The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis: Castro, Mikoyan, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Missiles of November 9781503627314

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The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis

Divided Together The United States and the Soviet Union in the United Nations, 1945–1965 By Ilya V. Gaiduk Marigold The Lost Chance for Peace in Vietnam By James G. Hershberg After Leaning to One Side China and Its Allies in the Cold War By Zhihua Shen and Danhui Li The Cold War in East Asia 1945–1991 Edited by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa Stalin and Togliatti Italy and the Origins of the Cold War By Elena Agarossi and Victor Zaslavsky A Distant Front in the Cold War The USSR in West Africa and the Congo, 1956–1964 By Sergey Mazov Connecting Histories Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945–1982 Edited by Christopher E. Goscha and Christian F. Ostermann Rebellious Satellite: Poland 1956 By Paweł Machcewicz Two Suns in the Heavens The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962–1967 By Sergey Radchenko The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six-Day War Edited by Yaacov Ro’i and Boris Morozov Local Consequences of the Global Cold War Edited by Jeffrey A. Engel Behind the Bamboo Curtain China, Vietnam, and the World beyond Asia Edited by Priscilla Roberts Failed Illusions Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt By Charles Gati Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953–1964 By Balázs Szalontai Confronting Vietnam Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, 1954–1963 By Ilya V. Gaiduk Economic Cold War America’s Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–1963 By Shu Guang Zhang WOODROW WILSON CENTER PRESS STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis CASTRO, MIKOYAN, KENNEDY, KHRUSHCHEV, and the MISSILES OF NOVEMBER

SERGO MIKOYAN Edited by Svetlana Savranskaya

Woodrow Wilson Center Press Washington, D.C. Stanford University Press Stanford, California

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars is the national, living U.S. memorial honoring President Woodrow Wilson. In providing an essential link between the worlds of ideas and public policy, the Center addresses current and emerging challenges confronting the United States and the world. The Center promotes policy-relevant research and dialogue to increase understanding and enhance the capabilities and knowledge of leaders, citizens, and institutions worldwide. Created by an act of Congress in 1968, the Center is a nonpartisan institution headquartered in Washington, D.C., and supported by both public and private funds. Conclusions or opinions expressed in Center publications and programs are those of the authors and speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Center staff, fellows, trustees, advisory groups, or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to the Center. The Center is the publisher of The Wilson Quarterly and home of Woodrow Wilson Center Press and dialogue television and radio. For more information about the Center’s activities and publications please visit us on the Web at www .wilsoncenter.org. Jane Harman, President, CEO, and Director Board of Trustees Joseph B. Gildenhorn, Chair Sander R. Gerber, Vice Chair Public members: James H. Billington, Librarian of Congress; Hillary R. Clinton, Secretary of State; G. Wayne Clough, Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution; Arne Duncan, Secretary of Education; David Ferriero, Archivist of the United States; James Leach, Chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities; Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services. Designated appointee of the president from within the federal government: Fred P. Hochberg Private citizen members: Timothy Broas, John T. Casteen III, Charles E. Cobb Jr., Thelma Duggin, Carlos M. Gutierrez, Susan Hutchison, Barry S. Jackson Wilson National Cabinet Eddie & Sylvia Brown, Melva Bucksbaum & Raymond Learsy, Ambassadors Sue & Chuck Cobb, Lester Crown, Thelma Duggin, Judi Flom, Sander R. Gerber, Ambassador Joseph B. Gildenhorn & Alma Gildenhorn, Harman Family Foundation, Susan Hutchison, Frank F. Islam, Willem Kooyker, Linda B. & Tobia G. Mercuro, Dr. Alexander V. Mirtchev, Wayne Rogers, Leo Zickler

The Cold War International History Project

The Cold War International History Project was established by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in 1991. The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War and seeks to disseminate new information and perspectives on Cold War history emerging from previously inaccessible sources on the “the other side”—the former Communist world—through publications, fellowships, and scholarly meetings and conferences. The project publishes the Cold War International History Project Bulletin and a working paper series and maintains a Web site at www.cwihp.org. At the Woodrow Wilson Center, the project is part of the History and Public Policy Program, directed by Christian F. Ostermann. Previous directors include David Wolff (1997–98) and James G. Hershberg (1991–97). The project is overseen by an advisory committee chaired by William Taubman, Amherst College, and includes Michael Beschloss; James H. Billington, Librarian of Congress; Warren I. Cohen, University of Maryland at Baltimore; John Lewis Gaddis, Yale University; James G. Hershberg, George Washington University; Samuel F. Wells Jr., Woodrow Wilson Center; and Sharon Wolchik, George Washington University. The Cold War International History Project has been supported by the Korea Foundation, Seoul; the Leon Levy Foundation, New York; the Henry Luce Foundation, New York; the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Chicago; and the Smith Richardson Foundation, Westport, Conn.

Contents

List of Documents x Series Preface, by James Hershberg xiii Editor’s Preface and Acknowledgments xix List of Frequently Used Abbreviations xxii Introduction: The Overlooked Crisis between Moscow and Havana

1

Chapter 1: Why Mikoyan?

11

From a Mountain Village to the Kremlin 11 The War and the Postwar Issues 17 Avoiding Stalin’s Traps 21 De-Stalinization and Khrushchev’s Reforms 22 Mikoyan’s Diplomacy 25 Personality and Character 30

Chapter 2: The Journey across the Ocean: The Soviet Discovery of Cuba

39

The Cuban Revolution and the Beginning of U.S.-Cuban Confrontation 39 Contours of the New Cuba 44 Was the Conflict with the United States Inevitable? 45 The Early Reforms 50 Castro Invites Mikoyan 53

Chapter 3: Ten Days That Changed the Face of the Hemisphere

61

Havana, My Love 61 Flying over the Island of Cuba 65 The Die Is Cast 69

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Meeting with Hemingway 75 Castro’s and Mikoyan’s Impressions of Our Visit 79 Only Forward! 83

Chapter 4: The Leap Over the Ocean

89

How It All Started 89 So Why the Missiles? 94 The Nuclear Balance 99 Secrecy and Deception 103 Persuading the Cubans 107 What If the Agreement Was Public? 110 The Secret Is Revealed 113 The Outcome That Should Have Been Predicted 113

Chapter 5: Operation Anadyr: Military Success, Political Trap

121

Origins of the Idea 121 The Transportation of Troops to Cuba 124 The Deployment and Cooperation with the Cuban Armed Forces 127 The Submarine Mission 136 Open Confrontation 138 The Moment of Truth 143 The Outcome 145

Chapter 6: When the World Was Hanging by a Thread

147

The Potential Cost of a Misunderstanding 147 Mikoyan Flies to Havana 155 Deciding in the Kremlin 164

Chapter 7: Storm Clouds Over Havana

173

Havana’s Military Aesthetic 173 War or Peace? 176 The Path to Compromise 182 An Unacceptable Risk 186 The Tragic Start of the Dialogue in Havana 191

Chapter 8: Mikoyan Face to Face with Fidel The Kremlin’s Gifts to the White House 195 Mikoyan’s First Conversations in Havana 202 The Crisis within the Crisis 207 The Il-28 Crisis 213 Castro Fights for the Nuclear Warheads 223 The Breaking Point 227 Farewell to Havana 231

195

Contents

Chapter 9: Drawing Conclusions in the United States Meetings in New York 235 The White House: Anastas Mikoyan and John Kennedy 242 Meetings with Rusk, Udall, and Robert Kennedy 257

Postscript, by Svetlana Savranskaya 261 Documents 269 Notes 565 Index 579

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235

Documents

1 Soviet Record of a Dinner Conversation between CC CPSU Politburo Member A. I. Mikoyan, White House Envoy John McCloy, and U.S. Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson, November 1, 1962 2 Cable by V. V. Kuznetsov on the Conversation between CC CPSU Politburo Member A. I. Mikoyan and Acting UN Secretary-General U Thant, November 1, 1962 3 Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan to CC CPSU Regarding the November 1, 1962, Meeting with A. Stevenson, November 2, 1962 4 Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan in New York to the CC CPSU (1), November 2, 1962 5 Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan in New York to the CC CPSU (2), November 2, 1962 6 Notes of Conversation between A. I. Mikoyan and Fidel Castro, November 3, 1962 7 Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador to Cuba, A. I. Alekseyev, to the USSR’s Foreign Ministry, November 4, 1962 8 Memorandum of Conversation between Castro and Mikoyan, November 4, 1962 9 Memorandum of Conversation between Castro, Mikoyan, Guevara, and Rodriguez, November 5, 1962 10 Mikoyan’s Meeting with Cuban Leaders, November 5, 1962 11 Ciphered Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan to the CC CPSU, November 6, 1962 12 Record of Conversation between A. I. Mikoyan and Fidel Castro in Pinar del Rio, November 8, 1962 13 A. I. Mikoyan’s Telegram to the CC CPSU, November 8, 1962 14 Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan to the CC CPSU, and Gromyko’s Response, November 8 and 9, 1962 15 Trip to Varadero, November 9, 1962 (Friday) 16 Trip to Playa Giron and the Treasure Lagoon, November 10, 1962 (Saturday) 17 Coded Telegram from Mikoyan, November 10, 1962 x

271

281 287 291 293 294 298 300 318 328 340 349 353 355 357 363 366

Documents

18 Telegram from Khrushchev to Mikoyan, November 11, 1962 (Sunday) 19 Mikoyan’s Cable to Khrushchev (Special No. 1809), November 11, 1962 20 Transcript of Conversation between A. I. Mikoyan and Fidel Castro, November 12, 1962 21 Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan to the CC CPSU, November 12, 1962 22 Khrushchev’s Instructions to Mikoyan, November 13, 1962 23 Record of Conversation between A. I. Mikoyan and F. Castro, November 13, 1962 24 Khrushchev’s Letter to Mikoyan, with Instructions, November 16, 1962 25 Record of Conversation between A. I. Mikoyan and Ernesto “Che” Guevara, November 16, 1962 26 Record of Conversation between A. I. Mikoyan, J. M. Fortuny, and J. Árbenz, November 16, 1962 27 Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan to the CC CPSU, November 16, 1962 28 Mikoyan’s Telegram to Khrushchev and Khrushchev’s Reply, November 17, 1962 29 Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan, November 17, 1962 30 Mikoyan’s Telegram to Khrushchev, November 18, 1962 31 Record of Conversation between Comrade Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan and Comrades Fidel Castro, Osvaldo Dorticós, Ernesto Guevara, Emilio Aragonés, and Carlos R. Rodriguez, November 19, 1962 32 Transcript of Conversation between A. I. Mikoyan and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, November 19, 1962 33 Mikoyan’s Telegram to the CC CPSU, November 20, 1962 34 Mikoyan’s Speech at the Military Council of General Pavlov’s Group, November 21, 1962 35 Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan to the CC CPSU, November 22, 1962 36 Additional Instructions to Comrade A. I. Mikoyan on the Cuban Issue, November 22, 1962 37 Memorandum of A. I. Mikoyan’s Conversation with Comrades F. Castro, O. Dorticós, E. Guevara, E. Aragonés, and C. R. Rodriguez, November 22, 1962 38 Khrushchev’s Telegram to Mikoyan (Special No. 1220), November 22, 1962 39 Telegram from N. S. Khrushchev to A. I. Mikoyan, November 23, 1962 40 Anastas Mikoyan’s Logbook—Trip to Santiago de Cuba and Conversation with Fauro Chomon , November 24, 1962 (Saturday) 41 Anastas Mikoyan’s Logbook—Conversation with Manuel Terrasas and Mikoyan’s Television Address, November 25, 1962 (Sunday) 42 Cable from Mikoyan to the CC CPSU, November 26, 1962 43 Mikoyan’s Telegram to Khrushchev, November 27, 1962 44 Mikoyan’s Telegram to the CC CPSU, November 27, 1962 45 Transcript of Conversation between Comrade A. I. Mikoyan and the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cuba to the United Nations, Ambassador Carlos Lechuga, November 27, 1962 46 Conversation between J. Kennedy and A. I. Mikoyan, November 29, 1962 47 Transcript of Conversation between Comrade A. I. Mikoyan and U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, November 30, 1962

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369 381 384 392 393 396 403 410 421 430 432 435 441

443 450 459 465 478 479

481 492 496 497 505 516 517 519

525 534 548

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48 A. I. Mikoyan Visits a Shopping Center in Rockville, Maryland, November 30, 1962 49 Memorandum of Conversation between A. I. Mikoyan and Robert Kennedy, November 30, 1962 50 Message Sent by A. I. Mikoyan to the CC CPSU on a Talk with Stewart Udall and Robert Kennedy (No. 2019), December 1, 1962

557 558 562

Series Preface

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here have been myriad publications about the Cuban Missile Crisis, and more are on the way to mark its fiftieth anniversary—so why another book, and why this one? The reason is that this book breaks new ground, even for aficionados familiar with the voluminous literature—it is not Thirteen Days (whether Robert Kennedy’s or Kevin Costner’s) or another take on The Missiles of October. For the first quarter century after 1962, reconstructions of the crisis focused almost exclusively on its American side. Journalists, former officials, political scientists, historians, and eventually even Hollywood all vividly depicted, dissected, and deconstructed John F. Kennedy’s decisionmaking and the “ExComm” sessions in the White House.1 Yet, because these reconstructions were reliant on Pravda pronouncements, arcane Kremlinology, and a few driblets from Nikita Khrushchev’s smuggled-out memoirs, most paid scant attention to the equally weighty yet tightly concealed internal deliberations in Moscow (let alone those in Havana). The frigid Communist secrecy entombing records on the other side (really, sides) of the story finally started to melt in the late 1980s, during Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost. First surviving Soviet and then Cuban veterans of the events began to tell their tales—but even then the relevant archives mostly stayed shut.2 The Soviet Union’s collapse led to a fitful, fragmentary opening of repositories in Moscow, and some limited releases in Havana. But in the past two decades, only a handful of works have seriously exploited the newly available sources to truly explore the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviets’ perspective—or what Russians and other former Soviet denizens still recall as “the Caribbean Crisis,” because, in Kremlin-vetted news, the “crisis” centered on Washington’s blockade, not on the weapons legitimately supplied to Cuba for its self-defense. The present volume, xiii

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then, examines Soviet dealings with Cuba in 1959–62 through the lens of Anastas Mikoyan, an “old Bolshevik” on the Soviet Politburo/Presidium and Khrushchev’s most trusted lieutenant, trouble-shooter, and emissary to Fidel Castro. This book—which is the English-language edition of a work by Anastas Mikoyan’s son, Sergo Mikoyan, that appeared previously in Russian in a different form—is another addition to that handful of essential volumes on the Soviet dimension of the crisis, illuminating its origin, course, and aftermath, as well as the tempestuous, crucial personalities in Moscow and Havana who so dominated the two governments and the relationship between them.4 Using primarily Russian-language sources, ranging from long-hidden documents to witnesses who have only recently testified, Sergo Mikoyan takes readers inside some of the crisis’s key events inside his father’s February 1960 journey to Cuba, which was crucial in forging the bond between Khrushchev and the fiery Barbudos (bearded ones), as the Cuban leaders were known; inside Operation Anadyr, the Soviet leader’s secret deployment of nuclear missiles to the Caribbean island; and inside the Kremlin at the peak of the superpowers’ October 1962 confrontation. Then the book lavishes the most careful attention upon Anastas Mikoyan’s ensuing lengthy and still-mystery-shrouded visit to Cuba to negotiate with Castro and his associates, who were taken aback by how Khrushchev had agreed to remove the missiles without even informing, let alone consulting, the Cubans in advance, and even—to add insult to injury—agreeing to the United Nations inspecting their removal. As the book’s narrative clearly shows, the very survival of the Soviet-Cuban alliance seemed to hang by a thread, and it was Mikoyan’s job to somehow salvage it. This book is the first serious work in English to delve so deeply into this SovietCuban missile crisis—that is, the tense, bitter, volatile, yet largely cloaked, crisis between the Soviet and Cuban leaderships in November 1962 that followed the essential resolution of the Soviet-American missile crisis with Khrushchev’s agreement on October 28 to withdraw the missiles in exchange for a U.S. commitment not to invade.5 Outside observers sensed acute Cuban displeasure at how Khrushchev had seemed to settle the crisis in correspondence with Kennedy over Castro’s head and, during Anastas Mikoyan’s prolonged stay on the island, hints and rumors pointed to his difficulties in dealing with the Havana leadership. But they were only rumors, which have been elaborated and contradicted over the years by emerging gossip and recollections of varying credibility. Only now—by following the story from the inside, with the benefit of this book’s full, contemporaneous Soviet record of both Mikoyan’s talks with the Cubans and his exchanges with Khrushchev back in Moscow—can readers truly measure the extent and depth of that Soviet/Cuban discord, and understand how the two sides tackled the numerous issues left by the crisis—from the disposition of Soviet weapons to the less concrete but more nettlesome questions of mutual confidence and trust.6 As the secret negotiations progressed, Mikoyan and his interlocutors faced pivotal questions. Would the Cubans cooperate with Moscow and accept the UN

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inspections on their soil of the missiles’ removal, as Khrushchev had promised Kennedy? Or would they do their best to reignite the superpowers’ confrontation, not only rejecting inspection but also insisting, over Moscow’s objections, on trying to shoot down continuing U.S. aerial surveillance flights? Would the SovietCuban alliance endure, or would it collapse amid mutual resentment, with Havana perhaps even tilting toward the more militant Chinese and their enthusiasm for armed struggle rather than “peaceful coexistence”? Was the outcome of the missile crisis actually a disguised diplomatic triumph for Communism, assuring the Cuban Revolution’s survival, as Mikoyan insisted? Or was it an undeniable defeat for revolution in Latin America and what was then known as the third world, as the Cubans maintained? Was Kennedy’s commitment to forswear invading Cuba politically binding, at least through his expected second term, or was it a completely worthless scrap of paper, because the imperialists were inherently untrustworthy? Would the Soviets, despite withdrawing their medium- and intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Cuba—as Khrushchev had agreed with Kennedy to do—leave behind their tactical nuclear weapons (which Washington had not discovered), effectively making Cuba an independent nuclear power? Or would they, too, along with the Soviet Il-28 bombers, also be crated up and shipped home? How had recent events changed the very nature of the Cold War, the global struggle between Communism and imperialism, and the nuclear arms race, beyond bilateral Soviet-Cuban ties? Sergo Mikoyan carefully seeks to answer these and other questions with the benefit of an unprecedented array of inside sources. However, this book is far more than a story of dry diplomatic back-and-forth and give-and-take, or cold strategic calculation; a torrent of churning emotions stirred on both sides. Castro and his associates, and many of the Cuban people, were in shock, puzzled, disappointed, disillusioned, even infuriated at what they regarded as Khrushchev’s unthinkable and humiliating retreat, and they struggled to balance revolutionary ardor, raised to a fever pitch to fight the imperialists, with necessary if far less romantic pragmatism. For Anastas Mikoyan, these emotions included grief at the news of the death of his wife, Ashkhen, in Moscow soon after he reached Havana; steely determination to nevertheless complete his mission; and admiration mingled with exasperation at his Cuban hosts. And for Khrushchev, who was already beleaguered by criticism of his failed gambit, Mikoyan’s reports from Havana generated fury at the Cubans for their seeming lack of gratitude for Moscow’s aid and risk taking and for their refusal to cooperate in resolving the crisis—even as the Soviet leader tried to save himself from the further embarrassment in front of the Communist world of an open Soviet/Cuban rupture, which could only redound to Beijing’s benefit in the widening China/USSR schism. This book comprises Sergo Mikoyan’s narrative and fifty documents on the crisis, and each aspect of the volume offers singular rewards. Mikoyan’s narrative provides more than simply the perspective of a son who enjoyed intimate access

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to his father’s recollections and documents—he was an actor and witness in his own right, accompanying his father on the two pivotal visits to Cuba in February 1960 and November 1962 (although he had to cut short the latter trip to attend his mother’s funeral, even as his father stolidly continued his talks); and in those early postrevolutionary days, he met and interacted with leading figures, from Castro to Ernest Hemingway. Moreover, Sergo Mikoyan went on to become one of the Soviet Union’s leading specialists on Latin America, gaining an expertise that informed his cultural and political analysis. It should come as no surprise that he shared his father’s and his country’s ideological sympathy for the Cuban Revolution; their belief in the rectitude, and even heroism (if not wisdom), of the secret deployment of nuclear weapons to defend it; and their disdain for many U.S. policies in the region—but these sentiments hardly diminish the value of his historical testimony. Yet readers do not need to rely solely on Sergo Mikoyan’s interpretation of the evidence—in the fifty documents at the end of this book, now they can read it, in English, for themselves. Complementing Mikoyan’s lucid narrative, this rich documentary compendium offers a full, contemporaneous record of Mikoyan’s travels in November 1962 in the wake of the missile crisis. From his three-week stay in Cuba, there are accounts of his sometimes testy encounters with Castro and his associates (and with others on the island, such as the exiled Guatemalan leader Jacobo Arbenz) and his dialogue with Khrushchev in Moscow; there are communications among the Soviets as they grappled with their disappointed revolutionary ally and struggled to salvage the relationship; and from Mikoyan’s stops en route to and from Cuba in New York City and Washington, cables record his exchanges with figures ranging from U Thant and Adlai Stevenson to John Kennedy and Robert Kennedy as the superpowers tried to clean up the detritus of their collision over Cuba and plot a path forward. Moreover, these detailed records are a gold mine for specialists on a wealth of subjects beyond the missile crisis and the inherent drama of Mikoyan’s “mission impossible” to Cuba—from the impact of the Sino/Soviet split on intercommunist dynamics, to conflicting assessments of the prospects for revolution in Latin America and the third world, to the personalities and dynamics of the Cuban and Soviet governments, to the state of East-West relations at a decisive juncture, to the history of nuclear weapons, and much more. Thus these Soviet records—most of them printed here for the first time, from Mikoyan’s private collection—shed new light and in some cases yield significant new findings, in addition to generating new mysteries and areas for investigation.7 ✺ ✺ ✺

We deeply regret that Sergo Mikoyan (1929–2010) did not live to see this project come to fruition, and we thank him for his generosity in making available many historical materials relating to his father. For working with Sergo over the years to

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modify his Russian-language work for an international audience, for overseeing its translation into English, and for myriad other labors related to this book, he would surely be grateful to Svetlana Savranskaya of the National Security Archive. As editor of the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) Series, I would like to express my gratitude also to her and to the archive’s director, Thomas S. Blanton, for all they did to bring this project to a successful conclusion; and to Joseph Brinley, the director of the Woodrow Wilson Center Press, for taking on such a large manuscript and bringing it out in time for the fiftieth anniversary of the missile crisis. For their comments on the manuscript at various stages, I thank Vladislav Zubok and Sergey Radchenko. For contributions toward the translation of this manuscript, in addition to Thomas Blanton, I also thank CWIHP director Christian Ostermann, and Blair Ruble, director of the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute. James Hershberg, July 2012

Editor’s Preface and Acknowledgments

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he idea of this book was first conceived by Sergo Anastasovich Mikoyan during an October 2002 conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, which brought together the surviving participants including Fidel Castro and top international scholars of the crisis. Sergo Mikoyan was a historian, an expert on Latin America, and the editor of the influential scholarly journal Latin America published by the Soviet Academy of Sciences. He was also a personal secretary for his father, the Soviet deputy prime minister, Anastas Mikoyan—a longtime member of the Soviet Communist Party’s Politburo, and Nikita Khrushchev’s closest associate—on his father’s trips to Cuba at the time of the crisis. Even before the 2002 conference, which was organized by the National Security Archive and convened in Havana, Sergo Mikoyan had become a key contributor to the international history of the Cuban Missile Crisis. He had participated in the earliest international critical oral history conferences on the crisis, which were organized by James Blight and Janet Lang when the Soviet Union was still in existence, starting in 1987.1 While taking an active part in these conferences, Sergo realized how little of the Soviet story of the crisis was actually known and understood in the West. At the time, Sergo Mikoyan was already working on a Russian manuscript of his father’s recollections of the Cuban Missile Crisis, but as a result of the 2002 conference, the concept of the book was expanded to become a comprehensive history of the crisis, taking into account all the newly released documents, recent findings from critical oral history, and research in both the United States and in Russia. His finished volume, the 1,000-page Russian book The Anatomy of the Cuban Missile Crisis, was published in 2006 to great acclaim and instantly became xix

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a bestseller.2 However, Sergo’s dream was to speak to two audiences, and thus to help the Western and especially U.S. readers get an insight into the Soviet story of the crisis—a crisis of its own, between the Soviet Union and its independentminded client, Cuba. This Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis proved to be more difficult to resolve, and it profoundly affected relations between Moscow and Havana for many years thereafter. This story was told in the Russian Anatomy book, but there it was just one aspect of the full, complex portrait of the crisis. The book set as one of its tasks to familiarize the Russian audience with the rich U.S. research tradition on the crisis and its most recent findings. So one could not simply translate the Russian volume and publish it in the United States, where the American side of the story was already familiar. Therefore, in 2005 Sergo Mikoyan approached the National Security Archive, with which he had a long-term partnership, to help him rework his book for the Western reader and to publish it in English. During the National Security Archive’s long and fruitful relationship with Sergo Mikoyan, he was a friend, a colleague and a coconspirator in our mission to locate and declassify important documents, and an invaluable participant in our conferences and research projects. In 2002, he donated his personal archive of documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis to the Archive. At the time, in Russia, these documents—memoranda of Anastas Mikoyan’s conversations with Castro, Kennedy, and others, and his almost daily exchanges of telegrams with Khrushchev —were made available by the archival authorities to only a few selected scholars; most of them are still closed to the public even today. That made the study of the crisis dependent on connections and proximity to the central powers. Sergo wanted to tell the Soviet story of the crisis based on documents and to make these documents fully available to scholars in any country. So he envisioned that the reworked book would consist of, first, a narrative based on his conversations with his father and his own research; and, second, an extensive collection of documents, which he saw as integral to the book. Thus readers would be able to read all the pertinent words of Mikoyan, Khrushchev, Kennedy, and Castro for themselves and draw their own conclusions. In 2005, Sergo Mikoyan asked me to help him edit and translate the manuscript (and translate and organize the documents) for an American audience and to help him through the publication process. By that time, the National Security Archive had already translated a significant portion of the documents that Sergo had donated to the archive and had given his permission for these documents to be used at our 2002 Havana conference. I was very fortunate to work on this manuscript with Sergo, gaining new insights into the story of the crisis with every session we had. Sometimes we met at his home, where his wife, Tatiana, gave us warm encouragement and fed us great food, and other times we met at the National Security Archive’s office. Unfortunately, we had to cut and revise substantial portions of the text that dealt with U.S. historiography and the facts that are already known to the U.S. reader. Sergo also restructured his manuscript in re-

Editor’s Preface and Acknowledgments xxi

sponse to suggestions from the publisher and from his colleagues. The manuscript went through several drafts, but Sergo was very committed to this project even while he was already starting to work on his next book—about his father’s role in the Soviet foreign policy. The work to guide this book to publication was a truly collective endeavor encouraged and supported by the National Security Archive’s director, Thomas Blanton. James Hershberg of George Washington University, who is also the editor of this series, was an invaluable and persistent partner in this multiyear project, to whom I so often turned for advice and editing help and who spent countless hours with this manuscript. This book would not have been possible without the dedication of the National Security Archive’s team of staff and outstanding unpaid interns—Amanda Conrad, Matt McGorrin, Adam Mayle, our indexer Lisa Thompson, and my irreplaceable assistant Anna Melyakova—as well as others who translated, proofread, organized, and helped edit the manuscript. Initial financial support for the translation of the book’s first three chapters was provided by the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and the remainder of the translation was funded by the National Security Archive. And my very special thanks go to Sergo Mikoyan’s family, and especially to his wife, Tatiana, who supported this project from its very beginning and who was so generous with her own time and hospitality. Sergo’s untimely death caught everyone unprepared; the manuscript was in its final stages but was still unfinished. My colleagues and I felt deeply committed to bringing this book to completion and seeing it published in time for the fiftieth anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis—just as Sergo wanted it to be. In my work on this manuscript, I tried to keep it as close as possible to how Sergo had envisioned the final book, even though I no longer had the benefit of his advice. Sergo intended this book was to be a tribute to his father, Anastas Mikoyan. Now it is a tribute to both father and son. Svetlana Savranskaya May 2012

Frequently Used Abbreviations

CC CPSU CIA CWIHP

ExComm MFA TASS

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Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Cold War International History Project (of the History and Public Policy Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) Executive Committee of the U.S. National Security Council USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Telegrafnoye agentstvo Sovetskovo Soyuza (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union)

The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis

CIA map prepared for President Kennedy showing range of Soviet mediumand intermediate-range missiles.

Introduction: The Overlooked Crisis between Moscow and Havana

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he Soviet Union experienced its own Cuban Missile Crisis—the Caribbean crisis, as it is known in Russia—which started earlier, lasted longer, and had long-term consequences for the USSR’s relations with Cuba and for its role in what was then known as the third world. The dimensions and intensity of this crisis are the subject of this book. The goal of this book is to correct the imbalance in the studies of the Cuban Missile Crisis and make its interpretation more multilateral, more based on primary sources, and more nuanced. To familiarize the reader with the Soviet and Cuban perspectives on the crisis, Sergo Mikoyan wanted to publish a selection of formerly top secret Soviet documents from his father’s personal archive. In his view, this narrative and these documents together would bring the reader closer to a truly comprehensive understanding of this momentous event and away from a United States–centric interpretation of it. In Sergo Mikoyan’s view, the predominant interpretation of the Cuban Missile Crisis in the United States centered on U.S. president John F. Kennedy’s decisive maneuvers to make the USSR remove its missiles from Cuba—missiles that it had deployed there in an attempt to redress the imbalance in strategic nuclear capabilities between the United States and the USSR. This interpretation contained a simplified caricature of Soviet motivation and decisionmaking leading up to the installation of the missiles and the massive transfer of technology and personnel that Operation Anadyr, as Moscow code-named the secret deployment, represented for the Soviet Union. In the U.S. version of events, the crisis lasted for thirteen days—from Tuesday, October 16, when Kennedy learned of the missiles, until Sunday, October 28, when, under considerable duress, Khrushchev agreed to withdraw them. But for the Soviet Union, it took as much if not more work to persuade the bitter and 1

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Introduction: The Overlooked Crisis between Moscow and Havana

passionate Fidel Castro to get the missiles out, and to revoke an earlier promise made by the Soviets—which was to leave behind in Cuba all the other weapons, including Il-28 bombers and the tactical nuclear weapons, about which the United States had no idea, that would have made Cuba a nuclear power. A word is needed here about these bombers and weapons. The Il-28s were medium-range bombers capable of carrying nuclear bombs, and they were first deployed in the USSR in 1949 and had become practically obsolete by 1962. Raymond Garthoff, of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), pointed to the fact that, technically, Il-28s were capable of reaching U.S. territory and thus should be included in the category of matériel to be removed from Cuba. The tactical nuclear weapons were frontline cruise missiles and warheads for a dual-use short-range launcher known as Luna (Frog). The U.S. side did not become aware until 1992 of the fact that Soviet tactical nuclear weapons were deployed in Cuba in 1962. These weapons were the subject of the November 1962 negotiations between Moscow and Havana. The missiles of November were no less important than the missiles of October. Moreover, in the American historiography of the crisis, there were only two principal actors—Kennedy and Khrushchev, or the Soviet Union and the United States—and the usual story revolves around how the two were “eyeball to eyeball” until the other blinked. In this telling, Cuba was not an important actor but merely the location of the missiles. Yet in fact, Sergo Mikoyan knew, Castro was a key actor—a strong and independent leader, who was prepared to sacrifice his country in a nuclear conflict with the United States for the cause of world socialism; and who felt betrayed by his superpower ally, the USSR, but was not willing to simply swallow the offense. Thus it was Castro with whom Anastas Mikoyan negotiated in Havana for three weeks in November 1962 to achieve the real resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Sergo Mikoyan felt a strong need to give a more nuanced and complete account of these negotiations and of the Soviet motivations, and of the actual resolution of the crisis, to U.S. and international readers. That was his goal for this book. Sergo Mikoyan also knew quite well that the story of the Caribbean Crisis—as this crisis was known to the Soviet public, to emphasize that it entailed Washington’s blockade of Cuba, not any action by Moscow—was not well known in Russia either. In Soviet times, there was a standard official interpretation of the crisis presenting the U.S. noninvasion pledge as a Soviet victory, and further study of the event was discouraged. Even with a renewed interest in the history of the crisis during the glasnost years, little real evidence was released, and by the mid1990s the study of the crisis was still possible only for people who had exclusive access to restricted archives (or were able to read English-language scholarship). Besides, the Russian reader was absolutely unfamiliar with the U.S. side of the story—interests, motivation, and decisionmaking—let alone the Cuban aspect of the story. The story of Anastas Mikoyan’s negotiations in Cuba, therefore, was also all but unknown in Russia throughout the 1990s.

Introduction: The Overlooked Crisis between Moscow and Havana 3

The core character of the book is Anastas Mikoyan (1895–1978), an unusual Soviet statesman, a prerevolutionary Bolshevik with a charming smile and mild manner, who often represented the Soviet Union abroad. Having survived hairraising adventures during the Russian Revolution in the Caucasus, he went on to become a member of the Communist Party’s Politburo under Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev, a record for a Soviet politician. In the 1930s, Anastas Mikoyan was the USSR’s external and internal trade minister, and one of the first members of the Soviet government to visit the United States. He was an avid learner with a taste for economic innovation, who easily engaged with Americans and brought back ideas that he implemented in his Soviet homeland—like ice cream, popcorn, and hamburgers. And he outlived Stalin’s purges—although it is generally believed that at the end of his life, in March 1953, Stalin was ready to turn on Mikoyan but died before he could carry it out. Mikoyan supported Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign and soon became first deputy prime minister, the number two person in the Kremlin hierarchy. He continued to be actively engaged in Soviet foreign policy, accompanying Khrushchev on his foreign trips and often going on foreign trips on his own. He had a reputation as a man who was sent by Khrushchev to all the “hot spots” in the socialist world—such as China, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and, finally and most important, Cuba. In October 1956, Mikoyan was sent to Budapest on a fact-finding mission during the uprising. His reports presented the Soviet Presidium with far more balanced and nuanced information and evaluations than the ones sent by the Soviet Embassy there headed by Yuri Andropov (later KGB chief and briefly, in the early 1980s, Soviet leader); Mikoyan did not think that the situation was dire or that it warranted the use of Soviet military force. In fact, Mikoyan tried as best he could to prevent the Soviet military intervention in the Hungarian reform process, he openly contradicted Khrushchev on this issue, and he was thinking of resigning (or even committing suicide, Khrushchev said in his memoirs) if force were used.1 Because of his considerable international experience and political skills, Mikoyan was trusted with the most sensitive foreign assignments. In early 1960, in a visit vividly described in this book, he was the first Soviet official to visit Cuba after the Revolution to establish contacts with the new regime. He spent several weeks traveling in Cuba accompanied by the new leadership, with Fidel Castro as his guide. He negotiated an extensive set of economic contracts and aid between the Soviet Union and Cuba, the most important of them being agreements on the sale of Soviet oil to Cuba and the purchase of Cuban sugar, both aimed at countering U.S. economic pressure. It was on this early trip to Cuba that Mikoyan’s warm personal relationship with the Cubans emerged, which would help him enormously in his difficult task in November 1962. At that moment, in the wake of Khrushchev’s agreement to withdraw the missiles in exchange for what Havana considered a worthless pledge from Kennedy to forswear an invasion of Cuba, it is safe to say that Mikoyan was probably the

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Introduction: The Overlooked Crisis between Moscow and Havana

only Soviet leader who could accomplish the mission of bringing the Cubans back from the brink. Anastas Mikoyan was truly Khrushchev’s right hand, especially in foreign policy. His unique stature in Soviet politics and his strong personality made it possible for him to openly disagree with Khrushchev on a number of occasions— most important, on the use of force in Hungary and on the deployment of missiles in Cuba, which Sergo Mikoyan describes in this book. Still, Anastas Mikoyan’s closeness with Khrushchev made him unwelcome in the close circles around his successor, Leonid Brezhnev. After Khrushchev was ousted in October 1964, Mikoyan was promoted to the purely ceremonial position of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, formally the Soviet head of state, for a brief period. However, already next year he was sent into retirement due to his “old age.” Once in retirement, he was not active politically and kept quiet. He was not even allowed to meet with the visiting Castro, regardless of the latter’s requests to see him. Anastas Mikoyan died in 1978 at the age of eighty-two of natural causes— which was no small feat in the Soviet Union, where almost all the old Bolsheviks had perished in prisons or in the Gulag. In his retirement, Anastas Mikoyan started to dictate his recollections to his son, Sergo, with the purpose of writing his memoirs. They collaborated on the first volume, where he described his early revolutionary years in the Caucasus in vivid detail, including his initial engagement with Stalin.2 Anastas died before he could write about his years on the Soviet Politburo. But Sergo picked it up from there. Unfortunately and strangely, there is no scholarly biography of Anastas Mikoyan, either in Russian or in English. This was one reason that Sergo decided to include a biographical essay on his father in the present volume, where it is chapter 1. Next, chapter 2, on Mikoyan’s first visit to Cuba in February 1960 and the establishment of Soviet-Cuban relations, provides a unique perspective because Sergo was not only a historian but also a participant on that trip. And chapters 3 through 7 continue with the details of the story of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Chapters 8 and 9 constitute the most important and new part of this book; they recount Mikoyan’s negotiations in Cuba (as well as in New York City and Washington) in November 1962. Here is where Sergo and his evidence take the story of the Cuban Missile Crisis where it had not yet gone. He shows that from the point of view of understanding nuclear danger and the politics of international relations, the missiles of November merit as much attention as the missiles of October. The story of “thirteen days” that we all know is just another result of the United States–centric historiography and the American political foreshortening of the crisis. Partly, it is also a result of the U.S. side not knowing the full extent of the Soviet military operation—of the fact that in addition to intermediaterange missiles and old bombers, the Soviets also deployed dual-use launchers and more than 100 tactical nuclear warheads to the island—or the extent and gravity of Soviet-Cuban tensions over the outcome of the crisis.

Introduction: The Overlooked Crisis between Moscow and Havana 5

Anastas Mikoyan was sent to Cuba just after the exchange of letters between Khrushchev and Kennedy on October 26–28 led to a compromise between the two superpowers—that the Soviet Union would remove all the “arms which you [Kennedy] describe as offensive” from Cuba and that the United Stated would pledge not to invade Cuba. The Soviet leader did not even care to inform Castro that the compromise had been reached, and the proud Cuban learned about it from the radio. Naturally, Castro was furious. He was not going to allow any inspections on the Cuban soil that the Americans required as a condition of their noninvasion pledge. He had not initially agreed to the deployment of the missiles, and now he did not agree to their removal. He believed that nuclear weapons were the best deterrence against a U.S. attack and did not trust American noninvasion pledges anyway. So Mikoyan was sent to Cuba to try to pacify the unruly but important ally and to explain the Soviets’ reasoning to him. As he arrived in Cuba, however, Mikoyan was hit with terrible news—his wife, Ashkhen, of forty-three years, already ill, had just died in Moscow. Sensing the full complexity of the situation in Cuba, Anastas decided to stay and continue the negotiations, and sent Sergo back to Moscow to attend his mother’s funeral. His personal tragedy and his decision to remain in Havana had an impact on the Cuban leadership, who treated him very warmly even as they felt betrayed by his superiors, above all Khrushchev. Now, face to face with the Cubans, Mikoyan had to answer for all the mistakes and insults committed by the Soviet leadership and try to bring the Cubans on board for the final resolution of the crisis. This story has never been told in detail before—it is a gripping, significant, suspenseful tale of international relations and also a psychological drama. Mikoyan started with complete sympathy and a sense of responsibility for the predicament in which the Cubans found themselves as a result of the risky maneuver by Khrushchev, whose wisdom and even rationality he had questioned from the very beginning. Initially, he shared the stated Soviet position, which was especially firmly held by the Soviet military commanders on the island of Cuba and in Moscow—that after the removal of the strategic missiles, the rest of the weapons that had been brought to Cuba—including the Il-28s and the tactical nuclear weapons—would stay behind on the island. Soviet instructors would train Cuban personnel to maintain and use the technology, and the weapons would be eventually transferred to the Cuban armed forces, possibly with some Soviet oversight of the tactical nuclear warheads. Those were the mutually understood provisions of the military agreement between the Soviet Union and Cuba that was drafted in the summer and that both sides intended to sign shortly. Thus Cuba, unbeknownst to the United States, was going to become a nuclear power. In this scenario, Castro would be given a consolation prize of tactical nuclear weapons and would not feel completely abandoned by the Soviet Union in the face of American aggression. As bitter as the Cubans were, this scenario provided them with grounds to reconcile with their Soviet ally, which preferred to negotiate with their worst enemy. However, soon after that the Kennedy administration

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Introduction: The Overlooked Crisis between Moscow and Havana

demanded that the Soviet Union include the Il-28 bombers among the weapons subject to withdrawal. Once again, Moscow made the decision to give in to this demand without consulting with the Cubans. Mikoyan was the one who had to explain the decision to them and bring them on board. They listened, but for two days after the decision, nobody would talk to Mikoyan, and Castro canceled their trips, saying he was not feeling well. Yet once again, the warmth of Mikoyan’s personal relationship with the Cubans played a role, and he was able to bring them back to the negotiating table. By mid-November, Mikoyan appreciated the full depth of the Cubans’ frustration and bewilderment with the Soviets’ behavior, but he also observed what he called “the psychological factor” first hand—the impulsive and insolent way in which the Cubans reacted to any U.S. actions. Earlier during the crisis, in late October, Castro inspired—practically gave orders to—the Soviet antiaircraft unit to shoot at an American U-2 reconnaissance plane, which brought it down on October 27. In November, incensed over incessant low-altitude overflights of U.S. planes trying to verify the removal of the missiles, he gave orders to the Cuban air defenses to resume firing at the planes, which Mikoyan saw as a dangerous and irresponsible action while the efforts to resolve the crisis were still precarious. Gradually, Mikoyan began to question the wisdom of leaving nuclear weapons in the hands of hotheads who were preparing their country to die in the fire of a nuclear confrontation with the United States in the name of world socialism— even while at the same time understanding the heavy Soviet responsibility for that situation. The final straw came on November 19, when Castro sent instructions to Cuba’s representative at the United Nations, Carlos Lechuga, to use references to the tactical nuclear weapons that Cuba had as leverage in negotiations, and also as a way to establish the fact that the weapons were in Cuban possession. Mikoyan was extremely worried about that message and suggested to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Presidium that when he next spoke with Castro about the military agreement between Moscow and Havana, he should inform him that all tactical nuclear weapons would be withdrawn from Cuba. He was well aware of the sensitivity of the issue for the Cubans and of their likely reaction to this last resort of resistance to U.S. aggression being taken away by the Soviets. He had to break this unpleasant news to his hosts, and he had to do it in such a way that they would remain Soviet allies. In the most crucial moment of the book, Anastas Mikoyan and the Cuban leadership have a three-hour, middle-of the-night conversation, where he informs them of the latest decision. That was the final blow to the Cuban revolutionaries, now that the Soviet Union was removing all the weapons for which Cuba had to suffer so much. In desperation, Castro almost begged Mikoyan to leave the tactical warheads in Cuba, especially because the Americans were not aware of them and they were not part of the agreement between Kennedy and Khrushchev. But Mikoyan was now convinced that leaving any nuclear weapons

Introduction: The Overlooked Crisis between Moscow and Havana 7

in Cuba would be reckless and dangerous, so he rejected Castro’s pleas and cited a (nonexistent) Soviet law proscribing the transfer of nuclear weapons to third countries. This ended Cuba’s surreptitious hope to become a Latin American nuclear superpower. Anastas Mikoyan celebrated his birthday, November 25, in Cuba and left the following day for New York, having essentially settled the most acute phase of the Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis. The strategic missiles were out, on the Soviet ships; the Il-28s had been disassembled and were in the process of being shipped; and the issue of the tactical warheads had been settled (they left Cuba in December). Mikoyan spoke to the Soviet troops who had accompanied the missiles on the island and explained to them that their mission had been accomplished successfully and they could now go home, that the Soviet Union had achieved what it wanted to achieve—the United States had pledged not to invade Cuba. He pronounced the crisis over, but it was not yet over. Echoes reverberated for years, resulting in a serious cooling of Soviet-Cuban relations in the 1960s. Mikoyan and Castro would never see each other again, but the Cubans continued to hold Mikoyan in high esteem, probably more than any other Soviet official. The lasting respect for and appreciation of Mikoyan in Cuba was visible even during the conferences in Havana to mark the thirtieth and fortieth anniversaries of the crisis, which were held in 1992 and 2002. Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership treated Sergo Mikoyan as a special guest, even though his retelling of his father’s November 1962 story often presented the Cubans not in the best light. After Cuba, Anastas Mikoyan had another task to accomplish at the end of November 1962—he flew to New York and then to Washington to negotiate the final understandings between the Soviet Union and the United States. He felt a sense of deep obligation to the Cubans to ensure that the United States reaffirmed its noninvasion pledge. His task was complicated by the fact that now the United States had gotten all the concessions out of the Soviet Union and he had nothing left with which to bargain. Another complicating factor was that the Cubans still did not allow inspections on their soil and the United States had to agree to inspections on the high seas. He met with a number of Kennedy administration officials, including John Kennedy and his brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, for long and often very difficult conversations where he was obliged to respond again and again to charges of lying by the Soviet authorities. It is ironic that it fell to him—the strongest opponent of the deployment and the deception in Khrushchev’s inner circle—to defend those positions and justify the deception. On December 1, having settled all the remaining issues in Washington, Mikoyan flew to Moscow. The U.S.-Soviet crisis was over. But the Soviet Union now had to restore its damaged relations with Cuba, and this took many years. In this book, in addition to the eyewitness account and the scholarly narrative, Sergo Mikoyan tried to preserve and make public every word that passed between the Cuban leaders and his father, between Khrushchev and Anastas Mikoyan in Cuba, and between him and the U.S. leaders. This unique collection

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is not available anywhere else in any language. Sergo was not able to put together all of the documents for his Russian-language book. Therefore, the staff of the National Security Archive continued the search and assembled as full a compilation as possible, mostly from the documents provided to them by Sergo from his personal archives, but also supplemented with documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry Archive. These documents—which form the last part of this book—provide an excellent source for anyone seeking to study the Cuban Missile Crisis, but they are much more than that. The unique nature of this collection is that they give the reader an unprecedented insight into the inner workings of the Soviet leadership at the most dangerous point of the Cold War. These documents bring alive some of the most complex and intriguing personalities of the entire Cold War period. They include substantial background information on the early stages of the Cuban Revolution—when Castro took Mikoyan around the country showing him the highlights of new Cuban reforms in agriculture, industry, and education. They discuss visions for the future, not only for Cuba but also for all Latin America and the entire socialist camp. It needs to be noted here, however, that these documents concern the November 1962 Soviet-Cuban Missile Crisis and Mikoyan’s follow-up in the United States—they do not cover the early Soviet-Cuban relationship or the October U.S.-Soviet crisis. And given limitations of space, these documents are only a selection of the best ones, not a comprehensive collection of all available sources on the Mikoyan mission. In addition to Castro’s voice, the reader hears the legendary Che Guevara discuss his ideas for the revolutionary movement in Latin America, and also the issue of the Sino-Soviet split. Until the Cuban archives are opened for researchers (an uncertain prospect at best), this collection of documents offers uniquely informative insights into not only Soviet-Cuban relations at the moment of their most acute stress but also internal developments of the Cuban Revolution and its role in the international Communist movement. Reading these documents closely helps one better understand Cuba’s future behavior in Africa—the classic case of the “tail wagging the dog,” whereby a small independent actor manipulated its powerful patron, the Soviet Union.3 Along with Mikoyan’s conversations with the Cubans, while he was in Cuba, he also met with former president of Guatemala, Jacobo Árbenz, who had been removed eight years earlier, in June 1954, as a result of a United States–sponsored coup.4 This discussion provides the reader with the perspective of a non-Cuban leftist talking about changes in his country and about Cuban actions in the hemisphere in support and promotion of revolutionary movements. Mikoyan needed to cautiously explain to his interlocutors that the Soviet Union, in fact, was not interested in exporting revolution to Latin America. Ironically, he also had to explain this same position to his American hosts during his meetings in New York and Washington. In another fascinating document, Mikoyan had to explain the changing policies of the Soviet government to the Soviet troops stationed in

Introduction: The Overlooked Crisis between Moscow and Havana 9

Cuba, who at the time were more attuned to the thinking and feelings of their Cuban hosts than to their highest command in Moscow—partly because they, like the Cubans, had not been informed about the U.S.-Soviet negotiations. Today, fifty years after the Cuban Missile Crisis, this book reveals a still obscure yet extremely significant dimension of this event—the story of the Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis. It does so based on the documents, oral history, and insightful analysis of Sergo Mikoyan, who, as both an eyewitness and a historian, wanted to share his knowledge and evidence with others. We hope that this book will inspire further discussion and investigation concerning the remaining mysteries of the crisis and also more document releases on all sides.

1 Why Mikoyan?

From a Mountain Village to the Kremlin

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or a variety of reasons, my father, Anastas Mikoyan, figures as the main actor in many pages of this book. Most likely, his last name is barely familiar to the majority of American readers. One might ask, who was this person? This question may arise particularly when one reads the chapters dealing with the Cuban Missile Crisis, or hears an eyewitness account of Khrushchev’s words, “We have no better diplomat than Mikoyan.” To respond to these questions, I venture to tell the reader about this man. Indeed, how did it happen that a boy from an Armenian mountain village, who did not speak a word of Russian and whose first job was to shepherd goats on a hillside, became known around the world as the Soviet superpower’s envoy to all the hot spots, assigned to quench the flame of conflict or to prevent it from breaking out? Anastas Mikoyan was born in 1895. His father, an illiterate village carpenter, saw that Anastas stood out among his other children, and decided that he should get an education. When Anastas was eleven years old, he was sent to a seminary in Tiflis (later Tbilisi) in Georgia. However, if one is to believe the words of the Russian writer Mikhail Bulgakov, “No school can make a person truly educated. But any good school can teach discipline and the skills necessary for the future, when a person begins to educate himself outside the walls of any educational institution.”1 It seems that this was the case with my father. At the beginning of World War I, Mikoyan left the seminary to volunteer with the Russian army. He served in a unit led by the famous Armenian general Andranik Ozanyan, which fought on the Turkish front to free Western Armenia 11

12 Why Mikoyan?

from Turkish domination. Mikoyan reached one of Armenia’s ancient capitals— the city Van—with his unit, before he came down with an acute form of malaria and was taken to a base hospital. Shortly afterward, the Young Turks, who were ruling Turkey at the time, organized a genocide to liquidate the Armenian population. After Mikoyan recovered, he returned to the seminary, and upon completing his studies, he entered the theological academy in Echmiadzin, not far from Yerevan, Armenia’s capital. He left the academy to become a professional revolutionary and moved first to Tiflis and then to Baku, in Azerbaijan, where he became friends with the Bolshevik revolutionary Stepan Shaumyan and conducted propaganda work with Armenian oil field workers. My father once again saw action, this time in the civil war that was breaking out in Baku. He was wounded. He again fought Turkish troops when they approached the city. However, Baku politicians considered it better to invite the British to defend the city, and sent the Baku Commune to prison. Anastas Mikoyan was not in the commune’s leadership and switched to underground activity. On the day that Turkish troops entered the outskirts of Baku, Mikoyan freed Shaumyan and his associates (thereby saving them from the invaders’ massacre) and sailed away on a steamship headed across the Caspian Sea for Astrakhan. However, the ship’s crew preferred to sail to Krasnovodsk in Turkmenia. Here, Mikoyan’s senior fellows were arrested and killed by socialist revolutionaries, who acted on advice from the British authorities in Delhi. Because Mikoyan was a relatively unknown Bolshevik propaganda worker, he was sent to a prison in Ashkhabad along with a group of similarly insignificant people. After a year of imprisonment, Mikoyan arrived in Baku. Half a century later, the American author and New York Times correspondent Harrison Salisbury, who was closely acquainted with Mikoyan, wrote about this period of Mikoyan’s life: “He is living on time doubly borrowed. He cheerfully admits that he is in the world today because ‘I have been very lucky.’ He does not exaggerate. He has been clever, too. Bold when he had to be bold, clever when cleverness was his only protection. He should, of course, have been dead many, many years ago in the infant days of the Revolution.”2 In 1920, after the Bolshevik Revolution had seized power, Anastas Mikoyan, who had by now mastered Russian, was transferred to work in the Russian city of Nizhniy Novgorod (later known as Gorky during the Soviet era), about 250 miles east of Moscow. He lived and worked according to his ideals, and even when he became the head person in Nizhniy Novgorod, he suffered from malnutrition and contracted tuberculosis. Through hard work and participation in the political life of this major industrial center, the main city of a large province on the Volga River, he intended to earn the position of secretary of the Provincial Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the ruling party. He achieved this goal. He not only learned to make persuasive speeches but also

Why Mikoyan?

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studied the art of working with the masses. This was very serious work, which entailed finding convincing arguments with a feel for the people’s psychological state. One needed to appear sure, persistent, and determined in order to win the following of the masses who were discontented by devastation, the lack of goods, and the low standard of living. I am certain that mastering this skill prepared him for government work, including the diplomatic field. From 1922 to 1926, Mikoyan was the head of Russia’s vast Southeastern Region, which was later given the more precise name of the North Caucasus Region. This area spans the lands from the River Don to the Caucasus Mountains and from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea. Here he learned to win the respect of different nations by in turn showing respect for the languages, cultures, and traditions of the Don Cossack, Dagestani, Chechen, Balkarian, Karachaev, Kabardin, Ingush, and Ossetian peoples. Rather than issue dry orders, he used persuasion, economic stimuli, appeals to century-old traditions and consideration for these traditions in his work. I think Mikoyan’s experience in the North Caucasus formed his habitual practice of honoring the different nations, beliefs, traditions, and customs that he encountered in his political work. The North Caucasus years were also a wonderful school for future diplomatic missions and negotiations. Regard for foreign cultures and traditions and the desire to understand the distinguishing psychological traits of the other side became his recipe for success in the sphere of foreign policy. The task at hand was to lift Russia out of its postwar devastation. And in pursuing this task, Mikoyan was so successful within the bounds of his region that when the people’s commissar (minister) of trade, Lev Kamenev, resigned in 1926 due to his opposition to Joseph Stalin, he recommended that Mikoyan take his place. Stalin agreed, because he was already familiar with the North Caucasus secretary. But for a long time, Mikoyan persistently rejected this assignment. Despite the decision made in Moscow, Mikoyan opposed transferring to the center. It was not because he did not trust Stalin; on the contrary, he was very well disposed toward him at the time. Mikoyan rejected the offer because he was concerned that he could not manage a leadership position on a national scale. Highlevel positions were never his goal. His work, duty, and responsibility before the people stood above all, and he gave 100 percent to his work. For a long time, Mikoyan nurtured the hope that the negative traits slowly enveloping Soviet-style “barracks socialism” would be overcome. He saw many positive outcomes from his years of work. In 1967, on the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution, he proudly presented data to Harrison Salisbury showing how the world’s second-strongest superpower had surpassed the backward Tsarist Russia: Turkmenia alone was producing more electrical power than all of Tsarist Russia, which, with a territory larger than the Soviet Union, produced 2 billion kilowatt-hours. In 1967, the USSR produced 590 billion kilowatt-hours (“nobody could deny the Soviets’ industrial achievement,” Salisbury commented).

14 Why Mikoyan?

Anastas Mikoyan’s first negotiations on the international arena took place when he was thirty-one. The position of people’s commissar of trade encompassed foreign trade, and in this capacity he met with delegations from Germany, Great Britain, France, and other nations.3 In these matters he worked closely with Stalin, considering him a friend—for their entire lives, they had used the familiar form of address with each other. For a long time, Stalin expertly used Mikoyan’s friendship and loyalty in his intrigues. But Mikoyan always kept his own point of view on matters in his professional field of economics, in which he had a better understanding than Stalin. In 1928, at the Central Committee (CC) Plenum of the country’s sole ruling Communist Party, Mikoyan proposed to supply villages with affordable consumer goods, even at the cost of temporarily reducing the sales of these items in cities. That is to say, Mikoyan had proposed to use economic measures to deal with the problem of dwindling grain sales to the government. Practically the same solution had been suggested by Nikolai Bukharin, whom Stalin had already begun to push out of the leadership circle, accusing him of leaning to the right.4 But Stalin preferred “hot dishes,” to quote Lenin. He decided to get the grain by force. He completely did away with the New Economic Policy, which had been instituted in 1921 and was developing a market economy. This policy had been intended by Lenin to last for ten to fifteen years and might have changed the regime’s political image independently from its creator’s intentions. But Stalin shut it down after seven years, which led to the closing of private enterprises and a sharp drop in the supply of consumer goods. This decline in supply did not stimulate farmers to sell grain; it seemed logical to hold on to it until its purchase price increased. In other words, the market economy mechanism was functioning. To counter it, Stalin initiated the collectivization program, which was a real war against a significant portion of the population. This war brought terrible consequences to the economy and to politics. About 10 million peasants were relocated to Siberia and Central Asia, and millions died. The livestock population dropped by half, and the sheep population by two-thirds. It is possible that Stalin had not foreseen these consequences—“[he] told Winston Churchill during World War II that the collectivization drive was worse than the war against the Nazis.”5 In 1930 and 1931, Mikoyan sent in a letter of resignation following criticism of his People’s Commissariat for the poor state of trade under collectivization and the enormous losses it had brought to agriculture. The People’s Commissariat could not supply the country with goods that were simply no longer being produced in the villages and cities. But on Stalin’s orders, the Council of the People’s Commissars (the country’s leadership) did not accept Mikoyan’s resignation. Stalin must have needed Mikoyan’s effective leadership abilities and his still wholehearted loyalty. Soon, Mikoyan was transferred to the position of people’s commissar (minister) of food industry and assigned to create something that had not existed in

Why Mikoyan?

15

Russia in the modern sense of the word. Thus, in 1936 he spent two months touring the United States, from New York to San Francisco, from Chicago to the Grand Canyon, studying the American experience, buying up whole factories, and adopting everything that could be used in the USSR. As a result, the food industry made a significant leap forward, which was interrupted only by the Great Patriotic War (as the Soviets called World War II), after Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. In the United States, Mikoyan met with Henry Ford, who advised him not to build meat-processing plants but to switch to soybean cultivation, as his family had done. Additionally, he recommended first building roads and only then creating an automobile industry (even though, by this time, he had already helped to convert a small factory in Moscow into the automobile giant ZIS—the future ZIL, which would become well known for manufacturing the black limousines favored by Kremlin elites). And Mikoyan discussed the prewar political situation in Europe and the roles of the United States and the USSR in international affairs with Franklin Roosevelt’s secretary of state, Cordell Hull. In 1939, at the Eighteenth Communist Party Congress—the highest forum in the country at that time—Mikoyan said that “we learned a great deal from the Americans, and we have to keep learning.” He repeated his country-wide call to manufacture household refrigerators, electric and gas stoves, vacuum cleaners, frozen foods, prepackaged goods, and much more, as well as to develop canning and vitamin industries. And the people’s commissar did not stop at making speeches; he already had practical achievements. In a short period, he had started the vitamin and canning industries, opened meat-processing plants in major cities and confectionary plants in Moscow and Leningrad, and begun the mass production of ice cream in major cities. Mikoyan assumed the additional position of deputy chairman of the Soviet (i.e., Council) of People’s Commissars (this was the title of the country’s leadership until 1944, when it was renamed the Soviet of Ministers). In this capacity, he supervised trade and much more. Harrison Salisbury, who knew my father well, wrote of this period: For years Mikoyan labored to modernize and improve Soviet production and particularly the supply of goods in the civilian sector. He was an ardent admirer of American production efficiency and the ingenuity of the American distribution systems. . . . Mikoyan was, as can be seen, an intensely pragmatic man and one of ready imagination. . . . Given those characteristics it is hardly surprising that in the post-Stalin era Mikoyan came into his greatest prominence, actively aiding in efforts to regenerate his country’s economic and cultural life after the long grim years of Stalin. He engaged in extensive trade dealings with foreign industrialists, including those of the United States, and often carried out diplomatic missions of great delicacy both in Western nations and within the Communist world. . . . There was little, indeed, in the Soviet epoch in which he did not participate, and if he did not participate personally he knew what had happened

16 Why Mikoyan?

and who was responsible for what happened. He was a shrewd, intelligent man and nothing escaped his quick eye and his remarkable intellect.6

Of course, Mikoyan could not stop Stalin’s axe, which fell in 1937–38 on many people whom he knew personally, and millions whom he did not. Several times my father had to affix his own signature to the fatal lists of repressed individuals; and he was able to save only a handful of people from prison and execution. However, when he became people’s commissar of foreign trade, he managed to get an order from Stalin to prevent the arrest of his employees by the repressive organizations. There are several factors to consider if one is to seek an explanation for Mikoyan’s actions during this tragic period. He understood the helplessness of his position, and he understood that nobody could be saved and that nothing could be changed in society through open protest; moreover, open protest would lead to the addition of your name and the names of numerous coworkers to the fateful lists of the doomed (there were precedents). The absence of open political resistance to Stalin can be defined as an enforced consensus. Anastas Mikoyan could not have remained unaffected by this phenomenon, and yet his personal conscience awoke even before Stalin’s death. In August 1939, the USSR and Germany signed a nonaggression pact and a collaboration agreement. My father always thought that the USSR’s Western allies —Great Britain and France—left it no other choice but to sign this agreement, although he did not believe that this agreement would stave off war for long. The British historian Alan Bullock points out an important aspect of the agreement: Hitler wanted to get around the British blockade by importing raw materials and food from the Soviet Union, at the same time giving Stalin an opportunity to obtain equipment, machinery, and weapons from Germany.7 Karl Schnurre represented the German economic interests at the negotiations; Anastas Mikoyan represented the Soviet Union. Schnurre offered a list of Germany’s demands worth 1.4 billion reichsmarks, whereas the initial agreement was for 70 million reichsmarks. Mikoyan insisted that sixty Soviet specialists visit Germany. Once there, they “demanded to see everything, especially the latest German military developments.”8 The German side was astonished at what they considered to be “licensed espionage.” Moreover, the Soviet list consisted mostly of military technology, including airplanes, artillery and ships that were in service, and technology in the various stages of development. The German side objected and threatened to annul the entire trade agreement. “Mikoyan’s reply on December 19 was: ‘The Soviet government considers delivery of the entire list the only satisfactory equivalent for the deliveries of raw materials which, under present conditions, are not otherwise obtainable for Germany on the world market.’”9 It seemed that the negotiations had reached a dead end. My father said he was sure the Germans would yield on all points. However, the German foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop wrote a personal letter to Stalin and transferred the center of gravity into the political arena

Why Mikoyan?

17

by reminding him of the Berlin agreement that would give the Baltic states to the Soviet Union. Stalin agreed to the new draft. Still, the new agreement, signed on February 11, 1940, included forty-two pages listing in small print the latest models in German aviation, ships, chemical, and metallurgical processes, which had been trade secrets. During this period, Mikoyan was also conducting trade negotiations with the German ambassador to Moscow, Friedrich-Werner Graf von Schulenburg, who wrote: “He was a man of exceptional intellect who learned a great deal from many years of experience. Mikoyan was one of the most pleasant partners in negotiation. . . . Of course, his flexibility and initiative was limited sharply by the nature of the regime under which he worked.” In 1940, Mikoyan held negotiations with the prime minister of Finland, Väinö Tanner. After having lost its educated and experienced officers in the latest round of repressions, the Soviet Red Army had secured a very difficult victory over Finland. Tanner was surprised at the cordial relations he was able to form with Mikoyan. He sensed that Mikoyan was, in a way, a kindred spirit. My father even said to him: “Stalin is a Georgian, I am Armenian. . . . We understand very well the position of a small country.”10 Of course, it would have been impossible to omit a reference to Stalin from this conversation. But, leaving Stalin aside, it is not difficult to understand the meaning of his words.

The War and the Postwar Issues In the days before Hitler’s troops attacked the Soviet Union, Mikoyan was among the group of Politburo members who urged Stalin to take seriously the numerous signals pointing to the inevitably approaching aggression against the USSR. However, this time Stalin was blind to the point of stupidity, which was quite unlike him. His argumentation was too abstract; he reminded the Politburo members that Bismarck had warned Germany against fighting a war on two fronts. World War I had proven Bismarck right, and, Stalin thought, Hitler would take this into account. Only the early morning of June 22, 1941, when the Soviet Union was attacked, brought Stalin back to reality. After the start of the war, Mikoyan was assigned one of the most important jobs: to supply the army and the home front—in other words, the entire country—with food, equipment, clothes, shoes, gasoline and other types of fuel, and artillery shells. Together with a few other key people, he carried the bulk of responsibility for organizing a historically unprecedented evacuation of hundreds of industrial plants, warehouses, and provision depots to the eastern part of the country in a matter of weeks. The Germans were quickly advancing on Moscow and Leningrad. Already, in September 1941, they reached the outskirts of the “northern capital,” Leningrad, and promptly surrounded the city. The main food depots were deliberately destroyed with German incendiary bombs, leaving the population to face a terrible famine that brought suffering and death to hundreds of thousands. Stalin said to

18 Why Mikoyan?

Mikoyan: “As the primary manager of the supply of the front and the home front, you are in the best position to oversee that Leningrad’s necessities are supplied in a timely fashion.”11 The blockade lasted for 900 days, and hundreds of thousands (some counts estimate nearly a million) died of starvation. Mikoyan also led the international negotiations over Lend-Lease (FDR’s initiative to aid the Allies, which supplied the USSR with about 4 percent of the amount spent on the front and the home front).12 In addition, he conducted negotiations regarding war loans with the United States and Great Britain. Stafford Cripps, a prominent politician who had been appointed as Great Britain’s ambassador to the Soviet Union, also participated in these negotiations. One should keep in mind that the negotiations were held in Moscow in August 1941. German troops were advancing rapidly along the entire front and were close to the capital. The British government thought that in this situation, the USSR would accept the credit under any conditions. But Mikoyan conducted the negotiations just as firmly and persistently as if the Soviet troops were advancing on Berlin and not vice versa. Cripps was surprised and complained to Stalin, who refused to interfere. The British ambassador was faced with a decision my father had foreseen: He would have to either concede or refuse to give the Soviet Union the loan. The latter option was politically impossible; the Eastern Front became part of the “battle for Britain.” He chose to concede. My father often participated in negotiations with the U.S. ambassador to Moscow, Averell Harriman; and he met with Winston Churchill and many Western statesmen who managed military deliveries to the Soviet Union. Harriman writes about this: I first met Mr. Mikoyan in September 1941 when I visited Moscow as the head of an American mission together with Lord Beaverbrook, who headed the British mission. . . . Beaverbrook and I dealt largely with Stalin, but we talked on a number of occasions with Mr. Mikoyan, and the members of our missions dealt with Mikoyan to obtain detailed information on the supplies needed. I learned then of the close relationship that existed between Stalin and Mikoyan. In my many visits to Moscow, as well as during my two and a half years service as our wartime ambassador, I had many opportunities to talk with him. He was probably Stalin’s closest advisor on foreign trade. Lend-Lease came under his supervision. He had a warm personality, but no one was a tougher trader. . . . Throughout the years that I knew Mr. Mikoyan, I marveled at his intimacy and frankness with Stalin and yet the fact that he had managed to survive purge after purge of Stalin’s other close associates.13

“The Eastern Front,” as it was called in Europe and the United States, was attacked by and destroyed no less than 80 percent of Hitler’s armed forces. This practically saved Britain from German invasion. The allied forces took on less than one-fifth of Hitler’s troops. When they landed in Normandy as late as June 1944, the Soviet army had already freed a part of Poland and set its sights on Ber-

Why Mikoyan?

19

lin. Therefore, the British loans and American Lend-Lease were no gifts; they had paid for the Soviet people’s terrible losses and suffering in the process of distracting the German armies from Western Europe.14 Roosevelt had used this argument before Congress to explain the need for Lend-Lease. It is regrettable that today some members of Congress and journalists declare that America freed Russia from Hitlerism. After the war, my father tried in vain to convince Stalin to accept the Marshall Plan in the USSR and Eastern Europe; this American program would have aided the postwar industrial and economic recovery process. He told me about this himself, and I also heard about it decades later, in 1979 in Stockholm, from the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal, who had been executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Post-War Europe at the time. The former Hungarian finance minister Miklós Nyárádi, who defected to the United States, recalled Mikoyan telling him in 1948: “Frankly, I hope that with time the Marshall Plan will help to ease the tension between East and West in the economic sphere, and improve political relations as well.”15 Mikoyan’s reasons to try to persuade Stalin were economic and political. However, Stalin refused participation in the Marshall Plan for the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries in the USSR’s sphere of influence, thereby crushing Mikoyan’s hope to check the oncoming Cold War. Conversely, the Marshall Plan was never intended for Eastern Europe. As one of the creators and champions of the Marshall Plan wrote in an issue of Foreign Affairs dedicated to the plan’s fiftieth anniversary, Marshall’s June 1947 proposition was addressed to all the countries only after the State Department’s specialists on the Soviet Union (George Kennan, Charles Bolen, and others) had guaranteed to the U.S. government and Congress that the Soviet Union would refuse to participate. The plan was born out of the desire to normalize the situation in Western Europe, where Communists and other leftist parties had received a large number of votes and could have potentially come to power. The goal of the plan was to push them back to marginal positions. And yet President Harry Truman was right when he said in his memoirs that “for a short while, it appeared as if Marshall’s proposal might not only result in economic reconstruction but also in a lifting of the iron curtain.”16 Stalin’s ideas about the Cold War were in unison with the ideas of its initiators in the West; he did not try to prevent it and thought it was inevitable. At the same time, he was wary of the political influence that economic aid would bring. The prominent American Sovietologist Adam Ulam was right to consider Mikoyan one of the people among the Soviet political elite who were upset with Stalin for “stubbornly refusing to consider the changing circumstances and tying Moscow’s hands in new diplomatic initiatives.” As Mikoyan wrote in his memoirs, for a while he hoped that Soviet society would undergo a certain level of democratization after the victorious end of the war. These hopes were disappointed.

20 Why Mikoyan?

Vice President Truman, who became president in April 1945, was not an advocate of friendly and allied relations with the USSR. One might recall that as a senator in 1941, he said that the United States should aid Germany and the Soviet Union in turn, so they could “kill as many [of each other’s people] as possible.” In 1946, Mikoyan was preparing for negotiations with Harold Wilson, the young British minister of foreign trade (and future prime minister), who was coming to Moscow to discuss the repayment of the British war loan. My father was considering how to lower the Soviet payments, which were supposed to be 3 percent according to an agreement signed in 1941. In 1941, he only managed to lower the proportion from 3.5 to 3 percent; but one of his economic advisers reminded him of a precedent: Great Britain took into consideration France’s contribution to the allied war effort and lowered its interest rate sixfold, from 3 to 0.5 percent. Such a decrease would allow the USSR to save tens of millions pounds sterling. At the first meeting with Wilson, Mikoyan expressed the USSR’s readiness to repay the loan at 0.5 percent. Wilson was dumbfounded and asked Mikoyan to repeat his statement. Naturally, the negotiations entered a difficult stage. Wilson flew to London for consultations. Only at the last meeting before one of Wilson’s trips to London did Mikoyan ask the following question: How does Great Britain view the Soviet Union’s contribution in World War II? It was April 1947, and the West had not yet “forgotten” the Soviet Union’s role. Wilson expressed sentiments similar to Winston Churchill’s, when the latter gave Stalin a handmade replica of an ancient sword that was placed in the Museum of the Defense of Stalingrad. My father proceeded to ask him, “Does the British government consider France’s role in the war more important than the Soviet Union’s?” Wilson hotly and emphatically denied this suggestion. At this point, Mikoyan asked him whether this should not warrant that France and the USSR should be treated at least equally for interest charges. Otherwise Great Britain would be expressing unacceptable discrimination against its ally. Wilson flew to London in complete confusion. Whitehall could not find an argument to refute the Soviet minister’s reasoning.17 The four months of negotiations resulted in a lower interest rate, which saved the Soviet Union ₤58.3 million. In the course of his political career, Wilson never tired of calling himself Mikoyan’s student in the art of negotiating. Once, when he was already prime minister, he said this to me at a press conference in the House of Journalism in Moscow. Early in 1949, Stalin unexpectedly chose Mikoyan for an important foreign policy assignment: In February 1949, about nine to ten months before the Chinese Communist Party took over the Kuomintang regime, Mikoyan was to go to the mountain village Xibaipo, where Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee resided. He was to discuss numerous issues with the future Chinese leader, including collaboration, policies toward Kuomintang and the United States, domestic politics, the future of the Mongolian People’s Repub-

Why Mikoyan?

21

lic, coordinating a supply of captured Japanese weapons to China and technical help, and many other matters. Mikoyan sent daily ciphered telegrams to Stalin, and received messages from him.18 When this secret task was complete, his work was approved by the Politburo.

Avoiding Stalin’s Traps Heidi Aspaturian, an American biographer of Mikoyan, writes, quoting Robert Conquest’s work The Great Terror: “Partially due to his high professional competency, partially due to his political insight, and even more because of his astute personal decisions, as well as for reasons we will never know as they are forever hidden in the twilight zone of Stalin’s mind, Mikoyan was not touched by the repressions. He earned a place in the first row, among very competent administrators, who were capable of working under the threat of liquidation.”19 Time magazine reported in 1957 that, according to “reliable sources,” soon after the war Malenkov’s wife complained to Mikoyan that there was a deficit of pantyhose in stores. He replied: “Yes, but we have plenty of portraits of Stalin.” It is difficult to vouch for the accuracy of this joke. He might have thought this, but to give Georgy Malenkov—the CPSU leader who was to succeed Stalin as premier —such a weapon against himself? Although, who knows? Nevertheless, about four months before his death in March 1953, the insidious and suspicious “Father of Nations” decided to get rid of Molotov and Mikoyan. The reason for his anger at Mikoyan and the decision to dispose of him was that Mikoyan, who had become tired of playing along with the dictator, in a private conversation did not agree with the impossible conclusions of his latest work, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR. Also, Mikoyan did not support Stalin’s proposal to introduce a new tax on the peasants. At the CC Plenum on October 15, 1952, immediately after the Nineteenth CPSU Congress, Stalin harshly criticized both Mikoyan and Molotov. Mikoyan writes about it in his book Tak bylo (How it was). But the picture might seem more dynamic if described from an outsider’s point of view. The renowned Russian writer Konstantin Simonov, who at the time had just been conferred the position of candidate member of the CC, recalled: Despite his anger, which at times reeked of intemperance, when Stalin spoke he maintained his usual rigid structure. He followed this structure in the next part of his speech, devoted to Mikoyan. It was shorter, but in some aspects even more malicious and disrespectful [in comparison to the speech about Molotov —S.M.]. The room was silent. I did not look at my neighbors, but I could see the four Politburo members who were sitting behind Stalin and the stand from which he spoke. I saw them: They all had stony, tense, motionless faces. . . . Molotov and Mikoyan’s faces were white and dead. Their countenance did not change when Stalin finished, returned to his seat, and they went up to the platform—first Molo-

22 Why Mikoyan?

tov, then Mikoyan—where Stalin had just been standing. There they tried—Molotov at length, Mikoyan more briefly—to explain to him their actions, justify themselves, tell him that the accusations were not true and they have never been cowards or capitulated, and they are not afraid of new clashes with the capitalist camp, they do not capitulate before it. . . . . There was no doubt that he wanted to compromise both of them, humiliate them, and take away the halo from the main historical figures after himself. . . . After the severity with which Stalin spoke about them, after the rage that rang in many parts of his speech, both speakers appeared to be defendants speaking their last words; and even though they denied all charges against them, they could scarcely hope for a change of their already-decided fate.20

The dictator was preparing something, because he declared the two men politically suspect: “Molotov and Mikoyan have both been to America,” he said, “and they came back impressed by the power of the American economy. I know that both Molotov and Mikoyan are courageous people, but it seems they were scared by the overwhelming might they witnessed in America.” In February 1953, Stalin told Malenkov and Khrushchev that the leaders who had fallen in disfavor were American spies. By this time, it had been two months since Mikoyan had started keeping a loaded gun in his bureau drawer, in case someone came to take him away. He told his grandson, my son Vladimir, about this, adding that he figured: “I would have time to shoot myself while they were approaching my office.” He hoped—following the example of Grigory Ordzhonikidze, an associate of Mikoyan who was said to have taken his own life in 1937 amid Stalin’s purges—that suicide would protect many of his coworkers and his family from repressions. He was lucky; Stalin suffered from a fatal stroke before he could get to another round of purging “members of the opposition” and “spies.” After Stalin’s death on March 5, 1953, Mikoyan took an active role in implementing some long overdue economic reforms to benefit the people and especially the peasants; he also participated in the foreign affairs work of the new “collective leadership.” He combined the positions of minister of interior and foreign trade with the position of deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, and in this capacity he supervised a score of departments that he had been managing for a quarter of a century. Special relations began to form between Mikoyan and Khrushchev, but not right away. Soon, Mikoyan would become his main ally in issues of current policy.

De-Stalinization and Khrushchev’s Reforms Some senior Kremlin apparatchiks, headed by Lazar Kaganovich and Vyacheslav Molotov, opposed radical change and the mass release of Gulag prisoners after Stalin’s death. These two men had signed the mass execution lists with Stalin. A close acquaintance of Mikoyan and Khrushchev, Aleksey Snegov, who had spent

Why Mikoyan?

23

eighteen years in the Gulag, was able to convince first my father, and then Khrushchev, that if they did not condemn Stalin’s crimes at the first CPSU congress after his death, they would never be able to prove that their involvement had been involuntary. Mikoyan’s enormous accomplishment is in getting Khrushchev to put the denunciation of Stalinism in first place on the agenda at the Twentieth CPSU Congress in February and March 1956. As my father told me, during the preparation period for the congress, issues like the peaceful transition to socialism, the development of virgin land, and mass housing projects had topped the list. But when Khrushchev realized the significance of de-Stalinization, nobody could stop him. A week before Khrushchev’s report, Mikoyan made the first sharp criticism of Stalin at the congress, which displeased many of the old school apparatchiks. A week later, after long altercations at the Presidium with Molotov, Kliment Voroshilov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich, Khrushchev made his famous speech, ushering in a new era in the country’s history. Khrushchev’s best qualities came through at this moment—his persistence, comparable only to a steamroller; his courage in the face of a pro-Stalin apparatus and many members of the CC; and his sincere empathy for victims of torture, executions, and tyranny. As Harrison Salisbury, who spoke with my father at the Kremlin in 1967, wrote: “Those speeches [by Khrushchev] were no accident,” Mikoyan recalled. “They were carefully planned. We fought and fought for that. For three years we carried out a quiet, meticulous investigation—analyzing everything. That’s why the Twentieth Party Congress is so important.” . . . There was a fire in Mikoyan’s eyes as he spoke. Well might there be. For on the infinite list of Stalin’s victims and prospective victims, his name held a high place on the final tabulation, the purge to end all purges, the one Stalin was preparing just before his death on March 5, 1953.21

Salisbury described Mikoyan’s and Khrushchev’s close relations: There is no doubt that the wise, battle-scarred Armenian has been the closest man to Khrushchev in the days since Stalin’s death. At each step of Khrushchev’s rise you could see Mikoyan striking out ahead, testing the ground, as it were, for Khrushchev to follow. This was true on the occasion of two of Khrushchev’s most dramatic actions—his denunciation of Stalin [in February 1956] and his trip to America [in September 1959]. At the Twentieth Party Congress it was Mikoyan who first openly attacked Stalin—in terms more sharp, in some respects, than used by Khrushchev. And it was Mikoyan who first came to America [in January 1959], measuring the temper of the country and reporting back to Khrushchev what it was like and what he might expect when and if he came over.22

Averell Harriman wrote that in one of their conversations, “Khrushchev said the phrase ‘Mikoyan and I’ so many times that one could get the impression of a kind of duumvirate.”

24 Why Mikoyan?

After the Twentieth CPSU Congress, Mikoyan became the head of the Commission for Rehabilitation of the Wrongfully Convicted. To speed up the release of prisoners, he organized ninety-three commissions with the participation of the public prosecutor and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The members of these commissions went directly to the labor camps, in order to release large numbers of people based on the article under which they were convicted, rather than releasing on an individual basis. This enabled them to release prisoners by the thousands. After Khrushchev’s 1957 purge of the CC Presidium in the so-called AntiParty Affair (removing Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov), the “Ukrainian mafia” was brought in. This was how the people in Moscow jokingly described the group of people who worked with Khrushchev in Ukraine and were considered to be loyal to him. They knew that Khrushchev liked adulation, liked to be praised, and liked to hear approving remarks regarding his proposals. During this period, I had the opportunity to go on several domestic trips with my father. In Estonia, he behaved differently from the other Kremlin leaders: He saw Estonia as a special republic with its own traditions and interests, not as a mute part of the Soviet Union. Two months after visiting Estonia with my father, I returned with my son, Volodia, and heard admiring opinions about my father. I understood that people were impressed by his qualities, such as the ability and readiness to listen carefully, to penetrate the country’s problems, to be sympathetic toward it and not treat it condescendingly like a “younger brother,” to respect its peculiarities and traditions, and to consider the people’s national character. The same thing happened when I accompanied my father to Turkmenia and Tajikistan. This does not mean that my father was always soft and tractable in his life and work. He was rather the opposite. Often he was tough, uncompromising, and strict. When the occasion required it, he could become hard like flint, persistent and exacting. These qualities were inherent to his character, and they solidified over years of working under harsh conditions. While Stalin was still alive, Mikoyan managed to push through his idea from the prewar years to manufacture household refrigerators. It is strange to read about this now, but it took him great pains to obtain the government’s permission to manufacture 100,000 pieces a year (some said that 50,000 would be more than enough). In reality, he organized the production of 150,000 refrigerators. Salisbury wrote in 1960: “At the diplomatic party last summer some Swedish businessmen were congratulating Mr. Mikoyan on the fine appearance of the Moscow citizenry. They were surprised to find Muscovites so well dressed. Mr. Mikoyan beamed. Consumer goods is his field. ‘Yes,’ he said, ‘it’s true. Our people do look much better. Their clothing has improved. In fact there are times when you can’t tell them from Americans.’ He turned to me. ‘Isn’t that true, Mr. Salisbury?’ I was happy to support Mr. Mikoyan.”23 Of course, Mikoyan also made mistakes. For example, he believed that all sanatoriums should be available to everyone, especially to workers (he treated them with enormous respect, according to the Soviet tradition). To achieve this,

Why Mikoyan?

25

he helped to transfer the management of many departmental sanatoriums to the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. In practice, this led to a sharp decline in the quality of service. Mikoyan approved the construction of a cellulose plant on Lake Baikal, the largest freshwater lake in the world. At home, he assured his opponents—his oldest son, Stepan, and me—that the engineers made accurate calculations, the water purification system would protect the lake and the plant would cause no damage. But the lake was harmed. His pitfalls were his “technocratic” bias and excessive trust in the specialists-engineers, who persuaded him that there would be no adverse side effects because the calculations had accounted for everything. Likewise, he was sometimes fooled by the spellbinding numbers and formulas in government reports. And he was enticed by the economic effect of development. I consider my father’s treatment of the nation’s health care system to be one of the weak points of his work. For some time after the war, he supervised the Ministry of Health. To a large extent, he placed his confidence in the people who headed this ministry. Health care was free in the USSR, but its hospitals were, and regrettably still are, in very bad shape. He should have allotted to health care at least a fraction of the energy he spent on developing the food industry, household goods, and trade. Some of the positive outcomes of his influence on the situation in the country include the government’s distinct decentralization, with the transference of some authority to the fifteen Union republics. Initially, Stalin had considered any show of self-sufficiency in these republics a manifestation of “bourgeois nationalism.”

Mikoyan’s Diplomacy A British newspaper wrote of my father: “‘Smiling Mick,’ as the Americans called him, became world-famous for years to come as the first and best socialist businessman. . . . Foreign observers called him ‘the bottleneck liquidator’ for a reason. If a delicate foreign policy problem arose, Mikoyan would be on the spot, working on it with expertise and success. . . . No other Soviet leader knew the world better.” I heard Averell Harriman express his opinion even more precisely: “Mikoyan is the only person in the Kremlin with whom it is possible to have a conversation.” In May 1955, my father went to Yugoslavia together with Khrushchev and Bulganin in order to restore relations with Marshal Tito, whom Stalin had despised. Tito invited Mikoyan (only him out of the three senior guests) and his wife to vacation on Brioni Island. They accepted the offer the following year and went on holiday with Tito and his wife, where they continued their political discussions. On the foreign policy front, Mikoyan was very involved in Hungarian affairs, trying to achieve the removal of the Communist Party leader Mátyás Rákosi (Mikhail Suslov, the main “ideologist” of the CPSU, convinced Khrushchev to hold off on this) and start a policy of reform that people anticipated so eagerly

26 Why Mikoyan?

after the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. Mikoyan wanted the Hungarian CC to elect János Kádár, who had recently been released from prison, as first secretary of the ruling party, and he wanted Imre Nagy for prime minister. But the Hungarian comrades delayed this for six months. Like Suslov, they did not know that the people would not forgive them this delay. In the fall of 1956, a people’s uprising began in Hungary, as the result of which Nagy came to power.24 Against all odds, Mikoyan tried to convince his Kremlin colleagues to withdraw Soviet troops from Budapest. These troops had been sent out at the request of Yuri Andropov, the USSR’s ambassador to Hungary. By the force of his will and persuasion abilities, Mikoyan achieved his goal, despite the fact that on this issue he did not have a single ally in the Kremlin. A few days later, he visited Budapest and had constructive talks with Nagy and the leaders of the revolution. He was returning home, confident that all differences could be settled through negotiations, only to find that in his absence the Kremlin had decided to once again bring in troops and crush the uprising.25 He tried in vain to convince Khrushchev post factum, after the troops were in the city, to discuss the issue once again and to consider a political rather than military solution. A short while before these events, Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Molotov had visited Warsaw, where changes had taken place in the Communist Party: Władysław Gomułka had been elected first secretary of the party. Gomułka had spent several years in prison during Stalin’s regime. Immediately after the election, he made several remarks in favor of Poland’s complete independence. Khrushchev interpreted these comments as a threat to the socialist camp and the Warsaw Pact. Violent verbal confrontations erupted as soon as the Soviet delegation set foot on Polish soil. In the course of the negotiations, Soviet tanks twice left their bases to the west of Warsaw and approached the city. Gomułka warned that if the tanks did not return to their bases, he would order weapons to be distributed to the city’s workers. Both times, Mikoyan pressured Khrushchev to countermand the orders given by Konev, with Khrushchev’s permission. After my father’s death, Józef Cyrankiewicz (who was Poland’s chairman of the Council of Ministers at the time of these events) told me in Warsaw in 1979 that the Polish side knew that Mikoyan was the only member of the delegation who was friendly toward them.26 It seemed that everything had ended well. Khrushchev and Mikoyan flew home together and discussed the successful resolution of the conflict. But as soon as Khrushchev arrived in Moscow, he changed his mind once again. Molotov and Kaganovich, who were his neighbors on Vorobyevsky Highway in the Lenin Hills, came over to his house and advised him to crush Warsaw. Luckily, they called my father. They waited to notify him of the decision made by the majority of the Presidium members, who were gathered in Khrushchev’s garden. Their plan was to occupy Warsaw and use force to hand over the power to compliant CC members (although they never did think of anyone compliant enough). Even under these conditions, one against all, Mikoyan was able to first delay the deci-

Why Mikoyan?

27

sion and later to bury it completely. Otherwise, the uprisings in Hungary and Poland would have happened simultaneously; one can only guess at the consequences this would have for the USSR and the number of lives it would have sacrificed on the altar of Kremlin’s chauvinistic majority. There also could have been serious repercussions in the international arena: U.S. president Dwight Eisenhower’s position of nonintervention in regard to Hungary could have changed if a war in both Poland and Hungary had been at stake. It is also possible that some other Eastern European countries with “people’s democracies” and that were members of the Warsaw Pact could have joined in the conflict. Despite Khrushchev’s arguments with Mikoyan and a certain measure of jealousy he felt toward the latter’s experience and wisdom, Khrushchev valued Mikoyan’s ability to negotiate. This art required the ability to respect one’s negotiating partner; to clearly see both sides’ goals; to pursue the realization of one’s objectives as far as possible; to be tough if necessary, but to maintain self-control; and, in case of success, to make the other side feel that it had not suffered total defeat. Because Mikoyan had these abilities, he was assigned to various missions: China (several times, after the joint trip with a large delegation in 1954), Mongolia, India (twice), Pakistan, Burma (twice), Afghanistan, Vietnam, Guinea, Iraq (under Prime Minister Abd al-Karim Qasim), Morocco, Mali, Ghana, Indonesia, Japan (twice), the Federal Republic of Germany (where he even became friends with Konrad Adenauer), the United States (four times), Norway (twice), Finland (thrice), Denmark (twice), and Austria (several times). Needless to say, he visited the socialist countries of Eastern Europe—the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria—on numerous occasions. One of his trips to the United States, in January 1959, was necessitated by a careless statement made by Khrushchev. In a November 1958 speech in Leningrad, Khrushchev raised the question of repealing the 1945 Potsdam Agreement, which was signed on behalf of the United States, the USSR, and Great Britain by Truman, Stalin, and Attlee. Khrushchev suggested that the Soviet Union intended to liquidate West Berlin’s international status, which had been established in 1945. This was practically an ultimatum to the West: Prepare to withdraw from West Berlin within six months. But Khrushchev had not discussed this at the CC Presidium before making the speech. At the Presidium after the speech, Mikoyan sharply objected to such intentions. Soon, following the reaction of President Eisenhower and the West, Khrushchev himself realized that he would not be able to bluff through this affair. There was a danger of passing the point of no return and starting a war. This is when Khrushchev suggested that Mikoyan should take a “vacation” in the United States, meet with leaders in political circles and businessmen, and in general restore the situation to the level of calm before his speech. Mikoyan tried to reject this assignment, saying, “You made this mess, and you clean it up. Go yourself. Nobody invited me there.” But Nikita Sergeyevich made it clear that he,

28 Why Mikoyan?

as chief executive, could not go on a “personal trip,” while Mikoyan could. It would be easy to come up with an excuse for the visit—Mikoyan would be accepting the invitation of Ambassador Mikhail Menshchikov, who had for a long time worked as deputy minister of foreign trade, that is, as Mikoyan’s deputy. Khrushchev added that Mikoyan should take his son on this “personal visit.” He meant me, as he knew me best among Mikoyan’s children. As the representative of the New York Times, Harrison Salisbury accompanied my father on his tour of major U.S. cities. And I did indeed accompany him on this trip. The crème de la crème of society gathered in each city—the leaders of major corporations and banks, renowned and up-and-coming politicians, prominent attorneys. Every night, my father would speak for three or four hours, without any notes, and answer all possible questions, which were often very sharp. He spoke before the press and on television. His responses were straightforward; he never dodged questions and spoke confidently, wittily, and convincingly. He visited factories, supermarkets, and power plants. During this “vacation,” his workday lasted fourteen or fifteen hours. There were also some unpleasant impressions. There was a considerable number of Hungarian refugees in America at the time, people who had left Hungary after the crushed public uprising. Of course, they considered Mikoyan responsible for the Soviet invasion of Budapest—even though, in reality, he had played exactly the opposite role. The refugees organized demonstrations in the airports and at the hotels where we stayed. The renowned American cultural figure Vartan Gregorian (an Armenian born in Iran), who is currently president of the Carnegie Corporation on New York, remembers this in his autobiography: In 1956 [here, he clearly mixed up the dates of the Hungarian uprising and my father’s visit —S.M.], for the first time in my life I took part in a political rally. It was directed against the Soviet Union’s involvement in the Hungarian Revolution. The protest was organized around the visit of Anastas Mikoyan, the Soviet deputy prime minister. Mikoyan was Armenian. I gave an interview to a radio program. . . . Mikoyan turned out to be a very shrewd person. When he was asked what Prime Minister Khrushchev advised him before his departure for the United States, he replied: “Not to run away and stay in America.” This comment surprised everyone and made them laugh; it changed the whole atmosphere and really disarmed the reporter.

Salisbury recalled this trip in the context of the Cold War: “Then, in the winter of 1959, Mikoyan suddenly revealed that he was going to spend his ‘vacation’ in the United States, visiting his old friend Mikhail A. Menshchikov, Soviet ambassador to the United States. What ensued was not exactly a ‘vacation,’ but by the time Mikoyan’s month-long travel in the United States ended, the international atmosphere had radically changed.”27 To conclude the trip, Mikoyan met with President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. During the course

Why Mikoyan?

29

of the meeting, Mikoyan smoothed over the impression from Khrushchev’s hasty, belligerent words. Of course, he did not repudiate his country’s leader; he explained that Khrushchev had not intended to issue an ultimatum and that the six-month time frame was relative—he merely wanted to emphasize the fact that there needed to be some kind of movement. Moreover, nobody in the Kremlin even considered the use of force in Berlin.28 “I saw a good deal of Mikoyan during his tour of America,” Salisbury writes. I think I got to know him fairly well. I remember sitting in the parlor car of the Pennsylvania Railroad going back to New York from Washington. Mikoyan had finished his mission and was taking the plane later in the day to return to Moscow. . . . As I looked at this man who had whirled across the country with an energy equaled only by that of Khrushchev, a man full of zest, lively curiosity, and ready argument, it seemed for a moment as though the public face which he had worn had dropped away and left him there, rather small and alone and old and tired. There were fatigue lines around his mouth and his eyes were far away. Perhaps, I thought, for a moment he is running back in his mind through all the years, the years of struggle, of achievement, of danger, all the battles won and lost, the early dreams and the mounting disillusionment, the comrades who had fallen by the way. . . . He had got things started on the path of better relations between the two countries. Now he would go back to Moscow and report to his chief. Then the next phase of the battle would begin. There was no rest in this eternal struggle of being a Bolshevik. You fought as hard as you could and you hoped that it was good enough to survive another day or week or month. And even now, having come out into the sunlight after passing through the deep shadows of Stalin’s last days, Mikoyan knew that the battle was not finally won—that none of the battles were finally won. And whether the future would take a form anything like the original aspiration of the Communists, he could not know.29

I also accompanied my father to Indonesia, which at that time was the USSR’s “friend” in the developing world (or as it was then known, the third world). He met with President Sukarno, and I recorded their conversation. Sukarno listed his wishes and had no doubt that they would be fulfilled. Thus, he asked the USSR to supply his government with missiles and air power capable of striking Singapore, which he considered a part of “historic Indonesia.” He laid claim to Malaya, which at the time had not yet united with Singapore to form Malaysia. He even mentioned the Philippines as his next aim. And he based all these expansionist claims on the fact that the Indonesian, Malay, and Filipino languages stem from one linguistic family. He added that he had a million volunteers ready to fight for Singapore. Mikoyan asked him: “A million, really? So many?” Sukarno proudly replied that all he has to do was give out the rallying cry and this number would increase. He did not understand that he was falling into a trap. Mikoyan responded: “For now, I ask you to send only 5,000 out of this million to build the

30 Why Mikoyan?

power plant, for which we brought in our equipment and engineers with their families, but there are no construction workers.” Sukarno was very embarrassed and promised to send workers immediately. As for Singapore, my father replied to Sukarno, Moscow could not approve, much less supply the weapons, for aggressive actions that would break international laws. Mikoyan’s toughness surfaced in international negotiations, when the USSR’s partner presented unjust demands, went against legal norms, and tried to impair its interests or damage its image. In the late 1950s, my father visited several West African countries: Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Morocco. Guinea’s leader, Sékou Touré, declared his intentions to build his own version of socialism. Soon afterward, he encountered serious problems with the Soviet Union; most of the students he sent to Soviet universities soon turned to his opposition. He demanded to have them deported directly home. It was clear that nothing good lay in store for them. Mikoyan contributed to the Kremlin’s unexpected decision to send them home through Paris, rather than on a direct flight to Conakry. In Paris, they could decide their own fate. Unquestionably, this saved their lives, but it caused a small crisis in international relations, which Mikoyan reconciled. Sometimes, Mikoyan loved a joke during serious negotiations. Humor was in his nature. During the negotiations in Guinea, my school friend, Ashot MelikShakhnazarov (who later became and remained until his death the Armenian ambassador to Mexico and Cuba), translated the conversation. Touré was an ambitious leader, who received Guinea’s independence directly from Charles de Gaulle, and was very proud of this. Like many third world leaders, he considered unilateral help from the USSR to be in the order of things. Guinea had never had as high-ranking a visitor from Moscow as Mikoyan, so the question of economic relations inevitably came up during the negotiations. My father always tried to arrange mutually beneficial economic relations, with the notable exception of Cuba, where the political factor was more important. The following passage comes from Ashot Melik-Shakhnazarov. My father tried to organize large deliveries of alumina (the raw material for aluminum) from Touré. But alumina could be sold to the West for hard cash, so the Guineans were not eager to do this. When the conversation turned to the size of deliveries, one of the Guineans said: “A French proverb says that even the prettiest girl in the world can only give what she has.” Mikoyan immediately replied: “Yes, but she can give twice.” Everybody laughed, and an agreement was reached. Frankly, I never heard such frivolous expressions from him at home, but I do not doubt my friend’s story.

Personality and Character Mikoyan’s opinion was taken into consideration at the Politburo during Stalin’s dictatorship and at the CC Presidium during Khrushchev’s domination. It was

Why Mikoyan?

31

impossible not to appreciate the clarity and independence of his thought, backed up with arguments but always presented in an inoffensive form. From his youth, his work taught him to think critically and see the heart of the matter. In difficult moments, wisdom came to his aid; wisdom that was based on education, natural intellectual abilities, and experience. He protected himself from intrigue by being careful, cunning, and tough—whichever was more useful in a particular situation. The intrigue plotters could see that he never strove to move up the hierarchy. As one academician told me, for this reason Mikoyan’s physicist friends jokingly suggested introducing a new “unit of stability—1 mikoyan.” In any polemics, Mikoyan was quick like a rapier; his thought never lagged for a second behind the conversation. He found arguments on the spot, spontaneously. He did not suffer from “L’esprit de l’escalier,” as the French call the mental situation whereby things should have been said earlier but did not come to mind at that time. Using modern terminology, one could say that Mikoyan’s brain was akin to a fast-operating computer. Mikoyan was a brilliant organizer. I do not know all his tricks of the trade, but I observed several of his traits. He was firm and persistent, both with his colleagues and subordinates. He was exacting and required frequent and regular progress reports, but at the same time he created favorable conditions for work. Work was to be carried out strictly within a time frame, which was based on realistic capabilities. Any difficulties would be systematically discussed. If Mikoyan found out that somebody did not persistently try to resolve a problem, that employee could get a scolding. My father was precise about everything—first and foremost about time. His wording was exact, and if someone spoke evasively, my father would interrupt him, saying “Make yourself clear! Don’t shuffle.” He almost never raised his voice. Instead of volume, a metallic ring appeared in his voice, together with assertiveness, firmness, and an irrefutable, clearly stated argumentation. This had a stronger effect than shouting did on us, the members of his family, and also on his colleagues. He liked to know numbers, because they are the embodiment of precision. He remembered by heart many numbers and chemical formulas, such as the composition of metal, the chemical agents in manufacturing processes, and the chemical composition of foods; and he remembered enough quantitative indicators to fill a large reference book. That was why he disliked the words “a lot” or “little,” if they were not backed up by numbers. Mikoyan had similar demands from his advisers and other subordinates. They knew that he would forgive a mistake but not a lie. He never humiliated a person, even when giving a sharp reprimand. Once, he became angry at Konstantin Chernenko, who at the time, in 1965, was a midlevel employee of the USSR Supreme Soviet apparatus, of which Mikoyan was chairman. Chernenko had been exposed for engaging in lying and dishonest conduct, and Mikoyan said to him, “There is no place for you in the party!” Chernenko got scared and ran to Brezhnev, who gave him the high post of deputy of the CC’s General Department (as

32 Why Mikoyan?

we know, in February 1984, a little more than a year before his death, Chernenko became general secretary of the CC CPSU). I think there was a misunderstanding. Chernenko had no place in the kind of party that Mikoyan remembered and understood. But in reality, a new party arose in society, the kind of party where Chernenko fit in perfectly. The people who worked with my father knew that the demands he placed on them were no higher than what he expected of himself. If his subordinates made a mistake, they knew almost for certain that there would be no negative reaction from him; on the contrary, Anastas Ivanovich would take the heat off them. He liked self-reliance and initiative in people, and these qualities inevitably led to some mistakes. But he believed that an intelligent person learned from mistakes. If he had to reprimand one of his subordinates, he made sure to finish the conversation on a softer note or even with a joke. He was well respected and warmly regarded by his immediate subordinates as well as the people who worked in the ministries he managed, which included trade and foreign trade; the food, beef and dairy, and fish industries; health care; the navy, the river fleet, and the administration of the Northern Sea Route; the industrial cooperation agreements; the Committee for State Grain procurement; and others that I cannot even recall. Ivan Vasilievich Arkhipov, who worked with my father for more than twenty years and was his successor on the Council of Ministers, said to us years after his death: “He was a man in a thousand, extraordinary. What can I say, we were all in love with Anastas Ivanovich!” He went to all the graduation ceremonies at the Institute of Foreign Trade, which he created. While he was the minister of foreign trade, he personally met with everyone who received a permanent assignment to a foreign trade mission. He helped to organize businesslike work ethics in the institutions under his jurisdiction and the Council of Ministers. In modern terms, he was a brilliant highlevel manager. In the United States, he was often told that if he had lived in America, he would have become a billionaire. The following anecdote comes from his 1959 trip to America: after looking at the main conveyer at the Ford factory, Henry Ford Jr., the son of Mikoyan’s old acquaintance Henry Ford, expressed his wish to give Mikoyan a present—a Lincoln convertible, in which his guest could open and close the top with a push of a button. Father said that he could not accept such a present. Ford replied: “Then I will sell it to you for 50 cents.” Mikoyan, who did not have any cash, took a dollar from the ambassador and handed it to Ford, who searched in his pocket and said: “I do not have change to give you right now.” Mikoyan replied: “That’s alright, I can take two.” Everybody laughed at the joke, but of course Mikoyan did not take the Lincoln. In photographs, my father often looks intent and severe. But as I mentioned above, in reality he was a cheerful person who loved humor, jokes, laughter, and was extremely gallant with women.

Why Mikoyan?

33

In 1964, Mikoyan was in Japan on a business trip with a delegation from the USSR Supreme Soviet. The delegation included the Georgian actress Medea Dzhaparidze. Mikoyan lavished her with extra attention, as he did the other woman in the delegation, a representative of Chukotka’s leadership. Medea was a relative of one of Mikoyan’s executed friends from the days of his youth, Alesha Dzhaparidze, who was one of the leaders of the Baku Commune, so he showed her a little more attention. He immediately perceived her joyful nature, and their friendship became centered on humor. She would laugh at his jokes until she cried, and exclaim: “He is so fun! When I get to Tbilisi I will tell everyone, but you know, Sergo, people will be surprised!” It seems she was right. Melor Sturua, the son of Mikoyan’s old friend who had twice saved his life in a Baku jail in 1918, described how he almost got expelled during his fifth year at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO). The expulsion would have ruined his chosen career. This happened in 1951. Sturua angered Vyacheslav Molotov by organizing an informal “beauty contest” of the female students at the institute. MGIMO was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There were not many girls at the institute; this “monastery” began to accept girls in 1946, at a level of 10 percent of the total number of students, just so Svetlana Molotova, the only daughter of the minister of foreign affairs, could attend. The contest was quite innocent even by the puritanical standards of the day. The girls were not actually present and were judged in absentia. But rumors spread around the university. Svetlana did not get a winning vote, and she must have told her father about this competition in tones that got him worked up. He raised this joke to the level of “moral degradation.” Melor saw his only hope in Mikoyan. He talked with him and explained everything. Mikoyan asked him sternly whether it was true “that the girls were not called and undressed for evaluation.” Melor swore that nothing of the sort took place. Several days passed. My father waited for a moment when Stalin was in good humor and joked with his colleagues. When such a moment came, Mikoyan said: “Vyacheslav got upset that the students did not recognize his daughter as the number one beauty.” “Is that so? Didn’t they understand whose daughter she is?” the “boss” sneered. “Well, now they will, because Vyacheslav is going to expel them from the university.” Stalin looked at Molotov with a mocking smile. Molotov was extremely embarrassed and did not know how to react. In any case, the “affair” was put to an end the next day.30 What was my father like in an informal setting? His family always felt his determined character, willpower, and boundless devotion to his work. Our mother, Ashkhen Lazarevna, raised us, their five sons, because my father was only home on Sundays and even then spent much of his time reading messages from TASS [Telegrafnoye agentstvo Sovetskovo Soyuza, Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union] and other documents, even if he was sitting in a boat in the middle of a lake. At home, before breakfast, he read the ciphered telegrams from the embas-

34 Why Mikoyan?

sies, printed on thin tissue paper and classified as “Top Secret.” Sometimes he gave me a page or two to read, probably the least important ones. He understood that my education at the Institute for International Relations was related to issues reported in the ciphered telegrams. At the time, I was interested in India and the newly created Pakistan. Father knew for certain that his sons, who had all reached the age of responsibility after the war, would never let him down; the content of the ciphered telegram would not spread. It seems that by letting me in on these issues and by taking me with him on important assignments (such as to Cuba during the missile crisis) in the capacity of his personal secretary, he wanted to help me grow in the political sphere. But this did not mean career growth—on the contrary, he tried to prevent me [from pursuing a political career path] and strongly recommended that I stay at the Academy of Sciences, despite the advancement opportunities I received, including from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the CPSU CC. During discussions, he never forced his opinion on any issue and at home easily allowed us to engage in polemics and take independent points of view. He even liked the latter if they were backed up by facts and arguments. His sons and their wives liked to ask him questions and dispute government policy. He never got upset, and he liked to explain. When his grandchildren got older, they also participated. One of them, Stepan’s oldest son, Vladimir (two grandchildren were named after Mikoyan’s son who died during the war), became a “dissident” to a certain degree. Father paid him a great deal of attention, often went for walks with him, and had long conversations with him. Not only his family members held debates with him, but also our friends, whom all four of us invited to our house. Many of them still remember those discussions. We argued about all kinds of topics—from the law of value according to Marx within the framework of the Soviet economy to the outlook for the situation in East Germany to the role of censorship in the USSR. As for me, I always tried to be around when he came home for lunch, and I joined him at the table. Every conversation with him enriched me in some way, whether in factual knowledge or observation of his thought process. After my father retired, he started frequenting the theater. He discussed which shows to attend with his grandchildren, especially his granddaughters Ashkhen, Svetlana, Olga, Karine, and Nina. They all remember how they walked down the orchestra section and were surrounded by applause. People recognized Mikoyan. In the aisle, they would shake his hand, and he would exchange a few words. One could see that he was pleased—people remembered him fondly. Not many could hope for such a reception after retirement. Until Stalin’s death and Khrushchev’s normalization of the top leadership’s working hours, my father spent only Sundays at home.31 In the morning, he would catch up on a week’s worth of sleep, and there was not much time left to chat with us. Even on Sundays, a courier officer would stop by the house and bring a folder of documents. Later on, Saturdays were added to the weekend. Despite his lim-

Why Mikoyan?

35

ited time at home, we always felt his presence in our upbringing. We, his five sons, knew what he expected of us, and we knew his personality. Physical punishment was never used in our family; for us, it was enough to know that our father would be displeased. He would say a few words in a low tone, or maybe not speak for several days, limiting himself to monosyllabic answers, and this would be the worst punishment for us, his sons Stepan, Vladimir, Aleksey, Vano, and Sergo. In July 1942, Vladimir, who had just finished aviation school, where he had enrolled at age seventeen, persuaded our father to “pull some strings” for him: to call the Air Force and get Vladimir assigned to Stalingrad, the most dangerous front at the time. Volodia died in air combat in September 1942.32 The relationship between our parents was ideal. I have to admit that in this respect we did not always live up to our parents’ model. We saw how our mother took care of our father, maintained his wardrobe, preparing everything neatly so in the morning he did not have to worry about his outfit and could put on what she had gotten ready the night before. He was considered the best-dressed member of the Politburo, and this was entirely her achievement. Perhaps he did his part by not gaining weight, remaining slender and active, eating very little and almost always skipping dinner, and not drinking strong beverages. The people who accompanied him on business trips also helped him to maintain his elegant look. Most often, this was the chief of his security detail, Sergey Kryukov, who was quite at home in our family. Of the members of our father’s security team, Sergey was the only one who accompanied him on foreign trips. Because there was a shortage of high-quality goods in Soviet stores, mama handed Sergey a list of necessary items, for example, “two dark ties, with red or burgundy threads; three white cotton shirts; a tie clip; one dark gray hat; dark socks to match the suit.” The list was short, because our father’s daily travel allowance was the standard amount in the Soviet Union; in the 1950s, it was $11, and later $15. Whatever remained after the purchases from mom’s list, he returned to the treasury. He was in charge of billions of dollars in the interests of the state and its development, but he could not ignore even the trifling amount left over from his travel allowance. Perhaps this was naive, but such was his nature. Until she became seriously ill (in the late 1950s), our mother always stayed up until our father came home from work or from a meeting with Stalin. She had to stay up especially late on the nights when he had “dinner” with Stalin. This was difficult, but it meant a great deal to him. The most she allowed herself was to lie down on the couch until she heard the front door open. I can imagine how important a warm welcome at home and her attention were to him after the agitating and unnerving hours spent with Stalin. Mother could help him relax after a stressful day filled with intense work on a very tight schedule, and an evening in a diverse and unpredictable atmosphere with Stalin. Our parents rarely quarreled, only sometimes mother would become upset, and then father would become extra attentive and later jokingly demand that she smile. At dinner he would say, “Smile, Ashkhen! Otherwise I will not eat a bite,

36 Why Mikoyan?

even though I am hungry. And I will not drink, either.” Usually she would give in, smile, and the conflict would come to an end. We, their sons, admired this most happy and faithful couple. To follow their example was more than we could do. Our father became more attentive toward his sons when he was getting on in years. I cannot bring myself to call him “old” because the words “old man” did not fit him at all. Determination remained in his voice and character, his mind was clear, he had a sprightly step and quick movements, and even his hair remained predominantly black—all of this does not fit with “old age.” His increased attention toward us was a gift; by then, I was sure that the grandchildren would take him away from us. But our father was happy whenever one of us would spend the night at the dacha where he lived after retirement. He had relocated to the dacha from Zubalovo, and the two-story wooden house was not large. There was not enough space for the large family to spend the night, so only the grandchildren would stay. He had fun with them. Once again, I come back to Averell Harriman’s memories of Mikoyan: In 1975 President Ford appointed me to head the American delegation to the Thirtieth Anniversary Celebration of VE Day in Moscow. Mikoyan had retired from office then, and yet he came to all the international affairs and ceremonies. I believe he was the first senior official to retire and still retain the privilege of participating in public functions. He came to the American Embassy for dinner one evening and sat next to me. . . . He said to me that day that he worked closely with Khrushchev but that Khrushchev was difficult because of his lack of education. In fact, Khrushchev told me himself that his academic education was limited to one year in primary school. Mikoyan said he had opposed Khrushchev’s Berlin policy and also his installing the Soviet missiles in Cuba. “When President Kennedy forced Khrushchev to remove the missiles,” Mikoyan told me with a smile, “Khrushchev repaid me for my opposition by sending me to tell Castro that the missiles had to be removed.” Unfortunately something came up on each of my succeeding visits to the Soviet Union that prevented my getting together with Mikoyan. Finally, in 1978, we had a definite engagement to meet in Moscow in early December. Unhappily, Mikoyan died just a few weeks before I arrived in Moscow. . . . Anastas Mikoyan had a fascinating life. . . . He was an able man and served his country well.33

Here it is useful to look back at Mikoyan’s trip to the United States. For all intents and purposes, Walker Cisler, the president of the Detroit Edison Company, organized Mikoyan’s visit to Detroit in 1959. He arranged a visit with Henry Ford Jr. (where at lunch we sat at the same table with Robert McNamara, though we did not imagine under what circumstances we would get to know each other later), and with the heads of General Motors and Chrysler; and he organized a lunch at a country club that hosted the “crème de la crème” of the city’s society. After my father’s death, I often received Cisler in Moscow, and he said many good words about Mikoyan (whom he had known through correspondence since

Why Mikoyan?

37

World War II34). Once he concluded his remarks with the words: “You should be proud of your father.” Once we, his four sons, came to visit him at the dacha on his eighty-first or eighty-second birthday. At the end of dinner, he said something that I never heard him express so directly before. He told us that only once in his life had he pulled strings for one of his sons, and that was when he helped Volodia to go fight on the Stalingrad front, and die there. “You never asked for my patronage. I have always been against using my influence to that aim. Now I am happy that you earned your positions yourselves, through your abilities, mindset, and hard work. I have a good reason to be proud of you. And you should be satisfied for having achieved everything without my help. I can say firmly and with a clear conscience—I am pleased with you.”35 We could not imagine a better reward from him. It seems his firmness knew no bounds. It was the middle of October 1978. My father would soon turn eighty-three. A week earlier, he had slept with his window ajar, as was his habit. Then, unexpectedly, he woke up with a cold and a fever, which grew into pneumonia and then into pulmonary edema. During this time, he deteriorated and could barely speak, even though he was glad to see his sons and grandchildren, who visited him in the hospital ward. A council of doctors took every measure, but did not give much hope for recovery. My brother Vanya and I stopped by his ward in the intensive care unit. He was covered with a bed sheet, and his head was raised. An oxygen mask hung above his face. He had difficulty breathing. We said hello and I asked him: “Papa, how are you feeling?” We heard his firm and loud answer: “Well.” He passed away about two days later, on the evening of October 21, 1978. In the 1970s, I had begun to help him with his memoirs. I was the editor in chief of an academic journal (starting in late 1969) and had published some articles and small books, so it seems he finally recognized me as a professional and paid more and more attention to my suggestions. Because he did not want to get distracted and skip over the years of his youth—for example, his work in the 1920s and 1930s—I wrote “his” memoirs of the 1959 trip to the United States for him. He read it and made some corrections, but on the whole he approved of my work; although he was not sure whom to credit as the author if the book were ever published (it was not). When I advised him to write more about modern times—for example, about Cuba—he replied: “No, I will dictate and publish my memoirs in a chronological order, like I lived them. I will get as much done as I can. As for Cuba, I will not get to it. You should write it yourself, but from your own point of view. You know everything, you were there with me.” In this book, I fulfill his assignment.

2 The Journey across the Ocean: The Soviet Discovery of Cuba

The Cuban Revolution and the Beginning of U.S.-Cuban Confrontation

I

need to start the story of the Soviet “discovery of Cuba” by telling about Mexico. In the following pages, it will become clear why. The time is November 1959, and the place is Mexico City. The capital of the northernmost Latin American country is enormous, bustling nonstop with the lives of millions of people. The historical destinies of Mexico and Russia had much in common, even while there were some considerable differences. Traditionally, Mexico maintained closer relations with the Soviet Union than other countries on the continent. Despite close economic ties with their northern neighbor, for a long time many Mexicans had more or less anti-American sentiments. When all the countries on the continent broke their relations with Cuba (in the 1960s) under U.S. pressure, Mexico was the only one that did not submit to the dictate. Receiving me in the Los Pinos Palace, President Luis Echeverría (who served as president during the years 1970–76) told me that Mexico’s northern border represents the entire Latin American border with the United States; and though Mexico must be on good terms with the northern colossus, it does not need to comply on every issue. To have some counterbalance to the pressure from the north, Mexico demonstratively maintained normal diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia from the first years of its existence (with a short break at the turn of the decade between the 1920s and 1930s). Starting in the 1970s, Mexican presidents made state visits to the Soviet Union, which opened the way for the presidents of other countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region. 39

40 The Journey across the Ocean: The Soviet Discovery of Cuba

The first major Soviet statesman to visit Mexico was the first deputy secretary of the USSR Council of Ministers, Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan. His visit took place in November 1959. To avoid provoking the United States, Mexico’s invitation was timed to coincide with the opening of the Soviet Exhibition, which was being transferred to Mexico City after a successful run in New York. Mikoyan spent a considerable amount of time in Mexico, about two weeks. I was told by President Echeverría, and by senators, journalists, and scholars, that he was received not only as a high-level politician but also as a welcome guest. Many things about him impressed the Mexicans, but first and foremost they appreciated his sincere interest in and respect for their historical monuments, traditions, and culture. Before the trip, Mikoyan spoke with V. N. Kuteishchikova, an excellent specialist on Mexican history and culture. He read the books she recommended and amazed his hosts with his knowledge of the subject. The Mexicans liked the fact that he always tasted the surprises of the local cuisine in every state he visited. He even ate a small, extremely hot chili pepper, which foreigners usually cannot even stand to try.1 While Mikoyan was touring Mexico, the experienced Soviet intelligence officer and specialist on Latin America Aleksandr Ivanovich Alekseyev (real name: Shitov) was carrying out an assignment in Cuba: to find out what was happening in this small island state, the typical “backyard” of the United States, after the rebel army, the Barbudos, entered the capital on January 1, 1959. This army had been carrying out attacks against the army of 40,000 under Fulgencio Batista, the country’s longtime and last dictator, and these attacks finally led to victory. What kind of change were the Cuban Revolution’s leader, Fidel Castro, and his comrades in arms bringing to Cuba? Could one believe the leaders of Cuba’s Communists when they said that the regime change was not just another one of the Latin American pronunciamento coups, which changed the mask but not the content? In this regard, one must especially consider the fact that Castro had already visited Washington in the spring of 1959 and had met with Vice President Richard Nixon. As could be expected, the question of Cuba’s future under the new leader interested the U.S. intelligence services and government much more than it did the USSR. At the time, it was a marginal interest for the Soviet Union; not many people in the Kremlin cared about Latin America. Moscow was only dimly aware of the “July 26 Movement,” as Fidel Castro’s organization of young revolutionaries was called. Certain archival materials on the activity of the trade union leader Lázaro Peña were not very convincing. In their book One Hell of a Gamble, Alexander Fursenko and Timothy Naftali reference Peña’s discussions at the CC CPSU’s International Department, supposedly on Fidel Castro’s orders, and their consequences.2 All this did not play a big role. Until the Kremlin had reliable information on what was truly going on in Cuba, it could not make any “historical decisions.” Sending two Spanish immigrants to train the rebels did not amount to much. Castro intuitively understood that he would need to

The Journey across the Ocean: The Soviet Discovery of Cuba 41

influence the Kremlin by extraordinary measures in order to attain “historical decisions.” The first member of the CC CPSU Presidium who had an idea about the events in Cuba was my father, Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan; and the first sources of his impressions were, curiously enough, American television broadcasts in January 1959, during the first days after Castro’s victory. Once, when we were in the building of the Soviet legation on Park Avenue, the televised evening news broadcast a recording supplied by the Cuban leadership, which showed the execution of the dictator Batista’s henchmen. I remember that my father watched all the other programs about Cuba with great interest; but he was unpleasantly surprised by this footage of the execution. “I don’t understand,” he said, “It is clear that the scoundrels got what they deserved for the torture, humiliation, and mass executions. They killed and tortured to death 20,000 people! But what is the need to show the execution scene, and distribute a recording all over the world? They should not have done this.” In the fall of the same year, Aleksandr Alekseyev became his next source of information in Mexico. Later, he and I became good friends. Regrettably, he passed away in 2001. Alekseyev was the perfect intelligence agent. He had a cheerful personality, he was charming, and he could easily communicate with people and win their favor. To do this, one must have personal qualities that one is not used to seeing in professional spies in movies and in some examples from real life. He was more open, and he was brave in his opinions and even in relations with his direct superiors. He was an extremely emotional person, who valued friendship and friendly interaction—and I believe this was sincere, not out of obligation. These qualities were strongly manifested in his relationship with the Cuban leadership. Alekseyev came to Cuba under the guise of a journalist. With the help of other journalists, he came in contact with Ernesto “Che” Guevara, through whom he met Fidel Castro and Raul Castro. Alekseyev did not hide from them the fact that the status of correspondent was only a cover for his real mission, the essence of which was to supply the Kremlin with authoritative information about the events in Cuba and the nature of the new regime. All this is described in his memoirs, first published in the journal Latin America, where I was editor in chief for twenty-one years after the journal’s inception; and then in Ekho planety (Echo of the planet) and several other periodicals.3 It took us a long time to convince Alekseyev to give his memoirs to our journal. By that point, I had already published my article on the Cuban Missile Crisis.4 After finishing his story-interview with the entire editorial staff of Latin America, he said: “In any case, I did not tell you everything, so don’t judge my story too harshly.” Thus, Fidel Castro met Alekseyev. This took place at the La Cabaña Military Base near Havana, where Alekseyev was brought in a car. He lived at the Hotel Capri. Everybody there knew him; they knew he was a journalist from Russia and a very pleasant man. Once, he received a phone call and people in military

42 The Journey across the Ocean: The Soviet Discovery of Cuba

uniforms came to his room and asked him to follow them to the car downstairs. He took his briefcase with a bottle of vodka and cans of black caviar and came down. He understood that Guevara kept his word and he would be taken to meet Fidel Castro. The worried hotel staff thought he had been arrested by the Barbudos, and felt sorry for him. Alekseyev knew he was going to visit the prime minister, so he dressed in a black suit, white shirt, and tie. “When Fidel saw me, he scanned me from head to toe and made a face. He was dressed in a simple military outfit with no insignia, his olive-color shirt was unbuttoned. He made a sarcastic comment about my ‘bourgeois’ look, which he did not expect from ‘a representative of Communist Moscow.’ ‘How old is your revolution? Forty? Does that mean we’ll also turn bourgeois in forty years?”5 The caviar and the vodka made an impression —especially the caviar, as Castro was never fond of drinking. Fidel said he hoped that caviar would start being sold in Havana, if the USSR and Cuba established trade relations. Trade with the Soviet Union interested him for other vital reasons; by this time, the prospects of trade with Cuba’s northern neighbor did not look promising. Apart from the caviar trade, Castro expressed to Alekseyev his wish to establish close relations with Moscow to counter pressure from the United States, which had powerful leverage over Cuba’s economy. Doing business in Cuba had certain advantages for businessmen who had established relations with the government. Instead of honest competition, one could bribe the government for licenses and monopolize the market: “All you needed was to find a way to get a phone call in to Batista and he could fix it.”6 Therefore, almost no one in the Cuban leadership could think of independent political action. Batista was not even interested, because he grew rich off U.S. companies. Fidel Castro was a young graduate of the University of Havana’s Law School, but he was already a relatively well-known political activist who could not reconcile himself to the Batista regime’s arbitrariness vis-à-vis the Cuban people’s interests. The Cuban essayist and nineteenth-century patriot José Martí was Castro’s ideologist, teacher, and hero; to a large degree, Castro followed in Martí’s footsteps. After several futile attempts to take legal action against Batista’s constitutional violations, Castro started preparing to overthrow the dictatorship by force. He and his comrades organized a group of people who shared his views and began military training. On July 26, 1953, they attacked the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba. The attack was unsuccessful, and the survivors hid in the mountains near the city. The Castro brothers—Fidel and Raul—were among them. Batista’s officers had orders to kill Fidel Castro immediately upon discovery. However, Lieutenant Pedro Sarría, who found Fidel sleeping in a hut in the mountains, had known him from their university days. He did not shoot Fidel on the spot, but went against orders and handed him over to the civilian police. The captives were tried and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. During the court

The Journey across the Ocean: The Soviet Discovery of Cuba 43

hearing, Fidel made a speech in his defense, which was later published under the name “History Will Absolve Me.” A solidarity movement grew in the country in support of the young revolutionaries. Fidel Castro was well known in the capital as a student leader. Popular dissatisfaction with Batista’s regime grew. In these circumstances, the dictator considered it best to grant Fidel and Raul amnesty two years later, on the occasion of Batista’s “election” as president in 1955. The Castro brothers and their comrades were freed. But they knew that it was dangerous to remain in Cuba. Moreover, Fidel had a plan that required the revolutionaries to go to Mexico. Upon arrival, they immediately began to prepare a new stage of the struggle. At this point, Ernesto “Che” Guevara joined them as a doctor for the planned expedition. What drove Fidel? Was his guiding star some theory or teaching? He read the numerous works of José Martí, whose views appealed to people who could not accept the oppression of their nation, its wounded dignity, or the violation of the common people’s rights, for whom the term “justice” did not exist. Perhaps this set of ideas could be called Martí-anism. This was why Jean Paul Sartre wrote at the beginning of the new Cuba’s existence: “Neither Fidel nor Raul, his younger brother, knew what they were going to do in this world.”7 When this French philosopher, the extraordinary phenomenon of those days, came to Cuba and asked Fidel to explain the meaning of his self-proclaimed status as a professional revolutionary, Castro replied simply, “It means I can’t stand injustice.”8 Years later, similar words would be written in a farewell letter to his children by another revolutionary from the same pleiad, Che Guevara. The acclaimed novelist Gabriel García Márquez talked with Fidel for hours, and rarely about politics. This writer whose power of observation and remarkable perceptions of people, and especially their private dreams and ambitions, are known to millions of readers, said about Fidel: “A man of austere ways and insatiable illusions, with an old-fashioned formal education, of cautious words and simple manners and incapable of conceiving any idea which is not out of the ordinary. . . . I believe he is one of the greatest idealists of our time and perhaps this may be his greatest virtue, although it has also been his greatest danger.”9 Fidel explained to the Italian journalist Gianni Mina, “Really, Batista underestimated us. He knew we didn’t have any resources or money, and he was more afraid of those who had been in government and were millionaires, rich people.”10 The same could probably be said for the CIA and the U.S. State Department. In the summer of 1958, Batista announced the start of a general attack on the Rebel Army. The attack failed and turned into a retreat. The regime began to fall apart, and the government army fought more and more reluctantly. The unwillingness to fight could have partially been caused by the rebels’ tactics, as Fidel Castro told the Havana conference participants in October 2002: “During the war, we did not touch regular prisoners of war; instead, we let them go. Sometimes a soldier would be captured two or three times, and we always let him go. The government army would mobilize him, and we would capture him again. We

44 The Journey across the Ocean: The Soviet Discovery of Cuba

released him again, just like the first time. . . . I described this method to Nicaragua’s and El Salvador’s leaders when they were fighting civil wars.”11

Contours of the New Cuba On January 1, 1959, two columns of the Rebel Army headed by Camilo Cienfuegos and Ernesto “Che” Guevara entered Havana, greeted by the crowds. President Eisenhower’s brother, Milton Eisenhower, wrote in 1963: “If, during the heyday of its interventionism in Cuba the United States had initiated even a reasonable degree of social justice, universal education, and true democracy—which it seems to me it was in a position to do—all succeeding developments in our relations with Latin America would have been far different from what they proved to be. There would surely never have been a Batista or a Castro.”12 This reminds me of Hemingway’s simpler condition: “If the United States had supplied each home in Central America with a refrigerator.” In short, when the senator and future president John F. Kennedy criticized the policies of Eisenhower’s administration, he had good reason to admit the United States’ responsibility for this revolution: Such impudent treatment of an independent country would sooner or later have provoked an explosion, or at least a sharp political conflict. Kennedy linked Castro’s ideas with the heritage of Bolívar and urged the Eisenhower administration to have a “patient attitude” toward the new regime.13 At first, the CIA was calm. It assumed that “no sane man undertaking to govern and reform Cuba would have chosen to pick a fight with the United States.”14 But that was just it: it was the United States’ refusal to recognize the new government’s right to conduct radical reforms, even within the bounds of social-democratic ideology and practice that was blocking the path to reform in Cuba. Fidel Castro and his comrades faced a choice: Either reject serious reforms or challenge the United States. He would not have been Fidel Castro if he had not chosen the second path, which produced several CIA reports questioning his mental stability. Reading them, I cannot help but remember the days when dissidents in the USSR were sent to mental institutions. During a conversation, one CC worker told me his opinion that these people must surely be insane. For what normal person would go against such a powerful government machine? It is the same logic. Then Fidel Castro came to Washington and spoke at the National Press Club. He made a television appearance on Meet the Press. He was invited to meet with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Senator John F. Kennedy was a member of this committee, but he must have been out of town at the time. Dwight Eisenhower refused to meet Castro, not because he was busy relaxing and playing golf at Camp David but because he already had unfavorable information from the CIA. In 1992, I personally heard Castro tell the American delegation at a conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis: “Eisenhower begrudged me a cup of coffee.”

The Journey across the Ocean: The Soviet Discovery of Cuba 45

Was the Conflict with the United States Inevitable? Before Castro’s meeting with Nixon, he was invited to lunch by the new secretary of state, Christian Herter (who had replaced the ailing John Foster Dulles), but this did not serve as an olive branch to the leader of new Cuba. Castro recalls: I was invited by the press, and I didn’t mind—sincerely. But the president of the United States didn’t even invite me for a cup of coffee, because I wasn’t worthy of a cup of coffee with the president of the United States. They sent me Nixon, in fact. It’s not a question of it being a dishonor to have Nixon, since Nixon was vice president. . . . I was received at the Capitol in a little office. He talked to me; he let me talk. He doesn’t speak much. He asked a few things and let me talk. I explained the social and economic situation in Cuba, the poverty, the inequality, the hundreds of thousands of unemployed, the landless peasants, the measures that we had to adopt to solve the situation—and Nixon listened, said nothing, and made no remarks. But when the interview concluded, it’s well known that he sent a memo to Eisenhower saying, “Castro is a Communist and the revolutionary government has to be overthrown.” He said it right there. He suggested this to the president as early as April 1959. Not Mikoyan, not a single Soviet had visited this country.15

Nixon was not interested in hearing about the unemployed and the unfortunate—this to him sounded like Communist propaganda. It seems that if Nixon had been in the same office a quarter of a century earlier and Franklin Roosevelt had visited him in the capacity of an administration official rather than its head and started talking about the American people’s suffering during the Great Depression, Nixon would have immediately reported to J. Edgar Hoover about this dangerous Communist in the government apparatus. Nixon’s official summary of his conversation with Castro played a part in the fact that overthrowing Castro became a kind of mania for Eisenhower. This was easily understandable if one considered that before, such actions did not give the United States much trouble. The latest coup took place in Guatemala in 1954, only five years before the events described here. A column of drunk, armed CIA hirelings from the Guatemalan army headed by Colonel Carlos Castillo-Armas entered the capital and President Jacobo Árbenz capitulated. Why not repeat the ordeal, even if it takes a bit more time and effort? The historian John Lukacs wrote that the key to the visionary revolutionary events that became possible through the force of Fidel Castro’s personality was not Communism but anti-Americanism. According to Lukacs, apart from the usual inferiority complex that South Americans often feel toward the North American colossus, the roots of Castro’s hostility toward the United States could lie in the influence of his father, a Spaniard who moved to Cuba from Galicia. Ángel Castro hated the Yankees for “liberating” Cuba from a country with which it had cultural ties.16 Lukacs noted Castro’s special relationship with Spain, his father’s homeland.

46 The Journey across the Ocean: The Soviet Discovery of Cuba

I can confirm this, as I personally heard Fidel Castro saying openly to my father: “We have normal diplomatic relations with Spain. Just like you, we are not fond of Franco, and he is not of us, but you have to understand that Spain is a special case for us. We will maintain diplomatic and other relations with her regardless of their internal situation.” As the result of Castro’s visit to the United States and meeting with the vice president, his anti-American sentiments only grew. When the new government conducted agrarian reforms (they were approved in May 1959), it nationalized the majority of the country’s sugar plantations. Before the nationalization, 1.5 percent of plantation owners held 46 percent of the land. The reform left the latifundistas with 400 hectares of land, but this did not compare with what they lost—some plantations had been as large as 200,000 hectares. The United States officially demanded “quick, effective, and fair” compensation for the former landowners. Speaking at the UN General Assembly, Castro said that to demand immediate compensation is equal to demanding that Cuba reject the reforms.17 He expected that there would be difficulties with foreign capital. At the forum discussing agrarian reform, he said: “Are there any aspects of our Revolution that will not conflict with foreign interests? How can we reconcile foreign interests with our Revolution?”18 In March, the country’s telephone network, which was monopolized by the American company ITT, was taken over by the Cuban government, which revoked Batista’s 1957 permission to raise prices for telephony services (for which Batista had received a gold telephone). The energy company was also forced to lower prices for electricity to the pre-Batista levels; and the cost of medications was reduced. City reform lowered rents, to the joy of people in Havana and other cities. Cuba called itself “the first free territory in America,” which did not suit Washington at all. The very term “first” implied that others could follow; this became an immediate fear. First Eisenhower and then Kennedy were “haunted by the specter of ‘another Cuba,’ . . . because Cuba, as symbol and reality, challenged United States hegemony in Latin America.”19 Soon after the Revolution, the Cuban government began to actively support and even organize partisan activity in some countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, which gave a fitting and substantial reason to accuse Cuba at a forum such as the Organization of American States. According to the investors’ original calculations, the total compensation due from the Cuban government to American companies and private persons came to $3.2 billion. However, after a document review, it turned out that the companies had appraised their assets much higher for the purposes of compensation than they did for tax payments. As the result, $1.4 billion was added illegally. The remaining sum came to roughly $1.8 billion. The American government asked for an additional $200 million, so the total sum came to about $2 billion.20 The compensation was offered in the form of Cuban state bonds, with a collection span of twenty years at 4.5 percent. By international standards, this was not a bad deal.

The Journey across the Ocean: The Soviet Discovery of Cuba 47

The United States started to encourage and organize hawkish Cuban émigrés to take hostile actions against the new regime. The CIA’s director, Allen Dulles, composed a memorandum about this in December 1959. In January 1960, not long before our arrival in Cuba, a bomb had gone off at a large department store during its hours of operation with both vendors and customers inside. On March 4, 1960, a month after we left Cuba, the French freighter La Coubre exploded in the Havana harbor. It contained Belgian weapons for the Rebel Army. Around one hundred Cuban port workers and ship crew members were killed, and the material damages from the explosion amounted to $15 million. Before this incident, the U.S. consul in Brussels appealed to the Belgian firm not to sell the weapons, while the military attaché in Cuba addressed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, requesting that it not buy weapons.21 It was clear to Castro who organized the explosion. He made a speech in which he condemned the architects of the crime. In his book Cuba, Castro, and the United States, Ambassador Philip Bonsal expresses displeasure with Castro’s comparison of the explosions on La Coubre and the cruiser Maine in 1898, reminding the reader that the investigation of the explosion on Maine lasted more than three weeks whereas Castro did not conduct any investigation.22 Considering that the Maine investigation did not prove the Spanish military’s guilt, this accusation sounds rather naive. Bonsal proposes that the explosion on La Coubre could have been the result of carelessness during discharge or the sabotage activity of the local counterrevolution, unbeknownst to the CIA. This explanation is also offered by Wayne Smith, who was the third secretary at the embassy.23 Be that it as it may, the U.S. secretary of state, Christian Herter, summoned the Cuban temporary chargé d’affaires in Washington and rudely reprimanded him for Castro’s speech. In response, the U.S. government received a note from Cuba, demanding that it follow diplomatic norms when dealing with Cuba’s representatives. All this evidenced an escalating confrontation, and the fact that the United States fomented Cuba’s anti-American sentiments through its hostile forays. At the international conference dedicated to the fortieth anniversary of the crisis—in Cuba called the October Crisis, in Russia the Caribbean Crisis, and in the United States the Cuban Missile Crisis—that took place in Havana on October 11–12, 2002, Fidel Castro participated in all the meetings (as he did in 1992), made speeches, answered questions, and recollected. At one point he said, “In 1959–60 the North Americans prepared our nation for socialism; they pushed the Cubans away, starting with the Oil Embargo and then by other actions.” Jean Paul Sartre notes an objective reason that pushed the newly independent colony to a planned economy system: It seems to me that one would not find a liberal in Europe who would not admit that the Cuban circumstances require a planned economy. The superindustrialization of the continent imposes it on this agricultural island. The revolutionary

48 The Journey across the Ocean: The Soviet Discovery of Cuba

government submits to the pressure of reality; it deliberates each day under a menace, transforms the foreign menace into a requirement of the Cuban economy, makes known the effort that has to be made, which sector is more or less immediately in danger. How could it be otherwise?24

The historian John Lukacs noted in 1966 that Fidel Castro’s anti-Americanism was not categorical or doctrinal—Castro often had friendly conversations with American journalists; showed his admiration for Ernest Hemingway, who lived in Cuba for many years; played baseball; and so on. Wayne Smith, who at the time was a young diplomat at the embassy in Havana, offers another opinion about Castro’s anti-Americanism: Castro was, after all, a product of history and of his environment. He believed that in defying Yankee imperialism he was following the teachings of the revered José Martí. The United States had rarely favored liberal reforms in Cuba or anywhere else in Latin America. . . . Even if the United States was prepared to live with his internal programs, . . . Castro’s turn away from us and toward the Soviet Union was essentially a function of his foreign policy objectives, not of his domestic programs. . . . He had not fought his Revolution just to implement agrarian reform in Cuba. Indeed, given his ambition and ego, it is difficult to imagine Castro content on the small stage that was Cuba. One of Castro’s most sympathetic chroniclers has noted: “There is also a Messiah complex. Fidel has all along felt himself to be a crusader, if not a savior. He is out to achieve a second liberation of Latin America.” This messianic vision is crucial to understanding Castro’s actions in those early days. . . . Foreign policy objectives outweighed all domestic goals and considerations, and the centerpiece of his foreign ambitions was the “liberation” of Latin America, a goal encapsulated in the slogan “The Andes will become the Sierra Maestra of South America.”25

An unannounced but brutal war was being waged against Cuba. Only the offensive side was well armed, and it opposed Cuba’s attempts to acquire weapons for self-defense. This was clear from the fact that in the summer of 1959, President Eisenhower planned to ask Congress to declare war on Cuba if the island fell under the Soviet Union’s control.26 He need not have worried; it was not in the cards for the Soviet Union to gain control over Cuba. Nevertheless, the scale of U.S. state terrorism only grew and assumed various forms. For many years, specialists have wondered whether Eisenhower could have avoided the development of Soviet-Cuban friendship by personally meeting with Prime Minister Castro and showing an interest in his country’s problems. I personally doubt this. During the Cold War, different levels of closeness with the Soviet Union were sometimes necessary not only for real revolutionaries like Castro. For example, both Mexico and countries located far from the United States—like India, Indonesia, and Egypt—sought some level of counterbalance to American and Western influence, and at times just wanted various

The Journey across the Ocean: The Soviet Discovery of Cuba 49

types of support. Moreover, Cuba wanted to end its humiliating relations with its northern “boss,” which did not see any reason to radically change its Latin American policies. It would have been a different matter if Eisenhower had offered Castro something like an “Alliance for Progress” and a shift to completely equal collaboration. If Washington had decided to make the relatively undeveloped country of Cuba a showcase of capitalist progress at the expense of the economic positions of America’s own companies, with no pressure on Havana and with considerable financial help, then there might have been a chance for constructive relations. There were strong anticommunist attitudes within the “July 26 Movement” and among the population. Fidel could have stalled Che Guevara’s plans while he waited for results from collaboration negotiations with the United States, especially if Eisenhower had not imposed the “little brother” role on Cuba and had agreed not to intercede on behalf of North American companies, whose domination of his nation Castro would not abide. However, all these “ifs” sound unbelievable, considering the existing situation between the United States and Cuba in the Western Hemisphere and the psychology of the U.S. government and public. Interestingly, the well-known historian Michael Beschloss has written that John Kennedy himself also asked this question. Kennedy reflected on whether Castro would have been more rational if the United States had not supported Batista so tolerantly for so long. And Kennedy, who had anathematized Batista for the murder of 20,000 people, exclaimed: “I don’t know why we didn’t embrace Castro when he was in this country in 1959, pleading for help. . . . Instead of that, we made an enemy of him, and then we get upset because the Russians are giving them money, doing for them what we wouldn’t do.”27 As for Kennedy’s psychology, one of his biographers believes that he yearned to help the former U.S. and European colonies achieve independence, democracy, and prosperity. He thought these countries wanted to “Americanize” by following the path that the United States chose in 1776.28 In his March 13, 1961, speech at the White House, he announced the Alliance for Progress program and said that the United States would join in “a vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the Latin American people for homes, work and land, health and schools—techo, trabajo y tierra, salud y escuela.”29 His Treasury secretary, Douglas Dillon, spoke in Punta del Este in August 1961 of the need to ensure an annual increase in gross national product of 2.5 percent in the Latin American countries, which was twice their level in the 1950s. The president’s economic adviser, Adolph Berle, promised that the United States would raise the people’s standard of living in the region by 50 percent in ten years.30 Thus, the Alliance for Progress program was not a chance initiative or an empty show of demagoguery. Kennedy’s program was the answer of a smart and farsighted president to the loss of Cuba and the danger of the revolutionary movement’s expansion to other Latin American countries. It is clear that Gue-

50 The Journey across the Ocean: The Soviet Discovery of Cuba

vara’s and Kennedy’s ideas about possible developments in the region coincided in many aspects. But one of them viewed the situation positively, and the other negatively. Before Kennedy and the Cuban-Soviet collaboration, it never occurred to anybody in Washington to consider using generous support for development as a means to prevent events that Washington considered undesirable and even dangerous. Two years before Kennedy offered Latin America $20 billion to boost progress and give it a way out of poverty, the Americans ridiculed Castro for saying that the United States should provide $30 billion for the development of the continent. He made this suggestion at the Economic Summit in Buenos Aires, where he flew directly from the United States in April 1959. It must be noted that Kennedy’s successors did not have the requisite breadth of thinking to continue his program. On the contrary, under Ronald Reagan billions of dollars were spent supporting repressive and destructive regimes and their armed forces in El Salvador and Guatemala, and the “contras” in Nicaragua, rather than on the development of at least the Central American countries.

The Early Reforms The political map of Latin America looked rather grim in those days. Most of the countries were led by right-wing, highly reactionary, semifascist dictators. Every U.S. administration faced the dilemma of how to constantly proclaim democratic values and support bloody dictatorships at the same time. Franklin Delano Roosevelt was the first to try and at least partially change the way his country was perceived by its southern neighbors by announcing in 1933 that the “good neighbor” policy would replace the “big stick policy,” which had been openly promised by his older relative, Theodore Roosevelt, at the turn of the century. But FDR was not able to resolve this contradiction and finally uttered his famous phrase, which entered the history textbooks, about one of the most odious dictators, “He may be a son of a bitch, but he is our son of a bitch.” On January 3, 1961, during his last month in the White House, President Eisenhower severed diplomatic relations with Cuba. Castro gave him a reason by demanding that the staff of the U.S. Embassy in Havana be reduced to the number of people at the Cuban Embassy in Washington—eleven. Of course, at the time the State Department did not expect to be losing its observation post in Havana for long. The consensus in Washington was that Castro’s regime would be dampening U.S. spirits for only a couple more years. In August 1959, still during the first year of the new Cuba’s existence, at the Organization of American States’ Conference in Santiago, the United States initiated an attempt to denounce the Cuban leadership for the social changes promoted by Castro’s government. But these kinds of changes were overdue for practically every country on the continent, so there was no denunciation. It is fitting

The Journey across the Ocean: The Soviet Discovery of Cuba 51

to mention here that the American military administration itself conducted quite radical agrarian reforms in 1945 postwar Japan. Certainly, there were no American landowners involved and the American command was backed up not by a landowning oligarchy but by its own occupation forces. One can imagine the repercussions of the Cuban Revolution in other countries on the continent, and what a powerful antidictatorship liberation movement it sparked. Aside from Communist parties, which had long ceased to present a real danger to the dictatorial and rightist military regimes, there appeared movements and fronts based on the July 26 Movement (which was not welcomed by many Communist parties). It is just as easy to imagine what indignation and hostility Fidel Castro caused in the U.S. government, which had strong suspicions regarding his future behavior, his disobedience to Washington, and his connections to leftist powers. And yet, in April 1959, Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles could not imagine how the situation in Cuba would develop in the next two or three years. They clearly underestimated the significance of the Cuban Revolution. Naturally, Washington could not foresee the consequences of the Soviet Union’s support for the Revolution. Thus, even if a meeting between Castro and Eisenhower had taken place, it might have allayed the proud leader’s feeling of having swallowed a bitter pill but it would have been unlikely to change Castro’s government policy. In the bipolar world under the Cold War’s conditions, the only way to counterbalance pressure from the United States was by using connections to the USSR. Six months after Castro’s visit to Washington signaled the United States’ first major mistake in its policy toward the new Cuba, Castro and his comrades received a present: a person from the USSR, Alekseyev, sent specifically to make contact. They discussed with him what the Soviet Union could do for Cuba; Alekseyev was not authorized to make decisions in this regard, but he could—and was ordered to—listen to the wishes of Castro, Che Guevara, Camilo Cienfuegos, and Raul Castro. José Miró became the first prime minister under President Manuel Urrutia. However, Fidel Castro soon became prime minister. He became the rare type of politician who begins to steadily implement the promised program, which he had announced several years earlier at the court hearing. As we know, victorious leaders usually quickly forget about their promises or quietly reduce them to naught. Fidel was probably one of the few leaders in my historic memory who scrupulously carried out the proposed plan—except for one very important detail: to truly restore the democratic Constitution of 1940. By the summer of 1959, Castro was ready to take immediate action to realize the program stated in his “History Will Absolve Me” speech at his trial, and he started work on some points.31 Formally, even the democratic Constitution of 1940 was reinstated. But this is where a glitch occurred. The Constitution stipulated regular elections, and this important point was not brought back—the pres-

52 The Journey across the Ocean: The Soviet Discovery of Cuba

idential and parliamentary elections were postponed for three or four years. Castro gave his explanation, but not everybody was satisfied, especially the middle class, which had supported him even after all the reforms. The peasants and the lower-class city dwellers were not interested in elections because they knew from experience—there are many elections, but there is no change. As Costa Rica’s president (1974–78), Daniel Oduber, noted: “Unfortunately, people of these countries [Central America] have not believed in democracy because in this region it has always meant faked elections, corruption, and brutality. . . . In the last two decades [the period since the Cuban Revolution is implied here —S.M.], . . . our most important democratic leaders have been killed, tortured, or exiled by army men, paramilitary groups, or death squads.”32 The concrete benefits of the Revolution easily outweighed the importance of elections in the public’s eye. Fidel’s explanation was the following: “We have to put an end to poverty and consolidate the work of the Revolution before we can conduct elections.”33 This gave Washington a chance to blame Castro and propose the “stolen Revolution” thesis (attributed to the historian and Kennedy aide Arthur Schlesinger). In general, Americans have a deeply rooted belief that elections are the best—if not the only—indicator of democracy. Meanwhile, in the history of Latin America, compromised elections often bore little or no resemblance to the democratic process. Elections were the pastime of the elites and their traditional parties. The majority of the population could not tell the difference between politicians or understand the need for the whole procedure, because it did not change anything in their lives. On these grounds, the July 26 Movement delayed elections in order to prevent the traditional parties from clouding people’s minds.34 Frankly, when I was in Cuba and witnessed the enormous popularity of Castro and the entire July 26 Movement I could not understand—and I still do not—why they postponed elections. If Castro had conducted the elections in the summer of 1959, he would have received 98 percent of the vote (this estimate comes from the New York Times correspondent Herbert Matthews). When we were in Cuba a year later, the signs on the houses saying “This Is Your Home, Fidel!” did not at all look like a campaign orchestrated from the top, as we were used to in the USSR. These were sincere feelings of love and trust in the national hero. I personally witnessed the relationship between vast numbers of people and the leader of the Revolution. People watched his televised speeches at home for hours into the night, when all they had to do was turn off the switch. In May 1960, Princeton University conducted a survey, which showed that 86 percent of Cubans supported Castro and only 14 percent opposed him to some degree.35 Even many years later, three-quarters of the votes would be guaranteed to the revolutionary government. Plus, the opposition had moved to Florida. Elections would have made a positive impression on Western Europe. In my opinion, not conducting the elections in the first year or year and a half was a major mistake of leaders inexperienced in world politics. It was clear from Fidel’s words that he was worried about “consolidating the Revolution.” This concern bespeaks a familiarity with the experience of the pre-

The Journey across the Ocean: The Soviet Discovery of Cuba 53

ceding twentieth-century revolutions in Latin America—Mexico (1910–17), Bolivia (1952), and Guatemala (1944–54). Not a single one of them “consolidated.” Most likely, Castro considered this problem even before his victory and probably discussed it with the most educated and well-read member of his group, Ernesto “Che” Guevara. On January 8, 1959, the first day after his arrival in Havana, Castro made a speech at Camp Columbia. He said: The Revolution must avoid the special dangers standing in its way. I would not say they are too great. Other revolutions in other countries, such as Mexico, ran into problems consolidating their victories into final triumph. But it will not happen here. My great care is that abroad, where the entire world admires our revolution, it does not become the subject of conversation for three or four weeks, or even one week; so we do not have to spill Cuban blood to consolidate the Revolution. This would mean it is not an authentic Revolution.36

Here echo the lessons of turn-of-the-century Mexico, with its armies commanded by independent leaders; of Guatemala, where the army supported CIA’s hirelings; and of Bolivia, where the professional army waited out the storm of the city by armed peasants and miners, but a little while later again became the sole “protector of order,” the old order. In the same speech, Castro briefly mentions the forthcoming elections as a matter of course. Despite all the arguments about “consolidation”—that is, making sure that the fruit of the Revolution does not get snatched up by traditional parties and neutralized—I think the decision to postpone the elections was faulty. The situation in Cuba differed sharply from the countries where revolutions were truly “stolen.” Here, immediate elections would have consolidated the Revolution substantively as well as legally in the eyes of the entire world and, within the country, among people opposed to the July 26 Movement.

Castro Invites Mikoyan Castro knew that Alekseyev would report everything to Moscow but that the results would be long in coming, and there would be no guarantee that his report would prompt decisive action. Even if Moscow reacted positively, it would most likely be too late. In this Castro was right—and probably more so than he thought, for he could not have known how slowly the wheel of the Soviet state (and Communist Party) bureaucracy turned, and how many unqualified and extracautious people would be involved in reviewing Alekseyev’s report, not to mention in taking real steps. It was highly likely that the information would not move past the chairman of the KGB or the head of the CC CPSU International Department. The latter was headed by Boris Ponomarev, an extremely careful man who did not have any serious influence on the CC CPSU Presidium members. The Presidium member Mikhail Suslov, who stood above Ponomarev, was an even more apprehensive, dry, and mistrustful person. Aleksandr Shelepin

54 The Journey across the Ocean: The Soviet Discovery of Cuba

was the chairman of the KGB, and was later replaced by Vladimir Semichastnyi —both former Komsomol workers with no real idea about international issues. Plus, they were more concerned with personal advancement than the fate of a distant and unknown country. The same could be said for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I heard many of its workers openly say that they would rather deal with “normal” bourgeois regimes than with victorious revolutionary movements like those in Algeria, Burma, Indonesia, and Guinea. Rightist dictatorships in Latin America did not fall under the category of “normal” regimes, because the majority of them severed relations with the Soviet Union at the onset of the Cold War, following a dictate from the U.S. State Department. But formal relations with Mexico, Costa Rica, Argentina, and Uruguay remained. After the end of Getúlio Vargas’s dictatorship, relations with Brazil were gradually restored under presidents Juscelino Kubitschek and Jânio Quadros, although they were not fully restored until late 1961 under João Goulart. Nevertheless, Alekseyev was carrying out an assignment from the KGB’s First Main Headquarters (i.e., foreign intelligence): to be informed of the events in Cuba. The results of his labors could have varied, but it is unlikely that they would have led to a turning point in the relations between Moscow and Havana. Antonio Núñez Jiménez, a distinguished scholar of geography and Castro’s comrade in arms (he fought under Che Guevara), writes that Camilo Cienfuegos suggested to Castro to invite Anastas Mikoyan, who at the time was in Mexico. Cienfuegos was the head of the Rebel Army Headquarters, as well as a close friend to Jiménez and Castro. Jiménez mixes up the dates a little bit; he writes that the suggestion to invite the Soviet Exhibition and Mikoyan came while they were still in the United States.37 But in January 1959, Mikoyan was in the United States for a different reason, and the Cuban Revolution had other cares. The exhibition was opened in New York six months later by Frol Kozlov. In reality, of course, the time and place was Mexico City in November 1959, where Mikoyan opened the Soviet Exhibition. Jorge Castañeda writes that Mikoyan worked in the UN General Assembly in November 1959.38 This is also a misunderstanding. As was noted, Mikoyan was in the United States in January 1959; he visited the United Nations and was received by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, but this was a courtesy visit unrelated to the work of the General Assembly. In any case, by this time the confrontation with the United States had reached the point where the Cuban leadership began to think about seeking support from the USSR, the other superpower, which was already actively supporting some countries in Asia and Africa that had been liberated from colonial dependence. Jiménez writes that after he and Cienfuegos proposed the idea to invite Mikoyan, Castro said to Alekseyev (the following is my very close rendition of Alekseyev’s words): “Fly to Mexico and convey our invitation to Mikoyan, so he

The Journey across the Ocean: The Soviet Discovery of Cuba 55

can fly directly to Havana; the exhibition should be transferred here as well after it closes in Mexico.” Alekseyev replied: “Fidel, an invitation from the Cuban government should be presented by an official representative, not me.” “All right, we will authorize an employee from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But you have to be there with him, to tell Mikoyan about us and convince him to accept the invitation.” Alekseyev was a little taken aback by such a quick reaction. Besides, it is one thing to transmit this request even to the chairman of the KGB through the appropriate department channels, but totally different to arrive uninvited to a different country and try to persuade a Presidium member directly. I am sure that someone else in Alekseyev’s place would have flatly refused to go until he got official approval from headquarters, which would have arrived already after Mikoyan’s departure from Mexico. But Alekseyev, as I mentioned above, was an unusual KGB agent—he was straightforward, brave, enterprising, and very down to earth, not to mention charming and emotional. He related to me how it happened: They bring me to Mikoyan and I am terribly nervous. How will I describe all this directly to a Politburo member? I appear out of the blue with an offer that is impossible to accept without Moscow’s permission. But I knew that Mikoyan was practically the number two man in the Kremlin and to convince him would mean virtually to resolve the issue. I described my main impressions about Fidel and the others, about their revolution, with which I had fallen in love at once. I read some of Cuba’s new laws and resolutions so he could have something other than my words by which to judge their actions. Mikoyan turned out to be very accessible, easy to talk to; he knew how to listen, quickly understood and asked pertinent questions. It seems I was able to convey to him my feelings about the young Cuban revolutionaries. Maybe he remembered his own revolutionary youth. In about an hour and a half the Cuban representative with the official invitation was brought in. Mikoyan spoke with him for a little bit, heard my translation of the invitation, which was printed on the revolutionary government’s letterhead. Later, without the Cuban representative, he told me: “You must understand that it will take several weeks to move the exhibition and prepare it for opening. But it is a good idea. I will immediately suggest to Moscow to resolve this question positively. I think they will accept it. As for my visit, it is a different matter. It looks like it does not have to be connected to the exhibition; I can come with it or separately. Naturally, a question like that has to be decided in Moscow. I will state my positive view of this invitation. Once again, I do not think they will object. Then I will be able to fly to Cuba as soon as I am done with my visit here. Tell this to Fidel Castro.”39

Alekseyev was very happy with the outcome and immediately flew to Havana. An unpleasant surprise awaited him there. Castro was also happy with the results, but said: “I did not consider the fact that the World Catholic Congress is taking place here in a couple of days. Should a Soviet leader of this caliber be here at the

56 The Journey across the Ocean: The Soviet Discovery of Cuba

same time, the press will launch an anticommunist campaign.” At the time, his government did not control the press, and only had its own newspaper, Revolución. The Communists had the newspaper Noticias de Hoy; while the old-time, popular, large-circulation papers like El Diario de la Marina and La Prensa, which had received subsidies from Batista, and other newspapers looked to the United States and were influenced by anti-Soviet propaganda. “Therefore,” Castro said, “It would be good to hold off on Mikoyan’s visit a little. Can you explain this to him?” Alekseyev was in cold sweat. He had just put so much effort into convincing Mikoyan to come over, and now he had to fly back and ask him to postpone! The second time he flew to Mexico, he had the same sense of dread. “I thought he would say: ‘Is this a joke? I already reported to Moscow, changed my plans, and now it was all for nothing? Are you suggesting I hang around in Mexico after completing my official visit, waiting until I can set foot in Cuba?’ And he would be right. What will he think of Fidel! I praised him so much, and now he is not showing his best side. Sent an invitation and then canceled it.” Alekseyev had to fly to Mexico for the second time. A young man from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs flew with him, and I met him myself and discussed this subject with him, but I did not remember his last name.40 Alekseyev apprehensively went in to see Mikoyan; “my knees were shaking,” he recalled. He thought Mikoyan would yell at him and show him out. But it was not so bad. Mikoyan saw the reason in Castro’s argument. He even saw a positive element; if he had flown from Mexico, it would have appeared to be a convenient stop on the way. If he flew from Moscow, it would be a special visit to Cuba, which would raise its significance. Plus, the Soviet Exhibition would be ready in Havana, giving him a formal reason for the visit. “So let’s postpone it, not for two weeks like Castro suggested, but for two months.” Alekseyev returned to Havana in good cheer, and everyone was satisfied. Mikoyan described everything to Khrushchev and the other Presidium members, telling them that Alekseyev’s impressions were convincing and that the materials he brought to give evidence of Castro’s reforms suggested that this was a serious revolution, not the usual Latin American military coup. Some of the new Cuban leaders considered the possibility of a slow transition to a socialist society. After this bit of news, interest in Cuba quickly jumped. Moscow wanted to know more. Aleksandr Petrovich Malkov, a second-generation Ministry of Foreign Trade employee, described the following episode: When he was returning from Havana after negotiating a purchase of sugar, a black car took him from the airport straight to the Kremlin. When they passed the Kremlin gates, he decided that Mikoyan, as the manager of the Ministry of Foreign Trade through his position of first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, would call him on the carpet. He tried to think, “For what? What did I do wrong?” It turned out, however, that the leaders wanted to find out more about Cuba from the second person to

The Journey across the Ocean: The Soviet Discovery of Cuba 57

visit there. They were interested in his observations, impressions, and whether he would confirm Alekseyev’s opinion. Malkov had not met with Castro, but he gave a positive review of the developments in the country. When the question of visiting Havana was settled, someone remembered Nikolai Leonov. The KGB had appointed him to be Mikoyan’s translator, because he had chanced to make the acquaintance of Raul Castro and his wife, the revolutionary leader Vilma Espín, in 1953, aboard a steamship from Genoa to Veracruz (a port in Mexico) on his way to an apprenticeship job with a foreign literature publishing house. The young couple was coming back from a Youth Festival in Prague. Later, in Mexico City, he met and made friends with the Cuban revolutionaries, who had been deported to Mexico by Batista. The KGB did not advise him to become close with them, and the embassy was not happy about his dealings with suspicious foreigners. Leonov studied in the “Spanish” group of our class, which entered the Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO) on September 1, 1947. From then on, I knew him as a bright, extraordinary individual. He was an excellent writer and a clear, organized speaker. From the days of our youth, I knew him to be smart, serious, and responsible. Like Alekseyev, Leonov did not become corrupted by his KGB generalship. On the contrary, I know of several occasions when he helped people get out of trouble with the KGB. I was one of those people.41 Leonov would go as a translator; his personal acquaintance with Castro in this case would only help. He was simply indispensable in Cuba. He was in good standing with the KGB. Alekseyev was still in Cuba and could join our delegation once we arrived. Officially, the delegation consisted of the USSR Chamber of Commerce’s chairman, Sergey Borisov, whose group included officials from the Ministry of Foreign Trade; the USSR ambassador to Mexico, Vladimir Bazykin and his wife Lyudmila, an opera singer. She was a great help to her husband, who was languid, a bit of a slow-witted bumpkin. She was the opposite—a brilliant, sociable woman. Albert Matveev was the second translator; he was also from our MGIMO class and an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Most of the work fell on Leonov, however. The journalists Henry Borovik from Ogonek magazine (also my friend and classmate) and Nikolai Chigir from TASS got to Cuba ahead of us. Leonid Kamynin of Izvestiya and several others flew in with us. Vasiliy Chistov, one of my father’s three advisers, came on the trip, and I came as my father’s personal secretary. I was overjoyed when he told me I would be coming. We planned to leave Moscow early in February 1960. I remember a friendly gathering at Khrushchev’s dacha during the last days before our departure. His son-in-law, Aleksey Adzhubei—who was editor in chief of Izvestiya, and I think at that time already a member of the CC and deputy of the Supreme Soviet, and thus rather well informed—warned us: “Most likely, you will see a typical Latin American dictator, the kind described by O. Henry. He’s already been to the United States and is under its influence. Don’t get any illusions about Fidel Castro.”

58 The Journey across the Ocean: The Soviet Discovery of Cuba

My father was of a different opinion, and thus he prepared for the trip in earnest. Following his orders, Jiménez’s hefty book The Geography of Cuba was urgently translated and published in Russian (Alekseyev gave him the Spanish version in Mexico). The geography described in the book was closely tied to the country’s politics. Our polygraph and publishing houses had never known such speeds before! My father continued to read materials about Cuba on the airplane. He took with him a two-volume edition of Hemingway and read up on whatever he had not read before. Earlier, my father’s adviser, Vasiliy Chistov, gave him Alekseyev’s article in Komsomolskaia Pravda, from which we learned that the famous American writer lived in Havana—the article was even called “Don Ernesto Lives in Havana.” Mikoyan read the newly published Znanie (Knowledge) brochure on Cuba, written by an employee of the International Department, Konstantin Obyden. The author criticized Castro for transferring the sugar plantations and factories—centrales—to the government, instead of giving the land away to the people. My father was frustrated by these remarks. “What a fool,” he said, using his usual expression for someone who did not deserve praise for his show of intelligence (though he never used stronger language), “He doesn’t understand that one cannot approach the problem so dogmatically. It is clear that the sugar plantations are more profitable when a large tract of land serves a particular factory. This is a good system that formed naturally, because it is advantageous for production. This Obyden wants the revolution to ruin it! Just to think that he works in the CC and teaches foreign Communists what to do. It seems this Castro is a smart man.” When we finally approached Havana, a beautiful view opened before us: the blue ocean; new Havana with its few skyscrapers; the older part of the city with mansions painted white, pink, blue, and other bright colors; blossoming trees; and, finally, the harbor with the ancient Spanish fort and the old city. The airplane flew in from the ocean, as if to show the passengers this incredible sight. For some reason, railroad tracks crossed our landing strip; this is something I never saw anywhere else in the world. I had flown with my father on numerous occasions and was used to seeing from the airplane window an orderly welcoming group waiting for us on the ground. I was stunned by what I saw at the Havana airport. There was a crowd right on the airfield, where our plane was taxiing with the help of the airport staff. The crowd was not standing still; it was bustling and paying no attention to the approaching aircraft. It looked like some kind of Brownian motion. Looking carefully, one could see that the movement centered around one point in the crowd, and it did not seem to concern our airplane. This was partially true, as we found out when the staff brought the ladder and opened the door. A tall, bearded man stood next to the ladder. The movement I noticed had been centered around him. He was dressed in military fatigues; several more men in uniform stood

The Journey across the Ocean: The Soviet Discovery of Cuba 59

around him. The rest of the people were just a mixed group of the public in a state of excitement. I immediately understood that the cause of excitement was not our arrival, as only the bearded man and his fellows were looking at the ladder. Mikoyan came out first, followed by Leonov, Chamber of Commerce chairman Borisov, adviser Chistov, and the journalists who had come with us. I knew that my father would not approve if I pushed myself into the front rows. In time, I stepped onto the hot Cuban soil.

3 Ten Days That Changed the Face of the Hemisphere

Havana, My Love

H

avana’s warm air was a nice contrast to Moscow’s frosts and the piercing wind in the snowy Gander airport in Newfoundland, where our Il-18 refueled. The tropics have a unique aroma. I finally understood what was happening on the field. When Fidel Castro came out to meet us, the throng of people, who could not stay calm when they saw the revolutionary leader, followed him. Nobody dispersed the crowd; no soldiers or security personnel surrounded the airport. This pleasantly surprised me. I got a chance to say hello to Fidel Castro, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, and Antonio Núñez Jiménez, and also to a man whom I mistook for Fidel’s bodyguard due to his broad shoulders and large build, but who turned out to be another one of the leader’s comrades—Emilio Aragonés. A trio of cheerful musicians wearing straw hats and playing guitars and traditional instruments appeared next to us and started performing an upbeat Cuban melody. They greeted every international flight arriving at Havana’s airport in this manner. Our hosts led us to the cars in a chaotic procession, and I tried to stay close to one of my father’s advisers, Vasiliy Chistov, for fear of being left at the airport. We arrived at a villa with a garden, which was to be our residence. My father, Anastas Mikoyan, went to wash up (he had shaved on the way from Gander to Havana). I was not yet shown to my room and stood looking around with great curiosity. There were a multitude of soldiers, probably the guards, who freely came up and talked with Fidel. I wanted to approach him to make a closer acquaintance, but this would have required interrupting someone, which seemed impolite. Yet he spoke with everyone who came up to him, and people approached him in turn 61

62 Ten Days That Changed the Face of the Hemisphere

and out of turn. I realized there was no place for ceremony here, made my way over, and briefly spoke with him in English. Back then, I did not speak Spanish. Finally, my father came out, and Fidel joined him. The crowd receded a little. In a more private group, we came out to the patio surrounded by lush shrubbery and large, colorful flowers. Everybody sat down to talk. Fidel began to outline the agenda for Mikoyan’s visit, but concrete plans were made only for the next day— the Soviet Exhibition’s opening. We would drive through old Havana in the morning, where Mikoyan would lay a wreath at the José Martí memorial on the Paseo del Prado. From there, we would head to the Museum of Fine Arts, where the exhibition displays had already been mounted. Fidel mentioned meetings with Cuban businessmen, a press conference, and more activities for the other days, but nothing overly concrete. Early the next morning, Sergey Kryukov woke me up, saying it was time for breakfast and the beginning of the day’s program. He was my father’s bodyguard, the only one out of his security team whom my father had agreed to take on the trip.1 Kryukov took care of my father as he would his own, if not better; the entire security team was very fond of him. The old city near the port is like an open air museum. The former governor’s palace is a specimen of Spanish architecture, with inner patios and rows of columns, but the tall palm trees on the patio give it a tropical tint. I was very impressed by the Paseo del Prado, with its symmetrical rows of palm trees lining the elevated promenade and Spanish-style mansions, each one different from the other. Perhaps this style was no longer Spanish, but Cuban? The wreath-laying ceremony went as usual—and this was the only moment “as usual” during our ten days in Cuba. Even the opening of the Soviet Exhibition had a twist; gun shots were fired nearby during Mikoyan’s speech. Fidel had only to cast a glance at someone as the man left, then returned and whispered something to him. The entire time my father continued his speech as if nothing had happened. Later, Fidel said that someone had been preparing to detonate a bomb near the José Martí memorial during the ceremony. The Soviet officials’ assailants also brought guns, just in case. In short, their preparations were supposed to leave us no chance of survival. But it seems that because of the sweet Latin American habit of always being late, the terrorists were not in the right place at the right time.2 When they arrived and saw that the wreath had already been laid and the people were gone, they proceeded to the Museum of Fine Arts, which is located nearby. There they ran into the security services, because the building’s entrances were guarded. Thank God, no one was killed, and the incident gave Fidel an opportunity to once again publicly condemn the enemies of the Revolution. Speaking of security measures, it should be noted that when Fidel’s brother, Raul Castro, was with us on the patio, Che Guevara did not join us. We were told that all three leaders no longer appeared in public together; in case of a “successful” attempt on their lives, at least one of them had to stay alive. And they were right in their precautions. On January 13, 1960, in Washington, the first meeting

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of a “special group” took place. This group was tasked with carrying out the order from CIA director Allen Dulles, stated in a memorandum from December 1959, calling for “thorough consideration [to] be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro.”3 The main obstacle the group found was “‘that the only organized group within Cuba today were the Communists and there was therefore the danger that they might move into control.’ Both President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Herter were opposed to the premature assassination of Castro in the absence of a government in exile approved by the White House. . . . Otherwise, there was always the risk that an even more unacceptable figure, such as Raul Castro or Che Guevara, would take Fidel Castro’s place.”4 But to return to the opening of the Soviet Exhibition in Havana. After the opening, we had a short tour around the stands. With the help of interpreters, Soviet specialists explained the displays. Among the interpreters, I saw and greeted a colleague from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Arnold Kalinin, who later became the USSR’s ambassador to Cuba. After lunch, we flew to Varadero. It would not have taken very long to drive there, but flying was faster and possibly the leaders were afraid of ambushes on the road. The reader has already seen the determination of the Cuban people, and what a heated period the year-old Revolution was facing. It had plenty of resolute opponents. An operation had just commenced to liquidate the remaining bands of Batista’s army in the Escambray Mountains. In Varadero, Raul showed us the Villa DuPont, which had already been nationalized (today, it houses a restaurant for the numerous tourists visiting this endless, hotel-covered beach). Afterward, we boarded a yacht, which did not sail anywhere, but it was cozy to sit in the cabin and talk. On the dock, we ran into young American tourists, who enthusiastically greeted Raul Castro. A memorable part of the program on the first evening was the visit to the Tropicana—the largest and most famous cabaret and casino in Latin America. Much later, I found out that John Kennedy had also visited this entertainment complex when he was on vacation in Cuba in December 1957 and early 1958.5 Almost every tourist considers a visit to the Tropicana mandatory. Fidel wanted to show us the “dancing revolution,” as he once said. Luxurious cars drove up to the casino building, which adjoined the cabaret. The women and men emerging from the cars were dressed up—the higher class in Cuba strictly observed the dress etiquette, despite the hot climate. One went to the casino as one would to a reception for the queen of England. At the cabaret, we watched a show that would have made our puritanical Moscow ideologues queasy. Fidel, however, sincerely enjoyed the frivolous jokes, the barely clad dancing girls, and the general good cheer in the open air auditorium surrounded by enormous palm trees. The next day, we returned to the Soviet Exhibition. From there, Fidel took us to the beach, telling us that all the beaches in Cuba were now public property. By the way, later the beaches in other Latin American countries were also made pub-

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lic property. We went to see the construction of a block of apartments for workers and other ordinary people. We were struck by the original architecture of the complex, and by the apartments themselves. For example, few people in our country knew what a bidet was. Here, following the custom in the Latin countries, there was a bidet in every apartment. Toward evening, Mikoyan was invited to a businessmen’s club, located on a narrow street in the old city. There were many foreign journalists, mostly from the United States, as well as several representatives of the American intelligence agencies, who came to Havana in large numbers during those days (I met some of them much later in the United States, and they told me about their urgent business trips to Cuba because of Mikoyan’s visit). The businessmen, mostly sugar manufacturers, as well as the American journalists, showered Mikoyan with questions. They were interested in the possibility of trade relations with the USSR. The Cuban businessmen smoked cigars and exuded an air of self-confidence and assertiveness; when asking questions they touched upon trade-specific details. They behaved like real masters of the country. Soon I understood that we were speaking with a group of people whose power was melting before their eyes and who would not hold on to the role of owners of the national property much longer. In a little while they all moved to Miami, where they probably transferred a part of this property ahead of time. Most likely, Mikoyan also could not imagine how quickly the audience in the room would leave the stage of the Cuban economy. It then seemed that they had at least a couple years ahead of them. In any case, the parties had an interesting exchange of opinions. The first question was: “We know that your country produces a lot of beet sugar. Are you going to compete with Cuba in sugar exports?” My father replied that, on the contrary, the country’s sugar manufacturing produced an insufficient quantity—41 kilograms per person. Thus, the Soviet Union was interested in buying sugar, including from Cuba. The next round of questions touched upon goods that interested the Cuban businessmen. Cuba had always imported petroleum through North American companies, and the businessmen wanted to know whether it would be possible to import petroleum from the Soviet Union. Mikoyan replied that “the Soviet export of oil is expanding, and for this purpose we are building pipelines.” Knowing my father’s remarkable memory, I was not surprised when, in response to various questions, he easily provided from memory dozens of specific numbers pertaining to different sectors of the economy—ranging from the comparative value of a kilowatt-hour of power from coal, diesel, and hydroelectric power stations to the amount and price of exported manganese. He even remembered the chemical formulas for fertilizer. There were questions about the Marxist approach to the bourgeoisie. It seemed that the regime’s socialist tendencies were already worrying some people, even though all the economic indicators showed Cuba to still be a capitalist country at the time. Castro used the state budget to build apartment complexes in cities, lay

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roads in rural areas, conduct agrarian reform, and provide free breakfasts in schools. But this was still within the framework of capitalism, albeit with socialdemocratic leanings. The journalists, especially the Americans, were primarily interested in the political significance of Mikoyan’s visit. Would Mikoyan sign an intergovernmental agreement to purchase sugar from Cuba? My father did not hide the fact that this question was under negotiation (the agreement was signed by the end of his visit). Did this mean that Cuba would look more toward the Soviet Union than the United States? Mikoyan suggested that this question should be addressed to the Cuban government. He did note, however, that Cuba’s development of trade relations with the USSR did not necessarily have to damage Cuba’s relations with other countries. He gave examples of Soviet trade with American allies in Europe, with Japan, and with many other countries. Later in the evening, there was a reception at the Havana Hilton Hotel, organized by the Cuban side. There were many journalists there as well; not far from the Hilton stood the Edificio Focsa building, where many of them lived. This building’s style of architecture later became the signature of New Arbat Street in Moscow: Khrushchev’s daughter, Rada, and her husband, Alesha Adzhubei, visited Cuba and told N. S. Khrushchev about the original and beautiful Focsa; as a result, three such buildings were erected in Moscow on the newly constructed street.

Flying over the Island of Cuba From the start of the February 1960 visit, Fidel and Anastas Ivanovich discussed the question of traveling around the country. Castro wanted to show Mikoyan as much as possible, and the opportunity presented itself to use a Soviet MI helicopter, which was on display at the Soviet Exhibition, to fly around the island. Fidel was thrilled by the idea, and we set out on our way. Fidel pointed out the landmarks; sometimes he sat with the pilots, looked below, and pointed out where to land. The first landing was southwest of Havana, in the tobacco-growing region of Pinar del Río Province. Nobody knew of our arrival ahead of time, but all the villagers were enthusiastic and excited by Fidel’s visit. I think they were not too interested in the foreign guest. After looking at the tobacco plantations, everyone was treated to the traditional meal of pork with rice and black beans. The next stop was Isla de Pinos, where we would spend the night. At first, I thought that the tobacco growers’ village was an unplanned chance landing, but soon I realized that Fidel had planned only the overnight stops and that everything else was being improvised. Here, Fidel showed us expansive fields, the pine groves that gave the island its name, and herds of the Zebu cattle that are well adapted to the tropical climate but give little milk. He told us that the island was uncultivated. Batista had only built a model prison here, where Fidel spent about two years. He said that the island could be used for fruit tree plantations.

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Suddenly, Castro asked: “Would the Soviet Union buy fruit from us? Oranges, pineapples, grapefruits?” “Of course,” father replied, “Our population needs it, and we don’t have the climate for such tropical and subtropical fruit. How much and what kind of fruit would you be able to provide?” “As much as you want!” “No, let’s be more precise. How many tons of oranges per year? What about grapefruit, pineapples? Perhaps the Institute of Agrarian Reform would be able to supply us with precise numbers?” “I am telling you, as much as you want, no limits, to supply your country’s demand,” Fidel insisted. “You cannot imagine the scale and demands of our country,” Mikoyan replied. As I already mentioned above, Mikoyan liked precision in everything, and in this kind of matter he considered it mandatory. Fidel’s answers clearly did not satisfy him. Later, he assigned Sergey Borisov and his staff at the USSR Chamber of Commerce to seriously investigate the possibility of fruit commerce: to find out the quantities, prices, and transportation in refrigerated containers, and so on. Soon, I saw Cuban grapefruit and canned pineapple juice on Moscow store shelves for the first time in my life. We spent the night at a wonderful hotel for American tourists, with the symbolic name El Colony, located on a completely deserted beach. In the morning, I was the first one to come out for a breath of fresh air, and I saw how well we were guarded. Several soldiers with rifles stood in a circle around our wing of the hotel. During the day, Fidel showed us the local farming industry, complaining about the small amount of milk produced by the local Zebu cattle. Already in those days he must have had the idea to breed the Zebu cattle, which could survive in the tropical climate, with large European horned cattle, which gave more milk. Soon it was time to board the helicopter, and we flew east. Along the way, Fidel pointed out tiny islands to the pilot. We landed on one of them and were told that it was Cayo Largo, although the isle did not look “largo,” or large, at all. In 1996, I visited an incredible resort on Cayo Largo with endless beaches of superfine white sand, and I realized that in 1960 we were either at the cape-shaped edge of the island or on a small unnamed isle near Cayo Largo. Several soldiers guarded this frontier island. They were very happy to see Fidel, and one of them, a large black man, even put his elbow on the comandante’s shoulder and talked with him. This did not strike Fidel as undue familiarity; they talked for a considerable amount of time. Meanwhile, my father put on his swimming shorts and plunged into the ocean. I followed his example. The large, slanting waves felt wonderful, and the water was warm. Another bodyguard, an unfamiliar man sent by the KGB chairman separately from our delegation, swam next to my father, spotting him just in case. Later I found out that his last name was Yatskov. We curiously examined an iguana, a descendant of the dinosaurs. The

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soldiers brought the monster for us to look at. I mentally magnified its size by fifty and saw the dinosaur itself. By watching the interaction between the Cuban soldiers and their commander in chief, I came to understand something that I observed on numerous occasions afterward: Cubans lack a sense of respect for rank; they feel no inferiority before a person of higher rank. It is difficult to tell apart the “boss” from the subordinate by observing the interaction between two people. There is no affectation here; everything is natural and accepted as the norm by both the “bosses” and their subordinates. This marvelous quality made a great impression on me, especially in contrast to my homeland. The next part of our flight is best told in Fidel Castro’s words, as he described it at a conference in Havana in 2002 dedicated to the fortieth anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis. First, he told all the participants what a good impression he had of Mikoyan: He was a friendly, amicable person, whom you could trust. I showed him Cuba from their own helicopter, taken directly from the Soviet Exhibition. It was a great opportunity to see the country in a short amount of time. However, the Soviet pilots did not have an appropriate map; they were probably given maps out of a school textbook. From Cayo Largo, they set the course due east. I did not notice right away, but when I did, I asked them: “Where are you flying?” “East,” they replied. They should have been flying north. I asked them to change the course, but they pointed to the city of Cienfuegos on the map and disagreed with me, saying that they first have to stop at a place where they could refuel. Then I asked them how much fuel we had left. “We have enough for about 20 or 30 minutes,” they said. They thought they would reach someplace to refuel in that time. I explained to them that farther east is a large stretch of sea and in half an hour they would not reach any dry land at all, much less Cienfuegos. They were stubborn and disagreed. I did not know what to do, short of pulling out my gun! I could not allow myself and my distinguished guest to drown in the sea! I had to tell Mikoyan. He ordered them to follow my instructions. I told them to go north to Laguna del Tesoro, where we were expected. It was a little to the north of the Playa Girón.

“Mikoyan almost freed the United States of Castro,” Fidel joked about this episode.6 This is how we found ourselves at the edge of Laguna del Tesoro, a magnificent lagoon, instead of on the magnificent sandy bottom of the Caribbean Sea. Near the water, a wooden helipad stood raised on beams. It was designed for lightweight helicopters and almost collapsed under our MI. The pilots had to raise the aircraft half a meter above the helipad and wait while we jumped onto the platform, fighting the strong airflow from the blades above our heads. The helicopter went to refuel at a place designated by Fidel. Laguna Tesoro is a great vacation spot. People say that the pirates of the Caribbean were the first to discover it and rested there between attacks on passing

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Spanish galleons, laden with silver and gold. Perhaps the pirates hid the looted treasures here (hence the name “Tesoro,” which means treasure in Spanish). Although no one ever found treasure here, it is said that the British writer Robert Louis Stevenson wrote his Treasure Island about this place, but later transferred it to Isla de Pinos. Near the lagoon, we visited a crocodile nursery. The crocodiles were relatively small, but each had quite a mouthful of teeth. In the morning we all got spinning rods, boarded motor boats, and went out into the small bays of the Caribbean Sea. These must have been good places for fishing. My father and Fidel were in one boat, and I was in another. There was also a third boat for the security guards, who had machine guns and carbines instead of spinning rods. This did not surprise me because we were only 80 kilometers from the Escambray Mountains, with their remnant of Batista’s army, and there were also many small bands in other places. I got the impression that Fidel had picked out the safest or most unexpected places for us to visit to avoid potential terrorist attacks—for example, the hotel El Colony in Pinos, Laguna del Tesoro, and the mountain in Oriente Province, where we had yet to go. Fidel was a renowned champion angler; it was not so long ago that Ernest Hemingway had presented him with a prize at the annual competitions near Havana. Curiously enough, my father also had some success and caught two or three large fish. At Laguna del Tesoro, we met the leaders’ wives. You could not call Vilma Espín just Raul’s wife. She was a decisive woman with her own revolutionary biography of underground resistance. Rather tall and with an authoritative personality, she clearly dominated this sorority. She had worked underground in Santiago in 1956 with Frank País; they prepared the uprising connected with the landing of the Granma. Espín was a revolutionary in her own right. She passed away in 2007, at the age of seventy-six. She and Raul had a baby after the Revolution, as did many of the other leaders, including Ernesto “Che” Guevara. Later they had more children. Not too long ago, in October 2002, I saw her in Havana with a young man named Alejandro, whom she introduced as her “youngest.” He must have been the youngest of her grandchildren. Surprisingly, she remembered how many children I had, because she met them in Moscow when they were in grade school, and asked about them. The young revolutionaries could start a normal family life after the victory, following several years of underground resistance and civil war. Only Fidel was not married—his wife had left him and their son during the years of revolutionary struggle, and she left for Spain with her new husband and children immediately after the triumph of the Revolution. Aleida, Che Guevara’s second wife, a woman with light brown hair and astonishingly beautiful light eyes, was just as reserved as her husband. They also had a baby, and another one on the way.

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Haydee Santamaría, the sister of the murdered revolutionary Abel Santamaría, was a nice, modest, industrious woman. I met her on numerous occasions as one of the leaders of the Cuban Movement for Sovereignty and Peace, which is analogous to the USSR’s Peace Committee. She married Armando Hart, who was later appointed as minister of culture. Celia Sánchez was a thin, dark-haired woman, older than everyone else. After Fidel’s Granma fighters landed in November 1956, she organized weapons and ammunition supplies from Santiago. It was said that she had an affair with Fidel at some point. When we were visiting, she was the keeper of the Revolution’s archive, akin to a CC secretary, and was a highly respected and prominent member of Castro’s team. The New York Times’s Herbert Matthews wrote that she herself was apolitical but endlessly devoted to Fidel. Che Guevara joined us at Laguna del Tesoro. We met him after returning from fishing, and he joked about our catch. After lunch in the merry, loud company, Che Guevara, Fidel Castro, and Mikoyan, accompanied by Nikolai Leonov, Mikoyan’s translator, spent a great deal of time apart from everyone else, engaged in a serious discussion.

The Die Is Cast Mikoyan—along with Leonov, Fidel Castro, and Che Guevara—walked around the bridges and pathways among the marshes and connected lakes near Laguna del Tesoro. They were having the most serious political conversation of the visit so far. I guessed that they were having an important exchange of opinions, which needed no extraneous participants. Their discussion concerned the nature and future development of the Cuban Revolution, the goals of the July 26 Movement, and Cuba’s future. Of course, the Cuban and Soviet sides had been discussing politics all the time, but usually there were too many people nearby to have a truly confidential conversation. This time, however, they were able to have a long and frank conversation. My father told me about it in detail afterward, and some things I found out from Leonov. Castro said that the Revolution in Cuba did not follow Marxist laws, and even happened despite them. Mikoyan objected: “If you take a dogmatic approach to Marxism, you may be right. But in essence your path is close to Marxism, if you consider that it is not a petrified dogma. That is how I understand it.” Castro’s words most likely refer to the fact that while he was engaged in armed struggle, Cuba’s Communist Party (officially called the People’s Socialist Party) did not support him. It considered guerilla warfare in the countryside “petit bourgeois,” because, according to Marxist canons, a socialist revolution is supposed to stem from the proletariat’s organized action in cities. My father commented that this was a sectarian and dogmatic point of view. I might add that some Communists ignored the party’s official stance and joined Fidel’s ranks, for example, Carlos

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Rafael Rodríguez. Castro did not trust the Communist Party for a long time. With the exception, of course, of his above-mentioned comrade, Castro said: “They weren’t good recruits. I wouldn’t advise that such people be recruited; those who renounce one idea aren’t usually good supporters of another cause.”7 Hence we can see that during the war in Sierra Maestra, he still thought that his movement and the Communists had different ideological aims. During the conversation, Castro and Guevara said that their Revolution would assume a socialist nature. Castro was cautious with time estimates, saying, “We will probably need around ten years to change public opinion, which has been formed by anti-Soviet propaganda.” Guevara disagreed: “If we do not turn around in two or three years, we will be crushed.” He meant the United States and the Cuban bourgeoisie, who kept its old party structure and still had economic power. Both Cuban leaders touched upon the topic of developing closer Cuban-Soviet relations and the possibility that the Soviet Union would help Cuba withstand the predictable pressure from the United States. Earlier, Mikoyan had expressed Moscow’s readiness to provide $100 million in credit to Cuba, but Castro said that $100 million would not be enough, and Guevara agreed with him. Castro explained that they foresaw the need to completely redirect the economy— around three-quarters of Cuba’s exports and imports were to or from the United States. And most important, there was an urgent need for reforms, which required funding. Cuba had nowhere to get the means, save for nationalizing private property. The agrarian and urban reforms had already used up a great deal of the funds. In addition, the leaders promised to repay the debt to U.S. citizens within twenty years. What would Latin America say if the quality of life fell and the economy started to lag as the result of the confrontation with the United States? Plus, Cuba had to be ready to stave off forceful attempts to liquidate the Revolution. Guevara supported Castro’s views. He added that the reorientation of the economy was an inevitable and very crucial matter. “If the Soviet Union gives us a credit of $100 million to $200 million and then abandons us, we will be in a dead end and unable to solve our problems,” he said. Mikoyan was authorized to offer a credit of only $100 million, even though onsite he understood that relations with Cuba would begin to develop much faster and differently than had been initially planned in Moscow while preparing for his visit. The terms of the Soviet purchase of sugar were also not too favorable for Cuba. But all this was put together in Moscow under the assumption that the USSR’s relations with Cuba would be, at best, similar to those with Burma or Algeria. It was now clear to Mikoyan that with Cuba there would be a higher level of collaboration. He assured the Cuban leaders that he would do everything within his power to convince Moscow to aid the Revolution by immediately establishing trade in essential goods and offering Cuba new credits. But first, they should use this credit of $100 million, which was not a bad start.

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Next, the Cuban leaders told father that many engineers and other specialists were leaving Cuba. They made an agreement that technicians, engineers, and other specialists with interpreters would be sent from the Soviet Union to help the Cubans become familiar with Soviet technology. Only civilian technology was the subject of discussion—construction equipment, and so on. For some reason, there was no word about arms or military specialists. Perhaps, this was because a shipment of weapons was coming from Belgium. At the time, Havana thought that hostility with Washington had not reached such levels as to require urgent defense measures against an invasion. Here, however, it was underestimating Eisenhower and Nixon, who had already toyed with the idea. As for Nixon, he had had this idea for a long time. Washington was clearly ahead of Havana in hostility. Looking back, I think that at the time of the main political conversation with my father, Castro was not leaning toward socialism 100 percent. He was cautious in his time estimates—10 years!—for this reason: He wanted to have time to examine socialism as practiced in the USSR and other countries, to see whether this system would be appropriate for Cuba, to consider its compatibility with Cuban national values and with the ideas of his hero, José Martí. Mikoyan had similar thoughts, and in his mind he did not blame Castro; on the contrary, he respected him for his independence of thought. History did not give Castro much time to think. The U.S. government acted as an accelerator of Cuban history and forced Cuba to make emergency decisions. There was little President Eisenhower could do in April 1959, but the United States’ policy toward Cuba could have been more careful and respectful during the entire year from 1959 to 1960. The United States should not have been blinded by the show of Soviet-Cuban friendliness. It should not have immediately chosen a course of armed struggle against Castro. Policies should not have been based on an ultimatum from either the USSR or the United States. No one knows at what rate socialism would have spread in Cuba and how warm Cuban-Soviet relations would have become if the United States had made appropriate changes in its policy. The trade agreements and credits in themselves were not catastrophic for the United States. “The Soviets were not generous,” Wayne Smith wrote of the agreements signed in Havana. And he was right. In principle, they did not change anything. Ambassador Philip Bonsal echoed this view. The USSR was already selling its oil to Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. It had been buying sugar from Cuba even under Batista. The massive reorientation of the sugar trade was shocking, of course; would the USSR be able to buy quantities of sugar as large as those bought by the United States? Calculations showed that it could, given that it had a larger population, but used only two-thirds of the amount used in America. Would the American supply of sugar suffer? The U.S. ambassador wrote years later: “This deal did not in itself jeopardize the American economic position in Cuba. The amounts involved did not threaten the Cuban capability for supplying the American market.”8 Which means that it was a matter of politics.

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The ambassador wrote bitterly that with a stroke of a pen, the U.S. president had ruined all attempts to maintain decent U.S. relations with Cuba and had pushed it into Mikoyan’s arms. In the United States, Mikoyan’s visit to Cuba was seen as a turning point, after which there was only one path—the fight to overthrow Castro’s regime. At a conference in Havana in 1992, it was noted that Eisenhower set this goal after Mikoyan’s visit. Wayne Smith, who at the time worked as a third secretary in the U.S. Embassy in Havana, said, Ambassador Bonsal was called to Washington for consultations, I think in December 1959, where he convinced Eisenhower and Secretary of State Herter that we should try one more time to reach a settlement with Cuba through negotiations. . . . But later, in February [1960], Anastas Mikoyan came to visit Cuba—it was very interesting to compare notes with Sergo Mikoyan, which became possible in the last few years. Based on this visit, the warm speeches and reception, the signed agreements, etc., we at the American Embassy decided that the die has been cast and Cuba has made the decision to collaborate with the Soviet Union. Therefore, when the Cuban government contacted us soon after the visit and said that it is ready to assign a delegation and begin negotiations, the United States government was no longer interested and proposed conditions that in essence made the negotiations impossible. It was no accident that in March of 1960 President Eisenhower signed a resolution that allowed the CIA to engage in actions that eventually led to the Bay of Pigs.9

Fidel Castro immediately replied with a joke: “Now it’s all Mikoyan’s fault! Turns out our friend’s father’s [he meant me; I was sitting close by —S.M.] visit on behalf of the Soviet Union became an instant excuse to order the overthrow of the Cuban Revolution. If they knew what a noble person Mikoyan was, if they did [not] act on prejudice, they would not have done this.” After Laguna del Tesoro, we flew to Fidel and Raul’s Castro’s hometown, Santiago de Cuba, in Oriente (Eastern) Province. This is where their father’s plantation was located. We toured Santiago in a car, sightseeing through the windows. We visited the Moncada Barracks, where the walls were still riddled with bullet holes from the executions of prisoners. We got out of the car, and Fidel started to describe the attack plan in detail, including why it failed and how it ended. The sun had started setting when we set out in jeeps for Gran Piedra Mountain; near the top, we had to walk. We arrived at a small clearing with workers’ tents and a mess tent. I cannot remember what they were building, Leonov thought that it was a tourist complex. I only remember that the workers were happy to see Fidel. Fidel was very annoyed because his order to deliver food and additional tents with bedding and blankets to the mountain, where it got rather chilly at night, had not been carried out. This was the place where he wanted to spend the night

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with the high-level guest from Moscow. My father was quite happy, however, for he remembered the hardships of his revolutionary youth, the inspiration, the disregard for comfort, and being used to its absence. Therefore, he was pleased with Fidel’s idea to rough it. The only people who came with us to the mountain were the drivers; the security guards; Chistov, my father’s adviser; and Kolya Leonov.10 Three figures promenaded in the cool dusk: Anastas Mikoyan, Fidel Castro, and Leonov. Sometimes, Castro excused himself to inquire when at least food and mattresses would be brought for the night; he must have given up on the tents. We stood in the distance—Vasiliy Vasilievich Chistov and I. Because neither the mattresses nor the tents were ever brought, Castro told the workers that they would have to make some room. Accompanied by Leonov, my father and Castro continued to walk around and talk. As my father later told me, they resumed their exchange of opinions on the subjects they had discussed at Laguna del Tesoro: the ways of the Cuban Revolution, the outlook for socialist transformation, the future of Cuba’s relations with the Soviet Union. At a 2002 conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis in Havana, Castro remembered Anastas Mikoyan very warmly, including in connection with this episode: We came to Gran Piedra on jeeps from Santiago. I had ordered food and sleeping arrangements to be prepared ahead of time. None of this was done, because of the carelessness of the person charged with the task. We found some sardines and beans in the workers’ kitchen, and I think there was nothing else. Mikoyan was quite satisfied; I think he even liked these conditions. We could barely find a bed for him. But he did not show any displeasure, even though we had just arrived from a city with hotels and it would take only thirty minutes to an hour to get back. Somehow, we managed the night on Gran Piedra.11

Chistov told me that one of the cars would be going down to Santiago, and he asked whether I would like to sleep in a hotel. I imagined the cheerful, bustling city, where all my fellow journalists were staying, and thought—why not? I could not hear Castro’s and Mikoyan’s conversation in any case. During a pause in the conversation, I approached them and carefully asked my father—I was afraid he would think I was seeking out the comforts of a hotel. But he replied: “Go ahead. It looks like there is not enough sleeping space here, the tents will be crowded.” In an hour, I was with my friends at the hotel. We walked around the city, curiously looked around, and had an animated discussion of our impressions. I told them about our helicopter flight. Meanwhile, Mikoyan and Castro went to sleep in an unfinished, empty concrete building, which was probably intended for future tourists. Two folding beds with blankets—the only two available—were offered to Mikoyan and Leonov. Castro and his comrades settled in another room, where they sat down around a large tub of coffee, which they ladled with tin cups as they sat talking, not going

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to sleep at all that night. It was then, at night on Gran Piedra, that Castro and Mikoyan really became friends. Our visit was coming to an end. I had seen many things and met many people, listened attentively when I could, and tried to analyze what I saw. During these nine days, I had become close friends with Antonio Núñez Jiménez, who flew with us to Laguna del Tesoro. I met Jiménez again in Lima, where he was the Cuban ambassador under Velasco Alvarado’s military government, and in Havana and Moscow. I also made the acquaintance of Carlos Rafael Rodríguez. He was a very serious person; my relations with him were respectful, but less warm than those with Antonio Núñez Jiménez, for example. Only many years later, when we had a chance to spend more time together and talk, in Moscow and Havana, did we develop a more personal relationship, which was not there in 1960. I valued his intellect and scholarship. The final destination in our tour of Cuba was the city of Camagüey. From the helicopter, we went straight to a rice-hulling plant, where a meeting had been prepared. The audience was very enthusiastic about Castro’s speech, despite its length. My father spoke more briefly, but passionately. I think he remembered his youth, when the ability to reach the listeners’ hearts and minds was the main weapon of revolutionary struggle. The podium was made out of bags of rice, which gave it a particular flavor. Everything in Cuba had its own special, inimitable flavor. I began to realize that I had fallen in love with this country, its Revolution, its leaders, and its people. Everything here was unlike the Soviet bureaucratic system, with its rigid rules and idiotic instructions, from which people were afraid to deviate even in minor points because of the pathological, inexplicable fear of displeasing the authorities. The next day, we returned to Havana on our Il-18 airplane, whose commander grumbled about having to let an armed group of soldiers from our security team on board, where they took up the second cabin, saying that he was not allowed to have people with firearms on his airplane. Nonetheless, of course, he had to let them on. A signing ceremony was held for the intergovernmental agreement on the Soviet purchase of 1 million tons of sugar and the $100 million credit to Cuba. Evgenii Kosarev, at the time an employee of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade’s Market Research Institute, attended the Soviet Exhibition in Havana.12 Later, he became deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Latin American Institute. Recently, he told me that according to Moscow’s “scenario,” Borisov was supposed to sign the agreement from the Soviet side, and Che Guevara or any other person of the same rank from the Cuban side. But Anastas Ivanovich decided to raise the level of the agreement. He appointed himself, the first deputy chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, and Prime Minister Fidel Castro to sign the agreement. Of course, the numbers and sums had been decided in Moscow, because Mikoyan already knew about Cuba’s needs from Alekseyev, from

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Aleksandr Malkov of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and from what he had read about Cuba’s dependence on its sugarcane monoculture. He knew that Washington was reducing Havana’s quota for sugar imports to the United States. Soon, the United States liquidated the quota completely. When Eisenhower first attempted to punish Cuba by refusing to buy the 600,000 tons of sugar remaining from the quota, the Soviet Union responded by buying up this sugar. Moscow’s additional purchases were a triumph for Castro and an important argument in his struggle against anticommunist sentiments among the population. In this case, even the opposition press commented positively on the agreement, because the entire country depended on the revenue from sugar sales. To conclude our visit, my father made a televised appearance. As always, he was animated and resourceful when responding to questions.

Meeting with Hemingway A few days before our departure, in midafternoon, we came to Finca Vigía in San Francisco de Paula, a town not far from Havana, to visit Ernest Hemingway. We had started thinking about this meeting on the flight from Moscow to Havana, and here we now were, in the home of the great American writer. The jovial, grayhaired man in a checkered shirt and an old wool vest showed us around his house, treated us to some Russian vodka, and joked. We were there for the first time, but it felt as if we had known the host for ages and were glad to see each other again after a separation. Our group was made up of some members of the Soviet delegation, headed by Mikoyan. I brought the journalist Henry Borovik with me, which resulted in some unique and memorable photographs. Why did Mikoyan want to make time to meet with Hemingway? He had read many of his works and was greatly impressed by them. The writer lived near Havana. How could we not try to meet with him? Ernest Hemingway met us on the threshold of his home with a welcoming smile. However, there was a noticeable tension in the ensuing conversation. Hemingway must have thought that the high-ranking guest’s visit was a dictate of fashion or the result of a desire to supply the sensation-hungry newspapers with some material. “I am one of your readers and admirers!” my father said at the outset. At once, Hemingway rather sharply inquired, “Which of my works have you read?” “A Farewell to Arms, To Have and Have Not, your short stories, The Old Man and the Sea, . . . everything that is in the two-volume edition of your works that was just published in the Soviet Union.” “What do you like about them?” our host asked, still mistrustful, thinking that he was leading Mikoyan into a trap. “Your love for the ordinary man. What I value most in your works is your ability to discover the highest human qualities in people who stand on the lowest

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rungs of the social ladder. . . . Sometimes you do not find these qualities among the privileged.” The atmosphere immediately lightened, and the conversation became lively and good-natured, with many sounds of laughter. My father introduced me to the writer, saying: “This is my son, you can speak with him in English.” Hemingway turned to me with an examining glance. Then he asked me, “Do you really speak English?” “A little,” I said, and heard his reply: “As do we all.” I met his eyes; there was not a hint of a smile. He was completely serious and thoughtful. Later, I understood that he was thinking about the imperfect language of many writers, including himself. He once said, “What people consider my style is actually my gnarled language.” I understood how exacting he was about words. This living classic of literature was not at all like the image associated with the word “classic.” There was no solemnity or concentration; the air was full of spontaneity, simplicity, and mutual sympathy. (Mary Hemingway noted this atmosphere in her book How It Was.13) A lion skin hung on the wall in one of the rooms. We thought it was one of Hemingway’s trophies, but it turned out to belong to the author’s fourth and last wife—Mary. She was very proud of it and enthusiastically told us how she had killed the lion. Mary was a slender and very lively woman, although no longer young; in a checkered shirt with rolled up sleeves, she seemed to be a great companion for her husband, a “female version” of Hemingway. Together, they gave us a tour around the cozy, sunlit house, which stood on a hill in shady, parklike grounds. Two paintings depicting a bullfight hung on their dining room wall. The paintings felt very familiar to me, even though I had never seen a bullfight. It would have been impossible for these paintings not to have adorned the home of the author of The Sun Also Rises. Hemingway’s favorite place to work was not the huge desk surrounded by bookshelves in the study but a little bureau hanging on a wall in the bedroom. He wrote standing up, as he said, “So I don’t sit around too much.” Later, he admitted that after he sustained a serious injury in a plane crash in Africa, his back hurt if he sat for too long. Also in the bedroom, his correspondence and the books he was reading or looking through were strewn on the bed. “You know, Mary made a special place for me to work,” he said, and, smiling, led us outside. We went up a spiral staircase to a tower; at the height of its third floor, there was a room. “I thought I would isolate him from the noise that happens around the house, like conversations or the vacuum cleaner. But what do you think, he never works here. We come up here only to enjoy the view of Havana,” Mary explained. “Over there you can even see the sea!” Hemingway pointed out. Suddenly, he was called downstairs to the telephone; one of his sons was calling. “I bet he needs money!” the writer chuckled and ran down. Coming back, he confirmed his hypothesis—his son was buying a house and needed money.

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As our host told us, the old man who served as the prototype for The Old Man and the Sea lived in these parts. Hemingway was quite at home among the fishermen, the loaders, and other working people, although not all of them knew that he was a writer. Many years later, I visited Key West, where Hemingway had lived in the late 1920s and early 1930s with his second wife, Pauline Pfeiffer, and two little children. I walked around the house, which had been turned into a museum, and then stopped by his favorite bar, where the guides explained to the public that this was the place where he wrote The Old Man and the Sea, saying that he had come here from Cuba immediately after Castro’s victory in the Revolution (which was the beginning of 1959). The guides can make up such stories and mislead the public in any way they want. I could not help myself and told them about our meeting on the outskirts of Havana in February 1960, about Hemingway’s meeting with Castro, and about his positive words about the Revolution. The guides indignantly objected to fact that I could have met him in Cuba in 1960. “At that time he was living here!” they cried out. I mercilessly informed them that Hemingway left Cuba only in the summer of 1960, when his health was quickly deteriorating. Moreover, he never returned to Key West; from Cuba he went to Idaho, where he had a house in the mountains, but spent a great deal of time at the hospital. At least I was glad that the house museum exists and draws many visitors, and that his favorite bar is nearby, adorned with an enormous portrait of the writer and several photographs. But returning to 1960— “The Cubans are a wonderful people,” our host, Hemingway, said. They are spirited, energetic. For many years they were oppressed, while the leaders thought only of personal wealth, robbed the country, and lied to the people. The new leadership has different goals; they want to help the people. They are still very young. When they were children, some of them even played with my children, here, in San Francisco de Paula. [Hemingway meant the perished hero of the Cuban Revolution, Camilo Cienfuegos, who, when a child, had lived in Hemingway’s neighborhood and had been friends with his son. —S.M.] I met Castro last year during the spinning competition, in which we both participated. Quite a striking character! Several days ago, I found out that the composer Aram Khachaturian is in Havana. [A group of Soviet artists came over to support the Soviet Exhibition —S.M.] I love his music. We invited him over and had an interesting conversation during dinner. We liked him and his wife. He gave me this bottle of vodka that I’m treating you to right now.

Naturally, we also came with vodka. Hemingway gargled it to demonstrate that he could handle our strongest drink, which was known around the world and manufactured in different countries. My father, however, drank a cocktail that our host recommended and made for him. Of course, it was a daiquiri.

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Mikoyan gave Hemingway the gift of the translated Russian publications of his works, which the writer greatly appreciated, particularly the two-volume edition that came out in the Soviet Union very early in 1960. “I heard that my books are published in the Soviet Union. Although until now I only had the story The Old Man and the Sea, which was sent to me by a Russian engineer from a ship standing in Havana’s harbor. I see you have exactly the same book; let me sign it for you.” “Your books are not only published in the USSR; they are also immensely popular—teaching the readers the values of courage and heroism.” “You see, a real writer unconsciously cultivates his readers,” Hemingway said thoughtfully. “Perhaps involuntarily, but he also becomes a politician.” “I am not a politician!” Hemingway objected. “Of course, I understand. I mean that this happens regardless of your intentions. The writer’s talent, his honesty and truthfulness, objectively lead to the fact that his best works gain a political resonance. But this is not the point. In our country, people love you for your humanism, your love of life. They consider you one of their own.” “Of course, I am glad that people read my works all over the world, but I am an American writer in the strictest sense of the world.” “The best writers are dear to all people.” “Aren’t you praising me too much?” our host replied, laughing. “Writers should be judged by their work. Sometimes writing a good description of an event is as hard as taking part in it. I think that you, drawing from the rich experiences of your life, can confirm the truth of this statement. I am very glad to have met a person like you.” My father asked Hemingway if he was planning to visit the Soviet Union. “You would be very well received!” he added. At this point, Hemingway taught his guest a lesson. My father said that even though the Soviet Union had not signed the convention that would bind it to pay royalties to foreign authors, it would pay royalties to Hemingway. The author replied that money was always welcome. But he clarified: Would all foreign authors be paid? For example, Faulkner, Steinbeck, and other American writers whose works he knew were published in the Soviet Union. My father replied that after the convention was signed, this would happen with all authors; meanwhile, a decision was made to pay Hemingway separately, in view of his extreme popularity. “No, I cannot agree to this. In this case, do not pay me either. I don’t want to be an exception to the rule. But this does not have a direct bearing on my visit to your country. I have the means to go. I like to travel, and I do it all the time, if I’m not busy with a major project. I always wanted to see your country, but circumstances always prevented me. I would love to visit, but I am a simple man and I don’t like large receptions, so there is no need to plan them for my trip.” “Of course, you could come to just to go hunting.”

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“Definitely! Although not right now. I am already sixty, and I cannot postpone my existing plans. I am working on a new novel, which is centered on a bullfight. I hope it will be better than The Sun Also Rises. I doubt I will be able to travel before I am finished.” Before we left, my father invited our host to a good-bye dinner at the Havana Hilton, which would take place the next evening. “Thank you for the invitation,” he replied, “but I never do anything that would prevent me from getting up at 6 a.m. I work every day from 6 a.m. till 12 p.m.” When we parted, we were sure that in the near future, when the author finished the novel or allowed himself a little break, we would meet again in Moscow. Even later, when we knew about his illness, we could not imagine such a tragic ending. The news of the author’s death by suicide on July 2, 1961, was shocking; it seemed to be a mistake that would be refuted, as had happened before. But this time there was no refutation. On February 12, 1960, I wistfully boarded our airliner. My father boarded last, after saying good-bye to the Cuban leaders. Again, we heard the music and singing of the trio who had met us here only ten days before, even though I felt as if I had spent months there—we had seen, heard, understood, and felt so much. In about twelve hours, we were in snowy Oslo. The core of Norwegian life was herring—the best of the huge catch was displayed on large stands in the center of the city. Every nation has its own cares. Yet life in Norway appeared so boring, even though my father was wonderfully received by Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen, who gave his guest a tour of manufacturing enterprises and organized festive lunches and receptions.14 I was unfair to Norway. Subsequently, I visited it in the winter and summer and was able to appreciate its northern beauty and its people, who, regardless of the benefits of civilization available to them, did not wish to step away from their land’s severe nature but sought challenges by traversing elevated icy plateaus in piercing winds.15 Yet in those days, the contrast with Cuba’s revolutionary impulse was too strong, and I was not able to enjoy Norway.

Castro’s and Mikoyan’s Impressions of Our Visit Soon after our departure, on February 18, 1960, Fidel Castro gave a press conference, answering the local and foreign journalists’ multitude of questions. As Jorge Mañach, the moderator, reported, the famous Mexican muralist David Alfaro Siqueiros attended this press conference during a visit to Cuba. The artist was a longtime member of Mexico’s Communist Party, an effusive person who called himself colonel who had taken part in the 1940 attack on the house of L. D. Trotsky in Coyoacan, near Mexico City. At this press conference, Castro was asked about “the first vice premier of Russia, Mikoyan, his impressions of Cuba, Castro’s impressions about Mikoyan and the agreement signed by the two governments, which was so favorable to Cuba.” His reply was as follows:

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Castro: All right. . . . You are asking me about many things at once. First of all, my impressions about Señor Mikoyan are very positive. During the time he was here, we had many discussions, I had the opportunity to show him different aspects of our country: cooperatives, housing construction, enterprises. . . . We came away with a very good opinion of him and his colleagues. Among other things, he is a person of strong character, not inclined to demagoguery or politicking. You could say I saw a steadfast man, who was extremely respectful in all situations, with an extraordinary sense of tact. . . . He never once, even minimally, offended our national pride in the slightest; he is an exceptionally tactful person. I think his televised appearance and his answers to various questions could inform our public opinion. I heard this press conference, and I think he showed great talent, this man of great tact who respects our national feelings, which could be seen from his answers to our questions. . . . You could say that he always rose to the challenge of his mission, with absolute respect for our country, our feelings, our Revolution. Finally, I want to share one last observation with you. Despite his age, and he must be 64 or 65, he did not get tired of the long journeys we made; he was always ready to visit all the points of interest, including Cayo Largo, where he wanted to go for a swim and seized the opportunity. When we were on Gran Piedra, we had to walk a good ways up the mountain, which he did readily. There were some instances when due to an oversight in places like Gran Piedra we arrived to find that nothing was prepared for our visit due to the neglect of the person assigned to organize beds and food for us. There was nothing. Mikoyan was with us in the mess tent, where the workers ate; he and his company slept in an unfinished building. And yet, in the end he expressed great satisfaction at having visited the place, by which he earned great sympathy and respect. This is one of the most striking things about him, his respect and tact. I think this is obvious. As for his impressions, perhaps our public opinion can judge for itself from his appearances on TV. He talked about his personal impressions, which you are asking about. They were positive. Now moving on to other questions. . . . Journalist: Tell us about the agreement with the Soviets. . . . Give us an idea. . . . It seems Communism does not really play a role here; this is a purely commercial agreement, which appears to be profitable to Cuba? Castro: Which details and aspects of the agreement are you interested in? First and foremost, this agreement is enormously significant to Cuba. . . . Journalist: The agreement about sugar and the $100 million credit. Since the agreement is highly profitable, I believe we should increase the upcoming zafra [i.e., the harvesting of sugarcane —S.M.].16

The journalists also wanted to know whether Cuba would purchase equipment to drill for oil, following the example of an agreement with Argentina to search for oil on the island of Cuba. Castro replied in the positive: An oil explora-

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tion program was included in the budget and would be carried out. The necessary equipment for this program would be received under the latest agreement. It is also interesting to note that, already at that time, the journalists asked the Cuban prime minister whether the USSR would help Cuba to create an iron and steel industry. After Che Guevara became the minister of economic affairs, he raised this question again with Mikoyan. My father told us how he patiently tried to convince him that for a country with no coal or iron ore, it would be unprofitable to make steel, because the materials would need to be imported from far away. It would be much more advantageous to buy steel abroad by sharply increasing the nickel production in the city of Moa, exporting the nickel, and purchasing steel. Guevara insisted that if Cuba manufactured steel, it would make a great impression on other Latin American countries, the majority of which do not have a coal and steel industry. He visited Japan in 1959 and said that determination was more important than the presence of raw materials. My father finally managed to dissuade him by providing numbers that proved the high cost that such a demonstrational effect would have for Cuba. Later, Guevara admitted the faultiness of his plans. Speaking in Algiers on February 26, 1965, he talked about the mistakes of the Cuban Revolution: “We copied, automatically, from the experiences of brother (socialist) countries, and this was a mistake. . . . In making our plans, we committed errors in our conception of the development of industry and agriculture, and in the balance of our economy. In industry, we evolved a plan based on the hope of becoming self-sufficient in a whole series of consumer products and of medium industry, which, however, could easily have been obtained in friendly countries.”17 In conclusion, I think it would be fitting to add a short story that A. I. Mikoyan told to the renowned scholar of Latin America and former intelligence officer Joseph Romualdovich Grigulevich about his impressions after his first visit to Cuba. Upon a request from Grigulevich, I organized a meeting between him and my father. At the time, Grigulevich was completing a book from the series “Zhizn’ zamechatel’nykh lyudei” (The lives of outstanding people) on Che Guevara. Logistically speaking, it was a simple affair: I told my father about this scholar, who was my colleague (not in the Intelligence Services Department, of course, but in our work at the Academy of Sciences, where, at the time, he also worked as an editor in chief of the journal Social Sciences and Modernity) and drove Grigulevich to our dacha, where my father had been living since his retirement five years earlier. I tried not to encumber their conversation with my intrusive presence, so I witnessed a part of it, but by far not all. On May 25, 1971, Grigulevich wrote, I visited Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan at his dacha near Moscow. We walked around the well-tended paths in the park. Dusk descended slowly.

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I conveyed to Anastas Ivanovich greetings from his Cuban friends—Raul Castro, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, and Antonio Núñez Jiménez, with whom I met on a recent trip to Cuba. Judging by Anastas Ivanovich’s comments, he continues to carefully follow the events in revolutionary Cuba. Her people, her leaders, her affairs, difficulties, and successes are close to his heart. . . . I asked Anastas Ivanovich to tell me about his impressions after first meeting revolutionary Cuba. “We arrived in Havana on February 4, 1960, for the opening of the Soviet Exhibition of achievements in science, technology, and culture,” Anastas Ivanovich recounted. “At the airport, we were welcomed by Prime Minister Comrade Fidel Castro; Comrade Ernesto “Che” Guevara, who at the time was director of Cuba’s National Bank; the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Raul Roa; and other members of the Cuban Revolution. Many workers were assembled at the airport; the meeting was warm and cordial. I immediately felt surrounded by friends and kindred spirits. The Cuban leaders’ youth and revolutionary ardor, their enthusiasm, complete sincerity, faith in their cause, as well the belief in the Revolution and the enthusiasm among large segments of the population—all of this indicated that the Cuban Revolution answered to the hopes and expectations of the working masses. “It was absolutely clear that the leaders of the Cuban Revolution commanded great authority and love among the masses. . . . During our time in Cuba, the atmosphere was hot in the literal and figurative sense of the word. The revolutionary government was carrying out important, deep social transformations, particularly the agrarian reforms. These changes were met with fierce opposition from exploitative circles and representatives of foreign capital. . . .” Did the revolutionary Cuba in 1960 remind you of the first years of the formation of Soviet power? “To a certain degree, yes. All true social revolutions have a great deal in common with each other. They awaken the energy and enthusiasm of the working classes, multiplying their resolution and will to struggle tenfold. Revolutions make the masses politically aware, and capable of self-sacrifice and heroism. Marx called social revolutions the real engines of history. This is true. At the same time, each revolution has its particularities, its own national flavor, if you will. . . . Yes, in essence, no genuine popular revolution ever blindly copies the experience of other revolutions. Each one proceeds from its own conditions, and therefore is unique. . . .” It sometimes happens that the revolution needs some time to become conscious of itself, to find its own right, victorious path.18

I think my father’s last thought was related directly to Fidel Castro and implied that it took the Cuban leader some time to decide which path to take. Most likely, among the factors affecting his decision were Washington’s shortsighted, outrageous neocolonial politics. This probably was what Castro meant when he said at a conference in October 2002, “In 1959, 1960 and later, the North Americans pre-

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pared our people for socialism. They pushed the Cubans away with the embargo on oil and other vital resources.”

Only Forward! Mikoyan’s visit to Cuba turned into a major diplomatic victory for Cuba as well as for the Soviet Union. Cuba found a supporter in the world’s second superpower, which could provide assistance in the most important spheres—political, economic, scientific-technological, and military. At the height of the Cold War with the West, and most of all with the United States, Moscow had now secured a dependable ally right under the Americans’ nose, so to speak, 90 miles from the southern tip of Florida. American observers, including agents of the CIA and the State Department who came to Cuba, understood this. Wayne Smith writes that it was Mikoyan’s visit and its immediate results, already evident during those ten days, that definitively convinced Washington that it had lost Havana. Smith’s account is confirmed by what I heard from many representatives of the American political establishment. For example, I personally heard a formerly prominent American intelligence officer say that the CIA came to the same conclusions as the U.S. Embassy in Havana and the State Department. This person was speaking to a circle of colleagues and former diplomats. When he suddenly saw me in the audience, he stopped for a second and continued, “Yes, it was after his father’s visit, . . . [he pointed at me] and I think you were also there? So it was this visit and its outcomes that meant the end of one era and the beginning of another in our relations with Cuba; there was only one option left out of a myriad considered earlier. That was to overthrow the regime.” Overall, the unexpected friendship between Cuba and the Soviet Union became a turning point in public opinion, especially of the entire leftist movement in the Western Hemisphere. And it was just as momentous for the Kremlin’s politics. A small country, economically and politically dependent on the United States, suddenly had become completely independent from its powerful northern neighbor. Moreover, it had challenged the United States by establishing a collaboration and friendship with “Enemy No. 1,” the Soviet Union. I remember Vilma Espín in Moscow in 1960, at the home of Nikita Khrushchev, saying, “We are grateful even for the fact that you gave us the opportunity to say ‘No’ to the United States.” An entire generation of revolutionaries stemmed from the Cuban Revolution. Cuba had directly helped to organize the rebel movements in Venezuela, Central America, and Bolivia; and it had helped the partisans in Colombia. But even if it had not done these things, the Cuban Revolution in itself had become an inspiration for revolutionary movements, which used the July 26 Movement as a model. To work out a struggle tactic, they used Che Guevara’s method of creating a foco—that is, a core for the rebel movement, whence it was supposed to grow

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outward throughout the entire country. This resembled the theory of the “small motor,” which would start the “large motor.” Revolution did not spread around the entire continent overnight, as Cuba had hoped and the United States feared. But the movements to depose rightist oligarchic dictatorships, to bring about democracy and social-economic reforms, returned. There were many unexpected results born of the Cuban Revolution— such as the progressive military regimes in Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Panama; the election of the socialist Salvador Allende as president of Chile; the victories of movements modeled on the July 26 Movement in Nicaragua and El Salvador; democratization in Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay; and leftist election victories in Guyana, Jamaica, and Grenada. Latin America would never be the same. Repressive dictatorships like those of Somoza in Nicaragua and Stroessner of Paraguay clung to the foundations of their power. Yet democratic regimes established relations with Cuba and blatantly used the new option of support from the USSR to pressure the United States into more favorable politico-economic relations. A direct result of the Cuban Revolution, the Alliance for Progress program, which was offered by the Kennedy administration in 1961 to its southern neighbors, showed that the United States also understood the irreversible nature of the changes taking place in the Latin American and Caribbean region. Of course, the Cuban Revolution’s discrepancy with Marxist postulates did not go unnoticed by the followers of dogmatic Marxism, with close connections in the CC CPSU International Department. The Revolution perturbed the community of traditional Communist parties. The majority only talked about revolution, but in practice had long become a part of the political structure, content with the opportunity to be elected to parliament and organize factions, while making mostly ineffectual speeches. The strength and effectiveness of these parties depended on the regime’s level of democracy. For example, in Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Chile during certain periods, Communist parties played a role and had a measure of influence on the policies of the leading circles. They were supported by the legacy of the Guatemalan Revolution (1944–54), whereby leftist forces, among which the Communists played a hefty role, came to power by parliamentary means. Moscow traditionally relied on these parties, providing them with political and material support. However, the United States’ intervention of 1954 in Guatemala showed that in Latin America this path could not lead to definitive victory. Instead of standing in the vanguard, in the decades after the intervention Guatemala turned into a concentration camp, where the murder of dissenters and the genocide of entire Indian peoples became a daily practice. Later, the same pattern occurred in Chile, when in 1973 the democratically elected president, Salvador Allende, was overthrown and a reactionary military regime seized power. Democracy fell next in Uruguay. Thus, the historical experience suggested that in order to stay out of the clutches of the secret police, Communist parties had to stay within certain boundaries.

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They were not to make any real attempts to gain power or to change the existing order by any means—parliamentary or insurrectionary. This policy eventually turned into habit, and then a tradition. Any oppositional voice within the party was denounced as Trotskyism. The Communist parties also severely criticized the calls for immediate action through guerilla warfare, which snowballed after the rise of the new Cuba. The critics blamed these movements for exhibiting petitbourgeois tendencies. As a rule, “any activity they did not control was unacceptable to them,” wrote one of the leaders of the Tupamaros, urban guerillas in Uruguay.19 The apparatchiks of the CPSU Central Committee began to have similar suspicious attitudes toward these movements; Boris Ponomarev and his department still had more trust in “traditional” Communist parties. Some Communist parties underwent difficult processes of leadership change, reorienting their course from a “struggle to survive” to the struggle for revolution. Such processes took place in El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Chile (after the murder of Allende and the establishment of Pinochet’s dictatorship), Guatemala, and Honduras. According to Che Guevara’s theory of guerilla warfare, Moscow considered unacceptable the view of democratic regimes, where mostly traditional parties came to power through fair elections and did not implement repressive policies or obstruct the work of leftist parties. Guevara concluded that there needed to be a strategy of polarization, whereby these parties would either submit to popular movements by implementing radical reforms or revert to repressions, thereby starting a phase of armed confrontation. In the latter case, the popular movements should conduct the same kind of struggle as they would against dictatorial regimes.20 Within the framework of this conception, in Venezuela in the early 1960s, after the dictatorial regime of Pérez Jiménez had already been toppled and the elected Betancourt government was in power, the Cuban Special Forces inspired and armed the leftist forces, including the Communists who were afraid to be left off the bandwagon, to armed actions against the government. They were defeated, because neither the rural nor the urban population supported them. The influence of these forces visibly fell, and practice proved the faultiness of the theory. The CC CPSU International Department had every reason to consider these tactics destructive to leftist forces. However, not everyone agreed with this. Douglas Bravo, the leader of a guerilla movement in Venezuela, blamed Castro for ceasing to call the peoples of Latin America to organize rebel movements.21 It must be noted that before this work came out, Guevara also expressed some different views. For example, he once said that the possibility of creating a foco could exist only in the banana republics (i.e., in Central America); conversely, in countries where the government is supported by the majority of the population, it would be impossible to create a hotbed for a partisan movement. He said that successful outcomes could be expected in places where the regime is despised by the people, where the traditional parties are removed from power, and where the army is demoralized. In fact, analogous steps taken in Peru and Argentina made

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even less progress; the partisans could not even get to the area where they hoped to create the center of the rebel movement. Vice versa, Guevara took part in efforts in Nicaragua that in a few years led to the formation of a powerful Sandinista National Liberation Front, which had the support of the people and won, taking power in 1979. A strong guerilla movement formed in El Salvador, in which the Communist Party, led by the new leader Schafik Handal, actively participated in a union with other leftist organizations. Therefore, life has shown that it is necessary to differentiate tactics based on the countries’ and regimes’ different characteristics. Unfortunately, the tragic fate of Che Guevara and his division was also the result of an incorrect interpretation of these differences. From Guevara’s Bolivian Diary, we can see his frustration with the lack of support from the peasants and other layers of the population outside a narrow group of selfless individuals.22 After several years of rather sharp clashes with Moscow, Castro was influenced by the developments in his region and understood the importance of these differences. He accounted for them in the policies he directed at the development of liberation movements. Thus, he gave great ideological support to the patriots in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, successfully calling them to unite, particularly in Nicaragua. Through this, he helped them to rid themselves of the repressive bonds of the criminal military factions. The CIA even blamed him for this, calling his efforts “intervention.” However, to share experience, to give sound advice and an outsider’s point of view, and to use one’s authority to convince a group of young people do not amount to interfering in the affairs of another country. And this was all the more true because Castro did not give advice or try to persuade the parties in South America, where the era of repressive dictatorships was ending across the board. After Stroessner’s demise in Paraguay and the “decompression” of the rightist military regime in Brazil, by the mid1980s only Pinochet’s dictatorship in Chile remained, but it had to be dealt with by different means. As for the evolution of Castro’s views and policies, in 1992 he stated that “times have changed and we have changed,” that Cuba would no longer try to intervene in the internal political struggles of other countries. “There have been great changes in Latin America. We have friendly and respectful relations with almost all the countries in Latin America. There’s a new situation in Latin America. Have we changed? Yes, we’ve changed. The world has changed, and Latin America has changed. And, therefore, that kind of activity by Cuba no longer exists.”23 One can only add as a commentary on Castro’s words that the Cuban Revolution and the numerous processes stemming from this historical event played a significant role in the changes that took place in Latin America. Thus, to summarize, after January 1, 1959, Latin America began to experience changes that defined a new political situation for the rest of the twentieth century. The Cuban Revolution became a powerful catalyst for progressive political and socioeconomic shifts, regardless of their relationship to the Revolution.

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As for the fate of the Revolution in Cuba, eyewitnesses like A. I. Alekseyev testified, “I emphasize that A. I. Mikoyan played a decisive role in the formation of Soviet-Cuban friendship.”24 Likewise, many years later, Nikolai Leonov, already a general of the KGB, said to a circle of friends where I was present, “If it were not for Mikoyan and his visit, and his unceasing support for Cuba in the CC CPSU Presidium, the Cuban Revolution would have had no chance for survival—the new Cuba could not have successfully opposed the United States.” His opinion seems to reflect the historical reality. On the basis of this conclusion, Mikoyan’s visit to Cuba in 1960 and his establishment of Soviet-Cuban collaboration can be considered the starting point of the entire American-Cuban confrontation (and the Soviet-American confrontation over Cuba)—and, consequently, a harbinger of the future missile crisis.

4 The Leap Over the Ocean

How It All Started

T

he installation in Cuba of medium-range missiles with nuclear warheads in September and October 1962 became the most dangerous event of the era of nuclear confrontation between the Soviet Bloc and the West. The Cold War was on the brink of escalation into World War III. Nothing like this had ever happened before. On the basis of Khrushchev’s recollections and the recollections of those with whom he first discussed his idea to install medium-range missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba, this plan was conceived in his mind in connection with the fact that the United States allowed itself to deploy nuclear missiles in Turkey—so close to the USSR’s border. “Why can’t we do the same in response?” was his logical conclusion after he looked at the horizon over the Black Sea from the Bulgarian shore. They say that Khrushchev, as was his custom, used a Russian folk saying: “Why don’t we throw a hedgehog into Uncle Sam’s pants?” According to Aleksandr Alekseyev, Khrushchev shared this idea not only with the highest leadership—that is, with the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee—but first with a limited circle of persons: Anastas Mikoyan, Presidium member; Frol Kozlov, Presidium member; Andrey Gromyko, minister of foreign affairs; Rodion Malinovsky, minister of defense; and Marshal Sergey Biryuzov. Aleksandr Alekseyev was also called to that meeting. After the issue had been decided in this narrow circle of people, it was raised at the Presidium meeting, and further discussions took place with participation of its full staff. According to my father, Anastas Mikoyan, Alekseyev’s recollection is not quite accurate; the first person with whom Khrushchev shared his new idea was Mikoyan. 89

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I saved the notes I took when Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan recalled these events to members of our family, and sometimes to me alone. These recollections center on the period following the crisis and several years thereafter. In the mid-1960s, he also described these events to large audiences, for example, at the Institute of Physical Problems of the USSR Academy of Sciences (the Institute of Academician Pyotr Kapitza), at the Cinema House, and at the House of Writers. Because my father regarded this event in his life and career as a memorable one, he came back to this topic many times. I very diligently wrote down everything he told me, and I did it right after such conversations. At the age of thirty, I had a very good memory; I cannot complain about it now either, especially when it comes to serious issues of the past politics. Moreover, my father came back to the subject often when he shared his memories with his other sons—my brothers, as well as with other close relatives like his brother, Artem Mikoyan—a world-renowned aircraft designer (his design bureau still designs MiG fighters, which were involved in the missile crisis) and my mother’s brother, Gai Tumanyan, a former officer with the Main Intelligence Department of the General Staff and lieutenant general of the Tank Corps. A third close relative was my mother’s sister’s husband, Anushavan Arzumanyan, director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences. We regarded Leo Shahumyan as our relative as well.1 So, after I first took notes of my father’s recollections about the Caribbean crisis, I repeatedly heard the same stories and had a chance to make additions. I would like to stress that my father did not tell these stories with the intent to have them published. A couple of times I tried to convince him to make a tape recording of his stories to have them for history, but he never gave me permission to do so.2 Thus, my father acted in a completely opposite way from Khrushchev. At the time, the scandal around Khrushchev’s memoirs becoming available abroad was at its peak. Still, I am not sure that my father’s position on this issue was the right one. Khrushchev’s position seems preferable to me: to leave as much for history as possible, even if the materials have a subjective point of view and understanding of the events, without supporting documents or newspaper articles (although this did leave room for mistakes in Khrushchev’s description of the dates, venues, and names of participants of some of the events and conversations). Khrushchev often mixed the truths, half-truths, and omissions; and he did not discuss the context of exchanges, points of views, and events, which changed the whole picture.3 Despite my sympathetic feelings toward this man, who respected me, and in whose home I used to be a frequent guest, as a historian I need to say that any reader of his memoirs should be careful about their accuracy, and should check the assertions against documents or other memoirs. As for Mikoyan’s memoirs and oral history, it should be taken into account that my father told the same story both to his relatives and in auditoriums. There were no discrepancies in details; only the number of details was either greater or smaller, depending on the mood of the narrator, or the circumstances—but they

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were never contradictory—I know it because I took notes on many occasions. Finally, by virtue of his nature, my father was less subjective than Khrushchev. He recognized his mistakes, and he allowed others to argue with him on different issues, including very serious ones. I observed that trait both in our home, where we always had many people, and in other homes we visited. It is a well-known fact that Khrushchev did not possess such qualities. Thus, Khrushchev shared his plans for the missile deployment with Mikoyan. This is understandable, because they had a relationship of trust. Nikita Sergeyevich knew that he could not have a better adviser than Mikoyan (from which stemmed his occasional jealousy of Mikoyan, which for some reason grew into dislike following his resignation). After 1960, Mikoyan became a kind of expert on Cuba. During that period, Khrushchev often used my father to test his ideas. My father was able to suppress some of them at the beginning stages. The two men lived next door to each other—in buildings No. 34 and No. 36 on Vorobyevsky Highway in the Lenin Hills (later, Khrushchev moved to building No. 40, also very close). Often, they would go through the unlocked gate of a nearby garden to walk around it and talk about serious matters. We saw them on these walks. However, let us get back to the subject at hand. Here is the first of A. I. Mikoyan’s recollections: When the idea of installation of the missiles with nuclear warheads came to Khrushchev’s mind, he was only thinking about Cuba’s defense against an attack. Even before his trip to Bulgaria, he told me his concerns about possible aggression from the United States. I shared his concerns completely. There was no specific plan of action in place at that point. Upon his arrival from Bulgaria in May, Khrushchev told me that he was constantly thinking about possible options of defending Cuba from an invasion. We both thought that an invasion would inevitably take place again, and that Americans would use different types of forces to ensure a quick and total American victory. Khrushchev said: “What if we send our missiles there and deploy them quickly and unnoticeably? Then, we will notify the Americans about it, first through diplomatic channels and then publicly. That will put them in their place. They will be put in a position of the same balance of forces as with our country. Any aggression against Cuba will mean a strike on American territory. They will have to give up any plans of an invasion of Cuba.” In my view, this plan had many weak spots. I told him that it was dangerous. Such things are hard to hide—what if they are detected? Besides, it would be difficult to make the Americans accept a constant threat of a “direct strike” on their territory. They might not want to make any concessions and could strike our missiles in Cuba, which cannot be concealed from such an attack on Cuba’s terrain. This would be an attack of our forces, since the missiles have to be heavily protected by our land troops. What are we supposed to do in such a case—respond with a strike on U.S. soil?

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But Khrushchev did not give up his idea. We started to discuss it at the Politburo meetings. Nobody else dared to contradict him. At some point, I hoped for the support from our military men, but Malinovsky acted as a total flatterer—he agreed with everything Khrushchev said.4

Later, after reading some American books on the Caribbean crisis, and especially after the October 1987 International Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University—where I listened to the ideas of Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Raymond L. Garthoff, and others—I began to think that, despite my father’s strong sentiments, it was not flattery that guided the USSR’s defense minister’s decisions. Perhaps he immediately calculated the huge strategic advantage for the Soviet Army that would be gained from the deployment of missiles in Cuba. After all, this would have automatically helped to rectify the USSR’s unfavorable position in the nuclear confrontation. Following the installation of Soviet medium-range missiles in Cuba, the travel time of these missiles would have been considerably reduced, which would have balanced the situation vis-à-vis the American missiles located in Western Europe. The existing ratio of intercontinental missiles was far from being in the USSR’s favor, even though Khrushchev liked to say that its factories produced them like “hot dogs.” According to the CIA (based on the information of its agent, Colonel Penkovsky, an employee of the Main Intelligence Department of the USSR General Staff ), the Soviet Union possessed between 24 and 44 intercontinental missile launchers (plus or minus 6). The USSR’s missiles still used liquid fuel, so the preparation process to launch a missile required two and a half hours. The United States had 134 intercontinental missile launchers (172 by October of 1962). Shortly thereafter, 144 Polaris missiles on submarines were added, along with 1,200 strategic bombers. As a matter of fact, until the summer of 1961, the United States concealed its military dominance, so as not to trigger a boost in the manufacturing of missiles and warheads in the USSR. Later, the U.S. deputy secretary of defense, Roswell Gilpatric, was asked to disclose the actual number of U.S. missiles to cool Khrushchev’s enthusiasm when it came to threatening the West with missiles. Moreover, it became obvious that the USSR fell behind in terms of intercontinental launchers. The USSR’s medium-range missiles were not capable of reaching U.S. territory, while American medium-range missiles deployed in European NATO member countries could have been used to strike Soviet territory. Thus, Malinovsky may have used the formula from Time magazine: “Medium-range missiles + NATO = Intercontinental missiles.” In this particular case, for the USSR, the formula looked a little different: “Medium-range missiles + Cuba = Intercontinental missiles.”5 According to Alexander Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, this maneuver doubled the number of missiles that the USSR could use against the United States.

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General Anatoly Gribkov, deputy chief of the Operations Department of the USSR General Staff, articulated the same idea in his memoirs: “N. S. Khrushchev expressed his opinion to the leadership of the Defense Ministry as if he was seeking a confirmation of his righteousness. Marshal Malinovsky explained that the American Jupiter missiles deployed in Turkey were capable of reaching some vitally important centers of the Soviet Union in only 10 minutes, but our intercontinental missiles required 25 minutes of travel time to strike American territory.”6 However, it is impossible to agree with many authors of articles and books, as well as speakers, who say that this goal was Khrushchev’s main objective.7 Nowadays, some people make references to his memoirs, in which he mentioned that these calculations existed. It goes without saying that calculations of this kind appeared in the course of implementing his plan. But the primary underlying cause of his plan, the reason this plan came into being, was Khrushchev’s desire to secure Cuba against attack and to keep the country in the Socialist Bloc. Besides, the balance of forces was calculated based on the approximation of how many times over the United States could obliterate the USSR, and vice versa. I believe America could have obliterated the Soviet Union twenty to thirty times, while the Soviet Union could obliterate America about three times. A reasonable answer was that effective deterrence required the capability to obliterate each other “only” one time. Khrushchev himself recalls a discussion in the Presidium this way: “Comrade Mikoyan spoke about his reservations. Of course, it is impossible to avoid reservations on issues like that. He implied that we were going to undertake a dangerous step. But I had expressed the same idea as well. I even said that such a step, roughly speaking, was on the verge of being reckless. The recklessness of the plan was that our desire to defend Cuba could lead to an unprecedented nuclear war. We needed to find ways to avoid it by any means, because a deliberate initiation of such a war would definitely be reckless adventurism.” As we can see, several years after the events, following his resignation, Nikita Sergeyevich had a better understanding of the situation. But at the time of the crisis, he was entirely absorbed by his foolhardy idea to save Cuba in precisely this way. At the first American-only conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, which was held on one of Florida’s southern islands on March 8, 1989, there was a discussion of the strategic aspects of the Soviet actions. Both Robert McNamara, defense secretary for President Kennedy and President Johnson, and Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy’s adviser, confirmed that the strategic imbalance was not important for President Kennedy at the time when he learned about the installation of Soviet missiles and was working on the American reaction to it. John Kennedy could see the big picture. He was wise enough to make a calculation of another kind: The United States and the USSR together were able to destroy all of human civilization seven times over.8 But he could not come to terms with the sudden appearance of surface-to-surface missiles on the neighboring island, especially because they were installed secretly and deceitfully.

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So Why the Missiles? Scholars started to raise this issue—“why missiles”—at the time when very few documents about the crisis had been published. The late Adam Ulam was one of the most knowledgeable specialists on Soviet issues. He expressed an opinion that the problems of Cuba and Berlin were closely connected, and that the Soviets wanted to force the Americans to make vitally important concessions in Berlin and Germany. Further, he went into more detail: “There is therefore a very strong presumption that for some time the Soviet leaders had been toying with the idea of installing nuclear missiles in Cuba and, around the beginning of September, were seized with an irresistible desire to solve the most grueling dilemmas of Soviet foreign policy with this one bold stroke. Once in Cuba, the missiles would become negotiable, their removal conditional upon the United States’ meeting Soviet conditions on the German peace treaty and other pressing international issues.”9 In fact, it needs to be emphasized that Ulam did not have access to the wealth of documents available to the public today. It is interesting that such a deepthinking researcher constantly kept Berlin in mind. This helps us to realistically outline the scope of Moscow’s retaliatory actions in the event of a deadly American strike on Cuba and the Soviet forces that were deployed on the territory of the island. Besides, it is clear that Ulam exhibited a level of strategic and geopolitical thinking that Khrushchev lacked at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Arthur Schlesinger, Raymond Garthoff, and Michael Beschloss quote my father’s words when, on November 30, 1962, at a secret meeting in Washington with diplomats from socialist countries, he mentioned that the purpose of the missile deployment was to achieve “a definite shift in the balance of forces between the socialist and capitalist worlds.” This quotation has been used with reference to a book by János Radvanja (a former Hungarian plenipotentiary representative in Washington), and later used in a book by Chalmers Roberts.10 The meaning of Mikoyan’s words could be interpreted in a different way: not “achieving a shift,” but rather “not to allow a shift in the balance of forces to take place” by way of destroying revolutionary Cuba, where the Revolution itself signaled that a “shift in the balance of forces” had already occurred. It is impossible to agree with John Gaddis’s opinion in the part that the Cuban Missile Crisis occurred due to the fact that Khrushchev understood more clearly than Kennedy that the West was winning the Cold War. Gaddis does not have a grasp on all the psychological aspects of the Soviet leaders’ ways of thinking. Furthermore, that issue had been decided approximately fifteen years before the missile crisis. Even Stalin was reconciled with the fact that Western Europe and Japan had gone under the American sphere of influence. Were not the Marshall Plan, NATO, the occupation of Japan by U.S. troops, and the military pact between the United States and Japan enough to have an understanding of issues on the spheres of influence? Nobody in the Kremlin needed to wait until 1961–62 in order to realize what was obvious.

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Khrushchev never had any intention of starting World War III—both Moscow and the West knew that there would be no winners in such a war. Khrushchev belonged to the cohort of romantics (whose ranks seriously thinned in the 1930s due to Stalin’s repressions); he believed in the victory of socialism in the global competition because it would more successfully address social issues and increase people’s standard of living. Western authors should be fair to Khrushchev. When he pronounced his sacramental phrase “we will bury you,” he did not mean a war or any aggression; he meant that the socialist system would become more attractive to people than the capitalist system. According to him, the latter would ultimately disappear. No matter how odd it sounds to Americans, especially in modern times, such were the logic and style of Kremlin rulers’ behavior under Khrushchev. Judging by the conversation that Mikoyan and Kennedy had on November 29, my father held a similar view. He even joked that the socialist ideas might become so popular in America that Kennedy himself would have to follow Fidel Castro’s path, because Castro had not initially supported Lenin’s and Marx’s theories. The president joked back, saying that such a role might be more suitable for his younger brother. Mikoyan’s joke showed his inner confidence in the rapid spread of socialist ideas around the whole planet.11 It is evident from the transcript of their conversation that Kennedy did not start arguing about peaceful competition between the two systems. But it is remarkable that three years before this conversation, when Kennedy was delivering a speech as senator, he stated: “Of course, each side proceeds depending on its own success in the competition. Mr. Khrushchev leaves no doubt about his confidence, but I am sure that if peace is preserved, we will see freedom spread and flourish even for Mr. Khrushchev’s grandchildren.”12 Regrettably, Kennedy did not live to see this come to pass. It is not surprising that Kremlin leaders continued to believe in the global triumph of the socialist system. As for Cuba, it provided proof that socialism had crossed the Atlantic—it was another sign of its triumphant march around the planet. The mission of the missiles in Cuba was designed to prevent its adversaries’ attempts to impede with military force the worldwide victorious march of socialism. That is what Mikoyan implied when he was delivering his speech in Washington at the November 30 meeting of diplomats from socialist countries (the meeting about which Radvanja talked). The Soviet decision to protect and support Cuba should be considered precisely in this context. It was not a case of a superpower’s unusual altruism with respect to a small country; it was politics based on the global view of the conflict between the two systems. At first, Kennedy did not understand this. His thoughts were revolving around Berlin. Kennedy’s thinking was reflected in the discussions that took place in the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm), which the president established to advise him for the duration of the crisis and which consisted of his top advisors. ExComm became the nerve center of the administra-

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tion, where most important decisions on the Cuban Missile Crisis were deliberated. The participants came up with various versions while they were trying to understand the motives of the missile installation. However, during the first several days, it did not occur to anybody that the main reason for the missile installation was the defense of Cuba from an invasion. This version was considered false. That is why Khrushchev’s statements about the defensive nature of missile deployment did not sound convincing to anybody, and they were not taken seriously. Of course, another reason was the strategic intention to force the Americans to live under the same kind of threat from missiles close to their territory as the USSR had done from missiles deployed in Turkey, Italy, and Britain. However, the issue of defending the Cuban Revolution could be easily traced in the secret communications between Khrushchev and Mikoyan when the latter visited Havana to conduct negotiations with Fidel Castro.13 It goes without saying that their telegrams were not intended for publication. The idea of defending Cuba from invasion runs through the content of the telegrams, conversation transcripts, draft agreements, and long negotiations with the United States. For example, in connection with Fidel’s hurt feelings due to the removal of Il-28 bombers, Khrushchev wrote: “We sent our people to Cuba, where we had expected an invasion to take place. We knew that in case of invasion, both Cuban and Soviet peoples would shed blood. We were ready for that. We were prepared for that for the sake of the Cuban people. Yes, we pursued our interests as well. But our interests were general revolutionary interests, interests of the Revolution, interests of the international workers movement, and Marxist and Leninist teachings. We did everything for the sake of that.” He also said, “We assumed a big risk, and we knew that we were assuming a big risk because a real danger of thermonuclear war emerged at the tensest moment. . . . Everything has been done for the sake of Cuba, not for our sake.” My father continued his story about how the plan was conceived: Khrushchev asked him [Malinovsky —S.M.] about the time frame for such an [invasion], provided that it was launched near our coastline. Malinovsky answered that it would take about three to four days, or a week at the most. In other words, an island of that size could be taken over in a short period of time, even in case of serious resistance by the army and the local population. I believe that this assumption was correct to some extent. Certainly, resistance brigades could have continued their underground combat actions for a long time, but the Americans could have gained control over the country within several days or a week. Khrushchev asked me, “Do you see? We have no other option.” However, I kept opposing his opinion and objecting to him persistently. I told him what I saw with my own eyes in the 1960s: no woods to hide missile launchers, just some palm trees too far away from each other. Plus, a palm tree was considered to be a “naked tree,” with leaves only on top. I told them that the consequences could be dangerous or even catastrophic. The Americans could launch

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a strike on our missiles and destroy them in several minutes. What would we have to do then? Just swallow that, look disgraced in front of the entire world, and possibly lose Cuba, for whose sake we are doing everything? Or retaliate with a nuclear strike, which would mean the initiation of the war? Khrushchev responded, “Let’s not talk about it any more. We will ask Fidel Castro, and then we will decide. We will send Biryuzov [Marshal Sergey Biryuzov, commander of the Strategic Missile Forces at that time —S.M.] with his specialists to check if there are spots to hide missile launchers to make them invisible to the aircraft.” I started thinking that most likely Fidel would refuse. Deployment of our troops and military bases would provide the grounds to say that Cuba is our satellite. It would be too hurtful for the pride of the Cubans. The Latin American countries are aware what the position of a satellite means, and they hate it. Surely he would refuse and say, “You’d better provide us with a bunch of weapons, and we will defend ourselves.” Biryuzov will see that there is no place to hide the missiles. It will be out of question. However, Khrushchev’s actions left me speechless, and my arguments did not mean anything, because of the achieved results. Castro gave his consent, and the Cuban landscape was found to be suitable for camouflaging the missiles. I did not believe that conclusion.

Shortly thereafter, Khrushchev obtained approval from the above-mentioned group, and he brought up this issue at the Presidium of the Central Committee in the presence of the Central Committee secretaries, defense minister, ministers of foreign affairs, and the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces. A published collection of documents, called “The Archives of the Kremlin: The Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee 1954–1964,” edited by Academician A. A. Fursenko,14 contains a short note made by Malin, the chief of the Central Committee’s General Department: Protocol No. 32 Meeting on May 21, 1962 Present: Brezhnev, Voronov, Kozlov, Kirilenko, Kosygin, Kuusinen, Mikoyan, Polyansky, Suslov, Khrushchev, Shvernik, Grishin, Ilichev, Ponomarev, Shelepin, Gromyko, Malinovsky, and Biryuzov. I. Information presented by Khrushchev about his trip to Bulgaria. About helping Cuba. How to assist Cuba and make sure it survives. (Khrushchev) Talk to F. Castro to enter into a mutual agreement on joint defense. Deploy missiles and nuclear weapons. Carry out in secret. Announce later. Missiles under our command. This is going to be an offensive policy. Comrades Malinovsky and Biryuzov should make calculations and determine the timeframe. Prepare a letter for Castro.

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Protocol No. 32 (continuation) Meeting on May 24, 1962. 1. Issues regarding Cuba Khrushchev, Kozlov, Brezhnev, Mikoyan, Suslov, Kuusinen, Kosygin, Polyansky, Voronov, Kirilenko, Shvernik, Gromyko, Malinovsky. To agree with the proposals of Khrushchev N. S. on the Cuban issues. Approve the plan.15

Malin’s notes do not indicate the presence of a discussion or how it went. As is known from Khrushchev’s recollections and other oral sources, it was a very brief discussion—each speaker said just a few words. For example, Kuusinen acknowledged that he did not have an opinion on the issue, but he trusted Nikita Sergeyevich, and that is why he fully agreed with him. The rest of the speakers had approximately the same opinion, although not everybody took the floor. My father articulated his doubts regarding the feasibility of a secret missile installation. When he told me that “he kept opposing” Khrushchev’s opinion, perhaps he was referring to his personal meetings, his eye-to-eye conversations with Nikita Sergeyevich, or small group talks. Unfortunately, Malin took only very brief notes. Mikoyan’s thoughts were partially correct when he predicted Fidel’s feelings and his attitude toward this matter. In 1992, during the trilateral conference in Havana, Fidel actually repeated my father’s thoughts: “Provided that the missiles were needed solely for our defense, we would not have accepted them. In such a case Cuba would have become a Soviet military base, which means that we would have had to pay an extremely high price due to the detriment of our country’s image.”16 In May 1962, Aleksandr Alekseyev was recalled from Havana for his appointment as ambassador to Cuba (done at Mikoyan’s suggestion). Because he knew Castro well, he was asked a question about Fidel’s possible reaction to the idea of missile deployment. The newly appointed ambassador suggested that Fidel would react negatively, citing the reasons that my father had talked about earlier. Both based their judgments on their personal knowledge of Fidel’s character and beliefs. Neither thought that Castro would interpret Khrushchev’s intentions incorrectly. On the basis of the assumption that Cuba would refuse to become the home for a foreign military base, Mikoyan did not suggest the cheaper, more effective, and less dangerous choice of offering Fidel the deployment of a large Soviet military unit, a division for instance, in order to deter the Americans’ aggressive intensions. Such an act could have had a tremendous impact on further U.S. actions, because then any invasion of Cuba could have been considered an attack against the USSR. Thus, Mikoyan’s narrative quoted above supports the hypothesis that the idea of sending the missiles overseas to Cuba was conceived in order to prevent a U.S. invasion—about which I do not have any doubts. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet military leadership came up with some additional ideas about how such an action

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would somehow help the Soviet Union to reduce the lag in missile production and how it would also serve as a response to the deployment in Turkey and Europe of American missiles, which were directed at the USSR from a “point-blank” distance. Most likely, when trying to determine the number of missiles to be sent to Cuba, marshals Malinovsky and Biryuzov were guided by some secondary ideas that were within their “realm.” I believe that the R-14 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (range: 2,500 kilometers), with the capacity to reach the entire continental United States, were not needed for the prevention of a strike on Cuba; it was “too much” to have them there. It was sufficient to deploy the R-12 missiles (range: 1,700 kilometers). Of course, the aerial photography of launchers for such powerful missiles caused big concerns in Washington with respect to Moscow’s intentions. The historian Graham Allison performed a brilliant analysis of four possible hypotheses regarding the “why missiles?” question—the defense of Cuba, Cold War politics, an adjustment to the balance of forces, and Berlin.17 Moreover, he found supportive evidence for each of them. Personally, I would put defending Cuba from invasion at the top of the list, because it was the Kremlin political leadership’s objective; but I could not confirm that other ideas outlined by Allison did not appear at other stages of the crisis. For example, the ideas of a missile balance prevailed in the military environment. The diplomats probably thought about the possibility of finally conducting negotiations on the basis of equality, because the United States would have lost its grounds to talk from a “position of strength.” But all these opinions originated from the decision that had been already made. The Kremlin’s decision was based on its intention to defend Cuba from a seemingly inevitable invasion. It goes without saying that the strategic imbalance was not the main motive for the missile deployment. In subsequent years, the Soviet Union did redress the strategic imbalance by increasing its manufacturing of intercontinental missiles and the creation of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle warheads. Actual parity was acknowledged later, but already by 1962 the possibility of retaliatory action on the part of the USSR made it unfeasible to use nuclear weapons to obtain concessions in the United States’ favor. However, if the United States had accepted the existence of Soviet missiles in Cuba, provided that they were deployed based on a published international agreement between the USSR and Cuba, the Soviet leader, by virtue of his personality, could have become even more aggressive on various international issues, including Berlin.

The Nuclear Balance Khrushchev bluffed when he said that Soviet Union’s missiles were manufactured as “hot dogs.” He was most likely ill informed about the number of missiles that the United States possessed (at least before Gilpatric’s speech in the summer of

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1961). But he knew that more time was required to reach at least a relative balance of forces. On the basis of common sense, it was not necessary to spend huge quantities of funds to achieve the balance of forces. It was enough to make the United States understand that nuclear retaliation would take place in the event that it launched the first strike. Both Khrushchev and Mikoyan understood that after the first artificial Earth satellite had been launched in November 1957, the United States would not launch the first strike that could initiate World War III. The satellite showed the United States that the USSR had created a nuclear delivery vehicle and that the USSR could retaliate. I cannot say the same for the rest of the Politburo members, because most of them had a poor understanding of world politics; but I know that my father understood this even before his trip to the United States in January 1959. After his talks with Eisenhower and Dulles, tours around the country, and meetings with the political and business elite of American society, he strengthened his opinion that the U.S. political leadership would not launch the first strike on the USSR. He was absolutely positive about it, and he expressed his view both at the end of his trip and afterward. This was not naïveté or blind trust. Both Khrushchev and Mikoyan possessed common sense—they probably convinced the Kremlin leadership that the Soviet missile forces had enough capability for at least a weak nuclear retaliation, which could have inflicted “unacceptable damage” on the United States. But the White House shared the same understanding of the issue as the Kremlin. Despite Khrushchev’s bluff, there were no misunderstandings in this respect. In general, nuclear deterrence worked well, even at that time. Khrushchev was not a cynic, but a romantic. That is why it was important for him to rescue Cuba, and it was his main objective. But the story is different for military leaders such as Rodion Malinovsky and Sergey Biryuzov. It is very likely that strategic ideas prevailed in their minds. They interpreted strategic interests from a military standpoint. However, in the Soviet Union, military men never had any influence on foreign policy issues, and even when they happened to be involved, it was to a very insignificant extent. In any event, the key role of the Politburo or the Presidium of the CPSU was never questioned by the military throughout the entire history of the Soviet regime, from October 1917 up to December 1991. However, we should get back to Mikoyan’s story about the way the decision was made: Somehow I put my hopes on Biryuzov—I was hoping that he would do his best to provide an assessment of the Cuban landscape from the standpoint of camouflage and coverage in case of an air strike. Compared to the deceased Marshal Nedelin,18 he was stupid. He [Marshal Nedelin] was a wonderful military man, decent, and smart. We have not had as good a missile officer since then. All of a sudden, such a thing happened—Fidel gave his consent! Later, I asked him directly with-

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out hiding my bewilderment: “Why did you agree?” He gave his permission because he was thinking that it was necessary to fight imperialism on a global scale. In other words, his consent sacrificed Cuban interests, Cuba’s security was put at stake; moreover, even its existence was put at stake for the principles of socialism in general! He was acting as an internationalist in the full sense of the word. When Biryuzov arrived with a positive response, we all understood that the Cuban leaders believed that such a step was necessary for the defense of Cuba from invasion. I was not able to do anything under those circumstances. Besides, Biryuzov blabbed that it was easy to camouflage the missiles in the royal palm groves. I objected again, saying that I knew how the Cuban landscape looked, as I had flown around the island in a helicopter together with Fidel. I repeated many times that the palm trees were very tall trees with leaves only at the top and that they did not grow close enough to each other. Thus, I articulated again that in comparison with our woods, it would simply be impossible to hide and protect the missiles from the air. I pointed to the absence of mountains, or rocky places to hide the launchers. Americans were constantly flying over Cuba, and it was easy for them to detect the missiles. However, the military stated that they could ship surface-to-air missiles to stop their flights, and install the main launchers within a very short period of time. The surface-to-air missiles were “in the hands” of our group of forces, but the military men were not allowed to bring the American planes down in order to not provoke a confrontation or cause any suspicions. That is why Malinovsky’s argument became useless: the antiaircraft missiles were required only in case of an actual conflict, but not for the purpose of its prevention. Finally, a little more than a month later, we were ready to publicly announce the deployment of a mediumrange missile with nuclear warheads for the defense of Cuba from invasion. It was planned to be done via the UN.

These words need some commentary. In 1992 in Havana, in Fidel Castro’s presence, Alekseyev spoke about the way Biryuzov conducted the conversation with Castro. Because they expected that Fidel would not agree with the plan, Khrushchev instructed Biryuzov to tell Fidel that there was no other alternative for the efficient defense of Cuba, and to see his reaction. Alekseyev said that Fidel did not reply immediately. He kept thinking, and then asked: “‘Is this in the interest of the socialist camp?’ And we said, ‘No, this is in the interest of the Cuban Revolution.’ This is what Khrushchev said. But, subsequently, the leaders of the Cuban government got together, they discussed the matter, and they came to understand that there was a serious intention by the Soviet government to defend the Cuban Revolution. Thus, the Cuban leadership agreed to the negotiations.”19 Fidel Castro, the main figure, denied that consent was given only for the sake of defending Cuba. At each stage of negotiations, from the first day and beyond, at every conference and each interview, while delivering speeches or making statements, he always insisted and still insists that the Cuban leadership was guided by

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the interests of the socialist camp. He stated the same thing both in his secret telegrams to Khrushchev during the crisis and in secret negotiations with Mikoyan in November 1962. It is obvious from the Protocols of the Presidium of the Central Committee, to which Biryuzov and Rashidov reported, that only those who reported took the floor, and no discussions took place with Khrushchev himself. Actually, Rashidov did not play any role in the negotiations because he did not participate in preliminary Kremlin deliberations. He was sent to Havana only to add political weight to the mission because he was a candidate for Politburo membership. In other words, no discussions took place. A very important detail should be stressed in this context: Total silence meant the lack of enthusiasm: Protocol No. 35 Meeting on June 10, 1962 Present: Brezhnev, Kirilenko, Kozlov, Kosygin, Kuusinen, Mikoyan, Polyansky, Suslov, Khrushchev, Rashidov, Grishin, Demichev, Ilichev, Ponomarev, Shelepin, Malinovsky, Grechko, Chuikov, Biryuzov, Zaharov, Epishev, Gromyko, Ivanov S. P. I. Information presented by Comrade Rashidov from his trip to Cuba. (Rashidov, Biryuzov, Khrushchev) Start resolving the issue. I believe that we would win the operation. Comrade Malinovsky must prepare the draft of the resolution. Approve the draft resolution. Comrades Kosygin and Ustinov—to consider practical proposals.20

Evidently, Malin took notes only of Khrushchev’s words. The lack of enthusiasm was palpable throughout the mail-in voting system as well. The voting packet was delivered to Presidium members and the Central Committee secretaries’ homes by General Semyon Ivanov, chief of the General Staff Operations Department—lower rank officers were not trusted with this mission. Ivanov reported to Khrushchev that the candidate members of the Presidium and the Central Committee secretaries did not vote “yes,” saying that they did not have the right to vote. This was in compliance with the CPSU Charter, but Khrushchev made a decision to involve as many people as possible, and he made up his mind to violate the Charter. Another issue was Mikoyan’s decision not to vote “yes”—it appeared that he was still not in agreement. Then, Khrushchev sent Ivanov back to the people who did not sign the form, saying to him: “OK. They will sign. I am going to call them now.” I think he reminded my father that his objections contradicted the findings of the Russian delegation to Cuba that visited Fidel, and that his refusal to vote “yes” was not justified. This was how the first secretary obtained all the signatures. At the 1992 conference in Havana, Oleg Troyanovsky—Khrushchev’s special assistant for international affairs, who played a key role in drafting Khrushchev’s

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letters to Kennedy and interpreting Kennedy’s letters, and who had been a translator for Mikoyan—described how he learned about the missiles in Cuba from Lebedev, Khrushchev’s adviser, and that he immediately expressed his concerns about the appropriateness of such an action: “From the very beginning, the adventurism of the missile plan was obvious to me personally. I knew two things for sure: first of all, the Americans would not tolerate missiles in Cuba, and they would undertake some radical measures. Second, a military conflict was not envisioned in Khrushchev’s plan, and it meant that at some critical moment he would be forced to retreat.”21 His colleagues agreed with him, but they advised him not to raise this issue in a conversation with Khrushchev, because the leader was unable to even listen to the opinions of people who disagreed with him— even of those people, who, due to their positions, had to express their viewpoints before any decision was adopted, for example, the foreign policy adviser. Troyanovsky remarked that Khrushchev was always polite with his advisers and never “directed his bad mood against any of his subordinates.” However, there was a belief, which existed both in the Kremlin and in the Old Square (the Building of the CPSU Central Committee), that advisers would risk a great deal if they dared to say anything that the “master” would not like, or question any of the supreme leader’s decisions. But Troyanovsky, whom I have known since I was young, was an extremely honest, tactful, and pleasant man. He managed to express himself in such a way that even Khrushchev could not cut him off, and listened to him without bursts of anger.22 He understood that it was too late to try to talk him out of it—it was already September and the missiles were being shipped to Cuba. In October, Khrushchev said to him: “Missiles will be installed soon, and the big storm is coming.” Troyanovsky noted figuratively: “I am afraid our boat might sink.” Khrushchev said, “It is too late to change anything.”23

Secrecy and Deception Judging from military reports, the operation was conducted brilliantly. However, during the conferences in which the USSR’s American counterparts participated, they found out that the camouflage at the launch site construction stage had been done very poorly. At the 1992 conference in Havana, Soviet military men, including General Anatoly Gribkov, stated that the camouflage had been applied appropriately, but it was just not possible to hide the launch sites completely. He repeated the same statement in the book he cowrote with General William Smith (at the time of the crisis, he was assistant to General Maxwell Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ).24 As for camouflage measures in Cuba, on June 7, 1962, three days before the final decision was made by the USSR Military Council, and a long time before the missiles were sent to Cuba, Major General A. A. Dementiev, a military adviser in Cuba, responded to Khrushchev’s question about the possibility of secretly installing the USSR’s missiles in Cuba. He said, “Nikita Sergeyevich, it is impossible to do.” He explained that the Cuban landscape was un-

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suitable for camouflaging missiles and equipment; moreover, he added that “there was no place to hide a chicken, let alone a missile.” This response contradicted Marshal Biryuzov’s conclusion. It seemed that they needed to review the entire plan, perhaps reject it altogether, and consider the alternative plan of sending a large military unit without nuclear missiles. Moreover, if the USSR wanted to insist on its demands, it should have undertaken both diplomatic and military measures: It should have signed an agreement with Cuba to be published at the right moment; but, first of all, it should have sent, deployed, and used the C-75 antiaircraft missiles. While analyzing the operation, Marshal Biryuzov did not talk about his mistakes in the assessment of the Cuban landscape in May 1962, which resulted in such a decision, but he pointed to the “negligence in the application of camouflage, which led to the detection of the Missile Group of Forces in Cuba.”25 Nobody talked about whose fault it was. Were the unit commanders at fault? Was General Ivanov at fault? Certainly, he was partially responsible for the detection of the missiles. But he did not even visit Cuba. Biryuzov went there first, then General Issa Pliev, his deputies, and later General Igor Statsenko. Finally, two weeks before the deadly U-2 flight, Gribkov arrived in Cuba. Following these events, somebody, perhaps Ivanov, issued a late order to improve the camouflage of the missiles and to take some immediate measures to rectify the situation. The order came after the photos had been already taken. Incidentally, General Ivanov was fired on some other formal grounds. On May 21, 1962, the urgent decision to prepare a plan for missile deployment was made at the Defense Council.26 Three days later, on May 24, 1962, the plan was approved at the joint meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Defense Council. At that point, Marshal Biryuzov had not yet gone to Havana to assess the feasibility of secret missile deployment. This means that Khrushchev made his own decision regardless of Biryuzov’s future findings. Thus, he was also responsible for the detection of missiles. Of course, they would have had to cancel everything if Fidel had not given his consent. But the USSR’s leader decided not to lose time. Such were some of the characteristics of his personality: impatience, and stubbornness. On June 10, 1962, after Biryuzov had returned with positive answers to both questions, the Defense Council adopted its final decision.

Secrecy in the USSR At all stages of preparation for the operation, it was required to observe strict secrecy both in Moscow and within the territory of the USSR. From its inception, the operation had been given top secret status. For example, Marshal Biryuzov arrived in Havana under the guise of an engineer named Petrov. Stenographers were not invited to record the discussions of the Presidium of the Central Committee. The generals of the General Staff handwrote documents by themselves. All further preparation for the operation was carried out at such levels of secrecy and deception that even the unit commanders who were actually sent to Cuba had been told that they were going to another place. They were informed that the

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missiles were supposed to be installed on the island of Novaya Zemlya in the Arctic Ocean; hence, the name of the operation: “Anadyr”—after the name of the town and river in far northeastern Siberia.27 The organizers of Operation Anadyr did not use radio devices, telephones, or even typewriters. They had to write everything by hand and use sealing wax to seal envelopes. The packages were hand-delivered by a special courier. General supervision over the preparation process was carried out by Colonel General Semyon Ivanov, chief of the General Staff Operations Department, who did this job together with four other generals, including Anatoly Gribkov. The fact that Moscow’s secrecy measures worked impeccably could be seen in the fact that Penkovsky, colonel of the Main Intelligence Department of the USSR General Staff, who was recruited by the CIA, was not aware of the plan. As a relative of Marshal Vorontsov, he often visited the homes of top military officials. Certainly, he spent much time in his department, where he was always under the patronage of I. A. Serov, chief of the Main Intelligence Department.28 He never found out about the operation, although he disclosed priceless information about missiles and weapons to the United States, along with other information to which he had access. He was arrested on the remarkable day of October 22, 1962.

Secrecy en Route This stage of the operation was organized brilliantly from the very beginning. Military units were provided with winter clothes, including skis (to comply with the legend about Novaya Zemlya; plus, the name of the operation spoke for itself). When Robert McNamara heard about the skis, he joked that if the Americans had learned about it, they would have expected troops landing in the state of Vermont! A large number of ships had to be modified to carry large loads. The parts of decks that could be seen aerially were crammed with fertilizer packages, agricultural machinery, and other innocent types of cargo indicated in the documentation. Il-28 bombers and MiG-21 fighters were disassembled and shipped in wooden crates. Spare parts for cruise missiles, the missiles themselves—which looked like smaller, nonpiloted MiG-15s—were also shipped. Patrol boats had to be equipped with the Luna tactical missiles, Sopka coastal defense missiles, and others. Special attention was given to the shipment of the nuclear warheads. The cargo ship Indigirka was supposed to carry warheads for the R-12s, Luna missiles, and nuclear bombs for the Il-28s. The cargo loaded on Indigirka had an explosive capacity that exceeded the capacity of all the allied bombings of Berlin during World War II. A decision was made that this ship would go without an accompanying vessel in order not to attract attention. The warheads for the R-14s and the missiles themselves were to be shipped later. The personnel had to endure terrible conditions because they were transported in closed holds. They were prohibited from coming up on deck during the

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daytime. The temperature in the holds reached 50 degrees Celsius. Despite increased ventilation, people had a very hard time, and one soldier died. Some relief came on the Atlantic Ocean, when the soldiers were issued light short-sleeved shirts, light pants, and summer shoes. There was also a luckier group; 2,000 people were sent to Cuba disguised as tourists.

Secrecy on the Island of Cuba It was more difficult to observe secrecy in Cuba. First of all, the Cubans saw the arrival of unusual cargoes. No doubt they discussed them. There were many agents connected with the CIA and émigrés in Cuba. Locals stayed in touch with their relatives in Miami. People wrote letters to each other and discussed the news. Second, it was necessary to unload missiles, planes, boats, artillery, and other military equipment that people had not seen before. All this had to be transported manually and in trucks. And third, the most challenging task was to assemble the launchers, keeping in mind U-2 photo reconnaissance flights at altitudes of 20 kilometers. In general, in the summer of 1962, the U.S. intelligence services were closely watching the weapons delivery process to Cuba with the help of U-2 photo reconnaissance flights, and the information was submitted to the White House. As a result, they detected Mosquito boats, which were intended for coastal defense and were equipped with missiles with a range of 30 nautical miles (by the way, Kennedy was very upset when he learned that the United States did not possess such weapons in its own arsenal). Among the weaponry detected by American intelligence were Il-28 bombers (created in 1948–50), which had been outdated and removed from operational use in the USSR,29 but that were still suitable for coastal defense; MiG-21 fighters, in addition to MiG-15, MiG-17, and MiG-19 fighters, which were delivered for the Cuban Army; S-75 surface-to-air missiles, which the Americans called SAMs, with a shorter range than the SA-2 missiles (which were transferred to the Cuban arsenal). As agreed with the Cuban side, all ships arrived at eleven different ports around the island. The landing of troops and unloading of equipment were only carried out at night. Until the very end of the crisis, the U.S. intelligence services believed that there were about 7,000 to 10,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Actually, however, there were about 41,900 of them there! The American side only learned this in 1992. Further inland, the missiles were moved under soft covers, only at night as well. The Cuban intelligence services had predicted that people would write about these events, and they withheld about 17,000 letters containing information about strange occurrences on the island. The agents added ridiculous fantasies on top of the news that they heard from locals. The fantasies were ridiculous to the extent that even the CIA did not believe them. The fact of the unloading and assembling of planes was not kept secret; Il-28 bombers had also been delivered to other developing countries. The MiG-21 was a new aircraft, but the delivery of newly modified fighter planes was within the

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framework of updating the equipment of the Cuban Army. During discussions in the White House, Kennedy said he did not have concerns about the Soviet planes: “We must be prepared to live with the Soviet threat as represented by Soviet bombers.” But the strategic missiles in Cuba would have had a certain impact on Latin America.30 Assembling the R-12s presented the biggest danger. In fact, the assembling of the S-75 antiaircraft missiles could have caused concerns—and the Americans were really concerned about it. They understood that the missiles were intended for bringing down U-2 spy planes. In this sense, it became obvious that there was something to hide from the reconnaissance aircraft. The construction of the launch sites was organized poorly. First, they needed to assemble the S-75 surface-to-air missiles quickly to stop aerial photography. However, they were assembled only by October 15, the day after the U-2 flight that had provided the U.S. government with a comprehensive picture of what was going on. Additionally, it could have been better to concentrate efforts on the assembly of R-12 launchers, which had arrived in Cuba at the beginning of September. If that had happened, they could have been prepared for combat actions before October 14, and not by October 25, as was the case. The commander of the Strategic Missile Forces had made the decision to simultaneously assemble the launchers for the R-14, but the ship with them on board did not have a chance to go through the quarantine line, and it had to turn back home. All the difficulties started with the assembly of the launchers. They required some parts that were well known to the American side. Fuel tanks, long trailers to transport missiles, concrete pads for the launch sites, forklifts for the missiles, electrical cables—everything that would provide a clear picture for experts if they were not camouflaged in one way or another from aerial discovery. It would have made sense to assemble the S-75 launchers to first deter the overflights, and only after that to assemble the R-12s. Why was this not done? At the October 1992 conference in Havana, General Gribkov reported briefly: “We had an order from Moscow to use the S-75s only in case of attack.” Fidel Castro responded, “I was not able to understand the purpose of the S-75 installation. If it was installed, it was installed for something. But there was no use for it. As you say, the U-2 was brought down spontaneously. They were given an opportunity to fly around our territory without any constraints. That was dangerous; they fly around to specify the disposition, and then, to destroy.” Marshal Yazov responded: “We reported that they flew around us every day. But there was no order to open fire.”31 It was odd that the Americans were “given” an opportunity to detect the launchers and perform aerial photography from the U-2 aircraft.

Persuading the Cubans “It is too late to change anything,” Khrushchev said in response to the expressed concern that “the boat could sink.” He was wrong. A certain very important element could have been changed: He could have informed President Kennedy

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about the secret agreement between the USSR and Cuba, and let Kennedy make a choice about whether to disclose it immediately or to wait until after the elections. At that point, Fidel Castro still hoped for the publication of the agreement. This would have significantly reduced the element of deception, which was an extremely important factor, though even in this case, the Kremlin’s previous promises would not have been kept. Khrushchev’s promise not to deliver surfaceto-surface missiles to Cuba, which was made through Dobrynin and Bolshakov, and then via Gromyko at the time when Kennedy was aware of the ongoing installation, constituted the most insulting lie, which placed Kennedy in an awkward situation vis-à-vis Congress and the whole American nation. According to Theodore Sorensen—and as confirmed by McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy’s national security adviser—if it were not for such a rude and absurd lie, the situation could have been resolved via Kennedy’s statement regarding a limit on the number of the Soviet missiles in Cuba.32 Kennedy himself regretted his decisive September statement, which did not leave him with a way out: “I should have said that we don’t care.”33 Kennedy made his “decisive statement” because he believed Khrushchev. In other words, Khrushchev himself invited Kennedy to make a statement that soon left him no another option but to immediately seek the removal or destruction of the missiles. And all this happened because of the Kremlin’s habit of practicing deception. The most that could have happened if the agreement between Moscow and Havana had been published before Kennedy made his “decisive statement” was the opening of normal diplomatic negotiations to resolve the situation. Cuba could have taken part in such negotiations. In the course of normal diplomatic negotiations, the Soviet and Cuban sides could have achieved considerably more than what resulted from Khrushchev’s frontal retreat on October 28, 1962. A timely warning could have prompted the United States to make concessions. The deception inevitably prompted the United States to act with extreme harshness. Khrushchev chose the worst of all possible options, without stopping to think of what he would do if his deception was discovered. Yet it was impossible for the deception to remain undiscovered, considering the order from Moscow not to use S-75 missiles to prevent aerial photography. There is another question that Fidel Castro repeatedly asks to this day: “If our conduct is legal, if it is moral, if it is correct, why should we do something that may give rise to a scandal? Why should it seem that we are doing something secretly, covertly, as if we were doing something wrong, something to which we have no right? . . . Why not publish the military agreement?”34 Since the very beginning, the Cuban position had been to sign an agreement with the USSR and to publish it officially. Why could the United States openly and officially install missiles in Turkey, but the USSR not do the same in Cuba? These were completely analogous situations. Even some technical characteristics of the missiles were similar in terms of their poor qualities (liquid fuel, several hourlong preparation processes to launch a missile, etc.). In July, Raul Castro came to

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Moscow and almost persuaded Khrushchev to sign an agreement. But it was strange that he had to persuade him in the first place. In his first telegram to Fidel Castro, on May 30, Khrushchev mentioned the forthcoming signing of the agreement. For some reason, however, he changed his mind and delayed the signing until November. Publication was out of question at that time. In a speech in January 1968, Castro said that his Kremlin partner had delayed signing until November without any explanations. It is unclear how these plans for the future tied together with current events. Did Khrushchev intend to sign the agreement after notifying Kennedy, or after Kennedy found out on his own? Or to do it simultaneously? The bottom line is that, as a typical Soviet leader, he underestimated the political significance of an agreement in such a complex situation that he himself created. He valued secrecy most of all. He did not realize what a negative effect his blatant lie would have. Very soon, it became clear that this was his biggest mistake. Aleksandr Alekseyev recounted how in Moscow in July, he and Raul Castro labored over the text, composing the Russian and Spanish versions of the agreement simultaneously, which they initialed afterward. Due to the secrecy of the matter, they did not recruit a professional translator to work on the agreement. Fidel Castro himself edited it in Havana. On August 27, he sent the text to Moscow with Ernesto “Che” Guevara and Aragonés. The world “missiles” was not mentioned in his version (most likely, it was a concession to Khrushchev); the draft agreement mentioned only measures to “prevent possible aggression against the Republic of Cuba and the USSR, in conformity with UN principles.”35 Nonetheless, Khrushchev for some reason did not sign even such a veiled agreement. Evidently, the Soviet mania for secrecy and the habit of doing everything covertly prevailed, together with the Kremlin’s pathological and long-lasting adherence to deception, regardless of the political system. But in this particular case, it is all the more strange because in the first telegram after Biryuzov’s return from Havana, Khrushchev not only stated that he was happy about the Cuban leadership’s consent to the missile installation but also himself offered that Raul Castro or somebody else should come to Moscow to “confidentially consider the relevant issues.” Further, he dictated: “We mean that while your representative is here, we could jointly develop a draft agreement to be submitted to you for review and then signature” [emphasis added —S.M.]. Some researchers believe that Khrushchev was afraid of an information leak about the agreement by somebody in Castro’s circle. But a leak of information about the installation of missiles without an appropriate agreement was even more dangerous. Thus, the text edited by Fidel Castro did not even mention the word “missiles.” Let us assume, however, that Washington would have guessed what was going on. Moreover, rumors and fears that the Soviet Union would ship missiles with warheads had appeared from time to time. But then the U.S. president would not have put himself in an awkward position by denying these rumors, which were particularly being spread by Senator Kenneth Keating, who referred to informa-

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tion provided to him by one of Kennedy’s opponents in the U.S. intelligence complex. It is amazing that on April 19, during the combat operations in Playa Giron—a year and a half before the missile crisis—Robert Kennedy, his brother’s confidante as well as the U.S. attorney general, who was more hawkish on Cuba than his brother, wrote these prophetic words to President Kennedy: “If we don’t want Russia to set up missile bases in Cuba, . . . we had better decide now what we are willing to do to stop it.”36 Evidently, the possibility of Soviet missiles in Cuba occurred to Robert Kennedy before it occurred to Khrushchev! On September 2, 1962, TASS issued a communiqué formally announcing Cuba’s military alliance with the Soviet Union, but it could not be seen as a substitute for the formal agreement between the governments. It did not disavow Khrushchev’s personal numerous assurances provided to Kennedy that the surface missiles would not be sent to Cuba. Why did he make those statements a week before the arrival of missiles on the island? If they considered it risky to publish the agreement because of the possibility of an American blockade, what was the reason for not entering into a secret agreement with Che Guevara at the end of August, and then publishing it in nine or ten days (right after the arrival of the ships Poltava and Omsk with R-12 missiles onboard)? By that time, flights over the territory of Cuba could have been stopped with the help of the antiaircraft missiles. Of course, it would have caused tensions, but not comparable to the direct lies by Ambassador Dobrynin and Minister Gromyko.37 Khrushchev failed to use such an instrument as a government-to-government agreement; thus, in the eyes of the world public opinion and of most of the UN members, the operation looked like a violation of international law. Kennedy was insulted. Indeed, Kennedy appeared to be in a stupid position that resulted in his rigidity, or even aggressiveness.

What If the Agreement Was Made Public? What would have happened if an official agreement was published? Sorensen and Bundy, as well as other American participants in the U.S.-Soviet discussions in 1987, confirmed that in such a case, the United States could have found itself in a difficult situation, because it would have been hard for it to find persuasive arguments against such an agreement, given that the United States had deployed its missiles in Great Britain, Italy, and Turkey.38 But in this case, the United States could have impeded the shipment of the missiles by way of force, or introduced a quarantine immediately. In October 2002, in Havana, Marshal Yazov said that if the USSR and Cuba published the declaration on missiles, “neither of the ships would have arrived.”39 Fidel objected: “Nobody at that time knew what kind of weapons were being shipped. We trusted the Russians too much both in politics and in military affairs. That is why we did not insist on the publication.”40 There was a good possibility that the quarantine would have been introduced. But first, after September 8, it would not have been so detrimental (especially if

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the shipment of warheads was scheduled at the same time as the missile shipment). Second, the introduction of the quarantine would have violated international law, and the United States would have had a worse image in that case than it had after the declaration of the blockade in response to the secret missile installation. Both the United Nations and world public opinion would not have supported such actions by Washington. In such a scenario, the USSR could have raised the issue of the deployment of American missiles in Turkey, Italy, and Britain. Then bargaining could have taken place—and either the United States could have made a noninvasion pledge or the parties could have reached a mutual agreement on the presence of the missiles in Europe, Turkey, and Cuba. To make a long story short, the missile agreement with Cuba would have opened different options for both the USSR and Cuba with respect to a possible compromise with the United States. I want to consider the same option from Khrushchev’s standpoint. It should have been feasible to calculate the timing of all the steps. Guevara brought the text of the agreement to Moscow at the end of August. At the beginning of September, the R-12 missiles arrived in Cuba onboard Poltava. It should have been possible to speed up the arrival of Indigirka with the warheads. But as it turned out later, it was not important—until the very end of the crisis, in fact, until 1992, neither the CIA nor the Pentagon knew for sure whether the warheads were shipped. “We did not believe that the warheads were in Cuba. We did not have any information about them,” McNamara said in 1992.41 From what we know from the “Kennedy tapes,” this issue had already been discussed, and there was an assumption that they were not on the island (as they did not see a bunker for them), but nobody excluded the possibility of their presence. Kennedy believed that they were supposed to be shipped together with missiles (that is why he was very cautious in making his decisions). Khrushchev should have published the agreement, or informed Kennedy officially after the missiles—with or without warheads—were shipped. Besides, if it became known that the Soviet forces included about 42,000 military personnel; about a hundred T-34 and T-55 tanks; many artillery, plus the S-75 antiaircraft missile complexes; boats equipped with missiles, frontline (FKR) coastal defense cruise missiles with tactical nuclear charges; 42 fighter-interceptors MiG-21; 42 Il-28 light bombers, which were suitable for the defense of the island; and Luna tactical complexes with nuclear charges—perhaps, it would have been enough to disclose the information about those weapons—in that case, would it not have been necessary to bring the R-12 and R-14 missiles? All these weapons did not fall into the category of offensive weapons (Bundy himself excluded Il-28 bombers from the list of offensive weapons42). More important, then, there would have been no need to ship the intermediate-range missiles, just as the Kremlin had repeatedly promised President Kennedy. Che Guevara was always skeptical about promises. For that reason, upon his arrival in Moscow at the end of August 1962, he asked Khrushchev directly about what Moscow’s action would be in case the Americans demanded the withdrawal

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of missiles or launched an invasion of Cuba. In fact, Fidel asked him to pose these questions. A month before that, he had requested that Raul Castro ask the same questions, but Raul did not get any meaningful answer. The text of the agreement, which was initialed by him and Alekseyev, was in actuality far from perfect. Fidel Castro worked on it himself, and he even deleted the world “missiles,” because he understood that Khrushchev was afraid to call things by their own names. The final version of the draft was handed to Che Guevara and Argonez. Khrushchev reserved the right to make changes. But he was not interested in the draft; he was not going to sign it or, moreover, publish it. In 1968, just as he did during the negotiations with Mikoyan in November 1962, Fidel stated that if he had known that the Soviet Union would remove the missiles under pressure from the United States, he would not have accepted the missiles at all. Perhaps Khrushchev foresaw that; therefore, he did not find a better solution than to say to Raul and Che Guevara that Moscow would never make any concessions at all—in the case of an invasion, it would send the Baltic Sea Fleet to Cuba. Besides, the USSR possessed intercontinental ballistic missiles, and it would thus retaliate with a massive strike. Everything seemed absurd. I do not understand why the smart Guevara believed Khrushchev. And for his part, Khrushchev acted irresponsibly on this issue. Of course, he knew that he would never launch a first strike on the United States with the intercontinental missiles. So the “missile men” slept peacefully. How much time would it have taken for the Baltic Fleet to reach Cuba? By the way, in accordance with the ironic remarks of American scholars, the Baltic Fleet was the weakest of the four USSR fleets. What would Khrushchev have done after the United States occupied Cuba if he was faced with the U.S. naval and air forces, which were much stronger than the Soviet forces? What would the final outcome have looked like? Was this stance the outcome of astonishing thoughtlessness, or intentional deception? The last opportunity to rescue the situation occurred when Gromyko met with Kennedy on October 18, shortly after Kennedy had learned about everything. Although Kennedy did not mention that the missiles had been detected, he repeated that he would not tolerate their shipment to Cuba. Some time later, he recognized that he felt a temptation to tell Gromyko that the missiles had been discovered. Gromyko was not authorized to disclose this information, even to Ambassador A. F. Dobrynin. Even after Kennedy’s televised address, the Soviet Embassy in Washington did not receive any information. Ambassador Dobrynin had no clue about what was actually going on.43 This happened not because of secrecy reasons, but due to a poor work style and irresponsibility. Fidel Castro concluded: “Perhaps, I made a mistake in 1962 when I accepted the missiles because of the solidarity reasons. We trusted Moscow’s experience too much. Khrushchev took part in World War II. Besides, he was the leader of the great country. It looked like Khrushchev was a courageous man. I do not understand.” Yazov tried to explain: “When you deal with a dog, you need to show

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your teeth, too. In our case, the missiles were like teeth!” Fidel objected: “You showed your teeth in Berlin, not here! Tanks were lined up. They were scared. You built the wall up. In our case, Khrushchev promised us to send the Baltic Fleet, but he never gave an order to shoot the U-2 down! I do not understand.”44

The Secret Is Revealed The information about hiding the missiles, which was reported by the military, was truthful until the cargo arrived at its destination. Poor camouflaging measures were undertaken, starting from the moment when constructors and assemblers had commenced their job. The operation was a top secret matter: Radio communication was absolutely excluded; only a limited circle of the General Staff employees was involved; handwritten documents were delivered hand to hand via couriers, including the Kremlin’s internal mail, and the mail delivered within the Cuban territory. Finally, the shipment and unloading were carried out brilliantly (even orders to Russians were given in Spanish!). As for the last stage—the construction of launch sites—it was most likely performed irresponsibly. Perhaps the officers in charge of construction set their minds at rest knowing that surface-to-surface S-75 missiles had already been shipped, and that reconnaissance aircraft would not enter Cuban airspace for that reason. However, the leadership knew that the missiles would not be used. They were not even assembled at the beginning of the operation. Actually, I was on friendly terms with General Igor Statsenko, whose article on the crisis was published in the journal Latin America. He was a cheerful, lifeloving man, and a wonderful officer. He liked to tell how they all, together with the Cuban soldiers, were ready to combat the Americans in the case of invasion. In fact, he was in charge of the missile units. When he was ordered to meet with U Thant, the acting UN secretary-general, he was supposed to introduce himself as the commander of the Soviet troops on the island. For some reason, he had to give a false number for the Soviet group of troops—5,000. Perhaps Washington’s hawks would have been more cautious if he had told them the truth. But it was too late. The photos that were taken on October 14 contained clear images of missile fuel tanks. They did not even have soft covers or camouflaging nets. The generals said that the missiles themselves were camouflaged. In fact, they were just sitting in 20-meter-long tents, which were perfectly observable from the plane—their length spoke for itself. As for the rest of the equipment, parts were not covered at all. The Cuban woods did not conceal other details, which were so helpful for those who read the images. Three launchers were discovered immediately.

The Outcome That Should Have Been Predicted As was mentioned by Mikoyan, November was envisioned as the time to make the announcement about the presence of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. He did not

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indicate a date, but it was clear that the Kremlin was going to do it after the U.S. midterm elections for Congress. Most likely, the Kremlin considered mid-November to be the most suitable time for this fateful announcement. However, Khrushchev could have coordinated this step with his trip to the UN General Assembly in New York in September. According to his plan, all R-12 launchers were scheduled to be assembled by about that time, but the United States was not yet supposed to know anything about the missiles. It is unexplainable why Khrushchev was not informed about the U-2 flights. Thus, he was not able to assume that Washington had already obtained the information about the missiles. During the period from October 16, when the president obtained the photographs of the construction sites, to October 22, the time of Kennedy’s televised address, the assembling of the R-12s was reaching its final stage. According to General Gribkov, four launchers were almost ready for combat action at the time when they were detected; by the time of Kennedy’s public address, the assembly of the rest of the launchers had almost been completed. Altogether, the number of R-12 launchers, which the Americans called SS-4s, totaled 42, and they were equipped with 36 nuclear warheads. Some launchers were fully assembled. Roughly speaking, they needed one more month for full combat readiness. My father spoke about the final stage of the installation, which had been carried out before Kennedy made his public statement: A different decision could have been made: to launch an immediate strike on our missile sites without any blockades and/or ultimatums. He could have justified such a decision by a deadly threat to the United States. People in his country, and not only in his country, could have accepted it. Besides, he could have launched an air strike on Cuba—on the troops and the big cities. That could have been done in several minutes, and we could have faced this fact and a choice—to initiate World War III, swallow the defeat, or retaliate with a localized strike on the points which were sensitive for the West, such as American missiles in Turkey, provided that the action was limited to the missiles only. Nonetheless, if our group of forces, totaling 42,000 people, was destroyed, it would have meant that the strike on the missiles in Turkey would not have been a sufficient action; most likely, in such a case, West Berlin could have been involved. Of course, the city would not have been bombed, but it would have been taken by the allied forces under a formal control of the GDR [German Democratic Republic; i.e., East Germany] after a blitzkrieg. Certainly, we would have tried to limit our actions only with the Berlin operation and the use of conventional weapons in hope that both theaters of war “would be localized conflict zones.” Despite all the efforts of both the USSR’s and the United States’ governments, there could have been the danger of a nuclear war—in other words, a total catastrophe.

Evidently, my father was not aware of NATO’s military doctrine. In response to such actions with regard to Berlin, a nuclear attack against the USSR could have been launched. Following his assumptions, it could have been logical to give

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Gromyko the authority to disclose information to Kennedy during their meeting on October 18. At the 1989 Moscow conference on the crisis, Gromyko did not mention that Kennedy’s leading questions caused his concerns. This fact was not spelled out in his publications either. On the contrary, Ambassador Dobrynin stated that Kennedy’s artificial calmness resulted in Gromyko’s excessive optimism, which was reflected in his telegram to Moscow.45 Even though Dobrynin did not know anything about the missiles, he noticed that Kennedy was very concerned. In his book, the ambassador wrote that he advised Gromyko to be less optimistic in his assessment of the discussion. Evidently, Kennedy possessed wonderful self-control skills. Gromyko did not notice that he was worried. After he left, Bundy and the diplomat Robert Lovett (a former secretary of defense and senior foreign policy expert) joined Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and Llewellyn Thompson (former ambassador to the USSR and current ExComm member) in the Oval Office. Kennedy said, “I ought to finish the story by telling you about Gromyko, who, in this very room not over 10 minutes ago, told more barefaced lies than I have ever heard in so short a time. All during his denial that the Russians had any missiles or weapons, or anything else, in Cuba, I had the low-level pictures in the center drawer of my desk, and it was an enormous temptation to show them to him.”46 Of course, it was impossible to expect a direct and sincere conversation with the minister; he was not authorized by the center to be sincere, even if Kennedy’s emotions prevailed and he showed his concerns or the worries that he surely had. If Gromyko had the right and the authority to be sincere, depending on Kennedy’s reaction, and if the USSR’s minister became concerned during the discussion at the White House, then, at that point, it could have been possible to change something. There are too many “ifs” here, are there not? In retrospect, it is obvious that notwithstanding Kennedy’s actions, he could have used that last chance to tell the truth. As they say, “better late than never.” In such a case, the situation with the deception could have been smoothed over a bit. The lies insulted Kennedy; he never forgot or forgave them. And this resulted in the inflexibility of his demands and conditions. The deception was on the Kremlin’s conscience in front of the whole world. Yet no matter how strange it sounds, the Kremlin was not concerned about that at all. Does politics without deception even exist?—that was the way of thinking among the majority of the USSR’s leaders. To avoid leaking information, Gromyko could have asked for a severalminute-long tête-à-tête—his English was good enough to speak without a translator. This idea looks fantastical. But it does not look too fantastical if we take into account that the U-2 flights over San Cristobal in Cuba should have been caught by radar attached to S-75 missiles, and should have been immediately reported to Moscow. Besides, the Americans carried out their aerial photography from aircraft that were also flying at low altitudes so that anyone was able to see them and hear their noise from the ground. Someone should have reacted and taken practi-

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cal steps. Somebody should have thought about a logical chain, such as if the flights took place, aerial photography was performed, and Kennedy was informed about everything. Consequently, it was better to tell the truth. The idea that Kennedy knew everything should have come to Gromyko’s mind at the moment when he was denying the USSR’s intention to ship offensive weapons to Cuba, and when the president asked his assistant to give him a copy of his September 12 statement, which prohibited shipment of any offensive weapons to Cuba. He read appropriate paragraphs of the text to Gromyko. Kennedy was astonished to see that Gromyko did not suspect anything: “He must have wondered why I was reading it, but he did not respond.”47 The people in the White House and on the ExComm were sure that “they know that we know.” It was a logical conclusion, because it was impossible that flights at low altitudes were not noticed by the USSR’s antiaircraft gunners. If the ambassador, who used to know Kennedy well, was informed about the missiles, he could have suspected that Kennedy was aware of something; and he could have brought that to the minister’s attention. Finally, it could have been feasible to deliver the information in an absolutely confidential and “top secret” manner through the Robert Kennedy– Dobrynin “channel.” In his memoirs, Gromyko mentions the fact that Kennedy did not ask him a direct question, and he did not mention anything about the missiles for that reason. I do not think that he was authorized to answer this question truthfully, even if the president posed a straightforward question. At the 1989 Moscow conference, he was asked the question: “If Kennedy asked you a direct question, what would have you answered?” The experienced diplomat responded: “I would have given an appropriate answer.” Period. There should be no doubt about it: Khrushchev did not give Gromyko any authority to act in accordance with the situation, and to tell Kennedy about the missiles. However, Kennedy did not ask the question; he just stressed that it was inadmissible to deploy surface missiles in Cuba. Gromyko replied to this question correspondingly. Interpretation of the term “offensive weapons” was not very important at the moment. The term “surface missile” speaks for itself. Dobrynin asked a question: “Why did President Kennedy keep silence?” Further on, he writes: “I do not have a response to this question, but I believe that he did not have a specific plan of action in mind. Perhaps because of that, he did not want to initiate a useless debate with Gromyko.”48 From the discussions in the ExComm, we know that the American side expected to obtain information from the Soviet minister, but it had no intention of providing him with the information from its side, in order to preserve the element of surprise in case force was used. Overall, the Americans did not want to give the Soviets a chance to bring the propaganda machine or diplomatic action into play. Before that, Rusk and Thompson recommended that the president should not show photos to Gromyko, and should not demand the removal of missiles. It was clear that the top secret status was introduced, and there was no sense of violating

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it in the conversation with a representative of the country that caused all troubles. It was true that the White House staff did not put a plan of action together. They were waiting for the initiative coming from the other end, but they did not want to rely on that too much. The outcome of the meeting caused disappointment and negative emotions. Most likely, Kennedy kept an idea of an “indirect” ultimatum in his mind. He tried this idea when he was quoting his rigid September statement; he was not understood the way he wanted to be, although he made it almost clear that he was aware of everything. In this respect, Graham Allison’s finding, which was supported by the “Kennedy tapes,” is astonishing: Kennedy actually said to Gromyko twice that he was ready to commit not to attack Cuba, and not to allow anybody do so. Gromyko ignored his proposal. In fact, this is what Khrushchev wanted. The outcome of the crisis, which brought the world to the brink of nuclear war, would have been the same. Moreover, when the transcript of the discussion made by American side was compared with the text of Gromyko’s telegram to Moscow, Allison discovered that Gromyko did indicate the president’s proposal in his telegram (the tape of their discussion has been declassified, the same as the Gromyko’s telegram to Moscow).49 Perhaps, if Kennedy did that, at that time, the Kremlin would have reacted, and it would have removed the missiles and shipped them back. In his memoirs, Dobrynin describes it differently. He presents a quotation from Gromyko’s telegram to Moscow: “Taking into account the objective factors, and the official assurances that the United States does not have a plan to invade Cuba, it is possible to say that it is unlikely that a reckless military scheme by the United States against Cuba would take place.”50 So, why did the Gromyko telegram say nothing about Kennedy’s unprecedented offer that could have alleviated the crisis immediately? It is hard to imagine that an experienced diplomat (moreover, there were two of them, Gromyko and Dobrynin) could have disregarded such an important statement. An assumption could be made that Gromyko, who knew Khrushchev well, did not even imagine cancellation of the plan, which had been conceived in his boss’s mind. Nonetheless, it is a mystery why he did not mention the proposal in his telegram. Dobrynin did not suggest that they should mention the proposal in the telegram either. Neither Gromyko’s nor Dobrynin’s memoirs talk about that. Gromyko writes that although he was afraid of Khrushchev’s “burst of anger,” he warned him, saying that a discovery of missiles would cause political turmoil in the United States. Gromyko conveyed Khrushchev’s desire to set a date in November for a “summit” and to coordinate it with Khrushchev’s plan to attend the UN General Assembly—his proposal was considered a mockery. Perhaps Khrushchev naively believed that he could have informed Kennedy about the missiles at the meeting. The president felt insulted for a long time.51 Kennedy told his friend Kenneth O’Donnell: “I was dying to confront him with our evidence. In effect I told him that there had better not be any ballistic missiles in Cuba. And he told me that

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such a thing had never entered Khrushchev’s mind. It was incredible to sit there and watch the lies coming out of his mouth.”52 Possibly professional diplomats know better whether it is acceptable to lie blatantly, knowing that the truth would come out to the surface a month later. But how would the liar look later? One of the problems was the lack of coordination in the top echelons of the Soviet state as far as decisionmaking regarding Cuba was concerned. Because there was no group of people like the ExComm in the USSR to keep track of the entire chain of events related to the plan and its objectives there was no headquarters to coordinate the plan’s diplomatic and military elements, review the intelligence data, information from the USSR’s embassies, and reports from the military. Knowledgeable experts were kept out of the loop. Assistant Troyanovsky learned about the plan accidentally when it was too late. Minister Gromyko did not have the permission to tell anybody about it. The ambassador to the United States had no clue about it. Even an expert as good as Georgy Kornienko was never invited to participate in the discussions. The first deputy minister of foreign affairs, V. V. Kuznetzov, was not involved at all (and later on, he was cut off when he tried to express his opinion). Military men were doing their business. Did it surprise anybody that the plan failed? General Gribkov, who was one of the main military planners of the operation, writes: “Considering all the risks, it is surprising that the plan came so close to success.”53 Many participants—first Mikoyan, and then Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, people from the Kennedy’s office, Robert Kennedy, McNamara, and many researchers—have asked the question of what the Soviets were planning to do in the event that the missiles were discovered. The answer is unbelievably simple: Nothing was supposed to be done! In fact, Khrushchev, the author of the idea, did not think about it. When he was forced to address this issue, he would begin his childish explanations about help from the Baltic Fleet and from “our powerful artillerymen.” Fidel Castro was not persuaded by the argument regarding sending the Baltic Fleet, but he was convinced by the calmness and confidence of the leader of such a great superpower as the USSR, which possessed powerful weapons and experience. He and his fellow young insurgents, who had assumed the responsibility for governing the small island of Cuba only three years ago, did not have all that. “There is nothing to worry about!” said the Soviet leader; and the power of his country, which had survived and won the hardest wars, seemed to support his words. But what was behind Khrushchev’s confidence? Absolutely nothing. Ambassador Alekseyev diplomatically stated: “Unfortunately, we did not envisage any alternatives in case the Americans discovered the missiles before they were brought to combat readiness.”54 His statement could be corrected: “before we told Kennedy about it.” The history of international relations does not contain a similar example of a momentous foreign policy crisis that could have resulted in a catastrophic mili-

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tary conflict whose initiators would not even try to foresee all their adversaries’ possible responses and did not try to plan their counteractions correspondingly. History knows both clear-sighted and nearsighted politicians, but it does not know such politicians who would not even try to think about the consequences of their actions, no matter how unpleasant or unexpected they could be. The author of Operation Anadyr tried to play “chess” with only white pieces, following the principle that “the one who starts wins the game.” But such a thing could only work if the black pieces were never touched.

5 Operation Anadyr: Military Success, Political Trap

Origins of the Idea

F

rom a military point of view, the implementation of Operation Anadyr was a great accomplishment of the Soviet Armed Forces. Military history knows few analogues of such deployments of huge numbers of personnel, and more important, new, modern, and very sensitive military equipment that had recently been added to the arsenal and presented a hazard for people even during the period of its storage and military exercises. Most important, the operation was implemented in an unfamiliar locality with a different climate, which was unusual both for the creators of the missiles and for the soldiers who serviced them; plus, the deployment involved massive amounts of arms and equipment, and it was carried out at a distance of 10,000 kilometers from the main armed forces and under a tight deadline. From Moscow, it was difficult to foresee the details and specific problems of the deployment of the Soviet Group of Forces. That difficulty caused additional hardships for the officers and soldiers who had been transported to the island. Such difficulties could have been minimized provided that the political and military leadership had given some time to troop commanders for serious and thorough reconnaissance of the scene and to figure out all the inevitable difficulties and problems. That was not done, first, because of the impatience of the political leadership, and second, due to lack of imagination on the part of high-ranking officials of the General Staff, who adhered to the stereotypes of similar actions in the territory of the Soviet Union. No real preliminary reconnaissance had been carried out at all. This oversight can be explained by the fact that the high-ranking officials of the General Staff were rushing to meet the tough deadlines of the di121

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rective set by the leadership of the country and their Supreme commander in chief; for this reason, they neglected reconnaissance tasks that are absolutely critical for any possible operation in a totally unknown theater of war. All this is vividly described in Strategic Operation “Anadyr.” This book presents a compilation of memoirs of the participants in the operation; it was published in Moscow in 2001 by MOOVIK, the organization of the operation’s veterans, only in a limited edition and only in Russian. Yet its most important and interesting facts deserve a wider audience here. This will allow the reader to visualize Operation Anadyr not from an office in the General Staff—the view provided in the book by A. Gribkov and W. Smith1—but with the same perceptions held by those people who performed the operation themselves: courageous, strong, and resourceful soldiers and officers who possessed the highest level of responsibility. They made possible the implementation of the ideas that were born in the Kremlin and developed by the General Staff. Not long before his death in 1998, Lieutenant General Leonid Garbuz recalled:2 My international mission in defense of the Cuban revolution began with my designation as a deputy commander of the Combat Training of GSVK [the Soviet Group of Forces in Cuba —S.M.]. . . . This was in the beginning of June 1962. By that time, all basic positions were filled in, including all the positions starting with deputies of commanders, chiefs of the Operation Departments, and finishing with chiefs of departments of the GSVK Staff. The apparatus of the commander was formed of high-level commanders and executives such as generals and officers of the Central Administrative Offices of the bodies of troops and service branches. The vast majority of them participated in the Great Patriotic War and had the highest level of military training, as well as rich experience in the military service. In the beginning of June, all deputy commanders of the Soviet Group of Forces were called to the Defense Ministry in Moscow (a candidate for the position of the commander had not yet been discussed at that time). On the eve of the departure of the reconnaissance group to Cuba, all deputy commanders of GSVK had a meeting with the minister of defense. Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky made a brief presentation on the military and political situation and clarified the details of the future operation. In conclusion, he informed everybody about the forthcoming meeting in the Kremlin with the first person of the country—the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, the supreme commander in chief. N. S. Khrushchev entered that hall at a rapid and energetic pace. There were eight participants in the Kremlin meeting. As far as I know, notes were not taken. . . . Khrushchev started his speech as follows: “We all in the Central Committee decided to make an unpleasant surprise for America—to install our missiles in

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Cuba so that America would not ‘swallow’ the Island of Freedom. We have Cuba’s consent for that. The only aim of this operation is to help the Cuban Revolution withstand the aggression of the United States. Our political and military leadership, having thoroughly analyzed all the circumstances, does not see any other way to prevent the aggression from the side of America, which, in accordance with our information, is intensively preparing for it. After we deploy our missiles, America would feel that in case it dares invade Cuba, it would have to deal with us.” [As it became known later, the U.S. government believed that the presence of even one division would have made such an invasion impossible, because this act would have meant the beginning of war with the USSR Armed Forces, in other words, World War III. Moreover, it means that if serious bilateral negotiations on the Cuban issue had been conducted, the crisis would not have taken place. —S.M.] After these words, Nikita Sergeyevich [Khrushchev] began to explain to us the reason why it had been agreed to carry out the entire operation secretly. He said, “If we manage to ‘catch hold’ of Cuba, then the Americans will have to accept what happened, and we will conclude the Treaty on this issue with the Cubans; the preparation for it is being completed.” [The logic of his statement was obviously twisted; he should have said: “If Americans put up with what happened, we would be able to ‘catch hold’ of Cuba.” Besides, there is no explanation as to why the Treaty with the Cubans had to be signed after “the Americans have accepted it.” Logically, it should be assumed that they would “accept it,” given that the official treaty was published. However, the military men were not used to considering such kinds of political nuances. —S.M.] It was obvious that Khrushchev doubted that it was feasible “to hide an awl in a sack.” [The word “doubted” sounds too mild and diplomatic in this context. General Dementiev, chief military adviser under the Cuban armed forces, categorically denied such an opportunity, saying, “it was impossible to hide even a chicken in Cuba.” —S.M.] Nikita Sergeyevich [Khrushchev] gave us a hint that he stayed in touch with the White House and could contact Kennedy directly, and that both governments had control of the situation and would not allow a tragic ending. [His statement was far from the truth. First of all, the hotline was opened after the crisis. It is still a mystery how “the government of the United States had control over the situation” in order “to prevent a tragic outcome” as the government did not even know what was going on; besides, everything was done to keep it secret. —S.M.] We were leaving the historic Kremlin with mixed feelings and deep concerns. The meeting lasted only forty minutes, but it covered so many issues: defense of the Cuban revolution; possible adversary—powerful America; absolutely unknown theater of war; caution in decisionmaking process for the successful implementation of combat tasks without provoking a military conflict; remoteness

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from homeland and military and strategic forces of other countries; as well as many other military and professional issues. . . . But we possessed a combat spirit. By that time, all of us had been through the “army life schooling” and experienced bitter failures and joyful victories, as we were the veterans of the Great Patriotic War.3

The Transportation of Troops to Cuba The redeployment of military units to Cuba required unprecedented efforts. Unfortunately, this side of the issue has never been covered in the literature. Only due to huge efforts by the participants in the events, a collection of their memories was published thirty-eight years later, after most veterans had died. Just the transportation alone of the personnel and cargo to the loading ports on the territory of the Soviet Union required 21,000 railroad cars (including passenger, covered, and uncovered platform cars). V. G. Bakaev, the minister of Maritime Fleet, recalled: “This entity was responsible for sea transportation of 230,000 tons of cargo and more than 40,000 military personnel within the period of July 15–November 15, 1962. Preliminary estimates for such an operation required that at least 70 large-capacity vessels were needed, which had to make 115 to 120 trips. However, the reality caused some changes. For the completion of the assignment, 86 vessels were used, which performed 180 trips.”4 When talking about his visit to the port of Nikolaev, V. N. Polkovnikov, who was in charge of the dry cargo ship Mettallurg Bardin, pointed to the difficulties encountered in connection with the loading of the large-dimension equipment: In order to carry out the embarkation, five berths with a mooring line of 900 meters were used to service four ocean vessels. The territory of the port was inundated with the military equipment; for example, a single missile complex included more than thirty items, units, and machines such as an R-12 missile measuring 22.76 meters long and weighing more than 4 tons; an erector with dimensions of 15.62 meters by 3.15 meters, weighing 33.57 tons (with a launching platform); a ground truck 22.73 meters long and 2.66 meters wide; an AT-T artillery prime mover, which weighed 20 tons; et cetera. The loading of missile fuel tanks caused specific difficulties. Thus, hydrogen peroxide, which was kept in a special auto tank, was loaded onto the rostrum with an attached jack, so that in case it became overheated and presented a threat of explosion, it could be thrown overboard. Due to their large dimensions, the erectors were loaded on the upper deck and covered with wooden containers to look like two huge wooden boxes. . . . Two antiaircraft ZU-23 units with ammunition were camouflaged and placed on the captain’s bridge along with a gun crew. Besides, not all the personal weapons were packed in boxes, so that in case of an attempted capture of the vessel, we would be able to rebuff an attack.5

V. N. Polkovnikov also recalled:

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In May 1962, there were rumors that the military unit 32157 (181MR) [Missile Regiment] . . . will be sent abroad. We had no clue about the place, but we were aware of the existence of two hot spots of that time: Indonesia (Southern Kalimantan) and Cuba. . . . This was the only regiment in RVSN [i.e., Strategic Missile Troops] at that time that possessed some experience in launching R-12 missiles with nuclear warheads [at the New Land Island —S.M.] . . . While the equipment was being loaded, the staff was going through the medical checkup in order to exclude infected people from getting on board. As we learned later, the civilian clothes that were provided to us at the military warehouses had been bought at the reduced-price stores. The clothes were adjusted to our sizes in the same warehouses where they were given to us. . . . One set of clothes included a suit, two shirts, a tie, and canvas bell-bottomed trousers. Speaking of shirts, it is interesting that many subdivisions were provided with checkered shirts; and later in Cuba, the American intelligence service tried to find out what color shirts officers were wearing and what color the soldiers were wearing. However, different colors of shirts did not mean different ranks; we were getting whatever shirts were available at the warehouses at that time. . . . By the way, besides casual civilian clothes, everybody had a winter military uniform [to mislead people in their guesses about the true destination —S.M.]. Before the departure, we had a meeting with P. A. Degtyarev, the General Staff representative. He said to us that those who were afraid to go on the mission could refuse to do so. There were no such people in our battalion; thus, in the darkness of that September night, we moved to the unknown location and uncertainty. We passed through neither border patrol nor customs control.6

According to L. S. Garbuz, commanders and officers of the Soviet Group of Forces were transported to Cuba by Aeroflot airplanes. The first group of troops, under the command of I. A. Pliev, left for Cuba on July 10: It was critical to organize the command of units and vessels, establish reliable communications with subordinates, and ensure the combat preparedness of forces and equipment, and management bodies. The apparatus of the commander was responsible for the adjustments of combat plans of the operation (primarily the defense of the island), timely emplacement of forces and warships on their positions, defense of the troops, and the organization of latent management thereof. It should be stressed that an atmosphere of high responsibility for the fulfillment of the assignment, as well as impeccable discipline and performance, prevailed in all the units. The personnel worked extremely hard and courageously while implementing their mission in unusual weather conditions. All deadlines for the combat preparedness of units were met and, in some cases, the work was completed even before the deadlines.7 [Of course, L. Garbuz rightly characterizes and describes the atmosphere of high responsibility. But one should be familiar with the recollections of the lower-

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rank officers to understand the scale of problems that were constantly arising at that time. —S.M.]

The commander of the Group of the Tactical Nuclear Charges Storage and Assemblage, R. A. Zakirov, describes the conditions of transportation of soldiers to Cuba from a different perspective: In July 1962, I was on my vacation and was recalled to the military unit in the village of Klimovo in Bryanskaya Oblast. In the middle of July, all the staff and military equipment were loaded on a train; at the end of July, we arrived at the port of Baltiysk. The embarkation of equipment and ammunition to the dry cargo ship Izhevsk was carried out in an organized and neat manner. We quickly changed from our military uniforms into civilian clothes. It was difficult for us to understand what all this meant, but everybody assumed that it was preparation for a serious overseas assignment. Our special machines for the assemblage of tactical nuclear charges for cruise missiles, as well as other equipment, were carefully loaded into the holds and reliably fastened by the crew members and staff. A part of our equipment was loaded on the deck and was planked with boards with signs in English saying “Agricultural Machinery.” We built three-tier plank beds in between decks. Although we did not have any prior experience, the embarkation was carried out neatly and uninterruptedly; all officers and soldiers followed the instructions diligently and worked selflessly. Around evening time, Izhevsk left the berth and entered the Baltic Sea. We were discussing a possible objective of our trip and were lost in our guesses, but no one was able to guess that we were going to Cuba. We communicated with the crew members and learned that after crossing a certain point in the Atlantic, the captain of the ship would announce the itinerary; in the meantime, we reached the Straits of Skagerrak. On our right, there was the Swedish shore; on the left, the Danish shore with the ancient castle Elsinore, which Shakespeare described in Hamlet. It was prohibited to go on deck during daytime; provided that such permission was given, a person had to put on a striped vest and a white cap to look like a sailor. Only late at night were we allowed to come out to the deck to enjoy some fresh ocean air. . . . In La Manche [i.e., the English Channel], both sport planes and warplanes were flying back and forth at different heights above our ship. Some of them descended almost down to the mast level in order to take pictures. The captain had to pay much attention to every detail, since he knew what kind of “combine harvesters” and “seeding machines” he was transporting. He also knew how to deal with a provocation or an attack. Perhaps, he was not aware of the final destination point of the cargo and personnel, but there was a “pilot” from the General Staff next to him. It was he who opened a package with the further itinerary right after we passed La Manche. The package contained an instruction to go across the Atlantic to the Equator. At a certain point, the “pilot” and the captain opened one more package containing an order to proceed to Cuba. It was good, joyful news

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for everybody as people were thinking about the exotics and tropics, Fidel, and Barbudos. This was what they heard on the radio and read in the newspapers in the Soviet Union. Nobody was able to assume what kind of exotics they would face in the next several months. The sun produced tremendous heat. It was hard to breathe in the metal “box” of the hold; we were looking forward to the short walks at the upper deck as we were extremely exhausted by the heat, stuff y air, and seasickness. The windows between decks were covered with tarpaulins and the air was delivered through the ventilation system. Often, the inside temperature reached 50 degrees Celsius. Food was served two times a day during nighttime. Most of the food (butter, meat, and vegetables) rotted very easily due to high temperatures. No soldiers in any army of the world were exposed to such conditions before us, or after us.8

The Deployment and Cooperation with the Cuban Armed Forces After the main forces of the Soviet military contingent had arrived in Cuba, very close communication and combat cooperation were established between the commanders of the Soviet Group of Forces and the military and political leadership of Cuba. Garbuz recalled: The commanders of both the Soviet and Cuban Forces and their executive bodies —the headquarters—were working on planning combat actions in case of enemy invasion; they also were dealing with issues of the deployment of troops, adjustments to dispositions of the combat arrays, concentration of forces and weapons at dangerous points of defense; moreover, they organized the construction of engineering facilities, computed the amounts of forces and equipment, which were required for the defense of objects, in particular, subdivisions of the missile regiments and warhead storehouses. The work was performed in an organized, fast, and creative manner. The Cuban military listened attentively to our advice and recommendations on the strategic issues. Most likely, it could not have been otherwise. Most of them (if not the vast majority) did not have enough education, and due to this, their horizons did not go further than a battalion group. We taught them some basics of the “academic” military art, and they were gaining necessary experiences.9 [It is obvious that the close interaction with the Cuban military units meant for the latter a priceless training in the “workplace” without the necessity of obtaining higher military education in the Soviet Union. —S.M.]

The senior assistant of the chief engineer of the R-12 Missile Regiment, V. I. Yesin, recalled and cautiously commented on an unaccomplished task of Marshal S. S. Biryuzov’s delegation: “The military delegation did not have enough time to conduct a detailed reconnaissance of the area, which had been selected in Moscow [!] for the deployment of the missile regiments, and later that had a negative impact both on the selection of the launching sites for the missile battalions and

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on the completion of the infrastructure engineering and camouflage. Changes were required to be made later.”10 Yesin added, “On July 12 and 19, reconnaissance groups arrived. . . . The sites previously chosen as the missile-launching sites appeared to be unsuitable. It was necessary to find others. The limited amount of time for the fulfillment of such a huge scope of work created much pressure for the personnel of these groups (on September 9, the concentration of the division started). In order to select ten sites in the central and western parts of Cuba, it was required to carry out a thorough reconnaissance of 151 areas in the range of 650 kilometers from West to East, totaling 900 square kilometers.”11 [Those who have visited Cuba during summertime can easily imagine the conditions in which the soldiers were performing such a huge amount of work in the unbearable heat, in areas not even close to the sea, where they had to march long distances in hilly areas. —S.M.] In his memoirs, Garbuz omitted such details and depicted a more general picture of the events: “The Reconnaissance Group, with Statsenko in charge, arrived in Cuba by TU-114 on July 12, and immediately started to work on the selection of areas for the deployment of regiments, battalions, and strategic missiles troops. The concentration of the division on Cuban land was initiated on September 9, upon the arrival of the motor ship Omsk with the subdivision of Sidorov’s regiment on board.”12 The first deputy chief of the Main Staff of the Strategic Missile Troops, Lieutenant General A. S. Butsky, narrated: The Strategic Missile Troops Staff developed two documents: a 40-hour Program on Training of Reconnaissance Group Personnel, and an Instruction on Performance of Reconnaissance Works for the Selection of Launching Sites of the Missile Regiment Armed with Missiles 8K63 (8K65), which were approved by Marshal Biryuzov on July 23, 1962. The instruction presented basic requirements for the missile-launching areas, elements of combat array of the regiment, areas of the concentration of battalions and routes thereto, estimations of capacities of land-surveying support, and the scopes of works on camouflage and measures for combat support at unloading points (stations and ports) on routes, in the areas of concentration, and missile-launching areas themselves. It also included the requirements on the rear supply.13 [However, it was unlikely that the instruction, which was developed in Moscow without any knowledge of a specific locality, could have been useful. Moreover, it was based on standard practices used in the USSR for totally different conditions such as climate and support from the side of other parts of the army in the absence of rigid deadlines. —S.M.]

V. N. Pokolnikov recalled: After we had found some suitable areas for the launching sites—they were selected taking into account many criteria such as suitability in terms of camouflag-

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ing of the personnel; availability of drinking water sources and rivers for bathing; such factors as nonflooding during tropical rains—we immediately submitted the documents for the approval by the commanders of the Soviet Group of Forces. . . . The areas of Santa Cruz de los Pinos and Candelaria met the above criteria to the largest extent. In addition, some reserve combat positions were chosen in the valleys of mountains of Sierra del Rosario (one for each battalion). Cubans provided us with the RVS engineering units and equipment to build positioning areas. Next to the existing bad bridges, we erected crossings over small streams, which used to turn into very powerful streams during tropical rains. With the help of bulldozers, we cut the slopes of the streams and reinforced the sides and bottom with crushed stones and concrete. The water started to run over the reinforcements and our machines did not have any difficulty in crossing the streams over such coverage. For the purposes of fast deployment of the weapons and equipment, with the help of motor graders and bulldozers, we connected all the roads in the area. Besides, by the time our ships with personnel and weapons arrived, we managed to build light wooden quarters (four light quarters) for the personnel.14 The main task of our land surveyors was an accurate calculation of places to be chosen for the launchers, as well as further calculations of a flight assignment of missiles. They fulfilled the task successfully. This was what officer U. P. Perkon, the chief land surveyor, described.15 However, those who were responsible for the missile targeting faced some difficulties. We did not know anything about the targets to aim missiles at; we only took guesses. We were only aware that the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces provided the commander of the Soviet Group of Forces in Cuba with a list of targets, geodesic [i.e., precise geographic] coordinates, types of nuclear explosions, their capacities, and basic direction of launchings for all five regiments with 42 launchers.16 [People were facing more and more difficulties, even in terms of star observations. It goes without saying that Moscow did not take this aspect into account. —S.M.]

V. V. Tretiyak, officer of the Targeting Control Service and Astronomic and Geodesic Support, described the problems: Everything was different on this island from what we had in our homeland: the red soil, heat, humidity, and what is more important, the sky, stars, and the system of coordinates. The stars, which we used to observe at our latitudes, were far behind the horizon, with some exceptions. The Ursa Minor and the Big Dipper periodically disappeared behind the horizon. New unknown stars and constellations appeared in the sky. But the main thing was that our favorite North Star was easily seen, which aided us in computations of the astronomic azimuths and their conversion into geodesic ones for the purposes of missile targeting. However, compared to our motherland, the North Star was observed at a different height above the horizon, slowly making its way around the ellipse. It was more conve-

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nient for the observation and accuracy of the azimuth calculation as the incline of theodolite did not affect the accuracy of the azimuth calculation. The best domestic theodolites of that time, AU 2/10, were used to calculate high-accuracy azimuths; sea chronometers were used to determine the star passage time. The coordinates of launchers were computed by an expedited and less accurate method with the use of topography machines, which were not on the list of RVSN’s equipment.

In general, geodesists faced many difficulties related to the latitude of Cuba, namely: There was a lack of a special unit in the RVSN’s staff list (astronomic and geodesic unit) to resolve difficult strategic tasks. For this reason, a new combined group was established under the leadership of Major S. P. Tsheulin, senior officer of the Astronomic and Geodesic Brigade and the Command Post of the Army Staff. Later, a combined group from the Military and Topography Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces was sent to Cuba under the command of Colonel M. S. Mordvinnikov, hero of the Soviet Union. It was an oversight from the side of the GSH VS [the General Staff of the Armed Forces] and an unexpected task for us that we had to switch from the American Coordinate System (1866 Clark’s ellipsoid) to the domestic 1942 Coordinate System (Krasovsky’s ellipsoid), because all calculations were made solely in our Coordinate System. The Geodesic Group officers successfully performed this specific task in a short period of time. There was a lack of initial data and external signs of the state geodesic and gravimetric system of the island for purposes of positioning of the launching areas. It was only later that the motor ship Divnogorsk delivered the collapsible metal signs RZM-12 in sufficient quantities. In order to determine the acceleration of gravity in the starting points, it was required to recalibrate the work range of the SN-3 theodolite to the latitude of the island. . . . It should be stressed that the geodesic group in Cuba effectively fulfilled extremely complicated assignments under tough time constraints. . . . In the end, all the unforeseen obstacles to gathering the geodesic data were successfully overcome. In 1963, taking the Cuban experience into account, an astronomic and geodesic group was established within RVSN. The team was able to prepare input data for the calculation of the flight assignments of all strategic missiles.17

Thus, forty-two medium- and intermediate-range missiles were delivered to Cuba. They were unloaded only at night. A mountain infantry battalion, totaling 300 people, stood guard over the external avenues of approach to the ports. Every two hours, divers checked both the underwater parts of vessels and the harbor bottom. Transportation to the sites was only carried out during the nighttime.

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Using sham routes, columns of Cuban trailers started out, and then the roads were closed under the pretext of accidents; only then were the missiles transported. The transporting and storage of nuclear warheads were carried out by the staff of the Nuclear and Technical Support Force, with Colonel N. K. Beloborodov in charge.18 “A serious problem with the storage of the nuclear tactical warheads arose in connection with the specific storage requirements, since a very comfortable temperature needed to be maintained,” recalled R. A. Zakirov, chief of the group responsible for storage and assembling of the tactical nuclear components of the Operation Anadyr. “After reconnaissance had been carried out, old concrete casemates in the mountains of Sierra del Cristal were selected as storages for the warheads (it should be pointed out that the United States did not know about the presence of the strategic and tactical nuclear warheads; of course, it did not know the place of their deployment), but these casemates were not at all suited for storage purposes. Air-conditioners were needed. Where were we supposed to find them? The Cubans helped us: Fidel Castro ordered to take them from the houses of prostitution in Santiago de Cuba and deliver them to our storage.”19 [At that time, domestic producers in the Soviet Union had just started manufacturing air-conditioners. At the very least, they could have been purchased in any country for the needs of the operation in Cuba; but it would have been suspicious. However, the troops were not provided with the air-conditioners, either in holds onboard the ships or on the territory of Cuba. People who constantly had to work hard suffered from the exhausting heat of the Cuban summer, to which they were unaccustomed. There was no rotation of units, and the personnel did not have any rest at all. —S.M.] Radio and technical subdivisions, together with the antiaircraft defense of the Cuban Revolutionary Forces, established a united radio location notification system for conditions in the air, on land, and at sea. The notification system included fifty-three Soviet and Cuban radio location stations, which covered all ranges of the reconnaissance. All means of radio reconnaissance and communications were checked for technical serviceability and were readied for work. However, it was strictly prohibited to broadcast anything, in order not to reveal the presence of the group of troops. Permission to use radio broadcasting was only given on October 26, after the Cuban leadership had obtained the information about a possible invasion of Cuba by the United States. One of the veterans wrote: I remember the meeting with Fidel Castro and A. I. Alekseyev, ambassador of the USSR to Cuba, in the club of the Communications Battalion in El Chico. The commanders of the Soviet Group of Forces and the members of the operation group were present at the meeting. Fidel, a tall strong man who was wearing a military uniform and had a pistol on his belt, energetically walked into the hall. In his speech, he sincerely praised us as internationalists who had come to protect

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the revolutionary achievements in Cuba. His idea can be approximately conveyed in such words: “I am proud that notwithstanding the mortal danger, you came to aid, protect us, and share our fate.” Such words touched our souls. Throughout our entire stay in Cuba, we constantly experienced a warm and friendly attitude toward us from the side of the ordinary Cubans. The Cuban people are worthy of praise. During those tense days of the Caribbean crisis, we witnessed how women and children behaved courageously when they were bringing food for their sons, brothers and fathers, who were sitting in trenches all along the coast. They were joking and laughing; it seemed that nothing could have changed their joyous character or undermined their belief in the righteousness of their actions as well as their victory over the enemy. [It has been mentioned in the USSR’s literature that General Pliev appeared to be “a bad diplomat.” This vague characteristic in practice meant that he did not have a normal relationship or regular meetings with the head of the country where he was the commander of the Soviet Group of Forces, and which he was supposed to protect until the very end. The fact that General Pliev did not invite Fidel Castro to any of the missile-launching sites offended him, and in November, Fidel hinted as much to Mikoyan. It was stupid to keep secrets from Fidel Castro, if only for the fact that the Americans had become familiar with such sites long ago through aerial photography of Soviet territory. Malinovsky should be reproached in this respect as well, because he did not ask Pliev to show respect toward the head of the country of their “assignment.” Khrushchev himself could have anticipated such a situation, or provided appropriate instructions to Ambassador Alekseyev via a telegram. —S.M.] At the end of August and the beginning of September 1962, all personnel and weapons of the regiment were delivered to port Mariel by the four vessels and the motor ship Admiral Nahimov. Unloading each ship took no more than two to three days. The weapons and equipment were grouped on the sites in the port. The missiles were unloaded during the night and were transported to the hangar. As they reached readiness, columns from each missile battalion marched to the launching site areas once darkness descended, guarded by the Cuban subdivisions. The preliminary engineering work in the launching site areas helped to reduce the preparation time of combat launchings to five to seven days. . . . There were plenty of difficulties of all kinds, but the most significant of them was related to the component of missile fuel. The missile R-12 was a liquid fuel missile, and it was refueled with an aggressive oxidizing compound, fuel, and hydrogen peroxide. In order to transport these components, special containers were used. In the port of Bahia Honda, these components were pumped over to mobile containers. Even if a small amount of these substances was spilled, it resulted in poisonous fumes. The personnel responsible for refueling faced a lot of difficulties as well; people worked in special protective clothes and gas masks. Everybody involved with that operation showed great courage and self-sacrifice.

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The merits of people such as Officer A. I. Harchenko, Lieutenant Colonel M. D. Ogarkov, and Officer A. M. Klemeshev are especially noteworthy. There were also many difficulties when dealing with compressed air. The air should be delivered to the missiles with an air humidity of no more than 45 percent; but the level of humidity in the tropical air was almost 100 percent. Often, due to this reason, when the missile systems were checked, their circuits malfunctioned. Missile Service engineers Zobnin A. P., Zabolotnyi V. S., and Orlov N. F. found the solution. Underground facilities were constructed at the missilelaunching sites in which six containers with air were placed with dry ice situated between them to cool off the air. These measures allowed the horizontal and vertical tests to be successfully completed. At all combat missile-launching sites, the missiles were covered with field tents (8U12) and were set up on concrete pads. They were placed on ground carts and were hermetically sealed with silicon gel belts to maintain the necessary humidity. In case an order to launch a missile was given, such storage conditions would have allowed delivering a missile to its launcher in 5 minutes. [When reading these descriptions, it is easy to imagine the disappointment and different mixed feelings of those people, who received an order on October 28 to begin the immediate dismantling of weapons and all equipment, right after they had finished assembling them. —S.M.] In accordance with the technological procedures, the missile heads were supposed to be stored in special facilities constructed and reinforced with concrete. . . . During the crisis, when the situation became very tense, the commanders of the Soviet Group of Forces [in Bejucal] decided to move the heads from the central storage base to the service bases, where they were kept in special trucks, which were thoroughly hidden next to our launching site areas. . . . Upon the receipt of an order from Moscow, the nuclear heads were to be attached to the missiles and, in two hours and thirty minutes after the order had been obtained, the missiles were to be launched at their targets. During this period, we were supposed to attach the head parts when the missile was in horizontal position, bring the missile to vertical position, fi ll it with the fuel components, and finish all operations on board. Combat launch personnel, especially the engineering and technical support staff, demonstrated initiative and engineering resourcefulness, since all joint trainings were carried out during nighttime. In this connection, I recall a very interesting situation, or rather, a funny incident, which occurred in the missile regiment under the command of Colonel N. F. Bandilovsky. During the missile testing with a dummy warhead attached, there was a delay in its takeoff from the launcher. The nighttime was wasted and the American intelligence planes had a chance to take pictures of this missile in a vertical position, as if it was ready for launching. This incident ended up being a distinct misinformation in our favor.

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[A courageous officer writes with pride that it was deemed that the dismantling was “in our favor”; however, he understood that, in the Pentagon, this missile would be on top of the list of their targets. —S.M.] Besides the traditional tasks, the reconnaissance groups faced unusual objectives and situations. . . . For example, all power stations in Cuba were producing a current of 60 Hz [the standard established by American companies a long time ago versus the USSR’s standard, which was 50 Hz —S.M.]; it was extremely difficult to perform the earthworks due to tropical rains and the heat; the bridges that were en route of the columns did not have enough carrying capacity. Planned measures to camouflage the launching sites with palm trees proved to be ineffective, etcetera. . . . The commander of the division frequently had to take unconventional measures, in particular, those related to paving the bottoms of the rivers to enable super-size machines to cross them without bridges. There were many problems with the geodesic equipment also.20 The Rear Service, with Colonel V. I. Patzar in charge, encountered rather difficult tasks as well. We had a lot of unexpected problems with drinking water, food storage, and medical services for the personnel, etcetera. When stored, even during a short period of time, the food got rotted easily: cans of meat and fish swelled, flour and cereals attracted moisture, bread became moldy, and even sauerkraut became rotten.21

In his turn, V. N. Polkovnikov recalled: As required, immediately after the arrival of the main forces, a guard was assigned to shield the battalion. From the external side, it was protected by the subdivision of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces under the command of Sergeant Ronaldo Monte. Riflemen were kept in secrecy. . . . They were armed with Czechoslovakian M-12 short-barreled guns and Belgian rifles. The age of soldiers varied from 16 to 30–40 years old, since at that time RVS [Revolutionary Armed Forces] was formed on the voluntary basis. We had a very good relationship with soldiers. The officers, who had arrived before and picked up some Spanish, helped us communicate with the Cuban soldiers in broken Spanish. They were joyful men who had very expressive gesticulation that sometimes helped us understand them without any difficulty.22

The officer of communications, V. V. Dashivetz, who was a communications duty officer in the Black Sea Fleet before arriving in Cuba, adds his details to the picture: In the process of daily routine, the specialists of the communication service helped repair communication means on the warships of the Cuban Navy in Havana and Cienfuegos. . . . We established very good relationships with the soldiers who guarded the communication service center. We met together in grand fashion. . . . We also had very good relationships with the representatives of the local authorities and population. Senior Lieutenant A. Y. Trendelev, who was in charge

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of our club, visited local small businesses, where he played Soviet movies.23 [This was the way our soldiers and officers achieved combat unity with the Cuban military and civilians. In many cases, people had personal friendly relationships, which were never forgotten. —S.M.]

According to Garbuz, By October 25, all three R-12 regiments with twenty-four launchers were brought to battle readiness. This was achieved due to a huge amount of work, which had been done to prepare launching sites and access roads; to camouflage the weapons and motor vehicles; to organize the defense of the battle arrays; to camouflage the positions; to organize living quarters for the personnel. The engineering works were carried out both during the day and the night. All equipment tests and indepth launch training were conducted only at night. When the blockade was declared, all work was performed only during the nighttime. As a deputy of the commander, I had to visit the subdivisions of the division in order to supervise the preparations for combat tasks, or render necessary assistance. I should say that people did their best and worked very hard under pressure in such a complex political and military situation as well as unfriendly climate conditions. They displayed professionalism and resourcefulness, and moral and psychological strength. The deputy commander, Colonel B. I. Bondarenko, the chief of the staff, Colonel I. Z. Osadchy, and the chief engineer, Colonel A. M. Ternov, managed to organize efficient work regimens in many sections of the unit. They helped to resolve the most complicated issues that were within the scope of authority of the higher management and supply units. In addition, they helped establish appropriate connections with Cuban military formations, the commanders of the Revolutionary Armed forces, and local authorities.24

Another veteran of the event also describes how many issues were resolved at the location where they arose: The engineering units of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces with their equipment were assigned to us to construct the launching site areas. . . . Our assignment was to install a launching platform precisely at the point that had been determined by the geodesists. We prepared a round foundation pit, which was 3 meters in diameter and 1 meter deep. The bottom of the foundation pit was covered by a 60–70 centimeter layer of gravel and sand with containment rings on top. The rings arrived with the equipment and each ring consisted of four identical concrete segments that were 30 centimeters thick. The segments were tightened together with bolts and, as a result, we had a concrete circle of three meters in diameter. On top of it, we placed a launching table, which was able to rotate 360 degrees. In accordance with the standard launch scheme, we prepared places to set machines and units surrounding the launching table. At that time, it was a

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sophisticated complex, which included 20 pieces of military equipment and 150 service personnel. In spite of the exemplary heroism displayed by all soldiers and officers sent to defend Cuba, we mustn’t forget that these people were placed in difficult conditions by their very own commanders. Nowadays, it is not a secret that many serious mistakes were made while planning Operation Anadyr and preparing the forces to fulfill it. The General Staff, the Rear of the Armed Forces, and the Engineering and Technical Support Department of the USSR Ministry of Defense did not foresee a lot of consequences related to the arrival of our troops and navy to the tropical climate. In such extreme climate conditions, the personnel did not have enough rest to restore their physical capabilities after a hard day (many factors such as hot and humid weather, and insect bites were really exhausting). Lack of clean drinking water resulted in mass food poisoning and the outbreak of dysentery. There were a lot of problems with the food supply: crackers, canned meat and fish, condensed milk, and even tobacco were getting rotten. . . . People were aware of these problems and stoically tolerated these critical moments in their everyday life and service. It was absolutely unexpected when our radio electrics and transformers stopped working. We had to change the work regime of many devices. Before our operators turned on our transformers to full capacity, they let them dry under the direct sun. The broken ones needed repairing. The Cubans found a wire for the transformers, and it was re-reeled.

This was the recollection of General M. G. Kusivanov, who at that time was a colonel of one of the frontline cruise missile regiments.25

The Submarine Mission Captain V. N. Agafonov, commander of the brigade of submarines, reminisced about their mission. Captains R. A. Kotov, A. F. Dubivko, V. G. Savitzky, and N. A. Shymkov were commanders of the submarines.26 According to Agafonov, On September 30, I was called to the Military Council of the North Fleet, where my candidacy for the position of the commander of the submarine brigade was approved. I had two hours to pack and report to the shore base of the submarines squadron. On October 1, 1962, at about 2.00 a.m., I arrived at Saida Bay (village of Gadzhiyevo [north of Murmansk]), where the brigade’s submarines were stationed. At that time, the submarines were being prepared for the trip—one torpedo with a special [i.e., nuclear] combat part was loaded in a torpedo section in the rostrum of each submarine. In the morning on October 1, L. F. Rybalko, commander of the submarine squadron of the North Fleet, introduced me to the personnel of the brigade. Admiral V. A. Fokin gave a speech for the personnel on board the mother ship Dmitryi Galkin. He said that a brigade of four submarines (B-4, B-36, B-59, B-130)

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had to fulfill a special assignment for the Government of the Soviet Union to secretly cross the ocean and arrive at a new base in one of our friendly countries. He stressed the importance of the mission. However, he did not specify a country and a place of the new base. After that, as the commander of the brigade of the submarines, I was handed a package of documents with a stamp “Top Secret.” The package contained four separate sealed packages. The packages could be opened only in the open sea. Right before the departure, Admiral Fokin and Vice Admiral A. I. Rassoha visited each submarine. They took a look at all the sections of submarines, talked to the personnel, and shook hands with everybody. The following people were in charge of submarines: Commander Ryurik Alexandrovich Ketov, submarine B-4 (Captain Vitaly Naumovich Agafonov, commander of the brigade, was on board this submarine); Commander Aleksey Fedoseyvich Dubivko, submarine B-36; Commander Valentin Grigorievich Savitsky, submarine B-59 (Vasilyi Aleksandrich Arkhipov, who was the chief of staff of the brigade of submarines, also was on board this submarine); and Commander Nikoly Aleksandrovich Shumkov, submarine B-130. [It should be noted that in the Navy, compared with the Army, commanders treat their subordinates with more respect; for example, admirals personally visited each submarine and shook hands with each sailor. —S.M.] By the end of the day on October 1, 1962, the submarines left Saida Bay, . . . each submarine followed its own underwater course in accordance with to the documents prepared by the Main Staff of the Navy. The commander in chief of the Navy and the Central Command Post of the Navy were in command of the submarines. . . . There were some control points that had to be passed at certain times. In order to recharge their batteries, the submarines had to surface frequently and decamouflage themselves, moving further with their diesel engines on. We had the so-called collective séance of radio communication when we duplicated all radiograms transmitted to their addresses within the last twenty-four hours. Such a séance was to be conducted at midnight, Moscow time. However, it was 6 o’clock [p.m.] in the area where the submarines were at that time [Western Atlantic], in other words, practically, it was daytime. Such bad instruction was effective during the whole trip. The instruction affected the secrecy of the submarines’ course; it was impossible to surface unnoticed in such conditions. The intensity of actions from the side of the American antisubmarine forces increased as our submarines were approaching the area of the Bahamas. As soon as we raised the periscope or RLS [radio location station], we immediately detected the work of RLS on board of the American antisubmarine warplanes. . . . The planes used radio and hydro acoustic buoys from the system Julie with explosive devices. Significant U.S. antisubmarine forces and surveillance systems were used against the four Soviet submarines along the entire American shoreline. . . . The submarines had to surface and recharge their batteries while they were sur-

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rounded by U.S. warships and planes. After their batteries were recharged, the submarines submerged and managed to escape the enemy, thanks to the very good job of their commanders (submarines B-36, B-59). Because of three diesel engines malfunctioning (the manufacturer’s fault), submarine B-130 ended up in a difficult situation. The ships of the Northern fleet were sent to help it. When the submarine surfaced, it was boldly attacked by the Americans27—they used their machine guns and were shooting above the surface of the submarine; moreover, artillery guns, torpedo apparatuses, and other antisubmarine weapons were pointed at it; their ships tried to ram the submarine. We heard dirty, abusive language via the loudspeakers from the decks of their vessels; the personnel of the ships showed inappropriate gestures and profaned both the Soviet and our navy flags. When the submarine B-59 surfaced, warplanes and helicopters from the aircraft carrier Randolph flew around the submarine at a lower height (100–200 meters). Each time they flew around the submarine, they used the aircraft guns (they shot up to 300 times). The trip was hard, especially in the tropics. The temperature of the ocean water was +30 degrees Celsius, even at a depth of 100 to 200 meters. The temperature in the submarine sections reached as much as 60 degrees Celsius, with 100 percent humidity. It was hard to breathe. People were sweating heavily and their bodies were dehydrated. Due to such high temperatures and the evaporation of diesel fuel, some sailors fainted in the diesel sections of the submarines. The personnel had a limited resource of drinking water. They tried to save it and use it economically—just for cooking. People had just one cup of tea in the morning and evening. For lunch and dinner, the staff was allowed to have only one glass of canned juice. The water-desalinating devices did not work well, and the quality of the produced water was so poor it could not be used for drinking or cooking purposes. For personal hygiene, sailors had to use rubbing alcohol under the supervision of a doctor. . . . On board of one of the submarines (B-36), a sailor who dealt with hydroacoustics had paroxysms in his appendix. The doctor on board the submarine performed successful surgery. The sailor recovered very quickly and got back to his duties. I liked the job done by the personnel of the B-4 submarine while I was on board. . . . I was entirely confident in each member of the crew. Such people would have been able to fulfill their tasks in a real combat situation, if it had occurred. It looked as if we were very close to that.28

Open Confrontation Garbuz recalled: After the American reconnaissance plane revealed and photographed our launching sites on October 14, military, political, moral, and psychological tensions considerably increased. The impudent and unlawful actions of the Americans [the

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reconnaissance airplanes repeatedly intruded into Cuban airspace, especially after October 22] provoked the commanders of the Soviet units, who wanted to stop these airspace intrusions. But the commander of GSVK [the Soviet Group of Forces in Cuba] gave a strict order not to undertake any measures that would allow the Americans to reveal our system of air defense and provoke combat actions. That same day [October 22], we received an order from Moscow that contained the instruction to bring the Soviet troops to full battle readiness. The text of this telegram will be in my memory forever. It said that, in light of a possible landing operation of the Americans on the island of Cuba, we were to bring the troops to the top level of alertness without delay in order to be able to repulse a possible attack of the enemy together with the Cuban army. It also contained the order not to use the missile division and nuclear weapons for the R-12 missile. The telegram was signed “Director,” meaning R. Y. Malinovsky.29 In the meantime, we were getting prepared for the defense of the Island of Freedom. As of October 18, the main forces and weapons of the Soviet Group of Forces were deployed and in arrays in accordance with the plan of the Command. Instead of the 45,526 people initially intended for deployment in Cuba, only about 42,000 of the personnel had arrived. On October 15, two antiaircraft and missile divisions (under the command of General Tokarenko and Colonel G. A. Voronkov) were on duty. The combat capacity of our antiaircraft forces was strengthened by a fighter plane regiment of MiG-21s.30

“Once, while visiting the Soviet and Cuban troops, together with Air Force Major-General Sytnik, we stopped at our fighter plane regiment armed with the high-tech MiG-21 planes,” Gribkov recalled. “The regiment was considered the best in the Soviet Air Force. It was based in Kubinka, not far from Moscow. A first-class pilot, N. V. Shabanov, commanded the regiment. All pilots in the regiment were first class.” [The author of this book was very pleased to read such evaluations of the regiment from Kubinka. Just a few years before the described events, the commander of this regiment was my deceased elder brother, Aleksy Mikoyan, a brilliant pilot and a wonderful commander who was loved by his subordinates. It is good to think that he could have been with the people who were in Cuba during the crisis. —S.M.] According to Gribkov, The pilots asked with indignation, “Why do the Americans so boldly intrude into the airspace of Cuba, as if they are in their own homeland, but we sit and do nothing about it?” I explained to them that there was an order not to open fire on the intruders in order not to aggravate the situation. However, after I talked to the commander of the regiment and the pilots, I decided that in case it happens again, I would let a couple of pursuit planes intercept an American plane. We decided that as soon as our radio reconnaissance indicated the appearance of a solitary American plane in the airspace of Cuba, our pilots would try to force the intruder

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to land the plane without opening fire on it. This would have been a good chance to find out which side had the advantage in tactics and technical capacities of the aircraft in real conditions. The idea was implemented partially. As the commander of the Regiment told me later, a couple of our MiG-21 planes showed their superiority over the F-104 both in maneuverability and technical capabilities, although we did not manage to force the plane to land. Nonetheless, later, not a single plane intruded the airspace close to the airfield where the Soviet fighters were based. General Statsenko’s missile division comprised three regiments armed with R-12 missiles with twenty-four launchers (under the command of Colonel I. S. Sidorov, Lieutenant Colonel Y. A. Soloviev, and Colonel N. F. Bandilovsky, respectively). The division became battle ready in accordance with the approved plan, having prepared the launching facilities and accumulated a stock of missiles, GCH [the head parts, i.e., the nuclear charges] and KRT [the acidic missile fuel] at the BSP [launching platform]. Besides the troops to defend the missiles, additional troops were sent for the defense of the island—more evidence that the purpose of the missiles was to prevent an invasion of Cuba. Other kinds of troops were needed in case of such intrusion. Three motorized regiments arrived in Cuba on September 19, and they were brought to the state of preparedness to carry out their combat task. By October 1, the fourth motorized regiment took its position. Three regiments, augmented by the missile battalions and armed with Luna tactical missiles and both conventional and nuclear ammunition, were responsible for the defense of the missile regiments and the staff of RVSK from a land adversary. The regiments worked hard to improve the defense of the launching areas, and they organized lines to counterattack the landing troops of the enemy together with the units of the Cuban Army. The air grouping—comprising two frontline cruise missile (FKR) regiments, an independent aircraft squadron (Il-28), and an independent helicopter regiment (Mi-4)—completed their preparation and inspection of the warplanes and equipment. The Navy forces of GSVK were at different levels of preparedness. An independent mobile coastal missile regiment with the Sopka system (under the command of Colonel A. G. Shikov) set up their arrays, but the brigade of missile boats and a mine-and-torpedo aviation regiment were still completing their preparation for the combat tasks.31

A. F. Marenko described the mobile coastal missile regiment: The regiment under the command of Colonel Shikov consisted of four independent battalions and an independent technical squadron. At the beginning of August 1962, four vessels transported the regiment to Cuba. Lieutenant Colonel V. S Tzarev’s battalion took its firing position 40 kilometers from Havana, in the area of Santa Cruz del Norte at 84 meters above sea level in order to shield the island

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in the north. The battalion of Major Y. G. Yurchenko deployed at the cape of Banes, 120 kilometers north of Guantánamo and 1,000 kilometers from Havana, in order to protect the routes to Cuba in the east. The battalion of Lieutenant Colonel A. I. Karpetyan was assigned to carry out the defense from the area of Cienfuegos to the south. The battalion of Major M. G. Kuzivanov was supposed to defend the western approaches to Cuba. Thus, the regiment took the defense positions at the front stretching for [several] thousand kilometers and was managed by the staff via the radio. . . . All the battalions were mobile and armed with Sopka cruise missiles, which had a shooting range of 130 kilometers. These S-2 missiles were housed in the fuselage of the MiG-15 plane with the addition of a 270-kilogram explosive charge. One can estimate their destructive capacity based on the following examples. When a gunnery test was conducted in the USSR, and such a missile was used without the explosive charge, its mass perforated the hull of a captured Italian destroyer in such a way that it was possible to ride three horses in one line through the hole. In the course of a gunnery demonstration on the island of Pinos, the S-2 missile with the explosive charge destroyed an entire target ship. Our task was to shoot at American troop carriers with the landing force on board, as well as large warships defending them. On the morning of October 22, and further every morning and every evening, American pursuit planes and fighter-bombers flew over our positions at a very low height. The Cuban soldiers and the members of people’s volunteer corps began to build their fortifications in places of possible landing operations. . . . In selected areas, people were digging trenches, camouflaging tanks, preparing fire lines for guns as well as antiaircraft guns. After it was done, people started to work on communications and tactics to fight enemy seaborne and airborne landing troops. Starting from October 23, Americans took control over our radio transmissions and jammed them with their powerful devices. For this reason, in order to transmit a cipher text, our radio operators had to “play” with waves and frequencies, as well as use intermediate radio stations. In other words, they reached Pinos from Havana via Banes, or Cienfuegos, and back. During the whole period of the blockade, our radar service kept the sea under thorough observation, and many moving and motionless objects were detected there.32

A sailor, V. S. Semezhenkov, described the experience in a missile regiment: The situation was worsening with each hour, and we had to dig up full trenches despite of our unwillingness to do it. It was wrong to use the verb “dig up” in this context, because the soil was rocky, and we were using drilling hammers 24 hours a day. The trenches were built along the ravine going down to the sea, to prevent the enemy landing troops from penetrating into the territory of Cuba. Every evening, we saw up to 60 of our adversary’s vessels, only a couple of miles off the

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coast. All units of GSVK were brought to the N-1 level of alertness. We were very nervous, since we expected that a landing operation would take place soon. . . . During one of those uneasy nights, we got ready for combat actions and prepared our ammunition—four sets of cartridges for Kalashnikov submachine guns and cases with F-1 hand-grenades—and took our positions in trenches. It was depressingly quiet and very dark; we only saw the blinking lights of our enemy’s vessels very close to our positions. We put on our striped shirts and sailors’ caps in case we would have to fight back.33 . . . During the night of October 27–28, after the American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was destroyed, the personnel of the regiment had a sleepless night, expecting the commencement of combat. The United States began the blockade of the island on October 22, 1962; on October 23, at 5:40 a.m., Soviet forces went on military emergency. At 8:00 a.m. on the same day, the commander of the division brought the troops to the top level of alertness. In the regiment under the command of Colonel I. S. Sidorov, the time frame for full preparedness for the R-12 missile launching was 2 hours and 30 minutes (warhead mating, missile installation, acidic missile fueling, and conclusive operations). The regiment of Colonel N. F. Bandilovsky and the battalion of Lieutenant Colonel U. A. Soloviev had almost the same level of readiness for the fulfillment of their combat mission. In case of a possible American Air Force strike, the commander of the division decided to choose additional field areas. In order to reduce the time for the preparation of the first salvo of Colonel Sidorov’s missile regiment, General I. A. Pliev ordered the head parts [i.e., warheads] relocated from the main depot [the air-conditioned bunkers near Bejucal south of Havana] to the missile deployment area.34

The narration of one of the veterans of the political officers of that time provided unique details: We needed to politically prepare not only the combat units, but also the supply and service divisions. . . . We visited a hospital in the village of Kunovakan [sic]. The hospital came from Podolsk and was staffed with very experienced medical personnel, including many women among the doctors and nurses. They assumed that they were going to military exercises for several days. But in 16 days, they ended up in Cuba. In such a situation, the women required a lot of attention and a sympathetic attitude. . . . On October 26, there was a tropical rain. At about 10:00 a.m., Juan Almeida, commander of the Central Army and brother in arms of Fidel Castro, visited the regiment together with a group of offices and an adviser. After they had left, we tried to contact the staff of GSVK. The reception was bad, but we managed to find out that the situation was very tense, and we had to be ready for vigorous actions and maintain communication with the Cuban Army. The deputy chief of staff, Major Shamarin, was sent to the headquarters of the Cuban Army. . . . The regi-

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ment with MiG-21 aircraft arrived from Kubinka, Moscow area. In Cuba, our pilots were given the assignment to protect the missile battalions of Colonel Sidorov, our regiment, and other units located in the province of Las Villas.35 In the meantime, the tension was increasing. I want to tell about one episode in more detail. This episode could have provoked the beginning of a large-scale military operation in Cuba with unpredictable consequences. It was that very day when the Soviet antiaircraft gunners hit the U-2 reconnaissance plane of the U.S. Air Force. The Americans called it “Black Saturday.” Right afterward, the White House imposed a military and naval quarantine on Cuba, and the commanders of the Soviet Group of Forces declared the state of military preparedness at the highest level, Number 1. All antiaircraft means were brought to a 6-minute readiness. . . . On October 26, at 21:30, all radio and technical means were turned on. In accordance with the information obtained by the Cuban intelligence service, the American side was discussing the issues of timing and methods of its invasion of the island.

The Moment of Truth Garbuz continued: We faced an important issue: How do we conceal our positions from the eyes of the enemy? [It goes without saying that the Cuban landscape was not suitable for hiding troops and large-sized machinery from aerial reconnaissance. Plus, there was a lack of basic and improvised means for camouflaging purposes. This was one of the causes of failure of the camouflaging process, for which Moscow was responsible. Why did Pliev and Gribkov not learn about all this? Why did they not ask Fidel or Raul Castro to help? —S.M.] The commander issued an order to all subdivisions of cannon and antiaircraft artillery to open fire without warning in case the air adversary approaches. The Cuban commander in chief, Fidel Castro, issued the same order to the Cuban revolutionary forces even before us. We asked Moscow to provide us with instructions on how to act in such situation, but the minister of defense did not respond. [What a peculiarity of the Soviet-Russian mentality! The minister of foreign affairs did not provide A. F. Dobrynin, ambassador of the Soviet Union to the United States, with any instructions; moreover, the minister of defense did not answer the questions of the Soviet Group of Forces in Cuba. Three weeks earlier, Minister Malinovsky had asked Gribkov to draw Pliev’s attention to the fact that he seldom reported to the center about the situation. It would have been logical to report daily at a specified time and in case of any emergency. —S.M.] On October 27, at 10 a.m., I arrived at the Command Post of GSVK. I saw the deputy commander of the antiaircraft defense, General S. N. Grechko, who was analyzing the reports on U.S. Reconnaissance Air Force actions. When I saw him,

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he said: “We have a ‘guest’ who is making circles in Cuban airspace. I think that we should bring the American aircraft down because he could reveal our missilelaunching sites, and in a few hours this intelligence data will be known in Washington.” We decided to contact I. A. Pliev directly, but we did not find the commander in the staff. In the meantime, the officer on duty reported that the U-2 aircraft changed the course of his flight; he turned north after he reached Guantánamo. It became clear to us that the pilot was going to leave after he had fulfilled his combat task. I assumed that all missile-launching sites were divulged; that is why we should have prevented the secret information leaking to the Pentagon. According to President Kennedy’s speech on October 22, the Pentagon already possessed the secret information; but purely from a military standpoint, it was important to limit the amount of our adversary’s intelligence data on positions of the Soviet Group of Forces. S. N. Grechko tried to contact the commander several times, but he did not manage to find him. It was impossible to communicate with Moscow within such a short period of time. Besides, we were aware that during the last several days, Pliev had repeatedly requested that Malinovsky, in Moscow, allow us to shoot down the American reconnaissance aircraft, but he did not get an answer. After giving it some thought, S. N. Grechko said: “Well, we will be responsible for that together.” Thus, the Command Center received the order to destroy target #33, the U-2 aircraft. The commander of the First Battalion of the Antiaircraft and Missile Regiment, Major Ivan Gerchenov, received the order as well. Antiaircraft gunners immediately fulfilled the order. Surface-to-air missiles brought down the American plane, which was piloted by Major Rudolf Anderson of the Air Force. The first missile only damaged the plane and the pilot was getting ready to catapult, but the second missile was deadly. To use official language, the decision to seize the flight had been dictated by operational and strategic necessity. It was inadmissible for us that the military and political leadership of the United States should get intelligence information about the deployment, the amount of weapons, and the equipment of the Soviet and Cuban forces and also, most important, the intelligence data on the missile-launching sites of General Statsenko’s division as well as the information on antiaircraft defense.36

General Gribkov wrote later that both he and Commander Pliev learned about the U-2 flyover of San Cristobal (that first revealed the presence of Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles) with the purpose of aerial photography right after the flight took place on October 14. However, Gribkov did not say whether he or Pliev informed Moscow about it, although this was absolutely necessary, because it had an impact not only on the military side but also on the political side. If such information was sent to Kremlin, there could have been some changes in the planned operation. One can get the impression that such an idea did not come to Gribkov’s mind during the crisis, but only almost forty years later. At an earlier time, in October 1962, he had a meeting with Raul Castro, who provided him with similar information.37

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The lieutenant general of the Strategic Missile Forces, A. S. Budskiy, recalled: S. S. Biryuzov repeatedly stressed the necessity to inform the commander of the Soviet Group of Forces, General I. A. Pliev, his deputy general, P. B. Dankevich, and the commander of the division, General I. D. Statsenko, that the missiles delivered to Cuba were the means of the supreme commanders and they must be used solely in accordance with an order from Moscow. . . . By October 24, the units of I. D. Statsenko’s division were brought into combat alertness (in other words, the readiness to bring the missiles from constant to complete military preparedness, and, if required, in accordance with an order of the supreme commanders, to launch the missiles.)38

In those critical October days, General Pliev conducted a combined meeting of the military council, where he ordered all military units and bodies of troops into complete combat readiness. At the end of the military council, the general said: “If the adversary does not use their nuclear weapons, we will use conventional weapons, too. We cannot retreat; we are far from our motherland; we have enough ammunition for five or six weeks. If the Soviet Group of Forces is defeated, we will fight with a division. If a division is defeated, we will fight with a regiment. If a regiment is defeated, we will retreat to the mountains.”39 [It was not clear whether General Pliev was going to leave the strategic and tactical nuclear warheads for the Americans to capture. —S.M.]

The Outcome On October 28, at 15:00, the commander of GSVK informed the commander of Division 51 (a missile unit) about the General Staff of the Armed Forces’ Directive 7665, which conveyed the USSR minister of defense’s order to dismantle the missile-launching sites and relocate the division to the Soviet Union. On October 29, the personnel started to dismantle the equipment and missilelaunching sites. On October 31, this work was completed. [It is easy to imagine the moral state of the people who worked hard twenty-four hours a day to fulfill the order from Moscow to bring the missiles to complete combat preparedness as soon as possible! —S.M.] Recalled Zakirov: Our soldiers were traumatized psychologically by the procedure of the withdrawal of troops from Cuba. Th is was carried out secretly. The loading was carried out during the nighttime only, and we didn’t have a chance to say good-bye to our Cuban friends: The ships left empty berths. We were leaving Cuba as if we were guilty, although we honestly fulfi lled our duty and the order of our motherland.40 We were supposed to control the process of dismantling the missile-launching sites, loading equipment and putting people on board the vessels of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet, and sending them to the USSR. This process was guided by

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Directive 7665 of the USSR General Staff of the Armed Forces of October 28, “On Complete Dismantling of the Missile-Launching Sites and their Relocation to the USSR.” By way of the tremendous efforts of the personnel of the subdivisions of regiments armed with R-12 missiles, the dismantling process of all the launching sites, which was started on October 29, was entirely completed by October 31.41

According to Colonel A. F. Marenko, “After the Caribbean Crisis was settled and A. I. Mikoyan arrived in Cuba in November 1962, we started to train the Cuban soldiers and used our equipment for that. We compiled an eight-month program and prepared four battalions, with 365 people in each. In the end, we conducted a shooting demonstration on the island of Pinos, where with the first missile we managed to destroy the target—a ship.”42 Missile regiment commander Sidorov attended the meeting with A. I. Mikoyan, who delivered a speech to 300 Soviet officers. Mikoyan quoted Khrushchev’s words: “We prepared an unpleasant surprise for the Americans.” Somebody in the audience said loudly, “But we got an unpleasant surprise for ourselves, too.”43 Such was the end of the Strategic Operation Anadyr, which is unparalleled in military history.

6 When the World Was Hanging by a Thread

The Potential Cost of a Misunderstanding

A

t first, Khrushchev sent a dreary letter with accusations of piracy, adding that the United States would be responsible for the consequences. He asserted that he would not order the ship captains to acquiesce to an inspection. His October 23, 1962, letter has obvious indicators of having been rushed, in addition to lacking even basic editing. The exact same phrases were repeated verbatim twice. Although it is apparent that these two or three phrases changed positions, they did not have time to erase the repetitions. To one degree or another, the same can be said of other correspondence. In essence, no one edited the correspondence either in terms of content or in a strictly technical sense. Still, demagoguery and empty reasoning should have just been excluded. For example, his October 26 dispatch asserted that missiles in Cuba could not threaten the United States by merit of the fact that an attack on the country would only be possible if the infantry invaded in the wake of missile strikes. Such a notion, which was reminiscent of World War I or World War II, contradicted every one of Khrushchev’s previous and subsequent approaches to missiles carrying nuclear warheads as weapons capable of deciding the outcome of any given war. In this sense, Khrushchev was completely right, although it was hardly his own idea. After all, he himself threatened the United States with missiles located in Siberia and the Urals, for some reason never mentioning the infantry. The blockade/quarantine did not really solve the problem of missile deployment. So, the assembly of launch sites accelerated as work went on twenty-four hours a day at Moscow’s orders and the attainment of a state of readiness was only a matter of days away. 147

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As it turned out, no single option was able to preclude the chance of a final strike that could follow any number of scenarios—a clash at sea and retaliatory strikes by the USSR, a delay in negotiations and the simultaneous completion of missile placement assembly. Therefore, U.S. military preparation for a strike continued nonstop. In such a case, it would be necessary to achieve readiness in the shortest possible period of time from the president’s order to the beginning of action. It was impossible to conceal all this preparation from Soviet and Cuban spies, and it was not supposed to be concealed, because the sword of Damocles that took the form of a threatened air strike followed by an invasion gave the United States the ability to exert pressure in any talks. It was precisely this sword that in the end played the deciding role in accelerating Khrushchev’s proposal for a compromise. As my father recalled later: When Kennedy announced the blockade and demanded the dismantling and removal of the missiles, Khrushchev put on airs. But an extremely dangerous moment unexpectedly arose [when] Malinovsky made a proposal to hand over command of the missile batteries to the Cubans and officially announce that the missiles are in the possession of the Cuban military. This idea appealed to Khrushchev. Of course at that point Kennedy’s appeal to the USSR became senseless. . . . Negotiations should have been conducted with Cuba, but we were no longer interested. All the while, the risk of a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union was supposedly lessened. It was only on a superficial level that all of this seemed to make sense. While compelling the United States to enter into talks with Cuba about the missiles and refusing to get involved ourselves sounds tempting, could it actually have happened? After all, Washington had come to terms with the fact that we have nuclear weapons ages ago. They understood that even under the threat of containment we would never permit their use. Not to mention the fact that we completely understood the consequences of nuclear war for the entire human race. But nuclear weapons capable of striking the United States in Fidel Castro’s hands were another matter altogether. There was no way they could come to terms with this. Simply put, they would begin to panic and immediately come down on Cuba with all of their might. There would be nothing left of the people, island, or our troops. Our efforts would have been nothing more than a cruel joke. So, I immediately took the floor and resolutely objected. I presented a host of arguments touching upon the extraordinary riskiness and profound consequences of the proposed option and succeeded in winning over Khrushchev and, I think, other members of the Presidium as well. At the very least, Khrushchev backed away from supporting Malinovsky’s proposal, which had been so close to being approved. Of course, it soon became crystal clear to everyone, including Khrushchev, that there was nowhere to go. The encrypted communiqué was sent with stunning speed; Robert [Kennedy] met with Dobrynin and [on October 27] all but

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presented him with an ultimatum. We had also received information that not only were intensive military preparations for an invasion of Cuba taking place in southeastern ports and U.S. military bases, but that practically everything was ready for a strike on Cuba. If the intelligence was accurate, preparation at any given moment could be measured in hours. Although intelligence agencies went overboard and created a false sense of alarm, this was better than the alternative. It is well known that we had almost 42,000 soldiers stationed on the island to provide a smokescreen for the missiles and building teams, but our air force presence was insufficient. The Il-28 bombers were inadequate for repelling a strike insofar as they were extremely vulnerable to enemy fighter jets. MiG-21s were also there, but they were not of a caliber to so much as challenge U.S. air supremacy. Understandably, for those in the region, all of their aircraft were nearby. We had surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), but their presence on the island was well known to the Americans. The relocation of these rockets was considered, but such an undertaking would have proven very difficult. The Cubans had less-accurate SAMs, but at least they were easier to hide and move around. What’s more, it would be completely possible to eliminate our SAMs, even if U.S. bombers would take significant losses. And so, by scrambling their available local forces, the Americans would have enjoyed clear and overwhelming superiority in the air, especially considering the fact that since the war in Vietnam had not yet begun, they would have been able to bear down on Cuba with all their military might. Of course, we had every intention of asking Fidel for his opinion on, as well as explaining our reasoning for, the decision to remove the missiles. Correspondence with him on such matters became fairly active. However, at first our correspondence with Fidel bore an entirely different character: an exchange of information, a discussion about options for a response in the event of U.S. military action, forwarded messages from Kennedy. Our largest mistake at that moment was that in encrypted messages with Castro, the possibility of removing the missiles was never noted, or even alluded to, although it was perfectly obvious to us. Be that as it may, this mistake can be explained in terms of psychology. After all, Khrushchev had yet to discuss this option in his correspondence with Washington, regardless of the fact that it was becoming more and more clear that we would have to give in. A bitter exchange of accusations and explanations took place. Wasting precious days on demagoguery, Khrushchev was in a state of extreme agitation. No one in those days could interfere with his dictated letters to Kennedy, with the possible exception of light corrections to the text. All the same, I had to interfere in order to insist that Fidel be informed about our alreadyinevitable decision before it was completely reached. So, in the following two or three days, when different variations of an agreement were coming to fruition, correspondence with Washington kept everyone busy. Khrushchev’s letters were extremely long, verbose, rife with redundancies and general arguments, and took up a significant amount of time. Realizing that there would inevitably be corrections or additions, no one proposed that Fidel be

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asked for his opinion. On the last day—the 28th—time had already become a pressing factor in our minds. While telegrams were encrypted, there [in Washington] they were decrypted, and then the same process with responses to us. . . . And the same thing had to be done either with copies of telegrams to Washington, or dispatches of their main points, to Havana. Indeed, it was absolutely necessary if only on October 27 to send Havana a copy of telegrams sent to President Kennedy on October 26, in which, as a matter of fact, there was mention of missiles in Turkey. Fidel would have found all of this to be extremely unpleasant, but at least the necessity of receiving consent from the government of Cuba (and Turkey) in order to grant access to inspectors was also noted. This had been the only dispatch that remembered Cuba! Yet, it was precisely this dispatch that went unanswered, and we didn’t push for a response. Moreover, in a telegram to Kennedy on the 27th it should have been necessary to emphasize that only the Cuban government could agree to inspections of its territory. The fact that we failed to write this was a huge mistake. It goes without saying that I am guilty. Khrushchev should have been reminded, he was involved with general considerations. At the same time, I wasn’t always involved, especially since he went to another room from time to time so that the typist wouldn’t be bothered by the noise of other conversations. Later when reading the telegrams, there was a nerve-racking sense of being rushed. In essence, the quarantine gave us time with which it would have been possible to calmly discuss matters and take into consideration the finer points flowing from Alekseyev’s telegrams about the views of Cuban leadership. We didn’t use this opportunity. A state of panic descended upon Khrushchev which precluded sober discussions for everyone. On October 26, it would have been completely possible to tell Fidel about our decision, send a copy of the Kennedy dispatch, and ask for his opinion. Even on Sunday, October 28, while Khrushchev’s radio statement [to Kennedy] was being prepared, even if it still hadn’t been finished, a brief telegram could have been sent to Havana requesting comments. In the text of Khrushchev’s statement, which had been worked on with Gromyko and Ilyichev, Cuba’s right to agree to inspections should have been discussed. Apparently Cuba was mentioned only once in the text, but it wasn’t explicitly stated that only her government can give permission for a territorial inspection by UN authorities. If it had been done differently, at least there would have been some semblance of a consultation and Fidel would have found out from us rather than the radio. Also, if inspections had been made dependent upon the agreement of the Cuban government, and Fidel himself, their entire leadership, all of Cuba, and the entire world would have seen that we take the opinion of this country into consideration. Later, especially while in Havana, I blamed myself for not making such proposals before Khrushchev, Gromyko, and Ilyichev retired to the room with the typist. Everyone already sensed that on that day it wasn’t for us to revise the details: Ilyichev read those pages that had been prepared aloud to Khrushchev, and so forth. Likewise, if Khrushchev had not made any corrections himself, then everything would have stayed as it

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was. Later Ilyichev himself volunteered to drive to the Radio Committee. Everything was done incorrectly on our part. We certainly didn’t know that the alarming message from military intelligence about Kennedy’s speech, which possibly announced the commencement of military action against Cuba, would not be confirmed. On Saturday, October 27, Fidel himself warned that according to his information, a strike by the armed forces of the United States could—and most likely would—be undertaken in the near future, perhaps within a period of one to three days. But all the same, in light of our agreement to remove the missiles, the danger of a strike by the United States disappeared. The technical details could also be fully discussed, including the matter of inspections. Perhaps it was possible to compel the Americans to talk with the Cubans about inspections, let’s say through the United Nations. After all, we had to refuse to talk about a matter that it was not our matter to decide. It was a convenient pretext and moment for Khrushchev to tell Fidel about the decision to compromise as being an unavoidable way to prevent the beginning of a nuclear third world war. As late as October 23, a day after Kennedy’s televised speech, Khrushchev maintained his courage in a telegram to Castro, not even hinting at a searching for compromise. Nevertheless, it must have been evident to everyone that a compromise was inevitable after the blockade was announced. So, on Sunday, October 28, there was definitely very little time: Only hours, some even believed minutes, remained. The delayed response could be interpreted in Washington as an attempt to buy time to finish construction on the still incomplete missile installations. However, a substantial portion had already been prepared for use due to the fact that construction had continued at an accelerated pace during deliberations with Washington. Khrushchev gave that order for some reason. Apparently, he hadn’t understood that there wasn’t another solution besides removing the missiles. In general, it would have been understandable if the Americans, unwilling to wait for a response, initiated something or other. Moreover, we had precise information from various sources that this is exactly where things stood.1 The risk was too great. All things considered, an immediate response had to be given, and that’s what we did. Fidel, nevertheless, had terrible luck, and this, too, had been my fault. An awful lot depended upon Fidel’s position. This, too, was partially my fault. An awful lot depended upon Fidel. Khrushchev agreed to protect the territory of Cuba, a task that even he could barely manage. Fidel Castro, and the sovereign government of Cuba, must have agreed to this, yet as a participant in the conflict, the Cuban side was all but forgotten. They were confident that Castro would more likely agree to verification under the auspices of the United Nations, or control by neutral countries of his choosing . . . or even a trip of several Latin American states. . . . It goes without saying that in our message there were several provisos and conditions, concerning the use of the United Nations, for instance. United Nations [acting] secretary-general U Thant himself had proposed this. It seemed

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that any version would suit Fidel. As it turned out, in his addresses and his talks with Alekseyev, Fidel categorically refused any type of inspection except for mutual control (i.e., in both Cuba and the southern coastal regions of the United States). In all likelihood, he would probably even want inspections of a few bases in Florida. This, too, was proposed by U Thant. As far as Kennedy was concerned, in those circumstances he couldn’t possibly agree to inspections at bases in Florida. Besides, he had already lost his chance to find common ground with the Cubans and us since we had backed off. Generally speaking, in an extremely difficult situation no president could accept such a loss in the political prestige of the United States right after being deceived in front of the entire world. Notwithstanding, I still supported Fidel Castro’s viewpoints in my talks with [John J.] MсCloy, saying that such a mutual territorial verification would help to defeat any rumors about preparations for a U.S. invasion of Cuba. But McCloy responded that we would just have to take him at his word. I expected nothing less. On the other hand, more bellicose members of the U.S. leadership could have used Fidel’s rejection of control on the ground, in the air, and even at Cuban ports, as a pretext for writing off the agreement and to consider their own obligations null and void. At the same time, construction work on our missile placements wasn’t only halted, but disassembly was even sped up as materials were prepared to be moved to ports. Khrushchev was fleeing from the cliff ’s edge. He was in too much of a hurry. That is, they had already gotten us to fulfi ll our obligations for all intents and purposes, there was no longer a threat posed by the deployment of our missiles in Cuba. However, on the basis of their own obligations, they couldn’t formally refuse. But they did give stipulations and establish conditions that would indicate a refusal. In other words, the framework for talks was unbelievably difficult.

If we turn our attention back to Khrushchev, to his consent to something to which he did not have a legal right to agree, all without so much as attempting to contact Castro in advance about the terms of the agreement, it is clear that his consent was dictated by two circumstances. First and foremost, in the words of Dean Rusk, he “blinked.” Frankly speaking, he began to panic from the consequences of his own plan. In Moscow, the clock was ticking: On the morning of October 28, a message arrived from GRU (Soviet military intelligence) stating that at 5 o’clock that evening, Kennedy would give a televised speech.2 The thought arose that he would announce a strike against Cuba and the USSR’s missiles. Robert Kennedy had allowed this disinformation to leak during his meeting with Dobrynin. Moreover, agencies on all sides accurately reported the concealed deployment of the U.S. military toward the area surrounding Cuba. The Pentagon was doing everything possible to prepare for an invasion when the political decision was made.

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Moreover, the psyche of any given Kremlin boss always included a slight sense of contempt toward the USSR’s friends (even strong ones, e.g., China); respect was more often shown toward the opposition. For Stalin, this was generally the case. One of Khrushchev’s greatest achievements was that he took a different approach to diplomacy—he “went to Canossa,” he took off for Belgrade (along with Bulganin and Mikoyan) to apologize to Yugoslavia. But this did not last long. As the events in Poland and Hungary in 1956 had shown, Moscow’s rapport even with its “friends” was hardly friendly. On October 26, Khrushchev approved two complete messages to Washington, implying that he was already extremely nervous, with the result that no one in the White House knew what was going on. The first letter had been prepared in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was then sent. He later thought to dictate his own letter, which, as was often the case, included many general words while missing the necessary ones. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had made mention of the necessity of receiving Cuban and Turkish approval for missile inspections. Khrushchev did not mention it at all. Unfortunately, a convenient moment to insist upon Cuba’s rights was missed due to Khrushchev’s diplomatic overconfidence. For technical reasons, his letter was the first to arrive in the early hours of October 27 [actually, the evening of Friday, October 26, Washington time —S.M.], whereas the letter prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs arrived later, on the morning of the 27th. The ExComm was perplexed. Llewellyn Thompson and Robert Kennedy proposed ignoring the second letter, which contained a demand that [American] missiles be removed from Turkey and a phrase about the necessity of receiving Cuba’s consent. One of Khrushchev’s greatest mistakes was that he failed to use the same wording that Kennedy had used twice: “adequate verification.” The president only mentioned “international control” on one occasion. If such a team had worked for Khrushchev, or at least had similar monitoring, someone would have undoubtedly noticed this, and recalled that Castro was talking about mutual control and the impossibility for Cuba to agree to unilateral control.3 All this, in tandem with Khrushchev’s weapons, sounds like nonsense. He had even been dissatisfied with Mikoyan for his “special views.” The deputy minister of foreign affairs, V. V. Kuznetzov, a highly experienced diplomat, was silenced on everything except for one point about which nothing else could be said. Because he knew the boss’s character, Gromyko, as foreign minister, consciously agreed with him on everything. Even in May 1962, in the hallway, if only in passing, he had expressed his doubts about the risk of transferring missiles to Cuba. As could be expected, it was to no avail. Oleg Troyanovsky, as the only one who could, calmly communicated his apprehension; but this, too, was to no effect. Khrushchev simply would not tolerate open discussions about the replacement of dictated phrases, words, or sentences with different words or ideas. So, the text of Sunday’s message to Kennedy (sent on October 28) was in desperate need of careful editing and a reconsideration of important wording. With-

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out making changes, it would have been impossible to immediately and completely agree. First, the issue of international control over the dismantling of missile placements should have been subject to the opinion of the Cuban government. It could have been proposed to Kennedy that either the United States itself conduct talks with the Cuban representative at the United Nations, or that U Thant be given time to conduct such talks. In the event of Cuban disagreement, an “adequate” method could be sought. It was also unnecessary to dismantle the missile placements before an agreement was reached—halting construction was sufficient. After all, nonstop work on the missile sites had provided the U.S. military with grounds for demanding an immediate strike. Second, Khrushchev’s message never should have said that measures taken to defend Cuba were no longer necessary, allowing for the removal of different types of weaponry and the withdrawal of military advisers. In any case, an adviser is certainly not an “offensive weapon.” Why would Moscow introduce the prospect of limitations on itself? It should not have fundamentally restricted itself with respect to military advisers. Advisers had nothing to do with the emergence of the crisis. Third, the dismantling of missiles should have been coordinated with the simultaneous formulation of an American guarantee at the United Nations not to attack Cuba. But because this was not done, following the dismantling of the missiles, the United States clearly sabotaged such a formulation under various pretexts and it never materialized. And all this was the case despite the fact that there had initially been an agreement with the United States and U Thant. Fourth, there should have been an end to superfluous wording, such as “weapons, which you consider to be offensive,” which merely allowed the Americans to broaden the list of weapons as they saw fit. The Soviet Union should have said directly which weapons would be the subject of discussion, which weapons the Soviet Union would agree to remove, which weapons they would not agree to remove, and which weapons were not even up for discussion. Because one man imagined that he was capable of doing everything himself, none of this happened. That is not to say that Khrushchev folded in vain. After all, he wrote to President Kennedy that “only lunatics or people with suicidal tendencies could initiate a conflict over the course of which they themselves would want to perish and destroy the entire world in the moments before their own death.” A step back should have been taken, without panicking, but rather having thoughtfully considered all possible interpretations of wording and the consequences of any deviation. Concerning the advantages of the “quarantine,” as a decision made by Kennedy, the historian Graham Allison incorporates an extremely elegant quotation taken from English authors. I am very tempted to repeat this quotation, although it may have already lost some of its grace: “The threat was found in local, nonnuclear, action, in the extent of highly limited vio-

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lence, only manifested in access to ships. On the ladder leading up to the use of force, there must have been many rungs allowing both sides to decide between ascent and descent.”4 Khrushchev did not make use of these rungs; instead, he carried on without so much as noticing them.5

Mikoyan Flies to Havana Although it appeared from a cursory glance as if the apex of the crisis had passed after Khrushchev’s radio message to Kennedy on October 28, the fact remained that the lack of a concrete agreement with Cuba could have been, and was, used to resume calls for a strike against the island. Needless to say, moral standards no longer would have welcomed such an approach; yet from a military standpoint, the task had been simplified. The Soviet missile placements had already been dismantled. More important, guarantees to not attack Cuba would have been invalidated. The U.S. government did everything possible toward this end; it put forward newer and newer formulations of old conditions that had threatened to compromise their promise. For example, how could the United States be sure that none of the “offensive weapons” remained on the island? Inspections on the ground would not provide anything useful—there were exclamations that the weapons were probably stashed away in an unidentified cave. What then? Should every cave on the island be found and inspected? No one was willing to let the absurdity reach that point. What, then, was the necessity of onsite inspections? It was meant to persuade them that the missiles had been removed. Where were they taken? Performing calculations on a ship would be much more reliable. Or—could they be sure that without a special system of control the same thing would not happen again? The discussion led to the necessity of inspecting Soviet ports in addition to Cuban ones. If the discussion were to turn to the indefinite future, then the inspection posts would have to remain there for decades. However, no one reached this absurd point either. All the same, what was the point of a one-time inspection? Moreover, the idea of mutual control in connection with the promise to close camps established to prepare for an invasion was excluded outright. What if Cuba all of a sudden resumed its aiding of revolutionary movements in Latin America? The critical matter of who would define and assess Cuba’s behavior was hardly explained, but it was assumed that this would be done by the United States with the assistance of its obedient voting machine in the Organization of American States. Regardless, it would still be possible to get by without this organization, if only by way of information provided by the CIA. It was obvious what kind of price there would be for the CIA’s information. Broadly, Cuba could behave “poorly,” and precisely in that way contradicted U.S. interests. There were decisionmakers that announced similar variations, such as causus belli, or “the pretext for war.” As Mikoyan said,

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It was imperative to immediately fly to Fidel, negotiate with him, and also identify other methods of control over the removal of missiles from the American perspective. I decided in advance, and it was agreed upon in the Central Committee, to reach a compromise suitable for both sides in order to create a safety net. The missile shipment still had not been carried out, so there was some time left. But I understood that there were things to which Fidel would never agree. Besides, there was the fact that he found out about the missile removal from a message on American radio, which from the onset set an unpleasant atmosphere for our talks with him. Nikita made me clean up his mess yet again!

I was thrilled when my father told me that he would be taking me with him. My mother was somewhat anxious, but also happy that I would fly with my father. She said: “You will bring your father luck. Thanks to you there was no tragedy that time you flew from America. I don’t worry as much when you’re with him!” But we all worried about her. She had already been immobile for several months. She lay in bed at the dacha in the midst of heart failure. Unfortunately, our doctors at that time believed it was best if the afflicted did not get up for a long period of time following a heart attack. As a result, she became so weak that walking became an overwhelming task. Apparently, her heart muscles had also been weakened. Sometimes she could not get enough air even in front of an open window. I remember how in the summertime my brothers and I would bring the armchair in which she was sitting out to the garden. My brother Vano, an aeronautical engineer with the design bureau for MiG planes, attached wheels to the armchair because our mother categorically refused to use a wheelchair. Mikoyan dictated to a stenographer in the Kremlin several months later, in January 1963, how it turned out: On [Monday], October 22, I received a call at the dacha at around seven o’clock in the evening and was told that members of the Presidium of the Central Committee were requested to go to the Kremlin for a meeting that evening. Before this, I called T. Kozlov to find out why we were meeting. Kozlov said that President Kennedy was expected to give an important speech on Cuba. Everyone gathered. It was said that according to American radio, at 7 o’clock [Monday evening] Washington time, or at 2 o’clock [Tuesday morning] Moscow time, President Kennedy would make an especially important announcement about the security of the United States. We understood this had something to do with Cuba. Not yet knowing the content of the speech, we exchanged views about expected issues from the U.S. government’s position, what steps it would take, and possible countermeasures on our end. We decided to await Kennedy’s speech there at the meeting so that, having become familiar with the president’s speech, and without needlessly wasting time, we would be able to take responsive measures since anything could be expected without so much as a minute’s delay. . . .

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First and foremost, we decided to task Malinovsky with ordering the commander of our forces in Cuba, General Pavlov, to prepare for the defense of Cuba with military action in the event of an American invasion, and if that failed, to use the intermediate-range missiles. Malinovsky said that he had prepared a draft message, which he requested that we confirm. In the telegram it was said that all means at Pavlov’s disposal should be in a state of readiness. Khrushchev at that point noticed that all means without any sort of qualification would include missiles, that is, the beginning of thermonuclear war. How could that be? Malinovsky couldn’t respond because this had been extremely reckless on his part. There was a revision to the effect that the use of all means would exclude intermediate-range missiles armed with nuclear warheads. Without an explicit order from Moscow, missiles would not be used. . . . We ordered the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union—missile forces, submarine forces, and others—to enter into a state of operational readiness, and also ordered the Warsaw Pact to assume a state of readiness. We decided to have all of our ships carrying weapons to Cuba turn back and to have our civilian vessels stay at sea until the situation surrounding the so-called quarantine was better understood. The question arose as to what would be done about the flotilla of submarines that was a three-day journey away from Cuba. I suggested that we avoid putting the flotilla in danger and keep them at a safe distance from Cuban shores. I reasoned that if they were to force their way through to Cuba they could be spotted —after which there could be a clash between our Navy and that of the Americans. Considering the prevailing atmosphere, all of this would have made things worse still, possibly giving rise to a serious crisis. Khrushchev agreed, but the minister of defense spoke out against this position and was backed by two or three members of the Presidium of the Central Committee. Consequently, my proposal was rejected. We then took a lunch break. I told Nikita Sergeyevich over lunch that “I have thought long and hard and believe we should bring up our talk about the submarine issue again. . . .” Nikita Sergeyevich, not saying anything, gave no objection. Later on, after everyone had reconvened, he said that Mikoyan once more proposes that the submarine matter be discussed. I expressed my reasoning, but the same comrades opposed and, once more, my proposal was shot down. I was convinced that I was right and considered that the matter had been improperly rejected. As such, I looked for a different way to return to the topic, not on that day, but the next. I introduced solid arguments in support of my proposal, but Malinovsky said that the submarines would be able to reach Cuban waters undetected. In turn, I noted that Cuban waters there are not deep but treacherous, there are a lot of islands, and it would be extremely difficult to get there without being noticed.

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Although it was obvious that he didn’t know what he was talking about, Malinovsky stood his ground. It looked like he later recounted all of this for Gorshkov [commander of the country’s Naval Forces], and Gorshkov is well versed in this type of matter and is responsible for the outcome. That evening’s meeting, at which Malinovsky gave a presentation, was attended by Gorshkov. I asked Gorshkov if he could tell where our submarines were located and if they could advance further. Using the map, Gorshkov astutely showed us the location of the vessels and their forward movement. He pointed out that in one place the vessels would have to pass through a narrow strait next to a small island hosting an American base with a radar station and other instruments. It would be impossible to pass through the strait unnoticed. From this standpoint, he considered it expedient to keep the flotilla at the distance of a two- or three-day journey from Cuba. Malinovsky couldn’t possibly object. Everyone was in agreement. It was very fortuitous that Malinovsky had brought Gorshkov along to the meeting. Having prevented a misstep that the minister of defense wanted to take, Gorshkov provided a valuable service. On October 27 or 28, we received a ciphered message from our ambassador to Cuba, Alekseyev, expressing the dissatisfaction of the Cuban leadership with our position. Whereas we had been told that only some of the Cuban comrades misunderstood the Soviet Union’s position, Fidel Castro told our ambassador that the Cuban people as a whole didn’t understand our position. . . . Nikita Sergeyevich said: there you go, he doesn’t get the fact that we saved them from an invasion. We saved them and he doesn’t understand our politics. Don’t try to explain this through letters, or else they won’t understand anything at all. We should send someone over there and clearly explain everything. I listened to him in silence and felt that he was speaking truthfully, but it seems that he took my silence for doubt as to whether or not we should go there. Addressing me, he said “You should go.” I said “It isn’t up to me if I should go—I’m ready, but only if it’s necessary.” He started talking about how they know me there, how I have visited and met with them before. It would be easier for me to explain the situation for them and make a strong case. I said that I was ready. When I left, I immediately instructed Aeroflot to prepare an airplane, and also instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take care of the necessary paperwork and visas. Khrushchev suggested that on my trip I should stop off for a day in New York as if to accidentally meet up with my old acquaintances McCloy and Stevenson, who happened to work on matters related to Cuba. I would then continue from New York to Havana.

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I said that Aeroflot had been instructed to fly on the next day at night so that I would arrive in New York during the daytime. The British quickly consented to our landing at Prestwick. The Canadians permitted us to fly over, but the clearance couldn’t be given immediately, perhaps within six hours; . . . that is to say that I would have to spend the night in New York and ruin my plans. . . . I phoned our ambassador in Ottawa so that he would get in touch with [Canadian foreign] minister [Howard] Green. . . . The Americans didn’t give me a visa in New York and as for flying across America, they dragged their feet in making a decision about the plane’s landing in New York and didn’t give permission. . . . After an appeal by Dobrynin, the State Department called within about fifteen minutes and granted permission to land.

We departed on October 31 aboard an Il-18—a specially designed jet-engine passenger aircraft with a modest sleeping area for two people, as well as work space for six people with armchairs that faced one another. The small delegation consisted of one of Mikoyan’s aides, the well-balanced, educated, and intelligent Vasili Chistov, as well as the head of security and bodyguard, Sergei Kryukov. I went in the capacity of a personal secretary. Roman Karmen, the most distinguished Soviet documentary maker, was also with us. It would seem that he had been in every one of the most dangerous places possible for a Soviet director, beginning with the Republic of Spain during the period 1936–38. He lived life to the fullest and was a jovial individual. Although he was older, no one would have sensed it. We had already been friends for a long time and I called him, like all his friends, Rimoy. We sat next to each other for the entire trip. After the trip, he made an impressive film, When the World Was Hanging by a Thread. Nikolai Chigir, a correspondent and friend from TASS who had already worked in Cuba, also flew with us. We landed in New York at midday. They housed my father at 680 Park Avenue in a luxurious villa, in a luxurious locale, belonging to the USSR’s Mission to the United Nations. I remembered all this from my visit in 1959. Right there in that magnificent villa my father immediately set out to deliberate with the first deputy minister of foreign affairs, V. V. Kuznetzov; the ambassador to the United Nations and Central Committee member, Valerian Zorin; and Yuri Zhukov, a journalist from Pravda who had incidentally been included in the USSR’s group of negotiators. It is also possible that my father went on to meet with his American colleagues McCloy and Stevenson. Everyone else was placed in a small guesthouse sitting opposite the Council of Foreign Relations. Come morning, Mikoyan already had important meetings to attend, the most important of which were talks with the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, and President Kennedy’s personal representative tasked with crisis management, John McCloy. My father had known both these officials since his trip to the United States in January 1959. My father met with Stevenson at the Lawyer’s Club of Chicago, where an auditorium of almost a thousand people was

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constantly engulfed in laughter due to jokes made by Mikoyan and Stevenson. Both of them were, as they say, in great form. The serious subject of U.S.-Soviet relations was touched upon in an atmosphere of good humor and general merriment. Troyanovsky did an excellent job of translating and conveying my father’s humor to the audience. My father also had only the best memories about McCloy, whose acquaintance he also made while in New York in 1959: McCloy and I had maintained especially good relations since 1959. He treated me incredibly well, with kindness, affinity, and respect. He himself was very wise, intelligent, and collected. As such, our relations became special, even better than those with Stevenson, although everything with him went well, too. This also became clear during our stop in New York. We met with each other as if we were old friends. Overall, Stevenson conducted himself fairly well, although from time to time he took unwarranted steps in an attempt to exert pressure. Apparently this was prompted by his post as ambassador to the United Nations. Kennedy had absolutely put Stevenson in a difficult position. But of course, the ambassador to the United Nations has to follow every order issued by the State Department, even if that ambassador is Stevenson. Bureaucrats had given him his instructions; . . . what was he supposed to do? The whole time I remained focused on how I could achieve a mutual agreement on control over the removal of missiles. Fidel Castro had already clearly announced, both in print and to U Thant, that he would not allow any control on Cuban territory whatsoever—not even in Cuban territorial waters. He conceded to control only on the basis of a mutual arrangement. But just try and persuade the Americans to go along with that! Likewise, go ahead and try to convince Fidel to back away from issues of fundamental importance not only to him, but to Cuba as an independent state. But if the Cubans could not allow American inspectors on their territory, then we could not allow their presence aboard our vessels. All the while, the Americans demanded the former and the latter. The Central Committee empowered me to talk some sense into Fidel on the subject of on-theground inspections. Knowing Fidel, I imagined how difficult, if not impossible, this would be. It stands to reason that McCloy also understood that the primary purpose of our talks was to reach some sort of compromise. Accordingly, during our conversation he leaked an extremely valuable thought, which I caught but pretended not to notice. It could be that he let the cat out of the bag accidentally. He could then deny having leaked anything, claiming that the others didn’t understand what had been said. Yet, taking his intellect and experience into consideration, I interpreted it as having been intentional, hinting at a possible way out of our current position. Then he would repeat what had been said. I wanted him to repeat his thought again so that it wouldn’t disappear, so that I could ask him to agree to the version to which he had alluded. Because he was in constant contact with Presi-

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dent Kennedy, our consent would immediately have the strength of a bilateral agreement. In this case, Cuba’s consent wasn’t necessary. McCloy repeated his idea. He said that if push comes to shove, if we reach a dead end, control over the removal of missiles could be done visually by American ships, which would approach our ships in international waters—that is, beyond Cuban waters. Knowing perfectly well that Cuba had declined every single compromise proposed by U Thant (concerning inspections by the UN, the Red Cross, and so on), I painstakingly mulled over how to approach the matter for the duration of our flight and while in New York. And then there was McCloy’s proposal. That proposal, or, more accurately, the idea encapsulated in the proposal, offered a real way out of a position that was seemingly inescapable when the United States began to seek a pretext for a strike on Cuba. However, stemming from the agreement reached in Moscow and from the formal orders of the Central Committee, I was expected to talk Fidel into agreeing with on-the-ground inspections by UN inspectors, the Red Cross, or Latin American envoys from countries without hostile relations with Cuba. All of these options were completely different from one another. This would have expedited the preparation and announcement in the United Nations of a proper document from the two powers, or a separate document from each of them, as well as one from Cuba. I was certain that without inspections on U.S. territory of the dismantling of émigré camps that had been built in preparation for an invasion, Havana wouldn’t agree to any of the options for on-the-ground inspections. Without a doubt, the United States also would have categorically rejected mutual inspections. Thus, a dead end would have been reached. But I still considered convincing Fidel Castro to be an expedient move. Castro would resolutely say “no” and he would have a sense of victory. After this it would be easier to convince him to agree with something else. If at one point he were to stand his ground, it would be psychologically easier for him to compromise at another time. It wasn’t in his character to constantly surrender. The same could be said about Ernesto “Che” Guevara, who I also knew quite well. I figured that other leaders would be easier to persuade since they were less expansive and more inclined to deliberation in an argument. The positions taken by Fidel and Che would be particularly important for such leaders. I decided to use the same tactic with the Americans. I would first insist on a position that they couldn’t possibly accept, perhaps the notion of mutual inspections on American territory. In several instances, only demanding the maximum, at least it would be possible to achieve the minimum. After the meeting with McCloy and Stevenson in the building housing our Mission to the UN, I made such a decision: publicly reject demands made by the United States in relation to onthe-ground inspections and come out in support of Fidel’s “five points,” which had just been transmitted by radio and in writing to U Thant. There had been no time to send Moscow a copy.

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Castro’s “five points” occupied an important place in the history of the crisis; therefore, it is appropriate to repeat them here: (1) an end to the economic blockade and other measures placing economic pressure on the entire world; (2) an end to all subversive action, landings by diversionary groups, weapons shipments onto Cuban territory, the penetration of saboteurs and spies into Cuba from U.S. territory and from the territory of other participating countries; (3) an end to acts of piracy against Cuba from U.S. and Puerto Rican territory; (4) an end to the violation of the waters and airspace of Cuba by U.S. naval vessels and aircraft; and (5) a U.S. departure from the military base in Guantánamo and the return of Cuban territory occupied by the United States. Fidel obviously rushed me to warn about his position, since he gave this speech in the morning [Sunday, October 28], while I was expected to arrive in Havana that very evening. There had been no time to send a copy to Moscow. Straightaway in the airport, immediately before my flight to Havana, I came out with an announcement in support of Fidel’s “five points.” I think this was extremely helpful in establishing a friendly atmosphere for the commencement of our talks as well as changing the Cuban leadership’s demeanor. Not to mention, it was useful for the Americans to hear my position—they would be prepared to compromise. My statements made at the airport in New York drastically changed our meeting at the airport in Havana, and subsequent talks, for the better. Before my departure, Stevenson undertook the following escapade. He sent straight to the airport an envelope containing a letter about how they had forgotten to include Il-28 bombers and Mosquito motorboats in the number of offensive weapons! Unbelievable! “Forgot”! It was nothing more than impudence that had been imposed on him by the State Department. When Kuznetzov read me the letter beside the airplane, I said “Return this letter to whoever brought it and say that Mikoyan refused to so much as take this letter and that as far as he’s concerned, he hasn’t even seen it.” In that way, I unambiguously made it known that there could be no talks about this.

The entire spectacle at the airport occurred before my very eyes. The same is true for the meetings in the house of the USSR’s Mission to the UN. To be sure, I was not present at the talks, but in the space between them I met McCloy and greeted Stevenson as a longtime acquaintance. At some point in 1959. I was a guest in the home of Stevenson’s son, Adlai Jr., who I also met with later on when he became a congressman. I even hosted him in Moscow. After my father’s departure, the deputy minister of foreign affairs, Vasily Vasiliyevich Kuznetzov, and V. Zorin maintained an extremely decisive position. In a telegram to Moscow on November 7, they said: On November 5, we had a meeting with Stevenson and McCloy. . . . The Americans came to the meeting with the clear intention to put pressure on the Soviet side in order to get further concessions [their actions exactly followed the scenario that

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Castro had predicted —S.M.]. Throughout the conversation, which lasted more than three hours, they tried to make it appear as if the Soviet side had not shown willingness to fulfill the obligations regarding the Il-28 bombers and nuclear missiles and warheads stipulated in the exchange of messages between Cde. Khrushchev and President Kennedy. At the same time, the Americans avoided discussing issues related to carrying out the United States’ commitments. . . . Over half of the conversation was taken up by an exchange of views about the Il-28 bombers located in Cuba. . . . The essence of Stevenson and McCloy’s arguments on this subject was as follows: . . . Cde. Khrushchev in his letter from October 28 said that the Soviet government issued an order to dismantle and return to the Soviet Union weapons that “you call offensive.” The Americans want to categorize both missiles and jet bombers as offensive weapons. We pointed out to the Americans that if they bring up new questions, we can also bring up many questions, for example, about American military bases on foreign soil. But we do not do it, not wishing to complicate the negotiations. . . . Stevenson and McCloy said that an agreement cannot be reached without a decision to withdraw the Il-28 bombers from Cuba.6

Clearly, all tactical advantages in the negotiations were with the United States; the USSR had already dismantled the missiles, there was no more threat of retaliation from the island, and prolonging the conflict in that state only served Washington, giving it an opportunity to put forward new demands and abandon its previous concessions. For example, as mentioned above, Mikoyan described how McCloy himself, during the peak of the crisis, offered to set up control of the removal process by visually inspecting from American ships the missiles on Soviet ships. Now McCloy had seemingly forgotten about this. Kuznetsov had to remind him. At the same time, Kuznetsov and Zorin several times tried to get the Americans to discuss the assurance of security for Cuba and the removal of the quarantine. McCloy and Stevenson did seriously engage in this discussion, but not even to the extent they had in their past meetings: McCloy also read some intelligence information on Soviet submarines, which allegedly appeared in the Caribbean Sea between July and October. . . . I said that I did not know anything about submarines, but even if there were submarines, they were in international waters, where the ships of any country may sail. In accordance with your 1290 and 1306, I said that we have no objection to showing the Americans photographs of dismantled missiles, and missiles loaded onto ships. It was also said that we would not object to having American ships approach Soviet ones at close range in the open sea to observe the dismantled missiles on Soviet ships.

McCloy, of course, could not have forgotten that he had proposed this solution himself. Perhaps that is why he said that

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he believes that the Soviet Union is taking serious steps to provide an inspection, and is seeking to help resolve this issue if it proves to be impossible to arrange an onsite inspection in Cuba. He asked the Soviet Union to provide a schedule of departures of ships carrying special weapons, so the U.S. side could be prepared for inspections, should the president accept this proposal.

It had probably already been discussed with the president. Kuznetzov also touched upon the important issue of protocol, taking stock of the agreement between Khrushchev and Kennedy, which could have been handed over to the United Nations. It would have been very important in strengthening Kennedy’s promise not to attack Cuba. McCloy confirmed, suggesting that in one way or another this should have been done. Notwithstanding, McCloy’s common sense was obviously not to someone’s liking in Washington. First and foremost, it was not to the president’s liking, but because they always coordinated their positions there was no discord. For one reason or another, by the next day McCloy had already stopped talking about the document that would have solidified the guarantee not to attack Cuba. It was during those days that Mikoyan’s talks in Cuba began. The Soviet ambassador to Cuba, Aleksandr Alekseyev, a good friend after all we went through together, recalled how Castro had not planned to go to the airport. Formally speaking, he was not obligated to do so. “But I reminded him about 1960 [about Mikoyan’s arrival and everything it entailed —S.M.], and said that you don’t act like that with old friends, I mean it has nothing to do with protocol. You’ll offend Mikoyan.” Castro arrived with Ernesto “Che” Guevara, Osvaldo Dorticós, and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. I think my father was right with respect to the role of the announcement he gave before takeoff in New York. That very announcement was transmitted to Castro. Having made such an announcement, Mikoyan could have significantly weakened Castro’s impression of the secret agreement that had been reached by the two superpowers at Cuba’s expense. Nevertheless, his impression remained, and rightly so, but it was easier for him because Moscow had openly supported his demands against the United States. Later, in 1992, Fidel said as much. As a matter of fact, at that moment Moscow proper had no idea that it had supported these demands. Mikoyan told them a bit later.

Deciding in the Kremlin Mikoyan explained: However, regarding the bombers we had to back down, when they sent that kind of a demand to Moscow, Washington obviously understood that Khrushchev was on the verge of relenting. Not to mention, Kennedy set the condition that the blockade of Cuba would be ended only after the mandatory removal of the Il-28s by the USSR. In fairness, we resisted the possibility of removing the bombers, and

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not immediately either. This was done over the course of a month, which was good. It is possible that from the very beginning, when the missiles had not been dismantled, if the Americans had been reminded that nothing besides missiles had been mentioned in the agreement, then they wouldn’t have started to expand the list at the expense of the bombers and motorboats. It would have been possible to immediately and resolutely announce to the Americans that we would not stand for a fulfillment of the agreement that corresponds with their growing appetite. After all, from a military point of view, although they were theoretically capable of carrying nuclear weapons, the bombers were not only formally “light” but even outdated. They only would have been effective at defending Cuba from an attack, something that the Americans knew perfectly well. They couldn’t have possibly had any misgivings. There’s absolutely nothing to say about the Mosquito motorboat. Is that really some sort of offensive weapon? Indeed, the Americans were forced to back away from this last demand. Kennedy probably needed this for the domestic market—to show how strict he was with Cuba and the Soviet Union. The war hawks in government and military circles certainly must have exerted pressure on him as well. We received information to this effect from Dobrynin. This especially created significant difficulties for me in conducting talks with the Cubans, threatening the success of the talks right when we had seemingly made a positive breakthrough. All the same, I successfully won over Fidel. Khrushchev, having begun to back off, was not able to stop in time. If negotiators on the other side of the table detect such a psychological nuance, they certainly take advantage of it. So Kennedy imposed conditions, such as a continued blockade of Cuba, which the Cubans couldn’t accept. Kennedy definitely had an explanation: He had made mention of the Il-28 in his first radio address, despite the fact that it was mentioned in one of his last communications that missiles and other types of offensive weapons must be removed. As if to say that he precisely had the Il-28 in mind. It was all disputable. Still, in the announcement made by Khrushchev himself, which established the basis for an agreement, the Il-28s were not mentioned! The United States agreed to the conditions laid out in Khrushchev’s radio message. Had he firmly stated that these terms could not be disputed, Kennedy hardly would have pressed as he did. He could have spoken on this subject and had a laugh, for example, at our poor bombers. So when he raised the question of continuing the blockade, there was no longer any other way out. We didn’t have an adequate response to the continuation of the blockade. Even I agreed that we had to make a concession. When all was said and done, Fidel fairly easily agreed, too.

If we turn the discussion to the “light” Il-28 bombers and the Mosquito motorboats, in forming an acceptable expression, there was certainly a place for misunderstanding arising from the Kremlin’s unwise maneuvers and all the USSR’s propaganda that failed to call things as they were. An analogy would be the situation

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at the end of 1979—“a limited contingent of Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan.” No other phrase would be printed, nor any other accepted in official circles. The very same idiocy played a role during the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The word “missiles” was never directly uttered. The accepted phrase had been “weapons, which you call offensive.” Having denied their placement for so long, the Kremlin was embarrassed to use the word “missiles.” Such was the case, even after photographs of the missiles had spread all over the world! Besides, there was a certain subtext that the Kremlin considered these missiles to be defensive weapons. Such word games were useless insofar as the Kremlin had explicitly promised in a string of assurances not to deliver “surface-to-surface” missiles. Therefore, there was no longer any sense in the USSR’s gimmick to prove that the missiles had been placed for Cuba’s defense, and, as such, notwithstanding their offensive capabilities, that such missiles were “defensive weapons.” All the same, even Khrushchev himself did not back away from this position in the midst of the crisis, regardless of the fact that the entire world knew what had prompted the crisis in the first place. In his telegrams, and in the last message transmitted by radio, the word “missiles” was never used, although there was already a need for precise wording. Messages were composed in different ways. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs would prepare the basic document, from which Khrushchev and other members of the Politburo would continue. Then Khrushchev dictated his text and sent it on for editing by “specialists in the sphere of ideology,” such as L. F. Iliyichev and L. M. Zamyatin. There were no scholarly, comprehensive discussions of thoughts, linguistic constructions, words, or phrases—although such discussions were very much needed. No matter how talented Khrushchev may have been at dictating, he simply could not have such excessive discussions. Meanwhile, editing was essentially only stylistic—fearing Khrushchev’s reaction, the poor ideologists did not do anything else. Unfortunately, the Presidium of the Central Committee after the purges, led by Khrushchev in July 1957, saw the introduction of new members on the merits of their personal ties and allegiances—although this may sound ironic, after October 19647—and could not support a full-fledged and balanced discussion of everything that Khrushchev said and wrote. Bona fide experts were not gathered (Malinovsky and Biruzov were not even halfhearted experts). In this sense, Washington’s ExComm was a vastly more effective and productive collective body. But why? First and foremost, there was continued inertia in the Kremlin to agree with the first secretary, a habit formed under Stalin in the mid-1930s. There was a place for arguments in the days of “collective leadership,” that is, from March 1953 through July 1957. However, after the emergence of Khrushchev’s “cult of personality,” only Mikoyan continued to argue with Khrushchev, both in private and during Politburo meetings. Even Sergei Khrushchev wrote, with apparent annoyance, that “Anastac Ivanovich always has a personal opinion on everything.”8 It

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would seem that if every member of the Presidium had always had his own point of view, then arguments would have seen the emergence of truth. It was such a shame that other members of the Presidium either lacked an opinion, or, if they did have one, did not have the courage to express it if it differed from the leader’s own view. Sergei Khrushchev is not restrained in his descriptions of the decisiveness and strong-willed character of Nikita Sergeyevich (and on this topic, he is undoubtedly correct), noting that Mikoyan had no peers as a diplomat, but that he lacked the decisiveness and resolve to immediately crush the rebellion in Hungary, for example. Such criticism was acceptable only if instead of decisiveness and resolve—which were not found in Mikoyan—different terminology was used, such as “cruelty” and “dogmatism.” Khrushchev’s strong-willed qualities were wonderful during the period of de-Stalinization, and thank God he had them. However, such qualities reached the point of absurdity when considering normal issues, such as the exploration of virgin lands, corn production, and the struggle with excessive building for the sake of developing housing on a large scale. The same was true when dealing with unique matters, such as missiles in Cuba, which demanded a genuinely collective, balanced discussion. Needless to say, I am describing what could tentatively be characterized as Khrushchev’s own “cult of personality.” Such a characterization is extremely tentative, because there was a massive difference between Stalin’s cult of personality and that of Khrushchev. Under Khrushchev, and thanks to Khrushchev, the fear of repression typical of Stalin’s cult of personality vanished. If only because Khrushchev did away with the “Great Terror,” the entire country should owe him a debt of gratitude. The fear of repression also disappeared for members of the Presidium, but they were still subject to the bureaucratic abasement on the nomenklatura ladder. Although such a consideration was no longer a matter of life or death, it was still influential for those in positions of leadership. Khrushchev himself composed a list of future Presidium members, by hand, and did not consult with anyone else. He only occasionally showed Mikoyan the list for the purpose of receiving advice. The unilateral decision about the membership of the Presidium was a major, but not exclusive, argument in favor of agreeing with everything said by the first secretary. After all this, how could their actions in October 1964 be condemned? From my perspective, his removal represented a large loss for the development of the USSR’s society, but for its Communist Party elite, it was liberation. Even Stalin was at times capable of showing greater patience for the views of Politburo members than Khrushchev did in the later stages of his career. Occasionally, he would propose straightforward discussion in hopes of verifying his own thoughts without revealing them. The proposed membership list for the Politburo was always discussed with his members, except for the last one in 1952. Then people would speak out. Khrushchev, conversely, preferred to talk

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first, nullifying any such discussion. I would think that he was smart enough to understand this; he just never doubted the correctness of his own thoughts and decisions. Meanwhile, while discussing the missile crisis, allowing for open discussion was simply essential, just as it was essential while deciding on the shipment of missiles to Cuba. There also should have been face-to-face discussions between the country’s leaders and experts (military, diplomats, Central Committee consultants, KGB representatives). Yet Khrushchev’s character, following a Kremlin tradition, rendered this sort of discussion impossible. From Mikoyan’s earlier story, it is apparent that the presence of Naval Commander Admiral Gorshkov at even one meeting was explained by the fact that “Malinovsky brought him along.” He could have just as easily decided not to bring him. In the Kremlin, immediately after Kennedy’s October 22 speech to the American people, judging by the notes of the head of the General Department of the Central Committee, V. N. Malin, the following brief discussion took place between Malinovsky and Khrushchev: Comrade Malinovsky: I don’t think that the United States can immediately take military action. Obviously, the radio [and television] address was just a campaign stunt. . . . I don’t think that we’re in a position where we have to put the missiles on an hour’s notice. Comrade Khrushchev: I agree with Malinovsky’s conclusions. The thing is we don’t want to unleash a war. We wanted to intimidate and contain the United States vis-à-vis Cuba. The difficulty rests in the fact that we didn’t focus on everything that we wanted and failed to announce an agreement. Tragically, they can attack and we will respond. It can spill out into a massive war.9

In states that have enjoyed the development of a political system sanctifying long-held traditions, discussions takes shape differently. “The model of governmental politics,” wrote Graham Allison, “is not seen by a single actor, but rather by many actors. . . . The apparatus of every national government represents a difficult, complex arena for interstate games. . . . Besides this central arena, consistent concentric circles branch out from it, capturing narrower levels of officials in the use of power, the press, nongovernmental organizations, and society. The struggle in internal circles helps to set the stage for decisionmaking by players capable of influencing choices made by the government and also actions taken in response to the business of the day.”10 It is clear that in the period of secret discussions, “concentric circles” shrank. But a comparison of the discussions in Moscow from May to October 1962 and those in Washington from October 16 to 22 speaks for itself. It was exceptionally fortuitous for analysts and historians that extensive notes and even secret tape recordings were made of the discussions. If Kennedy had spoken openly about this secret taping system, the nature of discussion could have changed; someone might have started speaking, perhaps, “for history.” The Kremlin did not keep

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recordings at all, not even Malin, who by profession should have known everything and, for that reason, considerations of secrecy did not play a role. It was not so much about elevated secrecy; no one suspected that Malin would leak information. There was simply no need for detailed recordings of what the leader said, and that with which everyone else in the chorus agreed, going up to an unseen upper echelon, for which few of them were prepared, or had adequate experience, education, or intellect. Talk about “concentric circles” of specialists! Even when the special secrecy faded away, none of the specialists from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could participate in the discussions taking place in the Kremlin or Novo-Ogarovo (on the last day), with the exception of the minister, Gromyko, who was already trained to avoid contradicting the head of the state. Of course, someone could have meekly proposed to clarify the wording of the agreement with the United States, but his voice would likely have gone unheard. But it was so essential! At this point, there no longer should have been a place for the imprint of bygone public and private announcements that had left their mark on the propaganda-based selection of input. For this very reason, no one suggested that, instead of “weapons, which you call offensive,” to formulate that they precisely had in mind “missile launch sites, R-12 missiles, and corresponding nuclear warheads.” No one was capable of escaping this inertia, even at the most crucial moment—not even Kuznetzov, who, in his secret messages to the Kremlin, spoke of “special weapons”! This unjustifiable habit of the USSR’s higher-ups played into the Americans’ hand. They thought they could declare anything they wanted as being “offensive.” It is incredible, then, that they did not demand the removal of imported tanks and AK-47s from Cuba. After all, they could “consider to be offensive weapons” anything they wanted. Still better, after the Il-28, Kennedy put a stop to his fleet of aides from the Department of Defense and Department of State, having said: “I do not intend to push the Russians even an inch further than what is necessary.”11 Unfortunately, the State Department and other authorities in Washington, doing everything possible to expand their list of demands, hardly maintained this approach—especially with the Il-28s. Raymond Garthoff personally took responsibility, because at that time he had been a young bureaucrat in the State Department, and on October 29 he composed a memorandum confirmed by Alexis Johnson and Dean Rusk. The memorandum recalled that the Il-28s had been mentioned by the president in his televised address to the American people on October 22. Llewellyn Thompson, in the ExComm, also referred to this—saying that Khrushchev “having swallowed a camel would also swallow a fly.” Kennedy agreed with the position taken at the November 2 ExComm meeting (and that was why Stevenson’s letter was brought directly to the airport to be given to Mikoyan!), although earlier—on October 20—he had said that bombers “don’t bother me” and he did not intend to insist on their removal.12 From the looks of it, he was forced to rethink his decision when he remembered that he had mentioned them in his address to the American people. Yet the bombers were not

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mentioned by Khrushchev in his October 27 telegram, containing the terms to which Kennedy had consented. All this can be interpreted in various ways; however, the spirit of every set of talks suggested that discussions were exclusively focused on missiles. Bombers were mentioned later on by the president, and while the matter was already under way, the list helped the Americans force Moscow to remove as many weapons as possible. It seems to me that Mikoyan did the right thing at the airport in New York. It was possible to abandon this line. If Khrushchev had only persevered and refused to talk about the issue, as Mikoyan had done, or told the American leadership that the Mosquito motorboats and bombers belonged to the Cuban government (this could have been done at the time, but it would not have been completely true), then Washington would have swallowed the pill. Or if it had been necessary for Washington to enter into negotiations with Havana, that in and of itself would have represented a political victory. Washington understood that the very terminology that was being abused had been thought up by Moscow. Moreover, the perseverance of a negotiator often depends upon an awareness of the negotiator’s correctness or incorrectness. We left Idlewild Airport13—later known as John F. Kennedy Airport—in an uncertain situation. The gangway was crowded with journalists carrying microphones. My father gave a short statement in support of Castro’s five points. It was still later that the incident with Stevenson’s letter took place, when Mikoyan refused to accept the letter and returned it to the sender. This incident amazed me insofar as, at face value, it seemed to be an obvious mistake: During the many hours spent negotiating, neither McCloy nor Stevenson had so much as mentioned the Il-28. It turns out that they “forgot.” In fact, at one of our conferences, Garthoff confirmed that Stevenson indeed forgot about the Il-28. This was absolutely telling. It is only possible to forget about something that is not very important and that had not been discussed earlier. In all likelihood, Kennedy probably only remembered after being reminded by Rusk and Thompson. Their arrival and assembly were known even before October 16 by U.S. aerial surveillance, but there were no protests or agitations in Washington. Therefore, their delivery to the island was also known. The Il-28 issue came to be of the utmost importance to Kennedy due to rising accusations of “spinelessness” from those who insisted on striking Cuba even after the agreement was made with Khrushchev to remove the missiles. Regarding the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, everyone was officially put in a state of “full military readiness,” with the possible exception of a few troops on leave. Everyone else privately took measures following orders passed down the military chain of command. This was possibly the only wise decision made by the Kremlin or the Ministry of Defense during the entire period of the crisis; it showed American intelligence and the Pentagon that the USSR was not planning a preventive strike.

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Robert Kennedy, in response to a suggestion that the American leadership be placed in government bunkers in Washington, refused, saying: “If it comes to that, 60 million Americans will be killed and as many or more Russians. I’m better off staying at Hickory Hill [the Kennedy estate in McLean, Virginia, in suburban Washington].” During the crisis, it was apparent that the entire world was close to disappearing in terms of a “functioning society.” By the laws of radiation, it is widely known that the remainder of the world beyond the strike targets would have had to await a slower, although no less torturous, death.

7 Storm Clouds Over Havana

Havana’s Military Aesthetic

W

e flew into Havana at twilight. What a contrast compared with 1960! Back then, this was a lovely white city flooded with sunlight and opulent tropical greenery. When we arrived, a city that had extinguished its lights in case of an air strike was presumably hidden behind the expansive darkness. The airport’s usual crowd of musicians in straw hats with guitars and folk instruments had been replaced by a handful of people with serious countenances. Still, they smiled as they welcomed us at the gangway. Fidel briefly greeted Mikoyan before shaking hands with everyone else. My father was then invited to ride in his own car. Besides the interpreter, V. Tikhmenev, I do not remember exactly who drove with him. I was invited to ride with Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. Although he spoke English well, attempts to converse with him were not very successful. He was understandably gloomy and gave dismissive, one-word responses. Havana looked nothing like the city that I remembered from my last trip. Twin-barreled antiaircraft guns and artillery crews in olive-colored fatigues were found everywhere from public squares to rooftops. There were patrols on the streets. Of course, there were passers-by, too, but nothing typical for Cuba. Were there happy groups of young people? Pretty mulattos proudly strolling around the Malecon? Subdued, yet playful, conversation among residents in their gardens? All gone. All that remained was an atmosphere of anxiety that, unwittingly, even conveyed itself to me. The Cubans had every reason to expect an attack before the crisis, too. Even in Moscow, we felt the atmosphere fill with a sense of alarm. In January 1962, at the conference in Punta del Este, the Organization of American States had virtually expelled Cuba from its ranks. This had been done through extremely strong pres173

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sure from the United States through Rusk. Such action could be perceived as a diplomatic precursor to aggression. Brigades of Cubans from Florida were dispatched with greater and greater frequency in order to commit acts of sabotage. Still, it was apparent to everyone that Kennedy could not repeat the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. On the contrary, the United States needed to wash away this shameful stain and effectively “get rid of Castro.” As such, the next invasion would be supported by the U.S. military on a scale that would guarantee success—that is, an overthrow of the revolutionary government and the imposition of military control over the island’s territory. At that time, Moscow still did not know about the approval of Operation Mongoose or the establishment of a special committee (the Special Group, Augmented) led by Robert Kennedy, which was responsible for acts of sabotage and preparations for the invasion of Cuba. It is likely, however, that the Cuban security services knew a great deal about Operation Mongoose—they had agents among the Cuban émigré community in Miami. Of course, it is not a stretch to take Castro at face value when he notes that up until the spring of 1962, he had been convinced that the United States was planning an invasion of Cuba. Such a conviction was also present in Moscow. Washington, it seemed, was not concealing its plans: “Several weeks later, American reporters were invited to a huge military exercise off the southeast coast of Puerto Rico designed to liberate a mythical republic controlled by a dictator named Ortsac—Castro spelled backward.”1 Unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy attempted to see events from a Latin American perspective, with all its problems and needs. In 1960 he published a book, The Strategy of Peace, in which he wrote that “Fidel Castro is part of the legacy of Bolivar, who led his people across the Andes Mountains proclaiming ‘a fight to the death’ against Spanish dominance, saying that wherever a goat will go, the army will go there, too.”2 Moreover, Kennedy considered Cuba to be in need of a revolution, but of course one with a different outcome. Despite his desire to have a “different Cuba” within reach, President Kennedy understood that liberation movements along the lines of the July 26 Movement could spread to a significant portion of Latin America. What is more, this idea had occurred to many in Washington. On the basis of this idea, Kennedy proposed, and Congress approved, the Alliance for Progress. All this allows the conclusion to be drawn that Kennedy understood the driving forces of the Cuban Revolution and their potential resonance in Latin America much better than his predecessor. So, while only military commanders continued to discuss the plan for an invasion with U.S. troops or a naval blockade, everyone discussed sabotage and landing groups of rebels, after which—to “help the people’s uprising”—strong U.S. military units would need to land. This final step was drawn up in the second half of October 1962 and was meant to secure a democratic majority in the upcoming congressional elections following a triumph in Cuba.

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Upon my invitation to participate in a discussion for the Moscow periodical Latin America some twenty-five years later, the renowned Latin America expert Cole Blasier noted that for the United States, Cuba was not just a foreign policy issue but also a domestic policy issue.3 Truth be told, those of us in Moscow did not quite realize the extent to which this was correct. Nobody wanted to come to terms with the fact that Castro enjoyed the support of an overwhelming majority of the population. Herbert Matthews, who had visited Cuba many times, estimated support for Castro as being around 75 to 80 percent even seven to ten years after the Revolution. Stunningly, in the summer of 1962 the CIA confidently estimated support for Castro at only 20 percent.4 Because the American Embassy in Havana had already closed, the CIA depended upon wild guesses and speculation from Cuban émigrés who harbored resentment for the Revolution. So, for all intents and purposes, no “local sources” of any value whatsoever could be relied upon. The myth about a potential “people’s uprising” made up of millions of Cubans dissatisfied with Castro was made up by emigrés and then supported by official U.S. propaganda, a result of which was widespread belief among official circles in their own propaganda—a phenomenon that is frequently encountered in many states, including the Soviet Union. The dead-on-arrival plans for a “people’s uprising,” which had been put to such unfortunate use by Kennedy in April 1961, were resuscitated to serve political objectives simply because there was nothing else. Additionally, perhaps one could look to the advice that Nixon gave Kennedy: Find a more-or-less suitable legal cover and invade the island with U.S. forces; that is, obliterate the Castro regime directly with military might.5 The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, headed by General Lyman Lemnitzer (Maxwell Taylor’s predecessor), advocated a quick “resolution” of the Cuba question, not even bothering to seriously reflect upon the appropriate grounds for such action. On April 10, 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara regarding a massive American invasion of Cuba. Attached to the memorandum was an addendum titled “Pretenses for U.S. Intervention in Cuba,” which was meant to provide peace of mind for the civilian side of government. Over the course of five pages, five operations were proposed in order to justify U.S. intervention in the eyes of the public: 1. Organize an attack on the base at Guantánamo by “friendly Cuban” forces. 2. Organize an explosion on a boat without passengers in close proximity to a large Cuban city. 3. Describe a “Communist Cuban terror campaign” in the Miami region. 4. Establish a weapons stash in a Caribbean country, then dispatch jets that have been painted with identifiable Cuban insignia so that they look like MiGs. 5. Detonate a remote-controlled American plane that has been substituted for a chartered civilian flight; the list of passengers will consist of fictitious names.6

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Before August 8, 1962, another secret document concerning the consequences of a military intervention in Cuba, where the military consequences were interpreted on the basis of the weapons in Cuba’s possession, was prepared and presented to the Kennedy administration. The assessment was given that the Cuban army only had defensive capabilities, and therefore American territory was in no way threatened. Yet in Cuba itself, after bitter resistance in designated areas, there would be a drawn-out civil war. In point (d), it was said: “In the future the CastroCuban capability for counteraction will improve if Soviet’s [sic] continue to provide the Cubans with additional military equipment and training. Thus, the urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro’s constantly increasing capabilities.”7 Notwithstanding continuous CIA attempts to get rid of Castro, with the passage of time the moderate notion of establishing unofficial contacts with the Cuban leadership dawned on both of the Kennedy brothers. They came to the same conclusion that was reached by Senator J. William Fulbright and set forth in a memorandum: Either eliminate the regime or come to terms with it. As Fulbright indicated at that time, Cuba did not pose any threat to the United States itself. The Alliance for Progress must liquidate the threat to stability in Latin America. Castro, he believed, was a “’thorn in the flesh, but it is not a dagger in the heart.”8 It could be that they gave heed to the wise words of the patriarch of American journalism, Walter Lippmann: “For the thing we should never do in dealing with revolutionary countries, in which the world abounds, is to push them behind an iron curtain raised by ourselves. On the contrary, even when they have been seduced and subverted and are drawn across the line, the right thing to do is keep the way open for their return.”9

War or Peace? Although we took part in a joint television interview during a conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in October 1987, Robert McNamara and I had somewhat different recollections. He said: “If I had been in the Kremlin at that time, I also would have thought that the United States was preparing an invasion of Cuba. But it wasn’t the case. We didn’t plan on doing this.” I responded: “That’s hard to believe, but now that McNamara says it, I believe him because he’s an honest person.” Still, documents from recorded ExComm conversations had not been published at that time. Later, it was proven that indeed McNamara had personally been opposed to an invasion in 1962 and that John and Robert Kennedy had been of the same opinion. McNamara also repeated his sentiment at conferences in Havana in 1992 and 2002, saying that the Cuban government had every reason to consider an invasion as being a fait accompli. Military personnel had done all the preparations for an invasion, but a political decision never came about—Kennedy was against it.

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Although an invasion plan was considered and prepared, in the midst of the crisis it could never be implemented! But the view that another resolution should be sought, allowing for a peaceful outcome, was shared by the Kennedy brothers, Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, Llewellyn Thompson, Theodore Sorensen, and others—who triumphed with a majority of eleven to six. One way or another, the matter was not settled with a vote. The president gave the final and decisive word. John F. Kennedy was sufficiently wise and mature to appreciate the thought of the famous English military strategist Liddell Hart: “Never corner an opponent, and always assist him to save his face. Put yourself in his shoes—so as to see things through his eyes.”10 Senator Mike Mansfield spoke common sense: Without economic progress, “Castroism is likely to spread elsewhere in Latin America whether or not Castro remains in power in Cuba.” Robert Kennedy understood this, and elaborated upon the senator’s logic: “If reforms, social, economic and political, are put into effect, then Communism and Castroism will collapse in Latin America.”11 Concerning the ongoing secret war and planned open war in 1962, there was much public and private discussion by a vast number of people in government— Congress, the CIA, the Department of Defense—in the midst of well-informed journalists. As such, Soviet intelligence could not help but know the details of these undertakings. The same thing happened in the spring of 1961. The “war party” did everything possible to make itself known to others. Naturally, everyone from members of the KGB and GRU (Soviet military intelligence) to Cuban intelligence knew. What the KGB, GRU, and Cuban intelligence did not know, however, was that when the idea of invading reached a critical point, President Kennedy put an end to it and refused to give the order to act. Kennedy only told his closest advisers that he was not planning an invasion. In the company of his Cabinet, he simply said that there would be no invasion in the next three months. His statement was made in early October 1962—a month after Senator Kenneth Keating announced the presence of Soviet missiles on the island and criticized the inaction of the president, and several days before the very same missiles were sighted. Although bellicose plans were well known, episodes of restraint—for instance, disagreement by key players, such as McNamara—were completely unknown. Indeed, if one attentively reads through the available literature and memoirs on this subject, it seems that at times attempts at taking action were impeded by a strange collection of factors: the apathy of some, the ignorance of others about how to forgo the issue, and a failure to work with Cuban émigrés by still a third group. In essence, these are the very factors with which intelligence agencies are least capable of coming to terms. Unlike public announcements about discussions at different official levels, signals were given by the extent of Cuban emigration. All this was noted by Soviet and Cuban intelligence operatives and placed on the desks of politicians in Moscow and Havana. A general picture was painted,

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which could be reduced to a single, indisputable image: The United States was prepared to put an end to revolutionary Cuba with armed force. But this picture was completely flawed. To succeed, the U.S. military command had to attack with all branches of the armed forces. The operation would have had to begin with a strike by two army paratrooper divisions. After the first strikes by air and sea, transfers of tanks from Fort Benning (Georgia) and Fort Hood (Texas) would be under way, along with deployments of marines from Georgia, Oklahoma, and Kentucky.12 The primary objective of the invasion, as it had been since April 1961, was to take Castro alive; but if that proved to be impossible, to kill him. The same objectives were established with respect to Ernesto “Che” Guevara. It is true that an “evacuation” of Raul Castro was even proposed—one can only guess what this meant in CIA jargon. For its preparations, Cuba constructed underground bomb shelters and bunkers of different sorts, trained officers with various specialties in Soviet academies, mobilized the civilian population as reservists, and so forth. The Soviet Union gave Cuba tanks and planes, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), miscellaneous antiaircraft weaponry, radar equipment, and so on and so forth. Cuba was prepared to defend itself to the last soldier, and the United States understood that the operation would be no walk in the park. In fact, it would cost American forces dearly and also inflict significant damage on the United States in international opinion. Algerian president Ben Bella spoke with Kennedy about such an inevitable and catastrophic loss of prestige while visiting Washington on the eve of the crisis. After visiting Washington, Ben Bella paid a visit to Cuba during the full throes of the crisis and enjoyed a friendly conversation with Castro.13 Ben Bella, by the way, also warned Castro that Cuba should be extremely cautious about assisting other Latin American peoples with their struggles for national liberation. It would seem that precisely a loss of prestige and the infliction of damage on a global level stopped Kennedy, or forced Kennedy to stop his “war hawks.” Kennedy was too intelligent and too modern to follow the maxim used by the Roman emperor Caligula: “Let them hate us, as long as they fear us.” However, the logic of political struggle within the United States, and also the ignition of the war machine, could drive him to the edge, where he would no longer be capable of controlling the war machine or putting off an invasion of Cuba. Following the arrival of Soviet military contingents and missiles in Cuba, Washington had no idea what to expect in the event of an invasion. A total of 42,000 servicemen from practically every branch of the Soviet military, along with generals and other officers, were prepared to rebuff an American landing. When Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and I drove around the streets of a pitch-black Havana, I already knew something about the prepared invasion of Cuba from what my father had told me. Moreover, a basic understanding of history had taught me that the United States would not calm down after the Bay of Pigs. It was

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clear that this time the United States would come down on the island with the full might of its own military, leaving no room for Cuban immigrants. They would only be remembered when it became necessary to proclaim the founding of a “democratic” government. There was no doubt in my mind that the Cubans would courageously resist such an invasion in every trench, home, and sugarcane thicket. The losses would be massive on both sides. Such was the dreary perspective as seen by many people in the Soviet Union and Cuba from the beginning of 1962. In reality, the most likely moment for an invasion of Cuba, albeit for different reasons, was October 16–28, 1962. For the first week of the crisis, from October 16 to 22, President Kennedy and ExComm discussed in complete secrecy what to do about the detected missiles. It is known from recovered ExComm recordings that essentially three types of action were discussed (other options were quickly dismissed): • “surgical” air strikes against Soviet missiles; • air strikes, followed by a massive invasion of Cuba by U.S. forces; • a blockade of Cuba meant to halt the transporting of new missiles and warheads (the presence of which on the island was still unclear), and then compel their removal. A blockade, which was referred to as a “quarantine,” was the chosen path. On October 22, 1962, the president gave a televised speech in which he outlined the state of affairs and the decisions that had been reached through these lengthy discussions. After the speech, there was no longer any need to conceal the ExComm meetings. At the same time, increased pressure was placed on those who were discussing the developing situation, such as ExComm in Washington, the Presidium of the Central Committee in Moscow, and the Cuban leadership in Havana. Light has already been shined on Washington’s position and, to a lesser extent, on Moscow’s position by the participants and researchers themselves. After radio broadcasts announced that Khrushchev had agreed to remove the missiles from Cuba, and also agreeing to ground inspections on Cuban territory, in accordance with President Kennedy’s promise not to attack Cuba, Cuba’s mood was well stated in a telegram from Ambassador Alekseyev to Moscow (which was sent on October 29, several days before Mikoyan’s flight from New York to Havana): Met with Fidel Castro and conveyed the contents of No. 848-1691. In my three years of close contact with Fidel Castro, I have never seen him so distraught and irate. The basic idea of Castro’s comments can be summarized in the following manner: I know the Americans too well, he said, to harbor any illusions about them leaving us alone after the special weapons are removed.

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Mark my words, after the first concession they will demand more and more concessions, possibly reaching the point where they begin to successfully include émigré scum in our government. The extremely unexpected decision to dismantle installed special weapons has damaged the Cuban Revolution. The revolutionary consciousness and anti-imperialistic sentiments of the Cuban people are so profound that it will be difficult to convince them to believe Kennedy’s promises let alone accept humiliating inspections on our territory, no matter who conducts them. We, said Castro, invited U Thant to take part in talks, not to conduct inspections, which will always remain a difficult matter. We will not allow anyone to conduct any inspections on our territory. . . . With respect to the document conveyed to Castro of American origins and our advice that he address it in terms of the given problem [the removal of missiles in exchange for promises not to attack Cuba —S.M.], he didn’t respond and only said that he would carefully look over the materials and decide later. Two times over, Castro very carefully read the final point of the message, about us supporting his announcement regarding guarantees on the U.S. side, and was very surprised by it. It was apparent from everything that he expected that there would be an agreement to soften our position on this issue. He also paid attention to the fact that the Americans had not raised the issue of removing coastal missiles [obviously Luna —S.M.] or surface-to-air missiles. I was under the impression, however, that Castro feared losing personnel and defensive means under American pressure. Toward the end of the meeting. Castro softened up a bit and said that if there can be a successful separation from the Americans, and if the guarantees are actually backed up, then regardless of the current political winner, the results for humanity, socialist countries, and Cuba will be massive, although, unfortunately, this will not be immediately understood and it will be necessary to endure a period of confusion. Knowing that Castro reacted badly to our decision to act without consulting with him, I repeated the arguments that I had made yesterday for Dorticós. I assured him that there was no agenda or absentmindedness, but simply, and understandably, that the circumstances demanded an immediate decision. I also reminded him about his alarmed letter to Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, in which he spoke of the inevitability of an air strike on special objects.14 Castro said that there was a sense that the Soviet Union had backed down under American pressure. My problem, said Castro, is that I don’t believe Kennedy’s promises.

The exchange of telegrams was tied up for six days. During this time, work on the launch pads for Soviet missiles was done at an accelerated pace day and night, and from ExComm’s standpoint, this did not indicate anything good.

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For an entire week after it had begun, the crisis had the entire world on the edge of its seat. The crisis then entered into a stage that was less apparent to the general public, but during which several inherently dangerous minicrises occurred. The point of a blockade was to disrupt the supply of missiles that were still en route or in ports in the USSR. A significant prediction was made: The CIA and the Pentagon believed that there were not yet any warheads in Cuba. As a matter of fact, however, all the warheads had been delivered, including those for the R-14 intermediate-range missile (covering the entire territory of the continental United States, except for the states of Washington and Alaska). Warheads for unassembled missiles arrived at the last minute aboard the vessel Aleksandrovsk on October 23, just before the blockade came into effect. But not a single R-14 went through the line of control before the announcement of the quarantine. The advantages of a blockade over other potential solutions were obvious: It reinforced the resolve of the United States to prevent reinforcement of the status quo, and it made Moscow responsible for further developments. The blockade gave the United States massive and clear-cut military advantages because the USSR had no means of crushing the blockade so close to bases on U.S. territory and so far from its own bases. The blockade could have become more severe in the event of unavoidable pressure on the USSR, including all large freight, a ban on oil and petroleum products, or, in the most extreme case, a ban on anything being sent to the island. The president understood that a blockade was also fraught with the potential for war if Soviet ships refused to submit to the demands of the U.S. Navy. But the Kremlin had the opportunity to consider its actions before its ships in the Atlantic had reached the quarantine line. By American estimates, Soviet ships would not reach the line for twenty-four hours and, as such, Kennedy told congressional leaders that “we can have a war in twenty-four hours.”15 He envisioned Soviet vessels failing to obey the terms of the quarantine, military action being taken, and potential retaliation by Moscow in other parts of the world, first and foremost in Berlin. Simultaneously, the USSR was told to cease construction on, and instead to begin dismantling, missile placements under threat of an air strike on existing placements. All these moves made by the United States remained within the framework of conventional warfare, leaving nuclear war as a threat in the event of noncompliance with American demands concerning the removal of the missiles from the island. At the insistence of Kennedy and McNamara, a moderate approach was adopted over the span of the quarantine. Insofar as Khrushchev announced that the quarantine was little more than piracy, and that Soviet ship captains would not receive any order to submit to American demands, the president went back to his guiding principle: “Don’t back an opponent into a corner.” He ordered tankers to be let through without inspection, and that inspections be performed on foreign freight ships, knowing in advance that they would be carrying harmless cargo and would be allowed to pass. As for the Kremlin, all this was supposed to serve

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as a warning and push it toward a change in its position. And that is exactly what happened.

The Path to Compromise The Kremlin made the reasonable decision not to go all in and risk everything. When Washington received the message that Soviet vessels had slowed their pace and then stopped, everyone breathed a sigh of relief: There would be no war because of the blockade. Precisely at this moment, Rusk said that after a long stare, “eyeball to eyeball,” the other side “blinked.” Saturday, October 27, became the peak of the crisis: Correspondence had not allowed for a resolution, and Soviet construction workers had in no way halted their work—all of which indicated that all missiles would soon be launch-ready. It was with great alarm that this was noted by McNamara and everybody else. At the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in New York—and notably not in Washington—thick smoke could be seen emanating from chimneys belonging to offices responsible for encryption, suggesting that documents were being incinerated. Such action is typical on the eve of war. The death of a U-2 pilot, who had been shot down over Cuba by a S-75 SAM battery, was stunning news for ExComm. It was well known that such SAM placements, which had been brought to Cuba in order to defend against air strikes on R-12 (SS-4) intermediate-range ballistic missiles, were controlled by Soviet forces. S-75 missiles, which differed from missiles in the possession of the Cuban Army that could achieve an altitude of about 12 kilometers, could achieve a range of practically 30 kilometers, leaving the U-2 vulnerable. Different accounts arose: Either the SAMs were placed under Cuban command, and the order was given by Fidel Castro, or it was all a signal that the Kremlin was on the warpath. In a coincidental development that could have been just as plausibly created for a movie, on the same day a U-2 wound up over Chukotka in the Soviet Far East against McNamara’s strict order that all flights near the territory of the USSR be suspended. The plane was not shot down, but its very presence in Soviet airspace at such a tense moment could have been construed by the Kremlin as evidence that the United States was preparing for an aerial nuclear strike. Soviet fighter planes were put on alert and, in response, the same order was given by the U.S. Air Force command in Alaska. Fears of war spiked in Washington, and among any officials aware of the incident. But, luckily, the U-2 exited Soviet airspace in time and the presumably inevitable air combat above Chukotka did not take place. Still, such a confrontation could have easily become the catalyst for escalation around Cuba. In connection with the downing of the U-2 over Cuba, a fantastical legend appeared about how Cuban forces under Castro’s command stormed the Sovietcontrolled batteries, and once more by Castro’s order launched the fateful missile. Supposed witnesses to the Cuban-Soviet battle for the missile battery were even found. A similar article, by Daniel Ellsberg, even appeared in the Washington Post

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in October 1987, during the same days when we were discussing the crisis at the Kennedy School. Of course, it was a fantasy that had no foundation in reality. In fairness, later on a Soviet soldier recalled that a small fire, which was quickly extinguished, had broken out on one of the pads. Perhaps someone saw the commotion from far off and imagined a story about an ensuing battle. Besides, participants in Operation Anadyr recall that while counterrevolutionary groups attacked two Soviet units, they were repelled by strong firepower.16 Be that as it may, ExComm interpreted the U-2 casualty in terms of an expected message from Khrushchev or from hard-line forces that were influencing him to take a tougher stance. “The president feared an escalation as a result of the shooting down of the U-2 that day,” Robert Kennedy said to A. F. Dobrynin that night. “There is now strong pressure on the president to give an order to respond with fire if fired upon. If we start to fire in response—a chain reaction will quickly start that will be very hard to stop.”17 For a moment, even Khrushchev forgot that the U-2 was only vulnerable to the S-75, which at that time had yet to be given to the Cubans (they were left to them after the crisis). Khrushchev decided that this was the work of Cuban artillery units and then expressed his dissatisfaction to Castro through Ambassador Alekseyev. Castro responded indifferently, having affirmed his determination to shoot down American aircraft while failing to directly answer who shot down the U-2. (Subsequently, Castro announced the name of the Soviet battery’s commander and awarded him the highest Cuban military order.) It is not clear how Khrushchev could even suppose that the U-2 was downed by Cubans. It is true that he asked Malinovsky, who honestly responded that Soviet artillery units had never been ordered to shoot the plane down. Malinovsky gave the same response to General Issa Pliev/Pavlov. All the same, Malinovsky obviously understood perfectly well that the U-2 had been downed by a Soviet missile and possibly not without Pliev’s approval, and as such sent the following telegram with a very mild reaction to the unauthorized events at the most critical moment. This mildness is telling insofar as some of Minister Malinovsky’s satisfaction has crept in. Furthermore, this telegram shows the dispositions of all members of the military at that time, from soldiers and officers to the minister in Moscow: Trostnik—to Comrade Pavlov We consider that you rushed to shoot down the United States’ U-2 reconnaissance plane just as a peaceful agreement that could prevent an invasion of Cuba began to take shape. We decided to dismantle the R-12s and evacuate them—follow through with the implementation of this order. Confirm receipt. Director No. 76645 October 28, 1962, 16.00

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This did not seem sufficient for Malinovsky, and he sent yet another ciphered message through the GRU of the General Staff of the USSR: Trostnik—to Comrade Pavlov In addition to the order not to employ the S-75s—also follow the order not to scramble fighter aircraft so as not to clash with U.S. reconnaissance planes. No. 4/835 Director October 28, 1962, 18.3018

In fact, the launch had been carried out by the commander of one of the twenty-four S-75 batteries with the permission of Lieutenant-General Voronkov. General Pliev could not be immediately reached, because he was with a different military unit at the time. So, having learned that in two to three minutes the reconnaissance plane would be out of range, Pliev’s second in command, General Stepan Grechko, approved Voronkov’s decision to open fire. None of the three men realized how close they came to persuading ExComm to approve an air strike on the missile placements, which would have meant the beginning of a massive military operation for the “resolution” of the entire crisis.19 The order to dismantle the R-12s (the Americans called them SS-4s) was, of course, immediately carried out. In subsequent talks with Mikoyan, Castro especially drew attention to the fact that the United States was not demanding the removal of SAMs, leading Mikoyan to understand that Castro was counting on the missiles remaining on the island. Mikoyan understood this, and decided to gain Moscow’s approval for Cuba’s retention of all Soviet weaponry, except for nuclear weapons, that had arrived with troops. That was exactly what ended up happening, and from this arrangement the military capabilities of the Cuban military grew significantly. Besides the United States, there were no longer any other powers in the Western Hemisphere that had any chance of successfully invading the island. Saturday, October 27 came to be known as “Black Saturday”—passions reached a fever pitch while ExComm perceived the Kremlin as adopting a hard line rife with the potential for military action. The SAM’s fateful launch, executed that afternoon without guidance from the Kremlin, was interpreted as an indicator of the Kremlin’s intentions. “It was the blackest hour of the crisis,” observed one participant in discussions that took place at the White House.20 Pliev ordered that his forces be put on high alert in order to resist the anticipated invasion. He addressed this in his correspondence to Malinovsky in Moscow, who personally agreed with the decision, but nevertheless presented the telegram to the Kremlin with the intention of receiving approval for Pliev’s proposal. Approval was given.21 Malinovsky sent Pliev the following telegram: Top Secret Trostnik—to Comrade Pavlov In connection with the potential landing on the island of Cuba of Americans conducting military exercises in the Caribbean, take immediate measures to ele-

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vate combat readiness and to resist the enemy with the joint forces of the Cuban army and all Soviet military forces with the exception of STATSENKO resources and all of the BELOBORODOV’s cargo. Director No. 4/389 October 22, 1962, 23.30

“STATSENKO’s resources” referred to R-12 missiles, while “BELOBORODOV’s cargo” meant all nuclear warhead payloads and bombs. It is worth adding that on September 8 the minister of defense and the head of the General Staff expressed the following in their draft order to Pavlov: In the event of an enemy landing operation on the island of Cuba and a concentration of enemy vessels carrying landing forces off the coast of Cuba in her territorial waters, when the obliteration of the enemy reaches an impasse and there is no possibility of receiving direction from the minister of defense of the USSR, you are permitted at your own discretion to employ nuclear resources such as “Luna,” Il-28, or FKR-1 [frontline cruise missiles] as means for local war to annihilate the enemy on land and at sea with the goals of a complete defeat of landing forces on Cuban territory and the defense of the Cuban Republic.22

McNamara subsequently formulated a wise thesis, known as “McNamara’s Law,” in the fall of 1987 at the Kennedy School at Harvard: “It is not possible to predict with confidence the consequences of military action between the Great Powers and their allies, because of misjudgment, misinformation, and miscalculation.”23 After thirteen days of crisis, after the exchange of telegrams between the White House and the Kremlin, after Khrushchev’s final announcement and the agreement of Kennedy’s government to a political resolution of the crisis, keeping an eye on events by way of the ciphered telegrams from the embassies and missions to the United Nations, which my father sometimes let me read with him in Moscow, I somewhat naively assumed that Cuba was no longer threatened by anything. The United States had promised not to attack or to allow others to have their way with the island. I was certain that President Kennedy would not break his promise. Therefore, it seemed that Cuba, at full-scale military readiness, was preparing for a war that could not take place. But, as was later made clear, my impressions were superficial. In Washington, extremely serious pressure was put on Kennedy even after Khrushchev’s radio address took a step back from the threat of nuclear war. Precisely for this reason, hotheads from the high command—such as General Taylor, General LeMay, General Lemnitzer, and political figures such as Douglas Dillon, Dean Acheson, and several others—figured that they could not miss their chance to get rid of Cuba. Khrushchev’s long-awaited broadcast was transmitted in the late afternoon on Sunday, October 28—early morning in Washington. Before this, the hawks still demanded a strike on Cuba with all their might on Monday, October 29, or on Tuesday, October 30. They wanted to persuade President Kennedy. On Sun-

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day, October 28, after Khrushchev’s broadcast had been received, LeMay demanded that the operation commence “today.”24 In response to Khrushchev’s agreement to Kennedy’s proposal, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff claimed that they had been had. LeMay exclaimed that the United States “ought to go in and make a strike on Monday anyway.”25 Demands of this sort circulated both before and after the receipt of Khrushchev’s radio broadcast. It is apparent that the Cubans were well aware of the course of events in the U.S. armed forces, and also the separate work of intelligence, because, on October 27, Ambassador Alekseyev corresponded with the Kremlin: F. Castro is in our embassy and is personally preparing a letter to Khrushchev which will be immediately forwarded to you. In F. Castro’s opinion, invasion is practically inevitable and will occur in the next 24–72 hours. 27/X-62—Alekseyev

For those without sufficient information, it could have appeared as if, after Sunday, the matter should have become irrelevant. But it did not become irrelevant. The demand for a strike on Cuba (implying a strike on the USSR’s troops, too) was sustained by arguments claiming that there would never be a better time to liquidate unruly Cuba. In this sense, of course they were correct. Still, they were lousy at chess, only calculating their own moves, figuring that the other side would not be able to adequately counter them. American intelligence did not know that Soviet tactical missiles armed with nuclear warheads, called Luna missiles, had been provided for the island’s coastal defense. Evidently, at Pliev’s request, who had prepared himself for a fight to the death, Moscow responded with the following ciphered telegram: Trostnik—to Comrade Pavlov In response to No. 8/154 It is categorically confirmed that the employment of nuclear weapons in the form of FKR missiles, “Luna” missiles, or from aircraft without approval from Moscow is forbidden. Confirm receipt. Director No. 76639 October 27, 1962, 16.3026

An Unacceptable Risk Despite Moscow’s formal order not to unleash either Luna missiles or mediumrange missiles without the center’s approval, there was a serious belief that the troops were prepared to use tactical missiles in the event of an American invasion. First and foremost, the preceding order, which had been asserted by Malinovsky and the Presidium of the Central Committee, was to defend the island

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with all forces present (which is discussed in the documents introduced in the book One Hell of a Gamble); General Gribkov talked about this in 1992 at a conference in Havana. This is difficult to doubt, because General Gribkov did not tell me at an official meeting, but rather in private as we went for a stroll beneath the palm trees in the garden of the residence housing our delegation. Later, while releasing the book Operation Anadyr, he was more cautious, but said: “On the evening of Friday, October 26, expecting an invasion on the next day, Pliev ordered several mobile bases to move toward the missiles under the cover of darkness.” Warheads for the Luna missiles and cruise missiles had already been installed, notwithstanding the strict ban on their use. “The greatest uncertainty [in following the strict order from Moscow—at that point was the fact that Pliev’s local military resources could be compromised to the point that separate Soviet divisions would have to conduct military operations on their own. We saw his [Fidel Castro’s —S.M.] cause as our own, and we saw the protection of Cuba as a sacred duty. . . . No matter what, one can conceive circumstances under which Soviet defenders would be capable and fully intent on using tactical nuclear weapons.”27 There can be hardly any doubt that this would have happened if the warheads had been available. After all, a SAM battery commander had fired at, and shot down, the U-2 spy plane. The commander even had “a contrary” order from high command. None of the commanders were able to, and should not have been able to, think along political lines with respect to the impact that their actions would have on ExComm’s mood in Washington, for instance. The commanders were focused on the military assignment that had been put before them, and they addressed it in terms of military protocol and from their own understanding that one decision or another would have to be made in the course of a rapidly changing situation when it would be impossible to receive new orders replacing older ones from the center. What qualms could the commanders in Moscow or Cuba possibly have over tactical missiles when a firestorm would be unleashed on our troops by the U.S. military? At the moment of attack, military units cannot act like sheep being led to slaughter; they must fight using everything at their disposal. At a conference in Havana in 1992, I touched upon this subject during a conversation with Raymond Garthoff. “Can you imagine,” he said, “what the U.S. response would have been if tens of thousands or more of those who would have taken part in an operation against Cuba—the Navy, Marines, land forces, aircraft carriers, and so forth—were decimated by tactical nuclear strikes by the USSR?” I could only imagine that it would be just about impossible to keep from slipping into World War III. In fact, the extent of the damage to American forces had been calculated by the USSR’s commanders. The precise moment to begin the volley was even calculated in order to inflict the greatest damage possible on the enemy without inflicting the mushroom cloud’s poisonous fallout on the island. I seem to recall the USSR’s generals saying that such a strike would occur as the American vessels were still at sea, but not far from Cuban shores. They would await or-

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ders from Moscow up until that moment, so that the USSR’s forces would not fall victim to the strike. Moreover, a massive aerial bombardment would certainly precede the invasion. This did not mean that the ability to resist would be destroyed. After all, even the U.S. Air Force did not guarantee President Kennedy that all strategic missile placements would be taken out at once. Cuban and Soviet forces would have shown themselves to be better than the Americans in terms of morale and their commitment to fight to the last man. After the commencement of air strikes on Cuba, every Soviet commander would have acted independently. Contact with Pliev, after all, would have already ceased to exist. Furthermore, assessments would be made in the heat of the moment, when there would be no time to contact any command, let alone distant Moscow. It also seems apparent that the Americans were ignorant of the Luna missiles’ positions, although the opinion was held that they had such information.28 The same was true for the FKR-1 missiles. As such, there would have been a retaliatory strike. Moscow’s order to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons would have only worked for intermediate-range missiles. There could have been no illusions about the fact that the order would have prevented the Luna missiles from being used. At a conference on the crisis in Moscow in January 1989, Robert McNamara recalled asking Admiral Anderson, who had been responsible for the quarantine (i.e., the blockade of Cuba), what he intended to do if the Russians kept moving. “Well,” responded the surprised admiral, “after a warning shot, I will issue the order to open fire and sink them. I have orders about the blockade, and there are Navy regulations dictating the manner in which such an order should be followed. Isn’t that enough? Civilians don’t understand that we know in advance what to do in these situations.” Needless to say, this quotation was written from memory, but that was precisely the gist. Such was the logic of a military official. The exact same reasoning was demonstrated in a private conversation by one of the Soviet generals who had been in Cuba. “Understand,” he said, “that we were deployed to defend Cuba from an attack. An attack on Cuba would have meant an attack on us. Of course, we all would have carried out our military duties to the end, using all means, we would have carried out military operations against the enemy to the last man. How could it be otherwise?” It is worth considering the psychological factor. The United States considered the USSR to be “enemy number one” and, likewise, the Soviet Army considered the United States to be “enemy number one.” Let us imagine the case of an officer in charge of troops that had been attacked by “enemy number one.” All his years or even decades of training and experience had been focused on this enemy, and all of a sudden they attack. Does this commander really need additional instructions on what to do? Be that as it may, military personnel should not bear all the blame for this aggression and recklessness. When all is said and done, the decision to ship missiles armed with nuclear warheads to Cuba was made by a civilian official. Apparently

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in the United States and the Soviet Union alike, the distinction between “doves” and “hawks” is not always marked by one’s outfit. Understandably, different evaluations of the behavior and decisions of all three sides came about in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Without getting lost in the finer points of each opinion, special attention must be paid to one view that has been put forth in the United States: Washington should not have sought a political resolution; it was necessary to immediately resolve the crisis by military means. To fully clarify the folly of such ideas, it is worth considering one of Mikoyan’s statements from his talks with Fidel Castro. As was explained by Mikoyan, the defeat of Revolutionary Cuba as the result of a strike by the U.S. war machine would not only mean Cuba’s defeat. Perhaps an irreparable blow would have been dealt to all anti-imperialist forces, and there could be a significant change in the balance of power between the two systems. It was exactly along these lines that the Kremlin reasoned, and it was correct. Interestingly, John F. Kennedy also followed this type of thinking, as is evident from his conversation on the eve of the crisis with Algerian president Ben Bella. “The Cuban question,” said Kennedy, “in reality isn’t a Cuban-American issue anymore, but rather the outgrowth of a global problem between two camps in the international system.”29 It goes without saying that the defeat or annihilation of 42,000 Soviet soldiers would have been seen as a sufficient and direct strike on the USSR. Therefore, those who assumed that Kennedy sought a compromise in vain—that he should not have corresponded with Khrushchev or have awaited a response to the issued ultimatum (or, having received a response, should simply have ignored it), but instead should have struck with the full force of the U.S. military—are wrong. Those that are of this opinion, and I have been forced to listen to their voices, believed that the Soviet Union would not have retaliated and that the affair would not have led to a large-scale war—that the USSR would not have gone to war because of the loss of Cuba. So, what did Kennedy think? “The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” Robert Kennedy recalled, “were unanimous in calling for immediate military action. . . . When the president questioned what the response of the Russians might be, General LeMay assured him there would be no reaction. President Kennedy was skeptical. ‘They, no more than we, can let these things go by without doing something. They can’t, after all their statements, permit us to take out their missiles, kill a lot of Russians, and then do nothing. If they don’t take action in Cuba, they certainly will in Berlin.’”30 Over the course of discussions in ExComm, McNamara was right in suggesting that preparations should be made for action in Europe if a strike on Cuba were to nevertheless materialize. McNamara, after all, was well aware of the fact that Soviet tanks could reach the shores of the Atlantic in a matter of days.31 It is not known what kind of lightning-fast maneuvers our army counted on to avert an American nuclear strike—there was no way that the United States could erase France, Germany, and other allies in Western Europe off the face of the Earth.

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From the Kremlin’s point of view, U.S. military action would not just be interpreted as the loss of Cuba. There was much more piled onto this plate; a retaliatory Soviet strike would be inevitable. But where? In what form? We will never know for sure. An episode that took place about three years after the crisis serves to reaffirm what has been said. This episode is recalled by A. I. Mikoyan in his book Tak bylo (How it was): In mid-May, 1965 the United States intensified its bombing of North Vietnam and initiated military intervention in the Dominican Republic. This caused a great stir in the Central Committee of the CPSU and in the government. Many were noticeably agitated. At a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Defense Malinovsky spoke and gave an assessment of the situation and proposals that, as it later turned out, was from First Secretary of the Central Committee Brezhnev. The minister read through the address, which had been written out, but occasionally added a word or two of his own. In my opinion, the assessment of the situation had been given improperly. The sense of one event or another had been contorted, the meaning had been exaggerated, both events were interpreted, as a matter of fact, as an American step toward a confrontation with us. It was asserted that we mustn’t limit what we were doing —helping Vietnam— and that following the Dominican events, actions against Cuba were to be expected. Therefore, we had to actively oppose the Americans. It was proposed that military demonstrations be conducted in the West (in Berlin and near the border with West Germany) and that we dispatch several units—airborne and others— from our territory to Germany and Hungary. The minister emphasized that we must be prepared to strike West Berlin. Later, he added on his own that “overall in the established atmosphere we must not be afraid of risking war.” Malinovsky’s words surprised me. . . . Brezhnev spoke after Malinovsky with the same spirit. . . . I spoke later. I said that we need a sober estimate of the situation. As far as Vietnam was concerned, the Vietnamese themselves have said that they are prepared to carry out their struggle for ten years or more, until the complete liberation of their country. . . . “In addition,” I emphasized, “we ourselves can’t take any measures insofar as it would be impossible without Chinese agreement and cooperation. And China, of course, will not agree to our troops entering Vietnam. Even the Vietnamese themselves refused the forces that we offered them.32 With regard to Cuba, well, undoubtedly the Americans, and first and foremost Johnson, would want to get rid of Castro, but I don’t see any facts that suggest they are preparing to invade Cuba.” Speaking about the Dominican Republic, I said that we have no obligations, but will lead the entire necessary struggle against the Americans in defense of the

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Dominican Republic by political means in the Security Council. Castro is very satisfied with our position on this conflict. I expressed my surprise and displeasure with the tone of the minister’s presentation: “None of the proposed measures will have any effect without the conscious goal of initiating World War III. Must we wage war against the Americans in Europe when they give us no cause and when they behave fairly decently in Berlin and other countries where our forces are located? . . .” Then I was shocked by Gromyko’s speech, in which he said that the current global atmosphere was analogous to a situation preceding war. I vocalized my amazement at such an interpretation of the current situation by the minister of foreign affairs. Certainly the Americans avoid any conflict with us in Europe and everywhere else regardless of where our forces are located. And why is it necessary to consider what they’re doing in the Dominican Republic as being directed against us? It reflects their interests in Latin America and is in no way similar to a situation preceding war, such as when Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union and other countries was being prepared.33

Such a long passage from A. I. Mikoyan’s book is perfectly relevant to a psychological characterization of those in the Kremlin who had made such important decisions. Because of an invasion of the Dominican Republic by a small number of U.S. Marines without noteworthy military action, and because of the increased bombings in North Vietnam, at the initiative of the USSR’s minister of defense, and with the agreement of the general secretary of the CPSU’s Central Committee, the Kremlin seriously discussed whether or not it would risk starting World War III. Moreover, the general secretary, far from being as expansive as Khrushchev, practically encouraged the minister of defense’s statement “Don’t fear the beginning of war.” Mikoyan’s main argument against this was that the United States behaves itself fairly well “where our troops are located.” The parallel could have easily be drawn with the fall of 1962 and with where the USSR’s forces had been located.

The Tragic Start of the Dialogue in Havana It was late evening when we arrived at a residence in the Vedado region. Castro stepped out with my father for about fifteen minutes, agreed on a meeting time for the next day, and left. After his departure, Alekseyev started talking about what was not included in his telegram to Moscow: about Castro’s moods, about his indignation with Khrushchev’s behavior, about events associated with the island’s defense, about the population’s preparations for war, and so forth. Castro’s statements to a French journalist in 1963, which had been quoted by Philip Brenner, began to be understood: “If Khrushchev were to come himself [to Cuba, instead of Mikoyan], I would have boxed him.”34 But Khrushchev chose his envoy well. It was not just memories from 1960 that endeared Castro to Mikoyan. In their very first conversation, Castro said,

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as they joked in Havana, that they had their own representative in the Kremlin —Mikoyan. In the morning, we went to Castro’s residence on Eleventh Street. It was not a splendid villa or palace, but rather a cluster of short and unexceptional buildings in a typical Vedado neighborhood. Castro met us at the entrance downstairs and led us to the second floor. The reception area contained armchairs made from dark wood and upholstered with brown leather. Two or three soldiers stood guard. There was also Castro’s longtime secretary and friend, Celia Sanchez, whose office it seems was either a floor above or below where we were. Moving further, there was the door to Castro’s office, which, for some reason, one had to climb one or two steps to reach. I was really counting on being allowed into the room where the talks would take place in the capacity of a personal secretary. From the looks of it, my father also had this in mind. Otherwise, why would he take me with him and leave one of Chistov’s assistants in the room? Would I then have to wait in the reception area and not in the same residence? But insofar as Castro granted my father access through the door with a gesture and, unfortunately, did not so much as glance in my direction, my father was reluctant to interfere with Castro’s intended procedure. Castro had even greeted me downstairs, so he could not have forgotten about my presence—it clearly was not an accident. But he had apparently been in such a terrible mood that he did not want to have extra people in the talks who would be witnesses to a temper that he knew he could not contain. As such, my father was forced to tell me “sit here,” to which Castro showed no reaction (although he did not know Russian, he could have easily guessed what was being said). I had to take a seat in one of the armchairs. I exchanged several phrases with Celia, but at that time my Spanish did not allow me to say much more. The atmosphere was saturated with the exact same sense of alarm that had been felt on the streets of Havana. Although she wore her usual kind smile, which I remembered from 1960, Celia looked anxious. The time passed, perhaps an hour and a half or two. The doors were probably double-barreled to ensure that nothing would be overheard. I read the Cuban magazine Bohemia. An official from the USSR’s embassy appeared and, at his request, Ambassador Alekseyev was summoned from the office. They said that he had received a telegram that he must immediately and personally read at the embassy. Alekseyev left. The talks were interpreted by Vladimir Tikhmenev, a future official in the Latin American Sector of the International Division of the Central Committee of the CPSU. After some span of time, Alekseyev returned, and his face was gloomy even by comparison with the tension and stress surrounding us. He walked into the office. After several minutes, the door opened and my father exited without looking at anyone and went downstairs.35 At a loss for words and not knowing what to do, I stood there. Castro and the others, all silent, came out of the office. Alekseyev walked up to me and informed me about the death of my mother. Even before he

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had said anything, I suspected that something horrific had happened to my family. My mother’s likeness appeared before my eyes, but not the same likeness that was imprinted in my memory from the time of our departure. It was her entire life, my mother at various ages—her age and my age, her kind eyes, her gentle and caring hands when I was sick, her anxious face whenever one of her five sons or her husband was out of sorts, her quiet happiness when all was good and well with us, her love for my late wife, Alla, and our children. Finally, our last months at the dacha outside Moscow. I was struck by a sharp sense of pity when she said she had trouble breathing while sitting in front of a wide-open window. When I saw her colorless face and white hands, I nevertheless waited for an improvement from the new medicine that had been prescribed by the doctors. November is a miserable month. Alla had died five years earlier in November, and now my mother. I stood there, lost among strangers. Everyone was from another world. My mother remained on the other side of the ocean. But she was not there anymore— how could I come to terms with this? Alekseyev led me to a car; my father had already left. At the residence, I decided not to drop in on him; he was alone in his room. He summoned me a few hours later. He was on his back sprawled across the wide bed. He had apparently walked in and just collapsed. He had tossed his head back and was looking at the ceiling, not at me. I will never forget the way his face looked at that moment. I heard an indistinct, barely recognizable voice say “Your mother has died. . . . You have to fly to Moscow for the funeral.” “How’s that?” I asked, “I can’t cut short such important business.” In all honesty, I was not thinking about work. I asked him and myself: How could he stay here alone? How would he bear such grief? But he found the strength. Khrushchev did not attend the funeral in Moscow, despite the promise he had made to my father in the telegram. I learned about the text of the telegram as soon as I returned from Castro’s house: “Decide for yourself what you would like to do: Fly in for the funeral or stay behind to continue these important talks and have your sons bury Ashen Lazarovna.” Khrushchev later received me in a small room in the Great Kremlin Palace. Aleksei Adjubei instructed me to tell Nikita Sergeyevich that my father was having a difficult time and that I must return immediately. I decided against making such a straightforward statement. I was certain that he himself would say “You should return to him. It would be best if he wasn’t alone,” or something of that sort. But I was mistaken. He said “I didn’t attend the funeral. I don’t like funerals. After all, it’s not like going to a wedding, right?” His words surprised me and came across as cynical. Nevertheless, I read the telegram. After what he said, I did not want to talk about anything. He asked how things were in Havana, but I was very abrupt. He concluded by saying “Only Anastas with his oxlike perseverance can withstand this. I would have put my foot down long ago and left!”

8 Mikoyan Face to Face with Fidel

The Kremlin’s Gifts to the White House

M

ikoyan did not fly back. The talks resumed the next day, November 4, 1962, while I was still in Havana. Those who claimed that Castro would not receive my father for some time were mistaken. Some said it was days, others that it was weeks. Their sources are unclear—most likely, rumors embellished by somebody’s imagination. This time, the talks were held in the Presidential Palace (which later was turned into a museum). Fidel Castro did not conduct them alone; five members of the leadership participated with him: Ernesto “Che” Guevara, Raul Castro, Osvaldo Dorticós, Emilio Aragonés, and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. The members of the Cuban party expressed their condolences and came to the correct conclusion that work would take the guest’s mind off his personal grief. And there was no time to put off the talks. Knowing my father, he had been thinking for many days in advance about how to conduct the talks. I myself saw him during these days—on the plane between Moscow and New York, New York, and Havana, for every minute he had free from negotiations and talks he sank deep into thought. It seems he was trying to solve the difficult puzzle of how to tie together the absolutely incongruent interests of the three conflicting nations in order to bring the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement into effect. If he had all the trump cards with regard to the Cuban leadership, it was the opposite vis-à-vis the United States—it had all the bargaining chips; he had nothing with which to shake Washington’s tough position. Washington planned to squeeze the maximum out of Khrushchev’s retreat. The shock of the tragic news he received from Moscow could have brought some confusion into the work that he had traveled across the ocean to do. But my 195

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father was a man of enormous willpower and had a highly developed sense of duty. After the talks that had just taken place in New York, the tasks before him became clearer. First, he had to convince the Cuban leadership that Cuba’s security had been assured and that there was no danger of invasion, even though the missiles were being removed. At the same time, he had to explain the situation in which Khrushchev did not consult or inform Castro beforehand of the decision to remove the missiles from Cuba in exchange for Kennedy’s promise of nonaggression toward Cuba. This was absolutely necessary in order to continue with productive negotiations, so the Cuban side would listen to the arguments without immediately rejecting them because of hurt feelings; and so it would agree to certain concessions, without which the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement would be invalid. The difficulty was that referring to the lack of time on the night of October 27–28 would not explain to the Cubans why they knew nothing of the exchange of letters between Khrushchev and Kennedy on October 26–27, which had preceded the agreement. Khrushchev’s attempt to convince them of the opposite naturally did not succeed; it is in general difficult to pass black for white, and with such a smart and logical person as Fidel Castro it was impossible. “I do not see how you can say that you consulted with us about the decision you made,” Fidel dryly reported to the Kremlin on October 29, a few days before Mikoyan’s arrival. And the Cuban leadership’s attitude toward everything that happened was extremely negative, even though it was slightly veiled by general phrases. Thus, Castro said during the first talk with Mikoyan that the Cuban people admire the Soviet government’s policies; they are learning from the example of the Soviet people, toward whom they feel heartfelt gratitude for the invaluable help and support. But in this difficult moment, it is as if our people have lost their way. The people were shocked by the message that on October 28, N. S. Khrushchev gave an order to the Soviet officers to disassemble the missilelaunching sites and that there is not one line in the order about the Cuban leadership’s agreement to this action.

Second, it was necessary to explain the Kremlin’s decisions, which were already announced, and come to an agreement regarding which additional Soviet weapons and military forces could be withdrawn from Cuba with the Cuban leadership’s consent, and which should stay on the island. In addressing the latter question, Mikoyan was not bound by decisions from the Kremlin. The question was the amount and type of weapons that would be delivered to Cuba in the future according to a previous agreement on military aid. The fine work of diplomacy was in deciding through a bilateral agreement questions that were essentially in the Soviet jurisdiction. Third, moving on to the main issues, it was necessary to explain why Khrushchev had agreed to an international ground inspection in Cuba without obtaining

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Cuba’s agreement. And it was necessary to convince Castro to agree to an inspection by the United Nations, by the Red Cross, or by representatives of countries chosen by Cuba. This was needed to guarantee that the United States would not use the absence of an inspection as a pretext to render the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement void. Such a move would provide Washington with an opportunity to attack Cuba while its offensive forces were deployed in the southeastern parts of the country and in the Caribbean Basin. Moreover, the inspection was partially necessary in order to leave the United States without a pretext to evade the commitment to nonaggression in a UN document. Formally, the inspections were supposed to be reciprocal. In Florida and Puerto Rico, the inspections were to make sure that all training camps for Cuban émigré interventionists were liquidated. But after the negotiations in New York, Mikoyan came to terms with the fact that there would be no reciprocity. From a practical point of view, such inspections would be meaningless—the territory of the United States is large, there are many military bases, and, if need be, there are plenty of places to organize training camps. It was more a matter of showing the formal equality of the two sides. Otherwise, Cuba refused to allow inspections. Cuba wanted the reciprocity of the inspections to keep the respect of the entire world, to protect its sovereignty, and to end the dictates from the United States, in which Khrushchev suddenly joined Kennedy. Such subtle points never crossed Khrushchev’s mind. It would seem strange that they did not: In May 1960, he had canceled a meeting in Paris and Eisenhower’s visit because of the deception and insult to the Soviet Union. And then, without a thought, he lied to Kennedy and offended Cuba. At the same time, he offended Kennedy and lied to Cuba’s leadership. The Kremlin is just that kind of place, where its leader loses his sense of reality. It began with Stalin, but did not end with Khrushchev. The negotiations taking place in New York between Soviet deputy foreign minister Kuznetsov (together with Zorin, the head of the USSR’s UN mission) and McCloy and Stevenson showed that the American side complicated the inspections agreement in all kinds of ways. It demanded inspections on the territory of Cuba but refused point-blank to permit UN inspectors on its own territory. Incidentally, Moscow also rejected the Americans’ attempts to get permission to board Soviet ships to make sure that the missiles were being removed. In the eyes of the superpowers, only Cuba was supposed to swallow the bitter pill and allow its territory to be inspected. Fourth, it was important to convince the Cuban leaders that this time, in this situation, after such a crisis and such a dangerous moment in international relations, the U.S. president’s pledge of nonaggression toward Cuba and his commitment not to allow others to attack Cuba should not be received as yet another empty promise that could be revoked at any moment and under any pretense. At that point, it was not yet clear that the subsequent U.S. presidents would follow Kennedy’s commitment. My father only had to convince the Cubans that Ken-

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nedy personally would not be able to and would not want to break that kind of a commitment. And because everybody was almost certain that he would be elected for a second term, this meant that the commitment would be in effect for at least six years. In these six years, Cuba’s army would be strengthened with Soviet help, which would create the danger of massive losses for invading forces and would deter the United States from aggression. The fifth point was the difficult but necessary task of convincing Castro to restrain his feelings for some time, even if for a short period, and thus not fire at U.S. surveillance planes. The United States, regrettably, had grounds to claim that because it has just been deceived, it had to make sure that the missile-launching sites were really being dismantled and that the evacuation of warheads back to the USSR was being prepared. In addition, the United States promised that only then would it remove the “quarantine,” that is, the blockade that preserved the state of a military threat. My father could use the fact that Cuba itself would be interested in having aerial photography take the place of ground inspections. The sixth point, finally, was to return Soviet-Cuban relations as close as possible to their pre-October state. In many ways, the success of Mikoyan’s mission depended on the fulfillment of this task. History did not end with this crisis; there would be many issues in the future where the collaboration of the two countries would be mutually beneficial. To achieve this, it would be necessary to maximally alleviate the Cuban leadership’s mistrust of Khrushchev as the author of the idea to send the missiles and also as the author of the decision to concede to Washington’s demands. Some researchers and individuals, including Cubans, maintain that the crisis undermined the Cubans’ trust in the Soviet Union as a country. Several years after the incident, Fidel gave an interview to an American journalist and mentioned that after the crisis there was such a lack of trust. The journalist asked, “[Was it] distrust by Cuba of the Soviet Union?” Castro specified: “I would say distrust between Khrushchev and ourselves.”1 The prehistory, along with the story of the crisis itself, gives one an idea of the difficulty of each task. Fidel and Raul Castro, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and Emilio Aragonés were smart people who needed to be convinced with arguments rather than fulsome assurances of love and friendship. The mission, as it became clear during the negotiations, kept becoming more and more complicated on every point as Mikoyan received ciphered telegrams from Moscow. The fact of the matter was that once Khrushchev conceded on the major issue, he could not stop and continued to concede on every other point. In addition, the mission became more difficult because of the U.S. side. Having noticed that their partner in confrontation had “blinked,” the Americans escalated their demands, producing new ones and trying to fit them under the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement. The agreement consisted of several documents: Khrushchev’s message from October 26, Kennedy’s response from October 27, Khrushchev’s open radio broadcast from October 27, as well as the October 28 message to Kennedy and his message in response to the Kremlin. Not all the

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points in them corresponded. Khrushchev did not understand the urgent need to carefully discuss, summarize, and formulate very precisely his concluding telegrams that offered the conditions for the agreement. Washington was quite happy with the unclear and discordant offers, because the missiles were being withdrawn; that is, its main condition was being fulfilled. Therefore, American diplomacy had room to maneuver and it was based on the real positions of both sides. American diplomacy had all the advantages after the blockade of Cuba went into effect and the Soviet missile-launching sites were dismantled, and the American side did not hesitate to use these advantages. Soviet diplomacy, conversely, was driven into a corner. From the point of view of the USSR, the difficulty with formalizing Kennedy’s promise of nonaggression in the form of a UN document was the most painful deviation from the agreement. The State Department and the White House skillfully used the faulty wording in Khrushchev’s messages, which were created without thorough discussions, in a high-strung atmosphere, under conditions in which the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) staff either did not dare to correct the texts that Khrushchev had dictated or simply was not given access to them. Therefore, if Kennedy mostly used the phrase “adequate control,” Khrushchev of his own initiative used the phrase “UN control on the spot” of missile dismantling. If he had retained such an indefinite term as “adequate control” and pretended to forget about the international control that Kennedy had mentioned once, it would have opened up the opportunity to interpret the phrase differently—for example, to inspect ships on the open sea rather than Cuban territory. Already, after the quarantine had been put in effect, Kennedy had said during a discussion with McCone, Stevenson, Bundy, and others at the White House: “Our goal is to prevent new military shipments, to stop the work on missile sites, and to obtain some method of inspection”2 [italics mine —S.M.]. It follows that even the dismantling could have been delayed until a method of inspection acceptable to Cuba had been agreed upon and until the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement had been formalized at the United Nations. By hastily beginning the dismantling, while the American side only expected the cessation of work at the launching sites, Khrushchev left the USSR’s diplomacy without the conditions necessary to defend its and Cuba’s interests. U.S. secretary of state Dean Rusk emphasized that the quarantine did not forbid shipments of other military cargo besides missiles, warheads, and related equipment.3 Instead of using the word “missiles,” as Kennedy had done in his messages, Khrushchev insisted on speaking of “weapons that you consider offensive,” thereby allowing the United States to expand at will the list of weapons it considered offensive. Sometimes, the texts of Moscow’s messages reveal promises of concessions for which Kennedy had not even asked. For example, nowhere did Kennedy demand the removal of regular weapons, military advisers, and Soviet military equipment (whose number, the reader will recall, American intelligence had grossly under-

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estimated). But Khrushchev was so preoccupied with concessions that of his own initiative he spoke of removing items that nobody had pressured him to remove: all military units, all military advisers. (By sending his telegrams to Moscow, Mikoyan succeeded in separating this inclination of Khrushchev from the measures that supposedly followed from the agreement with Kennedy.) All this is supported by documents. In his letter of October 26, Khrushchev shows that he is ready to do anything; he writes that if the United States will agree to make a pledge of nonaggression toward Cuba, then “this will change our position on liquidating not only of weapons that you consider offensive, but all types of weapons.” In the same letter, he writes: “Then the presence of our military specialists will no longer be necessary” [emphasis mine —S.M.]. Kennedy’s letters, wishes, conditions, and demands to Moscow from this period do not contain a word about other weapons or advisers! Why does Khrushchev want to make such “presents”? It only remains to be added that Moscow’s telegrams to A. I. Alekseyev and Fidel Castro in Havana do not contain even a hint of the generous propositions made to Kennedy. And in the so-called second letter of October 27, Khrushchev addressed Kennedy: “Therefore I’m making this offer: we are prepared to remove from Cuba all our equipment that you consider offensive. . . . After this, representatives of the UN Security Council would be able to inspect on the ground our fulfillment of obligations. Of course, the agreement of Cuba’s and Turkey’s leadership is necessary for the representatives to enter these countries and to inspect the fulfillment of obligations by both sides” [emphasis mine —S.M.]. As is known, this message raised the question of the reciprocal removal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey, as well as stipulated the submission to the UN of a solemn pledge of USSR nonaggression toward Turkey and U.S. nonaggression toward Cuba. This letter also mentioned the necessary agreement of Cuba’s government. The ExComm decided to ignore this message, because another message that had been received a little earlier had not mentioned the Jupiter missiles in Turkey, but also had not mentioned the necessity of the Cuban government’s agreement to inspections in Cuba. Llewellyn Thompson and Robert Kennedy advised President Kennedy to reply to this personal message. No one in the White House could understand why there were two messages and why they were not identical in content. A hypothesis was even put forth that the Kremlin “hawks” had taken the resolution of the conflict into their own hands and that Khrushchev was no longer free in his decisions. We did not have such hypotheses, and Georgy Kornienko explains the phenomenon of the two messages with different content in his book Kholodnaia Voina (The Cold War), which came out in Moscow in 2001. The short explanation is the following: “Upon receiving such alarming information [about the impending air strike—S.M.], Khrushchev, to use the expression Kuznetsov used as he was telling me this, ‘wet his pants’ and in the first part of the day on October 26 personally dictated a new letter, in which he dropped the question of removing American missiles from Turkey and Italy; in

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other words, he reduced his demands to a minimum.”4 Khrushchev “the diplomat” simply did not think that it was necessary to have the Cuban government’s agreement to conduct inspections on the ground in Cuba. Instead, he promised to remove all types of weapons that the United States would consider “offensive.” Kennedy mentioned “appropriate supervision and control by the UN” in his letter. He also spoke of “adequate agreement through the United Nations for confirmation of fulfillment” of the pledge. He never used the expression “on the ground,” which had caused so much strife and even put the entire agreement in question. It was Khrushchev who introduced this expression, virtually helping the State Department. All this stood against the background of Soviet reminders and assurances to protect Cuba and the Cuban people’s right to independence and security. But with only a single phrase, which was not presented as one of his conditions, Khrushchev expressed his hope that U Thant’s talks “with representatives of the United States, the USSR, and Cuba” would be successful. And the October 28 radio statement about the agreement to have UN representatives confirm Khrushchev’s fulfillment of his commitment to remove the weapons is based only on his letter of October 27, in which he mentions that “we both agreed to come to an agreement that a United Nations representative would be able to confirm the dismantling of this equipment.”5 Once again, there is not a word about the necessity of having the Cuban government’s agreement, because the message was again written without the participation of experts and the USSR’s MFA diplomats. In the same radio address, Khrushchev announces that he issued an order not only to cease work on missile-launching sites, for which Kennedy had asked, but also to rapidly—within forty-eight hours—dismantle them and send them back to the USSR. After the sites had been dismantled, the American side got some room for action. First of all, it began presenting new demands. Moreover, after the United States began to fly over Cuba at low altitudes to have greater precision in monitoring the assembly of the Il-28 bombers, the U.S. Air Force switched to low-level flights without aerial photography. By this time, the missiles had been removed and the Il-28s were disassembled and packed into containers. The planes were flown only to demonstrate their impunity and to express contempt for Cuba’s rights to its airspace. Washington pressured Khrushchev on the issue of removing the Il-28 bombers, even though their appearance and assembly in Cuba had not caused any panic at the White House. Raymond Garthoff, the originator of the idea to remove the Il-28s, confirmed that he himself had been a “hawk”; in other words, he believed that the United States should not bargain with the Russians but instead should present maximal demands and the Russians would back down. I have heard echoes of these sentiments from him at conferences. The U.S. president himself, as was mentioned above, was not convinced of the need to insist on removing anything besides the surface-to-surface missiles with nuclear warheads. But the State Department, which was skilled in the art of

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squeezing out new concessions, convinced him. The president was reminded that he had mentioned the Il-28s in his address to the people. “Although he sometimes wondered whether such a position was necessary,” Kennedy still agreed to insist.6 Plus, pressuring Moscow now was easier than it had been during the height of the crisis: The missile-launching sites were being dismantled quickly, too quickly; the missiles were being moved to the ports to be loaded onto ships. The United States had already got what it wanted, and though the Russians were in a hurry to fulfill everything, why not continue the pressure while the quarantine was still in effect?

Mikoyan’s First Conversations in Havana The conditions for Mikoyan’s talks were thus very unfavorable. He was pressured from all sides—from the American side, through Khrushchev’s cables; from Khrushchev himself; and from the side of the Cubans, who were prepared to fight for their sovereignty and dignity and were trying to salvage at least something of the powerful alignment of the Soviet military. Mikoyan no longer had the opportunity to independently conduct firm negotiations with the Americans (after leaving New York); now he had to defend other people’s positions before Fidel, positions that were dictated to him from Washington and Moscow. He understood the Cubans’ feelings perfectly. At the same time, he was a rational man who had to conduct talks with people for whom emotions often stood on the same level as practical issues. In a sense, he was caught between three fires. How Mikoyan fulfilled the first tasks can be seen from his telegrams to Moscow. He reported the following about his first conversations: Special Telegram No. 1762-1775 CC CPSU I think that right now I can draw some conclusions about the talks taking place here. . . . At the first meeting Fidel received me at his personal residence. He came out to meet me on the street where the car had stopped in front of the house, and led me to the second floor. You have received his statements, which were made in a calm and friendly tone, but his sharp displeasure with our policies was palpable. The second meeting took place in the presidential palace. All six leaders participated in the talk. Each time they met me in the hallway and led me to the room where the talks were conducted, and afterwards walked me to the car and we parted warmly. I was warmly received everywhere.

Mikoyan’s ciphered telegrams dispute the conjectures that Fidel did not want to receive Mikoyan. And they also show that the assertions that Mikoyan used a very harsh tone in speaking with Fidel Castro are groundless.7 On the contrary, although Khrushchev’s telegrams betrayed his impatience and indignation, which had flowered in the quiet rooms of the Kremlin where nobody ever contradicted the USSR’s dictator and, accordingly, although Fidel’s persistence per-

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plexed him, Mikoyan never conveyed to Fidel the tone of such messages. He conducted the necessary talks in such a way so as not to hurt the feelings of the leaders, who were already offended by the Kremlin. This required self-control, a true respect for the other side, and an understanding of its valid feeling of indignation and of its legitimate demands. In other words, he not only had to soften the sharp edges of the previous affronts but also conceal from the Cubans the new ones, which the Kremlin delivered without being aware of it. My father answered the questions of the Cuban leaders, although I do not think that he was successful in convincing them that there was no opportunity to include Cuba in the talks. Fidel Castro and his colleagues had a perfectly logical position, and it was impossible to refute it. Despite all the explanations of the rush to prevent an attack on Cuba and World War III in general, Fidel Castro says quite convincingly, that these sharp questions could have been discussed differently. . . . After all, the threat from the United States was the only reason for Cuba to arm itself. When Kennedy accepted this proposal (we did not know that he would accept it),8 the conditions were appropriate to develop Soviet proposals and to prepare the declaration regarding the bilateral agreement. You could have said that the USSR is willing to disassemble the equipment but would like to discuss it with the Cuban government. In our opinion, this should have been the resolution of the question, instead of immediately giving orders to evacuate the strategic weapons. This course would have not only allowed to ease the international tension and provided an opportunity to discuss this issue in better circumstances, but also would have led to a signed [nonaggression] declaration.

Fidel Castro is absolutely right in this matter. After all, the United States could not decide the question of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey, not only because it did not want to undermine itself in the eyes of NATO but also because it did not want to belittle Turkey by making a one-sided decision. Supposing that the Jupiter missiles without warheads were practically in the hands of the Turks, but the United States could have said, without waiting for their agreement, that the warheads themselves would be removed! They were not given over to the Turks. But everyone on the ExComm, except for the president, was afraid to even think about such an option. Negotiations with Turkey on this issue were already planned. So why would the United States not accept a consultation by the USSR with Cuba as normal procedure? Of course, Moscow’s transgressions should not be blamed on Washington. It was not Washington’s job to think about Cuba’s reputation and to observe the proprieties! And not only “proprieties,” also but international law— Khrushchev had made an agreement that he had no right to make without Cuba’s consent—he agreed to a ground inspection of Cuba. It seems that until the end of the crisis, he never did understand anything with regard to Cuba. One of his telegrams from Moscow, which is discussed below, testifies to that. Meanwhile,

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Fidel Castro explained absolutely correctly and irrefutably how the Kremlin should have acted to reduce the tension and at the same time not humiliate Cuba. Furthermore, Castro correctly pointed out that Khrushchev could have said to Kennedy: We agree to remove the missiles, but you must negotiate with Cuba about ground inspections, and only Cuba can give permission for an inspection on the ground (as we remember, such a phrase was in the letter drafted in the USSR’s MFA, but in the letter dictated by Khrushchev there was no place for such a “trifle”). Che Guevara also spoke about this. He said to Mikoyan that Fidel was absolutely right when he said that “the United States wanted to destroy us physically, but the Soviet Union destroyed us legally through Khrushchev’s letter.” It is surprising that Khrushchev did not think about that. After all, he was very cautious about any inspections on Soviet territory, even onboard our ships. And he was right to do so, for he was preserving the country’s dignity and sovereignty. But it did not cross his mind that an analogous approach should be used with Cuba. There is no other explanation for it but the superpower syndrome: that it supposedly has the right to make decisions for a small country. After this kind of an exchange of opinions, it seems as if Mikoyan made a tactical mistake: He decided to make a rather broad speech to explain the state of affairs before his arrival, to describe the talks on the way in New York, and to express Moscow’s support for Cuba’s legitimate demands. Of course, even before our arrival in Havana, Fidel knew that, in a statement to the press at the New York airport, Mikoyan already supported his “five points.” That spontaneous statement played a major positive role, which Castro recognized then, in 1962, and still spoke about forty years later at a conference in Havana. By telling about his stern talks in New York, Mikoyan expected to ease the upcoming difficult talks about certain details of the agreement that offended the Cubans’ pride and dignity, most of all the ground inspections and the flights over Cuban territory. What Mikoyan did not take into account was that Fidel in general did not like listening to long speeches in a foreign language and then listening to the interpreter. And in the heated circumstances of those days, Fidel was tense to the limit. Carlos Rafael later told my father that his extensive speech had exhausted Castro. During these negotiations, the most that Mikoyan could get from Fidel was an admission that in the long term, in the historical perspective, it would seem that the behavior of the Soviet Union was right. But in the present, it created confusion. By right behavior, he meant the removal of missiles, but not the form in which it was done. The other participants in the negotiations had a similar opinion of Moscow’s behavior. Che Guevara was even more implacable (possibly telling here was the feeling that Khrushchev had personally tricked him in August when he promised that the entire Soviet military power, including the Baltic Sea fleet (!), would be used to rebuff the Americans, and that Che Guevara, like a naive child, had believed this lie). Emilio Aragonés sided with him, because he also went to Moscow

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and was deceived. Raul Castro wanted to be understanding of Moscow, but he was also subject to feelings of resentment and regret; after all, he was deceived by Moscow in July. Osvaldo Dorticós and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez were sharply critical of Moscow’s behavior, but they sought a way for compromise. For the second of his objectives (which had the first place in importance), Mikoyan brought up point by point all the possible arguments to “prove the correctness of our policies,” as he reported to Moscow. But he tried to prove what cannot be proven. Mikoyan recalled that on Saturday, October 27, Comrade Castro himself had warned of a quickly approaching inevitable invasion. To prevent the invasion, Khrushchev made the radio address with the agreement to remove the missiles. There was no time to contact Havana, because the USSR’s intelligence was bringing in the same information as Cuba’s intelligence: It was a matter of twenty-four hours before Cuba would be attacked. . . . And we have results: An attack was prevented, peace preserved. Even though you are right in this regard, in terms of the consultation procedure not everything was accomplished that would be possible under normal circumstances.

First of all, it is necessary to point out that Mikoyan did not interpret this message as Khrushchev did, as an appeal for the USSR to be the first to start a nuclear war. Then Fidel expressed his point of view: I would like to reply to Comrade Mikoyan. With great attention we listened to the message and to Comrade Mikoyan’s explanation. . . . We thank him for his wish to explain these positions to us, for all the pains he took on this account.

Further, Fidel Castro came back specifically to the installation of the missiles. Yet also here, an important misunderstanding came up—even though Mikoyan and Fidel had already worked it out in the car on the way from the airport. My father had asked him then: “Why did you agree to install the missiles? It was an enormous risk for you! Personally, I was sure that you would say: ‘Give us more weapons and instructors to go with them, and we will build our own.’” ‘We thought that you needed it,’ Castro replied.” And it turned out that Castro had not changed his mind: The deployment of strategic weapons on Cuba was carried out in the interest of protecting not only Cuba, but the entire socialist camp. This was done with our full consent. . . . We have nothing against the fact that the measures had a double aim—namely, not to allow an attack on Cuba and the prevention of a world war.

That is how Fidel answered the question of “why missiles?” But in this case, it was not the explanation of the Soviet government but of the Cuban government’s position: That is how we understood you, and this is why we agreed. Furthermore, Fidel Castro specified, that

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we did not say that we expected an invasion. . . . In our opinion, an air attack with the single aim of destroying the strategic weapons on Cuba would be more likely.

Evident here is the Cuban government’s clear misunderstanding of American plans: In Washington, virtually everyone agreed that even a “surgical strike” on the missiles would lead to an attack on all the Soviet military aircraft on the island, which would in turn entail the invasion of Cuba. But Fidel Castro was right in his message to Khrushchev of October 27 that behind all the imminent events, a war between the USSR and the United States was clearly taking shape because of the Soviet missiles and the 42,000 troops that would be fighting shoulder to shoulder with the Cubans. Fidel Castro was simply generous in his statements during his talks with Mikoyan, whom he saw as a representative of the Kremlin that had humiliated his country by totally ignoring its point of view. He not only expressed gratitude to Mikoyan for “the effort he put into explaining the events to us. We are mindful of the special circumstances under which you had to work. . . . I would like to assure you, Comrade Mikoyan, of our complete trust.” He also said: “We do not doubt the friendly nature of our relations, which are based on common principles. Our respect for the Soviet Union is unshakable. We know that it respects our sovereignty and is prepared to defend us from imperialist aggression.” At this stage, it could be said that the first and second objectives had been accomplished, as unbelievable as it may seem. Moscow understood this as well. At the 1992 conference in Havana, Oleg Troyanovsky said that upon receiving the telegrams from Mikoyan, Khrushchev had been very pleased and said that “nobody else but him could have succeeded in this task.” But as my father told me, he had to repeatedly state many of the points for the duration of the talks. And even such an accomplishment as the restoration of mutual understanding turned out to be shaky. Two instances had caused an eruption by Fidel Castro. Mikoyan had brought up two corrections to Castro’s verbose speech on October 28. He noted that contrary to the Cubans’ opinion, the Soviet side had not agreed to remove all its weapons and pull out all its advisers (he did not know that Khrushchev would be prepared to concede in this, too). He mentioned that all the weapons of the Soviet forces not mentioned in the Kennedy-Khrushchev letters would remain in Cuba to equip its army. This was Mikoyan’s own decision. Furthermore, not all the advisers were being withdrawn, only those who had been servicing what had been removed—the missiles. In response to a post factum plan proposed by Fidel Castro on a better way to have conducted negotiations with the United States on the removal of the missiles, Mikoyan once again had to repeat the thesis of the time shortage in view of the imminent attack on the missiles and on Cuba. But realistically, this was not a convincing answer because in Castro’s plan, the point about consulting with the Cuban government would be

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presented after the words of agreement to the removal of missiles had been stated. The entire world would have accepted that as a normal process, and the United States could not undertake military action just because of this. Thus, in essence, Mikoyan was unable to disprove Castro. My father was clearly in the wrong, and he understood it, but I would say his unhealthy loyalty to the “CC” [Central Committee]—that is, to the CPSU’s first secretary—remained paramount.9 Nevertheless, even he had to add: “Even though you are right in that not everything that would have been possible under normal conditions had been followed in the procedure of the consultations.” On the question of “why missiles?” Mikoyan naturally thought he was right, while Fidel remained just as convinced that the truth was on his side. My father decided that it would be wiser not to continue the argument and to say nothing, which he reported to the Kremlin. To this, Khrushchev replied: In his conversation with you, Fidel Castro expressed the thought that we stationed missiles on Cuba in the interests of the entire socialist camp. Please explain to Fidel that he misinterprets the situation. By stationing the missiles on Cuba, according to the agreement with our Cuban friends, we aimed to help Cuba, to protect it against the threat of aggression. . . . We believe that our goals have been met and our action is justified.

The third and fourth objectives were related. To leave the United States without an excuse to delay the formalization of the pledge of nonaggression toward Cuba, it was necessary to conduct international inspections in some form that Cuba could accept.

The Crisis within the Crisis Everything seemed to be going well, as long as it was a question of mutual inspections that would include some parts of the United States’ territory. Mikoyan suggested considering the issue of bringing the United States to formalize its pledge of nonaggression in a UN document, as well as getting it to remove its “quarantine” as soon as possible, because it was causing great losses to the USSR and Cuba. Because Mikoyan knew that there would be no reciprocal inspections with the United States, he understood that Castro would flatly reject the possibility of ground inspections on Cuba’s territory. So he suggested a compromise: to accept U Thant’s proposal to have his representatives approach Soviet ships in Cuban ports and, without even stepping on the ships, to document the presence of missiles onboard. The Americans would be told that the inspection took place in Cuba. With a little stretch, Khrushchev’s promise could be considered to be officially fulfilled. This proposal by Mikoyan shows that he had overestimated the flexibility of Fidel’s position. Also, he had relied on information from Alekseyev, who had unintentionally misled him.

208 Mikoyan Face to Face with Fidel

“I thought,” Mikoyan wrote, “that we had reached a consensus, that the Cubans would accept this proposal. Comrade Alekseyev, who was sitting next to me, whispered to me that the Cubans would surely accept it.” Thus the first “crisis within the crisis” had taken place. Personally, I do not quite understand why my father brought up this question. On the way from New York to Havana, he himself told me that in New York McCloy had offered him a standby option: to conduct the same kind of inspection in open waters. Perhaps if it had been done the way he proposed it, U Thant would really have had a good chance of getting the United States to formalize the pledge of nonaggression in a UN document. That was how my father explained his proposal. If U Thant had achieved the desired goal as a result of the agreement, the gamble would have been worth it.. Otherwise, Kennedy’s obligation would apply only to him. And what about the next president? It is evident that Mikoyan accepted Alekseyev’s assurances. It seems that Alekseyev had spoken with somebody in the Cuban leadership, who was sure that Fidel would agree. But it turned out that making such a proposal to Castro was a bad mistake. Mikoyan and Alekseyev, and also the unknown person from the Cuban side, had not taken into account that in such moments Castro became unpredictable. To be on the safe side, Mikoyan proposed not to discuss this issue right away, but to have the Cubans discuss it without the presence of the Soviet colleagues. This was his tried-and-true method for allowing the other side to vent some emotions and calm down before reassembling and approaching the question at hand more rationally. But Fidel rejected this proposal right away. All his emotions were heated, and they stirred up the recent injuries. As a result, he made a statement that sounded virtually like a proposition to end all the military ties between the USSR and Cuba. Here is how Mikoyan described what happened in his telegram: Then, speaking in an outwardly calm tone, Fidel suddenly made the following unexpected statement: . . . “I would like to say to Comrade Mikoyan, and I speak for the entire Cuban people, that we will not agree to a [unilateral] inspection. We do not want to compromise the Soviet troops and endanger world peace. If our position puts world peace in jeopardy, we would think it more appropriate to consider the Soviet side free of their obligations; we would put up our own resistance. Come what may. We have the right to defend our dignity.” I was not surprised by his refusal to allow inspections in the ports. Rather, I was shaken by the concluding part of his speech. For several minutes we were silent. I thought about where to lead this matter. I decided not to mention this shocking statement. . . . I said that I did not understand the reason for such a sharp reaction to my proposal.

Further, he explained why—after all, these were Soviet vessels and therefore Soviet, not Cuban, territory. But Fidel did not accept this explanation.

Mikoyan Face to Face with Fidel 209

“Then Dorticós came to the rescue and offered to take a break. . . .” For another page in his telegram, Mikoyan goes on to justify Castro’s words, trying to protect him from the Kremlin chauvinists, who had grown accustomed to speaking condescendingly to their allies. He suggests that the cause might be the American press’s insinuations that the USSR would force Castro to back down, and so on: In my opinion, we should not draw conclusions based on this statement. . . . It is no accident that the next day—today, November 6, in the evening—Guevara halfjokingly said “We are not Albanians and will not demand that you liquidate your military bases on Cuba. . . .” Moreover, today in a conversation with Alekseyev, Rodriguez said that he recently met with Fidel Castro and told him about his latest talks with me, which in his opinion were warm and friendly, and Castro was very happy to hear that.

Knowing his colleagues in the Kremlin, Mikoyan tried to cushion the complications in negotiations about UN inspections aboard Russian ships in Cuban ports. But despite his attempts, clouds of anger had been growing in the Kremlin directed at the “whims” of the junior partner. This can be seen from Khrushchev’s expressive telegram, which came a little while later: We learned from your message that in his quick temper, Fidel Castro said that if the Cuban position (on the issue of inspections) jeopardizes world peace, then the Soviet side can consider itself free of its obligations. . . . We are very disappointed by this understanding from our friend Fidel Castro, toward whom we feel boundless trust and respect as a true hero who is selflessly devoted to the revolution. . . . Of course we have the right to be free of our obligations, just as the other side has the right to tell us about it. . . . But to say it at such a moment and in such a context, misunderstanding us, means to traumatize us, to make us deeply worried. We sent our people to Cuba, which had been expecting an invasion. We knew that if Cuba were invaded, then the blood of Cuban and Soviet soldiers would be spilled. We were ready for this. We were doing this for Cuba, for the Cuban people. Yes, we were also doing it in our self-interest. But our interests here were expressed as the common revolutionary interests. . . . This was painful for Mikoyan to hear, and no less painful for us to read about it.

Most likely, Castro himself regretted making such a strong statement. Several of his colleagues spoke with my father and asked him to try to forget about the episode. Because of this incident, Fidel could not continue the talks on other questions for several days. C. R. Rodriguez said that Castro explained his position to him as follows: We cannot compromise the Soviet Union. We cannot act as if we do not care about world peace. But in our situation we cannot back down—this would compromise our influence among our people and the peoples of Latin America. I

210 Mikoyan Face to Face with Fidel

thought that if the situation were to become any more strained, we would have to offer for the Soviet Union to withdraw the troops and weapons that compromise it.

To which Mikoyan replied: For several minutes I was silent, because at that moment I could have said such words that would have made me responsible for many years to come. I restrained myself. I had the self-control, which I had developed over the years, but as a Communist I was deeply offended. I saw this statement as an expression of mistrust toward our party. . . . I also understood that he wanted to put us in a favorable position and took a chivalrous stance. C. R. Rodriguez: You are right. This is the essence of the matter. However, at that moment he had been shocked. . . . He [Fidel —S.M.] told us that one should not disturb the past—we would not understand each other. The Soviet comrades have their point of view and we have our own. We thought that the issue of inspections would not be brought up again. A. I. Mikoyan: It was a question not of your, but of our vessels. The ships would have been ours. You are still young diplomats. . . . I took very hard the two days when we did not have meetings. It was a real moral torture. . . . C. R. Rodriguez: In the evening Fidel was happy when he saw that Mikoyan was leaving the meeting in a good mood, he felt that we would be able to find a common point of view. . . . A. I. Mikoyan: . . . I am glad that Fidel is willing to seek flexible forms of mutual actions. . . . The most important thing is collaboration. We cannot do without it. If you are not with us, then with whom would you be? . . . Where would Cuba get practical assistance? I am not speaking of our assistance. You know what it is. We are doing everything up to the threshold of a nuclear war. We cannot step over that threshold. The goal is to save Cuba. Should we step over that threshold, the goal itself would disappear.

However, for the Kremlin it was difficult to grasp the metamorphosis. A message from Khrushchev came several days later; its content was about the same as Fidel’s words, but expressed in the name of the great superpower. In this form it sounded threatening, inappropriate, and offensive. Transcripts of the talks show that Mikoyan did not convey anything from that part of the letter to the Cubans. His entire mission would have come to nothing if he had told the Cuban side the contents of the letter. So he did something totally different. He even improvised a part of letter, reading what Khrushchev had never written: “I noted that Comrade Khrushchev emphasizes the fact that ground inspections in Cuba are out of the question, because they are unacceptable to the Cuban government. This made a big impression on them.” In reality, in the telegrams Khrushchev had sent to Mikoyan for Castro, he had begun to treat the entire affair as well planned, successful, and resulting in his

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victory. The fact that because of his carelessness and self-assurance the world had come within a hair’s breadth of a catastrophe, and that the peaceful resolution of the conflict had in essence not depended on him, but on President Kennedy’s self-control and wisdom—this, of course, was never mentioned. Cuba’s humiliation also was not mentioned—that is, the fact that nobody bothered to ask for its opinion as the agreement was given to remove the missiles and conduct ground inspections on its territory. Khrushchev never apologized to the Cubans for portraying them as the guilty party in installing the missiles on the island. He wrote to President Kennedy that “we sent them to Cuba per request of the Cuban government [emphasis mine —S.M.],”10 even though it was known that the exact opposite had taken place. By making that claim, Khrushchev had shifted the blame to Fidel Castro, and he did this in several messages to Kennedy. It is clear that Cuba had its own, more justified, “clusters of anger.” The anger, as well as the Cuban side’s understanding of the issue, is well expressed by the exchange of opinions between Guevara and Mikoyan, which are described in more detail below. However, in the framework of the sixth objective for Mikoyan’s program, Mikoyan and Che Guevara discussed the questions of trade and economic development. The meeting devoted solely to these issues took place on November 16. In questions of the economy, Mikoyan had already been leading in terms of the internationalist approach to Soviet-Cuban relations. Considering these talks, it is difficult to agree with Jorge Castaneda, who writes that an abyss had opened between Che Guevara and the Soviet leadership.11 Mikoyan concluded his talk with Guevara on November 16 with the assurance that the USSR would always stay with Cuba. In conclusion, he said: Do you think that we are helping you because we have an overabundance at home? Do you think we have a lot to spare? We don’t even have enough for ourselves. But we want to preserve the base of socialism in Latin America. You were born as heroes, but in a time before a revolutionary situation was ripe in Latin America, before the socialist camp had grown enough to provide you with full support. We are giving you ships, weapons, people, fruit and vegetables. . . . The time will come when we will show our enemies what we are capable of. But we don’t want a noble death. Socialism has to live. Excuse me for the excessive rhetoric.

The essence of it is clear. Guevara was against any kind of compromise with the United States, while the Soviet Union based its entire existence on mutual compromises with the United States. They responded with the same. In my opinion, it was not an abyss but a misunderstanding. I will try to explain why. At the base of this misunderstanding lay Guevara’s, and also Fidel’s, overestimation of the Soviet Union’s capabilities in the economic and military dimensions. Guevara sincerely believed that it was the Soviet Union’s internationalist

212 Mikoyan Face to Face with Fidel

duty to assist all the revolutionary countries in alleviating their economic troubles at its own expense. If this had been a possibility, Guevara’s opinion would have been worth considering. And this was all the more so because Cuba, even with its limited resources, had always acted on these principles vis-à-vis friendly countries in need of help. But he did not know that the Soviet Union’s economy was barely able to support the arms race, that inside the country economic backwardness was far from being overcome, and that the population’s living standards were not much different from those of the countries that the Soviet Union was supposed to be assisting. Besides, the Soviet Union was lagging behind in the arms race. Mikoyan mentions this very briefly. But it seems that he should have thoroughly familiarized the Cuban leadership with the difficult economic and social problems facing the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Cuban leadership should have been shown films on nuclear weapons testing and they should have been told about all the consequences of using this weapon, of its effects in space and time. They should have been given at least the general idea of the data available to the American leaders, data on the proportion of power in warheads and carriers in both camps. The Cubans probably did not know that dozens of U.S. bombers armed with atomic bombs were constantly on duty in the air in order to make the United States invulnerable in case of a nuclear attack from the USSR. If they had known this, they would have understood the price of Khrushchev’s generous promises—such as “our gunners will stand up for you.” Later, at a conference in Havana, Fidel said that he had no idea that the United States had seventeen times more warheads than the Soviet Union, and that the number of intercontinental missiles in the USSR was about 30 or 40, against about 150 missiles in the United States. The latter also had about 1,500 long-range bombers (that the USSR did not have at this time) and missiles on submarines. Khrushchev often liked to brag about missiles being produced “like hot dogs.” Regrettably, in Havana Mikoyan also talked with Cuban leaders of the Soviet Union’s “superiority” over the United States in missiles. Is it possible that he did not know the real state of affairs? I cannot believe that. And he could not have meant the enormous power of the USSR’s bombs that were being tested. That means his words were simply chosen from the standard set of propaganda that our leaders used to deceive other people, if not even themselves. Additionally, the Cuban leaders were not well informed about the terrible consequences of nuclear explosions, regardless of their location. At that time, one scientist had said that one of the superpowers could destroy the other even without delivery vehicles—all it had to do was explode all its reserves on its own territory. The other superpower, along with the rest of the world, would die a terrible death from the nuclear cloud that would cover the entire planet. If the Cuban leaders had had that kind of understanding of the power of nuclear weapons, they would not have been offended by a concession that prevented such events—the

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explosion of many warheads on any territory. Their readiness to take the first blow in a nuclear world war might have also been dampened. During these three weeks, there were also important talks within the framework of the second objective—to reach an agreement on which weapons would be removed and which would be brought in according to the new military agreement. Already, on November 10, during the trip to Playa Giron and the Lagona del Tesoro, Fidel made a significant statement in response to Mikoyan’s suggestion to think about the long-planned military agreement, but in a way that would not make the Cubans feel like their country was turning into a Soviet military base. Mikoyan conveyed this message in a telegram to Moscow: Castro listened carefully and when I was finished he said: “You have carefully and correctly considered this question.” Further he said that since the missiles were withdrawn from Cuba, the situation became very different from what it had been until then. He thinks that in the present circumstances it will be very difficult for the Americans to use open aggression toward Cuba. Of course, they will seek ways to hinder the further development of the Cuban revolution. . . . Not only the world public opinion, but individual U.S. allies will not understand and approve of new harassment from the United States.

Fidel’s words show that by this time he had understood the new situation quite well. In the end, it turned out that he correctly predicted the overall picture of Cuban-American relations for many years ahead.

The Il-28 Crisis However, let us come back to Khrushchev’s telegram to Mikoyan from November 11. The telegram raised a new question, one that would return Mikoyan to the second task, which had seemingly been fulfilled. This question would raise one more “crisis within the crisis.” I am referring to the message from Moscow notifying of the agreement with President Kennedy’s demand to remove the Il-28 bombers, which were discussed above. The fact of the matter was that the clouds over Cuba had not cleared. Fursenko and Naftali describe in detail how in November, particularly on November 8, U.S. armed forces had moved up to Florida’s south shores in expectation of a command to storm Cuba.12 Even the number of American casualties had been calculated—down to one person, as only the Americans can calculate—a total of 18,484 people, and of that number 4,462 on the first day. For some reason, the Americans assumed that they would be fighting with a well-trained and equipped Cuban army of 100,000, while in reality it was 200,000 and could be raised to 350,000 with auxiliary forces. They did not take into account the tens of thousands of Soviet soldiers with full state-of-the art equipment, which would equal three divisions. Perhaps the Americans thought that after October 28, the Soviet soldiers were automatically out of the game. It is

214 Mikoyan Face to Face with Fidel

true that the intelligence service reported to the U.S. government that the number of troops covering the missiles did not exceed 10,000 men. The data from the USSR’s General Staff show that its security troops did, in fact, number 8,000 to 9,000 people. The rest of the troops were there to fight in case of an American invasion. The Americans had very ambiguous information about the Luna tactical missiles. The Pentagon had a surprisingly careless approach to such a serious operation, with many unknowns. The predicted number of casualties was overly optimistic. The wish to straighten out the mutinous island 90 miles off the coast of Florida that had defied the superpower was just too great. R. Garthoff said in 1992 that “the buildup at that time included one Marine and five U.S. Army divisions—of which two were Airborne. It included a paratroop force larger than the one that had landed in Normandy. The force totaled 100,000 Army and 40,000 Marine combat troops. . . . The Navy had 183 ships, including 8 aircraft carriers on station. The air strike plan called for 1,190 strike sorties on the first day, and potential casualties were estimated at some 18,500 in ten days of combat.”13 At a conference in Havana in 1992, General Gribkov reported that our intelligence was informing us that an air attack and an invasion of Cuba were being prepared. Together with the Cuban military we developed the defensive strategy. We considered the possibility that as a result of the fighting Cuba could be separated into several parts. Accordingly, we planned for our units to control those regions. The morale of our and Cuban armed forces was very high. Everybody was prepared to fight to the end. We even considered the possibility of switching to guerrilla warfare in case the island was occupied. There was no possibility of retreat. . . . In any scenario the offensive would sustain great losses. An air strike could not destroy all of the missile forces. Even without the use of R-12, the Luna launching sites would be used in case of a nuclear attack. The enemy’s losses would have been enormous.14

The United States might have decided to resolve the question through military action if the Soviet Union had refused to remove the Il-28 bombers. As we now know, President Kennedy tried to avoid such advice from the hawks around him and in the Pentagon. Here is how Robert McNamara, who was then the secretary of defense and in the best position to know such information, described the president’s attitude toward military action: “What would he have done if Khrushchev had not announced the withdrawal on Sunday? . . . In a sense what I’m saying is that Kennedy did not want to invade Cuba. He didn’t want to invade it on Sunday the 28th, he didn’t want to invade it on Monday the 29th, he didn’t want to invade it ever, if he could avoid it. . . . That would have been a disastrous thing, not just from the point of view of Cuba, but from the point of view of history, and of the history of the United States.”15 It is evident that this was the case not only from these and other analogous statements by McNamara, but also from Kennedy’s remarks at the ExComm ses-

Mikoyan Face to Face with Fidel 215

sions and outside the sessions, along with his actions. Among those actions were the above-mentioned instructions to Andrew Cordier to be prepared to give U Thant the text that he would submit as the UN’s proposal for the mutual and simultaneous removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba and the Jupiters from Turkey, in case Khrushchev insisted on immediate and public commitment to remove them. It is sufficiently clear that the president tried in all kinds of ways to delay the decision to attack and to avoid it altogether, to resolve the crisis peacefully. Kennedy also resorted to a secret mediation effort by Brazil to influence Castro to eject the Soviet missiles.16 Nevertheless, the question of the Il-28s unexpectedly became extremely important at the State Department’s urging. Castro has a simple explanation for this: As the ships with the missiles got father from Cuba, the United States’ demands grew and the tone of the negotiations changed. It is true that the Kremlin had shown itself to be poorly prepared for diplomacy because it had given all the trump cards to its opponent long before the game had ended. Moscow should have stipulated how Washington’s nonaggression pledge should be formalized, how Washington should obtain Havana’s permission for an inspection, and how and where they should conduct it. The Kremlin had done everything to make the Soviet bargaining position unfavorable. As a result, already in January 1963 Secretary of State Rusk had begun to voice reservations at a closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voice brought the agreement to naught. This is what happens when the conditions of an agreement are not carefully specified while the two sides’ positions are still more or less equal and it is difficult for one party to dictate to the other. Khrushchev wrote a ciphered telegram to Mikoyan on November 11, 1962, about the Il-28s, which would cause the “crisis within the crisis”: Special Telegram No. 1013 On the last message from President Kennedy and the questions that he posed, we report our thoughts about the outline of our steps with the purpose of reaching favorable results and the realization of the obligations that United States of America has undertaken, as they are presented in the President’s messages, and in our message to the U.S. president, from October 28. We give them to you for reflection and digestion. We would like to know your opinion, since right now you are like a Cuban yourself. We discussed these issues with our entire collective leadership and military men, and all arrived at the unanimous conclusion that it would be prudent to do the following—agree to remove all Il-28s from Cuba; in all we have 41 there. . . . They might say that the appetite comes during the meal, that the United States will bring forth new demands and insist on their fulfillment. But we will resist this in negotiations.17

My father told me about what became his main difficulty. He had just discussed with Castro the idea about “the appetite that comes during the meal,” only

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in different words. As my father told me, Fidel had warned him: “You do not know the Americans as we know them in Latin America. As soon as you satisfy one of their demands, another one comes up. If you satisfy that one, a third and a forth will appear. And this will go on indefinitely, until you capitulate completely.” The day before Fidel had said: “They could still demand something. Your missiles are no longer here, so now they think they can pressure you as they will. Now they could demand the Il-28 bombers to be removed. You give them your wrist and they’ll demand your arm up to the elbow. You agree to that and they will immediately want to bite up to the shoulder. You just cannot make concessions with them.”18 My father immediately assured Fidel that the USSR would not tolerate new demands. He even told him about Stevenson’s impudent letter about Il-28 that he had received in the New York airport, and how he had replied to it. And suddenly, literally the next day, he has to add a new condition and to propose a new concession! And this was exactly the concession that Mikoyan had assured Castro he already rejected in New York. Fidel also told about this episode, but in 1992, long after the passions had died down. He recalled how he conveyed this idea to Mikoyan: “With Mikoyan, whom I remember fondly, we discussed this question of the Il-28s—bitterly, I would say. . . . We knew the Americans better than the Soviets did: their psychology, their actions, what they do, their history. We were closer to them here. We have learned to guess what they are doing, to interpret them. Often we know what they are doing not through intelligence, but through intuition. We guess what they are thinking, what they are planning, what they’re scheming.”19 Fidel Castro was absolutely right. Even then, he warned Mikoyan about the forthcoming demand about the Il-28s. As he reported to Moscow, my father had “received, read, and thought through” Khrushchev’s telegram. And he had to agree with its conclusions. He only added: I am only afraid that once this demand is fulfilled, Kennedy will continue to delay the diplomatic resolution of the entire package. . . . We should make this the last concession and leave Kennedy without any more opportunities for further blackmail.

Of course, Kennedy had been pressured by the State Department and the Pentagon to pursue further concessions. He had tried to stop such attempts. “Only this [the missiles], and I will not pressure the Russians an inch further!” he said to the people who liked the American policy of extorting concessions, according to Robert Kennedy.20 But they still encouraged the president to raise the issue of the Il-28s. Mikoyan offered Khrushchev to turn the question of the Il-28s into a reason to bargain by demanding reciprocal concessions. This would have been quite logical

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from the point of view of diplomacy in general and for the protection of Cuba’s and the USSR’s interests in particular: Perhaps we could let the President know through unofficial channels that you would be willing to discuss this question under the conditions that the negotiations start immediately; that an acceptable agreement on the guarantee of nonaggression toward Cuba is made; and U Thant’s plan for UN inspections on the territory of the Caribbean Sea countries, including the southern part of the United States where the Cuban counterrevolutionary camps are located, is accepted.

In the same message, he directed Khrushchev’s attention to the completely inappropriate concession that concerned the USSR’s relations with socialist countries in general: 2. On the issue of military specialists, I think that we should not make a commitment to recall them to the last man. It would be better to say that we have an agreement with the Cuban government to gradually replace the Soviet personnel with trained Cuban personnel. . . . And in principle we should not assume the obligation to Americans not to assist a socialist country with our military specialists. Based on previous correspondence, Kennedy does not have the right to raise this question. And in his public speeches he did not question the legitimacy of Soviet specialists in Cuba.

Mikoyan warned Khrushchev against further unnecessary and, in principle, intolerable concessions. Moreover, Mikoyan proposed to right away obtain from the Americans what they promised, but what they clearly wanted to evade, while the question of the Il-28 was still being discussed and there was some leverage with which to bargain. Mikoyan reminded him of this. Finally, he demanded respect for the Cuban side, at least at this stage, when there was no particular rush: I consider it absolutely necessary that when your response to Kennedy is prepared I would have the opportunity to show Fidel Kennedy’s letter and your response before it is delivered to Kennedy [in both cases, the emphasis is mine —S.M.]. . . . I do not know how the matter will go after the new assignment is carried out [about the Il-28 —S.M.], but yesterday, at the end of the conversation on the military agreement, I felt Fidel’s full trust toward us. We should protect this feeling of trust.

Khrushchev did not follow a single one of my father’s suggestions. At first glance, it would seem that he sent to Castro a draft of his reply to Kennedy, so that Castro could examine it. At this stage, there was ample time to fully consult with the Cuban government. Nevertheless, after sending to Mikoyan in Cuba the text of his message to Kennedy, and after giving Mikoyan permission to use it during talks at his discretion, Khrushchev sent the message to its final destination in

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Washington, without waiting for a response. Why again such disregard for Cuba’s opinion? What was the rush with this issue? It is completely inexplicable. I have only one guess: that it was his certainty in his own infallibility, plus the big-headedness of a superpower. But he never tired of teaching others what to do: We understand your difficult situation very well. But what can you do? Educate them, there is no other option. These are necessary labor and necessary expenses, because we believe in Fidel’s honesty and we do not doubt it.

To my father, it was just another confirmation of the fact that Khrushchev still did not understand that at this point it was Fidel who needed to be convinced of the Kremlin’s honesty. What was going on in the Kremlin could be seen from these records: No. 271 Protocol No. 66 Session of November 16, 1962 Present: Brezhnev, Voronov, Kirilenko, Kozlov, Kosygin, Kuusinen, Polyansky, Suslov, Khrushchev, Grishin, Demichev, Ponomarev, Shelepin. 1. On the message from President R. Kennedy [sic in the text —S.M.] and the further steps in Cuba. Khrushchev, Gromyko, Brezhnev, Kosygin, Kozlov, Ponomarev, Gromyko [sic], Suslov. On Castro’s position—unreasonable, loud. Teaches us a lesson. We have come to a turning point: Either they will cooperate or we will remove our people. Letter for Cde. Mikoyan for talks with Castro. Reply that we agree to remove the Il-28s (verbally).21

Mikoyan had to start a new round of arguments about the art of diplomacy and cold calculations in relations with the United States. As he had expected, the conversation was difficult. It was after this conversation that Fidel disappeared for two days and did not meet with Mikoyan, without any explanation. This incident has been interpreted in the literature according to this or that author’s power of imagination.22 The interruption did not happen right away. And it did not last for a week, as some people have written (sometimes they have even spoken of two weeks), but two days. My father was not very worried by the first empty day. He thought that Fidel was taking a time-out to calm down, compose himself, and consider his options. When Mikoyan felt that the pause had gone on too long and saw that no meetings were being scheduled, he went to visit Antonio Nùñez Jimenez, his close acquaintance from meetings in Cuba in 1960 and later in Moscow.23 Jimenez was Fidel’s close friend, although he was never a part of the highest leadership levels.

Mikoyan Face to Face with Fidel 219

However, here we should allow Mikoyan to tell the story, as he told it to me and my oldest son Vladimir (Vladimir recorded it; he had many years of experience recording conversations from his work at the MFA. In this particular case, his record is verbatim): The next day [after he told Fidel about Khrushchev’s agreement to remove the Il28 —S.M.], he just took off for some distant province, without excusing himself with something like “I am leaving, please do such-and-such activity, go and visit such-and-such a place.” He could have said: “I have some business to take care of, please take some time and visit any place you would like.” But he did not say a word! I am waiting for him to schedule a time for a meeting. Then I find out that he went to a province and did not leave any instructions. I am waiting there like a fool. He could have told me to use the time to rest, or something of the sort. He has such a violent temper. It is true that we had disagreements. But he has an anarchistic type of personality. But overall, I usually succeeded in convincing him. Sometimes the process would begin all over again. We would come to an agreement on everything, and the next day he would begin defending his old position. For five days in a row, I could defend some issue and bring it to a close every day, and we would reach an agreement, just to have him begin it all over again in a few hours. He is an interesting person; I respect him. As a person, he is honest and good; I cannot say a bad word about him. But sometimes his behavior was just impossible! I got up early in the morning and didn’t know what to do. Nobody is telling me anything. For example, they didn’t say that “today there will be no talks.” And they didn’t offer any activity, not even some sightseeing. That is elementary. I wait for a day, nobody stops by, and nobody tells me what will happen tomorrow. And there are six of them, the people who participated in the talks. If Fidel left or does not feel well, does not want to talk today (I would understand that after our conversation on the day before), then why is there no news or a meeting with one of the others? Today I don’t know, tomorrow I also don’t know. What if the same thing happens? Is that a signal for me to leave? Why are you still sitting here, so to say: Nobody wants to talk to you, and you’re still sitting here! Then I used a trick. I made this move. There was a scientist there, Jimenez, who was a very good person. I had previously known Jimenez, he is a very polite and educated person. He has a family, I knew his wife as well. He just came home from somewhere [from Algeria —S.M.]. I called him [the ciphered telegram to Moscow says that Jimenez called himself —S.M.] and said that I want to stop by, look at his children. They have four children. He received me very well, and there we were, sitting and talking. Toward the end of the conversation, I say casually, among other things: You know, I am thinking of leaving tomorrow or the day after. “Why are you leaving?” he asks me, “Is everything settled already?” “No, not everything. But what can I do? It looks like the talks don’t need to be continued, and

220 Mikoyan Face to Face with Fidel

there is no point for me to sit here without work. Fidel is busy with his own affairs.” “What do you mean? Why do you think so?” “What else can I think? I did my job, even if without any results. But it does not depend on me, it depends on two sides, not one. We cannot come to an agreement; we can’t even talk. I will ask my government to call me back, let somebody else lead the negotiations. Or to cease the negotiations altogether, it seems they are not needed here.” Of course, that was my gamble. I had no plans to leave before I concluded the talks successfully. Jimenez started to talk me out of leaving. He said to me: “You should wait and continue the negotiations.” That same night he somehow found him, although this is difficult, since he [Fidel —S.M.] is often in a different province every night. But I did not know whether he would be able to find him. And then I decided to also visit Raul Castro. He is also a very good person. He has a calm, normal personality, not volatile like Fidel’s. Fidel is a very good person, with a good soul; it’s only his personality that’s so difficult. With Raul, we spent the whole night talking. I said to him casually: “What if one of you came to visit us, could we do such a thing? That would never happen. I—I said—am not the last person at home, I have work to do there, and a great deal of work. I am not doing it for the sake of these negotiations. So I am not doing anything there, and I’m not doing anything here.” He started to talk me out of leaving. He did not try to justify his brother or explain anything. He just said: “Sometimes urgent matters come up.” I understand that he was not authorized to talk with me; otherwise, he would have called me himself or come to visit. But he persuaded me very gently, on human terms and very politely. And the next day Fidel suddenly showed up at lunch at our embassy. He spoke some good words about his respect for me, about the fact that we’ve been friends for a long time and that there is no one better to conduct the negotiations.

Fidel found some way out of the embarrassing situation. A day before the agreement about the removal of the Il-28s was made public, U Thant received a letter from Castro. The letter had already been published in Granma in Cuba, and the information went overseas. In the letter, Castro stated that the airplanes were the property of the Soviet Union (which was the case), and that a joint decision with Cuba had been made to remove them. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez explained to Mikoyan that “the purpose of this statement was to avoid this time the shock that the Cuban people felt after the announcement about the removal of the missiles.” The records from the conference in Havana in 1992 show that Castro remarked that “Mikoyan was against removing the Il-28s,” and added: “Mikoyan said originally that the Il-28s were not included. It was very hard for Mikoyan, and Khrushchev said quite rightly that no one could have done the job better than Mikoyan. He was an extraordinary man. He was a wonderful man. Mikoyan said that the Il-28s would not be withdrawn. When we asked him what we’d do if the Ameri-

Mikoyan Face to Face with Fidel 221

cans then demanded the withdrawal of the Il-28s, Mikoyan said ‘To hell with the Americans! To hell with the Americans!’ A few days later, they demanded the withdrawal of the Il-28s. The Soviets acceded to the demand for the withdrawal of the Il-28s, and Mikoyan was forced to explain to us that the Il-28s were to be withdrawn. You can imagine how we felt. . . . So we cooperated. . . . We told U Thant that we would not hamper the withdrawal of the Il-28s.”24 That is exactly how it happened. But at first there was such strong indignation in the Kremlin about the Cuban part that Castro simply could not talk about it even with Mikoyan, as much as he was on great terms with him. My father had to use a trick, which was aimed at the psychology of his partner in the negotiations. In his telegram to Khrushchev, Mikoyan describes the entire episode: CC CPSU To our No. 1837. On November 15, as I already wrote, Ambassador Alekseyev gave a lunch. Before and during the lunch there was animated conversation. At the beginning of the conversation Fidel Castro said that he was greatly troubled by what N. Jimenez told him of his talk with me. He added: “Who could carry out this mission better than you! If you cannot do it, then it is impossible. And we all know that it is not so. There is an old and strong friendship between us.” . . . Before the Cuban comrades left I asked him one-on-one whether my further presence might be burdensome to him. He embraced me and said that I must not offend him with such words.25

But in another telegram, he shares his gloomier thoughts with Khrushchev: PRIORITY CC CPSU, to Comrade Khrushchev My intent is to leave Cuba after 23 meetings with our Cuban friends . . . was dictated by the impression I had that my functions here were becoming exhausted. Twenty-four hours later, even before receiving your telegram, I felt that the mutual understanding and trust we had reached were shaky. I got in a very bad mood and was dissatisfied with my work. I already decided for myself to delay my departure until I can strengthen the understanding and trust.26

This time Khrushchev showed his best side and decided to cheer up his friend and comrade. He wrote to Mikoyan: To Cde. Mikoyan (personally) 1837. I just received your telegram, in which you report of the major difficulties in the work with our Cuban comrades. I understand you completely. We all, and I personally, consider the fact that your task is a very difficult one. But it is also exceptionally important. You can be sure that we value the work you have done, and have done well. We understand that your personal grief, even though you are bearing it with fortitude, is making your position more difficult. We wish you health, and are certain that you will continue to carry out the important task that

222 Mikoyan Face to Face with Fidel

rests on your shoulders in relation to your trip to Cuba as well and honorably as you have been until now.

Thus, Mikoyan resolved another “crisis within a crisis.” And, just as in the main crisis, the result was positive: Each side understood that it could not go too far. This was his small lesson in diplomacy to his Cuban negotiations partners and to himself. And the matter had gone pretty far: Fidel and his comrades’ refused plans for inspections by either UN forces, the Red Cross, or by ambassadors of several Latin American countries in Havana—all these options were offered by U Thant. When these new difficulties came up, Khrushchev started to seriously consider Mikoyan’s departure and the cessation of further negotiations with the Cuban leadership. He sent a telegram that was impetuous in tone and in substance was threatening to the Cubans. One got the impression that Khrushchev had already decided to join the Americans in demanding “exemplary conduct” from the Cubans: In short, we have to reach an agreement now: If there is no hope for Cuban cooperation, then probably you will have to leave Cuba. But then we will say that since our Cuban friends do not need our cooperation we have to draw the appropriate conclusion and we will not impose ourselves. In any case, we believe today that the decision about your trip to Cuba was correct and your stay there has been useful. . . . One could say that your presence in Cuba is a deterrent factor both for the United States and the Cubans.”

But after the feeling of dissatisfaction with his talks, Mikoyan was able to reach a breaking point—without, of course, passing on a single negative thought from the telegram he received to the Cubans. Here is an excerpt from his ciphered telegram to Khrushchev: I told them that . . . Dobrynin, our ambassador to the United States, has started confidential talks through President Kennedy’s agents with the following goals: the Americans have to immediately lift the quarantine, cease the flights of U.S. planes over Cuba, and settle the mutual obligations. . . . I emphasized that while stating these requirements, Khrushchev considered the conditions Castro brought forth during our last talk.

I think Mikoyan understood that neither Kuznetsov nor Dobrynin would be able to achieve a total cessation of U.S. flights over Cuba. However, he planned on raising this issue himself on the return trip from Havana. He knew that it was one of the most sensitive issues for Castro. This was immediately confirmed when Fidel replied: We should not tie the issue of American flights over Cuba to the removal of the Il-28 bombers, since we already agreed that Cuba will send a statement to U Thant regarding the flights. Then he said that several hours ago he sent such a statement to U Thant.

Mikoyan Face to Face with Fidel 223

This was a great lesson Castro taught to Mikoyan and Khrushchev. Mikoyan expressed his surprise at not being notified of such a letter before it was sent to U Thant. Fidel Castro made the following reply: “I could wait no longer, and while visiting the antiaircraft gunners today I told them that starting on Sunday or maybe Saturday we will open fire on all American airplanes flying over our aerodromes, ports, and military bases. Of course, we will only fire within the range of our antiaircraft artillery.

My father calmly noted that Soviet representatives are working on making Kennedy cease the flights. He reminded Castro that the most important issue at the moment was to secure the removal of the quarantine without allowing an inspection on Cuba. He said that within the next several days, when it looks like the agreement to lift the blockade is going to be made, it would be advantageous for Cubans to refrain from firing at American aircraft. Mikoyan was mistaken in this, and Fidel, as it turned out, had done the right thing. But the disagreement over the low-altitude flights of American planes did not become the subject of a major argument. Mikoyan did not make any more objections after Fidel told him that he visited air defense squadrons of the Cuban army and saw the fighters simply weeping with helplessness as they told him how the American pilots make hedgehopping flights and make fun of them, knowing that they are not allowed to fire. Fidel became angry and said that starting on Sunday they would be allowed to fire. This was not a completely thoughtless action, as Mikoyan had believed. On the contrary, the action had been carefully thought through. Why did he give time until Sunday? During this time his, Fidel’s, telegram would reach U Thant, who would then have to warn the Americans that “airplanes violating Cuba’s airspace will risk their destruction.”27 Castro knew very well that the United States did not need the low-altitude flights for their “control”: U-2 planes were flying regularly and conducting aerial photography. But these planes were virtually invisible and inaudible from the ground. So let them fly at that altitude! The lowlevel flights were used to humiliate the army and the population, to demonstrate their impotence. This was why he gave that order. Despite Khrushchev’s apprehensions and his threats to Cuba in relation to this, the Americans understood that they should not gamble the pilots’ lives in this game.

Castro Fights for the Nuclear Warheads A very serious issue unexpectedly came up, which Mikoyan had to resolve then and there. An important conversation within the framework of the mission’s second objective—to come to an agreement about weapons in Cuba—took place toward the end of Mikoyan’s stay in Cuba, on November 22. The conversation was preceded by Mikoyan’s telegram to Moscow, with the following message:

224 Mikoyan Face to Face with Fidel

Special Telegram No. 1892 CC CPSU I do not consider it a coincidence that Cuba’s MFA gave Cde. Alekseyev a copy of its instructions to the UN representative, which contains a reference saying that “we have tactical atomic weapons, which should be kept.” Tomorrow, on November 22, the conversation that will start at 22 o’clock Moscow time could among other things touch upon the fate of the new military agreement. In connection with this, the present question could arise, which I will have to answer. I am thinking about saying that the Soviet Union has an unpublished law that states that any kind of atomic weapons—strategic or tactical—cannot change hands. In case of war, these weapons would be used to protect the entire socialist camp, but without changing hands. Since we will not have our own base here, the weapons cannot remain in Cuba. November 22, 1962. A. Mikoyan

USSR minister of defense Marshal Malinovsky considered it expedient to leave in Cuba a Soviet military force armed with Luna missiles with nuclear warheads. It is clear that Mikoyan was against this. It is possible that his words about the law were not true. It is more likely that he was talking about a decision made in a small circle of people: the CC Presidium. Mikoyan might have been the initiator of this several years earlier, in relation to China in 1959 (judging by his stories). In the case of the Cubans, Mikoyan’s point of view was approved. Moscow asked the Cuban MFA to take measures to remove the phrase about tactical atomic weapons from the directive for the UN representative in order to prevent an information leak—after all, the United States still did not know about the presence of the Luna missiles with nuclear warheads on the island. Moscow also proposed to have committees from the two countries to discuss the new military agreement in the near future, but separately from Mikoyan’s presence in Cuba. But the question was not settled. A meeting with the Cuban leadership took place, which “at first had a heated atmosphere” but “ended well.” The heated atmosphere was caused by Kennedy’s statement, in which he mentioned the alleged commitment to remove Soviet troops: After listening to my comments [Mikoyan writes], he [Fidel —S.M.] expressed his wish not to hurry with withdrawing the troops. The second question he was worried about was Kennedy’s statement that all nuclear weapons had been removed from Cuba. He asked me whether the tactical weapons had been removed or not. I replied that they were still in Cuba, but they would not be transferred to the Cubans and would be withdrawn. We have a law that forbids any atomic weapons from changing hands, including tactical weapons. We have not transferred it to anybody and do not plan on transferring it. In case of war we would use the atomic weapons to protect the entire socialist camp.

Mikoyan Face to Face with Fidel 225

He asked me whether it would be possible to leave the atomic weapons in Soviet hands in Cuba, without transferring it to the Cubans. [This is the option proposed by Malinovsky. –S.M.] I said that this would be impossible because there would not be a Soviet base and the Soviet officers will be advisers to the Cuban army. The Americans do not know that there are tactical atomic weapons here, so we are not removing it at the request of the Americans, as the Cubans think. It is our own decision to remove it. After all the explanations, they came to terms with this. . . . It is clear that they want to have not only our weapons as a deterring factor, but also a military agreement of support. They feel that the U.S. guarantee of nonaggression alone will not suffice.

The record of this conversation—which can be found in document 37 at the end the present volume—will give the reader a better idea of Fidel Castro’s emotional state than the account cited above. Here, I emphasize only a few points: 1. If the Cubans had known that the USSR would be ready to concede and remove the R-12 missiles, they would not have agreed to bring them to the island. 2. Cuba’s constant wish was to make an open agreement, so the actions would not be undertaken in secret. 3. Fidel Castro was justifiably puzzled why the S-75 antiaircraft missiles were not used to prevent the American spy-planes from discovering the R-12 missiles. 4. He was also puzzled by the poor camouflage of the missiles and by the fact that the servicemen did not ask Cuba for help in hiding the missiles, which would have made the missiles impossible to see from the sky. 5. Fidel Castro expressed his mistrust of the U.S. guarantees. 6. He once again emphasized that as the result of the entire crisis, Cuba came out “as having zero importance, like a dirty rag,” which meant that his deep indignation had not passed. 7. Mikoyan said that all the military technology of the Soviet military bases— including the T-34 and T-55 tanks and armored vehicles, coastal Mosquito patrol motorboats, frontline cruise missiles, and all the weapons of Pavlov’s troops except the nuclear weapons—would remain in the Cuban army. There was also a funny incident during the talk. In response to Fidel Castro’s disappointment with the settlement of the crisis, Mikoyan expressed Moscow’s evaluation of the outcome. To this, Fidel replied: “We do not accept responsibility for others. But if you say so, then perhaps that’s how it is.” The exhausted interpreter, V. Tikhmenev (usually there were two interpreters, so one could rest while

226 Mikoyan Face to Face with Fidel

the other translated), made a mistake and translated: “You say it as U Thant might have said it.” (The word “tan” means “so” in Spanish, it seems that caused the translator’s mistake.) Mikoyan was offended—not because he did not respect U Thant, but because the relationship between Havana and Moscow, especially between Fidel and Mikoyan, was special. And suddenly there was such a statement. As Alekseyev reported, lightning flashed in Mikoyan’s eyes, and he frowned and said: “Why would you compare me with a bourgeois statesman?” “I am not comparing you,” Fidel said. He could not understand why Mikoyan’s countenance changed, and what had prompted this question. At this point, Tikhmenev understood that he had made a mistake. He asked Castro to repeat his statement and translated it correctly. Everybody laughed. But Tikhmenev had bad luck that day, or perhaps three weeks of translation had completely worn him out. When Castro asked “Will you demand that the United States liquidate its bases in Turkey?” The interpreter said: “Might the United States demand that you liquidate your bases aimed at Turkey?” My father was once again shocked. This time, Alekseyev turned to Tikhmenev and said: “Are you sure you translated correctly?” Tikhmenev realized what had happened, said that he had made a mistake, and gave the correct translation. At this point, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, who had a quick sense of humor, took his gun out of its holster, moved it along the large table toward Tikhmenev, and said: “It seems to me there’s just no other option for you. . . .” Everybody had a good laugh. As my father told me, he often had to convince Fidel of the same thing many times. It was the same in this conversation, when Fidel came back to the subject of Cuban dissatisfaction with the removal of the Il-28s. Despite the fact that a week before this conversation Fidel had been very disturbed by the sudden news that the Il-28 bombers would be removed, and, as discussed above, he evaded talks for two days, afterward he gave his agreement to remove the bombers relatively easily and quickly, agreeing that they were not particularly valuable for defense because they were very vulnerable. It is a different matter altogether that the spirit of the decision made in the Kremlin reflects the suddenly chauvinistic great power’s approach to its small and largely dependent ally, in relation to which the superpower should have actually felt a sense of guilt. Most certainly, the great power should not have accused it of intractability, of an irrational approach to the different possibilities of inspections offered by U Thant. It should not have made an issue of Castro’s order to shoot at American planes over Cuba, of the Cubans’ reaction to the Il-28s, and of everything else that accumulated during the three weeks of talks between Mikoyan and the Cuban leadership in November. The impression given was that the Kremlin had collected a pile of everything of which Cuba could be accused—or at least of which it wanted to accuse Cuba—in order to cast off the guilt complex it felt toward Cuba. The Kremlin saw Mikoyan’s role in the situation as the following:

Mikoyan Face to Face with Fidel 227

You should personally think all of this over, considering the situation and the personalities of the people you will be talking with. You have to convey to them our thoughts and wishes. Let them reply to you and let them take all the responsibility. Since they do not want to collaborate with us, it begs the conclusion that they want to take all the responsibility for it. That is their right. They are a government and they are responsible for their country, and their politics, but in that case we will not be involved in their affairs. Since they do not want our collaboration, we cannot take the cue from their politics, which on top of everything is unreasonable on the present issue. In order to give Kennedy a response on this questions, we would like to know your opinion.

The list of accusations of the Cuban government is so inconsistent, absurd, and unseemly that any desire to quote it further disappears. Whoever would like to can look it up in the documents section at the end of the present volume. The cycle came full circle—at first the Kremlin, following Mikoyan, was offended at Fidel’s readiness to excuse the USSR of any obligations to protect Cuba, and now it came to the same conclusion without seeing anything reprehensible in the fact that it was blackmailing a small country with the threat to leave it to face to face alone with its powerful and hostile neighbor. Naturally, Mikoyan did not pass on anything from the Kremlin’s threatening telegram. Meanwhile, there were ultimately no serious issues left between Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan and Fidel Castro, especially after Castro showed himself a diplomat by stating in a special letter to U Thant that Cuba would itself propose to remove the Il-28s. This was easier for it to do than to remain outside the game while the USSR and the United States come to an agreement among themselves.

The Breaking Point Mikoyan’s fourth objective, to convince the Cuban leadership that Kennedy’s commitment of nonaggression toward Cuba could and should be taken seriously, was resolved three days earlier at the lunch to which Fidel Castro unexpectedly arrived after his two-day absence. The conversation came to the most important question for the future: to what extent Cuba could trust the United States’ commitment not to attack Cuba and not to let others attack it. Guevara was doubtful, alluding to similar talks that had taken place before the Playa Giron and before October 22, after which the United States concentrated its forces around Cuba for an invasion. In response to this, my father tried to explain to the Cubans that there are different kinds of promises. It is one thing for a president to simply say that he will not attack, and then he can find an excuse to reverse his decision some time later. But when such a commitment is stated in an exchange between the leaders of two states, it assumes the nature of an international agreement. There was a good

228 Mikoyan Face to Face with Fidel

chance that Kennedy would be reelected. That would mean that for six years, Cuba would be guaranteed against invasion. That would be a long time—and it would be a totally different matter if the USSR and Cuba were to succeed in formalizing such an agreement as a UN document. That would tie the hands of all future presidents (in the end, the United States did not agree to this option). And in general, in the present case the president assumed this responsibility in the name of the United States, which should tie the hands of future presidents [which Nixon confirmed in 1970 —S.M.]. During the same lunch that was discussed above, Guevara brought up a second question that spoke of Havana’s somewhat light-minded attitude toward nuclear war: “Do you think that when the imperialists recover from the shock [Mikoyan had used this phrase earlier, when he spoke of the state the Americans were in —S.M.], they will decide that the Soviet Union would never begin a nuclear war to protect its interests or the interests of its friends?” Mikoyan did not respond to this question directly, because it showed that the Cubans had too simple an attitude toward nuclear war, but to tell them that would have meant to once again disturb the friendly setting of the talks. Therefore, he steered the conversation to the fact that the Americans do not consider themselves to be winners, they are not trumpeting victory, and they are respecting the Soviet demands that not a single American soldier go aboard a Soviet ship. The third objective—the problem of inspections—was under discussion for the entire three weeks of the talks, but it did not bring results. U Thant offered several possibilities, including his own visit with military advisers from the UN. The last proposition was to create UN control groups for various cases such as this crisis. On one of the last days of the talks with Cuban leaders, Mikoyan did something akin to a review of his work. He reported to Moscow: I noted that if the balance of forces in the world is in our favor, in the region of the Caribbean Sea the Americans have a good position. However, the balance of forces in the world binds them. I made the case about the possibility of using some pressure in Berlin and in some other places. . . . Fidel, agitated, told me about the Americans’ impudent bombing of the Cuban steamship Rio Domoje, which was coming from Canada. After three days of shadowing, in the latitude of Charleston, an American bomber made four runs in the dark and dropped several bombs, which exploded 30 to 50 feet from the ship. He added with indignation that if the bombs had hit the target, the ship would have disappeared without a trace. I commented that the Americans are real pirates. You know Comrade Fidel, I told him, that we have been and are doing everything necessary to protect Cuba—we give you people, materials, equipment, weapons, and we don’t tally the expenses. But you have to know that we cannot agree to a thermonuclear war. That is a line that we cannot cross.

Mikoyan Face to Face with Fidel 229

Fidel supported me: “That is right, I am of the same opinion, it cannot be allowed to happen.” If it happened, Cuba would cease to exist, I continued. Many millions of people would die. The survivors would never forgive the Communist leadership for not having used every possibility to avoid the war.

(Here one cannot help but remember the words of Dean Rusk that were cited in the previous chapters, as he said that the surviving Americans would hang the president and secretary of state on the nearest tree.) This passage in the ciphered telegram once again confirms that Khrushchev’s interpretation of Fidel’s message was incorrect. In his memoirs, Khrushchev reads Fidel Castro’s telegram from the night of October 26–27 as conveying an urge to begin a thermonuclear war because the telegram supposedly speaks of a preventive nuclear attack on the United States. But Fidel’s telegram should be read with the consideration of his emotional strain during the period when, as Robert McNamara said, “people in the Pentagon were even speaking about making the first strike. . . . LeMay spoke openly of a first strike against the Soviet Union.”28 The telegram should be viewed, as Fidel views it, along the lines Friedrich Sorge’s messages to the Kremlin in June 1941.29 Castro wanted the Kremlin to know of what he thought were imminent events and to take measures that it would deem appropriate. Around the same time, Castro informed Khrushchev clearly that he was not urging a preventive strike. The telegram was important for another reason as well: In his correspondence, Khrushchev makes it seem as if he agreed to remove the missiles after receiving this telegram. Castro correctly observes that the message to Washington stating agreement to remove the missiles was sent before the telegram had been received. The Presidium received Castro’s letter in the morning of October 28, while Khrushchev had already offered to remove the missiles in his messages to Kennedy on October 26 and 27. Incidentally, the CC Presidium text shows that Khrushchev himself warns his colleagues that if the United States strikes, “we will respond,” and then World War III could begin.30 Thus it remains unclear of what exactly he is accusing Fidel. Following the Pentagon’s military logic (and it appears that Fidel was right in this respect), a strike on Cuba would only be “the first round”; “the second round” would immediately be a powerful nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. Military and civilian participants of the crisis along with historians all confirm the real possibility of this scenario. G. M. Kornienko notes that “the United States’ official military doctrine always provided for (and does to this day) the possibility of being the first to use nuclear weapons in analogous situations—in the case of somebody attacking the United States or its allies using only conventional weapons. Castro can hardly be blamed for allowing the possibility of that line of action from the USSR in response to acts of aggression by the United States against it and its ally Cuba.”31 In response to the first blow from the United States and the destruction of a Soviet force of 42,000 people, Castro was offering Khrushchev for the USSR

230 Mikoyan Face to Face with Fidel

not to find itself in a situation similar to that of the USSR in June 1941. The United States had already dealt the first blow. Furthermore, according to the military doctrine Kornienko described, any response from the USSR to the destruction of its major military force would bring a nuclear attack upon it. Speaking at the conference in Havana in 1992, Oleg Troyanovsky confirms neither the detailed description of how Khrushchev was informed of Fidel’s message (as Sergey Khrushchev describes it in his book Krizisy i rakety [Crises and missiles]32), nor the fact of the matter—which was expected, because Sergey Khrushchev was not present at the session. “This letter was read to Khrushchev over the telephone and was circulated to the Politburo members. Thus, at the meeting, everyone had the letter before him. . . . I cannot assert that Fidel Castro’s letter was considered a call for a preemptive strike.”33 What is more, in his book of recollections, Oleg Troyanovsky (as do many other witnesses, including my father) connects the urgency of the decision and its transmission to Kennedy by no means with Castro’s telegram, but with an erroneous report that Kennedy was about to make a new television address: From the very beginning the participants at the meeting were in a highly charged state. Khrushchev was virtually the only one who said anything, Mikoyan and Gromyko made some comments. The others preferred to remain silent, as if to say: you got us into this mess, and you will have to deal with it. . . . At this time General Ivanov, the secretary of the USSR Security Council, a stout and somewhat sluggish man, was unexpectedly called to the telephone. When he returned, he asked to speak and said that an urgent message from the United States had just been received: It had been announced that at 17 o’clock Moscow time Kennedy would present a new televised address. Only later was it discovered that it would actually be a repeat of his address from October 22. But that came later, while at that moment the participants of the meeting believed the worst, decided that Kennedy would announce an invasion of Cuba or—what seemed more realistic— he would announce a decision to bomb the missile-launching sites. Right away, it was decided to urgently accept the American president’s latest proposal and to broadcast it on the radio before Kennedy’s supposed address, thereby preventing his possible actions.34

Besides Castro’s telegram, the Kremlin also received a telegram from GRU personnel in the United States. Both warned the Kremlin against a situation analogous to June 22, 1941. Only Fidel Castro made the warning twenty-four hours earlier. Returning to Mikoyan’s talks in Havana and to his exchange of ciphered telegrams with Moscow, it needs to be noted that Mikoyan virtually ignored the stream of accusations and even blackmail that the Kremlin addressed at Cuba, and that essentially Khrushchev addressed at Fidel Castro in the message from November 16. Mikoyan did not respond to that part of the message at all. The next day, he made a review of the difficult month of November 1962, and he addressed Khrushchev personally:

Mikoyan Face to Face with Fidel 231

From far away, you understood me: that it was difficult, very difficult for me because of my personal grief as well as because in this state I had to deal with such a complicated matter. They are good people but with difficult personalities, they are effusive, emotional, high-strung, quick to flare up, and oversensitive to every trifle.35 Reason often gives way to their heated feelings. It was a great help to me that you prepared so many arguments and considerations—there wasn’t a lack of them. All this helped me greatly to convince them of the correctness of our position. But the greatest help and inner support, what helped me to bear my personal grief and made easier the difficult task at hand, were the warm feelings and brotherly sympathy, the understanding of my situation, that I found in the CC telegrams and in your letters. Thank you for that. November 17, 1962 A. Mikoyan

Farewell to Havana The time for Mikoyan to leave Cuba was drawing near. The twenty-four days he had spent there had been busy, with talks with the entire Cuban leadership on the questions of the missile crisis, on the issues of economic relations, on the military agreement for the postcrisis period, and on other questions. My father had visited construction sites, schools, and factories. He had invited for lunch the poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko and the movie producer Michael Kalatozov and director Sergey Urusevsky, who were making a movie about Cuba. He had visited the Soviet fish trawler Sverdlovsk. He had laid a wreath at the Jose Marti memorial (as he had done in 1960). He had spoken many times before different audiences—students, schoolchildren, workers, and Soviet military personnel—and he had even appeared on television. Everywhere, he had been received warmly. The rumors that are sometimes cited by well-respected authors about the hostile attitude of the audiences are totally unjustified.36 My father and the interpreter Vladimir Tikhmenev, as well as many Cubans, told a different story. But that was not the end of Mikoyan’s mission. On November 24, he received a humorous and friendly congratulatory telegram from Khrushchev: Dear Anastas Ivanovich, you tried to hide your tricks from us, but we discovered them and found out that you were born on November 25. On this occasion I greet and congratulate you from all the members of the CC CPSU Presidium, from candidate members of the Presidium, from the CC CPSU Secretaries, the deputies of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers as well as from myself personally. We wish you good health and great successes. And when you return, we will add to the greetings and celebrate this day belatedly. November 24 N. Khrushchev

Mentally, Mikoyan was reviewing his long stay in Cuba, summing up the results of his talks from the perspective of the objectives he had planned to achieve.

232 Mikoyan Face to Face with Fidel

Sometimes, he discussed things with Alekseyev, and sometimes he checked his thoughts and impressions in conversations with other members of the delegation and with the people accompanying him. Of course, he did this every day, and I often witnessed him doing this during his other assignments. It was important to him to know whether he had made any mistake that he should not repeat, or that could be fixed. The same went for the positive outcomes: He wanted to see how they could be developed, what he could count on. There were visible benefits from this kind of review. Participants made observations, because my father intentionally created that kind of atmosphere. Sometimes he asked specifically: Was everything said and done correctly in this case? There were no Soviet officials in Cuba besides A. I. Alekseyev and V. V. Chistov. The interpreter V. E. Tikhmenev did not feel comfortable expressing his opinion; it would go against the CC CPSU’s schooling. But at that moment, Mikoyan was reviewing the outcomes of his entire work in Cuba. He felt that he partially met the first and third objectives, as well as he could—I mean the restoration of trust with the Cuban leadership, and the smoothing of sharp corners in their relationship with the Kremlin. Regrettably, the return of trust happened only on the personal level: The Cubans were assured that Mikoyan was a real friend who sincerely sympathized with them and had tried to do everything possible to restore their wounded national pride. Yet it was simply impossible to convince them that Khrushchev had no other option but to suddenly, without consulting with Havana, agree to remove the missiles and agree to a ground inspection of Cuba after giving assurances of the opposite. Fidel succeeded in improving his relations with Khrushchev only during a lengthy trip around the Soviet Union in April and May of the next year, 1963. But as his later statements showed—for example, the one in Havana in January 1968 and independent interviews with him during the following years, as well as his speeches at 1992 and 2002 conferences in Havana on the Cuban Missile Crisis—his resentment toward the Soviet Union, and especially Khrushchev, never really went away. “You cannot change the past,” as he once said. Years later, Fidel Castro accepted and acknowledged that during its existence, the USSR had provided an enormous amount of often free help in many varied areas. Everybody knows that the economy of the Soviet Union was stagnant, that only profits from exporting oil kept it going. So the aid did not come from an overabundance of means. The USSR’s economy itself had a sharp need for those means—although there is no guarantee that they would have been put to better use within the country. In a 1990 interview with an Italian journalist, Castro said some revealing words at a time when the union of Moscow and Havana was rapidly eroding: “We are very grateful to the Soviet Union, which offered us decisive solidarity during the economic blockade and aggression from the United States. We would be the most ungrateful people in the world if we didn’t recognize this and claimed all the merit for our successes and progress. The economic relations—the equal terms of

Mikoyan Face to Face with Fidel 233

trade and its credits—which we have with the Soviet Union helped us to achieve our economic and social development.”37 Castro also spoke very highly of N. S. Khrushchev and his relations with Cuba, of his mind, his sincerity, and other personal traits—which speaks of Fidel’s generosity and confirms Mikoyan’s description of him as of a “man with a good soul.” The hurt of 1962, which never completely went away, did not prevent the Cuban leader from recognizing that Khrushchev, despite his personal shortcomings (and who does not have them?), was Cuba’s sincere and true friend and a worthy leader of the Soviet Union. Even then, in November 1962, Mikoyan succeeded in convincing the Cuban leadership that the decision to remove the missiles and even the Il-28 bombers was correct. He succeeded in convincing the Kremlin to leave the rest of the technology to the Cubans, and also to keep one motorized infantry brigade as a symbol of the allied relations in case the United States tried some attempt at aggression. He was not able to talk Fidel out of his command to open fire on U.S. airplanes flying at low altitudes from the middle of November 1962. Time has shown that Castro was right in his decision, while Mikoyan was mistaken. He also did not succeed in convincing the Cuban side to agree with various possibilities of an international inspection on Cuba’s territory. The United States immediately rejected U Thant’s proposals that spoke of mutual inspections, even when U Thant called it “a UN presence” rather than an inspection. This meant that in the forthcoming talks with John McCloy and Adlai Stevenson—and, most likely, with President Kennedy—Mikoyan would need to try to reach an agreement that the visual inspection of the USSR’s ships from the decks of American ships and aerial photography of Cuban territory from U-2 spy planes during November 1962 had in fact fulfilled the objective that had been intended for a ground inspection in the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence. Consequently, the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement should assume the legal weight of an international agreement. Undoubtedly, there was logic in this argument. But it would be very difficult to succeed in getting the American side to admit it. Shortly before leaving for New York, on November 26, my father received the following telegram from Khrushchev: Special Telegram No. 1220 To the Soviet Ambassador To Cde. Mikoyan . . . We will make a general summary regarding the situation in Cuba and our future line in this issue when we hear your reports here, in Moscow. . . . We believe that a visit to Washington [besides New York —S.M.] would be beneficial. We still think that publicly the trip should be motivated by the need to meet with embassy workers. . . . And some people from the president’s team are telling us that if you are in Washington, there might be a meeting with Rusk, and a meeting with the president is not out of the question.

234 Mikoyan Face to Face with Fidel

To which he immediately replied: Special Telegram No. 1901 CC CPSU I received your No. 1220. You are in a better position to judge in Moscow, and your thoughts coincided with my sentiments—I also feel that it is time for me to leave Cuba. Today we discussed the departure date with our Cuban friends. We agreed that I would leave on November 26, Monday, and I will take their offer and spend the last two days in Santiago, where Raul Castro resides. On Sunday I will finish my work and make a televised appearance. Earlier, in the situation of those days, I had doubts about the use of going to Washington. But now, after a serious success and the liquidation of the blockade, these doubts have dissipated. I ask Cde. Gromyko to assign Kuznetsov, Zorin, and Dobrynin to prepare a schedule of my meetings and talks in New York and Washington. A. Mikoyan November 22, 1962

As for the outcome of Mikoyan’s mission in Cuba in terms of the personal relations with the Cuban leadership and society, Fidel’s words six years later, in a speech that was never intended for publication, are revealing: “They should have made the Yankees begin a direct dialogue with us. . . . And the results could have been different and at least more appropriate and within the limits of the most basic respect for our country.” With regard to the talks with Mikoyan, he then summed up: “It goes without saying that we have the highest opinion of Mikoyan as a personality and as a person; he was always sympathetic with Cuba, he was a friend of Cuba. And I think that he will remain a friend of Cuba; I mean that he has done a great deal for us. That is why we value him so highly.”38

9 Drawing Conclusions in the United States

Meetings in New York

T

he flight from Havana to New York took more than three hours. During this time, Mikoyan was able to make a mental summary of the events, and to outline the tactics of negotiations. In essence, it was clear what he should demand from the American side. However, as the Americans would say, his “bargaining position” became quite unfavorable by the end of November: The missiles were already shipped out, the bombers were disassembled and packed into crates, and they were supposed to be shipped out according to the agreement reached in mid-November. The Americans did not need any more concessions in return for which they could also concede something. Now they would only demand that Cuba carry out to the letter all the conditions to which Khrushchev had given his consent, without asking the Cuban leaders for their opinion or proposing that the United States try to come to an agreement with them—for example, on the issue of inspections. In the present conditions, after Moscow had already given up all its positions, it was almost unrealistic to get anything out of Washington. Formally, Mikoyan was coming on an invitation from U Thant. They understood each other well, and during the dinner they exchanged opinions, which for the most part were the same. U Thant expressed regret that Fidel Castro had not accepted any compromise options for the inspections, even the veiled ones. Mikoyan, who had come to America to continue negotiations with Adlai Stevenson and John McCloy in addition to U Thant, had three main tasks, which were contingent precisely on the unfavorable conditions that had developed by that time. These conditions were determined by the developing situation—by the 235

236 Drawing Conclusions in the United States

fact that the Soviet Union was already completing everything that it promised to do, and by Cuba’s rejection of all proposals that could pass as “adequate” inspections. So these were Mikoyan’s three tasks: 1. To get the United States to agree that the inspection of missiles being shipped out of Cuba on the high seas from the ships of U.S. Navy as well as the aerial photography of the disassembling of the missile launchers would suffice instead of onsite inspections. Thus the pledge of noninvasion of Cuba would become a legal commitment. 2. To make sure that the United States’ commitment not to invade Cuba was written down as a document submitted to the United Nations, best of all as a joint Soviet-American declaration about the achieved agreement, and was registered as a UN document. 3. To obtain the United States’ agreement to stop flights over Cuban territory. This task had a somewhat utilitarian character: to demonstrate support for Cuban interests, but in the case of a U.S. refusal to stop overflights, to formulate it so that the continuation of overflights would officially replace ground inspections. And therefore, the pledge not to invade Cuba would also retain its force on these grounds. None of these tasks looked easy. Only the first one—the noninvasion pledge— followed from the obligations undertaken personally by President Kennedy, but was made contingent on the inspections, which Cuba did not allow. For this reason, they had to exclude the possibility of using that loophole for an invasion of Cuba in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, while all the U.S. armed forces were still concentrated in the Caribbean. The second task was already a big “if.” And the third task, about the cessation of overflights, was almost entirely unreal because of Cuba’s refusal to allow ground inspections. But at the same time, it permitted the negotiating parties to frame the concept of overflights as an adequate replacement for onsite inspections. While Mikoyan was in Havana, he received all the transcripts of conversations of Vassily Vassilievich Kuznetsov on these particular subjects. The negotiations produced practically no results. There were also other issues, which made it important to demand that Kennedy carry out all the agreements in full without any conditions that threatened to make them useless—for example, Cuba’s “subversive actions” in Latin America, that is, its support for revolutionary movements there. Maybe Kuznetsov was right when he proposed to Khrushchev on October 26 and 27 to create some difficulties for the Americans in Berlin: “Although Kuznetsov did not specify what kind of pressure he had in mind, nonetheless, it caused a sharp, I would even say, explosive reaction on the part of Khrushchev. He stated in an aggravated tone that he could do without this kind of advice, ‘We are just starting to untangle ourselves from one adventure, and you propose that

Drawing Conclusions in the United States 237

we get ourselves into another one.”1 It is notable of course that the author of the whole idea admitted that it was an adventure. Meanwhile, Kuznetsov, an experienced diplomat, proposed an interesting move. The White House was most afraid of precisely any kind of pressure in the area of Berlin. And such pressure— regardless of what form it could take—could serve as a bargaining chip at the moment when in Cuba all the trump cards had already been surrendered and all concessions had been so hastily made. Then they could have some hope for a positive resolution of at least some tasks that were facing Soviet diplomacy.2 However, Castro also bears part of the blame; if he agreed to the most innocent form of inspection, such as an “excursion” by four or five ambassadors of Latin American and neutral countries in Havana to the locations of the missile launchers, that already could have been accepted as a completed inspection. Kennedy was showing sufficient flexibility and even willingness to compromise regarding the methods. Or Fidel Castro could have invited U Thant to come for one more visit with his military adviser, the Indian General Rikyi [sic] (who would be accompanied by two or three of his officials, not Americans but representatives of neutral countries like Austria, Sweden, and Finland). This method would have also satisfied Kennedy’s demands. I am confident that Fidel would have accepted one of those methods if he had not been extremely upset and insulted by the Khrushchev-Kennedy deal made behind his back, which did not even mention Cuba, as if it was not involved at all. Of course they should have informed Cuba about the recall of the missiles before Khrushchev’s first telegram to Washington, and definitely before the radio announcement, and they should have asked for Cuba’s opinion, at least on the subject of the ground inspections. In one of his telegrams to Mikoyan in Havana, Khrushchev expresses his bewilderment bordering on indignation about the Cuban government’s refusal to allow such innocent forms of inspection. He just could not understand the depth of hurt he had inflicted on Castro and Cuba. Here one can only refer once more to the Spanish proverb: “You don’t feel a kick to another’s head.” Troyanovsky expresses some justification for the Kremlin’s behavior: “Of course it is easy to judge with the benefit of hindsight. At that time, however, in the situation of highest nervous intensity, many important nuances simply disappeared from sight.”3 One could accept this as a description of the last day of exchanges of messages, October 28, but not of the previous days. Having arrived on November 26 from gentle and warm Havana to cold and windy New York, Mikoyan also sensed the change of climate in the atmosphere of negotiations. In the evening, the USSR’s negotiators told him about the lackluster results of their meetings. It is possible that they had some hope that the negotiations at the higher level would be more successful. But they also understood very well that both McCloy and Stevenson were standing by the line approved by the State Department and the president.

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On November 27, Mikoyan had dinner with U Thant, during which they had much to talk about. The U.S. interest in engaging the United Nations in negotiations with the USSR on the Cuban Missile Crisis was at its peak at the height of the crisis, when Washington was desperately seeking any approaches to resolve it peacefully. But when the danger for the United States receded, and the crisis was moving toward resolution, Washington started to gradually push the United Nations aside, trying to narrow all negotiations to a direct settlement with the Soviet Union. At the same time, for Moscow, the active engagement of the UN was becoming even more desirable. It became even more important, therefore, at that moment, to formalize commitments undertaken by the USSR and the United States in the form of UN documents. Theoretically speaking, a trilateral protocol on U.S.-USSR-Cuban commitments would have formulated most precisely the obligations undertaken by the sides in this case, and would have been most appropriate for the crisis situation. But the policymakers in Washington understood very well that if they accepted this option, it would have meant an indirect recognition of Fidel Castro’s government—and that was seen as absolutely unacceptable. However, if that version had been presented as a condition of the agreement in the course of correspondence with Kennedy from October 23 to 27, during the hot days of the crisis, when in the White House they were gripping their heads to find a way to defuse the dangerous confrontation, Washington probably would not have been able to avoid it. In the end, now the Soviet delegation had to fight for three separate declarations to be submitted independently to the UN Security Council. What worried the Soviet side most of all was that the guarantees not to invade Cuba now looked as if they were starting to somehow dissolve into discussions of under what specific conditions the Unites States would be “forced” to intervene. On November 28, Mikoyan met with McCloy and Stevenson, accompanied by Kuznetsov, Zorin and Mendelevich on the Soviet side and by Yost, Stevenson’s deputy, on the American side. Mikoyan stated that he did not want to formally get involved in the negotiations, but expressed his desire to push them along. “To tell you the truth, your document is bad; it cannot serve as a basis for an agreement”—this is how he began his comments about the American delegation’s draft for submission to the United Nations. First of all, Mikoyan noted that the draft was missing or partially omitted some important stipulations, which were included in the exchange of letters between Khrushchev and Kennedy. Second, Kennedy’s pledge not to invade Cuba was being made conditional on Cuba not taking any actions, which could threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere (considering the fact that one could always fabricate accusations of such “actions”). These conditions were never mentioned in the letters. “Putting forth such a condition practically devalues and even annuls the U.S. guarantees,” added Mikoyan. And third, the draft attempted to legalize the flights of American planes over the Cuban territory, which violated the norms of international law.

Drawing Conclusions in the United States 239

As far as “Cuba’s subversive activities” were concerned, if one mentioned them, then one would also need to speak about the subversive activities that were more obvious to everybody than the Cuban ones, as Mikoyan observed: It is no secret that the United States has been conducting undisguised subversive activity against Cuba. . . . However, the American draft skirts this issue. Where is the logic, then? The Americans criticize Castro all the time, but it is precisely Castro who proposes to ensure that all the so-called subversive activities be stopped by both sides. . . . Then the question about inspections. In our opinion, this question should be divided into two parts. As far as disassembling the Soviet missiles and their removal from Cuba, and also the removal of the Il-28 planes, inspections related to that now belong to history. . . . There we were able to find an alternative and decided the question on a mutually acceptable basis.

This statement, of course, was too audacious, because the United States was not willing to lose a trump card, which consisted precisely of the fact that Cuba refused to allow inspections on the ground. But Mikoyan’s goal was exactly this— to get the opposite side to accept the idea that the sides found an “adequate” version of inspections, which could replace the ground inspections. And from there the conclusion would follow that the American pledge not to invade Cuba was still valid. But Mikoyan went even further: He proposed that the United States consider Castro’s “five points.” He noted that the first four points, in essence, directly repeated the UN Charter. And the fifth point was about liquidation of the naval base in Guantánamo: “We understand that today it is difficult for the Americans to make a decision on this issue. Taking that into account, we coordinated a more flexible position on this issue with the Cuban government, which is presented in our draft protocol, namely, ‘The United States agrees to enter negotiations about the return of the Guantánamo base.’” Mikoyan was obviously hitting back for all the slights that both the great powers had incurred in Cuba—one for more than a half-century, and the other in the last months of 1962. He put forth several other objections regarding the American draft, but they were much less important. If the U.S. side had accepted what he listed, it would have changed the entire context of U.S.-Cuban relations. It was clear that neither McCloy nor Stevenson was authorized to make concessions on issues like that. Therefore, raising those issues became a way to prepare for the meeting with President Kennedy. He, of course, would be informed about the negotiations that took place, and he would know the extent of demands of the Soviet side—but whether he would make concessions was the question of the nearest future. Stevenson was happy about one thing: that Mikoyan supported the proposal to only submit declarations to the UN Security Council and was not trying to coordinate the text of a joint protocol. This was simply because Mikoyan under-

240 Drawing Conclusions in the United States

stood that many months would pass and it would not lead to any result, and that declarations could be approved already today as official UN documents. The United States’ side had repeatedly stated at different levels that for its purposes, aerial photography removed the need for ground inspections. And this was also confirmed by President Kennedy in his conversation with Mikoyan the next day. As far as Castro’s five points were concerned, the United States refused to discuss them formally, citing the fact that they were not part of the KennedyKhrushchev agreement. It was hard to refute this position; one could only feel regret that during the last week of October, in the absence of any consultations with Cuba, Moscow did not know (and most likely was not even interested in) what demands Cuba would put forward. Otherwise, Khrushchev could have included them in the agreement, and then everything, except perhaps the Guantánamo base, had a good chance of being accepted. One could not completely exclude the possibility that negotiations about the future leasing of Guantánamo, though limited in duration, could be promised for the future, after some fixed period of time. Stevenson found one more point of agreement in suggesting that in order to remove difficulties, it would be desirable to come to the UN Security Council with coordinated drafts of the declaration. However, he said, if we do not arrive at an agreement on the substance of the declaration, then we could submit separate declarations to U Thant so that he, in his turn, would inform the Security Council, and the issue would be resolved. Apparently, Stevenson and McCloy did not know yet that the State Department was already trying to undermine the idea of submitting the declarations as such—a procedure that was too binding. The State Department intended to artificially link Kennedy’s noninvasion guarantees with the “creation of appropriate agreements through the United Nations to ensure their implementation (the withdrawal of the missiles and excluding the possibility of their reintroduction in the future)”—words from Kennedy’s letter to Khrushchev on October 27. Undoubtedly, it was more important for the United States to be sure itself than to convince the United Nations. Therefore, the complaints about the absence of ground inspections were a pure formality. The U.S. side itself proposed the method of inspections on high seas. It had no reason at all to express dissatisfaction and to allege that the agreement had not been fulfilled. As far as the future guarantees were concerned, Khrushchev did not promise anything of that sort in any of his letters, especially in the letters from October 27 and 28. Kennedy’s unilateral statement, made more than three weeks later, had no relationship at all to the agreement. And moreover, all this had no relationship with Cuba—it did not participate in the preparation of the agreement and did not promise the United States anything at all. Havana stated from the very beginning that inspections could only be reciprocal. Washington rejected that, so the responsibility rested with it. And in general, talking about future guarantees was pure demagoguery. Most likely, the president needed it for “internal consump-

Drawing Conclusions in the United States 241

tion” and to justify the U-2 overflights. Very soon, artificial Earth satellites replaced the planes. McCloy expressed his surprise at the speed with which the missiles were disassembled and removed (I bet he was, but that was exactly the point—that in this situation the USSR should have consciously shown no haste), with the conditions for inspections on the ships, and with the USSR’s agreement to withdraw the Il-28s. As far as Castro’s five points were concerned, McCloy said, “Mr. Mikoyan presented Castro’s demands better that Castro himself could have done.” Mikoyan noted, at that moment, that “McCloy, obviously, is not familiar with Castro and therefore does not give him enough credit.” McCloy was a reasonable person, and so he said the words that nobody else said, except for John Kennedy, and no future U.S. president implemented: “If Castro behaved in such a way so as not to cause danger for other Latin American countries, but concentrated all his efforts on the economic development of Cuba, then the issue of sanctions would not even exist, and on the contrary, the United States could provide Cuba with assistance to develop its peaceful economy.” Mikoyan decided that he should convey a proper appreciation for the efforts of the U.S. president and his representatives in the negotiations in his response: “The success that was achieved gives us hope for future progress.” He supported U Thant’s proposal on UN inspection teams, which could visit different sites for inspections if required, but of course not military installations. His last statement was rejected as defending a stipulation that was not part of the exchange between the heads of state. The following statement by Stevenson was important: Concessions were made by both sides. In particular, the United States agreed to inspections on the high seas to verify Soviet removal of missiles from Cuba as well as removal of warheads, the United States is making a statement about noninvasion of Cuba and that it would not support any invasion of Cuba, which practically removes any danger of such an invasion, and finally, the United States gave up its demand of inspections in Cuba as a condition for U.S. guarantees of noninvasion of Cuba.

Natalie Latter, who came to the United States as a child with a refugee family, was translating the conversation for the U.S. side. At the end of the negotiations, Mikoyan invited everybody to see the Bolshoi Ballet, which was then touring New York. McCloy and Stevenson could not come. Then Mikoyan insisted that Latter should come. She refused: “I have to take the train tonight so that I can translate the president’s words for you.” “But you are welcome to fly with me on my airplane tomorrow,” offered Mikoyan. However, Latter politely refused. Much later, she explained to me that she had no right to do this without permission from Washington, even though McCloy and Stevenson were persuading her to agree: “I did not even ask for permission, because it would have looked strange

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to my bosses. And if the permission came, it would have come much later, already after the meeting at the White House.” Remembering Mikoyan’s conversations in New York, Latter noted how different they were from the conversation the next day at the White House. Stevenson, as a professional lawyer, had a habit of putting his words into a complicated verbal form, which made them more difficult to translate and for Mikoyan to understand. McCloy was more direct. But that did not mean that Stevenson was more flexible. As McCloy said later, sometimes Stevenson became even more inflexible that McCloy himself, even though the latter was sent specifically to “reinforce” Stevenson, who was seen as too soft. That happened after Stevenson proposed an agreement with Moscow that would have required Washington to make too many concessions. Kennedy believed that such concessions were possible, yet not at the beginning of the negotiations, but in the end, if needed. Parenthetically, among those concessions Stevenson proposed evacuating the Guantánamo base. According to Latter, the negotiations in New York were less productive because both sides came with prepared statements (not on paper, but in their heads), and so they exchanged statements rather than reacting to the interlocutor’s comments. However, she admitted that many years had passed and that she could be mistaken in such conclusions.

The White House: Anastas Mikoyan and John Kennedy With these contradictory results, Mikoyan flew on an Il-18 to Washington and landed at Andrews Air Force Base. On November 29, he had a meeting with President John Kennedy at the White House. Protocol memoranda of conversations (memcons) usually differ from the real atmosphere of the meetings. Sometimes they include a phrase about the “warm, friendly atmosphere.” Sometimes they do not. If the memcon is read by the participant (I am talking about the Soviet side, of course), then he might include personal impressions or add details of the conversation that were not directly relevant to the substance of negotiations. Mikoyan usually read through the memcons of his conversations in Havana; thus they give one more of a feel for the atmosphere and the tone of the conversation, and even personal impressions. Mikoyan did look through the memcon of the Washington conversation, but it was compiled from a brief report, which was sent immediately after the meeting, and also from the notes taken by the translators. The record of the conversation with the president was intended to be circulated among members of the Presidium and the secretaries of the Central Committee. Therefore, it has a more formal character than the records that Mikoyan sent directly to Khrushchev immediately after the conversations. According to Mikoyan’s recollections of his conversation with John Kennedy and Robert Kennedy, the atmosphere and the relationship appears warmer than one would conclude on the basis of the official record. My father mentioned

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many details and personal impressions, which would not be appropriate for the memcon intended for circulation. Natalie Latter, in conversations with me, expressed the same opinion. In her opinion, President Kennedy and Mikoyan spoke in a friendly way, even when they differed on substance and had to express some considerations that were not entirely pleasant for the other side. My older brother Stepan remembers well when our father told him how in the beginning of the conversation “Kennedy asked me, ‘tell me about Castro, what kind of person is he?’” Our father gave Fidel Castro the highest assessment as a person and as leader. By the way, the record of their conversation does not reflect this episode. This is how my son Vladimir recorded the recollections of the embassy official I. D. Bubnov, who translated the beginning of the conversation (according to the protocol, Latter was translating Kennedy’s words and Yu. Vinogradov was supposed to translate Mikoyan’s words, but he was late for the meeting 4): Mikoyan’s stay in Washington was framed by an emphatically correct and sensitive attitude toward him from all officials, who obviously felt real human sympathy toward him because of the recent loss of his wife. Of course the Americans were impressed by Anastas Ivanovich’s decision to stay in Cuba instead of following a completely natural impulse to return to the USSR for the funeral. This atmosphere was immediately noticeable when A. I. Mikoyan entered the White House. Kennedy greeted him at the door. From the beginning, the president set a calm and balanced tone, even though one could feel that the president and his circle believed that the crisis was created by the Soviet Union and that it was ultimately resolved due to concessions made by the USSR. Clearly, it was practically impossible for Mikoyan at that stage to obtain more definitive commitments from the Americans, which would reliably guarantee Cuba’s security. By that moment, the object of bargaining on our part already did not exist.

At the start of the conversation, President Kennedy asked Mikoyan about his impressions of Cuba: A. I. Mikoyan answers that he had the most positive impressions—that Cuba is a beautiful island, and that the Cubans are very interesting people who are building a new life with enthusiasm. Castro personally devotes great attention to this project, in particular, to the development of agriculture, to the building of schools, hospitals, and other such measures.

One could guess that the president asked this question not simply as a conversation starter. John Kennedy, when he was a senator, twice went to Cuba unofficially in 1957 and 1958 with his friend George Smathers, a senator from Florida. Thus, when he asked Mikoyan about his impressions of Cuba, the president could not but remember his own experiences in Cuba and his warm feelings toward the Cubans. Unlike Hemingway, he did not entertain good feelings toward Fidel Castro personally. As a representative of the New England aristocracy, he was irri-

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tated by the fact that Castro was still wearing fatigues years after the Revolution had ended. Castro’s messianic pose and his rhetoric did not sit comfortably with Kennedy either. Nonetheless, during the conversation with Mikoyan, Kennedy admitted that “the efforts of the Cuban people and Castro in the fields of education, medical services, the development of the economy of the country are unquestionably a good thing, but that the United States is concerned about these developments— that Cuba is turning into the beachhead of Soviet politics directed toward undermining Latin America.” Here, obviously, was clearly an ill-fated misperception, more like a wrong perception of the real situation: The middle echelon of the Soviet leadership did not approve of such Cuban activities at all, and therefore one could not conclude that the island was becoming the Soviet beachhead in the struggle for Latin America. One must say, however, that such an approach became especially clear in the USSR after the days of Kennedy and Khrushchev. The latter was replaced by party cynics, who adopted the psychology of the middle echelon. They all saw the “triumphant march of socialism,” and especially across the ocean, as a burden and not something to admire. Admiration was left to propaganda, but not to practical support. Moscow was spending a lot on Cuba, and the thought that one more Cuba might appear, God forbid an even larger one, caused more anxiety than joy. Several years later—in the period 1970–73—this could be seen in the case of Chile. Fisheries and a house-building plant were all that Moscow could offer to the socialist government of Salvador Allende. Later, Grenada, due to its insignificant size and small population, required minimal efforts. The agreement on military aid to Grenada looked more like a list for recycling light arms and primitive communications technologies—everything included was classified “b/u,” which meant “used.” And weapons were supplied to Peru on a commercial basis, although the shipments became possible only due to the progressive character of Velasco Alvarado’s military government. Cuba itself provided the most serious assistance to countries in the Western Hemisphere, and to some countries in the rest of the so-called third world. It was Cuba that pulled the Soviet Union into Angolan and Ethiopian affairs. It was practically the same situation with Nicaragua after the Sandinista victory in 1979. Therefore, the main issue that Kennedy worried about was gradually becoming a figment of the Washington strategists’ imagination—another misperception. It was a logical thing to imagine, but it did not take into consideration the financial difficulties of the Soviet Union or its loss of ideological dynamism in the struggle to spread socialism, which was already noticeable to those in Moscow. Needless to say, when the “revolution of red carnations” reached its turning point in Portugal in 1974, Moscow did not encourage the leftist forces to take extreme action, and thus to take power, which would have been quite a realistic scenario. Portugal remained a member of NATO and a capitalist country, although the

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events could have taken a completely different turn if Moscow had decided to provide massive assistance and engage in conflict with NATO. The large stocks of Portuguese porto (port wine) on the shelves of shops in Moscow remained the most noticeable sign of the USSR’s cooperation with a revolutionary country on Europe’s westernmost reach. Kennedy continued: Nonetheless, in my speeches I criticized those who wanted to invade Cuba. My attitude to Playa Giron is well known, too. Last summer, Cuba started a military buildup. Hundreds of Soviet ships with weapons appeared there, and in the end even missiles. All this puts us in a difficult situation. How can I know that this would not happen again a month later or that such weapons are not delivered to Cuba by the Chinese? And still, notwithstanding all this, we argued against those who alleged that Cuba was a Soviet military base. And precisely at that same time, we received assurances from Chairman Khrushchev that there were no offensive weapons in Cuba. How is it possible after all that to guarantee that, let’s say, in the beginning of the next year such weapons would not be delivered there again? A. I. Mikoyan said that the Soviet government, taking into account the good relationship between N. S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy, decided at the time to inform president Kennedy confidentially at first, and only then announce publicly in the press about the delivery of weapons to Cuba, whereas the U.S. government does not inform us about what kind of weapons it delivers to their bases. . . . J. Kennedy notes that the point is not about informing or not informing his government. Of course we do not inform you about such things, and you don’t have to inform us. But even as late as September, TASS made a statement that there were no offensive weapons in Cuba. More than that, Ambassador Dobrynin told Attorney General Robert Kennedy about that. This turned out to be a lie.

One could not avoid this moment in the negotiations. Mikoyan had nothing left to say other than repeat the explanations, already familiar to the U.S. president, about the defensive mission of the missiles. Neither side was satisfied. I think Mikoyan was least enjoying the necessity to play the game of semantics, to pin everything on the interpretation of the mission of the missiles, all the while understanding that Kennedy was right. Mikoyan had to shift the conversation to a different subject, and tell the story of how Eisenhower and Dulles had agreed with him in 1959 that the USSR did not intend to attack the United States, and how they had asked him a similar question about the concerns on the part of the Soviet government. At the time he had responded: We do not think this way either, but we have grave concerns about it. We ask ourselves the question: If the United States does not want to fight with us, then why do they need the bases located in the immediate vicinity of the Soviet Union?

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. . . In this connection, I would like to ask President Kennedy the same question: Does he think that the Soviet Union wants to fight with the United States?

Here Kennedy made a mistake and got himself into a difficult situation; instead of responding, he started asking his interlocutor why they needed to deliver weapons to defend Cuba, even though “everybody knew that the United States did not threaten to invade Cuba neither in the spring nor in the summer of that year.” The deployment of missiles was “a huge insult to me,” he added. Nobody doubted that it was an insult, but the rest of his statement sounded absolutely unconvincing. Preparations for an invasion were going on practically openly at every level of the U.S. government, except for the presidential one. Everybody was expecting such an invasion—in Cuba and also in the USSR, and in the United States, too, although, it is true, there had been no political decision to invade. Mikoyan only mentioned the belligerent statements by generals from the Pentagon and by Richard Nixon. But in order to stop the unproductive polemics of this kind, where he could press the president to the wall with the unquestionable facts, he turned to recollections once again, this time about his meeting with Cordell Hull, secretary of state under Franklin D. Roosevelt, in 1936. He spoke about Hull’s words that the United States and the Soviet Union had in their hands the key to stop Hitler’s aggression. Mikoyan said that now, in these new conditions, the two countries had to bear an even greater responsibility. But Kennedy was obviously still overpowered by the emotions from the perceived insult and continued on the same subject: “As far as the generals from the Pentagon, the government is in control of their statements. He does not know any officials who would make proposals to invade Cuba.” Of course, it was not completely true. One did not have to strain his memory to recall such statements made by many members of the Senate and the House of Representatives: Today, said the president, a situation developed where although the two countries have no territorial claims on each other, we clash with you almost everywhere, which in the present nuclear age is fraught with great dangers for the entire world. As soon as a revolutionary spark flashes anywhere in the world—your presence is noticeable. You are right there. We should mutually try to avoid an aggravation of the situation in all parts of the world.

To this, Mikoyan retorted that in the Soviet Union they knew nothing about the development of the revolution in Cuba, whereas the United States had an embassy, had intelligence, and had capital. Kennedy confirmed that they knew very well that the Soviet Union had nothing to do with it: If we are realists, continued A. I. Mikoyan, we have to admit that revolutions break out not because a mythical “Moscow hand” is involved, but because in some countries appropriate social, economic, and political conditions become ripe for a revolution. Revolutions did happen, and revolutions will happen. And

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they will win in countries of the Americas. And they will win in the United States as well. It is quite possible that you could find yourself playing Castro’s role, who leads Cuba to socialism without being a Marxist.

At last, Kennedy started laughing and joked that it was more likely that his brother could find himself in such a situation. Capitalizing on the fact that the difficult part of the conversation about the lies was over, Mikoyan turned to the practical issues of today. He said that there was an agreement with the U.S. representatives about a document formulating the settlement of the Cuban crisis not in the form of a protocol but in the form of three declarations—by the USSR, by Cuba, and by the United States. These declarations would be submitted to the UN Security Council for approval. However, there was still no agreement on the declarations’ concrete points. Kennedy expressed his opinion that the declarations should only be registered with the UN secretary-general because during discussion it could turn out that the Cuban declaration would be unacceptable to the United States and vice versa: “But the main thing is to reach an agreement on the texts between the United States and the USSR and to pass them on to the secretary-general, and the Cubans can say whatever they want in their declaration. We are not interested in that.” To Mikoyan’s remark that “we submit draft declarations to the Security Council, in which we list the points on which we have reached an agreement” (he deliberately did not name the countries, implying that a Cuban declaration would be included), Kennedy responded that “Cuba should not be part of it, and that we are only talking about coordination of the USSR and U.S. declarations.” Then a very important exchange took place: J. Kennedy states that the Soviet Union has already removed missiles from Cuba and that soon it would remove the bombers. Besides, as he is hoping, the troops stationed for the defense of the missiles would be withdrawn, too. For its part, the United States has lifted the quarantine and announced that it would not support aggression against Cuba. Therefore, significant progress has already been achieved. The issue about withdrawal of troops defending the missiles was not directly mentioned in Khrushchev’s letter, but it was implied that it would be done. He believes that the rest of the troops and the remaining weapons would be withdrawn, too.

Unfortunately, Mikoyan deduced all this from some of Khrushchev’s deliberations. And here Mikoyan decided that it was necessary to tell Kennedy directly that he was not going to play at concessions with him. Therefore, Mikoyan stated firmly, the president is mistaken; we will withdraw no more and no less than what was named by Khrushchev in his letter. Then he notes that the American draft of declaration was so far unsatisfactory, because it essentially undermines the non-

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invasion of Cuba given by the American president. By including in their draft the stipulation that the noninvasion guarantee would be in force as long as Cuba would refrain from “subversive activities” and would not undertake actions that would violate the security of other countries of Americas, the United States thus was trying to assign itself a right to interpret the actions of the Cuban government and put it under its own control. Who gave the United States that right? How can we agree to that? Castro told me, “What right does the U.S. president have to attack Cuba and at the same time to present the case in such a way as if he was doing a great public good by promising to give a guarantee not to invade it? Cuba is an independent country, after all.” I could not disagree with him. . . . We have to stipulate mutual obligations—not to commit subversive acts and not to send mercenaries. Then it would be fair.

Moving to Castro’s five points, Mikoyan said that one of them is somewhat difficult for the United States—about the liquidation of the Guantánamo base; therefore, Castro had agreed to start negotiations only about the time frame of its liquidation. The other four points were really basic demands from the point of view of international law: not to introduce an economic blockade, an end to all subversive action, to take measures to exclude piracy, and an end to the violation of the waters and airspace of Cuba. Of course, Mikoyan understood that even a beginning of negotiations about the time frame of the Guantánamo lease would be a great victory for Castro and a concession on the part of the United States. He could talk this way when he had trump cards in his hands, but not today when all the levers for pressuring Washington had been lost. It is not surprising that in his response, Kennedy did not even mention Guantánamo: J. Kennedy said that he agrees, and that such actions are against the U.S. law. He noted that such sporadic action does not serve any practical purpose, but rather is done to cause a stir. The most important thing, he stressed, is that the United States is not preparing troops to invade Cuba. We declare, Kennedy said, that there will not be an invasion. You said the other day that the hands of the imperialists will be tied. That is why when it comes to providing documents to the UN, we want to be particularly careful. It is not a question of two months, but of two or six years—in a word, while I am president.

Moreover, Kennedy said that he did not want Castro to think that he could do whatever he wanted against the other countries in the region. He did not respond to Mikoyan’s suggestion for mutual guarantees against “subversive activities.” Or, he responded as follows: “If Castro focuses on public education and economic development, we will have no problems.” Mikoyan then turned to the issue of U.S. flights over Cuban territory. His main calculation was to get an admission that overflights would replace ground inspection. Such a formula would be very important, and he obtained it.

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“I was told that you have the means to take pictures of Cuban territory while flying along Cuba’s coast, without violating its airspace. Why, then, would you violate its sovereignty and insult their dignity?” Mikoyan asked. As I. Bubnov later recalled, at this point J. Kennedy leaned forward and nearly stated his agreement, when Secretary of State Dean Rusk instantly caught the president’s willingness to meet us halfway. “Just a minute, Mr. President”—he stopped Kennedy and, coming up to the president’s table, took a stack of aerial photographs. “You see, Mr. Mikoyan, these photographs were made at an angle from aircraft that did not enter Cuba’s airspace. You can barely see anything on them, besides the horizon. These photos, on the other hand, were made while flying over Cuba and you can clearly see the distinct rectangular shapes—these are the former launching pads for Soviet missiles.” A. I. Mikoyan continued to look at Kennedy questioningly; he also caught the president’s willingness to agree with his request. It was again Rusk who broke the silence, sensing that he crossed the line: “In any case, this is not the last word, we will think about this issue,” he said.

When my father was telling me about this incident, he said that Kennedy smiled and said: “You overestimate our technical capabilities. We do not yet have equipment that can capture images at such a steep angle that would allow our aircraft to remain outside Cuba’s airspace and territorial waters. Lately, our flights have not been causing great concern for Cubans because we fly at a high altitude, while low-altitude flights have been stopped.” Because the conversation moved on to the subject of fulfillment of obligations, Kennedy brought up the central issue for the United States, as Mikoyan had expected—the question of inspections. “N. S. Khrushchev’s message, Kennedy continued, provided that the dismantling and removal of the missiles will be carried out under UN supervision. It is true that we agreed on another way to verify the removal of these weapons.” Kennedy then went on to suggest that if the USSR did not want to mention the declaration in the Rio de Janeiro Treaty, the USSR, Cuba, and America could abandon the idea of filing a declaration with the UN in general, and limit themselves to unilateral statements on the press conference platform, for example. In essence, he proposed further reducing the level of the declaration: “In the meantime, let Kuznetsov and McCloy continue negotiations at the UN. If they do not succeed, . . . I could make some kind of statement, for example, at a press conference.” Here Kennedy betrayed the U.S. government’s plan, most likely created at the State Department, to reduce its commitment to a minimum. A press conference statement could be easily overridden by another statement at another press conference. As a result, Mikoyan moved toward a conscious provocation: A. I. Mikoyan: I conclude that, contrary to our position, which is to complete the mutual settlement of the Cuban missile crisis as soon as possible and to cre-

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ate a favorable environment for addressing other issues [here, Mikoyan was clearly alluding to the problem of Berlin and other potential hot spots such as Laos, where events had started to worry Washington. These were the only trump cards left in Moscow —S.M.], the United States seemingly does not want to put out the fire and wants to avoid carrying out the agreement reached in the exchange of letters. J. Kennedy says that his interpreter must have misinterpreted his meaning. A. I. Mikoyan: That is what I thought. J. Kennedy: We have not swayed from the position stated in the letter from October 27. On the other hand, there was no UN verification of the dismantling and removal of missiles, to which the Soviet Union had agreed. Though, we later found other means to verify the removal of the missiles. Kennedy goes on to say that given the circumstances—namely, that the USSR could not completely fulfill its obligations—he is trying to be as understanding of the Soviet position as possible. A. I. Mikoyan: I disagree with the statement that the Soviet Union has not fulfilled its obligations. The Soviet Union did everything that was promised by Khrushchev on the part of inspections. These promises were made within the Soviet Union’s rights as the owner of the missiles. As for ground inspections on Cuban territory, Khrushchev’s letter from October 27 [the version created in the USSR’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which the ExComm left unanswered —S.M.], and again referenced in the letter from October 28, specifically stipulated that this can be done only with the consent of the Cuban government. We found a mutually satisfactory alternative, another way to monitor the removal of missiles. This was done with the participation of U Thant, acting as UN secretary-general. Therefore, we completed the dismantling and removal of the missiles under control in an agreed-on format.

I think this exchange of statements is a clear answer to all those who continue to assert that the terms of the agreement were not fulfilled. They include not only scholars and authors of some books published in the United States. Some public figures also took this position, for example, Dean Rusk and later Ronald Reagan. It is not surprising that Cuba felt threatened. Fidel Castro said that the only time Cubans were not worried for themselves was during the Vietnam War.5 Mikoyan’s second goal in the conversation with Kennedy—to secure a joint statement at the UN—was virtually impossible. Out of considerations for its prestige, the Kennedy administration did not want to present a joint document with the USSR, much less to do so at the UN. It offered to make do with the U.S. president’s unilateral statement. Kennedy certainly did not intend to retain the option of invading Cuba. But he was worried that his agreement with the Soviet proposal—even though it was first put forward by U Thant—would be seen by his Republican opponents as showing a “softness” toward Cuba and the USSR. Republicans could start a propaganda campaign so the president would not appear

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to be the winner in the recent crisis. For its part, the Soviet side was afraid that Kennedy’s commitment could be declared invalid by any succeeding president. There were grounds for such apprehensions. It was not out of the question, but considering the U.S. political culture and traditions, it would not be so easy. And indeed, the commitment remained in force in the future. After John Kennedy’s funeral, Lyndon Johnson confirmed to Mikoyan that the commitment remained in force.6 Richard Nixon even signed a protocol in 1970 stating that the commitment was not made personally by the president but on behalf of the United States as a nation.7 It is true that Ronald Reagan was often incited to say that the commitment was invalid because Cuba did not allow ground inspections on its territory. But even Reagan, who was quite comfortable with statements that, to put it mildly, did not correspond to reality, did not accept this advice. Perhaps somebody informed him that many official documents from the time of the crisis had noted that aerial photography was an effective and “adequate method” of verification and that the Soviet side had thus fulfilled its obligations. For example, on November 3, 1962, the State Department’s secret memorandum to a UN delegation reads: “There [will] be undertaken such aerial and other appropriate surveillance of Cuba as may be necessary to assure that all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability are dismantled and withdrawn from Cuba and that such weapons are not reintroduced to Cuba.”8 The last part of this sentence clearly indicates that a single trip by diplomats and UN officials, or representatives of the Red Cross, would be even less effective. Kennedy himself explained during a conversation with Mikoyan about the flights over Cuban territory that they were necessary to effectively prevent the missiles from being returned: Kennedy added that the Soviet Union has nothing to worry about regarding an attack on Cuba. “We have so far failed to agree on a system to guarantee that offensive weapons will not be returned to Cuba,” he continued. “You are against our flights over Cuba, which we are carrying out for this purpose. Let us continue the negotiations, and perhaps we will find an accommodating solution.”

Moreover, Kennedy said: “What do we have now? A direct military confrontation over Cuba. Who is to say that this will not happen again, say, in six months?” He even asked: “How can I be sure that it will not happen again in a month, or that such weapons will not be supplied to Cuba by the Chinese?” It seems that Kennedy was still venting his resentment over the deception. After all, the whole arrangement with Khrushchev was based on mutual promises. The Soviet side believed Kennedy’s promise not to invade Cuba. But how could one ensure that offensive weapons would not be brought into Cuba, except to believe the Soviet side’s promises? What mechanisms within the UN or outside it could enforce these promises? Clearly, there were no such mechanisms. In reality, these words, along with similar statements at the press conference, could be considered the president’s propaganda effort to counter attacks from the right. But it would have

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been impossible to base diplomatic negotiations on them. Alternatively, these statements could have been used to undermine the agreement, to create the appearance that it was incomplete. Regrettably, one gets the impression that this was precisely the direction in which the State Department was nudging the president. From Kennedy’s words one can conclude, above all, that control over the removal of weapons was over—it had been completed. Now the question at hand was ensuring that there was no reintroduction of offensive weapons. This was a completely different issue. Khrushchev never mentioned it in his telegrams. It had nothing to do with ground inspections. After all, the United States did not expect UN inspectors to settle permanently in Cuba, and on top of that would constantly scour its territory to ensure that weapons would not be reintroduced. Kennedy tried to expand the scope of the agreement with Khrushchev, adding the condition: “If he [Castro] will refrain from subversive activities against his neighbors.” This item also was not in the correspondence between the two leaders during the crisis. Therefore, Mikoyan had to remind the president about it. When Kennedy said that Castro had to change his behavior, Mikoyan responded that Castro himself had said that he wanted to live in peace and wanted to negotiate with the United States: J. Kennedy points out, if this is the case, why cannot Castro agree to the U.S. wording? [in the UN declaration —S.M.]. A. I. Mikoyan: Conditions such as “if the government of Cuba does not . . .” would be offensive to any nation.

In the course of this debate, Kennedy said that Mikoyan had spent a great deal of time in Cuba, but was giving him, Kennedy, too little time. Therefore, Kennedy offered to continue the negotiations in New York between Stevenson and McCloy, on the one hand, and Kuznetsov and Zorin, on the other. Mikoyan correctly saw the danger in this: If they did not agree to anything right then and instead placed all their hopes on the success of negotiations in New York (about which Kennedy himself said “maybe we will find a negotiated solution”), they could be left empty-handed. It would be easy to drive lower-level negotiations into a dead end. Therefore, Mikoyan decided to summarize: He agreed with the spirit of the president’s statements, but he had to note that the United States was trying to raise side issues without reaching an agreement on the main issue. The main issue was a guarantee of nonaggression. One could not propose new provisions in order to assure guarantees for Cuba; one could not include provisions for flying planes over Cuban territory without the consent of the Cuban government. As for provisions to normalize the situations [i.e., rejection of subversive activities —S.M.], they would need to be the same for all countries in the region. If Kennedy were to give appropriate instructions to McCloy and Stevenson, they could make real progress in the negotiations. And, finally, Mikoyan put the question bluntly:

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What can I report to Khrushchev? Does the U.S. government still adhere to the language contained in the correspondence or not? J. Kennedy replied that the United States will not invade Cuba and that it does not depart from the position set out in the letters, and he hopes that the USSR will do the same. “As I already said,” Kennedy went on, “the United States will not attack Cuba and will not allow others to do so.”

This can be regarded as the key exchange of phrases during the negotiations between President Kennedy and A. I. Mikoyan. But the interpretation of the agreement depends on the integrity and common sense of the person doing the interpretation. Dean Rusk had already played a very unseemly role on January 11, 1963, only a month or two after the crisis. Speaking to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as already mentioned above, he said: “First of all, we never gave an unconditional obligation not to invade Cuba,” and besides, “of course, we did not mean that there will be no invasion under any circumstances,” for example, “if Cuba takes aggressive actions against other countries or attacks Guantánamo,” and “if as the result of our need for overflights in Cuba the situation will come to a point where we will have to invade.” Rusk’s statement sounded absolutely preposterous when he said that considering the intelligence data on Castro’s possible intention to send Soviet troops from the island, he did not exclude the possibility that these troops would open fire on the Cubans “like the events in Hungary,” in which case the United States would need to do something. Every word of this was absurd. One was not so much surprised by the informant’s silly report (there were a good deal of them during the crisis), as by the secretary of state’s willingness to believe such nonsense. It showed a complete detachment from any real understanding of the state of affairs, of the psychology of the Cubans and the Soviet soldiers, and of the limits of what was possible and impossible. Tired of complicated phrasing, Rusk finally said something that required no further argumentation: An invasion could take place “if Castro were to do the kind of things which would from our point of view justify invasion.”9 And this was said while President Kennedy was still alive, a month and a half after his assurances to the contrary! By saying these things, Rusk justified Castro’s words, which Mikoyan tried to refute: “My problem is that I do not trust Kennedy’s promises.” As it turned out, Kennedy’s promises were the ones that could be trusted. However, along the diverse spectrum of American political elites, quite a few people were tempted by the possibility of declaring the commitment invalid. A year later, A. I. Mikoyan attended the funeral of John F. Kennedy, to pay tribute on behalf of the Soviet Union to the victim of terror, a promising politician of the new generation. After the funeral, he met with the new president, Lyndon Johnson. In the course of the conversation, Johnson mentioned that he would remain faithful to Kennedy’s commitment of nonaggression toward Cuba.

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My father, who attached a great deal of importance to this promise, used the following trick: He pretended that he did not hear or did not pay attention to Johnson’s words. He wanted a clear statement, which would not be made in passing in the course of a general conversation. As Mikoyan expected, Johnson was somewhat surprised at the lack of an adequate response. He repeated his statement again. Only then did Mikoyan respond, expressing satisfaction that Johnson would keep the agreement in force. Here it would also be appropriate to remember Richard Nixon, whose position on Cuba was well known. But it was under him in 1970 that a protocol was signed affirming Kennedy’s commitment on behalf of the American state. Returning to the conversation between Mikoyan and Kennedy, it should be noted that for a long time the president could not leave the issue of deception and the fact that Soviet missiles were installed so close to the United States. Finally, he recalled that there were agreements with Khrushchev on Laos, and according to some reports they had been violated. He expressed his concern about the presence of North Vietnamese troops in Laos and their infiltration into South Vietnam. He said that the two countries had mostly passed the Cuban crisis, but there was still the danger of conflict in other parts of the world. At this point, Mikoyan asked whether it would not seem appropriate to the president to sign a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact; this would defuse the situation in Europe, one of the most important parts of the world. Kennedy evaded the question by saying that while the Soviet Union considered revolutions in other countries to be its business, no agreements would make a difference. And suddenly he asked, as a sort of joke, whether Mikoyan would sleep peacefully if one hundred missiles aimed at the Soviet Union suddenly appeared in Finland. It was an unfortunate question; frankly, it was a losing question. In the chess literature, this kind of move would be followed by a question mark in brackets: A. I. Mikoyan replied that people in the USSR are sleeping peacefully despite the fact that very close, or more precisely right near his homeland of Armenia, there are American military bases in Turkey. The Soviet people know that these missiles are in the Americans’ hands, and the Americans are well informed about the response capabilities of Soviet missiles. Soon you will have to eliminate those bases.

Judging by these words, it seems to me that my father got a little angry at Kennedy for asking such a question about Finland, while the president had seemingly forgotten about the missiles in Turkey. Kennedy agreed that “the missile bases in Turkey and Italy do not serve much of a purpose. For about 20 months we have been considering whether it makes sense to keep these bases.” Kennedy could not admit that he asked numerous times when these bases would finally be eliminated but the State Department had ignored him, even though the meaning of the questions was clear, as Robert Kennedy said. After all,

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when the president received a message from Khrushchev on October 26 with the proposal that America not only commit itself not to invade Cuba in response to the Soviet removal of missiles from Cuba but also to remove its Jupiter missiles from Turkey, the president indignantly asked: “Just to be clear, can you specify when was the last time I asked to remove these damned missiles from Turkey? Not the five times when I asked for them to be removed, just the date of my last order?” It turned out that the last order had been given in August, two months before the crisis. It was true that the orders were always phrased along the lines of, “What is the best way to remove these missiles?” As Robert Kennedy noted, “The president believed he was president and that, his wishes having been made clear, they would be followed and the missiles removed.”10 It is clear that both Kennedy brothers understood that the obstruction was coming from the State Department and the Pentagon. Even when Rusk referred to the political costs of such an action for the prestige of the United States vis-àvis NATO and Turkey, Kennedy disagreed, but Rusk still soft-pedaled it. After that, Kennedy’s observation about Rusk became clear: “You never know what he is thinking; . . . excellent secretary if you’re not interested in foreign affairs—but I am. . . . [He] knows more than anyone else in the White House or State about all these problems—the alliance of free peoples. But he’s too busy to run the Department. . . . How do you fire a secretary of state who does nothing—good or bad?”11 The conversation between President John F. Kennedy and A. I. Mikoyan, which lasted three hours and fifteen minutes, came to an end. It finalized some outcomes of the crisis. Most important, it solidified Kennedy’s promise of nonaggression toward Cuba. At the same time, the negotiations did not change the Americans’ approach to the protocol details of the settlement, as could be expected. We once again spoke with Kennedy’s interpreter, Natalie Latter, in April 2003, when work on this book was nearing completion. She told me that the atmosphere of the conversation was not strained, despite the intensity of the crisis. In her opinion, the parties spoke to the point, straightforwardly, without wasting time and words on “diplomatic” formulations of their thoughts. Latter said that Kennedy was unlike many people in the State Department (she worked in the State Department’s translation bureau), in that he spoke clearly and was easy to understand both for the interpreter and for his negotiating partner. She did not listen closely to Mikoyan because he had his own interpreter, according to protocol. I often heard my father negotiate (sometimes I even translated short exchanges of views), and I think that the conversation styles of Kennedy and Mikoyan were similar. My father did not like when other people “weaseled,” and he never did so himself. He spoke to the point, straightforwardly, sometimes even sharply, but never offending his interlocutor. Especially in the talks with the Cuban leaders, he constructed every phrase so as not to offend the Cubans, who had already been offended by Moscow. Thus, Kennedy and Mikoyan fit each other as interlocutors; both spoke substantively, straightforwardly, without diplomatic “frills” or demagoguery, and they listened to each other and gave concrete

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responses to questions. Latter recalls that the conversation ended in a friendly atmosphere. This observation coincides with my father’s stories and the following conversations; both Rusk and especially Robert Kennedy conveyed to Mikoyan that the president considered the meeting useful and productive. It seems that with these messages, Kennedy wanted to consolidate the friendly atmosphere that had formed toward the end of the conversation. He may have realized that Mikoyan had no personal responsibility for the deception with the missiles, and after the event positively viewed Mikoyan’s firmness and the normal conversation, in which there was no trace of recrimination (so characteristic in the correspondence with Khrushchev). At the same time, Kennedy must have understood that Mikoyan could not say openly, “Yes, Khrushchev deceived you, and it was wrong of him.” If Mikoyan could have said that, the conversation could have been completely different, not even just in tone but in the essence of the issues discussed. Such acknowledgments are very important to the Americans; I noticed this on more than one occasion. Natalie Latter recalls an amusing incident. According to her, Mikoyan’s translator, Vinogradov, was very nervous, and when an interpreter is nervous, he makes mistakes. He translated a long passage, but his text was missing two or three key words. One could get the gist of the passage, but it was not clear exactly what Mikoyan meant to say. Kennedy turned to her and said, “I’m afraid I missed the point.” According to protocol, Natalie was not supposed to interpret Mikoyan. But she also could not leave the president’s question unanswered. She added the key words that Vinogradov had missed, but immediately turned to Dobrynin: “Anatoly Fedorovich, did I say it correctly?” Dobrynin confirmed. She said he liked to correct interpreters, especially in his first years in Washington. “Later, when he learned more English, he corrected interpreters less frequently.” In this case, she needed to get around an awkward moment in the protocol. She noted that Mikoyan paid her a compliment, and even said to Kennedy, “You see how beautiful and capable our women are!” (Though “our” Natasha Kushnir had long become the American Natalie Latter.) Kennedy laughed. I asked Natalie to explain the place in the conversation where Kennedy said that his interpreter must have made a mistake in the translation, and Mikoyan responded: “That is what I thought.” She did not recall any mistake or correction. She expressed her belief that Kennedy may have corrected himself, and she knew from experience that it was often done this way—by claiming an inaccurate translation. In connection with the main issue of the conversation—the guarantee of United States’ nonaggression toward Cuba—it is important to note that thirty years later, the messages between Kennedy and Khrushchev that formed the core of the agreement were declassified and published. The different interpretations

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they received are typical. The New York Times ran an article titled “Cuban Missile Crisis: Kennedy Left a Loophole.” The Boston Globe wrote that “the documents make Kennedy’s commitment evident.”12

Meetings with Rusk, Udall, and Robert Kennedy The next day, November 30, for three hours from 1 to 4 p.m., Mikoyan was at a lunch at the State Department. The lunch was organized by the Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Mikoyan came with Ambassador A. F. Dobrynin and AdviserCounselor G. M. Kornienko. As Mikoyan reported to Moscow, “Rusk behaved amicably, he did not try to escalate the situation or start a discussion, but rather explained the American point of view and sought to better understand our position on the issues.” But Rusk did not need to try to escalate the situation: Everything that the American side achieved was already done; everything on which the American side did not want to make concessions was being chewed over in New York City in negotiations with V. V. Kuznetsov, to whom nobody was going to make concessions. The concessions the American side had made were confirmed by Kennedy, so Rusk could not bargain them back. Kennedy’s tentative attempts in conversation with Mikoyan to get an agreement on the withdrawal of all troops and weapons from Cuba had failed. Kennedy also could not get Mikoyan’s consent to the idea that the American commitment to nonaggression was contingent on Cuba’s “behavior.” Being in a state of “highest nervous tension,” to use Troyanovsky’s words, the ExComm missed this point in Kennedy’s letter of October 27. Now it was clear that there would be no further concessions from Moscow. Rusk, in essence, turned the conversation from Cuba to other issues, saying that he “was not sure, whether we can discuss the question of nonaggression toward Cuba in a different framework.” Further talks dealt with nuclear nonproliferation, the nontransfer of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union and the United States to their allies, a nuclear-free zone in Latin America (Brazil’s proposal), measures to prevent surprise attacks between the United States and USSR, a ban on nuclear testing, the question of Berlin, and a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In the evening of the same day, November 30, Mikoyan was invited to the home of Stewart Udall, secretary of the interior. Also present at the dinner were Robert Kennedy; the deputy secretary of state, George Ball; the editor of the New York Times, Orville Dryfoos; and Ambassador A. F. Dobrynin. Udall was a longtime friend of Mikoyan; he had visited the Soviet Union. Before dinner, Robert Kennedy asked Mikoyan to speak one to one, with only Dobrynin as the interpreter. Robert said that “the president considers yesterday’s conversation very useful, contributing to further mutual understanding between the two governments and their leaders. In this regard, the meeting can be de-

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scribed as definite progress. This is the opinion of the president himself.” Then he said how important mutual understanding was between the heads of state, and the trust between them, which, frankly, had suffered some damage. Robert Kennedy expressed the hope and desire that the further development of their relationship would take a happier road than it had thus far. Mikoyan agreed and added that the Soviet leadership gave credit to the selfcontrol the president had shown at a time when the world was on the brink of nuclear war, which had thus been averted. He seized the moment to return the conversation to Cuba, because the American side always switched to other subjects: Let us now complete the emerging solution of the Cuban question without complicating it by some petty objections to form or, more gravely, by some deviation from the agreement on the final settlement of this issue. R. Kennedy said that he agrees that in essence there is very little left to do— after all “90 percent is already done,” even though there are certain difficulties to overcome.

However, he clearly did not want to discuss this subject, not only because negotiations were under way in New York on a joint statement for the UN but also most likely because the United States did not want to make such a joint statement. So he went back to the subject of how important it was to further develop the mutual understanding between John Kennedy and Khrushchev: I agreed. Referring to my conversation with the president, I said that although there were several sharp moments, in general I agree with the president’s assessment, as R. Kennedy described it. Apparently, this was reflected in my subsequent conversation with Rusk, which also took place in a businesslike and friendly atmosphere. R. Kennedy smiled, but did not say anything. . . . On the whole, R. Kennedy’s statements apparently reflected, among other things, the president’s desire to improve the impression that could be created from yesterday’s conversation with him. Namely, that he does not show the necessary cooperation with us in the completion of the settlement of the Cuban question—and the president understands that this, in turn, can have an impact on our position when dealing with other international issues, which are now becoming more relevant.

This seemed to be Mikoyan’s attempt to suggest to Khrushchev in this telegram that it was not too late to link the settlement of other issues—Laos, Berlin— to the agreement on a joint statement at the UN regarding the United States’ noninvasion pledge toward Cuba and the USSR’s commitment not to deliver “surface” missiles to Cuba. Unfortunately, the advice was not considered and Kuznetsov did not receive any specific guidelines in this regard.

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During the general conversation at the dinner table, the participants asked whether Castro was interested in normalizing relations with the United States, as well as Mikoyan’s opinion about Castro himself. My father never missed a chance to tell his American interlocutors about his high opinion of Fidel Castro and his achievements in social reforms for the people of Cuba. The situation, as my father told me, was purely informal. Udall had six children, and his wife introduced the children to the guests. Naturally, my father remembered his ten grandchildren waiting for him in Moscow. He also remembered that Robert had many children, more even than Udall, and he asked why he came without his wife and children, as they probably would have had fun. Robert replied that his children had gotten a cold and had passed the bug to each other, so he and his wife had decided that they should go to Florida to quickly recover in the warm and sunny weather. I remember this detail; when my father got home, he said, “That’s rich for you! Caught a cold and went to Florida to recover!” He did not know that the Kennedy family had an estate in Florida. In any case, the reader can judge to what extent the Soviet top leadership was not spoiled, if this made such an impression on Mikoyan. Robert Kennedy made a very positive impression on my father. John Kennedy, too, as a person, seemed to my father to be smart, self-restrained, direct, and fairly friendly—in a word, a person with whom it is pleasant to have a conversation and even negotiate on sensitive issues. But Robert Kennedy, in contrast to John F. Kennedy the day before, was not constrained by any protocol or any official part of the negotiations. He was direct, lively, and friendly. The work program at this meeting in the United States had been completed. To sum it up, we need to acknowledge that the American side evaded an agreement on one of the major questions of the negotiations: the affirmation of the agreement on nonaggression in Cuba in the UN. The American side limited itself to a verbal confirmation of its promise. As the result, it left open a possibility for different interpretations of the agreement, as described above. A joint statement at the UN would have strongly hampered attempts to revise the agreement. The absence of such a statement, however, left a loophole for interpreters, who were not always conscientious. In this sense, Mikoyan’s mission in Washington ended in failure. But, objectively speaking, he was left without real leverage to achieve the results necessary for Cuba and the USSR. President Kennedy’s admission that high-altitude reconnaissance U-2 flights had replaced the United States’ ground inspections in Cuba could be considered a certain measure of success. This aspect of Kennedy’s position is usually hushed up in the American literature, especially in official documents. Meanwhile, this position by President Kennedy in fact means that an equivalent replacement was found for ground inspections. This, in turn, means that questioning the United States’ commitment to nonaggression in Cuba is absolutely unjustifiable.

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As for the general atmosphere of the conversations, it was good; the negotiations on other issues of mutual interest were more productive. The overall positive result was demonstrated by the fact that after the offense and even insult that President Kennedy rightly believed he had suffered, the general conversation returned to a normal track, and the atmosphere was restored to at least the level of trust that had existed before the crisis.

Postscript by Svetlana Savranskaya

W

hen Anastas Mikoyan returned to Moscow, he was not given even a day of rest. On December 3, 1962, he made a long report to the Presidium of the Central Committee on his three weeks in Cuba. Unfortunately, the only source that we have today from that fascinating meeting are the two pages of notes taken by Khrushchev’s aide, V. N.. Malin. Khrushchev used the Presidium session to defend his decisions and to try to shift the blame to Fidel Castro for forcing the Soviets to withdraw the weapons. Khrushchev stated pointedly that “Castro said ‘open nuclear fire’—and now he is retreating, trying to paint it over.” The Soviet leader was so irritated by his Cuban partner’s behavior that he even suggested that they should not sign a defense treaty with the Cubans, but to make “some sort of declaration” later on.1 Even Malin’s sparse notes provide some glimpse of the difference of opinions within the Presidium, with Defense Minister Malinovsky speaking in a more conciliatory tone about the crisis and about the need to help the Cubans strengthen their army. Malinovsky, who had favored leaving the tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba, was thinking ahead to future Soviet-Cuban military cooperation. He implied that the plan to withdraw the Soviet troops from Cuba needed further discussion. Malinovsky’s line strikingly differed from Khrushchev’s forceful boasting about how the Soviets had become stronger as a result of the crisis, becoming “members of the world club.”2 However, all the members of the Presidium voted unanimously to approve Mikoyan’s work in Cuba and expressed high praise for his mission, calling it “brilliant.” In their book on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Alexander Fursenko and Timothy Naftali conclude the chapter on the Mikoyan mission by saying that “by the time Mikoyan left North America all but one of the main issues had practically 261

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been resolved. The last remaining issue, the removal of all nuclear weapons from Cuba, the Soviets solved on their own.”3 The more extensive evidence presented in this book shows that, in fact, by the time Mikoyan left North America, all the main issues of the crisis had been resolved. Mikoyan was the person who solved the last of the main issues, the removal of tactical warheads—which he discussed with Castro on November 22. The tactical nuclear weapons left Cuba on December 1 on the ship Arkhangelsk and arrived in the port of Severomorsk on December 20, 1962, according to head of Soviet nuclear arsenal Nikolai Beloborodov.4 Moreover, Anastas Mikoyan deserves most credit for the successful resolution of what could have become a much more dangerous crisis. His presence in Havana in November 1962 could be compared with a control rod slowing down a nuclear reaction. Castro did not have to agree, nor did he intend to agree, to what seemed to him the never-ending Soviet concessions to the Americans. He certainly did not trust the word of the U.S. president and did not see any benefit from the Soviet efforts to obtain the noninvasion pledge from the Americans. All Mikoyan’s diplomatic skill, combined with his empathy and great patience, was applied to persuading the passionate Cubans to accept the Soviet decisions about which they had not even been consulted. If not for the personal connections and trust that Mikoyan had already established during his first visit to Cuba in February 1960, the resolution of the Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis could have been far more difficult, and likely very different. Anastas Mikoyan, the number two person in the Kremlin, was probably the only person in the entire Soviet leadership who could have pulled off this mission impossible. His son, Sergo, who was deeply involved in all things Cuban, and who served as his father’s personal secretary, set himself a goal to tell this largely unknown story of the Soviet side of the Cuban Missile Crisis—not only in his words but also in the documents and recollections of his father, as was explained in the introduction to this book. But the book’s goal has been more ambitious than just telling the story of Anastas Mikoyan. In this book, Sergo Mikoyan has told the story of the Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis by putting it in the larger context of the U.S.-Cuban conflict and how that conflict first pushed Cuba into the arms of the Soviet Union, and in turn led to Khrushchev’s decision to deploy missiles in Cuba. Sergo wanted to explain the USSR’s policies toward Cuba to a Western readership. Unfortunately, he passed away before he had a chance to write a conclusion to his English-language manuscript. However, his book does contain a number of revelations and lessons for us to consider. Sergo Mikoyan himself believed that the main scholarly contribution of his book was the argument about the reasons behind the decision to deploy missiles to Cuba. His answer to the question “why nuclear missiles?” is that the weapons were shipped across the ocean to protect Cuba. This was not the only factor, of course. Other considerations—such as the USSR’s significant missile gap with the United States (exposed to the world in the famous October 1961 Gilpatric speech), the sting Khrushchev and the top Soviet military leadership felt from having the

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United States’ Jupiter missiles pointing at the USSR across the Black Sea from Turkey, the impracticality and prohibitive expense of providing Cuba with a conventional (nonnuclear) deterrent force, and the ongoing stalemate in Berlin— also entered the calculation.5 However, Sergo argues, one cannot understand the Soviet story of the Cuban Missile Crisis without putting it into the context of sharply deteriorating U.S.-Cuban relations after the Cuban Revolution. The Cuban Revolution reminded the Soviet leaders of their own revolutionary youth, even though the Soviets had no prior direct ties with and almost no understanding of Fidel Castro and his movement, which they considered nationalist and not Communist, in contrast to the more conventional pro-Moscow Partida Socialista Popular led by Blas Roca. But the audacity of the young revolutionaries, and the challenge they were not afraid to pose to their powerful neighbor to the north, soon captured the Soviets’ imagination. Soon, the name for Cuba in Moscow became “the Island of Freedom,” and Soviet citizens became aware of the Cuban Revolution from newspapers and television. As the United States became more and more critical of Cuba, Castro’s natural choice was to reach out to the USSR. The brilliant decision the Cubans made was to invite Anastas Mikoyan to visit Cuba. In a way, one can say that early Soviet-Cuban relations developed almost in response to the United States’ negative reaction to the Revolution. According to Sergo, Anastas Mikoyan’s February 1960 mission was the turning point of not only Soviet-Cuban but also U.S.-Cuban relations, and therefore the starting point of the escalation of the conflict that eventually culminated in the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 (although it appears that the Eisenhower administration had essentially lost hope of working with Castro and had instead begun focusing on removing him by the end of 1959). During his ten days in Cuba, Mikoyan discovered Cuba for both Soviet citizens and for the Soviet leadership. He signed economic agreements that were vitally important for the survival of the Cuban economy—on purchasing Cuban sugar and on providing credits to Cuba. In addition to these agreements, the main accomplishment of this trip was the close and almost affectionate relationship that developed between Mikoyan and the Cuban leadership, which came in handy in November 1962. The American government was alarmed by Mikoyan’s activities in Cuba, fearing that Cuba was becoming an ally of its number one enemy. Thus, in March 1960, President Eisenhower secretly approved a covert action plan to overthrow the Castro government, which prompted the CIA to start training anti-Castro Cuban exiles in Guatemala, and a full trade and economic embargo was introduced in September 1960. The Eisenhower covert action project (code-named Operation Zapata) culminated in the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961. Although it was crushed by the Havana government’s forces, it left both the Cubans and the Soviets convinced that it had been just the first try and that a more serious and determined attack was coming—this time to be carried out by U.S. forces, rather than less formidable Cuban exiles. Nothing in the actions of the U.S. government would make an atten-

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tive observer think otherwise. The Soviets felt that time was running out for them to find ways to protect their now-important Latin American ally and this living example of socialism chosen by the people. Cuba was thus especially important because it added legitimacy to the entire socialist cause—revolution was on the march across the globe. Moreover, in the context of the emerging Sino-Soviet split, protecting Cuba from potential American aggression would put the lie to Beijing’s charges that Moscow was soft in promoting revolution. The idea for a perfect solution came to Khrushchev in May 1962 and found a receptive audience in the Soviet military leadership. What this book makes clear is that while for Khrushchev the plan to defend Cuba using missiles was the top priority, the generals saw in this plan an opportunity to fix the strategic imbalance between America and the USSR. Sergo bases his account of the Presidium’s discussions on his father’s recollections and documents. Khrushchev’s impatience and determination are palpable, as is the lack of discussion of possible options and consequences. We see Anastas Mikoyan instantly uncomfortable with the idea and arguing openly against the deployment. In his opinion, it was a risky and adventurous proposition. After the Presidium ratified the decision to give Cuba nuclear assistance, the most important task was to persuade the Cubans to agree to accept the Soviet offer. After long negotiations, the Soviets were able to persuade the Cubans to accept the weapons using all their authority and reputation as an experienced revolutionary power and the leader of the socialist camp. However, as the documents and recollections given in the preceding pages have shown, the Cubans either misunderstood the Soviets’ motivations or heard what the Soviet generals were really thinking. In any case, after the visit to Havana at the end of May by a Soviet delegation headed by Sharaf Rashidov and Sergey Biryuzov, the Cubans agreed to accept the missiles, but emphasized that they were doing this not to protect their country from a U.S. invasion but only for the cause of strengthening the world socialist camp. Later, in 1963, Fidel Castro would say that this was a misunderstanding—that the Cubans thought at the time that the Soviets were doing this for the socialist camp and to redress the strategic imbalance. But the Cubans posed one more problem—they wanted the deployment to be done publicly and in accordance with international law, and they wanted to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union. Khrushchev envisioned this as a stealthy surprise—“to throw a hedgehog into the pants of American imperialism.” Sergo’s analysis is particularly critical of Khrushchev’s decision to carry out the deployment in secret. He comes to the conclusion that if the Soviets had signed a treaty with the Cubans and had announced the decision to deploy publicly in the summer of 1962, it would have been very hard for the United States to have challenged it in the light of the U.S. deployments of similar systems in Turkey and Italy. This conclusion reflects the Cuban position at the time. When Ernesto “Che” Guevara and Emilio Aragonés traveled to Moscow in late August with a draft of the military agreement approved by Castro, Khrushchev would not sign it. To Guevara’s

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question of what would happen if the United States discovered the deployments and demanded the withdrawal of the missiles or even attacked Cuba, the Soviet leader responded that no concessions would be made to the Americans; and Malinovsky assured him that, if necessary, the USSR was ready to send its Baltic Sea Fleet to defend Cuba (a promise at which Guevara later scoffed). The “cocky” Soviet leaders also reminded their guests that the USSR had intercontinental ballistic missiles. The treaty was never signed, and deployment proceeded in secret. How this deployment was actually carried out is another major contribution of Sergo’s book. He worked with an extensive collection of documents and interviews gathered by the Interregional Public Organization of Veterans–Internationalist “Cubans” (MOOVIK), which were never before published in English or used by any Western scholar.6 The inside story of the actual Operation Anadyr that emerged from these documents and oral histories is one of individual courage and patriotism but also of a lack of contingency planning and strategic thinking by the top political and military leadership. Sergo points to numerous mistakes, poor camouflaging methods, and often brutal conditions for the transportation for military personnel, who had to hide under the decks of the merchant ships en route to Cuba. These personnel were poorly informed of their mission and were left completely in the dark at the height of the crisis. While Khrushchev and Kennedy were negotiating the resolution of the crisis and the withdrawal of the missiles, the Soviet troops in Cuba were preparing to repel an attack, possibly involving nuclear weapons, and were ready to die alongside their Cuban comrades. Amazingly, the Soviets in Cuba shared completely the Cuban sentiments of revolutionary fervor and sacrifice, which their leadership did not. On November 21, Anastas Mikoyan had to explain to the Soviet troops why they had to abandon these ideas and go home. Persuading the Cubans was a much more difficult task. It was a Soviet initiative, not Cuban, to deploy the nuclear weapons on the island. The Cubans were insulted by the Soviet betrayal—not only no Baltic Fleet to the rescue and humiliating concessions to Kennedy, but they were not even consulted by their socialist big brother. As Anastas Mikoyan explained in his long cables to Khrushchev, the “psychological factor” explained much of the Cuban intransigence. And in addition to that, the Cuban leadership believed that after this confrontation nuclear weapons would be the only deterrence against a new U.S. attack. That was why, unlike the Soviets, the Cubans did not see the confirmation of Kennedy’s noninvasion pledge as the top priority for the resolution of the crisis. They could not believe any U.S. pledges. In fact, they even found it hard to believe any Soviet promises. Nuclear weapons, conversely, were seen as a real guarantee of security. The core of Sergo Mikoyan’s book is the story of how Cuba almost became a nuclear power and how Anastas Mikoyan steered his hosts—and history—away from that outcome during his three-week stay in Havana in November 1962. Khrushchev was already uncomfortable with Castro’s impulsiveness and what the

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Soviet leaders understood as his implied request on October 27 to launch a preemptive nuclear strike against the United States if Washington attacked Cuba. The sudden realization of very real nuclear danger dawned on the Soviet and the U.S. political leaders, and enabled them to negotiate their way out of it—but apparently not on the Cubans. The revolutionary hotheads in Havana were not averse to employing all available means in the confrontation between the global forces of socialism and capitalism to ensure the victory of their cause—or to go down in flames, literally but, in their view, honorably. Yet even in those circumstances, the Soviets initially decided that after they withdrew the strategic missiles, the Cubans could keep the other weapons already deployed in Cuba as a kind of a “consolation prize” in order to preserve Moscow’s strategic and ideological ally in the Western Hemisphere. Mikoyan was tasked to deal with these other missiles of November, of which the world had no, or very little, idea at the time. (The U.S. intelligence services eventually detected the presence of some nuclear-capable Soviet tactical weapons systems during the crisis, but did not know whether they were in fact nucleararmed.) From today’s perspective, fifty years after the events, the missiles of November deserve no less attention than the widely studied missiles of October. When Anastas Mikoyan was sent to Cuba to negotiate the resolution of the Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis, he informed the Cubans that all the weapons other than those specifically mentioned in the Khrushchev-Kennedy letters would be gradually transferred to the Cuban armed forces after training by Soviet military specialists. Those weapons included the nuclear bombs for the Il-28 bombers, the warheads for the dual-use Luna tactical launcher, and the frontline cruise missiles (FKRs). Because none of these weapons were mentioned in the KennedyKhrushchev correspondence and because the Americans were essentially oblivious to their delivery to the island, this would have been the most natural and logical way to resolve the Soviet-Cuban crisis. After the Soviets reached a compromise with the Kennedy administration to withdraw the Il-28s, and the Americans agreed to lift the naval blockade (as of November 20), there were still more than 100 tactical nuclear warheads on the island that could be transferred into the hands of the Cuban military. It was Mikoyan’s observations and his reassessment of the situation over the course of his stay in Havana that made the USSR’s leadership decide to instead withdraw its remaining nuclear weapons from Cuba and radically curtail its military presence on the island. What became clear to Mikoyan during numerous conversations with the Cuban leadership is that the Soviets could not really control their Cuban ally, and that if they were going to maintain Cuba as an ally, they would need to accept the fact that the Cubans would not always follow the Soviet script and that in fact they would develop quite an independent foreign policy. These themes are most prominent in Mikoyan’s conversations with Che Guevara and with former Guatemalan president Jacobo Árbenz, who complained to the Soviet representative that the Guatemalan students who were sent to Cuba for education were

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trained in military and subversive tactics and turned into guerrillas by the Cubans. Mikoyan had to explain to them the Soviet view against exporting armed revolution to other countries. In the course of those conversations, he came to understand that the future was likely to bring more such activities by the Cubans in Latin America and elsewhere, and that the Soviet Union would have very little leverage over Cuba if they did not want to lose it to their ultimate Communist rival—China. In essence, Mikoyan understood then that the Cuban tail was quite capable of wagging the Soviet dog in their third world policies. Taking into account the apparent absence of any nuclear learning on the part of the Cuban leaders—indeed, their evident nuclear irresponsibility—and their passionately independent spirit, Anastas Mikoyan came to a difficult but unavoidable conclusion: The Soviets could not trust their Cuban allies with these powerful weapons. The Soviets could not take responsibility for Cuban actions in the future, and they could not control their actions, as he learned during his stay in Cuba. Possessing nuclear weapons would have been likely to make the Cubans even more assertive and independent in their foreign policies. As much as he felt for the Cubans for being left completely out of the loop by the Soviet political leadership, and as much as he disagreed with the whole idea of the secret deployment in the first place, Mikoyan understood that it would be his task to reconcile his hosts to the loss of all the nuclear weapons they were promised. He suggested this course of action to the Presidium early on November 22, after he learned about the Cuban instructions to their UN representative Carlos Lechuga stating that Cuba possesses tactical nuclear weapons that they should keep, and he faced the top Cuban leadership to explain this decision during the long and intense conversation on the night of November 22. Castro tried to persuade Mikoyan to leave the tactical weapons in Cuba. The Cuban leader pointed out that the Americans were not aware of the presence of these weapons on the island, and that the Soviets did not have to keep a military base in Cuba but could train the Cuban military, as the initial agreement had stipulated. He said these weapons could be hidden in caves. He begged the Soviet representative to leave him the weapons that meant so much to the Cubans. But Mikoyan was not swayed by his arguments. To put an end to the very unpleasant conversation, he actually invented a nonexistent “law” prohibiting the transfer of nuclear weapons to third countries. This was how Cuba did not join the ranks of nuclear powers. Looking at all the evidence presented in this book, one can conclude that Anastas Mikoyan is the person who should be given the credit for walking Cuba back from the brink and preventing it from becoming a nuclear power. He probably was the only person in the Soviet leadership who was fit for this unprecedented and daunting task, and who carried it out effectively, in such a way that Cuba would remain a Soviet ally for decades to come, despite Havana’s disillusionment with Moscow’s friendship. The romantic honeymoon was over, but more practical considerations remained, such as Cuba’s dependence on the USSR’s oil and economic and military aid, and the two nations’ common identi-

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fication with the global socialist cause. This is the story of how weak actors can influence history in vital and unforeseen ways and how dangerous it is for great powers to ignore their influence. This is also a story of how individuals can influence history—told most eloquently in the dialogue between Fidel Castro and Anastas Mikoyan in November 1962. Svetlana Savranskaya, April 2012

Documents

Document 1 Soviet Record of a Dinner Conversation between CC CPSU Politburo Member A. I. Mikoyan, White House Envoy John McCloy, and U.S. Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson

November 1, 1962 At the outset of the conversation, A. I. Mikoyan poses a question about the lifting of the American blockade on the surroundings of Cuba for the period of negotiations, as it was proposed by U Thant in his first missive to Comrade N. S. Khrushchev and to President Kennedy on October 24 this year. A. I. Mikoyan says that the USSR accepted recommendation of the acting secretarygeneral of the United Nations, and the United States did not. On October 24, U Thant proposed that the Soviet Union would stop delivery of weapons to Cuba for the duration of talks (two to three weeks), and the United States during the same period would suspend the blockade. The Soviet Union fulfilled the recommendations of U Thant, but the United States did not. McCloy remarks that U Thant seeks to start as soon as possible to check up Soviet vessels sailing to Cuba, by the forces of the International Red Cross. Stevenson says that the United States hoped that by the end of next week observers of the International Red Cross would be able to begin their work in Cuba. Here apparently some sort of misunderstanding emerges. It was understood that the suspension of the “quarantine” would be conditioned on the simultaneous introduction of inspection. A. I. Mikoyan objects that no such understanding took place. McCloy remarks that perhaps U Thant did introduce the proposal mentioned by A. I. Mikoyan, but the United States accepted not his proposal, but the proposal of Chairman Khrushchev in his letter to President Kennedy. Stevenson says that in fact the issue about immediate suspension of the “quarantine” is purely academic. Soviet ships will probably not reach Cuba until next week, and mean271

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while he hopes that the inspection of the Red Cross will be already in force, and then, naturally, there will be no need for the “quarantine.” A. I. Mikoyan reiterates that N. S. Khrushchev accepted the proposal of U Thant and the Americans did not accept it. Stevenson: We believe that a certain understanding was achieved in the letters of N. S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy. A. I. Mikoyan: This is correct. What was envisaged in the letters must be implemented and will be implemented. However, had the United States adopted the same reasonable approach, permeated with goodwill, as was adopted by the Soviet Union, then they would have accepted the proposal of U Thant and would have lifted the blockade immediately. McCloy: Would you make a stop on the way back [from Cuba] in New York? A. I. Mikoyan: I have no definite plans on this score, but I would not exclude such a stopover. McCloy (in a jocular tone): But would Castro let you out? A. I. Mikoyan: He and I are special friends and will work it out somehow. Stevenson: Perhaps you will bring him along over here? A. I. Mikoyan: You showed such poor hospitality to him, that he can hardly be convinced to come to New York again. Such a great power as the United States should be ashamed to mistreat such a small country. When Stevenson had not yet been the U.S. representative [in the United Nations —ed.], he had good understanding of everything, but now apparently his official position makes him speak and act in a different way. Stevenson: We learn in government office, but we forget nothing. We immediately accepted the proposal on inspection by the Red Cross. I do not know how many Soviet ships are approaching Cuba, but I would prefer that there will be more of them, so that they would sooner take away your missiles. I must tell you that we were very favorably impressed by the speed with which Soviet officers dismantle the missiles. McCloy: I am struck by the speed of assembling as well as disassembling [of the missiles —ed.]. A. I. Mikoyan: Those who can assemble fast, can also disassemble fast. Our military are men of discipline; they punctually fulfill the order of N. S. Khrushchev. But there are not enough ships around Cuba to carry away the equipment which is the subject of the understanding, so in addition other ships will be necessary. And your blockade stands in their way to Cuba and, consequently, hampers the withdrawal of missiles. In other words, the “quarantine” turns itself against your own interests. McCloy: We would gladly let your ships pass in both directions, if they carry all your missiles away. I would like to be on the ship that would transport the last missiles from Cuba, added McCloy in jest. A. I. Mikoyan (in a jocular tone): So lift the “quarantine” and then everything will be in order. Stevenson will become the one he had used to be before he was nominated [to his position] in the UN. Stevenson: When do your ships arrive in Cuba? A. I. Mikoyan: But you have not yet lifted the blockade. Our ships are now in the open sea, about four to five days away from Cuba. They should reach Cuba, disembark their

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load, then load themselves and leave. This would, of course, require a certain time, no less than ten to fifteen days. Stevenson: We could agree on a schedule. Next week, one might agree on an inspection of the Red Cross; then the “quarantine” might be lifted. A. I. Mikoyan: I would like to know if [the leadership of] the United States think[s] that we should work out an agreement that would seal what has been said in the exchange of letters between Kennedy and Khrushchev? Or you are interested only in the dismantling and withdrawal of missiles? Would you think that we should agree on other issues touched upon in the exchange of missives, and confirm the achieved understanding in a written document? Stevenson: First of all, we want to reach understanding on the withdrawal of missile equipment from Cuba and we do not want to tolerate that until the establishment of inspection by the Red Cross there would be an uncontrolled flow of armaments into Cuba. McCloy: There is already too much armament there. We cannot tolerate its buildup. A. I. Mikoyan: It is correct that there is sufficient amount of armament in Cuba, but we already stopped sending it there. McCloy: Yes, but we cannot risk, when it may happen that some arms are being withdrawn and other arms are being shipped in. When the missile equipment will be shipped off, the political atmosphere will ameliorate and it will be easier to agree. You preferred UN inspections to an inspection of the Red Cross. We agreed to that. We are interested in your ships reaching Cuba soon, and we will not obstruct their way. A. I. Mikoyan: Arms were not provided to Cuba to attack the United States, but as a means of containment [sderzhivaiyushchego], so that there was no aggression against Cuba. But since in his answer to the letter of N. S. Khrushchev, J. Kennedy gave the assurance that neither the United States, nor its Latin American allies would attack Cuba, we declared our readiness to pull out some types of armaments from Cuba. Stevenson: I do not think there is any disagreement on the issue that Soviet ships should enter the ports of Cuba. It is only that the “quarantine” should be preserved until the establishment of the Red Cross inspection. We are interested to see that there will be no new shipments of arms, and we hope you will understand us. A. I. Mikoyan: We agreed with the proposals of U Thant and declared that we would not bring armaments to Cuba pending the talks. Those ships that are now at sea carrying no weapons at all. I must say that Stevenson is a good diplomat: I am pushing him in one direction of the talk, but he veers off. Then for some time, the conversation was focused on the issues of protocol nature. In the second half of the conversation, the discussion of business resumes. A. I. Mikoyan: Yet I would like to pose the following question. Would the U.S. government think to come to an agreement where all that was said in the exchange of well-known letters would be fixed? I have in mind the kind of document that would formulate the settlement of the crisis. We think it is preferable to work out such a document. V. V. Kuznetsov: The need in working out such a document stems from the understanding achieved between the sides about the settlement of the crisis. Stevenson: In our opinion, the sole problem that confronts us is to work out conditions

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for inspection that should be carried out by representatives of the Red Cross. This is a relatively easy task. One could set up two checkpoints at the approaches to Cuba’s ports, in the South and in the North, where two ships of the Red Cross could be located. These might be ships of neutral countries or any other ships, perhaps even sailing hospitals. On board there could be Red Cross inspectors who could check on ships going for Cuba, so that the character of this checkup would be via radio—inquiring on the ship’s origins, where it goes and with what cargo. Inspectors would not board ships. I think that such [a form of] inspection should not create problems. We would be glad to hear from you which ships, in your opinion, must be utilized for these aims. I would like to repeat that one could easily reach understanding on this issue. There is, however, one problem: measures to check the fulfillment of obligations on dismantling and withdrawal of missile equipment from Cuba. As I understood from U Thant, Castro did not agree to UN inspections stipulated in the exchange of letters between J. Kennedy and N. S. Khrushchev. We hope that you will discuss this issue once again in Havana. McCloy: I must emphasize that we do not accept the 5 conditions of Castro as the conditions for fulfillment of what had been said in the letter of Mr. Khrushchev. Stevenson: The problem that concerns us most is that an inspection should be carried out before you report to the Security Council about the completion of withdrawal of missile equipment. Naturally, there should be a check-up of how this undertaking is implemented. I think that such a checkup need not be difficult to carry out. In addition to that, of course, there is the issue of the form of the United States’ assurance that Cuba will not be subjected to invasion. This also need not present any difficulties. McCloy: And to a certain extent this is an answer to the question previously posed by Mr. Mikoyan. A. I. Mikoyan: You keep focusing all attention only on the issue of withdrawal of armaments from Cuba and on inspection. However, the first-order question is to grant to Cuba guarantees of nonintervention against it on the part of other countries of the Western Hemisphere, recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Cuban Republic, observation of its territorial inviolability, and noninterference into its domestic affairs. Castro demands it, and you apparently do not want to give such assurances. Castro puts forward also a demand to liquidate the U.S. base in Guantánamo. Why are you refusing to discuss this issue? While pressing your demands, you do not want to hear the legitimate demands of the other side. Of course, this is an issue of American-Cuban relations, but in any case this issue must be discussed with Castro. The exchange of letters between N. S. Khrushchev and Kennedy—this is in essence already an agreement. But by itself the exchange of letters cannot be considered as a final document. One must carry out negotiations to work out such a final document on the basis of the exchange of letters, since this issue has acquired a bilateral international character. We suggest to conduct negotiations on this basis and believe that the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba should sign a protocol, with participation of U Thant. Such a protocol might fix all the basic premises contained in the letters of N. S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy. I repeat, we think that you should consider the proposals advanced by Castro. They are legitimate ones. You should also consider the issue of the base in Guantánamo. I see that

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you disagree with Castro’s demand, but it does not mean that you should turn down any discussion of his demands. One cannot turn such a discussion down, when one wants to normalize the situation. I would touch on an interesting plan advanced by U Thant; after an agreement among the parties involved, which could be approved by the Security Council, one might agree on the presence of UN inspectors in the area of the Caribbean Sea, including Cuba, and on the southeast coast of the United States and the neighboring Latin American countries. These inspectors could watch over implementation of the understanding on mutual noninterference between the United States and Cuba. This is a very important proposal and its implementation would give a chance to fully settle the conflict. One should take into account that Cuba is an independent state. It is impossible to demand that some kind of inspection would cover only its territory, if there were no analogous inspection covering the territory of the other side, on the basis of reciprocity. I must emphasize that if the letter of J. Kennedy had not told of guarantees of nonintervention against Cuba, we would not have agreed to dismantle and withdraw missile equipment from Cuba. But now it comes out as follows: we are withdrawing weapons, and you are backpedaling on your commitments. Castro does not have trust in your word and he has a right [not to], since the territory of Cuba has already been invaded. It would be a different matter if there would be an official document enforced, containing appropriate guarantees for Cuba and approved by the Security Council. I would like to know your opinion about the guarantees. What can I tell Castro when I meet him? We proceed from the fact that the letter from Kennedy already contains a basis for an agreement on granting to Cuba the guarantees of nonintervention. This is a bilateral problem and both sides must resolve it and fix it in an agreement. McCloy: In our opinion, the most important [thing] is to withdraw appropriate [offensive —ed.] types of armaments from Cuba as soon as possible. If it is not done, the situation will worsen very much. One can speak about the assurances of Kennedy concerning nonintervention against Cuba, but Castro must not set new conditions on withdrawal of missile equipment. Meanwhile, Castro told U Thant that he would not tolerate UN inspections. The Soviet Union and Cuba must agree between each other on what would be the form of inspection. It is a matter of your relationship. We have only one interest: that the armaments on which we have achieved the understanding would be shipped away and that we would be convinced that they are really shipped away. I do not think that there would be any problems on the question of the access of ships and on the withdrawal of missile equipment from Cuba. The main thing is to remove missile equipment. As to the question on granting the guarantees of nonintervention to Cuba, if you think that what the president said is not enough, one could talk about some kind of appropriate commitment [obiazatelstve]. You are posing a question about the possible presence of UN observers on U.S. territory, so that there would be no invasion of Cuba. I must say that if you keep insisting on that, there will be additional complications. A. I. Mikoyan: U Thant expressed this idea. McCloy: No, he did not suggest it. I repeat: nothing will come out of it.

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A. I. Mikoyan: Today in conversation with me U Thant reiterated this idea and said that this issue should be discussed at the Organization of American States. Stevenson: We believe that the exchange of letters between Kennedy and Khrushchev contains concrete and clear formulas. I think that there is no need for any new understanding, except for resolution of the issue about the inspection method. If we fail to carry out ground inspection, let us seek other means which would assure us that the armaments are withdrawn. Otherwise, the danger of conflict will be reborn. I hope that, when the atmosphere will clear up and the missile equipment will be withdrawn from Cuba, it will be easier to agree on other issues. Kennedy has already given appropriate assurances concerning non-intervention against Cuba, and we can confirm it. We would like to say clearly that any discussion of the issue about liquidation of our base in Guantánamo is out of question. It was given up [ustuplena] to us by the government of Cuba on a legal basis, and the American people will under no circumstances renounce it. A. I. Mikoyan: But the government of Cuba puts forward this question, so it should be discussed. V. V. Kuznetsov: The government of Cuba has put this question even earlier. McCloy: We will not concede on this. The position of Castro represents an obstacle on the way to fulfilling commitments formulated in the letter of Mr. Khrushchev. A. I. Mikoyan: Castro is not and will not be an obstacle to fulfillment of these commitments. The armaments we are talking about is Soviet weaponry and it will be evacuated. As for Castro, he has declared that he would assist the evacuation of these armaments. McCloy: But he has 145,000 soldiers against 10,000 Russians. He can obstruct the dismantling [of missiles —ed.]. Moreover, I think he is already obstructing it. A. I. Mikoyan: The government of Cuba has the right of sovereignty and one must seek its agreement on any kind of inspection on Cuban territory. It put forward five conditions, including the demand about liquidation of the American base in Guantánamo. However, beside the issue of the base, there are four more points in Castro’s program, and these points are in full agreement with what Kennedy wrote in his letter to Khrushchev. Why don’t you want to accept them? Stevenson: There is only one issue between the Soviet Union and the United States: about full withdrawal from Cuba of certain types of armaments under conditions of inspection and in the presence of the understanding that the supplies of this weaponry will not be resumed. Under these conditions, the guarantees of Cuba’s security on the part of the United States will be ensured. Castro raised a number of other issues, but they have nothing to do with Soviet-American relations. In our negotiations, we should begin to consider the issues that are within the realm of Soviet-American relations, in the framework of the understanding between Khrushchev and Kennedy. A. I. Mikoyan: Speaking about the exchange of letters between N. S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy, you blow up only one aspect and maintain silence on the other. You dodge such issues as lifting of the blockade, granting the guarantees of independence to Cuba. We believe that all this should be fixed [zafiksirovano] in the document where certain formulas should be reiterated and specified. We believe that our negotiations should result in a

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document registered in the United Nations and approved by the Security Council. Otherwise, what is happening? The ink has not yet dried up on the letter, but Rusk is already declaring that the United States has not guaranteed the independence of Cuba. It was published in your newspapers, and I read about it on my way to New York. Stevenson: Rusk said nothing to disavow the guarantees that have been granted in Kennedy’s letter. The press gave a wrong interpretation to his declaration. A. I. Mikoyan: We are proposing to you to prepare jointly an appropriate document and introduce it jointly to the Security Council, then there will be no other interpretations. Stevenson: I would like to say a few words about the procedure. U Thant believes that the operation could be finalized in two statements: the Soviet Union could make announcement about the end of withdrawal of the certain types of weapons from Cuba, and the United States would make an announcement that we made sure that these weapons are withdrawn from Cuba. Earlier, it was supposed that the appropriate checkup should be done by the forces of the UN, but after Castro’s refusal to let UN representatives into Cuba, the question emerged about the method of inspection. After the withdrawal of the certain types of weapons from Cuba will be confirmed, the United States will declare the abolition of the “quarantine” and that it guarantees nonintervention of Cuba. I see no reason for any other treaties and documents. If the Soviet side has some draft proposals, it is desirable to obtain them, and the American side then will do the same thing. A. I. Mikoyan: There is no time to consider this issue in detail. It seems to me we should think how to continue the talks. V. V. Kuznetsov: If the American side agrees, we will discuss this issue. A. I. Mikoyan: On our side, we prefer to have a protocol. Stevenson: The Soviet Union can and must ensure the withdrawal of the certain types of armaments and a verification that would satisfy the United States and the Latin American countries. The question, however, emerges on what form of inspection is feasible under current circumstances. Four days have already elapsed, and there is no inspection in sight. Therefore, now we should discuss possible forms of inspection. We do not want to constrain you by those formulas that were advanced concerning international inspection. If Castro does not want such an inspection, one can think of different forms of control. McCloy: We should look at what is acceptable and feasible, but in any case the inspection should be introduced. Therefore we should adapt ourselves to the new situation. In the first order, of course, we should, as they say, remove the pistol from the negotiating table, in other words to dismantle and withdraw the missiles. Stevenson: I do not think that some kind of protocol will be necessary, besides the declarations that will be made in the Security Council. A. I. Mikoyan: Normalization would be complete if the Soviet Union, the United States, and Cuba signed a joint document together with the UN secretary-general on the basis of the exchange of letters between N. S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy. In any case, this issue cannot be resolved without Cuba. A decision in which Cuba is not a party will not be binding for it. Cuba must have guarantees of nonintervention.

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I would like to know: Do you have any ideas about forms of control? If you have them —discuss them in the next few days with V.V. Kuznetsov. Stevenson: As to the territorial integrity of Cuba, the formulas in the letter of Kennedy are simple and clear: after certain types of weapons will be removed from Cuba, the United States will make an announcement about the guarantee against any kind of invasion of Cuba. McCloy: As to the forms of verification, the ideal form in my mind would be regular overflights by planes doing aerial photo-reconnaissance, and ground inspection. I hope that the Soviet Union would bear on Castro so that he will agree to the conduct of such inspection as was stipulated in the letter of N. S. Khrushchev. However, if Castro refuses to accept such inspection, we should look for another form. The United States might continue overflights by its planes giving us confidence that one does not resume in Cuba assembly of types of weapons that represent danger for us. But in this case, we would like to have assurances that our planes will not be downed. One could also consider yet another possibility. Could you pass to us the lists of armament that is being withdrawn from Cuba? We know approximately how many missiles you now have in Cuba. If you could pass to us the lists of what you will transport on your ships (of course, I understand that these documents will not contain specifications of these armaments), then through comparison of these data with the data about the presence of armaments in Cuba, that are at our disposal, we would follow the process of evacuation of armaments that are dangerous for us. I believe that this would be enough. In this case we would get on along ground inspection. The system of passing of the lists of cargo removed from Cuba would not touch on your security interests. As to overflights, you, as we understand, cannot guarantee that the Cubans would not shoot at our planes. But we are glad that when today our plane flew over Cuba, it was not shot at. As far as we know, the antiaircraft missiles deployed in Cuba are not in the hands of the Cubans, but in the hands of your people. Today we intercepted radio commands and conversations of the antiaircraft units deployed in Cuba and that confirmed us again in our conclusion. I must say that we are glad that these antiaircraft missiles are in the hands of the Russians whose hands are not itching like the hands of the Cubans. In passing, I would like to say that although we do not include antiaircraft missiles into the category of offensive weapons, we would very much like that you withdraw these missiles as well. A. I. Mikoyan: As I see, your sense of humor has completely disappeared. Stevenson: In your conversations in Havana, you could cite good arguments in favor of ground inspection: On one hand, it would assure us that you are fulfilling your obligations; on the other hand, Castro would obtain confidence that no invasion of Cuba would take place, since UN observers would be around. A. I. Mikoyan: I believe that, in the course of today’s conversation, we have laid the ground for upcoming negotiations. I think that we should not now go into detail. You should reflect on what we have spoken about here. We will prepare our drafts as well. It seems to me that until the election day it would be hard for you to make any decisions, but, on the other hand, one should not procrastinate with liquidation of the Cuban crisis.

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Stevenson: We could agree even tomorrow in all details with a plan of inspection of ships by the forces of the Red Cross if both sides approve of the proposal of U Thant. We should not put off resolution of this issue. What flag would be on these two inspection ships is of no significance to us. As to the oversight of the territory of Cuba, if Castro refuses to agree on ground inspection, we could limit ourselves to unilateral conduct of aerial reconnaissance. For this we would only need your assurance that our planes will not be shot at. McCloy: It seems that it would take not ten or fifteen days, but probably a month for the removal of your missiles. A. I. Mikoyan: All these are [mere] details. We brought with us military experts—a general and colonel—who could discuss all these technical issues with you. I would like to speak on another, more important question. It is out of the question that we agree with you now on overflights of your planes over Cuba: It is sovereign Cuban territory. But if the United States agreed to the inspection over the area of Miami, it would be a good thing. Then, possibly the Cubans would agree to such inspection over their territory. One cannot carry out unilateral inspection—no matter which, ground or aerial. The Cubans would have full reason to be offended, if you were granted the right of regular and permanent overflights over their territory, in a unilateral way. As for inspections that must ensure a verification of the dismantling and withdrawal of our missiles, here we stand on the same position that was expressed in the letters of N. S. Khrushchev. Stevenson: As to ground inspection, it was U Thant, not us, who came up with a proposal about the presence of UN inspectors during the dismantling and withdrawal of the missiles. Incidentally, he had in mind permanent inspection till the end of dismantling of the missiles. This would serve the interests of both sides. I understand that Cuba is an independent country, but if it agrees with this, then there would be no need to seek other forms of checkup. A. I. Mikoyan: We agree to conduct ground inspection, as the letter of N. S. Khrushchev stated, but it is necessary to have some kind of element of reciprocity so that this understanding does not affect the national feelings of the Cubans. This also flows from my conversation with U Thant. I would like to know if McCloy and Stevenson consider today’s exchange of opinion useful? Stevenson: The conversation was useful and I became persuaded that our positions stay not too far apart. A. I. Mikoyan: There is misunderstanding [nedoponimaniie] as far as the issue of reciprocity of inspections is concerned. U Thant said that Castro is concerned with the presence in the United States of camps where Cuban émigrés prepare themselves for invasion similar to one that took place last year. McCloy: I must assure you that these camps no longer exist, they are closed everywhere. A. I. Mikoyan: You mean that they do not exist in Latin American countries as well? McCloy: The camps are closed everywhere. Perhaps there is something somewhere, but in any case the United States does not support this business.

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A. I. Mikoyan: But you count Cuban émigrés among your own military forces? McCloy: We are not training them for invasion of Cuba. We allow volunteers of any nationality to be enlisted in our military forces; even Russians can do it. In any case, I assure you that there are no more camps in the United States where Cuban émigrés are trained, prepared for invasion of Cuba. However, I would like to tell you frankly, that any inspection on U.S. territory is out of question. You have to trust in our word. Stevenson: I want to say that the United States is trying to normalize the situation in the area of the Caribbean Sea, but on condition of Castro’s cooperation. We might work out some form of mutual guarantees acceptable for Castro and his neighbors. If Castro is afraid of them, they, too, are afraid of him. I believe that after the settlement of the Cuban crisis the situation in this region will become more relaxed. A. I. Mikoyan: What you are saying is very important. Castro might ask me: Is the United States going to restore diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba, or is this question not on the agenda? Perhaps you have in mind not to do it right away, but after some time? I would like to know what I can tell Castro. Stevenson: You understand that I cannot answer this question. It is within the competence of the Organization of American States. We cannot conduct business with Castro without its involvement. But one could think of certain regional arrangements providing confidence to the countries of the Caribbean Sea. I hope that we would be able gradually to liquidate the antagonism between Cuba and its neighbors. Now this antagonism is being heated by subversive activities which, perhaps, reciprocate each other in this region. McCloy: I would say that Cuba is the source of infection, and the recent events in Venezuela provide an example. But I would not like to dwell now on this issue. I am satisfied with today’s exchange of opinions. I would be glad to meet you and follow up on this conversation, on your way back from Cuba. The conversation lasted for three hours and forty minutes. Those present were comrades V. V. Kuznetsov, A. F. Dobrynin, M. A. Menshikov, and G. A. Zhukov. From the American side, J. McCloy, A. Stevenson, and A. Akalovsky participated. The note takers were G. Zhukov and Yu. Vinogradov.

Source: Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation; provided to the CWIHP. Copy on file at the National Security Archive. Translation by Vladislav M. Zubok for the National Security Archive. Published in CWIHP Bulletin, issues 8–9 (Winter 1996–97): 315–20.

Document 2 Cable by V. V. Kuznetsov on the Conversation between CC CPSU Politburo Member A. I. Mikoyan and Acting UN Secretary-General U Thant

November 1, 1962 Ciphered Telegram Top Secret No copying is allowed Copy No. 1 November 2, 1962 CC CPSU Transmitting the record of conversation of Comrade A. I. Mikoyan. The conversation took place with U Thant on November 1, 1962, in the United Nations Mission of the USSR. At the start, Comrade Mikoyan passed to U Thant regard from Comrade N. S. Khrushchev as well as on his own behalf. He told U Thant that N. S. Khrushchev recalls with warmth the conversations that he had with the acting secretary-general. Personally, N. S. Khrushchev and his colleagues believe that U Thant took a good initiative with the aim of resolving the Cuban crisis and that in this regard we are acknowledging his large contribution. This raises the authority of U Thant himself as well as of the United Nations that could express itself in such a dangerous situation. He remarked then that although the immediate danger of war has ebbed; nevertheless there are political and diplomatic difficulties and they should be resolved according to the ideas and proposals advanced in the letters of N. S. Khrushchev [and] Kennedy and in the declaration of Castro. He stressed that for its part the Soviet Union was ready to continue its efforts to achieve final resolution of the Cuban issue. He remarked that the acting secretary-general could exercise a certain influence, using his authority, in the process of ultimate settlement of the conflict. 281

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He informed that he was heading for Cuba to meet with the Cuban friends, and decided to stop in New York in order to see U Thant and hear his considerations with regard to his recent trip to Cuba. U Thant welcomed Comrade Mikoyan. He reminded him of their meetings in Yalta in November 1955 when U Thant accompanied [Burmese leader] U Nu, and then in Burma. U Thant recalled with warmth his meetings with N. S. Khrushchev in 1955 in Yalta as well as during the trip of Khrushchev to Burma, and also in the United Nations in 1960 and again this year in the Soviet Union. U Thant expressed his sincere gratitude to Khrushchev for his encouraging words passed to him in his letters to U Thant and also through our representatives in the UN. He values highly and rejoices at the assessment that the Soviet Union gives to his efforts in the resolution of the Cuban issue. U Thant stressed that the position of the Soviet government and its head, N. S. Khrushchev, in the Cuban crisis was gratefully received by the vast majority of the peoples of the entire world and met with gratitude by the whole of mankind. He remarked that the people now see much more clearly the sincere desire of the Soviet Union to have the UN as an efficacious instrument for maintaining peace and for preventing war. After that, U Thant turned to his trip to Cuba and said the following. The trip was taken in connection with the exchange of letters between him and Fidel Castro. In his first appeal to Castro, U Thant called on him to cooperate with the UN in the name of securing peace. In his reply, Castro invited U Thant to visit Cuba personally in his capacity of acting UN Secretary-General and to discuss with him the issues concerning the attitude of the government of Cuba on the question under consideration of the Security Council. U Thant accepted this invitation and visited Cuba, staying there on October 30 and 31. He held two meetings with Prime Minister Castro, when the Cuban issue was discussed. In Havana he met some diplomats accredited by the government of Castro. The most useful conversations were ones with the ambassadors of Brazil, Yugoslavia, the United Arab Republic, and the USSR. One of the issues on U Thant’s agenda during the trip was to clarify the reaction of the Cuban government concerning the agreement of the Soviet Union to allow United Nations observers to check on the fulfillment of the commitment to dismantle Soviet missile launchers in Cuba and to return them to the USSR. Castro said in categorical form that Cuba is a sovereign and independent state and it would not allow any external organization—be it the UN or anything else—to interfere in the internal affairs of Cuba. Imposition of inspection on the part of the UN would be considered by the Cuban people as an infringement on its sovereign rights and would be considered as a humiliation of the people of Cuba. Such a step cannot be accepted by the Cuban government. If the USSR wants to meet the announced goals of sending the groups of inspectors, then Castro believes that such inspections might be carried out outside of the territorial waters of Cuba. Castro informed U Thant that on Thursday, November 1, he was going to speak on radio and television with a speech where he intends to mention this issue. U Thant reportedly advised Castro to postpone this speech, since it is very delicate and would be assessed

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as a declaration of policy with all consequences that flow out of it. Castro responded to U Thant that he had already put off making of this speech with regard to [U Thant’s] visit in Cuba. If the speech were delayed one more time, then people would not understand it. Therefore, Castro could not once again postpone his speech. Then U Thant asked Castro not to mention in his speech the position of the government of Cuba regarding the [issue of] UN inspection, to which he gladly agreed, saying that he would remove this paragraph from the text he had already prepared. U Thant asked Comrade Mikoyan, having in mind the confidential character of his conversations with Castro, not to raise this issue on his own initiative. As Castro pointed out, in his speech he planned to lay out the entire foreign policy of Cuba and in particular to emphasize the five points on the settlement of the Cuban crisis he had advanced on October 28. To this U Thant responded that in view of the deliberations on the Cuban issue in the Security Council and his own speech he could not do it. The Security Council did not authorize him to discuss with the sides issues of permanent or long-term character of settlement of the conflict in the Caribbean Sea. To this Castro responded that a temporary resolution of immediate problems did not resolve the Cuban issue as a whole. The resolution of these immediate questions, in the opinion of the government of Cuba, had to be linked to resolution of the longer-term problems. The Security Council had to discuss also and resolve the issue about a lasting peace in the area of the Caribbean Sea. If the Security Council were preoccupied with resolution of only immediate problems, then similar problems would emerge in the foreseeable future again, and they could create a situation similar to the current one. Therefore the government of Cuba is convinced that to ensure lasting and secure peace in the whole world it is necessary that the Security Council should preoccupy itself with the issue of ensuring lasting peace in the Caribbean region. In case the Security Council would be convened, Castro intends to send to the UN Minister of Foreign Affairs Raul Roa so that he would present the viewpoint of his government on the entire Cuban issue. The delegation of Cuba would address the Security Council with a request to find a lasting and final solution to this issue. The government of Cuba is firmly convinced that such a solution can be found only on the basis of five points advanced on October 28 by Premier Castro. U Thant told Castro that at that point he was not competent to discuss this issue, although he received with understanding the viewpoint of the Prime Minister of Cuba. Then in the conversations U Thant and Castro touched on the issue about “the UN presence” in the region of the Caribbean Sea during the period of the crisis. U Thant told Castro that in the interests of the government of Cuba and the Cuban people themselves it would be useful to have in Havana UN representatives, and, if Castro agrees, he was ready to leave two or three of his officials to establish contacts and to followup on their dialogue. Castro responded that had the government of Cuba agreed at the present moment to the presence of UN representatives in Cuba, it could have been interpreted by people as consent to the presence of inspecting groups of the United Nations. While saying so, he referred to American radio broadcasts which affirm on an hourly basis that the U Thant

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mission had exactly the inspection goals in mind. Under such terms people might have misperceived such a step. Castro asked U Thant not to insist on this proposal. He then declared that, if the Security Council accepted some kind of formula to resolve the Cuban issue on a permanent basis, then he, Castro, would be glad to have some kind of UN presence on the reciprocal basis. However, this cannot be done in the present phase. In conversations with Castro, U Thant raised the question about the return to the USA on humanitarian grounds of an American pilot who, according to press publications, had vanished without a trace in the area of Cuba. Castro told him that the U.S. aircraft of the type U-2 had indeed violated the aerial space over Cuba in violation of international legislation and the UN Charter. It was shot down by the Cubans, and the pilot died, since he could not bail out. Castro would have been ready to return the pilot, and alive, but he is dead, therefore he is ready to return the body under auspices of the UN. (This information U Thant passed to the Americans.) Castro also said that any further violation of the aerial borders of Cuba would be dealt with in a similar way. The next question that was discussed between U Thant and Castro was about a voluntary suspension by the Soviet Union of its supplies of weapons for Cuba for a period of two or three weeks and the simultaneous voluntary suspension of the quarantine on the part of the United States. U Thant informed Castro about the acceptance on the part of the Soviet Union of such a voluntary commitment, and also that the United States would have also agreed to suspend the quarantine for two or three weeks, on the condition that there would be a mechanism for checking if Soviet ships heading for Cuba were not carrying arms. U Thant informed Castro also that the Soviet Union had agreed that the Red Cross should deal with inspection of vessels outside of the boundaries of the territorial waters of Cuba. He said that for the Red Cross it would have been more convenient to inspect ships in the ports of arrival, and not in the open sea, if, of course, the government of Cuba agreed to that. Castro said to this, that his government would not allow groups of the Red Cross to inspect Soviet ships on Cuban territory, but if the USSR agreed to the inspection, then the UN should start organizing this business on the open sea. Responding to the question of U Thant about a possible time of convocation of a next session of the Security Council on the Cuban issue, Castro said that he would have preferred that the Council convene no sooner than next Wednesday, that is, after the elections in the United States. Comrade Mikoyan thanked U Thant for interesting and useful information, stressing that this would facilitate his talks with Prime Minister Fidel Castro. He observed that the Americans were now trying to focus all attention on the dismantling and withdrawal of missile equipment, doing nothing on their part concerning the guarantees of Cuba’s security. Therefore, Castro is right when he speaks about the need to solve the Cuban issue on a permanent basis. Now it is important to move from general declarations to concrete steps for cardinal solution of the entire issue on the basis of the letters of N. S. Khrushchev [and]

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Kennedy, and also the just and constructive proposals of Fidel Castro. Naturally, the Americans will object to some proposals of Castro, but his proposals face in the right direction. On the time of convening the Security Council, Comrade Mikoyan remarked that we understand the considerations of Fidel on this score. We also would like to say that since general principles of complete liquidation of the conflict have been adopted and declared by the interested sides, and also by the UN, since the acting secretary-general is taking active part in this, then, in our opinion, the Security Council should be convened at the moment when the current negotiations would approach the phase of an agreed-upon document finalizing this crisis. Until then convening of the Security Council would hardly assist in this matter. Comrade Mikoyan voiced the idea that after the end of talks of the sides, some kind of document might be passed for approval to the Security Council and on its basis and in following up on it the Council might take a decision on subsequent practical steps. Such a document might have the character of a protocol which would describe talks that would have taken place between the sides with participation of U Thant on the basis of the letters of N. S. Khrushchev and Kennedy, and also the declarations of Fidel Castro, and that would inform about the achieved agreement that, thereby, would have been sealed by the Security Council. [Mikoyan] said to U Thant that we learned with great interest about his initiative concerning the practicality of having observers in Cuba, in the United States, and in other countries neighboring Cuba for a duration of some period. He informed [U Thant] that N. S. Khrushchev was delighted to see this initiative of U Thant and considered it to be interesting and useful. It is good that Fidel Castro took it in a positive way. This proposal contains in itself the principle of reciprocity, and the USSR is ready to support such a proposal. It could be included into a draft protocol. He asked U Thant if he had spoken to the Americans on this subject and if so what was their attitude toward this idea. U Thant said that in conversation with Soviet representatives he advanced several formulas for solution of the issue in its entirety, and the problem of guarantees in particular. At one of these meetings with Comrade Zorin he indeed proposed that, provided the agreement of the sides, the presence of the UN in the Western hemisphere, in the flashpoints, would be useful. Were it to prove acceptable, then, in the opinion of U Thant, such a measure would have facilitated a settlement of the situation in the Caribbean region on the permanent basis. U Thant discussed this idea with heads of missions of Latin American [countries] in the UN even before his trip to Cuba and they seemed interested. Some Latin American delegates not only were interested in this idea but also let U Thant understand that such a measure would be desirable. The United States so far does not want to openly express its attitude toward this proposal of U Thant. Its reaction was reduced to the argument that, well, because this arrangement concerns all the countries of Western Hemisphere, this issue should be discussed in the Organization of American States.

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Comrade Mikoyan asked U Thant about his opinion regarding a possible form of the document stating the reached agreement. U Thant said that if the sides agree in general, then the goal will be reached through any such document in the form of protocol, joint declaration, separate declaration of the sides, agreement and even in the form of summing-up declaration of the chairman of the Security Council. Comrade Mikoyan asked U Thant also to express his personal considerations on the time of convocation of the Security Council. U Thant said that it should be done after the elections in the United States, but everything depends on the sides’ agreement. If the sides come to agreement, the Council can be convened at any time. Then U Thant passed his wish to thank the Soviet ambassador in Cuba for his genuine and wholehearted cooperation during the trip of U Thant. In particular, U Thant noted that our Ambassador in Havana and the Soviet officer informed him without delay about the time when dismantling of the missile units began, about the time when work will be finished, and about the fact that ships are commissioned for withdrawal of these units. In this regard, U Thant asked as a matter of personal interest about the time of arrival of ships to Cuba to pick up the mentioned materiel. Comrade Mikoyan confirmed what our ambassador in Havana had told U Thant about the time-frame of dismantling. Concerning the time frame of withdrawal, he said that those ships that are now in Cuba will not suffice. However, with regard to the continuing quarantine Soviet ships cannot sail to Cuba. Therefore it is necessary to lift the quarantine, so that Soviet ships could enter Cuban ports, unload their cargoes and load on them the dismantled units [ustanovki]. If one does it speedily, then perhaps ten to fifteen days will be required. He promised to raise this issue in the forthcoming conversation with McCloy. U Thant said that he addresses the Americans every day with appeals to suspend the blockade. And yesterday, having returned from Cuba, he did the same, making the Americans aware that he was convinced that the dismantling had begun and was under way as it had been promised, and that it would be finished by the announced date. Comrade Mikoyan thanked U Thant for his useful and exhaustive information. They agreed that for the press they will announce about useful exchange of opinions and the friendly atmosphere of the conversation. At the end of the conversation, U Thant said that if A. I. Mikoyan would come back via New York, he (U Thant) would be glad to meet again and learn about the results of the trip. He would like that time to be a more generous host than now and to invite A. I. Mikoyan for lunch and breakfast. The conversation was recorded by Comrade V. N. Zherebtsov. 2.XI.62 V. KUZNETSOV Source: Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation; provided to the CWIHP. Copy on file at the National Security Archive. Translation by Vladislav M. Zubok for the National Security Archive. Published in CWIHP Bulletin, issues 8–9 (Winter 1996–97): 311–13.

Document 3 Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan to the CC CPSU Regarding the November 1, 1962, Meeting with A. Stevenson

November 2, 1962 We raised the question that it was necessary to write down in the form of a protocol the important provisions that are contained in the exchange of messages between Khrushchev and Kennedy taking into account the statement by Fidel Castro. The Americans by all means were evading discussion of this question and trying to bring the whole matter to the organization of control over the dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of the Soviet missiles. Nevertheless, in the course of conversation they were obliged to answer our questions relating to the settlement of the Cuban problem in general and disclosed some of their positions that seem interesting for further negotiations. To save space in this cable, we omit our remarks during the conversation. You may learn them from the transcript of the conversation, which is being sent separately. First, though reluctantly, the Americans agreed with the need to fix in documents the corresponding commitments, including the nonaggression commitment against Cuba. In their opinion, these documents must include: a statement by the Soviet Union on the completion of the missiles’ evacuation; a U.S. statement saying they are convinced of the withdrawal and giving corresponding nonaggression guarantees to Cuba; possibly also a statement by U Thant. The statement by the Soviet government must be the first. The texts of these statements will be coordinated in advance. It is foreseen that a corresponding statement will be made by the Government of Cuba. All these statements must be presented to the Security Council. The unwillingness of the Americans to sign a protocol, apparently, can be explained in addition by the following thing: they do not want to put their signature side by side with the Cubans. 287

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The Americans underlined their readiness to include in their statement provisions based on corresponding wording from Kennedy’s messages regarding the issue of nonaggression guarantees for Cuba. When we mentioned that in the American press there has appeared a statement by D. Rusk to the effect that Kennedy’s statement is not a nonaggression guarantee to Cuba, Stevenson assured us that D. Rusk had not said it, but that the press gave an erroneous interpretation of his speech. Stevenson and McCloy confirmed that the United States is ready to give a nonaggression guarantee to Cuba as it was mentioned in Kennedy’s letter, if an inspection in some form confirms that the Soviet “offensive” armament is really removed from Cuba. Stevenson and McCloy affirmed that the encampments where the Cuban exiles had been training for an invasion of Cuba were currently closed. Second, during the conversation, we resolutely demanded the removal of the so-called “quarantine,” underlining that its continuation in no way can help to create a suitable atmosphere for the solution of the Cuban problem and may only complicate the situation. In this regard, we noted that the Soviet Union had complied with the request from U Thant for a temporary suspension of armaments supplies to Cuba, but that the United States had not stopped their “quarantine” for at least some time, as it had been suggested by U Thant. McCloy and Stevenson evaded a clear answer to the question of ending the “quarantine,” having limited themselves to a reference that to the Soviet vessels going to Cuba would be applied the same procedure as it was on October 25 regarding the tanker Bucharest, without an inspection on board, but with the help of a hailing-request by radio. It is illustrative that in response to our statement that in the event of dropping the practice of “quarantine” and giving our vessels the possibility to visit Cuba without any obstacles some ten to fifteen days will be needed to dispatch [from Cuba] all the armaments called offensive by the Americans, McCloy and Stevenson said that in their opinion it is hardly possible from the technical standpoint to carry out the mentioned volume of work in such a short period of time. According to McCloy, at least a month would be needed for that. Third, there has been a detailed discussion of methods for control of the dismantling and removal of missiles. Apparently, feeling the weakness of their position and taking into account objections on the part of Fidel Castro to permit verification on Cuban territory, McCloy and Stevenson declared in the course of discussion that the American side would be ready not to insist on verification methods foreseen in the message to N. S. Khrushchev and was ready to look for some new methods that would in essence give the Americans the possibility to be certain of the implementation of our commitment to withdraw the weapons. To our specific question what new methods was he referring to, McCloy said: the United States could limit itself to the continuation of their flights which give them confidence that there has not resumed in Cuba an installation of the dangerous for them types of armaments. If Castro is against ground verification, continued McCloy, another thing could be done —a transfer of the lists of armaments withdrawn from Cuba, when they would be re-

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moved, and of the corresponding information, which, however would not disclose Soviet technological secrets. We do know roughly how many missiles currently are situated in Cuba. In this case we could manage without ground verification. We are glad, said McCloy, that today our plane had not come under fire when it had been flying over Cuba. As far as we know, the antiaircraft missiles in Cuba are in the hands of your people, not the Cubans, although it is possible that there are some Cuban personnel. McCloy received a very firm response that the United States [has] no right to overfly Cuba and nobody can guarantee the security of such illegal flights. Fourth, we raised the question of normalizing relations between the United States and its Latin American allies, and Cuba. We also asked what is their attitude to U Thant’s plan for a UN presence in the Caribbean. The Americans flatly rejected any inspection of their territory whatsoever and declared: “You will have to trust our word.” At the same time, Stevenson said that the United States aspires to normalize the situation in the Caribbean, but under the condition of Castro’s cooperation. We could in some form elaborate mutual guarantees, acceptable to Castro and his neighbors. If Castro is afraid of them, they are afraid of him, too. I consider, said Stevenson, that after the Cuban crisis is settled the tension in this region would be lessened. In this regard we put the question in this way: “Castro may ask me if the United States is going to reestablish diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba. Maybe you intend to do so not immediately, but some time later?” Stevenson said that he was not able to give an answer to that question insofar as it is part of the competence of the Organization of American States. But perhaps we can consider the possibility of organizing corresponding regional arrangements, giving the necessary confidence to the countries of the Caribbean. I hope that steadily we will succeed in eliminating antagonism between Cuba and its neighbors. At the same time, Stevenson made the observation that currently the “antagonism” between Cuba and its neighbors is instigated by “subversive actions in this region, perhaps undertaken mutually.” McCloy noted that “Cuba is the breeding ground of infection and Venezuela an example.” It was clear that in the immediate future the United States is not going to reestablish diplomatic and economic ties with Cuba. Fifth, Stevenson and McCloy stated that the United States refuses point-blank to discuss the question of liquidating the American base at Guantánamo. Sixth, in the course of the conversation, McCloy attempted to broach the subject of an eventual evacuation from Cuba of the Soviet “ground-air” antiaircraft missiles. We have resolutely warded off this probing, declaring that such a question could not be raised and that we had sold these weapons to a number of countries, including the United Arab Republic and Indonesia. McCloy made the observation that “they are good machines against attacks from airspace.” Seventh, McCloy and Stevenson agreed that it would be good for Soviet and American delegations to try to reach preliminary agreements over the issues to be discussed by the Security Council.

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And eighth, McCloy and Stevenson expressed satisfaction over the exchange of opinions and Stevenson underlined that the USSR’s and United States’ positions “are not so far from each other.” Both of them were inquiring whether I would stop on my way back from Cuba. I said in response that for the moment I had no plans to do so but if necessary I assumed it would be possible. 2.XI.62 A. MIKOYAN

Source: Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation. Copy on file at the National Security Archive. Translation by V. Zaemsky for the National Security Archive. Published in CWIHP Bulletin, issues 8–9 (Winter 1996–97): 314–15.

Document 4 Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan in New York to the CC CPSU (1)

November 2, 1962 From the following telegram, you will learn the details of the important statement made by McCloy in the talks on monitoring the dismantling of the “offensive weaponry.” He declared that in view of Castro’s refusal to agree to ground-based monitoring, the Americans were willing not to insist [on that], knowing the forms and methods of monitoring put forth in Khrushchev’s message, [but] that it was necessary to find other methods for convincing the Americans that the dismantling process had been completed and that everything had been removed. In response to my question about whether there was some concrete proposal as to how this should be done, he said the following: to allow them the possibility of flights over Cuba for inspections from the air, without ground-based monitoring; this was the first point. The second was that the Soviets provide the Americans with information about how much of the weaponry has been dismantled and removed, and when. The important part of this is not to impart secret military information that reveals the nature and capacities of this weaponry. I rejected here the possibility of flights over Cuba, since that would affect the sovereignty of Cuba itself. The proposal about information from our side, I said, should be discussed with our military specialists, who arrived with me to aid Kuznetsov. McCloy reported with great satisfaction that on November 1, their plane had flown over Cuba without being fired at, and had taken photos. He attributed this to the presence of Soviet specialists at the antiaircraft missile installations. I conclude that if our agreement with Castro not to shoot down American planes retains its force, then when they fly one or two more times it will mean that inspections on the dismantling have been carried out. There remains the issue of inspections on the re291

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moval of the dismantled weaponry, which could be resolved through means suggested by McCloy. In view of this, Castro’s position, which rejects the possibility of onsite inspections, will cease to be an obstacle to settling with the Americans the issue of monitoring the dismantling and removal of the weaponry. I consider all this to be expedient. In my talks with Castro I will fully explain our position on the issue of monitoring in accordance with Khrushchev’s message, I will show him its correctness and acceptability, from our point of view, for Cuba. In connection with the Americans’ proposal laid out earlier, and taking into account the Cubans’ arrogance, I consider it expedient not to insist or ensure that they reject their position on not allowing observers onto their territory to check on the dismantling and removal process, the position which they have made clear to U Thant and have published several times in the press. In truth, in Castro’s speech yesterday this position was made to seem somewhat more flexible. I await instructions concerning this matter in Havana. 2.XI.62

A. Mikoyan

Source: Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation; provided to the CWIHP. Copy on file at the National Security Archive. Translation by John Henriksen for the National Security Archive. Published in CWIHP Bulletin, issues 8–9 (Winter 1996–97): 321.

Document 5 Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan in New York to the CC CPSU (2)

November 2, 1962 Yesterday, in the hour-long discussion with McCloy and Stevenson, the positions of the parties on all issues connected with the Cuban conflict were explained, as well as the American position in the form in which the Americans consider it necessary to define it. We will be sending to you a short exposition of the most important points of the discussion within two or three hours, and today, November 2, at 1:00 in the afternoon I will be flying to Cuba. Our comrades will compose a detailed record of the conversation, and will send it after I am gone. The conversation was important, and you should become familiarized with that detailed record of it. McCloy has declared that with the aim of speeding up the removal of the missiles, before the fine-tuning of the observation system by the Red Cross has been reached, they agree to and are interested in allowing Soviet vessels bound for Cuba entry into Cuban ports without inspection, by way of a hail like the one that was given to the tanker Bucharest. We are introducing a proposal to give instructions to all our vessels bound for Cuba to proceed to their destinations. 2.XI.62

A. Mikoyan

Source: Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation, provided to the CWIHP. Copy on file at the National Security Archive. Translation by John Henriksen. Published in CWIHP Bulletin, issues 8-9 (Winter 1996–97): 321.

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Document 6 Notes of Conversation between A. I. Mikoyan and Fidel Castro

November 3, 1962 This morning a two-hour conversation took place between comrade A. I. Mikoyan and Fidel Castro, where I, Soviet ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr Alekseyev, was also present. Unfortunately, A. I. Mikoyan said, some differences of opinion have arisen between the leadership of the Republic of Cuba and our leadership. Ambassador Alekseyev has informed us about these differences, and about the speech by Fidel Castro on November 1, 1962, in which the latter explained to the Cuban people the position of the revolutionary government. The CC CPSU, Mikoyan emphasized, had sent me to Cuba to discuss in the most frank way all the unclear questions with the Cuban comrades. Judging by the welcome at the airport, the Cuban leaders consider this a useful meeting. I came here to speak to you sincerely and openly. And now it seems to me that it would be useful if you, comrade Fidel Castro, tell me frankly what the questions are that worry you. Only by speaking frankly is it possible to assure complete confidence and mutual understanding. As we agreed before, after this conversation a meeting will be organized with the secretaries of the National Committees for the Defense of the Revolution leadership in order to discuss all the issues in detail. In response, Fidel Castro said that the Cuban leadership was glad to see A. I. Mikoyan in Cuba once again, and to speak with him about questions that are important for both sides. We are aware, joked Fidel Castro, that N. S. Khrushchev once said: “There is a Cuban in the CC CPSU and this Cuban is A. I. Mikoyan.” We can speak to you, Fidel Castro continued, very frankly. We profoundly trust the Soviet Union. Regarding the questions that caused some differences, as we explained it to our people, I [Castro] would like to say the following. 294

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These questions are motivated, first of all, by psychological factors. I would like to stress that in those days when a serious danger arose, our whole people sensed a great responsibility for the fate of the motherland. Every nerve of the people was strained. There was a feeling that the people were united in their resolve to defend Cuba. Every Cuban was ready to repel the aggressors with arms in hand, and ready to devote their lives to the defense of their country. The whole country was united by a deep hatred of U.S. imperialism. In those days we did not even arrest anyone, because the unity of the people was so staggering. That unity was the result of considerable ideological work carried out by us in order to explain the importance of Soviet aid to Cuba, to explain the purity of the principles in the policy of the USSR. We spoke with the people about the high patriotic objectives we were pursuing in obtaining arms to defend the country from aggression. We said that the strategic weapons were a guarantee of firmness for our defense. We did not classify the arms as defensive and offensive, insofar as everything depends on the objectives for which they are used. . . . [ellipses in the original] Speaking of psychological questions, we would like to underline that the Cuban people did understand us. They understood that we had received Soviet weapons, that Cuban defense capacities had increased immeasurably. Thus, when Kennedy attempted to frighten us, the Cuban people reacted very resolutely, very patriotically. It is hard to imagine the enthusiasm, the belief in victory with which the Cubans voluntarily enlisted themselves into the army. The people sensed enormous forces inside themselves. Aware of the real solidarity of the Soviet government and people, Cubans psychologically felt themselves to be strong. The Soviet Union’s solidarity found its material embodiment, became the banner around which the forces and courage of our people closely united. In observing Soviet strategic arms on their territory, the people of Cuba sensed an enormous responsibility to the countries of the socialist camp. They were conscious that these mighty weapons had to be preserved in the interests of the whole socialist camp. Therefore, regardless of the fact that U.S. planes were continuously violating our air space, we decided to weaken the antiaircraft defense of Havana, but at the same time strengthen the defense of the missile locations. Our people proudly sensed their role as a defender of the socialist countries’ interests. Antiaircraft gunners and the soldiers protecting the missile locations were full of enthusiasm, and ready to defend these at the price of their own lives. The tension of the situation was growing, and the psychological tension was growing also. The whole of Cuba was ready for defense. . . . [ellipses in the original] And suddenly—concessions. . . . [ellipses in the original] Concessions on the part of the Soviet Union produced a sense of oppressiveness. Psychologically our people were not prepared for that. A feeling of deep disappointment, bitterness and pain has appeared, as if we were deprived of not only the missiles, but of the very symbol of solidarity. Reports of missile launchers being dismantled and returned to the USSR at first seemed to our people to be an insolent lie. You know, the Cuban people were not aware of the agreement, were not aware that the missiles still belonged to the Soviet side. The Cuban people did not conceive of the juridical status of these weapons.

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They had become accustomed to the fact that the Soviet Union gave us weapons and that they became our property. And suddenly came the report of the American [news] agency UPI that “the Soviet premier has given orders to Soviet personnel to dismantle missile launchers and return them to the USSR.” Our people could not believe that report. It caused deep confusion. People didn’t understand the way that the issue was structured—the possibility of removing missile armaments from Cuba if the USA liquidated its bases in Turkey. I was saying, Fidel Castro continued, that in the postrevolutionary years we have carried out much ideological work to prepare people for understanding socialist ideas, Marxist ideas. These ideas today are deeply rooted. Our people admire the policies of the Soviet government, learn from the Soviet people to whom they are deeply thankful for invaluable help and support. But at that difficult moment our people felt as if they had lost their way. Reports on October 28 that N. S. Khrushchev had given orders to dismantle missile launchers, that such instructions had been given to Soviet officers and there was not a word in the message about the consent of the Cuban government, that report shocked people. The Cubans were consumed by a sense of disappointment, confusion, and bitterness. In walking along the street, driving to armed units, I observed that people did not understand that decision. Why was that decision made unilaterally, why are the missiles being taken away from us? And will all the weapons be taken back? These were the questions disturbing all the people. In some forty-eight hours, that feeling of bitterness and pain spread among all the people. Events were rapidly following one another. The offer to withdraw weapons from Cuba under the condition of liquidating bases in Turkey was advanced on October 27. On October 28, there came the order to dismantle the missiles and the consent to an inspection. We were very worried by the fact that the moral spirit of our people had declined sharply. That affected their fighting spirit too. At the same time the insolent flights of American planes into Cuban airspace became more frequent, and we were asked not to open fire on them. All this generated a strong demoralizing influence. The feeling of disappointment, pain, and bitterness that enveloped people could have been used by counterrevolutionaries to instigate anti-Soviet elements. Enemies could have profited because the legal rules about which we had been speaking with the people were being forgotten. The decision was made without consultation, without coordinating it with our government. Nobody had the slightest wish to believe it, everyone thought it was a lie. Since then, our people began to address very sensitively the matter of sovereignty. Besides, after the current crisis the situation remained juridically constant, as the “status quo” did not change: 1. The blockade organized by the U.S. administration is still in place. The United States continues to violate the freedom of the sea. 2. The Americans seek to determine what weapons we can possess. Verification is being organized. The situation is developing in the same direction as it is or was in Morocco, Guinea, Ghana, Ceylon, and Yemen.

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3. The United States continues to violate Cuban airspace, and we must bear it. And moreover, the consent for inspections has been given without asking us. All this seemed to our people to be a step backward, a retreat. It turns out that we must accept inspections, accept the right of the United States to determine what kinds of weapons we can use. Our Revolution rests firmly on the people. A drop in moral spirit can be dangerous for the cause of revolution. The Soviet Union consolidated itself as a state a long time ago and it can carry out a flexible policy, it can afford maneuvering. The Soviet people readily understand their government, trust it wholeheartedly. Cuba is a young developing country. Our people are very impulsive. The moral factor has a special significance in our country. We were afraid that these decisions could provoke a breach in the people’s unity, undermine the prestige of the Revolution in the eyes of Latin American peoples, in the eyes of the whole world. It was very difficult for us to explain the situation to the people. If the decisions had been taken in another way, it would have been easier. If a truce were suggested first and then the issues were coordinated, we would have been in a better position. Comrade A. I. Mikoyan made an observation that the threat of aggression was so critical, that there was no time for consultations. Then, for half an hour, Mikoyan discussed the issues about which Castro had talked, but these explanations were interrupted by an incoming report about the death of Mikoyan’s wife. The transcript of this part of the conversation will be transmitted with the notes of the next conversation. 3.XI.62 ALEKSEYEV

Source: Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation; provided to the CWIHP. Copy on file at the National Security Archive. Translation by Vladimir Zaemsky. Published in CWIHP Bulletin, issue 5 (Spring 1995): 93–94.

Document 7 Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador to Cuba, A. I. Alekseyev, to the USSR’s Foreign Ministry

November 4, 1962 Today talks were conducted between A. I. Mikoyan and Comrades Fidel Castro, O. Dorticós, R. Castro, E. Guevara, E. Aragonez, and C. R. Rodriguez, as well as myself. Comrade Mikoyan conveyed warm, fraternal greetings from the Presidium of the CC CPSU and N. S. Khrushchev to the Cuban leaders. He expressed a lofty appreciation of the Cuban Revolution, and support for the rebuff to the interventionists; he spoke about our support for Cuba; and he remarked that the CC CPSU was delighted by the courage and fearlessness displayed by the leaders of the Cuban Revolution in these perilous days, and the readiness of the Cuban people to hold firm. Then Comrade Mikoyan said that when the Central Committee learned of the misunderstanding arising in Cuba of several issues and decisions made by us, they came to the conclusion that it would be impossible to clarify these issues by way of mere correspondence. The Central Committee made the decision to send Comrade Mikoyan to Cuba to clarify to our friends our position, and to inform them of issues that are of interest to them. Comrade Mikoyan remarked that he naturally did not have any intention of exerting pressure; his task was simply to explain our position. Knowing our Cuban friends, A. I. Mikoyan said, I am sure that they too will agree with this. It could of course turn out that even after the explanations there will be certain points on which our points of view will remain different. Fidel Castro declared that he has already informed the Cuban comrades present at the talks of the issues raised by him yesterday before Comrade Mikoyan, and made a short resume of these issues. A. I. Mikoyan remarked that Fidel Castro spoke yesterday in detail and with sincerity, and asked whether the other comrades wanted to add anything to this, whether they had other remarks to make. 298

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O. Dorticós asked for an explanation of why N. S. Khrushchev approved the proposal made by Kennedy to declare that there would be no attack on Cuba on the condition of the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, even though the Cuban government had not yet at this time expressed its own opinion on this proposal. C. R. Rodriguez put a question to Comrade Mikoyan—where does the Soviet leadership see the essence of victory, does it consist in military success or in diplomatic success? We believed, Rodriguez noted, that we could not yet talk about victory, since the guarantees from the United States were ephemeral. Then A. I. Mikoyan, developing arguments made in N. S. Khrushchev’s letters to Fidel Castro, and also from the discussion of the issue in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, offered additional arguments with the aim of driving away any doubts from the minds of our Cuban comrades. He spoke moreover of the main points of his talks with U Thant, McCloy, and Stevenson. We will send a full record of the conversation to Moscow via diplomatic mail. Further information on certain new points touched on in Mikoyan’s explanations will be provided by separate telegram. The talks lasted seven hours, more than five hours of which were taken up by Comrade Mikoyan’s explanations. Our Cuban comrades listened with attentiveness to A. I. Mikoyan, were interested in details, and sustained the general feeling of cordiality and trust. We agreed to continue the talks in the same composition tomorrow, on November 5, at 2:00 in the afternoon local time. 4.XI.62

Alekseyev

Source: Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation; provided to the CWIHP. Copy on file at the National Security Archive. Translation by John Henriksen. Published in CWIHP Bulletin, issues 8–9 (Winter 1996–97): 323.

Document 8 Memorandum of Conversation between Castro and Mikoyan

November 4, 1962 A. I. Mikoyan with Fidel Castro [Cuban President], Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado [Defense Minister], Raul Castro, Ernesto Guevara, Emilio Aragonés, and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez A. I. Mikoyan transmitted to the Cuban leaders cordial fraternal regards on behalf of the Presidium of the CC CPSU and N. S. Khrushchev. He said that the Central Committee of the CPSU feels admiration and respect toward Cuban leaders, who from the very beginning of their struggle demonstrated courage and fearlessness, confidence in revolutionary victory in Cuba, readiness to devote all their forces to the struggle. We are proud of the victory achieved by the Cuban revolution against interventionists on Playa Giron [Giron Beach, Bay of Pigs]. Cuban revolutionaries demonstrated such a potent spirit of resistance that it inspires admiration and proves that the Cubans are always ready to fight until victory is achieved. Cuban leaders have shown great courage, intrepidity, and firmness in dangerous days. The CC CPSU admires the readiness of the Cuban people to stand up. We trust Cuban leaders as we do ourselves. In the course of the Cuban events, our party and government were acting having in mind to do whatever was necessary to make [the situation] better for Cuba. When Ambassador Alekseyev informed [us] about the opinion of Comrade Fidel Castro, that there are some differences between our parties, we were very pained. Immediately, all the leadership held a meeting, for the question of Cuba worries us a lot. We felt it necessary to reestablish mutual trust because trust is the basis of everything, the basis of really fraternal relations. We understood that no correspondence could suffice to explain completely the misunderstanding of those days. Therefore, the CC CPSU decided to send me to Cuba in order to explain to our friends the Soviet position and to inform them on 300

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other subjects that may be of interest to them. We know—Mikoyan continued—that if we explain everything frankly, then you, our brothers, will understand us. Comrade Mikoyan made the observation that he, naturally, had no intention to put pressure [on Cuba], that his task was to explain our position. Being acquainted with the Cuban comrades—A. I. Mikoyan said—I’m confident that they will agree with it. It is certainly possible that even after our explanations, there will remain some issues about which we shall still have different points of view. Our task is to preserve mutual trust, which is needed for really friendly relations with Cuba, for the future of Cuba and the USSR and the whole world revolutionary movement. Yesterday Comrade Fidel Castro explained very frankly and in detail that the Cuban people had not understood everything regarding the most recent actions of the Soviet government. Comrade Fidel Castro also spoke on the issues that worry the Cuban leadership. He underlined the role of the psychological factor, which has special significance in Cuba. Several particularities of the psychological mold of Cubans have formed as a result of the historical development of the country. And, as Comrade Fidel Castro was saying, it is very important to take this into account. In New York, said Mikoyan, I learned the substance of the speech by Comrade Fidel Castro on November 1. Certainly I could not perceive completely the speech insofar as the American press frequently distorts the substance of the statements made by Cuban leaders. But even on the basis of the American press interpretation, I understood that it was a friendly speech pronounced by Comrade Fidel Castro underlining the great significance of friendship between the Soviet Union and Cuba, mentioning the broad aid rendered by the Soviet Union to revolutionary Cuba. He also said that there were some differences in views between us, but those differences had to be discussed on the level of parties and governments, not mass rallies. Those words of Fidel Castro, testifying sentiments of friendship and trust toward our country, were reaffirmed by the welcome reception on my arrival to Havana. The very tone of the conversation with Comrade Fidel Castro was imbued with a sense of fellowship and trust. I’m confident, continued Mikoyan, that the existing mutual trust between us will always be there, notwithstanding some differences of opinion. The American press spreads a lot of conjectures regarding the aim of my trip to Cuba. They are writing that I went to Havana allegedly in order to apply pressure on Cuban leaders, in order to “pacify” them, as [U.S. negotiator John] McCloy had stated to the American newspapers. About my conversation with McCloy, I can tell you in detail afterward; but first of all I would like to answer the main questions. As I have already stated before my departure from New York, the Soviet government was supporting the five points put forward by Comrade Fidel Castro. The demand on liquidation of the U.S. Guantánamo Base is a just and correct demand. I had no plans to speak publicly in New York, but when I read in the American press the speculation about the objectives of my trip, I decided to voice that statement in order to make my position completely clear. Using radio, American propaganda is trying to embroil Cuba [in a conflict] with the Soviet Union, is trying to sting Cubans to the quick. It is natural, because the enemy cannot behave differently. He always acts like this. But the enemy must be repulsed.

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By decision of the CC CPSU, my task includes explaining our position to Cuban leaders within my abilities and capacities, so that no doubts are left. We also want to discuss new problems that arise in front of our two countries. It is not a part of my task at all to put pressure on Cuban leaders. That is an impudent conjecture of American propaganda. Our interests are united. We are Marxist-Leninist, and we are trying to achieve common objectives. We discussed the current situation at the CC CPSU and came to a decision that there was no complete relaxation of tensions yet. On the military side, we can observe a considerable decrease in danger. I can add for myself that in essence currently the danger has abated. But the diplomatic tension still exists. Plans for military assault have been frustrated. A victory was gained regarding prevention of a military assault. But still we are facing even larger tasks on the diplomatic field. We must achieve a victory over the diplomatic tension, too. What does that victory mean? How do we understand it? I’ll explain later. I would like to do whatever is necessary to ensure that you understand us correctly. I am not in a hurry, and if you do not object, I will stay in Cuba as long as necessary to explain all the aspects of our position. I think, first of all, we must consider those issues where some differences have appeared. I will do my best to help you understand us. We must consider all these questions and decide what can be done jointly to ensure the success of the further development and future of the Cuban Revolution. At the moment of critical military danger, we had no opportunity for mutual consultations, but now we have good possibilities for thorough consultations on diplomatic forms of struggle in order to determine how to act in common. Comrades, I would like to begin by asking you to say what steps of the Soviet government have caused misunderstanding and differences, in order to give you the necessary explanations. True, yesterday Comrade Fidel Castro already narrated much about this. But I would like to ask both Comrade Fidel Castro and all of you to raise all those questions that you are interested in. F. Castro: My colleagues are aware of the substance of our conversation yesterday, but in order to summarize the questions which are important for us let me repeat them briefly. As Comrade Mikoyan has already said, recent events have considerably influenced the moral spirit of our people. They were regarded as a retreat at the very moment when every nerve of our country had been strained. Our people are brought up in the spirit of trust in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, many people do not understand the linkage between the Cuban events and the issue of the liquidation of American bases in Turkey. The unexpected withdrawal of Soviet missiles without consultations with the Cuban government has produced a negative impression upon our people. The Soviet Union gave its consent for inspections also without sending a notification to the Cuban leadership. It is necessary to take into account the special delicacy of our people, which has been created as a result of several historic developments. The “Platt Amendment,” imposed by the Americans upon Cuba, played a particular role in this regard. Using the Platt Amendment, the United States of America prohibited the Cuban government from deciding by itself questions of foreign policy. The decisions were made by the Americans behind the back of the Cuban

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people. During the current crisis, there was also an impression that important issues, concerning all of us, were discussed and resolved in the absence of Cuban representatives, without consultations with the Cuban government. The U.S. imperialists undertook a series of aggressive measures against the Republic of Cuba. They set up a naval blockade of our country, they try to determine what kind of armament we can have and use. Systematically, they violate Cuban airspace and elevate these violations of the sovereignty of the Cuban Republic into a prerogative of the U.S. administration. There is the question of inspections. True, inspections are a sore subject for us. We cannot take that step. If we agree to an inspection, then it is as if we permit the United States of America to determine what we can or cannot do in foreign policy. That hurts our sovereignty. In conclusion, I said that we are a young country, where a Revolution has recently triumphed, so we cannot carry out such a flexible policy as does the Soviet Union because they are a consolidated state and on that ground they have possibilities for maneuvering, for flexibility in foreign policy. The Soviet people easily understand similar decisions of its government. The mentioned facts represent a danger for the revolutionary process, for the Cuban Revolution itself. Here is the summary of the questions elucidated by me in the conversation yesterday with Comrade Mikoyan. We did not touch on the issue of the assessment of the international situation. I made the observation that at the most critical moment, it had appeared that we had no understanding of preceding steps. For example, the objective of placing strategic armaments in Cuba was not clear enough for us. We could not understand where is the exit from that complicated situation. By no means were we thinking that the result could be a withdrawal of strategic armaments from Cuban territory. Yesterday, Comrade Mikoyan partly explained some issues but the conversation was interrupted by the tragic news of the spouse of A. I. Mikoyan. A. I. Mikoyan: Perhaps the Cuban comrades want some other questions to be answered? Dorticós makes the observation that in the summary offered by Fidel Castro, there have been generalized all the questions that have caused differences, but he asks [Mikoyan] to explain why N. S. Khrushchev has accepted Kennedy’s offer to make a statement of nonaggression against Cuba under the condition of removing Soviet missiles from Cuba, though the Cuban government had not yet given its view in this regard. A. I. Mikoyan asks if there are more questions. C. R. Rodriguez says that his question is related to that formulated by Dorticós. It is not clear what the Soviet Union regards as a victory, whether its substance consists in the military success or the diplomatic one. We were considering that for the time being it is impossible to speak about victory insofar as the guarantees on the part of the United States are ephemeral. A. I. Mikoyan says that he will give the most detailed answer to all the questions raised by Comrade Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders in order to make the Cuban comrades understand us completely. Therefore, I will have to speak for a long time. Later, when you bring forward your opinions and perhaps ask some other questions, I would like to say

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some more words. If my arguments seem to you not convincing, please notify me, I will think over what to do in order to make you understand me, I will try to put forward new arguments. The main issue, the issue of prime importance, is why we have decided to withdraw the strategic missiles from the Cuban territory. Apparently, you agree that this is the main question. If there is no understanding over this issue, it is difficult to comprehend other questions. Being in Moscow, I did not realize that this question would be asked. Previously, it had not arisen. The fate of the Cuban Revolution has always been important for us, especially beginning from the moment when Fidel Castro declared the objective of constructing socialism in Cuba. Socialist revolution in Latin America should develop and strengthen. When we received the news that had defeated the counterrevolutionary landing on Playa Giron, it naturally made us happy, but to some extent it worried us, too. Certainly, it was foolish on the part of the Americans to organize such an invasion. But that fact indicated that they would try again to organize an aggression against Cuba, that they would not tolerate the further development and strengthening of socialist Cuba. It is difficult for them to reconcile with the existence of Cuba which is constructing socialism in the immediate proximity of their borders. This event worries us, as we were realizing that the Americans would not give up their attempts to suffocate the Cuban Revolution. And indeed, the American imperialists began elaborating two parallel plans. The first one consisted of an attempt at the economic suffocation of the Republic of Cuba in order to provoke discontent inside the country, to provoke famine, and to achieve the collapse of the new regime due to pressure from within, without military intervention. The second plan foresaw preparation of an intervention with the participation of Latin American mercenaries and with the support of the United States. This plan envisaged invasion as the means to deal the final blow and to kill the revolutionary regime, if the economic hardships weaken it from inside. After the defeat on Playa Giron, the American imperialists proceeded to the execution of those plans. The victory of the Revolution in Cuba is a great success of Marxist-Leninist theory, and a defeat of the Cuban Revolution would mean a two- or three-times larger defeat of the whole socialist camp. Such a defeat would throw back the revolutionary movement in many countries. Such a defeat would bear witness to the supremacy of imperialist forces in the entire world. That would be an incredible blow, which would change the correlation of forces between the two systems, and would hamper the development of the international revolutionary movement. We were and are considering to be our duty, a duty of Communists, to do everything necessary to defend the Cuban Revolution, to frustrate the imperialist plans. Some time ago, our comrades informed us that the economic situation in the country [Cuba] had worsened. This deterioration was caused by pressure on the part of the Americans and large expenses for defensive needs. We were afraid that the worsening of the situation could be the result of the implementation of the [American] plan for the economic suffocation of Cuba. The CC CPSU discussed the situation in Cuba and decided,

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without your request—you are very modest and try not to disturb us by requests—to undertake some measures in order to strengthen our help to Cuba. If before you were receiving part of the weapons on credit and only a portion of armaments free of charge, now we decided to supply you gratis with weapons and partly with military uniforms—100,000 sets in two years—and equipment. We saw that the Cuban trade representatives, who were participating in the negotiations, were feeling themselves somewhat uneasy. They were short of more than $100 million to somehow balance the budget. Therefore, we accepted all their proposals in order to frustrate the plan of Kennedy designed for [causing] an internal explosion in Cuba. The same thing can be said regarding food and manufactured goods. In order to alleviate the economic situation in Cuba, we sent there articles and food worth 198 million rubles. Speaking very frankly, we have been giving you everything without counting. According to my point of view, we have entered a new stage of relations, which nowadays has a different character. Indeed, during the first stage there was some semblance of mutually beneficial trade. Currently, those supplies are part of clearly fraternal aid. I recall that, after his trip to Bulgaria [May 14–20, 1962 —ed.], N. S. Khrushchev told us that while staying in that country, he was thinking all the time of Cuba, and he was worried that the Americans would organize an intervention in Cuba with the aid of reactionary governments of Latin America or would carry out a direct aggression. They do not want to permit the strengthening of Cuba, and the defeat of Cuba, N. S. Khrushchev said to us, would deliver a very powerful blow upon the whole world revolutionary movement. We must frustrate the plans of the American imperialists. It was at that time when there appeared a plan that carried great risk. This plan placed huge responsibility on the Soviet government insofar as it contained within it the risk of a war that the imperialists could unleash against the Soviet Union. But we decided that it was necessary to save Cuba. At one time, N. S. Khrushchev related that plan to us and asked us to think it through very seriously in order to make a decision in three days. We had to think over the consequences of its implementation, what to do during different stages of its execution, and how to achieve Cuba’s salvation without unleashing a nuclear war. It was decided to entrust our military with elaborating their considerations and to discuss it with the Cuban leadership. The main condition for the success of this plan was to carry it out secretly. In this case, the Americans would find themselves in a very difficult position. Our military people said that four months were necessary to implement that plan. We foresaw that the delivery of armaments and Soviet troops to Cuban territory would take a half of the preparatory period. Measures were also thought out in order to prevent the unleashing of global nuclear war. We decided to work through the UN, to mobilize international public opinion, to do everything in order to avoid a world collision. We understood that the Americans could use a blockade. It appeared to be the most dangerous thing if the U.S. imperialists blockaded the supplies of fuel to Cuba. They could abstain from limiting food deliveries to Cuba, while demagogically declaring that they do not want to doom the Cuban people to famine, and at the same time prevent supplies of weapons and fuel to Cuba. And Cuba, which does not have its own energy resources, cannot survive without fuel. Our commu-

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nications with Cuba are very stretched. We are separated by enormous distances. Therefore, transportation to Cuba is very difficult. We cannot use our Air Force or Navy forces in case of a blockade of Cuba. Therefore, we had to use such means as political maneuvering and diplomacy; we had to utilize the United Nations. For example, we could not blockade American bases in Turkey in response because we have no other exit to the Mediterranean. We could undertake such steps neither in Norway, nor in England, nor in Japan. We do not have enough possibilities for a counterblockade. Countermeasures could be undertaken in Berlin. Our plans did not include creation of our base here, on the American continent. In general, the policy of constructing bases on foreign territories is not a correct one. Such a policy was carried out in the time of Stalin. There was our base in Germany, which was created on the ground of our right as conqueror. Currently, our troops in Germany are quartered there according to the Warsaw Pact. Under the treaty, there was our naval base in Finland. We also had a base in Port Arthur in order to defend our eastern borders from Japan. All these bases were liquidated. Right now we do not have any bases on foreign territories. Nevertheless, there are our troops in Poland in order to ensure communications with our forces in Germany, and Soviet troops are quartered in Hungary in order to protect us from the side of Austria. We do not need bases in Cuba for the destruction of the United States. We have long-range missiles that can be used directly from our territory. We do not have plans to conquer the territory of the United States. The working class of that country is stupefied by capitalist propaganda. Besides, such a plan would contradict our theory. We can use the long-range missiles only to deliver a retaliatory blow, without landing troops on U.S. territory. The objective of bringing Soviet troops and strategic weapons to Cuba consisted only in strengthening your defense potential. It was a deterrence plan, a plan designed to stop the imperialist play with fire regarding Cuba. If the strategic armaments were deployed under conditions of secrecy and if the Americans were not aware of their presence in Cuba, then it would have been a powerful means of deterrence. We proceeded from that assumption. Our military specialists informed us that strategic missiles can be reliably camouflaged in the palm forests of Cuba. We were following very intently the transportation of troops and strategic weapons to Cuba. Those sea shipments were successful in July and August. And only in September the Americans learned about the transport of those forces and means. The U.S. intelligence worked badly. We were surprised that Kennedy in his speeches was speaking only about Soviet military specialists, but not Soviet troops. At the very beginning, he really was thinking so. Then we understood that he was not saying everything he knew, and that he was holding back in order not to complicate the [congressional] election campaign for himself. We let the Americans know that we wanted to solve the question of Berlin in the nearest future. This was done in order to distract their attention away from Cuba. So, we used a diversionary maneuver. In reality, we had no intention of resolving the Berlin question at that time. If, comrades, the question of Berlin is of interest to you, I can give you the necessary information.

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Kennedy addressed N. S. Khrushchev through confidential channels and made a request not to aggravate the situation until the end of the elections to Congress [on November 6, 1962 —ed.] and not to proceed to the Berlin issue. We responded that we could wait until the end of the elections [campaign], but immediately after them we should proceed to the Berlin issue. When the Americans learned about the transporting of strategic weapons to Cuba, they themselves began crying a lot about Berlin. Both sides were talking about the Berlin crisis, but simultaneously believed that at that given moment the essence of their policy was located in Cuba. By mid-September, the Americans apparently received data regarding the transport to Cuba of Soviet troops and strategic missiles. I have already spoken about this fact with Comrade Fidel Castro. The American intelligence was not the first in obtaining that information; it was West German intelligence that gave that information to the Americans. The American administration sent planes to the airspace of Cuba for aerial photography and the ascertainment of the deployment areas of the strategic missiles. N. S. Khrushchev gave the order to place the missiles into vertical position only at night, but to maintain them in a lying-down position in the daytime. Nevertheless, the Americans managed to take a photo of the missiles in the firing position. Kennedy did not want to speak about Soviet missiles in Cuba until the end of the congressional elections. He did not want to strain relations. But two Republican senators [a clear reference to senators Kenneth Keating of New York and Everett Dirksen of Illinois —ed.] learned about the fact of the strategic missiles placed in Cuba, and therefore Kennedy hastened to take the initiative into his hands, or else he would be hard-pressed. We had no information on how he intended to act. The United States organized maneuvers in the area of Vieques Island [in the Caribbean], naming them “Ortsac”—that is, Castro, if you read it backwards. But those maneuvers could appear to be not an exercise but a sea cover for a strong blow against Cuba. At that moment, when Kennedy made a statement and announced [on October 22 —ed.] the decision of declaring a blockade against Cuba, we did not know if the Americans were really carrying out maneuvers or were preparing for a direct attack upon Cuba. On October 28, in the morning [presumably, this refers to Moscow time, which would mean the evening of October 27 in Washington —ed.], we received reliable reports of preparations for an attack against Cuba. Indeed, we were aware of the fact that the Americans had interrupted their maneuvers because of a hurricane. The maneuvers did not resume when the hurricane went away, but the American combatant ships remained in the same area in direct proximity to Cuba. N. S. Khrushchev rebuked Kennedy for declaring a blockade around Cuba. We strongly opposed the American attempts to assume the right to determine what weapons Cuba can use and what armaments it may not possess. And then the Americans decided to carry out a direct aggression. Their plan consisted of two parts. Wishing to free themselves from the threat of a blow from the strategic missiles, they decided to liquidate the launchers in Cuba with the help of conventional warhead missiles and immediately after that land troops on Cuban territory in order to liquidate centers of resistance as soon as possible.

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It would have been impossible for us in these circumstances not to repulse the aggression of the United States. This assault would mean an assault upon you and us, as far as in Cuba there were situated Soviet troops and strategic missiles. Inevitably, nuclear war would be unleashed as a result of such a collision. Certainly, we would destroy America, and our country would be strongly damaged too, but we have a larger territory. Cuba would have been destroyed first. The imperialists would do their best to liquidate Cuba. The objective of all the measures undertaken by the Soviet Union was the defense of Cuba. It was necessary to determine our line of conduct. The loss of Cuba would mean a serious blow to the whole socialist camp. And exactly at the moment when we were pondering the question of what to do in the created situation, we received the communication from Comrade Castro, it was on Sunday, that an aggression against Cuba would be unleashed in the next twenty-four hours. From other sources, we were in possession of information that the U.S. aggression would begin in ten to twelve hours. Despite the fact that these were separate sources, the information corresponded. Until the moment of the start of U.S. aggression against Cuba remained ten to twelve hours. It was necessary to use the art of diplomacy. Had we not been successful in this regard, there would have been unleashed a war. We had to use diplomatic means. Kennedy was making statements that he had nothing against the stationing in Cuba of Soviet weapons, even troops, but that placing strategic weapons in Cuba was evidence of preparations for an assault against the United States. Therefore, the United States would defend itself. Considering that the missiles had been discovered and were no longer a means of deterrence, we decided that for the sake of saving Cuba it was necessary to give an order to dismantle and return the strategic missiles to the Soviet Union and to inform Kennedy of this. You agreed with the withdrawal of strategic missiles from Cuba while leaving there all the other kinds of armaments. We managed to preserve all the forces and means that are necessary for the defense of the Cuban Revolution, even without strategic missiles, which had been a means of deterrence, but they were discovered and therefore lost their significance. We have enough powerful missiles that can be used from our territory. Since Kennedy agreed with the retaining of Soviet troops in Cuba, the Cubans kept powerful armaments and antiaircraft missiles, so we consider that he [Kennedy] also made a concession. The statement of Kennedy about nonaggression against Cuba on the part of the United States and the Latin American countries also represents a concession. If we take into account these reciprocal concessions and all other factors, we will see that a big victory has been gained. Never before have the Americans made such a statement. That is why we decided that the main objective—the salvation of Cuba—had been achieved. There would not be an assault against Cuba. There would not be a war. We are gaining more favorable positions. Indeed, it was necessary to send the draft of our decision to Cuba in order to have consultations with you, to receive your consent and only then announce it. It would have been done in this way if there were normal conditions. In his letter, Fidel Castro informed us that an inevitable aggression was expected in twenty-four hours. By the moment when we received it and were discussing the situation, only ten to twelve hours were left before

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aggression. If we had tried to send you our draft, we would have had to encode the document, transmit it by radio, decipher it, and translate it into Spanish. All this could take more than ten hours, and such a consultation would not have made sense by that time. It would be too late. It could happen in such a way, that the answer would be received, but Cuba itself would have ceased to exist, and a war would have been unleashed. It was a critical moment. We thought our Cuban friends would understand us. Moreover, we knew from the cable from Fidel Castro that the Cuban leadership was aware of the direct threat of assault. At that moment, the main objective consisted of preventing an attack. We thought the Cuban comrades would understand us. Therefore, we made the decision to act immediately, but without paying due attention to the psychological factor, about which comrade Fidel Castro spoke here. Regarding the possibility of a truce at that moment, mentioned by the Cuban comrades, the Americans would not take such a step in those conditions. There are a lot of revisionists in the Pentagon, and Kennedy is a deterrent element with respect to them. The Americans would have burst into Cuba. We had no time. Certainly, it was a decision that created some difficulties for you, the Cuban people. Let us compare the situation at the present time and the situation before the crisis. Before the crisis, the Americans were preparing an intervention against Cuba. Now they have committed themselves not to attack Cuba. It is a great success. Certainly, the events also had negative consequences, especially as American propaganda was trying to suit their own ends by using some facts and distorting them. But that is inevitable. These are the costs of events that have crucial importance. Our task is to eliminate the negative consequences of the recent events. Comrade Dorticós is correct when he asks why we gave our consent to Kennedy’s message on nonaggression against Cuba without the concordance of the Cuban government. But it was exactly our consent (and nothing else) that ensured some truce for a certain time. One cannot perceive nihilistically all agreements and commitments, although sometimes these agreements and commitments are important only during a certain time, until conditions change. So they keep their importance until the situation changes. We were asked about our demand on the liquidation of American bases in Turkey. Speaking frankly, we were not thinking about bases in Turkey at all. But during discussion of the dangerous situation, we received information from the United States, including an article by [the columnist Walter] Lippmann [in the Washington Post on October 25], where it was said that the Russians could raise the question of liquidating the U.S. bases in Turkey. They were speaking about the possibility of such a demand inside American circles. This question was discussed in the United States. Turkish bases do not have great importance for us. They will be eliminated in case of war. True, they have certain political significance, but we do not pay them special importance, though we will seek their liquidation. From your statements, I see now that the Cubans were regarding this demand as if it was some sort of exchange. There are U.S. bases not only in Turkey but also in England and other European countries. But nowadays, these bases do not have decisive importance insofar as the long-range strategic missiles, aimed at Europe, can quickly destroy them.

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F. Castro: There is a question on which we are insufficiently informed. On October 26, the Soviet government sent Kennedy a letter without a word about Turkey. On October 27, we learned about Turkey from the broadcasts of Soviet radio. The American media expressed some surprise because this problem had not been raised in the message of the 26th. What is it, a false communication or were there two letters of October 26 and October 27? We have received one letter that coincided with the document transmitted by Moscow radio. A. I. Mikoyan: There were two letters. The letter of the 26th was not published. The letter of October 27 was published. But the content of the letter of October 27 covers the questions raised in the letter of the 26th. The question of Turkey was not raised at the beginning. Later, this issue was included. You have all the correspondence on this issue. If there is such a necessity, we can check it. F. Castro: Here is the letter of October 26, whose text, as it seemed to me, is identical to the other letter at my disposal, which was received from the transmission of Radio Moscow and TASS. It seemed to me that one letter has not been published. A. I. Mikoyan: If you want, we can check. F. Castro: For all that, when did Kennedy accept the proposal of N. S. Khrushchev and promise guarantees not to attack Cuba? Wasn’t it in response to the letter of October 26? What did he say then? C. R. Rodriguez: There were secret letters. A. I. Mikoyan: Comrades, all the documents have been given to you. F. Castro: On October 27, Kennedy gave guarantees not to attack Cuba, if the Soviet government removed its offensive weapons. The impression is growing that it was in response to [Khrushchev’s] letter of October 26. That is an important question. It was decided urgently, without consultations. Apparently, before my letter to Khrushchev, N. S. Khrushchev wrote to Kennedy and simultaneously with my letter an answer from Kennedy to Khrushchev arrived. After all, why is Kennedy already speaking about the Soviet proposal about dismantling, etc., in his response of October 27 to Khrushchev’s message of October 26, if it was not directly said in the confidential message from Khrushchev of October 26? Negotiations began at night, after the message from Kennedy. Consequently, it was not possible to consider inevitable an attack against us. When I was writing to N. S. Khrushchev, I didn’t know that Khrushchev was writing to Kennedy and Kennedy —to Khrushchev. It seems to me that on October 27, at that time, there was no unavoidable threat of attack. The principle of agreement had already been found. It seems to me that there was available time for consultations. A. I. Mikoyan: In his answer of October 27, Kennedy was formally responding as if only to the confidential message of the 26th, but practically he was answering both this one and chiefly the message from Khrushchev of the 27th, openly transmitted by radio, though there was no direct reference in Kennedy’s message. All the messages between Khrushchev and Kennedy and everything received from him confidentially were given to comrade Fidel. I’m a participant of all the meetings, I’m aware of everything, but if you want me to do it, I’ll check all the documents that I have with me, and tomorrow I’ll complement my information.

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F. Castro: I agree with Comrade Mikoyan’s suggestion. A. I. Mikoyan: So, let’s pass to the next question. To many Cubans it seems that instead of our demand for the liquidation of American bases in Turkey, it would be better to put the question of the liquidation of the base in Guantánamo. Such a demand seems tempting from the Cuban political and practical points of view. But from the point of view of the military and practical interests of Cuba, we could not put the question in this way. If the question were raised about withdrawal from Cuba of all kinds of armaments, then the [Guantánamo] question would be raised. There are no nuclear weapons at Guantánamo. But we did not have intentions of taking away all the armaments from Cuba. The Guantánamo Base does not have a huge real significance insofar as the Americans can transfer their forces to Cuba without difficulties due to the geographical situation of the United States and Cuba. Indeed, it was not possible to lose all our armaments in Cuba. If we were to raise the question of Guantánamo Base liquidation in exchange for withdrawal of Soviet weapons from Cuban territory in general, that would undermine Cuba’s defense capability. We cannot do that. You know that in the message from N. S. Khrushchev to Kennedy it was said that “we want to create confidence among Cubans, confirming that we are with them and we do not relieve responsibility for rendering help to the Cuban people.” F. Castro: But we are speaking only about strategic missiles. Such an act would have political rather than military significance. We were looking for an exit from that situation. It seems to us that it was possible to create a more difficult atmosphere for the Americans by raising such a question as the liquidation of the Guantánamo Base. A. I. Mikoyan: If the Americans had accepted such an offer, and they could do so, we would have had to leave Cuba. We could not afford it. Now I’ll pass to the issue of inspections. If we had made a statement declining inspections, the Americans would have taken it for our desire to swindle them and their intervention would have become a reality. We declared that we agree to inspections. What we are speaking about is not a broad inspection, but a verification of the sites, known to the Americans due to aerial photography and which have been locations of the strategic missile launchers. The objective would have been to verify if the missiles had really been dismantled and their embarkation really accomplished; verification of the areas where the missiles had been assembled could be carried out in one day and verification of loading—in several days. It was not a question of any permanent or general inspection. It was said that representatives of neutral countries would carry out verification only once. We were not deciding this question instead of you. Cuban issues are solved by the Cuban leadership only. But, being owners of that kind of weapon, we stated our consent for verification of dismantling and loading. We believed that after coordinating with you, you would accept this suggestion. But we could not decide it instead of you. We were assuming that it was possible to give consent to verification by representatives of neutral countries of the dismantling and withdrawal of the missiles—doing all of this without hurting Cuba’s sovereignty. Certainly, no state would bear violation of its sovereignty. But in particular cases, sovereign governments also permit some limitation of their actions, owing to voluntary agreements. Now we are not speaking about those cases when foreign powers impose their will over other countries.

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I can give examples how our state and other countries voluntarily limit their actions while preserving their sovereign rights. For example, the sovereignty of a host country does not apply to the territory of foreign embassies. In this case, we see a limitation of actions without limitation of sovereignty. Another example: An agreement to create an international verification commission was achieved in Geneva [in 1954] during the discussion of the Indochina issue. The proposal was made by representatives of the Soviet Union, China, and other countries. The proposal was also supported by the leader of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Comrade Ho Chi Minh, who was directly concerned. Currently both Ho Chi Minh and the king of Cambodia ask to preserve that international verification commission. In this case, there is no question of limiting the sovereign rights of either Vietnam or Cambodia. Further, between India and Pakistan in the area of Kashmir an international verification commission is working without infringing on their sovereign rights. Several years ago, we proposed [in May 1955 —ed.] to the Americans and English to create jointly international verification posts on railway junctions, in large ports, and along highways. In due time [in the 1957 Rapacki Plan —ed.], we also suggested to organize international verification in the zone covering 800 kilometers on both sides along the demarcation line in Germany. In the event of the acceptance of this suggestion, a part of our territory, Poland, and Hungary would have been controlled. And such an act, under the condition of voluntary acceptance of the commitments, would not have undermined the sovereign rights of the states. A similar example is the creation of an international commission in Laos in order to verify compliance of the 1962 agreement, in particular, to verify the withdrawal of foreign troops from Laos and a ban on the introduction of weapons. [Laotian prince] Souvanna Phouma did not object to such a verification. The Communists of Laos and Vietnam allowed international control, and the Communists of India did not object to international verification. Poland agreed to verify the withdrawal of American troops and the troops of Ho Chi Minh. And it was done with the consent of comrade Ho Chi Minh and the Laotian communists. I am giving you all these examples because when we, on the basis of the above-mentioned experience, were thinking about you, we did not pay due attention to that psychological factor, about which we learned here from Comrade Fidel Castro. In principle, everything is correct; but not all that looks good in principle can be applied to a concrete situation. Everything I am talking about I am saying not to gain a change of the international stand of Cuba but in order to explain to you the motives which guided us. It is unthinkable that I might try to exercise any pressure. During the conversation with McCloy in New York, I touched on the question of verification of the dismantling of our missiles. McCloy said that insofar as Cuba was objecting to verification organized with the help of neutral countries, the United States did not insist on this form of control and it was necessary to seek other measures so that the Americans could be convinced that it had been done. He said that they were aware of dismantling work, but they were afraid that the missiles could be hidden in Cuban forests. They need

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to be sure that those weapons are removed from Cuban territory. I asked him about other forms of verification that he had in mind. McCloy answered that, in their opinion, an aerial inspection could be used for this aim, but that it was necessary for Cuba to agree to verification from airspace. I resolutely said in response that such a method is out of the question because it was damaging Cuban sovereign rights. I added that it was not worth going on with the discussion of that issue—we categorically rejected such a method and stressed our reluctance even to convey that proposal to the Cubans. We knew that the American planes had been flying over the territory of Cuba and had carried out air photography. I told McCloy that on the basis of that aerial photography, the Americans could be convinced of the fact that work on the dismantling of the missiles had already begun. He answered me that air photography reflected the process of dismantling work, but that was not all, because in their view there were delays in dismantling. McCloy underlined that for the Americans it was very important to be sure of the removal of the missiles from Cuban territory. Then they would not have doubts about missiles being hidden in the forests. He added that the information is needed to be convinced of the missiles’ withdrawal. Meanwhile, the Americans do not seek any secret information; they are worried by the question of whether the missiles have been withdrawn. I could not, continued A. I. Mikoyan, go on discussing that issue with McCloy, but I was aware that military consultants, a general and a colonel, had been sent from the Soviet Union to [deputy foreign minister Vasily] Kuznetsov. I hope the issue will be further examined. There is another method that I did not mention to the Americans, but I can explain it to you. The process of dismantling and loading of the strategic weapons can be photographed, and these documents can be used in order to achieve the declared objective. How is verification at sea carried out? It is done at a considerable distance from territorial waters. Observers examine vessels and give their consent for further travel. On November 1, during my conversation with McCloy, I said nothing to the Americans regarding the fact that we were looking for ways to keep our promise and give the Americans the opportunity to be certain that the dismantling and carrying away of the missiles had really been done. We are doing that in order not to contradict your statement objecting to control on Cuban territory. During the conversation, McCloy told me that the Cubans could try to prevent the withdrawal from Cuba of the strategic missiles. He added that the Cubans had 140,000 soldiers and Soviet troops are only 10,000. Regarding the first remark I told him that it was nonsense, because Fidel Castro himself had announced that he was not objecting to the withdrawal of the Soviet strategic missiles. Certainly, I did not dispute his data on the numbers of the troops. By the way, he said that the U-2 plane had been shot down over Cuban territory [on October 27—ed.] by Russian missiles, though antiaircraft launchers, in his opinion, could be operated by the Cubans. I neither confirmed, nor disputed, this observation of McCloy. F. Castro: These planes are flying at the altitude of 22,000 meters and the limit of our artillery is lower. Therefore, it is understandable that in this case the antiaircraft missiles were used.

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A. I. Mikoyan: I did not engage in further discussion with him of this issue. We insisted on immediate lifting of the quarantine. If you want us to finish the withdrawal of strategic missiles from Cuba as soon as possible, I said to McCloy, then give the vessels access to Cuba because there are not enough steamships in Cuba right now to withdraw the equipment and personnel. It could be done before the official agreement, in order to accelerate the evacuation. McCloy responded that he was ready to give orders in practice not to carry out examination of the vessels. The verification will be completely formal, as happened during the encounter of the tanker Bucharest with American ships. A question was asked by radio about the character of the cargo, and the Bucharest without examination continued its journey to Cuba. Nobody stopped the ship; nobody came on its deck. I objected to this kind of verification also. Then we passed to other issues. [U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Adlai] Stevenson told me that the Americans had accepted [UN secretary-general] U Thant’s proposal. I reproached them and made the observation that U Thant was suggesting not to withdraw weapons and to lift the blockade. We accepted U Thant’s suggestion about verification on the part of the Red Cross. In general, it is necessary to note that the cargo transportation to Cuba represent an interest for you, not us. You are receiving the goods. We incur considerable losses. Steamships are obliged to wait at sea. We were forced to agree to the Red Cross verification in order to reduce our losses. Such verification is better than the American one. This organization does not have any political or state character. Vessels that can be used for such verification are not American but neutral and Soviet. U Thant suggested two options for verification: in port and at sea. We did not want to hurt your sentiments and therefore responded that we agree to verification at sea, but not in port. This issue, chiefly, has importance for you. But seeking to make your situation easier, we agreed to Red Cross verification at sea. Having returned from Havana, U Thant told me in New York that you do not agree to verification in port, although, in his opinion, it was more comfortable to do it in port. U Thant is ready to choose the corresponding staff. He has two ships available. On other details of this issue, I lack information. Comrade Kuznetsov is in charge of them. It is still necessary to consider the issue concerning U Thant’s plan and verification. During the crisis, U Thant behaved himself decently, even well. It is hard to demand anything more from him. He treated both us and Cuba with sympathy, but his situation is not easy at all. We have received the “U Thant plan” of guarantees, which had been sent to everybody. This plan seemed interesting to us and useful for Cuba. What do we see positive in it? If the UN observation posts are created in Cuba, on the southern coast of the United States, and in the Central American countries, then attempts to prepare for aggression against Cuba would be quickly unmasked. In this way it will be possible to rapidly suppress any aggression attempts against Cuba. I am assessing this issue from the point of view of international law. It is not excluded that a similar agreement can be violated, but it must not happen under normal conditions. This issue is also interesting from another point of view. There is the Organization of American States (OAS). The Americans try to use the OAS as a cover in order not to allow

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a UN inspection. If the Americans had accepted UN inspection, it would mean that Latin American issues are resolved at the UN bypassing the OAS. Briefly, we positively assess U Thant’s plan. He said that Fidel Castro also had a positive attitude toward his plan, but I do not know if Comrade Fidel Castro really has such an opinion. U Thant told me that representatives of Latin American countries, to whom he had spoken, took a favorable view of his plan. I asked what was the U.S. position, and U Thant informed [me] that the Americans had called it an OAS issue without outlining their own attitude. But I managed to clear up this question during the conversation with McCloy. At first, McCloy and Stevenson said that there was not a “U Thant plan.” Then they admitted their knowledge of the plan, but declared that the United States opposes any verification procedures on its territory. McCloy said they could pledge their word that all the camps for mercenary training in Central America had been liquidated or were in the process of liquidation. I asked McCloy if it had been done in all countries. McCloy answered that it was necessary to check it. I asked why the United States recruits Cuban counterrevolutionaries to its armed forces. He prevaricated for a long time, trying to explain it by the necessity of teaching those people English. He was cunning and evasive. Then he declared that Cuba represents “a source of revolutionary infection.” Stevenson said that the United States would like to find a possibility for settling the Cuban issue, but Cuba is afraid of the United States and the United States is afraid of Cuba. We did not discuss this question any more. But there is an impression that a possibility exists to reach an agreement—in the form of a declaration or some other form—between Cuba and the Central American countries pledging not to carry out subversive work and not to attack each other. Comrade Fidel Castro was right in saying that it was necessary to maneuver on the issues of international policy. It is easier for the Soviet Union than for Cuba to do so, especially when American propaganda complicates your possibilities for maneuvers. Firmness should be combined with flexibility while you carry out a policy. Nowadays, it is a necessary thing for Marxist diplomats. It is wrong to say that we are more liberal than others. We are firm, but we display flexibility when it is necessary. The Revolution in Cuba has enormous importance not only for the Cuban people but also for the countries of Latin America and the whole world. The Cuban Revolution must develop and be strengthened. Therefore, it is necessary to use maneuvers, to display flexibility in order to ensure victory. Really, a victory has been gained over the Americans, and here is why. If we have a look at the whole thing retrospectively, the question is being raised as to whether it has been a mistake to send strategic missiles to Cuba and to return them to the Soviet Union. The CC CPSU considers that there was no mistake. The strategic missiles have done their part. Cuba found itself at the center of international politics, and now when their job is done, when they have been discovered, they cannot serve any more as a means of deterrence. They are withdrawn. But the Cuban people keep powerful arms in their hands. There is no other country in Latin America that is so strong militarily, that has such a high defense potential, as Cuba. If there is no direct aggression on the part of the United States, no group of Latin American countries has the possibility to overpower Cuba.

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Let us try to understand, of what does our victory consist? Let us compare situations in June and now, in November. The Americans have virtually forgotten the Monroe Doctrine. Kennedy does not mention it anymore and, you know, the Monroe Doctrine has been the basis for American imperialism in Latin America. Previously, the Americans were declaring that they would not tolerate a Marxist regime on the American continent[s]. Now they are committing themselves not to attack Cuba. They were saying that foreign powers could not be present on the American continent[s] in whatever form. They know about the Soviet military in Cuba, but do not speak of the Monroe Doctrine. Cuba found itself at the center of international political events. The United Nations is engaged on the Cuban issue. U Thant practically backs Cuba and comes out against the U.S. policy. And you remember that previously it was not possible to obtain support for Cuba at the UN. World public opinion has been mobilized, and even among some nations that were previously against Cuba. In the United States, there are hysterics, but in their souls many people understand the fairness of the Cuban demands. In the end, the prestige of the socialist camp has been strengthened. It defended peace, though the United States was rapidly sliding down toward war. People have united in order to resist American plans aimed at unleashing a war, and simultaneously the Soviet policy was carried out in the framework of settling the issues by peaceful means. The immediate threat of military attack against Cuba is gone. I believe it has been moved aside for several years. It is necessary now to fix that success on the diplomatic field, so that Cuba—a beacon of Latin American revolution—can develop more rapidly in every respect and give a decisive example for mobilizing other peoples for struggle. Our support becomes more and more active. We are helping you as our brothers. More possibilities have been created. Americans are obliged to take Cuba into account, to solve issues, regarding Cuba, with our participation. We are not speaking about Russia [sic —ed.] as such, but as a country of socialism. Socialism, which you are also meritoriously representing, became a decisive factor of international policy. American propaganda is repeating over and over again about a diminishing of Cuba’s prestige. Just to the contrary: Cuba’s prestige has been undoubtedly strengthened as a result of recent events. In conclusion, A. I. Mikoyan apologized to the Cuban comrades for having tired them out. Joking, he added that the only compensation is that he is worn out, too. So there is complete equality. He suggests to set the time of the next meeting. F. Castro asked, if it was possible, to discuss Soviet policy regarding the Berlin issue. A. I. Mikoyan answered that he would do so, and also would discuss the exchange of letters between the CPSU and the Communist parties of India and China on the issue of the conflict between India and China. He can explain our plans in the sphere of disarmament and on the ceasing of tests of hydrogen weapons, and answer all other questions including economic issues.

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It was decided to have another meeting in the Presidential Palace at 14:00 [2 p.m. —ed.] on November 5. Ambassador Alekseyev was also present on the Soviet side. Recorded by V. Tikhmenev [signature]

Source: Russian Foreign Ministry Archives. Copy provided by Philip Brenner. Copy on file at the National Security Archive. Translation by Aleksandr Zaemsky for the National Security Archive.

Document 9 Memorandum of Conversation between Castro, Mikoyan, Guevara, and Rodriguez

November 5, 1962 A conversation between A. I. Mikoyan and the same composition of the Cuban leadership as on the previous occasion took place on November 5, at the Presidential Palace. The conversation lasted two hours and thirty minutes. During the previous meeting, F. Castro asked Comrade Mikoyan a question that showed his doubts, as if we had not given him all the messages from N. S. Khrushchev to President Kennedy. He asked how the statement of Kennedy of October 27 could be explained, insofar as there was already a reference to our consent to dismantle ground launchers for special equipment. Comrade Mikoyan answered Castro that all confidential letters from N. S. Khrushchev had been given to the Cuban comrades and the open messages are known to them from the media. No other letters have been sent from Khrushchev to Kennedy, said Mikoyan. To render the trend of developments more precisely, Mikoyan suggested, to answer that question during consecutive conversation—that is, on November 5—after looking through the whole correspondence on this issue once more. In the conversation [on November 5], Mikoyan said that the correspondence between Khrushchev and Kennedy had been looked through again, and the motives, which had prompted Kennedy to refer to our consent about the dismantling of the missiles, had been determined. You are aware of the content of all the messages from Khrushchev to Kennedy, and I would like to say that Kennedy in his letter of October 27, which attracted your attention, formally is answering the confidential message of Khrushchev of 26/X [October 26], but in essence he is simultaneously responding to Khrushchev’s letter of 27/X [October 27], which had been published even before the aforementioned response from Ken318

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nedy, and in which we had raised the question of dismantling the ground launchers in Cuba under the condition of liquidating the American base in Turkey. You have been given all the correspondence between Khrushchev and Kennedy except for one confidential message from Kennedy of October 25, which is not connected to the issue of dismantling and only accuses us of denying the fact of the construction of ground launchers for special equipment in Cuba. We can read it out and then give you the translation. (The letter is read out.) F. Castro: Thank you. Now this issue is clear to me. A. I. Mikoyan: I will continue. Having received that message we answered it on October 26 through confidential channels. In that letter, there were no concrete proposals yet. We were speaking only about the necessity to eliminate the threat of an assault against Cuba. The letter included only the idea of seeking an agreement. We did not receive an answer from Kennedy on the 26th. There was no answer on the morning of the 27th, either. We came to the conclusion that the Americans were actively preparing for an attack, but preferred not to disclose their plans before world public opinion. Therefore, in order to tie the Americans’ hands, we decided to send Kennedy a new letter and publish it in the press. That was the letter of October 27, known to you, where the demand for the liquidation of the American bases in Turkey was advanced. We published this letter very quickly, even before the American ambassador received its text. Our objective was to forestall the Americans and frustrate their plans. Only then we received a message from Kennedy. It was sent on the evening of October 27. We received it on October 28 toward the morning (the time difference [between Washington and Moscow —ed.] must be taken into consideration). This letter by its form seemed to be an answer to the confidential message from Khrushchev of October 26, but in effect it was the response to the letter of October 27. On October 28, in the morning, having received the letter from Comrade Fidel Castro, and having at our disposal other data about preparations for an attack literally in the nearest hours, Khrushchev made an open radio statement that the Soviet officers had received orders to dismantle and evacuate the strategic missiles. As you understand, there was no time for consultations with the Cuban government. By publishing the messages we had the possibility to send them quickly to Cuba, but we could not wait for an answer because it would take a lot of time to encode, decipher, translate, and transmit them. Acting in this way, we were proceeding from our conviction that the most important objective in that situation was to prevent an attack against Cuba. I would like to underline that our proposals to dismantle the strategic missiles and to liquidate the American bases in Turkey had been advanced before receiving the letter from comrade Fidel Castro of October 27. The order for the dismantling of the strategic missiles and their evacuation was given after we had received the letter from Kennedy of October 27 and the letter from Fidel Castro. In our message of October 28, as you have noted, the demand for the liquidation of bases in Turkey was no longer suggested. We did this because we were afraid that in spite of our proposal of October 27 the American imperialists could assault Cuba. We had nothing else to do but to work on the main task—to prevent an attack against Cuba,

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believing that our Cuban friends would understand the correctness of our actions, although the normal procedure of coordination had not been observed. The question was that there were twenty-four hours left before an assault against Cuba. It must be taken into consideration that we had only a few [literally, “counted” —ed.] hours at our disposal and we could not act other than we did. And there are results: An attack against Cuba is prevented, the peace is preserved. However you are right that the procedure of consultations, which is possible under normal circumstances, was not followed. F. Castro: I would like to respond to comrade Mikoyan. We have listened with great attention to the information and explanations offered by Comrade Mikoyan. Undoubtedly, all those explanations are very valuable because they help us to understand better the course of events. We are thankful for the desire to explain everything to us, for the efforts undertaken in this regard. The arguments also raise no doubts among us that the strategic missiles, once discovered by the enemy, lost practically all military significance, or their significance became very small. We are grateful for all these explanations and do understand that the intentions of the Soviet government cannot be assessed only on the grounds of an analysis of the most recent developments, especially as the atmosphere is rapidly changing and new situations are created. The totality of adopted decisions, which became the basis for supplying strategic weapons and the signing of [the Soviet-Cuban —ed.] agreement, must be taken into consideration. It was supposed to publish that agreement after the installation of the strategic missiles and after the elections in the United States. These decisions are testimony to the firm resolution of the Soviet Union to defend Cuba. They help to understand correctly the policy of the Soviet Union. Therefore, I repeat, an analysis of the USSR’s position can be correct only with due regard for all the events and decisions both before and during the crisis. We do not doubt that if all the works on the assembly of the strategic weapons had been completed in conditions of secrecy then we would have received a strong means of deterrence against American plans for attacking our country. In this way, objectives would have been achieved that are pursued both by the Soviet government and the government of the Republic of Cuba. However, we consider that the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba was significant for the interests of the whole socialist camp. Even if we consider it to be a military advantage, it was politically and psychologically important in the struggle for the deterrence of imperialism and the prevention of its aggressive plans. Thus, the installation of the strategic missiles in Cuba was carried out not only in the interests of the defense of Cuba but also of the whole socialist camp. It was done with our complete consent. We understood perfectly well the significance of this action and we considered it to be a correct step. We also completely agree that war must be prevented. We do not object that the measures undertaken were in pursuit of two objectives—that is, to prevent an attack against Cuba and to avoid starting a world war. We completely agree with these aims pursued by the Soviet Union. Misunderstanding arose in connection with the form of discussion of this issue. However, we understand that the circumstances were demanding urgent actions and the situa-

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tion was abnormal. Assessing past events, we come to the conclusion that the discussion of these sharp questions could be carried out in another form. For example, the issue, which we have already discussed here, in regard to my letter in connection with the decision of the Soviet government and the publication of the Soviet government statement of October 28. True, my letter bore no relation to issues mentioned in the messages of October 26 and 27 between the Soviet government and the U.S. administration. Such a letter [from Castro to Khrushchev —ed.] pursued one objective—to inform the Soviet government about the inevitability of an assault against Cuba. There was not a word about any minor hesitation on our side. We clearly declared our resolve to fight. Besides, we did not say that we were expecting an invasion. We wrote that it was possible, but not so likely. In our opinion, more probable was an air attack with the sole aim of destroying the strategic weapons in Cuba. The basis of the Soviet government decision of October 28 had already been reflected in the message to Kennedy of October 26 and clearly manifested itself in the letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy of October 27. In those two documents, there is the real basis for the decision announced in the letter of October 28. So Kennedy’s letter of October 27 meant acceptance of Khrushchev’s proposals of October 26, consisting of his consent to evacuate from Cuba not only strategic armaments but also all the weapons if the United States stopped threatening Cuba with an attack, because the threat on the part of the United States had been the only reason that forced Cuba to arm itself. When Kennedy accepted this proposal (we did not know that he was accepting it), the conditions were created to develop the Soviet proposals and prepare a declaration regarding the agreement of the parties. The United States could have been told that the USSR was ready to dismantle the equipment but would like to discuss it with the Cuban government. In our opinion, the issue should have been solved in this way instead of giving immediately an order to evacuate the strategic weapons. Such a procedure would have lessened international tension and secured the possibility to discuss the issue with the Americans in more favorable conditions. In this way it could have been possible not only to achieve a lessening of international tension and to discuss the issue in better conditions but also to achieve the signing of a declaration. It is only a simple analysis of previous events that does not have special importance right now. Nowadays, it is important for us to know what to do under the new conditions. In what way shall we seek to achieve our main goals and at the same time fight to prevent an aggression and preserve peace? Certainly, if in due course we manage to secure a lasting peace, then we will have an opportunity to better assess the undertaken steps in light of new facts. The future results of our struggle will demonstrate the importance of today’s events. Certainly, only a little bit in this struggle depends on us personally. We are very grateful for all the explanations given to us by Comrade Mikoyan, for all the efforts undertaken by him in order to make us understand the recent events. We take into consideration the special conditions under which it was necessary to act. We have no doubts regarding the friendly character of our relations, based on common principles. Our respect for the Soviet Union is unshakeable. We know that it respects our sovereignty and is ready to defend us from an aggression on the part of imperialism. Therefore, the most important thing now is to determine our joint steps.

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I would like to assure you, Comrade Mikoyan, of our complete trust. A. I. Mikoyan: I am deeply satisfied by the statement of Comrade Fidel Castro. We have always been confident of our sincere friendship, which nothing can disrupt. I will transmit word by word your statement to the CC CPSU, and I am sure that it will produce gladness on the part of the Central Committee. I would like to make a small explanation, very briefly. I agree completely with the assessment made by Comrade Fidel Castro of his own letter. He is interpreting it correctly. It is a legitimate question raised by him—could we have made another decision instead of sending instructions for dismantling the strategic weapons? But we had been informed that an attack against Cuba would begin within the next few hours. Perhaps it was really intended to deliver a blow first of all against the strategic missile sites, but it would be followed by a strike against Cuba. We had to act resolutely in order to frustrate the plan of attack on Cuba. We realize that by doing this we had to sacrifice the necessity of consultations with the Cuban government. Regarding comrade Fidel Castro’s opinion that in the letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy of October 26, there was a promise to withdraw from Cuba all the weapons and all military specialists. The Americans did not demand from us such a step. The issue was the offensive weapons. Perhaps Comrade Fidel Castro made such a conclusion on the basis of the phrase where a withdrawal of technical specialists was mentioned. But this implied specialists who operate strategic missiles. The fact that it regarded only them is confirmed by all the letters, by the totality of their context. They were about offensive weapons only. Fidel Castro confirms that his understanding was just the same. A. I. Mikoyan: It is no coincidence that in his answer to this letter, Kennedy does not raise the question of removing from Cuba all the weapons. If such a proposal had been present in our letter, Kennedy would undoubtedly have taken advantage of it. Therefore the opinion, outlined by Comrade Fidel Castro regarding this part, is incorrect. There is nothing of the kind in the letters of October 27 and 28. I would like to mention, that the Americans are trying to broaden the list of weapons for evacuation. Such attempts have already been made, but we will not allow them to do so. For our part, we gave our consent only to withdraw strategic weapons. When I was speaking with McCloy, he told me with a smile that it would be good if we removed from Cuba the antiaircraft missiles, too. But those are defensive weapons, not offensive ones. Half an hour before my departure from New York, those pilferers (now we are speaking about Stevenson) sent a letter to Comrade Kuznetsov, saying that they supposedly had forgotten to raise questions about some kinds of weapons. They were referring to the Il-28 bombers and Komar [Mosquito] patrol boats. Stevenson wrote that it would be necessary to discuss that issue. Immediately, I told comrade Kuznetsov that this issue was not a subject for discussion. These bombers have low-speed and low-altitude limits. Nor can the Komar patrol boats operate at a great distance. Therefore, those weapons are clearly defensive. In the first Kennedy message [possibly an allusion to Kennedy’s October 22 speech, which included a reference to the bombers —ed.] the American administration spoke about the bombers; later, this question fell away. Now they want to raise again this ques-

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tion. We have resolutely rejected such a discussion. Comrade Kuznetsov received corresponding instructions from Moscow. This is nothing more than attempts to complicate the whole matter in order to create once again a tense atmosphere and dangerous situation. Let me specify the list sent by Stevenson. Here it is. There are mentioned: bombers, Komar patrol boats, air-to-surface bombs and missiles, sea-to-surface and surface-tosurface projectiles [i.e., cruise missiles]. The Americans are impertinently continuing their attempts to complicate the situation. It is very important to have a document of agreement, which one can use at the UN. It can be carried through the UN with the help of U Thant. But for that, it is necessary to have evidence proving the dismantling and evacuation of weapons. Then the situation would improve. The earlier it is done, the more advantageous it will be for us. For the Americans, it is better to postpone the solution of this question. In this case, they have the possibility to continue the quarantine and other aggressive actions. We would rather help U Thant in order to give him a chance to report to the UN that the Soviet side has carried out the dismantling and evacuation of offensive weapons from Cuba. We should talk about it. We have resolutely rejected the American demand for aerial inspection. Nevertheless, with the help of air photography, the Americans collected data that the dismantling of the strategic weapons had concluded and published that information by themselves. U Thant could have informed the UN, but he needs evidence, proving the evacuation of the weapons. UN representatives must see how the evacuation is carried out and inform U Thant on the results of their observation mission. Then the situation will become significantly simpler. The issue will be sent to the Security Council, where the decisions are taken not only by the United States’ representatives. I am not insisting that you answer this question right now. Maybe you can do it tomorrow. If it would be acceptable for you, why, for example, not give consent for U Thant’s representatives to verify how the weapons’ loading onto Soviet ships is carried out? You know that different international commissions or representatives of foreign powers often operate at sea ports, and that fact does not limit the sovereignty of the host country in the slightest measure. Such a possibility would allow U Thant to consider accomplished the decision to withdraw the strategic missiles from Cuba. These observers would be given the opportunity to visit Soviet ships, anchored at the ports, to verify the fact of the armaments’ removal. From my point of view, that would not represent any infringement of national sovereignty. The people of the socialist countries, insofar as we are Marxist-Leninists, need to find a way of securing a unity of actions, even in those cases when our opinions are somewhat different. Moreover, I believe, it would be taken into consideration that there are Soviet troops on Cuban territory. Therefore, our cooperation in the fight against imperialism must be especially effective. You may respond to this proposal of mine maybe not today, but tomorrow; in general, it seems to me that it is a minimum concession which would allow U Thant to present a report to the UN Security Council about the evacuation of the missiles. In the contrary case, we will inevitably hear at the Security Council that the Cubans do not permit verification to be conducted, and that the Russians are only talking

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about control. But if the Security Council is given the opportunity to establish compliance with the promise of Khrushchev, then the quarantine may be lifted. The stage of diplomatic negotiations will begin. Roughly such an appeal was put forth by U Thant during his conversation with me. I ask you to discuss this proposal. I believe that the solution of this problem will help create definite conditions to settle the crisis situation that has developed in the Caribbean Sea. The Americans would like to delay the solution of this issue. Dragging it out gives them the opportunity to prolong the term of the quarantine. We told the Americans that we would be able to evacuate the weapons in ten days. They are not in a hurry and say that it could take even a month. It is advantageous for the United States to preserve tension in this area. And we are standing for a lessening of tension, in order to solve this question at the Security Council. In our view, it is difficult for the Security Council to discuss this issue until the end of the U.S. elections. The elections will be held tomorrow, and so it would be appropriate to think about its solution. It is very important to keep U Thant on our side. It seemed to me that he was very satisfied by his meeting with comrade Fidel Castro. But if we delay the solution, the Americans will seize the opportunity for their benefit. C. R. Rodriguez: So, if I understand you correctly, the question is about verification of loading at the Cuban ports as a minimum demand and the Americans would consider such a control a sufficient guarantee? Won’t they later demand an onsite verification, in the forests? I am afraid if we go along such route, we can even reach an inspection onsite, where the strategic missiles previously have been located. A. I. Mikoyan: The imperialists are not the point. Such verification is necessary for us. If the imperialists protest, we can send them to hell. But it is necessary to take into consideration that the support of U Thant is very important for us, and the imperialists can say what they want. We will send them to hell, the more so as they have already been convinced of the dismantling of the missiles with the help of air photography. If we manage to come to an agreement over verifications on ships, then the UN representatives will be able to control the process of loading also. We will not accept any more. Indeed, appetite comes with eating, but we will resolutely oppose such a rise of appetite, we will do a step forward and that is enough for them. We rejected inspection, we did not allow surface verification, and we will not permit control over dismantling. But in order to strengthen our position at the UN, the representatives of this organization should be given the facts. Otherwise, it will be difficult to restrain revisionists at the Security Council. But if the evacuation of weapons would be carried out and verified, then we’ll obtain the lifting of the quarantine. I think we should not put the sign of equality between the UN and the American imperialists. The matter is that the UN cannot exceed the limits settled by the two messages. If we manage to receive support from the UN, then the Americans would go to hell. We promised to allow verification of the evacuation. That verification can be organized by means of the UN. We did not pledge anything else. But if we do not fulfill our promise, the situation may become considerably more complicated. Perhaps you will discuss this issue without our presence and at the same time consider the possibilities for our further joint action. If you find the opportunity, we can meet today. However, the meeting can be held tomorrow. F. Castro: And what will the inspection look like?

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A. I. Mikoyan: Representatives of U Thant will arrive at the port of loading. Currently, there are four or five ships assigned for that purpose. Then they will climb on board. They will be shown the cargo and given corresponding information. In this way, they will be convinced that we are fulfilling our promise and will go away. That is my understanding of this form of verification. If we come to an agreement regarding this proposal, I will inform our representative at the UN, and then we will have the opportunity to settle the technique and procedure of this work. I would be able to inform Moscow that we had agreed to give both U Thant and the UN the information necessary to declare the verification to have been carried out. F. Castro: Is it not possible to do the same on open sea? A. I. Mikoyan: The form of loading verification is more suitable for U Thant. It is not hurting your sovereignty either, because the verification will be carried out not on your territory, but aboard our ship. F. Castro: I understand very well the interest in keeping U Thant on our side. But such an inspection will undoubtedly have a painful effect on the moral condition of our people. The Americans are insisting that the agreement on verification has been achieved by the exchange of messages. And, indeed, in the letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy of October 28, it is said: “As I informed you in the letter of October 27, we are prepared to reach agreement to enable United Nations representatives to verify the dismantling of these means.” Therefore, it implies representatives of the Security Council for the mission of verification of dismantling at the site. In the message of Khrushchev, it is said that consent would obviously be needed on the part of the governments of Cuba and Turkey in order to organize control of compliance of undertaken commitments. That means that Khrushchev, in his letter of October 28, is making reference to the message of October 27. The necessity of obtaining consent on the part of Cuba is mentioned there, but that is not a responsibility of the Soviet Union, insofar as the USSR has already warned in the letter of October 27, that the permission of the Cuban government is needed. Comrade Mikoyan is saying that the imperialists could be sent to hell. On October 23, I received a very clear letter in which the precise position of the Soviet government is explained. Kennedy’s statement is characterized therein as an unprecedented interference into internal affairs, as a violation of international law, and as a provocative act. The Republic of Cuba, like all sovereign states, has the right to reject control and decide by itself what kinds of weapons it requires. No sovereign state must give an account of such actions. These concepts of the letter of October 23 are very precise and correctly reflected our position. One more question: The formula that foresees UN observers in Cuba, in the United States, Guatemala, and other countries seems to me a more reasonable verification. A unilateral inspection would affect monstrously the moral spirit of our people. We made big concessions. The American imperialists are carrying out aerial photography freely and we do not impede them due to the appeal of the Soviet government. It is necessary to look for some other formula. I would like to explain to Comrade Mikoyan that what I am saying reflects the decision of the whole Cuban people. We will not give our consent for inspec-

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tion. We do not want to compromise Soviet troops and endanger peace in the whole world. If our position imperils peace in the whole world, then we would rather consider the Soviet side to be free of its commitments and we would defend ourselves. Come what may. We have the right to defend our dignity. O. Dorticós: The statement voiced by comrade Fidel Castro reflects our common resoluteness, and we consider that this issue does not deserve further discussion. A. I. Mikoyan: I do not understand such a sharp reaction to my proposal. What we were speaking about was not an inspection of Cuban territory but a verification procedure in the ports. Foreign representatives can be found in any port. It does not have anything to do with aerial or surface inspection. I am saying that, not to call into question your statement, but in order to explain. Besides the issue we have just finished discussing, we were going— according to your proposal—to talk over a plan of joint actions. We can have such a discussion not now, but at a time convenient for you. F. Castro: On the basis of yesterday’s meeting, we came to the conclusion that the Soviet government understood the reasons for our resoluteness not to allow a verification of Cuban territory. That resoluteness is a starting point for us. We are proceeding from the same point regarding joint actions as well. It is difficult to talk about them, if we have not come to an agreement on the previous issue. That issue is the most important for Cuba now from a political point of view. The guarantees are very problematic. It is not peace that we are speaking about. But inspection is a component of their strategy in the struggle against the Cuban Revolution. The American position is weaker. The magazine Time wrote that the dismantling was proceeding rapidly. Verification in the ports and at sea is just the same. But verification in the ports is very insulting for us from the political point of view and we cannot fulfill this demand of the U.S. administration. A. I. Mikoyan: My proposal was regarding not the Cuban territory but only the Soviet ships; vessels are considered to be territory of the state to which they belong. Such a proposal I put forward on my personal behalf. Moscow did not entrust me to suggest it. Speaking frankly, I considered that insofar as such verification did not regard Cuban territory but Soviet ships, it could be accepted. I was saying that although we understand the Cuban position, the verification procedures were not dangerous. I do not understand your reaction to my proposal. Our Central Committee entrusted me to explain in detail the Soviet position on all the issues that are of interest to the Cuban comrades, entrusted me neither to impose our opinion, nor pressure you in order to obtain consent for inspection of the Cuban territory. F. Castro: But verification would be carried out from the Cuban territory. A. I. Mikoyan: No, it could be carried out only aboard the ships. For that purpose, Soviet and neutral-country ships could be used. The UN representatives could live and sleep aboard those steamers. F. Castro: Such verification in the ports does not differ from control on ships on the open sea. A. I. Mikoyan: There is no doubt that verification can be carried out on the open sea, too, but does not bear relation to Cuba.

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O. Dorticós: It seems to me that now we should interrupt our work. We can agree upon further meetings through Ambassador Alekseyev. Ambassador Alekseyev was also present on the Soviet side. Recorded by V. Tikhmenev. [signature] Source: Russian Foreign Ministry Archives; copy provided by Philip Brenner. Copy on file at the National Security Archive. Translation by Aleksandr Zaemsky for the National Security Archive.

Document 10 Mikoyan’s Meeting with Cuban Leaders

November 5, 1962 Top Secret Memorandum of Conversation A. I. Mikoyan with Osvaldo Dorticós, Ernesto Guevara, and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez Evening, November 5, 1962 After mutual greetings, Comrade Dorticós said that Fidel Castro had not been able to come because he is feeling poorly. A. I. Mikoyan expressed his sympathy in regard to the fact that F. Castro is feeling under the weather. O. Dorticós: We have analyzed Comrade Mikoyan’s latest proposals regarding verification of the loading of the strategic missiles on the decks of Soviet ships in Cuban ports. Our opinion is thus: Keeping in mind chiefly the maintenance of the high moral spirit of our people and, besides that, wishing not to allow the outbreak of legal arguments in relation to the issue of the extraterritoriality of the ships, we want to give a conclusive answer to Comrade Mikoyan. We believe that it is impossible to accept that proposal. We must refuse it, since in principle we do not allow inspections, not on Cuban territory, nor in our airspace, nor in our ports. After we have finished our consideration of the issues which concern us, we could move to a consideration of our tasks in the near future. We would like for the new steps that stand before us to be agreed on with the Soviet government. We believe that, after the elections in the United States, it will be possible to make a joint statement of the Soviet government and the government of Cuba or to make separate, but simultaneous statements. 328

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The Cuban government unilaterally will declare that it opposes any surveillance of its territory, airspace, and ports aimed at inspection of the dismantling and removal of “offensive” weapons. However, we are ready to consider U Thant’s proposal about the possibility of inspection or verification on Cuban territory under the condition of a simultaneous inspection on the territory of the United States, Guatemala, and in other countries of the Caribbean Basin upon the coming into force of an agreement on the liquidation of the conflict in this region. Of course, we have no right to oppose inspection on the open seas. That is not in our competence. We would like Comrade Mikoyan to understand why we oppose inspections in Cuba. It is not just a matter of thoughts of legal procedure. The political side of the issue also has great significance. Such is our position. There are other issues of concern to us, but we would not want to mix them up with the current question. Therefore we would be glad to hear Comrade Mikoyan’s opinion. A. I. Mikoyan: The variant that includes inspection on ships which are being loaded— that is my initiative. I have already told you that I had no authority to put forth that proposal. We understand your position. It seems to me that we have made our position clear to you. We are informing the CC CPSU and the Soviet government about your position on this issue. As far as a declaration is concerned, then I do not see the point for either you or us to make a declaration on the first point, especially since that has already been loudly declared by the Cuban leadership. Second, the publication of separate declarations would reveal the disagreements between us on this question, and that would be disadvantageous for both sides. When I spoke about the necessity of thinking through our joint positions, I did not have inspections in mind. We must think about the entire complex of measures, both in the sphere of diplomacy and in all other spheres, so as to satisfy our common interests. Whether it will be in the form of a protocol or a declaration is not so important. The main thing is not the form, not the points, rather it is the position from which we can speak to U Thant and the United Nations. It follows that we should come to an agreement on our position, so as to make possible unity of actions. Concerning disagreements on the control issue, I do not see the point of making a declaration on that issue and continuing its consideration after the speech of comrade Fidel Castro. However, I have already spoken about that. I think that we will not make a declaration on that topic and we will respect each other’s position, maintaining our own opinions on this issue. Concerning the proposals about inspections in the United States and other countries of the Caribbean Sea region, this proposal is in accord with the plans of U Thant, we support it, and we can envisage it in the draft of the protocol that we will propose to the Americans. To this point, it is mentioned there in a somewhat general form. I spoke about it with U Thant, since this question seemed interesting to us. Although the Americans may support such a proposal regarding to other countries, they will not allow observers at home. If you agree with this point in the draft of the protocol, then it could occupy a place in our joint proposals. On the basis of a conversation with U Thant, I came to the conclusion that a coordinated declaration will not satisfy the Americans and that they will call for declarations from each of the sides. However, form is not the main thing. It is necessary to coordinate

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our positions so that both our and your representatives in New York could act in a coordinated manner. The draft of the document with which you are familiar is not limited to U Thant’s plan, but it would still be possible to revise it. U Thant has said that it would be possible to make more concrete the part of the document in which the plan for the presence of the UN in the Caribbean Sea region is noted. U Thant, referring to such states like the United States, Cuba, and a range of other Central American states, believes it would be possible to do this. This could be done in the text. This issue of coordinated observation by representatives of the UN on the territory of the United States, Cuba, and other countries of Central America could be reflected in the protocol. In this case, we would be starting from a common position. However, thus far we do not know your attitude to the given document. Comrade Kuznetsov, who is located in New York, asked me to find out the opinion of the Cuban comrades. Not knowing your opinion, Comrade Kuznetsov has been deprived of opportunities to speak with U Thant and the Americans. A. I. Alekseev: This would give us the possibility to work out a common position in regard to other articles of the protocol as well. O. Dorticós: We reviewed the text of the protocol immediately after it was given to us, that is, even before the conversation with Comrade Mikoyan. We have no fundamental objections. It seems to me that in the protocol there is one article about an inspection in Cuba. It would make sense to work out the issue of the conduct of a one-time observation both in Cuba and in the United States and in other countries of Central America. In view of the information that was given by Comrade Mikoyan yesterday, we believe that we will not have any major objections to the document. C. R. Rodriguez: I have doubts whether the proposed formula regarding the fact that the United States is obliged to secure inspections in Central American countries is lawful. E. Guevara: That formula really causes doubts. A. I. Mikoyan: It is still possible to do some serious editing work. Despite the fact that the Americans may not accept the proposals contained in the document, it will be advantageous for us to have a common position and to link it with U Thant’s plan, even if the Americans will be against it. The inspection will not be unilateral, it will be multilateral, so it evidently does not bother you. Whether or not the document will be accepted, it can still have great significance. The idea belongs to U Thant. It is possible to specify the list of countries that will be listed in this document—for example, Cuba, the United States, Guatemala, and others. It seems to me that it makes sense to think over this issue. It would be an advantageous position. The Americans will be opponents of such a proposal, since they do not want to allow inspections on the territory of the United States. However, even our posing of this issue will have great political significance. It is difficult to say how this will end, but the struggle for acceptance of these proposals should bring us a victory. In this way, we see that the protocol does not prompt objections if it does not speak about the necessity of striking articles about inspections of the dismantled weapons as applied to Cuba. Where it speaks about multilateral inspection, it seems to me that it would be necessary to name the countries. And what is your opinion, comrades?

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O. Dorticós: I agree. Consequently, we should strike Article 13. [Editor’s note: Article 13 of the draft protocol read: “The Government of the Republic of Cuba agrees to allow onto the territory of Cuba confidential agents of the UN Security Council from the ranks of representatives of neutral states in order so that they can attest to the fulfillment of obligations vis-à-vis the dismantling and carrying away of the weapons mentioned in Article 9 of the present Protocol.” Draft Soviet-American-Cuban Protocol, unofficial translation, October 31, 1962, Russian Foreign Ministry Archives.] C. R. Rodriguez: And change Article 10. [Editor’s note: Article 10 of the draft protocol read: “The Government of the USSR, taking into account the agreement of the Government of the Republic of Cuba, from its side agrees that confidential agents of the UN Security Council from the ranks of representatives of neutral states have attested to the fulfillment of obligations vis-à-vis the dismantling and carrying away of the weapons mentioned in Article 9 of the present Protocol.” Draft Soviet-American-Cuban Protocol, unofficial translation, October 31, 1962, Russian Foreign Ministry Archives.] A. I. Mikoyan: In Article 10, something is said about Cuba? E. Guevara: Yes. I would like to add that it seems to me that it makes sense to take into account the points that we made about the form. The document signed by the representatives of three countries cannot determine the list of countries in which observers from the UN or the Security Council should be present. A. I. Mikoyan: Maybe in this article references should be limited to the United States and Cuba, and stipulate that other countries can be included upon the agreement of their governments. So, for instance, from the direction of Guatemala they constantly will be threatening aggression. It would be advisable to point out that fact. It would be possible to ask the Security Council to set the list of countries. It could do this in Article 15, where U Thant’s plan is mentioned. We could leave the article without changes or note that the countries are to be determined by the Security Council. It seems to me that it is important to preserve the reference to U Thant’s plan. C. Rafael Rodriguez: It would be possible to make many editorial changes here. So, for example, in Article 3 it is said that “the Government of the United States will restrain those who intend to undertake aggression against Cuba both from the territory of the United States and from the territory of the neighboring states of Cuba.” This type of formulation seems to give the United States the right to determine the actions of other states. A. I. Mikoyan: What are you going to do about that? They are satellites. Maybe another editing will tie them even more. So far we have no other version, but it is possible to think about it. Article 5 contains clauses that have a similar nature. However, international law allows similar formulations. [Editor’s note: Article 5 of the draft protocol read: “The Government of the United States declares that the necessary measures will be taken to stop, both on the territory of the United States and on the territory of other countries of the Western Hemisphere, any sort of underground activity against the Republic of Cuba, [including] shipments of weapons and explosive materials by air or sea, invasions by mercenaries, sending of spies and

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diversionists.” Draft Soviet-American-Cuban Protocol, unofficial translation, October 31, 1962, Russian Foreign Ministry Archives.] C. Rafael Rodriguez: That is so, if the governments of those countries will not object. However, Guatemala will oppose this proposal. The situation will change, and the United States will refuse its obligations. A. I. Mikoyan: In Kennedy’s message, pretty much the same thought is expressed, but the use of a phrase like “I am sure, that other countries of the Western Hemisphere will not undertake aggressive actions . . .” approximately in such a form. Comrade Carlos Rafael Rodriguez’s observation is just. But it is necessary to think up something. The Americans may say that this is an issue for each of these countries. Let’s take a look at the formulation in Kennedy’s message. A. I. Alekseev: In this message, it is said that “I am sure that other countries of the Western Hemisphere will be ready to proceed in a similar manner.” C. Rafael Rodriguez: It would be possible to propose approximately this formulation: “The Security Council will undertake measures so as not to allow aggression against Cuba from the countries of the Caribbean, and also the use of weapons and the territory of these countries for the preparation of such aggression.” It also would make sense to note that the “United States will take upon itself the obligation that no preparations will be conducted on its territory or with the assistance of its weapons. . . .” It would be possible to work out this variant. A. I. Mikoyan: Yes. This variant really is interesting. It is important to note that the United States acts not only from its own territory. This is a very important point for Cuba. O. Dorticós: It is necessary to work on the editing of this document. We are not prepared for this today. Here, it is necessary to think about the form, and also to work on the editing of this document, although we are essentially in agreement with this document and understand how important it is to achieve success. We can work a little bit together, significantly improving the formulation, but it makes sense to do it quicker. E. Guevara: In essence, we are in agreement with this document. O. Dorticós: Naturally, we have to overcome certain language difficulties, too. A more careful editing of the document evidently is necessary in both languages. A. I. Mikoyan: That is good. Our Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA] is waiting for a communication about your attitude towards this document. Comrade Kuznetsov also requested a clarification of your position on this issue. Now we could report about the principal agreement, excluding Article 13, thoroughly editing Article 5, and bearing changes in Article 3 regarding the United States’ position in respect to the countries of Central America. After our report about your fundamental agreement, the MFA and also our representative at the UN will be able to begin work. Maybe we could present our variant tomorrow. C. Rafael Rodriguez: The formulation of Article 5 bothers me. A. I. Mikoyan: Yes. It encroaches on the sovereignty of the countries of Central America, but the governments of those countries are conducting a very bad policy. O. Dorticós: We will try to prepare our variant by tomorrow. A. I. Mikoyan: Working out this document, we are thinking about providing for the security of Cuba. It seems to me that it is not possible to limit the declaration about non-

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aggression to the United States only. The United States of America can push other countries towards aggression and provide help to them in aggression, while remaining on the sidelines itself. We have to oblige the United States to fulfill Kennedy’s promise. Comrade Carlos Rafael Rodriguez is entirely right. It is not of course a matter of these governments, rather, the important thing is in the essence of this issue. Kennedy on this issue came to meet us. We demanded that not only the United States would give its word about nonaggression, but its allies too. This is a compromise for them. We should use this compromise. It was not easy for the United States to make it. A. I. Alekseev: We should not miss this opportunity. A. I. Mikoyan: I am trying to evaluate the situation that flows from your positions. McCloy said that he gives his word that the camps will be liquidated, that there will be no preparations for aggression. This type of declaration has significance even in oral form. When the world knows, it will be uncomfortable for them not to fulfill their promises. I think that it would be useful for you, comrades, to think about issues of mutual tactics. Let’s say that the United States will not agree to inspection on its territory. However, as it seems to me, it would be important to organize observation on the territory of Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and certain other territories with the assistance of the UN representatives. It seems to me that it would be important to arrange for inspection in the countries of Central America. Is Cuba interested in this? What are the positive and negative sides of this type of proposal? I am in no way an authority on issues of Central American policy, but it seems to me that it would be important to secure the presence of the UN there, in order to mitigate the significance in this region of the Organization of American States and the Organization of Central American States. Comrades, have you thought about this issue? It will be easier for you to decide, than for us. Could the following situation come to pass? They will say to us that inspections of the Central American countries are possible, but they cannot be realized on the territory of the United States of America. Would you agree to that, or in your opinion is that type of a resolution not interesting to you, if it does not extend to the United States? This would be important for us to know in order to work out a joint tactic. It is clear that the United States will figure on the list. Or perhaps an agreement can be reached on inspection in Central American countries, while the United States will be limited only by the declaration. You could give your answer to my questions not today, but tomorrow. O. Dorticós: If inspections of the United States will be excluded, then in the same way inspections of Cuban territory will be excluded too. A. I. Mikoyan: You could thoroughly consider this issue, and then inform us of your decision. C. Rafael Rodriguez: It would make sense to specify the terms of the multilateral inspections as they apply to Cuba. It should spell out the fulfillment of the obligation that the Soviet Union has accepted on itself, that is, the verification of the dismantling and evacuation of the Soviet missiles. As far as the rest of the countries are concerned, this inspection would refer to the areas where camps for the training of counterrevolutionary mercenaries for aggression against Cuba are set up. The inspection could be extended to part of Florida,

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not touching, naturally, Cape Canaveral. It is also necessary to organize an inspection of camps in Puerto Rico, on the island of Vieques and in certain other territories, that is, the inspection will touch not the entire territory of the mentioned countries, but rather those regions where these camps exist. A. I. Mikoyan: It is immediately evident that Carlos Rafael Rodriquez is a great specialist on these issues. In this way, we could drive the aggressors into a corner. It is important to find an appropriate formulation. This variation represents a big step forward. Maybe tomorrow [Soviet officials] Bazykin and Alekseyev will meet with some of you and confer on editorial issues. It will be important to have this document immediately following the elections in the United States. We will take the initiative, and we will not allow the Americans to capture it. Perhaps the Security Council can be convened on November 7 or 8. A. I. Alekseev: According to my information, this will be done on the 6th. Dorticós objects. Guevara objects. A. I. Mikoyan: U Thant told me that on November 6, the Security Council cannot be convened: we will argue. There are protocol issues here, and declarations, and procedures. We must not underestimate the importance of the struggle in the UN and the opinions of the member states. O. Dorticós: We believe that it is possible to act in the following way. Let us undertake a thorough revision of the document, and we will try to do it quicker. Right after we have prepared it, comrades Bazykin and Alekseyev can meet with our representatives in order to consider editorial issues. There is information from Comrade [Carlos M.] Lechuga [Hevia], our new representative at the UN, regarding the fact that U Thant is inclined to put off the convening of the Security Council. It is possible that his session will not even be this week. U Thant is interested in holding bilateral meetings before convening the Security Council. Besides this, now we are entering a pretty complicated time: in the recent hours the United States has not only begun to create even more tension, in relation to the Il-28 bombers, but has also announced unlimited airborne surveillance. This is dangerous. We will consider what to do under conditions of a renewal of provocations from the air. A. I. Mikoyan: You, Comrade Dorticós, possess trustworthy information. We told U Thant that it would be good if the Security Council were convened after the elections. I already said that when we withdraw the strategic missiles and present evidence of that fact, we will be able to begin to speak about something else. Maybe tomorrow, in the first half of the day, the comrades will work on editing the document, and after lunch we will organize an exchange of opinions. I would also like to propose that we not publish a report about every meeting. It seems to me that there is no point in doing this today, and in general it would make sense for us to come to an agreement about this. Dorticós agrees with Comrade Mikoyan’s proposal. A. I. Mikoyan: When we complete the evacuation of the missiles, many issues will be seen in a different light. While we still have not withdrawn them, we must maintain a dif-

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ferent line. For that, five of six days are necessary. It is necessary to hold the line; otherwise they will accuse us of treachery. After we complete the evacuation, we will be able to adamantly oppose overflights, the quarantine, verification by the Red Cross, violations of airspace. At that moment the correlation of forces will change. It is necessary to get the UN on our side. We must achieve more than was promised in Kennedy’s letter. We must not underestimate the value of diplomatic means of struggle. They are very important in periods when there is no war. It is important to know how to use the diplomatic arts, displaying at the same time both firmness and flexibility. E. Guevara: I would like to tell you, Comrade Mikoyan, that, sincerely speaking, as a consequence of the most recent events an extremely complicated situation has been created in Latin America. Many Communists who represent other Latin American parties, and also revolutionary divisions like the Front for People’s Action in Chile, are wavering. They are dismayed [obeskurazheni] by the actions of the Soviet Union. A number of divisions have broken up. New groups are springing up; factions are springing up. The thing is, we are deeply convinced of the possibility of seizing power in a number of Latin American countries, and practice shows that it is possible not only to seize it, but also to hold power in a range of countries, taking into account practical experience. Unfortunately, many Latin American groups believe that the political acts of the Soviet Union during recent events contain two serious errors—first, the exchange [i.e., the proposal to swap Soviet missiles in Cuba for U.S. missiles in Turkey —ed.]; and second, the open concession. It seems to me that this bears objective witness to the fact that we can now expect the decline of the revolutionary movement in Latin America, which in the recent period had been greatly strengthened. I have expressed my personal opinion, but I have spoken entirely sincerely. A. I. Mikoyan: Of course, it is necessary to speak sincerely. It is better to go to sleep than to hear insincere speeches. E. Guevara: I also think so. Cuba is a country in which the interests of both camps meet head on. Cuba is a peace-loving country. However, during the recent events the United States managed to present itself in the eyes of public opinion as a peace-loving country that was exposing aggression from the USSR, demonstrating courage, and achieving the liquidation of the Soviet base in Cuba. The Americans managed to portray the existence of Soviet missiles in Cuba as a manifestation of aggressive intentions from the Soviet Union. The United States, by achieving the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, in a way received the right to forbid other countries from making bases available. Not only many revolutionaries think this way, but also representatives of the Front of People’s Action in Chile and the representatives of several democratic movements. In this, in my opinion, lies the crux of the recent events. Even in the context of all our respect for the Soviet Union, we believe that the decisions made by the Soviet Union were a mistake. I am saying this not for discussion’s sake, but so that you, Comrade Mikoyan, would be conversant with this point of view. C. Rafael Rodriguez: Even before your arrival, Comrade Mikoyan, immediately after the famous decision of the Soviet government was made, comrades from the Editorial Board of the newspaper Popular phoned me and requested an interview. They wanted

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urgently to receive our declaration regarding the situation that had developed, since the representatives of the “third force” were actively opposing Soviet policy. You know that group; it is deputy Trias. I gave an interview, not very long, since though I had been informed about the basic points in the speech by Fidel Castro that should have taken place on November 1, I could not use them, and in conclusion I observed that the development of events in the coming days would show the significance of the decisions that had been made. A. I. Mikoyan: The meetings and conversations with Comrade Fidel Castro had for me very great significance. They helped me to understand more deeply the role of the psychological factor for the peoples of these countries. E. Guevara: I think that the Soviet policy had two weak sides. You did not understand the significance of the psychological factor for Cuban conditions. This thought was expressed in an original way by Fidel Castro: “The United States wanted to destroy us physically, but the Soviet Union with Khrushchev’s letter destroyed us legally [iuridicheskii].” A. I. Mikoyan: But we thought that you would be satisfied by our act. We did everything so that Cuba would not be destroyed. We see your readiness to die beautifully, but we believe that it isn’t worth dying beautifully. E. Guevara: To a certain extent, you are right. You offended our feelings by not consulting us. But the main danger is in the second weak side of the Soviet policy. The thing is, it is as if you recognized the right of the United States to violate international law. This has done great damage to your policy. This fact really worries us. It may cause difficulties for maintaining the unity of the socialist countries. It seems to us that there already are cracks in the unity of the socialist camp. A. I. Mikoyan: That issue worries us, too. We are doing a lot to strengthen our unity, and with you, comrades, we will always be with you, despite all the difficulties. E. Guevara: To the last day? A. I. Mikoyan: Yes, let our enemies die. We must live and live—live like Communists. We are convinced of our victory. A maneuver is not the same as a defeat. Compare the situation of a year ago, and today. A year ago, the presence of Soviet soldiers in Cuba would have provoked an explosion of indignation. Now, it is as if the right of Russians to be on this continent also is recognized. That is good. McCloy even told me jokingly during a conversation that the presence of Russian officers [in Cuba —ed.] calms him down. The Cubans could open fire without thinking, he observed. But Russians will think. Of course, there could be objections to this remark, but the psychological aspect is taken into consideration. Sometimes, in order to take two steps forward, it is necessary to take a step back. I will not in any way teach you, though I am older. You may say: It is time to consign it to the archive, request that we resign. Recently, I read Lenin. I want to tell you about this not for some sort of an analogy, but as an example of Leninist logic. When the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed, Bukharin was working in the International Committee of the party. Although he was repressed, I consider him a good person. He tried, it happens, mistakenly, emotions had great significance for him. We were friends (not in 1918, at that time I was working in the Caucasus, but

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much later). And so the International Committee accepted a resolution in which it was stated that the concession in Brest was shameful. The point of Soviet power is lost. The comrades accepted the resolution as if rejecting Soviet power itself. Lenin wrote about this resolution: monstrous. How is it possible for such a thought even to occur to a Communist? But you know, at that time we practically had no armed forces, but those comrades wanted to die heroically, rejecting Soviet power. E. Guevara: Yes. I see that there is no analogy here, but great similarities. A. I. Mikoyan: There really is no analogy in this example. Imagine, Russia at that time was alone. We had no forces. There was some sympathy from the working class of other countries, but sympathy alone does not help much. Cuba is powerful. You have no war. You have the support of the socialist camp. It is true, your geographic situation is disadvantageous, and communications are far extended. This is a weak position. The Americans can disrupt communications and not allow the delivery of fuel to Cuba. We could have brought 200 million people into the streets as a demonstration of protest. But this would not have garnered any fuel for you. How can the blockade be disrupted? How can it be broken? We have at our disposal global rockets. Using them would lead to nuclear war. What do you say to this? Shall we die heroically? That is romance. Why should revolutionaries die? It is necessary to maneuver, develop the economy and culture, serve as an example of other peoples of the countries of Latin America, and lead them to revolution. Lenin, in a complex situation, even agreed to the conduct of the conference in the Prince Isles. Study Lenin. To die heroically—that is not enough. To live in shame is not permitted; but nor is it permitted to give to the enemy your own destruction. It is necessary to seek a way out through the art of diplomacy. A barber comes to me in the residence with a pistol, and I ask him: “You want to shave me with a pistol? No, with a razor.” Or, a correspondent from the newspaper Oy interviewed me, what a pleasant young man, also with a pistol. He has to take notes, but he lost his pencil. What can he write with a pistol? Do you understand me? If Kennedy maneuvers, dissimulates, and conducts a flexible policy, why don’t the Cuban comrades use that weapon? You will not manage to knock off the reaction with a pistol; the diplomatic art is necessary, too. I was very satisfied by the conversation with comrade Fidel Castro, but today I did not even know what to say regarding his reaction. But I repeat that it was amazing. Maybe I spoke foolishly, but before that I thought for a long time. For me it has been morally difficult during these days. And today it was difficult for me to understand his reaction. Perhaps I let some clumsiness show, spoke in some kind of tone? No, I, it seems, gave no grounds. I said that it is necessary to help U Thant. It is necessary to keep U Thant on our side. Comrade Fidel asked an appropriate question: Why not conduct the verification on the open sea? But U Thant will not gain anything with the assistance of this type of verification. Today I became a victim of Fidel’s good speech, evidently because I extemporaneously put forth my idea. An old man, I have the shortcomings of the young. E. Guevara: One day before that, we said that there would be no inspections. Comrade Mikoyan said that he had told McCloy that airborne inspections are inadmissible.

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A. I. Mikoyan: My proposal did not concern even the shore. The subject was verification of our ships. Ships are sovereign territory. The waters are yours; therefore, we were trying to elucidate your point of view. We did not touch the land. We were talking about the waters. The land had nothing to do with it. Evidently, I was naive. I thought that this variant was possible. Our ambassador, a young person, told me secretly: “I think that the Cubans will accept this proposal.” (To Alekseyev:) Don’t you speak for them. You are not a Cuban. C. Rafael Rodriguez: I have been reading Lenin’s works for a long time. In the present situation, we need evaluations that correctly reflect the situation. It is not a matter of feelings. These are the objective conditions in Latin America. In the first day of our conversations, Comrade Mikoyan spoke about two types of struggle. I think that in certain conditions, the last word belongs to the political struggle. In Latin America, after these events a feeling of demoralization arose among the people. The nationalistic petit bourgeoisie lost their faith in the possibility of confronting imperialism. Diplomacy may change the situation. Many people believe that if Kennedy affirms his promises only orally, that will be equivalent to a defeat. But if pressure will be applied by the Soviet Union, if Cuba will act decisively, if we use U Thant and the neutral states to the necessary extent, if we insist on the acceptance of the demand regarding verification of the enemy’s territory, if we achieve acceptance of Fidel’s five points, we will gain a significant victory. An oral declaration of nonaggression definitely will create a feeling of a defeat. A. I. Mikoyan: I agree with Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. Comrade Guevara evaluated the past events in a pessimistic tone. I respect his opinion, but I do not agree with him. I will try during the next meeting to convince him, though I doubt my ability to do that. Comrade Carlos Rafael Rodriguez pointed out the directions of the future struggle. I like this way of framing the issue. Of course, it is foolish simply to believe Kennedy; it is necessary to bind him with obligations. C. Rafael Rodriguez: And with strategic missiles? A. I. Mikoyan: We cannot defend you with these missiles. I received the possibility to visit you, while others could not do that. We had to request the agreement of Canada, the United States to the overflight, and to overcome other difficulties. They told us, for example, that we could not fly to Canada without escort planes. We had to receive visas. What could we do? That is their right. Our minister of foreign affairs phoned the U.S. State Department and asked: Will you give a visa to Mikoyan or not? Canada delayed giving an answer, the Canadian minister was absent, he was in New York. Other officials could not resolve that issue. Approval was granted at 1:30 a.m., and at 3 a.m. we took off. But somehow we started talking about me. If Cuba was located in Greece’s place, we would have shown them. I am satisfied with my meetings with you. The business side is important. Basically, we have come to an agreement on the protocol. Besides that, I must say that I thought that I understood the Cubans, and then I listened to Comrade Che and understood that no, I still do not know them. A. I. Alekseev: But Che is an Argentinean.

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A. I. Mikoyan, to Che: Let’s meet and talk a little. I would like to exchange some thoughts with you. It is not a matter of who will be victorious over whom. We must try to help each other. I understood a lot. I understood how important the psychological factor is in Latin America. I am at your disposal. Every meeting is very useful for me. However you want it: one on one, two on each side, and so on. When I return to Moscow, I should have the right to say that I understood the Cubans, but I am afraid that when I return I will say that I do not know them, and in fact I will not know them. Our stake in Cuba is huge in both a material and moral [sense], and also in a military regard. Think about it, are we really helping you out of [our] overabundance? Do we have something extra? We do not have enough for ourselves. No, we want to preserve the base of socialism in Latin America. You were born as heroes, before a revolutionary situation ripened in Latin America, but the camp of socialism still has not grown into its full capability to come to your assistance. We give you ships, weapons, people, and fruit and vegetables. China is big, but for the time being it is still a poor country. There will come a time when we will show our enemies. But we do not want to die beautifully. Socialism must live. Excuse the rhetoric. If you are not against it, let us continue our conversation tomorrow. O. Dorticós: We can meet, but we would like to know the opinion of the Soviet government and Comrade Mikoyan about what we will do about the agreement on military assistance. A. I. Mikoyan: Let’s consider that. Think about a program of future work. I am free. I am prepared to visit you. O. Dorticós: Thank you. Tomorrow we will set the conditions with the ambassador. A. I. Mikoyan: I agree. Ambassador A. Alekseyev attended the conversation. Recorded by: [signature] V. Tikhmenev. Comrade Mikoyan A. I. has not looked over the transcript of the conversation.

Source: Russian Foreign Ministry Archives. Copy on file at the National Security Archive. Translation by Mark H. Doctoroff for the National Security Archive.

Document 11 Ciphered Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan to the CC CPSU

November 6, 1962 Top Secret Making Copies Prohibited Copy No. 12 Ciphered Telegram CC CPSU It seems to me that it is now possible to go over some conclusions from the conversations I have had here. In connection with this, I would like to cite a few characteristic moments. Several hours before my arrival in Havana, the Cuban leadership had decided that two representatives of the leadership would meet me at the airport, Guevara and Raul Castro. However, two hours before my arrival, upon receiving the text of my statement at the airport in New York in support of Cuba, their intentions changed, and the entire leadership (except for the president), with Fidel Castro himself, greeted me warmly and in a brotherly fashion. They all came with me to the residence, and we conversed for about fifteen minutes. For the first conversation, Fidel received me in his private apartment. He went outside into the street and greeted me in front of the house, where the car stopped, and he walked me to the upper floor. You received his statements, which he made in a calm, friendly tone, but in essence I could feel his acute dissatisfaction with our policy. The next—second—meeting took place at the Presidential Palace. All six leaders participated in the conversation. Each time they met me in the corridors of the palace and accompanied me to the room where the discussions were held, and at the end of the discussions they all walked me to the car and we parted warmly. I was treated warmly everywhere. 340

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During the conversations, they acted calmly and listened attentively when I, in the course of several hours, tried to dispel their doubts, citing all possible arguments, one point after another, trying to prove that our policy was correct. They all listened to me with great attentiveness and took notes. I had the impression that I was speaking persuasively— except for two moments, about which Fidel Castro posed questions during the conversation, expressing his dissatisfaction and his alarm: First, the American radio and press have disseminated information that there is allegedly one section in the confidential letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy from October 26 that cannot be published. Apparently, that led him to entertain some suspicions. Fidel asked whether there was another message from Khrushchev in addition to what had been given to him. I said that there was not. Fidel said: “If so, why would Kennedy, in his response from October 27 to Khrushchev’s October 26 letter already be mentioning the Soviet proposal to dismantle, and other things, although that was not directly mentioned in the confidential letter from Khrushchev from October 26?” Apparently, he suspects that there is another message from Khrushchev that was hidden from him, or a section of Khrushchev’s letter of October 26 that was not shown to him. I explained that in his response from October 27, Kennedy formally responded only to the confidential letter of October 26. However, in reality, he responded both to this one [October 26] and, mainly, to Khrushchev’s message from the 27th, which was openly transmitted on the radio, although Kennedy’s letter did not cite it directly. I said that all the letters from Khrushchev to Kennedy, and everything that was received from Kennedy confidentially, were given to Fidel. I participated in all the meetings and I know this very well, but if you want me to check again, then I will check all the documents I have with me and will add to my information tomorrow. We checked everything carefully. After that, I said that actually there was one Kennedy letter, as we just found out, that did not make it to Fidel, but it does not have any serious meaning. It was his confidential letter from October 25 in response to the confidential letter of Khrushchev from the 23rd, the text of which he has. In that letter, Kennedy continues to insist that the Soviet people allegedly lied to the Americans by secretly delivering the missile systems to Cuba. We read the text of the second short letter. All these explanations allayed their suspicions, and after that Fidel immediately spoke and one could see that he was satisfied and that this question no longer had significance for him. Second, I said further: We had our information that the Americans were on the verge of attacking Cuba, and we received a telegram from Fidel Castro with similar information from other sources that within the next twenty-four hours an attack was expected. Then we decided to tie Kennedy’s hands before world public opinion, and to thwart the invasion of Cuba. Then Comrade Khrushchev on October 28 made the open statement on the radio ordering the dismantling and removal of the missiles. Of course, under normal conditions the draft of Khrushchev’s letter would have been coordinated with our Cuban friends, but that would have required encoding, decoding, and translating it—and the same regarding the reply. That would have taken so much time that normal

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consultations would not have had a chance to be completed; the invasion of Cuba could have occurred and Cuba could have perished. We had no other choice but to solve the main problem—prevent the attack against Cuba, hoping that our Cuban friends would understand the correctness of such actions, even though the normal procedures of consultation were not observed. We only had twenty-four hours before the invasion of Cuba. One has to take into account that we had just hours left, and we could not act in any way differently than we did. And we have the results. The attack on Cuba was prevented; peace was preserved— although you are right that not everything regarding procedures of consultation was followed that would have been possible under normal conditions. It seems as though this got through to them and they understood me. When I finished all these explanations, Fidel for his part responded and gave his assessment of all the previous discussions and his own analysis in the following words: I would like to respond to Comrade Mikoyan. We listened to Comrade Mikoyan’s statement and explanation with great attention. Undoubtedly, these explanations, which help us to better understand the developments, were very valuable. We are thankful for your desire to explain all these developments to us and for all your efforts in this regard. We have no doubts about your arguments regarding the fact that strategic missiles, after they have been discovered by the enemy, as a practical matter lose all military significance—or their significance becomes extremely small. We thank you for all these explanations and we understand that the intentions of the Soviet government cannot be assessed only on the basis of an analysis of the most recent events, especially because circumstances change very quickly and new situations develop. In [our] analysis, we have to take into account all the decisions that have been made on the basis of which the strategic weapons were deployed to Cuba and the agreement was signed. We intended to publish the agreement after completion of the assembly of the strategic missiles and after the elections in the United States. These decisions are evidence of the firm decisiveness of the Soviet Union to defend Cuba. They allow one to understand the political line of the Soviet Union correctly. Therefore I repeat that the analysis of the Soviet position can be correct only if one takes account of all the events and decisions, both in the period preceding the crisis and during the crisis as well. We do not doubt that if all the work on the assembly of the strategic weapons had been completed under conditions of secrecy, then we would have had a powerful means of deterrence against the American plans to invade our country. In this way the goals which both the Soviet government and the government of the Republic of Cuba pursued would have been attained. We believe, however, that the deployment of the Soviet missiles on Cuba had significance for the interests of the entire Socialist camp. Even if one does not see this deployment as providing military superiority, it had political and psychological importance in the struggle to deter imperialism and to prevent it from carrying out its aggressive plans. Therefore the deployment of strategic missiles in Cuba was carried out not only in the interests of defending Cuba but of the Socialist camp. This was done with our full consent.

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We understood the importance of this step very well, and we believe that it was the right step. We fully agree that we should not allow the unleashing of war. We have nothing against your statement that the measures you undertook pursued two goals, namely, not to permit an invasion of Cuba and to avoid unleashing a world war. We are in full agreement with these goals, which the Soviet Union pursued. A misunderstanding emerged regarding the form that discussion of this issue took. However we understand that circumstances demanded quick actions and the situation was not normal. Evaluating past occurrences, we came to the conclusion that we could have conducted consultations on these critical issues in another form. Here, for example, the issue we are now discussing. It relates to the effect my letter had on the Soviet government decision to withdraw the missiles and the making public of the Soviet government’s letter of October 28. It is true that my letter did not have any relation to the issues raised in the letters of October 26 and 27 exchanged between the Soviet government and the government of the United States. My letter pursued one goal—to inform the Soviet government about the inevitability of an invasion of Cuba. In it, we did not speak about the slightest vacillation on our part; we clearly announced our willingness to fight. In addition, we did not say that we expected an invasion. We wrote that although it was possible, it was less probable. More probable, in our opinion, was an air attack with the sole purpose of destroying the strategic weapons on Cuba. The basis of the Soviet government decision of October 28 was already laid out in the letter to Kennedy dated October 26 and was clearly outlined in the letter of N. S. Khrushchev to Kennedy from October 27. Those two documents contain the real basis of the decision, which was stated in the letter of October 28. Thus, Kennedy’s letter from October 27 meant his acceptance of Khrushchev’s proposal from October 26 regarding his [Khrushchev’s] consent to remove not only the strategic arms, but all the weapons if the United States would stop threatening Cuba with invasion. After all, this threat from the United States was the only reason that forced Cuba to arm itself. When Kennedy accepted that proposal (we did not know that he had accepted it), conditions emerged for developing the Soviet proposals and preparing a declaration regarding the agreement of both sides. You could have told the United States that the USSR was prepared to dismantle the equipment but wanted to discuss it with the Cuban government. In our opinion, this is how the question should have been resolved instead of immediately giving instructions on the withdrawal of the strategic weapons. This approach would have allowed us to weaken international tension and would have given us an opportunity to discuss the issues with the Americans under more favorable conditions. This way, we could have reached not only a lessening of international tensions, and not only discussed this issue under better conditions, but also attainted a signed declaration. However, this is only simple analysis of preceding events, which do not have any special importance at the present time. Now it is important for us to know what to do in the new conditions. How are we going to try to attain our main goals and at the same time not permit the unleashing of aggression and fight for the preservation of peace? Of course, if with time we can ensure a really stable

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peace, then in light of these new facts we will be able better and more correctly to assess the importance of those steps that have already been taken. The results of our struggle in the future will speak about the importance of the events of today. Of course very little in this struggle will depend on us. We are very grateful for all the explanations that Comrade Mikoyan has given us, and for his efforts to make us understand the development of recent events. We take into account the special conditions under which it was necessary to act. We do not have any doubts about the friendly nature of our relations, which are based on common principles. Our respect for the Soviet Union is unshakable. We know that it respects our sovereignty and is prepared to defend us from aggression on the part of imperialism. Therefore at present it is most important for us to define our future joint steps. I would like to assure you, Comrade Mikoyan, of our complete trust.

Upon listening to this, it became clear that in general things were going well and that the mood was changing for the better compared to what it had been at the beginning. However, even this statement had moments that could not be left alone without new explanations. For my part, I expressed satisfaction with the progress of discussions and with the analysis of past events, and said that I have to make two comments, not with the purpose of prolonging the discussion about the past, but to bring some clarity. First, it is not clear where our comrades got the understanding that the Soviet Union gave the Americans its consent to withdraw all weapons and all military specialists from Cuba, as if the Soviet Union gave its consent to that in Khrushchev’s confidential letter of October 26. If that were so, then the Americans would have stuck to that and it would have been mentioned both in Kennedy’s statement published in the press and in the next letter from Khrushchev. But you know that both Kennedy and Khrushchev in all these statements spoke only about the so-called offensive weapons and the personnel supporting them. You simply misunderstood one phrase in Khrushchev’s letter from October 26 where it speaks about the withdrawal of Soviet specialists. In this context, Khrushchev had in mind not all specialists but, as it follows from the documents, only those who were involved with “offensive” weapons. And you know that not only in these letters but today also, we hold to the position that you will keep all the weapons with the exception of the “offensive” weapons and associated service personnel, which were promised to be withdrawn in Khrushchev’s letter. Fidel confirmed that this is correct. Second, F. Castro’s question about whether, instead of ordering the dismantling of strategic weapons we could have made a different decision—a legitimate question. However, we had information that an invasion of Cuba was to begin in the next several hours: it could be that they really intended to deliver an air strike against the positions of the strategic missiles first, but an invasion of Cuba would follow after that. We had to act decisively in order to thwart the plan of the invasion of Cuba. We understand that by doing that we had to sacrifice the opportunity for consultations with the Cuban government in order to save Cuba.

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I did not think it necessary to comment again on Fidel’s statement, in particular about the fact that the weapons deployed in Cuba had as their purpose the defense of the interests of the entire socialist camp. By that, he reiterated that he did not agree with my previous statement in response to his similar statement in which I said that these weapons were deployed not in the name of, and not for, the camp, and not for the Soviet Union. It was done only, exclusively, in the interests of defending revolutionary Cuba itself, which has international importance, great importance, for the entire socialist camp. Then I turned to the issue of how necessary collaboration between the Soviet Union and Cuba, as between two socialist countries, is. But in this case, we were talking about something more than that. We have to have an especially close collaboration due to the fact that Soviet weapons and Soviet military personnel are located in Cuba. Therefore our actions need to be coordinated. Even if we have differences of opinion we should strive for unity in our actions. Therefore I propose to work out a plan of joint coordinated actions without touching upon the past. I would like to hear what proposals our Cuban comrades have in this respect because we need to act together. This is how the issue stands now because our victory in preventing a military attack on Cuba should be confirmed by a diplomatic victory. Here we should show the necessary skill in diplomacy and policy while firmly defending our main goals. The Americans are interested in prolonging the Cuban crisis. We are interested in its speediest resolution through negotiations between the interested sides and then through the UN Security Council. We are interested in finalizing everything with an international document that defends the interests of Cuba, and removing the blockade and the dangerous situation in the Caribbean basin. The interim secretary-general of the United Nations, U Thant, who obviously sympathizes with Cuba, can play a great, positive role. It would be good if the Cuban comrades helped U Thant so that he could have at his disposal enough arguments and information to make a statement in the Security Council, which would have approximately the following content: that he is convinced that the “offensive” weapons were dismantled and removed, and that thus the conditions for lifting the blockade and normalizing the situation have been created. Regarding the dismantling, U Thant could cite the Americans’ own statement that according to their air reconnaissance the dismantling has been completed, and therefore the need for aerial inspections of the dismantling has disappeared. Only one fact remains unconfirmed, which could be raised by our enemies: It is the fact of the loading and dispatching of these weapons on Soviet ships. I think that you could allow U Thant’s neutral representatives to arrive by ship at a Cuban port and, without setting foot on Cuban territory, to observe the fact of the loading and dispatching of these weapons on Soviet ships. That would require three or four days and all the work would be completed in that time. I also said that the earlier we resolve the issue of the withdrawal of these “offensive” weapons and the inspection of the fact of their withdrawal, the sooner the quarantine can be lifted, which is in Cuban interests in the first place. The Soviet Union will bear big losses because its ships are sitting at sea with shipments for Cuba, and they cannot proceed

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under the quarantine. We cannot tolerate these losses any longer, and we have to take joint measures to achieve the lifting of the quarantine; my proposal regarding inspection of ships in Cuban ports could facilitate matters. (I felt that we came to such an understanding that the Cubans would accept the proposal. Comrade Alekseyev, who sat next to me, whispered in my ear that the Cubans will definitely accept it.) I added: I am asking you not to give an answer to this question now. We could interrupt our conversation and you could discuss it without us, and then we could meet again, continue our work and listen to your opinion. Then suddenly Fidel, in a calm tone, made the following unexpected statement: A unilateral inspection would have a monstrous effect on the morale of our people. We have made large concessions. The American imperialists freely carry out aerial photography, and we do not prevent them from doing so because of a request by the Soviet government. We need to search for some other formula. I want to say to Comrade Mikoyan, and what I am telling you reflects the decision of our entire people: We will not agree to an inspection. We do not want to compromise the Soviet troops and risk peace throughout the world. If our position puts peace throughout the world at risk, then we would think it more correct to consider the Soviet side free of its obligations and we will resist by ourselves. Come what may. We have the right to defend our dignity ourselves.

I was not worried about his refusal to allow the inspections at the ports. I was shocked by the final part of his statement. Everyone was quiet for several minutes. I thought: how do I proceed with this matter? I decided not to comment on this shocking statement. I thought that maybe it was something they had not thought through, or maybe they had discussed that as a possibility among themselves, and then he just blurted it out unexpectedly. After some thought, Dorticós said that Fidel expressed their common opinion. The rest were silent. I said I did not understand such a sharp reaction to my proposal. First of all, we were not talking about inspections of Cuba, either by air or land, which we had already discussed. We were talking about inspections on Soviet ships in Cuban waters, and ships are considered the territory of the state to which they belong. We were speaking about Soviet ships and therefore Soviet, not Cuban, territory. What this has to do with the infringement of Cuban sovereignty is impossible to understand. Finally, I do not have direct instructions from my government to present this proposal. I only did it hoping to make it easier for U Thant to support the Cuban cause in the UN and taking into account the favorable atmosphere that has developed in our conversations. I repeated that our Central Committee instructed me to give thorough explanations of the Soviet position on all issues of interest to our Cuban comrades without imposing my opinion and without putting any pressure on you in order to obtain your consent for inspections of Cuban territory. Fidel noted: Why can we not carry out these inspections of the ships in neutral waters? I said that I believe, of course, it is possible, but that does not have any relationship to Cuba. He agreed.

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Several hours later, in the meeting with Dorticós, Guevara, and Rodriguez, Dorticós stated: We have analyzed Comrade Mikoyan’s latest proposal for loading the strategic missiles on the decks of Soviet ships in Cuban ports. Our opinion is as follows: Taking into account the need to keep up the morale of our people, and, in addition, wishing not to allow legal disputes regarding the issues of the extraterritorial location of the ships, we would like to give a final response to Comrade Mikoyan. We believe that it is impossible [for us] to accept this proposal. We have to reject it because we do not accept in principle inspections on Cuban territory, in our air space, or in our ports. The statement that F. Castro blurted out was so unexpected that this formulation of the issues caught not only us but all of his friends unawares. It appears that the awkwardness of the situation touched even Castro himself. Dorticós came to his rescue, suggesting we take a break from our work. How could one explain F. Castro’s statement? We had the impression that he had not planned on saying this, but that it had slipped out. Moreover, F. Castro’s friendly attitude toward us and his desire to find a commonality of opinion with us about cooperation in the future did not give any reason even to imagine that such thoughts were in his head. After all, he had already accepted in full sincerity that the removal of missiles from a military point of view would not weaken the defense of Cuba, and he expressed his interest in keeping our other powerful defense weapons in Cuba, expressing concern lest we remove certain other types of weapons from Cuba under pressure of the Americans. One would like to believe, and most likely it is truly so, that the phrase Castro used was a result of his passing mood and his desire to show how important the issue of not allowing any kind of inspections is for the Cuban Revolution, and that in order to preserve this principle they are prepared for anything. One should not forget the complicated personal qualities of Castro’s character, his acute sensitivity. While in power, he made many thoughtless statements caused by a fleeting impressionability [vpechatlitel’nost’] which he later regretted. The provocative buzzing [podzuzhivaniye] of the American press to the effect that Castro has lost his independence, and that the Soviet people are in command in Cuba undoubtedly has had an influence on him. The embassy knows that Castro takes it hard when he reads the statements of reactionary agencies in which he is called a “puppet of the USSR.” The North American press especially blows out of proportion the issue of inspections, alleging that Castro would have to retreat under our pressure, notwithstanding his categorical statements about the impermissibility of any form of inspections. Castro probably believes that after his militant statements against inspections, accepting them in any form means compromising his position as a leader of the people of Cuba and Latin America, and that he could begin to lose prestige. We should not exclude the possibility that Castro actually suspects us of intending to put pressure on him on this issue, and that he decided to make such a statement in order once and for all to cut off any possibility of our doing so, as a way of emphasizing the inviolability of the principles that he defends.

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In my opinion, we should not yet draw any conclusions based on only this one statement. I will be able to get a better feel for his real mood and understand the direction of his thinking on this issue better in my future talks with him. One should not forget that in the evening, when the conversation continued—with Dorticós, Guevara, and Rodriguez—Dorticós mentioned at the very beginning of the conversation that Fidel Castro could not come because he felt unwell. It was clearly felt that they wanted to erase what had happened; they do not want us to take Fidel’s outburst seriously. It is not a coincidence that the next day—today, November 6—in the evening Guevara half-jokingly noted: “We Cubans are not Albanians, and we will not demand the liquidation of your military bases on Cuba.” This was said after I responded to their question about what to do next with the known agreement about military aid by saying that as soon as we overcome the current crisis in the Caribbean we will discuss it in a calm atmosphere and hopefully will arrive at a decision coordinated in a brotherly fashion. All three confirmed their full agreement. In addition, today in his conversation with Alekseyev, Rodriguez said that he had just met with F. Castro and told him about the most recent and, in his opinion, very warm and friendly conversations with me, about which Castro was very pleased. Immediately after this, Rodriguez expressed his regret regarding such an unpleasant end to our conversation of November 5. Rodriguez did not say anything about F. Castro’s opinion. However, the fact that he himself raised this issue speaks to the fact that the Cuban leaders, apparently, have discussed the situation that has been created and are now trying to repair it. 6.XI.62 A. Mikoyan Copy 39, printed 8.XI.24 Issued by Shiryanev Nikolaev Yezhov

Correct: (signature)

Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, special declassification, April 2002. Copy on file at the National Security Archive. Translation by Svetlana Savranskaya and Andrea Hendrickson for the National Security Archive.

Document 12 Record of Conversation between A. I. Mikoyan and Fidel Castro in Pinar del Rio

November 8, 1962 Before the Revolution, remarked F. Castro, in this region, which is at the present time designated “Local Industrial Union PR-2” (the abbreviation PR refers to the province of Pinar del Rio owning the union), there were 10,000 unemployed persons. The area of the region consisted of 120,000 hectares. There were 50,000 heads of livestock in the region. We are importing industry from Canada, the United States, New Zealand, and Australia, announced Castro. A. I. Mikoyan, F. Castro, and the personnel accompanying them inspected the premises where the cows are milked. Castro remarked that Cuban specialists consider it necessary to turn away from the methods of milking cattle currently employed in Cuba and employ those methods used in Australia. This method, added Castro, seems to be more profitable in my opinion because it allows one person to service from thirty to fifty cows using a small milking machine with a low-powered motor. Castro treated Mikoyan to the cool cow milk. It is interesting to note that the cattle, which were living on the premises where the milking occurred, stepped into a shallow pool filled with dissolved copper sulfate. This operation, Castro noted, strengthens the hooves of the animals. By every milking apparatus, which are all situated in a row, there is fencing made of metal pipes fixed on hinges. After the milking is finished, the cows push on the fence with their muzzles, and leaving the milking area, open the passageway for the next animal. The extraction of milk does not exceed 7 liters in a twenty-four-hour period. This is a milking site brought from Canada. 349

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Then Mikoyan and Castro looked at the poultry houses, in which a large quantity of ducks and chicken are bred. Castro said that in the following year Cuba will produce 1 million ducks. He announced to Mikoyan that at the present the [unrecognized word] produce up to 2 million chickens per month. Currently, they fatten up 100,000 head of cattle in Cuba every year and want to increase the number to 1 million head. The majority of the ducks in the pond are two months old. Their average weight is 5 pounds. Mikoyan remarked that in West Germany, there are very interesting attempts to raise ducks without a reservoir. With such a measure, he added, the Federal Republic of Germany raises 1.8 million ducks. He also added that the most profitable age for the slaughter of ducks is at sixty days old. Usually their weight at this age is around 5 pounds. On the other shore of the lake Castro indicated, you will see the new village for the workers. Twenty-five [houses] were already made for the tenants, and another twenty-five still await construction. During another visit, with the intention of viewing a separate cattle breeding farm, Mikoyan and Castro conversed in a lively manner. Castro described how in 1963 they will introduce norms for accounting for workers’ labor at these farms. Mikoyan remarked that under these conditions, when the Cubans feel the danger of foreign intervention, would it not be better to introduce the normalization of labor now than at another time. Castro described how in the province of Pinar del Rio they produce light tobacco, which is frequently exported. At the present, Cuban tobacco is exported to such countries as Britain, France, and Canada. The United States has completely stopped its importation of Cuban tobacco. In the past, the United States tried to expand tobacco production into Puerto Rico. However, despite what seems to be similar climactic conditions in Puerto Rico with regard to those in Cuba, the quality of the Puerto Rican tobacco is significantly lower than that of Cuba’s. Castro turned Mikoyan’s attention to the field covered with tall, gray grass. He explained that this “[unknown word]” is a technological culture used is the production of fiber and contains a significant number of proteins. We are planning to use the “[unrecognized word]” in the textile industry, remarked Castro. In this region, said Castro, we have a large cattle farm, which provides the meat for our students. This year the number of livestock exceeds last year’s number by at least 100,000 head. We are hoping, said Castro, that the number of heavy cattle in 1963 will consist of 2 million. Next year, we will double the production of our fishing industry. In 1961, there were 50,000 pigs in Cuba. In 1962, there were already 250,000. Despite the marked improvement, Cuba simply cannot completely satisfy the demand of its growing population. As I already said, added Castro, we are developing a network of dining halls for workers. In these we can feed nearly 60,000 workers. We are introducing, said Castro, additional supply (after all, we have a card system) for the workers of the logging

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and mining industries. In the period of the sugarcane harvest, the state farm workers, who are occupied by the harvest, will use this additional nourishment. The system of supplying the population through the use of cards, said Castro, will be in place in our country for a few years. We think we will change it no sooner than 1965–67. Mikoyan remarked that in a few instances the card system led to counterrevolutionary elements and speculators trying to use the services within the system for their own purposes. Castro said that currently the sale of fish uses the card system; only herring is free to sell in workers’ quarters. In restaurants, fish dishes are available without a card. Then Mikoyan and Castro visited the people’s estate Los Pinots, where they observed the planting of different vegetables, utilizing a hydroponics system. The sites currently used for the cultivation of tomatoes looked like greenhouses in the sandy soil that are constantly pumped with water, which carries nutrients. It shows the high quality of the construction work, and the low number of service personnel. Castro spoke about how sage is cultivated at the farm. We brought the seeds of the plant, he added, from Sierra Maestro. In this estate, remarked Castro, we built many good, new houses for the workers. When the car went to the open pen for the cattle feeding, Mikoyan noted that poultry production is more profitable than pork production. Three kilograms of feed allows 1 kilogram of bird meat, while at the same time 1 kilogram of pork requires an input of 5 kilograms of feed. During the inspection of the open pens, Castro turned Mikoyan’s attention to the heavy, dark cattle, the Aberdeen breed. Here is where the cattle “[unknown phrase].” During the inspection in the pens, there were nearly 20,000 head of cattle kept in the open air without a high level of security. Briquettes of feed are brought up on the road, which lies between the separate sectors of fences. These fences are long and wide and exceed a kilometer. The feed is made with pressed hay and molasses. During the return trip to Havana, Mikoyan noted the good taste of Cuban architecture and the high quality of the construction work. The houses, which are meant for tourists, have all the comforts and are rented for a comparably low price—6 pesos for a family per day. But they are empty; there are no tourists. Castro said that unfortunately, because of the rain, we cannot visit the greenhouse where we grow orchids, it is located on one of the hills. He also noted, confidentially, that in the houses located on the hills south of Soroa live Latin Americans who came to Cuba for military training. After the visit to Soroa, Mikoyan and Castro returned to Havana. In the car, Castro spoke about the appearance of sectarians in the process of forming the united revolutionary organizations. He remarked that a group of leaders of the ORI [Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas, Integrated Revolutionary Organizations] (having first in mind Anibal Escalante) bring forth incorrect politics in the matter of assigning work to communists in the administration, directing methods of party workers, being seen with leadership of mass organizations, in administrative work. They weaken

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the party. An unsuitable cadre politics of sectarians leads to party workers always securing administrative posts. This, in Castro’s opinion, weakens the party organizations and administrative organs, leaving the latter under the control of the leadership of the party organizations. Mikoyan told Castro about Khrushchev’s plan to change the party leadership in the industries and village farms. He said that we reached a level in our economy when we can make these kinds of changes. Bidding farewell to Mikoyan, Castro invited him to come with him to the resort town of Varadero.

Source: From the personal archive of Sergo A. Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Adam Mayle for the National Security Archive.

Document 13 A. I. Mikoyan’s Telegram to the CC CPSU

November 8, 1962 Upon his return to Havana, A. I. Mikoyan dispatched the following report to the CC CPSU (Special No. 1796): To the CC CPSU: Today, November 8, we took an automobile trip around the region west of Havana from eleven in the morning until seven at night with Fidel Castro. He wanted to demonstrate the changes that took place over the last two years and took me to the places I saw with him on my last visit. There were definitely great changes. We visited a new, medium-sized experimental farm for the cultivation of fruit trees and beans and experimental methods of fattening up swine through grazing. We stopped by several major national poultry estates, like our state farms, including one farm with 140,000 ducks. The reservoir resembled our Tszaripinskie Ponds. We also visited some farms for the fattening of cattle and swine. These are large contemporary industries that are worth boasting about. We visited a dairy farm that has 400 head of cattle and Canadian mechanized milking units. At the end of the trip we visited a tourist center in the mountains, which was created after the revolution. It is built in a modernist style, with amenities; it is a good tourist center —except there are no tourists. The entire time we talked, or more precisely, he did most of the talking. He spoke with enthusiasm, ecstatic about what is being built and what is intended to be built in the near future. 353

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In particular, he noted that the state farms currently yield 2 million chickens per year, but they want to get up to 12 million after three years. Right now they fatten up 100,000 head of cattle per year, they want to increase the number to 1 million, and so on. He shared his thoughts on the questions of party and state development, criticizing their mistake regarding Escalante, but not naming him directly. He was satisfied with my positive attitude toward what he said on the question. At an opportune moment, I told him about Comrade Khrushchev’s plan to change the party leadership in the industries and village farms. I said that we reached a level in our economy when we can make these kinds of changes. This interested him a great deal and he was very glad that I told him this. He added his thoughts about the improvement of his government in Cuba. With interest and admiration he spoke about Algeria and praised Ben Bella. He said that Cuba’s experience will be useful to the Algerians, that reforms will be introduced in Algeria that will be more radical than in Egypt, and that Ben Bella is not under the influence of Nasser, as the Czech comrades thought at one point. Fidel said that the Communist Party of Algeria acted incorrectly when they assumed a neutral position in Ben Bella’s struggle with the right-wing faction in Algeria. In the coming days the Cubans are planning to send one experienced Soviet Spanish communist to Paris. He is a friend of Torres from Spain. He was there twice during the Algerian war and knows all the leadership very well. He can explain to Torres and the Algerian communist party Cuba’s position regarding Algeria, so they can take a better position with regard to Ben Bella. In the course of the conversation, I informed Fidel that we are actively helping the Yemeni revolution with weapons and military specialists, although right now the help comes more under the OAR banner, as Nasser asked us to do and we agreed, considering internal Arab relations. It was obvious that Fidel was very happy with today’s visit, our conversations, and our impressions of what he showed us. He was in a good mood, and feeling very friendly toward the USSR. He proposed that we take a trip to another region tomorrow, to which I agreed. 8.XI.62

A. Mikoyan

Source: From the personal archive of Sergo A. Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Adam Mayle and Anna Melyakova for the National Security Archive.

Document 14 Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan to the CC CPSU, and Gromyko’s Response

November 8 and 9, 1962 As I already wrote [to you], the Cuban leadership is very interested in the fate of the known agreement about military aid. They were very pleased when I said that we were ready after everything calms down to discuss it in a brotherly fashion and reach a decision. Until that happens, they will make all kinds of guesses—what changes would be introduced into the agreement and in what direction. I consider it expedient, if the Central Committee approves it, to mention in a casual manner in one of my conversations with Fidel, speaking just as a private person, that here in Cuba, taking into account the great significance of the psychological factor which Fidel emphasized so much, I had an idea about the direction of the agreement on issues of the military cooperation that we have to jointly discuss and work out. If the solution has a character of a Soviet military base, then, as I started to realize here, it could create certain psychological and propaganda difficulties, both in your relations with Latin American countries as well as in regard to the masses of your people. I am talking about your [Castro’s] legitimate acute feelings of independence and sovereignty, the feelings that you and your people exhibited so strongly during these events. In addition, North American propaganda uses it even to a greater extent to slander you, as if you were a government dependent on the USSR. I also think that in the political sense, it could weaken your positions in the struggle for the liquidation of the American base at Guantánamo. Therefore, wouldn’t it be better to adopt the following line: that the Cuban personnel with the assistance of our specialists will gradually start to operate all the Soviet weapons remaining in Cuba? 355

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As these personnel become prepared, gradually the Soviet people will be replaced with the Cubans. Upon completion of a certain time period necessary to master the military technology, all Soviet personnel will be replaced by the Cuban personnel, and those Soviet experts in special areas, without whom it would be difficult for the Cuban army to function, will stay with you and work here as advisers in such number and for such a period of time as necessary. Here I also emphasized that this idea was my personal idea, and that I did not consult about it with Moscow and was only stating it in order to find out whether such a definition of the issue would be correct from the point of view of the Cuban revolution. When you discuss this issue in the Central Committee, please pay attention to the fact that, according to the information of our ambassador and from my conversations with the Cubans, I have the impression that they consider this agreement as one that would serve the interests of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp to a larger extent than the interests of Cuba, and that in doing that they would be making their valuable contribution to the common cause of the socialist camp, and that it would give them the possibility to thank the Soviet Union in some form for its generous assistance and support of Cuba. Fidel Castro literally used these expressions in one of his conversations with our ambassador. However, for us this form would be convenient because it would practically eliminate the possibility of all kinds of tensions if we find some differences of opinions between the sides on some issues. It corresponds to the general Soviet concept that we do not need military bases on the territory of foreign states to defend our Motherland because we rely on the gigantic power of our missile technology with nuclear weapons, which is capable of reaching any enemy from the territory of the Soviet Union. Please give me instructions. November 8, 1962

A. Mikoyan

Gromyko’s Response to Mikoyan To Soviet Ambassador for comrade Mikoyan A. I. We received your number 1787. We are preparing materials for your negotiations with our Cuban friends. In this material we will present considerations that completely correspond with your ideas. We have the same understanding [of the issue]. Without waiting for our material to reach you, you can discuss this topic with the Cubans at any time you consider it necessary. November 9, 1962

A. Gromyko

Source: From the personal archive of Sergo A. Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.

Document 15 Trip to Varadero

November 9, 1962 (Friday) A. I. Mikoyan was accompanied by Ambassador A. I. Alekseyev and by the head of the group of the main advisers, F. E. Titov. Fidel Castro was accompanied by Major R. Vallejo and by the president of the Federation of Cuban Students, Rebellion. Shortly after leaving the Castro residence at 9 a.m. Fidel Castro told A. I. Mikoyan that he would like to show him the school for poultry husbandry, which was located close to the residence. When the cars approached the section of Havana where the school was located, Castro remarked with displeasure that all the entrances to the area were blocked with portable barriers, which hindered the movement. He said that he did not understand why the administration of this school considered it necessary to block free movement and erect these barriers. Around 150 young men attend the school; 100 of them came from the people’s estates and the other 50 were children of small village farmers. When Fidel Castro’s car stopped at the school building, students surrounded it. During the conversation, which began on Castro’s initiative, it turned out that some of the students of the school were dissatisfied that they were transferred to this educational institution from the courses preparing administrators of agricultural boarding schools for children. As one of those young men told Fidel Castro, the Ministry of Education ordered that 106 young men be transferred from those courses to this educational institution. Turning to A. I. Mikoyan, Castro said that this measure might have been only temporary—that it was possible that they planned to transfer the students to different courses of the same subject. One of the young men told Castro with bitterness that while he was studying, he found out that his whole family, who lived in the village of Caimanera not far from the American base at Guantánamo, ran to the United States. Castro remarked, ad357

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dressing the entire group of the young men, that it appeared that this boy, unlike his other relatives, was a real patriot. Castro asked the students questions and all of them answered unanimously that they were really interested in poultry husbandry, and that they were satisfied with the conditions of their education and their living conditions. When Mikoyan and Castro were leaving the school, they saw a group of students doing military drills. In the car, Castro, turning to Mikoyan, remarked that he did not like the practice of some ministries making decisions without taking into account the general political line of the revolutionary government. He emphasized that he had given instructions to the Ministry of Education that students should not be transferred from one educational institution of a certain profile to an educational institution of a different profile, unless there were sufficient grounds to do so. However, if these students do not have a calling to pedagogical work, then it is a different question. I would like to look into this, added Castro. The car with Mikoyan and Castro approached the house of the minister of education, Armando Hart. Hart’s wife, Haydée Santamaria, a member of the ORI [Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas, Integrated Revolutionary Organizations] national leadership, came out first, leading a two-year-old child by the hand. She said that her husband was sick with the flu. However, while Castro was talking with Haydée, Hart came out of the house and joined the conversation. Castro asked Hart to look into the issue about the transfer of 106 students from the courses for training of administrators for agricultural boarding schools to the school specializing in poultry husbandry. Hart tried to explain that those young people, according to their teachers, allegedly have no aptitude for working with children. Castro, however, asked him to have a good look into this once again. Mikoyan gave Hart and Santamaria’s son a Soviet pin. Later in the trip, Castro told Mikoyan that the revolutionary government made a decision to change the working hours of retail stores so that people would have time for shopping after work. Currently, retail stores are open from noon till 8:30 or 9:00 p.m. Mikoyan said that as far as he knew, there was a memorial house of José Martí in Havana, which undoubtedly must be a very interesting historical monument. Castro was pleased to continue the conversation about it, and invited Mikoyan to visit Martí’s memorial house in Varadero. However, they learned that they were doing renovations in the museum, and it was impossible to visit it. Castro was disappointed that the administrator was not at the site, and that Mikoyan would not be able to see the renovations carried out by the revolutionary government. A large group of local residents gathered around Mikoyan and Castro. They greeted Castro and Mikoyan. Mikoyan wanted to be photographed with Castro next to Martí’s house. Castro was pleased to accept the proposal. Martí’s memorial house is located in the area of the railroad terminal, near the port. Castro told Mikoyan that he arrived in Havana for the first time when he was 16 years old, precisely by this railroad. He saw the capital for the first time when he came out of this railway station.

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My parents sent me here, said Castro, to continue my education at the Collegio Belén. That was a secondary educational institution under the supervision of “holy fathers,” he added with a smile. Mikoyan told Castro that he was just eight years old when he moved to a big city— Tbilisi—for the first time. It was very hard for me [to be] without my relatives, added Mikoyan. Castro also noted that he left his parents’ home for the first time when he was very young: “I was five years old, when they brought me to Santiago and housed with a teacher. Frankly speaking, I felt very bad there. I missed my family badly.” Turning to the interpreter, Castro added, “I would prefer that my words about the period of my life in Santiago not become public knowledge. I know that our interpreter is a journalist, and therefore,” he added jokingly. “I am asking [him] not to write in the press about this story, because the teacher is still living, although she is a very old lady now, and she would be really hurt if she learned that I felt bad in her home. That teacher lives from her memories now, and she really likes to talk about the period when I lived in her apartment.” When the motorcade passed through the tunnel under the entrance to the Havana harbor, Mikoyan inquired when it was built. Fidel Castro responded that the tunnel was built by French engineers in the years 1955–57. Several kilometers east of Havana, there is now a new residential area—East Havana— built in the postrevolutionary period. Mikoyan and Castro toured East Havana by car. Castro proudly said that residents of this region enjoy all conveniences designed for them by the planners. “They have a retail center, an outpatient clinic, and various children’s facilities,” said Castro. “We started to build East Havana,” said Castro, “right after the victory of the Revolution.” Mikoyan noted that he remembered how the construction sites looked during his first trip to Cuba. There were only basements of several buildings here then. Mikoyan added that he really liked the plan and the architectural design of the buildings in East Havana, and that many of the architectural solutions of this construction could be very interesting for Soviet architects. Castro listened to Mikoyan’s remarks with great satisfaction, and said that unfortunately, in the near future, the Cubans would not be able to build houses like the ones that were built in East Havana. “That construction had cost us a great deal of money. I think,” added Castro, “that East Havana should be seen as a first sign of future. We will start building similar buildings again in about 1980.” To the south of East Havana, on the other side of the highway, big buildings of a military hospital were visible. Pointing to these buildings, Castro told Mikoyan that the counterrevolutionaries captured after the victory at the Bay of Pigs were held in this hospital for some time. He added that a certain number of the counterrevolutionaries had already been sold to the Americans or to the relatives of the mercenaries: “We have already received about a million dollars for these ‘worms.’ ” The motorcade followed the highway Via-Blanca toward the city of Matanzas. On the way, Castro drew Mikoyan’s attention to small beautiful houses located not far from the

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highway. “This,” said Castro, “is a children’s estate created very recently on my instructions. This idea came to me about two years ago. After the victory of the Revolution, I housed sixteen kids in my country residence in Cojimar. They were not just schooled there, but they were also engaged in agricultural works. I believe,” continued Castro, “that children’s engagement in real productive labor has a great pedagogical importance. Subsequently, those kids were transferred to this children’s farm. Today, forty kids go to school and work here. They support themselves [fully] from sales of fruits and vegetables, which they grow on their land. This farm has 25 hectares of land. The children raise cows, pigs and rabbits. They plant malanga and do a great amount of work in planting young eucalyptus trees.” Castro drew Mikoyan’s attention to a small pond located on the territory of the farm. “The boys raise ducks in this pond,” said Castro. Mikoyan inquired who was the owner of this land before the Revolution. Castro responded that a small portion of this land belonged to small farmers. The rest of the land was expropriated from private owners, who were planning on selling this land for construction of country houses at speculator prices. The revolutionary government compensated the small farmers for the value of their plots, which became the land of the children’s farm. In addition, continued Castro, we built new houses for these peasants. Mikoyan fully supported Castro’s idea regarding the need to engage children in productive labor in the process of their upbringing. He told Castro about the restructuring of secondary education in the USSR, and the importance that our party and the government assign to the issues of trade education. When the cars approached Hills of Saint Mary from the Via-Blanca Highway, Castro drew Mikoyan’s attention to a large group of buildings located to the left of the highway. Castro said, “There you see the boarding schools, which will house 5,000 schoolchildren. To the right of the road, you can see the school buildings, which were built recently. Before, this area was the location of country houses of Havana bourgeoisie. At the present time, 200 houses were transferred to become housing quarters for the boarding schools. There were 9 school buildings built there as well. In this section, 500 kids from Algeria and 500 kids from Cuba will live and study together. Kids themselves plant [trees and flowers] on the school grounds.” Castro drew Mikoyan’s attention to one of the cottages. Before the Revolution, Prío Socarrás, former president of Cuba, used to live here. Presently, he is residing in the United States, where he works with the Cuban counterrevolutionaries. Castro proudly showed Mikoyan a medical center, a dental clinic, and a hospital, which were built for children. Right now, there are very few kids on the premises. We sent all teenagers to harvest coffee in the mountain regions, said Castro. Mikoyan asked about the prospects of exporting coffee. Castro told him that the coffee harvest reaches 50,000 tons a year. In 1963, the Cubans are planning to harvest 1,250 quintals (1 quintal equals 50 kilograms). “It is interesting to note,” continued Castro, “that there exists a certain periodicity in the size of coffee harvests: In the first three years, the harvests are increasing, then they shrink, and then a new cycle begins. In three or four years, we plan to double the size of our coffee pro-

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duction. Last year, after the demand of the domestic market was satisfied, we had only 200 quintals left in reserve. In a couple of years, we will be able to export coffee. Our coffee is of excellent quality. Before the Revolution, our people did not have a chance to drink real coffee, they had to drink surrogates. In the last three years, the consumption of coffee grew substantially.” Castro expressed an idea to Mikoyan that it would be expedient to send two or three ships with tourists from the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist camp to Cuba. “This,” continued Castro, “would permit us to increase employment among the personnel of the National Institute of Tourist Industry. The program of people’s [domestic] tourism by itself does not give us an opportunity to use all our tourist centers, which were created in the post-revolutionary period.” Mikoyan told Castro that in the Soviet Union the work on the industrial plants is organized in shifts. This system of labor organization gives one an opportunity not only to increase the production output without increasing the production facilities of the enterprise, but also allows one to use the presses and machines more efficiently. The problem is, continued Mikoyan, that machines grow morally older [Russian economic term for growing outmoded], that is, after a certain period of time, when [old] machines can still be used in production, new machines with higher production capacity are made. Then one has to replace the presses and machines, which have not been fully used, with new, more technologically advanced presses and machines. When you organize labor in shifts, you can use the same machines better. After [the cars passed] the city of Matanzas, they saw fields with tall plants, which looked like agave on the right side of the road. “This is henequen,” explained Fidel Castro. “It produces very tough fibers, which are then used for making cords. Here, in the field, you see a small factory, which processes hemp for fiber. The cut stems are processed on the drums, and the crushed soft tissue is then washed away with water, while the fiber is moved by the transporter [belt] and then goes to dry.” In the resort city of Varadero, Castro drew Mikoyan’s attention to a new town, which was built by the revolutionary government for fishermen. Before, Varadero’s fishermen had to live in huts put together from old pieces of wood and covered with palm fronds. These houses [now] are built from light reinforced cement sections; they are convenient in use and inexpensive. Then the motorcade entered the territory of the property that used to belong to the American millionaire Dupont. “Here,” said Fidel, “in a former Dupont villa, a new boarding school is now located.” However, the villa turned out to be empty. Castro turned to a person, who was dressed in the uniform of people’s militia, apparently a night guard, and asked, “Where are the children?” He responded that the children had been evacuated. Apparently trying to suggest the expected answer, Castro asked him, “Evacuated because of the cyclone?” The militiaman said that it was not because of the cyclone but because of the threat of intervention. The children were evacuated to the town of Cárdenas, about 20 kilometers from Varadero. Castro noted that it did not make any sense to evacuate children from one town

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on the northern shore of Cuba, to another close-by town on the same shore. He told the militiaman to tell the administrator of the boarding school that they should either return the children to the Dupont villa or to evacuate them to the area of the Sierra Maestra Mountains, where they could engage in productive work. Castro’s country house is located on the premises of the same property. After arriving at the country house, they went for a swim in the sea. Castro noted that Cubans consider this time of year winter (water temperature was +26°C) and therefore do not swim. After swimming, Mikoyan, Castro, and the people who accompanied them talked about China. In particular, the conversation touched upon people’s communes. Mikoyan explained that the Chinese leadership has now practically restructured those communes by enlarging them, although it was not announced in the press. Castro agreed that people’s communes did not meet the expectations. He noted that the Chinese who live abroad conduct substantial work for gathering hard currency resources, which serve as an important source of hard currency for the Chinese government. Mikoyan confirmed that the Chinese government received more than $100 million a year through those channels. At the supper, the conversation touched upon the issue of development of cinema in the Soviet Union and in Cuba. Castro said that the director of the Cuban Institute of Cinematography and Movie Industry, Alfredo Guevara, would soon arrive at the residence and bring some Cuban documentary films and the second part of the Soviet feature movie Ivan the Terrible. Mikoyan explained how this movie was made, and noted that Stalin put significant pressure on the authors of this film so that the character of Ivan the Terrible was presented in a positive light. “Nonetheless,” noted Mikoyan, “the director of the movie was such a great artist that Stalin’s instructions notwithstanding, the character of Ivan the Terrible shows clear features of a despot.” In the evening [the group] watched documentaries May 1, Playa Giron, Cuba on Guard, and the second part of Ivan the Terrible. They spent the night at Castro’s country residence.

Source: From the personal archive of Sergo A. Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.

Document 16 Trip to Playa Giron and the Treasure Lagoon

November 10, 1962 (Saturday) In the morning, A. I. Mikoyan and Fidel Castro left by car in the direction of Playa Giron. On the way, Fidel Castro was talking about the fighting, in which the Cubans persevered during the days of resistance against the counterrevolutionary invasion in April 1961. He said that at the moment the counterrevolutionaries landed, the Cuban Air Force had only fifteen airplanes, and the situation was even worse with the pilots. There were only seven pilots, and three died. On the first day of military action, all our planes were ordered to carry out air strikes against the ships transporting the counterrevolutionaries. Our troops were in a difficult situation, because the enemy attacked suddenly, and we had to have some time in order to transfer the necessary forces and equipment to the area of the Bay of Pigs. On April 19, we concentrated fifty-four surface-to-air launchers in the area of the Zapata Swamp. Our army suffered great losses from American aviation, which used Cuban Air Force insignia, on the first day after the counterrevolutionary group landed. We were worried, continued Castro, that there would be another landing in the province of Pinar del Rio. However, fortunately, the enemy did not land there. In the evening of April 19, we moved our tanks onto the offensive. Five tanks accompanied by infantry moved along the highway from the Crocodile farm to the tourist village at Playa Giron. At 19:30 our units entered Playa Giron. When I arrived at Playa Giron and was preparing information for the press about eliminating the counterrevolutionary landing group, our artillery continued to fire on the village. My adjutant and I had to hide behind the cliff on the shore next to the water. It is interesting to note, said Fidel, how we prepared the surface-to-air missile personnel. We had very few instructors. We could only send enough instructors for two antiaircraft batteries. And we had a hundred batteries with personnel—untrained personnel. 363

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Where would we find so many instructors? Then I gave an order for all soldiers who trained with the Soviet instructors on the two above-mentioned antiaircraft batteries to work as instructors in the rest of the batteries after their own classes. Therefore, these young men trained with the Soviet antiaircraft specialists in the morning, and in the evening they passed on the knowledge and skills they had just learned to their compatriots in the other batteries. Having passed the city of Jaguey Grande and the Australia sugar plant, the cars arrived at the national park. An experimental farm, which occupied 90 hectares of drained land, was located there. This region is located in the so-called Zapata Swamp. Fidel Castro and the national leadership of the ORI [Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas, Integrated Revolutionary Organizations] devote a great deal of attention to the development of this area. F. Castro showed A. I. Mikoyan plots used for planting tropical fruits and vegetables. Here they saw fruta-bomba (the name “papaya” is not used in Cuba), feed grass, pangola, malanga, bananas, pineapples, and other fruit. F. Castro noted that thanks to the introduction of the fertilizer “G-12-K” at a ratio of 400 kilograms of fertilizer per hectare, they were able to reap good harvests. “In the eastern part of the Zapata Swamp,” said Castro, “we began to use the Dutch method of draining the marshlands by creating so-called polders. However, the Soviet specialists are now developing a new drainage plan.” F. Castro also noted that they were going to organize the extraction of peat in the region of the Zapata Swamp. It is very important, continued Castro, because, as you know, our country has practically no energy resources of its own. By using peat, we are hoping to produce cheap electric power. When the cars passed through the village of Palmiche, Fidel Castro said that during the intervention in April 1961, the counterrevolutionaries dropped 158 paratroopers in the area of the Zapata Swamp. After passing the village of Playa Larga, the cars turned west to the Buenaventura settlement. Here they built a large number of houses for the residents and a good school over the last year. Residents of this region took an active part in the struggle against the counterrevolutionary landing force. Upon visiting the village of Buenaventura, A. I. Mikoyan and F. Castro went to Playa Giron. It was precisely here that the fierce battles for eliminating the invading forces took place. At present, the tourist center of Playa Giron has been transformed into a school for fishermen. Fidel Castro said, “1,700 young men and boys are taking courses here. They use 10 commercial fishing ships based in the port of Cienfuegos, located to the east of Playa Giron, for education. Soon the boys will receive 40 more ships.” Of course, these are small motorboats; they cannot be compared to the big commercial fishing ships, which the Soviet Union sent to Cuba. A. I. Mikoyan and the persons accompanying him toured the settlement, visited the seashore where the landing occurred, and talked to the students. After visiting the fishing school, they looked at the remains of an American bomber that was shot down by the Cuban Air Force pilots in April 1961. Castro told them that they were carrying out a countrywide collection to build a memorial in honor of the Cuban patriots who defeated the

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American mercenaries in the region of Playa Giron. “At present,” continued Castro, “we are conducting a competition for the best design of the monument. Soon we will erect a monument at Playa Giron, so that our people will always remember this glorious victory.” From Playa Giron, A. I. Mikoyan and F. Castro followed the highway to the national crocodile farm. There they took a motorboat and went along the canal to the Treasure Lagoon, approximately in the center of which is an island where Fidel’s modest country house is located. Mikoyan visited this place in 1960. Fidel reminded Mikoyan about that first fishing trip, in which they both took part, and suggested that they take a motorboat to fish for trout. The fishing trip took about an hour and a half. A. I. Mikoyan and F. Castro returned to the country house with their catch. After returning to the national crocodile farm, F. Castro showed Mikoyan a big tourist village with the Indian name “Guama.” These pile-buildings, the style of which follows the style of houses used by the ancient populations of Cuba—Taíno—were built in the last two years. Even though from the outside these houses look like simple Indian huts, the interior design satisfies all the requirements of modern comfort. The floors and walls of these houses are paneled by expensive wood, there is modern wicker furniture, and the rooms are equipped with refrigerators and designed in the national spirit. Fidel Castro told him [Mikoyan] that it was his idea to create this tourist center. Antonio Nùñez Jimenez helped him greatly in implementing this project. A. I. Mikoyan expressed his admiration for the quality of the work, and noted that the village was located in a picturesque setting and represents a very convenient place for recreation for Cuban working people. Fidel Castro introduced the administrator of “Guam” village, Abraan Masiles, to A. I. Mikoyan; he told them about the extensive works on drainage in this region and on the building of new sectors of the tourist village. Castro started a conversation with a group of vacationers. One of the young men turned out to be an employee of the Cuban Institute of Fossils. He told [Castro] that recently the [employee] organizations in his institute created a number of cafeterias for the employees of the institute. Then A. I. Mikoyan toured ponds and cages, in which the crocodiles are kept. The number of crocodiles increased by 1,200 over the last year. Currently, there were 4,000 crocodiles on the farm. From the national crocodile farm, the cars started their way back [to Havana]. F. Castro was very tired and soon fell asleep. They returned to Havana at about 10 p.m.

Source: From the personal archive of Sergo A. Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.

Document 17 Coded Telegram from Mikoyan

November 10, 1962 Top Secret Making copies prohibited Copy No. 12 Ciphered Telegram Spec. 1802–3 Top Priority CC CPSU Last night, November 9, we traveled with F. Castro around the provinces east of Havana and he talked, but yawned and dozed, and complained that his sleep was poor and brief, and that he felt bad recently. We stayed the night in the resort town Varadero. I observed his poor health and we kept the conversation on questions that are known to you. The conversations were on themes that did not have enough actual political value to report here now. This morning, before the continuation of the journey, we saw that his attitude had improved and he said himself that he was more or less rested and I gave him the contents of our 1787. I said to him that we agreed with comrades Dorticós, Guevara, and Rodriguez, that when everything settled down we will discuss how to better alter the famous agreement about military assistance. I said to Fidel that in the next few days, I will think a lot in what ways these changes would be introduced from the point of view of the best defense of the Cuban revolution. 366

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I was totally convinced about the accuracy of your assertion of the significance of the psychological factor for Cuba. The changes must have such a character that it does not arouse psychological, political, or propagandistic problems with other nations in Latin America, in your own people, and, most important, to bring about American propaganda against us. All these considerations are intended for what is best, from the point of view of Cuba’s interests. It seems to me, I added, that considering the psychological factor and the intense feeling of Cubans toward sovereignty and independence, wouldn’t it be pointless to think about how to better preserve the defense capabilities of Cuba with the use of the weapons acquired from us and the presence of soldiers here, without our presence in Cuba in the form of Soviet military bases. I emphasized that this is my personal opinion, which I would like to confirm in conversation with you, in so far as it is right, before I gave Moscow some sort of proposal about the finalization of a new military agreement. Castro carefully listened and when I finished, he remarked: You have considered this question thoroughly and correctly. He further said, after the removal of missiles from Cuba, a situation was created in Cuba that was categorically different than the one that existed before. He thinks that in the present it will be very hard for the Americans to undertake direct aggression against Cuba. They will of course try to find a pretext to complicate the immediate development of the Cuban Revolution, but despite that they have placed themselves in a disadvantaged position in the diplomatic and international arena and will have to maneuver to find arguments providing support for their aggressive politics. It is not only the world’s general opinion, but the individual governments allied with the United States that do not understand or approve the United States’ new demands. Castro said that the first draft of the military agreement that was sent to us from Moscow and after a detailed analysis we were forced by political considerations to change it in form a little. With regard to content we were in full agreement. We understand that the agreement has positive and negative sides. The negative side consists in the possibility of the use of this agreement as reactionary propaganda, like the subordination of Cuba to the Soviet Union. But in so far as there is a positive side to the agreement—it is a strengthening of Cuba’s defense capability and an augmentation of the faith of the Cuban people—which exceeded the negative significance, we accept this agreement without hesitation and only introduce a few formal corrections, in order to lessen the possibility of the use of this agreement against us. Now, since the missiles have been removed, the situation has become completely different and it has become necessary for us to demand a new variation of the agreement, a new approach which will nullify reactionary propaganda, not give new trump cards to American imperialism, and impress upon the Cuban people that it is still certainly the master of the situation and there are not Soviet bases on Cuban territory. I remarked that such a formulation of the question will improve the Cubans’ position in their struggle to liquidate the U.S. base at Guantánamo. Currently the Americans do not accept this demand, but it is necessary to conduct the struggle at all times, and sooner or later they will have to accept it, the situation is leading to this conclusion.

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He agreed and emphasized: It is important that this question be taken from theory to a practical plane and one fine day the United States will be forced to face it. Returning to their future military agreement with us, Castro said that the general traits of his thinking coincide with mine, although he has not analyzed these questions in detail. Castro was in a very good state of mind because it was a very delicate question for him and the initiative issued from us strengthened his faith in that we did not proceed from a principle of our own self-interest by having the presence of a Soviet force in Cuba, but solely from an interest in the defense of the Cuban revolution. F. Castro said that after he exchanged his opinion with his comrades, in the coming days it will be possible to meet for a cooperative discussion of this question. I ask that it be taken into account that I deliberately raised this, and, if it will not be an instruction of the CC, then I will engage concrete questions which include on what conditions they will deal with the remaining Soviet arms that they have and, secondly, and on what conditions they will pay for military specialists. II. XI. 62 A. Mikoyan Reference: No. 1787-1788/ No. 51167/ from 8.XI.62 Cde. Mikoyan gave over a number of proposals in connection with questions raised by the Cuban government related to an agreement about military assistance.

Source: From the personal archive of Sergo A. Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Adam Mayle for the National Security Archive.

Document 18 Telegram from Khrushchev to Mikoyan

November 11, 1962 (Sunday) The following telegram from N. S. Khrushchev for Comrade A. I. Mikoyan was received in the morning (Special No. 1013): In connection with the last letter from President Kennedy which was sent to you, and the issues which he raised, we are informing you about our considerations and the steps we are planning to take with the goal of achieving a favorable result and fulfilling the obligations undertaken by the United States, as set forth in the president’s letters and in our October 28 letter to the U.S. president. We are passing them along to you for your consideration and reflection. We would like to know your opinion, since by now you are almost like a Cuban. We discussed these issues before the full quorum of our collective leadership and our military, and all those present arrived at the unanimous conclusion that it would be reasonable to act as follows—to agree to the removal of all Il-28s from Cuba; we have fortyone of them altogether. What do we lose and what do we gain as a result of the removal of the Il-28s from Cuba? There are no particular losses. There will be only moral losses for Cuba. From the military perspective, there are almost no losses because these planes, as is well known, are obsolete and do not play any role in the armed forces; we have already discontinued their production a long time ago, and are breaking up the Il-28 units. The remaining planes, which we still have, exist as a result of U.S. actions and our response to these actions. If there had been no such action by the president when he demanded authorization to mobilize 150,000 reservists, we would not have had these planes and units supporting them; those planes would already have been removed from service. 369

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We can imagine how difficult it would be to impress such an understanding on our friends. But therein lies the art of politicians—when encountering difficulties to show the ability to overcome such difficulties. We take into account the fact that our agreement on the removal of the Il-28s from Cuban territory will inspire internal counterrevolution in Cuba, and will inspire aggressive forces in the United States to turn this to their advantage and exaggerate this as their own success. After all, we could [choose to] not agree with the U.S. demand to remove the Il-28s. We are confident that this would not cause a military conflict or an immediate invasion of Cuba, although this can never be guaranteed, of course, when one has to deal with lunatics. However, we think that in the present conditions it would be difficult for the United States to take such a step. The insistent demand of the United States to remove the Il-28s can be explained first of all not because they are worried about their presence in Cuba, or because they want to remove them from Cuba, saying that they are offensive weapons. This is an argument they made up because the United States themselves, the American military, understands that this is a weapon that is completely unsuited for use abroad because, due to their slow speed, Il-28s need antiaircraft cover. But the main problem is not the speed but the ceiling, because their ceiling is only 12,000 meters, and such planes, as you know from your sons’ reports, have already been rejected by us even as flying targets, because they do not satisfy the requirements. We cannot use them for training troops for antiaircraft cover. The Americans, of course, are aware of all this. Why are they focusing attention on these planes now? Here, so to speak, two factors play a role. First is that the president mentioned the planes—the bombers—in his proclamation. And before that, as you will see from the letter, in his speech on October 22, he spoke about the “jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear arms,” and so on. This is one point. This is an issue, so to speak, of prestige—an issue of presidential prestige, and of the prestige of the country. However, the main issue, we think, is that currently criticism of the president’s position is growing in the United States because the president, in his correspondence with us, bound himself by the following obligation: If the other side fulfills certain conditions, then the United States will undertake an obligation not to invade Cuba and to restrain its allies—that is, countries in the Western Hemisphere—from doing so. This is the main concern that worries Kennedy now because the fire of his [domestic] opponents’ criticism is targeted exactly on this point. Therefore the president now wants to do a maneuver: either to obtain full satisfaction of those conditions he put forward—to remove missiles and Il-28 bombers from Cuba—or alternatively, to abrogate the agreement, i.e. not to fulfill the obligations he undertook in his letters from October 27 and 28, justifying this before world public opinion by saying that we do not fulfill our obligations. This is his main point. Now we are faced with the following task: We have to assess the situation as revolutionaries and as leaders, to weigh what is most important and what factor should be given preference in the interests of Cuba—to leave the bombers, and consequently to undermine the fulfillment of the obligations that were given on condition of the removal of the mis-

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siles, but to keep the Il-28s in Cuba, or to remove the Il-28s as we removed the missiles, but to have an agreement on noninvasion of Cuba both on the part of the United States and on the part of other Latin American countries surrounding Cuba. All this should be weighed. When we were thinking about and discussing these issues, all those present arrived at the indisputable conclusion that these [two alternatives] are not equivalent. The Il-28s are no longer any good for offensive action, as we have already explained, and the Americans understand that. As far as defense is concerned, Il-28 planes are not absolute weapons that would make the territory where they are deployed impenetrable to the enemy. We understand this very well, and we are able to estimate the situation, and we think that this would be a persuasive argument for our friends as well. If our enemy, for example, had the weapons Cuba has, including Il-28s, then for the Soviet state, assuming we have the weapons we do, it would not be an obstacle to aggressive actions by us because it would not be possible to resist the might that we possess. With these weapons one can exhibit heroism, but to achieve the main goal—to repel aggression—these means are insufficient. They are sufficient for repelling aggression like that in 1961, and even aggression by more powerful forces, but not all those forces in the possession of the United States. Through diplomatic channels we are aware that the U.S. representatives, while agreeing that Il-28 planes are indeed obsolete weapons, and that they do not represent a great danger for the United States, justify their demand for the removal of Il-28s from Cuba by saying that this weapon represents a great threat for Latin American countries. They therefore state that there should be a guarantee that there would be no threat to countries in the Caribbean. That should also be taken into consideration, because the removal of Il-28s from Cuba gives serious grounds to demand that there should be a guarantee from the other side as well, that is, a guarantee through the United Nations that no Caribbean country would undertake actions of aggression, attack, or sabotage against Cuba. These would be mutual obligations for all Caribbean countries. Therefore, we believe that if our friends would understand us correctly then from the point of view of cold reason we should agree to withdraw Il-28s from Cuba with all service personnel, and, as the United States demands, with all the equipment. As a result, we would create such conditions for the United States that it would be forced to fulfill its obligations as set forth in the president’s messages of October 27 and 28. And we believe that this is more important than a show of resolve in retaining the Il-28s in Cuba. It is true, some people can say that the appetite grows at mealtime and that the United States would pose new demands and insist on their fulfillment. But we will resist that in our negotiations. With respect to the question of our instructors’ staying in Cuba after the removal of the missiles and Il-28s, there would be no weapons that the Cubans could not master on their own. Therefore, the question regarding the Soviet instructors in Cuba is not a problem, not for today. We shipped some weapons to Cuba that were required to protect the people operating the missiles; now that the missiles have been removed the need for this protection is no longer there.

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But the weapons that were shipped to Cuba are already there, and nobody is thinking of removing them. Later, when the situation is normalized, most likely it would be expedient to transfer those weapons to the Cubans. They are quite capable of mastering them (tanks, armored personnel carriers, and other types of weapons) themselves. A portion of the antiaircraft systems is already in Cuban hands. In the future, a situation could emerge where, we think, there would be no need to have our troops operating these anti-aircraft systems. (But this is for you [personally]; this is, so to speak, for the future.) Now, about the Il-28s. From the point of the view of ensuring Cuban security and using them for defensive purposes, the fighters they already have are a better means than the Il-28s. But those are fighter planes; we are not talking about them now. The Americans, to the contrary, are saying (Robert Kennedy in his conversation with Dobrynin on November 5), that they are not raising the issue about the recall of the fighters from Cuba, and by the way, the fighters are more modern weapons. We are mentioning the fighters to you so that when you talk to our friends, tell them that the fighters that are already in Cuba would carry out the same defensive functions, for which the Il-28s were intended—and more successfully. Moreover, they are more versatile because they can take part in aerial combat, of which the Il-28s are not capable. Not now but later, depending on how events develop, if there is a need we may have to give reinforcements to the Cubans, but not in the form of bombers, but in the form of fighters, about which they should be informed. We believe that on the question of verifying fulfillment of the agreement on removing the Il-28s, we would be able to agree with Americans that this verification would be based on the same conditions mutually agreed upon in relation to the missiles—inspections on ships in neutral waters. This order would not require inspections on Cuban territory. This is how we understand the issue of verification. Of course, when we start concrete negotiations about this, obviously the United States will exert some pressure on us, but this should be anticipated, and we think that the precedent that we already have will be applied for this weapons system as well. Regarding the presence of our military instructors in Cuba: This question, as we understand it, was set forth in the U.S. president’s letter not as a condition for the resolution of this conflict but as a suggestion for the future in order to finally normalize the situation. It seems as if it is an acceptable suggestion for the future, and it would not create difficulties either for Cuba or for us on the condition that the agreement is reached on the same basis as was laid out in the letters, and if that agreement is followed. The psychological side of the issue is the most difficult one. And each person’s psychology reveals itself in a special way; you cannot prove [dokazat’] it completely; the issues are resolved in discussions about the possible and the impossible. When our Cuban friends say that they cannot trust the United States, this is true—one cannot disagree with this; we know it from our own experience. But on the other hand, so far we have no alternatives other than to rely on these words and the assurances we have received. In fact, this is basis of coexistence between two state systems with different sociopolitical structures. While exhibiting vigilance and caution, we should build normal relations between states because there are no other alternatives.

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If we start from the assumption: I do not believe, I do not tolerate—that would mean to deny the possibility of peaceful coexistence. That would mean, so to speak, permanent war, until one side emerges as the absolute victor. However, we have our own understanding on this issue. It is set forth in the decisions of the congresses of our party in the Program of the CPSU, and it found its own expression in the Declaration of Communists and Workers Parties of 1957, and in the Statement of Eighty-One Parties of 1960. We live in a time when two worlds exist—the socialist world and the world of capitalist countries, as well as intermediate transitional states, which at decisive moments unfortunately do not vote with us at the UN on the main issues. We must take all of this into consideration. I think that our friends understand that if we now chose exacerbation of the situation in the Caribbean, and did not make compromises and mutual concessions, that would be a movement towards a dead end. We do not want that. Apparently, our enemies—the imperialist camp—are being forced to accept the fact that if they do not exhibit understanding and restraint on their part, the matter could end in catastrophe. Therefore, we believe that for our camp, precisely for our camp and not only for Cuba— but for Cuba primarily—the elimination of the tensions that have been created in the Caribbean by means of an agreement based on conditions set forth in the exchange of letters between the United States and the Soviet Union would be a positive result. Moreover, there would be other pluses for us, and for Cuba, because this is an unequal and uneven agreement: on the one hand, the obligations undertaken publicly and solemnly by the United States that they and other countries of the Western Hemisphere will not invade Cuba, and on the other hand, withdrawal of the Il-28s from Cuba. A person who is free from a certain moral psychological factor, and who with his mind’s eye could get a wider view of the situation that has emerged in connection with Cuba, would understand the clear benefit of such an agreement for us and for Cuba. Let’s return to the Cuban statements to the effect that the United States cannot be trusted. In general this is correct, and this is what we call vigilance. But we think it is hard to believe that the United States now, having entered into an agreement with us, would decide to invade Cuba after the removal of the Il-28s. To think like this means to not understand the importance of the Il-28s, to overestimate their capabilities as a weapons system, and at the same time to underestimate the capabilities of the enemy and the weapons they possess. According to the considerations of our Cuban friends, the situation looks like this: The Americans cannot be trusted, and if we remove the Il-28 planes after removing the missiles, that would create better conditions for aggression against Cuba. This picture does not correspond with reality, because if the United States had indeed intended to invade then the Il-28s would not be a deterrent factor. To think otherwise would be not to comprehend the real state of affairs. Of course, the removal of the Il-28s is a concession on our part. We wanted to separate that weapon from the missiles, but to some extent it fits under the category of offensive weapons because it is a bomber and it has quite a long range. In its time, about twelve years ago, it was the best bomber in the world and we publicized it widely. But now it has already become obsolete, and we retired it from service.

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We are telling you all this so that you yourself, so to speak, will comprehend it, and if something is unclear to you, you can ask us for additional explanations in order to help you prepare to conduct discussions, and to try to persuade our Cuban friends that this step we are suggesting is a step toward the stabilization of the situation in Cuba. For us sitting here in Moscow, and for you there, it is clear that if we drag out the debate now we will postpone an agreement, prolong an abnormal situation in the Caribbean, and maintain tensions. Now difficulties have been created for the movement of ships to Cuba. And in general, of course, with the blockade of Cuba, there is no possibility to send ships to Cuba under protection in order to break through the blockade, because the distance and geographical situation of Cuba—and our Cuban comrades should understand that themselves—are very unfavorable for us. Therefore, Cuba would suffer from the continuation of the blockade because it needs uninterrupted communications with the external world, and most of all with the Soviet Union. This is also a factor that the enemy is taking into account, and it wants to exploit this factor—that is, to prolong the blockade, or, as the United States calls it, the quarantine (but it is a blockade). The United States can maintain this situation for a long time, and maybe even indefinitely. But for Cuba—I do not know how Cubans see this—we think that it would be very hard to live through this. They can say we will handle it, we will die. . . . We know this ourselves; we have handled things for forty-five years already, and we were under a blockade—barefoot, hungry, living on 250 grams of porridge—and battled on. Therefore, such arguments for us are something we have already experienced in the past. We marched on and we died, and many more of us died. But after all we were not fighting in order to die, although our song went: “We all will die as one for the power of the Soviets.” Those who went into battle sang that song, but the people sent their representatives to battle in order to survive and to win. And we have achieved that. And Cuba will survive and win, too. But in this struggle, we must not rely only on weapons or act too forcefully. No, we must show flexibility, taking the current situation— and first of all Cuba’s peculiarities and geographical location—into account. The question is not and cannot be defined the same way in relation to Korea or Vietnam—we are not even talking about the European socialist countries—these countries have already been written off for capitalism. However, in the Western Hemisphere the imperialists, of course, will do everything possible to achieve their goal. But we should not make it easier for them to exploit the benefits of their situation. And to exacerbate the situation to the extreme, to armed conflict, would do exactly that. This is one approach. And there are some forces in America that would desire such a development of events. But obviously the most important method that the president of the United States and his circle have chosen for themselves is to strangle Cuba economically by isolating it commercially. They want, as the U.S. press put it before the crisis, to make Cuba too expensive an experiment for the Soviet Union so that it will exhaust the resources the Soviet Union has available for aid, and therefore undermine the economy of Cuba and to make Cuba not only an unattractive but even a repulsive model for the Latin American peoples. They want

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living standards in Cuba to drop even lower than they were before the revolution, when Batista was in Cuba. These stakes are not new for us. Some time ago, similar calculations were made in relation to Soviet Russia when they tried to strangle our revolution with the bony hand of hunger. The imperialist interventionists, when they were thrown out of Soviet territory and lost the opportunity to crush the revolution with armed force, also believed that their main approach would be to create conditions of economic disaster and undermine the socialist revolution in Russia by economic means. They are currently pursuing the same goals in relation to Cuba. If the Cuban comrades, our friends, correctly understand us and trust our conclusions, if they agree with the steps that we are planning, then Cuba will live. We will not abandon Cuba—we are Cuba’s brothers; we have said this publicly, and we repeat it now. We will do everything in our power so that Cuba will rise again—and it has the ability to do so. Along with sending military assistance, we also sent our technicians, agricultural specialists, veterinarians, irrigation specialists, and scientists so that they could focus their efforts on strengthening Cuba’s economy. This is the main factor. And Cuba can demonstrate before the entire world its economic capacity, which emerged as a result of the expulsion of the U.S. monopolies and the seizure of power by the people under the leadership of their chief, Fidel Castro, and his comrades in arms. Strictly speaking, this is how the question stands now in our understanding. If we look back to the history of our state, during Lenin’s period, Lenin was willing to undertake serious maneuvers, compromises, and mutual concessions. And this was correct and justified by history. One cannot submit to a loud revolutionary phrase. That is perhaps as useful as lightning in darkness: It flashes, illuminates the road, and disappears immediately. It is good on the barricades. But when the barricade battle ends, that means that the period of acute struggle is over and that it is passing into a phase of protracted struggle and a period of prolonged coexistence. And this prolonged coexistence necessarily carries with it mutual struggle because the social systems confronting each other are antagonistic and it is impossible to reconcile them. On this long historical path—and there is no measure for how many years this path would take—we must be guided not only by feelings but also by facts, by our theoretical Marxist-Leninist principles, and by the successes in the development of the economies of socialist states—and on this basis we should show our skill in this struggle. If cannons do not fire, then diplomacy carries out the functions of the cannons. One must not exclude the other: not just cannons, and not just Il-28s. No, that is incorrect. At this point, a rational step that puts the enemy in an unfavorable position before the entire world would often be more useful than 100 cannons. The law is on Cuba’s side. Cuba wants to be an independent sovereign state, and all the states of the world understand this. Even the unbridled imperialists cannot openly trample upon this right and cannot deny such aspirations of the Cuban people. It is precisely this that will create even greater problems for the imperialists when the independence and sovereignty of Cuba are protected by an agreement affirmed through the United Nations.

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If one talks about whether to trust or not to trust the United States, then history teaches that there was the League of Nations, then it collapsed, and then there was a world war. Could the UN now collapse? We give no guarantees. Yes, it could. Could world war break out? It could, and we are close to this. But we, as people, as politicians, as Communists, who enjoy the trust of their own people—and not just our own but of the peoples of other countries as well—should utilize everything in order to preserve peace and ensure the independence of their own states and the right of every people to develop in a direction chosen by the people of each country. This should be understood. Therefore, the words “to believe or not to believe” have meaning only at a rally, and a very transient one at that. And in politics, we should rely on factors of a more constant character, acting over a longer term. This is the meaning of the agreement at this stage. We learned from your letter that Fidel Castro, in his impulsiveness, said that if the Cuban position (on the issue of inspections) jeopardizes peace throughout the world, then the Soviet side may consider itself free of its obligations. What can we say to that? Only one thing: We are very disappointed by this understanding on the part of our friend, Fidel Castro, toward whom we feel limitless trust and respect, as to a real hero selflessly devoted to the Revolution. And when he said that, we think that he himself understood that we of course have such a right—to free ourselves from obligations, just as the other side has the right to tell us about it. This is logical and understandable to us. But to say it at this moment and in this connection, understanding us incorrectly, means to injure us, to force us to suffer deeply. Ask Fidel and his friends: What motivated us to come to an agreement with them and to send our people to Cuba; what motivated us to send our weapons there, what motivated us to send our technical specialists, to send our fishermen, what motivated us to send them oil and other goods and to buy their sugar? How could the Cuban comrades think that we pursued any commercial aims, that we got any sort of economic benefit from that? Apart from material expenses, this gives us nothing, and this is known to everyone and is known to our Cuban comrades. We sent our people to Cuba when an invasion was expected. We knew that if there was an invasion the blood of both the Cuban and Soviet peoples would be spilled. We did that. We did that for Cuba, for the Cuban people. Yes, we also did it in our own interests. But our interests here were expressed as common revolutionary interests, the interests of the Revolution, the interests of the international worker’s movement, and Marxist-Leninist teaching. We did it only in the name of all that. And now that the situation we expected has developed—and we expected it when we took this step, almost all of us foresaw this—this is how they see us [i.e., as caring only about Soviet interests —ed.]. It was painful for Mikoyan to listen to that and for us it was no less painful to read about it. Tell Fidel and our other friends that we could have adopted “the most revolutionary” position as some do now. And how would that, so to speak, revolutionary character be expressed? In empty phraseology. When the crisis erupted and a threat hung over Cuba, we could have passed a resolution, an address with the most abusive words against impe-

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rialism, the United States, and world imperialism, and we could have written there that they were capable of every base act, that they were mean and ignoble and we could have broadcast it on every radio station in all the languages of the world. And we would have considered that our revolutionary duty toward heroic Cuba had been fulfilled. So what? Would it have had great significance? As we know, the imperialists do not lose weight from our insults—we have cursed them for forty-five years. And if our efforts had been limited only to cursing imperialism without undertaking any measures for the real strengthening of the forces of socialism, the forces of revolution, then most likely we would have stopped cursing them long ago. They would have physically compelled us to shut up, as they are capable of doing. They would have dealt with us as they have [previously] dealt with more than one revolution in more than one country. Under Lenin’s leadership in the first years of the Russian Revolution, when we did not have diplomatic relations with anybody and when diplomatic channels for expressing the will of the Soviet government were completely unavailable, then we only had one opportunity: to curse the imperialists. And then we had only one radio station; it was called “Named after the Comintern” [Imeni Kominterna]. And then we, so to speak, would plaster the imperialists and capitalists of all countries with curses in every language. That was the extent of our diplomatic activity. But we got through those times. We developed different kinds of relations with the outside world. Now not only the Soviet Union but one-third of the world lives under the banner of Marxism-Leninism. We have diplomatic relations with most of the countries of the world. Therefore, now the resolution of issues depends not only on the correlation of forces, although the correlation of forces—economic and military—is of course the main factor. But when the cannons are silent, diplomacy is assigned a sufficiently large role, and it would be unreasonable for us to reject this instrument that has been developed and tested for ages. One has to have weapons. But weapons bring extermination, especially in our age. Therefore, there is a great deal of work for diplomacy here. Of course, it would have been easy for us to fulfill our revolutionary duty if we had done like certain others: showed our solidarity with the Cuban people and offered to give our own blood at donation centers so they could mix it with Cuban blood. That is quite a cheap revolutionary gesture. We could have sent a lot of blood once the war had begun; but this blood would have been mixed not with blood but with Cuban soil. And it is doubtful that it would have helped the Cuban people. We have undertaken steps of a different character. We upgraded the armed forces of the Soviet Union and our missile technology to combat readiness, and set in motion the diplomatic machinery. And we believe that we achieved [our] goals in the interests of Cuba, in the interests of the people of the Soviet Union and of all the people of the world. We demonstrated the aggressiveness of the United States of America; we showed the peaceloving nature of the socialist countries and the Soviet Union, as the most powerful among the socialist states. And that is not the least factor in the struggle for the minds of the people today. That is why we are disappointed that our friends obviously did not understand that; we took these steps in the name of friendship. They not only did not value this, but even said

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words that hurt our noblest feelings and our noblest revolutionary outpourings of friendship to the Cuban people. Fidel Castro in a conversation with you expressed the idea that the deployment of our missiles in Cuba was carried out in the interests of the entire socialist camp. Explain to Fidel that this is not our understanding of the situation. The interests of the defense of the socialist camp, and the USSR as the most powerful socialist state, did not require the deployment of our missiles in Cuba. We possess sufficiently powerful missiles on the territory of the USSR to ensure this defense, and we can use them against the imperialist aggressor. In deciding to deploy the missiles in Cuba, upon our agreement with our Cuban friends, we pursued the goal of rendering assistance to Cuba, of defending it in the face of the threat of aggression. We understood that this would cause a great shock among the American imperialists, and it did cause such a shock. They drew a conclusion regarding noninvasion guarantees to Cuba, which were expressed in Kennedy’s letters. We believe that the goals we pursued have been achieved and our action of deploying the missiles in Cuba has been justified. We received information from our military comrades that at a ceremonial session that was arranged by our people on November 6, the head of the intelligence administration general staff of Cuba, Pedro Luis, tried several times to raise a toast “to Fidel and Stalin” at his table. We have raised a toast to Fidel ourselves. We have raised a toast to Fidel ourselves here, but we condemned Stalin. We are offended that Pedro Luis, a person who enjoys great trust, a person who works in the intelligence service, catches our enemies, would extol that which we have condemned, especially at this moment of tensions between the countries of socialism and the countries of imperialism. This is to some extent a violation of the relationship of trust between the Soviet Union and Cuba. It was very unpleasant for us to read this report, and it was unpleasant for our people in Cuba to hear it. (This information should be carefully checked. You should talk to the comrades who were present; you should talk to comrades Gribkov and Pavlov.) We wanted to say everything to you candidly. These are not the last difficulties that we will experience. We should be able to assess the situation today patiently and skillfully, and to look toward tomorrow, toward the future—and this future is good. We will have to live through this crisis. This will not be the final crisis because the imperialist camp will not leave us alone and will create crises in other places. Therefore, we should remember one thing: if we really share the same positions, the Marxist-Leninist positions, then we should look for joint decisions and undertake coordinating steps that correspond to the interests of the socialist camp, the interests of peace and socialism. Our efforts are following this course. Cuba today finds itself in the epicenter of the struggle for these ideals. Therefore, we are doing everything in order to secure a position such that Cuba would be following the path chosen by its people—it would be developing on a socialist basis. Regarding the inspections: We agree that unilateral inspections are unacceptable for any country, including Cuba. But U Thant’s proposal about “the UN presence” is beneficial

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for Cuba. In general, this is beneficial for any small country because in this case the United Nations—the world organization—to some extent becomes a guarantor against an invasion of the country that is threatened by invasion. Of course, this must be implemented on an equal basis so that UN observers would be [stationed] in Cuba, in some region of the United States and also in other countries of the Caribbean. Then sovereignty, equality, equal conditions, and equal guaranties will be ensured. If the imperialists announce that Cuba is planning an attack and therefore they want to have observers there, then in its turn Cuba, if someone is planning an attack against it, can demand that observers be sent and observer posts be established in those countries from which such aggression is possible. We believe this approach to be correct. As early as 1955 and then in 1958, we ourselves introduced proposals at the disarmament negotiations, which presupposed establishing observer posts at airports, at railway hubs, on highways, and in large ports on a mutual basis. Those proposals remain in force today. Their purpose is to avert the danger of some aggressive country preparing a sudden attack, concentrating forces, and carrying out an invasion of the other country. Apparently, even if we eliminate the crisis we are currently living through—and we think that we will eliminate it on the basis of a mutual agreement—this question will take on an importance beyond Cuba (but Cuba could start the process). This system then could be expanded to Europe and Asia, which would serve the cause of guaranteeing the security of all countries of the world and most of all of the two camps—of the countries of the socialist camp and the countries of the imperialist camp that have joined NATO’s military bloc. We believe that this is reasonable. Therefore now we need to enter diplomatic negotiations, which have already started. In order to create a basis for that, our country has to fulfill its obligations so that the other country can fulfill its obligation. The U.S. president accepted this in principle in his letter. (But you should not cite this last confidential letter in your conversation with the Cubans.) In our letter to Comrade Fidel Castro, we have already given an explanation [in response] to his statement that we allegedly have not consulted with him. We have no other alternatives except to repeat what we have already said: We believe that there was consultation when we received a telegram from Havana, which said that an attack on Cuba was almost inevitable, and that the alternative to this was to preempt and to deliver a nuclear strike. We understood that you wanted us to undertake measures that would preempt the enemy, and preclude the possibility of an air strike or an invasion of Cuba. You believed that this could have been achieved by our delivering a nuclear strike on the United States. According to your information about the timing of attacks on Cuba, we did not have time for formal consultations, which we wanted to conduct before doing what we did. Therefore, we hope that you will understand that we acted in the interests of Cuba, in the interests of the Soviet people, and in the interest of the people of the entire world. And in our opinion, we achieved those ends. When you are prepared, choose a moment for conversation. As you can see from Kennedy’s confidential letter, we need to give him an answer. We have been delaying this

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answer for some time, and we would like to receive your opinion, which would be passed to us after having already incorporated the reaction of our friends. Then we would be able to give Kennedy an answer that we would not have to change later—an answer that would ideally express a coordinated position and would satisfy ours and Cuba’s mutual interests. We know that a hard task has befallen you. But we decided, and the military for their part quite firmly said, that in the interests of normalizing the situation the Il-28s should be removed from Cuba in order not to make the Il-28 into some kind of fetish—either the Il-28s or nothing. This would be foolish because this is not the kind of weapon for which it would be worth breaking off negotiations and thus jeopardizing all the achievements we have reached in our correspondence with the president. We should not provide an opportunity for the aggressive forces to undermine what was already achieved and place the responsibility for the breakup on us. This would be unforgivable from our side; it would show a lack of understanding of simple things. From the materials we have obtained (and we sent these to you), you can see that among the responsible leading circles of the United States they allegedly allow for the possibility that in order not to create a crisis out of the dispute over the Il-28s, the Americans could even agree to leave the planes there; however, we must give assurances that their numbers will not increase in the future. This, of course, would be the best option for us. But it would not be completely correct to start from this assumption in elaborating our steps. Therefore, we should exhibit caution. We are using this, but only in the course of bargaining. If we can get this bargain, then of course we would not refuse it, but we have to determine our ultimate decision, and our ultimate decision is the agreement to withdraw the Il-28s, which will not affect the defensive measures that have been taken in Cuba. On the contrary, the moral strengthening of our position in the negotiations is worth the withdrawal of these airplanes since then the United States will be faced with the necessity of affirming, even more firmly before the entire world, the obligation undertaken in the president’s letter, and to register it at the United Nations. This act warrants the withdrawal, the removal of the Il-28s from Cuba. N. Khrushchev

Source: From the personal archive of Dr. Sergo A. Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.

Document 19 Mikoyan’s Cable to Khrushchev (Special No. 1809)

November 11, 1962 CC CPSU Comrade N. S. Khrushchev First, I received No. 1013, read it, thought it through. I believe that the decision on Il-28 that you are considering is absolutely the right one. It is too bad that we did not decide this issue this way at the same time with the missiles. Notwithstanding the moral damage that the new concession would do, we have to do it in order not to give the Americans the excuse to use the pretext that we did not fulfill our obligations in full and thus evade the guarantees of noninvasion of Cuba and to extend the quarantine for practically an indefinite length of time, that is, to eliminate what we, with full justification, consider a victory. I have suspicions that Kennedy, having received satisfaction on this issue, would continue to drag out the diplomatic resolution of the entire complex of issues related to the relaxation of the situation around Cuba, insisting on some other new issues, which are mentioned in his letter, but which are not formulated as required conditions in this letter. We should settle this business in such a way that it would be our last concession, not to give Kennedy any opportunities for further blackmail. Therefore, maybe we should let the president know through unofficial channels that you are ready to discuss this issue on the condition that the negotiations start immediately and if there is a satisfactory agreement about guarantees of noninvasion of Cuba, and if the U Thant plan on UN inspections of the territories of countries in the Caribbean Sea is accepted, including the part of the southern territory of the United States where the camps of the Cuban counterrevolutionaries are located. This is important so that we could counter the U.S. claims for permanent unilateral inspections of Cuba with the system of multilateral control by the United Nations throughout the entire region of the Caribbean Sea. 381

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It is even more important because the Cuban comrades agree with this only on condition that some part of the U.S. territory would be included in such inspections. At the same time, we should drive the settlement in such a way that the practical removal of Il-28s would be carried out after or simultaneously with the approval of the necessary Security Council documents, lifting of the quarantine, and the pullout of troops and naval forces of the United States that are targeting Cuba. If we use, as I assume we would, the confidential channel, then it would give us an opportunity to delay your response to Kennedy for some time. By that time, the KuznetsovMcCloy negotiations would be under way, which would give us an opportunity to feel out the Americans’ behavior. Second, on the issue of military specialists, I believe, we should not give commitments regarding their recall, especially of all of them. It would be better to say that we have an agreement with the Cuban government regarding gradual replacement of the Soviet personnel by the Cuban ones, as they get the training. This might take ten to twelve months. After the completion of this work, there will remain a limited number of Soviet specialists working for the Cuban government as advisers or instructors, who would be demobilized from the Soviet Army. This formula will fully correspond to the agreement that F. Castro has and therefore he would not raise any objections to it. And as a matter of principle, we should not make commitments to the Americans not to provide assistance with our military specialists to a socialist country. On the basis of the previous correspondence, Kennedy has no right to raise this issue. And in his public statements he never questioned the legitimacy of the presence of Soviet military specialists in Cuba. Third, of course I will make every effort to convince our Cuban friends, especially because your letter contains an extensive arsenal of convincing arguments. Considering the character of our friends and their state of mind, this issue will create unpleasant feelings and hurt them. Later, they of course will understand the correctness of this decision and that it is in the interest of defense of the Cuban cause. To achieve this, it would be necessary to talk to them several times, to return to the same issue again and again to try to convince them. It would be best if at first I would have a one-on-one discussion with Fidel, without all the members of the leadership present, as it was yesterday during the discussion of the issue about the military agreement, and then talk to all of them again. But he may not agree to a one-to-one conversation so that he does not get himself into a vulnerable situation. Yesterday, Saturday, he told me that he decided to take the day off on Sunday, and on Monday or Tuesday to call a meeting to discuss the question of the military agreement with the Cuban leadership. However, today Rodriguez informed Alexeyev that on Monday they would discuss this issue among themselves and the meeting with us is scheduled for Wednesday, November 14. Yesterday Fidel told me that he wants me to visit the eastern province of Camaguay, to learn about their achievements in animal husbandry, and that he would like to come with

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me. However, he has many things to do in Havana, and therefore he wants Rodriguez to accompany me instead. I agreed. The trip is planned for Tuesday with return to Havana on the same day. We will try to meet with Fidel one-to-one late at night on Tuesday. If that does not work, then during the meeting on Wednesday, after the discussion of the military agreement, I will explain the new instructions (about Il-28s and other things) in the presence of everybody. Fourth, I consider it absolutely necessary that when your response to Kennedy is prepared, I would have an opportunity to familiarize Fidel with the Kennedy letter and your response before it is given to Kennedy. Sooner or later, the information will leak through the American press that there had been an exchange of letters on these issues and if Fidel is not informed about it beforehand, it could lead to a new trauma or mistrust toward us. I do not know how things will work out after I carry out the new instructions, but yesterday, at the end of the conversation about the military agreement, I felt full trust toward us on his part. We should treasure this feeling of trust. . . . 11.11.1962

A. I. Mikoyan

Source: From the personal archive of Sergo A. Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.

Document 20 Transcript of Conversation between A. I. Mikoyan and Fidel Castro

November 12, 1962 Ambassador A. I. Alekseyev attended the discussion. Fidel Castro reported that he seldom took time off and that he had spent the last few days on a trip around experimental plots in the provinces. He reported that in one of the villages an interesting new strain of bean had been discovered, or actually four different types of beans that had very much interested him. Castro told Mikoyan that this bean, which had vines like grapes, was a perennial. The farmer who had raised the bean said that it would keep growing back for four or five years. I brought some of these beans home, Castro continues, and was convinced that they were excellent for cooking and tasted fine. A. I. Mikoyan noted that he had never heard of such a thing as a perennial bean. F. Castro said that he, too, had never heard of the perennial bean. But the farmers had convinced him. He added that from just a few bean plants, which grew like grapes on a common vine, twenty-five beans had been gathered on one farm. The farmers who were growing these strains of beans could feed their families virtually entirely from the crop. F. Castro: What did our country use to produce? Essentially only sugar and tobacco. In my opinion, using this kind of bean could solve our food problem. I should note that this bean even withstood an eight-month drought, when most plantings in our country failed. A. I. Mikoyan: I would like to discuss with you, Comrade Fidel, one of the important issues. We are interested in the most rapid resolution of the existing conflict in favor of Cuba. Our country has fulfilled its obligations, although the Americans have not removed the quarantine. They fear complications, are looking for catches and are trying to find reasons not to keep the promises Kennedy gave to N. S. Khrushchev. If the Soviet Union withdraws offensive weapons, they promise to guarantee nonintervention from the United States and restrain their allies. Then the situation in the Carib384

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bean will normalize. Kennedy is being criticized in the United States for promising to provide a guarantee not to invade Cuba. This is happening because advocates of war are growing more active in the United States. A number of American figures are advocating the use of force to resolve the situation. They are unhappy with the fact that the problem is being resolved in a peaceful fashion. In our opinion, Kennedy wants to use the economic blockade and the bony hand of hunger to strangle Cuba. Such attempts were used against our country in the past. Of course, you have read about the economic blockade staged against the young Soviet republic by the imperialists and what advantages our enemies hoped to gain by using hunger against Russia. By trying to create economic difficulties, Americans are hoping to undermine Cuba from within. Kennedy said outright that he would create conditions to weaken Cuba economically. Then the Soviet Union will not have the strength to aid Cuba, and the Cuban government will fall. The military circles of the United States, on the other hand, disagree with Kennedy and favor using force to resolve the crisis in the Caribbean Sea. Without military pressure or a military blockade, the trade embargo by the Western countries will not hinder Cuba’s development. The Soviet Union will provide all possible aid to revolutionary Cuba, so that Cuba will become a real model, a vivid example for all of Latin America. This is quite realistic. We deeply believe in this and can provide all the necessary conditions for this. Kennedy and a number of other American political figures believe that the Soviet Union has not completely fulfilled its obligations. We believed that the agreement only referred to missiles, [but] in the opinion of the U.S., there is also the question of the Il-28 bombers. Kennedy spoke about the bombers in his public speech. They believe that we have not completely fulfilled our obligations, meaning the Il-28 bombers. On formal, legal grounds, they are stating that we have not fulfilled our obligations and, proceeding from that, believe they are in the right to refuse to keep their promises to remove the quarantine and provide guarantees [against invasion]. We are refusing to remove the Il-28 bombers from Cuba and we can go on refusing. We do not think that war will break out over that. Of course, knowing the nature of these mad men, no one can guarantee that they will not take the route of a military confrontation. But, since formally we have not met Kennedy’s demand to withdraw the bombers from Cuba, the United States will maintain the blockade against Cuba, will continue the quarantine for an indefinite time, will refuse to fulfill its obligations concerning nonintervention, and will keep up the tension in the Caribbean Sea in order to launch an attack on Cuba at some other time. This is one prospect. Another prospect is possible. We agree to withdraw the Il-28 bombers with personnel and equipment if the Americans provide complete guarantees and a promise not to invade Cuba, and completely remove the quarantine and liquidate the tension in the Caribbean Sea. Of course, people can say: what are the American guarantees worth? Of course, they cannot be completely trusted. Imperialism and socialism are implacable enemies. However, we cannot entirely dismiss the promises given by representatives of bourgeois countries. There are certain international properties, legal norms, laws, interna-

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tional public opinion. All these factors will force the imperialists to keep their word. But if the objective conditions change, they can forget their word and change their position drastically. We need high vigilance. Nevertheless, we cannot completely nullify the possibility of an agreement, since such a rejection would amount to denying the fact of the coexistence of two opposing social systems. After all, in the Party Program passes at the TwentySecond Congress of the CPSU and the Declaration of the Conference of Representatives of Communist Workers’ Parties in 1957 and the Statement of Eighty-One Fraternal Parties at the Conference in 1960, the fact is clearly determined that not war, but peaceful coexistence of two systems will decide that matter in favor of socialism. That means that all these most important documents talk about the peaceful coexistence of two systems, of the preservation, as it is said in law, of the modus vivendi. We believe that the United Nations’ approval of the documents that contain statements in support of Cuba would be an important diplomatic factor. These documents would restrain the imperialists, would tie their hands and would not allow aggression to be unleashed. Socialism and capitalism are approximately equal. We cannot destroy imperialism. They cannot destroy socialism. Thus only one path lies before us, and that is the path of peaceful coexistence. We see how quickly the socialist countries are growing and gaining strength. And the forces advocating socialism in the capitalist countries are also growing stronger. The liberation movement in the colonial countries is growing. The number of neutral countries is increasing. The question arises: Is war possible? Yes, it is possible, but there is no fatal inevitability of war. War can be averted. Can the UN prevent a world war? That is quite unlikely. However, the UN is one of the instruments of peace. True, there was once the League of Nations. When the contradictions between socialism and capitalism worsened, the League collapsed. The UN may also collapse. However at the present time, the UN can and should be used, since there are many representatives of neutral countries there. True, the representatives of neutral countries often let us down in difficult moments but inside the UN the correlation of forces is changing in our favor. We must fight for peaceful coexistence and in that struggle use the representatives of peaceful countries. At this juncture, it seems to me that we must be free from the power of all, even the most noble feelings and push to the side psychological considerations that are usually very important, and after soberly and calmly thinking through everything, take the decision that will be to Cuba’s advantage. We must analyze the positive and negative aspects of both prospects that you and I are discussing. We must soberly evaluate the significance of the Il-28 bomber and understand what we are losing if we agree to the removal from Cuba of this weapon. Morally, of course, it is a loss. After all, it is a new concession. It causes you pain and distress. However, these planes have almost no real military value for Cuba. F. Castro: Why are these arguments being cited? You should say outright what the Soviet government wants.

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A. I. Mikoyan: We brought forty-two Il-28 bombers here. Only two of them are assembled, and the rest remain in their containers. This was a good bomber, but it has grown quite outmoded. Our industry has taken it out of production. A. I. Alekseyev: It has been removed from our arsenal. A. I. Mikoyan: We believe that although the Il-28 is capable of long-distance flight, it has no importance for Cuba since its altitude is only 12,000 meters. It can be shot down by any type of antiaircraft weaponry. These planes can be used only along Cuba’s coast. The Americans themselves understand that this plane is outmoded. Cuba has the MiG-21. This is a modern aircraft whose tactical and technological capabilities considerably exceed the combat ability of the outmoded Il-28 bomber. It is important to note that the MiG-21 can carry bombs and missiles, can bomb and strafe infantry, destroy land and air targets and disable a ship. Moreover, the MiG-21 is capable of engaging in and maintaining aerial battle. There are forty such planes in Cuba now. They will remain here in any event. Kennedy knows that these planes are in Cuba. But he is not saying anything about them. From the military point of view, the Il-28 no longer has any significance. In the near future, we were intending to increase in Cuba the number of MiG-21s, which are the most modern combat aircraft. If we resolve the matter of removing the Il-28s from Cuba, we will thus disarm the United States of the formal argument that it is trying to exploit. Although the United States is saying that these bombers are no threat to the United States itself, they claim, however, that the Il-28 bombers are terrifying to Latin America, because countries there do not have strong aircraft artillery. Having resolved the matter of removing these bombers and their service personnel and equipment from Cuba, which the Americans are calling offensive, we are forcing the United States to fulfill its obligations and normalize the situation in the Caribbean Sea region. It is said that the appetite grows during the meal. Of course, it is essential to put an end to the appetites that have grown out of hand. However, it is difficult to argue about the Il-28. After all, it is a bomber, although only in the formal sense. With regard to other means, we will give the Americans a complete and decisive rebuff. If we remove the bombers from Cuba, then we will gain support from the UN. In that case it will be easier to accept U Thant’s plan and normalize the situation. I have many other arguments; however, I will not cite them here, but note that I am speaking with you, Comrade Castro, on behalf of the CC CPSU. As Marxist-Leninists, we must resolve the question in order to rid Cuba of the blockade and force the United States to maintain its obligations. We cannot guarantee escort of our ships en route to Cuba since the United States possesses the advantage in this region. If the blockade is continued, our forces will be undermined, and the plans of the imperialists will be carried out. If the Il-28 bombers are withdrawn, Cuba will cease to be under threat. We urge you, Comrade Fidel, to understand us correctly. I am not asking you to answer now. Think about it and discuss this very important issue. Perhaps you will decide to meet with your comrades. This matter deserves the most profound study.

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We trust you completely. You understand, of course, that we are not pursuing any other interests except the defense of the Cuban Revolution and the entire revolutionary movement from imperialist predators. We are not pursuing any commercial or national interests in Cuba. We are guided exclusively by the interests of internationalism. We understand you completely. We admire very much the great spirit of the Cuban people. In the first years of the existence of our country, as you know, we were in very difficult circumstances, when the imperialists wanted to use a blockade to destroy us. We very much understand the high political meaning of your slogan “Motherland or Death.” In the years of the [Russian] civil war and of foreign intervention, we were also guided by such a slogan. We recall how, going to the front in order to defend Soviet power, our patriots, who were so like Cuban patriots, sang: “And as one, we will die for the power of the Soviets.” Our people displayed great fortitude. We encountered great difficulties but we overcame them and grew very strong. V. I. Lenin, who led our country in those years, knew how to maneuver. He believed that maneuvering and flexibility were necessary to preserve the conquests of the revolution. All of our great experience of struggle for victory and preservation of the revolution tells us that a decision to withdraw the bombers would be correct. We are talking to you, outlining our considerations as brothers and comrades, and telling you all this from purely [text missing]. We will be together with you, we will always to shoulder to shoulder with you in a common struggle. You know that we sent our people to Cuba so that we could be with you constantly during these difficult moments. We gave the order to General Pavlov to defend Cuba along with you. Our only interests in this is to defend Cuba, to preserve the Cuban Revolution. Some people believe that you can fight the imperialists by denouncing them. However, no matter how sharp the denunciation, the imperialists do not weaken because of it. We had a Comintern [Communist International] radio station at one time in our country. It resolutely scolded the imperialists in broadcasts in various languages. But it could not provide practical help to our friends abroad. We are providing Cuba with military, economic, and diplomatic aid. We have sent our military specialists here. We have done all this to preserve Cuba as a revolutionary beacon in the American region. We are with you Comrade Fidel, as brothers and friends. True, there can be differences even among brothers. However, you must understand the sincerity of our intentions. F. Castro: I think that this is a question of the torpedo carriers at the base in San Gallein. A. I. Mikoyan: The Il-28 planes really can carry torpedoes. I want to emphasize once again that Cuba has MiG-21s. As the Cuban personnel are trained, we will transfer the planes to you. They can wage aerial combat and be used it attack land targets and destroy the enemy’s paratroopers and perform as dive bombers. As for the Il-28s, we would have turned them into scrap metal if the Berlin crisis had not broken out and if Kennedy had not called up 150,000 reserves into the army.

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We are not saying that the MiG-21 exceeds the Il-28 in its offensive tactical and technical capabilities. [Text missing] the artillery of the United States would be able to shoot it down without much difficulty. However, we must keep in mind the opinion of the Latin American public. In the documents known to you, Kennedy called the bombers as well as the missiles “offensive weapons.” F. Castro (without listening to the explanations of Mikoyan): Will they later raise the issue of inspection of Cuban territory as well? A. I. Mikoyan: Kennedy says that if the bombers are not withdrawn from Cuba, no guarantee of nonintervention with regard to Cuba can be given. Although these bombers are not so terrible for the Americans, the Il-28 is called a bomber. It was a good combat plane in its day. But for the defense of the country, the Il-28 is not needed, and the United States is not intending to invade Cuba. The MiG-21 fighters, as we have already said, are very powerful fighting machines, although their range is a little less than the Il-28. These fighters can be used to perform combat missions against land targets and against enemy ships at sea. These airplanes are so new that we do not even have very many of them. They completely meet the requirements for Cuba’s defense. The MiG-21s can stay on Cuba the same as all other combat weapons. As for the possibility of the United States raising the issue of inspecting Cuban territory and overseeing the withdrawal of the Il-28 bombers, I would like to say the following. We could agree to such inspections of the ships carrying the missiles out of Cuba. Of course, the Americans would like to carry out inspections on Cuban territory, but we respect the Cuban position and will never permit a unilateral inspection of Cuban territory. We could agree to a visual check at sea of the removal of the bombers. We possess precise information. Kennedy is maneuvering. If he achieves his demands he will be forced to keep his promises as well and give a guarantee that neither the United States nor its allies will invade Cuba, and he will have to lift the blockade. If Kennedy’s demands are not met, then the United States will maintain the blockade and continue it, accusing us of not keeping our promises. In that case even the UN will not support us. It is our informed judgment that, given the availability of such modern fighters as the MiG-21, the Il-28 bomber has no important significance for the defense of Cuba. We propose to meet Kennedy’s demands, as long as the Americans remove the blockade and provide firm guarantees not to invade Cuba. If, on the other hand, we leave the bombers in Cuba, then we are thereby giving the United States grounds to withdraw the promise of guarantees and grounds to maintain the blockade. That would be bad for both you and for us. Think this matter over several times, Comrade Castro. Think calmly and make a decision. If we stubbornly refuse to withdraw the Il-28 from Cuba, then the negotiations will be at a stalemate. That will give the United States the opportunity to keep up the blockade and achieve a worsening of the economic situation in Cuba. In that case, the example of Cuba will no longer inspire peoples. Consequently, you will also suffer moral losses. A guarantee not to invade Cuba must be extracted from the United States, using the Soviet

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Union’s support and that of other socialist countries. Then Cuba may develop its economy rapidly and that is important for Latin America and for the world. Predators are predators, but for the sake of achieving a great purpose, one often has to maneuver. We, Comrade Fidel, will also act in the interests of revolutionary Cuba. This statement reflects the determination of the entire CC CPSU. We believe that the path described is the best path for Cuba. The defense capabilities of Cuba are quite great. Cuba is in the right. Achieving an agreement in the United States will undermine all attempts to stifle Cuba using military force. F. Castro: What position will the Soviet Union take if, despite the withdrawal of the bombers, the United States insists on inspections and using the excuse that Cuba did not agree to an inspection, does not remove the blockade? A. I. Mikoyan: We will withdraw the bombers in the event that the United States fulfills its obligations. We will keep the bombers in Cuba until we attain an agreement with the Americans and a removal of the blockade. The practical question of the inspection was covered during my conversation in New York with [John] McCloy. We will tirelessly defend your position. The procedure which could be used to oversee the removal of the planes from Cuba, as we see it, could be the same one that was used during the withdrawal of the missiles. This could be done at sea in order not to infringe Cuba’s interests. This is the revolutionary government’s wish, and thus the inspection of Cuban territory will not even be raised at the present time. F. Castro: I would like to note, Comrade Mikoyan, that we will never permit an inspection. I ask you to convey to the Soviet government that this is our final decision and cannot be reviewed. A. I. Mikoyan: I already informed the Soviet government about the determination of the Cuban government not to allow an inspection of its territory. This issue is not being raised. By allowing a visual inspection of our ships, we proved that we are fulfilling our obligations. No matter how much the American government insists we will not yield. It can be considered that you and we have never had any disagreements on this matter. We respect your sovereignty. I will report the opinion you have expressed to our government. F. Castro: I will be meeting now with the rest of the members of the leadership in order to discuss this question, although I do not see any special reason to hurry. A. I. Mikoyan: I would like to add as well that the withdrawal of the missiles has deprived you only of offensive weaponry. The missiles were a means to deter the enemy. But Cuba does not intend to invade the United States. Thus you do not need the Il-28 bombers. As is known, they cannot be a means of deterrence. All the other combat weapons are the most modern means to defend the country. Of course if the United States were to attack you with all its might, then even all these powerful means would not be enough to defend you. But if the governments of the Latin American countries tried to commit aggression against Cuba without the direst intervention of the United States, they will suffer a harsh defeat. Cuba’s fire power is very strong. I think that not a single other socialist country, if we leave out the Soviet Union, possesses such modern powerful combat weapons as you have.

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F. Castro: I would like to meet with my comrades now. I will remember all your arguments. I am already forming an opinion on this matter. A. I. Mikoyan: I am prepared to meet with you or with all the leaders of the revolutionary government together at any time in order to provide additional explanations if they are needed. I can cite other arguments if today’s arguments have seemed unconvincing. I ask you to convey warm greetings to your comrades. F. Castro: Thank you. Tell me, Comrade Mikoyan, are you going to Havana University tonight, where you have been invited? A. I. Mikoyan: Should I? F. Castro: Of course you should. That would be good and useful. Are you going to Turiguano tomorrow? A. I. Mikoyan: Perhaps it is better not to go to Turiguano, but to use that time for discussion? F. Castro: No. I think that the trip will be interesting. I would very much recommend that you go. We can arrange to talk tomorrow evening when you return from the trip, or on Wednesday. A. I. Mikoyan: All right. Good-bye, Comrade Fidel. F. Castro: Thank you. Until we meet, Comrade Mikoyan. Recorded by V. Tikhmenev. (Signature)

Source: Anatoly Gribkov and William Smith, Operation Anadyr: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994), 191–99.

Document 21 Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan to the CC CPSU

November 12, 1962 A meeting took place with Fidel Castro, and I fulfilled your assignment (your No. 1013 about everything connected to the “Il-28”), marshaling in this conversation almost all the argumentation in Comrade Khrushchev’s letter to me. In the middle of the conversation, he became agitated and almost blew up, saying that instead of putting forth arguments, it should be just said outright what the Soviet government wanted. Without losing my calm, I laid out our proposal and cited our arguments. Fidel spoke very little. In another telegram, I will report in full on everything concerning his reaction. Toward the end of the conversation, he gradually began to calm down and stated that he understood our arguments, that he was forming an opinion (he did not say what it was) and that he would discuss this with his comrades, and then a meeting would take place with us. In order to understand Fidel’s mood the following facts are characteristic: He asked if I was going to the university, where I was invited this evening, and I asked, “Is it necessary?” He replied that it would be good and useful. He himself returned to [the subject of] tomorrow’s trip to the province, and I expressed the opinion that it might be better to use that time for discussion. He began to insist on the trip, saying that a discussion would take place either tomorrow evening, after I return from the trip, or on Wednesday. We parted on friendly terms, bid farewell warmly, in a fraternal manner. No. 864 12. XI. 62

A. Mikoyan

Source: Anatoly Gribkov and William Smith, Operation Anadyr: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994), 189–90. 392

Document 22 Khrushchev’s Instructions to Mikoyan

November 13, 1962 Havana Soviet Ambassador for Comrade Mikoyan, A. I. I read the short content of the conversation, more precisely not the conversation itself, but with your impressions of the conversation that you had with Fidel. Your situation is difficult; we understand this well, but what is there to do? Enlighten him—there is no other way out. It is a necessary work and these are necessary efforts because we believe in and do not doubt Fidel’s honesty. Because of his youth, both in age and as a political figure, it is apparent that it is hard for him to understand how it is possible for us to behave in such a manner in our revolutionary activities, and even more so in the situation that the Soviet Union occupies in the world right now, where we move with two pawns or two figures: the military figure and the diplomatic figure. But we have already acquired such a weight in the world that our every diplomatic move is very important in the relationships between governments and in the solutions of international issues. It is, of course, not easy to understand—and not only for Fidel, but also for people who are older than him in age and who possess much experience in revolutionary activities. It happens that even these people do not completely understand this, and even understand less than Fidel. Therein it is necessary to work and work so that he understands us. We already sent you the president’s answer to my confidential message to him, also given orally. We assess it as very favorable. Right now we are already sending our answer to the president’s answer, also confidential. We are referring it to you for orientation and to use it in some degree in the appropriate format and in your conversations with our friend Fidel. We are granting you the right to decide for yourself how to use our answer: as an argument, as a kind of reference, or to familiarize him with the content of our answer. 393

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As to the confidential answer of the president, which repeats the announcement that America is supporting its affirmations about its nonintrusion on Cuba, we give it great meaning. Cuban friends might not understand this at the moment and might take it lightly, considering this announcement not to have especial importance. But this is unlikely. The announcement, unconditionally, has meaning, especially if it is released by a government like the United States or the Soviet Union. This announcement ties the United States to the long term. In any event, you can consider that it ties them to President Kennedy’s time in the White House. But the matter looks such that Kennedy, who gives obligation to the nonintrusion of Cuba, will be elected for a second term. In this way, Cuba has, at least, a six-year guarantee of nonintrusion from the outside. A six-year term for revolution and revolutionaries—it is a big term. Moreover, you need to have in mind that we are currently on the rise—I mean the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries in regard to economic development, in the realms of strengthening our armed forces, in the growth of popularity, authority, and the growth in popularity of socialism in general in the world. People who exhibit against socialism are compelled to publicly announce that they are also supporters of the building of socialism. This speaks about the strength of our Marxist-Leninist idea. Therefore you cannot take the United States’ given obligation to nonintrusion in Cuba so lightly. Indeed the question stood thus: either war or agreement to the path of compromise through mutual concessions. Going with agreement, we are the very ones who made the United States turn away from intrusion in Cuba. We Communists have to keep in mind the president’s situation: There were not people in America, taking up the official position, who would have recognized that in the Western Hemisphere the development of other systems besides capitalism is possible. Therefore, they were always drawn to the Monroe Doctrine, the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, and various other agreements imposing American imperialism in order to not allow the appearance of other socioeconomic systems in the Western Hemisphere. Now representatives of the same rabid imperialist government, the United States, took the obligation and affirm that they are prepared to formulate this document, through the United Nations, about nonintrusion in Cuba. So is this really our retreat? Who is really retreating? Retreating are those who wanted to intrude in Cuba. They are announcing that they are not going to intrude. This is an advance of socialism, an advance of revolutionary force, and a retreat of reactionary strength. That is how things stand. We are writing this to you about our worries. I am saying straightforwardly that we are very pleased with the receipt of the answer. We consider that we have played well and won the game that we started. It is well known to you that when we decided the questions we foresaw ourselves the path of the crisis that broke out; we foresaw all of its moves and possibilities. It flowed the way that we suggested and with the same conclusion, that is, with the conclusion to our advantage. We, so to say, are concluding this crisis, brought about by the appearance of our rocket array in Cuba, and, like we said, this was a shock. Now the Americans literally and themselves use this word. They use it after they experienced this

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shock. Now they have obviously not escaped this shock. But this is going to be a stimulus for more rational measures and agreement about other questions that need to be decided. It is clear that this is enough for you for the time being. I wish you luck. Right now I am sitting with the “posse” in Semyonovskoe and preparing my report for the plenum. N. Khrushchev

Source: Personal Archive of Sergo Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Amanda Conrad for the National Security Archive.

Document 23 Record of Conversation between A. I. Mikoyan and F. Castro

November 13, 1962 The conversation took place at A. I. Mikoyan’s residence. After exchanging greetings, Mikoyan talked about his visit to the cattle farm located on Turiguano Island. He made this trip by plane on the same day, together with Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and head adviser F. R. Titov. A. I. Mikoyan: Today’s trip was very interesting. We were impressed with the work carried out by the revolutionary government in developing animal husbandry. The Santa Gertrudis cattle breed can take a high place at any exhibition. F. Castro: The revolutionary government plans to export cattle from this farm in the future. A. I. Mikoyan: Our minister of agriculture acquired a few animals of this breed in the United States. I saw them. It is a very promising breed. Speaking about the cattle farm in Turiguano, Mikoyan expressed his admiration for the scope and quality of the construction of buildings for cattle and pigs. Judging by the scope and quality of the ongoing work, one could say that this is not a socialist, but a Communist farm, Mikoyan joked. The cattle farm in Turiguano is very large. I would say that there few farms of this scale in the world. We have similar types of farms in Uzbekistan and Siberia, but I think the farm in Turiguano far exceeds them in size. F. Castro: Have you read the article about the arrest of an American CIA agent who was sent to Cuba? A. I. Mikoyan: Yes. I read these materials today. Here is the true face of the “free” Western world for you. Ambassador Alekseyev told me today that some time ago there was an assassination attempt on Comrade Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. F. Castro (jokingly): This attempt, it seems, was due to the shortage of meat in Cuba. 396

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C. R. Rodriguez (also jokingly): At the time, he did not yet hold a post at the National Institute of Agrarian Reform. F. Castro: Comrade Mikoyan, please, let’s talk about the issue raised in yesterday’s conversation. A. I. Mikoyan agrees with Fidel Castro’s suggestion. F. Castro: We basically did not agree with the removal of strategic missiles, just as we disagree with the removal of Il-28 bombers from Cuba. These measures create a difficult situation for us. They undermine our sovereign right to determine for ourselves what type of weapons we can have, and what agreements we can make. With respect to the missiles, we are faced with a fait accompli, and we will not persist with regard to Il-28 bombers. We are aware of the Soviet government’s intention to withdraw the Il-28 bombers from Cuba as a basis for negotiations with the Americans. The same thing happened with the missiles—first you made a commitment, then you started to remove them. Our position is as follows: tie the removal of the naval blockade and the cessation of the violation of Cuban airspace to the withdrawal of Il-28 bombers. Without these requirements, we cannot give our consent. I believe that it is a minimal, but also our firm requirement. Otherwise, the five points put forward by the revolutionary government will become meaningless, and we consider them our guarantee. If the requirements I outlined—to lift the naval blockade and cease violating Cuba’s airspace—are met, then the Il-28 bombers can be removed from Cuba. We already spoke with Comrade Mikoyan about the need to send a letter to the acting UN secretary-general U Thant that, despite the removal of offensive weapons from Cuban territory, the Americans continue to violate our airspace. We have taken a passive, permissive stance on violation of Cuban airspace. The Americans are insolent. They make shaving flights over Cuban territory, flying at 100 meters over our military bases and units. This is bad for the morale of our people and makes them resentful. Our position led to the point that now our enemy knows everything. The Americans’ reconnaissance flights over Cuban territory led to the weakening of our country’s defense. It is difficult to explain to our people this concession to the enemy. It is difficult to explain why we let ourselves come to this state of affairs. All we need now is for American planes to land on our territory to refuel. And what are we doing? We are enabling them. In effect, we are allowing the enemy to violate our airspace. The Soviet Union, the socialist countries, or any other sovereign nation would not allow it. Why do we? Such enabling on our part can be interpreted as a sign of cowardice, like we forgot the principles of morality. We think that after the strategic missiles are removed from Cuba, we can no longer allow this to go on. We decided to write to the acting secretarygeneral U Thant that all the planes making shaving flights over Cuba will be shot down. Now I would like to speak about the Il-28 bombers. Since they are the property of the Soviet Union, we, despite the statement I just made, will agree with the Soviet government’s decision to remove them, just as we agreed with the decision to remove the missiles. This is not just my personal opinion. We discussed the issue of Il-28 bombers at the secretariat of the ORI national leadership and unanimously came to this decision.

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A. I. Mikoyan: I would like to respond to this question in several parts. First, I will talk about our position on the issue of violations of Cuba’s airspace. At one time, we considered it necessary not to shoot down American planes. This issue was raised some time ago by Comrade Dorticós. After a conversation with Comrade Dorticós I informed the Soviet government of the Cuban position. The day before yesterday, during a conversation with Comrade Fidel, I told him that our government came to an agreement with your position regarding contacting U Thant and demanding an end to these brazen flights. This protest could be motivated by the fact that the Soviet Union kept its promise, but the United States does not want to keep its. This kind of protest against the violation of Cuban airspace would serve as a warning from the revolutionary government of Cuba. It would be a serious warning to the Americans. F. Castro: I agree with this formulation of the issue. We understand your concerns. A. I. Mikoyan: We had to tolerate this lawlessness only to a certain point, not more. F. Castro: We understand Comrade Mikoyan’s considerations. A. I. Mikoyan: We believe that the withdrawal of the Il-28 bombers has to be tied to the removal of the naval blockade. It is to this end that we agreed to negotiate regarding the removal of Il-28s from Cuba. All our actions are directed toward achieving this goal— lifting the naval blockade. The CC CPSU adopted the following resolution: to agree to withdraw the Il-28 bombers from Cuba if the United States will fulfill its obligation; but if they do not remove the blockade, we leave the bombers in Cuba. You see that our position is quite clear. I do not want to come back to topics we already discussed, but it seems useful to note that after the strategic missiles were discovered, they ceased to be a deterring force. They already served their purpose. After they were discovered, they ceased to be a deterrent. The Il-28 bomber is an old type of aircraft with a small ceiling. They are not very important for Cuba’s defense. The fact that Cuba has weapons like high-speed fighter planes, missile-carrier boats, antiassault landing and antiaircraft means—this covers all the losses that might be caused by the removal of the Il-28 bombers from Cuba. I will report your considerations to the CC CPSU. I want to reiterate that very powerful defensive weapons remain in Cuba. We will be able to transfer them to you when the Cuban military officials become familiar with them. This military equipment is incomparably more powerful than any equipment Cuba currently has. These are the most advanced weapons Comrade Pavlov currently has. The CC CPSU’s resolution is to transfer these weapons to you over the course of time. I would like to emphasize that we are taking these measures in Cuba’s interest, in order to ensure that the United States does not keep the blockade. We want to provide the best conditions for the comprehensive development of Cuba. The issue was discussed in the CC CPSU, together with our military. Both perspectives I described have been carefully studied. Our comrades have decided that the only correct way is to lift the blockade and withdraw the Il-28 bombers from Cuba. Comrade N. S. Khrushchev wrote me with instructions to tell Fidel Castro and his comrades about our position and about our guiding motives. He again noted that the Soviet Union will always support Cuba.

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We admire the courage of the Cuban people and their leader Fidel Castro and his comrades. I want to emphasize that we consider your difficulties to be our difficulties, and we regard your victory as our victory. Of course, one can criticize the government of imperialist countries and condemn their policies, but this does not help if there is no practical assistance. We offer you all kinds of fraternal assistance—military, economic, and diplomatic. I would like to add that we are planning to consider the possibility of providing additional weapons to Cuba. We are a fraternal nation, and we will do everything to protect Cuba. We fully supported the five points put forward by Comrade Fidel Castro. I received a telegram from Comrade Kuznetsov, in which he writes about the steps taken by our diplomats to support the five points of Cuba’s revolutionary government. We understand that there will be many difficulties in the struggle to realize these five requirements, and that we will not immediately succeed in implementing them. This struggle will take place in practical terms in our negotiations with the Americans. We believe that your UN representative should join this struggle. Our task is to use the UN and its secretary-general, U Thant, to the fullest extent to resolve questions that are important to us. The Americans wanted to use Cuba’s economic difficulties to strangle the revolution with the bony hand of hunger. But if there is no blockade, Cuba will have an opportunity to develop its economy. Our economic aid will increase, and Cuba will win. F. Castro: I have a question related to the Il-28 bombers. What are the USSR’s intentions? If the Americans fail to fulfill their promises and lift the blockade, then the bombers, as you said, will remain here. What does that mean? I do not understand in what form you plan to announce the withdrawal of the Il-28 bombers. A. I. Mikoyan: For now we are continuing to assert that the Il-28 bomber is not an offensive weapon. The Americans argue that any bomber is an offensive weapon. So far, we have not agreed to remove the Il-28s from Cuba. If you agree to our proposal, we will state that as soon as Kennedy’s promises will be fulfilled, we agree to remove the Il-28s from Cuba. Consequently, we are talking about the possibility to start negotiations. I want to stress that we will not remove the Il-28s, the personnel and equipment until we reach an agreement with the Americans. F. Castro: Will this position include the requirement to cease the violation of our airspace? A. I. Mikoyan: We consider such flights to be illegal. You are planning to send your protest to the UN. It will be a serious warning to the Americans. F. Castro: I quite agree with you, Comrade Mikoyan. A. I. Alekseyev: The Il-28 bombers are material for negotiations, so to speak. A. I. Mikoyan: Yes. We want to have an agreed position with you when we conduct negotiations with Americans regarding the blockade. The antiaircraft missiles will remain here. That is a modern weapon. We will leave them in Cuba. The Americans do not dare talk about them, although they are a dangerous weapon. A. I. Alekseyev: I read today in a review of the foreign press a report that said the MiG21 fighter planes can be used as offensive weapons.

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A. I. Mikoyan: Yes, they can be used like that. F. Castro (jokingly): If you fly the MiG-21 one way and jump off with a parachute, then the aircraft can be used at a distance of 600 kilometers. E. Guevara: No. It would be a distance greater than 600 kilometers. A. I. Mikoyan: More precisely, the range of the aircraft will be 600 to 700 kilometers one way and the same on the way back. The designer of the aircraft created a wonderful machine, which broke the record of height and speed for this class of aircraft. The record is registered by the International Aviation Federation. F. Castro: Of course, from a military point of view, the Il-28 is not very important to us. The question of withdrawing the Il-28s can be used to make the Americans fulfill our demands. A. I. Mikoyan: We understand the negative psychological effect of withdrawing this outdated bomber from Cuba. F. Castro: It would be bad if this was a unilateral move. We have to demand concessions from the Americans. A. I. Mikoyan: So we will turn the question of the withdrawal of Il-28s from Cuba into a subject of diplomatic negotiations, we will win the support of the UN and neutral countries. C. R. Rodriguez: And if the Americans will not remove the blockade and the Il-28s will remain here, what should we do in such a case? A. I. Mikoyan: I already said that we cannot send warships to escort commercial ships in the Caribbean. Considering the correlation of forces in the Caribbean, the Americans could continue the blockade. We want to deprive them of the excuse they want to use. In this case, we can work through the UN. After all, this is not an issue worth starting a nuclear war. If Cuba was located geographically closer to the Soviet Union, the issue would be resolved without difficulty. Cuba’s geographical location is very disadvantageous for us. Is it worth firing nuclear missiles? That would not help to resolve the current crisis. It would be better to take this step, without decreasing Cuba’s defense capabilities, to remove the Il-28 bombers in order to guarantee nonaggression. The guarantee will be valid—this is the general consensus—for a certain length of time. Two tendencies are clearly emerging in the United States. Kennedy is under harsh criticism. Militant circles are trying to use the fact that the Il-28 bombers are still in Cuba to delay and prolong the blockade. Kennedy would like to strangle Cuba by the blockade. He needs to save his prestige, too. Kennedy is not any more positive toward Cuba than any other American reactionaries. But he is smarter, he understands that he should not undermine the prestige of the United States by a military attack on Cuba. He thinks that the blockade can undermine your system, cause economic hardship and the fall of the revolutionary government. Kennedy hopes that the entire burden of economic aid will fall on the Soviet Union, and that the Soviet Union could not bear the economic difficulties associated with the need to help Cuba. He believes that Fidel Castro’s government will not be able to cope with the situation, and the people of Cuba will overthrow the government. In other words, his whole calculation rests on the idea that Cuba will collapse economically.

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Kennedy’s plan is better than the plan put forward by the U.S. military, because it is unrealistic. Cuba has great potential for the development of its economy. Our assistance will enable the growth of Cuba’s economy, culture, and science. As a result, Cuba will become a model for Latin America; it will be a center of attraction for the people of Latin America. If the blockade continues, the Cuban people’s standard of living will fall, and difficulties will increase. We have to secure the removal of the blockade and guarantees that the United States and other countries will not attack Cuba. These guarantees have to be reflected in UN documents. It is unlikely that this will be done in the form of a protocol, but it is still necessary to achieve UN control in the Caribbean. Comrade Kuznetsov has been insisting on this plan at the UN. This plan is good because it does not allow for the possibility of a surprise attack on Cuba. Americans cling to the OAS [Organization of American States], trying to extend the activities of this organization to Cuba. They are opposed to the UN addressing issues of the threat of sudden attack. However, if U Thant’s proposal on control is accepted, then the UN will act in the Caribbean and the OAS will be on the sidelines. Of course, the Americans will oppose the adoption of this and other proposals. But we have to fight for the five points put forward by Comrade Fidel, as well as for all our requirements. F. Castro: Perhaps my colleagues have more questions? E. Guevara: I do not have a question. I would just like to comment on the issue at hand. We must pray to God that the Americans do not find out about our conversation. The Americans are tying the withdrawal of Il-28s to the inspections, referring to the letter from Comrade Khrushchev. From a diplomatic point of view, they can find fault with the fact that in Comrade Khrushchev’s letter he mentions both the removal of offensive weapons and inspections on the ground. If the Americans know that the blockade will not lead to nuclear war, they will keep the blockade. A. I. Mikoyan: I think they will not attack, but they very much want to maintain the blockade. Formally, they can say that there was no onsite inspection. However, the Americans themselves retreated on the question of inspections of strategic missiles. We believe that since they confirmed the removal of these missiles through aerial photography, it will suffice. Demands for onsite inspections are just nitpicking. If the Americans wanted to complicate the issue, they would say that they have no information as to whether or not the missiles were removed. We agreed only on visual surveillance of the removal. It was used when strategic missiles were removed from Cuba. There was also visual surveillance from ships at close distances. Although there was one attempt to go aboard one of the Soviet ships with weapons, but Soviet sailors thwarted the attempt and did not allow the controllers aboard the ship. They also put up a protest regarding this attempt to breach the agreement. After all, we agreed only to allow controlling ships to come within a small distance. Therefore, when the captain of the control ship tried to get on board our ship, he was not allowed. It should be noted that for the entire time of the blockade, controllers did not go on board Soviet ships, they feared conflict.

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I emphasize once again that different forces are at play in the United States. Kennedy does not want conflict. The American press is shouting that there is no certainty as to whether all missiles were removed or a part of them was hidden. It is important that we reached an agreement on control precisely in this form. Kuznetsov was asked about the whereabouts of the warheads intended for the missiles that were removed. He replied that warheads cannot function without missiles. Even with ground inspections, it is practically impossible to find the warheads. With the withdrawal of the Il-28s from Cuba we want to alleviate the conditions of the struggle. Of course, there is no guarantee that the Americans will accept all our demands, but we will fight hard to achieve our goals. F. Castro: All right. We agree with this. Ambassador A. I. Alekseyev was present at the conversation, which lasted an hour and a half. Recorded by V. Tikhmenev. Verified: [signature]

Source: From the personal archive of Dr. Sergo A. Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.

Document 24 Khrushchev’s Letter to Mikoyan, with Instructions

November 16, 1962 Havana, Soviet Ambassador, to Comrade A. I. Mikoyan We are sending you Kennedy’s confidential oral reply to our oral confidential message. From this letter, you can see that Kennedy has agreed to our assurance regarding the removal of the Il-28s with crews and equipment. If we give Kennedy this assurance, then he will immediately lift the quarantine. From his letter, it is clear that he does not even demand that it be published but, so to speak, is relying on a gentlemen’s agreement regarding the removal of the Il-28s over the period of, as he says, thirty days. Therefore, it seems that it would not be difficult to reach agreement on this issue. But this is not the main issue. The main issue is stopping the overflights of Cuba and [getting] confirmation of the noninvasion guarantees, which were given in Kennedy’s letter of October 27 and 28. From Kennedy’s letter, it is clear that currently he is holding us to our promises to remove offensive weapons and to our statement that with the consent of the Cuban government we agree to inspections by UN representatives concerning the removal of the weapons, which the Americans call offensive, from Cuba on condition that the United States gives guarantees through the United Nations that it will not invade Cuba nor will it allow such an invasion by other countries of the Western Hemisphere. To our regret, we did not find any understanding on the part of the Cuban government of our efforts to confirm the U.S. pledge through the United Nations not to invade Cuba. Moreover, the Cuban government has publicly announced that it does not agree with the steps we are trying to take in the negotiations that began in order to achieve confirmation 403

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through the United Nations of the U.S. obligations mentioned above in the interests of Cuba. Therefore, the necessary cooperation between us and the government of Cuba on this issue has not been established from the very beginning, and therefore the statements that we made in our letters look as if they have no basis, which Kennedy is exploiting as a pretext for refusing to confirm his pledge at the United Nations not to attack Cuba. We, the Presidium of the CC CPSU, in full quorum, discussed this issue fully, taking into account the last letter from Kennedy, and believe that the position of our friends on this issue cannot be considered rational. Living in a world that contains two antagonistic camps means that you cannot always rely only on weapons. Under certain conditions one has to show significant flexibility, so that while relying on force—that is, on weapons—one is still able to use diplomatic channels as well, when the situation demands that and when it is in our interests. We believed and now believe that we accomplished a big favor for Cuba when we snatched the statement out of Kennedy about a noninvasion of Cuba. We believe that if our missiles and our weapons had not been deployed in Cuba, then Cuba would already have been invaded by the armed forces of the United States. The military maneuvers that were announced by Pentagon in October—that was precisely the announcement of the invasion of Cuba. Therefore, if our Cuban comrades are able to think that the missiles we deployed invited the U.S. threat to Cuba, then that is a big delusion. We believe that Kennedy’s proposal, and those proposals put forward by U Thant, created a good opportunity to resolve the difficulties over inspections of the withdrawal of our missiles. In particular, we had in mind U Thant’s proposal to the effect that he and the UN officers accompanying him could be given an opportunity to visit the locations where our missiles were being dismantled and to make sure that they were being dismantled. That proposal was the most reasonable and the most appropriate one for our side. There was also the second proposal—for the ambassadors of five Latin American countries represented in Cuba to visit the dismantling locations as a tour. How could Cuba’s sovereignty suffer from this in any way? But they rejected [those proposals]. We simply do not understand that. It was also suggested that representatives of nine neutral states—Ghana, Guinea, the United Arab Republic [Egypt], Austria, Sweden, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Brazil—visit the dismantling locations. We had no objections against those countries, because we had no doubts about their good will toward Cuba. That proposal was also rejected. All this creates a situation where we have been denied an opportunity to cooperate with the Cuban government in this question for the benefit of Cuba—not in our interest, but precisely in Cuba’s interest. Now the Cubans have taken the following step: They have sent a protest against the American overflights of Cuban territory to the UN Security Council. This is correct. But, at the same time, they have issued a warning that if such flights continue then American aircraft would be shot down. In the situation where diplomatic contacts have been established and negotiations are going on, of course, it is a step that does not encourage the swiftest resolution of the conflict around Cuba.

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American aircraft, as is well known, have been flying over Cuba since the first days of the Revolution. Civilian planes also fly over Cuba. We have information that this year, and even in August and September, American planes were flying over Cuba and that the Cubans issued an order not to shoot down those planes; in any case, they did not open fire and did not shoot them down. The question arises, what does it mean to press such an ultimatum now when diplomatic negotiations are going on? If we raised such conditions we would have to implement them; that is, begin to shoot down the planes. We believe that our people cannot participate in this because, according to our deepest convictions, not every opportunity has been utilized for realizing the mutual obligations of both sides, that arose from the exchange of correspondence with President Kennedy. To act in such a manner now would lead to a military conflict, and that could develop if one were to follow such a course; it could not be justified by anything and would have no grounds. This is our understanding of the situation and this is our assessment of the position of our Cuban friends on the issue of American aircraft flights over Cuba. All this puts us in a very difficult situation already because our people are there [in Cuba] servicing these weapons. Of course, they would believe that these weapons have to be used. But we cannot give the order to our people to use those weapons because to give such an order would mean to start pulling ourselves into a war. And we do not want that and we consider it irrational. In addition, we believe—and this is very important—that even if they opened fire on the American aircraft, and we would regret it if such a development occurred, if that were to happen, that fire would not be effective. It would not result in a real strengthening of Cuban security by military means. But that could cause the onset of U.S. military actions against Cuba. And it is a fact that the United States possesses military capabilities that exceed those of Cuba by many times, even though now Cuba is much better armed than it was before. Therefore, to open fire on American aircraft would be an irrational act, which would give the most notorious reactionary forces in America an opportunity to press Kennedy from their extreme militaristic positions. They, those forces, are doing exactly that— they are putting pressure on Kennedy and using the opportunities that the current position of the Cuban comrades creates for them. We have done, and we are doing, everything possible in order to shield Cuba from intervention, and to arm Cuba. We undertook a great risk and we knew that we were taking a great risk, because the danger of unleashing thermonuclear war really did emerge at the most intense moment. Now, through our diplomatic actions, we shook down this tension and placed the negotiations of the two sides that are involved in the conflict within diplomatic channels, under conditions that will present a mutually beneficial resolution of the situation for both sides. All this is being done primarily for Cuba and not for us. However, it looks like Cuba does not want to cooperate with us. Cuba, which now does not want to even consult with us, wants practically to drag us behind it by a leash, and wants to pull us into a war with America by its actions. We cannot and will not agree to this. We will not do it, because we see the conditions that were created through our efforts, that allow us to resolve the issue of Cuban security without war, the issue of noninvasion guarantees.

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If the Cuban comrades do not want to cooperate with us on this issue and do not want to take measures that would help us resolve this issue and avoid being pulled into a war together with us, then apparently the conclusion that we see is that our presence in Cuba is not helpful for our friends now. Then let them state that openly and we will have to make conclusions for ourselves. If our Cuban comrades take steps that in their opinion protect their interests—that is their right. But then we have to raise with them the issue that we would be forced to absolve ourselves of all responsibility for the consequences their steps might entail for them. If they do not take our arguments into account, then it is clear that our side cannot bear the responsibility for it. We regret this, and we regret it very much, but we will have to state the following— because our advice is not being taken into account, we disclaim any responsibility because we cannot be attached by force to actions we consider to be irrational. In that case, let the Cuban comrades bear full responsibility for the situation and for the possible consequences. What should our conclusion be and what would the next step be if, of course, the Cuban comrades agree to take rational steps? We believe, as we have already informed you, that we can give an oral assurance to President Kennedy that we will withdraw the Il-28s from Cuba on condition that the president promises to lift the quarantine immediately, which he has expressed a willingness to do. The issue of nonintervention guarantees is more complicated now. As you can see from Kennedy’s latest confidential letter, he is tying this question to the fulfillment of our promises regarding inspections. Therefore, the question of lifting the quarantine and our obligation to withdraw the Il-28s is not the main question now, but realistically is only an interim condition for the solution of the main issue—the reason, as the Russians say, the whole mess developed in the first place—which is to squeeze out of the United States and to affirm through the United Nations an assurance of noninvasion of Cuba. The United States, of course, got into a difficult situation, taking into account the fact that for many years after the Revolution in Cuba they declared that they could not tolerate a state with a different sociopolitical system in the Western Hemisphere. Now, as clearly follows from the president’s letters of October 27 and 28, they (i.e., the United States) have stated exactly the opposite, namely: The United States has agreed to tolerate a state with a different socioeconomic system and is willing to undertake an obligation not to intervene in Cuba and to prevent other countries in the Western Hemisphere from intervening if we withdraw from Cuba the weapons that President Kennedy has characterized as offensive. Our understanding is that all this means a significant and important step in the interests of Cuba, and in the interests of its independent development as a sovereign socialist state. Unfortunately, the Cuban comrades do not understand that. Now the Cubans, by their stubbornness, and I would say by their certain arrogance, which shows through in their statements about sovereignty, are helping the most extreme reactionary forces in the United States to reject the obligations stated in Kennedy’s letters, and are helping those forces to put pressure on Kennedy to make him disavow those obligations with a longterm target in mind—to ultimately embark on a military invasion of Cuba.

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It is clear that this would only be in the interests of the enemies of the Cuban Revolution. Therefore, we believe that the Cuban comrades should gather their courage and reconsider their position on this issue. They should choose one of the forms that have been presented to them: either U Thant’s representatives, the ambassadors from five Latin American countries, or the representatives of nine neutral countries. If they do not accept these proposals, the United States will be the only winner, and they will score this victory only because we could not rationally use [the bargaining chips] we were able to obtain during the period of the most critical tensions in our relations, when we were on the brink of war. We consider it wrong to open fire on the American aircraft in the current circumstances. Figuratively speaking, now the tension has subsided, and somewhat like a truce has emerged where none of the sides opens fire on the other. The Americans are flying over Cuba, but they were flying there before. To open fire on U.S. aircraft now would mean to reject the diplomatic channels and to rely only on weapons, that is, to make the choice of possibly unleashing a war. We believe that this is irrational, and we will not take part in it. We are negotiating with the Americans. We want to cooperate with Cuba, and if Cuba wants to cooperate with us for its own benefit we will be happy. But if Cuba does not want to cooperate with us, then obviously our participation in the resolution of the Cuban conflict would not bring any benefit. In such a case, we would have to ascertain the opinion of the Cuban leadership, then discuss the new situation so that we could draw appropriate conclusions for ourselves regarding our people who are presently in Cuba. Frankly speaking, we have the deepest regrets that at a time when we are making every effort to exploit every opportunity for confirming through the United Nations the U.S. obligations not to intervene in Cuba, our Cuban friends do not exhibit any desire to cooperate with us in this cause. We do not believe that the Cubans would want to force the unleashing of war, and if that is so, then it would be irrational [on their part] to deny us, and themselves, an opportunity to quickly remove the remaining elements of conflict on the basis of the obligations that had been already undertaken by the Soviet Union and the United States in their correspondence. You should personally think it over once again, because you know the situation and the personalities of the people with whom you are going to speak. You need to bring our thoughts and our wishes to their attention. Let them respond to you and let them take the responsibility upon themselves. If they do not want to cooperate with us, then obviously the conclusion is clear that they want to assume all responsibility themselves. That is their right, they are a government and they are responsible for their own country, for their policy; but then they should not involve us in their business. If they do not want our cooperation, then we cannot adhere to their policy, which moreover is irrational on this issue. In order to give Kennedy a response on this issue, we would like to know your opinion. At this point we do not know yet how events will develop, but obviously if the negotiations are prolonged then the Americans will complicate the entire issue more and more. They have this opportunity because they enjoy a more favorable strategic and geographic

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situation. This has to be taken into account. Therefore, they could stall and would not suffer or lose anything from the prolongation of this conflict. But the losers here first of all would be Cuba and us, both in terms of material [damage] and also in the political and moral sense. The President raises the issue of certain guarantees for the future with regard to the issue of sending so-called offensive weapons to Cuba. He even says that it allegedly follows from our correspondence that we undertook an obligation regarding inspections in the future for purposes of not allowing further shipments of such weapons to Cuba. By the way, we did not undertake any such obligation in our correspondence, although in Kennedy’s letters that question was raised. In presenting everything in such a light as if a mutual agreement existed on that issue, Kennedy, of course, exaggerates. However, it follows that by doing so he is trying to extract the highest possible price from us for his confirmation through the UN of the pledge not to invade Cuba. This also complicates the issue. Now to the question of UN posts. Earlier, we presented this position to you and now we repeat that the idea of creating such posts as means of preventing an unexpected attack seems reasonable. Kennedy apparently is consciously trying to link our proposals on that issue, which we made during consideration of arms control issues, to Cuba. He even puts the question in such a way as to suggest that the creation of UN posts in the Caribbean, including the corresponding area of the United States, allegedly requires the organization of such posts in the Soviet Union as well. Of course, it is not difficult for us to explain that our proposals regarding the posts were made when negotiations on the issue of general and full disarmament were being conducted in London and later during the negotiations in Geneva on prevention of unexpected attacks. Therefore, those proposals having to do with Soviet ports do not and cannot have any relation to Cuba because at the time they were made no Cuban issue existed. We are hoping that Kennedy will understand the inappropriateness of raising the issue of UN posts on Soviet territory in connection with Cuba and will not insist on that. Now we are moving toward the Plenum of the CPSU. We have already informed you of our opinion, and now we are even more convinced that we made the right choice when we recommended that you stay longer in Cuba, even while we understood that your long stay there was beginning to outgrow the framework of necessity. As you have probably noted, the Americans are already saying that apparently the difficulties in our relations with the Cubans are so substantial that Mikoyan has to stay in Cuba for a long time and cannot leave yet. We even admit that it might be possible that the Cubans are beginning to feel a certain awkwardness as a result of your prolonged stay in Cuba. In short, obviously we have to reach an agreement now: if there is no hope for Cuban cooperation, then probably you will have to leave Cuba. But then we will say that since our Cuban friends do not need our cooperation we have to draw the appropriate conclusion from all this and we will not impose ourselves. In any case, we believe today that the decision about your trip to Cuba was correct and your stay there has been useful. Now, when you have these important and serious conversations with our Cuban friends we would like you to take all circumstances into account

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and to test the grounds regarding your further stay in Cuba. If you feel that the Cubans are not inconvenienced by your further presence, it would probably be useful for you to stay there longer. Your presence in Cuba represents, one may say, a deterrent factor both for the United States and for the Cubans. N. Khrushchev

Source: From the personal archive of Sergo A. Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.

Document 25 Record of a Conversation between A. I. Mikoyan and Ernesto “Che” Guevara

November 16, 1962 Ernesto “Che” Guevara received A. I. Mikoyan and his colleagues—deputy chairman of the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for Foreign Economic Relations, Comrade A. I. Alikhanov; the head of the group of chief advisers-organizers of production in Cuba, Comrade F. E. Titov; and the adviser on economic affairs to the embassy, Comrade N. V. Goldin—in his office at the Ministry of Industry. After exchanging greetings, A. I. Mikoyan suggested to E. Guevara that Comrade Alikhanov would give a progress report on the Soviet Union’s obligations for building industrial facilities in Cuba. A. I. Alikhanov reported the following. During the time we spent in Cuba, Soviet experts and heads of Cuban organizations have reviewed the state of affairs in the implementation of the Soviet-Cuban agreement on economic and technical cooperation, and we visited a number of construction sites and projects. Construction has begun on a number of facilities provided by our agreements, including industrial objects. In May of this year, only one project was being built—a file-making plant; but today a whole range of projects is under construction, including two large power plants: one in Mariel, with a capacity of 200,000 kilowatts; and the second in Renta, with a capacity of 100,000 kilowatts; as well as a mechanical plant in Santa Clara. Work has started (though still in its initial stages) on the reconstruction of a steel works plant. Construction is also under way for training centers to prepare skilled industrial workers. Construction of the file-making plant is nearing completion. All equipment for this plant has been delivered from the Soviet Union and installation is almost complete. The 410

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plant is scheduled to start manufacturing goods this December, that is, a year ahead of schedule. Construction of the mechanical plant is proceeding well. The Cuban workers are promising to complete construction of the building in December. A part of the equipment has already been delivered from the USSR, and considering that construction of this plant is proceeding ahead of schedule, we will try to take action so the majority of the essential equipment will be shipped in the first half of 1963. Then Comrade Alikhanov spoke about the construction of other facilities. He informed Comrade Guevara that the main lift crane equipment for the construction of the power plant in Mariel will be shipped in December of this year, and equipment for the power plant in Renta will be shipped in the first quarter of 1963. He also said that due to the difficulties of shipping a 50-ton crane for the installation of engineering structures, the Cuban side promised to find a crane for this purpose in Cuba. Comrade Alikhanov said that all matters relating to the construction of industrial facilities were reviewed with the deputy ministers of industry comrades Borrega, Trueba, and Solodriguez [sic], as well as with the minister of public works, Comrade Cienfuegos, and his deputies. In connection with the request made by Comrade Borrega on behalf of Comrade Guevara regarding the delivery of finished steel structures for the reconstruction of a steel works plant and the construction of power plants, Comrade Alikhanov suggested that it would be inexpedient to change the course we agreed upon earlier, when it was decided that steel structures would be manufactured in Cuba from metal imported from the Soviet Union. Comrade Alikhanov also said that changing the previously established procedure for manufacturing steel structures will delay their production, and that a part of the metal has already been shipped from factories in the Soviet Union. As for the possibility of manufacturing critical and nonstandard equipment in the USSR, Comrade Alikhanov said that we will review this question further when we return to Moscow. Comrade Guevara agreed. It was reported to Comrade Guevara that Soviet organizations will satisfy his request for the extension of Soviet adviser Comrade Fedorov’s stay in Cuba, and on sending an expert metallurgist to work on the reconstruction of the steel works plants. It was reported that the Soviet government approved a request from the Cuban side regarding the question of the Soviet Union providing technical assistance in the organization of production of spare parts in Cuba. For this purpose, 140 specialists will be assigned to Cuba, including 30 this year. In the first quarter of 1963, the necessary equipment for creating four laboratories (welding, metallographic, chemical, and controlling and measuring instruments) will be delivered. E. Guevara: I would like to ask a question regarding the construction of a refinery plant. Cuban specialists recently received the Soviet project for it. When they looked it over, they saw that the cost of the work outlined in the project is approximately twice as much as the construction costs of similar North American plants that are located in Cuba.

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The specialists are well aware of the costs of building North American plants, since they participated in the construction and continue to work in these plants. Also, I know that American monopolies tend to inflate the cost of construction in underdeveloped countries, because it helps them to take out large profits in the metropolis. Therefore, the actual difference may be even greater. A. I. Mikoyan: Right now, it is difficult to answer this question. We do not have the necessary data, but we will look into this and let you know the answer. N. V. Goldin: The specialists who worked on this project will arrive here in a few days. They will look into this matter together with the Cuban side. A. I. Mikoyan: I would like to tell you, Comrade Guevara, that our design engineers often overstate the cost of the projects, and we have to be in an uncompromising struggle with them. Sometimes, we manage to reduce the initial cost by as much as 20 to 30 percent. For example, the project of the largest oil refinery in Belarus comes to mind. After a thorough review and amendment we were able to reduce construction costs by 30 percent. Overstating the cost usually happens because a lot of support structures are included into the project, and these support structures are not always necessary. The design engineers usually place various buildings at a great distance from each other, citing fire concerns. This, in turn, lengthens the communication lines, thereby increasing their cost. When I was in Mexico, I noticed that the various service buildings of the oil companies were arranged very compactly. And rightly so, because it reduces the construction costs. And if there is a fire, it seems to me that the enterprise will burn either way (general laughter). In addition, design engineers sometimes make mistakes in counting the cost of equipment, especially if it is a new model. Different kinds of mistakes can happen, too. I remember a case with an oil refinery that we were planning to build in Ethiopia. This refinery was designed to power half a million tons of oil. When the project was finished and the Ethiopians looked it over, they said that they did not like it because it cost more than similar North American projects. We studied the situation and found out that the cost of the project included expenses for construction of a power plant that was supposed to supply electricity for the plant and for a large city, as well as expenses to build a water purification plant, which was also designed to meet the utility needs of the city, and in addition there were expenditures for construction of port facilities for receiving oil. We only had to deduct these expenses from the cost of the project and everything fell into place. The cost of our project no longer exceeded Western models. As you can see, our engineers are far from commerce, and made plant construction cost calculations based on our internal regulations. That is why I say that we need to look into the matter. I will give an order to organize a special expertise on this project in Moscow. In connection with this, I would ask you to give us precise data on the construction costs of North American plants, to facilitate the work of our experts. If our design engineers really made a mistake, we will correct them. Such a study would be useful to the Soviet Union as well. If our plants are more expensive to make, we will have to catch up. Therefore, your criticism will be beneficial to us.

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E. Guevara: But I did not criticize anybody. (Everybody laughs.) I only made a preliminary comment on the project. A. I. Mikoyan: We do not need to be afraid of criticism. Criticism and self-criticism are at the heart of our development. I ask you to give information about the North American plants to our comrades. E. Guevara: Yes, I will give instructions to prepare the data. N. V. Goldin hands A. I. Mikoyan a brief reference on the planned oil refinery. After studying the reference note, A. I. Mikoyan says, addressing E. Guevara: As far as can be seen from these data on the composition of the future refinery, there is ample evidence that the construction costs should be reduced instead of being inflated. I see that the new plant is tied to an existing plant and therefore they will have a number of shared services. This should lower the cost of construction. However, despite this, we should examine this question. Comrade Goldin will help in this matter. He is a big specialist, he built the steel plant in Bhilai. E. Guevara: Yes, I know about it. A. I. Mikoyan: You should put him to work more. (Everybody laughs.) He built a plant there for 1 million tons of steel. It is a large plant. And now it is already working at full capacity. The British and the West Germans also built a factory each in India. But they are still working only at two-thirds of their capacity. As for the oil refinery plant, I think there is some kind of misunderstanding here. In India we are building an oil refinery, also for 2 million tons of oil. The question of excessive costs did not arise there. Apparently for the Indian project the world market prices were taken into account, I do not know why the problem of cost came up in the Cuban project. E. Guevara: I noticed that there are some paradoxes in the prices of Soviet industrial equipment. Some equipment is sold far below world prices, other equipment is sold at world prices, and yet other is considerably above world prices. A. I. Mikoyan: That is not entirely correct. We usually sell our industrial equipment at world market prices, or rather, slightly below. Inside the country the price of industrial machinery and equipment differ significantly from international prices. For example, we make a profit on the production of trucks and tractors, but we produce passenger cars at a loss. When we sell products abroad we set prices in line with world prices. For this purpose, we study reference manuals, magazines, newsletters, and so on. If we cannot find price data on certain equipment in reference materials, we give instructions to one of our trade representatives to contact the Western enterprise in question, which manufactures analogous products, and, acting as a potential buyer, to inquire about the prices for this product. It is true that pricing industrial equipment is a complicated matter. It is not like wheat or some other agricultural commodity, the prices for which are readily available every day. Different companies producing analogous equipment do not copy each other exactly. Furthermore, it has been established as a general rule that equipment produced in West Germany is cheaper than equipment produced in North America. British equipment is more expensive than West German, but cheaper than American. The Japanese often sell their

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equipment even cheaper than West Germans. So the pricing of equipment sold abroad is a complicated matter. Further, A. I. Mikoyan directed E. Guevara’s attention to an issue that in his opinion is very important for Cuba. He was talking about setting up production of spare parts for industrial equipment. A. I. Mikoyan said that Soviet specialists working in Cuba told him that Cubans allocated large production facilities for organization of enterprises that will produce spare parts for Soviet vehicles. This factory will be created on the base of the former Amber Motors. Soviet specialists believe that it would be possible to set up production of spare parts for American cars at these production facilities as well. This is of paramount importance if we consider that there are 300,000 North American cars that are already well worn. Soviet specialists proposed to invite an additional number of engineers from the Soviet Union, so they could study the relevant parts and make working drawings of them, because there are no such drawings available in Cuba. However, I think that this is not the best option. It could be arranged much faster if you send the parts to the Soviet Union and the working drawings were made there. We have hundreds of design engineering bureaus which could quickly do this work. Sending the specialists to Cuba could take a long time. E. Guevara agrees. A. I. Mikoyan: I wanted to bring to your attention another very important question, Comrade Guevara. The uninterrupted supply of Soviet goods to Cuba’s industries in the course of the next year depends on the resolution of this issue. Our Ministry of Foreign Trade received an order for supply of goods in the nomenclature. However, it does not have the specifications that are necessary to place the orders in our factories. This matter has taken a very long time. If we do not receive the specification in the near future, the uninterrupted continuity of our shipments will be compromised starting next year. I took an extreme measure and instructed Minister Patolichev to place orders from Cuba whenever possible without specifications. However, he told me that it is impossible with regard to machinery, equipment, ferrous metals and certain other goods. So I ask you to take the necessary steps to ensure that the required specifications are transferred to our Minister of Foreign Trade. E. Guevara: The following happened with regard to the specifications. When I was in Moscow and spoke with Comrade Khrushchev, we discussed issues of foreign trade. We have developed a trade deficit in your favor in the amount of 190 million pesos. We agreed that this matter would be resolved later. Therefore, we did not want to produce orders for next year before we addressed the issue of balancing our trade relations. And then the events happened, of which are aware, and made us neglect this issue completely. A. I. Mikoyan: It is wrong to wait for a settlement of the deficit and not prepare trade for the coming year. E. Guevara: But how can it be otherwise? On what basis can we do trade, if we owe you. A. I. Mikoyan: On the basis of trust. We are friendly countries. Moreover, I am informing you that our government has decided to register Cuba’s foreign trade debt as a trade credit. I have not told this to your leadership yet. I am telling you this now. E. Guevara: You are talking about our debt for this year?

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A. I. Mikoyan: Yes, for this year. And besides, did anyone tell you that we cannot do the same thing next year? I cannot give a specific number, but we can agree on a trade credit for next year, as well. E. Guevara offers the present company to smoke. All except Comrade Titov refuse on the grounds that they are nonsmokers. E. Guevara lights a cigar. A. I. Mikoyan: Smoking is a bad habit. Our scientists estimated that out of six people who died of cancer, five smoked. In our CC CPSU Presidium, for example, almost nobody smokes. Only Comrade Brezhnev smokes sometimes, but even that is more for amusement than real smoking. I have a pretty big family, around twenty people. And none of us are smokers. Four of my sons were in the army, where the conditions are very predisposed to smoking—there is even a free issue of tobacco for each soldier—and still they did not acquire this habit. I smoked at one point. But then doctors told me I could not. I started developing tuberculosis on the tops of my lungs, and I quit smoking. E. Guevara: I also have tuberculosis, but I smoke. Neomycin works for me. A. I. Mikoyan: Tuberculosis is a terrible disease. We have a goal in our country to eliminate tuberculosis completely. We developed a special program to combat this disease. In particular, we have now established a worldwide network of boarding schools for children, working on a system reminiscent of your system becados. The network will continue to grow. We decided to put all children sick with tuberculosis into these boarding schools, taking them out of the family. Tuberculosis can be cured within a year, using new methods of treatment. Thereby, we will completely eliminate this disease among young people. We will also increasingly rely on sanatoriums for the treatment of adult patients. E. Guevara: Tuberculosis is a terrible disaster in Cuba. It is perhaps the most widespread disease here, especially in rural areas. It seems to be due to the hard work and constant malnutrition. It is a terrible plague that we inherited from capitalism. In Cuba, TB causes more deaths than cancer. And if in the Soviet Union five out of six people who died smoked, in Cuba every five out of six people smoke. A. I. Mikoyan: How is your tobacco production? E. Guevara: With tobacco things are good. Natural conditions in Cuba are extremely favorable for the production of tobacco. We have some difficulty selling it abroad. The United States used to buy a lot of it. The capitalist bosses are used to Havana cigars, and right now they have to do without them. A. I. Mikoyan: You know, when I was in New York en route to Cuba, I was talking with Adlai Stevenson. He complained to me that he misses Cuban cigars. I gave him some friendly advice to normalize trade relations with Cuba and thus solve the problem. (Everybody laughs.) E. Guevara: Recently, the use of tobacco within our country has increased. A. I. Mikoyan: Do you have large trade surpluses of tobacco? E. Guevara: I do not remember the exact number. A. I. Mikoyan: At what price do you sell tobacco? E. Guevara: We produce different varieties of tobacco. There is tobacco that costs 500 pesos per ton, and there is tobacco that costs 12,000 pesos per ton.

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A. I. Mikoyan: In principle, we could buy tobacco from you. But we need cheap tobacco. We produce enough expensive grades of tobacco ourselves. Our domestic production is around 80,000 to 90,000 tons per year. Sometimes it goes up to 110,000 tons. Our domestic consumption of tobacco is about 180,000 to 190,000 tons. We make up the deficit by buying abroad. But, I repeat, we are buying cheaper grades. For a while, China supplied us with large quantities of tobacco. But in recent years, because of falling production, China has refused to supply us with tobacco. Bulgaria is our regular supplier of tobacco; we buy 30,000 to 40,000 tons. We buy tobacco from Greece and Turkey out of political considerations, but not in large quantities. This year Bulgaria had a bad harvest of tobacco, and it supplied us with only 20,000 tons. So we could buy your tobacco. And in general, we could always buy the tobacco that you do not sell to other countries, provided that it is cheap-grade tobacco. We could conclude a long-term agreement on this, securing a certain share of Cuban tobacco in our purchases of tobacco abroad. E. Guevara: Could you buy black tobacco from us? A. I. Mikoyan: I think so. We process a large number of tobacco products and, blended with other varieties of tobacco, we might be able to use the black tobacco. I think we should instruct our trade associations to discuss this issue. E. Guevara agrees and makes a note in his notebook. The present company is served Daiquiris. Guevara explains that this is a Cuban drink made of rum and finely crushed ice. A. I. Mikoyan praises the drink and says that it is very tasty. He notes that a Daiquiri is much nicer than pure rum, and it is weaker, so it is less dangerous in terms of intoxication. E. Guevara jokingly explains that the strength of the drink depends on who prepares it (everybody laughs). A. I. Mikoyan: In our country, we pursue a policy of limiting the consumption of hard liquor and we are developing the production of wines and beers. The fight against alcoholism is very important, especially among the youth. We have data that half of the crimes are committed in a state of intoxication. Based on this fact alone, it is worth fighting drunkenness. E. Guevara: The opposite is the case in Cuba; recently, the tendency has been to increase the consumption of alcoholic beverages. This year, for example, beer production will only be 60 percent of last year’s production, while production of liquor grew to 110 percent. A. I. Mikoyan: You have good beer. When we recently visited the Isle of Turiguano, we were treated to Cuban beer, which I really liked. At the time, I joked that by the quality of the beer you can tell that Minister Guevara has been doing a good job. (Everybody laughs.) Why is your production of beer dropping? E. Guevara: Our breweries are suffering from a lack of raw materials. We import hops and malt. We buy the hops from the Czechs, but they have a limited amount to sell us. The same can be said about malt. A. I. Mikoyan: I will check back home in the Soviet Union to see if there is something we can do to help you in this regard. Why don’t you organize production of raw materials on site? You should try to master the cultivation of hops in Cuba and buy barley abroad and make malt out of it on site. This is much cheaper. It is not difficult to set up this pro-

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duction, it can be arranged in a matter of six months. If necessary, we can send you our specialists and equipment. The Czechs can probably do the same. Then you will have no shortage of raw materials, and you will be able to further develop the brewing industry. Beer brings a good income to the state. Considering that your country has too much money in circulation, increasing beer consumption would play a positive role. And while you are building a factory for the production of malt, we could negotiate the purchase of barley from us and its treatment, either in the Soviet Union or in Czechoslovakia, if the Soviet Union does not have the capacity. You will buy our barley, and we will follow your instructions to send it to Czechoslovakia for processing and further transportation to Cuba. This work in two directions will help you to quickly increase production and meet demand. E. Guevara made a note in his notebook and said that this option should be looked into. E. Guevara: In particular, my ministry has a farm. We conduct various experiments on this land. We should try to plant hops there. I will also give an assignment to study the possibility of building our own malt production plant. The present company is invited to proceed to the convention hall of the ministry, where dinner is served. While the rest of the company moved away, A. I. Mikoyan told E. Guevara that on the occasion of the forty-fifth anniversary of the October Revolution, the CPSU received a congratulatory letter from the leadership of the American Communist Party. A. I. Mikoyan: This letter is of some interest. In particular, it notes that the events in Cuba greatly influenced the mood of the American working class. They awakened the working class, forced it to think about political issues. In recent years, there has been an influx of workers into the Communist Party. This is a welcome phenomenon. In this letter, the American Communist Party is critical of the fact that it did not use the Cuban events to the fullest extent possible in its work. It notes that the party should have been more vigorous in defending the Cuban people. It seems to me that this letter is of some interest to the Cuban leadership. I received this letter because as a member of the Presidium of our Central Committee, I am informed about all our important matters, for which a variety of materials are directed to me here from Moscow. We are not talking about the fact that the Americans asked us to send you the contents of this letter. I think that the Cuban leadership will be interested to know its contents, to have a better understanding of the situation in the U.S. working class. It is impossible to fight against U.S. imperialism without knowing the sentiments of the American working class. E. Guevara agrees. Everyone walks over to the dinner table. Guevara introduces Mikoyan to Guevara’s deputies—Orlando Borrego, Juan Castineras, Tirso Saenz, Gomez Trueba, Mario Sorrilia, and Santiago Riera—who join them for dinner. During the dinner conversation, the question was raised about the difficulties of socialist construction. A. I. Mikoyan said that Cuba could build socialism with far fewer sacrifices than did the Soviet Union. A. I. Mikoyan: We really had it very tough. We were alone. Out of the forty-five years, we spent fifteen with food rationing, when even supplying the population with bread was

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a difficult task. We had food rationing cards during the Civil War, during the collectivization of agriculture, and during the last war, all the way up to 1947. During the war, we had bread rationing of 300 grams to 1 kilogram of bread per day per person. Workers employed in particularly heavy industries received the highest rations. Meat and butter were given out in very small quantities. In the last years of the war, we introduced a system of so-called commercial shops, where people could buy food at higher prices but without the rationing cards. At the time, we ended up with two price systems. Goods could be obtained through rationing cards at the low prewar prices, while prices in the commercial stores were three to four times higher. In 1947, the rationing cards were canceled. We also reinstated uniform prices for goods. These prices were higher than before the war but below commercial prices. The increase in prices served to absorb the excess money collected in the population during the war years. The money reform had the same goal, when we exchanged money at the rate of 1 new ruble for 10 old ones. Note that we exchanged cash up to 3,000 rubles, and money in bank savings up to 10,000 rubles. This reform was welcomed by the majority of the population, although, of course, a small portion of the people who had accumulated large sums was displeased. This reform improved the monetary circulation in the country. The situation is completely different in Cuba, Mikoyan continued. If our task was to provide the population with bread, then in Cuba, it is to provide the population with meat, fats, etc. E. Guevara: If we talk about the plight of the masses as a factor that causes revolutionary upheavals, then of all the countries in Latin America, Cuba was the least suitable country for a socialist revolution. The standard of living in Cuba was is one of the highest in Latin America. A. I. Mikoyan: Russia was also an exception. If you follow dogmatic Marxism, the most suitable country for a socialist revolution was and is the United States, since the socialization of production there is the highest among all the capitalist countries. Russia during the Revolution was one of the most backward countries in Europe, with strong vestiges of feudalism. And then a socialist Revolution happened in this country. It was our luck that the Russian bourgeoisie was weak and had a dumb political line. It was unable to solve a single problem of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The working class is an advanced class, but it should not be idealized. It lends itself to bourgeois influences. If the Russian bourgeoisie had abolished the Tsarist government and conducted at least some land reform, like the one the Americans did in Japan, and to some extent solved other problems of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the socialist Bolshevik Revolution in Russia would have been delayed for many years. Therein lies the greatness of Lenin—he was able to understand the complex situation of the time and advanced the slogans that brought the vast majority of the population to the side of the Communists. This slogan—“Peace, Bread, and Land”—is essentially bourgeois. Peace is for all people. Land is for the peasants, that is, the majority of the population. And only bread is for the working class. Through this slogan, the Bolshevik Party was able to win over the masses. It is not a paradox that at one point there were people who said they were for the Bolsheviks but against Communism.

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The Cuban Revolution also took place “against the rules.” The study of this revolution is of great theoretical interest. To properly understand the issues of the socialist Revolution in Cuba would be to make a major contribution to the development of Marxism-Leninism. The great significance of the Cuban Revolution is that it is the first socialist revolution in the Americas. If Cuba was somewhere in the region located close to the Soviet Union, it would not have such significance, and it would not attract so much attention. The Cuban Revolution lit the torch of socialist transformation in America. It is difficult to say when and which Latin American countries will follow. E. Guevara: It seems that the further development of the revolutions in Latin America must follow the line of simultaneous explosions in all countries. Only this way can they succeed. A. I. Mikoyan: This is incorrect. The countries of Latin America have their own national characteristics, which cannot be ignored. Because of these features, the revolution cannot occur simultaneously in all countries. These revolutions can happen shortly one after another, but an overall explosion is unlikely. E. Guevara: Unless there is a simultaneous explosion, the revolutions in individual countries will be suppressed by the reactionary forces in alliance with imperialism. This is confirmed, in particular, by the events in Venezuela and several other countries. A. I. Mikoyan: This is possible, but not inevitable. If the revolution takes place quickly and the rebels manage to seize power throughout the country before the intervention begins, they can survive. But if this is not achieved, and the country has two governments, the imperialists will have a “legitimate” excuse to provide armed support to the government the rebels are trying to overthrow. Otherwise, it is difficult to organize intervention, because even imperialists are not always able to flout law and public opinion, especially now that there are powerful forces in the socialist camp, standing guard over the revolutionary movement. As for Venezuela, I do not have enough information, but it seems to me that the recent attempt at insurrection was unsuccessful due to the fact that the rebels did not have a connection with the people. It was something like the battleship Potemkin during the 1905 Revolution, when the rebellious sailors were isolated from the people and defeated. E. Guevara: We told our Venezuelan comrades that they were using the wrong tactics. They entered into an agreement with the army. They sent their people into the army. There was an uprising. As often happens in Latin American history, the army rebelled and the army surrendered. As the result, the Venezuelan comrades lost their people, who were either killed in open battle, or captured. A. I. Mikoyan: The battleship Potemkin was a good lesson to our revolutionaries. The uprising in Puerto Cabello can have the same significance for Venezuela. The uprising must be supported by the masses. Individual acts, like the recent sabotage of American oil fields, are not very useful. They do not cause serious damage to American imperialism as such. They hurt a particular company, and even that damage is relative. The company will rebuild the damaged installations and will continue to exploit people.

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E. Guevara: Indeed, the company can rebuild the installation, but these installations can be blown up again. If this happens repeatedly, the imperialists will see the advanced firing line and they will lose any desire to invest their capital in that place. A. I. Mikoyan: Speaking specifically about this case does not really prove the point. In recent years, there has been a tendency in the world not to import refined petroleum. Now it is more profitable to import crude oil and to develop the petrochemical industry around refining it. That is why American companies can let go of their oil refineries in Venezuela. This will only help them to exploit the Venezuelan people even more. As for the theory of a simultaneous explosion, I would like to say that during the first years after the October Revolution, we were also waiting for socialist revolutions in other countries. Many people thought that if such revolutions did not take place, we would not make it. And in fact a socialist revolution broke out in Hungary and Bavaria. However, these revolutions were soon crushed by the reactionary forces. Some time passed, and we saw that the time for revolutionary crises in capitalist countries had passed, and then we made an important decision and announced that capitalism had entered a period of partial stabilization, and we need to build socialism on our own. With this, the conversation ended and the Cuban comrades present at the dinner warmly said goodbye to A. I. Mikoyan and his accompanying colleagues. Recorded by O. Darusenkov. 18 o’clock: In the embassy building, A. I. Mikoyan received the former president of Guatemala, Jacobo Árbenz, and the Guatemalan Labor Party Central Committee member, José Manuel Forntuny, at their request.

Source: Personal archive of Sergo Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Anna Melyakova for the National Security Archive.

Document 26 Record of Conversation between A. I. Mikoyan, J. M. Fortuny, and J. Árbenz

November 16, 1962 After mutual greetings, Comrade J. M. Fortuny asks Comrade A. I. Mikoyan to give him the floor. A. I. Mikoyan: Welcome, Comrade Fortuny! I was informed that you requested that we receive you to exchange opinions about your party’s struggle. We will be happy to discuss all the questions that interest you. J. M. Fortuny: Thank you very much for your attention to us, Comrade Mikoyan. We are pleased to inform the CC CPSU that our party’s situation has improved. The Guatemalan Labor Party (GPL) has rebuilt its forces, which had suffered huge losses as a result of the 1954 intervention. The situation in Guatemala reminds one of the situation in Venezuela. The GPL enjoys great popularity among intelligentsia, students, that is, the so-called middle class. These are people with good fighting spirit. The GPL’s influence has grown also in the countryside, especially among agricultural workers. During President Árbenz’s administration (1951– 54) there was no GPL organization in Escuintla Province. In recent years, a strong GPL organization was created in that province and many laborers joined it. The Guatemalan labor unions have grown stronger, too. As a counterbalance to the yellow labor unions created by the government, the Autonomous Federation of Labor Unions emerged in the country, where Communists enjoy a great influence. Although we cannot give you exact numbers about the strength of this federation, the powerful proof of its growth is that labor unions belonging to this organization now work throughout the country. The main reason for the growth of the GPL’s influence is that notwithstanding the cruel repressions on the part of the government, it continued to work actively in the 421

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underground during the time when all other democratic parties have practically fallen apart. A. I. Mikoyan: To be able to understand better in what conditions the GPL has to work, I would ask you, comrades to tell me about other parties working in the country, what influence do they have, are there [illegible word] in disguise in those parties, and do they enjoy respect among the leadership of those parties? J. M. Fortuny: I will not speak about the government party because its character is well known. I would like to emphasize that Guatemalan political parties, besides the GPL, which is engaged in a persistent daily struggle, show any activity mainly during the electoral campaigns. The “Opposition Revolutionary Party” led by Mario Mendez Montenegro is torn by internal contradictions. The problem is that the top of this party is the right-wing reactionaries, and the bottom is democratic. The democratic part of the Guatemalan society is represented by two parties who support former President Arevalo, and the Party of Revolutionary Unity (PRU). Our party cooperates with the PRU and has significant influence over its political line. We have our own people in the PRU leadership. There is, for example, the university professor Julio Gomez Padillo, who recently visited the Soviet Union, who is one of the prominent PRU leaders and at the same time he is also a member of our party. J. Árbenz: I would like to stress, Comrade Mikoyan, that the PRU is a serious party that is doing a great work. The government felt threatened by the prospect of its further growth and changed the procedure of registration for political parties during electoral campaigns demanding that they submit lists with no less than 25,000 members. Before, they demanded that lists with only 10,000 members be submitted for the registration. In the conditions of harsh repressions and the anticommunist campaign currently carried out by the government of Ydígoras Fuentes, the population is afraid to sign up as members of democratic parties. This makes it necessary to engage in elaborate educational and propaganda work. Our party—the Guatemalan Labor Party—won its reputation among the people because it always carried out its obligations notwithstanding all the difficulties of working in the underground. The fact that in the eight years of clandestine work not a single party member got into the hands of the police tells you a lot about the seriousness of the GPL work. The party devotes great attention to the development of its tactics and strategy. In the first stage of its work, the GPL fought for the democratic development of the Guatemalan revolution. The Cuban Revolution had a great impact on the consciousness of the masses. However, I think that on this issue, we should let Comrade Fortuny speak. J. M. Fortuny: The Third Congress of the GPL took place in May 1960. It adopted a political platform, which envisioned a peaceful progress of the Guatemalan Revolution. However, one has to mention that many of the Congress delegates spoke about not a peaceful way at all. A somewhat strange situation developed. The Congress presented one perspective, but a significant part of the party members called for a different one.

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However, the Third Congress of the GPL recommended to create a special commission, which would start preparations for armed struggle. The resolutions of the congress spoke about the need to undertake agrarian measures, but did not say anything about an agricultural reform. However, because the congress recommended to start preparations for armed struggle, one had to think about introducing a revolutionary agricultural reform. That difference in views reflected the different points of view of Guatemalan social classes. Students and peasants were in favor of an immediate uprising or preparation of an uprising in the shortest possible time period. Representatives of the labor movement took a more conservative line. The discussion about the forms of the Guatemalan revolution lasted several months. Then, after a thorough analysis of the situation in the country and the conditions that developed in Latin America, the leadership of the GPL came to the conclusion of the necessity to “counter the counterrevolutionary violence with the revolutionary violence when the situation demands it.” Therefore, our party, by making such a statement, spoke about its willingness to lead a revolutionary uprising or to take part in the leadership of armed struggle of the masses. The GPL decided to call all other political organizations and groups, which struggle decisively against the dictatorship, to unite in action. The political line developed by the leadership of the GPL is being carried out in practice. When the Alejandro de Leon Movement was founded, on November 13, the country saw mass rallies against the dictatorship. Guatemala City experienced especially acute fighting. The course of events forced the political commission of the Central Committee to give instructions to the special commission of the Central Committee about launching a guerilla movement. However, the guerilla unit, which was formed by the CC GPL was destroyed by the repressive organs because that armed group did not receive the necessary training. The political commission of the CC GPL very quickly realized that serious mistakes were made in that work. The party faced up to the fact that under the influence of the Cuban experience it had mechanically replicated the Cuban methods. We did not take into account sufficiently the conditions of our country and the new situation that developed in the world. Unfortunately, many comrades think that the Cuban experience has universal importance and that it could be applied in any circumstances. In addition, the Cuban comrades make great efforts to spread their experience and even to impose it sometimes. However, our party understands how important it is to take into account the concrete circumstances in Guatemala. For example, today the country is preparing for the electoral campaign. There is a possibility that less reactionary political groups will win in this election. It is possible that Arevalo will win. Therefore, our party considers it necessary to exploit this opportunity for launching a wide mass struggle, which the elections present. The so-called Cuban line did not cause any difficulties in the Guatemalan revolutionary movement, because a large part of the Guatemalans who received their military training in Cuba are members of the GPL and of the Patriotic Labor Youth (PLU)—the youth

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organization of the party. Besides, we fully agree with the Cuban comrades in the sense that it is necessary to prepare the cadres who would have military training. However, we believe that often the Cuban friends are rushing to use those cadres in some country without having studied sufficiently the concrete conditions in that country first. The Cuban friends, and especially the people working with Che Guevara (Piñero, Patoja), are trying to influence the Guatemalans who are undergoing military training in Cuba so that they should act outside the GPL, and call on them to join the military groups of the Alejander de Leon–November 13 Movement. The Cuban friends say that since members of those groups, and most important, their leaders, are not Communists, it would be easier for those groups in their struggle. Some irresponsible comrades make statements to the effect that communist parties of Latin America do not want to engage in revolutions. Consequently, one should act outside of the party framework. In their conversations with unaffiliated persons, those irresponsible comrades speak a lot about the Cuban model, often without thinking about the terms they are using and going to the extremes. Thus for example, some Guatemalans were telling us that the Cubans told them about the necessity to rise with arms to fight against the government, together not only with the Communists, but also with the anticommunists. The main thing is to rise, and then the party will support such an uprising, just as it happened in Cuba. They also emphasize the fact that the People’s Socialist Party did not support the revolutionary July 26 Movement from the very beginning. . . . Our comrades acted reasonably and never disavowed such statements, believing that their main task was to receive the military training so that at the right moment they would be ready to serve the party and the people. Our party allows for and foresees a possibility of armed actions organized from Cuba, but we are also taking measures so that we can warn our allies and the Alejandro Leon group that the conditions in Guatemala are different from the conditions that existed in Cuba before 1959. In Cuba, part of the bourgeoisie supported the revolution, which made it possible for the guerillas to carry on. The struggle in Guatemala will be more difficult and that is exactly why it should be conducted under the leadership of the Guatemalan Labor Party. Our party never forgets its work on organization and cohesiveness of the masses. Therefore, without halting the preparations for armed struggle, in the course of the electoral campaign, we should persist in explaining to the masses that the way out of the situation which developed in Guatemala could be found only on the road of a decisive destruction of the government apparatus, which currently exists in the country. The Cuban comrades spend a lot of resources in order to provide material assistance, support with weapons and to train personnel of the groups that would be used in other countries of Latin America. Several days ago, one of the Cuban comrades who work with Che Guevara suggested to a young Guatemalan, a PLU member, to recruit 1,000 young men in Guatemala to train them at the guerilla courses. Then, he said, these young men would join the ranks of Alejandro de Leon–November 13 Movement. He also noted that it would be better to recruit individuals for those courses not from members of the GPL or PLU.

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The Cuban comrades help us a lot, we are grateful to them, but unfortunately, they often try to act in a rush, without studying the situation and without consulting the leadership of communist parties of other Latin American countries. J. Árbenz: Recently, I attended training conducted by Major “Angelito”—he is a Spaniard serving in Cuba—with a group of Guatemalan young men. That group was very well trained. The lectures of Major “Angelito” were very substantive. But the trouble is that this entire group was sent to Havana to study at the university. People sent by Comrade Piñero incited them to quit their studies at the university and to transfer to the guerrilla courses. So these twelve Guatemalans, who intended to be students, became guerrillas. And not all of them are party or Komsomol members. J. M. Fortuny: I have to emphasize, Comrade Mikoyan, that the Cubans simply deceived us. When I spoke with Comrade Piñero and objected against the transfer of all these twelve people to the guerrilla courses, he told me that he received appropriate instructions from the CC GPL via Comrade Victor Manuel Gutierrez, who was in Mexico. I told him that not all of the twelve are healthy enough and not all of them received a proper clearance. Besides, our party constantly emphasizes that only volunteers should be used in armed struggle. But Piñero did not even want to listen to me. I wrote a letter to Gutierrez, in which I informed him about this incident. And he responded to me that he had never given any instructions concerning that group. He did, however, pass a request to Piñero about organization of military training for the GPL members who were in Cuba. But it had nothing to do with the university students. I protested against Piñero’s decision to Blas Roca. Comrade Blas responded to me that apparently Piñero did not understand the instructions. V. M. Gutierrez asked me to return the young men back to the university, but too much time had already passed and the guys really fell behind. Therefore, I had to allow all the members of the group to continue their training and after they finish their courses to come back to the university. Besides, to tell you the truth, I did not want to spoil my relationship with Piñero. The Cuban friends invite all Guatemalans who come to Cuba to participate in military training. They do not take into account the political background or party affiliation of candidates for these courses. Some time ago, two Guatemalans who completed their studies in the Central Komsomol School in Moscow were invited to Cuba. As soon as they arrived they were sent to guerilla training, even though our Party had not intended to use these comrades for military work. I again had to have an unpleasant conversation with Fidel. Recently, a group of Guatemalans took a crash course in military training. Despite the instructions received from the Central Committee of the GPL, all members of this group were sent to Guatemala on regular commercial flights. We had asked the Cubans to send them back one by one, but they sent them in groups of four. It was assumed that members of these groups should deploy diversionary work and carry out acts of sabotage in Guatemala during the crisis. It seems they were supposed to follow the example of the Venezuelan subversive groups, which blew up objects at the oil fields. I raised the subject with my Cuban comrades of the need to conduct political conversations with Guatemalans who are participating in military training. They agreed. However,

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they did not take me to the camp where our countrymen were stationed. I thought that something had malfunctioned in their apparatus, that someone was negligent in his duties. However, the representative of Dominican Communists, Felicervio Doucoudre, told me that he was in the same situation. I would like to mention one other issue that is important to us, Comrade Mikoyan. In recent years, the governments of five Central American countries and the bourgeoisie associated with the U.S. have made great efforts to implement the integration of Central America. The bourgeoisie is trying to exploit the desire of the people of our countries, who have been historically linked. Lately, the volume of trade has been increasing between member countries of the Organization of Central American States. Agencies have been set up to facilitate trade. The integration of Central America is beneficial to American imperialists. The reactionary governments of our countries also support it. Attempts have been made to combine armed forces and repressive bodies of the five countries. These steps have been taken for the purpose of combining forces to suppress the liberation movements in Central America. We ask ourselves whether the measures taken by the governments of the five Central American countries constitute a direct step to suppress the liberation movement. We believe that combining the armed forces of the five countries is aimed at suppressing the revolutionary actions of the peoples of Central America, to suppress the liberation movement. If we look at the political line of the Communist parties of Latin America, we see that El Salvador’s political line is very similar to the line developed by our party. The conditions in Costa Rica and Nicaragua differ from conditions in Guatemala and El Salvador, therefore the political line of their Communist parties is different. The Honduran party has not yet determined its political line. The Cuban Communists’ tactical line, which is reflected in the second Havana Declaration, is similar to the lines developed by the Communists in El Salvador and, I think, Panama. I think that we, the Communists of Central America, should further strengthen cooperation between our parties in the development of mutual tactics and measures that we could apply in concert with each other. After all, if there is any new deep crisis, we must act together. A. I. Mikoyan: I would like to make a few remarks in connection with your statements, comrades. The Communist Party must always be ready to be active in any situation, and depending on the specific circumstances to choose the forms and methods of struggle. These questions should be decided by the party on its own, they cannot be decided from outside. That is why the Comintern was abolished—because today no international organization should be able to give orders or instructions to participants of the Communist movement. The party itself, taking into account the situation in its country and the experience of other parties, should choose the forms and methods of their struggle, and make responsible decisions. And the point here is not about the theoretical side of issues, but about the practical side, because each party is responsible for the success of its activities. Of course, our party has great experience, but still, we do not impose our will, and we do not give advice to other parties unless they ask us for it. And when we do give advice to

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friendly parties at their request, that advice represents only a generalization of our concrete experience. However, we have one common essence of our movement—the leadership of the working class in society. The form of action can be very diverse and it always depends on the particular situation. V. I. Lenin stressed this often. I understand the psychology of our Cuban comrades. I remember the first years after the Great October Socialist Revolution. You recall that in those years, Soviet power sprung up in Hungary and Bavaria. To us, young revolutionaries, it seemed that the revolution would spread rapidly throughout the world. We were carried away. The Cuban comrades are in about the same condition right now. The course of history over the years has shown that there are various forms of struggle, various forms of government by the people, which depends on society’s different stages of development. After World War II, states with people’s democracies were created, and then the People’s Republic of China [came into existence]. Now we are adults, we understand the feelings of our friends in the countries newly liberated from the yoke of capitalism. But we do not impose our views, which would be wrong and harmful. Situations change, and the methods and forms of struggle change according to national circumstances. In the first four years after the Soviet victory, we thought that if the revolution is not victorious in other countries, we will not make it. Then, when the revolutionary wave subsided, the revolutionary ideas of V. I. Lenin took the upper hand. Trotsky’s stipulation about the so-called “national limitation” was discarded by the party. Life itself refuted this “theory” of Trotsky. The Cuban Revolution is a unique event in human history. It took place in a Latin American country located so close to the stronghold of imperialism—the United States of America. Cuba is a kind of social volcano, and the force of eruption grows all the time. It is the duty of fraternal Communist parties to support the Cuban Revolution, to preserve revolutionary Cuba, to help it thrive. If Cuba lives, it will facilitate the victory of the revolution in other countries. If the imperialists succeed in crushing the Cuban revolution, it will be a defeat for the entire revolutionary movement. These were our considerations when we made the decisions you are familiar with. These decisions were necessary in the circumstances. We are confident that Cuba will win, that the revolution will endure in Cuba. This is important for all of Latin America. We would stop at nothing to achieve that goal. During the crisis, we brought the world to the brink of war, but we stood up for Cuba. Our Cuban friends point out that there is a great deal in common in the customs, traditions, and living conditions of the people of Latin America. This is true. But we must not forget that in addition to these common traits of the people of Latin America, there are features and special characteristics and conditions in each country. Perhaps our Cuban friends do not notice this. That is the conclusion I came to while carefully listening to your information. Right now it is very difficult to tell how the revolutions will occur in any particular country in Latin America. Each party should take into account the entire experience of revolutionary struggle, study this common experience, internalize it, and develop its own

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line. One must take into account that imperialism’s reaction will now be different, too. The imperialists have also gained experience from the Cuban Revolution. When it began, the Americans thought that it would be another coup, and a new junta would come to power. And quite honestly, this revolution began as a liberal one. After all, Castro was a liberal in the past, and he comes from an aristocratic family. He spoke out against corruption, he championed justice and humanism, but the Revolution began to develop rapidly into the interior. Now the Americans are kicking themselves, regretting that they did not help Batista in time. It is true that the existence of revolutionary Cuba will help the Latin American countries fight for their freedom, but this fight will be very serious, it must be well prepared for, and should not be fought without the masses. In Cuba, the masses supported the Revolution, that is why there was such a powerful explosion. Comrade Fidel Castro is a very striking figure. He became a leader in the course of the Revolution, and he personally influenced the development of the revolution. That is how it always happens—leaders develop in the course of revolutionary struggle. But we must not forget that historical events usually do not follow the same path. This is natural, since history is moving forward and conditions are changing. I completely understand the GPL’s desire to lead the revolutionary struggle. If this were not the case, your party would not be a Marxist-Leninist party. But we must not forget that a poorly prepared revolt leads to unnecessary casualties, inhibits the development of the Revolution. It is true that the masses learn from the struggle—this is a severe school, its lessons lead to victory. An armed uprising cannot be delayed for too long, and should be prepared for with determination. Indeed, the situation in many Latin American countries is fraught with revolution. For example, in your country, [and] in Venezuela, even in Brazil there is a lot of fuel for it. But in Mexico, as far as I know, the situation is different. The actions prepared or carried out behind the GPL’s back are doomed to fail. After all, the Guatemalan party, the Communist Party of Guatemala—is the leading force of Guatemalan society. All the revolutionaries must reach mutual understanding and unity. You have to exchange views, develop a common vision, and achieve victory. Now about the Organization of Central American States. I think that your evaluation of the integration process in Central America is correct. The Americans are not acting directly in their desire to join the police forces to suppress the national liberation movement in Central America. They are acting through the Organization of Central American States. They are talking profusely about integration, but it is only a screen. Although, economic integration does have an element of progressiveness. (Relations are strengthened; a certain progress is reached in economic development.) However, this integration will eventually be used by the imperialists in their own interests. Briefly, I would like to note that you were right to say that a Marxist-Leninist party has to develop a program of radical agrarian reform. But I want to point out that putting forward a broad program of agrarian reform does not exclude partial transitional demands on agriculture. History had prepared a leading role for Guatemala in the revolutionary process in Latin America. Maybe mistakes were made in the course of the revolution; perhaps the enemy took advantage of a weakness in the revolutionary process, I do not know. But

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Guatemala could have been the first socialist country of the Western Hemisphere. And you, Comrade Árbenz—the first president of a socialist country in Latin America. But at that time it was very difficult for us to organize broad aid to the Guatemalan Revolution. At the present time [illegible words]. We help Cuba by all our means: economic, political, and military. In conclusion, I would like to ask a question: How did our maneuvering in defense of Cuba during the Cuban missile crisis reflect in the Western Hemisphere? Has the prestige of your party dropped? If you do not have information from your country right now, naturally, you do not have to answer the question. J. M. Fortuny: Comrade Mikoyan, I meet with many Latin Americans living in Cuba or visiting here. A minority of them support the Cuban point of view. Almost no one supports the view of the Communist Party of China. The vast majority of Latin Americans understands and fully justifies the steps taken by the Soviet Union in order to protect Cuba during the Cuban missile crisis emergency. J. Árbenz: I also would like to emphasize, Comrade Mikoyan, that we strongly support the position of the Soviet government and the CPSU in the struggle for peace and preservation of revolutionary Cuba. We are deeply grateful to you for your attention to us. We wish you continued success in your noble work. J. M. Fortuny: As the representative of the GPL in Cuba, I heartily thank you, Comrade Mikoyan, for the attention accorded to the Guatemalan Party of Labor. Please convey my warm greetings to the CC CPSU and to Comrade N. S. Krushchev. The conversation lasted about two hours. It was attended by Ambassador Comrade A. I. Alekseyev and the adviser of the embassy, Comrade K. P. Monakov.

Source: Personal Archive of Sergo Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Svetlana Savranskaya and Anna Melyakova for the National Security Archive.

Document 27 Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan to the CC CPSU

November 16, 1962 I am sending you an information note from Comrade Dementiev about his meeting with Fidel Castro on November 16: To CC CPSU Presidium Member A. I. Mikoyan On November 16, 1962, I spent six hours with Fidel Castro. He was clearly in a good mood, he joked a great deal. He was very pleased with the decision to open fire on American planes violating Cuban airspace, and by the first results of his announcement. Fidel Castro spoke about the Americans’ possible responses to the Cuban governments’ decision to open fire. He expects a possible attack by enemy aircraft of Cuban aircraft on the ground, as well as an attack on the antiaircraft equipment. He talked about what the Cuban government would do in the event of a total blockade of the island, saying that they would take the entire urban population to the countryside to work on food production for the people. He said that they would introduce a rationing system for everything, but that they would persevere and they will fight to the last man capable of bearing arms. Following your instructions to show Fidel Castro the positions of antiaircraft missile divisions, I invited him to see one such division. He agreed immediately and spent an hour at the division. He admired our equipment and got acquainted with the system of protection of the division against a possible attack from the air. On the spot he made a decision to strengthen every Soviet antiaircraft missile division by one 30-millimeter battery. He said he would like to keep most of these divisions not deployed at the moment, but instead to keep them in areas of concentration, well camouflaged and ready to take prepared positions. 430

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This proposal is substantiated by the fact that low-altitude American planes might suddenly attack these divisions, since it is impossible to hide them in Cuba, and bring down the antiaircraft missiles in the early hours of the attack. Before leaving the division, Fidel Castro made a speech to the personnel, in which he said many warm words about Russian soldiers, their courage in the struggle against their country’s enemy. He said he was confident of Soviet soldiers, who, together with Cuban soldiers, in great danger were ready to defend, and if need be give their lives for our motherland. During our meeting he touched upon the possibility of removing the Il-28 bombers from Cuba. He believes that currently, the Il-28s do not present a major strike force, and he agrees with the decision to remove them from Cuba. Head of the group of military specialists, Major-General Dementiev. A. Mikoyan

Source: From the personal archive of Sergo A. Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.

Document 28 Mikoyan’s Telegram to Khrushchev (1837) and Khrushchev’s Reply (1179)

November 17, 1962 CC CPSU for Comrade Khrushchev My intention, after two or three meetings with the Cuban friends, to leave Havana, please trust me, was not caused by my desire not to miss the Plenum, but it was dictated by the impression that I had at the time that my functions here were completed. A day later, even before I received your telegram, I started feeling that the mutual understanding and mutual trust that we have achieved were not solid. I got into a very bad mood and was dissatisfied by my work here. Thus I decided for myself to postpone my departure until I can achieve a lasting trust and mutual understanding. Can you imagine—on Wednesday, when the next meetings were supposed to take place—the Cubans did not schedule any meetings. All that day I was doomed to idling, and did not know whether the next day would bring any meetings. Initially, I wanted to ask Fidel for a meeting myself, but then I decided to send Comrade Alexeyev to Dorticós to feel out the situation under the pretext that we needed to consult with him on when we should organize a dinner for their leadership hosted by our ambassador. Dorticós was irritated when he received him, and told him: we produced a draft protocol here together with you, but Kuznetsov passed the document to the Cuban representative in New York with big changes. Dorticós also added that he had not yet figured it out fully, but until the end of the day he did not tell us anything about this issue. At the end of the day, Dorticós called and said that they agreed to dinner at 8 p.m. on the next day. He also added that instead of Raul Castro, who is absent, Foreign Minister Raul Roa, who is not part of the leadership, will attend the dinner. 432

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So this way already two of my working days were doomed to idleness and in addition to that I was overwhelmed by the thought—maybe they suspect that we behave dishonestly —that we agreed to one thing in Havana, and proposed another one in New York. I tasked Comrade Alexeyev to get the foreign minister to clarify—what were the discrepancies? I was concerned that it could become the subject of discussion at the dinner next day, and I was not ready to discuss it. In the evening, our good friend Nùñez Jimenez, who just recently returned from Algeria, called me and expressed his desire to visit me. I went to his apartment, and told him about my state of dissatisfaction in the course of a friendly conversation—that even though I reported to Moscow that everything was going well, today it seemed like it was just the opposite, that I even started to think that it might be the right thing to do to tell our Central Committee that maybe another person would have done a better job, that apparently I have failed. I added that today it seemed to me that there was none of the mutual understanding that there was yesterday, and about which I wrote to Moscow. I did not know when I could leave, and I could not leave without achieving a complete understanding. Nùñez said that he was going to visit Dorticós tonight and Fidel in the morning, and asked my permission to tell them all about it. I responded that I am not asking him to tell them, but I do not forbid him to do it either. During the night, Alexeyev connected by phone with Roa, who said that there was no need to meet in person, that everything was worked out and they had no more comments on the draft that their representative received from Kuznetsov. This gave me comfort. Fidel showed up three minutes earlier than the scheduled dinner time, followed by the others. Fidel hugged me very warmly, like a brother, greeted me; one could feel that he was in a very good, energetic mood. He told me that Jimenez informed him about our conversation, and asked me emotionally with great concern and real sincerity why was I in such a mood; he started to explain the absence of any meetings on Wednesday and Thursday by the fact that both he and Dorticós were sick on those days. Fidel and all his colleagues behaved in a very friendly way all the evening. I spoke with them from 8 p.m. to 12 midnight. I will inform you of this conversation in another telegram. From far away, you understood me, that it was hard for me, very hard, both because of my personal grief, and because I had to deal with a very complex task in such a state: They [the Cuban comrades] are good people, but temperamental, explosive, emotional, hotheaded, quick to anger, and extremely sensitive to every little detail. Hot feelings often overwhelm reason. It was of great help to me that you prepared so many arguments, considerations, plenty of them. All this helped me a lot in persuading them that our position is the right one. But it was the warm feelings and brotherly sympathy, the understanding of my situation, which I gathered from the Central Committee and your telegrams, that were my biggest help and emotional support, which helped me weather my personal grief and made my difficult task easier. Thank you for that. 17/XI-62

A. Mikoyan

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For Comrade Mikoyan (personally) 1837. I just received your telegram, in which you informed us about the great difficulties in your work with the Cuban comrades. I understand you completely. We all and I personally are fully aware that your task is very difficult. But it is also exceptionally important. Please be assured that that we value the work that you have done and you have done it well. We fully understand that your personal grief, even though you bear it like a man, makes your situation even more difficult. We wish you health, we are convinced that you will continue to carry out your important task, which landed on your shoulders as a result of your trip to Cuba, just as well and as honorably as you did before. 17/XI-62

N. Khrushchev

Source: Personal archive of Sergo Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.

Document 29 Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan

November 17, 1962 Top Secret Making copies prohibited Copy No. 12 Ciphered Telegram CC CPSU No. 1837. On November 15, as I already reported, Ambassador Alekseyev held a dinner. Before and during dinner, there was a lively conversation. At the beginning of the conversation, Fidel Castro said that it is terrible that he was worried by N. Jimenez’s story about his conversation with me. He added: “Who, if not you, and only you, can carry out this mission! If you cannot do this, then it proves that in general this is impossible. But we all know that this is not so. We share with you an old, strong friendship and trust.” Fidel and his friends, being disturbed by Jimenez’s story, endeavor in every way possible to create an even more warm and friendly situation. I reported to the Cuban comrades about the telegram from N. S. Khrushchev; I said to them that he and all our leaders continually and attentively watch the motion of our conversations. I candidly told them that I considered our mission to be for the most part fulfilled, that I wrote about this to Moscow and intended to leave in two or three days; however, from a telegram I found out that despite the Plenary Session of the CC beginning on the 19th, Comrade Khrushchev and the Central Committee deem it necessary that I remain in Cuba, as the current crisis in the region of the Caribbean Sea is still not completely liquidated, to support contact and consultation at the highest level between parties. 435

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I reported to our Cuban comrades about our position on the Il-28. I communicated that, side by side with negotiations, in which in New York Comrade Kuznetsov insisted and continues to insist that we are against the withdrawal of the Il-28, our ambassador in the United States, Dobrynin, before the trusted agent of President Kennedy began confidential negotiations with the objective of obtaining the following: Americans must now remove the quarantine, put a stop to the piloting of U.S. planes over Cuba, fix in writing mutual obligations, which are the results of the messages of Kennedy and Khrushchev from October 27 and 28, and those governments of countries, which believe in obligations, will draw up the appropriate documents with the assistance of U Thant. I stressed that while placing these demands, Khrushchev took into consideration the conditions that Fidel Castro proposed during the last talks. I told the Cubans that Kennedy’s agent reported that the president agreed to this, to definitely look forward to the declaration in time, and on that day of the achievement of such an agreement the Soviet Union will remove the Il-28 bombers and the United States will remove the quarantine. The government of Kennedy confirmed, I said to the Cubans, that it would be possible to announce all this simultaneously. I said to our Cuban comrades, that our government hopes, while acting through those channels, that following the agreement in principle about the removal of the Il-28 planes the Americans would at once remove the blockade, while not waiting for the removal of the Il-28, and would also put a stop to flying over Cuba, and so on. Fidel Castro expressed satisfaction with the direction of these confidential negotiations, but noticed that the issue about the flying of American planes is presently not enough to bind with the removal of the Il-28 bombers, since we already agreed that Cuba will send a declaration on the issue about the overflights to U Thant. Here he said that not many hours ago he sent to U Thant such a message. I expressed surprise that I had not been informed about the sending of such a letter to U Thant. Fidel Castro said the following: “We talked with you during the last meeting about it, that it would follow to notify the United States through U Thant. The rockets are already being removed. I cannot tolerate any more, and having called in today on the antiaircraft gunners, I said to them that on Sunday or perhaps Saturday we will open fire on any American war planes that fly over airports, ports, and military bases. Of course, only in those situations when the facilities of our gunner’s artillery has at its disposal the necessary firing range.” In the letter to U Thant, there is not a time indicating the beginning of the open fire, and in fact there is not an order to do this on Sunday. I continued my own report about N. S. Khrushchev’s telegram, alluding to the fact that we were striving through confidential channels through [Robert] Kennedy for the cessation of American flights over Cuban territory. I reminded the Cubans that during the previous talks they agreed with us that the main thing in the present moment is to secure the removal of the quarantine, while not permitting inspections on Cuban territory. I said that in the next days, namely, when the agreement for the lifting of the blockade is taking

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shape, it is advantageous for the Cubans themselves to refrain from firing on American planes. Fidel interrupted me and said that he already reported about the Soviet decision to the antiaircraft gunners and “presently not under any circumstance can he revoke his own decision.” He added that, in his opinion, not one socialist country ever permitted, or will permit, unpunished flights over its territory. I objected, having noted that there were cases when we knew about violations of our air space by foreign planes, but in definite circumstances for tactical reasons they were not shot down, although the means to shoot them down were at our disposal. Such flights were not publicized. Fidel asked: How is it that you are going to remove from Cuba the Il-28s, when your people declared in New York that these planes had been given to the Cubans? To this, I replied that in a letter to me Comrade Khrushchev writes that he has in mind, as soon as he reaches an agreement with Kennedy about the removal of the quarantine and so on, to make a statement, which will be in accordance with the Cubans, about the removal of the bombers from Cuba. It should be noted, that when we spoke about the necessity to record in writing in the UN the mutual obligations, which were concluded by Khrushchev and Kennedy in messages on October 27 and 28, I stressed again that we scored a great victory, and Americans received a shock from which up to now they could not recover. In connection with this Guevara expressed doubts—whether to attach great importance to the promises of Kennedy, while alluding that he, like Johnson, still up to October 22 said that the United States would not attack Cuba. This very Kennedy said that, noticed Guevara, in the face of that very invasion of interventionists on Playa Giron. To this I in detail explained to him that for one thing, when a president announces on some sort of ground that he does not intend to attack, he could after a week say the reverse, having selected for this some other sort of reason. Another thing, when this obligation of the American side is fixed in the messages of the heads of two governments it acquires the character of an international agreement. It is yet an entirely different matter when such an agreement will be raised and made level to the United Nations, it will be approved and recorded by the Security Council. This still will be a document of international importance, which not any ruler always dares to break. It is forbidden to display nihilism in relation to international obligations and international agreements because it is forbidden to believe in the bourgeois. This is equivalent to the denial of the peaceful coexistence of two different socialistic systems. More than that, the denial of the declaration of international agreements would have been equivalent to the denial of peaceful life between governments. Of course, there is the possibility that some sort of new president in some kind of new period will endeavor to break this obligation of the United States, but this is almost impossible for Kennedy while he serves as president, and as we understand, Kennedy has a considerable chance to be selected for a second term. And this means that in the course of about six years these guarantees will function in relation to Cuba. This is a great time for revolutionaries. From this time Cuba will get stronger and the international alignment of

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forces changes still more in favor of socialism, to the detriment of imperialism. These thoughts, which were proposed by Comrade Khrushchev, I set forth in detail, and it seemed to me, they were convincing. Guevara asked a second question: “Do you think that imperialists, who were recovering after receiving the shock, now decide that the Soviet Union in general will not start a nuclear war in defense of their own demands or the demands of friendly countries?” To this I said the following to him. It is not an accident that neither Kennedy nor Rusk shout out their victory and the defeat of the USSR as a result of the Cuban crisis. And, more than that, they urge correspondents not to talk in this tone. If it had been the law of Comrade Guevara they probably would have made noise about the victory. But they did not do this, for they understand that it is not their victory. If they had felt themselves victors would they really have not accomplished their threat to the blockade—to climb on board our ships and check all cargo? And you see there is not one ship for this whole time on which Americans climbed on board. Here Guevara retorted that on board one ship apparently Americans boarded and searched it. I decidedly declined such a version; I announced that it is unclear to me whose information Comrade Guevara is using. Here Fidel and other Cubans nodded as a sign of their support for me in this, and not Guevara. I added that it was attempted by one American war ship, under the threat of the use of force, to climb on board our two ships that were leaving Cuba with weapons. Our captains refused such demands, we declared a protest to the American government secretly, and the Americans did not dare to carry out their threat. If Americans had felt themselves to be victors, they would have conducted themselves differently. They have no foundation to insist on ground inspections in order to verify the fact of the dismantled rockets and to demand inspections while loading the rockets onto ships. However, they have limited themselves by announcing the truth about the dismantling, in fact given by confirmation while photographing by aerial reconnaissance. I noted that Comrade Khrushchev stresses that ground inspections in Cuba have not and will not take place so long as this is unacceptable for the government of Cuba. This has made a great impression on them. Americans, I said further, were limited to visual observation, which was finding on board our ships rockets and not to dare to demand the docking on board of the ship for verification. Is all this together really not enough evidence in order to refute the opinion of Comrade Guevara? Americans act thusly because they are scared of nuclear war, for they know what gigantic nuclear power Soviet long-range missiles have; they know that it can annihilate the United States. Our strength is not in the missiles that are being removed from Cuba, but in this power. The whole world knows this and the fact that we rescued the world from the threat of nuclear war, having defended Cuba, improved the authority of the Soviet Union as a peacemaker.

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I led before these still other additional arguments, in particular those that were connected with the Monroe Doctrine, by agreements in Rio de Janeiro, and by the near confession now on the side of the United States and of other countries of the permissible existence of communism on the American continent. They listened with great attention, it was felt, that they understand this. They did not make any remarks to my answer. I said also to Fidel and all those present, that the attention of the Cubans is greatly valued and more than once wrote to the CC, to Comrade Khrushchev, about this attention, and that they strongly supported me in my personal sorrow and that I am very grateful to them for this. Then I, having stressed that I feel myself surrounded by real friends, would have wanted to discuss some of our survivals, to talk about some psychological moments. I then told about those moments, which I reported about in the evening telegram—the history with differences of opinion in protocol, the absence during two days which were outlined in an earlier meeting. I said that even the protocol department, which serves residents, asked me today who is accompanying me personally concerning the day of my departure. In embarrassment they, as I already reported, explained the situation arose because Fidel and Dorticós were sick, and Raul Roe, so they were embarrassed. I answered that there had not been any detailed instructions about the time of my departure from his side. You comrade Fidel feel bad and Dorticós, too, announced I; I still understand this but why could you not meet with me, for example, Comrade Guevara? I intend to pay him a visit tomorrow at a convenient time, especially as when Guevara was in Moscow he paid a visit to me; we talked after dinner together with Comrade Titov. Guevara here answered that he would have been very glad for our visit and would be better with the morning. The Cuban friends in conclusion of this portion of the talk felt that they were not the only ones with a reason to be hurt in connection with “psychological moments,” and in every way possible tried to make amends for their tactless behavior. It was implied that they were sick, and for me they cannot spare the time, but a message to U Thant was sent. During the dinner a lively conversation took place, the Cubans made many jokes, asked questions, and attentively listed to my opinions. At the end of the dinner I said: “If you want to look for better friends—do not try— you will not find better friends than us. We are the closest and most reliable of your friends.” Fidel Castro and other Cubans all together nodded their assent, warmly smiled, while supporting my saying. Before the departure of our Cuban comrades I, while feeling appropriate humor toward Fidel, turned to him one on one and asked whether in the future my stay in Cuba will be a burden to him. He embraced me and said that I must not offend him with such words. The whole meeting in entirety went normally, stressing a friendly atmosphere on their side, which we naturally reciprocated. 17.XI.62

Mr. A. Mikoyan

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Reference: No. 1837-1839/ incoming. No. 52446/ from 17.XI.62 Comrade Mikoyan informed about our impressions in connection with the meetings with Cuban friends, about the meeting with Nùñez Jimenez, and also about that which took place at the November 15 dinner with Fidel Castro, Dorticós, and other Cuban leaders. Copy 31 Printed 18.XI.20.5 Correct: (signature) Issued by Kanbanov

Source: From the personal archive of Sergo A. Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Andrea Hendrikson for the National Security Archive.

Document 30 Mikoyan’s Telegram to Khrushchev

November 18, 1962 CC CPSU, Comrade Khrushchev To your 2507/ts. I believe that getting a preliminary agreement with Kennedy about his lifting the quarantine in connection with our agreement to withdraw Il-28s was a big success. The earlier it is announced and carried out, the better. Therefore, I believe that we should respond in such a way that they would announce without any further delay about lifting the quarantine in connection with our promise to withdraw Il-28s, and that negotiations on other issues should proceed on their course. From conversations with the Cubans, it is clear that they believe that the main thing for them is the lifting of the quarantine. They do not see the importance and do not consider necessary to link the withdrawal of Il-28s with American promises to stop violations of their airspace. Fidel Castro told me directly that after his message to U Thant the cessation of American flights over Cuba should not be linked with the withdrawal of Il-28s. I agree with you that lifting the quarantine is not the main issue, even though it is important. The main issue is to formalize through the United Nations the noninvasion pledges contained in Kennedy’s letters. As you could see from my last coded cable about the conversation in connection with the dinner at the ambassador’s, which you received already after you sent your telegram, before that conversation the Cubans, as strange as it is, did not see any importance at all in formalizing the Kennedy non-invasion pledges given in his messages through the United Nations. In my next conversations, I will try to figure out whether they understand it well now— it seems that I will have to work more with them to help them comprehend it better. 441

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I have an impression from the exchanges with Kennedy through Dobrynin, that Kennedy wants to end this entire affair peacefully and more or less reasonably. But he would not be against gaining more than he has a right to get on the basis of the exchange of letters. If we do not accept his latest demands in full—and we should not do it, then he will be inclined to drag it out in order to on the one hand bargain for more, and on the other—so that after the lifting of the quarantine and the relaxation of situation, he could still preserve some tension to satisfy the reactionary circles. It seems to me that to get an agreement with the Americans on all the issues will take several weeks in the best case. The biggest difficulty will be in the desire of the Americans to have a permanent control over Cuba in some form without any reciprocity on their part. They could even try to tie the question of inspections in our ports to this. Of course, there is no question about whether the Cuban friends want to cooperate with us. They want it, they like us. And they cannot exist without us. The trouble is that they have an unbelievable pride—both national and personal. They created a militant and intense mood among the people and themselves got caught in this heated enthusiasm of the masses, who march in military fatigues with pistols or even without those and think that this is defense. One has to have in mind that in the course of these weeks of anticipation of a direct invasion, and then in the situation of continuing tension, sleepless nights, in the atmosphere of constant harassment by the American hostile and humiliating propaganda, their nerves are raw and it is difficult for them to weigh everything calmly and to make rational decisions. At the same time, I feel that the time is taking its course and our conversations were not in vain. It seems to me that we can find agreement with them on all the questions of our future tactics, but the issue with inspections on their territory is just some kind of ulcer. When they return to normality, I think they will understand this too. Of course they are not Albanians and not Yugoslavs, and the statements like the ones by Raul Castro and Guevara were not hypocritical, they were sincere. Obviously, they will have to accept one of the three flexible forms of inspection proposed by U Thant, but I would not count on this happening in the nearest future. We need more time and conversations. For the time being, we could and should conduct negotiations with the Americans about inspections of dismantling and taking out the missiles on the basis of the current Cuban position on inspections. During this time I will be working with the Cubans on finding possibilities of their agreement to one of U Thant’s proposals in some form. Yesterday, before I received your telegram, Dorticós proposed through Guevara to meet at his place this evening; it is possible that Fidel will come too. If he is not there—I will ask to see him tomorrow. 18.XI.62

A. Mikoyan

Source: Personal archive of Sergo Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.

Document 31 Record of Conversation between Comrade Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan and Comrades Fidel Castro, Osvaldo Dorticós, Ernesto Guevara, Emilio Aragonés, and Carlos R. Rodriguez

November 19, 1962 Ambassador A. I. Alekseyev was present at the conversation. The conversation, which lasted for two hours, took place on November 19, 1962, at the Presidential Palace. After mutual greetings, Fidel Castro turned to A. I. Mikoyan and asked how he and persons accompanying him spent Sunday. Mikoyan responded that they all had a good swim, even twice, and that the water here even in the winter is warmer than the Black Sea in the summer. At the beginning of the conversation, A. I. Mikoyan informed Fidel Castro and his comrades that he had received one more telegram from N. S. Khrushchev. He said that comrade Khrushchev devoted great attention to the resolution of the crisis, and was regularly informing him about the progress of negotiations in the United States, and about unresolved issues, and gave recommendations as to what he could do to help the Cuban friends. Mikoyan emphasized that the issues about which he is going to talk were discussed at the Presidium of the CC, and all the Presidium members came to a unanimous opinion. He said that during the confidential negotiations which are continuing through intermediaries in Washington, it became known that Kennedy was ready to lift the quarantine immediately after receiving Khrushchev’s consent on the withdrawal of Il-28s from Cuba, and that he did not object to the possibility that the actual withdrawal of the bombers would be carried out over one month. Mikoyan noted that the CC believed that lifting the quarantine was not the main thing. The main issue is to reach a point where the United States would formally affirm its obligations regarding a noninvasion of Cuba through the United Nations for its own part and on the part of its allies. In the opinion of our CC, the most reactionary and aggressive 443

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circles of the United States, unhappy about Kennedy’s obligations, want to preclude affirmation of these obligations at the United Nations. Mikoyan drew the attention of the Cuban comrades to the fact that according to our intelligence, an invasion of Cuba was being prepared before the October crisis, as early as September. That operation was conducted under the guise of maneuvers in the area of Vieques Island, close to Puerto Rico, and was defined as “maneuvers of a paratrooper brigade.” The Americans concentrated thousands of paratroopers in this region, and a great number of military vessels. The following facts testify that this operation represented a concentration of forces for use in an invasion of Cuba. Normally, the Americans conduct their maneuvers according to a plan. Such a maneuver had not been planned for 1962. Admiral River, commander of amphibious forces of the United States in the Atlantic Ocean, was assigned command of the naval infantry and paratroopers. Those exercises with landings on Vieques Island had already been held in 1961, and there was no reason to repeat them again. The exercises were interrupted “due to the hurricane,” but they were not renewed after the hurricane. Therefore, emphasized Mikoyan, the United States was ready to begin an invasion of Cuba as early as September, and only the fear of Soviet strategic missiles prevented them from attempting to carry out their plan. Therefore, Kennedy’s promise not to attack Cuba was a forced one on the part of the United States. Now the most reactionary circles in the United States want to undermine the fulfillment of Kennedy’s promise and free their hands for actions against Cuba in the future. Mikoyan explained to the Cuban comrades that Comrade Khrushchev and the CC CPSU thought that the affirmation of Kennedy’s obligations through the UN would be extremely important, because as a result the following would be achieved: 1. International, legally formulated guarantees, as a result of which Cuba would acquire an opportunity to develop freely as a socialist country. 2. A moral victory, because it would undermine the statements that the existence of a Communist regime in the Western Hemisphere is legally not acceptable. As a matter of fact, it would mean acceptance and tolerance of the new regime in Cuba, acceptance of the existence of a Communist regime in one of the countries of Latin America in the international-legal sense. Mikoyan noted that an acceptance of this kind does not exclude, however, new attempts to commit aggression in the future. He emphasized that if we cannot achieve this agreement as we had wanted in the interests of Cuba, then the Americans could proceed with their efforts to find a loophole: they can announce that not all the missiles were withdrawn, because there were no inspections in situ, keep up the tension, and undertake measures to interdict petroleum deliveries to Cuba. Then it would be more difficult to provide assistance to Cuba. We are not capable of providing military convoys for the [oil] tankers sailing to Cuba. At the present time, the struggle has moved from the military sphere to the diplomatic sphere. This stage of the struggle will have great significance. Of course, we cannot accept

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the American proposals regarding unilateral inspections. Mikoyan is aware that Castro has not accepted the three options proposed by U Thant. Mikoyan understands that the reason for this is the biased character of the measures contained in those proposals. Mikoyan made his judgment about it on the basis of [his knowledge] that Castro gave his consent for multilateral control, which would be carried out on a mutual basis on Cuban territory, as well as the territory of other countries of the Caribbean Basin. Consequently, Castro agreed to U Thant’s plan, because it took into account the principle of reciprocity. On Saturday, U Thant summoned V. V. Kuznetsov and presented him with his new plan, which preserves the principles of U Thant’s plan coordinated by us in the protocol. Ambassador Alekseyev visited Minister Roa, who is familiar with the essence of this plan. Comrade Khrushchev’s telegram contains the following summary of the essence of U Thant’s new plan on mobile groups of the UN (he reads it). These proposals are based on the principle of equal access both to Cuba and to the United States, which is reflected in this plan (he reads it). The positive importance of this plan is in the fact that it is built on the principle of reciprocity and multilateral control, that is, it preserves the spirit of the protocol that was coordinated with the Cubans. Our CC believes that Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership in general would not have any objections to this new plan. A positive decision on this issue would strengthen our position and weaken the position of our enemies. U Thant asked [us] to inform him of our attitude to this plan. We are not informing him about our point of view until we receive the consent of the Cuban side. In essence, we see his plan positively; however, we gave the following answer through Kuznetsov: “Your new proposal was received with interest. We will inform you of our opinion additionally”; that is, our opinion would depend on the results of these negotiations [in Cuba]. The last proposal by U Thant could lead the negotiations out of a dead end, where the aggressive circles of the United States want to push it, and create prospects for a better solution of the issue in Cuba’s interests. We hope that the Cuban leadership, led by Fidel Castro, will think about this issue carefully, taking into account N. S. Khrushchev’s considerations, will discuss it, and inform us of their attitude toward the plan. Mikoyan is ready for discussions at any moment. F. Castro: What are these groups going to do? A. I. Mikoyan: As said in Khrushchev’s letter, these mobile groups of UN observers will constantly work at the UN headquarters in New York and will carry out inspections concerning fulfillment of the obligations. After the decision on this issue in principle [is made], it will be important to discuss who will determine the membership of the groups, the need for their travel to one or another countries, and other issues. F. Castro: When Kennedy posed the issue about removing the Il-28 bombers from Cuba as a condition for lifting the blockade, he obviously raised the issue of inspections. A. I. Mikoyan: If we can get the UN to affirm Kennedy’s obligation not to invade Cuba, then by doing that we will bind the Americans’ hands and feet, we will force them to move onto the defensive. We would like to bring to your attention confidential information regarding the session of the Council of the Organization of American States, which we received from Moscow (calls on Comrade Alekseyev, who reads the information).

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If we accept the new U Thant plan in principle, then we would knock the weapons out of the Americans’ hands and therefore put the United States on the defensive. After determining our attitude toward this new plan in principle, it would be important to clarify the following questions: who will make decisions about sending the mobile groups, in what situations can they be sent, for what length of time; that is, we should try to resolve all these issues so that there is no abuse on the part of the United States, so that Cuban interests are protected. Therefore, I believe that we will consult on these issues, if you do not object, after the clarification of our attitude toward the plan in principle. At the present time, your representative at the UN, Carlos Lechuga, and our representative, V. V. Kuznetsov, are conducting negotiations on this issue with the goal of working out an acceptable solution. Of course, the Americans will undertake to ruin this plan, but we should fight for its acceptance, because this plan takes into account Cuban demands regarding sovereignty and is built in the spirit of the protocol discussed by us. Our CC hopes that the Cuban government will study this issue, discuss it, and state its opinion. Then we will be able to give a response to U Thant. F. Castro: The plan presupposes that the groups will be formed from representatives of neutral countries. One should not forget that while U Thant’s idea was discussed in our conversations, we spoke about the multilateral inspections in the framework of the resolution of the Cuban issue as a whole, that is, in such a framework, as it is said in the protocol, without limiting these issues to inspections or the missile withdrawal. The protocol contains all the points we discussed [with you], reflecting all five conditions set forth by the Cuban government, including also the question of withdrawing the U.S. base from Guantánamo. Consequently, we are considering the question of multilateral inspections in this larger framework. This is a good decision. A. I. Mikoyan: Of course, the inspections have to relate to both the withdrawal of missiles from Cuban territory and with the camps that supply mercenaries. . . . F. Castro: And to the measures of economic pressure and subversive activities as well. We demand to raise the issue of the base. Of course, we do not even entertain the thought that they could remove it now. If we agree to allow groups of inspectors who would limit their activity to two or three questions only, then we will find ourselves confronted with the fact of a semi-intervention on the part of the United Nations. A. I. Mikoyan: Consequently, two questions arise: First, to determine what kind of agreement we should achieve in the UN. Naturally, such an agreement could be reached only as after a fight. We should discuss this issue. And second, what can we decide regarding the inspections carried out by these mobile groups. . . . F. Castro: And by all means in the large framework, and within the protocol. A. I. Mikoyan: That is why we are bargaining. F. Castro: To bargain firmly with the enemy—one point after another, one position after another. If the enemy does not yield on one issue, then we should pressure him on another one. A. I. Mikoyan: So far, the United States has not discussed the protocol. They need an exchange of opinions between Stevenson and Kuznetsov. At the present stage of negotia-

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tions, Stevenson said that in his opinion, it is not necessary to prepare a protocol. The Americans consider this unacceptable. At this time, they are talking about the possibility of unilateral statements on the part of the Soviet Union and the United States at the United Nations. Stevenson so far has not agreed to Cuba’s participation in such statements. We, however, believe that the UN should formalize the documents. Taken together, they would create a comprehensive resolution of the Cuban problem, formalized by the United Nations. The agreement has not been reached yet. Kuznetsov insists on putting the obligations into the form of a protocol. When this issue was discussed in Moscow, we allowed for the possibility that the Americans might not agree to a protocol at all. U Thant also told us about this. However, the form is not the main issue. Of course, a protocol would be better. Fidel was right when he noted that now the Americans would not give their consent to eliminate the base at Guantánamo. However, of course, we need to raise this question now. F. Castro: We should state these demands. To start negotiations on this issue. A. I. Mikoyan: Correct. F. Castro: We should not make concessions. We are not satisfied only with those guarantees that were presented in Kennedy’s letter. We cannot accept inspection groups in exchange for these promises. I deeply despise formal American guarantees, and I believe that the real guarantees exist in the decisiveness of our people, in the assistance of the Soviet Union and in the solidarity of other peoples. I do not want [to create] any cult of these guarantees. The U-2 overflights are continuing. They fly wherever they please; maybe we do not need any guarantees. If we achieve the lifting of the blockade, paying the price of the Il-28 withdrawal, it would be an important step, although I am only expressing my own opinion and not the opinion of our leadership. If in addition to that we could obtain formal obligations, that is good, but that’s all. After the blockade is lifted, you should not make any new concessions in the name of the formal obligations at the United Nations. I emphasize that this is only my personal opinion. If they give guarantees affirmed through the United Nations, I will not sleep better or worse as a result. Of course, affirming these obligations through the United Nations has diplomatic and propaganda importance. I think that we will obtain a lifting of the blockade and cessation of overflights of Cuban territory by all kinds of planes (with the goal to avoid a collision between the sides), and then we have to start our struggle for a general resolution of the Cuban issue as a whole. The present stage could serve as a basis for the ultimate resolution. At the second stage, we should make it our goal to obtain an extensive resolution of the Cuban issue. Naturally, that would take some time. A. I. Mikoyan: I agree with you. It is important to resolve the issue of non-invasion guarantees, and to strengthen the defenses of the country. It is hard for the Americans to agree with the existence of a Communist Cuba as such; we have to be vigilant. You should sleep peacefully, but we need vigilance. With the help of the United Nations, we should bind the Americans’ hands. The Americans are bandits; that is why we need to bind their hands. It is an additional measure, but an important one too. Kennedy promised to lift the blockade after Khrushchev’s statement about his consent to withdraw the Il-28s. However, if there were no inspection over the fulfillment of obligations regarding the removal of the

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missiles and the Il-28 bombers, then the Americans could withdraw their own obligations. The longer the negotiations take, the more it benefits the United States. It would be better for us to complete them as soon as possible. I am not suggesting that we should make new concessions. We want to work together with you, and we do it not in our national interests, but in the interests of Cuba, in the name of the common interests of world communism. We will act against the United States in coordination [with you]; we will apply pressure on them while trying not to prolong the resolution of the issues. F. Castro: How are you going to announce the withdrawal of the planes? A. I. Mikoyan: If we have an agreement on this issue in principle, then we will prepare a draft document [together]. I think that it should be short. I will ask Moscow to send me a draft. F. Castro: I have one more issue. Kennedy will make a statement tomorrow. If Kennedy speaks from a position of force in a blatant and humiliating fashion, then we will find ourselves in a difficult situation. A. I. Mikoyan: If we give our consent to withdraw the Il-28s, that will not happen. The blockade will be lifted and we will withdraw the Il-28 bombers. F. Castro: We have to be vigilant. A. I. Mikoyan: Of course, they are bastards. F. Castro: More than that, I would say that they are sons of bitches. A. I. Mikoyan: I agree. F. Castro: Until the present moment, nobody here knew that we had the Il-28 planes. I think that we can make a statement, noting that these planes are Soviet [property]. We do not object to the decision of the Soviet government regarding the withdrawal of the planes. If we give consent for their withdrawal, then they should immediately lift the blockade and stop the overflights. To be more precise, we are not angry simply because of the violations as such, but that the right to violate our airspace is now becoming a matter of principle. I would like to raise one more issue. We want to make sure that we are not accused of sabotaging the agreement. A. I. Mikoyan: They are capable of that. I would like to say that as long as there are no inspections on the part of the United Nations, they will not give assurances regarding a cessation of overflights. On the basis of our previous conversation, I reported to Moscow that you, Fidel, decided not to link the overflights with the issue of Il-28 withdrawals. In addition, the Americans do not agree to stop the overflights of Cuba without establishing international controls. F. Castro (interrupts): OK. That is true, I spoke about it that evening. Let’s leave the overflights aside. We can take necessary measures ourselves. We could work out a more comprehensive, non-obligatory formula. A. I. Mikoyan: Yes. F. Castro: Of course, we cannot prevent overflights at high altitudes; that is why I consider it necessary to talk not just about violations but also about the policy of violations. A. I. Mikoyan: Correct. It is necessary to condemn these acts of banditry, citing the UN decisions.

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F. Castro: If before they were flying at the altitudes of 20,000 meters, now they have became so obnoxious that they use grass-cutting altitudes of 100 meters, right above the troops. You cannot have an army and undermine its morale with your own actions at the same time. A. I. Mikoyan: After the blockade is lifted, we will fight decisively against the overflights. F. Castro: I believe that the statement on the withdrawal of the Il-28s should coincide in time with the lifting of the blockade. The people know that these planes are Soviet property. We should try to make it easier for the Soviet Union, so that it will not happen with the bombers as it had happened with the missiles. A. I. Mikoyan: I agree. We will say that we discussed this issue together with Fidel. We will think about the form of the statement. F. Castro: We should try to put pressure on the Americans ourselves in order to achieve the cessation of overflights. A. I. Mikoyan: I agree. But even if we do not achieve it now, the fact of lifting the blockade itself represents a step forward. F. Castro: We should make a statement, for example, in the form of a letter to U Thant before Kennedy’s speech. A. I. Mikoyan: I will inform Moscow about your suggestion. Maybe it could be helpful if you told me about the main ideas of the forthcoming statement, so that I could inform Moscow about them. But even if we do not have time to get Moscow’s reaction to it, I am convinced that you will say everything properly, because we have a common understanding on this issue. F. Castro: It is necessary to raise the issue before Kennedy speaks. It would weaken his position. A. I. Mikoyan: I think that his speech will not be blatant. F. Castro: He could make insulting, humiliating remarks, he could try to turn us into a dirty rag and that could badly affect the morale of the people and the army. A. I. Mikoyan: My personal opinion is that he would not speak in that manner. F. Castro: Now we will discuss the issues that we raised with you. A. I. Mikoyan: Good. We agree. Then with your permission, we will leave the palace and later you will inform us about the rest of the conversation. Recorded by V. Tikhmenev.

Source: From the personal archive of Dr. Sergo A. Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.

Document 32 Transcript of Conversation between A. I. Mikoyan and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez

November 19, 1962 C. R. Rodriguez arrived at the residence at 9 o’clock p.m. He said that the Cuban leadership had only just approved the text of Fidel Castro’s message to U Thant. The leadership’s meeting ended, the document having been approved, and he was authorized to familiarize A. I. Mikoyan with said document before it would be sent to New York. President Dorticós is awaiting a message from him, C. R. Rodriguez, about A. I. Mikoyan’s position on the contents of the message so that, in case there are no comments from him, an order can be given to send the message’s text to Cuban representative Carlos Lechuga in New York for immediate delivery to U Thant. U Thant has been forewarned about this, said C. R. Rodriguez. Tomorrow the text of our message will be published in the papers. A. I. Mikoyan, having familiarized himself with the contents of the message, said that he feels it is unnecessary to make any comments whatsoever about the text insofar as the message is the Cuban government’s business. He said that he would forward everything to Moscow. C. R. Rodriguez then asked if he could tell President Dorticós that A. I. Mikoyan has no objections to forwarding the message. A. I. Mikoyan responded in the affirmative. C. R. Rodriguez, explaining the urgency of sending Fidel Castro’s message, referred to the necessity of the message’s receipt and publication before President Kennedy’s speech planned for November 20 at 6 p.m. The message’s original design had been prepared earlier, he continued, during a discussion corrections were made by Fidel meant to avoid intensifying or aggravating ongoing talks in New York. Included in the message was the assertion that Il-28 jet bombers present in Cuba belong to the Soviet Union. This was meant to avoid another shock like the one that the 450

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Cuban people had experienced following the Cuban government’s announcement about missile withdrawals, and it was also meant to facilitate confidential talks between the USSR and the United States. The fact that the Cuban government would be the first to reveal the withdrawal of the Il-28s would help the Cuban people understand the necessity of removing these Soviet bombers from Cuba. What’s more, we want to stay a step ahead of Kennedy so that he cannot announce that the aircraft belong to Cuba. In such a case, it would be more difficult for us to agree to their removal. In discussing the drafted message, we had wanted to include a position on our agreement to multilateral international inspections in the complex of protocol matters, including Fidel’s five points. Moreover, although the issue of a base in Guantánamo should continue to be raised, we understand that its resolution at this point is unrealistic. Since the raised issue has become rigid, we excluded it from the message to U Thant so as not to interfere with the successful course of talks between the USSR and United States. We discussed our position on U Thant’s last proposal about control groups and supported Fidel Castro’s opinion. Tomorrow, November 20, we will forward the text of our decision to you. We agree with U Thant’s last proposal, under the condition that it does not touch on only a fraction of the issues (missiles and whatnot), but rather the complete complex of problems that have been drawn out by protocol. A. I. Mikoyan expressed his gratitude for the interesting, valuable, and comrade-like commentary given by C. Rafael Rodriguez on Fidel Castro’s message. It is precisely in such a friendly atmosphere, in close cooperation, that we must work, he said. C. R. Rodriguez further raised the matter that, in his opinion, it would be expedient to discuss the issue of Soviet soldiers in Cuba and formalize their status with a special agreement. Fidel Castro, he said, is reluctant to take the initiative with this point. Therefore, it would be good if you, Comrade Mikoyan, when the opportunity arises, were to show the initiative. At this moment, C. R. Rodriguez was summoned to the telephone. Upon returning, he said that he spoke with President Dorticós and relayed A. I. Mikoyan’s comments. The text of Fidel Castro’s message is already being forwarded to New York by teletype. C. R. Rodriguez: In the morning, I will contact Dorticós so that you will have received a response on the issue of U Thant’s new proposal later that day. A. I. Mikoyan: I agree with you. Comrades Fidel Castro and Dorticós should be contacted. However, it would be interesting to know your general response so that it could be sent to Moscow, then later we could all elaborate upon it. C. R. Rodriguez: Tomorrow, I will forward this to Fidel and Dorticós. I would like to go back to the discussion that took place in Varadero. After returning, Fidel called me and said that there was progress on the soldier issue. Making full use of your visit to Cuba, I think it would be expedient to return to this issue—at a convenient time for you, of course. A. I. Mikoyan: The leadership did not discuss the matter? C. R. Rodriguez: We discussed it. Doubts are not the main thing. Fidel is not choosing to raise this question in connection with one important consideration. You recall, Comrade Mikoyan, that moment. . . .

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(Note [in the original]: Rodriguez is talking about Fidel Castro’s unexpected announcement at a talk between the Cuban leadership and A. I. Mikoyan on November 5 of that year: “I want to tell Comrade Mikoyan that what I say also reflects the decision of all of our people: we do not agree to an inspection. We do not want to compromise Soviet forces and put the peace of the entire world in jeopardy. If our position puts the peace of the entire world in jeopardy, then we will consider it more appropriate to free the Soviets from their responsibilities and we will ourselves resist. Come what may. We have the right to defend our dignity ourselves.”) A. I. Mikoyan: I remember that moment. I was speechless for a few minutes. C. R. Rodriguez: Did this dumbfound you? A. I. Mikoyan: Yes. C. R. Rodriguez: Fidel was bewildered. This feeling has not left him to this moment. He must be helped. I am helping as an old agent of the international communist movement. A. I. Mikoyan: Was this announcement accidentally blurted out? C. R. Rodriguez: It was not accidental. On the morning of the day of the meeting, he told me about this decision. He said: “We cannot compromise the Soviet Union. We cannot act like we do not care about the peace of the entire world. However, in our position we cannot back off—we are putting our influence over our own people, and over the people of Latin America, at risk. I thought that if the situation became more heated then we must suggest to the Soviet Union that all forces and weapons that could compromise them be removed. Furthermore, the fact of their presence in Cuba also affects the U.S. position.” However, I did not think that he would raise this issue at that moment, although I did suspect it was a possibility. He spoke just when a new form of inspections was brought up. This formulation had come about earlier in the interest of not allowing anything to discredit the Soviet Union. But his statement had not been made in the same spirit that he had intended earlier that morning. There was a sense of discontent in it. That morning he had planned to put forth the same idea, but in a different form. After all, that evening’s statement came about due to shock. A. I. Mikoyan: At that point, it occurred to me that he made this remark in a moment of anger, not having thought it through earlier, without seeking guidance. . . . I saw that you were all shocked just like me. Over the course of several minutes, I did not speak so as not to say something for which I would be held responsible for many years to come. I grabbed a hold of myself. I had sufficient self-control, which had been developed over many years, but as a communist I was deeply offended. I interpreted this statement as an expression of dissatisfaction with our party. When we traveled around the country I forgot about all of this. In Varadero, Fidel and I understood each other after two words. I messaged Moscow about this. The comrades understood. Fidel Castro, I thought, took offense, but understood us. I also understood that he wanted to put us in an advantageous position, while assuming a chivalrous position himself. C. R. Rodriguez: That is right. Therein lies the root of the problem. Yet, at that moment shock manifested itself. You recall that the meeting began in good spirits. He told us that there is no point in bringing up the past—we will not understand one another. Our Soviet

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comrades have their own point of view, and we have our own. You cannot get rid of past differences. None of us thought that the inspections issue could be brought up again. A. I. Mikoyan: The matter was not put on you, but rather on us. The ships were ours, after all. You are still young diplomats. C. R. Rodriguez: Yeah, yeah. But as soon as Comrade Mikoyan put forth the proposal, we felt like we had reached a dead end. . . . Today, Fidel was afraid of discussions. He was afraid that difficulties would arise. He was worried that some sort of heated issue would come up. A. I. Mikoyan: I could sense that, but I did not know what the problem was. C. R. Rodriguez: Yesterday, seeing that Mikoyan left the meeting in a good mood, and feeling that we could find a common position, Fidel was satisfied. Together, we rode in his car to his home on 11th street. He said: “I am satisfied. The letter turned out well.” At first the letter’s composition was entrusted to Che Guevara when we were in Turiguano. Then Fidel personally reworked it. When he read it to us, we understood that it was a different letter—nothing touched the Soviet Union. His idea was clear. During the days of the crisis, Fidel was often set off for one reason or another. Just like when you were here, it was the same on other occasions. He often expressed his dissatisfaction, but, while speaking in public or making decisions, he always tried to avoid harming our friendship and was always unhappy whenever there was friction in his talks with Mikoyan. The conversation that took place here, in his residence, in the late hours of the night, seemed to be a crisis. He called me after this meeting. When I told him about the discussion, he walked for a long time and spent a great deal of time thinking. It seemed to him that something had not been done as it should have been. He was very pleased that the tension subsided. Specifically this goal cast a shadow over his trip to Varadero. A. I. Mikoyan: I am pleased that Fidel agrees to seek versatile types of collaborative action. I still have not thought about those types. Cooperation is most important. Without it, there is no way. If not with us, then who? The governmental line of Latin American states is known. Socialist countries are in a great position and would be happy to help. But how can help be given? Public demonstrations can do anything. Take [Italian Communist Party leader Palmiro] Togliatti, for example. If you need it, give a sign and all of Italy and France will rise up in demonstrations, but where will practical help for Cuba come from? I am not talking about our assistance, you already know about it. We are doing everything up to the brink of nuclear war. We will not pass this threshold. The aim is to save Cuba. If we go past this threshold, that very goal will fall apart. Somebody would survive. . . . They will study the history of how wars begin and say: “Surely the Communists, including the Cubans, could have found a way to save mankind from nuclear war.” Ideas favoring thermonuclear war cannot be supported. Communism will triumph. We knew this from the beginning. But we do not know how much longer imperialism will survive. That said, we cannot give in to our emotions. You are an emotional people, but these emotions must be subservient to cold logic. I am considering what should be done so that I am understood. I worried, slept poorly at night, and thought that I could not win. I was in a terrible mood.

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You, Comrade Rodriguez, know about the massive assistance that the Soviet Union has given to Cuba. We already talked about the fact that, although the global balance of power is in our favor, the Americans have an advantage in the Caribbean. We cannot escort trade vessels going to Cuba. We either had to initiate a global nuclear war, or show flexibility, in order to avoid war and thus create opportunities for peaceful existence and the prosperity of Cuba’s economy. You know, every passing year goes in Cuba’s favor. The total number of socialist countries is growing. We must maintain our composure in order to achieve changes in the balance of power. It is said of the Chinese that when they are insulted, they smile. This is testament to their composure. We have been given spectacular examples of Bolshevik self-control by V. I. Lenin. As you recall, I already talked about the peace following the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. In those days, V. I. Lenin was in the minority of the Central Committee. Only through the threat of resignation could he install Stalin and others in proper positions. You are probably well aware of how the Americans “helped” those going hungry in the Volga region. The Americans did not render this assistance through the government, but rather through a committee of representatives of reactionary parties. It is true that this committee was led by Kamenev. The committee—“Pomgol”—recruited a network of agents and trained rebels. A threat to our power formed. We disbanded the committee and told the Americans: “Go to hell.” All of this to say that one must learn flexibility. It is necessary to combine flexibility, diplomacy, and firmness to have room to maneuver and be able to lead one’s enemy by the nose. Sometimes you should make the enemy wait and scare him (an example being the twenty-four-hour Suez Crisis). Politics is an art form. Many people in your country talk about being prepared to die. Who needs a party that is only prepared to die?! Even if many do die, they will die for the sake of life, not for the sake of death. There is no sense in proving that we are not pursuing either nationalistic or economic interests in Cuba. You know that without the goods that we import from Cuba our country could easily get by. Likewise, we do not need military bases in Cuba. Our interests are internationalist. The destruction of Cuba in the event of a conflict would be a brutal blow not only to the revolutionary movement in Latin America, but to the entire international Communist movement. Neutrals would come under an imperialist roof. But of course the international Communist movement would continue to exist. Our duty, as participants in the international Communist movement, is to preserve the torch lit by the Cuban Revolution on this continent. It is most important to safeguard the free development of Cuba. In this sense, we must not budge by a single inch. So, in terms of relations with the Americans, we can maneuver. We can exert pressure on the Americans in the direction of a general war. The Americans are afraid of war. We have grown accustomed to fighting, you cannot scare us. Military confrontation is no exception. Our troops are here in Cuba. There are moments when the guns begin to fire by themselves. But the reckless should not be helped. There are factions among the American reactionaries. One faction thinks about an invasion, another wants to economically suffocate Cuba. We must play into the hands of the most moderate factions.

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C. R. Rodriguez: I had not planned on talking to you, Comrade Mikoyan. But when Blas Roca is not here, I consider it my duty. What I am about to say is important for the future of our party and important for Cuba. I am a professionally emotional orator. Thirtythree years as a revolutionary. Twenty-eight years as a party member. More than twenty years as a member of the Central Committee. In this crisis, emotional elements are not what matters most. Comrades Guevara and Dorticós are very offended when Comrade Mikoyan talks about the importance of the psychological factor. . . . A. I. Mikoyan: I quoted Fidel. C. R. Rodriguez: The psychological factor is important for the people, not for us. At a certain moment the question arose whether or not the Cuban Revolution could withstand the advance of imperialism. Khrushchev’s statement that in a critical moment Soviet artillery forces can reinforce the Cuban people with their own missile fire instilled confidence in the people. Even several levels of the leadership felt more confident. Many leaders, even including Fidel, decided that the Soviet Union would not allow the Cuban Revolution to be smothered by force. A. I. Mikoyan: That was a figure of speech. C. R. Rodriguez: This statement prompted a lot of debate. Old Communists understood the statement in a literal sense. Blas Roca and I said that the statement must not be taken literally. Fidel and Raul believed, and Che Guevara, as usual, doubted. Then there was the speech at the United Nations. In his speech, Fidel said: Those who think that Khrushchev’s statement is just talk are mistaken. Khrushchev rose and said that they are mistaken. Everyone saw this moment on television. There was a sense of military support. Fidel acted cautiously, so as not to compromise the Soviet Union, supposing that the matter did not just concern us, but also the entire Communist movement and the Soviet Union. That position existed in the span of a moment. When the proposal about missiles was raised, even we, old Communists (Blas Roca, Ordoki, and others), decided that the Soviet comrades and Khrushchev have a strategic concept including Cuba as a fundamental piece of the international communist movement and envisioning the Soviet Union’s war readiness in the interests of defending Cuba. With all respect to the CPSU, I assume that the biggest mistake endured in this crisis was the fact that this matter was not discussed with the Cuban leadership from a political standpoint. If the possibility of removing the missiles (a maneuver in the balance of power) was assumed, this issue should have been discussed during Khrushchev’s talks with Che and Aragonés. Khrushchev instilled confidence in them that the Soviet Union will not back down and will not remove the missiles. Khrushchev spoke about the dispatch of the fleet from the Baltic as a major component of military pressure meant to force the Americans to accept a fait accompli. When Che returned, he said in an intimate conversation with Dorticós and me that now he understands that he was mistaken. Khrushchev is prepared to do anything to protect the Cuban Revolution. Under those conditions, changes occurred that took us by surprise. Among the majority of the national leadership, especially among new Communists, the opinion arose that

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the Soviet Union will not fight for Cuba, that the line will not be crossed, even if the United States attacks us. These comrades believe that our position is worse now than it was before. This evening we spoke about this. My opinion, that we are now in the best position, is hardly shared by these comrades. For some more, for some less, but that is the position. Therefore, a sense of disappointment is developing, and the comrades are reworking their strategy in which Soviet assistance is removed from defined limits. This is leading to positions of despair. For instance, it has led to the notion that the Soviet Union cannot break the blockade and, consequently, the base at Guantánamo should be attacked before we all starve to death. Opinions are changing. It is not insufficient trust in the assistance of the Soviet Union, but an adjustment of strategy. There is the view that the Soviet Union will not fight for Cuba. This means that sooner or later the Americans will attack us. Fidel says that there will be no massive invasion. I have faith in the fact that the Soviet Union will not allow us to be overrun, but I do not have the same conviction that I had earlier. There is an illusion of sorts that is maintained so that faith in the assistance of the Soviet Union is not lost. It was felt during the negotiations. But all of us, myself included, think that the negative consequences will not only be found in Latin America, but also in recently liberated countries. There are two aspects of the assistance to the Cuban Revolution from the side of the Soviet Union. With economic assistance, the bourgeois and petty bourgeois have announced that the Soviet Union can help economically and allow Cuba to exist and develop. For example, the national bourgeois of Brazil began to play a game with the goal of pushing away the United States and hoping that the Soviet Union will help. In Venezuela, the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), the left-wing of the Democratic Movement and Democratic Union was inspired, preparing to carry out an anti-imperialist revolution with a socialist orientation. Such was the case in Chile. Allende, a petit bourgeois, moved towards a compromise with the bourgeoisie. But he then moved to the left, betting on assistance. The Cuban crisis weakened their positions. They feel that the imperialists are strong and that the Soviet Union cannot help. Pressure from the right was exerted on Ben Bella. Did Núñez Jiménez tell you about this? A. I. Mikoyan: He did. C. R. Rodriguez: All of this had an impact. As such, Fidel came out as a stimulating element of all of these forces, even including Algeria. This does not mean that Fidel’s arguments, or Che’s arguments for that matter, are correct, but they should be considered in order to understand the position of the national leadership of the Operational-Investigations Division. Significant efforts must be made to avoid the development of anti-Soviet sentiments in the country. Anti-Soviet elements are still holding out their position, but at the moment are not taking action and are not sowing doubt, they are not compromising. . . . Fidel’s speech was required to paralyze and suppress these elements. The old cadres have endured the crisis (Anibal Escalante’s mistakes). The crisis did not appear among the leadership, but rather among the membership and in grassroots organizations. (At this moment, C. R. Rodriguez was summoned to the telephone. Upon returning he said that he spoke with Fidel and must leave shortly.)

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A. I. Mikoyan: I see that you have finished and are in a hurry. I will not argue with you. I would like to ask a question as one comrade to another. How can I better fulfill my mission? What measures must be taken? What am I doing wrong? C.R. Rodriguez: There were no mistakes. Everyone thinks that there is hardly anyone other than you who could bring about a resolution to the matter. The proposal about inspections on vessels was made at an inconvenient time. At any moment when matters are not progressing, there is a feeling that it is not because of Mikoyan. The position laid out in Khrushchev’s message is logical. That logic leads to some form of inspections. Therefore, Fidel himself expressed his consent to find in the form of multilateral inspections a suitable course. He thought to incorporate into his message to U Thant some of the elements of the proposal for such inspections. We got rid of them later. Fidel wanted to allude to the fact that Khrushchev did not consider accepting inspections without the consent of the Cubans. In Khrushchev’s message from October 27, in which Cuba and Turkey were discussed, the necessity of receiving the consent of the Cuban and Turkish governments was stated. Today Fidel thought about using this element, but he did not find a way to do this without detracting from the letter in connection with the concrete issue of withdrawing the Il-28s. We all valued Mikoyan’s tact and patience. On that evening, when we were with Dorticós and Fidel, we thought that Mikoyan would listen to his opinion. After all, Mikoyan has incredible experience and is the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. Fidel did not have to take Mikoyan’s arguments into consideration, but Fidel did not raise several issues. I am raising the military question because, in my opinion, it will help to establish balance, correcting this series of events, and make the national leadership aware of how far they can go and what they must not do. Yesterday I told Fidel what Mikoyan had said to us about West Irian and the Soviet fleet. I told him so that he would understand. He agreed that the navy could not take part in a confrontation without the Soviet Union’s approval. A. I. Mikoyan: We later approved the fleet’s actions, but under an Indonesian flag. C. R. Rodriguez: This is a different situation. Sukarno wanted to conquer territory and we will not attack. We will take the defensive. A. I. Mikoyan: I had a difficult time getting through those two days when there were no meetings. It was a real moral trial. I want to meet with our comrades and help them understand our position, but I am afraid of meddling. They will say: The old man is teaching us, or trying to teach us, how to understand. How can we meet more frequently without being cumbersome? It would be very useful. The meeting with Fidel helped immensely. I do not need to relax, I am healthy. I am ready for meetings day and night. Tell me, with whom, and when, can I request a meeting? C. R. Rodriguez: Fidel is a good comrade on trips, such as the one in which you took part. He likes to travel. He does not care much for meetings. He puts up with them only when he himself speaks or leads the discussion. When he has to wait, it is agonizing for him. I told him that he has to be very careful because the moment is perfect for an assassination attempt. He then said: “If I have three of those difficult and agonizing meetings,

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such as yesterday (for instance, with Mikoyan), without an assassination attempt my nervous system will fall apart.” He can speak for twenty hours but cannot sit at a table and listen. He cannot wait for Mikoyan to make his arguments when he has his own arguments. A. I. Mikoyan: Is there a way out? C. R. Rodriguez: No. He did not want to speak with Mikoyan one on one because that would mean that later he would have to tell us about the meeting. I could not give a response on my own behalf. When we finished the message he said that “we worked well collectively.” Here’s the thing: Che and I went to another hall by his order, he then arrived and wrote 80 percent of the letter. Yes, we will always say that our “CC” (the Spanish acronym for Central Committee) works well, because our “CC” stands for Commandant Castro. A. I. Mikoyan: Have you told him this? C. R. Rodriguez: Yes. Che, Aragonés, and I were there. He responded: “This is collective work.” Remember, he said, how the message looked before the conversation with Comrade Mikoyan? This message is drastically different from what we had before the conversation. Dorticós and I said that this was an exaggeration. Positive elements from the talk with Mikoyan were used. Tomorrow, you and Che will go to see a combine for harvesting sugar cane. A. I. Mikoyan: Che did not say anything concrete. C. R. Rodriguez: How is that? You were not informed? He told me about the trip. I think that the matter will be settled. Aragonés will also be going. A. I. Mikoyan: Could I ask to just talk with Fidel? C. R. Rodriguez: No, this is not a good time. He will say: “Once more, a new problem.” You can look for another way. A. I. Mikoyan: I will wait. C. R. Rodriguez: Fidel believes in Alejandro (Comrade Alekseyev). A. I. Mikoyan: Vilma Espín talked about the trip to Santiago... C. R. Rodriguez: Yesterday, we discussed the trip to Santiago. We then decided that questions could arise and it would not be right for you to go. Raul is a true friend. A. I. Mikoyan: When you send the letter to U Thant, message me. C. R. Rodriguez: The letter was sent in plain text. We forwarded it to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by teletype. A. I. Mikoyan: Accordingly, we can also forward it openly. C. R. Rodriguez: Yes. See you in the morning. The original conversation was transcribed by V. Tikhmenev.

Source: Personal archive of Sergo Mikoyan donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Matt McGorrin for the National Security Archive.

Document 33 Mikoyan’s Telegram to the CC CPSU

November 20, 1962 At approximately midnight, F. Castro came to the residence and spoke with A. I. Mikoyan, F. E. Titov, and A. I. Alekseyev for about an hour, about which Mikoyan reported to the CC CPSU (Special No. 1868). Mikoyan to CC CPSU November 20, 1962 CC CPSU To your 1866. In the evening, after Rodriguez left the residence, Fidel Castro paid us a visit for which he used the pretext of changing one word in the letter to U Thant, which did not change the meaning of the phrase at all. The conversation lasted about an hour. Fidel said the following in his statement: We believe that this is the beginning, which defines our common point of view to resolve these issues. We need to look for a solution starting from the [existing] general situation. Therefore, we had the idea to write this letter in order to help the Soviet Union resolve the present situation. Although we have certain differences of opinion, and we ourselves would prefer a different resolution of this issue—in the current situation we believe it is our duty to help the Soviet Union. I thought that in response to the U.S. demand for the withdrawal of the Il-28s from Cuba, the Soviet government could achieve the following demands: 1. A formulation of guarantees on the part of the United States. 2. The cessation of flights of American planes over Cuba. 3. The lifting of the quarantine. 459

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I thought that the Soviet Union would have presented these demands in response to the U.S. demand regarding the withdrawal of the Il-28s. However, the Soviet Union devoted great attention to fighting against a full blockade of Cuba. As far as we are concerned, we were ready to stand strong and survive the blockade, without requiring the Soviet Union to make concessions. I feel that you have already made the decision regarding withdrawal of the Il-28s; however, if Kennedy makes a threatening, arrogant statement then he would put the Soviet Union in a difficult and unpleasant position. Ultimately, the threat of a blockade up to the [level of] interdicting fuel deliveries is not all that frightening after all—we could bear it for a long time: one or two years. I have a [contingency] plan for a general blockade: The morale of our people is so high that, in my opinion, the conditions exist for us to survive this test as well. We would survive it. Our enemies would not be able to strangle the Revolution with the blockade. Of course, we would have to undertake harsh measures but imperialism would end up facing very unfavorable conditions—dissatisfaction and agitation would emerge among the peoples of Latin America. We should not be afraid of the blockade. Th is will not break the back of the Revolution.

I did not consider it necessary, understanding Fidel’s exhaustion, to try to explain how wrong his arguments were in this conversation. The blockade, the fate of the Cuban Revolution, and other things. I will talk to him about it at an appropriate moment in more detail. I just told him that I understood his statement regarding the Il-28s and the USSR’s position. I reminded him that just several days ago I informed him that, while agreeing of the withdrawal of the Il-28s, Khrushchev is demanding that the Americans immediately lift the quarantine, stop the overflights of Cuban territory, and quickly affirm America’s obligations through the United Nations not to invade Cuba. The Americans agreed to fulfill the first demand, but refused to accept the second before there is a system of international control. Regarding the third demand—they agreed to repeat everything that had already been said in Kennedy’s letter. Then you proposed, I told Fidel, not to link the question of overflights with the withdrawal of Il-28s, because you were going to send a protest to the United Nations and to warn that you would be shooting down airplanes with antiaircraft fire. At that time you proposed correctly that the issue of Il-28 withdrawals be linked only with the lifting of the quarantine. I informed comrade Khrushchev about that. Fidel did not object to these statements. The Americans are interested in dragging out the negotiations through diplomatic channels, and we, to the contrary, are interested in speeding them up, I said, and that is in the interests of Cuba. We have to have close cooperation [with you] in this diplomatic struggle in order to complete it successfully. We should not pour water on the mill of the blatant aggressive circles of the United States by our actions and statements. To the contrary, we should help the cause of reaching an agreement in Cuba’s interests on the basis of the exchange of letters between N. S. Khrushchev and Kennedy. And we are of the opinion that it would be difficult for Kennedy to back away from it.

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I told him that the Soviet missiles that were brought to Cuba and then removed from Cuba after we received the guarantee of noninvasion not only did not increase the danger of attack on Cuba, as some people might think, but to the contrary, prevented such an attack. Because it is a fact that even before the missiles were brought to Cuba, even before the Americans got wind of it, in the second half of September, the Americans announced Naval exercises with the landing of 2,000 paratroopers on the island of Vieques. These maneuvers were not in the plans of the U.S. Navy for military maneuvers this year. Similar maneuvers had already been conducted with landings on this island, according to last year’s plan, and it did not make any sense to repeat them again. In addition, the commander of these maneuvers was not just a commander of an appropriate rank, but the commander of all paratroop forces of the United States in the Atlantic Ocean. The hurricane, which the Americans cited, could have interrupted the maneuvers but could not have led to their cancellation. Everything was gathered for the attack on Cuba. Upon learning about the presence of the Soviet missiles in Cuba, the Americans were forced to redraw their plans and to prepare to deliver a first strike to take out the missile launchers and then to carry out an invasion. The open statement by Khrushchev about [our] readiness to withdraw the missiles messed up their cards once again, and prevented the invasion. Fidel was listening attentively, making no objections. Then he noted that it impresses the enemy when our side takes active measures and, to the contrary, the enemy increases his demands when he sees that he is granted one concession after the other. I responded: you are right when you say that we cannot give one concession after another to the enemy. This is the correct tactic for fighting the enemy, and we abide by it. The agreement to withdraw Il-28s cannot be considered a new concession because even though they were not mentioned in Khrushchev’s last letter, he gave his consent to withdraw the weapons the U.S. president called offensive. It is true that Kennedy spoke about the bombers several times. Formally, of course, bombers are offensive weapons even though Il-28s cannot be considered as such because they are obsolete. On this basis we began to challenge the offensive categorization of the Il-28s, and refused to withdraw them. Later, upon weighing all the factors, and because the military importance of these planes is too small, and because the President has some grounds to consider our refusal to withdraw them as an incomplete fulfillment of our obligations, we gave an agreement on their removal on condition of an immediate lifting of the quarantine. Therefore, we cannot talk about any new concessions. I emphasized the importance of affirming Kennedy’s noninvasion obligations at the UN, because in that case it would become an international document. After the blockade is lifted, Cuba will be able to ensure a quick growth of the economy. We are sure of that, because of everything we saw here in Cuba when we visited the agricultural enterprises, and the same will happen in the industry. One should conduct a diplomatic struggle flexibly and skillfully. Of course, you are in shock [now] from the missile withdrawal; however, powerful forces and means [weapons] still remain in Cuba. You have never had such forces before.

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Fidel Castro interrupted me, saying that all these forces and means can be destroyed in fifteen minutes, because the enemy knows about their location as a result of photoreconnaissance. I responded that we could regroup them. Fidel said that he informed the commanders of the Soviet forces over the last several days that all the antiaircraft systems, including the central command and control post, are at risk of being destroyed. I objected, saying that the Americans will not dare to do it now, knowing that the Soviet troops were here. I added that we would conduct regrouping later. I noted that whereas the correlation of forces in the world is in our favor, in the Caribbean basin the situation is favorable to the Americans. However, the correlation of forces in the world binds the Americans, ties down their hands. I cited arguments about the possibility of putting pressure on Berlin, and in other places. I noted that it would be useful, if the Chinese could strike against Hong Kong, Taiwan, or Macao. Fidel emotionally told me about the blatant bombing by the Americans of the Cuban steamship Rio Domoji en route from Canada. At the latitude of Charleston, after following it for three days, in the dark, an American plane made four passes at the ship, and dropped several bombs, which exploded 30 to 40 feet from the ship. He added indignantly that if those bombs had hit the target, then the ship would simply disappear. I noted that the Americans are real pirates. You know, Comrade Fidel, I said to him, that we are doing and have done everything necessary to defend Cuba. We are giving you people, materials, equipment, weapons, we are not counting the money, but you have to know that we cannot permit a thermonuclear war—this is a threshold that we cannot cross. Fidel supported it: that is correct, he shares the same opinion that this should not be permitted. In that case, Cuba would cease to exist, I continued. Many millions of people would die. Those who would survive would never forgive the communist leadership that they have not used all the opportunities to avoid war. In that case, communism would lose its attractive force in the eyes of the people. We had chosen a different way. We secured peace, and protected Cuba. Now we cannot stop halfway through. We have to define our position regarding U Thant’s new idea. I was told, I continued, that you would give you response tomorrow. To that Fidel responded, that the question of multilateral inspections should be considered as part of the overall problem. In the opposite case, he said, we would prefer to do without guarantees. Kennedy gave a pledge not to attack, but he does not guarantee it. These obligations notwithstanding, he can attack even without any pretext. I cited arguments regarding the importance of formalizing these guarantees through the United Nations, as a result of which they would have a force of an international agreement. I added that the Americans would not want to lose their prestige. Fidel objected, saying that they would always find a pretext, and they can organize a self-orchestrated attack against the base in Guantánamo, and other things. I responded to Fidel that the Americans would be afraid to do it, because then we will squeeze them in other locations, and they have many other problems to worry about. I noted that the United States is afraid of new changes in the correlation of forces in favor of

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socialism, and that three years ago, thanks to the Cuban Revolution, the correlation of forces changed even more in favor of socialism. Then I cited the agreement on Laos, as an example. Kennedy had to retreat, citing the fact that he inherited the Laos issue from Eisenhower. Fidel posed a question: does the Soviet government intend to undertake any step before Kennedy’s speech tomorrow? I responded that so far I do not have any information on this issue and I do not think that it is necessary. I added that as far as I know, Kennedy is not going to speak in the bellicose spirit, because it is in his interest not to step very far. But if it turns out to be that, then we will not be caught without a response. Then Fidel suggested that the fact of publication of the Cuban statement (letter to U Thant from November 19), should help the negotiations. I responded affirmatively. That letter, I added, does not give them any opportunity for speculations regarding suspected differences between us. It is written in the spirit of equality and reciprocity. Fidel said that they were not against negotiations. Replying to him, I emphasized that until we use all the diplomatic pieces on the international chessboard, it does not make any sense to use the war pieces. I reminded him of our superiority in long-range missiles. I cited examples of their launches in the assigned area of the Pacific Ocean, and mentioned the military importance of the group flight of spaceships, of Americans lagging behind us in missile construction, and about the 100-megaton hydrogen bomb. Fidel jokingly noted that it would not be bad to drop one of those bombs on Adenauer. To that I responded saying that in his dialogue with Kennedy, when he [Kennedy] mentioned Adenauer’s position, N. S. Khrushchev noted that Adenauer could now console himself with the fact that missiles from Cuba will be targeted at West Germany. When I noted that our global missiles are carefully hidden from air reconnaissance, Fidel smiled and said: “If I was a Soviet, I would have done the same.” I told him that, thanks to our sputniks, we have detailed photographs of the enemy territory. That made a great impression on him. He inquired whether the American nuclear tests in the atmosphere affected the capability of the equipment that was used [for those photographs]. I responded negatively. Getting ready to leave, Fidel said that the Cuban people does not give him a possibility (apparently the text of this sentence was somewhat altered during the transmission), to make a decision based on purely rational factors. One has to take into account the emotional factors as well. This, he said, is very difficult for the Soviet Union to understand from a distance. “Just imagine, he said, our soldiers cried in the trenches, having no opportunity to shoot at the planes, which were flying at grass-cutting altitudes. That affected their morale negatively. And one has to take into account that the enemy will threaten us for a long time still. The Cubans do not want war, they understand its danger. However, the peoples’ hate of the imperialists is so great that they would almost prefer death. We have to coordinate our reason and emotions better. The Revolution is becoming deeper, the morale of the people has become stronger, and the irreconcilable attitude to the enemy has emerged now.”

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I responded to him, emphasizing that he enjoys such authority and trust among the people that it is in his power to ensure the desired changes in the moods. Fidel responded that he himself was guilty of the situation that has been created. If you only knew, comrade Fidel, I told him, what maneuvers Lenin exhibited in policy in the difficult years immediately after the Revolution. According to the Treaty of BrestLitovsk, he gave up a large portion of our country. He believed that time was working for us, and that the situation would change. That is exactly what happened. Many in the party and among the people did not understand and did not support those Lenin’s maneuvers then. Even the Moscow Regional Party Committee openly spoke against him. You could explain [the situation] to your people the same way as Lenin did in 1918. Fidel responded that in the first moments of the crisis he thought that “the dead came to life again. . . .” I told him once again that he enjoys great trust and respect of N. S. Khrushchev and of all members of our government. Comrade Khrushchev and the Central Committee constantly assist me in our negotiations, they follow their development very closely, give advice, and present many necessary arguments, being very careful that I should be able to give you every opportunity to understand our positions fully, and to achieve full cooperation between us in the struggle to defend Cuba against imperialism. Today also, after I returned from the meeting at the palace, I reread the last telegram from N. S. Khrushchev, where he suggests new arguments in the favor of accepting U Thant’s last proposal. In conclusion, I emphasized that we have no special national interests in Cuba, we are only pursuing international goals to encourage the development of Communism. The Cuban Revolution inflicted huge losses upon imperialism. Fidel interjected that Cuba could not be defeated, it could only be destroyed. I reminded him of [John Foster] Dulles’s intentions to reinstall the capitalist regime in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and other countries. I said that in the present conditions, such intentions are empty delusions, which Kennedy has now rejected. I promised to tell him about our position on the Berlin issue. Fidel replied: “Comrade Mikoyan, we are interested in everything. For us, everything is relevant. It is important for us to understand all the issues of the modern world.” I noted in a friendly way that now he is not a guerilla any longer, but the head of government. I felt that he was pleased to hear that. Departing, Fidel said that he likes to work, but in these days it was very difficult. The conversation was very friendly, brotherly. Comrade Titov and Alexeyev were present at the conversation. November 20, 1962

A. I. Mikoyan

Source: From the personal archive of Sergo A. Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.

Document 34 Mikoyan’s Speech at the Military Council of General Pavlov’s Group

November 21, 1962 Dear comrades, officers, generals, representatives of all units of General Pavlov’s group, let me pass to you the regards, warmest regards, from the Soviet people, from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, from the Soviet government and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Comrade Khrushchev (stormy applause). I do not intend to talk about domestic issues in the Soviet Union, although this is probably also interesting, but then we would not have time to talk about the issue that is more important for us at the present moment. In addition, right now the Plenum of the Central Committee is taking place, and the brief summary of Comrade Khrushchev’s report, which, as I was told, was distributed to you, will show you which problems are facing the party in the economic sphere, in the sphere of improving management, and perfection of party and government leadership over the entire economy—agriculture and industry. I can only say that you can be confident that the development of our country— economic, cultural, and in other spheres—is proceeding according to plan and ahead of the plan. Therefore, you should not worry about your motherland; life is improving with every day, we are enjoying great success that exceeds the estimates of the Seven-Year Plan. When you read Comrade Khrushchev’s speech in more detail, everything will become clear to you; I do not want to spend more time on this. As far as Cuba is concerned, one has to say that the Cuban problem is currently the main problem in the struggle of world Communism against world imperialism. And we are involved in the resolution of this problem, so that we can defend the interest of world Communism and the Cuban Revolution. And we believe that we are leaving this confrontation better off, with a victory over the forces of imperialism, while, of course, making 465

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some concessions to it, but at the same time having received considerable concessions in exchange which exceed those we had to make ourselves. You probably remember, in 1958, when the Berlin problem was raised and even before that, the main goal of our foreign policy was to preserve the status quo. One time, Comrade Khrushchev said in his speech: Our goal is to preserve the status quo in the relationship between the socialist camp and the camp of capitalism, imperialism. Then John Foster Dulles and others, as representatives of aggressive policy, wanted to roll Communism back to the east, and further back. They made efforts to resurrect capitalism in the GDR [German Democratic Republic, i.e., East Germany], to push us out of the GDR. That was their goal. They made efforts to resurrect capitalism in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, and in general to roll us back to the borders of Russia, the Soviet Union. Those were their plans and they were shouting about it. Then we believed it was correct to raise the issue of status quo. Let’s do this; we are not going any further than we already have, and you give up your attempt to reach where we are sitting. They did not agree. But then we were the first to launch Sputnik, almost two years earlier than the Americans. And the Americans, Eisenhower, a year before we launched our Sputnik, announced that soon they would have an American satellite. We made no announcements that we were preparing our satellite; we were silent as if we would have nothing. And then, as you remember, in October 1957 suddenly the Soviet Sputnik was launched and there was no American satellite. They had to wait about one and a half to two years to catch up with us. Then they announced that they were lagging behind and threw all their dollars into this, and announced that they would catch up with the Russians and overtake them in the next five years. Five years passed, they could not catch up with us. Their manned spacecraft made only three orbits, whereas ours was in space for more than three days. Our two Sputniks met in space. This, from the military point of view, has great significance—but we did not shout about it. If they could approach each other so closely, why cannot one Sputnik, if the other one belongs to the opponent, shoot at that one in space and destroy it? If we can move Sputniks so close one to another in space, we can also carry out such tasks. Military people understand that, even though the Americans were not shouting about it and we were not shouting either. Therefore, it has been confirmed, and now for so many months since 1957, we have been ahead of them in space. This has military significance. We are ahead of them in longrange missiles, both in quantity and in quality. This has been proven by the fact that we have been launching our missiles for several years in a row from the Western part of the Soviet Union to the Pacific Ocean, almost to the U.S. shores in the sea. Our scientific observer ships stay in the area and observe where the missiles land. The Americans stay very close to our ships, because nobody can order them to leave and they see that it is not just propaganda, not advertising, but a fact that our missiles fly from 12,000 to 18,000 kilometers and reach their precise targets. They see where the ships are, which means that the Russians are expecting the missile to land in that exact place and they land in that exact spot. So, one does not need any secret intelligence or espionage to know that. Today the

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time has come, when the most secret weapons are impossible to keep secret. Missile launches and nuclear explosions are impossible to hide. Therefore, it is both a plus and a minus. It is a minus that the enemy knows a great deal, and it is a plus in the sense that they should know—and tremble. This is a plus. And this is our strength. The correlation of forces has changed all over the world in our favor. The Americans are not talking anymore (when Kennedy came to power, he spoke about this directly) about any kind of return of capitalism to the socialist countries, whether to the GDR, or Czechoslovakia, or Poland. The question has been eliminated. They cannot even dream about that. Moreover, in the past Berlin was open, so they penetrated it, were able to organize an uprising or conduct espionage—whatever you want. Now that we have erected the wall in Berlin, nobody can do it. The GDR has become like a fortress, and they are sitting in a mousetrap in West Berlin. There are 10,000 troops sitting in that mouse trap. This is what the correlation of forces is like. Two years ago, Communists who were in the government were arrested in Laos. Then they escaped. After that Souvanna Phouma was also kicked out as left-wing bourgeois. The Americans orchestrated all that. But the revolutionary forces brought him back to power again, and now we have provided assistance to Souvanna Phouma and to Kong Le, who became a colonel-general, both by diplomatic negotiations and by providing military support. Now they are a neutral government that includes Communists. Communist troops have occupied quite significant territory. The correlation of forces has changed. After all this, the Americans pulled their troops out of that country. It is a noncommunist, but neutralist country, which has established relationships with all countries of the world. The prestige of the Soviet Union has grown considerably even in such a distant corner of the globe. Indonesia has struggled and continues to struggle for West Irian. They threatened the use of force, but of course they had very few forces and where could they get them? Holland was more powerful than they were, NATO is helping it [Holland], they conducted diplomatic negotiations. Holland did not want to compromise, no matter what. Publicly, the Americans acted as if they tried to persuade the Indonesians to conclude a truce; however in reality they supported them. But when the Indonesian government—Sukarno— asked us to help them with weapons, we gave them a lot of weapons, good weapons, the same weapons as we have for our troops. This summer, when Sukarno was getting ready to decide this issue and when negotiations in Washington were going on, he played with two pieces, played very intelligently with our help. He asked and we gave him several submarines with Soviet crews, several (I cannot cite the numbers) TU-16s with antiship missiles, so that they could destroy Dutch ships. They had great aircraft carriers and other means—antiaircraft missiles and sea ships. Indonesia was very smart—as if it was hiding something from the Americans, but in reality it actually helped the Americans to find out what Soviet weapons they had. The Americans learned about this. Now they were facing the question: Did they want to get into a confrontation with those ships on the side of Holland (they are allies)? But this was

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very unfavorable for them; they knew what kind of forces we had that were concentrated in that area. All those forces were under the Indonesian flag. There was no Soviet flag on those ships, they had been temporarily transferred to Sukarno. And therefore, Sukarno was able, while playing with two pieces on the political chessboard, to force Holland to give up Western Irian to Indonesia through the Americans. This is what we have done. It would not have happened without our support and assistance. Imperialism lost its base, a strategic base in the distant region of the Pacific Ocean. It became a neutralist base, and therefore friendly to us. As you can see, the correlation of forces is changing more and more in our favor and time is working for us. Nobody expected, neither the American imperialists nor us, that there would emerge such a revolutionary volcano in Cuba, which would burn stronger and stronger, producing eruptions one more powerful than the other, the volcano of Communism on American land, in the American atmosphere. The American imperialists failed in their calculations. When Castro was approaching Havana, they thought that it was a normal change, customary for Latin America, from one junta to another. One junta comes in, holds power, then leaves, and another one comes in. Just like Makhno [an anti-Bolshevik commander during the Russian Civil War —ed.] used to say: The Bolsheviks are acting incorrectly—they take a city and do not give it to anybody. One should do like this: hold it for some time, then give it to another. This is how they saw Castro, especially because Castro is from an aristocratic background, his father was a large farm [latifunda] owner. He was not a Communist; it is a fact. He led the Revolution under the banner of liberal demands, against imperialism, for democracy, against corruption, for honest government. Even the agrarian reform at first was not clearly defined; then it became more distinct. While leading the people, he was himself becoming one with the people [sam vglub’ naroda vlez], and he accepted all the core problems of the people: from the peasants, agrarian reform; from the working class, social reform of the socialist Revolution. And the presence of the American monopolies caused in him a patriotic desire to get rid of the parasites—the American monopolies. He was moving together with the people, the people were pushing him and he was pushing the people, and he is a person of the people’s soul, connected with them with his roots, an honest person, and a person who desired to do the best. They came to the result that this so-called liberal Revolution developed and later was declared (and it is a fact, not just a declaration—this is what it is) a socialist Revolution in Cuba. Can you imagine in the very center of the Americas, 100 kilometers from the United States, an island that proudly carries the banner of socialism and is struggling to the death for the victory of socialism! What kind of situation have capitalism and imperialism in general found themselves in, can you imagine! I do not want to cite any comparisons, but, for example, if something like that emerged in the center of our camp—a similar volcano of imperialism, capitalism—what a blow it would be to the socialist countries and the Soviet Union! Now they are biting their lips for having missed it earlier, for not having helped Batista to strangle the Castro movement at the very beginning. Of course, they could have done

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that if they had understood everything, they would have given him great military assistance, they could perhaps have choked them, but not for long. Now they see that this is a dangerous epicenter and they see the influence of the Soviet Union. Since it is a socialist country, of course, we have an agreement, and the influence of the Soviet Union is spreading as the sphere of influence of American imperialism is shrinking. More than that. As McCloy told me in a conversation: Cuba is a center of infection, of contagion, the center of Communist contagion. That is truly so. Cuba is developing as a country of socialism, achieving successes in cultural, political, and economic life; it is becoming a center of attraction for all Latin American countries, and at the same time an explosive force by the fact of its own flourishing. The Americans are afraid that this example, as a torch attracting other countries, could tear Latin America, where they have invested billions, from their control. They are plundering it, they are sucking blood from there, and for them to lose it is almost like cutting off a leg. That is why they have taken all possible measures to liquidate Cuba as a Communist country, as a socialist country. They attempted an invasion—remember last year in the spring—but unsuccessfully. The Cubans defeated that counterrevolutionary intervention, which was carried out with American support, not formally by the Americans but by counterrevolutionary Cubans. That has improved the morale of the Cuban people even more, and it made the Americans even angrier when they saw the defeat, the shame of defeat. And they were preparing to do it again, better this time, so that they could win. It was clear that they were preparing a more serious attack on Cuba, so that they could achieve decisive success. And if they had done that, there would have been no revolutionary Cuba. That would have been a great blow to the entire world Communist movement, to all socialist countries, to everything progressive. That would have thrown back the struggle of the peoples of Latin America, which is itself in the very early stages, and not only Latin America, but Africa too. That would have changed to some extent the correlation of world forces in favor of the United States against us. The Soviet government decided to defend Cuba, not to let the Americans choke it. That is the reason why you are here in Cuba, not as tourists (it is unlikely that you would have been sent here as tourists), but you are here to carry out your duty, and you know what that is. The struggle with the United States on this issue is continuing, and Cuba has become the focus of world politics and, at the same time, a threshold beyond which war is possible. Both of the world’s largest powers, the world forces of socialism and capitalism, found themselves at the point of a sword, and the eruption of war was possible at any second, not just a local war, not a regional war, but a war that could have developed into a general, thermonuclear war. Now we can speak about this; in today’s circumstances many people can see it better than they saw it before; they will understand what we were speaking about earlier, and now Comrade Khrushchev has confirmed it. One can say that the leadership of the Soviet Union, of our party—Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev—skillfully, with great knowledge, and guided by Leninist science and forty-five years of experience in statecraft and foreign policy leadership has led us to victory in these difficult conditions, without using weapons

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that could have led to a devastating thermonuclear war, which nobody needs. We do not need such a war. History is working for us. If we have peace, the victory of Communism is guaranteed. We are growing faster than they are; our prestige is growing high, while theirs is declining. That is why we do not need such a war—but we have to be prepared for one, so that the enemy does not dare to bring one about. In making conclusions about what happened here in the last two weeks, one has to make some judgments: what happened, did we act correctly, what did we do right, what are the results? These are natural questions, because one has to think through everything. Let’s say that plans are one thing, their implementation is another, and the results are yet another thing. And of course, questions arise—should we have sent so much military force here, in particular, the missiles and the Il-28 bombers? Such questions do arise. Some people say maybe we should not have brought so many of them here—then we would not have to take them back. Why did we have to bring them here? Other people even say that the danger of invasion of Cuba itself was caused by the fact of our deployment of missiles here. If we had not brought the missiles here, maybe there would not have been any direct threat to Cuba at all. All these speculations are wrong. I will tell you why. You see, in September, the missiles had not yet been deployed to Cuba, and the Americans did not know anything about them. They learned about them rather late—only on the 20th or the 19th. That is when they learned our missiles were here. They were discovered by German intelligence; West German intelligence (we have such information) informed American intelligence. Then they flew the U-2 and discovered that our missiles were sticking up just like they were at the military parade in Red Square. Only in Red Square they would be placed horizontally, and here they were deployed vertically. Apparently, our rocket forces decided to make an offensive gesture to the Americans [pokazat’ Amerikantsam kukish], and deployed them in full view instead of covering them with camouflage and hiding them. They published the photographs—all the missiles to the last one were photographed, in broad daylight, as it should be. But already a month before they learned that there were the missiles there, they announced maneuvers or training exercises for Navy and paratroop forces under the name “Ortsac,” that is, Castro if you read it backward. Children have such a habit—they write and read backward. So there was this name. Landing on an island in the area of Puerto Rico. They announced that the maneuvers would be held in October. They began, and a great number of troops were involved—two aircraft carriers, 20,000 troops on ships, forty ships. The commander was not an officer of a usual rank for this type of case, but an admiral—commander of all the forces (what they call amphibious forces) of the United States in the Atlantic Ocean, that is, with a higher military rank than appropriate for such maneuvers. Besides, those maneuvers were not part of a U.S. armed forces plan for this year, 1962. They publish all their plans. Moreover, they had already conducted similar exercises with a smaller number of troops last year. Therefore, if such exercises had already been held a year earlier, why would you need to conduct them again a year later? Finally, if they were not included in the plan, why organize them outside of the plan? And also, why did they

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need to appoint the highest commander as the head of such exercises, and not somebody from the middle ranks? Then they interrupted the exercises, ostensibly because of the hurricane. Yes, there was a hurricane; indeed, but it was not dangerous for forces like those. One would think—OK, they interrupted the exercises, but then the hurricane passed, so they should resume them. No, they never resumed the exercises. Why? Because they understood that the situation had changed. Because they knew that if they did not take out the missiles with nuclear warheads in advance, some number of them could explode on their territory. And that is terrible. That is why they stalled for several days in order to prepare anew. You are military people; you know that from the military point of view this task is feasible, if you keep in mind that the missile bases were deployed at very short distance from the American shore. Then we were faced with the question—first of all, you are stationed here in addition to the Cubans. If you had been attacked, we would have had to defend you, and you would have had to defend yourself in Cuba. That could have led to world war. Should we have entered a world war in order to save Cuba, especially if Cuba would have been the first to perish completely in such a war? In principle, that kind of thing might be permissible but only if one reaches one’s goal. But in this case, there was no sense in it. And from the point of view of the whole of world politics, the interests of the Soviet Union, that would have been a catastrophe overall. That is why we fully supported N. S. Khrushchev’s initiative; our leadership was fully united during these events. Truth be told, we did a lot of thinking. We were thinking night and day in order not to make a single wrong step, to do everything with cold reason, with an exact calculation of forces. Then we proposed, since the missiles had already been discovered—all of them in the photographs—then they ceased to be a means of deterrence, which is why we brought them here. We did not intend to attack America—not from here, and not from there. These missiles were a means for deterrence, so that they would not attack Cuba. Then Comrade Khrushchev proposed to remove those missiles without weakening Cuban defenses in the military sense. In this case, we would be removing the means of deterrence (but it had already ceased to be that due to the fact that it had been discovered), but in return we are attaining our goal—that Kennedy would announce officially that the American government would not attack Cuba, and that it would prevent its allies in the Western Hemisphere from doing so. In other words, the goal to defend Cuba is being achieved by withdrawing the missiles, which should have been defending it as the means of deterrence; the goal is being achieved by exchanging concessions: we made a concession by taking back the missiles, and they made a concession in that they are willing to officially and solemnly announce, and have already announced, that they would not invade Cuba. Was it worth doing that? Was this game useful, right, profitable? Profitable. To ensure without going to war that Cuba would not be attacked! And what does it mean for the Americans?

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They have the so-called Monroe Doctrine; that is, not a single country located outside the American hemisphere can interfere or intervene here; the United States is the leader of all the countries of this hemisphere. And here is the double meaning of this. Some time in the past, this doctrine had a different, more progressive meaning, when it was directed against the colonial powers—England, Portugal, and Spain. Later it became a reactionary slogan, ensuring the control of the United States, monopolistic control over Latin America. By agreeing not to attack Cuba, and by announcing it publicly, the United States is thus admitting that with regard to Cuba the Monroe Doctrine is going to hell. However, there is an agreement—it is called The Treaty of Rio de Janeiro—after the city where it was signed; it happened not long ago. All the countries of the Americas gathered together and decided that nowhere on this continent could there be a Marxist-Leninist, Communist government. And now the missiles have forced Kennedy to give the assurance—and his allies will have to give such assurances—that the Communist regime and Marxism-Leninism can blossom in Cuba. They only want to make sure that Cuba does not forcefully export Marxist-Leninist ideas to other Latin American countries. In general, we think it is absurd that ideas could be exported forcefully. Ideas travel by themselves freely, and the United States has no measures against that. They invented one instrument—the Alliance for Progress. This is the name Kennedy gave it. They want to invest $20 billion, to improve life, in order to somehow slow down the revolutionary storm in these countries. But one and a half years have already passed, and this Alliance for Progress has not had any effect, just embarrassment. Therefore, they had to accept, even though not de jure but de facto, that a socialist state with a Marxist-Leninist government can exist in Latin America and in general on the American continent. As an exception, under our pressure, they went from a position of intolerance to a position of tolerance in this case. This does not yet mean that they will not try furtively to create obstacles or harm. They will do it, but in a way that would not be noticed. They will not start liking Cuba or socialism—no. We forced them, in our struggle, to take certain positions and not to reach beyond them. And this is the right thing to do— as in the GDR—we force the Americans not to interfere, not to engage in openly subversive activities, but to quietly and calmly sit in Berlin. This is why this is such a big victory for Cuba. It is true that some Cuban comrades felt hurt. They are very emotional people. Their emotion, pride, courage—all the things that characterize them as good fighters, are very powerful, so powerful that sometimes cold reason cools down—completely freezes—and their feelings and emotions start to act. They hated to part with the missiles, which could pose a threat to the Americans, even though before that they never dreamed about any missiles, and did not feel bad because of that. But this is an achievement, it gives them a lot, they get an opportunity to develop peacefully. Some Cuban comrades are saying—can you trust the bourgeoisie? They will cheat, sure enough. How much, they say, are such treaties and statements worth—they are just pieces of paper, which they can tear apart at any time. Such treaties are worth no more

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than the cost of the paper itself. There are such statements. I am quoting the most extreme expressions. This is not right. If that were true, such a state of affairs would have precluded the possibility of any kind of coexistence, not only of social systems but also of states in general. If that was true, we should be sending all diplomats into retirement without a pension, and then the military alone would unsheathe their bayonets, open their cannons, and shoot all the time. But this is impossible! Wars have happened, but there cannot be an endless war. International life is possible when there exists some confidence in international documents. Of course, there can be moments in the history of nations and states when certain key questions are at stake. There can be moments when treaties are violated and when force is used. Hitler did this, some other people did this, but it happens in very extreme situations. And this delivers a blow to the state that has acted that way, a very strong moral blow, and it is not forgotten for centuries. That is why treaties have substantial force. Can we say—we have lived alongside the bourgeois world for so many years now—that treaties are meaningless? They are very meaningful. Why are we sitting in Berlin, in Germany—on the basis of what? The treaty. Power is the most important factor here—our power. But this power brought to life treaties and documents, which possess an independent power of their own. Or take the United Nations. Now it brings together 109 nations, big and small. What do you think—doesn’t their opinion carry power? Yes it does. When one finds himself in the minority in this forum it is a moral blow; when you get a majority—then that is a success. Let’s say Kennedy gives us his assurance. Some would say: “Earlier he declared at times that he would not attack. He is cunning; he is trying to soothe us. And if he states it himself like this, as he stated today, then a month or a year later, whenever he wants to, he can find some pretext, and will say that now I am stating the contrary. And you cannot do anything about it, it is his right.” However, if a statement of noninvasion is made in an exchange of letters with Khrushchev, this is not like a unilateral Kennedy statement; then it is an exchange of letters, that is, a special form of international agreement, which one cannot simply break. Then the other side will change its decision as well, and then he will have a conflict with us, not with Cuba. Finally, we are trying to get, and we already have, a preliminary agreement with the Americans that this noninvasion assurance would be made in the United Nations, the world organ, that it would be approved by this forum. Then the power of that document would be even stronger than a bilateral treaty. That is why we should treat it as a great achievement. However, we have not obtained it yet, the argument is continuing. We decided to withdraw the missiles without waiting for an overall settlement because their continued presence would have increased tensions and complicated negotiations. We agreed to withdraw the so-called offensive weapons without specifying them in detail. Kennedy in his two statements included not only the missiles but the Il-28 bombers in this category. He called them the “missile bombers.”

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We started arguing that this weapon is so outdated that it cannot be considered a practical offensive weapon. But if you approach the question seriously, we have to say that the Americans do have a loophole [zatsepka] here. After all, this “Ilyushin” is called a bomber. Bombers were never considered weapons of defense. No one defends himself like this—it is a counterstrike. They agree that this is an outdated system, but it is a fact that this bomber can carry even nuclear weapons to the American territory. During confidential negotiations we say to them: “You have an antiaircraft defense system such that at this altitude, a maximum of 14,000 meters, and at the speed this plane can reach, it would not be able to penetrate the antiaircraft fire and would be shot down. Therefore, what sense does it make to attack the United States with this kind of weapon?” They understand—this is true. However, for the countries of Latin America it would be a real problem, because they do not possess such defensive systems; take any country, you will not see any serious obstacles, any antiaircraft fire. That is true, too. Kennedy is under attack from extremely aggressive elements in the United States, from the Pentagon, the military; they are upset that Kennedy is not seizing the moment to choke Cuba, that he made a deal with Khrushchev, that he made a concession. They say that Khrushchev made a concession, and that is true. And then say that Kennedy made a concession as well. The right-wing elements in the United States are saying: “Why did he make a concession, what for?” His concession is in the fact that he refused to attack Cuba, will not commit an attack against Cuba, and gave a guarantee not to attack. He is currently himself under attack from the Republicans, and the extreme right-wing elements—they are criticizing him. And he decided to cling to the fact that we were not withdrawing the bombers (he considers them offensive weapons), that is, that we were not fulfilling our obligations in full. That gives him grounds to not fulfill his own obligations in full either. However, it is true, there was an agreement that the Red Cross would be enforcing the quarantine, not them. And the most important detail is that they will not affirm the noninvasion guarantees if they see that the Soviet side is not fully abiding by their obligations. Then we decided to think it over—what would we achieve if we continue to insist on our position? In essence—we are right, but formally, they have a loophole—the bombers, the means of offense. What are we going to achieve? Does the Il-28 represent such a great military value for Cuba? Of course, they do have some value. We cannot deny that completely, especially in regard to the countries of Latin America. But they do not represent such value that it would be worth rupturing negotiations with Kennedy because of them, and not achieving guarantees of the sort we want—final confirmation of Kennedy’s concession. And what if we do not get that? We have already removed the missiles, only the bombers are left, and Kennedy has some grounds (they are incorrect, but still it is a hook for public opinion) not to fulfill his promises. We came to the conclusion that we need to withdraw these bombers under one condition —if they immediately lift the quarantine and negotiate to confirm the noninvasion pledge, as well as stop the overflights of Cuba. These are the demands that we set forth.

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Yesterday, you probably heard that Kennedy made the statement, and this is very important (we agreed confidentially, and he gave his consent), that if Khrushchev gives his word as a gentleman that he will withdraw the Il-28 bombers in one month, then that would be sufficient for Kennedy and he would give the order to lift the blockade that same day. Yesterday, he fulfilled that promise. Khrushchev wrote to him that we agreed to withdraw the Il-28s in one month, and Kennedy gave his order on those grounds; he did not make any demands, did not link it to anything else, and did not say that we would lift the blockade the same day you withdraw the Il-28s. He could have posed the question that way. If the Americans felt themselves to be the winners, that is how they would have done it: let’s lift the blockade on the same day you [the USSR] withdraw your bombers; when you withdraw the last one, that is when we will announce the lifting of the blockade. They agreed on the basis of only a promise, one month before the withdrawal, which we promised, to lift the blockade. Isn’t that new proof that we have won in this case? Some say that, you see, if you make a concession to the enemy then his appetite will grow during the meal. In general that is correct. But sometimes there are dinners where the appetite disappears and does not grow during the meal. Such cases happen in life. And here the appetite does not come, and has not come. I will tell you why this is so. We gave just a sliver of a concession. That sliver was the offensive weapons. Beyond that line there could be no conversation. This is our position. The Americans, of course, made some efforts, they wanted to develop the appetites. When I was in New York, McCloy told me that he considered us good “friends.” In 1959, he received me very well in New York, organized a warm welcome when newspapers attacked us, when they threw eggs, tomatoes, threatened to kill us and all that. A nightmare. (This was when I flew there the last time.) But he organized a festive welcome; about 600 aces of the business world were there. So that friendship has held up from that time, although I am afraid that one day at some party cell meeting they will expel me from the Communist Party for maintaining a friendship with such a millionaire and capitalist. He tells me: We know that there are Soviet officers on these missile antiaircraft systems; most likely there are Cubans, too, but definitely Soviet officers. They knew that our people shot down the U-2, but did not speak about it. And why, he said, are you leaving these missile systems behind? Remove them. I said, what kind of an offensive weapon is that? That is for attacking those who attack Cuba; it is an antiaircraft system. Could it be otherwise? Then he smiled, and withdrew the question. Later, when the discussions ended, I went to the airport to fly to Havana; Stevenson passed some paper to Kuznetsov and me, too. He said we forgot yesterday (can you imagine, they forgot, such little boys!) to raise the issue of the withdrawal of the Il-28 bombers and the Komar speedboats—and you know that those speedboats are serious weapons against ships—and there were four more names of weapon systems. Well, we sent all of these to hell, except the Il-28s, which are offensive systems. This is the spirit of it. And if you compare the MiG-21, which we have here, it handles all the tasks the Il-28 can handle, plus it has something better than that other one. And nobody dares to raise his voice

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against the MiGs. They know that we have them. It is considered a means of defense. And for defense, of course, this system is better than the Il-28. It is not only fast, and a highaltitude fighter, it can attack troops, ships and land targets. It is the strongest, most powerful weapon. The Americans have swallowed this needle. They have not said anything. Therefore, if you say that the appetite comes with the meal, then you can observe that the appetite is not coming, it has been spoiled. If the Americans felt themselves to be the winners, first of all, their president would be the first to say I defeated Khrushchev, and he has not said that, and Nixon has not said it either. Neither has the press. Sometimes you could see some of that, very moderate words; it does not look like the American appetite. Where else can it be seen? For instance, Khrushchev gave them the promise that they could observe the actual dismantling and removal of missiles in situ. Although he added the caveat that if it is in situ, in Cuba, then the Cuban government should give its consent. That is correct. We cannot speak for other states where it concerns their sovereignty. The Americans could have made a fuss about the fact that Castro is against inspections (he said—I will not let them in here—and we have to accept that); they could have said that there was no proof that the missiles had been dismantled, no proof that we had removed them, or whether we had removed all the missiles. They could have said—you have only shown us what you wanted, and therefore, we will consider that you have not fulfilled your obligations as long as there is no inspection in situ. From the legal point of view, this is quite possible; if they felt themselves to be the winners, they would most likely do it this way. I do not know how we would have acted in their position. I think we would have acted differently from what they are doing today. We would have insisted on inspections; but they did not insist. The Americans themselves made this suggestion—I was then in New York—McCloy put it straight himself: If Castro is against inspections, we will have to find another alternative. It is a Latin word; it means a different opportunity, in other words. I pretended that I was not interested in this issue, and said what kind of alternative do you have in mind? For example, giving us some information that would convince us that you have dismantled and withdrawn the missiles. We are not asking for military information, or military-technological, or strategic, just general facts that can be observed. I pretended again that I was not really interested, said nothing, and passed by. However, that is a very big concession on their part. They photographed practically everything and naively published everything in the newspapers. If they were real crooks, they would not have published anything, they could have said that the photos were not good, that they could not see anything in them. Go then try to figure out, whether you can see anything or not! And then they could have demanded —let’s go and see [in situ]. No. They essentially honestly told us everything that they had seen and published the photos in the newspapers. Then the question is clear—if they photographed everything, what kind of inspection is needed in situ after everything has been photographed? This option is out. We agreed that they could observe everything at sea, visually, without boarding the ships, and counting with their fingers. They could have said—let us board the ships and

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count with our fingers how many boxes of missiles you have. They did not demand that, they agreed to accept our statement that everything has been loaded on the ships, you can observe from a distance, at sea. Generally speaking, in the open sea, one can look at another without permission. One joke just came to mind, I will tell you so that you do not get bored. There is this guy from the Caucasus (Georgian, or Armenian—they all have the same nature), and there is a woman in front of him, and he stares at her very intently. She starts feeling uncomfortable and says, why are you looking at me like that? He responds, Lady, it’s my eye, I look where I want to look. (Laughter). Now to the Americans. Generally speaking, the sea is international territory. You can come close and look, just do not collide. If you collide with somebody, that is bad; it is a violation. But if you just come close and look, it can even be welcomed. This is no concession on our part. It is a very big concession on their part because they have to make sure that we have withdrawn everything. We said forty-two missiles, and showed them fortytwo. Now they do not even say—how would we know that there were forty-two, maybe you had more than that? They could raise this question after all. But they trust us; they know what it means. First of all, they know how many there were from the photos. They announced the quarantine, published the president’s proclamation that they would climb on our ships and search them (commercial vessels going to Cuba) to establish that they are not carrying offensive weapons. Not weapons in general, but offensive weapons. But how did it go? They never boarded any ships coming here, and never even tried to. Two times it happened, they addressed captains of two ships, and there was not a single conflict, although there was a crowd of their military ships around our ships. There were two instances where two of our ships carrying weapons were sailing from Cuba. Their war ship approached them and demanded that inspectors be allowed on deck for inspection. Our captains gave orders not to allow them; they rejected the American demand. Those Americans threatened to use weapons. Our commanders said, we will not submit, and we are not afraid of your threats. We issued a protest, without publishing it in the press. The American military commanders did not dare to implement their threat, and did not board the ship. In addition, those ships were not going to Cuba, but coming back from Cuba. All this went beyond the framework of the president’s proclamation. That is also a fact. These American imperialists are obnoxious, more so than the fascists. The correlation of forces throughout the world is generally in our favor and, according to President Kennedy, we are equal in terms of military power. . . .

Source: From the personal archive of Dr. Sergo A. Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.

Document 35 Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan to the CC CPSU

November 22, 1962 CC CPSU I think it is not an accident that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba gave Comrade Alexeyev a copy of their instructions to their representative to the UN, which contain a reference to the fact that “we possess tactical nuclear weapons, which we should keep.” (See our no. 1885.) Tomorrow, November 22, the conversation, which will take place at 22:00 Moscow time, could also touch upon the fate of the new military agreement. In that connection, this question might also arise, to which I must give an answer. I think I should say that there exists an unpublished law in the Soviet Union, according to which nuclear weapons of any kind—strategic or tactical—cannot be transferred to third parties. In the event of a war, these weapons would be used to defend the entire socialist camp, but without transferring them to third parties. Because we will have no base of our own here, then, of course, these weapons cannot be left in Cuba. A. Mikoyan

Source: From the personal archive of Sergo A. Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.

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Document 36 Additional Instructions to Comrade A. I. Mikoyan on the Cuban Issue

November 22, 1962 # P68/U To comrades Khrushchev, Gromyko Extract from protocol # 68 of Session of the Presidium of CC CPSU from November 22, 1962. About additional instructions to comrade A. I. Mikoyan on the Cuban issue To approve draft instructions to comrade Mikoyan on the Cuban issue (attached). Secretary CC To paragraph 5 of Protocol # 68 Secret Top Priority Havana Soviet Ambassador—for Comrade A. I. Mikoyan To your [telegrams] # 1893, 1892, 1885. In accordance with the instructions, I report the following on the issues raised by you: 1. We sent you information about Kuznetsov’s and Zorin’s negotiations with McCoy and Stevenson, in which it was pointed out that the U.S. representatives were planning to give us the draft of the American declaration in the next several days. We will prepare and send our draft of the declaration (which we already have) for preliminary coordination with the Cuban friends, taking into account the U.S. document. In addition, we have to 479

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keep in mind that the Americans, having stated that the form of the protocol does not suit their needs, have not made any statements regarding the substance of the protocol so far. 2. We were worried about the information that the directive from the Cuban Foreign Ministry to their representative in New York Lechuga contained the following phrase: “We have tactical nuclear weapons, which we should keep.” Your considerations regarding the response to the Cuban friends on this issue were seen as correct. In your conversations, start from the assertion that these weapons belong to us, and are to be kept in our hands only, we never transferred them to anyone, and we do not intend to transfer them to anyone. In addition, as we have told the Americans, all nuclear weapons had been removed from Cuba. It would be advisable for the Cuban friends to correct urgently the directive given to Lechuga in that part, and to tell him clearly that there are no nuclear weapons in the Cuban hands. It is important to give such a directive to Lechuga immediately, so that he would not be able to make some statement in a careless conversation, which could be eavesdropped on, referring to that mistaken directive. All this is very important, because otherwise it could seriously complicate the affairs, if the Americans got the information, which does not correspond to reality as a result of the directive, which was given by the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Lechuga. 3. As far as the new military agreement is concerned, we should start from the assumption that the issue of such an agreement will be discussed after you return to Moscow and that it would be inexpedient to discuss it now in Havana. 419-nb zf

Source: From the personal archive of Sergo A. Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.

Document 37 Memorandum of A. I. Mikoyan’s Conversation with Comrades F. Castro, O. Dorticós, E. Guevara, E. Aragonés, and C. R. Rodriguez

November 22, 1962 At the beginning of the conversation, which took place in the Presidential Palace, Fidel Castro asked A. I. Mikoyan what he did yesterday and inquired about his plans for the next several days. A. I. Mikoyan briefly spoke about his trip out of town and, reminding [Castro] that Vilma Espín invited him to spend one or two days in Santiago, he asked whether Raul Castro had already returned to Havana. F. Castro responded that Raul was still in Santiago, and that if Comrade Mikoyan wanted to go there, they should call Raul so that he would not leave Santiago. A. I. Mikoyan agreed with that suggestion and asked what were the impressions of Comrade Fidel Castro and his comrades regarding President Kennedy’s statement at the November 22 press conference. F. Castro: Do you want to know my sincere opinion? A. I. Mikoyan: Of course. Just like we always talk to each other. F. Castro: Very bad. A. I. Mikoyan: In what sense? F. Castro: In every sense. A. I. Mikoyan: You feel bad that the blockade was lifted? F. Castro: No, that the blockade was lifted is not bad. It was bad that we lost the Il-28 planes. Right now we are preparing a response to Kennedy’s statement at the press conference. We really do not like his statement that they are going to continue the air reconnaissance. A. I. Mikoyan: Comrade Fidel, we have taught Kennedy to some extent. Did you notice the form of his statement? 481

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F. Castro: I do not like the form either. He is stomping on the same [issues], like a bear in the circus. A. I. Mikoyan: You are wrong, Comrade Fidel. Taking into account your wishes, N. S. Khrushchev sent Kennedy some “directives” so to speak, regarding his [forthcoming] speech. And if you examine the statement carefully, you will notice that its tone is very different from Kennedy’s previous speeches on the Cuban issue. F. Castro: I am still in a bad mood, because some points are still unclear to me. I am concerned, first of all, by the Kennedy’s statement that all nuclear weapons were removed from Cuba. Has the Soviet Union ever given such a promise? Is it true that all the tactical nuclear weapons are already removed? A. I. Mikoyan: The Soviet government has not given any promises regarding the removal of the tactical nuclear weapons. The Americans do not even have any information that they are in Cuba. F. Castro: So then the tactical nuclear weapons are here? And no assurances were given regarding their withdrawal? A. I. Mikoyan: Not about tactical nuclear weapons. F. Castro: Therefore, then, the weapons are here? A. I. Mikoyan: Yes, they are here. They are in Comrade Pavlov’s hands. These weapons are not offensive weapons. They can be used in the place of nuclear cannons. F. Castro: If I am not mistaken, you refer to the weapons that we call Colina [Kolina]? A. I. Mikoyan: Yes. And it can be used with two types of warheads—conventional and nuclear. F. Castro: This kind of weapon makes one respect it. A. I. Mikoyan: That is true. The power of the warhead is quite substantial, although the range is short. F. Castro: I am also concerned with another issue. Judging by Kennedy’s statement, it appears that the Soviet government assured the U.S. government that all the Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Cuba. Is that true? A. I. Mikoyan: Americans knew the regions where the missiles were stationed; therefore, they also know the regions where the support troops are deployed. F. Castro: And what is the number of support troops? A. I. Mikoyan: Presently we have four support regiments in Cuba, 2,000 people each, and 8,000 people altogether. All their armaments and combat equipment, including tanks and armored vehicles, will be transferred to the Cubans. We should start thinking about the plan of withdrawal of the personnel. It is clear that the soldiers will be the first ones to be withdrawn, later officers, and then senior officers. We should do it in such a way so that the Soviet personnel have an opportunity to pass their skills of operating these weapons and equipment on to the Cuban personnel. F. Castro: One more question. When we spoke with you, Comrade Mikoyan, in Varadero, I was very inspired about your concern about us. We need to sit down and have a good talk. This issue is not resolved yet, and we should discuss it in detail. All we did in Varadero was a walk on the beach, but the question deserves serious discussion. I do not think that Kennedy believes that all the Soviet regiments in Cuba serve

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the purposes of supporting the missile. For example, there were no strategic missiles in the Oriente Province, but Soviet troops were deployed there as well. We thought that they would serve for destroying the paratrooper landing forces in the event of an invasion. A. I. Mikoyan: Missiles were supposed to be delivered to the Oriente Province as well. F. Castro: It means that all the Soviet troops are just support forces, then . . . A. I. Mikoyan: No. The support forces consist of only four regiments, that is, 8,000 soldiers and officers. Altogether, there are 34,000 Soviet soldiers and officers in Cuba. Four regiments of the support battalion support one missile battalion. We will start the withdrawal of the personnel in accordance with the timetable coordinated with you. F. Castro: It would be better not to rush with the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. However, I am afraid the Americans will remind you about them soon. A. I. Mikoyan: But they know whom they are dealing with. You see, the United States was shouting about the blockade, but there was no real blockade. Then it made noise that it would demand proof that the strategic weapons were removed from Cuba; it was saying that it would search the ships. And what came out of it? The Americans were scared of confrontation and limited themselves to visual observation. To be precise, they limited themselves to receiving our information—there was no real inspection. And what did they see? Boxes, kind of like coffins. But they still did not demand to inspect the ships. F. Castro: I believe that the American guarantees have no great significance for us. There were no guarantees before October 22. The blockade existed [before], approximately the same. But we had the Il-28 bombers. Now our situation is even worse. We agreed to the withdrawal of the Il-28 bombers only in order to help the Soviet Union. A. I. Mikoyan: No, Comrade Fidel. If we remind ourselves how we compared the Cuban situation in June of this year with its situation today, in November, we would see that it has improved in the military as well as in the political and diplomatic sense. Recall how the Americans were preparing an operation under the code name “Ortsac,” that is, “Castro” spelled backward. They were preparing to land 20,000 marines! F. Castro: Well, the invasion was only hypothetical! A. I. Mikoyan: And what would you say about the active preparations for the invasion in the Latin American countries?! You know well that the United States was preparing an invasion in mid-September under the guise of naval maneuvers. F. Castro: We saw a possibility of an invasion even in October, but it was only a probability. A. I. Mikoyan: It was you, Comrade Fidel, who informed us that a U.S. attack on Cuba was possible in the next twenty-four hours. The first goal of such an invasion could be to destroy the missiles, but the second would be an invasion. F. Castro: I think that first of all there would have been a strike against the missile bases, and speaking about an invasion, it was much less probable. I do not believe in an invasion. And I do not think that an invasion would have caused a world war. Such danger was present, it seems to me, at the moment when the Soviet missiles were discovered. Obviously, the Soviet military specialists did not undertake all necessary measures to camouflage the missiles. They should have used the antiaircraft guided

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missiles against the U-2 from the very beginning to prevent them from discovering the missiles. A. I. Mikoyan: I have already told you, Comrade Fidel, that when we received your telegram where you spoke about the danger of imminent invasion, we immediately gave Comrade Pavlov an order to bring the Soviet forces in Cuba to the highest combat readiness so that the Soviet soldiers and officers could fight together with the Cubans to repel the aggression. After all, we have a whole army here. If an invasion on the part of the Americans began, it would have led to a global confrontation. F. Castro: Maybe. . . . However, I wrote my telegram to Khrushchev having in mind mainly [the possibility] that the Americans could deliver a strike against the missile bases. If I had known that he would make a decision to remove the missiles, I would not have written that. And here is one more question that concerns me. We had no idea at all about the framework in which the strategic missiles could be used. We did not even know what measures were undertaken to prevent the enemy from discovering them. Why didn’t we use the antiaircraft guided weapons, in order not to allow overflights of our territory by the U-2 planes? We were talking with you about the most solid defense, about having bases 90 miles from the United States, while at the same time we have not undertaken the necessary measures of camouflage. And it is understandable that the enemy had discovered the missiles. We relied on the Soviet military comrades—because they have both political and military experience—but what they did with the missiles was not at all what should have been done properly. We had a number of issues, which were still unclear to us when the missiles were already en route to Cuba. We practically did not know the framework of the achieved agreement. C. R. Rodriguez: It turned out that we were speaking about solidarity, and not about a nuclear war. F. Castro: It all began with the Soviet marshal of the Rocket Forces [Sergey Biryuzov] promising us the missiles. We believed that the missiles were delivered to Cuba not in the interest of Cuba, because we did not need them. Then I gave my consent, thinking that we were fulfilling our duty to the socialist camp. We took the risk, believing that the socialist camp would also take the risk for us. We were even prepared for a nuclear war in the event if the Soviet Union was attacked. Now I can see that the Soviet government was not prepared to do the same for us. A. I. Mikoyan: We were also prepared to make sacrifices for Cuba. The Americans were not as much afraid because we deployed our missiles in Cuba as they were afraid that we would transfer them to you. F. Castro: Doesn’t the Soviet Union transfer nuclear weapons to other countries? A. I. Mikoyan: We have a law prohibiting the transfer of any nuclear weapons, including the tactical ones, to anybody. We never transferred it to anyone, and we did not intend to transfer it. The nuclear weapons, remaining in our hands, would be used in the event of a war to defend the entire socialist camp. F. Castro: Would it be possible to leave the tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba in Soviet hands, without transferring them to the Cubans?

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A. I. Mikoyan: No, Comrade Fidel, it would not be possible, because if there is no Soviet base in Cuba, then the Soviet officers will be acting only as advisers to the Cuban army. The Americans are not aware that the tactical nuclear weapons are here, and we are taking it out not because of the American demands, as you would think, but of our own will. F. Castro: I understand you, Comrade Mikoyan. However, we thought that the jointly developed strategy is a factor in strengthening the ties between the countries of the socialist camp both in the political and psychological sense. We are not afraid of responsibility. We understood the Soviet statements in their direct sense, not in a figurative sense. We did not think that you would choose the less dangerous option. If we had known about it, we would not have agreed to the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba. A. I. Mikoyan: Are we returning to the first day, Comrade Fidel? F. Castro: Maybe we have never left it. A. I. Mikoyan: You have not learned anything? F. Castro: We realize that you made a great deal of effort, Comrade Mikoyan, and we thank you for that. A. I. Mikoyan: Let’s not talk about it. F. Castro: Good. But still, if one sums everything up, we still have not achieved the acceptance of the five points. We made concessions. It did not give us anything other than the lifting of the blockade. A. I. Mikoyan: And what concessions have you made? F. Castro: What do you think we are? A zero on the left, a dirty rag. We tried to help the Soviet Union to get out of a difficult situation. A. I. Mikoyan: We did not allow inspections, we achieved the lifting of the blockade. . . . F. Castro: We could not even shoot at the U-2. The Americans constantly violate our airspace when their planes take off from Guantánamo Base. The airfield is built in such a way that even if they did not want to violate [our airspace], they would violate it anyway. We repeatedly wrote about it and made protests. All this is very unpleasant for us. I am saying this to you with all sincerity. A. I. Mikoyan: I value [your] sincerity. However, we see the results differently. It is a success that we achieved the lifting of the blockade. This is the assessment of the CC CPSU, of N. S. Khrushchev. He asked [me] to tell you about it, and also to give you his regards. Your letter to U Thant was published in Pravda, with the title “The Decision Should Be Acceptable to Everybody.” F. Castro: We are not taking responsibility for other people. If you say so, maybe [it is so]. (The interpreter, having heard this Fidel Castro’s phrase incorrectly, translated it as “You say it as U Thant might have said it.”) A. I. Mikoyan: Why are you comparing me with a bourgeois actor? F. Castro: I did not compare you [to anybody]. Interpreter (asked Castro to repeat what he has said): My fault, Anastas Ivanovich; I did not hear it well. (Everybody laughs). A. I. Mikoyan: I would like, comrades, to remind you about how the Soviet missiles were deployed in Cuba. The marshal of the rocket forces reported to N. S. Khrushchev that

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the missiles could be camouflaged in Cuba by stationing them in the palm forests and caves. N. S. Khrushchev gave an order that the missiles should be lowered to the horizontal position in the daytime and carefully camouflaged, and that they would be raised to the combat position only in the nighttime. It was planned to make public the fact of the missiles’ deployment in Cuba at an appropriate time, when all the assembly work would have been completed. Only then they would be able to play a real deterrent role. However, apparently our military acted incorrectly. It turned out that there are practically no palm forests in Cuba, and it was almost impossible to camouflage the missiles. F. Castro: I accidentally saw the missiles in the combat position during one of my trips. But, to tell you the truth, nobody ever invited me to look at the missiles. I truly familiarized myself with the missiles only after they were dismantled. I think not all possible means were used for the purposes of camouflage. We could have built fake buildings or fake storage structures. For example, the kind of buildings that we use for birdhouses [on poultry farms], in my view, would be very suitable for hiding the missiles in the horizontal position. It could also have been done so that the buildings, which housed the missiles, would have removable roofs. Those roofs would slide back only for the time when the use of the missiles was probable. The rest of time they would have stayed closed. A. I. Mikoyan: It is true; our military, obviously, failed to take into account the great skills of the Cuban architects. F. Castro: It was also possible to use light tents, which we use for covering the tobacco plantations, and to camouflage the missiles. You probably saw them, Comrade Mikoyan, in Pinar del Rio Province. A. I. Mikoyan: Yes, I have seen them. F. Castro: It was very important not to allow the missiles to be photographed, and we had the capacity to do so. We are engaged in extensive construction in the countryside. The palm trees could have been transplanted. A. I. Mikoyan: Of course, they could have been transplanted. But it is too late to discuss it now. F. Castro: Unfortunately, we abstained from asking questions, because the plan was prepared in the Soviet Union. Of course, we know much less about the military issues than you do. But we know our geographic conditions, and our resources, much better than you. And that, of course, offended us. A. I. Mikoyan: I understand you. Comrade Raul also was telling me about it. F. Castro: Let us turn to a different issue now. A. I. Mikoyan: I agree. F. Castro: Did you inform Moscow that we are very interested in the issue of the military agreement? A. I. Mikoyan: Yes, I informed N. S. Khrushchev about my conversation with you. He approved my idea that I should hear your opinion—although I have no authority, and I do not feel prepared to conduct negotiations on military issues—and report it to the CC CPSU.

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F. Castro: It would be very good for us to have a military assistance treaty with the Soviet Union, like the ones the Soviet Union has with other countries of socialism, and to have Soviet troops here. A. I. Mikoyan: In principle, we are against having our troops or bases in other countries. Some time ago, we had military bases in Finland. In China, we had a military base in Port Arthur. Neither the Finns nor the Chinese demanded that we close those. We made the decision to dismantle them ourselves. At the present time, we have no bases abroad. F. Castro: You had a submarine base in Albania. A. I. Mikoyan: Yes, we did; but then we liquidated it as well. You cannot hide military bases, but you can easily hide nuclear warheads. For example, there are American bases in Turkey. But we keep them constantly under the observation of our radio locators [radar installations —ed.]. We have missiles targeted at those bases. F. Castro: Do you demand that the United States remove the bases in Turkey? (The interpreter could not hear the phrase well, and translated it as “Would the United States demand liquidation of your bases targeted at Turkey?”) A. I. Mikoyan: Comrade Fidel, and you say this after the forty-fifth anniversary of the Great October?! (It turns out that it was the interpreter’s mistake. The mistake causes some agitation.) A. I. Mikoyan: When the conditions are ripe, we will raise the issue of liquidation of all American bases abroad. And we will achieve that! To prove how accurate our long-range missiles are I can remind you, comrades, that already four years in a row we have been conducting tests of our long-range missiles by targeting them to a certain region in the Pacific Ocean at a distance of 13,000 kilometers. The missiles drop [hit the target] precisely in the assigned region. Soviet ships deployed in that area observe the accuracy of the hit, and American ships come there as well. What can you do? Those are international waters! This example tells you that if we can strike a target in an assigned region of the Pacific Ocean with great accuracy, then we can easily deliver even more precise strikes against any American bases located at shorter distances. The Americans do not have such missiles. F. Castro: So you have a law that prohibits transfer of tactical nuclear weapons [along with other nuclear weapons] to other countries? It is a pity. And when are you going to repeal that law? A. I. Mikoyan: We will see. It is our right [to do so]. F. Castro: So you can deliver accurate strikes at the U.S. targets using your missiles from the Soviet territory? A. I. Mikoyan: Yes, we can. However, if we strike at the United States, it would naturally cause an American strike against Cuba. F. Castro: In the event of a world war, nuclear missiles will strike you, too. A. I. Mikoyan: Naturally. The weapons, which will be transferred to you from Comrade Pavlov, will have great importance for the defense of Cuba in the present conditions. For example, you have T-34 tanks; Pavlov has the newest T-55 tanks. The cannons of these

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tanks are equipped with a gyroscopic mechanism, which would ensure the accuracy of targeted fire while the tank is moving. This is our most modern machine. F. Castro: And the Soviet Union will transfer all Comrade Pavlov’s weapons to us? A. I. Mikoyan: Nuclear, no; all the rest, yes. F. Castro: And what will happen with the military agreement? A. I. Mikoyan: It is always easier to ask questions than to answer them. I already told you that I am going to inform the CC CPSU and Comrade Khrushchev. I think that your decisive position against any inspections in a certain sense turned out to be even useful for Cuba and for your prestige in the countries of Latin America. The American press writes that one cannot make a puppet out of Cuba. If it were possible to achieve multilateral controls in the region of the Caribbean Sea, it would be quite useful for Cuba. F. Castro: We usually agree with your proposals. A. I. Mikoyan: When the issue of creating our missile base in Cuba was raised for the first time, F. R. Kozlov told me jokingly: we should not agree to a base—for us it would be as some sort of handcuffs in Latin America. F. Castro: But the decision was made anyway. We appreciate it. A. I. Mikoyan: The emergency measures have been lifted in the Soviet Union. The same is being done in the United States. Are you, Comrade Fidel, planning to call demobilization? Not a full [demobilization], of course. In your circumstances, it is always necessary to maintain armed forces capable of repelling the enemy’s incursions. F. Castro: We also plan to do it. By the way, Comrade Mikoyan, I have one more question. Where could I buy bombers? A. I. Mikoyan: We already spoke about MiG-21 planes. These planes are capable of carrying out all kinds of combat tasks, beginning from air combat, including storming of enemy troops and ships, and up to bombing concentrations of enemy forces. This is the most modern fighter; it is greatly superior to MiG-17 and MiG-19 planes. Of course, it cannot be used for bombing Chicago, but in the Caribbean Sea it can be used successfully. As far as Il-28s are concerned, you know yourself that they are outdated. Presently, it is best to use them as a target plane. F. Castro: And why did you send them to us then? A. I. Mikoyan: Accompanied by fighters, they can be used as means of defense. F. Castro: Maybe we could use them to defend our commercial fishing ships? A. I. Mikoyan: It does not make sense. F. Castro: Our army, after it receives your equipment, which is present here, will become very strong. These forces will enable us to create a solid defense, but we believe that it is not enough. It would be good to have some means of deterrence. The Soviet troops, of course, should be removed from Cuba gradually. Of course, it will have to be done because they bother the imperialists. Ultimately, we will cut the number of the Soviet personnel in Cuba to the minimum. We could, using our terminology, call the Soviet military advisers “specialists.” A. I. Mikoyan: I agree. F. Castro: If we could ensure peace, then even the minimal number of military advisers would be enough. But I would like to repeat it—we are asking you not to rush with the

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troop withdrawal. We believe that our troops only cannot be counted upon as a deterrent. At the present time, the new conditions have emerged: The military agreement concluded by us continues to be in force, but the Soviet troops have to be withdrawn. It would be desirable to send a mission from Moscow to conduct negotiations on working out a new treaty, or to receive a Cuban mission in Moscow. All the European socialist countries have military agreements with the Soviet Union. If we could also sign a new military agreement, then it would emerge as a strong deterrent factor, which together with the modern weapons received from you would greatly enhance Cuba’s defense readiness. If we sign a military agreement with you, then we will be in the same situation as the rest of the European socialist countries. A. I. Mikoyan: Comrade Fidel, do you have the Warsaw Pact in mind? F. Castro: No. I am thinking about a bilateral military agreement. A. I. Mikoyan: I have not thought about this aspect of the issue; I do not have the authority, and I do not feel myself prepared for conducting such negotiations. However, we should think about your proposal; obviously, such negotiations would be useful. I will report about it to the CC CPSU upon my return to Moscow. F. Castro: If we replace the existing agreement with an agreement of a different type, then I think that the imperialism would not be able to use that fact as a political weapon against Cuba and the Soviet Union. At the same time, such a step on the part of the Soviet Union would considerably strengthen the trust of the Cuban people as well as of all the peoples of Latin America toward the Soviet Union. Besides, the imperialists would not be able to exploit the existing situation. A. I. Mikoyan: As you know, N. S. Khrushchev said that we understand the responsibility of the Soviet Union for the defense of Cuba against the imperialist aggression. F. Castro: I remember that the marshal of the Rocket Forces spoke to the effect that we should not limit ourselves to a declaration alone. We believe that it would be useful to sign a mutual defense agreement with the Soviet Union. A. I. Mikoyan: We will do everything in order to strengthen the Cuban defenses. As far as deterrence means are concerned, they are located on Soviet territory. N. S. Khrushchev has already said that the missiles, which are being withdrawn from Cuba, would be targeted at Berlin. Cuba has been recognized as a socialist state. We are forcing the imperialists to recognize the GDR [German Democratic Republic, i.e., East Germany] de facto. We are ready to try and achieve conclusion of a nonaggression pact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. However, the American are scared of that. They are afraid that a pact of that nature could exert a significant influence in terms of relaxation of international tension. F. Castro: Comrade Mikoyan, it would be very important for us to feel the shield in the form of a military agreement. We would ask [beg] the Soviet Union not to hurry with the withdrawal of troops. A. I. Mikoyan: We are not in a hurry. F. Castro: It would be good if you would not hurry with the withdrawal of the support forces either. A. I. Mikoyan: So far, we have not started withdrawing them.

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F. Castro: We are currently preparing a statement, which will be signed by the Revolutionary Government and by the ORI [Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas, Integrated Revolutionary Organizations] national leadership, and which will represent our response to the Kennedy statement at the press conference. In this statement, we will present our point of view, and we will emphasize that it is not ourselves but the Americans who bear responsibility for the tensions that developed in the Caribbean Basin, and that Cuba is not interfering with the progress toward the settlement—therefore, the version about Cuba allegedly opposing the negotiations does not correspond to the reality. E. Guevara: This statement will be written in a calm, positive tone. A. I. Mikoyan: Approximately in the same tone as your letter to U Thant from November 19 was written? F. Castro: Approximately like that. I am concerned about the fact that as far as I can see, in the Soviet Union, there is very little information about what is happening in Latin America. A. I. Mikoyan: What can we do? Our ambassador here is very young. F. Castro: We have a very good rapport with Alejandro (talking about Alexeyev). A. I. Mikoyan: We are satisfied with Ambassador Alexeyev. Comrade Kudryavtsev is a good diplomat, but he was not appropriate for Cuba. F. Castro: Comrade Kudryavtsev is a good person; he always tries to do good. We respect him. However, he follows protocol, the tradition, too much. In a revolutionary country, it is better when the diplomat does not follow the protocol. Like we are talking here with you, very simple. A. I. Mikoyan: I told N. S. Khrushchev—Alexeyev is still an immature diplomat, but the Cubans, as far as I can see, like him. N. S. Khrushchev accepted this proposal. And it was the right thing to do. I think that Cuba does not need a career diplomat as Ambassador right now. F. Castro: I would like to say something about General [Aleksey] Dementiev. He is a wonderful person. He did so much in order to raise the level of combat readiness of our armed forces; he understands us perfectly, and he is a good revolutionary. A. I. Mikoyan: I am glad that you like Comrade Dementiev, and that he was able to find the common language with you. I would like to say a couple of words about the commander of the group of Soviet Forces in Cuba, whom you know under the name of Pavlov. His real name is Pliev. I have known him since 1924. He served in the military school then, where Comrade Grechko, who is now marshal, was a cadet as well. Comrade Pavlov is a very good commander, and he has perfect nerves. F. Castro: I had very little contact with Comrade Pavlov, but I worked constantly with Dementiev. He devotes a lot of energy to his work with the officer corps. We worked very closely together after the Playa Giron. It is bad that your officers come without their families. A. I. Mikoyan: We only send officers with their families to the GDR [German Democratic Republic, i.e., East Germany], but there they have to serve for three years. F. Castro: Maybe you should reconsider this procedure for Cuba as well. The Soviet comrades helped us a lot in creating a good army. At the present time, we have strong and well-organized military units. Officers from Spain also provide great assistance.

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A. I. Mikoyan: [You mean] the Spanish comrades from the Soviet Union? F. Castro: Yes. Please pass our gratitude on to Comrade [Dolores] Ibarruri. A. I. Mikoyan: I will definitely do it. F. Castro: Our people did not like the decision to withdraw the Il-28 planes from our territory. We anticipated that [reaction], and so we published it in small print. We tried not to do anything that could harm our common cause. Of course, we defended our point of view. But we always, when there was an opportunity, tried to do everything in our power to make it easier for the Soviet Union. A. I. Mikoyan: We also try to do everything in order to help you. And even in those cases when something is not quite right, we always maintain our trust in you, our confidence in your honesty. It reassures us. F. Castro: Well, I cannot always manage to stay calm. I lost my nerve twice, and I think it was not the interpreter’s fault, but Mikoyan’s. A. I. Mikoyan: I agree. F. Castro: What is Comrade Khrushchev writing to you? A. I. Mikoyan: He is writing that he is satisfied, and that he sends his best regards to you and your comrades. The letter is calm, and confident in our power. He tells me that I should make the decision regarding the timing of my return myself. I think to stop by in New York on the way back, to have an official meeting with U Thant, to talk with him during the dinner at the UN, to exchange opinions. I think I will also meet with McCloy. F. Castro: Stevenson will be there, too? A. I. Mikoyan: Quite possibly. He is my “old friend.” I should feel him out, put some pressure [on him]. Probably I will also meet with Ambassador Thompson. I think he will ask for a meeting with me. If they ask me to meet with Dean Rusk, I will not object either. A meeting with Kennedy is a possibility as well. I would like to stay in New York for one day only. However, I might extend my stay there if necessary. And then—straight home. I am thinking of leaving Havana on Monday, November 26, in the morning. I would be willing to make a TV statement before the departure. In addition, I will put a wreath at the José Martí monument. F. Castro: It would be good if you could emphasize the Soviet Union’s willingness to help Cuba in the future in your TV statement. A. I. Mikoyan: Of course, I was thinking about saying that. Comrade Fidel, maybe our comrades could let Comrade Raul Castro know that I am flying to Santiago? F. Castro: There is no need to do it, we will let him know ourselves. It is quite possible that Raul with return to Havana with you. The tensions are going down; we will start demobilization soon. The Americans have ceased their ground-shaving flights. Ambassador Alexeyev A. I. was present at the conversation. The conversation lasted four hours. Recorded by V. E. Tikhmenev. Source: From the personal archive of Dr. Sergo A. Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.

Document 38 Khrushchev’s Telegram to Mikoyan (Special No. 1220)

November 22, 1962 For Comrade Mikoyan “Just one last story, and my chronicle is over” [a famous line from Boris Godunov, by Aleksandr Pushkin]. Evidently, the same is true of this dispatch, and if it is not the last, then it is quite possibly the second to last. Of course you already know that Kennedy kept his word and removed the blockade, or, as he calls it, the “quarantine.” He sent a message through the confidential channels that, in addition to [removing the blockade], he gave an order to reduce the state of alert for the American armed forces, which had been publicly announced at the beginning of the events in Cuba, and to return to reserve status those air squadrons that had been called to active-duty during the Cuban crisis. Obviously you also already know from messages transmitted by radio that the activities which we undertook in connection with the Cuban crisis regarding the elevated war-readiness of our armed forces have also been cancelled. As such, we have already met all conditions required for the global community to understand that we consider the Cuban crisis to be a closed chapter. However, we ourselves understand that not everything has been finalized. We went to meet Kennedy half-way, having withdrawn our Il-28 aircraft, yet, on his part, he immediately initiated a “quarantine.” Now, other issues still remain for a resolution. Issues which require a continuation of the diplomatic “battle,” questions of understanding, interpretation of a guarantee or assurance, including those relating to the non-shipment of corresponding types of weaponry, and so forth. But this is already precisely about interpretation, an understanding of the guarantee and assurance, and their corresponding formalization. 492

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We have the feeling that the Americans actually want to eliminate alarming tensions. If they had wanted something else, then they had the opportunity to have it. If they had in fact pursued the objective of forcing an invasion, then they had the chance, all the more so when we removed our missiles from Cuba. Apparently, Kennedy himself does not take an extreme position. But it is better not to plunge into some sort of tangent about the future. Of course anything is possible, but at least in the short term, and in all likelihood in the coming years, an invasion should not be expected. We read, of course, all of your conversations, [they were] fairly voluminous. It was necessary for us to read them. But, and you obviously do not take offense when we tell you the truth, this did not give us much pleasure. Still, I repeat, we are very satisfied with the mission that fell on you. This mission is difficult, to give explanations for such matters which, it would seem, should be understood by friends. But the occasion demanded clarification. That is to say, these matters were not understood as they should have been by those you spoke with. If they now correctly understand them and will make correct conclusions, then there will have already been a benefit from this. We will make a broad summary about the position in Cuba and our long-term line on this question when we hear from you here in Moscow. Indeed, time should be set aside so that questions can be settled and, so to say, all unpleasantries and grief can be digested. We have had enough of the former and the latter. We wanted to do good, so we had to prove it to those for whom we made sacrifices and underwent hardships. And all of this was in Cuba’s interests. It was all done to help her. You have all of our confidential correspondence with the president. Therefore, you will not be further informed about anything. We now consider your departure from Cuba possible. Choose a time yourself and get ready. Of course we will not rush your departure, but your presence there is now less needed. Yet, if you deem it necessary to stay there, then we will of course agree with you. We want to repeat for you that we feel it is possible for you to return by the same route through New York so that you could have a meeting with Kuznetsov and Zorin, and also with U Thant, McCloy, and Stevenson. We think all of this is useful. If you happen to have any questions for us, we will answer them. From our side, there are no questions for you, because we have already said everything and you know about everything. All documents of interest to you were also received by Kuznetsov in New York. As such, just like you, our representatives in New York are fully informed in order to equip you for talks which could potentially take place between you and U.S. representatives and U Thant in New York. We also now believe that, obviously, it would be useful if you were to travel to Washington, too. First and foremost, we think that this trip would have to be publicly motivated by the need to meet with embassy workers. This reason, which can always be put forward, will be completely understandable to everyone. That is to say, it will be understood why the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, while in the United States, would want to meet with people who represent the Soviet country, especially at such a tense time. Several individuals from the president’s circle have also suggested to us that, if you are in Washington, your meeting with Rusk is a possibility, and your meeting with the president is not out

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of the question. Of course, we do not know for sure whether or not meetings will take place with these individuals. But at least Thompson, as an old “Muscovite,” will undoubtedly request a meeting with you. This also cannot be refused. Such a meeting should be attended because it could be useful. Our Plenum is going very well. We are pleased with the speech, and as the speaker, I am that much more pleased. It seems like we will finish the Plenum on Friday or by Saturday at the latest. We are waiting for you in Moscow. We believe that, if it can be put in such terms, the Cuban operation bore fruit. By the deployment and then removal of our missiles, we succeeded in getting an announcement from the president saying that the United States itself will not invade Cuba and will restrain other countries in the Western Hemisphere from invading [Cuba]. The U.S. president’s press conference was moderate. The advice, so to speak, that we gave to the president that he refrain from making statements at the press conference which would heighten tensions was taken into consideration and thus he fulfilled this “directive” of ours. We also believe that Comrade Fidel Castro’s message to U Thant was good and constructive, both in terms of tone and content. So, in conclusion, what is there to say now? We successfully dissuaded the most aggressive and imperialistic country from adhering to its own doctrine and demands, which were rooted in the notion that there cannot be any states in the Western Hemisphere with a social-political order that does not correspond with that of the United States. Although diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States do not currently exist, Cuba is essentially recognized by America as a socialist state. In short, the construction of socialism in Cuba is legitimized and recognized by the entire world and, first and foremost, by the United States of America and their satellites. We consider this to be a big deal and a huge accomplishment. The statements that Fidel Castro made to you during your talks, and his questions— which guarantees can the United States give, for how many years will these guarantees actually be real guarantees—these were all parts of conversations that are also taking place between communists about guarantees from the imperialists. These are not serious conversations. We are talking about present day and about tomorrow. What happens after that, we will see. After all, when all is said and done, you know we have not destroyed the weapons we withdrew from Cuba—we simply moved them from one place to another. If we removed forty-two missiles that had been targeting the United States, then instead of these forty-two missiles, we can deploy another eighty-four intercontinental missiles which will target the United States from even better positions. Our friend Fidel should also remember this. This is obviously understood by the U.S. president and, for that very reason, he carried himself in a composed manner and certainly took steps to avoid escalation. This is not a concession to us, it is not a demonstration of understanding for our position, rather, it is a recognition of our power and clout. Obviously this is not our last skirmish with the United States since there are a lot of issues which still require a solution. We will have to arrange and resolve these issues with the United States and, first and foremost, with President Kennedy.

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We are not going to overburden you. Send our regards to Comrade Fidel Castro and his colleagues. It would be good if during your conversations with Fidel you could allude to whether or not he has thought about visiting us. We believe that now, and not literally now, of course, but in a little while, he could visit us. It would be useful for him to spend time with us, to see the country, to meet with the people. Likewise, it would be beneficial for our leadership to talk with him. Tell him this carefully, and do not pressure him too much. Now I do not think my visit to Cuba, which was tentatively planned for January, is worthwhile. There is nothing to say to him. When you arrive we will discuss whether or not I should even go and, if I should, then when. At any rate, this is not a pressing matter for the time being. With respect to a possible meeting with Kennedy, it must be kept in mind that the issue of a ban on nuclear weapons testing relates to a number of issues that urgently require a solution. But you know our position. Moreover, Zorin and Kuznetsov will familiarize you with the relevant documents when you are in New York. On the issue of West Berlin, our position remains just as it was before your trip. Regarding arms control, the directives which we put forth when our delegation went to the UN General Assembly, and which were outlined at the assembly by Gromyko, are still in effect. We have not received a response from the Western powers about these proposals yet. We think that the Western powers will now pay more attention to our proposals on arms control. The matter of American bases in foreign territories. Now, obviously, this will be more acutely perceived by the people of countries where such bases are located. From the way it looks, a larger number of people are now beginning to understand that these bases should be liquidated. Apparently even U.S. bureaucrats have a clearer sense of the need to resolve the issue with these bases. If you have any questions, send them when you decide to leave and we will respond. All of the comrades send their greetings to you. We are waiting for you in Moscow. 22.X1-62

N. Khrushchev

Source: Personal archive of Sergo Mikoyan donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Matt McGorrin for the National Security Archive.

Document 39 Telegram from N. S. Khrushchev to A. I. Mikoyan

November 23, 1962 It was decided, as promised, to turn our attention to the message. We are now turning Kennedy’s and Mikoyan’s attention to the message. We are sending you the message received from Kennedy and our answer to this dispatch. We regard the initiative shown by the president as a good sign. Clearly, the president himself was very alarmed during that time and when we reached the agreement, which brought about the liquidation of the tension, he in good order, so to speak, demonstrated a sincere satisfaction towards the initiative and wrote to us himself. We replied to him, in order to reinforce his assurances and our confidential ties, and to prepare the dialogue upon different questions. We, as you see, said to him [F. Castro] that you will soon leave. But we did not clarify what the itinerary would be for your return. Possibly, it can also clearly serve to awaken his desires to meet with you for a dialogue. But this of course is not the most important thing. If there is a meeting—good, but if there is not—we will not suffer and advise you. We will finish the Plenum tomorrow. The Plenum went very well and on every level the oratory was presented remarkably. The entire “posse” says hello. Give our greetings to Comrade Fidel and all his friends, and now all our friends. Give our congratulations to Pavlov on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday. We awarded him with the Order of Lenin in connection with this date. Let Pavlov give our good wishes to the generals, officers, and all the personnel of our Armed Forces located in Cuba. Goodbye, N. Khrushchev Source: From the personal archive of Sergo A. Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive. 496

Document 40 Anastas Mikoyan’s Logbook— Trip to Santiago de Cuba and Conversation with Fauro Chomon

November 24, 1962 (Saturday) With the invitation of Raul Castro’s family, on the morning of November 23, A. I. Mikoyan flew on an Il-18 to Santiago de Cuba. On the flight, the secretary of the ORI [Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas, Integrated Revolutionary Organizations], Emilio Aragonés, accompanied A. I. Mikoyan, as well as the director of the group of the primary advisers-organizers of production, F. E. Titov; the vice chairman of the GKEC, A. I. Alikhanov; and the adviser on economic issues of the embassy of the USSR in the Republic of Cuba, N. V. Goldin. At the airfield in Santiago de Cuba, Mikoyan was met by Raul Castro, commander of the First Western Army, Mayor Calicsto Garona, and other representatives of the governmental and social organizations of the Oriente Province. Near the entrance to the building at the airport were gathered workers, officers, and soldiers from the garrison and locals, who very much wanted to greet Mikoyan. Resting a few minutes at the residence located on the edge of the city at the high shore of the Bay of Santiago, Mikoyan, in the company of Raul Castro and Emilio Aragonés, completed the trip around Santiago de Cuba. With great interest, Mikoyan inspected the place, which he had first visited almost three years before. The area of the construction sites made a particular impression—the Nuevo Vista Alegre. Previously, there were pitiful shanties here that were inhabited by the city’s poor. Now, before the guest’s eyes there were elegant, individual apartments buried in verdure and blooms. With interest women observed the row of automobiles passing down the streets. People recognized Raul Castro and Mikoyan. Friendly proclamations were heard. The trip was finished. Raul Castro invited Mikoyan to participate in a lunch arranged by the command of the First Western Army in honor of the command of the Soviet complement located in the region. Mikoyan accepted the invitation. 497

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The lunch proceeded in a warm, friendly environment. During the conversation, Raul Castro, with great affection, spoke about the Soviet military specialists working in Cuba and greatly appreciated the help rendered by the Soviet Union for Cuba in the matter of bolstering its armed forces. Especially, he gave a high opinion of the work of the director of the group of military advisers, Comrade Dementyev, and characterized him as a knowledgeable and humble man, making every effort to fulfill the task set before him. In connection with the fact that the term of Dementyev’s official visit had expired, Castro asked Mikoyan to accept that this term be extended. Mikoyan promised to support this request. At 7:00 p.m., Mikoyan, with Raul Castro in his company, went to the student town Camilo Sanfuegez. On the road, they stayed the night in the place Las Mercedes. Early the next morning, they continued the trip. In the student town, Mikoyan and those who accompanied him met the general secretary of the ORI of Oriente Province, Mayor Armando Acosta. He introduced to the guests the director of the school’s dorm, Berrard Sarabira, his young wife, who had worked previously in the Ministry of Education in Havana. Acosta and Sarabira showed Mikoyan the student town that was being built. In a picturesque location, on a foothill of the Sierra Maestro, were many bright and welcoming buildings. This is a real training center. Currently around a thousand children of Cuban peasants study here. When the construction of the city is finally completed, 20,000 Cuban children will receive their primary education here. Leaving the student town, Mikoyan left the following note in the guest book: Words cannot express the great impression, which this great creation of the Cuban revolution—this education center for the children of the people in a fairy-tale setting, in a new fairy-tale atmosphere for the children. Here everything is young, like the Socialist Republic of Cuba itself—the first socialist nation on the American continent. In this smithery of the cadres of the future construction of socialism, everything is new—the buildings, the spirit, and the teachers. It is good that we visited this student town together with a friend of the Soviet Union, with our brother comrade Raul Castro, whose older brother Fidel Castro has turned out to be initiator and inspiration of not only the Cuban revolution, but the center of the forge of revolutionary cadres. The spirit of the Cuban Revolution is felt in every part of the world. It is especially felt here. Long live the total victory of socialism on the Island of Cuba, this lighthouse beckoning other oppressed peoples to it.

Warmly bidding farewell to the director of the boarding school, the teachers and the students, Mikoyan and his accompanying persons sat in the automobiles and left on the other road. Beyond the windows of the speeding cars stretched extensive fields of rice, maize, and sugarcane. Villages for the workers of the people’s estates and agriculture constructions—poultry houses, hog yards, cattle yards—all flashed by. With pride, Raul Castro and Armando Acosta told about the immense construction work being done by the revolutionary power for the improvement of the peasants’ living conditions. From time to time Raul Castro turned Mikoyan’s attention to this or that part of the city and with won-

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der spoke about the military actions that occurred here in the time of the war against the tyranny of Batista. Upon arriving in Santiago de Cuba, Raul Castro invited Mikoyan to lunch at his house. Mikoyan, Vilma and Raul Castro, Emilio Aragonés, Calisto Garcia, Armando Acosta, and others all participated in the luncheon. After lunch, an exceptionally warm and friendly environment emerged, and together with Raul Castro, Emilio Aragonés, and Armando Acosta, Mikoyan went to the University of the Capitol of the Oriente Province. The students of the university arranged that day a lunch in honor of their comrades, who were returning from the coffee harvest. After finding out that Mikoyan was in the city, they invited him to join them. As soon as the Soviet guest came to the new building of the university, a group of young boys and girls completely encircled him. There was wild applause, heartfelt welcomes, and warm friendly handclapping. “Fidel, Khrushchev—we are with you!”—exclaimed the students accompanying Mikoyan in the spacious hall of the university cafeteria, in which there were 1,500 people. For a long time the ovations, in honor of the important Soviet guest and the inviolable Soviet-Cuban friendship, did not die down. After a short speech by Raul Castro, Mikoyan presented a speech before the students at the University of Santiago: Dear friends, Cuban youth! I am very happy to meet with you. I look at you, I see in your eyes, and I feel your revolutionary enthusiasm, the beating of your fiery hearts, and I remember my youth and grow young again with you. (Applause) I pity that I cannot be with you for long. When I was in Cuba the first time, Raul Castro invited me to lunch. It was my first lunch in the Cuban family. Vilma, the wife of Raul, also invited me to lunch with them at home. When we were with them, Comrade Acosta, your party secretary, said that you invited us to lunch. I could not offend Vilma, therefore we decided to eat with them, but to stop a little while at the place for the student lunch, to drop in for a little while at the university on the way to the airfield and eat with you a second time (laughter, applause). Really, we were fed so well that we can’t eat. I see that there are bottles of water on the table here. For that reason, we will drink with you. Here before you my good friend Raul spoke, a man I call my younger brother. Why brother and not son? After all, he is younger than my youngest son. I call him my brother because between a father and a son, the relationship is different. A father has more liberties than a son. I cannot and do not want to have such liberties. Between brothers—it is a different affair. Brothers can argue between each other. But between good brothers exists a deep friendship. Raul spoke very well here. He touched upon a serious question. He spoke about the strength of the Cuban Revolution. The Cuban people are independent. They are firmly in support of their own government. I am totally sure of that. In such conditions it is much easier to defend the revolutionary conquest. Besides, your friends support you. Raul spoke correctly about the rockets here. These missiles were not placed in Cuba in order to attack the United States. They were a means of intimidation, a means of restraining

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American imperialism. And they succeeded in this capacity. For the first time in all of your history, the United States felt the imminent threat of a destructive war on their own territory. This aroused psychological shock with Americans. They were forced to give a promise not to attack Cuba in exchange for the removal of the rockets. Despite the removal of the rockets, there remains in Cuba excellent means of defense, fully capable of the defense of the nation from an outside attack. Besides, we have not thrown the removed rockets into the ocean. They are in the Soviet Union and are aimed against the Federal Republic of Germany. Comrade Khrushchev spoke about this. The Americans proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine, with which they attribute to themselves the singular right to decide the fate of the nations of the Americas and the fate of their people. By means of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, they announced that they cannot suffer the existence of a Marxist-Leninist regime on the American continent. It was not enough for them extract fabulous profit from Latin American nations. They wanted to establish complete control over your ideas and not permit the proliferation of Marxism-Leninism. But it is impossible to contain ideas for they do not have borders. It is impossible to spread ideas by relying on the use of force. The ideas of Marxism-Leninism are widespread and invincible because they are as strong as your inner strength. And now the Americans are forced to retreat. Giving the guarantee not to attack Cuba, they are denying themselves the Monroe Doctrine and the agreement at Rio-de-Janeiro. They recognize the right of Cuba to build socialism right under their noses. (Applause.) Many say that it is impossible to believe the imperialists. In general that is true, but not even the imperialists can permit the serious consequences of breaking the agreement. The intermediate range missiles have been removed from Cuba. But we have many more powerful missiles of longer range, which are hidden in our forests and aimed at the United States. They are maintained in a state of full combat readiness. (Wild applause.) In Western Berlin the United States has its own forces. They are practically in a mousetrap there. We can grasp this mousetrap and kill the mouse. In our politics we use two figures on the chessboard. There is the threat of force and diplomacy. Combining these two components, we are forcing the Americans to retreat. We think that from the present crisis Cuba has emerged with victory. And it is also our victory because your affairs—are our affairs. Cuba can be calm. We helped, are helping, and will continue to help revolutionary Cuba. Our specialists, many specialists are here in Cuba. It is difficult for me to say what they do. In their hands they have wonderful, powerful technology. And they are prepared to rise shoulder to shoulder with their Cuban brothers to the defense of the Revolution in Cuba. Without friends, it is impossible to live. If a person does not have a friend, that means that he is a bad person. You have many friends. And we have turned out to be your best friend. And if you would begin to look for better friends, this would turn out to be a fruitless venture and you would nevertheless not find them. We will never refuse you assistance. And if it is necessary and Fidel Castro turns to our government with a request to send you still more of our specialists to defend the socialist Revolution in Cuba, I am charged by government to say that this request will always be granted. And our specialists will not come empty-handed.

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The rockets have been removed, but in the hands of Fidel and Raul, in their experienced hands, remain the powerful forces, capable of successfully defending the conquests of the Revolution. (Applause.) Comrades, I watch you young students, I see your revolutionary enthusiasm and your fire. You are the support of the Revolution, its strike force. Having such a wonderful youth, the Cuban people are not surrendering. The affair of the socialist Revolution in Cuba will succeed. Long live the revolutionary leadership in Cuba—most important, the legendary hero, Fidel Castro! Long live Soviet-Cuban friendship! Viva Cuba Socialista! (Wild applause that does not die down for a long time, with proclamations: “Fidel, Khrushchev—we are with you!)

After a fiery and emotional leave-taking with the students and teachers of the university, Mikoyan and his accompanying personnel went to the city’s cemetery. Here Mikoyan laid a wreath on the grave of the Cuban national hero, José Martí. The visit to Santiago de Cuba was finished. The motorcade approached the airfield. Warmly saying goodbye to the representatives of the local authority and military command, as well as the Cubans who had gathered around the plane, Mikoyan climbed onto the plane. Raul Castro, Emilio Aragonés, Armando Acosta, and Soviet comrades, who had accompanied Mikoyan on the trip, followed him. On the way back, an hour-and-a-half conversation began between Mikoyan and the Cubans, in the course of which Mikoyan explained in detail the major currents of inner Soviet politics, the position of the Soviet Union on the Cuban question, gave a comprehensive analysis of the development of the Cuban crisis, and explained why the Soviet Union considers an exit from this crisis as a victory for peaceful, progressive forces. With great attention and comprehension, the Cuban comrades listened to Mikoyan. It was clear that they were very satisfied with the contents of the conversation. In fact, about this subject, Raul Castro turned to Mikoyan with the request to continue this conversation on the next day at any time that was suitable to him. Mikoyan agreed to this. Written by O. Darusenkov Information about A. I. Mikoyan’s trip to the province of Oriente was published in the newspaper Pravda on November 26. On the night of August 24, A.. Mikoyan sent the following telegram to the CC of the CPSU about the excursion to Santiago (Special No. 1912): CC CPSU During the day yesterday, I accompanied Aragonés to Santiago, where Raul Castro was. I returned today, Saturday, with Raul Castro and the general secretary of the province who is an old Communist from the workers, Acosta. They showed me the sites of the battles in the mountains, a large instructional center that was there also, a type of dormitory where there are now 1,000 participants and after three years they say will increase to 20,000, and a heavy rural farm for it.

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On the road I saw that in the state farming estates there have been built many new residential buildings, a large quantity of poultry houses, and swine yards, a few of which are still empty due to an insufficient number of heads of cattle. The harvest of rice, corn, and sugarcane is going well and, as everyone here maintains, is significantly better than last year. As Raul Castro, along with a group of our officers with whom I met at a lunch in Santiago, which was arranged for them by Raul, all speak about the very friendly relations between them. Raul emphatically commented on the good relations between their officers and our advisors for their armed forces. Upon the invitation of the students and professors of the University of Santiago, I gave a speech at their large meeting, at which I explained our politics regarding the Cuban issue and gave my understanding of what had occurred. This was followed by a short address by Raul in the spirit of an understanding of our politics. He especially emphasized that the missiles, which were transported from Cuba, are now pointed at Western Germany and Adenauer, who is the chancellor there, . . . delivered a proclamation which made an aggressive announcement with respect to our country. Our people, he continued, are alone in the defense of the revolution, we still have powerful weapons, and with the help of the Soviet Union no one can defeat us. The participants of the meeting met with us in a very warm manner, interrupted the oration several times with wild applause, and standing up, cheered “Fidel, Khrushchev, we are with you.” In the course of the trip, several times I explained this or that aspect of our politics, in general, and that which regarded Cuba in particular. From Raul Castro, I was met with a positive attitude. On the return flight, I explained to him the issue of our relations with the United States, the German question, and argued again, in different words, the significance of our victory, along with Cuba, in the crisis. It was clear that all of this made a huge impression, not only on Raul Castro and Aragonés, but especially on Acosta, who had before not participated in such conversations. And then Raul, satisfied with the conversation, jokingly said that he thought that his brother Fidel loved to talk about politics more than anyone. This turned out to be wrong because Mikoyan speaks even more. Raul asked whether I would agree, for the benefit of the party, to informally speak more tomorrow with him and his two comrades, adding that Acosta is regarded as the best regional secretary. (He definitely made a very good impression as being a Communist and our friend.) I agreed to the meeting tomorrow, Sunday, and added that he can bring with him whomever he likes. Raul said it is better if the circle does not get any bigger. 24. XI. 62 A. Mikoyan 8:00 p.m. In the apartment of the minister of communications, F. Chomon, there was a conversation between him and A. I. Mikoyan, in which Alekseyev and Tikhmenev participated. Record of the conversation between A. I. Mikoyan and Faure Chomon Mediavilla (the conversation occurs in F. Chomon’s apartment).

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F. Chomon: My spouse and I are glad to see you, Comrade Mikoyan, in our home. We have always warmly recalled our meetings with you in Moscow and are eternally thankful to you for your great help that you rendered to us in that time when I worked in the Cuban embassy in the Soviet Union. I am very thankful that you made this visit. A. I. Mikoyan: I, too, am glad to see you, Comrade Chomon, here in Havana. F. Chomon: Unfortunately, we are meeting in these days when you must participate in utterly difficult dialogues, as I understand it. I do not suppose that you, Comrade Mikoyan, can talk about how, however brief it may be, you understand the atmosphere that has been created. A. I. Mikoyan: Alright. Although I just returned from Santiago, where I was by the invitation of Raul Castro and his wife, Vilma Espín, and am a little tired, a meeting with an old friend is always pleasant. You know, Comrade Chomon, that not only the Soviet Union, but a large majority of all who appreciate world peace, understand the decision accepted by the Soviet Union in the period of Caribbean crisis, as an important step, which ensures the maintenance of peace. The missiles of intermediate range were removed from Cuba. Some consider that this fact attests to an American “victory.” It is important to understand, however, that the Soviet Union did not place the missiles on Cuba to attack the United States, but precisely so that they play a role in the factor of restraint. These rockets fulfilled their role. It is known to you, I am sure, that in October the Americans were preparing powerful naval, aviation, and amphibious infantry forces for an attack on Cuba. Moreover, they were prepared to destroy the Soviet missile bases in Cuba with the aid of a major missile strike using conventional explosives. Such steps on the part of the American government would have drawn the world to a destructive world war. And as you surely understand, the first strike of this war would have been inflicted on Cuba. Cuba would have ceased to exist. The Soviet government, by announcing to withdraw our missiles from Cuba, forestalled this American plan. They also expressed the assurance that the allies of the United States would take upon themselves the same obligations. It cannot be doubted that the Americans will sooner or later breach this obligation. But the fact that for the present moment peace was maintained, Cuba received a respite and can now develop its economy has great significance. It is necessary to understand that the confluence of forces in the region of the Caribbean is useful to the Americans. Our communications in Cuba are very longwinded. We are in an inauspicious position here. We will have many more opportunities to place pressure on the Americans in different regions where the situation is otherwise. It is important to note that the Soviet Union supports the five points established by Comrade Fidel Castro. We support this program in the affair. We think that in the given circumstances it is impossible to realize them immediately, to realize them we must struggle together with you much more. If we had not removed the rockets and the Il-28 bombers, which although antiquated are formally included in the classification of offensive weapons, then the Americans could have taken advantage of them to begin aggressions against Cuba. Of course we could have struck the Americans with our global missile forces. But it would have been no easier for the Cuban people if Cuba ceased to exist.

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The missiles were not intended for a strike on the United States. They were meant to play, as you understand, a deterrent role, and they succeeded in it. At the present time, the defense capacity of Cuba, thanks to the help of the Soviet Union, has been strengthened considerably. I suppose that there is not one nation in Latin America with a military that can compare with the armed forces of the Republic of Cuba. Some [Soviet] defensive forces still remain in Cuba. In due time, we will withdraw them, but their technology and weapons will be transferred to the Cuban armed forces. The defensive might of the Cuban army and navy will be strengthened even more. The Soviet Union will continue to provide practical, effective assistance to the Republic of Cuba. I don’t have to tell you about it. Having worked as Cuban Ambassador in Moscow, you must have a very good idea of the volume of assistance provided to your country by the Soviet Union. F. Chomon: I certainly understand that the Soviet Union has given and continues to give Cuba comprehensive and immeasurable help. The Cuban people are deeply grateful to the Soviet Union, CPSU, and N. S. Khrushchev. A. I. Mikoyan: If you do not have any more questions, Comrade Chomon, then allow me to wish you and your wife and children good health and success. F. Chomon: Thank you, Comrade Mikoyan. And once again please permit me to give you my deepest sympathies in connection with the great loss that has befallen your family. I understand that it is very difficult for you to bear this grief, which has found you away from your family and homeland. A. I. Mikoyan: I am touched by your sympathies and hope to see you again in Moscow. F. Chomon: I would be very happy if I was presented with the opportunity to visit or to work in Moscow again. Permit me to wish you, Comrade Mikoyan, health and much success. I ask you to send a warm hello to the Soviet government, and N. S. Khrushchev. Bidding farewell to Mikoyan, Chomon asked permission to introduce to Mikoyan his close colleagues and comrade in arms. Mikoyan met them. During the conversation, Ambassador Alekseyev was present. The conversation lasted about an hour. Transcribed by V. Tikhmenev.

Source: Personal Archive of Sergo Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Adam Mayle for the National Security Archive.

Document 41 Anastas Mikoyan’s Logbook— Conversation with Manuel Terrasas and Mikoyan’s Television Address

November 25, 1962 (Sunday) A. I. Mikoyan received N. S. Khrushchev’s telegram (Special No. 1272), in which he answered (the resident) after the telegram. Message for Comrade Mikoyan A. I. Dear Anastas Ivanovich, You have tried to hide your tricks, but we have discovered that you were born on November 25. On this occasion, from the members of the Presidium of CC of the CPSU, the candidates for membership in the Presidium, vice chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR, and from me personally, we greet you and wish you luck from the bottom of our hearts and I wish you health and much success. When you return as a completion to this greeting we will mark this day for the past date. November 24

N. Khrushchev

Special No. 1991 CC CPSU to Comrade Khrushchev N. S. I received your warm wishes on my birthday from the members of the Presidium of the CC, candidates for the Presidium, secretaries of the CC, the vice chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR, and from you personally. This date cannot be celebrated because I am far from my homeland, but it was nice to receive the timely expression of the feelings of camaraderie and love. Thank you all from the bottom of my soul. 505

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25. XI. 62 A. I. Mikoyan. 11:00 a.m. The laying of a wreath at the memorial of José Martí. About the ceremony a correspondent from TASS was sent the following announcement: Arrival of A. I. Mikoyan in Havana. In the first half of the day on November 25, the first vice chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR, A. I. Mikoyan, laid a wreath at the foot of the monument of the Cuban national hero, José Martí. At the ceremony of the laying of the wreath, the extraordinary and plenipotentiary USSR ambassador to Cuba, A. I. Alekseyev, and colleagues from the embassy, and hundreds of citizens from the Cuban capital were present. Buried in live flowers, the golden star, sickle and hammer flashed—the symbol of peace and labor of workers from all countries. The wreath was inscribed: “To the Apostle José Martí, A. I. Mikoyan, the first vice chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR.” During the laying of the wreath, the residents of Havana who were gathering in the central park warmly greeted every Soviet guest. A. I. Mikoyan warmly waved to them and exclaimed: “Long live Cuba!” In response, beneath the thundering applause, rang out responses: “Long live the Soviet Union!”—“Long live the friendship of the Soviet Union and Cuba!”—“Long live peace!” After the departure of the important Soviet guest, the residents of Havana surrounded the memorial to José Martí, approached the wreath laid by Mikoyan, looked at the inscription, took a mental picture, and conversed with their Soviet comrades, expressed their gratitude to the Soviet Union for the continual, selfless help and the support of the Cuban people in their just struggle for consolidation of their national independence. 11:30 a.m. In the building of the Soviet Embassy, A. I. Mikoyan received the secretary of the CC of the Mexican Communist Party (MCP), Manuel Terrasas, and had a conversation with him, in which Ambassador Alekseyev, adviser Monachov, and Tikhmenev participated. Transcription of A. I. Mikoyan’s conversation with a member of the Political Commission of the Central Committee of the MCP, Manuel Terrasas. 25. XI-62 After mutual greetings, Comrade Terrasas reminded A. I. Mikoyan that they met in 1956 [unrecognized words] on a trip of the Communist Party of China. He remarked that he asked him since he wanted to report to A. I. Mikoyan about the position of the CC of the MCP in the period of the Caribbean Crisis and receive explanations from A. I. Mikoyan with regards to a few questions. M. Terrasas: The Central Committee of the MCP fully supports the steps taken by the Soviet government for the salvation of the Cuba in the Caribbean Crisis. We think that the Soviet Union and Cuba won a great victory over the forces of war. Our CC published documents, which state our support for the measures taken by the Soviet Union. We think that the current conditions for the preservation of Cuba have an extraordinarily important

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significance for all of the revolutionary processes in Latin America. The very fact of the existence of the Cuban revolution has a revolutionary influence on all the nations of our continent. The removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba, which was necessary to avert an attack on Cuba and the consequences of a destructive world war, was an essential step that brought peace loving forces to victory. I want to announce to you, Comrade Mikoyan, and to all those in the Central Committee of the CPSU, that our party is leading a persistent struggle on behalf of the masses. In the coming months there in going to be a Congress of the MCP. At the present, we are actively making preparations for the Congress. Our party has significantly strengthened, especially in the states of Nouveau Leon and Sinaloa. We have spent much attention on orientation work to prepare young cadres. A. I. Mikoyan: You could send young comrades, in need of serious ideological preparation, to a party school in Moscow. M. Terrasas: Thank you, Comrade Mikoyan, we are doing this. However, I think that it would be harmful for a few Cuban comrades to be seriously instructed. I have an impression that it is not sufficient for someone from among the Cuban comrades to correctly appreciate that help, which the Soviet Union rendered to the Revolution in Cuba. I would like to receive from you, Comrade Mikoyan, information that is essential to the Central Committee of my party in order to more correctly understand the significance of the measures accepted by the Soviet Union for the salvation of Cuba and rendering them support. A. I. Mikoyan: To appreciate the events in the period of the Caribbean crisis, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the confluence of forces in the Caribbean Sea is not in our interests. Cuba is located a very long distance away from the Soviet Union and entirely too close the United States. Here the Americans have a great advantage at their disposal, in the navy for example. Therefore, we have fewer opportunities to maneuver. Of course, it would have been possible to act in a different manner. As, for example, the Chinese comrades often cry out. They have sent to Cuba a heap of messages, in which they urge the destruction of American imperialism and announce their support. A few members of the Chinese Embassy gave blood at donor points, as if this was what Cuba seriously needs, this blood. I think that it would be of more use if they sent to Cuba two ships with rice. We rendered Cuba extensive assistance. You, of course, know that we sent here to Cuba all necessary weapons and sent people. We have put 4 million tons of oil in Cuba, and more than half a ton of bread. We have given credit to Cuba that is the sum of their trade balance deficit incurred during 1961 and 1962. Moreover, the very fact that Soviet persons and weapons are in Cuba attests to the fact that the Monroe Doctrine has ceased to function. It is necessary for the Americans to become resigned to this outcome. The agreement about the defense from “Communist penetration” signed in Rio de Janeiro has lost its clout. The imperialists suffered a huge moral defeat. You have correctly noted, however, that many of our friends do not fully understand all of the significance of the great help that we rendered to Cuba. M. Terrasas: I think, Comrade Mikoyan, that time itself will convince them that they are confused. A. I. Mikoyan: We sent many modern weapons to Cuba. We dispatched military specialists there. And last, we placed missiles in Cuba. Then a situation developed in which it

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was necessary to remove the missiles, when the conditions of aggression were being prepared by the Americans. It was a correct step, and you noted truthfully that sooner or later our friends will understand this meaning. In a conflict, it is necessary to maneuver. Even Lenin taught us that. M. Terrasas: History works on all of us. I suppose that history will show everyone that the Soviet Union was right. A. I. Mikoyan: We rendered great help to all people struggling against imperialism. From this time forward, it will be possible to talk openly about this help, which peoples of colonial and dependant nations receive from the Soviet Union. M. Terrasas: Surely, in the current conditions, when the Soviet Union and other nations of socialism have consolidated to such an extent, the imperialists will begin to suppress national-liberation movements all the more forcefully. And the example of the resolution of the Caribbean Crisis is also witness to the Soviet Union as being the emergent power of all the socialist camp. It is important to note that this victory was secured without war— you won victory without shooting. A. I. Mikoyan: It is pleasant for me to notice that you correctly understand the developing situation and that our views correspond. M. Terrasas: I will be happy to relay to the Central Committee of our party that the point of views of the CPSU and the government of the MCP, just as we expected, are corresponding. I would like to ask you, Comrade Mikoyan, to send our desires for further success to the Central Committee of the CPSU, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, and all the Soviet comrades. The Mexican Communists are deeply grateful to the Soviet people not only for the help, which they rendered the Revolution in Cuba, but also for the persistent efforts of the Soviet government and CC CPSU to frustrate the plans of the American imperialists. The Soviet Union impeded the route to war; the peace-loving forces of the world secured a great victory. We are very thankful to you, Comrade Mikoyan, that you found time for this conversation, accepted our wishes of health and subsequent success in your noble actions. A. I. Mikoyan: Thank you Comrade Terrasas, and I ask you to relay to the CC MCP a warm greeting from the CC CPSU and wishes of success in your difficult struggle. Ambassador Alekseyev and adviser Monachov were present at the conversation. The conversation continued for about an hour. Transcribed by Tikhmenev. 12:00 p.m. At the beach house in Santa Maria, there was a celebration for General Pavlov’s (Pliev’s) sixtieth birthday. At the celebration, generals and officers from Pavlov’s group, colleagues from the embassy, personnel accompanying A. I. Mikoyan on his trip were present. A. I. Mikoyan’s birthday was also marked. Cuban defense officer Ernandes announced that at 1:00 p.m. that his son was born, and that in honor of A. I. Mikoyan he decided to name him Anastas.

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8:00 p.m. A. I. Mikoyan makes an address on television. The text was published in full in the newspaper Pravda on November 27: November 25 Dear Cuban friends! I was in Cuba and made a speech on television more than two years ago. It was the beginning period of your Revolution. The Revolution grew, intensified, and developed, not by the day, but by the hour. Now the Revolution, under the auspices of the government of Fidel Castro and his comrades in arms, has grown from a democratic one into a Revolution of socialism. I am honored to be in Cuba a second time, observe your miraculous country, and meet with you heroic people—with those who lead as well as those who file around the leadership in the name of securing the victory, in the name of the defense of their own independence against the enemies of the Cuban Revolution. On the eve of my trip to you, Comrade Fidel Castro in his famous address on November 1 said that a few questions had arisen that would be “necessary to discuss with the Soviet people on the level of government and the party, to discuss everything that is necessary.” I have been in your country close to three weeks, have had many meetings, exchanged opinions with your leaders, met with the common people, with students, and professors, and have watched and listened. Before my departure I am happy to report to you that, just as your leader Fidel Castro said it, I am satisfied with our meetings and dialogues. It is not only my opinion, but the opinion of our government and Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev. We came here for conversations with brothers and comrades, and we leave with a feeling of mutual trust, brotherly collaboration, and with an even firmer understanding that the affairs of Cuba—are the affairs of all Soviet people. We were friends, remain so, and will always be your best friends. Before anything, what occurred in the past in you country is remarkable. The best of your people left their lathes in the factories, the work in the fields, the students disregarded their classes. They armed themselves, in order to defend Cuba from imperialism, defend the great conquest of the Cuban people. It was not an affair of only the Cuban people, but an affair of all nations of socialism. The Cuban Revolution is led by Fidel Castro, who began this struggle and led Cuba to the socialist Revolution, contributing heavily to the struggle of all people for freedom against the oppression of imperialists and capitalists. This example inspires other peoples in their quest for a way to achieve their goals. Today, as on my last trip, I laid a wreath by the memorial to José Martí. You all correctly understand him as the great thinker of Cuba, a political participant, and a warrior who gave his life for the freedom of his country. That, which he wrote and said, has become the leadership to action. Just as soon as the struggle against the Spanish colonizer ended with victory, the struggle against the imperialist Americans began. And now, when you are liberated from all oppression, they threaten you with a return to that damnable past.

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Today, when I stood before the monument of José Martí, I thought this: If he would only wake up for one hour, would look at his country today, would find out what occurred, what the people did, who leads them and how, he would see: “I fought well, but my cause has continued so well, and even better.” And surely, everyone exalts at the bravery of the Cuban people, the wisdom of its leadership, the preparedness to continue their affair to its victorious conclusion, and the faith of the people in their government in such a dangerous and difficult moment. Even with the danger threatening Cuba, the popular masses still rally around the revolutionary government, led by Fidel Castro. They say: It is necessary to conduct a poll—whether the people of Cuba support their government or not. Mister Falsifier of Elections, who confuses his own people and brings all exploiters, can say: It is better to check the opinions of the people, the very best poll was mobilized, but it is more accurate to say that the Cuban people mobilized themselves in defense of their native land. Now this is a poll! Not worrying about their own lives, the Cuban people stood up, ready to be victorious or die. But it is not necessary for Cuba to die. Let the enemies of Cuba die. Cuba was victorious, preserved victory, and is now augmenting it. Socialist Cuba will be an even brighter lighthouse, attracting all peoples who are oppressed. Of course, it is difficult for you comrades; but we understand you well. It was a difficult course for us in those distant years when we were alone. Fourteen governments—which included the English, Japanese, Americans, and French imperialists—brought war upon us, invaded our territory, and ripped our country to sunders, frequently seizing it bit by bit. For a few years, we lived in a blockade. The bountiful granaries of bread, coal, and oil were in the hands of the enemy. But we persisted. We endured, were victorious, and cast off our enemies. And what is the Soviet Union now! How strong, on such a high level of culture, such an industrial power, such remarkable skilled workers! Whose satellites were the first to fly through space? Soviet satellites! And who flew the farthest in space out of everyone? Soviet cosmonauts! The most bountiful nation, which has so many millions of dollars and so much insolence connected with these millions, that they are to rule and the whole world must be subordinated. Even five years ago, the United States announced: We are lagging behind the USSR in the space race, but in about five years we will catch up. But five years have passed, and they are still catching up. Look where we have been and where we are going. It is easier for you. The Soviet Union and all the socialist nations are with you, all of a progressive mankind is with you. Lenin said in those trying years: “Life will take care of itself. Let the bourgeoisie dream, do evil to distraction, go too far, and make foolishness: acting as the bourgeoisie act, how all the classes act that are condemned to the grave. The Communists must know that in any case the future belongs to them, and because of this we can—and must—unite the supreme passion in the great revolutionary struggle of madly casting off the bourgeoisie with the most cold-blooded and sober calculation” (V. I. Lenin, Comp., vol. 31, p. 81). These words of wisdom serve the leadership for you and for us today.

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And our government, Premier Khrushchev, and all the collective leadership of our government behave as though Lenin hung above them. And we succeeded, with your support, shoulder to shoulder with your country to force the hand of war away from Cuba and to the grain where peace is, and in doing so saving mankind from nuclear war. Cuba became the focus of world politics in these days. World society’s opinion was with Cuba. The real friends of Cuba came forward and showed themselves, and the enemies of Cuba were unmasked. Today in the eyes of world society, the opinion of Cuba is even stronger than before. Faced with the wisdom of Cuba and the steadfastness of her people, all who love socialism and treasure revolution have kneeled down. The Cuban factor has become a still stronger factor and inspires the revolutionary movement in Latin America, as it does in all countries where there are those who struggle for liberation. Everyone understands the wisdom of the politics that saved the world from the danger of nuclear war and helped the Cuban people to defend their independence so that they could consolidate a new social movement. I traveled through this country together with Comrade Fidel Castro. Yesterday—with Raul Castro, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and Emilio Aragonés—we traveled to numerous provinces. And what is striking is the great enthusiasm of the people with whom he is rebuilding this country. It is necessary to see with what fiery enthusiasm Fidel Castro and his comrades are managing the rural farms, the cattle yards, the sugarcane, the planting of fruit trees, and the construction of hospitals, schools, and training centers. If the imperialists are bound by the hands, and this is necessary to do, and is being done, then Cuba will demonstrate the miracle of the quickest tempo of development in all regions. And this fact is not accidental, that in the course of one year, 1 million illiterate Cubans became literate, were taught to read and write. All of your Cuba studies, young and old. Cuba is the first country in Latin America to turn itself into one with high rates of literacy. A total of 70,000 young Cubans are studying with the support of the government. These are the future cadres of the Cuban Revolution. Previously, how many sons of peasants and workers could study? Now under their auspices, under the auspices of people of labor, and not under the capitalists the doors of universities have been opened, all paths to government and farming activity, to cultural life, and to the development of their talents and abilities. Cuba became a laborer and a socialist. And one wonders: Why are they afraid of Cuba, who is Cuba threatening? With what are they doing it? Cuba cannot see itself as a military threat. It does not want to attack anyone. But Cuba—the symbol of the oppressed, the example of how a people can liberate themselves and in a short time end poverty and darkness and achieve equality, fraternity, happiness, and freedom. But why don’t they love you, those whom you rightfully don’t love as well? It is not necessary for you to wait for them to love you. They will never love you. But it is necessary that debatable questions between the capitalists and socialists are not resolved in war. Of course, there are those who want weapons to resolve these questions, but these weapons will not compare to the weapons of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp. Before they raise a hand, they must think of what awaits them. The United States could have, the aggressive forces could have, begun a nuclear war, but this war would have had a different character—it would have been a catastrophe for them. It would have been

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the first and the last war on American soil. Intelligent people in the United States understand this; the people understand this. These days were alarming for us, when you exchanged your instruments of labor for the weapons of conflict, for the first time the Americans felt that there could be such a war where it would be possible for horrible bombs to fall. To many the understanding became clear, many understood, that it is impossible to play with fire, and that the atomic bomb is no joke. It is necessary for reason to assert itself and reasonably ask these questions. It is necessary to say that in this conflict the leaders accepted rational decisions; this is not a nuclear war, and the military threat was removed from Cuba. This single greatest guarantee is not to attack Cuba—the Cuban people, who support their government, the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, who inspire your party and people. But there are also the international guarantees not to attack, corroborated by those who stand arm in arm with you, like brothers, the Soviet Union and the countries of socialism. All of this ensures that there will be a blossoming of economics and culture in Cuba, that Cuba will be an example of how in the shortest time to decide historical questions by the people. Yesterday, Comrade Raul Castro told me in Santiago that after three years of the Revolution, more schools have been built for the people than in the last half century. What popular power. Today, you still have difficulties and ration cards for the products of sustenance. The Revolution is not guilty in this. It is the inheritance of the dominion of the monopolists and the result of the economic blockade. But do not let this frighten you. We see that as your rural farms develop, we see tens of new poultry houses and swine yards, and after a year there will be fattened for the slaughter 1 million head of cattle and 4 million chickens every month. Thus these trials are temporary. The Cuban people have the strength and the opportunities to overcome them. Traveling through your country, the understanding percolated in me, that the Cuban people are invincible. Before you stand many questions, and you are able to solve them. For this Cuba needs peace, as do other people. Comrade Fidel Castro’s announcement, in which he raised five points—this is a program of struggle for peace. In these, there are no threats to anyone. If it is a bourgeoisie humanist—who does not approve of Communism, reading this announcement—then if he is honest, he must say that it is fair and humane. It is a great program of peace for Cuba and for the nations of the Cuban sea. No program can exist without conflict. All the Cuban people struggle for this. The Soviet Union considers it fair and supports it with all possible means. Dear friends, in these trying days of experimentation for Cuba, all our people, the CC CPSU, our government, and the close friend of the Cuban people, Nikita Khrushchev, live with Cuba. I saw this personally when I was in Moscow, I know this from the letters that I have received from Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev while I have been here in Cuba. All these premises are satisfied by what Comrade Khrushchev personally did to solve the crisis. There is not a doubt that those who study history will give an objective and fair critique. Comrade Khrushchev asked me to relate to all of his Cuban friends that we are brothers. This is true. We will always be so. The Soviet Union is helping Cuba and will always do

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so like brothers. Let the Cuban people be assured that our feelings of friendship will continually strengthen toward you. Yesterday, I spoke at the University of Santiago at the request of students who were gathered there in order to meet with their comrades returning from the coffee plantations. It was unexpected for me; I had only just come from the mountains where the conflict was fought and victory was secured by Fidel Castro. I do not know whether I spoke well or not, but I saw the faces of the boys and the girls, their fiery countenances, as they were confident in their strength and how they were inspired by the friendship of the Soviet Union and Cuba. They cheered: “Fidel—Khrushchev, we are with you.” This is important in the friendship. If we are to always be together, and all nations of socialism are with us, relying on the victorious powers of our people—we will be invincible. From year to year, history directs mankind on the path to socialism. The victory of socialism throughout the world is unavoidable, just as the death of capitalism is unavoidable. It is maddening to the imperialists. Let them be enraged. History is with us. And history is the most important judge. Revolution is the locomotive of the history of mankind. Everything progressive, everything honest that there is in the world stands beneath the sign of socialism. It is not accidental that in the countries of Asia and Africa, which were until recently under the yoke of imperialism and colonialism, many governments that did not support Marxist-Leninism now speak about socialism. It is impossible to direct the people and cast off socialism. Those who are socialists must, of course, continue to study. But it is no accidental fact that they surge toward the flag of socialism—otherwise, the people would not follow them. These people stand for peace because war halts their development. They are not guilty for lagging behind. They want to live in peace in order to catch up with other countries, and raise themselves up quickly. They feel the danger of war and struggle against it. Eighty years ago, the great Cuban José Martí said: “There was a time when they ran to war as the first means of resolving an argument, today—it is already the last means, and tomorrow war will be a crime.” It is the will of all honest people in the world. Not long ago, a congress was held in Moscow that gathered people from different religions, with different political views, ranging from workers to the reasonable bourgeoisie, from atheists to spiritual persons. They all have the general opinion that it is impossible to permit war. This war will not be ordinary; it will be the most horrible of all wars. This is why the Cuban people and the people of all socialist nations struggle for peace. And rest assured that the forces of peace are stronger than war, and we will defend peace. The danger of war exists. It is impossible to remain passive; it is necessary to struggle for peace. For now, a general disarmament has not been reached, so it is important to augment one’s forces and defense. You are doing this. We see this, and are inspired by you. I want to repeat the words of Khrushchev, which were written not long ago in these difficult days: “We want to create confidence in the Cuban people that we are together with them and we will not do away with our responsibility for rendering help to the Cuban people.” These words are not only directed toward our Cuban comrades but also to those who harbor a quarrel with Cuba. They must understand that Cuba is prepared for its defense,

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has contemporary weapons for this end, and that Cuba is supported by the Soviet Union and the nations of socialism. For this reason, let them be cautious. Cuba will live and flourish as a socialist nation. Socialism has not come to Cuba to simply leave. Socialism has come to Cuba to grow and become entrenched. Dear friends, we salute our Cuban friends today, those legendary Barbudos, who came down from the mountains of the Sierra Maestro in order to join the workers and all the people to cast off the tyranny of Batista. They achieved a shining victory. But they did not stop at this. They strengthened the Revolution and elevated it to new levels. Of course, many enemies of the Revolution still endured, many of whom have even now escaped. Good riddance; let them run. The air will be fresher. The Cuban people will be even firmer. You have successfully developed and reinforced the Revolution, and the majority of the people, all people, during this exceptional moment, in these most difficult days have supported the government of Fidel Castro. The authority of Fidel Castro, his comrades, and of all revolutionary forces, which are proceeding from the experience of military danger, is strengthened. I brought to Cuba the warm greetings from Moscow to your government and people. The meetings that I had with your government and the exchanges with your people gave me the possibility to sense to an even greater extent the immense love and friendship that the Cuban people maintain for the people of the Soviet nation. When Khrushchev speaks, Cuba listens to him and supports him. There is great popularity for Fidel Castro and your other Barbudos, the veterans of the Revolution. There is not a corner of the country where there is not a portrait of Fidel Castro, where they do not know him or his comrades. From the small to the great, the Cuban people know, love, and respect Fidel and the Cuban people for their bravery, honesty, principles, and understanding of how to persist in difficult conditions, not bend, and to build a happy way of life. In the United States, many speak about the so-called American way of life. Fidel Castro led the people to the construction of a new socialist way of life, which gives happiness to all people. I beg you, Cuban friends, overcome all difficulties, augment your independence, and secure the victory that is yours. Long live the unbroken friendship of the Soviet and Cuban people. [Together—we are victorious]!!! (in Spanish). 9:00 p.m. There was conversation with Raul Castro in his apartment. Alekseyev participated, and Tikhmenev translated. At one o’clock in the morning, Fidel Castro joined in the conversation. A. I. Mikoyan sent a letter about the conversation to the CC CPSU: To the CC of the CPSU (spec. No 1916): CC CPSU At 9 o’clock at night, after the television address, with Raul Castro’s invitation, I dropped by his apartment to see him for a comrade’s conversation. He was alone. The conversation was pleasing, reassuring, and useful.

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At one in the morning, Fidel showed up. The conversation with Fidel continued in this spirit until three. Saying good-bye, I asked him the question: What shall I relate to N. S. Khrushchev from you? Fidel answered: Tell him everything that we spoke about. Tell him we were sad, distressed, but firmly united with the Soviet Union. A little before this, he said that time is playing its own role and it will help calmly clear everything up. With concern to my hints about whether there was not a Chinese influence in their consideration of the Cuban events, it merited the attention, said Raul Castro directly, that in their leadership there is not one adherent to the Chinese line, but in the average [unclear word] it may be that there is. Chinese diplomats are trying warm to us, they invite us to lunches, engage in conversations, but we try to keep them at a distance. Raul gave an open analysis of the Chinese government in connection with the Cuban crisis, which coincides with ours. About the remaining information I will report during the trip. In the morning, I fly to New York. 26.XI.62

A. Mikoyan

During the night of November 26, in the name of Mikoyan, a text announcement of the National leadership, the ORI [Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas, Integrated Revolutionary Organizations], and Soviet of Ministers of Cuba (answer to the announcement of the president of the United States), was received. The announcement was published in the Cuban newspapers on November 26 and in Pravda on November 28.

Source: Personal Archive of Sergo Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Adam Mayle for the National Security Archive.

Document 42 Cable from Mikoyan to the CC CPSU

November 26, 1962 Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) Upon arriving in New York, I discussed the matter of my trip to Washington with Comrades Kuznetsov, Zorin, and Dobrynin. It was agreed that Dobrynin will return to Washington today to find out from Llewellyn Thompson the likelihood of meetings with officials, while for the time being not mentioning my intention of going there as if it were a bygone conclusion. Through this we intend to confirm whether or not there is interest in such meetings on the American side. Today, during a lunch meeting with U Thant, Stevenson, and McCloy, and in response to questions posed by media correspondents, we gave strong hints to this effect, hints which should reach Washington. If our probing of Thompson shows that the American side has no interest in meeting, then under such circumstances (we are of one mind on this issue) such a trip to Washington would be pointless. The meeting here with Stevenson and McCloy, initially scheduled for November 27, will, from their suggestion, take place on Wednesday, November 28, upon the return of both men from the capital. They will head there tomorrow. 26.X1.62

A. Mikoyan

Source: Personal Archive of Sergo Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Matt McGorrin for the National Security Archive. 516

Document 43 Mikoyan’s Telegram to Khrushchev

November 27, 1962 In the morning, A. I. Mikoyan sent the following telegram to Comrade N. S. Khrushchev (No. 2455): I will leave for Washington by plane on Thursday, November 29; the same day at 4:30 p.m. local time—meeting with the president; November 30—meeting with Rusk. Apparently, there will be separate meetings with Thompson and R. Kennedy. I plan to fly out of Washington on the morning of Saturday, December 1. 1. In the anticipated meeting with Kennedy, he could return again to his theory that we, deploying missiles in Cuba, supposedly “deceived” the United States. If he does not mention this again, it may be worth addressing this reproach during our conversation. It could be said that we, bringing missiles to Cuba, in no way wanted to make our activities secret and had a mind to make this known to the president in a confidential manner and, a bit later, announce it in the press. However, considering the fact that such an announcement could become public during the congressional election period, we decided to put this off until the elections had ended. Moreover, the president had led us to believe that any undesirable steps on our part during this period of time could have negative implications on the presidential campaign. We also took this into consideration. It is also evidently worth clarifying that the weapons which we brought to Cuba, and those that the Americans have called offensive, were in no way indicative of any sort of offensive goals. In general, we are not preoccupied with any preparation for an “attack” on the United States, and it would be stupid to prepare such an attack from Cuba. This is even obvious to people with no ties to military matters. 517

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Therefore, corresponding with reality, and not twisting the truth, we have said through both official and unofficial channels that we do not have weapons in Cuba that would be intended for offensive objectives. Clearly everything was meant for deterrence, not an attack. I also want to tell Kennedy that we never considered transferring the weapons to the Cubans. It should be known that we have a law, unpublished, in fact, that forbids the transfer of nuclear weapons to outside parties. 2. In good time, we alerted the president through confidential channels that in midNovember we would resume the dialogue on West Berlin. It would soon be December. Naturally the question was raised as to when we intend to initiate this dialogue. There are two possibilities: if the president or Rusk do not touch this matter, then it will have no relation to their own initiative. Second, what to say if they present this issue. There is nothing new in this respect. 3. If you have any thoughts that could be useful to the exchange of views with the president or Rusk, I request that you send them. 27.X1.62

A. Mikoyan

Source: Personal Archive of Sergo Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Matt McGorrin for the National Security Archive.

Document 44 Mikoyan’s Telegram to the CC CPSU

November 27, 1962 CC CPSU First, on the evening of November 26, I spoke with U Thant in the UN Secretariat Building. At the beginning of our conversation, I said that I accepted the invitation that U Thant had issued me during our first meeting on my way to Cuba, and I had stopped in New York on the way back. I voiced several impressions from my stay in Cuba. I emphasized that during my time in Cuba, I had productive discussions with the leadership of the Cuban government and became acquainted with the country and its people. I noted the incredible elation found among the Cuban people, the sturdy resolve of the Cubans, especially the youth, to save the freedom and independence of their country. There was a willingness to make any sacrifice for the sake of this great goal. I said that the mood in Cuba was very reminiscent of the mood in our country during the first years of the October Socialist Revolution. I told U Thant about the massive scale of the creative work being done in Cuba and about the successes of the Cubans, especially with the development of culture in the two and a half years that followed my previous trip to Cuba. I said that now the Cuban people, a significant portion of whom had been in the people’s militia during the period of the crisis, had returned to peaceful labor and burned with the desire to put all of their strength into the construction of a new society. I further reported that, as I had an opportunity to verify during my stay in Cuba, the Cuban people and their government do not trust the United States and this is understandable. The Cubans were repressed for many years by the Spanish and later the Americans. In view of this, the Cubans are understandably distrustful of those who are trying to take their freedom and independence again. At the same time, I emphasized that the Cuban 519

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government and the Cuban people, as is especially apparent from announcements made by the Cuban government and the leadership of the Department of Operational Investigations from November 26, correctly understand the international atmosphere and have come out in support of peaceful coexistence and the resolution of difficult issues through negotiations. I told U Thant that his plan for the creation of a United Nations inspection group for states in the Caribbean had support from Fidel Castro, who not only thinks very highly of U Thant’s work, but trusts and respects him, as well. I added that we also support U Thant’s plan insofar as it is based on the principle of legal equality and a multilateral approach, and therefore allows everyone to take part and supports a just resolution to the matter. I highlighted the fact that the Cuban government imparted special significance to the legally equal approach insofar as Cubans, like the peoples of other small countries, have an elevated sense of national honor and dignity. The Cubans should be remembered, taking into account their interest in a just approach and the detailed plan for the creation of UN oversight of the fulfillment of responsibilities by both sides in order to reach a final conclusion to the crisis in the area of the Caribbean Sea. On this note, I added that the Cubans agree in principle with just, multilateral, inspections, but worry that such inspections might not be multilateral, but merely formal, and in reality would assume an anti-Cuban character. Every aspect of the plan for UN oversight in the Caribbean Sea region should be thoroughly worked out in order to eliminate the possibility of any such abuses during this plan’s implementation. Furthermore, I said that the Cuban government and people consider Fidel Castro’s five points to be fair and, in our opinion, they are right insofar as these five points entirely correspond with international law and the UN charter. Moving on to the American declaration, which McCloy handed over to Kuznetsov on November 24, I said that the draft is lousy. In this document, the Americans at one point back out of an agreement that has already been reached between Comrade N. S. Khrushchev and Kennedy, and in other instances put forth new conditions which had not been discussed earlier. At the same time, the American side clearly strives to legalize flights by U.S. spy planes over Cuba. While this is not directly stated in the text, the idea of one of the points says as much. It was emphasized that it would be impossible to interpret this in any other way than an attempt to broach the matter from a high-handed position and to exercise the rights of the strong over the weak. Such a policy cannot lead to a successful outcome. It was also noted that, as is apparent from the design of the American declaration that the United States, in the capacity of the guarantee not to attack Cuba, included a new point demanding that the Cuban government assume specific responsibilities in relation to the states of the Western Hemisphere, while the United States itself does not assume any such responsibilities. Such positions were not supported in correspondence from the U.S. president. It was added that at the present moment, now that the military stage of the crisis has blown over, there is every possibility of finishing up the settlement’s diplomatic stage. This must be done in a calm setting without postponement. Now that both sides have put forth

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their plans, the time has come for an agreement. I underscored that at this stage the acting secretary-general of the United Nations could work in an especially productive and active manner to help in bringing the talks to a close. I said that the Soviet side and, I assume, the Cuban side will support the acting secretary-general in his efforts to facilitate a quick and final resolution to the crisis in the Caribbean Sea. U Thant expressed his gratitude for this information and made several points about his plan for United Nations oversight in the Caribbean Sea region. He said that if both sides come to an agreement on basic positions relating to the final resolution of the crisis, then he will be prepared to put forth a concrete plan based on his idea for the implementation of said oversight. As he said, this plan will provide for the establishment of United Nations monitoring groups comprised of representatives from neutral governments, agreed upon by all sides, with a permanent mission to the headquarters of the United Nations in New York, from which these groups will travel to fulfill their duties. Furthermore, U Thant noted that although his idea about United Nations oversight in the Caribbean Sea region is supported by the Soviet and Cuban governments, much to his satisfaction, the United States for the time being has not accepted this idea. In U Thant’s words, in talks the Americans allude to the understanding reached between Khrushchev and Kennedy, as they have interpreted it, and specifically the fact that surely the Soviet government has not expressed its readiness to support ground inspections in Cuba. In connection with this point, U Thant stated that the Cuban government’s position is completely clear and, as he understands it, was set forth again in the Cuban government’s announcement from November 26, which he received from the Cuban representation to the UN. Moreover, U Thant said that he was visited by Stevenson, McCloy, and Charles Yost on November 26. According to U Thant, the Americans presented him with the basic content of a document that McCloy had given to Kuznetsov, however copies of the document surely were not given to U Thant. On this note, U Thant said that he cannot comment on the text of the American draft declaration in detail. However he noted that from what he could understand from the comments made by McCloy and Stevenson, the U.S. government’s approach to a final resolution to the crisis in the Caribbean Sea region is based on a desire to resolve present issues while not endeavoring to agree on a long-term resolution to the Cuban problem. As was emphasized by U Thant, this approach, in his opinion, is fundamentally different from that of the Soviets and Cubans, which envisions a long-term, peaceful resolution in the Caribbean Sea region as a result of ongoing talks. U Thant did not say which approach he personally prefers, but judging from his tone, it seemed like he was more drawn to our approach, which is the only approach that allows for the realization of his plan for United Nations monitoring in the Caribbean Sea region. In conjunction with U Thant’s comments, further details were provided on the subject of inspections. It was explained to U Thant, that in the correspondence between Comrade N. S. Khrushchev and Kennedy from October 27 and 28, it was said that we, as the keepers of the missiles, agree to the implementation of inspections which would confirm their removal from Cuba, but this presupposes that inspections could be carried out on Cuban

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territory only with the agreement of the Cuban government. We could not approach the issue in any other way insofar as we respect Cuba’s sovereignty and recognize her inalienable right to settle all issues relevant to that sovereignty. I further said that, from the standpoint of the objectives laid out in the correspondence between Comrade Khrushchev and Kennedy, the Americans and us have found an alternative form of on-site inspections and worked out a mutually acceptable procedure for verifying the removal of Soviet intermediate-range missiles from Cuba. Such a verification process has practically already been carried out and the Americans had no reservations. In that way, this is an issue that has already been settled. If the Americans want to reach an agreement on any controls in the future, this can only be realized on the basis of a just approach that completely corresponds with U Thant’s idea for UN oversight in the states of the Caribbean. I also added that in the coming days Soviet participants in the talks will present the Americans with concrete remarks and points about the American draft declaration. It would be useful if the United Nations’ acting secretary-general would meet with interested parties for an exchange of views and help them in quickly finalizing talks. U Thant addressed this by saying that in the interest of a rapid, peaceful resolution to the Cuban problem, he will do everything possible to try to bring together each side’s position in order to find a mutually acceptable solution on the basis of the agreement reached between Comrade Khrushchev and Kennedy. I thanked U Thant for his good intentions and aspiration to bring about a quick solution to the matter on a fair basis. With this, the conversation ended. On our side, Kuznetsov, Zorin, Morozov, and Mendelevich, and the translator, Kherebtsov, all attended the discussion. On U Thant’s side, his assistants E. D. Kiselev, Omar Loutfi, and C. V. Narasimhan, and his military adviser, General Rickhye, were in attendance. Second, lunch took place immediately after the conversation with U Thant. Other than those who had taken part in the conversation, Stevenson, McCloy, Yost, an American assistant to the secretary-general, Ralph Bunche, and the Brazilian Hernane Tavares De Sa were all present for lunch. Actually, the Cuban issue was not discussed during lunch. To tell the truth, I told Stevenson and McCloy that the American draft declaration clearly fails to address the objective of a speedy conclusion to the talks and, possibly, they could fix it before it is discussed. However, Stevenson and McCloy did not support this idea. It was apparent that at the moment they are not prepared for an exchange of views on the American draft declaration. Lunchtime conversations took place in a calm and friendly atmosphere. As was the case on our side, the Americans also made comments meant to further cultivate U.S.Soviet friendship. We reminisced about World War II, when our countries worked closely together against Hitler’s Germany. McCloy spoke with a certain level of pride about how, during the war years, having served as assistant secretary of war, and having been responsible for the supply of armaments to the Soviet Union under the terms of “Lend-Lease,” he had helped us immensely. He fondly recalled his conversations with Comrade Khrushchev at Pitsunda.

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There was some sharing of views on the German issue. I expressed my views on the dangers facing the cause of peace due to the complicity by Western powers, and especially the United States, in moving along the path of revanchism and militarization in West Germany. Stevenson sarcastically asked if the Soviet Union was truly apprehensive about the threat posed by West Germany. I said of course we are not afraid of West Germany, insofar as the balance of power between the Soviet Union and West Germany is now nowhere near that of twenty years ago. However, if the West German revanchists receive support from the United States, there could be dangerous consequences. In connection with this, I brought up the reckless calls made by West German revanchists, notably the minister of defense, Franz Joseph Strauss, for war to be unleashed against the Soviet Union. McCloy began to reassure me that Strauss does not enjoy any especially significant influence in West Germany, rather Adenauer is the one enjoying a decisive role in West German political life. Regardless of his old age, there is no way, he said, that Adenauer could be a revanchist and have an anti-Nazi past. At the same time, McCloy recognized Germany’s potential for danger insofar as, as he said, Germans have two souls—good and evil. Having stressed the need to use the Germans’ “good soul,” McCloy stated that the United States will no longer tolerate an outpouring of aggression by Germany. Stevenson supported McCloy’s comments adding that the United States has adequate experience with German affairs by merit of the fact that America has had to cross the Atlantic Ocean on two separate occasions in order to take part in quelling German aggression. I said that such statements could be applauded and that we believe that Americans of an older generation, having experienced two world wars, do not want to permit renewed German aggression. But does the younger generation make the same judgments? In response to my question, Stevenson stated that it is possible the younger generation, not having experienced World War II, could assess things differently. Altogether, the comments made by Stevenson and McCloy about the German issue were positive in nature. It must be mentioned, however, that at one point during the conversation McCloy, with Stevenson’s support, began to ask questions about the SovietGerman agreement of 1939. This was an attempt to label the agreement as having been a “deal with Nazism.” I responded by explaining that the policy of Western powers—namely Great Britain and France, which had attempted to push away the Soviet Union and Germany —at the same time compelled us to realize the Soviet-German nonaggression agreement in order to delay military confrontation with Germany as well as to best prepare for it. McCloy and Stevenson did not respond to my explanations. McCloy only said it is not worth reminiscing about the past. As lunch ended I mentioned the enormous role that the United Nations could, and must, play in reinforcing peace. To this effect, I acknowledged the UN secretary-general’s important role and underscored our respect for U Thant, who strives to cooperate in resolving matters facing the United Nations. I stated that U Thant belongs to an Asiatic people, and emphasized that the culture of Asian peoples is in no way lower than that of European or American peoples. This prompted a pleased reaction from U Thant and his present assistants, the majority of which are Asiatic.

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Third, upon leaving, a crowd of journalists awaited us. I answered their questions. In my answers I especially emphasized the aspiration of the people and government of Cuba, as I had yet again been led to believe during the time of my stay there, to live in peace and friendship with all states and peoples, as well as the necessity of adhering to a fair approach to deciding matters related to inspections. 27.X1.62

A. Mikoyan

Source: Personal Archive of Sergo Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Matt McGorrin for the National Security Archive.

Document 45 Transcript of Conversation between Comrade A. I. Mikoyan and the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cuba to the United Nations, Ambassador Carlos Lechuga

November 27, 1962 On the Soviet side, V. V. Kuznetsov and V. I. Bazikin were present. On the Cuban side, besides Ambassador Lechuga, assistants of the permanent mission of the Republic of Cuba to the United Nations—comrades Raul Trimeles, Manuel Perez, and Raul Fornem—were present. At the beginning of the conversation, Comrade Mikoyan told about how the day before yesterday he had the pleasure to swim in the town of Santa Maria. The water had a temperature suitable for swimming, and the beach’s soft sand would seem to make this region one of the best resort regions in Cuba. Lechuga agreed that this beach is one of the best in Cuba and added that there are more than 800 varieties of fish in Cuban waters, which draw large numbers of fishermen. Comrade A. I. Mikoyan told about he had gone with Comrade Fidel Castro aboard one of the Soviet fishing ships, where they all sampled many different types of amazing fish. On the beaches of Santiago, there is no sand and there are many rocks. However, even there Comrade Mikoyan had the opportunity to swim in a pool filled with sea water. Lechuga noted that Comrade Mikoyan had tanned nicely in the heat of the Cuban sun. However here, in New York, he said, Comrade Mikoyan is met with a stark contrast in climate, both physical and political. Comrade Mikoyan spoke about how, during his days in Santiago de Cuba, he had lunch with the military commander of Oriente Province, Cuban minister of defense Raul Castro. In this city he met with students, brought together for a reception in honor of youth returning from the coffee harvest. I decided to meet with them, Mikoyan continued, and, giving way to their mood, delivered an ardent speech. In this speech, I said that we are strong because the USSR and 525

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Cuba are together. I explained to them why we removed the missiles from Cuba. The students were in a very good mood. We spent several hours in the mountains together with Raul and later visited the Cienfuegos academic center. Lechuga said he is very happy that Comrade Mikoyan made the trip to Cuba and that he senses his visit was very useful. Comrade Mikoyan mentioned that he informed Comrade Khrushchev about his trip and the warm hospitality that he had been shown. Lechuga observed that in the Noticias de Hoy newspaper there was an announcement, corresponding with what Comrade Mikoyan would have announced, saying that the meeting with Stevenson had been difficult. Comrade Mikoyan explained that this announcement should be understood in the sense that it was not a single concrete meeting with Stevenson that had been difficult, but rather their talks as a whole. He added that it used to be much easier to converse with Stevenson, and that in the time since he had become the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations he had seriously changed. Moreover, Mikoyan said, naturally Fidel is “for” Cuba, while Stevenson is “for” the United States. Lechuga agreed with Mikoyan and emphasized that one’s post often influences a person. Comrade Mikoyan said that he sat next to Stevenson at lunch. The latter asked if things actually were not going well in Cuba with the supply of goods. I told him, Mikoyan continued, that the sale of bread was not controlled. Meat, butter, and lard are distributed by way of cards, but the rations are good. To the question of whether or not there was inflation in Cuba, I answered no, it is not felt and there is no information to suggest that it is on the horizon. Comrade Mikoyan remarked that in the three years since his first trip to Cuba, more than ten thousand schools had been built in Cuba. In other words, more than in the fifty years before the revolution. A large number of hospitals have been built, and 70,000 students receive scholarships from the state. Before the Revolution there had been 1 million illiterate Cubans. Now illiteracy has been eliminated. Lechuga said that although the Americans put forth information on Cuban achievements, they significantly distort it. A. I. Mikoyan: Imperialists always exaggerate the negative in socialist countries, especially in Cuba, and understate the positive. C. Lechuga: We often have to watch as the Americans show incredible ignorance about what is happening in Cuba. A. I. Mikoyan: If money is not controlled, then inflation can take place even in socialist countries. As far as our country is concerned, we always keep count of how much money should be held in relation to the quantity of goods produced. In the realm of finance, balance must always be kept. On three occasions, we have revalued our currency and carried out monetary reforms. With respect to the economic standing of Soviet Russia following the Revolution, it was somewhat worse than the current situation in Cuba. A blockade had been organized against Soviet Russia. Fourteen states attacked it. Among the states that had deployed troops against the young Soviet state were Britain and Japan. Bread rations for the majority of the working class was 200 grams, and 400 grams was given out only to those engaged in especially difficult work, as well as some potatoes and cabbage.

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C. Lechuga: We always say that there can be no comparison between the extremely difficult trials that faced Russia during the time of the civil war and blockade and those hardships encountered nowadays in Cuba. A. I. Mikoyan: China also lived through significant hardships in recent years, especially with rice and legumes. The commodity problems that arose in China corresponded with their organization of communes. Everybody wants, but not everybody works. In the Soviet Union great importance is given to the principle of material incentive. Ideological work is necessary if there is to be an increase in the productivity of labor. Over the last three or four years, the principle of material incentive has not been put to use in China. However, with time the Chinese came to understand. Nowadays, they are trying to fix their mistakes, although they do not make this known publicly. The Chinese are aware of our mistakes but, nevertheless, they themselves repeat them. C. Lechuga: The Chinese have had a lot of issues with communes. A Czech correspondent that had spent some time in China told me about this. A. I. Mikoyan: The Chinese committed these three fundamental mistakes in establishing communes: (1) In these communes, payment was determined by “need” rather than by work. (2) The communes as enterprises were too strong; 20,000 families were brought into one commune. Can you really oversee such a powerful enterprise? Even if you look at the army, divisions do not exceed 12,000 people. (3) Communes should have engaged in numerous and diverse undertakings—industry, military matters, educational matters, and so forth. C. Lechuga: I agree with your observations, Comrade Mikoyan. A. I. Mikoyan: Of course, the organization of Chinese agriculture is their business. We also made mistakes in our time. Mao Zedong expressed a wise thought. He said that the Soviet experience is helpful for China not only because it indicates the path to progress but also because it warns China about circumstantial mistakes that should not be repeated. Nevertheless, a year after Mao Zedong said this, the Chinese repeated many of our old mistakes. It would seem that one must commit mistakes on their own, then they will not repeat them. From the looks of it, psychology explains everything. C. Lechuga: There is a saying in Spanish: “No one feels a blow against another’s head.” R. Trimeles: And there are many who do not pay attention to the blows against our head. (Everyone laughs.) A. I. Mikoyan: The issue of reorganizing economic management is currently being discussed in the Soviet Union. Economic stages require changes in methods for the direction of industry and agriculture. If ten years ago we had tried to implement the adjustments to agriculture that we are implementing today, it would have been a huge mistake. Concerning Lechuga’s question, the reorganization of economic management also touches upon the work of the planning organs. Where there had been four or five regions, now only one is formed. We strengthened the collective farms, but we did not create such enormous enterprises like the Chinese. This strengthening is explained in part by the fact that new machines, which are produced by industry for agriculture, are not best used on relatively small plots. Moreover, great, qualified cadres emerged in agriculture. Where there had once been twenty collective farms, we created four or five collective farms. In tandem with

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this strengthening, the opportunity arose to reduce the number of qualified worker-administrators from three hundred to twenty or thirty people. A few economic regions frequently had inadequately developed industry and could not cooperate with other regions. Before reorganization, such was the case: when one district or another encountered agricultural problems, that district’s party leader transferred all work over to the management of agriculture. The situation in the countryside showed improvement, but the party leader would neglect a number of issues important to industry. The party leader would then be criticized and tasked with addressing industrial production, etc. There will now be two party leaders: one will work on industry; the other on agriculture. It is important to note that the task of revising agricultural production will fall under the purview of the agricultural manager, as is the case with sugar mills, for example. C. Lechuga: So, the ongoing reorganization of economic management allows for a reduction in the number of administrative personnel and must have a positive impact on the development of all of the people’s enterprise, i.e. industry and agriculture alike? A. I. Mikoyan: Certainly there will be fewer administrators. This is good, too. V. V. Kuznetsov: It underscores the importance of establishing the Supreme Council of National Economy. A. I. Mikoyan: We have centralized the project in a defined way. There are all sorts of machine construction and each designer will make decisions about separate units and parts as they see fit. However, there are many parts that can be made in an identical fashion. This can be done with all tractors, for instance, regardless of their power or purpose. C. Lechuga: Cuba has encountered serious difficulties with the national supply of spare parts for different machines. We understand perfectly well how important for the national economy it is to have as many interchangeable machine parts and mechanisms as possible. A. I. Mikoyan: It is also noteworthy that the reworking of several scientific sectors was conducted in an abstract fashion, without any practical consideration of the national economy’s needs. At present, part of the scientific research centers are being transferred from the control of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR over to industry. C. Lechuga: I propose a toast to the prosperity of the Soviet Union. A. I. Mikoyan: And also to the Republic of Cuba! (He adds in Spanish: “Together we will triumph!”) C. Lechuga: As far as our country is concerned, our country faces a serious problem with manufacturing such parts, as they are called, and this is a massive and difficult work. A. I. Mikoyan: In Cuba, a massive ascent is visible everywhere. The people’s awareness is very high. The people grew up in a period of struggle and, trusting in Comrade Fidel, raised high the prestige of those leading the Cuban Revolution. The prestige of the leadership is built by the people. If the leadership’s prestige is great, then it is followed and supported by the people. Using the name Fidel, one can do an awful lot in Cuba. From the standpoint of a dogmatic approach to Marxism-Leninism, this is incorrect. In that case, the idea is an epitome of materialism and dominates the masses. Your party arose from several revolutionary currents. Therein lies its power, but also its weakness. Its strength lies in the fact that it absorbed different revolutionary forces, yet its weakness is found in the

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fact that it is impure. It is important to remember, however, that in those trying days, in the days of the crisis, the party was united in Cuba. Our party was not brought together from different currents, nevertheless, it has not always been united. Such was the case when it was necessary to show incredible flexibility, when one had to take sharp turns. It was this way, for example, when the issue of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk came up, and later with the necessary implementation of the New Economic Policy. Factions have emerged in our party during difficult times. The very fact that during those seriously trying days the United Revolutionary Organization of Cuba remained united is testament to the fact that the party is healthy. The forces of the revolution must be further developed. Your country has been purged of 170,000 undesirable and antirevolutionary elements that fled Cuba. This is equivalent to 2.5 percent of the population. Leaving Cuba, they left behind their villas, automobiles, and other belongings. Comrade Fidel said that nobody tried to stop them from leaving. With respect to doctors and engineers, I told Fidel that they should be taught to believe that there are honest people among them who can be of service to the revolution. The Chinese try to reeducate that type of person. C. Lechuga: The Chinese are very patient while Cubans are not. V. V. Kuznetsov: After the Bolshevik Revolution, 2 million people fled Russia. Some were shot, and many counterrevolutionaries were shipped off to Siberia. A. I. Mikoyan: I spoke about this with Comrade Fidel. V. V. Kuznetsov: Many of those who had fled Russia and gone abroad after the revolution later understood their mistake and returned to their homeland following World War II. A. I. Mikoyan: Count Aleksei Tolstoy fled the country, but, being a nationalist, once he saw how the Soviet Union was prospering and that the people and the party were united he returned to his homeland and wrote a great deal about how good it is to live in the Soviet Union. C. Lechuga: On that note, I would like to tell a joke about the Cubans that fled to the United States. One strong landowner in Miami decided to have his boots polished on a street corner. Once his boots had been polished, he told the shoe-shiner that he no longer has any money and therefore cannot pay. However, he said he would pay the shoe-shiner $20 after Cuban emigrants succeed in returning to Cuba with the help of the United States. The shoe-shiner said that the Cuban should just pay 35 cents now since, as a former Russian count himself, he has already waited over forty years to return to Russia. V. V. Kuznetsov: A former member of the Russian State Duma, Zhulgin, actively opposed Soviet power. Conducting subversive activities against the Soviet authorities, he illegally appeared in the territory of the Soviet Russia. However, with time, he was fully convinced that the people fully supported the government. By the time of World War II, he had changed his views. One day he illegally made his way to the Soviet Union, convinced that Soviet power was lasting, but then once more returned overseas. While there, he announced his desire to return to his homeland even if it would mean going to prison. He later wrote a great number of articles in which he exposed the failure of the “white emigration” and implored others to follow his example.

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A. I. Mikoyan: Among emigrants, there are good people that have been brainwashed by enemy propaganda. With time they recognize their mistakes. I would think that a lot of Cuban emigrants are still coming to their senses. In our country there was yet another interesting development. As you know, many Kulaks were sent to Siberia. Twenty years after the de-kulakization in Siberia, collective farms were organized from former Kulaks. Good children were raised on these collective farms. After Stalin’s death, people began to relate to this group differently. Kulaks received the right to live in the location of their choosing and work hard. C. Lechuga: We have not gotten to that point in Cuba yet. A. I. Mikoyan: In three to five years many Cubans who do not currently support the Revolution may reassess their positions and come over to the Revolution’s side. On my return trip from Cuba, I deliberately stayed in New York, just as I had done on my way to Cuba. My reason for staying was an invitation from U Thant. When I was on my way to Cuba, we exchanged views with comrades Zorin and Kuznetsov on how to find an alternative to inspections. We now want to reinforce our position on the guarantee against an attack on Cuba. I had lunch with U Thant. A meeting with Stevenson and McCloy is expected. I want to exert pressure in order to facilitate talks for Comrade Kuznetsov. V. V. Kuznetsov: We are exploiting Comrade Mikoyan. A. I. Mikoyan: In all likelihood, I will go to Washington under the premise of a meeting with staff members in our embassy. If U.S. officials want to meet with me, I will not solicit a meeting, but will not refuse either. If they request a meeting, I will agree. It is already being reported in the press that Kennedy’s press office is asking whether or not there will be a meeting with Mikoyan today. There was a negative response to this question. However, in response to the question of whether there would be a meeting tomorrow, it was said that there would be a message about this during the latter half of the day. The Cubans are to oppose with absolute resolve. This is good. In the meantime, they undervalue the importance of diplomatic actions meant to prevent aggression against Cuba. Rather, they are aware of the importance of these diplomatic actions, just not to the same degree that we are. When we take steps meant to receive a guarantee not to attack Cuba from Kennedy, we do not do this because we have more faith in Kennedy than in the Cubans. Realizing such steps, we act from the fact that a statement from the head of the American government about guarantees, fixed in the United Nations in due course, assumes the character of an international agreement. Having made such a statement, Kennedy cannot go back on it without risking his honor. C. Lechuga: I am one of the few members of the Cuban government that did not presume the possibility of direct aggression on the part of the United States. It was another matter once this crisis unfolded. A. I. Mikoyan: I also believe that during the development of the crisis, the real danger of a direct attack on Cuba by the United States emerged. C. Lechuga: It seems to me that in recent days the United States has tried to ignore Cuba and only conduct talks with the Soviet Union. At the same time, the United States is trying to exclude the United Nations from negotiations about the Cuban issue. A. I. Mikoyan: This must be challenged. We will make a serious effort to this effect.

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C. Lechuga: I suspect that the Americans, taking into consideration the fact that the most heated stage of the crisis has already passed, are hatching new plans for Cuba. They are apparently still sticking to their aggressive plans, but direct aggression against Cuba without a pretext, that is, the presence of Soviet missiles on Cuba, is difficult for them. A. I. Mikoyan: It is difficult for the Americans to start this all over again. As you know, President Kennedy is being criticized for having promised not to attack Cuba. The very fact that Cuba is able to live and prosper is a victory for you and us. However, conditions were set forth in an announcement by Kennedy that give the Americans the option of taking any action against Cuba if Cuba does not uphold all of its commitments. These terms were neither in Khrushchev’s nor Kennedy’s messages. Judging from Kennedy’s announcement, the Americans have given themselves the right to decide when to reject their guarantee not to attack Cuba. We must throw this all out and formalize all obligations in the United Nations that were contained in the messages sent between Khrushchev and Kennedy. The Americans do not accept U Thant’s plan for multilateral inspections in the Caribbean and claim that they have the right to confirm by their own means what is being done in Cuba. I will raise this matter during my meeting with the Americans. They want to limit the issue by issuing unilateral announcements, practically bypassing the Security Council. It is assumed that these statements are forwarded in the Security Council without ever having been discussed in the Council. Of course, the very fact that the Council received a statement affirming obligations adds something positive to the exchange in correspondence between Khrushchev and Kennedy. However, discussion of these statements in the UN Security Council allows for the option of approving them, rejecting them, or taking them into consideration. The Security Council can call on all sides to discuss stillunresolved matters and involve the United Nations secretary-general in any discussion of these matters. We must push for a definition of obligations tied to the guarantee not to attack in the Security Council. We also must try to do everything we can to get rid of any loopholes that the Americans could use to back out of their promises and guarantees. C. Lechuga: The Americans proposed to U Thant that the Security Council not be convened. They wanted to restrict the entire affair to the statements that they have put forth on the topic of Cuba. A. I. Mikoyan: Perhaps you are right, but they will not succeed. We must actively oppose this and act together. We believe that, as was the case with Comrade Fidel’s letter to U Thant, the Cuban government’s response to Kennedy’s announcement will significantly strengthen Cuba’s international position with regards to its principles of peaceful coexistence. On the night before my departure, Raul Castro gave me the text of the Cuban government’s last statement and, even later, around one in the morning, Fidel stopped by. I said that I would not read the statement at that time even though my Cuban friends requested to hear my remarks. Even if I had had remarks at that time, all the same I would not have shared them. When I had read through the statement, I came to the conclusion that I did not have any comments to make about it. However, at the time I did not have the opportunity to tell this to my Cuban friends. (Comrade A. I. Mikoyan proposes that everyone drink some coffee with cognac.) V. V. Kuznetsov: That’s Mikoyan’s recipe.

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C. Lechuga: Mikoyan’s recipes are always good. I think that the proposal about multilateral inspections in the Caribbean will be difficult for the governments of other regional Latin American states to dismiss, especially considering the fact that American propaganda could cause a fuss about how Cuba may have aggressive intentions towards these countries. A. I. Mikoyan: When the discussion turned to multilateral inspections, Fidel wavered. But Comrade Che Guevara said that the Americans would probably accept this proposal all the same. Therefore, he said, we can come to an agreement with them. It must be kept in mind that the Americans can attempt to use the proposed multilateral inspections against Cuba if we do not organize and dispatch United Nations mobile groups in a way that prevents arbitrary control by the United States. C. Lechuga: Present agreements on multilateral inspections could be used to quell the propaganda being produced by counterrevolutionaries in the United States. This would also hinder minor pirate attacks on Cuba. A. I. Mikoyan: I will never say this to the Americans, but it should be kept in mind that the definition of obligations in the United Nations on the guarantee not to attack Cuba, as well as the proposal on multilateral inspections, serve to undermine the Organization of American States and Treaty of Rio de Janeiro. The British recognized the USSR as being de facto from the start. We were happy with this. As far as the United States is concerned, it did not recognize us for sixteen years. The Americans have essentially recognized you, Cuba, that is, four years after the Revolution. Lenin stressed the important role played by diplomacy. It played an enormous role in our day as well. Take the revolutions in Korea, Vietnam, and Germany—take, for example, the corps of traitors to the homeland under the command of General Andrey Vlasov (this is analogous to the Cuban Miro Cardona) that was located in Czechoslovakia. We had an agreement with the allied command that prisoners captured during operations would be handed over to the side that had dealt the decisive blow. Under the onslaught of Soviet forces, Vlasov’s troops ran from us and surrendered to the Americans. It was demanded that these troops be handed over to the Soviet command and this was done. A. I. Mikoyan: In concluding, when I left Raul at three in the morning, I asked Fidel what he would like me to tell Comrade Khrushchev. This question was unexpected for Fidel. He became quiet, then said that I should relay everything that we had spoken about. He added that he had been saddened and disappointed, but that Cuba would always be steadfast in its solidarity with the Soviet Union. I have already conveyed this to Comrade Khrushchev. C. Lechuga: Thank you very much for the honor of taking part in this breakfast. A. I. Mikoyan: As a friend, I must be accountable before you. On another occasion, this gives me the right to expect the same from you. V. V. Kuznetsov: It is duly noted that Comrade Lechuga was Cuba’s representative to the Organization of American States and that he perfectly understands all of America’s tricks in that organization. In talking about his experiences, he has shared this with us. A. I. Mikoyan: Diplomats must also meet with their enemies in order to understand what drives them.

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C. Lechuga: I must ask your permission to leave. In two hours’ time, I have to bring diplomatic mail to the airport to send to Cuba by way of Mexico. A. I. Mikoyan: I spoke with Ambassador Alekseyev so that he would tell your ambassador that Cuba can demand visas for Soviet pilots in Cuba’s service from Canada. The Canadians are violating international law by denying these visas. C. Lechuga: Thank you for the advice. We really need to normalize air transport. I am very grateful for the invitation and it was nice to make your acquaintance. Thank you very much, Comrade Mikoyan! Good-bye. A. I. Mikoyan: Good-bye, Comrade Lechuga.

Source: Personal Archive of Sergo Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Matt McGorrin for the National Security Archive.

Document 46 Conversation between J. Kennedy and A. I. Mikoyan

November 29, 1962 After an exchange of greetings, J. Kennedy asks A. I. Mikoyan about his impressions of the trip to Cuba. A. I. Mikoyan replies that he came away with the best impressions—that Cuba is a beautiful island, and that the Cubans are very interesting people who are enthusiastically building a new life. Castro personally gives a great deal of attention to this effort, in particular to the development of agriculture, to the construction of schools and hospitals, and to other such activities. A. I. Mikoyan talks about Castro’s family, noting that the brothers—Fidel and Raul— had long given their considerable lands to the peasants, while their older brother, who until recently had not shared their revolutionary ideas, remained a landowner. However, he finally understood the meaning of changes taking place in Cuba, and also gave his land to the peasants. This brother now says that he would have joined Fidel and Raul a long time ago, if he could have foreseen in what direction they would take the Cuban revolution. J. Kennedy asks when Castro became a Communist. A. I. Mikoyan replies that Castro has been a Marxist for the last one or two years. Previously, he and his closest friends, such as Aragonés, were revolutionary liberals. Raul Castro and Che Guevara become Communists earlier. A. I. Mikoyan notes further that from numerous meetings with representatives of the various segments of the Cuban population, he got the impression that Cubans have a quite natural distrust of the United States and American imperialism based on their bitter experience, and openly talk about this. It is necessary to openly acknowledge that relations now between the United States and Cuba, through the fault of the former, are completely unsatisfactory. 534

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J. Kennedy agrees that relations between Cuba and the United States are not satisfactory, and remarks that the efforts of the Cuban people and Castro in the spheres of education, medical care, and the development of the country’s economy are positive events. However, the United States is worried that Cuba is turning into the springboard of Soviet politics aimed at undermining Latin America, that Cuba and Castro will lead subversive activities against the Latin American countries. Nonetheless, Kennedy went on, in my speeches I criticized those who wanted to invade Cuba. My attitude to Playa Giron is well known, too. Last summer, Cuba started a military buildup. Hundreds of Soviet ships with weapons appeared there, and in the end even missiles. All this puts us in a difficult situation. How can I know that this would not happen again in a month, or that such weapons are not delivered to Cuba by the Chinese? And still, notwithstanding all this, we argued against those who alleged that Cuba was a Soviet military base. And precisely at that same time, we received assurances from Chairman Khrushchev that there were no offensive weapons in Cuba. How is it possible after all that to guarantee that, let’s say, in the beginning of next year such weapons would not be delivered there again? A. I. Mikoyan said that the Soviet government, taking into account the good relationship between N. S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy, decided at the time to inform President Kennedy confidentially at first, and only then announce publicly in the press about the delivery of weapons to Cuba, whereas the U.S. government does not inform us about what kind of weapons it delivers to its bases. As time went on, one way or another, this would cease to be a secret, but we wanted to stress that when we directed these weapons to Cuba, we did not pursue any kind of aggressive aims, and clearly we did not do it to attack the United States. You are a military man, Mr. President, A. I. Mikoyan went on, and you understand that it would have been stupid even to think about attacking the United States from Cuba. It would seem even every civilian understands that. The president let Comrade Khrushchev know through informal channels that during the American presidential election campaign, he did not want the Soviet Union to take any steps on Berlin or other issues that could have an unfavorable impact on the campaign. Wishing to not complicate the position of the president, it was decided to communicate confidentially on this issue immediately after the elections, and then to publish in print. I repeat, the weapons were supplied not with an aim to attack the United States but as a deterrent, and for the purpose of reinforcing Cuba’s defense capabilities to protect it from the possibility of an outside attack. J. Kennedy notes it is not an issue of informing or not informing his government. Of course, we do not communicate with you about these things, and you do not have to inform us either. But in September there was a statement from TASS that there are no offensive weapons in Cuba. Furthermore, Ambassador Dobrynin said this to the U.S. attorney general, R. Kennedy. This turned out to be a lie. A. I. Mikoyan says that this is incorrect; there was no lie. A difference in the interpretation of these weapons occurred. We sent these weapons to Cuba for defensive purposes, not for an attack. In our September statement, we emphasized the purpose of these weapons; their purpose is one thing, while their nature is another. Therefore, we made this statement. These weapons were sent to Cuba only for the purpose of defense, as a means

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of deterring possible aggressors. It would have been foolish to consider using these missiles to attack the United States. It is well known that the USSR has powerful enough missiles with a huge range. Everyone understands that if the missiles stationed in Cuba were used against the United States, the matter would not be limited to Cuba—it would start a world war. But it is well known that we do not want to attack anybody, we do not want war. In this regard, A. I. Mikoyan notes, I recall my conversation with Dulles and Eisenhower. I asked Dulles if he thought that the Soviet Union wanted to go to war with the U.S. He was silent for a moment and answered that he did not think so, and asked whether the Soviet government believes that the United States wants to go to war with the Soviet Union. I answered, A. I. Mikoyan continued, that we do not think this way either, but we have grave concerns about it. We ask ourselves the question: If the United States does not want to fight with us, then why does it need the bases located in the immediate vicinity of the Soviet Union, which fan the “Cold War,” and why do they conduct their policy “on the verge of war?” Further, A. I. Mikoyan notes that Kennedy’s words about turning Cuba into a base against the United States and countries of Latin America reminded him of the abovementioned conversation with Dulles. In this connection, he would like to ask President Kennedy the same question: Does he think that the Soviet Union wants to fight with the United States? J. Kennedy says that he, in turn, would like to ask A. I. Mikoyan why the Soviet Union, despite the public and confidential assurance of its leaders to the contrary, delivered to Cuba medium-range missiles and other offensive weapons, although it was well known that the United States did not threaten to invade Cuba either in the spring or summer of that year. He said so frankly to Khrushchev even in Vienna. Despite the fact that he, Kennedy, faced attacks from those who claimed that the United States is allowing the creation of military bases in Cuba, in September and even in October he spoke publicly against an invasion of Cuba. And the United States could have formally justified such an invasion, but it did not think that this would be a solution. So we could have told Khrushchev then that we would not invade Cuba. We proceeded from the idea that we would be working on greater international issues together with you, and we did not intend to invade Cuba. Ambassador Dobrynin knows this well. Chairman Khrushchev said that Cuba does not have offensive weapons; the same thing was said in the well-known TASS statement, and Ambassador Dobrynin talked about this also. Suddenly, we find out that missiles are installed in Cuba. This was a great insult to me. We are interested in avoiding dangerous conflicts in the next years, and something has already been done in this direction; in particular, we have already agreed on a peaceful regulation of the Laotian problem. The most important thing is that Khrushchev and I understand each other well. What do we have now? A direct military confrontation because of Cuba. Who can say that this will not happen again, let’s say, in six months? A. I. Mikoyan says that without mutual understanding between Khrushchev and Kennedy, between the USSR and the United States, it is indeed difficult to count on the preservation of peace. He notes that the goal of the Soviet government, including in this conversation he is having with Kennedy, is to find ways to improve the mutual understanding

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between the USSR and the United States on all contentious issues, thereby strengthening peace in the whole world. On one hand, continues A. I. Mikoyan, you announced that you are not planning to attack Cuba. But on the other hand, it is well known that on U.S. territory, as well as in some countries of the Caribbean, military training of considerable groups of Cuban immigrants was under way. Moreover, there was recruitment of Cuban émigrés into the U.S. military for the purpose of creating Spanish-speaking divisions. Subversive activity continued against Cuba; officials from the Pentagon gave speeches that contradicted the president’s statements. “My good friend” Nixon echoed their sentiments, continues A. I. Mikoyan. Besides that, everyone remembers the invasion of Cuba that was done with U.S. assistance. I know from your words, which were said to Khrushchev, that the Bay of Pigs invasion was prepared by your predecessor; however, it still took place under your presidency. A. I. Mikoyan repeats that the Soviet government announced truthfully that the missiles delivered to Cuba were only for defense purposes. We consider the missiles in Cuba as a “deterring” force, not at all as “offensive” weapons. If we wanted to attack the United States, then we have extremely long-range missiles. It is known that the territory of the Soviet Union is not enough for us to test such missiles, so we have to launch them into the Pacific Ocean, not far from U.S. shores. We have sufficient means for delivery, and we have enough hydrogen and atomic bombs. The United States, of course, also has such bombs. Thus it is clear that the forty-two missiles located in Cuba were meant only for defense. Everyone knows that if these missiles had been used against the United States, it would have meant a world war. However, the missiles in Cuba were meant for defense; they were in the hands of Soviet officers and could not be used without our order. I have to tell you confidentially, not for publication, notes A. I. Mikoyan, that we have a law that forbids the transfer of nuclear weapons to second hands. We understand that at the present moment the issue is not only restricted to Cuba; we are talking about the relationship between the USSR and the United States. We proceed from the necessity of the gradual resolution of all contentious issues and, therefore, believe that we should completely eliminate the conflict over Cuba and move to resolve other pressing problems. Next, A. I. Mikoyan talks about his own conversation with U.S. secretary of state Cordell Hull in 1936, in the course of which Hull said to A. I. Mikoyan that Germany and Japan are preparing aggression and that the only countries that can stop the aggression are the United States and the USSR. Noting that at that time the situation was not as it is right now—when we are the only two powers with unprecedented destructive weapons —A. I. Mikoyan says that today the preservation of peace is even more dependent on the two greatest world powers—the USSR and the United States. Mikoyan notes that the whole world was pleased at the agreement between N. S. Khrushchev and John Kennedy on overcoming the situation on the brink of war in connection with Cuba. Mikoyan emphasizes that our goal now is to resolve the Cuban problem as soon as possible and to start working on other urgent issues. J. Kennedy notes that Nixon can say anything he likes, but he does not determine U.S. policy. Nixon indeed criticized the policies of the current U.S. government regarding Cuba and the USSR, calling them too “soft.” As for the Pentagon generals, the government con-

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trols their statements. He does not know any officials who would come forward with proposals to attack Cuba. Kennedy further notes that he had to take the responsibility for the invasion on Playa Giron. But neither in the spring nor in the summer of this year, he stresses, was there talk about an invasion of Cuba. It is not Cuba (what can it really do against us), but the actions of the Soviet Union that have significance for us, Kennedy says. Just as the Soviet Union does not want to attack Albania, so we do not want to attack Cuba. The Soviet Union and the United States have strength sufficient to destroy one another, and if we do not understand each other on some issue, it could lead to a major explosion. I hope that someday the Soviet Union will understand this, and will limit itself to its own borders and its internal construction, and will stop pressing on us. Then the United States will be ready to do the same. Today, said the president, a situation has developed whereby, although our two countries have no territorial claims to each other, we clash with you almost everywhere, and in the present nuclear age this situation is fraught with great dangers for the entire world. As soon as a revolutionary spark flashes anywhere in the world—your presence is noticeable. You are right there. We should mutually try to avoid an aggravation of the situation in all parts of the world. A. I. Mikoyan touches on Kennedy’s observation about the revolutions, referring to the example of Cuba. We, the Soviet Union, did not know anything beforehand about the armed insurrection being prepared and headed by F. Castro in Cuba; and we did not meddle in any way in this insurrection, which ended nonetheless with such a wonderful success. And the Americans had their embassy there, as well as an obedient government. American monopolies were in effect there. Does the U.S. president really not know of all this? (Kennedy here immediately corroborated that U.S. policymakers firmly know that the Soviet Union had nothing to do with it.) If we are realists, continued A. I. Mikoyan, we have to admit that revolutions break out not because a mythical “Moscow hand” is involved, but because in some countries appropriate social, economic, and political conditions become ripe for a revolution. Revolutions did happen, and revolutions will happen. And they will win in countries of the Americas. And they will win in the United States as well. It is quite possible that you could find yourself playing Castro’s role, who leads Cuba to socialism without being a Marxist. J. Kennedy laughed, saying, “Not I; but my little brother can end up in such a situation.” A. I. Mikoyan says that the Soviet government’s policy, led by Chairman N. S. Khrushchev, is to solve all problems step by step, and to strengthen peace. We strive to eliminate all pockets of danger, and already have achieved a great deal in this direction. In cases when we are not successful in finding a solution to a controversial problem, this happens only because we do not have understanding from the Western powers. Urgent issues need to be resolved—not left up in the air. Leaving unresolved issues creates an atmosphere that is always fraught with new and dangerous outbreaks of conflicts. We are for solving issues, not avoiding them. And, to speak frankly, it is impossible to avoid them.

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In one of your messages regarding Cuba, says A. I. Mikoyan to Kennedy, you yourself raised the matter of the desirability of a signing a nonaggression pact between the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This would be a major step to strengthen peace. Together with this, we should discuss questions such as the cessation of nuclear testing, the Berlin issue, and disarmament—questions that are waiting for resolution. I would like to touch upon these issues in today’s conversation, if you are ready to discuss them. A. I. Mikoyan says that the exchange of messages between N. S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy is a basis for settlement of the Cuban issue. Working with the Cuban side, the Soviet side used the messages of N. S. Khrushchev and Kennedy to develop a draft protocol and included in it a number of positions consistent with the spirit of these messages. Unfortunately, the U.S. representatives rejected this draft. But, to date, we have agreed with U.S. representatives at the negotiations in New York on two important points: (1) The document formulating the settlement of the Cuban crisis must not be in form of a protocol, but in the form of a trilateral declaration—by the USSR, Cuba, and the United States. (2) These declarations are presented to the UN Security Council for approval. However, an agreement has still not been reached on the concrete points of this declaration. J. Kennedy notes that he cannot say anything about the Cuban declaration, and asks whether UN approval implies a simple registration of the declarations with the secretarygeneral of the UN, or a vote in the United Nations. In his opinion, the secretary-general should register these declarations. It goes without saying, he continued, that we cannot vote for Castro’s declaration, which he [Kennedy] supposes will contain positions clearly unacceptable to the United States. I suppose that our declaration also is unacceptable to Castro. But the main thing is to reach an agreement on the texts between the United States and the USSR and to pass them on to the secretary-general, and the Cubans can say whatever they want in their declaration. That does not interest us. A. I. Mikoyan says that as he sees it, the texts of the declarations must be agreed and then brought to the UN Security Council, since the Cuban issue is on its agenda. Thus, A. I. Mikoyan explains, we will bring to the Security Council a draft of the declaration, in which the issues on which we reached agreement will be shown, and the Security Council can take it into account or approve them, charging the sides to regulate peacefully the remaining unresolved issues. We do not intend to strike up a debate between us in the Security Council. We want to come to an agreement beforehand both on the text of the declaration, and on the draft resolution of the Security Council. J. Kennedy notes that Cuba cannot take part, and that we are talking about agreeing on declarations only of the USSR and the United States. To Kennedy’s remark that the Soviet Union seemingly does not particularly like the American draft of the declaration, A. I. Mikoyan says that this is the case. J. Kennedy states that the Soviet Union has already removed missiles from Cuba and that soon it would remove the bombers. Besides, he hopes that the troops stationed for the defense of the missiles would be withdrawn, too. For its part, the United States lifted its blockade and announced that it would not support aggression against Cuba. Therefore,

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significant progress has already been achieved. The issue about withdrawal of troops defending the missiles was not directly mentioned in Khrushchev’s letter, but it was implied that it would be done. He believes that the rest of the troops and the remaining weapons would be withdrawn, too. A. I. Mikoyan says that the president is mistaken; we will withdraw no more and no less than what was named by Khrushchev in his letter. Further, he notes that the American draft of declaration was so far unsatisfactory, because it essentially undermines the noninvasion of Cuba given by the American president. By including in their draft the stipulation that the noninvasion guarantee would be in force as long as Cuba would refrain from “subversive activities” and would not undertake actions that would violate the security of other countries of Americas, the United States thus was trying to assign itself a right to interpret the actions of the Cuban government and put it under its own control. Who gave the United States that right? How can we agree to that? Castro told me, “What right does the U.S. president have to attack Cuba and at the same time to present the case in such a way as if he was doing a great public good by promising to give a guarantee not to invade it? Cuba is an independent country after all.” I could not disagree with him. The first part of the American declaration is acceptable overall, but we will suggest a somewhat different version. As regards the so-called subversive activities of Cuba, if we are to talk about Cuba’s commitment not to engage in such actions, in which it is not engaged anyway, then the same obligations should be recorded for all of Cuba’s neighbors. We have to stipulate mutual obligations—not to commit subversive acts and not to send mercenaries. Then it would be fair. In the draft of the Soviet-Cuban protocol, there is one fairly difficult point for the United States: the issue of the liquidation of the base at Guantánamo. Castro agreed, and it has been written down in the draft protocol—for now to begin the discussions on the time frame for the liquidation of the base. The rest of Castro’s five points included in the protocol, from the point of view of international law, are elementary demands [sic]: Do not impose an economic embargo; take measures to prevent privacy; stop firing on hotels in Havana, as happened recently. J. Kennedy said that he agrees, and that such actions are against the U.S. law. He noted that such sporadic action does not serve any practical purpose, but rather is done to cause a stir. The most important thing, he stressed, is that the United States is not preparing troops to invade Cuba. We declare, Kennedy said, that there will not be an invasion. You said the other day that the arms of the imperialists will be tied. That is why when it comes to providing documents to the UN, we want to be particularly careful. It is not a question of two months, but of two or six years—in a word, while I am president. Besides which, who can guarantee that, let’s say, in three years the Chinese will not put missiles and atomic weapons in Cuba, or you yourselves will not once again transfer them there. We need to be very cautious while working on such documents. We also need to recognize that Castro is not our friend. The United States, although it would not intentionally attack Cuba, needs to assure the people of the Western Hemisphere that they have every guarantee that missiles will

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not be transferred to Cuba once again, and also that Cuba will not carry out subversive activities against neighboring countries. After all, Cuba could increase such activity, relying on complete impunity, if the United States gives a formulated announcement of nonaggression. A. I. Mikoyan confirms what he said, and considers that it was well said. We want to tie the hands of the imperialists in aggressive acts, but we do not plan to tie their hands in good activities. J. Kennedy says, I think you know that we would not attack Cuba, but you want some public assurance in this regard. However, we must assure the people of the Western Hemisphere that there are no missiles in Cuba and that they have every guarantee that they will not be there again. I hope that we will succeed in resolving this issue either by achieving the agreement about onsite inspections, or by way of inspections by other methods, to trouble Castro as little as possible. I know that you and Castro are against our flights over Cuban territory, but right now there is no other way. This problem needs to be resolved. We need to have satisfactory means of verification, or we will continue our flights over Cuba. Furthermore, Kennedy shows A. I. Mikoyan a clipping from the New York Mirror newspaper from November 28, in which there is a reference to “underground sources in Cuba,” and a list of places is given, including a cave where Soviet missiles are allegedly hidden, with a map attached. Kennedy asks how, in his place, A. I. Mikoyan would have reacted to such a note. A. I. Mikoyan answers that it would have made me laugh. J. Kennedy says that we believe you and we are also laughing. A. I. Mikoyan says that they showed him this note in New York and that he said it had been intended for fools, but he hoped that there were not many of those in America. (Kennedy laughs at that.) As far as the missiles in Cuba are concerned, they have all been removed. Your newspapers established this fact and published aerial photographs of the dismantling of all missile installations, and your officers ascertained the removal of the missiles from Cuba on our ships. The continuous flights over Cuban territory only summon the completely understandable anger of the Cubans, and are a gross violation of Cuba’s sovereignty and of the UN Charter. I was told that with your equipment, you have been able to make intelligence surveys of Cuba’s territory from the air while flying outside Cuba’s air space. Thus it becomes clear that your flights over Cuba have as their goal only to insult Cubans by violating their sovereignty. J. Kennedy says that the United States has no device allowing it to survey at such a big angle, so that the planes could be outside the 3-mile zone. Lately, he notes, our flights have not caused great worry to the Cubans, because they were done at very high altitudes, while low-altitude flights were ceased. A. I. Mikoyan says that it is clear that the numerous and frequent low-altitude flights were simply hooliganism on the part of the United States, and the current high-altitude flights are also hooliganism, only at greater altitudes. J. Kennedy repeats that in his opinion these infrequent high-altitude flights should not especially worry Castro.

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A. I. Mikoyan notes that Castro still knows about these flights, and they irritate the Cubans because they present a violation of Cuba’s sovereignty. The Cubans are a proud people; they have suffered enough in their history—Spanish and then U.S. domination, the military base, the Platt law, and now the U.S. press criticizes them every day. Indeed, how can you say that the United States has the right to conduct such flights, when the UN Charter outlines governments’ obligation not to violate the sovereignty of other countries? If the United States has some fears about the future, then Castro and we can agree to international control, continues A. I. Mikoyan, but this international control must be multilateral and equal for all countries of the Caribbean. This corresponds to U Thant’s last plan. Castro, naturally, rejects unilateral control. You write in the declaration that you intend to collect information through your means. If by this you mean flights over Cuban territory, then this is a violation of international law, and we cannot sign such a document, and Castro and the UN also cannot. Furthermore, the declaration states that guarantees will be in effect under the condition that the Cuban side will not undertake subversive activities. How can this be reconciled with international law? If we are to talk about Cuba’s commitment not to engage in such actions, in which it is not engaged anyway, then the same obligations should be recorded for all of Cuba’s neighbors. Then it would be fair. The U.S. side’s advancement of such a condition now, after it was not provided in the exchange of messages between the president and N. S. Khrushchev, in effect nullifies the obligation of nonaggression toward Cuba you provided. J. Kennedy reads out the American draft, which states that the United States will guarantee nonaggression under the condition that there will be no offensive weapons in Cuba, and that Cuba will not threaten other countries. He asks: If Cuba does not plan to threaten other countries, then what here is unacceptable? A. I. Mikoyan says that we are not disputing the point regarding the import of “offensive weapons.” However, the above-mentioned condition on “the subversive actions of Cuba” is, in essence, a negation of the declaration of nonaggression. J. Kennedy notes that he understands the Soviet side’s concern regarding the formulations, but asks them to understand his position also. Kennedy says that he is being asked to take on the obligations or give guarantees, that is, “to tie his hands” for several years, no matter what Castro might do. I can give guarantees, he continues, only under the condition that there will be no nuclear weapons in Cuba. I am announcing that we will not attack Cuba, but we clearly understand that Castro is our enemy. At the same time, we are ready to meet N. S. Khrushchev halfway—just as he, I hope, is ready to meet us halfway. We do not want Castro to think that as soon as the declaration is signed he can do what he will in the Caribbean. I do not want Castro to think that he can do what he wants against other countries of the region. A. I. Mikoyan says that it sounds like you want to have control over the actions of the Cuban government. On what grounds? If you are worried about his “subversive activity,” then let us take Castro’s offer—let’s come to an agreement on a multilateral base. You want to continue subversive work against Cuba and at the same time keep the “right” to attack Cuba should Castro want to respond in kind. This is a departure from the position stated in the exchange of messages. You say that Castro is your enemy. This is incorrect. You can

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turn him into your enemy by your own actions. He is proposing to you to lift the economic embargo of Cuba, and in general to normalize relations between the United States and Cuba. But you want to keep the economic embargo, as well as have the possibility of carrying out subversive activities against him. The messages talked about only one condition—the removal of “offensive weapons” and their not being reintroduced. Everything else is related to the sphere of normalizing relations. Castro states as much. You should reread his message to U Thant from November 26. Further, your draft references the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro. We think that this question is irrelevant to the present issue. It is not a subject of the discussions between the USSR and United States. Plus, you excluded Cuba from the inter-American system. Then what does this treaty have to do with this issue? A reference to the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro in the declaration is absolutely unjustified, and needs to be removed. J. Kennedy notes that A. I. Mikoyan is talking about the United States’ departure from the initial position, but there is, he says, also a departure by the Soviet side. It also has not fulfilled all of its obligations. In N. S. Khrushchev’s message, Kennedy continues, it was stipulated that the dismantling and removal of missiles would be carried out under UN supervision. It is true that we agreed on a different verification method of the removal of these weapons. Further, it was said that there will be guarantees that such weapons will not be imported in the future. But you could once again decide to bring them to Cuba. In the message, there was no mention of conducting inspections on U.S. territory. Right now you put forth this condition, even though you say nothing of inspections on the territory of the Soviet Union. The USSR and U.S. declarations have official status in the Security Council. Therefore the United States believes that as long as they are not provided adequate verification, they will have to carry it out by some other means. I want to be sure that the American people will not be made fools of again. How can I know that there are no missiles in Cuba and that they are not still being imported? What do I answer to such questions, to such criticism? It is necessary, first, to use our own means until a system of verification within the UN framework is organized; and second, we need to consider that we are tied by the position of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro. I am prepared to give guarantees of nonaggression, but if the declaration is issued through the UN, we need to make a reference to that treaty. As for the guarantee of nonaggression, McCloy and Kuznetsov can return to this issue again in New York. But I have to stress that we may be asked whether we are remain tied by the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro. Also, we can be asked about how matters stand with the inspections. We need to have some way to make sure that press releases such as the article in the New York Mirror do not correspond to reality. Of course, I remember what I wrote to N. S. Khrushchev, but we expect that Castro will behave in a restrained manner, that he will not provoke us. If Castro focuses on public education and economic development, we will have no problems. There remain the problems of verification and the format in which to provide the nonaggression guarantee. This could be done at a separate press conference or announcement. Kennedy continues that if the Soviet Union is not satisfied with a reference to the condition, under which the obligation of nonaggression toward Cuba will remain in force, and also a reference to the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, then the American side could soften some

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of the wording, but in this case sides’ declarations would not be registered with the UN, but done in some other form, for example, as an announcement at press conferences in Washington and Moscow. Again, if we cannot find a coordinated formula, then we can make a separate announcement at a press conference, in which I would clearly expound our political intentions in relation to Cuba based on the exchange of our messages with N. S. Khrushchev. We made such an announcement at the last press conference, saying that that we will not begin aggression towards Cuba and that we will not allow others to do so. I know that Khrushchev responded positively to this statement. I think that we already made considerable progress, and we could close this phase of the crisis. Meanwhile, let Kuznetsov and McCloy continue their discussions in the UN. If they do not succeed—and we should take into account the desirability of presenting coordinated documents to the UN Security Council in order to avoid unnecessary arguments—I could make some kind of statement, say, at a press conference. Chairman Khrushchev and I could make separate statements about what we achieved and what we did not achieve, and expound upon our plans—what measures need to be taken to reach an agreement. This would allow us to ease the situation and avoid a crisis in the UN. After this we could have time to “cool down.” A. I. Mikoyan says that from this, I conclude that, contrary to our position, which is to complete the mutual settlement of the Cuban crisis as soon as possible and create a favorable atmosphere for the resolution of other issues, the United States, it seems, does not want to put out the fire and wants to avoid concluding the agreement reached in the exchange of messages. J. Kennedy says that his interpreter must have misinterpreted his meaning. A. I. Mikoyan says, that is what I thought. J. Kennedy says that we have not swayed from the position stated in the letter from October 27. On the other hand, there was no UN verification of the dismantling and removal of missiles, to which the Soviet Union had agreed. Though, we later found other means to verify the removal of the missiles. Kennedy continues that given the circumstances, namely, that the USSR could not completely fulfill its obligations, he is trying to be as understanding of the Soviet position as possible. A. I. Mikoyan says, I disagree with the statement that the Soviet Union has not fulfilled its obligations. The Soviet Union did everything that was promised by Khrushchev on the part of inspections. These promises were made within the Soviet Union’s rights as the owner of the missiles. As for ground inspections on Cuban territory, Khrushchev’s letter from October 27, and again referenced in the letter from October 28, specifically stipulated that this can be done only with the consent of the Cuban government. We found a mutually satisfactory alternative, another way to monitor the removal of missiles. This was done with the participation of U Thant, acting as UN secretary-general. Therefore, we completed the dismantling and removal of the missiles under control in an agreed format. We fulfilled our obligations to you. Now it is already a fact of history. I would like to ask, do you want to move backward or forward? Presenting an array of conditions for Cuba cannot be seen as anything but a retreat from the guarantees of non-

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aggression. We are ready to go further, ready to add new conditions; however, everything has to be consistent with the spirit of the exchange of the messages. You can make any statement you like about the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, but it is not a subject for inclusion in the declaration. J. Kennedy notes that the messages did not say anything about a declaration. If you do not like the wording, Kennedy continues, then give us your wording. But we say directly that we will not attack Cuba. Castro needs to change his behavior. A. I. Mikoyan says that Castro himself announced that he wants to live in peace and wants to have negotiations with the United States. J. Kennedy points out, if this is the case, why cannot Castro agree to the U.S. wording? A. I. Mikoyan says that conditions such as “if the government of Cuba does not . . .” would be offensive to any nation. J. Kennedy says, but the statement about nonaggression is also unusual. Kennedy then asks whether N. S. Khrushchev would agree to the wording along the lines of: “This commitment will no longer be valid if nuclear weapons are brought into Cuba by China or any other country.” A. I. Mikoyan says that this is a completely different issue, and does not have anything to do with us. J. Kennedy says that the following points should be reflected in the declaration: The United States remains bound by the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro; the United States receives assurance that offensive weapons will not be imported to Cuba in the future; Castro can count on a nonaggression guarantee, if he refrains from subversive activities against his neighbors. Kennedy notes that Mikoyan spent a lot of time in Cuba, but to him, Kennedy, he is giving very little time. Therefore, it would be advisable to continue the negotiations between Kuznetsov and McCloy in New York. Kennedy adds that the Soviet Union should not be worried about an attack on Cuba. We, continues Kennedy, have still not succeeded in coming to an agreement on a system of guarantees that offensive weapons will not be brought to Cuba again. You oppose the flights over Cuba, which we carry out for this purpose. Let us continue the negotiations, and perhaps we will find a coordinated decision. Mikoyan says that he agrees with the spirit of the president’s statements, but has to point out that the United States is attempting to raise other questions without having reached an agreement on the main issue. The main issue, as it was fixed in the exchange of messages, is the guarantee of nonaggression. We have fulfilled our obligations regarding the missiles and we will remove the bombers. It looks like it was easier to carry out the actual measures than to formulate them verbally. You cannot put forward new regulations as a condition of providing guarantees to Cuba; you cannot include positions about flights over Cuba without the consent of the Cuban government. The provisions for the normalization of the situation need to be common to all countries in the region. If Kennedy will give the appropriate instructions to McCloy and Stevenson, there will be a real possibility for progress in the negotiations. Mikoyan asks Kennedy: “What can I report to Khrushchev? Does the U.S. government still adhere to the language contained in the correspondence or not?”

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Kennedy replies that the United States will not invade Cuba and that it will not depart from the position expounded in the messages, and he hopes that the Soviet Union will do the same. As I already said, continues Kennedy, the United States will not attack Cuba and will not allow anyone else to do it. Mikoyan says, in connection with the president’s mention of the statement at the last press conference, that in general the announcement made a positive impression on him, and that he heard from Comrade Khrushchev that he was of the same opinion. Kennedy says that certain progress was already reached in the negotiations; let McCloy and Kuznetsov continue their work in New York. Kennedy notes that he and N. S. Khrushchev understand each other and that he, Kennedy, will fulfill the obligations he assumed. But since his “hands will be tied,” he must pay extremely close attention to the wording of the documents. Kennedy says that he would like to use the opportunity to touch upon a few questions related to Laos. Khrushchev and I reached an agreement on Laos, Kennedy goes on, and I attach a great deal of importance to the implementation of this agreement. I ask you to convey to N. S. Khrushchev that right now three points in the present situation in Laos reveal the violation of spirit of the aforementioned agreement, and this worries me. I am talking about the following: 1. The “North Vietnamese troops” are still not removed from Laos. 2. Their infiltration into South Vietnam continues, reaching at the present time the level of 500 people a month. 3. Recently, on the Plain of Jars, over territory that is controlled by the forces of Pathet Lao, an American plane with foodstuffs was shot down despite the fact that the flight had Souvanna Phouma’s permission, and the fact that the plane was questioned from a local airport control tower and was cleared to continue the flight. Two Americans were killed. It is important that incidents like these do not happen again. Kennedy continues that the Laos issue is very important, because it relates to an actual agreement between him and N. S. Khrushchev. It is necessary that the sides fulfill their obligations. This ensures the success of negotiations on other international issues as well. Mikoyan replies that the Soviet Union fulfilled and will continue to fulfill its obligations in Laos. The president should not have any doubts about this. Kennedy notes further that the USSR and the United States for the most part made it through the Cuban crisis. But there is a risk that the interests of these two biggest and richest world powers can collide in other parts of the world and bring about the danger of a military conflict. Mikoyan asks, wouldn’t the president think that a nonaggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries would serve these goals? This would ease the situation in one of the most important regions of the world—Europe. Kennedy says that at a time when people in Latin America, China, and Asia are in need so much, it is silly for the Soviet Union and the United States to waste time and resources intimidating each other. In these conditions, even thirty nonaggression treaties would not

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help if the USSR considers revolutions in other countries to be their own business, not bearing in mind the United States’ special interests in some regions of the world, for example, in Latin America. Kennedy, returning to the issue of Soviet missiles in Cuba, asks Mikoyan in a halfjoking, half-serious manner whether he would sleep peacefully if, let’s say, 100 missiles positioned against the Soviet Union appeared in Finland unexpectedly. Mikoyan replies that people in the USSR are sleeping peacefully despite the fact that very close, or more precisely right near his homeland of Armenia, there are American military bases in Turkey. The Soviet people know that these missiles are in the Americans’ hands, and the Americans are well informed about the response capabilities of Soviet missiles. Soon you will have to eliminate those bases. Kennedy mentions that he is of the opinion that the missile bases in Turkey and Italy do not serve much of a purpose. For about twenty months, we have been considering whether it makes sense to keep these bases. In conclusion of the conversation, Mikoyan conveys greetings and best wishes of health to Kennedy from Khrushchev. Kennedy thanks him for the good wishes and asks Mikoyan to convey his best wishes to Khrushchev. The conversation lasted three hours and fifteen minutes. Present were, from the Soviet side, the USSR ambassador to the United States, F. Dobrynin; and from the American side, the secretary of state, Dean Rusk, and the adviser to the president on Soviet affairs, L. Thompson. Yu. Vinogradov and I. Bubnov recorded the conversation. 2.XII.62.

Source: Personal Archive of Sergo Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Andrea Hendrickson and Anna Melyakova for the National Security Archive.

Document 47 Transcript of Conversation between Comrade A. I. Mikoyan and U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk

November 30, 1962 The conversation took place during a breakfast hosted by D. Rusk in honor of A. I. Mikoyan. D. Rusk says that, in President Kennedy’s opinion, yesterday’s talk brought about definite progress and, it has been observed, that he, Rusk, is uncertain whether or not the guarantee not to attack Cuba can be discussed in a different framework. He further notes that the United States is extremely interested in the declaration of a zone in Latin America free of nuclear weapons. In Rusk’s opinion, this proposal allows for good prospects and will grant every country in this region guarantees that will resolve the issue of Cuba retaining nuclear weapons. We express great interest, continues Rusk, in a comment made in one of N. S. Khrushchev’s dispatches to Kennedy about measures for preventing a sneak attack, that is, the establishment of control posts alongside critical national locations, and specifically at major railroad junctions, ports, airports, and major highways. If we are successful in moving forward towards a resolution to this problem, it will help to resolve the broader problem of disarmament. It is not clear to us whether this is part of a general disarmament program, or if the Soviet Union is prepared to discuss this question separately as a first step towards universal disarmament. Concerning the arms race issue, Rusk says that he could trace the policy of the United States in this respect back to 1945. In comparison with 1950, we have doubled our expenditures on armaments, but not because General Motors or other firms want to attack someone, but rather because of the invasion of South Korea. An intensive arms race began specifically from this period onward. A. I. Mikoyan says that he does not want to go into the history of disarmament negotiations let alone dissect why the United States began to build up its stockpiles. Now is the 548

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time to consider disarmament. We want disarmament. The arms race is a massive burden for the United States, too. Disarmament talks have already dragged on for many years and the Soviet Union, as is well known, showed the greatest possible flexibility while the United States has moved forward slowly. It should be remembered, the Soviet Union took heed of, and agreed with, de Gaulle’s wish that the first priority of disarmament be the liquidation of delivery systems for nuclear weapons. We were ready for this yet understood that the United States would not go along with us. We then assumed a more flexible position, having put forth as the first stage of disarmament an agreement on the defined quantity of missiles in the possession of the USSR and United States. Yet the United States is not making any constructive proposals on matters of disarmament. On the topic of creating a Latin American nonnuclear zone, A. I. Mikoyan continued, I read the Brazilian proposal, to which Ecuador added decent amendments. Needless to say, the version that forbade Latin American states themselves from possessing nuclear weapons, while the United States would be allowed to have such weapons in those countries at their bases, was unacceptable. Under the condition that the United States will not have nuclear weapons at their bases in Latin America, and that a few details will be clarified, this proposal merits study and support. During our talk, Dorticós expressed a similar view. With such a course, stressed A. I. Mikoyan, there could be a solution to the issue touched upon yesterday by the president—that in the long-run weapons will not be brought back to Cuba. I am satisfied by what Rusk said today about how the president considers yesterday’s discussion to have produced real progress. I am of the same opinion. I had wanted to ask the president at the end of our conversation if he thought we had made any progress or not, but I did not ask. Rusk says that he would want to return to the proposal to create a Latin American nonnuclear zone. It would seem that there are several misunderstandings from both sides since, in Rusk’s opinion, the United States and USSR are not too far removed from one another in their positions. In the event that such a zone is established, the United States assumes that the American military base in Cuba at Guantánamo and the Panama Canal must be included. We do not want, Rusk continued, to apply this to Puerto Rico since it is part of the United States and we are not discussing whether or not the United States should be included in a nonnuclear zone. The creation of such a zone would hamper the future placement of nuclear weapons on any bases in Latin America. It is also implied that Guantánamo and the Panama Canal will be open to inspections just like anywhere else in the zone. A. I. Mikoyan says that this is an important point. Rusk observes that they must go further and, in his opinion, the difference in opinions is not as great as it seems to the Soviet side. It must be openly said, continues Rusk, we do not think that this proposal should extend to the shipment of nuclear weapons through the Panama Canal. For instance, the deployment of missiles from the East Coast to the West Coast of the United States. We could not agree to that. With respect to positioning nuclear weapons in the Panama Canal, we are willing to agree not to send weapons there.

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A. I. Mikoyan: As I understand it, this could be summed up in the following way— neither Latin American governments, nor the governments of other states with bases in Latin America, will be allowed to deploy nuclear weapons there. D. Rusk: I agree with this, and in this respect the United States theoretically has, for example, a right to Trinidad. There are now around 400 defensive troops, but the United States will not deploy nuclear weapons. A. I. Mikoyan: Your comments were one of the indicators of the progress achieved yesterday. I will submit this to the representative of the Council of Ministers, Mikoyan continued, and we will send you a message with our official opinion. D. Rusk: I have a feeling that the Cubans added several of their unacceptable points. A. I. Mikoyan: Each side has a right to add whatever they see fit. D. Rusk: I would like to get back to the matter of preventing a sneak attack and to the organization of monitoring posts at critical points and ask if they can make progress on this. A. I. Mikoyan: I had not intended to avoid this question, and had a mind to say something about it. D. Rusk: Should they actually start their discussion on the issue with the intention of reaching something conclusive? On this note, I would like to know how I am supposed to interpret the comment made by Khrushchev’s representative about a sneak attack and inspections. A. I. Mikoyan: The Soviet Union, as early as 1955, introduced the matter of preventing a sneak attack and, in particular, the organization of monitoring posts. We were coming from the standpoint that disarmament takes a number of years and in the course of disarming there would still be the danger of a sneak attack. There could be no doing away with pacts automatically taking effect in the event of a war. Therefore, there must be a revised preventive system in place against the threat of a sneak attack. This system must keep tabs on the accumulation of troops at ports, major railroad junctions, highways, airports, and so on. Missiles come in all types, but a war cannot be waged with missiles alone. It would be necessary to have a place for the deployment and accumulation of troops. And if this is under control, then a sneak attack would be impossible. We are in favor of carrying out the creation of these sorts of control posts during the first stage of disarmament, but in the form of an agreed-upon general disarmament plan. Comrade Khrushchev’s proposal is a constituent part of the first stage of a general disarmament program. Attempting to detach this issue from the broader problem of disarmament will give the impression that the United States wants to put solving the matter of general disarmament on the back-burner. D. Rusk: The establishment of such posts alongside other means of preventing a surprise attack would be advantageous for both sides. Perhaps this should be implemented even before the first stage of a general disarmament program, having drawn up a preparatory “preschool” stage or, as they say, a “kindergarten” stage. A. I. Mikoyan (in a joking tone): We are not children anymore, we have grown up. D. Rusk: Well, we could still learn a thing or two from children.

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A. I. Mikoyan: We should hardly adhere to “kindergarten” principles with policy. With policy, children have nothing to teach us. As I understand you are pushing disarmament aside and, apparently, you consider it to be a lost cause. Is that right? D. Rusk: No, that is not what we think. We believe that the complete disarmament package could be divided into three groups of issues. First, and most difficult, are talks on complete and total disarmament. The United States listened with interest to what the Soviet Union said about the maintenance of a defined quantity of nuclear weapons delivery systems during the first stage. Concerning later stages, we must see if there is any basis for an agreement. Second, the matter of banning nuclear tests. I hope that we can make significant progress on this issue. And third, separate issues which can be separated from the disarmament process. For example, the creation of a nonnuclear zone in Latin America, measures to prevent a surprise attack, and an agreement on the nontransfer of nuclear weapons to third parties. Such issues, which are not immediately connected to complete and total disarmament, would nevertheless lead to reduced tensions and would in and of themselves have great importance. A. I. Mikoyan: I would like to talk about the attractiveness of the proposal made by scientists for automatic monitoring of underground nuclear tests. This proposal was conceived by English and American scientists at the Pugwash Conference this summer, even Soviet scientists had taken part in the proposal’s preparation. At that time the Soviet Union also introduced a new, constructive element. Now we do not dismiss the possibility of installing apparatuses for automatic seismic monitoring stations with the help of foreign specialists while observing defined conditions and precautionary steps against espionage. It is stressed that the Soviet Union will not come to an agreement on test bans that does not include underground tests. We believe that all conditions are in place for the drafting of an agreement on the banning of all nuclear tests. The agreement is waiting on the United States. D. Rusk: We will be prepared to discuss questions about the banning of nuclear tests in the future. These “black boxes,” as the Americans call them, are incapable of distinguishing an earthquake from an underground nuclear explosion. A. I. Mikoyan: British scientists confirm that such stations are capable of telling one from another. But you and I are not scientists, let’s defer to what the specialists think. D. Rusk: The United States is in favor of conducting meetings with scientists from England, the United States, and the USSR. A. I. Mikoyan: The specialists have already met and made their recommendations. D. Rusk: The scientists have not come to a conclusion on how to differentiate nuclear tests from earthquakes. They merely said that automated stations can replace manned stations. We presume that the Soviet Union has instruments capable of telling the difference between underground nuclear explosions and earthquakes over a large distance. If the Soviet Union could put a flight team in space when the space ships were located only three miles apart from one another, then it can also develop a perfect seismic apparatus. It is

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good to know that there is such an apparatus, Rusk said. Unfortunately, we do not know what your apparatus is. A. I. Mikoyan: I would like to ask you a question that I asked the president yesterday, but did not receive an answer. The general idea relates to the U.S. position on finalizing a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. It was mentioned that the president either passed over the question, did not have enough time to answer it, or was merely demonstrating his diplomatic skill. It is possible that you will not answer the question, but it would be good if Robert Kennedy, with whom I will be meeting this evening, could say something on the subject. D. Rusk: I discussed this matter with Gromyko and, as a result of the established exchange of views, there would be definite progress. Indeed, the American side is interested in finding a path that would minimize the risk of confrontation between NATO powers and the Warsaw Pact countries. The United States has not been given the authority from NATO states to concretely discuss this issue, but it is ready to discuss it in a strictly unofficial capacity. Further, one aspect of relations between the NATO countries and members of the Warsaw Pact is the matter of nontransference of nuclear weapons to national forces of other states. On this issue, I had conversations with Gromyko and at the present time can already talk about it in a more concrete form. I intend to talk over this issue with Dobrynin up until his trip to Europe for a meeting of the NATO council. This could be an extremely important step. This being the case, I acknowledge as critical the moment that a relative understanding of a refusal to transfer nuclear weapons to other states not only entails a refusal in a straightforward sense but also in a more oblique sense. On the questions of ceasing nuclear testing and the nontransfer of nuclear weapons, Beijing plays an important role. Judging by the claims put forth by the Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily] newspaper, Beijing is against any measures in this sphere. I also wonder whether or not we had the same feeling. I personally consider that the Soviet Union and the United States have shared interests in not permitting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, regardless of the ideological or political orientations of our states. A. I. Mikoyan: I would like to stress that the United States does not recognize China, yet you just broadly expressed interest in China’s position on this series of issues. Naturally, we are conversing for the USSR, not for China, and cannot speak for them. China did not authorize us to negotiate on its behalf with the United States. So I ask if you should be understood as having said that if China takes a particular position on the topics of interest that the United States will consider a resolution of such agreements as being impossible? D. Rusk: In the draft agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests there is a position, by which if any country continues to conduct tests, then signatory states will be allowed to resume testing as they wish. As far as the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is concerned, I told Gromyko that it must be included in the first point that nuclear powers will not transfer such weapons to other governments and will not assist other countries in the production of nuclear weapons. Also, in the second point it should be said that other governments themselves will not receive or produce nuclear weapons. It is clear that the re-

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fusal of any country capable of producing nuclear weapons to sign the agreement would raise serious concerns. So, for instance, the Soviet Union would be discomforted if France were to refuse to sign such an agreement . . . as would the United States if Beijing were to refuse. If this happens and China takes such a position, it will not only prompt serious concern on the part of the United States, but it would also cast doubt on the usefulness of such agreements. A. I. Mikoyan: The very root of the American formula there is the danger that the Germans could receive nuclear weapons, under another flag, through NATO. This could come about through a loophole for the Germans, and this loophole would have to be closed. D. Rusk: You are right, this is the most important issue. We are prepared to agree that we will not transfer nuclear weapons to other countries, that is, directly. But how an oblique transfer of weapons is understood should be explicitly stated, and for this we need talks. On its part, the United States does not wish to broaden the number of countries in which nuclear weapons would be placed. As is well known, the United States and France are not in agreement on this matter. All sides of this question should be clearly envisioned, and I intend to speak with Ambassador Dobrynin about this. A. I. Mikoyan: So do you have the guts to take the heat from your allies in NATO? If there is a war, then we will use nuclear weapons to defend the entire socialist camp, but we will not give these weapons to a third party. So, how will you act? D. Rusk: You illustrated your position very well. We must clearly state what is envisioned under the nontransfer of weapons. There are American weapons in several other countries, but under American control. First and foremost, the United States is interested in other countries not being able to settle the issue of using these weapons. The United States does not have in mind the transfer of atomic weapons, but rather consultations with its allies about the placement and use of such weapons, and the United States reserves this right. A. I. Mikoyan: It would be desirable to continue discussing this matter with our Ambassador. The Cuban question could lead to nuclear war. We have now gotten through the most heated period of this crisis and hope that the crisis can be quickly and finally settled. But there is another issue. I mean the issue of Berlin, which could also lead to an extremely dangerous position, and it cannot be drawn out forever. This is an issue about the German peace treaty and the settlement, on this basis, of the question of West Berlin. We are showing incredible patience, putting off the signing of the peace treaty and as such hoped that the Western powers would understand the necessity of liquidating the remainders of World War II. Over the past two or three years, talks have allowed for some movement forward. I recall that in 1959 [John Foster] Dulles complained as if the six-month long period that we had called for was some sort of ultimatum and the United States could not settle such an important matter in that short period of time. It was explained to him that there was no such ultimatum and that from a well-advised approach to the matter on the part of the West we are prepared to put off the resolution of this question. The period of time is not of the utmost importance to us. The most important thing is a readiness to understand

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the necessity of resolving the German question, for the time being it has not exacerbated international tensions. From Khrushchev’s well-known message, you know about our next proposition regarding western troops in Berlin. I do not want to expound upon the point of this proposition, but I cannot avoid noting that you have thus far remained silent on this point and have not introduced any constructive proposals. This could be taken as you wanting to indefinitely draw out the matter, freeze it, and make the occupation of Western Berlin permanent. We once more assert that if we come to believe that Western powers do not want an agreement on West Berlin, then we will be required to make our own decision. We do not want this, we would like to reach an agreed-upon solution with our allies from World War II. D. Rusk: There have been many conversations about Berlin, and I am happy to say that some progress has been made. The West is ready to move forward under the condition that the Soviet Union will reciprocate. We have gotten the impression that as soon as we get close to an agreement on a definite point, attempting to agree with the Soviet Union, this point will be put aside and the Soviet Union will raise a new point. I believe that both sides must demonstrate sincere reciprocity in resolving this matter. However, we are told that the issue of East Berlin cannot be discussed and that our interests in Eastern Berlin are practically nonexistent. We are told: Only discuss West Berlin. But we consider this to be an absence of the spirit of reciprocity. Over the course of several years, we have said that the presence of Western troops in West Berlin is critically important for us. We are not saying that such a situation must be kept forever, we do not want to make the regime of occupation eternal. We put forth proposals, you reject them, and vice versa. But this does not mean that we are the only ones responsible for the lack of an agreement. A. I. Mikoyan: I could respond to these comments with a reproach, but I do not want to do this and instead will ask only one question. For how long and on what basis does the United States want to keep its forces in West Berlin? D. Rusk: It is difficult to call some sort of defined period for the settling of the Berlin question outside of the framework of a general peaceful resolution with Germany. The resolution of the West Berlin matter, just like the resolution of the entire German matter, can be reached in a way that does not create a huge crisis. Time itself will help in resolving it. Relations between West Germany and East Germany can change if they work toward an improvement in those relations, the development of trade, if they will live in the world with one another and so forth. We are prepared to approach a resolution to the German question in one of three ways: 1. A decision of the German question in its entirety. This would allow for an end to a state of war and an occupied status. 2. The German problem must be seen from the standpoint of existing facts, that is, the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), East Germany, and West Berlin. 3. Think about how to approach a resolution to the problem and how to create a spirit of cooperation [text illegible]. The United States proposes the founding of a permanent [word illegible] at the level of ministers of foreign affairs.

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But for the time being, not one of the three approaches has led to an agreement. There is no sense of progress in this. We want to make a new attempt in the hope that the Soviet Union wants the same thing. We are ready to seek a resolution that would be suitable for both sides and that would satisfy our interests. We are certain that we can find a peaceful solution to this problem. A. I. Mikoyan: according to international law, Berlin is part of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, i.e., East Germany), and we could demand its inclusion as a part of the capital of the GDR. But the GDR understands the established position and agreed to West Berlin’s receipt of a special status as a free city. We have no intention of interfering in the domestic affairs of West Berlin. [Several words illegible] get rid of the occupation regime. The best outcome, of course, would be to conclude the German matter with an agreement between all allies from the bygone war, and on this basis settle the issue of West Berlin. But if this is impossible, we are prepared to complete two separate agreements on West Berlin. If time is helpful to the settlement of several issues, then the matter of West Berlin, moreover, [several words illegible] reach a breaking point. Think about it again. D. Rusk: The United States is prepared to extend talks on a resolution to the Berlin question at any time. If the parties involved show a real spirit of reciprocity, a resolution to this problem will be found. The United States is in Berlin by an agreement from 1949, when it was given a part of the territory of West Germany. We would like to get rid of this ongoing source of tension and find a basis for a tolerable resolution that takes our vitally important interests into account. It is difficult, but nevertheless must be tried. We do not want to draw out the discussion of this matter for the sake of drawing it out. The Soviet Union is responsible to the same extent as we are for the drawn-out settlement of this matter. If we find a course toward a crisis-free resolution of this problem, it will be better for our countries and people. I think that in this case I can speak on behalf of the president. He thinks that we can reach an acceptable settlement to the Berlin issue and move on to settling other important problems since we still have much to do for our people. A. I. Mikoyan: The Soviet Union is awaiting a response from the president in connection with our proposals on West Berlin and the German question overall. D. Rusk: We have also raised a series of proposals, but there was only one response: It is not a subject for discussion. A. I. Mikoyan: Think again. A way out of this established position must be found. Understand the significance of this issue for the Soviet Union. D. Rusk: I hope that Moscow will also think this over again. It is a difficult question and we all must attentively think it through again. The fact of the matter is that we are not working on behalf of some outside party. The question of West Berlin touches on critically important interests for the United States itself. It would be a mistake to think that the initiative of the United States has been paralyzed because of pressure exerted by any one of its allies. A. I. Mikoyan: From what was said, it is obvious that we can find common ground between the interests of the USSR and the United States. At the end of the conversation, in agreeing on what to say to representatives of the press, Rusk stated that in today’s message for the press concrete matters that had been discussed

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must be listed, especially the Berlin issue, in order to get rid of several negative sentiments held by the press in light of the brevity of yesterday’s statement about the outcomes of the meeting with the president. The talk lasted for two and a half hours. In attendance, on the Soviet side, there were the ambassador of the USSR to the United States, A. F. Dobrynin, and the counselor of the embassy, G. M. Kornienko. On the American side, there were U.S. deputy secretary of state George Ball, adviser to the president on the USSR Llewellyn Thompson; and the deputy assistant secretary of state, Richard H. Davis.

Source: Personal Archive of Sergo Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Matt McGorrin for the National Security Archive.

Document 48 A. I. Mikoyan Visits a Shopping Center in Rockville, Maryland

November 30, 1962 4:30 p.m.–5:30 p.m.: A. I. Mikoyan, in the time between meetings and official appearances, visited a recently opened large, modern shopping center belonging to the prominent American company “Giant” in Rockville, Maryland, a town bordering Washington. The shopping center in Rockville, occupying along with an automobile service station a plot of 16 hectares, is a complex under one roof, uniting grocery and manufactured goods stores, and also points for daily services of the population—dry cleaning, repair for clothes and shoes, a laundromat, a barbershop, and a gas station with a small garage for repairs and car washes. In this shopping center there are around seven hundred workers, who are capable of serving up to ten thousand shoppers. The self-service method is widely in effect here. A. I. Mikoyan spent about an hour in the shopping center and carefully familiarized himself with the system of service and the transfer and packaging of foods and goods, and spoke with the merchants and shoppers. Americans who met with A. I. Mikoyan were warm and friendly. Many approached Mikoyan to shake hands. At the automated drycleaner’s, the work of a machine was demonstrated and explained by one of the shoppers, Russian-speaking housewife Mrs. Musa Grant. An employee of the pharmaceutical department of the center, Allen Sherman, a salesman in the meat department, Nick Gett, other salesmen, and dozens of shoppers addressed their Soviet guest by wishing him success, happiness, and good health. We are happy that you visited our center, said one of the escorting directors of the Giant Company to A. I. Mikoyan. A. I. Mikoyan was accompanied by the spouse of Ambassador A. F. Dobrynin and embassy employees. Source: Personal Archive of Sergo Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Matt McGorrin for the National Security Archive. 557

Document 49 Memorandum of Conversation between A. I. Mikoyan and Robert Kennedy

November 30, 1962 On the evening of November 30, A. I. Mikoyan was present at a dinner in honor of the American secretary of the interior, Stewart Udall. The guests included Robert Kennedy, the attorney general; the deputy secretary of state, George Ball; the chairman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers, Walter Heller; the chairman of the Board of Directors of the New York Times, Orville Dryfoos; and the Soviet ambassador, A. F. Dobrynin. All the American guests were with their wives, except for Robert Kennedy, who came with his eldest daughter, age thirteen. He has seven children in all. He said that his wife, together with the other six [children], who had the flu, had gone to Florida to bring them up to [good] condition. Before dinner, Robert Kennedy, after conversations of a protocol-like nature in the presence of all, asked A. I. Mikoyan to step into another room, where one on one (Dobrynin) [they] first touched on the matter of one Zaslavskii (a Soviet citizen), who married an American tourist, but our court annulled the marriage. He [Kennedy] said that he is embarrassed to present this matter officially, since it has no bearing on the relations between our governments. But for the minister of justice [i.e., attorney general], the resolution of this question is important. The question is small, but delicate, and its resolution would be greeted with satisfaction. Then he touched on the major questions for which they had left the company—the significance of yesterday’s conversations with President Kennedy and the need for contacts between Khrushchev and Kennedy and mutual actions. The president, said Robert Kennedy, considers yesterday’s conversation extremely useful, promoting further mutual understanding between our governments and their heads. 558

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In this respect, this meeting can be characterized as definite progress. Such is the opinion of the president himself. What is most important now, continued R. Kennedy, the most important, even more important than the fates of my children and your grandchildren, although they, of course, are the nearest and dearest to us, is the question of mutual understanding between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy. Indeed, it now decides the fate of the world. One must admit that in the course of the recent crisis, their personal relations and mutual trust underwent serious trials, as a result of which, frankly speaking, damage was sustained. Therefore, it is very important to do everything to restore fully the trust on which so much depends. We ourselves understand the need for this, for we must look ahead. We, concluded R. Kennedy, sincerely hope that the development of our relations can [now] follow a happier course than in the past. A. I. Mikoyan replied to R. Kennedy that he fully agrees with the idea of the importance for preserving peace and for the basic improvement of relations between our countries of good personal relations between N. S. Khrushchev and President Kennedy, their mutual understanding and trust of one another. As one of N. S. Khrushchev’s comrades in arms [soratnik], said A. I. Mikoyan, I can assure you that exactly these thoughts define his approach to his relations with the U.S. president. N. S. Khrushchev values the personal quality of these relations. The Soviet government renders its due to the self-possession [otdaet dolzhnoe vyderzhke] exhibited by the president in the most dangerous moment, when the world stood at the edge of thermonuclear war, but by mutual concessions and compromises, succeeded in averting this war. Moscow, continued A. I. Mikoyan, noticed the positive role you, the president’s brother, played during the confidential negotiations between the president and the head of the Soviet state. Of course, we understand that you did this, as did we, in the interests of one’s own country, one’s own people. It was important, however, that you understood correctly, in the critical moment, what those interests were. Let us now complete the outlined resolution to the Cuban question, without complicating it with trivial formal cavils [melochnaia pridirka], or even worse, some deviation from the agreement on the final settlement of this question. Indeed, if one speaks the truth, there is not much left to do; it is only necessary to put in writing or to finalize, without excessive procrastination that which the American side obligated itself to do during the exchange of messages between N. S. Khrushchev and the president. R. Kennedy noted that he agreed that little of essence remained to be done—indeed, “it’s 90 percent done,” although there are still difficulties that must be overcome. But he, R. Kennedy, did not intend to analyze these difficulties. They were the subject of detailed discussion in New York. He only wanted to emphasize briefly that with which he began: the importance of further developing mutual understanding between the president and N. S. Khrushchev. This will determine to a large extent the success and solution of other questions that still await settlement. A. I. Mikoyan agreed with this. Returning to his conversation with the president, A. I. Mikoyan said, that although in its course there were a few sharp [ostryi] moments, on the whole he agrees with R. Kennedy’s evaluation of the conversation with the president.

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To all appearances, this was reflected in the ensuing conversation with Rusk, which took place in a businesslike and friendly atmosphere, clearly, not without the influence of the president. R. Kennedy smiled, but he did not say anything. In concluding the conversation, R. Kennedy asked [Mikoyan] to give greetings to N. S. Khrushchev. In his turn A. I. Mikoyan sent greetings to the president. Robert Kennedy showed interest in visiting the Soviet Union and expressed this desire. A. I. Mikoyan said that this was a good idea and completely realizable. If the decrease in tension between [our] countries continues further and the political atmosphere warms up, then this trip would not only be interesting but useful for him. After our return to the other room, Udall made the first toast to the leaders of the two great nations—N. S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy—“people of strength and peace.” One theme of the toasts and remarks of the American representatives during the meal was to express satisfaction over the fact that our two countries have succeeded in avoiding a clash in the Cuban crisis and [to support] the need to search for ways of avoiding the repetition of similar crises in the future. Note the following pronouncements. Udall emphasized the pleasant impressions from his trip to the Soviet Union and from his meeting with N. S. Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders. He said that his feelings of sympathy for the Soviet people grew stronger, and he said so despite criticism of these statements in the United States, still in September. He asked me to transmit his invitation to visit the United States to the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Comrade Novikov, and to the energy and electrification minister, Comrade Neporozhnyi, noting in jest that he was ready to show “some secrets,” as was done during his visit to the Soviet side. A. I. Mikoyan pronounced a toast to the host, Secretary Udall, his wife, and children, who were presented to Mikoyan by their parents. Udall has six children. A. I. Mikoyan joked that although Khrushchev’s acquaintance with Udall was brief, and Mikoyan’s acquaintance with Udall at the time even briefer, Udall immediately won over Khrushchev and then Mikoyan. Khrushchev said to Mikoyan: What a simpatico [simpatichnyi] and good man is Mr. Udall! When I met him at dinner, said Mikoyan, he made such an impression on me. There are some people, whom you know for years, but actually do not know, and suddenly after decades you see the real face of the man. And there are also those, who after several hours, you can tell what kind of man they are. Udall belongs to this category. When he returned to his homeland after visiting the Soviet Union he landed in an atmosphere of anti-Soviet hysteria. The agents of monopolies, the press and radio tried to get anti-Soviet statements out of him, counter to those he had made in the Soviet Union. Udall’s conscientiousness [dobrosovestnost’] was confirmed and he did not give in to this pressure and said what he thought, that is, he repeated in the United States what he had said in the Soviet Union. A. I. Mikoyan transmitted greetings from N. S. Khrushchev and offered a toast to [Khrushchev’s] health. Ball underlined that the necessary condition for greater trust between the USSR and U.S. was our renunciation of “the practices of a closed society,” stating, in particular, that this should be demonstrated concretely by the broadening of exchanges and in our agreement to the sale of bourgeois newspapers on the streets of Moscow.

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Replying to Ball, Mikoyan said, that so long as the arms race continues, it is impossible and unrealistic to demand the open society of which Ball spoke. You also do not have an open society. You have more advertising [reklam], but society is closed, but in its own way. When the arms race is eliminated and disarmament takes place, we will then open many places in which the presence today of foreigners is forbidden. Then we will have open exchanges and contacts. Wishing to draw Heller, the chairman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers, into the conversation (he appears pleasant, a relatively young professor, for the most part silent), A. I. Mikoyan asked Heller how he would explain the fact that, in particular, the United States has more steel producing potential than the USSR, but the USSR in the third quarter of this year produced more steel than the United States. “If you did not need so much steel, why build so many factories and remove huge amounts of capital from circulation, including the living work force [that has become] unemployed. In general, what measures are you taking to remove such disproportions and are they removable at all in a free enterprise system?” Heller avoided answering by changing the topic of conversation, not wishing to enter an argument where he felt himself weak. A. I. Mikoyan in the context of the dinner did not insist on an answer. Heller promptly supported Mikoyan’s statement on the appropriateness of transferring power and means freed up by the end of the arms race toward raising the standard of living of the people from underdeveloped countries and of the people of the states participating in the arms race. A. I. Mikoyan invited Heller to visit the Soviet Union. Those present asked Mikoyan if, in his opinion, Castro is interested in normalizing relations and about Castro himself as the ruler of Cuba. A. I. Mikoyan, in his statements about his trip to Cuba, underlined Cuba’s interest in having the chance to build a [word illegible] life in a peaceful setting, and the lack of any serious signs of readiness on the part of the United States to normalize [relations] with Cuba. Dobrynin and Bubnov transcribed the conversation.

Source: Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation; provided to CWIHP. Copy on file at the National Security Archive. Translation by David Wolff for the CWIHP.

Document 50 Message Sent by A. I. Mikoyan to the CC CPSU on a Talk with Stewart Udall and Robert Kennedy (No. 2019)

December 1, 1962 CC CPSU: On the evening of November 30, the U.S. secretary of the interior, Stewart Udall, arranged a dinner at his home. Present on the American side: R. Kennedy; Ball, Rusk’s first deputy; Heller, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under the president; and Orville Dryfoos, publisher of the New York Times. On our side there was Comrade Dobrynin. Before dinner, R. Kennedy asked me to speak with him one on one (Dobrynin interpreted). The president, said R. Kennedy, considers your meeting with him yesterday to be extremely useful in promoting long-term mutual understanding between our governments and their leaders. In this sense, the meeting can be seen as definite progress. Such is the opinion of the president. What is most important now? continued R. Kennedy. Most important—even more important than the fate of my children or your grandchildren, although to us they are, it goes without saying, incredibly close and dear—is the question of mutual understanding between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy. Now this could determine the fate of the world. It should be recognized that over the course of the recent crisis their personal relations and mutual trust for one another underwent serious trials. As a result, they were, speaking frankly, damaged—as is well known. Therefore, it is now very important to do everything possible to completely restore this personal trust on which so much depends. We ourselves understand the necessity of this since we need to look ahead. We sincerely hope, concluded R. Kennedy, that the development of our relations can follow a more fortuitous path than it has thus far. 562

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I responded to R. Kennedy, saying that I completely share the thought he expressed about the importance of good personal relations between N. S. Khrushchev and President Kennedy, their mutual understanding and trust for one another, for the preservation of peace and a fundamental improvement in the relations of our countries. As one of Khrushchev’s colleagues, I said further, I can believe that these precise ideas define his approach to his relations with the president of the United States. N. S. Khrushchev values the personal character of these relations. The Soviet government is showing necessary restraint, which was shown by the president at the most critical moment, when the world was on the brink of thermonuclear war, but mutual concessions and compromise from both sides succeeded in averting such a war. In Moscow, I continued, they noticed the large and important role that you played, as the president’s brother, over the course of confidential negotiations between the president and the head of the Soviet government. Needless to say, we understand that you did this, as did we, in the interests of your own country and people. It is important, however, that you correctly understood what these vital interests were determined by at that critical moment. Let’s now conclude the outlined resolution of the Cuban issue, without drawing it out with any sort of nitpicking about its form or, more significantly, some sort of digression from an agreement on the final resolution of this matter. After all, in all honesty, there is not all that much left to do—only to formalize without unnecessary delay the commitment that the American side took upon itself during the exchange of messages between N. S. Khrushchev and the president. R. Kennedy stated he agrees that, in essence, there is little left to do—because “90 percent has already been done,” although there are still well-known difficulties which must be surmounted. However, R. Kennedy does not intend to analyze these difficulties right now. They are the subject of a special discussion in New York. He would like once more to just briefly underscore what he began with: the importance of the long-term development of mutual-understanding between the president and N. S. Khrushchev. In many ways, this will determine the successful settling of many different issues which still await their own resolution. I agreed with this. Further touching upon my talk with the president, I said that although there were several heated moments, overall I agree with the president’s assessment that was put forth by R. Kennedy. All things considered, this was reflected in my last conversation with Rusk, which also took place in a professional and friendly atmosphere, apparently not without the president’s influence. R. Kennedy smiled, but did not say anything. At the end of the conversation, R. Kennedy requested that his greetings be sent to N. S. Khrushchev. In turn, I sent my greetings to the president. I also noted that it would be useful for him, R. Kennedy, to spend time in our country—not now, but when the global situation has improved a bit. It was remarked that this idea was obviously very appealing to him. In sum, R. Kennedy’s comments apparently, among other things, also reflected the president’s desire to patch things up and improve the impression that we might have about yesterday’s talk with him. Specifically, he is showing necessary cooperation with us in

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reaching a resolution to the Cuban issue on the basis of his agreement with N. S. Khrushchev, which was reached through their exchange of messages. As the president understands, this in turn can have resonance on our position in deciding other international issues which are now much closer to being the order of the day. Concerning conversations with other Americans in attendance, I will talk about this in Moscow. In general it should be said that Udall earned his salt with us; he conducted himself very well and the evening he had organized was both pleasant and useful. 1.XII.62

A. Mikoyan

Source: Personal Archive of Sergo Mikoyan, donated to the National Security Archive. Translation by Matt McGorrin for the National Security Archive.

Notes

Series Preface 1. “ExComm” was nickname for the Executive Committee of the U.S. National Security Council. By far the most influential study during this period was by Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Allison, a political scientist, and Philip Zelikow produced a revised second edition, published by Longman in 1999. 2. On the series of oral history conferences involving U.S., then Soviet, and finally Cuban former officials, see esp. James G. Blight and David A. Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill & Wang, 1989; 2nd ed., Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1990); and James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse (New York: Pantheon, 1993). 3. Although many works on the crisis have appeared since 1991—including important compilations of declassified U.S. documents and ExComm transcripts—only a few English-language narrative accounts seriously explore the Communist side of the story on the basis of newly available Russian evidence: Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964: The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997); and Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008). Fursenko and Naftali updated their analysis in Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006). In addition, some translations of Soviet documents have appeared through the publications (Web and print) of the Cold War International History Project—particularly the Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 5 (Spring 1995) and nos. 8–9 (Winter 1996–97)—and the National Security Archive. One should also note the many articles by Mark Kramer, director of Harvard University’s Project on Cold War Studies, which have not yet appeared in book form but extensively use Russian and other Soviet Bloc sources to reassess the missile crisis. 4. The Russian-language edition—Sergo Mikoyan, Anatomiya Karibskogo Krizisa [The Anatomy of the Caribbean Crisis] (Moscow: Academia, 2006)—contained much material on the U.S. side of the crisis, drawn from sources familiar to non-Russian scholars, and some political analysis of subsequent Latin America Cold War history that was deleted from this edition for space considerations. 565

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5. James G. Blight and Philip Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba’s Struggles with the Superpowers after the Missile Crisis (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), also addresses Soviet-Cuban tensions following the missile crisis, but focuses in particular on the tensions between Havana and Moscow in early 1968 surrounding Fidel Castro’s secret speech to a Cuban Communist Party plenum sharply critical of the Soviets. Naftali and Fursenko also cover Soviet/Cuban tensions in their works using some Russian archival materials, although not in as much depth or with the same records that Mikoyan was able to consult. 6. Although the present volume contains virtually the entire Soviet record of Mikoyan’s November 1962 visit to Cuba, very little about the Cuban side of the missile crisis has become available. For a rare exception, see Philip Brenner, “The Mikoyan-Castro Talks, 4–5 November 1962: The Cuban Version,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin nos. 8–9 (Winter 1996–97): 320, 339–43. To balance the Soviet perspective offered by the documents that appear at the end of this book, one hopes that the Cuban authorities will fully open their records on exchanges with the Soviets during and after the crisis. Historians would also be able to understand Soviet-Cuban relations more accurately if both the Russian and Cuban governments would release the still-closed records of Castro’s extensive talks with Khrushchev during his trip to the Soviet Union in May 1963. 7. Many of these documents were circulated for the October 2002 Havana conference, La Crisis de Octubre: Una visión politica cuarenta años después, which was organized by the National Security Archive to mark the fortieth anniversary of the crisis, but were not subsequently published.

Editor’s Preface and Acknowledgments 1. See James Blight and David Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill & Wang, 1989), and James Blight, Bruce Allyn, and David Welch, Cuba On the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993). 2. Sergo Mikoyan, Anatomiya Karibskogo Krizisa [The anatomy of the Cuban Missile Crisis] (Moscow: Academia, 2006).

Introduction 1. On Mikoyan’s position on Hungary, see Mark Kramer, “New Evidence on Soviet DecisionMaking and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises,” CWIHP Bulletin, nos. 8–9 (Winter 1996– 97): 358–84, esp. 371–72. 2. Anastas Mikoyan, Memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan, Volume I: The Path of Struggle, edited by Sergo Mikoyan (Madison, Conn.: Sphinx Press, 1988). 3. On Cuban involvement in Africa, see Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1965–1976 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003). 4. On the United States–sponsored coup in Guatemala, see Richard Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982); Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944–1954 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); and Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005).

Chapter 1 1. M. A. Bulgakov, Zhizn’ gospodina de Moliera [The life of Monsieur de Molière], Collected Works, 5 vols. (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaya literatura, 1999). 2. Harrison E. Salisbury, To Moscow—and Beyond: A Reporter’s Narrative (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), 167.

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3. Early in the 1920s, he had received the American businessman Armand Hammer in Rostov Oblast and checked the performance of Ford tractors, which Hammer had been marketing in Russia. 4. On Bukharin, see esp. Stephen F. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography 1888–1938 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974). 5. Harrison E. Salisbury, ed., The Soviet Union: The Fifty Years (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967), 14. 6. Harrison Salisbury, “Preface,” in Memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan, Volume I: The Path of Struggle, edited by Sergo Mikoyan (Madison, Conn.: Sphinx Press, 1988), xiv–xv. 7. Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 662–63. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid., 663–64. 10. Author’s personal archive. 11. Anastas I. Mikoyan, Tak bylo [How it was] (Moscow: Vagrius, 1999), 427. 12. The total amount given to the Soviet Union over the duration of the war (the deliveries started in the summer of 1942) came to about $11 billion—3 percent of the United States’ war costs. Alexander Werth, Russia: The Post-War Years (New York: Tarlinger, 1971), xiii. 13. Anastas I. Mikoyan, The Memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan: The Path of Struggle (Madison, Conn.: Sphinx Press, 1988), vii–viii. 14. In his famous speech at American University, in June 1963, John F. Kennedy spoke of 20 million Soviet lives lost. In reality, even the new figure of 27 million might not be adequate. A territory equivalent to the area from the Atlantic Ocean to Chicago was laid to waste, with a comparable number of cities and industries. 15. Author’s personal archive. 16. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Volume 2: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959), 140. 17. Mikoyan, Tak bylo, 500-511. 18. Author’s personal archive. Editor’s note: On this mission, see Sergey Radchenko and David Wolff, “To the Summit via Proxy-Summits: New Evidence from Soviet and Chinese Archives on Mao’s Long March to Moscow, 1949” (and the accompanying translated documents), Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 16 (Fall–Winter 2007–8): 105–82, esp. 130–58. 19. Her work, which was done at Wellesley College, is in my personal archive. 20. Konstantin Simonov, Glazami cheloveka moego pokoleniya [Through the eyes of a person of my generation] (Moscow: APN, 1989), 239-245. 21. Salisbury, Soviet Union, 18. 22. Salisbury, To Moscow, 167. 23. Ibid., 48. 24. My good friend Bela Kiraly, who in 1956 was a general and the military commander of the uprising, read my work and sent me a letter, in which he expressed his opinion that the term “Hungarian Revolution” should be used. 25. Cold War International History Project Bulletin, nos. 8-9 (Winter 1996–97): 366–72. 26. By 1979, Józef Cyrankiewicz had left the post of premier he had occupied for decades due to age and health reasons and worked as Poland’s chairman of the Committee for the Protection of Peace. The meeting with him was organized by Elzhbieta Kotarskaya, my close acquaintance and an employee of the Continents journal. 27. Salisbury, Soviet Union, 445. 28. Characteristically, Nikita Sergeyevich only cursorily mentions Mikoyan’s visit to the United States in his memoirs. He attributed it to 1958, without mentioning the cause and goal of the trip. Because of the shift in date, father’s visit appears to be aimless and unrelated to the tension surrounding Berlin after November 1958. 29. Salisbury, To Moscow, 168–70. 30. This story was vividly depicted by Melor Sturua in an essay published in the weekly Nedelya. Now he lives and teaches in Minneapolis.

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31. Stalin went to sleep at 3 a.m., which affected his deputies, ministers, and their apparatus; anybody could receive a nighttime phone call. Khrushchev introduced a normal work schedule —until 6 p.m. Saturday was later added to the weekend. 32. “Volodia” is the familiar version of the name “Vladimir.” 33. Mikoyan, Memoirs, viii–ix. 34. Cisler had been contracted by the FDR administration to manufacture railway mobile diesel power plants to supply to the USSR through Lend-Lease. He knew that Mikoyan managed the Lend-Lease in the Soviet Union. 35. At the time, Stepan had just finished testing new fighter planes, which he had been doing for twenty-five years as deputy head of the Air Force Test Operations Center in Akhtubinsk on the Lower Volga. His new position was in Moscow, as flight-testing deputy chief designer of the Design Engineering Bureau that produced the manned spaceship Buran—the Soviet version of the American Challenger. Aleksey left the position of Air Force commander of the Turkestan Military District in Tashkent and became deputy head of Air Force Command, which regulated the USSR airspace, including civil aviation. Vano continued to work at the Artem Mikoyan Design Engineering Bureau, where he developed the fighter jets MiG-21b, MiG-23, and MiG-29 from the design stage to the testing stage. He also recently flew to the Federal Republic of Germany to help keep in commission the fighter jets left over from the German Democratic Republic’s Air Force. I had been working for several years as the editor in chief of the academic journal Latin America, and finally defended my dissertation and got my Ph.D., which my father had expected of me for a long time.

Chapter 2 1. He told us that as a specialist in the food industry he was interested in different dishes, and he knew that this always pleased the hosts in a foreign country. His Mexican hosts tried to dissuade him from trying this type of pepper, telling him that tasting the other dishes is good enough and that no European can bear to even have a piece of this pepper in his soup. “Then I took a pepper and ate it whole. My mouth and throat were on fire, but I pretended that it’s as normal for me to eat as bread,” father recalled. We, his family members who knew his willpower, were not at all surprised. 2. Alexander Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 11. 3. Ekho planety, no. 33 (November 1988): 26–27; see also November 11 and 17, 1989. 4. Latin America, no. 1 (1988): 238–42. 5. On October 12, 2002, the participants of a conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis were invited to a reception at the Palace of the Revolution. There were many North Americans at the conference. In any case, the protocol required a coat and tie. Fidel himself wore a military outfit with a tie. 6. Morris H. Morley, Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba, 1952–1986 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 53. 7. Jean Paul Sartre, Sartre on Cuba (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1961), 44. 8. Ibid. 9. Gianni Mina, An Encounter with Fidel Castro: An Interview by Gianni Mina (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1991), 23. 10. Ibid., 158. 11. Author’s record of Fidel Castro’s words. 12. Herbert L. Matthews, Cuba (New York: Macmillan, 1964), 112. 13. Thomas G. Paterson, ed., Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy 1961–1963 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 124. 14. Ibid., 128. 15. James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), 178. 16. John Lukacs, A New History of the Cold War (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1966), 223. 17. Obra Revolucionara (Havana), no. 26 (September 1960): 7–38.

Notes to Pages 46–62

569

18. Fidel Castro, La Revolución Cubana (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1972), 164, 189. 19. Paterson, Kennedy’s Quest, 124, 127. 20. Wayne S. Smith and Esteban Morales Dominguez, eds., Subject to Solution: Problems in CubanU.S. Relations, (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1988), 75. 21. Fidel Castro, Speeches and Addresses (Moscow: Politizdat, 1963), 394. 22. Philip W. Bonsal, Cuba, Castro, and the United States (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971). 23. Wayne S. Smith, The Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic Account of U.S.-Cuban Relations since 1957 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 56. 24. Sartre, Sartre on Cuba, 82–83. The world-famous economist Charles Bettelheim told me about his work in Cuba to create a planned economy, the necessity for which Sartre describes. 25. Smith, Closest of Enemies, 48–49; the quotation is from Herbert Matthews, The Cuban Story (New York: George Brazillier, 1961), 191. 26. Michael R. Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1963 (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 97. 27. Ibid., 101. 28. Hugh Brogan, Kennedy (London: Longman, 1996), 58. 29. Paterson, Kennedy’s Quest, 105. 30. U.S. Department of State Bulletin 44 (May 1, 1961): 617–21. 31. Castro, La Revolución, 20–51. 32. Kenneth M. Coleman and George C. Herring, eds., The Central American Crisis: Sources of Conflict and the Failure of U.S. Policy (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1985), 197. 33. Jules Archer, Thorn in Our Flesh: Castro’s Cuba (New York: Cowles Book Company, 1970), 89. The book’s title reproduces Senator J. William Fulbright’s words to Kennedy before the Bay of Pigs: “Cuba is a thorn in the flesh, but it is not a dagger in the heart.” 34. Both in the USSR and in Russia, we are familiar with this situation; we have elections, but not democracy. 35. Bonsal, Cuba, 141. 36. Castro, La Revolución, 146. 37. Antonio Núñez Jiménez, En Marcha con Fidel (Havana: Editorial Letras Cubanas, 1982). 38. Jorge Castaneda, Companiero: The Life and Death of Che Guevara (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), 173. 39. Author’s personal archive. 40. I am also well acquainted with Ramiro Valdés. Neither the young diplomat nor Alekseyev mentioned his name even once in their stories about the visits to Mexico. He never spoke about it either. 41. In 1983, I almost lost my position as editor in chief of the journal Latin America, which was published by the USSR Academy of Sciences. The KGB was concerned with my too liberal and open conversations with foreigners “from the NATO countries.” However, the stated official reason for my removal was “the journal’s poor performance.” The Social Sciences Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences decided to have a committee discuss—in essence, condemn —my work. The discussants were the second KGB commander in chief, representing the U.S. Department; the deputy head of the CC CPSU Propaganda Department, Vladimir Sevruk; the deputy head of the Department of Science, Volkov, Chernenko’s son-in-law (Chernenko soon became the CC CPSU general secretary); the SSR Academy of Sciences’ vice president, Petr Fedoseev, and his deputy, Boris Kovalyov, representing the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium Department of Social Sciences. This was a difficult struggle. The decisive session took place on June 6, 1984, and I emerged victorious. Leonov was among the people who spoke openly in my defense.

Chapter 3 1. When Mikoyan traveled abroad or within the Soviet Union, he never took more than one person from his security personnel, despite protests from the KGB. He said that if the receiv-

570 Notes to Pages 62–90

2.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

ing side takes security measures, our people are unnecessary; if it does not, our people would be helpless in case of an attack. I regret not finding out the details from one of the attackers, whom I met in Miami in 1989, after reading a lecture at a university. He met me like an old friend—so many years ago, he was supposed to blow us up! After this period of time, Cubans are like brothers, for they become friends in five minutes, unless you take it into your head to address him with “usted”—i.e., the formal “you,” instead of “tu,” the familiar “you,” to which they switch five minutes after getting acquainted. Morris. H. Morley, Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba, 1952–1986 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 97. Ibid., 98. Michael R. Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1963 (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 98–99. James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), 177. Gianni Mina, An Encounter with Fidel: An Interview by Gianni Mina (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1991), 159. Philip W. Bonsal, Cuba, Castro, and the United States (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), 131. Wayne Smith writes about this in more detail; see Wayne Smith, The Closest of Enemies (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987). “Kolya” is the familiar version of the name “Nikolai.” Author’s recording during the conference. The Market Research Institute was created at Mikoyan’s initiative when he headed this ministry in 1938. Mary Hemingway, How It Was (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976). These enterprises included the “Tandberg” tape recorder manufacturing plant. These recorders were used to record the ExComm discussions during the missile crisis. For more on ExComm—the Executive Committee of the National Security Council—see chapter 4. E.g., my friend Arne Olaf Brundtland and his wife Gro, the future prime minister of the country. Transcript of the press conference, obtained by the author from the Cuban archives in October 2002. Herbert L. Matthews, Revolution in Cuba: An Essay in Understanding, compiled by J. A. Sierra, www.historyofcuba.com/history/che2.htm. Iosif R. Grigulevich, Ernesto Che Guevara i revolutsionnii protsess v Latinskoi Amerike (Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiya, 1977). “Los tupamaros y la lucha armada,” in Punto Final (Santiago, 1968). Donald C. Hodges, ed., The Legacy of Che Guevara: A Documentary Study (London: Thames & Hudson, 1977), 24. Ibid., 122–23. Ernesto Che Guevara, Bolivian Diary (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1994). Blight, Allyn, and Welch, Cuba on the Brink, 182. Ekho planety (journal), no. 33 (November 12–18, 1988): 27.

Chapter 4 1. Leo was the son of Stepan Shahumyan, the leader of the Baku Commune, who died in 1918. Leo Shahumyan was de facto in charge of the Editorial Staff for the Great Soviet Encyclopedia. 2. Once I said to him: “Papa, don’t you trust me? I will keep the recording for so many years as you tell me. I will never give it to anybody.” He responded, “You won’t give to anybody, but a tape-recording is such a thing that a copy of it could be made very easily, and you won’t even know about it.”

Notes to Pages 90–103

571

3. Here is an example of an incident in connection with Mikoyan and the arrest of Beria. In his memoirs, Khrushchev did not quote his own words; he quoted only Mikoyan’s words in his own interpretation. My father told me that he once asked Khrushchev: “What are you going to do with Beria?” He answered, “We intend to appoint him minister of oil industry.” Father remarked, “He will manage that job just fi ne.” According to Khrushchev, Mikoyan asked him to give Beria a job instead of arresting him. In other words, he tried to discredit Mikoyan. It is not honest. It is hard to believe that it happened due to the forgetfulness of the author. 4. This is from the author’s personal archive. 5. John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 264, 268. 6. V. I. Yesin, ed., Strategicheskaia Operatsiia Anadyr’: Kak jeto bylo [Strategic Operation Anadyr: How it was], (Moscow: MOOVIK–Poligrafresursy, 2000), 27. 7. Among them are Arnold L. Horelick, “The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior,” World Politics, April 1964; Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999); and Raymond Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1987). 8. Thomas C. Reeves, A Question of Character: A Life of John F. Kennedy (New York: Free Press, 1991), 394. 9. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–73 (New York: Praeger, 1974), 668–69. 10. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (New York: Ballantine Books, 1979), 543–44. 11. Much later, he became skeptical about how the Soviet version of socialism had transformed; our family had a chance to observe this change due to some of his remarks and comments. However, his skepticism never dominated his world view. Despite its drawbacks, socialism was better than capitalism—that was my father’s belief. He did not want to and was not able to give up his lifetime ideals. 12. Joseph A. Bagnall, ed., President John Fitzgerald Kennedy’s Grand and Global Alliance: World Order for the New Century (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1992), 5. 13. See document 18 at the end of the present volume. 14. A. A. Fursenko’s outstanding achievements: He has obtained permission to declassify the notes; and he and his colleagues from the editorial board, as well as other employees of the Presidential Archive, accomplished extensive work on V. N. Malin’s handwritten notes, which had been made by him in a hurry. Fursenko warns about the fact that the notes were made by Malin on his own initiative, and it should be taken into consideration when reading all nonstenographic documents. 15. Presidium TsK KPSS, 1954–1964 [Presidium of the CC CPSU], edited by Alexander Fursenko (Moscow: Rosspan, 2003), 556. 16. There might be a discrepancy with the stenographical notes, because I used my own notes of his words, which I have translated from Spanish. 17. Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 77–105. 18. The first commander of the Strategic Nuclear Forces, Marshal Nedelin, died while supervising a missile test in October 1960. The missile was not launched yet. In violation of safety rules, the liquid fuel was not drained. A group of leaders in charge of the test left the shelter and came too close. The missile blasted at that very moment. 19. James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), 78. 20. CPSU, Archives of the Kremlin, 568. 21. Oleg Troyanovsky, Cherez gody i rasstoianiia [Through the years and distances] (Vagrius, Moscow, 1997), 241.

572 Notes to Pages 103–111

22. E.g., Khrushchev interrupted V. V. Kuznetzov, deputy minister of foreign affairs, when the latter offered to begin threatening Washington with regard to West Berlin as a response to Kennedy’s threats with respect to Cuba. Khrushchev rudely cut the deputy minister: “We do not need such advice!” It was not important whether Kuznetzov was right, or wrong, but such kind of reactions of the first person of the country precluded many people from expressing their opinions. The majority of people from the Presidium of the Communist Party felt the same way. 23. Troyanovsky, Cherez gody i rasstoianiia, 243. 24. Blight, Allyn, and Welch, Cuba on the Brink, 77. Anatoly I. Gribkov and William Y. Smith, Operation Anadyr: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994), 38–41. 25. Yesin, Strategicheskaia operatsiia Anadyr’, 70. 26. The participants in the meeting were Khrushchev, chairman of the Defense Counsel; members of the Central Committee Presidium: Brezhnev, Kozlov, Kosygin, and Mikoyan; Malinovsky, minister of defense; Grechko, deputy minister of defense; Zaharov, chief of the General Staff; and Epishev, chief of the Main Political Department; Ivanov, chief of the Main Operations Department of the General Staff. Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr. 27. Anadyr is the name of a river in northeastern Siberia. This river flows into the Anadyr Bay of the Bering Sea. 28. Serov was formerly Beria’s deputy in the Ministry of State Security, later renamed Committee for State Security (KGB) and was in charge of the repressive bodies in Ukraine. His family had friendly relations with Khrushchev’s family before the war. In 1953, Khrushchev put him in charge of the KGB due to their family connections. In 1959, at Mikoyan’s request and because of his suspiciously close relations with Ignatov, he was transferred to work for the Main Intelligence Department. But after the incident with Penkovsky, he was transferred to the Central Asia to be in charge of the military school. He retired thereafter. 29. McNamara was not aware of this situation with respect to the Il-28s. At the ExComm meeting, he stated that “they were used” in the USSR. In general, he highly overestimated this outdated bomber. The bombers were delivered for Indonesia, Egypt, and India before the crises. 30. Ernest R. May and Philip Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997), 196. 31. Author’s personal notes taken at the conference. 32. May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, 667. 33. Ibid. 34. Blight, Allyn, and Welch, Cuba on the Brink, 85. 35. La Crisis de Octubre: Una Vision Politica Cuarenta Anos Despues, Fragmentos de la intervencion del Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro en el pleno del Comite Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba, 25–26 de enero de 1968, documents from the Cuban Archives, Havana, October 11–12, 2002. 36. Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy, 506. 37. At the 1990 conference in Moscow, I personally heard that in response to Dobrynin’s statement that he did not know about the missiles, and he even did not believe Kennedy at the time when the latter had made his statement, Gromyko asked him: “Didn’t I tell you about them in Washington?” “Not a single word,” said Dobrynin in response. Gromyko shook his head and said: “See, how our secrecy worked—I was not supposed to tell anything to the ambassador.” 38. At the first meeting in Florida, which was devoted to the crisis, and six months before the meeting in Kennedy School, Sorensen said: “He (Khrushchev) could have signed the agreement with Cuba and openly declare his intension to install missiles in Cuba, and that would have limited our options to respond.” 39. My note of Yazov’s words, October 12, 2002. 40. Author’s personal notes. 41. Conferencia Tripartita Sobre La Crisis de Octubre de 1962, Havana, January 8–12, 1992.

Notes to Pages 111–134

573

42. “Until now, everything that has been shipped to Cuba falls under the category of the assistance of the Soviet Union to neutral countries such as Egypt and Indonesia, but I won’t be surprised to find out about some additional weapons of the same sort,” he said on October 14. Garthoff, Reflections, 105. 43. “The Embassy faced a unique situation, as I did not get any information from Moscow about what was going on. How truthful was the information of the President Kennedy? Complete and inexplicable silence.” Anatoly Dobrynin, Sugubo doveritel’no: posol v Vashingtone pri shesti prezidentakh SShA (1962–1986) [In confidence: Moscow’s ambassador to America’s six cold war presidents (1962–1986)] (Moscow: Avtor, 1996), 66. 44. Author’s personal notes taken in October 2002 in Havana. 45. Anatoly F. Dobynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962–1986) (New York: Times Books, 1995), 64. 46. May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, 169. 47. Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 691. 48. Dobrynin, Sugubo Doveritel’no, 63. 49. Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 108. 50. Dobrynin, Sugubo Doveritel’no, 64–65. 51. Michael R. Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1963 (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 458. 52. Ibid., 456. 53. Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, 15. 54. Yesin, Strategicheskaia operatsiia Anadyr’, 72.

Chapter 5 1. Anatoly I. Gribkov and William Y. Smith, Operation Anadyr: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994). This volume, which was published in both Russian and English, includes the narration of the former deputy chief of the Main Operation Department of the General Staff of the Defense Ministry, Lieutenant General Anatoly Ivanovich Gribkov, about the appearance of the idea of the Operation and its development by the Supreme Command. 2. V. I. Yesin, ed., Strategicheskaia Operatsiia Anadyr’: Kak jeto bylo [Strategic Operation Anadyr: How it was], (Moscow: MOOVIK–Poligrafresursy, 2000), 26–27. 3. Ibid., 82. 4. Ibid., 77. 5. Ibid., 149. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid., 83. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid., 29. 11. Ibid., 58. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid., 65. 14. Ibid., 153. 15. Ibid., 102. 16. Ibid., 61. 17. Ibid., 192. 18. Ibid., 61. 19. Ibid., 182. 20. Ibid., 58. 21. Ibid., 88. 22. Ibid., 153.

574 Notes to Pages 135–169

23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43.

Ibid., 189. Ibid. Ibid., 112–13. Ibid., 98. Editor’s note: The American version of these episodes described any shots fired or explosive devices used as merely part of signaling exercises that were supposedly well known to Soviet submarines in the Atlantic. But from the point of view, as noted here, of submarines out of touch with Moscow and potentially under attack, the distinction between signaling and attacking may not have felt so clear, as one U.S. Navy captain admitted at the 2002 Havana conference on the missile crisis. Yesin, ed., Strategicheskaia Operatsiia Anadyr’, 98. Ibid., 86. Ibid. Ibid., 47–48. Ibid. Ibid., 200. Ibid., 62. Ibid., 146. The former province of Las Villas was divided in 1978 into three—Villa Clara, Cienfuegos, and Sancti Spiriti—all in the center of Cuba east of Havana. Yesin, ed., Strategicheskaia Operatsiia Anadyr’, 146. Ibid., 40. Ibid., 68. Ibid., 239. Ibid., 184. Ibid., 70. Ibid., 121. Ibid., 147.

Chapter 6 1. In addition to Fidel Castro’s reports and our intelligence, Robert Kennedy gave a clear warning to Ambassador Dobrynin: “If you do not withdraw the missiles, we will do it ourselves.” He describes this exchange in this book The Thirteen Days, and Dobrynin confirmed it. —S.M. Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971). 2. This turned out to be a garbled report of an announcement on Voice of America that it would rebroadcast Kennedy’s October 22 speech. 3. Ibid., 15. 4. Albert Wohlstetter and Roberta Wohlstetter, Controlling the Risks in Cuba, Adelphi Paper 17 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1965), 16. 5. Ibid., 14–16. 6. This is from the National Security Archive, Washington. 7. It was precisely the people whom Khrushchev had brought in who voted for his immediate resignation and retirement. 8. Sergey Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev: Krizisy i rakety: vzgliad iznutri (Moskva: Novosti, 1994). 9. CPSU, The Archives of the Kremlin: The Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee 1954–1964 (Moscow, Rosspen, 2003), 617. 10. Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 255–56. 11. Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 127. 12. Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1987), 106; Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (New York: Ballantine Books, 1979), 567.

Notes to Pages 170–187

575

13. For some reason, Fursenko and Naftali write in their book One Hell of a Gamble that we had to fly to Montreal, and from there to Havana. Th is is incorrect. There were regular fl ights from Canada, but we flew on a special plane directly from New York to Havana. Alexander Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997).

Chapter 7 1. Thomas C. Reeves, A Question of Character: A Life of John F. Kennedy (New York: Free Press, 1991), 364. 2. Herbert L. Matthews, Cuba (New York: Macmillan, 1964), 105. 3. Latin America [journal], no. 4 (1979). 4. U.S. Department of State, “NIE 85-62: The Situation and Prospects in Cuba (March 21, 1962),” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–63: Volume X, Cuba, 1961–1962 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office 1997), 11. 5. Richard Nixon, “Cuba, Castro and John F. Kennedy,” Reader’s Digest, November 1964. 6. Peter Kornbluh, ed., Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba (New York: New Press, 1998); cited by U.S. News & World Report, October 26, 1998. 7. Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, eds., The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader (New York: New Press, 1992), 50. 8. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 251. 9. Herbert Matthews, The Cuban Story (New York: George Braziller, 1961), 249. 10. Michael R. Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1963 (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 351. 11. Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 509. 12. Alexander Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 149–50. 13. After this, the U.S. Congress cut off assistance to Algeria. 14. This is from a telegram by Alekseyev to Moscow, October 29, 1962. National Security Archive, Washington. Characteristically, even in an encrypted telegram, a week after the United States announced to the world that it had pictures of missiles, the ambassador was still avoiding the word “missile” and speaking about “special weapons.” 15. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), 119. 16. V. I. Yesin, ed., Strategicheskaia Operatsiia Anadyr’: Kak jeto bylo [Strategic Operation Anadyr: How it was], (Moscow: MOOVIK–Poligrafresursy, 2000), 26–27. 17. Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 282. 18. This is from the National Security Archive, Washington. 19. Upon returning to the Soviet Union, the officer was summoned by Malinowski, but there was no reprimand. Malinowski apparently felt that the officer correctly understood his task and performed it. Malinowski never told Khrushchev the details of this significant episode. 20. Reeves, Question of Character, 386. 21. Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 271–73. 22. Anatoly I. Gribkov and William Y. Smith, Operation Anadyr: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994), 181. 23. James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), 41. 24. John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 262. 25. James W. Hilty, Robert Kennedy, Brother Protector (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997), 450. 26. This is from the National Security Archive, Washington. 27. Yesin, Strategicheskaia operatsiia Anadyr, 64–65.

576 Notes to Pages 188–215

28. In the book One Hell of a Gamble, the authors mention that one of the six planes saw the installations. Nonetheless, I remember how astonished the U.S. delegation, including former deputy CIA director of reconnaissance R. Klein, were when they heard General Gribkov’s information about the missiles. Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble. 29. From a telegram from Soviet ambassador to Havana Alekseyev to Moscow, October 18, 1962; National Security Archive, Washington. 30. Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971), 36. 31. Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947–1991: A Documentary Collection (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2001), 258–59. 32. I do not think that there is any mention in scholarly literature of the USSR’s offer to aid North Vietnam by sending its troops there. 33. Anastas I. Mikoyan, Tak bylo [How it was] (Moscow: Vagrius, 1999), 619–23. 34. Phillip Brenner, “Cuba and the Missile Crisis,” Journal of Latin American Studies 22, no. 1 (February 1990): 135. 35. It is possible that Primakov’s retelling of Fidel’s words—recounted by Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 295—which he recounted to me personally, may not be accurate. Fidel recalled that it was he who told my father the sad news from Moscow. Alekseyev, meanwhile, says that he was the one who went to Mikoyan by the window and read the telegram. This is more likely true, because the message was of course in Russian. Fidel must have immediately gone to my father to express his condolences; hence his alternate memory.

Chapter 8 1. Lee Lockwood, Castro’s Cuba, Cuba’s Fidel (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 202. Usually, when Castro uses the collective pronoun, he is referring to himself. 2. Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, eds., The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader (New York: New Press, 1992), 182. 3. Ibid., 180. 4. Georgy Kornienko, Kholodnaya Voina (Moscow: Olma Press, 2001), 129. 5. Chang and Kornbluh, Cuban Missile Crisis, 226–29. 6. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (New York: Ballantine Books, 1979), 567. 7. E.g., Dino Brugioni writes about this. He even gives examples of Mikoyan’s harsh words, which were never said, in quotations marks without any reference to the source. Dino Brugioni, Eye to Eye: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Random House, 1991), 515–17. 8. This proposal was to not attack Cuba, if the “offensive weapons” were removed. 9. The word “unhealthy” might perplex the reader, but it is based on my years of observation of my father in similar situations. 10. Chang and Kornbluh, Cuban Missile Crisis, 186. 11. Jorge Castaneda, Compañero: The Life and Death of Che Guevara (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), 232. 12. Alexander Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 298. 13. James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), 163. 14. My record of General Gribkov, personal archive. 15. Blight, Allyn, and Welch, Cuba on the Brink, 162–63. 16. James G. Hershberg, “The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Part 1),” Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 3–20. 17. At one of the ExComm sessions, McNamara announced that the airplanes were built in the 1950s but were still on active duty and certainly fit the category of offensive weapons. It seems the intelligence had not yet known about the disbandment of the Il-28 regiments. Ernest R.

Notes to Pages 215–234

18.

19. 20. 21. 22.

23.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

37. 38.

577

May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997), 267. Conversely, R. Garthoff writes that Bundy knew as early as October 14 that the Il-28s were being withdrawn from operational status and sold to Egypt and Indonesia, and these airplanes did not bother him. He tries to prove that before the missiles the planes were of no importance, but together with the missiles they suddenly begun to matter, which is quite unconvincing. Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1987), 106. The observation Castro makes is supported by the recent history of U.S. foreign policy. Take, e.g., the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 and the emergence after the overthrow of Milošević of new demands as conditions for the end of the blockade. But they practically did not fulfi ll their own obligation to keep Kosovo a part of the country. Blight, Allyn, and Welch, Cuba on the Brink, 91. Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971), 127. CPSU, The Archives of the Kremlin: The Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee 1954–1964 (Moscow, Rosspen, 2003), 646. Theodore Sorensen was the first to introduce this version. Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 720. Later, Brugioni wrote about it and many others. Brugioni, Eye to Eye. I regret to say that A. Nùñez Jimenez is no longer with us. He was a scientist and geographer with broad interests in science. He was the president of Cuba’s Academy of Science, he worked at the National Institute of Agrarian Reform, and he was an ambassador to Peru. In 1995, he received me warmly in his office, which Fidel Castro helped to turn into a real ethnographical and paleontological museum not only of Cuba but also of all Latin America. I am sure that it has been preserved. Blight, Allyn, and Welch, Cuba on the Brink, 92–93. See document 29 at the end of the present volume. See document 28 at the end of the present volume. Jane Franklin, Cuba and the United States: A Chronological History (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1997), 61. New York Times Magazine, August 30, 1987. The author must have meant Richard Sorge, a Soviet spy who warned Stalin of Hitler’s plans. Friedrich Sorge was Richard’s uncle. See the documents at the end of the present volume. Georgy Kornienko, Kholodnaia voina: svidetel’stvo eio uchastnika [The Cold War: Evidence from its participants] (Moscow: Olma Press, 2001), 144. Sergey Khrushchev, Krizisy i rakety: Vzgliad iznutri [Crises and missiles: An inside look] (Moscow: Novosti, 1994), 356–57, 361–62. Blight, Allyn, and Welch, Cuba on the Brink, 116, 115. Oleg Troyanovsky, Cherez gody i rasstoianiia [Through the years and distances] (Moscow, 1997), 250–52. In my opinion, the qualities described in this list all seemed characteristic to Khrushchev himself. He forgave himself for them, but not others —S.M. Michael Beschloss cites some absurd, absolutely false rumors that distort the atmosphere of Mikoyan’s entire stay in Cuba. The rumors say that when Mikoyan spoke before a Cuban audience, the people, supposedly, threw rotten fruit at him. Michael R. Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1963 (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 552. Gianni Mina, An Encounter with Fidel: An Interview by Gianni Mina (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1991), 88. La Crisis de Octubre: Una Vision Politica Cuarenta Anos Despues, Fragmentos de la intervencion del Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro en el pleno del Comite Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba, 25–26 de enero de 1968, documents from the Cuban Archives, Havana, October 11–12, 2002, 11.

578 Notes to Pages 237–265

Chapter 9 1. Oleg Troyanovsky, Cherez gody i rasstoianiia [Through the years and distances] (Vagrius, Moscow, 1997), 247. 2. I had a short conversation on this issue with V. V. Kuznetsov, when he already became deputy chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. This is exactly how he explained the essence of his proposal, which he mentioned briefly when he complained about the absolutely hopeless conditions of his negotiations in New York in November 1962 before A. I. Mikoyan’s arrival there. 3. Troyanovsky, Cherez gody i rasstoyaniia, 245. 4. Yu. Vinogradov’s hotel room had a faulty lock, and he could not open the front door. Of course, Mikoyan could not be late, so Dobrynin sent Bubnov to interpret. Vinogradov arrived later and replaced Bubnov during the negotiations. 5. James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), 98. 6. This is from S. A. Mikoyan’s personal archive. 7. Raymond Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1985), 91. 8. Raymond Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1987), 218–20. 9. Ibid., 127. 10. Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971), 95. 11. Michael R. Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1963 (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 356–57. 12. Conferencia Tripartita Sobre La Crisis de Octubre de 1962, Havana, January 8–12, 1992; Robert Pear in New York Times, January 7, 1992; Pamela Constable in Boson Globe, January 7, 1992.

Postscript 1. Presidium TsK KPSS, 1954–1964 [Presidium of the CC CPSU], edited by Alexander Fursenko (Moscow: Rosspan, 2003), 663. English translation available at the University of Virginia’s Miller Center Kremlin Decision-Making Project Web site, http://web1.millercenter.org/ kremlin/62_12_03.pdf. 2. Ibid. 3. Alexander Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 315. 4. U kraia yadernoi bezdny [On the Brink of the Nuclear Abyss], (Moscow: Gregory-Page, 1998), 208, 212. 5. On Khrushchev’s rationales for sending the missiles, see, e.g., William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), chap. 19, 529–78; Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, chap. 9, 166–83; Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), esp. 426–37; and James G. Hershberg, “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume II: Crises and Détente, edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 65–87, esp. 67–70. 6. Strategicheskaya operatsiya “Anadyr”: Kak eto bylo [Strategic Operation “Anadyr”: How it really was], (Moscow: MOOVIK–Poligrafresursy, 1999).

Index

A Acosta, Armando, 498, 502 Admiral Nahimov (ship), 132 Adzhubei, Aleksey, 57, 193 aerial reconnaissance, 106, 107, 115, 139, 144, 223, 241, 249, 279, 541 discovery of missiles and, 107, 113, 114, 115, 470, 484, 485 in lieu of ground inspection, 259, 288, 291–292, 323, 447, 521–522 See also U-2 aircraft Afghanistan, 166 Agafonov, V.N., 136–138 agrarian reform, 46, 428 agricultural production, 349–351, 353–354, 360–361, 364, 384, 396, 502 air conditioners, 131 air strikes on Cuba, 114, 173, 179 air transport, 533 Aitken, William Maxwell, 18 alcoholic beverages, 416–417 Alekseyev, Aleksandr I., 40, 330, 384, 429, 490 Fidel Castro and, 41–42, 51, 53, 179–180, 186 message to Soviet Foreign Ministry, 298–299 Mikoyan’s mission to Cuba (1960) and, 54–56, 57, 74, 87 Mikoyan’s mission to Cuba (1962) and, 164, 192, 207–208, 221, 226, 232, 294–297, 357, 432

dinner party, 435–440, 441 missile agreement drafting and, 109 missile deployment and, 89, 98, 101 Algeria, 178, 354 Alikhanov, A.I., 410, 497 Allende, Salvador, 84, 244 Alliance for Progress, 49–50, 84, 174, 176, 472 Allison, Graham, 99, 117, 154–155, 168–169 All-Union Council of Trade Unions (Soviet Union), 25 Almeida, Juan, 142 Anderson, George Wheelan, Jr., 188 Anderson, Rudolph, 144, 284 Andropov, Yuri, 26 Angola, 244 Aragonés, Emilio, 61, 109, 111, 198, 497, 502 Árbenz, Jacobo, 8, 45, 266, 421–429 Archives of the Kremlin: The Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee 1954–1964, 97 Argentina, 85 Arkhipov, Vasily A., 137 Armenia, 11–12 arms race, 212, 466, 548–549 arms transfers to Cuba, 47, 71 Arzumanyan, Anushavan, 90 Aspaturian, Heidi, 21 astronomy, 129–130 Azerbaijan, 12 579

580 Index

B Bahía Honda (Cuba), 132 Bakaev, V.G., 124 Baku (Soviet Union), 33 Ball, George, 257, 556, 558, 560–561, 562 Bandilovsky, N.F., 133–134, 140, 142 Batista, Fulgencio, 40, 42–43, 49 Bay of Pigs Invasion (1961), 72, 110, 174, 175, 178, 263, 363–365, 537, 538 Bazykin, Lyudmila, 57 Bazykin, Vladimir, 57, 525 Belgium, 47, 71 Beloborodov, N.K., 131, 185 Ben Bella, Ahmed, 178, 354 Berle, Adolph, 49 Berlin question, 27, 94–95, 114, 237, 467, 523, 553–555 Beschloss, Michael, 49, 94 Biryuzov, Sergey, 89, 97, 99, 100–101, 104, 109, 484 reconnaissance and, 127–128, 145 Blasier, Cole, 175 Bohlen, Charles, 19 Bolivia, 53 Bolshakov, 108 Bolshoi Ballet, 241–242 Bondarenko, B.I., 135 Bonsal, Phillip, 47, 71–72 Borisov, Sergey, 57, 66, 74 Borovik, Henry, 57 Borrego, Orlando, 411 Brazil, 215, 282, 428, 456 Brezhnev, Leonid, 4, 190 brothels, 131 Bubnov, I.D., 243, 249, 547, 561 Bucharest (ship), 293 Budskiy, A.S., 145 Bukharin, Nikolai, 14 Bulgakov, Mikhail, 11 Bulganin, Nikolai A., 25 Bulgaria, 91 Bullock, Alan, 16 Bundy, McGeorge, 92, 108, 110, 115 Butsky, A.S., 128

C Camagüey (Cuba), 74, 382 Canada, 533 Candelaria (Cuba), 129 Caribbean Region, 283, 401, 408, 520 Castañeda, Jorge, 54, 211 Castillo-Armas, Carlos, 45

Castineras, Juan, 417 Castro, Ángel, 45 Castro Ruz, Fidel, 1, 2, 5, 40, 42–44, 45–46, 48, 198 assassination plots against, 62–63, 178 early life of, 359 Five Points speech, 161–162, 164, 170, 239–240, 248, 278, 283, 301, 451 lack of consultation and, 132, 149, 299, 302 messages to Khrushchev, 229–230 Mikoyan mission (1960) and, 61–62, 67, 69–73, 79–81 Mikoyan mission (1962) and, 164, 173, 191, 204–205, 219–221, 223, 294–297 Cuban tours during, 349–352, 359–362, 363–368 talks with Mikoyan, 300–317, 340–348, 349–352, 359–362, 384–391, 392, 396–402, 460–463, 515 missile deployment and, 98, 100–101, 205, 225 opposition to secrecy, 108–109, 111 missile withdrawal and, 112–113, 149–152, 158, 179–180, 190, 196, 294–297 nuclear war and, 229–230 onsite inspections and, 160, 190–191, 208–210 policies of, 51–53, 69–71, 86, 349–352, 353–354 Soviet concessions and, 208, 325–326, 346–348, 376–378, 452–453 U Thant and, 160, 161, 220, 222–223, 227, 237, 274, 282–284, 436, 439, 441, 450–451, 458, 463, 494 visit to U.S. (1959), 44–45 Castro Ruz, Raul, 41, 42, 51, 57, 68, 144, 220, 432, 481, 497 Mikoyan and, 497–498, 502, 515 missile agreement drafting and, 108–109, 111 security and, 62, 177 cattle, 66, 349–351, 353–354 Cayo Largo (Cuba), 66 CC CPSU. See Communist Party (Soviet Union) Central Committee Central America, 333, 426 Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.), 43, 44, 83, 396 Chernenko, Konstantin, 31–32 Chigir, Nikolai, 57, 159 China, 20, 362, 454, 515, 527, 552 Chistov, Vasiliy, 57, 61, 73, 159, 232 Chomon, Fauro, 502–504 Churchill, Winston, 18 Cienfuegos, Camilo, 44, 51, 54

Index

Cienfuegos (Cuba), 134 Cisler, Walker, 36 Cold War, 19, 94–95 Commission for Rehabilitation of the Wrongfully Convicted (Soviet Union), 24 communications, 134–135 Communism, 14, 84, 94–95, 102, 418–420, 526–530 export of, 244, 266–267, 289, 335, 423–426 Communist Party (Cuba), 69–70 Communist Party (Mexico), 506–508 Communist Party (Soviet Union) Twentieth Congress (1956), 23, 26 Communist Party (Soviet Union) Central Committee International Department, 84, 85 messages from Mikoyan, 287–290, 291–292, 340–348, 353–354, 355–356, 366–368, 392, 430–431, 435–440, 459–463, 501–502, 562–564 from New York, 519–524 on tactical nuclear weapons, 480 Presidium, 89, 97, 102, 167–168, 478–479 follow-up to crisis, 261 Communist Party (United States), 417 compressed air, 133 Conquest, Robert, 21 consumer goods, 24 Cordier, Andrew, 215 Cripps, Stafford, 18 crocodiles, 365 Cuba Constitution of 1940, 51–52 economic conditions, 351–352, 527 guerrilla training, 424–426 people of, 132, 134–135 Cuban exiles, 47, 174, 175, 275, 280, 529–530, 537 subversive activities, 47 Cuban Missile Crisis settlement, 233, 470–477 fulfillment of obligations, 250, 251, 543–545 Soviet vs. U.S. view of, 2, 4 Cuban Movement for Sovereignty and Peace, 69 Cuban Revolution (1959), 8, 40–44, 417, 419, 427–428, 455 impact of, 84–87 Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces, 127–136 Cuban Revolutionary Navy, 134 Cuban Special Forces, 85 Cuba-Soviet Union relations development of, 40–42, 70–71 economic assistance, 70–71, 212, 375

581

economic relations, 353–354, 357–362 military assistance, 355–356, 366–367, 374–375, 487–488 military assistance treaty, 486–487, 489 military relations, 127–136, 355–356 Soviet concessions and, 225–226, 232, 234, 265, 294–296, 302, 454–457, 483–484, 485, 491, 515 Soviet defense promises, 112, 204–205, 264–265, 455–456 technical assistance, 411 tensions in, 8, 232–233, 430–431 trade relations, 42, 66, 71, 74, 414–417 Cuba-United States relations, 534–535, 542–543 anti-Castro policies, 71 early tensions in, 44–49 severing of, 50, 289 trade relations, 71 Cyrankiewicz, Józef, 26 Czechoslovakia, 354, 417

D Dankevich, P.B., 145 Darusenko, O., 501 Dashivetz, V.V., 134–135 Davis, Richard H., 556 Degtyarev, P.A., 125 Dementiev, Aleksey, 103, 490, 498 Department of State (U.S.), 43, 83, 162, 169, 216, 240 de-Stalinization, 22–25 destruction of documents, 182 development assistance, 50 Dillon, C. Douglas, 49 disarmament, 550–551, 559 Dmitryi Galkin (ship), 136 Dobrynin, Anatolii, 143, 159, 165, 222, 256, 257, 552, 553, 556, 558, 561 John F. Kennedy’s meeting with Gromyko and, 115–117 negotiations in New York and, 234, 257, 436, 442, 516, 536, 558 Robert Kennedy and, 148, 152, 183, 245, 372, 535 Soviet promise on offensive weapons, 108, 110 Dominican Republic, 190, 426 Dorticós, Osvaldo, 205, 208, 299, 303, 326, 328, 330, 398, 432, 450 Mikoyan and, 328–339 Doucoudre, Felicervio, 426 Dryfoos, Orville, 257, 558, 562

582 Index

film industry, 362 Finland, 17, 547 fishing, 68, 231, 361, 365, 525 Fokin, V.A., 136, 137 food supply, 134, 136 Ford, Gerald R., 36 Ford, Henry, 15, 32 Ford, Henry, Jr., 32, 36 Fortuny, J.M., 421–429 France, 20 Frog Missiles. See Luna Missiles Front for Peoples’ Action (Chile), 335 fruit, 66 Fulbright, J. William, 176 Fursenko, Alexander, 40, 97, 213, 261–262

García Márquez, Gabriel, 43 Garthoff, Raymond L., 2, 92, 94, 169, 170, 187, 201 military action against Cuba, 214 nuclear weapons use, 187 Geodesy, 130 Gerchenov, Ivan, 144 Gilpatric, Roswell, 92 Goldin, N.V., 410, 497 Gómez Trueba, Angel, 417 Gomulka, Władisław, 26 Gorshkov, Sergey, 158, 168 Goulart, João, 54 Granma (periodical), 220 Granma (yacht), 68 Gran Piedra Mountain (Cuba), 72–74 Grechko, Stepan, 143, 184 Gregorian, Vartan, 28 Grenada, 244 Gribkov, Anatoly, 93, 103, 104, 107, 114, 118, 143, 378 nuclear weapons use, 186–187 U.S. invasion plans, 214 Grigulevich, Joseph R., 81 Gromyko, Andrey, 89, 97–98, 102, 191, 218, 230 John F. Kennedy and, 112, 115–117 Khrushchev and, 150, 153, 169 Mikoyan and, 234, 356, 478, 495 secrecy and, 118 Soviet promise on offensive weapons, 108, 110 Guantanamo Naval Base, 240, 248, 274, 301, 311, 355, 367, 447, 456, 549 Guatemala, 45, 53, 84, 333, 421–429 Guevara, Alfredo, 362 Guevara, Ernesto (“Che”), 8, 41–42, 43, 44, 49, 50, 51, 61, 109, 198, 266 guerrilla warfare and, 85–87, 424–425 industrial development, 81 Mikoyan (1960) and, 69–73 Mikoyan (1962) and, 211–212, 330–339, 410–420, 438, 439 missile agreement drafting and, 109, 111 security and, 62, 178 sense of humor, 226 Soviet concessions and, 204–205, 335–337 Guinea, 30 Gutiérrez, Victor Manuel, 425

G

H

Gaddis, John, 94 Garbuz, Leonid, 122–124, 125, 127, 128, 135 on U-2 aircraft downing, 143–144

Hammarskjöld, Dag, 54 Handal, Schafik, 86 Harchenko, A.I., 133

Dubivko, Aleksey F., 136, 137 Dulles, Allen, 47, 63 Dulles, John Foster, 28, 466, 553 Dzhaparidze, Alesha, 33 Dzhaparidze, Medea, 33

E East Germany, 489 Echeverría, Luis, 39, 40 economic blockade, 385, 430 economic reform, 527–528 economic summit in Buenos Aires (1959), 50 Edificio Focsa (Havana), 65 education, 357–360, 498 Egypt, 335 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 27, 28, 46, 50, 63, 71, 72 refusal to meet with Fidel Castro, 44, 45, 48–49, 51 Eisenhower, Milton, 44 Ekho Planety (periodical), 41 elections Cuba, 51–52 United States, 174–175 Ellsberg, Daniel, 182 El Salvador, 44, 86, 426 Espín, Vilma, 57, 68, 481, 499 Estonia, 24 Ethiopia, 244, 412 Executive Committee, National Security Council (U.S.), 95–96, 116, 169, 177

F

Index

Harriman, Averell, 18, 23, 36 Hart, Armando, 69 Hart, Liddell, 177 Harvard International Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis (1987), 92, 110, 176, 183, 185 Havana, 62 173 East, 359 Heller, Walter, 558, 561, 562 Hemingway, Ernest, 44, 48, 58, 68, 243 Mikoyan and, 75–79 Herter, Christian, 45, 47, 63 Hitler, Adolf, 17, 18 How It Was (Book), 190 Hull, Cordell, 15, 537 Hungarian uprising (1956), 25–26

I Il-28 aircraft, 2, 105 withdrawal of, 162–163, 165, 169, 170, 201, 213–218, 220–223, 369–374, 379–380, 381–383, 385–391, 397–402 441–442, 448, 483 Iliyichev, L.F., 166 Indigirka (ship), 105, 111 Indonesia, 29, 467–468 industrial development, 81, 410–414 Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (Cuba), 351–352, 358, 364, 490, 497, 515 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 92, 112, 212, 265, 494 International Committee of the Red Cross, 161, 197, 222, 251, 271–274, 279, 284, 293, 314, 335, 474 International Telephone and Telegraph, 46 Interregional Public Organization of VeteransInternationalist “Cubans,” 122, 265 Isla de Pinos (Cuba), 65 Isla de Turiguano (Cuba), 416 Ivanov, Semyon, 102, 104, 105 Izhevsk (ship), 126

J Japan, 32, 94 Johnson, U. Alexis, 169 July 26 Movement (Cuba), 40, 42, 49, 51, 52, 61, 69, 83–84, 174, 424

K Kádár, János, 26 Kaganovich, Lazar, 22, 23, 26

583

Kalatozov, Michael, 231 Kalinin, Arnold, 63 Kamenev, Lev, 13 Kamynin, Leonid, 57 Karmen, Roman, 159 Karpetyan, A.I., 141 Keating, Kenneth, 109, 177 Kennan, George, 19 Kennedy, John F., 1, 44, 46, 50, 63, 93, 108 concern about Soviet weaponry, 107 early support for Cuba, 49, 174 invasion of Cuba and, 177–178, 189, 214 Mikoyan and, 242–244, 245–250, 251–253, 255, 257, 534–547 negotiations and, 169, 201–202 November 22 press conference, 481–482, 494 October 22 speech, 114, 144, 156–157, 168 October 28 speech, 152 speech rumor, 230 Strategy of Peace, 174 Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of letters (1962), 147, 153–154, 196, 233, 238, 318–322, 341, 383, 403, 496 Kennedy letters, 201–202 Khrushchev letters, 199–201, 211 Kennedy, Robert F., 95, 110, 118, 148, 174, 177 disinformation and, 152 Dobrynin and, 7, 116, 183, 245, 372, 558–561, 562–564 invasion of Cuba and, 176, 177, 189 John F. Kennedy and, 216, 254–255 Mikoyan and, 242–243, 256, 257–258, 259, 552, 558–561, 562–564 negotiations and, 153, 200, 216, 436 nuclear strike and, 171 Ketov, Ryurik A., 137 KGB, 57, 177 Khrushchev, Nikita S. Cuban reaction to concessions and, 218, 226–227, 379–380, 394–395, 403–407 decisionmaking and, 25–26, 166, 168 memoirs of, 90 messages to Fidel Castro, 209, 210–211 messages to Mikoyan, 215–216, 222, 237, 369–380, 393–395, 403–409, 492–495 birthday greeting, 505 instructions, 492–495 missile deployment decision, 89, 103–104 missile withdrawal and, 148–152, 153–155, 158 offensive weapons assurance, 110 personality of, 103, 104, 153–154, 167, 193

584 Index

Khrushchev, Nikita S. (continued) radio address (October 28), 185, 201 removal from power, 167 socialism and, 95 speech to Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba, 122–123 Khrushchev, Sergey, 167, 230 Klemeshev, A.M., 133 Konev, Ivan, 26 Kornienko, Georgy, 118, 200, 229–230, 257, 556 Kosarev, Evgenii, 74 Kotov, R.A., 136 Kozlov, Frol, 54, 89, 156, 488 Krasnovodsk (Turkmenistan), 12 Kryukov, Sergey, 62 Kubinka (Soviet Union), 139, 142 Kubitschek, Juscelino, 54 Kuteishchikova, V.N., 40 Kuzivanov, M.G., 135–136, 141 Kuznetsov, V.V., 118, 153, 159, 162, 169, 323, 330, 332, 399, 402 Berlin question and, 236–237, 258 Khrushchev and, 200 Mikoyan and, 200, 234, 281–286, 291 negotiations and, 163, 197, 222, 236–237, 238, 249, 252, 257, 258, 273, 276–278, 313, 322–323, 382, 401–402, 432, 436, 445, 522, 525, 546

L La Coubre (ship), 47 Laguna del Tesoro (Cuba), 67–68 Laos, 467, 546 Las Villas Province (Cuba), 143 Latin America Communist parties and, 84–85, 424, 429 economic development and, 177 Soviet Union and, 54, 244 U.S. policy and, 50, 549 Latin America (periodical), 41, 113, 175 Latter, Natalie, 241–242, 243, 255, 256 leaks of information, 109 Lechuga, Carlos M., 334, 450, 479 Mikoyan and, 525–533 LeMay, Curtis, 229 Lemnitzer, Lyman, 175 lend-lease operations, 18, 19 Lenin, Vladimir, 14, 336–338, 375, 377, 388, 418, 427, 454, 464, 469, 508, 510, 511, 532 Leonov, Nikolai, 57, 73, 87 Lippmann, Walter, 176

Lord Beaverbrook. See Aitken, William Maxwell Lovett, Robert, 115 Lukacs, John, 44, 48 Luna Missiles, 2, 105, 111, 140, 180, 185, 186, 187–188, 214, 224, 266

M Malenkov, Georgy, 21, 23 Malinovsky, Rodion, 89, 92, 93, 96, 97, 99, 100, 122, 132, 143, 190, 261 military aid to Cuba and, 261 submarine mission and, 167–168 surface-to-air missiles and, 101, 144, 148 tactical nuclear missiles and, 224 U-2 downing and, 183–184 Malin, Vladimir, 97, 102, 168, 169, 261 Malkov, Aleksandr Petrovich, 56–57, 75 Mañach, Jorge, 79 Mansfield, Michael, 177 Mao Zedong, 20, 527 March, Aleida, 68 Marenko, A.F., 140–141, 146 Mariel (Cuba), 132, 411 Market Research Institute (USSR), 74 Marshall Plan, 19 Martí, José, 42, 48, 62, 231, 358, 501, 506, 510, 513 Masiles, Abraan, 365 Matanzas (Cuba), 359–360 Matthews, Herbert, 52, 69, 175 Matveev, Albert, 57 McCloy, John, 158, 159–161, 163–164, 170, 197, 546 Mikoyan and, 238, 241, 271–280, 287–290, 293, 522–523 McNamara, Robert S., 36, 92, 93, 105, 175, 188, 229 invasion of Cuba and, 176, 214 “McNamara’s Law,” 185 medical personnel, 142 Meet the Press, 44 Melik-Shakhnazarov, Ashot, 30 Méndez Montenegro, Mario, 422 Menshchikov, Mikhail, 28 Metallurg Bardin (ship), 124 Mexico, 39–40, 43, 48, 53, 428, 506–508 MiG aircraft, 106, 139, 143, 387, 388–389, 399–400, 476, 488 Mikoyan, Alexsey, 35, 139 Mikoyan, Anastas I., 2, 3–5 career of, 14–15, 20–21, 24–25, 32 early life of, 11–13

Index

family of, 33–35 Joseph Stalin and, 13, 14, 16, 18, 21–22 negotiating skills of, 20, 25–30, 222, 255–256, 262, 453–454 Nikita Khrushchev and, 4, 23, 27–28, 166–167, 193, 217, 231 personality of, 30–37 Visit to Mexico (1959), 40 Visit to U.S. (1959), 27–28, 36–37 Mikoyan, Anastas I. Mission to Cuba (1960) helicopter incident, 67 impact of, 3–4, 71–72, 83, 263 impressions of Cuba, 81–82 invitation, 54–58 Laguna del Tesoro talks, 69–73 meeting with businessmen and, 64–65 signing of trade agreement, 74–75 terrorism plot against, 62 travels during, 65–68 Mikoyan, Anastas I. Mission to Cuba (1962), 4–7, 158–160, 191–192, 202–207, 219–220, 298–299 Cuban control of missiles and, 148–152 ground inspection and, 207–211 Il-28 withdrawal and, 215–221, 322–323 meetings with Cuban leaders, 301–317, 318–327, 328–339, 340–348, 432–434, 435–440, 443–449, 481–495 messages to Khrushchev, 217, 221–222, 224, 230–231, 381–383, 432–434, 441–442, 517–518 missile deployment to Cuba and, 89–91, 93, 97 opposition to, 96–97, 98, 100–102, 101 negotiating strategy and, 161–162, 170, 217–218, 219–220, 337, 382–383, 441–442 November 25 televised speech of, 509–514 objectives of, 196–198, 232–233 onsite inspection and, 160–161 press conference, 79–81 speech to Soviet military personnel, 465–477 submarine mission and, 157–158 tactical missiles and, 224–227 tensions in, 432–434, 435, 452–453 U.S. noninvasion pledge and, 227–228 Mikoyan, Anastas I. Talks in New York (November 1–2, 1962), 158–160, 170, 271–280, 287–290 ground inspection, 291–292 ship inspection, 293–294, 313–315

585

Mikoyan, Anastas I. Talks in New York (November 27–28, 1962), 7, 233–242, 257, 493, 530 ground inspection, 237, 239–241 objectives, 236 U.S. draft proposal, 238–240, 520–521, 522 Mikoyan, Anastas I. Talks in Washington, D.C., 7, 242–260, 493, 517–518, 530, 534–547, 558–561 UN-sponsored protocol, 250–251, 539–541 Mikoyan, Artem, 90 Mikoyan, Ashken Lazarevna, 33, 156 death of, 5, 192–193, 195–196, 297, 433–434 Mikoyan, Sergo, 1–2, 4, 7–8, 35, 73, 176, 262–265 Cuban friends of, 74 Mikoyan, Stepan, 35, 243 Mikoyan, Vano, 35 Mikoyan, Vladimir, 22, 35, 219, 243 Mikoyan, Volodia, 24 Mina, Gianni, 43 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Cuba), 224, 479 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Soviet Union), 166, 169, 298–299 Ministry of Foreign Trade (Soviet Union), 74, 414 Miró, José, 51 missile bases camouflage of, 101, 103, 113, 143, 486 construction of, 92, 107, 113–114, 129, 130–133, 135 engineering challenges, 134, 135–136 reconnaissance for, 127–128 missile deployment, 304–307 alternatives to, 104 Communist Party Central Committee and, 97–98 Cuban consultation on, lack of, 5–6, 150–151, 154, 167, 180, 196, 205, 206–207, 217, 232, 240, 262, 265, 296, 297, 302–303, 308–310, 319–320, 486 Cuban view of, 225, 485 Cuba-Soviet Union treaty for, 107–110, 264–265 impact of secrecy, 110–113 discovery of, 113–114, 118, 144 mistakes made, 107, 115–116 deception, 115–116, 166, 197 planning, 118–119, 143 policy coordination, 118, 166–169 rationales for, 89, 91–92 balance of forces, 92–93, 99, 264

586 Index

missile deployment (continued) rationales for (continued) Cold War politics, 94–95, 99 defense of Cuba, 96–97, 98, 101, 262–263, 264, 378 U.S. missiles in Turkey, 96, 99 secrecy and, 103–107 See also nuclear warheads; Operation Anadyr missile fuel, 132–133 missile testing, 487 missile transport hardship of, 105–106, 126–127, 131 secrecy of, 105 missile withdrawal from Cuba, 112, 145–146, 155–156, 199, 271–280 missile withdrawal from Turkey, 200, 203, 215, 254–255, 309–311, 487, 547 Molotov, Svetlana, 33 Molotov, Vyacheslav M., 21, 22, 23, 26, 33 Monakov, K., 429 Mongolia, 21 Monte, Ronaldo, 134 MOOVIK. See Interregional Public Organization of Veterans-Internationalist “Cubans” Mordvinnikov, M.S., 130 Moscow State Institute for International Relations (Soviet Union), 33, 57 Mosquito boats, 106, 162, 165, 170, 322 Myrdal, Gunnar, 19

N Naftali, Timothy, 40, 213, 261–262 Nagy, Imre, 26 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 354 nationalization, 46 national liberation movements, 86, 174, 244, 335, 419, 426 Mikoyan’s statements on, 427–428, 538 National Press Club, 44 National Security Archive, 8 naval quarantine, 110, 142, 154, 179, 181–182, 188 suspension of, 271–278, 288, 441, 443–44 Nedelin, Marshal, 100 Netherlands, 467 Nicaragua, 44, 86, 244 nickel, 81 Nixon, Richard M., 40, 45, 71, 175, 537 nonaggression pacts, 546–547, 552 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 92, 94, 553

Noticias de Hoy (periodical), 526 Novaya Zemlya, 105 nuclear balance of power, 99–100 nuclear deterrence, 93, 100 nuclear nonproliferation, 552–553 nuclear testing, 551–552 nuclear warfare, 100, 157, 171, 185, 186–189 Cuban view of, 212–213, 228–229, 267, 438, 484 Mikoyan’s comments on, 453–454, 462 risk of, 114, 186–189, 229–230 nuclear warheads, 181, 185 launch procedure, 133 shipment of, 105, 111, 131 storage and testing of, 131, 133–134 See also Missile deployment nuclear weapons free zone, 548–550 Nuñez Jiménez, Antonio, 54, 61, 74, 218–220, 221, 365, 433, 456 Mikoyan’s visit with, 433, 435 Nyárádi, Miklós, 19

O Obyden, Konstantin, 58 Oduber, Daniel, 52 offensive weapons, 169, 251–252 oil industry, 80, 411–413 sabotage of, 419–420 Omsk (ship), 128 One Hell of a Gamble, 187 onsite inspections, 155, 160, 163–164, 197, 199, 311–313, 328–330, 445–446 in Caribbean region, 445–446, 451, 520–521 in Central America, 333–334 in Cuba, 201, 203–204, 207–211, 279, 282–283, 288, 291–292 of ships, 208, 284, 293, 313, 323–324, 346–347 in U.S., 217, 275, 280, 333–334, 381–382, 446 Operation Anadyr, 121–146 See also missile deployment Operation Anadyr (Book), 187 Operation Mongoose, 174 Operation Zapata, 263 Ordzhonikidze, Grigory, 22 Orgakov, M.D., 133 Organization of American States, 46, 50, 173, 426, 428 Punta del Este Conference (1962), 173 ORI. See Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (Cuba) Oriente Province (Cuba), 525–526

Index

Orlov, N.F., 133 ORTSAC military exercise, 174, 307, 470, 483 See also Puerto Rico Osadchy, I.Z., 135 Ozanyan, Andranik, 11

P País, Frank, 68 Panama Canal, 549 Patsar, V.I., 134 Pavlov [General]. See Pliev, Issa Peña, Lázaro, 40 Penkovsky, Oleg, 92, 105 Peru, 85 Pinar del Río Province (Cuba), 65, 349–352 Playa Giron (Cuba), 363–368 Pliev, Issa (“Pavlov”), 104, 132, 142, 143, 144, 145, 157, 183–186, 225, 378, 398, 465–477, 482, 490, 496, 508 Poland, 26 Polkovnikov, V.N., 124–125, 128–129, 134 Poltava (ship), 111 Ponomarev, Boris, 53 Portugal, 244–245 Potemkin (ship), 419 Presidium. See under Communist Party (Soviet Union) Central Committee Puerto Rico, 174, 444, 470–471, 549 See also ORTSAC military exercise Pushkin, Aleksandr, 492

Q Quadros, Jânio, 54 Quiñones, Manuel de Jesús (“Pedro Luis”), 378

R radio broadcasting, 131 Radvanja, János, 94 Rákosi, Mátyás, 25 Rashidov, Sharof, 102 Rassoho, A.I., 137 Reagan, Ronald, 50, 250, 251 Revolutionary Movement 13 November (Guatemala), 424 Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 16 Riera, Santiago, 417 Rio Domoje (ship), 228, 462 R-12 Missiles, 99, 105, 107, 110, 111, 114, 124–125, 127, 132, 135, 139, 140, 142, 146, 169, 182, 183–184, 185, 225 Roa, Raúl, 283, 436

587

Roberts, Chalmers, 94 Roca, Blas, 425, 455 Rockville (Maryland), 557 Rodríguez, Carlos Rafael, 74, 173, 205, 209–210, 220, 299, 303, 324, 330, 331, 396 Mikoyan and, 330–339, 450–458 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 15, 19, 45, 50 Rusk, Dean, 115, 116, 152, 169, 170, 173, 229, 249, 250, 547 on invasion of Cuba, 253, 288 Kennedy’s assessment of, 255 Mikoyan and, 257, 493, 548–556 Russian Foreign Ministry Archive, 8 Russian Revolution (1917), 417–418, 529

S Saenz, Tirso, 417 Salisbury, Harrison, 12, 13, 15–16, 23, 28–29 Sánchez, Celia, 69, 191 Sandinista National Liberation Front, 86 Santa Cruz de los Pinos (Cuba), 129 Santamaría, Abel, 69 Santa María (Cuba), 525 Santamaría, Haydee, 69, 358 Santiago de Cuba, 72, 497–504 Sarabira, Berrard, 498 Sarría, Pedro, 42 Sartre, Jean Paul, 43, 47–48 satellites, 100 Savitsky, Valentin G., 136, 137 Schlesinger, Arthur, 52, 94 Schnurre, Karl, 16 Schulenburg, Friederich Werner Graf von der, 17 secrecy policy (Soviet) Cuban opposition to, 107–108 impact of, 107–109, 115, 166, 264 Operation Anadyr and, 103–105, 113 in Cuba, 106–107 Semezhenkov, V.S., 141 Semichastnyi, Vladimir, 54 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (U.S.), 44 Serov, I.A., 105 Shahumyan, Leo, 90 Shahumyan, Stepan, 12 Shelepin, Aleksandr, 53–54 Shymkov, Nikoly A., 136, 137 Sidorov, I.S., 140, 142, 143 Sierra del Cristal (Cuba), 131 Simonov, Konstantin, 21

588 Index

Singapore, 29–30 Siqueiros, David Alfaro, 79 Smathers, George, 243 S-75 missiles, 106–108, 111, 113, 115, 182, 184, 206–207, 225 Smith, Wayne, 47, 48, 71, 72, 83 Smith, William, 103 Socarras, Prio, 360 Soloviev, Y.A., 140, 142 Somoza, Anastasio, 84 Sorensen, Theodore, 93, 108, 110 Sorrilla, Mario, 417 Soviet Exhibition in Havana (1960), 62–63 Soviet Exhibition in Mexico City (1959), 54 Soviet Group of Forces in Cuba, 121–122 Soviet Union, 48, 282 economic conditions, 212, 526–527 military advisors in Cuba, 106, 214, 217, 382, 451, 482, 488–489 military alert of, 140–145, 170 order for, 138–139, 157, 184–185 training of, 146 withdrawal of, 482–483 military bases, 487 negotiating positions, 15 nuclear capability, 212 Soviet Union Armed Forces, 121 Soviet Union Baltic Sea Fleet, 112, 118 space race, 466 Spain, 44–45, 490 Special Group, Augmented (U.S.), 174 Stalin, Joseph, 13, 14, 16, 20, 33, 167, 362, 378 World War II and, 17, 19 Statsenko, Igor, 104, 113, 128, 140, 145, 185 steel, 81, 561 Stevenson, Adlai II, 158, 159–160, 197, 216, 414, 526 Il-28 aircraft withdrawal, 162, 169, 170, 322 Mikoyan and, 238, 239–240, 241, 242, 271–280, 287–290, 522–523 Stevenson, Robert Louis, 68 Strategic Operation Anadyr, 122 students, 357–358, 498–501, 502 Sturua, Melor, 33 submarine mission, 136–138, 157–158, 163 subversive activity, 239, 248, 537 sugar, 64, 71, 74–75 Sukarno, 29–30, 467 Surface-to-air missiles, 101, 106, 107, 182, 184, 289, 430, 475–476 Soviet order not to fire, 107 Suslov, Mikhail, 25, 26, 53

T tactical nuclear weapons, 223–227, 266–267, 479, 482, 484–485, 487 Tajikistan, 24 Tanner, Väinö, 17 Taylor, Maxwell, 103 Ternov, A.M., 135 Terrazas Guerrero, Manuel, 506–508 Thant, U, 113, 160, 222, 224, 226, 345 Mikoyan and, 235, 238, 241, 281–286, 519–524 proposals of, 151–152, 154, 201, 207, 208, 215, 217, 228, 233, 240, 250, 271–280, 287, 288, 314–316, 323–334, 381, 387, 397, 401, 404, 407, 436, 442, 445–446, 456, 462 translation error and, 485 The Cold War (book), 200 Thompson, Llewellyn, 115, 116, 169, 170, 200, 493, 547, 556 Tikhmenev, Vladimir, 173, 194, 225, 231, 232, 504, 508 Time (periodical), 21, 92 Tito, Josip Broz, 25 Titov, F.E., 357, 396, 410, 414, 497 tobacco, 415–416 Tolstoy, Aleksey, 529 Touré, Sékou, 30 tourism, 361, 365 translation errors, 225–226, 256, 485, 487 Treasure Lagoon (Cuba), 365 Trendelev, A.Y., 134 Tretiyak, V.V., 129–130 Tropicana (night club), 63 Troyanovsky, Oleg, 102–103, 118, 160, 206, 230, 237 Truman, Harry S., 19, 20 Tsheulin, S.P., 130 tuberculosis, 415 Tumanyan, Gai, 90 Turkey U.S. missile bases and, 89, 111, 200 Turkmenistan, 24

U U-2 aircraft Cuban threats to fire on, 404–405, 430, 436–437 overflights of Cuba, 139–140, 201, 222–223, 248–249, 284, 397, 449, 453, 485, 541–542 shootdown over Cuba, 6, 104, 107, 142, 143–144, 182–184, 187, 284, 313, 475 violation of Soviet airspace, 182 See also aerial reconnaissance

Index

Udall, Stewart, 257, 259, 558, 560, 562, 564 Ulam, Adam, 19, 94 United Arab Republic, 282 United Kingdom, 12, 18, 20 United Nations, 101, 110, 114 United Nations Security Council, 285–286 United Nations-Sponsored Protocol, 271–280, 284–285, 323, 328–339, 382, 462–463, 523, 539–541 U.S. opposition to, 250, 286–287, 443–444, 446–448, 473, 531, 545–546 United States invasion of Cuba, 143, 174, 175–179, 185–186, 213–214, 484, 492–493, 537–538 negotiating positions, 162–163, 165–166, 169–170, 198–199, 215, 286–290 escalating demands, 215–216, 381 noninvasion pledge, 117, 164, 185, 197, 199, 200, 208, 227–228, 275, 288, 404–407, 437, 441, 443 retaliatory preparations, 143, 147–148, 152, 179, 189–190 United States Special Group, 63 Urusevky, Sergey, 231 USSR Chamber of Commerce, 66

589

Vinogradov, Yu., 256, 547 Vorontsov, Marshal, 105 Voroshilov, Kliment, 23

W warfare risk of, 189–191 weather, 133, 136 West Germany, 470 When the World Was Hanging by a Thread (film), 159 Wilson, Harold, 20 women, 142 World War I, 11–12 World War II, 15–19

Y Yazov, Marshal, 107, 110, 112–113 Yemen, 354 Yesin, V.I., 127–128 Yevtushenko, Yevgeny, 231 Yugoslavia, 25, 282 Yurchenko, Y.G., 141

Z V Vallejo, R., 357 Varadero (Cuba), 63, 357–362, 366, 451, 482–483 Vargas, Getúlio, 54 Venezuela, 85, 419, 421, 428, 456 Vietnam War, 190–191 Villa DuPont (Cuba), 63

Zabolotnyi, V.S., 133 Zakirov, R.A., 126, 131, 145–146 Zamayatin, L.M., 166 Zaslavskii [Soviet citizen], 558 Zhukov, Yuri, 159 Zobnin, A.P., 133 Zorin, Valerian, 159, 162–163, 197, 234, 238, 252, 285, 478, 493, 495, 522, 530