The crisis years : Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963 9780060164546, 0060164549

From one of our nation's foremost historians, an important and immensely readable book that tells in dramatic detai

236 39 87MB

English Pages 815 [872] Year 1991

Report DMCA / Copyright


Recommend Papers

The crisis years : Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963
 9780060164546, 0060164549

  • 0 0 0
  • Like this paper and download? You can publish your own PDF file online for free in a few minutes! Sign Up
File loading please wait...
Citation preview





39 95

"This is marvelous history.... Beschloss done .i superb job of rese.irch. The book is full of surprises. Beschloss is a strong n.irr.itive writer working with a fabulous cast of The result is better any politic.ii novel known to me. Recom­ mended without reserv.ition." - Stephen E. Ambrose Author of Rise to Globalism and Eisenhower During the years from 1960 to 1963, the American people passed through the most d.ingerou period since World II. Parents built fallout shelters. Children raced through duck-and-cover drills. Americans withstood a series of shocks-the Bay of Pigs, the Vienna summit, the Berlin Wall, the Cuban Missile Crisis, John Kennedy's assassination, i1nd ikita Khrushchev's overthrow-whose origins and connection they could only dimly understand. Now, in .i gripping n.irrative, .i distinguished historian shows us how and why it all happened. Michael R. Beschloss has interviewed American and Soviet officials and drawn on thousands of freshly dedassified American documents and Soviet sources, newly av.iilable through glasnost, to bring us the first comprehensive history of the relation­ ship behveenJohnKennedy and Nikita Khrushchev and its impact on the Cold War. Written with the pace and intimacy of a novel, this is a page-turning story with an international cast, including Robert Kennedy, Robert McNamara, Adlai Stevenson, Richard Helms, Fidel Castro, Willy Brandt, Andrei Gromyko, Anatoly Dobrynin, and a little-known Soviet intelligence agent named Georgi Bolshakov who, as this book shows, helped to change the course of history. The narrative keeps coming back to Kennedy and Khrushchev, two proud, vulnerable, and leg­ endary leaders whose estimation and manipulation of each other had more effect on world events than perhaps any relationship between leaders since the Big Three during World War II. Besch.loss's acc1:ss to Soviet sources allows him to show Khrus -;c�::,:·� in (continued on back flap)



Books by .\I,chael R. Re. chlo KE

ED\' A D R

E\'ELT: Tl! E



!IE\' A

EA \' ALLIA D Tilt


E (19 0)

-2 AFF IR (19 6) I

60-1963 (1991)








Michael R. Beschloss

Edward Burlingame Books HarperCollin. Publishers

An Imprint of

Sausotito Pub\ic library Sausalito, California 9496�



1m < R1,1, H \Rs (.opH1gh1 c 1q91 b, \!1 h.iel R. Bes(hlo,s ..\II 1 1ght, re, ·ned. P1 1nted 111 the l rnted 1ate, of .\mencJ :\l> pa1 t of 1h1 hook ma� be used or reproduced 111 ,111, manner \\ hat oe,er "11hout written perm1,s1on except 111 1h c, ,e f bnef quo1auon, ('mhod1ed m c nucal a1 llt le, and re,1e\, ,. For mfo1 mat ion add1-e,, Harpe1Collm, Publisher. 10 Ltsl 531 d treet. :-,;cw York, i\'Y 10022.

Librar, of Congre

atalo ing-111-Pubhcation Data

Be chlo s. '.\lichael R. ( 1955-) The cri 1 ,ear : Kenned, and Khru hche,. 1960-1963 I b; �ichael R. Be chlo . -1 t ed. p. cm. I nclude bibliographical reference and index. ISB:\ 0-06-016 -15 -1-9 (cloth) 1 . L'nited State -Foreign relations-So,iet Gnion. 2. Soviet nion-Foreign relations-United tale . 3. World politics-1955-1965 . 4. Cold \\"ar. 5 . Kennedy, John F. Uohn Fitzgerald), 1917-1963. 6 . Khrushchev, :S.:ikita Sergee\'ich, 1894-1971 . I. Title. E183.8 .S65 B469 1991 90-55946 909 .82'6-dc20 91 92 93 94 95 CC/RRD 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

For Ajsaneh Mashayekhi


This volume examines the relationship of John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev and its impact on the Cold War. Why did these two leaders, who both came to power with genuine hopes of reducing the harshness of Soviet-American relations, take humankind instead to the edge of nuclear disaster and into the most ferocious arms race in world history? The book benefits from new scholarship and new information on the Kennedy-Khrushchev period. Like every scholar, I stand on the shoulders of many others and am happy to here express my debt to all of those who have gone before me. Recent years have seen the opening of the majority of John Kennedy's papers bearing on the Soviet Union and of other archives shedding light on his relations with Nikita Khrushchev. American political, military, and intelligence officials of the period have become more willing to be interviewed at length about sensitive aspects of their service. Thanks to a Harvard group, Soviet and American officials and historians have gathered to reexamine the crises over Berlin and Cuba. In my last book, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair, * I complained about the "paucity of Soviet sources open to Western scholars". The increased openness of the Soviet government has ex*Harper & Row, 1986, p. xvi. VII

viii I


cited expectations that at last historians can write with equal access to Soviet and American sources. This book does hendtt from hundreds of oral and written reminiscences by So\'iet figures that were not until recently a\'ailable. These expand our knowledge and understanding of Soviet decision-making. Still I have used them with considerable self-restraint, for they arc subject to the same p,1rtisa11 motives, faulty memories, and other limitations that distort Western oral history and memoir. Unlike in the \\'est, we do not yet ha\'e access to a substantial number of contempo­ raneous official Soviet docwnents that might help us to bctter judge their accuracy. L'ntil the Soviet go\'ernrnent opens its classified ar­ chi\'es to \\'estern scholars, \'olurnes such as this one must be more tentative in their treatment of the So\'iet than the \\'cstern side. Until that time, no scholar can aspire to \ffite a fully comprehensive or reliable histon of any portion of the Cold \\'ar. Information is not the only ingredient \'ital to historiography. So is the passage of time. It is difficult to think of two leaders whose reputa­ tions have oscillated more wild)� in three decades than those of Khru­ shchev and Kennedy. The distance of thirty years allows w, to look at both men with greater dispassion. The end of the Cold \\'ar enables us to study that dangerous half century not as an earlier phase of current politics but as a discrete epoch. By exploiting the assets of retrospect and increasing informa­ tion, historians in both East and \\'est can begin to work toward consensus on the o\·erarching questions of why that epoch started, why it ended, and how to prc\·ent another such tragic and costly struggle.

I 1 ·ashi11gto11, D. C. .\larch 1991






1 Almost Midnight 2 "He's Younger Than My Own Son" 3 "Our Clue to the Soviet Union" 4 Novosibirsk 5 "I'm Not Going to Risk an American Hungary" 6 ''A Big Kick'' 7 The Secret Agent 8 "Not as a Cripple" 9

"He just Beat Hell Out of Me"

10 The Ticking Clock 1 1 "A Wall Is a Hell of a Lot Better Than a l'Var" 12 "I Want to Get Off" 13 "Dear Mr. President" and "Dear Mr. Chairman" 14

15 16 17

"Your President Has Made a Very Bad Mistake" V ",' o One Will Be Able Even to Run" "He's the One Playing God" "The 1\,foment We Hoped Would Xever Come" IX

1 13 38 62 go 118 152 182 211 23 7 266 291 317 354 3 94 4 31 477

x I "! Don·,

ee I low ll'e '!! Have a T'el)' Good rl'a,"


".\'ow Jl'e !lave l'11/1ed Our Hand!. ..


"The Peare peec/1"

2 1

The p1 n I of.\ fosrow


Fragile Oppo1/111111le


",\'ow Peare h l'p lo l'ou ..


The Culmma/1011

7 7 709 725 7 9

kn wlcdgmcnl General

50 546 576 603 6..p 664 690


'OlC' Index





(jollou·mg page 2 7·1 J

John Kenned\ campai�ning 111 Buflal Uohn 1-. Kenned'r L1b1an) Kenned, and Adlai 't \ n on arm in� at arl)le Hotel (CPI/Bettmann '.\e,, photo\) K nned, gr eun RB-.17 ptlot Uohn F Kenned, Library) " kull e ion" in the .abtnet Room Uohn l·. Kenned; L1brar)) Fidel a tro and :--:ikna Khru hche, (\\' 1de \\' orld) Kenned,. \\'illiam Thomp on. and eorge mather (Wide World) Kennedy and hi father (j oe her chel/ Life Magazine) uban exile preparing to retake uba (\\'ide World) The ima ion begin Pri oner of war di pla,ed (\\'ide \\'orld) The Kennedy and Prime �tini ter and Mr Con tantine Caramanli (Noel Clark/ Life tagazine) Robert Kennedy (\\'ide \\'orld) Georgi Bol hako\' (UPI/Bettmann :\'ew photos) The President and First Lady monitor the Alan Shepard flight (John F. Kennedy Library) 'With Charles de Gaulle, Elysee Palace ( PI/Bettmann ewsphotos) At \'ersailles (UPI/Bettmann :\'ewsphotos)




Kennedy greels Khrushchev, Vienna (Paul Schutzer/Life Magazine) The first meetings end (Wide World) At Schonbrunn Palace (Werner Wolff/Black Star) The Khrushchevs and Jacqueline Kennedy (Wide World) The Sunday confrontation Uohn F. Kennedy Library) The summil breaks up Uames Whilmore/Life Magazine) Return to Washington (Wide World) Khrushchev and the Llewellyn Thompsons Uames Whitmore/Life Magazine) Kennedy, Maxwell Taylor, Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara (UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos) The Wall around West Berlin (UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos) Lyndon Johnson and Konrad Adenauer (Wide World) Kennedy, Johnson, Lucius Clay, Charles Bohlen (UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos) Children duck and cover (Wide World) Checkpoint Charlie confrontation (Wide World) Khrushchev at the Twenty-second Party Congress (Wide World) Kennedy ends the year 1961 (Wide World)

(following page 626) Alexei and Rada Adzhubei (UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos) Robert McNamara (Wide World) Castro at a Havana rally (UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos) Khrushchev and advisers (Wide World) Khrushchev at Benny Goodman concert (UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos) John McCone (Wide World) McGeorge Bundy (UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos) Kennedy reveals the Soviet gamble (UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos) The Soviet Embassy, Washington (UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos) Khrushchev at Boris Godunov (Wide World) The missiles depart Cuba (UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos) Anastas Mikoyan in Havana (UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos) Adlai Stevenson on the Today program (UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos) Kennedy receives Brigade flag (UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos) Khrushchev in East Berlin (Wide World) Exile commandos arrested (Wide World)




Kennedy, Willy Brandl,

d naue, (\\'1cle \\'orld)

Kennedy al the Berlin \\',111 (\\'ide \\'oriel) Kenned) at the B ·rl1n Cit\ I l.111 (\\'1cle \\'oriel) Khrmh he,. 1-\\ereII l la11 im,lll. FO\ Kohler (\\' 1cle \\' oriel) Before the treat, ,igning (L'Pl/Beumann ;\ie",photo,) Rusk and Khrn,h( he, (l'Pl/Bellmann l\'e1, ,photo�) T sling th

mcloor-outdoor pool (l PI/Be1tm,11111 New,pho1m)

Kenned, in Sall Lake

.it, (l Pl/B 'llmann



I lenrv C1bot Lodge and '\go Dmh Diem (John I·. l\.ennedv Lib, ,11 \) Kenned, 111 F01 l \\'01 th (l'Pl/Beum.111n '\e,, ,phow ) Johmon lea, mg Parkl,llld I lo p11al (John F. h.enn ·ch L1b1 ,11 \) Robert and J1(quel111 · h.ennech (Daffm I 1mn Jlnafd/Black Star) Khru,hd1e, at .'p,1 o l lmr,e (l Pl/lkttma1111 l\likO\an .it .\1 lrnglon '\:?. l lelms had concluded that the plob were going no­ where. l k suspected that at least one of the \lob's hit squads in Cuba had bee11 captured and tortured b� C1,;iro', forces. But as he recalled ye;,r� later. he ,aw little harm in k11i11g the g;111g�ters keep 011 trying to kill the dictator in order to Wl' whether the \!afo actually had any \'aluabk intelligence a,,ets rn1 the i,la11d. During this n101 ni11g 's Spet ial Croup ,e,�io11, to a\'oid betraying the secret of the 111i��iles 011 Cuba. Robert Ke1111ech bel1a,-cd as if there were 110 special news from the i�land. \\'ith more heat than usual, he complained that the job of Ca...iro's 1-emo,·al had been "botched." '.\!ongoose h;1d been going for a yea1 without success. \\'hy couldn't the\' do something? The Pre�idcnt was 110/ ha/J/Jy. ,\fte1· the meeting. he went to Bundy's oflice in the White I louse basement to look at the L'-2 pictures for himself. Bending O\'er the pinw-es with a magnih·ing glas-.. he hi-.sed, "S/111! Shit! Shit!" In the O\'al Office, the l're�ident asked his close aide and �peech writer Theodore Sorensen to look up what kind of public warning he had issued against So\'iet offensi\'e missiles in Cuba. The answer: before July 1962, Kennedy had ne,-cr formally cautioned the Soviet l 1 nion against such an installation on the island. By then, the missiles had to ha,·e been already on their way. \\'hite House aides not cleared to know the Cuba secret wondered why Kennedy was so edgy this morning. He kept pulling at the wattle under his chin, tracing his lips with his index finger.jamming his foot against the drawers of his desk, and bouncing his knee up and down. David Powers, the man-of-all-work who had served the President since his first campaign for Congress in 1946, thought, God, he looks like someone has just told him the house is on fire. Salinger assumed that Kennedy was angry about Ben Bella. After the imposing \\'hite House welcome and what the President had

Almost .\!idnight

I 7

thought was an amiable conversation in the Oval Office, the Algerian had confirmed Kennedy's private prejudices about the opportunism of nonaligned leaders by flying straight to Havana and joining Castro to demand that the United States abandon the ninety-nine-year lease to its Guantanamo naval base on the island.

At 1 1 :50 A.M., Kennedy walked into the Cabinet Room and sat down with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert .\fcNamara, and other liege men around the coffin-shaped table.The President was the only one present who knew that he had ordered this session secretly recorded by a tape machine connected to micro­ phones hidden in the draperies. As the reels began to turn, Kennedy asked Arthur Lundahl and a CIA missile expert, Sidney Graybeal, to explain the L'-2 pictures to the laymen present.The tape of the dialogue has been preserved: LUNDAHL:

This is a result of the photography taken Sunday, SIL




There's a medium-range ballistic missile launch site and two new military encampments on the southern edge of Sierra de! Rosario in west central Cuba....


How do you know this is a medium-range ballistic missile?


The length, sir.


The what? The length?


The length of it.... .\Ir. Graybeal, our missile, uh, man, has some pictures of the equivalent Soviet equipment that has been dragged through the streets of .\Ioscow...


Is this ready to be fired?


�o, sir.


How long have we got? \\' e can't tell, I take it.


:1\o, sir. ...




8 I




This same morning in '.\loscow, Kennedy's new Ambassador to the Sm iet l 1nion, Foy Kohler, had gone to the Kremlin for his first oflicial audience with the 111a11 who was both Chairman or the Council or Xlinislers and First Secn·tar\' of'1he So\'iet Communist Party's Central Committee. Nikita Scrgc)T\'ich Khru,;hchL·,··� face wa,; still pink and glowing from two months of swi111111i11g, sunbathing. and badminton-playing with his wift·. son. daughters. and grandchildren at his estate at Pit­ sunda on the Black Sea. The 1,,·o 1110111hs were 1101 merely fri\'olous. Since the davs of' Stalin, \\'ho rarely left '.\loscow, SPY planes were "harass­ ing" Soviet merchant ships heading for Cuba. Why was the United States so worried about Cuba? The SO\·iet go\'ernment had "no inten­ tion of putting an� offcnsi,·e ,,·capons in there." Kohler explained that one reason Americans \\'ere so worried about Cuba was Castro's re­ cent announcement that the SO\·iet Cnion was building a new port on the island. The Chairman said, 'Just because I am building a fishing port in Cuba. you \\'ant to go to war. After all, I'm not doing anything you ha, en't done to me in Turkey and Iran." He in\'eighed against the Jupiter missiles placed by the Cnited States in 1959 along the Soviet border in Turkey. \\'hile insisting that the Cuban port would have no military \'alue, he conceded that Castro's announcement had caused Kennedy political trouble: "If I had been in '.\loscow, the announce­ ment would ne\·er ha\'e been made....After the elections, there will be plent,· of time to talk about these things."

Almost .\fldmght

I 9

Afler returning to the American Embassy, Kohler cabled Washing­ ton that Khrushchev had been "charming" and "extremely amiable." In his ignorance about the missiles in Cuba, Kohler reported that the conversation had been "very reassuring." In the afternoon, the President ,,,ent to the State Department audi­ torium for an off-the-record session with five hundred editorial writ­ ers and broadcasters. Several in the audience wondered why Kennedy seemed so distracted and intense. He declared that the overriding problem for the United States was to ensure "the survival of our country" without igniting "the third and perhaps the last war." He recited a Spanish bullfighter's verse that Robert Kennedy carried in his wallet: Bullfight critics ranked in rows Crowd the enormous Plaza full; But only one is there who knows. And he's the man who fights the bull. That evening, after another Cabinet Room council on the missiles, he and Jacqueline were driven to Georgetown for a dinner gi\'en by the columnist Joseph Alsop and his wife, Susan Mary. As Alsop re­ called, the President "sat at the head of the table and damn near threw a ruin on the evening because he was in such a deep bro,rn study." Twice Kennedy asked two other guests, Chip Bohlen and the Oxford historian Isaiah Berlin, what the Soviets had done in the past when backed into a corner. Mrs. Alsop was surprised that the President "wanted to go back for more on a subject that didn't even seem interesting." That night in bed, she told her husband, "I may be crazy, but I think something is going on." Berlin left the dinner wondering whether "deep in the President's mind he may not have a presentiment that he may not li\'e a long time ... and that he must make his mark on history quickly.'" Buoyancy and optimism were hallmarks of Kennedy's political per­ sona. "Like a lot of flags on a ship," observed his Har\'ard friend Charles Spalding. But as his admirer the historian William l\lanches­ ter observed, "Under the facade there is, though scarcely suspected, a dark vein of sadness." The President's foreign policy aide ,ralt






R I S I s

\' EA R S

Rostow noticed that Kennedy's "\'oracious enjoyment of life" was always balanced against "a sense of the possibility of failure and tragedy." Fatalism was a rational response to Kennedy's life experience. Son of a deeply pessimistic Irish fother, he ne\'er lost sight of how his own career had been shaped b\' accident. I lad his father not amassed a fortune, had his older brother, Joe, sur\'ived \\'oriel \\'ar II to enter politics, had one voter per precinct in 19df "the candidate of the Kremlin.·· Richard :\'ixon called Kennedy's "nai\'c" comments new evidence of his inexperience: no Presidelll must e,·cr apologize "for trying to defend the l'nited States." Time reported that the "new cold air mass" from �loscow had brought "an entirely new atmosphere in U.S. politi­ cal life." Senator Henry Jackson of \\'ashington said, "The public is going to expect a tough. tough line." \\'ith Kennedy on the threshold of the Democratic nomination, surveys now showed that Americans were ha\'ing second thoughts about enlrusting their security to a forty-three-year-old back-bench Senator. The new atmosphere did not cause Kennedy to lose the remaining primaries, but had the l!-2 wrecked the Paris summit in �larch rather than �lay, he might ha\'e been defeated by someone such as Adlai Sle\'enson who was more experienced in world affairs. In June 1960, on the Senate floor, Kennedy proposed a twelve­ point plan including increased defense spending to resist the "Soviet program for world domination": "As a substitute for policy, President Eisenhower has tried smiling at the Russians, our State Department r


"Ile 's l'ounger Than My Own Son"

I 23

has tried frowning at them, and Mr.Nixon has tried both ....So long as Mr. Khrushchev is convinced that the balance of power is shifting his way, no amount of either smiles or toughness-neither Camp David talks nor Kitchen Debates-can compel him to enter fruitful negotiations." That summer, in Havana, Castro expropriated American property and asked for Soviet aid. Anti-American rioters in Tokyo forced the President to cancel a visit to Japan. Soviet forces were invited to the Congo.The Soviets walked out of Geneva disarmament talks.Injuly, they downed an American RB-4 7 over the Barents Sea and jailed the two survivors. In August, they subjected the U-2 pilot, Francis Gary Powers, to a humiliating show trial ending in a prison sentence. Nikita Khrushchev had already twice remolded the 1960 campaign, first by meeting Eisenhower at Camp David and then by destroying the Paris summit.In September, emboldened by his summer's gains, he sailed to New York to attend the UN General Assembly. For twenty-five days, he competed with the two presidential nominees for the attention of nervous Americans, giving press conferences from the balcony of the Soviet mission, embracing Castro in Harlem, gas­ conading at the UN, and, in the most famous gesture of his career, removing his shoe and beating his fists on the desktop. The 1952 election had not been particularly fought in the vernacu­ lar of which candidate could stand up to Stalin. But Khrushchev's three meetings with Eisenhower, his rocket-rattling, and his flamboy­ ant visits to the United States had so personalized Soviet behavior that Americans in 1960 thought in terms of which man could best confront Khrushchev. Nixon boasted of his encounters with the Chairman and warned that Kennedy was "rash and immature," the kind of man "Mr. Khrushchev would make mincemeat of." The truth was that neither candidate enjoyed the towering experi­ ence in foreign affairs that Nixon claimed for himself. Indeed, the Vice President had traveled on numerous vice presidential goodwill trips, including the Soviet tour in 1959 that included the "kitchen debate " with Khrushchev. He boasted about his talks with thirty-five presi­ dents, nine prime ministers, two emperors, and one shah. His cam­ paign used the slogan "It's Experience That Counts." But for the past seven years, the small circle on whom Eisenhower called for foreign affairs and defense advice had seldom included Nixon; when it did, the President tended to consult him about the domestic context. The Vice President privately complained that Ei­ senhower "regards me as a political expert only. If I try to speak up


CRISIS \'t: ,\RS

on defense maltcrs, say, from a strictly military point of \'iew, he says, '\\'hat docs this guy know about it?'" Despite Ken11edy's international-minded upbringing and foreign travel, his writing and speaking, he had no serious history in diplo­ matic bargaining or managing an organizatio11.Critics noted that the largest enterprise he had e\'er run was the PT- I 09, which had been sunk.During his three years on the Sc11ate Foreign Relations Commit­ tee. he was largely away from \\'ashi11gton campaigning. In his campaign broadside Kr1111rdy or Xixon: Dors It .\Jakr Any Dijfrr­ r11rr? the Har\'ard historia11 and Kennedy supporter Arthur Schles­ inger.Jr., sensibly did not try to argue that his man had a deep foreign policy backgrotmd: "Experience is helpful. Especially experience in doing good things. But experience in doing stupid things is no advan­ tage." Years later Schlesinger wrote that "anyone with political judg­ ment, intellectual curiosity. a retenti\'e memory. a disciplined temper­ ament, and sense of the way history runs can grasp the dynamics of foreign polic\' quickly enough."• Kennedy defended himself with a strong offense: ":\Ir. Nixon is experienced-experienced in policies of retreat, defeat, and weak­ ness.... \\'a\'ing your finger under Khrushchev's face does not in­ crease the strength of the lJnited States."t Still, Kennedy's polls showed that Khrushchev's rantings at the UN were scaring \'Oters into the :-..:ixon camp.He pri\'atcly expected I ixon to try to "put us on the defcnsi\·e as the soft-on-communism party." Walt Rosto\\' warned him Lhat this was the only way Nixon "knows how to operate .. .. Don't leave any fishhooks lying around. Be prepared for the issue and the thrusl." Rostow was correct. :\'ixon quietly asked his friend William Rogers, the Attorney General. to "try your hand" at speech material, noting \

*In 1965, Jacqueline Kenned,· bridled when she read in a draft of Schlesinger's A Thousa11d Da_rs that her husband had entered the White I louse "knowing more about domestic than foreign matters." \\"ith more loyalty than historical judgment, she insisted to the historian that her husband "knew as much about foreign as domestic affairs & certainly more than any other American President coming into office." Schlesinger chi\'alrousl� re\'ised his text to say that Kennedy "had had a considerably more \'aried and extensi\'e international experience than most men elected Presi­ dent." tSte\'enson had written Kennedy after his nomination that "the 'youth and inexperi­ ence' argument is an essemially false argument. . .. You either ha\'e leadership qualities or you don't.... Since it is apparent that the Republican emphasis will be on l\:ixon's 'experience' in dealing with the Communists ... it is essential 10 make it clear that ...the question is not who can face a mob or shake his finger in a dictator's face, but who can build a program and supply a leadership which will prevent such incidents from occurring."

"He's Younger Than My Own Son"

that Kennedy "would be a very dangerous President, dangerous to the cause of peace and dangerous from the standpoint of surrender. Here we can put a fear into them." Kennedy thus began the fall campaign with anti-Communist rheto­ ric that would have pleased John Foster Dulles. In September, at the Mormon Tabernacle in Salt Lake City, he said, "The enemy is the Communist system itself-implacable, insatiable, unceasing in its drive for world domination .... This is not a struggle for supremacy of arms alone. It is also a struggle for supremacy between two con­ flicting ideologies: freedom under God versus ruthless, godless tyr­ anny." The Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith soon wrote the Kennedy pollster Louis Harris, "JFK has made the point that he isn't soft. Henceforth he can only frighten." The Senator's chief foreign policy adviser, Chester Bowles, wrote him that he had "brilliantly " brought the campaign "to a point where no one can call us soft on communism." But Kennedy's problems in the fall of 1960 ran far beyond the need to assert his anticommunism. He had the unhappy task of running against the heir to a President who had brought the United States to the zenith of its power and influence in the Cold War. The nation enjoyed a preponderance in nuclear strength and economic produc­ tivity it would never know again. Aware of the fact that he could not easily win unless he gave voters a bleaker portrait of the American position in the world, Kennedy fashioned an argument that the United States was behind or falling behind the Soviet Union in long-range missiles, economic growth, and political influence. Central to Kennedy's charge that Eisenhower and Nixon had weak­ ened the nation was his use of the missile gap issue.In its purest form, the argument ran that Eisenhower's obsessive concern with a bal­ anced budget had forced him to shortchange the intercontinental ballistic missile program: while the United States built ICBMs at a leisurely pace, Soviet factories were, as Khrushchev bragged, turning out ICBMs "like sausages." This issue allowed Kennedy to assert his toughness and show that Democratic doctrine on the value of deficit spending was compatible with the building of American strength.The problem was that there was no missile gap. Eisenhower had access to closely held U-2 and other intelligence that was enough to convince him that, whatever Khrushchev's boasts, there had been no crash Soviet buildup: the United States was firmly in the lead. Nixon wanted the President to kill the issue by sharing the facts of




American nuclear superiority with the American people. But Eisen­ hower did not wish to co111proll1ise secret intelligence sources. :'\or did he wish lo disrupt the tacit agreement he had de\'cloped with Khrushche\'. \\'hen confronted in public with the Chairman's boasts that the So\'iet union was outproducing America in ICB:-.ts. Eisenhower sim­ ply st11nmoned his credibilit\ as the hero of\\'orld \\'ar II and replied that American strength was awesome and sufficient. As long as Eisen­ hower did 1101 disturb the illmion that the Sm·iets exceeded the United States in long-range missile strength, Khru�hche\ was willing· to forego the huge expenditure th;1l ;1 cra\h Sm iet ICB:-.1 buildup would actual!�· require. The President imlirecth tried 10 \ignal Kt·mwcl� not to disturb this delicate .1rr,111gelllcnl ,llld scare the nation about a missile gap that did not exi\l. One of Eisenhower's science ach·i�ers, Jerome \\'iesncr of "ho had seen the intelligence showing American superiority, wa� ":.-aou1Hkd" when the J >re\idcnt appro,Tcl his request to ad\'ise Kennech· during the campaign. \\'ie,ner thought that Eisenhower's intention wa,; to let the Ikmocrat know the truth about the missile gap. In Aug'll',t. CIA Director Allen Dulles went to Hyannis Port for the intelligence briefing offered lo both presidential candidates, Eisenhower asked him to �tress America's commanding military strength. But when Kenned� asked Dulles how the nation stood in the missile race. the CIA man CO) ly replied that onl) the Pencagon could properly amwer the question.• Later in August. when the Strategic Air Command briefed Kennedy in Omaha. the candidate was annoyed not to he gi\'en a full top-secret accounting of American-SO\ iet bomber and missile power. He com­ plained that he had been gi\'en more information as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee: if SAC and the Air Force were this complacent, he would remember next year at budget time. Assured that there was no missile gap during a Joint Chiefs of Staff briefing in September, Kennedy said, "Don't you ha\'e any doubting Thom­ ases in the Pentagon?" Kennedy could argue that he had not been shown the raw intelli­ gence that had persuaded the President there was no missile gap. But


*Dulles later explained his caution by saying that, until the united States enjoyed full satellite CO\'erage of the So\'iet Cnion, a missile gap could not be absolutely ruled out. Richard i\ixon later suspected that Dulles had framed his answer in order to allow Kennedy to keep exploiting the issue-a fa\'or that a \'ictorious Kennedy might re­ member after the election when pondering whether or not to replace him.

"He's l'ounger Than .\ly Own Son"

Eisenhower, the Joint Chiefs, and SAC had all affirmed that if there was a missile gap it was strongly in America's favor. Despite this considerable body of evidence, Kennedy persisted in exploiting the issue. He knew this would frighten Americans and limit the next Presi­ dent's freedom to act by generating public pressure on him to escalate the arms race. He knew it might goad the Soviets to respond, if he was elected, in kind. He did exercise some caution by referring to the Soviet missile "advantage," avoiding numbers and dates, citing non­ partisan experts. But he continued to issue the accusation, telling crowds that Republicans were "the party which gave us the missile gap." �fore fairly, Kennedy charged the administration with overreliance on nuclear weapons, "tying our hands in a limited war." He promised a con\'entional defense buildup and efforts to keep the United States from being second in science, education, and outer space. He issued the specious complaint that the Soviet Union enjoyed "an economic growth of two or three times as much as the great productive country of the United States" and that in 1959 "the United States had the lowest percentage of economic growth increase of any major industrial society in the world." Sophisticated as he was about the se\'ere limitations of the command economy and Kremlin manipu­ lation of Soviet growth figures, Kennedy kne,.,,· full well that the United States was not in danger that the Soviet economy would soon exceed America's. The disturbing statistics he cited were a manipulation. The Ameri­ can figure was artificially low because 1959 was a recession year, the Soviet figure artificially high because it reflected the Soviet Union's recovery from the devastation of World War II. In 1960, the Soviet economy was still a fraction of the size of America's. The United States was producing nearly one third of the world's goods. Kennedy charged that the incumbents had let down American world prestige. He noted secret United States Information Agency surveys that found sagging American prestige and demanded their release.* By November, a Gallup poll found that nearly half of Ameri­ cans felt that world respect for the United States had declined in the past year. In one of his standard lines, Kennedy said, "I ask you to join with *v\'hen these polls were leaked to the press. a furious Eisenhower had the same suspicions about USIA Director George Allen that Nixon did about Allen Dulles. He pri,·ately carped that the USIA man was "playing politics" to keep his job in the event of a Kennedy victory.

28 I



me in a journey imo the 1960s, whereby we will mold our streug1h and become firs! again. Not firs! if. Nol first but. Not first whm. Hut first period. I wan! the people of the world to wonder not what 1\lr. Khrushchev is doing. I want them to wonder what the Uni1ed States is doing."• American presidential campaigns arc inclined to treat foreign is­ sues with cartoonish simplici1y. Nine1cen-sixty was no cxccp1ion. Kennedy's u1tcrances offered lilllc insigh1 in10 how he would act on the two Cold \\'ar trouble spots that would pro\'c 10 dominate his term as President-Cuba and Berlin. I le found 1hat \'Olers asked him more often about Cuba and Castro 1han any 01her foreign issue. As his speech wrilcr Richard Goodwin recalled, the emergence of a pro-So\'iel dictalOr 11inc1y miles off the American coasl had done "more than Khrushchev could to anger and alarm the American people." Cuba ga\'e Kennedy another chance 10 attack i'\ixon from the right. He asked his staff, "How would we have sa\'ed Cuba if we had 1he power?" Then: "\\'hat 1he hell, they never told us how the\' would ha,·e sa\'ed China." He scored the Republicans for permitting "a Communist menace" to arise "only eight jet minutes from Florida": "\\'e must make clear our intention not to let the So\'ict Union turn Cuba into its base in the Caribbean-and our intention to enforce the �fonroe Doctrine." He demanded more propaganda and sanctions to "quarantine" the Cuban rc,·olution. more support for Cubans who opposed the Castro regime. His campaign manager, Robert Kennedy, worried that the Eisenhower administration might irn·ade Cuba before the election, thereby impro,·ing :'.'\ixon's election chances. In late October, flying to ;\;ew York, the candidate told Goodwin to "get ready a real blast for Nixon." That e\'ening Goodwin drafted a new assault for 1he morning papers on the Republicans and Cuba: the United Stales must strengthen democratic anti-Castro Cubans "who offer e\'entual hope of o\'erthrowing Castro. Thus far these fighters for freedom ha\'e had \'irtually no support from our government." *With such statements he rejected :-.:ixon's public suggestion that neither candidate discuss the subject of national ,,·eakness while Khrushchev "·as in the country. "I want to make it clear that nOLhing I am saying will give Mr. Khrushchev the slightest encouragement," Kenned,· told crowds. "He is encouraged enough." He proposed to "discourage him" b v "rebuilding national strength and vitality. The most ominous sound that 1\lr. Khrushchev can hear ... is not of a debate in the United States but the sound of America on the move, ready Lo move again."

"He's }'oungn· Than My Own Son"

I 29

According to Goodwin, Kennedy was asleep when the draft was fin­ ished and it became the only such statement in the campaign to be released without the candidate's clearance. When Nixon saw the morning headlines (KENNEDY ADVOCATES U.S. INTERVENTION IN CUBA), he was furious. He assumed that Dulles had briefed his opponent on the CIA's plans to invade Cuba; was Kennedy so craven that he would jeopardize the operation for votes? On a secure line, his adviser Fred Seaton, Secretary of the Interior, called General Andrew Goodpaster, the President's staff secretary, who in­ formed him that Kennedy had been "fully briefed."* *In March 1962, Nixon's memoir Six Crises, charging that Kennedy had subordinated national security to political ambition, caused a public sensation. Nixon wrote that Dulles had told the Democratic nominee that for months the CIA had"not only been supporting and assisting, but actually training Cuban exiles for the eventual purpose of supporting an invasion of Cuba itself." McGeorge Bundy wrote the President, "This subject turns out to be more compli­ cated than I had hoped." He had talked to the retired Dulles and his colleagues, who "agree that you did not receive any briefing on an actual plan for an invasion of Cuba, but unfortunately this is not what Nixon asserts....Allen Dulles reports that his notes for a July briefing do indicate that he was prepared to tell you that CIA was training Cuban exiles as guerrilla leaders.... He says he could not have briefed you on anything beyond that because nothing beyond this then existed. ... But it can be argued that what Nixon says is not wrong. "On the other hand ... it appears that you had only sketchy and fragmentary information about covert relations to Cuban exiles and no briefing at all on any specific plan for an invasion.The difficulty is that the notes that Dulles has would give some support to Nixon's stated position.Dulles is ob"iously in the middle and I am sure his preference will be to keep out of it if he can." Bundy recommended issuing a statement that the President was gi\'en a "general briefing" by Dulles in July, but that not until after the election did the CIA Director "give the President-elect a full briefing on covert plans relating to Cuba." Kennedy did not heed this graceful effort to repair his political problems without resorting to a presidential lie.On March 20, the \Vhite House flatly announced that Kennedy"was not told before the election of 1960 of the training of troops outside of Cuba or of any plans for 'supporting an invasion of Cuba.' " The President also asked Dulles to issue a statement saying "that the President never knew about it." But Dulles told reporters only that Nixon must be victim of"an honest misunderstanding." Soon thereafter, he was stripped of certain of his CIA retirement privileges. On the day of Dulles's statement, John l\lcCone called Nixon in California and told him "categorically" that Dulles had actually informed him privately that he had "told Kennedy about the covert operation " in 1960.I-le added that Senator Smathers had confirmed for him that Kennedy knew about the Cuban plans "before the election." Goodpaster informed this author that Allen Dulles told him in October 1960 that he had indeed briefed Kennedy"about the planning, which was to form the unit and to train the unit, that this was what had been appro\'ed." Richard Goodwin said in 1981 that Kennedy "may \'ery well ha\'e known" in Octobt:r 1960 about the CIA's

30 I





\' EA R S

Nixon called the \\'hite House ;rnd said he felt he had been "put into a corner by this." After consulting the President, he tried to preserve the operation's secrecy by saying the opposite of what he actually believed. In their fourth television debate, he auackcd Kennedy's idea as "the most dangerously irresponsible recommendation that he's made during the course of this campaign....It "·ould be an opc11 invitation for :\Ir. Khrushche\ to come in, 10 come i1110 Latin America and engage us in a civil war, and possibly eH'II worse than that." 111 response to this and 10 liberal criticism, Kennedy said he did not favor intcrYention that would \·iolatc American treaty obligations, only letting 1he freedom figh1crs know that America "sympathized with them." The Xrw l'ork Timrs called 1he re\·crsal a "major blunder." Adlai SteYc11so11 privately wrote a friend that Kc111111, .11111 pt oh.,hh the I lc-.1cl \l.111 lto11ld he ,1Tt1 .111d g1H'll .1 little 1110 1 .11 ,11ppo1 t th.II 111rgl11 ,.11 e the ,1111.111011 for tllHTed the failure. he did not wish to be caught in the public e)e. Only the next morning, after :\lajor Yuri Gagarin com­ pleted his mission in triumph, did Khrushchev rush back to J\loscow to bask in the cosmonaut's reflected glory. Khrnshchn ma�terfull) u�ed space spectaculars lo conceal Soviet militar) inferiority and entrance the world, especially the Third World. into beliC\ing that communism was the future. I le later said, "\\'e tried to exert pressure on the American militarists and also influence the minds of more reasonable politicians so that the United States would start treating us beuer." In October 1957, the launching of Sputnik panicked much of the world into accepting the false notion that the Soviets had over­ night become the greatest power on earth. This was despite the fact that �loscow was not e, en close to perfecting a guidance system that could pinpoint military targets. In 1959, to bolster his prestige, he timed the first So\'iet moon landing for three days before his arrival in Washington. Khrushche\· e\'idently wished lo engineer another such triumph during his Yisit to the U:\' in 1960. In his luggage were miniature spaceships for un\'eiling at the magic moment. But two Soviet rockets said to be bound for :\[ars fizzled on the launching pad. �lci\;amara's well-publicized insistence that the United States was ahead of the So\·iet Union in missiles may have moved Khrushchev lo order his scientists to hasten the first Soviet manned space flight. On March 23, 1961, during top-secret final training, the chosen cosmo­ naut, Lieutenant \'alentin Bondarenko, was locked into a pressure chamber. After medical tests he removed the sensors from his body, used alcohol-soaked cotton wool to clean himself, and then tossed the wad onto the ring of an electric hot plate. Flame raced through the

''I'm Xol Going to Risk an American Hungary"



oxygen-charged atmosphere, burning off Bondarenko's skin, hair, and eyes. He died within hours. On Khrushchev's orders, his government concealed the accident from the Soviet people and the world. Before Moscow released photo­ graphs of the first group of cosmonauts, Bondarenko's image was removed by airbrush. We do not know whether the Chairman ever reflected on the fact that Bondarenko might not have died had Khru­ shchev not pressured his space scientists to get him into the skies so quickly. !(Khrushchev had any regrets, they did not deter him from demanding that his men try again immediately.* On Wednesday, April 12, Yuri Gagarin, who had stood over the cosmonaut's deathbed, was strapped onto a rocket and launched into a single orbit. Only after the mission was clearly successful was it revealed to the public. With Khrushchev's enthusiastic approval, the mission was called Vostok ("the East"), signifying the rising of com­ munism. Pravda claimed that during his 108-minute trip, Gagarin sent greetings to the African peoples struggling below to break the chains of imperialism. Now that he knew he had a hero, Khrushchev greeted the cosmo­ naut in Moscow with an enormous bear hug and repeated kisses on both cheeks. A national holiday was declared. People sang and danced in the streets. Hundreds of thousands of happy Soviets paraded in Red Square under huge Gagarin portraits. Three decades later, there were statues of Gagarin in every corner of the Soviet Union; there were none of Bondarenko. Khrushchev boasted that Gagarin's success demonstrated Soviet military might and the sweep of advanced technology through the Soviet economy; soon per capita production would surpass the United States. Actually it represented only the inordinate resources that Khrushchev had lavished on his space program. Nevertheless, as with Sputnik, many people around the world mistook the flight to demon­ strate the predominance of the Soviet military, social, and economic system. At the White House, told that Gagarin had returned safely, Kennedy approved a prewritten statement praising the Soviet "tech­ nical accomplishment." At a news conference, he tried to minimize the event: "A dictatorship enjoys advantages in this kind of competi*Soviet secrecy about the Bondarenko accident may have cost the lives of the three Apollo One astronauts who died in an oxygen-rich fire in their cabin during training in January 1967. Knowledge of the Soviet mishap would have warned NASA about the highly flammable materials in the Apollo One cabin and the absence of a quick-rdease hatch and effective fire-fighting equipment.

1q I




tion O\'er a short period by its ability to mobilize its resources for a specific purpose." Still, Edwin Newman said on NBC that evening, "This is the end of an uncomfortable day for the great mass of American people, as well as for President Kennedy and his associates. Today belonged to the Russians." 'Ti111f reported that Americans were feeling ''frustra­ tion, shame, sometimes fury." Pri\'atcly the President said, "Russian housing is lousy, their food and agricultural system is a disaster, but those facts aren't publicized. Suddenly we're competing in a race for space we didn't e\'en realize we were in. �o matter what progress you make, the critics bomb away that we're second in space." Kennedy himself had made no effort to publicize such facts about the SoYiet system in 19Go. Such pri\'ale talk showed how far he had come from his campaign complaints that the United States was second in space and elsewhere falling behind. \\'ith the new pressure for a dramatic American success somewhere in the world, he continued to supcr\'ise planning for the landing at the Bay of Pigs. Sorem,en noted that by now his boss was committed enough to the Cuban project to be irritated by doubters. The President told his aides, "I know everybody is grabbing their nuts on this." On Wednes­ da\', April 12. someone suggested that if the invasion succeeded but a new Cuban exile goYernmenl needed military help to establish itself, the United States might ha\'l' to send in some supporting forces. "Under no circumstancesl" Kennedy exploded. "The minute I land one ).larine, we're in this thing up to our necks. I can't get the United States into a war and then lose it, no matter what it takes. I'm not going to risk an American Hungary. And that's what it could be, a fucking slaughter. ls that 1111derstood, gmtlemen?" That afternoon, al the same press conference al which he com­ mented about Gagarin, someone asked how far the United States would be willing to go "in helping an anti-Castro uprising or invasion of Cuba." Kennedy declared, "There will not be, under any condi­ tions, an intervention in Cuba by the United States armed forces." After numerous delays, the President had to make the final "go" decision by Friday, April 14. He read a telegram from a l\farine colo­ nel who hadjust inspected the exile group, Brigade 2506, in Guate­ mala. It reported that the officers had "a fanatical urge to begin battle" and that they "do not expect help from the U.S. armed forces." Kennedy called Bissell and approved the air strikes against the

"/'111 .\'ot Going to Risk an American Hungary"



three main Cuban airfields that were scheduled for Saturday; how many B-26s would be sent? Bissell said, "Sixteen." The President said, "I don't want it on that scale. I want it minimal." Bissell reduced the number. On Saturday morning, the world learned that six B-26s with Cuban markings had bombed Cuban air bases, destroying less than half of Castro's small air force. Following the CIA's instructions, another exile pilot )anded his bomber at Miami International Airport and claimed that he and two other "defectors from Castro's air force" had done the bombing. At the UN, Castro's ambassador scoffed at the pilot's story and blamed the attack on the United States as the "prel­ ude to a large-scale invasion attempt." Adlai Stevenson had not been informed that the Miami "defector" and his story were counterfeit. That afternoon, as requested by Wash­ ington, he defended the story before the UN General Assembly. Then he was told that he had disseminated a lie. Stevenson sputtered that he had been "deliberately tricked" by his own government. Back at his Waldorf Towers suite, looking ill, he told a friend, "I've got to resign. There's nothing I can do but resign. My usefulness and credibility have been totally compromised." Then: "I can't resign-can't-the country is in enough trouble."* He later complained about Kennedy's "boy commandos" and wrote a friend . that the "Cuban absurdity" made him "sick for a week." Stevenson feared that open U.S. action against Castro would taint the American image around the world. He cabled Rusk that "if Cuba now proves any of the planes and pilots came from outside, we will face an increasingly hostile atmosphere. No one will believe that bombing attacks on Cuba from outside could have been organized without our complicity." Worried that Stevenson might resign and denounce Kennedy, wor­ ried that the U.S. government was about to be humiliated, as during the U-2 affair, by revelation of its public deceptions, Rusk and Bundy telephoned the President on Sunday at Glen Ora, his newly rented 600-acre estate in the Virginia hunt country. Kennedy would have preferred a place on the Eastern Shore of Maryland, near the water, but consented to Glen Ora in deference to Jacqueline, who often spent four days a week here riding. The Presi*Breakfasting with Stevenson in New York on l\londay morning, Bundy found him "very decent" about the matter: "He did not fuss about the box he was in. All he wanted was more information so he would not dig deeper holes."






dent founs ... \'I\',\ CllB:\ ... I)() NOT PLAY \\'ITII F!Rt:). thousands of students and workers hurled ball bearings and bottles of blue-black ink at the U.S. Embassy, shouting "I lands f of Cuba!" and "Inten·e1Hionists into the sea)" A Red Arm� general, militiamen, and police on white horses arri\'ed to wind things down. Some of the African students refused to stop protesting. "They didn't realize this was a pageant," recalled Boris Klosson. "The So\'iet police pulled them off the fence, and if they didn't come off they'd knock the living daylights out of them. These kids were not brought up in the Russian way of protest, which was to do the ballet and then go home." Later a So\'ict official told Klosson, "How terrible it is, in\'ading a small country!" Klosson replied, "We won't trade in\'asion stories." American embassies were stoned in Warsaw, Cairo, Tokyo, and New Delhi. The official Chinese news agency announced that "angry condemnation" of the United States was "sweeping through Chinese cities." Kennedy was particularly pained by the bloody Latin Ameri­ can demonstrations against "Yankee imperialism." In Recife, workers holding torches and Castro portraits demanded that Brazilian troops be sent to aid Cuba. In Mexico City, students shouted, "Castro si, Kennedy no.'" The President read Khrushchev's message before he sat down in the family dining room for his regular Tuesday breakfast with leaders

"A Big Kick"



of Congress. He told the congressional leaders that he doubted Khru­ shchev would send "volunteers" to Cuba, as he had threatened to do during the Suez War of 1956, or resupply the island with military equipment: Khrushchev knew that the United States "wouldn't stand" for a large number of Soviets in Cuba. With the same exquisite caution he had shown throughout the weeks of secret meetings on the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy did not mention Berlin. The last thing he needed now was to have Congressmen walk­ ing out onto the White House steps and complaining before television cameras th?t the President was so paralyzed by fear of what Khru­ shchev might do in Berlin that he was about to abandon the coura­ geous exiles on the Cuban beaches. :\'evertheless, Kennedy took the Chairman's message as a blanket threat to march against West Berlin if the United States persisted against Cuba. He later privately told Cuban exile leaders that Khru­ shchev's message had forced on him a choice between risking a Berlin confrontation, which could touch off a large-scale war, or maintaining world peace and suffering the loss of fourteen hundred men in Cuba. It was a difficult and painful decision, but the priority clearly had to be world peace. Late on Tuesday morning, Kennedy read a note from Bundy: "I think you will find at noon that the situation in Cuba is not a bit good. The Cuban armed forces are stronger, the popular response is weaker, and our tactical position is feebler than we had hoped. Tanks have done in one beachhead, and the position is precarious at the others." Bundy predicted that the CIA would "press hard for further air help-this time by Navy cover to B-26s attacking the tanks." He recommended saying yes "because it cannot be easily proven against us and because men are in need." But the real question was "whether to reopen the possibility of further intervention and sup­ port, or to accept the high probability that our people, at best, will go into the mountains in defeat." (Even at this late moment, the Presi­ dent's people had not discovered that from these beachheads there was no such escape.) Bundy thought "the right course now is to eliminate the Castro air force, by neutrally painted U.S. planes if necessary, and then let the battle go its way." Over luncheon with James Reston of the Xew fork Times, Kennedy said that defeat in Cuba would be an incident, not a disaster; if the Cuban people were not ready to back a revolt, the United States could not impose a new regime on them by invasion. Reston asked whether American prestige would not suffer. The President said, "\\'hat is







\' E A R S

presLige? Is it the shadow of power or the substance of power? No doubL we will be kicked in Lhc ass for the next couple of weeks, but that won't affect the main business." Rohen Kennedy, Lyndo11Johnson, �tc:'\alllara, Bohlen, and others generally agreed that Khrushche\' would not risk war o\'er a country like Cuba thaL was so far from the So\'ict Union. I !is message had pledged ''all necessary assistance" btll did not lllention the rockets he had in ·�)(io twice specifically threatened Lo use for Castro's defense. At se,·en 011 Tuesday e\'ening. Rusk called �knshikov Lo the State Department and gan· him Kennedy's response. It said that the Chair­ man was "undc1· a serious misapprehension" about Cuba: "It cannot be surprising· LhaL. as resisLancc within Cuba grows, refugees have been using whate\'er means arc a\'ailahle to return and support their counLrymen in the continuing struggle for freedom." The United States would not inter\'ene militarilv in Cuba but, if "any outside force" became in\'oh·ed. it would "honor our obligations to protect this hemisphere against external aggression." The President's message noted Khrushchev's comment that the e\'ents in Cuba might affect peace elsewhere: "I trust this does not mean that the SO\iet go,·en1mcnt, using the situation in Cuba as a preLext, is planning to inflame other areas of the world." At 1 1 :58 P.:-.1., after the annual \\'hite I louse reception for members of Congress. Kennedy returned to the Cabinet Room, where the long Lable was littered with notes and newspapers. On a metal easel was a map of Cuba and the Caribbean adorned by tiny magnetic ships. Still in \\'hite tie and dress uniforms, the President and Vice President, Robert Kennedy, Rusk, Mc�amara, and General Lyman LemniLzer and Admiral Arleigh Burke of the Joint Chiefs of Staff listened as Bissell laid out the options that now remained. The CIA man argued that the operation could still be saved if the President allo\\'ed the use of jets from the Essex. Admiral Burke said, "Let me take two jets and shoot down the enemy aircraft." Kennedy said he had told the Pentagon "over and over again" that he would not commit U.S. forces. Burke suggested an American show of strength by lening unmarked jets roar .over the beach-or they could bring in a destroyer. The President said, "Burke, I don't want the United States involved with this." The Na\'y chief cast off his deference: "Hell, Mr. President, we are involved!"

"A Big Kick"



Finally Kennedy approved a compromise. For one hour, six jets from the Essex could fly over the beachhead to protect the Brigade's ammunition supply flights and their B-26 escorts.The jets must not fire at Castro's planes or ground targets unless the Brigade's aircraft should be attacked. Rusk reminded him of his pledge not to use American forces: "The President shouldn't appear in the light of bei�g a liar." Kennedy raised his right hand to the base of his nose: "We're already into it up to here." Ken O'Donnell thought that his boss was as close to weeping as he had ever seen. Off to the side of the room, a miserable Robert Kennedy kept murmuring, "We've got to do something." After the meeting ended, with tears in his eyes, Robert put both hands on his brother's shoulders: "They can't do this to you!" Without ajacket, the President opened one of the French doors and walked out into a gentle breeze on the South Grounds.Secret Service men kept their distance as he strolled until almost three in the morn­ ing by himself through the damp grass, his head bent, his hands thrust in his pockets. On Wednesday, April 19, after dawn, the U.S. Navy jets approved by the President took off from the Essex. A timing mistake brought them too early over the beaches of the Bay of Pigs.Without proper defense, the Brigade's supply flights were driven away and two of its B-26s were downed.That afternoon, the demoralized exiles began surrendering. One hundred and fourteen were dead. The other 1, 189 were captured by Castro's troops. Told what was happening, Kennedy returned to the family quarters for a nap and lunch with Jacqueline. He was haunted by the image of the brave men on the beaches who would now be shot like dogs or taken off to Castro's jails.The only times his wife had seen him weep before were in the hospital at moments of sheer frustration over his back.He did not cry, but tears would fill his eyes and roll down his cheeks.That day in Jacqueline's bedroom, he put his head into his hands and almost sobbed. Then he took her into his arms. Rose Kennedy, who was visiting the White House, later wrote in her diary that she had "phonedJoe, who saidJack had been on the phone with him much of the day, also Bobby.I asked him how he was feeling and he said 'dying'-result of trying to bring up Jack's morale.... Jackie walked upstairs with me and said he'd been so upset all day. Had practically been in tears, felt he had been misinformed by CIA and others. I felt so sorry for him." In the Cabinet Room, Robert Kennedy barked at collcag-ucs that



they must now "act or be judged paper tigers in i\loscow."* They could notjust "sit and take it." \\'ith all that talent around the table, somebody ought to find something to do. Walt Rostow later recalled that he "had what I can only describe as a tender feeling " toward the President's brother. I le took him outside and said, "If you're in a fight and get knocked off your fcct, the most dangerous thing is to come up swinging." That was the way 10 get badly hurt. !\ow they should "pause and think." There would be plenty of times and places to show the Russians that they were not paper tigers: "Berlin, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere." Robert said, "That's constructi\'e." I k wrote his brother a pro­ phetic memo: "If \,·c don't wa111 Russia to set up missile bases in Cuba, we had better decide now what we arc willing to do 10 stop it." They could send American troops imo Cuba, which "might have to be reconsidered,·· or they could blockade the island, an act of war that would bring "worldwide bitterness." A third option was to ask the Organization of American States 10 ban all arms shipments to Cuba and guarantee the island's territorial integrity "so that the Cuban go\'ernment could not say they would be at the mercy of the L'nited States." The OAS might agree Lo such a course "if it was reported that one or two of Castro's i\liGs attacked Guantanamo and the United States made noises....i\laybe this is not the way to carry it out, but something forceful and determined must be done....The time has come for a showdown, for in a year or two the situation ,,·ill be \'astly \,·orse." The President and First Lady allended a dinner at the Greek Em­ bassy gi\Cn by ,·isiting Prime �linister Constantine Caramanlis. Jacqueline later told Lem Billings that she and Jack had given Cara­ manlis "a \'ery boring state gift," but at the last moment she had picked up one of her "fa\'orite snuff boxes " and given it to the Prime �linister's wife. After returning from the dinner, Kennedy returned to the Cabinet Room. As Robert recalled, "Everybody really seemed to fall apart." The Attorney General told the assembly, "\\' e should pick ourselves up and figure out what we are going to do that would be best for the country and the President o\·er the next six to twelve months. . . . \\'hat worries me most is now nobody in the government will be *In 1957, :,,tao Tse-tung had gained much attention with his gibe that the \\"est was a "paper tiger." Khrushchev not only did not share :,,1ao's view, but it was one of the Chinese articles of faith he decried at the eighty-one-delegation Communist Party meeting in �loscow in November 1960.

"A Big Kick"

willing to stick his neck out, to take a chance, to plan bold and aggres­ sive action against the Communists." Chester Bowles observed that by now the consensus was to "get tough with Castro." He felt that had the President now wished to send in troops or bomb Cuba, go percent of the room would have ap­ proved. Bohlen strongly argued for sending U.S. troops. Rusk ob­ jected. Others spoke of blockading the island. Robert Kennedy later recalled having "a slight flare-up " with Lyndon Johnson: during a discussion of who had been in favor of the Cuban project, "we had the impression he was just trying to get off it himself." The President's immediate task was to write a speech for delivery on Thursday to the American Society of l\ewspaper Editors, the same group that had invited Castro to the United States in 1959. He loped down the checkered linoleum hallway lined with filing cabinets to Ted Sorensen's office.

This intense young man ,vas perhaps the most serious liberal in Kennedy's inner circle. Sorensen had the instinctive distrust of easy charm and emotionalism that was characteristic of both New England and the American Midwest. Central to his admiration for Kennedy was his conviction that "the liberal who is rationally committed is more reliable than the liberal who is emotionally committed." This view was tested in October 1959, when Sorensen read a draft of john Kennedy: A Political Profile, by James MacGregor Burns. Based on access to the Senator, his family, and his papers, Burns's admiring volume concluded with a reservation: although Kennedy would bring "bravery and wisdom " to the Presidency, "whether he would bring passion and power would depend on his making a commitment, not only of mind but of heart, that until now he has never been required to make." Sorensen wrote Burns, "'The impression should never be giYen that he does not believe deeply in what he says or will not fight fiercely for the causes in which he belieYes.... I really think he is a unique figure in American politics-where he combines extraordinary qualities of strong leadership and intellectual brilliance with an uncanny sense of public relations and the public mood. Not only do I think he will be President-more than any other living man he ought to be."* *Burns's conclusion was not all that rankled Kennedy and Sorensen. After Burus"s editor mailed Sorensen a sampling of praise from prominent liberals who had read the manuscript, Sorensen replied by sending Burns a list of rC\'isions he and the

,Ai I




Sorensen's father was a progrcssi\'e Nebraska lawyer who managed campaigns for the ma\'erick Senator George Norris and was himself twice elected the state's attor11e\' general.Knmn1 as a crime buster and foe of corporate wealth, C. A.Sorensen met his Russian Jewish wife, Annis Chaikin. while defending her along with other pacifists during \\'orld \\'ar I. Born in 1928. the son registered with draft authorities after \\'oriel \\'ar II as a noncombatant and helped 10 form local chapters of the Congress of Racial Equality and Amerirans for Democratic Action. Arri\'ing in \\'ashington after the l 1 ni\'ersity of Nebraska Law School, he worked for two \Tars as a goH_·mment lawyer before presenting himself for an inten'iew ,,·ith the ne\\'I\' elc( ted Senator frolll �1assa­ chuseus in .January •05'.�· I le much later said, "I felt I could ha,·e had the job right then.... But I also felt that if I was going to throw in with him, then there were things I wanted lo know....\\'e had another inten·iew, and this time I asked the questions-about hi, father, Joe 7-.kCarthy. the Catholic Church.I le must han: thought I "·as an odd duck ... but I know we satisfied each other." For the next decade, Kennedy "was the only human being who mattered to me." A friend thought Sorensen ,a\\· Kennedy as "his work of art." From the start, he worked to hdp the Senator become a figure of presiden­ tial quality, steering him toward the liberali-;m of the national Demo­ cratic Party. Sorensen also ga,·e the Senator his \'oice.The hackneyed speeches of Kennedy's congressional years ga,·e way to the staccato phrases, contrapuntal se11tences, soaring rhetoric, and quotations from the great for which Kennedy would alwars be remembered.* Sorensen once said, "A Kennedy speech has to ha,·e class." His hand was not absent from Profiles in Courage, the'book that allo\\·ed Kennedy's supporters 10 call him "the Pulitzer Prize-winning Senator wanted. The,e. he said, were "the basis for our judgment that publication of this book in the form in which we read it would be a disaster-a major setback to the campaign and a real weapon in the hands of our opponents. \\'e are not impressed by the fact that the liberal bigots feel the book is slanted the other wav-we know that is ine\'itably their altitude and "e know it is useless lo pander to their prejudices." Burns made some changes in cases where he felt Kennedy and Sorensen were "justified in your point of \'ie,,·" but insisted to them that "there has to be ultimately onh· one author of the book." This greatly irritated the candidate, and especially his brother Robert. Although Bums campaigned for Kenned\' in the \\'isconsin primary, their relations were ne,er the same again. Cnlike scores of academics less dose to the candidate than Bums, he was ne,er offered a place in the new administration. *In a high school \'aledictory address, Sorensen said, "To pro\'e ourseh'es, \\'e must impro\'e the world."

"A Big Kick"

I 127

Senator." Sorensen told the historian Herbert Parmet in 1977,"I do not want current history books-and maybe not even future history books-to say that Sorensen ...took credit for all things that ap­ peared with Kennedy's name. "That was a very sensitive subject while he was alive-Ve?)'.... Nothing upset him more than the charge that he was not the author of Profiles in Courage, and I still feel some inhibitions in talking about this matter frankly even today.... I'll tell you that I did have a substantial role in all of the output,and his role was that of being the final responsible person who signed it."* In 1957 and 1958, Sorensen traveled with Kennedy to all forty­ eight states,filing the names of thirty thousand Democrats on index cards.Sorensen occasionally saved the Senator time by impersonating him on the telephone.When someone told him that he was "getting more like Jack than Jack himself," Kennedy took the man aside and said,"Don't-he gets that from all sides." Sorensen took full part in the Senator's political life and almost no part in his social life.The political scientist Richard Neustadt,who later helped Kennedy orga­ nize his White House staff, observed that "never have two people been more intimate and more separate." When the Senator hired new people in 1959 in order to run for President, Sorensen was not immune to a natural possessiveness about his boss. That fall, when Kennedy recruited the Stevenson Democrat Hy Raskin of Chicago,Kennedy said,"Don't worry about Sorensen.Bobby's coming onto the campaign next week,and he hates him even more than you do." Still,the morning after the 1960 elec­ tion,it was Sorensen who awakened Kennedy with the news that he was President-elect. Kennedy worried that formal titles might tend to ossify his staff but relented when Sorensen insisted on being called Special Counsel to the President.Neustadt noticed that once Sorensen got his title,he "accepted intellectually the fact that the new situation was too much for him to dominate.Now he was established in control of speeches and programs."

Roaming Sorensen's large,bare office after midnight,Kennedy told his 4idc that he wanted his speech to the editors to forestall demands *After examining the Senate papers of Kennedy and Sorensen. Parmct coududcd that Kennedy "served principally as an overseer or, more charitablv, as a sponsor and editor" of the book: "The burdens of time and literary crartsma11ship were clearly Sorensen's, and he gave the book both the drama and flow that made for· tTadabilitv."




for \'iolcnt retaliation against Castro, reassure the free world of Amer­ ica's prudence, and dissuade the Communists from presuming that restraint meant weakness. Herc,in private with the trusted Sorensen, the President said what he would not say in the larger meetings: the main reason he had been so allergic to American force against Cuba was fear that Khrushchev might use it as a pretext to move against Berlin. As Kennedy bade Sorensen good night. he snatched a magazine from the desk.At 1 :30 A.:">t., Sorensen telephoned the family quarters to ask him a question. but the operator said the President was still presumed to be with him. Sorensen put down the telephone, walked down the corridor. and almost fell O\'Cr someone slumped in a chair, reading. \\'ith a start, he realized it was Kennedy. 011 Thursda\', April 20, O\'Cr breakfast and throughout the morn­ ing. the President worked on his ASNE address. ";"\ever did he look back," recalled Bohlen."'He was always looking forward." But during a walk togethe,· 011 the South Crounds, Sorensen found his boss "depressed and lonely." Kennedy complained that he had "unneces­ sarily worsened" relations with the Soviet Union just as test ban talks were starting again.He had handed his critics a stick with which they would fore,·er beat him. At the Statler Hilton, he told the editors, "Our restraint is not inexhaustible.... I want it clearly understood that this government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations, which arc to the security of our nation." The next line went to the heart of Khru­ shche\''s Tuesday message: "Should that time ever come, we do not intend to be lectured on 'intervention' by those whose character was stampcdforall ti111e on the bloody streets of Budapest!" The ballroom rocked \\°ith applause. "We face a relentless struggle in e\'ery corner of the globe that goes far beyond the clash of armies or e\·en nuclear armaments....They ser\'e primarily as the shield behind which subversion, infiltration, and a host of other tactics steadily advance, picking off vulnerable areas­ one by one-in situations that do not permit our own armed interven­ tion.... \\' e dare not fail to grasp the new concepts, the new tools, the new sense of urgency \,·e will need to meet it, whether in Cuba or South \'ietnam." He dosed: "History will record the fact that this bitter struggle reached its climax in the late 1950s and the early 1960s.Let me then make clear as the President of the United States that I am determined


"A Big Kick"



upon our system's survival and success, regardless of the cost and regardless of the peril!" Cuban exile leaders in Miami who heard the speech on radio slapped one another on the back. Ambassador Menshikov had been scheduled to breakfast with Stevenson on Friday; after hearing Kennedy's address, he canceled his appointment. Robert Kennedy thought his brother's speech "very effective." Richard Goodwin, now a White House aide, told the President that his hint about a future invasion of Cuba sounded like a vague threat, especially if the United States had no such intention. As Goodwin recalled, his boss replied in a "mild, barely distinct" voice. "I didn't want us to look like a paper tiger. We should scare people a little, and I did it to make us appear tough and powerful." Kennedy shrugged. "Anyway, it's done. You may be right, but it's done." Scaring people a little was calculated to protect the President against the criticism that was already being unleashed upon him. Barry Goldwater declared that Kennedy's Cuban fiasco should fill every American with "apprehension and shame." General Lauris Nor­ stad, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe, told a friend that Cuba was the worst American defeat "since the ,var of 1812." The Cold War braggadocio of Kennedy's ASNE address helped to vent his frustration at his inability to make the invasion succeed. It put Khrushchev on notice to think twice before moving massive arma­ ments and Soviet troops onto the island. But the President's pledge to fight the "new concepts" and "new tools" of Communist insur­ gency suggested that he was still so mesmerized by Khrushchev's Wars of Liberation speech that he missed the meaning of the Bay of Pigs. Khrushchev had gained an ally not by subversion of Cuba but mainly by sheer luck. Castro had come to power not because the KGB or Red Army installed him, as they had the dictators of Eastern Europe, but through a genuine popular revolution. After reading the ASNE speech, Llewellyn Thompson cabled, "At the risk of being considered an apologist, I suggest we should keep in mind that in recent trouble spots-Iraq, the Congo, Cuba, and, so far as I am informed, Laos-the Soviets did not initiate the crisis but followed their usual policy of taking advantage of opportunities." One of the debacle's chief lessons was that, until Castro's popularity crumbled, his regime would be resistant to American tactics like coun­ terinsurgency. Nevertheless, anyone who scrutinized Kennedy's speech, including Khrushchev's analysts in l\loscm,·, would ha\'e di­ vined that the President would make another effort to topple Castro,




either by CO\'Crl action or full-scale in\'asion by l Tnitcd States armed forces. The Soviet poet \'evgeny \' c,·lllshenko wrote a poem about a Cuban mother camping on the beach near the gra\'c of her son, killed al the Bay of Pigs: Thr sN1 . . . That is 1t'hnr !hr m11rdrrns ramr from! I k11owThry ra11 rome bark atai11! Kennedy faced the press 011 Friday 111orni11g. April 21. \\'ith a lordly stroke that later Presidents would em·y, he foreclosed questions on Cuba by saying that no "useful national purpose" would be scr\'cd by further public discussion: "I prefer to let my statement of yesterday s11fli.ce for the present." Sander \'anoc11r ofi'\BC asked why they could not explore the "real facts " behind the Bay of Pigs. Kenned� replied. "There's an old saying that ,·ictory has a hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan.. .. Further statements, detailed discussions. arc not to conceal responsibility, because I'm the respon­ sible officer of the gm·ernmcnl-and that is quite ob\'ious-but merely because I do not bclic\'C that such a discussion would benefit us during the present difficult, uh, situation." For the remainder of the session, no one challenged Kennedy on his silence about this most important e,·enl of his administration thus far. The President took responsibility, blll there were efforts to spread the blame.A \\'bite House aide told reporters on background how the Joint Chiefs had selected the landing beaches and the CIA had prom­ ised uprisings: "Allen and Dick didn't just brief us on it.They sold us on it." Hedley Dono,·an complained to Time-Life colleagues that Kennedy was gelling "preposterous praises " for stating the constitu­ tional fact that he was responsible while "telling scores of friends, senators, journalists, only slightly privately, that his mistake was to pay any attention to the CIA and military brass." The President told Jacqueline, "�1y God, the bunch of advisers we inherited.... Can you imagine being President and leaving behind someone like all those people there?" He told one reporter that Allen Dulles had assured him the operation's chances for success were "as great as in Guatemala." Telling the tale to someone else, he attributed the quote to the Joint Chiefs. On another occasion he carped, ''I'll bet Dean Rusk wishes he had spoken up in a louder voice."

"A Big Kick"






Back in his office after his Friday press conference, Kennedy was already speaking of the Bay of Pigs in the past tense. "We can't win them all," he told Johnson and Schlesinger, "and I have been close enough to disaster to realize that these things which seem world­ shaking at one moment you can barely remember the next. We got a big kick .in the ass-and we deserved it. But maybe we'll learn something from it." On Saturday morning, April 22, he received Khrushchev's response to his Tuesday message and his ASNE speech: "Mr. President, you are taking a highly dangerous road. Think about it. . .. No one can have any commitment to defend rebels against the lawful government of a sovereign state like Cuba." The Chairman noted that some Americans were suggesting that Moscow was turning Cuba into a Soviet base: "We do not have any bases in Cuba, and we do not intend to establish any." If the President felt aggrieved by Cuba, the Soviet Union had "no lesser grounds" against states along its border whose territory was being used to threaten Soviet security. Khrushchev noted that Kennedy "did not like my words in my previous message that there can be no stable peace in the world if there are flames of war anywhere. But . . . the world is a single whole, whether one likes it or not.I will only repeat what I said: it would not do to put out the flames in one area and thereby kindle a new confla­ gration in another." The President regarded this message as one last volley in the propa­ ganda battle over the Bay of Pigs. His Soviet experts recalled Khru­ shchev's threats to send Soviet volunteers to the Middle East only after the Suez War had cooled: "He's got this \'ery good habit of jumping all over things when the danger is over, and not before." Now that the tumult over Cuba was over, Kennedy did not bother to reply to the Chairman's message. The State Department highhand­ edly announced that he would not be "drawn into an extended debate with the Chairman" over "this latest ... Communist distortion of the basic concepts of the rights of man." In retrospect, Khrushchev's message was of cardinal importance. For perhaps the first time, the Chairman made the clear public argu­ ment that he considered Soviet interests in Cuba now to be parallel with American interests in countries along the Sm·iet perimeter like Turkey, where the United States maintained a substantial military establishment. What logically followed from this was that if the l 1 nited States






continued Lo commit hostile ans against Cuba, it gave the Soviet Union the right to harass American allies along its border. For the United States to place missiles in Turkey that the Soviets considered offensive, for instance, granted the Soviet Union similar license in Cuba. As \\'ith so many other· subtleties in the long history of the Cold \Var, this signal to Washington was O\'c:rlookc:d. \\'hen the failure of the Bay of Pigs was certain, Kennedy had asked Sorensen, "How could I ha\'iclent-dect's offer lO be ambassador to :\'ATO. The only full-time job he would ha\'e accepted was his old om·. But 1\·hen Kennedy in �larch l!)Gt publicly called on him LO ad\'ise on Germany and Berlin. Acheson's secretary noted that "DA is buoyed up by it all and looh better and , ounger than I have seen him in ,·car,." His modest return lO goH'rnrnent did not rcstrin his sharp tongue. In a �peech to the Foreign Scr,icc after the Bay of Pigs, he reported the feeling among Europeans that they were "watching a gifted young amateur practice with a boomerang when they saw, to their horror, that he had knocked himself' out." Kennedy heard about the speech and, as Acheson recalled, "didn't like this at all." '.'Jow. in the Cabinet Room, he argued that Khrushchev had started his newest Berlin crisis to weaken '.'JATO, buttress the East German regime, and legalize the Odcr-;,...'eisse Linc with Poland that the Sovi­ ets recognized as the GDR's Eastern frontier.* �tost of all, the Chair* At the Potsdam conference in Juh 1945. the Allies had pro,·isionally established the Oder and :\ei,,e riH·rs a, the boundari between the old western and eastern German pro, inces, the latter of which ,,-ere allocated to po,t\\·ar Poland. The extrusion of the eastern prm·inces from what had been Germam before the war remained a live political issue in the FRG. Adenauer', aide Felix ,·on Eckhardt brought a secret request from the Chancellor to both Kennedy and :\ixon in July 1960 not to mention the Oder-:\'eisse Linc during the campaign: "He realizes there may be some pressure from Pole, in this countq .... All sensible Germans recognize that there cannot be a change in the Line. But with the German elections coming up in September 1961, any state­ ments in the l'.S. would be used in ... local campaigns to the disadvantage of the Chancellor and his party." \'on Eckhardt transmiued his message to Kennedy through Harriman, who told him that "the sooner all hands agreed to the Oder-;"l,'eisse Line, the belter it would be for e,·ervbod\'." Since Kennedy was eager to avoid the issues of Berlin and Germany am·way, he was happy to comply ,,·ith Adenauer's request. The closest he came to discussing the Oder-:\'eisse Line in the fall campaign was to tell the Polish-American

The Ticking Clock

I 243


man was testing America's will. America could not back down from such a sacred commitment as the defense of Berlin. Khrushchev would take willingness to negotiate as a sign of weakness. He had only dared start this crisis because rising Soviet strength had reduced his fear of a nuclear confrontation. The Eisenhower State Department had quietly drafted "three es­ sentials" to protect in Berlin even at the risk of nuclear war: access by air and ground, continued Western garrisons and other forms of presence in West Berlin, and the freedom and survival of the Western sector.* Acheson said that Khrushchev must be made to know that the United States was "irretrievably committed" to these three interests. The President must order a rapid buildup of conventional and nuclear forces, put two or three additional divisions in West Germany, hold three to six more in reserve for transport overseas on short notice, declare a national emergency. If Khrushchev signed a peace treaty, Kennedy should not quibble. But if the Soviets and East Germans blocked access to Berlin, the President should launch a new airlift. If they interfered with the West­ ern planes, he should order a ground probe of two divisions-too large for East Germany to stop without Soviet help. The President must show Khrushchev that he had the resolution to go on, if neces­ sary, to nuclear war. That done, he might offer face-saving conces­ sions, such as barring espionage and subversion from West Berlin or even recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line. Some in the room were upset by Acheson's seeming nonchalance about risking nuclear war. They thought that starting off with negotia­ tion would show Khrushchev that the West was ready to reduce West Berlin's irritation value while protecting Western rights. Llewellyn Thompson, back in Washington to advise on Berlin, said that Khrushchev's chief motive in starting a new Berlin crisis was not to humiliate the United States but to improve the Communist position in Eastern Europe and disrupt NATO. Thompson favored a quiet Western military buildup, followed by a diplomatic offensive after the West German elections in September. Then the Soviet Union would have to suffer the world's hostility for opposing the Western plan to avert a nuclear war over Berlin.


Congress of Chicago, "We must eliminate Poland's fear of the West, fears that arc very real, and this includes in particular fear of Germany." *When the West Germans were told of the three essentials at a NATO meeting in May 1961, Mayor Brandt's aide Egon Bahr had complained, "This is almost an invitation for the Soviets to do what they want with the \,Vestem sector."




Y E .\ R S

Thompson argued lhat a national emergency declaration would make the United Slates look "lwsterical." IL might force a rash coun­ termo\'e from Khrushchn that he did not really wanl lO make. Kennedy asked whether it was "really lo our advantage" lO press the old \\'estern demand for reunification of Berlin. Rusk said that "self-determination is a heller ground than unification." The Presi­ dent asked him to draft a proposal for a plebiscite allowing Berliners to choose their own destiny: no one could doubt who would win. He worried aloud that a new military buildup might be matched by the Soviet Union. Acheson agreed that "such back-and-forth challenges" should be a\'oided "as far as possible." Kennedy asked what to do "if Khrushche\' proposes a summit this summer." Acheson said, "IL would not be hard to find answers as we go along." The President should propose lower-le,·el talks first. There were "plenty of elderly, unemployed people" like himself who could "con\'erse indefinitely without negotiating at all." He could easily do so "for three months on end... Listening to Acheson, Robert Kennedy thought that he would ne\'cr wi�h "to be on the other side of an argument with him." That week .\'ewsweek published secret information on contingency planning for Berlin b� the Pentagon, including a mobilization of American armed forces. Professing concern about how Khrushchev would ,·iew the information, Kennedy ordered the FBI to investigate. In fact, like the transcripts of the Vienna talks, the President or his aides may ha\'C themseh·es authorized the leak-in this case, to send a stiff alarm lo Khrushche\'. * Khrushche\' got the message. In a :\loscow speech, he scoffed at "reports" of\\'estern mobilization plans. \\'bile auending a perform­ ance by Dame :\!argot Fonteyn at the Bolshoi Theater, he called Sir Frank Roberts, the British Ambassador, to his box and warned lhal any effort lo resist his German peace treaty would be futile; if the \\'estern powers sent a new di\'ision to Germany, the Soviet Union could respond a hundredfold. Six ofhis hydrogen bombs would be "quite enough" lo destroy the British Isles. Nine would take care of France. Exploiting his awareness that the British were more willing than the Americans lo bargain over Berlin, Khrushchev asked, "\\'hy should two hundred million people die for two million Berliners?" *DaYid Klein of the '.\SC, whose mandate included Berlin, supposed that the culprit was in the \\'hite House or Defense Department.

The Ticking Clock




On Tuesday evening.July 4, for the first time in three years, Khru­ shchev and his wife turned up at Jane and Llewellyn Thompson's Independence Day reception at Spaso House. They were followed by Mikoyan and Kozlov, Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky, and five other Soviet marshals. The Chairman's visit was in character; he tended to make such calls when he was anxious that a crisis with the West might'be about to grow overheated. Boris Klosson entertained him until the Ambassador could grace­ fully leave his own receiving line: "I have a complaint. You're going to exploit me. You're going to print your new Twenty-year Plan on Sunday, so I am going to have to work on Sunday." Khrushchev said, "You mean you're going to read that?" Jane Thompson gave him a Scotch highball, which he nursed and then gave to Nina Petrovna, saying, "I want to live. Mikoyan does all the drinking." Seven-year-old Sherry Thompson took the Chairman by the hand and showed him her vegetable garden. Khrushchev inevitably de­ manded to see her corn patch, but she told him that the stalks were not yet high enough to display. Someone cried, "The assault of correspondents has begun!" Khru­ shchev said, "We will repel it, but not with rockets." A reporter: "Our only weapon is a typewriter. Have you a secret weapon?" Khrushchev: "We need no weapons and no uniforms. All we need is brains." l\1ikoyan: "His tongue is his weapon." Another reporter: "That is a good weapon, and it gives us plenty of ammunition, but it is not a secret weapon.''

On Saturday, July 8, Khrushchev scrapped his program to reduce the Red Army by 1.2 million men. Under military pressure, he aban­ doned his argument that missile forces could substitute for troops. The Soviet defense budget would be increased by one third. "These are forced measures, comrades. We take them because we cannot neglect the Soviet people's security." He noted that Adenauer was "shouting himself hoarse for nuclear weapons." Kennedy had increased military spending. "This is how the Western powers have replied to the Soviet Union's unilateral reduction of armed forces and military expenditures over the past several years." To remove the edge from his announcement, Khrushche,· cited the President's call for a peaceful competition. "This, of course, is much

1qG I



better than competing in the development of C\'er more destructive typcs of weapons." Arkady She\'chcnko recalled that "a crisis atmo­ sphcre prc\'ailcd as we waited to sec what kind of countermeasures Kennedy would take." The Presidem was at I lyannis Port. Told of the a11110uncemenl, he said that Khrushchev had just hardened his Berlin challenge. The prc\'ious week. he had sent John :'\lcCloy to l\loscm,· in an effort to jump-start the Genc\'a disarmament talks.* , ow he asked Bundy, "Should we break them off. using the recent So\'iet increases as our argument, and ask that the matter he taken to the llN?" Earlier that day, wearing a beige tweed jacket and chinos, Kennedy had joined his wife, Rusk. ;\lc.:\'amara. ;\(axwcll Taylor, and the Charles Spaldings for fish chowder and hot dogs aboard the ,\far/in. Jacqueline hopped on:r the side to water-ski. Taylor and l\!cNamara swam. Still wearing his business suit, the Sccrctar) of State sat on the fantail with Kennedy. who complained that a month had passed since \'ie1111a, and still State had produced no reply to Khrushchev's Berlin aidc-ml·moire. Rusk reminded him that the text had to be cleared with the Western allies: the So\'icts would seize on the slightest nuance to wrench the alliance apart. The President bloviated that he did not intend to make himself dependent on the Allies. Didn't Rusk understand? The L'nited States bore the main responsibility for Berlin. In the end, it alone would decide the policy. Kennedy had read a memo from Schlesinger and two other staff members criticizing Acheson's fixation on the military aspects of the Berlin problem and what they thought to bf> the "least likely eventual­ ity"-an immediate blockade of \\'est Berlin. He agreed. He gave Rusk ten days to gi,·e him a plan for negotiations on Berlin. Taylor and :'\kNamara climbed back onto the boat. Still irritated, the President complained about the military planning on Berlin. If the SO\·iets se,·ered access, NATO would be hard pressed to respond by conventional means. He wanted a wider choice than "holocaust or humiliation." He ga,·e McNamara ten days to draw up a plan for non-nuclear resistance on a scale large enough to demonstrate that the West would resist a "cheap and easy" seizure of Berlin by East German *�lcCloy wrote Eisenhower that he was leaYing "for another session with the Russians which I really do not relish, as my hands are pretty well tied, due to our relations with the Allies as well as to the other government agencies."

The Ticking Clock

I 247

guards. It must be large enough to allow a true pause-a month instead of an hour-for himself and Khrushchev to choose retreat or nuclear war. In the Cabinet Room on Thursday,July 13, Rusk told Kennedy that "Khrushchev's timetable is not under our control." If the President offered negotiations now, he could "take the fever" out of the crisis. The problem was that, as Acheson had said, the United States was "not currently in a good position to negotiate." If Khrushchev was "willing to protect our basic rights," he would not have started this confrontation. McNamara recommended a national emergency declaration to arouse Americans to the dangers over Berlin and prepare them for sacrifice. The President should call up the reserves and the National Guard, extend the service of those on active duty, retrieve American dependents from Europe, and ask Congress for an additional $4.3 billion for defense. Rusk worried that an emergency declaration "would have a danger­ ous sound of mobilization. . .. We should try to avoid actions which are not needed for sound military purposes and which would be considered provocative." Khrushchev would be more impressed if the "more drastic of our preparations" were "taken later on, as the crisis deepens." As an alternative, the President could ask Congress for a resolution to let him call up armed forces as needed. Acheson complained that if the President did not call up reserves until late in the crisis, it would not affect Khrushchev's judgment any more than "dropping bombs after he had forced the issue to the limit." Lyndon Johnson argued that the President "should take the lead" because otherwise Congress would assume that Kennedy was shifting the burden to them. After the meeting, the President took McNamara into the Oval Office: he should proceed on the assumption that America would act with force only if West Berlin were directly threatened. Only two things mattered in this crisis: "our presence in Berlin" and "our access." The United States would not challenge the Soviet Union in its own sphere of influence. The U.S.government had still not responded to Khrushchev's Ber­ lin aide-memoire. Members of the Kennedy circle later transformed the long delay into a famous parable demonstrating the torpor of'thc State Department. In an interview, the President later complained

:q8 I





\' E .\ H S

thal it look "man} weeks lo get our answer 0111 1hro11gh 1he S1a1c Depanment. . . . ii seems w me 1ha1 one of the ltmnions of the Presidenl is 10 1ry 10 have il 1110n· wi1h more \l)t'ed. 01herwise you can wait while 1hc world collapses." The actual slOn· was not so clear-nu. �lartin l lillcnbrand of Slate la1er recalled tha1 a draf1 reph· was sent shonh after \'ienna, bu1 1ha1 "\\'hi1e I louse adminis1r;11iH: procedures were so sloppv i1 ended up in the safe of a presidential aide named Ralph Dungan, who 1hcn \,·enl off on a I wo-\,·eek holidav .... Finallv we pr sp . >- ... o ,, . I tire So\'H ....I would hope. in an� case, we could refrain from any 'chest -beating' or intima­ tion that the 0\ iet, had knuckled under." The President asked Thompson to quicth inform DobrYnm that he appreciated Khru­ shcheY'::. personal intenention in the case. On Thursda,·, '.\'o,·ember 2 1. Thompson reported back that Dobry­ nin had "said he would transmit the me ,age, but made no comment other than to expres ,;urprisc at the amount of the reaction here. I indicated to him that ,,·e had taken some action to try to keep this from getting out of hand but did sa� that this affair had been far from helpful in our relations." This message was transmitted to the Presi­ dent in Texas. Kennedy and KhrushcheY had not directly corresponded since early October. On Thursday, October 10, after the Chairman signed the Limited Test Ban treaty at the Kremlin, Zarin had handed Kohler a letter from Khrushche\' lo the President suggesting that they seek solutions to other "ripe" issues such as Berlin, nuclear proliferation, bombs in orbit, and the fear of surprise attack. Ten days later, the State Department sent Bundy a draft reply saying, "I am conYinced then that the possibilities for an impro\'ement in the international silllation are real. ...These opportunities, how-

Fragile Opportunities

I 663

eYer, are still fragile ones, and we must be constantly on guard to move forward, lest our hopes of progress be jeopardized." After the President read the draft, Bundy scrawled, "Approved. Let's get it out." Later, Bundy was informed that "due to clerical misunderstanding in the State Department," the President's reply to Khrushchev was never sent. Had Kennedy learned of the error, the air of the Oval Office woyld haYe rocked with epithets about bureaucratic incompe­ tence. But the President never found out, because Bundy was not told that the letter had gone unsent until December 1963. Waiting in �loscmv for Kennedy's reply, Khrushchev might have wondered why Kennedy had not responded to his cordial letter about new opportunities for peace. As the weeks passed in silence, his dark imagination may have begun to take over: was the President about to turn his back on their emerging detente? The proud, vulnerable, eYer-anxious Chairman refused to be the first to break the silence. This was how the pri\·ate correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev died.


p T


23 'Now Peace Is Up to You"


LL AL'T MN IT HAD BEL COLD A D RAI Y I WASH! GTON. AS Robert Kenned· recalled, b mid- ovember 1963, his brother wa feeling "rather gloomy." One rea on for the President' melancholy may have been that the bloom eemed to be fading from the rose of rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Another source of gloom was Vietnam. As Kennedy had feared, the coup in Saigon was producing more turmoil. Soon he would have to decide how far the nited States would go to defend South Vietnam. Still another source was the prospect of running for reelection against the John Birch Society and millions of others who were seething over civil rights and the Soviet detente. Nowhere was the hatred more intense than in Texas, where the President was to make a "nonpolitical" tour. Whatever its billing, the trip's main purpose was to raise campaign money and resolve a bitter feud between the state's two senior Democrats, the conservative Gov-

".\'ow Peace Is r.:p lo You"

I 665

ernor John Connally and the liberal Senator Ralph Yarborough. Kennedy feared that the feud between the two men might harm his chances to win the state in 1964.. From Dallas, the President was to fly to a Democratic fund-raising dinner in Austin, where he would be introduced by his \'ice President. Defensive about the second largest city in his home state, Johnson remembered that Stevenson had been spat upon during an October visit. He told aides that he intended to open his speech with a joke: "Mr. President, thank God you made it out of Dallas alive!" Kennedy spent the last weekend of his !ife at Palm Beach with his Harvard friend Torbert Macdonald, with whom he had dined at the Carlyle on the eve of the Missile Crisis.Macdonald recalled, "It was like being back in 1939, when there was nothing of moment on any­ body's mind." Bundy sent the President weekend reading: "A paper showing the German military mind at work.... Zbigniew Brzezinski meets the press, and I think you may find it more interesting in that it shows a somewhat more balanced view than some other remarks of his... . George Ball's views on the handling of less deYeloped countries ....A good summary of the situation in Yemen....The joys of public celebration in Indonesia." On Saturday morning, Kennedy and ti.Iacdonald flew to Cape Canaveral and joined Lyndon Johnson to watch a Polaris missile fir­ ing. Returned to Palm Beach the next day, the President bet his chum that the Chicago Bears would defeat the Green Bay Packers and col­ lected his money after they watched the victory on television. That evening, they screened the new film of Henry Fielding's bawdy classic Tom Jones.

Before Kennedy's Florida trip, the FBI and Secret Service had re­ ceived information that anti-Castro exiles might erupt in violence against him.During the Canaveral visit, the President had ordered a f Secret Service agent to "keep those Ivy League charlatans of the back of the car." This was the same occasion on which he o,·erruled the agents and told his Vice President to "get in my plane,'' laughingly asking "Don't vou fellows want ti.lcCormack as President?" On �1onday, Kennedy returned to Washington on ,lir Forrr 011r.I !is back hurt.Lying on his stateroom bed, he summoned George Smath­ ers from the front of the plane: "God, I wish you could think of some way of gelling me out of going to Texas.... Look how screwed up it's going to be.You've got Lyndon, who is insisting that J.ickie ride with him. You've got Ralph Yarborough, who hates L� 11l Gcn11;111 teclmi­ cian. I lors1 Schwirkrnann. c;1111e to '.\loscow 10 check the FRC Embassy for t·a,·e,droppi11g de, ices. \\'hen he found 1hcm. he st•nt a high­ \'Oltage joh through 1he Jim·,. which gan· KGB lis1eners a painl'ul shock. !'he setret police �;1w their opportunil\· to s;1bot,1ge Khru­ -;hchc\''s rapprochc111t·111 with \\'e\l Cennan\'. \\'hill' touring the Za­ gorsk '.\lo11as1e1 \', Schwirk111a11n was shol in 1hc IHrttorks with nilrogen 1m1s1ard gas !11.11 could ha, e killed him. The oulraged \\'l'\l Ccnnans a111101111ced 1ha1 Khn1'hchev nHrld 1101 \'isit Bonn u111il lhl' case wa., ,a1isfat1orih resol\'cd. The So\'iet apologv in Onobc1· was u11u,ualh ,pccific: "Those "ho indulge in such .inion, are In i11g 10 u11dl'rmi11e thl' good relations between our 1wo comuries." Bui it w;1s issued too latl'. lh then, Khrushchl'\' had been ot1s1ed b\' men ,,·ho had 01her ideas about relations "·i1h \\'est Germ all\. John Kennedy's near-canonization and Barry Goldwater's nomina­ tion pren'Illed the campaign of 196 -1 from becoming the rancorous struggle o,er foreign policy that the late President had feared. Con­ trasting himself with Gold\\'ater and his "\\'hy :'\ot Victory?" platform, Ln1don Johnson campaigned as a cemrist. The Presidenl asked Khrushchev through Norman Cousins to "keep out of the election'': he \\'ished to defeat Goldwater soundly and must not appear to be the Kremlin's candidate. During a Moscow ,·isit, Da, id Rockefeller of the Chase '.\lanhauan Bank told the Chair­ man ofJohnson's hope that they could establish "relations of the sort * :\'ot long afterward Gromyko told a \'isitor, "\\'hy was Khrushchev O\'erthrown? Because he sent Adzhubei to Bonn, of course." This comment reflected Gromyko's tunnel \'ision more than reality, but the Adzhubei mission no doubt contributed to Khrushche\' S downfall. 0

Epilogue which you had with President Kennedy," which were "very useful in times of conflict." Khrushchev felt thatJohnson had "turned out to be a clever man." He was relieved that the President had not reversed Kennedy's poli­ cies, even under pressure from Goldwater. He presumed that once the Texan was elected by a landslide, he and Johnson could resume and augment the detente begun with Kennedy.

The Chairman did not know that his closest colleagues had been plotting against him for months.According to the KGB chief Vladimir Semichastny, Brezhnev asked him in June 1964 whether Khrushchev could be poisoned or his plane sabotaged when he returned from a visit to Nasser in Cairo. By Semichastny's account, he replied that he was "not a murderer." Not only were the Chairman's crewmen devoted to him but Gromyko and others would be aboard the plane. There was further talk of stopping Khrushchev's train and arresting him on his way back from a Swedish visit in July.* That same month Khrushchev asked Brezhnev to resign the Presi­ dency in favor of Mikoyan in order to "concentrate" on his Central Committee duties. Brezhnev may have taken this as Khrushchev's signal that he would not be the Chairman's successor.t Brezhnev may have felt even more unsettled by Khrushchev's call for a November Central Committee meeting. A \Vestern reporter was told that the meeting would see "many changes at the top.Almost all the leaders except Khrushchev will be affected." Sergei Khrushchev recalled that his father was planning to add younger men to the Presidium "who would one day take over." These included Adzhubei, Kharmalov, and Yuri Andropov, who had served as Ambassador to Budapest during the Hungarian revolution. In September, Sergei was called by a security agent named \'asily Galyukov: "I've found out that there is a plot against Nikita Ser­ geyevich ! I wanted to tell him about it in person.... I can't go to *The historian William Taubman correctly suggests that this charge should be 11 ea1t·d with some caution: by the time Semichastny made it in 1989, there was considerable political gain to be had from criticizing the by-then-despisl'd Brc,hue,·. tBrczhnev may have heard that Khrushchev complaint•d lo his sou and others that Brezhnev lacked the strength of character to succeed him. Khr11shchl',. rccallnl 1h.11. in the prewar Ukraine, Brezhnev had been nicknamed "the Balleriua": "A11rn11e \\ho wants to can turn him around."

G98 I




Semichastny. I k's acti\'(:ly irn·ol\'(:hown much interest in his f.1ther. but from this day forward the dog lll'HT left hi,. sic!(•. That eYcning. �likO\an came to assure Khrushchev that he would ha,·e a pension. a dacha. and a citv house for life: he had suggested his hiring as a consultant, hut that was rl:jectcd. Khrushchev thanked him: "It'\ good to know ,·ou ha\'e a friend at your side." The Armenian sei,ed hi,- old partner and kisscd him on both checks. Then Khrmhchc\' watrhcd him "alk quickly to the garden gate. He n:ties. Boston: Little, Brown, 1988. Graves, Robert. Oxford Addresses on Poetry. London: Cassell, 1962. Griffith, William E. Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift. Cambridge, ;\lass.: ;\fIT. 1963. ---. The Sino-Soviet Rift. Cambridge: MIT. 1964. Gromyko, Anatoly. 1036 dnei prezidenta Kennedi [The IOJ6 Days of President Ke1111edy ]. Moscow: Politizdat, 197 1. ---. Vneshnaya politika SShA: uroki i deistvitel'nost', 60-70-e gody [l'.S.A. Fomg11 Policy: Lessons and Reality, the 1960s and 1970s]. Moscow: ;\1ezdunarodnaya Otnosheniya, 1978. Gromyko, Anatoly, and Andrei Kokoshin. Bratya Ke1111edi [ The Kmnedy Brothm]. Moscow: Mys!, 1985. Gromyko, Andrei. Jfemoirs. New York: Doubleday. 1989. Translaterl by Harold Shukman. Grossman, Michael Baruch, and MarthaJoym Kumar. Portrayi11g thr President." The White House and the Xews .Uedia. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1981. Gunther, John. Inside Europe. 1937. ---. Procession. New York: Harper, 1965. Guthman, Edwin 0. ll'e Band of Brothers. 1ew York: Harper, 1971. ---, and Jeffrey Shulman. Robrrt Ke1111edy: hi lits 011'11 ll'ords. Thr l '11J111hl1.1hrd Recollections of the Kennedy }'ears. New York: Bantam, 1 �J88. Halberstam, David. The Best and the Bnghtest. :-.lew York: Random l lou,e, 1 !JI>:\­ ---. The Powers That Be. New York: Knopf, 197!)· Haldeman, H.R., with Joseph DiMona. Tlte E11ds of l'ml'rr. r\l'W York: Timl's lloob. 1978. Hammer, Armand. "·ith i'\eil Lyndon. Ilammrr. :-S:ew York: l'ut n.,m, 1 !)K7.

CE:-;ERA1. Sot•RcF.�

llammcr, Elknj .. I /)m/1, 111 Xoi·rmbn:.·lmn1rn 111 1'1r/11a111, 1963. ;\;ew \'ml-: Dutton, 1987. I Ltmmt•r, \lanfried. et al. Dm .\la11nb11cl, Berlin: Ohnh:tum, 198.1. Ilcar,t, \\'illiam Randolph.Jr.. Frank 01111ill and Bob Con�idine..lsk .\/r,lu1/l1111.�: Our ,/d1•1'11/11us u•11I, Kh1whcl1n•. :"\e\,· York: \lcCr;rn I lrll. t !llio. I krken. Crq�g. Cowi:;r/s oj Jl'm. :"\cw \'ork: Knopf. 198 ,:1 , lll'v111a1Jt1. C. D.I\id.. I ll'oma11 .\'amrd jack,,. :'\ew York: 1.\lc Stuan, t !)89. Higgins, Trumbull. Thr /'nfrr/ Fmlurr- Km11rd1, EDrnhowr, muf tl,r CU al the /l ay of l'igi. :'\cw \'ork: :'\orton, t !)87. I lil�ma11, Roger. To .\loi·r a Xa/1011. !hr !'ohllo oj F01 r1,£,'7l /'o/,n III tl,r. ld1111111slralw11 of Jo/111 !-. Kr1111rd1 :\cw Yori.: Doubled.t\', l!)G7. 11 irsrh, Richard, and.John rrcnto. /Jll' Xat1011al. lno11a1111r.1 a111! SJ>aa. ld1111111llmllo11. '.'\cw \'oil-: J > r;wge1. t !li:\· llof111:tn11, Gunter. 11'11/1 /lrm1dt.· l'mtral r111r1 .llljkl"'"IS a11.1 /)r11/Jrldaml I Limburg: Rowohlt. 1!)88. I liilme, I lein,. and I lerm.nm /.olling. /'hr Gmn"l ll'a.1 a Spy. :'\ew York: Coward, :"-.hC;mn and Geoghegan, 197'..!. I lollow;I\. Da\'id. Thr Sm•irl { '111011 a11d !hr .·11111.1 /{au. :"\ew I l.1,Tn: \',ile, t 98:J· Ilon·lirk, .\rnold I.., .111d \hr on Ru,h. Stmll'![IC l'uttn and Sol'irl Fom1;11 l'ul,ry. ChiLtgo: l'ni\l't ,it\ of Chic.rgo. 19(iG. Ilorne. Ali,t;H1. .\lncm1/la11 19 5 7-1986 London: \lannill;rn, 1989. llurt, Ilcnn. /fraw11ablr Doub/ :--;l'\\' \'01k: llolt, 1985. 11\land. \\'ill1.1m .md R1d1ard Shnork. Th, Fall oj Klm1Jhchn•. :'\e\\ \'ml-: F1111k & \\',1g-n;1lh, 1968. b.1,H ,011, \\'alter .rnd l-.\'an ·r homa,. Thr ll'lJI' .\Im. St, Fnnub a11d lhl' ll'orld Th ry .\ladr. :'\ew \'or k: Simon and Schmtcr, 1!)86. Jahn, I Edgar. .fo .ldr11a11n·s Sntl'. \!unich: Langen :"-.liiller, 1987. Jaipur. :"-.l.1haran1 ol. A 1'1111ctll Unnrmbrn. Delhi: Tarang reprint, 1984. Johnson, lla\'lll'S. Thr Ba_, oj l'i�l. :"\e\,· York: :'\orton, 1984. ---. and lkrn.1rd \I. G\,crtrnian. Fulbnght: Thi' D1Ss,11/l'T. :"\cw York: Doubk­ da,. 196S. Johnson. Ln1don 13. Th, 1'a11la(I' Po111/: Prnpullz'l'l 011 lhl' Pus1dr11n·. 1963-1969. ;\;ew York: Hoh. 19; 1. Johnson, Pri�cilla. Khm.1hcl1n• and th, .·lrt.1: Thi' Pol,t,n of Soui,/ C11//11rr: 1962-196.1, Bu�ton: :"-.!IT. 1965. Kalb. �ladeleine G. Thr Congo Cab/l's: Thi' Cold Jl'ar 111 Afnca. :\ew York: �lacmillan, 1982. Kaplan. Fred. Th, 11'1:arru of .fr111ageddo11. :"\ew York: Simon and Schmter, 1983. Karnow, Stanle,·. 1'll'hiam: .-1 /!1s/01)'· :--:ew York: Penguin reprint, 1984. Keams, Doris. L:;11do11 Jo/111.son a11d thr Ammcan Dream. �ew York: Harper, 1976. Kelle�, Kitty. Jack.11' Oh! :'\e\,· York: Ballantine reprint, 1978. ---. His Ila:; : The l '11alllhori:ed Biography of Frank Sinatra. :-.:ew York: Bantam reprint. 1987. Kennan, George F. . \lemoirs: 1950-1963. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972. Kennedv, Edward:"-.!., ed.. Th, Fmitful Bough. Privately published, 1965. Kennedy, John F. Profiles 111 Courage. Harper, 1964. The Strategy of Pl'aa. :-:ew York: Harper, 1960. ---. Jl'hy E11gla11d Slrpt. :'\ew York: \\'ilfred Funk, 19,10.

General Sources Kennedy, Robert F. The Enemy Jl'ithin. New York: Harper, 1960. ---. Thirteen Days: A ,\femoir of the Cuban .\fissile Crisis. New York: Norton, 1969. Hereafter cited as RFK 13. Kennedy, Rose Fitzgerald. Times to Remember. New York: Doubleday, 1974. Kern, J\lontague. The Kennedy Crises: The Press, the Presiden cy and Foreign Policy . Chapel Hill: UniYersity of North Carolina, 1983. Khrushchev, Nikita S., Khrushchev Remembers. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970. Trans­ lated and edited by Strobe Talbott. Hereafter cited as NSK1. ---. Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes. Boston: Little, Brown, 1990. Translated and edited by Jerrold L. Schechter with \'yachesla\· V. LuchkoY. Hereafter cited as 1'SK3. ---. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament. Boston: Little, Brown, 1974. Translated and edited by Strobe Talbott. Hereafter cited as ;-..;sK2. Khrushchev, Sergei N., Khrushchev 011 Khrushchev: An Inside Account of the .\fan and His Era. Boston: Little, Brown, 1990. Edited and translated by William Taub­ man. Hereafter cited as s;-..;K. King, Larry, with Peter Occhiogrosso. Tell It to the King. :',;ew York: jo\'e reprint, 1989. Kissinger, Henry A. Jl'hite House Years. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979. Kistiakowsky, George B. A Scientist at the ll'hite House. Cambridge: Han·ard, 1976. Klurfeld, Herman. ll'inche/1: His Life and Times. :',;ew York: Praeger, 1976. Knightley, Phillip, and Caroline Kennedy. An Affair of State: The Profimw Case and the Framing of Stephen ll'ard. New York: Atheneum, 1987. Koch, Thilo. Tagebuch aus Washington. Frankfurt: Fischer Bticherei, 1965. Koerfer, Daniel. Kampf ums Kanzleramt; Erhard und Adenauer. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1987. Kohler, Foy D. Cnderstanding the Russians. '.'\ew York: Harper, 1970. Kokoshin, Andrei, and Sergei Rogov. Serye kardinaly belogo doma [GraJ Cardinals of the Jl'hite House] . .\ioscow: NoYosti, 1986. Kraft, Joseph. Profiles in Power: A ll'ashington Insight. New York: :,,;ew American Library, 1966. Kroll, Hans. Lebenserinnenmgen eines Botschafters. Cologne: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1967. Kutler, Stanley I. The Jl'ars of Watergate. New York: Knopf, 1990. Lacey, Robert. Ford: The ,\fen and the .\fachine. Boston: Little, Brown. 1986. LaFeaber, Walter. America, Russia and the Cold War, 19-15-1975. New York:John Wiley, 1976. Laqueur, Walter. A ll'orld of Secrets: The Cses and Limits of lntellige11re. :--:e\,· York: Basic, 1985. Lash.Joseph P. A ll'orld of Love: Eleanor Roosroell and /Jrr Frimds, 19-13-1()62. �t·\,· York: Doubleday, 1984. Laskv, Victor. It Didn't Start with Jl'atl'rgate. 'ew York: Dial. 1977. --'-.J.F.K.: The ,\Ian and the J!Jth. New York: J\lacmillan, 19G:\. Lawrence, Bill. Six Presidents, Too .\/any ll'ars. New York: Saturday Rc:\'il'\\, 197'-?. Lebow, Richard Ned. Between Peace and ll'ar: The Xature of I11trma/101wl Cm1.1. B.tltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1981. Leg\'old, Robert. Gorbachro 's Foreign Poliry: I low Should the { '.S. Rr.1por11U '\c:\, York: Foreign Policy Association, 1988.

71fi I

Ct.!'..t:R.\I. SOl'RO s, \\'olfgang C/11/d oj th, Rn.·ol11tw11. Clucago, Rq�rwn, r �158. ---. The Kr,11d111 S111re Stali11. :--:t•w \'01 I..: l'r;rq�cr. 19.I 011 lhi�. l()(i5. l.og"lon, Jol111 ;\I. rl,r Drm1011 to Co In tllf .\101111 l'i1JJl'l.1c:'>l.tlio11, 1'.ch,.111! B •. ,nd Leon.1rd Curn \fnl,ml Cm·rm/" 111 thr ll'l11tr /lowr. \\';i,lungwn. D.C.: F,rn ,1gu1. t ()87. :'>l.1u11ill.111, ll.1rnld . . It thr l:11d ojthr /)(l) :'\t'\\ \011..: IIJl)H'I, 1!17:1· ---. Po111t111g thr ll'm 1959-JcJfJJ :,,:l'\, Yori... ll.rrpl'1 , 1972. ---. Ru/111g thr .\tom, 1956-1959 '\'l'w Yori..: ll.upcr, 1�171 . :-.t.1c:--;e1l. Robl'tl. rl,r R,glit l'laa at !hi' !1m, Bmto11: L1ttle, Bro,,11, 1982. ;>.Lthone,. R1d1arcl I) jfK O,dral 111 .lfnra :--=e" York: Oxford. 1983. \lam hcster, \\'1111.1111. Tl,, Drat!, of a /',rw/r11/ .\'ot•rmb,r 20-25, 1963. i\ew York: 11,nper, l!JG;. ---. U11r B11rj S/1111111� .\lomml lfrml'l11br1111!( Kmwrl, Bo\ton: Lillie, Brown, 1983. ---. Portrmt oj a P.m1dl'llt. Joh11 f A:rr111,d1111 l'rojilr. Bo�ton: Lntk, Brown, 19fot. \larcheui. \'ictor, and.John \larks. Thr CU a11d thr Cult of h,trll1grnce. i\ew \'ork: Dell reprint, 1975. \Ian in. Da,id C. 11'1/drn1f'JJ of .\lmon. Harper, 1980. :'>lanin.Jolm Banlow . . -Id/a, Stn•rT1Jo11 a11d thr ll'orld. :--:ew York: Doubleday, 1977. ---. It Srems Like 011(1 l'estnda) Xcw York: :'>lorrow, 1986. \Ianin. Lawrence. Thr Prrndmts a11d the Pmnr .llmuters: ll'a.ih1ngton and Ottawa Face to Face. :-.:ew York: Doubleday, 1982. :-.tanin. Ralph. A Hero for 011r Time: A11 lnt1matr Story of the Kennedy !'ears. :-,;ew York: \lacmillan, 1983. \fazo, Earl. Richard .\'ixo11. �ew York: Harper. 19590 ;>.lcCaulev. \lanin, ed. Khnishchev a11rl Kh111shchev1sm. London: :-.tacmillan, 1987. ;>.le Dougall, Walter .-\.... the Hem•ms and the Earth: A Political Hutory· of the Space .-lge. :--:ew York: Basic, 1985 . ;>.lcGehee, Ralph \\'. Deadly Deceits: .\ly 25 l'ears in the CIA. �ew York: Sheridan Square, 1983. \lccGwire, \[ichael. .\lilitary· Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987.

General Sources \kLellan, David S., and Da\'id C. Acheson, eds. Among Friends: Personal LFl/ers of Dean Acheson. New York: Dodd, \lead, 1980. \kl\lillan, Priscilla Johnson..\farina and Lee. '.\ew York: Harper, 1978. \kNamara, Robert S. Blundering into Disaster. :-.Jew York: Pantheon, 1986. \kl\:eil, Neil. Dirksen: Portrait of a Public .\Ian. Cle,·eland: World, 1970. :\kSherry, James E. Kenned)' and Khmshchev in Retrospect. Palo Alto: Open-Door Press, 1971. \ledved, nfichael. The Shadow Presidents: The Secret History of the Chief Executives and Their Top Aides. New York: Times Books, 1979. \[edvedev, Roy. All Stalin's .\Jen. '.\Jew York: Anchor/Doubledav, 1984. Translated by Harold Shukman. ---. Khrushchev. New York: Doubleday, 1983. Translated bv Brian Pearce. \1icunovic, \'eljko, ,\Joscow Diary. i'iew York: Doubledav, 1980. Translated bv David Floyd. \liller, Arthur. Timebends: A Life. New York: Grove, 1987. ntiller, :\ferle. Lyndon: An Oral Biography. :\:ew York: Putnam, 1980. l\liroff, Bruce. Pragmatic Illusions: The Presidential Politics ofJohn F. Kenned \' . '.\ew York: :\kKay, 1976. nfoldea, Dan E. The Hoffa ll'ars: Teamsters, Rebels, Politicians and the .\Job. ;,,,:ew York: Paddington, 1978. 1'1oran, Lord. lrinston Churchill: The Struggle for Survival. 1940-1965. London: Constable, 1966. 1'1orley, \[orris H. Imperial State and Revolution: The Cnited Stales and Cuba, 19521986. London: Cambridge, 1987. Morris, Charles R. Iron Destinies, Lost Opportunities: The Arms Race Betu•een the [ '.S.. -1. and the L'.S.S.R., 1945-1987- New York: Harper, 1988. '.\fosley, Leonard. Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen and John Foster Dulles rmd Their Family .\'etu•ork. Xew York: Dial, 1978. i\avasky, Victor S. Kennedy Justice. New York: Atheneum. 1971. i\eustadt, Richard E. Presidential Powe,·: The Politics of Leadership. '.\:ew York: \\'ilc,. 1960. Neustadt, Richard E., and Ernest R. nlay. Thinking in Time: The l'ses of Jl1Stort'}or Decision .\fakers. New York: The Free Press, 1986. Newhouse, John. ll'ar and Peace in the .\'uclear .-lge. ;',;ew York: Knopf. 1989. l\itze, Paul H. From Hiroshima to Glasnost. :S:ew York: Grove, 1989. Nixon, Richard. R.\': The Jlemoirs of Richard .\'ixon. Ne"· York: Grosset & Dunlap. 1978. ---. Six Crises. New York: Doubleday, 1962. Novosti..\'ikita Khrushchev: Life and Destin)'. \foscow: Novosti, 19H!J· Nye.Joseph S.,Jr. Bound to Lead: The Changing .\'ature ofA111er1ca11 Pm,•a. :-.:ew \'ork. Basic, 1990. Oberg, James E. Red Star in Orbit. New \'ork: Random I louse, 1!)H 1. ---. Cncovering Soviet Disasters: Exploring the l.i1111t.1 of GlarnOJt. �l'W \'ork: R:111dom House, 1988. O'Donnell, Kenneth P. and David F. Powers with .Joe \kCartln·. 'Jo/111111. ll"r Hardly Knew }'e ": .\Jemo,·ies ofJohn Fit:grmld Km11rd\'. Boston: l.1ttll'. 1\1 o\, 11. 1972. Hereafter cited as Odon. Opotowsky, Stan. The Km11edy Go1•nw11ent. :-.:cw York: D11lltr .\faun '.\l1111id1: Stern 1 �181 . Phillip,. D.,,·id .\tlce. Thr .\',ghl ll'alrh. :\t•w York: B.illantinc rt'print, 1�177. Pit'rpoint. Rohc1 t . .11 lhr ll'/11/r 1/011,r: ./111g11111rnl /11 SI.\ l'uodm/.1. :'\cw York: l'u11u111, 1981 . Pisir.1k. L11;1r. Kh,·whrhr;•, /l11r 10 l'm,·n· :'\c\, York: l'racgcr. 19!i1 . Plimpton. Ccorgc. and Je;111 Stl'lll . ./111rnra11 }0111111'\·: Flu• '/imr.1 oj Nobnt Kn111rd1•. \;ew York: I l.1rcoun, l�)j. Power,. Rid1aicl G1d . Srnrn a11d l'ou·rr. Thr !.,Jr of}. l:t��a, 1/oowr. :-,.,:l'\\ York: Free l'rcss, 198;. Power,. lhoma,. Thr .\/a11 ll'ho Krpl llir Srort� R,duod llr/111.1 & thr Cl.I. New York: Knopf. l!)i!l· l'r;1dm, John. Thr So1·1rt l:".illmatt· l'. S. l111r/!1ge11re . / 11r1h111 and R11.,.11r111 ,\J,/i/a,y S11n1gtk :--:t·w York: Iha!. 1982. l'i·ittic, J'crn·1KC. JI',//_\- /frr111dl. :--:cw York: Sd1mke11, '9i-t· /'u/,/,r l'11pr1.1 of thr 1'1r.11dmts of thr l '111/rd Stair.,: I>i,·,ght /J. £1.11·11hou•rr, 1953-1961. l1.S. Co1·crnme111 Printing Office, 1!)5-t-l!)U 1 . llcrcaftt'r lited as DDEPI'. l'ublir l'aprn of tlu l'm1drnt.1 of thr l'111/rd Stairs: John F. },:r1111rdy, 1961-1963. C.S. c;mt·rn111e111 l'n111i11g Office. 196:t-1961. lkrcaftcr cited as.JFKPI'. Q.111rk,.Joh11 l'atnck. The Cm/ml /,,/rll1ge11rr.lge110. Cuilford, Conn.: Foreign lntel­ ligt'ncc l'rn�. 1986. Rabincrn itch, Alexander. Rn:0/1111011 r111d Polit10 111 R11s1w. nloomington, Ind.: In­ diana L'ni\Tn,it\·, 1972. Randagh . .Joh11 . The Agmr;,·: The R1.1e a11d Der/111e of the CIA. :-.:cw York: Simon and Schmtcr, 1986. Repo,1 to the P1e.11de,1/ by /he Co111111us io11 011 Cf.-1. Art11•1t1es w11hi11 the l'11ited States, .\'elso11 ,·/. Rorkefellrr, Chr11mu111. \\'ashington, D.C.: U.S. Go1·ernment Printing Office, 19i5· Re,ton.James.Jr. The Lo11e Star: The Life ofjoli11 Co1111al/y. i\t'W York: Harper, 1989. Roberts, Chalmers '.\I. Fmt Rough Draft. �ew York: Praeger, 1973 . Rositzke, Harry. The CIA 's Seael Operaliom. i\ew York: Reader's Digest, 1977. ---. The A:GB. The EJ eS of R,mia. London: Sidgwick &Jackson reprinL, 1983. Rostow, \\'.\\'. The Dtjf11sio11 of Power. :'\ew York: '.\lacmillan, 1 972. ---. Open Skies. Austin: University of Texas, 1982. Rovere, Richard. Fi,ial Reports. ;\ew York: Doubleday, 1984. Rowan, Carl. Breaki11g Barril'l's. Boston: Little, Brown, 1991. Rusk, Dean, with Richard Rusk. A.1 I Saw It. !\'ew York: Norton, 1990. Rust, \\'illiam J. Ke11nedy in l'iet11am. i\ew York: Scribners, 1985. SakharoY, Andrei . . \Jemoirs. ;\ew York: Knopf, 1990. Translated by Richard Lou­ rie.

General Sources

I 719

Salinger, Pierre. With Kennedy. New York: Doubleday, 1966. Hereafter cited as Sal. Salisbury, Harrison. A journey for Our Times. New York: Harper, 1983. ---. Without Fear Or Favor: The .\'ew fork Times and Its Times. New York: Times Books, 1980. Saunders, Frank, withJames Southwood. Torn Lace Curtain. ;,,;ew York: Holt, 1982. Scheim, David E. Contract on America: The .\lafia .\/urder of Presidl'lllJohn F. Kenned_)'. New York: Shapolsky, 1988. Schick,Jack M. The Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962. Philadelphia: University of Pennsyl­ vania, 197 1. Schlesinger, Arthur M.,Jr. The Cycles of Ame,ican llistory. Boston: Houghton l\lif­ flin, 1986. ---. Kennedy or ,\'ixon: Does It Make Any Difference? New York: ;\lacmillan, 1960. ---. Robert Kennedy and His Times. Boston: Houghton l\fiffiin, 1978. Hereafter cited as AMSRK. ---. A Thousand Days: john F. Kennedy in the fl'hite House. Boston: Houghton Miffiin, 1965. Hereafter cited as AMSTD. Schmidt, Helmut. .\lenschen und Machle. Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1987. Schoenbaum, Thomas J. ll'aging Peace and ll'ar: Dean Rusk in the Truman, Kmnedy andjolwson Years. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988. Schorr, Daniel. Clearing the Air. Boston: Houghton Miffiin, 1977. Seaborg, Glenn T. Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Tes/ Ban. Berkeley: University of California, 1981. ---. Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson !'ears. Lexington, l\lass.: Lex­ ington, 1987. Searls, Hank. The lost P,ince: l'oung Joe, the Forgollen Kennedy. Cleveland: \\'orld, 1969. Sejna,Jan. ll'e Will BwJ You. London: Sidgwick &Jackson, 1982. Shell, Kurt L. Bedrohung und Bewdhrung: Fiihrung und Bewdlkenmg in der Berl111 Kme. Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1965. Shevchenko, Arkady N. Breaking wilh Jfoscow. New York: Knopf, 1985. Shulman, Marshall. Beyond the Cold War. New Haven: Yale, 1966. ---. Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised. Cambridge: Har\'ard, 1963. Sick, Gary. All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter u•ith Iran. New York: Random House, 1985. Sidey, Hugh.John F. Kennedy, President. New York: Atheneum, 1 96:i· ---. John F. Kennedy, President (second edition). New York: Atheneum, 1!)G.1. Hereafter cited as Sidey ( 1964). Simmonds, George W., ed. Soviet Lraders. New York: Crowell, 1DG7. Slater, Ellis D. The Ike I Knew. Privately published, 1980. Slusser, Robert M. The Berlin Crisis of 1961. Baltimore: Johns I lopkim, 1\)7:1· Smith,Jean Edward. The Defense of Berlin. Baltimore: Johns I lopkim, 1!)t>:I· Smith,Joseph Burkholder. Portmil of a Cold Warrior New York: 1'11t11a111. 1!)7{>. Smith, Wayne. The Closes/ of EnemiPs. New York: Norton, l!)H7. Spector, Leonard C. .\'urlear J>rolifern/1011 Today. New York: \'inta�c n-pri111. • !)H.1. Sorensen, Theodore C. Kennedy. New York: I larp('r, 1!)G:J· I lne;iltn rited .1, Soi. Steel, Ronald. Wal/Pr L 1jJ/111 1 m1 11 m 1 1/ thr ,·/111rrir1111 Cmtw1·. llmton: .\11.11111< l.it1k. Brown, 1980.

7'-W I

Cu-t.RAI. Sot'Rc:Es

Stein. Je;111. and (:corge l'li111pton . . ·l111rnrn11.fo11mn" 11,r '/i111r1 of Robl'll A"l'm1nl\'. :-.:e\,· York: l l.1n our!, 1!Ji. Stoughton, Cecil. ;111d Chc,tcr \'. Clifton. /'hr .\lt111011,·1: }FA". 1961-1!l , l)l)El.. :'-knshikm­ Stevenson cont:1n,: St,•\t•n,on 111cnuo11 of :'-kn,hiko\ meeting 1 1/16/lio, Stc­ \'Cllson 1 '.1pt'rs. Sit'\t'n,011-.JFK 1 1/!!2/lio,JFKI.. 011 Korlleich11k h;nkg101111/lio, ll.11 rir11;1111';1pt·1 ,. :'-k11shikm-ll:11ri111arr 1ont;rr1s: ILrrrim;111 me11Hom r 1/:11/tio ;rml 1 2/14/(io. . lFKI. and ll:rrn111a11 l':1(HTS. Ro,tm,·-\\'ic,ncr :'-lo,row 1nceling ,: Roqo" 111t·mo 1 1/2 7/(io-1 -i/7 /(io, JFK!.. Rostc>1, oh. ,\\I� 11) '.'o 1-.1 RFK-:'-kmlukm lum ht•o11: RFK-Ru,k 1-i/18/ tio, RFK l'.ipcr,. \ll'mh1km-Salr,IHt1 \ conl,1n,: Sall\ht1n 111/lio,JFKI.. PrirHip:rl somte, for impendmg Sino-�miet ,plit are CL\ memo .1/1/{i 1 , JFKI., Caddr, .l1111·11m :.1:.1:\-·I· C.1clcl1, Stl(/tre1r, r!ll-:>· t·1.11n F•.\/m1111011 li 2:J-5. l1la,11 U1l'(d1 28ti-:\08. :'\SK lo ,\dt•11;i11,·1: q1101cd 111 11. C.,rlct:>· "Onh wh,·11 the .\men(an,": .\nclrci (;ro,mko 25 r--i. :-..:SK oil \lao: SR !)/7/7.1 . Sino-So,r,·t terrsion, lit l!l)!J-l!) (io: lenill -i8t-:l, C!uhb.1:\:i-7 , lhfarrcl :rnd Slrl\mk .1-17. l.rtu 10 1-ii. L111dt·11 101-.1 , l'l,1111 1:.\/H1111w11 li:H-5· Hr-p;11ty 11u·ctmg: .j/I/!i I Cl.\ memo, :'\\-1 1 :.?/2/(io and :.iii '.l/li1. "Bl.rnll' ,,·hen d1i11g,": l'elll.o"k' 21i.1 . :-.:sK '!Jlio do111c,t1c pr ohk111,: lk,dilo" .\/1J\l/ti) :{23-5. Lrtu 1 1.1-:.1 :.! • Linden Io 5-ti. l l.1m Ull'al, :10;'>-1 :1, l'bm l:.\pa1111011 li:H--10. Tho111pson­ llcrte1 1/:.!!)/lio on Smo-So,ll'l I nllion r, in I) IH.I.. ·" .11 c Tho111pso11-Ikrtl'r 10/1.1/(io .1115-78

Norstad l',1pers, Tre,,-hitt 20-1 . "Terrible mistake": �lc:-,..'amara int. \\'CIHI.JFK reaction: Taylor 205. JFKl'I' 2/8/61, �k;-.:amara int. �tcNan1.ira int. \\'GHI I. Origin of Defense lmclligence Age11cy: Tre"hitt 85. "i\o, not reallv": l.odge­ Herter 2/9/Go, DDEI.. "Both to get \our ,Hh·ice"; Ru,k-Thompson, 1h5/G 1 , JFKL. Bohlen', and Thompson's rc;1ppoint111c11ts had been reported i n N\'T 1 /8/(i 1. Thompson arri\',il in \\'ashington: T '.!./ 1 o/(i1, DFR 2/ 1 :1/G 1 , Jane Thompson int. "It's wonderliil":Jam· Thompson int. Thompson tutori;tl forJFK: Thompson-Ru,k 2/2/61. JFKI.. Eisenhower 111ad1inery 011 Soviet relations: Goodpa-ier int. Solarium exercise file in DDEI., Kennan 181-2. .JFK Febru.1rv meetings 011 Sm·iet rebtions: 2/11/6 1 IIIL'lllCon. JFKL, Rusk, Bundy int�. Kennan, Bohlen, Thompson ohs, JFKI., ;\'\r r 2/ 1 0/G1, 2/12/G1 , 2/19/61. Thompson-DFR 2/1:1/01, \\' iplomntu IIH/1111·. F.111 1984. I have not applied for permission to l'Xaminc thl' Alll'n Dulll's l';1pn, because of the extraordinary dl'mancls imposl'd h\' thl'il prop1 il't1 an< h man: q11oted 111 L'lam l:.1JH11111011 fll'e !"ran 21>0-- 1 and Odon 288. Annm11tcc111e11t of ,ummit: TASS .\lalcmenl of 5/ 1 n/(j I and .'\\-r :>/20/li I. Fulhrigl11 Oil "Ill'! \'ClllSlll'SS": DFR 5/20/fi 1 . Jarhon\'illr alld Carsoll C:i11 ri1i1ell rt'aniom: l 'S.'\ G/5/li1 ".\fr. Khrushchn· 111a1 1w1 Sl'e": :'\Yl..r ti/3/(i1. Hiddll' < .,hie: Uiddle-Rusk 5/:i 1 /ti 1 , JFKL. .\"r1,•111•rrk report and Co1 e a11d Hicl..ellloopcr Oil s11mmi1: ;,,;\\' 5/2!)/G 1. lt,11 and Goldberg oil summit: Sul,herger i5.:, --li and R.ilph .\lani11 :{50. ;\lanslield to JFK 011 s11m111i1. ,:1 hG/61. i, i11.JFKI.. Rcstoll rol11mll (.'\\T -tl:10/ti1) was re­ printed m l'rm·df/ 5/5/ti 1 . JFK m mid-;\l:11· 1Dti1 : Sidl'1· (1 9(i-1 ) dio--1. JFK derision lO mal..e second St,lle of thl' l'11io11: Soren,l'll oh, Sicll'I' 12:1, 1 i2, JFK spl'ech ll'XI is 111 JFKl'I' .:/25/li 1 . Son·n,en on lil..dihood of Rockefeller in 19ti1: Soremen oh. Achin• lO JFK 10 distance him,l·II from l'rojen .\krcun: .\ld)o11g.11l 3!1-10. "h therl' .1111· 1,l' ca11 catch them?": Siclt•1 122. "In the eves of the 1,orld": Hirsch and Trento 108.JFK considcratioll of moon program: Sor 52:\--ti. .\lcDoug,111 31 i-22, S1dc·1 1 1 :\-23. I-.i,e11ho1H·1 rt'si,1a1Ke of 1110011 rare: Amhro,e F.1.1ni/,oi,•er (i p>-1 . ",\lmn�t h1 ,1 encal": Eisenhower draft letter (i/:.!2/ti1, l)l)EI.. Fl\t'llllll\\er to Bonn.111: li/ 18/li5. DDEI.. l'rt·,coll Bush on 111fb1io11: :',;YI' 5/2(i/fi1 . .Joseph Kenned, on 11nh;1l.111(l'd b11dgTt: Corcoran int. .JFK n-;1d, hriehng m;11en.1k Roqow D1j/1mo11 22.1, Side,· itif>--70. "Here are the beginning,": Bunch-JFK 5/:.!ti/li 1. JI· Kl.. St.IIt'ro111l'": dt· G.,ulll' :?5l>. ·1 r11j1llo 11n11 dt·1 .111d ll',1rt1011 111l'a11,: Rusk to DFR t:!ho/(i1, Bmdt·, oh. ;,,;\T li/J/li 1. Sal I i:!-:l, Sidl'\ 1H7-H. "ln­ fhtl'llll' "hid1 ,trl'tdtl',": :"\\\' ti/1:1/61 . \'er,.11lk, cli11nl'1: :-.:,·1 li/1/li1, I. (i/!1/C11. Odo11 2S!J, Kelk·\ Jark1r 1,70, ,\\IS'! I) :1:>1-:i · "Yo11'H' ,t11drl'd": llohh-11 oh, Bohlt·n 110((•,. "I haH' mon· ro11hdl'nrl'": \l.111d1t•stt• r Sl1111111i: 1Hli . .JFK 011 Frid,1\ night: :"\\"I lih/(i 1, ll.11ri111.111-JFK. "C111n·111 ol Ct•asl-' llll' l"11t•," 1111d.ued, l l.11r1111.111 1'.1pt•1 s, l Ldbcr,1.1m /lr1/ j4-5. JFK !'.iris dq,.u llll l' ,rml flight to \'il'llll,i: :\hr.u11 Ch.1\1:, oh, Kohln i11t.J,111t· l l1111111"011 111t. So1l'!l\l'll oh, :-.Ykr G/1 i/II 1, Stdl'I 1 !)2 . .JFK t l'f11,.tl to go to Europe.,, rnppll' \, ;!', vo1< l'd to Ccueraf Chl'\ll'l' Clifw11: Sl0111!;hto11 a11d Clifton 7. JFK on Rno,1·1ch ;111d Kunin 1,a, ,pokl'11 ;u S.tlt•1u, \!.,".:CR:?/:? 1/.1!J R.ullnlll-S11\-2:!7

2�)5-li. "I le n."alh bclieH·s it": rl10111p,1m-Ru,k 2h/fi1 .JFKL. "11111111.. hi, prob­ lem": Hart kll int. Pres\ bril.'fmg on fir,t dav: :\\T fi/.1/ti1. :\\'kr (i/17/!i1 . Sal 179-80. Randolph Churchill boredom and dep.1rtu1 e: ;\:\-r (i/4/G 1, :--:Ykr ti/17/ Ii 1, Russl'll Baker in :\\-!' 1 2/9/S7. .Jarq11l.'linc and :\in.1 l'l.'tron1.1 011 S;11urd.1v: :'\\T !ih/l>t. ti/.1/!i1, :-.:Ykr ti/17/ lit. Philip C-7. ",\ little ,hooting pain": A\ISTD dr,tft. b.1,ed onJacqueline Kenned, intenie,,·, \'I. :,i.JFK ,peech is in JFKl'P 7/:.?5/61. "That bm is cool": Leo11.1rd Baker 101. .'.'ixon on ,peecli: Dalla.1.\/on1111g .\'n,•1 7/29/61. Le11ers and telegram, to \\'hite llom1·: :\YT 8/:>/tii. ll,1rt111,111n on JFK: /.0.1 .foRrlr1 T111u1 7/2S/f>1. ludw11apu/,,I .\'n,•, C0111l1H'llt: 7/28/!i1. TASS cl,1i111· .'.\\"I 7/27/61. Ti'mP.I headline i, Tht Ti'111r.1 (London), 7h!i/(i,. Da,id Brun• on Herlin: Bruce-Rmk 7/17/01, JFKI.. Rt•ston on 11egc>t1.1blc i�,uc,: .'.\\T 7/26/f> 1, 7/29/f> 1. ll1ggim on JFK thoughts: :\\'IIT 7h7/fi1. \lcClm· ,·i,it to Sodet l'nion and :-.:SK: \lcClm notes in \ltClo) Papers, l'ra, 7/2 7/61. �,-r i /28/6 1. H/1/61 . . \la11chrstn C11md1m1 8/23/61. A\ISTD 392, h.1acson .rnd Thomas ti 13--1. "Reali, mad 011 Thur,d.11 ": \lcCloY-J FK 7/29/6 1, JFK!.. "Heline �Oll ,hould repon": Ru,k-\llClO\ 7/29/61.JFKL. "\\'e 1,·e1e not 111 control": Burla1�J..., ,It llarl';1rd, 9/27/88. ";\ recoid number nl refugees": \lan11illa11 1'0111/111.c: 392. Alphand complaim: Bund ) -Baule 7/1:3/61,JFKL. Fulbright 011 Berlin: .'.\\T 8/3/61, \I art) mt. /Jpr Tagmp1r�F! on Acheson and Korea is 8/2/{i 1. "Realistic" lormula: .\',urJ D,111srhlm1d ( East Berlin), 8/2/{i 1 . "A , ariet� of com111en1": Bund, -JFK 8/-1/61, JFKL. Bundr explanation of remark: Bund, int, Bundy 682. \\'onder abo111 Fulbright �uggestion: Koch Go, Catuclal 200-'.i· JFK �l't'S \lcClm: ;,.;\T 8/1/61. "If we expect the Sm·icts": Thompson­ Ru,k :ill 6/(i1. .JFKI.. "Khr mhchev i, losing List German)": l'ariations of this comment appear in Ro stow oh, Rostow D1.f111.sro11 23 1, ,\\!STD 39-l· I 1.

"A ll'all /s a Hell of a Lot Beller Than a ll'ar"

Earh August \I meow meetings: Pra,· 8/6/61, .'.\\T 8/6/G 1, i\'YHT 8/4/61, Griffith 83--1. '.\'SK-l'lbricht exchanges on border closing:Jan Sejna in Der S/Jtegel S/l 6/j6, Sejna 1 12-5 and \\\·den ll'a/1 85-90, drawing on an interview with Sejna. Sejna ,,·as deputy defense minister and Warsaw Part liaison officer for Czechoslo1 akia. As Cat11dal notes, his recollections must be regarded with some cau1ion. (Catudal 5ofn) Other sources include Sergo \likoyan and Sergei Khru­ shchev at Han·ard, 2/13/8 9-2/15/89, Burlatsky at Harl'ard, 9/27/88, Zolling and Bahnsen 102--1, Liselotte Thomas 211. .'.\SK August speeches, response and Penkovsky: Thomas Hughes memo 8/7/61,JFKL, Pra,· 8/8/61, lzv 8/9/61, :--YT 8/8/61-8/J 0/61, \\'yden ll'a/1 116-21, Garthoff 40-1, Oa,·id \lartin 111-7. Fan­ fani-i\'SK meeting: Salinger-JFK 8/8/61,JFKL, NYT 8/3/61, 8/5/61, 8/28/61, Watt 2-13. JFK on possible border closing: JFKPP 8/Jo/61. Rusk meeting with Adenauer: \1emcon 8/Jo/61, JFKL. NSK 8/t 1/61 and 8/12/61 appearances: Prav 8/12/61, 8/J5/61, NYT 8/12/61. "A check list of the anions": Bundy-JFK 8/4/61, JFKL. Presidential fallout shelter: NYT 4/4/75. SoYiet trawlers: DJ. Brennan-William C. Sullivan 9/3/63, FBI Files.JFK 8/t 2/61

.\'oles to Pages 271-282

I 751

activities: 8/12/61 PA, NYT 8/13/61. Border closing scene: Der Tagessp,egel 8/15/ 61, \\'yden Ira/! 150-2, Catudal 257-61. Washington response: Rusk int, Kohler int, Kohler oh, Ausland in Foreign Servire journal, July 1971, Kohler 333, Gelb 167-81, \\\den ll'a// 170-6, 213, Catudal 22-35, Cate 30 4-7. JFK notified and response: Rusk int, Kohler int, 8/I 3/61 PA, "Statement concerning travel restric­ tions in Berlin," 8/13/61,JFKL, \\'yden Jl'a// 26--g, 176-7, Catudal 35-8, \\'eintal and Bartlett 211. "We kidded among ourselves": NSK2 506. Brandt notified and response: Brandt 13, 18, \\\den Jl'a// 152, 162-3. Zolling and Bahnsen 16-18. On Brandt, background and relations with Adenauer, see Brandt, Prittie, Hofmann. Brandt onJFK: Brandt 70-1. Brandt first \\'hite House meeting: Rusk-JFK 3/10/61,JFKL, Brandt 80-1. "Kennedy is making mincemeat": \\'yden ll'al/ 164. "On August thirteenth" and "The curtain went up": \\\·den ll'a/l 164. "The Soviet Union had defied": Brandt 25. JFK 8/14/61 meeting: Slusser 149. Bundy-Amory meeting: Amory int, Amory oh, \\\den Ira// 217-8. Bundy on "clear initiative": AMSTD 398. ";,.tore and more pressure": JFK­ McNamara 8/14/61,JFKL. "What steps will we take":JFK-Rusk 8/14/61,JFKL. JFK-Kennan meeting: Kennan oh, 8/15/61 PA, Isaacson and Thomas 614. Brandt at Rathaus: Petschull 155-7, Zolling and Bahnsen 144-5, \\"yden Ila// 225-6. Brandt-JFK letter andJFK reaction: Frankfurter A//gemeine Zeltung 8/I 9/61, :-.:\T 8/20/61. l'ierteljahrschefle fur Zeitgeschichte, vol. 33, 1985. Brandt 31, \\',·den ll'a/1 224. Adenauer notified about closing, response and slur against Brandt: :-.:\T 8/17/61, Zolling and Bahnsen 11-2, 141 StUtzle 133-40 , Koerfer 54-t-5. Prittie 286. Smirnov to Adenauer: Watt 250 . Reports on flagging morale in \\'est Berlin: \\\den Wall 226. "Remember that what is at stake": Rostow-Bundv 8/I 6/61, JFKL. JFK calls LBJ: NYT 8/18/61, Leonard Baker 69-7 0 , Odon 30 3, Lincoln Kennedy andJohnson 174-5. "The President sent me a message": ;\facmillan Po111t­ ing 393.JFK silence:JFKPP 8/13/61-8/20/61. Reports of JFK shock, "Actually he saw" and "Why would he put up": Odon 303. Fifteen years "to get out of their jail": NYT 9/6/61. This was in aJames Reston column written after a conversation withJFK.JFK pique at failure to ,,-arn of \\'all: Allen Dulles and Robert Amory, quoted in Catudal 242. The FRG intelligence chief Reinhard Gehlen also insisted that pre,·ious warning would have been almost impossible. (Wessel int, Gehlen 239. Hahne and Zolling 221-2) \\'essel. as Gehlen's successor, cooperated with Hahne and Zolling in their re�carch. (Wessel int) "Today, the endangered frontier":JFKPP 7/25/61. ";\lay have given advance encouragement": Bundy 367-70. Paques and \\'halcn: Rusk int, Barron 31, ;\larchetti and ;,.rarks 214-5. Gelb 142fn. "After they put the \\'all up becau,e I was disgusted": RFK oh. Eisenhower revulsion: Eisenhower inten ie" with Moos 11/8/66, DDEL. "If \\'e had acted vigorously": Acheson oh. "\\'e might have been ahlc to ha\'c stopped": Clay oh. Couve de Mur\'ille on "immediate reaction": Come ck '.\!m­ ville oh. Leonhard on probable East Berlin reaction: Leonh,ml f:rmd111. .JFK mentioned his Potsdam meeting with Eisenhower to Brandt: Br,mdt 7:1· ,\ photo­ graph exists of the occasion and is reprinted in Liehcrson 4ti. "I Ltd "l' torn rt d0 \1·n": Sorensen oh. "Until the other side is just too tired": B111 Li1,k1 ,rt I 9/27/88. Strauss on risking \\'orld \\'ar III: Quoted 1t1 B11nd1 :1ti7. ":\, Hlll klll'd to lite• ,tlllltor ll\ Jmcph R.111h. (R.111h fOII\) Jl'h lc.11 11, ol ll.1111111.11 ,l11ild dl';11h. Stell'\ :qH-:) "· c:1e11lt\lo­ R11,l 'H"l'll'ttlhl'I •!11i1 t.tll,· Ru,l-JI· K !1/:.w/(i1, B11111h- I ,lll'\H'II Slicp.11 cl !lh:s/ ti1.JFKI.. :\YI. !1h:.1/ti1 , q/21/t1 1 . !1hH/ti1, !lh!1/tir. 10/1/ti1, 10/ti/ti 1, I !jh!j/(i1, '"' lll/:z/(j1, 10/q/(i 1, \\,Ill :z(iti. S111.1l1.1 ,II I h.111111, 1'011. h.l'llc•\ /hi 1111, :pH�,. S.11111dc·1 , H:.1-r,. JFK \\llllllg ol l':"\ ']ll't',a, .\/, /'11111/mt" mu/ "f)m, .\/,_ Chr111111r111" S.1lmgl'1 1.,ll', lr11t·r lo 'sc'\\)l1,J;1l111 4'.tl-·1 · Stt ;iu" :1:,;--ti;. Koerler fi 1 :I· B1wf111g ol .\dt·11.1ut·r: Amon oh , Gaeldi, .\trntr�1r1 :107. I-.111hm l'II .111d S1111d1 t'.l'.!-.12. Lt·1111111te1 < 0111pl.1i111 ahout hriel111g: Le11111111t·1-:"\ol\latl 11/:1:1 /f>t. :-..ol\l,ul l'.tper, . :'\SK 111 . 'me111he1 '!JGt: Slu,scr ·159-\·llolem.111 juh luncheon: llolem.111 mt and Holeman memo 7/1 1/ 1>2 . .Ji'KL. ;'l:�h to ,,,.c,11 on C.1pt1H· '-:atton,· \;1'011 .\J,m11111 107-8. .\Ii,. Khnr­ �hrhe1-:J.111t• I homp,011 c·x1 hang,·: .J.111e l"homp,011 1111. Khr11,hc he, - l"homp,on farewell clinnn. .J.111c rhornp,on 1111. , \..I ;h5/fi2. I homp,011-:--:SK 10/8/t,2, Thomp,on PJpn,. "Sddorn ha, there bt'l'll ,11ch a lack": ;'I:\\' ;/9/62. '\SK i111nn,tl problc1m. �,rn1mer 1962: L11u 22i)-60. "Khru,hrhe, JI B.11 ": Ro,lO\,· /J1ffimo11 2 5 1-2, Ros­ tm,· oh . T 8/2 5/8;. Cli11l' rl'JCtton .ind Ro,tow unconcern on Cuba: Prado� Sov1P/ Estwza/1' 1 3.1 and n17bcrger grh. ":\o one 1,ill be able l'lt'll to run"': Acheson to Truman 5/:\/fi2. Trum.111 l'.1per-,. JFK on pace: JFKl'P 8/22/62 ,md 9/12/G2. Estimate� of .\IRB\I and IRB\I rangl': .frza/2011 ll'rrk I r/12/62, Gartholf 2011. Count of So\"iet personnel. ll-28 ,. anti- aircraft sites, '.\IRB\ls. IRB.\I� for Cuba: Castro in SriISRK 50-1. Soviet troops kept in secrecy: CCT. .\ICT. Possibilit� of :-.:SK fall trip and possible content of bargaining: llils­ man-Rusk 9/2 0/62 . JFKL. Dobn nin to Rusk: BunddFK 8/31/62, JFKL, Rusk to DFR 9/5/62. Chinese 0 11 Rusk proposal: Gnffoh S1110 35 r, lJlam fapansion 6 6 -1- 6. \longoo,e activit�: Da, i, Ken11ed_) s 39;-9. Thomas Powers 129-30, A:'>ISRK ,t;;-80. Prados Si'crel ll'ars 19-1-207. Discussion of Castro "liquidation'": Ha,pers July 19;5. Goodwin 18 9, Thomas Po"·ers 129- 30. :lssassmalion Plots , 0 5, 1 6 1, A:'>ISRK 49 7-8. 8/30/62 U-2 incident and :\:SK response: :\'\T 9/5/62. Prav 9/6/62 , Bus111ess ll'eek 9/8/62, :,..;w 9/17/ 62, Rusk to DFR 9/5/62. CIA surveillance of Soviet ships: Prados Sovzel Es/zmale, Laqueur 159-60, Burrows 1 1 6-2 3. Schlesinger on support of uprising: Schles-

.\'otes to Pages -112-"20 inger-JFK 9/5/62, andJFK-Schlesinger 9/5/62,JFKL. :'11issile force size: Ganhoff ( 1 989) 1 8-20, ACT. Alexeye,· on Biryuzoy's belief: :'IICT. Sergo :'llikoYan on "absolutely Russian": CCT. Castro on disguise as agricultural products: :'liikO \an in CCT. Agent and refugee reports: 10/18/62 William K. Hane, summan'. of agent reports since July 1962, JFKL, also Frank SieYarts official histon· "The Cuban Crisis, 1 962," written for State Department internal use on the basis of official sources, 1963, JFKL. Hereafter cited as Sie,·ans histon·. "Clear!�· something new'': CIA, Office of Current Intelligenc;, Current Intelli­ gence .\1emorandum 8/2 2/62, JFKL, .\lcCone suspicions of nuclear missiles in Cuba: Bundy int, Helms int, Rusk int, SEP 7/27/63. :'llcCone alert of JFK and JFK response: Laqueur 1 65-g. Prados Soviet Estimate 127-50. C-2 8/29/62 flight: Hitsman memo 2/5/63, Hitsman Papers. Carter on "crash program": Caner to DFR, 9/5/62. Rusk on SoYiet buildup: Rusk to DFR, 9/5/62. :'11arine rehearsal and Castro interpretation: ..\rbesu and Risquet in .\!CT, Garthoff 36. Keating and other charges on C O Yerup: Keating in look 1 1 /3/64. Keating suspicion of bug­ ging: Lasky ll'atngate 8 1 -2. Helms on Keating charges: Helms int. JFK on "fifty thousand-odd Cuban refugees": JFK to Theodore \\'hite 2/J 3/63, in \\'hire notes, Schlesinger Papers. Republican demands for blockade: Xaliona/ Rl'1.·1ew 9/25/62, 1 0/23/62, Garthoff 16. :\'.ixon on "clear and present danger": :\'.YHT 1 1 /4/62. Rebozo sends article: Rebozo-;,;ixon 9/J 0/62, :\'.ixon Papers. Houston security incident: S..\C Houston-]. Edgar Hoo,·er 9/J 7/62, FBI. Congressional authority for resen ists callup: ;-.:YT 9/22/62. Cuban banners in Houston:]. Edgar Hoover-Chief, Secret Sen·ice 9/ 1 4/62, FBI.JFK defers action through first two years and plans for 1 962 election: Odon 307. Xe-1.1,1 Republic on JFK and The King and I: 10/J/62. .\lcCone background and personality: Amory int, Hilsman oh, Amon· oh, R.O. L"Allier­ \\'.C. SulliYan 9/28/6 1 , FBI, SEP 7/27/63, :'\YT 9/27/6 1 , T 10/6/61. I. 10/6/61. Cline 215-g, Thomas Powers 159-67, Halberstam Bes/ 1 52-5. Phillips 151-2, Laqueur 79-81, Alsop 232-3, 244-5, Hilsman 46-7, Wise and Ross 193-g. "He liked Ethel": RFK oh. "Snob and a puritan": Da,·id .\lartin 186. JFK on mo11e1 and religion: A.\ISTD 72. .\lcCone and Cal Tech professors on test ban: \\'i�e and Ross 1 92-4, Halberstam Best 1 52-5. "An operator, not a policy-maker": Di,·ine BloU'ing 256-8. :'llcCone denoumT, test ban: :'llcCone-Krock 2/23/61, Krock Papers. Kistiakowsk) on \lcCone ;111d public opinion: Kistiakowsky 197-203, 261-2, 281-5. 372-3. "Let's look for­ ward" and "Phi Beta Kappas": .\lcCone-.'.':ixon 11/10/60, .'.':ixon Papers. and :'llcCone-Krock 2/23/6 1 , Krock Papers. Charge of war profiteering and \kCone response: Halberstam Bes/ 1 52-5. JFK thinks of RFK for Cl.\ and decide, on .\lcCone: RFK oh, Sor 630-1. O'Donnell indignation about appoi111me111,: \",1110 cur int. ".\lcCone is an alley fighter": Hilsman oh, Hibman 4G-7. Ei,e11hmH·1 tu :'llcCone on appointment: 9/27/6 1 , DDEL. .\lcCone arri, al at Cl.\: D.1rnl \l.111111 19:.?-:\ 1 1 8 . .\lcCone and Kirkpatrick report: Ranelagh 380-1. \\'i,e and Ro" Cline on .\lcCone and assassination: Cline 215�). 2 2.1 . .\lcCom• hdiel 111 11np01tance of nuclear balance: Bundy int, Bundv 419-20. .\lcCnm· ,cc, C1lp.11rn .111d questions· Cuba buildup: Detzer 63-4, Abel 16-H . .\kCnnc wrn n .1ho111 !), r 1 1 /2/(>2. S1t·,.1n, lm1on. Che,1cr Cooper oh . .\dH',011 oh, llorne :1fi.1-5. A< he,011 brief, de C.111lk: ·1 1 1 /2/(i2, .\che,on oh. JFK-Ei,enhower call: Ei,c11ho11n m1e1 , ie1, \\ 11h .\loo, 1 1/8/!iti. 1-.i,cnhowl'I I o/:ni mcnH011. 1)()1,.L. Penkm·,J.., arrnt .mrl con1rihution: I ldm, inl, C,1rthofl in I ICCT, Carlhoff :19-t 1, Rohen, 2 1 1 . Bli�hl .md \\"de h 208. Bunch told the current author of hi\ convir1ion 1h:1t l'enkcn �1..,·, 1mpor1.11Kl' had hecn exaggerated in 1hc li1era1un: on the period, .ind noted 1ha1 in 1he 1ext of hi, hi,wn of nuclear \\Tapon\ Da111;er all(/ S1111·11·al he had m,111,1gl'd 10 a,oid l"\l'll .i ,ingk rcfr1c1Ke IO 1he �PY· (Bundy int) RFK before w/:12/ti:.i :'\SC lll.;SK-JFK 10/23/62 and attachments, JFKL. Soviet alert and NSK at Bolshoi and State Department reading: Garthoff 41-2, Hilsman-Rusk 10/24/62, T 1 1/2/6 2 , :"\SKI 497. Radio Moscow announcement: 10/ 2 3/62 text in JFKL. For other world reaction, see CIA memo 10/23/62, JFKL. JFK relief on 10/23/62 morning: RFK 13 35. JFK mystification about failure to blockade Berlin: Bradlee 12-1-5. Sulzberger 926-7. Bundy on JFK fear of Berlin reprisal: Bundy 421-2 and Odon 318-g, 329-31. NSK on Russian and American bloodshed: NSK1 500. 10/23/fo: morning Ex Comm meeting: Bundy memcon, JFKL, Hilsman-Rusk 10/ 2 3/62, Hilsman Papers. JFK-NSK 10/23/62 and drafts are in JFKL. CIA estimates on blockades of Cuba and West Berlin: CIA, "The Possible Role of a Progressive Economic Blockade Against Cuba," 1 0/25/62, "Survi,·abi litv of\\'e,1 Berlin," 10/23/62, "Effect on Cuba of a Blockade Covering All Goods Excq>l Food and Medicines, 10/23/62, JFKL. 1 0/23/62 evening Ex Comm meeting: Bundy memcon, JFKL. JFK signs quarantine: NYT 10/2.1/62, Sie\·art� hi,ton·, Abel 1 35-6, L 11/2/62. JFK on risk of miscalculation and Thr G1111., oj .1111;11.1/: RFK13 40. Soviet military attache comment and CIA report 10 JFK: Abel 1 '.1-1 RFK-Dobrynin 10/23/62 evening meeting: RFK13 4 1 -4, Dobrynin in �ICT. ",-\II my telegrams were coded": Dobrynin in MCT. Jaipurs dinner: Jaipur '.18.1-:i· AMSTD draft. JFK-Ormsby-Gore relationship: de Zulueta int, Da,·id Brnce oh, :\:\IS J"l) 423-4, NYT 10/t8/6 1 , Macmillan Pointing 338-g, Sor 559, Odon !11· 'lt>(i-;. "I must let you know how privileged": Ormsby-Gore-JFK!>/ 18/(i 1 ,J FKL. l-.l 11.1ht·1h II on envoy: Elizabeth II-JFK 5/I4/62,JFKL. "I trust na,·id": B.1ml'l. lllw111r ,i 1 1 "A number of people": Ormsby-Gore-JFK 5/I8/fi1, JFKL. 01111,ln-(:o,c rn1 "ostrich position": Ormsby-Gore-JFK 5/26/fo, JFKL. "I kcd ,0111 p.111111g .ul­ vice" and "practically incomprehensibh: message": Ormsln-C01 c-:JI· K ;I' :1/ti·,, 9/ 1 9/62,JFKL. Ormsby-Gore wires Maunillan, Gait\kcll su,pit ion ,111d ( )rm,h, _ Gore-JFK 1 0/23/62 evening talk: AMSTD draft. ,\:\!STD H 1:1-K, Rl·h.1 :1 11-•1, Abel 138-40, 148. McNamara 1 0/22/!i2 balkg-roun d IHil'irng· 11.111,c11p1. ll·hl CIA to JFK on storage sites: estimates, 10/2:1/(i'.1, 10/:q/li,i, 111 11·1-i.l No conclusive evidence of warhead arri,·al: Rll\k int. Sin ,111, 111,11>1', ( ,,11 th o ll in HCCT, 1 0/25 afternoon 111ce1ing- nw11Hon.JFKI. \'oll..og o nm o n 11 "·n1, "· 11• heads: MCT. U.S. information on \\·arl 1c;1d, 011 l'o/rm•fl (:.111h o ll :n � l).i\ic, delive1·s quarantine list: Davies int. So \"iet dc111on,11.111011,· D.1\ln 1,11, l, .. t.l/1>2, Rusk-Kohlt'r 10/27 /02. llils111a11-Rmk io/:.?li/li:.!, JFKI.. Komer on Knox: Ko111l'r-B11mh 10/25/li 2, .11,o Klci11-B11111h I o /:\o/(i2, JFK!.. :'\'SK reply 10 Russell: :'\SK-Rus,t'II 1 0/:q/li2, Fo1r1gr1 /lmrulrwt /1,f,11111alw11 Srrr•1a. 1 o /:q/G2 morning Ex Co111111 mcc1ing: CIA, "The Cri,is l SSR /Cub;i," 1 o/ 2 4/G:.1, Ex Comm Rcrn,d of At1io11 w/:q/fo, JFKL. RFK1:\ -t!)-52. .JFK 011 "major cri,i," and "nct'd for a ,ummit": JFKl'I' 2/q/li;i: . "We're c,cb;ill lO cn·ball": SEI' 1 2 /18 /li2. :'\SK on ,hips ,:nling "straight through": :\SK 1 49li. Onml)\-Core to 11111111', 10 /:q/fn: llund,-JFK 10h.1/li2. \lannillan-JFK t.ilk. 10/24/fi2: \Linnill:111 Al /:II(/ 1�i(i-203. G.111,l..dl .111d \\'il,011 to111mcms: CIA. "'l'hl' Cri.,is." 10/:q/li2. RFK 011 l\ol,h.1k0\ dfon 10 dd1H·r :"\SK llll'ss;1ge: RFK oh. lbnktt 111t·e1111g "!lh Bol,h.1k0\ .md RFK I e;1cuo11: ll.11 lll'll i111, RFK oh, ll;1r1lct1-RFK 1 ohfi/li:.!, RFK 1'.1pns, C,trthoU 27, Sor lili8, A\ISRK 50:.!, Bol­ �hakov in .\'m·o_\r 1•rn11_ir, nm. 4-li, 1989. ;'\\\' 1 2/21/li2, /.1111k 1 2/18/(ii. A, suggc,ted 111 thc text, t•x.inh wl1.1t :\SK .md \lil..m.111 ,.11d, t·x,u1h what w;i, 1eprntcd, b, "ho111 .111d to "hom h,I\ been obs1111cd In lhl' fog of lmtr}, Sor­ c11s1·11 wri1e, th.11 :"\SK .ind \lil..m.111 Bolsh.11..m lhl' 1111·";1ge, bu1 1101 1ha1 RFK ddl\ l'l cd 11. .\'r.1'1trrrlt. 1q1FR 1/11/(i3 . ;-,.;\\' 11/12/fo. 11/:.?li/fo. T 11/29/fo, Scrgo :\liko)..111 in l.at1wka.111 ,·l111r11ka. J..11111;,r� 1988. ;-..;sK1 500. 50.1, G,1rthoff G4-5. Report on :\hl..o�.111 pelted "1th frull: Sejna 54. :-.:SK on :O.likm,111 during Anti-l';1rt\' Coup: :\linmuvic 278�)· Sergo :\likoyan enthusia,m fur Castro: Sergo '.\l1k on l\fissile Crisis operations 2/I 2/63, JFKL, Garthoff 73-4. JFK to \lannill,111, de Gaulle, Adenauer, 11/20/62, is inJFKL. See also Ganhoff 73. JFK-l'\SK, 1 1 /:.! 1/ 62, is in JFKL. 11/23/62 Ex Comm meeting: mcmcon, Hunch�JFK 1 l/n/(12, 11/23/62, 11/24/62,JFKL, Sorensen intJBM, 11/23/62 instructions 10 '.\llC:I,". McCloy Papers. Il-28s gone from Cuba: Sievarts history. K111.11e1so, pie., to \' on sc.111d;1J. 19811: \\'I' :,/19/89. Brnct' rn1 �l.1c1111ll;in poss1blt• rqil.,n·· mt•nt: llruce-RuJ. Harriman Papers. "De Gaulle has said that he wanted his trn n ": St·.1hoq;: Ar1111rd1 999· ,. "' .n:\, l\11mh -_J 1· h 1I/q/l>:\ . Gromyko-JFK 10/10/63 meeting: 1o/10/ti:� mem'. 011, JI· Kl., ,\11d1t·1 ( ,101111 ln 18 1 -2, N\�r 8/27/G3. Bcn-Gurion 011 Dimona: \\'e1\�111.11 1 .md """'ll"\ 111 fl·h

�on, 101',cu, lili-liliO ,IIHI

B1111 :1titi-7. Soi :,;1 8 ,

B11111 h :-ioi,-w. l' .11 111t·1 '""' :.!:.!:-1

-:n. JFK ,.. \\'hi,e 011 J--7. Thompson rt·,1c llllll lo ,1,.,.1"111;111011: I ho111p,011 oh,J;111c Tho111pso11 int, .\l.111< hc,tcr n,at/1 2(i 1. Hohlen n·.1c uon: Bo hint oh. Bohl,·11 note,. Flight lo \\'a,h111g1011: .\ hc·,11·1 /)m/h :1:19-:> :!. Roher h "·on, .rhotll R11,,i.1m: Chad cs Ro liert, oh. Cronn ko le.m1, Ill''" .mcl t.ills hohkr: Kohk1 mt. :\ndr er C101m ko 18:i. Os­ wald do"1t•r 01 dcrl'd .111d I ho111p,on n·.1c t ron: .\lane hntl't /)roth :1ti.1-5. "Ir I hr, i, tnr1trlc": Risqul't 111 �IC'I , C.11 1 holl 1oli, l �:-,.; :�/H/fi2, ;,.,:,-1 !l/15/H:1- Ri,que1 011 \'ie1 na111: :\CT. :'\SK Oil l'raguc 111\,1\IOIJ' :-..·-;K:1 1:rn-, 1. :'\'�K 111 rct1n'llll'lll: .',:'\h I fi:1-:\'.\ 1 . �led, cdc, J.:lr111.1lrrlrn :.15--5. "\'ou can take c,enth111g": S:'\'K 217. "It's hce11 ,1x ,e. 1r,": S.'\K :103-.1. "l'nlortunacel) ;1 ccrt. 1i11 · degree": s:-..·i.;, :140. Lenn, fro m Jane 1 hompson and .Jacqueline Ona,sis: Jane Thomp,011 Ill(, S:\K :1.t •·:'\SK on.JFK Ill llll'lllOir�: :-.:sK:i 5 1 :1-4. �SK 10 St'll,ttors on gra11drhilchn1 II\ ing under rn111111unism: :'\'tT !lit 7/5!1 and .JFK noccs, 9/1G/ 59.JFKL. ··om first prm/rorkn" F111n11nnl r1111r, 4hg/8H. "Struggling to gel this


h11ge": j.111c l'homp,0 11 1111. .\d1h11be1\ fate afccr 19G4: ,\dthuhei inc \\'GEHi, .:\'tT I tI q/ti4. "'[ he Khrmhdtc\ penod 1,·as the ltrst act": \\'!' 1 o/t5/89 . "Free­ dom and glarno., '.!'..!!), jO,"i, .pt i1,. :, 1 '.\, ;J I :°l · ti-1:1. 700 Cub.111 \11"ile Cri,1, .md. 500-2, 557. 5ti!l B.1r11C'1t, \lanh;1, .:,6 B,llista, Fulgencio. !l1�)2. !l-1· 99 Bell. .Jack. 28 -1 Brn Bell,1, Ahmed. 3. 6-7 Ben-Curion, i);l\'id. 180. 0 -1 7 lkq�quiq, Laura. 99-1 oo lkrle, Adolf. i 3· -1 86 Bl'rlin. -l'· i9· 1 21 . 133. 15-1 , 17 -1 -i8, 316. 3-1 8, 365. 366. 3 69. -155-5G. 5-!9· G 18-19. 6-15--17. 659. 668, 7 0 2 as 1960 campaign issue. 30--31 1961 crisis. 231--18. 255-go. -150. See Berlin \\'all battle group sent by Kennedy, 277, 28-1-85 consequences for Khrushchev , 351-52 end of, 3q-15

.John,011', tnp lo Bl'1 h11, '.!7 7, ��:���ti fuh 2:i ,pt'ti-:>1-1 11,tlloll,d ('lll('l�('lll I lonimer, 30211 Capti,·e :--;aiions \\'eek, 409 Caramanlis. Constantine, 1 24 Carter, Gen. :'>larshall. 4 14. 418, 4.10 Caner, George, 651 Casey, Ralph, 41611 Casey, \\'illiam, 1 87, 1 88 Cassini, Igor, 304 Cassini, Oleg, 467 Castro. Felix, 377 Castro, Fidel. 92-106, 1 57, 200, 201, 702-3. See also Cuba: specific lopies

1959 \'isit to the U.S., 95-g6 1963 visit to the Soviet Union, 595 Bay of Pigs in\'asion and, 118-19 CIA assessment of (April 1962),


coven operation, .1ga111s1, G, 134-.1°, :175. :17fi. -1 1 1, G7.1, GH:1. tiin. 703 Kcnnech ·, knowledge of, 1:17-39 :'>bfi.i, 1:1.:, :'>tcCone ;111d. 418 :-,;ixon's role, 1:15-:17 gelling rid of. ;1s top priorit), 5-6 Kt·nnt•dv\ an1ago 111,111 toward, 1 o I Kennech \ a,s;1,si11a11011 and, (i7H. tiH:1 :'>li,,ile Cri,i, and, 5:18-:19 .1cn·1J1;11Kt' of mi .... ik,. 38\h) 1 I t·ac lion to Kt'lmed)-Klu 11shd1e1· de.ii. 5-l�r:,2 n·,ol111irn1 of nis1,, 5-1:� thre;ll lo down l'.S. 'I'} plane,, , 55-1 .:,5° mohal11 ..11m11 onk1t·d b), .179 old-luw Co111 11111ni,1' and, 37:l person.11 h.1cl..grou11d of. 92�),lj \'em·,ud.111 (oup auempl .111cl, 6i12--g3 wish lo re,core comm1111ica1ion, with the U.S., 638. 659 Ca'-lro. Raul. 96 Cuban :'>fissile Cri�is and, 398 Cclebrcnc, Anthon), -174 Central Europe, 341 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), q6. 192. 1 93. 342, 596, 050. See also 111dn•1d11al d1rec/ors

Berlin Crisis of 1 96 1 and, 277, 27811 covert operations against Ca�tro, 6, 102-4, 134-40, 376, 412, 63�40. 674, 683 Kennedy's knowledge of, 137-39 Cuban exiles trained by, 2911 Cuban :'>lissile Crisis and, 424, 425, 428, 461, 524 blockade, assessment of effeccs of, 49011 intelligence reports on missile sites, 413- 1 4 missiles considered operational, 5o3 Dulles, Allen, 102 invasion of Cuba and, 104-5, 130, 132, 134


Kennedy's assassination and, 686-87 Kennedy's personality, 102-3 potentially damaging information on Kennedy, 103 "The President's Intelligence Checklist" prepared by, 3 profile of Khrushchev, 167 Sino-Soviet Task Force, 44n Vienna summit and, 167-68 Chang, Suzy, 61o Chase, Gordon, 638, 640, 657, 693 Chennault, Gen. Claire, 403 Cheston, Frazier, 48711 Chiang Kai-shek, 248, 592 Chicago Tribune, 505 China, 31, 69, 82, 84, 160, 176, 332, 618, 620, 676. See also Sino-Soviet relations Cuban Missile Crisis and, 571 first nuclear weapon detonated by, 700-1 Laos conflict and, 161, 395, 397 nuclear test ban treaty and, 619, 622, 624-26 Vienna summit and (1961), 202-3 Vietnam War and, 338 Chou En-lai, 330-3111 Christmas Island, atmospheric nuclear tests on, 363, 369 Church, Frank, 65711 Churchill, Randolph, 207 Civil defense, 258 Civil rights, Robert Kennedy on, 304 Clay, Gen. Lucius, 277, 574, 605 in Berlin, 281, 283, 369, 333-35 Cleveland, Harlan, 466, 691n Clifford, Clark, 143, 302, 417 Clifton, Gen. Chester, 86, 162, 285, 307, 475 Cline, Ray, 3-4, 41011, 418 Cohen, Eliot, 69511 Cold War, 11, 18, 599, 618 Colson, Charles, 61411 Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (C0l\10R), 423 Communism vs. capitalism, discussed at Vienna summit, 195-96. 199. 205-6

I 793

Communist movement (world communism), 67, 70, 701 Communist Party, SoYiet Union, Twenty- second Congress of, 319, 327, 329, 335. 336 Conein, Lucein, 655-57 Congo, the, 55, 62, 69. 79-82 Congress, U.S. See also specific Senators and Representatives

Cuban Missile Crisis and, 414, 415 leaders informed of missiles, 480-81 relationship with Kennedy, 511 Connallv, John, 597, 598, 665, 666, 669 Cook, Chauncey, 660 Cordier, Andrew, 538, 569 Counterforce strategY, 406-7 Cousins, Norman, 586-88, 597, 696 Couve de Murville, �laurice, 282, 603 Covert operations. See Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): Cuba, covert operations agaimt Castro regime Crabmeat, SoYiet, 59-60 Cranksha w, Edward, 34-1 Crete, 582 Cuba, 69, 87-110. See al\O Castro, Fidel; and specific topics before 1959, 9 1-95 as 1960 campaign issue, 28-:lo anti-Castro Guerrillas in. 37-1 Bay of Pigs invasion of (19l> 1). 88. 114-15, 200, 241, 518 aftermath of. 1 23. 12l"l-:{ I· 143-51 air strikes, 1 14-1 o. 12:i-2:l, 11 - ;,. 149 board of inquin cstahli,hcd In Kcnnech. qG-.18 Eisenhower and, 1.1-1-·I :, Kennc5\1 b,c11l11>\H'1 ', poht, tm,.tnl. !17, 101-2. 10.1. :171 - 11 I l111rica 11l' Hor.,. (i:/l Kl'11m·1h ', '!157 ,llld 1115S ,:1c.H1011, in . 111( 99 Ill'\\' 111\ ,1,io11 \l'l'll ,I\ llllllllll('llt Ill I \l(i 2, '.\7 ;1 • '.\ 7 7-7!1 Org,lllit,ll1· :i K 1-8:1 con ,l'que1Kl'' !OJ K l11u,hthe,. :1 fi:.?-6:1 (;11lw t' to gl'I Cuh.111 pl edge 1101 to e:-.p 1l I t·,ohnion, :1 (i(i-(i7 K e 1111edv', i111mu11it, from uit1t1,111, 5ti1 pl-2:1. :>:1:1. 0,:1:1, 5-1� S1 Ru,k. ·I :12-·I o ,11.i1cgir' c111c,11011, 442, 41- 7 ·15C>-51 · 1ck1·1\1011 ,pee< h I)\ Ke1111cd} ((ktoher 2 2), 4G1 , 4G8, 478. .18G dr;d1 of, 454. 461. 48411 reaClion, lO, .18(>-87 l ·1 ha,11·, proposals, 50 2-7, 51 5-1G L'-2 pin111e, of mi,\lles, (i, 7 I crifteaiion i,sue, 55 5, 561 Cul>da, Rola11do, 639. 658, 67 4, 683 Curtis, Thomas, 556 Cmhing. Cardinal, 57 4 Cutler, Robert, 2 52 Czechmlovakia, 174 Daley, Richard, 141 !Jal/as .\lom111g Xews, 5 1 o, 5 1 4, 670, 671 D'Amato, Paul "Skinny," 14e>-41 Daniel, Clifton, 10911 Daniel, Jean, 6 58, 67 8 Darcel, Denise, 99 Davies, John Paton, 35 8 Davies, Richard, 8, 46 1 , 4 8 2, 49 5. 516, 61211 Dealey, E. M. "Ted," 327-2 8, 514 Dean, Arthur, 292, 306, 400, 55311, 570, 572, 573, 633 Decker, Gen. Bernard, 396

Index Defense budget. See Military spending Defense Department, U.S., 68 De Gaulle, Charles, 3, 81, 162, 208, 306-7, 676, 681. See also France Berlin Crisis of 1961 and, 263, 269 Cuban Missile Crisis and, 477-78 meetings with Kennedy before Vienna summit, 182-86 nuclear test ban treaty and, 603-4, 626 Dejean, Maurice, 612, 626n Del Valle, Sergio, 479 Democratic Party, 19 Denney, George, 639 n Des .\loines Register, 616 De-Stalinization, 170, 335-36, 580 Detente, 542, 563 Dick, Jane, 506 Diefenbaker, John, 163 Diem, Ngo Dinh, 337, 339n, 650-57 Dillon, Douglas, 46, 258, 435, 442-45, 460, 468, 668, 681 Dirksen, Everett, 480, 616, 629 nuclear test ban treaty and, 635-36 DiSalle, Michael, 14-15 Disarmament, 41, 195 complete and general, discussed at Vienna summit, 213, 214 eighteen-nation Geneva talks on, 363-64 Dobrynin, Anatoly, 80, 81, 180, 395, 408, 645, 658n, 662, 691 appointed ambassador Lo the United States, 368 Berlin and, 399, 400 Bolshakov and, 368-69 Cuban Missile Crisis and, 421, 429, 445, 455, 481, 491-g2, 494, 515, 524n, 542, 546-47, 56o, 582-83 October 27 meeting \\'ith Robert Kennedy, 536, 537 indictment of American foreign policy delivered by, 584 Laos and, 396 nuclear test ban treaty and, 596 Dobrynin, Irina, 368 Dominic, Operation, 369

I 797

Dominican Republic, 104, 185 Domino theory, 339 Donovan, Hedley, 130 Donovan, James, 427, 428 Doolittle, Gen. James, 148 Dorticos, Osvaldo, 390, 429 Douglas, William 0., 300, 359, 643 Drummond, Roscoe, 240 Dryfoos, Orvil, 109 Duffy, LaVern, 616 Duke, Angier Biddle, 229 Dulles, Allen, 29, 46, 102 Berlin Crisis of 1961 and, 286 covert operations against Castro and, 102-4, 138 Cuba and, 375 first full intelligence briefing of Kennedy, 102-4 invasion of Cuba and, 91, 119, 130, 134, 132 Joseph Kennedy and, 103 missile gap issue and, 26 Dulles, John Foster, 37-39, 172, 195. 358, 392 Bohlen and, 39 Dungan, Ralph, 248 Dutton, Frederick, 635 East Berlin. See Berlin East Germany, 171-74, 645 Oder-;,,.;eisse Line as Eastern Frontier of. 242 peace treaty with. See German peace tn;aty refugees from, 264-65. 2Gf,-(i!> Eckhardt, Felix ,·on, 24211 Economic growth Soviet, G8, 69. 78. 2:1i1-.10 U.S., as 19Go ca111p.1i g- n i"llt', 27 Eddowes, l\lichael. HH:>" Eden, Antho111. 119 Edinburgh, Duke ol. til'l I Edwards. India. 187 Edwards. Shdhdd. 1:1:i, 1:17. •:!•l Egvpt. 15.1 Ehrlichm.111, .John. 1:1ti, :10211 Eichmann, ,\doll, :q 1 Eiscnhown, J>w1g-ht I). I(), :l'l, :1!1, 1 · 7• :i !)II, fio, titi, l� j. 11-1111,


Ei\t•nhown ( r,1111 'd I 14{i-.17, :qo. '.\'.\I, '.IH11, 478, ·l!Jli. fioo.(i5711 :\. ·I .'>(l, ·I ti!J, 1 . 70..189-90. :'J7 al Vienna summit ( 19G 1 ). 207�1220 Kenncdy,John,Jr., '.l· 181, :l,15· 666 Kenned\, John F. Srr nl.,o ,;,,.nju 1op1, 1 1957 and 1958 \,1c1t1011, 111 Cuh.1. 98, ()!) 191> 0 , .1mp:11g11. \'fl' l'1 l',1d1· ra111p,11gn ( 1\Jlio) 1!Jlio prim:ll'in, 2 1 I gli2 dect1011, .111d, :1S·1 1!Jli.1 camp.11g11 pl.111,, h 11 12 :ifi. 1 i 1 s \\l(IJ \\Olll, 10:\, q1. 1(it'>-1>7 . 178, 1 79. 27 1 . :191�)8, :102. ·172 foreign affairs Vil'\\, of. 1 08 imasion of Cub;1 and. 107-8 Ste,e11,011 and, .11> -t ,trol..e, :HH Kennech, .Joseph (Joe). .Jr., di Kennech, Kathlee11, 1Ii Ke111wrh. Pau·ick. ti:11 Kennerh. Rohnt. 9. 1 1. -t 1. 7:1 • 7ti, 1 :rn , qG. 1 5:1 . 1 18. :.q8. :P 1i. 311· :H 7, 3 tH, .p>H •.1ti I, !'> 73. :>D:i · tio1. Ii 10. ti25 195:, trip to the Smiet Union, :�oo, :Jot Adam, r.1,c· and. li:H. G:�5 ,1, ,\t10111l.·,· G· :.Hi mi,\iln m Cuh.1. :.i penonal li.,c kgrnund ol, 1(i9-jo i\l nudt·.,r tt·,1 b.m trl',ll} .111.1li11 A.'0111m111111t, :1 Hti Kom101110/1kt1w l'1 h.orn1c11ko, Cl'orgr. 1 :>• 1 1o, 2 :tH, :>1h, S:H" Ko,lm, Frol, 41· 53. :\ 5:,, :iHH, 461 , •,13. .r,H:1-K1. r,�1G cll';llh of. 58:, 'Ii 1-:rl'l\k,. 1\111110. :>:ti 1-:r()( I.., ,\ 1 thur, 3:1�). 14 711 Kroll. 11.m,, 1 i·I· :B(i Krnt'l(c1,j.1(k, .r,10, 51.! Krnl.1k, :,.1,1.1. Ccn. \'1ttor, G5-4 1-:r. Im , h ;m. :F 5 K udr. ,ll\l'\, • ('IJ.:l'l, :n 5 Ku11ll· 1,,, 1!} Ku,ncl\o,, \'a\rh, 8, 40, ·I 1 11, :>7• 4 7, 4HK, 553-55. 558, 559, 561-63. 572 L-1bomssc, l larn, 582 I..n Co11br, explosion, 97 Lmd1s. James. 3 0.1 Lansdale. Gen. Edward, 375-76 l..ansb. :-.lever, 99. qo Laos, 55. 69, 4, 86-87, 16o-63, 231, 316. 321, 33i, 395-98, 591-93 de Gaulle on, 1 4-85 Gene,·a agreement on, 650 Geneva conference on, , 61, 231, 398 settlement of conflict, 398 at \'ienna summit (1961), 211-213 Laski, Harold, 16 Latin America, 62-63, 96, 595. See also Organization of American States (OAS)

Index Castro's pledge not to export revolution to, 565-66, 568, 667 Cuban :\lissile Crisis and, 440, 443, 509, 566-67 Lausche, Frank, 636 Lawford, Peter, 107,141n, 312, 467 Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, 367 Lebanon, 153-54 Lebow, Richard .'.\ed, 383n Lechuga, Carlos, 638,659 Le�lay, Gen. Curtis,544,632 Lemnitzer, Gen., 328, 339, 341, 474 Leonhard, \\'olfgang, 282 Leuchtenburg, \\'illiam, 51 in Lightner, Allan, 177,277, 333 Lincoln, faelyn, 58, 163, 346, 482, 513,53° Lippmann,Helen, 1 10--12 Lippmann, \\'alter,48,110--12, 145, 168, 176, 253, 325, 529, 548 Lisagor, Peter,313 L 'l 'nita, 355 Litvinov, �laxim, 321-22 Liu Hsiao,430 Lleras Camargo, Alberto, 475 Lodge, Henry Cabot,35, 4011, 66, 253, 51211, 614, 652, 653. 654, 655, 656, 669 London Kennedv's visit to, after \'ienna summit, 225-29 Long, Russell, 633 Lovett, Robert, 74, 75, 253. 404, 449. 458 Lowell,Robert, 298, 308 Luce,Henry, 29711 Lumumba, Patrice, 79, 81 Lundahl, Arthur, 3, 7 �lcArdle, \!al, 99 �lcCarthy,Joseph, 39, 64, 299. 320 �lcClov, John, 74, 85.246, 449, 553· 555,558, 559. 561-62, 563, 601 Berlin Crisis of 1961 and, 262-65 �lcCone, John,2911, 57-58, 306, 355· 396, 413-14, 462, 478, 498. 671-72, 692

appointed CIA Director, 417-18 co\·ert operations against Castro and, 418 Cuban �lissile Crisis and, 419.424, 425, 428, 430. 434, 437. 442, 448,468, 469, 489, 503. 508-g . 532, 581 marriage to Theiline Pigott, 419 nuclear test ban treaty and, 632-33 personal background of. 416-17 \'ietnam and, 655-56 �lcCormack, John, 1111, 302 �lacdonald,Torbert, 2. 430. 665 �lacDuffie, �larshall, 169 �lcElroy, .'.\eil, 439 �lcGrory, �la[), 259 �lcHugh, Godfrey, 225 �lacmillan, Harold, 81, 223, 226-27, 236, 264, 292, 348, 493. 631, 676 1963 meeting with Kennedy, Gog Cuban �lissile Crisis and. 477. 481. 494. 499-500. 558 nuclear test ban treat� and, 362-63. 596, 597.598, 599. 623-24 resumption of nuclear te,ting b\ So\·iets and, 307 �lcXamara, Robert.46. 61, 72. 1 :�8. 295. 329, 331· 34.344· .,00-7. 475, 652, 673. 675.G91 1968 presidential candidan. possibilit\ of. 643-44 appointed Secretan of lkf• 58 I, 58811 air ,trik:1 5 \lc\\'illic, Ll'" i,. l>HG .\laddo., (de,1rm er). G(}'.l-94 \lafia (organi,ed cnml'), 6854!G C8· 2Go \!tiler, :\lmr,I\ "Dml\," (i8G \!tiler, \\'1lk1111, -18i \!ills, \\'ilhur. 25811 \linh, \laJ. Gen. Duong \'an "llig." 655. 6:1 li \lino\\', :---l·,,10n, -1fi5 \fm11l2.1 Kcnnnlv ,peed, a1111oum ing. 1>·i7 limitl'd, 292 Khrw,hrht·1 \ ,,illmgnn, lo acrq>I, .pl;1 · .p7 \lannill.1n ,11111. :1ti2-ti:1 nl'gll,ition, 011. ti I q-20. 7°:l




!\:udear te,t ban treat, (co11/'d) first da� of formal talks, 6:.?3 ;,.lultilateral Force (;,.ILF), 13:.!o secret than11d to Ke 11nl'd�. G22 \\'ithdrawal d;rnse, G23. G28 on-site impcction,, 85. 155. 213, 4oo, 57:.!, 573. 577. 58(....88 Khm,hd1cv', \\ rthdr,m.11 of ofk1 for, G18, 621 Sl'nate delegation to ;,.foscm,·, (i28-29 Senate hearings .111d ratification of. ti:11-36 ,ig11mg of, ti28, li:\o ,ll \'ienna ,ummrt (1961), 180, 2 I :l-15· 233-:H :S.:uckar tt'an. -1 ti. 5-7 7, 8:1 , 101, 122, 138, 1 -1 7, I 78, I H5, 2!15, :10-111, 309, :1 1 ti, :117' 3 2,j, 3'.\ I' :1(>5-(j(i, ; ;JI ' 57-1· ti10, 6.1'.l, 6:1 0. 67-1 . G!P llc:rhn and. :1G9 . , lkrhn C1 1\I, ol l!Jtit and, 2-1 1 :qti, 2.,7. 258. 259. 2ti -1 , 2li' 9-70. 272-73. -.?75. 287, 2H8 Crn1111ko. l,tlk \\llh. :11 1-12 on co11n11·do1n· str,11eg\, -1 ofi-711 C11h;1 and, :n5 Cuban �li,\llt· Cri,1, .111d. 7. 11, -II.I· -128, -1-12, 1 · 51· -1 5'.l11, 1 · 55· -1 57, 1 . 58. 1ti2, 16!r7 1, -1 80, -1 98, 5°1 · · !i07, 515· 521· 523· . 2, 519, 56711, :>82-83 !i3H, 51 0, to hc1 1G C.1hinct mn·1111g, · :� 2-:15 I 111va51011 of Cuha and, 108. 1 15, l iti, 125. 130 John Kenned\·, a s\e�,mc:nt or, 35f>-60 Rohen Kc 11 1H:dy on. 358-59\ c onll1c t and, 161, 395. 397 leak� and, 71 �lc:-S:amara and. -101 no11aggre5sio11 p;1n and, 630 nuclear tc,1 ban treaty and, 597, 60 1-2, 629 nuclcar t-:z t, ti:111 Smith. \\'illi.1111, :>·lo"




Sn\'Clcr, Cen. I low;trd, 5911, 187 Sorensen. C. A .. 12ti Soremt'n. Theodore, fi . 57, 58 . f>:\. 77, I q. 12:,-28, 1:\2, 1:1 H, qf> . :.q1, 248, :.!51>. :P5, :\:ii>. '.IH· :\l'q11. :179· 428, 1 · 19· (i.l..j, li1. 5 . ti _r1 \J. fifi8. (i82 Berlin Cri,is of l()lit ,1ml, 257. 287 Cuban �lis,tlt• C:11\1, ;111d, 121 •.152. 1· 5:\, l · :19· 1. 60. 5oli, 522. 512, 5(i2 dr ,th of po,,1hle 1dn 1,1011 add11'" I)\ Kt·111w2-fi Zorin exchange with, 505-6 im asion of Cuba and, 115 . I 16, 145, qg Robert Kennedv and, 301 Kennedy's assassination and, 676 nuclear test ban treaty and, 62g relationship with Kennedy. 463-G7 l!:">: job offered lo, 465 \'ienna summit and, 168 women and, 467-68 Stoessel, \\'alter, 660, 6G2 Stone, Irving, 516 Stoughton, Capt. Cecil, 431 Strategic Air Command (SAC), 26, 27, 37° Strategy of Peace, The (Kennedy). 1o1 Strauss, Franz-Josef, 3, 222, 249-50, 282, 341

Index Strauss, Lewis, 628 Sturua, Melor, 524 Sukhodrev,Viktor,8,455. 456 Sullivan, William, 556n Sulzberger, C. L., 308, 309, 320, 321 Summit meetings American-Soviet-British,proposed by Macmillan, 620-21 Geneva (1955), 19 Kennedy-Khrushchev, 70, 81, 158-60. See also Vienna, summit meeting in (1961) Bolshakov-Robert Kennedy channel, 155-57 Kennedy's desire for,77, 78 Kennedy's proposal for, 150-51, 155 Kennedy's reply to Khrushchev s acceptance, 162-63 Khrushchev's acceptance of Kennedy's proposal for, 151, 155. 162 Khrushchev's call for another (September 5, 1961), 308, 309, 314 Khrushchev's reluctance to meet, 87-88 Menshikov's proposal for, 45, 47 November 1962 suggested by Gromyko, 456, 458 nuclear test ban treaty and, 621 October 1962 proposal by Khrushchev, 497 orally transmitted proposal for a second summit, 314, 316 Rush's skepticism about, 76-i7 Soviet desire for, 41, 42,44, 45, 47 . Zhukov's inquiry regarding (October 29, 1962), 549 Paris (1960; cancelled}, 20-21 Surface-to-air missiles. See SAMs Suslov, Mikhail, 44, 698 Sweeney, Walter General,469 Switzerland, 100 Sylvester, Arthur, 59n Symington,James, 156-57 Svmington, Stuart, 51 1 S�ulc,Tad, 109, 138,36211

Taft,Robert,39 Taiwan, 202-3 Taping system,secret,346-47 TASS, 261,677 on Soviet missiles,423,445 Tatu,Michael,580,583 Taubman, William, 697 n Taylor, Gen. Maxwell,146-47,246, 260, 275,338,673 covert operations against Castro and,411 Cuban Missile Crisis and,433.434. 436,443.459,462,469,531 Vietnam and,652,653,655 Teamsters Union,14on, 313,32011 Television exchanges proposed by Salinger,361,364. 365 Teller, Edward,633 Test ban treaty. See Nuclear test ban treaty Texas, November 1963 trip to, 664-65, 668-71 Thailand, 397, 398 Thant, U, 336, 629 Third World,60, 331-32,351 Thirteen Days (Robert Kennedy). 41911, 536n Thompson,Jane,36, 46,50-54. 245. 394--95,535. 7°5 Thompson, Llewellyn, 35-37,39· 4 1, 4311, 44n, 45, 46, 49-5o. 66-70, 77-78, 80-83, 86, 98, 119, 129, 156, 175. 180, 231. 245, 309, 348. 356,368. 377 11· 394-95. 397,589. 613· Glg, 662, 673. 674 appointment of successor to, Sm •et view of, :160-61 Berlin Crisis of 1961 and, 2.1:1--1-1 · 263. 265 .. . Herlin issue and, 1 7s-78, 31>5. :11>1> Cuban Missile Crisis and .. pq, ·P:,, 453.45s. 520. 5�:1. :,28. :i:1:1. 544, 554 television spetTh In Kt·nnech (Onolwr 22). ,182 J. anuary 1!Jli l with Khnl\lu hn. 5·1-:> G

81.1 I Thompson I ro111 'd J 011 Khru,hrhn ·, J.111t1.11\ Speech, (i I on Ko,lm, ;1 1 1( �l.nrh l!JOI 111t't't111i,: \\Ith Klmrsh< ht•\. S 1--H:i . 11 mct·ting of ;,chi,cr , on l '.S . -Sm tt'l I d.n1om Fchru.11,, I I • I !l(j I • tiH--70 per , hat I.ground of, 50-5 1 RB-17 ll1n, .111d, ,r,.1-,r,7 rcbtro11,h1p ,,uh Klu11,hd1t·,.


,dcn1on of ,urce"ol to, .10H on Srno-So,rel Id.111011,, :l5.'i ,ummit rneeting .me.I. 15!1-fio tuton.,I tclq�ram, to Kcnncc.l,, ti7-tiH ,.tledrtlot\ t.rll \\1th Khnr,hd1t·,, ·I \I \'icnn., ,11111n11t .111d, 1 'G, '..109 weelcncl .11 Khn1,hd1n ·, dad1.r (19!>0). :,:.!-;JI Thomp,011. Sherr,, 2.1;> rho111p,on, \\'illi.1111, 1.j I Thor llllSSllt'�. 4:rn . .1-1 0 Tl101111111d Dm1, .I (Schk,inge1 ). ·I 7:l" Thurmond. Strom. 59. 4 1 5 T1111r, 22 Togliattr, l'aln11ro, 35511 Tower. John. 415 Tractors for Freedom Committee, 427 Trade. So,iet-:\mcrican, f>(io T Tra!icante. Santos, 135. 14011. G85 Tr.ivell.Jane, 5fi. 188, 189. 208 Trevelyan, Humphre�·. 601 Tre,,-hiu, Henry. 405 Trollope plo�, 528. 535 Trujillo, Rafael, 92, 9411. 185 Truman. Harr�, 56, 240, 350 nuclear test ban treatv and. fi27-28 Tsarapkin, Semyon, 85 Tse-tung, �lao, 42 Tshombe, �loise, 81 Tuchman, Barbara, 491


I 111 lc,. 200--1, :,H:.? l . S. rni"rln in. 8, ti 5. 38 r --8:.?. . tiH, - :l!l--lo, 1· 1·1· ·l:,:l, 1 I:'-!, 1 5oS, 5:.?.1--:1°, .:,:1:1-:1S, :1 1G--.17, ."i ."i :I, :,titi. :,S811 O, tolH'l 27 Khru,hd1n ,pet'ch. .:1 '..11 --2G ,t·< 1 t't tort< t'"ion ll\ Kcnnc,h to encl Cuh.111 �lr"1lc Cn,1, ( •!tfol, :,:1-:1 H. 51ti--.17 f1m1n Jo\ (dcstro1t·r). ti!l·I I\ ler. \\ 1111.1111, .'>2!1· :, IH, (io.1 I\I t'