The Social Democratic Parties in the Visegrád Countries: Predicaments and Prospects for Progressivism 3031307917, 9783031307911

Citation preview

The Social Democratic Parties in the Visegrád Countries Predicaments and Prospects for Progressivism Edited by Ania Skrzypek · András Bíró-Nagy

The Social Democratic Parties in the Visegrád Countries “This path-breaking volume examines the transformation of social democracy in the four countries of Visegrád – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The analysis demonstrates that there was not a single path to power for these parties but distinctive national trajectories reflecting the unique political traditions and histories of each country. Yet a common occurrence across the Visegrad is the comparative electoral weakness of social democratic parties in recent times. These parties performed strongly in the 1990s, but found it increasingly difficult to differentiate themselves from their centre-right opponents. Voters apparently doubted whether the social democrats offered a robust alternative to market liberalisation. Overall, this study offers a brilliant account of the politics and performance of social democratic parties in Visegrád over the last three decades. Rich in detail and cogently argued, the work is a major contribution to debates about the changing nature of social democracy across Europe, and will be required reading for scholars and students alike.” —Professor Patrick Diamond, Queen Mary, University of London “A group of renowned NGO experts from progressive think-tanks have authored a must-read primer for everyone interested in the challenges of contemporary politics in Europe. From progressivism to illiberalism, the book delivers a particularly insightful glimpse at the political currents of Central Europe. An important contribution to the debate on the future of social democracy in Europe.” —Aleksander Kwa´sniewski, President of Poland (1995–2005) “This volume is an essential contribution to the European debate about the state and future of social democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. It depicts the trajectories alongside which the four and then five parties in Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia (re) emerged after the 1990s, consolidated and grew to be a viable political alternative. It provides insights into their traditions, achievements, and legacy in shaping the post-transformation reality and paving the way for the EU. Being completed with academic precision and an excellent understanding of the socio-economic reality of the country-cases studies, the book is a longawaited, absolute must-read.” —Biljana Borzan, Vice-President of the S&D Group in the European Parliament

Ania Skrzypek · András Bíró-Nagy Editors

The Social Democratic Parties in the Visegrád Countries Predicaments and Prospects for Progressivism

Editors Ania Skrzypek Foundation for European Progressive Studies Brussels, Belgium

András Bíró-Nagy Policy Solutions Budapest, Hungary

ISBN 978-3-031-30791-1 ISBN 978-3-031-30792-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30792-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Maram_shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

Visegrad: From Hope to Horror and Back Again At the time of joining the European Union, social democrats were strong in Central Europe. Péter Medgyessy, Vladimír Špidla, and Leszek Miller governed in Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland. Shortly after, Robert Fico led Slovakia into the eurozone. Today neither these politicians nor their successors are in government. The Hungarian and Slovak centre left is split, the Czech social democrats took a leave from parliament and the Polish united new left has just re-emerged in legislative work after four years of marginalisation. Of course, there are countries in Western Europe too where progressive parties are just shadows of their previous selves. The meltdown in France has been spectacular, and the situation is not much better in the Netherlands or Ireland either. “Pasokification” has been a political science category in the past decade, used to describe the pheonomenon of the shrinking centre-left, replaced by a more radical challenger. But in Western Europe we can also speak about strongholds: Northern Europe where the erosion has not given way to a breakdown, Portugal and Malta where the center-left has gone from strength to strength, together with Spain, Germany, and Italy, where the recent years brought revival, and a solid role in national governments as well as municipalities.

v

vi

FOREWORD

The broader Eastern picture shows that there were only two cases where social democrats proved to be considerably strong for a longerlasting period: Slovakia and Romania. In both cases progressive politics has been pursued with a nationalist blend which may not be replicable or even desirable elsewhere. But it would be wrong to assume that the decline of a political tendency is just a matter of the wrong tactics. In the 1990s, the decade of the Washington Consensus, the programme of progressive parties in this transitional region was social-liberal at best—; contributing to the new capitalist political economy with strong semiperipheral features, which in turn undermined the social base that would have been needed to stabilise social democratic politics for the next generation. It is yet to be proven that the semi-peripheral development of East Central Europe can converge on the social market economies of the West. For many, convergence became an individual as opposed to collective strategy, producing the Westward migration of millions, which in turn generated major social-policy conflicts, like in the case of the posted workers. The lack of strong industrial relations has caused further tensions around wage-dumping, triggering the legislative campaign for EU- level minimum wage co-ordination, while stubborn social problems like Roma exclusion raise questions about social citizenship and resilient welfare states in general. The weakening of progressive parties in the Visegrad region did not only give us the unpleasant experience of being in opposition and missing out on social convergence, sometimes for a very long time. It also brought Poland and Hungary into a constant conflict with the EU institutions regarding the rule of law, and Slovakia to be a border line case from the point of view of governability. In Czechia, the decline of social democrats opened up a large playing field for the neoliberal populism of Andrej Babiš, whose reign was followed by a further shift to the right in a parliament with no progressive representation. These are, however, not identical patterns. Visegrad as a group was defined over three decades ago not on the basis of homogeneity of domestic social, cultural, or political trends, but on the basis of geopolitics and economics: a shared endeavour to finally and firmly connect the three and then four countries to the Euro-Atlantic sphere instead of the declining but still apparently dangerous post-Soviet Russia. Interestingly, this common definition broke down during the 2022 war of Russia against Ukraine, due to the behaviour of the authoritarian Viktor Orbán,

FOREWORD

vii

but this does not mean that other structures of this geopolitical mini-bloc could not function and survive for a long period. Do we have, after all, common features of Visegrad weakness that explain why a joint research makes sense and the connected studies should appear in a dedicated volume? The answer can only be yes since, despite some important differences, the nations of the region have shared much of their history, often lived in common federal states or empires, understand each other well thanks to their overlapping cultural heritage, and probably also share some of the key factors that shape their future. The authors of this book do not only reflect on the causes of decline, but also explore the various factors that either support or block the restoration of social democratic influence. They point out the important role of media, which after the rise of various social media platforms cannot be interpreted in the same way as in the early stages of the labour movement. Sometimes they find a paradox: an appeal of the progressive economic programme while the deficit of credibility, which is often linked to the assumed or sometimes real connections between contemporary socialists and pre-1989 communists. Crucially, the point in this collective exercise is not to find silver linings in the current situation, but to provide necessary inputs for the development of new strategies. A major question from the point of view of progressive political reproduction is the appeal to the youth, which also is conditioned on by education and participation. A shared conclusion might be that the future of the centre-left largely depends on combining genuinely progressive social policies with systemic (and not superficial) climate and environmental policies. While the former mainly affect older left-wing voters, the latter tend to be decisive for younger age groups, without which we cannot speak about a social base preserved or broadened. Such lessons, of course, are not confined to the Visegrad group, which allows us to conclude that the analysis and insight of this volume should be interesting for readers elsewhere in Europe and perhaps in an even broader geography interested in progressive politics. The specific point in

viii

FOREWORD

Visegrad is that an effective social democracy here requires a strategy that combines the fights against authoritarianism and neoliberalism, instead of just choosing one of the two evils. Brussels, Belgium

Dr. László Andor FEPS Secretary General European Commissioner 2010–2014

Acknowledgments

This book was produced with the financial support of the European Parliament. It is a result of a research conducted within a joint project of FEPSFoundation for European Progressive Studies and its’ partners: Policy Solutions (Hungary); Centrum Ignacego Daszynskiego ´ (Poland) and Masaryk Democratic Academy (Czech Republic). The articles reflect the opinions of the respective authors, not those of the European Parliament, or the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), or its partners. The responsibility of FEPS is limited to the publication in as much as it is considered worthy of attention of the readership. With that in mind, this volume was edited by Ania Skrzypek and András Bíró-Nagy, whose work was vastly supported in terms of project coordination by Celine Guèdes.

ix

Contents

Introduction András Bíró-Nagy and Ania Skrzypek The Visegrád Discomfort: Understanding the Predicaments and the Prospects for Progressivism Ania Skrzypek

1

9

The State of Social Democracy in the Czech Republic Pavel Šaradín and Patrik Eichler

53

The State of Social Democracy in Hungary András Bíró-Nagy and Gábor Gy˝ ori

89

The State of Social Democracy in Poland Bartosz M. Rydlinski ´

137

The State of Social Democracy in Slovakia: The Twilight (or Rebirth) of Social Democracy? L’ubomír Zvada

177

Index

225

xi

Notes on Contributors

András Bíró-Nagy is the director and owner of Policy Solutions, a leading Hungarian progressive think tank. He is also a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Political Science of the Centre for Social Sciences (TK PTI), and a member of the board at the Hungarian Political Science Association. In 2013–2014, he worked at the European Commission as a political adviser to EU Commissioner László Andor. Since 2014, he has been the editor of the English-language yearbook series on Hungarian politics published by FES and Policy Solutions. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Corvinus University of Budapest and an M.Sc. in Public Policy and Administration from the London School of Economics and Political Science. His main areas of expertise include European integration, the values of Hungarian society, radical right-wing parties, and contemporary social democracy. Patrik Eichler is a journalist and deputy director of the Masaryk Democratic Academy, a political think tank of the Czech Social Democratic Party, where he focuses on the programmatic of Central European political parties and historical politics. As a political commentator he also publishes in a number of Czech media, including the printed daily Právo and internet daily Deník Referendum, and is a editor of the Central European cultural-political bimonthly Listy. He is the co-author and/or co-editor i.a. of Za svobodu, spravedlnost a solidaritu: dˇejiny sociální demokracie v cˇ eských zemích (For freedom, justice and solidarity: history of social democracy in the Czech Lands ), Prague 2016, xiii

xiv

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

2018 and the anthology Masaryk: Politik na evropské úrovni (Masaryk: A European-Class Politician) Prague 2022. Gábor Gy˝ ori is a political analyst in the position of Senior Analyst at Policy Solutions. Previously, he worked as an analyst at the Prime Minister’s Office and for a variety of institutions active in the areas of think tank research, education, and journalism. Since 2014, he has been the main author of the English-language yearbook series on Hungarian politics jointly published by FES and Policy Solutions. He studied in the United States and received an M.A. in International Relations from the University of Chicago and a B.A. in Social Studies from Harvard University. Bartosz M. Rydlinski ´ holds a doctorate in political science from Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw (2013) and teaches at the Institute of Political Science at CSWU. He is a chair and co-founder of Ignacy Daszynski ´ Center and a member of the board of the “Amicus Europae” Foundation, established by former Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski. Rydlinski ´ is a former EASI-Hurford Next Generation Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and was a visiting scholar at Georgetown University’s Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies (CERES) in 2014 and 2022. Pavel Šaradín works as an associate professor at the Department of Politics and European Studies, Faculty of Arts, Palacky University Olomouc. He teaches mainly the theory of democracy, local politics, and the party system of the Czech Republic. In the last five years, he has worked on several projects, mainly related to democratic innovation and civic education. He has authored or co-authored several books and numerous studies ˇ and articles, for example Ceši a demokracie v digitální dobˇe (Czechs and Democracy in the Digital Age), Brno 2021, Implementation of democratic innovations in Prague (Czech Republic): an empirical exploration (Cities, 2022), Local Action Groups as an Example of Participation and Development of Community: the Case of “Moravian Way” Local Action Group, (Journal of Deliberative Democracy, 2022), Participatory Budgeting: Case Study of Possible Causes of Failures (Slovak Journal of Political Science, 2022). Ania Skrzypek, Ph.D., is a Director for Research and Training at the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) in Brussels. She completed her doctoral thesis magna cum laude at the Faculty of

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

xv

Journalism and Political Sciences of Warsaw University with a disertation “Cooperations of socialists and social democratic parties in uniting Europe 1957–2007”, following which she has been also offering guest lectures at the universities in Europe and in the US. Skrzypek’s research interests evolve around the party systems, contemporary political thought, and the European studies, on which subjects she authored more than 100 published peer-reviewed papers, popular articles, and reviews. She remains a reviewer for a several among the academic journals, including Warsaw University’s European Review. L’ubomír Zvada is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Department of Politics and European Studies, Palacký University in Olomouc, Czech Republic. During his studies, he visited universities in Israel (Hebrew University and the University of Haifa) and Poland (Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski ´ University in Warsaw, Bialystok University of Technology). From 2019 to 2020 he served as an Associate Editor of the journal Central European Papers. His research focuses on Slovak politics, the history, and contemporary politics of the Visegrád countries, and foreign policy analysis (FPA). He has published in scientific journals such as the Czech Journal of Political Science, Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politics, Politické vedy, Slovak Journal of Political Sciences, and Filozofia.

List of Figures

The Visegrád Discomfort: Understanding the Predicaments and the Prospects for Progressivism Graph 1

Graph 2

Graph 3

The electoral performance of the social democratic parties (PES members) in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia between 1989 and 2021 The electoral turnout in the parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia in the 1990s–2020s The electoral turnout in the European elections in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, 2004–2019

15

22

23

The State of Social Democracy in the Czech Republic Fig. 1

Fig. 2

The number of social media mentions for individual government representatives in 2021 (Source Czech Voter [2021]) Self-identification of citizens on the left-right scale (Source CVVM; red [left], blue [right], violet [centre], grey line [I don’t know])

70

81

The State of Social Democracy in Hungary Fig. 1

Party revenues of Fidesz, MSZP and DK

98

xvii

xviii Fig. 2

Fig. 3

Fig. 4 Fig. 5 Fig. 6 Fig. 7

Fig. 8

Fig. 9

LIST OF FIGURES

Number of media appearances of social democratic politicians in 2020 (Mentions and appearances in the top news shows) (Note red = politicians of MSZP, blue = politicians of DK. Source National Media and Info-communications Authority) Facebook followers of social democratic politicians (Thousand people) (Note red = politicians of MSZP, blue = politicians of DK. Source Facebook) Distribution of voters by residence (%) (Source Závecz Research, February 2021) Distribution of voters by age (%) (Source Závecz Research, February 2021) Distribution of voters by education (%) (Source Závecz Research, February 2021) Distribution of voters by income (%) (Note Without those who refused to answer. Source Závecz Research, February 2021) Distribution of potential social democratic voters by their primary partisanship (%) (Source Závecz Research, February 2021) Which of these do you consider to be the biggest problems in Hungary currently? (Source Policy Solutions, March 2021)

99

100 122 123 124

126

127

128

The State of Social Democracy in Poland Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3 Fig. 4

Facebook followers of the political parties in November 2021 (1000 people) (Source Facebook) Twitter followers of the political parties in November 2021 (1000 people) (Source Twitter) Facebook followers of social democratic politicians in November 2021 (1000 people) (Source Facebook) Twitter followers of social democratic politicians in November 2021 (1000 people) (Source Twitter)

148 148 149 149

The State of Social Democracy in Slovakia: The Twilight (or Rebirth) of Social Democracy? Fig. 1 Fig. 2

The evolution of Smer-SD membership and fees (Source Author based on data published by Smer-SD) Visegrád countries and its %GDP on healthcare (Source Author, based on the World Bank data)

191 199

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 3 Fig. 4

Fig. 5

Fig. 6

Fig. 7

Visegrád countries and its %GDP on education (Source Author, based on the World Bank data) Position of Slovak political parties to EU foreign policy and Russian interference (Source Author, based on Chapel Hill Expert Survey Bakker et al. [2020]) Position of Slovak political parties multiculturalism and anti-Islam rhetoric (Source author, based on Chapel Hill Expert Survey Bakker et al. [2020]) The evolution of electoral preferences, January 2021–April 2022 (Source Author, based on data published by FOCUS agency) Votes distribution, January 2021–April 2022. (Note ‘Others’ include only the party that achieved more than 5% in the public survey. Source Author’s calculation, based on data published by FOCUS agency)

xix

199

201

203

213

213

List of Tables

The State of Social Democracy in the Czech Republic Table 1 Table 2 Table Table Table Table Table

3 4 5 6 7

ˇ Voting support for the CSSD (1990–2021) Socio-demographic profile of voters during elections to Chamber of Deputies in 2006 ˇ Contributions from the state to the CSSD Number of Facebook likes ˇ Organisational structure of the CSSD Merit in promoting programme themes ˇ Electoral potential of CSSD (2016)

54 58 67 71 71 80 82

The State of Social Democracy in Hungary Table 1 Table 2

MSZP and DK results in European parliament and national parliamentary elections since 2014 Spending increases proposed by MSZP in high-priority policy areas

92 111

The State of Social Democracy in Poland Table 1 Table 2

The European parliament and national parliamentary election results of the SLD and Wiosna since 2014 Support of the SLD Electoral Committee in the 2019 parliamentary elections by age groups

138 164

xxi

xxii

LIST OF TABLES

The State of Social Democracy in Slovakia: The Twilight (or Rebirth) of Social Democracy? Table Table Table Table Table

1 2 3 4 5

Smer-SD parliamentary election results 2002–2020 Smer-SD results in the 2013 and 2017 regional elections Smer-SD results in municipal elections Smer-SD results in EP elections Hlas-SD deputies elected in the 2020 parliamentary election on Smer-SD’s candidate list

181 183 184 185 189

Introduction András Bíró-Nagy

and Ania Skrzypek

The herewith presented book is an attempt to study and compare the social democratic parties within the four countries of the Visegrad group (V4). These are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The regional, intergovernmental cooperation among them is well established, which justifies the focus on these states as selected from within the broader spectrum of Central and Eastern Europe. And it explains why they were extracted from within the group of states that joined the European Union within so-called Eastern Enlargement in 2004. Subsequently, the four respective country case studies abide by the same outline. The scheme includes elements such as a historical overview; the party organisations; the position of the social democrats within the party system; programme; voters’ and electoral appeal; conclusions and a

A. Bíró-Nagy Policy Solutions, Budapest, Hungary e-mail: [email protected] A. Skrzypek (B) Foundation for European Progressive Studies, Brussels, Belgium e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Skrzypek and A. Bíró-Nagy (eds.), The Social Democratic Parties in the Visegrád Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30792-8_1

1

2

A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND A. SKRZYPEK

bibliography. This coherent and comprehensive setup had been designed to ensure consistency in focus and enable the qualitative comparative analysis, of which main findings are featured in the fifth chapter. When it comes to the historical overview, the country case studies look at the perspective of the last three decades. The starting point for each of them is the dawn of the Soviet Block, the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the transformation of the political systems within the so-called client states. There, the methodology derives from history and analyses of the historical sources, whereby the authors refer to a vast but fragmented literature that describes the developments in the 1990s and 2000s in the region. The scope of the respective texts does not permit entering nuances. And hence only the most relevant events are being referred to and the qualitative analyses are limited to the minimum. Even then, the book shows that yes, there have been many common experiences, but there have also been many disparities in the way things unfolded. This is an important insight, especially for those, who otherwise give in to the tendency to generalise and consider the paths to democracy in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary as fairly the same. Consequently, against this historical background, the authors motivate their choice as per which parties they selected to be analysed under the label “social democrats”. While some may assume that this is relatively obvious to categorise and extract organisations relevant for such a study, it is worth remembering that especially in the 1990s the political systems were very fragile and volatile. Some parties had operated in exile (like CSSD), some others came to exist as successors of the former communist parties (see SdRP or MSZP). Quite a few parties emerged and disappeared, of which perhaps the most telling examples are Slovakia and Poland. And later, there have also been numerous splits, unifications and temporary electoral alliances. As these all have been complicating factors, the authors converged around a definition that would see social democrats as the parties that would adhere PES (Party of European Socialists) and/or have its representatives subscribe to the PES Group (currently: S&D Group) in the European Parliament. This denominator allowed the selection of the organisations that would be carefully then examined. The subsequent sections of the chapters investigate the respective parties’ origins. Because of the dynamic context within which those organisations emerged (either as the ones returning from exile or as successors of the communist parties or as new beings), they all needed to

INTRODUCTION

3

define not only their own space within the political party scene. By extension their task was to determine what centre-left would in case of their countries would comprise of. Hence, they embarked on the search for modern political identity. This formative period correlates with the emergence of the reformist agenda for the centre-left in the Western Europe, which started to be known as Third Way. To examine the connection, the authors look at the relevant, vast literature that echoes a grand ideological debate around it. Evidently, the sister parties inside of the PES were at that point divided about the way forward. It became an unamendable split, which was then visible especially when Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroeder signed jointly a common letter to the electorate that was meant to be an alternative to the PES Manifesto 1999. The rift from those days resonates until today, both in the relevant writings and in the political debates. Evidence of that is also the recent speech of the UK Labour Party Leader Keir Starmer at the occasion of the Labour Party Conference in Liverpool in September 2022, during which he claimed the legacy of the Blair and Brown governments as proud achievements of the Labour Party. Three decades after the emergence of the Third Way debate, the literature offers many important volumes that critically assess its heirloom. In this book the authors quote several of the key publications arguing that hardly any among these makes a connection with what kind of an impact the Third Way ideas had in the CEE. By filling in that vacuum, this book may help understanding why the British and German programmatic shifts were so influential there and what made the leaders of MSZP, CSSD and SLD try to import Third Way proposals into their own domestic context. It appears that they shared the understanding that it was an agenda of modernisation, and it would help them westernise and solidify their position as organisations with the potential to fulfil the voters’ hopes for the future. While the authors lean towards an unenthusiastic approach to these reformist attempts, they point out that the new type of progressivism in CEE countries that emerged as Third Way inspired was the most neoliberal version of it since it intertwined with parallel transformation processes. Approaching the evolution of the social democratic parties in V4 countries from the angle of the contemporary political thought only partially clarifies the quick rise to power and almost equally rapid decline of the social democratic parties in the Visegrad region. Essential supplementary explanation derives from the further explores, which anchor in the

4

A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND A. SKRZYPEK

perspective of the sociology of organisations and use the quantitative methods from within the studies of the political parties’ systems. It is true that CSSD, MSZP and SdRP could count on a set of resources that made their respective organisations persevere through the hard times on the 1990s. Just after the transition the centre-left was maliciously associated by the citizens with negative experiences of the past and with communism (“real socialism”). And consequently, it was met with resentment from the citizens. When that first wave of hostility was over (of which duration was again a country-specific issue), the analysed parties could bounce back because they were able to rely on solid organisational frameworks. These involved: infrastructure, understanding of organisational procedures among the members and also a long so-called front bench. The latter meant that a new generation of leaders could have been recruited from among younger members, many of whom already had relatively high profiles. The fact that they were familiar to the public was an advantage as voters perceived those politicians as experienced, predictable and well prepared to govern. All these qualities shouldn’t be underestimated in their appeal, especially that societies amid transformations seek some reassurance and stabilisation. The reflections about the organisations provoked authors to look deeper into the question of the party structures. On one hand, they took onto their respective workshops the statutes and examined the internal procedures, trying to assess these against the criteria of degree of internal democracy, openness and embedding in the external environment. On the other hand, the authors looked at the issue of representativeness and this brought them to deliberations about the party membership, elites and electorate. The individual chapters include an analysis of the parties’ leadership structures and the key internal party processes, including programme formulation and candidate selection. Methodology used to analyse these was mostly qualitative, anchored in the studies focused on elites and structures of voters. Diverse conclusions have been drawn, some of which could further help in endeavour of framing theories of the party change. But perhaps the most outstanding one among them concerns the fact that the politics in Visegrad countries, and consequently within the social democratic parties, is exceedingly personalised. Therefore, also who and in which style held the leadership at the given time would determine the electoral chances of the party in question, prompting a reflection that these parties are more presidential than collective leadership type of organisations.

INTRODUCTION

5

The time census of the three decades of the developments permits also to look at the transformation that the analysed parties have undergone as organisations. Firstly, they are being looked at from the prism of the functionality and assessed based on their performance in opposition and in the government. Secondly, they are studied as parties that have chosen to adhere a traditional political family, which came with benefits (such as legitimacy) and with challenges (such as the crisis of the historical parties). Consequently, they were on the side of the system when the wave of contestation and disapproval for the institutions arrived. In Western Europe the disappointment manifested itself with initial electoral abstention, gradual social mobilisation and search for alternative. It fuelled fragmentation and polarisation of political scenes. And this was the understanding with which the researchers involved in this book approached the Visegrad region. Their subsequent work shows that the hypothesis about the crisis of the traditional parties found confirmation also there. One could even say it hit harder since the political party systems have continued to be volatile to the extent in which parties in power could as well be failing to cross the threshold in the subsequent elections. The authors offered a number of observations, however, they also had to struggle and propose a qualitative method to capture the developments, since there is no model that would allow to investigate party change comprehensively. The passing time also meant a generational change alongside with giving into tendencies known in the West as professionalisation and mediatisation of politics. The social democrats in V4 followed these footsteps, which meant internal transformations and outsourcing of many of the processes. The most relevant examples of what happened were of course their campaigns. Although the papers do not refer directly to them, as yet again it would fall beyond of what the word limits of the chapter allows, they analyse the exposure of the centre-left in the leading media using the quantitative methodologies deriving from the communication studies. The outcomes of these reflections show that in Poland and Hungary, the state media are under the supervision of the authoritarian governments, which translates into a lack of accessibility for any of their political competitors. The exposure for the latter is more significant in commercial ones, however, far less extensive than for the centre-right and right-wing parties. In Slovakia the relations between SMER and media is simply tensed and full of distrust. But while the deficiency in publicity opportunities could have been relieved by the emergence of the so-called social

6

A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND A. SKRZYPEK

media, the authors show that just by comparing the number of followers, the centre-left leaders fall significantly behind and prove unable to pierce the bubbles. Since these parties can hardly count on the media effect that would support their strive for power, the authors found also necessary to seek an answer in how far the multiplication effect could potentially come from strategic partnership with trade unions, civil society organisations and others. Having examined the context, yet again by using methods from within sociology of organisation, authors come to several conclusions. Perhaps three are a common thread among them. First, the environment in which these parties operate is showing tendencies for volatilities of the possible partnering organisations. This relates to the rather weak position of the trade unions, as also with the hardships experienced by civil society in the context of authoritarian policies of the government. They evidently affect the existing NGOs, as also make some civil society mobilisations appear more as ad-hoc partners, who later fade away once the protest moment passes by. Secondly, the earlier mentioned crisis of the traditional parties resonates in a certain distrust that the civil society also shares, being extremely cautious about pledging allegiance to only one of the political actors. This is a difference with the Western Europe, where some associations, students’ unions and social coalitions are distinctively left or right. And finally, there is also an aspect, which possibly is best explained is examined with the lenses of political culture. This is a question of a compromise, which is essential for any coalition to emerge, and which is frequently regarded in V4 countries in the categories of capitulation and concession. And that bridges to the pre-last valid point to be made in this methodological note. The authors looked at the evolution of the programmatic platforms of the parties, where it would seem that an interesting phenomenon is taking place. The qualitative analyses show that the social democratic parties in the V4 are predominantly focused on two questions. The first is the notion of social progress, which is translated into the proposals that aim at keeping societies open, vibrant, egalitarian, democratic and benefitting from cultural liberalism. There, Europe, NATO and international orientation play also an important role, and this is how they draw the demarcation line of the conflict with right and authoritarian right. The second is the issue of socio-economic dimension. There they generally take on the modernising proposals, discussing equity and solidarity, embracing socio-ecologism, defending premises of a big

INTRODUCTION

7

and active state with adequate provision of public services. The specific policy proposals vary, also within the countries—of which an outstanding example are differences between MSZP and DK. But the point that is interesting to make here is that in comparison with what was happening in the 1990s with the embracing of the Third Way, the current programme shows much more self-confidence. This may be paradoxical, as before these parties were on the rise and now several among them are in truly precarious position. But an explanation may lay in the fact that they have been active for 3 decades within which they acquired an understanding that it is trustworthiness and proximity of the proposals that may convince the voters. Finally, equipped with the previously outlined understanding, the authors investigate the electoral appeal of these parties. All chapters reveal the composition of the current electorate of social democratic parties, but also look at who the potential voters of these parties are. They provide interesting insights which allow to depict the median voters, as also understand the limitations of the social democratic parties outreach. Comparing to the relevant literature on the matter, the authors come to the conclusions that have been drawn for the other social democratic parties. With the erosion of core electorates, it can rely predominantly on the urban, better educated, median income voters. In several cases the electoral outcomes showed also that they were able to win those, whom their policy benefits would benefit more indirectly than directly but failing to acquire the trust of those most vulnerable and impoverished. To that end, each of the chapters finishes with a summary that attempts a SWOT—outlining the strengths and weaknesses of social democratic parties, alongside with what opportunities and threats they face. They also attempt at suggesting what would need to happen in order to make these once-great social democratic parties in the countries of the Visegrad region rise again.

The Visegrád Discomfort: Understanding the Predicaments and the Prospects for Progressivism Ania Skrzypek

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the Iron Curtain opened the way to reconciliation on the European continent. Though there was also substantial uncertainty about the dynamic of the transformation processes, it was the sense of liberation that dominated within the societies of Central and Eastern Europe.1 Citizens hoped the new chapter would bring peace, freedom, stability and prosperity.2 They were ready to face the hardship of transition, expecting that at the end of the road they would find themselves respected by and reunited with the West. They would belong fully to the EU and inside that Union, they

1 Antoszewski, A., Herbut, R., & Sroka, J. (2003). System partyjny w Polsce. In A.

´ Antoszewski et al. (Eds.), Partie i systemy partyjne Europy Srodkowej (p. 116). Wroclaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wroclawskiego. 2 Reykowski, J. (2011). Trzecia Rzeczpospolita a lewica. In J. Reykowski, K. Janik, & L. Nikolski (Eds.), Projekt dla Polski. Perspektywa lewicowa (p. 21). Scholar Warszawa.

A. Skrzypek (B) Foundation for European Progressive Studies, Brussels, Belgium e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Skrzypek and A. Bíró-Nagy (eds.), The Social Democratic Parties in the Visegrád Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30792-8_2

9

10

A. SKRZYPEK

would be working towards the realisation of now a common vision of a better, more democratic and socially just future.3 Certainly, although today one speaks about ‘Eastern enlargement’ or ‘First Balkan enlargements’,4 classifying several countries into one category, the dynamics of the changes within the respective states that joined the EU in 2004, 2007 and 2013 significantly differed.5 ,6 There were those among them to which the tectonic political shift of 1989 and the beginning of the 1990s would bring military conflicts. But there were also those, on the contrary, which underwent peaceful transformations. The character of the latter has been encapsulated in such illustrative descriptions as the ‘Velvet Revolution’7 —which refers to the way the situation was handled in the current Czech Republic.8 But even there, where the processes were non-violent, the costs of the transition remained high. Nothing could remain as it was. But what was new was not always as empowering, emancipating and reassuring as citizens had initially hoped. But regardless of both the anticipated and the unforeseen challenges, the drive to accomplish a change as soon as possible remained unequivocally strong. The new reality seemed to have been appearing as one full of opportunities, all of which people tried to grasp. Those more entrepreneurial would enter the uncharted waters of the free markets. The pioneers among them would import goods from the West, which at first they would sell from stretchers lined up along the pavements. These suddenly would become a part of the urban landscape, to be then gradually replaced by kiosks and later boutiques. Similarly, there were those who would depart on an expedition to search for used cars, some of which had been in collisions. They would purchase these cheaply, drag

3 Crook, N., Dauderstädt, M., & Gerrits, A. (2002). Social democracy in Central and

Eastern Europe (pp. 20–21). Bonn/Amsterdam: Wiardi Beckman Stichting – Alfred Mozer Stichting – Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 4 See, for example, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/external/html/euenlargement/def ault_en.htm (accessed on 18 September 2022). 5 Antoszewski, A. et al. (Eds.). (2003). Partie i systemy partyjne Europy Srodkowej (p. 235). Wroclaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego. 6 Ash, T. G. (1990). Wiosna obywateli (p. 42). London: Polonia. 7 Keane, J. (2000). Václav Havel: A political tragedy in six actis (pp. 335–405).

London: Bloomsbury. 8 Evidently the transition labelled as ‘Velvet Revolution’ took place in Czechoslovakia.

THE VISEGRÁD DISCOMFORT: UNDERSTANDING …

11

them back and restore them, making remarkable profits. In that sense, the liberalised market benefitted many as a springboard. Such open access to the market was not the only avenue that those longing for change pursued. Funds such as PHARE9 ,10 would mean that there was much more support, especially in the areas that had to reform the state from an administrative angle, as also to ensure more social and economic cohesion. The rural areas would consequently undergo metamorphosis, as a result of the adjustments made to steer the countries onto the path of EU accession. As a result, the new generation of farmers would include individuals and communities who would define their production processes in a more entrepreneurial sense. But then there was the other side of the coin. First, democracy cannot simply be bestowed upon a state or a nation. It is an ideal that societies may choose to pursue, a system they want their state to be based on and the philosophy behind the interactions among the citizens.11 ,12 This meant that the initial choice, as bold as it was, was just the start of a long and winding road. The countries and the people from within the region would have to find new articulation for the principle rules of the new social contract, as in addition to learning by doing, they would have to establish which procedures (including the electoral) would ensure this true representative democracy they had been longing for. And so during those first years, many political parties entered onto the political stage. Some of them made a mark, even if as organisations they have proven to be too weak to survive the test of time. Second, while on a mission to create a better future not all were able to focus on this noble aim without looking back. Some insisted on bringing the past into the future, using it as an anchor for their existence in the new reality. Then again, in some states, reconciliation meant a full disclosure of the secret files of the previous regime, following a common decision

9 Dinan, D. (1994). Ever closer Union: An introduction to European integration (2nd ed., p. 186). The European Union Series. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 10 PHARE—programme originally created in 1989 as ‘Poland and Hungary: Assistance

for restructuring their economies’, which evolved to cover then 10 assession countries of the EU, being a support mechanism in their respective transition. 11 Dahl, R. (2000). On democracy (p. 26). New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 12 See: Norris, P. (2011). Democratic deficit: Critical citizens revisisted (pp. 4–5). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

12

A. SKRZYPEK

to move on. In some others, the files were weaponised in dirty political scheming—being used (in their original or fake form) to call the respective political opponents ‘collaborators of the previous regime’ and consequently to knock them down. Third, the transformation meant that some phenomena unknown in the past became reality. Market liberalisation meant pressure on the public sector, while its employees found themselves trapped in salary brackets, which made their income increase very slowly, also to be a group kept in the rigid brackets of very slowly growing salaries. Soon their salaries became incomparable with the income available to those who were fortunate to benefit from the boom in business. Unemployment started to rise, exposing yet another aspect of the transition: even with requalification, there was no longer a guaranteed job for everyone. These issues, mixed with many other new issues, would become most challenging, especially since the region was not immune to the parallel processes of globalisation (which in addition would leave clear winners and losers). It was bound to implode, with many disenchanted voters looking for ways to express themselves.13 The ever-growing volatility, which in the region was even greater than in the so-called West,14 would make the governments of the first year rather fragile. Against this backdrop, social democracy entered the stage in the four countries of Visegrád—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. For two, it was born of the transformation of the previous workers ’ parties: in the case of the Czech Republic, it was recreated, building on the proud traditions that had existed since 1878; in Slovakia, it marked its beginnings as SMER (Direction—Social Democracy) only at the end of the 1990s, SMER being a breakout from the post-Communist SDL. One could argue that each of them walked a different path and had a distinctive dynamic when it comes to their respective evolutions. But while that is true and there are many differentiating factors to which

13 Antoszewski, A., & Herbut, R. (Eds.). (1998). Demokracje Europy Srodkowej´ Wschodniej w perspektywie porownawczej (pp. 217–220). Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego. 14 Mair, P. (2014). Populist democracy vs. party democracy. In I. van Biezen (Ed.), On parties, party systems and democracy: Selected writings of Peter Mair (pp. 516–517). ECPR Press, University of Essex.

THE VISEGRÁD DISCOMFORT: UNDERSTANDING …

13

attention must be paid,15 these have been united by the experience of the last three decades, which inside the region bore many similarities. Hence these four can be examined in one collection and one comparative chapter. At the beginning of the fourth decade since the transformation, the countries seem to have yet something else in common. The analysed parties appear all to have been reduced, especially when compared to the beginning of the century when subsequently social democrats led the governments in each of the four countries.16 Currently, those states in which they are active are considered as challenged at best, looking at analyses pointing to diverse infringement of democracies there.17 Consequently, this chapter will also examine how far Visegrád discomfort is a result of some of the social democrats’ doing, as well as how far—in their respective positions—they could be capable of reversing the negative trends. The core question that remains is whether social democrats in the region can consolidate the strength that will allow them to provide much-needed solutions and reassurance, steering the countries towards the goals that have existed since the 1990s: democracy, stability and social justice.

1 The Electoral History: From a Splendid Rise to a Bitter Challenge Electoral history is a tale of diverse battles. Before they take place, there seems to be a frequently illusionary certitude about which slogans will frame the debates and where the main skirmishes will take place. Despite careful planning, the dynamic of electoral struggles is never immune to context. New issues and new actors emerge, new (and old) mistakes are made and those who are lucky get to shine in the heat of the moment.

15 See the argument and plead for caution in comparison by: Keman, H. (2017). Social democracy: A comparative account of the left wing party family (p. 13). New York: Routledge. 16 For SMER, the moment to enter government comes later, in 2006. 17 European Commission. (2022, July 13). Annex to the Communication from the

Commission to the European Parliament , The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. 2022 Rule of Law Report. Luxembourg, COM 2022 / 500 final, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/4_1_194 542_comm_recomm_en.pdf (accessed on 18 September 2022).

14

A. SKRZYPEK

When the campaign is over and votes are counted, the new landscape that emerges is always more or less at odds with what was anticipated. The big test is how well both winners and losers will be able to find their ways in this landscape. That is, in a nutshell, a description of what happens in countries that can be proud of long democratic traditions. But even here there is much push and pull, and in recent years it has become clear that nothing can be taken for granted, or electoral polls fully trusted. Furthermore, there has been fluctuation regarding what is and is not acceptable. There have been movements and parties emerging to supply a popular demand, which citizens view as about ‘telling the political elites the whole truth to their face’—with ‘them’ being a loosen common denominator for the existing political elites.18 They go beyond mere criticism of the state of politics and affairs, which is given in any campaign.19 And they do not abide by either political correctness or rules that preclude the use of discriminatory and offensive speech. What would have been inadmissible in public discourse just a couple of years ago seems to have become a new normal for some. This reflects some of the malpractice that affected deeply the democratic standards in those countries which have been democratic regimes for several decades. Evidently, the region of Central and Eastern Europe has not escaped such malpractice, adding to the existing challenges of building democracy in the transition period.20 That is also why the respective electoral histories within the Visegrád group of countries would seem to be a chronicle of radical shifts, in several cases many short-lived glories and disempowering traps. Once caught in the latter and having been knocked off from the positions of either first or second, social democratic parties in particular would find it extremely difficult to reclaim their place on the electoral podiums. In other, simpler words: once you start going down, there is no stopping. This is one of the observations that can be drawn from Graph 1, which shows the electoral performance of the four social democratic parties 18 Wright, T. (2019). Democracy and its discontents. In A. Gamble & T. Wright (Eds.),

Rethinking democracy (p. 8). Oxford: Wiley. 19 Hindmoor, A. (2018). What’s left now? The history and future of social democracy (p. 220). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 20 Vachudova, M. A. (2015). The positions and fortunes of social democratic parties in East Central Europe. In M. Kaeting & D. McCrone (Eds.), The crisis of social democracy in Europe (p. 56). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

THE VISEGRÁD DISCOMFORT: UNDERSTANDING …

15

studied. The explanation to be offered here is that in the case of Hungary, it includes MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party) only, skipping DK (Democratic Coalition). This is dictated by the fact that in 2014 both parties ran a joint list, so it would be only of value to compare these two in relation to the 2018 parliamentary elections—which would not influence the overall picture that the graph offers. In the case of Poland, social democrats have been encoded as ‘SLD’ (Democratic Left Alliance), even though in the respective elections they would run in diverse coalitions. Still, the emphasis was put on SLD itself—being permanently the largest party in any of the alliances that were established ahead of the national elections.21 Social democratic parties in V4: electoral performance 50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 1989

1994

1999

2004

CSSD

MSZP

2009 SLD*

2014

2019

SMER

Graph 1 The electoral performance of the social democratic parties (PES members) in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia between 1989 and 202122

21 Politt, H. (2009). Left-wing parties in Poland. In C. Hildebrandt & B. Daiber (Eds.), The left in Europe: Political parties and party alliances between Norway and Turkey (p. 144). Rosa Luxembourg Foundation Brussels Office. 22 DK (Democratic Coalition) is not included in this graph, as it was established later as the split off the MSZP. The party is still analysed in the text of this chapter. At the same time, ‘SLD’ in this graph stands for the predecessor of SLD, the alliances that this party led in the electoral context and for its successors.

16

A. SKRZYPEK

Analysing the graph from a comparative angle, there is a clear convergence when it comes to the trends in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in the 1990s.23 In all three cases, the social democrats are entering the political stage and are already notable contenders in the first national elections after the system’s change. In the case of Hungary and Poland they started from the level of 10%; however, within the Czech Republic, their initial position was just under the threshold. ˇ Of course, the CSSD (Czech Social Democratic Party) was also stepping onto the political stage with a somewhat unique image.24 It was a recognised historical party, founded in 1878 and also active in the Czechoslovak Republic between the wars. It had been forced to merge into the Communist Party, but, in parallel, independently also survived ˇ in exile. So, for the CSSD, 1989 and 1990 (following the Congress in March) were more about re-establishing itself and underlining the continuity with the non-communist stream, symbolic of which was the election to the position of chairperson of Jiˇrí Horák, now returned from abroad. ˇ As mentioned, although in the first elections CSSD did not manage to cross the threshold, from the next vote onwards it was one of the two strongest parties—either governing or as the main opposition force, until 2017. ˇ This makes CSSD different in comparison to MSZP and the Polish sister party—which in the 1990s was known under the banner of SdRP. The latter was established at the congress of 29 January 1990, which started with the dissolving of PZPR (Polish United Workers’ Party). Once the former prime minister and its last first secretary, Mieczysław F. Rakowski, gave the order to ‘Walk the standard out!’, the new era began. But it did not come as a clean slate.25 SdRP (Social democracy of the Republic of Poland) may have been clear about its new approach and the adoption of the social democratic principles. It may have been

23 Schmidt, I. (2016). The three worlds of social democracy: A global view (p. 19). London: Pluto Press. 24 De Waele, J-M., & Soare, S. (2011). The central and eastern European left: A political family under construction. In J. Cronin, G. Ross, & J. Shock (Eds.), What’s left of the left: Democrats and social democrats in the challenging times (p. 291). Durham: Duke University Press. 25 Kwa´sniewski, A. (2000). Dom wszystkich – Polska (pp. 175–181). Warszawa: Perspektywy.

THE VISEGRÁD DISCOMFORT: UNDERSTANDING …

17

outspoken when it comes to pro-EU26 and pro-NATO attitudes. And this line was consequently pursued by the leaders when they entered public offices. The best examples here are the legacies of Aleksander Kwa´sniewski, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz and Leszek Miller. But for better or for worse, SdRP (and later SLD—Democratic Left Alliance), which was built on the basis of a large coalition of parties and civil societies) would still be perceived for most of the 1990s as the post-communist party. For worse, they continued to be blamed for all the crimes and malpractices of the state before 1989. For better, they evolved to be perceived as a clear alternative to a vindictive narrative of the right wing that was focused on the past. They were a force looked upon by many with nostalgia and as a chance to really move on from 1989. As such, they won the 1993 elections, entering government as a senior partner. The reconciliatory tone and the plea to look to a future27 in which a universal right to dignity and respect is indispensable was behind the first and second presidential election of Aleksander Kwa´sniewski, who was seen as belonging to credible, professional and energetic new(er) generation of leaders.28 It served as the rationale for all those who showed up at the referendum in 1997 to lend their support for the new constitution. MSZP observed an even faster growth in electoral terms. True, unlike SLD (which emerged through an alliance) it entered the stage as a consolidated, post-communist successor party. It was there, helping to shape ˇ the transition. And, similarly to CSSD in the second half of the 1990s, until 2010 it was one of the two main parties—heading the government three times. Even though it split into two parties eventually, seeing Ferenc Gyurcsány leave to create the Democratic Coalition (DK), it has been stable and less troubled by splits than SLD turned out to be. Because the dynamic of the transformation would differ inside the respective countries, there are many aspects of electoral politics that

26 Naturally, at the beginning of the 1990s—so before the establishment of the EU by the Maastricht Treaty—these were simply pro-European Integration declarations. 27 Callaghan, J., & Favretto, I. (2006). Introduction. In J. Callaghan & I. Favretto (Eds.), Transitions in social democracy: Cultural and ideological problems of the golden age (p. 2). Manchester: Manchester University Press. 28 De Waele, J-M., & Soare, S. (2011). The central and eastern European left: A political family under construction. In J. Cronin, G. Ross, & J. Shock (Eds.), What’s left of the left: Democrats and social democrats in the challenging times (p. 296). Durham: Duke University Press.

18

A. SKRZYPEK

remain incomparable. That said, there are some that link the experiˇ ences among the three—CSSD, MSZP and SLD. All three were growing in strength, even if of course MSZP and SdRP/SLD had a head start here, being able to count on the structures and infrastructure inherited from their communist predecessors. The popularity of all three rose in the second half of the 1990s, reaching its height around the turn of the century.29 One could ask how it was possible to reach the peak so quickly. There are at least three explanations. First, the transition meant that the tectonic shifts on the electoral stage were very sudden and very frequent. It meant greater volatility for all, but at the same time it also enabled a faster rise. Second, these times were influenced by the fact that the unconditional support for the transition began to fade and citizens were looking for some reassurance. The social democratic agenda organised around the principles of equality and social justice, which had an emphasis on universal rights, public good and social security, appealed to them. It was a clear alternative to the hardship of liberalisation, as well as to the effects of enhanced globalisation that roughly in that period began to take their toll. ˇ CSSD, MSZP and SLD were credible alternative forces able to propose alternative policies and take care of those pressing challenges. Thirdly, they were the organisations with no shortage of capable leaders. Indeed, it is frequently underestimated how much leadership matters in general. That said, the politics of the 1990s was already a very personalised one30 and in the V4 countries, it was of great relevance indeed ˇ who was at the helm of the organisation. In CSSD, the clear difference was observed when the leadership was taken over by Miloš Zeman, who was a speaker in the Chamber of Deputies and has been recognised as a bold, charismatic ‘voice of the real people’. His position as chairman went later to Vladimír Špidla, broadly respected for his clear political views on the EU accession—which by the time he took over the party in 2001 was the key divisive political issue. He was followed in 2005 by Jiˇrí Paroubek, who according to all the surveys was perceived as a strong, charismatic 29 Sassoon, D. (2010). One hundred years of socialism: The west European left in the tentieth century (p. XIV). New York/London: I.B. Taurus. 30 Poguntke, T., & Webb, P. (2009). The presidentialisation of politics in democratic societies: A framework for analyses. In T. Poguntke & P. Webb (Eds.), The presidentialisation of politics: A comparative study of modern democracies (pp. 10–11). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

THE VISEGRÁD DISCOMFORT: UNDERSTANDING …

19

and pragmatic politician. Being in addition a great campaigner was what ˇ made him triple the preference vote behind the CSSD. Neither Mirek Topolánek nor Bohuslav Sobotka, or Lubomír Zaorálek, even if they operated in the changing context, were able to replicate this success. The first among them had been facing difficulties connected with the behaviour of Miloš Zeman, which somewhat overshadowed the incredible activity of ˇ CSSD during that period as the opposition party. The latter two already had to face Andrej Babiš and his predatory style of politics. The cases of SdRP (SLD) and of MSZP seem to confirm the hypothesis about the unprecedented relevance of the personality of the leader. Looking at the latter, the integrity and the respect that Gyula Horn commanded were key in shaping the party, ensuring its relevance in the 1990s and winning the supermajority in 1994. Next, László Kovács, having been the party spokesperson, represented a certain continuity and political pragmatism, which fortified the party and led to gaining over 40% of electoral support. The subsequent election in 2006 saw the historical win of 42.3%—which was attributed also to the was the disposition of Ferenc Gyurcsány. His charisma has proven to be a quality that allowed him not only to survive the scandal but even preserve a political capital large enough to establish a new party—DK. The latter noted impressive results, especially in the 2014 and 2019 European parliamentary elections, which are considered atypical (as second-order) and where the individuality of the candidates is expected to carry a lot of weight in the vote. With that in mind, MSZP has given much thought to the question of how to improve and have more open procedures for selecting leadership. Consequently, it has become the first party in the region to not only have a twin-chairs solution but also to have a female leader. The position is currently in the hands of Ágnes Kunhalmi and Bertalan Tóth, both representing the new generation in power within MSZP. To that end, Slovakia is even bolder proof that strong leadership is especially determining the potential for political success in the Visegrád countries. SMER enters the political stage later than the other examined parties, seeing its formative times run almost parallel to the heyday of MSZP and SLD. It constitutes itself at the eclipse of the period marked firstly by the autocratic and illiberal regime of Vladimír Meˇciar and the so-called ‘normalisation years’. Shortly after, it wins the elections of 2006 and becomes the senior partner in a troublesome coalition with HZDS (The Movement for Democratic Slovakia) and SNS (The Slovak

20

A. SKRZYPEK

National Party). The party is seen as created by and hence unquestionably following Robert Fico. His political talents and perseverance are so outstanding that the political analysts refer to that time of Slovak politics as ‘Fico’s era’. Under his reign, SMER gains public support as a force of modernity, even if its political proposal so frequently comes to be at odds with what European Social Democrats united in the PES (Party of European Socialists) consider to be the programme for social justice and progress. The strategic choices (such as the already mentioned coalition in 2006, completed when the PES was abiding by the rule of cordon sanitaire vis-à-vis right-wing radicals and extremes) result in SMER being suspended as a PES full member.31 The programmatic divergence fuelled many internal debates and inspired some declarations, which nevertheless, one must admit, remain largely inconsequential for the position of Robert Fico and SMER inside the country. Especially as the party wins an unprecedented absolute majority in 2012. To that end, even if there is a clear erosion in support observed, especially since the 2017 regional and local elections, as also on the wave of changes to the electoral law—it is hard to predict in which way those are to continue and what kind of impact the still relatively new HLAS party (Voice—Social Democracy) of Peter Pellegrini will have at the end of the day. Taking another look at the Graph 1, there is another observation that needs to be made. The lines present themselves as curves that go up and then continue declining. The question is why it is not more of a sinusoidal development, which 30 years and roughly eight to nine national elections could easily see as a tendency. There is a handful of plausible explanations. First of all, the top electoral results of the analysed parties (with the exception of SMER) fall in the same period and coincide with the negotiations to join the European Union. While it would be hard to argue that this clear pro-European standpoint in itself is to be credited with the victories, one could argue that as an attitude it made these parties stand out with their stanch narrative and ability to clearly pick sides. Second, the period in question was marked in Europe by the dominance of social democracy inside the EU member states’ governments. Many among them were victorious because of their decision to embrace the Third Way agenda. For better or worse, it was considered at the time the ultimate

31 Euroactiv. (2006, October 13). Slovak Party suspended from PES. https://www.eur activ.com/section/eu-priorities-2020/news/slovak-party-suspended-from-pes/.

THE VISEGRÁD DISCOMFORT: UNDERSTANDING …

21

modernisation plan.32 And it appeared pragmatic.33 For those opposing, it was equal to treason that gave way to primacy of neoliberalism.34 The opposition to the Third Way created friction that remains to this very day the most profound divide in the movement’s modern history. That said, it did have a certain appeal and tempted to a large extent the parties in question. The miscalculation was not only that one cannot copy another party’s programme and try to import it fully, but also that by internalising Third Way proposals, the social democrats in the V4 blurred the programmatic demarcation lines.35 The same miscalculation that in the 1990s made them appear as an alternative to the (neoliberal, many say) logic of the transformation. The fall out of grace among the voters can thus be also seen in the perspective of the trouble experienced more commonly by the social democrats across the Union at roughly the same period. And third, as already remarked upon, the transformation meant that the political systems were volatile. To a degree that translated into openness to organisations that quickly gained primacy, emerging from the radical right. This was ANO in the Czech Republic, FIDESZ (Hungarian Civic Alliance) (and Jobbik (The Movement for a Better Hungary) in Hungary, PiS (Law and Justice) in Poland and OLANO (Ordinary People and Independent Personalities) in Slovakia. These parties, their narratives and their actions are the core reasons why there is an assessment that democracy is deteriorating in the V4 countries, and in the case of the two countries (Hungary and Poland), one should already talk about illiberal democracy or an authoritarian regime. But even if there are many arguments that contribute to such an evaluation, this is not because people refrain from taking part in elections. In fact, on the contrary, Graph 2, shows that the turnout in the respective countries in the national elections is not declining. It was falling in the second half of

32 Lagos, R. (2012). The southern tiger: Chile’s fight for a democratic and prosperous future (p. 215). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 33 Kennedy, P., & Manwaring, R. (2018). The dilemmas of social democracy. In R. Manwaring & P. Kennedy (Eds.), Why the left loses: The decline of the centre-left in comparative perspective (p. 205). Policy Press of University of Bristol. 34 Beck, U. (2012). The five self-delusions of a supposedly unpolitical age. In U. Beck (Ed.), Twenty observations on a world in turmoil (p. 155). Cambridge: Polity Press. 35 Rae, G. (2011). Trzecia Droga a lewica w Europie Srodkowo-Wschodniej. In M. Syska (Ed.), The left in east-central Europe (p. 25). Warszawa-Wroclaw: Osrodek Mysli Spolecznej im. Ferdynanda Lassalle’a.

22

A. SKRZYPEK

Turnout, parliamentary elections 1997-2021 90.00% 80.00% 70.00% 60.00% 50.00% 40.00% 30.00% 20.00% 10.00% 0.00% 1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2 per. Mov. Avg. (Poland)

2 per. Mov. Avg. (Hungary)

2 per. Mov. Avg. (Czech Republic)

2 per. Mov. Avg. (Slovakia)

2025

Graph 2 The electoral turnout in the parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia in the 1990s–2020s

the 1990s. But (noting the respectively lowest levels over the first decade of 2010) it started growing again. That would suggest that some of the claims made by social democrats in Europe that if turnout were higher, their results would improve do not seem to be correct in absolute terms in the Visegrád countries. Similarly, there is a tendency for turnout to grow in the European elections, even though it remains modest. In Slovakia and the Czech Republic is still far below the European average (Graph 3). The hegemony of PiS and FIDESZ as also the strength of the ANO (in the second decade of the 2000s) and recently of OLANO seem to be pointing out that it has become exceedingly difficult for the social democrats to stand and/or even stand their ground. In the case of some of the V4, this was because the social democrats were weaker at the point of the emergence of the radical right. To give the example of Poland, when PiS was founded, it was the Civic Platform that PiS would consider as their arch-enemy. This set a duopoly, which social democrats were not even a part of and hence voters would not consider them as serious contenders when casting their votes more strategically.

THE VISEGRÁD DISCOMFORT: UNDERSTANDING …

23

European elections turnout 50.00% 45.68% 43.36%

45.00% 40.00%

38.50%

35.00% 30.00%

28.30%

25.00% 20.00% 15.00%

20.87% 16.97%

36.31% 28.22% 24.53% 19.64%

28.97%

28.72%

23.83%

22.74%

18.20% 13.05%

10.00% 5.00% 0.00% 2004 Poland

2009

2014

Hungary

Czech Republic

2019 Slovakia

Graph 3 The electoral turnout in the European elections in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, 2004–2019

Furthermore, these parties would quickly come to dominate nationallevel politics. They would be loud, they would be bold and they would cross the limits. This earned them attention and momentum. Subsequently, they could move on to conquering the regional and local government levels. The battles there would differ, as for example, again in Poland, the main contender in the rural areas was PSL (Polish People’s Party) and not SLD. But in the small and medium agglomeration, the situation was similar to that experienced in Hungary, the Czech Republic and later Slovakia. The social democrats found it very hard to resist the conquest of the radical right on the regional level (with some symbolic and important exceptions). Among the reasons was the weakness of their own organisations, which were in decline—having been neglected together with the rest of the party apparatus during the heyday of governing. Finally, there seems to be also a particular predicament when it comes to social democrats and the electoral coalition forming. Logic would suggest that the parties joining forces would be stronger as an alliance than if they ran separately. That was the case for the MSZP, DK and three smaller left-wing and liberal parties, which joined forces in 2014 and together ended 18 points behind FIDESZ. This was an achievement

24

A. SKRZYPEK

for all the parties involved to run together, however, electorally it still resulted in a defeat. Even more discouraging were examples from Poland. In 2007, LiD (Lewica i Demokraci), which was an attempt to marry SLD, SdPL (Socjaldemokracja Polska, which was a split from SLD), UP (Unia Pracy) and DP (Democratic Party)—and that made her end with just 13%. Four years later, another amalgam—the United Left—barely crossed the threshold, only to see an even broader alliance of Zjednoczona Lewica (United Left, composed of SLD, Twój Ruch, PPS—Polish Socialist Party and the Greens) fail to accomplish that. Having worked its way back to the parliament, SLD joined forces with WIOSNA and RAZEM in 2019, successfully crossing 12.56%. This together depicts a rather unclear picture, in which the support levels of the potential coalition partners simply do not add up. The difficulty here may derive from the fact that the coalitions are met often with distrust, especially if they are established for the purpose of the elections. For many voters, who are still loyal to social democracy, the coalitions often appear suspicious. And for the other voters, who are more volatile, the coalitions seem to magnify the question that many still see as persisting. Even after all those years it is: what exactly defines social democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and makes it special?

2

The Organisations: From an Inherited Réseau Towards a New Open Model

Graph 2 shows the tendency for turnout in the national elections within the brackets of the last decade is to rise. That is of course only one of the factors taken into consideration when speaking about political participation within the respective societies. Among the variety of measurements, an important one relates to the statistics indicating how many citizens engage with and become members of political parties. These are difficult to analyse fully, as for many parties (including the ones examined here) such records are confidential. The relevant literature suggests that there is an overall decline in the so-called ‘traditional political parties’, which have difficulties with both: keeping already registered and reaching out to the new, especially young potential members. There are many hypotheses as to why this is the

THE VISEGRÁD DISCOMFORT: UNDERSTANDING …

25

case.36 On the one hand, there are many processes that used to be part of party life which are now outsourced. For example the drafting of the programmes (that often have been entrusted to experts or party-related think tanks), the campaigns (which on the wave of the professionalisation of the campaigns have been entrusted to PR agencies and spin doctors).37 Furthermore, some of the parties in an attempt to open up organised semi-open or open primaries to choose leaders or electoral candidates. The result may have been connection with individuals not involved until that point, but it also may have resulted in disenfranchising those already connected, who would see their prerogative to elect the party chair diminished or even taken away. All in all, many previously entering the party ranks would ask the question about the purpose of enrolling. On the other hand, it would seem also that the parties themselves started looking at membership issues differently. When in government, they would often find it safer to close ranks to exert control, which would then diminish efforts focused on new recruitment. To that end, the fact that many among the traditional parties benefited from state funding made the contributions received via membership fees less detrimental to the parties’ survival.38 Although this is rather a harsh conclusion to draw, academics have been investigating the question how interested parties are today in gaining members. These are the tendencies widely observed in the countries in Western Europe, but Central and Eastern Europe have not been immune to these either. If anything, the corrosive processes were even more intense, because of the specific political context. First, the period of transformation has been a time of finding oneself. But it also meant, after the market opened and neoliberal reforms started taking their toll, that social attitudes changed. After everything has been subordinated to the free market rules, in order to ensure their socio-economic security and decent living standards, many people suddenly have to run behind more than just one

36 Wiesendahl, E., Jun, U., & Niedermayer, O. (2009). Die Zukunft der Mitgliederparteien auf dem Prüfstand. In U. Jun (Ed.), Zukunft der Mitgliederpartei (pp. 17–20). Verlag Barbara Budrich: Opladen and Farmington Hills. 37 Crouch, C. (2010). Post-democracy (p. 25). Cambridge: Polity. 38 Krouwel, A. (2012). Party transformations in European democracies (pp. 235–238).

New York: State University of New York Press.

26

A. SKRZYPEK

job.39 This would leave very little time to engage in political activities. Second, many citizens found it liberating that membership of the party would not determine their social status, but that also meant that for many it has become something repulsive. Especially in uncertain times, in which parties would rise and fall, committing to any of them seemed rather hazardous. Even more so in the case of the so-called ‘post-communist’ parties, belonging to which could have been a reason for being treated ostentatiously. And third, further, into the 1990s, citizens would also experience what could be labelled as transformation fatigue, which would make them disenchanted and start disengaging. Looking at the parties in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, one needs to say that their standings at the beginning of the 1990s are not fully comparable. SdRP and MSZP would be able to count on some structures (and infrastructure) inherited from their communist predecessor. This was an incredible comparative advantage, as it meant that these parties were right away present across the country, having representatives and offices also at the regional and local levels. The other side of that coin was however that their members had to battle hard for respect, having been often subjected to negative and aggressive treatment as post-communists. This of course did not help, especially at the ˇ beginning, with opening up. At the same time, CSSD was in a different situation. It has to re-establish itself and thereafter build the structures. Under Miloš Zeman, it could appropriate some infrastructure, like the party headquarters—Ludovy dum—in the city centre of Prague. Its survival was at the beginning thanks to the members and new members, whose membership fees were key in ensuring development (especially after the first election, when the party failed to cross the electoral threshold). In the 1990s it had about 30,000 members. Later the party managed to attract private sponsors, which meant moving to a model in which one third of the budget results from fees, one third from private contributions and one third from the state. In the years 1998–2020, the party received from the state about 120 million euros. Eventually, all the funds received ˇ made CSSD for several years the richest party in the country. In that sense, SMER’s first year can be partially compared with those ˇ of CSSD. However, SMER was funded right away with the idea of it

39 Crouch, C. (2012). The strange non-death of neoliberalism (p. 166). Cambridge: Polity.

THE VISEGRÁD DISCOMFORT: UNDERSTANDING …

27

becoming a mass organisation, and indeed quickly it became the largest within the Slovak system. As soon as it became eligible, it started to heavily rely on the financial subsidy from the state. In their budgetary constellation, membership fees have also only been representing one third of the resources. Similarly, they also play less of a role for MSZP and SLD (Nowa Lewica), as both also rely heavily on the state subventions. From the latter they also finance others (think tanks affiliated to them, and so on). The second half of the 1990s and the first of the 2000s were marked by the idea of transforming the organisations into something that would be more of a catch-all party. This was coherent with the determinant political thought of those days, where many tend to trust the saying that elections are won in the middle. That may have been so for the two parties, single-constituencies system of the UK—but not for the more multi-partisan ones. But still, building more of a mass party was a dream ˇ of, for example, Jiˇrí Paroubek, CSSD, which ambition was additionally fuelled by the revived enthusiasm for social democrats in the region. The reason to join the social democrats and their parties at that moment was a straightforward one. There was a drive that they had—attempting to win the popular vote and to govern. Joining and being part of it was simply ‘incredibly cool’. The above-mentioned dreams to build an organisational powerhouse were also shared by the organisations, which with their different status were close to or even functioning within the parties. Among them were women’s organisations and parties’ foundations, as also affiliated ˇ platforms like the Workers’ Sports Association in the case of CSSD. Certainly, the 1990s/2000s were also the years in which the three parties’ youth organisations were at their best. Respectively, MSD, Fiatal Baloldal (today’s Societas)40 and SML/SMLD41 (today’s FMS)42 grew and brought about a new generation—of which representatives would take the lead of those parties little less than two decades later.

40 DK also has a youth organisation—Demokratikus Lendület—which is not mentioned in the text, as it did not exist in the period that this paragraph refers to. 41 Which had two at the eclipse of the previous century. 42 Which is one of the two youth organisations of Nowa Lewica, next to what was

formely known as Przedwio´snie. The two are not intending to merge.

28

A. SKRZYPEK

Further organisational development follows somewhat the similarly shaped curve, like that used in Graph 1 to depict the electoral performance of the parties. There is a decline in terms of membership. To give ˇ examples, CSSD in 2016 had 21,000 members, in 2021 little more than a half of that, and just a year later a little more than 9,000. In Hungary, there was of course an effect of the split between MSZP and DK, of which the latter saw firstly a raise and then a clear stagnation in terms of outreach capabilities. MSZP remains more decentralised and more present in the rural areas countryside, while DK is rather focused on larger urban areas and remains centralised. It is of course possible that the numbers here are relative, as splits may attract some new members who would not have joined the party in its old form—as also it may be a disenchanting moment for others, who then decide to leave altogether. That said, in Slovakia SMER noted a steady decline—moving from 17,000 in 2010 to 14,000 in 2019. There was a further exodus in 2020, when the ‘Pellegrini eleven’ break out to create a new party, HLAS. The latter seems indeed to attract several newcomers to politics, but even with that the support of the two parties is on the level of 13% for SMER and 20% for HLAS, lagging behind what SMER alone used to carry electorally in the past. Nowa Lewica, in the case of Poland, is a little bit of an exception here. In 2019, a decision was taken to complete a merger between SLD and Wiosna (the organisation created by and around Robert Biedron). ´ The step was an outcome of several reflections, especially through of the cooperation established ahead of the national elections in 2019. Just as a reminder, in the European elections in the same year, the two parties competed separately—with Wiosna standing for the first time and SLD being part of a large Civic Coalition (aimed at being an alternative to PiS). The parties united at the Congress in October 2021, having jointly accumulated about 27,500 members (1,500 of whom come from Wiosna), having elected Włodzimierz Czarzasty (former SLD) and Robert Biedron´ (former Wiosna) as chairs. The merger is being completed on the regional and local levels with the preservation of the two structures in the shape of ‘party platforms’. But even though the numbers of each are at clear odds, the decision-making mechanisms ensure a fifty-fifty split of the votes everywhere. Next to the growth noted in terms of membership, there has also been a generational shift. Although SLD had already promoted younger politicians, especially on the party’s regional governance level, it is the merger that brought into the ranks a new generation. Many of them started as civil society activists, which also means that their approach to

THE VISEGRÁD DISCOMFORT: UNDERSTANDING …

29

party and what it means to be a member is guided by somewhat different understanding. To summarise, in the past three decades the social democratic parties in the four Visegrad countries have experienced tendencies similar to those facing traditional parties in Western Europe, according to the relevant literature. With some very singular and very much context-driven exceptions, the partisan membership has also been declining due to reasons such as the professionalisation of politics and growing voter volatility, as well as due to the specific characteristics of the transformation processes. With that in mind, one can of course ask if the curve depicting this propensity will continue dropping, or is there a way to turn the tide? And here comes a reflection that may even sound worrying. Even if it is true that the current societies are somewhat disenfranchised and not so much inclined towards lending their time, energy and support to only one party—this doesn’t prevent entire segments of the societies from engaging with right-wing radicals. This is an inconvenient question, especially if the fact that Victor Orbán managed to build his entire organisation from the ground and keeps attracting new adherents is taken into consideration, while PiS—even after the tragic plane crash in Smolensk where it lost almost the entire party elite—was able to quickly recreate itself. Since social democrats want to compete with these, they would need to give a further and more profound reflection to the question of what kind of organisations they want to become. And what the raison d’etre of the membership within them is. Of course, decision-making mechanisms and the trajectories of inner parties’ processes are just one way to look at these—the geographical and generational profiles of members are another; but there is also a question of relations with their own ecosystems (affiliated organisations and others).

3 The Programme: From Catch-All Offer to a Core Competence Search As already described in the introduction to this chapter, the 1990s were a period of intense ideological debate. On one hand, the Third Way/Neue Mitte were the agendas that gained popularity. They were considered by their architects, as well as by their supporters, as carrying guidelines to determine what modern social democracy should be about. The opposition to its fundamental claims was a reason for dispute, which set a bold dividing line inside the social democratic movement worldwide. The echo

30

A. SKRZYPEK

of the arguments and the memory of the experience persists, especially as since then there has been no other ideological conflict of that magnitude within the centre-left. On the other hand, there was a growing popular feeling that the public institutions grew weak and that the political parties failed in their role connected to political agency. The claims were coined that all the political organisations were the same and that they themselves are acting in a discouraging way. These, among others, were the reasons for civil society to try to pursue another path, setting out platforms such as the World Social Forum. The time was ripe, especially since the world of established politics applied the narrative that the most defining process of the time— globalisation—could only be tempered,43 while many among the citizens tended to trust that an alternative trajectory for global development was not only possible but also badly needed.44 Paradoxically, though in the V4 countries neoliberalism in its aggressive form could be sensed almost from day one of the transition, there was hardly any resonance of those big debates on the end of ideology or globalisation. Evidently, for the societies that had been on the other side of the Iron Curtain, interconnectedness would have first and foremost a positive affinity. And when it comes to civic disengagement and political fatigue, the context in Central and Eastern Europe could not be any different in the 1990s. Hence, it was only a part of the conversation that transcended. And indeed, the post-communist SdRP and MSZP, who were looking for ˇ that was a party in ways to gain political credibility,45 as also was the CSSD its formative years—wholesome or part of the Third Way as a programme for modernity was exceedingly appealing in the second half of the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s. The fascination with the Third Way lasted approximately as long as it did in the West; however, once it faded away, it left the social democratic parties a little vulnerable. Unlike their Western sister parties, they could not resort to a narrative that while in government they may have strayed towards policies based on broader 43 Th. Meyer with Hinchman, L. (2008). The theory of social democracy (pp. 165–167).

Cambridge: Polity Press. 44 Berman, S. H. (2006). The primacy of politics: Social democracy and the making of Europe’s twentieth century (pp. 208–209). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 45 Fishman, N. (2009). Afterword. In J. Callaghan et al. (Eds.), In search of social democracy: Responses to crisis and modernisation (p. 292). Manchester: Manchester University Press.

THE VISEGRÁD DISCOMFORT: UNDERSTANDING …

31

social compromise. Instead, they needed to search for new sources of political credibility and find anew what, in terms of a programme, they could claim as their core political competence.46 This process does not seem yet fully completed, even though there are some features that allow a suggestion of what the main co-ordinates of the respective programmes of the central-left parties in Central and Eastern Europe are. ˇ First, all the more recent programmes of CSSD, MSZP and DK, NL and SMER begin with the socio-economic angle. The proposals connected with labour market policies, social security and public services are given a very prominent role—strongly implying that all of the analysed parties want to be seen as labour parties in the most traditional sense of this label. With regard to what the parties would see as essenˇ tial reforms, there is a whole catalogue of issues. For CSSD, it includes a strong demand for the closing of the gender pay gap, which has been the focus of several sister parties, alongside the PES and PES Women in recent years. For SMER, it is about limiting the trial period of the new contracts, a new definition of dependent work, eliminating severance pay and increasing salaries (as they still tend to be comparably low, when looking at the EU market). For NL it is teleworking and digital working schemes. But while good jobs and decent work are in the spotlight, NL, MSZP and SMER look at the current challenges through the prism of two principles: social justice and indispensable rights. Consequently, these three are also very verbal about the need for well-functioning and strong trade unions. Second, browsing through the proposals, one cannot resist the impression that there is a shift in terms of how to define the public sector. In that context, there is still much attention given to guaranteeing certain minimums (including here, especially in the cases of NL and MSZP, a minimum wage, the latter of which wants to raise it to the highest level in the region). Focusing on these has been very characteristic of the programmes of the social democratic parties in the West since the financial crisis. When it hit, they felt that they had been trapped to back, in many cases, the vicious agenda of austerity and their comeback was

46 Paczesniak, A., & De Waele, J-M. (2011). Pragmatyzm wygrywa z ideologia. In A. Paczesniak & J-M. De Waele (Eds.), Ludzie partii. Idealisci czy pragmatycy? Kadry partyjne w swietle badan empirycznych (p. 141). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.

32

A. SKRZYPEK

to be about certain indispensable standards. For the V4 countries, similarly, being so determined about setting the minimums is partially about putting the end mark to what was first a transition period, where (as it was the case especially for Hungary) devastating impact of the neoliberal policies was enhanced by the impact of the 2007–2008 crash. But partially it is also about recognising the toll that the pandemic has taken, defending the public goods, social security expenditure and working on improving the condition of the entire public services sector. For MSZP it underpinned advocating for a basic income—which they propose as the only among the compared parties, and for DK for ‘defined minimum per person (which would include also minimum quantity of water and elecˇ tricity available per person free of charge). But while Nowa Lewica, CSSD, SMER and especially MSZP would agree that the public sector should be boosted, DK advocates a different stand—which would still evolve around the logic of competitiveness, PPP (private–public partnership) in education and healthcare, as also tuition fees. This is one of the programmatic aspects, which may well explain why there is a not only a personal, but also effectively a programmatic division inside the Hungarian left. Third, all five parties have taken a sharp stand on taxes. For NL, it starts from a plea to have a coherent economic policy. The party advocates ‘moving the burden away from SMEs towards the corporations’, many of which evade paying taxes. It wants a five-stage progressive taxation system, alongside new tax on inheritances and donations. It is also ˇ outspoken in favour of Financial Transaction Tax (FTT). CSSD, especially in its ‘Decalogue’, sets out the taxes that would be an expression of real solidarity—namely on the wealthy and on big corporations. It also wants a tax on empty flats and fourth properties owned by individuals. This is a more radical position than the party used to cultivate. But they see that implementing these fiscal rules would be a way to share the costs of the pandemic fairly, which is a leitmotif of this particular document. For MSZP and DK, the matter is to first and foremost introduce progressive taxation—whereby DK, with its more liberal approach than that of MSZP, falls rather short when it comes to details. Gyurscány’s party advocates for competitiveness first, which is also why when it comes to taxes, they navigate around general guidelines that it should be the contributions from the richest and not from the middle class that should help the poorest. Finally, when it comes to SMER, its position is also clear, as they were the party which, when in government, replaced the flat with the progressive taxation system.

THE VISEGRÁD DISCOMFORT: UNDERSTANDING …

33

These debates about rights, responsibilities and contributions are for the parties in the region extremely important. It is their response to both the divides: the one that the political sciences literature grew to call winners and losers of globalisation; and the other that one from around the kitchen table that addresses deserving and the undeserving. In the midst of the statement about social justice and progress, there is a long list of areas that the social democrats take into consideration when it comes to social policy (education, healthcare and especially pensions). Based on that, a sketch of a somewhat distinctive, but regionally shared, vision of a modern state emerges. A sketch, as the programmes still tend to refer to some of the issues, while neglecting the others, which also has to do with trying to cater to specific groups of voters. This is why in general, this sketch vision refers to pensions vastly and only sporadically, if at all, to young people. But for better or for worse, there is clearly an attempt to create ˇ a vision. For CSSD it translates into a democratic and fair welfare state. And for Nowa Lewica it is an attempt to define a ‘caring state’, which following their narrative, could be a modern and regional-specific translation of the concept of a welfare state.47 The only party among the five which does not subscribe to such a common vision, however, is DK. As mentioned, it prefers to see the state more as a regulator and supervisor, with no micro-managerial corrective role. Fourth, there are nevertheless some further subjects on which these parties’ respective proposals correlate. Without a doubt, this is the case when discussing the EU and NATO, which in the case of all five parties come into the programme as two intertwined issues. It may still be the legacy of a belief that being a member of both is a matter of recognition and belonging, which understanding was particularly dominant in the 1990s. In that sense, the phrasing may be somewhat different from that of the Western sister parties’ programmes. But even more than that, for several among those parties it is a source of credibility and proof of a programmatic integrity—as it was ‘their’ governments in the case of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic that finalised the negotiations and introduced those countries as members to the EU. Many of them were already building bridges with their sister parties towards the end of the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s, with MSZP being perhaps a little more at the fore of rapprochement at the start. 47 Which many voters in the region consider to be a system that has been invented and works in Germany/Austria, as also in the Scandinavia.

34

A. SKRZYPEK

In that spirit, especially in the case of the parties from Poland and Hungary, there is an understandable need to underline that they see the future for their countries as the European Communities’ members. To that end, Nowa Lewica in particular refers to how it perceives itself as a part of the European social democratic family. There, it wants to contribute to the building of a prosperous, secure and social Europe, of which the health union could be an important building block in the future. Additionally, Nowa Lewica sees—as does MSZP—a need to further develop European security and military co-operation as complementary to NATO. But Nowa Lewica’s statement is more of a general one, taking in the big picture (democracy, rule of law and so on) compared to the programme of MSZP. The latter goes beyond declaring ‘Our Place is in Europe’ and lists the points alongside which it would reverse Hungarian foreign policy. It speaks about enhancing the standing of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and OLAF, while it also supports the creation of the Health Care Union. The competitor to MSZP, DK, expresses its ‘pro-European, pro-western attitude in the category of European Patriotism. The party favours deeper integration and also supports the entry of Hungary into the European Monetary Union (EMU). Finally, SMER joins the choir, even if the primarily pro-European approach has been criticised by analysts as not always coherent. That said, the doubt about what stands behind the pro-European declarations by the social democratic parties in the V4 is not limited to the critical outlook of the Slovak case. All the parties faced somewhat disapproving comments about their lack of involvement in the debate on ˇ migration and stunt opposition of some among them (CSSD, SMER) to the quota system. The policies seem to have altered in some cases. Nowa Lewica explains that more openness is needed, taking into account the demographic situation in Poland, and appeals to develop policies that would support those entrepreneurs who agree to employ migrants and refugees. Indeed, the sound of that is a reminder of the debate inside the European centre-left in the 1990s, when social democrats tried (not entirely successfully) to underpin the cosmopolitan agenda ˇ with socio-economic argument. CSSD proceeds with ‘rejection of the refugees’ rejection’, which is a big shift, even if the party is not that forthcoming when it comes to proposing new alternatives. MSZP is also rather cautious, emphasising that there is a need for respect for people’s fears when designing migration policies. So is DK, in which programme migration is not among the major threads.

THE VISEGRÁD DISCOMFORT: UNDERSTANDING …

35

Looking at another dimension of the European policies, it would also seem that all five parties have altered a little, converging their position on environmental issues with those advocated by the other social democrats within the key documents of the PES. This said, a comparison of what their programmes state suggests also that pursuing the reforms from within the green agenda in the region is bound to be a difficult task, which is now only at the point of inception. To that end, the most enthusiastic about it is Nowa Lewica. It perceives the New Green Deal as a welcome agenda that would give impulse to a fundamental economic change. The party argues that Poland needs to intensify its efforts to lay the ground for the implementation, devising climate, green energy and housing policies. MSZP and DK are both in favour of the Deal, but there is not much attention devoted to the environmental issues. This may strike, especially taking into account the geography of the country and what those proposals could mean for the modernisation of the rural areas. ˇ Quite another position is expressed by CSSD. In its programme it is very cautious about the Deal, calling it an opportunity, which however should not lead to devastating jobs losses or what the party calls hypocrisy. To that end, SMER, which was initially somewhat sceptical, has never adopted the post-material values of which sustainability and pro-environmentalism are considered to be parts of. Their narrative remains here rather incoherent, even though Robert Fico’s government was among the first to ratify the famous Paris Agreements. The last on the foreign policy agenda are the relations with global players other than the EU. As mentioned, for all the parties NATO is an important alliance they are very committed to. In that context, no further deliberations about neutrality have been even entertained, which evidently also relates to the geopolitical context and the geographical placing of the Visegrad countries. Consequently, they all have defined positions towards Russia.48 Nowa Lewica wants the EU to keep pressure on Russia and support inner tendencies that aim at bringing about pluralism and democracy. It also refers to a need for dialogue with China, pursuing questions on human and labour rights in the negotiations and finally about a partnership, when it comes to the sustainable development agenda. MSZP speaks about the importance of bilateral relations with Russia, alongside those with India and China. DK traditionally speaks about Russia as 48 The programmes that are being analysed here had been adopted before the Russian invasion on Ukraine.

36

A. SKRZYPEK

an opponent, demanding a scaling-down of Russia’s expansion. Analysts suggest that this is a turn in policy since Ferenc Gyurcsány is remembered as a prime minister who was architect of a new agenda aimed at rapprochement with Russia. ˇ These all are the issues that are more or less common for CSSD, MSZP, DK, Nowa Lewica and SMER. That is, even if the parties’ positions may differ on them in one way or another, the extent to which the lists of dossiers converge, with the socio-economic questions being given priority, is a reason for which one would be entitled to speak about a certain programmatic consistency. That said, there are evidently also many aspects that are distinctive and feature in only one or the other programme. The majority among them derive from the fact that specificities of the national contexts and the positioning of the parties in question differ. The most telling here are the following examples. In Hungary, what is common for MSZP and DK is their commitment to rebuilding democracy. It is not surprising taking into account years of corrosive governance by FIDESZ and Victor Orbán’s agenda, according to which democratic principles are undermined and democratic mechanisms eliminated. The situation is dire, especially that also parliamentary elections are not run according to the standards and have already three times been declared by the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) as unfair. That said, for MSZP the focus remains on socio-economic issues, and the more definite aspects of democracy and cultural liberalism are not playing any pivotal role in the programme. The party barely mentioned gender equality and women’s issues, whose rights tend to be addressed through the prism of the right to equal pay for equal work, support for median families and a baby bonds programme, for example. There is almost no reference to discrimination, that is, against the Roma population, and there is no commitment when it comes to the LGBTQI+ community. Given that MSZP has one of the strongest (alongˇ side CSSD) party women’s organisations,49 this may come as a surprise. But when looking at the profile of the median voters, it does not. It would seem that the unspoken understanding, which is not uncommon in the region, that stronger positioning (for example regarding the support of same-sex marriage) could alienate older, more conservative in their citizens’ rights understanding supporters, seems to be in place. 49 And a representative of MSZP—Zita Gurmai—is the President of the PES Women since 2004.

THE VISEGRÁD DISCOMFORT: UNDERSTANDING …

37

In comparison, DK is more outspoken, possibly aiming at another profile of more centrist voters. It is in favour of the legalisation of gay marriage, its one distinctive proposal; however, it is not embedded in any broader LGBTQI+ agenda. It is stronger in its narrative on women’s rights, demanding 30% of quota across the institutions, as also it has specific chapters on gender equality and the Roma population. Regarding democracy and election issues, it also postulates removing voting rights from citizens holding dual nationality and not residing in Hungary. This is evidently a response to the electoral law, curved by Victor Orbán in order to tap into yet another réseau of potential votes. ˇ In contrast, CSSD makes a stronger statement on egalitarian policies (including in its programme for example promise of introducing of samesex marriage). But it is in fact Nowa Lewica’s programme that is the boldest here and is most obviously dictated by the need to respond to the challenges from within the national context. PiS’s long time in power (in coalitions and alone) has fundamentally altered the state. The reforms, one by one, were ruthlessly introduced and in the majority of cases not much attention was paid to the protests that erupted as a result of them. Since the mid-2010s, SLD adopted a narrative that would promise the restoration of normality and a return to a dignified life in a just, normal Poland, and it continues to speak about restoring respect and dignity for all the citizens. This is for Polish social democrats a way out of the socio-political divide that drains the country today. The catalogue of issues that Nowa Lewica’s programme outlines is consequently a list of the disagreements with the ruling party policy and a clear commitment to either reversing the PiS reforms or changing a law again. Nowa Lewica promises to fight for pluralism of media,50 for women’s rights (which includes establishing a full right to abortion, access to in vitro and equal paternity and maternity leave) and for LGBTQI+ rights (being in favour of same-sex marriage). It advocates for legalising marihuana and hemp oil (connected to a very personal story for SLD)51 and places itself as a defender of disabled people and 50 Which is also an answer to the so called ‘TVN Bill’, that would see media outlets with the founding capital from outside of the EU banned from the Polish market. 51 A spokesperson and one of the founders of the SLD think tank Ignacy Daszynski ´ Center passed away after fighting cancer, during which struggle he was denied access to ‘medical’ marihuana, which could have relieved him of pain. The party ever since has been fighting for what has been named after him ‘Kalita’s Bill’.

38

A. SKRZYPEK

their families’ rights (lack of support for whom caused extended strikes and saw the occupation of the parliament by parents of dependent children) and the advocate of people at risk of eviction (calling for a ban on forced removals and for a new housing policy). From these standpoints, it is far stronger and more outspoken than its counterparts in the region. But then again, context may help explain why PiS and FIDESZ are compared by many—even if the specificities of their respective road towards illiberalism differ. Additionally, Nowa Lewica is an amalgamate of SLD and Wiosna, boiling down two traditions—of the centre-left that caters to older voters, sometimes more conservative but loyal voters; and the new group, which includes younger citizens, who are taking part in protests and searching for a fresh alternative. Today its ambition is to represent the poorest and the median-income citizens. What also makes Nowa Lewica’s programme different is its bold commitment to the Catholic church. None of the other parties in the region attaches so much attention to the secular state as Nowa Lewica.52 Again, it is understandable given the very privileged position and political involvement of the church and church-affiliated organisations in Poland. The fight against its dominance has always been a political matter. Therefore, Nowa Lewica demands the renouncing of the Concordat with the Vatican, the withdrawal of religion classes from public schools, the dissolving of the Joint Commission of the Representatives of the Governments and Polish Bishops Conference and the introduction of taxation of churches. Last but not least, there is one final aspect in which the programmes of the five analysed parties differ. This is the process by which they were constructed and the longevity that their documents may expect. There is not much information about drafting, as they usually remain very much part of internal party processes. And in the documents there is little mentioning of any aspects of inner-party democracy. That said, ˇ several researchers suggest that CSSD has always had high-quality, sophisticated programmes, and the current ‘Decalogue for the Czech Republic 2030’ is yet further proof of that rule. The Decalogue includes 3000 proposals, which—typical also for the other parties in the region—makes ˇ CSSD still come across as a little bit of catch-all party. But what is important is that this time also the process of drafting the documents 52 Robert Fico of SMER even publically spoke expressing the opposite position, announing that he was a devoted Catholic himself.

THE VISEGRÁD DISCOMFORT: UNDERSTANDING …

39

was much more inclusive, led by Jana Malácová (the former minister for labour and social affairs) alongside a committee of experts, who jointly listened to the numerous rounds of consultations. It seems that a similar tendency was dictating the process inside Nowa Lewica, which also broadly consulted outside of the party. Citizens were invited to take part in discussions during a pan-Polish tour led by Maciej Gdula (an MP and professor of sociology) and Anna Zofia Mackiewicz (earlier Chair of the Women’s Organisation). Both processes are a sign that there is a new kind of thinking about the role of the party programmes, and of a content-focused dialogue with citizens.

4

The Voters: From Diverse Electorate to Mobilisation Across Divides

There is a certain paradox inside social democracy. Since the movement’s inception, the founding fathers have been arguing that the reality is unacceptable as socially unjust, but that it can be changed and they as the voice of the suppressed class (the workers) would be able to accomplish its enacting. Over the years, social democrats have shifted when it comes to the means their political struggle would resort to, evolving to be more of a governing party. The latter would apply also to the years spent in opposition, which contrary to some impressions were in several EU member states more numerous than the years in power. But also from there, social democrats participated in institutional politics, co-shaping the history of the respective countries and the Union (directly or by extension). With all of this, they have accomplished much in their fight for universal suffrage, empowerment and emancipation—creating the conditions for societal development. In a vastly changed world, where also the nature of capitalism is very different from that of the nineteenth century, still, ironically, there are moments when the social democrats resort to the narrative about being the representatives of the workers’ class. For many, this is a narrative that proves their integrity, and their self-consciousness about where they come from. And there is no doubt that their mission is to be the representatives, the political agents of labour. But one cannot fully depict the opportunities of that innovations and modernity can offer, if one describes what they can bring in relation to an image of a society that existed one and a half centuries ago. Thus there is a dissonance. Membership of many social democratic parties declined and changed, while those parties feel more at ease talking

40

A. SKRZYPEK

about restoration of their image and not so much about building a new one. Against what this may suggest, it would not be at odds with cherishing the proud traditions. It would simply be about being more true to ourselves, whereby also the electoral offer and hence appeal would be more consistent with where the parties are now. Otherwise, some already have fallen into a trap of producing an electoral programme for some others, whose preferences are detected through the use of more or less strategic polls. The above is a struggle in many corners of Europe, which applies to the Visegrád region as well. It has an effect of multiplying the concerns that the social democratic parties from that region already have in regard to how to build a credible profile, how to construct a more lasting relationship with citizens in times of voter volatility and then also how to stand tall as an alternative in a competition, which framed by the behaviour of right-wing radicals seems to have lower and fewer standards. Furthermore, as already discussed in the earlier sections of this chapter, the electoral curve depicted in Graph 1 shows a steady decline tendency. It is true that these are the circumstances in which there is undoubtedly a greater voters volatility. There is also a greater fragmentation and polarisation. They lead to the proliferation of the political stage by smaller parties. This means that ‘winning’ in a sense of coming first out of the election may not require obtaining the same numbers as in the past. But then there is a question of the overall split of the votes and how far they stay in the centre-left and left spectrum. And what follows, if a progressive coalition with social democrats at the helm can be established and if a government can be claimed. And while in Western Europe there are cases of diverse transfers of the electorate, they do not have the same dynamics as in Central and Eastern Europe. To that end, it seems also—as indicated earlier that in Visegrád in particular—once the social democrats started declining it has been hard if not impossible so far to profoundly change the descending electoral trends. The questions, therefore, are who are the voters for those parties today and is there any potential to reach out to others? Starting from the assessment of the current state of play it would seem ˇ that, particularly for MSZP and SLD, but also for CSSD and SMER, the core electorate—if one can still use this terminology—originates from older generations. For MSZP, 81% of voters in 2021 were over 50, with at least half among them being over 60. Only seven per cent of the supporters are younger than 30. DK tends to attract a slightly younger

THE VISEGRÁD DISCOMFORT: UNDERSTANDING …

41

electorate, but the difference is not a game-changer just yet. For SLD the situation changed after the establishment of an electoral coalition with Wiosna and Razem, both of which brought a rather radical rejuvenation. Currently, it would seem that a quarter of the voters are over 60, with a similar number of voters aged between 18 and 29, leaving the rest of the voters to share a more or less equal split between citizens in their 30s and in their 40s respectively. What is interesting is that even though the beginnings of SMER were different from those of the other sister parties from the V4, still looking at the division of the votes within the diverse age brackets, in 2012 it could count on the support of over a half of those older than 60, while it would only be a choice of every third person in their 20s and 30s. But in the elections of 2016, it was becoming apparent that SMER lost its appeal among the first-time voters and the elderly were more of a powerhouse among its electorate. Looking further at the demographics, very generally speaking, there is ˇ no particular gender bias among the voters. For SMER and for CSSD the numbers are close, even though in the case of the latter, gender policies are relevant for the overall electorate of the party—with for example 86% ˇ of the CSSD voters expressing their opposition to the gender pay gap. Similarly, 44% of MSZP voters were men and 56% women. But there is a difference in the data available for DK. For DK the numbers were showing more approval from women: 41% to 59%. For Nowa Lewica the support is close to proportionally spread: 44.6% men and 55.4% women. What may change the statistics is the fact that recently, especially in the aftermath of the women’s strike, more young women have started identifying more intensively with the left wing. When examining age and gender, there are several similarities among the profile of the median social democratic voters inside the Visegrád countries. But when analysing the educational and occupational aspects, there are several important differences. They may be a result of dissimilar traditions on the centre-left inside the respective countries, as also they may be connected with how different social groups were affected by the transformation and globalisation—the respective trajectories of which were not, as established, exactly the same for all four countries. In Slovakia, there is a clear negative correlation: the better educated a person is, the less likely it is that they will vote SMER. This has been a tendency since the beginning, as even on the occasion of the first election SMER failed to attract intellectuals (who at that time were sticking to SDL). It is worth noting that SMER remains the only one among the five that

42

A. SKRZYPEK

has no think tank affiliated with the party. Similarly, among the voters of MSZP, there is a dominance of those with the lowest educational attainment, who constitute 43% of the party’s voters. In comparison, only 10% of the supporters have a university degree. That said, the situation is very ˇ different in the case of CSSD, as also in the case of SLD and then Nowa Lewica. When looking especially at the latter, there is a clear dominance of voters with higher and secondary education, constituting 50% and 38% respectively. These proportions are particularly interesting when mirrored with those of the MSZP—as the two parties have had so many common features when it comes to their history and programme but seem to differ decisively when it comes to the profile of their respective median voter. From the available data, it would seem that aside from those voters who are retired, there are also some divergences among the voter occupational profiles of the respective parties. Next to pensioners, Nowa Lewica tends to have three additional larger groups among its electorate: employees of the public sector (20%); specialists and employees in managerial positions (20%) and students (around 15%). The smallest proportion among the voters is farmers and those who would describe ˇ themselves as workers. For CSSD, interestingly, among the voters there is a large group of self-confident middle-class professionals (interested in substantive political issues or representing individualistic approaches to life), as also a segment of those who are insecure and vulnerable. These voters are a mix of active employees above the age of 45, many of whom work in the public sector, as civil servants and social workers. Finally, MSZP can count on those with median and low income voters. Next to age, education and occupation, an important characteristic for a social democratic voter is their domiciliation. It has its specificities and may be underpinning a set of bolder polarisations in the V4 region, even though such divides are also not uncommon in Western Europe. There are two aspects to it. The first concerns the geographical split inside the respective countries. The second is about different electoral dynamics and preferences that occur between large agglomerations and rural areas. The regional split emerges as a result of an electoral map within which certain constituencies are or are not likely at all to consider supporting the centre-left. That is the case for Poland, which sees a strong demarcation line between East and West, which strangely enough for several elections remained on the nineteenth-century border that existed between Russian and Prussian districts in the times of Polish partition. Similarly, in Slovakia there is a west–east and south-north gradient. SMER’s key to the

THE VISEGRÁD DISCOMFORT: UNDERSTANDING …

43

electoral victory was winning three among them: their later strongholds in the north and east (which are poorer and in the case of the east worse represented than the West), and the south—where their popularity picked up as they moved, regrettably, onto the anti-Hungarian rhetoric. On the other hand, in the V4 the urban–rural divide is also strong. And there are greater differences among the five parties in terms of where their voters come from. Starting from Slovakia, SMER has been describing itself as a rustical social democracy. The term is related to the party’s popularity in the countryside. In the first elections that SMER took part in, it became clear that the party did not appeal much to the urban voters, which tendency continued—as its support also started declining in the new municipalities. The opposite is the case when analysing the voters’ profiles in Hungary and Poland. For both MSZP and DK the votes from the large cities and especially Budapest are very much over-represented. MSZP could count on some support in smaller towns and DK in some of the villages, but overall the truth has been that the social democrats lost the countryside. In Poland, Nowa Lewica noted 14.4% support in agglomerations above 200,000 inhabitants, which support would decline in proportion to the size of cities and towns, settling on 7.5% only for the countryside. An interesting twist is that SLD has been over-represented in those towns which used to have military garrisons. These numbers have to be understood from a perspective of a country that still is quite rural. Those are the statistics that allow a description of the median voter of all of the four parties from the V4. But while similarities and opposites have been detected, the question that still remains only partially answered is that about a progressive electoral potential. There are three observations to be made here. First, in all the V4 countries there still seems to be a breach between citizens, who directly and indirectly (through issues) declare themselves progressive, and the pool of the social democratic voters. This fissure may be a result of some prejudice (correlating the centre-left parties with communism), the disenchantment with the social democratic parties when they have been in the government, as also it may be the effect of them having been searching for their ideological identity and hence taking time (even if a long one indeed) to define what a social democratic programme in Central and Eastern Europe, and in their respective countries, would mean. Second, the political history of the region teaches that demand for progressive policies is not a synonym for demand for the social democratic parties. This is how it is possible

44

A. SKRZYPEK

for the voters of the centre-left to drift away to the right and right radicals, or why, on the other hand, only a percentage of the voters of the social democratic parties describe themselves as ‘leftists’. This is a matter, as suggested before, of having or not a clear political competence as well. Third, one of the reasons behind the decline curve is the fact that for many voters social democrats are no longer the first choice when they find themselves at the polling station. They are no longer essential in the constellation ‘government-opposition’, as some examples have been indicating (Poland, and sadly recently the Czech Republic); a situation in which there is no left in the parliament is not only plausible but became very real.

5

Way Forward: Can Social Democrats Resolve the Visegrád Discomfort?

This chapter is an attempt to complete a comparative study of five ˇ parties—CSSD of the Czech Republic, MSZP and DK of Hungary, Nowa Lewica (earlier SdRP and then SLD) of Poland and SMER of Slovakia. As indicated in the introduction, these parties share a fairly common experience of the transformation years, even if clearly there are aspects that have been very specific to and characteristic of the political dynamics and socio-economic impact for only one or only some among them. They all belong to the European socialist family—with four among them being members of the PES, and five having had members inside the S&D Group in the European Parliament.53 Also, all of them have had an experience of having led governments, having been one of the two leading parties of their respective states, and finally declining in terms of both the numbers of members and voters. Certainly, several of the processes that led to their current condition have not been uniquely experienced in Central and Eastern Europe. But because the region itself had been undergoing a historical change, opening its borders and markets, the impact of phenomena such as globalisation has been undoubtedly stronger. The search for recognition, respect and reunification with the European Union and NATO underpinned the drive for the citizens to persevere through the hardest years. But even though the new reality was considered as a incredible opportunity by

53 CSSD ˇ has currently no MEP.

THE VISEGRÁD DISCOMFORT: UNDERSTANDING …

45

many, still just a few years into the process it has become clear that the price to pay for embracing neoliberalism and the dogma of competition was high. It was made even more steep, as some of the features of the state have been undermined or even sacrificed, which left the social security systems and public goods depleted. The rift between the losers and winners has been deepening, and with the growth of frustration there was a search by the voters to let it ooze out by turning away from more traditional parties and lending support to the radicals. In the midst of this, social democrats suffered. First, some among them (such as MSZP and SLD) continued to be faced with a prejudice that they were just revamped communists. This was a reason for distrust for some, for aggression for others; but it also brought those parties together with a somewhat older generation that was hoping for a new kind of social reconciliation and stability. Among them were those who would seek protection from persecution—which right wing in V4 countries has been tempted to enact. This consolidated the electoral base and had an influence on what those parties felt they needed their programme to be about. Searching for new impulses, many turned also to the Third Way/Neue Mitte, which in the second half of the 1990s was particularly influential and for many synonymous with the standards of what the modern left should be about. The attempts to implant it did not succeed, and still now—two decades later—there are those who would call the policies of those days a betrayal of the ideals. They assess that the Third Way was what effectively upscaled neoliberal globalisation.54 The search for the regional and then the national translations of social democracy has not been an easy process, but looking at the party programmes of the last years, there is definitely a change. The parties value the processes of drafting, they aspire to be distinctive by putting socio-economic issues first and with that, they are seeking a new kind of position as political agents with clear political competence. It is true that the programmatic documents are still robust, as also that they enlist very many issues (as the catch-all parties used to do) and that on some crucial questions there is not yet a clear commitment (see for example the green issues). That said, a process accomplished should be recognised.

54 Lavelle, A. (2014). Death by a thousand cuts? In D. J. Bailey et al. (Eds.), European social democracy during the global economic crisis: Renovation or resignation? (p. 274). Manchester: Manchester University Press.

46

A. SKRZYPEK

Second, it would seem that there is also a better understanding nowadays of the predicaments of the contemporary political systems. Everywhere in Europe, there have been tectonic shifts—which saw the collapse of the two-party systems, with fragmentation and polarisation offering the opening for the radical and extreme parties. The latter from the fringe kind of organisations entered the main spotlight, enabled by more and more volatile voters. The social democratic parties—even if reˇ born only after 1989 as was the case for CSSD or established much later, as was the case for SMER—had to battle with the fatigue that all the polls suggested that citizens felt about them, seeing them as traditional parties. Hence they were seen more as a part of the problem than as a solution, losing their position as either governing or the main opposition party. What is more, they have started to become not only not the first, but also not even the second choice of the electors in the strategic approach ˇ to voting. For some—like SLD and CSSD—the worst became reality, as they found themselves voted out of the parliaments. That said, there is a certain change in the attitudes that the parties opt for now in comparison to the past. Earlier, when in trouble they would ‘close ranks’ in an attempt to regain control over the organisations. This was the case after the scandals (several of which happened when those parties were in government and damaged heavily their credibility55 ) as also after splits (of which there have also been several, especially in the case of Poland). Today, instead, they are looking for ways to open up, to engage in more inclusive debates (for example via the think tank affiliated to them) and be more present in the context of the actions organised by civil society and trade unions. They cherish very much the relations with the latter, and not only because of the proud tradition—but also because this way they are somewhat also instinctively trying to reclaim the ground that would belong to a redefined labour movement. Third, there is a question about their potential to rise again. It is especially important in the context of countries such as Poland and Hungary, which turned towards authoritarianism. However, for the Czech Republic and Slovakia a democratic future is not there by default and should not be taken for granted. There is no simple answer. These countries are very divided electorally and clearly the social democratic parties face

55 Rydlewski, G. (2010). Lewica w rzadach i rzadzeniu w III RP. In D. Waniek (Ed.), Lewica w praltyce rzadzenia (p. 75). Torun: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszalek.

THE VISEGRÁD DISCOMFORT: UNDERSTANDING …

47

numerous limitations. Their voters are older, as also (with the exception of SMER) they have not found yet the way to bridge the divide between, for example, urban and rural populations. Furthermore, even if there is a demand for the progressive politics and progressive values are popular, there is no guarantee that this translates into votes for the social democrats. What is very important is that alongside other disadvantages to their positioning, there is also the fact that there seems to be a deficiency ˇ in terms of their access to media. In the Czech Republic, CSSD used to be able to count on its own press, which featured newspapers and magazines. All were promoting debates, as also launching and promoting new ideas. The last among them—Právo lidu—saw its final issue in April 2001, leaving the space for more independent editions (such as Listy, which continue the Prague Spring Tradition). There are also some others, including here web A2larm Deník Referendum. Lack of own press makes ˇ CSSD vulnerable, in the climate in which media are generally hostile to the left. In Slovakia, the conflict between SMER and media has been ongoing for almost a decade, seeing some particularly hard moments for example in 2015 and 2016, respectively around the election of the Chief of Slovak Radio and Television, as also when Robert Fico openly accused journalists of being corrupted. In Poland and Hungary, the situations are even more difficult for the social democrats. In the first among them, there is a political media duplicity, whereby the state media (such as Polish Television, Polish Radio, Polish Press Agency) are under the control of the government (and by extension PiS party), and the private ones tend to heavily lean towards PO (Civic Platform). The percentage describing Nowa Lewica’s appearances in the public media as compared to the other parties can be counted in single digits, while in commercial ones it doesn’t cross over 15 points. The party itself can count still on some printed and web ones, like Trybuna, wPunkt and Przeglad—but their own readership is not excessive. Finally in Hungary, in 2020 51% of media and media networks (Central European Press and Media Foundation—KESMA). To that end, sadly the social media do not seem to provide the desired solution. Primarily because they are more of a market for individuals than for the organisations. And in case of the parties, they seem to be used more effectively by the radicals. For example in Poland, on Facebook, Nowa Lewica is only fifth in the ranking of the ‘most followed’ parties. As for the interest in persons, in the Czech Republic Jan Hamácek managed to become the 3rd most followed politician in

48

A. SKRZYPEK

the social media—but that is rather an exceptional record. In the other states, social democrats are lagging further behind—with only a handful of already established and well-known leaders (such as Ferenc Gyurcsány, Attila Mesterházy, Robert Biedron), who appear in comparative statistics with the noteworthy number of the followers. In those circumstances, it is difficult to find a way to break through and overcome the invisibility in the media, as also being ignored by the right radicals—who no longer seem to pick social democrats as their arch-enemies. But though the conditions are tough, the analyses in this chapter show that there is still much potential and that there begins to be a new kind of understanding. There is a new inner strength, which clearly comes from different angles: determination to change the tides, the programmatic revival, the realistic assessment, as also willingness to open up and build the new kind of structures. These can be the key to forming new kinds of coalition. And these may develop to be both political and social, taking into account a growing popularity of progressive ideas in the region. Perhaps efforts to build majorities will prove unsuccessful at first or second attempt, perhaps the alliances will be volatile and will put the parties under several stress tests, but at the end of the day the real power of conviction and a sense of mission have never failed to write a new chapter of the history. And the Visegrád region, after the lengthy transition and a period of political and socio-economic experiments, followed by tough illiberal regimes, is in dire need of one.

Bibliography From Within This Volume A. Biro-Nagy & G. Gyori, The state of social democracy in the Visegrád countries: Hungary. B. Rydlinski, The state of social democracy in the Visegrád countries: Poland. P. Saradin & P. Eichler, The state of social democracy in the Visegrád countries: Czech Republic. L. Zvada, The state of social democracy in the Visegrád Countries: Slovakia. The twilight (or rebirth) of social democracy.

THE VISEGRÁD DISCOMFORT: UNDERSTANDING …

49

Additional Antoszewski, A., & Herbut, R. (Eds.). (1998). Demokracje Europy SrodkowoWschodniej w perspektywie porownawczej. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wroclawskiego. Antoszewski, A., Herbut, R., & Sroka, J. (2003a). System partyjny w Polsce. In A. Antoszewski et al. (Eds.), Partie i systemy partyjne Europy Srodkowej. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wroclawskiego. Antoszewski, A., et al. (Eds.). (2003b). Partie i systemy partyjne Europy Srodkowej. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wroclawskiego. Ash, T. G. (1990). Wiosna obywateli. Polonia. Beck, U. (2012). The five self-delusions of a supposedly unpolitical age. In U. Beck (Ed.), Twenty observations on a world in turmoil. Polity Press. Berman, S. (2006). The primacy of politics: Social democracy and the making of Europe’s twentieth century. Cambridge University Press. Callaghan, J., & Favretto, I. (2006). Introduction. In J. Callaghan & I. Favretto (Eds.), Transitions in social democracy: Cultural and ideological problems of the golden age. Manchester University Press. Crook, N., Dauderstädt, M., & Gerrits, A. (2002). Social democracy in central and eastern Europe. Wiardi Beckman Stichting – Alfred Mozer Stichting – Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Crouch, C. (2010). Post -democracy. Polity. Crouch, C. (2012). The strange non-death of neoliberalism. Polity. Dahl, R. (2000). On democracy. Yale University Press. De Waele, J-M., & Soare, S. (2011). The central and eastern European left: A political family under construction. In J. Cronin, G. Ross, & J. Shock (Eds.), What’s left of the left: Democrats and social democrats in the challenging times. Duke University Press. Dinan, D. (1994). Ever closer union: An introduction to European integration (2nd ed.). The European Union Series. Palgrave. Euroactiv. (2006, October 13). Slovak party suspended from PES. https://www. euractiv.com/section/eu-priorities-2020/news/slovak-party-suspended-frompes/ European Commission. (2022, July 13). Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. 2022 Rule of Law Report. Luxembourg, COM 2022/500 final. https://ec.europa.eu/ info/sites/default/files/4_1_194542_comm_recomm_en.pdf. Accessed on 18 September 2022. Fishman, N. (2009). Afterword. In J. Callaghan et al. (Eds.), In search of social democracy: Responses to crisis and modernisation. Manchester University Press. Hindmoor, A. (2018). What’s left now? The history and future of social democracy. Oxford University Press.

50

A. SKRZYPEK

Keane, J. (2000). Václav Havel: A political tragedy in six actis. Bloomsbury. Keman, H. (2017). Social democracy: A comparative account of the left wing party family. Routledge. Kennedy, P., & Manwaring, R. (2018). The dilemmas of social democracy. In R. Manwaring & P. Kennedy (Eds.), Why the left loses: The decline of the centre-left in comparative perspective. Policy Press of University of Bristol. Krouwel, A. (2012). Party transformations in European democracies. State University of New York Press. Kwasniewski, A. (2000). Dom wszystkich – Polska. Perspektywy. Lagos, R. (2012). The southern tiger: Chile’s fight for a democratic and prosperous future. Palgrave Macmillan. Lavelle, A. (2014). Death by a thousand cuts? In D. J. Bailey et al. (Eds.), European social democracy during the global economic crisis: Renovation or resignation? Manchester University Press. Mair, P. (2014). Populist democracy vs. party democracy. In I. van Biezen (Ed.), On parties, party systems and democracy: Selected writings of Peter Mair. ECPR Press, University of Essex. Meyer, Th. with L. Hinchman. (2008). The theory of social democracy. Polity Press. Norris, P. (2011). Democratic deficit: Critical citizens revisisted. Cambridge University Press. Paczesniak, A., & De Waele, J-M. (2011). Pragmatyzm wygrywa z ideologia. In A. Paczesniak & J-M. De Waele (Eds.), Ludzie partii. Idealisci czy pragmatycy? Kadry partyjne w swietle badan empirycznych. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar. Poguntke, T., & Webb, P. (2009). The presidentialisation of politics in democratic societies: A framework for analyses. In T. Poguntke & P. Webb (Eds.), The presidentialisation of politics: A comparative study of modern democracies. Oxford University Press. Politt, H. (2009). Left-wing parties in Poland. In C. Hildebrandt & B. Daiber (Eds.), The left in Europe: Political parties and party alliances between Norway and Turkey. Rosa Luxembourg Foundation Brussels Office. Rae, G. (2011). Trzecia Droga a lewica w Europie Srodkowo-Wschodniej. In M. Syska (Ed.), The left in east-central Europe. Osrodek Mysli Spolecznej im. Ferdynanda Lassalle’a. Reykowski, J. (2011). Trzecia Rzeczpospolita a lewica. In J. Reykowski, K. Janik, & L. Nikolski (Eds.), Projekt dla Polski. Perspektywa lewicowa. Scholar Warszawa. Rydlewski, G. (2010). Lewica w rzadach i rzadzeniu w III RP. In D. Waniek (Ed.), Lewica w praltyce rzadzenia. Wydawnictwo Adam Marszalek. Sassoon, D. (2010). One hundred years of socialism: The west European left in the twentieth century. I.B. Taurus.

THE VISEGRÁD DISCOMFORT: UNDERSTANDING …

51

Schmidt, I. (2016). The three worlds of social democracy: A global view. Pluto Press. Vachudova, M. A. (2015). The positions and fortunes of social democratic parties in east central Europe. In M. Kaeting & D. McCrone (Eds.), The crisis of social democracy in Europe. Edinburgh University Press. Wiesendahl, E., Jun, U., & Niedermayer, O. (2009). Die Zukunft der Mitgliederparteien auf dem Prüfstand. In U. Jun (Eds.), Zukunft der Mitgliederpartei. Verlag Barbara Budrich, Opladen and Farmington Hills. Wright, T. (2019). Democracy and its discontents. In A. Gamble & T. Wright (Eds.), Rethinking democracy. Wiley.

The State of Social Democracy in the Czech Republic

Pavel Šaradín

1

and Patrik Eichler

Electoral Results of the Czech Social Democratic Party

The story of Czech social democracy began in 1878, making the Czech ˇ Social Democratic Party (CSSD) one of the oldest social democratic parties on the European continent. It was founded near Prague as a workers’ party in the environment of Austro-Hungarian politics, and it later came to form an integral part of the democratic political system of the first Czechoslovak Republic (1918–1938). Although it was banned during the ˇ war years 1939–1945, the CSSD functioned again briefly after the second world war, but was then forcibly merged with the Communist Party and subsequently moved its activities into exile. The Prague Spring of 1968

P. Šaradín Department of Politics and European Studies, Palacky University Olomouc, Olomouc, Czech Republic e-mail: [email protected] P. Eichler (B) Masaryk Democratic Academy, Prague, Czech Republic e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Skrzypek and A. Bíró-Nagy (eds.), The Social Democratic Parties in the Visegrád Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30792-8_3

53

54

P. ŠARADÍN AND P. EICHLER

ˇ saw efforts to re-establish the CSSD in Czechoslovakia but these efforts were abandoned after the Soviet occupation of the country in August ˇ that year. Voters then had to wait another 20 years for the CSSD to be restored. The first steps were taken to rebuild the party in 1989, but it was not until after the Velvet Revolution of November 1989 that a preparatory committee was set up. The renewal congress took place in March 1990, when Jiˇrí Horák, who had lived abroad since 1948, was elected ˇ chairman. Since 1990, the CSSD has participated in all parliamentary elections and for a time became one of the two largest Czech political parties, able to reach up to a third of the Czech population (Table 1). ˇ In addition to the CSSD, the party system in the early 1990s included the marginal Association of Social Democrats and several smaller parties that gradually broke away from the Communist Party. A detailed overview of changes in Czech politics is provided by the chapter on the Czech Republic in The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe (Berglund, 2013). In the first democratic parliamentary elections (1990), the party failed to reach the necessary 5% quorum. It did a little better in the next election (1992), but it was still a party of minimal influence on Czech politics. The situation changed only when Miloš Zeman became leader of the party (1993), as he managed to mobilise voters who were inclined towards the left and who were dissatisfied with the course Table 1 Voting ˇ support for the CSSD (1990–2021)

Year

Election

1990 1992 1996 1998 2002 2004 2006 2009 2010 2013 2014 2017 2019 2021

National parliament National parliament National parliament National parliament National parliament European Parliament National parliament European Parliament National parliament National parliament European Parliament National parliament European Parliament National parliament

Source Czech Statistical Office, own elaboration

Votes in % 4.11 6.53 26.44 32.31 30.20 8.78 32.32 22.39 22.08 20.45 14.17 7.27 3.95 4.65

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY …

55

of privatisation and the economic reforms prepared by the right-wing economist and at that time finance minister Václav Klaus. Furthermore, the Czech-Slovak federal state was partied in 1993, which meant debate on the state-organisation disappeared from the public sphere and social issues quickly came to prevail in public and political debate. Zeman’s potential was confirmed when, as chairman, he led the party into in the ˇ first parliamentary elections in 1996. The CSSD emerged from these elections only 3% behind the winning Civic Democratic Party (ODS). ˇ Although the CSSD did not participate in the formation of the government, Zeman became the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies. This was ˇ the first high public office held by a member of the CSSD. After Zeman ˇ became chairman, the CSSD gained in popularity, being joined by dozens of active politicians, mainly from the Civic Forum or the liberal-oriented Civic Movement, as well as by well-known personalities. One of the important aspects of the 1996 elections was that the right-wing parties that had ruled from 1992–1996 did not win a majority. Instead, only a minority government of the ODS, the Christian Democrats and the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) was formed. This soon became a source of instability, and the government eventually resigned in November 1997 due to the poor economic and social situation and corruption scandals. When early elections were then held ˇ in 1998, the CSSD came out victorious, bringing the left to power for the first time since the Velvet Revolution and demonstrating the political system’s ability to alternate left and right. Against all expectations, the ˇ CSSD managed to reach almost a third of all voters (32%). But the road to governance was not easy in 1998. A majority government could still be formed by three right-wing entities, as indeed had been the case until the 1997 resignation that was caused by conflicts between them, mainly between their chairmen. A minority government ˇ of the CSSD was then formed unexpectedly, which was tolerated by its biggest political opponent the ODS (Nikolenyi, 2003). Indeed, members of the right-wing ODS had walked out of the chamber during the vote of ˇ confidence in the government, reducing the quorum. All CSSD members of parliament nevertheless voted for confidence in the government, which was headed by Zeman and had 18 other Social Democrats sitting in the ˇ cabinet. In order to be able to govern, the CSSD had to conclude a controversial Opposition Agreement with the ODS, in which the two parties committed to coordinate selected political actions, to fill various supervisory boards and control commissions, and to adopt an electoral

56

P. ŠARADÍN AND P. EICHLER

law whose rules would help the two strongest parties. It was in this context that political scientist Michal Klíma wrote about the hidden silent grand coalition (Klíma, 1999). Such a merger of two ideologically opposed parties was considered by a part of the public as a “voter fraud” given the strong animosity that had existed in the campaign, especially from the ODS, which had run a very strong negative campaign against the ˇ ˇ CSSD. Politicians from both the CSSD and ODS nevertheless spoke of a rational decision and avoid a governmentlessness. Until the announcement of the opposition agreement, the small centre-right parties—the Union of Freedom and Christian Democrats—had believed that the ODS would make concessions that would lead to the formation of a common right-wing government. However, the ODS felt blackmailed and therefore turned to Zeman and the Social Democrats. Nobody had expected such a conciliatory step from the ODS towards social democracy, which indeed then led to the formation of a minority left-wing government. Political science works with minority governments, they can be parliamentary coalitions, permanent or ad hoc (Herman & Pope, 1973) In the Czech society, however, due to the so-called ‘voter fraud’ on voters, this way of interpretation has not been heard. ˇ The minority CSSD government then faced a number of problems, both personnel-related and programmatic, which stemmed primarily from the nature of being a minority cabinet. In the first year, the government managed to find allies for the adoption of the most important law—that on the state budget. Over time, however, confidence in the government ˇ weakened, and by 2000 the CSSD could find no support for its state budget law. Another more detailed agreement therefore had to be drawn up with the ODS—the so-called Tolerance Patent—which allowed the ˇ minority CSSD government to complete its mandate and secure the votes to pass the annual budget laws. Overall, the government contributed to several important steps (such as the privatisation of banks), decided on the completion of the Temelín nuclear power plant, successfully continued the EU accession negotiations, and completed the process of the Czech Republic becoming a member of NATO in March 1999. From the point of view of internal party developments, it was important that Miloš Zeman resigned as party chairman during his reign and was replaced at the 2001 congress by Labour and Social Affairs Minister ˇ Vladimír Špidla. This move enabled the CSSD to offer the electorate a ˇ new leader and a fresh start for the party. Indeed, the CSSD then went on to defend its victory in the next elections (2002) with 30% support.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY …

57

Špidla managed to break away from the alliance with the right-wing ODS, once again being able to attract the traditional voters of social democˇ racy. After the elections, the CSSD formed a minimal winning coalition with the liberal Union of Freedom (US-DEU) and the centrist Christian ˇ Democrats (KDU-CSL). The programme was strongly pro-European, with the government having three main objectives: to complete the country’s accession negotiations with the EU; to hold a European referendum and to offer voters arguments that would make them support EU accession; and to actually join the EU. All three objectives were achieved, and the Czech Republic joined the EU on 1 May 2004, along with nine other countries. Czech elections to the European Parliament were then held on 11 and 12 June 2004, approximately halfway through the term of the ˇ ˇ coalition government of the CSSD, KDU-CSL, and US-DEU. In line with the theory of second-order elections (Marsh, 1998), in which the main ruling party will make the lowest gains around the halfway point of ˇ its second four-year cycle, the CSSD gained only 8.8% of the vote in the European Parliament elections (while the victorious ODS gained more than three times as much support). With regard to the political situation, citizens were now becoming increasingly concerned about rising unemployment, which stood at 10% at the end of 2003, and unresolved social problems. The government was also damaged by disagreements between the various coalition partners, as ˇ well as by permanent disagreements within the CSSD, which were mainly influenced by the failure of Miloš Zeman in the presidential election (2003). In indirect elections, Zeman was not supported in parliament by ˇ several CSSD members, including the then party chairman, Špidla. This ˇ situation of internal party conflict, along with the CSSDs decline in the European elections, eventually led to the resignation of Špidla’s cabinet ˇ and a change of CSSD chairman. Interior Minister Stanislav Gross thus ˇ replaced Špidla, both as head of the CSSD and as head of the government. However, Gross only remained in both positions for a few months, due to uncertainties regarding the financing of his apartment. In spring 2005, Jiˇrí Paroubek then became prime minister and later chairman of ˇ the CSSD, having previously served as Minister for Regional Development in the government. At that time, opinion polls showed a preference of around 10% for the Social Democrats. However, through much hard work and a good election campaign Jiˇrí Paroubek managed to triple this ˇ preference, with opinion polls showing 32.32% for the CSSD and thus a

58

P. ŠARADÍN AND P. EICHLER

better result than in 1998. There were several reasons for this rise. Firstly, Paroubek presented himself as a strong leader. Secondly, the campaign was very professional. And thirdly, there was a political escalation in the ˇ socio-economic conflict between the CSSD and the right-wing ODS. Nevertheless, while Paroubek believed he had a chance of winning the election, in the end, he was 3% short. The explanation he gave for this in his memoirs was that the election was decided by the so-called Kubice affair, in which ODS vice-chairman Ivan Langer had circulated a report to journalists by police officer Jan Kubice saying that politicians were interfering in the investigation of police cases and organised crime. The ˇ CSSD considered the report to be a fabrication and part of an unfair preelection fight. Yet although Paroubek’s explanation may be true, there is no evidence to confirm it. Table 2 shows a basic overview of the sociodemographic profiles of voters of the main political parties in 2006. In ˇ terms of characteristics, the CSSD did not stand out much compared to its political competitors. A deviation can be seen in just one variable, where male voters were slightly overrepresented. The 2006 elections ended in stalemate: left political parties won 100 seats, while the nascent centre-right coalition of the ODS, Christian Democrats, and the Green Party also won 100 seats. This stalemate ˇ was only resolved at the beginning of 2007, when two CSSD members of parliament offered support to the right-wing government. Yet their support was most likely motivated by counter-payment—in other words, Table 2 Socio-demographic profile of voters during elections to Chamber of Deputies in 2006 Political party

ˇ CSSD ˇ KDU-CSL ˇ KSCM ODS SZ Total

Male (share)

Age (average)

University degree (share)

54 39 52 52 42 49

50,1 53,3 60,3 43,5 34,6 45,4

13 14 8 25 13 13

Source Outlý (2013, p. 114)

Visiting church share (weekly) x share (never) 5 43 1 4 3 6

52 4 73 55 55 55

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY …

59

their support was corrupt behaviour under the influence of Miloš Zeman, ˇ who was taking revenge on the CSSD for his failed presidential election. During the right-wing ODS government of Mirek Topolánek (2007– ˇ 2009), the CSSD was very active in opposition and attempted five times to pass a vote of no confidence in the government. The fifth attempt, which took place in the middle of the Czech presidency of the EU Council, was successful. Elections to the European Parliament were then ˇ held in 2009, but the CSSD did not win. This may also have been due ˇ to the fact that the CSSD raised a vote of no confidence in the Czech government during its presidency of the EU Council. The media reported that the party had not behaved in a statesmanlike manner and had damaged the reputation of the Czech Republic. In the European Parliaˇ ment, the CSSD was represented by six MEPs. Early Czech parliamentary elections were due to be held in the autumn, but the Constitutional Court ruled that there was no mechanism for the lower house to dissolve itself. In the end, the elections were held on the regular date in 2010. ˇ According to the polls, the CSSD was the clear favourite. However, the 2010 election result turned out to be a major disappointment for the ˇ CSSD. Despite the pre-election polls, the party weakened unexpectedly (winning only 22% of the vote) and in the end could not even form a government, despite it winning the elections. A month before the elecˇ tions, polls had suggested that the CSSD was approaching the 30% mark. The election result was the first big warning from which the party apparently drew a clear conclusion: the main and perhaps only culprit for the low support in the election was the party chairman Jiˇrí Paroubek. However, the election year 2010 also showed the first major weakening of all the so-called traditional democratic parties and the rise of populist and marketing groups. After years of stability in the party system, 2010 marked an initial shake-up. A centre-right government led by the ODS was formed, but due to its poor economic policy, corruption, and a series of scandals, it had little popular trust for most of its mandate. Prime Minister Petr Neˇcas resigned in 2013 after a police raid on the offices of the government, and early elections were held in October. The strongest ˇ opposition party throughout this period was the CSSD, which maintained its leading position in opinion polls. ˇ The attempt to weaken the CSSD electorally came twice from within. The first time was in the 2010 elections, when the Party of Citizens’ Rights—Zemanovci ran in the elections. This party was formed in autumn

60

P. ŠARADÍN AND P. EICHLER

2009 from among Miloš Zeman’s circle of friends, who were originally from a civic association. The Party of Citizens’ Rights—Zemanovci ˇ sought the same voters as the CSSD, and indeed it gained the support of ˇ 4.3% of voters who would probably have voted for the CSSD. The second ˇ attempt to weaken the CSSD electorally was made by Jiˇrí Paroubek, ˇ who founded the National Socialists—LEV 21. In the end, the CSSD only appealed to 0.1% of voters and could not therefore put up a fight. Common to both the Party of Citizens’ Rights—Zemanovci and the National Socialists—LEV 21 was the fact that they were founded by ˇ ˇ former CSSD chairmen in an attempt to weaken the CSSD. At the same time, however, the anti-corruption and anti-clientelist narrative, which was strongly manifested in the 2010 elections, continued in Czech society. As a party that has always benefited from socio-economic ˇ conflict with the right, the CSSD nevertheless failed to respond to this ˇ narrative in 2010. It is likely that the CSSD therefore underestimated the whole situation (although in each subsequent election this same narrative has produced new parties and movements). And yet, as a traditional party, ˇ the CSSD could not really have been a leader in the fight against corruption, as some of its most visible members were involved in corrupt and clientelist activities themselves. In the period of the Neˇcas centre-right coalition government (2010– 2013), billionaire Andrej Babiš came to prominence, acquiring his wealth in an unclear manner and in cooperation with several Czech politicians. The emergence of his ANO 2011 movement can largely be dated back to Babiš’s appearance in the media (November 2011), when he described the Czech Republic as highly corrupt. Indeed, in Babiš’s view, corruption permeated the entire public administration. Yet while he was able to name the Czech Republic’s problems succinctly, he was not a good cure for them. In 2011, Babiš began forming a civic initiative, which he registered the following year before embarking on a tour of the country. In 2012, Babiš became the chairman of his ANO 2011 movement, which he presented as being a grassroots movement, despite it being a typical marketing product. As late as June 2013, the movement had not even reached 5% support according to the polls (STEM). Interestingly, the movement did not just target specific segments of the population during the campaign for the 2013 elections, but rather all segments, trying to present itself as a centrist group. In June 2013, an anti-mafia unit intervened at the offices of the government, targeting people from the circle of Prime Minister Petr Neˇcas (ODS). The circumstances have still not all

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY …

61

been clarified, but this intervention was another boost to Babiš’s anticorruption initiative. ANO 2011 was later followed in this argument by the Czech Pirate Party in the 2017 elections, and by the Pˇrísaha movement in 2021. ˇ The CSSD won the 2013 election, but only by a 2% margin over Babiš’s populist ANO movement. The government was formed by the ˇ CSSD leader Bohuslav Sobotka, with the ANO movement and the Christian Democrats. Babiš’s movement had the advantage of unlimited financial resources in the campaign and, above all, was thrust into the spotlight by the fall of the Neˇcas government. Billionaire Babiš presented himself as a successful businessman, and as someone who was financially secure and did not need to “steal”. His anti-corruption rhetoric was successful in the elections, and more than 18% of voters supported the ANO movement. The 2013 election results largely pointed to the formation of the only real government that could gain confidence in the Chamber of Deputies. After initial hesitation, the ANO movement and the Christian Democrats thus agreed on a joint approach to forming a government. The situation ˇ within the CSSD was quite tense, as many party members were dissatisˇ fied with their party’s election result, and the CSSD presidium even called ˇ on the CSSD chairman Bohuslav Sobotka to resign and voted against him leading negotiations on a government. Some of the disgruntled party members met President Miloš Zeman without the party chairman’s knowledge. The situation eventually escalated into a conflict, after which Sobotka’s critics, who were close to Zeman in opinion, left the party leadership. The fact that they had been negotiating with Zeman without Sobotka’s knowledge and had tried to conceal this action proved decisive. The government gained confidence at the beginning of 2014, and Sobotka served as its chairman, with Babiš’s predatory style of business and ANO’s unlimited financial and media opportunities soon catapulting ANO to the top of the electoral preferences. ANO then won 16% of the ˇ vote in the 2014 European elections, while the CSSD came third. Both parties received four seats for their gains. Meanwhile, as the owner of ANO, Babiš eliminated intra-party competition and had an influential say in all decisions. He also repeated his success in the 2016 regional elections, coming first in opinion polls and won the regional elections. Babiš then completely dominated the next parliamentary elections in 2017— ˇ although the Social Democrats largely enabled him to win. The CSSD has always been very closely associated with social policy in all political

62

P. ŠARADÍN AND P. EICHLER

coalitions. However, for almost four years it failed to deliver a clear and understandable narrative to the people about the social legislation it had succeeded in bringing about, how it would help people, and why society needed a social democratic vision for the future. ˇ Throughout this period, the CSSD was furthermore plagued by intracoalition disputes, and it was weakened in the regional elections of 2016. Prime Minister Sobotka then dismissed Andrej Babiš from his position of ˇ finance minister in the government in May 2017, even though the CSSD was far from prepared for how to manage the communication strategy of the whole operation. Babiš was dismissed because of a conflict of interests with his business undertakings. However, older voters in particular did not approve of or understand the removal of the finance minister. Sobotka even decided that the entire government should resign, but eventually he reneged on this decision. As a result of Babiš’s dismissal, the ˇ CSSD lost voters, especially older and more conservative voters (who were ˇ also supporters of Miloš Zeman). In the end, the CSSD was damaged by ˇ the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSCM) and especially by ANO ˇ over a fictitious affair in which the CSSD was accused by both parties of wanting to steal the country’s mineral wealth, specifically lithium, in cooperation with an Australian company. Although the affair may have ˇ affected up to 5% of the electorate, the CSSD nevertheless lost the 2017 election, only winning 7.3% of the voters. Indeed, just before the elections, Sobotka was replaced as elections leader by Lubomír Zaorálek, the foreign minister. Over the course of the years between the two elections of 2013 and 2017, ANO completely transformed its electorate. While in 2013 it managed to take over the right-wing electorate, in 2017 it “stole” ˇ the left-wing electorate from the CSSD and the communists. Indeed, it was much easier for ANO to give pensioners raises and discounts than to fulfil its promises to the more demanding voters of the right. ˇ In 2018, Jan Hamáˇcek became the chairman of the CSSD and decided ˇ to make a risky manoeuvre. Taking the CSSD into government with ANO, a minority government was formed in June 2018, with the support ˇ of the KSCM. Hamáˇcek became the interior minister, and for the first ˇ time the CSSD found itself in a junior position in government. Hamáˇcek and the entire rejuvenated leadership received very strong support at ˇ the next CSSD congress (March 2019), and immediately afterwards the ˇ disunity within the CSSD ceased, which, along with other factors, was in turn reflected in an increase in support in the polls. However, just before the European elections in 2019, publicly presented intra-party

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY …

63

problems, incl. problematic dismissal of the Minister of Culture took place. And no leader was chosen for the elections who could reach out ˇ to non-core CSSD voters. It was anticipated that there would be a relatively low turnout in the Czech Republic for the European election, but in reality anti-Babiš groups were mobilised and the turnout was higher ˇ than predicted. The typical CSSD voter does not tend to vote much for European elections, so with the increased turnout in the 2019 European ˇ election, the CSSD’s gain was only enough to obtain 4% of the vote. For ˇ the first time since 2004, the CSSD did not win any MEPs. It did eventually gain one in 2021, but this was only when Radka Maxová left the ˇ ANO movement and joined the S&D group for the CSSD. ˇ At the 42nd Congress of the CSSD in April 2021, two wings of the party came into a head-on clash. This involved essentially the conservative or more traditionalist wing and the liberal wing, the former being represented by Jan Hamáˇcek, and the latter by Foreign Minister Tomáš Petˇríˇcek. Hamáˇcek defended his position as party chair, but with much less support from delegates than in 2019, which meant that he also became the electoral leader for the 2021 parliamentary elections. Immediately after the congress, however, some of the liberal-leaning wing left the party because of their feeling of being unrepresented—and act which ˇ may well have weakened the party. In the end, the CSSD did not achieve the necessary 5% of votes needed to enter the Chamber of Deputies, and for the first time in its modern history it lost the opportunity to influence the highest level of Czech politics, falling approximately 18,000 votes short. There are number of reasons that led to this failure. Leaving aside the weakening of social democracies across almost the whole of Europe, the domestic reasons included the fact that firstly, the membership base had been shrinking for several years, as had local organisations, meaning that the party lost its foothold when campaigning. Secondly, the number of candidates in local elections fell by 5,000 between 2014 and ˇ 2018. In local councils, the CSSD has less than 2,000 councillors, down ˇ from about 3,800 in 2014. Thirdly the CSSD had the weakest electoral core (convinced voters) of all relevant parties. Fourthly, research has long ˇ shown that potential CSSD voters do not express much willingness to turn out to the polls, meaning that election campaigners thus have the task not only of convincing individuals of the importance of voting for the ˇ CSSD, but also of convincing them that they need to turn out the polls in first place. Fifthly, the membership base had become tired after 30 years and thus difficult to mobilise. Lastly, the European (2019) and regional

64

P. ŠARADÍN AND P. EICHLER

(2020) elections showed that the dispute over Andrej Babiš resulted in the mobilisation of the camps of ANO supporters and centre-right coalitions, ˇ while the CSSD seemed to fall between these camps, with the subsequent ˇ high turnout playing against the interests of the CSSD. All this highlighted that the cultural dispute over Andrej Babiš would prevail and that ˇ the CSSD, as a ruling party, had political co-responsibility for Babiš. After losing the election, Hamáˇcek resigned as party chairman and an extraordinary congress was held in early December 2021, at which Michal Šmarda, the successful mayor of Nové Mˇesto na Moravˇe, took over as ˇ chairman of the CSSD. ˇ The history of the CSSD since the party’s founding is well described and analysed in the literature. Among the key works are those dealing with the nineteenth-century labour movement and the formation of the social democratic political current (Kárník, 2019; Koˇralka, 1996; Marek, 1927; Polášek, 2013; Urban, 1982). The state-building activities of social democracy during the First Republic (1918–1938) and the period up to the February 1948 communist coup, which marked the beginning of the totalitarian character of the republic, are depicted in a number of historical works that have received considerable academic acclaim (Broklová, 1992; Horák, 1960; Kárník, 1968; Kaplan, 1991; Pfaff, 1993). Another part of the literature focuses on the exile activities of the party (Horák, 2015; Hrubý, 1996; Luža, 2001), and the last stage of research on the activities of social democracy consists of both historical works mapping the situation after 1989 and contributions from other social sciences, especially political science and sociology. In addition to descriptions and analyses of party development (Kopeˇcek, 2005) and contributions that include electoral analyses at all levels of governance (Koubek, 2020; Linek & Lyons, 2013), authors have focused on, for example, the transformaˇ tion of the organisational structure of the CSSD, its management style (Polášek et al., 2012), the conduct of electoral campaigns and political marketing (Bradová & Šaradín, 2007; Lebedová, 2013; Matušková, 2006), and the way it is governed. Among such contributions, one of the ˇ most notable is the book on the alliance between ODS and CSSD, which we described above as the Opposition Agreement (Kopeˇcek, 2015). In recent years, analytical contributions have been added that have ˇ focused on the CSSDs electoral losses, or vote shifts. Lysek et al. (2021) examined the voting patterns of Social Democracy through maps in 2006–2017. Thus, they captured both the rise and the fall of social

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY …

65

democracy. This is particularly visible in the spatial visualisation of the 2017 elections, when the ANO movement left right-wing voters and it became a left-populist entity. Maškarinec (2019) observed similar changes in voter shifts that fundamentally transformed the strength of parliamentary parties, but there was no ideological transformation of voters or fundamental changes on the left-right axis. A number of texts looking at the evolution of social democracy reach findings such as Delwit 2019: “(…) the electoral drop in the 2010’s was considerable. It was part of an overall collapse for the socio-economic left. However, the slump for the social democrats was more pronounced than that experienced by the socio-economic left. To put it a different way, Social Democracy has, in contemporary times, lost its influence over the socio-economic left”. One of the key factors in the evolution of social democracies is that disaffected voters are most easily reached by populists. Thus, the main research quesˇ tion of the chapter is: is the same true in the Czech case? Has the CSSD ceased to be a spokesperson for the socio-economic left and become an electoral base for the populist left?

2

ˇ The Party Organisations of the CSSD

ˇ The CSSD has for many years been one of the richest political parties in the Czech Republic, as a large part of its money comes from the state treasury mainly due to the party’s electoral gains. This financial stability ˇ has also been helped by the property the CSSD owns across the country, including Lidový dum ˚ (the People’s House) in Hybernská Street in the ˇ heart of Prague. The CSSD’s complex of buildings and plots of land was acquired primarily with money from the party’s members from the Austro-Hungarian era. In 1921, however, this property was the cause of clashes between the Social Democrats and their radical colleagues who co-founded the Communist Party. After the communist coup in February 1948, Lidový dum ˚ was confiscated by the Communist Party. It was only after the Velvet Revolution of 1989 that the Social Democrats were able to reclaim their property. Although the Communists ˇ handed the People’s House over to the CSSD, when it then became the official party headquarters, the right-wing finance minister Ivan Koˇcárník from the ODS brought court case against the ownership of the Lidový dum ˚ because in his view, the Lidový dum ˚ belonged to the state. The lawsuit prevented the party from disposing of its property. The court case ˇ was clearly politically motivated, meaning that the CSSD was not able to

66

P. ŠARADÍN AND P. EICHLER

ˇ use its property for work or election campaigns. The CSSD nevertheless sued for the property for several years and finally won it back. However, party chairman Miloš Zeman’s failure to reach an agreement with one of ˇ the lawyers plunged the CSSD into renewed legal disputes that continue to this day. These include disputes over the payment of legal fees and late payment penalties. ˇ With time, the CSSD managed to approach private sponsors and to raise hundreds of millions of Czech Crowns for electoral results. Most of its funding was used for costly election campaigns, but when electoral support diminished, the party lost most of its state-provided contributions. Furthermore, it has not been able to replace these contributions with private resources, because it has long been the case that the parties with active sponsors in Czech politics are right-wing parties, not left-wing. The decline is further compounded by the fact that right-wing voters are more active than left-wing voters in the Czech Republic. ˇ Between 1998 and 2020 the CSSD managed to garner several one-off contributions to cover election expenses, and a permanent contribution for the mandate of a deputy, senator, and regional representative. The ˇ total amount paid to the CSSD by the Czech state was approximately CZK 3.05 billion (e120 million) (Table 3). As the oldest political party in the Czech Republic, once it had been reˇ established in 1989, the CSSD was a party with a very large membership base. In general, there is a dislike of political parties in the Czech Republic and citizens therefore tend to avoid becoming members of them. In the 1990s, the biggest parties were those that existed before 1989 (Christian ˇ Democrats, Communists), followed by the CSSD and the ODS—each of which had between around 25,000 and 30,000 members at their most favourable time, around 2006. Although Jiˇrí Paroubek’s strategy was to ˇ make the CSSD a more mass party with around 60,000 members, he ˇ did not succeed. While the CSSD had more than 21,000 party members in 2016, by 1 January 2021 it had only 11,500 and by the end of the year only 9,500. This decline can be attributed to political fatigue, longˇ term dissatisfaction with the CSSD’s activities, or an ideological break with the party. Today left-wing parties are indeed losing members faster than right-wing ones. ˇ The CSSD is one of the political parties that does not make any specific demands on membership. The statutes stipulate that membership is open to “a citizen of the Czech Republic over the age of 18 who is of

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY …

Table 3 Contributions from the state to the ˇ CSSD

Type of election 1998 Chamber of Deputies 1999 2000 Regional elections 2001 2002 Chamber of Deputies 2003 2004 European Parliament, Regional elections 2005 2006 Chamber of Deputies 2007 2008 Regional elections 2009 European elections 2010 Chamber of Deputies 2011 2012 Regional elections 2013 Chamber of Deputies 2014 European elections 2015 2016 Regional elections 2017 Chamber of Deputies 2018 2019 European elections 2020 Regional elections

67

Millions of CZK 225.8 53.8 53.5 120 262 113.4 118.2 108.6 284.7 117.2 132.1 191.6 169.1 162.7 161.3 144.9 143.7 133.3 128.7 105.5 84 35.2 67.4

Source Ministry of Finance, own elaboration

legal capacity, who is not a member of another political party or moveˇ ment, who agrees with the programme objectives of the CSSD and these ˇ statutes, and who has signed an application form” (CSSD, 2019). Since 1989 when the party started operating in the political system, the role of its members has gradually changed. In the 1990s, particuˇ larly when the CSSD was beginning to build its structures and lacked money for its day-to-day activities, the party relied on the activity of its members and sympathisers. Volunteering therefore played a fundamental role in promoting the interests and goals of the party. The situation began to change after 2006, when political marketing became the party’s main ˇ tool and when the CSSD’s campaign management became much more professional. However, this political marketing has replaced or displaced volunteering, and has neglected the importance of members, especially

68

P. ŠARADÍN AND P. EICHLER

at the local party level. The result has been apathy among the membership base, which has become removed from the activities that the party ˇ desperately needs to survive. While the CSSD has remained in the media space, it has nevertheless disappeared from villages and towns and has thus ceased to engage with civil society. Media Reach In the past, social democracy had its own media. In 1990 it started publishing Právo lidu again, the former main press organ of the party (1892–1948), which had also been published in exile (as had Demokracie a socialismus magazine, for example). In 1990 Právo lidu was published on a fortnightly basis, in 1991 on a weekly basis, and in 1992 on a daily ˇ basis, but in 2001 it ceased to be published by the CSSD altogether. The ˇ last issue was published before the 30th Congress of the CSSD in April ˇ 2001, but the CSSD nevertheless continued to publish the advertising supplement Pohled within the daily Právo (another title, transformed from ˇ the main daily of the KSC—Communist Party of the Czechoslovakia) for some time. A successful print publication was the magazine Trend, published by Willy Brandt and Bruno Kreisky Foundation, which was a periodical popularising social democratic ideas and the political work of the party. ˇ The CSSD did not own any other media with national coverage, although for a time its politics found a kindred view in certain left-wing periodicals such as the daily Právo. Commentators included the former Czech dissident Petr Uhl and the former minister of culture Pavel Dostál. From the beginning, the media environment in the Czech Republic has been strongly anti-communist and essentially anti-leftist. By contrast, the cultural hegemony of the right is clearly visible in the media environment. The policy of the ODS was thus positively received, especially ˇ in the 1990s, while that of the CSSD was instead viewed negatively, receiving much criticism. Indeed, although the anti-communist argument was directed against the Communist Party, it was also strongly aimed at ˇ ˇ the CSSD. This meant that the CSSD had less room for manoeuvre to form a majority government of the left (Koubek & Polášek, 2013) and to a large extent, this is still valid today, as most journalists hold rather centre to centre-right views. Furthermore, it cannot really be said that ˇ the CSSD is close to any major media outlet. While the daily Právo was previously close to the party in its ideological orientation, this newspaper

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY …

69

is now independent and influenced mainly by Andrej Babiš. Indeed, it is Babiš who is the most frequently interviewed and widely read politician, as well as being the most watched in Saturday interviews. Although there are no media tied directly to social democracy in today’s leftist milieu, the web dailies A2larm and Deník Referendum nevertheless claim to be leftist, and the tradition of the Prague Spring is continued by the formerly exiled bi-monthly Listy. There are also several left-oriented publishing houses such as Idea and Neklid. ˇ The CSSD is also active on social media, currently with around 28,000 likes on Facebook. Among the politicians who have represented the party, only two have exceeded this number of Facebook likes—party chairman Jan Hamáˇcek and party vice-chair Jana Maláˇcová. The number of likes ˇ for other CSSD politicians is rather below average. Figure 1 shows the number of social media mentions for individual government representatives. ANO prime minister Andrej Babiš held the top spot for a long time, ˇ while the CSSD’s Jan Hamáˇcek moved to third place in February 2021 due to his chairmanship of the Central Crisis Staff during the Covid-19 pandemic (number of mentions 118,047). Looking at these social media mentions in more detail, a quarter of them were negative, about 7% were positive, and most were neutral. The vast majority of these were Facebook posts, with the measurement taking place between 26 January and 25 February 2021. ˇ The specific data are then shown in Table 4, which lists the CSSD’s members of parliament (p) and ministers (m) for 2017–2021. Agriculture minister Miroslav Toman did not have a Facebook account. There is a clear imbalance between the party chairman Jan Hamáˇcek and vice-chair Jana Maláˇcová on the one hand, and the rest, on the other hand. ˇ Organisational Structure of the CSSD ˇ In the mid-1990s, the CSSD was shaped into a classic catch-all party—a position it maintained until its gradual weakening after the 2010 elections, ˇ from when its cartelisation became visible. Alongside this, the CSSD has modernised, held intra-party referendums, and changed its statutes several times in recent years. Indeed, it last did so in 2019 (Table 5). ˇ With the 2019 statutes, the CSSD simplified its structure and made decision-making more flexible. There are nevertheless still debates within the party about being even more progressive and introducing the direct election of the party chair and other regional officials. Election by all

70

P. ŠARADÍN AND P. EICHLER

Fig. 1 The number of social media mentions for individual government representatives in 2021 (Source Czech Voter [2021])

members is supposed to be a safeguard against backroom deals by individual regions, which then reduces the room for manoeuvre for the leadership and especially the chairman, who in turn cannot make many decisions against the will of those who elected him. ˇ Since its inception, the CSSD has been internally very pluralistic and has had a number of different platforms of opinion. Its organisational structure is based on four levels—local, district, regional, and national. At the local level, the basic organs are the local organisation and the local

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY …

Table 4 Number of Facebook likes

Jiˇrí Bˇehounek (p) Václav Votava (p) Antonín Stanˇek (p) Tomáš Hanzel (p) Roman Onderka (p) Ondˇrej Veselý (p) Jan Birke (p) Jakub Kulhánek (m) Roman Sklenák (p) Petr Dolínek (p) Alena Gajdušková ˚ (p) Jan Chvojka (p) Kateˇrina Valachová (p) Lubomír Zaorálek (p), (m) Jana Maláˇcová (m) Jan Hamáˇcek (p), (m)

71

473 505 546 815 984 1,057 1,217 1,502 1,784 1,823 1,999 2,334 8,134 9,764 41,069 48,000

Source Own elaboration

Table 5

ˇ Organisational structure of the CSSD

Organisational structure

Executive collective body—the Bureau

Congress

A supreme body convened at least once every two years. It is convened as necessary by the Bureau This is convened by the Bureau to discuss topical and concrete policy and programme issues This manages the activities between the congresses. The number of members (about 50 in total) is determined by the number of members in the regions This manages the activities between the Presidencies. It consists of the party chair and vice-presidents This focuses on compliance with the party’s statutes and internal regulations

Conference Bureau

Gremium Central Audit Commission Source Own elaboration

presidium, while at the district level they are the district conference, the district presidium, and the district control commission. The same structure can be found at regional level—in other words, county conference, county bureau, and county audit commission. At the national level, the highest organ is the congress, followed by the conference, the bureau, the gremium, and the central audit commission. Local organisations are the ˇ basic political and organisational units of the CSSD. Their meetings are

72

P. ŠARADÍN AND P. EICHLER

held at least once a quarter. The number of members must not fall below five for one year or the organisation will lose its licence. A district organisation consists of all local organisations within the territorial jurisdiction of the district. The highest organ is the district conference, which consists of the members of the district presidium, the presidents of the town presidencies and delegates elected at the meetings of the local organisations. Those delegates are elected according to a predetermined key based on the number of members in the local organisations. The regional level of the party is organised in the same way (—that is, the members of the regional conference are the chairmen of the district presidencies, and the delegates are elected at the district conferences according to the number of members). A regional conference must be held at least once every two years. The statutes also deal with how membership of the party can be obtained or revoked and the powers of the various organs, interest organisations within the party, and cooperation with the Young Social Democrats, the Masaryk Democratic Academy, and the Workers’ Sports Association. These can be regarded as affiliated organisations of the ˇ CSSD. The actions of all party organs are governed by the statutes. As mentioned earlier, a citizen of the Czech Republic who is over 18 years of age may become a member of the party. They may not be a member of another political party, and their application should be submitted at the place of permanent residence; if there is no local organisation there, the application should be submitted to the district organisation. Membership is decided by an absolute majority of the members of the local organisation present. ˇ The CSSD is made up of 893 local organisations (in 2020) with between five and several dozen members. They are represented by 91 district organisations, which are followed by regional organisations. These total 14. Local organisations are declining in the context of a reduction in the membership base.

3

Position in the Party System

ˇ After its revival in 1989 (see Eichler, 2016), the CSSD continued its former traditions and from the beginning was placed on the left of the political spectrum. In the first democratic elections in 1990, the party failed, but in 1992 it was supported by 6.5% of voters. Its biggest competitor on the left at that time was the Communist Party, but the

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY …

73

ˇ appealed mainly to protest voters whose dissent was expressed in KSCM ˇ criticism of the new regime. With the arrival of Miloš Zeman, the CSSD embarked on a more radical path of defining itself against the rightwing government and of opening to new people, whether those more liberally oriented or, on the contrary, those who had left the Communist Party and subsequently worked in smaller post-communist entities ˇ (such as the Democratic Labour Party). The CSSD gradually therefore became a catch-all party, which consistently defended social security and the interests of workers, pensioners, and families. Since 1996 (see Table 1), when it reached a quarter of the electorate, it has become the strongest left-wing party. It managed to win four parliamentary elections and was part of governments in 1998–2002, 2002–2006, 2013–2017, and 2018– 2021. Its participation in these four governments partly transformed its ideological role because (except for the first term) it was part of government coalitions and therefore had to abandon or modify some of its programmatic demands. ˇ The CSSD first joined the government after the elections of 1998, when Zeman then became prime minister. The minority government was ˇ tolerated by the right-wing ODS, which did not restrict the CSSD too much in social democratic politics—except perhaps on the budget, for which the ODS wanted to limit the national debt as much as possible. ˇ In order for the budget law to pass, the CSSD therefore had to work within the parameters laid down by the ODS. In 2002, Vladimír Špidla could have ruled alone in a minority cabinet, which would have been ˇ tolerated by the Communists. Certain members of the CSSD nevertheless wanted their party chairman to form a coalition with the Communist ˇ Party (KSCM). Yet because of the anti-system position of the Commuˇ nists, the chairman of the CSSD did not want to cooperate with the ˇ KSCM. Given that the coalition did not require the direct participation ˇ of the KSCM, Špidla thus referred to the so-called Bohumín Resolution, ˇ where the CSSD forbade government cooperation with the Communists. The strong anti-communism sentiment of Czech society also played a role in this decision. In a government coalition instead therefore with the ˇ centrist Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL) and the right-wing Freedom ˇ Union (US–DEU), the CSSD had to form programmatic compromises, which pushed it towards the centre. Moreover, given that it was a minimal winning coalition it was not very ideologically connected—indeed, the

74

P. ŠARADÍN AND P. EICHLER

ˇ CSSD only had 101 seats out of 200. There were also several occasions when one US-DEU member of parliament in particular voted against government agreements, regularly causing a cabinet crisis. After ˇ Jiˇrí Paroubek became the head of government in 2005, the CSSD began ˇ to orient itself more towards the KSCM when passing laws, despite the ˇ ˇ CSSD’s two coalition partners. Indeed, in times of opposition, the CSSD has always functioned as a clear ideological opposition to the right—as ˇ demonstrated, for example, in 2008, when the CSSD won all regions in the regional elections at the time the right-wing government was introducing healthcare fees and cutting social benefits. By criticising the ˇ government on this, the CSSD gained considerable popularity among the electorate. ˇ The CSSD did not have another government engagement until 2014– 2017 (government was appointed in January 2014 after the elections 2013), when Bohuslav Sobotka came to head a coalition government. ˇ However, the CSSD did not have a majority in this government, and thus cooperated with the Christian Democrats and the newly formed ANO 2011 group of billionaire Andrej Babiš. ANO 2011 appealed especially to people who were dissatisfied with the political system and to rightwing voters. As a billionaire and big businessman, Babiš promoted a lean state, lower taxes, and limits to administration. However, ANO fundamentally altered its electorate during its time in this government, drawing leftist voters, less-educated voters, and senior citizens—indeed, the offer of a pension increase was surely an easier and faster way of appealing to voters than the construction of motorways or changing the tax system. This populist ANO movement thus gradually became a major competitor ˇ of the political left and although the CSSD promoted its own agenda of the end of cheap labour and pension increases, for example, ANO had unlimited financial resources to outrun its competitors. Babiš also used the media he owned to publicise ANO’s goals, and in this way ˇ he was able to appropriate the successes of the left-wing CSSD. After a massive election campaign, ANO won the following parliamentary election of October 2017 with a landslide victory and Babiš became the prime minister. Initially he formed a minority government, but this failed to win ˇ confidence in parliament. After long negotiations, the CSSD eventually ˇ joined the government and in the summer of 2018, the CSSD formed a minority coalition government with ANO which was tolerated by the ˇ ˇ KSCM. In this government, in which the CSSD had only five ministers ˇ out of 14, the CSSD managed nevertheless to legislate in many areas of

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY …

75

its concern, especially in social policy—such as the abolition of the withdrawal period in order to enable sick leave to be paid from the first day ˇ of sickness. The CSSD also substantially increased pensions and parental leave, and it contributed to increasing teachers’ salaries. However, it was unable to break away from the dominant ANO movement, which ˇ ˇ ultimately resulted in the CSSD’s electoral failure. The CSSD’s 2021 campaign had mainly promoted the themes of work, housing, and the economy. The party did not want the costs of the Covid-19 pandemic to be borne by those on low income and the middle class, and it thus focused primarily on working people, the elderly, single mothers, and people on lower incomes. ˇ The CSSD has long been dogged by an ideological internal dispute over whether to appeal to more liberal or more traditional voters but the leadership has now decided to appeal to the more traditional voter. Nevertheless, it has not omitted other issues from its programme, such ˇ as support for marriage for all. The CSSDs internal polarisation has been a long-standing phenomenon, with two wings—a moderate wing and a radical wing—opposing each other even back in the early 1920s. Indeed, it was an opposition from which the Communist Party emerged. The ˇ CSSD was also divided in exile, and this division carried over into the early ˇ 1990s. Speaking of this division, the former CSSD chairman Jiˇrí Paroubek said: “I think the division, which continued for many years and has not stopped until now, was brought to social democracy by the exiled Social Democrats. I can’t get rid of this impression. But then again, without the exiled Social Democrats we would not have rebuilt the party, and would not have formed links with foreign social democratic parties”. After the ˇ CSSD congress in December 2021, the party expanded ideologically and now wants to reach out to voters across the left-wing spectrum.

4

ˇ The CSSD’s Relationship with the S&D Member Parties and Civil Society

ˇ For most of its existence, the CSSD has cooperated with civil society, especially trade unions. Programme documents have always included support for or recognition of civil society, or an emphasis on citizen participation in governance. This relationship was stronger in the 1990s, and a certain weakening of it can be seen after 2010, which corresponds to the ˇ cartelisation of the CSSD. While there has been occasional criticism from

76

P. ŠARADÍN AND P. EICHLER

certain individuals, those people have now joined extremist entities and ˇ their influence on the CSSD has probably been eliminated. Their criticism was mainly inspired by chain e-mails, fake-news, so-called alternative servers, and the culture prevailing in the disinformation environment. In 2003 and 2006, the Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences conducted a survey in which respondents who voted for the ˇ CSSD in 2002 identified themselves as less engaged citizens. This attiˇ tude corresponded to the willingness or unwillingness of CSSD voters to participate in other types of elections than those for the Chamber of Deputies. However, what was particularly highlighted by the survey was the involvement of citizens in the functioning of the party, which in turn ˇ led to a real connection between the CSSD and society. Around 2008, ˇ the CSSD registered some 23,000–25,000 members, the highest number ˇ in the party’s modern history. This greatly helped the CSSD because at that time the preparation of electoral and long-term programmes was often based on cooperation with the non-profit sector. This was enriching for the party, providing it not only with feedback, but also with a much-needed active link with citizens and the professional public. ˇ The CSSD’s link with trade unions has always been strong and several leading trade unionists have also stood as candidates for the party—for example, the presidents of the largest trade unions within the CzechMoravian Confederation of Trade Unions (Milan Štˇech was a long-time senator and also president of the Senate, Richard Falbr was an MEP and ˇ senator, and Jaroslav Zavadil was a member of parliament). The CSSD has always defended the interests of employees within the Tripartite Council, which consists of key players—trade unions, employers’ organisations, and members of government—and which aims to ensure social reconciliation in the country. Several interest platforms have operated within the party for more than ˇ 30 years. These include the Christian Social Platform of the CSSD, which was established in 2009 and seeks to connect Christian-minded individuals with the democratic left. This platform also included the former prime minister Bohuslav Sobotka and the former ombudsman Anna Šabatová. The preamble of the platform states that “this debate must be open to a genuine plurality of ideas, worldviews and social concepts”. The Bell Ringer (2008) is another important platform, although it is not as active within the party today as it used to be. This is an ecological platform, to which, for example, Minister of Culture (until 2021) Lubomír

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY …

77

Zaorálek, and former Minister of Education (until 2021) Kateˇrina Valachová subscribe. One of the Bell Ringer’s goals is to cooperate “with other similarly focused groups, NGOs and independent experts” in the field of environmental protection. In addition to these platforms that cooperate with civil society, there are also ideological platforms within ˇ the party that try to emphasise a certain area of part of the CSSD’s policy. These ideological platforms include the Left Platform Doleva!, Save the ˇ ˇ ˇ CSSD, For a Better CSSD, and the Socialist Faction of the CSSD. Connections with the civic society are also ensured by organisations that function within the party as interest organisations and which are ˇ also mentioned in the CSSD’s statutes (Article 21). These include the Social Democratic Women, and the Mayors’ Club. The statutes also state that the party “cooperates with the Young Social Democrats, the Masaryk Democratic Academy and the Workers’ Sports Association of the Czech Republic”. The Democratic Academy, named after the first Czechoslovak president, Tomáš G. Masaryk, describes itself as “a social democratic educational institution popularising the values of social democracy, organising debates, seminars and training courses”. Its director is former prime minister and EU commissioner Vladimír Špidla, and it works as a think tank which is partly financed by the public budget as it serves as the politˇ ical institute of the CSSD. The annual amount of financing it receives is determined according to the party’s electoral results. ˇ When the CSSD Party resumed its activities after 1989, it had support mainly from its sister parties in Germany, Sweden, and Austria. This involved both training in political skills and the printing of election mateˇ rials. Gradually, the German SPD became the CSSD’s main partner. The cooperation was not only limited to support in election campaigns (e.g. G. Schröder, M. Schulz) and participation in both parties’ congresses, but also to visits and exchanges of documents with the SPD headquarters in Berlin. The Prague office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung always played an important role in mediating and supporting those contacts. A specific moment of Czech-German cooperation as far as Social Democracy is concerned is the long-standing relationship with the Seliger-Gemeinde, an organisation which brings together Germanspeaking social democrats who left Czechoslovakia after World War II. The other main partner for the Czech Social Democratic Party has been the Slovak SMER-SD party. There was also a joint training

78

P. ŠARADÍN AND P. EICHLER

programme for members and supporters of both parties, the Academy of Social Democracy (2010–2018). Prague hosted the PES Congress in 2006 and the PES Convention ˇ in 2016. The CSSD is a member of the Progressive Alliance. It was a member of the Socialist International until 2022. International cooperation as an agenda is in the responsibility of one of the party’s vice-presidents. The separate Foreign Affairs Department was cancelled after the 2021 election defeat.

5

Programmatic Positioning

ˇ The CSSD has always presented itself with very high-quality and sophisticated programmes, be they electoral or long-term. In 2021, it presented a ˇ shorter pre-election Decalogue, and also the CSSD Vision for the Czech Republic 2030, which contained more than 300 programme proposals. In ˇ the Decalogue, the CSSD presented itself as a party that promotes social and economic policies directed mainly towards more solidarity through the revenue gained from multinational companies, the wealthiest individuals, banks, and others. The agenda of the Decalogue was thus slightly more radical than in 2017. ˇ The CSSD has consistently been based on the defence of democracy and a fair welfare state. At the same time, it has responded to current issues that are mainly linked to the post-Covid pandemic period. The Decalogue states: “We will share the costs of the Covid pandemic fairly: this time it is primarily those who can afford it who must pay, including billionaires”. It was in this chapter that proposals were made for the introduction of special taxes on estates over EUR 4 million, the abolition of tax exemptions for large corporations, the introduction of a bank tax, progressive taxation of personal income, progressive inheritance tax on estates over EUR 2 million, and a reduction in VAT on basic foodstuffs. Other important aspects of the programme included increased salaries in social services, cheaper and more affordable housing, pension reform, and closing the wage gap between men and women. The longer-term Vision consists of 17 areas and covers the whole spectrum of social problems. The programme was sponsored by the party’s vice-chair and minister of labour and social affairs Jana Maláˇcová (in office 2018–2021), and dozens of experts, party members and expert programme committees worked on it. The Vision is a very modern and timeless document that is also dedicated to current issues, with a

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY …

79

very strong social line running through the entire programme. The bold courage seen in some areas of the Vision is due to the current politˇ ical set-up and reaction on the political rivals of the CSSD. Furthermore, the public and media space is dominated by ANO, and no political party wants to make a mistake that would then become the subject of an easy negative election campaign. The rejection of refugees or the rejection of ˇ the European Green Deal were almost a necessary part of the CSSD’s programme because when the competing Czech Pirate Party in many ˇ ways backed down from its formerly vigorous demands, the CSSD then strategically needed to assume some of them in its Vision—not only on refugees and the European Green Deal, but also on higher taxation for empty flats, for example, or on the introduction of a progressive tax on a fourth property owned by a single individual, with the first three properties meanwhile being subject to a low tax. ˇ The CSSD has been cautious about The European Green Deal, seeing it as an opportunity, but not wanting it to lead the EU into debt or to “devastate European industry or jobs, and if it does not promote nature ˇ conservation it will mask the subsidisation of natural gas”. The CSSD is no different in this from other relevant political parties. The only exception is the Green Party, but it only has the support of around 1% of the vote. In public debate, the issue of the European Green Deal has been reduced simply to the issue of banning the production of combustion engine cars. This reduction in scope is mainly because of the populist ANO, which has made it impossible to have a deeper debate on climate change. ˇ The CSSD places considerable emphasis on equality, also in areas that are avoided by today’s mainstream. These include, for example, equality in partner relationships, or the promise to introduce marriage for same-sex couples, which would mean that “two women or two men can enter into a marriage with all the rights and obligations of two women or two men” ˇ 2021).Originally, the Czech Pirate Party also advocated this idea, (CSSD, but in the end did not put this commitment into a joint coalition project with the Mayors and Independents party. ˇ At the end of the 2017–2021 parliamentary term, the CSSD had drawn up a law on affordable housing, but did not manage to have it discussed in parliament. In the Vision, nine specific points are devoted to the issue of housing, including enforcement of the law on public benefit housing companies, which would make apartments up to 30% cheaper. Together

80

P. ŠARADÍN AND P. EICHLER

Table 6

Merit in promoting programme themes ˇ Potential CSSD voters

All respondents

Restoration of sick pay in the first three days of illness Minimum wage increase Preparation of pension reform Increase in pensions

Credit to ANO

Both of them

Credit to ˇ CSSD

Credit to ANO

Both of them

Credit to ˇ CSSD

34

28

38

29

43

27

40

29

31

34

35

30

45

30

25

36

34

30

51

25

24

43

34

24

ˇ Source CSSD Archive

with other measures, such as higher taxes for empty apartments, about 60,000 apartments could be made available to people annually. ˇ Table 6 shows what merits the public gives to the ANO and CSSD movements in promoting selected aspects of their programmes. Four ˇ themes were selected which were promoted by the CSSD. However, the table shows that all respondents and even potential CSSD voters attribute their successes mainly to the ANO movement. The table is one of the answers to the research question and illustrates the loss of competence of the CSSD in the area of the social-economic left and attributes it to the ANO movement.

6

Social Democratic Voters, Social Democratic Issues

ˇ The last time the CSSD won a parliamentary election was in 2013, but it only reached a fifth of the electorate. In the 2016 regional elections, it was defeated by the populist ANO 2011 movement. In polls published ˇ at the time, the CSSD was perceived as a party with no internal energy and no strong unifying message. For many voters, it represented a second choice, and this characteristic accompanied the party right up to the 2021 parliamentary elections.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY …

81

There is a wealth of research that shows the potential voters of the ˇ CSSD. It is also interesting to observe how voters rank themselves on a left-right scale and how this has changed over time. Figure 2 shows how the ideological anchoring of Czech society is changing and how there has been a lower self-identification of citizens with the left over the last few years. Currently, about 23% of respondents claim to be on the left, while in 2013, when the right-wing government was in crisis, more than 40% of citizens claimed to be on the left. In 2019, the polling agency Median conducted a large-scale survey for the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, “The Left in the Czech Republic”. The survey showed that some of the respondents (the so-called attitudinal left, tending towards the political centre) perceived the left as communism and as something untrustworthy. Furthermore, they perceived the left as promoting irresponsible politics, and recalled the mistakes made by leftwing politicians and governments in the past. Declarative leftism, on the other hand, is associated more with programme and political content.

Fig. 2 Self-identification of citizens on the left-right scale (Source CVVM; red [left], blue [right], violet [centre], grey line [I don’t know])

82

P. ŠARADÍN AND P. EICHLER

Meanwhile, other research has shown that some voters see a difference between the terms “left” and “social democracy”, with the term social democracy having a more positive connotation. ˇ The CSSD has around 60% of purely left-wing voters. However, not ˇ every CSSD voter is left-wing, so it is more accurate to use the term social ˇ democratic for CSSD voters than left-wing. Nevertheless, the two labels are often used synonymously. ˇ Table 7 highlights that in 2016 the distribution of the CSSD’s electoral potential according to liberal-conservative and left-right orientation ˇ shows that the CSSD had reserves among centre-liberal and conservative voters. The camps of voters (liberals vs. conservatives) were balanced, with the “more likely to vote” category being fundamentally dominated by supporters of the conservative orientation. In 2016 potential voters were thus primarily those of a conservative orientation, with the voter base composed equally of liberals and conservatives. The change in the electorate occurred in May 2017, when the prime minister Bohuslav Sobotka entered a dispute with the finance minister Andrej Babiš over Babiš’s alleged conflicts of interest with his business undertakings. Sobotka therefore decided to remove Babiš from the government, but the president Miloš Zeman prevented this. In the end, Table 7

ˇ Electoral potential of CSSD (2016)

Electoral potential ˇ of CSSD

Liberal vs. Conservative values

On the scale of left–right wing, do you consider yourself being? Strongly left-wing

Definitely would vote for N = 680 000 8.4% Probably would vote for N = 1 000 000 13.4% Possibly would vote for N = 1 270 000 16.8 Source Own elaboration

Moderately left-wing

Centrist

Rather liberal 50 000 Rather conservative 20 000

140 000 200 000

140 000 130 000

Rather liberal 40 000 Rather conservative 90 000

130 000 240 000

260 000 260 000

Rather liberal 10 000 Rather conservative 110 000

190 000 200 000

330 000 430 000

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY …

83

ˇ this conflict led to the weakening of the CSSD and the inclination of the more conservative part of the party towards the ANO movement. This ˇ group of voters was inclined towards Zeman and valued the CSSD as a stabiliser in the government. It was only by provoking another clash with ˇ Babiš that this characteristic of the CSSD passed away. ˇ The 2018–2021 period involved a search for the most likely CSSD voter, and there was a continued effort to convert voters’ instinct of the ˇ CSSD being their party of second choice into it being their party of first ˇ choice. The data showed that the CSSD mainly retained those voters who had agreed with its governmental engagement and could appreciate the ˇ achievements the CSSD had been able to make in government. The base ˇ of CSSD supporters was thus pensioners, followed by people of working age over 45, civil servants or social service workers. The party had to compete for votes mainly with the ANO movement, whose base was ˇ mainly pensioners and those it had taken over from the CSSD’s electorate (having also taken over certain parts of its programme). The liberaloriented electorate switched mainly to the Czech Pirate Party, although some of them also changed to the newly formed Pˇrísaha movement, which was led by former police officers. In 2020, the potential electorate consisted of three groups of voters, ˇ but all of a different weight and a different proximity to the CSSD. The Insecure and Fearful Group This segment of the electorate supports the protection of “our Czech” and left-wing economic measures such as higher taxation of the rich and big companies, and protection of the labour market. They want controls on abuses of the system, and they bear an anti-corruption stance. To win ˇ this segment over, the CSSD needs to protect the economically vulnerable and their security in these uncertain times. The Left-Wing Optimistic Group A more educated segment, this group of voters prefers substantive policies focused on strategic issues. This segment also favours left-wing economic measures, while wanting other issues such as the environment, education, and affordable housing to be addressed conceptually.

84

P. ŠARADÍN AND P. EICHLER

ˇ The ability of the CSSD to address conceptual problems such as housing or drought needs to be underpinned by ‘explanations’ and expertise. The Individualist Group This segment has a very low willingness to vote, and is more “right” oriented. These individualists do not follow politics very much and their decisions are more emotional.

7

Conclusion and Discussion

ˇ The CSSD was one of the two largest political parties in the Czech Republic between 1996 and 2017. It has managed to win elections to the lower house four times and was the ruling party for 15 years from the beginning of the independent Czech Republic in 1993 until 2021. Since its re-establishment in 1989, it has gradually gained momentum, winning thousands of municipal representatives, and hundreds of regional ones. It has also been successful in European and Senate elections. However, there was a visible drop in popularity in the 2017 and 2021 parliamentary elections. In the last election, the party did not win any more seats. ˇ Founded in 1878, the CSSD is the oldest Czech political party. After many vicissitudes in the twentieth century, when its activities were banned several times, it was revived in 1989 after the end of the communist era. It was then able to rely on active members, former party members who had ˇ belonged to the CSSD before the communist coup in 1948, and exiled collaborators. Although the party had little money, it was able rely on financial support from abroad at key moments. ˇ After initially floundering, with poor results, the CSSD became stronger during the era of Miloš Zeman (1993–1998) who, with his associates, managed to pull the party up to the point where it was supported by a third of the electorate and became a government entity and a permaˇ nent part of Czech politics. The CSSD was then to be reckoned with in every election. Its role was crucial, especially in economic and social issues, and its competence positively influenced the living standards of millions of citizens. ˇ Yet in 2021 the CSSD became a party without a seat in the Chamber of Deputies and became weakened at all other levels. The populist ANO

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY …

85

movement of billionaire Andrej Babiš had a major influence on this weakening. Although originally a right-oriented party, ANO took over the ˇ electorate of the left-wing parties, and of the CSSD, but after a series of serious mistakes committed by the Social Democrats. Another factor ˇ contributing to the fall of the CSSD was its move towards political marketing, which helped it win elections but weakened the relationship between the party members and the leadership, especially in terms of members’ participation in campaigns. Furthermore, the thematisation of the fight against corruption and clientelism has resulted in the displaceˇ ment of the CSSD’s main line of conflict, the socio-economic dispute ˇ between the left (CSSD) and the right (ODS). As a traditional party ˇ that had long been responsible for Czech politics, the CSSD could not compete with the new anti-corruption movements. ˇ Overall, the CSSD’s political work in Czech society can be assessed as positive. Yet it has not all been successful. For example, in the traditional places of support, such as the Ústí and Karlovy Vary regions, there are areas with major social problems in which one would expect the ˇ CSSD to be very actively involved in finding solutions. These problems include, for example, an enormous number of foreclosures, a quality of education worse than the national average, as well as high unemployment, and a higher proportion of people with only primary education. ˇ Today, however, these citizens do not trust the CSSD and instead look to populists (ANO) or extremists (Freedom and Direct Democracy) for support. ˇ It now remains to be seen whether the CSSD will be able to make a comeback in the Czech Republic in the next parliamentary elections. In the central European area, we have already seen the decline of the left in Poland and Hungary (see chapters 4 and 5). Slovakia retains a more populist version of the left through its Direction and Voice parties. The ˇ CSSD is very fortunate in having a government formed by the centreright as this government’s weakened social policy can be expected to help ˇ ˇ the CSSD. Before any chance of victory, however, the CSSD will have to undergo major internal reforms, especially in terms of its personnel. However, there is another way, for example, the integration of the fragmented left. This is how the right-wing (ODS, TOP09, Christian Democrats) won the 2021 parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic. However, the aim of this chapter was not to substitute the role of prognosticators in the conclusion. We have shown from the state the socio-economic competences of the CSSD, even on the points it

86

P. ŠARADÍN AND P. EICHLER

managed to push through. The credit goes to the ANO movement, which has become the spokesperson for the mainstream left. A number of important questions remain for further research in this regard. We need to continue to study the relationship between populism and its actual competence to tackle important social and, in particular, economic problems. Another problem is the public’s distorted relationship with politics as a tool for resolving societal conflicts. The relationship between the collective interest and its political representation has been damaged (Buchtík, 2021). In the Czech Republic, the ANO movement entered top politics at a time when the economic trajectory was very good. This helped it a lot. Perhaps more importantly, however, is another issue: political institutions and structures are weakening, and with this, so are political parties. They are being replaced by all sorts of movements, groups of the richest, extremists, populists and protest and critical communities. The party is an untrustworthy concept. So can the CSSD revive itself on a party basis, or should it follow the path of an ideological association of personalities, social organisations, and smaller movements and parties that are ideologically aligned? From other chapters (especially Poland and Hungary) we see a similar ˇ weakening of social democracy/left. However, the CSSD has been anchored in Czech society for more than 140 years (except during totalitarian regimes). So why is it not following the path of Finnish, German, or Danish social democracy, which can win even in these critical times? Is the only explanatory factor really the distrust in society so deepened in 1948–1989? There are thus a number of questions for further research. Although they are encountered in the media and can be considered fundamental, no one has yet answered them in academic texts.

References Berglund, S. (Ed.). (2013). The handbook of political change in eastern Europe (3rd ed.). Edward Elgar Publishing. Bradová, E., & Šaradín, P. (2007). Permanentní kampaˇn a proces vládnutí: politika v éˇre konzultantu. ˚ In P. Šaradín (Ed.), Politické kampanˇe, volby a politický marketing (pp. 31–52). Periplum. ˇ Broklová, E. (1992). Ceskoslovenská demokracie. Sociologické nakladatelství.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY …

87

Buchtík, M. (2021). Jedna spoleˇcnost → ruzné ˚ svˇety. Poznatky kvalitativní studie o fragmentarizaci cˇeské spoleˇcnosti. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V., zastoupení v ˇ Ceské republice, Masarykova demokratická akademie. ˇ ˇ CSSD. (2019). Stanovy Ceské strany sociálnˇe demokratické (Party Statutes). https://www.cssd.cz/data/files/registrovane-stanovy-19_1.pdf ˇ CSSD. (2021). Volební program (Election Manifesto). https://www.cssd.cz/kestazeni/volebni-programy/desatero-cssd-pro-volby-do-poslanecke-snemovny2021/ Czech Voter. (2021). Czech Election Study. https://www.herzmann.cz/?s=ˇceský+ voliˇc Delwit, P. (2021). “This is the final fall”: An electoral history of European social democracy (1870–2019) (CEVIPOL Working Papers, 1, a-58). https://www. cairn.info/revue--2021-1-page-a.htm Eichler, P. a kol. (2016). Za svobodu, spravedlnost a solidaritu: dˇejiny sociální demokracie v cˇeských zemích. Masarykova demokratická akademie. Herman, V., & Pope, J. (1973). Minority governments in western democracies. British Journal of Political Science, 3(2), 191–212. Horák, J. (1960). The Czechoslovak Social Democracy Party. Columbia University Press. ˇ Horák, P. (2015). Stranické legitimace, vážení! Ceskoslovenské sociální demokracie na útˇeku pováleˇcnou Evropou (1948–1953). Nakladatelství Lidové noviny – FF UK. ˇ Hrubý, K. (1996). Léta mimo domov. K historii Ceskoslovenské sociální demokracie v exilu. Grégr. ˇ Kaplan, K. (1991). Pravda o Ceskoslovensku. Panorama. Kárník, Z. (1968). Socialisté na rozcestí: Habsburk, Masaryk cˇi Šmeral. Svoboda. Kárník, Z. (2019). Na úsvitu dˇejin cˇeské sociální demokracie: Od prvopoˇcátku˚ hnutí k základum ˚ moderní politické strany (1844–1893). Dokoˇrán. Klíma, M. (1999). Skrytá tichá velká koalice. Politologický cˇasopis, 6(2), 170–182. Kopeˇcek, L. (2005). Comparison of left parties in central Europe: Some causes of different successfulness. In L. Kopeˇcek (Ed.), Trajectories of the left. ISPO. Kopeˇcek, L. (2015). Deformace demokracie? Opoziˇcní smlouva a cˇeská politika 1998–2002. Barrister & Principal. ˇ v habsburské rˇ íši a v Evropˇe 1815–1914. Sociálnˇehistorické Koˇralka, J. (1996). Ceši souvislosti vytváˇrení novodobého národa a národnostní otázky v cˇeských zemích. Argo. ˇ Koubek, J. (2020). Pˇrehled výsledku˚ CSSD v krajských volbách 2000–2016. MDA. Koubek, J., & Polášek, J. (2013). Antikomunismus: nekoneˇcný pˇríbˇeh cˇeské politiky? Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Lebedová, E. (2013). Voliˇci, strany a negativní kampan. ˇ Politická komunikace v ˇ Ceské republice. Sociologické nakladatelství.

88

P. ŠARADÍN AND P. EICHLER

Linek, L., & Lyons, P. (2013). Doˇcasná stabilita? Volební podpora politických ˇ stran v Ceské republice v letech 1990–2010. Sociologické nakladatelství SLON. ˇ Luža, R. (2001). Ceskoslovenská sociální demokracie. Doplnˇek. Lysek, J., Pánek, J., & Lebeda, T. (2021). Who are the voters and where are they? Using spatial statistics to analyse voting patterns in the parliamentary elections of the Czech Republic. Journal of Maps, 17 (1), 33–38. ˇ Marek, J. (1927). Šedesát let programové výstavby Ceskoslovenské sociálnˇe demokratické strany. Ústˇrední dˇelnické knihkupectví a nakladatelství. Marsh, M. (1998). Testing the second-order election model after four European Elections. British Journal of Political Science, 28(4), 591–607. Maškarinec, P. (2019). The rise of new populist political parties in Czech parliamentary elections between 2010 and 2017: The geography of party replacement. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 60(5), 511–547. Matušková, A. (2006). Volební kampaˇn 2006: nástup politického marketingu do ˇ ˇ Ceské republiky. In D. Caloud, T. Foltýn, V. Havlík, & A. Matušková (Eds.), Volby do Poslanecké snˇemovny v roce 2006 (pp. 62–88). CDK. Ministry of Finance. (2021). Party contributions. https://www.mfcr.cz/cs/ver ejny-sektor/podpora-z-narodnich-zdroju/politicke-strany-a-hnuti/prispevkyvyplacenepolitickym-stranam-p-46509 Nikolenyi, C. (2003). Coordination problem and grand coalition: The puzzle of the government formation game in the Czech Republic, 1998. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 36(3), 325–344. ˇ a ve Outlý, J. (2013). Navrhování a výbˇer kandidátu. ˚ Politické strany v CR stˇrední Evropˇe. Periplum. ˇ Pfaff, I. (1993). Ceská levice proti Moskvˇe 1936–1938. Naše vojsko. Polášek, M. (2013). Revizionisté, progresivisté a tradicionalisté: programové debaty ˇ v Ceskoslovenské sociální demokracii v letech 1924–1938. Univerzita Karlova v Praze, Fakulta sociálních vˇed – Doplnˇek. Polášek, M., Novotný, V., & Perottino et al. (2012). Mezi masovou a kartelovou ˇ ˇ v letech 2000–2010. stranou: možnosti teorie pˇri výkladu vývoje CSSD a KSCM Sociologické nakladatelství. STEM. (2013). Stranické preference. https://www.stem.cz/wp-content/upl oads/2015/12/2867_1724.pdf ˇ Urban, O. (1982). Ceská spoleˇcnost 1848–1918. Svoboda.

The State of Social Democracy in Hungary András Bíró-Nagy

1

and Gábor Gy˝ori

Introduction

The situation of social democracy in Europe in the early 2020s presents a mixed picture (Brandal et al., 2021). While in the Iberian Peninsula and Scandinavia, social democratic parties have had great success in recent elections, and in Germany, the SPD has won re-election and formed a government, in several major countries the left is in deep crisis. The crisis is affecting Western European and Eastern European countries alike, with the phenomenon of ‘pasokification’ (Moschonas, 2013; Sotiropoulos, 2014), previously named after the dominant Greek left-wing party, taking place in France and the Netherlands, and the melting of the electorate has

A. Bíró-Nagy (B) · G. Gy˝ ori Policy Solutions, Budapest, Hungary e-mail: [email protected] G. Gy˝ ori e-mail: [email protected] A. Bíró-Nagy Institute for Political Science, Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest, Hungary

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Skrzypek and A. Bíró-Nagy (eds.), The Social Democratic Parties in the Visegrád Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30792-8_4

89

90

˝ A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND G. GYORI

happened in several Eastern European social democratic parties as well (Bakke & Sitter, 2021). In the Czech Republic, the CSSD was eliminated from parliament, and in Poland, the left was able to return to parliament as part of a broader alliance after a term out of parliament. Hungary’s social democracy is also going through a period of crisis. For two decades after the 1990 regime change, the history of the Hungarian left was also the history of the Hungarian Socialist Party. The party started as a small party and within a few years became the largest Hungarian party, which was in government for 12 years between 1990 and 2010 (BíróNagy, 2013), and after 2010 it became a medium-sized party and then a small party again, with single-digit support. In addition, since 2011, the left-liberal Democratic Coalition (DK), which split from the MSZP, has been competing for the same voters. Not to mention that in contrast to the situation before 2010, which was characterised by the concentration of the party system (Enyedi, 2006), the main direction of the development of the Hungarian party system has been fragmentation in the post-2010 period, with new Green and liberal parties emerging on the opposition side and the radical right-wing Jobbik also going after anti-Orbán (Böcskei & Seb˝ ok, 2018). Abou-Chadi et al. (2021) also draw attention to the importance of fragmentation in the Western European context. They provide empirical evidence that ‘in Western Europe only a small minority of former social democratic voters have left for radical right parties. Social democratic parties have lost voters mainly to Green and mainstream right parties’. By analysing the electorates in the Hungarian context, we confirm that while there are potentially recoverable supporters among voters of Jobbik, there are also potential social democratic voters among those who currently vote for liberal parties or even Fidesz. In his comprehensive paper on the causes of the crisis of social democracy in Europe, Bandau (2022) stresses that ‘there is not one explanation that stands out but that the electoral crisis of social democracy is a complex phenomenon with multiple causes, such as socio-structural changes, fiscal austerity and neoliberal depolarization’. The present paper uses the Hungarian case to demonstrate that the crisis of social democratic parties can be indeed traced back to a number of factors (including the leadership issue and the weakening organisational background), and that the neoliberal public policies of previous government cycles, which went against the preferences not only of the left-wing voter base but also of the majority of Hungarian society as a whole, are certainly among

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY

91

the most important causes. This also confirms what Snegovaya (2022) wrote about the modernisation of left-wing parties in Eastern Europe: ‘pro-market left parties obtain reduced support; this effect is particularly pronounced among the economically vulnerable occupational groups. In countries with more pro-market left parties, these groups have a higher propensity to vote for right-wing parties.’ It cannot be forgotten that, in the Hungarian context, democratic backsliding and increasing authoritarian tendencies have taken place in the country alongside the decline of social democracy (Bozóki & Heged˝ us, 2018; Greskovits, 2015). Accordingly, an important challenge is what strategy the left can pursue in an illiberal democracy (Bíró-Nagy, 2017; Buzogány, 2017; Pirro & Stanley, 2022) and how to relate to the political positions that have brought success to the governing parties. Drawing on the Western European experience, Abou-Chadi and Wagner (2020) argue that more authoritarian/nationalist and more anti-EU positions are if anything associated with lower rather than greater electoral support for social democratic parties. Bandau (2022) also finds that ‘a liberal turn on sociocultural issues does not necessarily lead to vote losses’. The Hungarian example shows that the decline of the MSZP, which had previously dominated the left, is not due to cultural liberalism, but primarily to the fact that MSZP’s credibility of left-wing economic policy has been permanently shaken in the minds of voters as a result of previous government cycles. MSZP, and the DK, which broke away from it, became the ‘double successor parties’ (Lakner, 2011), which made the reconstruction of the Hungarian left after 2010 much more difficult. Voters not only regarded the MSZP and the DK as the successor parties of the pre-1989– 1990 regime but also as the main responsible parties for the economic and social policy failures of the two decades after the fall of communism, the socially insensitive crisis management and the austerity measures. The history of the Hungarian left from 2010 to the present day is a story of dealing with these serious legacies and of the attempts to start over and rebuild in relation to them, while having to contend with and forge cooperation with a number of new competitors on the progressive side of the party system.

92

˝ A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND G. GYORI

2 Electoral Results of the Hungarian S&D Member Parties The Socialists & Democrats (S&D) have two member parties in Hungary today, the Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt, abbreviated as MSZP in Hungarian) and the Democratic Coalition (Demokratikus Koalíció, abbreviated as DK in Hungarian). Both parties are represented in the Hungarian parliament, the National Assembly, as well as in the European Parliament, where their MEPs are members of the S&D Group. In the following, we will review the intertwined history of these two parties, with a special focus on recent years and their status as opposition parties in the illiberal regime led by Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party (Table 1). As the post-communist successor party that substantially shaped the transition to democracy, the MSZP emerged as one of the major parties after the regime change from communism to democracy in 1989–1990. It was the dominant force on the left for over two decades and always one of the two largest parties between 1994 and 2010, leading the government for three terms and 12 years (Bíró-Nagy, 2013). However, its dominant position collapsed following its re-election victory in 2006, when the MSZP prime minister at the time, Ferenc Gyurcsány, introduced austerity measures and admitted in a closed session of his parliamentary faction that the re-election victory had been achieved at the cost of lying to the public and the concealment of vital budgetary and macro-economic information. The MSZP’s support in the polls plummeted, and while it continued to be the leading force on the left until recently, its position was substantially Table 1 MSZP and DK results in European parliament and national parliamentary elections since 2014

Year

2014 2014 2018 2019 2022

Election

National parliament European parliament National parliament European parliament National parliament

Left-wing parties MSZP (%)

DK (%)

26.21*

26.21* 9.75 5.38 16.05 34.46**

10.9 11.91 6.61 34.46**

* MSZP and DK ran on a joint list in 2014 ** MSZP and DK ran on a joint list as members of ‘United for

Hungary’ in 2022

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY

93

diminished and has continued to erode. Meanwhile, the leading rightwing party in the Hungarian system, Fidesz, which had usually more or less tied with the MSZP in elections before 2010, took a huge lead over its main competitor on the left and emerged as the strongest party by far, dominating all elections in the last decade. In 2011, a recently formed platform within the MSZP, the Democratic Coalition, led by former prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány, announced that it was splitting from the MSZP to establish a new party. Ten of the party’s 59 MPs at the time therefore resigned from the MSZP faction in parliament and formed a new group in the Hungarian National Assembly. While the Democratic Coalition quickly established itself as a firm presence in the Hungarian party system, it failed to become a major force until recently. In the national parliamentary election in 2014, the MSZP and DK formed a joint list along with three smaller left-wing and liberal formations. This ended up over 18 points behind Fidesz, but still well ahead of the rest of the opposition. The European Parliament election a month later marked the DK’s first separate run, and it surprised everyone by winning almost 10% of the vote, finishing just one point behind the MSZP. However, European Parliament elections are notoriously lowturnout elections, when the highly disciplined voters of minor parties—in particular, the DK, whose success rests in large part on the personal charisma of former Prime Minister Gyurcsány—tend to have a larger impact. Four years later, in the national election of 2018, which featured a record turnout, the DK could not replicate its success of the 2014 European Parliament election and it barely passed the 5% threshold, winning a mere 5.38% as compared to MSZP’s 11.91% (the MSZP ran together with the green-left Párbeszéd party). However, the European Parliament election of 2019 marked another breakthrough for the DK, which became the leading opposition force for the first time with a share of 16.05%, beating the MSZP (6.61%) by almost 10 percentage points. Opinion polls since then have continued to affirm the DK’s position as the leading opposition party on the left, and even as the leading party of the entire—fragmented—opposition, with a vote share that is roughly on a par with its European Parliament result of 2019. Meanwhile, in most polls, the MSZP hovers around the 6–7% it won in the European Parliament election of 2019. Although the MSZP has a number of young politicians with specialised public policy expertise the actual rejuvenation of its leadership has not

94

˝ A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND G. GYORI

been accompanied by a perception that the party itself is young. Despite the fact that the MSZP has staked out a more clearly left-wing position after a centrist turn in the 2000s, the polls do not suggest that policy positions espoused by the MSZP have had a major impact on its social perception. The failure of the once leading force on the left to allow politicians to rise within its ranks who are seen by the public as potential national leaders are emblematic of the ongoing crisis, and it forces the MSZP to rely on the talents of outsiders who are assumed to improve its electoral performance. This was most reflected in the MSZP’s decision to recruit a young green-left politician, Gergely Karácsony, to run as their prime ministerial candidate in 2018. Although Karácsony did not end up winning the 2018 election, he did clinch the Budapest mayoralty a year later, once again with the backing of the MSZP. Karácsony was also the MSZP’s candidate for the primary elections of the Hungarian opposition in 2021. The primaries ended with the victory of the independent conservative candidate, Péter Márki-Zay against the DK’s Klára Dobrev, following the tactical withdrawal of Karácsony in favour of Márki-Zay before the second round of the primaries. The DK and MSZP fared more successfully in the single-member constituencies of the primaries, where the opposition parties had agreed to nominate a single candidate to run against the ruling party candidate to maximise the opposition’s chances of victory. Part of that agreement was that the candidates for each seat would also be selected by way of a primary and that took place in parallel with the first round of the primaries for the prime ministerial candidate. The DK ended up with the most winners (32 out of 106 constituencies), confirming their leading role within the Hungarian opposition, but the biggest winners of the process were the MSZP and their green-left allies Párbeszéd, which jointly received a disproportional number of nominations compared to their support in the polls (25 constituencies). In certain key respects, the DK has emerged as the opposite of the MSZP. Whereas the MSZP has been devoid of strong leadership but has a fairly robust and transparent platform, the DK is all about leadership while its platform is less emphatic and its ideological position on the traditional left-right spectrum is hazy (see Sect. 5 for a more detailed discussion). At the same time, the DK has established itself as one of the harshest and loudest critics of the Orbán government and this has made it stand out for years, while the green-left party Politics Can Be Different (Lehet Más a Politika—LMP), and the far-right Jobbik—Movement for

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY

95

a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom—Jobbik) which later shifted to the centre, also both sought to play the role of a constructive opposition, an effort that they did not fully abandon until 2018. The DK has attracted a portion of the former MSZP electorate, presumably in particular the segment that was drawn by Gyurcsány’s personal charisma (and by that of his wife, Klára Dobrev). Indeed, there was a certain amount of ill-will between the two parties because when Gyurcsány seceded in 2011 after much of the party leadership at the time felt he bore major responsibility for the MSZP’s collapsing support between 2006 and 2009 (his second term as prime minister, which was cut short by his resignation), he took several of the party’s MPs and a portion of its base along with him. Many in the MSZP at the time perceived that their party, and the left on the whole, would have been better served by the former prime minister’s quietly fading into the background, as his predecessors had done. In terms of governmental experience, it is crucial to point out that the MSZP and DK are the only opposition parties that have at least a few figures with relevant governmental experience. However, given the widespread consensus that the period from 2002 to 2010, when the MSZP was the leading governmental party, was not a success, governmental experience is not necessarily an asset (Lakner, 2011). Between 2010 and 2019, left-wing politicians were removed from almost all levels of public power. The left made modest gains in the 2014 municipal elections, while 2019 led to a more decisive breakthrough, with the entire opposition performing beyond expectations and the MSZP being disproportionately successful. Despite the fact that the MSZP won the fewest votes among the four opposition parties, its successful bargaining with the other parties concerning the electoral coordination meant that it received over half of the mayoralties won by the opposition in 2019 in municipalities with 10,000 residents or more (including Budapest district mayoralties). Furthermore, it also netted almost 40% of the council seats in the municipalities, making the MSZP the most influential party in terms of municipal leadership. Although not a Socialist politician himself, the mayor of Budapest Gergely Karácsony was also nominated by the MSZP. But in a sign that the MSZP and DK remain competitors, two Budapest district MSZP mayors switched to the DK in early 2020, which predictably agitated the MSZP leadership at the time.

96

3

˝ A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND G. GYORI

The Party Organisations of the MSZP and DK

This section reviews the organisational background of the two S&D member parties, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the Democratic Coalition (DK). Based on the data at our disposal, the initial growth spurt in the membership of the DK had stalled by the mid-2010s, while the MSZP has proved unable to halt the ongoing decline in its membership throughout the past decade. As regards financial resources, the MSZP has been far-better positioned between 2018 and 2022. Its state funding has been 50% higher than the DK’s allotment, and the MSZP party foundation receives twice as much in funding as the DK party foundation. The two parties’ reach in television and radio news shows and social media has been roughly on par, although at the same time, the pre-eminent public attention directed at DK chair Ferenc Gyurcsány is striking. The two S&D member parties are in a substantially weaker position than Fidesz in terms of their human and financial resources, as well as in terms of their media reach. Compared with the level of its national support, the MSZP won a disproportionate number of municipal assembly seats (277) and mayoralties (16) in the last municipal election, which was held in 2019. The DK, by contrast, punches below its political weight in terms of its municipal presence (it netted four mayoralties in 2019 and 164 assembly members). The MSZP is a multi-tiered organisation, with a decentralised decision-making process. The DK, by contrast, is more centralised, with many decision-making competences (e.g., the nomination of candidates) being within the remit of the party presidium. The Memberships of the MSZP and DK It is difficult to analyse the members of Hungarian political parties and the trends impacting them over time because there are no widely accessible public records on the subject. In 2015, the DK reported 10,867 members, while the MSZP’s membership was estimated at 15,000 (the latter figure was reported by the since defunct left-wing daily Népszabadság [2016] which cited internal party sources). Based on these figures, the total membership of the two left-wing parties makes up the majority (55%) of all those who are members of an opposition party. There is also a connection between the two parties’ membership figures in that the DK was initially launched as an internal platform within the

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY

97

MSZP. After the DK seceded from the MSZP in 2011, a segment of the MSZP’s rank-and-file left together with the DK leadership. In 2020, the DK had 4,575 members who had voting rights within the party, although the number of the total membership, which also comprises supporting members who have no voting rights, is significantly larger (24. hu, 2020). A statement by the DK politician László Varju in 2020 suggested that there are some 5,000 such supporting members (Klubrádió, 2020). The MSZP’s current membership can best be gauged on the basis of the party’s revenues stemming from membership fees. Using this as a gauge, the MSZP had about 8,000 fee-paying members in 2019, but the real membership figure is likely to be higher, probably by several thousand. Financial Situation The opposition parties in Hungary receive substantial amounts of public funding, but their revenues are nevertheless dwarfed by the income of the governing parties. Three-quarters of the total state funding is allocated in proportion to the individual parties’ electoral results, which is why the governing Fidesz party receives the highest amount of funding. Furthermore, Fidesz also has much higher revenue than the opposition parties from membership fees, donations and other sources (see Fig. 1). The MSZP’s total funds in 2019 amounted to over 0.5 billion forints (1.4 million euros) (the party had a total revenue of 565 million forints while it spent 690 million). In the same year, the DK’s budget was half that amount (it had revenue of 268 million forints and spent 260 million—approximately 720.000 euros). Figure 1 also shows that both S&D member parties raised about 20 million forints (55.000 euros) in membership fees. At the same time, the MSZP received 50% more in state funding than the DK in the 2018–2022 term, about five times as much in donations and has ten times as much in ‘other income’. Beyond each party’s budgets, we also see a similar contrast in the financial figures of the party foundations operating alongside the parties. The MSZP’s Táncsics Foundation had an annual budget of 359 million forints (1 million euros) at its disposal in the legislative term from 2018 to 2022, while the DK’s For a New Republic Foundation only receives 195 million forints (540.000 euros) annually. It is important to highlight that the governing parties halved the public funding for parliamentary parties in 2020, arguing that ‘everyone needed

98

˝ A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND G. GYORI

Fig. 1 Party revenues of Fidesz, MSZP and DK

to contribute to the common efforts aimed at combatting the epidemic’. The DK suffered a loss of 103.5 million forints (285.000 euros) in revenue as a result of this decision, while the MSZP received 150 million forints (415.000 euros) less than originally allotted. Media Reach The difference between the governing parties and the opposition parties in terms of their respective media reach is even more striking than the gap in their funding. The government’s popularity is amplified by state-funded propaganda that is reflexively supportive of its policies. The government’s messages are conveyed by the public media as well as a media network that operates under the aegis of a public foundation, the Central European Press and Media Foundation (abbreviated as KESMA in Hungarian). In addition to boosting the government, these media outlets are also engaged in a continuous negative campaign against the opposition. The single most important event in the trend of the declining market share of the social democratic parties was the loss of the major left-wing daily newspaper Népszabadság in 2015. Until that time, the MSZP’s party foundation had held a 28% share in Népszabadság but the party foundation sold its share to Vienna Capital Partners in 2015, which then went on to close the newspaper in 2016. It is not difficult to compare the media reach of the two Hungarian S&D member parties in 2020 since the News Monitoring databases of the National Media and Info-Communications Authority cover the relevant statistics (Fig. 2). One piece of data that stands out is Ferenc Gyurcsány’s

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY

600

99

563

500 400 300 200 100

330

290

262

229

188 179 166

140 121 111 90 90

53 51 46 36 36 35 34 33 29 26 24 23 22 18

Ferenc Gyurcsány Lajos Korózs Bertalan Tóth Balázs Barkóczi Ágnes Kunhalmi Gergely Arató Ildikó Bangónély Klára Dobrev László Varju István Újhelyi Péter Niedermüller Tamás Harangozó Zsolt Molnár Ágnes Vadai Erzsébet Gy. Németh Imre Komjáthi Csaba Horváth Zoltán Varga Zoltán Komáromi Kata Tüttő Imre László Balázs Pollreisz Lajos Oláh Csaba Molnár Zsolt Legény Sándor Szaniszló Attila Mesterházy

0

Fig. 2 Number of media appearances of social democratic politicians in 2020 (Mentions and appearances in the top news shows) (Note red = politicians of MSZP, blue = politicians of DK. Source National Media and Infocommunications Authority)

strikingly high presence in the news. However, one of the reasons for the frequent mentions of this former prime minister is that he is being demonised in the pro-government media and is presented as a negative figure who is essentially the leader of the opposition alliance. It is also surprising that alongside this, Klára Dobrev, a vice-president of the European Parliament and the DK’s prime ministerial candidate during the 2021 opposition primaries, is only ninth on the list of politicians most frequently mentioned in the media. Among the MSZP politicians, Lajos Korózs was the most prominently featured in the media, and indeed he was the second most frequently mentioned social democratic politician after Gyurcsány (which was also mostly due to a negative campaign against him by pro-Fidesz media). Former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány also stands out by a significant margin among all politicians in both social democratic parties in terms of the number of his Facebook followers. With over 303,000 followers at the time of our data collection (June 2021), he is among the most intensely followed politicians in the entire opposition. By comparison, Budapest mayor and MSZP prime ministerial candidate Gergely Karácsony is followed by roughly 279,000 users, while Péter Jakab, the leader and prime ministerial candidate of the right-wing Jobbik party, has about 377,000 followers. Among the MSZP politicians, Attila Mesterházy has a fairly large following on Facebook (235,000). This is probably due to his previous role as the chair of the MSZP from 2010 to 2014, and the

100

˝ A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND G. GYORI

fact that in 2010 and 2014, he was also the party’s candidate for prime minister. It is worth noting that there are several social democratic politicians who appear less frequently in the news coverage of legacy media than the top-tier opposition politicians but who have nevertheless amassed a substantial Facebook following. This includes the MEP István Ujhelyi and the Budapest district mayor Csaba Horváth (both MSZP), as well as the MEPs Csaba Molnár and Klára Dobrev and the Hungarian National Assembly MP Ágnes Vadai (all DK). Figures 2 and 3 also show that the presence of MSZP and DK politicians is relatively balanced both in legacy media and on social media platforms. The data provided by the National Media and Info-Communications Authority show that the television channels ATV and RTL Klub were the most likely to allot speaking time to the social democratic politicians in these two parties. In other words, these two television channels, which are independent of the government, provide a vital platform for the dissemination of the DK and MSZP messages. 350 303

300 235

250 200 150

133 129 100

100

9

7

7

6

6

5

2

2

0.6

Zsolt Legény

11

Zoltán Varga

12

Balázs Barkóczi

13

Zoltán Komáromi

17

Kata Tüttő

25

Balázs Pollreisz

28

Imre László

31

Gergely Arató

31

Erzsébet Gy. Németh

37

Lajos Oláh

43

Imre Komjáthi

43

Sándor Szaniszló

65

50

Lajos Korózs

Ildikó Bangóné Borbély

László Varju

Péter Niedermüller

Bertalan Tóth

Tamás Harangozó

Csaba Horváth

Ágnes Vadai

Ágnes Kunhalmi

Klára Dobrev

István Újhelyi

Csaba Molnár

Attila Mesterházy

Ferenc Gyurcsány

0

Fig. 3 Facebook followers of social democratic politicians (Thousand people) (Note red = politicians of MSZP, blue = politicians of DK. Source Facebook)

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY

101

Organisational Infrastructure, National Presence The organisational infrastructure of the DK is more regionally concentrated and, in terms of offices, less extensive than that of the MSZP. According to the organisational charter of the DK, one constituency organisation can operate in each of Hungary’s 106 electoral constituencies. Currently, the party has seven Budapest offices and 14 offices outside the Hungarian capital. On top of that, the DK has three regional offices, one based in Pécs to cover the South Transdanubia region, one based in Gy˝ or to cover North Transdanubia and one in Miskolc for Northern Hungary. The DK’s youth organisation is called Democratic Lendület (meaning ‘momentum’ or ‘impetus’ in Hungarian). The MSZP’s infrastructure spans the entire country. It has local organisations in every Hungarian county, as well as 23 local organisations in Budapest. Outside the capital, the party has the highest number of local organisations (44) in Pest County surrounding Budapest. Furthermore, the party has 91 local organisations in the eastern half of the country and 59 organisations in the Western Transdanubia region. The youth organisation of the MSZP is called Societas. Another good indicator of national presence is the distribution of opposition representatives in municipal assemblies by the party. Based on the number of municipal assembly members and mayors, we can conclude that the MSZP pursued a successful strategy in 2019. Before the 2019 municipal election, the DK was ahead of the MSZP-Dialogue for Hungary party alliance in terms of its national support in the polls. Nevertheless, the MSZP won one and a half times as many (277) municipal assembly seats as the DK (164). With this result, the MSZP was able to slightly increase the number of its municipal assembly representatives (from 268 to 277) as compared to the 2014 municipal election. The DK, too, boosted its local presence, increasing the number of its municipal assembly representatives from 93 to 164. As a result of the 2019 municipal election, the MSZP won 19 mayoralties in Budapest districts or other urban areas with 10,000 residents or more. In Budapest, the MSZP won six mayoralties, the highest number among the parties of the opposition (the opposition won 13 districts overall). Of the ten major urban areas with a county status in which the opposition candidates gained control of the mayor’s office, MSZP politicians won four (Érd, Salgótarján, Szombathely and Szeged). Nevertheless, since the municipal election two Budapest district mayors have switched

102

˝ A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND G. GYORI

parties, moving from the MSZP to the DK, while Szeged’s MSZP mayor, László Botka, left the party after his victory. Not counting Botka, László Kiss and Sándor Szaniszló (the latter two were those who switched to the DK), the MSZP currently holds 16 mayoralties. The DK won four mayoralties in towns with 10,000+ residents or Budapest districts. In addition to three districts in the capital, the DK also won the mayoralty of Tatabánya in 2019. If we add the two former MSZP politicians to this tally, then the DK currently holds six mayoralties. The Parties’ Leadership Structure and Internal Organisation The MSZP’s organisational structure has several levels and many units, and the decision-making on many issues is decentralised. Political, organisational and personnel decisions in the party may be rendered by a local members’ convention, a regional members’ convention, a delegate convention, a party congress, an official body in the party or a party vote. Party members shape the party’s activities and its policies either directly, or through delegates or elected bodies, and they decide in open votes which method will be used. Local party organisations nominate the MSZP’s municipal assembly candidates, the candidates on the party’s municipal list and its mayoral candidates. The regional federations—which are made up of local organisations—are responsible for adopting the political aspirations in the area of civil and economic development for a given county (or the capital). The most important body of a regional federation is the delegate convention. The delegates are designated by the local organisations that make up the regional federation, with each sending delegates in proportion to the number of party members in the respective local organisation. Based on the proposal of the presidium of the regional federation, the regional delegate convention uses a secret ballot to select the federation’s delegates at the party congress, and it also decides leadership and other issues within its remit. The party congress is the MSZP’s most important decision-making body. The congress adopts the party’s manifesto for the national and the European Parliament elections. It can also amend the party’s charter and it can decide whether the party will join the government. The congress

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY

103

elects the party’s presidium as well as the president of the MSZP board. The members of the presidium are the party’s two co-chairs (a man and a woman, currently Imre Komjáthi and Ágnes Kunhalmi), the party’s deputy chair, two vice-chairs and a further 11 elected members. The party’s presidium and board jointly propose the party’s candidate for the position of the prime minister; the party’s slate for the European Parliament elections as well as the national parliamentary elections; and its candidate for the position of president of the republic. These selections nevertheless need to be approved by the congress. Decision-making is considerably more concentrated within the DK, and the party’s organisational structure is more centralised than that of the MSZP. The most important local-level organisation is the electoral district-level members’ assembly. The DK’s main decision-making body is the party congress. The congress adopts the party manifesto and its charter, and it also elects the presidium. The members of the party’s presidium are the party chair (currently Ferenc Gyurcsány), its vice-presidents and ten further elected members. The presidium has the authority to amend the party’s by-laws, as well as to nominate the party’s candidates in the single-member districts in parliamentary elections; in municipal elections; in European Parliament elections and in mayoral elections. It further has a right of assent when it comes to the nomination of municipal assembly candidates.

4

Position in the Party System

Large segments of the Hungarian media (independent and opposition media included), commentators and the politicians of other opposition parties tend to lump the MSZP and the DK together as the ‘old left’. The MSZP and DK are seen as parties that represent the left-wing establishment that dominated much of the post-transition era between 1990 and 2010, not only politically—where power mostly alternated between left and right—but also in terms of social and cultural influence, especially in the media. In recent years, however, the previous harsh rejection of the two S&D member parties by the other opposition parties has mellowed considerably, especially as far as the MSZP is concerned. It needs to be underlined that two opposition parties, Jobbik and the LMP, ‘came of age’ organisationally and ideologically during the years of the MSZP governments. Jobbik and the LMP were in opposition to establishment politics, especially the left-liberal elite that was politically

104

˝ A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND G. GYORI

dominant at the time. This led to their intense animosity towards the MSZP and Ferenc Gyurcsány personally, who was the leading Socialist politician of the era. Gyurcsány is therefore seen by many as the exemplification of the problems with the ‘old left’—the suspicions surrounding the sources of his personal wealth; the strongly pro-market economic policies at the time; the vocal internationalism and anti-nationalism that flew in the face of the surging nationalist/patriotic sentiments of the young generation in the 2000s; and a morally flexible pragmatism that was very ˝ vividly manifested in Gyurcsány’s infamous Oszöd speech in 2006, when in a closed meeting, Gyurcsány, as prime minister at the time, admitted that he and his party had only won re-election based on a campaign of lies. The leaking of the speech led to violent protests—the first in Hungary since 1956—and the image and polling figures of the left never recovered. While Jobbik seized on the disaffection with mainstream politics to build an electoral coalition of far-right nationalists and rural voters disappointed by the MSZP, the LMP ‘harvested’ young urban leftists, environmentalists and the segment of the intelligentsia that had turned away from the traditional left-wing parties. The fundamental animosity between the LMP and Jobbik on one side, and the MSZP and DK on the other, was the key reason behind the opposition’s inability to unite against Fidesz. For years, the prevailing perspective in Jobbik and the LMP was that the ‘old left’ was no different from Fidesz and that whatever anti-democratic measures the right-wing governing party took, they were basically an indirect result of policies of the MSZP and Gyurcsány before 2010. Any cooperation with the latter was therefore ruled out, since in the views of Jobbik and the LMP these parties were essentially the flipsides of the same coin that was the corruption and arrogance in power of Fidesz. This perception was not universally shared in the LMP, which even split over the issue, leading to the secession of many founding members who set up their own party, the Dialogue for Hungary (Párbeszéd), a green-left party that went on to cooperate electorally with the MSZP and DK in 2014, and is in an ongoing and recurring electoral alliance with the MSZP. The fragmentation of the opposition proved to be a major liability in light of an election system that disproportionately rewards the party with the most votes, even if it is a minority party. Running against a divided and highly fragmented opposition that refused to cooperate electorally, Fidesz won sufficient single-member constituencies in three successive elections to rack up two-thirds constitutional supermajorities in parliament despite

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY

105

winning only around half of the votes nationally in two elections (2010 and 2018) and only 44.9% in 2014. Momentum, a new liberal party that emerged in 2017 and has since established itself as one of the major opposition parties with roughly 8– 10% of the vote, essentially shares the other opposition parties’ view of the MSZP and the DK, although it has been more pragmatic towards the ‘old left’ from the very start. The fact that Momentum did not come into being between 2006 and 2010 (and not therefore in opposition to the MSZP) but instead a decade later, in opposition to Fidesz, may be the reason why Momentum has been more focused on ousting the incumbent party and has proven more willing to compromise and to cooperate pragmatically with any opposition party that shares this objective, the MSZP and DK included. By the time of the 2018 election, Jobbik and the LMP had also gradually come around to this realisation, although their shift came too late to achieve meaningful coordination in that election, with the result that Fidesz won another two-thirds majority. It was only the impact of this election and the government’s continuation of its anti-democratic practices that finally pushed the entire opposition into serious and, thus far, relatively successful cooperation. This cooperation began with the pro-democracy and anti-government protests organised in the immediate aftermath of the election, when for the first time the opposition parties demonstrated together (New York Times, 2018), and it continued throughout the civil disobedience-type protests when a handful of opposition MPs representing all opposition parties occupied the public media building in December that year (Euractiv, 2018). The opposition’s cooperation then culminated in the unexpectedly successful municipal election in October 2019, when opposition candidates wrested control of the Budapest mayoralty and municipal assembly, along with a majority of the district mayoralties and over ten major towns in Hungary, making the opposition the dominant political force in urban Hungary. Apart from the inevitable logic of electoral mathematics, a key reason behind the shift in the attitude of the new opposition parties towards the parties of the ‘old left’ was the new parties’ growing acceptance and worry that Fidesz is engaged in building an authoritarian regime, and their concomitant admission that for all their flaws, the MSZP and DK have no such designs and are committed to the democratic system.

106

˝ A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND G. GYORI

The opposition’s national party organisations continue to cooperate fairly smoothly and contributed to the organisation of the intraopposition primaries in which they allotted the position of single-member constituency candidates for the 2022 election. From the perspective of the main ruling party Fidesz, the MSZP and DK occupy different positions, despite their relative proximity in other respects (common history, as well as their common membership in the European S&D Group). The MSZP used to be the most vociferously rejected party by Fidesz, but in recent years the once intense enmity has abated on the part of the governing party. This is in part due to the departure of Ferenc Gyurcsány from the MSZP, given that Orbán has regarded Gyurcsány as his archnemesis since his electoral defeat against the then-Socialist prime minister in 2006. It is therefore now the DK that is considered by Fidesz as the worst opposition party, although many analysts also assess that due to Gyurcsány’s polarising ability, the two parties and their respective leaders are useful foils for one another, with each using the other to mobilise their base. Looking at the relationship between the two S&D member parties themselves, it can be seen that this has been relatively cooperative and has featured less overt friction than would initially have been anticipated, given their prehistory (outlined in Sect. 1) and given the fact that they have remained close competitors in seeking the support of the same voting bloc. Although the other opposition parties regularly attack Gyurcsány in harsh terms and describe him as a liability for the opposition, the MSZP’s criticisms of him have been relatively subdued, and if there are spats between the two parties these are mostly being resolved outside the public view. Correspondingly, on matters involving opposition cooperation, especially in forming a joint list in 2014 and coordinating the list of candidates in the single-member constituencies in 2018, the two parties concluded deals with apparent ease. Both the underlying competition between the two parties and the root of the working relationship between them are reflected in the secondary preferences of their voters— in the case of both the MSZP and the DK the respective other party is the most popular choice as the secondary preference (see Sect. 6 for more details). Given that they both play a necessary role in the electoral alliance of the opposition parties, in the foreseeable future the two centreleft parties of the opposition, the MSZP and the DK, will continue to play an influential role.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY

5

107

The Relationship Between the Hungarian S&D Member Parties and Civil Society

The MSZP has traditionally nurtured close ties with left-wing civil society organisations. Among these, the partnership between the MSZP and trade unions stands out. This bond was reinforced by the MSZP’s protest against the ‘Slave Law’ in 2018. After parliament adopted the amended Labour Code, the opposition parties jointly organised demonstrations in support of workers’ rights. Subsequently, the MSZP consulted with trade unions and introduced several bills aimed at strengthening trade unions and workers. Furthermore, the MSZP has also established ties to several pensioner and youth organisations, local interest groups and specialised research institutions. At the same time, it seems that in the past five or six years it has revamped its formerly far-flung network of organisational ties and has narrowed its focus on a few closer partnerships. This was reflected in the changes in the spending of the MSZP’s party foundation. While the Táncsics Foundation supported over 30 organisations in 2015 and 2016, in 2019 only 18 organisations received funds from Táncsics. As budget documents from 2019 revealed, among the organisations that received small amounts of funding there were youth/student organisations; four local interest organisations; two senior/pensioner organisations;three professional associations and four unspecified types of organisation (Táncsics Alapítvány, 2020). At the same time, the Villányi Street Conference Centre and Open University Foundation have received a pre-eminent amount of funding in recent years (over 20 million forints [55.000 euros] in 2019 for implementing the Budapest Open University programme), as has the Institute for Social Democracy (38 million forints [105.000 euros] in 2019). In other words, in the late 2010s, the party foundation did not spend most of its financial resources on the organisations that were part of a movement network or on organisations engaged in addressing specific social problems but on the expert organisations affiliated with the MSZP. The MSZP is further also indirectly connected to civil society through its party alliance with the green-left Párbeszéd (Dialogue) party. Párbeszéd nurtures close ties with Hungarian environmental organisations, an example being seen in a bill sponsored by Párbeszéd that was initially proposed by six green organisations in the interest of protecting

108

˝ A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND G. GYORI

the great lakes. A precursor of this—the Balaton protection action—was launched by the MSZP (2020) in cooperation with NGOs in 2020. Based on the information available on its online platforms and its publicly available documents, the DK has a far less extensive network of ties with civic organisations. One characteristic strand in the DK’s relationships with civil society is the support for minorities and marginalised groups. This is illustrated by the two working groups of the Foundation for a New Republic, the DK’s party foundation. One of these is the Roma Social Integration Working Group and the other is the LGBTQ Working Group. During the coronavirus pandemic, the DK (2020) also supported the Roma local self-government in Gyöngyöspata with masks and food. Although there is no institutionalised partnership, the DK has traditionally stood with the Hungarian LGBTQ communities. The other strand that defines the DK’s engagement with civic organisations and its civic partnerships is its support of charitable organisations. In 2017, the DK called on the government to support the NGOs that helped the poor during the winter in preventing freezing deaths. In the same year, the DK (2017) entered into electoral cooperation with the Hungarian Solidarity Movement. As part of their agreement, the DK promised that the civil organisation would have parliamentary representation. In September 2020, the DK also supported the Oltalom Charitable Association—renowned for its work with homeless and underprivileged persons—with a food delivery. Additionally, during the second wave of the coronavirus pandemic, the DK donated protective gear to health and social institutions as well as NGOs. An event that has had a vital impact on the operation of Hungarian civil society was the adoption by the government in 2017 of the ‘NGO Act’, which was based on the Russian model (the law was ultimately rescinded by the Orbán government in 2021 in response to a ruling by the European Court of Justice). This new law obliged the organisations that received at least 7.2 million forints (about e20,000) annually in foreign donations to report such donations to the authorities, who would keep a public record of them. The organisations were further also required to identify themselves as ‘foreign-funded organisations’ on their website and press material. This law, which violated the right of association, was discriminatory and intent on stigmatising the affected organisations. It also constituted a danger to the entire Hungarian civil sphere, especially the NGOs that are active in public affairs and politics. Furthermore, the NGO Act was a threat to the civic partners affiliated with the Hungarian

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY

109

S&D member parties, and the MSZP and DK both protested against the law. However, to put the civil partnerships reviewed above in perspective, movement politics in Hungary is not chiefly the domain of the S&D’s Hungarian member parties. In the 2000s, Fidesz built an extensive civic network, which it continued to operate when the party came to power in 2010 (Greskovits, 2020). In fact, Fidesz then reinforced this network using state funds (e.g., the Civil Alliance Forum), and the governing party often used a movement-type approach to mobilise its base (for instance by organising pro-government Peace Marches). Hungary’s first green party, Politics Can Be Different (LMP), was founded partly on the basis of a network of Hungarian environmental NGOs. The formerly far-right and currently centre-right Jobbik party also defined itself as a movement, as did the centrist-liberal Momentum party. The former integrated numerous organisations affiliated with the nationalist and far-right subculture in the early 2000s, while the latter made its debut in the political arena with a signature-collection campaign to thwart the government’s plans to host the Olympic Games in Budapest, and then built its base primarily around urban intellectuals. By contrast, in the recent past the S&D member parties have been far less engaged in building mass movements and have instead become more proactive in building ties to charities and specialised NGOs.

6

Programmatic Positioning

Before reviewing the overall positioning of the two S&D member parties in Hungary, some common features need to be highlighted, which stem from the particular Hungarian context in which these two parties are embedded. This will be followed by an overview of the parties’ positions on key policy areas. We will conclude with a brief discussion of some of the vital differences in the programmatic outlook of the two parties. The most important common feature between the programmes of the MSZP and DK is the massive emphasis on democracy and the rule of law, which is the starting point and the most extensively covered issue in both party platforms. This is clearly a result of the unusual situation in which Hungary finds itself under the Orbán government, which has taken massive steps to undermine the democratic ground rules and the rule of law. Relying on their constitutional supermajorities, since 2010 successive Fidesz governments have adopted a new constitution and a

110

˝ A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND G. GYORI

wide array of legislation to weaken democratic competition and to tilt the political playing field in their own favour. Fidesz has used its majorities in the legislature to undermine the system of checks and balances, removing practically all oversight of the government’s activities and vastly diminishing the possibilities for reining in corruption and abuses of power. Crucially, Hungarian elections have now twice consecutively been classified as unfair by the OSCE (Guardian, 2018), and whether the remaining weak rules protecting the considerably diminished democratic competition will be enforced is completely dependent on the government’s ‘goodwill’ since there is de facto no independent institution to ensure that the will of the voters prevails. It is therefore only logical that the opposition parties focus on this issue in particular. Since the relevant concerns are fairly widely covered in international media, and since the two parties are in agreement with respect to reversing Fidesz’s harmful decisions and to increasing democratic accountability, their stances in this context will not be discussed in detail here. Two specific aspects should be highlighted, however. First, much of what the opposition parties plan to do to reassert democratic principles and to shore up the rule of law would theoretically require a two-thirds majority in parliament, which they are very unlikely to win. This could well result in a situation in which even in the event of an election victory, the opposition parties will not be able to deliver on their most significant promise to voters because Fidesz will retain a veto on any changes that weaken its influence over the political system. Second, if the left-wing parties’ plans in this context are comprehensively enacted, Hungary will be a vibrant democracy, while the central government will have less control and autonomy to operate than it has ever had before. Given that the DK has not released its own platform for 2022, we looked at its manifesto for the 2018 election, which was filed under the heading ‘programme’ on the party’s website (DK 2017). Although some details on which the MSZP’s (2021) programme for 2022 programme specifically reflects (e.g., the privatisation of almost the entire higher education system into the hands of Fidesz-controlled foundations) were thus not covered in the DK programme because the relevance of the given issue was not clear in 2017, on the whole the circumstances were similar enough to make the DK’s previous programme relevant.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY

111

Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) The programme of the MSZP is the strongest and most detailed when it comes to economic and social issues, while the other three core areas (cultural liberalism, green issues and foreign policy) feature less prominently. The programme sets out vital indicators concerning the party’s intention to increase public spending in key areas, and we have collected the relevant promises from the most prominent areas (Table 2). Even considering that some of the areas may overlap and that some of the amount in spending increases may thus be counted twice in the table above, what is apparent is that the MSZP plans to expand public spending massively. Some of the party’s specific promises follow below. Significantly, the MSZP proposes the introduction of a basic income, although its realisation would be slightly more complicated than the model where everyone is basically given a fixed amount. Instead, the MSZP proposes to calculate a minimum allowance that people need for subsistence, and to make sure that everyone receives this payment—direct Table 2

Spending increases proposed by MSZP in high-priority policy areas

Policy area

Public healthcare Elementary and secondary education Pensions Social transfers Municipal governments Public funding for research and development

Current spending as a MSZP’s target in spending as a % of % of GDP1 GDP

Percentage increase over the current level of spending (%)

4.7 5.1

7 6–6.5

39 18–27

8.3 13.8 6.9

10 18 11

20 30 59

1.482

2.2–2.4

49–62

1 According to the MSZP programme, we did not verify their data. 2 On public funding for R&D, the MSZP programme did not mention a specific

figure, so for this particular area we draw on EU statistics: https://ec.europa.eu/eur ostat/documents/4187653/10321624/RD_intensity_2019data_Kreslic%C3%AD+pl% C3%A1tno+1.jpg/eab014e5-dafc-1bb6-33c3-3b1ab5a5a5c9?t=1606313161665.

112

˝ A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND G. GYORI

transfers would only be provided to those who do not receive an amount equivalent to the minimum allowance from either income or other social transfers such as pensions, public work, unemployment benefits, etc. Probably also as a reflection of its base, which tends to be elderly, the MSZP wants to support pensioners, specifically by significantly raising the minimum amount of pensions (so that no pension can be below the minimum needed for subsistence). Furthermore, the MSZP proposes that for a transition period of three years, the inflation-based indexing of pensions be supplemented by an index based on real wage increases. This is to counteract the increasing gap between pensions and wages because the latter has been rising far slower recently than the former, leading to an increasing gap in the respective incomes of retired pensioners and active workers. Moreover, the MSZP also wants to decrease inequality between pensioners, which is why the portion of the indexing based on the increase of real wages would be distributed equally among pensioners (unlike the inflation-based element of the indexing, it would not be proportional to the individual’s pension), and the bonus 13th monthly pension would also be equal in amount across the board. Increasing spending on healthcare, education, unemployment benefits and family assistance, the overall policies of the MSZP strongly aim to reduce socio-economic inequalities. The party therefore wants to replace the flat tax system with a progressive taxation system, for example, and it also wants to increase Hungary’s low corporate tax rate, especially as concerns large corporations, which the MSZP says have been favoured by the government’s economic policies. The MSZP stresses that it does not share the widely held perception that the overall tax rate in Hungary is too high. Instead, the MSZP believes it is too low, so the party wants to increase the tax burden on the whole. The MSZP does pledge, however, to reduce the highly regressive value added tax, which at 27% is extraordinarily high by international comparison. In terms of family support, the MSZP wants to change Fidesz’s policy of aiming most support at medium and higher income families, and it wants to boost spending on the types of benefits aimed at poorer families, while promising to retain some of the more popular middle-class benefits, such as, for example, the income tax deduction for families with children under the age of 18. The programme notes the big decrease in education spending and points out that the quality of Hungarian education has declined significantly under Fidesz (the document refers to the widely cited PISA

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY

113

figures which confirm this). Furthermore, the Hungarian education system, which has always been very unequal, is among the worst performers of developed countries in terms of reproducing and increasing inequality. Changing this is among the priorities designated in the MSZP’s programme, and at least some of the substantial increase in education spending proposed (between 18 and 27% of the current level of spending) will be used to that end. This includes a major expansion in early intervention (starting before children reach the age of three), for example by expanding the network of social workers to ensure that children from underprivileged backgrounds do not start falling behind. The MSZP programme also includes an extended version of the baby bond programme, which would give underprivileged children a larger nest egg from the state with which to start their adult lives. In addition, the MSZP wants to reverse a decade of Fidesz’s efforts at weakening the rights of workers, including amendment of the brutally restrictive measures of the Labour Code (which was massively overhauled by Fidesz to benefit employers back in 2011 and which has been restrictively amended ever since). The MSZP promises to repeal the controversial ‘Slave Law’, which allows employers to force workers into massive overtime for which they get paid only with significant delay. The party would furthermore strengthen the collective bargaining rights of workers, which Fidesz has essentially hollowed out. In addition, the MSZP pledges to raise the minimum wage and to make it the highest among the Visegrád countries (from its current lowest level) and to make it tax-exempt. The party also wants to put a cap on executive pay. The MSZP programme does not dwell heavily on issues involving cultural liberalism, which is probably partly a reflection of its efforts not to alienate voters who are open to its left-wing economic and social policies but are often sceptical of left-liberal values in the social and cultural realm. One striking element of the MSZP programme that is likely to appeal to such voters is the heavy emphasis on security issues, in the context both of public safety/policing as well as the military, which appear early on in the manifesto. Although the programme does not tabulate how much it would spend in total on the police, it does propose increasing police pay, hiring new officers and reorganising the entire force—with a view to increasing public safety, particularly in underserved (especially rural) and underprivileged areas. Likely in response to the strong negative attitudes in Hungarian society towards refugees—which are to a significant extent the result of the Fidesz

114

˝ A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND G. GYORI

government’s massive taxpayer-funded campaign, which focused relentlessly on the dangers of migration and the EU’s allegedly wrong attitude about it—the MSZP devotes scant attention to the subject. Rather than laying out its vision or policies in detail, its terse statement on the subject says: ‘The Hungarian Socialist Party believes that the local population’s sense of physical, economic and cultural anxieties concerning the settlement in Hungary of people from foreign countries needs to be respected and […] other methods of solidarity and supporting refugees should be applied.’ (MSZP programme, p. 35). Among the issues where the party stakes out a clearly left-wing position on a cultural issue is that of confessional schools, which have massively gained ground under Fidesz thanks to legislative assistance and disproportionately favourable funding from the government. The relevant constitutional principle, which states that local schools may only be turned over to religious denominations if non-confessional public alternatives are available nearby, has suffered significantly as a result. The MSZP programme promises to remedy this problem, if necessary by taking back schools from the churches. If this were to happen, it would very likely generate a massive conflict with both the churches and Fidesz, which represents the Christian right. The MSZP’s manifesto does not focus on issues that are currently in the focus of many left-wing programmes internationally. The situation of women is therefore barely discussed in the platform, with a mere 8 mentions on 129 pages, usually as asides in a larger discussion. And while some of these mentions are important—e.g., the promises of equal pay and to address the discrimination of women in the labour market—there is little attention paid to the situation of women overall. Hungary’s vast Roma minority, which is estimated at 5–8% of the total population, and large segments of whom live in dire poverty and are subject to systemic discrimination, are mentioned only twice in the document, both as sidenotes to a broader point. Sexual minorities are not mentioned at all, nor does the MSZP explain how and whether it wants to countermand the discriminatory legislation enacted by Fidesz against them. While the MSZP programme is very strong and focused on issues that are traditional left-wing concerns (especially inequality, labour, public education, healthcare and social benefits), green issues are less emphasised, although the party’s commitment to improvement in this area is clear. Despite some of the environmental promises sounding ambitious by current Hungarian standards (the rapid closure of all coal power plants

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY

115

and a 55% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2030), on the whole, the programme is not very detailed, involving promises of drafting policies in the future and of offering some sort of incentives rather than taking resolute action and setting clear indicators. At the same time, the document does include firm commitments that under the MSZP Hungary will join and comply with the requirements of international climate agreements, including the European Green Deal. Arguably the party’s position does therefore provide a basis for more ambitious domestic policies, even if the programme itself is less rich in the details. The commitment to the European project suffuses the whole of the MSZP platform. In the chapter entitled ‘Our place is in Europe!’, the MSZP makes very clear that it wants to reverse what could be called the eastern reorientation of Hungarian foreign policy under Fidesz and to firmly entrench Hungary in the Western alliance system once again, with a forceful re-engagement in European affairs. Among the relevant commitments are its support of a European defence force (which in the MSZP’s vision would complement NATO rather than compete with it); the promise to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office; the creation of a European Health Union; enhanced cooperation with OLAF; and support for the European Green Deal. Even more importantly, the European Union as the linchpin of Hungarian development and as the relevant policy framework and point of reference, recurs throughout the document in a wide array of public policy areas, which makes it clear that the MSZP envisions Hungary’s progress and its public policies as firmly embedded in a joint European framework. While it does not repudiate the ties to major powers outside the EU and the West, emphasising the importance of bilateral ties with Russia, China and India, on the whole, it is clear that these take a backseat to the priority of Hungary’s EU and NATO membership. Foreign policy is arguably the policy field where the party has the best track record in government because during the MSZP’s governance Hungary was a firm European and NATO ally. This strongly enhances the credibility of the MSZP’s promise to restore Hungary’s foreign policy to its earlier Western alignment. Democratic Coalition (DK) A vital distinction between the DK and the MSZP is that the former identifies itself as a centre-left force that is open to the political centre,

116

˝ A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND G. GYORI

and its members and supporters equally include persons with progressive social democratic, liberal and conservative worldviews. This kind of catch-all approach is also reflected in the party’s programme, which includes a wide variety of policies, some of which might appeal to leftwingers/social democrats and some of which liberals might find more appealing, although there is nothing in the DK’s manifesto that appeals in particular to conservatives, save for a few commonplaces with fairly universal appeal (e.g., soft commitments to better public safety and nurturing Hungary’s cultural heritage). It is in terms of the programme’s economic and social dimension that the mutual and occasionally conflicting presence of left-wing and liberal elements is most striking. The DK’s commitment to left-wing values is most vividly reflected in its emphasis on decreasing inequality, fighting poverty and extending equal opportunities. Among the more left-wing socio-economic elements of its programme, the DK wants to establish a minimum family income that would top up whatever income is available to poor families and unemployed individuals with a supplementary benefit that would be calculated on the basis of the other social benefits they receive and the size of the household to ensure that when all their income has been tallied up they dispose of the minimum needed for their subsistence. In an innovative twist on the popular utility price freeze imposed by the Fidesz government, the DK would mandate that up to a defined minimum which a person needs for subsistence, water and electricity must be made available free of charge, while utility providers would, in turn, be more flexible when pricing their services above the mandatory minimum. The DK would also make sure that a minimum amount of heating materials is made available to households, adjusted to the type of heating they use. In terms of more classical welfare policies, the DK would increase, among other things, the universal family allowance (which Fidesz has neglected in favour of benefits aimed at the middle and upper classes); the period of eligibility for unemployment benefits (which Fidesz had slashed drastically from nine months to three) and the minimum wage (although not as ambitiously as the MSZP, which wants to have the highest minimum wage in the four Visegrad countries before converging towards the figures in western Europe) by agreeing with employers to increase [the minimum wage] by a rate of 3–5% above the rate of inflation for a period of five years so that its amount will rise to the minimum

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY

117

necessary for subsistence. The DK also wants to ensure that the rights of employees can be asserted and that their right to strike is restored. In addition, the DK plans to increase pensions, and in order to ensure that the purchasing power of pensions does not decline, it plans to regulate the consumption basket on the basis of which pensions are calculated by law, in order to make sure that pension increases track the actual spending of pensioners. Furthermore, the DK would also pay an extra pension, an unspecified amount in excess of the inflation-based indexing. Pensions mark one of the few areas where the DK’s spending plans are specific, with the promise that if the economic growth figures are up to expectations (—in other words, if the real growth of the economy is at least 3–4%), the DK would use a substantial chunk of the additional state revenue—which it estimates at 150 billion-180 billion forints (about e400m–e500m)—to top up pensions. An interesting contrast emerges between the DK’s outlook on primary and secondary education on the one hand, and its approach to healthcare on the other, with higher education falling somewhat in between. Primary and secondary education (as well as kindergarten) are unequivocally state responsibilities, the DK says, and it promises a variety of measures to improve education, teachers’ pay and the access of underprivileged children to quality education. With regard to healthcare, however, the DK makes clear that the state can play a partial role at best. Instead, the DK manifesto argues that society must be made to understand that the improvement of its health situation is primarily in its own hands. For the DK, this responsibility involves a wide range of activities on the part of the individual, such as exercise, keeping up with screening tests and potentially also seeking private insurance for services that a DKenvisioned public healthcare system would not provide. Thus, while for pre-university education the DK identifies a clear state responsibility, for healthcare it proposes a tripartite system, in which emergency services are universally available; a set of standard healthcare services are available to those who are part of the social insurance system; and a variety of optional services are available to those who have private insurance or seek out private providers. This is clearly a move away from the universal social healthcare model and a step towards a partial privatisation of the healthcare system, although in some ways it would merely constitute an official acknowledgement of what is actually happening in reality. In higher education, the DK takes a compromise stance on the polarising issue of tuition fees (when the government led by the current DK

118

˝ A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND G. GYORI

chair Ferenc Gyurcsány in the second half of the 2000s lost a referendum on the subject by a wide margin, it ultimately catalysed Gyurcsány’s resignation at the time). The DK thus proposes to offer every student the first year of university for free, while from the second year onwards the DK would extend some merit- and needs-based scholarships for eligible students, with those who are ineligible being required to pay fees to continue with their studies. The party’s more liberal bent is even more pronounced when it comes to economic policy. Although, like most opposition parties, the DK commits itself to restoring progressive taxation, it plans to lower the income tax rate of 15% on most incomes, while the lower of the two planned higher tax rates would only enter into effect above a threshold of a gross salary of 1 million forints (2750 euros), which would affect very few employees. The highest tax rate would actually be an extra tax levied on incomes in excess of 3 million forints (8300 euros), a month, which would barely affect anyone in Hungary. Taken together with the rest of the programme, which emphasises that the rich rather than the middle class need to be called to task for helping the poor, the DK’s income tax policy meshes with the party’s overall approach. In general, too, the DK promises to simplify and slash taxes and to make the life of enterprises easier. However, in contrast to the MSZP, the DK says nothing about either increasing corporate taxes or about taxes in Hungary being too low overall. Much of the focus in the economic section of the DK programme is on increasing competitiveness and helping enterprises by reducing red tape and superfluous regulations, while rejecting the prevailing corrupt form of subsidies where political loyalty rather than competitiveness or productivity determine eligibility. The DK eschews the vision of a muscular state that micromanages and dominates the economy, arguing that the state’s role in the economy is primarily that of a regulator and supervisor. The DK also pleads for a responsible fiscal policy where the deficit does not exceed 3%, arguing that the state’s investment needs and social outlays should be covered by the surplus revenue generated by a 3–4% real growth rate. Although it does not devote much space to these issues and remains vague on the details, the DK manifesto puts a far stronger emphasis on the classic social and cultural policy issues in Hungary than the MSZP programme. In a terse statement, the DK commits itself to the legalisation of gay marriage, although it does not explore the situation of sexual

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY

119

minorities in any detail. The DK also dedicates distinct chapters to the situation of women and the Roma minority, in which it highlights the importance of these issues in Hungary and how the social reality lags behind what is desirable. Taking a clear stance on a divisive issue, the DK commits itself to a 30% quota for women in all kinds of state institutions and also supports mandatory quotas for corporate boards in line with the relevant European recommendations. Regarding immigration policy, the DK programme skirts the issue altogether, merely noting that the party wants the EU to manage this area and is willing to follow EU policy. The DK does, however, take a clear position on another highly polarising issue in Hungary, and therefore the party rejects voting rights for dual citizens who are not residents of Hungary—a proposal that is squarely aimed at ethnic Hungarians recently enfranchised by the Orbán government in large part because they overwhelmingly support the governing party. This makes the DK the only opposition party to call for the revocation of the voting rights of non-resident ethnic Hungarians. While environmental considerations repeatedly arise in various sections of the programme (e.g., agriculture, transport), the DK’s manifesto does not put much of an emphasis on environmentalism. The dedicated subsection is brief at 2 pages and does not allow for much detail nor does it make many far-reaching promises by today’s standards. On the plus side, the programme does promise that the DK will adopt a climate protection plan that puts forth more ambitious emission reduction targets than those of international climate agreements. Much of the DK programme on this issue is focused on incentives and subsidies, especially for renewables but also for energy storage and other areas where environmental success neatly meshes with economic growth. It is apparent from the DK’s proposals that much of its environmental focus is on the areas where the needs of the environment can be reconciled with economic dynamism, such as for instance investments in the generation of renewable energy. One key specific target set by the DK is that by 2025 a quarter of Hungary’s energy needs should be covered by renewables, while by 2050 this ratio should rise to two-thirds. To this end, the DK wants to offer subsidies and loans for the development of solar and wind power plants; use EU funds to help establish companies in high-unemployment areas that supply the necessary products; and fund the energy-efficient remodelling of residential buildings, with the goal that a quarter of residential buildings become net energy producers by 2025.

120

˝ A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND G. GYORI

On Europe specifically, and Hungary’s place in the Western alliance system in general, the DK is clearly the party with the strongest proEuropean and pro-Western message in the Hungarian party landscape. The DK is the only party that openly commits itself to the idea of a United States of Europe, and it calls for European patriotism in the place of traditional nationalism. In the same vein, it also argues for the introduction of the euro, accession to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and deeper integration in all policy areas. In addition, the DK also seeks to reorient Hungarian foreign policy towards a greater commitment to NATO. The DK’s brief but dedicated chapter on foreign policy not only stresses where Hungary’s loyalties ought to lie but is also unusually direct in identifying Russia as an opponent and in committing itself to joint European policies aimed at scaling back Russian expansion and preventing the spread of Russian influence. In a remarkably strong statement, the DK also says that it looks at the ‘full sovereignty of the Baltic states as the guarantee of our own security’. The strong words on Russia are striking, especially given that relations between Russia and Hungary actually began warming during the premiership of the current DK chair Ferenc Gyurcsány—at a time when the then-leader of the opposition, Viktor Orbán, was harshly critical of the rapprochement. In summary, while there are some key similarities between the two party programmes—e.g., the commitment to democracy and the rule of law; to Europe and NATO; and to the fight against poverty and the lack of opportunities for underprivileged groups—the two parties are also distinct in their emphases and approaches. The MSZP programme is to a significant extent that of a classic social democratic party, while the more recent issues that tend to figure prominently on the agendas of centre-left parties today—e.g., gender and the social integration of minorities—receive little attention in the MSZP manifesto. The DK, by contrast, takes a distinctly more classical liberal approach on economic issues—and that liberalism heavily influences the DK’s health policies and also leaves an imprint on its approach towards higher education. At the same time, however, the DK programme is somewhat stronger on issues involving cultural liberalism. While it would be tempting to thus classify the MSZP simply as more left-wing and the DK as more centrist, the actual reality in the Hungarian party landscape is more complicated. The DK’s positions on gay marriage; the vision of a united Europe; nationalism and in particular the voting rights of ethnic Hungarians outside

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY

121

Hungary, for example, make it clearly the least moderate among the parliamentary parties. Whether its positions on these issues qualify as leftwing or liberal is a different matter, but the fact is that on these issues the MSZP is closer to the ideological centre of Hungarian society while the DK represents an ideological flank.

7

Social Democratic Voters, Social Democratic Issues

In the following section, we will examine the voter profiles of the supporters of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the Democratic Coalition (DK). For analytical purposes, we will compare and contrast the preferences and characteristics of these voters with the relevant data about government party voters and the average Hungarian voter. We will also look at the main trends with respect to the Hungarian public’s support for social democratic values and public policies. Distribution of Voters by the Level of Urbanisation The distribution of the MSZP and DK voters based on the type of settlement in which they live differs from the distribution of the Hungarian public overall in two respects. Firstly, village residents are underrepresented among these two parties’ supporters, and secondly, the residents of Hungary’s largest urban area by far, the capital Budapest, are heavily overrepresented in turn. When comparing the voters of the DK and the MSZP, we found several differences that were significant beyond the survey’s margin of error (Fig. 4). In 2021, DK voters were five percentage points (27%) more likely to be Budapest residents than MSZP voters (22%). The margin was the same in the county seats, except there the difference tilted in favour of the MSZP (18% vs. 13%). There were also modest differences in terms of the MSZP and DK voters’ respective likelihood of living in smaller municipalities, with the share of small-town residents being slightly higher among MSZP voters (37% vs. 35%). Meanwhile, the DK had a slightly higher share of village residents (25% vs. 22%). We found a major shift since 2018 in the distribution of the two parties’ voters by municipality type, as both party bases have become stronger in the capital. The share of DK supporters living in Budapest in 2021 had increased by 11 percentage points compared with 2018, while

122

˝ A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND G. GYORI

Fig. 4 Distribution of voters by residence (%) (Source Závecz Research, February 2021)

MSZP voters are now five percentage points more likely to live in the capital. Between 2018 and 2021 the parties experienced the biggest drop among small-town residents, with the MSZP supporters in that demographic falling by seven percentage points, and the DK supporters falling six percentage points. Gender Composition There are no major differences in the gender composition of the MSZP and DK. Men are underrepresented in the bases of both parties (44% of MSZP voters were men in 2021 and 56% were women, while for the DK the relevant figures were 41% and 59%, respectively). It is also worth highlighting that the share of women in the DK’s voter base has increased significantly (by 12 percentage points) since 2018 when men and women were almost equally represented (53% and 47%, respectively). Age Composition As compared to the general population, the oldest age group is overrepresented in both party bases (Fig. 5). At the same time, the MSZP’s voter base is significantly more elderly not only than the average population but

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY

123

also as compared to the DK voters. Eight out of ten (81%) MSZP voters in 2021 were at least 50 years old, a share that is 34 percentage points higher than in the population at large and 22 points higher than among DK voters. A quarter of MSZP voters are between the ages of 50 and 59, and over half are older than 60. Among DK voters, the share of voters over 60 is also significantly (13 points) higher than in Hungarian society overall—they made up 42% of the DK’s base. Young people are somewhat underrepresented in Fidesz’s base, too, but the share of the two youngest age cohorts in the Fidesz base (33%) is still three times higher than in that of the MSZP. Fidesz’s edge among young voters is somewhat less pronounced when compared to the DK, but the governing party’s share of voters under the age of 40 was still seven points higher than that of the DK (33% vs. 26%). The MSZP’s voter base has shifted radically towards the older cohorts in recent years, and the DK has experienced a similar trend, albeit to a lesser extent. In the case of the MSZP, the share of voters under the age of 30 dropped by seven percentage points between 2018 and 2021; the share of those between the ages of 30 and 39 dropped by eight points; and the proportion of those between the ages of 40 and 49 fell by six points. At the same time, the share of those between the ages of 50 and 59 surged by 12 points, and the proportion of those over 60 was nine points higher in 2021 than it had been three years earlier. There were only

Fig. 5 Distribution of voters by age (%) (Source Závecz Research, February 2021)

124

˝ A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND G. GYORI

two age groups whose share declined within the DK base (the proportion of those under 30 fell by two points, while the share of those between 30 and 39 dropped by five percentage points), while the share of the oldest generations increased somewhat (by 2–3 points). Composition by Educational Attainment In terms of their educational attainment, only MSZP voters diverge markedly from the national average (Fig. 6). Among MSZP voters, the share of those with the lowest educational attainment (43%) is 14 percentage points higher than in the population at large. At the same time, the share of those with university degrees (10%) is eight points lower than in the general public, and the proportion of those with vocational education (18%) is four points below the national average. The educational attainment of DK voters did not differ significantly from either that of the government party supporters or that of society overall. Since 2018, the share of voters with a maximum of eight years of primary education has increased in the voter bases of both the MSZP and the DK. In the former group, it surged by ten points between 2018 and 2021, and in the latter by four points. While the percentage of those with vocational training dropped among MSZP voters (down by two points), it increased significantly among the DK’s supporters (up by seven points

Fig. 6 Distribution of voters by education (%) (Source Závecz Research, February 2021)

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY

125

as compared to 2018). The share of those with completed high school education was nine points lower in the bases of both parties in 2021 as compared to three years earlier. Changes in the shares of those with higher education degrees were within the margin of error. Distribution by Wealth and Class Identity The distribution of the social democratic voters based on their financial situation reveals a very distinct pattern. Figure 7 presents the share of various income groups in three political communities (MSZP, DK and Fidesz) as well as in society overall. In the interest of better comparability, these figures only include voters who answered the question about their financial situation. On the whole, there are major differences between the financial situations of the MSZP and Democratic Coalition voters. The share of voters from backgrounds in which the per capita monthly income per household member was 150,000 forints (about e420) or less is far higher in the MSZP base than among DK supporters (73% vs. 56%). While on the whole, the financial situation of DK voters converges towards the average of Hungarian society and towards that of Fidesz (although it needs to be highlighted that the two uppermost income segments were overrepresented in the DK base), among the supporters of the MSZP the below average income groups are substantially overrepresented. The Potential Voters of the Social Democratic Parties We analysed the potential voting pool of the social democratic parties— that is, their theoretically attainable base of voters—based on the secondary preferences of voters. Závecz Research measured this in a survey conducted in February 2021 by asking the respondents who they would vote for if their preferred party was not on the ballot. The voters of both social democratic parties exhibited a substantial willingness to support the respective other parties. At the same time, it was more typical of DK supporters to select the MSZP as their second choice, while the DK in turn was less likely to be picked by MSZP voters as their nextbest alternative. While 65% of DK voters said that the MSZP was their secondary preference, only 39% of MSZP voters selected the DK as their second choice.

126

˝ A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND G. GYORI

Fig. 7 Distribution of voters by income (%) (Note Without those who refused to answer. Source Závecz Research, February 2021)

In our analysis, we classified those voters as potential social democratic voters who did not select either of the two S&D member parties as their first choice but indicated that one of them was their secondary preference. Based on the surveys, 5% of the Hungarian voting-age population (roughly 400,000 voters) are potential social democratic voters. We found the largest pool of potential social democratic voters among those whose first choice was Jobbik (30% of the total pool we identified), the party that has shifted from the far-right to the centre-right in recent years (Fig. 8). The voters of the centrist-liberal Momentum party provide the secondlargest such group: 28% of potential social democratic voters would opt for Momentum as their first choice right now. The preference patterns of social democratic voters were not unique or distinct as compared to society overall. At the same time, it is worth pointing out that 38% of them live in villages, a figure that is nine percentage points higher than the share of rural voters in the total population. Furthermore, 56% of potential social democratic voters thus identified are men, while 44% are women.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY

127

Fig. 8 Distribution of potential social democratic voters by their primary partisanship (%) (Source Závecz Research, February 2021)

The Most Pressing Problems as Perceived by the Hungarian Public and the Popularity of Social Democratic Values In the following, we will present the issues that Hungarians deem as the most important by reviewing what we refer to as the problem map of the Hungarian public (Fig. 9). The respondents of a survey conducted by Policy Solutions (2021) in March 2021 were asked to select the three most important issues from a list of 14 problems in Hungary which we present in the figure below. The severe impact of the economic crisis triggered by the covid-19 pandemic was also reflected in the responses, as four out of the five most often-mentioned problems concerned the economy or subsistence. Hungarians were most likely to see the high cost of living as the most pressing issue (55% of respondents referred to this). The problem of low pay did not lag far behind (52% mentioned it), and the low quality of healthcare was also mentioned by a high proportion of respondents (42%) at the time when the third wave of the covid-19 pandemic began.

128

˝ A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND G. GYORI

After the top three problems, there was a significant gap in terms of the frequency with which the fourth most often cited problem, namely inequality, was mentioned—it was selected by fewer than a third of all respondents (29%). The problem of low pensions was also mentioned relatively often, with over a fifth (23%) picking it as a top issue. Corruption (16%), being in a vulnerable position at work (14%), and the low quality of education (13%) were each mentioned by a similar share of respondents. Roughly every tenth respondent designated environmental concerns, housing problems, immigration and the democratic deficit as important problems. Emigration (mentioned by 7%) and the difficulties of life in small rural communities (8%) rounded out the list. We also looked separately at the respective responses of the government party, opposition and undecided voters, to see how they each perceived these problems. The top five problems were the same in all groups, and their ranking was also virtually identical. In other words, financial difficulties and the deficiencies of the healthcare system were considered as

Fig. 9 Which of these do you consider to be the biggest problems in Hungary currently? (Source Policy Solutions, March 2021)

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY

129

the top problems in all political subsegments. There were, however, more substantial differences in the ranking of the less frequently mentioned issues. As compared to the other groups, the issue of environmentalism was somewhat further ahead according to government supporters (17% of them mentioned it), as was immigration (11%), while corruption and democratic decline were in the last spots in the subsample of Fidesz voters (each was mentioned by 6% of these respondents). Opposition voters, by contrast, were more likely than the average to mention corruption (18%), the declining quality of education (18%) and the problem of the democratic deficit (13%). The undecided voters’ ranking of problems and the share of respondents in this segment who mentioned each issue was roughly on par with the average values of the public overall. The exceptions were two issues that were designated as relatively important by either government supporters—namely migration—or opposition voters—the decline in the quality of democracy. These were far less likely to be seen as important by undecided voters. A survey conducted by Policy Solutions (2020) at the end of the summer 2020 also showed that there is a massive demand in Hungarian society for left-wing economic policies. An overwhelming majority of Hungarian society (82%) agreed that it is the state’s responsibility to reduce inequalities within society, while only 15% of respondents would leave this up to the market. Currently, those who have lost their jobs are eligible to receive unemployment benefits for a maximum of three months. Seven out of ten Hungarians thought that the eligibility period for unemployment benefits should be extended. This was a significant shift compared to the relevant data in 2018. While 54% of respondents indicated back in 2018 that the eligibility period for unemployment benefits was too short at three months, in 2020 this number was 16 percentage points higher. Even a substantial majority of Fidesz voters (60%) support a longer unemployment benefit eligibility period. The majority of Hungarian society also sympathise with the left-wing position on tax policy. Over three-quarters of Hungarian society (78%) support the introduction of a progressive tax scheme, whereas only every fifth Hungarian shares the Orbán government’s view that the flat tax is the fairest form of distributing the tax burden. There is a near social consensus on the question of taxing the super-rich. A mere 8% of respondents therefore said that there was no need to levy a tax on the wealthiest of the wealthy, whereas 88% of Hungarians agreed with the proposition

130

˝ A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND G. GYORI

that ‘the rich should pay!’ Furthermore, based on data from Policy Solutions (2021) in March 2021, nearly two-thirds of Hungarians support the introduction of a basic income scheme, with 65% of respondents agreeing that the state should provide everyone with a minimum amount of money that is necessary for subsistence. Only 29% believed that this should not be a part of the state’s responsibilities. While on economic issues the majority of Hungarian society clearly incline towards left-wing positions, when it comes to cultural/identity policy issues they lean towards conservative views. Based on our data from August 2020, a majority of Hungarians (58%) are opposed to same-sex marriages, while only slightly more than a third of respondents (35%) would liberalise the institution of marriage. Hungarian society is divided when it comes to the issue of fostering the socio-economic inclusion of Roma. The share of those who agree that the state needs to focus preeminently on helping our fellow Roma citizens was just as high as the share of those who believe that this objective deserves no special effort on the part of the state (48%–48%). Among the issues involving identity politics, the Hungarian public only proved progressive with respect to women’s equality. An overwhelming majority of Hungarians (86%) therefore believe that it is unjust that women in Hungary often receive less pay for the same work as men. Many in Hungary also reject the notion that the issue of violence against women is overblown (68%). Furthermore, three-quarters of Hungarians (74%) would support the adoption of a law that would oblige employers to publicly release information concerning the pay differentials between men and women at their companies.

8

Conclusion

For the Hungarian opposition, the period beginning in 2010 was the decade of fragmentation. While before 2010 Hungarian politics was defined by the struggle between two major parties, it took until 2022 for the political system to revert back to a situation in which two roughly equally strong sides face off against one another. For this to come about, six different parties have had to cooperate, none of which really stand out in terms of strength and none of which is obviously equipped to play the leading role in this alliance. One aspect of the overall fragmentation on the opposition side was that the Democratic Coalition (DK) seceded from the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) in 2011. As a result, the S&D Group in the European Parliament came to feature two

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY

131

Hungarian member parties. The emergence of a diverse and multi-party opposition also implies that the MSZP and DK must brace themselves for long-term cooperation—be it in government or opposition—with political forces which espouse views that are vastly different from their own. The ambition of both the MSZP (a party which pursues more traditional social democratic policies) and the DK (which has a social liberal outlook) will therefore be to infuse the policy platform of the emerging multi-party formation with as many of their own values and positions as possible. Furthermore, after the 2022 election, the opposition parties will have to grapple with the question of the type of organisational structure in which they—including the Hungarian S&D member parties—can conceivably or practically operate. One often-voiced opinion among the current Hungarian opposition politicians is that there are too many parties. Given this widely shared sentiment, it is plausible that the cooperation between some of the opposition forces will become more intense during the 2022–2026 term of parliament, which would in turn result in a narrowing of the dispersed and broad selection of opposition parties. Among the Hungarian S&D member parties, the MSZP performed better in the polls and in elections until 2019. The first time that the DK performed better than the MSZP was in the European Parliament election of 2019, and since then the balance between the two parties has shifted in favour of the DK, which has established a sustained lead over the MSZP. Although the DK has had more voters than the MSZP in the past three years, the latter continues to retain a relatively strong party organisation and infrastructure. As compared to the DK, the MSZP has had more funds at its disposal. Furthermore, the MSZP also has far more local politicians in elected positions than the DK. Although the resources of the MSZP lag far behind those of the ruling party, within the resource-poor opposition the MSZP’s organisation and financial resources make it an essential player. Consequently, the MSZP finds it less challenging to tackle the administrative/mobilisation hurdles with which the more recently established political organisations often massively struggle and which sometimes even threaten their very survival. The DK, too, is an essential player in the opposition bloc on account of the level of its support. Indeed, throughout 2021, the DK was consistently the leading party of the opposition, which it also proved at the intra-opposition primaries in September–October 2021. It also needs to be noted that part of the DK’s current high level of support is due to voters that the DK has

132

˝ A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND G. GYORI

successfully lured away from the MSZP. One data point that illustrates the high level of fluidity between the voters of the two parties is that the supporters of both, the MSZP and the DK, were most likely to select the respective other parties as their secondary preference. The willingness to pick the MSZP as their second choice is especially pronounced among DK voters. A key problem that confronts both S&D member parties is the ageing of their electorates. The MSZP is even more strongly affected by this problem than the DK. While 80% of MSZP voters are over the age of 50, the same ratio is 60% in the case of the DK. Such a pronounced demographic reliance on elderly voters clearly jeopardises the long-term prospects of these parties. Furthermore, this trend of ageing voters has continued in both parties since the 2018 election, as has the trend that both parties are increasingly likely to be supported in major cities (in the case of the DK, especially in Budapest) and among women. The strategic challenge is thus obvious: young people, rural residents living in small municipalities, and men are the demographic groups that both parties must do more to attract. From the data presented in this chapter is readily apparent that those younger voters who would be potentially open to voting for one of the social democratic parties (we defined this segment as those voters who picked either the MSZP or the DK as their second preference but did not select the other social democratic party as their primary preference) are most likely to be the supporters of either Jobbik or Momentum at this time—both of which are traditionally popular among young people. For DK supporters, former prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány and his wife Klára Dobrev, a Member of the European Parliament, are the central forces of the party, and they hold the political community together. However, at the same time, the former prime minister (and his controversial public standing) is the main obstacle in the way of further expansion in the DK’s societal reach and public support. Fidesz wished to turn Ferenc Gyurcsány into one of the centrepieces of its own campaign for the 2022 election, warning of the threat that a return of Gyurcsány and his allies to power would imply. The frequent presence of the former prime minister in public discourse puts a dent in the opposition’s hopes that the public will forget about the memories of the pre-2010 governments. The impacts of the major transformations in the media market and the consequent overwhelming media dominance of the governing party are

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY

133

not just limited to the MSZP and DK as they affect the entire opposition negatively. Nevertheless, these impacts make it more difficult to convey social democratic messages to the electorate. Fidesz has used the public media as a tool for governmental propaganda ever since winning power in 2010, and at the same time, it has also devised and is implementing a strategy in which government-friendly investors take over a growing number of commercial media outlets and realign them politically and editorially to support the government and to criticise the opposition relentlessly. Concomitantly, the opposition parties—and especially the left-wing parties among them—have access to fewer and fewer media that cover their views. Despite the limited possibilities, these parties must nonetheless achieve progress in this area. For the time being, the best option for the MSZP and the DK is to focus on online solutions and to shore up their personal presence in as many parts of the country as possible. In the future, the S&D member parties’ greatest potential for increasing their electoral support lies in the Hungarian public’s embrace of social democratic values. On socio-economic issues, a clear majority of Hungarian society hold left-wing views, and the popularity of what one could call social democratic positions is far higher among the public than the aggregate support for the MSZP and DK. The question of who will most credibly represent these left-wing values in Hungarian politics is a vital one. Although the credibility of the MSZP and the DK took a serious hit during the period of the left-wing governments between 2002 and 2010, support for these parties could conceivably be boosted among voters if the parties were able to reposition themselves as the most credible representatives of the public’s preferences on issues involving the costs of living; the struggle against inequality; workers’ rights; solidarity; fairness; and social mobility. This could then see their political prospects improve substantially. It is also important to stress that if political discourse were to centre on these problems, which are traditionally seen as left-wing issues, then it would be favourable not only for the MSZP and DK specifically but also for the entire opposition, which would then have a better chance to improve their position. If, however, the central issues on the Hungarian political agenda are cultural issues, it provides a more favourable terrain for Fidesz since the governing party’s conservative stances on these issues (e.g., family policies, LGBT issues, migration) are closer to the preferences of the majority and are also more likely to mobilise them. The most

134

˝ A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND G. GYORI

vital question of the coming period will thus be whether Hungarian politics will focus on socio-economic or cultural issues. This question will also massively determine whether the diverse Hungarian opposition, including the two S&D member parties, will be in a position to mount a serious challenge to Viktor Orbán and his ruling Fidesz party in the 2022–2026 term.

Bibliography 24.hu. (2020). Gyurcsány a szavazatok 97,4 százalékával nyerte a DK elnökválasztását. https://24.hu/belfold/2020/02/18/gyurcsany-ferenc-dkelnokvalasztas/ Abou-Chadi, T., Mitteregger, R., & Mudde, C. (2021). Left behind by the working class? Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Abou-Chadi, T., & Wagner, M. (2020). Electoral fortunes of social democratic parties: Do second dimension positions matter? Journal of European Public Policy, 27 , 246–272. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1701532 Bakke, E., & Sitter, N. (2021). Each unhappy in its own way? The rise and fall of social democracy in the Visegrád countries since 1989. In N. Brandal, Ø. Bratberg, & D. E. Thorsen (Eds.), Social democracy in the 21st century (pp. 37–68). Emerald Publishing Limited. Bandau, F. (2022). What explains the electoral crisis of social democracy? A systematic review of the literature. Government and Opposition (online first). https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2022.10 Bíró-Nagy, A. (2013). Hungary. In J. M. De Waele, F. Escalona, & M. Vieira (Eds.), The Palgrave handbook of social democracy in the European Union (pp. 452–469). Palgrave Macmillan. Bíró-Nagy, A. (2017). Illiberal democracy in Hungary: The social background and practical steps of building an illiberal state. In P. Morillas (Ed.), Illiberal democracies in the EU: The Visegrad Group and the risk of disintegration (pp. 31–44). CIDOB. Böcskei, B., & Seb˝ ok, M. (2018). Hungary: Left without a party in a twoparty system. OpenDemocracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-eur ope-make-it/hungary-left-without-party-in-two-party-system/ Bozóki, A., & Heged˝ us, D. (2018). An externally constrained hybrid regime: Hungary in the European Union. Democratization, 25(7), 1173–1189. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2018.1455664 Brandal, N., Bratberg, Ø., & Thorsen, D. E. (Eds.). (2021). Social democracy in the 21st century. Emerald Group Publishing. Buzogány, A. (2017). Illiberal democracy in Hungary: Authoritarian diffusion or domestic causation? Democratization, 24(7), 1307–1325.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY

135

DK. (2017). Választási együttm˝ uködési megállapodást kötött a DK és a Magyar Szolidaritás Mozgalom. https://dkp.hu/hirek/3013/valasztasi-egy uttmukodesi-megallapodast-kotott-a-dk-es-a-magyar-szolidaritas-mozgalom DK. (2020). A Demokratikus Koalíció ezer maszkkal és tartós élelmiszerekkel segíti a gyöngyöspatai roma önkormányzatot. https://dkp.hu/hirek/4968/ademokratikus-koalicio-ezer-maszkkal-es-tartos-elelmiszerekkel-segiti-a-gyongy ospatai-roma-onkormanyzatot Enyedi, Z. (2006). Survival of the fittest: Party system concentration in Hungary. In S. Jungerstram-Mulders (Ed.), Post-communist EU member states: Parties and party systems (pp. 177–202). Routledge. Euractiv. (2018). Opposition MPs ejected from Hungary state TV after protest. www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/news/opposition-mps-ejectedfrom-hungary-state-tv-after-protest/ Greskovits, B. (2015). The hollowing and backsliding of democracy in East Central Europe. Global Policy, 6, 28–37. Greskovits, B. (2020). Rebuilding the Hungarian right through conquering civil society: The civic circles movement. East European Politics, 36(2), 247–266. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2020.1718657 Guardian. (2018). Hungary election: OSCE monitors deliver damning verdict. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/09/hungary-election-oscemonitors-deliver-damning-verdict Klubrádió. (2020). Valójában mekkora a DK? https://www.klubradio.hu/ada sok/valojaban-mekkora-a-dk-111212 Lakner, Z. (2011). Utak és útveszt˝ok - Az MSZP húsz éve. Napvilág. Moschonas, G. (2013). A new left in Greece: PASOK’s fall and SYRIZA’s rise. Dissent, 60(4), 33–37. MSZP. (2020). Országos programmá b˝ovíti Balaton-véd˝o akcióját az MSZP. https://mszp.hu/hir/orszagos_programma_boviti_balaton-vedo_akci ojat_az_mszp MSZP. (2021). Kormányváltást! Korszakváltást! https://mszp.hu/page/dow nload?ct=art&cid=17915&dt=atch&did=1027 Népszabadság. (2016). Kezd összeesni az MSZP, a párt inkább hallgat a taglétszámról. http://nol.hu/belfold/kezd-osszeesett-az-mszp-a-part-hallgat-a-tag letszamrol-1625233 New York Times. (2018). Thousands of Hungarians protest against newly elected leader. www.nytimes.com/2018/04/14/world/europe/hungary-pro test-orban.html Pirro, A. L., & Stanley, B. (2022). Forging, bending, and breaking: Enacting the “illiberal playbook” in Hungary and Poland. Perspectives on Politics, 20(1), 86–101.

136

˝ A. BÍRÓ-NAGY AND G. GYORI

Policy Solutions. (2020). The prospects of green-left politics in Hungary. https:// www.policysolutions.hu/userfiles/elemzes/316/fes_policy_solutions_green_ left_politics_in_hungary_en_summary.pdf Policy Solutions. (2021). Hungary’s anxiety map 2021. https://www.policysol utions.hu/userfiles/elemzes/325/policy_solutions_hungarys_anxiety_map_ 2021_en_summary.pdf Snegovaya, M. (2022). How ex-communist left parties reformed and lost. West European Politics, 45, 716–743. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2020. 1869447 Sotiropoulos, D. A. (2014). Triumph and collapse: PASOK in the wake of the crisis in Greece (2009–13). In D. J. Bailey, J. M. De Waele, F. Escalona, & M. Vieira (Eds.), European social democracy during the global economic crisis (pp. 193–212). Manchester University Press. Táncsics Alapítvány. (2020). Beszámolók. https://tancsicsalapitvany.hu/beszam olok

The State of Social Democracy in Poland Bartosz M. Rydlinski ´

The case study of Polish social democracy, with particular emphasis on Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD (the Democratic Left Alliance), perfectly illustrates the emergence of a new left-wing grouping on the ruins of a socialist and undemocratic party of power. In Central and Eastern Europe, newly formed political formations were quicker to see parliamentary representation than long-term support and social standing (Wincławska & Brodzinska-Mirowska, ´ 2016). In contrast to other new parties of democratic Poland, SLD was a grouping with a solid and stable institutional structure. This organisational maturity, the loyalty of its members, and the community of political life stories constituted the strength of Polish social democracy from 1989 to 2005 (Wincławska et al., 2021). This chapter aims to point out the role of obsolescence or cleavage (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967) changes in the decline of the political significance of social democracy in Poland after this period. Particular

B. M. Rydlinski ´ (B) Institute of Political Science and Administration, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University, Warsaw, Poland e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Skrzypek and A. Bíró-Nagy (eds.), The Social Democratic Parties in the Visegrád Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30792-8_5

137

138

´ B. M. RYDLINSKI

attention will be paid to the facts that led to the SLD’s fall out of parliament in 2015 and the left’s spectacular return to the Sejm four years later.

1 Electoral Results and a Brief History of the Polish Member Parties of the PES Europarties affiliation is one of the essential factors of ideological strat´ 2021). For ification (Kosowska-G˛astoł, 2017; Pacze´sniak & Rydlinski, years the Polish member parties of the Party of European Socialists (PES) were SLD, and Unia Pracy, UP (the Labour Union). The SLD was the strongest party of the Polish centre-left and still, today has parliamentary representation both on the national and European levels, co-governs in three voivodships at the level of regional assemblies, and influences many local governments. By contrast, the UP is a marginal party that does not have any members of parliament. For many years it has not cooperated with the SLD on any level but has instead associated itself with minor parties. Till December 2021, the SLD sat in the Left Coalition Parliamentary Club with Wiosna Roberta Biedronia (Robert Biedron’s ´ Spring), Lewica Razem (the Left Together), and Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, PPS (the Polish Socialist Party). On 9 October 2021, a unification congress of the SLD and Wiosna was held, and a new party called Nowa Lewica, NL (the New Left) was formed. This process was in line with the tradition of the post-communist left of merging with single, smaller formations to create new parties (Table 1). Table 1 The European parliament and national parliamentary election results of the SLD and Wiosna since 2014

Year

Election

Left-wing parties SLD (%)

2014 2015 2019 2019

European parliament National parliament European parliament National parliament

9.44 7.55* 38.47** 12.56***

Wiosna (%)

6.06

* The SLD ran on a joint leftist list (Zjednoczona Lewica) ** The SLD ran on a wide opposition list (Koalicja Europejska) *** Wiosna, Razem, and the PPS ran on the SLD list

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

139

To better understand the historical context of Polish social democracy as a force originating in the previous system of real socialism, it is necessary to consider the element of transition discussed left from a party that was the main force of an authoritarian state to a platform that was mainly involved in writing a new democratic constitution and consolidating the Polish presence in Western structures. On 29 January 1990, Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR (the Polish United Workers’ Party) was dissolved and was replaced by Sojaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej, SdRP (Social Democracy of Poland) in new democratic conditions with clear social democratic programme and approach (Wiatr, 2010). In 1991 the SdRP then formed a broad coalition with other, smaller parties of the left, and the coalition was called Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD (the Democratic Left Alliance). This cooperation resulted in the SLD winning the parliamentary election in 1993 and its leader Aleksander Kwa´sniewski winning the presidential election in 1995 (Tomczak, 2008). In 1999 the SLD became a single political party, taking the place of the SdRP on the Polish political scene. The UP, which was founded in 1992, managed to enter the Sejm (the lower chamber of parliament) only once in 1993, and then formed a lasting coalition with the SLD after losing all its seats in parliament. Together these parties achieved the spectacular result of 41.04% in 2001, which is still the best result of the left in the whole history of the third Polish republic (‘2001 Wybory do Sejmu: wyniki głosowania na listy komitetów wyborczych w skali kraju,’ 2001). As a result of several mistakes and structural changes, the SLD ceased to play the role of a top-league party after 2005. A number of scandals, a lack of communication skills, and the neoliberal policies of the government of Leszek Miller and Marek Belka then led to a fundamental reshuffle on the Polish political scene. After Poland joined the European Union—for which the SLD and its leaders such as Aleksander Kwa´sniewski (president of Poland at that time), Leszek Miller (prime minister), and Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz (minister of foreign affairs) can mostly be credited—Polish social democracy was able to fulfil its historical goals. Indeed, with its involvement in the Round Table Talks in 1989, its preparation and adoption of a democratic Constitution in 1997, and support for Polish aspirations to join NATO in 1999, the left wing had for long a clear historic mission. After Poland became a member of the EU on 1 May 2004, there was a symbolic ‘end of history’ for many politicians of the post-communist left, which gave wind to the sails of two parties

140

´ B. M. RYDLINSKI

originating from the Solidarity movement: Prawo i Sprawiedliwo´sc´ , PiS (Law and Justice) and Platforma Obywatelska, PO (Civic Platform). Since the autumn 2005, when Poland held both a presidential and parliamentary elections, these two forces have been the main parties in the political debate, depriving all other forces of political oxygen. The SLD has tried to break the PO-PiS duopoly in various ways. In 2007, under the patronage of the former president of Poland, Aleksander Kwa´sniewski, an electoral coalition called Lewica i Demokraci, LiD (the Left and Democrats) was formed. This consisted of the SLD, Social Democracy of Poland (SDPL, a grouping set up by the SLD’s breakaway members in 2004), the UP, and the Democratic Party (a niche grouping set up by left-wing politicians from the Freedom Union). Despite 13% support, the left wing did not enter government and remained in the second political league (‘2007 Wybory do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej,’ 2007). In 2010, the then leader of the SLD, Grzegorz Napieralski, achieved the third best result in the first round of the presidential election with 13,68% support, becoming an extremely popular politician in Poland (‘2010 Wybory Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (I tura),’ 2010). Yet, in the parliamentary election of 2011, a year later, the SLDUP coalition barely passed the electoral threshold for a coalition, reaching just 8,24% (‘2011 Wybory do Sejmu i Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej,’ 2011). Four years later, this limit turned out to be lethal for the left. With only 7.55% support in the 2015 parliamentary election, the entire left coalition ended up falling out of the parliament (‘2015 Wybory do Sejmu i Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej,’ 2015). For the first time after Poland regained its independence, left-wing voters, therefore, had no representation in parliament. The coalition was called Zjednoczona Lewica, ZL (United Left) and consisted of the SLD, Twój Ruch (Your Movement— a seasonal liberal protest party), the PPS, and the Green Party, but it had been a disastrous solution. In 2015, another left-wing party, Lewica Razem (the Razem party), an initiative of progressive youth inspired by the form of activity of Spain’s Podemos and Greece’s Syriza, also took part in the parliamentary election. Its 3.8% result did not guarantee the Razem party a seat in parliament, but it did serve to increase voter turnout, which proved to be politically fatal for the SLD. An important factor in the political decline of the SLD was the party’s fielding of Magdalena Ogórek in the presidential election preceding the 2015 parliamentary election. She was an unknown person to a broader

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

141

audience, being a background person. Until she was appointed as a presidential candidate, Magdalena Ogórek was a former parliamentary fraction employee and journalist for television programs dealing with church issues. During the campaign, Ogórek presented neoliberal-conservative populist views, which missed the profile of even the most loyal and identity-minded SLD voters. Ogórek achieved five first-round results at 2,38% (‘2015 Wybory Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (I tura),’ 2015), ridiculing the outgoing leader of the party Leszek Miller, who at that time held the SLD chair for the second time in history. After such a blunder, the SLD decided to form a politically broad and ideologically incoherent coalition. This decision turned out to be a mistake, and the SLD paid the highest cost for it, as the SLD decided to change its leadership at the end of January 2016. Włodzimierz Czarzasty, a politician with no parliamentary or ministerial experience, who was a member of the National Broadcasting Council, became the party chairman despite allegations of misdeeds. The second highest-ranking person in the SLD was Marcin Kulasek, a Warminsko-Mazurskie ´ voivodship councilor, who had no national political experience. Under its new leadership the SLD spent three years without elections, remaining outside the Sejm, and with the left wing having no access to the media as its politicians were not invited to give their views on television or radio programs. Internal conflicts therefore increased, and the party coffers were empty. Voter demotivation was visible in opinion polls. Nevertheless, despite these adversities, the SLD functioned in the public space, and no major significant divisions within the party took place. Additionally, the Law and Justice party’s attack on the tripartite division of power, women’s rights, the withdrawal of retirement benefits from former officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from the period of the People’s Republic of Poland, as well as the radical anti-communist policy of memory, gave the SLD a second breath. The first sign that the left could return to the top political league was the local elections in October 2018 (‘2018 Wybory samorz˛adowe,’ 2018). Although the SLD lost many seats in the provincial assemblies, it increased its share in co-governance in a few regions. SLD candidates successfully fought for mayoral positions in many cities and towns and became part of governing coalitions in Łód´zs, Wrocław, and Lublin. During the elections to the European Parliament, there was a massive shift on the left of the political spectrum. Robert Biedron, ´ mayor of Słupsk and

142

´ B. M. RYDLINSKI

one of the most famous gay activists in Poland, as well as former parliamentarian of Twój Ruch, announced a new centre-left formation called Wiosna. This formation brought together people who wanted to introduce new topics to the public agenda and were disillusioned with the political status quo represented by the Law and Justice Party, the Civic Platform, the Polish Peasants Party, and the Democratic Left Alliance. At that time, the SLD took part in a joint list of opposition running together against Jarosław Kaczynski’s ´ Law and Justice party. The European Coalition consisted of parties from the European People’s Party (PO, PSL), the Party of European Socialists (SLD), and the ALDE (Nowoczesna). Neither the Razem party nor representatives of right-wing populist Kukiz’15 took part in the initiative as both groupings failed to cross the electoral threshold. The European Coalition did not manage to win the election, but the SLD could consider itself the winner of this alliance, achieving only 6% support in the election and introducing five MEPs, while Wiosna introduced three (‘2019 Wyniki wyborów do Parlamentu Europejskiego,’ 2019). Because of the visible increase in support for the left-wing segment in the opposition bloc, Civic Platform decided not to continue with a broad anti-PiS front. Meanwhile SLD, Wiosna, and Razem, then decided to cooperate, with Wiosna and Razem running as part of the SLD’s electoral committee to minimise the risk of not crossing the 8% threshold. For the first time in many electoral cycles, there was only one social democratic list in the 2019 general election. In addition, a record low number list of committees ran in the election, which rewarded this left-wing exceptionalism because the 12.56% support for the SLD’s electoral committee translated into the third best result in the stakes (‘2019 Wybory do Sejmu i Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej,’ 2019), 49 members in the Sejm and two senators. Indeed, in terms of the absolute number of votes since 2001 it was the best result. In December 2019, the SLD and Wiosna then decided to merge into a single formation called the New Left (NL).1 The process ended on 9 October 2021 with the election of Włodzimierz Czarzasty and Robert Biedron´ as party co-chairs, and Marcin Kulasek as secretary-general of the New Left. The New Left’s congress was attended by an equal number of delegates from the SLD and Wiosna (500 each), which transformed into two factions within one party. 1 Razem decided on organisational independence but remained in the joint Coalition Parliamentary Club of the Left.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

2

143

The Party Organisations of the NL

The formation of the NL by the SLD and the Wiosna makes the analysis of the differences between the former parties irrelevant. However, it is worth noting that the apparent asymmetry in the number of members of the two parts of the NL exemplifies one of the main obstacles to the political merger process of the recent past. It was when riding the wave of electoral success in 2019 that the SLD and Wiosna had decided in December that year to merge into a single party (on the legal and institutional basis of the SLD) (Szcz˛es´niak, 2019). One of their key agreements was the establishment of only two factions with the names of the former groupings, the co-chairmanship of the party by the leaders of these two factions, an equal number of delegates at the New Left congress, and an equal division of the number of vice-chairs of the New Left—all of whom were to make up the NL National Council. After the unsuccessful presidential election of 2020, in which the leader of Wiosna, Robert Biedron, ´ received a mere 2,22% (sixth from the top result in the first round) (‘2020 Wybory Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (I tura),’ 2020), SLD politicians began to consider that the previously agreed 50/50 split for the leadership of the NL was not entirely fair. Additionally, the SLD faction had 19,925 members at the time of the merger, while the Wiosna faction had only 1,475 (6,047 members of the NL had not yet chosen a faction).2 This apparent disproportion was one of the main arguments of those opposing the merger of the SLD and Wiosna on equal terms, which had been agreed upon immediately after the parliamentary election. In July 2021, some of SLD’s executive board members wanted to establish additional factions within the NL and dismiss Włodzimierz Czarzasty from the post of SLD chairman. However, this attempted internal putsch failed because Czarzasty used the new transitional provisions of the New Left’s statute and suspended the rebels. Despite the battle within the SLD, which received widespread media coverage, the original resolutions of December 2019 were implemented on 9 October 2021 during the United Congress of the New Left.

2 This information was obtained on 5 November 2021 from Patrycja BakłaszczukZielinska ´ of the NL National Council Office.

144

´ B. M. RYDLINSKI

The Membership of the NL On 5 November 2021, the NL had 27,467 members, thus showing its strength on the Polish left. The other party that is part of the Coalition Parliamentary Club of the Left has a much smaller membership base than that of the NL—Lewica Razem (Left Together) has approximately 3,000 members. When ranked against all other political parties in Poland, the NL is in fourth position. The Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL (Polish People’s Party) has approximately 100,000 members, PiS has 45,000 and PO has 30,000. The radically right-wing Konfederacja (Confederation) is not a single political party but a coalition of smaller national and libertarian groupings, whose membership base is much smaller than that of the so-called ‘big four’ of Polish politics. Financial Situation In the context of party membership and its influence on the party’s financial situation, it is worth noting that the SLD/NL was a party whose members were effectively paying membership fees. In 2020 the SLD/NL received PLN 474,759.51 in fees (the total funds from individuals were close to PLN 1 million). In the same way, PiS obtained PLN 1,450,000, PO obtained 1,114,000, PSL obtained PLN 1,208,000 and Confederation obtained PLN 238,000. Razem obtained PLN 454,000 from individuals among the NL’s political allies (‘Komunikat Panstwowej ´ Komisji Wyborczej z dnia 24 maja 2021 r. w sprawie sprawozdan´ o z´ ródłach pozyskania s´rodków finansowych przez partie polityczne w 2020 r.,’ 2021). In the context of financial accounts, the New Left took over the assets of the SdRP/SLD. Although these parties are, in a sense, the political and financial heirs of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR), none of these left-wing formations fully took over the PZPR’s property (which was only partially distributed by post-Solidarity parties and the state budget after 1989). In a few cases, there was nevertheless a transfer of some properties to the SdRP and SLD. Currently, the NL owns property in Wałbrzych, Lublin, Biała Podlaska, Nowa Sól, Radom, K˛edzierzyn Ko´zle, 3 The NL also receives Rzeszów, Katowice, Kielce, Stargard Szczecinski. ´ a full electoral subsidy, which results from the Electoral Committee 3 This information was obtained from NL Secretary-General Marcin Kulasek.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

145

of the Democratic Left Alliance following the election to the Sejm in 2019. According to the calculations of the State Election Commission, individual formations will receive the following subsidies each year (for 2020–2023): PLN 23,499,528.06 for PiS, PLN 19,800,329.59 for PO, PLN 11,496,714.07 for the SLD, PLN 8,348,292.79 for the PSL, PLN 6,865,855.09 for Confederation, PLN 303,066.27 for Zieloni, and PLN 101,022.09 for Inicjatywa Polska (Orlikowski, 2019). In terms of state subsidies, contributions, and real estate, the NL is second only to PiS and PO. Due to legal restrictions, the NL cannot transfer part of its subsidy to Razem. Such a transfer in support of other parties would risk the withdrawal of the NL’s right to collect all the funds available and would risk enormous penalties. All this therefore contributes to the NL’s almost hegemonic position on the Polish social democratic scene. Media Reach One of the biggest challenges that the whole Polish left wing has to face is dominance of PiS and PO in the media. Any dispute between these two parties regularly results in widespread media coverage.4 On the one hand, Polish Television, Polish Radio, Polish Press Agency, Informational Radio Agency, and several private right-wing newspapers and internet portals5 support PiS, while on the other, the main private stations such as TVN and TVN24, as well as Gazeta Wyborcza, Radio TOK FM, Polityka, and Newsweek Polska are likely to support PO. Except for the daily newspaper Trybuna and a young internet portal wPunkt, the NL has no positive mass media support. This can clearly be seen from the NL’s lack of strong presence in the media. While members of parliament from the Coalition Parliamentary Club of the Left (Koalicyjny Klub Parlamentarny Lewicy) are invited to the main news programmes to comment on current political events, they do this less often than politicians from PiS and PO. A

4 It is also worth noting that the described phenomenon of limited access of the Polish left to the media is noticed by party activists themselves. As Jacunski, ´ Brodzinska-Mirowska, ´ Pacze´sniak, and Wincławska notice in their research, during qualitative interviews, SLD members openly say, among others, that as a party that receives state subsidies, it should have guaranteed access to public media on equal rights as other, main parliamentary parties (Jacunski ´ et al., 2021). 5 Supported by the government through advertising buybacks (Kowalczyk, 2020).

146

´ B. M. RYDLINSKI

qualitative analysis of the media presence of representatives from the SLD electoral committee during the 2019 parliamentary election campaign (from 9 August to 10 October 2019) offers a good illustration this state of affairs. Jakub Mikulski, the author of a report published on the website of the Rzeczpospolita daily newspaper, recorded the presence of guests on the principal political coverage programmes after the main edition of the day’s news. In the case of TVN, this is the programme ‘Fakty po Faktach’, TVP ‘Go´sc´ Wiadomo´sci’, Polsat News ‘Go´sc´ Wydarzen’ ´ and ‘Wydarzenia i Opinie’ (Mikulski, 2019). The percentage of programme guests by election committee affiliation is shown below: Law and Justice (PiS) ‘Go´sc´ Wiadomo´sci’ TVP: 69.05% ‘Fakty po Faktach’ TVN24: 28.45% ‘Wydarzenia i Opinie’ and ‘Go´sc´ Wydarzen’ ´ Polsat News: 41.82% Civic Coalition (Civic Platform—PO, Nowoczesna, the Green Party, Inicjatywa Polska) ‘Go´sc´ Wiadomo´sci’ TVP: 11.90% ‘Fakty po Faktach’ TVN24: 46.55% ‘Wydarzenia i Opinie’ and ‘Go´sc´ Wydarzen’ ´ Polsat News: 30.91% Democratic Left Alliance (SLD, Wiosna, Razem, PPS) ‘Go´sc´ Wiadomo´sci’ TVP: 4.76% ‘Fakty po Faktach’ TVN24: 14.66% ‘Wydarzenia i Opinie’ and ‘Go´sc´ Wydarzen’ ´ Polsat News: 12.73% Polish Coalition (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe—PSL, Kukiz’15) ‘Go´sc´ Wiadomo´sci’ TVP: 14.29% ‘Fakty po Faktach’ TVN24: 10.34% ‘Wydarzenia i Opinie’ and ‘Go´sc´ Wydarzen’ ´ Polsat News: 12.73% Konfederacja Wolno´sc´ i Niepodległo´sc´ —Freedom and Independence Confederation (Freedom and Hope Coalition for Restoration of the Republic of Poland, National Movement, Polish Crown Confederation) ‘Go´sc´ Wiadomo´sci’ TVP: 0.00% ‘Fakty po Faktach’ TVN24: 0.00% ‘Wydarzenia i Opinie’ and ‘Go´sc´ Wydarzen’ ´ Polsat News: 1.82%

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

147

It can be seen from this that the left was much less frequently present in prime-time coverage of the election campaign than politicians from PiS, PO, and even the PSL. While no institution in Poland conducts quantitative measurements of the presence of politicians on television or radio. The arrival of Szymon Holownia’s new centrist party, Polska 2050 (Poland 2050) PL2050, additionally makes the left appear even less frequently in the media. Polsat News also regularly invites farright representatives from the Confederation to prime-time programmes. Right-wing representatives of different shades—from PO, to the PSL, to PiS, to Confederation—all participate in political discussions on this station. The approach to the left of TVN as a leading private TV channel is also noteworthy. Although social democrat politicians were present at demonstrations defending TVN’s independence and defending the right of this channel to have its licence extended by the National Broadcasting Council (Theus, 2021), TVN continues to present the left as unreliable and sometimes even presents it in a hostile way. During the unification congress of the New Left, representatives from two youth organisations affiliated with the SLD and Wiosna gave the main opening speeches. Kacper Krakowiak represented the Federation of Young Social Democrats, and Oliwia Jankowiak represented the Young Left. Both also spoke in front of former president of Poland Aleksander Kwa´sniewski, and the future NL co-chairs Robert Biedron´ and Wlodzimierz Czarzasty. Their speeches drew attention to the challenges of climate change, the fight for good jobs for the young, the rights of women, and minorities suffering discrimination. They spoke of the need to build cheap state-run rental housing. However, the material of Michał Tracz that was broadcast on TVN’s main news programme ‘Fakty’ about this NL congress contained statements of politicians from an older generation, and from former activists of the Polish United Workers’ Party, and the central theme was the internal tensions of the newly formed NL party. No reliable information on the course and spirit of this congress was conveyed to TVN viewers that day (Tracz, 2021). This example of unreliable TVN coverage of the NL reflects the fact that the NL is forced to fight on two media fronts—the right-wing conservative and the right-wing neoliberal. In this context, it is worth considering the NL’s activity on social media, where the situation is more balanced. The leading platforms for public political communication in Poland are Facebook and Twitter, and the number of followers on each platform sheds a different light on the activity of particular formations. The NL and Razem are far ahead of the

148

´ B. M. RYDLINSKI

PSL and Poland 2050, with the NL being fifth in terms of the number of followers on Facebook, and third on Twitter, whereas Razem is fourth on Facebook and fifth on Twitter (Fig. 1, 2, 3, and 4). However, in the context of the NL politicians’ activity on social media, there is visible asymmetry. Sampling of co-chairmen, the secretarygeneral, and vice-chairpersons for analysis. Robert Biedron´ is the clear leader in the group analysed, while the vice-chairmen from Wiosna are much more visible than the SLD’s representation in the NL leadership. 700

665

600 500 400

308

308

300 200 100

165

143 77

50

0

Fig. 1 Facebook followers of the political parties in November 2021 (1000 people) (Source Facebook)

Fig. 2 Twitter followers of the political parties in November 2021 (1000 people) (Source Twitter)

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN POLAND 150

640

149 700 600

120

500

84

90

400 300

60

29

30

28

11

10

200 9.1

7

7

6.7

4.3

0

3.5

1.9

1.5

1.2

0.7

0.7

100 0

Fig. 3 Facebook followers of social democratic politicians in November 2021 (1000 people) (Source Facebook)

150 120 90 60 30 0

381.6

400 94

300

84.2

200 44.9

34.6 17.3

9.5

100 7.6

4.7

2.6

2.3

1.3

0.9

0.6

0

Fig. 4 Twitter followers of social democratic politicians in November 2021 (1000 people) (Source Twitter)

Organisational Infrastructure and National Presence The NL, like the SLD, has a party structure in every county in Poland, thus being one of the four parties (along with PiS, PO, and the PSL) that has a nationwide operation. The party currently has two youth organisations, which before the formation of the NL, were associated respectively

150

´ B. M. RYDLINSKI

with the SLD and Wiosna. Federacja Młodych Socjaldemokratów (Federation of Young Social Democrats) and Młoda Lewica (Young Left), formerly Przedwio´snie (Early spring), cooperate but have no imminent plans to merge, as did their ‘mother parties’, the SLD and Wiosna. The NL is in many respects much stronger in western Poland, in the voivodships of Zachodniopomorskie, Lubuskie, Wielkopolskie, ´ askie. In the first three voivodships, the NL forms Dolno´sl˛askie, and Sl˛ a governing coalition at the provincial assembly level. Also, in these voivodships, social democratic candidates have won direct elections for mayors for years. An additional and important element for a better understanding of the condition of the left is to consider the agglomeration factor in the analysis of electoral geography. The left has for many years been increasingly strong in large urban centres, especially in provincial capitals. In the 2019 parliamentary election, as many as three left-wing members of parliament entered the Sejm from the constituency covering Warsaw, and two members of parliament each from Wrocław, Szczecin, Poznan, ´ Łód´z, Kraków, Bydgoszcz, Torun´ and Zielona Góra. Two also won mandates from districts covering former voivodship towns, such as Jelenia Góra, Legnica, Słupsk, and Kalisz. In these constituencies, there have, in turn, been fundamental social and economic changes associated with both the systemic transformation and the administrative reform of 1999. Both processes had a significant impact on the living standards of the inhabitants of these cities and the neighbouring municipalities. Another social democratic ‘stronghold’, Cz˛estochowa, is a similar example where apart from one seat in the Sejm election, the left wing can also boast of winning one of two seats in the Senate, a social democratic mayor, and the biggest left-wing club of councillors (‘Klub Radnych Lewicy—Cz˛estochowa,’ n.d.). The last critical study of electoral geography is the analysis of Zagł˛ebie D˛abrowskie, which is the best electoral district for the left wing in Poland in terms of popular support, with the SLD electoral committee achieving 21.90% support in the Sejm election (compared with 12.56% nationally). This related to the fact that the list gained two parliamentary seats, including that of the SLD leader, Włodzimierz Czarzasty. Many factors contributed to the SLD electoral committee’s success here: Zagł˛ebie was a place of essential struggles for the workers’ movement during the Revolution of 1905; Edward Gierek (first secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party) came from Sosnowiec; and heavy industry, including coal mines, seriously declined in the 1990s, creating

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

151

a serious challenge on the local labour market. To this day, the inhabitants of the district feel the harmful effects of the transformation to the neoliberal system (Okraska, 2018). In D˛abrowa Górnicza and B˛edzin themselves, the mayors come from social democratic backgrounds, and the mayor of B˛edzin, Łukasz Komoniewski, has recently been elected vice-chairman of the NL (‘Zarz˛ad Krajowy Nowej Lewicy,’ n.d.). Higher support for the left in the earlier mentioned voivodships of Poland was also seen in the elections to the European Parliament on 26 May 2019, which saw eight MEPs added to the S&D Group. Five of these MEPs joined the S&D Group on the recommendation of the SLD, which was part of the European Coalition, while the other three MEPs were from Wiosna. Two of Poland’s S&D MEPs were elected from the Warsaw constituency, two others were from the Wielkopolska constituency and the Silesia constituency, one S&D MEP was from the Łód´z constituency, and the eighth of Poland’s S&D MEPs came from the constituency comprising the Zachodniopomorskie and Lubuskie voivodships. The NL’s Leadership Structure and Internal Organisation The organisational structure of the NL is essentially based on the local and regional associations of the SLD, which had permanent structures in all 16 voivodships and all the Polish counties (over 300). According to the NL statutes, the party is organised on four levels: local chapters (‘circles’, which are the ‘basic organisational unit of the party’), the district, regional (voivodship), and national levels. Local chapters must have at least five members (‘Statut Nowej Lewicy,’ n.d.). At the regional and national levels, the organisational structure is determined by factional logic: there are two factions in the party, and every party member must assign themselves to one of the two factions. The leadership positions at the regional and national levels are filled equally by members of both factions. An application of this rule at the district level is possible but not prescribed by the statutes. The statutes do not specify the number of possible parliamentary factions and describe the basic procedure for founding one. However, the NL party executive can refuse the admission of a parliamentary group, which gives the two existing parliamentary factions a de facto blockade possibility against any potential competing currents. Each of the factions is headed by a co-chair of the party.

152

´ B. M. RYDLINSKI

The co-chairpersons and party executive are elected by the National Congress for a four-year term, as is the secretary-general. The party executive committee is composed of equal numbers of representatives of the political factions, and there must be a minimum representation of at least 35% of either men or women in the executive committee. The executive committee meets at least once per a quarter of a year and comprises elected members and ex-officio members: the two co-chairpersons, the secretary-general, the party vice-chairs, the leader(s) of the parliamentary groups in the Sejm and Senate, and the chair of the NL delegation to the European Parliament. Internal party jurisdiction is the responsibility of the National Party Court, and the controlling body is the National Audit Commission. The statutory organs of the party are The National Congress and the National Council. The executive bodies are the two co-chairpersons and the National Party Executive Committee.

3

Position in the Party System

Due to the fact that Western literature either does not take Polish social democracy into account at all (Keman, 2017) or analyses it in an oversimplified way (Gwiazda, 2008). But it is worthwhile to take a closer look at the role and significance of the Polish left in the broader partypolitical system. Over the past thirty-four years, Polish social democracy has performed different roles. It had played a stabilising role when, as a party that originated from the communist party, it guaranteed the success of political reforms, keeping in check ministries of power that had limited confidence in the democratic party (Wiatr, 2000). The SdRP was also the party of public opposition to neoliberal transformation. The fact that the Left was not politically responsible for implementing the privatisation program, associated with mass unemployment, worked in favor of its popularity in the mid-1990s (Wojtasik, 2008). Social democracy also played a modernising role, both in European and cultural politics (Wiatr, 2010). Since the beginning of the Third Polish Republic, the Left has consistently advocated a secular, open society with a vital role for trade unions in economic life (Wojtasik, 2008). Although social democracy does not play a critical political position in the current stage, it still plays the role of an innovator in the conditions of neoliberal-conservative duopoly and right-wing hegemony, thanks to its presence in parliamentary life.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

153

Also, for this reason, the recent consolidation of the Polish Left deserves special attention. Together with its ally from Razem, the NL has constituted a united social democratic front since summer 2019. Despite attempts to break up the Coalition Parliamentary Club of the Left, politicians from two mentioned parties have expressed their desire to continue working together for the 2023 parliamentary election. The left has learned its lesson from the lost election of 2015 when no social democratic committee entered the parliament, which paved the way for the independent rule of PiS. Joining forces in the Coalition Parliamentary Club of the Left allows the entire Polish left wing to avoid the threat of fragmentation and of sending conflicting messages to a small segment of progressive voters.6 Since 2005, the SLD has fought an extremely difficult battle with two hegemonic forces, PO and PiS, on two different fields of sociopolitical division. Donald Tusk’s PO party has long been an adversary of the SLD in social and economic policy. Departing from the practice of the new third way characterised by the governments of Leszek Miller and Marek Belka, the SLD has tried to cooperate more closely with trade unions and has expressed its unceasing opposition to the policy of ‘privatising profits and socialising losses’ which characterised the governments of Donald Tusk and Ewa Kopacz. The SLD also opposes raising the retirement age for women and men to 67, and like other left-wing parties, it does not support the commercialisation of healthcare and higher education. The SLD stands shoulder to shoulder with the Polish Teachers’ Union and defends the ‘Teachers’ Charter’ as a form of collective agreement for this profession. Regarding its battle with PiS, the SLD especially speaks out on the politics of memory, and it supports aggrieved former civil servants from the Ministry of Internal Affairs who were active before 1989 and have been deprived of their vested pension rights due to statutory changes in 2016. In local governments, the SLD has put up resistance to the policy of decommunising the public space—a policy resulting from a cross-party agreement between PiS, PO, Nowoczesna, the PSL,

6 Worth noting is the departure from the Left in December 2021 of five parliamentarians who formed the Parliamentary Circle of the Polish Socialist Party. The mentioned politicians see their future through participation in a broad anti-PiS coalition under the aegis of the Civic Platform (“Pi˛ecioro parlamentarzystów odchodzi z Lewicy I tworzy koło PPS,” 2021).

154

´ B. M. RYDLINSKI

and Kukiz’15 (‘Senacki projekt ustawy o zakazie propagowania komunizmu lub innego ustroju totalitarnego przez nazwy budowli, obiektów i urz˛adzen´ uzyteczno´ ˙ sci publicznej,’ 2016). First, the SLD and now the NL point to the incompetence of PiS in European politics, and they highlight genuine threats that result from the conflict created by PiS between Warsaw and Brussels. The NL consistently builds its political agenda by applying a strategy of ad hoc ‘symmetrical distance’ from PiS and PO on various issues. It regularly promotes a modern, secular welfare state that is permanently embedded in the European Union and NATO. However, in the atmosphere of constant antagonism between PiS and PO, Kaczynski ´ and Tusk, the ‘anti-PiS’ voters, in particular, do not appreciate the NL’s strategy. An aversion to PiS overshadows all other views on politics for the leftist voter, even if this approach hits the voters’ economic and social interests. The NL declares its readiness to cooperate with other parties of the democratic opposition. On the initiative of the left-wing parties that are in opposition to PiS, the so-called ‘Senate pact’ was created—that is, the idea of putting up a joint opposition candidate in single-mandate Senate districts. As a result, PO, the PSL, the PPS, the PL2050, and independent senators hold a majority in this chamber of parliament. While this cooperation comes about under the general banner of defending democracy, the independence of the judiciary, or Poland’s presence in the European Union, when it comes to tax issues, social policy, women’s rights, LGBT+ rights, or the relationship between the state and church, it would be challenging, if not impossible, to find common ground. Since PO has repeatedly purloined key politicians from the left for years, politically corrupting them with high places on the electoral lists, the cooperation between the NL and PO is characterised by understandable distrust.

4

The Relationship Between the NL and Civil Society

The NL maintains the tradition of close cooperation with trade unions gathered under the All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions (OPZZ). This relationship has continued for over 37 years due to the close contact of the OPZZ, first with the PZPR, then with the SdRP, and then with the SLD. After 1989, OPZZ trade union activists regularly became leftwing members of parliament, running on SLD lists. Even today, many

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

155

influential trade union activists can boast of their social democratic parliamentary experience. Although currently in the Coalition Parliamentary Club of the Left, none of the NL or Razem members of parliament have a trade union membership card. However, cooperation between the parliamentary representation and the class trade unions is excellent. Both the leadership of the OPZZ and chairpersons of its branch trade unions regularly consult new left-wing legislative proposals and give joint opinions on government proposals (‘Zwi˛azkowcy i posłowie Lewicy spotkali si˛e w Sejmie,’ 2021). Furthermore, NL politicians take part in street demonstrations organised by trade unions, and they celebrate Labour Day with the OPZZ every year on 1 May—both at central celebrations in Warsaw and in the voivodships. The OPZZ and the Polish Teachers’ Union (ZNP) gave their opinions on the NL’s programme proposals for labour, higher education, and primary and secondary school education, thus symbolising openness and closeness between social democracy and trade unions. Poland does not have a law on political foundations financed by the state budget, which means that the NL (and previously the SLD) does not have a party think tank. However, the NL cooperates closely with the Ignacy Daszynski ´ Centre Foundation (CID) (‘Centrum im. Ignacego Daszynskiego,’ ´ n.d.) which, with the support of both the SLD and the OPZZ chairman, is a full member organisation of FEPS. The law on political parties prohibits the financing of external entities, which means that the NL cannot donate money for its activity in CID. Similarly, the NL cannot directly support other smaller left-wing political parties, foundations, or associations. Despite these legal obstructions, the NL cooperates with organisations representing civil society. At the Polish Left congresses as well as the unification congress of the New Left, there were representatives of many left-wing organisations such as the Federation for Women and Family Planning, the Democratic Union of Women, the Agreement of Socialists, the National Party of Pensioners, the Pokolenia Association, All Poland House, the Movement of Working People, the Society of Secular Culture, the Regions Trade Union of Agriculture and Rural Areas, the Edward Gierek Movement for Economic Revival, the Tenants’ Defence Committee, the Secularism Congress, the Spójnik Association, Animals in Need, Stop Farms, Open Cages, and Campaign Against Homophobia. The ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal led by Julia Przył˛ebska on 22 October 2020—making it impossible to perform an abortion in the case

156

´ B. M. RYDLINSKI

of a high probability of severe and irreversible disability of the foetus— provoked the largest demonstrations on the streets of Polish cities since the second world war. Politicians from the NL, Razem, and the PPS were very visible on the front line of these events. They have also defended detained women and men, intervened in police stations, and used their political immunity to extract citizens from police blockades. The NL cooperates closely with all feminist circles that strive to change the law on abortion. Female NL politicians are part of the committee of the civic bill ‘Legal abortion. No compromises’ (‘Komitet ustawy obywatelskiej ‘Legalna aborcja. Bez kompromisów’ zarejestrowany. Zbieramy podpisy!,’ 2021). Similarly, the other main political parties in Poland are also well rooted in the circles of various NGOs depending on the NGOs’ causes for concern. PiS has an almost absolute exclusivity for Catholic organisations, although in recent years it has had to compete with Confederation for the favour of foundations and associations of national character. By contrast, PO serves the interests of employers’ and business organisations, the Committee for the Defence of Democracy (Komitet Obrony Demokracji), and smaller organisations formed in protest against PiS’s destruction of the tripartite division of power and the assault on the independence of the judiciary in Poland.

5

Programmatic Positioning

As in the case of the position in the party system, programmatic changes in Polish social democracy have not been seriously analysed in Western literature. Even though SLD under Leszek Miller in 1999–2004 was a party following the popular trend of the Third Way, it was not included in essential publications about the departure from the doctrine of Giddens, Blair, and Schröder (Cramme & Diamond, 2012). Similarly, programmatic discussions of Polish social democracy have not been included in other important publications referring to debates about the future of the left after the period of combining welfare state policies with neoliberal ideology and economic practice (Meyer & Rutherford, 2012). Even though Poland is in the semi-peripheries of globalisation, it is worth appreciating the effort that SLD and NL have put into ideological reconstruction in the last few years. For that reason, in this section, the SLD and the NL programmes will be analysed. The first important aspect of these programmes is that

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

157

they were both prepared for the new illiberal reality created by the fact that PiS is a self-majority government for the second term, after winning the parliamentary elections in 2015 and 2019. Such a situation has not occurred in the entire history of sovereign Poland since 1989 because due to the proportional electoral law, the winning formation has always had to form a coalition government, which then generally had to work to fuse its views. With an unstable government majority, laws were often passed by taking into account the position of opposition parties. In other words, until the victory of PiS in 2015, compromise and moderation characterised parliamentary political practice in Poland for over a quarter of a century. Since 2015, PiS has not only been governing in a way that completely ignores the amendments of opposition parliamentarians but has also been making constitutional changes using ordinary laws. This is particularly visible in the rule of law, and in the undermining both of the judiciary’s principle of independence and of the equivalence of the powers of the judiciary with those of the executive and legislature. In this respect, PiS differs from Hungary’s Fidesz party led by Viktor Orbán because Fidesz has a constitutional majority. By contrast, observation of the Constitution, the checks and balances principle, and the rule of law principles is fundamental for Polish social democracy. It was the SLD that drafted the current Constitution—its principal patron, advocate, and promoter being President Aleksander Kwa´sniewski, who came from the centre left. On the initiative of Kwa´sniewski and the SLD, a constitutional referendum was held in 1997—which approved the content of the Polish ‘bill of all laws’. The second important aspect of the SLD and NL programmes is the ‘social democratisation’ of the SLD’s programme, which was initiated in 2005. Before becoming prime minister, Leszek Miller did not hide his fascination with the New Third Way/New Middle Way doctrine, whose prominent faces were Tony Blair of the UK and Gerhard Schröder of Germany (Kowalik, 2001). The governments of Leszek Miller and Marek Belka thus pursued a rather neoliberal social policy, with the common practice of cutting state spending and social investments. This was motivated by the desire to rebuild economic indicators, which had achieved terrible results during the right-wing premiership of Jerzy Buzek when Leszek Balcerowicz was finance minister (Rydlinski, 2017). When the SLD rebuilt itself politically and ideologically after 2005, it took the

158

´ B. M. RYDLINSKI

course of traditional social democracy, defending the achievements of the welfare state—as did the other third-way parties, siding with the losers of transformation and globalisation. The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) The SLD programme—‘We will restore normality. A dignified life, a just and normal Poland’—was adopted by the party’s National Council in 2017 after nearly a year of discussion at various levels of the party (‘SLD— Przywrócimy normalno´sc´ ,’ 2017). It is a document that takes into account the leftist review of the practice of PiS governments. This angle is particularly clear in the parts of the programme entitled ‘Silver revolution’, ‘Reproductive rights—informed decisions’, ‘Equal work—equal rights’, and ‘Taxes—wise and fair’. The preamble to the programme states: ‘The Democratic Left Alliance is a party declaring a commitment to all the values of European social democracy—freedom, equality, social justice, dialogue, and cooperation as the basis for the organisation of society in the twenty-first century’. The policy of remembrance that is visible in this document is also symbolically important. The SLD expressly refers with respect and appreciation to the people who created the People’s Poland, as well as to the achievements of the past socialist state (the enclosure of Poland after the second world war, the development of the Western territories after the change of borders, the elimination of illiteracy, the development of higher and vocational education, and the creation of the social and economic infrastructure giving rise to the success of the Third Republic of Poland). The actual part of SLD’s programme begins with the labour issue, where particular emphasis is placed on the minimum wage (including the hourly one), the right to organise in trade unions, and decent wages from the public sector. The second theme that shines through is the issue of seniority pensions (40 years of work for men and 35 for women) and the seniority policy called the ‘silver revolution’ by Polish social democrats. On further pages of the program, we can see demands: increase public spending on health to 7% of GDP, construction of public rental housing, maintaining the Teachers’ Charter—a nationwide collective bargaining agreement for the teaching profession, separation of state and church, women’s right to decide on their bodies, multi-level tax progression, a progressive foreign policy based on an active role in the European Union and NATO.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

159

The SLD’s 2017 programme can be analysed in several ways. First, the programmatic provisions in ‘We Will Restore Normality’ are strictly social democratic in nature, in line with existing standards of European parties from the same ideological family. Particular emphasis is placed on well-functioning public services, economic redistribution of wealth, respect for human rights, and a progressive foreign policy. It is an in-depth and comprehensive programme consulted with a broad membership base. It can be hypothesised that its multifaceted nature and clarity may have resulted from its fallout with the Polish parliament in 2015. Party leaders who would usually be absorbed in the mundane of parliamentary life during the period left by the extra-parliamentary opposition were able to animate the life of the SLD on internal affairs. Among such fields of activity, we can undoubtedly include writing the program, which is the essential reference point for preparing the electoral postulate. Since the SLD after 2005 found that one of the reasons for their failures was their naive belief in the Third Way doctrine, perhaps the period of greatest marginalisation after 2015 resulted in a permanent shift to explicitly leftist positions (Kosowska-G˛astoł, 2021). The second aspect of SLD’s programme analysis is the timing of the document’s preparation. Local elections took place a year after the party adopted it, crucial for the Polish centre-left in many aspects. This was the first major electoral test after 2015 when SLD fell out of the top political league. In addition, the local government election program, titled ‘Strong Local Government, Democratic Poland’, saw an expansion of some of the provisions dedicated to the so-called ‘Silver Revolution’ and leftist memory politics (‘Silny samorz˛ad, demokratyczna Polska. Program samorz˛adowy Sojuszu Lewicy Demokratycznej,’ 2018). And here we come to the issue of profiling the programme under the profile of the leftist voter at the time. In 2018, the SLD planned to win over the most loyal voters who voted for the centre-left in previous years. During the 2015 parliamentary elections, voters over 60 (9.3%) and those in the 50–59 range (7.3%) were the most likely to vote for social democracy (‘Głosowanie w wyborach parlamentarnych wg wieku—infografika,’ 2015). That’s why the issues of well-functioning public services, pensions, and memory policy were too prominent in the party’s programme and local government election manifesto.

160

´ B. M. RYDLINSKI

The New Left (NL) The merge of the SLD and Wiosna into a single political party required both original parties to work on a new programme for the NL. As a party with a better social base and as a member of the Party of European Socialists, the SLD had a greater programmatic output than Wiosna. During the elections to the European Parliament, Robert Biedron’s ´ Wiosna party presented a rather general and eclectic programme, mainly referring to the civilisational challenges faced by Poland in 2019 (Marchwicki, 2019). In contrast to the SLD, which put the key emphasis in its programme on socio-economic issues, Wiosna was much more explicit as regards global and cultural issues. This difference in focus between the original programmes of the SLD and Wiosna could easily be seen in the programmatic priorities of the NL, which were approved by the NL congress on 9 October 2021. However, the NL does not make this difference in focus a weakness but rather an asset. Indeed, the introduction to the NL’s programme—‘The future is now’—states: ‘By combining the Democratic Left Alliance and Wiosna forces, we are welding together different traditions of left-wing politics. On the one hand, the New Left wants to counteract the harmful effects of the systemic transformation, and to build a socially just and secular state where human rights are an unquestionable standard. On the other hand, we are strong with the power of social movements and the introduction of new topics and problems into politics, such as LGBT+ rights or counteracting climate catastrophe. We combine traditions of sensitivity to current social needs with the knowledge of how to govern the state—courage in formulating demands and reason in implementing them’. The NL programme is based on five pillars: Cooperation, Equality and Respect, the New Green Deal, a Bold Europe, and the Caring State (‘Nowa Lewica—Przyszło´sc´ jest teraz,’ 2021). The programme is the result of two years of cooperation between the SLD and the Wiosna at parliamentary level, and it is also the result of debates at all party levels including regional conventions. The NL programme was discussed with social partners, trade unions (the OPZZ and ZNP), experts, and left-wing think tanks, and the outlines of the NL programme were presented at open meetings in all 16 provinces as part of the ‘New Left—New Programme’ campaign. As in the case of the SLD’s 2017 program, the NL’s 2021 programme corresponds to both the profile of voters and its place in the Polish party system. In the analysed document, we can see an attempt to merge two

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

161

traditions, on the one hand, a classical social democratic perspective and a rather postmaterialistic ‘New Left’ attitude. Therefore, NL equally replicates the language and demands of trade unions and addresses animal rights and the need to care for the environment. The New Green Deal occupies a much more prominent place in the NL’s programme than leftist politics of memory. It is also worth noting a certain programmatic continuity. The NL, like the SLD, remains consistent on labour rights, public sector wages, state-cooperative rental housing, decent pensions, and public policies. Thus, we can pose the thesis that in making programmatic compromises, the SLD was able to align on the issue of remembering those who were active professionally before 1989. Still, socio-economic issues continued to remain a priority for them. The Polish centre-left, even after the 2019 elections, significantly changed the structure of its support—which will be analysed later in this chapter—did not abandon the social democratic direction taken after 2005. Of course, the Future is Now programme includes cultural and right-wing demands that are particularly important for the new generation of left-wing voters. Still, the NL programme does not abandon the traditional canon of values of European social democracy.

6

Social Democratic Voters, Social Democratic Issues

Support for Polish social democracy, including the SLD, has undergone fundamental changes over the last 16 years. Due to the obsolescence of many sociopolitical divisions after 2005, Polish social democracy fell into the electoral second league. However, 2019 saw its return, with the third best result in the parliamentary election, and the SLD’s own best result since 2001 in terms of the number of votes received. To better understand which voters decided to trust the SLD, it is worth referring to the IPSOS detailed exit poll results (Kope´c & Pawłowska, 2019). As far as the electorate flows are concerned, the result of the SLD electoral committee in 2019 was primarily due to the votes of those who had voted for the United Left Party (ZL) four years earlier (71.4%). Just over half of Razem voters (55.5%) cast their vote for the SLD committee, the only left-wing committee in this election, thus showing moderate loyalty from Razem (‘Polish Podemos’) voters. Meanwhile, 27.5% of former Nowoczesna voters, 16.1% of PO voters, and 10% of Polish People’s Party (PSL) voters decided to change their preferences, casting their vote for

162

´ B. M. RYDLINSKI

SLD candidates (In turn, only 55% of voters of Razem from 2015 bet on the Left this time) (Danielewski, 2019). It is also worth noting that compared with the aggregate result of the ZL and Razem, the SLD electoral committee gained an additional 620,000 voters in the 2019 election, which was the best result among the opposition parties. Furthermore, it is interesting to note what happened to the ZL and Razem in this election. In the case of the former social democratic coalition from 2015, it lost 18% to PO in the 2019 election. With regard to Razem, the 2019 election also resulted in a loss to the coalition led by PO. This loss was as much as 22.8% of former ZL and Razem voters. Distribution of Voters by the Level of Urbanisation As far as the distribution of voters on the left is concerned, 7.5% of all voters living in the countryside voted for the SLD’s committee, as did 12.2% of those living in towns with a population below 50,000, 13.7% of those living in cities with a population between 51,000 and 200,000, and 14.4% of those living in towns with a population between 201,000 and 500,000. The proportions of support for the left are distributed a little differently among the group of exclusive voters. Village City up to 50,000 inhabitants City 51,000–200,000 inhabitants City 201,000–500,000 inhabitants City over 500,000 inhabitants

22.6 27.1 18.1 10.1 22.1

The visible differences between the data relate to the fact that the rural electorate is very numerous in Poland, and just 7.5% of all voters make up one-fifth of the support for the SLD. Apart from the agglomeration component, whose increased importance has been observed in the SLD’s results for the last two parliamentary elections, it seems that the inhabitants of Polish rural areas constitute a strong share of the voters of the SLD, the most progressive force in the whole political spectrum. However, we can surmise that this result comprises former metropolitan voters who have left the big centres in recent years and moved back to their rural estates.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

163

The SLD was supported most strongly in 2019 in towns up to 50,000 inhabitants, which undoubtedly reflects the significant over-representation of the left in former military garrison towns and former industrial centres that underwent severe depopulation after 1989. Gender Composition The prevalence of women in the 2019 left-wing electorate is no surprise. Due to the so-called ‘Black Protests’ by women against a ban on abortion, the SLD had clearly gained in the polls even back in 2016, not so much through its special visibility during these protests, but through its credibility. During the first SLD-PSL government, the social democratic team had twice managed to liberalise the abortion law on social grounds. However, the first of these changes were ultimately blocked by a veto from President Lech Wał˛esa, and the second changes were blocked by the conservative verdict of the Constitutional Tribunal which ruled that the changes were incompatible with the Polish ‘Basic Law’. The predominance of the female vote was also reflected in the high number of women in the Coalition Parliamentary Club of the Left (21 out of 49 seats) (‘Dane o posłach wg stanu na dzien´ wyborów—Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej IX kadencji,’ n.d.). Men Women

44.6 55.4

Age Composition The results of the support for the left wing by specific age groups are interesting, where a critical share of the youngest and the oldest voters can be seen. Primarily, it seems the sum of young voters of Wiosna and Razem and older voters of the SLD have been a visible group of loyal leftwing voters for years. The SLD managed to reach both groups during the 2019 electoral campaign through at least two key events. The first was the participation of SLD politicians in the march against violence and aggression towards LGBT+ people, which took place in Białystok at the end of July 2019. The second was at a press conference in Szczecin at the end of September that year when, not shying away

164

´ B. M. RYDLINSKI

Table 2 Support of the SLD Electoral Committee in the 2019 parliamentary elections by age groups

18–29 years 30–39 years 40–49 years 50–59 years 60 and over

23.8 20.3 19.0 13.3 23.6

from using historical political arguments, one of the leaders of the left said: ‘With great respect, in this place, we wanted, first of all, to bow to those who fought and led so we can call this place Poland. Regardless of whether they were Polish soldiers or Soviet soldiers […] these people liberated us, these people gave us freedom from Germany and Germans, from fascists’ (‘Czarzasty o Armii Czerwonej: Ci ludzie nas wyzwolili, dali nam wolno´sc´ ,’ 2019) (Table 2). We can see that the strategy of winning over both voters who identify with the colour of the rainbow and those who identify with the colour of the military uniform from the period of the People’s Republic of Poland proved to be effective for the SLD. Composition by Educational Attainment In the context of education, it can clearly be noted that people with higher or secondary education mostly vote for left-wing parties. Indeed, the SLD has only a thin trace of support among people with primary or vocational education. These results can be interpreted as having a profound discord between the popular class (Gdula, 2017; Gdula et al., 2014; Haremska, 2018) and the electoral offer of the SLD. They also reflect a gradual ‘intellectualisation’ of the Polish left. While the SLD and Aleksander Kwa´sniewski could count on the support of less-educated voters in the 1990s, many of those voters now hold a university or high school diploma and have become loyal left-wing voters. In 2019, these more educated voters had either previously worked as managerial and administrative staff in the People’s Republic of Poland, or were young voters from large cities who were attending university in large numbers.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

Primary school Vocational school High school Graduate

165

3.4 8.3 38.0 50.3

Distribution by Profession Further confirmation of the dichotomy between the Polish left wing and the working class in 2019 is provided by exit poll results showing the distribution of support for the left wing by job and occupational status. With just 1.6% of support for the SLD’s electoral committee among the unemployed, and 5.8% of support from workers, it is clear that the SLD’s electoral committee, despite many pro-worker pledges (‘Reflektor OPZZ,’ 2019), did not prove credible enough for the vote of these two groups in 2019. By contrast, the SLD recorded its highest support among pensioners and disability pensioners (20.9%), service administration employees (20.7%), and directors, managers, and specialists (16.9%). These professional groups overlap with both the historical share of SLD voters and the group of metropolitan voters, who more often chose the candidates of Wiosna and Razem in the 2019 parliamentary election. Company owner/co-owner Director/manager/specialist Administrative or service assistant Farmer Worker Pupil/student Unemployed person Pensioner Other

11.1 16.9 20.7 1.5 5.8 12.0 1.6 20.9 9.5

The Ideological Profile of Social Democratic Voters and the Popularity of Social Democratic Values When analysing the profile of the Polish social democratic voters, a significant cleavage must be borne in mind between Polish socio-economic and

166

´ B. M. RYDLINSKI

worldview-cultural issues. This cleavage strongly influences how left-wing voters position themselves on the axis of values and benefits. Post-election research conducted by the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) on voters’ profiles states that SLD supporters ‘are distinguished […] primarily by their worldview liberalism, especially the opinions on the relationship between the state and church, and their attitude to the formalisation of same-sex partnerships. The vast majority (84%) believe that a concordat between Poland and the Holy See is not necessary, and that the state should not favour any confession or church. Three-quarters of voters for the SLD (75%) favour institutionalising civil partnerships for homosexuals. Most voters (60%) support the legal permissibility of abortion. Nearly all (93%) believe that sex education should be taught in schools’ (‘CBOS: Elektoraty 2019—charakterystyka pogl˛adów,’ 2019). Can thus see that the social democratic electoral cohort is exceptionally liberal, like the metropolitan profile of PO voters. However, it is on the axis of values that the Polish left wing can find the source of their strength. This is reflected in the SLD’s very high proportion of pro-European voters. Indeed, more than two-thirds of its declared voters (69%) believe that Poland should strive for the closest possible integration with the European Union, wanting Poland to belong to the political West to share its values, rules, and democratic principles. On 22 October 2020, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, under the leadership of Julia Przył˛ebska, significantly restricted the right to terminate a pregnancy in Poland. Anti-government protests of a unique scale swept across the country. Indeed, Michał Sutowski from ‘Krytyka Polityczna’ even stated ‘it was—and still is—the most numerous street protest in the history of Poland’ (Sutowski, 2020). These street protests had a formative character, especially among the youngest voters, which soon translated into further historical changes in public opinion polls. In a CBOS survey of young men and women’s political views, the percentage of those declaring themselves left-wing overtook the percentage of those with right-wing views for the first time since 1990. As the CBOS press release states: ‘the general increase in declarations of left-wing views among young Poles was marked everywhere and did not omit smaller towns either. The strongest increase (around twofold) was noted in small towns with a population of up to 20,000 (from 12 to 30%), in cities with a population between 100,000 and 500,000 (from 19 to 36%), and in rural areas (from 12 to 25%)’ (‘CBOS: Elektoraty 2019—charakterystyka pogl˛adów,’ 2019).

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

167

Over the past few years, young women in particular have begun to selfidentify with left-wing views. Indeed, the percentage of young women who declare leftist views has increased from 9 to 40 percentage points over the last half-decade. It is also worth mentioning that the prevalence of left-wing views among women occurs in every group with regard to the place of residence—be it a village or a small, medium, or large town. In the socio-economic realm, left-leaning voters are an interesting case study as they exhibit highly neoliberal views. As noted by Ryszard Szarfenberg when analysing data from the European Social Survey, 79% of the left wing voters surveyed in Poland believe that social benefits cause laziness. By contrast, 64% of left-wing voters in Sweden believe that those benefits do not contribute to laziness (Szarfenberg, n.d.). When looking at the views of individual electorates on the flagship social programme of the PiS government—which is the ‘Family 500 plus’ child subsidy programme—it can clearly be seen that the voters of the NL are second only to the voters of Confederation when it comes to disliking this solution of providing a boost to low-income families living beyond the large urban centres, who feel frustrated that they do not share sufficiently in Poland’s economic growth. In general, do you support or oppose the Family 500 plus programme, under which families receive a child benefit of PLN 500 for each child?

Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwo´sc´ , Solidarna Polska, Porozumienie) Poland 2050 (Polska 2050) Civic Coalition (Koalicja Obywatelska [Platforma Obywatelska, Nowoczesna, Inicjatywa Polska, Zieloni]) The Left (Lewica [Nowa Lewica, Lewica Razem]) The Confederation (Konfederacja Wolno´sc´ i Niepodległo´sc´ [KORWiN, Ruch Narodowy, Braun])

Support

Against (%)

Hard to say (%)

98

1

1

59

36

5

55

43

2

51

46

3

38

56

6

Source (‘CBOS: Program Rodzina 500 plus po pi˛eciu latach funkcjonowania,’ 2021)

While the aversion of NL voters to the Family 500 Plus program can always be explained by the high aversion of social democratic voters towards PiS, it can nevertheless be seen that the NL’s programmatic

168

´ B. M. RYDLINSKI

proposals in the socio-economic field seem to demotivate its existing voters. Despite this apparent dichotomy between the views of the NL electorate and the ideological profile of their political formation, the NL has submitted several social democratic proposals on social and economic issues: workers’ rights, strengthening trade unions, building state-run rental housing, increasing tax justice, and increasing healthcare expenditure. During the Covid-19 pandemic, it became obvious that the neoliberal minimum state was not functioning correctly. This resulted in increased activity from the NL to strengthen the social role of the state. Nor does the newly formed NL leave aside the so-called worldview issues. NL politicians are thus collecting signatures for the ‘legal abortion without compromises’ social project. They have also submitted a proposal on civil partnerships and marriage equality. Moreover, the flags of the NL and Razem are visible at every gender equality parade and every women’s demonstration in Poland.

7

Conclusion

The history of Polish social democracy is inseparably connected with the history of democratic Poland. After the collapse of communism in 1989, the SLD took on many vital roles: defenders of the good name of those who created the People’s Poland, representatives of the losers from the neoliberal transformation, modernisers, supporters of rapid Westernisation, and defenders of the weak. Some of these roles have become obsolete today, and other parties have replaced the SLD on some cleavages. While PiS took over the popular class, PO primarily took over the SLD’s pro-modernisation voters. After 2004 when Poland had become a member of the EU, the SLD tried in various ways to return to the top of the political league, but it never succeeded. The loss of all its seats in parliament in 2015 and its spectacular comeback in 2019 illustrate well the extremes of the SLD’s condition in Poland in recent years. The merge of the SLD and Wiosna into a single formation in October 2021 nevertheless offers positive potential for social democracy in Poland. The worst scenario that could happen before the 2023 parliamentary elections would be a fragmentation of the left—a division into two or three parties and two electoral lists. The threat of no social democratic representatives in parliament for the second time would be genuine because the votes of centre-left voters would be divided similarly to 2015. While the

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

169

creation of the NL will not entirely stop voters’ potential flow to PO or Poland 2050, it will significantly strengthen the left-wing segment within the camp of opposition parties. There is also a high probability that during the next parliamentary election in 2023, Poles will find a single left-wing list, which is different from the situation observed in the Czech Republic or Slovakia. When evaluating the state of social democracy in Poland, the NL’s structural strength must also be considered. The party has branches in every district in Poland and is represented in the Sejm, the European Parliament, and local government. Nearly 30,000 members pay membership fees and form an identity collective of people who profess common values. Given that the NL has a constant cluster of young voters, the left wing does not have to worry too much about the typical ‘ageing voters’ process of the left in central and eastern Europe. However, to broaden its support, the NL cannot stop courting the now-retiring post-war generation of baby boomers. These people not only socialised in the years of the People’s Poland and lived out their youth there but also experienced the gains of the (admittedly undemocratic) welfare state. They will also soon need good quality public services and the reform and radical subsidising of welfare benefits. Furthermore, this group of voters (60+) already constitutes the largest, as it comprises almost 10 million citizens in Poland (‘Rocznik Demograficzny 2021,’ 2021). In strategic terms, the NL cannot politically abandon the former provincial cities that were severely battered by the right-wing administrative reform of 1999. These cities are now undergoing radical depopulation because the lack of self-governing political power and the frequent collapse of industry there after 1989 led to mass migration, the flight of the young, and social desolation (‘Raport PAN: 122 miastom w Polsce groz˛ ˙ a zapa´sc´ i marginalizacja,’ 2017) In addition to the idea of deglomeration, whereby some central offices are moved from Warsaw to these cities, the NL could also start calling for financial compensation and political redress for these cities. The lack of positive media for Poland’s social democrats is one of the NL’s most significant challenges for the future because the bipartisanship and tribalism of television, press, and radio do not give the NL and Razem much room for manoeuvre. At best, in the dispute between PiS and PO, between Kaczynski ´ and Tusk, the NL may be asked to comment on this political ‘holy’ war. Perhaps Bernie Sander’s strategy of attacking

170

´ B. M. RYDLINSKI

the liberal and conservative media’s lack of objectivity in the US will prove to be the solution for the NL to break out of this clinch (‘Trump’s Worst Nightmare (Bernie Sanders),’ 2020). This is especially important in an era of decline for traditional media and the rise of the political reach of social media platforms and channels. The popularity phenomenon of right-wing populism in Poland stemmed mainly from the SLD’s failure to pursue effective and fair public policies in the early first decade of the twenty-first century. To counteract Poland’s further slide towards an illiberal democratic state, the centre-left has a historic role to play. In this matter, winning the trust of the working and lower class is fundamental for the Polish social democrats. Despite the apparent predominance of economically and culturally liberal voters, the NL shouldn’t abandon its social democratic demands. A state that does not respect workers’ rights does not pursue a full employment policy, and does not help the losers of globalisation is neither democratic nor legal. Therefore, Article 2 of the Polish Constitution, which states that Poland ‘is a democratic state governed by the rule of law, realising the principles of social justice’, should be an essential guideline for Polish social democracy in the future (Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r., 1997).

Bibliography 2001 Wybory do Sejmu: wyniki głosowania na listy komitetów wyborczych w skali kraju [WWW Document]. (2001). https://wybory2001.pkw.gov.pl/ sjg2_k.html. Accessed June 21, 2022. 2007 Wybory do Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [WWW Document]. (2007). https://wybory2007.pkw.gov.pl/SJM/PL/WYN/M/index.htm. Accessed June 21, 2022. 2010 Wybory Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (I tura) [WWW Document]. (2010). https://prezydent2010.pkw.gov.pl/PZT1/PL/WYN/W/index.htm. Accessed June 21, 2022. 2011 Wybory do Sejmu i Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [WWW Document]. (2011). https://wybory2011.pkw.gov.pl/wsw/pl/000000.html. Accessed June 21, 2022. 2015 Wybory do Sejmu i Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [WWW Document]. (2015). https://parlament2015.pkw.gov.pl/349_Wyniki_Sejm.html. Accessed June 21, 2022.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

171

2015 Wybory Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (I tura) [WWW Document]. (2015). https://prezydent2015.pkw.gov.pl/319_Pierwsze_glosowanie.html. Accessed June 21, 2022. 2018 Wybory samorz˛adowe [WWW Document]. (2018). https://wybory2018. pkw.gov.pl/pl/geografia#general_committee_stat. Accessed June 21, 2022. 2019 Wybory do Sejmu i Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [WWW Document]. (2019). https://sejmsenat2019.pkw.gov.pl/sejmsenat2019/pl/wyniki/sejm/ pl. Accessed June 21, 2022. 2019 Wyniki wyborów do Parlamentu Europejskiego [WWW Document]. (2019). https://pe2019.pkw.gov.pl/pe2019/pl/wyniki/pl. Accessed June 21, 2022. 2020 Wybory Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (I tura) [WWW Document]. https://prezydent20200628.pkw.gov.pl/prezydent20200628/. (2020). Accessed June 21, 2022. CBOS: Elektoraty 2019—charakterystyka pogl˛adów [WWW Document]. https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2019/K_124_19.PDF?fbc (2019). lid=IwAR2fNep2TjrzByc19413mMve-JmUPVAKOCgIoKC2GhuDA_i7B miK3cJz1lI. Accessed June 23, 2022. CBOS: Program Rodzina 500 plus po pi˛eciu latach funkcjonowania [WWW Document]. (2021). https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2021/K_029_ 21.PDF. Accessed June 23, 2022. Centrum im. Ignacego Daszynskiego ´ [WWW Document]. (n.d.). https://cid. org.pl/. Accessed June 21, 2022. Cramme, O., & Diamond, P. (2012). After the third way: The future of social democracy in Europe. I.B. Tauris. Czarzasty o Armii Czerwonej: Ci ludzie nas wyzwolili, dali nam wolno´sc´ [WWW Document]. (2019). https://www.tvp.info/44518552/czarzasty-o-armii-cze rwonej-ci-ludzie-nas-wyzwolili-dali-nam-wolnosc. Accessed June 23, 2022. Dane o posłach wg stanu na dzien´ wyborów—Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej IX kadencji [WWW Document]. (n.d.). https://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm9.nsf/ page.xsp/poslowie_wybory. Accessed June 23, 2022. Danielewski, M. (2019). KO w stagnacji, Lewica i Konfederacja w ofensywie. Porównujemy wyniki wyborów 2019 i 2015 [WWW Document]. https:// oko.press/ko-w-stagnacji-lewica-i-konfederacja-w-ofensywie/. Accessed June 23, 2022. Gdula, M. (2017). Dobra zmiana w miastku. Neoautorytaryzm w polskiej polityce z perspektywy małego miasta, Krytyka Polityczna. Gdula, M., Lewicki, M., & Sadura, M. (Eds.). (2014). Praktyki kulturowe klasy ludowej. Instytut Studiów Zaawansowanych.

172

´ B. M. RYDLINSKI

Głosowanie w wyborach parlamentarnych wg wieku—infografika [WWW Document]. (2015). https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/glosowanie-w-wyborach-parlam entarnych-wg-wieku-infografika-6027736472732289a. Accessed September 25, 2022. Gwiazda, A. (2008). Party patronage in Poland: The democratic left alliance and law and justice compared. East European Politics and Societies, 22, 802–827. https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325408316534 Haremska, K. (2018). Populizm, autorytaryzm, Polska. Maciej Gdula o konsekwencjach polskiej transformacji liberalnej. Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal, 8. https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.8.1.7 Jacunski, ´ M., Brodzinska-Mirowska, ´ B., Pacze´sniak, A., & Wincławska, M. (2021). Party organization and communication in Poland. Palgrave Macmillan. Keman, H. (2017). Social democracy: A comparative account of the left-wing party family. Routledge, an imprint of the Taylor and Francis Group. Klub Radnych Lewicy—Cz˛estochowa [WWW Document]. (n.d.). https:// bip.czestochowa.pl/artykul/71612/1166668/klub-radnych-lewicy. Accessed September 29, 2022. Komitet ustawy obywatelskiej “Legalna aborcja. Bez kompromisów” zarejestrowany. Zbieramy podpisy! [WWW Document]. (2021). https://lewica. org.pl/aktualnosci/6586-komitet-ustawy-obywatelskiej-legalna-aborcja-bezkompromisow-zarejestrowany-zbieramy-podpisy. Accessed June 21, 2022. Komunikat Panstwowej ´ Komisji Wyborczej z dnia 24 maja 2021 r. w sprawie sprawozdan´ o z´ ródłach pozyskania s´rodków finansowych przez partie polityczne w 2020 r. [WWW Document]. (2021). https://pkw.gov.pl/finans owanie-polityki/finansowanie-partii-politycznych/sprawozdania-finansowepartii-politycznych-za-rok-2020/komunikat-panstwowej-komisji-wyborczej-zdnia-24-maja-2021-r-w-sprawie-sprawozdan-o-zrodlach-pozyska?fbclid=IwA R1NvCBbi8JgDu9XVO8coX776izt1rcSc08S4rLAW4xCU_V-q_8cxNddVb0. Accessed June 21, 2022. Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r. (1997). Kope´c, J., & Pawłowska, D. (2019). Wyniki wyborów. Ci, którzy dawniej nie głosowali, w znacznej mierze poparli Lewic˛e. Analiza przepływów wyborców [WWW Document]. https://biqdata.wyborcza.pl/biqdata/7,159116,253 15161,wyniki-wyborow-wyborcy-pis-znowu-staneli-za-pis-lewica-wziela.html. Accessed June 23, 2022. Kosowska-G˛astoł, B. (2017). Are the Europarties real political parties? National parties’ involvement in multi-level structures of European political parties. Historia i Polityka. https://doi.org/10.12775/hip.2017.009 Kosowska-G˛astoł, B. (2021). Te same, ale czy takie same? Analiza oblicza ideowo-programowego polskich partii politycznych—rózne ˙ perspektywy

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

173

metodologiczne. In A. Kruk (Ed.), Postulaty Polityczne i Wyborcze Partii Politycznych (pp. 17–35). Oficyna Wydawnicza Uniwersytetu Zielonogórskiego. Kowalczyk, M. (2020). Swoi swoim. Panstwowe ´ spółki kupuj˛a reklamy w prorz˛adowych mediach [WWW Document]. https://oko.press/reklamy-pro rzadowe-media/. Accessed June 21, 2022. Kowalik, T. (2001). Spory wokół Nowej Trzeciej Drogi. Scholar. Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (1967). Party systems and voter alignments: Crossnational perspectives. In R. R. Alford & others (Eds.), International yearbook of political behavior research (Vol. 7). Free Press. Marchwicki, M. (2019). Co obiecuje nowa partia Biedronia? Program wyborczy Wiosny [WWW Document]. https://natemat.pl/263679,program-wyb orczy-wiosny-biedronia-co-obiecuje-byly-prezydent-slupska. Accessed June 21, 2022. Meyer, H., & Rutherford, J. (2012). The future of European social democracy: Building the good society. Palgrave Macmillan. Mikulski, J. (2019). W TVN24 najwi˛ecej polityków KO, w Polsacie News wi˛ecej PiS. Sasin rekordzist˛a. Kogo zapraszały w kampanii wyborczej telewizje?— rp.pl [WWW Document]. https://www.rp.pl/kraj/art1085121-w-tvn24-naj wiecej-politykow-ko-w-polsacie-news-wiecej-pis-sasin-rekordzista-kogo-zapras zaly-w-kampanii-wyborczej-telewizje. Accessed June 21, 2022. Nowa Lewica—Przyszło´sc´ jest teraz [WWW Document]. (2021). https://lew ica.org.pl/images/dokumenty/Przysz%C5%82o%C5%9B%C4%87-Jest-TerazPriorytety-Programowe-Nowej-Lewicy.pdf. Accessed June 21, 2022. Okraska, M. (2018). Ziemia jałowa. Opowie´sc´ o Zagł˛ebiu. Trzecia Strona. Orlikowski, P. (2019). Wybory parlamentarne 2019. Partie dostan˛a ponad 280 mln zł z subwencji—Money.pl [WWW Document]. https://www.money.pl/ gospodarka/wybory-parlamentarne-2019-partie-dostana-ponad-280-mln-zlz-subwencji-6435730678925441a.html. Accessed June 21, 2022. Pacze´sniak, A., & Rydlinski, ´ B. (Eds.). (2021). Europejskie partie polityczne: dyskurs programowy w Unii Europejskiej (Wydanie pierwsze, ed). Wydawnictwo Sejmow. Pi˛ecioro parlamentarzystów odchodzi z Lewicy i tworzy koło PPS [WWW Document]. (2021). https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/kraj/artykuly/ 8313758,lewica-poslowie-odchodza-kolo-pps.html. Accessed June 21, 2022. Raport PAN: 122 miastom w Polsce groz˛ ˙ a zapa´sc´ i marginalizacja [WWW Document]. (2017). https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/spoleczen stwo/1716098,1,raport-pan-122-miastom-w-polsce-groza-zapasc-i-marginali zacja.read. Accessed June 23, 2022. Reflektor OPZZ [WWW Document]. (2019). https://issuu.com/centrum.das zynskiego/docs/reflektoropzz. Accessed June 23, 2022.

174

´ B. M. RYDLINSKI

Rocznik Demograficzny 2021 [WWW Document]. (2021). https://stat.gov.pl/ obszary-tematyczne/roczniki-statystyczne/roczniki-statystyczne/rocznik-dem ograficzny-2021,3,15.html. Accessed June 23, 2022. Rydlinski, B. M. (2017). Economic crisis as a factor of the neoliberal policy in Poland. Prakseologia 39–62. Silny samorz˛ad, demokratyczna Polska. Program samorz˛adowy Sojuszu Lewicy Demokratycznej 2018 [WWW Document]. (2018). https://lewica.org.pl/ images/dokumenty/Silny_samorz˛ad2c_demokratyczna_Polska.pdf. Accessed September 25, 2022. SLD—Przywrócimy normalno´sc´ [WWW Document]. (2017). https://lewica. org.pl/images/dokumenty/SLD_program_Przywrocimy_Normalnosc.pdf. Accessed June 21, 2022. Senacki projekt ustawy o zakazie propagowania komunizmu lub innego ustroju totalitarnego przez nazwy budowli, obiektów i urz˛adzen´ uzyteczno´ ˙ sci publicznej [WWW Document]. (2016). https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm8.nsf/ PrzebiegProc.xsp?nr=302. Accessed June 21, 2022. Statut Nowej Lewicy [WWW Document]. (n.d.). https://lewica.org.pl/images/ Statut_Nowej_Lewicy_uchwalony_20.12_copy_copy.pdf. Accessed June 21, 2022a. Sutowski, M. (2020). Pa´zdziernikowa rewolucja godno´sci [WWW Document]. https://krytykapolityczna.pl/kraj/michal-sutowski-pazdziernikowa-rewolu cja-godnosci/. Accessed June 23, 2022. Szarfenberg, R. (n.d.). Czy zasiłki socjalne powoduj˛a lenistwo? Odpowiedzi według autoidentyfikacji na skali lewica-prawica, porównanie Polski, Federacji Rosyjskiej i Szwecji. [WWW Document]. http://rszarf.ips.uw.edu.pl/gra fika/socjal-lenistwoPL-RU-SElewica-prawica.jpg. Accessed June 23, 2022. Szcz˛es´niak, A. (2019). Nowa Lewica. „Pierwszy w historii polityczny zwi˛azek partnerski”. SLD i Wiosna ł˛acz˛a si˛e w jedn˛a parti˛e [WWW Document]. https://oko.press/nowa-lewica-sld-i-wiosna-lacza-sie-w-jedna-partie. Accessed June 21, 2022. Theus, J. (2021). Protesty przeciwko Lex TVN. “Władza chce, zeby ˙ nas nie było!” [WWW Document]. https://oko.press/protesty-przeciwko-lex-tvn-wcalej-polsce-wladza-chce-zeby-nas-nie-bylo/ Accessed June 21, 2022. Tomczak, Ł. (2008). Polska lewica—konsekwencje podziałów i konsolidacji. In Ł Tomczak (Ed.), Polska Lewica u Progu XXI Wieku: Wybrane Aspekty (pp. 7– 40). Wydawnictwo Marina. Tracz, M. (2021). Kongres Nowej Lewicy. Włodzimierz Czarzasty i Robert Biedron´ współprzewodnicz˛acymi—Fakty TVN [WWW Document]. https:// fakty.tvn24.pl/ogladaj-online,60/kongres-nowej-lewicy-wlodzimierz-czarza sty-i-robert-biedron-wspolprzewodniczacymi,1080360.html. Accessed June 21, 2022.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

175

Trump’s Worst Nightmare (Bernie Sanders) [WWW Document]. (2020). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=30cneQiSE94. Accessed June 23, 2022. Wiatr, J. J. (2000). Socjaldemokracja wobec wyzwan´ XXI wieku. Scholar. Wiatr, J. J. (2010). SdRP 1990–1999: Nowa partia polskiej lewicy. My´sl Socjaldemokratyczna, 20, 5–15. Wincławska, M., & Brodzinska-Mirowska, ´ B. (2016). Niewykorzystane szanse? Polskie partie polityczne w działaniu. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika. Wincławska, M., Pacze´sniak, A., Brodzinska-Mirowska, ´ B., & Jacunski, ´ M. (2021). Party management from the perspective of party members: Evidence from Poland. Problems of Post-Communism, 68. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 10758216.2020.1757466 Wojtasik, W. (2008). Stamt˛ad do wieczno´sci. Ewolucja programowa SLD 1991– 2006. In Ł. Tomczak (Ed.), Polska Lewica u Progu XXI Wieku: Wybrane Aspekty (pp. 41–61). Wydawnictwo Marina. Zarz˛ad Krajowy Nowej Lewicy [WWW Document]. (n.d.). https://lewica.org. pl/wladze/czlonkowie-zarzadu-krajowego. Accessed June 21, 2022. Zwi˛azkowcy i posłowie Lewicy spotkali si˛e w Sejmie [WWW Document]. (2021). https://www.opzz.org.pl/aktualnosci/kraj/zwiazkowcy-i-poslowielewicy-spotkali-sie-w-sejmie. Accessed June 21, 2022.

The State of Social Democracy in Slovakia: The Twilight (or Rebirth) of Social Democracy? L’ubomír Zvada

1 Introduction: Decline of the Left and the Visegrád Context The fall of the left is not truly exceptional in the cycle of political history, and its penultimate wave, which one might observe before the current one, had taken place in the turn of the 1980s and 1990s. At that time, scholars studied the gradual decline and fall of the leftleaning political parties across the European political systems (Merkel, 1991; Pontusson, 1992, 1995; Sainsbury, 1984). The ongoing process of decline, frequently referred to by the term ‘pasokification’,1 commenced in Greece at the beginning of the 2010s (Moschonas, 2013; Sotiropoulos, 1 The term has been associated with the rise of the Syriza, a populist and left-leaning political party, that replaced the PASOK, a traditional center-left party. It was the very beginning of the domino effect for the decline of the left and center-left oriented parties in Europe.

L’. Zvada (B) Department of Politics and European Studies, Palacký University Olomouc, Olomouc, Czech Republic e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Skrzypek and A. Bíró-Nagy (eds.), The Social Democratic Parties in the Visegrád Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30792-8_6

177

178

L’. ZVADA

2014), and it has appeared in various forms and extents, regardless of the size of the countries, its democratic experience in the past, or economic performance. And thus, this wave affected the Labour Party in the United Kingdom (Manwarring & Beech, 2018), social democrats in Sweden (Taylor, 2018), traditional left-leaning bastions in Spain (Delgado-Fernandez & Cazorla-Martin, 2017), France (Di FrancesoMayot, 2018), and Germany (Dostal, 2017). The decline then resulted in a rise in the number of new populist parties and movements, be it left or right-leaning. These newcomers, collectively known as technocratic populists, or even far-right parties have become one of the most evident manifestations of the contemporary redesign of European political scene. Berman and Snegovaya, for instance, argued that the most important cause of this decline was ‘the left’s shift to the center on economic issues during the late twentieth century (…), it watered down the left’s distinctive historical profile; rendered socialist and social-democratic parties unable to take advantage of widespread discontent over the fallout from neoliberal reforms and the 2008 financial crisis; created incentives for parties to emphasize cultural and social rather than economic or class appeals; and undermined the representative nature of democracy’ (Berman & Snegovaya, 2019). On the other hand, Abou-Chadi, Mitteregger and Mudde rebutted the generally assumed hypothesis that would have linked this decline of the left to the automatic rise of extreme right parties. Specifically, their analysis shows that (a) working-class preferences should not be reduced to authoritarian/nationalist positions; (b) social democratic parties have not disproportionally lost the working-class voters; (c) only a small share of former social democratic voters have switched to the extremist right (see Abou-Chadi et al., 2021). In a very recent study, Bandau (2022) scrutinised the most popular explanations and causes of the decline of social democracy (sociological, materialist, ideational, and the institutional ones) and challenged them with the empirical evidence of 51 studies. His results indicate that ‘there is not one explanation that stands out but that the electoral crisis of social democracy is a complex phenomenon with multiple causes, such as socio-structural changes, fiscal austerity, and neoliberal depolarization, and that the findings suggest that a liberal turn on sociocultural issues does not necessarily lead to vote losses’ (Bandau, 2022). Furthermore, the data show that the merger of social democratic parties and green parties, or any cooptation of the green agenda may be more resistant to the outlined phenomenon (Gingrich,

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA: THE …

179

2017). The most recent victory of the Socialists in Spain and the SPD in Germany may indicate a temporary cessation of the overall decline. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned studies were focused on the context of the West and its left-leaning parties (Brandal et al., 2021; Manwarring & Kennedy, 2018). The crisis of the left has, however, affected the area of Central and Eastern Europe too, and the Visegrád (V4) countries as specified in this book. Not much of academic attention has been paid to this crisis of the left (Bakke & Sitter, 2021; Lysek et al., 2020), though. Chronologically, the decline had been signalled by the abandoning of the influential position in case of Poland’s Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) in 2005 to the benefit of the PiS, which was then followed by the defeat of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) five years later. The 2017 general election was fatal for the Czech Social Democratic ˇ Party (CSSD) when the party suffered the consequences of its former cooperation with the populist movement of ANO, led by the billionaire, Andrej Babiš. The crisis of the left is necessary to understand in broader context of what Haughton and Deegan-Krause call the ‘hurricane season’, which is characterised by three main symptoms: (1) losses of established parties; (2) rapid gains of uncorrupted newcomers; (3) equally rapid newcomers’ losses to even newer parties (Haughton & Deegan-Krausse, 2015). In comparison to the West, where no great changes have occurred within the rule of law, a crucial feature of the Visegrád countries resides in the fact that a significant democratic backsliding has already taken place in Poland and Hungary (Greskovits, 2015). It has been further accompanied by a shift to illiberal politics (Bustikova & Guasti, 2017; Buzogány, 2017; Buzogány & Varga, 2018; Pirro & Stanley, 2022) and ethnopopulism (Vachudová, 2020). Since 1993, Slovakia’s political system has been settled mainly in three ideological roots that may be further framed by three significant periods of Slovak politics: (1) Meˇciar’s autocratic and illiberal regime from 1993 to 1998, known for its strongly authoritarian tendencies standing against civil society, which brought Slovakia to the international isolation; (2) the ‘normalisation years’ in which the centre-right political forces grouped together in the Dzurinda I and Dzurinda II governments (1998–2006) and then brought Slovakia back to Europe. This period consisted not only of the fight for democratic and civic freedoms—which could also be called anti-Meˇciarism politics—but also sharply enforced neoliberal thoughts;

180

L’. ZVADA

(3) and finally, Fico’s era, starting in 2006 and (most likely) ending after the 2020 general election.2 This chapter engages in the latest stage of Slovakia’s political development, as mentioned above, and aims to analyse and depict the current state of social democracy in Slovakia as represented by the Smer-SD (Smer-Sociálna demokracia, Direction-Social Democracy). This in-depth analysis primarily focuses on the last decade of policymaking in terms of social democratic policies with an emphasis on the era beginning by the 2014 European Parliament (EP) election and onward. For a more comprehensive and detailed analysis, the chapters will also deal with the issues and respective contexts related to the Smer-SD occurring before the examined period. The main goal of this chapter is to offer answers to several research questions reflecting the other sub-chapters, such as: What is the position of the Slovak left in its political system? What results has the Slovak left notched up in the latest elections? How does the party organise itself internally, and is it being affected by the crisis of partisanship? Who are the key partners of the left in civil society? What is the content of its programme and what aspects have been highlighted recently? Who are the voters of the Smer-SD and how is the electorate geographically distributed? Most importantly, though, the principal objective is to contribute to the debate on the state of social democracy in Slovakia so that the decline of the strongest left-leaning party may be explained in the context of V4, and possible future scenarios may thus be outlined as well. Two points must be, however, stressed before moving forward. First, the chapter will be primarily oriented on the hegemonic Smer-SD due to a broader consensus that it is a genuine representative of social democracy in Slovakia. Despite many disputes over the Smer-SD and its social democratic orientations, for the purpose of this analysis, we will accept the categorisation in the same manner as other political scientists have done in their works (e.g., Marušiak, 2006, 2017, 2021; Rossi, 2020; Rybáˇr & Spáˇc, 2017). Second, it is worth mentioning several other political parties that explicitly self-proclaimed to be centre-left, social democratic, or newly progressive left parties amid the latest (2020) parliamentary election: Progresívne Slovensko (PS, Progressive Slovakia), that has been in a coalition with the Spolu (Together) but did not pass the 7% 2 These three dominant periods were briefly interrupted by Radiˇcová’s center-right government which had been in office from 2010 to 2012.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA: THE …

181

threshold set-up for two-party coalitions when gaining just 6.96%; Dobrá vol’ba (Good Choice)—led by Tomáš Drucker, an independent who had formerly served as Minister of Health Care and Minister of the Interior in Fico’s and Pellegrini’s government, respectively—gained 3.06% of votes; Socialisti. sk (Socialists. sk) led by Eduard Chmelár, a civil activist; and Solidarita-Hnutie pracujúcej chudoby (Solidarity Working Poverty Movement), which reached a marginal of 0.55% and 0.11%, respectively.

2

Electoral Results

The first chance for social democrats to create a government coalition came after the 2006 parliamentary election. Smer-SD and Fico’s popularity and ideological basis quickly made the party a main ideological opponent to the Dzurinda’s centre-right SDKÚ; Smer-SD formed a coalition with the national populist political parties HZDS (Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko, Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) and SNS (Slovenská národná strana, Slovak National Party). Since the establishment of the party, it experienced continuous growth, with the main peak being after the 2012 election when Fico’s Smer-SD reached an unprecedented win and gained an absolute majority in the Národná rada Slovenskej republiky (NRSR, National Council of the Slovak Republic) with 83 seats. Since this time, Smer-SD has set off on an opposite trajectory (Table 1). After the 2016 parliamentary election, Smer-SD accomplished a government formation, thanks to the securitisation of the migration crisis and mainly because of a surprising post-election decision made by Table 1 Smer-SD parliamentary election results 2002–2020

Years

Votes (%)

2002 2006 2010 2012 2016 2020

13.46 29.14 34.79 44.41 28.28 18.29

Votes 387,100 671,185 880,111 1,134,280 737,481 527,172

Seats 25 50 62 83 49 38

Source Author, based on data from the Slovak Statistical Office3

3 Retrieved from: https://volby.statistics.sk/index-en.html.

182

L’. ZVADA

Radoslav Procházka, a leader of the newly established political project called #Siet’ (#Network), who decided to support the Fico III cabinet. While Fico and his party celebrated a historic win in the 2012 parliamentary election, he and his political party now face an existential crisis after the 2020 parliamentary defeat by Matoviˇc’s populist movement OL’aNO (Obyˇcajní l’udia a nezávislé osobnosti, Ordinary People and Independent Personalities), which not only put Smer-SD to the opposition but undoubtedly contributed to the split Smer-SD experienced when the former PM Pellegrini and his followers left Smer-SD and established a new social democratic party, Hlas-SD (for more details, see parts ‘Organisation’ and ‘The Way Forward’ in this chapter). The common declining trajectories and disappearing hegemony SmerSD is seeing is not only on a national level and in parliamentary elections but also within second-order elections.4 With respect to the last two regional elections (vol’by do VÚC ) held in 2013 and 2017, the results of Smer-SD can be interpreted as follows. Firstly, despite the fact that SmerSD remained the strongest political force at the regional level, Fico’s party continuously lost support throughout the Slovak region. Meanwhile, in the 2013 regional elections, Smer-SD reached 118 out of 408 deputies of regional councils who run under the Smer-SD flag.5 Four years later, in the 2017 election, Smer-SD’s result slightly decreased to 97 out of 416 deputies who were elected to regional assemblies. As demonstrated in Table 2, Smer-SD also lost power in its traditional bastions such as the Trenˇcín, Žilina, Košice, and Prešov regions. Erosion of Smer-SD’s power was much more visible within the election procedure of regional governors during this period.6 After the 2013 regional election, Smer-SD held six out of eight regional governors’ 4 Regional election, municipal election, presidential election, and election to the

European Parliament. 5 If we also count the Smer-SD seats gained within coalition with KDH (Krest’anskodemokratické hnutie), Christian Democrats which run in Nitra and Banská Bystrica regions, the overall seats gained rises to 175 of 408. 6 Electoral procedure for the Slovak 2013 regional elections combined bloc system voting and direct election (majority system with run-off).

183

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA: THE …

Table 2

Smer-SD results in the 2013 and 2017 regional elections

Year|Region

Bratislava Trnava Trenˇcín

Žilina

Nitra Banská Bystrica

Košice

Prešov

2013 2017

1 6

19 10

* 17

26 16

35 16

12 1

25 16

* 15

Note * Smer-SD runs in an electoral coalition with the Christian Democrats Movement, KDH Source author, based on data from the Slovak Statistical Office7 ,8

seats. This success mainly covered up Smer-SD’s failure in the Banská Bystrica region, where extreme-right candidate Marian Kotleba defeated well-known Smer-SD deputy Vladimír Manka. ˇ The absolute dominant position held by Smer-SD was in regions such as Trenˇcín, Žilina, and Prešov, where Smer-SD candidates were voted for as early as the first ballot; other candidates who succeeded gained a comfortable win in the second ballot in the Trnava, Nitra, and Košice regions. Traditionally, the Bratislava region was too far away to succeed. Elections held four years later in 2017 were completely different. A group of Smer-SD MPs had initiated changes in electoral procedure when a majority system with runoff was substituted for a first-past-the-post system. As a result, Smer-SD lost four out of six regional governors in favour of opposing candidates and lost regional governors in cities such as Žilina, Košice, and Prešov; many analysts commented on these results as a ‘fiasco’ or ‘fatigue of governing by Smer-SD’ (Pravda.sk, 2017a). We can also observe very similar patterns in other elections. In the municipal election (komunálne vol’by), as Table 3 demonstrates, Smer-SD lost considerable support between 2014 and 2018. While Smer-SD held three out of eight regional mayors in 2010 and 2014, after the 2018 election, no Smer-SD candidates had been elected, even though regions such as Žilina or Košice had the most Smer-SD representatives such as Juraj Blanár or former minister Richard Raši. After the 2018 municipal elections, Smer-SD lost almost 9% of all elected mayors, as well as 7% of all elected municipal deputies.

7 Retrieved from: https://volby.statistics.sk/osk/osk2013/VUC/Tabulka4a_sk.html. 8 Retrieved from: https://volby.statistics.sk/osk/osk2017/sk/download.html.

184

L’. ZVADA

Table 3 Smer-SD results in municipal elections

Year

Regional mayors

Elected mayors—Overall

Elected deputies

2010

3 of 8

599 of 2,907 (20.60%)

2014

3 of 8

847 of 2,909 (29.11%)

2018

0 of 8

592 of 2,904 (20.38%)

4,576 of 21,032 (21.76%) 5,123 of 20,753 (24.68%) 3,692 of 20,646 (17.68%)

Source Author, based on data from the Slovak Statistical Office9

Another double defeat for the leading Slovak left came from a presidential election and a European election held one year later. For the presidential election held in February and March 2019, Smer-SD nominated the well-known Maroš Šefˇcoviˇc, Slovakia’s top representative within the EU and a recognisable diplomat. After the very constructive and polite campaign against his opponent, civic activist, and lawyer Zuzana ˇ Caputová (who was favoured by public polls), Šefˇcoviˇc gained a massive defeat in both rounds of presidential elections. As political scientists ˇ researched, ‘Caputová’s victory was substantial and supported by the fact that she dominated in all of the eight Slovak regions in the first round, and seven out of eight regions in the second round, respectively […] in the prospect of districts, she beat Šefˇcoviˇc in a ratio of 49:30 in the second round’ (Zvada et al., 2020, 187, 196). The ethos of the ˇ presidential election, that leaders like Caputová might be in opposition to authoritarian policy in V4, has boosted also the result of the newly established coalition PS-Spolu (Progresívne Slovensko-Spolu, Progressive Slovakia-Together), which contributed to another defeat of Smer-SD in the EP election.10 Even though in 2017 Prime Minister Fico described Slovakia as a ‘pro-European island in Central Europe’, it seemed that voters denied the losing Smer-SD’s vision about Europe. Despite the fact that Smer-SD obtained about 20,000 more votes nominally compared to 9 Retrieved from: https://volby.statistics.sk/index-en.html. 10 Coalition PS-Spolu gained more votes only nominally. The electoral formula gave

this coalition only two seats, meanwhile Smer-SD gained three seats.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA: THE …

Table 4 Smer-SD results in EP elections

Year

Votes (%)

Votes

2004 2009 2014 2019

16.89 32.01 24.09 15.72

118,535 264,722 135,089 154,996

185

Seats 3 5 4 3

Source Author, based on data from the Slovak Statistical Office12

the 2014 EP election,11 Fico’s party gained only three seats in the EP, two less than in 2009 when Smer-SD gained a top result with five Members of European Parliament (MoEP) (Table 4). In comparison with the 2013 EP election, Smer-SD did not introduce any political programme. Three key points, entitled ‘What we focus on in Europe’, were stressed during the campaign: (1) social equality in Europe; (2) unity not division (3); we do not lose our identity. Otherwise, social democrats were the only political party that nominated a woman as a leader of the candidate list. A longer-standing member of the European Parliament, Monika Benˇ ová, had far more preferential votes (89,472) than other running candidates across the political spectrum and massively held the Smer-SD flag. The support and reputation Flašíková had are fascinating because, as analysis showed, she was named as the ‘worst effective member of EP during 2014–2019’ (Gabrižová et al., 2019, 17). Finally, in the broader context described above, it is crucial not to overlook two other important issues which undermined Smer-SD as a hegemonic political actor and Fico, who is seen as an uncontested leader. Firstly, as a Smer-SD leader and serving Prime Minister (PM), Fico lost in the 2014 presidential election against unknown businessman and philanthropist Andrej Kiska, who defeated Fico and became the fourth Slovak president. Moreover, Fico entered the election from a PM position, and his popularity was at the top. Secondly, Fico’s attempts to be elected as a judge at the Constitutional Court failed too even though Fico stood before the Parliamentary commission at the public hearing, but after that he announced that he will not run, finally.

11 The turnout of this election was the highest in Slovak history. Despite this fact, in comparison to other EU countries it remained at a very low level. 12 Retrieved from: https://volby.statistics.sk/index-en.html.

186

L’. ZVADA

3

Organisation

Smer-SD is the biggest political party within the Slovak political system, with the biggest impact on what Slovak politics look like currently. Since its establishment in 1999, Smer-SD has become the most important and influential party on the left of the political spectrum. Every citizen of the Slovak Republic who has reached the age of 18 and at the same time agrees with the statutes and programme goals of the party can become a party member. In addition, the candidate must not be a member of another political party and must be of good repute in civil and criminal law. The membership status varies as such: (1) (co)founder member; (2) member; (3) activist/sympathiser. The applications are under the review process of Smer-SD regional offices.13 Due to the party statutes, a political party is ‘operating at the national, regional and district level’.14 Despite that Malová correctly claims that ‘Slovak parties have a low level of institutionalisation’ (Malová, 2017, 6), Slovak social democrats have the most complex political networks within the system,15 especially if we compare them with the newest political parties or movements such as OL’aNO, Sme Rodina (We are Family), or Za l’udí (For People). The political party activities are in line with the four Smer-SD central bodies: (1) Party Congress (snem); (2) Presidency of the Party; (3) Central Audit Commission; and (4) Arbitrary Commission.16 The first and second mentioned, the party congress held at the national level, and the Smer-SD presidency represents the supreme bodies of the political party; the two other bodies have the control function. According to the Smer-SD statutes, the party congress ‘is the highest body of the party […] determines the strategic lines within the domestic politics as well as formulates the foreign policy orientation of the party’. Subsequently, Article 11 of Smer-SD statutes capacitates that the party congress decides, for example, issues such as ‘election and removal of members of the party presidency, election and removal of the chairman of the party, election 13 Article 6 Smer-SD Statutes; Retrieved from: https://www.strana-smer.sk/o-nas/sta novy. 14 Article 9, ibid. 15 Also, KDH as a traditional political party has a widespread political network across

Slovakia. 16 Article 10, ibid.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA: THE …

187

and removal of the party’s vice-presidents, the election and removal of the general manager of the party, election and removal of members of the Central Audit Committee, election and removal of members of the Arbitration Commission, for making the party’s program and policy etc.’17 The party presidency, on the other hand, ‘is the executive and statutory of the party’, according to Article 12 of Smer-SD statutes. The presidency membership is mandatory for chairperson, vice-chair(s),18 and the general manager. Other seats are elected and removed by the party congress.19 The maximum number of party presidencies is limited to 15. The chairperson also has the option to invite other representatives to the presidency meeting such as the regional chairman, the chairman of the Club of Deputies in the National Council of the Slovak Republic, chairman of the Board of Advisors to the Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic and other participants.20 The presidency acts by way of resolution. The presidency decides by the majority of all attendee members. If there is a tie, the chairman has the right to cast a vote. By the same principle, they provide the internal life within the party at the regional and municipal levels. The real power inside Smer-SD was, and still is, cumulated around the chairman and other figures, especially vice-chairs, who are responsible for pursuing a party goal in domestic and international politics. Party Leadership The political issues connecting Kuciak and Kušnírová’s murders in February 2018 led to the biggest public protests since the 1989 Velvet Revolution and brought the reconstruction of the Fico III government (BBC.com, 2018; Germanova & Santora, 2018). It resulted in the leave of PM Fico from office and the resignation of Minister of Interior Robert Kalinˇ ák, well-known and popular vice-chair of Smer-SD. They were replaced by a new government led by PM Peter Pellegrini. Some analysts called the new PM an interim or part-time PM and compared the new political environment to Kaczyn´ski’s Poland, where Beata Szydlo or

17 Article 11, ibid. 18 Six vice-chairs are the maximum according to statutes. 19 Article 12, ibid. 20 Ibid.

188

L’. ZVADA

PM Morawiecki were only puppets, and the real executive power was held and still is held by the PiS chairman, Jaroslav Kaczynski ´ (Kern, 2018). While the investigation of Kuciak’s murder continued, and the system of politics functioned under the governing of Smer-SD, which was based on corruption, clientelism, contacts, and impact on the general prosecutor, special prosecutors, and judiciary power, the Smer-SD political preferences became extremely enshrined. The continuous tensions amongst the social democrats gave way to the leave of one of the other most popular figures, Minister of Culture Marek Mad’ariˇc, who was responsible for Smer-SD campaign strategy and media communication. Shortly after Kuciak’s murder, Mad’ariˇc resigned on ministerial seats and in the autumn of that same year, he also cancelled his membership of the party and finished the electoral period as a non-partisan. The SmerSD presidency was not surprised by his decision because, according to Fico, ‘he left [ideologically] Smer-SD much earlier’ (Pravda, 2018a). Other misunderstandings between Fico and other representatives could also be seen, for example, in the debate about the UN Migration Pact; i.e., Miroslav Lajˇcák who was a Foreign Minister, and who was nominated by Smer-SD as a non-partisan stood in opposition to Fico’s denial of the documents and boycotted the conference in Marrakesh, or when MoEP Monika Benˇ ová criticised Smer-SD deputies in the NRSR for 2019; TASR.sk, their position on tightening abortion legislation (Jesenák, ˇ 2018). Moreover, in the middle of the turbulent political events of 2018, the Smer-SD leadership also faced a sudden and significant loss. Pavol Paška, NRSR Speaker and one of the co-founders and vice-chairman of Smer-SD, died suddenly due to a heart attack (Terenzani, 2018). Considering these events, Fico used PM Pellegrini’s popularity amongst society and entrusted him with leading a candidate list with the new slogan ‘responsible change’ (zodpovedná zmena). It was a historical moment for the party because it was the first time since its establishment that Fico was not a leader of the candidate list. However, this rebranding was not successful, and the massive electoral defeat also became historical. The election loss of social democrats not only resulted in the establishment of a four-party centre-right coalition led by Igor Matoviˇc, but it also brought about the definitive split within Smer-SD. Pellegrini’s wing, or ‘Pellegrini’s eleven’ that involved Smer-SD’s members who were elected as MPs in the candidate list in the 2020 parliamentary election, had forsaken the party and announced the establishment

189

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA: THE …

Table 5 Hlas-SD deputies elected in the 2020 parliamentary election on Smer-SD’s candidate list

Name

Peter Pellegrini Richard Raši Denisa Saková Erik Tomáš Peter Žiga Matúš Šutaj Eštok L’ubica Laššáková Peter Kmec Róbert Puci Ján Ferenˇcák Ján Blcháˇc

2020 preferential votes

Order at 2020 ballot

Final result

413, 555

1

1

154,722 144,100 62,004 28,386 5,049

4 3 9 6 10

3 4 5 9 12

10,781

13

13

1,524 2,689 2,679 3,184

16 26 28 38

16 26 28 38

Source Author, based on data from the Slovak Statistical Office

of a new social democratic project, Hlas-SD (Hlas-Sociálna demokracia, Voice-Social Democracy) (Table 5). This split resulted in the re-election of the Smer-SD executive presidency, which had been dramatically changed, except for the uncontested and undisputed Fico leadership. Re-election brought seats for wellestablished Smer-SD members such as Ladislav Kamenický, the former minister of finance, and for the lesser-known Smer-SD deputy, Richard Takáˇc, a regional politician from Prievidza. Two other elected candidates for vice-chairs of the party, L’uboš Blaha and Erik Kalinˇ ák, raised an echo in public discourse. The first of the two is a political scientist who defends Marxist thoughts and ideals and is probably the most extreme thinker on the left part of the political spectrum in the NRSR. Moreover, Blaha was named by the Slovak media as a leading politician spreading conspiracy theories on social media platforms and was the central figure cited within the Slovak conspirator media circle (Struhárik, 2020).21 The second, Erik Kalinˇ ák, nephew of Robert Kalinˇ ák who served as a former minister 21 Slovak media informed, e.g., that Blaha invested more than 14 thousand EUR for the purpose of Facebook entertainment. Nowadays, both, Blaha’s personal Facebook account and official Facebook account using for political activities were blocked by Meta company due to a violation of the rules of use.

190

L’. ZVADA

of interior, is responsible for media communication. Although Kalinák ˇ had no political history, he had never been active in politics before, and within the Smer-SD structures, he served as an admin of Blaha’s Facebook account, and after he was elected, he proclaimed that he would establish Smer-SD on the social platform TikTok and try to bring Smer-SD closer to the younger generation and their needs. Since the 2016 parliamentary election, Smer-SD was not representing a political party which is ‘acting […] in an extremely coherent manner, without open controversy or doubts regarding its leadership […] and enjoys exceptional unity in parliament’ (Malová, 2017, 7). During the Fico III government, the ideological tension increased and brought many controversies that flew within the public space, escalating after the 2020 election when Pellegrini’s wing split with Smer-SD and created, it seems, a much more attractive, social democratic alternative for voters. Meanwhile, Hlas-SD enjoys the support of 20% and over; Smer-SD stabilised, and its preferences oscillated around 12–13%, in accordance with the latest public polls provided by FOCUS, published in May and June 2021, respectively (FOCUS.sk, 2021a, 2021b). After his circle of followers was reduced, Fico chose a new figure for the executive presidency and extensively rebuilt it. There is no disputing that the presidency member is truly loyal to their chairman. For the moment, it seems that Smer-SD persisted through the hardest part of the internal clash. Still, for future development, it is vital to note how other things around the deep state investigation under the governing of Smer-SD and mediatised corruption cases will proceed, as well as how trustworthy the new Smer-SD leaders will be in the eyes of voters. It is too early to judge these internal processes, but something has not changed, Smer-SD is still closely connected with Fico’s leadership, character, visions, and finally with his political decisions. Membership and Financial Situation Regarding the current decline of traditional partisanship across the world, many currently sit on the left wing of the political spectrum (see, eg, Berman & Snegovaya, 2019; Laroze, 2019; Loxbo et al., 2021; Whiteley, 2011) and Smer-SD is no exception. Figure 1 demonstrates the declining trends of party membership as well as income from membership fees. Since its establishment, between 2000 and 2007 Smer-SD continued to develop its grass-roots membership, rising from 6,500 to 16,000

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA: THE …

191

Fig. 1 The evolution of Smer-SD membership and fees (Source Author based on data published by Smer-SD)

members (Cabada, 2017, 21). In 2012/2013, at the height of membership popularity, Smer-SD was affiliated with almost 17,000 (16,869) members. Since 2013, the numbers have only declined. The last accessible numbers, from the Smer-SD Annual Financial Report published in 2019, claimed 14,136 members. From this point of view, Smer-SD membership was only half of Meˇciar’s HZDS, which at the height of its popularity had 40,000 members. On the one hand, the decline of party affiliation is also connected to the declining trend in membership fees. On the other hand, membership fees are only a marginal part of the budget; social democrats are no exception. According to the last publicly accessible numbers, Smer-SD reached a financial contribution of e2,670,000 in 2019, representing a 37.9% share of overall Smer-SD income for that year, according to a Smer-SD Annual Financial Report published in 2019.22 Despite Smer-SD being defeated in the last parliamentary election, due to the electoral law, SmerSD is eligible for a financial subsidy of e7,077,473.13 for the next four years for their political activities. From this point of view, the party is financially stable, and there is no problem with, for example, supporting a political campaign.

4

Position in the Party System

As I mentioned, since 1993, the Slovak political system has been modified/settled mainly in three ideological roots that could be framed by 22 Retrieved from: https://www.strana-smer.sk/storage/app/media/VS_SMER_2019_ u.pdf (p. 89).

192

L’. ZVADA

three significant periods of Slovak politics. The evolution of the Slovak left after 1993 was ‘very problematic […] contain a many unsystematic decisions […] yet Smer-SD entered to the political contest, the real unifying process of Slovak left has been started’ (Gbúrová, 2016, 135). Smer-SD was established as a fraction of deputies who split from SDL’ (Slovenská demokratická l’avica, Party of the democratic left), a leading left political party in Slovakia after 1993,23 due to Fico’s reluctance to accept SMK (Strana mad’arskej koalície, Party of the Hungarian Coalition) as a part of the government coalition, as well as Fico having not reached any ministerial seats in Dzurinda’s first government, even though he achieved the most preferential votes for SDL’. Since the party’s establishment, Fico and his party have intentionally denied the left–right divide and demanded rationality and pragmatism in politics. The party was in opposition to both poles of the political spectrum, Meˇciar’s HZDS and Dzurinda’s SDKÚ. Fico also denied calling Smer-SD a political party (associated with the negative connotation of the Communist regime). Rather, Fico chose, inspired by the left in Western Europe, the adjunct ‘the third way’, which became the party’s original name between 2003 and 2005 (Marušiak, 2006). It declared a more explicit ideological affinity to the modern progressive centre-left way of politics. The ideological profiling of Smer-SD to social democrats finished in 2004 when Smer-SD merged with the marginal and faded left political parties SDL’, SDA,24 and SDSS.25 From this time, the party began using the label ‘social democracy’, which also contributed to the fact that Smer-SD entered the international networks of socialist organisations such as the Party of European Socialists (PES) and Socialist International (SI) (Euractiv.sk). However, Smer-SD does not resemble the typical social democratic parties that we know from other Western European countries, because the Slovak left never adopted post-materialist values. Shortly after the party entered the PES, Smer-SD created a coalition with the populist and nationalist movements HZDS and SNS, a move which was criticised 23 Except for the SDL’ there were also other political parties at the left: (1) radical

populist movement ZRS (Združenie robotníkov Slovenska, Association of Slovak Workers) led by Ján L’upták who governed with Meˇciar between 1994–1999). 24 SDA (Sociálno demokratická alternatíva, Social Democratic Alternative), established by Peter Weiss, Milan Ftáˇcnik, and Brigita Schmögnerová; 25 SDSS (Sociálnodemokratická strana Slovenska, Slovak Social Democratic Party) led by Jaroslav Volf.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA: THE …

193

by other social democratic parties across Europe, due to undermining the social democratic ideals, the minority rights and the democratic values. As a result, Smer-SD was not a member of the PES between 2006 and 2008. In contrast with the Czech social democratic party, with the tradition going back to 1878, Smer-SD is very specific and unorthodox also compared to the other Viségrad Group (V4) social democratic parties because of a very vague historical tradition. Smer-SD did not follow the historical legacy of the Slovak or Czechoslovak social democratic party from the start of the twentieth century but rather be stylised as a Dubˇcek successor, as a successor who defends ‘politics with a human face’ or socalled reform communism. This fact is, of course, very problematic at both a personal and foreign policy level. A following of Dubˇcek’s legacy in Smer-SD politics was denied by Dubˇcek’s son when information about the possibility that Fico would be a leader of Dubˇcek’s Foundation was mediatised. Moreover, the different interpretation of historical Dubˇcek’s role during 1968 and his position in Czech and Slovak history is a subject of still relevant disputes amongst the Czech and Slovak historians, but also amongst the highest representatives of both states; the Czech President Zeman, who denied Dubˇcek the historical legacy during the Prague Spring and called him ‘tremulous/skittish’ meanwhile, for the Slovak left and also for the Slovak social democrats, Dubˇcek is the ‘symbol of courage and bravery’ (Aktuálnˇe.cz, 2018; Pravda, 2017b). In general terms, Smer-SD became a dominant or hegemonic political party after the 2004 and 2012 parliamentary elections. No party has been able to create a majority government in modern Slovak history except Smer-SD. Also, only Smer-SD and Fico serving as PM governed for three executive terms. In modern Slovak political history, no more powerful and influential political forces occurred than Smer-SD (for detailed programmatic positioning, see an upcoming sub-chapter no. 6).

5 Relationships with Civil Society, Social Movements, and Trade Unions Slovak social democrats have had long-term support from the KOZ (Konfederácia odborových zväzov, Trade Union) or OZ KOVO, even though since the earlier years of Smer-SD political activities, the relation between the party and trade union was unclear. The cooperation between them dates to 2005 when KOZ President Ivan Saktor and Robert Fico signed a bilateral agreement. Fico and his party, amongst others, emphasised to ‘promote measures that are in line with the ideas

194

L’. ZVADA

of trade unions […] which will lead to the strengthening of the position of employees […] we will do everything we can to maintain the institute of the minimum wage and ensure its growth over the next five years to the level of 60% of the average earnings in the national economy’ (Sme.sk, 2005). KOZ openly supported Fico in the 2014 presidential election, and Fico’s party maintained a stable bilateral dialogue. Amongst the other civic organisations who openly support Smer-SD and vice versa are, for example, Jednota dôchodcov na Slovensku (Unity of senior citizens in Slovakia) or Slovenský zväz protifašistických bojovníkov. On the other hand, there are also several important social democratic-oriented institutions, for example, the social democratic youth organisation Mladí sociálni demokrati (Young Social Democrats), the leftist think-tank Analýzy, Stratégie, Alternatívy (Analysis, Strategies, Alternatives). However, it must be stressed that the voices of organisations mentioned above, or the other social democratic organisations such as ProForum, or Nové Slovo have no broader public attention in comparison with, for example, the position of the Masaryk Democratic Academy in Czechia, or others leftist think-tanks in Western Europe. A different story is about the relations of left representatives towards civil society in a broader term. Smer-SD and chairman Fico’s co-existence with civil society could be described through the motto ‘who is not with us, is against us’. The rhetoric and discourse of Slovak SDs are ultimately dividing rather than unifying, especially towards journalists, NGOs, and broader cultural elites/communities in the country. Fico and Smer-SD representatives started conflict with Slovak journalists through the election of the chief of Slovak Radio and Television, when Smer-SD voted for Jaroslav Rezník, a candidate who was voted for not only by coalition parties but also by extremists K-L’SNS. Rezník, in his previous executive positions, made several very problematic financial transactions with the infamous businessman Koˇcner and the financial group J&T and Penta, which cast on him the shadow of corruptive behaviour. Social democrats and the former PM intensified a conflict with the Slovak journalists in 2016, when PM Fico described the Slovak journalist as a ‘dirty, anti-Slovak prostitute’ (Heath, 2016). Fico had reacted to information published by the Slovak media about the corruption at the Slovak Foreign Ministry when the whistle-blower Hlávková spoke about the dubious practices in public tenders at the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs while being in charge of cultural presentation during Slovakia’s 2016 EU Council Presidency.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA: THE …

195

Fico’s attack on Slovak media is well-known and sets a precedent in the long term. For example, during the 2015 presidential campaign, not only did he attack contender and future president Kiska, calling him a Scientologist, but during the Smer-SD conferences he also continuously attacked journalists from daily SME and weekly Týžden. ˇ Additionally, the murders of Kuciak and Kušnírová had been used by social democrats, led by PM Fico, as a catalyst for intensifying the domestic fight against the opposition political parties and President Kiska. Fico accused the broader cultural elites who had been responsible for a viral video against him and made speeches at the protest that spread across the country, calling them those ‘who dance at the grave of this young people’ (Aktuality.sk, 2018). Also, Smer-SD leads a persistent counter-campaign against the NGOs operating in Slovakia such as Transparency International and the anticorruption NGO Nadácia zastavme korupciu (Stop Corruption Foundation). Citing Chairman Fico’s words, ‘there is also a second kind of NGOs, they are trying to make a politics and try to affect the dynamic of power. Why would the state pay for them from taxes?’ (Pravda.sk, 2018b). Fico and his party intensified this anti-NGO rhetoric after their defeat in the last election. A couple of months ago, social democrats, through the statements of their chairman, accused the NGOs mentioned above of ‘a political corruption’, because according to Fico, the non-profits did not inform about the case of lawyer Michal Miškoviˇc for the promised increase in subsidies from the Minister of Investment, Regional Development and Informatization, Veronika Remišová (Za l’udí). Fico also argued that state subsidies had been increased under Matoviˇc’s government from e200,000 to e1,000,000. The issues discussed concerning the spreading distrust within civil society are also linked with another phenomenon, with an anti-Soros agenda that has been coopted by social democrats. Smer-SD has been linked to an anti-Soros group, including worldwide populist leaders like Donald Trump, Nigel Farage, Mateo Salvini, Vladimir Putin, and especially Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán (see Kalmar, 2020; Plenta, 2020). First, Fico and other Smer-SD representatives blamed Soros for his impact on the migration crisis in 2015 and 2016. Later, according to Fico, the well-known Hungarian native businessman and philanthropist ‘financed and organised the massive anti-government protests’ after the journalist’s and his fiancée’s murders (Pravda.sk, 2018). According to a sociological survey by FOCUS research agency for Slovak daily SME, the hoax about the foreign financing of mass protests organised by Decent Slovakia (Za

196

L’. ZVADA

slušné Slovensko) has been accepted by 35% of respondents; 10% did not reply, and only a tight half of respondents, 55%, denied Fico’s plot (Cuprik, 2018). Lastly, the so-called ‘Soros card’ was used in 2021 April when Chairman Fico reacted to the fact that business group Penta sold a minority interest in daily SME. With the coming of a new owner, the Media Development Investment Fund (MDIF), supported by the Soros Open Society Foundation, would according to Fico ‘significantly change the quality of Slovak journalism’, who during his speech did not forget to repeatedly call Soros the ‘biggest thief in the world’ with ‘dirty money’ (HNonline.sk, 2021). From this point of view Fico utilised the anti-Soros rhetoric in the very same manner as a leading figure of illiberal turn, Viktor Orbán, and used and still uses it as a tool for delegitimisation of political opponents. However, as shown us the recent study ‘Smer-SD played an unimportant role in the anti-Soros discourse within parliamentary debates instead, opting for alternative forms of communication such as press conferences and social media communication’ (Zvada, 2022). To sum up, on the one hand for the Slovak social democrats, there are several stable islands of support connected with long-term partners such as the Trade Union or groups unified by the elderly or anti-fascist fighters. On the other hand, there is no disputing that Smer-SD and its representatives are not widely popular figures in many elements of civil society. This is especially evident concerning the broader cultural elites and the long-term tentative relations towards the selected Slovak journalists or NGOs. Unfortunately, as the last public protests under Smer-SD and far-right extremist K-L’SNS against the Heger government’s Covid19 approach showed, it seems that the wall against extremism already supports extremism and contributes to the division of society itself.

6

Programmatic Positioning

From the ideological point of view, economic issues and social policy must be central to every social democratic party, followed by other agendas concerning defending democratic values and social liberalism, minority rights, and green issues. If we evaluate Smer-SD politics from the last couple of years, the focus is primarily on economic and social policy issues.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA: THE …

197

Economic and Social Policy Issues The most significant social politics for Smer-SD occurred during Fico’s first and second cabinets, especially surrounding the Labour code, which saw a very turbulent ideological left-right contest between Smer-SD and SDKÚ-DS. Blaha, in his essay ‘Slovakia and the Social State Question’, stressed five specific points that SD changed: (1) the new definition of dependent work; (2) the maximum employee trial period of three months; (3) the adjustment of fixed-term contracts; (4) the termination of employment and severance pay; and (5) the strengthening of unions (Blaha, 2016, 370–371). We have to bear in mind that between 2012 and 2016, Smer-SD could have passed every law due to having a comfortable majority in NRSR and no coalition partner. Despite this, Slovak social democrats under Fico’s leadership did not make a profound social democratic footprint and did not provide key long-term social reforms, reforms in pension systems, or in healthcare or education systems. Instead, they chose misconception and populist law, which targeted their electoral cohorts in an attempt to mobilise them, very often in the very short time before the election, through the so-called ‘social packages’ that began in 2014. During Fico’s second majority government, SD introduced three social packages which included not only a growing minimum wage and pension but also spouted well-known catchy benefits like ‘free train for students and elderly’ (Úrad vlády Slovenskej republiky, 2014). Fico’s third cabinet, tools like ‘school lunch for free’ or ‘skiing allowance’ which caused many television debates and were consistently used within the political campaign against Fico’s party from the centre-right political parties such as SaS, OL’aNO, or later Za l’udí. What is perhaps Smer-SD’s most crucial moment occurred after the flat tax was replaced by progressive taxation in 2012 (Onuferová, 2012). Social democrats introduced a tax rate of 19% of the tax base, up to 176.8 times the applicable subsistence minimum of up to e36,256.38; and 25% of the tax base exceeding 176.8 times the relevant subsistence minimum, i.e., exceeding e36,256.38. This taxation applies only to employees as self-employed persons and companies have a different form of taxation and can charge for costs and deductibles. Self-employed persons and companies with a turnover of up to e100,000 were taxed at a rate of 15%; with a turnover of over e100,000, the tax

198

L’. ZVADA

rate is 21%.26 The ideological father of flat taxes and liberal SaS leader Richard Sulík has paid attention to the possible risks leading to tax and VAT optimisations and he rather proposed 12% flat tax than ad hoc social packages (Sulík, 2015). Unfortunately, the many cases involving the speculative mailbox company and tax fraud were most visible and mediatised, e.g., the Bašternák case, during the last year under the Smer-SD governing. It is true that in nominal terms, the pensions and minimum wage have grown, but with respect to conversion through purchasing power parity, the legacy of SD and their impact on the economy could be described through the latest published analysis by the Socio-Economic Analysts Association, which showed that ‘the Slovak employees can buy fewer goods and services with the average salary, than, for example, Turks, Bulgarians, and Romanians’ (Radio Slovakia International). In other words, Fico’s slogan introducing the social packages in 2014/2015 ‘with good results, it is the duty of the government to respect citizens a certain share in Slovakia’s economic growth and more efficient tax collection’ will not ring true after the decade of social democrat government. It implies that in the overall product of social states, the share on economic growth is insufficient, indicating a problem with redistribution. This problem is most visible in the flagship of social policy: the healthcare system. Figure 2 shows the GDP percentage invested in the healthcare system. The invested percentage of GDP was the highest in 2010 amongst the V4 states. Since this time we can observe a decreasing trend. What is disturbing is that according to the widely used Health Care Index, the Czech healthcare system was placed in 8th place and was the most robust in V4, while Slovak came 23rd out of 36 European states in 2021. Regarding the Slovak expenditure on healthcare, which was under the Smer-SD control for almost over a decade, this implies, among other things, that the GDP percentage and redistribution of resources within a healthcare system are not satisfactory. Finally, regarding education policies, the lowest-level financing of education amongst the V4 states is symptomatic of the misunderstanding of how the social state invests in the future and demonstrates the misconceptions and ad hoc politics making use of this sector. Figure 3 shows us that the government led by Smer-SD did not set education as a strategic priority, and the GDP percentage gap comparing the V4 states is crystal clear.

26 For 2021 turnover has been reduced on e49,790.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA: THE …

199

Fig. 2 Visegrád countries and its %GDP on healthcare (Source Author, based on the World Bank data)

Fig. 3 Visegrád countries and its %GDP on education (Source Author, based on the World Bank data)

200

L’. ZVADA

The result of this policy is even more evident with respect to a tertiary sector. Poland had two universities in the prestigious Shanghai ranking in 2012, which in the latest edition has grown to ten universities in 2021; Czechia grew from one to seven, and Hungary from two to four universities. Meanwhile, the Slovak Republic has only one (Comenius University)—at the bottom ranking. Moreover, the quality of education derived from underfinance is a problem not only for a tertiary education in Slovakia. Slovakia has had the worst results in the standardised PISA test over the long term. The executive summary from the last survey in 2018 also revealed a significant finding touching on equal education. PISA claimed: ‘Some countries still have a long way to go in moderating between-school differences. In Argentina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Peru, the Slovak Republic and the United Arab Emirates, a typical disadvantaged student has only a one-in-eight chance of attending the same school as high achievers (those who score in the top quarter of reading performance in PISA’ (PISA, 2018). EU and Foreign Policy Issues With respect to EU and foreign policy issues, the idiom ‘two sides of the same coin’ is most fitting for Smer-SD’s stance, and two examples from the last couple of years best explain this. Firstly, in Slovak foreign policy exists a trendy ethos that describes Slovakia as a bridge between the East and West. Even though Smer-SD proclaimed that its foreign policy orientation is based on EU and NATO membership and Euro-Atlantic orientation, the allocated data showed an interesting result. Firstly, Fig. 4 evaluates the position of Smer-SD with respect to Russian interference (or so-called hybrid warfare) and EU foreign policy and shows us that the position of Slovak social democrats is more centrist and neutral as opposed to predictable in EU/NATO’s favour. This confirmed the position of Smer-SD on recent questions about establishing a US military base in Slovakia and the Russian attack on Ukraine. In the first case, Smer-SD waged an annoying campaign against the highest repreˇ sentatives of the Slovak Republic, especially against President Caputová, Foreign Minister Korˇcok, and Interior Minister Nad’ called them ‘American agents’. In the second case, the Social Democrats frame the Russian invasion of Ukraine as an American-Russian war and constantly reject every step and official EU and NATO politics.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA: THE …

201

Fig. 4 Position of Slovak political parties to EU foreign policy and Russian interference (Source Author, based on Chapel Hill Expert Survey Bakker et al. [2020])

Fico and other Smer-SD MP’s statements often contradict official EU or NATO strategies and statements made by the highest representatives of these institutions. For example, in the Ukraine–Russia crisis over Crimea, Fico and his party stood against the EU sanction against Russia. After the Crimea occupation, PM Fico claimed that they supported the EU position ‘only from solidarity […] and that Ukraine do not fulfil the Minsk agreement as a Russia do’ (iRozhlas.cz, 2016). In the context of the latest diplomatic rift between the Czech Republic and Russia, the Vrbˇetice case, Fico’s party seated in opposition to Heger’s government’s expulsion of three Russian diplomats from Slovakia by saying that ‘this was not a step by the Slovak government but by the government of American agents’ ˇ 24.cz, 2021). (CT In addition, vice-chairman of the social democratic party and leading figure L’uboš Blaha, who openly supports and adores the group of Night Wolves,27 addressed in an open letter to the Russian Ambassador in 27 Motorcycling Group financed by President Putin, which is according to many historians or political science analysts, the leading Russian actor within the hybrid warfare

202

L’. ZVADA

Bratislava, where he stood ‘on behalf of the Slovak nation, to apologise to our fraternal Russian nation for the evil committed by the government of Eduard Heger. We see the expulsion of three Russian diplomats as a stupid and aggressive gesture, which the Slovak government acceded to at the behest of the American embassy’ (Strana-Smer.sk, 2021). With respect to NATO and a very current Afghanistan issue, Fico’s speech at the 2012 Globsec conference, held in Bratislava, reiterated that Slovakia ‘remains true to its commitments in Afghanistan’ and stressed that ‘Slovakia is one of the largest contributors to soldiers per capita’ and that ‘only democratic, stable, and secure Afghanistan to be key to NATO credibility and stability in the region. Slovakia is, therefore, ready to extend its presence in Afghanistan for as long as necessary’ (Euractiv.sk, 2012). These days social democrats, as an opposition party, through the statements of its leaders, speak about the huge NATO and USA failure. There is no surprise that this kind of incoherent and flip-flop random strategy in foreign-policymaking under the Smer-SD has resulted in dividing the Slovak population’s opinions regarding NATO. Globsec trends published in the 2017 Münich Security Report showed that only 38% of Slovaks see the Slovak NATO membership as a positive, and only 43% respondents would vote to stay in NATO (Münich Security report, 2018). Another case represented in Smer-SD foreign politics is the migration crisis that heated Europe in 2015/2016, where Smer-SD did not play a ‘social’ role. At the EU pitch, they had played a key role with the other V4 states where they stood against accepting the migration quotas. Within the domestic political arena, they broadly used—in common with the nationalistic and extreme-right parties—an anti-Islam and antiMuslim rhetoric accompanying the stereotypical Islamophobic manifestation, which combines race and cultural prejudices (Cunningham, 2016; see also Granˇcayová & Kazharski, 2020; Zvada, 2018 the Fig. 5 then illustrates Smer-SD position towards a multiculturalism). The passing of two important laws has embodied this migration crisis. The first, the so-called ‘Counter-Terrorism Law’, which emphasised the police forces and Secret Service competencies in the fight against terrorism, did not echo as loudly as the second law, which made against the West and represents a so-called a ‘Fifth column’ as the main propaganda actor of Putin’s regime (see Snyder 2018, 140; Harris, 2020a, 2020b).

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA: THE …

203

Fig. 5 Position of Slovak political parties multiculturalism and anti-Islam rhetoric (Source author, based on Chapel Hill Expert Survey Bakker et al. [2020])

it challenging to register churches in Slovakia, which is a condition for a government financial subsidy and targeted the country’s Muslim communities. Cultural and Post-material Issues In general, the issues related to so-called post-material values like environmental and sustainable politics, politics of gender equality, or sexual minority rights have never been adopted by Slovak social democracy. I sketched that the context and party position towards multiculturalism and immigration tended to be more conservative than social democratic, the latter of which Smer-SD provides concerning other issues, concretely towards the environment and gender and sexual minority rights policies. Firstly, environmental and sustainable politics are overlooked in Slovak politics as Slovaks are generally more interested in green politics than the political elite. A public poll conducted ahead of the 2019 EP election showed that the same number of respondents (81%) expect politicians to stop tax fraud and protect the environment, nature, and animals (BPB.sk, 2019). The Smer-SD position could be characterised as schizophrenic

204

L’. ZVADA

or making a different policy towards the external actors than internal stakeholders. When the green NGOs28 operating in the Slovak republic e-mailed political parties to inquire about their position on environmental issues before the last parliamentary election, one of the two political parties that failed to respond was Smer-SD. Additionally, party statements towards environmental issues are marginal, if they exist at all. On the other hand, Fico’s government ratified the Paris Agreement as a fourth country. Three years later, Pellegrini’s government approved a strategic document called ‘Greener Slovakia: Strategy for the Environmental Policy of the Slovak Republic 2030’. This strategic document defined the most significant environmental challenges as issues including ‘waste management, air quality and habitat and species conservation, especially in forest, meadow and wetland ecosystems’, and also set the following goals (some very vague, others more concrete): a strong reduction in emissions compared to 2005; heating systems in households and urban transport will shift to more environmentally friendly alternatives; Slovakia will reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the sectors of emissions trading by 43%, and outside these sectors by at least 20%, compared to 2005; the municipal waste recycling rate, including the preparation for re-use, will be increased to 60%, and the land-filling rate will be reduced to less than 25% by 2035; Slovakia will achieve at least a ‘good status’ of water, and water potential in regards to drainage, water treatment in agglomerations with more than 2,000 inhabitants will be 100%, and in agglomerations with fewer inhabitants 50% by 2030 (Ministerstvo životného prostredia, 2019). However, this is only an intended strategy, and as Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI) sketched that Slovakia has not acted as an international agenda-setter for global environmental policy. Also, the newly adopted EU 2030 targets imply that Slovakia will need to adopt ambitious goals for both renewable energy sources and energy efficiency (SGI, 2021). Moreover, during the last decade, other clashes around the Istanbul Convention and sexual minority rights between Smer-SD leader Fico and Foreign Affairs Minister Lajˇcák occurred due to their different opinions.

28 Namely: Greenpeace Slovensko, Priatelia Zeme—CEPA, Slovenská klimatická iniciatíva (SKI), Fridays for Future Slovensko, Budovy pre budúcnost’, Slovenská ornitologická spoloˇcnost’ /BirdLife Slovensko, Extinction Rebellion Slovensko, Znepokojené matky a Nestrácajme cˇas.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA: THE …

205

The Fico’s party saw the Istanbul Convention as a danger for Slovak families, the same as the other radical and populist conservative forces, and the social democratic rhetoric could not be different from the other far-right or populist conservative forces such as K-L’SNS, KDH, Sme Rodina, or OL’aNO. Here, Foreign Affairs Minister Lajˇcák was more likely to favour official EU and UN politics than Chairman Fico. Although, during the last decade, LGBTQ issues have become a subject of political deals. The most visible was in 2014 when Smer-SD banned the same-sex marriage law in exchange for Christian Democrats’ support for judicial reform. Smer-SD support, commonly with the conservative politicians, the constitution amendment, which defines marriage as a ‘unique union between a man and woman’ (see Balogová, 2014; Guasti, 2021).

7

Voters

The Smer-SD election results are determined predominantly by two main factors: (1) the rural character of Slovakia and (2) the set-up of the electoral system. Regarding the first factor, it is important to mention that around 5.5 million of the Slovak population is distributed amongst the 2,887 municipalities. Officially, since 2020, there are only 141 cities or towns and ‘the rest of the remaining municipalities has an urban or rural character’ (Nestorová-Dická et al., 2019, 84). As the authors show us, ‘extremely rural areas, underdeveloped human potential, massive population-ageing processes and hindered accessibility occupy the northeast and south parts of Slovakia’ (ibid., 91). Moreover, within Slovak electoral geography, we can detect what Madlenˇ ák called the ‘west-east gradient’, which means that the level of political representation of the regions in NRSR decreases from west to east Slovakia. As Madlenˇ ák showed in his analysis, for example, the Košice, a capital city for the eastern part of the republic and second-largest city in the country, is even less politically represented in comparison with other regional cities such as Trnava, Trenˇcín, or Banská Bystrica (see Madlenˇ ák, 2019, 496). The intentional changes of electoral law provided by Meˇciar’s government, which changed the electoral system from a four-constituency proportional system into a single-constituency proportional system,29 has brought about a paradoxical situation because, on the one hand, the

29 Law No. 187/1998.

206

L’. ZVADA

Slovak political system is evaluated as one of the most proportional in the world. On the other hand, it is highly under-represented in over half the regions in the country. As the last parliamentary election uncovered, Slovakia is a country that has a problem in poorer regions where extremist and populists’ political alternatives have succeeded. In addition, and most importantly, Slovakia is ‘an internally heterogeneous country […], where the voting patterns differed not only between the western and eastern parts of the country but even between districts within a common geographic area or region […] Slovak electoral patterns are more complex and go beyond the urbanrural or centre-periphery cleavage’ (Lysek et al., 2020, 296–297). From which areas are recruiting a leftist electorate? Who are the SmerSD voters? Spatial Support After the dissolution of the Czech-Slovak federation, the stabilising of the social democrats’ voter base was a long-term process. According to Pink, ‘as early as ten years after the established Smer-SD, this party received a repeated electoral support’ (Pink, 2012, 171). During the period from 2002 to 2010, areas with high Smer-SD electoral support included the eastern part of Slovakia and districts such as Kežmarok, Stará L’ubovnˇ a, ˇ Humenné, Sobrance, or northern districts such as Púchov and Cadca. The party reached super-electoral support in eastern districts such as Snina and Medzilaborce, and in the central region called Považie, in districts such as Prievidza, Topol’ˇcany, or Bánovce nad Bebravou (Pink, 2012, 18; Plešivˇcák, 2011, 244). In this early stage of reaching voters across the country, Smer-SD did not attract intellectual urban voters who voted most likely for another leftist alternative, the former Fico party, SDL’. Smer-SD in its earlier years of existence also shared significant voter support with HZDS-L’S in districts such as Dubnica nad Váhom, Trebišov, and Michalovce where, in retrospect, the electorate of both looked very similar. After Meˇciar’s party left the parliament, Smer-SD picked over HZDSL’S as a part of its electorate and spread the support in these areas. On the other hand, marginal Smer-SD support was gained, thanks to an antiHungarian rhetoric, in the southern part of Slovakia where the Hungarian minority is settled, as well as in the bastion of Christian Democrats in northern districts such as Tvrdošín and Dolný Kubín. With the growing

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA: THE …

207

Smer-SD power, the party gained the capability to reach a voter base predominantly in rural, excluded areas of the northern and eastern part in the Žilina, Trenˇcín, Prešov, and Košice regions where the peripheral part of these regions faced higher unemployment and worse quality of life compared with urban areas of these regions. Regarding the last couple of years, these main spatial trends of Smer-SD support are clearly visible in any kind of election. Slovak social democrats can also never be truly established in the capital, Bratislava. The occasional success Fico’s party reached was in 2010 as the only party that supported Milan Ftáˇcnik in the mayoral campaign in Bratislava, and he won the election. However, Smer-SD never succeeded in the capital city, and as Bahna and Majo stated in their study, ‘Bratislava is blue […] Bratislava is a centre-right bastion’ (Bahna & Majo, 2012, 203). The inability of Slovak social democrats to build and maintain a solid voter base in the largest cities across the country is rare also in comparison to the SD in Western Europe, such as in Poland and Hungary. The 2019 presidential, as well as the 2020 parliamentary, election could detect ˇ this trend. ‘Whereas Caputová strongly relied on voters from the western part of Slovakia and other greater urbanised regional cities, Šefˇcoviˇc’s voters are found in the north-eastern or central and less urbanised parts of Slovakia’ (Zvada et al., 2020, 199). Šefˇcoviˇc, the social democrat candidate, did not succeed, nor in the second ballot, because the southern area inhabited by the Hungarian minority voted almost exclusively for ˇ Caputová, as well as because few voters, as Šefˇcoviˇc expected, were mobilised (ibid., 198). Very importantly, it also seemed that the voting changed after the 2019 presidential election towards the 2020 parliamentary election. Those who supported anti-system and extremist candidates Kotleba and Harabin for president voted for Smer-SD exclusively if they voted. Their spatial support in the first ballot had a familiar pattern to ˇ Šefˇcoviˇc’s. On the other hand, almost the whole of Caputová’s electorate was recruited from the areas where the political parties such as PS-Spolu, SaS, Za l’udí, or OL’aNO succeeded, ergo from highly urbanised areas with the highest share of educated voters (Lysek et al., 2020, 287).

208

L’. ZVADA

Socio-Economic Characteristics of Smer-SD Voters Gender and Age The gender composition is the least significant socio-economic factor that impacts Slovak political party results within the Slovak party system (except the extreme-right, K-L’SNS, Kotlebists—People Party Our Slovakia, where the male voters are over-represented), and Smer-SD is no exception. There is no significant gender bias within the Smer-SD electorate; it is roughly gender-equal. Concerning age variables, it is a different story. According to 2012 exit polls data, 56.2% of voters from the 60+ age cohort voted for Smer-SD, followed by 45.7% of voters between 40 and 59. Significantly lower votes for Smer-SD came from those between the ages of 18 and 19 (31.4% from all) and 20–39 (35.9% from all), respectively. This composition was modified after the 2016 parliamentary election in the following ways. First, Smer-SD significantly lost the support of first-time voters, decreasing from more than 30% in the 2012 election to only 1.5% in 2016. Smer-SD lost these votes in favour of new political anti-systems, extremists, and populist parties, such as K-L’SNS (17.3%) and Sme Rodina (10%). Second, the support in other cohorts has declined by about 10% amongst retirees and 5% amongst the middle class (for more detail see Bútorová et al., 2012, 180; Gyrfášová & Slosiarik, 2016, 3). These facts demonstrate that Smer-SD is truly oriented on only middle class and elderly ‘bread and butter’ issues, and not on the needs of the young generation. Thanks to the last two parliamentary elections, the age 60+ variable is the strongest positively correlated with the Smer-SD results (Hlaváˇc, 2016; Lysek et al., 2020). According to the latest published analysis, which applied a global regression model, the variable age 60+ was the strongest predictor for explaining Smer-SD results. According to published results of an analysis from the last two parliamentary elections, with every increase in the percentage of inhabitants aged 60+, the support for Fico’s party grew by 0.398% in 2016, and 0.255% in the 2020 election, respectively. In addition, the age 60+ with the variable divorced (0.110%) were the only two variables positively correlated with the votes for Smer-SD in the 2020 parliamentary election (Hlaváˇc, 2016, 440).

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA: THE …

209

Degree With respect to the level of degree, the Smer-SD’s core electorate includes predominantly both, graduates and non-graduates. In the 2012 election, more than half of undergraduates voted for Smer-SD (54.5%), and almost half of the graduate voters decided in the same manner (44%). At the height of Smer-SD popularity, in the 2012 election, the level of support from voters with a university degree was at 32.6%, while after the 2016 election, this was reduced to 19.8%. The statistical models demonstrate that the correlation between the university degree variable and Smer-SD’s result is strongly negative. In other words, with respect to the 2016 or 2020 parliamentary election, models showed that with every percentage of inhabitants with a completed university degree, votes for Smer-SD decreased by about 0.939% (in 2016), or about 0.440% (in 2020), respectively (Hlaváˇc, 2016, 440; Lysek et al., 2020, 289). Unemployment In the 2012 parliamentary election, the left thesis echoed in the regions with the highest unemployment, and the relationship between unemployment and the Smer-SD result was also positively correlated in the 2016 election (see Bútorová et al., 2012, 111; Hlaváˇc, 2016, 441). However, in some cases, the unemployment rate did not explain spatial support for Smer-SD; Kerekeš refused the positive connection between the unemployment rate and support for Smer-SD in his spatial analysis in Košice, the second-largest Slovak city (Kerekeš, 2018, 54). To a large extent, the latest electoral data and statistical models have shown a negative relationship between unemployment and Smer-SD gains concretely. With every percentage of the higher unemployment rate, the votes for Fico’s party decreased by about 0.131%. On the other hand, the centre-right Kiska’s party Za l’udí was positively correlated with the unemployment variable, and Matoviˇc’s populist movement OL’aNO gained an especially massively positive correlation, as every percentage of growing unemployment saw OL’aNO results grow by about 0.354%. It indicates that since 2012, the left arrangements did not bring a satisfactory response for the vulnerable group of unemployed, who decided to choose more populist or centre-right economic visions offered by political parties.

210

L’. ZVADA

Ethnicity, Religion, and Population The support of the Slovak left is exclusively based on the support of ethnic Slovaks, and this is no different regarding other political parties, except for the Slovak-Hungarian centrist Most-Híd and the political party oriented primarily on the Hungarian community, SMK. Regarding the religious patterns of Smer-SD voters, there is a negative relation between the predominant Catholic church (especially Roma Catholic denomination) and Smer-SD support within the two last parliamentary elections, even though, as I mentioned, the SD leaders look for support amongst the Slovak church regularly. However, Slovak Catholics tend to vote for other political parties, especially after Fico’s viral video during the 2015 presidential campaign, when he self-claimed as a ‘believer’ and ‘Catholic’. Meanwhile, the media published his declaration before he entered the Communist party when he denied the Catholic doctrine, claiming that he grew up in a strictly atheist family and adored the Marxism-Leninism ideology (Benedikoviˇcová, 2014). Lastly, regarding the population variable, there is a clear negative correlation between larger settlements and populations and Smer-SD results; ergo, the support for Smer-SD declines in growing municipalities. This is an unorthodox and unusual pattern when compared to the Western or V4 social democratic parties. To sum up, the Smer-SD electorate relies primarily on the elderly electorate and the middle working class. A negative correlation was detected between the Smer-SD results and voters with a university degree. The Smer-SD, self-claimed as a ‘rustically social democracy’, which is generally not so attractive for young or first-time voters. The spatial support for Slovak SD is visible, especially within less urbanised areas in the east and north-eastern parts of the country, as well as in peripheral parts of other regions. Long-term marginal support is still prevailing in the south borderland with Hungary, inhabited by Slovak Hungarians or in the capital city, Bratislava.

8

The Way Forward---Opportunities for Social Democracy

In the end of this chapter and within all the examined aspects, we will encapsulate the current position pertaining to Slovakia’s social democracy, and we will endeavour to sketch the possible trajectories of development of the Slovak left and social democracy for the near future.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA: THE …

211

As regards the research questions and the ensuing analysis, we may conclude the following. The last decade was an unprecedented period concerning Slovak social democracy. After the 2012 election, the SmerSD reached an absolute majority in the NRSR and was one of the PES’s most popular and successful political parties. Nevertheless, the party had not promised significant changes. Instead of implementing any massive social democratic plan, the party representatives fell to using a more populistic agenda and rhetoric, which led to the splitting of SmerSD. However, as manifested in many other analyses, indicators, and the outcome of the parliamentary election, the fruit of social democratic politics and the Slovak social state is very contradictory, even if we consider that between 2012 and 2016, the Smer-SD could have introduced any law, due to having a comfortable majority in the NRSR and no coalition partner. The Smer-SD’s politics has been built up on a divisive rhetoric that undermines the democratic institutions and independent judiciary or civil rights of some groups. The party’s speeches contribute to the division of citizens when emphasising the ‘we’ and ‘they’ rhetoric. Not only did the Slovak social democracy fall foul of the President of the Slovak Republic, ˇ Zuzana Caputová, just as previously in the case of the former President Kiska, but they also systematically criticised the functioning of the judiciary, prosecutors, and they even escalated further conflicts with the media. A dominant style of politics, as evident in the era when the SmerSD used to be in power, also intensified a conflict between the Smer-SD and the third sector, newspapers, and scholars. Furthermore, the newly elected Head of Trade Union, Monika Uhlerová, announced a follow-up depolitisation of the Trade Union. As an opposition party, the Smer-SD has moved towards a more far-right rhetoric than ever before. Not only did the Smer-SD organise anti-governmental protests together with the Slovak far-right parties, such as the K-L’SNS and Republika, but it also played a negative role during the COVID-19 pandemic when the representatives of the party questioned and refused vaccinations. Moreover, despite the claimed pro-Western affiliation, the statements on foreign and security policy, as delivered by the Smer-SD high representatives, do not support the EU and NATO’s proclaimed goals and principles. In terms of the electorate, we may conclude that the Smer-SD’s electorate primarily relies on the elderly voters and the middle or working class. One of the key findings is that a negative correlation was detected between the Smer-SD’s results and voters with a university degree. The

212

L’. ZVADA

Smer-SD claims to be a ‘rustically social democracy’ while favouring ‘conservative socialist ideas’, which is generally not attractive for young or first-time voters. The spatial support for the Slovak SD is visible, especially in the less urbanised areas in the east and north-eastern parts of the country and in peripheral parts of other regions. The long term and marginal support still prevails in the southern borderland with Hungary, inhabited by the Slovak Hungarians, or in the capital city of Bratislava. The intra-party disagreements of recent years culminated in the last election when the candidate leader and former Prime Minister, Peter Pellegrini, and ten other party supporters had split the Smer-SD and subsequently founded a new social democratic party, the Hlas-SD. The Smer-SD then also experienced a decline in partisanship. This drop, however, was not so substantial as the total of members of the party decreased from almost 17,000 in 2012/2013 to 14,136 people in 2019. Hence, it will be an incentive to observe a more dramatic trajectory of the sine curve downwards after the split-up of the party. As indicated by the current election polls, the most optimistic scenario includes three political parties for the left in the NRSR (see Fig. 6). In this situation, there is an obvious level of demand for the left agenda from sundry left-leaning groups. However, the PS declared the lack of interest to politically cooperate with the Smer-SD or Hlas-SD, and the leader of Hlas-SD himself keeps denying any future cooperation with the Smer-SD. Yet, the Smer-SD has the most stable electorate in the political system and as Fig. 7 shows, together with the Hlas-SD, it has continuously held around 33–35% of the votes. However, the opponents of the social democratic party hold a slight majority of ca. 5% votes, notwithstanding the newly established Uhrík’s extremist party, Republika (the Republic). Owing to a chaotic political situation during the investigation of Kuciak and Kušnírová’s murders, the prosecution of prominent party representatives, connected to Fico’s former governments, is still being gradually exposed. It is perhaps too early to provide a flawless prognosis for any future scenarios of rustical Slovak social democracy, especially in the situation when it seems that not all the legacies of Fico’s government have been uncovered. At the beginning of May 2022, the former PM Fico was facing charges of organised crime as the Slovak parliament had denied his extradition. By contrast, the former Minister of the Interior, Rober Kalinˇ ák, has been sent to prison under the same case. Pellegrini’s newly established Hlas-SD will presumably become a leading social democratic actor, while the Smer-SD will be a relevant

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA: THE …

213

Fig. 6 The evolution of electoral preferences, January 2021–April 2022 (Source Author, based on data published by FOCUS agency)

Fig. 7 Votes distribution, January 2021–April 2022. (Note ‘Others’ include only the party that achieved more than 5% in the public survey. Source Author’s calculation, based on data published by FOCUS agency)

214

L’. ZVADA

counterpart on the left, based on the yet-to-be-mentioned conservative socialism ideals. The question is how much of the Smer-SD’s future politics will be social and how much will be democratic. The rhetoric, as opted for after the elections, has testified to the fact that the Smer-SD has the ambition to win a significant part of the electorate of far-right parties. Under specific circumstances, this kind of rhetoric could meet with success, and it could bring Smer-SD back to the top. It seems that in the current situation, the way in which the Hlas-SD will be carrying out the internal political agenda and which themes will be put into discourse may turn out to be the most important for the Slovak left. Will the Hlas-SD be able to drain the former electorate of Smer-SD? Will they function in line with truly social democratic ideals? Will they build a social democratic party for the twenty-first century with coopted and clearly formulated positions on the post-material issues or will they serve as another populistic political party while using a social democratic label? Let’s assume that Pellegrini’s party rejects any cooperation with the Smer-SD. In that case, it will probably create a mutual agreement with other centrist, conservative, and populist movements which can bring Pellegrini’s new version of social democracy into power. If the Hlas-SD succeeds without any cooperation with the Smer-SD, one of the most realistic scenarios for the Smer-SD will be that the party may become an isolated political force, just like Meˇciar’s HZDS, and its votes and mandates in the NRSR will de facto be blocked because of the overall unwillingness of other political parties to cooperate. The Smer-SD will then probably follow Meˇciar and Dzurinda’s paths and will amalgamate. If Pellegrini’s party cooperates with Fico, which is exactly what the party does, owing to the previous reject vote on Fico’s extradition and continuous criticism against Heger’s government in the same patterns as previously Fico’s party did, and not obtaining the majority after the next parliamentary election, he will ruin the ideological basis of his new party. And it will result in a marginal coalition potential in the near future. The last scenario means a stronger Smer-SD. This scenario resides in the presumptions that there will be a political rebirth of Fico. In this case, Fico and his party could benefit from all accusations and may then stylise himself into a political martyr and a leading anti-establishment figure as he and his party did after the party was established. In this case, it could drain the electorate from far-right parties, other protest votes, or those directly cooperating with the anti-system parties. In this manner, it will be very important to monitor the upcoming development in terms of

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA: THE …

215

populist challenges and how the social democratic parties, both but especially the traditional Smer-SD, deal with them and whether the Smer-SD contributes to legitimising the far-right populists as a relevant political actor within the Slovak political spectrum. If that happens, Fico and his Smer-SD could draw inspiration from the Polish but more from the illiberal ideas by Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz. As this chapter demonstrated, the main challenge for the Slovak left will lie in the matter of how to deal with the populist and far-right groups and their political offers in the social and economic area. When the Smer-SD electorate voted for other parties in the last election, they voted especially for the OL’aNO, K-L’SNS, Sme rodina, or did not vote. The main reason for doing so was most likely rooted in an unenviable social policy. However, the necessary condition for rebranding social democracy in Slovakia will require real social democratic reform and most importantly, bringing together some true social democrats like all the famous figures in the 1990s, such as Brigita Schmögnerová, Peter Weiss, Boris Zala, and Milan Ftáˇcnik, unlike the bystander’s technocratic managers as in the case of Smer-SD. Although, the Slovak left will have to bear in mind that in the postmodern world and the post-Covid era, the future success of the left in the twenty-first century will not only lie in their defence at the socioeconomic level while building a social state with functional healthcare and educational systems, but also in the capacity to adapt to the post-material values and with efforts to defend the rule of law guaranteeing civil rights and liberties for everyone, especially for all the marginalised groups, and by contrast, not to build up the very own brand on blundered and missing concepts, such as ‘Slovak social democracy’ which has its own specifics and needs. Social democracy is a universal set of ideas based on the premises of ‘being democratic’ and ‘being social’. From this perspective, the task will be even more difficult for social democracy since, apart from the cultural or economic issues, it will have to react to the key challenges as faced by social democracies in the West and which are linked to ‘rebalancing the principles and pragmatism, changing electoral sociology, meeting the populist challenge, structural changes in the party system and new forms of participation’ (Kennedy & Manwarring, 2018, 203–204). It seems that in 2024 or even earlier, the left and social democracy will lead a fight that will have told us a lot more about the future of Slovakia’s social democracy. We are yet to learn how much and whether the Slovak social democratic parties are truly democratic and social and

216

L’. ZVADA

how they cope with various challenges. If we consider this period to be an important milestone in the post-war history of politics, it can also turn out to be a breakthrough in the further formation of social democracy in Slovakia after 1993. Acknowledgements The author would like to thank both editors, Ania Skrzypek and András Bíró-Nagy. I also express my gratitude to Patrik Eichler from Masaryk Democratic Academy; Pavel Šaradín from Palacký University in Olomouc; Michal Ondruška and Kristýna Ševˇcíková from Charles University in Prague; Martin Petlach from Mendel University in Brno; Monique Manson; Helen Johnston, and Liviyaa Sree for their valuable comments and proofreading of an early version of this paper. This article was supported by the grant OP VVV- CZ.02.2.69/0.0/0.0/19_073/0016713.

Executive Summary • In the last decade, the Smer-SD has experienced a turbulent period. While after the 2012 parliamentary election, Smer-SD formed the first majority government in Slovakia’s history, afterwards the political support was continuously declining in each of the next elections, and then resulted in the 2020 parliamentary defeat by the populist movement of OL’aNO, led by Igor Matoviˇc. Between 2012 and 2020, the party lost support from 44.42% to 18.29% • The Smer-SD represents a sui generis social democratic party because of its strong nationalistic ethos and populist rhetoric. • Slovakia’s social democracy is generally not so attractive to young or first-time voters. The spatial support includes especially less urbanised areas in the east and north-eastern parts of the country as well as the peripheral parts of other regions. The Smer-SD’s core electorate consists of predominantly both graduates and nongraduates and senior citizens. A long-term marginal support still prevails in the southern borderland with Hungary, inhabited by the Slovak Hungarians, or in Bratislava, the capital. • The internal disagreements of recent years culminated in the last election, when the candidate leader and former Prime Minister, Peter Pellegrini, and ten other party supporters split the Smer-SD and subsequently founded a new Social Democratic Party, the Hlas-SD. • Nowadays, the former PM, Robert Fico, faces charges against organised crime.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA: THE …

217

• The Smer-SD politics has been built up on divisive rhetoric that undermines democratic institutions and independent judiciary. The party’s speeches contribute to the division of citizens when emphasising the ‘we’ and ‘they’ rhetoric. • As an opposition party, the Smer-SD has moved towards more farright rhetoric than ever before. Not only did the Smer-SD organise anti-government protests together with the Slovak far-right parties, such as the K-L’SNS, or Republika, but it also played a negative role during the COVID-19 pandemic when the representatives of the party questioned and refused vaccinations. • The Smer-SD statements on foreign policy do not support the EU and NATO’s proclaimed goals and principles.

Bibliography Abou-Chadi, T., Mitteregger, R., & Mudde, C. (2021). Left behind by the working class? Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Aktuality.sk. (2018, June 21). Fico: na hrobe dvoch mladých l’udí tancovali politici, tretí sektor aj herci. Aktuality.sk. https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/ 600568/fico-na-hrobe-dvoch-mladych-ludi-tancovali-politici-treti-sektor-ajherci/ Aktuálnˇe.cz. (2018, January 10). Dubˇcek se podˇelal hruzou, ˚ prohlásil Zeman. Nevhodné, navíc bˇehem oslav, ohradili se Slováci. Aktuálnˇe.cz. https://zpr avy.aktualne.cz/zahranici/slovensky-ministr-kultury-kritizoval-zemana-za-vyr oky-o-dubc/r~b9a04024f5f811e7984d0cc47ab5f122/ Bahna, M., & Majo, J. (2012). Bratislava zblízka: vol’by ’10 a ‘12. In V. Krivý ˇ im predchádzalo, postoje a výsledky (pp. 203– (Ed.), Slovenské vol’by ’12: Co 235). Sociologický ústav SAV. Bailey, D. J., De Waele, J., Escalona, F., & Vieira, M. (Eds.). (2014). European social democracy during the global economic crisis. Manchester University Press. Bakke, E., & Sitter, N. (2021). Each unhappy in its own way? The rise and fall of social democracy in the Visegrád countries since 1989. In N. Brandal, Ø. Bratberg, & D. E. Thorsen (Eds.), Social democracy in the 21st century (pp. 37–68). Emerald Publishing Limited. Bakker, R. et al. (2020). 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey. University of North Carolina. https://www.chesdata.eu/2019-chapel-hill-expert-survey Balogová, B. (2014, June 5). Updated: Slovakia amends its constitution. The Slovak Spectator. https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20050998/updatedslovakia-amends-its-constitution.html

218

L’. ZVADA

Bandau, F. (2022). What explains the electoral crisis of social democracy? A systematic review of the literature. Government and Opposition, 58(1), 183– 205. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2022.10 BBC.com. (2018, March 5). Slovakia’s leaders clash over journalist’s killing. BBC.com. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43281518 Benedikoviˇcová, M. (2014, January 8). Fico sa vo videu spovedá, akým je ˇ ˇ vynechal. Sme.sk. https://domov.sme.sk/c/706 katolíkom. Clenstvo v KSC 0721/fico-sa-vo-videu-spoveda-akym-je-katolikom-clenstvo-v-ksc-vynechal. html Berman, S., & Snegovaya, M. (2019). Populism and the decline of social democracy. Journal of Democracy, 30(3), 5–19. Biezen, I., & Poguntke, T. (2014). The decline of membership-based politics. Party Politics, 20(2), 205–216. Blaha, L’. (2016). Slovensko a otázka sociálneho štátu. In M. Pekník (Eds.), Pohl’ady na slovenskú politiku po roku 1989 (pp. 364–388). VEDA. BPB.sk. (2019). Prieskum: Vol’by do Európskeho parlamentu Slovensko. Budovy pre budúcnost’.sk. https://bpb.sk/prieskum-slovaci-riesia-klimu-stale-viac-pol itici-zatial-velmi-malo/ Brandal, N., Bratberg, Ø., & Thorsen, D. E. (Eds.). (2021). Social democracy in the 21st century. Emerald Group Publishing. Bustikova, L., & Guasti, P. (2017). The illiberal turn or swerve in Central Europe? Politics and Governance, 5(4), 166–176. Bútorová, Z., Gyarfášová, O., & Slosiarik, M. (2012). Verejná mienka a voliˇcské ˇ im predchádzalo, postoje a správanie. In V. Krivý (Ed.). Slovenské vol’by ’12: Co výsledky (pp. 137–202). Sociologický ústav SAV. Buzogány, A. (2017). Illiberal democracy in Hungary: Authoritarian diffusion or domestic causation? Democratization, 24(7), 1307–1325. Buzogány, A., & Varga, M. (2018). The ideational foundations of the illiberal backlash in Central and Eastern Europe: The case of Hungary. Review of International Political Economy, 25(6), 811–828. ˇ Cabada, L. (2017). Clenství a vnitˇrní organizace ve stˇredoevropských politických stranách. Politické Vedy, 20(3), 8–27. ˇ CT24.ceskatelevize.cz. (2021, April 22). Slovensko vyhostí tˇri ruské diplomaty. ˇ https:// Moskva dle Reuters odpoví stejným poˇctem. CT24.ceskatelevize.cz. ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/svet/3301645-slovensko-vyhosti-tri-pracovniky-rus keho-velvyslanectvi Cunningham, B. (2016, February 10). We protect Slovakia. Politico.eu. https:// www.politico.eu/article/slovakia-fico-migrants-refugees-asylum-crisis-smer-ele ction/ Cuprik, R. (2018, December 26). Ficove reˇci o Sorosovi na l’udí zapôsobili. Sme.sk. https://domov.sme.sk/c/22014352/prieskum-focus-pre-smekto-financoval-protesty-za-slusne-slovensko.html

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA: THE …

219

Delgado-Fernandez, S., & Cazorla-Martin, A. (2017). The Spanish socialist workers’ party: From hegemony to decadence. Revista Espanola De Ciencia Politica, 44, 247–273. Di Francesco-Mayot, S. (2018). The French Parti Socialiste (2010–16): From office to crisis. In R. Manwaring & P. Kennedy (Eds.), Why the left loses: The decline of the centre-left in comparative perspective (pp. 151–166). Policy Press. Dinuš, P. (2016). Základné smery vývoja ponovombrového politického myslenia. In M. Pekník (Ed.), Pohl’ady na slovenskú politiku po roku 1989 (pp. 585– 600). VEDA. Dostal, J. M. (2017). The crisis of German social democracy revisited. Political Quarterly, 88(2), 230–240. Dubniˇcka, I. (2016). Zelené ideály a realita po roku 1989. In M. Pekník (Ed.), Pohl’ady na slovenskú politiku po roku 1989 (pp. 484–493). VEDA. Eunice, G. (2020). Labour’s 2019 campaign: A defeat of epic proportions. Parliamentary Affairs, 73(1), 84–102. Euractiv.sk. (2009, December 10). Slovak ruling party joins European socialist ranks. Euractiv.sk. https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-europe/news/ slovak-ruling-party-joins-european-socialist-ranks/ Euractiv.sk. (2012, April 13). Fico: NATO nie je dáždnik pod ktorý sa môžeme skryt’. Euractiv.sk. https://euractiv.sk/section/zahranicie-a-bezpec nost/news/fico-nato-nie-je-dazdnik-pod-ktory-sa-mozeme-skryt-019050/ FOCUS.sk. (2021a). Press release. FOCUS.sk. https://www.focus-research.sk/ files/n282_Volebne%20preferencie%20politickych%20stran_jun%202021a.pdf FOCUS.sk. (2021b). Press release. FOCUS.sk. https://www.focus-research.sk/ files/n281_Volebne%20preferencie%20politickych%20stran_maj%202021b. pdf Gabrižová, Z., Geist, R., & Korenˇ , M. (2019). Slovensko a eurovol’by 2019: EÚ v programoch a pozíciách slovenských politických strán pred vol’bami do Európskeho parlamentu. Euractiv.sk. https://euractiv.sk/wp-content/upl oads/sites/8/2019/05/Final-EA-ANALY%CC%81ZA-052019-Programypoliticky%CC%81ch-stra%CC%81n-do-volieb-EP-20191.pdf Gbúrová, M. (2016). K problematike vzt’ahu demokracie a partitokracie v podmienkach Slovenskej republiky. In M. Pekník (Ed.), Pohl’ady na slovenskú politiku po roku 1989 (pp. 129–141). VEDA. Germanova, M., & Santora, M. (2018, March 2). After murder and protests, slovak leaders struggle to keep power. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/12/world/europe/slovakia-rob ert-kalinak-jan-kuciak.html. Gingrich, J. (2017). A new progressive coalition? The European left in a time of change. Political Quarterly, 88(1), 39–51.

220

L’. ZVADA

Granˇcayová, M., & Kazharski, A. (2020). ‘The Slovakebab’: Anti-Islam agenda in Slovak parliamentary elections and beyond. Czech Journal of Political Science, 27 (3), 259–277. Greskovits, B. (2015). The hollowing and backsliding of democracy in East Central Europe. Global Policy, 6, 28–37. Guasti, P. (2021). Same same, but different: Domestic conditions of illiberal backlash against universal rights in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In A. Lorenz & L. H. Anders (Eds.), Illiberal trends and anti-EU politics in East Central Europe. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics (pp. 179–206). Palgrave Macmillan. Gyrfášová, O. & Slosiarik, M. (2016). What characterized the voters. Working Papers in Sociology No. 1. https://sociologia.sav.sk/pdf/Working_Papers_in_ Sociology_012016.pdf Harris, K. (2020a). A hybrid threat: The night wolves motorcycle club. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (forthcoming). https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X. 2020.1862752 Harris, K. (2020b). Russia’s fifth column: The influence of the Night Wolves Motorcycle Club. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 43(4), 259–273. Haughton, T., & Deegan-Krause, K. (2015). Hurricane season: Systems of instability in central and East European party politics. East European Politics and Societies, 29(1), 61–80. Heath, R. (2016, November 23). Robert Fico calls reporters ‘dirty, anti-Slovak prostitutes’. Politico.eu. https://www.politico.eu/article/robert-fico-calls-rep orters-dirty-anti-slovak-prostitutes-foreign/ Hlaváˇc, M. (2016). Performance of political parties in the 2016 parliamentary election in Slovakia: Regional comparisons and district-level determinants. Regional & Federal Studies, 26(3), 433–443. HNonline.sk. (2021, April 22). Fico privítal Sorosa ana Slovensku. Opät’ vytiahol stretnutie Kisku a zaútoˇcil na médiá. HNonline.sk. https://strategie. hnonline.sk/news/media/2335011-fico-privital-sorosa-na-slovensku-opat-vyt iahol-stretnutie-kisku-a-zautocil-na-media iRozhlas.cz. (2016, September 17). Fico: Zemˇe V4 odmítnou dohodu o brexitu, omezí-li možnost práce v Británii. iRozhlas.cz. https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpr avy-svet/fico-zeme-v4-odmitnou-dohodu-o-brexitu-omezi-li-moznost-pracev-britanii_201609171930_dpihova Jesenˇ ák, Š. (2019, December 19). Monika Benˇ ová: Fico kauzy nikdy nevysvetlí. Po vol’bách dojde v Smere k personálnym zmenám. Týžden. ˇ https://www.tyz den.sk/rozhovory/60919/rozhovor-benova/ Kalmar, I. (2020). Islamophobia and anti-antisemitism: The case of Hungary and the ‘Soros plot.’ Patterns of Prejudice, 54(1–2), 182–198.

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA: THE …

221

Kennedy, P., & Manwarring, R. (2018). The dilemmas of social democracy. In R. Manwarring & P. Kennedy (Eds.), Why the left loses: The decline of the centre-left in comparative perspective (pp. 203–217). Polity Press. Kerekeš, D. (2018). Vol’by 2016 v Košiciach: Priestorová analýza. Sociológia, 50(1), 30–56. Kern, M. (2018, March 18). Preˇco je Fico stale šéf a Pellegrini bude len poloviˇcný premiér. Denník N . https://dennikn.sk/1064006/preco-je-ficostale-sef-a-pellegrini-bude-len-polovicny-premier/ Krno, S., & Slobodníková, M. (2016). Politické strany a hnutia na Slovensku. In M. Pekník (Ed.), Pohl’ady na slovenskú politiku po roku 1989 (pp. 66–112). VEDA. Laroze, D. (2019). Party collapse and new party entry. Party Politics, 25(4), 559–568. Loxbo, K., Hinnfors, J., Hagevi, M., Blombäck, S., & Demker, M. (2021). The decline of Western European social democracy: Exploring the transformed link between welfare state generosity and the electoral strength of social democratic parties, 1975–2014. Party Politics, 27 (3), 430–441. Lysek, J., Pánek, J., & Lebeda, T. (2021). Who are the voters and where are they? Using spatial statistics to analyse voting patterns in the parliamentary elections of the Czech Republic. Journal of Maps, 17 (1), 33–38. Lysek, J., Zvada, L’., & Škop, M. (2020). Mapping the 2020 Slovak parliamentary election. Analysis of spatial support and voter transition. Czech Journal of Political Science, 27 (3), 278–302. Madlenˇ ák, T. (2019). Geografická reprezentativita poslancov NR SR zvolených v podmienkach jedného volebného obvodu. Sociológia, 51(5), 483–501. Malová, D. (2017). Strengthening social democracy in the Visegrad countries: Limits and challenges faced by Smer-SD. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. http://lib rary.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/prag/13217.pdf Manwarring, R., & Beech, M. (2018). The case of the British Labour Party: Back to the wilderness. In R. Manwarring & P. Kennedy (Eds.), Why the left loses: The decline of the centre-left in comparative perspective (pp. 25–38). Polity Press. Manwarring, R., & Kennedy, P. (Eds.). (2018). Why the left loses: The decline of the centre-left in comparative perspective. Polity Press. Marušiak, J. (2006). Fenomén strany Smer: medzi „pragmatizmom “a sociálnou demokraciou. Stˇredoevropské politické studie, 8(1), 19–55. Marušiak, J. (2017). Political entrepreneurs as a challenge for the party system in Slovakia. Czech Journal of Political Science, 24(2), 179–200. Marušiak, J. (2021). Slovak, not Brussels social democracy. Czech Journal of Political Science, 28(1), 37–58.

222

L’. ZVADA

Merkel, W. (1991). After the golden age: Is social democracy doomed to decline? In M. Lemke & C. Marks (Eds.), Crisis of socialism in Europe (pp. 187–222). Institut d’Edicions de la Diputació de. Ministerstvo životného prostredia. (2019). Greener Slovakia: Strategy of the environmental policy of the Slovak Republic until 2030. https://www.minzp. sk/files/iep/greener_slovakia-strategy_of_the_environmental_policy_of_the_ slovak_republic_until_2030.pdf Moschonas, G. (2013). A new left in Greece: PASOK’s fall and SYRIZA’s rise. Dissent, 60(4), 33–37. Münich Security Report. (2018). To the brink—And back? Münich Security Conference. https://espas.secure.europarl.europa.eu/orbis/sites/def ault/files/generated/document/en/MunichSecurityReport2018.pdf. Nestorová-Dická, J., Gessert, A., & Sninˇcák, I. (2019). Rural and non-rural municipalities in the Slovak Republic. Journal of Maps, 5(1), 84–93. Onuferová, M. (2012). Poslanci Smeru schválili koniec rovnej dane. Pozrite si hlavné zmeny. Sme.sk. https://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/6626668/poslancismeru-schvalili-koniec-rovnej-dane-pozrite-si-hlavne-zmeny.html#axzz4iZEN 5UUl ˇ Pink, M. (Ed.). (2012). Volební mapy Ceské a Slovenské republiky po roce 1993: vzorce, trendy, promˇeny. CDK. Pirro, A. L., & Stanley, B. (2022). Forging, bending, and breaking: Enacting the “illiberal playbook” in Hungary and Poland. Perspectives on Politics, 20(1), 86–101. PISA. (2018). Insides and interpretations. Oecd.org. https://www.oecd.org/ PISA/PISA%202018%20INSIGHTS%20AND%20INTERPRETATIONS% 20FINAL%20PDF.PDF. Plenta, P. (2020). Conspiracy theories as a political instrument: Utilization of anti-Soros narratives in Central Europe. Contemporary Politics, 26(5), 512– 530. Plešivˇcák, M. (2011). Postavenie regiónov Slovenska z hl’adiska územia volebnej podpory politických strán v parlamentných vol’bách r. 2002–2010. Geografický cˇasopis, 63(3), 227–251. Pontusson, J. (1992). At the end of the third road: Swedish social democracy in crisis. Politics & Society, 20(3), 305–332. Pontusson, J. (1995). Explaining the decline of European social democracy: The role of structural economic change. World Politics, 47 (4), 495–533. Pravda.sk. (2017a, November 5). Analytici komentujú výsledky volieb: zobudili sme sa do dobrého rána. Pravda.sk. https://spravy.pravda.sk/volby-do-vuc-2017/ clanok/447092-krajske-volby-su-prepadakom-pre-smer-tvrdi-baranek/ Pravda.sk. (2017b, November 18). Fico: Dubˇcek je stelesnením odvahy a statoˇcnosti. Pravda.sk. https://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/448492fico-dubcek-je-stelesnenim-odvahy-a-statocnosti/

THE STATE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA: THE …

223

Pravda.sk. (2018a, October 26). Fico o Mad’aroviˇcovom odchode zo Smeru. Pravda.sk. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DBgR0hP4AfM Pravda.sk. (2018b, November 11). Podl’a Fica Soros financoval protest. Naznaˇcil sledovanie organizátorov štátom. Pravda.sk. https://spravy.pravda. sk/domace/clanok/491426-dve-percenta-z-dani-poukazat-rodicom-fico-tonavrhuje/ Pravda.sk. (2020). Fico obvinil neziskovky z politickej korupcie. Pravda.sk. https://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/560453-fico-obvinil-neziskovky-zpolitickej-korupcie/ Radio Slovak International. (2021, September 6). Slovak average salary lowest in EU. Radio Slovak International. https://enrsi.rtvs.sk/articles/news/267 372/slovak-average-salary-lowest-in-eu?fbclid=IwAR01GsdezoEKAfCvCRy dnPCsdEwj5XKD-2vECD7U8loyZVbGh_Eo0hqVSmk Reuters. (2016, November 30). Slovakia toughens church registration rules to bar Islam. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-slovakia-religionislam-idUSKBN13P20C Rossi, G. (2020). Slovakia after Fico: Systematic change or more of the same? Czech Journal of Political Science, 27 (3), 235–277. Rybáˇr, M., & Spáˇc, P. (2017). The March 2016 parliamentary elections in Slovakia: A political earthquake. Electoral Studies, 45, 153–156. Sainsbury, D. (1984). Scandinavian party politics re-examined: Social democracy in decline? West European Politics, 7 (4), 67–102. Sme.sk. (2005, December 21). Smer-SD a KOZ podpísali dohodu o vzájomnej spolupráci. Sme.sk. https://domov.sme.sk/c/2520085/smer-sd-a-koz-podpis ali-dohodu-o-vzajomnej-spolupraci.html Strana-Smer.sk. (2021, April 23). Otvorený list vel’vyslancovi Ruskej federácie. https://www.strana-smer.sk/aktuality/clanky/post/otv Strana-Smer.sk. oreny-list-vevyslancovi-ruskej-federacie Snyder, T. (2018). The road to unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America. The Bodley Head. Sotiropoulos, D. A. (2014). Triumph and collapse: PASOK in the wake of the crisis in Greece (2009–13). In D. J. Bailey, J. M. De Waele, F. Escalona, & M. Vieira (Eds.), European social democracy during the global economic crisis (pp. 193–212). Manchester University Press. Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. (2013). Order of political parties by obtained mandates in self-governing regions. https://volby.statistics.sk/osk/ osk2013/VUC/Tabulka4a_sk.html Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. (2017). The elections to the bodies of self-governing regions 2017 . https://volby.statistics.sk/osk/osk2017/sk/dow nload.html

224

L’. ZVADA

Struhárik, F. (2020, February 20). Blaha ovládol dezinformaˇcnú scénu, žiadna konšpiraˇcná stránka sa mu nevyrovná. Denník N. https://dennikn.sk/177 4122/blaha-ovladol-dezinformacnu-scenu-ziadna-konspiracna-stranka-sa-munevyrovna/ Sulík, R. (2015, June 10). Rovná danˇ 12 percent namiesto sociálnych balíˇckov. Denník N. https://dennikn.sk/blog/155532/rovna-dan-12-per cent-namiesto-socialnych-balickov/ Sustainable Governance Indicators. (2021). Slovakia. https://www.sgi-network. org/2020/Slovakia/Environmental_Policies TASR.sk. (2018, November 29). Fico: Strategic interest of Smer is to reject migration pact and keep Lajˇcák. TASR.sk. https://www.tasr.sk/tasr-clanok/ TASR:20181129TBA02018 Taylor, K. (2018). Swedish election highlits decline of center-left parties across Western Europe. Pew Research. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/ 2018/09/12/swedish-election-highlights-decline-of-center-left-parties-acr oss-western-europe/ Terenzani, T. (2018, April 8). Pavol Paška dies. The Slovak Spectator. https://spe ctator.sme.sk/c/20797297/pavol-paska-dies.html Trend.sk. (2021, August 16). Fico má drsný odkaz, Afganistan je podl’a neho príkladom totálneho zlyhania NATO a USA. Trend.sk. https://www.trend. sk/spravy/fico-domnieva-afganistan-je-prikladom-totalneho-zlyhania-nato-usa Úrad vlády Slovenskej republiky. (2014, November 17). Vybavené—od 17. Novembra sú vlaky pre študentov a dôchodcov zadarmo. Úrad vlády Slovenskej republiky. https://www.vlada.gov.sk//vybavene-od-17-novembrasu-vlaky-pre-studentov-a-dochodcov-zadarmo/ Vachudová, M. (2020). Ethnopopulism and democratic backsliding in Central Europe. East European Politics, 36(3), 318–340. Whiteley, P. F. (2011). Is the party over? The decline of party activism and membership across the democratic world. Party Politics, 17 (1), 21–44. Zvada, L’. (2018). Securitization of the migration crisis and islamophobic rhetoric: The 2016 Slovak parliamentary elections as a case study. Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politics, 12(2), 216–235. Zvada, L’. (2022). Anti-soros conspiracy rhetoric in Slovak parliamentary discourse: Actors, narratives, and implications. Politické Vedy, 25(2), 177–207. Zvada, L’., Petlach, M., & Ondruška, M. (2020). Where were the voters? A spatial analysis of the 2019 Slovak presidential election. Slovak Journal of Political Sciences, 20(2), 176–205.

Index

A Anályzy, Strategie, Alternativy (Analysis, Strategies, Alternatives), 194 ANO 2011 (Akce nespokojených obˇcanu, ˚ Action of Dissatisfied Citizens), 60, 61, 74, 80 A2larm, 47, 69

B Babiš, Andrej, vi, 19, 60–62, 64, 69, 74, 82, 83, 85, 179 Balcerowicz, Leszek, 157 Belka, Marek, 139, 153, 157 Benˇ ová, Monika, 185, 188 Biedron, ´ Robert, 28, 138, 141–143, 147, 148, 160 ˇ Blaha, Luboš, 189, 190, 197, 201 Blair, Tony, 156, 157 Blanár, Juraj, 183 Botka, László, 102 Buzek, Jerzy, 157

C ˇ Caputová, Zuzana, 184, 200, 207 CBOS (Public Opinion Research Center), 166, 167 ˇ Ceská pirátská strana/Czech Pirate Party, 61, 79, 83 Chmelár, Eduard, 181 CID (Centrum im. Ignacego Daszynskiego, ´ Ignacy Daszynski Center), 155 Comenius University, 200 Cordon sanitaire, 20 ˇ ˇ CSSD (Ceská strana sociálnˇe demokratická, Czech Social Democratic Party), 16–19, 26–28, 30–38, 40–42, 44, 46, 47, 53–86, 179 Czarzasty, Włodzimierz, 28, 141–143, 147, 150

D Demokracie a socialismus , 68

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Skrzypek and A. Bíró-Nagy (eds.), The Social Democratic Parties in the Visegrád Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30792-8

225

226

INDEX

Demokratikus Lendület, 27 Deník Referendum, 47, 69 DK (Democratic Coalition, Demokratikus Koalíció), 15, 17, 19, 23, 27, 28, 31–37, 40, 41, 43, 44, 90–106, 108–110, 115–125, 130–133, 162 Dobrá vol’ba (Good Choice), 181 Dobrev, Klára, 94, 95, 99, 100, 132 Doleva!, 77 Dostál, Pavel, 68 Drucker, Tomáš, 181 Dubˇcek, Alexander, 193 Dzurinda, Mikuláš, 181, 192, 214 E European Commission, 13 European Parliament (EP), 13, 44, 54, 57, 59, 67, 92, 93, 99, 102, 103, 130–132, 138, 141, 151, 152, 160, 169, 180, 182 F FES (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung), 10, 77 Fiatal Baloldal, 27 Fico, Robert, v, 20, 35, 38, 47, 180–182, 184, 185, 187–190, 192–198, 201, 202, 204–210, 212, 214–216 FIDESZ (Magyar Polgári Szövetség, Hungarian Civic Alliance), 21–23, 36, 38, 90, 92, 93, 96–99, 104–106, 109, 110, 112–116, 123, 125, 129, 132–134, 157 FMS (Federacja Młodych Socjaldemokratów, Federation of Young Social Democrats), 27, 147, 150 ˇ For a Better CSSD, 77 For a New Republic Foundation, 97

FTT (Financial Transaction Tax), 32 G Gdula, Maciej, 39, 164 Gierek, Edward, 150, 155 Gross, Stanislav, 57 Gurmai, Zita, 36 Gyurcsány, Ferenc, 17, 19, 36, 92, 93, 95, 96, 98, 99, 103, 104, 106, 118, 120, 132 H Hamáˇcek, Jan, 62–64, 69, 71 Hlas (sociálna demokracia), 189 Horák, Jiˇrí, 16, 54, 64 ˇ HZDS (Ludová strana, Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko, Movement for a Democratic Slovakia), 19, 181, 191, 192, 206, 214 I Idea, 26, 27, 47, 48, 68, 69, 76, 79, 120, 154, 169, 193, 212, 215 IPSOS, 161 J Jakab, Péter, 99 Jednota dôchodcov na Slovensku (Unity of senior citizens Slovakia), 194 Jobbik (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, Movement for a Better Hungary), 21, 90, 94, 99, 103–105, 109, 126, 132 K Kaczynski, ´ Jarosław, 142, 154, 169, 188

INDEX

Kalinˇ ák, Erik, 189 Kalinˇ ák, Robert, 187, 189 Karácsony, Gergely, 94, 95, 99 ˇ KDU-CSL (Kˇrestˇanská a ˇ demokratická unie–Ceskoslovenská strana lidová, Christian and Democratic Union–Czechoslovak People’s Party), 57, 58, 73 KESMA (Central European Press and Media Foundation), 47, 98 Kiska, Andrej, 185, 195, 209 Klaus, Václav, 55 ˇ K-LSNS, 194, 196, 205, 208, 211, 215, 217 Koˇcner, Marián, 194 KOD (Komitet Obrony Demokracji, Committee for the Defense of Democracy), 156 KO (Koalicja Obywatelska, Civic Coalition), 28, 138, 167 Konfederacja, 144, 167 Kopacz, Ewa, 153 Korózs, Lajos, 99 Kotleba, Marian, 183, 207 Kovács, László, 19 KOZ (Konfederácia odborových zväzov), 193, 194 Krakowiak, Kacper, 147 ˇ ˇ KSCM (Komunistická strana Cech a Moravy, Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia), 58, 62, 73, 74 Kukiz 15, 142, 154 Kunhalmi, Ágnes, 19, 93, 103 Kwa´sniewski, Aleksander, 17, 139, 140, 147, 157, 164 L Lajˇcák, Miroslav, 188, 204, 205 Langer, Ivan, 58 LEV 21 (Národní socialisté, levice 21), 60

227

LiD (Lewica i Demokraci, Left and Democrats), 24, 140 Lidový dum, ˚ 65 Listy–Dvoumˇesíˇcník pro kulturu a dialog, 47, 69 LMP (Lehet Más a Politika, Politics Can be Different), 94, 103–105, 109

M Mackiewicz, Anna Zofia, 39 ˇ c, Marek, 188 Madariˇ Maláˇcová, Jana, 69, 71, 78 Masaryk, Tomáš G., 77 Matoviˇc, Igor, 182, 188, 195, 209, 216 Maxová, Radka, 63 MDA (Masarykova demokratická akademie, Masaryk Democratic Academy), 72, 77, 194, 216 Meˇciar, Vladimír, 19, 179, 191, 192, 205, 206, 214 Median polling agency, 81 Mesterházy, Attila, 48, 99 Miller, Leszek, v, 17, 139, 141, 153, 156, 157 Miškoviˇc, Michal, 195 Molnár, Csaba, 100 Morawiecki, Mateusz, 188 MSD (Mladí sociální demokraté, Young Social Democrats (Cz)), 27, 72, 77 MSD (Mladí sociální demokrati, Young Social Democrats (SK)), 194 MSZP (Magyar Szocialista Párt, Hungarian Socialist Party), 2–4, 7, 15–19, 23, 26–28, 30–36, 40–45, 90–116, 118, 120–125, 130–133, 179

228

INDEX

N Nadácia zastavnme korupciu (Stop Corruption Foundation), 195 Napieralski, Grzegorz, 140 Neˇcas, Petr, 59–61 Neklid, 69 Népszabadság, 96, 98 Neue Mitte, 29, 45 New Green Deal, 35, 160, 161 Newsweek Polska, 145 NL (Nowa Lewica, New Left), 31, 32, 138, 142–145, 147–157, 160, 161, 167–170 Nové Slovo, 194 O ODA (Obˇcanská demokratická aliance, Civic Democratic Alliance), 55 ODS (Obˇcanská demokratická strana, Civic Democratic Party), 55–60, 64–66, 68, 73, 85 Ogórek, Magdalena, 140, 141 ˇ ˇ OL’aNO (OBYCAJNÍ LUDIA a nezávislé osobnosti, Ordinary people and Independent), 182 Open Society Foundation, 196 OPZZ (Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Zwi˛azków Zawodowych, Polish Trade Unions Alliance), 154, 155, 160 Orbán, Viktor, vi, 29, 36, 37, 90, 92, 94, 106, 108, 109, 119, 120, 129, 134, 157, 195, 196, 215 P PA (Progressive Alliance), 78 Párbeszéd (Dialogue Party), 93, 94, 104, 107 Paris Agreements, 35, 204 Paroubek, Jiˇrí, 18, 27, 57–60, 66, 74, 75

Paška, Pavol, 188 Pellegrini, Peter, 20, 181, 182, 187–190, 204, 212, 214, 216 PES (Party of European Socialists), 2, 3, 20, 31, 35, 36, 44, 138, 142, 160, 192, 193, 211 Petˇríˇcek, Tomás, 63 PHARE, 11 PiS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwo´sc´ , Law and Justice), 21, 22, 28, 29, 37, 38, 47, 140, 141, 144, 145, 147, 149, 153, 154, 156–158, 167–169 PL2050 (Polska 2050 Szymona Hołown), 147, 154 Podemos, 140, 161 Pohled, 68 PO (Platforma Obywatelska, Civic Platform), 22, 47, 140, 142, 144, 145, 147, 149, 153, 154, 156, 161, 162, 166, 168, 169 PPS (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, Polish Socialist Party), 24, 138, 153 Prague Spring of 1968, 53 Právo, 68 Právo lidu, 47, 68 Procházka, Radoslav, 182 ProForum, 194 Przył˛ebska, Julia, 155, 166 PSL (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, Polish People’s Party), 23, 142, 144, 145, 147–149, 153, 154, 161, 163 PS (Progresívne Slovensko, Progressive Slovakia), 180, 212 PS-Spolu (Progresivne Slovensko-Spolu, Progressive Slovakia Together), 184, 207 PZPR (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, United Polish

INDEX

Workers Party), 16, 139, 144, 154 R Rakowski, Mieczysław, 16 Raši, Richard, 183, 189 RAZEM (Together), 144 Remišová, Veronika, 195 Revolution 1905, 150 Rezník, Jaroslav, 194 Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung, 15, 81 S S&D Group (Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats), 2, 44, 63, 92, 106, 130, 151 Šabatová, Anna, 76 Sanders, Bernie, 170 ˇ Save the CSSD, 77 Schröder, Gerhard, 77, 156, 157 SDL’ (Strana demokratickej ˇlavice, Party of Democratic Left), 12, 41 SdPl (Socjaldemokracja Polska, Polish Social democracy), 24, 137, 139, 140, 152, 156, 157, 161, 168, 170 SdRP (Socjaldemokracja Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej), 2, 4, 16–19, 26, 30, 44, 139, 144, 152, 154 Šefˇcoviˇc, Maroš, 184, 207 Seliger-Gemeinde, 77 #Siet, 78, 192 SI (Socialist International), 78, 192 SLD (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, Democratic Left Alliance), 3, 15, 17–19, 23, 24, 27, 28, 37, 38, 40–46, 137–151, 153–166, 168, 170, 179 Šmarda, Michal, 64 Sme Rodina (We are Family), 186

229

SMER (Sociálna Demokracia, Direction-Social Democracy), 5, 12, 13, 19, 20, 26, 28, 31, 32, 34–36, 38, 40–44, 46, 47 SMK (Strana Mad’arskiej Koalicie-Magyar Koalicio, Party of Hungarian Coalition), 192, 210 SNS (Slovenská národná strana, Slovak National Party), 19, 181, 192 Sobotka, Bohuslav, 19, 61, 62, 74, 76, 82 ˇ Socialist Faction of CSSD, 77 Socialisti.sk, 181 Societas, 27, 101 Solidarita - Hnutie pracujúcej chudoby (Solidarity Working Poverty Movement), 181 Soros, George, 195, 196 SPD, 77, 89, 179 Špidla, Vladimir, v, 18, 56, 57, 73, 77 Spolu (Together), 180 STEM, 60 Sulík, Richard, 198 Syriza, 140, 177 Szaniszló, Sándor, 102 Szydło, Beata, 187 T Táncsics Foundation, 97, 107 The Bell Ringer, 76, 77 Third Way, 3, 7, 20, 21, 29, 30, 45, 153, 156, 157, 159, 192 TOK FM, 145 Toman, Miroslav, 69 Topolánek, Mirek, 19, 59 Tóth, Bertalan, 19, 93 Trend, vi, 13, 16, 40, 68, 96, 98, 121, 123, 132, 156, 190, 191, 202, 207 Tusk, Donald, 153, 154, 169

230

INDEX

TVN, 145–147 TVP, 146 Twój Ruch, 24, 140, 142 Týždenˇ , 195

U Ujhelyi, István, 100 UP (Unia Pracy, Labour Union), 24, 138–140 US-DEU (Unie Svobody–Demokratická unie, Freedom Union, Democratic Union), 74 UW (Unia Wolno´sci, Union of Freedom), 56, 57

V Valachová, Kateˇrina, 71, 77 Varju, László, 97 Velvet Revolution, 10, 54, 55, 65, 187

W Willy Brandt and Bruno Kreisky Foundation, 68 WIOSNA Biedronia (Biedron’s ´ Spring), 24, 28, 38, 41, 138, 142, 143, 147, 148, 150, 151, 160, 163, 165, 168 Z Za l’udi (For People), 186 Zaorálek, Lubomír, 19, 62, 71, 77 Za slušné Slovensko (Decent Slovakia), 196 Zeman, Miloš, 18, 19, 26, 54–57, 59–62, 66, 73, 82–84, 193 Zemanovci, 59, 60 ZL (Zjednoczona Lewica, United Left), 24, 138, 140, 161, 162 ZNP (Zwi˛azek Nauczycielstwa Polskiego, Polish Teachers Union), 153, 155, 160