GoSS Ministry of Constitutional and Legal Affairs / Juba / 7 August 2008. 53 CPA Chapter 3, Article 2, 2.1 & 2.5; ICSS Article 180, Sections 5–6.

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‘overshadowed by the fear that communities might be dispossessed of their lands’.54 The SPLM team believed that once the CPA was signed, the communities would themselves make the appropriate land laws for Southern Sudan. Luk acknowledged that much was left undefined by the CPA, and indicated that a lot of hope was put into a future land policy: We thought that soon after the agreement, when we set up ourselves as a government, then [we could address them]. We though that in the Interim Period, we would come up with a clear land policy that takes into account all the rights of the communities as well as the need for government to have control over and utilization of the land. And that is why there is a land commission.55

While the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, ratified in December 2005, made a more explicit mention of local land rights, it also left the issue of land undefined: All lands traditionally and historically held or used by local communities or their members shall be defined, held, managed and protected by law in Southern Sudan…Communities and persons enjoying rights in land shall be consulted and their views duly taken into account in decisions to develop subterranean natural resources in the area in which they have rights; they shall share in the benefits of that development.56

The Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan acknowledges an unspecified role for customary law and states that the communities should be consulted. However it has left much room for interpretation by the GoSS Assembly, the Southern Sudan Judiciary, and the Southern Sudan Land Commission, the purpose of which was to arbitrate on land disputes and to advise on land issues. The Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan was drafted by a team composed mainly of senior SPLM members from a legal background and was supported by the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law in Germany.57 As a member of the team that drafted the constitution, Chief Justice Madol recalled that while there were discussions about how to integrate human rights law and customary systems,58 the committee did not discuss how the articles on land would impact GoSS-led urban development in Juba, or how they might impact processes of land allocation in the Interim Period. He explained, ‘Allocation of land for development purposes, and the community perspective in the way of 54 Interview 17: John Luk Jok, GoSS Minister of Energy and Mining / Juba / 10 September 2008. 55 Ibid. 56 Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, Article 180, Sections 5–6. 57 The Committee was headed by Michael Makwei, who was the Commissioner for Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development of the SPLM, and was later appointed to be the GoSS Minister for Constitutional and Legal Affairs. Luka Biong, who was later appointed to be the Minister for Cabinet Affairs, acted as the rapporteur for the Committee. Also included on the committee were John Luk, Ruben Madol, Peter Kok, and Awot Deng. 58 Interview 3b: Ruben Madol, Justice, Supreme Court of Southern Sudan / Juba / August 2008.

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development were not so clear at the time that we were discussing and drafting the constitution’.59 He maintained that they did not anticipate that there would be an incompatibility between community interests and the interests of GoSS: But even then, the belief was that we cannot magically distinguish community interest from the [regional] state interest, or for that matter development cannot be seen to be serving any interest other than the community interests. So the [possibility that] communities would be anti-development, simply because they feel that they have a right over land, was not an issue that was contemplated at the time.60

In various public and private meetings, SPLM leaders attempted to counter the growing view that the CPA had endowed rights to land in communities. During a special public session on the land issue in Juba at the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly in August 2008, Speaker Wani Igga stated, There is no article in the CPA which says that land belongs to the community. It is not there. Yes, it was the negotiating position of the SPLM, mainly because of the inhuman displacement of our people, particularly in the oil areas. But the other side rejected it, so it was not agreed. So that article is not in the CPA, but it is in our minds and in our spirit. That is the problem. Of course it is not that we must rob land from the communities… that will only antagonize them, and be used to divide us.61

GoSS Minister John Luk openly acknowledged that the ‘spirit of the discussion was that land belongs to the community’, yet he was careful to point out that there had not been a decisive decision in terms of law: It does not actually state that “land belongs to the community” in the agreement. We didn’t agree on that. At best you could say the issue was left [to be determined at a later date]. The middle way was to agree that the utilization and usage could be concurrent, and that the government would then look [at the issue of how to] regulate land. In doing so we will take into account the customary and traditional rights of communities. What are these traditional and customary rights to land by the communities? These are to be ascertained and taken into account in the process of trying to develop a land policy and a land law….Until that is done we have a problem…It was not just a blanket policy that “all land belongs to the community”, no.62

The GoSS position was that land in Juba, as in other towns, fell under the authority of GoSS, and was thus outside the purview of the customary land tenure system.63 Therefore, no traditional claims for lands within urban centre could exist or apply. Minister Luk explained, Ibid. Ibid. 61 Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, Public session: ‘Urgent and important matter on allocation of land in Juba to beneficiaries’, Juba, 11 August 2008. 62 Interview 17: John Luk Jok, GoSS Minister of Energy and Mining / Juba / 10 September 2008. 63 Report of the Ministerial Committee of the Government of Southern Sudan on the Status of Juba as the Capital City of Southern Sudan and the Seat of Government of Southern Sudan. Meeting No. 9, 4 May 2006. 59 60

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A city like Juba is not a community area. It is an urban area. This has been the capital of the south for many many years. Juba has to have a town plan where plots are mapped out and distributed to individuals irrespective of where they come from. Not necessarily [to] people who were originally from this place, but anyone who has come to be a resident in Juba can apply for a plot and get them.64

He contended that while the SPLM leadership wanted to preserve the rights of communities to their traditional homelands, their intention had not been to create a southern government without any powers over land: Yes, the spirit of the discussion was that land belongs to the community, but what was meant was not that communities are fully in charge and therefore you have a landless government. We could not have contemplated that we would have a landless government. Government also [has to] have land. Which lands are government lands? Which lands are community lands? Who is defining this? It is defined through the legislative bodies, the parliament, the government making the policy. This becomes now the real land policy, land tenure and land utilization. This is how it will come up. It doesn’t come up by the people saying, “Oh the government has no land, all lands belong to the community”. This is not what was meant.65

SPLM leaders used the language of development to make their claims to authority over land in Juba. In Madol’s view, GoSS interests in the land in Juba were on behalf of the community: I wouldn’t think that there can be any difference between the position of the government, whether it’s at the level of the [CES Government] or at the level of GoSS, [as to] having an interest other than the interest of the community when it seeks to use this land for development, for the betterment of their community. To the extent that people say [GoSS] is grabbing land, it gives the impression that [GoSS] is actually interfering with ownership of the land to the detriment of the community, which is not the case. That is not what [GoSS] can be seen to be doing. [GoSS] for genuine development needs, in order to improve the conditions of the people of Southern Sudan, which in fact is what the whole war was fought for, needs to use this land for the community….GoSS is actually using the land for the betterment of the people.66

Luk added that the uses of land in Southern Sudan were not limited to ‘traditional and customary use, or subsistence food production’, but that land was an important commercial commodity, essential for promoting ‘investment projects and industrialization’.67 The debate over land was intimately connected to others on decentralization and political jurisdiction, and all culminated in competing claims to the capital. SPLM leaders argued that GoSS had the prerogative above all other levels of government to any land in the town that 64 Interview 17: John Luk Jok, GoSS Minister of Energy and Mining / Juba / 10 September 2008. 65 Ibid. 66 Interview 3b: Ruben Madol, Justice, Supreme Court of Southern Sudan / Juba / August 2008. 67 Interview 17: John Luk Jok, GoSS Minister of Energy and Mining / Juba / 10 September 2008.

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was not under customary law.68 This meant that all the land in Juba and other southern towns was under the control of GoSS, which could then designate specific responsibilities in the process of land management, such as leasing out parcels of land to individuals, to be handled at lower levels of government, SPLM leaders claimed that as the capital of Southern Sudan, Juba had a special status, and should be managed by GoSS and available to all of the citizens of Southern Sudan.69 Minister John Luk explained, Now Juba has become a dual capital, a capital for the two levels of government, which is an issue that is not yet really resolved. No one government is in charge of it. The real issue would be defining what are the limits of this town… if there is expansion [and] the town stretches into tribally held land, then still the government can acquire that. The government has the power of eminent domain; it could acquire those lands so long as it pays compensation to anybody who is affected…The owners are compensated and they will get another land somewhere…Governments do this kind of thing.70

Representatives of the CES Government, on the other hand, argued that Juba was part of the local government structure outlined in the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan and fell under the authority of CES Government, not GoSS.71 The problem was how to determine the exact boundaries of the town. Although attempts had been made to determine the borders of the municipality, in particular during the 1970s, firm boundaries had never been established, and the town had continued to expand on an ad-hoc basis.72 In 2006, the only existing map of Juba was mounted in a frame hung on a wall of the Survey Department. GoSS leaders protested that the land issue was not only inhibiting urban reconstruction, but also the state-building process. SPLM leaders argued that the CES Government was hindering development by not making land in and around Juba available for investment.73 They claimed that the allotment of land by the CES Government was selective and lacked transparency.74 In a speech in November 2007 at the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, SPLM Member and CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Alikaya Aligo Samson, argued: This maxim of “lands belong to the People” has grossly served as a blank check in the hands of the remaining three parameters of our land predicaments particularly in Juba, namely hooliganism and vandalism, land grabbing and the

Report of the Ministerial Committee of the Government of Southern Sudan; Interview 3b: Ruben Madol, Justice, Supreme Court of Southern Sudan / Juba / August 2008. 69 Interview 3b: Ruben Madol, Justice, Supreme Court of Southern Sudan / Juba / August 2008. 70 Interview 17: John Luk Jok, GoSS Minister of Energy and Mining, Juba / 10 September 2008. 71 Report of the Ministerial Committee of the Government of Southern Sudan. 72 Interview 28: Cornelious Goja Lado Kulang, Director-General of Lands, CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 27 August 2008. 73 Work Plan and Strategic Policy of the Ministry of Physical Infrastructure Central Equatoria State (CES), presented by Minister Alikaya Aligo Samson. November 2007. 74 Ibid. 68

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unscrupulous land speculators… The Central Equatoria State executive and legislature organs need to immediately take decisions that can adversely remedy or reduce the negative impact of this verse especially in Juba, where demand on land is greater now than ever before.75

Minister Luk similarly saw claims to ‘community’ rights in land as detrimental to ‘development policies’ such as housing development and infrastructure projects: The claim of the community land has become so strong. Some of the elite members of society want to get interests out of this problem by inciting communities, [claiming] that “land belongs to you; no development project can be done unless you say it; this cannot be done unless you yourself authorizes it, or unless you get this or that”….to the extent that it is impeding government development policies.76

There was no avoiding the fact that as its population grew, the town would need to expand beyond its boundaries into Bari lands held under customary law, but SPLM leaders tried to characterize themselves as pursuing the best interests of all in the town and region. Chief Justice Madol argued, GoSS needs to use this land for the community for genuine development needs, in order to improve the conditions of the people of Southern Sudan, which in fact is what the whole war was fought for … GoSS is actually using the land for the betterment of the people.77

In an interview given while the jurisdictional dispute between GoSS and CES was at its peak in the summer of 2006, Speaker Wani Igga argued that GoSS could not render services and development without authority over land. He said, ‘a government without land powers is a paralyzed government’.78 SPLM leaders put their faith in the institutions of the new state. They pushed for the drafting a Land Bill, which they argued was urgently needed to clarify the CPA and the rights of Southern Sudanese communities in land. In his speech at the second inauguration of the GoSS Assembly in 2006, Wani Igga stated: ‘All that is needed is land law – which binds everybody and will clarify the CPA’.79 Two years later, at a speech in the Assembly, Wani Igga reiterated the call for laws: ‘With or without the presence of that article in the CPA, we definitely need a law. It is the only exit out of this mess! Whether it is in the CPA or not’.80 John Work Plan and Strategic Policy of the Ministry of Physical Infrastructure… Interview 17: John Luk Jok, GoSS Minister of Energy and Mining / Juba / 10 September 2008. 77 Interview 3b: Ruben Madol, Justice, Supreme Court of Southern Sudan / Juba / August 2008. 78 Interview 8: James Wani Igga, Speaker of the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, Lt Gen (Retd) SPLA / Juba / 2 September 2006. 79 Speech by Speaker James Wani Igga at inauguration of 2nd session of Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, Juba, 6 September 2006. 80 ‘Urgent and important matter on allocation of land in Juba to beneficiaries’, Juba, Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, Public session, 11 August 2008. 75 76

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Luk explained that land legislation needed to be brought up to date in line with the needs and requirements of the state-building process in Southern Sudan: There is supposed to be a law that is to be enacted that is to define which lands are government lands, which lands are traditional lands, or lands in which the communities have customary or traditional rights. It is the law to define this… And you will also look at the role of customary law vis-à-vis modern legislation, because I don’t think one can live in the past in terms of land tenure. We have to address the issue of land tenure, taking into account the responsibilities of the [CES Government]…of [GoSS]. So this was what was meant [in the CPA]: that we need land policies and land legislation that will recognize some of the traditional rights, and customary land rights of communities.81

Yet, given the multiple interpretations of the CPA it was not at all clear that a Land Act or land policy would resolve the disputes over land and political jurisdiction in Juba.

CONCLUSION The differing interpretations of the articles on land tenure in the CPA espoused by SPLM leaders in GoSS, Equatorian leaders in the CES Government, and Bari community leaders corresponded to differing agendas for urban reconstruction, and amounted to strategies for realizing specific aims to that effect. Bari leaders used land to preserve the authority of their traditional institutions, to keep a distance from the state in the local sphere, and to mitigate the harmful effects of the state-led urban reconstruction plans. Their interests were parochial; they saw themselves as the true Jubans, and wanted to exercise control over the nature and scope of change in the town through their traditional authority structures and civic association. But they were not merely spoilers opposed to reconstruction. By demanding to be consulted, the Bari demonstrated that they wanted to be involved in the process of building the regional state. For CES Government leaders, the debate about land rights provided an avenue for advocating regional and local rights, and of promoting a genuine devolution of authority under the decentralized system. The Equatorian leaders of the CES Government wanted to maintain the town’s regional character as their own political base. Lacking resources and connections to the aid community, the only way that the CES Government could wield influence over the reconstruction process was by representing the Bari’s rights to land in the town and surrounding areas. Yet the CES too should not be viewed as singularly interested in promoting its own power. On the contrary, the CES could only have power within the framework of a decentralized state and so the successful building of a state was in its leaders’ interests. They sole aim was to ensure that decentralization delivered meaningful devolution of power to the state level. 81 Interview 17: John Luk Jok, GoSS Minister of Energy and Mining / Juba / 10 September 2008.

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SPLM leaders viewed land in terms of their development agenda. They sought to create of a ‘modern’, multi-ethnic capital city that would represent the diverse populations of Southern Sudan and propel the economic development of the entire region. They were adamant that GoSS’ role in land management was important to the reconstruction of the south. Chief Justice Madol argued that all of the confusion demonstrated a need for the dissemination of the CPA and ‘for people to be made aware of the meaning of the positions of the constitution’.82 What was required, he maintained, was ‘to make the people here understand that the government is not going to take their land from them, but rather to make use of the land for their own benefit. This message has not been sufficiently given to people’.83 Yet, a Juba University professor reflected on the discourse of ‘development’ employed by GoSS and CES Government leaders: So when we unpackage that question, “for development”. Whose development? Is it an entrepreneur; is it a government? But just remember when you say government of GoSS and the Central Equatoria State Government it is not in the sense that some formal government institution has made this decision, but players who play double roles. They are in their own right personalities who know the process of acquiring and dispensing of property and stuff like that, so the position is used to give them that right leverage to do what they want to.84

The implication was that priorities for development were different, and self-interest was also a factor underlying the complicated politics of land in Juba. SPLM leaders struggled to reconcile the flexible conceptualization of ‘community’ land rights espoused by Bari and CES Government leaders with their nationalist and developmentalist vision of statebuilding, in which the demarcation and commoditization of land was seen as essential to promoting reconstruction. Although there was a range of perspectives amongst SPLM leaders, most were deeply committed to protecting what they saw as the rights of communities. They sought to build a southern regional state that was based on the recognition of those rights, not only to land, but also to other natural resources and ‘cultural practices’. For many SPLM members, this had been a key motivating factor in joining the armed struggle. And while they were committed to the SPLM agenda for reconstruction in Southern Sudan, they believed that this would have to be approached in a way that acknowledged, and if possible, ameliorated the concerns of communities. Yet, the SPLM was unwilling to be entirely excluded from the process of land allocation, especially given the initial challenges of realizing the JAM framework’s vision of urban reconstruction in the capital. The dual purposes of the CPA, building a framework for unity while establishing a southern regional state, had important consequences for 82 Interview 3b: Ruben Madol, Justice, Supreme Court of Southern Sudan / Juba / August 2008. 83 Ibid. 84 Interview 85: Duncan, Juba University Professor / Juba / August 2008.

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the politics of land in Southern Sudan. With their focus on protecting the south from the northern government, SPLM leaders did not anticipate how the discourse of ‘community’ rights to land would become a political tool for enacting a land reform process which would empower the Bari community and the CES Government vis-à-vis GoSS. In the optimistic movement of change ushered in by the CPA, the challenges that land tenure reform might pose, and its potentially negative consequences for both urban reconstruction in Juba, and the nature of Southern Sudanese statehood, were overlooked. Reconciling these competing interests was an enormous challenge. Not only would customary laws have to be reconciled with statutory land laws, but they would also have to conform to human rights principles and guarantees of non-discrimination in the CPA.85 Furthermore, determining the boundaries of customary law in a town with such a high degree of ethnic intermingling, and with a large number of returnees, required a significant degree of discussion and legal interpretation. Yet it was clearly not simply a matter of legislating a way out of the impasse. Better laws, as the case of Juba demonstrates, would not automatically eliminate or reconcile the different agendas, interests, and visions of the various local stake-holders in its reconstruction. These differences simply had to be worked out in the process of local statebuilding. Sara Pantuliano, The Land Question: Sudan’s Peace Nemesis (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2007), p. 7.

85

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4

The Unseeing State: Corruption, Evasion, and other Responses to Urban Planning

The different agendas for urban reconstruction espoused by the leaders of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), by the Equatorian leaders in the Central Equatoria State (CES) Government, and by Bari community leaders, were at the root of the lack of progress in urban development in the capital during the Interim Period. When the SPLM began establishing the institutions of GoSS in Juba, they were confronted with a war-torn town that appeared wholly unprepared to serve as the region’s capital. Most of the town’s inhabitants had no access to running water, electricity, or sanitation facilities. According to a November 2005 report by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 55% of the inhabitants of Juba fetched water from common wells, 23% bought untreated water from water tank trucks, and 22% took water directly from the River Nile.1 Of the twelve residential quarters surveyed, none was supplied with electrical power.2 Juba town lacked a sewage system, and only a limited number of latrines were provided throughout the town centre and residential quarters. The few available health centres were supported by churches and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), of which the most notable was the International Committee for the Red Cross. Due to the unavailability and high cost of building materials, most residents lived in tukls made of mud brick and grass roofs (Photograph 1). The few permanent structures dated from the colonial period and were in severe disrepair. The agents of reconstruction tasked with rebuilding imagined a town that was a ‘blank slate’ waiting to be filled by the technological ideas of planners.3 A particular target for intervention was modernization of the land administration system, run by the CES Government. A March 2005 Joint Emergency Study on the Planning and Support for Basic Physical and Social Infrastructure in Juba Town and Surrounding Areas. Final Report, JICA. 24 November 2005. 2 Ibid., pp. 6–12 – 6–14. 3 For critiques of the ‘blank slate’ paradigm, see: Christopher Cramer, Civil War is not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for Violence in Developing Countries (London: Hurst & Co, 2006), pp. 255–256, citing Jarat Chopra, ‘Building State Failure in East Timor’, Development and Change, 33:5 (2002), pp. 979–1000; and David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). 1

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Assessment Mission (JAM) report states: ‘In order to be able to manage, deliver and account for the range of critical programmes needed to accelerate development in Southern Sudan, the entire public service, including personnel and systems, has to be built up virtually from scratch’.4 Capacity building and urban planning were made high priorities by SPLM leaders and their international partners, whose assessments of the needs of Juba formed the basis of several reports identifying the key challenges inhibiting the reconstruction process in the town, and detailing the required steps for urban development.5 In addition to the March 2005 JAM report, from April to July 2005 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in collaboration with the Development Planning Unit of University College London and the SPLM Local Government Secretariat, conducted a study to assess the specific requirements of urban development in Southern Sudan. The resulting report, Southern Sudan Urban Appraisal Study, identified urban population increase as a likely strain on existing local government institutions, urban development management as an important priority, and the ‘shortage of skilled and experienced managerial, professional, technical and administrative staff’ as a major constraint.6 A 2007 Overseas Development Institute (ODI) report states: The lack of functionality of the land administration both at the central and local levels is a key part of the problem. Survey departments are in shambles; important data and records have been lost and there is no reliable information on which to base new land allocations and transfers or secure tenure rights. There is a risk that cadastral and land registry data may disappear…7

Implicit in the various urban plans being developed for Juba were ideas about the new Southern Sudanese state, its cultural character, and the privileging of the rights of citizens over those of communities. In his book, Seeing Like a State, James Scott argues that the bureaucratic state seeks to simplify and record local lived realities in order to render them ‘legible’.8 In so doing, it facilitates the economic and political penetration of the ‘state’ into local communities. Scott’s aim is to show how state planners seek to make social and economic life legible by mapping and demarcating land, among other things, and therefore exerting power over subjects and citizens. However, in an attempt to expose the nature of state power, Scott presents a monolithic view of the state. He assumes that the cadastral official, or the land surveyor, is JAM Sudan, A Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication, pp. 46–47. 5 See: Ibid.; Patrick Wakely, Tom Carter, and Kate Clifford, Southern Sudan Urban Appraisal Study (UNDP and Development Planning Unit, University College London, August 2005); Creative Associates International, Juba Assessment. Town Planning and Administration. November 2005. 6 Patrick Wakely, Tom Carter, and Kate Clifford, Southern Sudan Urban Appraisal Study. 7 Sara Pantuliano, The Land Question: Sudan’s Peace Nemesis (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2007), p. 7. 8 James Scott, Seeing Like a State. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 4

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politically aligned with the central government, and that he aims to implement its wider political agenda. As Migdal has pointed out, local level bureaucrats can exert a significant influence over the implementation of policies devised at the national or regional level, and they can also wield great power over the allocation of resources.9 This was indeed the case in Juba. In the initial transition period, the agents of reconstruction in Juba – SPLM bureaucrats, urban planners, and GoSS leaders – focused on implementing change through building capacity, streamlining processes, and improving technology in the CES Government, all of which would increase transparency and render local patterns of land allocation and management ‘legible’ to SPLM bureaucrats in GoSS, and amenable to the urban planning process in the capital. Yet CES Government bureaucrats who were responsible for the gazetting, surveying, demarcation and registration of plots in Juba, used their positions to mediate and evade state power by making the real patterns of land use illegible to SPLM technocrats. They avoided ‘capacity-building’ schemes designed by SPLM leaders and their international partners; they withheld records, obstructed housing development projects, and sought to discredit SPLM planners. Their acts of evasion, feigned ignorance, and corruption, represented a bureaucratic resistance aimed at retaining a privileged sphere of local knowledge, which was tied to a broader political agenda focused on maintaining local authority vis-à-vis GoSS. Clearly Juba was not a blank slate on which new institutions could be effortlessly created. Although aid agency reports painted a picture of the land administration system in Juba as entirely dysfunctional and chaotic, there was a clear logic to the way in which it operated, one that was important enough for certain local interests to prevent change in order to protect the status quo. Scott argues that those in subordinate class positions exercise hidden forms of ‘everyday resistance’ when public options such as demonstration or protest are untenable or likely to result in negative consequences.10 These ‘everyday acts of resistance’ include the seemingly ordinary practices of ‘foot-dragging, dissimulations, false compliance, feigned ignorance, desertion, pilfering, smuggling, poaching, arson, slander, sabotage, surreptitious assault and murder, anonymous threats, and so on’.11 While it is evident that acts such as murder are not ordinary, and clearly cannot be compared to a practice such as ‘feigned ignorance’, the point that Scott is making is that the actions of less powerful actors, which may seem to be irrelevant individual crimes or complaints, may in fact constitute part of a wider attitude among subordinate groups, which can grow into a political agenda and motivate more public forms of opposition.12 Acts of resist9 Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). 10 James Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1985). 11 Ibid., p. 34. 12 James Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance. Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 199.

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ance need not be deliberate or even conscious. They need not have formal organization, leaders or manifestoes.13 Yet even if they are not formally organized in pursuit of a political agenda, such acts demonstrate that individuals involved in resisting a dominant agenda ‘have developed views of what the state and political representatives should do and of their failures’, and are not naïve as to the political effect of their actions.14 Without attention to these ‘hidden transcripts’, the analysis would ‘miss the immense political terrain that lies between quiescence and revolt’.15 Similarly, Bruce Baker offers the idea of ‘disengagement’ as ‘an escape from, or at least mitigation of, unacceptable domination, largely without recourse to violence and often without the need for organizing collective action’.16 Although both Scott and Baker focus on subaltern groups, subordination is a relative concept. The idea of the political role of such forms of resistance can be extended to include any group in a comparatively less powerful position. Indeed, Scott points out that everyday resistance is ‘not a peasant monopoly’, and that resistance can be interpreted as ‘a stratagem deployed by a weaker party in thwarting the claims of an institutional or class opponent who dominates the public exercise of power’.17 The resistance to SPLM attempts to create transparency in, and thereby establish control over, land allocation and management in Juba was an attempt to participate in and shape urban planning and development efforts, even to introduce alternative visions of Southern Sudanese statehood. Insofar as they were ignored by CES Government leaders, acts of resistance were tied to the wider political agenda of the CES Government. Weary of the influx of non-Equatorian returnees into the town, local elites – Bari traditional leaders and Equatorian leaders of the CES Government – were strongly opposed to large-scale housing development that would facilitate a major demographic shift in the town. Rapid change threatened local elites with loss of political and economic status, and it impelled responses that ranged from evasion to subtle challenges to outright resistance from multiple groups in the town. The use of the term ‘resistance’ in this context is to demonstrate the agency of local actors in ‘pushing back’ against the dominant urban development and state-building agenda, and ultimately, in shaping it. The term connotes not just the refusal or denial of the dominant agenda of state-building, but also implies debate and negotiation aimed at influence and compromise. In short, the responses of CES Government bureaucrats to the attempts by SPLM leaders to implement the GoSS agenda for urban reconstruction did not represent merely a negative sphere of action, but also entailed a productive space of politics. Bruce Baker, Escape From Domination in Africa. Political Disengagement and its Consequences (Oxford: James Currey, 2000 and Trenton: Africa World Press, 2001), p. 155 with reference to Scott, Weapons of the Weak, p. 35. 14 Ibid. 15 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, p. 199. 16 Baker, Escape From Domination in Africa, p. 4. 17 Scott, ‘Everyday Forms of Resistance’, p. 52. 13

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LAND ALLOCATION AND MANAGEMENT: OFFICIAL PROCESSES, IRREGULAR PRACTICES, AND DISCOURSES OF ‘CORRUPTION’ Juba was the centre of a political community that had survived and in some cases prospered under the previous government. During the war there were few economic opportunities in Juba, and employment was mainly limited to the public sector. The SAF controlled the shipment of goods into the town (which were limited to supplies flown in from Khartoum), and monopolized the town’s markets. For those who were lucky enough to obtain one, jobs in the Equatoria Region Government provided access to economic and political resources. After the CPA, when the institutions and personnel of the Bahr el Jebel State Government were transferred to the new CES Government, local bureaucrats and leaders found themselves in control of the bureaucratic management of land. The CES Government Ministry of Physical Infrastructure became the new home of the Department of Lands and the Department of Survey (Photograph 5), the two main institutions responsible for surveying, managing and allocating land. A third institution, the Land Registry, housed within the Judiciary of Southern Sudan, was responsible for the registration of plots. The CPA’s acknowledgement of the rights of communities changed the stakes of control over the land allocation system in Juba. Control of land allocation and management provided rents to CES Government bureaucrats who earned meagre salaries in what was rapidly becoming an expensive town as the influx of foreign aid workers and returnees increased the value of urban plots and rates of rent in the town. Illicit activities in the allocation of urban plots became a profitable enterprise for CES Government civil servants. In 2008, there was a subtext to discussions about the inefficiencies of the official process of land allocation and management in Juba. Long-time residents and newcomers alike expressed cynicism about the possibility of attaining plots in Juba through the CES Government Ministry of Physical Infrastructure. Not only residents but also former-NCP members, judges in the Judiciary of Southern Sudan, and GoSS officials repeatedly characterized the irregular practices of CES Government bureaucrats responsible for land allocation and management as ‘corrupt’. Allegations included claims that CES Government officials allocated multiple plots to family members, and demarcated unofficial plots for sale outside the formal allocation process: in effect operating a parallel market in urban plots. While not denying the questionable motivations underlying such practices, my intention here is to demonstrate that the selfish motivations of CES Government bureaucrats seeking to preserve economic and political gains were tied to the broader political aims of the CES Government. Together they created a broad-based impediment to the SPLM reconstruction agenda in Juba.

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5 Central Equatoria State Survey Department, 2006 (© Naseem Badiey)

The official process of land allocation Land allocation and management in Juba, as in the other towns of Southern Sudan, was based on the British colonial system of town planning whereby land was first ‘gazetted’ or acquired from villages on the peripheries of the town following negotiations with Bari chiefs, sub-chiefs and elders.18 This land was surveyed by the Survey Department and demarcated into planned residential areas, gardens, reserve areas, special ‘government containment areas’, and military zones. Residential areas were divided into blocks, within which plots were demarcated into three classes, differentiated by size and quality. Class 1 plots were the largest and variable in size; Class 2,typically 20 x 20 square metres, and Class 3, 10 x 20 square metres. The size of the plots was uniform and did not take into consideration topographical features, soil quality, or other elements that might affect value, such as established fruit trees. Class 4 plots were a special case provided for temporary use. Originally, they were intended to accommodate migrant workers and rural farmers who came to the town for part of the season. In the mid–1990s, an initiative was introduced to halt demarcation of new Class 4 plots and to convert all those existing into Information on the process of land allocation comes from interviews with officials in the CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, including Director-Generals of Land and Housing, the Director of Survey, the Assistant Land Registrar, land officers, survey officials, registry officials, as well as judges and various foreign advisors working on the land bill and master plan for Juba. All the interviews were conducted in Juba between July and September 2008. 18

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Class 3. This was in response to the fact that many of the communities who had settled in Class 4 plots had become permanent residents of the town. While previously, Class 4 plots were allocated and registered by the Town Council, the initiative intended to formalize occupancy in Class 4 areas and bring it under the leasehold system managed by the Equatoria Region Government. This process had been implemented gradually over a decade and there will still Class 4 plots in Juba in the transition period. Residents who previously held Class 4 plots in areas such as Munuki had been issued lease titles and were registered in the Land Registry as Class 3 plot holders. However, segments of Class 4 plots remained in Juba in areas such as Atlabara, near the centre of town. The classed plots were individually numbered by the Survey Department and recorded by the Land Registry, and then leased to applicants by the CES Government Ministry of Physical Infrastructure for 20–50 years.19 Prospective lessees were informed of available plots through public announcements on the radio and in newspapers. Applications were received by the Department of Lands within the CES Government Ministry of Physical Infrastructure from ‘qualified’ individuals. Official eligibility requirements included a minimum of 30 years of age, and Sudanese citizenship, verified by a ‘Native Certificate’ from a village sub-chief or headman. However, few people were actually able to obtain plots in Juba through the official process, either during the war or in the transition period. Once a set of applications was compiled, a Land Committee within the CES Government Ministry of Physical Infrastructure convened and chose individuals for the allocation.20 A list was approved by the DirectorGeneral of Lands and the Minister of Physical Infrastructure, and the names of individuals who had been allocated plots were published on a notice board outside the Land Office.21 These individuals could then obtain a lease document from the Department of Lands for a small fee, and thereafter register their plot with the Land Registry, where they would be issued a ‘sales certificate’. Armed with a copy of the sales certificate and the lease, the individual was recognized as the sole legal leaseholder for the plot. This meant that he could ‘sell’ his plot to another person via a leasehold transfer, in effect introducing it into the small private market. A further benefit was that the leaseholder’s descendants could inherit the lease. 19 Ellen Martin and Irina Mosel, City limits: Urbanisation and vulnerability in Sudan; Juba case study, Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute. January 2011, p. 18. 20 The CES Land Committee was comprised of the Director-Generals of Land, Survey, Finance, and Housing, the Commissioners for Prisons and the Police, a Legal Advisor, and the Commissioner for Juba County. Interview 26: Emmanuel Waga Elia, CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 22 July 2008; Interview 27: Joel, Land Officer, CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 24 July 2008. 21 Class 1 and Class 2 plots were allocated by the Ministry, while Class 3 plots were divided between the Commissioner of Juba County and the Director-General of Lands. Interview 30b: Alikaya Aligo Samson, Former CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 17 August 2008.

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Residential plots were supposed to be available to anyone who applied, for a nominal fee, irrespective of ethnicity, religion, or region of origin. However, many long-time residents of Juba claimed to have repeatedly applied for a plot allocation without success. One resident complained, ‘I have [submitted] a lot of applications… It is not easy to get the land that way. You have to know someone. There are a lot of deceitful things’.22 Obtaining land through the official process was even more difficult for new residents, especially as the growing population of the town exceeded available plots. A representative of the Norwegian Refugee Council acknowledged that acquiring plots through the CES Government in demarcated areas was extremely difficult: ‘When those are demarcated and put up for sale they are gone even before they are put out. It is very difficult’.23 A January 2009 Sudan Tribune states, ‘It is to a large extent difficult to obtain land in Juba through legal procedures…Many residents…failed to obtain a plot after applying several times with the state Department of Land Survey’.24 The conflation in the article of the Department of Land and the Department of Survey is indicative of the confusion over the official process of acquiring land. An American aid worker with the International Rescue Committee pointed to the confusion surrounding the land allocation process: ‘It seems like there is no precise procedure for anything with regards to land. It’s all up in the air’.25 In practice, the Minister, the Director-General of Lands, the Juba County Commissioner, and the Governor’s Office were each given discretionary power to allocate plots, and provisions were also made for the GoSS Ministry of Housing, Lands, and Public Utilities to do so on occasion.26 This left few plots for the Land Allocation Committee to distribute. Therefore, in the absence of connections to high-level political leaders in the executive branch of the CES Government, it was very difficult for most local residents to obtain land through official processes of allocation.

Illicit practices and unofficial methods of land allocation Beyond being inefficient, the official system of land allocation in Juba also obscured the various illicit mechanisms of allocating land operated by CES Government officials in the Department of Survey, Land Registry and Ministry of Physical Infrastructure. Survey officials were allegedly demarcating plots and omitting them from official survey maps, and then either allocating plots to themselves, registering them in their Interview 44e: Caleb, Kator resident / Juba / 14 August 2008. Interview 60: Asbjorn Lode, representative of Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) / Juba / September 2008. 24 James Gatdet Dak, ‘Squatters demolitions in Juba begins amidst tight security’, Sudan Tribune, 27 January 2009. 25 Interview 59: Brennan Webert, resettlement officer, International Rescue Committee (IRC) / Juba / 29 July 2008. 26 The Director-General of Housing at the GoSS Ministry of Housing denied that the Ministry had any land allocation function. However, the Minister of Physical Infrastructure indicated that requests for plots from GoSS were considered by the Ministry, and also a number of demarcated plots were assigned to GoSS for allocation by the CES Government. 22 23

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children’s or spouse’s names, or selling them in the burgeoning land market. A long-time resident pointed to the large plots and newly renovated homes of junior survey officials as evidence of bureaucrats profiting from selling plots illegally.27 A Juba University professor explained, One the most interesting things that has been going on is that the so-called surveyors and what not are becoming very wealthy people, because everywhere they do surveys, they get two or three pieces for themselves. They might reserve a size as big as the university. Say in a five square mile area they might keep three quarters of a square mile for themselves. They might keep some of those pieces in their own names, or they might sell pieces. They know you want land; they will approach you and say, “We can do something for you”. Well the powerful people benefit.28

It was indeed curious that junior civil servants with presumably meagre salaries were able to embark on such grand building projects. In addition, there were also allegations of CES Government officials selling duplicate titles for the same plots. This led to many land disputes in the transition period. Judges in the Judiciary of Southern Sudan indicated that a large number of court cases had been filed involving duplicate or fraudulent titles. A particular problem was the re-sale of registered plots belonging to individuals who were deceased or known to have left the area during the war. If the previous lessee, or his descendants, became aware of the new ‘owners’, they initiated lawsuits to dispute the new title. A Court of Appeal judge explained, Now after the peace, some people want to rush there and push the people off their land, with the assistance of these survey officials who have the map. It is a game in a way; you are given a plot of somebody, and then when the owner comes that is where the problems start.29

One such case was of the Home and Away Conference Centre in the Amarat neighbourhood of Juba. The original lessee had died, and the investors, who were well-connected individuals, including some senior SPLM members, had allegedly learned about the vacant plot through Survey Department officials.30 They had gained access to the large plot of land and developed a conference centre there which included a bar and restaurant. On learning of the development, the children of the original lessee, who were entitled to inherit the lease, filed a claim with the Judiciary of Southern Sudan. They were, however, unable to compensate the new lessees for the construction they had completed, and so the descendants of the original leaseholder agreed to settle out of court.31 While this Interview 44e: Caleb, Juba resident / Juba / 14 August 2008. Interview 85: Duncan, Juba University Professor / Juba / August 2008. 29 Interview 66: Kuc John Akot, Acting President of the Court of Appeal of Greater Equatoria Circuit, Southern Sudan Judiciary / Juba / 21 July 2008. 30 Interview 84c: Stuart, SPLM member / Juba / 12 September 2008. 31 Interview 68: Justice Atillo Fuad, Justice of Supreme Court of South Sudan / Juba / 21 July 2008. 27 28

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case was resolved amicably, for many less educated residents who were unaware of their legal rights, the justice system was not a realistic option in offering protection against irregular land acquisitions by elites. An SPLM member described the collusion between officials in the Survey Department, the Land Registry and the Ministry of Physical Infrastructure as the ‘Juba Land Mafia’: [The] Survey [Department] is not supposed to allocate any land. The [legal] powers and the allocation committee are in the Department of Housing in the Ministry of Physical Infrastructure. The Lands Registry is just a registry; it should just give the documentation. But the opposite now is happening. They can get you the legal documents from the Land Registrar, and then in the Department of Housing the name is not there. It actually becomes a mafia, a group of mafia among themselves. Especially during the war it was very bad, because during the war a lot of extra power went to the security or the army. So it becomes a kind of legalized corruption. And now because of this peace opportunity also, the land market has gone high. As a result you can find one plot sometimes has three or four papers, sometimes without the knowledge of the Governor, [and] without the knowledge of the Minister.32

In this instance, corruption served to keep the state out of the local sphere. Moreover, the corrupt practices of CES officials were not linked to ethnicity, manifested as ‘political tribalism’ as is often the case in Africa, but were carried out by both Bari and non-Bari Equatorian individuals for a variety of complex reasons. This reinforces the point that what appears to be an expression of ‘tribalism’ does not necessarily reflect ethnic divisions, but is rather a response to processes of state-building. As Leonardi argues, it concerns the effects of the ‘government economy’ which transcend ethnic boundaries:33 The recent popular concerns in Southern Sudan about both land and corruption… are a manifestation of long-standing ambivalent relations with the state, in which people seek to make claims on the state’s resources, but simultaneously resist its intrusion into their social relations and local economics because they fear its extractive tendencies.34

What appears to be patrimonialism and corruption are often responses to the disruptions introduced by the process of state construction. This does not necessarily entail a rejection of the state and what it offers. As Berman points out, local leaders throughout Africa have used state resources to increase their own wealth and to distribute to kin and supporters. But in doing so they also provoked a challenge to the very state that was the source of their largesse.35 However, this is not a rejection of the state altogether. On the contrary, it reflects an unsatisfied desire to have access to the Interview 84: Stuart, SPLM member / Juba / 11 August 2008. Cherry Leonardi, ‘Paying “buckets of blood” for the land: moral debates over economy, war and state in Southern Sudan’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 49, 2 (2011) p. 236. 34 Ibid., p. 234. 35 Bruce Berman, ‘Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: the Politics of Uncivil Nationalism’, African Affairs 97 (1998), p. 317. 32 33

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state, and to benefit from the development which it offers. Bari leaders and CES bureaucrats did not want to destroy the state, which was the source of their power and money, but wanted to keep it at a distance as much as possible. In early 2006, the SPLM-led GoSS appointed a long-time SPLM member, Alikaya Aligo Samson, to be the new CES Government Minister of Physical Infrastructure. A trained engineer and public housing expert, Alikaya had been a member of the SPLM Technical Committee for the transition. On taking up the post of CES Government Minister of Physical Infrastructure in 2006, he set about enacting the recommendations of the various assessments and reports. He initiated plans to update the arcane system of land allocation and management. He purchased computers, held various training sessions, and hired a computer specialist to build a programme to improve both. The system he envisioned would prevent ‘tampering’ and irregularities.36 The exercise of computerizing the ministry would make ‘legible’ the practice of the bureaucrats in the ministry and the functioning of the actual land market in Juba to GoSS. The assumption was that the failures of the existing land delivery system could be solved by building ‘capacity’, introducing technology and improving data management in the ministry. However, survey officials and managers in the Ministry of Physical Infrastructure allegedly removed documents in order to obscure their irregular activities; they obstructed Alikaya’s efforts to change the existing system; they refused to computerize their operations or make available their records; and they failed to attend workshops on the use of computers and AutoCAD drafting software.37 Capacity building threatened to diminish the rents of these bureaucrats, but economic motives were also tied to their anxieties about change. The transition introduced new political actors and relationships, and endangered the relative economic privilege and political status of local elites. In response, local bureaucrats jealously guarded records and information. The result was a pervasive lack of transparency. Records and documentation of any kind, including survey maps were hard to come by. A Juba University professor explained, One of the problems we have is that we still don’t have a public access to information law. If my friend wanted some information he could get a runaround. But if you wanted access to information in Britain and the US, and somebody refused, you could go to a court and you get a court order saying that this information should be given to you and you have all the means to verify that it is actually the information you are looking for and not some other file that has been given to you. We don’t have that.38

The Assistant Registrar, who had been working in his position since 1995, justified the lack of public access to records in the Land Registry on the grounds of privacy: 36 Interview 30: Alikaya Aligo Samson, Former CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 11 August 2008. 37 Ibid. 38 Interview 85: Duncan, Juba University Professor / Juba / August 2008.

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For example, this office looks like a bank. When you bring your records, when you remit your money to a bank, no one will come and say, “I want to know how much Mr. X has in the bank”. When you bought your land you registered it here it is to be kept so that nobody will interfere with it.39

In the end, the SPLM’s initial attempts to streamline the process of land allocation failed. Rakodi points out, ‘Improvements to data, technology and techniques will not obtain initial support and resources unless they can be shown to contribute to the tasks that matter politically’.40 Yet, the personal gain of a few middle-level CES Government bureaucrats alone does not explain why higher-level officials did not intervene to end the practices that were so clearly counterproductive to urban development in the town. Migdal points out, Scholars and aid officials alike have singled out bureaucrats in the Third World for their slothfulness, lack of will, and absence of commitment to reform. These scholars have paid scant attention to the calculus of pressures these bureaucrats have faced that have made them so “lazy” or “uncommitted”.41

It was apparent that CES Government bureaucrats, and powerful interests in the CES Government backing them, were not supportive of Alikaya’s plans, and sought to perpetuate the status quo in land management. The corrupt practices of bureaucrats involved in the land allocation and management system served to keep GoSS out of the affairs of the CES Government. The evasion went on with the silent acquiescence of CES Government officials at higher levels, because by keeping the ‘seeing eye’ of the SPLM-led state out of local practices, corruption and inefficiency in the land management process supported the CES Government’s wider agenda of maintaining autonomy vis-à-vis GoSS. The effect of these practices in Juba and the protection offered by CES Government political leaders to bureaucrats raised them to a political plane and made them complicit in a broader political dynamic between GoSS and the CES Government.

URBAN PLANNING IN JUBA: THE ROAD TO NOWHERE The failures in instituting changes in the process of land allocation in Juba were linked to the SPLM’s urban planning efforts. The corrupt practices and evasions in the CES Government Ministry of Physical Infrastructure were part of a wider antagonism towards SPLM-led urban planning in Juba, a process which for the most part excluded the CES Government and did not invite local participation. Multiple planning efforts were undertaken in the transition period. These involved initiatives led by interna39 Interview 70: Frances Taban Kitara, Assistant Registrar, Judiciary of Southern Sudan / Juba / 25 July 2008. 40 Carole Rakodi, ‘Forget planning, put politics first? Priorities for urban management in developing countries?’ International Journal of Applied Earth Observation and Geoinformation 3:3 (2001), p. 221. 41 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, p. 242.

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tional agencies and NGOs, as well as those spearheaded by SPLM leaders. Donor-funded plans entailed the efforts of foreign advisors to build townplanning capacity in preparation for demographic change, as well as a long-term project to produce a master plan for Juba. The key plans spearheaded by SPLM leaders included a large-scale housing development in the peri-urban area of Wolyuang, devised by the SPLM Minister of Physical Infrastructure for the CES Government, Alikaya Aligo Samson. A further plan for an industrial capital on Gondokoro Island was devised by GoSS Vice President Riek Machar. Although all these were ambitious in their vision for the town, none of them addressed the continuous debates over land rights or engaged with the local communities that would be affected. For these reasons, they ultimately failed.

Donor-funded urban plans Following the CPA, various donor-funded urban planning processes were initiated to support the SPLM in building a new capital city in Juba. In early 2005, the SPLM Secretariat for Physical Infrastructure and Town Planning (SPITP) appointed a consortium which included three engineering and development contractors: GiBB Africa,42 a Kenyan consultancy; PADCOAECOM, an American firm; and KV3, a South African company. The responsibilities of the consortium included conducting a ‘Housing Sector Development Policy Study’, providing technical assistance in the preparation of urban master plans for the ten state capital towns in Southern Sudan, and contributing to the rehabilitation of physical infrastructure in Juba town. The AECOM International Development website describes the project as a partnership between the three firms in assisting the ‘Government of Southern Sudan in structuring public-private partnerships for the development of housing in urban areas’.43 It identifies a ‘huge need’ for housing ‘[the] ongoing large-scale return of refugees and internally displaced persons to Southern Sudanese towns’, and lists a range of project deliverables, including housing demand and supply surveys, housing policy options, an urban land development policy and programme, as well as options for community-based housing development.44 Meanwhile, in 2005, Creative Associates International, an American NGO also funded by USAID, began a ‘Strategic Participatory Town Planning project’. The aim of this project was to improve the capacity of land administration and town planning authorities at the various levels of 42 GiBB Africa came into contact with some SPLM leaders during the negotiations in Naivasha, and had shown interest in helping in developmental projects in postwar Southern Sudan. 43 PADCO-AECOM was formed from the combination of PadCo, a Washington, DCbased AECOM subsidiary, and TSG, an international development services firm based in Virginia. AECOM is a large US-based engineering, design and management firm. It has annual revenue of $6.1 billion dollars, and employs 44,000 staff in 100 countries. PADCO-AECOM was the primary implementing partner of USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives, which initiated a programme for Sudan in 2003. See AECOM website: http://www.aecominterdev.com/ MarketsAndServices/44/04/index.html [Accessed on: 9 July 2009] 44 Ibid.

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government in Southern Sudan in anticipation of urban growth. A report based on a September 2005 assessment by Creative Associate’s team of urban planners, architects, and land tenure specialists concluded that relevant municipal authorities were ‘understaffed, poorly trained, and underequipped’.45 It recommended a physical town plan, an improvement of infrastructure ‘to cope with the demand of the anticipated influx of residents’, and as ever, capacity building. Added to these initiatives was a long-term project led and funded by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA). In November 2005 JICA initiated a bilateral relationship with GoSS and began work on a twoyear comprehensive study of the planning needs of Juba. The agreement between GoSS and JICA lists the objective of the study as: ‘To help build a foundation of the sustainable development of Juba Town that is expected to function as the capital of Southern Sudan through enhancing the IDP returnee accommodating capacity of Juba town’.46 The project entailed the development of a ‘master plan’ for Juba with the target year of 2015. Throughout 2005 and 2007, attempts were made to coordinate the various private firms and NGOs. These usually entailed conferences and workshops aimed at informing the teams of each other’s activities, and familiarizing local ‘stakeholders’ with the planning exercises underway. The first of these was a two-day Urban Management Conference on February 13 and 14, 2006, hosted by the GoSS Ministry of Housing, Lands and Public Utilities, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).47 The conference opened with a speech by Governor Clement Wani, after which consultants from PADCO-AECOM, GiBB Africa, Creative Associates, UNDP and other NGOs made presentations explaining the process of planning, practices in land management, and reconstruction. During the various sessions, foreign consultants argued that the existing land management systems in Southern Sudan lacked capacity and technology and were inefficient in dealing with layout and allocation of plots, and record keeping. They claimed that existing systems favoured educated and elite groups while neglecting low-income groups. They argued for the promotion of ‘equitable procedures, which safeguard interests of all groups, especially the marginalized and the disadvantaged’.48 Effective land management systems were said to ‘constitute good governance’, and therefore it was recommended that an urban land management system be created that was ‘efficient’, ‘equitable’, and ‘transparent’, one that made use of current technology and information systems.49 They emphasised the need to ‘prepare and make available large quantities of land for 45 Creative Associates, Juba Assessment. Town Planning and Administration. November 2005. 46 JICA, Scope of Work for Emergency Study on the Planning and Support for Basic Physical and Social Infrastructure in Juba Town and Surrounding Areas. 24 November 2005. 47 Ruth Atieno Omondi and Elijah Agevi, ‘Urban Management Conference 13–14 February 2006. Report’, GoSS Ministry of Housing, Lands and Public Utilities and UNDP. 48 Ibid. 49 JICA, Scope of Work for Emergency Study.

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housing’, and they argued for the ‘extension of the gazetted urban areas to include existing urbanized (built-up) areas’ so that affordable plots could be demarcated in response to demand created by population growth and resettlement.50 From July 24 to 26, 2007, Creative Associates International hosted a Southern Sudan Town Planning Conference in collaboration with the GoSS Ministry of Housing, Lands and Public Utilities. Once more, the event brought together all of the various groups in an effort to coordinate their planning activities: PADCO-AECOM, GiBB Africa, Creative Associates, and JICA. Also in attendance were GoSS ministers and representatives from other commissions, as well as from UNDP, UN-HABITAT, the World Bank/Multi Donor Trust Fund, United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMISS), and the European Commission. According to the conference report: Several themes were reiterated over the course of the conference, in particular, the need for reliable information for planning, the urgent need to develop human capacity within the state and GoSS administrations, the pressing needs for essential urban infrastructure…and the necessity for transparent budgeting and similar integrity-strengthening measures. All the states emphasised the need to build local capacity to manage physical development, including having staff trained in GIS and AutoCAD applications, in the resolution of land disputes, in the fair and efficient allocation of land and land use permits…51

However, the political consequences of the policies and changes were not discussed at either conference. The only two attendees from the CES Government were the Minister for Physical Infrastructure, Alikaya Aligo Samson, and the Director-General of Housing, Lewis Gore George. There were no representatives of the Bari community. It seemed that few of the planners were aware of the rapidly escalating political conflict between CES Government and GoSS over the jurisdiction of Juba, or the various competing claims to land in the town and its peripheries. The lack of attention to local political dynamics reflected the fact that international planners were secluded from local life in the town. Due to the security protocols of the various aid agencies, they were largely sequestered in guarded tent camps with little access to the rapidly changing urban spaces of Juba’s neighbourhoods, or to the wider politics of reconstruction that was unfolding around them. In fact, despite his role in the February 2006 conference, in an interview in July 2006, Governor Wani stated that he had not seen any drafts of urban plans.52 As James Ferguson argues, the technocratic planning approach has no capacity to include political issues and interests, and much less nuanced 50 Omondi and Agevi, ‘Urban Management Conference 13–14 February 2006. Report’. 51 ‘Overview: Southern Sudan Town Planning Conference. 24–26 July 2007’, GoSS Ministry of Housing, Lands and Public Utilities, Creative Associates International and USAID. 52 Interview 21: Clement Wani Konga, Governor of Central Equatoria State / Juba / 6 September 2006.

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debates between actors with ambivalent identities.53 The main justification is to be apolitical; but the neglect of the ‘big picture’ of reconstruction also has to do with the structure of such interventions, such as the emphasis on rapid time-frames and the limited focus on specific technical problems, at the expense of attention to history, politics, and changing identities. In spite of an ambitious agenda and significant funding, the plans did not translate into successful urban development. GiBB Africa, supervising the implementation of road works, electricity plants, the installation of water sanitation and sewerage systems, and the renovation of 700 government offices and houses in Juba, became the target of various angry newspaper editorials. The high cost of its contract and its slow progress in urban development were cited repeatedly. A Sudan Tribune editorial states: Two years down the line, GiBB Africa seems to have difficulties carrying out its duties: either it is unable to push the contractors to complete their work, or it has interest in delaying the completion of these projects. For example, ministers and their employees have been told to evacuate their offices and houses, some since mid 2005, and none of these ministries and houses was renovated. In every house or office, a handful of workers are assigned to do the work, and in most cases, only work until midday, especially if they are Chinese complaining about the heat. In fact, most of the GoSS officials are complaining that they are displaced from their houses, where some are forced to spend $250 US dollars daily to get accommodation in the tents and containers’ hotels in town, while they could not employ new employees, apart from the displaced directors, because the offices are still under renovation since the government was formed last year.54

Responding to the lack of progress in the various projects, the 2007 Sudan Tribune editorial stated pointedly, ‘GiBB Africa should also pack and leave as it seems to be playing games by claiming payment without the delivery of services to Southern Sudan’.55 Following the conference, Creative Associate’s contract expired and was not renewed. From their office in the CES Government Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, the JICA team, which consisted of engineers and planners from two Japanese engineering consultancies, continued to revise drafts of the Juba master plan. In March 2007 they produced the ‘final report’ entitled, Emergency Study on the Planning and Support for Basic Physical and Social Infrastructure in Juba Town and the Surrounding Areas in Southern Sudan. The report was the culmination of two years’ assessments and data gathering activities, analysing the physical and social infrastructure in Juba Town and surrounding areas, and constituted a master plan for reconstruction and rehabilitation.56 Despite being James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: ‘Development’, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 54 John G Nyuot Yoh, ‘Who is responsible for delays of development in New Sudan regions?’ Sudan Tribune 16 March 2007. 55 Jacob Lupai, ‘World Bank involvement in Southern Sudan: an asset or liability’, Sudan Tribune. 27 March 2007. 56 JICA, Final Report for the Emergency Study on the Planning and Support for Basic Physical and Social Infrastructure in Juba Town and Surrounding Areas, Government 53

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intended for dissemination, the plan was near impossible to attain. Officials at the CES Government Ministry of Physical Infrastructure were unable to provide clear information about the status of the master plan. During my many visits to the Ministry, officials variously explained that the plan was being revised, that it had been rejected, that it was a failure, or that it was unclear what had happened to it. The JICA urban planners were equally evasive. I visited the JICA offices on five separate occasions in August and September 2008. My appointments with the Japanese planners were not kept, my calls were not returned, and my requests for a copy of the final report were denied, despite the agreement to make the report widely available. A JICA official explained that bound copies of the report had been disseminated to all of the officials in the ministry, and directed me to their CES Government counterparts for a copy. The CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, his assistant, and the CES Director-General of Land, could not produce copies of the JICA master plan. The DirectorGeneral of Land directed me back to the JICA office, insisting, ‘They are the ones who are doing the planning, so they must have the plans’.57 He complained that the JICA team communicated only with the Minister and the Governor, and that conversations regarding the plan did not include the Director-General of Lands or the ministry’s planners. He stated: We gave our input [in July 2007] and they said they [were] going back to sit and go over the input and…after three months they would report it back to us. That was the end of it. It never came back…They keep all the information. They don’t leave anything down here. They keep it in their small computers, their laptops, and they go away with it.58

It appeared that CES Government officials were also suffering from lack of information. Once I was finally able to acquire a copy of the JICA plan, it became evident that the ambivalence of CES Government officials towards the urban planning processes stemmed from the fact that it completely disregarded local land politics. In its strategy for a ‘socio-economic development framework’, the report anticipated that the urban area would need to be expanded to a 55 kilometre radius.59 This entailed the addition of 15 square kilometres to the existing urban area of Juba, extending the town’s reach into Bari villages. The expansion would accommodate an ‘approved’ housing development plan that would create 20,800 plots in seven residential areas in Juba, and a housing development plan in proposed areas of new settlement in the town’s peripheries that would create another 22,500 new plots. The areas proposed for new settlement of Southern Sudan, Government of Central Equatoria and JICA Study Team. March 2007. p. 10–7. 57 Interview 28: Cornelious Goja Lado Kulang, Director-General of Lands, CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 27 August 2008. 58 Ibid. 59 The JICA team arrived at this estimation using approximate figures for the population, working population by sector, school enrolment projections, as well as data from a land use survey that they had conducted. See: Final Report, pp. 4–9. (cont.)

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included Munuki West, Nyakoron south, Lologo south, and the east bank of the Nile River. Among the many recommendations in the report was the establishment of a ‘sound land market reflecting the economic value of land’, which was, it argued, a matter of urgency, ‘essential not only for infrastructure development, but also for restriction/inducement measures for realizing the land use plan, and introduction of private sector investments’.60 There was no mention in the report that the new systems might serve the dominant agenda and dispossess numerous other competing claims, and that there had been no attempt to ask what these various agendas and claims were. Two months previously, on January 31, 2007, JICA had formally submitted a draft of the report to GoSS and the CES Government. According to the minutes of a meeting to discuss its conclusions, ‘the Sudanese side agreed in principle’ to the report’s contents. It was decided that GoSS and CES Government representatives would prepare and submit comments on the report by the end of February. Further, the participants also explicitly agreed that the final report would be made available for general use, and that access to it would not be limited to ‘concerned agencies’.61 A draft of the proposed master plan of Juba was endorsed by the Council of Ministers of the CES Government in February 2007.62 However, by August 2008, approval of the plan had gone no further.

The Wolyuang housing development scheme Meanwhile, Alikaya Aligo Samson, the SPLM-appointed CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, went ahead with his own plan. A housing expert and engineer educated in the UK, Alikaya believed that planning was crucial. In his view, a comprehensive plan was needed in order to respond to demographic changes, to provide for the resettlement of returnees, and to make room for much needed infrastructure and housing development. He argued that planning was the purview of the highest level of government: In all cities the plans are supposed to be centralized. The roads, everything has to be centralized. Like in Khartoum now, the national planning council sits every four months, and reviews the housing developments.63

He decried the approach of CES Government bureaucrats who had ‘no basic concept of planning’: For them they think that planning is just measuring 20 x 20 plots on the paper. After a 20x 20 plot, what activity is going to be there? How are those people going to develop it? Water is coming, etc… This state has a plan for 20,000 houses.

JICA, Final Report for the Emergency Study on the Planning and Support, p. 10–7. JICA, Minutes of Discussion on the Draft Final Report for the Emergency Study on the Planning and Support for Basic Physical and Social Infrastructure in Juba Town and Surrounding Areas among the Government of Southern Sudan, Government of Central Equatoria and JICA Study Team. 31 January 2007. 62 Interview 30: Alikaya Aligo Samson, former CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 11 August 2008. 63 Ibid. 60 61

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Where is the area? How is it being planned? What is the input of the government? That is how planning goes…. The Government of South Sudan says, “I am expecting my population to be about 5 million, having 4 million families coming from outside. How am I going to house them? What are the challenges? So we need to build in the next four years. How are we going to do it?”64

He emphasised the urgent need for housing development. He noted that the demand estimate of 30,000 plots was expected to ‘increase drastically as we are vividly campaigning for [the] return of refugees and [the] diaspora in order to participate in the forthcoming South Sudan population and housing census’.65 As Minister of the CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, he attempted to make changes to the process in his ministry in order to facilitate housing development: The ministry should be encouraged and supported to develop a vibrant electronic cadastral land registration and documentation programme, which will bring into maximum control the rampant ill practices of tampering with individual plots between the concerned lands departments. The electronic land registration program will help provide security, confidentiality and better services to our customers…we need to enhance efficiency for better land management and documentation.66

While foreign planners worked on the Juba master plan, he devised a housing plan in Wolyuang, an area in the western perimeter of Juba. The plan would demarcate 10,000 residential plots. However, when he attempted to distribute drafts of his urban plan for the Wolyuang housing development project, Alikaya encountered opposition. He explained, People were not happy about it; especially the Bari community…there was resistance. I distributed the plans to the Land Registry almost four times. We would duplicate a set for them and give to them; then they would say “No, this it is lost, the minister has not got it”. We would give them another copy again. Even the Land Registry, they would say “No, the Minister has not given it”. And then they said that “The Minister is saving everything in his computer”. If you go you will find not less than 26 computers in the ministry, and in all those computers the plans are there, ready. I told the Land Registrar, “Come and copy. Any department which is related to land has to come and take their own copy”.67

As he forged ahead with the allocation of plots in Wolyuang, local elites and their supporters attempted to discredit Alikaya and block the implementation of his plan. CES Government bureaucrats accused him of ‘topdown’ planning; they argued that he was favouring his SPLM colleagues in the allocation of plots. Alikaya defended the criteria he employed in allocating plots in the Wolyuang scheme: ‘At the end of the day they will think that you have favoured Mr. X and Y, because people did not know the criteria we used to Interview 30: Alikaya Aligo Samson, former CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 11 August 2008. 65 Ibid. 66 Work Plan and Strategic Policy of the Ministry of Physical Infrastructure Central Equatoria State (CES), presented by Minister Alikaya Aligo Samson. November 2007. 67 Interview 30b: Alikaya Aligo Samson, former CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 17 August 2008. 64

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establish and get the list out. It was a series of debates and a series of compromises’.71 By his own admission he prioritized those he considered to be ‘VIPs’, as well as GoSS parliamentarians, ministers and other political leaders; those who had no plots; those returning from the war; and those who had pending applications on file since 1997.69 These ‘compromises’ were not acceptable to Bari community leaders who believed that Alikaya was partial to his SPLM cohort, and insisted that their land had been taken from them without adequate consultation. Referring to the housing development project in Wolyuang, the Chairman of the BCA asserted: The [Bari] community was not involved in these plans. During the time the community asked [Alikaya] to bring [in] a community representative to the land administration, but he said he didn’t want to. He worked alone without even a person in the ministry or the community, and that was the problem [why the community rejected his plans].70

A senior official in the CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure expressed a similar view: …[Alikaya] did not even entertain the idea of planning with the people….rather he had wanted to do what he called ‘planning for the people’…. Without involving them…I was telling him the way we had been doing it since 1975. I was trying to give him the background to the way we had been doing it. He said “No, no, no, I don’t even want to consult with these people, because I am an engineer an architect…and planner”. So he was planning on his own. That is why he fell out with the community…the plots which he planned they were withdrawn by the community as a result.71

The BCA Chairman characterized Alikaya’s planning as a reflection of a wider problem that induced fears of displacement in the Bari community. He argued that despite its name, the area proposed for the Wolyuang housing development project extended even beyond Rejaf: ‘It was a massive development. And the villages all around the area are not actually shown in the plan. They would be removed’.72 In his view, SPLM and CES Government leaders were ‘playing’ with Bari land, They don’t consult, they get a big chunk of land and they divide it illegally, giving down, without notification. This is what we rejected. Other people, they take investors into the villages and they get that big money without the community’s knowledge, without the community benefiting.73

Ibid. Interview 30b: Alikaya Aligo Samson, former CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 17 August 2008. 70 Interview 40b: Tongun Lado Rombe, Chairman of the Bari Community Association / Juba / 25 August 2008. 71 Interview 28: Cornelious Goja Lado Kulang, Director-General of Lands, CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 27 August 2008. 72 Interview 40b: Tongun Lado Rombe, Chairman of the Bari Community Association / Juba / 25 August 2008. 73 Ibid. 68 69

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According to Alikaya, various chiefs and BCA leaders had been consulted and their representatives had agreed to the allocations. He attributed the failure to the resistance of the Bari community, stating: ‘Much of the reasons behind our poor land delivery in Juba are basically the Bari community issue’.74 Bari youth, allegedly organized by the Bari Youth Committee of the BCA, attacked survey staff and chased workmen away from the development site.75 Finally, in meetings with Bari community leaders and CES Government representatives, the Wolyuang plan was rejected. According to Alikaya, the chief in charge of the area reneged on the initial land deal and offered instead a much smaller parcel of land, which could accommodate only 800 new plots. Alikaya insisted that in order for appropriate planning to remake Juba into a new ‘modern’ capital, more land needed to be surrendered to GoSS. He stated, ‘Juba is not going to remain within the gazetted area of 1956 or early 1970s. It has to expand an extra radius of 4 kilometres because of the influx of the people and the volume of investment also intended to come here’.76 In his view, select groups of Bari elites and Bari chiefs were profiting from deals with investors in the name of preserving ‘community’ rights. He claimed that the Bari community had sold large tracts of land in Wolyuang and other areas to foreign companies and investors.80 Supporting this viewpoint, a Juba University professor acknowledged, There are chiefs doing land deals…and the community actually doesn’t benefit… and in that process the chiefs have become corrupt. The chiefs are taking all the proceeds. There is one Bari chief I know who has built himself a couple of very nice houses…78

On 21 June 2007, Governor Wani instructed Alikaya to cease the implementation of the Wolyuang project, effectively terminating the housing development project.79 The land was returned to the Bari Tokiman. In response, Alikaya made a speech in November 2007 to the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly.80 He outlined a host of malpractices committed by the bureaucrats of his ministry, and implicated the CES Government and the Bari community in obstructing his efforts at reconstruction. He claimed that while the Wolyuang housing development project was intended to accommodate a variety of public offices for GoSS, foreign agencies, NGOs, investors, and industries, as well as 10,000 residential plots, by mid–2007 it had successfully handed over only 283 residential plots to beneficiaries in the Nyakuron West area and 400 plots in Gumba. Alikaya called this a ‘total failure’: Work Plan and Strategic Policy of the Ministry of Physical Infrastructure. Ibid. 76 Interview 30: Alikaya Aligo Samson, Former CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 11 August 2008. 77 Work Plan and Strategic Policy of the Ministry of Physical Infrastructure… 78 Interview 85: Duncan, Juba University Professor / Juba / August 2008. 79 Work Plan and Strategic Policy of the Ministry of Physical Infrastructure… 80 Ibid. 74 75

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If a government cannot give plots according to the demand, and the demand of the people is not less than 30,000 families, that means we [,] the government – whether it is the Government of Southern Sudan or the Government of Central Equatoria – have failed.81

Reflecting on his experience, Alikaya argued that the Bari community was usurping his planning role, and standing in the way of development.82 He urged the gazetting of all government land with the hope that ‘[it] will envisage the government plans for the next 20 years with less interference from the local people…Nobody should be above a planning policy’.83 In the end, Alikaya’s efforts to change the culture within the ministry brought him into conflict with CES Government bureaucrats, while his attempts to institute housing development in Juba brought him into conflict with the Bari community. It became apparent that CES Government bureaucrats and the political leaders backing them did not support the extension of Juba and the allocation of so many plots to ‘outsiders’. On June 28, 2007, on the recommendation of CES Governor Clement Wani, President Salva Kiir dismissed Alikaya from his position as Minister of Physical Infrastructure. Ironically, one of the reasons given was that he refused to allocate land. The Chairman of the BCA maintained that [Alikaya] was removed because he was making the name of the CES Government unpopular, because he was doing [it] alone without his own people in the ministry, not contacting the community. The situation is clear: the land belongs to the people, the community and they must be consulted! The Governor, after finding out that this man was working alone, and giving [a] bad image to the government, removed him.84

A new CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure was appointed on November 22, 2007. The choice of retired SAF Major General Emmanuel Waga Elia indicated that the SPLM had lost the battle to influence the direction of urban development, at least for the time being.

The Gondokoro plan While teams of advisors from various development organizations and NGOs worked with the CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure on developing a master plan for Juba, GoSS Vice President Riek Machar developed his own proposal to build what he envisaged as an industrial capital on Gondokoro Island. Gondokoro is a river island to the northeast of Juba. It is approximately 10 x 13 kilometres, and is home to a relatively insular community of Bari agriculturalists, organized around two sub-chieftaincies in ten villages, each with a population of approximately 2,000 inhabInterview 30: Alikaya Aligo Samson, former CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 11 August 2008. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid. 84 Interview 40b: Tongun Lado Rombe, Chairman of the Bari Community Association / Juba / 25 August 2008. 81

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itants. The island’s fertile soil makes it suitable for agriculture, and the Bari of Gondokoro subsist mainly by fishing and selling their produce in the markets of Juba, to which they travel by boat.85 In 2006, Vice President Riek Machar, who at the time also held the position of GoSS Minister of Housing, Land and Public Utility, came up with the idea of acquiring the entire island – which was outside of the gazetted area of the town – as a site for a new capital. In his view, this would be an ideal solution to the impasse over the jurisdiction of Juba between GoSS and the CES Government. Prior to actual attainment of the land he unveiled his plan for Gondokoro in a press conference in August 2007. A Sudan Tribune article quotes the design consultant, Philip Curtain, articulating his vision for a new industrial capital on Gondokoro: ‘the outlook of the “modern Juba city” would be based on other cities such as London, Paris and Brasilia’.86 The total cost of construction was estimated at SDG 1.5 billion. The proposal provoked outrage from the Gondokoro community’s representatives in the CES Government and the GoSS Legislative Assemblies, and was roundly rejected by the Gondokoro Bari and the BCA. A resident of Gondokoro Island was defiant: ‘This is our land! Gondokoro Island is the bread basket of Juba town’.87 A Bari Priest stated pointedly, ‘The plan failed. We did not want it’. He explained, The home of the people should not be touched! The people on the island, they have their living there. [They get] their resources from there. You cannot give out [their land] to carry the town. Where are the people going to live? GoSS, they go to grab.88

The new CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure was equally certain that Gondokoro residents would not give their land to GoSS. He stated: Gondokoro Island up until now, we have not yet touched it. It is a different thing altogether. I think Gondokoro Island will be just like Tuti Island in Khartoum. The government can’t touch Tuti.89

Speaking of the rural island in the centre of the ‘three towns’ capital (Khartoum, Khartoum North, and Omdurman) where the Blue Nile and White Nile converge into the Nile, the Minister was referring to the repeated failure of successive governments to incorporate the island into the northern capital, owing to the determined refusal of the island’s agriculturalist inhabitants, the Maha people, to sell their land.90 He argued that the CES Government had already given GoSS land to build a new capital on the western side of Jebel Kuruk, which he thought was ‘better’ than Gondokoro: Interview 77: Sylvester, Gondokoro resident / Juba / August 2008. ‘South Sudan to build a new City’, Sudan Tribune, 6 April 2007. 87 Interview 77: Sylvester, Gondokoro resident / Juba / August 2008. 88 Interview 39: Monsignor Constantino Pitya Aguata / Juba / 5 August 2008. 89 Interview 26: Emmanuel Waga Elia, CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 22 July 2008. 90 Situated in the convergence of the White Nile and Blue Nile into the Nile River, Tuti Island covers eight square kilometers of predominantly agricultural land. The 85 86

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They want Gondokoro; what is the aim behind it? What are they going to do in Gondokoro? OK, if they want land along the river, we can take them even up to the border, but I think that area [on Yei road] is better than Gondokoro….91

As a Juba University professor argued, the total lack of consultation that characterized Machar’s plan typified the challenges of transition: If you were to do a brief policy analysis of Riek’s decision that [Gondokoro] island should be developed as part of the capital of Southern Sudan, you would have to ask, where did this discussion take place? Is this just one of those dreams, you know, Biblical-type dreams someone had during the night and decided to act on? Or is it really a series of meetings, of consultations? We don’t have a culture of consultation, except in the rural areas, the traditional system – when there is a problem – all the most important elders, and even some women come under the tree, and discuss the problem. But the transition to the modern state has its own ways of making decisions…where does the modern state make these decisions? Is it in the coffee shop? Is it at a dinner somewhere? There is no documentation on that. So somebody will go to his office and may be interviewed by the press and then announce it out of the blue that we plan to build this city over there. And of course when you announce it, you sound big; you sound like you are really thinking; you are really planning; you are really doing your job. But it is a hollow announcement, because you never did your homework for it.92

In his view, the Gondoko plan was indicative of an endemic problem in the urban planning and reconstruction process in Juba. He explained, One of our major problems in Southern Sudan, or all over Sudan, is marginalization… what is meant by that? Exactly what is happening in Juba. The elites decide, they will make all your decisions for you…, government will make your decisions for you. You are never engaged in the decision process…you are never engaged in establishing, determining your priorities. Good democratic political philosophy makes a basic assumption, which is that all individuals know what they want; it is only how to get it.93

A Sudan Tribune article echoed the professor’s sentiment, questioning the economic basis, political process and costs of the Gondokoro plan: ‘Who else are providing their visions on a master plan for Juba? Who is undertaking these studies? Why not invite an open competition? Who estimated the $5.2 million price tag for four studies?’ The author described a disturbing alternative vision of the ‘modern’ capital city: The thought of the heart of the GoSS based in Gondokoro, without competent civil service professionals, an industrial zone without industries, [a] railway line that connects to Gulu, Malakal and Lokichoggio with no goods being transported,

Mahas people are not the original inhabitants, but migrated from Dongola in the 15th century. There were various plans to incorporate Tuti island into the Sudanese capital, including a 1906 plan to develop a parkland resort on part of the island, which would have meant the resettlement of the island’s small popuation. That plan, and subsequent others, were unrealized. H. R. J. Davies, ‘A Rural “Eye” in the Capital: Tuti Island, Khartoum, Sudan’, GeoJournal 33:4 (August 1994), pp. 387–92. 91 Interview 26: Emmanuel Waga Elia, CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 22 July 2008. 92 Interview 85: Duncan, Juba University Professor / Juba / August 2008. 93 Ibid. (cont.)

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perhaps just raw materials, city tramways and a hovercraft ferry with no maintenance rotting way, power that is not affordable and all this because capital goods were bought with petrol dollars but no attention given to technology transfer or diffusion, is a nightmare. If we can plan for a new Juba we can also plan to avoid this realistic nightmare scenario.94

On 2 July 2007, Vice President Riek Machar was relieved as Minister of Housing, Public Land and Public Utility in a cabinet reshuffle. The Gondokoro plan dissolved. Machar explained that he had offered to resettle the inhabitants of the island in the Jebel Lado Agricultural Scheme and was willing to pay compensation. He stated: ‘We would negotiate, we would resettle them; they would be the richest people.’95 Responding to the idea that they would be given money as compensation for their land, the Bari priest said: ‘What do I do with money?’96 A Gondokoro resident explained, We will not accept [even hundreds of millions of dollars], because we are going to be displaced. We have to be maximum careful if we accept that kind of thing. Although it may benefit our people, we have to be maximum careful. Because if you are going to build hotels on the island where are we going to cultivate? Where are we going to stay? That land has been left to us by our ancestors. Where are we going to go? If we give this land, we have to go away. To which land? To whose land are we going to go?97

The Bari inhabitants of Gondokoro Island were not averse to development, but they had their own priorities, and they wanted to do their own planning. The same Gondokoro resident explained, The government plan and they don’t do. But sometimes we do things on our own, and they help us. For example, the school is on the mainland. We are now trying to build a big school [on the island] with eight classes. We have got a school in the island, a very small one, but not big like the one outside. Because of that, most of the Gondokoro children cross the river; they come and go back [to go to school]. We are now building another school in the island, because we want the children to be around us. Because you see, in Juba Town here, there are so many attractions that they will not continue with the school, with their studies… [a child], he can drop out, because he has seen a Senke [motorcycle]. He wants to drive a Senke to get money… he can see the video and see a wrong behaviour. But we want them to be in the village, so whenever they come back from school they go to be their families in the evening. Like this son of mine; in the evening I can take him and do certain activities [with him], because he needs to be trained also. This boy of today, he can be a good man of tomorrow. But if he go[es] like that without being trained in cultivating, how will he learn to cultivate? Then he becomes useless.98

Still optimistic about the prospect of planning, despite the continuing problems related to urban development, Vice President Riek Machar was resolute: ‘There are still those who think CES Government should leave 94 Constantine Bartel, ‘Planning for a modern Juba: the pitfalls in choosing partners’, Sudan Tribune, 10 April 2007. 95 Interview 16b: Riek Machar, Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan / Juba / 28 August 2008. 96 Interview 39: Monsignor Constantino Pitya Aguata / Juba / 5 August 2008. 97 Interview 77: Sylvester, Gondokoro resident / Juba / August 2008. 98 Ibid.

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and go somewhere else. I don’t agree. It would be problematic. We can build a new capital better than CES Government’.99 In the end, urban planning in Juba failed not because of lack of funding or of technical expertise, but because it proposed changes to the town that threatened local interests without attempting to engage with local actors and their concerns.

CONCLUSION In the initial transition period, SPLM leaders and donors, as the agents of reconstruction in Juba, were preoccupied with implementing change through building capacity, streamlining processes, and improving technology in the CES Government. They hoped that such activities would increase transparency and render local patterns of land allocation and management legible to SPLM bureaucrats in GoSS, and also amenable to the urban planning processes in the capital. However, nowhere in the various assessments, draft plans, conference reports and advisor recommendations listing the importance of ‘capacity-building’ and technological improvements in the reconstruction plans for Southern Sudan was it acknowledged that local bureaucrats may not have wanted their ‘capacity’ to be built, or may have viewed the introduction of new technology aimed at increasing transparency as threatening their interests. By 2009, the urban development process in Juba was at a standstill. It was apparent that, despite significant funding and technical resources, all the planning processes that had been intiated had failed to produce tangible results. No large-scale housing developments had been constructed to accommodate the growing population, and little had changed in the process of land allocation and management in the town. In essence, the failure of the planning processes demonstrates the contested nature of GoSS’ agenda of urban reconstruction in Juba. The recommendations of the various donors and government reports and assessments of urban development avoided the thorny question of who had the authority to allocate land and how such decisions would be made. All interested parties presumed they would have unlimited access to land in the town and in the peri-urban areas for resettlement schemes and for the realization of urban plans in general. This ignored the fact that the agenda of the CES Government was at odds with the direction that urban plans were taking, namely, to expand the town’s boundaries and settle large populations of new residents within its expanded limits. The SPLM’s reconstruction programme was premised on the idea of making Juba an inclusive capital, where all Southern Sudanese citizens would have equal rights to residency, if not necessarily access to affordable housing. To do so meant expanding the town beyond its boundaries into Bari villages, and allocating permanent housing to non-locals. The prospect of GoSS Interview 16b: Riek Machar, Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan / Juba / 28 August 2008.

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gazetting large tracts of land on the peripheries of the town, and allocating upwards of 30,000 plots to newcomers, threatened the interests of CES Government political leaders and Bari elites alike. The rapid transformation of the land management system also threatened the economic interests of CES Government bureaucrats. In his analysis Cramer argues, ‘…those who have secured material wealth and political position during wars influence the reach and character of postwar states…this is why postwar state-building cannot be reduced to a technical exercise’.100 This was the case with Juba’s local bureaucrats and political leaders. However, SPLM leaders and their international partners explained it only in terms of corruption, poor skills and training, or inefficiency. In his opening statement at the SPLM’s Second National Convention in May 2008, GoSS President Salva Kiir condemned the inefficiencies and corruption that had impeded reconstruction activities: This managerial inadequacy was coupled with a serious phenomenon that could not be justified under any guise. The name of that phenomenon is corruption; I mean corruption in all its forms: embezzlement, nepotism, use of public assets for private gain and kickbacks. Dear Comrades, let me tell you loud and clear that those practices are rampant at all levels of government in the Sudan.101

The SPLM planners had all the accoutrements of power: resources, the support of donor governments, and knowledge of contemporary planning practices. The very fact that the SPLM leaders of GoSS, despite significant financial resources and international support, could not push through their urban plans, without the support of local actors – elites as well as non-elites – demonstrates that their authority to implement the ambitious reconstruction plans outlined in the JAM Framework was limited. This speaks to the power of the state at the centre of reconstruction, and questions approaches which presume that all that is needed is for the state to enact policies, procedures, regulations, and laws in top-down fashion. At the same time, it also speaks to the meaning of conflict between the various groups. CES Government officials and local leaders who resisted SPLM-led reconstruction efforts were not opposed to reconstruction in any form. They simply sought to impose their own priorities on aspects of the reconstruction agenda being enacted in the town. Although they delayed progress in urban development, and threatened to derail the statebuilding process, these debates were part of the process of an emerging state. Cramer, Civil War Is Not a Stupid Thing, p. 134. Salva Kiir Mayardit, ‘Opening Statement at SPLM 2nd National Convention’, Juba, 15–20 May 2008. 100 101

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Local Land Disputes: Informality, Autochthony, and Competing Ideas of Citizenship

So far in this book, the exploration of the dynamics of land control and urban development in Juba has been limited to relations between state and local elites and to wider debates about authority over territory and political jurisdiction. Yet, local state-building in Juba was not only comprised of interactions between elites. The end of conflict introduced a variety of actors into the town who had a stake in the politics of reconstruction. These included ex-combatants, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), refugees returning from neighbouring countries, and members of the diaspora. These groups, each with different experiences of war, represented the diversity of Southern Sudan, and they also played an important role in local state-building. While the leaders of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and the Central Equatoria State (CES) Government debated authority over land in the capital, Juba’s residents articulated their own visions of the Southern Sudanese state as they claimed plots of land in peri-urban areas of the town. Their various claims rested on their status as victims of war, historical residency, and contributions to the liberation movement. Their role in the local politics of land had to do with access to property and status as legitimate residents of the city, as well as claims on the state and conceptions of citizenship. Debates over land were not only an issue of political authority and jurisdiction; they were about access to property. Questions over access to land arose in the context of a massive demographic transformation in the town following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). At the time of the CPA it was estimated that there were 686,000 Sudanese refugees in neighbouring states, and another two million southerners who were thought to be still living in camps around Khartoum. Following the CPA, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) initiated an effort to repatriate as many southerners as soon as possible, in time for the 2008 Census.1 As the most developed town in Southern Sudan and the headquarters of GoSS, Juba was the obvious destination for the majority of 1 Amber Henshaw, ‘Sudanese stand up to be counted’, BBC, 21 April 2009. In a June 2007 statement António Guterres, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, acknowledged that the agency had stepped up its efforts to repatriate Sudanese refugees from neighbouring countries in light of the Census: ‘EAST AFRICA: Accelerating the return of Sudanese refugees’, IRIN, 20 Jun 2007.

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these returnees. While many had customary rights to land in their areas of origin, Juba provided access to education, employment and social services, as well as proximity to family and social networks. It not only represented economic and political opportunity, to which all wanted access, but as the capital it was a compelling symbol of a new, developed Southern Sudan. By the end of 2006, the first in a series of waves of IDPs and refugees from neighbouring states began to appear in Juba. When they arrived home, returnees found the paradox of an underdeveloped town with extremely high land prices. Aside from tent hotels that had sprung up to cater to the growing community of aid workers, and which charged exorbitant prices ranging from US $100–200/night (Photograph 6), there were few affordable housing options for returnees. While those with connections to the CES Government could acquire plots through official allocations, prices for empty plots on the private land market exceeded US $15,000. A Norwegian aid worker explained the difficulties this posed for the majority of the town’s residents, ‘A Class 2 plot within Juba Town, Munuki or Kator payam would now cost you $15-$20,000 on the private land market. So that would be impossible to 99% of the population’.2 Although the economy was burgeoning with incoming flows of aid money, the impasse over land allocation on the peripheries of the town and jurisdictional disputes between GoSS and CES, had prevented any new housing developments in Juba. The inaccessibility of the formal system of land allocation operated by the CES Government, and the high price of land on the private market, meant that there was an acute shortage of housing. Without any other options, newcomers set up residence on vacant plots in settlements on the town’s peripheries (See Photographs 7 and 8 on pp. 158 and 165). They dug boreholes, cleared roads, and built permanent structures, establishing residency in Juba and thereby asserting their rights as citizens of Southern Sudan. By 2008 the town was transformed: informal settlements marked by ad hoc divisions and new construction stretched in every direction; impromptu structures had sprung up on almost every vacant plot in the town. Looking from above when flying into Juba airport, the changed landscape of the town was impossible to ignore: thousands of tin roofs spread out into the distance, while the main road, once a pedestrian thoroughfare, was blocked with automobile traffic. What just two years before had been an endless expanse of green fields was now a densely populated area, the making of a city. Informal settlements were not a new phenomenon in the town. A representative of the Norwegian Refugee Council explained that Juba had been a destination for self-settlement for displaced persons from nearby areas for decades. He stated, ‘People have been coming to Juba since the 1950s. There has been a bit of an ebb and flow, but you have IDPs from the floods Interview 60: Asbjorn Lode, aid worker, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) / Juba / 25 August 2008.

2

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6 Tent hotel in Juba, 2006 (© Naseem Badiey)

in late 1970s and 1980s’.3 During periods of conflict, IDPs came in waves to Juba, fleeing the fighting in nearby areas in Equatoria. They settled on the town’s peripheries and eventually moved into the town centre.4 According to a 2001 Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) report, many of the long-term IDPs in Juba arrived between 1983 and 1991, fleeing from hostilities and famine.5 The NRC aid worker also pointed out that many who are categorized as ‘IDPs’ were in fact from nearby areas such as Lobonok. They had been living in the town for years and had no plans to leave.6 The differences between the historical patterns of in-migration and the new waves in the post-CPA period were numerous: the scale of the influx, the ethnic and cultural character of the migrants, and the political consequences of the demographic change for the CES Government and local elites. More non-Equatorians came to Juba than in any previous time in the town’s history, upsetting a delicate balance of power within the Interview 60: Asbjorn Lode, aid worker, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) / Juba / 25 August 2008. 4 Ellen Martin and Irina Mosel, City limits: urbanisation and vulnerability in Sudan; Juba case study, Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute. January 2011, p. 33. 5 Marv Koop, ‘Grass Roots Regional Assessments – Government Controlled Areas of Sudan’, IGAD, 1 May 2001, p. 59. 6 Interview 60: Asbjorn Lode, aid worker, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) / Juba / 25 August 2008. 3

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formerly isolated garrison town. The informal settlements and the claims to land that accompanied them challenged the CES vision of Equatorian privilege, and raised the question of who could claim ‘legitimate’ residence in the capital. Local elites characterized the settlers as ‘land grabbers’ who were ‘robbing’ from the rightful owners.7 These dramatic changes, and the shortage of housing which it reflected, provided the backdrop to a series of confrontations. By 2007, land disputes were erupting throughout the town, threatening to escalate into violence. Two disputes in the peri-urban areas of Tongping and Gudele that took place in 2008 illustrate the perspectives and interests of different groups of residents, returning IDPs and refugees, ex-combatants, and long-time residents of Juba. In detailing the arguments made by disputants, my intention is not to compare the relative merits of such claims, but rather to examine the various narratives employed by claimants. This serves to highlight the ways in which claims were used as a strategy for promoting particular ideas about the role of the new state and the scope of citizenship. Berman states, ‘At the heart of ethnic politics is the use of historical and cultural resources of past and present in a struggle for control of the future and definition of the terms of social change’.8 He refers to the storytelling that accompanies attempts to make one’s claims appear more valid in the face of changing circumstances and power dynamics. In highlighting the importance of narratives in legitimating land claims, Carola Lentz poses several questions: ‘Who narrated such stories, why, and when, and to which audiences? What were these stories supposed to achieve, who listened and who judged, and according to which criteria?’9 It is with these questions in mind that the disputes in this chapter are analysed. The narratives employed in the course of the land disputes, between the leaseholders and new settlers in Tongping, and between the Sisters of the Sacred Heart congregation and the settlers in Gudele Block 9, reveal the type of authority system, the facet of ‘stateness’, to which individuals are referring. In this sense, narratives play an important role in state-building. Discourses of autochthony, of wartime sacrifice, and of Interview, Bari Catholic Priest / Juba / 5 August 2008; Interview, Denis Daramalo, Chief of Tokiman Bari and Paramount Chief of Juba / Juba / September 2008; Interview, Albert Pitya Redentore, Juba County Commissioner / Juba / 6 July 2008. 8 Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh, and Will Kymlicka, ‘Ethnicity & the Politics of Democratic Nation-Building in Africa’, in Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh, and Will Kymlicka, Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa (Oxford: James Currey, 2004), p. 5, with reference to: Mamadou Diouf, ‘Between Ethnic Memories & Colonial History in Senegal: The MFDC & the Struggle for Independence in Casamance’; Jacqueline S. Solway, ‘Reaching the Limits of Universal Citizenship: “Minority” Struggles in Botswana’; Cheryl Hendricks, ‘The Burdens of the Past & the Challenges of the Present: Coloured Identity & the Rainbow Nation’; Dickson Eyoh, ‘Contesting Local Citizenship: Liberalization & the Politics of Difference in Cameroon’; and Shula Marks, ‘“The dog that did not bark”, or why Natal did not take off: Ethnicity & Democratization in South Africa’, all in the same volume. 9 Carola Lentz, ‘First-comers and late-comers: the role of narratives in land claims’, in Sandra Evers et al (eds), Competing Jurisdictions; Settling land claims in Africa (Leiden: Koninklijke N.V. Brill, 2005), p. 165. 7

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ethnic privilege reveal different modes of thinking about ‘stateness’ and thus different approaches to state-building. And insofar as they communicate the different perspectives of claimants, they shape the state. Lentz maintains that narratives are important because they ‘help to persuade and to build consensus’.10 Indeed, in so doing, they change perceptions and structure outcomes.

TONGPING: EX-COMBATANTS AND SPLM MEMBERS V. LOCAL EQUATORIAN ELITES Tongping is a residential area of large Class 1 plots in the northern part of Juba near the airport. It was originally a forest, within the territory of the Juba na Bari chieftaincy, but it was gazetted by the colonial administration in the 1930s.11 Following devastating floods in Bor in the 1960s and 1970s, the government resettled a community of Dinka in the area. At the time, the redivision debates were taking place in Juba, and there was opposition to the Dinka being brought to the town. Therefore, the IDPs and their cattle were moved to rural areas north of the town.12 The Bor Dinka settlers named their new area ‘Tongping’, which means ‘the land is the same’ in their language.13 After redivision, and following the outbreak of the second civil war in 1983, most of the Dinka residents of Tongping fled Juba, and many joined the SPLA. The area became a strategic military outpost controlled by the Sudan Armed Forces. During the war years, land was surveyed, plots were demarcated, and leases were issued for the plots by the Equatoria Region Government to local and northern elites. However, due to the area’s proximity to the airport – a main target for the rebels – little construction took place and most plots were left vacant. When Juba was transferred to the SPLM after the CPA, the question of whose claims to the area were legitimate surfaced, prompted by the construction of large concrete houses throughout Tongping, beginning in 2007 (Photograph 7). These belonged to new occupants who were mainly Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk SPLA soldiers and ex-combatants working in GoSS, who had acquired their plots informally. Several cases were brought before the Judiciary of Southern Sudan.14 Despite confrontations between settlers and locals, the former went ahead with their construction, insisting that they had acquired their land legally through the Dinka ‘chief’ of the area. Lentz, ‘First-comers and late-comers’, p. 158. Interview 28: Cornelious Goja Lado Kulang, Director-General of Lands, CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 27 August 2008. 12 Interview 60: Asbjorn Lode, aid worker, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) / Juba / 25 August 2008. 13 Ibid. 14 Interview 23: Simon Lumori Philip, Chairman of CES Land Commission / Juba / September 2008; Interview 67: George Lado Tartisio, Justice of the Court of Appeal, Greater Equatoria Circuit / Juba / 15 July 2008; Interview 68: Justice Atillo Fuad, Justice of Supreme Court of South Sudan / Juba / 21 July 2008. 10 11

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7 New building construction in Tongping, 2008 (© Naseem Badiey)

The account of one settler illustrates the plight of ex-combatants who returned to Juba in the early transition period. A Nuer from Nasir, James had been a child soldier with the SPLA, and then a refugee in the United States. After many years abroad, he returned to Juba in 2007 to work as a bureaucrat in the Vice President’s office in the GoSS Secretariat. For a while, he lived in government housing, then in a series of tent hotels in Juba. He could not find permanent accommodation through the CES Department of Land, or on the private market. In 2008, he was introduced to someone he identified as the Dinka ‘chief’ of Tongping by a friend who already had a plot there. While the nature of this chief’s authority is unclear – whether he was a member of the original community of Bor Dinka settlers, or if he was a traditional chief, or both – as far as the newcomers to Tongping were concerned, he was a legitimate leader of the community of Bor Dinka that had settled in Tongping following the floods, and therefore he had the authority to allocate land in the area. For 1000 SDG (at the time equivalent to $500) the Dinka chief allocated James a plot of land to build on, and ‘registered’ him by recording his name in a ledger. Over the next several months, James used his wages to build a tworoom concrete house in a corner of the plot. It had an indoor toilet and a water tank: modern amenities by Juba standards. His intention was to live in it for a while, then to build a larger house on the same plot and rent out the smaller unit for additional income. He wanted to bring his family to Juba eventually, and his plan would make that possible. James’ network of contacts in the SPLA and GoSS, many of whom found

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themselves in similar situations, provided him with the security he needed to invest his modest income in building a house on disputed land. However, at another level of proof, he strongly believed that he was the rightful occupant of his plot. The basis of his claim was the conviction that the formal titles to the plots in Tongping had been wrongfully reallocated by the local allies of the northern Government during the last war. In his view, the original Dinka inhabitants of Tongping lost their land because they had been willing to fight for the liberation of Southern Sudan. Indeed, during the second civil war, anyone who was linked to the SPLA was labelled a traitor or criminal, and this justified the seizing of their lands, reallocation of their plots, and the issuing of ‘official’ leases for them.15 James maintained that when the northern government controlled Juba during the war, they viewed everyone who was linked to the SPLA as traitors or criminals, in order to justify giving away their lands. Indeed, during the war, titles were given out for plots in the area, and land that had been given to people who were found to be associated with the SPLA was reallocated under new leases.16 As a result, the previous inhabitants were officially dispossessed. Although it was also the case that the Dinka IDPs in Tongping had never been given leases for the land on which they lived, James viewed the demarcation and allocation of those lands as illegitimate. He stated, ‘It was the war that really kept all of us out of the land. We are not claiming the whole of Juba, but I think Tongping is ours. We believe that this is our place’.17 More broadly, and more significantly, James’ claim to land in Tongping reflected a view that Juba was the capital of all Southern Sudanese citizens, equally. In James’ view, the land in Juba did not belong only to the Bari or to the Equatorians who had worked in the Bahr el Jebel State Government, but also to those who were willing to fight and die for it. He stated, If you look at this area here across the river, this area called Gumbo, the northern government has killed so many Dinka and so many Nuer in this area. Can these Dinka and Nuer come all the way there and die there if they are not a part of the community? Could they really come to die here for nothing? Come on now – you die for the land they don’t want you to harvest any fruit of it?18

As he recounted the history of Tongping, and emphasised the sacrifices made during the war by SPLA soldiers, he argued that the idea of ‘community’ should not be reduced to those who had lived within the perimeter of the town during the war. He explained, ‘When they say that “land belongs to the community”, it does not mean that this land, Juba, belongs to Equatorians….[it] means all the southerners are owners of the land’.19 Any Equatorian is free to go and work in Bahr el Ghazal and live in Bahr el Ghazal. Somebody from Bentiu has a right to come and lease here, in Juba. Somebody in

Interview 60: Asbjorn Lode, aid worker, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) / Juba / 25 August 2008. 16 Ibid. 17 Interview 75: James, Tongping resident / Juba / August 2008. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 15

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Aweil has a right to come and lease here. As long as you are a southerner you have a part of the lion’s share…This is the heart of the government now. It really symbolizes the new nation of South Sudan.20

He pointed out that all Southern Sudanese were benefiting from the oil that came out of the soil of Bentiu, yet the people of Bentiu could not exclude the people of Juba from the benefits of the oil.21 While he did not deny his individual interests, including supporting his family and kin and making sure they had a place to stay in the capital of the new state, James referred to the contribution that he was making to the development of Southern Sudan: ‘Development will never come by saying, “Oh, don’t take this one. You go over there. No, don’t take that one. Don’t take Gudele. Don’t take Tongping”’.22 Referring to the illicit allocation of land by officials in the CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, he remarked, ‘You don’t have to reserve a plot of land for your last son who is not even born yet’.23 Often under-educated and under-skilled, the fate of ex-combatants lay in a delicate balance as competition for jobs in GoSS and the civil service increased. In the long term, James argued, his children and their descendants would all be Jubans. He saw his future in the capital of what he hoped would become an independent Southern Sudan. Gaining access to land was a way of establishing permanent residency in the town, and thus consolidating his belonging to the state. In contrast, local Equatorians who held titles to plots in Tongping, and their allies in the CES Government, did not privilege the position of those who had fought with the SPLA. Simon Lumori Philip, the Chairman of the CES Government Land Committee explained, Somebody comes and occupies somebody’s land, maybe because he was not here during the war. The owner comes back and says he wants his land. [The settler] says, “No, I cannot go out because I’ve been here for a long time. After all I also contributed in the war”. The other cases are connected with people who just see a patch of land, just because he has a gun, he says “It’s my land”… So it leads to conflicts, sometimes to the extent of people fighting. At a certain level, even the government is involved: an investor may come, they just go and say, “Here is your piece of land”. The community says, “No, this is our ancestral land. How do you just come and say you want to give it to an investor?” And sometimes lands are taken without compensation. This is what brings conflict.24

CES Government leaders maintained that the Bor Dinka had only been given permission to live in Tongping temporarily, and that they were never issued leases or deeds for plots in the area. The CES Director-General of Lands insisted, ‘They don’t have any claim at all on any land here in Juba’.25 He maintained, ‘The area was not demarcated; the area was just a village for Interview 75: James, Tongping resident / Juba / August 2008. Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Interview 23: Simon Lumori Philip, Chairman of CES Land Commission / Juba / July 2008. 25 Interview 28: Cornelious Goja Lado Kulang, Director-General of Lands, CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 27 August 2008. 20 21

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the Bari. But they were given a piece of it temporarily to stay. There are no title deeds for them, completely nothing’.26 The Bari believed that, whether or not the land had once been occupied by the Bor Dinka, anyone who had been granted a lease – by the Equatoria Region Government, or later, the Bahr el Jebel State Government, or indeed by anyone else – should be recognized as the legal owner. The Chairman of the CES Assembly Land Committee, explained: The story is that there were people displaced from Bor in 1967… they came to Juba, they were displaced there, and in 1983 the war broke out, so most of them went out. Later on that land was gazetted as a government area. Now when these people came back they said, “This is my land”. And somebody else says, “No, this land has been given to me as a plot!” [Thus] …creating these conflicts. Yes, most of them might have been displaced, but all the same, the underlying thing is that since this is gazetted area, it belongs to the government.27

The attitude of Bari leaders towards newcomers was almost wholly negative. They saw the disputes in Tongping as part of a wider phenomenon of ‘land grabbing’ in the town and surrounding Bari lands. Settlers were characterized as ‘outsiders’ who were ‘robbing’ the land, as opportunists who had come to take a piece of the capital.28 The Paramount Chief of Juba, Denis Daramalo, explained, A lot of people are coming because of the agreement of the CPA… people become free, then they come. Everyone wanted to come to the town. Of course, yes, it is being used as the capital city of Southern Sudan. Well, everybody wants to come to the capital city. Everybody wants land in the capital city, and they want land very quickly. That is why they may go and see a place and then they begin to build on it. That is forbidden! Then we, the community, we are not happy; then we have to go to the [CES Government] and say there are grabbers.29

The Chairman of the CES Land Commission, sympathized with the position in which the Bari community found itself: Up to now, there is this rush for land. Everybody wants to own a piece of land, wants to own investment land, and so on…how do you deal with the situation where everybody wants your land? And the CPA says that the land belongs to you. And the government here may also not be doing enough, really. So it’s really difficult.30

However, the Bari view on disputes over land in Tongping was slightly different from that of non-Bari CES Government leaders. According to the Ibid. Interview 23: Simon Lumori Philip, Chairman of CES Land Commission / Juba / September 2008; 28 Interview 39: Monsignor Constantino Pitya Aguata / Juba / 5 August 2008; interview 64: Denis Daramalo, Bari Chief of Tokiman; Paramount Chief of Juba / Juba / August 2008; interview 33: Albert Pitya Redentore / Juba County Commissioner / Juba /16 July 2008. 29 Interview 64: Denis Daramalo, Bari Chief of Tokiman; Paramount Chief of Juba / Juba / August 2008. 30 Interview 23: Simon Lumori Philip, Chairman of CES Land Commission / Juba / September 2008. 26 27

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Chairman of the BCA, Tongping was on the site of a village called ‘Porda’, which belonged to the Juba na Bari chieftaincy. He maintained that the Bari Paramount Chief at the time, Andrea Farjalla, agreed to the resettlement of the Bor Dinka only as a temporary measure, with the expectation that they would return to Bor when the floods subsided. The area would then revert to the people of Juba na Bari.31 Thus, it was not land that had been gazetted by the CES Government, and owned by the CES Government. This introduced another layer of complexity to the land debate, raising the question of whether ‘government’ was in favour of ethnic land rights, or using them strategically when it served a political purpose. Equatorian elites pursued a citizenship that privileged identity and historical residency, and which protected existing rights to property acquired under the previous government. For CES Government leaders, existing land tenure, law and documentation, as well as practices, were essential to maintaining authority. The increase of informal settlements jeopardized the identity of the town as the centre of a Bari homeland and an Equatorian regional hub, and thus threatened the privileged economic and political status that had protected local residents who had remained in Juba during the decades of the war. The claims of James and other excombatants in Tongping drew on their larger contribution to the liberation of Southern Sudan, and thus pursued a privileged citizenship that acknowledged their role as warriors and heroes. While ex-combatants insisted on a citizenship that would afford them new rights and status, Equatorian elites insisted on a citizenship that would prevent them from losing existing rights and status. On one level, Equatorian claims were motivated by a desire to assert historical rights, and ultimately to control land in Juba. On another level, such claims signify a response to the intrusion of the state, and a desire to mitigate its negative effects. As Leonardi argues, When Equatorians decry the notion that their land can be bought with the blood of soldiers, they are not only asserting antecedent land rights against other ethnic groups. At a deeper level of moral concern, they are resisting the appropriation of the productive resource of land into the market economy and the penetration of the military and monetary cultures of government and army into the rural refuges of kinship and productive relations.32

The prospect of state-building, which would foster the intrusion of the government and with it the market economy, military and monetary cultures, was received with apprehension and suspicion. So far, these aspirations had failed to offer tangible improvements in local life, and, given the history of violent and predatory states, they carried the real 31 Interview 28: Cornelious Goja Lado Kulang, Director-General of Lands, CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 27 August 2008; Interview 40b: Tongun Lado Rombe, Chairman of the Bari Community Association / Juba / 25 August 2008. 32 Cherry Leonardi ‘Paying “buckets of blood”for the land: moral debates over economy, war and state in Southern Sudan’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 49:2 (2011) p. 234.

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possibility of harm. Leonardi positions the SPLM’s failure to deliver benefits in the initial transition period as a motivating factor in land disputes. She maintains, ‘Since 2005, the frequently observed lack of any constructive manifestation of the anticipated peace dividend, the flimsiness of the elite economy of tent hotels, and the instability of salaries, banks and currency, seemed to epitomize the false value of the government economy’.33 For most Equatorians, the monetary economy established by the state was increasingly ‘exclusive, predatory and unreliable’. As a result, ‘Most people have had to fall back recurrently on the resources of family and rural community, even as they aspire to participate in “development” and the urban economy’.34 In this sense, resistance to land allocation in Juba was not only motivated by preventing other groups from laying claim to the resources believed to belong to the Bari peoples, but it was also a response to larger, uncontrollable, and potentially negative forces of state-building. Rather than a regressive ‘traditionalism’, therefore, Juba’s local elites have displayed a strategic caution towards an impending change that will surely distribute resources – political and economic – unevenly in the future. This explains, perhaps, why discourses of ethnicity and autochthony were so prevalent in the Interim Period, given the issues at stake in urban reconstruction. As demonstrated, they were reflective of the historical ambivalence towards the state, and consequently led to a cautionary approach towards statebuilding. Local groups acted strategically to protect themselves, in case state-building did not work in their favour, as had been the case so many times in the past.

GUDELE: THE GUDELE BLOCK 9 SETTLEMENT V. THE SISTERS OF THE SACRED HEART CONGREGATION During 2008, another dispute in an area on the periphery of Juba reflected the competing interests of a wholly different set of actors. The Gudele area is located on the northwest periphery of Juba. Like other neighbourhoods on the perimeter of the town, it had originally been the site of Bari villages, but became a military outpost when the second civil war broke out in 1983. Part of the area was surveyed during the war, and some allocations were made to residents of Juba, but potential SPLA attacks and the presence of landmines and military patrols made it an unsuitable location for building housing structures. In 1994, the Sisters of the Sacred Heart, a small local community of nuns, acquired a large plot of land – approximately 500 x 400 x 570 meters – in Block 9, through the Equatoria Region Government. Their intention was to expand their modest facilities in the centre of Juba town and build an orphanage and retirement home for nuns in the area. Yet, lacking the funds for a construction project, they never occupied or developed the plot. 33 34

Leonardi, ‘Paying “buckets of blood” for the land’, p. 232. Ibid. p. 218.

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After the CPA the Sisters began investigating options for developing facilities on the Gudele plot.35 They considered leasing out a portion of the plot to a British de-mining company, and using the funds to build on the remaining portion. Their plans were interrupted when, in 2007, they discovered a large informal settlement of returning refugees and IDPs on the site (Photograph 8). In August 2008 I interviewed one of the nuns in their main residence near the centre of Juba. Sister Melanie explained the predicament of the community of nuns, and their frustration towards the ‘squatters’: They just started coming; they just came and demarcated! One takes an area from there to there, the other one has from there to there. I went there and I found all the land was demarcated. I said to these people, “stop building! If you are making a temporary shelter because you are looking for another place, OK. But this is a proper structure!” They said to me, “if you want us to leave this land, you go to the archbishop, let him find for us a place and take us there, because we have nowhere to go”. I said, “the bishop is not in charge of land now. He cannot give you any piece of land. This land we bought it for development and it is also for your benefit”. But they would not listen.36

The Sisters initially attempted to convince them to leave the area of their own accord. However, their efforts were unsuccessful. Sister Melanie claimed that the nuns had been insulted and threatened by settlers on their various visits to the site. The nuns felt offended by the attitude of the Block 9 residents towards them, and felt they were not appreciated for the work they had done in Juba during the war years.37 Following various confrontations, the Sisters initiated a process in mid-2008 through the Juba County Commissioner’s office to evict the residents. An ad hoc demolition committee organized by the Commissioner enacted a demolition order. By then, however, the residents of Gudele Block 9 had established a resident committee, and elected a ‘block leader’ to represent them in dealings with the local government. The Gudele Block 9 Committee, began a campaign to prevent the demolition of their homes. They solicited the help of various NGOs, including the Norwegian Refugee Council and the International Rescue Committee; they met with the Minister of Physical Infrastructure of CES; and they even wrote letters of appeal to the Archbishop of Juba in an attempt to prevent the demolition of their homes. The unique predicament of the Sisters of the Sacred Heart congregation was to position their interests against disadvantaged groups while also retaining their moral authority as a charitable organization. They did this by defining their ‘community’ as those who had been ‘inside’ Juba during the war years, and distinguishing those who had been ‘outside’ as opportunists. While residents who had been ‘inside’ during the war received the church’s generosity and protection and therefore appreciated the Sisters’ contributions, those who came to Juba after the CPA, were viewed as self-serving and disingenuous. Indeed, the feeling that SouthInterview 72: Sister Melanie, Sisters of the Sacred Heart Congregation / Juba / September 2008. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 35

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8 Informal Settlement in Gudele Block 9, 2008 (© Naseem Badiey)

erners who had fled to neighbouring states as refugees had experienced less suffering during the war was pervasive amongst Juba residents. A 2001 IGAD report states that among Juban women there was ‘a fee1ing that they would have been much better cared for if they were refugees outside of the Sudan’.38 This sentiment played into the Sister’s attitudes towards the new settlers. The Sisters of the Sacred Heart is a community of two hundred nuns throughout Southern Sudan and Northern Uganda established in 1949 by a Comboni missionary. The community in Juba consists of eight nuns, and is part of the Local Dioceses of the Catholic Church, which provided essential services in Juba during the war, and played a political role few others could, such as informing human rights organizations of the names of missing individuals and abuses committed by the government.39 One of the sisters explained: ‘During the war we could have evacuated and gone to Uganda, or gone to stay with our sisters in Khartoum, but we said, “No, we cannot go. We are for the people we have to suffer with them”’.40 Although she acknowledged that they were not able to support the people ‘materially’, they felt their presence had provided important moral support. She stated, ‘In fact those who are treating us like that these are 38 Koop, ‘Grass Roots Regional Assessments – Government Controlled Areas of Sudan’, p. 61. 39 Interview 39: Monsignor Constantino Pitya Aguata / Juba / 5 August 2008. 40 Interview 72: Sister Melanie, Sisters of the Sacred Heart Congregation / Juba / September 2008.

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people who were not with us here…some were in Uganda, some were in Khartoum. When we were suffering here, they were not around. They don’t know what happened here’.41 The Sisters emphasised the illegitimacy of the illegal occupants, pointing out that they did not have legal documents, and that they were not needy. The Sister stated, ‘These people act as if they have a right to live there. Some of them, at least three-fourths are working classes. And the others build houses there and put them on rent; they are not living there.’42 The Gudele settlers were mainly returning IDPs and refugees from Kenya and Uganda. Separated form their communities, lacking ancestral claims to land in Juba, funds to acquire land through the private market, and political connections in GoSS or the CES Government, the settlers physically linked themselves to the land through occupation and construction. The ultimate goal of the settlers was to be formalized: to be issued leases for their plots in the settlement. In mid–2008 they submitted a request for documentation to the Juba County Government, but received no response. Although several NGOs advocated for them, these were largely ineffective in the face of CES and local government officials. In my visits to the community, I spoke at length to two of the community’s resident leaders: Jane, a community monitor for the International Rescue Committee in Block 9, who was coordinating with NGOs to prevent a possible demolition of the settlement; and Sarah, a member of the Gudele Bloc 9 Committee. A young woman in her thirties, Sarah lived in the settlement with her husband and her younger siblings. Originally from the nearby village of Lainya, she had lived in Juba as a child, but had no customary claims to land in the town. Following years living as a refugee in Uganda and later Kenya, in 2006, she returned to Southern Sudan. She initially lived with relatives in Yei, and then came to Juba in search of work. Once in Juba she and her family stayed with friends for a period, until she heard that plots were available in Gudele. She went to Gudele Block 9, and made an arrangement with an existing settler to divide his large plot. Following that, she went to the ‘block chief’, an elected leader in the informal settlement, who recorded her name and the location of her plot in a ledger. After that, she was considered to be ‘registered’ and moved into the settlement. While in this particular case no fee was required for settling in the community, the residents of Gudele were required to contribute from their limited resources, not only towards building materials, but also to the settlement as a whole through paying for the digging of wells and the construction of roads. In making their claims, the settlers presented themselves as vulnerable victims of war. Jane described the impossible position Gudele Block 9 many returnees found themselves in, and explained the strategy of the Committee in the face of possible demolition: If you go all over Juba you cannot even find houses for rent. And the people used all their money for building in Block 9, some people still have credits for the mate41 42

Ibid. Ibid.

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rial they borrowed for building. If you want to rent a house, they charge you six months rent in advance! And where will you get that money?43

Sarah described their plight: ‘If they come to demolish us we have nowhere to go’.44 Although the settlers acknowledged that they had customary rights to land in their home areas, they argued that going home was not a viable option, because their livelihood depended on access to employment and social services in Juba. Sarah explained, Most of the people they can’t go to their villages, like me for Lainya…I work in Juba, how do they expect me to come from Lainya and work in Juba? Because in Lainya I definitely have a place. If I go I will build my house and stay. But now I work in Juba. That is the reason why I should be here in Juba.45

The settlers justified their rights by demonstrating their willingness to improve the land by building permanent structures, and thereby contributing to the ‘development’ of the town. They detailed the improvements they had made to the land, including building structures, digging boreholes and building roads. They differentiated themselves through these activities from long-time residents like the Sisters who had multiple plots in Juba and had benefited by their relationship with the previous government. Sarah pointed out, ‘The Sisters they have not wasted even one pound for that land’.46 Although they overlooked the fact that the Sisters had paid for the land at the time that they acquired their lease, their point was that in failing to construct anything on the large plot, the sisters demonstrated that the plot was not a priority for them; they did not need it and they had no sense of urgency to develop it. Referring to the informal occupants of Gudele variably as ‘the community’ and as ‘citizens’, settlers articulated a universalist conceptualization of citizenship in which the state did not privilege ethnicity or community membership, but rather was responsible for promoting certain rights – to housing, and access to employment opportunities and social services.47 Jane maintained, ‘like any other person’, Gudele residents had the right to be in Juba, ‘because that is where the government has decided that you serve your country…in that part of the land’.48 Jane argued that the response of CES Government officials indicated a duality of rights, one for locals and another for ‘outsiders’: The message we got is that you come and stay in somebody’s place, and you do not have rights. I was living in Uganda as a refugee but at home I do not expect my people to treat me the same way, because this is where I have rights. This is where I feel I am at home. This is where I feel I am the citizen of this place. If I am a citizen of this land I should be respected more. That is the thing that is frustrating.49 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

Interview 79: Jane, Gudele Block 9 resident / Juba / 27 August 2008. Interview 73: Sarah, Gudele Block 9 resident / Juba / 30 August 2008. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Interview 79: Jane, Gudele Block 9 resident / Juba / 27 August 2008. Ibid.

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In the view of the inhabitants of the Gudele Block 9 settlement, access to land was a human right, a means of livelihood. By acquiring land informally, occupying it, and building abodes in the spaces of the urban centre, they established their status as legitimate residents of Juba, and by extension reaffirmed their identity as Southern Sudanese citizens, an identity which decades of living outside the region had diluted or put in question. These individuals had no connections to SPLM leaders of GoSS, the local elite circles of the Bari community, or to the CES Government; nor did they have funds to enter the private land market. Thus, they resorted to a universalist discourse of Southern Sudanese identity, citizenship, and human rights, arguing that the state should provide everyone in Juba with a minimum level of access to affordable housing, whether formal or informal, by allowing squatters rights in the absence of available alternatives. Attempting to escape the endless transience of refugee and IDP life, returnees sought to claim land on which they had demonstrated they were willing to build and invest, and in doing so promoted their own vision of the post-conflict state. In contrast, the sisters viewed land as a right rooted in the narrow legal and bureaucratic processes sanctioned by the state. Like other non-Bari residents who had lived in Juba during the war, the Sisters sought to uphold the rights they had acquired under the Equatoria Region Government / Bahr el Jebel State Government, regardless of the circumstances or methods by which they had acquired the land. By upholding the commitments of the previous government, their aim was not only to protect their lease titles, but also to retain their political and economic status in the rapidly changing society of Southern Sudan.

CONCLUSION The disputants in Tongping and Gudele employed several different types of claims to land, which implied different interpretations of history, drew on different conceptualizations of citizenship, and promoted differing visions of the post-conflict state. The first claim, that is, the Bari position, favoured land rights that privileged autochthony and articulated a pluralistic vision of the state, empowering communities vis-à-vis the CES Government and GoSS. It suggested an exclusive system that barred many southerners, including many long-time residents, from equal access to land in certain parts of Juba. The second claim, the CES Government position, was based on an attempt to preserve the legitimacy and authority of the previous government institutions in Juba, to protect the privileged political and economic status of local elites, and to strengthen the state government vis-à-vis GoSS. Attempts to exclude ‘outsiders’ were couched in the language of ethnic land rights, in reality a fragile alliance based on the exclusion of ‘newcomers’ between both Bari and non-Bari Equatorian elites who had status and property owing to their relationship to GoS during the war. The alliance belied very different views on land rights and control over land in the town. The third claim, made by returning IDPs,

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refugees, ex-combatants, and others who did not have ancestral claims to land, drew on universalist conceptualizations of citizenship, and demonstrated their ability to improve the land by building permanent structures, and contributing to the development of the town. Returning IDPs and refugees promoted human rights and citizenship rights, while ex-combatants presented land as a reward for those who had fought to secure it. The different views of and interests in land rights articulated by these diverse local actors drew on competing interpretations of history, and promoted distinct visions of citizenship within the post-conflict state. In the context of the CPA’s recognition of ‘community’ rights to land, claims to land based on the Bari identity had important political backing in Juba. While many of the informal settlements were illegal, they served an important socio-economic function in the rapidly changing postwar town: they responded to an acute housing shortage, providing local solutions to problems that would threaten to destabilize the local economy or to foment political instability. Yet the power of the CES Government was challenged by this influx of residents, who looked to GoSS for protection and rights as citizens of the new Southern Sudanese state. Because they represented a privileging of citizenship rights over ethnic entitlements, informal settlers became a target. They were characterized as ‘land grabbers’ who were breaking the law and endangering the rights of local citizens. An International Rescue Committee representative explained, The Governor wants to clean up Juba, and doing so requires getting IDPs out so Bari and other local people can come back in. …[CES Government officials] seem pretty interested in getting all IDPs out of the city. They were telling NGOs that it’s our job to get IDPs out, that Eastern Equatoria and Western Equatoria are secure now and these people need to get to their villages of origin. But the thing is, a lot of them don’t necessarily want to go back to their place of origin.50

CES Government leaders reacted harshly to informal inhabitants. In January 2009, following an announcement by Governor Clement Wani, state authorities commenced a large-scale demolition of informal settlements throughout the town and its peripheries. The demolitions continued for several months, and by May 2009 had left over 30,000 people homeless in the capital, prompting condemnation by the United Nations and other international agencies.51 The informal settlement in Gudele Block 9 was entirely cleared, although James’ house in Tongping was spared. While the Governor framed the demolitions as an exercise to recover ‘grabbed lands’ in the capital, informal residents whose homes and shops had been demolished, complained that they would willingly have obtained plots legally if the formal land allocation process had been accessible to them. The rapid growth of informal housing in the town’s peripheries and the subsequent attempts to demolish these settlements had deep ramifications for both urban development in Juba, and the politics of the stateInterview 59: Brennan Webert, resettlement officer, International Rescue Committee (IRC) / Juba / 29 July 2008. 51 ‘Thousands homeless as shelters demolished in Juba’, IRIN, 26 May 2009. 50

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building process. In the atmosphere of upheaval and change that characterized the immediate transition period in Juba, land disputes were an expression of struggle over who was a legitimate resident of the town and which institutions ultimately had the authority to make those decisions. The SPLM leaders of GoSS promoted an integrative conceptualization of land rights that would facilitate the development of a multi-ethnic Southern Sudanese capital, and aid in the creation of national citizenship, centred on a strong central state. Yet, preoccupied with the challenges of reconciliation and integration, and lacking housing for its own employees, GoSS was conspicuously silent on the plight of the returnees in Juba who had been encouraged to return to Southern Sudan. The protection of informal settlers was left to international actors, NGOs, and UN agencies. While these players expressed dismay at the planned evictions, they were unable to do much to help. An International Rescue Committee representative expressed frustration at the plight of returnees: What kills me is these people, they flee their home of origin…they come back to Juba trying to build their life back up. They build their house; they actually put a foundation down, and spend all their money on it, and then someone comes and says they have to get off the land! That has to be heartbreaking.52

Their views reflected international norms regarding rights to housing and protection of IDPs and refugees. As we have seen, they were far removed from local perceptions and understandings of legal practices. An Overseas Development Institute report states: At present there appear to be no adequate strategies in place to integrate IDPs who may not wish to return to their home areas. Appropriate strategies would include accelerating urban planning processes, facilitating legal access to a residential plot and investing in water and electricity services, and possibly in government-subsidised low-cost housing. Instead, urban plots occupied by IDPs are being forcibly vacated to make land available to private investors.53

Although such reports indicated the international community’s sincere desire to find solutions to the land issue in Juba, their prescriptions were out of touch with what was politically possible in the underdeveloped town. The outcome of the disputes demonstrates the relative political strength of claimants, and how their relationship to the CES Government impacted the outcome of their claims. It demonstrates that while social and political relationships are fluid and negotiable, the vulnerable are at as much of a disadvantage in local politics as they are in national politics.54 As Lund states, ‘Plurality of institutions may open alternative avenues for some – also for poorer people – but the more affluent, the Interview 59: Brennan Webert, resettlement officer, International Rescue Committee (IRC) / Juba / 29 July 2008. 53 Sara Pantuliano, The Land Question: Sudan’s Peace Nemesis (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2007), p. 8. 54 Pauline Peters, Dividing the Commons: Politics, Policy, and Culture in Botswana (Charlottesville; London: University Press of Virginia, 1994). 52

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better connected, and the more knowledgeable tend to have the upper hand in such contexts’.55 Indeed, the Gudele settlers did not fare well in relation to more power elites like the Sisters of the Sacred Heart and exSPLA soldiers. The terrain of power and privilege was complex and constantly shifting. While some non-Bari Equatorians who enjoyed privileged access to the CES Government, like the sisters, were able to use their connections to protect their property, others were less able to do so and saw their property confiscated by ‘land grabbers’ and ‘squatters’. Ultimately, irrespective of the outcomes of these particular disputes and the validity of the claims upon which they were based, they present a fleeting image of the millions of everyday encounters and negotiations through which the post-conflict state is constructed. 55 Christian Lund, ‘Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa’, Development and Change 37:4 (2006), p. 700.

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This book offers a glimpse into the local dynamics of an emerging capital city during a historically pivotal transformation, a town immersed in a process of ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ fraught with complex challenges requiring difficult compromises. Concerns that the new Republic of South Sudan might inherit and replicate the conflicts between the northern government and local communities have brought land issues to the forefront of state-building priorities. Yet it is important to look beyond the question of who ultimately gets control over land in order to see what local land debates tell us about the nascent South Sudanese state. The previous chapters have explored how the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) altered the framework of land rights in Southern Sudan, how local actors in Juba interpreted the agreement, and how these interpretations and the interests that backed them up shaped the process of urban reconstruction in the town. This analysis offers a basis for understanding the challenges that confront South Sudan’s state-builders and their international partners in the years to come. The conflictual local dynamics of land in Juba were not only about access to property and political control over territory; they were not a cynical resource grab by competing groups, organized according to ancient, identities, who did not care about the consequences of their actions on state-building. Rather, they had to do with fundamental questions regarding what would soon become the independent state of South Sudan: whose interests it would represent, how power would be shared among the south’s various groups, and how the framework of decentralization would ensure equitable rights to political power and resources. The case of Juba exemplifies how each local setting brings its own unique history, determining factors, and set of actors with specific interests to any negotiation. It illustrates how templates and standardized approaches are poor substitutes for close study and engagement with local dynamics. At the same time, Juba’s uniqueness makes it a good case from which to develop a theory of reconstruction. Certainly, it reveals how great an amount of work still needs to be done to improve such interventions. 172

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ASSESSING THE INITIAL RECONSTRUCTION PROCESS IN JUBA As the dynamics of land unfolded in the early years of the Interim Period, international advisors, and consultants in land tenure and common law worked to produce a land bill. Finally, after a two-year process, fraught with competition and conflict between aid agencies, and after a special request by the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, the Land Act was passed in early 2009.1 The Act reinforced local communities’ rights to land and vested the authority to allocate and manage these rights in traditional authorities who were to adhere to customary laws. This legislation followed other bills that consolidated the devolution of power to Southern Sudan’s diverse communities. These included the Judiciary Act of 2006, which incorporated chiefs’ courts into the formal structure of the South Sudan Judiciary, and the Local Government Act of 2009, which delineated the relationship between traditional political institutions and local government structures. Despite this legislation, by the end of the Interim Period, the Land Act had not been fully implemented and the question of who ultimately had control over the land in Juba had not been resolved.2 On 4 February 2011, in a Council of Ministers meeting chaired by President Salva Kiir, GoSS reached the decision to relocate the capital to an alternative site. The option of Ramciel resurfaced. A process was initiated by the to GoSS Ministry of Housing, Land, and Public Utility to conduct feasibility studies, environmental and social impact assessment, seismic analysis, soil investigation, surveying, mapping, and land use planning exercises, in the area proposed for the new capital.3 The decision to relocate the capital was blamed on the opposition of the local Bari community to the expansion of the town into surrounding villages, lack of access to land for investors, GoSS projects and housing development, and disputes over jurisdiction between levels of government.4 On 31 March 2011, Governor Clement Wani issued five decrees establishing a Juba City Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly, Public session:‘Urgent and important matter on allocation of land in Juba to beneficiaries’, Juba, 11 August 2008. 2 For analysis completed before the referendum, see: Oystein Rolandsen, ‘Why is violence escalating in Southern Sudan?’ Noref Policy Brief No. 2, Norwegian Peacebuilding Center, February 2010. 3 The Korean Land Housing Corporation won a contract to conduct surveys and carry out the feasibility study of the area. In April of 2012, they submitted an initial report outlining the goals and general framework for the construction of a new capital. See: Josh Kron, ‘Amid Fighting, South Sudan Plans New Capital’, New York Times, 3 September 2011; ‘Survey of new South Sudan capital Ramciel to complete in six months’, Sudan Tribune 5 April 2012; Christian Doll, ‘Then We Will Benefit’: Utopic Expectations and the Enactment of Sovereignty in Ramciel, South Sudan’, (Panel Paper) presented at the Sudan Studies Association Conference, University of Pennsylvania, May 2013; Christian Doll, ‘Inception Report for the Consultancy Services for Mapping and Surveying and Conducting a Feasibility Study for Ramchiel [sic] New Capital City of the Republic of South Sudan’, Report for the Korea Land & Housing Corporation and the Ministry of Housing and Physical Planning, the Republic of South Sudan. April 2012. 4 ‘South Sudan to establish a new capital city and relocate from Juba after independence’, Sudan Tribune. 6 February 2011. 1

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Council to be headed by the new office of Mayor.5 The former payams of Juba, Kator, and Munuki would be consolidated into Juba City. Ostensibly, control over the town had been decided, while the future of the capital of Southern Sudan remained uncertain. Despite the lack of resolution over land rights and the failure of the implementation of urban plans, reconstruction in Juba continued apace, albeit in an ad hoc fashion. New housing developments were constructed, new roads were built, and an uneasy compromise was reached. Major interests were not threatened, and key state-building questions remained unresolved, such as the relationship between key local groups and their relationship to the evolving state. These were left to be worked out in the daily practices of the town’s inhabitants and its political leaders. As the possibility of Southern Sudanese independence grew nearer, and as more and more people came to the town in search of what the new country had to offer, it became clear that Juba would remain, at least for the time being, the capital of South Sudan. The question of relocating Juba was put on the back burner as other concerns – the financial crisis, the cessation of the oil pipeline, and intraSouth conflict – took precedence over building a ‘modern’ capital city. The narrative of reconstruction that I have presented began with three key groups who figured prominently in the local politics of Juba in the first half of the Interim Period. The SPLM was an internally-divided rebel movement in the midst of a difficult process of transformation. Amidst ongoing insecurity, individuals who had been military leaders all their lives had to extend themselves far beyond their abilities and ideological convictions to maintain internal cohesion and confront a massive statebuilding project. The leaders of the Central Equatoria State (CES) Government were local elites who were attempting to reconcile a past of cooperation with the Government of Sudan (GoS) while carving out economic and political positions in the new southern state. The various leaders of the Bari community had achieved a certain status in the local sphere through the difficult years of war. Now they were attempting to preserve their political institutions in the face of immense socio-cultural change in a territory that they considered to be their homeland. Added to these three key groups were a diverse mix of southerners – refugees returning from neighbouring states, internally displaced persons (IDPs), ex-combatants, and many from the diaspora – all coming to Juba in search of work, opportunity, and ultimately a new home. These men and women looked to Southern Sudan’s leaders to fulfil the promise of citizenship in a new Southern Sudanese state, one which entailed rights that had been central to their years of hardship and struggle. Some of the groups I have presented were more successful in their aims than others. In the first half of the Interim Period, the SPLM overcame several challenges, including a successful transfer of power to Salva Kiir following the death of John Garang. The rapidly changing organization managed to ride out the ideological and internal consequences of this 5 ‘CES Governor Appoints Mayor For Juba City Council’, Gurtong Trust. 3 April 2011.

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leadership change. Yet internal conflict continued to plague the organization in the second half of the Interim Period, particularly as its model of south-south reconciliation created a degree of heterogeneity within the organization that was difficult to manage as the work of building a functioning and competitive political party began. Following several public fallouts between southern leaders, including the ouster of Vice President Riek Machar in April in the summer of 2013, President Salva Kiir sacked his entire cabinet, the Secretary General of the SPLM, and various other high-ranking government officials and military leaders.6 Then, in November, Kiir dissolved party structures – the Political Bureau and the National Liberation Council – and postponed the SPLM’s national convention. Amidst Kiir’s purges, violence broke out in December between the SPLA forces under the president’s control and forces loyal to ousted Vice President Riek Machar. The violence spilled into Juba’s neighbourhoods, and took on a disturbingly ethnic nature, as Dinka soldiers targeted Nuer fighters and civilians. Kiir publicly declared that his men had thwarted a coup attempt, and arrested thirteen senior SPLM leaders. The following months brought the new country to the brink of civil war. At the time of writing the crisis has not yet been fully resolved. The SPLM’s plans for transforming Juba into a ‘modern’, multi-ethnic capital city within the six-year time-frame of the Interim Period were ultimately unsuccessful. The SPLM, in its first act as the ruling party of a regional government, confronted the first (but by no means the last) failure in realizing its goals. The leaders of the CES Government and Bari community, in alliance, managed to obstruct the SPLM agenda for urban reconstruction in Juba. CES Government leaders were successful in carving out a jurisdiction for the CES Government, and in protecting the status of local elites who had been formerly aligned with the northern government. Their efforts – whether interpreted as a cynical play for power on the part of former ‘collaborators’, or a sincere attempt to protect local interests – had a profound impact on the state-building process. They set a standard for the relationship between GoSS and the ten states, and served as a template for how the decentralized state would function. Bari community leaders in their own right set the standard for the protection of community lands throughout South Sudan. Yet, following the CPA, they watched helplessly as massive in-migration marked the inevitable transformation of Juba and its surrounding areas. They were relegated to yet one more group among many in the urban centre of a territory they considered to be their homeland. The success of powerful local interests in Juba exposed the limits of the regional state’s power, and revealed the problems in the SPLM’s statebuilding agenda. Yet the power of urbanization proved stronger than local alliances. Despite huge difficulties, the town continued to develop to meet the new requirements of an independent South Sudan. As the process unfolded, and the town gradually became a city with a large aid community, scores of journalists, migrant workers from neighbouring states, Simon Tisdall, ‘South Sudan president sacks cabinet in power struggle’, UK Guardian, 24 June 2013; ‘South Sudan’s Salva Kiir sacks cabinet’, BBC, 24 June 2013.

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investors, and even researchers, those groups changed. However, this snapshot from the initial transition period offers a sense of what was at stake at the local level in reconstruction, and the incredible amount of ingenuity that local stakeholders employed in resolving disputes, managing competing interests, and ultimately in negotiating a new state.

RETHINKING RECONSTRUCTION The international relations paradigm looks for answers in modes of intervention, formulations of the ‘problem’ and assessments of the needs of postconflict settings; but little thought is given to how these interventions, modes of thinking, and framing of reconstruction interact with existing social, political, and economic dynamics at the local level. In the prevailing approaches to reconstruction, the atmosphere of contestation in Juba reflects a failure of policy: not enough funds, poor management and coordination of policies, and lack of ‘political will’ and ‘capacity’ to absorb the resources, training, and advice of international agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The severe underdevelopment in Southern Sudan makes this argument hard to refute. If there were any place that was incapable of absorbing help due to sheer lack of infrastructure, education, skills, and social capital, it would be Southern Sudan. In such a situation, only better institutions and policies would solve the problems of Juba. However, this book does refute the notion that reconstruction is primarily an international or even national matter, a technical problem that can be solved through foreign expertise and ‘capacity building’. Neither the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), nor the Joint-Assessment Mission (JAM) framework could deliver reconstruction to Southern Sudan. The delays in urban development in Juba did not represent merely a failure of policy or approach; they were not the result of technical problems with reconstruction programmes, capacity limitations, technological backwardness, or even lack of resources. The tense process of integration, the competing interpretations of the CPA, the nuances of land allocation and management, and the disputes over land in the town, all challenge the idea of a monolithic regional state with the power to implement reconstruction seamlessly and benevolently. The conflicts over land and political jurisdiction had little if anything to do with the policies of the aid industry. Local dynamics in Juba during the Interim Period illustrate that state-building is not limited to something that international actors come and do; it is not a template or a set of policies, a matter of drafting legislation, or locating resources. Rather, the case of Juba demonstrates that state-building operates as much from the ‘bottom up’: in the interpretations and reactions of local actors – as it does from the ‘top down’: in the policies and programmes of national and international state-builders. It is a social process of negotiation, discussion, dispute, debate, and interpretation, through which political authority is established, institutions are endowed with legitimacy, and laws are given meaning. This process, which involves a range of actors with different identities, experiences of

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war, and interests in the post-conflict period, is how the state slowly comes into being. Although the debates I have recounted delayed progress in urban development, and threatened to derail the SPLM reconstruction agenda, they also demonstrate that actors at a variety of levels of the ‘state’ and ‘society’ in Southern Sudan were actively engaged in negotiating the state, and thus setting the parameters for debates going forward. In this sense, the case of Juba suggests that insofar as conflictual dynamics are indicative of the state-building process, they may in fact be constructive to post-conflict reconstruction. Certainly, in the case of Juba it indicated that actors were using the resources at their disposal to work out their political power relative to competitors, or to refashion identities in order to gain advantages. In this sense, local debates, over land and/or other political resources, can affirm identities, transform relationships, build legitimacy for new institutions, and engender fundamental renegotiations of national identity and the relationship of citizens to the state and to ‘stateness’. Thus, the debates over land in Juba in the Interim Period have been constructive insofar as they have allowed groups to work out identities and relationships in the post-conflict setting, and helped to build a common vision of reconstruction and of the post-conflict state from very diverging narratives and subjectivities. The divisions of the Addis Ababa period and of wartime needed to be resolved if there could be a chance to build a South Sudanese national identity, and if the project of building the institutions of a legitimate southern state could succeed. There was no alternative solution to these historical divisions but to work them out on a day-to-day basis, airing grievances, and allowing competing claims to state power to be negotiated. The meaning of the CPA, and its implications for the framework of land tenure, needed to be worked out by southerners themselves, on street corners, in schools, and amongst politicians. It could not be just something that foreign land tenure advisors drafted in a policy document, after limited consultations, paying lip service to ‘participation’. The citizens of Southern Sudan had to figure out how to live together, and come to terms with the realities of who was stronger and had more control over the state, for better or worse. The fact that questions regarding the nature of citizenship, the relationship of locals to the state, and the nature of ‘community’ were not resolved right away was a good thing in terms of what it suggests about South Sudan’s potential for allowing multiple voices and interests to shape its ‘democracy’. The institutional framework upon which the state was being built was problematic, but it was functioning for many at the local level. The state was not being built in a vacuum, but in a system built over years of struggle. As a result of the strategies and actions of the diverse agents engaged in the debates over land and political authority, the state that began to emerge from these processes was the product of a wide set of interests that reflected different views of the wars and different ideas about the status of Juba as the capital of the Republic of South Sudan. It was the result of negotiations that were legitimized by multiple authorities, and therefore accountable to a much broader segment of South Sudanese society. That

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is not to say that the new state of South Sudan would be without its problems; only that it rested on a foundation of meaningful dialogue and debate over power, rights, and resources. Working out identities and relationships does not guarantee a lasting peace. In Juba, Bari leaders’ success in asserting community rights to land, and CES Government leaders’ success in asserting the power of the local state, came at the expense of returning IDPs and refugees who sought to settle in the new capital of Southern Sudan. In light of the 2009 demolitions, and those that came after, it is clear that there are both ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in this process, and local elites are in some cases responsible for the tragic consequences for vulnerable groups. Control over land buttresses the reconstruction agendas of certain groups and institutions, while dashing the agendas of other groups. Seeing the struggle over control of land as a ‘continuing conversation’, as a negotiation over competing agenda that is fundamental to understanding the process of state-making, should not therefore lead to a denial of the fact that the exercise of power can produce real losers and exclusions, ones which end conversations and mark ruptures, especially in conflict situations.7 Indeed, outcomes can also be unproductive, the identities that are reinforced are sometimes exclusionary, the relationships that are forged are sometimes coercive, and issues are often left unresolved.8 There is also no guarantee that the potential for internal divisions – fodder for the everpresent interference of Khartoum – may not thwart the possibility for consensus. Therefore, while negotiation is certainly a factor in building a stable democratic state, a constructive outcome must not be taken for granted. Nevertheless, although most inhabitants of informal settlements were ultimately unsuccessful in securing rights to land in the capital, and many found themselves in dire straits, they spoke out, attempting to justify their presence in Juba, and to assert their rights to housing and access to employment as citizens of Southern Sudan. In doing so, and despite the outcomes, they asserted a position for themselves in the new state, and played an important role in shaping the debate. It is impossible to predict what the future holds for the newly independent Republic of South Sudan, or to foretell how the local debates over land in Juba will shape the reconstruction process. Various outcomes for the town of Juba are possible. Despite the decision to relocate the capital, the SPLM’s control of the state apparatus may lead it to create the core of a strong central state in Juba. Indeed, the continuing construction of GoSS institutions in the town is evidence that this may be the direction in which South Sudan is going. It is also possible that the Bari community may wield considerable influence in determining the expansion of the town. In this scenario the commitment to community land rights may present a significant check on centralization towards either GoSS or the CES Peters, Dividing the Commons; Christian Lund, Local Politics and the Dynamics of Property in Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 700. Christian Lund, ‘Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa’, Development and Change 37:4 (2006), p. 70. 8 For this point I am indebted to Dr Ricardo Soares de Oliveira. 7

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Government. Such a trend speaks to wider experiences in other African countries, where attempts to incorporate customary rights within a national legal framework, especially given high degrees of social, political, and economic differentiation, have also proved challenging. Yet another likelihood is that a strong division of powers between GoSS and the states leads to a federal system in which tensions over entitlement and belonging contribute towards a centrifugal dynamic, as observed in Nigeria. In such a scenario, Juba may become the centre of regional opposition to the South Sudanese state. However, the concentration of power in the GoSS executive and the channelling of international funding through the GoSS level of government, make this an unlikely scenario. At the local level, the implications of the devolution of authority for the relationship between the states and customary authorities are unclear. Although elsewhere in Africa, such as in Ghana, chiefs have been able to parlay customary authority over land into economic and political power at the local level, the separation of ownership and control in the CES Government’s interpretation of land rights in Juba raises the possibility of a different outcome in South Sudan. Finally, an unlikely scenario, given the fate of returnees thus far, will be that debates over land are decided in favour of the needs and numbers of returnees: refugees, IDPs, and excombatants. These vulnerable groups, positioned within high-profile categories, may achieve their aims as a result of pressure from international agencies or human rights groups. On the other hand, ex-combatants may gain a privileged position as a result of SPLM leaders’ calculated strategy, as was the case with Zanu (PF) in Zimbabwe. It is also likely that each group will be able to wield its state-building resources – not least of which is its distinct understanding of land rights – towards achieving a stable, and hopefully durable, compromise. While it is not yet clear what the future for Juba will be, wherever the capital of South Sudan ends up, it is certain that the process of state-building will have to contend with the contingencies of the local settings in which reconstruction is taking place. In its fragmented communities and colliding political cultures, Juba is an archetype of the post-conflict city. In its exceptionalism, it highlights the gaps in our current understanding of how state-building unfolds. The debates over land and disputes over political jurisdiction which characterized the early transition period in Juba, reveal state-building to be an inherently negotiable and conflictual process, one which entails reconciling the past with dynamic relations in the present, and forging a collective memory (or collective forgetting) into a new national identity. It is not just an elitedriven process but is shaped by a variety of actors with competing interests. These dynamics are at the root of state-making: we need to understand them as part of the process of the state, rather than as problems which compete with building the state. Applying a new conceptualization of the state to post-conflict reconstruction requires engaging with the highly situated, and constantly shifting realities that reconstruction engenders, and understanding the locally-rooted knowledge brought to bear in contesting competing reconstruction agendas. Doing so will make it possible to highlight innovative paths to positive change, and lasting peace.

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The following is a list of interviews conducted during fieldwork in Khartoum, Juba, and Nairobi in 2006, and Juba in 2008. Interviews were either recorded and later transcribed, or taken down in note form. Each respondent is numbered; the letters a/b/c/d indicates subsequent interviews with the same respondent. When only the respondent’s first name is included, it indicates that a pseudonym is being used. Following the name of the respondent is their title and/or occupation and then the location and date of the interview. Further relevant descriptive information about the respondent is provided, if available. This list reflects many of the men and women whose insights and perspectives constitute the basis of the analysis in this book. I am deeply grateful to them for their assistance and collaboration on this project. Any errors and omissions in the final product are my own.

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Interview 1: George Boreng Nyombe, GoNU Minister of Foreign Trade / Khartoum / 31 July 2006. Interview 2: Deng Alor Kuol, GoNU Minister for Cabinet Affairs; SPLA Lt General (Retd) / Khartoum / 29 July 2006. Interview 2b: Deng Alor Kuol, GoNU Minister for Cabinet Affairs; SPLA Lt General (Retd) / Khartoum / 31 July 2006. Interview 3: Ruben Madol, Justice, Supreme Court of Southern Sudan / Juba / 31 August 2006. Interview 3b: Ruben Madol, Justice, Supreme Court of Southern Sudan / Juba / August 2008. Interview 4: Thomas Cirillo, SPLA Lt General; Commander of Joint Integrated Units (JIU) /Juba / 4 September 2006. Interview 4b: Thomas Cirillo, SPLA Lt General; Commander of Joint Integrated Units (JIU) / Juba / August 2008. Interview 4c: Thomas Cirillo, SPLA Lt General; Commander of Joint Integrated Units (JIU) / Juba / 20 September 2008. Interview 5: Paul Mayom, Advisor to the President; SPLA Brigadier General (Retd) / Juba / July 2006. Interview 6: Pagan Amum, SPLM Secretary-General; Lt General SPLA (Retd), Member of Parliament / Juba / 19 August 2006. Interview 6b: Pagan Amum, SPLM Secretary-General; Lt General SPLA (Retd), Member of Parliament / Juba / 22 August 2006. Interview 7: Peter Wal, Director-General for Internal Affairs, Police & Security, GoSS Ministry of the Interior; SPLA Lt General (Retd) / Juba / 1 Sept 2006. Interview 8: James Wani Igga, Speaker of the Southern Sudan Legislative

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Assembly; Lt General, SPLA (Retd) / Juba / 2 September 2006. Interview 8b: James Wani Igga, Speaker of the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly; Lt General, SPLA (Retd) / Juba / August 2008. Interview 9: Michael Makwei, GoSS Minister of Constitutional and Legal Affairs / Juba / 24 August 2006. Interview 10: Elijah Alier Ayom, Executive Director of Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SRRC); Ministry of Public Services and Human Resources Development; SPLA Brigadier General (Retd) / Juba / 30 August 2006. Interview 11: Eliaba, Manager, Southern Sudan Commission for Census, Statistics & Evaluation / Juba / August 2006. Interview 12: Daniel Awet, GoSS Minister of the Interior; SPLA Lt General (Retd) / Juba / 1 September 2006. Interview 13: David Deng Athorbi, GoSS Minister of Public Services and Human Resources Development / Juba /11 August 2006. Interview 14: Anthony Lino Makana, GoSS Minister of Trade and Commerce / Juba / 18 August 2006. Interview 14b: Anthony Lino Makana, GoSS Minister of Trade and Commerce / Juba / 21 August 2006. Interview 15: Peter Pur, Liason Officer of Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SRRC) / Nairobi / 14 Sept 2006. Interview 16: Riek Machar, Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan / Juba / 2 August 2008. Interview 16b: Riek Machar, Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan / Juba / 28 August 2008. Interview 17: John Luk Jok, GoSS Minister of Energy and Mining / Juba / 10 September 2008. Interview 18: Raymond Pitya Morbe, Undersecretary, GoSS Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment / 7 August 2008. Interview 19: Secretary-General, GoSS Ministry of Constitutional Legal Affairs / Juba / August 2008. Interview 20: Deng Biong, Legal Advisor, GoSS Ministry of Constitutional and Legal Affairs / Juba / 7 August 2008. Interview 21: Clement Wani Konga, Governor of Central Equatoria State / Juba / 6 September 2006. Interview 22: Martin Elia, CES Minister of Agriculture; Chairman, Southern Sudan Democratic Forum (SSDF) / Juba / 22 August 2006. Interview 23: Simon Lumori Philip, Chairman of CES Land Commission / Juba / July 2008. Late thirties, Kakwa. From Morobo County. Interview 23b: Simon Lumori Philip, Chairman of CES Land Commission / Juba / September 2008. Interview 24: Louis Silvino Tombe, Director, CES Survey Department / Juba / 22 August 2008. In Survey Department since 1982. Interview 25: Wani Buyu Dyori, Director-General, CES Ministry of Finance, Economics and Manpower / Juba / 15 September 2008. Interview 26: Emmanuel Waga Elia, CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 22 July 2008. Appointed as a Minister of Physical Infrastructure, on 22 November, 2007. A former Anyanya officer integrated into SAF. Interview 27: Joel, Land Officer, CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 24 July 2008. Interview 28: Cornelious Goja Lado Kulang, Director-General of Lands, CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 27 August 2008. Mundari. Started working as a town planner in 1975. Later received a postgraduate diploma in London School of Architecture’s Town Planning Unit. Interview 29: Lewis Gore George, Director-General of Housing and Construction, CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 21 July 2008. Interview 29b: Lewis Gore George, Director-General of Housing and Construction,

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CES Ministry of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 22 July 2008. Interview 30: Alikaya Aligo Samson, former CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 11 August 2008. Mid-forties, Kakwa. SPLM member, formerly in SPLM technical committee based in Kampala. Interview 30b: Alikaya Aligo Samson, former CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba / 17 August 2008. Interview 30c: Alikaya Aligo Samson, former CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba /12 September 2008. Interview 30d: Alikaya Aligo Samson, former CES Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Land and Housing / Juba /18 September 2008. Interview 31: Robert Lado Loki, Chairman of the Southern Sudan Land Commission / Juba / 7 August 2008. Interview 32: Alfred Keri Loko, former Juba County Commissioner (1995–1998) / Juba / August 2008. Bari from Aguada and Koji. Southern Bari from family of hereditary chiefs. Taught etymology at Juba University in Khartoum. Interview 33: Albert Pitya Redentore, Juba County Commissioner / Juba / 16 July 2008. Southern Bari. Originally secretary of the SPLM in the county from 5 Sept 2006 until he became acting commissioner on 30 July 2007. Administrative Officer in the Bahr el Jebel State Government. Interview 34: Omar Pitya Wusong, former Juba County Commissioner (2001–2003) / Juba / 2 September 2008. Bari from Mongalla. Graduated in 1975 from the University of Khartoum, then seconded to the Jonglei Canal project. From 1995– 1998 he was Secretary-General of the Bahr el Jebel state government under Agnes Lokudo (1994–1997) and Henry Jada (1997–2001). Interview 35: Peter Jenkins Jaden, former Juba County Commissioner (2004–2007) / Juba / 18 August 2008. Graduated from Juba University, Khartoum in 1982. Joined SPLA in 1989. Interview 36: Sean, Rejaf Payam Administrator / Juba / 25 July 2008. Interview 37: Franco Elhag Natana, Munuki Payam Administrator / Juba / 5 September 2008. Appointed in 2002, at which time he was transferred from Northern Bari to Munuki. Originally from Katigiri. Attended Juba University. Interview 38: Margaret Peter Budi, MP Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly (NCP member) / Juba / 11 August 2006. Bari from Juba. Interview 39: Monsignor Constantino Pitya Aguata / Juba / 5 August 2008. Bari from Sindiru. 60+ years old. Studied pastoral law and administration in East Africa. Descended from Pitya Lugor. Member of the Executive Committee of Bari Community Association. Interview 40: Tongun Lado Rombe, Chairman of the Bari Community Association / Juba / July 2008. Mid-forties, Bari. Former NCP member. Interview 40b: Tongun Lado Rombe, Chairman of the Bari Community Association / Juba / 25 August 2008. Interview 41: Alfred Keri Lokuji, Professor, Center for Peace and Development, Juba University / Juba / 15 August 2008. Mid-forties. Interview 41b: Alfred Keri Lokuji, Professor, Center for Peace and Development, Juba University / Juba / 21 August 2008. Interview 42: Venansio Muludyang, Professor, Juba University / Juba / August 2008. Mid-forties, Bari from Gondokoro. Interview 42b: Venansio Muludyang, Professor, Juba University / Juba / August 2008. Interview 43: Paul Lado Demetre, Member of Bari Youth Committee / Juba / 25 August 2008. Early twenties, Bari. Interview 44: Caleb, Kator resident / Juba / 3 August 2006. Thirty years old. Teacher. Interview 44b: Caleb, Kator resident / Juba / 10 August 2006. Interview 44c: Caleb, Kator resident / Juba / 2 September 2006. Interview 44d: Caleb, Kator resident / Juba / 16 July 2008. Interview 44e: Caleb, Kator resident / Juba / 14 August 2008. Interview 45: Peter Samuel Moga, Advocate / Juba / 4 August 2006. Early fifties, Bari.

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Interview 46: Mattia, Administrator, Norwegian Church Aid / Juba / August 2006. Interview 47: Tom Rhodes, Editor, Juba Post / Juba / 10 August 2006. Interview 48: Bol, administrative assistant, UNOCHA / Juba / 1 September 2006. Mid-twenties, Southern Sudanese. Interview 49: Franco Sanchez, NDI consultant / Juba / 23 August 2006. Mid-thirties, European. Interview 50: Ron Isaacson, Multi Donor Trust Fund, World Bank / Juba / 28 August 2006. Mid-fifties. Interview 51: Michael Honnigstein, Economic and Political Affairs Advisor, Department of State, acting US Consul-General, Sudan, US Compound / Juba / 24 August 2006. Interview 52: David Joy, UNOCHA / Juba / 25 August 2006. Interview 53: David Gressley, Resident Coordinator, UN Office of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) / Juba / 5 September 2006. Interview 54: Allen Reed, Director, USAID Sudan / Juba / 26 August 2006. Interview 55: Tom Bell, BearingPoint consultant, Advisor to GoSS Ministry of Constitutional Legal Affairs / Juba / August 2008. Interview 56: Oumar Sylla, Land Tenure Advisor; consultant to the GoSS Ministry of Constitutional Legal Affairs; seconded to the Southern Sudan Land Commission / Juba / 15 July 2008. Interview 56b: Oumar Sylla, Land Tenure Advisor; consultant to the GoSS Ministry of Constitutional Legal Affairs; seconded to the Southern Sudan Land Commission / Juba / 28 July 2008 Interview 56c: Oumar Sylla, Land Tenure Advisor; consultant to the GoSS Ministry of Constitutional Legal Affairs; seconded to the Southern Sudan Land Commission, Juba / 28 July 2008. Interview 57: Jean Kyazze, World Bank consultant on investment law / Juba / 28 August 2008. Interview 58: Peter Baumann, Coordinator of the Technical Team of the Southern Sudan Land Commission; seconded from UNDP / Juba / September 2008. Interview 59: Brennan Webert, resettlement officer, International Rescue Committee (IRC) / Juba / 29 July 2008. Interview 60: Asbjorn Lode, aid worker, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) / Juba / 25 August 2008. Interview 61: Hans-Christian Vejby, Creative Associates International / Juba / 23 August 2006. Mid-forties, European. Interview 61b: Hans-Christian Vejby, Creative Associates International / 28 August 2006. Interview 62: Severino Wani Soko, Bari elder; architectural engineer / Juba / 28 August 2008. Interview 63: Henry Wani, Bari Chief of Lobonok / Juba / August 2008. 60+ years old, Southern Bari. Interview 64: Denis Daramalo, Bari Chief of Tokiman; Paramount Chief of Juba / Juba / 20 August 2008. Interview 65: Libero Lado Lago, Bari Chief of Sindiru / Juba / 4 August 2008. Interview 66: Kuc John Akot, Acting President of the Court of Appeal, Greater Equatoria Circuit, Judiciary of Southern Sudan / Juba / 21 July 2008. Interview 67: George Lado Tartisio, Justice of the Court of Appeal, Greater Equatoria Circuit, Judiciary of Southern Sudan / Juba /15 July 2008. Appointed a judge in Khartoum in 1990. Interview 68: Justice Atillo Fuad, Justice of Supreme Court of South Sudan / Juba / 21 July 2008. Interview 69: Anthony Sebit Natana, Chief Administrator, Judiciary of Southern Sudan / Juba / 21 July 2008. Interview 70: Frances Taban Kitara, Assistant Registrar, Judiciary of Southern Sudan / Juba / 25 July 2008. Appointed to this position in 1995 by Department of Judiciary.

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Interview 71: Elliot, Juba resident; former White House prisoner / Juba / 8 September 2008. Interview 72: Sister Melanie, Sisters of the Sacred Heart Congregation / Juba / September 2008. Mid-fifties. Interview 73: Sarah, Gudele Block 9 resident / Juba / 30 August 2008. Interview 74: Lucas, Riverside plot owner / Juba / 15 September 2008. Mid-forties, Bari. Interview 75: James, Tongping resident / Juba / 10 August 2008. Late-thirties, Nuer from Upper Nile. Interview 75b: James, Tongping resident / Juba / 26 August 2008 Interview 75c: James, Tongping resident / Juba / 2 September 2008 Interview 76: John, Kator resident / Juba / 19 August 2008. Early-thirties, Nuer. Interview 76b: John, Kator resident / Juba / 26 August 2008. Interview 77: Sylvester, Gondokoro resident / Juba / August 2008. Fifty-seven years old. Bari mechanic. Former White House prisoner. Interview 78: Joel, SupLibya Market vendor / Juba / August 2008. Early-twenties. Former Customs Market merchant. Returning refugee from Uganda. Interview 79: Jane, Gudele resident and Block 9 Committee member / Juba / 27 August 2008. Mid–20s, Pojulu from Lainya. Returning refugee from Kenya. Interview 80: Local teacher / Juba / 16 July 2008. Mid-forties, Bari. Interview 81: Gerald, SPLA commander / Juba / September 2008. Early-forties. Bari. Interview 82: Frank, Local UN employee / Juba / August 2008. Late-forties. Dinka. Former SPLA commander. Interview 83: Bettina, nurse-midwife / Juba / August 2006. Late-fifties. Latuka. Interview 84: Stuart, SPLM member / Juba / 11 August 2008. Late-forties. Kakwa. Interview 84b: Stuart, SPLM member / Juba / 17 August 2008. Interview 84c: Stuart, SPLM member / Juba / 12 September 2008. Interview 85: Duncan, Juba University Professor / Juba / August 2008. Interview 85b: Duncan, Juba University Professor, Juba. August 2008. Interview 86: Elijah, Land Commissioner, Juba Payam / Juba / 2 September 2006. Mid-fifties. Bari. Post-grad dissertation in London, Masters in Khartoum. Interview 87: Josiah, SPLM member / Juba / 7 August 2008. Former SPLM lawyer. Early-forties. Dinka. Interview 88: Clarence, Director-General, CES Government / Juba / July 2008. Interview 89: Ferdinand von Hapsburg, UNDP manager / Juba / August 2008. Interview 90: Momodou Dibba, UNDP Progam Manager / Juba / 31 July 2008. Interview 91: Susan, National Democratic Institute (NDI) / Juba / 1 September 2006. Interview 92: Paul Savage, PACT Sudan / Juba / 17 August 2006. Group interviews Interview 93: Group interview with northern Sudanese journalists / Khartoum / 29 July 2006. Interview 94: Bari Chiefs’ community meeting: George Morino and other Bari chiefs / Juba / 5 September 2006. Interview 95: Group interview with aid workers: Charlie, UNOPS; Frank UNHCR; Marie, UNOCHA / Juba / 19 August 2006. Interview 96: Group interview with GoSS managers: Peter, accountant, GoSS Vice President’s office; Warren, manager, GoSS Secretariat; John, assistant, GoSS / Juba / 5 September 2008. Interview 96b: Group interview with GoSS managers: Peter, accountant, GoSS Vice President’s office; Warren, manager, GoSS Secretariat; John, assistant, GoSS; Devan, manager, GoSS Ministry / Juba / 7 September 2008. Interview 96c: Group interview with GoSS managers: Peter, accountant, GoSS Vice President’s office; Warren, manager, GoSS Secretariat; John, assistant, GoSS; Devan, manager, GoSS Ministry / Juba / 11 September 2008.

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Interview 97: Group interview with residents of MTC: Latuka SPLA officer, earlyforties, 2 Latuka women, mid-fifties; Latuka man, late-fifties; Latuka man, early-thirties; Lokoya woman, early-twenties. Juba. 16 August 2006. Interview 97b: group interview with residents of MTC: Latuka SPLA officer, early forties; 2 Latuka women, mid-fifties; Latuka man, late-fifties; Latuka man, early-thirties; Lokoya woman, early-thirties, Juba. 15 September 2006.

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DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES, THINK TANKS, AND NGOS (BY AUTHOR/ORGANIZATION) African National Union. ‘The Memorandum presented by the Sudan African National Union to the Commission of the O.A.U. for Refugees’. Kampala, November 1964. African Rights. ‘Great Expectations: the civil roles of the churches of southern Sudan’. Discussion Paper 6 (1995); African Rights. ‘Imposing Empowerment Aid and Civil Institutions in Southern Sudan’. Discussion Paper 7 (1995).

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Akechak Jok, Aleu, Robert Leitch, and Carrie Vandewint. ‘A Study of Customary Law in Contemporary Southern Sudan’. World Vision International and the South Sudan Secretariat of Legal and Constitutional Affairs, March 2004. Clark, Giles and David Dowell. A Framework for Reforming Urban Land Policies in Developing Countries. Policy Paper, United Nations Development Programme/ United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat)/World Bank-sponsored Urban Management Programme, 1996. Commission on Human Security. Human Security Now, 2003. Available at: http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport. Creative Associates International. Juba Assessment Report. November 2005. De Witt, Paul. ‘Land and Property Study in Sudan’, Report jointly funded by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), United Nations High Commission For Refugees (UNHCR), and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NCR), December 2004. De Witt, Paul. ‘Land and Property Study in Sudan: Scoping of issues and questions to be addressed’. Interim Report, 2004. Dobbins, James et al. The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building, Rand Corporation, 2007. Doll, Christian. ‘Inception Report for the Consultancy Services for Mapping and Surveying and Conducting a Feasibility Study for Ramchiel [sic] New Capital City of the Republic of South Sudan’. Report for the Korea Land & Housing Corporation and the Ministry of Housing and Physical Planning, the Republic of South Sudan, April 2012. Duffield, Mark et al. ‘Sudan Emergency Operations Committee Consortium (SEOC): A Review’. February 1995. Es-Sir Mahjoub, Taj. ‘Planning for reconstruction: the Joint Assessment Mission (2006)’ Conciliation Resources. Available at: http://www.c-r.org/our-work/ accord/sudan/joint-assessment-mission.php. [Accessed on: 31 July 2009]. European Union. ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy’, (December 2003). Farvacque, Catherine and Patrick McAuslan. Reforming Urban Land Policies and Institutions in Developing Countries. The World Bank, Urban Management Program, 1992. Fox, William. Fiscal Decentralization in Post-conflict Countries. Best Practice Paper, Fiscal Reform and Economic Governance Project, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), December 2007. Gore, Paul Wani et al., ‘Analysis of Nine Conflicts in Sudan’, UNICEF, May 2003. Huggins, Chris and Jenny Clover. From the Ground Up: Land Rights, Conflict and Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa. A joint project of the African Centre for Technology Studies and the African Security Analysis Programme of the Institute for Security Studies, June 2005. Human Rights Watch. ‘Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights’. Human Rights Watch Report, 25 November 2003. Human Rights Watch. ‘Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan’. Human Rights Watch Report, 1 June 1994. Human Rights Watch. ‘War in South Sudan: the Civilian Toll. African Watch Condemns Abuses by all Sides in the Conflict in South Sudan’. Human Rights Watch Report, 1 October 1993. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The Responsibility to Protect. 2001. Available at: http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, December 2001. International Crisis Group. The Khartoum-SPLA Peace Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain Peace. Crisis Group Africa Report N°96 – 25, July 2005. International Crisis Group. Northern Uganda. Understanding and Solving the Conflict, ICG Africa Report No. 77, 14, 2004. April 2004.

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International Crisis Group. ‘Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead’. Crisis Group, Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006. International Crisis Group. Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock. Africa Briefing N°47, 12 October 2007. International Crisis Group. Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyond the Crisis. International Crisis Group. Africa Briefing N°50, 13 March 2008. International Republican Institute (IRI). ‘IRI Prepares Sudanese for Representative Government’, in IRI, a Quarterly Report of the International Republican Institute, Spring 2004. Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA). ‘Minutes of Discussion on the Draft Final Report for the Emergency Study on the Planning and Support for Basic Physical and Social Infrastructure in Juba Town and Surrounding Areas among the Government of Southern Sudan, Government of Central Equatoria and JICA Study Team’. 31 January 2007. Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA). ‘Infrastructure in Juba Town and the Surrounding Areas’, 2006. Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Emergency Study on the Planning and Support for Basic Physical and Social Infrastructure in Juba Town and Surrounding Areas. Final Report, 24 November 2005. Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Final Report for the Emergency Study on the Planning and Support for Basic Physical and Social Infrastructure in Juba Town and Surrounding Areas. Government of Southern Sudan, Government of Central Equatoria and JICA Study Team, March 2007. Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) Sudan. A Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication. Report prepared by the UN and World Bank Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) team in collaboration with GoS and the SPLM, 18 March 2005. Koop, Marv. ‘Grass Roots Regional Assessments – Government Controlled Areas of Sudan’. IGAD, 1 May 2001. Kreimer, Alcira et al. ‘The World Bank’s Experience with Post-conflict Countries’. World Bank Report, 1998. Litvack, Jennie, Junaid Ahmad and Richard Bird. Rethinking Decentralization in Developing Countries. Washington DC: World Bank, 1998. MacMichael, Gabriella. ‘Land Tenure and Property Rights in Southern Sudan: A Case Study of Informal Settlements in Juba’, in Land Tenure Issues in Southern Sudan; Key Findings and Recommendations for Southern Sudan Land Policy. USAID and Tetra Tech ARD, December 2010. Martin, Ellen and Irina Mosel. City limits: urbanisation and vulnerability in Sudan; Juba case study. Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, January 2011. Natsios, Andrew. US President’s Special Envoy to Sudan. ‘Testimony Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs’. U.S. Department of State, 8 February 2007. Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). Land Tenure Study in Southern Sudan. Report by the Secretariat for Agriculture and Animal Resources and Norwegian People’s Aid, February 2006. Oslo Donors’ Conference on Sudan 2005. ‘Chair’s Conclusions’. 12 April 2005. Available at: www.issafrica.org/AF/profiles/sudan/darfur/oslodonor.pdf. [Accessed 31 July 2009]. Pantuliano, Sara. ‘The Land Question: Sudan’s Peace Nemesis’. Overseas Development Institute, London, March 2007. Rolandsen, Oystein. ‘From Guerrilla Movement to Political Party. The Restructuring of Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Three Southern States’. Report written for the Center for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 2007. Siegle, Joseph and Patrick O’Mahony. ‘Assessing the Merits of Decentralization as a Conflict Mitigation Strategy’. Consultancy Report for the revision of the

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Decentralization and Democratic Local Governance Handbook, Washington DC: Development Alternatives Inc., 2006. Small Arms Survey. ‘Armed groups in Sudan. The South Sudan Defence Forces in the aftermath of the Juba Declaration’. Sudan Issue Brief. Human Security Baseline Assessment, Geneva, Switzerland: Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Number 2, October 2006 Taj es-Sir Mahjoub, ‘Planning for reconstruction: the Joint Assessment Mission’, Conciliation Resources, Finland: CMI, 2006 Taj es-Sir Mahjoub, ‘Planning for reconstruction: the Joint Assessment Mission (2006)’, Conciliation Resources. Available from: http://www.c-r.org/ourwork/accord/sudan/joint-assessment-mission.php. [Accessed on: 31 July 2009]. See: ‘A Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication’, presented at the Oslo Donors’ Conference on Sudan in April 2005. Available from: http://pcna.undg.org/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=25 [Accessed on: 31 July 2009] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Housing, Land and Property Rights in Post-Conflict Societies: Proposals for their Integration into UN Policy and Operational Frameworks. Geneva, UNHCR and UNHABITAT, November 2004. United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). ‘The UN strongly condemns the killing of an Indian Peacekeeper in Southern Sudan’, UNMIS Press Release, 27 January 2007. United Nations. ‘International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, 3 January 1976. United Nations. An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, A/47/277– S/24111, 17 June 1992, para. 15. United Nations. Supplement to an Agenda for Peace. Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995. United Nations. Implementing the responsibility to protect. Report of the SecretaryGeneral, United Nations General Assembly, 12 January 2009. United Nations. UN General Assembly, ‘2005 World Summit Outcome Document’, Part 3 (Peace and Security). United Nations. UN Security Council Resolution 1645 (2005). ‘Operationalizing the Peacebuilding Commission’. United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Land and Conflict: A toolkit for intervention. Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, 2005. United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Sudan Monthly Update. October 2006 [online]. USAID. Available at:http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/sudan/monthly_archive.html [Accessed January 2007] United States Agency for International Development (USAID). ‘Preparation of the First Budget of the Government of Southern Sudan’, Sudan, Economic Growth, 2006. United States Government, ‘The National Security Statement of the United States of America’, September 2002. Unruh, John. Post-conflict land tenure: Using a Sustainable Livelihoods Approach. Food and Agriculture Association (FAO), 2004. Wakely, Patrick, Tom Carter, and Kate Clifford. Southern Sudan Urban Appraisal Study. UNDP and Development Planning Unit, University College London, August 2005. William F. Fox. Fiscal Decentralization in Post-conflict Countries. Best Practice Paper, Fiscal Reform and Economic Governance Project, United States Agency for International Development (USAID). December 2007.

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World Bank. ‘Post-Conflict Reconstruction. The role of the World Bank’, World Bank Report, April 1998. World Bank. Report to the South Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) Administrator 3rd Quarter, 1 July–30 September 2006, October 2006.

SPLM/A DOCUMENTS (BY DATE) Establishment and Consolidation of the Civil Authority for New Sudan (CANS), The Fifteen-Point Programme of the SPLM. undated. Sudan People’s Liberation Movement Manifesto, 31 July 1983. A Major Watershed: SPLM/SPLA First National Convention Resolutions, Appointments and Protocol. Chukudum, New Sudan, n.d. (1994?) Civil Administration in New Sudan, Resolutions of the SPLM/SPLA First National Convention. Chukudum, New Sudan, 12 April 1994. Resolutions of the SPLM/SPLA First National Convention. 12 April 1994. Chukudum, New Sudan. ‘Speech by Dr. John Garang de Mabior on the occasion of the signing of the Nairobi Declaration on launching the final phase of the peace in Sudan’. 5 June 2004. SPLM Strategic Framework for War-to-Peace Transition. New Site, Kapoeta County, SPLM Economic Commission, August 2004. ‘Opening Statement by Salva Kiir Mayardit at SPLM 2nd National Convention’. Juba, 15–20 May 2008.

PEACE AGREEMENTS (BY DATE) The SPLM/SPLA Torit Resolutions. SPLM/SPLA Political High Command: Torit, 12 September 1991. Protocol Between The Government of Sudan (GoS) and The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) on Power Sharing. Naivasha, Kenya. 26 May 2004. The Nairobi Declaration on the Final Phase of Peace in the Sudan, signed in the State House. Nairobi: 5 June 2004. Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration between the Sudan People’s Liberation the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF). 6 January 2008. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army. 9 January 2005. GOVERNMENT OF SOUTHERN SUDAN & CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS (BY DATE) Central Equatoria State, State Taxes and Fees Act. 2008. Central Equatoria State Government budget, 2008. CES Ministry of Finance, Economics and Manpower. Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan. 2005. Report of the Ministerial Committee of the Government of Southern Sudan on the Status of Juba as the Capital City of Southern Sudan and the Seat of Government of Southern Sudan. Meeting No. 9, 4 May 2006. ‘Speech by Speaker James Wani Igga at inauguration of 2nd session of Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly’, Juba, 6 September 2006. Work Plan and Strategic Policy of the Ministry of Physical Infrastructure Central Equatoria State (CES), presented by Minister Alikaya Aligo Samson. November 2007. ‘Budget Speech for Financial Year 2008, presented to the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly by H.E. Kuol Athian Mawein Minister of Finance & Economic

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Planning’, 10 December 2007. ‘Opening Statement by the Chairman of SPLM, General Salva Kiir Mayardit, at the Opening Ceremony of the SPLM 2nd National Convention’, Juba, 15– 20 May 2008. ‘Urgent and important matter on allocation of land in Juba to beneficiaries’. Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly public session. 11 August 2008.

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Abdalla Rassas, Gismalla 51 Abujohn, Samuel 108 Abyei 28, 78–9, 190, 197 Acholi people, 82 Addis Ababa Agreement (1972) 4, 9–10, 19, 29, 44–51, 53, 68, 73–4, 107 Aggar, Malik, 79 Ahmad, Muhammad 33, 50, 54; see also Mahdi Ahman, Yasser 79 aidworkers 5, 25 Akol, Lam 54, 78 al-Bashir, Omar 1–2, 54 al-Hily, Abdalaziz 79 al-Mahdi, Sadiq 50, 54 al-Turabi, Hassan 50, 54 Alier, Abel 44–9 Aligo Samson, Alikaya 95, 99, 121, 132, 136–8, 140, 143–7, 182, 199 Alor, Deng 78 Amum, Pagan 78 Anglo-Congolese Agreement (1906) 34 Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Government Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement (1899) 29, 33–5 Baker, Samuel 32 district commissioners, 35; see also mamur Gordon, Charles, 11, 32 MacMichael, Harold 35, 38 Pasha, Emin 32–3

Pasha, Ismail 32 Symes, Governor-General, 41 Ansar 33, 50 Anyanya 28, 43–4, 53–4, 68 Anyanya 2, 68 Arabic language 31, 39, 61, 88 Juba Arabic 88 Arabs and Arabization 31–2, 43–4, 53, 55 Awet, Daniel 83 Bahr el Ghazal, 8, 35, 41, 45, 47, 49, 51, 54, 57, 67, 78, 82, 97, 169 Bahr el Ghazal Province 41, 51 Bahr el Jebel River 3; see also Nile River Bari Community Association (BCA) 105–7, 111–13, 145–6, 148, 162 Bari people Bari youth 7, 146 Northern Bari 106 Southern Bari 106 Tokiman Bari 105–6, 146 Bariland 19, 103, 105–6, 113 Bari language 47 battles Battle of Bedden 33 Battle of Omdurman 34 SPLA attacks on Juba (1992) 64–6 Bearingpoint 93 Belgium 33–4 Bentiu 52, 159–60 201

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Bilpam 53 bomas 55, 71, 85 Bor 45, 48–50, 57, 157–8, 160–62 capacity building 7, 100, 127–8, 136, 139, 151, 176 Central Equatoria State (CES) Government 27, 70–71, 88, 90, 93, 97–9, 109, 113–16, 123, 128–30, 137, 142–3, 147–8, 161, 167–8, 170–71, 175, 179 Anti-corruption Committee 94 CES Assembly Land Committee 97 Director-General of Land 69–70, 87–8, 113, 115, 133, 142, 160 Land Registry 131, 135–7, 144 Ministry of Physical Infrastructure 70, 130, 133, 135–7, 141–2, 145, 147, 160, 164 Survey Department 127, 134–5 Chevron oil company 52 chiefs 8, 18–19, 21, 24–5, 31–2, 35–7, 40, 42, 46, 55–61; see also chiefship and chieftaincy block chief 166 Chiefs of Land 36 Chiefs of Rain (Rainmakers) 36 Daramolo, Denis 61 Farjalla, Andrea 162 Government chiefs 36–7 Lugar, Pitya 60 Chiefs’ Court Ordinance (1931) 36 chiefs’ courts 36, 42, 61, 71, 173 chiefship and chieftaincy 19, 21–2, 29, 32, 36–7, 56, 60, 63, 103, 105–7, 110–11, 157, 162; see also chiefs Christian missionaries 29, 31, 42 Comboni missionaries 165 Chukudum 55, 81 Cirillo, Peter 70 Cirillo, Thomas 108 Civil Administration for New Sudan (CANS) 55–6, 76, 199

clans 20, 36, 38, 103, 106–7, 111 colonial town planning 40–41 commodification 20, 29 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) Power-sharing Protocol 2, 80, 82–3, 86 Wealth-sharing Protocol 87 Coordinating Council for the Southern States (CCSS) 49, 66– 8, 93 corruption 7, 25, 32, 105, 108, 110, 142–7, 149, 151, 153, 155, 157, 159, 161, 163, 165, 167–8 Creative Associates International, 140 customary laws 7, 18, 36–7, 40–42, 51, 61, 71–2, 102–3, 105, 109, 111–13, 115–23, 125, 154, 166– 67, 173 customs, 15, 52–3, 55, 129 Danagla 43 dar 42 Darfur 1–3 Deng, Nhial 79 demolitions 133, 164–5, 169, 178 Deng, Oyai, 64 Denmark 17 diaspora 8, 26, 32, 38, 107, 144, 153, 174, 190 Dinka people 9, 41, 45–50, 53, 56–7, 67, 81, 91, 110 ,113, 157–62,175 Aliab Dinka 50 Bor Dinka 158 Twic Dinka 49, 53 Dinka domination 45–9, 51, 91 displacement, 52 Eastern Equatoria State 86–7 Egypt 31–2, 34, 41, 50, 52 elections 45, 49, 60 Equatoria Province 33, 41, 48 Equatoria Region Government 57– 9, 69–70, 72 Equatorial Province 31–2, 38, 41

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Ethiopia 44, 53–4, 76 ex-combatants 9, 26, 162, 179 factionalism 45, 56, 86 famine 58, 66, 155 Fertit people 67 floods 50, 154, 157–8, 162 France 34 Funj Sultanate 42 Gambella district (of Ethiopia) 53; see also Ethiopia Garang, John 28, 49, 52–4, 56, 64, 73, 77–9, 81–3, 86, 104, 174 ghost employees 93–4 genocide 1–2, 19, 71 GiBB Africa 138–41 Gondokoro (Island) 31–3, 38, 57, 60–61, 106, 138, 147–50 Government of National Unity (GoNU) 21, 91, 108 Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) laws 173 Ministry of Constitutional and Legal Affairs 117 Ministry of Energy and Mining 116, 117 Ministry of Housing, Land, and Public Utility 133, 148, 173 Southern Sudan Land Commission 103, 117 Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly 80, 92, 94, 99, 103, 108, 114, 118, 121–2, 146, 173 Supreme Court of Southern Sudan 80, 116 governors 51, 55, 59, 69–71, 77– 8, 83, 93–4, 97, 132 Gudele 111, 156, 160, 163–9, 171 Gumbo 61, 111, 159 Haile Mariam, Mengistu 53–4 hotels 115, 141, 150, 154, 158, 164; see also tent hotels

203

Ibn-Mohammed, Abdulla 33; see also Khalifa indirect rule 9, 35 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 58, 77, 81, 155 Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan (ICSS) 71, 103, 105, 117 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 5, 7–8, 21, 23, 25–6, 74, 138–9, 153–7, 159, 164, 166, 168–70, 178–9 International Criminal Court (ICC) 2 Investment and investors 51, 106, 111–13, 115, 120–21, 134, 143, 145–6, 160–61, 173, 176 Islam 32, 39 Islamists 2, 53–4, 70 Islamization 43, 104 ivory 18, 31–2, 38, 72 Jada, Henry 69–71 Jaden, Aggrey 43 Jaileyin people 43 jallaba 36, 42, 87, 90–91 Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 5, 126, 139–43 Jebel Lado Agricultral Scheme 150 Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) 75, 77–8, 80, 106, 124, 127, 152, 176 Framework for Sustained Peace, Development, and Poverty Eradication 75 Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) 75 Jonglei Canal 3–4, 18, 52 journalists 26 Juba airport 57, 64, 68, 70, 154, 157 formation of 38 Town Council 59 Juba na Bari 38, 156 Juba Catholic Diocese 60 Juba County 59

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Juba County commissioners 59, 62, 88 Juba Declaration (2006) 82 Juba University 46 Kajo Kaji 58 Kakwa people 47, 63, 70, 109 Kampala 50 Kapoeta 48, 77 Kator 59, 61, 65, 84, 90, 97, 111, 133, 154 Kenya 5, 28, 40, 44, 69, 81, 116, 166 Khalifa 33 Khartoum Peace Agreement 66– 80 Kiir, Salva 49, 53, 79, 83, 87, 100, 147, 152, 173–5 King Leopold II of Belgium 33–4, 39 Kinga, George 108 kinship 20–22, 29, 162 Kitchener, General 33 Kokora policy 48, 50–51, 57, 69; see also redivision Kordofan 28, 78 Kuanyin, Kerubino 53, 58 Kumba, Festo 108 Kumba, Jemma Nunu 108 Kuong, Gordon 54 KV3 138

Unregistered Land Act (1970) 51–2 land grabbing 113, 115, 120–21, 161, 171 land tenure advisors 139, 177 Lokudu, Agnes 69–70 Lologo 57, 64–5, 67 Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 2 Lotuko people 109 Lutheran World Federation 58

Machar, Riek 65, 70, 82–4, 94–5, 97–9, 154, 163–4, 167 Madol, Ruben 80, 116–18, 120–22, 124 Mahdi 33, 50, 54; see also Muhammad Ahmad Mahdists 12, 14–15, 17, 23, 31, 33, 57; see also Ansar Mahdiyya period 33 Malakal 32 malakiya 39 mamur 35; see also district commissioners Manoja, Luka 48, 108 Manyang, Kuol 78 markets 50, 57, 59, 67, 92, 102, 130, 148 marshes 52; see also wetlands mass graves 65 Matip, Paulino 67–8, 82–3 Lado 22, 32–4, 38, 61, 88, 104, 107, Max Planck Institute for 109, 111–16, 121, 142, 145, 147, Comparative Public Law, 150, 157, 160, 162, 181–3 Germany 118 Lado Enclave 33 mechanized agriculture 18 Lagu, Joseph 44–5, 48–9 merchants 21,36, 39, 42; see also Lainya 166–7 traders Lakes State 78, 85 migrant workers 5, 18, 131, 175 land legislation militias and other armed forces Disposal of Town Lands Scheme 2, 33, 54, 57, 59, 67–8, 75, 81– Act (1947) 40 90, 102 Land Act (2009) 122–3, 173 Equatorian Defence Forces The Land Settlement and (EDF) 66–7, 82 Registration Ordinance (1925) Mujahedeen 59, 67 41–2 Mundari Militia 57, 68–9, 82 Titles to Land Ordinance (1899) Popular Defence Forces 59 41–2 South Sudan Defence Forces

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(SSDF) 3, 67–8, 82–3 monetization 20, 29 Mongalla 31–2, 34–5, 38, 41 Mongalla Province 34–5, 38, 41 Mundari people 47–8, 50, 57, 67–8, 82–3, 108–9 115 Munuki 111, 132, 154 Murle people 67 Nairobi Declaration of Unity with the SPLM/A (2004) 82 Naivaisha 28, 69, 81, 116 narratives of autochthony 9–10, 19–22, 27, 37, 110, 153, 155–7, 159, 161, 163, 165, 167–9, 171 National Congress Party (NCP) 2, 4, 49, 61, 70, 74, 79, 81, 83–4, 87–90, 96, 102, 107–8, 117 federal constitution (1996) 96 National Islamic Front (NIF) 90 National Security forces 59, 61, 64– 5, 84 Native Administration, 30, 35–7, 42, 50, 72 New Sudan 55 Nile River 28, 31–5, 38–9, 43, 45, 47, 49, 51, 53–6, 67, 78, 83, 85, 97, 99, 126, 143; see also Bahr el Jebel River Nimeiri, Jaafar 4, 44–5, 47, 50–52 Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) 5, 8, 21, 58, 105, 126, 138–9, 146–7, 164, 176 Nuba Mountains 52–53 Nubi 39 Nuer people 68, 81, 110, 158–9 nuns 163–5; see also Sisters of the Sacred Heart Nyakoron 143 Nyangwara people 47–8 Nyuon Bany, William 53 Ochang, Theopholis 66, 78, 82 oil-sharing 3 oilfields 52 Omdurman 34, 148

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Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) 58 Oslo Donors’ conference 78 PADCO-AECOMM 138 Pasha, Muhammad Ali 30–31 Passports and Permits Ordinance (1922) 36 pastoralism 52, 113 patronage 17, 33, 38, 106, 135 payams 55, 85, 115, 154 pipeline 52 police 7, 35, 38, 45–6, 59, 64, 95, 107–8, 132 prisons prisoners 63 White House Prison 65, 67 Rainmaker 36, 60, 166; see also Chief of Rain Ramciel 4, 173 rebels 7, 59–60, 69, 73, 75, 79, 81, 90, 92–6, 98, 100–104, 106, 108, 110, 112, 114, 116, 123, 173 redivision 48–53, 69, 96–7, 157; see also Kokora policy referendum on southern independence 1–2, 14, 75, 102 refugees 1, 7–9, 21, 23, 25–6, 46, 54, 71, 89, 101, 133, 138, 144 Rejaf 32–3, 59, 108, 145 researchers 176 Revolutionary Command Council 44 Rumbek 74, 77, 79 schools 7, 40, 42, 67, 102, 114 sectarian movements Ansar 33, 50; see also null Khatmiyya 50 Muslim Brotherhood 50, 54 September laws 51, 53 Shaigiyah people 43 Sharia law 4, 51 Shilluk people 49, 157 Sisters of the Sacred Heart 156, 163–71 slavery 31–5, 39

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south-south reconciliation, 76, 81– 3, 87, 175 Southern Policy 36 Southern Regional Government 4, 30, 44–51, 74–5, 89, 96–7, 104, 117 High Executive Council (HEC) 44–5, 49 People’s Regional Assembly 44– 5, 48, 51 Sudan African National Union (SANU) 44, 49 Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) 2, 4, 14, 30, 53–4, 57–9, 64, 66 ,68, 75, 77, 83, 90, 102, 107–8, 130,146–7 military intelligence 59, 65 Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) Advance Teams 83–4 Convention (1994) 55, 71, 81, 104 Convention (2008) 100 Fifth Colum 63–4 Local Government Secretariat 127 National Liberation Council 175 Politburo 50 Political Military High Command (PMHC) 55 Secretariat 138 Secretariat of Finance 93 Secretariat for Physical Infrastructure and Town Planning 138 SPLM Secretary-General 175 SPLM-Nasir faction (SPLMUnited) 54, 81 SPLM/A (formation of) 53–4 Strategic Framework for Warto-Peace Transition 56, 77 Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) 2, 7, 24, 28, 45, 52–4, 57–8, 61, 63–9, 71, 74–80, 82– 4, 87, 90–91, 95, 122, 157–60,

163, 175 Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) 49 Sudanese Pound (SDF) 74, 92, 148, 158 Sudd, 32–3, 52; see also wetlands Suru, Eliaba 48 Terakeka 58, 68 tent hotels 115, 141, 150, 154, 158, 164 Tokiman B Court 61–2 Tombora, Joseph 48 Tongping 156–62, 168–9 Torit 24, 43, 55, 57–8, 82 Torit mutiny 43 traders 29, 31–2, 38 tukls 5–6, 126 Turco-Egyptian rule (Turkiyya) 31–3 Turkiyya period 31–3; see also Turco-Egyptian rule (Turkiyya) Tuti Island 148–9 Umma Party 50 United Democratic Salvation Front 67 United Kingdom 3, 10, 143, 145 United Nations 10, 71, 77 UNDP 127, 139–40 UNHCR 71, 101 UNMISS 140 UNOCHA 24 United States Agency for International Development (USAID, 40, 77, 85–6, 92–3, 104, 138, 140 Upper Nile 34–5, 45, 47, 51–5, 83, 97 urban plans Gondokoro plan 147–50 Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) plan 139–43 Wolyuang housing development project 138, 143–7 villages 55

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Wani Igga, James 78–80, 84, 99, 106, 108, 119, 122, 180–81, 199 Wani, Clement 68–71, 78, 82–6, 98, 108–9, 114, 139–40, 147, 169, 173 Wani, Severino 48 Warrap state 81, 85, 93 wetlands 33, 52; see also Sudd Wildlife Services 64 World Bank 77–8, 92, 140 Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) 78, 91–2, 104

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Wunlit Covenant (Wunlit Conference) 81 Yei 41, 55, 57–8, 63, 68, 74, 95, 98, 115, 149, 166 Yirol 48 Zande 47, 49, 70 Zande District 41 zara’ib 31–3 Zimbabwe 15, 17, 76, 179

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