The Routledge Handbook of Religion and Journalism 2020021200, 9781138304963, 9780203731420

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THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF RELIGION AND JOURNALISM

The Routledge Handbook of Religion and Journalism is an outstanding reference source to the key topics, challenges, past and present global issues and debates in this exciting subject. The first collection of its kind, this volume comprises over 25 chapters by a team of international contributors. This Handbook is divided into five parts, each taking global developments in the field into account: • • • • •

Theoretical Reflections Power and Authority Conflict, Radicalization and Populism Dialogue and Peacebuilding Trends

Within these sections, central issues, debates and developments are examined, including religious and secular press; ethics; globalization; gender; datafication; differentiation; journalistic religious literacy; race and religious extremism. This volume is essential reading for students and researchers in journalism and religious studies. This Handbook will also be very useful for those in related fields, such as sociology, communication studies, media studies and area studies. Kerstin Radde-Antweiler is professor of Religious Studies at the University of Bremen, Germany. Xenia Zeiler is associate professor of South Asian Studies at the University of Helsinki, Finland.

ROUTLEDGE H A N DBOOKS IN R ELIGION

THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF MUSLIM–JEWISH RELATIONS Edited by Josef Meri THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF RELIGIOUS NATURALISM Edited by Donald A. Crosby and Jerome A. Stone THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF DEATH AND THE AFTERLIFE Edited by Candi K. Cann THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF RELIGION AND ANIMAL ETHICS Edited by Andrew Linzey and Clair Linzey THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF MORMONISM AND GENDER Edited by Amy Hoyt and Taylor G. Petry THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ISLAM AND GENDER Edited by Justine Howe THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF RELIGION AND JOURNALISM Edited by Kerstin Radde-Antweiler and Xenia Zeiler

For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com/ Routledge-Handbooks-in-Religion/book-series/RHR

THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF RELIGION AND JOURNALISM

Edited by Kerstin Radde-Antweiler and Xenia Zeiler

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 selection and editorial matter, Kerstin Radde-Antweiler and Xenia Zeiler; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Kerstin Radde-Antweiler and Xenia Zeiler to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Radde-Antweiler, Kerstin, editor. | Zeiler, Xenia, editor. Title: The Routledge handbook of religion and journalism / edited by Kerstin Radde-Antweiler and Xenia Zeiler. Description: Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2021. | Series: Routledge handbooks in religion | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020021200 | ISBN 9781138304963 (hbk) | ISBN 9780203731420 (ebk) Subjects: LCSH: Religion and the press. Classification: LCC PN4756 .R68 2020 | DDC 070.4/492—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020021200 ISBN: 978-1-138–30496-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-203–73142-0 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by codeMantra

CONTENTS

List of figures ix List of tables x List of contributors xi Introduction 1

PART 1

Theoretical reflections 15











v

Contents PART 2

Power and authority 77















PART 3

Conflict, radicalization and populism 167









vi

Contents



PART 4

Dialogue and peacebuilding

261











PART 5

Trends

351



vii

Contents









Index 427

viii

FIGURES

15.1 Illustration of intersectionality (Crenshaw 2002) 220 15.2 Caribbean and Latin America journalists by sex (GMMP 2015b, 2015c) 222 15.3 Brazilian journalists (Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC); National Federation of Journalists (FENAJ), 2012) 223 15.4 Brazilian journalists by race (Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC); National Federation of Journalists (FENAJ), 2012) 223 15.5 Journalists X population by religious groups (The Trust Project 2017; Demographic Census Atlas (IBGE), 2010) 224 25.1 Phase model illustrating (periodical) apogees and paradigm affiliations of globalization theories 371 28.1 Screenshot from the TED talk with Hans Rosling entitled “Religion and Babies” (2012) 416

ix

TABLES

20.1 Denunciations received per year 305 20.2 Themes of the most repeated stories in the press 306

x

CONTRIBUTORS

Sara Afshari, originally from Iran, holds a PhD in Media Religion and Culture from Edinburgh University and an MA in Media Communication from the University of Wales. She is co-founder and former Executive Director of SAT-7 PARS, a Christian satellite television channel in Persian/Farsi language. She is currently working on a number of writing projects, including a book on Religion, Media and Conversion in Iran: Mediated Christianity in an Islamic Context. J. Kwabena Asamoah-Gyadu, PhD, is professor of Contemporary African Christianity and Pentecostal/Charismatic Studies at the Trinity Theological Seminary, Legon, Ghana. His research interests include religion, media and culture in Africa. He has published widely on media and Pentecostalism in Ghana. Karina Kosicki Bellotti is professor of Contemporary History of the Federal University of Paraná (Brazil), with research on evangelicals and media in Brazil and the USA. Among her publications are the book Delas é o Reino dos Céus (Annablume/Fapesp 2010) and chapters in The Cambridge History of Religions in Latin America (Garrard et al. 2016) and The Media and Religious Authority (Hoover 2016). D. Ashley Campbell is a PhD candidate at the University of Colorado-Boulder in the Media Studies department. Her dissertation examines the narrative imaginaries of “America” and its boundaries of belonging. Her religion journalism is published in The Washington Post, Religious Dispatches and the public radio show Interfaith Voices. Paul Chaffee  is the editor of The Interfaith Observer (TIO), a monthly Internet magazine promoting healthy interfaith culture. He was founding executive director of the Interfaith Center at the Presidio, serving there for 17 years. He has been a trustee and conference planner for United Religions Initiative and North American Interfaith Network. Pauline Hope Cheong,  PhD, is professor and director of Engagement and Innovation at the Hugh Downs School of Human Communication, Arizona State University. Her award-winning research of more than 100 publications in digital culture, includes work that xi

Contributors

examines the interactions between digital technologies and different cultural communities, including religious authority practices and the socio-cultural implications of big data, artificial intelligence and robotics. Henrik Reintoft Christensen is associate professor of Sociology of Religion. His research interests and publications include religion and news: Spiritual Nontroversies ( JRMDC), Continuity with the Past and Uncertainty for the Future: Religion in Danish Newspapers 1750–2018 (TEMENOS) and religion in public institutions: Rooms of silence at three universities in Scandinavia (Sociology of Religion). Yoel Cohen  is professor in The School of Communication, Ariel University, Israel. His books include God, Jews & the Media: Religion and Israel’s Media and Spiritual News: Reporting Religion around the World. His research interests include religion news, religion and media in Judaism and nuclear policy and media He is convenor of the Religion & Communication working group of the International Association of Media & Communication Research. Magali do Nascimento Cunha holds a PhD in Social Communication with Postdoctoral Studies on Communication and Politics. She is researcher of the Brazilian Society of Interdisciplinary Studies on Communication/INTERCOM and author of From the Pulpit to Social Media. Evangelicals in Politics and Digital Activism (2019) and Latin American Religion in the news, published in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and the American News Media (2012). Kelber Pereira Gonçalves is a PhD student in Information Sciences and Communication at Tours University, France, and temporarily associated with Lorraine University, Nancy, France. He is a member of PRIM, Pratiques et Ressources de l’Information et des Médiations, CREM, Centre de Recherche sur les Médiations and the research group Communication and Religion of INTERCOM São Paulo, Brazil. Jennifer Hasty is a cultural anthropologist specializing in media and politics in West Africa. Her book, The Press and Political Culture in Ghana (1995), explores the role of news media in processes of democratization in the 1990s and early 2000s. She teaches Anthropology and African Studies at the University of Pennsylvania. Wai-Yip Ho is associate professor at the Education University of Hong Kong and Marie Curie fellow. He is the author of Islam and China’s Hong Kong: Ethnic Identity, Muslim Networks and the New Silk Road (Routledge 2015). His research includes Christian-Muslim relations, new media, madrasah and Muslim youths in China. Tim Hutchings is assistant professor in Religious Ethics at the University of Nottingham, UK. He is the author of Creating Church Online (Routledge 2017), co-editor of Materiality and the Study of Religion (Routledge 2016) and Christianity and the Digital Humanities (De Gruyter 2020) and Editor-in-Chief of the journal Religion, Media and Digital Culture (Brill). Mia Lövheim  is professor in Sociology of Religion, Uppsala University. She is editor of Media, Religion and Gender: Key Issues and New Challenges (2013) and Mediatization and Religion. Nordic Perspectives (2012, with Stig Hjarvard). Articles presenting current research are published xii

Contributors

in Nordicom Review, Feminist Media Studies, Media, Culture & Society, Nordic Journal of Religion and Society, Journal of Religion in Europe and Journal of Religion, Media and Digital Culture. Andréia Coutinho Louback is a communications strategist at the Institute for Climate and Society, in Rio de Janeiro. She holds a Bachelor in Media Studies at the Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio) and a Research Master in Racial and Ethnic Relations at the Centro Federal de Educação Tecnológica Celso Suckow da Fonseca (CEFET). Tanja Maier is a senior lecturer (Privatdozentin) at Free University Berlin, where she received her postdoctoral degree (Habilitation) in 2017. Her research deals with visual culture, gender media studies and digital media. Her recent books focus on Media Images of Forced Migration (2017) and The (In)Visible Religion. Transformations of Christian Images in the Popular Press (2019). Admire Mare is a senior lecturer in the Department of Journalism and Media Technology, Namibia University of Science and Technology, and a Senior Research Associate in the Department of Journalism, Film and Television at the University of Johannesburg. His research interests include mediation of conflict and peacebuilding initiatives in the global South. Andreas Mattsson is Program Director and lecturer, School of Journalism, Lund University, Sweden, and a freelance journalist. He maintains a multidisciplinary interest in online journalism, media diversity and the growth of digital media. Mattsson is an Affiliated Researcher at Swedish South Asian Studies Network (SASNET) and has studied the development of digital journalism in South and Southeast Asia for several years. Jolyon Mitchell, PhD, FRSA, is Professor and specializes in Religion, Violence and Peacebuilding, with particular reference to the arts and media, at the University of Edinburgh. He is a former BBC World Service Producer and Journalist, President of TRS-UK (2012–18) and current Director of CTPI. Books include Promoting Peace and Inciting Violence: The Role of Religion and Media (Routledge 2012), Media Violence and Christian Ethics (CUP 2007) and Peacebuilding and the Arts (Palgrave MacMillan 2019). Anna Piela is a visiting scholar at Northwestern University, Evanston, IL. She has a PhD in Women’s Studies from the University of York, UK. She has published widely on female religious agency in Islam, most recently in the Journal of American Academy of Religion. Her latest book, Wearing the Niqab: Muslim Women in the UK and the US, is published by Bloomsbury Academic in 2021. Cornelius B. Pratt  is a professor in the School of Journalism and Communication at Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, Guangzhou, China; and in the Lew Klein College of Media and Communication at Temple University, Philadelphia, USA. His research was published recently in the International Journal of Communication, in Communication Theory and in Sustainability. Katrien Pype,  associate professor in Social and Cultural Anthropology at KU Leuven University (Belgium) is, among others, the author of The Making of the Pentecostal Melodrama. Religion, Media, and Gender in Kinshasa (Berghahn Books 2012). Her work has appeared in Media, Culture & Society, Visual Anthropology and Africa, among others. xiii

Contributors

Kerstin Radde-Antweiler is professor of Religious Studies at the University of Bremen, Germany. Her research focuses on mediatized religion, mediatization theory, video gaming, Christian traditions and ritual studies. She authored numerous articles and co-edited several volumes and special journal issues, including Journalism, Media and Religion: How News Media Ascribe Meanings to the Terms “Sacred”, “Secular” and “Authority” ( JRMDC 2018), Mediatized Religion in Asia (Routledge 2019) and Methods for Researching Video Games and Religion (Routledge 2018). She is co-editor-in-chief of gamevironments, the first academic journal with a specific focus on video gaming and religion. Liane Rothenberger  is a senior researcher and lecturer in the Institute of Media and Communication Science, Technische Universität Ilmenau, Germany. Her research focuses on journalism, crisis communication and normativity. Her research has been published in peer-reviewed journals, including Communication Theory and the International Journal of Communication. Joyce Smith  is associate professor in the School of Journalism at Ryerson University in Toronto. In addition to studying the representation of religion in mainstream Canadian, American and South African news media, she continues to examine the evolution of journalism in a digital age. Johanna M. Sumiala is associate professor of Media and Communication Studies at the University of Helsinki. She is an expert in digital media anthropology and study of media and religion. Her most recent book Hybrid Media Events. The Charlie Hebdo Attacks and the Global Circulation of Terrorist Violence (Emerald 2018) is co-authored with Katja Valaskivi, Minttu Tikka and Jukka Huhtamäki. Teemu Taira is senior lecturer in Study of Religion, University of Helsinki. He is co-author of Media Portrayals of Religion and the Secular Sacred (2013, with Kim Knott and Elizabeth Poole) and author of four monographs (in Finnish), and he has published several articles about religion and media in edited volumes and journals. Joram Tarusarira  is assistant professor of Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding and the Director of the Centre for Religion, Conflict and Globalisation at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands. He is co-editor (with E. Chitando) of Religion and Human Security in Africa (Routledge 2019). Pradip Thomas is at the School of Communication & Arts, University of Queensland. His most recent publications are Empire & Post-Empire Telecommunications in India: A History (2019) and The Politics of Digital India: Between Local Compulsions and Transnational Pressures (2019) both published by Oxford University Press. Doug Underwood  is professor of Communication at the University of Washington in Seattle. He is the author of six books, including From Yahweh to Yahoo!: The Religious Roots of the Secular Press (2002) which won a Distinguished Book Award from the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion (SSSR). Priscila Vieira-Souza is a postdoctoral fellow at the School of Communication in the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (funded by CAPES Foundation), where she also completed xiv

Contributors

her PhD. Her current research work focus on pictures produced by evangelical and protestant media in Brazil. She has hold fellowships at the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities and the Centre for Iberian and Latin American Visual Studies. Diane Winston holds the Knight Chair in Media and Religion at the Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism at the University of Southern California. Her recent work is on religion and the entertainment media and her current project explores religion, politics and the news. Xenia Zeiler  is associate professor of South Asian Studies at the University of Helsinki, Finland. Her research is situated at the intersection of digital media, religion and culture, with a focus on India and the worldwide Indian community. She is author of numerous articles and book chapters on digital and mediatized culture (including themes such as Digital Humanities, video games and gaming, digital Hinduism and journalism) and co-edited several volumes and special journal issues, including Journalism, Media and Religion: How News Media Ascribe Meanings to the Terms “Sacred”, “Secular” and “Authority” ( JRMDC 2018), Mediatized Religion in Asia (Routledge 2019) and Methods for Researching Video Games and Religion (Routledge 2018).

xv

Introduction

1 RELIGION AND JOURNALISM A global view Xenia Zeiler and Kerstin Radde-Antweiler

Religious topics and events are omnipresent today, not least due to media and media communication. However, this has been the case throughout the history of news media, as topics related to religion have always been part of journalistic discourses. Currently, they are extensively addressed in journalism worldwide and are integral parts of all existing journalistic genres, e.g., print newspapers, radio, television and Internet news. The prominence of religion in journalism, on both local and global levels, goes as far as themes related to religion dominating the news media reports at specific times: “By reporting, interpreting, commenting, judging, and relativizing, the media treat religion as one subject of many, and thus also contribute to the transformation of religion” (Gärtner, Gabriel and Reuter 2012, 16). For example, during the time of the coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2), newsmagazines and television news reported on the exceptional prayer Urbi et Orbi by the pope to a deserted St. Peter’s Square in Rome. The status of his health remains one of the important issues in journalistic media as well. We can observe that by reporting on specific religious figures, the journalistic press “unconsciously or not – reproduced the pope’s authority and the existing structure in the Roman Catholic Church” in the public discourse (Radde-Antweiler 2018b, 417). Furthermore, religious figures themselves are part of journalistic media, e.g., by producing press releases and using them for gaining influence in the public discourse (e.g., Zeiler 2018). Some religious traditions are taken up much more negatively than others; for example, Islam is very often connected to terrorism, violence and conflicts (e.g., Lundby et al. 2017, Seib 2017, Golan 2018). And in relation to rituals, we can observe that through extensive television broadcasts, people worldwide took part in religious rituals such as the funeral service of the death of Nelson Mandela or the wedding of Prince Harry and Meghan Markle (as well as their leaving Britain). The public controversy in newspapers, on television and on the Internet after political events such as the attacks of 11 September 2001 or the cartoon controversy in Denmark, gives reason to think about the importance of religion in society. While it is instantly visible that journalistic media do intensively report on religious traditions, it is important to note that these are presented and discussed in differing ways. While some religious traditions remain on the periphery of reporting in most parts of the news

3

Xenia Zeiler and Kerstin Radde-Antweiler

media, others figure not only prominently but are also discussed in specific ways. As Zeiler and Radde-Antweiler (2018, 262) stressed, [i]n some cases, these presentations become the basis for the image of entire national cultures, such as when certain arguments in the news media describe a “Christian West” which is allegedly being conquered by dangerous foreign religions such as Islam. In such instances, journalism actively contributes to the construction of mainstream perceptions of religious traditions. The research field of religion and media is quite a broad one, and the field of religion and journalism is a subfield with a focus on religion in and as related to journalistic media – and thus it must be understood differently from religion as media or media as religion. Whereas in the field of religion the media usage and production of all actors play an important role, in the journalistic field the focus is on selected persons such as journalists who report on religion or on religion as a topic in news coverage. However, in contrast to popular belief, journalists do not necessarily have an objective or a non-religious perspective. Journalist have their own biographical background and do not necessarily have to be non-religious persons (e.g., Gärtner, Gabriel and Reuter 2012, Underwood and Stamm 2001). Furthermore, in countries with laws having a strong base in religion the press can be heavily intertwined with religious elements (e.g., Mellor 2018, Steele 2011). In journalistic reporting, religion is a social and political issue that journalists often discuss from a certain perspective, e.g., in relation to politics, economy, society. Also, because of their often-commercial nature – that is, news has to be sold – religious topics, just like any other topic, are given most attention when they are connected to scandals, conflict and negativity. In addition, they have to compete with other news. One consequence of this is that the majority of news, in which religious topics play a role, presents religion in a specific way, often negative (e.g., Schielicke 2014). The representations of religious traditions, events or persons are thus usually closely linked to the cultural and religious-ideological conflicts of the respective time – see, e.g., the current pejorative representations of Islam. Additionally, journalism in times of deep mediatization (Hepp and “Communicative Figurations” research network 2017), in which everyday practices are deeply entangled with media, is changing dramatically. Digitalization and, connected to this, changing media environments especially influence journalistic organizations as well as individual journalists. A differentiation of media channels and platforms, which is a simultaneous consequence, fosters individualized media use. Today, journalistic content is produced, used and distributed via multiple platforms, and social media increasingly complement traditional mass media, thus expanding the communicative options between journalists and their audiences. These developments stimulate increased connectivity between journalists and their audiences and a seemingly omnipresence of recipients’ feedback and other audience contributions. At the same time, the changing media environments motivate the formation of new media organizations with newsroom(-like) structures and novel organizational models for journalistic production processes, in the shape of networks, collaborative projects, etc. Today, we are confronted with blurring boundaries in journalism. The research on religion and journalism so far has produced some important monographs and studies, most of which necessarily focus on case studies by highlighting certain topics or a specific religious tradition. Many of these discuss Christianity in regional contexts (e.g., Hoover 1998, Horsfield, Hess and Medrano 2004, Winston 2012, Knott, Poole and Taira 2014). Volumes with a broader and more global approach include Hoover and 4

Religion and journalism in global contexts

Emerich (2010), which maps emergent global practices and discourses of mediated, spiritualized social change, and Cohen (2018), which focuses on news reporting on religion in different countries. Also, research on journalism and religion so far has often been published in volumes centering more broadly on the intersection of media and religion (e.g., Stout and Buddenbaum 1996, Hoover and Lundby 1997, Hoover and Schofield Clark 2002, M itchell and Marriage 2003, Meyer and Moors 2005, Geybels, Mels and Walrave 2009, Stout 2010, Lynch and Mitchell 2012, Stolow 2012, Campbell 2013, Hjelm 2015). Research with a specific focus on journalism and religion include, e.g., Sumiala-Seppänen, Lundby and Salokangas (2006) and, more recently, Radde-Antweiler and Zeiler (2018) and Sumiala and Harju (2019) (for a general and more detailed research overview on religion and journalism, see Zeiler and Radde-Antweiler 2018, 262–264). In contrast to the existing studies, this handbook takes a far more inclusive approach, highlighting two new objectives in the study of religion and journalism above all: First, it clearly highlights the international, global developments, and second, it will include the practitioners’ ( journalists’) perspectives. Cohen (2018) already stressed the necessity of including different geographical contexts. Consequently, in this handbook, we present the major geographical and cultural settings in each section (North America, Europe, Latin and South America, Asia and Africa), so that each theme is discussed in case studies from the major world regions in order to present a truly global perspective. This handbook’s leading idea and approach is thus not only to provide a coherent and comprehensive overview of the currently existing research on religion and journalism but also to do so by applying an innovative structure which simultaneously emphasizes the current global developments in the field.

The structure and content of this handbook Chapters in this book follow a similar structure. In their opening parts, the individual chapters include definitions of the concepts used (such as religion, journalism and concepts or theories on the respective chapter’s topic) and overviews of the existing research discourse on religion, journalism and the specific topic. Journalism and religion are not ahistorical entities as such, but they are defined in quite different ways in different disciplines; hence it is necessary to discuss the exact definitions and approaches. Then, the chapters present one or two concrete case studies from an exemplifying world region. The chapters conclude with reflections on what the specifically discussed case studies may contribute to the broader study of the field of religion and journalism and with estimations of how the field will develop in the future and what challenges can be seen. They also provide three to five recommended readings for further reference. This handbook is organized into three sections. It begins with a section on inclusive themes relevant to all research on religion and journalism (such as theories and gender issues), proceeds to the main section which discusses major themes in global perspectives (such as power and authority and dialogue and peacebuilding) and concludes with a section highlighting meta processes and trends (such as globalization and digitalization), which are discussed from the perspective of one researcher and one journalist each. The volume opens with an introductory chapter contextualizing the theme of religion and journalism, introducing already-existing literature on the theme, and providing information on the handbook’s aim, structure and content. The first part, Theoretical reflections, deals with overarching issues and reflections that are valid for all research on religion and journalism, as well as for journalistic reporting. 5

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It contains four chapters from academics and journalists. Jolyon Mitchell and Sara Afshari in Reporting refugees: the theory and practice of developing journalistic religious literacy consider the importance of journalists becoming more religiously literate while also reflecting on how this could improve coverage of the refugee crisis. The authors elaborate a case for developing literacy among journalists, consider the obstacles to religious literacy and ways of overcoming these and conclude with discussing the implications not only for digital journalists but also for digital audiences. Henrik Reintoft Christensen in Religion and journalism under secularization draws on Robert Bellah’s theory of religion in human evolution to compare the features of modern post-enlightenment religion to the development of journalism. The author argues that today both traditional religion and traditional mainstream media have witnessed increasing competition and pluralization and that various religious and journalistic elites are working on appropriate ways to remain relevant and reclaim authority. The chapter examines mindful journalism as such an attempt. In this part’s third chapter on The role and function of journalism for religious organizations, Tim Hutchings seeks to attract new attention to the work done by religious organizations and entrepreneurs to find space in the news for positive representation of their messages and themselves. Common tactics include issuing press releases; building personal networks with media professionals; studying the needs, expectations and working patterns of journalists and raising objections to perceived media bias and misconduct. The author proposes a typology of six visions of journalism: three classic ideas from journalism studies (the watchdog, the lapdog and the guard dog) and three new ones of particular relevance to religion news (the puppy dog, the working dog and the hunting dog). To explore these six visions in practice, the chapter discusses three case studies of religious communicators based in the UK: a Christian press officer, a Christian bishop active on social media and a Muslim media monitor. Mia Lövheim, in Gender, religion and the press in Scandinavia, discusses gender as a theme in the coverage of religion in Scandinavian, particularly Swedish, newspapers. Freedom of the press has strong support in Scandinavian societies along with widespread recognition of the significant role of the media in democratic deliberation. At the same time, tensions between freedom of speech, freedom of religion and gender equality are salient in political and media debates. The chapter employs theories of representation, framing and mediatization to highlight dominant patterns and complexities that emerge in newspaper articles and to discuss why newspapers combine and contrast gender and religion in dealing with social, religious and political changes that have taken place over recent decades. The handbook’s main and largest section focuses on themes in global perspectives, discussing three key themes in religion and journalism: power and authority; conflict, radicalization and populism; and dialogue and peacebuilding. These themes and the chapters discussing them include topics that have already dominated the journalistic discourse on religion for a long time as well as topics that have more recently become increasingly relevant and covered. The three themes, arranged in three designated parts, are again presented and discussed in a standardized structure: They include global perspectives, explicitly also highlighting world regions which so far have been underrepresented in the study of religion and journalism. Each theme is analyzed in detail by applying selected case studies from the major world regions, generally in this order: North America with a focus on the USA, Europe, Latin and South America, Asia and Africa. Opening the part Power and authority, Diane Winston in Race, religion and the news: the Reagan administration and the fairness issue relies on US newspaper articles to examine the Reagan administration’s attitudes and policies on hunger and poverty. This lens provides the method and means to look at the relationship between religion, journalism and power in the late-twentieth-century USA. This particular case study highlights the political, 6

Religion and journalism in global contexts

economic and moral nexus of President Ronald Reagan’s ideology and its depiction in the news media. Teemu Taira in The negotiation of religious authorities in European journalism examines religion in European journalism, introduces three main theoretical approaches – mediatization of religion, publicization of religion and mediation of religion – and outlines their main differences relating to religious authorities and/in journalism. These theories and their various implications for thinking about authority in religion-related journalism are discussed in relation to case studies focusing on Great Britain and the Nordic Countries, particularly Finland. From good press to fake news: who’s got the word? Religion, authority and journalism in Brazil by Karina Kosicki Bellotti explores three aspects of the Brazilian religious scenario: the relationship between journalism, religion and authority; the impact of news coverage on religious dynamics; and the ways the mediatization of religion has influenced negotiations of religious authority and power. Brazil, the largest country in South America, is characterized by a pronounced religious diversity, deepened by the Evangelical increase in the past 40 years after three centuries of Catholic hegemony and the growth of religious minorities like Afro-Brazilian religions. The chapter provides two interconnected case studies: the news coverage of Evangelicals by the mainstream press in the 1990s, which instigated religious prejudice against Evangelicals, and the use of the press by Evangelical groups in the 2010s, during which their political engagement rose, fomenting intolerance against Afro-Brazilian religions and LGBTQ+ and feminist groups. Yoel Cohen in Asian mass media: a pillar of religious authority? discusses the extent to which the media in Asia legitimize or delegitimize religious leaders. The author argues that when compared to other non-religious sources of authority such as governmental officials and politicians in Asian countries, the level of trust in religious leaders is significantly higher. The chapter compares three contrasting cases: Islamic countries, where religious authority is given the most importance; India as one of the countries where it is given the least importance and Israel, an example of a country with a clear Jewish character, yet one that aspires to be mostly secular in orientation. The chapter concludes that in many Asian countries – notably Islamic ones – journalistic media, rather than challenging religious authority, have become a pillar strengthening it. Religion and journalism in Ghanaian news media by J. Kwabena Asamoah-Gyadu discusses Ghana’s religious landscape and her media terrain where religion and politics compete fiercely for journalistic attention. Archbishop Duncan-Williams’ (Action Chapel International) public prayer for resuscitating the dwindling fortunes of the country’s currency and Pastor Otabil’s (International Central Gospel Church) sermon to support an opposition stance on free higher education constitute two examples of the intersection between religion and the public sphere in Ghana that attracted the interest of journalists. The two developments serve as case studies illustrating the critical importance of the relationship between religious authority and journalism in a developing African economy such as Ghana. In the concluding chapter of this part, Katrien Pype in Religion, gender and news media in Africa addresses key themes in the study of gender, religion and news media in sub-Saharan Africa in relation to authority. The main argument is that women actively participate in the production and circulation of information, but we can only appreciate their contribution by taking a broader stance toward journalism. Understanding journalism as the collection of data and their contribution in narrative form to a public allows the integration of categories such as griottes (West Africa) and animatrices (Kinshasa’s digital sphere) as information brokers. Based on literature reviews and original ethnographic research, this chapter approaches these categories as female reporters, i.e., public figures, who disseminate newsworthy information. The analysis shows how these women mobilize religious beliefs, discourse and content in order to carry out their work, attract audiences and gain more authority. 7

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The third part, on Conflict, radicalization and populism, begins with the chapter Reporting the divided soul of the nation: religion and politics in American news media by D. Ashley Campbell. This chapter examines the relationship between religion and politics in the US news media and its participation in fueling and sustaining conflict. Building on past studies about religion, politics and journalism and using two case studies – the Evangelical vote in the 2016 election and the National Football League’s (NFL) #TakeAKnee protest – this chapter illuminates how some misconceptions about religion in the news media and the media’s overlooking of a particular marriage of religion and politics – American civil religion – lead to a lack of nuance in public discussions of socio-political issues in the USA. Ultimately, this chapter aims to demonstrate how a more historically contextualized and nuanced approach to reporting on religion within and beyond the God beat ensures that news media live up to their role in educating civic society for the benefit of democracy. Tanja Maier in Media visibility of religion and conflict in the digital age uses the European, and specifically the German, context to examine visual journalism, religion and conflict in the digital age. The chapter’s theoretical framework is based on media studies, visual communication, cultural studies and digital studies. Through a qualitative analysis of print magazines, the case study examines the changing conventions of visibility in religious conflicts within the context of digitalization and media. The chapter argues that the visibility of religious conflicts in the digital age requires new modes of visual media analysis that account for the aesthetics and form of (digitalized) images and discusses the changing relationship between visual journalism, religion and social reality. In Gender, religion and new medias in Latin America, Kelber Pereira Gonçalves discusses how new social movements such as the feminist and LGBTI movements have been breaking out and gaining visibility in public space in recent years, particularly in the journalistic media, thanks in part to social media in Latin America. The chapter analyzes how this visibility has led to major changes in public policies on gender equality and reproductive and sexual rights, drastically changing the relationships between genders and the family model inherited from Catholicism and founded on the Sagrada Família in the region. In some Latin American countries, these changes have prompted a response from conservative political and religious groups, creating moral panic in public and media space around the implantation of a gender ideology. Using the Brazilian context as a case study, the chapter maps out how gender is represented in the journalistic agenda and the role of mainstream media in creating moral panic. Priscila Vieira-Souza and Andréia Coutinho Louback in Shukura: gratitude, faith and the unlikely relationship between gender, religion and journalism in Brazil present a case study to address the intersection between religion, journalism, race and gender in Latin America. The authors discuss the narrative of a black, Brazilian and Catholic woman journalist who found in the feeling of gratitude a lifestyle and catalyst for her accomplishments. The chapter suggests the intersection between religion and journalism in Latin America as a fertile field for researchers when a conservative turn has jeopardized progressive policies on gender and race issues. Pradip Thomas in Journalism and the rise of Hindu extremism: reporting religion in a post-truth era explores the contexts of contemporary journalism in India that include threats to the very idea of secularism, the rise of majoritarian Hindu forces and the commodification of news. The chapter deals with the silences and the impunity that characterize contemporary attacks on journalists and journalism as a profession and highlights the systematic nature of online sectarianism against the background of rising intolerance. Using the example of the murder of journalist Gauri Lankesh, it highlights the systematic ways in which the Hindu Right has been able to construct both offline and online a manufactured majoritarian identity that is based on selective interpretations of history. This turn toward insularity is, however, not found just in the majority religion but also in minority religions such as Christianity. The 8

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chapter also points toward critical media outlets that perform an invaluable role in exposing sectarian thinking and its consequences and putting forward democratic alternatives. In the section’s last chapter on Radical others and ethical selves: religion in African journalism, Jennifer Hasty discusses religion as a pervasive element of news media in African societies. Religious issues are constant topics of news coverage and commentary while religious values shape the professional practices of news gathering and news writing. The chapter gives an overview of African journalism, highlighting its religious aspects, and pursues two case studies on the intersection of religion and journalism: the representation of Boko Haram in Nigeria and the representation of Islamic communities in Ghana. The fourth part, Dialogue and peacebuilding, opens with the chapter Ethics, religion and journalism in the USA: their roles within political dialogue and the peacemaking process by Doug Underwood. This chapter examines the historical fusion – and modern separation – of religious belief and ethical values and its impact upon US journalists’ participation in the global dialogue and peacemaking process. Research shows that young people have contributed to a rapid rise of US Americans with no religious affiliation; that US American journalists – while more open to religion than their critics believe – are substantially less religious than their audience; and that journalists draw from secular more than religious values in their ethical and professional practices. Anna Piela in Peace- versus conflict-journalism in Poland: representation of Islam, Muslims and refugees by progressive and right-wing Polish media illustrates how different Polish media organizations report on Islamophobic and xenophobic incidents in Poland. With a gradual takeover of state media by members of the ruling Law and Justice party, the coverage of Muslims, members of other minority religions and refugees has become prejudiced. It is fueled by stereotypes adapted from Western European countries with larger Muslim populations; as Poland has only a small Muslim minority, these attitudes have been described in the literature as platonic Islamophobia. The chapter argues that this approach is imbued with many qualities of conflict journalism. Taking the 2017 Independence March in Warsaw as a case study, it demonstrates how the supposedly neutral state media failed to cover widespread xenophobic behavior of some participants, while focusing on praise for the organizers issued by Law and Justice dignitaries. The chapter also analyzes positive coverage of Muslims and/or refugees, as well as people who welcome them in Poland, as an example of peace journalism. In Journalism, religious intolerance and violence in Brazil, Magali do Nascimento Cunha offers a study on the relationship between media, intolerance and religious violence. The chapter takes a report that is the result of a survey promoted by the Human Rights Ministry of the Brazilian Government including data of national scope from October 2011 to December 2015 as a case study. The chapter analyzes elements contained in the report, with attention to two elements directly related to journalism: (1) the low incidence of news about religious intolerance and violence; and (2) trends in news production (editorial line). Wai-Yip Ho in Reporting religions with Chinese characteristics: sinicizing religious faith, securitizing news media argues that China has launched a campaign of Sinicization of religion and tightened the security measures on the usage of social media in the domain of religious dissemination and activity. In particular, Islam and Christianity are targeted as foreign threats to the sovereign power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This chapter argues that the contrast between the foreign journalists and state-run media covering religion in China indicates that the global rise of China does not lead to a path of Western liberalism, secularization and a free press. It concludes that China’s emerging trend of securitizing media and co-opting religion are the consequence of a stateled national campaign of Sinicization and that the deprivation of a free press and lack of citizen journalism explains why journalism could not play a strong mediating role in dialogue 9

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and peacebuilding regarding religion in China. This section of the handbook ends with the chapter by Joram Tarusarira and Admire Mare, Religious peacebuilding in Zimbabwe: the role of the printing press, which focuses on how a specific religious organization, the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance, whose interest is in pursuing broader political objectives, has used the print media in pursuing peacebuilding. The chapter describes and analyzes the differences and alliances built or broken between the different religious groups and political actors in Zimbabwe with respect to peacebuilding. As Zimbabwe is not religiously monolithic, regarding peacebuilding different religious actors have promoted or undermined peace and reconciliation via various media including print media. This is influenced by socioeconomic and political objectives at a particular given time. The last part of the handbook, part 5, Trends, builds on the understanding that especially in recent times and with changing media environments, the relation between religion and journalism has changed extensively. The different articles in this section refer specifically to these increasingly significant aspects, namely to differentiation, globalization and datafication. Today, in times of deep mediatization, journalism (as well as other fields in society) is confronted with media-related changes such as an increasing interconnectivity, a growing omnipresence and a rapid pace of innovation (Hepp and Hasebrink 2017). “Furthermore, in times of deep mediatization, actors and society as such are confronted with specific trends such as differentiation, increasing connectivity, media’s growing omnipresence, rapid pace of innovation and datafication” (Radde-Antweiler 2018a, 216; for the trends and consequences in general, see Hepp and “Communicative Figurations” research network 2017, 12–14). As this section deals with trends, which are not mere theoretical concepts but which also have practical consequences especially for journalists, each trend will be discussed by both, a researcher and a journalist. On differentiation, Johanna M. Sumiala provides her academic perspective on (De-)Differentiation and religion in digital news. The chapter explains how differentiation impacts religion by undermining its significance as a news topic and how it also affects reporting on religion by placing emphasis on the type of religion that fits the news criteria, resulting, for example, in an increase in reporting on Islam, which can be called the Islamification of religion in the news. The chapter applies an empirical study of the Charlie Hebdo attacks and the coverage of Islam in digital news to complement theoretical analysis of differentiation. In conclusion, the chapter argues for a process of dedifferentiation of digital news on religion, and consequently, a hybridization of the public presence of religion in today’s digitally saturated public sphere. Complementing the academic perspective with her journalistic perspective, Joyce Smith in Differentiation: when more sometimes means less argues that while audiences have never had so many ways in which to access news about religion, this range of platforms and technologies does not necessarily result in a commensurate increase in coverage. With special attention to the Canadian experience, this chapter examines the challenges to good reporting on religion in a differentiated market at a time when religion itself continues to evolve as a concept. The potential for news reporting to interact with and in part to influence religious behaviors and groups in an age of technological differentiation is posited. The theme globalization opens with the chapter Globalization as a trend for journalism: researchers’ perspectives by Liane Rothenberger and Cornelius B. Pratt. It avers that the coexistence of journalism and religious practices and institutions on a global landscape can best be understood by discerning three societal levels: micro, that is, the journalist as an individual key player in the global realm; meso, that is, the news media as institutional and organizational influencers and macro, that is, political, economic, cultural and scientific systems. 10

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In presenting two case studies that deal with the mutual interactions of religion and journalism, this chapter argues that both are converging and are constructing and shaping the identities of individuals, societies and institutions as interrelated, transnational and global agencies. It notes that journalism’s influence has been paradoxical, whereas religious media are a force for building congregations and for projecting a culture of religious adherences. Paul Chaffee in Religion and journalism in a globalized world: a journalist’s perspective asks: What does it mean to be a religion journalist in an increasingly globalized world? What constitutes religious or spiritual news, how is it packaged and circulated, and for whom? How have interfaith and intrafaith issues been changing religion and news about religion in the world? These questions, so the author argues, should tantalize anyone who writes about religion or wants to. The chapter considers the global influence of two new tools, the computer and the World Wide Web, and profiles two interfaith projects and how they handle news about religion – United Religions Initiative (URI) and The Interfaith Observer (TIO). The handbook’s last theme, datafication, includes chapters by Pauline Hope Cheong and Andreas Mattsson. In Religious datafication: platforms, practices and power, Pauline Hope Cheong provides an overview of datafication in light of the exponential growth of data in the global Internet of Things and advances three key points related to the development of big data and religion with implications for religious storytelling and journalism. The chapter argues that first, although data has recently surfaced as a prominent term and asset, the impulses to archive, categorize and assess based on data have historical parallels. Second, new technologies have facilitated new forms of datafication, constituted by innovative practices in varied contexts. Third, religious datafication is complex, requiring attention to interpretation and context of digital corpora as data processing algorithms are relational and contingent. This chapter proposes that in spite of its celestial affiliations, religious data is not pure. The emerging contours of bigger data sets and flows contribute insights into the dialectics of digital religion as they intertwine with emergent tensions in the contested areas of religious identity, authority and community. Datafication as a trend for journalism: a journalist’s perspective by Andreas Mattsson discusses, from a journalistic perspective, how the set of skills and the daily work in the newsroom have changed the journalist’s profession where traditional values might still be present but are challenged by how data is received, constructed and analyzed. This impacts how journalism is being produced: data contributes to the reporting and provides opportunities for how to conduct research and present the material; simultaneously, data also generates new ways of developing business models for the media industry. In the professional shift that is juxtaposed with the digital transition, this development creates new editorial positions that have led to a redesign of the actual newsrooms. The author builds on his observations as a journalist and journalism teacher to explore and examine what the datafication of journalism means for the individual journalist who executes the digital transition in the newsroom. Overall, this handbook presents a broad range of topics and case studies. It especially highlights global developments including both international and national contexts. Additionally, as one of this handbook’s aims is to address readers from various fields (such as academics but also journalists as the main actors in this field), this volume specifically includes the perspectives of the people actually producing the news on religion. Their discussions thus highlight the practitioners’ perspective in addition to the academics’ perspective. Bringing this work together into one coherent handbook will also allow for interdisciplinary reflection and interaction between Religious Studies, Theology, Communication and Media Studies (and adjoining disciplines such as Sociology) as well as journalists that can help map out future research agendas and implications in the study of and reporting on religion and journalism. 11

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References Campbell, H., ed., 2013. Digital Religion: Understanding Religious Practice in New Media Worlds. London: Routledge. Cohen, Y., ed., 2018. Spiritual News: Reporting Religion around the World. New York: Peter Lang. Gärtner, C., Gabriel, K. and Reuter, H.-R., 2012. Religion bei Meinungsmachern: eine Untersuchung bei Elitejournalisten in Deutschland. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. Geybels, H., Mels, S. and Walrave, M., eds., 2009. Faith and Media: Analysis of Faith and Media: Representation and Communication. Bruxelles: PIE Lang. Golan, O., 2018. Fundamentalist Web Journalism: Walking a Fine Line between Religious UltraOrthodoxy and the New Media Ethos. European Journal of Communication, 33(3), 304–320. Hepp, A. and “Communicative Figurations” Research Network, 2017. Transforming Communications. Media-Related Changes in Times of Deep Mediatization. Communicative Figurations Working Paper, 16. Available at www.kofi.uni-bremen.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Arbeitspapiere/CoFi_EWP_ Hepp-Research-Network.pdf, accessed 1 June 2017. Hepp, A. and Hasebrink, U., 2017. Kommunikative Figurationen. Ein konzeptioneller Rahmen zur Erforschung kommunikativer Konstruktionsprozesse in Zeiten tiefgreifender Mediatisierung. M&K Medien & Kommunikationswissenschaft, 65(2), 330–347. Hjelm, T., ed., 2015. Is God Back? Reconsidering the New Visibility of Religion. London: Bloomsbury. Hoover, S. M., 1998. Religion in the News: Faith and Journalism in American Public Discourse. Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: SAGE. Hoover, S. M. and Lundby, K., eds., 1997. Rethinking Media, Religion, and Culture. Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: SAGE. Hoover, S. M. and Schofield Clark, L., eds., 2002. Practicing Religion in the Age of the Media: Explorations in Media, Religion, and Culture. New York: Columbia University Press. Hoover, S. M. and Emerich, M. M., eds., 2010. Media, Spiritualities and Social Change. London, New York: Continuum. Horsfield, P., Hess, M. E. and Medrano, A. M., eds., 2004. Belief in Media: Cultural Perspectives on Media and Christianity. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. Knott, K., Poole, E. and Taira, T., 2014. Media Portrayals of Religion and the Secular Sacred: Representation and Change. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. Lundby, K., Hjarvard, S., Lövheim, M. and Jernsletten, H., 2017. Religion between Politics and Media: Conflicting Attitudes to Islam in Scandinavia. Journal of Religion in Europe, 10(4), 437–456. Lynch, G. and Mitchell, J. P., eds., 2012. Religion, Media, and Culture: A Reader. London: Routledge. Mellor, N., 2018. Religious Ideologies and News Ethics: The Case of Saudi Arabia. In: Cohen, Y., ed. Spiritual News: Reporting Religion around the World. New York: Lang, 267–281. Meyer, B. and Moors, A., eds., 2005. Religion, Media, and the Public Sphere. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Mitchell, J. and Marriage, S., eds., 2003. Mediating Religion: Conversations in Media, Religion and Culture. Edinburgh: T&T Clark. Radde-Antweiler, K., 2018a. Religion as Communicative Figurations. Analyzing Religion in Times of Deep Mediatization. In: Radde-Antweiler, K. and Zeiler, X., eds. Mediatized Religion in Asia: Studies on Digital Media and Religion. London: Routledge, 211–223. Radde-Antweiler, K., 2018b. The Papal Election in the Philippines: Negotiating Religious Authority in Newspapers. In: Radde-Antweiler, K. and Zeiler, X., eds. Special Issue on Journalism, Media and Religion. Journal of Religion, Media and Digital Culture, 7(3), 400–421. Schielicke, A.-M., 2014. Rückkehr der Religion in den öffentlichen Raum? Kirche und Religion in der deutschen Tagespresse von 1993 bis 2009. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. Seib, P., 2017. As Terrorism Evolves: Media, Religion, and Governance. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. Steele, J., 2011. Justice and Journalism: Islam and Journalistic Values in Indonesia and Malaysia. Journalism, 12(5), 533–549. Stolow, D., ed., 2012. Deus in Machina: Religion, Technology, and the Things in Between. New York: Fordham University Press. Stout, D. A. and Buddenbaum, J. M., eds., 1996. Religion and Mass Media: Audiences and Adaptations. Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: SAGE.

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Religion and journalism in global contexts Stout, D. A., ed., 2010. The Routledge Encyclopedia of Religion, Communication, and Media. New York: Routledge. Sumiala, J. and Harju, A. A., 2019. “No More Apologies”: Violence as a Trigger for Public Controversy over Islam in the Digital Public Sphere. Journal of Religion, Media and Digital Culture, 8(1), 132–152. Sumiala-Seppänen, J., Lundby, K. and Salokangas, R., eds., 2006. Implications of the Sacred in (post) modern Media. Göteborg: Nordicom. Underwood, D. and Stamm, K., 2001. Are Journalists Really Irreligious? A Multidimensional Analysis. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 78(4), 771–786. Winston, D. H., ed., 2012. The Oxford Handbook of Religion and the American News Media. New York: Oxford University Press. Zeiler, X., 2018. Digital Journalistic Uses of the Terms “Sacred” and “Trivial”: Online Press Releases on Portrayals of Hindu Deities in the USA. In: Radde-Antweiler, K. and Zeiler, X., eds., Special Issue on Journalism, Media and Religion. Journal of Religion, Media and Digital Culture, 7(3), 300–319. Zeiler, X. and Radde-Antweiler, K., 2018. Introduction to the Special Issue on Journalism, Media and Religion: How News Media Ascribe Meanings to the Terms “Sacred”, “Secular” and “Authority.” In: Radde-Antweiler, K. and Zeiler, X., eds. Special Issue on Journalism, Media and Religion. Journal of Religion, Media and Digital Culture, 7(3), 261–268.

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PART 1

Theoretical reflections

2 REPORTING REFUGEES The theory and practice of developing journalistic religious literacy Jolyon Mitchell and Sara Afshari

Introduction Asal was born just 47 minutes into 2018, so she was named “Vienna’s New Year Baby of the Year” (Eddy 2018). She was born to refugee Muslim parents, Naime and Alper Tamga. Following local popular tradition in certain parts of Austria, Asel’s photo with her proud parents was published on their New Year Baby’s Facebook page. This also attracted the attention of local media. Instead of good wishes, however, the newborn Asal and her family were greeted with a wave of racist comments, vicious posts and online polemical hate speech. One example out of dozens reflects a repeated refrain: “Deport the scum immediately” (Young-Powell 2018). As a result of such abuse their Facebook page was taken down. Several English language newspapers, such as The New York Times, The Telegraph and The Daily Mail, reported these digital attacks. In Britain, The Telegraph also highlighted how the Austrian President was forced to intervene (Young-Powell 2018). Their religion (Islam) and the fact that they were refugees were described as the main causes of this digital vitriol. Several news reports presented the voices and concerns of anti-migrants, especially far-right groups, alongside those who were arguing for the importance of welcoming migrants. The voices of refugees themselves were completely left out. They were instead commonly presented as outsiders and even dangerous intruders. This example of reporting about anti-refugee rhetoric overlooks a far larger challenge. In 2018, there were over 65 million people forcibly displaced worldwide, including over 22 million refugees from the Middle East and North Africa.1 Many of these people, hoping for sanctuary, a new start and a new home, have experienced far from warm welcomes in countries that they have travelled through or arrived in. At the same time, there are also around 10 million stateless people, who are “denied a nationality and access to basic rights such as education, healthcare, employment and freedom of movement” (UNHCR 2018). Some 55% of refugees come from three countries: Syria (5.5 million), Afghanistan (2.5 million) and South Sudan (1.4 million) (UNHCR 2018). Each of these three nations is experiencing (or has experienced) different kinds of civil war, which have exacerbated forced (Anon 2017) or voluntary migration: with individuals, families and even entire communities leaving the nations of their birth or residence. In spite of such observations and human loss some NGOs speak of a “conspiracy of neglect” (Amnesty International 2015). Over 5,000 migrants and 17

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refugees drowned as they attempted to cross the Mediterranean in 2016, on average over 14 people each day (Anon 2016). Behind these statistics of migration are countless stories of individual lives and divided families. One of the most poignant stories was made unforgettable by the photographs that circulated of a tiny Syrian boy, with red t-shirt and blue shorts, lying on a beach, head down in the surf. Several pictures showed a Turkish policeman looking down at this tiny lifeless figure, another showed the policeman tenderly carrying the lifeless body away. Some described this like a modern pieta (Mitchell and Rey 2016). Aylan Kurdi’s family, his father, mother and his five-year-old brother were trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea from Turkey to the Greek Island of Kos on an inflatable boat in search of safety and a peaceful life. The boat capsized and many refugees drowned. Three-year old Aylan, his five-year-old brother and his mother were among them, though his father, Abdullah, survived. The sea washed some of the bodies up onto the shore, among them the body of Aylan Kurdi. A Turkish photo-journalist, Nilufer Demir, took a series of photographs including the iconic image of the body of Aylan Kurdi. It became a symbolic representation of the effects of the ongoing violence in Syria, unsuccessful journeys fleeing from this violence toward peace and security, as well as the breaking of fragile human bodies and dignity. Turkish news media like other mainstream media initially refused to publish the photos, therefore the news first appeared on Twitter without being linked to any news source. The images soon went viral, with many claiming that it brought distant suffering close, effectively bringing the refugee crisis to life by showing a single death. Some claimed that this series of photos of Aylan led to some refugee policies being changed and some charitable giving temporarily being increased (see Mitchell and Rey 2016).

The need for religious literacy These two stories, a new baby provoking vilification and a dead toddler provoking grief, illustrate contrasting responses to and coverage of the refugee crisis. While neither story speaks of welcome, they do both raise questions regarding how stories about refugees are covered and responded to, as well as the religious and ethical implications of such coverage. During the huge influx of the Middle Eastern and North African refugees and migrants into Europe, especially since 2015, a wide range of different media have played a significant role in reporting and framing their journeys and arrivals. While covering their journey from their homes and then across different European countries, reporting on the policy changes and attitudes of policymakers as well as concerns of European citizens toward the newcomers, the news media in the UK and beyond initially provided very little detailed information about who these new arrivals were and why they came (Chouliaraki and Stolic 2017). Many of the reports have reported and reflected negative attitudes toward refugees and migrants (Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017). There were three recurring concerns: First, the refugees were represented as strangers, foreigners, about whom little was known; second, they were often depicted as scroungers or criminals; third, they are sometimes portrayed as dangerous Muslims, therefore many were likely to be terrorists (Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017). There are some counter examples of more positive reporting, where refugees and migrants were presented as vulnerable people who need to be spoken with, understood and then spoken for. Nevertheless, even the more sympathetic depictions portrayed them as silent actors, who could also be a threat to Western values and potentially dangerous (Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017), rather than as people who might bring skills, expertise and wisdom that could contribute to our society and our economy. This phenomenon raises critical questions such as: What prevented many 18

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journalists from including the voices of the refugees and migrants in their stories? Why were their religious traditions, beliefs and practices commonly represented so superficially or negatively? How should the part played by religion in the refugee crisis be covered? Answering such questions can provoke highly critical accounts of the journalistic coverage of the refugee crisis and of related stories about the part played by religion. It is striking how religion can either be entirely overlooked and ignored or stereotyped and caricatured in stories about the influx of refugees (Philo, Briant and Donald 2013). The same is true in relation to other news stories in which religion plays a significant role. Some scholars, such as Paul Marshall, Lela Gilbert and Roberta Green-Ahmanson (2009), writing before the current refugee crisis, have argued that many journalists have a blind spot when it comes to covering religion and can also be understandably hesitant in covering unknown territories or unknown areas of expertise. This approach is representative of those scholars who focus on the inadequacies of journalists’ coverage of religion. Not all voices are so critical. “Over the last three decades the coverage of religious news,” according to Gower and Mitchell (2012, 1), “has radically changed” as “religion is no longer” seen by many journalists as “a ‘soft’ story.” They argue that religious topics and issues “pervade the reporting of many stories related to domestic politics and foreign affairs alike” (Gower and Mitchell 2012, 1). Like other scholars before them (Hoover 2006, Zelizer and Allan 2011) they cite coverage of “the terrorist attacks in Western cities such as New York (11 September 2001), Madrid (11 March 2004) and London (7 July 2005), as well as the invasions of Afghanistan (from October 2001) and Iraq (from March 2003),” as evidence that “religion has increasingly broken into mainstream Western news agendas” (Gower and Mitchell 2012, 1). Gower and Mitchell also observe that others claim that “this process began even earlier with the Iranian Revolution (1979), the global performances of a media friendly Pope, John Paul II (1978–2005), and the rise of the religious right in the USA (from the late 1970s)” (Gower and Mitchell 2012, 1). Along with scholars such as Stewart Hoover (1998 and 2012), they go on to argue that the “cumulative result is that religion is less commonly marginalised, and is sometimes used as an interpretative key for making sense of many news stories” (Gower and Mitchell 2012, 1). Nevertheless, in the case of covering the refugee story from the Middle East and North Africa, some western journalists portray refugees as coming from an unknown or feared religious traditions, as well as relatively unknown territories (Chouliaraki 2017). Moreover, some journalists appear to have reflected public anxieties and confusion about the Islamic religion (Matar 2017, Kumar 2018). Arguably, ignorance or suspicion about what is currently the world’s second largest religious tradition, as well as blurring between refugees and migrants, has contributed to some negative or superficial reporting of this ongoing story in Europe and beyond. News stories about refugees are one among many possible examples of where coverage of the religious dimension could be further improved. A number of other scholars and commentators have emphasized that religion is an important element in many of today’s news stories (e.g., Religion and Media Centre n.d.), encouraging journalists to take religion far more seriously and to report religion and religious minority groups more accurately. To do so, it has been implied explicitly and implicitly through a number of different studies that many journalists would do well to deepen their understandings of the religious dimensions of both local and global international stories (Marshall, Gilbert and Green-Ahmanson 2009, Hoover 2012, Mitchell 2012, Al-Azami 2016). The improvement of journalistic religious literacy does matter for a number of reasons, including the sensitive nature of many religious aspects of news stories, the friction between certain religious communities and the tendency 19

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for misunderstanding of religious traditions, beliefs and practices. Precisely what is meant by religious literacy is also an area of debate (Hoover 2012, Mitchell and Gower 2012, Dinham and Francis 2015). For the purposes of this discussion, we follow Diane Moore’s definition, which was also accepted by the American Academy of Religion: Religious literacy entails the ability to discern and analyze the fundamental intersections of religion and social/political/cultural life through multiple lenses. Specifically, a religiously literate person will possess 1) a basic understanding of the history, central texts (where applicable), beliefs, practices and contemporary manifestations of several of the world’s religious traditions as they arose out of and continue to be shaped by particular social, historical and cultural contexts; and 2) the ability to discern and explore the religious dimensions of political, social and cultural expressions across time and place. (Moore 2007, 56–57) A religiously literate account of the contemporary refugee crisis will therefore bear in mind the pertinent historical texts, beliefs, practices, as well as relevant social, historical and cultural contexts. Increased religious literacy among journalists has the potential to enrich understanding of what lies behind the rapid growth in the number of refugees, especially since 2015, which caught many in Europe and beyond by surprise. Many journalists covered the rapidly evolving events through numerous stories of refugees attempting to journey across the Mediterranean Sea into European countries. Overladen boats, capsizing dinghies and failing life jackets were regularly represented but the refugees remained largely unknown. The refugees often became like objects, as they were rarely properly introduced as people. As suggested earlier, their voices as human beings were absent from the vast majority of media reports. So too were their religious beliefs. What was portrayed was either their vulnerability or the threat they might pose to European security and culture. Religion was commonly left out of the frame. For a brief moment, after the lifeless body of two-year-old Aylan Kurdi lying on a beach went viral, many news reports showed more sympathy toward refugee cases, even if religious practices and beliefs were understandably ignored (El-Enany 2016). This did not last long as new, even more dramatic stories replaced these memorable images. For example, the November 2015 Paris attacks further strengthened the negative image of many refugees, with a link to their religion, Islam. Arguably such negative reporting contributed to heightened anxiety and fear in such a way that it may have contributed to the increase in Islamophobia and hatred against refugees within Europe and elsewhere. There is already a notable body of research into the relationship between religion, journalism and the news emerging out of North America (see, for example, Silk 1995, Buddenbaum 1998, Hoover 1998, Winston 2012, 2013). This stands in contrast to books by academics and journalists in Europe that commonly tend either to overlook religion or to deal with it in a largely superficial fashion (see, for example, Tumber 1999, Marr 2004). This is slowly changing in Europe and other parts of the world, especially following the rapidly increased interest in the place of Islam relating to a range of dramatic news stories (see, for example, Moore, Mason and Lewis 2008, Lynch 2008, 163–182). Both our chapter and the rest of this book contribute to these developing discussions around the world. Our intention in this chapter is to consider the value of journalists becoming more religiously literate, while also reflecting on how this could improve coverage of the refugee crisis. Understanding the role that religion plays not only in refugees’ lives but also in why some people leave their homes, why others drive them away and why some give considerable 20

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time and money to welcome strangers would enrich interpretation of forced migrations. It might even dissipate some feelings of fear. Limited or superficial coverage of these issues can heighten anxieties, accentuate complexities and difficulties, as well as misinterpret different religions’ roles in contributing to or alleviating suffering. In the sections that follow, both theories and practices will be discussed, particularly in order to consider how religious literacy among journalists, news reports and audiences can be developed and improved.

Developing religious literacy among journalists Given the growing recognition of the significant and complex role of religion in many major news stories, it is not surprising that over the last two decades, increasing numbers of journalists, broadcasters and editors have recognized the importance of developing greater religious literacy in order to produce more balanced, accurate and insightful coverage (Marshall, Gilbert and Green-Ahmanson 2009). In an extensive report on religion and ethics coverage in 2017, the BBC admitted that “there is more we can do to increase levels of religious literacy within our teams” (BBC 2017, 26). In order to develop religious literacy in the BBC, they propose more work in at least three areas. First, to improve training at all levels (including on journalism foundation and leadership courses), as well as “online training in religious literacy” (BBC 2017). Second, to establish “ongoing cycle of briefings with external figures from religious and secular groups talking to relevant BBC teams on a particular theme” (BBC 2017). Third, to create “an audience portal that brings together audience data, qualitative and quantitative surveys, and external material to inform creative decision-making” (BBC 2017, 26). It is striking how little emphasis there is upon experiential learning and discovering the reality of lived religions. The success of such proposals will take some time to evaluate, especially because it is one thing to produce a report, it is another to implement the recommended actions. It is also a complex task to measure any increases in religious literacy in broadcasts, news reports and among journalists. Nevertheless, this is a vital task that applies to both journalists and audiences, as the “risk is that people remain locked in their own filter bubbles and fail to understand other beliefs beyond their own” (BBC 2017, 26). Filter bubbles, or as they are more commonly known, echo chambers, can feel like safe places to live and to interpret the world from, but they can close down conversations and reduce empathy with those living beyond known spaces. More religiously literate journalists can contribute to more religiously literate audiences and vice versa. Developing religious literacy is easier said than done, as religion is a broad and oftencontested realm, meaning different things to different people. Superficial forms of religious literacy may not be enough for journalists who report events or represent religion in their news reports, because religious belief and practice are enormously diverse. One danger of attempts to represent religion is to turn a particular religious belief or practice into a recurring global or universal pattern, to assume that one representative of a religious tradition acts or speaks on behalf of that entire religion. For as situations change so does the interpretation and the practice of religion, as Al Azmeh emphasizes: “there are as many Islams as there are situations that sustain it” (Al-Azmeh 1993). Over time, and in different places, as practice changes, religious meaning and interpretations change too. These are living, evolving traditions. Therefore, a religiously literate journalist is better equipped to serve as an interpreter of fragmented, evolving and diverse religious traditions. Religious literacy will enable a journalist to give better coverage of the particular religious experiences and memories of a refugee from Iraq, for example, and the similarities and differences of a refugee from Syria or Afghanistan. Furthermore, others such as Moore (2007) and Dinham and Francis (2015) argue that religious literacy ensures that persons are treated not as objects of news stories but as subjects 21

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in their own right. In order to present them as subjects, the journalist needs to consider realistic ways of building a relationship with them involving dialogue and discussion, not simply for the purpose of building networks, exchanging knowledge, discovering facts, but for a deeper and meaningful insight into the subject’s world. This issue becomes even more vital given that refugees come from different religious, cultural and linguistic backgrounds. Foreign territory may become more familiar through meaningful conversations, but this will inevitably take time. Time is a commodity that is commonly in short supply in journalistic settings. Nevertheless, in spite of what Philip Schlesinger (1987, 105) memorably described as the “stop-watch culture” of news, it is noteworthy that several media organizations (not just the BBC, but also organizations such as Google and Reuters) are developing courses on religious literacy, to provide journalists with some knowledge about different religious traditions and practices. This input aims not only to educate journalists about central beliefs and core practices, but also to prepare journalists to listen carefully, in order to be able to cover complicated stories, controversial subjects and unfamiliar territories. Alongside a pedagogic approach is a conversational approach for developing religious literacy among journalists. Proposed by a number of practitioners, this approach includes several elements; first, a journalist will enter into a dialogue with the marginalized people whose stories they are covering. In this dialogue the journalist’s task will be not only to add to their existing knowledge and understanding of the subject’s situation, but also to reflect critically upon their own pre-existing knowledge, their unconscious bias, through relationship and conversation with their subject. Second, as time permits, journalists can be in continuous conversation and negotiation with the information they receive, through experimenting, negotiating and even resisting dominant patterns of explanation: experimenting with new methods of interpretation, negotiating with different sources of meaning and resisting obvious or clichéd readings of an event. A conversational model allows for a multidimensional analysis of a religious news event and will include the voices of marginalized people. Closely related to pedagogic and conversational approaches to developing journalistic religious literacy are further related skills, which can be described as different aspects of experiential approaches: first, noted earlier, the skill of listening carefully to individual’s stories, second the skill of observing the impact of conflicts, chronic degradations and spectacular events upon religious practices and beliefs. For example, in the wake of recent Middle Eastern and North African conflicts, violence and wars, journalists have observed millions having to flee their homes and seek refugee status in both neighboring and distant countries. Many journalists have visited refugee camps or landing sites for refugee boats. These experiences have had a personal impact upon those covering this story (Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017). As people move, different religious traditions and beliefs have been brought into contact with others, further complicating the evolving religious landscape. Listening to, observing and participating first hand in these experiences can be a source of experiential learning, and even trauma, for both professional and amateur journalists. Up to this point, we have argued for the value of pedagogical, conversational and experiential forms of developing religious literacy. As a result of these and other forms of educative processes, journalists are beginning to understand that in order to describe any stories of Muslim, Christian, Yazidi or other refugees, in Europe, one needs, from religious, cultural and political points of view, to go beyond the borders of Europe and the Mediterranean Sea into the Middle East and North Africa, where religion plays a complex role in the ongoing conflicts and civil wars. With the rise of Islamic extremism, the recurring conflicts apparently related to religion and the massive migrations into Europe and other parts of world, religion has become a crucial factor in understanding these situations, not only socially and 22

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politically but also in the day-to-day ordinary lives of people (Williams 2012). There is a growing recognition that many news stories have a religious element. For example, this can be seen when considering stories about the likes of Aylan Kurdi, the reporting of the terrorist attacks in Paris, London and Brussels, as well as the uses of photographs of oceans of flowers and candles, paying tribute to the victims of such attacks, alongside coverage of the apparent rise of far-right groups. Arguably, these all are linked in different ways both to religious discourses and the ever-changing refugee crisis.

Identifying obstacles to religious literacy among journalists There are some obvious difficulties raised by attempting to develop religious literacy among journalists. These include time and money. Training costs both time and resources. Of course, misunderstanding or misreporting the religious element of major stories can be even more costly in the long term. Less obvious but equally significant obstacles include audience expectations, complex networks, pressurized environments, communicative contexts and journalists’ existing worldviews. Besides, the audience’s expectations are also the influences of audience’s beliefs and anxieties. While audiences can contribute to journalistic content, journalists’ own beliefs and anxieties can also influence the outcome of the news. For example, after the November Paris attacks more than half of the press articles and news of the period projected fear and negative views relating to refugees: Refugees were the most voiceless ones and appeared to be blamed – perpetuating stereotypes (Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017). If journalists primarily listen to native European audiences, who are often anxious about refugees being in their communities, then their fears and concerns may get reiterated in news stories (Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017). These are commonly related to fear of the unknown: Who are these people, what is their history, their culture, their religion, why do they want to come here or why are they here? In response to such questions, the journalist may well create stories that mirror and even heighten audience concerns. The largely negative portrayal of refugees in both terrestrial and digital media and especially their perceived links to religious extremism may further increase anxiety (Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017). Much media coverage has tended to emphasize the potential threat that refugees bring to European security and cultural values, rather than emphasizing on the exceptional benefit that many young refugees may bring to the economy of an ageing European population (Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017). As audiences become more concerned, it seems, some journalists reflect their concerns uncritically, which in turn might contribute to heightened anxiety. In this way, a communicative vicious circle may develop, and religious literacy is perceived as an unnecessary skill to develop. A related obstacle to journalists developing religious literacy is the complex networks of relations and the communicative contexts that reporters inhabit and work amidst. News stories, such as those about the influx of refugees, are produced in complex cultural and social contexts as well as pressurized professional, political and economic settings. This inevitably affects how journalists are inculturated and trained, as well as how they cover news stories. In The Language of News Roger Fowler claims that: News is not a natural phenomenon emerging from “reality,” but a product. It is produced by an industry, shaped by the bureaucratic and economic structure of that industry, the relations between the media and other industries and, most importantly, by relations with government and with other political organisations. (Fowler 1991, 222) 23

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All these factors contribute to the coverage of the many layers of the refugee crisis in Europe and beyond. This also adds to the complexity of the relationships between religion, journalists and audiences. In this tangled network of relationships, various experimentations, negotiations and dialogues take place, sometimes creating new narratives of meaning that can make sense to wider societies and communities. As Fowler goes on to suggest, news “reflects, and in return shapes, the prevailing values of a society in a particular historical context” (Fowler 1991, 222). In addition, the growth of social media and citizen journalism has also created challenges that affect the treatment of original news stories and, as a result, the journalistic treatment of refugees or migrants. For example, political polarization, especially through social media, combined with the predisposition toward so-called fake news, has led many to search not for the truth but rather for what confirms their original beliefs. The complex network of relationships is further complicated by the communicative context in which the news is produced. Daily journalistic rituals, routines and habits shape how professional journalists put reality together (Schlesinger 1987). The manufacturing of news is in the words of John Eldridge a “massive feat of social construction” (Eldridge 1993, 4). Journalists, photographers and editors join forces to retell news stories from a particular angle. The shape of news organizations, influenced by corporate culture, economic constraints and owners’ priorities all contribute to the formation of mainstream news. Around a hundred years ago, Lord Northcliffe (1865–1922) directed his newspapers, The Times and the Daily Mail, to demonize Germans, thereby cultivating an environment where it was all the easier to tumble into and then continue the so-called Great War (Granfield 2013). A further obstacle to developing religious literacy is the journalist’s own unrecognized bias or blind spots. In Unreliable Sources: How the Twentieth Century was Reported, Simpson (2010, ix) argues that “Journalists are like portrait painters: their work will be accurate and fair, or inaccurate and distorted, according to their individual capability.” This interpretation of journalism is too individualistic. As we have seen, it is more than just a journalist’s personal capabilities that shape coverage of stories about religion and its relation to the refugee crisis. There are other factors and pressures, which inform a story (Shoemaker and Reese 1991). Even if they seek to maintain balance and impartiality, a journalist’s own upbringing, life story and worldview will impact their angle on any story that they cover, whether it be the refugee crisis or another more explicitly religious story (Ginneken 1998, 66). Some researchers claim that journalists working in the USA tend to be more skeptical toward religious beliefs than the wider population (Lichter, Rothman and Lichter 1986). There is less empirical data about journalists working in Europe, but nevertheless, the background, training and beliefs of individual journalists will influence or at least inform the way that they cover a story, including its religious aspects.

Overcoming obstacles to religious literacy among journalists How can these obstacles be overcome? In an earlier section, we described some of the practices that can increase religious literacy among journalists, including pedagogical training, experiential learning and conversation rooted in careful listening. These practices may provide some of the necessary foundations to overcome these obstacles. This is a valuable project as both professional and amateur journalists still have the opportunity not only to represent the world in a way that can influence meaning making but also to bring the different perspectives about an event into conversation with each other and then to their audiences. In this context, if there is growing anxiety among citizens, combined with a rise of racism, then 24

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journalists, editors and other broadcasters can play a significant role: enabling refugees and migrants to speak in public for themselves, contributing to the creation of more nuanced and empathetic stories. Digital media makes this technologically simpler. How? One way to achieve this is for journalists to develop a more conversational form of engagement with their subjects so that the audience will in turn hear the refugee’s voice and opinions, and so learn what they can contribute to their new society and economy. This in turn may elicit greater empathy between incoming refugees and fearful or apathetic audiences. This could then lead to refugees being seen not as disposable objects but as valuable human beings with distinct cultures, histories and beliefs, who could enhance our communities. In this way, religious literacy begins with careful listening and moves toward conversations and different kinds of empathy (Boltanski 1999). Increasingly religiously literate journalists have the opportunity to report news in a way that is enriched by their deeper understanding of religious beliefs and practices. In reality, stories about the movement of refugees into Europe as well as other stories with religious undertones have created new potential for religiously literate reporters to find new ways practicing their craft. One of the ways is to adopt the audiences’ activities of experimenting, negotiating and resisting the news reports they receive, while journalists are submerged in the absorbing processes of investigation, interpretation and reporting of news. This process might, however, be more complex than simply mirroring audiences’ playfulness with news, since for professional journalists it also involves navigating within news organizations and their demanding agendas and complicated histories. Traditionally, experimenting, negotiating and resisting have described audiences’ activities as they read, interpret and reproduce the news and information they receive (Afshari 2017). Journalists covering the religious aspects of the refugee crisis can and often do embrace similar practices: They too can experiment with different ways of collecting materials, be open to negotiating with diverse interpretations and resist understudied and stereotypical assumptions. This approach will give journalists the potential to bring to light hidden data and unfamiliar facts, to offer more accurate interpretations, to include multiple and diverse voices. This process will render the unfamiliar familiar, and in complex situations, in which it is no longer enough or easy to collect and report the facts truthfully, will help journalists to seek out, to analyze and to interpret what they perceive is the reality behind the influx of hundreds of thousands of migrants (Marsden and Savigny 2009). To cover stories in depth, journalists obviously need to go beyond the public’s assumed knowledge in order to negotiate with different sources of meaning. In this way, new, richer narratives can be created in the midst of multiple competing views. While some scholars and journalists focus on precise details, specific incidents or relatively short periods, others have taken a broader view, charting the evolution of different news media. Taking a broader historical perspective, writers such as Harold Innis (2007), Marshal McLuhan (1964) and Walter Ong (1982) have developed what could be described as grand theories of media evolution. In this comparatively brief essay, we have not attempted to follow their example and attempt to outline a grand theory of religion and journalism. The increasing complexity of religious involvement in events and incidents concerning refugees from Muslim background requires journalists to adopt experientialist or practice-based approaches that could help us develop values that are now perhaps rather marginal, such as doubt and being open: “open to data and open to being wrong, to redoing one’s own work” (Witschge, Anderson, Domingo and Hermida 2018). The complex history of news, journalism and media interpretation offer rich insights into the relationship between journalism and religion (Katz et al. 2003), which is considered in more detail in several of chapters of this book. 25

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Conclusion How can the complex web of competing stories be untangled? Our discussion began by considering two visually memorable and contrasting news stories; the tiny body of Aylan Kurdi, washed up on a Turkish beach near Bodrum and the picture of a refugee family cherishing a newly born baby called Asal. To conclude, a third image will be introduced: Omran Daqneesh, a five-year-old Syrian boy, sitting bloodied in an ambulance chair after being dragged from the rubble. Taken on August 17, 2016, the image soon went viral. Both social media and mainstream media immediately covered the story. This five-year-old boy had been injured in a Russian-led air strike on the rebel-held Al-Qaterji, in the neighborhood of Aleppo in Syria. His family, three siblings and his parents, were rescued. He and his brother were taken to the hospital. His brother, Ali, died on 20 August. This air strike claimed the lives of eight people, including five children. The image of the injured Omran sitting bloodied in an ambulance chair after being dragged from the rubble caused international outrage and was widely featured in newspapers, on television and in social media. His image was described as “the image of Aleppo’s suffering” (Palin 2017) or “the real face of the Syrian war” (AFP 2016). Omran survived and now is living as a refugee in Turkey. Taken out of context, this story, like the stories of Aylan and Asal, has no obvious religious links, but set in a historical, cultural and social context religion becomes a contributing factor for understanding the cause and significance of what has happened in Syria, Austria and the Mediterranean. Behind each of these visually arresting images are multiple evolving stories and contexts that require more in-depth conversations between journalists and audiences. They are not frozen in time, but reflect many dynamic elements within the creation of news. Stories evolve, contexts are contested, journalists are creative and audiences weave new meaning into stories that they are offered. There is a multiplicity of representations, reporters and receptions, emerging out of a range of settings. The digitization of communication has further complexified this layered reality. We have seen that in order to develop a nuanced analysis of the development of religious literacy among journalists, it is useful to reflect upon both obstacles and practices. Mitchell (2012) has argued that the majority of scholarly studies and critical journalistic reflections have concentrated upon the actual content, the contexts and the producers of a news story related to religion. It is much rarer to consider the role of the audience. Nevertheless, with the digitization and convergence of communicative technologies, the growth of digital, online and citizen journalism, alongside the growth of interactive forms of news production this is rapidly evolving. These rarer audience-centered approaches ask questions such as how viewers, readers and listeners respond to and interact with what they learn? This approach correctly highlights how there are multiple audiences, bringing a variety of beliefs, traditions and theologies, as well as memories, personal experiences and narratives, to any news story they encounter. With the increase of digital citizen journalism, younger audiences (especially 19–34 years) are increasingly turning to unexpected parts of the web for news (Mitchell 2015). As Rupert Murdoch argues this age group “don’t want a God like figure from above to tell them what’s important” (Murdoch speech quoted in Allan 2010, 143). Increasingly audiences attempt to inform journalists what stories are noteworthy, though whether new media actually facilitate the building of bridges between amateur and professional news gatherers is open to debate. Some stories do circulate through independent media and percolate into the public sphere in such a way that they put the issue onto the

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professional news journalist’s agenda in unexpected fashions. In other words, the range of agenda setting sources has radically increased for both audiences and journalists over the last two decades. Audiences now arguably have more channels for public expression and therefore have the capacity, even if it is underused (Mitchell 2012), to influence what is included in mainstream news frames. In the light of this, the traditional news values (Galtung and Ruge 1973), which determine where and whether a story is covered, are open to further question. While journalistic craft has become more professional, religious leaders have become more open to challenge and criticism – both by journalists and by non-journalistic audiences (e.g., Askew and Wilk 2002, Rothenbuhler and Coman 2004, Livingstone 2006, 337–359, Miller 2006). Drawing upon these insights, the complex activity of the audience can be taken into account. Even when arguing for improving journalistic religious literacy, it is important to understand that audiences are by no means bound to be passive receivers of news stories but have the potential to become dynamic respondents in the face of the stories that they see or hear. Increasingly expressive audiences are adding to what Michel de Certeau (1984, 186) describes in another context as the “interminable recitation of stories.” As stories are repeated, they are edited, adapted and elaborated upon by audiences. As they circulate, stories can grow or dissipate in significance. Audiences too can become both more religiously and media literate (Potter 2004), for by so doing, they may even contribute to the journalists themselves becoming more religiously literate, which in turn has the potential to shed more light on both painful and memorable stories about human suffering.

Further readings Hoover, S. M., 1998. Religion in the News: Faith and Journalism in American Public discourse. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publication. Stewart Hoover examines the relationship between religion and the news media. Drawing upon interviews with journalists, he analyses practices within news media outlets, as well as providing a more general overview of religion and journalism in American public discourse. Knott, K., Poole, E. and Taira, A., 2013. Media Portrayals of the Religion and the Secular Sacred. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited. This is a comparative and longitudinal study of coverage of religion in British mainstream newspapers and television. By replicating the 1982–1983 study in 2008–2010, this project shows what has changed over almost 30 years relating to portrayals of religion in British media. Mitchell, J., 2007. Media Violence and Christian Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jolyon Mitchell considers a number of practices including remembering, reframing and redescribing violent representations through news, photography, film and adverts. He goes beyond focusing upon the content and producers of media violence, to the role and responsibilities of the audience. Mitchell, J., 2012. Promoting Peace, Inciting Violence: The Role of Religion and Media. London and New York: Routledge. Jolyon Mitchell explores the ambivalence of the sacred and the role of different media in a number of settings including after the First World War, the Iran-Iraq War, the genocide in Rwanda in the year 1994, creative responses to terrorist attacks and use of the arts to promote peace. Mitchell, J. and Gower, O., eds., 2012. Religion and the News. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited. Essays by journalists, scholars and religious leaders reflecting upon the relationship between religion and news. Poole, E. and Richardson, J. E., eds., 2006. Muslims and the News Media. London: I.B. Tauris. Written by both academic authorities and media practitioners, this book examines the role and representations of Muslims in the news media, particularly within climates of threat, fear and misunderstanding.

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Note 1 According the UN High Commissioner for Refugees: Refugees are persons who are outside their country of origin for reasons of feared persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order and, as a result, require international protection. The refugee definition can be found in the 1951 Convention and regional refugee instruments, as well as UNHCR’s Statute. (Refugeesmigrants 2016)

References AFP, 2016. Dazed Omran the ‘real face’ of Syrian War. Guardian Online, 19 August. Available at https://guardian.ng/news/dazed-omran-the-real-face-of-syrian-war/, accessed 12 July 2018. Afshari, S., 2017. The Reception of Christian Television in Contemporary Iran: An Analysis of Audience Interactions and Negotiations. Dissertation. The University of Edinburgh. Al-Azami, S., 2016. Religion in the Media: A Linguistic Analysis. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Al-Azmeh, A., 1993. Islam and Modernity. London: Verso. Allan, S., 2010. News Culture. 3rd ed. Berkshire: Open University Press. Amnesty International, 2015. The Global Refugee Crisis: A Conspiracy of Neglect. London: Amnesty International: Amnesty International Report no. POL 40/1796/2015. Available at https://www. amnesty.org/en/documents/pol40/1796/2015/en/, accessed 27 July 2018. Anon, 2016. Migrant Crisis: UN Says 5,000 Drown Trying to Reach Europe this Year: BBC Online, 23 December. Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-38420779, accessed 30 January 2019. Anon, 2017. Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016. Geneva: UNHCR. Available at http://www. unhcr.org/globaltrends2016/, accessed 29 June 2018. Askew, K. and Wilk, R. R., eds., 2002. The Anthropology of Media: A Reader. Oxford: Blackwell. BBC, 2017. BBC Religion and Ethics Review. Available at http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/ insidethebbc/howwework/reports/pdf/religion_and_ethics_review.pdf, accessed 20 July 2018. Boltanski, L., 1999. Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Buddenbaum, J. M., 1998. Reporting News about Religion: An Introduction for Journalists. Ames: Iowa State University Press. Certeau, M. D., 1984. The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley: University of California Press. Chouliaraki, L., 2017. Symbolic bordering: the Self-representation of migrants and refugees in digital news. Popular Communication, [e-journal] 15(2). Available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pd f/10.1080/15405702.2017.1281415, accessed 25 July 2018. Chouliaraki, L. and Stolic, T., 2017. Rethinking Media Responsibility in the Refugee “crisis”: A Visual Typology of European News. Media, Culture & Society, [e-journal] 39(8). Available at http:// journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0163443717726163, accessed 27 July 2018. Dinham, A. and Francis, M., eds., 2015. Religious Literacy in Policy and Practice. Bristol: Policy Press. Eddy, M., 2018. Vienna “New Year’s Baby” Greeted First with Hate, then Hearts: The New York Times Online, 4 January. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/world/europe/viennanew-years-baby.html, accessed 30 January 2019. Eldridge, J., 1993. Getting the Message: News, Truth, and Power. Oxon: Routledge. El-Enany, N., 2016. Aylan Kurdi: The Human Refugee. Law and Critique, [e-journal] 27(1). Available at: https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10978-015-9175-7.pdf, accessed 26 July 2018. Fowler, R., 1991. Language in the News: Discourse and Ideology in the Press. London: Routledge. Galtung, J. and Ruge, M., 1973. Structuring and Selecting News. In: Cohen, S. and Young, J., eds. The Manufacture of News. London: Constable Firm, 62–72. Georgiou, M. and Zaborowski, R., 2017. Media Coverage of the “refugee crisis”: A Cross-European Perspective DGI (2017)03. London: Council of Europe. LSE Media and Migration Project. Available at https://rm.coe.int/1680706b00, accessed 21 July 2018. Ginneken, J. V., 1998. Understanding Global News: A Critical Introduction. London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: SAGE Publications. Granfield, G. A., 2013. The Press and Society: From Caxton to Northcliffe. 2nd ed. Oxon: Routledge.

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Developing journalistic religious literacy Hoover, S. M., 1998. Religion in the News: Faith and Journalism in American Public Discourse. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publication. Hoover, S. M. 2006. Religion in the Media Age. New York: Routledge. Hoover, S. M., 2012. Quantity, Equality and Religion in the News Since 9/11. In: Winston, D., ed. The Oxford Handbook of Religion and the American News Media. New York: Oxford University Press, 81–92. Innis, H. A., 2007. Empire and Communications. Reprinted. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Katz, E., Peters, J., Liebe, T., Orloff, A. and Raabe, J., 2003. Canonic Texts in Media Research: Are there Any? Should there Be? How about These? Cambridge: Polity Press. Kumar, D., 2018. The Right Kind of “Islam.” Journalism Studies, [e-journal] 19(8). Available at https:// www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1461670X.2016.1259012, accessed 20 July 2018. Lichter, S. R., Rothman, S. and Lichter, L. S., 1986. The Media Elite. Bethesda: Adler & Adler. Livingstone, S., 2006. The Changing Nature of Audiences: From the Mass Audience to the Interactive Media User. In: Valdvia, A. N., ed. A Companion to Media Studies. Oxford: Blackwell, 337–359. Lynch, J., 2008. Debates in Peace Journalism. Sydney: Sydney University Press. Marr, A., 2004. My Trade: A Short History of British Journalism. London: Macmillan. Marshall, P., Gilbert, L. and Green-Ahmanson, R., 2009. Blind Sport: When Journalists Don’t Get Religion. New York: Oxford University Press. Marsden, L. and Savigny, H., 2009. Media, Religion and Conflict. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited. Matar, D., 2017. Media Coverage of the Migration Crisis in Europe: A Confused and Polarized Narrative. London: Strategics Sectors|Culture and Society. Available at http://www.iemed.org/observatori/ arees-danalisi/arxius-adjunts/anuari/med.2017/IEMed_MedYearbook2017_media_migration_ crisis_Matar.pdf, accessed 21 June 2018. McLuhan, M., 1964. Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. New York: MIT Press. Miller, T., ed., 2006. A Companion to Cultural Studies. Oxford: Blackwell. Mitchell, J., 2007. Media Violence and Christian Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mitchell, J., 2012. Promoting Peace, Inciting Violence: The Role of Religion and Media. London and New York: Routledge. Mitchell, J. and Gower, O., 2012. Religion and the News. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited. Mitchell, J., 2015. Journalism. In: Lynch, J. and Mazur, E. M., eds. The Routledge Companion to Religion and Popular Culture. New York: Routledge, 65–79. Mitchell, J. and Rey, J., 2016. Religion, Evolving Media and Distant Suffering. In: ApostolosCoppadona, D., ed. Religion: Material Religion. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 151–173. Moore, D., 2007. Overcoming Religious Literacy: A Cultural Studies Approach to the Study of Religion in Secondary Education. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Moore, K., Mason, P. and Lewis, J., 2008. Images of Islam in the UK: The Representation of British Muslims in the National Print News Media 2000–2008. Cardiff: Cardiff University and Channel 4. Available at http://orca.cf.ac.uk/53005/1/08channel4-dispatches.pdf, accessed 1 February 2019. Ong, W., 1982. Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd. Palin, M., 2017. The Face of Aleppo’s Suffering Is “alive and well.” Nypost, 6 June. Available at https:// nypost.com/2017/06/06/the-face-of-aleppos-suffering-is-alive-and-well/, accessed 20 June 2018. Philo, G., Briant, E. and Donald, P., 2013. Bad News for Refugees. London: Pluto Press. Poole, E. and Richardson, J. E., eds., 2006. Muslims and the News Media. London: I.B. Tauris. Potter, J. W., 2004. Theory of Media Literacy: A Cognitive Approach. London: Sage Publications. Refugeesmigrants, 2016. Definitions|Refugees and Migrants]. Available at https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/ definitions, accessed 27 April 2018. Religion Media Centre, n.d. Religion Media Centre. Available at https://religionmediacentre.org.uk/, accessed 28 July 2020. Rothenbuhler, E. and Coman, M., eds., 2004. Media Anthropology. London: Sage. Schlesinger, P., 1987. Putting “reality” Together: BBC News. London: Methuen. Shoemaker, P. J. and Reese, S. D., 1991. Mediating the Message – Theories of Influence on Mass Media Content. Longman: New York. Silk, M., 1995. Unsecular Media: Making News of Religion in America. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Simpson, J., 2010. Unreliable Sources: How the Twentieth Century was Reported. Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan. Tumber, H., 1999. News: A Reader. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Jolyon Mitchell and Sara Afshari UNHCR, 2018. Figures at a Glance. Available at http://www.unhcr.org/uk/figures-at-a-glance.h, accessed 7 April 2018. Williams, R., 2012. Faith in the Public Square. London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. Winston, D., ed., 2012. The Oxford Handbook on Religion and the American News Media. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Winston, D., ed., 2013. Heartland Religion: The American News Media and the Reagan Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Witschge, T., Anderson, CW., Domingo, D. and Hermida, A., 2018. Dealing with the Mess (We Made): Unraveling Hybridity, Normativity, and Complexity in Journalism Studies. Journalism, [e-journal] 20(5). Available at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1464884918760669#articleCitationDownloadContainer, accessed 20 January 2019. Young-Powell, A., 2018. President Steps in Over Islamophobic abuse of Austria’s New Year Baby. Telegraph Online. 7 January. Available at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/01/07/president-stepsislamophobic-abuse-austrias-new-year-baby/, accessed 20 July 2018. Zelizer, B. and Allan, S., 2011. Journalism after September 11. 2nd ed. New York and Abingdon: Routledge.

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3 RELIGION AND JOURNALISM UNDER SECULARIZATION Henrik Reintoft Christensen

Introduction Etymologically journalism is secular. The term secular is derived from the Latin saeculum, which among other things means century, our time and this world. In canonical law, it came to represent clergy who went out into the world. A secular priest was not an irreligious person, but a religious person out in the world delivering the message to the masses. In this respect, journalism is secular. It is out in the world, observing, reporting, and delivering messages to the masses. Journalism is also secular in a more modern sense of the term where it denotes the marginalization of religion and the rationalization of society. Journalism does not necessarily show deference to religion and does not treat religion differently from any other topic. However, it is also possible to argue that journalism has a religious dimension or perhaps even religious roots. In one of his aphorisms (1803–6), the German philosopher Hegel compares the reading of newspapers with prayer (Stewart 2002, 247). Reading the news is the modern substitute of the pre-modern Morning Prayer. In his secularization theory, Peter Berger notes that Christianity is a self-secularizing religion, meaning that secularization is a process with religious origin (Berger 1969). Similarly, Émile Durkheim argues in his seminal work on the elementary forms of the religious life that our capacity as humans to think about the world politically (i.e., with regard to relations and power) and scientifically (i.e., with regard to causes and effects) can be attributed to the way religious thought has helped the human species think about the world and our role in it (Durkheim 1912, repr. 1995, 418–448). The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the similarities and differences between religion and journalism under secularization. The aim is to show how secularization has shaped both, how journalism in some ways is also prone to secularization and finally to show that recent post-secular trends are changing them again. In order to examine this, the chapter first places religion and communication in human history drawing on the theory of Robert Bellah arguing that the binary distinction in different types of religion is important for understanding the relationship between religion and journalism. Following this, the next sections take a closer look at the early modern period and how some of the Enlightenment philosophers set the stage for the development of journalism and religion under secularization. The final section discusses religion and journalism under secularization arguing that from the sacred/profane perspective journalism can be perceived 31

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as religious, whereas it is more difficult from an immanent/transcendent perspective. The chapter closes with an example of a religiously informed journalism; a Buddhism-inspired mindful journalism that wants to reclaim some of its lost authority. This outline shows that the chapter takes it point of departure in a European Enlightenment context and American journalism history context. Although ideas from the Enlightenment and the development of journalism has since spread, it is worth noting that my argument is based on that perspective. The fact that Buddhism is used to rethink journalism does not happen in spite of a European or American development but because of it.

Religion and communication in human history Robert Bellah started working on his history of religion in the beginning of the 1960s. In the course of the evolution of human society, religion has become increasingly complex (internally) and autonomous (externally). On this background, Bellah (1964, 361 and 2011) suggests that the history of religion can be divided into a number of ideal-typical stages: the tribal, the archaic, the axial, the historical, the early modern and the modern stage. The historical religion type, which includes Christianity, is important for the present discussion. Religions of this type develop in the Axial Age and differ from the archaic religions on several accounts. They break with the cosmological monism of archaic religion and operate on a dualism distinguishing between this world, which humankind needs to be freed from, and a transcendental realm, which is attainable through salvation (Bellah 1964, 366). The primary distinction in the archaic religion was between sacred and profane, whereas the primary distinction in the historical religion is between immanent and transcendent. Additionally, the demythologization of religion and the ascension of man begin with the historical religions: man is no longer defined chiefly in terms of what tribe or clan he comes from or what particular god he serves but rather as a being capable of salvation. That is to say that it is for the first time possible to conceive of man as such. (Bellah 1964, 366) The early modern type of religion (for example, the Protestant denominations emerging from the Reformation) is characterized by the collapse of hierarchical order in this and the transcendent realm. The de-mythologization continues, and religion becomes a relation between the individual and God. This type of religion breaks with the mediated system of salvation and declares it available for everyone (Bellah 1964, 368f ). Bellah credits Kant, Schleiermacher and the development of liberal theology for forcing religious thinking to ground itself in the human (and not divine) condition. It is not a return to a pre-historical monist cosmology, but the realization that our world is “infinitely multiplex” (Bellah 1964, 371). “However much the development of Western Christianity may have led up to and in a sense created the modern religious situation, it just as obviously is no longer in control of it” (Bellah 1964, 372). In the modern type of religion, the individual works out his or her own search for meaning, and the established religions can only provide a supporting environment for this search without imposing their answers on the individual. In the modern stage, the primary distinction shifts from immanent/transcendent to religious/secular. “And it will be increasingly realized that answers to religious questions can validly be sought in various spheres of ‘secular’ art and thought” (Bellah 1964, 373). The emergence of new religious movements, available not only for the elite but also for the general population, is a recent development, and membership will be increasingly open and flexible. In his reply 32

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to Bellah, José Casanova (2012) argues that the category of religion is ambiguous because there are different classificatory schemes at play. The primary distinctions – sacred/profane (in archaic religion), immanent/transcendent (in historical religion) and religious/secular (in modern religion) – point to different structures of meaning and reality (Casanova 2012, 191). These distinctions are not structurally synonymous. The sacred tends to be immanent in pre-Axial cultures. The transcendent is not necessarily “religious” in some Axial civilizations. The secular is by no means profane in our secular age. (Casanova 2012, 214) These distinctions will be relevant for the concluding discussion of the role of journalism in the modern stage. One of the major factors behind the Axial Age was the emergence of writing. Writing, numeracy and central governments existed prior to the Axial Age, but according to Merlin Donald (2012, 72), these developments set the stage for the Axial Age and “led eventually to a more specialized division of cognitive labor.” With writing, the technology of thinking and recording facts changed human society radically. Ideas could be stored, retrieved and refined to a greater degree than ever before (Donald 2012, 73). It is no coincidence that Bellah identifies a new type of religion (early modern religion) at the time printing was invented (see Eisenstein 1979). This revolutionized the ability to record and access the reflections of individual thinkers as their thoughts could be disseminated at low cost and in the vernacular. From a media perspective, modern religion also owes in part to development of electronic media. The media researcher Niels Finneman (2005) draws on the works of Walter Ong, Elisabeth Eisenstein and Joshua Meyrowitz in his elaboration of five types of societies in which certain communicative media dominate: oral, written, print, electronic, and digital media societies. It should be noted that neither Bellah’s nor Finneman’s theories are inherently deterministic. More complex religion or media does not preclude less complex forms. The development of new forms has more to do with affordances and possibilities than with certainties and inevitabilities. “Nothing is ever lost” is Bellah’s (2005, 72) general principle. Tribal religion still exists and can even exist in later forms of religion, just as spoken language has not become obsolete. Today, all earlier forms exist alongside each other. For an understanding of contemporary religion, archaic, historical, early modern and modern types of religion are important. For an understanding of journalism, developments in the early modern and modern periods are also important. In the next section, we take a closer look at the Enlightenment project in relation to both religion and journalism.

The religious and enlightenment roots of journalism and secularization Secularization is a modern concept that acquires one of its academically most pronounced expressions by Peter Berger (1969, 107) in his well-known definition: “By secularization we mean the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the religious domination of religious institutions and symbols.” The modern project is in many ways a secularizing enterprise, but to understand this it is relevant to present the moral and political revolution heralded by the Enlightenment philosophers. The view of the role of Christianity in society changed, and the idea of informing the citizens of events and publishing their opinions became a natural norm in society in part because of their writings. Ideas like 33

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the social contract, and the separation of powers, and various freedoms have their origin in the works of seventeenth-century thinkers like Hobbes and Locke, and eighteenth-century thinkers like Montesquieu, Rousseau and Kant, Robert Bartlett writes that each of the philosophers of the modern project devoted a good part of his writings to the discussion of the relation between religion and politics with a view to preparing, as each saw fit, the specifically modern orientation. (Bartlett 1996, 286) A considerable portion of Hobbes’s Leviathan focuses on Christianity and addresses the problem of Christian politics. Locke’s first treatise is a Biblical criticism, and his Letter of Toleration and the Unity of God addresses how he thinks popular sovereignty should secure life, liberty, health and property, i.e., what he calls “worldly goods” (Locke 1689, 9). Through their writings, we get a sense of the importance attributed to religion and belief in relation to political life in the pre-enlightenment (pre-modern) era. In many ways, the modern project was the subordination of everything religious to such an extent that political administration of society could refer to rationales that take as their point of departure accounts based on socalled worldly things like philosophy, natural sciences and economy and not other-worldly things like theology, sin, and salvation. Bartlett argues that the Enlightenment philosophers had two scenarios for religion. The first scenario is the one found in, for instance, the writings of Montesquieu and Jefferson. In this scenario, politics could be freed from religion if religion was removed from public life and relegated to the unpolitical private sphere (Bartlett 1996, 288). The other scenario, which can be found in, for instance, Rousseau’s elaboration of the social contract, is the subordination of religion to politics in a civil religion. Religion is placed under political control, but it is still important that every citizen have a religion because that is a necessity for being a good citizen. At the end of his book on the social contract, Rousseau argues for the civil religion and for the exchange of opinion: The subjects then owe the sovereign an account of their opinions only insofar as the opinions matter to the community. Now, it matters very much to the community that each citizen should have a religion that makes him love his duty; but that religion’s dogmas are no concern of the state’s or of its members’ except insofar as they involve morality and the believer’s duties towards others. In addition to all that, a man may have any opinions he likes without that being any of the sovereign’s business. Having no standing in the other world, the sovereign has no concern with what may lie in wait for its subjects in the life to come, provided they are good citizens in this life. (Rousseau 1762, 72 in the version prepared by Bennet) In many ways, these writers herald a new role for religion and pave the way for the development of a free press. Their reflections on the consequences of the social contract that citizens enter with one another did not only reinterpret the role of religion, but also law and freedom. Similar to Bartlett’s argument for a new (modern and secular) idea of government, the journalism researcher Helle Sjøvaag (2010, 878) argues that the establishment of the free press builds on arguments that were “originally constructed in favor of religious freedom and the ultimate obtainment of truth.” The press was important because it was responsible for making opinions available to the public. As seen in the above quotation from Rousseau the subjects owe their sovereign an account of their opinions. Sjøvaag argues that Kant aptly illustrated this in his idea of freedom of the pen. 34

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To try to deny the citizen this freedom does not only mean, as Hobbes maintains, that the subject can claim no rights against the supreme ruler. It also means withholding from the ruler all knowledge of those matters which, if he knew about them, he would himself rectify […] to encourage the head of state to fear that independent and public thought might cause political unrest is tantamount to making him distrust his own power and feel hatred towards his people. (Kant 1793 in Reiss 1970, 84f) Sjøvaag writes that the modern press has inherited this enlightenment ideal. The social contract between the press and the population explicitly demands that the institutions of the press are obliged to make public the unintended consequences of legislation, and lawmakers are obliged to correct them when they learn about them (from the press). The press becomes the medium through which the public and the legislators communicate because society has become so complex that citizens need journalists to fulfil their part of the social contract (Sjøvaag 2010, 880). She sees this most clearly in investigative journalism. Here social morality forms the basis for journalism, a morality established by the citizens and the press: “Journalism participates in the establishment and maintenance of this moral order by exposing transgressions” (Sjøvaag 2010, 883). This leads to a paradox within journalism because the social contract implies that journalism expects or even demands a response from their audience. However, by “encouraging audiences to fulfil their contractual obligations, journalists are in breach of their own” (Sjøvaag 2010, 884). Then journalism is no longer a medium – it is no longer objective. Although this account in some ways pits religion against the right to free expression, it is worth noticing that the right to free expression was often sought on religious not secular grounds. Doug Underwood (2009, 19) writes that “many of the early advocates of freedom of the press were preachers and proselytizers whose religious seal […] placed them solidly in the traditions of the world’s first ‘journalists’.” In fact, Underwood (2009, 21) argues that many elements of modern journalism such as “outspoken columnists, investigative reporters, and editorial champions of social causes” are part of a long tradition going back to the Hebrew prophets. They told the Israelites unwelcome truths, held them accountable for upholding the standards of society or gave them hope in times of hardship. For this reason, he speaks of prophetic journalism. Underwood’s argument is that if we can trace this back to the Hebrew prophets, then the Enlightenment thinkers cannot be the only reason for the development of journalism. The development of the capitalist system is important because it put pressures on the publishers. Enlightenment skepticism, the rise of science, and the substitution of colloquial languages for Latin contributed to the weakening of the religious role that once monopolised the uses of writing. But the commercial pressures that were unleashed with the invention of printing was enormous, and they did much to undermine the original religious purpose of the employment of the printed word and to turn the venture toward commercialism and profit making. (Underwood 2009, 34) In many ways, the development of the journalistic ethos mirrors the development of the capitalist spirit described by Weber. The capitalist spirit has its roots in a certain Protestant ethic but once the religious energy necessary for the capitalist spirit to take off has been used, the auxiliary power of religion is jettisoned, and the capitalist spirit is ready to fly on its own. 35

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The same goes for the development of the press and the journalistic ethos. It too has religious roots, but at some point, the religious energy is no longer required for the freedom of the pen to work on its own. The only difference between the two developments seems to be the fact that journalism does not fly on its own, but by means of the capitalist spirit. The production of news became a lucrative business. In any case, regardless if journalism has religious roots hailing from the time of the prophets, the Enlightenment marks an important shift from the historical to the early modern stage. This implies a shift in the perception of the role of religion in public affairs, diminishing its direct influence on government while at the same time formulating ideas that encourage the exchange of public opinion for the sake of a better society. Slowly the press became an institution of increasing importance in society while religion slowly became less important. Underwood (2009, 42) argues that in “American journalism, we can think of the nineteenth century as the period when the voice of morality was appropriated from the church to the editorial page.”

The diffusion of the news paradigm In this section, I take a closer look at the diffusion of the modern news paradigm and its guiding principles, primarily objectivity because the objective and scientific approach to reporting is critical toward the revelation knowledge found in religion. The modern press developed in the USA and spreads to Europe. In their edited volume, Høyer and Pöttker (2005) are interested in the diffusion of the news paradigm from 1850 to 2000. In his introduction, Høyer (2005, 9) argues that the paradigm originated in the USA in the mid-nineteenth century and was fully developed after the Great War. He and most of the other contributors to the volume are not interested in religion. From a journalism studies perspective, journalism and the press jettison religion at this point and become a social institution in their own right. Høyer (2005, 11–13) argues that the elements in the emergent news paradigm are: the event, the news criteria that turn events into news, the interview as a tool of getting information from sources, for example the inverted pyramid structure of news reporting and journalistic objectivity. In their contributions, Michael Schudson (2005) and Harlan Stensaas (2005) examine the emergence of these elements. Schudson is particularly interested in the emergence of the objectivity norm and argues that it developed in American journalism before spreading to Europe and elsewhere. He is skeptical toward the economic and technological explanations of objectivity. The economic explanations holds that “objectivity emerged at the point where newspaper proprietors saw opportunities for commercial success” whereas the technological explanation focuses on how the impact of new technologies “specifically the invention of the telegraph, placed a premium on economy of style, brought about reporting habits that stressed bare-bones factuality” (Schudson 2005, 20). He acknowledges that both are important preconditions for the emergence of objectivity but he emphasizes the emergence of journalism as an occupational culture as equally important. Part of the occupational culture emerged in reaction to the rise of the public relations professionals because journalists felt a need to distinguish themselves from this new profession and their biased and non-objective communications. Here, objectivity seemed a natural and progressive ideology for an aspiring occupational group at a moment when science was god, efficiency was cherished, and […] partisanship a vestige of the tribal nineteenth century. (Schudson 2005, 29)

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The public relations professionals, the invention of the interview and other practices helped journalists identify as a group, which facilitated the creation of corporate coherence and occupational pride. By the 1920s, a self-conscious ethic of objectivity had emerged. Schudson (2005, 34) concludes that regarding its emergence, “there is no magic moment” when it came into being. It was a slow process and the result of several social conditions. Stensaas is interested in the emergence of not only objectivity but also the attribution of facts to experts and the invention of the inverted pyramid structure in news writing. He uses content analysis to examine six American newspapers in a 90-year period from 1865 to 1954 and concludes that objectivity was well established after 1880s although it was not explicitly formulated as an occupational ideal until 1920s where it became an industry standard (Stensaas 2005, 41). Stensaas then discusses various explanations for this development, and similar to Schudson he discards the economic and technological factors, but he is also critical of the public relations explanation and the occupational standard explanation mentioned by Schudson. Instead, he focuses on two developments that take place not only in journalism but also in society in general: the rise of science and secularization. Similar to Schudson he argues that there is no single or immediate explanation behind the development of the journalistic ideology and the emergence of the news paradigm. It results instead from a basic shift in Western culture and thought which came about within the same time frame […] the point is that until the closing decades of the nineteenth century Western culture and thought was based on Christian ethics and presuppositions. (Stensaas 2005, 46) The shift from the authority of religious knowledge to the authority of scientific knowledge had major implications for society as well as journalism as it was important for the rise of objectivity (Stensaas 2005, 48). The shift did not only have implications for the way news writing became formatted, but it also had implications for the actual content of the news – especially with regard to religion. Richard Flory (2012) shows that the coverage of religion declines significantly between 1870s and 1930s. The coverage of religion dropped by more than 50% of all news and by almost 90% of front-page news in this period (Flory 2012, 49). Additionally, the news was also decreasingly favorable to Christianity. From 1905 to 1931, the share of favorable stories decreased from 78% to 33% (Flory 2012, 50). Similar to Stensaas, Flory argues that the shift from traditional religious authority to scientific authority is the main reason. Like Schudson, he argues that the efforts to professionalize journalism along scientific and rational lines are also important. Flory has examined the professional journals within journalism at the time, and he demonstrates how journalism conceived of itself as the modern replacement for religion. Flory (2012, 59) concludes that “it was the responsibility of journalism to provide the information (truth) by which an adequate ‘philosophy of life’ could be constructed.” From having religious roots, modern journalism developed in response to a shift that specifically entailed the diminishing role of religion in society and took upon itself a role religion used to have. In many ways, modern journalism functions according to values that are opposed to those values that are perceived to govern religion. Consequently, it is relevant to examine in closer detail this historical development of secularization and the academic specification of a theory of secularization.

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The secularization paradigm With regard to religion, Europe is often described as more secular than the USA. The classical texts by Weber and Durkheim deal with the consequences of modernity. For Weber it is the transition from the early modern to the modern stage that is of particular interest. The iron cage of rational modernity had led to the disenchantment of the world. The fate of our times is characterised by rationalisation and intellectualisation and, above all, by the ‘disenchantment of the world.’ Precisely the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from public life either into the transcendental realm of mystic life or into the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations. (Weber 1918, 15) For Weber, religion was no longer a force in public life, but had been relegated to the private sphere. For Durkheim, who argued that what binds people together in a society, i.e., collectives larger than kinship or families are the moral of that society. In the pre-modern society, moral, culture, religion, and society overlap and the origin of them are coterminous. Originally religion was moral was culture was the ideal society that the individuals constantly strive to establish. In the pre-modern society, that ideal had to be activated and enacted on a regular basis or it would erode. In the modern period, the challenge was to identify what kind of moral could integrate the secular society. If today we have some difficulty imagining what feasts and ceremonies of the future will be, it is because we are going through a period of transition and mediocrity. The great things of the past that excited our fathers no longer arouse the same zeal among us, either because they have passed so completely into common custom that we lose awareness of them or because they no longer suit our aspirations. Meanwhile, no replacement for them has yet been created […] In short, the former gods are growing old or dying, and others have not been born. (Durkheim 1912, 429) Oliver Tschannen (1991) has examined some of the most influential works on secularization. He argues that it does not make sense to talk about a secularization thesis, but of a secularization paradigm with many similar but not identical theses. He examines the works of Thomas Luckmann, Peter Berger, Bryan Wilson, David Martin, Richard Fenn, Talcott Parsons and Robert Bellah. They have all formulated different secularization theses, which are not compatible at a theoretical level, but show considerable similarities at a paradigmatic level (Tschannen 1991, 396). Analyzing these similarities, he finds a common paradigmatic narrative in the theories, which focuses on three core elements: institutional differentiation, rationalization and worldliness. These elements are emphasized to various degrees in the different theories, but they all agree that functional differentiation is most important. Tschannen (1991, 412f ) concludes that none of the theories imply the actual disappearance of religion only its transformation into invisible, private, civil or general religion. Although secularization theory often is less applicable in the American context than in the European, several of the above scholars are American. More recently than the theories of Weber, Durkheim and the theories of the 1970s, Mark Chaves (1994) has worked on the concept of secularization. He relates it explicitly to religious authority and argues that it is better understood as the “declining influence of social structures whose legitimation rests 38

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on reference to the supernatural” (Chaves 1994, 756). With regard to religious authority, he defines it as a social structure that attempts to enforce its order and reach its ends by controlling the access of individuals to some desired goods, where the legitimacy of that control includes some supernatural component, however weak. (Chaves 1994, 755f) Expanding on Dobbelaere’s three dimensions of secularization, Chaves (1994, 757) argues, furthermore, that secularization on the societal level means the “declining capacity of religious elites to exercise authority over other institutional spheres” and at the individual level as the degree “to which individual actions are subject to religious control.” It is important to note that control concerns the access to certain religious goods, which the religious authority controls. The exact nature of these goods is highly contingent. No good is inherently religious and goods can be both: worldly or transcendent, psychic or material, collective or individual. Western societies are secular at the societal level if religion does not have any authority even if individuals hold religious beliefs – this includes individuals in public office. In this way, he emphasizes the distinction between external influence and power vis-à-vis internal beliefs and sentiments. Furthermore, he argues that cultural authority is the capacity to define social reality in certain settings (Chaves 1994, 762). He mentions doctors and accountants but explicitly emphasizes that it can be extended to other profession, for example journalism. Although religious vitality is often less applicable in the European context than in the American, Grave Davie uses the term vicarious religion to describe the situation for religion in Europe. Vicarious religion is “religion performed by an active minority but on behalf of a much larger number, who (implicitly at least) not only understand, but, quite clearly approve of what the minority is doing” (Davie 2006a, 22). There are a number of ways in which religion can operate vicariously: Rituals are performed vicariously, church leaders and churchgoers believe and embody moral codes vicariously and, finally, churches can offer space for the vicarious debate of unresolved issues in modern societies. Could it be that the churches offer space for debate regarding particular, and often controversial, topics that are difficult to address elsewhere in society? The current debate about homosexuality in the Anglican Communion offers a possible example, an interpretation encouraged by the intense media attention directed at this issue […] Is this one way in which society as a whole come to terms with profound shifts in moral climate? If [this] is not true, it is hard to understand why so much attention is being paid to the churches in this respect. If it is true, sociological thinking must take this factor into account. (Davie 2006a, 24, emphasis in original) I would argue that Davie in some ways either confuses church and media or at least mixes them. The intense media attention is probably a better example of the reporting of transgressions that we need to rectify (see Kant above) than it is an example of the churches offering space for an unresolved issue. However, she is probably right when she argues that (l)arge sections of the European media are, it seems, wanting to both have the cake and eat it too: pointing the spotlight at controversies within the church whilst maintaining that religious institutions must, by their very nature, be marginal to modern society. (Davie 2006b, 26) 39

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The concept of vicarious religion is relevant to my discussion, but before turning to this, Davie’s blending of church and media is a reminder that this presentation of the diffusion of the news paradigm and the elaboration of the secularization paradigms have been presented as two separate trajectories. However, it is worth noting that even as journalism and the press jettisoned explicit religious values and sentiments, Stewart Hoover have argued persuasively for the existence of an implicit Protestant logic in American culture (2017). The Protestant cultural articulations are intended to be implicit, subtle, and banal as well as subjective and lived […] Simply put, what appeared at mid-century to be secularism might instead have been a tacit, Protestant presentation of itself as the generic, banal, and implicit moral structure of the culture. (Hoover 2017, 2989) As part of the shift from the early modern to the modern stage, Protestantism retreated (and had sound theology to back this) from an explicit role in the public sphere and instead focused on perfecting the domestic sphere, but the public sphere remained implicitly Protestant. In this regard, both secularization and journalism have religious roots, and it is also possible to argue for an implicit Protestantism even as explicit references to religion is no longer evident.

Religion and journalism under secularization This section discusses the consequences of the journalistic appropriation of moral from the church and the lessons learned from secularization with regard to journalism. I argue that ideas from both vicarious religion and secularization theory have some similarities with the development of journalism, and in the last section I discuss some of the ways in which both religion and journalism try to reclaim some relevance and significance in society.

Moral appropriation and vicarious critics The first aspect I would like to address is the vicariousness elaborated by Davie. Although she does not use the term social contract, I argue that vicariousness rests on a social contract between the active and passive religious, and the content of this contract focuses on the ways an active minority believes and practices on behalf of the passive majority. In her conclusion, she points out that vicariousness has its limits. At some point, the contract will be broken. Either the active minority will no longer accept the free riding of the majority at the same time as they make demands (for same sex marriages, female pastors, pluralism or even syncretism) or the passive majority stop supporting the minority because they no longer accept how they believe or behave on their behalf. She speculates that vicariousness will continue until mid-century, but then it will increasingly work on a market model (Davie 2006a, 34). Religion might not be the only sphere in which we can find vicariousness. Although Sjøvaag does not use the term vicariousness, she argues that the social contract between journalists and public is a dynamic similar to vicariousness. In order to sustain the democratic order, the social contract demands that the citizens speak up against misuse of power and since society is very complex, “citizens need journalists to fulfil this contractual obligation on their behalf ” (Sjøvaag 2010, 880). This probably has its limits as well. Similar to the limits of vicarious religion, the minority ( journalists as active critics) and the majority (citizens who acknowledge that the journalists are critics on their behalf ) might break the contract. 40

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Sjøvaag (2010, 881) writes that if news becomes business then it will only provide the audience with more of what they want and probably less of what they need. In such a situation, citizens might become dissatisfied with journalism. The Eurobarometer surveys have measured trust in media and shown, on the one hand, that trust in the printed press (which tend to work on a market model) is lower in the UK than in most of the rest of Europe and, on the other hand, that trust in radio and television (which tend to be national public service corporations) is higher. Overall, the trust has decreased in the period between 2001 ( Eurobarometer 55) and 2015 (Eurobarometer 84). Additionally, the advent of digital media has made it easier for the public, the citizens, to make and disseminate their own news, which can provide alternative accounts of society. On the other hand, Sjøvaag also argues that journalists can break the contract and start publishing more subjective news, which explicitly call for action. This departure from the ideal of objectivity can be found in, for instance, the so-called journalism of attachment. It is possible that these two developments could reinforce each other when the mainstream media is perceived to produce fake news, which spurs the establishment of alternative news sources that tell true story. This battle is well known in the history of religion where dominant belief systems prosecuted heresies – or fake religions – in both the Catholic Church (the inquisition) and in Protestant churches (consistories in Calvinistic churches and superintendents in Lutheran churches). Today, true salvation is no longer at stake but true information. The mainstream press might have appropriated the morals from the church during the nineteenth century, but today there exists a skepticism not only (and perhaps less) toward the moral of the church but toward the press. In that regard, it is perhaps possible to argue for a secularization of journalism.

Decline of authority and the secularization of journalism Because secularization and differentiation are historical processes evolving out of concrete cultural, social and political struggles, Chaves’ understanding of secularization as the declining authority of religious elites might be extended to journalism. Naturally, journalists are not religious authorities, but I would still argue that the notion of secularization is relevant and that we (from a certain point of view) can speak of a secularization of journalism because it is fruitful for understanding the development I have sketched in this chapter and for understanding the role of journalism in contemporary society. Chaves made authority the focal point of his theory and argued that authority is related to the control of some good. So far, I have shown a number of similarities between religion and journalism, but also how journalism at some point appropriated the role of the church as the moral voice in society. The journalist and the newspaper are “a moral teacher, a preacher, a social critic and reformer” as Flory (2012, 58) quotes an editorial from the Journalist. Apart from appropriating the moral, it also perceived of itself as the replacement of religion. The emergence of an occupational identity is a first step toward claiming some kind of authority. The question is then what good they control and I propose that they control information. Not any kind of information though. Not the information necessary for the salvation of the soul. That is still the prerogative of the religious elites of the historical religions. Neither is it the information concerning the restoration of the body, which is the prerogative of medical elites (or those religious elites that channel healing energies). Journalists are instead controlling the information of the mind, the information necessary to be an engaged citizen concerned with the social contract and the preservation of a democratic social order. Journalism controls the information that help citizens counter or work against the constant 41

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risk of societal erosion. In a Durkheimian sense, the appropriation of moral literally means that journalism is the new religion in modern society. It is in the reporting of society that citizens come together and celebrate (discuss) the ideal society that they want. The secularization of journalism then entails the declining authority of journalism to control the production of information that is concerned with the state of society. Similar to traditional religion, the traditional mainstream media have witnessed an increasing pluralization of suppliers whether we call it religious diversity or media diversity. The individual (believer or citizen) has more choice than ever and it is reasonable to see part of this proliferation because of the development of digital media. Bellah argues that the consequences for religion in the modern religion stage are increased individualization and search for meaning. Similarly, Finneman argues that the transition to the latest type of media society, the digital media society, has consequences, too.The Internet is a medium for both private and public communication; it brings private corporations, public institutions, interest groups and individuals into the same platform, which brings about new opportunities. We are still listeners, readers and viewers as in previous media societies, but we are also increasingly writers, printers and producers (Finneman 2011). We are part of the audience and we have our own audience. This development also implies the possible decline in the authority of traditional elites (religious, media and other authorities) and the emergence of new elites and new genres with a changed relationship to their audience: religious elites on YouTube or the rise of civic journalism. It is no surprise therefore that both groups are trying to reclaim authority in different ways.

Conclusion: reclaiming authority and de-secularizing religion and journalism Studies of public religion (i.e., religion trying to be relevant on a societal level) or religion in public institutions (i.e., religion trying to be relevant for the individual patient, inmate, soldier or student) have documented the ways in which religion is trying to reclaim authority. However, religion has also been used to reclaim journalist authority, for instance, in the idea of Buddhist journalism (Gunaratne, Pearson and Senarath 2015). In his introduction, Shelton Gunaratne argues that the world needs a different breed of journalists who could bring about amity and sanity in the world community. Their task would be to foster a new genre of journalism, which we would identify as mindful journalism. (Gunaratne 2015, 1) These journalists should help others overcome suffering, but if journalists do not understand the cause of suffering (according to Buddhist teaching) they cannot help overcome it. Consequently, they argue that there is a need for a Buddhist inspired mindful journalism because the established news paradigm is too dependent on capitalism and emphasizes individualism. With the separation of church and state and the onset of colonialism and industrialization, the Judeo-Christian values became increasingly secularized, with heavy emphasis on individualism. (Gunaratne 2015, 4)

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In contrast to the traditional news production, the aim of the mindful approach “is not profit making but truthful reporting” (Gunaratne 2015, 5). Mainstream journalism should embrace the mindful approach because it offers a “logical moral framework” which is necessary as traditional journalism has lost its “moral compass”, and because both journalists, sources, and society will benefit from the mindful “ethical and reflective truth-seeking and truth-telling.” (Gunaratne 2015, 6) Gunaratne (2015, 9) then concludes “that the Digital Revolution has throttled traditional journalism into its jaramarana [sickness and death] stage.” The mindful journalism approach is an interesting attempt at reclaiming journalist authority through religion. It should be noted that it is important for the authors to stress that because the Four Nobel Truths have nothing to do with divine origin or inspiration and are only a set of verifiable statements discovered by an enlightened human being to alleviate human suffering/dissatisfaction, they are worthy of empirical testing by journalists. (Gunaratne 2015, 1) Mindful journalism is suggested as an approach that can alleviate the suffering of journalism, which is the result of the secularization of journalism. This approach is literally an attempt at de-secularizing journalism. Bellah argued that religion in the modern religion stage could only offer a supporting environment for the search for meaning. The mindful journalist has the same functions through seeking the truth and reporting it to the public. While they argue that mindful journalism is not dependent on a transcendent dimension, and even if we agree that Buddhism has nothing to do with this, then it is still possible to understand the mindful approach along another religion binary, that of sacred/profane. Mindful journalism agrees that at its basic, journalism holds sacred the social contract and although it had religious roots, they have long been abandoned. This does not mean that journalism became independent as it came to rely on capitalism instead. From a sacred/profane point of view, journalism is not just similar to religion. Journalism and religion are the same. In that vein, what Gunaratne et al. are suggesting is a return to a golden age before journalism was corrupted by greed and profit making: a motif well known from the history of religion. While the similarities are in themselves interesting, few would argue that journalism is a religion, nineteenth- and early twentieth-century journalists notwithstanding. However, I have shown that the reason we would refrain from describing journalism as a religion has more to do with our inherited concept of religion observing the world with the immanent/ transcendent binary. Journalism is concerned with the social collective found in the archaic religion and not with the divine transcendence found in the axial religions. What both religion and journalism face is the radical individualism of the modern stage in which sacred or transcendence is no longer obligatory. The mindful approach to journalism seems to argue that there exists a privileged point of view from where society can be neutrally and truthfully observed which seems unlikely. That the solution for journalism is better journalism can at best be only a small part of such a project. The evolutionary stages of religion presented by Bellah and of media presented by Finneman show that the problems are not confined to journalism, but are part of what constitutes modern society. They involve the inherited

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legacies like secularization and commercialization and new technologies like the Internet and social media, which have all changed religion as well as journalism. The perceived need for such Reformation of journalism is perhaps the prime religious trait reminding us of the similarity in fighting false prophets and fake news in the search for truth.

Further readings Horsfield, P., 2015. From Jesus to the Internet. Malden, MA: Wiley and Sons. Horsfield’s book is a thorough examination of the many ways in which different media have influenced the evolution of the Christian religion from the gospels to the digital age of today. Knott, K., Poole, E. and Taira, T., 2013. Media Portrayals of Religion and the Secular Sacred. London: Routledge. Knott, Poole, and Taira examine the British media representations of Christianity, Islam, Atheism and popular beliefs. Kühle, L., Borup, J. and Howerd, W., eds., 2018. The Critical Analysis of Religious Diversity. Leiden: Brill. Increasing religious diversity challenge the way we (as citizens, academics, journalists, teachers etc.) think about religion. This volume explores how researchers can improve the way they conceptualize religion and society. Mitchell, J. and Gower, O., eds., 2012. Religion and the News. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited. Mitchel and Gower have edited a volume with contributions from both academics, religious actors and media practitioners in an examination of the role of religion in the news in a British context. Winston, D., ed., 2012. The Oxford Handbook of Religion and the American News Media. New York: Oxford University Press. The handbook explores the many ways in which religion interacts with the news from various disciplinary perspectives. It examines coverage of religion in different media and of different religions in the American context.

References Bartlett, R., 1996. On the Decline of Contemporary Political Development Studies. Review of Politics, 58(2), 269–298. Bellah, R., 1964. Religious Evolution. American Sociological Review, 29(3), 358–374. Bellah, R., 2005. What Is Axial about the Axial Age? European Journal of Sociology, 46(1), 69–89. Bellah, R., 2011. Religion in Human Evolution. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Berger, P., 1969. The Sacred Canopy. New York: Doubleday. Casanova, J., 2012. Religion, the Axial Age, and Secular Modernity in Bellah’s Theory of Religious Evolution. In: Bellah, R. and Joas, H., eds. The Axial Age and Its Consequences. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 191–221. Chaves, M., 1994. Secularisation as Declining Religious Authority. Social Forces, 72(3), 749–774. Davie, G., 2006a. Vicarious Religion. In: Ammerman, N., ed. Everyday Religion: Observing Modern Religious Lives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 21–36. Davie, G., 2006b. Is Europe an Exceptional Case? The Hedgehog Review, 8(1–2), 23–34. Donald, M., 2012. An Evolutionary Approach to Culture. In: Bellah, R. and Joas, H., eds. The Axial Age and Its Consequences. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 47–76. Durkheim, E., 1912 [1995]. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Translated from French by K. Fields. New York: The Free Press. Eisenstein, E., 1979. The Printing Press as an Agent of Change. New York: Cambridge University Press. Eurobarometer 55, 2001. Public Opinion in the European Union. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_ opinion/archives/eb/eb55/eb55_en.pdf, 17 January 2020. Eurobarometer 84, 2015. Media Use in the European Union. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/ COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/72667, accessed 17 January 2020. Finneman, N., 2005. Internettet – I medieteoretisk perspektiv. [The Internet – from a Media Theory Perspective]. Roskilde: Forlaget Samfundslitteratur.

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Religion and journalism under secularization Finneman, N., 2011. Mediatization Theory and Digital Media. Communications, 36(1), 67–89. Flory, R., 2012. American Journalism and Religion, 1870–1930. In: Winston, D., ed. The Oxford Handbook of Religion and the American News Media. New York: Oxford University Press, 49–63. Gunaratne, S., 2015. Introduction. In: Gunaratne, S., Pearson, M. and Senarath, S., eds. Mindful Journalism and News Ethics in the Digital Era. New York: Routledge, 1–18. Gunaratne, S., Pearson, M. and Senarath, S., eds., 2015. Mindful Journalism and News Ethics in the Digital Era. New York: Routledge. Hoover, S., 2017. Residual and Resurgent Protestantism in the American Media (and Political) Imaginary. International Journal of Communication, 11, 2982–2999. Høyer, S., 2005. The Idea of the Book. Introduction. In: Høyer, S. and Pöttker, H., eds. The Diffusion of the News Paradigm 1850–2000. Göteborg: Nordicom, 9–18. Høyer, S. and Pöttker, H., eds., 2005. The Diffusion of the News Paradigm 1850–2000. Göteborg: Nordicom. Locke, J., 1689. The Letter of Toleration and the Unity of God. Available at http://www.earlymoderntexts. com/assets/pdfs/locke1689b.pdf, accessed 17 January 2020. Reiss, H., ed., 1970. Kant’s Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rousseau, J. J., 1762. The Social Contract. [e-book] Available at http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/ assets/pdfs/rousseau1762.pdf, accessed 17 January 2020. Schudson, M., 2005. The Emergence of the Objectivity Norm in American Journalism. In: Høyer, S. and Pöttker, H., eds. The Diffusion of the News Paradigm 1850–2000. Göteborg: Nordicom, 19–36. Sjøvaag, H., 2010. The Reciprocity of Journalism’s Social Contract. Journalism Studies, 11(6), 874–888. Stensaas, H., 2005. The Rise of the News Paradigm. In: Høyer, S. and Pöttker, H., eds. The Diffusion of the News Paradigm 1850–2000. Göteborg: Nordicom, 37–50. Stewart, J., ed., 2002. Miscellaneous Writings of G.W.F. Hegel. Translated by J. Stewart. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Tschannen, O., 1991. The Secularisation Paradigm. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 30(4), 395–415. Underwood, D., 2009. From Yahweh to Yahoo. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Weber, M., 1918. Vocation as Science. Available at http://www.wisdom.weismann.ac.il/~oded/X/ WeberScienceVocation.pdf, accessed 17 January 2020.

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4 THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF JOURNALISM FOR RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS Tim Hutchings

Introduction In 1840, Alexis de Tocqueville described the immense influence of the press on democracy in the USA. Newspapers, he argued, served as “the chief democratic instrument of freedom” (De Tocqueville 1840, 730), because they provided a means for exposing corruption and holding the powerful to account. The press also offered a voice to every oppressed citizen: each individual member of society can “appeal to the whole nation” and all of mankind for help and “the only means he has of making this appeal is by the press” (De Tocqueville 1840, 729). The newspaper therefore “places a powerful weapon within every man’s reach, which the weakest and loneliest of them all may use” (De Tocqueville 1840, 729). This classic understanding of journalism is still influential today, encountered – and disputed – in academic literature and public debate. In the study of religion and the news, however, this whole question of purpose has been largely overlooked. Instead, researchers have extensively explored how religion is represented in the news, typically by using content, discourse or visual analysis to study the stories journalists choose to tell about religious beliefs, practices and people (see, for example, Knott, Poole and Taira 2013). This media-centric, often quantitative approach focuses attention on the content of the media, assuming that agency in news production lies primarily with journalists and editors. For example, researchers might look for key themes in the media representation of different religious groups, compare representations of religious traditions in different media sources and see how themes have shifted over time (e.g., Winston 2012). This is a valuable approach, but it ignores two of the key issues that attracted de Tocqueville’s attention: The normative debate over the proper role and function of journalism and the contextual, strategic question of how individual actors outside the media industry try to use the press to share their own messages with the public. This chapter will explore what religious organizations themselves say about the news and its role and function in society. We will also demonstrate some of the work, training and strategic thinking that religious organizations invest in the project of achieving media representation. We will start by introducing the standard representational approach to religion and the news, showing how the common call for journalists to develop religious literacy is founded on this particular understanding of what news is and how it is made. To challenge 46

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this emphasis, we will introduce three rare examples of published academic studies that pay proper attention to the work that religious actors do to become trusted sources for journalists. We will then set out a new typology of six different visions of the role and function of the journalist. Three visions are drawn from classic journalism studies (Donohue, Tichenor and Olien 1995, 116, 118): the watchdog (who protects the public), the lapdog (who agrees uncritically with the powerful) and the guard dog (who works to represent and protect a special group by attacking their enemies). This chapter proposes three additional visions, which express common religious understandings of the figure of the journalist: the puppy dog (who just needs a proper education), the working dog (a highly trained professional with particular skills, needs and expectations) and the hunting dog (an aggressive enemy driven by personal bias). This chapter ends by exploring the blending of these six visions in three interviews, all based in the UK. These interviews represent three different religious organizations, each with a different kind of relationship with old and new media: Anna Drew, a communications director employed by two of the largest Christian denominations, the Methodists and the Church of England; Archbishop Angaelos of the Coptic Orthodox Church, which is based primarily in Egypt and Miqdaad Versi, a media monitor for the British Muslim Council. These examples are of course limited to the religious and media context of the UK, and further research will be needed to assess the extent to which the proposed six-part typology can be adjusted or expanded to reflect a wider range of religious, media and geographical contexts. Nonetheless, even this limited group of interviews can help us to recognize the diversity and complexity of religious understandings of the role and function of the news and the different approaches religious groups have developed to improve their representation.

Media representation and religious literacy Research focused on analysis of media representations has achieved significant gains in our understanding of the nature and influence of the media’s treatment of religion. For example, numerous studies of media representations of religion in Europe and the USA have demonstrated that Islam is associated closely in news coverage with violence and terrorism (Said 1997 [1981], Elahi and Kahn 2017). According to Kim Knott, Elizabeth Poole and Teemu Taira (2013, 79), references to Islam in the UK media increased almost tenfold between 1982 and 2008, and “militancy and extremism were the principal topics.” As schoolteacher and imam Monawar Hussain writes in his contribution to Jolyon Mitchell and Owen Gower’s valuable collection Religion and the News, this repeated theme has real consequences for Muslim audiences, producing a portrayal that is “deeply inaccurate, Islamophobic, d isempowering and leading to a feeling of alienation” (Hussain 2012, 130). In constructions of religion and the news that focus on representation and literacy, religious communities or organizations play a passive role. They exist to be reported by journalists, and it is the nature and quality of the reporting that merits scholarly attention. Journalistic inaccuracy is the problem, ignorance is the diagnosis and religious literacy for journalists is therefore the solution. For example, Paul Wooley, former director of the Christian thinktank Theos, complains that “it is striking how few religion ‘specialists’ in the news media are specialists in any real sense of the word” (Wooley 2012, 69) and insists that “media organizations have a responsibility to ensure that news producers and reporters who cover religion are religiously literate” (Wooley 2012, 75). In response to these kinds of criticisms, organizations and initiatives have been created to teach and reward a higher standard of religious journalism. Jolyon Mitchell and Sara Afshari 47

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(this volume) distinguish between pedagogical, conversational and experiential approaches to religious literacy training, based, respectively, on teaching journalists, involving them in discussions or sending them to directly observe and participate in events affecting religious people. In the UK, the Sandford St Martin Trust (The Sandford St Martin Trust n.d.) was founded in 1978 to reward high standards in broadcasting, and the new Religion Media Centre (Religion Media Centre 2018) was launched by former journalists in 2018 to run training events teaching journalists to cover religion more effectively. This literacy-focused approach can overlook the active roles that religious organizations and individuals themselves can play in imagining and constructing the news. The diverse perspectives represented in the recent essay volumes Religion and the News (Mitchell and Gower 2012) and On Islam (Pennington and Kahn 2018) demonstrate that religious organizations have their own ideas about the proper function of the media and often aspire to shape their own media representation. Radde-Antweiler, Grünenthal and Gogolok have recently studied communication in the Catholic Church in Germany and reported widespread concern among priests that the media “will gain the power to define Church topics, discussions and positions” and that “the public image of the Church will be endangered” by inaccurate and disproportionate media coverage (Radde-Antweiler, Grünenthal and Gogolok 2018, 279). At the same time, these priests still “use a very broad range of media” (RaddeAntweiler, Grünenthal and Gogolok 2018, 277) and have developed their own strategies to promote the message they want to communicate. Instead of waiting passively for journalists to decide how to represent them, many religious groups are finding ways to compete for the kind of attention they want to receive. Textual analysis of media representation and studies of the training and working processes of journalists and editors do not address the labor undertaken by religious groups to help particular stories, images, sources and interpretations to come to the attention of particular journalists in the first place. This kind of labor is, of course, not always successful: A media-centric approach will also miss all of the disappointments and failures experienced by religious organizations, when their carefully crafted press releases and publicity events do not attract the desired quality or quantity of coverage. To develop a more thorough understanding of the relationship between religious organizations and the news, we need to pay close attention to how the many press officers, communications directors and other media specialists who operate on behalf of religious institutions understand and conduct their work.

Journalists and their sources: three case studies Academic studies of this kind of religious media work are relatively rare. Researchers have studied mainstream media representations of religion in great detail, and they have also analyzed specialist media produced by religious organizations, like religious television, radio and social media channels. However, the role of religious organizations themselves in actively generating mainstream media coverage has been largely overlooked. To introduce some of the contours of the field, we will focus here on three recent and valuable case studies: Miriam Diez Bosch’s (2018) study of the reporters who specialize in covering the Vatican, Xenia Zeiler’s (2018) study of the press work of the USA-based Universal Society of Hinduism and Michael Munnik’s (2018) study of the relationship between journalists and Muslim sources in Scotland. According to Bosch, the turning point in relations between the Vatican and the press was the Second Vatican Council. Before the 1960s, she argues, “misinformation and obfuscation in the Holy See were the norm. Public and media transparency was not favoured. 48

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Nor was information considered a right for the citizenry. Journalists had no direct access to sources” (Bosch 2018, 80). After the Council, the Vatican developed a new theology of communication, seeing the press not as a threat but as an aid to the goal of communicating accurately with the world. This new era soon encountered new challenges: “the new dynamics of media clashed with an institutional power that was not used to explaining itself to others” (Bosch 2018, 80). Over time, both the journalists and the Vatican have had to adapt. The many hundreds of accredited reporters from around the world who now cover the Vatican have to become experts in navigating this complex organization, understanding “where the power is, and who represents it” (Bosch 2018, 84). At the same time, journalists have the freedom to cover only the details and individuals they consider newsworthy and tend to pay more attention to crisis and scandal than to the Vatican’s preferred messages (Bosch 2018, 85). The Vatican has had to adjust its own communication approach to fit journalists’ needs and expectations: “public and media reactions today have an impact on how papal statements and other operations with public relations consequences are packaged and timed” (Bosch 2018, 86). Xenia Zeiler’s study of the Universal Society of Hinduism shows a completely different kind of relationship between a religious organization and the media. The society was founded by Indian American Rajan Zed and serves to promote his own understanding of Hinduism – and himself – within the USA and worldwide. Zeiler reports that “Zed intensively uses media platforms” (Zeiler 2018, 304) to promote his views, like many other members of diasporic religious communities. For widely dispersed groups without access to their own channels of communication, engaging with the press offers a rare opportunity to spread messages, advertise identities and challenge public misconceptions. Zed specializes in the production of press releases, and Zeiler argues that this form of publication is “most probably … the main reason for his public success” (Zeiler 2018, 305). Each press release targets a current news story and offers a clear and controversial stance in language that is ready for journalists to quote. Each press release also explains what Hinduism is and why it matters and intensively promotes Zed himself as a reliable expert who speaks on behalf of a global religious community. Journalists use these press releases extensively as sources, and this media presence has established Zed as “a widely-perceived authority on Hinduism in the USA” (Zeiler 2018, 306). In this case, we see an individual entrepreneur become a religious institution by providing a valuable service – quotable, controversial content – to journalists who might have no prior knowledge or interest in his religious community. Michael Munnik’s (2018) study offers a third perspective, looking at a cluster of voices competing for attention. Munnik surveys the field of Muslim news sources in Glasgow, interviewing more than a dozen different individuals and groups who all hope to win media coverage for their chosen messages and campaigns. Using these interviews, he distinguishes between two kinds of sources: authorized knowers who have amassed social capital that journalists can recognize and new entrants who must win media attention in more imaginative ways. Authorized knowers develop a reputation among journalists through many years of media work, community leadership or participation in high-status professions like law and politics. New entrant groups do not have these advantages, but may try to compensate by undergoing media training in how to become better sources and attract better coverage. When Munnik’s example of an authorized knower describes his media relations activities, the source “gives the impression of a stage manager, orchestrating all the media actors to contribute to the outcome he wanted” (Munnik 2018, 9). The source persuades journalists to publish his preferred stories by drawing on his close personal relationships within the media industry, but also by knowing exactly how the journalistic process functions, including what 49

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information and verification journalists need before they can publish and what timeline they need to work to. In contrast, Munnik’s example of a new entrant organization has to work without this base of knowledge and networking. Without personal contacts, they choose instead to publish a press release on Twitter. As the campaign leader reported to Munnik (2018, 12), “no one picked it up,” leaving the group to guess what might have gone wrong: “it may be there was something bigger that week, something else happened. So there’s nothing you can do about that.” These three contrasting studies demonstrate that reporting about religion emerges from a process that includes a network of actors who are often invisible in the final media product. Religious news is negotiated between journalists, editors, institutions, more or less trusted sources and communication entrepreneurs, and each party may have their own agenda, strategy and understanding of what is happening. Powerful religious institutions like the Vatican can try to influence media coverage by providing a service to interested journalists, helping them to access authoritative sources and write accurate stories, while encouraging them to share a favorable interpretation of the institution’s activities. To ensure accurate coverage, journalists covering the Vatican are expected to work with the Vatican Press Office and to develop specialist knowledge not only of Catholic doctrine but also of the Vatican’s complex bureaucracy and power structure. In contrast, individuals like Rajan Zed who do not represent such high-profile groups can use their knowledge of the needs and interests of journalists to become publicly recognized as religious authorities. It is precisely the ignorance of American journalists about Hinduism that allows Zed to present himself as a reliable educator and spokesperson. The Muslim sources discussed by Munnik (2018) are more ambivalent about their efforts to win media attention. They undergo media training and try to develop networks of contacts to help improve the impact of their own communication projects. Munnik’s authorized knower works quietly behind the scenes to build credibility and social capital in the media industry, while the new entrant organization struggles for attention on social media against competing news stories.

Six theories of journalism: developing a new typology As these three examples demonstrate, the problem religious organizations believe they face in the media is not just inaccurate representation or media stereotyping. Nor can it always be fixed by encouraging journalists to undertake basic religious literacy training. To build a more nuanced picture, we need a broader understanding of what religious organizations actually believe about the role and function of journalism. What do they perceive to be the essential nature and purpose of the news media? This section develops a new six-part typology, categorizing different ways in which religious communicators and academics have tried to answer this question. We can begin our proposed new typology with one of the oldest and most influential metaphors for the journalist: the watchdog. As a watchdog, the journalist stands guard over society, protecting the public interest by exposing secrets and raising the alarm. The watchdog journalist serves a crucial function for democracy by revealing the truth to the public about the most powerful members of society, including politicians and other elites. This role is often described as “the Fourth Estate,” a term coined in 18th-century England (Donohue, Tichenor and Olien 1995, 118). This classic understanding is reflected in de Tocqueville’s discussion of the importance of the press for American democracy (1840), and it can be seen in at least some contemporary discussions of religion and the media. In Religion and the News (Mitchell and Gower 2012), for example, former BBC journalist and religious affairs 50

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correspondent Christopher Landau draws on the watchdog tradition when he defines “the news” as “something that somebody somewhere would rather was not made public knowledge” (Landau 2012, 80). The essential quality of journalism, for Landau, is the revealing of secrets for the benefit of the public. Theorists of journalism have long debated how accurate and realistic the watchdog metaphor actually is. Larry Sabato’s (1991) classic history of US journalism argues that different approaches to power have dominated at different times, including long periods of lapdog journalism in which the press refrained from subjecting politicians to any critical scrutiny. Instead of serving the public, the lapdog press works on behalf of those in power, ensuring that their messages and perspectives are communicated without challenge. References to lapdog journalism are relatively rare in studies of religion and the news. Observers are much more likely to describe competition and suspicion between religious organizations and journalists, rather than a master-servant relationship. In the USA, for example, Lynn Schofield Clark and Jill Dierberg (2012, 98) apply the watchdog and lapdog dichotomy to journalistic relationships with political power, but argue that by the 1920s mainstream journalism had already “firmly aligned itself with modernism and science and against conventional Christian religion” (Clark and Dierberg 2012, 101). In other parts of the world, however, the lapdog metaphor has remained relevant. Journalists in some regions, countries and time periods have found it necessary to avoid criticizing religious leaders. One example can be found in Susie Donnelly and Tom Inglis’s (2010) study of media reporting of clerical child sex abuse in Ireland. It was only late in the 20th century, they argue, that the media in Ireland “began to investigate and interrogate religious personnel and, in playing its role as the Fourth Estate, replaced the Catholic Church as the social conscience and moral guardian of Irish society” (Donnelly and Inglis 2010, 1). Donnelly and Inglis (2010, 1) attribute this shift in part to secularization, through which “the influence of the Catholic Church over the media has declined. It is no longer able to limit, let alone control what media organizations do or say.” The Irish media were once content to function as a lapdog for the Church and only began operating as a watchdog after escaping from Church control. George Donohue, Phillip Tichenor and Clarice Olien propose a more active, conflictseeking guard dog model of journalism. Unlike the watchdog, the guard dog serves “as a sentry not for the community as a whole, but for those particular groups who have the power and influence to create and control their own security systems” (Donohue, Tichenor and Olien 1995, 116). Instead of the lazy subservience of the lapdog, the guard dog press works busily to protect special interest groups or dominant community groups and their power structures from threats and intruders. We can see traces of this idea at work in discussions of religion and the news, too. Former Times religious affairs correspondent Ruth Gledhill points out that in the UK until relatively recently “most religious affairs correspondents had been clergy” (Gledhill 2012, 90), reporting religious news from a perspective of personal faith commitment, religious training and often religious employment. “If they were not actually preaching to the converted,” Gledhill (2012, 91) observes, “they were nevertheless covering the subject in a way which presumed a degree of specialist knowledge among their readership.” Just like the guard dog journalist, the traditional religious affairs correspondent worked on behalf of a special group in society, reporting their interests and criticizing a few deviant individuals without challenging the basic commitments and structures of the protected community. We can also see other visions at work in discussions of religion and the press, and we can use these to start expanding the typology beyond these familiar models of journalism studies. 51

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The first and most important is the widespread idea that journalists are simply uneducated about religion, an idea we have already encountered above. To continue the canine metaphor, we can name this the puppy dog theory of journalism. As we have seen, many religious and academic commentators argue that journalists need to develop religious literacy in order to function as competent communicators about religion. In On Islam, for example, Hilary Kahn (2018, 5) offers “to help journalists and media scholars to become more familiar with Islam and its believers” and to provide “the skills, knowledge, and attitudes they need to tackle the harmful misunderstandings about Islam that permeate public sentiment” (Kahn 2018, 6). The puppy dog theory argues that journalists are not malevolent or ill-intentioned in their reporting, but simply need training and guidance to encourage good behavior. Former BBC Director-General Mark Thompson proposed a similar argument in a controversial lecture in 2008: “accusations and grievances often fly back and forth” between journalists and religious communities, he admitted, but “one cannot help thinking it may be more a matter of misunderstanding than malice” (quoted in Wooley 2012, 62). Another common approach argues that journalists should not take all the blame for the supposed underreporting or misreporting of religion. This approach argues that it is unrealistic to demand high standards of religious literacy and specialist knowledge from journalists – particularly when such standards are not required in other areas, like business or science journalism (Beckett 2016, 101). Instead, it should be the responsibility of religious organizations themselves to learn to communicate their messages in the right way, so that journalists can recognize those messages as newsworthy and use them in the production of publishable news stories. We can call this the working dog theory of journalism. The working dog journalist is not ignorant: They are highly trained and competent professionals, doing a particular job in a particular way. Anyone who wants to build a productive relationship with a working dog needs to undergo their own training, in order to learn what the animal can do, what it will respond to and what signals and skills are needed to support effective collaboration. The working dog theory proposes that religious organizations need to recognize and respect the expertise of journalists and focus on developing their own knowledge, skills and experience in order to work with them more effectively. The Muslim sources interviewed by Michael Munnik (2018) are keen to develop greater media literacy and Xenia Zeiler’s (2018) study of Rajan Zed shows how effective a good understanding of the media’s needs and interests can be. Christopher Landau (2012, 85) argues that “it’s not just the media that need to change” and points out that if religious organizations hope for better engagement with the media, “it is essential that they themselves have a greater degree of literacy about those with whom they are seeking to build relationships.” The relative media success of many fringe groups, he points out, is due not only to the inexperience of journalists but to their own confidence and persistence in communicating newsworthy messages to news producers. To improve their coverage, mainstream organizations need to learn from their example. The puppy dog and working dog theories are essentially optimistic, promising that problems of religious misrepresentation can be solved through education and training. Not all observers share this generous interpretation and our final theory is much more critical. We can name this the hunting dog theory of journalism. The true purpose of the hunting dog journalist is not just to protect the public (the watchdog theory), to serve its masters (the lapdog theory) or to protect a special interest group (the guard dog theory); the hunting dog is not interested in religious education classes (the puppy dog theory) or a well-crafted press release (the working dog theory). Instead, the hunting dog journalist deliberately seeks opportunities to attack their chosen prey. Monawar Hussain and Catherine Pepinster both 52

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suggest that at least parts of the press harbor particular bias against certain groups, arguing that journalists exclusively, excessively and deliberately associate Islam with terrorism (Hussain 2012, 131) and Catholicism with sexual abuse (Pepinster 2012, 113). While both authors agree that such topics are newsworthy and must be reported, they claim that the media force this framing even onto unrelated stories, encouraging the public to exaggerate the scale of the problem within religious communities. Adherents to the hunting dog theory will have little use for religious literacy training, because they believe that journalists are not simply misinformed; they may even be aware that their stories are factually in error. The problem of media bias is much harder to fix. This section has proposed a six-part typology of understandings of the nature of journalism, combining three ideas from journalism studies (the watchdog, lapdog and guard dog) with three new categories representing key debates over religion and the news (the puppy dog, working dog and hunting dog). Each theory of journalism posits a different kind of opportunity or challenge to religious organizations. For example, should religious organizations welcome the media’s criticisms as cause for moral self-reflection (watchdog model), try to control and silence media critique (lapdog) or try to persuade the media to recognize them as a significant audience to be treated with respect (guard dog)? Is it more important for religious organizations to address media ignorance (puppy dog model), improve their own communication skills (working dog model) or draw attention to media bias (hunting dog model)? These are not mutually exclusive or competing models, but alternative visions that may be combined in different ways in different contexts. Different religious organizations operate in different social, religious and geographical locations, facing different cultural pressures and experiencing different kinds of media coverage. Researchers interested in religion and the news need to pay more attention to the complex blends of attitudes and responses we encounter in different religious organizations, asking what these groups see as the role and function of journalism and how their perceptions influence their media strategy. The final part of this chapter attempts to demonstrate some of this diversity by introducing three interviews with religious communication specialists. Each interviewee represents a different religious group, with different levels of media capital and a different strategy for winning attention. As we shall see, each represents a combination of some or all of the six approaches, but they differ in which aspect they choose to emphasize.

Journalism and the Church of England: first case study My first interviewee, Anna Drew, has worked in church communications in the UK for almost 15 years. She began work as a Media and Information Assistant for the national Methodist Church, was promoted to Lead Media Officer where she “took the lead in liaising with the media on behalf of the church,” 1 and then moved in 2015 to become Director of Communications for a diocese (one of 42 administrative regions) in the Church of England. Canterbury is the see of Archbishop Justin Welby, the most important figure in the international Anglican Communion, and Drew’s role now includes working as his local press officer. As Lead Media Officer for the Methodist Church, Drew spent much of her time on crisis management: “any time there was a crisis that involved Methodist Church anywhere in Great Britain, I would get the phone call.” However, she describes her work as “primarily, kind of, trying to sell our good news stories,” particularly through “campaigns on public issues.” These campaigns were operated by a joint team involving several Protestant denominations: the Methodists, the Baptists, the United Reformed Church and later the Church 53

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of Scotland. As an example, Drew mentions a campaign working to challenge government policy by commissioning reports to uncover “the lies they tell in the media about people on benefits, you know, they’re all [buying] flat screen TVs and drinking cider.” Drew’s role was to persuade journalists that these reports were newsworthy. That was not easy: “selling a good news church story to the national press is always pretty tough.” Other media projects were more experimental: We were the first national church to get podcasting, and that happened because my boss said to me have you ever done any podcasting? When I was a couple of weeks in, and I said no. And he said, do you wanna try? And I said yeah. And we just did it. When I asked why it was important for the Methodist Church to engage with the national media, scandal is the first issue Drew highlights: “if you’re handling crises, it’s better that you’re present in the story than absent.” More broadly, she argues, while “engagement with the media is never an end in itself,” “good communications pay off. It’s a basic principle. If you communicate with people, if you’ve got good news stories to tell, it’s worth it.” The denomination hoped “to demonstrate that here was a church that still had a cause, that still had a vision, that still had life and was making a huge difference in its communities in all kinds of ways.” The Church of England is a larger religious organization with more resources and a less centralized approach to media. Each diocese has its own communications officer and strategy. In Canterbury, Drew explains, media work focuses less on campaigns than on stories: “we’ve got news stories we can tell about food banks, about community hubs, about church communities that have grown up out of groups of marginalized people.” To turn one of these activities into something the media will cover, Drew says, “you have to imagine it in the outlet, you have to imagine where it will end up and then work back.” “You have to think through who’s going to be interested in this, how does it fit their particular agenda,” and then craft the story idea and presentation to fit. Drew’s approach to selling stories draws on her long experience and extensive networks in the media industry and she peppers our conversation with references to the interests and careers of specific journalists and broadcasters. Her exact approach can vary: “if it’s a story that doesn’t need much effort behind it, so a journalist can just pick up the press release and run with it as it is, then I prep a press release,” although it would also be crucial to “make sure we’ve got some good images to accompany it.” For a more high-profile story, “if I’m looking to sell it nationally, I might do some serious research about which particular correspondents would cover a particular story,” building up lists for each campaign. At the same time, the specific needs of the religious press have to be considered: You’ve got to bear in mind that your heartland as a church press officer is the Christian press, so make sure they see it coming, make sure you’re mindful of their deadlines. For example, Christian press in terms of print publications tends to be weekly, or monthly or quarterly if we’re looking further afield, so don’t put a press release out on a Wednesday afternoon if you want The Church Times to pick it up, because they’re going to print at that moment. So make sure you get the easy wins, and then work to get the harder ones. National attention is sometimes the goal, but Drew works most closely with local news. “The local news angle is really positive,” she explained, because “local newspapers are looking for 54

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good news stories with nice pictures, they will bite your hand off.” Local news is “really important in terms of what we do”: Being able to speak into those communities, having a voice in those newspapers, being able to demonstrate that we are doing good things, as I said with the Methodist Church, it demonstrates that we care about our community, that we are current, that we have something to offer. At the same time, Drew suggests that local journalists now cover so many beats that “religious literacy generally is pretty low,” particularly for younger, less experienced journalists “who are less likely to have a frame of reference in relation to the church.” This can mean that the Church has to offer “a bit of help” to make sure the nuance of a religious story is fully understood. The widespread adoption of social media has in some ways impacted Drew’s work. She notes that digital connectivity “speeds everything up,” forcing journalists to publish more quickly and leaving the Church open to unexpected public controversies. Nonetheless, Drew is adamant that the sharing of news through digital media could never replace professional journalism. Her argument in defense of journalism draws heavily on the watchdog model: It’s about trusting your sources and stuff, we always need independent reporting. It’s an essential part of democratic society. […] Journalism both holds us to account and advocates for us, I think. […] When you are the Established Church, as the Church of England is, it’s even more important, really, that someone is there holding us to account. […] We need good journalism, whatever the platform, and while I would love it if people would just hoover up all the good stuff we put out there, it’s not an honest society really, if that’s the only option.

Journalism and the Coptic Orthodox Church: second case study My second interviewee, Anba Angaelos, has been a bishop in the Coptic Orthodox Church in Britain since 1999. He became the first Coptic Archbishop of London in 2017. His personal website (BishopAngaelos.org 2013) lists a raft of awards and roles, including involvement in dialogue between Christian churches, dialogue between Christians and Muslims and patronage of charities focused on the Middle East. In our interview, Archbishop Angaelos claims that “I never set out to engage with media.”2 Instead, “the relationship has been quite gradual,” driven in part by the urgent need of journalists for reliable insight into the religious situation in Egypt and the Middle East. He initially began using Twitter in 2010 to publish a daily theological reflection, but when “things started to happen in Egypt, and Coptic Christians were particularly targeted, […] we then started to get questions from online and mainstream media.” Over time, he explains, “slowly but surely I think we built up a sense of credibility in the eyes of media sources, and they started to take on our statements, and it then developed from there, being approached by various people to comment.” According to Angaelos, his media credibility also relies on the careful, measured and balanced tone of his communications. His advocacy for religious freedom, for example, wins attention because “it’s not just the tribal message for our own, but a general message across the board, of what it means to be a free human being and a person who’s allowed to choose.” 55

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While the message is for everyone, Angaelos justifies the communication principles of balance and calm within the theological resources of the Christian tradition: The message of Christianity to me is one of hope and strength and resilience, but it’s also one of truth and honesty, and I feel that even that truth and that honesty need to be done with a level of grace and respect. And that’s the balance we try to maintain […] I think people can work through that, rather than dealing with extreme emotional outbursts, or a sense of brokenness or a sense of, I think, uncontrolled anger, it’s that mix that I think people appreciate. Angaelos’ enthusiasm for the media is blended with caution. His Church has been misrepresented in British and international media, he explains, although he would only give examples off the record. In his opinion, these mistakes are “often just out of ignorance or a lack of sufficient research. I don’t think any of it is particularly intentional” – although, he then admitted, in some cases he did feel that mistakes had been made deliberately. Nonetheless, even accidental mistakes matter: Here in the UK, sometimes if you put out something that is not so precise, it may be a little bit annoying, but doesn’t have any long-term effect in most cases. Whereas in situations like our own, as a numeric minority in a majority Muslim area […] if we are misquoted or misrepresented it could actually be quite literally life-threatening. To improve the accuracy of representations of religion, journalists, reporters and producers should be “taking the time to do their research and reaching out to legitimate sources before putting things out.” As his own media credibility increases, he feels that instances of inaccuracy are “probably decreasing, because people now have an avenue, they know where to come and who to go to, and they can, if they care to, get some precise details and information that is true.” Meanwhile, social media is central to Angaelos’s communication strategy. “Mainstream media wouldn’t be remotely interested in what I do on a daily basis,” he argues: His church is unfamiliar to British audiences and his daily routine of meetings is rarely newsworthy. Through social media, in contrast, he now has followers “who may never have heard of the Coptic Orthodox Church” or “may never have had a proper way in to reach the Orthodox Church to know who we are and what we stand for and what we have to say.” Social media “gives me an ability to share the things that I feel are important to share with people” and that “gives people a little bit of an insight into what I do and what we do as a church and what we hope to be in our very varied world.” Archbishop Angaelos also perceives some limitations and dangers in online communication. Social media brings increased visibility: there are, you know, billions of critics out there now, and something one does or one says or the way one acts can be picked up and commented on, and so it’s very important to realize that we’re always in the public sphere. This demands greater standards of honesty, but it also facilitates new kinds of deception: People find it acceptable to take clips and captions out of context and put them up in certain ways. So there is also that concern, of everyone being potential journalists and everyone being able to take anything and put it up in any way they choose. 56

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Journalism and the Muslim Council of Britain: third case study My final interviewee takes a completely different approach to the media and its representation of his religious community. Since 2016, Miqdaad Versi has recorded each reference to Islam in the British media. He fact-checks each story and submits a formal complaint if he finds an inaccuracy. This project began as a personal mission and is now funded by charitable grants to support paid staff members as part of the overall mission of the Muslim Council of Britain, where Versi’s previous role was as Assistant Secretary General. The MCB was founded in 1997 and is now the largest Muslim umbrella organization in the UK, with over 500 affiliated bodies (MCB 2018a). Its website lists the Centre for Media Monitoring run by Versi as one of its nine core projects (MCB 2018b). The Guardian has described Miqdaad Versi’s work as “a quixotic – and always scrupulously courteous – campaign against the endless errors and distortions in news about British Muslims” (Subramanian 2018). It is also, in Versi’s own account, highly successful. Each inaccurate news item is addressed first with a complaint directly to the news source. If that is unsuccessful, Versi then submits a formal complaint to the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO). IPSO is the UK’s main regulator of the press, established in 2014 to adjudicate complaints from members of the public. It operates independently but is funded by member publishers. By the time of our interview, Versi could claim to have received IPSO complaints committee rulings in his favor “more times than any other individual in the country.”3 This record of success is based on intimate familiarity with the complaints process: “I understand how it all works inside out,” he claimed, “I am well attuned to what types of things are likely to win at the complaints committee and what aren’t.” In fact, he had begun submitting recommendations to IPSO to suggest ways to improve their complaints process. According to Versi, the vision of the MCB’s Centre for Media Monitoring “is to encourage responsible reporting about Islam and Muslims.” Throughout our interview, Versi emphasizes the consequences of media coverage. Irresponsible reporting, Versi argues, is a fundamental betrayal of the media’s social function: I see the role of the media as a whole as to hold power to account, to inform and educate, and to report generally, but always in a responsible manner […] If there is any topic that is consistently talked about, and the public misunderstands the context in which it is talked about, then there is a duty on the journalist to ensure that the reader or the listener or the viewer understands and is not misled by the reporting that takes place. I think that’s the key thing for me. Citing academic studies, Versi argues that the media is “creating an atmosphere of hostility against Muslims” in Britain by repeating, corroborating and amplifying anti-Muslim myths and stereotypes. This “huge failure of many media organizations, print and broadcast,” he argues, has distorted public understanding of and attitudes toward Muslims and “played an important role in the rise of the far right.” Versi also diagnosed the causes of media error in our interview, differentiating between the key factors undermining accuracy in print and broadcast news. In British broadcast media, Versi identifies trust, balance and context as the key challenges. British broadcast news is trusted more highly by the public than print and, according to state regulations, must be impartial. However, news programs will frequently invite guests to discuss the headlines of the day. Too often, Versi argued, news programs attempt to find balance and provoke a 57

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watchable conversation by inviting a representative of a controversial and extreme position on air, hoping that the program’s presenter will be well informed and quick enough to explain who the interviewee is, put their views in context and challenge any inaccurate or prejudicial statements. In practice, this exposure tends to have three negative consequences: [Far right extremists] firstly end up being normalized, second they end up saying a whole load of things which […] often are anti-Muslim and aren’t challenged, and thirdly the random guy in the audience ends up misled about who this individual is, what he represents and what he says in other platforms, because they see him on the BBC or Sky and therefore think of him as a reasonable character. Versi argues that both Muslim extremists and anti-Muslim extremists are well aware of how much they can gain from appearing on television, even in a hostile interview. In this game of media exposure, he suggests, the media themselves have often been outwitted and outmaneuvered. One of Versi’s examples is Anjem Choudary, imprisoned in the UK in 2016 for encouraging support of Islamic State: Most journalists I have spoken to have admitted that the way that Anjem Choudary manipulated the media in his day was bad and did a disservice to the viewer. Because he would literally just call up every time something happened, he used to call them up and say the most controversial thing possible so he could get on TV. He built his network, he had no mosque, he had no Muslim institutions, he had no way of people knowing who he was, social media was there but it wasn’t that big, he was basically a nobody. The only way he could become a somebody is because all these organizations, the media organizations, gave him a platform and then he was able to basically create al-Muhajiroun and these really quite disgusting groups because he knew how to play the media game, and the media was played by him. For many British viewers, Versi argues, Choudary might have been the only Muslim they ever saw, encouraging them to use one individual to form their understanding of Islam as a whole. In print journalism, Versi places more of the blame on journalists themselves. There are three causes of error, he proposes: the explicit bias of “people who have a very clear antiMuslim perspective,” the unconscious bias of people who have internalized false ideas about Islam and so are willing to believe and publish stories that anyone with direct experience of Muslims would consider highly implausible and the accidental errors committed by people who are “not doing due diligence” because of the pressure to publish quickly. Each source of error requires a different solution. To address unconscious bias, Versi calls for “basic religious literacy and understanding,” backed up by a greater willingness to “engage with the experts.” Addressing the other kinds of error, however, requires “a stronger stick”: increased penalties for newspapers and journalists who publish mistakes. When newspapers are forced to publish corrections, Versi suggests that social media companies could be required to ensure that everyone who was exposed to the original article via online sharing also gets to see the correction. When it comes to “agenda-driven journalism,” “there needs to be greater accountability for journalists”: individuals who make repeated errors should face consequences. Journalists who deliberately mislead the public by withholding information and misrepresenting Muslims are undermining the integrity of their whole profession: “They should be fired! I mean I’m sorry, this is the very basics of journalism.” 58

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Conclusion As these interviews remind us, different religious organizations – at least in the UK – experience different levels of media awareness, interest and hostility and respond by deploying different financial and human resources to enhance their media presence. However, different organizations also develop different understandings of the role and function of the news. This understanding contributes to their perception of the specific opportunities and challenges presented to that organization by the media and the most effective solutions for achieving their media goals. Religious literacy training for journalists, for example, may seem like an attractive option to religious groups operating a puppy dog theory of journalism, but it seems an ineffective distraction to groups influenced by the hunting dog theory. Anna Drew’s approach reflects the working dog theory, developing and selling stories using her expert knowledge of editorial interests and publication cycles. Drew also stressed the value of the independent, professional press as the watchdog of society, with only a brief acknowledgment of the need to teach new puppy dog journalists a bit more about religious context and nuance. Drew’s work benefits from a general public interest in, nostalgia for and positive attitude toward her Church, suggesting a residual relevance for the guard dog approach. While it might be hard to sell some of the messages her organization most wants to promote, Drew can still rely on journalists to be eager for good pictures and entertaining local stories. Archbishop Angaelos operates in a very different situation, representing a minority church that few British journalists know much about. Angaelos has slowly established himself as a reliable and quotable expert source on newsworthy matters of international conflict and politics and uses this status to campaign for religious freedom. Like Drew, Angaelos adopts a working dog understanding of the press, developing his own skills as a media communicator and emphasizing the importance of accuracy, tone and audience for effective partnerships with journalists. These two interviews differ most strikingly in their understanding of journalistic error: While Drew made a light-hearted reference to journalists forgetting the difference between vicars and ministers, Angaelos argued from personal experience that media mistakes in the UK could endanger lives in his community in Egypt. Overall, he suggested, these mistakes were usually simple errors, made possible by inadequate research – a failure in the working practices of journalists. Our third interviewee, Miqdaad Versi, was more openly critical. Our interview was filled with references to error-filled headlines, academic studies demonstrating media bias and the careers of particularly egregious offenders. Like Angaelos, Versi was convinced that media mistakes had real consequences, but Versi was more willing to invoke the hunting dog theory of deliberate and aggressive media bias and called for strong penalties and punishments to raise the standards of journalism. The watchdog theory did feature briefly in our interview, but Versi moved on quickly to emphasize the importance of accurate media representation for public education. Versi’s approach to the working dog theory of journalism leaves space for competition between journalists and sources: Individual communicators had at times outwitted media producers, using their programs to promote extremist Muslim and anti-Muslim positions. Journalists, he argued, need to learn more about how to frame debates, challenge errors on air and produce news with positive social impact. The three interviewees all agreed that social media allowed them to communicate directly with audiences and share perspectives excluded from mainstream media. Drew and Angaelos pointed out that social media made communication between journalists and religious experts much easier, and both expressed concern over their experiences of online criticism. There were also differences between the interviews, particularly over the impact of social media on 59

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the role and function of journalism. Drew argued that social media was insufficient as a news source, suggesting that society would suffer if the watchdog role of the professional journalist was undermined. For Versi, in contrast, social media had a responsibility to act as a watchdog against the press, by drawing attention to errors and enforced corrections. This chapter has argued that studies of religion and the news need to pay much more attention to what religious organizations think about journalism and the strategies those organizations are employing to get their messages into the mainstream news. Studies of media representations of religion are valuable, but they do not capture the kinds of work being done behind the scenes on behalf of religious organizations by media specialists like Drew, Angaelos and Versi. Religious organizations are trying to understand the media more deeply, training themselves to communicate more effectively and ultimately seeking to improve the accuracy, favorability and impact of their media representation. More and larger studies of independent and organization-sponsored religious communicators, including studies in different world regions not reflected in this present chapter, will be needed before we can begin to understand the full complexity of the relationship between religious organizations, religious entrepreneurs and the news media.

Notes 1 Anna Drew, 2018. Interview. Interviewed by Tim Hutchings [Telephone], 13 June. 2 Archbishop Anba Angaelos, 2018. Interview. Interviewed by Tim Hutchings [Telephone], 11 May. 3 Miqdaad Versi, 2019. Interview. Interviewed by Tim Hutchings [Telephone], 18 January.

Further readings Mitchell, J. and Gower, O., eds., 2012. Religion and the News. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited. This edited collection brings together academics, journalists and religious communicators to share different perspectives on religious news. Essays are diverse and provocative, making this an excellent text for class discussion. Munnik, M., 2017. From Voice to Voices: Identifying a Plurality of Muslim Sources in the News Media. Media, Culture & Society, 39(2), 270–281. In this study of Muslim communities in Glasgow, Michael Munnik identifies a recent shift in how Muslims appear in the news, away from an old gatekeeper model in which one voice is expected to speak for the whole community toward a new diversity of representation. Very few research projects have tried to examine the work that religious individuals and organizations do in order to win the attention of journalists, so this is a groundbreaking study. Street, J., 2011. Mass Media, Politics and Democracy. 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. This textbook introduces key approaches to journalism and politics, including (particularly in Chapter 7) a discussion of the classic metaphors of watchdog and lapdog journalism. Zeiler, X., 2018. Digital Journalistic Uses of the Terms “sacred” and “trivial”: Online Press Releases on Portrayals of Hindu Deities in the USA. Religion, Media and Digital Culture, 8(3), 300–319. Xenia Zeiler’s study of Rajan Zed and the Universal Society of Hinduism analyzes a corpus of press releases to explore how a religious minority can win publicity and drive the media agenda. Where Munnik examines diverse voices in one region, Zeiler examines diverse discourses and tactics used by one individual.

References Beckett, C., 2016. Networked Religion. In: Mitchell, J. and Gower, O., eds., Religion and the News. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 99–106. BishopAngaelos.org, 2013. BishopAngaelos.org. Available at http://www.bishopangaelos.org/, accessed 3 July 2019.

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Role and function of journalism for religious organizations Bosch, M. D., 2018. The Vaticanologists: Covering the Holy See. In: Cohen, Y., ed. Spiritual News: Reporting Religion around the World. New York: Peter Lang, 77–90. Clark, L. S. and Dierberg, J., 2012. Late-night Comedy as a Source of Religion News. In: Winston, D., ed. The Oxford Handbook of Religion and the American News Media. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 97–112. Donnelly, S. and Inglis, T., 2010. The media and the Catholic Church in Ireland: Reporting Clerical Child Sex Abuse. Journal of Contemporary Religion, 25(1), 1–19. Donohue, G., Tichenor, P. and Olien, C., 1995. A Guard Dog Perspective on the Role of Media. Journal of Communication, 45(2), 115–132. Elahi, F. and Kahn, O., 2017. Islamophobia: Still a Challenge for Us All. London: Runnymede Trust. Gledhill, R., 2012. Mirrors to the World. In: Mitchell, J. and Gower, O., eds. Religion and the News. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 89–98. Hussain, M., 2012. Islam and the news. In: Mitchell, J. and Gower, O., eds. Religion and the News. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 129–138. Kahn, H., 2018. Prologue: The Vision Behind Muslim Voices. In: Pennington, R. and Kahn, H., eds. On Islam: Muslims and the Media. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 3–8. Knott, K., Poole, E. and Taira, T., 2013. Media Portrayals of Religion and the Secular Sacred: Representation and Change. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited. Landau, C., 2012. What the Media Thinks about Religion: A Broadcast Perspective. In: Mitchell, J. and Gower, O., eds. Religion and the News, Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 79–88. MCB, 2018a. Muslim Council of Britain, ABOUT. Available at https://mcb.org.uk/about/, accessed 3 July 2019. MCB, 2018b. Muslim Council of Britain, PROJECTS. Available at https://mcb.org.uk/projects/, accessed 3 July 2019. Mitchell, J. and Afshari, S., this volume. Reporting Refugees: The Theory and Practice of Developing Journalistic Religious Literacy. In: Radde-Antweiler, K. and Zeiler, X., eds. The Routledge Handbook of Religion and Journalism. Abingdon: Routledge. Mitchell, J. and Gower, O., eds., 2012. Religion and the News. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited. Munnik, M., 2018. A Field Theory Perspective on Journalist-Source Relations: A Study of “New Entrants” and “Authorized Knowers” among Scottish Muslims. Sociology, 52(6), 1169–1184. Pennington, R. and Kahn, H., eds., 2018. On Islam: Muslims and the Media. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Pepinster, C., 2012. Religion and the specialist press. In: Mitchell, J. and Gower, O., eds. Religion and the News. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 107–116. Radde-Antweiler, K., Grünenthal, H. and Gogolok, S., 2018. “Blogging Sometimes Leads to Dementia, Doesn’t It?” The Roman Catholic Church in Times of Deep Mediatization. In: Hepp, A., Breiter, A. and Hasebrink, U., eds. Communicative Figurations: Transforming Communications in Times of Deep Mediatization. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 267–286. Religion Media Centre, 2018. Religion Media Centre. Available at https://religionmediacentre.org.uk/, accessed 3 July 2019. Sabato, L., 1991. Feeding Frenzy: How Attack Journalism has Transformed American Politics. New York: The Free Press. Said, E., 1997 [1981]. Covering Islam: How the West and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World. Abingdon: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Subramanian, S., 2018. One Man’s (Very Polite) Fight Against Media Islamophobia. The Guardian, [online] 18 October. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/oct/18/miqdaadversi-very-polite-fight-against-british-media-islamophobia, accessed 3 July 2019. The Sandford St Martin Trust, n.d. Sandford St Martin Trust. Available at https://sandfordawards.org. uk/, accessed 3 July 2019. De Tocqueville, A., 1840. Democracy in America Volume II. London: Saunders and Ottley. Winston, D. ed., 2012. The Oxford Handbook of Religion and the American News Media. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wooley, P., 2012. A Relationship Worth Getting Right. In: Mitchell, J. and Gower, O., eds. Religion and the News. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 61–78. Zeiler, X., 2018. Digital Journalistic Uses of the Terms “sacred” and “trivial”: Online Press Releases on Portrayals of Hindu Deities in the USA. Religion, Media and Digital Culture, 8(3), 300–319.

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5 GENDER, RELIGION AND THE PRESS IN SCANDINAVIA Mia Lövheim

Introduction: media, gender and religion – the Scandinavian context In the eyes of the world, the Scandinavian countries might seem like a peculiar case. Denmark, Norway and Sweden are small in size: In 2017 the total population was around 21 million. At the same time, these countries, in international studies such as the World Values Survey (Institute for FUTURE STUDIES n.d.), rank secular-rational and self-expression values higher than other participating countries, as well as trust in other people and in core institutions of society. Furthermore, Iceland, Norway, Finland and Sweden are ranked among the top five countries with regard to gender equality (World Economic Forum 2017). This combination of individual self-expression, social trust and gender equality is mirrored by a model of organizing society where states provide public services in return for relatively high taxes, such as free public education through the university level, a national health care system and paid leave from work for both parents of infants (Engelstad, Larsen and Rogstad 2017). An important backdrop for this model is a history of cultural homogeneity and relative stability in terms of political and economic conditions during the 20th century (see further Lundby and Repstad 2018). These particularities of Scandinavian societies with state intervention and subsidies include all areas of the public sphere. Norwegian media scholars Trine Syvertsen, Enli, Mjøs and Moe (2014, 17) argue that the Scandinavian welfare state models the media system in several ways. The media are considered as communication services that offer public goods. This legitimizes extensive subsidies to stimulate and ensure a diversity of political opinions in the media. Editorial freedom is secured through self-governance by the media professional associations and by law. Freedom of expression has been enshrined in the law in all of the Scandinavian countries for more than 150 years, with Sweden’s law from 1766 being the first of its kind in the world. Government policies for public service media secure diversity and quality of media productions. In sum, the media is considered a main stakeholder in democratic deliberation. This chapter will focus on journalism in the daily press. The Scandinavian media model has contributed to a relatively strong position for the daily press. In 2017, 56 percent of the Swedish population read a newspaper daily, on paper or digital media (Nordicom 2018). High levels of readership and the role of the media in the democratic system have also 62

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contributed to maintain a significant position for the daily press in political deliberation, in particular the editorial pages (Nord 2001). This position of daily newspapers is, however, rapidly changing due to the increasing use of digital media in the populations, particularly among youth.

Religion: increasing diversity and contestation The Scandinavian countries have since the 16th century been predominantly Christian countries. The institution of Evangelical-Lutheran state churches formally supported and regulated by the state has only recently changed through a formal separation in Sweden 2000 and Norway 2017 (Furseth 2018). Thus, despite high levels of secular-rational values among Scandinavian populations strong collective cultural-religious traditions are present. Membership in the former state churches still encompass between two-thirds and three-quarters of the population. This historical cultural and religious homogeneity has, however, changed toward a larger religious diversity, primarily visible through the entry of immigrants from Muslim majority countries. Sweden, in particular, received high numbers of refugees from the war in Syria culminating in 2015 (Swedish Migration Agency 2018). As in other European countries, tensions over immigration have increased in Scandinavia during the last decades. The public visibility of Islam gives rise to new political conflicts, primarily over issues of migration and integration, but also concerning the role of religion in society. There is an increased tendency to politicize religion in Nordic parliamentary debates, which started in the late 1990s (Lövheim et al. 2018). In these debates, primarily the right-wing nationalist and populist parties criticize Islam as a threat to security and to national identity and culture. Issues concerning national culture and values are increasingly thematized through a selective embracing of Christianity as civilizational identity, connected to modern, progressive and liberal values such as gender and sexual identity (Brubaker 2017, 14). The growing diversity of the Scandinavian religious landscape is also mirrored in changes in press coverage of religion over time. As will be discussed further below media debates have primarily come to focus on the accommodation of increased religious diversity, where issues such as the use of headscarves among Muslim women in public spaces and gender equality is a prominent theme.

Religion and gender in the press In studies of how gender is depicted in the media, representations of women has been a strong theme (Gill 2007, 11). Semiotics analysis building on the tradition of structuralism and second wave feminist theory were until the late 1980s dominant approaches for analyzing how texts produce meaning and reproduce dominant ideologies of femininity and masculinity. Since the early 1990s, a broader variety of theories and topics has emerged, aiming to understand the diversity and complexity of gender as expressed in society and culture. Studies drawing on theories of intersectionality and performance have brought up the significance of race and heterosexuality for understanding normative portrayals of gender in media texts. Furthermore, studies of gender in the media have also been enriched by research focusing on normativity and complexity in the representations of men and masculinity in media (see further Kearney 2012). This chapter will focus on representations of women and religion. Previous research in this area has uncovered three salient themes. These are the underrepresentation of women, stereotypical representations of men and women as well as representations that reiterate 63

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asymmetrical power relations between men and women. Gail Tuchman (1978) used the concept of symbolic annihilation to describe patters of omission, trivialization and condemnation of women in the media. Despite the fact that women have gained a stronger representation in several public sectors of society, such as politics, these aspects are still applicable to studies of representations of women within news journalism. A report requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini 2013, 20) concludes that in the European countries, only a fourth of the subjects in the news are female. To some extent, coverage of gender in the media has moved beyond simple or crude stereotyping to account for more nuanced and complex expressions of gender identities in society, but there is still a need for more subtle models of analysis (Ross 2010). The pattern of omission and stereotypical representation of women as subjects and sources is also salient with regard to the covering of religion in the daily press. It might seem odd that even if most church attenders in the Western world are women (Pew Research Center 2016), women are largely missing in the news. Joyce Smith (2013) presents several reasons for why this might be the case. One reason for this fact is that journalists are trained to seek out the official point of view and since most recognized official representatives of religion tend to be men, men dominate media stories involving leadership, authority and accountability. Another reason for the underrepresentation of women and religion in news media has to do with practices within journalism that develop over time with reporting on a particular issue or area (a so-called beat) and the status assigned to various areas covered in journalistic practice. One example is the division between hard and soft news stories (Smith 2013, 75). Religion tended for a long time to be a marginalized area in journalism, along with socalled women or family issues. Furthermore, religion tended to be associated with issues that has been regarded as soft or light, both with regard to content and styles of reporting. Soft stories are contrasted to hard news stories that focus on immediate events with serious consequences, such as accidents and crime, often written in a straightforward manner. Soft news stories are not as immediate and may be written in a less formal style focusing on personal experiences and emotional aspects (Smith 2013, 75). When religion is covered in soft stories topics such as family life, sexuality, emotions and personal relationships are frequent. This kind of journalism thereby builds on and reiterates stereotypical conceptions of the position and interests of men and women in society, as well as of masculinity and femininity. In the case of news on religion, conceptions of religion as soft news in terms of content and style of reporting, along with religion being a marginalized area, contributed to making stories of women in religion a marginalized topic. This coverage also reflects a secularist understanding of religion as belonging in the personal and private, domestic sphere rather than in the public and political sphere of society. As other chapters in this volume show, religion as a theme in journalism has during the last three decades changed from being a marginalized topic to pervade reporting in domestic politics and foreign affairs, areas that represent hard news (Mitchell and Gower 2012). This change implies that reporting on religion become shaped by news valuation criteria of immediacy, conflict and economic or political consequences. Does this shift also change the reporting on gender and religion? During the latest decades, European media discourse on religion and gender has been dominated by coverage of Muslim women wearing the hijab or other forms of head coverings such as niqab or burqa (Reilly 2011). Most studies of this increased visibility of religion in newspaper coverage confirm previous patterns of stereotypical representations of gender and religion (Morey and Yaqin 2011, Ahmed and Matthes 2017, 233). An example is Elisabeth Klaus and Susanne Kassel’s (2005) analysis of the representation of women in Germany’s two 64

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leading news magazines Der Spiegel and Focus before and after the war in Afghanistan 2001. As will be further discussed below, their analysis shows how Muslim men are presented as violent perpetrators and Muslim women as mute victims of oppression in need of liberation from a patriarchal and violent religion (Klaus and Kassel 2005, 345, 350). These patterns are confirmed in several later studies of, for example, news reporting in the USA (Mishra 2007, Byng 2010) and in the British (Williamson 2014) and Flemish press (Broos and Van Den Bulck 2012, 118). This quote from an opinion article by Ghena Krayem, senior lecturer at Sydney Law School, the University of Sydney, published by the Guardian in May 2018, illustrates the experience of misrepresentation by news media among Muslim women. For some, we are a caricature to be shaped and moulded to fit an image already constructed. For others, we are the nameless victims in a saviour story where the saviour – a hero or heroine – is more important and consequential than the supposed victim. For yet others, we are academic subjects analysed within a theory designed to validate conclusions already reached. All too rarely are Muslim women acknowledged as living breathing beings, with real voices of our own. Voices that are often raised but rarely heard, let alone listened to. For many Muslim women, to be the understudy in your own story, to be relegated to the wings of life’s stage while others say your lines for you, is our reality. (Krayem 2018)

Theory: representation, framing and mediatization Why does coverage of religion and gender in the daily press seem to follow and repeat these patterns? A key concept to understand this process is representation; the process by which meaning is produced and exchanged between members of a culture through the use of language, signs and images which stand for or represent things (Hall 1997). As this definition shows, the use of language and images in the media to give meaning to things is a process that involves production of information as well as exchange of meaning between members of a culture. Both of these aspects are important to understand similarities as well as differences and possible shifts in press coverage of religion and gender. Mitchell and Gower (2012, 7) describe four approaches to the coverage of religion in news: focusing on the story, the context, the journalist and the audience. Framing is a useful concept to understand how news journalism works to produce information through constructing a story. Framing can be described as the process to “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient” in order to “promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman 1993, 51–52). Frames can be identified through the use of certain keywords, phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, etc., that “provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments” (Entman 1993, 51–52). Frames produce particular meanings through representing things in particular ways, but also through connecting them to a “repertoire of themes and stories” (Ettema 2005, 133) exchanged among members in a culture. Mediatization is a theory that focus on the “long-term interrelation processes between media change on the one hand and social and cultural change on the other” (Hepp, Hjarvard and Lundby 2010, 223). Mediatization theory places instances of representation and framing in particular media texts in a larger context. A key concept in theories of mediatization is media logic. Media logic on a general level refers to the technological but also institutional and aesthetic ways of working in particular media institutions (Hjarvard 2012). The focus on 65

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the institutional level means that media logic shapes media reporting on a more general level than the choices and practices of individual journalists. Media logic in news journalism consists of practices of framing, but also of shared professional norms, values and standards that “…reduce uncertainty and provide an overall structure that shapes the behaviour of both the news organizations and individual news journalists” (Asp 2014, 259). Mediatization, furthermore, is a theory focusing on the relation between media and other social institutions in a society. It works from the premise that, in highly modernized societies, technical mass media increasingly come to dominate public discourse and all forms of social interaction. Mediatization of religion, then, describes the processes through which the use of religious symbols in society becomes increasingly influenced by the ways in which various media operate. This implies that, in a society where few individuals have a first-hand experience of religious practice, media framing determines the kind of information that ultimately contribute to public knowledge about particular religions (Stout and Buddenbaum 2003, 2, Lövheim 2012). In what Stig Hjarvard terms journalism on religion (2012), religious content becomes represented by the standards of news journalism, such as newsworthiness, rather than by prescriptions from religious authorities. In this chapter, mediatization theory will be used to connect processes of framing in particular media texts with the logic of journalistic genres such as opinion journalism and feature journalism, and to discuss how media logic intersects with religious, social and political changes in contemporary Swedish society (see further Hjarvard and Lundby 2018).

Representations of religion and women in the Swedish press The particular religious landscape of the Scandinavian societies as dominated by a historical relation between the Lutheran Church and the state, low levels of regular practice of religion in the population and high levels of secular-rational values is mirrored in research about the coverage of religion in the Swedish press. There are few available studies that aim to cover changes over time and that use a comprehensive, quantitative approach. Data from two recent studies that have produced such data about coverage of religion will be used here: a Nordic comparative study1 of coverage of religion in four major newspapers in each country (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden) between the years 1988, 1998 and 2008 (Lundby et al. 2018) and a longitudinal study of the use of religion in editorials from 1976 to 2010 in 11 Swedish daily newspapers2 (Lövheim and Linderman 2015, Linderman and Lövheim 2016). These studies used a similar set of keywords to identify references to religion in the newspaper articles, aiming to cover a broad spectrum of traditions: religion, Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, new forms of spirituality, secularity and religious metaphor. The findings show an increase in references to religion over the period, particularly between 1998 and 2008. Furthermore, there is an increasing diversity in what kind of religious traditions are covered in the press. While articles about protestant Christianity dominate the coverage throughout the period, the number of such articles decrease from the early 1990s while the coverage of Islam increase. In Sweden, this increase in references to Islam is most prominent in editorials, where the number of editorial pages referring to Islam rise from about 3 percent in the period 1976–1980 to almost 12 percent in 2005–2010 (Linderman and Lövheim 2016). Protestant Christianity and Islam are by far the most covered religious traditions. The coverage of Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Sikhism and New religious movements is marginal and does not display any significant tendencies of change. The findings from studies focusing on a more limited time period show that the coverage of religion is more often negative and critical than positive. In a study of 14 daily newspapers 66

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between September 2008 and March 2009, the majority of articles that were coded as depicting religion in a positive way concerned Protestant Christianity, while less than 10 percent of the articles covering Islam were positive (Engstrand and Nordlander 2009, 15). A later study in 2015 focusing on images of Islam and presumed Muslims in Swedish news media (Axner 2015) categorized the majority of articles in the press as appearing in foreign news coverage and representing Islam in a generalizing manner connected to themes of terrorism, violence and extremism. These studies also show that the representation of religion is gendered. The findings from the Swedish studies follow the patterns identified in international research where men dominate the coverage of religion, mostly in articles about Islam, Catholicism and Judaism. News reporting repeatedly uses certain frames in order to bring out the news value of an event, such as conflict, economic consequences and the attribution of responsibility. These frames are often constructed as narratives, in which actors are assigned oppositional roles such as perpetrators and victims (Figenschou, Thorbjørnsrud and Larsen 2015, 130). In her study of the coverage of Islam in Swedish media, Axner (2015, 47) used a categorization of individuals or groups portrayed as perpetrators of violence, victims of violence or as actors contributing in a constructive way to a situation. She found that Muslims or presumed Muslims were often represented in a generalizing manner, as a group, and more often portrayed as perpetrators than as victims or as having constructive agency. Men are more often categorized as perpetrators and women as victims.

Framing of religion, women and equality in Swedish editorials In order to illustrate how theories of representation and framing can be used to analyze the coverage of gender and religion in the Swedish press, we will now proceed to discuss a couple of examples from the longitudinal Swedish study of editorials. Representations differ according to genre, for example, news media, feature material and opinion articles such as editorials and op-eds. The editorial is a journalistic genre that reviews and critically discusses opinions in national and international politics. It represents the newspapers’ opinion on an issue and is often written by senior editorial staff, and thus not signed by a particular name. The editorial can therefore be described as evaluative rather than strictly following news criteria. These features, however, make editorials an appropriate case for studying framing in terms of interpretation and evaluation of news events in the context of broader social and political issues (Nord 2001). As described earlier, frames can be identified through certain keywords, phrases or stereotyped images that supply “thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments” ( Entman 1993, 51–52). In this study, clusters of connections between religion and gender were identified using keywords referring to various expressions of religion (see above), as well as the keywords woman, women and equality. Thirty of 481 texts in the study contained a combination of keywords referring to religion, woman/women and equality. Four main clusters were identified in these texts. The first cluster focused on religion as threat to women’s rights and to equality. This cluster is the largest one and contains ten articles, of which seven refers to Islam. The second cluster contained seven articles and concerned the theme women as victims of or symbols for religious violence. The third cluster, which contained seven articles, focused on gender equality and the role of religious organizations in supporting or resisting such values. The fourth and smallest cluster of four articles focused on religion as a source of women’s rights. The first three clusters can be seen as thematically reinforcing each other in terms of the events reported and the evaluations of them given in the editorial. These clusters can thereby 67

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be described as constituting a dominant frame with sub frames. The dominant theme is religion as a problem in terms of threatening women’s rights, such as the right to education, freedom of speech and contributing to forced circumcision and veiling. The facts or events used to construct the frame are most frequently taken from various situations of conflict in the Middle East: the revolution in Iran 1979, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan 2001 and the government of the Islamist movement Hamas in Gaza 2006. This quote illustrates this tendency through discussing the possibility of Hamas regulating “(…) alcohol, understandings of gender equality and other things included in a free society” (Kvällsposten 2006). Most of the examples of women becoming victims of religious violence concern Islam, but other religious traditions are also included. Several texts, for example, use the underrepresentation of women in various Christian organizations as an example of the discrimination of women in society. A second step in analyzing framing of religion and gender concerns identifying problem definitions, interpretations, evaluations and recommendations promoted by media texts. In the dominant frame described above, women’s positions are primarily depicted as victims of religiously infused violence or as symbols of gender discrimination within particular religions. Moving on to framing as prescribing certain evaluations of and recommendations for the handling of a situation, the editorials in the dominant frame describe the situation as a clash between Swedish cultural norms and the values that immigrants from other countries and religious traditions bring with them regarding the position of women. This is exemplified through the following quotes from an editorial in the largest Swedish daily newspaper Dagens Nyheter, 17 January 2000. The editorial (Dagens Nyheter 2000) opens with the following statement: “Respect for cultural difference is central in the encounter with immigrants, but this respect does not mean that every behavior is accepted.”3 In the following sentence, this argument is further developed: “(…) one area where the Swedish norm system often clashes with that which some immigrants bring with them from their home country: namely the position of women” (Dagens Nyheter 2000). Another example can be found in an editorial in Dagens Nyheter (Hedvall 2001), which argues that women in Afghanistan need to “regain the possibility to work, freedom of movement and proper education and freedom from religious oppression. For this they need the support of governments in other parts of the world.”

Framing: media logic and shared themes and stories In order to understand the role of the problem definitions, interpretations and recommendations offered in the Swedish editorials, we need to move to the third step in framing analysis. This concerns how frames work through connecting particular representations to a repertoire of shared themes and stories in a particular culture. As described in the section on theory, media logic refers to shared professional norms, values and standards or ways of working that over time develop in particular media institutions. These shared values and standards are, however, not detached from the shared ways of making sense of oneself and society that over time become established in a society, in other words the repertoire of shared themes and stories to which particular frames are connected. Klaus and Kassel’s (2005, 337) analysis of patterns of representing Muslim women in German foreign news reporting on the war in Afghanistan 2005 is an example of such connections between representations and dominant ways of framing that can be identified in particular newspaper articles, and shared themes and stories in a society. As described above, news reporting often works through focusing on conflicts and antagonists. In the case of reporting on a war, this news media logic intersects with the ways in which a society establish 68

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shared understandings concerning when violent actions such as military operations can be accepted. Such understandings can more easily be seen as legitimate by the public if they are based on a dualistic and simplistic construction of good and evil. In such constructions, dualistic and hierarchical understandings of male and female characteristics and roles are often utilized and might even be reinforced (Klaus and Kassel 2005, 339). Klaus and Kassel find that the veil or headscarf became a key symbol in media reporting from the Afghanistan war through the intersection of what they refer to as three forms of logics or established systems of interpreting the world that are known and shared in a society. These consisted of the news media logic, the logic of legitimizing military actions and gender logic. Images and stories about the veiling of women were used to show how women were oppressed by Muslim men, but also to underpin an image of Taliban as opponents to the ideals and freedoms that were seen as characteristics of Western civilization. Along the same lines, images of unveiled women following the defeat of the Taliban regime were not only used as proofs of their liberation but also served to legitimize the German military intervention in Afghanistan in order to defend the core values of Western civilization. Finally, by portraying the women as in need of liberation from Taliban men by Western military invention the Afghanistan women were represented according to a gender logic where they remained passive victims rather than agents of their own situation. By connecting the logic of news reporting to existing gender relations and to political debates about the involvement of German military in the war in Afghanistan, this kind of analysis anchors an analysis of representation and framing in a particular news event within a wider social and political context. This kind of analysis shows how media representations of religion and gender tend to repeat certain dominant frames in the sense of standardized formats and stereotyped images. It also shows how this media logic interplays with established understandings, shared themes and stories, concerning various religions and nations.

Alternative frames: religion and women’s agency The study of framing in the Swedish editorials presented in the previous section identified one dominant frame made up of three larger clusters and one smaller cluster of texts, which represented a different theme. Articles in this cluster described religion as a source of women’s agency rather than religion, in general, or Islam, in particular, as a threat to the rights of women. Two of these articles base their arguments on examples of Christian churches as carriers of values that concern and support women’s needs. The other two articles discuss and encourage political decisions about Muslim women’s right to wear a veil or burqa in public. With regard to prescribing certain evaluations of and recommendations to handle a situation, a key argument in this frame is that religion needs to be included as a vital part of a pluralistic, democratic society (Lövheim 2017). As the following quote from Sydsvenska Dagbladet (Carlson 2009) shows, the right of Muslim women to wear a veil is presented as a sign of a pluralistic and safe society for all citizens: “this is what a vital plurality is all about: a veiled Muslim woman, a Jew wearing a kippa and a man in full drag queen gear – all of them must be able to feel safe….” The representation in the Swedish editorial of veiled Muslim women as symbol of a vital pluralistic society can be interpreted as a different kind of framing than the problem definitions and interpretations used in the dominant frame. The agency of the woman to express her religious identity through a headscarf is encouraged rather than dismissed as an obstacle to a democratic society. However, the way the article uses the Muslim woman’s headscarf as a symbol of a particular political vision is also problematic in terms of the underlying conventions about women and religion to which it is connected. 69

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We can further analyze this situation by bringing in another common news frame, the human-interest frame. This frame focuses on personalization and emotions and often work through presenting a model case, which serves the function of giving a human face to a political issue (Figenschou, Thorbjørnsrud and Larsen 2015). The human-interest frame is also commonly used in feature stories. A feature story is a longer text that can contain and build on news elements but aims to humanize, give color to, educate or entertain the reader. Axner notes that in feature stories about Islam, actors were more often given a face and agency, and various perspectives on a situation were presented. Also, women were more frequently portrayed in this kind of articles than in the regular news articles (Axner 2015, 58, see also Korteweg 2008). Articles using the human-interest frame can thus reduce the dichotomous model of perpetrators and victims used in hard news stories or editorials through giving a more nuanced presentation of, for example, Muslim women’s identities and agency. However, human-interest stories may also construct new dichotomies through their focus on presenting idealized model cases. In the following section, a feature article published in Dagens Nyheter (Orrenius 2018) will be discussed as an example of this ambiguity inherent in the human-interest frame. The topic of the article is the difficult situation of Swedish Muslims who have lost their faith but cannot exercise their freedom to leave Islam, granted to Swedish citizens, due to fear of punishment. One of the persons interviewed in the article is a young woman who goes by the name Miriam. The article tells the story of how Miriam was brought up in a Muslim family. During most of her childhood, she practiced Islam herself, but gradually she came to question her own faith as well as Islam as a religion. Now she is living a double life, she is secretly a committed atheist but lying to her family and participating in religious practice. Miriam describes her family as not very strict in keeping the commandments of Islam. Still she is afraid of exclusion from her family and even physical violence if she were to reveal her secret. From what she has learnt during her upbringing, leaving Islam is a deadly sin. The article allows Miriam to tell her story with more nuances than the ordinary news article. She is portrayed as an active, reflecting, independent and sensible young woman. A successful student interested in philosophy who on her own initiative found books critical of religion in the public library. A perfect daughter helping her parents and caring for her younger siblings. These characteristics and her story make her into a person that readers of the newspaper can identify with. She is, in many ways, an ideal model of a Swedish young woman: independent, enlightened, critical of dogmatic religion and patriarchal norms in the family. In a quote, she expresses that she “loves secular Sweden” (Orrenius 2018). She has taken off her veil and is critical to what she has learnt in her family, namely that her Muslim identity is to be put “before being a woman, before being Swedish, before being an Arab… before everything!” (Orrenius 2018). However, the portrayal of Miriam also includes an image of believing Muslims in Sweden as different from the Swedish majority population, as living in “bubbles where freedom of religion is not allowed” (Orrenius 2018). One example is how the article describes Miriam’s fear of hell: “Sweden is one of the most secular countries in the world. Miriam knows that many Swedes find it difficult to take in the idea of hell as a concrete place where people are punished through eternal suffering for their acts during life on earth” (Orrenius 2018). While Swedish people find frightening images of hell surreal, the article (Orrenius 2018) continues, this is “logical and normal in families that interpret Islam in the way Miriam’s parents do.” In a quote (Orrenius 2018), Miriam comments that she loves her family: “…there is nothing wrong with my parents, but with religion.” This example illustrates how the use of the human-interest frame for telling the story of a young woman leaving her Muslim faith, on the one hand, may challenge common stereotypes 70

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of Muslim women. On the other hand, this framing repeat stereotypes of practicing Muslims in Swedish society as having beliefs and values that seem alien to the secular majority population. As the story of Miriam shows, this ambiguity is constructed through presenting ideal cases that create sympathy and identification with readers through aligning with experiences and values that members of the Swedish majority population see themselves as upholding. In this case, we see how frames work through juxtaposing an ideal type and a common stereotype of Muslims. The representation of Muslim women as active agents is different from what was the case in the dominant framing, where women remained passive victims to religion. Nevertheless, the article about Miriam is still largely presenting Islam as different from and a problem in Swedish society, based on an understanding of Sweden as a secular society where collective belief in religious dogmas is an anomaly. A similar example can be found in Swedish press reports on the news about the Pakistani activist Malala Yousafzai winning the Nobel peace prize in 2015 (Axner 2015, 58). In most reports, Malala Yousafazai is portrayed as a strong, brave and independent Muslim woman. This image is, however, contrasted against Islam as a patriarchal and violent religion, in this case the oppressive rule of Taliban’s in Pakistan, who in 2012 attempted an assassination of Malala in retaliation for her activism. As with the previously discussed example from the Swedish editorial study, representations of Muslim women that do not repeat the dominant frame can, on the one hand, be interpreted as a different framing where religious women are given agency (see also Korteweg 2008). On the other hand, this kind of framing is also based in and upholding an ideal of gender equality and individual autonomy as core values of Western culture and which is threatened by Islam. Using topical, individual and often emotionally charged cases in the daily press, such as Malala or Miriam, can thus contribute to as well as reduce the nuances and complexities of Muslim women’s lives and identities. They are portrayed with agency, but also as symbols to argue for political positions concerning how to integrate religious diversity and what is perceived as core values of Swedish culture and democracy, such as secularity, gender equality and individual self-realization. In editorials, the connection between problem definitions of particular events and evaluations that draw on political opinions is more explicit. This is a consequence of the logic of editorials as a genre, closely following and responding to political debates. Framing in editorials thus make explicit the connections between the media logic of the daily press, and the wider political and social context, while this might be more implicit in news and feature articles.

Mediatization, religion and gender The analysis of the frames used in Swedish editorials over time shows that articles that discuss gender in the context of Sweden as a culturally and religiously pluralistic society become more articulated from the year 2000 and onwards (Lövheim 2017, Lövheim and Linderman 2015). There are also indications of an increase in using the human-interest frame for representing Muslim women in Scandinavian media (Abdel-Fadil and Liebmann 2018). Mediatization theory analyses changing relations between the media and other institutions in society from the perspective of media logics as the driving force of this process. If mediatization is approached as a dynamic rather than deterministic process of change, it is possible to discuss various outcomes of how journalistic practice over time come to shape representations of religion as well as gender. As the examples in the chapter has shown, a variety of framings can be found within journalistic genres such as editorials and feature stories. Formats, routines, values and norms within various forms of journalistic genres include newsworthiness but also values of impartiality, truth and of providing nuance and context to topical events. 71

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Furthermore, as pointed out above, the logics of media institutions is not detached from the values, norms and ways of making sense of oneself and society that over time become established in a society, in other words the repertoire of shared themes and stories to which particular frames are connected. From this perspective, the examples of different kinds of framings of gender and religion in editorials and feature stories presented in this chapter indicate changes in journalistic practices and in the role of the press in Swedish society. As pointed out in the introduction, digital media platforms challenge the traditional role of newspapers. In response, newspapers shift from supplying news to the general population to influencing the political agenda through more independent and opinionated journalism (Hjarvard 2006). As pointed out in the introduction to the chapter, religion has become a contentious subject in political discussions within Scandinavia, together with an increased focus on human rights issues such as freedom of religion and gender and sexual equality. The use of individual, emotionally charged examples of Muslim women in editorials and feature articles can be seen as a response to political debates which increasingly frame Islam as a problem representing different values than what is perceived as common Swedish culture. In the Scandinavian media system, this process is also supported by media policies and public expectations regarding the press as an independent and critical voice in the democratic order. These alternative framings may seem to be using a similar format as was previously labelled soft journalism in their portrayals of religion. Nevertheless, soft stories about religion can, due to changes in political opinions in a society, become a starting point for heated public debates regarding the legitimacy of religion and the agency of women in Scandinavian and European societies (Bracke and Fadil 2011).

Conclusion: contribution and further challenge for studies of religion and journalism This chapter has discussed representations of gender, in particular, women and gender equality, and religion in the Swedish press. The visibility of religious diversity in Scandinavian media has increased during the latest decades, primarily represented by increased coverage of Islam. In accordance with previous research, the coverage of these topics in news articles is predominantly negative, representing Islam as connected to conflict, terrorism and extremism, where women more often become passive victims than active agents. By using examples from editorials and feature journalism, this chapter has shown that, despite these general tendencies, attempts toward representing religious, in particular Muslim, women in other ways can be found. Using theories of framing and mediatization, this chapter has discussed how alternative frames like the human-interest frame can produce stories where women are portrayed as active agents. However, these kind of framings have ambiguous outcomes: presenting individual cases that readers in majority society can identify with can challenge some stereotypes about minority groups, but they also risk producing new divisions by contrasting the stories of individuals who comply with dominant values in Swedish society with generalizing depictions of those that express their religiosity and gender identity in other ways. In theories of the mediatization of religion, the concept of media logic has been used to explain why certain ways of framing religion dominate in societies where the mass media has become the prime source of information about religion. The use of conflictual approaches in analyzing media representations on Islam has been criticized for reproducing divisions and overemphasizing the media’s power to control and maintain unjust social representations. The complexity of media messages and variations and agency among media recipients is thus often reduced (Faimau 2015, 328, Bleich, Bloemraad and de Graauw 2015). This chapter 72

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suggests that a dynamic rather than deterministic understanding of mediatization, focusing on the interplay between media logic and changes in social relations and cultural values in society, can be helpful to contextualize differences within and possible shifts over time in media representations of gender and religion. Future research in this area should investigate differences within and between various genres of newspaper journalism, in order to provide more knowledge about when and how more nuanced understandings of how religion as one among several, intersecting social forces that can contribute to domination as well as agency for women. Such representations of religion align with studies of Muslim women’s experiences of media coverage of themselves. Deborah Broos and Hilde Van den Bulck (2012, 127–128) found that Flemish Muslim women could not identify with the stereotypical images of themselves in news media, which reduced the complexity of their identities in terms of nationality, religion and ethnicity into false dichotomies. The multiple voices of religious women and the complexities and nuances of their stories need to be acknowledged, as well as the attempts to challenge dominant frames of representation that are present in journalism seeking out new ways of working in a time of increased but contested visibility of religion.

Notes 1 The NOREL project was funded by the Nordic Research Councils for the Humanities and the Social sciences (NOS-HS), 2009–2014. 2 The project “The Resurgence of Religion?! A study of Religion and Modernity in Sweden with the daily press as case” was funded by the National Research Council of Sweden 2010–2014. 3 Quotes from Swedish newspaper articles have been translated into English by the author.

Further readings Kearney, M. C., 2012. The Gender and Media Reader. New York and Abingdon: Routledge. This reader provides a large selection of classical and contemporary key texts for studying gender and media, and introduced key concepts and theories within particular areas of research. Lövheim, M., ed., 2003. Media, Religion and Gender: Key Issues and New Challenges. London and New York: Routledge. This edited volume reviews theoretical and methodological approaches to research on gender within the field of media, religion and culture up until 2013. Case studies give examples of studying the interplay between gender and religion in various forms of media and popular culture.

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PART 2

Power and authority

6 RACE, RELIGION AND THE NEWS The Reagan administration and the fairness issue Diane Winston Introduction On December 8, 1983, presidential counselor Edwin Meese III met with reporters from Reuters, the Associated Press and United Press International. One of the journalists asked Meese how he balanced the need for spending reductions with the plight of hungry children. “Well I don’t know of any authoritative figures that there are hungry children” (Associated Press 1983b, 13b), he replied. Adding that “virtually everyone is taken care of by one program or another” (Associated Press 1983b, 13b), Meese seemed more perturbed that freeloaders might be bilking the system than by the prospect of starving children, “We’ve had information that people go to soup kitchens because the food is free and that’s easier than paying for it” (Associated Press 1983b, 13b). At another time of year, Meese’s remarks might have passed unnoticed, but two weeks before Christmas on a slow news Saturday, his comments made headlines. The Washington Post, Los Angeles Times and Chicago Tribune were just three of the national newspapers that put the story on page one. “Critics growl over Meese hunger remarks” (Rowley 1983, 1) the Tribune punned in an above-the-fold banner headline. The Post, likewise, ran the story at the top of page one proclaiming “Discussing Hunger in the U.S., Meese Sparks a Firestorm” (Hoffman 1983b, 1a). Among the big metropolitan dailies, only the New York Times slotted the Meese story midway in first section. For the rest of the year, Meese’s statements remained news. The story snowballed into features about hunger in America, soup kitchens and their clientele, and the likelihood that Meese’s comments also reflected the mindset of President Ronald Reagan. Underlying the coverage and specifically addressed in op-eds and editorials were questions about civic values. What is society’s responsibility to the poor? Are some of the poor more deserving than others? What constitutes equality? How to gauge fairness? What constitutes a good society? Such questions also troubled reporters. A majority of news stories, despite aiming for balance and objectivity, seemed slanted against Meese. Journalists did not call him heartless, but the structure, sourcing and framing of their work implied as much. Editorialists, on the other hand, openly expressed their opinions. Three years of frustration over budget cuts found a perfect foil in Meese’s skepticism about hunger in the USA.

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This chapter focuses on the relationship among power, journalism and religion in the USA. It uses Meese’s remarks to examine the political, economic and moral nexus of Reagan’s ideology and its depiction by the news media as an example for the interconnectivity and the influence of religion and journalism. The triangulation of religion, the news media and politics is a relatively undeveloped field of research. Domke (2004) has studied how the administration of President George W. Bush used religious language to rally public support for the War on Terror through the echoing press, and several scholarly articles have explored coverage of the Religious Right (Winston 2007, 2012). Recent research in the USA and Europe has focused on the reporting of political Islam and its impact on the representation of Muslims (Said 1997, Fārūqī 2009, Rane, Ewart and Martinkus 2014, Mertensm and de Smaele 2016, Lundby et al. 2017). In contrast to that, I work on a larger project about Reagan, religion and the news media. I argue that Reagan’s ideas about religion influenced his political positions. By religion, I mean evangelical Christianity; specifically, conservative Christian beliefs not only about the need to accept Jesus as a personal savior, the reality of Heaven and Hell, and the inerrancy of the Bible, but also about politics and society, such as the unborn’s right to life, support for Israel, the importance of a free-market economy, the desirability of limited government and the need for traditional heterosexual families. Reagan was a lifelong Christian. Over the years, he cited as inspirations his mother’s strong faith, his matriculation at a Christian college and his baptism after reading The Printer of Udell’s (Wright and Gilbert 1911) an inspirational novel. During his years in Los Angeles, he worshipped at the conservative Bel-Air Presbyterian church, and fellowshipped with a group of Christian luminaries, including entertainer Pat Boone, Pentecostal pastor Harold Bredesen and former football star Don Moomaw, Bel Air’s minister. During his successful 1966 gubernatorial campaign, Reagan let it be known that he had had a born-again experience. According to historian Darren Dochuk, Reagan confirmed press reports of his “spiritual conversion” in a 1967 interview, I can’t conceive of anyone trying to meet the problems we face today without help from God. I have spent more time in prayer these past few weeks than I have in any previous period I recall. (Dochuk 2011, 263) The 1980s press corps, however, rarely probed the president’s personal religiosity. Few accounts detailed his immersion in Southern California’s evangelical community, much less his lifelong relationship to the church, although some reporters did question why Reagan rarely went to worship services. Instead, journalists explored how his faith served his political purposes, following the standard practice of covering religion functionally, as politically instrumental for setting agendas and wooing constituencies, rather than substantively, as an autonomous phenomenon or, in other words, a conviction that provides believers with meaning, identity and purpose. This shortcoming was highlighted with the 2018 discovery of a personal letter that Reagan wrote to his father-in-law, Loyal Davis (Tumulty 2018). Davis, an atheist, was dying and Reagan, who was president at the time, described the importance of faith. There is no mistaking the depth of Reagan’s belief in this private missive. This chapter is based on the idea that Reagan’s religiously informed ideas about poverty influenced his economic policies. Reagan believed in the importance of family for instilling financial responsibility. He trusted that the free market economy and limited governmental interference would create the conditions that enabled responsible people to support their families. By focusing on journalistic reporting about tax cuts, welfare and fairness that 80

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preceded Meese’s comments, the chapter entails how that newspapers’ coverage contributed to changing notions about race and religion, political fairness and personal responsibility. Meese’s remarks reflect a longstanding debate in American religion and philanthropy: the distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor. The Reagan administration successfully sought news coverage that reframed this debate to highlight the role of race and gender in poverty.

Media matters According to researchers (McCombs and Shaw 1993, Bowe, Fahmy and Wanta 2013, McCombs 2014), news media establishes agendas, informs public opinion, influences policy and confirms ingrained perspectives. That is because the news media provides frames for thinking about issues, such as race, gender and poverty. The primary source for framing is elite discourse: speeches and other cultural products from government, corporate, entertainment, religious and social leaders. The American president is an example for that, because he commands pride of place in news making, and in the 1980s, the Reagan administration’s policies, speeches and activities were central to determining the news agenda. However, a distinctive confluence of religious, political and economic trends, coupled with Reagan’s powerful skills as a storyteller, made his presidency distinctive. Reagan’s bully pulpit, amplified by the media, led to the circulation of ideas, images and arguments that would have received little or no airing under previous administrations. Thus, even if Americans did not agree with Reagan’s budget cuts or his rationale for them, they knew that his priorities were important because he was the president. For others, Reagan’s conservative priorities dovetailed with opinions that were previously unexpressed in most public forums. In the midst of the Great Society initiative, President Lyndon B. Jonson’s legislative program to combat poverty, many Americans were leery of undeserving, able-bodied men and women cheating the system. With the Civil Rights movement in the forefront of the news however, the racial undertones of many such suspicions were difficult to ignore. Fifteen years later, when Reagan framed these perceptions as national problems that reflected a crisis that was spiritual as much as economic, he legitimated a subterranean swath of popular opinion. Moreover, through repetition in the news media, those opinions were mainstreamed. In addition to framing poverty as a moral and spiritual issue best remedied by work, family and self-sufficiency, Reagan’s words and like-minded discourse constructed poverty as a race and gender problem. Pervasive racism and sexism made minorities, especially African Americans, the face of the urban and undeserving poor. Poor black men were “threatening and violent” (Bullock, Wyche and Williams 2001, 229–246) while single black mothers were “immoral and neglectful” (Bullock, Wyche and Williams 2001, 226–246). Still, even if blacks received a disproportionate amount of federal assistance, they did not comprise the majority of America’s poor. Yet “media images emphasizing the relationship between poverty and ethnicity clearly fuel[ed] the perception that most poor people are African American” (Bullock, Wyche and Williams 2001, 226–246) and “led directly to public misconceptions of the poor and a decrease in public support” (Rose and Baumgartner 2013, 22–53). The 1960s notion that poverty is a systemic problem requiring government intervention was reframed in the Reagan era as a problem of personal choice that required personal change. Integral to solving that problem was the individual’s commitment to strengthening his or her family and to achieving self-sufficiency (Rose and Baumgartner 2013). Those who did not try to solve their own problems did not deserve sympathy, much less aid. The news as well as the entertainment media conveyed this message with 81

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[f ]raming techniques that present poverty as an individual problem rather than a societal issue rooted in economic and political inequality that further reinforce the perceived undeservedness of the poor. (Bullock, Williams and Limbert 2003, 237)

Reagan’s economic plans After the 1980 election, Reagan faced a troubled economy. The long postwar boom had ended, replaced by high unemployment, rising inflation and a stagnant GDP. For the 40th president, fixing the economy was more than solving these problems. Reagan wanted to operationalize his conviction that America’s God-given freedom meant each citizen was personally responsible for himself and his family. Reagan’s goal was to create a healthy economy that reaffirmed the values of family, self-reliance and the free market. This was the reason why he called for tax cuts that would force reductions in welfare programs. He explained what could be called spiritual neoliberalism in a December 1983 radio address: Families stand at the center of society, so building our future must begin by preserving family values . . . How can families survive when big government’s powers to tax, inflate, and regulate absorb their wealth, usurp their rights, and crush their spirit? (Reagan 1983b) Press coverage of Reagan’s ideas about family values, welfare and big government were telegraphed in sound bites that seemed stacked against single-parent families, especially poor ones headed by women of color. Journalists routinely played up comments that they deemed would have the greatest traction with their audiences. Frequently that meant lifting up conflict or pitting groups against one another. Stories explored whether the president favored the rich over the poor and if the country was worse off now than when he took office. Reporters could not directly critique Reagan’s arguments or even his policies since professional conventions required them to maintain standards of balance and objectivity. Still, the very act of framing stories around the president’s alleged insensitivity to poverty, usually by highlighting his critics, was a way to show their hand. However, the law of unintended consequences, facilitated by the repetition of certain themes, may have caused the opposite reaction to the one that reporters sought. Repeating Reagan’s message – thus normalizing his ideas about personal responsibility, the debilitating effects of government handouts, and the creation of an indolent underclass – hardened public attitudes about the nation’s responsibility to the poor. Reagan sought to convince his countrymen that spiritual and economic renewal went hand-in-hand and that belief in the free market system and personal responsibility were key to both (Kunde et al. 2012). Yet that outcome was far from journalists’ minds when Meese doubted the existence of hungry Americans. His remarks focused the press on issues of hunger and fairness, topics central to news coverage ever since Reagan proposed tax cuts that would drastically reduce federal aid programs. For more than a year, the administration and its critics vied to control the narrative about the impact of budget reductions. Much of the coverage was framed by the fairness issue, the contention that cuts were unfair to all Americans except the very wealthy. Political strategists initially deemed fairness – Reagan’s alleged tilt to the wealthy at the expense of the poor – to be the president’s Achilles’ heel, and the Democrats’ strongest suit for winning back the White House. Nevertheless, the Administration countered 82

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by identifying fairness with undeserving others, and by the end of 1983, some Americans wondered whether fairness was actually a demand for preferential treatment by minorities.

Reforming welfare By the mid-1960s, many Americans felt that the welfare system, rooted in the New Deal and expanded over the next four decades, needed reform (O’Connor 1998, Steensland 2011, Stoesz and Karger 1993). Despite a growing number of government programs aimed at ending poverty, the effects of indigence – teen births, high school dropout rates, drug and alcohol abuse, hunger, homelessness and crime – were on the rise. Critics on the left wondered if the raft of government benefits missed the point or merely failed to reach enough people. As the debate continued through the 1970s, moderate policymakers and elected officials, both Republican and Democrat, decided that a guaranteed annual income would reach more citizens, offer more security and end the stigma attached to receiving welfare. Conservatives, however, disagreed. Rebutting the claim that welfare did too little, they said it did too much and at too high a price. At best, welfare created an underclass of men and women unwilling to work. At worst, it enabled scofflaws and cheaters to take advantage of a flawed system. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, stories about welfare frauds were a journalistic staple. Among the most popular were narratives about unwed mothers who milked the system with fraudulent claims and then used AFDC money for drugs and alcohol. The mothers, typically African Americans, not only fueled racial stereotypes but also struck deep chords of religiously based sexism that depicted the women as deceptive, promiscuous and unreliable. Reagan repeatedly told the story of one such cheater during his unsuccessful 1976 bid for the Republican presidential nomination. He recounted a tale, initially reported in the Chicago press, of a woman who used 80 names, 30 addresses, 15 telephone numbers to collect food stamps, Social Security, veterans’ benefits for four non-existent deceased veteran husbands, as well as welfare. Her tax-free income alone has been running $150,000 a year. (Leven 2013) Using the moniker popularized by the Chicago press, Reagan called the woman a welfare queen. The term became a cultural meme and, in the popular imagination, Reagan was credited as its source (Fialka 1976, 7a). Notwithstanding the story’s veracity or whether this degree of fraud was widespread, the welfare queen captured the public’s imagination and negatively influenced perceptions about race, gender and welfare for years to come (Gilliam 1999). If Reagan’s story about the welfare queen could become commonsensical, it was because many Americans were primed to believe the worst about the poor, in general, and African-American welfare recipients, in particular. Black poverty had been identified as a national problem during the 1960s. What was previously hidden had been revealed by magazine spreads on the rural poor; books such as Harrington’s The Other America (1965) and organized protests including Martin Luther King Jr.’s Poor People’s Campaign. After his election in 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson pledged to expand economic opportunities for all American as well as to further the goals of the Civil Rights movement. Declaring a War on Poverty, Johnson promised a Great Society that would be achieved through jobs programs and vocational training; community-based aid, low income housing; funding for low-income schools; food stamps, and medical assistance for the elderly and the poor. It was the most ambitious social welfare legislation since the New Deal. 83

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Johnson’s Great Society represented a significant shift from earlier social programs (Quadagno 1994). It was “an effort to eliminate the racial barriers of the New Deal and to integrate Blacks into the national political economy” (Roberts 1996, 1563–1602). Eager to make the new system work for all people, welfare rights activists campaigned to register African American single mothers for benefits. Their efforts were successful and “by 1967, a welfare caseload that had once been eighty-six percent white had become forty-six percent nonwhite” (Roberts 1996, 1563–1602). In hard numbers, this meant that by 1969, the number of Americans on welfare went from four million, earlier in the decade, to six million (Danziger 1998). Both the increase in recipients and the rising percentage of Blacks resulted in calls for reform. White Americans worried that Blacks were ‘taking advantage.’ Calls for reform grew acute during the Carter era, because as the economic recession spread, welfare rolls spiked. By the mid-1970s, the number of recipients had grown from 6 million to 11 million, while those receiving food stamps had risen from 1 million (in 1969) to 19 million (Danziger 1998). One of welfare’s most vehement critics was Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan. Reagan made things simple. During the primaries, he promised tax cuts. However, during the campaign, he discussed welfare reform. For Reagan, the two went hand-in-hand. If tax receipts fell, then government programs would be reduced. As governor of California, Reagan had overhauled the state’s welfare system. Now he wanted to do the same for the nation. The result would be less government waste, more capital investment, increased consumer spending and the replacement of a federally funded underclass with productive citizens. It was a plan that played well in an election year when inflation was considered the nation’s #1 problem (Prasad 2012). Soon after his election, Reagan set his budget program into motion. A key goal was to reduce the high levels of federal spending that fueled inflation. As Reagan noted in his inaugural speech, “government is not the solution to our problem: government is the problem” (Weisman 1981, 1a). Several months later, he proposed legislation to cut back payments to the working poor and to encourage states to develop workfare programs. The administration intended to force recipients off welfare, but results were mixed (Pear 1983a). Some did leave the program, others left but came back and still others had no choice but to stay on welfare since jobs were hard to find. Unemployment was a real problem. In January 1983, almost 18 months after the tax cuts became law, the national unemployment rate was 10.4% (Norris 2011), and a majority of Americans was dissatisfied with the Reagan’s progress on the economy. According to a New York Times-CBS poll, (New York Times News Service 1983, 6) approval for Reagan’s job performance hit a low of 41% and just 35% of those surveyed thought he was “in control of his administration” (New York Times News Service 1983, 6). The key issue for many was the president’s inability to improve job numbers. Americans also were unhappy with the growing federal deficit, but even so 75% were willing to incur greater debt if it enabled the creation of new jobs (New York Times News Service 1983, 6). Reagan had a different opinion, and his 1984 budget, which was presented to Congress just days after the January 1983 poll, called for further cutbacks in social programs, including reductions in food assistance for needy children, food stamp eligibility and health insurance and medical assistance for the elderly (Pear 1983b). Several months later, the Congressional Budget Office reported that cuts in social programs, which would save $110 billion between fiscal 1982 and 1985, fell hardest on families with yearly incomes under $20,000. However, poor families were not alone in their economic distress. Newspapers cited a study by the AFL-CIO Public Employees Department that noted federal tax cuts resulted in higher state and local taxes, federal gasoline taxes and Social Security’s payroll withholdings for 84

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“average-income Americans” (Associated Press 1984, 5a). In other words, despite federal tax cuts, many Americans were paying more in taxes. Reagan’s critics made the most of the numbers. Columnist Michael Kinsley posed the question that had won Reagan support in the 1980 campaign, “Are you better off than you were four years ago?” (Commission on Presidential Debates 1980) Kinsley’s answer was no. Average workers’ weekly earnings were down 3%, the gross national product was barely higher than in 1981, and tax cuts had grown the federal deficit and enriched the upper classes but accomplished little else (TRB 1983). Millions of workers, mostly men over 50 who were employed in factories, lost jobs to automation and foreign competition. Now they were unable to find work at their previous salaries, if at all (Serrin 1983). When the Washington Post reported that Reagan’s “ambitious domestic agenda” was “being put on hold” (Hoffman 1983a, 3a) as the White House prepared for the 1984 presidential run, few were surprised. A former Reagan economic advisor said that with an election looming, “the administration’s economic policy is to do nothing and pray the recovery continues” (Hoffman 1983a, 3a). Miraculously, those prayers were answered by fall. Even the Midwest, the nation’s ailing industrial center, was bouncing back. When Reagan addressed the International Monetary Fund, he reiterated his vision of a political system that trusts in the market to promote and ensure human freedom. He offered thinly veiled criticism of Communism’s subjugation of the individual, and he questioned the wisdom of previous presidents who seemed to place their trust in American government rather than in the nation’s citizens. Rejecting the misguided policies of 1970s, which “permitted our governments to overspend, overtax and overregulate us toward soaring inflation and record interest rates” (Reagan 1983c, 1362– 1366), he said his administration placed its faith in “the magic of the market place” (Reagan 1983c, 1362–1366) and the “human spirit” (Reagan 1983c, 1362–1366). By winter, a Los Angeles Times poll found a majority of Americans believed Reagan’s economic plan was working. Sixty-three percent called it a success, and 52% said they were better off than when he took office (Treadwell 1983, 1b). The president’s job approval rating had soared to 61%, a strong comeback from numbers earlier in the year. The poll also revealed an interesting inconsistency. Support for the president’s efforts was up, but backing for his programs was down. Americans did not want further cutbacks on social programs or more reductions in governmental regulations. According to the newspaper, Reagan’s approval ratings were tied to the success of his program, not its merits. By a ratio of almost 2 to 1, the poll shows that those who support Reagan’s economic ideas do so because his ideas seem to be working—not because they believe the ideas are right. (Treadwell 1983, 1b) That pragmatism was based on results: Productivity, retails sales and investments were up, and the stock market was bullish. However, not all signs were strong. The $200 billion federal deficit remained a problem, as did high unemployment and job dislocations caused by a national shift from manufacturing to service industries and technology. There were other worries too, reported the New York Times: As ever, young blacks accounted for a disproportionate part of the unemployed. Their continuing distress stood in dismaying contrast to the year’s symbols of black achievement: a black astronaut, a black Miss America, a black Mayor of Chicago and a black contender for President. (New York Times 1983, 10b) 85

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In an otherwise typical New York Times article, uncluttered by adjectives and modifying phrases, these two sentences stood out. While they were factually correct, their construction was striking, reinforcing the very problem that they addressed. The words “As ever,” distress and dismaying in the sentence implied that young blacks were an ongoing problem. Even at a moment when some African Americans had shown they could do anything – run for president, win beauty pageants or conquer the stars – many other “young blacks” did not have jobs. That many remained unemployed while some found ways to break barriers created a “dismaying contrast,” because their “distress,” one might infer, might be self-inflicted.

Race and fairness Even if the Times had uncharacteristically faulted poor blacks for their situation, most readers likely would not have noticed. The casual racism that underlay the newspaper’s descriptions likely struck many as commonsensical: There was a large percentage of young blacks on welfare at the same time that new opportunities were opening up for African Americans. In fact, readers of the Times, as well as its critics, likely labeled the paper liberal. Similar to many news outlets, the paper of record had paid close attention to the fairness issue ever since it became a factor in the 1982 midterm election. Between January 1982 and December 1983, four major newspapers – the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times and Chicago Tribune – ran more than 120 stories on the fairness issue, with peaks before the 1982 midterm elections, during the summer of 1983 and in December (coinciding with Meese’s remarks on hunger) (Proquest Search 2015). By virtue of the stories’ presentation, laying out charges that the tax cuts were unfair and then offering the Administration’s argument, much of the coverage could appear biased against the president’s program. The fairness issue emerged when the public realized the ramifications of tax cuts on a wide swath of social welfare programs. Reducing funds for hungry children and single mothers seemed wrong to many, especially when the savings provided a windfall for the rich. Reagan and his advisors were so unsettled by accusations that he was insensitive to the poor that they launched their own fairness offensive in March 1982. At every public appearance, Reagan assured listeners that he was not only compassionate but also offended by accusations otherwise. He favored helping the truly needy, people who could not help themselves, and he pledged that tax cuts would create jobs for “average citizens” (Cannon 1982). Nevertheless, the president’s seeming lack of fairness to the poor struck many Americans as misguided, and budget cuts became a hot button issue when Democrats realized their impact on working- and middle-class voters. Appropriating the term for the 1982 mid-term elections, the Democrats turned the label fairness into a trope that telegraphed the president’s tilt to the rich at the expense of the average Joe. The party’s messaging played on class antagonisms to gain ground with white workingand middle-class voters who did not approve of Reagan’s affluent lifestyle and his reductions in programs that helped them, such as student loans, mass transit and services for the elderly (Roberts 1982). The strategy worked: On Election Day, the GOP suffered one of its biggest losses in decades. Twenty-six Democratic congressmen replaced 26 Republicans. The Democrats’ edge in the House grew from 243–192 to 269–166, and although they were a 47–53 minority in the Senate, Democrats had increased their ranks by one. Many observers ascribed the Republicans’ loss not just to the weak economy but also to the fairness issue (Baltz and Hornblower 1982). Reagan’s handlers realized they needed to reframe the debate. Throughout 1983, they found different ways to talk about fairness so it assumed the class, racial and gender dimensions, which, in much of the subsequent media coverage, suggested those most hurt by tax 86

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cuts were poor, black single mothers. Reagan and his team used a variety of strategies, alternately drawing on numbers, history and stereotyping to show that the president’s programs were fair and that the Democrats were the real culprits. They had mixed success. David Stockman, head of the Office of Management and Budget and a key proponent of Reagan’s economic program, testified to the Congressional Joint Economic Committee on the fairness of the administration’s economic policies. He claimed that tax cuts had a minimal impact on the poor, did not affect the truly needy and barely benefited the well-to-do. Soon after, a lengthy op-ed in the Washington Post by Robert Greenstein, director of a non-profit budget and policy center, demolished Stockman’s figures in wonky detail (Greenstein 1983). Reagan, too, used numbers to defend his policies, but he also invoked the past, especially the mistakes of his predecessors. The president previously disparaged the Democrats’ philosophy, now he launched a vigorous attack on Lyndon B. Johnson’s mid-1960s programs. LBJ’s Great Society sought to end poverty and racial discrimination, but the buildup of government giveaways had the opposite effect, said Reagan. It had “contributed to family breakups, welfare dependency, and a large increase of births out of wedlock” (Reagan 1983a). Moreover, LBJ’s initiatives “had destroyed the economy and made Americans poorer than they were 15 years ago” (Reagan 1983a). The root of the problem, concluded the current president, was the Democrats’ belief that “‘government and bureaucracy’ were ‘the primary vehicle for social change.’” (Reagan 1983a). Throughout the year, Reagan and his supporters blamed the Great Society initiative not only for destroying the economy, but also for causing the disintegration of poor families and the enrichment of government bureaucrats. He also blamed the current crop of politicians who supported big government programs, and the freeloaders who exploited them. His final target was the press, and Reagan inveighed against “the drum beat of doom and gloom from the misery merchants in some of the media” (Associated Press 1983a, 23). The economy was improving “[c]ontrary to the propaganda blasts you hear” (Reagan 1983b), and his administration was “committed to fairness” (Reagan 1983b). Republicans could play with numbers, berate Democrats and complain about press coverage to bolster their claims, but the real turning point came when they gave welfare a human face. Democrats had tried to make fairness an issue that cut across racial, gender and class lines. The tax cuts were as unfair to white autoworkers as they were to black women on welfare as they were to middle-class Asian students who lost their college loans. But when the Census Bureaus released figures on poverty, showing a rapidly increasing number of women and children in need, the administration, according to the Washington Post, embraced “a new defense of the domestic spending cuts that have embroiled the president in the ‘fairness issue’” (Williams 1983, 4a). The new defense asserted that the problem of poverty, especially in the African American community, resulted from the prevalence of female-headed households. The breakdown of the black family, according to this theory, was beyond the government’s control. If anything, government programs had made the problem worse. This was not an entirely new strategy. Reagan previously used stereotypes to deprecate African Americans and to question their dependence on welfare. In his aborted 1976 presidential campaign, he had castigated the strapping young buck (a pejorative Southern term for a black man) who used food stamps to buy steaks. Nevertheless, since the 1980 election, he was more circumspect, blaming government programs and greedy politicians for welfare fraud. Rather than raise negative stereotypes about cheaters, Reagan said that blacks had fallen into a culture of dependency that was destroying not just an individual’s moral fiber but also the well-being of the entire black community and, by extension, the nation. His actions to end the culture of poverty would be their salvation. 87

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The Census Report provided cover for going a step further. According to its most recent survey (White and Reaves 1983, 1), 15% of Americans lived in poverty, the highest number since 1965, when the Great Society programs began (Williams 1983, 4a). The fastest-growing segment of the impoverished population was female-headed households, which represented 46% of poor families. (In 1960, women headed 24% of families living below the poverty line.) While it was not unusual to see the poverty rate rise during a severe recession, government officials as well as independent researchers said that the typical bounce back might not help women on welfare, who often lacked job skills and, if they had young children, could not work full-time. According to Bruce Chapman, a White House staff member and former head of the Census Bureau, “fatherless families represent ‘an underclass [that] an expanding economy won’t reach’” (Bacon 1983, 1). Echoing Chapman, other Reagan appointees told the Washington Post that female-headed households were a serious problem and could result in a “permanent underclass” (Williams 1983, 4a). Overall, one in seven American families were female headed, but among the African Americans, the ratio was almost one in two. Women headed 46% of poor families, and a disproportionate number of those families were African American. According to the president, the best solution was to end programs “that increase dependency and break up families” (Williams 1983, 4a). A year earlier, Reagan had told a gathering of black Republicans “that blacks ‘would be appreciably better off today’ if the Great Society had never been inaugurated” (Weisman 1982, 1a). and that government programs had led to “a new kind of bondage” (Weisman 1982) for those on welfare. Others, however, said that the swelling numbers showed the need for more support, not less, and revealed an imperative to renew federal emphasis on job training programs (Williams 1983). The politics of fairness, by virtue of media coverage that focused on the president and administration officials, increasingly spotlighted the plight of black Americans; specifically, poor, female-headed African American households. Even when fairness was not mentioned, it hovered between the lines, prompting readers to wonder who was responsible: Were Reagan’s programs unfair, or was Johnson the real culprit? Was it fair for blacks to depend on government (e.g., whites’) support? Was it wrong for wealthy Americans to allow the less fortunate to languish in poverty? This new twist on the so-called problem of black Americans made for compelling news stories that played on deep currents of racism. It also tapped into middle class ambivalence about the impact of Reagan’s economic strategy on the poor. Yet regardless of which way the narrative in a given story tilted, most of the reportage served to widen the gap between us and them. Citing the increased prevalence of divorce and single parent households among black Americans, the Chicago Tribune predicted that [t]he break-up of the black family threatens to undermine much of the progress blacks have made in education, health care, nutrition and politics. It almost certainly will affect crime rates, drug use, welfare and even the religious habits of black America. (White and Reaves 1983, 1) The front-page article used census statistics to show that African American children in female-headed homes were economically handicapped. Describing a culture of poverty that destroyed children’s sense of self-worth, the reporter outlined how poverty leads to crime, drug use, unemployment and the loss of a religious compass. Blacks who did find a way out and joined the middle class would, as likely as not, turn their backs on those less fortunate. 88

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When the Washington Post did its own series on black families, it focused on “the leading edge of the fairness issue” (Coleman 1983, 1a) cuts in spending for the poor and their particular effect on African Americans. Like the Tribune, the Post had many numbers: One in three blacks lived below the poverty line, one in four were on Medicaid and on food stamps, one in five collected AFDC and one in seven lived in federally subsidized housing. Blacks also suffered from reductions in smaller government programs including student aid, child nutrition and job training. The takeaway? “[B]lacks are much more reliant on federal aid than is generally realized” (Coleman 1983, 1a), which is why budget cuts “had a far greater impact on black than white Americans” (Coleman 1983, 1a). Reagan’s justification for cuts – a healthy economy would create jobs for the poor – was cited as a rationale for change, but the Post noted that the defense budget had grown, and middle-class programs, such as Social Security and Medicare, were hardly touched. The obvious implication was that people with resources could protect their entitlements in ways that they poor could not. Reagan’s proxies told reporters that cuts were not made with the intention of hurting blacks but because welfare did more harm than good and that the welfare system was beset by problems. The bottom line, they said, was that government programs should focus on the truly needy. That sentiment was shared widely. Polls showed that Americans were concerned about unfairness (Harris 1982), but they cared most about their own well-being. As one of Reagan’s political managers noted, If people have got jobs, can make their house payments and keep the kids in college, they’re not going to worry about fairness. (Kondracke 1983, 13a). Despite widespread public doubt about the fairness of Reagan’s tax cuts – 56% agreed “the elderly, the poor, and the handicapped have been especially hard hit, while the rich and big business have been much better off” (Harris 1984) – he was re-elected in 1984 with a whopping 58.8% majority. Voters preferred an incumbent who lowered inflation and unemployment (Lipset 1985) to a challenger who promised fairness. Moreover, many had become skeptical, even cynical, about the plight of the poor. Even though they agreed that Reagan’s cuts had been hardest on disadvantaged groups, they did not necessarily want to do anything about it. According to a 1985 DNC survey, the term fairness had developed a negative connotation, a code word for giveaways (Lipset 1985). For many middle-class voters, fairness no longer applied to them and reductions in their government programs. Rather it referred to poor people who wanted something for nothing. That this perspective could become normative in a relatively short time was, according to some scholars, due in part to the media’s “potential to educate, raise consciousness, and shape public attitudes” (Bullock, Wyche and Williams 2001, 229).

Hunger and an election year At the start of 1983, Reagan’s advisors began defusing the fairness issue. They wanted to improve the president’s standing among women and blacks as well as to bolster his support among white working- and middle-class men. Their strategy “was to platonize the problem, describing it as a matter of perception separate from reality” (Clines 1983, 4e). Throughout the year, Reagan and his team did just that, arguing that the budget cuts were anything but unfair. Poverty? The Democrats created the problem, but Reagan was fixing it. Hunger? More people than ever received assistance, and there were programs for anyone who needed help. 89

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Unemployment? Again, the Democrats’ fault, but the economic recovery would spur new jobs. Indeed, the year progressed and the economy improved, but the fairness issue did not go away. By summer, the administration had opened a new front. The Republicans seemed resigned to conceding women and minorities to the Democrats, but they could not give up on men. Taking advantage of longstanding race, gender and class anxieties, the Administration had given fairness a face and it was not the one that white working- and middle-class men saw in their mirrors. By identifying poverty with single African American mothers, Reagan and his team had transformed the fairness issue from a concern affecting all but the very wealthy to a problem among the undeserving African American poor. Democrats, liberals and minorities might care about poor, black, female-headed households, but working- and middle-class whites – galvanized when policies were unfair to them – would not risk their own financial security for a welfare queen. By the end of the year, with the recovery in full swing, the Republicans’ divide-and-conquer strategy seemed to be working issues of fairness and hunger did not disappear after New Year, but they did recede from the headlines. When the Presidential Commission on Food Assistance, popularly referred to as the Commission on Hunger, released its final draft report on January 8, its findings echoed Edwin Meese’s infamous remarks from the previous month. The report stated, “allegations of rampant hunger simply cannot be documented” (Pear 1984, 1a). Although the authors of the report did concede, “hunger does persist” (Pear 1984, 1a). The carefully worded document generated the expected gamut of reactions. Republicans rooted, Democrats railed and pundits reiterated many of the arguments that Meese had made a month earlier. Yet the fervid coverage that followed Meese’s remarks was absent. Rather, the story simmered throughout the year, briefly coming to a boil when actual news occurred or when reporters found reasons to stir the pot. The Chicago Tribune, perhaps mindful of its location in the still-struggling Rust Belt, ran an ongoing series on “Hunger in America” (Mahany 1984a, 1, Mahany 1984b, 1, Mahany 1984c, D12, Mahany 1984d, 1, Mahany 1984e, 1). Periodic stories reminded readers that hunger had not only persisted but also increased. According to the Tribune, many white, working-class men, whose factory jobs had ended in the recession’s early days, were still unemployed and needed food assistance for their families (Drew 1984). Other newspapers kept the story local, focusing on the new poor, whose plight was unseen by neighbors who missed their surreptitious trips to food pantries. Then, in August, the Democratic-controlled House made “an election-year bow to the ‘fairness issue” (Shapiro 1984) by voting to increase food stamp benefits. The Republican-controlled Senate later killed the bill. However, the big story was neither the prevalence of hunger nor the administration’s denial of its existence. Rather it was, or should have been, the lack of public concern either way. When the year began, some pundits speculated that Democrats would make hunger the leading edge of the fairness issue. But the campaign never jelled. As the Republicans had hoped, Reagan coasted on the success of the economic recovery. Democrats raised myriad issues, including fairness and the escalating budget deficits, but none made a dent in the president’s popularity. In late September, William Raspberry, one of the country’s few African American columnists, wrote, Forget war and peace, forget fairness, forget the federal deficit. None of it matters for this election. The only thing that matters is whether individual voters think their personal finances are more likely to improve under a Mondale administration or a second Reagan term. (Raspberry 1984, 8d) 90

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Raspberry predicted the rise of “pocketbook selfishness” (Raspberry 1984, 8d) after seeing a Washington Post-ABC poll that revealed voters would put their own interests above those of the nation. A majority of respondents said that even though Democratic candidate Walter Mondale was more likely than Reagan to “reduce the threat of nuclear war” (Raspberry 1984, 8d) and “be fairer to all segments of the population” (Raspberry 1984, 8d), and that they shared Mondale’s political views and felt the “national economy was getting worse under Reagan” (Raspberry 1984, 8d), they still backed the incumbent. They explained that Reagan would insure they were “better off financially” (Raspberry 1984, 8d). Raspberry surmised, “Reagan has made greed an acceptable attitude” (Raspberry 1984, 8d). A Washington Post feature story put Midwestern names and faces on the trend. Several suburban housewives, including Sue Daniels of Mequon, Wisconsin, explained why they were voting for the incumbent this year. I’m going for Reagan because now I’m one of the haves and he’s gonna take a little less from me and give a little less to some of the people who don’t have. Mondale’s going to give my money to everybody, whether they’re down and out because they’re lazy or because they’re not. (Coleman and Broder 1984, 1a) Although voters knew Mondale’s policies were more fair than Reagan’s, most didn’t care. Those who did were public service workers whose income and benefits were affected by federal cutbacks and African Americans. According to the Post’s reporters, “the strongest feelings on the fairness issue are heard in the black community on (Milwaukee’s) Northside” (Coleman and Broder 1984, 1a). Statistics underscored the point: Test scores were low, lines at soup kitchen were long and welfare rolls were swelling. Meanwhile, members of traditionally liberal white communities were questioning their responsibility to help. A Democratic state legislator from a wealthy, liberal community explained, “I’m beginning to wonder myself about government programs that suppress people’s will to do better” (Coleman and Broder 1984, 1a). Not long after the 1984 election, columnist Ellen Goodman penned a chilling postmortem. Redefining the playing field in an “era of limits” (Goodman 1984, 19a). Republicans gave new meaning to the terms “winners” and “losers” (Goodman 1984, 19a) by justifying the former’s success at the latter’s expense. If we are going to limit opportunities for those stuck in the Other America, it is much easier to think of these people as failures. If we are going to chip away at social programs for the have-nots, it is easier to name them losers. (Goodman 1984, 19a) Neither Goodman nor Raspberry probed the press’ role in this shift. By virtue of whom it covered and how it reported, the news media enabled Reagan’s ideas and policies to be mainstreamed. That Reaganomics materially benefited a large swath of the public enhanced its appeal. Tracing the sweep of fairness coverage over 1983 shows that in reporting the debate, journalists repeatedly framed the story according to the administration’s point of view. Counterarguments usually were cited for their bite and pithiness rather than their deep contextualization of issues or reasoned analysis of ideas. The repetition of tropes about indolent blacks, welfare cheats and female-headed households – eased the slide of public opinion into us versus them. Most significantly, Reagan’s arguments about welfare’s deleterious impact on 91

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families gave credence to a moral judgment about the undeserving poor, a judgment that justified his economic policies. Skillfully triangulating religious rationalization, political policy and the news media, Reagan’s ability to coopt the fairness issue provides a good case study of the relationship between power and journalism.

Further readings Bowe, B. J., Fahmy, S. and Wanta, W., 2013. Missing Religion: Second Level Agenda Setting and Islam in American Newspapers. International Communication Gazette, 75(7), 636–652. This study is one of the few to look at religion as a factor in agenda setting. Bullock, H., Wyche, K. F. and Williams, W., 2001. Media Images of the Poor. Journal of Social Issues, 57(2), 229–246. An excellent article on how media contributes to the marginalization of the poor, especially people of color and welfare recipients. Dochuk, D., 2011. From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain-folk Religion, Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Evangelical Conservatism. New York: W.W. Norton. Dochuk’s book is a deeply researched exploration of how and why Southern California became a hub for conservative religion and politics. Steensland, B., 2011. The Failed Welfare Revolution: America’s Struggle Over Guaranteed Income Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. A thoughtful and accessible exploration of a failed attempt to end poverty.

References Associated Press, 1983a. Reagan Defends Policy, Raps’ Misery Merchants. Chicago Tribune, 10 July, 23. Associated Press, 1983b. What Meese Said to Reporters. New York Times, 15 December, 13b. Associated Press, 1984. Reagan Cuts Blamed for Tax Increases. Baltimore Sun, 27 August, 5a. Bacon, K. H., 1983. The Outlook: Fatherless Families: Key Poverty Problem. Wall Street Journal, 8 August, 1. Baltz, D. and Hornblower, M., 1982. Democrats Gain 26 Seats in House. Washington Post, 4 November, 21a. Bowe, B. J., Fahmy, S. and Wanta, W., 2013. Missing Religion: Second Level Agenda Setting and Islam in American Newspapers. International Communication Gazette, 75(7), 636–652. Bullock, H., Wyche, K. F. and Williams, W., 2001. Media Images of the Poor. Journal of Social Issues, 57(2), 229–246. Bullock, H., Williams, W. and Limbert, W., 2003. Predicting Support for Welfare Policies: The Impact of Attributions and Beliefs about Inequality. Journal of Poverty, 7(3), 35–56. Cannon, L., 1982. Fairness-to-Poor Offensive Launched. Washington Post, 25 March, 1a. Clines, F. X., 1983. Can Reagan Defuse the “Fairness” Issue? New York Times, 25 December, 4e. Coleman, M. and Broder, D. S., 1984. “Fairness” Issue Loses Potency. Washington Post, 7 October, 1a. Coleman, M., 1983. More Reliant on Aid than Whites, Blacks Hit Harder by Cuts. Washington Post, 4 December, 1a. Commission on Presidential Debates, 1980. October 28, 1980 Debate Transcript. Available at https:// www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-28-1980-debate-transcript, accessed 4 February 2019. Danziger, S., 1998. Welfare Reform from Nixon to Clinton: What Role for Social Science. Paper. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan. Available at http://fordschool.umich.edu/research/poverty/pdf/Isrconference.pdf, accessed 18 October 2018. Dochuk, D., 2011. From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain-folk Religion, Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Evangelical Conservatism. New York: W.W. Norton, 259–292. Domke, D., 2004. God Willing? Political Fundamentalism in the White House, the “War on Terror”, and the Echoing Press. London: Pluto Press. Drew, C., 1984. Proud Working Class Becomes “new poor.” Chicago Tribune, 10 December, 1. Fārūqī, A., 2009. Muslims and Media Images: News Versus Views. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Fialka, J., 1976. Reagan’s Stories Don’t Always Check Out. Eugene Register-Guard, 9 February, 7a. Gilliam, F., 1999. The “Welfare Queen” Experiment: How Viewers React to Images of African-American Mothers on Welfare. Available at http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/17m7r1rq, accessed 18 October 2018.

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Race, religion and the news Goodman, E., 1984. ‘The Needy’ Become ‘The Losers’. Washington Post, 14 November, 19a. Greenstein, R., 1983. Stockman Is Still Cooking The Numbers. Washington Post, 19 June, 1b. Harrington, M., 1965. The Other America; Poverty in the United States. Baltimore: Penguin Books. Harris, L., 1982. Public Verdict on Reagonomics: Unfair. Rochester: Harris Polls. Available at https:// theharrispoll.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Harris-Interactive-Poll-Research-THEPUBLIC-VERDICT-ON-REAGONAMICS-UNFAIR-1982-06.pdf, accessed 18 October 2018. Harris, L., 1984. The Reagan Mandate. Rochester: Harris Polls. Available at https://theharrispoll.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/Harris-Interactive-Poll-Research-THE-REAGAN-MANDATE-1984-11. pdf, accessed 18 October 2018. Hoffman, D., 1983a. War on Spending to Take Back Seat to Reagan’s Political Aims. Washington Post, 26 September, 3a. Hoffman, D., 1983b. Discussing Hunger in U.S., Meese Sparks a Firestorm: Meese Sparks a Political Firestorm with Remarks About Hunger in U.S. Washington Post, 10 December, 1a. Kondracke, M., 1983. The Fairness of It. Baltimore Sun, 23 December, 13a. Kunde, M., Campbell, K., Fischer, K., Schiappa, E. and Walzer, A., 2012. Ronald Reagan and the Resurgence of the Puritan Covenantal Tradition: The “City on a Hill” and a Reorientation of the People of the United States Into an “Economy of Grace. Ann Arbor: ProQuest Dissertations Publishing. Leven, J., 2013. The Welfare Queen. Slate, 19 December. Available at http://www.slate.com/articles/ news_and_politics/history/2013/12/linda_taylor_welfare_queen_ronald_reagan_made_her_a_ notorious_american_villain.html, accessed 18 October 2018. Lipset, S. M., 1985. The Elections, the Economy and Public Opinion: 1984. PS: Political Science & Politics, 18(1), 28–38. Lundby, K., Hjarvard, S., Lövheim, M. and Jernsletten, H., 2017. Religion between Politics and Media: Conflicting Attitudes towards Islam in Scandinavia. Journal of Religion in Europe, 10(4), 437–456. Mahany, B., 1984a. More and More Going Hungry in Land of Plenty: Hunger in America Hunger. Chicago Tribune, 12 August, 1. Mahany, B., 1984b. Hidden Malnutrition Hills Slowly, Surely: Hunger in America Nutrition. Chicago Tribune, 15 October, 1. Mahany, B., 1984c. A Family’s Strength to Survive: Hunger in America. Chicago Tribune, 18 October, 12d. Mahany, B., 1984d. All Poor Aren’t Equal under States’ Laws: Hunger in America Hunger. Chicago Tribune, 26 November, 1. Mahany, B., 1984e. Chicago a Study in National Hunger: Hunger in America Hunger. Chicago Tribune, 09 December, 1. McCombs, M. E. and Shaw D. L., 1993. The Evolution of Agenda-Setting Research: Twenty-Five Years in the Marketplace of Ideas. Journal of Communication, 43(2), 58–67. McCombs, M. E., 2014. Setting the Agenda: The Mass Media and Public Opinion. Cambridge: Polity. Mertensm, S. and de Smaele, H., eds., 2016. Representations of Islam in the News: A Cross Cultural Analysis. European Journal of Communication. London: SAGE, 616–617. New York Times News Service, 1983. Reagan Support Waning, Polls Show. Chicago Tribune, 25 January, 6. New York Times, 1983. An Economic Recovery Stirs, and a Campaign Curtain Rises. 29 December, 10b. Norris, F., 2011. From 1983, Hope for Jobs in 2011. New York Times, 4 February, 1b. O’Connor, J., 1998. US Social Welfare Policy: The Reagan Record and Legacy. Journal of Social Policy, 27(1), 37–61. Pear, R., 1983a. Most of Those Taken Off Welfare Are Said Not to Leave Their Jobs. New York Times, 29 April, 1a. Pear, R., 1983b. Reagan Asks Wide Cuts in Programs to Aid Poor. New York Times, 29 January, 6. Pear, R., 1984. U.S. Panel Says Hunger Cannot Be Documented. New York Times, 9 January, 1a. Prasad, M., 2012. The Popular Origins of Neoliberalism in the Reagan Tax Cut of 1981. Journal of Policy History, 24(3), 351–383. Proquest Search, April 29, 2015 on “fairness issue” January 20, 1981 to December 31, 1983. Quadagno, J., 1994. The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty. New York: Oxford University Press. Rane, H., Ewart, J. and Martinkus, J., 2014. Media Framing of the Muslim World: Conflicts, Crises and Contexts. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Diane Winston Raspberry, W., 1984. The Almighty Pocketbook. Washington Post, 30 September, 8d. Reagan, R., 1983a. Radio Address to the Nation on the American Family. Available at http://www.reagan. utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/120383a.htm, accessed 18 October 2018. Reagan, R., 1983b. Radio Address to the Nation on Economic and Fair Housing Issues. Available at http:// www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=41563, accessed 18 Oct. 2018. Reagan, R. 1983c. Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the Boards of Governors of the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Ronald Reagan, 1983. Washington, DC: GPO, 1362–1366. Roberts, D., 1996. Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship. The Yale Law Journal, 1563–1602. Roberts, S. V., 1982. Democrats Base Campaign Plans on Reagan Economic Record. New York Times, 4 September, 8. Rose, M. and Baumgartner, F., 2013. Framing the Poor: Media Coverage and U.S. Poverty Policy, 1960–2008. Policy Studies Journal, 41(1), 22–53. Rowley, S., 1983. Critics Growl Over Meese Hunger Remark: White House Moves to Limit Political Damage. Chicago Tribune, 10 December, 1. Said, E., 1997. Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World. New York: Vintage Books. Serrin, W., 1983. Recovery Irrelevant to Workers Left Behind. New York Times, 4 September, 1. Shapiro, M., 1984. House Votes to Increase Food Stamp Payments. Washington Post, 2 August, 3a. Steensland, B., 2011. The Failed Welfare Revolution: America’s Struggle Over Guaranteed Income Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Stoesz, D. and Karger, H., 1993. Deconstructing Welfare: The Reagan Legacy and the Welfare State. Social Work, 38(5), 619–628. TRB, 1983. Dr. Reagan Didn’t Deliver: His Pledge of Growth Without Inflation Isn’t Coming True. Los Angeles Times, 20 September, 5c. Treadwell, D., 1983. The Times Poll: Reaganomics Works, Most in U.S. Believe. Los Angeles Times, 21 December, 1b. Tumulty, K., 2018. Ronald Reagan’s Letter to his Dying Father-in-law. Washington Post, 24 September. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/09/14/ronald-reagansletter-to-his-dying-father-in-law-annotated, accessed 18 October 2018. Weisman, S. R., 1981. Reagan takes Oath as 40th President; Promises an ‘Era of National Renewal’. New York Times, 21 January, 1a. Weisman, S. R., 1982. Reagan Says Blacks Were Hurt by Works of the Great Society. New York Times, 16 September, 1a. White, J. C. and Reaves, J. A., 1983. Family Break-up Hurts Black Progress. Chicago Tribune, 20 October, 1. Williams, J., 1983. New Poverty Rationale May Be Emerging. Washington Post, 13 August, 4a. Winston, D., 2007. Back to the Future: Religion, Politics, and the Media. American Quarterly, 59(3), 969–989. Winston, D., ed., 2012. The Oxford Handbook of Religion and the American News Media. New York: Oxford University Press. Wright, H. B. and Gilbert, J. C. 1911. That Printer of Udell’s. New York: A.L. Burt.

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7 THE NEGOTIATION OF RELIGIOUS AUTHORITIES IN EUROPEAN JOURNALISM Teemu Taira

Introduction The sociologist of religion Grace Davie suggested a couple of decades ago that disproportionate numbers of those who have little or no interest in religion (in both a personal and professional sense) are present in the circles which dominate the media. Such dominance may, moreover, be one (possibly the principal) reason for the persistence of dismissive attitudes to religion in modern Europe. (Davie 2000, 104) This idea implies that the work European journalists and other media professionals do may have serious consequences for the role and status of religious institutions and religious authorities. It reiterates the more general argument that the media, with their increasing power and prominence, “constitute[s] a fundamental challenge to authority through their ubiquity and social location” (Hoover 2011, 617). Although these statements are mainly plausible and seem to echo religious people’s sentiments in Europe quite well, they offer only a partial truth about the complex relationship between religion and journalism. This chapter examines the relationship within the European context in detail, focusing on the question of authority: How is religious authority conceived, configured and negotiated in European journalism? Is it simply the case that antireligious journalists and journalism’s structural properties reinforce the decline of religious authorities or is the relationship more complex? The problem thus defined, it is worth clarifying the key concepts: religion, authority, journalism and Europe. The aim of this chapter is not to discuss the category of religion; it simply takes the social constructionist understanding of religion as its starting point. Religion is what is constructed as such in a particular social, cultural and linguistic context. This means that whatever is an established part of culturally and linguistically bounded discourses about religion may be material for this chapter, although it should be noted that journalists are one of the most powerful actors in deciding what counts as religious in European societies (Taira 2013, 487–489). Authority refers to positions in which certain speakers “command not just attention but the confidence, respect, and trust of their audience, or – an important proviso – to make audiences act as if this were so” (Lincoln 1994, 4). Hence, religious 95

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authority is not limited to assigned institutional roles, although these make authority structures more stable and predictable. Journalism as a term is often associated with print and, to some extent, with radio and television. This chapter concerns print but, in the current media sphere with new technologies, there is no point in limiting ourselves to the press, radio and television. A slightly more open understanding of journalism is needed so as not to exclude digital media platforms. Another key term here is Europe, which needs two clarifications. First, the chapter will selectively discuss studies and findings from different parts of Europe; however, it cannot cover the whole of Europe equally. The emphasis is on North-West Europe, particularly Britain and the Nordic countries. Second, in times of a globalized media sphere, the boundaries of European journalism cannot constitute simply Europe geographically defined. It is impossible to think about European journalism without paying at least some attention to the diasporic intensification of the media – technologies that enable geographically dispersed groups to have an influence on a more focused area. The theme of authority in religion and the media has been explored in many different ways. Many previous studies ask generally what happens to religious authority in the media age (Hoover 2017) and various scholars see the news media as detrimental to religion (Marshall, Gilbert and Ahmanson 2009) or moderately supportive of major denominations (Silk 1995, Knott, Poole and Taira 2013), while others explore the ways in which religion-related news production could be better (Buddenbaum 1998, Mitchell and Gower 2012). Other scholars ask whether there is a shift from the authority of religious institutions to media and television, in particular (Goethals 1981, 1990, Morris 1993)? Does the media institution’s logic diminish religious authority (Hjarvard 2011, Hjarvard 2012, Hjarvard 2013, Hjarvard 2016) and do the media create new authorities on religious matters? Do digital and social media platforms challenge traditional religious authority by opening the space for unorthodox religious authorities or affecting the democratization of organizational structures ( Eickelman and Anderson 2003, Campbell 2007, Turner 2007, Shirky 2008, Cheong 2013, Piela 2013) or do they challenge the secular media (Herbert 2011a, 2011b)? Much of the research on religion and authority in the media context has been about the USA and/or the media sphere, in general (Clark 2012, Cheong 2017). This chapter, however, addresses Europe and journalism more specifically. It proceeds by first considering three key concepts and approaches in thinking about religion and authority in European journalism. These are the mediatization of religion, publicization of religion and mediation of religion. Together these provide a map of key debates and arguments about the topic. Two case studies will then be introduced, first focusing on Britain and second on Finland and other Nordic countries. Their implications for the key approaches will be discussed. In the concluding section, some further challenges for the examination of religious authorities in European journalism will be explored.

Mediatization of religion Mediatization, particularly as outlined by Stig Hjarvard (2011, 2012, 2013, 2016), implies that media has emerged as a semi-autonomous institution, to the logic of which other institutions have to accommodate themselves. Furthermore, the media increasingly becomes part of how other institutions operate. Mediatization of religion, therefore, means that media logic begins to direct and control religious institutions and the knowledge people have of them, and that religious institutions re-organize themselves so that they try to make use of media in their activities for their own benefit. 96

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The main issue regarding authority is that religions, according to Hjarvard, are losing their authority for secular journalism: “the mediatization of religion involves the decline of institutionalized religious authorities (and the rise of media as authorities)” (Hjarvard 2012,  24). Rather than transmitting religious message, journalism is a key player in the production and framing of religious issues for a wider public. Therefore, journalism on religion is considered a secularizing force in European societies and even “an integral part of secularisation” (Hjarvard 2011, 119). The outcome of the process is “a new social and cultural condition in which the power to define and practice religion has been altered” (Hjarvard 2013, 83) and the media even take over many of the functions religious institutions and authorities used to have. Furthermore, Hjarvard (2016, 12–14) argues that the media create some space for new religious authorities beyond traditional religious institutions through popular media culture, mainly fictional films and television series, but this has very little to do with journalism as such. While Hjarvard’s thesis is meant to be pertinent to all contexts in which modern mass media operates as semi-autonomous institution, it is assumed to apply particularly well to Nordic countries, which have exceptionally high newspapers readership, stable role for public service media and well-integrated publics (Syvertsen, Enli, Mjøs and Moe 2014).

Publicization of religion If mediatization of religion has been linked to secularization, the second key concept, publicization of religion, has been closer to theories that question and challenge secularization, or at least some parts of it. Publicization of religion has been outlined by David Herbert (2011a, 2011b) by refining and updating the work of José Casanova (1994). Casanova (1994) suggested that the classic secularization thesis is in need of revision. He differentiated three moments or secularization sub-theses. First, secularization is related to differentiation of society, meaning that religious authority is in decline because religious institutions are losing control of other spheres of society. Second, secularization refers to the decline of religion according to which less people entertain religious beliefs and interest in practicing religion. The third sub-thesis argues that religion is becoming more privatized, thus exercising less authority in public matters. Casanova more or less accepts first two sub-theses but challenges the third. He suggests that rather than becoming increasingly privatized, religions are gaining more public presence as rational conversation partners in society. They do not gain authority by referring to the will of God or their own status but their authority is evaluated based on how well they convince others about their contribution to the public good. Casanova calls this process deprivatization of religion. Casanova however studied mainly Catholic countries and he did not theorize the media’s role in arguing for the public role of religions. Herbert (2011a, 2011b) has focused on the media and his idea of religious publicization is a process in which religious symbols and discourses have a heightened public presence because of rapid development and dissemination of media technologies. It does not necessarily mean that religions are more vital or influential but it does create space for increased visibility. This publicization process has implications for religious authority. Contrary to the neo-secularization theory, which argues for the decline of religious authority, Herbert sees that authority is reconfigured in a more distributed form but is not necessarily diminished. The question, then, remains what kind of evidence there is for the changes in authority and how it applies to journalism. Herbert suggests that diasporic intensification – the strengthening of ties across diaspora communities – made possible by new media technologies may change authority structures 97

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within particular traditions to more popularized and democratized styles and forms. Furthermore, the changes in media technologies enable communities to mobilize religious discourses in the public sphere, which means that religion is becoming more public and possibly a relevant part of public discussion. It remains an open issue how these possible consequences affect journalism. The strength of the theorization, however, is both in offering a framework to think about the question of religious authority and journalism within the context of new media technologies and in providing one possible counter-narrative to views that assume a simple decline of religious authorities in an increasingly mediated world (see Cloete 2016, Turner 2007).

Mediation of religion The third key concept highlights yet another aspect in the relationships between the media and religion, in general, and journalism and religion, in particular. Mediation refers to a process in which some medium is used in transmitting messages. In the context of religion and the media, this concept facilitates studying how religion is mediated, but it does not theorize a long-term process of change as such. Mediation of religion takes a much more cautious stance on the relationship between religion and journalism: Rather than offering a theory, it provides “an epistemological starting point from which the formative role of media […] as a constitutive part of religion can be acknowledged” (Meyer 2013, 13). Religion is mediated, even hyper-mediated in multiple ways, but the development of modern mass media is neither the starting point of mediation of religion nor as crucial a factor in diminishing religious authorities as the mediatization thesis implies. The mediation perspective sees authority as neither located in some semi-autonomous media institution as such nor as reconfigured by religious actors with the help of new media technologies. Instead, authority is dispersed and fragmented so that the mediation changes and challenges both the traditional media institution (secular journalism, for example) and religious institutions. The mediation of religion approach has many proponents, but in this context, it primarily offers an alternative standpoint to the mediatization thesis as it is said to capture the “heterogeneity of transformations to which media give rise” better (Couldry 2008, 48). (See also Hoover 2011, Morgan 2011, Meyer 2013). If the mediatization thesis argues that the media – and secular journalism in particular – shape the core elements and practices of religions, the mediation perspective suggests that religions have always been mediated in multiple ways. Therefore, the mediation thesis implies that mediatization overestimates the revolutionary role of the modern mass media, and its rationale is in exploring the multiple ways in which religious authority is mediated in and through journalism. The next two sections take two case studies as examples of the theoretical standpoints introduced and examined here. Both are based on the analysis of European journalism, with a particular focus on newspapers. The first deals with British media and the second with Finnish and Nordic media.

Negotiations of authority during the papal visit to Britain In the study of British media portrayals of religion Knott, Poole and Taira (2013) showed that the mainstream newspaper and television coverage of religion has increased both in absolute numbers since the early 1980s and in relation to other similar themes. This increase pertains unsurprisingly to Islam but also to Christianity. Their case study of the media coverage of 98

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the papal visit to Britain in 2010 offers a particularly illuminating example of how various voices and actors, religious or otherwise, negotiate their role and position in the media in religious matters, thus highlighting how secular journalism can maintain debates that involve conflicts and offer relatively strong support for religious authorities at the same time. In September 2010, Pope Benedict XVI made a state visit to Britain. The media analysis covered all the most relevant daily newspapers, key websites and selected television news, reports and documentaries during the visit. One of the findings was how the media narrative changed from serious doubts concerning the visit and the character of the Pope to an evaluation that saw Ratzinger as a “shy and thoughtful” man, rather than a conservative and rigid “God’s rottweiler” (Knott, Poole and Taira 2013, 159). The criticism that prevailed before the visit diminished significantly after the arrival of the Pope. It did not vanish completely – the demonstrations were covered in the press – but the journalists did not show much support for the criticism, except to those who had been victims of Catholic child abuse. Furthermore, the most vocal atheist and secularist critics, such as Richard Dawkins, were ridiculed in the press. The visual coverage told the same story. The analysis of more than 600 newspaper photographs of the Pope and other aspects of his visit, including front-page photographs of Pope with his hands spread wide and surrounded by a cheering crowd, concludes that the visual coverage supported the overriding narrative of a visit that was successful in overcoming people’s misgivings. It is true that “the media constitute an additional challenge to religious authority through their provision and mastery of images and image culture” (Hoover 2011, 618), but if this is taken as an example, the image journalism does not necessarily erode religious authority. The media discussion was not limited to the Pope, his critics and journalists, covering a wide variety of religious authorities from many traditions (Anglicans, Muslims, Jews, Sikhs, and so on). Although the Pope’s speeches did not address interfaith issues in particular, journalists highlighting the so-called marginalization of Christianity framed the visit as an interfaith event and supported that narrative by giving space to a variety of religious authorities who told the audience how and why the Papal visit to Britain was significant for all people of faith. The papal visit is just an example of how religion is dealt with in British journalism, but it also highlights a number of more general aspects. Knott, Poole and Taira (2013) found that three key aspects – the marginalization of Christianity, the discourse on religious diversity and suspicion expressed toward atheism and criticism of religion – were not limited to this case, but were dominant topics in the random sample of British newspaper and television journalism around that time. Other studies seem to confirm their findings, even when disagreeing in details concerning the interpretation. For instance, Robin Gill’s (2012) longitudinal study of religion in British newspapers shows that the overall amount of material deemed hostile in the religious content had increased. However, most of this increase pertains to Muslims in tabloids and most right wing and conservative broadsheets. The same papers are predominantly supportive of the Anglican Christianity and very critical of (what they consider left wing) atheism and secularism: “The 2011 survey of newspapers detected little or no hostility towards mainstream Christianity or to the Church of England in particular” (Gill 2012, 58). The stereotypical and even demonizing representations of Islam in the British media have been demonstrated by many studies (Poole 2002, Poole and Richardson 2006, Petley and Richardson 2011), but it would, however, be incorrect to suggest that journalists are not supportive of religious diversity as long as it is within the boundaries of acceptable 99

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diversity. Furthermore, some studies focus selectively on the most problematic examples rather than the overall changes in religious authorities in journalism. For instance, Petley and Richardson (2011) paint a bleak picture of the British media’s Islamophobia, but their examples are almost exclusively from tabloids and conservative right-wing papers rather than more liberal or left-leaning papers. Although it is true that journalists tend to be less religious than the rest of the population, British journalists do not embrace activist atheism and secularism (Knott, Poole and Taira 2013, Kettell 2015, Taira 2015, Aston 2017). Journalists do not necessarily favor any one religious viewpoint or hand authority to religious people, but do often reject the views expressed by celebrity atheists and secularist organizations. In addition to secular news journalism, religious broadcasting is one of the key factors in producing and distributing information about religion in the public sphere. Studies dealing with British religious broadcasting (Viney 1999, Hunt 2011, Knott, Poole and Taira 2013, Wallis 2016) all point out the slightly diminished role of religion in publicly funded and commercial journalism. The main changes have been that devotional content in religious broadcasting is considered old-fashioned, although it is not entirely absent. Religious programs are rarely broadcast during primetime and the conversational style that takes religious diversity as its starting-point dominates religious broadcasting. Journalists and other media professionals lean toward an individualistic and seekership approach but the leaders and institutions are still in the pole position when programs are designed. Criticism of religion is rare in religious broadcasting. Overall, if anywhere in secular journalism, it is in the religious broadcasting slot of the publicly funded mainstream media where religious authority still has a special place. Although it covers only a small part of the journalistic field, the public broadcasting system remains the norm not only in Britain but also in Europe more generally (see Davie 2000, 105–107). However, as the example of the papal visit demonstrates, the media presence of religious authorities is not limited to religious broadcasting, religious voices being taken seriously in journalism more generally, albeit their authority is not equally distributed among different traditions.

Liberal – not antireligious – journalism: the case of Finland Another case study deals with religion in Finnish (and Nordic) media. Finland, like other Nordic countries, is a Christian but increasingly secular and religiously diverse country. The quantitative content analysis of religion in Finnish journalism(Taira 2019) shows that the number of religion-related editorials in the most popular and influential newspaper Helsingin Sanomat was quite steady from the 1960s to the 1990s, but has almost tripled since then (from the annual average of 31 in 1988–1994 to 84 in 1996–2010). Much of the overall increase pertains to Islam. For example, the annual average of Islam-related editorials in Helsingin Sanomat since 1990 has been 35 whereas between 1946 and 1990 it was four. In readers’ letters, the Lutheran tradition still dominates. In the 2010s, about 60% were about Lutheranism, but there is evidence of increasing diversity there too: In the 1970s and earlier the proportion of Lutheranism among all religion-related readers’ letters was between 75% and 85%. The increased visibility is not primarily about religion gaining more authority but religion often being seen as a local or global problem to be dealt with. This is often related to conservative Christian groups and Islam. However, journalism about Islam is not simply about security issues, terrorism and difficulties in assimilation. For example, images about Ramadan in the past 25 years show how journalism participates in familiarizing the 100

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unfamiliar. The photographs in newspapers focus on food, home and the happy family. Islam is divided into good Muslims – those who are not fully like us but spice up our society with some exoticism – and bad Muslims – global terrorists who do not support our democratic values. Those who come to be labelled as good Finnish Muslims, are heard in the media more often than before, although they are perhaps more exposed to criticism than other religious authorities. This is probably because journalism is not supportive of any religiously conservative views. In accordance with the (relatively) liberal values prevailing in society, journalists tend to support the right of the individual to choose his or her religious tradition and its precise form. Religious conservatives may not always be satisfied with this journalism, but when the relationship between the established Lutheran church and mainstream journalism is explored, it is difficult to talk about an antireligious media. Empirical studies focusing on recent media coverage of religion in Finland (e.g., Niemelä and Christensen 2013, Taira 2014, Sumiala, Hokka, Valaskivi and Laakso 2017) have demonstrated how representatives of the established church are regularly given space and a voice in the secular media, both as representatives of the Lutheran church that partly functions as a public utility and discussants concerning the common good. Thus, the Finnish case adds some critical nuance to Hjarvard’s argument about mediatization being a secularizing force in society. This is evident in the analysis of overall media coverage, but it is highlighted in cases dealing with sexual minorities and female pastors. It is suggested that the media want to liberalize the church and in that process support the liberal strand of the church against atheist critics of religion while keeping its distance from religiously conservative views at the same time (Moberg and Sjö 2012, Taira 2014). Swedish findings are similar. Alf Linderman (2017) argues that the media highlight an individual as an authority in religious matters. Religion is not frowned upon; rather, it functions vicariously. People are happy when others believe and perform rituals, although they may not need such services themselves, at least not regularly (Davie 2007). In the media context, this means that people want religion to be aired on public television channels and covered by news production, although they may not be interested in following the services themselves (Linderman 2017). This applies primarily to the dominant denominations in all Nordic countries. However, journalistic self-understanding is changing slowly toward the recognition of diversity of convictions and identities, including the non-religious ones. Thus, the traditional roles of the dominant churches are not taken for granted. Rather, they are constantly discussed and debated in the media. In some cases, this makes religious people more willing to engage with interfaith activities, because this may provide better resources to defend their position in mediated debates (see Liebmann 2018). As in the British case, atheism and secularism do not get direct support from Finnish journalists. Although the general image of the non-religious journalist prevails, those journalists who often write about religion on the Finnish media are typically members of the Lutheran church and the content of their writing reflects the approach that sees religion – at least the established church – as a force for good in society. It is not uncommon that media professionals reveal secularist attitudes but, as in Britain, journalists rarely attack the established churches in concert with atheistic and secularist organizations. On those occasions, the positive aspects of the major denominations are highlighted much more commonly. In a word, journalists criticize the Lutheran church in order to make it more liberal, not in order to make people leave the church (Taira 2015, 2017a). Most Finnish studies about religion in journalism have produced similar results. Their main message is that the Lutheran church gets its own voice heard on the media and that journalists have a largely positive attitude toward it. The Finnish Orthodox Church is less 101

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visible on the media, but its treatment is also quite positive. This does not exclude negative reporting whenever hypocritical behavior or financial misconduct is revealed, for instance, but this is considered the normal task of journalists who write about appreciated and resourceful churches. This is also understood by the churches in that powerful institutions accept that their doings and wrongdoings are sometimes investigated minutely. Studies about religion in journalism in other Nordic countries are largely in support of the main findings (Axner 2013, 2015, Niemelä and Christensen 2013, Lövheim and Linderman 2015, Lövheim 2017, Furseth 2018). Axner’s (2013) study focuses on the presence of religious actors in Swedish newspapers, one of the main findings being that the Church of Sweden dominates and its representatives contribute to public discussion about the common good in general, not just about what concerns the church directly. Jews have a strong newspaper presence because of their long history in Sweden, whereas the presence of Muslims is often about assuring the public that they are loyal to Swedish values. Minorities – particularly those who are not easily accepted as part of society – are rarely taken seriously in more general discussion about the common good. Lövheim and Linderman (2015, 34) sum up the question of authority such that all religious authorities tend to adjust themselves to the format and agenda of the medium in question when they enter a public mediated debate. In that sense, media and journalism have significant roles but this does not mean that they oppose all religious institutions and traditions. The majority (59 of 104) of newspaper editorials took a secularist position and wanted religious issues to remain in the private sphere beyond politics, but a significant minority expressed a more positive attitude toward the public involvement of religions, particularly in their liberal forms (see Lövheim 2017). Furthermore, Scandinavian readers expect the media to be critical of religions, but they also want the media to facilitate dialogue between religious groups in order to relieve tension (Lundby, Hjarvard, Lövheim and Jernsletten 2017). Hence, Nordic examples suggest that although journalists have moderately secularist preferences, the increased visibility of religions and religious issues have not led to an antireligious media. Rather, Nordic journalism provides space and even moderate support for liberal religious authorities, particularly for those based on dominant and established communities.

Implications The cases demonstrate that the thesis concerning mediatization of religion is a very relevant framework but its testing has not provided unambiguous support for the thesis. The decline and diversification of religious affairs correspondents is an obvious example of the re-negotiation of religious authority. They used traditionally to be pastors but such positions have been increasingly filled by journalists who just happen to be interested in writing about religion. In some cases, they belong to minority religions but even for papers with influence and prestige, hiring no one as religious affairs correspondents has become normal. This development supports the mediatization of religion thesis, but it is only a small part of the picture. Other factors cast doubts on it. Hjarvard (2016, 14) uses the examples of mainstream newspapers where religious arguments presented by religious people are considered ineffective and outdated. Religious authorities have to use secular and rational language instead. This is certainly the case, but it narrows down the question of authority. Religious organizations and leaders have many other means to affect society through the media. Journalism requires some other justification than the will of God, but this does not mean that journalism would not accept religious leaders as relevant authorities on societal and moral matters in public discussion. 102

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In fact, journalists tend to support the role and status of established churches, often writing approvingly about religiosity, and religious leaders are heard in the media. There are forms of cooperation and areas of agreement between religious authorities and journalists that should be taken into account, rather than focusing on the absence or ineffectiveness of religious arguments (narrowly understood) as such. Although authorities of religious institutions and groups are changing, their strategies and tactics based on the media’s ability to deliver the information about religion, the journalistic content is far from hostile toward religion as a whole. Furthermore, those who criticize religions and try to diminish its authority do not get much support from journalists where the dominant denominations are targeted. Thus, the assumed theoretical connection between mediatization and secularization needs qualification. Journalism has a relatively positive attitude to religion as long as the form of religion does not violate the prevailing values of the media professionals and surrounding society. Religious authorities, especially those in the dominant churches, are in a relatively good position to get their message through in the media. Sometimes they are invited as writers and columnists and on opinion pages. Rather than linear secularization through mediatization, it seems to me that it is more appropriate to suggest that mediatization of religion means liberalization of religion. Christianity, particularly its liberal form, still holds a position of cultural centrality in relatively secular Europe, even when journalists do not share its beliefs and doctrines, thus offering – jointly with the media – the “dominant normative frame into which old and new religions have to fit” (Meyer 2018, 336). The media may mediate secularization and even in some contexts reinforce it as an unintended consequence, but it has not been demonstrated beyond doubt that the media and journalism are integral components of secularization. The evidence suggests otherwise, even in relatively secular Europe. The publicization of religion thesis derives initial support from the quantitative findings of the case studies since there are more stories about religion in the media, and public sphere and people, journalists included, are more aware of the presence of religion in society. However, there is little that would suggest religions being more authoritative than they were (see Axner 2015, Knott, Poole and Taira 2013, Hjelm 2015, Taira 2015). While new religious authorities emerge because of the changes in media technologies and they may have some influence in negotiating the role of religion in society, it has not significantly affected mainstream journalism about religion or the public sphere more generally (Lövheim and Axner 2015, 50). It is still the case that the most appreciated and valued platforms are occupied by leaders of religious communities. The representatives of established or dominant denominations are most likely to be heard on such venues. It is more difficult for minorities and their strategies vary, depending on how acceptable they are in the surrounding society and how willing they are to cooperate with journalists (e.g., Axner 2013, 2015). The authority of atheists and secularists has not increased either. It is rather that journalists are willing to maintain a somewhat polarized discussion without giving an authoritative voice to any party involved (Taira 2015, 122). Because the mediation of religion thesis is different in nature, it is more difficult to evaluate its implications for the debate on religious authority in European journalism. It can still be suggested that if the evidence in support of the other two theses is imperfect, it is tempting to abandon them and remain content with the general idea of the complexity of religion-related mediation which highlights the importance of the media but does not assume a linear or unilateral process from the less mediated era to the hyper-mediated one or predict the consequences of mediation for religious authorities. However, as there is little evidence of religious actors being able to bring masses of new members to their communities through the media 103

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or otherwise gain authority in society more generally, particularly in Europe, it is worth suggesting that the impact of the secular media is not insignificant (Hjarvard 2011, 132). The debate has focused on traditional mainstream journalism rather than micro publics generated by religious media influencers in national and cross-national settings. One of the current questions is whether the development of digitalization and new media technologies will change the role and situation of religious authorities in secular journalism. Cheong (2013) suggested that the Internet can simultaneously empower and challenge traditional religious authorities, but the question of what it does to traditional journalistic authorities in the religious context is also relevant. One of the weaknesses of the mediatization of religion approach has been its development as a theorization of the media institution. Although this has provided it with some clarity in terms of argument, it may rely too much on the era that preceded the development of social media technologies when journalism’s dominant image was based on communication from one to many. Conversations on the mediatization of religion have tried to address the relevance of social media but it remains the case that many of the claims originate from thinking about mass media journalism without the social media revolution that has changed communication into a more multi-centered process. In contrast to that, the publicization of religion approach was developed in close connection with the development of new media technologies and social media. However, it may rely too much on the promise of social media to do more than enhance bonding; it assumes that the social media function as bridging tool between religious authorities and journalism. While this may well be the case in some contexts, it remains to be demonstrated more generally. From the point of view of a mediation approach, the social media are just another example of multiple mediations. The social media increase and naturalize the role of media technologies in religious contexts but, in relation to journalism, a mediation approach would guide us to explore how religious authorities use various media to get their message through to journalism and also to people in general, sometimes without the mediation of mainstream journalists. Cheong points out that early digital religion studies emphasized the logic of disjuncture and displacement of religious authorities, meaning that the Internet replaces traditional religious authorities. More recently, however, scholars have highlighted the logic of continuity and complementarity, suggesting that authority is sometimes co-constituted by traditional and new actors but also that traditional authorities – having learnt to utilize new media technologies – have more resources to integrate the best of both worlds and thus preserve their authority (Cheong 2013, 74–82). The same applies to the power of journalism. Although the Internet and social media have revolutionized the platforms of journalism and raised questions of financial sustainability for the print media, traditional media houses are authoritative actors in the era of social media as well. People who are keen on seeking detailed information about religion on the Internet may well find mainstream journalism somewhat irrelevant, biased and untrustworthy when it comes to religion, at least compared with the opportunities offered by direct communication on social media. However, a large proportion of the population who are not interested in spending their time in finding out what goes on within religious communities, receive their information through the news production of large media houses. In this sense, traditional journalism is still relatively powerful and authoritative, although it has to adjust to the changing media environment (Taira 2017b). One useful way to connect the analysis above to the classic view of authority is Max Weber’s (1964) threefold classification of ideal types: Authority may gain legitimacy by 104

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reference to a tradition or custom (as in organized religion), by adhering to rational-legal procedures or by personal charisma (as in new religious movements). This is typically transferred to religion and journalism so that secular journalism is closest to the rational-legal authority that marginalizes other ideal types. However, the authorities of organized religions, especially representatives of established churches, are present in the media as regular contributors or as expert voices sharing their views on values, ethics and the common good. Surely, this counts as some sort of authority by reference to religious tradition and custom even when religious arguments as such are not highlighted. Furthermore, if journalists and the media like celebrities and personalities (Royle 2012, 158–159), personal charisma operates as one type of authority in religion-related journalism as well. Moreover, although journalists are often critical of non-institutional New Age type beliefs and practices, symbols and the ideas associated with them are often presented as facts or interesting fictions in weekly or monthly magazines that cover charismatic celebrities (Kraft 2017, 70). Although authority based on religious tradition and religious charisma cannot be said to dominate the field, it would be short-sighted to ignore their presence in journalism.

Conclusion and future challenges Future challenges in the study of religion and journalism in relation to the question of authority are twofold. First, the main future challenge is to provide conceptual clarity for the key approaches, so that they – or at least some aspects of them – can be tested in different contexts. At the moment, different concepts and approaches have proven inspirational in tying isolated studies into theoretical frameworks, thus generating lively theoretical discussion among scholars. This, however, has not yet turned into the accumulation of empirical evidence that would make us affirm, develop or abandon the key approaches based on something other than their theoretical sophistication. It may not be necessary to achieve full agreement on all details, but better understanding of the conceptual differences – what counts as evidence of authority and how it relates to theoretical narratives about religion and journalism in Europe – should facilitate the debate, further the research and add nuances to prevailing theoretical narratives. Second, rather than investigating how digitalization and social media affect the negotiation of religious authorities, one of the future challenges is to reflect on the convergence between religious authorities, traditional journalistic platforms and more recent (social and digital) media forms (Meikle and Young 2011, Taira 2017b). In other words, creating and establishing fully separate subfields such as religion in the printed press journalism and digital religion (Campbell 2013) is probably not the best way forward, because deep understanding of their complex interaction and their dialectical relation is needed. This should help us to remember that the European context is more diverse and more global than ever before.

Further readings Axner, M., 2013. Public Religions in Swedish Media: A Study of Religious Actors on Three Newspaper Debate Pages 2001–2011. Uppsala: Religion and Society Research Centre. A thorough empirical exploration of religious voices and their authority in printed press. Herbert, D. E. J., 2011. Theorizing Religion and Media in Contemporary Societies: An Account of Religious “Publicization.” European Journal of Cultural Studies, 14(6), 626–648. Presentation of the idea of religious publicization and a useful analysis of the relation between changing media and secularization. Hjarvard, S., 2013. The Mediatization of Culture and Society. London: Routledge.

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Negotiation of religious authorities in European journalism Hjarvard, S., 2011. The Mediatisation of Religion: Theorising Religion, Media and Social Change. Culture and Religion, 12(2), 119–135. Hjarvard, S., 2012. Three Forms of Mediatized Religion: Changing the Public Face of Religion. In: Hjarvard, S. and Lövheim, M., eds. Mediatization of Religion: Nordic Perspectives. Gothenburg: Nordicom, 21–44. Hjarvard, S., 2013. The Mediatization of Culture and Society. London: Routledge. Hjarvard, S., 2016. Mediatization and the Changing Authority of Religion. Media, Culture and Society, 38(1), 8–17. Hjelm, T., 2015. Is God Back? Reconsidering the New Visibility of Religion. In: Hjelm, T., ed. Is God Back? London: Bloomsbury, 1–16. Hoover, S. M., 2011. Media and the Imagination of Religion in Contemporary Global Culture. European Journal of Cultural Studies, 14(6), 610–625. Hoover, S. M., ed., 2017. The Media and Religious Authority. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press. Hunt, S., 2011. Transformations in British Religious Broadcasting. In: Bailey, M. and Redden, G., eds. Mediating Faiths: Religion and Socio-Cultural Change in the Twenty-First Century. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 25–36. Kettell, S., 2015. Illiberal Discourse: Pro-Faith Discourse in the United Kingdom. In: Hjelm, T., ed. Is God Back? London: Bloomsbury, 65–76. Knott, K., Poole, E. and Taira, T., 2013. Media Portrayals of Religion and the Secular Sacred: Representation and Change. Farnham: Ashgate. Kraft, S. E., 2017. Bad, Banal and Basic: New Age in Norwegian News Press and Entertainment Media. In: Gilhus, I. S., Kraft, S. E. and Lewis, J. R., eds. New Age in Norway. Sheffield: Equinox, 65–78. Lincoln, B., 1994. Authority: Construction and Corrosion. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Linderman, A., 2017. Media and (Vicarious) Religion: Two Levels of Religious Authority. In: Hoover, S. M., ed. The Media and Religious Authority. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 67–80. Liebmann, L. L., 2018. Media, Muslims and Minority Tactics: Compelling Dialogues in Norway. In: Lundby, K., ed. Contesting Religion: The Media Dynamics of Cultural Conflicts in Scandinavia. Berlin: De Gruyter, 187–204. Lundby, K., Hjarvard, S., Lövheim, M. and Jernsletten, H. H., 2017. Religion between Politics and Media: Conflicting Attitudes towards Islam in Scandinavia. Journal of Religion in Europe, 10(4), 437–456. Lövheim, M. and Axner, M., 2015. Mediatised Religion and Public Spheres: Current Approaches and New Questions. In: Granholm, K., Moberg, M. and Sjö, S., eds. Religion, Media, and Social Change. London: Routledge, 38–53. Lövheim, M. and Linderman, A., 2015. Religion, Media and Modernity: Editorials and Religion in Swedish Daily Press. In: Hjelm, T., ed. Is God Back? Reconsidering the New Visibility of Religion. London: Bloomsbury, 32–45. Lövheim, M., 2017. Religion, Mediatization and “Complementary Learning Processes” in Swedish Editorials. Journal of Religion in Europe, 10(4), 366–383. Marshall, P., Gilbert, L. and Ahmanson, R. G., eds., 2009. Blind Spot: When Journalists Don’t Get Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Meikle, G. and Young, S., 2011. Media Convergence: Networked Digital Media in Everyday Life. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Meyer, B., 2013. Material Mediations and Religious Practices of World-Making. In: Lundby, K., ed. Religion Across Media: From Early Antiquity to Late Modernity. New York: Peter Lang, 1–19. Meyer, B., 2018. Afterword: Media Dynamics of Religious Diversity. In: Lundby, K., ed. Contesting Religion: The Media Dynamics of Cultural Conflicts in Scandinavia. Berlin: De Gruyter, 333–338. Mitchell, J. and Gower, O. eds., 2012. Religion and the News. Farnham: Ashgate. Moberg, M. and Sjö, S., 2012. The Evangelical Lutheran Church and the Media in Post-Secular Finland. In: Hjarvard, S. and Lövheim, M., eds. Mediatization of Religion: Nordic Perspectives. Gothenburg: Nordicom, 79–91. Morgan, D., 2011. Mediation or Mediatisation: The History of Media in the Study of Religion. Culture and Religion, 12(2), 137–152. Morris, C., 1993. The Theology of the Nine O’Clock News. In: Arthur, C., ed. Religion and the Media: An Introductory Reader. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 137–146.

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8 FROM GOOD PRESS TO FAKE NEWS Who’s got the word? Religion, authority and journalism in Brazil Karina Kosicki Bellotti Introduction This chapter aims to approach three aspects of the Brazilian religious scenario: first, the relationship between journalism, religion and authority; second, the impact of news coverage on religious dynamics and third, the ways the mediatization of religion has influenced negotiations of religious authority and power. Brazil, the largest country of South America, is characterized by a pronounced religious diversity, deepened by the Evangelical increase in the past 40 years after three centuries of Catholic hegemony and the growth of religious minorities like Afro-Brazilian religions (mainly Candomblé and Umbanda). This chapter is divided into four sections, the first of which discusses the concepts of religion, journalism and authority, approached through the theoretical frame of the mediatization of religion. Then follow two interconnected case studies: first, the news coverage of Evangelicals by the mainstream press in the 1990s, such as the hegemonic television network Rede Globo and newspaper Folha de São Paulo, which instigated religious prejudice against Evangelicals. The second case study discusses the use of the press by Evangelical groups in the 2010s, during which their political engagement rose, fomenting intolerance against Afro-Brazilian religions and LGBTQ+ and feminist groups. Finally, the chapter discusses the specific challenges for scholars of religion, journalism and authority and asks how the Brazilian cases may help to reflect on the roles of the press and the scholarship of religion in a broader sense. Readers should note that in Brazil, the term Evangelical (evangélico) is used to define both Protestants and Pentecostals, despite their theological and liturgical differences. In Brazil, Anglo-Saxon missionaries founded Protestant churches in mid-1800s, while Swedish and Italian missionaries coming out of the Azusa Street Revival in the USA founded Pentecostal churches in the 1910s. However, only in the mid-20th century did Pentecostals start to outnumber Protestants, driving the Evangelical growth by the 1980s and thereafter (Freston 1993). 1

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Mediatizing religion in Brazil: religion, authority and journalism The theoretical frame of the Italian (or Roman) School of History of Religions, established in the early 20th century by Rafaelle Petazzoni, contributed to the development of a historical and comparative perspective on religions by considering religions as social and cultural production that is subject to change. Therefore, according to historian Angelo Brelich (1966), religion can be defined as a set of creeds and practices relative to super-human or divine beings in certain historical contexts, comprising both institutionalized organizations and individual expressions of faith, devotion and spirituality. This concept of religion is pertinent to the Brazilian religious scenario, once known for its high rate of Catholicism, due to three centuries of Portuguese colonization (1500–1822). The Catholic Church has been facing the competition of new groups, the Evangelicals, mostly Pentecostals. This Evangelical portion of the population has increased since the 1980s (from 6.6% in 1980 to 22.2% in 2010), followed by practitioners of other minority religions, with minor growth: Afro-Brazilian religions (Candomblé, Umbanda), Spiritism, Judaism, Islamism, Buddhism, New Religious Movements (New Age, Oriental Religions, etc.), among others (IBGE 2010). This diversity is permeated with religious competition. Shortly after the Brazilian Republic was proclaimed in 1889, religious freedom was nominally guaranteed by the constitution of 1891, but the Catholic Church worked hard to remain a hegemonic cultural institution. Catholics’ condemnation of Afro-Brazilian religions and Evangelical denominations helped to marginalize them throughout the 20th century. Moreover, through their means of communication and church services, some Pentecostal groups have been attacking Afro-Brazilian adherents in the past half-century (Silva 2007, 207–236), as will be demonstrated in this chapter. Using Brelich’s (1966) definition of religion, it is important to distinguish the institution Catholic Church from the various forms of Catholic devotions and practices in Brazil (Teixeira 2009, 17–30). This distinction explains the cultural permanence of Catholicism in Brazil, despite the decline of organized Catholicism and the competition it faces from other religions, mainly the Evangelical churches. These are a growing minority, organized in multiple denominations and very active in the media (Chesnut 1997). Besides these features, the Brazilian religious field also reflects the general tendencies of Western religious history over the past two centuries: the expansion of religious autonomy, deinstitutionalization and detraditionalization of organized religions, along with blooming religious hybridization and the mediatization of religion. This last tendency is paramount to this study. According to Stig Hjarvard (2013, 79), mediatization of religion may be considered part of a gradual process of secularization in the late modern society; it is the historical process by which the media have adopted many of the social functions that were previously performed by religious institutions …. Besides, … as a whole the media as conduits [of messages and symbols], languages [aesthetics] and environments are responsible for the mediatization of religion … The outcome is not a new kind of religion as such, but rather a new social and cultural condition in which the power to define and practice religion has been affected. (Hjarvard 2013, 83) 110

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Hoover (2016, 15–36) characterizes mediatization of religion as the influence of media in the shaping of cultural life in the Western world, including the religious realm, framing the way religious agents relate and communicate with their flock, and the insertion of religion into the public sphere. Hjarvard also identifies three types of mediatization of religion: first, the religious media, characterized by “media organizations and practices controlled and performed by religious actors” (Hjarvard 2013, 83); second, journalism on religion (Hjarvard 2013, 86–90), which frames religion in the public sphere according professional rules of journalism and banal religion, which brings “religious imagination to the cultural realm” (Hjarvard 2013, 90). This text addresses the religious media produced by Evangelicals and the journalism on religion – mainly on Catholic Church and Evangelicals in Brazil. Both cases reveal the ways that religious groups compete for cultural and political legitimacy and authority in the Brazilian public sphere, especially after the popularization of digital media in the 2000s. The mediatization of religion has grown over the past four decades in Brazil, affecting the religious authority of organized religions, which can no long take their position in society for granted. The discussion on religious authority can be traced back to Weber’s (1978) study on the three types of authority: legal or bureaucratic, charismatic and traditional. In the following scholarship of religion, media and culture, other studies have been expanding the notions of religious authority in the face of the mediatization of religion. As religious traditions become more available in the marketplace of culture through the media, they came to be relativized, with their religious authority being exposed, not determined solely by law, tradition or charisma. They are in constant need of negotiation in order to prove authenticity to their adherents (Hoover 2016, 30–32). Regarding the first type of mediatization of religion – the uses of media by religious groups – there is the case explored by Cheong (2016, 81–102) of the uses of Twitter by American Protestant and Pentecostal pastors to reinforce daily their position of authority and leadership in their communities and churches, with constant and omnipresent communication with their followers (Cheong 2016, 88–90). Such uses of media are also common in the Brazilian religious landscape. For instance, since the 1990s popular Catholic priests such as Father Marcelo Rossi and Father Fábio de Mello reinvigorated the figure of the clergy – traditional authority – using both new technologies of communications and legacy media (television, radio, books). Catholic media re-signify and transmit a plethora of saints and devotions every day, engaging adherents in worship practices on- and off-line (Carranza 2011). In reaction to the expansion of Evangelical media since the 1980s, Catholics present their message with the support of the Vatican, which also became more active in media with Pope John Paul II (1978–2005) and Pope Francis (2013–). Horsfield (2016, 55–56) analyzed the role of different means of communication in the struggles for authority throughout the history of Christianity – from the oral tradition of the first Christians to the written culture of the Church. In the context of the digital media, he highlighted the engagement of religious adherents as meaning-makers, which has been calling religious leadership’s attention. This is evident in the constant involvement by members of the Catholic and Evangelical clergy in Brazil with social media that shows not only their willingness to participate in the new media, but also their perception of the popular use of media for purposes like the exchange of ideas, the expression of dissent and the reinforcement of religious identities. Therefore, authority also addresses the notion of identity (Campbell 2007, 1043–1062), that is, within a religious organization, leaders may define who is a true believer or not, who deserves promotion or condemnation and to what extent the organization or its adherents 111

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may open up to other groups or practices – secular or religious. In one of the case studies of this chapter, Evangelical social media has been used in recent years to attack feminism, LGBTQ+ people, Afro-Brazilian religions adherents and symbols. Famous pastors and Evangelical politicians proclaim truths to be spread via news portals, reverberating ideas on gender, sexual and religious issues that are well known by their followers, who replicate the news in social media, especially on Facebook and WhatsApp. Therefore, the use of media by religious groups aims to establish the boundaries between the pious and the impious and promotes engagement of the flock as a sign of belonging. The second type of mediatization of religion – journalism on religion – refers to the presence of religion in the secular press, so that the language of the media shapes the religious sphere, including the very notions of religion, religiousness and non-religiousness (Hjarvard 2013, 86–90, Hoover 2016, 24). For this text, I consider journalism as not solely news coverage, since the Brazilian regulation of the journalist profession also includes press offices, higher education regarding journalism (teaching and research activities), chronicling and photojournalism, among other activities (Presidência da República 1979). However, the type of journalism approached in this chapter, which relates directly with issues of religious authority, includes the news coverage, reporting and opinion pieces, some of the bases of journalism in the country (Bergamo 2011, 233–269, Hjarvard 2013, 87). According to Hoover (2016, 26), “[…] modern media and mediation have the potential to inscribe different nuances of religious authority and inscribe or evoke authority.” In Brazil, news coverage of religion has spread stereotypes of certain religious groups and reinforced the authority of Catholicism and of organized religion as the only true face of religion. Despite the fact that religion is a crucial aspect of Brazilian life, there never was a specialized religious coverage in any of the mainstream press – an absence that is also reproduced in the curricula of the main journalism schools to this day. Brazilian scholars of communication such as Marialva Barbosa (2007) and Nelson Werneck Sodré (1999) have analyzed the main characteristics of the news media established in the country. Press Media in Brazil are concentrated in the hands of a few corporations owned by powerful political family groups. By far the most powerful group is Globo, owned by the Marinho family, running newspapers, magazines, Internet portals (G1.com; globo.com), the television network Rede Globo, radio and thousands of television and radio affiliates. Their main outlet is the television network, which established a high standard of production and transmission, boosted by the broadcasting politics of the federal administration under the dictatorship of 1964 to 1985. Nowadays, even with its dropping ratings due to the competition of other means of communication, the Globo network still manages to define political and cultural agendas for public debate. Two of their main products are telenovelas and the evening news Jornal Nacional (National News), on air since the late 1960s. Another major media outlet to be analyzed in this chapter is the newspaper Folha de São Paulo, of national circulation and founded in 1921, owned by the Frias family. An important characteristic of the news media in Brazil is the ideal of impartiality ( Barbosa 2007, 81), created by the incipient corporate media early in the 1920s/1930s and intensified after the 1960s, inspired by the American model of news coverage (Bergamo 2011). The idea of neutral coverage is a pattern cultivated until today in the news outlets and schools of journalism, which values information over opinion to convey the news of varied issues for a mass audience (Barbosa 2007, 151). However, scholars like Melo, Fadul and Silva (1979) affirm that ideology is intrinsic to communication and international studies as well reveal the ideological, racial, gender, class and sexual bias influencing the work environment of journalists and the production of the news (Allan 2010). 112

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Therefore, the relation between religion, authority and journalism in Brazil must be scrutinized in this larger context, since religious authority in Brazil is disputed within the religious realm and certain types of authorities are reinforced in the secular news coverage. Religion has typically received little attention from the printed media. With the advent of electronic media in the mid-20th century, along with the rise of media corporations, journalists continued to underestimate religion as news material, except when the Pope visited the country in the 1980s and 1990s. By that time, new religions started to seek visibility and old religions engaged in a battle for the hearts and souls of Brazilians with the use of media. The following two case studies show how these two realities were intertwined over the Brazilian scenario in the past 40 years.

Evangelicals in the news in Brazil (1990s–2010s). A first case study In 1989, Edir Macedo, the leader of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (IURD, in the Portuguese acronym), a Pentecostal church created in 1977 in the city of Rio de Janeiro, became the new major shareholder of a bankrupt television network, Rede Record. Once unknown by the media, the church started to be covered by the news media in a derogative way, e.g., its leader, the self-entitled Bishop Macedo, was usually only referred as a bishop in quotation marks and its clergy were labeled as pastors in quotation marks as well (Freston 1993, 6–25). Their flock was portrayed as puppets, poor and desperate people manipulated by greedy pastors, as shown in a poignant untitled cartoon in the second page of the major newspaper Folha de São Paulo, of national circulation (Oliveira 1995, 2b). The fact that IURD followed the Prosperity Gospel caused revolt in many journalists, who referred with awe to the charge of tithe in exchange for miracles (Rossi 1995). From 1989 onwards, IURD was targeted by major print outlets (newspapers and magazines), as well as television channels, with an ebb and flow of denunciations, varying from accusations of tax evasion, illegal business deals to finance the purchase of the television Record and charlatanism. On October 12, 1995, the national holiday of Our Lady of Aparecida, Catholic Patroness of Brazil, in a late-night church television program, IURD’s bishop Sérgio von Helde kicked a large image of the saint, mocking it for being an empty statue, incapable of performing any miracles. The episode, rapidly known as the kick of the saint, caused commotion among Catholics and in society in general, stirring the ongoing animosity between IURD and Catholic supporters in the secular media. Chiefly the Globo network, but also other media organizations, frequently labeled Evangelical churches and their followers as sects or fanatics. Religious scholars observed that this and other events revealed the predominance of the Catholic worldview in the language used by journalists when reporting news about IURD and other Evangelical churches and leadership. Paul Freston (1993, 6–25) demonstrated that the secular press and Catholic agents portrayed Evangelicals as illegitimate actors in Brazilian religious scenario, generalizing the case of IURD to the entire Evangelical field. Protestants have been rejected by Brazilian Catholics since their arrival in the 19th century, but when Evangelicals reached greater visibility, the counterstrike was fierce. The Catholic Church feared the growth of the – in their own words – Protestant sects, accusing them of stealing their adherents, as attested in the article “Growth of Protestant Sects forces Catholic Church to change” (Folha de São Paulo 1995b). Journalist Clovis Rossi (1995), from the Folha de São Paulo, in a column about the kick of the saint episode, stated: “The Universal Church demands more from the pockets than from the knees of their flock” and an editorial in the Folha de São Paulo (1995a), entitled “Dead souls,” also about this event, asserted: “The critique from 113

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the Catholic clergy of IURD is right. This church takes advantage of the cultural blindness of millions of Brazilians to thrive and multiply its profits.” Whilst the kick of the saint generated fury, the constant attacks made by IURD and other Evangelical churches against Afro-Brazilian symbols and adherents did not cause the same uproar. After that episode, rarely did the Universal Church come into direct conflict with the Catholic Church again. Nevertheless, it never stopped demonizing Afro-Brazilian religions’ deities and practices. For instance, part of IURD’s church services offer exorcism of demons and purification from the evil influence of Candomblé and Umbanda’s entities (Campos 1997). Afro-Brazilian religions have been largely practiced by disenfranchised people suffering from religious and racial exclusion (Chesnut 2003, 102–127) and these are IURD’s preferred targets. For many years, the press remained silent regarding this matter, which only hit the news when Afro-Brazilian religious agents won lawsuits against IURD’s actions, for example, regarding the right to reply on IURD’s television/radio shows (Gonçalves 2018, Redação 2018). That is – when it comes to scandals, any religion becomes news material. Stewart Hoover (2016, 18) mentions the case of the exposure of pedophile cases in the Catholic Church in the USA in the 1990s, which undermined the authority of that institution at the time, after decades of deferential treatment of institutional religions by the press. However, while in the USA the Catholic Church is a minority religion, in Brazil, the press treated these scandals as individual faults in a distant reality, so they barely touched the church’s authority in the mainstream media coverage. In the past few years, Brazilian news outlets that used to cover the Catholic Church and ignore other religious groups now give brief news on Evangelicals celebrations and on demonstrations of religious violence and intolerance against Afro-Brazilian religions adherents. The former is due to the Evangelical growth and the mutual approximation between some Evangelical leaders and the dominating media, namely Rede Globo. For instance, prominent Evangelical leaders including Silas Malafaia reported close conversations with Rede Globo’s staff in 2010 and by that period, he was seen on the evening news and variety shows (Anon. 2010). The latter is due to the high visibility of Afro-Brazilian movements and to the recognition of African heritage and racial equality in the past decade. One of the main achievements of the Afro-Brazilian social movements was the Law 10699/03, which instituted the teaching of African and Afro-Brazilian history and culture at all levels of basic education. Such teachings include the study of Afro-Brazilian religions, which are strongly rejected by Evangelical (and sometimes Catholic) families because of the demonization committed by certain Pentecostal churches of Afro-Brazilian religious symbols and creeds. However, in a time with a growing need for dialogue and comprehension concerning religious issues, the news media in Brazil are still largely negligent and silent. The ways the news media covered religion in the 20th century contributed to the reinforcement of certain notions of religion – namely, institutionalized Catholicism and of so-called legitimate religious agents and illegitimate religious subjects (Cunha 2016). Therefore, the news media contributed to the legitimation in the public sphere of the authority of the Catholic Church, in contrast to the decline of Catholicism registered in the national census since the 1980s. The news media also stereotype Muslims (a minority religion in Brazil), echoing prejudices of part of the international Western media. Magali Cunha (2017) demonstrated how Muslims appeared mostly as terrorists, while the Catholic Church received careful and constant attention, with news from the Vatican and Catholic authorities and national coverage of Catholic religious holidays, such as Corpus Christi and Our Lady of Aparecida Day. 114

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The other type of mediatization of religion is the religious media, including the press, to influence Brazilian education and culture during the 20th and early 21st centuries. Regarding solely journalism, throughout this period, it is clear that the neglect of pluralistic religious coverage in secular journalism provided space for biased representations of religious themes, thereby contributing to political and cultural prejudices in Brazil.

Good press and fake news: the past and the present of religious press. A second case study In the early 20th century, the Catholic Church invested heavily in print media in order to spread the good press and influence society in terms of taste, politics and education. After the legal separation of church and state in 1889, the Catholic Church invested in new ways to engage lay people in the public sphere. One of these initiatives was the investment in the good press, i.e., the diffusion of printed material (periodicals, books, newspapers) made by clergy and lay people in the early 20th century (Santos 2017). Despite the limited success of the good press, the Catholic Church managed to infuse the idea that Catholicism was the only true and authentic Brazilian religion, and this idea was incorporated in the public sphere, including in the news media. However, the cultural and political influence of the Catholic Church remained limited in the public and private spheres as secularization and religious competition advanced in the 20th century. Evangelicals also invested in print media in the 19th and 20th centuries in Brazil, for proselytism and religious instruction. However, it was the extensive use of radio and television that helped to popularize the Evangelical religion by the second half of the last century, not to mention the use of the Internet in the early 21st century (Bellotti 2016, 451–461). The digital media have the effect of influencing culture to achieve political results. The webpages of Evangelical news portals such as Gospel Prime, Gospel+ and Guiame claim that Brazilian Christians, especially Evangelicals, are persecuted by secular society and media. These Evangelicals blame mainstream media of being obedient to left-wing, feminist and gay agenda, which motivate the attack of Christian values and beliefs. Since the mid-2000s, these portals have conveyed news from other media outlets (even from dominant news media, like Globo’s G1), offering a platform for Evangelicals to debate and usually corroborate the conservative agenda. Gospel Prime’s editors, for instance, affirmed on 20 April 2018 that We’re in an electoral [presidential] year, and it is evident that the objective of the great media is to avoid the growth of the conservatives and their spokesmen, as is the case of Gospel Prime. (Prime 2018b) Their editors responded contrarily to a derogatory report by Época magazine (from Globo Company – Borges 2018) in which Gospel Prime was classified among the top ten greatest fake news websites. With the rise of left-wing administrations (2003–2016) and especially after the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016, a strong right-wing mobilization has been supported by Evangelical sectors in Brazil. They fomented opposition toward many political and cultural issues of the left, such as reproductive rights, gay and transgender rights, racial and gender equality and sexual education in public schools. Ben Cowan (2014, 101–125) and Richard Romancini (2018, 85–106) analyzed the recent rise of the “new right,” which allies right-wing agents (liberal politicians, economists 115

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and journalists) with Christian lay people and leaders – mainly Pentecostals and conservative Catholics. These agents have engaged in the secular and religious press – among which are the web portals analyzed here – to vocalize their discontent with the failures of the left-wing administrations in addressing the corruption in public administration and social-economic problems. Additionally, these conservative actors claim that any public policy favoring nonheteronormative practices or groups is against the will of God and the natural order. For instance, the creation of educational anti-homophobic material for public schools in 2010 was disparaged by Evangelical congressmen, who conducted an extensive campaign through the press and social media against its distribution. This material was pejoratively called “the gay kit” (Romancini 2018, 85–106) by these politicians and in 2018 was regularly mentioned in the presidential campaign by the Christian right-wing candidate Jair Bolsonaro to blame the former administrations for an alleged attack on traditional family values. This is similar to the case of the American cultural wars in the 1970s–1990s (Chapman 2010) in which the Religious Right fought for so-called family values to regulate politics, culture, education and the media. The right-wing Evangelicals also express their discontent against the mainstream media. The editors of Gospel Prime and Gospel+ accuse Globo’s telenovelas of indoctrinating immorality, adultery, sexual misconduct and homosexuality. Evangelicals also accuse Jornal Nacional, along with other news outlets such as the Folha de São Paulo, of conveying lies about Evangelicals and promoting left-wing leaders. Pastor Silas Malafaia attested that the Brazilian dominant media is the major promoter of fake news, according to a long report by Gospel Prime (Aragão 2018b). The strategy of websites like Gospel Prime and Gospel+ is to publish abridged news from secular press, focusing on specific subjects, with spectacular headlines, and spread it on social media. One example is a report that presented the picture of the drag queen Xochi Mochi speaking to children, taken on 14 October 2017 in the Michelle Obama Neighborhood Library, in California, USA, with the headline: “Drag queen, dressed as demon, is chosen to preach ideology of gender to children” (Chagas 2017). Although the article provided accurate information about the event such as the location, it also constructed an alleged gender indoctrination of defenseless children. This was followed by a great number (165) of comments by horrified Christians. Only a minority criticized the sensationalistic headline, along with the hate speech of fellow Christians in the comments. The portal has a variety of sections, including Israel, Christian World, Brazil, International and Politics. There is a remarkable similarity between the sections and even headlines of these two portals – Gospel Prime and Gospel+, including the section dedicated to Israel, in which Muslims are portrayed as menaces to the Israeli State, replicating pro-Israel and pro-USA arguments. I highlight two recurring subjects that characterize the fundamentalist activism that reinforces the dichotomy between an imagery of Us (that is, Christians) and that of a Them (i.e., the World/Infidel/Impure): First, the dread of the so-called ideology of gender, described as indoctrination infused by left-wing educators in order to teach children to choose their gender, rejecting their divine and natural order; and second, the derogatory representation of Afro-Brazilian religions. In the first case, there is the fierce opposition to the ideology of gender. Gospel Prime’s article “Marisa Lobo is sued due to her opposition to the ideology of gender” (Prime 2018a) states that Christians are living under a gag rule, which victimizes everyone that is against the sexual liberalization. Christian psychologist Marisa Lobo was once a columnist of Gospel+ (Lobo 2018) and ran for Congress. On the webpages of such portals in 2018, Evangelical politicians (such as congressmen Marcos Feliciano and Magno Malta), opponents to the ideology of gender, received attention. Therefore, such coverage supports a conservative and 116

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moral agenda that already managed to integrate gender issues into religious discussions in the National Education Curricular Basis in 2017, mainly due to the pressure of Evangelical congressmen and women (Saldaña 2017). The second case is a biased representation of Afro-Brazilian religions and left-wing celebrities. One example for this is the news about the Afro-Brazilian singer MC Carol. A Gospel Prime headline of 20 April 2018 is: “Author of the funk song ‘I’m smoking crack’ will run for congress for the PCdoB (Communist Party of Brazil),” followed by minor text: “MC Carol says she represents the ‘feminist, black and periphery movements’” (Aragão 2018a). Inspired by the example of black and left-wing congresswoman Marielle Franco, who was executed in March 2018 in Rio de Janeiro city, MC Carol claims she wants to fight for children’s rights in poor communities. Her song is a social critique about the lack of options poor children have in the favelas of Rio, leading them to drug addiction. The original source of the news was the website Extra, which did not focus on the Communist Party, drugs or feminism, unlike Gospel Prime’s derogatory portrayal of MC Carol, when it ran the more neutral headline “Influenced by Marielle Franco, MC Carol will run for State congress” (Alfano 2018). Another example is the news by Gospel Prime of Rede Globo’s telenovela Second Sun, set in Salvador (in the State of Bahia), a city with a high percentage of Afro Brazilians that is known for the practice of candomblé. Despite the fact that this telenovela is being criticized by the Afro-Brazilian movements for the absence of black actors, Gospel Prime’s headline is “New Globo’s novela ‘bets on’ orishas [African deities of Candomblé] in search for ratings” (Aragão 2018c). The original source of this news was GShow (from Globo), with the headline “‘Second Sun’: videos show first encounter of the cast of the next 9PM novela” (Gshow 2018), demonstrating that each character will have good and evil aspects, associated with different orishas. But in the comment section of the Gospel Prime’s article (95 comments were registered on 13 May 2018), there are many criticisms. For instance, the majority rejected the idea of the orishas, accusing it of being a false or demoniac religion propagated by Globo, which also was understood to be an evil corporation. At least two people were in favor of the novella and understood it as an opportunity to bring Afro-Brazilian religion into prime time. Finally, there is the recent case of an Afro-Brazilian history teacher who was repudiated by children and school staff for giving classes on Afro-Brazilian culture. Gospel+ announced “Teacher give classes on Afro-Brazilian religion with African clothes and is confronted: ‘Go away, Satan!’” (Chagas 2018). The info is taken from G1.com (“Teacher is substituted after giving class on African religion in school in Ceará” – Freitas 2018). Most of the comments about this news blame the teacher for expressing her faith through her clothes. While the individual use of crosses or other Christian accoutrements is common in the public sphere, the use of Afro-Brazilian religious clothes still causes uproar. Furthermore, the news at secular outlets focuses on the punishment she received – she was transferred to other functions at the school, not being allowed to give classes, after three children reported feeling sick after her class. The kids pointed her out in the street, saying – “Go away, Satan!,” “I’m gonna get this witch!” (Freitas 2018), and so on. These are a few of the many examples of news propagated via social media. This is a story to be closely followed, as Brazilian society aims at political renewal after political scandals in the past decade. Since these religious and political agents are battling for the authority over the destiny of the nation, the scholarship on religion and communication may contribute to better understand such processes. The religious media environment – to use Hjarvard’s (2013, 83) concept – of the early 20th century was unidirectional and had limited reach. Conversely, the early 21st-century environment of the religious digital media engaged Christians – Evangelicals and Catholics – in a moral and political campaign, to the point 117

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of electing in 2018 the right-wing candidate Jair Bolsonaro and several congressmen and women with Christian moral agendas, under the slogan Brazil above everything, God above all.

Conclusion: challenges for religion, authority and journalism in recent Brazil Through the conceptual lens of mediatization of religion, this chapter analyzed two aspects of the relation between religion, journalism and authority. The first aspect is journalism on religion in mainstream news media – from the representation of Evangelicals, under the heavy influence of the Catholic cultural settings in the 1990s, to the continuous overrepresentation of the Catholic Church as the epitome of religion, to the detriment of minority religions. The second aspect is the religious media. Once detracted by the mainstream media in the 1990s, the Evangelicals became, in part, opponents to Afro-Brazilian religions, left-wing politicians, feminists and LGBTQ+ activists. It also demonstrated how digital media helped to engage Evangelicals in the public debates and the spread of social panics that favor conservative politicians and celebrities. A major challenge for the scholarship on religion and journalism in Brazil is its own expansion, whether in Communication studies or other fields of knowledge. Although there is increasing interdisciplinary study of the relations of religion and media in Brazil, the analysis of religion and journalism is rarely central to the scholarship. It may be that the current political context will attract greater attention to this field as religious actors became more powerful and visible in Brazilian society. My main conclusions are that religions and religious issues have been practically absent from the news media in Brazil since their inception in the early 19th century. This resulted in a lack of information about religious diversity and religious conflicts in the country. In response to the question who’s got the word? in the Brazilian religious field, the answer would be the Catholic Church, considering the mainstream news coverage. There is almost a deadly silence on the other religions present in Brazil and in the world. While mediatization of religion helped to change the nature of religious authority, the way secular journalism broadcasts about religion still reinforces certain types of religious authority to the detriment of others. However, considering the religious digital media, the answer to that question should include other religious actors, whether leaders or not. For the scholarship on religion, journalism and authority, perhaps the new engagement of Evangelicals and Catholics in digital media and politics will foment studies on the issues of authority. These analyses might observe who claims to influence whom, with which instruments – and to which ends – in the Brazilian plural yet unequal religious field. Transnational and comparative studies in Latin America on religion, journalism and authority, regarding not only the status of traditional institutionalized religions, but also the situation of minority religions in the news, would also be interesting to explore. Such investigations may offer interesting results on how religious authority is perceived by religious leadership and their flock, as well as on the roles played by journalism in such scenarios.

Further readings Campbell, H. A., ed., 2013. Digital Religion: Understanding Religious Practice in New Media Worlds. London: Routledge. This book explores case studies in which digital media affected religious practices among adherents and clergy. It addresses discussions on authority, community, rituals and authenticity in the religious realm.

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Religion, authority and journalism in Brazil Hoover, S. M., 1998. Religion in the News: Faith and Journalism in American Public Discourse. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. The author released one of the first discussions on Religion and Journalism, demonstrating the meanings of religious news coverages in the public sphere and their relation with the notions of religion in contemporary American society. Hoover, S. M., ed., 2016. The Media and Religious Authority. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press. This volume presents conceptual analysis and case studies regarding the relation between religion, media and authority, reviewing traditional notions of authority (Weber) at the light of the legacy and new media in the religious fields. Garrard-Burnett, G., Freston, P. and Dove, S. C., eds., 2016. The Cambridge History of Religions in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press. This book offers a wide range of topics to religions in all countries of Latin America, including media and culture, religious diversity and history of the various religious groups existent in the continent. Schmidt, B. and Engler, S., eds., 2016. Handbook of Contemporary Religions in Brazil. Leiden, Boston: Brill. This is an updated volume with texts written by experts in the various Brazilian religious manifestations, contemplating the religions studied in this chapter – Catholicism, Protestantism, Pentecostalism, Afro-Brazilian religions.

Note 1 I am deeply indebted to Dr. Bethany Lynn Letalien for the careful revision of this text and to the editors of this book for the comments and suggestions.

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Religion, authority and journalism in Brazil Prime, G., 2018a. Marisa Lobo é processada por se opor à ideologia de gênero, 1 March. Available at https://www.gospelprime.com.br/marisa-lobo-e-processada-por-se-opor-ideologia-de-genero/, accessed 5 February 2019. Prime, G., 2018b. Nota de esclarecimento sobre ataque da Revista Época. Gospel Prime, 20 April. Available at https://noticias.gospelprime.com.br/nota-de-esclarecimento-o-exercito-de-pinoquiosrevista-epoca/, accessed 5 May 2018. Rossi, C., 1995. O mercado e a fé. Folha de São Paulo, 14 October, 2b. Saldaña, P., 2017. Governo Temer esvazia gênero na base curricular e mistura tema com religião. Folha de São Paulo, 6 December. Available at http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/educacao/2017/12/1940989governo-temer-esvazia-genero-na-base-curricular-e-mistura-tema-com-religiao.shtml, accessed 13 May 2018. Santos, F. C., 2017. Entre o altar e a fogueira: relações de gênero na censura católica a romances (1907–1924). Doctorate Thesis in History. Federal University of Paraná, Curitiba-PR. Silva, V. G., 2007. Neo-Pentecostalism and Afro-Brazilian Religions: Explaining the Attacks on Symbols of the African Religious Heritage in Contemporary Brazil. Mana, [e-journal] 3(1), 207–236. Available at http://socialsciences.scielo.org/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0104-93132007000100003, accessed 11 February 2019. Sodré, N. W., 1999. História da imprensa no Brasil. 4th ed. Rio de Janeiro: Mauad. Teixeira, F., 2009. Faces do catolicismo brasileiro contemporâneo. In: Teixeira, F. and Menezes, R., eds. Catolicismo plural: dinâmicas contemporâneas. Petrópolis: Vozes, 17–30. Redação, 2018. Record perde recurso contra direito de resposta de religiões africanas. Veja, 9 April. Available at https://veja.abril.com.br/entretenimento/record-perde-recurso-contra-direito-deresposta-de-religioes-africanas/, accessed 5 February 2019. Romancini, R., 2018. From “Gay Kit” to “Indoctrination Monitor”: The Conservative Reaction in Brazil. Contracampo, [e-journal] 37(2), 85–106. Available at http://periodicos.uff.br/contracampo/ article/view/17628/1102, accessed 5 February 2019. Weber, M., 1978. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, volume 1. Berkeley: University of California Press.

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9 ASIAN MASS MEDIA A pillar of religious authority? Yoel Cohen

Introduction Since the Reformation some five hundred years ago, religious authority has been transformed through, amongst other factors, the developments in printing and in modern journalism and mass media like radio and television and in digital media including news websites. The media age has changed the very nature of religious authority and power. In complex industrial societies, religion has increased emphasis upon personal choice and moral dictums and spiritual issues. It has led to an increased exchange of religious views mediated through print and electronic media and technology. In the process, religious authority and power has taken a new shape without giving a precise meaning and definition. But while in Western countries the debate around religious authority has focused upon the challenges to it by the mass media, in Asia, the relationship between mass media and religious authority has taken a different shape. Whereas in Western countries there is a gap between journalists and religious beliefs and behavior (Hoover 2016), you can find a greater religious identity among journalists from Asian countries. When speaking about relationships between journalism and religious authority, first, there is a need to define authority (Radde-Antweiler and Grünenthal 2018, 369). Religious authority will be defined here in terms of religious institutions’ authority figures – including imams, priests and monks – and how media perceive them (Campbell 2007). The chapter seeks to discuss the extent to which the media in Asia legitimize or delegitimize religious leaders. It thus contributes to our understanding of the complexity of the relationship between journalism and religion in Asia at large, as, with the exception of Islam, research on journalistic media and religion in Asia, with reference to the specific question of religious authority, has been sporadic and fewer than research on journalistic media and in the context of the USA and other Western countries. For example, Yao, Stout and Liu (2011) examine Chinese media coverage of religion and Yao and Liu (2018) relate to religious authority including Falun Gong. Min-Soo (2003, 2013) does so in the Korean context. Some research on Journalism and digital media has been carried out in the Indian context. Kumar (2003, 2018) surveyed the coverage of religion and spirituality – including an analysis of content in Indian newspapers, television and online websites – and its impact on religious authority, notably on Hinduism. Agrawal (2015, 2017) examined the impact of 122

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religious programming on the religious identity of Hindu and Muslim television viewers in India. Agrawal and Khan (2015) discuss how Hindu beliefs provide an unclear direction of influences of religious or dharma television. Thakur and Vaze (2013) review the early years of digital media and Patrick offers a more recent discussion of religion in Asian digital space (Patrick 2015). Patrick also examined Internet usage and religious identity among multireligious Chennai college students (Patrick 2014), Mitra (2019) the impact of digital media among diaspora Hindus, and Shah the impact of journalism and digital media on religious authority in Jainism (Shah 2015). Against the background of satellite broadcasting in the 1990s and the digital revolution in the Arab world, as well as interest in Islam in the aftermath of 9/11, a considerable amount of the research on journalistic media and religion in Asia has focused on Islam. Advancing beyond Rugh’s early study of the Arab press in the Seventies (1987), Mellor, Ayish, Dajani and Rinnawi (2011), Kraidy and Khalil (2009), Gunter and Dickinson (2013) and Hammond (2007) produced up-to-date studies surveying Arab media industries. Farouqui (2009) examined media representations of Indian Muslims in the wake of global Islamic radicalism. Pintak (2011, 2013), Mellor (2005) and Ewart and O’Donnell (2018) discuss the role of journalism in Islam. Maestri and Profanter (2017) address the changing role of Arab women in the media. Cohen and Hetsroni (2019) conducted a tri-national analysis of religion on television, comparing the USA (Christian content on television) with Turkey (Islamic content) and Israel ( Jewish content). Focusing upon the digital revolution, Ejaz (2019) surveys the impact upon Muslims in Asia. Taking this question further, Eickleman and Anderson (2003) discuss its impact within different Muslim countries, and Bunt (2003, 2009) looks at how Muslim religious authority has been altered as a result. In addition, many research articles on aspects of Islam and the media have been published. In Israel, the growth of the ultra-orthodox religious press was examined by Baumel (2002). The media and religion question was addressed by Cohen (Cohen, 2005, 2012) including the specific question of how religious authority has been challenged by digital media (Cohen 2011a, 2013, 2017, 2018, 2019).

Journalism and religious authority in Asia: overview from the Worlds of Journalism Study (2019) For a broader discussion of the relationship between journalistic media in Asia and religious authority, it is instructive to examine the trust among journalists in religious leaders and more generally, the question of whether religious considerations influence journalists. The Worlds of Journalism Study (2019) gathered data from 67 countries worldwide including countries inside Asia, which covered a broad range of questions about newsgathering. By using a common questionnaire distributed to journalists in all countries surveyed, it has been possible to produce a more precise picture about these questions. Among Asian countries in the project were Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Oman, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Turkey and United Arab Emirates (UAE). The survey data, among other things, also provide data about the relationship of media and religious authority. Overall, the survey showed considerable diversity between Asian countries reflecting, as suggested at the beginning of the chapter, that no single pattern emerges in the continent. For example, countries where Islam is the dominant faith show that the impact of religious authority is far greater than in some other non-Islamic countries. The survey claims that on a scale of 5 to 1 (5 – complete trust; 4 – a great deal of trust; 3 – some trust; 2 – little 123

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trust, 1 – no trust at all), it is possible to identify a pattern of the relationship of journalists to religious authority. On the question of the level of trust of journalists in religious leaders, the data varied from UAE (3.65), to Bhutan (3.39), Indonesia (3.20), Singapore (3.10), Oman (3.04) and Philippines (2.88) (see Table 9.1). When compared to other non-religious sources of authority such as governmental officials and politicians in the Asian countries surveyed, the level of trust in religious leaders was significantly higher with the exceptions of India, South Korea and Turkey. Therefore, although the figures for trust in religious leaders varied considerably from Asian country to Asian country, overall relatively religious leaders had considerable influence. By comparison, the level of trust in religious leaders in Asian countries is much more than trust in religious leaders in Western countries surveyed in the project. Trust in religious leaders in Western countries never reached the intermediate 3.00 of “some trust.” The figures in West Europe moved between “some trust” and “little trust” – from a high of UK (2.50), to Germany (2.30), Sweden (2.29), Ireland (2.20), Netherlands and Belgium (2.14 each), Austria (2.13), Spain (2.02), Switzerland (1.92), Denmark (1.87) and Greece (1.80). Yet a related question in the survey – religious considerations as a source of influence on journalists in Asia – was the same or even higher than the question of the level of journalists’ trust in religious leaders. Thus, in India and Turkey “religious considerations” were even higher than “trust in religious leaders”: 2.56 (India) and 2.28 (Turkey). More generally, the importance of religion and religious belief in Asian journalists’ perceptions was found in the survey to be higher than journalists’ perceptions of religious authority. The data was even higher than the specific question of trust in religious leaders: for example, in Indonesia (4.48), Malaysia (4.42) and Bangladesh (3.59), countries with very large Muslim populations. In terms of whether or not the journalist had a basic religious belief, in all Asian countries surveyed the majority of journalists reported a religion or denomination and in many of the countries very few reported no religion or no denomination. In India 41% of journalists, 37% in Turkey and 34% in Singapore reported no religion. The figure went down further to Bhutan (13%), Malaysia (12%), Israel (11%), Bangladesh (5%) and Indonesia (1%) (see Table 9.1). This contrasted with some other regions in the world. With the exception of Ireland, in all West Europe countries, for example, the majority of journalists in each country reported no religion or denomination. For example, 74% of journalists in Spain, 70% of journalists in Belgium, 61% in the UK and 51% in Switzerland reported no religion or denomination. In terms of religious belief itself, the dominant religion among journalists in Asia who were surveyed was Islam – with the exception of Bhutan, India, Israel and Singapore. Thus, 99% of journalists in UAE, 82% in Indonesia, 79% in Bangladesh, 55% in Turkey and 53% in Malaysia replied that they were Muslim. By contrast, in India 46% of journalists were Hindu, in Israel 75% of journalists were Jewish, in Singapore 22% were Christian Protestant and in Bhutan 78% were Buddhist. So the dominance of Islam, which has a long record of obedience to religious authority, is significant in assessing the impact of religious authority (see Table 9.1). Given the picture painted in this survey, this chapter now compares three contrasting cases: first, Islamic countries, where religious authority was given most importance, second India as one of the countries where it was given least importance and as a third case study, Israel provides an example of a country with a clear Jewish character, yet one that aspires to be mostly secular in orientation. The following case studies discuss the tensions within the three cases and their impact upon religious authority.

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Bangladesh Bhutan India Indonesia Israel Malaysia Oman Philippines Singapore South Korea Turkey UAE

Trust in religion leaders

Is religion Religious considerations important?

Mean*

Mean**

Mean***

No religion or denomination

2.34 3.39 1.90 3.20 2.13 3.50 3.04 2.88 3.10 2.55 2.06 3.65

2.69 3.62 2.56 3.02 2.13 3.72 – 2.78 3.11 2.18 2.28 3.38

3.59 4.11 2.53 4.48 2.67 4.22 – – 3.07 – 2.84 4.14

5.3% 12.8% 41.3% 1.2% 10.8% 12.1% – – 34.4% – 36.6% 0%

Source:  Worlds of Journalism Study, 2019. MEAN* 5 = complete trust; 4 = a great deal of trust; 3 = some trust; 2 = little trust; 1 = no trust at all. MEAN** 5 = extremely influential; 4 = very influential; 3 = somewhat influential; 2 = little influential; 1 = not influential. MEAN*** 5 = extremely important; 4 = very important; 3 = somewhat important; 2 = little important; 1 = unimportant.

Religious authority and journalism in Islamic countries: a first case study Authority is a central pillar in Islam. However, within the religion its various branches relate to Islamic authority in varying degrees. Strictest is the Shia stream, where the imam is the recognized religious leader, enjoying divine appointment, with the task of interpreting the Koran and the will of Allah. By contrast, in Sunni – the largest branch of Islam – the imam is a lay leader, who offers inspiration but his opinions are not binding. The media has had a mixed relationship to Islam. The transfer of knowledge, ‘ilm, is a prime motif in the religion and is a reminder of its role in Islamic religious missionary work. Indeed, authors have articulated a theory of mass media in reference to Islam – proximate to the social responsibility model – which both empowers the mass media in an Islamic society to advance Islamic goals and limits the media from publishing matter regarded as damaging Islamic goals. Ayish and Sadig (1997) articulate three principles of Islamic communication: first, the need for truthfulness and refraining from telling lies – not only in speech but even in thought. Second, recognition of another’s human dignity – including his right to privacy and a right to good reputation. Third, communication should be gracious or characterized by nice speech and wisdom. These standards exist in the mass media in strictly religious Muslim countries but in other more modern ones like Lebanon an Arabist or Western approach exists. Yet by the 14th century, against the background of the first printing press in Europe by Johannes Guttenberg in Germany, Islamic leaders became concerned that knowledge could 125

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be distorted and challenge authority. For example, Islamic leaders in Turkey placed a ban on any printing – a ban, which lasted three centuries until the 18th century. Given that Islamic clerics enjoy a high status in Muslim society, the extent to which religious authority there is challenged is less than in some other societies, such as in Western societies. For example, in a survey of 1,200 respondents in Tehran carried out in 2002, Abdollahyan (2008) compared exposure to media (globality) with local religious leaders (locality). He concluded that the more respondents were exposed to television the more they followed religious leaders. He found that those who use media 5–12 hours a day had a greater tendency to follow religious authorities in practicing religious commands than those whose media use ranged between 1 and 4 hours a day (Abdollahyan 2008). Not dissimilar, Rawan (2001), surveying 420 persons in Pakistani villages about the credibility of which opinion leaders were the best for objectively evaluating reality, found that after the khan and malek (community leaders) and relatives, the mullah was in second place (26.6%). This compared with radio (14.2%), television (13.8%), newspapers (7.8%) and teachers (0.5%). Yet, in strictly religious Muslim countries, the mass media is regarded by suspicion. For example, in Saudi Arabia the media has been monitored and controlled by Saudi ulama (clerics) and by the so-called Committee for Propagating Virtue and Preventing Vice. It was a recognition of the impact of Saudi media on public perceptions of Islam as well as the country having the two most important holy places in the faith, Mecca and Medina. While many Saudi journalists are themselves religious (Mellor 2018), this had not prevented tension between the worlds of Islam and of mass media in the country – partly due to supervision of the Saudi media by branches of the country’s police charged with ensuring religious observation. Since 9/11 and the political change in Saudi Arabia since 2018, the clerical hold over the Saudi media had weakened. On another level, social media, while itself opening up this control, have itself been adopted by religious leaders, making them, e.g., important bloggers. In other Islamic countries – including Bangladesh, Pakistan and Turkey – the influence of religious authority persons is incrementally less. The appearance of religion in popular programming in Turkey, for example, reflects the tension between secularism as fostered in the Ataturk era and the Sunni Islam, which characterizes the contemporary Erdogan era. Before the 2004 Turkish elections, when Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) came into power, the State Directorate of Religious Affairs had the mandate to ensure that religion, in general, and fundamentalist Islam, in particular, would be kept out of the public sphere – including in Turkish television. This changed in the last decade – partly in response to public demands and partly as tacit adherence to governmental expectations. There has been an increase of religion content in state broadcasting as well as in commercial stations. For instance, religious themes are now featured on Turkish television during the month of Ramadan. Turkish newspapers normalized the wearing a female headscarf (hijab) which used to be outcast in Ataturk times. Turkish filmmakers have loosened their secular approach in order to receive money from governmental funds that would sustain their productions. The important role of religion and religious authority figures can be recognized by the space it occupies in different Islamic media. For example, Rawan, examining three months in 1995 of the Friday issue of the Iranian daily Kayhan and the Pakistani daily Jumhuri Islami, found that religion ranked in top place in the former ahead of such other categories as politics, relations with the USA, crime and education/science and was in second place in the latter (Rawan 2001). The Worlds of Journalism Study (2019) showed that in Muslim countries journalists’ trust in religious leaders is high – ranging between 3 (some trust) and 4 (a great deal of trust). Thus, 126

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journalists in the UAE rated their trust in religious leaders as 3.65, Malaysia 3.50, Indonesia as 3.20 and Oman 3.04. But Turkey was much less, 2.28 (2 = little influence, 3 = somewhat influence). The extent to which religious considerations are important for journalists in Muslim countries is “high.” This ranges from a mean of 3.38 in the UAE, to 3.72 in Malaysia and 3.02 in Indonesia. 79.4% of journalists in Bangladesh, 54.9% in Turkey and 52.4% in Malaysia reported being Muslim. In Indonesia, 87.5% of journalists reported that their religious beliefs were “extremely important” and “very important, “ as did 77% of journalists in Malaysia, 63.9% in the UAE, 54.6% in Bangladesh and 42% in Turkey (see Table 9.1). The tension between professional journalists – 90% of journalists in the Arab world, surveyed by Pintak (2011), were declared Muslims – and religious authority exists throughout the Islamic world. These journalists are more inclined to be critical of religious leaders than the broader population. Arab media are facing pressure from those in Muslim authority: About one-third of the journalists singled out pressure from religious groups as among the most significant challenges to Arab journalism. Three-quarters of Arab journalists think that Muslim clerics should stay out of politics and that clerics should not influence how people vote, in contrast to less than half of the public. And while just 11% of the public think it is permissible for national laws to contradict Sharia law, 60% of Arab journalists believe civil law takes precedence over religious law. This finding reflects that notwithstanding that Muslim journalists are far closer to religious beliefs – and therefore less critical of religious authority – than their colleagues in Western countries, that nevertheless a gap also exists inside Islamic countries between journalists’ attitudes to religious authority and those of the broader public. Inevitably, there were differences between those journalists who are secular and those who are religious. In a study of Pakistani journalists, Pintak (2013) found that while only 20% of religious Pakistani journalists said they should be allowed to contradict Sharia, 43% of secular journalists said so. Yet just over 50% of religious Pakistani journalists agreed that religious leaders were meeting the moral needs of society. Apart from journalistic media, more broadly, the Internet has also both challenged traditional forms of Islamic religious authority as well as opening up vistas for creating an international virtual community – whose participants include off-line ulama who have adapted their outreach work to the era of the Internet. The Koran and Sumah (or Way of the Prophet), and Hadith (the collection of sayings of the Islamic oral tradition) are online with accompanying commentaries and study aids. Fatwas (or Islamic legal decrees) are online, including on such websites like Fatwa On-line and dar Alifta. Key functions in the Islamic faith performed previously off-line may be done also online. They start from the initiation process for a potential convertee to Islam to prepare for the ceremony of professing the Muslim faith. There is basic data about off-line mosques and the times of the five daily prayer services. For the Sunni stream there are the possibilities of online prayer services with prayers streamed through the Net, with the exception of the Friday midday service. There are online compasses to direct prayer toward Mecca. Day-by-day needs for the religious Muslim are available online. This includes information about Halal food products and banking in accordance with Islamic law. Charity – Muslims are required to donate 2.5% of their earnings to the poor, via Wakf or family trusts – may be transacted online. While the obligation to do the Haj to Mecca once in a Muslim’s life cannot be done online, related matters such as acquiring the ritual Ihram garments to wear for the Haj, maps of Mecca and travel arrangements in and to Mecca can be done online (Marin 2015). Islamic voices – both orthodox but also expressing alternative views to traditional Islamic thinking – are online. Anderson (2003) identified a number of new interpreters of Islam. First, 127

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the technical application of technology to Islam: younger Muslims, some motivated more by profit than religion have revolutionized the context in which Islam is mediated. Second, online activists with an alternative, informal Islamic agenda: Examples include women’s rights in Islam and homosexual communities (which are forbidden in Islamic orthodoxy). The new interpreters have been followed by official Islamic authorities, which had functioned previously off-line, finally recognizing the new media reality. Religious institutions, including educational ones (Rahimi 2018), have adapted. But while the contexts have changed, it has been questioned whether the basic Islamic message itself has changed as a result (Echchaibi 2008).

Religious authority and journalism in Israel: a second case study In contrast to many Islamic countries, Israel appears to be between religiosity and secularism. In the Jewish state, there is much Jewish symbolism. But as a secular democratic state which identifies with the West, individual religious Orthodox communities seek to preserve their own religious identity. Trust by Israeli journalists in religious leaders was inclined, according to the Worlds of Journalism Study (2019), toward the low side of 2.13 (2 – little trust, 3 – some trust), not dissimilar from Turkish journalists’ trust in religious authority in Turkey (2.06). The extent to which Israeli journalists took into account religious considerations in their work was also 2.13 (3 – somewhat important, 2 – less important), not dissimilar from journalists in South Korea (2.18) and Turkey (2.28) but much higher than journalists in West Europe. Basic religious beliefs do exist – but are considerably less than their colleagues in most Islamic countries surveyed by the Worlds of Journalism Study (2019). On a 1–5 scale, Israeli journalists had a mean of 2.7 in rating the importance of their religious beliefs. In Israel, 10.8% of journalists reported that they had no religious beliefs (which was much less than Indian journalists, of whom 41.3% reported no religion, and 37% in Turkey); 22.2% said that their religion or religious beliefs are “extremely important” and another 7.5% said that they were “very important” and 18.3% said these were “important.” However, 33% of Israeli journalists said religion or religious beliefs were “unimportant” (see Table 9.1). Authority and power in Judaism in Israel draws upon first, Judaism’s teachings and second, the authority which rabbinical heads of Orthodox Jewry in contemporary Israel enjoy. Bible-based rules are respected in Orthodox as well as Conservative Judaism, but is the basis of selective application in Reform Judaism. Rabbinic teaching on mass communication draws upon edicts, which originate in the Bible. Most innovative is Judaism’s prohibition in social gossip (loshon hara) (Book of Leviticus 19:17) which has been interpreted as embracing the disclosure of any information not publicly known about a person. This is not only negative information about a person but even information which is not negative about a person (Feldman 2015). Other Jewish rulings relate to copyright, journalistic objectivity and the non-functioning of the electronic media on the Sabbath – the day of rest (Cohen 2012). In Ultra-Orthodox or Haredi Judaism (who number 10% of Israel’s Jewish population), the influence of religious hierarchies – notably rabbis – is paramount in the Haredi communities, whether in the Lithuanian Haredi stream where the rabbi’s role is to interpret halakhah ( Jewish religious law) or in the Hassidic Haredi stream in which the admor, the spiritual head, fulfils a father figure role in the community and his influence is wide-ranging. The admor is also consulted on a range of social and family matters. Haredim declined to have contact with the secular society for fear that impure aspects of modern society will influence their religious style of life. 128

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Orthodox rabbis showed wide dissatisfaction with the coverage of the general Israeli media. In a survey of Israeli rabbis and mass media, carried out by Cohen (2011b), 95% of orthodox rabbis said that the press damage religious values “to some extent,” “to a large extent” or “to a very great extent.” Haredi rabbis were more inclined (64%) than modern orthodox (32%) to say that the press damage religion “to a very great extent” (Cohen 2011b, 97). Yet, even 39% of modern Orthodox rabbis agreed that the press damage religious values “to a large extent” (Cohen 2011b, 97). In the case of television there was a significant increase in modern orthodox rabbis (56%) saying that television damages religious values “to a very great extent” (Cohen 2012, 97). Similar findings were found for radio, the theatre, cinema and the Internet. The qualifications about mass media among Orthodox rabbis are also shared with non-Orthodox rabbis. Of all the types of media (press, radio, television, cinema, theatre and the Internet), the non-Orthodox were most critical of the Internet. Forty-seven percent of non-Orthodox rabbis said that the Internet damaged religious values “to some extent,” “to a large extent” or “to a great extent” (Cohen 2011b, 108). By contrast with rabbis, most journalists do not perceive the media as damaging religious values. Slightly fewer journalists say so in the case of television and the Internet as opposed to press and radio; 58% and 53% of journalists say that television and the Internet, respectively, do “not damage religious values at all” or “to a small extent” and 67% and 73% are inclined to say that newspapers and radio, respectively, do “not damage religious values at all” or “to a small extent” (Cohen 2016, 57–58). No less noteworthy is that 28% (same figures for television and the Internet) of journalists felt that television and the Internet damage religious values to “a large extent” (Cohen 2016, 57–58). Haredi rabbis have over the years issued religious decrees (pesuk din) against exposure to mass media – which is regarded by Israel’s Haredim as a threat to Torah values. The bans on press, radio, television and the Internet have been successful in varying degrees. Weakest has been Haredi bans on computers and the Internet. In order to preserve the cultural ghetto, leaders of the Agudat Yisroel Haredi political party established their own daily newspaper, Hamodia. Founded in 1950 by the Gerar Rebbe, Hamodia was intended to give Haredim a source of news under rabbinic supervision. Three other Haredi daily newspapers have since been established. But over the last thirty-five years an alternative Haredi media has also evolved inside Israel – comprising independent weekly magazines, Haredi news websites and Haredi radio stations – which have in effect challenged the rules of Haredi rabbis from within the community. The openness of the weekly magazines is characterized by the fact that, unlike the daily institutionalized Haredi papers each of which focuses upon their own political party sponsor, the weekly magazines report the activities of all Knesset (Israel Parliament) members irrespective of the specific Haredi party or stream to which they belong. While they do respect the code of not publishing immoral matter which may upset Haredi Jewish sensitivities, the independent Haredi weeklies introduced a new level of press freedom in an otherwise highly hierarchical media environment. Two Haredi radio stations are geared to provide the religious orthodox population with a station reflecting their interests. These are not strictly under the supervision of the rabbis. But like the commercial weeklies they do consult rabbis. For the Haredi rabbinical leadership, the invention of the Internet posed dilemmas to maintain the community’s religious self-identity. It illustrates the challenge posed by new media for religious authority. In 2000, just a few years after the Internet entered Western lifestyles, the Haredi rabbinical leadership imposed a prohibition on the Internet as a moral threat to the sanctity of Israel. The ban followed upon a special rabbinical court (bet din) 129

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established inside the Haredi community to deal with the threat from the spread of computers. In part, the ban was directed at children whose religious studies had been distracted with computers, using both the Internet and data bases. Gatherings and conferences have been held in different Haredi communities in Israel and abroad to generate consciousness over the Internet’s perceived danger. There have even been instances of so-called modesty squads demonstrating outside netcafes used by Haredim to surf. Even a handful of Haredi news websites exist, notably Kikar Shabbat and B’Hadrei Haredim, which operate independently from rabbinic supervision. They report criticism – sometimes vehemently – of the positions and behavior of Haredi leaders. In some cases, the names of those sponsoring the sites, and those editing them, have been hidden from the public. In light of the rabbinical ban on the Internet, some Haredi leaders refuse to be interviewed by the sites. One website, Kikar Shabbat, even carries pictures of faces of women. Yet despite the rabbinical ban, digital media is used by a considerable body of Haredi Jews today. Forty-three percent of Haredim were connected to the Internet by 2016–2017 (Israel Democracy Institute 2018). One of the major results of the loss of Haredi rabbinical hegemony, on the one hand, has been that today many Haredim seek higher education and many Haredi housewives go out to work. Indeed, the Haredi printed press have become a stage for discussion among the Haredi community about such issues as work employment for Haredim. On the other hand, the daily Haredi newspapers published by the Haredi rabbinical establishment has become a channel used to campaign against Haredim leaving the yeshiva portals or interrupting Torah learning (Cohen 2013, 2017). The independent Haredi press, notably weekly magazines, is not formally under the control of the rabbis, it is accurate to say that the rabbis have lost the battle inside their community. Yet, the basic feature of the cultural ghetto exists. The traditional off-line frameworks of Jewish life – the synagogue, the yeshiva and the Jewish home – remain paramount for Haredi Jews no less today. A criterion in Jewish law-making is that law pronouncements require to be acceptable to the community, otherwise this will bring into question the very legitimacy of the law-making body itself. Today, even Haredi rabbis require to address issues deeply and profoundly with people rather than giving directives from above. This may explain why rabbis came to terms with computers and with the Internet – in, albeit, a controlled environment. In contrast to Haredi rabbis, the rabbis of the modern orthodox (dati leumi) stream (which numbers 15%–20% of the Israeli Jewish population) have not issued legal rulings against exposure to newspapers, radio and television – reflecting their broader philosophy of seeking to create a synthesis between Judaism and modernity (Cohen 2012). The Modern Orthodox, with one foot among the secular Israeli population, is exposed to the wider media such as television and the Internet. These could be seen as religiously endangered were it not for the balancing effects of the religious education inside this community. For traditional-non-strictly observant or secular Jews, the question has been raised whether media are agents of religious identity. Hoover has argued that the media today have become important framers of religious faith (Hoover 2016). Theoretically, the media’s potential as platforms for the negotiation of religious identity has become acute with the Internet, by enabling the Jewish surfer – including Jews who are uncommitted or are unaffiliated to a community structure – to gather information relating to his own beliefs, thereby strengthening his belief system. But a closer examination suggests that the non-strictly religious do not actively surf the Net for religion-related matter (Cohen 2012, 230) and in the case of television there is little religion-related content (Cohen and Hetsroni 2019). All this suggests

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that the media’s role as a framer of religious identity and agent of spirituality in Israel is only partly true and revisits the question of the extent to which religious authority in Judaism has been challenged – or not.

Religious authority and journalism in India: a third case study By contrast to both Islam and Israel, India was shown in the Worlds of Journalism Study (2019) to be one of the Asian countries where religious authority enjoys a low regard among journalists. And in contrast to the earlier cases studies of Islam and Judaism in which there is the single supreme authority in monotheistic religions, Hindu religious traditions have multiple gods and goddesses in different areas of individual and family life – each enjoying specific authority and power. Hinduism is largely ingrained in re-birth and reincarnation of all forms of living beings. In examining the question of religious authority and the media in Asia, it is instructive to examine the case of India, for example, given its size and centrality in the region. In contemporary India – Hinduism has about one billion followers in India or 80% of the country’s population – religion has long been an ingredient of media content. This is despite that specialist religious reporters are absent in the Indian media – in contrast to, for example, media structures in Western structures – and religion is therefore covered by general reporters, who may not possess the background knowledge or network of contacts to cover the subject. In India, the Worlds of Journalism Study (2019) found that the level of journalists’ trust in religious leaders is low, 1.90 (3 = somewhat, 2 = little trust, and 1 =- no trust at all). But in terms of religious considerations as being a source of influence upon journalists this was higher, 2.56. The importance for Indian journalists of religious belief was in the middle of the scale of 1–5; 30.8% said that religion was “important,” 28.9% that it was “somewhat important” and 17.8% that it had “little importance,” and 41.3% of Indian journalists reported no denomination and 45.5% were Hindu (see Table 9.1). Religion is a prime theme in 35 religious television channels in India, mostly comprising Hindu channels. With most journalists from the Hindu upper caste (Yadav, Chamaria and Kumar 2006), Hinduism is the dominant faith also in terms of media coverage on religion. Surveying 315 Indian journalists who work for English and Hindu daily papers and television news, Yadav, Chamaria and Kumar (2006, 7a) found that while the Hindu upper-caste accounts for only 8% of the Indian population, its share was as high as 71% among journalists. Further, while Muslims comprise over 13% of the Indian population, Yadav, Chamaria and Kumar (2006, 7a) found that only 4% were present in the top media posts they surveyed. For example, key newspapers like The Times of India and The Hindu discuss Hindu spirituality in their columns – even if the press is broadly secular and partly opposes fundamentalist Hindu groups in their conflict with religious minorities such as Islam. In an analysis of religion content in Indian daily newspapers and television, Kumar (2018) found that much of the content was conflict orientated, such as Hindu-Muslim rivalries. A second major theme was coverage of Hindu ritual practices and celebrations (Kumar 2003, 2018). Religious authority itself was notably less present. This questions theories like Galtung and Ruge (1965) which gives prominence to elitism – or those in authority – as criteria in the construction of news. Agrawal (2015, 178) found that only 13% of Indians used digital media for religious purposes (in contrast to 81% for entertainment, 36% for news and 35% professional information). Broken down, only 13.5% of Hindus watched television for religious purposes or to gather religious information (in contrast to 52% and 47% of Muslim and Christian viewers,

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respectively), 20% of Hindus did agree that digital media helps understanding of religion and 16% of Hindus replied that it even provided religious experience (Agrawal 2015, 180). Thakur (2009) has argued that religious authority in India is strengthened through religious media. Surveying viewers of Swami Ramdev Baba’s prime time television dealing with Yoga – broadcast on the Aastha TV channel, the first 24-hour Hindu religious channel – Thakur found that viewers of the Swami program became more religious than before. Over 81% felt a need for a spiritual guru and 70% reported becoming more religious (Thakur 2009, 53). Moreover, the longer they viewed the program the more the felt-need for a guru was reported: 84% who watched the program for five years and 81% who had watched the program two to three years stated that they needed a guru, in contrast to 78% who had watched the program for only a year (Thakur 2009, 53). Yet the overall impact of Hindu media upon religious identity in the country appears limited. Examining the influence of religious telecasts in India, Agrawal (2017, 121), drawing upon a survey of 300 Hindu speaking viewers (89.6% or 448 of which were Hindu), found that only 15% of Hindus replied that belief in dharma had become very strong as a result of their exposure to the broadcast in contrast to 59.6% who replied “somewhat” or “a little” and 25.4% “not at all”; 25% in the Agrawal study said that digital media does not provide religious gain and moreover, 41% continued to rely on off-line religious leaders (Agrawal 2017, 121).

Conclusion The widely held view (Horsfield 2016) that religious authority has been challenged and weakened by developments in journalism and by technological developments in mass communication is uncertain. While it appears true in Western society, where the schism between the journalistic media and religion has undoubtedly placed religious authority in the defensive, similar developments have not occurred as prominently in Asian contexts. Indeed, in many Asian countries – notably Islamic ones – the media, rather than challenging religious authority, have become a pillar strengthening it. In contrast to their Western colleagues, Asian journalists seem more sensitive to religious thinking and themselves are more often believers – providing a specific channel for religious thinking through popular mass media. This is true even in some Islamic countries like Turkey where Islam’s impact is not as prominent. Moreover, even in non-Islamic countries such as India and Israel, as shown here, the tension between journalists and those in religious authority is far lower than in Western societies. But while in the West these changes currently challenge religious authority, the Asian case has taken a different path as online religious leaders, gurus, saints and even citizen journalists use online pulpits to sermonize. If anything, this strengthens rather than weakens those holding offline religious authority positions – who themselves have learnt the ropes of using new media in pastoral theology. So rather than observing a widening of a gap between the journalistic pen and the clerical cloth, in Asia we can observe that journalistic discourses about religion have become more diffused, diversified and voluminous. Yet even in Asia, certain distance is discernable between some journalists and Muslim clerics, as Pintak (2011, 2013) found. Therefore, also in Asia we find a debate not dissimilar from that in the West. But if in the West, the debate about the legitimacy of religious authority is characterized as a challenge by secular parties including journalistic media, in Asia and in Muslim countries, in particular, tension over religious authority may be more accurately defined as emanating from non-institutional religious voices, like journalists themselves, and institutional forces comprising the religious establishment within the region. 132

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Journalism and religion academic research has so far given limited attention to regions beyond the West, such as Asia. So, there is a need for further research to draw a differentiated picture of the relationship between journalism and religious authority in Asia. As journalism develops yet further, the impact of media change in the journalism and religious authority axis necessarily requires to be monitored. This is true even in the West itself; Silk (1995) and Underwood (2008) argued that journalists in the USA are less secular than are claimed to be. Given the emergence of religion as a significant force worldwide, the phenomenon of the contemporary decline in religiosity may not necessarily be long term as even those in the West pursue spirituality and meaning, if in albeit non-institutional settings. So the Asian model described here – of a religious non-institutional tension-cum-proximity – may in the future become copied elsewhere, even in the West.

Acknowledgement The author desires to thank Thomas Hanitzsch for data from The Worlds of Journalism Study.

Further readings Agrawal, B. C., 2015. Influence of Religious Telecast in a Multi-Religious India: An Analysis of Hindu and Muslim Television Viewers. In: Agrawal, B. C., ed. Changing Cultures and Religious Practices in Asia. Manila: University of Santo Tomas Publishing House, 141–153. An earlier version was printed in Religion & Social Communication, 11(1), 2013. This is a wideranging study of how Television impacts upon religious beliefs of Hindus and Muslims in India. Cohen, Y., 2012. God, Jews & the Media: Religion & Israel’s Media. New York: Routledge. The book provides a comprehensive guide to the interface of religion and mass media in the Israeli Jewish context. Pintak, L., 2011. The New Arab Journalist. London: Tauris. An important study drawing upon a survey of journalists in different Muslim countries, regarding journalists’ attitudes to Islam. Research on media and religion in the Asian context has been carried out at the Bangkok-based Asian Research Center for Religion and Social Communication, St John’s University, which publishes Religion and Social Communication.

References Abdollahyan, H., 2008. Gender and Generations Modes of Religiosity: Locality versus Globality of Iranian Media. Journal of Media & Religion, 7(1–2), 4–33. Agrawal, B. C., 2015. Sanatan Dharma and Digital Media: The Presence of Adaptation, Absorption and Assimilation in Hindu South Asia. Religion and Social Communication, 13(2), 174–184. Agrawal, B. C. and Khan, M., 2015. Hindu Dharma Satellite Telecast in a Multi-religious South Asia: An Analysis. In: Agrawal, B. C., ed. Changing Cultures and Religious Practices in Asia. Manila: University of Santo Tomas Publishing House, 153–152. Agrawal, B. C., 2017. Hindu Sanatan Dharma and Digital Media Adaptation in South Asia. Religion and Social Communication, 15(2), 113–124. Anderson, J. W., 2003. The Internet and Islam’s New Interpreters. In: Eickelman, D. E. and Anderson, J. W., eds. New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 45–60. Ayish, M. I. and Sadig, H. B., 1997. The Arab-Islamic Heritage in Commnunication Ethics. In: Christians, C. and Traber, M., eds. Communication Ethics and Universal Values. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 105–127. Baumel, S., 2002. Sacred Speakers: Language and Culture among the Haredim in Israel. Oxford and New York: Berghahn.

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Asian mass media Maestri, E. and Profanter, A., eds, 2017. Arab Women and the Media in Changing Landscapes. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Marin, F. X., 2015. Islam and Virtual Religious Visibility. In: Bosch, M. D., Mico, J. L. and Carbonell, J. M., eds. Negotiating Religious Visibility in Digital Media. Barcelona: Ramon Llull University, 81–90. Mellor, N., Ayish, M., Dajani, N. and Rinnawi, K., 2011. Arab Media: Globalisation and Emerging Media Industries. Cambridge: Polity. Mellor, N., 2005. The Making of Arab News. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Mellor, N., 2018. Religious Ideologies & News Ethics: The Case of Saudi Arabia. In: Cohen, Y., ed. Spiritual News: Reporting Religion around the World. New York: Peter Lang, 267–282. Min-Soo, K., 2003. The Public Interest in Religious Broadcasting: A Case Study of Korean Religious Cable TV. Religion & Social Communication, 1(1), 14–31. Min-Soo, K., 2013. The Rediscovery of Religious Silence in Social Media Era: A Korean case. Religion & Social Communication, 11(2), 138–154. Mitra, S., 2019. Hinduism Goes Online: Digital Media and Hinduism in the Diaspora. In: Grant, A., Sturgill, A. F. C., Chen, C. H. and Stout, D., eds. Religion Online, Volume 2: How Digital Technology Is Changing the Way We Worship and Pray. Santa Barbara and Denver: Praeger-ABC-CLIO, 199–218. Patrick, G., 2014. Dimensions of Society and Religion in Religious Communication through the Internet: A Study Based on the Response of College Students in Chennai. Religion and Social Communication. 12(1), 35–53. Patrick, G., 2015. Religion in the Digital Space – Exploring Its Dynamics with Reference to the Asian Context. Religion & Social Communication, 12(2), 116–131. Pintak, L., 2011. The New Arab Journalist. London: Tauris. Pintak, L., 2013. Pakistani Journalism: At the Crossroads of Muslim Identity, National Priorities and Journalistic Culture. Media, Culture & Society, 35(5), 640–665. Radde-Antweiler, K. and Grünenthal, H., 2018. Introduction: Religious Authority: Ascribing Meaning to a Theoretical Term. Journal of Religion, Media & Digital Culture 7(3), 368–380. Rahimi, B., 2018. Internet News, Media Technologies, and Islam: The Case of Shafaqna. In: Cohen, Y., ed. Spiritual News: Reporting Religion around the World. New York: Peter Lang. Rawan, S. M., 2001. Interaction Between Traditional Communication and Modern Media: Implications for Social Change in Iran and Pakistan. In: Hafez, K., ed. Mass Media, Politics & Society in the Middle East. Cresskill: Hampton Press, 270–281. Rugh, W. A., 1987. The Arab Press. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. Shah, K., 2015. Oral Traditions of Jainism Discourse in the Wake of Digital and Social Media: A Communication Study of Jain Mendicants. Religion and Social Communication, 13(2), 158–173. Silk, M., 1995. Unsecular Media: Making News of Religion in America. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. Thakur, K., 2009. Effects of Hindu Spiritual Channels on Viewers: Study of Swami Ramdev Bab’s Prime Time Live Broadcast on Aastha Television. Religion and Social Communication, 7(1–2), 31–60. Thakur, K. and Vaze, A., 2013. Hinduism and Internet in 2010–12. An Essay on Websites, Blogs, Social Media, Censorship and “Internet Hindu”. Religion and Social Communication, 11(1), 53–62. Underwood, D., 2008. From Ya-weh to Yahoo! The Religious Roots of the Secular Press. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. World of Journalism Study, 2019. News. Available at www.worldsofjournalism.org/, accessed 11 March 2019. Yadav, Y., Chamaria, A. and Kumar, J., 2006. National Media Devoid of Social Diversity: Survey. Maharashtra Herald, 6 June, 7a. Yao, Q., Stout, D. and Liu, Z., 2011. China’s Official Media Portrayal of Religion (1996–2005). Journal of Media & Religion, 1(10), 39–50. Yao, Q. and Liu, Z., 2018. Media and Religion in China: Publicising Gods under Atheistic Governance. In: Cohen, Y., ed. Spiritual News: Reporting Religion around the World. New York: Peter Lang Publishers, 199–215.

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10 RELIGION AND JOURNALISM IN GHANAIAN NEWS MEDIA J. Kwabena Asamoah-Gyadu

Introduction This chapter discusses the intersection between religion and journalism in relation to power and authority in Africa. In Africa, journalism has had to adjust to the new world order of democratic governance, sensitivity to human rights and the emergence of new communication technologies that have speeded up access to information (Bourgault 1995, 206, 207). This chapter focuses on the West African country of Ghana but what we discuss also has wider applicability for other African contexts. We first define the senses and contexts in which the expressions journalism and religion are used. This chapter then discusses the media and religious landscape in Ghana, focusing on how political democratization in this West African country has moved in tandem with new freedoms in the practice of journalism, with all this taking place within a religiously pluralistic context that is dominated by Pentecostal/charismatic Christianity. In the midst of Ghana’s religiously pluralistic public space, Pentecostal/charismatic Christianity with its emphasis on the experience of the Holy Spirit, spiritual power, extensive use of media and high-profile charismatic functionaries has become an important subject for journalistic activities and media reportage. Based on incidents involving two of its most high-profile charismatic leaders, the chapter examines the tensions between religion and journalism in Ghana in relation to religious authority figures. It shows how both religion and journalism have been transformed through mutual engagement as a result of several developments associated with modernity and globalization. These developments include technological change and the innovative uses of media by religious functionaries and their expressions of power and authority. Journalists take active interest in the activities of charismatic Christianity because the public likes news about such churches and their leaders (Hoover 1988, Mitchell and Marriage 2003, Hoover and Lundby 2006, Meyer and Moors 2006, Morgan 2008). African journalists have found the religious explosion in Africa such as the omnipresence of contemporary Pentecostalism an exciting subject. The movement offers a good case study for interrogating the influence of religion, precisely a certain type of evangelical Christianity, on public life. These case studies involving two well-known African charismatic figures serve to illustrate not just the dynamism of Pentecostalism in Africa but also the robust interest with which the media have approached the phenomenon because of the intersection of power and 136

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authority within the movement. The two Pentecostal/charismatic pastors we discuss here are Pastor Mensa Otabil of the International Central Gospel Church and Archbishop Nicholas Duncan-Williams of the Action Chapel International. Charismatic graces enhance personal profiles, and in modern Ghana, charismatic pastors, such as Pastor Otabil and Archbishop Duncan-Williams, have become very important and powerful within the public sphere. Their followers in particular have a high regard for them and their authority as people who possess a certain type of charismatic power that makes them influential. Journalists also take interest not just in what such charismatic personalities do inside their churches but also how their behaviors and utterances affect public life because they illustrate the nature of the authority and power that such charismatic figures wield. Journalists also look out for statements from charismatic leaders or personalities that betray either their political leanings or opposition to particular governments. Thus, the charismatic figures in contemporary African/Ghanaian Pentecostal/charismatic Christianity are not only considered mere agents of the supernatural that work in the interest of followers. Sometimes they even, in their sermons and writings, prescribe solutions to national problems. They are also public figures with great influence whose activities and utterances may be scrutinized by journalists in the same way that the actions of political figures are interrogated. In other words, even in preaching, such charismatic personalities are not considered mere mediators of the word of God, but also their sermons are deemed relevant for the wider public sphere whether in politics, economics or morality.

Defining journalism, media and religion Journalism, as used here, is understood to be a literary activity in which people, acting as both primary and secondary sources of information, document or make oral presentations on the material through various media outlets. In journalism, information is gathered with the view to making facts, figures and viewpoints available to the reading or listening public. The nature of the information and how it is interpreted – that is whether objectively or subjectively – usually depends on the sort of interest that the journalist or author has in the subject matter. What is published also depends on the legal and ethical contexts within which journalists operate. Thus, journalists who are also religious insiders might, for example, use the information to apologetically defend a faith. Religious outsiders may not feel that obliged to be sympathetic to any particular religious course. Whereas secular newspapers may be critical of religious practices, journalism related to church magazines and newsletters often writes with the interests of their institutions and leaders in mind. Journalists work through journalistic media. The media serve as a kind of midwives to journalism, and the public have the chance to make their own judgments concerning what they read about or listen to. The media in this case includes both the print and electronic forms and then also such new media outlets as the Internet and the use of mobile phones. The world of media has been greatly transformed since the days of the printing press (e.g., Asamoah-Gyadu 2018a). The application of electricity and photography to the processes of communication during the 19th century sparked a revolution in the media landscape that culminated in what were then considered as new technologies including the radio, the telegraph, photography, personal camera, television, wireless and so on. The media revolution has continued unabated, and the sources of information have been digitized to the point where journalistic voices from the remotest parts of the world now have a very fast and wide reach than was previously the case. Computer-mediated communication has evolved as now a major means of practicing journalism, and this is true even in such developing countries 137

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as Ghana. What this means is that a discussion on the intersection between religion and journalism based on studies from one part of the world can no longer be seen as concerning or belonging only to that location. All the stories discussed in this chapter, for example, are available on the Internet, and they are very easily verified through google and other search engines, Facebook and so on (Horsfield 2015, 237–260). The sort of journalism we deal with in this chapter straddles both the professional and non-professional types because the general public in Ghana likes to talk about religion. The chapter focuses on Pentecostal Christianity, in particular, because it is currently a very dynamic and vibrant stream of Christianity with very high-profile charismatic leaders who are constantly in the news for something they have said, done or even for their wealth. Besides, as compared to their mainline compatriots, the Pentecostals have been quicker to accept the new conditions of a diversified secular and religious marketplace and adapted to those changed conditions by defining new roles for their movements through them (Horsfield 2015, 241–242). Thus, we deal here with journalism in which information about a certain type of Christianity is put in secular public news media through information accessed either by public discourse, social media, popular gossip, rumor, preaching or even writings of the people at the center of events. This focus on religion as a subject of journalism means information and stories about religious activity have become important items in the media. Although the chapter makes references to other religions such as the indigenous religions of Africa, the focus is on Christianity and journalism. Ghana is a hotbed of religious activities, and it has a very vibrant media as well. Religion intersects with other spheres of life including economics and politics. Relatively speaking, the current intersection of journalism and religion in Ghana occurs within a context of religious liberalism, political democracy and media freedoms and liberties. In most of Africa, the democratization of politics in the early 1990s, after long periods of military dictatorships and apartheid in South Africa, led to the opening up of the media space, as well, and to a large extent freed it from political censure, oppression and vigilantism. Ghana is a typical example of these developments, and religious figures have been prosecuted on account of investigations by journalists. Ghanaian journalism takes a keen interest in religious reporting because traditionally, religion and politics remain inseparable within public spaces. Representations of religion and religious authority in Africa therefore constitute an irresistible topic for journalists in West African countries like Ghana, where religions like Islam and Christianity are mediatized and therefore enjoy an omnipresent stature within the public sphere. The case studies are drawn mainly from the Ghanaian Christian context because in terms of journalistic activity, it is both a hotbed of religion and a classic example of media vibrancy in democratic Africa.

Religion In this study, we work with an understanding of religion as the communion between two asymmetrical but intertwined realms of existence – the heavenly and the earthly. The heavenly or transcendent realm is generally invisible but believed to be real. What sets religion apart from the non-religious is the experience of the holy or the sacred. Religion is therefore a mode of communion with an ultimate reality “that is incapable of being subsumed under purely this-worldly, sensory categories” (Sharpe 1997, 61). The earthly realm is associated with the visible and concrete, and the invisible is associated with power symbolizing all those things that make life worth living. The weak, limited and powerless earthly realm relies on the heavenly realm for protection, sustenance, health and vitality. In other words, the earthly realm 138

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stands in need of the powers in the heavenly or supernatural realms. The communion between the two realms takes place through mediated forms of prayer and ritual facilitated by accredited religious functionaries – diviners, pastors, priests, gurus, Muslim clerics and the like. In the African traditional religious context, for example, indigenous priests, diviners and other religious functionaries are received as representatives of ancestors and deities. They are custodians of religious knowledge of a certain supernatural kind. In that sense, they are supposed to be endowed with the ability to bring communication from that realm for the benefit of the physical realm. Among the Igbo of Nigeria, the diviner is called a Babalawo, meaning Father of secrets, because of the power of discernment into and engagement with the supernatural realm of existence. The fact that the human realm has to look up to the non-human realm for sustenance and rewards is what gives rise to religious mediation. That ability to engage with the supernatural realm is what gives rise to belief in charismatic personalities. They are thought to understand the proper way to engage in ritual acts that create easy access to the supernatural realm. The religious functionaries we talk about here possess a charismatic personality on account of their perceived closer proximity to the divine realm. They offer powerful prayers and motivate followers through motivational preaching, sometimes even acting as agents of divine well-being for those who patronize them. The fear expressed in some religious and sociological literature in the middle of the last century, that religion was going to be extinct particularly in the modern West, under the weight of secularization, the enlightenment heritage, modernity and globalization, did not happen. For example, in the middle of the 1990s, Harvard University professor Harvey Cox, who had joined the death of God theologians to predict the demise of religion, revised his stance on seeing the dynamism and vibrancy with which Pentecostalism was transforming religious spaces across the world in terms of growth (Cox 1965, 1995). This revival of Pentecostal religion across Africa, in particular, has occurred alongside the expansion of new media.

Pentecostal/charismatic power, media and journalism The movements on which we focus here are the Pentecostal/charismatic ministries and churches that have burgeoned across urban Africa since the last three decades of the 20th century. This is the stream of Christianity that the two personalities – Mensa Otabil and Nicholas Duncan-Williams – represent. Emerging from the Christian tradition, the characteristics of Africa’s contemporary Pentecostal or charismatic churches are fairly standard: belief in the experience and power of the Holy Spirit, such as speaking in tongues; prophesying, seeing visions and revelations; innovative uses of modern media such as televangelism; prosperity preaching and lifestyles; contemporary and media-driven styles of worship; a sense of internationalism and the preaching of motivational messages that speak to the challenges of modern urban living. At the heart of contemporary Pentecostal/charismatic Christianity is the charisma of its leaders. The term charisma in this context refers to the extraordinary ability that religious functionaries possess by virtue of their perceived close proximity to the supernatural powers of whose help others stand in need. The possession of charisma signals the attraction of a mass following and numbers that make people influential. Their charismatic personalities and influences make them such important figures not just religiously but also politically and sociologically. Charismatic religious authorities such as the example we discuss in this chapter are very important in African life today and therefore significant within the public media space. Although Ghana has a particular religio-cultural and socio-political context, the happenings in this specific geo-political space to a large extent are exemplary for the sub-region as a whole. In fact, the extensive use of media by contemporary Pentecostals means that there is a high 139

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level of diffusion of similar religious experiences across cultures. Stories on religion, religious experiences, declarations and scandalous behavior involving its key functionaries is a very high sell when it comes to news reportage. In the end of 2018, for example, Ghana has gone through two key developments that have been explained using religious categories. The first is the democratic elections that have served as opportunities for various religious authorities to predict winners and losers in the media. The second is the death of high-profile music and entertainment stars and politicians. Religious functionaries, particularly styling themselves as Pentecostal prophets, have often claimed to have predicted these unfortunate deaths as a way of legitimizing their place as powerful charismatic authorities (Sackey 2018, 49–62). The point is that this stream of Christianity, which gained prominence from the late 1970s, is associated with a certain socio-religious mindset that makes it an institution of journalistic interest. Pentecostal/charismatic church leaders covet media attention; their gospel of prosperity message, which features money and material things as prime indicators of divine favor, have led to the emergence of some nouveau riche pastors among them (The Times 2018). Journalists have great interest in matters of this nature because they are newsworthy and commercially lucrative. That pattern is being repeated in Africa with contemporary charismatic pastors building palatial homes and acquiring personal jets. The charismatic belief in the power of the spoken word as having the potential to bring positive declarations into effect means the motivational messages of the pastors in question gain currency way beyond their regular Sunday audiences. In contemporary Ghanaian Pentecostal/charismatic Christianity, we are dealing with a stream of Christianity that usually foregrounds its discourses on evil in the belief that negative spiritual powers or forces, as they are popularly called in Ghana, are often responsible for Africa’s misfortunes.

Nicholas Duncan-Williams and the prayer over Ghana’s currency To exemplify the discourses on the relationships between Pentecostal charismatic authority personalities and journalism in Ghana, it is relevant to investigate the use of journalistic stories surrounding them. The first example is Archbishop Nicholas Duncan-Williams, founder and leader of the Action Chapel International in Accra, Ghana. He is not only the pioneering founder of charismatic churches in Ghana, but he has become an influential figure in the country and beyond. His Church, previously the Christian Action Faith Ministry, is now simply Action Chapel International (ACI). ACI belongs to the new stream of Pentecostal churches known for their charismatic and media-savvy leadership; urban-centered youthful congregations; dynamic, entertaining and exuberant worship and the preaching of a gospel that upholds material blessings as prime indicators of divine blessing (see, e.g., Gifford 1997, Asamoah-Gyadu 2005). The headquarters of ACI is located on Ghana’s Spintex Road, and its Prayer Cathedral was the first mega-size charismatic church building in Ghana. Its seating capacity can be anything between four and five thousand worshippers, and its architecture, in keeping with the flamboyant and supersize theological mindset of contemporary Pentecostal Christianity, is quite elaborate and imposing. Simply put, he is man with much influence. In February 2014, Archbishop Duncan-Williams was in the news for a public prayer made over Ghana’s currency in which he asked for the intervention of the Lord on behalf of the country because its money was losing value at the time. His sympathizers came to his defense when many members of the general public tried to question why an issue that demanded economic answers had to be spiritualized. Journalists reported widely on the prayer for the resuscitation of the ailing Ghanaian cedi that was losing market value. In this situation, the archbishop took on the role as a religious functionary with the ability to intervene in crisis by supernatural means. 140

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Economists called on the government to find practical economic and political solutions to the problem but to the charismatic archbishop, the dwindling fortunes of the cedi was to be explained in terms of supernatural evil forces that did not want Ghana to progress. The way to deal with the problem, as Archbishop Duncan-Williams understood it, was to take authority in the name of Jesus to bind the forces of evil and release the cedi from their grip so that it could find its place on the world market. Using his public prayer over the cedi as basis, I interrogate the interface between contemporary Pentecostalism and journalism in Ghana. In contemporary Pentecostal belief, there is power in the spoken word and this occurs through authoritative declarations. Based on the appreciation of the spoken word as enchanted, I discuss the intersection of religion and public life in Ghanaian journalism.

Cartooning a charismatic prophetic prayer On Tuesday February 4, 2014, Ghana’s Daily Graphic, the oldest and arguably the most important and widely circulating public newspaper in the country, carried an interesting cartoon on prayer for Ghana’s currency, the cedi. The Single Jump cartoon by artist Zingaro was inspired by the public prayer offered by Archbishop Nicholas Duncan-Williams (Zingaro 2014). In the cartoon, Zingaro depicted a vibrant prayer session involving religious leaders of different persuasions. The different traditions were identifiable by their religious regalia, postures in prayer and symbols of faith. Depicted at the prayer session were an Imam, okomfo or traditional priest and then a Christian religious functionary. The Imam wearing the Al Hajj turban also carried the Islamic tasbah (rosary) and the traditional priest in a raffia skirt had a bottle of drink to pour libation. The Christian pastor, who was obviously the focus of the cartoon, was imaged as a pot-bellied bishop wearing a large out-of-proportion cross. There were also non-Christian characters in the cartoon which made the representation look cynical and hilarious. This cynicism was further depicted with the caption from Proverbs 6:6–11 which warns about the effects of laziness. The version used in the cartoon read: “Go the ant you sluggard, consider its ways and be wise…A little sleep, a little slumber, a little folding of the arms to rest, and poverty will come on you like a bandit and scarcity like an armed robber.” (Zingaro 2014) The judgment here in the choice of Bible quote seemed to be that the prayer over the cedi was relying on supernatural intervention for economic problems to the neglect of practical solutions and hard work. Wearing a purple clerical shirt, the bishop was in the frontline leading the prayer session. He also wore a huge pectoral cross. With both arms outstretched toward heaven and a wide-open mouth – which signifies loud charismatic prayers – the bishop prayed over a Ghana fifty Cedi note spread in front of him. The cartoonist also placed within his work a neutral individual viewing the session from an open window with a question mark over his mind, ostensibly regarding the meaning of what he was witnessing. What is this bishop doing praying over a country’s currency? That is the question that presumably the cartoonist had placed on the observer’s mind. In the minds of the Ghanaian public, there would have been no doubt about the inspiration behind the cartoon. Thus, the story told by the cartoon was simply a media representation of something that had happened in church on the Sunday prior to the issuance of that newspaper in which it appeared. The Archbishop’s prayer was a public religious event that fascinated even the foreign media, including the Wall Street Journal. A report written by Drew Henshaw was titled “In Africa, Calls for Heavenly (Currency) Intervention: Why Has Ghana’s Cedi Plunged? Some Look to 141

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the Devil, or Mythical Dwarfs” (Henshaw 2014). A number of articles subsequently appeared in local newspapers within a span of almost a fortnight, and they referred either to the prayer over the cedi or directly discussed it. The prayer over the cedi by a Ghanaian Pentecostal bishop seemed to raise the very important issue of the relationship between the work of the Spirit and the economic order. For example, in an article related to the subject of Pentecostalism and economics, Nimi Wariboko (2013, 141), an ethicist and Pentecostal with some important standing, poses the following basic question: “Is spirit antithetical to economics?” He explores the interplay between spirit and economics, not as argued, but as lived. In what follows, I use what happened in Ghana to further illustrate how the relationship between spirit and economics has been made to flourish within contemporary Pentecostal Christianity in Africa.

Spirit and economics The charismatic Archbishop Duncan-William embodies the prayer, prophetic and prosperity theology cultures of contemporary African charismatic Christianity. Within such Christianity, there exists a close relationship between spirit and economics. Apart from the regular emphasis on tithes and offerings and the blessings they potentially conjure, almost any contemporary Pentecostal service of this charismatic kind mentions the power of money and its place as a sign of divine breakthrough, favor or blessing. The message is often that the power of the Holy Spirit grants breakthroughs in life, but much prayer is also devoted to destroying the powers of evil that work negatively to bring people, communities and nations to ruin. In the African contexts, these beliefs are continuous with those of witchcraft and in the Christian context with the theology of spiritual warfare against principalities and powers. In the African Christian imagination, evil powers come in all shades and forms – as domestic witches, territorial spirits or as demons on assignment to destroy economic fortunes and bring nations to their knees. That is why mystical forest creatures like dwarfs can be believed to negatively influence everything from marital life to the fortunes of currencies. The ultimate agenda of the evil powers is believed to inflict poverty and so charismatic prayer often also tries to bind the spirit of poverty and to release God’s prosperity on peoples and nations. It is a religious mindset that has everything to do with the belief in mystical causality and the power of the anointed word to deal with the causes of evil whether naturally or supernaturally caused. For example, Archbishop Duncan-Williams appeared on the front page of the Daily Graphic on Tuesday October 14, 2014 in connection with the Ebola crisis. According to the newspaper, Archbishop Duncan-William said that the church had declared a two-week fast for “preventive prayers against the Ebola virus from coming into Ghana” (Quaicoe-Duho and Bokpe 2014, 3). He had told the congregation that the “‘demonic Ebola virus’ had Ghana on its radar as its next destination” between October and November 2014 (Quaicoe-Duho and Bokpe, 2014, 3). In this discourse, Duncan-Williams was only following the Nigerian self-declared prophet T. B. Joshua who had preached that Ebola was demonic and subsequently shipped thousands of bottles of holy water to Sierra Leone, to help deal with its effects on people. The narration of Duncan-Williams on Ebola captured by the Daily Graphic is as follows: “I’ve declared another fast on Thursday because on Wednesday, I was resting and at 1:00 am, the Spirit of the Lord woke me up and He said: ‘Are you sleeping?’ And I said: ‘Yes, I am sleeping’, and He said, “Wake up! So I did and He said: ‘You have to go into prayer because the Ebola virus is looking for a door to enter your country between October and November.’” (Quaicoe-Duho and Bokpe, 2014, 3) 142

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As this example shows, there often is a perceived relationship between calamitous situations and the encroachment of evil powers on African public life (e.g., Ellis and Ter Haar 2004, 34). My observation is that, from the Africa side of things, journalists and contributors may write as believers in the workings of evil and so it is virtually impossible in many cases to maintain a critical distance from these implausible developments within such popular Christianity as Pentecostalism.

Interrogating the prayer for the cedi’s resurrection Archbishop Duncan-Williams usually claims to function within the tradition of Pentecostal/ charismatic pastors who possess prophetic power. It is therefore revealing that his public prayer for Ghana’s currency occurred at a time when there were ongoing public discussions on the free fall of the cedi against other major currencies. The prayer over the cedi by Archbishop Duncan-Williams ought to be appreciated against the backdrop of the general belief that as a Pentecostal pastor he possessed a certain level of spiritual power with authority over negative situations. Thus, the general tone for prayer in the Pentecostal/charismatic context is to take authority in the name of Jesus to bind the forces of evil, such as the one behind the depreciation of the currency, and then to declare in the name of Jesus Christ, for the powers of good and success, to be released for prosperity. For example, in the same call to prayer against Ebola, Duncan-Williams noted: “…You can write it down. I don’t just say things. I put 38 years of credibility on the line. So if I don’t hear, I don’t talk. When I say it, you better believe it.” (Quaicoe-Duho and Bokpe 2014, 3) The public media discussions had brought much pressure on the government of the National Democratic Congress led by John Dramani Mahama, to arrest the decline of Ghana’s currency. There were a lot of radio phone-in programs around the time of the prayer over the declining cedi, in February 2014. The phone-in calls were presumably led by those sympathetic to the opposition New Patriotic Party, who called for the resignation of the then finance minister, Seth Tekper, claiming he failed on the job by supervising the decline of the Ghanaian currency. While some – including members of the then ruling NDC government – blamed the problem on global economic downturns, the opposition parties in Ghana seized the opportunity to chastise the government for its poor record of economic management. In the midst of the rational economic and social scientific arguments, one leading government functionary joined the religious reasons band and blamed supernatural forces citing the work of dwarfs for the decline of the cedi against other major foreign currencies (Henshaw 2014). In his prayer for the Cedi on February 2, 2014, Archbishop Duncan-Williams asked for God’s intervention through the power of the Holy Spirit. In a specific part of the prayer, he commanded the cedi to rise, because in this form of Christianity prayer must be authoritative and not supplicatory. In typical charismatic fashion, the prayer was declarative and interactive. In other words, Archbishop Duncan-Williams led the church to make declarations after him, commanding the cedi to halt its free fall and rise: Say, “I lift up my money right now, and I command the cedi…” Say, “I, I hold this money in my hand right now, the cedi.” Say, “I hold up the cedi; I hold it up.” Say, “I hold up the cedi with prayer! And I command the cedi to recover! And I declare the cedi will not fall. It will not fall; it will not fall any further. It goes up. I command the cedi to climb.” 143

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Say, “I command the resurrection of the cedi in the name of Jesus.” Say, “I command a miracle for the economy. I command and release a miracle for Ghana’s economy in the name of Jesus!” Say, “Satan, take your hands off the President! Take your hands off the Central Bank and the Finance Minister.” Say, “We release innovation for the President, my God, the Governor of Bank of Ghana, Central Bank, in the name of Jesus Christ, the Son of God. The Finance Minister.” Say, “We command new ideas, breakthroughs, and a miracle for the economy. Let the cedi rise. In Jesus’ name. Amen.” (Peacefmonline 2014) The prayer thus commanded Satan and other demonic powers to loosen their influence on the currency and release the minds of political decision-makers so they can function productively. This public prayer, command or declaration for the rise or resurrection of the cedi must also be understood within the belief in the power of the spoken word in Pentecostal/ charismatic religious practice. In the face of public opprobrium against his action in the days that followed, Duncan-Williams took to the media again to defend his actions. In a separate interview with the Daily Graphic, Archbishop Duncan-Williams noted among others: “We all know the implications of the falling currency… the prices of petrol, food, transport fares, all go up. My concern is for the ordinary Ghanaian who has to face the consequences. I don’t see anything wrong in praying for the nation and the economy of my country…. If we can ask for prayers for the nation’s peace, peaceful elections, to avert flood…why can’t we pray for our economy and our leaders?” (Bokpe 2014, 23) Archbishop Duncan-Williams in further defense of his actions invoked his prophetic ability stating that in 2014, Ghana may go through crises because it was a “seventh year” and the famine in the time of Joseph in the Old Testament lasted for seven years (Bokpe 2014, 3). When the sound bites of the Duncan-Williams prayer were played back in the media, it was obvious that members of the ACI were with their leader in his worldview that the fall of the cedi was supernaturally caused as they responded with Amens, Hallelujas and “in the name of Jesus” (Peacefmonline 2014). Africa has a strong tradition of belief in the power of words, especially blessings and curses. There are forms of words, note, that are not mere statements but contain an action that may be called “performative utterances” (Ellis and ter Haar 2004, 38). In other words, African Christian new religious movements whose primary media of reference is the Bible also believe in the powers of oral blessings and curses, just as African traditional religions.

Pastor Mensa Otabil: religion, journalism and Machiavellian politics The second case study is based on the media presence of Pastor Mensa Otabil of the International Central Gospel Church (ICGC). Like ACI, the ICGC is also a mega-size contemporary Pentecostal church that attracts up to 10,000 worshipers to its two Sunday Services. Mensa Otabil is a popular television preacher and so, like Archbishop Duncan-Williams, issues concerning him have great journalistic appeal. Pastor Otabil established ICGC in 1984 and has over the years managed to form branches throughout Ghana and beyond. He is a gifted motivational preacher who emphasizes black empowerment. Pastor Otabil uses the Bible to challenge hearers not to rely on government but to take their destiny into their own hands if they want to succeed in life. Apart from his mega-size virtual middle-class congregation, the other most important evidence of his success is the establishment of the Central University (CU) 144

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in the late 1990s. In a little over a decade, CU has grown to become the single largest private university in Ghana. Additionally, Pastor Otabil has a national appeal because of his weekly television programs like Living Word (Ghana Television and TV 3) through which he addresses some of the basic challenges confronting particularly educated young people seeking to make something out of their lives and looking for the right motivation to do so. It is therefore not too difficult to understand why Pastor Otabil can preach messages that challenge Africans looking for free things all the time to change their mindset. For example, Pastor Otabil preaches that those who want money must understand that God does not give money. Africans who want to have a good life, he says, ought to work hard and invest their funds to be able to buy the things they want in life. He preaches sermons on black pride in order to disabuse African minds that they are inferior to the white race (Gifford 2004, 113, 120). Pastor Otabil is a very popular preacher in Africa so it is understandable why a political party would like to use his voice and message to run its electioneering campaigns. In using his voice in political campaigning, a Christian preacher who is supposed to be non-partisan was deliberately made to speak to partisan interests through the use of his media messages without his approval or consent (Otabil 2012). More recently, Pastor Mensa Otabil has been in the news for various reasons. For example, he set up a savings and loans company that later became incorporated as a bank. At the end of 2018, the government suddenly announced that the Capital Bank in which Pastor Otabil, his ICGC and some of its leading members had significant shares, had gone bankrupt. The government took it over and the failure of the bank generated journalistic interest (Hawkson 2018, 3). A number of people posted articles on the Internet and Ghana’s newspapers, on why Pastor Otabil who focuses his television preaching ministry of prosperity through making wise choices in investments, was unable to apply his principles to save the bank (Adombila 2018, 60). He responded by saying that he was not involved in the day-to-day operations of the bank and that he remained quiet so that the legal process could take its course (Adombila 2018, 3). This matter of Pastor Otabil and the failed capital bank became a matter of political and therefore journalistic interest. Additionally, when his sermons were used to buttress a political party, this brought in legal matters regarding copyright and defamation through the use of journalistic media. The reporting led to a public clash between Pastor Mensa Otabil of ICGC and political functionaries and members of the public who were sympathetic to then ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) of the Republic of Ghana in the run-up to the December 2012 Presidential and Parliamentary elections. The topic borders on emerging issues relating to the presence of charismatic Christianity in Africa, the appropriation of its very popular piety within various social institutions including politics and the potential conflicts that may arise as a result of the intersections of these issues within the Ghanaian public sphere. The media discussions on the events and the responses of the various parties involved in this drama was a demonstration of how important contemporary Pentecostalism had become in the politics of democratic Ghana, and therefore, matters of journalistic interest. Pastor Otabil had to be an important public figure for his sermons to be used in such a way and in that sense, he represents the political significance of contemporary Pentecostal leaders in Ghanaian public and political life. Paul Gifford (2004, 118) singles out Ghana’s Pastor Otabil for commendation among Africa’s charismatic pastors for his very practical sermons and rightly refers to the fact that Pastor Otabil is considered to have a broader horizon than most of Ghana’s charismatic preachers. The Ghanaian public often takes interest on what particular pastors, such as Mensa Otabil, say in their preaching about particular political events. It is very easy then for a particular pastor, especially the powerful ones with mega size congregations and enormous media 145

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presence, to be suspected of throwing their religious weight behind a specific political party. There are clearly new twists and turns in the relationship between Pentecostal/charismatic Christianity and democracy in Ghana fueled by an intense media interest in religion and its consequent discussions and speculations around charismatic personalities and the way they use their power and authority in preaching on matters of public interest. The NDC used bits and pieces of Mensa Otabil’s previous messages that had been published in electronic forms for their political campaign. This is itself not new because the lyrics of Gospel-life music either in their original form or with appropriate insertions constitutes some of the most-lively political songs used in Ghana and elsewhere in Africa. Much of the material, as it later became evident, had been taken out of its original context bringing into play issues relating to copyright and defamation because even when Pastor Otabil protested, the use of his voice for partisan political purposes continued. Pastor Mensa Otabil in his response to what he considered an illegal use of his voice and aspects of his sermons to gain partisan political advantage went as far as to implicate the then President, John Dramani Mahama, in the matter. In November 2012, Pastor Mensa Otabil had to call a press conference to literally chastise the ruling government led by President Mahama. This was because the government of President Mahama, which was seeking re-election at the time, had used his voice to support the campaign message of the ruling NDC that a free senior high school policy being promised by the then opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) was not a feasible proposition in a fledgling economy like that of Ghana (The Statesman 2012).

Using Otabil’s voice in a political game In the run up to Ghana’s 2012 elections, the opposition NPP set the agenda for the campaign by promising free senior high school education for all Ghanaians. Against the backdrop of an unproven belief on the part of the ruling NDC that Pastor Otabil favored the opposition NPP, a surrogate NDC group, Education Watch, pulled up certain sermons of Otabil in which he is heard warning against the dangers of free things and which mentions free education in particular. There can never be free education as long as we pay taxes, Otabil was heard to say on the tapes played on most radio stations in Ghana. The NDC was literally taking Otabil’s name in vain by making him say things in their favor regardless of the context of the message. Even more seriously, it turned out that the original messages had been doctored with Otabil’s voice from different tapes joined to make it sound as if these were fresh messages preached to indicate his support for the opposition NDC. In other words, politicians used the message of a popular and important charismatic pastor to support their cause by taking his message out of context and making it sound as if he was commenting on a present campaign issue on the side of one of the competitors. Mensa Otabil reacted through a press conference in which he described the NDC tactics among others as Machiavellian and an infringement on his rights. Subsequently he went on to preach a whole sermon titled “Your Vote” (Asamoah-Gyadu 2018b, 83–95). The sermon literally consumed the attention of the major political parties on how it affects their fortunes in the minds of those who admire Pastor Otabil’s bold, inspiring, practical and motivational sermons. Even without the press conference, it was obvious that to make a Christian sermon say what it was not intended to say, during a political campaign issue, was unfair to the preacher. For those who did not know that the messages were not new, Otabil’s image suffered greatly. By the time he came out to publicly denounce the use of his name for party political interests through campaigning, much damage had been done to his reputation. Pastor Mensa Otabil had been verbally assaulted by members of the opposition through both 146

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the print and electronic media. One NDC sympathizer described him as worse than Nebuchadnezzar following his rebuttal of the party’s approach to politics using religion and, in the process, breaching his rights. “NDC is Evil” was the caption of the story in which The Daily Guide newspaper reported the presence conference called by Pastor Otabil to respond to the use of sound bites from his sermons in a political game (Owusu and Anaman-Agbodo 2012). The Daily Guide is an anti-NDC paper and since the NDC as an institution was suspected to be behind the advertisements featuring Otabil’s voice although Otabil never called NDC by name during the press conference, it served the newspapers purposes to introduce the direct confrontation element into the discussion. This is how Daily Guide reported the matter in part: “Pastor Mensa Anamua Otabil, General Overseer of the International Central Gospel Church (ICGC), yesterday bared his teeth at what he described as attempts by political parties, especially some functionaries of the ruling National Democratic Congress, to drag him into partisan politics for their parochial interests.” (Owusu and AnamanAgbodo 2012, 3) The punch line in Pastor Otabil’s press statement is when he described what the NDC surrogate group had done in the following words: “This is defamatory. This is unethical. This is criminal. This is malicious. This is Machiavellian. This is evil. It is a violation of my person and my integrity.” (Owusu and Anaman-Agbodo 2012, 3) Machiavelli (1469–1527) was an Italian statesman and political philosopher who took the position that the acquisition and effective use of power may necessitate the deployment of unethical methods. To suggest that the NDC tactics were Machiavellian was therefore to suggest that they were using unscrupulous methods in their politics. There were three different sound bites that were used from various sermons preached by Otabil. The press conference took place after the third one had been used, and Otabil explained that the third one, in particular, consisted of different statements from his sermons, some of them preached almost a decade ago. They had been stringed together to make them seem current and this amounted to journalistic manipulation of information. At the press conference, Pastor Otabil did not restrain his ill-feelings toward those who were taking his name in vain: “[It was after listening to the third tape that] I realized that I was dealing with a marauding and bullying force that was bent on impugning my name and integrity without shame” (Owusu and Anaman-Agbodo 2012, 3). Certain that the ruling NDC government knew about the use of his voice in political campaigning, Mensa Otabil appealed directly for the intervention of the President, John Dramani Mahama to call his people to order: “I kindly call on the President to rise and speak upon this issue.” “With all due respect sir,” Mensa Otabil addressed the President directly: “although you may not be aware of these developments, the perpetrators of these blatant acts of impunity are largely affiliates and surrogates of your party.” He also described the tactic as immoral: “When political operatives sample, splice and edit a pastor’s words to mean something other than what was intended, and then go ahead to lift those words from their proper context and place them within a partisan context…that is immoral.” (Owusu and Anaman-Agbodo 2012, 3) 147

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It was mischievous for political operatives, Otabil continued, to hijack a pastor’s words, manipulate them to build partisan jingles and play them on party information vans across the country. In our technological age, the fine distinction that we make between electronic and print media has become nebulous because most newspapers can also be downloaded from the Internet.

Conclusion: religion, journalism and the future in Africa An important characteristic of contemporary Pentecostalism, as I have noted, is their innovative and extensive use of media. With the explosion in numbers that the Pentecostal movement has attracted, it is natural for journalists to take interest not simply in their religious activities but also in how the issues of power and authority intersect in the work of their leaders. It is quite easy to have access not just to sermons but also to live worship services through the Internet and other media. The issues emerging out of the developments we have discussed from the Ghanaian context show that what happens within the confines of a church, such as the preaching of sermons, could now serve as important and critical source of information also for journalism on religion in Africa. African Pentecostalism is now taken seriously as a subject for journalistic reportage. David Martin has argued that certain characteristics of Evangelical Christianity generally and Pentecostalism, in particular, has bearings upon the character of any political presence (Martin 1999, 39). Pentecostalism belongs to this broader Evangelical Christian tradition of which Martin speaks here. The churches that constitute the Pentecostal fraternity have virtually become the representative face of Christianity in Africa and their charismatic leaders wield much authority and power both on their followers and admirers. What this means is that through religious journalism, for example, the media could provide an important critique of religious expression, especially regarding how certain religious functionaries exercise power and influence within the public sphere. In much of Africa, the fact that Pentecostal/charismatic leaders have acquired influential voices within public space is a fact that is taken for granted. This shows, for example, in the way that Archbishop Duncan-Williams’ prayer for the revival of the fortunes of Ghana’s currency went viral and generated much interest among journalists interested in religious reportage. The impact of charismatic pastors is also a result of their use of media and of the interest that journalists have for their work. Another issue which the case studies exemplified is the issue of copyright in journalistic reporting in Ghana. As the case of Pastor Otabil demonstrated, it is against the right of a person for his or her published work to be used without permission if it had been previously registered. However, charismatic pastors use the media for church services. They also distribute their sermons widely on portable recording devices for sale. Sermons stream live on the Internet and are subsequently published as books. The books may be covered by copyright, but the electronic forms are usually not and so are repeated on other platforms without fear of being sued for infringements. These aspects highlight some critical issues on the relationship between religion and journalism because when information is put voluntary in the media for evangelistic purposes, interesting dynamics between how journalists may or may not use such information arise. The issue of defamation arose with regard to the manner in which parts of Pastor Otabil’s sermons were allegedly pieced together by the NDC and used for purposes intended to portray him as supportive of the cause of a political party. This resulted in Pastor Otabil’s messages being given a twist that his pulpit had been used for partisan politics which is a situation he never intended to use his messages for. 148

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What these case studies and the journalistic interests they generated showed is furthermore that, in the study of the interface between religion and media, attention ought to be given not just to the ways in which Pentecostalism uses media but also to the manner in which Pentecostalism as such generates exciting stories which journalists want to take up. The activities of charismatic pastors even affect the political order. The presence of the Pentecostal/charismatic fraternity in World Christianity is felt partly through the large numbers of people who may vote for candidates vying for political power and who may be sympathetic to their viewpoint. Ellis and ter Haar (2004, 95) noted that in Africa, one important reason why new religious movements like the Pentecostals are popular is because they promise original solutions for contemporary problems. They argued that due to the weakness of civil society groups and the reverential approach that African take toward religious leaders, Africa’s new religious movements constitute attempts to revive known sources of power (Ellis and ter Haar 2004, 100). The leaders of the movements are so powerful that in Ghana, for example, anything said or done by leading religious figures such as the Archbishop Duncan-Williams and Pastor Mensa Otabil has become important to the public, to political power brokers and therefore to journalists. In the words of Ellis and ter Haar: “The rather sudden and radical political changes in Africa in the 1990s encouraged the irruption of spiritual movements [like the Pentecostals] into political space as people sought alternative sources of authority…” (Ellis and ter Haar 2004, 100) In the study of religion and journalism and how that relationship relates to the deployment of authority and power, the interest that the media exercises in the ministries and utterances of leaders like Otabil and Duncan-William illustrates their importance as alternative sources of power besides the political order. Beyond satisfying the curiosity of the public, the reporting on these two personalities and several others serve as a window of appreciation on the significance of religion on African public life. The use of represents/misrepresents is important because the way a particular religious leader’s activities are captured is dependent upon the leanings of the newspaper, television or radio station and Internet websites.

Further readings Bourgault, L. M., 1995. Mass Media in Sub-Saharan Africa. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. This is a historical account of religion and media in West Africa and it is very useful for understanding the intersection between religion and journalism in the sub region. Gifford, P., 2004. Ghana’s New Christianity: Pentecostalism in a Globalizing African Economy. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. This is a book with extensive descriptions of African (Ghanaian) contemporary Pentecostalism. Much of the ethnographic data has been sourced from the media. Hackett, R. I. J. and Soares, B. F., eds., 2015. New Media and Religious Transformation in Africa. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. The book has useful essays on religion and media covering both print and electronic media but focusing in particular on new media including the Internet.

References Adombila, M. A., 2018. Otabil Wasn’t Qualified to Chair Captial Bank Board. Daily Graphic, 16 August, 60a. Asamoah-Gyadu, J. K., 2005. African Charismatics: Current Developments with Independent Indigenous Pentecostalism in Ghana. Leiden: E.J. Brill.

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J. Kwabena Asamoah-Gyadu Asamoah-Gyadu, J. K., 2018a. Communications, New Technologies, and Innovations. In: Hutchinson, M. P., ed. The Oxford History of Protestant Dissenting Traditions. Volume V: The Twentieth Century Themes and Variations in a Global Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 491–522. Asamoah-Gyadu, J. K., 2018b. Heavenly Commonwealth and Earthly Good: Contemporary African Pentecostal-Charismatic Discourses on Responsible Citizenship. In: Bompani, B. and Valois, C., eds. Christian Citizens and the Moral Regeneration of the African State. London and New York: Routledge, 83–97. Bokpe, S., 2014. Duncan-Williams Defends Prayer for the Cedi. Daily Graphic, 4 February, 23. Bourgault, L. M., 1995. Mass Media in Sub-Saharan Africa. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Cox, H., 1965. The Secular City. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cox, H., 1995. Fire from Heaven: Pentecostalism and the Reshaping of Spirituality in the Twenty-first Century. Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishers. Ellis, S. and ter Haar, G., 2004. Worlds of Power: Religious Thought and Political Practice in Africa. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Gifford, P., 1997. African Christianity: Its Public Role. London: Hurst and Co. Gifford, P., 2004. Ghana’s New Christianity: Pentecostalism in a Globalizing African Economy. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Hawkson, E. E., 2018. Pastor Otabil, Others Sued. Daily Graphic, 6 November, 3a. Henshaw, D., 2014. In Africa, Calls for Heavenly (Currency) Intervention: Why Has Ghana Cedi Plunged? Wall Street Journal, 6 March. Available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/heavenly-currencyintervention-is-sought-1394155501, accessed 15 January 2020. Hoover, S. M., 1988, Mass Media Religion: The Social Sources of the Electronic Church. Newbury Park: Sage. Hoover, S. M. and Lundby, K., 2006. Rethinking Media, Religion, and Culture. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Horsfield, P., 2015. From Jesus to the Internet: A History of Christianity and Media. West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell. Martin, D., 1999. The Evangelical Upsurge and its Political Implications. In: Berger, P. L., ed. The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 37–50. Meyer, B. and Moors, A., eds., 2006. Religion, Media and the Public Sphere. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Mitchell, J. and Marriage, S., eds., 2003. Mediating Religion: Conversations in Media, Religion and Culture. London: T&T. Morgan, D., ed., 2008. Key Words in Religion, Media and Culture. New York and London: Routledge. Otabil, M., 2012. You are Evil: Otabil Chides Mahana, NDC. Daily Guide, 13 November. Owusu, W. Y. and Anaman-Agbodo, P., 2012. NDC Is Evil. Daily Guide, 13 November, 3. Peacefmonline, 2014. XCLUSIVE AUDIO: How Duncan-Williams Prayed for the Falling Cedi. MG. Modern Ghana, 4 February. Available at https://www.modernghana.com/news/519797/xclusiveaudio-how-duncan-williams-prayed-for-the-falling-c.html, accessed 15 January 2020. Quaicoe-Duho, R. and Bokpe, S., 2014. Ghana Risks Recording Ebola. Daily Graphic, 14 October, 1, 3, 16. Sharpe, E. J., 1997. Understanding Religion. London: Duckworth Press. Sackey, E., 2018. Election Prophecies and Political Stability in Ghana. In: Bompani, B. and Valois, C., eds. Christian Citizens and the Moral Regeneration of the African State. London: Routledge, 49–62. The Statesman, 2012. You are evil!-Otabil charges at Mahama, NDC. MG. Modern Ghana, 13 November. Available at https://www.modernghana.com/news/429717/you-are-evil- otabilcharges-at-mahama-ndc.html, accessed 15 January 2020. The Times, 2018. Report on Prophet Bushiri of Malawi and His Wealth, 8 February. Wariboko, N., 2013. Spirit and Economics. In: Kärkkäinen, V.-M., Kim, K. and Yong, A., eds. Loosing the Spirit: Interdisciplinary and Religio-Cultural Discourses on a Spirit-Filled World. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 141–153. Zingaro, 2014. Single Jump Cartoon. Daily Graphic, 2 February, 2b.

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11 RELIGION, GENDER AND NEWS MEDIA IN AFRICA Katrien Pype

Introduction In 2010, when I carried out ethnographic research among television stations in Kinshasa (capital city of the Democratic Republic of Congo), I was following journalists producing news reports. Therefore, almost on a daily basis, I participated in the editorial meetings, scheduled in the early mornings. During these meetings, the chef de rédaction and the various journalists would discuss the themes to be filmed during the day and to be included in the evening newscast. One morning, the meeting started with a conflict. One of the female journalists, who had been working all night as she had been reading news reports on the radio, had found her clothes in the bathroom wet. She was supposed to wear these when returning home. It was not so much the fact that they were damp that led to anxieties; rather, she wanted to know who had sprinkled them with water, and why. In her anger, she claimed that someone most probably had carried out kindoki (Lingala for sorcery; witchcraft) on her clothes, and that surely it had to be one of her colleagues. Obviously, no one confessed of having touched her clothes, and the journalist left the meeting with more questions than answers. Everybody took her suspicion of kindoki seriously, as she was one of the news anchors of the television journal who seemed to attract a lot of fans. She was a rising star, and this certainly raised jealousy among some of her colleagues. I take this anecdote as an introduction into one of the various phenomena that sit at the heart of this chapter: the dialectics of news media, religion and gender in sub-Saharan A frica. Not much research has been carried out on the crossroads of these three analytical fields despite the intense scholarly investigation on the intersections of religion and gender (among others, Soothill 2007, Cole 2010, Sounaye 2011, Van de Kamp 2013, Pype 2016), religion and media (e.g., Hackett 1998, de Witte 2011, Schulz 2012, Grätz 2014, Meyer 2015) and also gender and media (including Fair 2009, Masquelier 2009, Mutongi 2009, Bosch 2013, Buiten 2013) in sub-Saharan Africa. In this chapter, I interpret news media in a large sense. In various African media worlds, formal news broadcasts are embedded within political propaganda (Pype 2011a). As a consequence, in Kinshasa, for example, spectators feel alienated of these news broadcasts as they understand the news reports to be embedded within political games (Pype 2011b, 2013). This sense of exclusion can lead to innovation in news production, e.g., in Kinshasa, 151

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Journal Télévisé en Lingala Facile has been created explicitly to engage the spectatorship into the political community. With this new news program, novel types of news reports, such as the proximity report (la proximité), have emerged, and news anchors behave in more informal ways on the plateau (in the studio). The form of this type of news is so far removed from the classic news broadcast that some of Kinshasa’s elite even wonder whether this is still to be called news (Pype 2011b, 58). This example shows that news media can take various forms and can vary in degrees of formality. For the remaining of this chapter, I argue that news here refers to information spread along mass channels and bearing value for the large masses. News in this sense is separate from rumor and gossip in so far these categories of informal information (and its circulation) connotate harm and secrecy. However, that does not entail that news as broadcast on Africa’s mass media channels is always objective and verified. In many African news rooms, journalists remediate images and texts produced by other platforms, without verifying the trustworthiness of the source, either because they attach great value to the source itself or because of personal loyalties toward their sources. In a similar fashion, journalism is not a straightforward category. One of the basic premises of this chapter is that journalism as a practice of channeling information and knowledge through spoken and/or written texts addressed to publics has various genealogies. While the word journalism can be traced back to the French written press in the early 19th century (Collins and Palmegiano 2007), it does not mean that the practice of collecting and circulating information on a wide scale was only invented at that time. Rather, alternative genealogies of reporting exist, before and parallel to the emergence of journalism in the West European written press. I understand journalism here as the collection of data and their distribution in narrative form to a public, using mass media, and carried out by a media practitioner who is conscious about her role as a broker of information. This rather broad approach to journalism allows us to include various categories of information brokers that at first sight might be rather far removed from the professional journalist working for an institution and handling highly sophisticated equipment. Newsworthy information is indeed produced within a highly complex field of knowledge and information systems of which the professional category of the journalist is only one among many figures of information production; in addition, journalism itself can appear in various forms depending on historical, social and cultural contexts. In many sub-Saharan African countries, journalists take on multiple roles in society: They not only broker information, but very often they are also political actors, activists, teachers, instructors, etc. For the scope of this chapter, gender is here limited to women, and I will solely focus on women’s participation in information production and circulation. However, media also shape masculinities, and men’s cultures have to a large extent designed the world of news in sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, masculinities in African news media remain largely underexplored. Queer identities are only in recent years becoming a focus of analytical attention in African studies (among others, Amory 1997, Gaudio 2009, Nyeck and Epprecht 2013), and unsurprisingly, scholarly works on queer news media in sub-Saharan Africa, in general, are equally absent. As a consequence, this chapter will provide a brief overview of research carried out on women, religion and news media in sub-Saharan Africa. After this cursory sketch of general themes and analytical foci on religious media and women in media in sub-Saharan Africa, I present two case studies: the griotte (in West Africa) and digital animatrices in Kinshasa (and its diasporas). While the first case study is solely based on literature reviews, the second case draws on ongoing ethnographic research. The chapter concludes with a reflection on contemporary transformations located at the crossroads of gender, religion and news media and what this can entail for future scholarship. 152

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Therefore, this chapter is not an exploration into news on religion, rather it looks at some intersections of religion and news, mainly pointing at the religious backgrounds of news and information production and circulation. An emphasis is on reporting women, and how female reporters mobilize religious beliefs, discourse and content in order to carry out their work and attract audiences.

Studying religion, news journalism and women in Africa Religious media can take various forms, ranging from evangelical newsletters, books, cassettes and television programs and mass conventions to power objects such as amulets, statues used in magical rituals and electronic prayers and conversations with healers. Religious news media are first and foremost intended to broadcast information deemed newsworthy for the own religious community. Grätz (2014) describes how, in Benin, on the Catholic Radio Immaculée Conception priority is given to news from Radio Vatican. Satellite devices are installed to capture programs of Radio Vatican as well as the French-based Christian news agency TopInfo. Apart from this foreign news, short self-produced runs of information are aired as well. Scholars (among others, Odhiambo 1991, Fordred-Green 2000, Nyamnjoh 2005, Mano 2010, Englund 2011, Skjerdal 2012) have paid attention to how news making in sub-Saharan Africa can take on different forms and aesthetics. Generally, all programs of religious radio and television associated with a particular church have a strong imprint of the church and its leaders: The main news broadcasts begin with news from the church, and its leader, in particular, reporting about visits and ceremonies. Main news broadcasts also document preaching, healing and parish affairs. Religious news media not only differ from other news media regarding the obvious priority to religious activities in the order of broadcast news items, rather also the claims made regarding justice are religiously inflected. Englund’s (2011) incisive ethnography of the Malawian news bulletin Nkhani Zam’maboma, broadcast in Chichewa and airing stories about witchcraft, highlights obligation and mutual dependence when reflecting on people’s grievances and injustices. This contrasts with news broadcast on public, state radio and outlets sponsored by NGOs and international organizations, where human rights rhetoric dominates. Despite these unambiguously religious characteristics of certain religious media in terms of programming and aesthetics, tackling the issue of religion, women and journalism in sub-Saharan Africa requires some caveats. In particular, while the distinction between secular and religious media is analytically warranted, empirical observations complicate this distinction. Especially since the 1990s, with many sub-Saharan states deregulating local media, religious broadcasters have mushroomed on the continent, while commercial and state channels have become more and more infused with religious content. Differences regarding media policies in the various countries led to differentiated mediascapes. In Ghana, for example, the media freedom does not allow religious organizations to set up their own radio and television stations, thus pushing religious leaders to buy airtime and appear on programs (de Witte 2011). The case is different in Nigeria, Benin, DR Congo and other countries where religious leaders can set up their own radio and television stations. This emphasis on religious ownership and content in late postcolonial African media means a return to the initial days of mass media on the continent. In Léopoldville (as Kinshasa was called then), for example, the first television station was owned and run by Catholic missionaries. Also in Benin, Christian institutions have a long history in editing newspapers and magazines. The oldest are very often Catholic, such as La Croix in Benin, which dates from 1946 (Grätz 2014). 153

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Importantly, religious media not only broadcast information related to the religious community, beliefs and rituals, but also attempt to contribute to social change and conflict resolution. In particular, religious media have been included in various countries in the process of democratization. An example in case is King fisher FM, a Christian station in South Africa that targets listeners aged 25–49 (Osunkunle and Wozniak 2015, 79): It has multicultural religious and secular programming, made up of 60% talk and 40% music. This station, like many other religious broadcasters, also addresses issues affecting the listeners and the citizen community at large; and occasionally brings in political leaders and administrators to debate ways to find solutions to such problems. Radio shows bring information on community projects and also broadcast health awareness programs. Religion and media intertwine also in other ways in African popular culture, e.g., in non-religious media, many of the media practitioners act as religious subjects in their professional environment. In Kinshasa, I observed how editorial board meetings in nonconfessional newsrooms open and conclude with Christian prayers, while some journalists double as pastors. Announcements for religious gatherings appear as news items in secular media outlets. Even though stories about magic, sorcery and witchcraft rarely make it into the formal news broadcasts, these are nevertheless topics of conversation behind the cameras, when drafting the text for the voice over and when pursuing professional careers in the media world. The above-mentioned dominance of Catholic media institutions at the beginning of electronic media in various sub-Saharan countries has had profound consequences for media training and the development of media careers. Especially in the colonial and early postcolonial eras, the Catholic missions were equipped with the best broadcasting material and thus were attractive places for aspirant media practitioners. Journalists and radio and television hosts very often set their first steps in religious media. Nowadays, faith-based radios are moving into another era as well and do not rely anymore on volunteers but rather on a “team of well-trained, full-time radio professionals, funding itself predominantly by accessing advertising income” (Osunkunle and Wozniak 2015, 82). Finally, it is important to acknowledge the overlap between religious and non-religious media in terms of media practitioners and audiences. Many media entrepreneurs easily move between various broadcasters, as they may have simultaneously commitments in different media outlets, while spectators and listeners do not limit themselves to the media of their spiritual leader. Rather, people also consume religious media produced by media entrepreneurs of communities other than their own.

Women and news media in sub-Saharan Africa With the rise of mass media in sub-Saharan Africa, requiring content to be broadcast, women has become an important theme in radio and television broadcast and written press. Englund (2011, 117) argues that about 28% of stories broadcast during the popular Chichewa news bulletin on Malawi’s public radio Nkhani Zam’maboma deals with marital and sexual misconduct. This attention to women’s physical and emotional well-being in mainstream media is the outcome of deliberate global political efforts. Especially since 1975, i.e., since the first UN World Conference on Women (in Mexico City), there is an active public discourse on gender and media in Africa (Gadzekpo 2009). Since then, as Gadzekpo (2009, 71) argues, key issues regarding the status of women have been mapped out globally. During the fourth United Nations World Conference on Women, in Beijing in 1995, areas to work on were: (1) poor status of women in decision-making positions in the media; (2) lack of 154

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gender sensitivity in media policies and programs; (3) poor access of women to media and ICTs; (4) poor participation of women in media and ICTs and (5) a continued stereotypical media portrayal of women and the increase in violent and pornographic images of women (Gadzekpo 2009, 72). In the last four decades, some drastic changes have been made: Women have become not only more and more subject matter of news, but there is also a steady increase in women reporting the news in Africa (Gadzekpo 2009, 72). This follows a new political order. The old media order was an inhospitable space for women; where female journalists were co-opted, intimidated and harassed. However, with media reforms and pluralism and in countries where civil society knew a rebirth, women have become more visible in the media “as employees, as decision makers, as subjects of the news and as newsmakers” (Gadzekpo 2009, 73). Shifts in political paradigms have enabled more local, regional and global women’s NGOs working outside the state apparatus to flourish, network and mobilize on a variety of issues. These changes offered new opportunities for women to publish their own newspapers and magazines and to produce their own radio and television programs, sometimes in alliance with women’s NGOs and listening clubs. Examples of women setting up their own radio are Meridian FM in Ghana and MAMA FM in Uganda. Fascinating research comes from east-Congo, where a network called AFEM-SK (Association of Media Women – South Kivu) is run by women who “give voice to those without voice” (Garcia-Mingo 2017, 215). Their work is one of these types of new forms of journalism that have emerged following war and political violence. AFEM-SK, which wants to offer the victims of rape and sexual violence the opportunity to tell their stories, was created in 2003, when the DRC was entering a new political era, then ending the war officially. The members were working in so-called “gender-blind” newsrooms – and hardly could raise the issue of sexual violence (Garcia-Mingo 2017, 216). Yet, determined to cover the experience of systematic violence perpetrated against women, they set up the network, with women partaking in radio listening clubs. Via these groups, women are informed about their rights and strategies to protect themselves, while the network also lobbies for women’s rights and trains rural women in political participation, media literacy and peace-building processes. Members of these listening clubs constitute a network of more than 500 rural women correspondents, petites journalistes (lit., small journalists) or mamans (lit., mothers) and have been trained to collaborate with the urban journalists in the work of collecting information in remote areas of rural south Kivu (Garcia-Mingo 2017, 216). The work by AFEM-SK, located in a strong rural area, draws our attention to geographically inflected differences regarding women’s experiences and their contribution to news media. In addition, the project signals a strong contrast with more conventional forms of journalism, as the mamans have an ardent motivation to fight against injustice and to reconstruct society (Garcia-Mingo 2017, 224). These news producers and broadcasters are primarily social movement militants even though their activism is performed under the umbrella of news reporting. Despite the above-mentioned formal expressions of a desire for gender balance in media, the media in sub-Saharan Africa remain a very male-dominated world, where female media practitioners need to juggle their reputation and are readily confronted with accusations of amateurism and moral looseness. Similarly, because of its intimate connections to politics, the genre of news itself is readily associated with a masculine world. Information about child caring, domestic work, cuisine and health are quickly associated with the sphere of women and usually do not find their way to the classic newsroom. This means that still today women are rarely perceived as intended audiences. Moreover, far too less women occupy other roles 155

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in African media. These observations also count for the religious world, where, also to a limited extent, women can become leaders of religious movements and can set up their own churches. However, it remains rare for religious female leaders to run a media ministry. Religious broadcasters – as mentioned above – may team up with NGOs and spread programs explicitly addressed to the young girl. Very often, in terms of finding funding, these community radios are approached by NGOs as the most direct channels for communication to large groups of women. Here, religious media practitioners are instrumentalized for their credibility and authority among large segments of the population. This is a fundamental recognition of the role religion plays in women’s lives on the continent. In the following parts of this chapter, I focus on two case studies, each of which relates in a different way some forms the entanglements of religion, gender and news production in sub-Saharan Africa.

West Africa’s griottes In the Africanist library, the figure of the griot is a relevant figure to associate with, in particular, the themes of religion, and journalism for various reasons. First and foremost, the social worlds of griot and griotte bear similarities with the life-worlds of contemporary African journalists, in particular, they all mediate between the societal elite and the population. In the Africanist library (male and female) griots have been appreciated for their multi-faceted roles: praise-singers, dancers, public orators, interpreters, historians, genealogists, mediators and political and social advisers (Duran 1995, 197). Nyamnjoh (2005, 139) describes how Beti journalists (from the Beti ethnic group in Cameroon) “were simply referred to as griots (praise-singers).” I have made similar observations in Kinshasa’s journalistic world, where television and radio journalists juggle their dependency on sources and patrons with ideals of objectivity (Pype 2011a). A continuation exists between the praise singing for political leaders and contemporary journalism in sub-Saharan Africa, where often journalists are regarded as small boys of the elite who produce news accounts that glorify the political visions, ambitions and economic businesses of their patrons. As a consequence, many audiences in sub-Saharan Africa doubt the existence of an independent press. This lack of trust in the objectivity of news production also feeds into people’s engagements with journalists, who seek out particular journalists when they are in need of a favor of the journalists’ patron. Just like griots, journalists are embedded in thick relationships with patrons, who, in the case of griots, “generously compensated griots for their services in the forms of “gifts”, including food and housing” (Schulz 1997, 446). A second reason to explore the work by the griots is that griots are connected to ancestral truths, rituals and invisible powers. Their skills and performances are intimately tied to sacred pasts and knowledge. Among the Mande society (in various West African countries), ngaraa is a particular title bestowed upon griots by elder griots, for its ability not only to touch people’s hearts but also to advise people (kings, economic leaders, etc.) on political and moral issues and to communicate “the truth” (Duran 1995, 202). While Duran (1995) argued almost two decades ago, that the jelimusow – the female griot – was an important public figure in Mande cultures, she has hardly been the subject of any systematic scholarly enquiry. Since then, some scholars have engaged with the griots and similar in-betweens. Influential in this regard is Yankah’s attention to the akyeame (spokespersons) of the Akan ethnic group in Ghana. In Speaking for the Chief (1995), Yankah describes how female akyeame are normal for Akan queenmothers, though less for male chiefs. Yet, “despite her gender,” so Yankah (1995, 77) writes about the exceptional akyeame 156

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Eno Asuama, “she appears to be the chief ’s favorite orator due to her unusually fertile mind and effective control over words – attributes that are indispensable in an ideal elder” (Yankah 1995, 77). This connection between control of words and elderhood is – as Yankah suggests – a masculine evidence. Yet, Eno is exceptionally gifted here, and thus moderates verbal exchanges between the chief and his audience, and occasionally settles cases all by herself. Like the orators of chiefs, queenmother’s akyeame stand up when their patrons speak; unlike them, however, these akyeame do not use akyeamepoma, orators’ staffs. In addition, these female orators have various rhetorical responsibilities: They need to take part in judicial proceedings at the Ashanti queen’s court; and they enjoy the privileges to enter the hallowed stool room with the queenmother to perform rituals, including libation prayer (have undergone the sokanhyire rites). Yet, despite this wide-ranging set of responsibilities, there are nevertheless limitations due to her gender: A female akyeame cannot enter the sacred stool room nor go to formal meetings when she is menstruating (Yankah 1995, 78). In these instances, she is represented by another akyeame. In addition, so Yankah observes, the akyeame usually remains in the background when the co-orators are male. Akyeame can only display their rhetoric potential when they are alone or accompanied by female co-orators. Strikingly, Yankah (1995, 83) emphasizes that female orators are important in moments of tension due to the aesthetics of indirectness which he sees as played out especially in the women’s conversations. Women, including the female akyeame, deploy more proverbs, but also textile rhetoric. All of these are non-violent means of crisis management. In a related vein, among the Mande, it is argued that female griots are people “whose use of words is competent” (Duran 1995, 202). This competence is a skill that can be acquired by learning stock proverbs and genealogies. Though, even better jelimusow are those “who touch (…) your heart” (Duran 1995, 202), a capacity (called ngaaraya, see above) that is neither taught nor inherited, and “is believed to be a gift from God, a state almost of possession that overtakes the singer, often induced by the inspired playing of the accompanists” (Duran 1995, 202). Here, we encounter the power of the jelimusow, who can drain the singer and which can be dangerous for the listeners, as “they too may go out of control and commit exaggerated acts of generosity” (Duran 1995, 202). Thus, griots are known for their supernatural powers. Furthermore, Malian griots are feared because their words can be deadly, while they themselves are also objects of occult attacks. Hoffman describes how in Mali, “nearly every griot, including women, carried special twigs protruding from the corners of their mouths to help ward off harmful energies” (Hoffman 2000, 37). In post-independence West-Africa, female griots have become more prominent in the local and international music scene (Duran 1995, Schulz 1997). This is the outcome of two generic features of griot performances: First, in post-independence Mande society, the emphasis in jeli’s music “shifted increasingly away from historical narrative towards praise and entertainment” (Duran 1995, 205). This has favored the women, who are freer to move on stage. As the men are usually seated playing an instrument, women can walk in the audiences and use dramatic theatrical gestures (Duran 1995, 205). Second, this gendered professionalization is due to a gendered division of public speech within the Mande society: “The jelimusow, by contrast, specialize in singing. … Very often, the team husband/instrumentalist plus wife (wives)/singer(s), is still the most common” (Duran 1995, 201). While customarily, jeli (men) do the story telling of the epics (Sunjata, etc.), women carry out mainly praise singing, recite proverbs, voice moral and social comments and make only scattered references to the heroes of the epic songs (Duran 1995, 201). In addition, the performances by the jelimusow are more inclusive than the epic songs recited by the jeli, who only appear to glorify the noble lineages. Being praised by a jelimusow lifts the worth of a lineage, whether they 157

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are noble or not. Wealthy businessmen and other prominent members of society who are not part of these noble lineages therefore approach the jelimusow and commission to record private cassettes for them in praise of their own families.1 In Mali, it has been observed that with political independence, the griots were also immediately approached by aspiring political leaders. Schulz (1997) describes the rise and fall of one of the first female griot stars of national renown. Listeners appreciated her voice and broad repertoire, though, when she took sides with the new military regime, people began to disapprove. People did not trust her because she was too quick to affiliate with the new politiki people – “she should not have walked up to them (that is, to become their client)” and thus showed a lack of “shame, no sense of honor of her profession” (Schulz 1997, 453). All in all, these transformations in the jelimusow’s economic opportunities have led to a certain stigmatization of these public women in Mande society. Divorce rate among the jelimusow is remarkably higher than among other professional domains in Mande society; their economic independence is not always appreciated by their husbands and older generations of male musicians define these jelimusow’s as shameless and thus express concerns about women’s mobility outside of the domestic sphere. This publicness and defiant role in society has remarkable echoes in Hoffman’s description of how a jelimosu should behave. Hoffman (2000, 246), who trained as a jelimuso in Bamako, describes how during ritual and ceremonial contexts these women are expected “to speak, sing, dance in order to demonstrate” their cast identity as a griot. It is clear that this particular role is only limited to a particular group of society and brings with it its own visual and behavioral codes. “Griot women (…) dress in bright colors (red was said to be a favorite) with lots of jewelry, they are loud, vociferous, emotional, sensual and unafraid to display their sensuality in dance and in their relations with men” (Hoffman 2000, 246). Such public performances obviously emphasize these women’s relative freedom in society, though bring along debates about morality. This short overview of the (changed) role of the female griot in west-African society and cultural worlds draws our attention to the social embeddedness of those who produce and circulate information. The griotte, as praise-singer, emphasizes the social construction of public speech: Patrons and sponsors attempt to define what is said, how it is said, and what information circulates in the public domain. In addition, at certain occasions, griottes speak truths, as they possess sacred powers. These religious backgrounds shape competition among griottes and also steer the way in which griotte’s words can be perceived. Of course, female journalists in contemporary Africa are not born in the griot caste nor are they only praise-singers. Yet, it is important to locate the genealogy of journalism in Africa beyond the introduction of mass media and the figure of the journalist as a trained professional hired for a particular news agency, working against deadlines and fact checking the reports (see also Nyamnjoh 2005, Mutsvairo 2018). Alternative routes to contemporary journalism in sub-Saharan Africa need to be acknowledged if we want to consider how information is valued and, especially, if we want to understand the social positionality of those who publicly broadcast information and messages.

Benny Samba – online Animatrices in Kinshasa (and its Diasporas) The second case study deals with one of the latest innovations in news reporting in Kinshasa: digital chroniqueurs or animateurs interviewing offline and online, and broadcasting edited excerpts of these conversations on social media platforms such as YouTube, Facebook and Instagram. Also in the Congolese digital world, women are very visible and obtain a lot 158

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of followers. Their heightened visibility comes with a flipside: These women immediately become the topic of debates about their assumed immorality. In the interviews and audience reactions, religion (in particular Christianity) is one of many topics. It is mobilized by the digital reporter herself as an identity marker in order to curb any attacks. So far, these women have not (yet) obtained the status of female influencers as we observe in Southeast Asia, where, in particular, religious female influencers are seizing on the Internet, where they open up spaces for discussions about what it means to be a female Muslim in today’s world (Slama and Barendregt 2018). Within the Congolese world of digital information circulation, two concepts need to be unpacked: the chroniqueur and animateur. Both refer to two different roles and each draw on different spaces of spectacle. Chroniqueur is mainly used in the context of media hosts interviewing musicians, sponsors and other cultural performers, who thus obtain a platform to explain their latest songs, albums and performances, inform their audiences about upcoming artistic events and speak out about gossip and rumors. As such, their work is very often defined as polémique, a concept which speaks to the social work of information distribution: It evokes antagonisms between protagonists or groups of people and obliges the spectator to take a position therein. The chroniqueur is usually embedded within rivalries between music bands and is thus, very much like news journalists, understood to be the smallboy (or small girl) of certain music leaders. Their dependency toward their patrons produces their journalistic work. Chroniqueurs favor particular musicians by inviting representatives of certain bands more than others, by the choice of music that is played during the broadcast and by wandering in these musicians’ in private circles. Often these intimate ties between a chroniqueur and a musician are due to ethnic solidarity, and music bands favor chroniqueurs of their own ethnic identity to report on their music activities, as it is assumed that they will mainly do favorable reporting. These chroniqueurs receive food, money, cars and other commodities in return for this propitious reporting. In the case of chroniqueuses, very often it is assumed that these women are tied to a particular musician through sexual relationships. Here, ethnic identity does not define the relationship. The second type of reporter on which the digital animatrice draws is the classic animateur or animatrice, which references a radio or television host whose expertise goes beyond the music scene, and who invites guests who can speak about politics, social issues, economics and entertainment. Very often, such radio and television broadcasts explain how to use soap, the necessity of registering one’s child at the town hall or the risks of using herbs for abortion, etc. Given the fact that these chroniqueurs and animateurs operate in a society where an informal economy thrives due to the lack of a viable formal economy, these celebrities depend on sponsors and audiences for survival and for the content of their work. It is therefore not surprising that female radio and television hosts use digital platforms in order to extend their public persona, which provide an increased visibility for their sponsors and allow them to invest much time in communicating with their fans. Various digital genres are available to female digital reporters. Mpofu (2018) describes Zimbabwean women’s blogging activities as political actions: The blogs become platforms in which personal, private matters become public and through which these women can contribute to ongoing economic, societal and political debates. So far, in the Congolese digital sphere, it seems that not so much blogging but rather audiovisual platforms such as YouTube, Facebook and Instagram are the digital platforms in which animatrices and chroniqueuses operate. Significantly, and most probably, in particular, to a large extent due to the economy of digital production as well, mainly women residing in the diaspora avail the digital screen as a space to report. Benny Samba (screen name) is an example in the case. Having partly 159

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grown up in Kinshasa and partly in the UK, this young woman in her mid-twenties feels that she cannot live her whole life in the UK. Working as a nurse in a retirement home in the outskirts of London, she takes any opportunity to spend time in Kinshasa. She turned to online broadcasting in order to establish a further connection with her home city and maybe to find an entry for a new job. Capitalizing on her diaspora status, Benny Samba has set up a digital news company. In 2015, Benny Samba started a YouTube channel, called Bstar tv, which counts 6.797 subscribers (Samba 2018f ). Her Facebook account (Samba 2018a) is called “Benny Samba (Star en Jesus)” (translated “Benny star (star with Jesus)”), and contains almost 5,000 followers ( June 2018). A few men and women, all media practitioners working for local television stations in Kinshasa, film on Benny’s behalf while she is in the UK and they accompany her when she is in Kinshasa. Via social media or over the phone, they discuss the subjects to cover, film with a small camera, do the editing at home on semi-professional equipment in Kinshasa and send the footage online to her, who works further on it in London, and posts the footage on her YouTube account, benefiting cheaper and easier Internet access in the UK. Benny’s spectators are not only the Kinois (from Kinshasa) audience, but the Kinois community, at large – in an Appadurai (1996) sense, meaning those who identify as Kinois and may live in the diasporas. Recently, she set up a business in Kinshasa, b-star concept which specializes in copying, printing (on paper, t-shirts, etc.) and recording. While she spends most of her time in the UK, she clearly does not want to display herself as a mikiliste (someone living in the diaspora). The video clips she posts on her YouTube channel are interviews with local celebrities, important pastors, musicians and she thus contributes to the polémique. Significantly, Benny Samba also reports on polémique in Kinshasa’s Pentecostal churches and posts clips discussing the value of dîmes (the tenth) in church, questions about immoral behavior of leading Pentecostal pastors and miracles performed by pastors. These religious-related video clips are far less numerous than clips about musicians and social issues, however. Some of her clips also explicitly deal with fraught diaspora-home relationships, e.g., comportement ya ba filles ya kin envers mibali ya poto, mibali ya poto balembi ba filles ya kin trop c trop (lit., the behavior of Kinshasa’s girls vis-à-vis men from Europe. The men from Europe are tired of Kinshasa’s girls. Too much!) (Samba 2018e). Overall, Benny Samba promotes herself more as a kinoise rather than as a mikiliste (someone living in the diaspora). She thus responds to Kinois’ ambivalent stances toward Congolese in the diaspora. On the one hand, Kinois attach a lot of value to those who have traveled and manage to set up a living in the diaspora. On the other hand, however, these nevertheless need to prove themselves as remaining a Congolese by speaking the latest version of kiKinois, by being knowledgeable about the latest rumors in Kinshasa’s celebrity scene and by partaking in the culture of polémique. On Benny’s Facebook account, more attention is devoted to her personal social and spiritual world in Kinshasa. For example, here, Benny embeds herself within the group bafilles ya presse (lit., girls of the press) – and shows images of these women at a swimming pool, doing some fitness exercises and announcing her Facebook friends that “botala niveay eyinaki” (lit., look how things are heating up) (Samba 2018g). Especially on her Facebook account, Benny Samba mobilizes time and again her Christianity, either by posting comments such as “bstar concept avec dieu nous ferons des exploits” (Samba 2018b) (lit., bstar concept, with God we are going to do great things) or “biso soki nzambe te mobulu (Kinshasa tjrs)” (Samba 2018d) (lit., for us: only God; otherwise chaos (Kinshasa forever)), while displaying a jetset life style: herself picturing either in flats (not a typical housing in Kinshasa); dining out in restaurants in town (too expensive for the majority of the population), at luxury Sunday afternoon outings or on her way to church, in a car and putting make up on. 160

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So far, hardly any research has been done on these young women, animatrices, who might use religious discourse and play with the lifestyles of highly mobile celebrities. It is a new category, which remains as contested as the female musicians and television actors (Pype 2012). However, just like the evangelizing television actresses argue that their reputation is protected because their work is in the service of God (Pype 2012, 88), so Benny is also performing her Christianity or displaying it in order to borrow sympathy from the audience. When in Kinshasa, she visits orphanages, donates food and goods to these orphanages, these visits are filmed and the clips are uploaded on her Facebook page. Benny’s screen name also has double explicit reference to Christianity: the name Benny finds its origins in the French word bénie, meaning blessed (by God); in her Facebook alias, which mentions between brackets star en Jésus (star with Jesus), she plays with the religious reference to a star (nyota in Lingala). In Congolese Christian understandings of personhood, everybody is born with an invisible star, only perceivable by people with two pairs of eyes, people with spiritual powers. One’s star defines one’s social success: With a bright star, you will attract many people. This large amount of followers, or wealth in people (Guyer and Belinga 1995), means that one can count on favors by these people attracted to you. If your star is fading, then your success is fading as well. A decline in favors is intimately tied to a reduction of one’s spiritual glow. A Christian is thus advised to pray so that no demonic influences change the shiny quality of one’s star. It is also in this perspective of working on her moral capital that we need to interpret Benny’s status updates on her Facebook account, e.g., taking a selfie and adding “have a nice Sunday all of you, What is yours is yours, so does the Eternal Jesus the Messiah say” (Samba 2018c). In this way, her Facebook page confirms her Christian identity. All in all, the Facebook page constitutes a separate space of informing her followers, though the information provided here is far more intimate than is possible on the YouTube channel. The Facebook page thus constitutes a platform for her reputation management. While the YouTube channel is a space of professional activity, the Facebook wall construes her social persona. This brief exploration into the social positioning of a digital animatrice in Kinshasa’s media world draws our attention to two themes in contemporary news reporting in Africa: (1) the identification of the digital world as a space of news making and (2) the influence of diasporic communities in the production of news and circulation of information. Benny Samba prefers to report in Kinshasa, while others mainly report on diaspora events. Their (intended) audiences are not geographically defined, rather their audiences are selected by the used language (kiKinois, slang of Lingala) and themes. Newsworthy then means information that relates to the Kinois community at large, meaning of relevance for Kinois living in Kinshasa and elsewhere. This case study also speaks to the currency of religious identity in the media world. As Kinois society is fraught with polémique and rumors about immorality (occult conniving, sexual decadence, etc.), Benny Samba produces an online persona that depicts her as Christian. While her male counterparts hardly show themselves en route to church or visiting a pastor, she obviously feels the need to portray her as a devout Christian, attending religious rituals and submitting her professional activities to the Christian God.

Conclusion This chapter has pointed at some fundamental dynamics at the intersections of religion, women and news and information distribution in sub-Saharan Africa. I have drawn attention to the various cultural and social parameters that define the possibilities of the role of women as reporters. The opening anecdote hinted at the role of occult powers within 161

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competition in a newsroom; the two case studies discussed the gendered and religious backgrounds of female information broadcasters in West Africa, the griotte and a Congolese online reporter living in the diaspora mobilizing Christianity as a strategy to purchase moral capital from her public. Throughout the 20th century, political and technological changes have led to new forms of news production, new types of publics and novel ways of storytelling. Yet religion continues to play an important role not only as a theme to report on, but also in the ways in which female journalists present themselves to their audiences. All of these obviously require thick analysis, which this chapter has been unable to provide. Just like societies in Africa are changing, also, religions and the mediascape on the continent have always been changing. These transformations continue to occur and the following paragraphs therefore can only present some of the strongest changes that this author feels will affect journalism in Africa. First, it is expected that the digital innovations on the continent and people’s increasing mobile lives lead to more hybrid forms of news media. Questions arise regarding the extent in which Chinese media infrastructures will design news produced in sub-Saharan Africa tomorrow, and how these will be reinserted in religious media production. As China is increasingly a destination country for African female traders and as more and more young women who have grown up in the diaspora are returning to their country of origin, we can expect novel centers of news production to emerge following the increasing return migration of (men and) women from African descent. This has already led to renewal in locally produced music and fiction. So, how do these mobile lives of return migrants who live on other continents transform the scale of what counts as newsworthy and what place will be given to the religious? We are only now beginning to scratch the surface of how the digital world transforms gendered worlds. One of the intriguing questions will be regarding the emergence of the new female leaders à la Benny Samba and how these women and the information they spread reconfigure what it can mean to be a Christian; Muslim or any other religious practitioner in a world that is electronically fashioned. Second, as various African governments are experimenting with digital technologies while trying to keep tight control on the information that their citizenry can have access to, various forms of truth production and validation will compete in and through multiple media platforms. How will religious practitioners be involved in this competition? At the same time, radical religious developments such as Boko Haram are – until now only in limited areas in West Africa – sharply redrawing the mobility opportunities for women. Female media participation is strictly controlled and limited in these regions. We do not yet understand the accepted forms of gendered media in Boko Haram controlled communities. We are now also observing how various religious communities in the same society try to address forms of radicalization (such as those led by Boko Haram) by joining hands and proclaiming an oikumene (Kaboré 2017). We need a deeper understanding of the role of gender in these inter-faith collaborations. Related to this question of the role of the government and other public authorities is the space of big data, and how international corporations redefine personhood and media consumption according to algorithms. It is a puzzle how religious media owners and users will engage with these debates, how big data will inform news production and whether women will take a different stance therein. Moreover, will women be targeted in the discussions about accepted forms data management and their risks? All of these are exciting new dynamics in Africa’s media worlds that will beg for analytical attention in the years to come. 162

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Note 1 This genre is performed on weddings and baptisms and circulated on recorded cassettes in the 1990s (Duran 1995).

Further readings Mutsvairo, B., ed., 2018. The Palgrave Handbook of Media and Communication Research in Africa. London: Palgrave Macmillan. This edited volume contains chapters that attempt to decolonize media studies. Various contributions deal with the politics of information, and/or gendered media worlds in sub-Saharan Africa. Njogu, K. and Middleton, J., eds., 2009. Media and Identity in Africa. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. This edited volume collects texts from communication scholars, historians, anthropologists and museologists. They illustrate how old and new media contribute to the production of social identities. Gender, religion, ethnicity and language are, among others, identified as major rubrics that determine the performativity of media texts in sub-Saharan Africa. Vokes, R., 2018. Media and Development. London: Routledge. This is the first publication that scrutinizes the nexus between media ecologies and ideas of progress, change, and betterment. The book offers a critical perspective on what useful information is, and can be, and thus challenges taken for granted ideas of information and politics. Gender receives attention throughout the book.

References Amory, D., 1997. “Homosexuality” in Africa: Issues and Debates. Issue: A Journal of Opinion, 25(1), 5–10. Appadurai, A., 1996. Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Bosch, T., 2013. Women as Radio Audiences in Africa. In: Carter, C., Steiner, L. and McLaughlin, L., eds. Routledge Companion to Media and Gender. London and New York: Routledge, 514–522. Buiten, D., 2013. Feminist Approaches and the South African News Media. Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies, 34(2), 54–72. Cole, J., 2010. Sex and Salvation: Imagining the Future in Madagascar. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Collins, R. F. and Palmegiano, E. M., eds., 2007. The Rise of Western Journalism 1815–1914: Essays on the Press in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain and the United States. Jefferson: McFarland & Co. de Witte, M., 2011. Business of the Spirit: Ghanaian Broadcast Media and the Commercial Exploitation of Pentecostalism. Journal of African Media Studies, 3(2), 189–205. Duran, L., 1995. Jelimusow: The Superwomen of Malian Music. In: Furniss, G. and Gunner, L., eds. Power, Marginality, and African Oral Literature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 197–207. Englund, H., 2011. Human Rights and African Airwaves. Mediating Equality on the Chichewa Radio. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Fair, L., 2009. Making Love in the Indian Ocean: Hindi Films, Zanzibari Audiences, and the Construction of Romance in the 1950s and 1960s. In: Thomas, L. and Cole, J., eds. Love in Africa. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 58–82. Fordred-Green, L., 2000. Tokoloshe Tales: Reflections on the Cultural Politics of Journalism in South Africa. Current Anthropology, 41(5), 701–712. Gadzekpo, A., 2009. Missing Links: African Media Studies and Feminist Concerns. Journal of African Media Studies. JAMS, 1(1), 69–80. Garcia-Mingo, E., 2017. Mamas in the Newsroom: Women’s Journalism Against Sexual Violence in Eastern Congo. Journal of African Media Studies, 9(1), 215–227. Grätz, T., 2014. Christian Religious Radio Production in Benin: The Case of Radio Maranatha. Social Compass, 61(10), 57–66. Gaudio, R., 2009. Allah Made Us: Sexual Outlaws in an Islamic African City. Oxford: Blackwell-Wiley. Guyer, J. and Belinga, O., 1995. Wealth in People as Wealth in Knowledge; Accumulation and Composition in Equatorial Africa. Journal of African History, 36(1), 91–120.

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Katrien Pype Hackett, R. I. J., 1998. Charismatic/Pentecostal Appropriations of Media Technologies in Nigeria and Ghana. Journal of Religion in Africa, 28(3), 258–277. Hoffman, B., 2000. Griots at War: Conflict, Conciliation, and Caste in Mande. Bloomington-Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Kaboré, K., 2017. Mouvement interreligieux et usages d’Internet au Burkina Faso. Le cas de l’Union fraternelle des croyants (UFC) de Dori. Emulations 24. Available at http://www.revue-emulations. net/archives/24-les-acteurs-religieux-africains-numerique/mouvement-interreligieux-et-usagesdinternet-au-burkina-faso-le-cas-de-lunion-fraternelle-des-croyants-ufc-de-dori, accessed 8 June 2018. Mano, W., 2010. Popular Music as Journalism in Africa: Issues and Contexts. In: Wasserman, H., ed. Popular Media Democracy and Development in Africa. Abingdon: Routledge, 91–104. Masquelier, A., 2009. Lessons from Rubi: Love, Poverty, and the Educational Value of Televised Dramas in Niger. In: Thomas, L. and Cole, J., eds. Love in Africa. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 204–228. Meyer, B., 2015. Sensational Movies. Video, Vision, and Christianity in Ghana. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mpofu, S., 2018. Women’s Voices Online and the Emergence of Lived Realities as Distinct Political Behaviour. A Womanist Approach to Selected Zimbabwean Blogs. Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies, 39(1), 4–26. Mutongi, K., 2009. Dear Dolly’s Advice: Representations of Youth, Courtship, and Sexualities in Africa, 1960–80. In: Thomas, L. and Cole, J., eds. Love in Africa. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 83–108. Mutsvairo, B., ed., 2018. The Palgrave Handbook of Media and Communication Research in Africa. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Nyamnjoh, F. B., 2005. Africa’s Media, Democracy and the Politics of Belonging. London: Zed Books. Nyeck, S. N. and Epprecht, M., 2013. Sexual Diversity in Africa: Politics, Theory, and Citizenship. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Odhiambo, L. O., 1991. Development Journalism in Africa: Capitulation of the Fourth Estate. Africa Media Review, 5(2), 17–30. Osunkunle, O. O. and Wozniak, J., 2015. Faith-based Radio: Beyond Spirituality, Encompassing Development. African Journalism Studies, 36(2), 77–94. Pype, K., 2011a. Taboos and Rebels: Or, Transgression and Regulation in the Work and Lives of Kinshasa’s Television Journalists. Popular Communication, 49(4), 625–645. Pype, K., 2011b. Visual Media and Political Communication: Reporting about Suffering in Kinshasa. Journal of Modern African Studies, 49(4), 625–645. Pype, K., 2012. The Making of the Pentecostal Melodrama. Media, Religion, and Gender in Kinshasa. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books. Pype, K., 2013. Reciprocity and Risk in the Work and Lives of Kinshasa’s TV Journalists. Journal of African Cultural Studies, 25(1), 57–71. Pype, K., 2016. Blackberry Girls and Jesus’s Brides: Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity and the (Im-)moralization of Urban Femininity in Contemporary Kinshasa. Journal of Religion in Africa, 46(4), 390–416. Samba, B., 2018a. Profile. Available at https://www.facebook.com/benny.samba, accessed 18 January 2019. Samba, B., 2018b. Photo Posted with Caption “avec dieu nous ferons des exploits”, [Facebook] 21 May 2018. Available at https://www.facebook.com/benny.samba/timeline?lst=645964744%3A100000512441 434%3A1547905961, accessed 18 January 2019. Samba, B., 2018c. Photo Posted with Caption “Excellent Dimanche à tous! Ce qui est à toi et à toi ainsi dit l’éternel yoshua mashiya”, [Facebook] 14 November 2018. Available at https://www.facebook.com/ benny.samba/timeline?lst=645964744%3A100000512441434%3A1547905961, accessed 18 January 2019. Samba, B., 2018d. Photo Posted with Caption “biso soki nzambe te mobulu”, [Facebook] 16 May 2018. Available at https://www.facebook.com/benny.samba/timeline?lst=645964744%3A100000512441 434%3A1547905961, accessed 18 January 2019. Samba, B., 2018e. COMPORTEMENT YA BA FILLES YA KIN ENVERS MIBALI YA POTO, MIBALI YA POTO BALEMBI TROP C TROP. [Youtube] Available at https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=TE_bknOkP98, accessed 18 January 2019.

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PART 3

Conflict, radicalization and populism

12 REPORTING THE DIVIDED SOUL OF THE NATION Religion and politics in American news media D. Ashley Campbell Introduction Observers of US presidential politics are not strangers to electoral coverage focusing on the religious vote. Since the 1980s, the broadly defined group of the Christian Right has dominated examinations of conservative victories. In 2004, headlines following the election of President Bush announced religion as a key factor in his victory (Campbell 2007, Vinson and Guth 2009). Mitt Romney’s Mormonism came under scrutiny in 2012 as journalists investigated a religion that had not made significant national news since the polygamy debates of the 1800s (Gordon 2002, Haws 2013). The most recent presidential election of Donald Trump proved confusing to many observers, as news media confronted the evangelical divide. The evangelical voting bloc’s differing opinions on Trump resulted in numerous headlines and segments about how a group formerly represented as unified by the news media could hold opposing views on a candidate. News media in this chapter is understood as the digital, broadcast and print communications of major networks (CNN, Fox News, NPR, etc.), legacy papers and magazines (The Washington Post, The New York Times, The Atlantic, etc.) and online outlets (Vox, Huffington Post, Slate, etc.). Media coverage of religion in American politics, however, extends beyond presidential campaigns. Journalists have been required to attend to intricacies of religious practice, theology and institutions for decades, from the 1925 Scopes Trial over the teaching of evolution to debates over social issues, or the culture wars, such as abortion and gay marriage. Lately, news media wrestle with conversations about Islam and the growing NONE population, as both influence issues of foreign policy, domestic bigotry and the changing moral landscape of the USA. Yet, journalism’s coverage of the role of religion in socio-political debates may not always lead to a better-informed civil society, but instead can participate in exacerbating reported conflict. Conflict, in this case, refers to public debates that occur on various platforms (personal relationships, social media, news media, etc.) and perpetuate the inability of two or more opinion camps to reconcile their differences, leading to polarization within civil society. This chapter examines the relationship between religion and politics in the US news media and its participation in fueling and sustaining conflict. Building on past studies about religion, politics and journalism, this chapter focuses on the coverage of two case studies – the 169

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evangelical vote in the 2016 election and the National Football League’s (NFL) #TakeAKnee protest. In particular, these cases illuminate how some misconceptions about religion in the news media and the media’s overlooking of a particular marriage of religion and politics – American civil religion – lead to a lack of nuance in public discussion of socio-political issues in the USA. Prior to examining the two case studies, this chapter outlines some of the past research on religion and politics in US journalism.

Media and scholarly understandings of religion Religion and news have an intimate past in the history of the USA. Among Puritan communities in New England, religious events served as news, and the news was interpreted with an eye toward religion (Underwood 2002, Winston 2012). In fact, Underwood (2002) sees religion as key to the emergence of today’s secular press, arguing that the biblical prophetic tradition and religious calls for social reform are the undergirding morality of journalism. Thus, from the beginning of the colonies to the Revolutionary War, news media have discussed religion with a concern for the nation’s and its residents’ place in a divine order. What qualifies as religion, however, remains contested. News media often focus their coverage of religion by highlighting institutions outlined by organized traditions – the Roman Catholic Church, Reform Judaism, etc. – or religious leaders – reverends, priests, imams, etc. (Vinson and Guth 2009, Winston 2012). In the case of stories about religion and politics, religious organizations and celebrity leaders, such as the Moral Majority or Billy Graham, take center stage. More recent stories expand this journalistic definition of religion to lay people and the religiously unaffiliated. The Religion News Association defines religion as “a general term referring to religious practice” in its stylebook, suggesting a broader understanding by which to cover religion (Religion News Association 2019). However, news media continue to center stories around a conception of religion outlined by institutions, organizations and denominational affiliation, leading many practitioners and scholars to comment that the media does not “get religion” (Hoover 1998, Gerson 2009, Mattingly 2009, Winston 2012, Mattingly 2014). In the past, the academic study of religion also took an institutional approach to defining religion, focusing on authority figures and the collective morality bestowed by these regulating bodies (Durkheim 1912, Hoover 2006). However, religious studies has shifted its understanding of religion as social norms and organizations have realigned, leading to the “lived religion” methodological movement (Hall 1997, vii). In fact, the label religion serves as a term to be defined by the scholar to classify observed beliefs and actions (Smith 1998). For the purposes of this chapter, I follow Geertz’s (1973) definition of religion as a cultural system of symbols that outline a social reality of beliefs, actions and myths. This definition allows for the media’s institutional approach, the contemporary disaffiliation movement and interrogations into practices and beliefs as understood by participants. Such a definition provides for the presence of religion outside the church news pages in early newspapers, given that concerns about religion were (and are) also closely connected to politics. As stated previously, events in society were sometimes read according to religious thinking. For instance, the defeat of Britain in the Revolutionary War was understood as divine victory and George Washington seen as a saintly father (Cherry 1998). Reading American history and events in terms of divine providence continues today in a secularized format that is often called American exceptionalism. We hear this belief reflected in the phrase city on a hill, which suggests that the USA serves as a light and example of democracy for the world. Sociologist Robert Bellah (1967) observed this phenomenon and referred to 170

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it as American civil religion. Civil religion functions as one cultural system of symbols that reinforces national understandings of beliefs (liberty, equality and freedom), rituals (4th of July, inaugurations, etc.) and myths (history). American civil religion adds another layer of complexity to religious and political narratives in the US media, as it is so embedded within the US imaginary and understandings of national reality that journalists, editors and readers may not notice it (Bellah 1967, Silk 2012). The presence of civil religion in media coverage of religion and politics will be discussed in the second case study. Before undertaking this examination, however, it is necessary to outline the media portrayal of religion in American politics and how a conflict over the place of religion in the public sphere unfolds in the press.

Reporting on religion and politics Alexis de Tocqueville observed the relationship between religion and politics in the USA in his 1835 tome Democracy in America. Tocqueville finds religion to be an extension of the political institution as it reinforces notions of freedom in the country and maintains “republican institutions” (Tocqueville 1835, 329). Yet, without the press, this affinity between religion and politics would not be supported. News media, according to Tocqueville (1835), place religion as the standard by which democracy is judged (Winston 2012). Religion serves as the moral compass for democratic ideals and the guarantor of freedom (Tocqueville 1835, 29). The press also reinforces the participation of volunteer associations, including religious organizations, in political mobilization (Tocqueville, 1835 cited in Winston 2012, 11), integrating religion into the democratic process. Yet, this mutually beneficial relationship between democratic ideals and religion, as portrayed by the press, does not extend to all religions. We can see the presence of religion in the US political process from the 1700s until today. Mark Silk (2012) observes how press coverage of the 1796 presidential election between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson highlights the influence of religious beliefs in politics. The allegiances of Jefferson to France, an anti-clerical nation by then, and his support of the separation of church and state1 were spread through the press, leading to his loss to Adams (Silk 2012). The focus of media coverage on the religious affiliation of candidates continues in the 20th and 21st centuries, amplifying a perceived conflict between a candidate’s beliefs and either the opposing candidate or the job of the president. John F. Kennedy’s Roman Catholicism, in the 1960s, was seen as a possible threat to representative democracy due to the perceived monarchial position of the Pope (Silk 2012). News media covered Mitt Romney’s Mormonism as a strange and exotic religion full of secrets that concerned voters (Ayers 2012, Turner 2012, Younge 2012). Most recently, the vague Christianity of Donald J. Trump was portrayed as a political ploy and antithetical to his lifestyle (Taylor 2015, Burke 2016, Gabriel and Luo 2016, Summers 2016). Media coverage of religion in US politics extends beyond presidential elections to debates about social norms and practices, including marriage, sexuality, patriotism and immigration. Yet, the conflict between religion and politics in journalism operates on a larger, philosophical level, too – the place of religion in politics from the beginning. Modern assumptions about the relegation of religion to the private sphere leave news media with little room to cover religion in politics except as an uninvited guest that promotes the beliefs of individuals instead of the democratic public good. One cause for the consigning of religion to the private sphere and out of public discourse emerges in the 20th century in the USA with the development of the secularization theory and the privileging of a secular public space. Secularization theory claimed that religion was losing its foothold in society and that the public sphere and its political processes should be devoid of religious beliefs and practices 171

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(Berger 1967, 1996, Casanova 1994). From this social norm, debates about the presence of nativity scenes in front of public buildings and court cases on the use of prayer in legislative meetings emerge (Markoe and Grossman 2014, Masci 2014a, 2014b, Wolf 2014), providing fodder for stories about disharmony between religion and US democratic principles. News media facilitated this dichotomous organizing of society as a result of its foundation in serving as a watchdog, pointing out perceived contradictions to democracy and its pluralistic ideals (Hoover 1998). The Scopes Trial of 1925 serves as a watershed moment for the contemporary coverage of religion in politics and the perceived conflict between religion and US politics. As one of the first trials broadcasted live via radio, the Scopes Trial, which addressed the teaching of evolution versus creationism in schools, shaped national opinion about the place of religion in modern society (Larson 1997, Moran 2002). News media portrayed the trial as a victory for rational, secular thinking in contradiction to a backwards, unintelligent religious belief even though the jury ruled in favor of teaching creationism (Moran 2002). Therefore, public opinion, as shaped by media, affirmed the growing belief that religion had no place in public discourse, especially politics. The Scopes Trial revealed that not all religions were deemed unacceptable in the public sphere – just those that advocate for a fundamentalist understanding of the Bible and an ultra-conservative society. This fundamentalist-modernist debate structures the media’s coverage of religion and politics to this day, revealing why the Christian Right, violent interpretations of Islam and other non-liberal and progressive traditions dominate conversations about religion and politics in the USA. From this debate, we receive press coverage of religion that incorrectly characterizes the so-called evangelical vote as unified, exaggerates the role of Islam in the Iranian hostage crisis, and constructs a narrative about a never-ending culture war occurring in the USA between the right-left, conservative-liberal and the religious-unreligious (Winston 2007, Hoover 2012, Silk 2012). In effect, the fundamentalist-modernist approach to covering religion emphasizes conflict and reveals that Tocqueville’s comments about religion contributing do the democratic process does not extend to all religions (Tocqueville 1835, Winston 2012). The following case studies serve to illustrate two ways in which news media’s coverage of religion and politics reinforce conflict, by overlooking the underlying nuances of a situation. These nuances provide a different angle from which to examine socio-political issues involving religion, possibly leading to better understanding rather than polarization. The first case study examines a narrative of schism among the evangelical vote in the 2016 presidential election. What I refer to as the evangelical versus evangelical story frame flattened and minimized difference among the evangelical vote as a result of the fundamentalist-modernist mindset. Such a framing reinforces division and polarization as the norm within the US political imaginary. The second case study focuses on the antagonistic and emotional #TakeAKnee protest in the NFL and how news coverage of this story requires an understanding of a narrative infused within society – American civil religion. By framing the opposing views of the #TakeAKnee protests in terms of politics, nationalism or race, a key unifying narrative is lost. American civil religion allows for political, patriotic and racial differences within the protest, while also providing context for the extreme division caused by the events.

Evangelical versus Evangelical Election coverage of the 2016 presidential campaign quickly discovered that the religious vote in the Republican Party did not follow past narratives. The evangelical vote was split with notable leaders, such as Jerry Falwell, Jr. and Robert Jeffress, supporting Trump and others denouncing him, including Russell Moore, the president of the Ethics and Religious 172

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Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention (Cornish 2016, Taylor 2016a). Such a divide within what has been seen as a consistent voting bloc over the past four decades baffled the media and upended the narrative of a unified religious and political conservative front. This case study examines the 2016 coverage of the evangelical vote (a total of 115 articles) to highlight how news media’s investment in particular narratives about religion – fundamentalist-modernist, the evangelical vote, culture wars, etc. – leads to essentialized treatments of religion’s place in politics and overlooks important historical nuances. Before analyzing news stories about the evangelical vote from The Washington Post, Vox, and National Public Radio (NPR), a brief history of the perceived evangelical voting bloc is necessary. The background to this chapter pointed to the Scopes Trial of 1925 as a turning point for the place of conservative religion, or fundamentalism, in the US public mentality (Larson 1997, Harding 2000, Moran 2002). With the rise of the fundamentalist-modernist debate in the USA, conservative Protestants appeared to retreat from the public relinquishing their voice in socio-political issues. The traditional narrative frames this shift in public persona among conservative traditions as a victory for reason and modernity. However, the story about the apparent retreat of conservative Protestants, now called evangelicals, is far more complicated. Following the Scopes Trial, secular and modern media portrayed conservative Protestants as a minority group who had lost their say in public discourse and their interest in engaging in culture. In reality, evangelicals remained politically active between the 1920s and 1980s (Williams 2010). Although, one group, who publicly became known as the fundamentalists, retreated while another group, the neo-evangelicals, continued to engage with modern society (Brint and Schroedel 2009). The fundamentalist/neo-evangelical divide, however, was not an immediate repercussion of the Scopes Trial. Sutton (2013) places the division in the 1940s, as two competing organizations developed to address the role of religious conservatives in the public square. Carl McIntire, a staunch fundamentalist, founded the American Council of Churches (ACC) in 1941. This organization “called for strict separation from mainstream culture” and could be characterized as “militantly pro-Gospel and anti-modernist” ( Diamond 1995, 95). In 1942, the neo-evangelicals responded to McIntire’s separationist focus with the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE). The NAE’s purpose, as described by its founder Ralph T. Davis, was “to find some common meeting ground for representation to government where legal matters may be handled as they concern one endeavor or another of the evangelical forces” (Sutton 2013, 7). Interestingly, the NAE admitted Charismatic Protestants, a previously ostracized group who believe in the gifts of the Holy Spirit such as speaking in tongues (Anderson 1979, Manuel 1980). This inclusive spirit set the stage for the emergent evangelical vote in 1980. Although neo-evangelicals and fundamentalists took different stances on engagement with society, other distinctions between the two groups were minimal. In a 1957 document entitled The New Evangelicalism, Harold John Ockenga explained that neo-evangelicals “believe that fundamentalism is right in as far as doctrine is concerned” (Sutton 2013, 33). Even Jerry Falwell, a self-identified fundamentalist, recognized “there is little difference theologically between Fundamentalists and Evangelicals” (Falwell 1987, 121). This doctrine includes (1) the inerrancy of the Bible, (2) experiential faith and the salvation of the individual and (3) the literal return of Jesus to earth (Harding 2000, Sutton 2013).2 From the beginning, then, the conservative Protestant population was divided, wrestling with their own internal conflicts of politics and engagement. Common theology, however, did set the stage for the media narrative that would become the evangelical vote. By the late-1970s, Falwell left the fundamentalist camp and found the political activism organization Moral Majority in 1979. Falwell also began referring to himself as an evangelical 173

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rather than a fundamentalist, making it easier for the media to mistakenly see all conservative Protestants as the same kind of evangelical rather than as a diverse population with varied political views (Harding 2000, Sutton 2013). The end of the 1970s also proved to be the moment of coalition among the various conservative Protestant groups. Jimmy Carter, a born-again Christian, lost the faith of the evangelical population as his administration had failed to support the stances of conservative Protestants in favor of maintaining Democratic Party policies on abortion and school prayer (Williams 2010). Yet, the appeal of Carter’s administration to the evangelical base reaffirmed a growing suspicion – conservative Protestants held considerable voting power and could form a coalition in support of a chosen candidate (Williams 2010). The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 with significant support from the newly minted evangelical vote solidified the media narrative the USA continues to hear today about the Republican voting base. In particular, Reagan’s overtures to evangelicals vocalized issues that contribute to the idea of culture wars – pro-life, halting of gay rights, and restoring morality to the United States (Williams 2010).3 From Reagan onward, the evangelical vote has been a key story in almost every Republican presidential campaign. Media stories from the 2016 election demonstrate surprise at the division within what, since 1980, has been considered a homogenous voting bloc. This headlined surprise emerges from (1) a focus on enduring media narratives such as the fundamentalist-modernist divide and culture wars and (2) the lack of historical interrogation within stories. These two themes emerge in the framing of the 2016 evangelical vote, as seen in one legacy print paper, an online platform aimed at younger readers and public radio. In order to have headlines that read, “Why Donald Trump is tearing evangelicals apart” (Boorstein 2016c) and “Trump Election Reveals Fractures Among Diverse Evangelicals” (Martin 2016), a presupposition of homogeneity must exist. News media have perpetuated the notion that the evangelical vote exists as a homogenous bloc, since its dominance in the 1980 Reagan election, by framing election stories through polling numbers and categorized voting populations. Stories from 2016 projected how the evangelical vote would swing in each primary election state-by-state, stating that 57% of Republicans participating in the Iowa primary in 2012 were “evangelical or born-again” (Prokop 2016). The emphasis on polling numbers and the percentage of evangelical voters reinforces the idea that evangelicals can be categorized together. The polling practice of placing evangelical voters into a single category participates in the on-going fundamentalist-modernist divide that sees US American society as split between biblical fundamentalists, understood as the evangelical vote, and those willing to embrace modern, pluralistic and progressive society. Blocking off evangelical also happens in the various phrases used to describe the importance of the evangelical vote “for any Republican seeking the White House” (Booker 2016) and the anxiety around its division. Wilkinson, in an article for Vox, writes, “it’s become increasingly clear that Donald Trump’s candidacy has created rifts that may keep the group from ever ‘banding back together’” (Wilkinson 2016). Media framing continues to support the idea of a coherent voting bloc that has always existed and is now threatened by their sudden and possibly irreversible breaking. Thus, by highlighting a seemingly new divide within the evangelical vote, news media perpetuate a narrative of a unified fundamentalist voting bloc positioned against a modernist vote. Some stories, however, do gesture to the fact that divisions among evangelicals have previously existed. These moments of historical contextualization often come from interviewees or guests rather than the reporters. For instance, in an NPR interview with Jerry Falwell, Jr., the host, Steve Inskeep, attempts to figure out why divisions are happening. Falwell responds 174

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by pointing out that evangelicals have always been divided referencing his father’s time in the 1970s and 1980s (Inskeep 2016). Russell Moore, an opponent to voting for Trump, highlights in an interview that “evangelicalism is far more diverse politically than some people assume” (Neary 2016). Other examples abound of self-identifying evangelicals pointing out to the press that their politics and beliefs are not as homogenous as the media portrays them to be (Bailey 2016b, Bever 2016, Kurtzleben 2016a). One pastor goes so far as to distinguish between a “true evangelical” and one “defined by the media” (McCammon 2016). In spite of these corrections on behalf of evangelicals, media coverage of the homogenous evangelical vote persisted. On occasion a reporter would write, “evangelicals, who have no formal leadership or hierarchy” (Bailey 2016b) or state that the evangelical “voting bloc isn’t monolithic” (Taylor 2016b). Sometimes stories would distinguish between evangelicals who regularly go to church and those who do not (Chang 2016, Zauzmer 2016a) or make references to the racial diversity of evangelicals in the USA (Bailey 2016b, Boorstein 2016b, Echavarri 2016, Martin 2016, Golshan 2016). However, the majority of coverage continued to frame evangelicals as one unified group to be counted, analyzed and understood in relation to their support for Republican candidates over the last four decades without ever fully outlining who is and is not an evangelical in media usage of the term. News media employed the culture war narrative to also depict the evangelical vote as homogenous. Within this narrative, evangelicals vote unanimously for candidates who uphold their values of morality, most often depicted in culture war terms – pro-life, marriage is between a man and woman, traditional gender roles, religious freedom, and a religiously informed lifestyle. Evangelical support of Trump in 2016 confused the media because his life seemed to contradict everything the supposed values voter wanted. The Washington Post, Vox and NPR repeatedly expressed this surprise by placing the following introductory phrase in multiple stories about the evangelical vote: “Trump, a twice-divorced, casino mogul” (Boorstein 2016a, Lehmann 2016, Zauzmer 2016b), placing his lifestyle as counter to that of his religious supporters. This idea of the values voter not actually voting for a candidate with morals shows up in various stories throughout 2016. A few headlines highlight that evangelicals appear to now be willing to elect someone who has committed “immoral acts” (Bailey 2016a, Kurtzleben 2016a), implying that this has never been the case before. It was beyond comprehension, according to media framing, that religious individuals could support a seemingly immoral man. Yet, sound bites and quotations from self-identifying evangelicals reveal that values voters do not necessarily vote the same way. Russell Moore, Pastor Max Lucado and others do reinforce the media’s narrative by agreeing that Trump “is without a moral core,” and they will not vote for him (Gjelten 2016). Other evangelicals challenge the media frame. Falwell told reporters, “We’re not electing a pastor; we’re electing a president” (Kurtzleben 2016b). Robert Jeffress, a Texan pastor, pointed out that evangelicals voted for Reagan who was a Hollywood divorcé, saying, “by voting for a candidate, they’re not endorsing a particular lifestyle” (Young 2016). What mattered to these evangelical voters were the policy promises that Trump made. Ralph Reed, co-founder of the Christian Coalition in 1980, stated: But the reality is…that the roughly one out of every four voters that are conservative people of faith are voting on issues like who will protect unborn life, who’s going to defend religious freedom, who’s going to appoint conservative judges. (Simon 2016) The issues that Reed highlights support the media’s culture war narrative, but also correct the commonly held notion that these values must also be a part of a candidate’s lifestyle. 175

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Once again, though, the news coverage of the evangelical vote takes explanations of longexisting political differences from self-identifying evangelicals and places them in a dominant narrative – evangelicals, a once unified group, now divided over Trump. Just as with evangelical corrections of history, the media would nod to the non-monolithic state of the evangelical vote, but continue to depict the 2016 election in terms of evangelical conflict. By the end of the election, news media did begin to qualify their use of evangelical by referring to the white evangelical vote and noting the political differences of Latino and African American evangelicals (Bailey 2016b, 2016c, Boorstein 2016b, Echavarri 2016, Martin 2016). However, employing the term evangelical and reporting on an evangelical vote, white or not, overlooks the history and divisions that have always been within the population. Covering an evangelical vote, especially after the 2016 election, reinforces old narratives about religion and politics that have not necessarily been true and definitely do not apply to the current US evangelical landscape. Rather than interrogate the ever-existing differences among US evangelicals, news media stuck with a narrative begun in 1980 about a homogenous evangelical voting bloc situated within the context of a fundamentalist-modernist culture war. Reiterating the fundamentalist-modernist narrative reproduces cultural and political divides as binary when, in fact, they are multifaceted. Providing a more historically contextualized and nuanced approach to the evangelical vote ensures that news media live up to their role as educating and protecting democratic society.

#TakeAKnee In the NFL pre-season games of August 2016, quarterback Colin Kaepernick took a knee during the national anthem to protest police violence and racial inequality in the USA. This silent protest evaded the attention of the public for a few games, but eventually became headline news on sports pages and beyond. When the nation did take notice, emotional cries of support and disgust circulated in opinion columns, social media and news broadcasts. Kaepernick was either a “voice for the voiceless” (Maaddi 2017) and using the platform of football for social justice or he was “anti-American” (Staff Writer 2016b) and disrespectful (Davis 2017). Kaepernick’s protest in the hands of news media and the opinions of the public quickly spun into a debate about the US flag, patriotism and respect for the nation. Comments from President Trump in fall of 2017 fueled the polarized stances on what has become known as the #TakeAKnee protests. Trump’s tweets declaring the protest disrespectful to the country, flag, and national anthem, while calling for kneeling players to be fired, reinvigorated public discussion in the news (Staff Writer 2016a, Davis 2017, Zeller 2017). Was kneeling disrespectful? Could a black athlete be patriotic and draw attention to national sins? Moreover, why were opinions over the flag and national anthem so polarized? Based on the analysis of 33 articles, this case study examines news stories and opinion columns about the #TakeAKnee protests from Fox News, The New York Times, The Washington Post, Religion Dispatches and Religion News Service. Studying the language used in these pieces demonstrates: first, how media coverage of the opposing views struggled to find the reason for the nation’s division over the protests and second, how American civil religion can provide journalists with a more nuanced reading of the situation that positions the conflict as one of religious expression and within the context of a larger conversation about US identity. News coverage attempted to explain why the act of kneeling during the national anthem brought out such emotionally heightened responses from NFL fans, the president and the football-illiterate alike. The Washington Post and The New York Times positioned #TakeAKnee in terms of on-going racial politics, highlighting that Martin Luther King, Jr. and other 176

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Civil Rights activists kneeled in the 1960s (Wang 2017). News outlets also noted that football and politics, especially racial politics, have long been intertwined, referencing the delayed desegregation of the sport in the 1970s (Freedman 2017a, 2017b). Other news media, including Fox News, noted that there exists a long history of athletes protesting during the national anthem, such as on the Olympic medal podium in 1968 (Carbone 2017). Supporters of #TakeAKnee looked to religion and the role of faith in social justice to explain and defend Kaepernick’s and other players’ actions. Quiros, writing for The Washington Post, called kneeling “a protest steeped in religion,” tying #TakeAKnee to the religiously motivated Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee’s (SNCC) protests aimed at desegregating churches (Quiros 2017). A few authors noted that kneeling is a religious act in the USA and, therefore, could not be disrespectful (Denker 2017, Maaddi 2017). Frost (2017) also called out the hypocrisy around the act of kneeling in the NFL, since Tim Tebow’s famous kneel to pray on the field has been deemed acceptable practice, while Kaepernick’s similar, silent kneeling pose is referred to as disrespectful and out of place in football. However, another form of religion can actually clarify the on-going debate about the respect and patriotism of #TakeAKnee – American civil religion. As a national system of symbols that inform the nation’s understanding of itself and its citizens, American civil religion fuels nationalistic and patriotic attachment to the USA. In fact, the reason Trump’s comments resonated so well with a part of the US population is because the protest touches upon a conflict over the appropriate way to partake in civil-religious rituals. Civil religion’s “beliefs, symbols, [myths], and rituals,” inform proper behavior toward and treatment of sacred objects (Bellah 1967, 42). Most news media were unable to appropriately integrate this precipitating source of conflict in #TakeAKnee because they may be unaware of American civil religion since it has primarily been a scholastic term. Multiple outlets do discuss nationalism or patriotism, but do not interrogate the underlying cause for such divergent opinions about national love and pride. For instance, some understood Kaepernick kneeling as “boldly thumbing his nose” at the American flag (Erickson 2016), while others recognized that #TakeAKnee is patriotic because it exemplifies free speech and calls the nation to live up to its principles (Hauser 2016, Robinson 2016, Winters 2016, Denker 2017). Yet, such views are never contextualized within the larger metanarrative about how we understand the place of the USA in history as outlined in American civil religion. In a rare exception, a New York Times forum entitled “Americans and Their Flag” ( Jones 2016, Leepson 2016, Miller-Idriss 2016, Robinson 2016) alluded to the idea of American civil religion without ever naming it. Each respondent noted the sacred nature of the US flag and the national anthem, explaining that these national symbols convey “meaning about the nation’s history, myths and ideals” (Miller-Idriss 2016). Yet, the meaning of the symbols and how they should be treated is, like the larger #TakeAKnee debate, disputed. Jones, a veteran, writes, “The flag is sacred to me – not because it represents the service members I know who died, but because it represents the values they died to defend” ( Jones 2016). Leepson sees the protest as disrespectful because it challenges the “near religious fervor” (Leepson 2016) accorded to the flag. Miller-Idriss (2016), on the other hand, believes that true respect of the symbols emerges from engaging in debate and discussion. She explains, It is precisely because they carry meaning, values and ideals that national symbols are important spaces for debate and transformation…so the best way to respect a national symbol is to embrace the moments when symbols force us to re-evaluate the meaning of being American. (Miller-Idriss 2016). 177

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While numerous folks recognize the religious emotion attached to American symbols, as the forum demonstrates, the implications are less clear in news media. Borden rightly observes that “the United States was not created on a common platform of religion or ancestry” ( Borden 2016) and requires some other overarching idea to unify the nation. Bellah proposed American civil religion as the unifying belief system given that it provides a system of “beliefs, symbols, [myths], and rituals” (Bellah 1967, 42) and situates American history and destiny “in the light of ultimate and universal reality” (Bellah 1967, 54). What American civil religion implies, then, is that nationalism, patriotism and religious fervor for national symbols are embedded within a larger belief system than we realize. To treat nationalism and patriotism as expressions of American civil religion reveals another layer to the #TakeAKnee controversy. Zeller (2016) and Campbell (2016) both recognize this missing piece of the #TakeAKnee debate. As demonstrated, journalists and news media attempted to address the religious sentiment affiliated with national symbols through the language of nationalism and patriotism. However, these stories only use the language of religion to explain the emotions in what is framed as a secular debate, but fail to fully engage with the religious layer. In engaging the civil-religious nuances of #TakeAKnee, we can better understand that the emotions of the debate are a response to different notions of sacrality by reading the protests as transgressions of the sacred. Those commentators who find #TakeAKnee disrespectful and upsetting view the objects of the flag and the national anthem as sacred unto themselves. As the holder of the past, present and future of the USA, the material object needs to be respected. To protest against the objects is transgressive of their sacrality. For those who support #TakeAKnee, the principles and the ideals behind the objects are what is sacred. The objects serve as physical reminders of the sacred ideas, but do not always convey the sacred meaning. Kaepernick states as much in his justification for kneeling, targeting what he thinks the flag is supposed to symbolize, such as freedom, liberty, and justice: “When I feel like the flag is representing what it’s supposed to represent, I’ll stand” (Smith 2018). Thus, the protest does not transgress the objects to violate them, but to illuminate the sacred meaning that they should hold has been lost. The underlying conflict to the #TakeAKnee debate, then, is not who is and is not a patriot, but the very definition of patriotism as the faithful expression of American civil religion. In emotionally arguing over the meaning and treatment of national symbols, residents of the US debate the foundation of the religious sentiment that aims to unify a diverse nation. Instead of reading #TakeAKnee protests as a threat to US identity or as disrespectful, American civil religion allows for journalism to analyze the debate in the context of any other religion – the (re)reading of scripture and (re)formulating of ritual. Incorporating an American civil religion lens in the media, therefore, provides journalists with another layer of analysis and allows them to further inform the public about itself, its nation, and its ideals – furthering journalism’s aim to uphold a well-informed democracy. The addition of American civil religion into the media, especially in the case of #TakeAKnee, could minimize conflict by revealing the underlying motivations for divergent opinions. Rather than fuel conflict, news media could progress public understanding.

Conclusion The two case studies presented in this chapter demonstrate how news media in the USA perpetuate conflict by reinforcing narratives about religion in politics that highlight divisions and overlook underlying causes. By contextualizing observations about religion and politics within historical precedent and ideological trends, journalism can reveal how seemingly large and society shifting changes in US religion are not actually cause for conflict and polarization. Instead, examples like the split in the evangelical vote or the #TakeAKnee protests are events 178

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informed by metanarratives like the fundamentalist-modernist culture wars and American civil religion that either create conflict where it need not exist or provide clarity to the primary issue. Journalism’s treatment of religion does aim to illuminate and to clarify the on-going power of religion in American society in spite of beliefs about secularization. Hopefully, continued attention will be given to religion in politics in the USA, but in order for it to not perpetuate misunderstandings that fuel conflict, news media need a more nuanced treatment. Religion and politics in the USA are not just about one religious group’s views about the culture wars, and it is not possible to treat similarly voting believers as monolith. Similarly, attention needs to be given to the religious dimensions of nationalism and patriotism to illuminate the motivating factors in the emotionally driven debates over the state of the nation, especially in the Make America Great Again era. However, the current state of journalism in the USA makes such practices unlikely. Newspaper staffs continue to be reduced, local news programming is disappearing and digital-native news platforms, such as Vox, wrestle with similar revenue issues as legacy media (Lynch 2014). The rocky transition to a digital-first approach to journalism appears to be bearing fruit. Legacy papers have increased digital subscriptions, broadcast media appears to being doing well, and digital-native platforms are expanding (Daly 2018). State of the News Media reports from Pew Forum (2017) however, suggest audience numbers may be dropping. One explanation – US trust in the media is at a low. Recent polls reveal that trust in news media has eroded significantly since 2003. A Gallup study in 2016 showed that only 32% of US residents have a “great deal or a fair amount of trust in the media” (Swift 2016). Although this percentage rose to 41% in 2017 (Ingram 2018, Knight Foundation 2018), less than half the US public believe news media to be accurate coverage of socio-political issues and events. These findings do not come as a surprise at a time when leaders perpetuate distrust by calling journalism fake news and social media users learn their information has been employed to manipulate them, such as in the Cambridge Analytica case (Granville 2018, Ingram 2018). Between the financial troubles of news media and the unending efforts to try and restore trust in journalism, religion coverage is not a priority. Reporting on religion and politics will most likely shift to political desks with journalists who may not have detailed knowledge of religions such as God Beat reporters possess. The future of religion journalism in the USA possibly lies with niche, non-profit outlets, such as Religion Dispatches and Religion News Service. However, these media are not without their own funding, editorial and staffing concerns. At a time when the media horizon continues to seem bleak, it may seem overwhelming to ask religion coverage to be more aware of problematic framing and detailed in contextualizing events. Yet, reporting on religion in US politics remains crucial, whether it is increasing awareness about religion’s role in current racial tensions, unmasking the prosperity gospel or exploring the disaffiliation movement. As The Washington Post’s masthead reads, “Democracy Dies in Darkness” and when polarization in the USA seems to be at a high, it is important to understand how the media can shift narratives that shape awareness about issues and events to not perpetuate conflict.

Notes 1 It should be noted that the separation of Church and State does not equal the separation of religion and politics. Jefferson’s letter to the Danbury Baptist Church, in which he spoke of a “wall of separation,” refers to the institutions of religion and government rather than their ideologies and moralities. Religion, as such, is not excluded from the political realm as long as the institutional powers of faith systems do not inform governmental rule – “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion” (Constitution of the United States).

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Religion and politics in American news media Bailey, S. P., 2016c. White Evangelicals Voted Overwhelmingly for Donald Trump, Exit Polls Show. The Washington Post, 9 November. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-offaith/wp/2016/11/09/exit-polls-show-white-evangelicals-voted-overwhelmingly-for-donaldtrump/?utm_term=.b2d2f8582dea, accessed 5 December 2018. Bellah, R., 1967. Civil Religion in America. Daedalus, 134(4), 40–55. Berger, P., 1967. The Sacred Canopy. New York: Anchor Books. Berger, P., 1996. Secularism in Retreat. The National Interest, 1 December. Available at https:// nationalinterest.org/article/secularism-in-retreat-336, accessed 20 December 2018. Bever, L., 2016. Franklin Graham: The Media Didn’t Understand the “God-factor” in Trump’s Win. The Washington Post, 10 November. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/actsof-faith/wp/2016/11/10/franklin-graham-the-media-didnt-understand-the-god-factor/?utm_ term=.9f87e8f4b354, accessed 5 December 2018. Booker, B., 2016. Evangelical Gathering a Sign Conservative Christians Slow to Embrace Trump. NPR, 10 September. Available at https://www.npr.org/2016/09/10/493399755/conservativechristians-slow-to-embrace-trump, accessed 5 December 2018. Boorstein, M., 2016a. Why Donald Trump Is Tearing Evangelicals Apart. The Washington Post, 15 March. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2016/03/15/evangelicalchristians-are-enormously-divided-over-donald-trumps-runaway-candidacy/?utm_term=. d4f230aa7603, accessed 5 December 2018. Boorstein, M., 2016b. For Evangelicals, the Question Has Become: Which Is a Worse Sin, Abortion or Racism. The Washington Post, 27 June. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ acts-of-faith/wp/2016/06/27/for-evangelicals-the-question-has-become-which-is-a-worse-sinabortion-or-racism/?utm_term=.5ca0f43565d5, accessed 5 December 2018. Boorstein, M., 2016c. Why Donald Trump Is Tearing Evangelicals Apart. The Washington Post, 15 March. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2016/03/15/evangelicalchristians-are-enormously-divided-over-donald-trumps-runaway-candidacy/?utm_term=.c4aa2de93c27, accessed 20 June 2018. Borden, S., 2016. Colin Kaepernick’s Anthem Protest Underlines Union of Sports and Patriotism. The New York Times, 30 August. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/31/sports/football/ colin-kaepernicks-anthem-protest-underlines-union-of-sports-and-patriotism.html, accessed 20 November 2018. Brint, S. and Schroedel, J. R., 2009. Introduction. In: Brint, S. and Schroedel, J. R., eds. Evangelicals and Democracy in America, Volume II. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1–21. Burke, D., 2016. The Guilt-free Gospel of Donald Trump. CNN, 24 October. Available at https://www. cnn.com/2016/10/21/politics/trump-religion-gospel/index.html, accessed 5 December 2018. Campbell, D. E., ed., 2007. A Matter of Faith: Religion in the 2004 Presidential Election. Washington: Brookings Institution Press. Campbell, D. A., 2016. Kaepernick’s Protest: Revealing the Sacred Materiality of Patriotism. Third Spaces Blog, [blog] 10 September. Available at https://thirdspacesblog.com/2016/09/10/kaepernicks-protestrevealing-the-sacred-materiality-of-patriotism/, accessed 15 December 2018. Carbone, C., 2017. Colin Kaepernick and the History of National Anthem Protests. Fox News, 3 October. Available at https://www.foxnews.com/us/colin-kaepernick-and-the-history-of-national-anthemprotests, accessed 20 November 2018. Casanova, J., 1994. Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Chang, A., 2016. Donald Trump’s Poll Numbers Show a Big Divide between Christians and Churchgoing Christians. Vox, 7 March. Available at https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2016/3/7/11174064/do-christians-really-favor-trump, accessed 5 December 2018. Cherry, C., ed., 1998. God’s New Israel. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. Cornish, A., 2016. Why Do Evangelicals Support Donald Trump? A Pastor Explains. NPR, [radio] 25 February. Available at https://www.npr.org/2016/02/25/468149440/why-do-evangelicalssupport-donald-trump-a-pastor-explains, accessed 5 December 2018. Daly, C. B., 2018. Journalism Isn’t Dying. But It Is Changing in Ominous Ways. The Washington Post, 31 July. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/07/31/ journalism-isnt-dying-but-it-is-changing-in-ominous-ways/?utm_term=.4fd2215241d5, accessed 28 December 2018. Davis, J. H., 2017. Trump Calls For Boycott If NFL Doesn’t Crack Down on Anthem Protests. The New York Times, 24 September. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/24/us/politics/

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D. Ashley Campbell trump-calls-for-boycott-if-nfl-doesnt-crack-down-on-anthem-protests.html, accessed 21 November 2018. Denker, A., 2017. Colin Kaepernick and the Powerful, Religious Act of Kneeling. The Washington Post, 24 September. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2017/09/24/ colin-kaepernick-and-the-powerful-religious-act-of-kneeling/?utm_term=.cbd6ff b89481, accessed 20 November 2018. De Tocqueville, A., 1835. Democracy in America. Translated from French by H. C. Mansfield and D. Winthrop, 2000. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Diamond, S, 1995. Roads to Dominion. New York: The Guilford Press. Durkheim, E., 1912. Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Translated from French by K. Fields, 1995. New York: The Free Press. Echavarri, F., 2016. Latino Evangelicals are the Ultimate Swing Voters that Could Tip Florida’s Scales. NPR, [radio] 6 November. Available at https://www.npr.org/2016/11/06/500898865/latinoevangelicals-are-the-quintessential-swing-voters-that-could-tip-florida-s, accessed 5 December 2018. Erickson, S. G., 2016. NFL’s Kaepernick Insults Americans, Law Enforcement Officers Everywhere. Fox News, 29 August. Available at https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/nfls-kaepernick-insultsamericans-law-enforcement-officers-everywhere, accessed on 20 November 2018. Falwell, J., 1987. An Agenda for the 1980s. In: Neuhaus, R. J. and Cromartie, M., eds. Piety and Politics. Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 109–124. Freedman, S. G., 2017a. The Quarterback Who Paved the Way for Colin Kaepernick’s protests. The Washington Post, 2 February. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/ wp/2018/02/02/the-quarterback-who-paved-the-way-for-colin-kaepernicks-protests/? utm_ term=.67935a770e30, accessed 20 November 2018. Freedman, S. G., 2017b. Opinion: Politics Has Always Had a Place in Football. The New York Times, 24 September. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/24/opinion/football-nfl-take-theknee-trump.html, accessed 20 November 2018. Frost, M., 2017. Colin Kaepernick vs. Tim Tebow: A Take of Two Christians on their Knees. The Washington Post, 24 September. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/ wp/2017/09/24/colin-kaepernick-vs-tim-tebow-a-tale-of-two-christianities-on-its-knees/?utm_ term=.688bc1cd15dc, accessed 20 November 2018. Gabriel, T. and Luo, M., 2016. A Born-Again Donald Trump? Believe It, Evangelical Leader Says. The New York Times, 25 June. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/us/politics/a-bornagain-donald-trump-believe-it-evangelical-leader-says.html, accessed 5 December 2018. Geertz, G., 1973. The Interpretations of Culture. New York: Basic Books. Gerson, M. J., 2009. Foreward. In: Marshall, P., Gilbert, L. and Ahmanson, R. G., eds. Blind Spot: When Journalists Don’t Get Religion. New York: Oxford University Press, xvii–xx. Gjelten, T., 2016. As Trump Defies Expectations of Faith, Might We Be Entering a New Era. NPR, 26 June. Available at https://www.npr.org/2016/06/26/483506379/as-trump-defies-expectationsof-faith-might-we-be-entering-a-new-era, accessed 5 December 2018. Golshan, T., 2016. Of course Donald Trump Got Into a Holy War with the Pope – and Could Win. Vox, 18 February. Available at https://www.vox.com/2016/2/18/11055338/pope-trump-support, accessed 5 December 2018. Gordon, S. B., 2002. The Mormon Question. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. Granville, K., 2018. Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need to Know as Fallout Widens. The New York Times, 19 March. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/ facebook-cambridge-analytica-explained.html, accessed 1 February 2019. Hall, D. D., 1997. Introduction. In: Hall, D. D., ed. Lived Religion in America: Toward a History of Practice. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Harding, S. F., 2000. The Book of Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist Language and Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hauser, C., 2016. Why Colin Kaepernick Didn’t Stand for the National Anthem. The New York Times, 27 August. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/28/sports/football/colin-kaepernicknational-anthem-49ers-stand.html, accessed 21 November 2018. Haws, J. B., 2013. The Mormon Image in the American Mind. New York: Oxford University Press. Hoover, S., 1998. Religion in the News: Faith and Journalism in American Public Discourse. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications. Hoover, S., 2006. Religion in the Media Age. New York: Routledge.

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Religion and politics in American news media Hoover, S., 2012. Quantity, Quality, and Religion in the News Since 9/11. In: Winston, D., ed. The Oxford Handbook on Religion and the American News Media. New York: Oxford University Press, 81–93. Ingram, M., 2018. Most Americans Say they have Lost Trust in the Media. Columbia Journalism Review, 12 September. Available at https://www.cjr.org/the_media_today/trust-in-media-down.php, accessed 20 December 2018. Inskeep, S., 2016. Ted Cruz Delegate Will Loyally Favor Trump; Falwell on Why he Backs Trump. NPR, [radio] 21 July. Available at https://www.npr.org/2016/07/21/486854408/political-starpower-comes-out-for-day-3-of-the-republican-convention, accessed 5 December 2018. Jones, B. A., 2016. I Fought to Defend Colin Kaepernick’s Actions. The New York Times, 1 September. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/09/01/americans-and-their-flag/ifought-to-defend-colin-kaepernicks-actions, accessed 20 November 2018. Knight Foundation, 2018. Indicators of News Media Trust. Knight Foundation, 11 September. Available at https://www.knightfoundation.org/reports/indicators-of-news-media-trust, accessed 30 December 2018. Kurtzleben, D., 2016a. ‘I’m Not Electing A Pastor in Chief ’ – How Iowa’s Evangelicals are Deciding. NPR, [radio] 31 January. Available at https://www.npr.org/2016/01/31/465047357/i-m-notelecting-a-pastor-in-chief-how-iowa-s-evangelicals-are-deciding, accessed 5 December 2018. Kurtzleben, D., 2016b. POLL: White Evangelicals Have Warmed to Politicians Who Commit “Immoral” Acts. NPR, [radio] 23 October. Available at https://www.npr.org/2016/10/23/498890836/poll-whiteevangelicals-have-warmed-to-politicians-who-commit-immoral-acts, accessed 5 December 2018. Larson, E. J., 1997. Summer for the Gods: The Scopes Trial and America’s Continuing Debate over Science and Religion. New York: Basic Books. Leepson, M., 2016. Don’t Mess with the Stars and Stripes. The New York Times, 1 September. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/09/01/americans-and-their-flag/dont-mess­­ with-the-stars-and-stripes-2, accessed 5 December 2018. Lynch, D., 2014. Above and Beyond: Looking at the Future of Journalism Education. Knight Foundation. Available at https://knightfoundation.org/features/journalism-education, accessed 23 December 2018. Maaddi, R., 2017. Christian Players Frustrated by Criticism for Anthem Protests. Religion News Service, 4 November. Available at https://religionnews.com/2017/11/14/christian-players-frustrated-bycriticism-for-anthem-protest/, accessed 21 November 2018. Manuel, D., 1980. The Gathering. Massachusetts: Rock Harbor Press. Markoe, L. and Grossman, C. L., 2014. Supreme Court Approves Sectarian Prayer at Public Meetings. Religion News Service, 5 May. Available at https://religionnews.com/2014/05/05/supreme-courtapproves-sectarian-prayer-public-meetings/, accessed 20 December 2018. Martin, R., 2016. Trump Election Reveals Fractures Among Diverse Evangelicals. NPR, [radio] 13 November. Available at https://www.npr.org/2016/11/13/501904202/trump-election-revealeddivision-among-evangelicals, accessed 5 December 2018. Masci, D., 2014a. Conflicts Continue Over Nativity Scenes on Public Property. Pew Research Center, [online] 15 December. Available at http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/15/conflictscontinue-over-nativity-scenes-on-public-property/, accessed 20 December 2018. Masci, D., 2014b. The “Christmas Wars”: Holiday Displays and the Federal Courts. Pew Research Center, 12 December. Available at http://www.pewforum.org/2006/12/12/the-christmas-warsholiday-displays-and-the-federal-courts/, accessed 20 December 2018. Mattingly, T., 2009. Getting Religion in the Newsroom. In: Marshall, P., Gilbert, L. and Ahmanson, R. G., eds. Blind Spot: When Journalists Don’t Get Religion. New York: Oxford University Press, 145–158. Mattingly, T., 2014. 10 Years at Get Religion: Why We are Still Here (Refreshed). Get Religion, 5 August. Available at https://www.getreligion.org/getreligion/2014/8/10-years-at-getreligionwhy-we-are-here-refreshed, accessed 15 December 2018. McCammon, S., 2016. Many Evangelicals are in “An Awkward Place” with Trump Atop GOP. NPR, [radio] 16 May. Available at https://www.npr.org/2016/05/16/478176365/many-evangelicals- arein-an-awkward-place-with-trump-atop-gop, accessed 5 December 2018. Miller, S. P., 2009. Billy Graham and the Rise of the Republican South. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Miller-Idriss, C., 2016. The Emotional Attachment of National Symbols. The New York Times, 1  September. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/09/01/americans-andtheir-flag/the-emotional-attachment-of-national-symbols, accessed 21 November 2018.

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D. Ashley Campbell Moran, J. P., 2002. The Scopes Trial: A Brief History with Documents. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s. Neary, L., 2016. With Cruz Out, Will Donald Trump Be Able to Capture Republican Evangelical Vote. NPR, [radio] 7 May. Available at https://www.npr.org/2016/05/07/477141237/with- cruzout-will-donald-trump-be-able-to-capture-republican-evangelical-vote, accessed 5 December 2018. Pew Research Center, 2017. State of the News Media. Pew Research Center. Available at http://www. pewresearch.org/topics/state-of-the-news-media/, accessed 23 December 2018. Prokop, A., 2016. Why Donald Trump and Ted Cruz’s Battle for Iowa Is So Important. Vox, [online] 14 January. Available at https://www.vox.com/2016/1/14/10764386/donald-trump-ted-cruzpolls-iowa, accessed 5 December 2018. Quiros, A. L., 2017. Kneeling During the National Anthem Isn’t Disrespectful. It’s a Protest Steeped in Religion. The Washington Post, 29 May. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ made-by-history/wp/2018/05/29/kneeling-during-the-national-anthem-isnt-disrespectful-its-aprotest-steeped-in-religion/?utm_term=.522b8a7f8da6, accessed 20 November 2018. Religion News Association, 2019. Religion Stylebook. Religion Link. Available at http://www.religionstylebook.com/entries/letter/r, accessed 09 November 2019. Robinson, R., 2016. Colin Kaepernick’s Actions Show That Symbols Pledge Allegiance to Principles. The New York Times 1 September. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/09/01/ americans-and-their-flag/colin-kaepernicks-actions-show-that- symbols-pledge-allegiance-toprinciples, accessed 20 November 2018. Silk, M., 2012. Religion and Politics in Print. In: Winston, D., ed. The Oxford Handbook on Religion and the American News Media. New York: Oxford University Press, 319–331. Simon, S., 2016. Faith Leaders are Still Backing Trump in the Wake of His Lewd Comments About Women. NPR, [radio] 8 October. Available at https://www.npr.org/2016/10/08/497164715/faith-leaders-arestill-backing-trump-in-the-wake-of-his-lewd-comments-about-wom, accessed 4 December 2018. Smith, J. Z., 1998. Religion, Religions, Religious. In: Taylor, M. C., ed. Critical Terms for Religious Studies. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 269–284. Smith, M. D., 2018. Colin Kaepernick’s Protest Might Be Unpatriotic. And that’s Just Fine. The Guardian, 12 September. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/sep/12/ colin-kaepernicks-protest-unpatriotic-justice, accessed 20 November 2018. Staff Writer, 2016a. Trump Calls Kaepernick’s Refusal to Stand for National Anthem “terrible.” Fox News, 20 August. Available at https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-calls-kaepernicksrefusal-to-stand-for-national-anthem-terrible, accessed 10 December 2018. Staff Writer, 2016b. Kaepernick Kneels for National Anthem to Continue Protest. Fox News Insider, 1 September. Available at http://insider.foxnews.com/2016/09/01/kaepernick-refuses-standnational-anthem-2nd-straight-game, accessed 20 November 2018. Swift, A., 2016. Americans’ Trust in Mass Media Sinks to New Low. Gallup, 14 September. Available at https://news.gallup.com/poll/195542/americans-trust-mass-media-sinks-new-low.aspx, accessed 20 December 2018. Summers, J., 2016. Is Donald Trump Really a Christian? What We Know About His Faith. Mashable, 18 February. Available at https://mashable.com/2016/02/18/donald-trump-christianreligion/#GsmRUNthDgqX, accessed 20 December 2018. Sutton, M. A., 2013. Jerry Falwell and the Rise of the Religious Right. Boston: Bedford/St Martin’s. Taylor, J., 2015. True Believer? Why Donald Trump Is the Choice of the Religious Right. NPR, [radio] 13 September. Available at https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/09/13/439833719/ true-believer-why-donald-trump-is-the-choice-of-the-religious-right, accessed on 5 December 2018. Taylor, J., 2016a. Trump Nabs Endorsement of a Top Evangelical Leader. NPR, [radio] 26 January. Available at https://www.npr.org/2016/01/26/464435834/trump-nabs-endorsement-of-top-evangelicalleader, accessed 5 December 2018. Taylor, J., 2016b. 4 Takeaways from South Carolina and Nevada. NPR, [radio] 21 February. Available at https://www.npr.org/2016/02/21/467532479/4-takeaways-from-south-carolina-and-nevada, accessed 5 December 2018. Turner, J. G., 2012. Mitt Romney’s Mormon Religion a Non-issue During the 2012 Presidential Election. The Washington Post, 3 October. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/mitt-romneysmormon-religion-a-non-issue-during-the-2012-presidential-election/2012/10/03/2b067322-0d7f11e2-a310-2363842b7057_story.html?utm_term=.a9d389d31866, accessed 15 December 2018.

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Religion and politics in American news media Underwood, D., 2002. From Yahweh to Yahoo: The Religious Roots of the Secular Press. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Wang, A. B., 2017. Amid Trump’s NFL War, Photos of Martin Luther King Jr. “taking a knee” Resurface. The Washington Post, 24 September. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/ news/retropolis/wp/2017/09/24/amid-trumps-nfl-war-photos-of-martin-luther-king-jr-takinga-knee-resurface/?utm_term=.358d0a2d12b0, accessed 21 November 2018. Wilkinson, A., 2016. Mike Pence’s Church Pitch, the Johson Amendment, and the Decline of the Religious Right. Vox, 7 November. Available at https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2016/11/7/13546186/johnson-amendment-mike-pence-donald-trump-evangelicalsreligious-right-moral-majority, accessed 5 December 2018. Winston, D., 2007. Religion, Politics, and the Media. American Quarterly, 59(3), 969–989. Winston, D., 2012. “Mapping the Royal Road”: An Introduction to the Oxford Handbook on Religion and the American News Media. In: Winston, D., ed. The Oxford Handbook on Religion and the American News Media. New York: Oxford University Press, 3–20. Winters, J., 2016. How Protesting Black Bodies are Imagined as a Threat to National Pride. Religion Dispatches, 22 September. Available at http://religiondispatches.org/colin-kaepernick-and-theambivalent-sacred-black-bodies-as-an-imagined-source-of-disorder/, accessed 20 November 2018. Williams, D. K., 2010. God’s Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right. New York: Oxford University Press. Wolf, R., 2014. Supreme Court Upholds Prayer at Government Meetings. USA Today, 5 May. Available at https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/05/05/supreme-court-governmentprayer-new-york/4481969/, accessed 20 December 2018. Younge, G., 2012. Mitt Romney Embraces His Mormonism in Public After Years of Discretion. The Guardian, 27 August. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/27/mittromney-embrace-mormonism, accessed 20 December 2018. Young, R., 2016. Evangelical Pastor on Reactions to Trump’s Election Victory. Here and Now, NPR, [radio] 9 November. Available at https://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2016/11/09/evangelicalreactions-election, accessed 4 December 2018. Vinson, C. D. and Guth, J. L., 2009. “Misunderstanding” Religion in the 2004 Presidential Campaign. In: Marshall, P., Gilbert, L. and Ahmanson, R. G., eds. Blind Spot: When Journalists Don’t Get Religion. New York: Oxford University Press, 87–105. Zauzmer, J., 2016a. Who Said 2016 Was Unusual? For Religious Groups, It Looks Like 2012 All over Again. The Washington Post, 13 July. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts- offaith/wp/2016/07/13/who-said-2016-was-unusual-religious-groups-are-voting-the-same-waypoll-says/?utm_term=.35ad7fc0754a, accessed 5 December 2018. Zauzmer, J., 2016b. By Picking Mike Pence, Trump Sends Conservative Evangelicals a Mixed Message. The Washington Post, 15 July. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/ wp/2016/07/14/pence-defines-himself-as-a-christian-above-all-else-do-christians-want-h imfor-vp/?utm_term=.5ddf375f0ad4, accessed 5 December 2018. Zeller, B. E., 2016. Why Kaepernick’s Refusal to Stand Is an Act of Religious Dissent. Religion Dispatches, 31 August. Available at http://religiondispatches.org/why-kaepernicks-refusal-to-standwas-an-act-of-religious-dissent/, accessed 20 November 2018. Zeller, B. E., 2017. #TakeAKnee: Race and Religious Violence at the Heart of Trump Attacks on Kaepernick/NFL. Religion Dispatches, 25 September. Available at http://religiondispatches.org/ takeaknee-race-and-religious-violence-at-the-heart-of-trump-attacks-on-kaepernicknfl/, accessed 20 November 2018.

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13 MEDIA VISIBILITY OF RELIGION AND CONFLICT IN THE DIGITAL AGE Tanja Maier

Introduction Media are important to our understanding of religious conflicts. In the 21st century, religious violence and other religion-related terrorism and scandals have changed the way in which religion is viewed in Western societies. For instance, the conflicts in the Middle East, the bombings in London in 2005, the attack on the Berlin Christmas Market in 2016 in Europe and the Catholic Church sex abuse scandal have colored the way some people see religion. In a 2011 survey on American media reporting, the Pew Research Center stated: “When religion did make news, it was often because of accusations about extremism or intolerance” (Pew Research Center 2012, 1). The visibility of religion-related conflicts has led to questions regarding the role of the media in these conflicts. Consequently, a growing body of research has examined issues related to the media, religion and conflict in the digital age (e.g., Marsden and Savigny 2009a). At least in the German case, images have received little research attention. Overall, the research has focused on media content and texts. As a result, the so far existing research on journalism, religion and conflict has failed to examine the iconology, aesthetics and forms the visuals assume, as well as their modes of visibility. This chapter will use the German case to advance our understanding of (visual) journalism, religion and conflict in the digital age. Three aspects need to be explained briefly. First, following Marsden and Savigny (2009b), conflict can be defined as controversy within religions or between religions and other agents, and more broadly to refer to a struggle between opposing forces, ideas and interest[s] which may or may not lead to violence. This highlights the existence and significance of a sense of ‘otherness’. (Marsden and Savigny 2009b, 119) Second, this chapter concentrates on religion journalism (Buddenbaum 2010) from a secular perspective, specifically the journalistic reporting on religious groups, institutions, actors and practices. Third, the term visual journalism refers to news pictures but also includes popular journalism and its diverse pictorial forms (illustrations, drawings, film stills). The reference to art becomes particularly obvious with regard to religious themes. To date, however, the 186

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use of images in religion journalism has received little attention. Overall, journalism makes us see religious conflicts as fundamentally grounded in social, historic and economic cultural contexts. In this way, journalism construes a normative context using specific formal and aesthetic conventions, leading to the creation of visibility and invisibility. The remaining part of the chapter proceeds as follows: In the next section, I provide a research overview of journalism, religion and conflict, placing the German case in the context of other international research on the subject. Consequently, it becomes obvious that images play a minor role in this field of research. The following section maps out a case study. Through a qualitative analysis of print magazines, the case study examines the changing conventions of visibility in religious conflicts within the context of digitalization. Specifically, I consider the visualization of religious conflicts in the media. The central goal of this section is to explore the ways in which journalism makes us see religious conflicts in the digital age. I argue that the visibility of religious conflicts in the digital age requires new modes of visual media analysis that account for the aesthetic and form of (digitalized) images. Finally, the conclusion discusses the changing relationship between visual journalism, religion and social reality.

Research on journalism, religion and conflict The field of journalism and religion has received increased attention in international research since the 1990s (e.g., Winston 2012). In German-speaking countries, however, religion plays a rather marginal role in journalism studies and communication research. This lack of interest could be explained by the (assumption of ) low importance of religion in the German society. Indeed, it was supposed for a long time that religion plays a marginal role in German society and media culture. In Germany, an average of 250,000 people leave one of the two largest religious groups every year (for Catholic and Protestant churches, see Schieder and Meyer-Magister 2013). It is widely agreed among researchers that religious conflicts have played an important role in bringing the subject of religion back into public and academic debate (e.g., Ahmed and Matthes 2017). During the last twenty years, an increasing number of media and communication scholars have analyzed the intersection of religion and conflict in German media as well as the role of conflict in journalistic coverage. However, the connection between religion and conflict is not always the focus of the studies. In addition to communication and media studies, research on religion, conflict and violence takes place in other scientific disciplines, including (but not limited to) sociology, theology, religious studies, history and art history. In the following, the connection between journalism, religion and conflict will be discussed from a communication and media perspective.

Approaches to studying journalism, religion and conflict There are various studies on the importance of mass media in the production of publicity for religion-related topics addressing the question of how religious groups, actors and topics are selected and presented through journalism. Primarily, the frequency and intensity of reporting on religious topics and actors are discussed (e.g., Hafez 2002, Meier 2005, Imhof and Ettinger 2007). These studies often investigate the presence and representation of religions in news journalism through quantitative content analyses, sometimes adding qualitative aspects. When the studies are based on a theoretical framework, they primarily focus on news values (e.g., Schielicke 2014), frames (e.g., Bantimaroudis 2007) and stereotypes (e.g., Poole 2002, for an overview, see Thiele 2015, 201–235). 187

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As one long-term study on daily newspapers suggests, Christianity generally plays a more important role than other religions in German media, with the reporting often concentrating on conflicts in the Roman Catholic Church (Schielicke 2014). In the digital age, however, little media attention has been given to the representation of the Protestant Church in German media (Schielicke 2014). Islam is the religion that receives the second-most coverage, followed by Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduism. There is a consensus that, in German-speaking coverage of religion, conflict is an important news factor and a theme that is used to bring religion into the public sphere (e.g., Kolmer 2008). For example, Schielicke (2014) examines German newspapers between 1993 and 2009 and finds that conflicts play an increasingly important role in the reporting of religion over time. These results correspond to findings on media coverage in Switzerland (Imhof and Ettinger 2007, Dahinden and Koch 2011, Favre 2011, Trebbe 2011, Koch 2012) and other European countries (e.g., Macdonald-Radcliff and Schatz 2009, Nötzold 2009) and have been confirmed by interviews with journalists (for Germany, see Gärtner 2008, for Switzerland, see Dahinden and Wyss 2009, Wyss and Keel 2009). This line of research conceptualizes media representation as a result of journalism practices, explicitly or implicitly characterizing media as an intermediary to the public. There is obviously no simplifying instrumentalist understanding of media, but the underlying idea is often that religious conflicts exist in reality and these conflicts are presented selectively and stereotypically by journalists (e.g., based on news factors or frames). Thus, the media has not been sufficiently studied in terms of its constitutive and operative importance in communication, for example, with regard to media aesthetic and form (Tholen 2005, 150–151). Moreover, these approaches focusing on news selection and presentation sometimes overlook the symbolic and discursive aspects of media communication. Through journalism, the world is neither adequately or stereotypically reflected nor represented based on certain news values and selection criteria (Hall 1997). Adding a stronger discursive element to the analysis of journalism, religion and conflict opens up new perspectives on the subject. Understanding journalism as a mode of constructing social reality involves investigation of the media construction of religious conflicts and the political effects of journalism. Such approaches are interested not only in topics and content itself but also in the discursive formation of “making things mean” (Hall 1997, 24). Several studies have presented more discursive perspectives on journalism, religion and conflict in the digital age (e.g., Maier and Stegmann 2003, Klaus and Kassel 2005, Maier and Balz 2010, Døving 2012, Williamson 2014). Such studies are usually designed as case studies and focus on a particular religious community or a religion-related conflict (whereby other religious traditions are often taken into account). Next, different approaches will be presented while focusing on the findings related to three specific religious communities.

Focus on Islam, Judaism and Christianity Over the last twenty years, considerable research attention has been paid to Islam and Muslims in media coverage (e.g., for Germany see Hafez 2002, Hafez and Richter 2009, Karis 2014, for Switzerland see Koch 2012, for other European countries see Poole 2002, D’Haenens and Bink 2006, Knott and Poole 2013, for an international overview, see Ahmed and Matthes 2017). A number of studies have shown that German-speaking media outlets tend to report negatively on Islam and Muslims, typically in crisis- and conflict-oriented contexts (e.g., Hafez 2002, Hafez and Richter 2009, Karis 2014). Consequently, investigating the conflict-oriented framing of Islam and Muslims has become a key aspect in the study of 188

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journalism and religion. Most of the research in the European context supports the notion that Islam is often shown as a threatening and dangerous religion (for an overview, see Ahmed and Matthes 2017). There is also a large body of research on the stereotype of fanatical, radical and extremist Muslims in the German-speaking media, particularly mainstream print media and news television (for an overview, see Thiele 2015, 201–235). In gender media studies, recent research has generally focused on how Muslim women are portrayed in the German media. Besides their portrayal as extremists, Muslim women are stereotypically shown as victims of patriarchal Islam (e.g., Hübsch 2008). Moreover, feminist studies have shown that the representations of Muslim women and men are gendered. In German media discourse, stereotypes of the violent, tyrannical male Muslim are often opposed with images of the oppressed Muslim woman (e.g., Lünenborg, Fritsche and Bach 2011). A number of feminist researchers have explicitly dealt with journalistic photographs, for example, in war and terrorism reporting (e.g., Maier and Stegmann 2003, Maier and Balz 2010, Drüeke, Kirchhoff and Klaus 2012). These studies have concluded that the German media as legitimation for the war on terror used the unveiling of the Muslim woman in front of the camera. They also examined the binary construction of a backward and violent Islamic religion versus a forward-thinking and democratic Western culture. Another line of research focuses on specific conflict events and themes, for example, on the controversially received speech of the former German President Christian Wulff on Islam (Lünenborg and Maier 2017). In this discourse, Islam is not presented and visualized as an explicit threat to German society and Christian culture but rather as the other and the foreign in relation to German culture. This construction of a conflict between Islam and Christian and/ or Western culture is also confirmed by studies dealing with integration and migration (e.g., Lünenborg, Fritsche and Bach 2011, Drüeke, Kirchhoff and Klaus 2012, Lünenborg and Maier 2017) and war and terrorism (e.g., Maier and Stegmann 2003, Klaus and Kassel 2005, Maier and Balz 2010) in visual and textual media coverage. Most of the research based on discourse analysis and theory suggests that othering is an important construction in the media discourse on Islam and Muslims. Following Said’s (1978) criticism of Orientalism implicitly or explicitly, the concept of othering describes those processes in which the definition of one’s own culture and religion as a manifest cultural entity is created by contrasting it with otherness. This process is driven and constructed in a special way by journalism (for an overview, see Fürsich 2010). In sum, Ahmed and Matthes’ (2017) findings from a meta-analysis of international reporting on Islam and Muslims from 2000 to 2015 can similarly be applied to German reporting: The events of 9/11 had an effect on the Western world’s perception about Muslims and Islam. Post 9/11, the international media focused intensively on Muslims and Islam and the Middle East in particular. [...] Furthermore, the murder of Theo Van Gogh (2004) and the Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy (2005) raised the question of Muslim integration in non-Muslimmajority societies, while the bombings in Madrid (2004), London (2005), Toronto (2006), Mumbai (2006), and Glasgow (2007) highlighted the threat of Muslim extremism globally. Correspondingly, we found numerous studies to follow 9/11, migration, terrorism, and war themes. This thematic pattern of linking Muslims and Islam with terrorism, violence, and orthodox ideals, highlights the religion as a threat of a resurgent atavism, and calls to mind Said’s criticism of the media. (Ahmed and Matthes 2017, 235) However, there are also indications in academic research that the framing and discursive construction of Islam and Muslims is more complex. For example, more recent studies on 189

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German media coverage (e.g., Hübsch 2008, Lünenborg, Fritsche and Bach, 2011, Lünenborg and Maier 2017) suggest that Muslims are depicted in connection with positively connoted themes, such as everyday culture. This seems to be particularly evident with regard to regional reporting or popular journalism (Lünenborg, Fritsche and Bach 2011). Hübsch (2008, 59–105) found emancipation and commonalities frames in the German reporting on Islam and Muslims. These results challenge previous findings and suggest a transformation of religious stereotypes, frames and conflict-related discourses under specific circumstances. Judaism, conflict and journalism is a small field of research. Cohen’s (2014) research on Jews and Israel’s media is a vast study in this area. A number of scholars have conducted research on media representations of Judaism, generally focusing on anti-Semitism in the German news media. In the digital age, German media coverage of Judaism is often connected with the conflict in the Middle East and contains anti-Semitic criticism of Israel and Jews (e.g., Medien Tenor 2003, Kolmer and Schatz 2007, for the Norwegian press, see Døving 2016). This line of research on journalism and Judaism has established that German print and broadcasting media employ anti-Semitic stereotypes (for an overview, see Thiele 2015, 209–214) and anti-Semitic interpretations in their textual reporting (e.g., Jäger and Jäger 2003, Becker 2015, Giesel 2015). This strand of research on anti-Semitism is strongly influenced by textual analysis and linguistic approaches. A few studies have examined Christianity, conflict and journalism in the German and European contexts. This topic has been dealt with in more depth in the American context. One early study by Kerr and Moy (2002), for example, examined the portrayal of fundamentalist Christians since 1980 in newspapers, drawing on articles from Lexis-Nexis. In the European context, researchers have not given much attention to fundamentalist Christians, although one line of research has found that Christian religions in general are more frequently portrayed in relation to conflict issues in German media coverage (e.g., Hahn, Schüller and Wode 2013, Schielicke 2014, Maier 2019). As mentioned previously, Christianity generally plays a more important role than other religions in German media coverage and the reporting often concentrates on actors and conflicts in the Roman Catholic Church (e.g., Schielicke 2014, Maier 2019). This news-factor conflict can even be found in the coverage of global celebratory church events, such as the 20th World Youth Day in Cologne (2005). Even though the festival was mainly portrayed as peaceful and happy in the German press, the conflicts between church-related sexual morals and the actual practices of young people were also considered a relevant topic (Klenk 2006, 356). However, compared to national reporting, local press reports in Germany seem to be less conflict-oriented (Meier 2006). As Thiele (2015, 201–234) stated in a meta-analysis of religious stereotypes in the German-speaking media, there is a research gap related to the Christian religion in media and journalism studies. This was also the starting point of my previous work, in which I examined the transformation of Christian images in German print magazines between 1949 and today (Maier 2019). I focused not only on explicit religious coverage but also on nonreligious contexts, such as science and technology reporting, that invoked religious images. The study aimed to analyze the media conventions of visualizing Christian religions in German print magazines, where the focus was not explicitly on conflicts. However, an interesting side finding was that, due to digitalization, a new form of image developed within the discourses on religion and conflict: the hyperpicture. Next, I will discuss the hyperpictures in media discourse on religious conflicts and how they influence the picture of religious conflicts. First, however, I will briefly summarize the state of research on journalism, religion and conflict and identify a significant research gap: images and visibility. 190

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Looking at the German (and also the European) context, research on journalism, religion and conflict is mainly concentrated on newspapers and television, whereas print magazines (and their transformation due to digitalization) and digital media are less studied. To date, little attention has been paid to the broader changes in the reporting and visualization of religion and conflicts. In addition, the research mainly focuses on studies dedicated to media texts and textual practices, at least in the German case; visuals have received far less attention. The few studies that analyzed journalistic images focused mostly on news photography in reporting on Islam and Muslims and the construction of the other. Other pictorial genres and forms have rarely been analyzed. Overall, there is no explicit analysis of the connection between journalistic images and religious conflicts.

Making religious conflicts visible in print magazines: a case study In what follows, I use and extend material from my previous work (Maier 2019) in examining how the topic of religious conflicts is visualized in German print media in the digital age. In this subchapter, I draw on and extend findings related to the coverage of religion in German print magazines to highlight how religious conflicts are made visible in the digital age. The theoretical framework of the case study is mainly based on journalism studies, visual communication studies, cultural studies and digital studies. Current debates on media and journalistic images in the digital age emphasize technological innovations in digital imagery and new media technologies (e.g., Manovich 2001, Ritchin 2013, Gómez Cruz and Lehmuskallio 2016). However, current research on digitalization in visual journalism and media studies tends to overlook the fact that analogue media and their images also changed in the course of digitalization. According to Bolter and Grusin (2000), digital media do not differ fundamentally from so-called older media. Digital media integrate and repeat the aesthetical and cultural practices of older media while rearranging images in specific modes – a process they call remediation. Hypertext and letterpress, email and mail and photography and illusionist painting have such a relationship to each other. Following this argument, digital media do not simply replace older media (e.g., print magazines). Rather, they challenge the latter to respond to the new developments. Remediation is not simply an act of unilateral repetition and advancement by the new media. Instead, as Bolter and Grusin emphasize, new and old media relate to each other in such a way as to always recreate not only themselves but also the other. Moreover, remediation is not just an act of unilateral repetition and advancement by and on the part of the new media. This specific twin-logic of cultural power is an intrinsic part of two processes: “immediacy” and “hypermediacy” (Bolter and Grusin 2000). Remediation helps explain that (not only digital) images should always be understood through their interaction with other media images, analyzing the aesthetic and form of the visuals and their modes of visibility. In addition, as current theories of visibility in the tradition of cultural studies suggest, there is an interpenetration of media and cultural conditions in society. Of interest are the relationships between images, culture and power as the politics of visibility (Thompson 2005, Schaffer 2008, Casper and Moore 2009, Maier 2019). According to these theorists, visibility is always produced in connection with social, media and discursive practices. Thus, visibility is debated through processes of negotiation. It is important to note that the concept of visibility (in contrast to the term visuality) includes the idea that the visible sphere also has another side: invisibility. Overall, this concept of visibility provides a theoretical approach that can be used productively in the analysis of religious conflicts. 191

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The methodological approach of this case study was developed in my previous work (Maier 2019). For this purpose, a qualitative image analysis of the religious, scientific and technical reporting by the magazines Spiegel, Stern and Bunte over a period of six decades (1949–present) was compiled. The study is based on a motif-orientated typecast of the image material and a subsequent analysis of chosen motifs, for which iconographic-iconological approaches (Panofsky 1957) were complemented with discourse analytical tools (Rose 2007). This procedure is accompanied by and grounded in the reconstruction of the historical, social and media context of this visual material. The sample of the case study includes more than 450 cover images on the subject of religion (from the German magazines Spiegel, Stern and Bunte between 1949 and today). The aim is to analyze media conventions for illustrating and visualizing religious conflicts in print media, in light of digitalization.

Hyperpictures and how they make us see religious conflicts As mentioned above, a systematic inventory of religious subjects and motifs between 1949 and the present was first completed (from the German print magazines Spiegel, Stern and Bunte). The cover pictures were differentiated based on motifs of similarity and current art-scientific classifications, depending on whether figures, landscapes or objects were the central pictorial subjects. The interesting aspect of the material is the emergence of a new form of image within the coverage of religion in the digital age: the hyperpicture. The term hyperpicture refers to the logic of “hypermediacy” (Bolter and Grusin 2000) and the discussions on “hyperimages” (Thürlemann 2013). The use of the term picture instead of image emphasizes the materiality of the image and its mediality (Mitchell 2009, 322). According to Bolter and Grusin (2000, 34), the hyperpicture relies on a visual style of “hypermediacy” that draws attention to the forms of mediation. Hypermediacy is a “style of visual representation whose goal is to remind the viewer of the medium” (Bolter and Grusin 2000, 272). In the context of religion coverage in print magazines, hyperpictures can be differentiated into two forms: photo collections and collages. Whereas a photo collection, an ordered pictorial form, is primarily used to depict diversity, a collage is often associated with conflicts and violence in the media discourse on religion. Such collages have appeared on the covers of Spiegel and Stern and in the pages of magazines since the mid-1990s and the frequency of their use intensified after the attacks on New York and Washington in 2001. After 9/11, the German print media began to visualize religions in connection with each other more frequently. Hyperpictures came into use for visualizing several conflicting forms of faith in a single image or making violent religious conflicts visible. Since the 1970s, magazines have rarely used collages, but in light of digitalization, the hyperpicture developed with a specific form, function and aesthetic. A hyperpicture is primarily used to depict diversity, conflicts and violence in media discourses on religion. In news that covers religion, this image form is often used in connection with topics of violence and conflict. Articles were headlined: “Betrayal in the Vatican. Power Struggle, Money Laundering, Secret Letters – The Intrigues around Pope Benedict XVI” (Stern 24/2012), “The Crusades. How Christians Sowed Hatred” (Stern 13/2005), “Hate against Fear – Terror in the Name of Allah: How Great is the Danger in Germany?” (Stern 04/2015), “The Religious Delusion. The Return of the Middle Ages” (Spiegel 41/2001) and “The Abused Faith. The Dangerous Return of Religions” (Spiegel 13/2016). The hyperpictures used in the context of such topics are a disordered and restless combination of various pictorial elements (photography, painting, drawings, etc.) whose visual 192

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impression remediates the artistic collage. Different images overlap in hyperpictures and different image forms and types are blended: religious art, event photographs of war and terror, portraits of religious and political actors, historical paintings of religious conflicts, etc. Hyperpictures in the news and other popular media can make religion visible as a source of conflict and through their form often evoke an extremist, loaded and violent sentiment. The hyperpictures visualize religions not only as violent and conflictive but also as being in conflict with political and social actors. In the news magazines Spiegel and Stern, such cover stories are often located at the intersection of religion and political reporting, which becomes apparent in the title stories “On Divine Mission. The Crusade of George W. Bush” (Spiegel 08/2003) and “An Eye for an Eye. The Biblical War” (Spiegel 15/2002). The former deals with the US-American war in Afghanistan, the latter with the war between Israel and the Palestinians. Overall, the images used in these conflict-related topics make conflicts between religions, conflicts within religion or conflicts between religions and other fields, such as politics, society and science, visible. The emergence of the hyperpicture in the digital age is significant, as what becomes visible and invisible change fundamentally. Such conflict-related images do not follow the conventions of journalistic image production, which are typically associated with the claim of documentary eyewitnessing (e.g., Zelizer 2007). The concepts of authenticity, objectivity, eyewitnessing, news photography and documentary photography are fundamentally challenged by hyperpictures. The repertoire of journalistic forms and formats has expanded considerably, triggered by social, economic and technological changes. Hyperpictures might be conceptualized as an expression of this development, especially with regard to digitalization. As mentioned earlier, the hyperpicture downplays the concreteness of the discrete images within the picture and draws the viewer’s focus instead to its own larger image and mediality. According to Bolter and Grusin (2000), a specific twin-logic of cultural power is an intrinsic part of this process: the only seemingly existing polarity between immediacy and hypermediacy. Moreover, two different viewing positions come together. As a viewer, one can look at the individual pictures and their content and then again at the entire arrangement, which Bolter and Grusin (2000) describe as an oscillation between “looking through” (33) and “looking at” (41). This development in the relationship between the visible and the invisible affects not only the form of the journalistic images and how they make us see religion and conflict but also their meanings. However, the images do not simply make an event or the actors involved in it visible; they also show the conflict and the violence itself. More precisely, they make the confusing and overlapping visible. This leads to the assumption that certainties and distinctions – having become precarious in current societies – are negotiated within and through hyperpictures. The meanings of the images overlap – to remain in the picture – with the social developments occurring at the dawn of the 21st century, as these religious conflicts themselves are complex situations of superposition. The hyperpictures are precise and tend to embed the matter into its concept through their way of representation; the hyperpicture corresponds to these religious conflicts and the asymmetry in making the inextricable aspects of religious conflicts and the entanglement of religions, politics and power visible. Through such hyperpictures, a conflict-oriented view of religions is created and emphasized, while concrete historical events are decontextualized and dispersed into the various parts of the picture. At the same time, Christian motifs in the middle of the hyperpictures often bring order and orientation back into the conflicts – under Christian auspices. The Christian imagery then promises crisis solutions in conflicts. 193

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Conclusion: visual journalism, religion and conflict To date, the research on journalism, religion and conflict paid little attention to the transformation of images and the modes and politics of visibility. To recap, in light of digitalization, remediation processes become more relevant for the analysis of media forms. The visibility of religious images and conflicts in the popular press is closely connected to the process of digitalization. Current debates on digitalization mostly emphasize the technological innovations of new information and media technologies. For example, according to Manovich (2001), the five pivotal principles of digital media are numerical representation, modularity, automation, variability and transcoding. Darley (2000) highlights simulation, hyperrealism and spectacle as central characteristics, where the loss of credibility and authenticity and the difference between image and reality are problematized in relation to digital images. However, the current studies on digital images tend to overlook the fact that analogue media and images can also produce specific forms of reality connected to problematic claims of objectivity, authenticity and being an eyewitness (Mitchell 1998). In journalism, images have historically been seen and used as a cultural practice of testimony that gives the illusion of being an eyewitness, that is, showing things as they are. As we have seen, with digitalization, new image forms and ways of seeing religious conflicts have developed in the print media. Within the coverage of religious conflicts, we can identify editing and contextualizing that go beyond the creation of an eyewitness perspective. In hyperpictures, various images and their meanings overlap, without attempting to or succeeding in delivering definitive answers, assessments or perspectives. Hyperimages challenge the concept of eyewitnessing as a promise of objectivity and authenticity. Therefore, the curatorial and moderating functions of journalism come into the foreground. In interpreting the emergence of the hyperpicture, we need to consider that the transformation of information and media technologies is closely connected to other processes of social change (Bolter and Grusin 2000, Jenkins 2006, Briggs and Burke 2010). As suggested by current theories of visibility, there is an interpenetration of media and cultural conditions in society. Changes in the religious landscape in Europe (especially an increasing de-­ churching) and social crises, such as 9/11, have certainly resulted in a new form of religious visibility in news and other media. Sociological literature discusses whether the collapse of the Eastern bloc countries has led to a movement “back to religion and the church” (e.g., Gabriel 2009, 101) as well as whether Islam in Europe has led Christian Europeans to return to their so-called own Christian culture (e.g., Knoblauch, 2008, 3). In this chapter, however, an image approach is adopted, which assumes that the hyperpicture form corresponds exactly to this social confusion: the asymmetry, the conflicts, etc. A hyperpicture represents the interferences of cultures, conflicts and the multitude. In the case study, the visualization of religious conflicts was not examined by means of the images but rather by their visual form. Schudson (1982, 98) stresses the importance of media forms in establishing journalistic authority: “[T]he power of the media lies not only (and not even primarily) in its power to declare things to be true, but in its power to provide the forms in which the declaration appears.” In this sense, journalism has the power to provide the cultural form to make religious conflicts visible. By decoupling images from their original clerical or religious surroundings, journalism can adopt the powers of meaning making and interpretation. The results of the case study therefore suggest subtle power shifts that enable new interpretations of pictures and perspectives on religious conflicts. Based on the findings, I argue that hypermediacy in the digital age constructs new interpretations of 194

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religious conflicts. Indeed, we can see an explicit effort to insert fuzziness, uncertainty and doubtfulness into the images. In such images of religion, various meanings overlap, without attempting to or succeeding in delivering definitive answers, assessments or perspectives. The montage-oriented arrangement clearly shows the viewers the construction of media images and yet the image form also produces a disharmonious view. Hypermediacy in the digital age produces new forms of seeing religious conflicts and creates ambiguities and diffusions, which has the effect of scrutinizing information on who might have the power of interpretation of images. Through hyperpictures, the journalistic authority as a privileged voice for the construction of media reality seems to lose its power. And this, in the end, happens by making the specific mediality of the journalistic image visible.

Further readings Berger, J., 1990. Ways of Seeing. London: British Broadcasting. This is a thought-provoking and influential book on practices of seeing and the perpetuation of artwork in popular culture. In his study, first published in 1972, Berger presents ideas that have lost none of their relevance to this day. The richly illustrated book offers a theoretical introduction to the visual culture of images – occasionally using Christian images. Hill, J. E. and Schwartz, V., 2015. Getting the Picture. The Visual Culture of the News. London: Bloomsbury. The book presents a concise analysis of visual journalism from a cultural studies perspective, looking at key trends and developments in visual journalism. Mitchell, W. J. T., 2006. What Do Pictures Want? The Lives and Loves of Images. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Mitchell looks upon the “magical relationship” we have with images and repeatedly addresses the religious foundations of seeing. Morgan, D., 1999. Visual Piety. A History and Theory of Popular Religious Images. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. This book offers a fundamental examination of popular religious images and their social and religious significance. Morgan is able to show the enormous cultural influence of the image of Christ since modern times.

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14 GENDER, RELIGION AND NEW MEDIAS IN LATIN AMERICA Kelber Pereira Gonçalves

Introduction: notes on contemporary Latin American religious landscapes It is important to realize that it is not possible to outline in depth the peculiarities of the media and journalistic and religious landscapes of each country in the region. Therefore, this chapter focuses on Latin American countries where Portuguese or Spanish are the official languages, with exception of the Caribbean countries. A more global definition of religion, understood as a “habitus expressed by the bias of spirituality, philosophies of life and experiences of the sacred which compounds a regime of beliefs” (Steil and Toniol 2013, 4–5), stands out in a landscape as plural as that of Latin America. However, the Latin American continent as a region theoretically and a priori has a number of common social and cultural characteristics inherited from Ibero-American religious-economic-colonialism by the Apostolic Roman Catholic Church. In the case of Latin America (at least for the moment), theories of secularization developed in highly industrialized societies do not apply, with the exception of Uruguay (Da Costa 2009). In this region of the globe, there is no question of a “return of the religious” (Willaime 2000, 319), in public space or in the media, because “it never left the peoples of this continent” (Löwy 1996, 52). According to Freston (2010, 2012), the polarity between Roman Catholics and evangelicals remains central in Latin American religiosity with a growth of people who identify themselves as evangelical (Parker 2005), particularly in Brazil, Chile and most Central American countries. Referring to published work by Cunha (2017) and Stoll (1993), it is also important to emphasize that although we know that the category of evangelicals is very far from homogeneous, we use the term evangelicals as an umbrella term to characterize Latin American Protestants, regardless of denominational affiliations. This chapter focuses on the polarity between Catholics and evangelicals. Recent studies (e.g., Parker 1993, 2005, 2009, Bastian 1997, Pédron- Colombani 2001, Steil 2001, Smith and Prokopy 2005, Freston 2010, Bastian 2012, Freston 2012, Pérez 2013) seem to agree with the fact that today’s religious landscape is more heterogeneous in Latin America. According to Morello, Romero, Rabbia and Da Costa (2017, 316) this religiosity, formerly marked by Roman Catholicism as an official religion, has for some decades been characterized by religious pluralization, which would not be a “reaction to secularization” but a way of “coping with everyday life.” According to Parker (1993, 105), it has considerable influence 199

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in the “constitution of the symbolic field in society” in many domains, such as journalism, politics, education or the judicial system. This pluralization concerns not only hybridization of the most varied religious syncretism but also emerging forms of religious bricolage (Bastian 1992, 544) in a context of fragmentation of the actors’ identities which transforms the way of conceiving the relation between the sacred and the profane (Pérez 2013, 10). Multiple affiliations and dual affiliation (Freston 2010), religious migrations (Machado 1996, 83) or customization of faith or “individualization of belief ” (Campiche 1993, 129) are also emerging in Latin America. New models of consumer culture have developed in more cosmopolitan cities organized by a more homogenous economic model and a uniformity based on the North American model. With the exception of the Cuban State, which, because of its relationship to religion as well as the peculiarities of its economic and media model makes the country an exception in the Latin American continent, the religious field is no exception to consumer culture. Garcia-Ruiz (2008, 387) states that religion “privatized at the same time as the telephone, diverse services and even the state” and finds its place as a full-fledged entrepreneurial model of independent businesses as salvation (Bastian 2012), which seeks to meet diverse and varied needs (Smith and Prokopy 2005). Religious leaders (especially Pentecostals) invest much into the best performing media.

Religion and gender roles: family as a nuclear entity in Latin America The Latin American continent has had a heterogeneous path in the development of its information and communication media and technology in society. This obviously varies among countries, but overall the continent has experienced considerable delay compared to socalled Western countries. In a historical perspective, the socio-cultural transformation of the continent begins in a more profound way from the second half of the 20th century. According to Parker (2005), the rural exodus and consequent rapid growth of big cities, the development of the mass media and more recently the new Internet-related media has reduced the geographical distances between Latin American peoples. In less than 40 years, 70% of the population that used to be peasants coexist today in cities, thus bringing a heterogeneity of cultures and ways of conceiving the world that defy notions of culture and identities (Martín-Barbero 2013). The sexual revolution and the gradual entry of women into the labor market (whether informal or not) have also shaken the notion of division of roles according to the gender and pattern characteristic of most traditional Latin American societies, in which the man was the only financial provider. Recent research by Machado (1996) and Barajas (2011) suggests that in recent decades, the very structure of the family as a hegemonic entity (father, mother, child), inherited from Catholicism, has been reconfigured. According to Vaggione (2008, 2014), this has been accentuated by the emergence of social movements, such as indigenous movements, feminist movements, movements for sexual diversity, the queer movement and so on. These movements have gradually gained greater visibility in the public and media spheres and as a result have gained more space in journalistic coverage. In the case of Latin America, unlike in the highly industrialized countries, these social movements emerged in the context of the establishment of “military dictatorships marked by a nationalist and family morality” (Miskolci and Campana 2017, 731). This was supported in several countries by the Catholic Church, which has slowed a deeper cultural, political and legal transformation of gender equality and reproductive and sexual rights. Although less drastic than in the so-called developed countries, these gradual transformations in the mononuclear family model have not been without traumas in a region 200

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where the Sagrada Familia is not only the allegory of the legitimate family model, but also a device of control and effective social organization in delineating gendered and hierarchical roles (Duarte 2006). For the Catholic Church the family is also perceived as a domestic church and a purveyor of evangelization in society. According to Butler (1988, 520), one of the notions of gender as a category is “a constructed identity, a performative accomplishment which the mundane social audience, including the actors themselves, come to believe and to perform in the mode of belief.” While the notion of performativity and the perception of masculine and feminine are not fixed and are in fact distinct according to different cultures, the categorization of gender in Latin America would also be reinforced by religion (Drogus 1990). According to Farias (2000, 78), through the culture (or cult) of the marianismo, inherited by Roman Catholicism, women would be interpreted as “models of submission, purity and suffering” and “apparently revalued.” But according to Stevens (1973), this presupposition of revaluation would hide only another face of machismo, reducing women to the “figure of a wife or mother who has suffered for a long time, and can still change men dissatisfied with their family” (Farias 2000, 80). Finally, these women would have a function or responsibility as regenerators of society. The marianismo would be still essentially responsible for the creation of two categories of women: The Christian mother will have to help her daughters to cultivate ‘their Marian attributes’, by supervising them through their education so that they are faithful to the two models imitated to them, namely that of her own mother and that of her mother Mary; as for boys, they must be protected from their unfortunate tendency to ‘exercise a libertine sexuality’ that would push them to other accursed women – the seductive prostitutes, different from their well-beloved mothers. (Farias 2000, 80) According to Butler (2006), categories of gender are articulated in a set of social dynamics that aim to exaggerate the difference between the sexes, well beyond the biological differences, in order to naturalize it and ensure control of any non-hetero-normative deviance in the whole of society. In the case of Latin America, this exaggeration in the delineation of characteristics associated with gender also includes gender subcategories (two completely incompatible types of women), that are still represented in all the media: from confessional journalism to the serialization of television journalism to the telenovelas or advertising or marketing. For example, research by Villegas, Lemanski and Valdéz (2010) on the representation of these two categories of women in television advertising in Mexico revealed that, despite a positive change over the last twenty years, the media portrayal of women has remained largely traditional. Thus, in the quest for effective marketing, it is better to be careful to avoid an advertisement that would feature a wife who has knowledge about sex. In this perspective, the media can participate in the creation of culturally gendered identities. In order to understand the complexities of gender, religion and new media in Latin America, it is important to understand how gender dynamics are experienced in the region, and how they are represented through diverse journalistic, media and religious landscapes. With regard to the media landscape, it is important to underline that the heterogeneity of the Latin American cultural and information industry is not synonymous with a plural media field, given the more or less important monopolization or oligopolization of media, depending on the country. In addition, Latin American media have historically often been marked by conservative ideological positions. As far as religion is concerned, although evangelicals (in growth) and Catholics (in recession) remain major actors – sometimes working together, 201

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when common interests are at stake – phenomena of syncretism, forms of customization of faith or religious nomadism are also very present in the region. Emerging forms of conceiving gender and religion are multiplying, but this plurality of beliefs and opinions is not sufficiently represented in the mainstream journalistic media. Regarding the direct relationship between religion and gender, although poorly represented in journalistic coverage by mainstream media because of their minority and deviant (or even often suggested heretical) nature, Latin America has seen a growth of many inclusive religious groups or churches pertaining to gender diversity and sexual diversity (see Barajas 2011, Barajas 2014, Barajas 2016 for Mexico and De Jésus 2008, De Jésus 2010, Natividade 2010, De Jésus 2013, Natividade 2017 for Brazil). Despite its controversial nature, we will use the term here to refer to churches or groups that also welcome the non-cisgender-heterosexual community. According to Vaggione (2009, 34), in recent years we could witness a strategic secularization through the ONGanisation of religion in Latin A merican countries from religious groups that seek to politicize sexuality in order to stop gender ideology and sexual and reproductive rights, including from pro-life movements organizations. According to Faúndes and Vaggione (2012) and Morán Faúndes (2018) this is a strategy that seeks to make the discourse more scientific because it aims to have more visibility in the journalistic agenda and more credibility in global journalistic and media coverage. While military dictatorships have caused a considerable delay in sexual rights and gender equality, new social movements such as the feminist and LGBTI movements are breaking out and gaining visibility, particularly in the journalistic and media thanks in part to social media.

Journalistic coverage and the interlacing of religion and gender issues in contemporary Brazil: a case study Plural religious landscape and exclusivist journalistic coverage In the case of Brazil, as well as in Latin America, changes in the contemporary religious landscape and a greater incidence of religious pluralism are possible thanks to the phenomena of conversion (e.g., Catholics converting to evangelicals) and not because of dynamics related to immigration or secularization, as is the case in Europe, for example. The plurality of religions and forms of spirituality has always been part of the country’s inhabitants since the discovery by the Portuguese. The contemporary Brazilian religious landscape can be divided into three essential spheres (Cunha 2016, 1): 1 2 3

The country has established itself as a predominantly Catholic country with the support of the colonial system and later by the Republic. Catholicism tries to maintain itself as a hegemonic religion in the face of the phenomenon of religious pluralization. The development of the Pentecostal movement today puts Catholic hegemony at risk.

Transformations in the Brazilian religious landscape are also reflected in the media landscape with an increase in the religious content in the country’s media. For example, according to studies by the National Film Agency (ANCINE), the dominant television category in Brazil is currently religious. Religious programs (services, masses, various religious events or any program for the transmission of a message of faith) predominate. Confessional productions occupied 21.2% of all programs on public Brazilian television in the year 2016 (ANCINE 2017). This increase in religious content on television has been possible particularly in the 202

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context of an amplification of religious leaders buying and using the media. This is especially common among Pentecostals – who often also perform political functions such as congressman and women or senators and many of who can be considered conservative or fundamentalist. However, the increase in programs with religious content is not synonymous with religious pluralism in the media or in the journalistic agenda. According to Cunha (2016), despite the plurality in the Brazilian religious landscape journalistic coverage of religion remains exclusivist, centered on Christianity and more specifically on Roman Catholicism, as historically Roman Catholicism was once the official religion of the country. By focusing on understanding how journalistic coverage deals with religion, how different religious groups are represented in Brazil and how journalists producing journalistic content perceive religion, Cunha analyzed two important journalistic media in the country: the newspaper Folha de São Paulo and the Jornal Nacional television news broadcast on prime time by the Globo channel. This research has revealed that religion remains poorly represented and since it is part of the journalistic agenda, Christianity and more particularly Catholicism is the religion treated in almost all of the journalistic coverage, followed by Islam which is presented in these media in a pejorative manner including in a global context of religious fundamentalisms represented notably by the Islamic State. Afro-Brazilian religions, spiritualism and evangelicals are not only neglected but also treated most often depreciably. The journalistic coverage seems to reinforce the idea of the evangelical movement as responsible for a fall in the number of members of the Catholic Church (in Brazil and throughout Latin-America). The various forms of popular religiosity linked to Catholicism are not part of journalistic coverage and when it enters the journalistic agenda, it is reduced to pilgrimages or festivals recognized by the institution. In the case of Christian religious holidays such as Passover and Christmas, journalistic coverage favors content restricted to Roman Catholicism. Thus Cunha, through the concept of dominant religion demonstrates how Catholicism remains anchored in the “social imagination” (Cunha 2012, 18) of the owners of the mainstream media and Brazilian journalists, despite the religious plurality and the variety of beliefs present in the country. The journalistic media of the Record channel, which is part of the Record Group and one of the country’s leading media conglomerate, was bought in 1989 by Bishop Macedo, leader of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God. With a mix of electronic church and secular content, Record has seen a significant increase in ratings over the years. The Record campaign A caminho da liderança (lit., On the path to leadership) seems to testify to the ambition of the bishop to overtake the channel Globo, still leader in terms of ratings. According to ANCINE, in 2016, the televised journalism of the Record Channel represents 35.85% of its programming, followed by religious content programs that correspond to 22.89% of the content broadcast by the channel. On the television channel Record, content related to the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God is sometimes presented from a journalistic or informative angle. For example, Jornal da Record, the journal’s main journalistic product broadcast on prime time, featured a report of about fifteen minutes on the inauguration of the Salomão Temple, the world headquarters of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, inaugurated in 2014 in the popular district of Braz, São Paulo. Every year, on the anniversary of the inauguration of the temple, the Record channel grants significant coverage to the temple, not only on television, but in all the media of the Record group, such as RecordTV, Record News and R7. In the case of the Record group, religion (or the religious) influences the selection of events that will compose the journalistic agenda in various media (television, Internet, radio, etc.). The case of the Record group is thus exemplary for a singular representation of religion in journalism. For example, the content selected to appear in 203

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the journalism agenda of the Record group included undercover reports and denunciations on alleged acts of questionable morality committed by religious leaders competing with Bishop Edir Macedo (see Cunha 2012). Such reporting contributes to dynamic disputes for the hegemony in the religious market. The Record channel has already been prosecuted for the dissemination of content considered intolerant toward other religions, particularly Afro-Brazilian religions. Finally, in the case of Brazil, the journalists and owners of mainstream media, in a media monopoly, thus contribute to the negation of pluralism and sometimes even participate in attitudes of intolerance. In this sense, religion or the religious do not escape the rule that the media is the main source of what is important or valued from a social or cultural perspective (Hoover 2014). The journalistic media actively participate in this process not only through the selection of information for the media agenda but also through how they cover an event.

Public policies, religion and gender: the role of mainstream media in creating moral panic In recent years, important public policy developments in Brazilian society in gender equality, women’s rights and those of the LGBTI population have taken place (e.g., Campos Machado 2018). The right to vote for women was only acquired in 1962 (Cunha 2017). Beginning in 2002, entities within the Federal Government that aimed at ensuring the rights of minorities were created, which was a decisive turning point for gender in Brazil. Some of these developments also included a law called Maria da Penha that was created to more severely punish gender violence, especially domestic violence, the recognition of femicide as a hate crime, the family no longer being recognized as an institution based exclusively on marriage, progress in the field of work, e.g., regarding the rights of housekeepers (in their vast majority women) and the creation of Casa da Mulher Brasileira among others. With regard to the rights of the LGBTI population, since 2010, a number of rights have been ensured by the Brazilian justice system, such as the right to homo-parental adoption, the right to use the so-called social name (the name by which transvestites and transsexuals wish to be recognized) and issues related to pensions and inheritances in the event of the death of a spouse. Cunha (2017) clarifies that this advancement of Brazilian women’s rights in society and the LGBTI population has been in symbiosis with a greater presence of conservative Catholic and evangelical religious groups active in politics in the country, with some of these groups owning their own media. This strong presence of religious groups in the political and media sphere is a new phenomenon, which has also changed not only the political landscape of the country but also the relations between evangelicals and Catholics. Those who did not agree before find themselves united in the name of a religious morality with regard to the body, sexuality and a notion of traditional family modeled in the image of a father, mother and their children. In the political and media fields, these conservative groups revolve around fighting sexual, reproductive and gender equality rights and also fighting a common enemy, the ideology of gender interpreted as the politico-Marxist-leftist project of implantation of an ideology that seeks to destroy the family and consequently annihilate society. These fundamentalist groups define those responsible for the implantation of this ideology as mainly homosexuals – through the establishment of a gay dictatorship – and feminists – often called feminazi. According to Martino (2017), starting from the assumption that changes in social practices are directly related to media practices, these transformations have reverberated throughout Brazil, in the media and journalistic fields: this is done in the so-called religious media (paper, radio, television, websites and social networks) but also in the so-called secular media. 204

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In September 2017 in São Paulo, the Latin American financial and cultural capital, an event titled the 35º Panorama da Arte Brasileira – Brasil por multiplicação (lit., Panorama of Brazilian Art – Brazil by multiplication) promoted by the Museum of Modern Art was controversial. While the event offered a very broad panorama of Brazilian art (architecture, dance, audiovisual etc.), it was especially famous for the performance entitled The beast by the artist Wagner Schwartz, where a choreographer was naked and invited the public to interact with him by touching his body. During a performance, images of a little girl with her mother who touched the artist’s foot were recorded and put on YouTube (G1 São Paulo 2017) and disseminated very quickly in other digital media and also in a wide variety of national journalistic media outlets. Conservative religious groups accused the exhibit of promoting and inciting pedophilia. The cultural event was reduced and renamed by a large number of journalists as The exhibition of the naked man. It has not only received extensive journalistic and media coverage in mass media, but has been investigated by the São Paulo Public Ministry. In the same month, an artistic exhibition entitled Queermuseu, – Cartografias da differença (lit., Queermuseum: Cartography of Difference), which was going to take place in the city of Porto Alegre, was canceled because of virulent opposition, in particular on social media including online petitions from conservative political and religious groups. These groups felt that the exhibition promoted and encouraged pedophilia, zoophilia and homosexuality. Also in 2017, the play entitled O Evangelho Segundo Jesus, Rainha do Céu (lit., The Gospel According to Jesus, Queen of Heaven), protagonized by the transsexual actress Renata Carvalho, has undergone numerous judicial censorship attempts and death threats against those involved in the shows in various Brazilian cities before or during presentations. The play is a rereading of the story of Jesus Christ and proposes that from a contemporary perspective, Jesus could become embodied in all marginalized bodies, such as those of transsexuals. In November 2017, an online petition called for the annulment of Judith Butler’s participation in the seminar Os fins da democracia (lit., The Ends of Democracy) at the SESC Pompeia in the city of São Paulo. Although the theme of the event did not concern such issues, the petition on the website citizenGo collected 350,000 signatures against the intervention of the person who sought to “implant an ideology that hides a Marxist political program” which “accelerates the fragmentation and corruption of society” (CitizenGo 2017, 1). On Twitter, the hashtag #Forabutler (Get out Butler) was created and presented content hostile to the researcher’s communication and her gender ideology by different religious groups and/ or extremist political orientations. In addition to the online campaign and thousands of signatures, groups of people protested outside the cultural center against (or in favor) of the presence of the academic. Various posters read “No to Pedophilia,” “Go to Hell,” “More Princes and Princesses, Fewer Witches,” “Butler Out,” “No to the Ideology of Gender,” “Butler’s Dream: to Destroy the Sexual Identity of our Children” (Garcia 2017), etc. Outside the cultural center, other protesters in favor of the presence of the academic shouted for freedom of thought and freedom of expression. At the end of the protest, an effigy depicting Judith Butler dressed as a witch was burned to public acclaim. In an interview with the Folha newspaper in São Paulo, Butler commented on this incident: Throughout history, witches have been given powers they could never have had; they have become scapegoats to whom death should, purportedly, purify the community of moral and sexual corruption. [...] The fantasy of these women with the demon or its representatives, finds, today echo in the ‘evil’ ideology of gender. And yet, the torture and murder of these women for centuries as witches is an effort to repress dissident voices, those that questioned certain dogmas of religion. [...] When violence and hate 205

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become tools of politics and religious morality, then democracy is threatened for those who claim to tear apart the social fabric, punish the differences and sabotage the social ties necessary to support our coexistence here on this Earth. (Butler 2017) In the same year, between April and October 2017, the telenovela A Força do Querer, broadcast in prime time by the channel Globo Television, the main channel in terms of ratings of the country, was partly responsible for making more visible gender issues and more specifically transsexuality in the public-media debate of Brazilian society, by depicting a transsexual character and a transvestite. The Globo Television channel’s advertising strategy is, very often, to draw inspiration from the themes of its soap operas to create events in order to manufacture material to feed its journalistic press as well as a very wide variety of its entertainment programs. For self-marketing, Rede Globo Television strives to invite its cast of actors to interviews and various events to talk about their characters. Conservative groups and religious leaders have accused the chain of inculcating the ideology of gender within Brazilian society (Brum 2017, 1). In the media, many religious celebrities in the country have invested in a kind of “media education” (Douyère and Antoine 2018, 12), vis-à-vis the content offered by Globo, creating genuine boycott campaigns that have become more visible with the use of new information and communication technologies and especially social-digital networks such as Twitter, Facebook or YouTube. This is essentially done in several ways: 1

2

3

Through the disqualification of sexual diversity and the obstruction of progressive laws such as those on gender equality, against homophobia, in favor of women’s rights or rights of those in the non-cisgender-heterosexual community, that is sexualities that are not only considered “contaminated” but “contagious” and pose the risk of “plaguing the social body” (Faúndes and Vaggione 2012, 180); Via the mass media serving both to convey conservative religious values and the demand for political support, particularly through the demand for voting, from a perspective where “brothers vote for brothers” within a confederation or religious segment (Freston 1993, 66); Greater visibility and the conquest of rights by the LGBTI and feminist movements seem to come together with a collective fear of the loss of bearings based in part on the traditional family structure where the theme of ideology of gender as a backdrop of “social and political conflicts, religiously codified” (Stolow 2014, 147) goes far beyond the individual and family sphere and enters the political and legal sphere (Natividade and Oliveira 2009).

This reflects what key gender issues do in a democratic society in the journalistic agenda as well as in the media as a whole. The visibility of its movements and the involvement of actors – including but not limited to the religious – in a digital activism testify to the extent of the phenomenon. Much of the large media in a multiplicity of journalistic media (print, TV news, radio) contributed in part to the “imaginary construction of the genre category” as “an enemy that must be fought” since on several occasions, the country’s leading journalistic press has spread the term gender ideology without the use of quotation marks, which denotes an accreditation of the expression of the part of its media (Cunha 2017, 266). The digital environment (various sites, blogs, social networks) has become a battleground (Souza, 2014 cited in Cunha 2017) in the country. If the study of religion and media in a globalizing perspective “takes specific forms in national and cultural contexts” (Hoover 2002, 06), it is no longer possible today to study the 206

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relationship between the media and religion without taking into account the political field in different societies. This is the case for both religious journalistic media as well as so-called secular journalistic media. Although Cunha’s research on conservative political-religious digital activism does not directly address gender issues, it demonstrates two phenomena: 1 2

The number of women in religious activism in the socio-digital networks remains inferior to men. The assiduity of hostile media-religious content concerns the theme of gender ideology and the fact that the alleged safeguarding of the hetero-normative family is widely discussed between the media-religious spheres in Brazil.

Thus, a greater visibility of these actors in digital social networks can also have effects on the creation of the journalistic agenda, especially and more directly as regards to web journalism. The Internet 2.0 or participatory Internet has permitted what might be called a non-professional intervention in the production and dissemination of news. Thus, the development of citizen or participatory journalism has blurred the line between professional journalists and content producers (Canu and Datchary 2010). In this sense, the Internet user’s interaction and feedback promoted by the Internet 2.0 (writing comments, sharing content on digital social networks, etc.) has gradually become an important tool for measuring reception and the economic and commercial value of a content, theme or information. According to Demers (2012, 10), “hyper-competition promoted and celebrated by the innovation industry” would have been one of the main drivers of a growing “increased dependence of the public.” For its part, the country’s mainstream media, which are historically conservative in all forms (online press, print media, television news, etc.), in the name of alleged journalistic impartiality, have often given the right of speech to conservative or fundamentalist religious leaders. These actors, under the cover of freedom of expression may give hateful or depreciative remarks toward women or LGBTI populations. The journalistic media also give voice to journalists, columnists, commentators or experts, who whether they are related or not to conservative religious movements, often partake in a discourse of intolerance and hate toward minorities. In the Brazilian context, gender, religion, journalistic media and both political and legal fields are intertwined in a complex way in the social fabric. The increasing visibility, in recent years, of religious leaders in political life, some of whom also own media or are associated with mainstream conservative media, only amplify the phenomenon. Although constitutional, secularism (laïcité) is still not a (fully) developed principle in Brazil. While the Roman Catholic Church has always had a great influence on social dynamics in Brazil, for some years now it has been sharing this influence with evangelical groups, including Pentecostal groups. Thus, some Catholic or evangelical political groups have become more and more articulated in the political agenda and they do not hesitate to show publicly that their position in the country’s public policies is articulated on the basis of religious beliefs or values. In this sense, the journalistic political coverage can possibly hide a religious dynamic.

Patrícia Galvão News Agency: when religion fits into the so-called secular media Since 2009, the Patrícia Galvão News Agency, created by the institute of the same name, has presented itself as an alternative media to the mainstream media specializing in gender issues. 207

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According to their website, the institute conducts field surveys and awareness campaigns against domestic violence, among other things to ensure that the media fulfill their function in the public sphere: inspect the constituent powers, explain the facts, to inform on the rights of the citizens and to promote the debate of ideas to encourage the changes of attitudes and mentalities. (Agência Patrícia Galvão n.d.) The content is accessible not only to the surfer, in general, but also aims at the journalists (professionals) or content producers looking for reliable, varied and up-to-date media content on gender dynamics in Brazilian society. When putting the term religião (religion) in the main search engine of the Patrícia Galvão News Agency site, we have so far more than 700 results directly or indirectly associated with religion and organized by date of publication and relevance of the keyword. The articles deal in most cases with the Brazilian context, followed by content encompassing issues of religion and gender in the Latin American region. Finally, more universal or universalizing themes in terms of human rights are included, e.g., on abortion and religion, the disclosure of seminaries or colloquies encompassing the theme of religion, gender and feminisms, religion and sexuality, religion and sexual orientation, religion and LGBT rights, religion and discrimination, the dynamics between religion and politics (including public policies on sexual and reproductive rights), the relationship between religion and gender violence. The professionals behind the articles selected and published by the Patrícia Galvão News Agency are from fields as varied as the themes of the articles themselves. This example shows that the theme of gender can be addressed in the media’s agenda from a very wide range of actors in a wide variety of fields (law, theology, philosophy, medicine, journalism, anthropology, etc.). However, what seems most relevant is that religion, or the religious, appears directly or indirectly related to articles dealing with gender, particularly with regard to public policies on gender reproductive equality, sexual abuse and the fight against homophobia or transphobia, e.g., in contents that a priori does not come from and does not rely on religious institutions or beliefs and values themselves, but are closely related. The selection, production and the chosen content which is put online is without doubt influenced by major societal changes which are closely linked to gender issues. The case of the Patrícia Galvão News Agency shows how in a secular agency dedicated to gender issues, religion or the religious is present in many contents of the journalistic agenda. In the same way that the term religious seems vague in describing a media managed by a religious institution, the term secular can seem vague, since between the two media “only the moral approach given to the information disseminated really distinguishes them” (Delporte, 2017 cited in Douyère and Antoine 2018, 4). In addition to this difficulty of establishing what is religious or secular in the journalistic agenda, we have also seen in recent years an “intensification of secular arguments” (Vaggione 2018, 25) in the public and media space by the Catholic Church with regard to gender issues and sexual rights in opposition to feminist and LGBTI movements. The use of secular arguments does not substitute theological and moral arguments, since these two models can be combined. The scientification of religious discourses can, of course, be valid in the case of certain evangelical branches. According to Bréchon, Duriez and Ion (2000, cited in Bratosin 2015, 11) it also seems true that “religion appears in the public media space through current affairs and society debates.”

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Conclusion The contemporary Latin American religious landscape is characterized by complexity, transformations and phenomena such as the customization of beliefs, religious syncretism, multiple religious affiliations or nomadism. The family as a nuclear unit in Latin America is highly important, not only in the organization of gender roles but also as a tool of social control. The very categorization of the gender, which differs according to different societies and varied historical moments, would sociologically speaking be strengthened in Latin America by the Roman Catholic heritage of Marianism. In the case of Brazil, the public policies put in place in recent years in terms of gender equality, women’s rights and LGBT populations have been largely responsible for the development of a moral panic within segments of society. This influences the growing complexity in the intersection of politic(s), religion and gender in the journalistic coverage in the country. Since many other resistances from conservative religious-political groups at the regional or municipal level have taken place, it must be suspected that this is only the tip of the iceberg. In Brazil, but also in Latin America overall, the scientification or secularization of religious discourses, added to the ONGanization of religious institutions in order to have more visibility and credibility in the journalistic and media agenda, makes the separation between that which would belong to religious and that which would belong to the secular more complex. How does one grasp the religious, political or journalistic facts and identify the boundaries (if any) when the commemoration of the victory of the president elected in Brazil in 2018 begins with a collective prayer of thanksgiving to God, followed by the reading of his official speech beginning with the verse “then you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free” (The Bible, John 8:32), broadcasted live and re-broadcasted in the major journalistic medias of the country? I think this question represents one of the challenges in the study on gender, religion and new media in Latin America, but also in other parts of the globe.

Further readings Compagnon, O., 2008. La crise du catholicisme latino-américain. L’Ordinaire des Amériques, [e-journal] 210, 9–25. Available at https://journals.openedition.org/orda/2613, accessed 28 February 2019. The author gives a succinct view about four and a half centuries of Catholic monopoly in the Latin American continent and the turning point of the Catholic crisis in the continent by the loss of the faithful. The study demonstrates the gap between the doctrine of Rome and the reality and aspirations of Latin American society. Machado, M. Das. D.C., 2018. O discurso cristão sobre a “ideologia de gênero”. Estudos Feministas, [e-journal] 26(2), 1–18. Available at http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&pid=S01 04-026X2018000200212&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=pt, accessed 28 February 2019. The study traces a detailed genealogy of the Christian discourse of gender ideology built by the Catholic Church in response to feminist movements and the development of gender studies and how these discourses were spread in Brazil. Peñas Defago, M. A., and Moran Faundes, J. M. F., 2015. Nuevas configuraciones religiosas/ seculares: las ONG “pro-vida” en las disputas por las políticas sexuales en Argentina. Religião e Sociedade, [e-journal] 35(2), 340–362. Available at http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S010085872015000200340&script=sci_abstract&tlng=es, accessed. 28 February 2019. The research seeks to better understand the strategies and lines of action put in place by pro-life NGOs in Argentina in recent years to make their voices heard and influence public opinion regarding political policies. In the area of sexual and reproductive rights, the authors suggest the idea of strategic secularization and emphasize a shift from religious or theological discourse to more scientific, medical or human rights discourses.

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Kelber Pereira Gonçalves Miskolci, R. and Campana, M., 2017. “Ideologia de gênero”: notas para a genealogia de um pânico moral contemporâneo. Revista Sociedade e Estado, 32(3), 725–747. Morán Faúndes, J. M., 2018. Religión, secularidad y activismo héteropatriarcal:¿ qué sabemos del activismo opositor a los derechos sexuales y reproductivos en Latinoamérica? La ventana. Revista de estudios de género, [e-journal] 5(47). Available at http://www.scielo.org.mx/pdf/laven/v5n47/14059436-laven-5-47-00097.pdf, accessed 28 June 2018. Morello, S. J. G., Romero, C., Rabbia, H. and Da Costa, N., 2017. An Enchanted Modernity: Making Sense of Latin America’s Religious Landscape. Critical Research on Religion, 5(3). Available at https:// doi.org/10.1177/2050303217732131, accessed 28 June 2018. Natividade, M., 2010. Uma homossexualidade santificada? Etnografia de uma comunidade inclusiva Pentecostal. Religião & Sociedade, [e-journal] 30(2). Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S010085872010000200006, accessed 10 June 2018. Natividade, M., 2017. Cantar e dançar para Jesus: sexualidade, gênero e religião nas igrejas inclusivas pentecostais. Religião & Sociedade, [e-journal] 37(1). Available at http://dx.doi. org/10.1590/0100-85872017v37n1cap01, accessed 10 June 2018. Natividade, M. and De Oliveira, L., 2009. Sexualidades ameaçadoras: religião e homofobia (s) em discursos evangélicos conservadores. Sexualidad, Salud y Sociedad-Revista Latinoamericana, [ejournal] 2. Available at https://www.e-publicacoes.uerj.br/index.php/SexualidadSaludySociedad/ article/view/32/445, accessed 18 June 2018. Parker, G. C., 1993. Otra lógica en América Latina: religión popular y modernización capitalista. Santiago: Fondo de Cultura Económica. Parker, G. C., 2005. ¿América Latina ya no es católica? Pluralismo cultural y religioso creciente. América Latina Hoy, [e-journal] 41. Available at http://revistas.usal.es/index.php/1130-2887/article/ view/2431/2479, accessed 11 June 2018. Parker, G. C., 2009. Religión, cultura y política en América Latina: nuevos enfoques, a modo de introducción. In: Parker, G. C., ed. Religión, política y cultura en América Latina. Nuevas miradas. Santiago de Chile: Universidad de Santiago de Chile, 13–73. Pédron-Colombani, S., 2001. Pentecôtisme et diversification religieuse au Guatemala. Socio anthropologie, 10, 31–44. Pérez, R., 2013. Empoderamientos públicos e incidencias mediáticas de la religión. Religión e incidência Pública, [e-journal] 1. Available at http://religioneincidenciapublica.gemrip.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/01-Perez-2013-Empoderamientos-Publicos.pdf, accessed 9 June 2018. Smith, C. and Prokopy, J., 2005. Introduction. In: Smith, C. and Prokopy, J., eds. Latin American Religion in Motion. New York: Routledge, 1–15. Steil, C. A., 2001. Pluralismo, modernidade e tradição: transformações do campo religioso. Ciencias Sociales y Religion, [e-journal] 3(3). Available at https://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/ handle/10183/19418/000301876.pdf, accessed 11 June 2018. Steil, C. A. and Toniol, R., 2013. A crise do conceito de religião e sua incidência sobre a antropologia. In: Giumbelli, E. and Béliveau, V. G., eds. Religión, cultura y política en las sociedades del siglo XXI. Buenos Aires: Biblos, 137–158. Stevens, E. P., 1973. Marianismo: The Other Face of Machismo in Latin America. In: Pescatello, A., ed. Female and Male in Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 89–101. Stoll, D., 1993. Introduction. In: Garrard-Burnett, V. and Stoll, D., eds. Rethinking Protestantism in Latin America. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1–19. Stolow, J., 2014. Religião e Mídia: notas sobre pesquisas e direções futuras para um estudo interdisciplinar. Religião e Sociedade, [e-journal] 34(2). Available at http://www.scielo.br/pdf/rs/v34n2/01008587-rs-34-02-0146.pdf, accessed 14 June 2018. Vaggione, J. M., 2008. Religión y sexualidad: entre el absolutismo y la diversidad. In: Vaggione, J. M., ed. Diversidad Sexual y Religion. [e-book] Córdoba: Católicas por el derecho a decidir. Available at https://rdu.unc.edu.ar/bitstream/handle/11086/1813/Diversidad_sexual_Vaggione_2008.pdf ?sequence=1, accessed 13 June 2018. Vaggione, J. M., 2009. Sexualidad, religión y política en América Latina. Río de Janeiro: Conicet. Available at https://laicismo.org/data/docs/archivo_923.pdf1, accessed 17 June 2018. Vaggione, J. M., 2014. La politización de la sexualidad y los sentidos de lo religioso. Sociedad y religión, [e-journal] 24(42). Available at http://www.scielo.org.ar/pdf/syr/v24n42/v24n42a10.pdf, accessed 27 June 2018.

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Gender, religion and new medias in Latin America Vaggione, J. M., 2018. Sexuality, Law, and Religion in Latin America: Frameworks in Tension. Religion & Gender, 1(8), 14–31. Villegas, J., Lemanski, J. and Valdéz, C., 2010. Marianismo and Machismo: The Portrayal of Females in Mexican TV commercials. CDMX: Journal of International Consumer Marketing, [e-journal] 22(4). Available at https://doi.org/10.1080/08961530.2010.505884, accessed 17 June 2018. Willaime, J. P., 2000. Les médias comme analyseur des mutations religieuses contemporaines. In: Bréchon, P., ed. Médias et religions en miroir. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 297–329.

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15 SHUKURA Gratitude, faith and the unlikely relationship between gender, religion and journalism in Brazil Priscila Vieira-Souza and Andréia Coutinho Louback Introduction Our work takes the thematic quartet of religion, journalism and race and gender as its structural basis. We commence from a Latin-American perspective, with primary emphasis on the Brazilian context to illustrate the key concepts. The first challenge for addressing such a theme is the absence of academic studies on the intersection between religion and news media. Facing this challenge brings us to the methodological perspective adopted: the analysis of a life-story and its context. The life-story as a case study is coherent with feminist theory and its methods, following here the critique developed by Matsuda (1986). Hence, the case study presents the narrative of a black, Brazilian and Catholic, woman journalist, who found in the feeling of gratitude a lifestyle and catalyst for her accomplishments. We also take a historical perspective that emphasizes the local historical processes and the different contexts. We consider great narratives of Western modernity culture, assuming its influence in the intellectual production of South America. Simultaneously, we face the diverse, different and proper characteristics of the local contexts. Remarkably, the text moves from general, abstracts concepts to rooted, local contexts.

Concepts, absences and intersections Works on the intersection between religion and journalism are rarely encountered in Brazil or by Hispano-American authors. All the reflections of this chapter are marked by this absence, as are the definitions that follow.

Religion: conceptualizing in interdisciplinarity As a theoretical concept, religion has two specifics: first, the challenge of providing one definition of the term; and, second, the interdisciplinarity of the concept. We therefore agree with Anne-Marie Korte (2011, 12) who notes the diversity of concepts of religion in the field and asserts: “we need to acknowledge our own various but often not explicated understandings of ‘religion’, since this creates one of the most stubborn and unrecognized incompatibilities of interdisciplinary research in religion and gender.” 214

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In the field of Sociology of Religion, the Brazilian Alexandre Fonseca gives an overview of the conceptualization, categorizing current definitions in two directions. According to Fonseca (2011, 11), the first direction “sees it from the substantive understanding” and defines religion through questions such as “who am I, where did I come from and where am I going?” The second direction comprises religion “from within a functionalist perspective” and defines it through its operation, “that is, as a set of beliefs and actions defined through understanding of the existence of a superhuman reality.” We follow Fonseca (2011, 11) in understanding religion “for its content and not for its function.” As such, we consider that religion “implies beliefs, practices and institutions” based on the existence of the supernatural (Fonseca 2011, 11). We emphasize the inclusion of beliefs and institutions, covering the dimension of the religious both for institutional practices and for the actions of individuals, based on their beliefs. We therefore propose to begin from Fonseca’s (2011) position and highlight the need to maintain the concept fluid. Korte (2011), as a way of retaining the interdisciplinary approach that is necessary to understand the gender and religion intersection, also takes this position. In addition, the fluid concept is strategic in maintaining the tension between the institutional and individual dimensions of the religious. We therefore consider religion as an experience of the sacred, capable of developing different forms of spirituality, with individual and collective consequences. It is simultaneously a phenomenon of institutional and social structure, capable of shaping subjectivity.

Journalism: modern, theoretical-practical The tension between institutional and individual is relevant to the trajectory constructed through this chapter. We refer in the case study to the intersections present in the person but also question the ways in which religion is absent or present in the public sphere and particularly in journalism – as the primary modern public space of political debate and social structure. We consider journalism an eminently modern phenomenon (Wolton 2004, Traquina 2005). The historical and modern perspectives of journalism demonstrates its dual character, theoretical-conceptual and practical-professional (Lopes 2013). As a phenomenon born in the era in which science dominates as a manner of producing truths, journalism emerges as a practice marked by the constant demand for concept and with institutionalizing implications. For this reason, discussing journalism opens many windows. There is complexity as a mere concept, without reflecting on the press, the role of the media and the systemic scenario of communication. Due to its dual character, the conceptual dimension of journalism is formed through practice, modifying itself through the new configurations that have emerged since its 19th-century birth. Thus, communication technologies and their technological developments are fundamental to consider and (re)define journalism. Therefore, journalism is a theoretical-practical composite; intrinsically modern and moldable to contexts and scenarios.

Gender: overlapping race In this approach, gender and race are intersectional concepts. Considering the multiple ways of being male and female outside the determinism of a biological and single division between the sexes, gender defines being a woman and being a man within a social construction. Therefore, being a woman is already challenging, because women are inserted into a system that overvalues and privileges men. Added to this is a degree of exclusion of black women, 215

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seen as synonymous to subordination and social inferiority. Therefore, as we will see later in our case study, our character Shukura problematizes a crucial point of our investigation: combating the impacts of the gender and race dimensions for the displacement of white hegemony, so that society becomes diverse in all possible sectors, including journalism. The social meaning of being a woman – and black – makes us reflect on the effects of the combination of racism and sexism. In view of this, the gender category cannot be universalized without paying particular attention to the theme of black women. The feminist movement needs to recognize that the intersectional dimension of gender and race favored – and still favors – white women before black women. There are networks of independent institutions and collectives moving toward deepening this theoretical and practical debate in order to sketch a path toward equity and mitigation of racial inequalities. The Brazilian political scientist Djamila Ribeiro (2017, 61) stresses that in prioritizing the “diversity of experiences, there is a consequent breakdown of a universal vision. A black woman will have distinct experiences from a white woman because of her social position, she will experience gender in another way.” Only from the understanding of multiple experiences, vulnerabilities, privileges and challenges can we solidify the basis of understanding the logical-linear concept of gender. The author brings the perspective that “when we talk about the right to a dignified existence, to a voice, we are talking about social locus, how this imposed position hinders the possibility of transcendence” (Ribeiro 2017, 64).

On religion, journalism, gender and blackness: a Latin-American perspective Research on journalism and religion in Latin America is almost entirely absent in academic studies. However, Magali Cunha (2018) traces the development of research regarding media and religion, particularly in Brazil. She notes there are two groups of studies. First, there are those focused on content analysis of religious media, predominantly in the 1970s. Secondly, there are those on the reception of religious media, specially from the 1990s. What seems to be missing, is an analysis on how the media approaches religion. And this last group would be the most important for understanding the intersection between journalism and religion. Searches of journal databases, especially those focused on South American and Brazilian productions (e.g., Periodical Portal Capes, Scielo), attest for the rarity of works specifically on religion and journalism. We agree with Stewart Hoover (2014, 64) who identifies the tendency for media scholars to underestimate religion “as much for theoretical as methodological reasons.” Hoover (2014, 64) continues, “media theorists tend to adhere to a fairly strict definition of secularization.”

Religion and secularization Based on Hoover’s proposition (2014), we briefly focus on secularization studies. One way of approaching the term is through the modern process of compartmentalization of experience and, prominently, the separation of public and private aspects of life. The Brazilian sociologist Cecília Mariz (2006) talks about encompassing social life to describe the centrality of religion in pre-modern societies. Secularization can be considered as the movement to remove religion from political-social centrality, creating the public sphere. Religion thus comes to occupy the private aspects of life. That helps understand the tensions between journalism and religion: the latter is understood as a part of private life while the former emerges as the voice of the public sphere (Wolton 2004, Vieira-Souza 2014). 216

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This remark does not explain the fact that there are works on the intersection between journalism and religion in other parts of the world, while in Latin America, the absence is notable. We suggest that in societies where the notions of public and private are more well established probably the interchanges between them are more visible. Consequently, it would be easier to describe, analyze and criticize them. In Latin America, the process of secularization is characterized by negotiations between religion and politics – the private and public spheres – and the intersection is more problematic. Perhaps the absence of studies on the intersection comes alongside an ideal of what journalism should be, based on the North-Atlantic experience. The secularization debate is long, large, full of nuances and even disagreements among scholars. Mariz (2006) and Zepeda (2010) affirm that it was necessary to deal with religion in the modernization process of societies. The approach to it however was to propose an atheistic/humanistic devotion; to simply think about overcoming it and moving forward; or, to replace its function of social aggregation with other institutions and social bodies; or even to maintain the sacred, without religion (Mariz 2006, Zepeda 2010). In the beginning of the 20th century, the secularization debate was based upon these diverse approaches. In addition to theoretical perspective, scholars observed the decline of religion both in institutional/political influence and in number of believers (Zepeda 2010, 130). In this period, research studies were mostly European and considered realities from the North Atlantic (Mariz 2001, Fonseca 2011). From the middle of the 20th century onward, Latin America played an important role for the creation of secularization theories. Its religious effervescence challenges propositions that are more radical and contradicts the hypotheses that bet on the end of religion.1 The Latin-American context (together with other peripheral regions) forced studies to become more refined and complex 2 (Mariz 2001, Fonseca 2011). The debate around secularization continues to this day. The complex compartmentalization of the aspects of life brought by modernity forced religions to reorganize their foundations and traditions. This generates, on the one hand, a fundamentalist response. On the other hand, space is made for new associations to break barriers. Thus, contact points emerge that permit the challenging of forces and diffusion, to rupture or simply to create new configurations (Vieira-Souza 2014). Hence, intersections are possible in modern-secularized contexts with negotiations among different areas of life/experiences.

Latin America, BECs and liberation The Liberation Theology and Basic Ecclesial Communities (BECs) are an example of recreating European inheritance and negotiating between religious and social realities. The religious experiences of Latin America reflect its history of colonial domination and resistance against it. The strength of Roman Catholicism throughout the region speaks clearly of the violence of colonization and its impositions. The forms of syncretism found within Catholicism and the contemporary religious plurality tell of resistance. Typically, in Latin-American experiences, LT and BECs respond to everyday oppressions with a mix of faith and social analysis. This experience also suggests a model of secularization that occurs in negotiation with religion, even in its institutional aspect: The BECs were promoted by the clergy and participated in the activities of the parishes. The BECs functioned as small mutual support groups that gathered to pray and discuss everyday life. With the influence of LT, which supposed that Christ’s incarnation pointed to the intervention of faith in structures, BECs came to form both individuals of faith and of political consciousness – and 217

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politicians. They were intense during the Latin-American dictatorships, as a way of confronting authoritarianism, oppressions and human rights violations, especially among the poorest (Hewitt 1990). BECs and LT have become weaker in recent years. However, the marks of this intense phase continue: These experiences have marked Shukura’s trajectory.

The multiplicity of conceptualizations of journalism In his work Being a journalist in Brazil – professional identity and academic training, Lopes (2013, 33) suggests that “a less narrow path to reaching an understanding of journalism is to avoid the slippery trail of stating what it is and affirm what it is not.” In this sense, the author maintains that her trade and definition is not “literature, advertising, science, art or history, although the journalist or the journalistic product may have characteristics that resemble or are shared with those” (Lopes 2013, 33). This means journalism involves knowledge, policy (through rhetoric) and rhythm of functioning marked simultaneously by the present time and periodicity (always current). Far from limiting the definitions of journalism, we find in these dimensions a crucial theoretical input to the presentation of the scope of the subjective and practical context of the profession (Lopes 2013). The dual character we capture from journalism is intimately linked to its modern origin. The history of news media can be traced back to the Enlightenment, to the advent of modern cities that produced daily news, information and politics. Mitchell Stephens (2007, 133) claims the press’s origin has a direct relationship with commerce routes and political power, which organize the first news system. The Industrial Revolution turned this first system into the rational and technological means for production and diffusion of information. The Brazilian researcher Nelson Traquina (2005, 34) also identifies the origins of journalism in the 19th-century press. The new media professionals were designated a new task: to provide information, instead of producing propaganda. Journalism gained legitimacy as a profession as media companies expanded. Traquina (2005, 34) claims that this commercial activity acquired the status of public service, as the profession focused on “news, searching for the truth, independence and objectivity.” This moment of journalism’s birth coincides with the consolidation of the separation of public and private, that is, with the effect of the processes of secularization in Europe. This is not mere coincidence: the modern notions of sovereignty, democracy and public are the conditions of possibility for the birth of the media, as we know it. (Wolton 2004). It is also probably no coincidence that the word public refers both to the sphere of politics and reason and to the group of people who consumes media: the audience. Religion and journalism then have an intimate relationship with secularization. However, the relationship goes in opposite directions. For religion, secularization came to be thought of as its end. For journalism, it permitted its start. We are of course constructing caricatures, but it is a fact that secularization is, for religion and religiosities, a turning point and in the institutional sense entails a loss of relevance (at least in most contexts and strongly in the West). For journalism, secularization brings about the demand for communication capable of putting itself in place or constructing what is public.

The concept of race: an analytical and discursive category Stuart Hall (2015) presents the concept of race as a category that is not conceptually scientific. It is a political and social construct within which discourses organized in a system of (socio-economic) power, exploitation and exclusion are framed – racism. He considers race a 218

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floating signifier, which gives meaning to the issues. According to Hall (2015, 1) race “is one of those major concepts which organize the great classificatory systems of difference which operate in human societies.” The term manages to give dimension to the discrimination that has affected the black population since enslavement. Even so, as we are discussing a kind of language, the meaning is not fixed and is instead subject to “slippage” of meaning and “floats in a sea of relational differences” (2015 [1995], 1). When we define it as a discursive category, we recognize that “all attempts to ground this concept scientifically, to locate differences between the races, on what one might call scientific, biological, or genetic grounds, have been largely shown to be untenable” (Hall 2015, 1). That said, one path to understanding the concept’s broad and specific dimension is identification of a sociological sense: when a person’s skin color is associated with a marginalized, denigrated and excluded ancestry. We must then remember that racializing the debate without bringing the whiteness agenda is problematic. Araújo (2006, 77) maintains, “(n)aturally, for all of us, by virtue of our cultural upbringing, the superior aesthetic standard can only be represented by those who continue to hold the privilege.” For Sueli Carneiro (2003) the answer lies in understanding the construction and reconstruction of representative systems that contribute to a denaturalization of the central position of whiteness in spaces of public visibility. Again, the modern universal is unmasked as private, because it is masculine and white. Therefore, race is reflected in a social representation, affecting black men and women in individual terms. It stipulates how people are seen – being white or being black, for example, is loaded with a symbology of privileges and exclusion, respectively. We therefore see a social and political dimension, because “the racial divide between blacks and whites genuinely exists” (Gomes 2005, 47).

Black Woman: why is intersectionality the key to many questions? Having presented a brief critical and constructive overview of the conceptualization of race, we would like to reinforce the impossibility of considering the categories of race and gender from different viewpoints. Intersectionality is a tool that allows us to analyze the complexities of experiences, scenarios and contexts – in which different people and groups are contemplated – without isolating any of the factors acting on those individual’s lives. The African-American author Kimberlé Crenshaw dedicated herself to studies on intersectionality after a personal experience that proved the multiple axes of oppression could not be analyzed separately. Thus, the concept of intersectionality presents itself to identify how racial discrimination and gender discrimination operate together, limiting black women’s chances of success. In an interview, Kimberlé contextualizes and justifies the continued use of the term: In every generation and in every intellectual sphere and in every political moment, there have been African-American women who have articulated the need to think and talk about race through a lens that looks at gender, or think and talk about feminism through a lens that looks at race. (Adewunmi 2014) In the definition of two Latin-American authors, Fernanda Lopes and Jurema Werneck (2007), intersectionality is defined more broadly, addressing factors of extreme social marginalization such as color, race, ethnicity, gender, social class, living with HIV and AIDS, 219

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Women

Race/ Ethnicity

Poor

Southern

Figure 15.1

Illustration of intersectionality (Crenshaw 2002).

disability or any other factors of social complexity. As a category of relational analysis, it allows us to identify social relations in their many dimensions. To understand, therefore, the functioning of intersectionality, it is necessary to reflect on the “coexistence of different factors (vulnerabilities, abuses and discriminations), also called axes of subordination, which happen simultaneously in people’s lives” (Werneck 2007, 3). A diagram helps us to visualize the functioning of intersectionality. Jurema Werneck explains that it corresponds to the meeting, that is, the intersection of the multiple factors that influence the lives of black women individually and collectively: We agree with Werneck (2007, 4) that “the central point where, as shown in the Figure 15.1, the color becomes more intense, signifies the intersectionality that produces the concrete way these different factors act on people in general and black women in particular.”

Gender symbology from the perspective of blackness The expression that chains feminism to a Eurocentric and universal perspective warns us of the barriers raised when it is not understood that we are talking about women with different vulnerabilities. As such, it is necessary to always question what gender realities we are talking about. We cannot unify them and approach them unilaterally. This is one of the first steps to the basis of understanding black feminism and tensioning all the limits of the traditional logic.

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Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex (1980) was unprecedented in the history of feminism in presenting grounds for redefining what it is to be a man or a woman. In the same way, the understanding of gender relations was also structured as “a first way of giving meaning to power” (Scoot 1989, 21). As studies deepened, women as a category of analysis was questioned on several occasions in relation to defining a single and indivisible biological identity. The spread of post-structuralist perspectives guided by the Foucauldian notion presented the idea of sexuality as a socio-historical construct forged by discourses and institutions (Foucault 2005). In this dialogue, the concept of gender has been expressed through notions of deconstruction and difference in the post-modern era. The gender construct can then be aligned with recognition of the role of racism and other forms of discrimination that cross this category. One can also address the dimension from the perspective that there is a specific group of women who present distinct experiences of oppression – defined as “any unjust situation where, systematically and over a long period of time, one group denies another group access to the resources of society” (Collins 2000, 4). Based on these theories, it should be emphasized that black feminism emerges by questioning racial inequalities and challenging the universalization of experiences. We also need to remember that the vector of race directly and primarily influences the experience of black women as a limiting element to the possibilities of success, recognition and positive representation of this specific group. Consequently, black feminism seeks to question historically imposed systems of domination, which resulted in racist and sexist practices. We therefore highlight the pertinence of addressing the axes of inequalities of race and gender among black women – specifically black woman journalists. The concepts apply to our proposed dynamic, as we understand the racial dimension’s impact – inserted in sexist perspectives – and discuss an exemplary case, Shukura, which demonstrates the trajectory that confronts the logic of workplace oppression.

Journalism in Brazil and South/Latin America The Global Media Monitoring Project (GMMP 2015a) study, developed by the World Association for Christian Communication (WACC), presents the global view of female media representation. The data is grouped by region and separates South America into Latin America and the Caribbean. Not all countries in these regions are included in the data, and Brazil did not participate in any of the 20 editions of the project (Figures 15.2a and b). From the graphs, we highlight that Caribbean countries have greater equity than the Latin-American region, though the study shows significant differences in the region: “in Trinidad & Tobago, Puerto Rico and Barbados three quarters of the newspaper reporters were female, while in Suriname only one in ten was a woman” (GMMP 2015c, 16). In Latin America, there is significant difference in the presenters’ age. Among women in this role, 43% are between 19 and 34 years old, 33% between 35 and 49 and only 21% between 50 and 64. Among men, the relationship with age is inverted: 53% of presenters are between 34 and 49 years old, 26% between 50 and 64 and only 14% between 19 and 34. The percentages suggest the image of youth is prized in women over professional experience. In Brazil, production of data on the profile of media professionals was non-existent prior to the 2012 study Who are the Brazilian Journalists – Brazilian Journalist Profile (Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC) joint with National Federation of Journalists (FENAJ), 2012). Comparison of data from the Brazilian study with that of the study across Latin America

221

Priscila Vieira-Souza and Andréia Coutinho Louback Caribbean

(a)

Male Female

46% 54%

Latin America

(b)

Male Female

Figure 15.2

(a) and (b) Caribbean and Latin America journalists by sex (GMMP 2015b, 2015c).

and the Caribbean is compromised by methodological differences. There is no specific data, for example, on newsreaders, as opposed to reporters in the Brazilian report. Another methodological issue is that the Brazilian study considered training in the area, not only active media professionals (this includes journalism graduates who are academics or work in other areas) (Figures 15.3a and b). Methodological differences aside, Brazil, Shukura’s country, reproduces the inequalities of Latin America. The study indicates that in Brazil, although women represent the majority, men occupy the highest positions, implying promotion and career evolution. The report also notes that the percentage of black men and women was less than half that of Brazil’s general population: only 5% classified themselves as black (Figure 15.4). After this first survey, other initiatives updated the data. A recent study by Comunique-se and Apex Conteúdo Estratégico (2018) demonstrates that transformations have affected the profile of the country’s journalists. The survey covered 26,000 professionals and included indepth research with 266 Brazilian journalists. This study included only media professionals. According to the study, men represent 58.2% while women represent 41.8% of all professionals. This means if we consider the media type in which each group operates, we arrive at the following indicators in the Brazilian scenario: male predominance in newspaper staff; in radio stations and studios, the number of male professionals is three times greater; in television, the number of women (49.9%) is almost equal that of men (50.1%). To better understand the field’s complexity, another study (2017) undertaken by the organization Gênero e Número (Gender and Number) in partnership with the Brazilian Association of Investigative Journalism (Abraji) revealed 86.4% of women have experienced 222

Gender, religion and journalism in Brazil Brazilian journalists by sex (2012)

(a)

64% 36%

Male Female

Brazilian journalists with income below and above five minimum salaries, by sex (2012) 70

(b)

65,5

60 50 Less than 5 MS

40

More than 5 MS

30

50 46 31,9

20 10 0

Men

Women

Figure 15.3 (a) and (b) Brazilian journalists (UFSC and FENAJ 2012).

2%

1% 2%

18%

White Black Brown

5%

Asian 72%

Indigenous Other. Which?*

Figure 15.4

Brazilian journalists by race (UFSC and FENAJ 2012).

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episodes of gender discrimination and 70.2% have witnessed or heard of cases of harassment in the professional environment. The survey was conducted with more than 500 professionals, demonstrating sexist attitudes in Brazil’s different regions and vehicles, especially in print newsrooms. Discussing female voices in journalism has been more contentious. Besides having been a male dominated profession, women could not find space or credibility to feature live or in coverage that is more complex. However, when we analyze the female and black voices, we still significantly lack representation in the contemporary panorama. The character presented is considered an exception to the profile of journalists of Brazil. Visibility and greater protagonism is not a reality for black women in the media. Regarding religion, studies on the profile of journalists in Brazil simply do not collect information. Finally, The Thrust Project conducted a survey during the years 2016–2017 with professionals in the country and included religion (Figures 15.5a and b). The result is surprising in its contrast with the national average: In the 2010 Demographic Census (the last conducted in the country) of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), agnosticism falls within the option without religion. The majority of journalists fall in this group. This contributes to understanding why research about journalists did not include data on religion and corroborates Hoover’s statement (2014, 64). Roman Catholicism, which covers 85% of the Brazilian population, appears as the religion of only 33.8% of journalists.

Profile of participating journalists

(a)

13,2% 1,0%

Atheist/agnostic Catholic Spiritist Protestant/Evangelical Jewish Other

4,4% 38,2% 9,3%

33,8%

(b)

Percentage distribution of the population by religous group 2,00% 2,70% 0,00% 4,10% 4,90%

Roman Catholics Pentecostal/Neopentecostal Evangelicals No religion Other evangelicals Missionary evangelicals Other religions Spiritists Umbanda and Candomblé

Figure 15.5

8,00%

13,40% 65,00%

(a) and (b) Journalists X population by religious groups (The Trust Project 2017; IBGE, 2010).

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Shukura, the life story of a Christian black woman journalist in Brazil: a case study In Brazilian journalism, female professionals are mostly white, single and aged 30 years old or less. The majority are agnostic (there is no data that cross-references sex with belief/ religion). Shukura, 39 years old, a black woman, Brazilian raised in Rio de Janeiro’s deprived urban periphery. We could list many personal and professional characteristics; she is after all a public figure. However, we limit ourselves to the key peculiarities that relate to our main theme. The character is a Catholic woman, journalist and known for acting in human rights and racism issues. What few know, however, is the path that led her to television screens to report to Brazilian citizens the latest news of the country – especially in Rio de Janeiro. I’m from a very poor community and, in my neighbourhood, we didn’t even have university students at the time. I was the first university student there, and I was the first university student of all generations of my family. And journalism appeared to me as a social issue, which is what I do to this day, activism. I had already participated in Basic Ecclesial Communities (BEC) linked to the Liberation Theology of the Catholic Church, which was very politicised. Yesterday I happened to visit the church where I said “this is where my social status for journalism was born” — I remember that I was there and I had already decided to do journalism, because I thought it was a tool for structural change in society, to call out injustices. This I already realised in adolescence, I said as a child that I wanted to be a journalist, in adolescence I had conviction that about it and I was seventeen or eighteen years old, when the Massacre of Eldorado dos Carajás3 happened, I remember that I was in the middle of a mass and the news of the slaughter came in the morning and I had that click: “This is what I want. To fight against this injustice in Brazil.” And we need to have a voice. The issue of the voice. The people need to have a voice in this country, the people. It’s not possible. And then I got engaged in journalism. I didn’t have racial awareness yet at that time. (Shukura, 39 years old) Shukura also presents an initial narrative regarding the encounter with journalism in childhood. The core of what she reports has a differential load with a social ideal of a “tool for structural change in society” (Shukura 2016). It all started in the BECs. As we presented earlier, this is an experience peculiar to Latin-American Catholic religiosity, with a strong social emphasis. It is in this environment of faith that Shukura develops as a (black) Brazilian woman and, after the tragic slaughter of the Massacre of Eldorado dos Carajás in 1996, she receives confirmation of her professional vocation. It is worth remembering that the insight she described in the interview occurs during a Catholic liturgy. The unrest she feels that morning is grounded in a social status. That is, being a black, poor, suburban woman draws her into a fight for her voice. The journalist begins on a path of creating strategies to address inequalities. Shukura’s trajectory is marked by surprises and opportunities as a black woman. Considering that, television media holds white men and women as an aesthetic standard, the effective presence of a black woman journalist in presentation positions is a significant achievement in the anti-racist fight in audiovisual media. This only confirms there is still a series of structural changes required to make equality a reality and not simply an egalitarian simulacrum represented by a minority. 225

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I arrive at PUC [Pontifical Catholic University] and it’s that thing, right? An initial shock. I was the only black journalism student that year. I was the only black student there for a long time, I had been the first of the project [of scholarships for black and poor students] too, the project was very recent. And there, I begin to perceive myself as black, as a black woman. At PUC I already did this differentiation — “I’m not that, that’s not me.” This starts to develop. And very early on I needed to work, because I was very poor. I’d get a lift, I did cleaning to go to university, all to pay the bus ticket. My dad was a bus driver and I used to hitch rides with his friends. Until they put me off the bus many times and I had to find a different way. (Shukura, 39 years old) In this sense, the university space is presented as a dividing scenario, accompanied by significant transformations to the trajectory, of the process of perception of ethnic and racial belonging – added to the challenges of living together and surviving in a white, elite environment.4 The social meaning of being a black woman journalist, that outlines the concepts of identification and identity, was one of the emblematic questions of the interview with Shukura. As we asked what does it mean to be a black woman journalist to you? we found the question could have multiple manners of response. After all, understanding your own subjectivity immersed in so many choices, notions of belonging, ruptures, experiences and processes of construction of thoughts and knowledge is already a path of conflicts. Although faced with a difficult trajectory, from the social and psychological perspective, with all the gender and race issues that Shukura shared, gratitude is a characteristic peculiar to her personality and narrative. Soon, once again, we see how religion also permeates this perception. Spirituality as a lifestyle and faith as a reconciling bond in her life – personal and professional – is recurrently mentioned, as in: I give thanks every day for what I have. My spirituality, my way of living makes me thankful all the time, for example, I give thanks for the plate of food, I give thanks because I will soon leave, I give thanks because I will see my godson, because I will pass by the church. I give thanks when the broadcast starts, I give thanks when the broadcast finishes. I always do this. And I found that this gives me pleasure all the time, in everything. (Shukura, 39 years old) Next, Shukura recalls her university career and her arrival to television, even if she “believed” that was not her place and writing away from cameras and visibilities would be a more real and predictable alternative for a black woman journalist. Going to PUC, I discover myself and start looking for an internship in print news – which is what I wanted to do. But I never got print internships I only got television. I went to Canal Futura, to GNT, and I was building a career in television. I stayed because I needed to pay my travel. I sat exams and “some mechanism” boycotted me on the print news exams and I passed the television exams. I passed all the television selection processes, even for Rede Globo. I went to the final phase, which was the interview, and at interview another person was chosen – who happened to have connections there. I always passed for television and never for newspaper. I kept staying because I thought it was a way to pay for my ticket, only not, right? It was fate acting. Until at the GNT 226

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internship, I really enjoyed writing. So I satisfied my desire to write reports on the street without appearing. I was super happy until my boss said no, I had to appear in the video. I’m saying this to explain how my racial awareness came about. I refused, I won’t do it. I won’t do it. Until my boss, one day, called my cameraman, I was leaving and my cameraman came back to talk to me, “So, Shukura, here’s the thing. They told me if I come back without a stand-up5 from you, I’m gonna get fired. So, sorry.” So I was forced to. And that was my reflection. (Shukura, 39 years old)

Were you ashamed? It wasn’t a question of shame. It was a matter of not thinking that was my place. So it was a matter of not seeing, not perceiving the black woman in the video. It was a much bigger issue. It was that Brazilian television had formed me as a “non-presenter”, you see? That was very clear to me. I started thinking about it, and when I appear in the video, it is clear I’m celebrated as a black presenter, I was chosen. Soon after I had a story in which I was chosen as the presenter, as the “face of GNT at the time.” Shame I only stayed there a few months. When I appeared in the GNT video, Band called me. So, in this way, it started growing in me really strongly. I began to ask “who is this Shukura who doesn’t want it?” Actually, I wanted an easier path in terms of the race issue. The path of not appearing. (Shukura, 39 years old) The journalist presents the “path of not appearing” as an issue of self-rejection. We can view this as the first climax of her narrative, because simultaneously a racial awareness begins to be forged – when Shukura reflects on her self-representation, her place as a black woman and her role as an intern in that environment. When Shukura says that “Brazilian television did not form her as a presenter,” she corroborates Araújo’s theorization (2006, 77) that “naturally, for all of us, by virtue of our cultural upbringing, the superior aesthetic standard can only be represented by those who continue to hold the privilege.” The persistence of the profiles of white men and women represented in the audiovisual is historical and cultural, leading us to naturalize this imaginary. When there is a disruption of this scenario by the channel of the Brazilian pay-TV channel GNT, the journalist describes the episode as a phenomenon celebrated by Brazilian viewers. What does it mean, after all, a black woman journalist in front of the network’s cameras? If we are part of a society that under-represents the image of black women, what happens in the collective imaginary when we place one, two or three active reporters with the power of decision and opinion in a medium of communication? For Sueli Carneiro (2003) the answer lies in understanding the construction and reconstruction of representative systems that contribute to a denaturalization of the central position of whiteness in spaces of public visibility. This is the same imaginary in fact that triggered in Shukura, as a black woman journalist, a sense of not belonging to that position of visibility, but to a category of lower aesthetic – exposure – like printed news, for example, where she would only have to sign the texts. “The path of not appearing,” described as easier and more obvious to her subjectivity, shows us how racism acts on the psyche, imprinting negative marks on self-esteem and self-projection. This reveals a kind of unconscious process of acceptance/rejection when she herself says “it was a matter of not thinking that was her place.” That is, there is a conflict between the projection of her identity and her body. 227

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Additionally, in January 2019, Brazil was shocked by a news report: Shukura was fired from the station where she had worked for almost 15 years. The news generated revolt and endless questions on social media, as the reason was not stated in the media. The first information came from the journalist herself on her Instagram profiles, where it said, “Yes. I’M SAYING GOODBYE. I ended up in public journalism consistent with my own beliefs... My feeling today is of much gratitude.” The mark of gratitude continues, even in the face of an event seen by many as adverse. At least three major Brazilian newspapers republished the news, but gave no opinion or hypotheses regarding what happened.6 What is worth noting is that, in all headlines, journalists reported the impact on representation of black professionals on television. Shukura with her history, representation and trajectory was one of our few references – a Catholic black woman journalist – with an active presence in the media. Now, it remains for us to continue to follow our character’s future professional trajectory, certain that religion, gender and race are significant factors to the exercise of analyzing oral narratives.

Conclusion This chapter contributes to the area of study primarily by proposing intersections. Considering the scarcity of work on journalism and religion the publication of this study, from a Latin-American perspective, breaks with this absence and has the potential to foster research on these two pillars. The same can be said in relation to the other intersections present in the text. Data, information and the history of a black woman journalist challenge the fields of communication and religion by displacing the gaze and thought. Gender and racial inequality must be considered in theories, categories of analysis and interventions proposed. Our initial approach was to follow a methodological perspective that contemplates the life story to visualize the intersections between journalism, race and religion. In this sense, we discussed a case study narrative that repeatedly showed how the character’s spirituality directly impacted on her lifestyle, career choice and awareness of the challenges of race and gender in the Brazilian – and Latin American – context. Another important point of our discussion was the impossibility of disconnecting the factors of race and gender. Being a black woman in practice carries a succession of episodes of exclusion and institutional barriers that operate in the professional, personal and structural contexts in Brazil. Religion occupies a central space in Shukura’s subjectivity, which constantly finds coping strategies in spirituality expressed in gratitude and recognition of what she has achieved so far. Even in the sensitive moment of her dismissal, which brings frustration and questions regarding the economic and power system, the character equips herself with this feeling as a weapon of resistance. For the intersection between religion and journalism, the data analyzed and life trajectory presented pose great challenges. The disregard of religion in the first surveys on the profile of journalists dissonates with Shukura’s narratives. Although journalists in the country tend toward a rather different religious configuration from national statistics, religion is present – either in the profession or in society. It needs to be approached and considered by these professionals. In fact, we suggest this disparity as an area for future studies. Considering the absence of data on religion in the first studies and its inclusion in the most recent research, we can suggest the topic tends to be a growing area of research in Latin America. It is important that journalists and communication scholars avoid taking the reality of their professional class as the basis for social analysis. In this point, we also see the proposition that the theory of secularization is sometimes taken in its most radical aspects (Hoover 2014).

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The trend toward growing interest in religion and its social intersections in Brazil is also rooted in the specific country context. For instance, the 2018 presidential elections in Brazil revealed a political-religious reconfiguration, with the rise of evangelicals to important posts in the government and an increase in the number of parliamentarians in congress. Alongside this, there is a conservative turn that attacks progressive policies on gender and race issues – such as issues related to reproductive rights and minorities access to higher education. In the secularization debate, it is important to be cautious and understand the nuances and history of these processes. The new political-religious configuration reveals religious adaptation to forms of secularization through negotiations with the political-economic field. It is certainly a fertile field for researchers in the area and to which we wish to continue contributing.

Notes 1 Mariz (2006, 105) affirms, “the Enlightenment believed in the end of religion” and sought “to replace all knowledge revealed, or based on faith, with rational knowledge.”





Further readings bell hooks, 2015. Feminism Is for Everybody – Passionate Politics. New York: Routledge. The book is a guide to learn about the specific issues which black people, especially women, face in society. Fonseca, B., 2011. Relações e privilégios: estado, secularização e diversidade religiosa no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Novos Diálogos. Fonseca describes the relations between religion and governments in the Republican age of Brazil (1888–1988) and presents a brief good account of the theory of secularization in a Latin-American perspective (for Portuguese readers). Hewitt, W. E., 1990. Religion and the Consolidation of Democracy in Brazil: The Role of the Comunidades Eclesiais de Base (CEBs). Sociological Analisys, 51(2), 139–152. The article is a classic text on the Theology of Libertation and REBs in Brazil. It gives the reader (academic or not) good information and critical analysis about the issue. Hill, P., and Bilge, S., 2016. Intersectionality. Malden: Polity Press. The book shows us that the concept of intersectionality has become a hot topic in academic and activist circles alike and what it really means in the reality of our society. Hoover, S., 2014. Mídia e religião: premissas e implicações para os campos acadêmico e midiático. Comunicação  e Sociedade, [e-journal] 35(2). Available at Universidade Metodista de São Paulo website https://www.metodista.br/revistas/revistas-ims/index.php/CSO/article/view/4906, accessed 8 October 2014.

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Hoover addresses some of the main issues in the media and religion field, such as the ways in which religion and media interact; how both dimensions have changed in recent years; and the implications and consequences of these changes for media professionals and for researchers in the field. For these reasons, the paper is an ideal first reading on the intersection of media and religion. Nascimento, Abdias, 2016. O genocídio do negro brasileiro: processo de um racismo mascarado. São Paulo: Editora Perspectiva. This book shows why the widely accepted concept of “racial democracy” in Brazil was, and still is, a myth. Questioning the idea of harmonic racial relations in Brazil, the book was censored from the 1977 World Festival of Black Arts, in Nigeria.

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Gender, religion and journalism in Brazil Hall, S., 2015. Raça, o significante flutuante. Tradução de Liv Sovik, em colaboração com Katia Santos. Rio de Janeiro. Revista Z Cultural 2/8. Available at http://revistazcultural.pacc.ufrj.br/ raca-o-significante-flutuante%ef%80%aa, accessed 7 June 2019. Hewitt, W. E., 1990. Religion and the Consolidation of Democracy in Brazil: The Role of the Comunidades Eclesiais de Base (CEBs). Sociological Analysis, 51(2), 139–152. Hoover, S., 2014. Mídia e religião: premissas e implicações para os campos acadêmico e midiático. Comunicação e Sociedade, [e-journal] 35(2). Available through Universidade Metodista de São Paulo website https://www.metodista.br/revistas/revistas-ims/index.php/CSO/article/view/4906, accessed 8 October 2014. Korte, A., 2011. A Genealogical Introduction to Religion and Gender. Religion and Gender, [e-journal] 1(1). Available at https://brill.com/view/journals/rag/1/1/article-p1_1.xml, accessed 11 November 2018. Lopes, F. L., 2013. Ser jornalista no Brasil: identidade profissional e formação acadêmica. Rio de Janeiro: Paulus Editora. MARIZ, C. L., 2001. Secularização e dessecularização: comentários a um texto de Peter Berger. Religião & Sociedade, V. 21, N. 1. Abril 2001. p.25–39. Mariz, C. L., 2006. Mundo moderno, ciência e secularização. In: Brígida, Eliane, ed., Fazer ciência, pensar a cultura: estudos sobre ciência e religião. Rio de Janeiro: UFRJ – Centro de Ciências da Saúde, 97–128. Martin, D., 1991. The Secularization Issue: Prospect and Retrospect. The British Journal of Sociology, 42(3), 465–474. Matsuda, M. J., 1986. Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls’ Theory of Justice. New Mexico Law Review, 16(3). Available at https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol16/iss3/18, accessed 12 December 2018. Ribeiro, D., 2017. O que é lugar de fala? Belo Horizonte (BH): Letramento; Justificando. Scoot, J., 1989. Gender and the Politics of History. New York: Columbia University Press. Shukura (pseudonym), 2016. Black Women Journalists in Rio de Janeiro: Their Life Trajectories and Resistance Narratives in the Face of Racism. Interviewed by Andréia Coutinho Louback (Master researcher). Rio de Janeiro, 13 October 2016. Stephens, M., 2007. A History of News. New York: Oxford University Press. The Trust Project, 2017. Brazilian Chapter [PowerPoint presentation]. Capítulo brasileiro –The Trust Project. Available at https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1wXvhhcVNhcoLFf h54kZUo90KEyhL4Awz9ncckTpKqYE/edit#slide=id.g23139f 7651_0_0, accessed 15 December 2018. Traquina, N., 2005. Teorias do jornalismo, porque as notícias são como são. Volume 1: Porque As Notícias São Como São, 2nd edition. Florianópolis: Insular. Vieira-Souza, P., 2014. Comunicação, Modernidade, Religião: relações culturais na história e produção do Centro Áudio Visual Evangélico – CAVE (1951–1971). Available through Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro website http://www.pos.eco.ufrj.br/site/teses_dissertacoes_interna.php?tease=15, accessed 5 January 2015. Werneck, J., 2007. Construindo a Equidade: Estratégia para Implementação de Políticas Públicas para a Superação das Desigualdades de Gênero e de Raça para as Mulheres Negras. Rio de Janeiro: AMNB. Wolton, D., 2004. Pensar a comunicação. Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília. Zepeda, J. J. L., 2010. Secularização ou ressacralização? O debate sociológico contemporâneo sobre a teoria da secularização. Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, [e-journal] 73(24). Available at http:// www.scielo.br/pdf/rbcsoc/v25n73/v25n73a08.pdf, accessed 7 April 2012.

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16 JOURNALISM AND THE RISE OF HINDU EXTREMISM Reporting religion in a post-truth era Pradip Thomas Introduction This chapter focuses on the relationship between journalism, the rise of Hindu extremism and reporting in a post-truth era. By post-truth, I mean a general devaluation of traditional journalism’s commitment to objective reporting and of the journalist’s vocation to hold truth to power and to make the powers accountable to their publics. This lessening of value arguably is a consequence of the decline of journalism best exemplified by the Leveson inquiry in the UK on corruption and collusion in the Murdoch press and hastened by the rapid growth of online media resulting in the further marginalization of mainstream journalism. This tradition of journalism arguably has been difficult to operationalize in India and elsewhere. There has been a steady decline in the integrity of journalism in India highlighted by scandals related to so-called paid news (news for favor) and media owners dictated editorial choices and positions, along with growing gaps between the principles of journalism and its practices. However, there are also many examples of journalism making a difference, of investigative reporting and sting operations that have exposed corruption and that have to some extent contributed to major political fallouts. For example, Abdi and Shourie’s writings in the Sunday magazine and the Indian Express on the Bhagalpur blindings in the early 1980s played its part in strengthening the space and place for investigative journalism in India. Also, the sting operation by the investigative magazine Tehelka in 2001 that recorded corruption in the purchase of defense equipment contributed to bringing down the first Bharitya Janata Party (BJP)-led government linked to the National Democratic Alliance. The posttruth era in India has additionally been shaped by resurgent expressions of fundamentalist Hinduism, that of Hindutva (the Hindu Nation) and a dominant politics that has enabled and legitimized such expressions along with numerous obscurantist practices ostensibly directed toward validating the greatness of Hindu civilization.

The contexts of journalism in contemporary India Today, the establishment of an all-pervasive truth, which is dictated by selected groups is fraught, and attempts to establish a singular, all-pervasive truth is contested. The rise of vernacular journalism and the expansion of engaged and argumentative mediatized publics in 232

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post-liberal media environments across the nation has arguably facilitated the descent of this kind of truth from its pedestal. This ranges from its elite moorings in an upper-middle-class/ caste Anglo-sphere to a situation where competing truths, expressed and mediated through multiple media, offline and online, now command sizeable audiences. In other words, truths propagated by elite sources are now weighed by multiple, mediated publics who are in a position to accept, deride or discard. While there have been numerous pieces on the role of the media and journalism in conflict in India in online portals such as The Wire, The Hoot and Scroll and magazines such as Communalism Combat, Frontline and The Caravan, academic writings tend to be scattered although there has been a rise in writings on the growth of cyber nationalisms in India. Social media’s role in exacerbating inter-religious conflict, most recently that of the use of WhatsApp in mobilizations and circulations of graphic footage of the lynchings of mainly Muslim and nomadic herdsmen, has reinforced the view that there is a post-truth scaffolding and enabling environments that facilitate exclusive mobilizations and the persecution of often vulnerable minorities (see Chaudhuri 2018, Joshi 2018). Moreover, the rather blatant complicity of the ruling party and some news media in these crimes has resulted in a situation in which hate crimes against minorities and rationalists are justified and multiple signifiers circulated thus obfuscating the evidence for murders, ignoring the rule of law and replacing truths with multiple, manufactured discourses (see, for example, the outputs from Republic TV and India Upfront). George’s (2017) monograph on hate speech offers a cogent account of media complicity in the rise of Hindu nationalism. Mann’s (2016) article on the representation of the Sikh community in the context of the crisis in Punjab in the early 1980s in the Times of India explores issues related to media framing – media framing that led to the manufacture of stereotypes that labelled all Sikhs as violent and pre-modern. Thus, it contributed to justifying state violence against this community. Chakrabarti’s (2014) account of the ways in which television soap operas naturalize Hindu nationalist ideologies highlights the circulation of nationalist popular culture in everyday life. Udupa’s (2015a) article on archiving as history making explores the ways in which alternative histories of India are being curated online by Hindutva supporters. Journalist Varadarajan (1999) offers a historical and contemporary account of the role played by journalism in exacerbating communalism in India. Truths – enshrined in the Indian Constitution from secularism to the rights of minorities to practice their religion – have come under attack from the proponents of muscular Hinduism. The latter, under BJP rule, are involved in rewriting history, editing out the contributions made by minority communities to the history of the nation and creating Indian identity that is solely within the parameters of Hindu identity (while much has been written on this project, one of the more interesting articles on this issue has been written by Visweswaran et al. (2009)).There has been a rich and textured debate and discussions on the place of secularism in a resolutely religious country such as India in the media, while academic debates have pitted post-colonial scholars such as the redoubtable Nandy (2001) and Madan (1997) against secularists. Both are more sympathetic to tradition and what they see as fundamentalist forms of the secular, against the philosopher of science Nanda, whose writings include a fulsome critique of the political economy of reinvented tradition that she describes as the state-temple-market nexus. In his monograph Disenchanting India Quack (2012) explores the world of organized rationalism in India and the culture wars that this has ignited. Nanda has openly castigated the tendency for post-colonial scholars to celebrate indigenity at all costs since the project of indigenity, as they see it, has suffered under the onslaught of Western modernity, science and the rational. In Nanda’s way of thinking, enchanting India meaning the attempts to imbue a religious dimension to all things Indian 233

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has become a massive arena for a Hindutva, in which commercialized television plays an important role. Post-colonial scholars such as Nandy et al. (1997) highlighted the secular ideology of humanists such as the first Prime Minister of Independent India, Nehru, as a form of cultural arrogance since it did not acknowledge the lives of the vast majority of ordinary Indians whose lives were rooted in religion. To these people, religion was their framework for life. As they saw it, secularism and science questioned this security and certainty and left people with nothing to hold on to. Nanda however questions the inability of post-colonial theorists such as Nandy to see the cultural and material basis for dominant Hinduism within neo-liberal India and the role played by a politicized and commercialized Hinduism in extending support for traditions of incredulity in the name of religion.

Split publics, religion and journalism The cultural scholar Rajagopal (2009) has described the contested nature of religious nationalism in India in terms of its bearings on two distinct publics – what he has termed split publics, namely the English media consuming publics, on the one hand, and the publics involved in consuming vernacular media, on the other hand. The English media used a specific type of reasoning, and secularism as their basis for contesting the rise of Hindu nationalism that culminated in the destruction of the Babri Masjid mosque in Ayodhya in the late 1990s and that remains a focal point for Hindu nationalists. In contrast to that, the vernacular, Hindi media articulated a range of frameworks and references that were heterogeneous and that reflected a variety of positional bearings that overlapped with many publics supportive of Hindu resurgence (see Charu and Sharma 1990, Ahmad 1993, Charu and Sharma 1996, Davis 1996, Nandy et al. 1997, Deshpande 1998, Kauser 2007, Ahmad 2010). One can use the term split publics to understand the rise of new publics in different parts of our world who are supportive of the politics of Trump, Farage and Le Pen. Hauser highlights the rhetorical conditions that underlie publics and the fact that these conditions contribute to the “quality of arguments reached in a public sphere” (Hauser 1999, 275). He and others have argued that there are indeed multiple forms of rationality that are based on a variety of understandings of reasonableness and in which critical rationality is one form of reasonableness. While Rajagopal’s concept of split publics certainly has value, I think it is important to highlight the fact that at least in the case of Hindu nationalism in contemporary India, and despite pre-existing traditions of anti-Islamism in India, the vernacular public as an oppositional political movement was to an extent manufactured through the mediations, interventions and legitimacy provided by Hindu nationalism. This legitimacy was used to attack Muslims and Muslim institutions, and as such, it was by no means a spontaneous, autochthonous uprising of Hindus against Muslims. In this sense, one can argue that publics can be shaped, even manufactured. This background is important because it has impacted the traditions of journalism in India. While the cultures of mainstream journalism in India continue to play an important role in bringing truth to power, there is a need to reckon with the fact that multiple sensibilities and sensitivities now accompany journalism practice in India. Since the early 1990s and the liberalization of the media sphere, the media ecology has changed and this has led to an expansive increase in all types of journalism across multiple media channels, formats and delivery modes. India is one of the largest media markets in the world, with more than 850 satellite television channels, out of which there are more than 50 dedicated news channels and thousands of registered newspapers and magazines in numerous languages spread across the nation. This diversity and the diversity of formats and possibilities for citizen journalism, phone ins, participation in talk shows, Reality television and the like has enabled talk and 234

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conversation on multiple topics and the making of public spaces in which both text and context is now accounted for. In other words, journalism in India today caters to extraordinarily diverse audiences who are now involved in multiple public spheres through their many engagements with many media (see Mehta 2008, Punathambekar and Kumar 2014). This media diversity simply cannot be expected to uphold a singular truth on matters both mundane and serious. I am not arguing in favor of ethical relativism although within the current political circumstances in India and what would seem to be studied silence from the prime minister’s office on matters related to inter-faith conflict, there are opportunities for Hindu religious extremists to publically state ethically relativist explanations for the causes and consequences of majority-minority violence. Such silences in turn can be seen as both a type of political opportunism and as a form of tacit support for the fringe groups that contribute to the cause of Hindu nationalism, although it also exposes the fault lines between modernity and tradition on matters related to ethics. Journalism ethics in India is difficult to operationalize because of the existence of complex moralities that are not easy to reconcile with the universal truths that undergird the endeavors of mainstream journalism. Western universalities and Eastern rationalities do not always mesh and the present political climate in India offers possibilities for the reinforcements of split publics. Occasions when truths embedded in the Indian Constitution trump tradition, such as Supreme Court judgments in favor of the right of India’s to eat beef against the wishes of Hindu extremists, merely highlight the fact that the institutions of modernity such as the judiciary and journalism can and do play an important role in keeping democracy on track although there is always the potential for this project to be derailed, slowed down, obstructed by agendas of a religious-nationalist kind. Arguably, therefore, the moniker often used to describe India as the world’s largest democracy only accounts for the fact that periodic elections are held in India, and the military does not interfere with the business of statecraft or national politics. Democracy however remains a partial truth because it refers to institutions, institutional processes and values undergirding modernity that continue to be negotiated and that are yet to become the basis for a fundamental contract between every citizen and the state in India. Not all Indians are born into a context and circumstances that offer life chances strictly within the modernist paradigm. The preceding information on the contexts of journalism are important because they point to the complexities that need to be factored into understanding the practices of journalism in India. Udupa (2015b, 19) in her ethnographic study of news making in Bengaluru within the Times of India Group highlights the fact that some English language journalists as well as those writing in Kannada exhibited what she has termed a bhasha sensibility, meaning attitudes nurtured by the “sentiments and discursive activities shaped by flexible market segmentations and cultural logics of regional language and caste, and how journalists interpret them as they interface a changing city and experience changes unfolding in their own professional field”. She adds that these sensibilities included various political subjectivities including “right-wing Hindutva, regional chauvinism and caste dominance to progressive pro-farmer and pro-poor positions” (Udupa 2015b, 204). Arguably, the existence of such sensibilities along with the nature of dominant politics in India that is pro-Hindu and majoritarian makes for a very conflictual and contentious environment for journalism in contemporary India. The rest of this chapter will highlight the contentious nature of the relationship between media and religion in the context of the rise of right-wing Hindu sensibilities and attempts to mainstream such sensibilities. It is important to point out that despite multiple attempts to mainstream Hindu nationalism, such sensibilities and attempted actions are contested both in journalism and outside of it. 235

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Contested religion and assaults on journalism On September 7, 2017, the Kannada/English language journalist Gauri Lankesh and editor of the Gauri Lankesh Patrike was shot dead in her hometown Bengaluru. Her crime? She had fearlessly and courageously critiqued the complicities of Hindu nationalists in their many projects directed toward coercing minorities and shaping the imaginary and identity of a nation within the framework of a belligerent Hindu nationalism. While the media were quick to condemn this murder, her assailants have only recently been apprehended and the media have moved on to report other issues and realities. Borpujari (2017) in an online piece in The Diplomat on this murder has commented on the repercussions of this event for journalists involved in writing anything critical about the ruling party or on the activities of the many quasi-political groups that support the cause of extreme Hinduism. Fittingly, her murder has made journalists in the mainstream media uncomfortable. Soon after her murder, some journalists received threats that they would face similar fate if they continued to challenge Prime Minister Modi, the BJP or the RSS, or if they were “traitors like Muslims.” One such journalist is the popular TV journalist Ravish Kumar of the Hindi news channel NDTV 24×7, and he recently penned an open letter addressed to Modi, asking if he should also fear for his life. An investigation by Alt News revealed that one of the persons attacking Kumar online is followed on Twitter by Modi’s official Twitter account. (Borpujari 2017) While reporting on religion remains a sensitive issue for journalists in India, other issues as well, such as corruption in high places and conflicts of interest between politicians and business leaders such as between the MNC groups owned by the Adanis reported in the Indian Express and the Economic and Political Weekly, have also led to law suits and defamation charges filed against specific journalists. Nielsen (2017) on the threats facing journalists in India cites five salient concerns: 1 2 3 4 5

Attacks on journalists by politicians often belonging to the ruling party using demeaning, portmanteau descriptors such as presstitutes Private pressure by politicians and the bureaucracy such as the threat of income tax raids The trolling of journalists by right-wing trolls often tacitly or otherwise supported by the government in power Commercial pressures from advertisers, media owners on the media to report on safe issues The threat of defamation that is now routinely used by politicians and business persons against journalists

The fact that the Hindustan Times was forced to retract its Hate Tracker (Niha 2017) that helped “track acts of violence, threats of violence, and incitements to violence based on religion, caste, race, ethnicity, region of origin, gender identity and sexual orientation” (The Wire Staff 2017), across India after the stepping down of its editor in chief Bobby Ghosh in 2017 is another example of the media playing safe in a climate in which the economic and political consequences of dissent have become risks that most media outlets are not willing to take. 236

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Lankesh’s murder however was not an aberrant case but illustrates the rise of pre-meditated murders of secular journalists and rationalists and death threats against academics, such as the historian Romila Thapar who has been a strident critique of the attempts to rewrite and mainstream an alternate Hindu history of India, and artists such as India’s best known painter M. H. Hussein who was forced to go into exile to Dubai for painting Hindu Gods in the nude. In fact, in September 2017 alone, 3 journalists were murdered in India and the Committee for the Protection of Journalists has observed that 27 journalists have been murdered in India between 1992 and 2016 although the International Federation of Journalists claim that 70 journalists have been murdered in India since 2005 (Committee to Protect Journalists n.d.). On August 20, 2013, the noted rationalist Narendra Dabholkar was murdered in Pune, a city in the state of Maharashtra. His crime – he had founded a rationalist association and had spent a good part of his adult life exposing God men debunking superstition and the trickeries associated with popular religion, particularly Hinduism, and critiquing the relationship between politicians and an array of religious charlatans. An equally well-known rationalist and President of the Indian Rationalist Association, Sanal Edamaruku, challenged a self-declared Tantric, Pandit Surendra Sharma, on a television panel to demonstrate his powers on him by killing him using only magic. The Tantric chanted mantras and performed a ceremony to kill Sanal Edamaruku on live television. Another attempt was made later that same night – this time under the night sky. The television channel India TV that telecast this event received a large boost in ratings. After his attempts failed, the Tantric reported that Edamaruku must be under the protection of a powerful god, to which Edamaruku responded that he is an atheist (Rationalists 2010). Edamaruku has also taken on the Catholic Church. In 2012, Edamaruku investigated what was being called a miracle: a crucifix dripping water at Our Lady of Velankanni Church in Mumbai. He quickly discovered the dripping was actually caused by water seeping through the wall onto the crucifix. Edamaruku reported his results on TV-9 and criticized the Catholic Church for creating the so-called miracle and being anti-science (Rationalists 2012). In response, the church demanded an apology and its supporters filed official complaints against Edamaruku. He was charged with violating 295(a) of the Indian Penal Code, also known as the blasphemy law, which prohibits deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings or any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs. His lawyers argued that the law infringes on free speech and they requested the courts declare the law unconstitutional. Meanwhile, he was refused bail and fled to Europe. (Shaffer 2013)

Religion and media: factoring in commodification What do these examples of religion and media tell us? From being treated by the media as an epi-phenomenon in post-independent India that was avowedly founded on secular values, religion has moved from being of periphery interest to the media, at best illustrated by a brief discourse on Hinduism on the last page of The Hindu newspaper, to the coverage of key religious events by the state broadcaster Doordarshan. It became of key media interest, a contentious issue and a commodity. In a post-neo-liberal, deregulated media environment there are out of the 850 cable and satellite channels available close to 50 that are explicitly religious – mainly Hindu, along with Christian, Islamic, Buddhist and Jain channels. For the most part, these channels are owned by religious figures such as the so-called God men and women, financed by their supporters and to a lesser extent by transnational and local media corporations. 237

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Many of the Hindu-Hindi cable and satellite channels now offer a 24-hour mediations and re-mediations of devotional songs, mythological serials, rituals or discourses in Sanskrit Hindi, thus creating an aura of authenticity between public Hinduism and its technology mediated and remediated versions. One of the interesting dimensions of this new version of public, nationalist Hinduism is that it is being shaped by the consumption of so-called authentic traditions associated with Hinduism, inclusive of Yoga and Ayurveda. Both old and new media platforms are being used to expand the footprint of a resolutely material Hinduism that is presented as indigenous, local and anti-multinational. A case in point is the production of a 90-minute biopic on the God man Baba Ramdev (a multi-millionaire God man who incidentally owns one of the most popular religious channels in India, Aastha TV ) by Sony Entertainment Television in 2016. It featured both a story of his life as well as an extensive publicity for Ayurveda and yoga products popularized by his highly successful company Patanjali Ayurveda Ltd. and its many products that include shampoos, toothpaste, biscuits, noodles, juices, rice, wheat, honey and ghee (clarified butter). The key point of this program is to expand publicity for the promotion of pure products that are based on Ayurveda, give a competitive edge to Patanjali products and key multinationals involved in the packaged goods market a run for their money. Analysts see Patanjali as a potential challenger to established packaged goods companies such as Hindustan Unilever Ltd (HUL), Colgate-Palmolive (India) Ltd and Nestlé India Ltd that compete in India’s Rs.3.2 trillion-a-year consumer packaged goods market. (Mitra and Ahluwalia 2016) Arguably, what we are seeing is the commoditization of certain traditions inclusive of the Vedic sciences, numerology, etc., that have become normalized and an everyday aspect of public Hinduism.

Reporting religion in the context of religious extremism This public growth of religion has not been accompanied by investments in religion sensitive journalism. While journalists involved in religious broadcasting and the religious press are involved for the most part in propagating religion, the religion beat is not the norm in mainstream media. The result is that most reporting on religion is carried out by journalists who do not generally have the aptitude, knowledge or commitment to providing background information on contested religion. Examples are the protectors of the cow (gau rakshaks) who have killed Muslim traders allegedly for smuggling beef, those who belong to the numerous fringe Hindu right wings groups protecting Hindu women against love Jihadis or on the many investments by extreme Hindu groups to recreate public discourse in India on the terms of Hindu discourse. A conflictual legal situation in India that has led to often intractable inter-religious conflicts is the constitutional support for the freedom of religion, on the one hand, and the lack of blasphemy laws, on the other hand. This paradox has contributed to a legal grey area and to the facilitation of legal rulings that uphold the rights of those communities whose religious sensitivities have been hurt by media reporting or other types of infringements against religion. This conundrum and potential opportunities for defamation charges against journalists has led to self-censorship on the part of journalists who tend to opt for anodyne basic descriptions of a religious event but who do not include analysis or critique for feat of risking the ire of incensed members of a community. The controversy over the Bollywood film Padmaavat that reputedly portrays the Rajput community in a bad 238

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light is just one example of an issue that both constant, pervasive and affects most if not all religious communities in India. In this case, a politician belonging to the BJP in the North Indian state of Haryana, Suraj Pal Amu, has issued threats against key actors including the Bollywood star Deepika Padukone and against the director of the film Sanjay Leela Bhansali (see DW 2017). Foreign journalists reporting on sensitive issues such as religion face the threat of deportation for their anti-national reporting and a number have been blacklisted and have been barred from entering India (see Masani 2015). The Hindu right believe that mainstream media is secular and therefore against the interests of the Hindu majority. However, that perception is not entirely backed because the vernacular, Hindi media have, for the most part, played a role as foot soldiers for the Hindu right in the context of reporting religious riots and religious projects. Examples are the building of the Ram temple on the site of the Babri Masjid mosque in Ayodhya that was destroyed by a right-wing Hindu mob in 1989. The English media too, with some exceptions, have not been willing to report critically on organized Hindu nationalism or on the many politicians who belong to the ruling BJP party and who routinely issue extreme, highly provocative statements against minority groups in India but who are guaranteed impunity. While there are some exceptions such as The Hindu newspaper and magazines such as Frontline and Caravan, the most innovative attempts to counter the right of extreme religion and politics are online initiatives such as The Wire (see Bhatia 2017), Scroll, The Quint and media reporting and watchdog portals such as NewsLaundry and The Hoot (see Khan 2015).

Journalism in the time of trolls and Twitter This expansion of religion in mainstream media has been accompanied by a massive presence of religion online. If televised serials (Rajagopal 2009) were among the first means that enabled a meshing of interests between diasporic longings and nascent Hindu nationalist mobilizations in India, the advent of the Internet has exponentially increased the potential for such correspondences. Sundaram in an article on cyber publics in India describes the …creation of a naturalised space of “India” on the web – initiated largely by Indians in the Diaspora. Dominated by expatriate Indians sympathetic to Hindu nationalism, these web sites pose Hindu identity as isomorphic with India: a space purged of a mbivalence… In the virtual space of ‘India’ on these web sites ‘Hindu’ identity becomes an artifact – a contestable process is replaced by a reified boundary…Here the web sites act as markers of homogenised spiritual space, with rigid cultural borders, where “India” functions as a virtual museum for those whom Hinduism can fulfil the great unfulfilled dream of legislative reason – a world without ambivalence. (Sundaram 1996, 16) The present government (BJP) in India is both net savvy and explicitly Hindu nationalist in its orientation. It belongs to what is called the Sangh Parivar, a family of Hindu rightwing groups, and the present PM of India himself is a member of the RSS, an India-wide, cadre-based Hindu supremacist organization. Their enemy are minorities, especially Muslim, secular India, the Congress Party and the Left. Their aim is to bring back the glory of Hindu civilization, rewrite the history of India and strengthen Hindu India. They use both political mobilizations and new media advocacy to nullify any opposition – especially academics, capture institutions of higher learning and in their absence of being unable to control the mainstream media – expand their presence on the Internet. There are a number 239

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of explicitly Hindu nationalist websites, major investments in social media by the BJP, an intentional effort to remake the PMs image through social media and his Twitter following, investment in an army of trolls who are quick to contest content seen to be inimical or critical of the ideology and interests of the present government.In other words, a variety of platforms are committed to control the terms of the debate on numerous issues related to the identity of India and its cultural and social future through creating moral panicsat the slightest excuse, using the reason of national security and hurting the feelings of the majority community to shut down debate by harassing any opposition both off and online. There is a strong feeling from both those on the Right of the political spectrum that mainstream media has been captured by enemies and vice versa by the Left. In the case of Hindu nationalists, there have been major investments in using social media as the basis for connecting to the Indian population and in particular through revamping the image of the PM Narendra Modi and using social media platforms and Twitter to expand his base. There is a strong belief that using SM to take the lead on stories will inevitably lead to the media having no choice but to follow – and the BJP to control the agenda. It is fascinating that the PM invited 150 prominent social networkers to his residence in conjunction with the launch of the Digital India initiative – including many prominent trolls committed to the cause of Hindu Nationalism and Modi (see The Quint 2015). Their role, along with many countless others, is to monitor both online and offline conversations in the media, harass journalists and others whose reporting is deemed to be anti-Modi through mobilizing those on the Hindu Right to act as a digital mob effectively to threaten, abuse, harass and silence those whose opinions differ. Bhushan’s (2015) article on the Power of Social Media, in which he explored the reality and practices of right wing trolls, was tweeted by the well-known Indian journalist Siddharth Varadarajan but was immediately contested by Deepak Jain, a Twitter troll, “@svaradarajan while ignoring the anti-BJP venom spewed by ‘liberal’ tweeters all the time! This is not balanced reporting” (see Varadarajan 2015). Bhushan has this to say on right wing trolls The internet is no stranger to trolls—users who post inflammatory, threatening or disruptive messages—with Twitter itself having admitted to not having proper policies in place to protect its users from harassment. The Indian Twitter troll, however, is an oddly specific creature. This troll belongs to a motley digital mob comprised of Hindutva converts, misogynists, minorities, Congress baiters and “sickular”—a pejorative portmanteau coined for those perceived as having a secular point of view—haters, all united by their atavistic chest-thumping bhakti—devotion—for Prime Minister Narendra Modi. (Bhushan 2015) While there has been some academic work on right wing Hindu web presence (see, for example, Sahana Udupa 2015a), in recent years, both the PM’s Twitter presence and the role played by non-experts in the online archiving of pro-Hindu material and that deemed anti-Hindu have been the focus for some academic attention. Udupa (2015a) on online archiving as a political project in India makes the point that a motley crowd of Internet Hindus are involved in an aggressive engagement with social media platforms and using such engagements as the basis for advancing the project of Hindu nationalism. This involves the construction of narratives and digital storytelling in which fact and fiction are marshalled to create so-called authentic online versions of early and contemporary history, the historiography of mythology and the contestation of narratives that contest the values of Brahmanic Hinduism. These forms of contestation can be online as well as offline – with some websites such as Indiafacts.org threatening secular writers with legal writs and others 240

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such as HinduUnity.org openly naming prominent anti-Hindutva intellectuals, journalists and commentators and encouraging acts of violence against them – very much like the strategies adopted by the anti-abortion activists in the USA. The website HindUunity.org was blocked on orders from the government in 2006 (see Biswas 2006) although there are sites that provide information on how to access these sites (see Bhaaratham 2012). Online archiving of so-called authentic Hinduism can and does become a ready reference on a number of issues – whether it is on the all-India validity of a singular Hinduism based on uncontested Hindu scriptures or the effacing of the positive contributions made by India’s Mughal rulers. One of the latest casualty, for example, was Akbar, a renowned cultural savant who married Hindu princesses, established anti-discrimination policies specifically for Hindus, contribute greatly to the arts and to the strengthening of inter-religious dialogue. There is a trans-national dimension to this: the emergence of mainly US-based scholars dedicated to the project of larger Hinduism, a variety of local actors who often take errant writers to court ostensibly for hurting the sentiment of the majority community and at the end of this spectrum, the physical intimidation, even the murder of rationalists, beef eaters and supporters of secularism.

Conclusion Arguably, digital repositories, databases and curation of alt facts online along with a range of blogs, microblogs, Facebook pages, Twitter accounts and retweets supportive of the interests of the Hindutva project offer a much wider canvas for ordinary Indian citizens who are online and who are interested in the Hindutva twist to a range of national and international issues. The fact that the online world is only loosely regulated as opposed to the mainstream media that is highly regulated remains an issue although any attempt at regulating the cyberspace will impact on the competitive advantage that Hindutva groups online currently have. While there is little evidence to show that access to such sites has led to the migration of readers and viewers from mainstream journalism to such sites, nevertheless, the existence of such sites suggests that there are today rival spaces for news gathering, interpretation and the construction and manufacture of religious and non-religious news and views. The fact that the circulation of the press, both English and in the vernacular, have grown over the last decade would seem to indicate that the split publics in India will have opportunities to navigate both online and offline content and live and long for their own imagined India based on plural or, for that matter, majoritarian futures. If it is any consolation, the growth of fearless journalism off and online such as The Wire along with many vernacular offline and online journalistic initiatives do have the potential to contribute to the reinforcements of a plural public sphere in which private and public expressions of religion are both celebrated and validated within a resolutely multi-religious framework. The Indian polity has repeatedly demonstrated its independence from a politics that is divorced from an enabling of the livelihood needs of its citizens. While religion is essential to the everyday lives of people in India, employment, food, shelter and the business of living within the daily dialogue of life remains an equally compelling reason for voting for another politics.

Further readings George, C., 2017. Hate Spin: The Manufacture of Religious Offense and Its Threat to Democracy. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: MIT Press.

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Pradip Thomas with hate speech, online sectarianism, political support for the re-writing of Indian history and impunity that has enabled those who propogate hate to be protected by the State. Nandy, A., Trivedy, S., Mayaram, S. and Yagnik, A., 1997. The Ramjanmabhumi Movement and Fear of the Self. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. This volume that was written against the background of major communal conflagrations in North India in particular advocacy to build a temple to Ram at the site of the Babri Masjid mosque provides insights into the mind-set of the supporters of Hindutva, delineates the history of Hindu-Muslim conflict, the realities of every-day Hindu-Muslim realtionships. and the uneasy pact with secularism in a hyper-religious country. Udupa, S., 2015a. Archiving as History-Making: Religious Politics of Social Media in India. Communication, Culture & Critique, 9(2), 1–19.

References Ahmad, A., 1993. Culture, Community and Nation: On the Ruins of Ayodhya. Social Scientist, 21(7–8), 17–48. Ahmad, S., 2010. The Role of the Media during Communal Riots in India: A Study of the 1984 Sikh Riots and the 2002 Gujarat Riots. Media Asia, 37(2), 103–111. Bhaaratham, 2012. How to Access Blocked or Banned Websites. Available at http://bhaaratham.com/how­­ to-access-blocked-or-banned-web-sites/, accessed 15 January 2019. Bhatia, S., 2017. There Is Method in the Targeted Murders of Regional Free Thinkers. The Wire, [online] 7 September. Available at https://thewire.in/174790/gauri-lankesh-vernacular-journalism/, accessed 21 January 2019. Bhushan, S., 2015. Sandeep Bhushan on the Power of Social Media: Emboldened Right-Wing Trolls Who are Attempting an Internet Purge. Available at https://caravanmagazine.in/vantage/power-social-mediaemboldened-right-wing-trolls, accessed 23 January 2019. Biswas, S., 2006. India Bloggers Angry at Net Ban. BBC News South Asia, [online] 19 July. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5194172.stm, accessed 23 January 2019. Borpujari, P., 2017. Silencing Dissenters in India: Can the Media Fight Back? The Diplomat, [online] 5 October. Available at https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/silencing-dissenters-in-india-can-themedia-fight-back/, accessed 21 January 2019. Chakrabarti, S., 2014. How Structure Shapes Content, or Why the ‘Hindi Turn’ of Star Plus Became the ‘Hindu Turn’. Media, Culture & Society, 36(4), 473–490. Charu, G. and Sharma, M., 1990. Print Media and Communalism. New Delhi: Progress Printers. Charu, G. and Sharma, M., 1996. Communal Constructions: Media Reality vs. Real Reality. Race & Class, 38(1), 1–20. Chaudhuri, M., 2018. If Hate Has Been Normalised, Can Whatsapp-Triggered Lynchings be Far Behind? The Wire, [online] 6 July. Available at https://thewire.in/society/if-hate-has-beennormalised-can-whatsapp-triggered-lynchings-be-far-behind, accessed 25 September 2018. Committee to Protect Journalists, n.d. Dangerous Pursuit. Available at https://cpj.org/reports/2016/08/ dangerous-pursuit-india-corruption-journalists-killed-impunity-appendix-murdered.php, accessed 21 January 2019. Davis, R. H., 1996. The Iconography of Rama’s Chariot. In: Ludden, D., ed. Making India Hindu: Religion. Community and the Politics of Democracy in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 27–54. Deshpande, S., 1998. Hegemonic Spatial Strategies: The Nation-Space and Hindu Communalism in Twentieth Century India. Public Culture, 10(2), 249–283. DW, 2017. India’s Bollywood epic ‘Padmavati’ Delayed among Death Threats. DW, [online] 20 November. Available at http://www.dw.com/en/indias-bollywood-epic-padmavati-delayed-amidmurder-threats/a-41453915, accessed 21 January 2019. George, C., 2017. Hate Spin: The Manufacture of Religious Offense and Its Threat to Democracy. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: MIT Press.

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Journalism and the rise of Hindu extremism Hauser, G. A., 1999. Vernacular Voices: The Rhetoric of Publics and Public Spheres. Columbia: University of South Carolina. Joshi, D., 2018. ‘WhatsApp lynching’ Is a Smokescreen – We Need Better Laws to Deal with Mob Violence. The Wire, [online] 12 July. Available at https://thewire.in/law/whatsapp-lynching-is-asmokescreen-we-need-better-laws-to-deal-with-mob-violence, accessed 25 September 2018. Kauser, Z., 2007. Communal Riots in India: Hindu-Muslim Conflict and Resolution. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 26(3), 353–370. Khan, S. F., 2015. The Rise and Rise of Online Hindutva, The Hoot, [online] 13 July. Available at http://www.thehoot.org/media-watch/digital-media/the-rise-and-rise-of-online-hindutva-8759, accessed 21 January 2019. Madan, T. N., 1997. Modern Myths, Locked Minds: Secularism and Fundamentalism in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Mann, R. D., 2016. Media Framing and the Myth of Religious Violence: The Othering of Sikhs in The Times of India. Sikh Formations, 12(2–3), 120–141. Masani, Z., 2015. The Saffron Censorship that Governs India: Why National Pride and Religious Sentiment Trump Freedom of Expression. The Independent, [online] 26 March. Available at http:// www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/the-saffron-censorship-that-governs-india-whynational-pride-and-religious-sentiment-trump-freedom-10137186.html, accessed 22 January 2019. Mehta, N., 2008. India on Television: How Satellite News Channels Changed the Way We Think and Act. New Delhi: Harper Collins. Mitra, S. and Ahluwalia, H., 2016. Baba Ramdev Biopic on Sony Will Showcase Patanjali Brand. Live Mint, [online] 25 June. Available at http://www.livemint.com/Consumer/7Mnx6qopyxpsO5VhgRjECK/Baba-Ramdev-biopic-on-Sony-will-showcase-Patanjali-brand.html, accessed 20 January 2019. Nandy, A., Trivedy, S., Mayaram, S. and Yagnik, A., 1997. The Ramjanmabhumi Movement and Fear of the Self. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Nandy, A., 2001. Time Warps: The Insistent Politics of Silent and Evasive Pasts. New Delhi: Permanent Black. Nielsen, R. K., 2017. A Creeping Quiet in Indian Journalism? Huffpost, [online] 15 November. Available at https://www.huffpost.com/entry/a-creeping-quiet-in-indian-journalism_b_5a046be2e4b0204d0c1714bb?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmZpLw&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAAPdmsSaW9fnBkHz1DgZmo79wdZoIujxdVNsttmk8OcdaPzq JHxapKFnr3Muban6lnNU4PtYA2NZzb9dngWG5SeAVmQs2_Cnxfrsi0m5Y4SdARzCezaQTws1uw-mp-pbJ2pQn71Adcn7kAOMTBqOkrsEzzAKhene72X9GCejNvEh, accessed 20 January 2019. Niha, M., 2017. HT Hate Tracker. The Hindustan Times, [online] 28 July. Available at https://www. hindustantimes.com/india-news/ht-hate-tracker-a-national-database-on-crimes-in-the-nameof-religion-caste-race/story-xj2o03dKF9PsW4IYIEvdgI.html, accessed 21 January 2019. Punathambekar, A. and Kumar, S., eds., 2014. Television at Large in South Asia. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. Quack, J., 2012. Disenchanting India: Organised Rationalism and Criticism of Religion in India. New York: Oxford University Press. Rajagopal, A., 2009. A ‘Split Public’ in the Making and Unmaking of the Ram Janmabhumi Campaign. In: Rajagopal, A., ed. The Indian Public Sphere: Readings in Media History. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 207–227. Rationalists, 2010. Sanal Edamaruku: Tantra Challenge Part 2. [youtube video] 16 February. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NpwCuv_izn4, accessed 20 January 2019. Rationalists, 2012. Sanal Edamaruku Exposes the Jesus Water Miracle at Mumbai. Church Leaders Threaten to Harass Sanal. 2012. [youtube video] 9 April. Available at https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=Tf J6_ftih0s, accessed 20 January 2019. Shaffer, R., 2013. Blasphemy, Free Speech and Rationalism: An Interview with Sanal Edamaruku. The Humanist, [online] 15 February. Available at http://thehumanist.org/march-april-2013/blasphemyfree-speech-and-rationalisman-interview-withsanal-edamaruku/, accessed 20 January 2019. Siddharth@svaradarajan. 2015. Sandeep Bhushan on the Power of Social Media: Emboldended Right Wing Trolls Who Are Attempting an Internet Purge, [twitter] 29 September. Available at https://twitter.com/ svaradarajan/status/648922278277840896, accessed 23 January 2019.

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17 RADICAL OTHERS AND ETHICAL SELVES Religion in African journalism Jennifer Hasty Introduction Although virtually ignored by the general scholarship on African news media, religion is a pervasive influence on African journalism. Religion is both subject and object of news stories, that is, religious activities and authorities are frequent topics of news stories while religious identities frame the very perspectives of journalists as they write on any and all topics. In this chapter, I give an overview of African journalism, highlighting religious aspects, then pursue two case studies on the intersections of religion and journalism in Africa: one case study on the representation of Boko Haram in Nigeria and the other on the representation of Islamic communities in Ghana.

African journalism: political renaissance and religious fervor Since the democratic renaissance of the 1990s, the journalism scene in most African countries has burgeoned into lively and contentious public spheres of news, critical commentary and debate (Hasty 2005, Nyamnjoh 2005). Walking down the main streets of African capitals, you will inevitably encounter the little wooden kiosks where newspapers are sold, the papers hung in a colorful spectrum of bright mastheads, sensational headlines and provocative photos. On weekday mornings at busy intersections, you will often see small crowds gathered in front of these kiosks, scanning the headlines and commenting on the breaking news of the day. Though print circulation tends to be fairly low, print journalism still drives the news circuit, breaking the stories that are later picked up by radio and Internet news organizations. In Ghana, where I have worked as a journalist, newspaper headlines are read out on many morning radio shows and discussed on radio and television talk shows, including the very popular call-in programs. In most African contexts, news media is divided between a state media apparatus (inherited from colonial rule) and private media organizations, often owned by economic or political elites. State media, including newspapers, radio, television and sometimes even film studios, tends to emphasize themes of development, citizenship, unity and peace; while private media focus more on corruption, scandals, conflicts and political critique. The public interest orientation of African development journalism practiced in the state media provides 245

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African governments with a means of communicating their agendas and accomplishments, often resulting in blatant propaganda. Development journalism can function to promote peace and public safety in times of crisis, however, particularly during and after contentious elections. The oppositional journalism practiced by many private newspapers has worked as a tool of democracy and accountability, broadening the field of political representation and exposing the misdeeds of public officials. Private media in many African countries have been responsible for publishing sensational allegations based on anonymous sources and rumor, resulting in a constant stream of libel suits against them. Some worry, too, that the divisive and polarizing rhetoric of many private newspapers undermines national cohesion and stability. The general literature on African journalism has had very little to say about the representation or influence of religion on African news production, texts or audiences. Instead, this literature is preoccupied with the twin political themes of democracy and development (Fair 1989, Ibelema 2008). Most books in this field trace the history of the press in Africa, journalism ethics in African contexts (Kasoma 1994), press-government relations (Asante 1996, Jeyifo 2016) and cultural practices of production (Bourgault 1995, Ansu-Kyeremeh 2005). Since the 1970s, many works traced the anti-colonial activism of the private press into struggles against authoritarian rule (Hachten 1971, Ziegler and Asante 1992, Monga 1996). Historical works sometimes do note the Christian identities of many early journalists and newspaper owners but have not pursued the ramifications of that identity to the production of news in Africa. While the book-length scholarship on African journalism overlooks religion, African journalism scholars who specialize in specific conflicts have devoted substantial attention to religious representation and conflict, particularly involving Islam. Nigerian scholars have been particularly active in this field. Akinro and Zeng, for instance, show how national newspapers framed and reframed the outbreak of Christian-Muslim violence in the Nigerian city of Jos in the early 2000s, a conflict that resulted in over 4,000 deaths (Akinro and Zeng 2017). A large number of studies of Boko Haram examine media representations and appropriations of this militarized conflict (Asogwa, Iyere and Attah 2012, Ekwueme and Obayi 2012, Popoola 2012, Okoro and Odoemalam 2013, Ayoola and Olaosun 2014). Examining text and photographic coverage of Boko Haram in Nigeria, for example, Ojebuyi and Salawu (2018) conclude that Nigerian editors tend to show ethical restraint in their selection of photos to depict the crisis, in an effort to avoid moral panic. However, religion is not just relevant to journalism in situations of conflict. Even in times of tranquility among religious groups, African journalism is profoundly shaped by religious themes, motivations, ethics, and affiliations. In Southern Ghana, where I worked in the 1990s and early 2000s, the majority of journalists ardently professed their commitment to Christian values, frequently tying their religious ethics to their professional obligation to fairness and truth by reciting Bible chapters and recalling the sermons of their favorite popular pastors. Many newspapers ran motivational Christian columns such as the Salt and Light by former Minister of Information Joyce Aryee. Many of my Ghanaian colleagues at oppositional newspapers were born-again evangelicals, they embrace a more activist form of Christianity infusing their investigative pursuits of social justice. Some journalists have suggested to me that Ghana’s reputation for peace and stability is largely due to the religiosity of most Ghanaians. Beginning in the 1820s, protestant missionaries flooded the area that become the Gold Coast, a British colony (Meyer 1999, Miller 2003). Methodist and Presbyterian missions were extraordinarily successful in building large congregations in the South of Ghana. More recently, Pentecostal and evangelical forms of Christianity have become wildly popular, often 246

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focusing on the prosperity gospel, a belief that Jesus will reward his faithful servants with health, wealth, fertility and social success (Guazon 2015). Hundreds of these new churches have emerged, centered around the teachings, prophecies and healing powers of charismatic pastors. In the context of economic liberalization, many Ghanaians have been attracted to the promises of these churches to provide the economic opportunities and business success associated with Ghana’s growing economy. The texts of Ghanaian newspapers bear out this evangelical fervor. Stories on the provocative exhortations of popular pastors frequently adorn the front pages of the private press as well as stories of sexual predation and financial mismanagement among the evangelical clergy. While providing the publicity essential to building the popularity of many celebrity pastors, the Ghanaian news media has recently become much more critical of the newer churches. Over the past year, newspapers have given prominent coverage to court cases involving Christian ministers accused of molesting children or fondling their female parishioners, sometimes in the context of prayer or healing rituals (Razak 2018, Ghana News Agency 2018b, Ghana News Agency 2018c). In a spectacular case emerging last November, the famous Daniel Obinim was charged with assault for publicly whipping two teenagers accused of extramarital sex (Daily Guide 2016). Other cases given attention in the press include cases of fraud, such as Pastor Joel Amenu, founder of Faith Embassy Ministry, accused of duping traders, artisans, hotel operators, schools and even other churches in schemes to provide soft loans, vehicle leases, and scholarships (Opoku 2017). While much of this critical coverage is aimed at corrupt pastors, some journalists argue that prosperity-hungry parishioners are also to blame for the widespread problem of religious fraud: …they can’t be bothered if the pastor is proven to be a Satanist. God does not matter. They are in church for a miracle, a prophecy, for visa or for a child. (Ashon 2018) As if to balance this critique, another genre of religious representation, common to both state and private news media, comprises reports on the magnanimous donations of churches to schools, orphanages, women’s groups and other civil society groups. For instance, “Divine Intervention Prayer Centre Donates to Orphanage” (Ghana News Agency 2018a) describes how the center gave the orphans “biscuits, mini-bags of rice, edible oil, bathing and washing soap, assorted drinks, and an undisclosed amount of money” in order to “put smiles on their faces during the festive season” (Ghana News Agency 2018a, 1). While here a prayer center is the generous benefactor, in most donation stories it’s either state institutions or prominent businesses who are portrayed as gift-givers, thus such stories of church donation position religious organizations as sources of material patronage alongside the state and business elites. Indeed, a more recent story reports how a Pentecostal church donated assorted items including furniture and a photocopier to a local police station in order “to help position them properly in their resolve to deal with crime and ensure law and order” (Awuah 2018). In this case, the church has become patron to the state. Thus, Christian institutions, beliefs, and practices are considered central to social life in southern Ghana, reflected in the form and substance of Ghanaian journalism. Therefore, it is curious indeed that mainstream scholarship on African news media pays so little attention to religion. Possibly African journalism scholars have been influenced by Western models that position news media in the secular realm of economics and politics, compartmentalized from the realm of religion. Habermas argues, for instance, that news media were originally developed by a rising capitalist class to construct a rational sphere of public debate in opposition 247

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to religious authority and feudal elites, forms of power associated with devotion and fealty (Habermas 1991). However, news media in many African contexts, including Ghana, were originally developed in the same time period many Africans were undergoing conversion to Christianity, in the missionizing period of the 19th century. Developing in tandem as powerful social forces, religion and journalism have always been deeply intertwined in many African societies.

Christianity and Islam in African public spheres Oddly enough, it is the Habermasian notion of the public sphere that has inspired recognition of the importance of religion in African public life, that is, the very same concept that originally separated the two realms of religion and political economy is now deployed to undermine the distinction between the two (Meyer and Moors 2006). Societies do not produce singular realms of rational discourse, but rather multiple public spheres animated as much by belief, devotion and desire as by rationality. In the early 2000s, a field of enquiry began to develop exploring the role of religion in the constitution of public spheres, particularly via media forms, both old and new. Many scholars of African religion have contributed to this scholarly boom, with studies on the role of media in religious identity-formation and community in such contexts as Mali, South Africa, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Nigeria. For instance, in her ethnographic work on Islamic religiosity in Mali, Schulz has shown how media forms can become “pathways” of spiritual renewal, providing a means of articulating and sharing religious experience. As radio discussions and video cassettes come to play a more central role in public religious debates, women are coming to assume more prominent roles in definitions of Muslim piety (Schulz 2012). The broader community of scholarship on religion and media is well represented in Hackett and Soares’ recent edited volume, New Media and Religious Transformations in Africa (Hackett and Soares 2015). Contributors to this volume illustrate the diversity of ways that religious leaders and activists appropriate new media technologies to revitalize and expand their communities while advertising their agendas and accomplishments. Such media engagement often works to transform religious movements from within, changing the very nature of religious experience through processes of mass mediation. For instance, Zappa’s examination of Islamic bookshops in Mali (2015) illustrates how print media works to both standardize Muslim religiosity while pluralizing religious language and doctrinal interpretations. Zappa shows how a genre of catechism-like Muslim pamphlets spread a kind of generic Islam, promoting a simple set of uncontroversial beliefs and practices. On the other hand, publications in French and Bambara challenge the linguistic dominance of Arabic, opening up spheres of religious discourse to a wider range of writers and readers. Likewise, Larkin’s study of Muslim reformist cleric Sheikh Abubakar Gumi (2015) argues that Gumi’s reformist message of egalitarianism and rational argumentation was actualized in his own strategic use of media technologies such as print, radio and videocassette recording. Using radio to amplify his reformist messages, Gumi relied on the reasoned listening of radio audiences, the historical association of radio with rationality and pluralism in Northern Nigeria. This process of transformation works both ways as religious themes can change the nature of media engagement. Pype (2015) explores how Pentecostal Christianity shapes fictional melodrama in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In one such television program, The Heart of Man, two sophisticated, urban women are motivated by jealousy to use secret occult rituals to inflict harm on their romantic rival. When one of these witches becomes blind, she 248

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is forced to confess her sins to an evangelical pastor who grants her forgiveness and chases the demons from her body. Pype describes a kind of haptic visuality whereby viewers can become bewitched or healed by engagement with media forms infused with such religious content. Studies in this field have foregrounded the importance of new media forms such as satellite television, the Internet and social media (although the not-so-new genre of film receives plenty of attention). African journalism tends to be overlooked in this discourse. Despite an entire section devoted to older media forms (print and radio) in Hackett and Soares (2015) volume, none of the articles explored the role of journalism and newspapers in African religious communities. The one article on print media is Zappa’s study of religious pamphlets in Mali, discussed above. While mentioned in passing in several chapters, print journalism remains unexamined.

Media and religious pluralism At the level of the individual situated in a religious community, people generally practice either Christianity or Islam, not both. Likewise, people who study religious communities in Africa tend to focus either on Christianity or on Islam. When studying how religious communities make use of media, then, studies tend to take a separatist approach, examining media forms designed for and consumed by a particular Christian or Islamic community. Less attention is paid to the role of religious beliefs and practices in larger national public spheres. So, for instance, scholars of African Christianity have recently explored the development of Christian radio stations (Gratz 2011, Damome 2012), the constitution of religious communities on Facebook (Gachau 2016) and the role of various churches in press-mediated controversies such as homosexuality in Uganda (Ward 2015). Focusing on Islam, scholars have been interested in orientalist representation of Muslims (Baderoon 1999, 2009, 2010), the construction of charismatic authority (Schulz 2015) and the communication of radical ideologies via social media (Chiluwa and Adegoke 2013, Chiluwa and Ajiboye 2014). Nevertheless, in many, if not most, parts of Africa, Christians and Muslims live alongside one another, interacting in everyday activities such as business, civil society, and politics. How do different religious communities understand one another? How do they distinguish themselves and characterize others? What might seemingly diametrical religious forms have in common? A more recent strand of the scholarship on media and religion in Africa has taken a comparative approach among religious communities. Noting similarities in emergent forms of evangelical Christianity and fundamentalist Islam, these scholars press for the examination of the role of media in Muslim-Christian relations and the dynamics of religious pluralism in African societies (Larkin and Meyer 2006). As Soares remarks, Among historians, social scientists, and scholars of religion, there has been increased recognition of the importance of studying Islam and Christianity in Africa not separately but together, as lived religions in dynamic interaction over time. (Soares 2016, 673) Meyer argues, “the point is to identify mediating categories…in which Muslims and Christians coexist” (Meyer 2016, 630). What African Islam and African Christianity have in common, among other things, is strategic and competitive use of media forms to galvanize 249

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community and gain new converts. Print media, radio, television drama and film are key tools used by religious communities to represent (and misrepresent) self and other. The following two case studies illustrate particular forms of religious coexistence in the way Islam is portrayed in the Christian dominated mediascapes of Nigeria and Ghana.

African news media and Islam – two case studies Christians and Muslims are entwined in historically complex, power-laden relations in national contexts the world over. In two case studies, I explore two ways how Islam is represented in West African public spheres dominated by Christianity. First, I examine the frame of militarized conflict emerging in Nigerian coverage of the religious radicalism of violent dissident groups such as Boko Haram. Then, I look at the more routine, everyday coverage of Muslim communities in the national press in Ghana, tracing the ways that Muslims are positioned as subjects in (harmonious but subordinate) relation to the state.

Boko Haram and the frame of terror Since 2009, the militant Islamic group known as Boko Haram has waged a campaign of terror across northeastern Nigeria, attacking Nigerian villages, churches, mosques, markets, schools and security forces. Boko Haram opposes Western education and the modern nation-state, seeking to establish an Islamic caliphate instead. In this sense, Boko Haram may seem to resemble other global forms of militant Islam such as Al Quaeda and ISIS (or Islamic State). However, Boko Haram is not some kind of Al Quaeda outpost, rather the local product of historical patterns of dissent and endemic factionalism within northern Nigerian Islam, processes with deep historical roots (Azumah 2014). Separatist strains of Islamic practice were popularized by reformers such as Uthman dan Fodio in the early 19th century and have played a prominent role in Northern Nigerian public life ever since. Although Boko Haram is a complex movement with historical and political roots, media coverage tends to brand it as a terrorist form of religious fundamentalism, emphasizing its militant, insurgent and violent elements. Osisanwo (2016) is a very good example of this approach. In his content analysis of news stories in four Nigerian newspapers, Osisanwo identifies 13 representational strategies used in the representation of Boko Haram. Those strategies include the depiction of Boko Haram as insurgents, militants, attackers, religious fundamentalists, killers, gunmen, criminals, abductors, political gangsters, miscreants, bombers, affiliates of Al-qaeda and wasters/damagers. Osisanwo identifies 20 discourse strategies, including labelling, condemning and controlling audience knowledge, used by journalists to convey these representational strategies. Osisanwo’s analysis is one of many studies using content analysis to document the frames and styles of Boko Haram coverage in the Nigerian news media ( Okoro and Odoemalam 2013, Nwabueze and Ekwughe 2014, Akinro 2016). Meticulously executed, these studies form a foundation upon which we might further explore the reasons and consequences of this kind of coverage. As Boko Haram is positioned as a violent and irrational Other, reduced to a global (foreign) form of religious fanaticism, local historical causes and political claims are largely ignored. Why do Nigerian journalists overlook the local social and historical tensions that gave rise to Boko Haram? Why are the substantial ideological perspectives and political demands of this complex movement almost totally eclipsed by frames of radicalism and terror? These questions suggest a pressing array of topics for future research by scholars of African news media. Beyond content analysis, scholars might analyze ideologies 250

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and practices of newsmaking as well as newsroom dynamics that might contribute to the stereotypical and ahistorical depictions of Boko Haram. Indeed, coverage of sectarian conflict may generate multiple, contradictory frames. Baderoon examined coverage of a 1998 mass murder in South Africa by local and foreign news media (Baderoon 2002). While CNN coverage referred to the label militant Islam to frame the murders, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) framed the incident as a gang-related killing. Baderoon points out that the image of the killer as a masked man, his face wrapped in a scarf, drew from popular representations of Muslims as inscrutable and unknowable. She argues that masked and veiled images of Muslims contribute to stereotypical representations of Muslims as violent, threatening, and exotic Others in global and national media. News media thus cover Islam rather than explaining and elucidating the complexity of news events involving Muslims. She argues for a more complex and varied portrayal of diverse Islamic communities, rather than the constant reproduction of this stereotype. Likewise, Adebayo (2017) identifies the tendency of the Nigerian press to report on sectarian issues in a warlike, and divisive style. He describes how the press developed its vociferous attitude in the anticolonial struggles of the early 20th century. In the postcolonial period, Nigerian news media have channeled their political enthusiasms into their coverage of sectarian and regional conflicts, becoming a tool for ethnicity and bigotry and fueling intranational conflicts. In an effort to address the problems of this divisive reporting style, Adebayo advocates for a form of conflict-sensitive journalism education emphasizing the responsibility of the journalist to promote peaceful and inclusive social messages (Adebayo 2016a, Adebayo 2016b). In his repeated calls for peace journalism, he frames Islamic communities among the several ethnic and geopolitical factions in Nigerian society, arguing that journalists should strive to unite rather than divide rivaling groups of the nation-state.

Ghanaian Muslims and the frame of national piety Adeboyo’s recommendations are reminiscent of the style of journalism practiced in state media organizations in Ghana. As I learned on the job, journalists for Daily Graphic and Ghana News Agency are charged with framing everyday news events in peaceful and inclusive social messages as an element of the distinctive house style of Daily Graphic and Ghana News Agency. Foregrounding the public pronouncements of government officials and the accomplishments of the government, state media journalists see it as their vocation to promote the unity and prosperity of the nation-state, avoiding irresponsible coverage that might foment dissent or violence. Critics point out, however, that this form of public interest media or development journalism amounts to state propaganda, providing a platform for the state to establish and maintain its political hegemony while marginalizing alternative and oppositional voices. The state press tends to gloss over real social divisions, obscuring the complaints and demands of minority groups. How do Muslim communities figure into this style of journalism? Rather than focusing on a particular conflict or event, I attempt to discover how Muslim groups are represented and narratively positioned in everyday coverage in the state press, including the full diversity of cultural and political stories involving Muslim communities. To that end, I conducted a content analysis of news articles involving Muslim actors and communities in the pages of the most widely circulated newspaper in Ghana, the state newspaper Daily Graphic. Daily Graphic is Ghana’s most widely read newspaper. Originally, a state-owned tool of propaganda, the paper is now only partially owned by the state and formally insulated from state control. A much thicker paper with stories on a diversity of topics and communities, 251

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Daily Graphic maintains its place in the Ghanaian mediascape is the most professional and well respected among the daily newspapers. For my sample, I conducted a series of searches of Graphic Online (Graphic.com.gh), aiming at retrieving as many stories involving Islam and Muslims as possible. Using the search terms Islam, Muslim, Muslims, Imam and Zongo, I collected 274 articles, ranging in dates from October 2012 to May 2018 (roughly a 5½ period). As my interest was to discover the predominant themes in the coverage of Muslim communities in Ghana, I grouped the stories into categories according to the main event depicted in the story, often foregrounded in the lead. I created categories to separate the stories involving Muslims in other African countries and other world contexts from those involving Muslim communities in Ghana. Thus, my analysis focused on the coverage of Ghanaian Muslims. The initial results were revealing, as the diagram below demonstrates (Table 17.1). The vast majority of stories involve the depiction of Muslim holy days and events, benevolent acts such as donation or development, and uplifting messages to and from Muslims. News stories on Christian-Muslim relations and feature stories on Muslim culture and lifestyle are also predominantly positive in tone. Summed up, this sort of coverage comprises 213 of the 274 stories (77.7%). In contrast, only 16 stories (5.8%) portray acts of conflict, crime or danger to society. Based on this strong result, we might be tempted to argue that Muslim communities are quite well represented in Daily Graphic. Aziz conducted a similar content analysis of the representation of Islam in Daily Graphic and Daily Guide. Likewise, Aziz finds the theme of violence to be marginal, with only 4.1% of stories referring to Muslims engaged in acts of violence. Out of 172 stories in Daily Graphic and Daily Guide (a private newspaper), the majority of stories (64.5%) were categorized as neutral in tone. “All news items that were written by Ghanaians were mostly positive issues like charity/donations and religious issues like celebration of religious festivals” (Aziz 2015, ix). Building on Aziz’s path breaking analysis, my own study takes a more critical look at stories categorized as positive or neutral. Delving into the categories, the seemingly positive coverage of Islam in Ghanaian newspapers is complicated by the problematic positioning of Muslims as Table 17.1 Themes in daily graphic coverage of Islam Category: predominant theme of story

Number of stories

Muslim holy days and events Benevolent acts for Muslim communities (Donations to Muslim communities) (Development for Muslim communities) Messages (From Muslims) (From Non-Muslims) World news Muslim culture and lifestyle Conflict, crime, and danger Christian-Muslim relations Africa news Leadership issues Zongo stories (misc.) TOTAL

75 57 (25) (32) 44 (34) (10) 23 23 16 14 11 8 3 274

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targets of state tutelage and aid in so many of the stories in almost every category. Space here will only allow for brief discussion of four of these categories: Muslim holy days and events, benevolent acts, messages, and the catch-all negative category of conflict, crime and danger.

Muslim holy days and events Like other state media, Daily Graphic routinely announces annual Muslim holy days such as Eid-ul-Fitr and Eid-ul-Adha as well as the beginning of Ramadan and other religious and cultural events. Often, stories describe the significance of the day and the forms of observance associated with it. These stories seem intended to de-exoticize Islamic beliefs and practices by explaining them in the context of Islamic doctrine. Stories on Ramadan, for instance, describe how and why Muslims fast and what meanings they impute to Ramadan, highlighting the moral and ethical aspects of Islamic piety. A 2013 story, “Muslims Begin Ramadan,” observes that Ramadan “teaches Muslims how to better practise self-discipline and self-control and sacrifice and show empathy for those who are less fortunate, thereby encouraging generosity and compulsion” (Obour 2013, 1). Likewise, a 2014 editorial on the end of Ramadan remarks: “It is our hope that they will bring the renewal they have gained during the Ramadan fast to bear on nationbuilding during these trying times in Ghana” (Daily Graphic 2014, 1). Evident in the above editorial, stories on holy days are often framed in a message to the Muslim community by representatives of the state. On 27 June 2017, President Akufo-Addo spoke to an audience of Muslims at the Eid-ul-Fitr celebration at Independence Square in the capital city Accra. A quote from the president formed the basis of the headline: “Don’t Allow Ideologues to Pervert Islam – President tells Muslims” (Syme 2017). In his speech, the president further elaborated on what Adebayo might call his peaceful and inclusive social message: “Describing Ghana as a nation where people of different faiths lived together in peace and harmony, the President urged Ghanaians to cherish that long-standing bond existing among them and use it as a basis for advancing the cause of the country” (2017, 1). Daily Graphic thereby takes the opportunity of holy days to remind Muslims of their ethical commitments to national unity and development, subordinating Muslim identity to national citizenship. The tone is indeed positive; but such stories position Muslims as a potentially divisive group subject to the strong and patient tutelage of the state.

Benevolent acts for Muslim communities After holy days, the next most common subject is benevolence to Muslim communities in the form of donations or development projects. Political figures, business elites and civil society groups are portrayed in acts of prestation (the anthropological term for gift giving) to Muslims in various neighborhoods and districts throughout the country. A smaller number of donations are presented to Islamic leaders such as the National Chief Imam, presumably for distribution to the less fortunate. Though only one story (of 25) refers to needy Muslims, the routine positioning of Muslim communities as recipients of donation (never as donors) would seem to suggest that Muslims as a whole are poor and in need of material support. Typical gifts include bags of rice, cooking oil, sugar and soap – all everyday necessities, indicating that these donations are intended to relieve extreme poverty. Frequently, a color photograph depicts donor and recipient, both smiling in a posed handshake, surrounded by the plenty of donated goods. Many of these donations are timed to mark Muslim holy days and most of them incorporate public messages exhorting Muslims to be peaceful and 253

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hardworking. In one story, the benefactor urged Muslims to pray for peace in the country and maintain their holiness. Stories on development typically portray a government official or donor representative launching a project for a Muslim community, such as a new school building, a water borehole or a community center. Stories in this period also include pronouncements and discussion of Akufo-Addo’s Zongo Development Fund, a special government fund aimed at enhancing infrastructural development and tackling the deprived nature of the predominantly Muslim zongo communities in many cities and towns in central and southern Ghana. As with donation stories, development stories position Muslims as passive targets of support from state and civic authorities.

Messages from Muslim and non-Muslim authorities Stories in this category highlight the public pronouncements of politicians and Muslim leaders. By the standards of Western journalism, such pronouncements would not always seem newsworthy. In Ghana, however, the public comments of authority figures are taken very seriously, comprising an entire genre of news coverage in the state press. Privileging the perspectives and agendas of elites, this speech act journalism reinforces elite authority and supports the status quo ordering of social groups. Politicians and Muslim leaders continually advise Muslim communities to avoid sectarian conflict and be loyal to the nation-state. In one example from January 2016, the Chief of Ejura warned Zongo youth in his area “to be wary of politicians who will use them for their selfish interests,” advising Muslim leaders to “ensure peace and stability in the country” (Barimah 2016, 1). Muslim leaders are also depicted addressing their own communities, exhorting Muslims to respect the lives and properties of non-Muslims by maintaining their pious commitments to “obedience, submission, and peaceful co-existence” (Jasmine 2013, 1). Thus, represented as naive and vulnerable to political or radical exploitation, Muslims appear in need of the ethical tutelage of elites, whether Muslim leaders or state officials. As mentioned in discussion of previous categories, messages encouraging Muslims to be peaceful and diligent citizens often adorn stories of holy days and benevolent acts as well as constituting this category of stand-alone stories. Thus, the vast majority of stories about Muslims contain these subordinating messages of national piety.

Conflict, crime and danger Perhaps most surprising in this content analysis is the paucity of stories on conflict, crime and danger. Moreover, the negative tone of such stories is often attenuated by the peaceful efforts of Muslim authorities or the seemingly frivolous nature of the conflict. In several stories, the National Chief Imam is shown as mediator of the conflict and advocate of peaceful solutions. In the town of Tafo, for instance, a group of Muslim youth attacked local traditional authorities who tore down a wall the youth were building around the Muslim section of the cemetery. Graphic reports how the National Chief Imam met with both parties to settle the dispute. In another story, the Imam urged dialogue in a clash between two sects, both wanting to worship at the same mosque in Tema. The seriousness of these crimes and conflicts varies considerably. One story reports on an elderly Muslim cleric accused of sexually molesting two boys, quite a serious allegation, while another story describes how a local Imam was accused of drinking an extraordinary amount of Coco-cola on his visit to the Minister of Parliament. Another story describes a dispute between Muslims and the West African Examinations Council over the wearing of 254

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veils by students sitting for national exams. While a serious consideration for pious Muslims, this conflict has not resulted in violence in Ghana. Two factors might condition the small number of negative stories involving Muslims. First, the content analysis here excludes stories about Muslims in other African countries or in world contexts in order to focus on the representation of Ghanaian Muslims in Ghanaian news media. The vast majority of stories involving Muslims in world contexts and other African countries are negative stories involving war and terror attacks and attempts by various countries to deal with these forms of violence. Factoring those stories into the category of Conflict, Crime, and Danger, the number rises from 16 (5.8%) to 40 stories (14.6%) of the 274 total stories in the sample. This is a significant increase and lends some support to the notion that Muslims are stereotypically associated with violence in the media. Second, while national news stories about Muslims rarely involve violence, many stories in Daily Graphic document various political and ethnic conflicts in primarily Muslim communities in the Northern part of Ghana. These stories do not identify the conflicts in terms of religious difference but as the conflicts occur in the northern, Muslim-dominated part of the country, they do tend to support the stereotypical association of Muslims with violent sectarian conflict. As stories of northern conflicts do not usually incorporate specific references to Islam or Muslims, they are not included in my sample; though such stories most certainly color the representation of Muslims in national news media.

Preliminary conclusions A brief comment on historical context is necessary to interpret these results. Islam originally spread into what is now northern Ghana by Sahelian traders and scholars in the 15th century (Bari 2009). Annexed into the British colony of the Gold Coast in 1902, the Northern Territories were by then a predominantly Muslim area. While the British encouraged Christian missionaries to establish schools and hospitals throughout southern Ghana, colonial authorities disallowed the spread of mission institutions into the North, fearing Christian-Muslim conflict. Rather, the North was cultivated a labor reserve, deprived of colonial investment so as to force Northerners to migrate south to work in the gold mines and cocoa plantations so vital to the extractive colonial economy. Settling in Southern towns and cities, Muslim migrants formed zongos, predominantly Muslim communities of workers and traders. In the postcolonial period, Northerners have been continually marginalized by national politics and development initiatives. Through these historical processes, Southerners came to view Northerners through a frame of poverty and religious difference, Muslim exotics in distinctive regions and communities not quite integrated into the nation-state. Daily Graphic is a national newspaper with historical ties to the state, published and largely circulated in the south of the country. For its Christian-dominated audience, the newspaper seems to be fashioning a narrative of Muslim national inclusion while still reproducing stereotypes of poverty and difference. As a mode of national incorporation, Muslims are mainly represented as objects of tutelage and aid, needy recipients of state, donor, and corporate patronage. With Christian audiences as witnesses, the paper exhorts Ghanaian Muslims to overcome their difference and poverty to join in the national struggle for unity and development. Stories in every category address Muslims as ethical citizens, with messages urging peace and loyalty to the nation-state as an aspect of Muslim piety. In sum, this distinctive portrayal of Muslim communities is rooted in the historical (colonial and postcolonial) underdevelopment and political marginalization of the North, home of Ghana’s Muslim-majority communities. While certainly an improvement on 255

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themes of violence and national threat, this recurring frame represents Muslims as passive subjects interpolated into the patronage of the state, rather than active, political subjects actively engaged in contest over their political and economic subordination.

Contribution The two case studies above demonstrate how Muslims are viewed alternatively through the lens of conflict (in Nigerian coverage of Boko Haram) and the lens of national development (in Ghanaian state press). Comparison of these two modes of representation disrupts the monolithic critique of orientalism in the African press, suggesting instead that the portrayal of Islam in national spheres is profoundly conditioned by specific socio-historically positioning of Muslim groups in African contexts. The comparison cannot be reduced to an opposition between negative and positive portrayals, however. Even when emphasizing themes of harmony and national unity, Muslims are stigmatized as needy and potentially disruptive, positioned in news stories as targets of national aid and tutelage. Ghanaian media scholars such as Aziz and Musah (both 2018, personal communications) are critical of the stereotypes that govern the portrayal of Muslims in Ghanaian media. As Aziz notes, Ghanaian journalists are quick to include the modifier Muslim to violent acts even when the religious affiliation of the perpetrators is unclear or irrelevant. Musah points out that the relentless coverage of the public pronouncements of the Chief Imam do little to educate the public about the practice of Islam in Ghana and the social complexities facing Muslim communities. Taken together, the above case studies of Islam in Nigerian and Ghanaian new media illustrate the implicit bias of Christian hegemony in West African journalism as messages of conflict and peace both represent Muslim groups as subordinated Others. Such tropes of Othering serve to objectify and marginalize Muslims rather than representing the diverse identities, histories, and agendas of Muslim communities in West African national contexts. Orientalism is not a singular lens for framing Muslim communities, but multiple techniques of representation implicitly shaping the stories of non-Muslim journalists.

Conclusion and future of the field As discussed earlier, the trend of current scholarship on religion and media in general emphasizes a comparative approach to contemporary forms of Christianity and Islam. More and more scholars are interested in the common uses of media among those two groups as well as ways that Christians and Muslims interact in mass mediated encounters, how those interactions reinforce and/or undermine stereotypes. I would predict that journalism scholars would take a similar turn away from a focus on singular communities and focus more broadly on the depiction and enactment of relations among Christian, Muslim and indigenous African religious communities. I would also argue for the importance of qualitative methods such as interviewing and participant-observation in order to answer questions about the dynamics of the various strategies of news production as well as patterns of reception among audiences.

Further readings Hackett, R. and Benjamin, S., eds., 2015. New Media and Religious Transformations in Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

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Radical others and ethical selves in African journalism Meyer, B. and Moors, A., 2006. Religion, Media, and the Public Sphere. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Meyer, B., 1999. Translating the Devil: Religion and Modernity among the Ewe in Ghana. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Meyer, B., 2016. Towards a Joint Framework for the Study of Christians and Muslims in Africa: Response to J. D. Y. Peel. Africa, 86(4), 630. Miller, J., 2003. Missionary Zeal and Institutional Control: Organizational Contradictions in the Basel Mission on the Gold Coast, 1828–1917. New York: Routledge. Monga, C., 1996. The Anthropology of Anger: Civil Society and Democracy in Africa. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner. Nwabueze, C. and Ekwughe, V., 2014. Nigerian Newspapers’ Coverage of the Effect of Boko Haram Activities on the Environment. Journal of African Media Studies, 6(1), 71–89. Nyamnjoh, F., 2005. Africa’s Media: Democracy and the Politics of Belonging. New York: Zed Books. Obour, S., 2013. Muslims Begin Ramadan. Graphic Online, [online] 10 July. Available at https://www. graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/muslims-begin-ramadan.html, accessed 24 May 2018. Ojebuyi, B. R. and Salawu, A., 2018. Nigerian Newspapers Use of Euphemism in Selection and Presentation of News Photographs of Terror Acts. Sage Open, 8(1), 1–14. Okoro, N. and Odoemalam, C. C., 2013. Print Media Framing of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: A Content Analytical Study of the Guardian, Daily Sun, Vanguard and Thisday Newspapers. Research on Humanities and Social Sciences, 3(1), 86–94. Opoku, E., 2017. Pastor Caged for Fraud. GhanaWeb, [online] 21 July. Available at https://www. ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Pastor-caged-for-fraud-561502#, accessed 24 May 2018. Osisanwo, A., 2016. Discursive Representation of Boko Haram Terrorism in Selected Nigerian Newspapers. Discourse & Communication, 10(4), 341–62. Popoola, I. S., 2012. The Press and Terrorism in Nigeria: A Discourse on Boko Haram. Global Media Journal: African Edition, 6(1), 43–66. Pype, K., 2015. The Heart of Man: Pentecostalist Emotive Style in and Beyond Kinshasa’s Media World. In: Hackett, R. I. J. and Soares, B., eds. New Media and Religious Transformations in Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Razak, G. A., 2018. Pastor Jailed for Assaulting Girl, 3. Daily Guide Network, [online] 15 May. Available at http://dailyguideafrica.com/pastor-jailed-for-assaulting-girl-3/, accessed 24 May 2018. Schulz, D., 2012. Muslims and New Media in West Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Schulz, D., 2015. Mediating Authority: Media Technologies and the Generation of Charismatic Appeal in Southern Mali. Culture and Religion, 16(2), 125–45. Soares, B., 2016. Reflections on Muslim-Christian Encounters in West Africa. Africa, 86(4), 673–697. Syme, S., 2017. Don’t Allow Ideologues to Pervert Islam – President tells Muslims. Graphic Online, [online] 27 June. Available at https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/don-t-allowideologues-to-pervert-islam-president-tells-muslims.html, accessed 24 May 2018. Ward, K., 2015. The Role of the Anglican and Catholic Churches in Uganda in Public Discourse on Homosexuality and Ethics. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 9(1), 127–144. Zappa, F., 2015. Between Standardization and Pluralism: The Islamic Printing Market and Its Social Spaces in Bamako, Mali. In: Hackett, R. I. J. and Soares, B., eds. New Media and Religious Transformations in Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Ziegler, D. and Asante, M. K., 1992. Thunder and Silence: The Mass Media in Africa. Trenton: Africa World Press.

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PART 4

Dialogue and peacebuilding

18 ETHICS, RELIGION AND JOURNALISM IN THE USA Their roles within political dialogue and the peacemaking process Doug Underwood Introduction While hostility toward Christianity, Islam and other theological systems can be found in the scholarship about journalists’ attitudes toward religion, the preponderance of research evidence shows American journalists applying their fundamentally tolerant professional outlook – the quest for balance and commonsensical solutions to controversy and division as well as the desire to communicate with audiences across the human spectrum – whenever they deal with religious matters (Said 1981, xi–xii, Lichter, Rothman and Lichter 1986, 21–53, Dart and Allen 1993, Hoover 1998, 56, Underwood 2002, 256, 264–270, Rubin 2009, 47–64). Throughout American history, one can find even the doubters among famous journalists holding two ideas in their minds at the same time: in Benjamin Franklin’s embracing his deist skepticism of Christian orthodoxy while advocating for the necessity of religious faith as the underpinnings of a moral democracy (Aldridge 1967, 129, Reichley 1985, 101, Underwood 2002, 119–120, 129, 141, 205, 275); in Thomas Paine’s slashing attacks upon the Bible and Christian teachings while pleading for the political liberation of humankind as a near mystical right ordained by a benevolent higher power (Gaustad 1996, 131, Underwood 2002, 28, 58–59); in Mark Twain’s bitterness at the hypocrisy of Christian teachings but his attachment to Christian idealism as reflected in his faith in Huckleberry Finn’s primal goodness (Underwood 2002, 24–25, 91–92, 141) and in newspaper publisher E. W. Scripps’ posting of the Ten Commandments as the operating guidelines in his newsrooms, even while declaring himself an “infidel” and an “atheist” in his personal beliefs (Underwood 2002, 117–118, 132). And yet, there have been 20th- and 21st-century developments that have eroded the concept of the USA as a monolithically Judeo-Christian country in its moral and religious outlook – as well as the image of journalists as dual-minded guardians of American culture’s civic and ethical values which (whether acknowledged by journalists or not) have grown out of the nation’s religious heritage. This has included the spread of scientific values and secular higher education, continued in migration from non-Christian parts of the world, the role of cable television and the Internet in exposing Americans to video Christian proselytizing and extremist messages from religious groups around the globe and in the advocacy of a humanistic alternative to theistic religion as the basis of morality by Walter Lippmann 263

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and like-minded contemporary thinkers (Lippmann 1929, 8, 12, 320, 326). These circumstances have had a major influence on press coverage of religion that has declined and/or has responded to a more diverse and pluralistic market for religion news. Training in public universities has led journalists to identify more with the progressive and professionalized values of other specialist fields, and few openly look to religion as guidance for journalistic conduct. Studies show that, while fewer Americans define themselves as religious believers, they still retain high levels of religiosity compared to many European countries – as well as a general belief in religiosity as the basis of morality (Gallup Jr. and Castelli 1989, 47, Gallup Jr. and Lindsay 1999, 13, 15, 25, Lipka et al. 2015). However, this is less so the case in journalism where journalists rank conscience, universal moral principles, the nation’s laws and individual intuition as the sources of their ethical value system ahead of such Judeo-Christian teachings as the ethical values espoused by Jesus, the Ten Commandments given by God to Moses and the excoriation of Israel’s moral transgressions by the prophets in the Hebrew scriptures (Underwood 2002, 153–154). And while religiosity among regular Americans has dipped some in the last few decades, the already lower rates of journalists’ backgrounds in and connections to religious faith have declined even more (Lipka 2015, Lipka et al. 2015, Willnat, Weaver and Wilhoit 2017, 47–48). Since the election of President Donald Trump in 2016, the somewhat tenuous connection many Americans make between their religious beliefs and their ethical values has only grown more controversial and sometimes left journalists in a bind. In their tense relationship with Trump, American journalists almost have had to act prophetically – rather than objectively – just to do the basic work of journalism in covering him. With Trump’s dismissal of legitimate allegations against him as fake news and his presentation of alternate facts when news coverage is not framed to his liking, he has launched an existential challenge to the role the modern American press has served as the largely secular protectors of the Judeo-Christian moral value system laid out in key biblical passages. In the Trump Administration, religion itself is not a big story but morality continually is. Trump’s prevarications, his history of salacious behavior and his hypocrisy do not phase his followers – including his religious followers. As an observer of President Richard Nixon during the Watergate scandal once commented, when the churches lose their interest in condemning immoral political behavior, the press steps in (Niehaus 1984, 203). In Trump’s case, journalists on an almost daily basis have challenged Trump’s words and actions and played the role of moralists and righteous scolds not unlike the prophetic figures in the Bible. And yet, much of the press’ leverage in this endeavor has been based in a trust in the essential moral decency of Americans to react with indignation to the exposure of political turpitude. Not only has Trump’s breaking of historical political and moral norms left the press grasping for strategies for dealing with him, it also has left observers of Trump’s supporters in the Christian community wondering how they can explain their backing of him in the context of their past support for family values and biblically-based moral accountability.

Terms and concepts, study thesis and literature overview My thesis in this chapter is similar to what I have written previously: That journalists in the USA are solidly connected to the nation’s dominant religious heritage – Judeo- Christian in broad form and Protestant in particular – and operate in many respects as personifications of the old religious virtues and the values and ethics that have directed A merican life throughout much of its history (Underwood 2002, 117–118, 147,  151,  160–161).

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Much of my thinking has grown out of a nationwide survey published in 2001 that my University of Washington colleague, Keith Stamm, and I conducted with American and Canadian journalists asking them about the basis of their ethical values and if and how religion tied into them (Underwood and Stamm 2001). This research revealed that – despite their embrace of ethics within the context of their seemingly secular and professional value system – most had grown up in religious homes, indicated that religion and spirituality were important in their lives and signaled in many ways that there was a connection (even if sometimes a largely unconscious one) between their ethical and religious values (Weaver and Wilhoit 1996, 13–15, Underwood 2001, 33–47, Underwood and Stamm 2001, 771–786, Underwood 2002, 130–162). However, since the turn of the 21st century, scholars have explored a variety of themes that have focused on the changing relationship of journalism, religion and ethics in the USA – including indications that journalists report lower levels of religiosity than they have in the past (Weaver and Wilhoit 1996, 13–15, Willnat, Weaver and Wilhoit 2017, 343). The declining religious background of American journalists (particularly Christian backgrounds) has led to studies that have expanded the discussion by examining the ethical values that can be found in most major religions and how this connects to mass media performance throughout the world (Christians and Traber 1997, Gunaratne 2010, 473–500, Fortner, Fackler and Christians 2011, Gunaratne 2015a, 409–515). Others have looked at the ways atheism, secularism and the declining numbers of Americans who identify themselves as religious or as followers of a religious tradition – including young people, in particular – have come to be reflected in news coverage and influenced the journalism profession (Sloan 2001, 52, Stephens 2014). Some scholars have examined the role of religiously influenced terrorism and the politics of hate, which has affected how religion is framed in the news (George 2014, 74–90, Tan 2016, 295–317). The coming of the Internet and the many ways that digital communication has changed culture also have been probed as catalysts for altering the relationship between media and audiences in the environment for religious news and political discussion (Gunaratne 2015b, Christians 2016, 2760–2773). Thus, an important question touched upon in this analysis is: Has the political polarization of Americans and the dip in the data measuring their religiosity, as well as that of the journalists who cover them, influenced the professional orientation of media organizations and the ethical calculations of journalists as they report on religion’s role in American cultural and political life? The term religion in this study will be used in the traditional sense that it describes a network of diverse viewpoints from around the globe, which involves devotion to a spiritual practice and/or the worship of and belief in a form of superhuman agency that governs the universe and explains humankind’s place in it. The term can incorporate the roles of revelation, ritual, theology, metaphysics and creeds and doctrine in guiding people to understand and experience a qualitative realm of existence beyond scientific explanation and the material facts of daily life. Ethics and moral behavior will be discussed in the context of their place within the teachings of religious groups and the formulations of individuals and organizations – including journalists and press operations – which have been influenced by the religious values of the broader culture and incorporated into professional practices and institutional codes of conduct, often now treated as secular in nature and civil in operation. My shorthand definition of journalism is the professional activity of people who write or broadcast the news and other publicly disseminated communication materials for media organizations.

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Journalism ethics within political dialogue and the peacemaking process The muckraker, Lincoln Steffens, once demonstrated the distinctiveness of the reform tradition in American journalism at a time when the neutral or objective practice of news writing was coming (along with a heavy dose of sensationalism) to dominate the turn of the 20th-century newspaper industry. As the city editor of the New York Advertiser, Steffens (1931, 285–291, 311–319) explained how he preached to his reporters that they should write a story with such empathy, compassion and societal context that the newspaper’s audience would not want to execute even a convicted killer. Steffens believed that Christian moral ethics should be the guiding principles in a news business that – among a number of his press competitors – was using sensationalized crime accounts to stimulate the public’s desire for retribution, inflaming the divisions within American political dialogue and trying to foment overseas wars by doing all it could to sabotage the peacemaking process. As a socialist and a supporter of the communists in Russia, Steffens was no pacifist – but he opposed the imperialism of the USA and the European powers and soured on revolution in his later years. Steffens believed throughout his career that newspapers should try to advance values of peace and dialogue through their reporting. He was an opponent of such figures as the New York World’s Joseph Pulitzer and the New York Journal’s William Randolph Hearst who used so-called yellow journalism tactics to sensationalize the events leading up to the Spanish-American War and whip up public support for American intervention in Cuba and the Philippines. Steffens’ views about the dangers of a highly commercialized press polarizing public opinion for monetary gain were shared by a number of his contemporaries, including New York World Sunday editor Elizabeth Jordan, whose Tales of the City Room (1898) and other writings expressed her resistance to the exploitative values of sensational journalism, and Will Irwin, whose series about corruption in the news business, The American Newspaper (1911), contributed to an undercurrent of reform advocacy that exists among working journalism professionals and press critics to this day. This can be seen in such developments as the adoption in the late 20th century of the do no harm clause in the ethics code of the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) and the rise of the Public Journalism movement which opposed press adversarialism and encouraged journalistic organizations to help solve social problems and invite the public into civic dialogue engendered by the news. The former Atlanta Constitution journalist and scholar Mark Silk has offered a different interpretation of the way mainstream journalistic culture reflects a covert religious viewpoint, which connects to the dialogue and peace-making process. Silk (1995, 142–143) points to a variety of values that grow out of the Judeo-Christian tradition – applause for good works, embrace of tolerance, contempt for hypocrisy, rejection of false prophets, denunciation of scandal and concern about religious decline – that routinely can be found on the typical newspaper editorial page. In a similar vein, some scholars – such as Clifford Christians, John Ferré and Mark Fackler (1993, 18–48) – have focused on universal values that can be found in all major religions and which journalists often have endorsed in surveys as a sign of religion’s continuing influence within American journalistic culture. But others have been offended – as the Minneapolis Star Tribune editorialized – by those the newspaper believes have suggested that only a religious person can be a moral person. “The argument that religion is essential to moral behavior is insulting and dangerous,” wrote the Star Tribune editorialists (Underwood 2002, 300n3). Since American journalists operate with no formal legal or professional oversight to expel people from the profession, they often are quite comfortable in simply trusting their gut in ethical decision-making. 266

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‘My father once told me in attempting to decide if a given action is right or wrong, you may think you do not know… but you know. Follow that kind of guidance… and you will never lose faith in yourself as a journalist,’ as the Associated Press journalist, Ray Cave, put it. (Underwood 2002, 128) In addition, the American press of the later 20th and 21st centuries has played an important role in the peace-making process by covering anti-war dissent and chronicling the failures in American military policy in conflicts in Vietnam, Lebanon, Somalia, Iraq, Libya and other places. Unlike Pulitzer’s and Hearst’s day, the main body of today’s American press often editorially supports the use of diplomatic tactics and moderate responses to threats of war. However, critics complain that the American press is nonetheless too willing to abandon positions of dispassion and balance when global developments put at risk American interests. It is prone to cover US government military policies uncritically and often shapes news about American military action with little interest in or knowledge about the peoples or societies that have been targeted. In the Arab world, for example, many Moslems believe the American press still presents its picture of the region’s conflicts within the centuries-old rivalry between Christianity and Islam for dominance in politics and military affairs in Europe and the Middle East (Said 1981, xi-xii, Adnan 1989, 63–70, Abdallah 2005, 123–128, Rubin 2009, 47, 63–64). Cultural and political developments in the late 20th and 21st centuries have only intensified the polarization between religious and secular forces and brought anxiety about how the press should treat religious dialogue in the news pages. The culture wars have turned this issue into a hot button one, and American journalists – often insecure about their knowledge of such a fraught and contested arena – sometimes have been reluctant to dive in or to do so in a thorough and contextualized fashion (Ahmanson 2009, 164–165). Publishers and editors have come to recognize how important religion is to American readers, and there was a big growth in religion coverage among the market-oriented press organizations of the 1980s and 1990s. However, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the Internet have changed this landscape. The polarization around the role of religion in world affairs – and particularly so the Islamic Middle East – has caught up American news organizations in what can feel like a new Cold War between the Christian and Muslim worlds. Aggressive defenders of atheism – such as Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris and Bill Marr – have made Islam the target of their claims that religion causes much of the world’s violence and division, both today and historically. Immigration from non-Christian societies combined with declining religious identification by Americans in some quarters of the population have altered the assumptions that journalists once made about the nature of their audience’s religiosity. For example, the association of Christianity with the critiques of a hegemonic, colonial history has helped to turn certain institutions (colleges and universities, in particular) into citadels of secularism. The move to the political extremes (with religious attitudes reinforcing political differences) has squeezed the mainline churches and precipitated their decline. Fears of the end of a monolithically Christian USA have fueled the forces of nativism and hostility to immigrant populations. Press discourse has been bifurcated in this environment, with two worlds of truth emerging in broadcast and Internet journalism. The ironically labeled fair and balanced FOX News has captured the conservative and evangelical Christian television audience with its War on Christmas mantra and similar themes. The New York Times and Washington Post, the three legacy television networks and the cable channels MSNBC and CNN have fought off charges of liberal bias and seen their claims to neutrality in coverage belittled by the political Right. 267

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De-regulation of broadcasting, the success of evangelical Christian forces in raising their political profile over the last 50 years and the availability of cable television and the Internet to highlight conservative causes and muster online conservative outrage – all have contributed to shifting rightward the center point of national political debate and breaking down the old gate-keeping and agenda-setting edifice of one-way news dissemination associated with licensed, over the airways radio and television broadcasters with federally required rights of reply, newspapers on printed paper and journalists in full charge of their communication with the public (Gaddy 2005, 49–55, Moore 2005, 87–99). The online environment has been a particularly big influence in this tribalization of American religious culture. The Internet has been used as a megaphone for religious extremists to connect and make their message visible. Digital networks are available to people pushing ideological causes, conspiracy theories or serving as channels for alternatives to legacy media’s concept of balanced news. With conventional, fact-based journalism distrusted, the pugnacious and conspiracy-oriented right-leaning web sites Breitbart News, InfoWars and The Federalist have helped to convince conservatives to view news organizations once thought of as moderate with such aversion that they believe little they report. At the other end of the partisan spectrum, Internet news and opinion sites like HuffPost, Salon and Vox have sprung up as counterweights that draw away left-leaning audiences from legacy media. A measure of the divisions within the diffusion of American political news can be seen in a 2016 Pew Research Center study that found more than one-third of Americans (and around 50% between the ages of 18 and 49) get their news from social media and online platforms (Mitchell et al. 2016). In addition, the Internet’s contribution to the eroding financial condition of mainstream media companies has seen major cutbacks in resources for traditional broadcasters and newspaper outlets – with staff cuts hitting religion reporting particularly hard. Thus, news consumers on the Internet often are left to view religion only through the lens of religious belief as it affects politics and foreign policy, hyped-up conflicts between atheists and believers in biblical literalism and online polemics from web sites with strong religious and ideological viewpoints. Today both Christian conservatives and secular liberals see themselves as guardians of the nation’s ethics and morals. In both camps there is lots of relativity and inconsistency – if one takes Jesus as one’s personal savior, if the political agenda of a politician reflects the right ideology, there is much forgiveness by Republicans for the moral failings in one’s personal life. Democratic candidates who are religious hesitate to discuss it in their campaigns for fear of unsettling their base; President Barack Obama talked about religion and his religious beliefs in his 2008 campaign but said little about them in 2012. In reality, a candidate’s religiosity has not been as important as his or her political rhetoric for some time now. President Ronald Reagan – who was weak on church attendance but had Christian conservatives in love with his political views – defeated the born-again Jimmy Carter in 1980 despite Carter’s commitment to Christian good works. Republicans in 2016 chose a presidential candidate whose moral and ethical behavior and provocations against women, immigrants and minority populations were well outside what had once been party norms and political audience expectations.

The historical background It has been called the greatest moment in American literature: Huckleberry Finn’s pronouncement that, even if he burns in hell for it, he is going to rescue his raft-mate and escaped slave, Jim, after he has been sold back into bondage. In his story of the pre-Civil 268

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War Mississippi River Valley, Twain’s scene offers a dramatic illustration of the historical connections that a famous journalist-turned-novelist made between literature, religion and ethics in 19th-century American life. Twain knew that his post-Civil War readers would readily grasp that Huck’s decision to ignore his deformed conscience, as Twain once described it, was a heroic moral act in its defiance of the laws of the slave-owning states. Like Twain, Huck had no use for Christian concepts – e.g., if Miss Watson, the church-going owner of Jim, was going to be in heaven, he had no interest in going there, as Huck put it early in the novel. In this sense, Huck’s badness was Twain’s barometer of true morality and his creation of the big hearted, freedom-loving, hillbilly boy in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (Twain 1884–1885) the embodiment of Twain’s disdain for the values of the culture in which he had grown up. Irony about religion and morality was everywhere in Twain’s writing. His bitter screeds – many published posthumously in his Letters from the Earth (Twain 1938) – persistently attacked the gap between Americans’ moral behavior and the ethical values espoused in the Bible. However, Twain hated the inconsistencies he found in Judeo-Christian scriptural teachings as well – and particularly the cruel accounts of conquest in the Hebrew Scriptures and the suggestion that God rewarded this behavior. In scene after scene in Huckleberry Finn, Twain implied that Huck – the untutored youth with virtually no religious training – was the good person versus a parade of remorseless villains, evangelizing true believers and unctuous characters that he and Jim found in the civilized towns along the banks of the Mississippi River. These people – often peddling what Huck called soul, butter and hogwash – demonstrated very little of the love thy neighbor philosophy of Jesus and preferred to spray bullets during family feuds, gun down an unarmed man in the street or swindle credulous village residents. The Church still prizes the Moral Sense as man’s noblest asset today, although the Church knows God had a distinctly poor opinion of it and did what he could in his clumsy way to keep his happy Children of the Garden from acquiring it. (Twain 1938, 23) It is most difficult to understand the disposition of the Bible God, it is such a confusion of contradictions; of watery instabilities and iron firmnesses; of goody-goody abstract morals made out of words, and concrete hell-born ones made out of acts; of fleeting kindnesses repented of in permanent malignities. (Twain 1938, 31) Twain’s grasp of the disconnect between true morality and Christian morality as it was interpreted in the monolithically Christian-believing Missouri of his youth has set the tone for other American journalists, including those who moved into novel and literary writing, in their critiques of the warped nature of ethics in the religious culture of their times. Besides Twain (“If Christ were here there is one thing he would not be – a Christian,” Twain 1898), well-known journalist-literary figures have complained at the way such biblical teachings as the Ten Commandments, the Sermon on the Mount and Jesus’ moral parables were ignored in the mainstream activities of American life. This included the escaped slave and abolitionist journalist Frederick Douglass (who distinguished the “Christianity of Christ” from the “Christianity of America” and considered slave-holders and clergy who justified them “sinful,” Finkelman 2006, 129); Steffens (who said, “I have never heard Christianity, as Jesus taught it in the New Testament, preached to Christians,” Steffens 1931, 526) and Scripps (who added, “All that Christ taught is good. Most, perhaps all, of the interpretations 269

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of Christ’s teachings by the theologians have been untrue, unscientific, un-Christian, unnatural, wicked,” Knight 1966, 166, 731–732). In one respect, these figures only confirmed what has become a common perception about members of the American press since the late 18th and 19th centuries: Journalists see themselves as Enlightenment-inspired rationalists who are debunkers of Christian theology, hostile to the idea of religion playing a role in public or political life and deeply skeptical of the moral sincerity of Christian believers. However, while this may be true for some of American journalism’s most famous literary alumni, a number of studies of American working journalists have shown them to be not nearly so irreligious in their personal values (Weaver and Wilhoit 1996, 13–15, Underwood 2002, 130–162). These studies have indicated that the religious views of American journalists and the way they are reflected in press coverage need to be treated in a nuanced fashion, and the role that religion plays requires reading between the lines to understand its influence on journalists’ professional and ethical principles. In particular, religion’s place in undergirding journalism’s reformist values – both contemporaneously and in history – has been more powerful than journalists themselves or the public often recognize.

The historical fusion – and modern separation – of religion and ethics The fusion of theological pronouncements with moral and ethical standards can be seen at the very beginning of Judeo-Christian culture that has so influenced American life – in the Ten Commandments that Moses brought down from Mount Sinai. The first four of the commandments – beginning with “thou shall have no other gods before me” (Exodus 20:2) and ending with “remember the Sabbath day and keep it holy” (Exodus 20:8) – are imbedded in a theological belief system and divine pronouncements meant to be applied specifically to the tribe of Israel. However, the next six – beginning with “honor thy father and thy mother” (Exodus 20:12) and ending with “thou shall not covet thy neighbor’s wife” (Exodus 20:16) – can be read as more general moral precepts and could be accepted by people across different cultures and religions. A favorite way of making the point that there can be universalities, and particularly ethical ones, common to all major religions is by examining the way that reciprocity ethics – or what in Western history has been called the Golden Rule – can be found not only in the teachings of Jesus (“In everything do to others as you would have them do to you,” Matthew 7:12) and the Hebrew Scriptures (“Love your neighbor as yourself,” Leviticus 19:18) but in similar textual exhortations from Islam (“None of you truly believes until he wishes for his brother what he wishes for himself,” Prophet Muhammad, Hadith), Buddhism (“Hurt not others in ways that you would find hurtful,” Udana-Varga 5:18), Hinduism (“One should never do that to another which one regards as injurious to one’s own self,” Mahabharata 5:1517) and other religious systems around the globe. From an anthropological point of view, reciprocity ethics can be understood as at the core of ancient tribal codes that evolved as humans came together to live in groups and were absorbed into advanced religious systems as they developed. This ethical bedrock – I will give up some of my freedoms (such as to do violence to you) for you doing the same – can be seen as necessary to making civilization work. In Judaism, this was expressed as a compact – those who follow God’s commandments are favored, but things may not go so well for those who do not. This so-called covenant thinking applies to individuals but also to a people as a whole. The prophets taught that the Israelites were punished by conquest and exile when they ignored God’s expectations by growing wealthy and powerful and neglecting their poor and their vulnerable; they were forgiven when their circumstances became broken, and they 270

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needed God’s support and reassurance. After the Hebrew Scriptures were incorporated into the Bible and Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire in 380 AD, medieval rulers allied with church leaders to wield the promise of heaven and the prospect of hell for those who came under the authority of the church and the laws of the state. Protestants who broke from the Roman Catholic Church in the 1500s treated ethical conduct less as an institutional matter and more as one of an individual’s personal relationship with God. But while abandoning certain transactional elements of Catholic practice – such as the seeking of forgiveness in confessing ones sins to a priest, paying indulgences to improve the prospects for loved ones in the afterlife or regulating economic and moral behavior in clerical courts – the risks of hell fire were still powerful constraints as Protestants wrestled with their consciences and their fear of damnation. These trends led to a teleological view of interpreting events that one can see in the early news environment of the American colonies. Puritan leaders, such as Cotton and Increase Mather, saw God’s punishment manifested in fires, storms and disease, and they considered their sermons and writings about this God’s scorecard for those trying to understand how the Massachusetts colony was faring. Interestingly, it was the Mathers’ conflict with a newspaper editor – Benjamin Franklin’s brother, James, the editor of the New England Courant – that highlighted the cultural splits that would continue to test the nation and its journalism. James Franklin’s hectoring of the Mathers in the Courant in the 1720s and his scorn for what he felt were their authoritarian Protestant views led to a famous encounter on the streets of Boston where Increase Mather rebuked him for “bantering and abusing” the ministry (Olasky 1996, 103–106, Underwood 2002, 57). The Enlightenment views of James Franklin, as well as the practical skepticism of Benjamin, both became infused in early American journalistic tradition as it evolved during the years after the American colonies’ break with England. As his imprisonment in 1722 by the British authorities for his printed abuse heaped upon the leadership of Boston signaled, James represented the tradition in American journalism of iconoclastic and dissident firebrands willing to suffer for their outspoken views. Benjamin, the cautious publisher who always looked out for his business interests first, represented the more tempered approach and (despite privately sharing many of his brother’s Deist views) decided he would prefer to avoid “printing such Things as usually give Offence either to Church or State” (Underwood 2002, 28) as he tried to do in the publications that he founded after leaving his apprenticeship in his brother’s print shop. Despite the hypocrisies that sometimes plagued early American commercial journalism, reciprocity ethics played into the contract thinking of the philosophers who have had a great impact upon the journalism tradition in the USA. John Locke’s optimism about human nature operating in a free and democratic fashion and his belief in natural rights (so influential with the founding American figures, who built them into the First Amendment freedoms granted the press and religious worshippers) played a major role in the ethical landscape in which American journalism developed (Altschull 1990, 49–54). The other compact theorists, including Thomas Hobbes, with his belief in the sanctity of the bond between citizens and their leaders who would secure the public against the natural savagery of humankind and Jean Jacques Rousseau, with his differing belief in the fundamental goodness of people that would emerge if they put their emphasis upon the collective social good, offered updated, Enlightenment-era versions of the reciprocity values that undergirded Moses’ Ten Commandments, Plato’s belief that educating and informing people will lead them to be good and Jesus’ and the Hebrew prophets’ teachings that one should love thy neighbor as thy self (Newman 1989, 22–27, 74–76, 87–88, 111–122, Altschull 1990, 44–48, 85–92, 285, 359). The English poet John Milton’s self-righting principle in his pamphlet, Areopagitica (1644), 271

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which is seen as so fundamental to Anglo-American free press values (“Let [Truth] and Falsehood grapple; whoever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?”) was written with a capital ‘T’ in truth – meaning that it was right-thinking, Protestant believers whom Milton felt could be trusted with the granting of free expression as demonstrated by his later role in helping to censor Catholic writings as part of the Protestant Oliver Cromwell’s Interregnum government (Altschull 1990, 36–42). The Enlightenment – so important to shaping journalistic thought as it came of age in the 17th and 18th centuries – still provides the rationalist foundation of modern American journalistic values which can be seen in its role in freeing many journalist-literary figures from rigid, doctrinaire interpretations of Christian orthodoxy while maintaining the humanistic aspects of Judeo-Christian morality and ethics (Lambeth 1986, 27, Newman 1989, 183–185). In its skeptical and investigative spirit, journalism as it evolved in America also retained some of the judgment of Puritan righteousness and its focus on the sin side of human nature. Just as the regulation of moral laxity and self-interested behavior was built into the US Constitution (such as in the adoption of divided power as a restraint against unchecked authority), journalists in the USA increasingly saw themselves as watchdogs for and exposers of offenses against the citizenry. Journalists also absorbed some of western philosophy’s more cynical teachings about human nature – Hobbes’ view of humans as self-willed and violent, the Scottish philosopher David Hume’s skepticism about all forms of human claims to knowing the truth, along with their recognition of leaders’ attraction to Machiavelli’s advice about seeking power and success at all costs (Strauss 1987, 297, Altschull 1990, 45–46, 59–64). This duality in journalistic thinking about human nature sometimes has been transformed into pragmatic axioms, as it was with Benjamin Franklin who, despite his skepticism about conventional religion, said, “If men are so wicked as we now see them with Religion, what would they be without it?” (Underwood 2002, 129).

Reform versus the objective/commercial tradition in American journalism Benjamin Franklin abided by a maxim at his publications – to cover the news in a respectful and proper fashion – that has become infused in the traditional value systems of many of today’s news organizations. In his journalism, Franklin introduced the idea of balance – to quote both sides of any controversy and then let the reader decide who was right. He knew this was good for business; it encouraged people of all political views rather than only party partisans to want to buy the paper. By following Franklin’s model, commercialism became the tie that bound ethics to the business prospects of American publications. The Calvinist infusion of the notion of business achievement as a sign that a successful Christian was predestined for salvation became an animating principle that sustained the journalistic practices of many early American editors. Even for those who did not subscribe to orthodox Christian belief, the Puritan emphasis upon thrift, discipline, industry and personal righteousness became a prominent element in the journalistic ethics of the period. Yet, while fairness and even-handedness were promoted in some quarters of the journalism industry, the period between the Revolutionary War and the 1830s saw many American newspapers subsidized by political parties – and factionalism, propaganda and the undermining of reputation became the operational principles for many editors rather than a commitment to facts and honest, dispassionate debate. When the steam-powered printing press was introduced in the USA in the 1830s, it allowed many publishers to forsake the political subsidies of the party press era and to sell as 272

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many cheap, mass-produced newspapers across the political spectrum as possible. During the period of these so-called penny press newspapers, the ethics of the reporters that urban publishers hired could be freewheeling in their moral standards and opportunistic in how they got the story (Smythe 1980, 6, 8). However, as industrialization transformed the publications industry, American daily newspapers – although dallying with sensationalism throughout much of the 19th and into the early 20th centuries – came for the most part to follow the all the news that is fit to print business model of The New York Times, where balanced news combined with high-minded editorial policies aimed at comfortable, civic-minded readers won out over the anything-goes, low-market strategies aimed at working class readers. Even as the various Great Awakenings of the Protestant evangelistic movements washed over the general population in the 18th and 19th centuries, American news organizations began to downplay church coverage to the back pages, increasingly reported about religion only when controversy was involved (such as the skirmishes between Darwinists and biblical literalists) and saw the church and religious press largely withdraw from news coverage to focus on denominational matters. In the free-wheeling, laissez-faire environment of American business culture of the 19th and early 20th centuries, Milton’s self-righting principle was transformed into the marketplace of ideas concept of the aggressive secularist, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. – with its emphasis on celebrating free opinion but implying at least figuratively that the capitalist marketplace was the best place to practice this. By the late 19th and into the 20th century, American journalists treated the ethic of balance almost as a moral principle, and – while it was sympathetic to compromise, civility and moderation – it also hardened into a formula that emphasized balancing opinion no matter its credence. Other developments of the era – journalism’s pretense that its news practices mimicked scientific objectivity; the use of a neutral form of news gathering and writing by the wire services needing to serve a wide clientele; the corporate consolidation of newspapers that diminished competitive expression – encouraged editors to produce a product tailored to the marketplace where news organizations operated as bastions of the economic status quo and newsroom overseers promoted workplace conformity. Meanwhile, the idea grew in journalism that religion should be a personal matter – and that the separation of church and state meant discouraging religious reflection in the public square. Ethics were interiorized and relativized, but journalists who wanted to rise in news organizations learned by osmosis to follow the prevailing practices of their employer. The turn of the 20th century also saw the reform tradition in American journalism flare up, and the progressive and populist movements inspired the muckrakers in ways that have lived on in today’s journalism. Figures such as S. S. McClure, Ida Tarbell, John Sanborn Phillips, Ray Standard Baker, William Allen White and David Graham Phillips became famous for their investigative articles aimed at cleaning up corruption and self-dealing in industry, government and politics. Media sociologist Herbert Gans (1980, 246–247) has noted that – although some embraced radical political philosophies – most of the muckrakers were progressives motivated by a faith in responsible capitalism to guard the interests of the common person without unduly shaking up the prevailing commercial order. A number of the muckrakers – including McClure, Tarbell, Baker, Steffens and Upton Sinclair – came from highly religious backgrounds. However, most shed their faith in Christian theology but not Judeo-Christian ethics or the prophetic approach to challenging corruption and injustice in American institutions. The socialists, Steffens and Sinclair, for example, repeatedly praised Jesus as an ethical and moral model but not a savior – and they were unrelenting in their critique of the mainline Christian churches as complicit in the sins of capitalism and compromised by their arrangements with the business and government establishment. In this 273

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way, the so-called social gospel of Victorian reformers was a great influence on a number of the muckrakers, even as their critics called them anything but peaceable in the vehemence of their broadsides. In fact, the tag muckrakers was given by President Theodore Roosevelt – who was both a critic and supporter – in comparing them to the character in the devout John Bunyan’s allegorical novel, Pilgrim’s Progress (1678), who was so intent on raking the muck that he forgot to look up at the stars. However, as the newsroom ethic became more secular, religion receded to a background influence, which became built into law, the practices of institutions and the conduct expected of professionals in many fields. Many journalists came not to think of themselves as religious – but religion was there in what sociologist Robert Bellah (1967, 1–21) would call “civil religion.” In this indirect fashion, the vestiges of religious ethical values were retained within the promulgation of the ethics codes of media operations and the standards adopted by professional organizations, which proliferated as university journalism education expanded and newsrooms professionalized in the post-World War I and World War II years.

Faith decline and the secularity of journalists-to-be – a case study For the last 12 years, I have been engaged in an unscientific, longitudinal study of the religious and ethical values of University of Washington students studying communication and/ or training to be journalists as an informal way to sample whether Americans – as reflected by young media professionals-to-be – are becoming more secular in orientation as some studies show. Although there are indications that many of my students (544 over a period from 2006 to 2017) had only moderate involvement with religious life, my findings did not fully align with the only (slightly) similar study of American university students’ relationship with religion during this period – a 2015 examination of 503 journalism, mass communication and non-communication students by Jeremy Littau of Lehigh University, which found that journalism students scored poorly on questions of religious literacy (Littau 2015, 145). My results from the ten media ethics classes I surveyed suggested that in a number of key areas – such as whether they attended church at least once-in-awhile (ranging from a low of roughly two-thirds in one class to a high of three-quarters in another), belonged to a church (roughly a quarter to a half of each class did) and had been raised in a religious home (from a classroom low of two-thirds to a high of nearly 90%) – the students maintained at least some connection with religious life. However, a decline in religious orientation showed up when students were asked if they believed in God or a divine power: 69, 85 and 82% of the classes said yes from 2006 to 2008 but dropped off to around 50% class averages from 2009 to 2017. On the question if religion or spirituality was important to them, more than 80% responded with yes in 2006 but fell off to affirmative percentage levels in the 30s–50s in the classes for the years following. Recent research has indicated that young people have contributed to a rapid rise of Americans with no religious affiliation. Pew Research Center says this group grew from just over one-third of the population in 2007 to more than 54% in 2014 (Lipka 2015). At high levels, young Americans report a lack of religious affiliation – and more than a third of millennials say they are atheists or agnostics or have no religious beliefs, which is one-third more than the percentage of Gen-Xers and more than double the Baby Boomers who say the same thing. Although little should be extrapolated from informal samples of university journalists-to-be, my findings align with past research showing American journalists – while more spiritually oriented than their critics often believe them to be – to be significantly less religious than the population they cover (Underwood 2002, 2–3, 145–147, 300 note 20). As also found in studies of working journalists, the media students I surveyed consistently 274

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indicated that their ethical values were more secular in orientation than religious. Thus, there was nothing in my results that deviated from past findings of a religious divide between journalists and their audience. But the downward trend lines in measurements of the religiosity of young people in general – which also was reflected in my study – suggests that researchers should be alert to the possibility that these patterns may continue to change among coming generations of journalists and their audiences (Underwood 2002, 153).

Conclusion New technologies, social and multi-media developments, increasingly intricate tools for measuring and controlling digital messaging and communication devices that are open to the whole universe of human voices make it difficult to predict how future media may operate – let alone foretell ethics’ and religion’s place within them. As with so many areas of life, the Internet has re-engineered the ethical framework that was established by industrialized press organizations and opened the field to everybody operating together within a collective, new ethical zeitgeist. The staggering expansion of digital communication has meant that the algorithm-driven schematics of big data – as much as conscious choices made by journalists – may come to drive the ethical communications dynamic of a future that is bringing us advances in artificial intelligence, virtual reality, digitally curated news, robotically controlled vocational tasks and more blended forms of news, advertising and marketing material. Whether this flux will continue to find a place for religion’s truths that have been considered fixed and eternal, as well as the ethical values attached to them, can only be a matter of speculation. The interactive, computer-engineered changes have come so rapidly – and journalism has been so disrupted by them – that one cannot presume that the human connection with the spiritual realm and its ethical dimensions will survive in historical form given the technological transformation taking place within American culture and the press. In teaching about journalism ethics today, one has to teach two versions – one for those headed to professional news organizations, the other for those using the Internet. In a sense, everyone is a journalist today – and everything (whatever writers’ ethics) appears online. People are protected by anonymity; practices that would not be approved by most mainstream media organizations – hidden cameras, doctored video, manufactured news, tweets passed along without verification, automation determining news placement, threats used to keep people from speaking out by putting them in the social media hot-seat – are everywhere in cyberspace. Increasingly one can choose among multiple news realities where it is hard to maintain ethical standards when people disagree on the very nature of facts. The temptations of click bait, the dark web and the constant pressure from Internet hackers and trolls and ghosts permeate the digital environment. Institutionalized ethics have been replaced in good part by the collective opinions of an anonymous crowd. Some news organizations, like The New York Times, are trying to survive by offering the balanced approach as its brand for readers looking for reliable news with a transparent best practices approach. However, it is an ethical Wild West on the Internet with the lowest form of behavior often getting the greatest attention. And in the USA, where free speech rights are strong and the large tech companies hold sway, there is less willingness to regulate for Internet privacy or to attempt to enforce policies of online conduct as there is in Europe. Within this vast stew of information and disinformation, news and opinion, journalists – now more actively, joined by the public – are making the choices, asserting their voices and influencing the collective ethical judgments that are driving the vestiges of the nation’s moral and religious heritage into our uncertain digital future. 275

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Further readings Christians, C. G. and Merrill, J. C., 2009. Ethical Communication: Moral Stances in Human Dialogue. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. Two iconic scholars of media moral philosophy team up to offer essays about major historical figures whose insights can be applied to the ethical dilemmas of modern journalism. Hoover, S. M. and Clark, L. S., eds., 2002. Practicing Religion in the Age of Media: Explorations in Media, Religion, and Culture. New York: Columbia University Press. This edited volume of essays discusses the intersection of religion and modern secularity. It examines how media technologies, changing ethical values, and other cultural factors have mixed the sacred and profane and often left secular standards to serve religious purposes.

Lynch, J. and McGoldrick, A., 2005. Peace Journalism. Stroud: Hawthorn Press.

Two veteran journalists and teachers of peace studies detail the way they have analyzed peace journalism and contrasted it to the news idioms and discourses that they call war journalism. Rodgers, R. R., 2018. The Struggle for the Soul of Journalism: The Pulpit Versus the Press. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. Rodgers examines religion’s historical influence on the news ethic of American journalism. In particular, he focuses on the importance of the social gospel movement in reshaping the moral mission of the media business. Youngblood, S., 2017. Peace Journalism Principles and Practices: Responsibly Reporting Conflicts, Reconciliation, and Solutions. New York: Routledge. Peace journalist Youngblood lays out the methods and concepts that can make up the foundation of journalism as a non-polarizing force and an instrument of peace.

References Abdallah, A., 2005. Post-9/11 Media and Muslim Identity in American Media. In: Badaracco, C. H., ed. Quoting God: How Media Shape Ideas about Religion and Culture. Waco: Baylor University Press, 123–128. Adnan, M. H. H., 1989. Mass Media and Reporting Islamic Affairs. Media Asia, 16(2), 63–70. Ahmanson, R. G., 2009. Getting It Right. In: Marshall, P., Gilbert, L. and Ahmanson, R. G., eds. Blind Spot: When Journalists Don’t Get Religion. New York: Oxford University Press, 159–171. Aldridge, A. O., 1967. Benjamin Franklin and Nature’s God. Durham: Duke University Press. Altschull, J. H., 1990. From Milton to McLuhan: The Ideas Behind American Journalism. White Plains: Longman. Bellah, R. N., 1967. Civil Religion in America. Daedalus, 96(1), 1–21. Christians, C. G., 2016. Social Justice and Internet Technology. New Media and Society, 18(11), 2760–2773. Christians, C. G., Ferré, J. P. and Fackler, P. M., eds. 1993. Good News: Social Ethics and the Press. New York: Oxford University Press. Christians, C. G. and Traber, M., eds. 1997. Communication Ethics and Universal Values. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Dart, J. and Allen, J., 1993. A First Amendment Guide to Religion and the News Media. New York: Freedom Forum First Amendment Center. Finkelman, P., ed. 2006. Encyclopedia of African American History, 1619–1895: From the Colonial Period to the Age of Frederick Douglass. New York: Oxford University Press. Fortner, R. S., Fackler, M. and Christians, C. G., eds. 2011. Ethics and Evil in the Public Sphere: Media, Universal Values and Global Development. Creskill: Hampton Press. Gaddy, C. W., 2005. God Talk in the Public Square. In: Badaracco, C. H., ed. Quoting God: How Media Shape Ideas about Religion and Culture. Waco: Baylor University Press, 43–58. Gallup, Jr., G. and Castelli, J., 1989. The People’s Religion: American Faith in the 90’s. New York: Macmillan. Gallup, Jr., G. and Lindsay, D. M., 1999. Surveying the Religious Landscape: Trends in U.S. Belief. Harrisburg: Morehouse. Gans, H. J., 1980. Deciding What’s News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek, and Time. New York: Vintage.

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19 PEACE- VERSUS CONFLICT-JOURNALISM IN POLAND Representation of Islam, Muslims and refugees by progressive and right-wing Polish media Anna Piela Introduction The core of the chapter is the discussion of journalistic coverage of the Independence March, an annual event organized by far-right organizations in Poland which has been normalized in the Polish civic sphere with all its attendant ideologies of white supremacy, nationalism and xenophobia under the guise of patriotism. Adapting some elements of peace journalism theory, I discern journalistic strategies employed by progressive media to counter the farright discourse regarding Islam, Muslims and refugees. For the purpose of this chapter, I focus on the sociological understanding of religion. Sociologists think of religion as social act and rather than focusing on the substance of religion, they are interested in how religion is performed socially, in a group (Davie 2007). When considering its links with journalism, it is useful to think of religion as a social practice that is always constructed, reproduced, and mediated. After the end of the Cold War, religious identity joined a host of other identities: national, linguistic, cultural and many others – as a common marker delineating Us and Them. This demarcation line has become particularly strong in Poland since 2015. The scarce extant research on the intersections of religion, dialogue and peacebuilding and the press in Europe highlights the fundamental role the media play in both facilitating and thwarting peacebuilding. For example, Mårtensson (2014) observes that the private media (both printed and broadcast) shape the public discourse about Islam in Norway. She further notes that Muslims receive the most media coverage in Norway (except the prime minister) and that this coverage is almost exclusively negative. Merdjanova and Brodeur (2011) in their case study of the role of the media in religious peacebuilding in the Balkans suggest that religious media have a particularly promising potential in creating bridges across communities as they are especially well placed to present balanced information about other faith communities to their readers. Merdjanova and Brodeur (2011) suggest that in order to improve the situation, training be provided for two groups: religion training for media professionals, especially editors and journalists, as well as media training for religious professionals who will then be more adept at engaging with the public on a wider scale. 279

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The role of journalism in covering minority religions This chapter looks at the ways in which mediation of religion shapes its representations and how such representations may in turn affect other social practices and beliefs. Indeed, Borden (2013, 51) argues that people are “dependent on the media to orient themselves to their communities.” She further posits that in order to be a virtuous practice, journalism must inform citizens well so that they can participate in civic life. This highlights the evolution of reporting from a mechanical job to an intellectual and ethical practice (Borden 2013). The latter is highlighted by Peleg (2006) who argues that journalism “becomes a crucial determinant in conflict and conflict resolution: it creates consciousness of, and attentiveness to, the other.” However, the increasingly important role of journalism in liberal democracies does not come without its risks for the profession and its impact. Peleg (2006, 2) points out that conflict journalism “promotes noises, distortions, interruptions, deceptions, ploys, and false clues, promotes and expedites conflict.” In contrast, peace journalism “relies on honesty, open channels and the effort to align the sent message with the received one” (Peleg 2006, 2). According to Bratic and Schirch (2007, 9), there are several functions of journalism which suggest that it may play a positive role during conflict. First, the journalist acts as information provider and interpreter. This means the coverage presents both facts and commentary (opinions) which should be fair and balanced. Next, a journalist can be a watchdog, uncovering events and stories for the general public, for example, through investigative journalism. Journalistic media as a gatekeeper can bring marginalized voices to the fore and filter out hate speech. Finally, media as peace promoter and bridge builder can promote positive relationships between groups, particularly in ethnic and religious conflict. This can be achieved in the following ways: by showing the Other in a similar light to self, thus engendering empathy; depicting members of different groups with similar types of problems, depicting members of different group with shared positions and interests and condemning violence. It is argued that journalism usually plays a greater role in fueling conflict rather than peacebuilding (Wolfsfeld 2004). This is because values that underpin modern reporting and guide journalists in what events to cover are not well aligned with dealing with the nature of peacebuilding. These values include immediacy, drama, simplicity and ethnocentrism (Wolfsfeld 2004). Immediacy means that the media are more likely to focus on specific, discrete actions and events, rather than long-term processes and policies that are inherent to peacebuilding, dialogue and mediation. Drama means that media is interested in covering violence, crisis, conflict, extremist behaviors and other outrageous acts. Again, moderate individuals and groups keen to participate in dialogue are less appealing. These two values, simplicity and drama, illustrate poignantly why religiously motivated terrorist attacks are given much more air time and column space than interfaith or educational initiatives. Simplicity means that coverage favors clear-cut opinions, images, strong personalities and two-sided conflicts. Complex opinions and explanations and multi-sided conflicts do not attract audiences. Finally, media ethnocentrism tends to present our beliefs, myths, symbols and suffering as valid. Their beliefs, myths, symbols and suffering are less welcome as subjects of reporting. It is always the Other that is the brutal agent: we do not commit brutality against others. One of the most glaring examples of this problematic relationship between religion and journalism is the contemporary reporting on Islam. The role of the media has been long discussed as key to securing popular support for controversial political strategies and engagements. Edward Said, in his classic work Covering Islam, analyzed the American media coverage of the first two months of the Iranian hostage crisis, demonstrating how knowledge 280

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of Islam “gets produced” (Said 1981, 167). In 2012, Karim observed that in the intervening three decades, a new set of journalistic narratives had emerged – one that positions Muslims as terrorists and Islam as a religion of violence. These concepts have been crucial in the construction of the ideological foundations for neo-colonialism, in particular the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions by the USA and its allies. During these invasions, an unprecedented number of journalists were embedded in military units, providing curated reports from the battlefield (Tumber and Palmer 2004). These representations of Islamic cultures as barbarous and requiring a civilizing influence of the Western military are served in another form that is equally noxious. It hijacks the notion of defending Muslim women’s rights without any regard for these women’s own struggles and voices. It operates both within and outside the West and it is seen by these very women as a form of neo-colonial violence. Abu-Lughod (2002) denounces the idea of saving Muslim women, put forth by the Bush administration, as an excuse for the invasion of A fghanistan, while controversies regarding the Islamic women’s dress-code rage on Western soil, with several European countries banning the facial coverings in an insincere attempt to bring gender equality to Muslim communities in the West (Brems 2014). Journalism bears responsibility for mediating religion and believers in a fair and balanced manner. Hence, there is a need for peace journalism in religion reporting; this is particularly important in environments where there is religious tension. I would argue that such tension in Poland is inevitable, given the dominant position of Roman Catholic Church (RCC) and its multifaceted influence on all spheres of public life. In a religiously and culturally homogenous country like Poland, journalists bear the responsibility of shaping attitudes to minorities (Pędziwiatr 2015). Yet, only two religious minorities other than Islam exist in the Polish media landscape and social consciousness, Orthodox Christianity and Protestantism (Bruncz 2015). Mędzelowski writes: The Polish society is not familiar with religious minorities in Poland. The common belief is that in Poland, there are only a few religious traditions. The media does not provide information on the variety of religious beliefs or advocate tolerance towards them. (Mędzelowski 2015, 7) The scarcity of media coverage parallels the gap in the academic literature on religious minorities in Poland. National, cultural and linguistic minorities get some attention in Polish media, but religious diversity seems secondary. Polish Jews are discussed in the media mostly in the historical context, but representations of modern-day Jews are usually negative. Where charges of anti-Semitism are levelled, they are fervently denied (Haraszkiewicz-Niewczas 2007). Polish Protestantism and Orthodox Christianity are largely invisible in the media (Bruncz 2015). However, in the recent years, sensationalized news stories about Islam have gained ground, especially ones to do with terrorism and refugees, two groups seen as a security and economic threat to the Polish society (Piela and Łukjanowicz 2018). In the light of the previous section that references peace and conflict journalism, two questions arise: How is this religious tension addressed across the Polish media? How could it be reported in order to foster peace and dialogue?

Responses to the refugee crisis in Poland Until 9/11, there was no wider public interest in the Islamic world in Poland despite the Polish military involvement in the invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq (Mello 2014, Doeser and Eidenfalk 2019). Polish scholarship on Islam remained the exclusive domain of academia, 281

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while the mainstream reporting reflected typical anti-Islamic biases related to presumed hostility to Christianity or abusive treatment of women (Nalborczyk 2004). Notably, Nalborczyk (2004) observed that journalistic writing often contained bizarre factual errors about Islam. More sophisticated and nuanced accounts of a variety of places in the Islamic world by respected reporters such as Kapuściński (1985) or Jagielski (2011a, 2011b) never affected the mainstream imaginary. In October 2015, the parliamentary elections in Poland were won by the staunchly Catholic, right wing Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, henceforth PiS) party. This formation builds its strategy on so-called Catholic values that reflect the insular character of the Polish society and indeed the Roman Catholic Church in Poland. Many key PiS politicians choose to unapologetically accumulate political capital by fomenting the fear of the Other, limiting reproductive rights of women and challenging the rule of law (Adekoya 2016). Their populist manifesto resonates, in particular, with older, less-educated and more religious Poles in small towns and more economically deprived regions of Poland (Orłowski 2017). These populations are more likely to build their identities around their religious belonging in an ethnically and culturally homogenous environment. This, coupled with a lack of politically effective, strong progressive political formations (with the main opposition party, the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, or PO), considered widely a failed proposition) creates a climate in which Islamophobia and racism more widely, thrive almost unchecked. 2015 was also a year when unprecedented numbers of refugees started arriving in Europe from the war-torn countries such as Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. This became known as the refugee crisis, mediated through images of overloaded boats arriving in Greece and Italy and thousands of people losing their lives during the dangerous passage across the Mediterranean (Greene 2016). In September 2015 (before the Polish October elections), EU countries agreed on a relocation program with quotas of refugees for each of them; Poland agreed to receive 7,000. However, the new PiS government has refused to honor this commitment and, as of November 2017, only a small number of Syrian Christians have been received in Poland. In 2020, Poland, along with Hungary and the Czech Republic, was found guilty in the European Court of Justice of failing to comply with European law (Sandford 2020). Why would these countries take such a rigid position in a conflict that, after all, is based on making limited provisions for a small number of refugees, especially that the European Commission assigned approx. 6,000–7,000 Euros worth of subsidy per relocated person? In the cases of Poland and Hungary, the right-wing ruling parties are bolstered by Euroscepticism and xenophobia and the refugees, primarily from Muslim-majority regions, presented with a perfect opportunity to demonstrate resistance against a shared European migration policy and construct an imagined threat of the Other. Anti-Muslim prejudice has been spewed through both state-controlled and privately owned right-wing media. That, in turn, mobilizes political support needed for the 2018 and 2019 elections in Hungary and Poland, respectively. Pope Francis’ repeated appeals for welcoming migrants and against exploiting the refugee crisis for political gain, the most recent one issued for the World Peace Day (1 January 2018) (Wooden 2017) fall on deaf ears in Poland, exposing a deep rift between the Vatican and the Polish Catholic Church. Instead of following the ecumenical path of interfaith dialogue, the Polish RCC hierarchy, together with the government, continue to construct the position of Poland in the EU as a bulwark of Christianity. In the next section, I develop an analysis of journalistic reporting of the Independence March, an annual event with strong right wing, nationalist, xenophobic and Islamophobic undercurrents. I also analyze responses to these events from anti-discrimination actors, Polish 282

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Muslim organizations, progressive NGOs, and the public. They are considered through the prism of the peace/conflict journalism theory (Peleg 2006) and the concepts of peacebuilding and dialogue as necessary strategies for achieving social cohesion in deeply divided societies (Cox and Sisk 2017). To illustrate the progressive perspective, I have used materials published by Oko Press (an investigative journalism organization), the daily Gazeta Wyborcza and the weekly Newsweek Poland. The right-wing perspective is exemplified by the state-controlled Telewizja Polska (TVP), which according to the Polish, law is supposed to be neutral, but since 2015 has been taken over by the ruling party Law and Justice, who appointed the broadcasting regulator, the National Board of Radio, and Television and replaced the existing TVP journalists with those aligned with the government (Gazeta Wyborcza 2016). In this chapter, I draw from the principles of critical discourse analysis (CDA), an approach pioneered by Norman Fairclough (1995) and Ruth Wodak (2001). Its usefulness is based on the systematic connection that it makes between discourse and the socio-political context. To be more precise, the chapter looks at how discourse reproduces and resists socio-political inequality and abuse of power. Discourse is key in enactment, representation, legitimation, denial, mitigation or concealment of dominance (Van Dijk 1993). Here, my focus is specifically on how dominant groups – in this case, the Polish government and its supporters – enact and legitimate their dominance over others, including political opposition, immigrants, refugees and Muslims. Critical discourse analysis, after all, targets “power elites that enact, sustain, legitimate, condone, or ignore social inequality and injustice” (Van Dijk 1993, 252). In the course of my analysis, I traced, on the one hand, instances of how current Polish power elites’ hegemonic discourse is cemented through an appropriation of historical and patriotic symbols by the far right, denial of a pluralism of perspectives by the state media and officials, biased representations and misappropriations of symbols related to Islam. I also examined attempts by progressive media and civil society actors to challenge the dominant discourse by fact-checking and dispelling myths about Muslims and refugees. Finally, I highlighted a diversity of voices engaging these issues in the Polish public sphere.

The Independence Day march – a case study The Independence March is a demonstration, which takes place annually in Warsaw on 11 November, the anniversary of the day Poland had its independence reinstated in 1918, after 125 years of partitioning by the Prussian, Russian and Austrian-Hungarian empires. The idea for the march came from the nationalist organizations: the All-Polish Youth and the Nationalist-Radical Camp. Members of these two organizations have founded the Independence March Foundation, the official organizer of the march since 2011. Other groups that participate in the march include a medley of far right and white supremacist organizations, Polish football hooligans, Catholic clergy, and members of the public. Every year the march is met by protesters representing a coalition of progressive groups including the LGBTQ organization Campaign Against Homophobia, the anti-fascist Never Again Association and, most recently, the Women’s Strike and the Citizens of Republic of Poland initiatives. Since 2011, march participants have engaged in acts of violence against the protesters, police, journalists and the city itself. For example, in 2012 a reporter and a camera operator were physically attacked during a riot that was incited by march participants (Noch 2012). In 2013, during similar riots in which 19 people were injured, the march participants burned down an art installation titled “Rainbow” which was interpreted as a symbol of homosexuality and therefore targeted (Wybieralski and Gawlik 2013). Each year, the march is assigned a theme; in 2015, the theme was “Poland for Poles, Poles for Poland”; in 2016, it was “Poland, the bastion 283

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of Europe” and in 2017, “We want God.” These three slogans illustrate the degree to which xenophobia, white supremacy and nativist interpretations of Christianity are merging in the march organizers’ rhetoric. Recognizing the potential for violence, administrators issued a warning to stay away from the event in a Facebook group for foreigners living in Warsaw. In particular, it was emphasized that people of color were at risk of abuse (Matzke 2017). Five days after the 2017 march, attended by 60,000 people, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling on Polish authorities to condemn the “xenophobic and fascist” march (European Parliament 2017), to which the Polish president Andrzej Duda and prime minister Beata Szydło responded in the spirit of outraged denial. Mrs Szydło said: “Poland is a country free of anti-Semitism and racism” (Wprost 2017). Immediately after the 2017 march, 45 counterdemonstrators were arrested but, strikingly, none of the violent march participants were. The Polish government or the state-controlled media did not address the violent actions committed by the latter (several women who carried anti-racist banners were physically attacked; subsequently, the investigation was discontinued). Instead, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs praised the march organizers for “uniting the nation around Polish values” (Nałęcz 2017) and bringing together Polish families in a patriotic celebration of an important historic anniversary. Their refusal to outright condemn the white supremacist, far-right violence is reminiscent of Donald Trump’s stubborn insistence that “both sides” (Shear and Haberman 2017) were responsible for the violence during the 2017 Charlottesville demonstrations. As of March 2018, the Prosecutor General of Poland was investigating whether march participants broke the Polish criminal law (which prohibits inciting racial, ethnic and religious hate and public propagation of fascism in article 256 of the Polish Criminal Code) (Gazeta Prawna 2018). The investigation involves an assessment of the march slogans and symbols displayed on banners by a historian. Examples of these, cited in Gazeta Prawna (2018), include “Europe will be white or deserted,” “We’re all diverse, we’re all white” and “Europe for whites only.” There were reports of chanting Nazi slogans such as “Sieg Heil” and “Jude Raus.” The investigation was discontinued and not a single individual was charged with hate crime (Sejm RP 2020). In the remainder of this chapter, I focus on the anti-Islam narrative at the 2016 and 2017 Independence Day marches, how it was countered by the anti-fascist protesters and how the marches were reported in different media outlets.

Right-wing Independence Day march narratives and progressive responses In 2016, the chairman of the right-wing organization All-Polish Youth and the MP Robert Winnicki made an announcement. In an interview for Radio Maryja, a conservative Catholic radio station, he said: “Due to colonisation of Europe by Islam, and our historical references, this year’s Independence Day March will opened by a re-enactment of the cavalry of the winged hussars” (Leszczyński 2016). The hussars were an elite Polish cavalry in the golden age of Polish military who were considered almost invincible on the battlefield. They are a potent patriotic symbol in the Polish imaginary, clad in evocative armor adorned with large wings. They fought in many battles from which Poland emerged victorious, including the Battle of Vienna where they fought against the Ottomans (Brzezinski 2006). The involvement of re-enactment groups no doubt is meant to send a message that just as in the 17th century, Poland will stop the Islamic deluge (no matter how incongruous the comparison is between the Ottoman military campaign and the refugees fleeing conflict in the Middle East). This reference is a part of a larger trend. The Polish sociologist Rafał Pankowski observes that far-right groups are increasingly working to reappropriate dates meaningful to 284

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Poles in order to gain support of the wider public (Klauziński 2017). Apart from the Independence Day, the far-right group the Radical National Camp organized a riotous march on 1 August, the date of the 1944 Warsaw Uprising (Nazaruk et al. 2017). As recently as on 3 May 2018, the same group participated openly in the Constitution Day celebrations, with many of the members wearing T-shirts with anti-Muslim slogans emblazoned on them and exposed bullet cartridges (Gazeta Wyborcza 2018). Winnicki’s statement was quickly addressed by progressive media. Oko Press’s commentator Adam Leszczyński, an academic historian, decisively debunked the former’s claims in a fact-checking mission. He said: “This is false. There’s no colonization whatsoever” (Leszczyński 2016), citing Pew Research Center statistics on Muslims living in Europe. He also points out that the strongest anti-Muslim prejudice is present in the countries with the smallest numbers of Muslims – Poland and Hungary. In addition to disputing the metaphor of colonization, Leszczyński challenges the idea of an inherently homogenous, Christian, ahistorical Europe. He references pre-Christian history of the continent and the Muslim presence here from the 8th century onwards. He concludes by saying: “If we can talk about a historically-derived right to live in Europe, Muslims have as much right to living here as Polish Catholics” (Leszczyński 2016). Oko Press continued with the fact checking in 2017, when the right-wing commentator Tomasz Łysiak challenged a Daily Mail Online article about “tens of thousands of fascists and far-right extremists” (Tahir 2017) who attended the march. Łysiak reacted by saying: Incredible lies about polish [sic] March of Independence commemorating our patriots at National Independence Day! Daily Mail calls polish [sic] ordinary people, thousands of polish [sic] citizens ‘fascists’. (Łysiak 2017) In order to address Łysiak’s emotional renunciation, Bianka Mikołajewska, an investigative journalist and deputy editor of Oko Press, reviewed photographic evidence from the march and concluded that several symbols used on the banners were indeed fascist ones (Mikołajewska 2017). She observed that the Celtic cross, widely employed during the march, had been adopted by white supremacists and neo-fascists. It is used as a replacement of the swastika and has been banned in Germany and France, but in Poland, courts generally accept the far-right’s excuse that the Celtic cross is purely a Christian symbol. Mikołajewska supplies photographic evidence of march participants mixing it in with other symbols from across the ideological spectrum, including the Nazi flag and the Polish eagle. She also discusses Islamophobic banners used at the march, for example, one which reads “Islam=Terror.” Importantly, at the end of the article, Mikołajewska encourages citizenship journalism – she asks the readers to send photographs or videos of violent acts they witnessed during the march in order to report the breaking of the law to the authorities. These two instances of debunking far-right propaganda regarding Islam by the Oko Press team suggest an affinity with peace journalism. According to Peleg (2006), while conflict journalism will sometimes distribute propaganda messages, especially if they are catchy and therefore newsworthy, peace journalism strives to debunk myths and paint a balanced picture, avoiding the us versus them approach. Polish Islamophobia became more volatile and consciously mobilized in 2015. Since September 2015, different far-right factions have competed with each other in their efforts to ramp up anti-Muslim, anti-refugee and anti-immigrant prejudice. An intra-farright race was in full swing in April 2018, with four different factions building local structures and attracting supporters. It was termed the “hottest political contest in Poland 285

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at the moment which however is ignored by most media” (Mierzyńska 2018). In order to make a bid for leadership on the far-right scenes, these groups resort to ever more aggressive tactics targeting Muslims and foreigners (Piela and Łukjanowicz 2018, Piela forthcoming).The continuing lack of reaction from Polish authorities (and often encouragement of xenophobic behavior) has paved the way for far-right entering the mainstream political sphere. It is not a coincidence that in 2015, Jarosław Kaczyński, the chairman of PiS, made a speech propped up by fake news about Shari’a law allegedly in force in Sweden (Fejfer 2017). This claim was promptly discredited by the leader of the Swedish parliament (Fejfer 2017). A similar, anti-immigrant fake news campaign about Sweden was launched in Poland in 2017 and the Swedish Embassy published a fact-check sheet in response (Fejfer 2017).

The Independence Day march 2017: the refugees as the Trojan Horse Robert Bąkiewicz, the chairman of the Independence March Association, stated that the 2017 theme “We Want God” is meant to counter the godless European Union and the “invasion of the so-called refugees” (Gądek 2017). However, different factions within the Polish far-right movement display a varied degree of openness about their prejudice. Overt, vulgar racism is openly expressed on its fringes, although it often comes through in the narratives of its public-facing representatives. TVP Info related the controversy around a tweet issued by Mateusz Pławski, the spokesperson of All-Polish Youth who tweeted that “A black person cannot be Polish” (TVP Info 2017b). In their article titled “Leaders of the National Movement: Racism is foreign to us, and the resistance to immigration is a sentiment we hold dear” (TVP Info 2017b), leaders of various far-right groups, including the National Movement chairperson and the National-Radical Camp, adamantly argued that they could not be racists, because “the nation is a cultural construct, not a blood brotherhood” (TVP Info 2017b). Claiming to be inspired by moral teachings of the RCC, they were keen to emphasize that contrary to the tweet, a black person could be a Pole. They did say, however, that they did not like immigrants, thus stereotypically conflating the concepts of a refugee and an immigrant. The article is illustrated by a photograph of a banner prominent during the Independence March (Falęcki 2017) which depicts the following scene: In the background there is a stronghold labelled “Europe.” The foreground is dominated by a wooden Trojan horse labelled “Islam,” with a window in which a male figure is sitting, holding a placard “I’m refugee” [sic]. The male is drawn in a farcical way—reminiscent of the 2006 Muhammad caricatures and anti-Semitic drawings of Jews – sporting a very prominent nose, a beard and a turban. He appears to be wearing a suicide belt. Contrasting with that, to the left of the picture there is a hooded, masked individual waving a Polish flag and throwing a flare. The literal meaning of the picture is clear: The march participants are defending not just Poland but entire Europe from insidious Islam. The figure of the Muslim refugee suggests that he is on a secret mission to destroy Europe akin to the Greek razing of the city of Troy, described in the Odyssey and the Eneid. In this sense, he is not a refugee at all, he is a terrorist in disguise. TVP Info used the photograph of the banner as proof that the Polish far-right was not racist, because the prejudice was directed against believers of Islam who universally subscribe to extremist and violent ideologies and not against some generic (and harmless) black people. Irony escapes the writers of the article, however. First, the type of depiction of the Muslim refugee/terrorist on the banner is highly racialized (Gottschalk and Greenberg 2011) and routinely used in cartoons about Arabs. This picture mobilizes the argument that 286

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hatred of Islam is not racism, because Islam is an ideology, not a biological characteristic of Muslim bodies. However, this racialized depiction of an Arab Muslim man lays bare the falsity of that argument. Here, Islam is just proxy for a variety of brown and black bodies (including both Muslims and non-Muslims such as Arab and African Christians, Hindus or Sikhs) that become the target of Islamophobic abuse – as Islamophobia includes acts against individuals perceived to be Muslim, even if they are not. In other words, the racist intention (to harm brown bodies) is concealed by an argument that poses to be anti-ideological, while remaining fundamentally, if not explicitly, biological. Simply, while overt anti-black racism is superficially shunned by the far-right leaders, anti-brown racism is acceptable to them. The question remains, why would far-right leaders resort to such puzzling rhetorics? I would argue that they recognize that overt anti-black racism is (still) unpalatable in Polish mainstream politics which they wish to join and have already begun to infiltrate (for example, Robert Winnicki is a member of the Parliament, despite being found guilty on counts of slander and inciting racial violence (Siałkowski 2018)). They are representing a new brand of far-right, neatly suited up and with a clean haircut. In order to gain and retain political legitimacy, they have to straddle the line that divides such racism from rhetorically convoluted prejudice that lays claim to a higher (cultural) reasoning. Such a stand is, after all, necessary to pander to their hooligan supporters who do recognize this narrative as a purely superficial, racism-normalizing political device. They in turn express they feelings about the Other in an unambiguous way, as the chants during the march illustrate (“The entire Poland is singing along with us, take the refugees the f**k out”). These words and behaviors were not covered by TVP Info. Instead, state-controlled media tend to focus on highlighting alleged problems that refugees are causing in Western Europe. A few examples of post-2015 article headlines about refugees from TVP Info: “Germans Don’t Feel At Home in Their Country Anymore,” “Refugees Banned From a Swimming Pool in Germany – Women Complaining of Harassment,” “Refugees Sent into Custody after Attempting an Illegal Border Crossing,” and, most tellingly, “Islamic State Cell Destroyed: It Was Set Up by a Refugee” (all TVP Info n.d.). This selection of headlines demonstrates journalistic framing of refugees as a threat. Other headlines frame them as victims: “Prison and Fine for Attacking a Refugee” (TVP Info n.d.). It is pertinent at this point to mention the results of a Pew Research poll, which has found that Poles, along with Hungarians, are the most Islamophobic nation in Europe while having one of the smallest Muslim populations (Westcott 2016).

Progressive journalistic responses What are the progressive journalistic responses that address such xenophobic and in particular Islamophobic events? They focus on anti-fascist initiatives organized to counter the Independence March and publish coverage of real people’s experiences and refugee accounts. For several years, since obstructing the legally registered Independence March has been illegal, an umbrella of anti-fascist groups has organized an alternative march in Warsaw to make a stand. A group of left-wing, feminist, LGBTQ and socialist association leaders have been interviewed by Gazeta Wyborcza in order to ponder the extraordinary growth in the popularity of the Independence Day March and far-right more widely (Karpieszuk 2017). They stated that while far-right xenophobia and violence are becoming normalized, they represent those Poles who oppose them. While some of those interviewed argued that the ordinary people might be unaware of the fact that the march is orchestrated by the far-right, others claim that on the contrary, the far-right slogans are displayed very rambunctiously, and people embrace 287

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them as the march is a form of belonging in a situation where other forms of community are absent. In other words, the far-right movement has managed to appropriate many followers because it is fulfilling some of the functions of the civil society (see Karpieszuk 2017). They are aided in this task by the current government and the media it controls. For example, it is notable that 45 counter-protesters were seized and later released, three of them with charges of obstructing a legal event and, bizarrely, propagating fascism and hate speech. This was due to one of their banners showing photographs of the 1930s Nazi marches and the modern-day far-right ones, which obviously condemned fascism, side by side (RMF24 2017). Another group of protesters, all of them female, held a transparent that read “Fascism Stop” on the march route; they were kicked, spat at and beaten up by the march participants. This was reported by Gazeta Wyborcza (Wójcik 2017). Regardless of that incident, the state-controlled TVP 1 aired comments by the Warsaw Chief of Police in its 7:30 pm news program that “This year’s march was very safe and peaceful” (TVP Info 2017a). Clearly, there is a discrepancy between the image that the march organizers and the state-controlled media are attempting to create (patriotic, family-friendly, protective of traditional values, normal) and the image that is actually emerging through progressive media outlets (nationalistic, xenophobic, racist, violent, extremist). In this particular case, the progressive journalism in Poland is not aligned with the peace journalism paradigm. It does report on political dissent that arises in response to the exclusionary and violent messages and behavior of the march participants. It also covers violence that is enacted against protesters, as to ignore it would conceal the degree to which far-right in Poland has grown and jeopardized the civil society and democracy. It must be emphasized that this right-wing turn is happening with full consent of the current government and its agencies (Piela and Łukjanowicz 2018). It should be noted that right-wing media and their readers routinely engage in hate campaigns against progressive media by denouncing their alleged otherness, usually in antiSemitic or generally xenophobic terms. The main liberal press title, Gazeta Wyborcza (pol. Electoral Gazette) is accused of unspecified Jewishness (and called by them the Kosher Gazette, Tzadik Voice, Jerusalem Voice) and of being selective in its coverage (Gazeta Wybiórcza, pol. Selective Gazette) (see Nonsensopedia n.d.). The Polish edition of Newsweek is usually denounced as German propaganda, as it is owned by the German and Swiss publishers, Axel Springer and Ringier. These and other progressive media attempt to counter the constant bombardment of the anti-refugee discourse by trying to re-humanize the representations of refugees. In contrast to the right-wing media, which generally depict refugees as a dangerous, angry, faceless mass, they run stories of actual refugees, families and individuals, who live in Poland. The story of Jakub Bierzyński, a media company owner, is a good example of this genre (Gazeta.pl 2018). Gazeta.pl is Gazeta Wyborcza’s sister online media outlet. According to Gazeta.pl, Bierzyński posted on his Facebook profile: I want to thank the right-wing citizens of Poland who advocated the idea that ‘if you want to receive refugees, do it yourself ’. I was inspired by it! Amrulo, Omina, and their 4 charming kids have been here for a week. They’re political refugees from Tajikistan. I have been trying to host refugees since May but it is very difficult because the Polish authorities refuse any help organising it. But it has worked I am homing that despite everything, they will find a safe haven here. Thank you to Fundacja Ocalenie [Foundation Rescue]! (Gazeta.pl 2018)

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Gazeta.pl reports that initially Bierzyński was trying to host a Syrian family, but eventually he was assigned a Tajik Muslim family. He has volunteered to host them for two and a half years and is helping the parents to find work. In that sense, by taking the sarcastic right-wing slogan literally, he turned the tables and showed that practical help for refugees is not just possible, but emotionally fulfilling. Explaining his actions, he said: I did it for myself. I felt soiled by the hate. I realised that only 3 years ago over 70 per cent of Poles wanted Poland to receive refugees, and at that time, this action would have passed unnoticed. (Gazeta.pl 2018) Other examples of progressive coverage of Muslims and/or refugees include initiatives that expose Poles to diversity in their communities. In April 2018, With Bread and Salt (the name refers to an ancient Polish custom of welcoming guests with bread and salt, still practiced at traditional weddings), a group affiliated with Association Open Poland organized a day of Polish bread baking for a diverse group of people: a gay man, a Jewish man, a Syrian male refugee, a Congolese female refugee and a Muslim man. Importantly, the TVN24 article (2018) included commentary from the protagonists of the story. For example, the Muslim man, a doctor called Salam, said: “My daughter is Polish. I would like to show her that life is wonderful” (TVN24 2018). The Congolese woman said: “In Congo, women are vulnerable at all times. In Poland, I’m protected” (TVN24 2018). The organizers of the event interviewed customers in the bakery to hear their reactions regarding the identities of the bakers. These were mostly positive; customers often referred to instances in Polish history when Poles themselves received help overseas or when the Polish state was more eager to provide such help to others. This example of Polish people’s social interaction with difference was covered by the television station TVN24 (TVN24 2018).

Discussion As illustrated by the examples of journalistic reporting discussed here, we can see that there are several strategies employed by progressive media to counter Islamophobia and, specifically from 2015 onwards, to humanize refugees. They include fact checking, providing a platform for progressive voices absent from state-controlled media and running stories about positive interactions with refugees living in Poland. How do these strategies align with the principles of peace journalism (Peleg 2006)? Peleg argues that peace journalism becomes the third party to a conflict in its facilitation capacity, i.e., by allowing for the rivalling sides to get to know one another, to uphold understanding and empathy, to focus on creativity and human ingenuity to resolve conflicts and to emphasize truth-oriented, people-oriented and solution-oriented journalism to expedite peace. (Peleg 2006, 2) Fact checking of stories run by right-wing media is undisputedly a characteristic of truthoriented peace journalism, as it dispels stereotypes and challenges prejudice. Providing a platform for progressive voices in this instance is a function of people- and solution-oriented peace journalism. Inviting people to get to know one another is exactly the solution to the problem of xenophobia. Countering the myth of all-white, all-Catholic, monolithic Poland

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helps progressive movements work toward that goal. Covering real-life stories of refugees living in Poland breaks the ice, as it portrays them as a diverse group of people who have talents, needs and desires just like anybody else. The fact that the protagonists were asked to bake bread, a powerful symbol in the Polish culture that denotes home, hospitality, community and security (Rabikowska 2010), is meaningful. Equally significant is the fact that customers were happy to eat the bread – thus, a relationship between the two groups was established. Salam’s reference to his daughter positions him as a loving father, parenthood being another universal characteristic. The mention of him being a doctor and saving lives serves as a reminder that he has talents, which he can use to enrich the host society. Rosa from Congo interprets Poland as a safe-space, despite high racism levels. While these journalistic strategies are certainly a step in the right direction, they are by no means sufficient to fully humanize the Other. As Chouliaraki and Stolic (2017, 1172) argue, “the refugee appears in Western spaces of publicity as a deeply ambivalent figure: a body-inneed, a powerless child, a racial ‘other’, a linguistic token or a sentimental drawing.” None of the refugee representations in Western media truly afford them agency. Both positive and negative strategies analyzed in this chapter appear to align with the regimes of visibility or types of journalistic representation, discussed by Chouliaraki and Stolic (2017) such as massification, vilification, infantilization, marginalization or aestheticization. The story about a Polish businessman taking in a Muslim family presents the refugees in a non-agentic way by the mere fact of not interviewing them for the article and preventing them from presenting their own perspective. By denying them that opportunity, the journalist infantilized and marginalized them. Placing the other refugees in a Polish bakery undoubtedly mobilized a positive aesthetic to domesticate their image, but it still situated them as attempting to secure acceptance from the host society, with unclear results. Trilling argues that it is a myth that telling human stories is enough to change people’s minds. He explains: if we want to understand why some people will keep moving despite the obstacles put in their way, then we need to see the whole person, rather than only the worst aspects of their situation or their most traumatic experiences. (…) It is also important to recognise that the stories we consume are, for the most part, commodities produced by profit-making companies. This can harm those at the centre of the stories, distort our understanding of a crisis and even contribute to a sense of panic. (Trilling 2018)

Conclusion The large body of research on Islamophobia in Europe and the role of mass media in this phenomenon is coupled with the growing recognition of religious diversity and related tensions in Eastern Europe. However, there is a telling lack of research on the topic of religious pluralism in Eastern Europe and how the media is key to laying groundwork for dialogue between believers of different faiths. The educational role of the media is particularly important in religiously homogenous countries such as Poland. It is important that the media discourse about diverse religions in Eastern Europe is documented in order to not only address Islamophobia but the civil society-driven interfaith and dialogue-oriented initiatives as well. This study adds to the current knowledge on Islam and the media by focusing on the relatively under-researched media representations of Islam and refugees in Poland, an

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Eastern  European country with a small Muslim minority. It develops the understanding of the recent complicated and indeed explosive dynamics playing out between religious, civil society and political actors: the Polish RCC, the growing far-right movement, Muslim organizations, anti-fascist and civil society organizations, Catholic lay organizations, as well as academics/experts, the media and the Polish government. It documents a specific socio-political junction at a time of a global sharp right-wing turn by discussing different perspectives on the future of religious and cultural diversity in this setting. Ethnocentrism is conducive to projecting a clash of civilizations vision of our time and right-wing media revel in contrasting the bastion of civilized Christian Europe and the barbarous (mostly Muslim and African) refugees. Georgiou and Zaborowski (2017, 3) stated diplomatically in their Council of Europe report on the European media coverage of the refugee crisis: “Media continue to face significant challenges in safeguarding the values of independent and fair journalism, while respecting freedom of expression for all and tackling hate speech in Europe.” While this may be an unfair status quo, this is simply the way media products are created to bring in maximum revenue for media organizations in the increasingly populist atmosphere of our time. It is alarming how the Polish far-right has managed to first hijack a patriotic commemoration, re-establish it on violent and exclusionary terms and then, with assistance of current Polish authorities and state-controlled media, normalize it as an acceptable element of the Independence Day anniversary proceedings (which, until 2011, used to be very formal, traditional and celebrated across most state-run institutions, including schools at all levels). It is true that, whether unaware, indifferent or affirming in relation to the march’s provenance, many ordinary citizens do not seem to mind marching hand in hand with the far-right. This domestication of fascism, as Majmurek (2017) argues, is the sign that civic education in post-communist Poland has largely failed. Stopping Islamisation is a sentiment shared by far-right across Europe and North America (Sundstrom 2013), but in Poland it sounds particularly hollow, as the small numbers of Muslims living in Poland can hardly justify such fears. Indeed, in an attempt to capture this absurdity, the Polish Islamophobia has been described as platonic (Pędziwiatr 2015). In a bizarre rhetorical turn, in the Polish media the word refugee has been reappropriated to mean Muslim, while the word immigrant is now used instead of refugee. Erasure of the correct meaning of the term refugee, which is meant to engender empathy and compassion for those fleeing persecution and replacing it with implication of financial greed, is no doubt intended to influence the public opinion.

Further readings Górak-Sosnowska, K., 2004. Deconstructing Islamophobia in Poland. The Story of an Internet Group. Warsaw: University of Warsaw Press. This short monograph demonstrates the interconnections between the rise of European Islamophobia, media discourses, and Muslim believers’ responses to the former produced in online spaces. It links the global with the local; it shows how international events (or their interpretations) provide a reference framework for local discussions between Polish Muslims and critics of Islam. Górak-Sosnowska, K., ed., 2011. Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe: Widening the European Discourse on Islam. Warsaw: University of Warsaw Press.

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Anna Piela Nalborczyk, A., 2004. The Image of Islam and Muslims in the Polish Mass Media before and after 11 September. TRANS, Internet Zeitschrift für Kulturwissenschaften [online], August. Available at http:// www.inst.at/trans/15Nr/01_4/nalborczyk15.htm, accessed on 18 January 2019. This article gives an overview of how similar media discourses about Islam are in Western and Eastern Europe. It further discusses this issue in the context of the scarcity of Muslims living in Poland, demonstrating the globalized character of reporting on Islam. Pędziwiatr, K., 2015. In: Kusek, R. J., Purchla, J. and Sanecka-Szeliga, J., eds. Nations and Stereotypes 25 Years after: New Borders, New Horizons. Kraków: International Cultural Centre, 132–150. This chapter links mass media representations of Islam to the rise of Islamophobia. It focuses on media strategies to misrepresent Islam such as the reliance on biased ‘experts’ and selective photography. It also demonstrates the significance of media discourses in shaping attitudes toward Muslims. Pickel, G. and Sammet, K., 2012. Transformations of Religiosity: Religion and Religiosity in Eastern Europe 1989–2010. Wiesbaden: Springer. This collection explores how the twin processes of secularization and religious revival shape Eastern European religious attitudes. With these as a backdrop, it explores modern themes in the sociology of religion, such as social capital, identities, and gender roles.

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Peace- versus conflict-journalism in Poland Sia ł kowski, K., 2018. Pose ł Robert Winnicki zap łaci 10 tys. zł grzywny za “bandytę w mundurze”. Wyborcza.pl, [online] 19 September. Available at http://warszawa.wyborcza.pl/warszawa/ 7,54420,23941624,posel-robert-winnicki-zaplaci-10-tys-zl-grzywny-za-bandyte.html, accessed 17 January 2019. Sundstrom, R., 2013. Sheltering Xenophobia. Critical Philosophy of Race, 1(1), 68–85. Tahir, T., 2017. Tens of Thousands of Fascists and Far-Right Extremist from across Europe Will Protest in Poland on Saturday to ‘Defend Western Civilisation’. Daily Mail Online, [online] 10 November. Available at https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5069557/Poland-march-draws-emboldenedfar-right-extremists-afar.html?ito=social-twitter_mailonline, accessed 19 January 2019. Trilling, D., 2018. Five Myths about the Refugee Crisis. The Guardian, [online] 5 June. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jun/05/five-myths-about-the-refugee-crisis, accessed 18 January 2019. Tumber, H. and Palmer, J., 2004. Media at War: The Iraq Crisis. London: Sage. TVN24, 2018. Gej, uchodźcy, ż yd i muzułmanin piekli polski chleb. Jak zareagowali klienci? TVN24, [online] 5 April. Available at https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju, 3/gej-uchodzcy-muzulmanini-zyd-piekli-polski-chleb, 827215.html, accessed 18 May 2018. TVP Info, 2017a. Policja: W Marszu Niepodleg łości bra ło udzia ł ok. 60 tys. Osób. TVP Info, [online] 11 November. Available at https://www.tvp.info/34779512/policja-w-marszu-niepodlegloscibralo-udzial-ok-60-tys-osob, accessed 17 January 2019. TVP Info, 2017b. Liderzy Ruchu Narodowego: Rasizm jest nam obcy, a sprzeciw wobec imigracji jest nam bliski. TVP Info, [online] 13 November. Available at https://www.tvp.info/34793656/ liderzy-ruchu-narodowego-rasizm-jest-nam-obcy-a-sprzeciw-wobec-imigracji-jest-nam-bliski, accessed 16 May 2018. TVP Info, n.d. TVP Info. Available at https://www.tvp.info/szukaj?query=uchod%C5%BAcy, accessed 17 January 2019. Van Dijk, T. A., 1993. Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis. Discourse and Society, 4(2), 249–283. Westcott, L., 2016. Europeans Fear Refugees Will Bring Terrorism, Take Jobs: Study. Newsweek US Edition, [online] 11 July. Available at http://www.newsweek.com/refugee-attitudes-europehungary-uk-pew-study-479510, accessed 16 May 2018. Wodak, R., 2001. What CDA is about. In: Wodak, R. and Meyer, M., eds. Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. London: Sage, 1–14. Wolfsfeld, G., 2004. Media and the Path to Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wooden, C., 2017. Build Peace by Welcoming Migrants, Refugees, Pope Says in Message. National Catholic Reporter, [online] 27 November. Available at https://www.ncronline.org/news/vatican/ build-peace-welcoming-migrants-refugees-pope-says-message, accessed 16 May 2018. Wójcik, P., 2017. Szarpanina, wyzwiska i kopniaki. Kobiety zaatakowane podczas Marszu Niepodleg łości. wyborcza.pl, [online] 11 November 2017. Available at http://wyborcza.pl/10,82983, 22634208,szarpanina-wyzwiska-i-kopniaki-kobiety-zaatakowane-podczas.html, accessed 16 May 2018. Wprost, 2017. “Polska jest wolna od antysemityzmu i rasizmu”. Premier Szyd ło o decyzji Parlamentu Europejskiego. Wprost, [online] 15 November. Available at https://www.wprost.pl/kraj/10086687/ polska-jest-wolna-od-antysemityzmu-i-rasizmu-premier-szydlo-o-decyzji-parlamentu-europejskiego.html, accessed 18 January 2019. Wybieralski, M. and Gawlik, P., 2013. Marsz Niepodleg łości rozwią zany: spalone auta i tęcza na Pl. Zbawiciela. Bójki, atak na ambasadę Rosji [BILANS]. wyborcza.pl, [online] 11 November. Available at http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,14932005,Marsz_Niepodleglosci_rozwiazany__spalone_ auta_i_ tecza.html, accessed 16 May 2018. Wyborcza, G., 2016. Szef KRRiT Odpowiada TVP: Od Kiedy PiS Przejął Media Publiczne, Telewizja Sta ła Się Rz ądowa. wyborcza.pl, [online] 13 April. Available at http://wyborcza. pl/1,75398,19912686,szef-krrit-odpowiada-tvp-od-kiedy-pis-przejal-media-publiczne.html, accessed 15 May 2019.

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20 JOURNALISM, RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE AND VIOLENCE IN BRAZIL Magali do Nascimento Cunha Introduction: religions in the news in Brazil In the 16th century, when the Portuguese colonizers came and took possession of the land that was later called Brazil, a variety of religious forms had already been experienced for centuries in the most different traditions. The encounter of diverse peoples with the colonizers also meant the encounter with a different culture and religion: Christianity and its expression of Iberian Catholicism. With the power of colonial occupation, Roman Catholicism became the religion of the Continent, demonizing and marginalizing indigenous religions. The religious meetings did not end with that experience (Brandão 2004). The arrival of the millions of people forcibly brought from Africa to live and work in the New World also promoted a new encounter with different cultures and religious forms. Once again, Roman Catholicism linked to the colonial system as an official religion demonized and marginalized the religion of the other. However, black slaves found ways to keep their traditions alive by adapting them to the dominant tradition. Brazil then began to experience its first syncretic expressions of religion. The meeting of these different religious traditions – Iberian Roman Catholicism, indigenous religions and African religions – and their subsequent practices, close to life and culture, made it possible for Brazil to become a plural country. This scenery became even more complex in the 19th century, with new encounters: the arrival of Protestant missions (Methodist, Presbyterian, Congregational, Baptist, Episcopal, Lutheran), mainly from the USA but also from Europe, as well as the arrival of immigrants from Asia to work on agriculture, replacing the black slaves, who had gained freedom in 1888. The result of such a variety of cultural encounters was the formation and development of a multiplicity of religious expressions of indigenous, European, African, Asian and North American origins in Brazil. At this point it is important to remember that Pentecostalism and its myriad denominations found fertile ground in the country and became the Latin American most significant religious phenomenon (Shaull and Cesar 2000). The numerical and geographical growth of Pentecostalism in Brazil, since the beginning of the 20th century, has been consolidated with the expansion of the presence of these religious groups in the media and in political parties. This increasing incidence has potentiated the numerical decline of Catholicism, which was considered, until the 1970s, a sovereign religious group due to its large majority of believers in these lands (Levine 2000). 296

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In a research carried out in 2014, we proceeded to survey if this religious plurality was present in the stories produced by Brazilian news media (Cunha 2018). We developed a survey on the content by two of the most expressive Brazilian news media in that year: Folha de S. Paulo (FSP) and Jornal Nacional ( JN). The first was the daily newspaper with the largest run and largest national circulation among the national papers in that year and a leader in digital editions. The second was (and still is) the leading daily television newscast Globo Network and reference in TV news production in the country. The survey has raised 28,360 news reports, informative matters in 2014. There were 22,000 in FSP and 6,260 in JN while 427 in total contained keywords in the theme religion: 312 in FSP and 115 in JN. The unimpressive numbers, in terms of the general picture of the stories produced (1.5% of all that was reported in one year), indicate that the theme religion is not a priority for these prominent media in Brazil and there is no specific section or editor for specialized coverage. We also verified that among the 427 news reports found, the highest incidence is the news coverage of themes related to Christianity (73%), followed by Islam (19%). The predominance of Christianity as the most valued religion in the news is evident, which corresponds to the fact that Brazil is a predominantly Christian country. However, the second religion of the country, Spiritism, according to the Brazilian Census Bureau (Teixeira and Menezes 2013), is not frequently represented in the news. This can be explained by the position of Islam in the global political context, especially in the year 2014, when the Islamic State was in great evidence. However, it is important to note the wide difference in the number of stories. The other religions gained a much lower approach in numerical terms in both media. Therefore, the numbers indicate that religion in the news is information about Christianity, perhaps about Islam, according to the journalism practiced in the most read and most watched media channels in Brazil. In this context, other religions are not subject to attention and valorization, receiving a small space in the news, just when they carry out themes that reach the level of relevance defined by these media, usually themes that involve violence and curiosities, as we will see ahead. It is important to point out that, in our 2014 research, the predominance of Christianity in news coverage does not represent the plurality that this religious segment experiences in Brazil. In the sub-theme Christianity surveyed, there is clear predominance of institutionalized Catholicism: 77.3% of all subjects in the two media (FSP and JN). Protestants appear as the second Christian group most present in stories about religion, however, with an inferior numerical difference: 17.5% in both vehicles. It is clear that Christian groups who are not Catholic are heavily disregarded in the general framework of the stories. The research included the categorization of the news found according to the value assignment to their content (positive or negative approach to the religious group). Catholicism was positively represented in 100% of the articles (even in those dealing with cases of pedophilia in the Church). The major content emphasis was on the Catholic agenda and approaches on social themes and events of the religious calendar, with highlights on papal speeches and visits. On the other hand, Muslims and Protestant Christians had the highest incidence of negative approach (82% and 72%, respectively). The African-Brazilian religions and Spiritism had such insignificant approach in the news coverage (only 1.4% of the news about religion published) that the 100% positive categorization of value assignment is not significant in this evaluation. These elements show that the plurality that signalizes the place of religions in Brazilian past and present history is disregarded by the news coverage in the country. Essentially, the news production is anchored in the notion of the so-called dominant religion focused on Catholicism, a concept that will be developed later in this chapter. 297

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This disregard of themes on religion in Brazilian news media is reflected in the coverage of cases of religious intolerance, as it will be identified in the case study proposed ahead. By emphasizing violence and curiosity around the few narrated situations that involve religious intolerance, the news media does not address the issue in depth, as a historical and sociocultural problem. In this sense, Brazilian journalism becomes a promoter of religious intolerance, since superficial and sensationalist approach of non-Christian and non-Catholic religious expressions end up encouraging intolerance itself under the imaginary around a so-called true religion.

Understanding religions, journalism and religious intolerance and violence Religions In general, religion can be popularly defined as the universe of beliefs that involve the transcendent that is beyond the palpable and concretely experienced by the five senses of the body. Hence, the general idea of religion is directed toward belief in one or more higher divine beings (called God or gods and goddesses), in spirits, in supernatural beings, in life beyond death. The origin of the term is related to the Latin word for ordinary use in ancient Rome religio, to refer to scruples, observance of laws and rules, warnings and prohibitions against the neglected with the collective. The word was not related to religion as we conceive it. It originates from the term relegere, meaning of scrupulous attention, patience, modesty and piety, while the derivative term religiosus was related to the worship to the gods in the Roman daily life, with the idea of “being scrupulous in relation to the cult” (Derrida 2002, 73). This meaning that connects the term religio to the worship of the gods is recorded in the writings of Cicero (1994). The way the term journeyed in the history of religions provoked profound transformations in its meaning. In the times of consolidation of Christianity, the conception of religare emerges as a re-signification of religio, from the pagan Romans, now tied to the true religion, of the true and unique God. Daniel Dubuisson (2003) assigns this re-signification to Lucius Caecilius Firmianus Lactantius (2nd century), one of the first Christians, adviser of the Roman emperor, Constantine I. In the work Divinae Instituciones, Lactantius uses the new etymology in opposition to the pagan expression relegere-religio: religare, religion, devotion, the link that binds the human being to the one true God, the Christian God revealed in Jesus Christ. The word goes beyond the idea of careful observance of the worship to signify the relationship of dependence of the human being with the God of Jesus. Augustine contributes to the consolidation of this notion in the 5th century, when he takes up the work of Lactantius. All this leads us to recognize that the concept of religion is a historical and cultural construction, used almost as synonymous to Christianity. Jacques Derrida (1998, 71–73) argues that although relegere-religio and religare are distinct etymologies, apparently competitors, they have a common point: they relate to the link, the bond that highlights a relation of responsibility to the divine. He proposes that the relation of complementarity between relegere and religare be the possibility of a common thought: the zealous, scrupulous observance of worship, of religious practice, and the links/bonds of devotion and loving relationship that unite human beings with the one and true god.

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In this sense, Otto Maduro (1982, 4) affirms that it is possible for us to be open to a “rich meaning, no doubt, but one that, by reason of its vital particularity, is complex, variable, ambiguous and obscure.” Consequently, since there are many social groups and many related dynamics of history, we need to take the term religion in the plural, in order to consider the variety of phenomena correlated to the religious universe. Otto Maduro’s definition of religions takes this direction: A structure of discourses and practices common to a social group, referring to certain forces (personified or not, multiplied or unified) that believers consider as anterior or superior to their natural and social surroundings, in whose regard they express their sense of dependency (through creation, control, protection, threat, or the like), and before which they consider themselves obliged to a particular pattern of conduct in society. (Maduro 1982, 6) In this sense, religions must be comprehensively understood in their universality, taking into account the diversity of particular forms, related to beliefs, myths, rites and collective organizations, within specific social, cultural and historical contexts. This common system of beliefs is socially, culturally and historically constructed from grand narratives that move society with a force that goes beyond what the materializing logic says (Gasbarro 2006). When we base ourselves on a socio-historical definition of religion, we are promoting a dialogue between social communication, sociology and history and giving up lexical, philosophical theological definitions, which certainly does not cover elements that refer to religions such as faith, revelation, conversion, mystical experience, the Holy Scriptures. It is a sociological view of what religions represent both as a social field and as a form of social communication (Pace 2011).

Journalism We can start from the understanding that journalism is a communication process fed by a narrative centered on the presentation of a punctual knowledge about the current state, concerning a more immediate social group and also the world. Therefore, the journalistic narrative becomes the periodic (routine, daily) report of current events. It is born from the correlation between event and news, or recent fact and immediate announcement, which gives the sense of topicality. All these dynamics result on a technical activity that aims to inform, produce information. Thus, journalism is based on the existence of events with newsworthy characteristics, and from the point of view of journalists and readers/listeners/viewers/users of digital media, they become news. The contents of journalism are, therefore, the events with the greatest degree of newsworthiness. News are “what newspapermen make it” (Gieber 1964, 173), which means that it is not something with particular existence, but rather a construction by those who produce it. This is what the notion of news-value in journalism signifies, those criteria for valuing events in order to be considered sufficiently interesting, meaningful and relevant to be transformed into news (Bednarek and Caple 2017). Journalism can be done in print, television, radio or digital media and the process takes place through professionals ( journalists), in journalistic organizations (companies, associations, NGOs), in the midst of a production process ( journalistic practices) producing a specific type of product (the news), which unfolds in genres such as reporting, commenting, analysis and opinion.

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All these elements are united by time through the senses of periodicity, instantancity and topicality to capture the events of the world. Language must be objective and focused on the public interest, which shapes the fundamental character of journalism: neutrality. It means that news producers deal with events that are transformed into news under the principle of freedom of expression, with no committed to governments, political groups, movements and anything that prevents them from being impartial. This neutral understanding is a target for critics of the theories of communication who question every idea of impartiality and exemption in journalism. This evaluation is supported by the realization that every narrative carries semantic and emotive associations (Franklin et al. 2005). Like any discourse, journalistic narratives carry value judgments from the process of defining what is news and what is not; through the selection of contents, what contains images and what images, titles and headlines; on the words used to classify characters or situations. This theoretical critique also includes in this process the role of companies, institutions, organizations, movements and sponsors that produce journalistic stories, which guide news content based on their criteria and interests, making journalists as hostages in their own jobs. Nevertheless, for a long time the (utopic) notion of the journalistic statement of impartiality prevailed as a set of representations focused exclusively on the explicit objective of informing, formulated according to the presumed codes and values of the public (Franklin et al. 2005). The studies that relate philosophy, sociology and anthropology to journalism strengthen criticism on the neutral understanding. They call attention to the human dimension and to the social time present in the process of journalistic production, considering the dynamics that involve the use of verbal language, the raw material of journalism. These studies criticize the understanding that journalism is the result of a technical work of reporting, but affirm that it is the result of a construction process that begins with the journalist’s understanding of the social reality, in which the events he/she reports take place. Miquel Rodrigo Alsina approaches this perspective: Reality cannot be completely different from the way actors interpret it, internalize it, rethink it and define it historically and culturally. The construction of reality, therefore, is the production of meaning through productive practice and routines of the organization of the journalistic profession. (Alsina 2005, 48, translated by the author) In producing news, a journalist draws on a worldview derived from the concepts built into the society and the social institutions with which he/she has interacted. These concepts help to construct a collective imaginary. In reporting a story, the journalist brings a social imaginary to the issues that in turn shape the writing of the story. Cornelius Castoriadis (1987) calls this collection of products of social interactions (figures/forms/images) imaginary significations, which form a coherent whole, the social imaginary. This collection of images is socially created and shared to give sense and cohesion to the existence of a group. Castoriadis considers that only from these imaginary significations it is possible to discuss something. The imaginary is, therefore, a component of human existence as a significantly social experience, which gives meaning to the collective life and is re-signified by it, becoming an element in permanent construction. It is the social elaboration of the collection of images formed by the human being related to everything that he/she visually and experimentally learns from the world (Castoriadis 1987). This dynamic is made possible by communicational processes, which allow human beings to interact, in an interpersonal and massive way, mediated or not. Journalism is among them. 300

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A collection of social meanings determines each person’s knowledge and worldview. A journalist, like any other member of society, experiences this process. His/her understanding of religion may or may not be the result of a religious experience but is directly linked to his/her understanding on beliefs. This means that the editorial approach to different facts and themes is related to the journalists’ imaginary connected to the social imaginary. The comprehension of the cultural and imaginary construction from a particular collective is important to understand how journalistic coverage of certain themes around religions is given.

Dominant religion The concept dominant religion or predominant religion, which comes out of the religious studies field, can be evoked here. The great world religions and the majority of Christian denominations in the continents often gain this classification of dominant religion or dominant group, which is related to numerical superiority and long-standing political positions and result in a variety of social privileges. This approach resonates with the reality in Brazil and Latin America to the extent that it identifies some of the same aspects that determine the dominance of Christianity and especially of Roman Catholicism. From the list made by Lewis Z. Scholosser (2003), reflecting the topic in USA, we can correlate: numerical superiority, historically higher political positioning, privileges in the public sphere and the classification of some groups within Christianity itself as non-Christian, such as the case of Pentecostals in Latin America, still classified by Catholic-Roman leaders as so-called sects. Scholosser highlights the role of the media in this process, once newspaper headlines reproduce these perspectives. Number, political position, privileges and disqualification of the other can be aspects that related to the status do Roman Catholicism in Latin America. However, considering the growth of Pentecostalism and its intense occupation of the public space in the continent (through media and politics) added to the consequent loss of believers in the Catholic Church (Teixeira and Menezes 2013), we must also relate the understanding of dominant religion to another perspective: the notion of hegemony. This notion, as developed by Antonio Gramsci (1998), is related to power strategies that produce both a worldview and its acceptance. Hegemony thus produces reality and produces the naturalizations that lead to its acceptance. The success of hegemony occurs when the dominance of certain beliefs and practices are treated as natural and unquestionable elements that make up the natural order of things. Hence, we find the place of religion being identified in a given society as a natural and obvious presence in the public sphere – a place that is guaranteed and reserved – even if a given religious group is numerically shaken, as in the case of Catholicism in Brazil. In addition, even if there is competition in the religious field and losses in the position historically assumed, the hegemony of one religion is supported by the role it plays in the process of constructing reality, the natural order of things. This hegemonic process also includes the cultural dynamics that results from the construction of the collective religious imagination. Raymond Williams (1976, 145) establishes the relationship between hegemony and culture when he indicates that “the result of the exercise of hegemony can be identified in its acceptance as ‘normal reality’ or ‘common sense’ by those who, in practice, are subordinated by it”. In other words, the idea of dominant religion associated to Roman Catholicism in Brazil results from a cultural practice built from the social imaginary of a so-called true and valid religion. This is where the role of the media becomes crucial, since this imaginary permeates the understanding of religion of news producers. 301

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Religious violence and intolerance Tolerance is the human beings’ capacity to maintain coexistence positively. Tolerance does not mean patience, but it is the valorization of the right that every person has to be what he/ she is and to continue to be. The opposite, intolerance, is the reduction of reality to only one side: the intolerant attitude is the denial of the right of the one who is different from existing. Hence, it is necessary to recognize the violent manipulation of intolerance to the other for the sake of power, a word that can be substituted in this understanding by violence (Freud 1964). It is concretized and taken to the extreme in segregation, exclusion and even elimination of the other through wars, regimes of separation (such as apartheid in South Africa, caste system in India), genocide, ethnic cleansing and persecution. Violent human actions are generated by different forms of intolerance (racism, machismo, classism, xenophobia, homophobia, ageism, hate for political options, hate against people with disabilities, hate against obese people). The subject of this chapter, religious intolerance, is another form. The first records of intolerance and violence for religious reasons in Brazil are from the process of colonization of the country by the Portuguese at the threshold of the 16th century. The hundreds of indigenous peoples who inhabited the conquered land practiced very old religions. After the Portuguese invasion, they began to suffer from the rejection and demonization imposed by Roman Catholic Christianity, brought as the official religion of colonizers and presented as the only truth of faith. Groups that did not submit to the catechesis of Catholic missionaries and did not convert to the imposed religion, had their expressions of faith forcibly eliminated in a process of decimation of cultures that marks the history of the country, or transformed by means of syncretism of rites and practices (Gonçalves 2012). The same process was experienced by millions of Africans enslaved and trafficked for centuries, brought to Brazil to work especially on coffee, sugar cane, cotton and tobacco plantations. They were mainly from Angola, Mozambique, Congo and Guinea and had distinct cultures and religions, not only those of tribal roots but also related to the Islamic faith. Collectiveness was forbidden, therefore they were separated and prevented from nurturing their beliefs. The slaves were impelled to the conversion to the Catholic faith and their religions were demonized and rejected by the religious leaderships allied to the colonial power. The religious intolerance experienced by natives and Africans motivated by Catholic exclusivism and by the ideology of European superiority was experienced by Lutheran and Reformed Protestants as well. When these groups attempted to migrate to Northeastern Brazil, coming from France and the Netherlands in the 16th and 17th centuries, they were violently expelled. The same intolerance was directed to Jews who populated the country in the same centuries, coming from Portugal and from Holland, under the power of the Holy Office of the Inquisition, installed in Portugal for 3 centuries, which acted in Brazil through visits and delegation of power to local bishops (Wiznitzer 1960). The coming of the Portuguese Royal Family to Brazil in 1808 (escaping from Napoleon attacks) promoted religious diversity within the Christian faith. Immigration of English, German and Swiss people, resulting from commercial agreements, navigation and colonization processes, brought Anglican, Episcopal and Lutheran Protestant faiths to the colony. However, only with the Imperial Constitution, after the independence of Portugal, in 1822, the freedom of worship of non-Catholics was recognized, although Catholicism was maintained as the official religion. This limited opening allowed the arrival of Protestant missionaries with proselytizing purposes in the second half of the 19th century, although there

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were several restrictions such as the requirement that the place of worship should not have the traditional architecture of Christian churches. Catholic leaders, however, who opposed any practice of faith other than their own, promoted many violent acts against Protestants (physical assault, stoning of temples, among others). On the other side, Protestant leaders closed to dialogue with Catholicism and deniers of the very existence of this Christian faith, in turn, also developed violent actions such as the public destruction of images of saints and offensive public preaching. During the 20th century, Brazil slowly opened for the rights on religious freedom. It was more difficult to the African-Brazilian religions that until 1950s were demonized and subjected to police persecution. Other religious groups found space during this period, such as Spiritism, Eastern religions, surviving indigenous religions and others that emerge from syncretic processes, favoring the experience of plurality in Brazilian lands (Brandão 2004). However, even when advances are recognized, the culture of intolerance stimulated by religious exclusivism is still alive. It is promoted by Christian hegemony in the history of the country (fundamentally Roman Catholic) and by the ideology of racism rooted in white and Judeo-Christian civilization superiority. Religious intolerance is present as a culture, in the most diverse social practices, and is propagated not only by intolerant religious groups but also by institutions, such as schools, the judiciary and the media. This is due to the various forms of expression of intolerance, ranging from attitudes of prejudice, to offenses to freedom of belief and even persecution and physical violence against religious minorities (Kunsch and Fischmann 2002). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the Brazilian Federal Constitution (1988) recognize freedoms of expression and worship as human and citizen rights. This means that religions and beliefs of members of the human family and of Brazilians should not constitute barriers to living and establishing human relationships. In this sense, people should be respected in public and private settings and equally treated before the law, regardless of having or not a religious confession. The most recent Report on Intolerance and Religious Violence in Brazil (2011–2015): Preliminary Results (Fonseca and Adad 2016), conducted by the Brazilian Government, shows eight types of violations of human beings due to religious motivation occurring in the country: psychological, physical, moral, institutional, patrimonial, sexual violence, violence relative to the practice of religious acts/ rites and negligence. The report lists 394 cases in the period, raised through denunciations collected by ten Brazilian Public Ombudsmen Offices for Human Rights. The majority of the cases are psychological violence (66%) and the highest incidence of violence occurs in houses (36%), where the perpetrators are mostly white (53%), family members (23%) and neighbors (27%). The majority of the victims are black and brown (64%) and linked to African-Brazilian religions (27%). This Report is the subject of the study case presented in the next session.

Journalism, religious intolerance and violence as study object As intolerance is an element present in different social experiences, it is possible to identify practices around the world that represent violence and intolerance in regard to freedom of expression and information. They take form of censorship, prohibitions, intimidation and physical violence against news producers. We can also consider the constitution of media monopolies, the restricted definition in the concept of news and the criteria of newsworthy as well as the insufficiency in the training of media professionals.

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The media are mediations, so they reflect, signify and re-signify imaginaries, cultures and attitudes of societies (Alsina 2005). Considering a plural society, such as Brazil, if tolerance and the right to freedom of expression and belief prevail in society, the tendency is for the media to reproduce these dimensions. Otherwise, in the prevalence of intolerance and denial of freedom, the media end up not expressing this plurality. The Catalog of Theses and Dissertations by CAPES Foundation (Coordination for Improvement of Higher Education Personnel), a department of the Brazilian Ministry of Education, records 14 researches in Humanities on the relationship between journalism and religious intolerance, from 2002 to the first half of 2018. Among these 14 studies, four deal, in general, with religions in the news coverage by the Brazilian mainstream media, four deal with the way Islam is represented, three evaluate journalistic approaches to African-Brazilian religions, three show the relation between journalism, respectively, and Protestants, Catholics and indigenous religiosities. All the studies attest the superficial content with which religious intolerance is referred by Brazilian mainstream media and how intolerance ends up being propagated through these journalistic practices. The report of the Brazilian government on religious intolerance quoted here has a chapter on how news media approached cases of religious intolerance in the country from 2011 to 2015. It is an official report and source for the deepening of these elements regarding journalism-intolerance-violence, which will be detailed in the following case study.

Religious intolerance and violence in Brazilian journalism: a case study The Report on Intolerance and Religious Violence in Brazil (2011–2015): Preliminary Results (RIRVB) (Fonseca and Adad 2016) is the result of a survey promoted by the Human Rights Ministry of the Brazilian Government, which gathered data of national scope, from October 2011 to December 2015. The project was developed in partnership with the Organization of Ibero-American States (OEI), with the support of the (Lutheran) Superior School of Theology (Brazil). Data collection covered all 27 states of Brazil and sources such as press materials, public human rights ombudsmen offices, judicial processes, registrations in specialized police stations, interviews with religious leaders involved in emblematic cases. The categories for analysis were based on the complaints received by the Ombudsman Office of the Ministry of Human Rights: • • • • • • • •

Psychological violence due to religious motivation Physical violence due to religious motivation Violence regarding the practice of religious acts/rites Moral violence due to religious motivation Institutional violence due to religious motivation Violence on the basis of religious motivation Sexual violence due to religious motivation Negligence due to religious motivation

The 146-page report is divided into five chapters. The text presents a portrait about the crimes of hatred practiced in contemporary Brazil that violate freedom and human dignity, violence and persecution for religious reasons. They are, as stated in the report, “practices of extreme gravity and are often characterized by offense, discrimination and even acts that affect life” (Fonseca and Adad 2016, 9, translated by the author). In this study, we analyze elements contained in Chapter 3 (data related to cases of intolerance and religious violence in Brazil reported by the written press), to search for ways to 304

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encourage journalistic practices aimed at the full development of human and citizens’ rights. RIRVB Chapter 3 draws attention to two elements directly related to journalism: (1) the low incidence of news about religious intolerance and violence; (2) trends in news production (‘editorial line’).

The low incidence of news RIRVB identified 65 news media in the 27 states of Brazil, classified as main news printed papers and portals and main news magazines in the country. The report registers 399 stories about intolerance and religious violence in Brazil published between 2011 and 2015. Considering the cases approached in more than one vehicle, there are 274 stories. Based on an equitable distribution with the use of a simple parameter, we identify little more than four stories per vehicle in five years, a number that is very small: less than one story per year in each news media surveyed. Since RIRVB highlights a high number of cases per year (Table 20.1), the journalistic coverage is quite far from what reality indicates. The low number of stories has an important meaning considered the report itself: … the subject of intolerance and religious violence is still an incipient matter in the journalistic environment so that there is not an adequate approach in relation to several aspects connected to it. (Fonseca and Adad 2016, 35, translated by the author) In this respect, it is important to emphasize that it is not only the issue of intolerance and religious violence that needs to be examined but that of religion itself. Religion has been a neglected subject in the Brazilian news media, as it was concluded in the study carried out by the author of this chapter in 2014, described above (Cunha 2018). In that study, we showed the inexpressive numbers regarding the general picture of the stories on religion in the two news media with the largest public reach in the country, a newspaper (print and digital) and a television newscast. Only 1.5% of all that was reported in a year dealt with religion. These figures revealed that the theme is not a priority in these prominent media in Brazil, a plural and very religious country, lacking a specific section or editor for specialized coverage. In this sense, if religion does not become a prominent topic for the news media, religious intolerance and violence become irrelevant, consequently. According to studies in journalism, it can be classified as a thematic that do not have news-value. Bad news (tragedies, crime, violence), in general, have news value, attracts public attention, as well as curious, unusual facts (surprises) (Franklin et al. 2005). This is confirmed by the RIRVB, which shows that the largest number of stories researched concerns subjects that deal with violence and curiosities. Major incidence is news on physical aggressions and depredations and situations like Muslim women and Catholic nuns wearing veils in public Table 20.1 Denunciations received per year

Denunciations

2011a

2012

2013

2014

2015

9

99

126

90

70

a From Odobar. Source: Fonseca and Adad (2016, 61).

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Stories

“Girl is hit by stone in her head after leaving candomble cult” (2015) “For judge, candomble and Umbanda are not religions” (2014) “Justice compels Protestant church to indemnify candomble temple after death of a priest in Camacari” (2015) “Police chief is arrested for shooting a Protestant believer” “Muslim women are victims of attack in streets of Rio” “Religious fight between TV actor Henri Castelli and his ex-girlfriend gets an end in Police Station”

41 12 10 6 S 4

Source: FONSECA, ADAD (2016, 43).

institutions and in photos of official documents, and disputes related to ritual practices in public spaces (see Table 20.2). This observation points to the conclusion that, in the perspective of journalistic coverage, the relevant element is not the religious motivation related to the cases but violence itself. This element may contribute to the deepening of the report’s analysis, which registers: … the occurrence of religious intolerance as a fact in itself is despised and the intolerant act as such is de-characterized, turning it into a mere artifice to exemplify prejudice. This leads to the lack of recognition of the act of religious intolerance as a type of violence that deserves attention/denunciation by the press. (Fonseca and Adad 2016, 35, translated by the author) The news value violence and curiosities silence the relationship between religious intolerance and violence and minimize the problem by characterizing it as simply prejudice. This categorization may be considered a result of the understanding of religion that is part of the imaginary of the news producers and make up editorial lines.

The “editorial line” of the media channels One of RIRVB highlights concerns the editorial line of the 65 vehicles surveyed. The text highlights that the editorial line of the newspaper needs to be sensitive to occurrences on religious intolerance or there will be a repressed demand. The report also considers the difficulty that journalists and news producers have to deal with cases of religious intolerance and violence due to lack of knowledge, a way of making the occurrences invisible (Fonseca and Adad 2016, 36). It is necessary to relate this aspect to what was emphasized above in this chapter: the fact that such position of insensitivity to intolerance, which results in ignorance and invisibility of the theme, concerns the very relationship of disregard of news media with the theme religion. First, there is no specialized editor or section in the vehicles, which results in the lack of enabled/qualified journalists to deal with the issue, promoting superficial and/or misleading content. The report offers an example of the story of a boy murdered in 2012 in the outskirts of a city in the Northeast of Brazil published as a case of black magic practices. Black magic is not included in the report as a key word as it is not considered a religious practice in Brazilian culture. As the researchers analyzed the case, it was evident that it would not fit 306

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as religious intolerance and violence because the boy had suffered violence but it was not an episode motivated by religion. The report concludes: “Actually, religious intolerance could be identified in the way the press portrayed the fact” (Fonseca and Adad 2016, 38, translated by the author). This type of approach can be evaluated as lack of knowledge or ignorance in the way news producers (editors and reporters) deal with the issue. However, it can also refer to a second aspect contained in this element and that is prior to the news production itself: the predominant understanding of religion among news producers. We raised in the 2014 research on religion in the Brazilian news (Cunha 2018), elements that demonstrate that we do not only deal with the issue of editorial line, but rather an element before it: news producers work from a reality constructed by a collective imaginary. Further these producers, having or not religious formation, also feed themselves with information from the news media that is a constructor of this reality. In this sense, it is important to consider that there is a predominant imaginary on religion permeating Brazilian culture. It dates back to the time of the Portuguese colony catechized by Catholic missionaries. In that conception, which still prevails, these lands were chosen by God to be made Christians, a faith that must remain exalted through sentences like: God is Brazilian, “Brazil is a tropical country blessed by God” (Ianni 2000). News producers, Brazilians who interact with this imaginary and cultural form, end up rebuilding and reissuing in the media the image of God, related to Christianity, and that of the true and valid religion concerning Catholicism. Despite the fact that Roman Catholic numerical dominance has been put in check in Brazil since the 1980s, especially with the vertiginous growth of Pentecostalism (Teixeira and Menezes 2013), the news media reconstruct the Catholic image of the dominant religion, the one that is true and valid. Then, the published news privileges the status of this religious group through the predominant amount of texts and the positive quality of the contents, guaranteeing its hegemony (Scholosser 2003). In this dynamic, the journalism practiced silences events that involve other religious expressions, or treats them pejoratively, denying the complex framework of religious diversity in Brazil, even within Catholicism itself, avoiding the deep report of situations of intolerance and violence practiced in the name of this true religion. This comprehension may explain why RIVRGB has identified the trend to a large number of stories on religious intolerance and violence published related to international events. The report concludes that this journalistic practice suggests that the news producers understanding restrict the theme to “ethnic wars and conflicts in the Middle East or in Europe involving populations particularly faithful to Islam” (Fonseca and Adad 2016, 36, translated by the author). This approach negates the subject coverage at the local level because denies its relevance or even its existence. For this reason, RIRVB identifies expressions of intolerance in the news media themselves – papers, magazines and portals as aggressors: Depending on the sensitivity given to this type of occurrence, this theme [religious intolerance and violence] is contemplated or not, and can be repressed, considered or even narrated in a biased way. This aspect result in newspapers with little news about local cases of religious intolerance and violence, giving more publicity to international, national cases (mainly those in the Southeast) and about demonstrations against religious intolerance in Brazil, such as marches, shows and cultural events. (Fonseca and Adad 2016, 45, translated by the author) 307

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Conclusion: learnings and perspectives for future studies The cases of violence against religions reported in the media researched and recorded in Chapter 3 of RIRVB are part of the dense portrait that permeates the daily experiences marked by prejudice, hatred and all kinds of aggression by many Brazilian religious groups. Aiming at communication studies that focus on the defense of human rights and citizenship, we must consider what is contained in the report: the discursive dimension of the approach of Brazilian journalism to religions, which is intolerant in the form of verbalizing cases of religious intolerance and also in the silences (the non-sayings). Religious violence in Brazil is also revealed in the discourse of the media. These approaches ultimately serve to promote intolerance and the intensification of disputes between religious groups. One of the conclusions registered in RIRVB points out: The search in the newspapers resulted in fewer news than expected. The conclusions can be several: or these cases do not even take a public dimension, staying in the private sphere, or they reach the public sphere seen as minor issues. An observation of the cases found shows the difficulty of the authorities themselves in dealing with religious conflicts, identifying the aggressors and the criminal type itself. Concerning the press, there is a low interest in the subject and a challenge that represents the promotion of critical and transformative thinking. Access to information and the establishment of new fronts, which corroborate the need for a better and more comprehensive press coverage. (Fonseca and Adad 2016, 55, translated by the author) Religious plurality, even within the hegemonic Christianity in the country, is a factor that seems to be ignored or even denied by news media in Brazil. This study still brings out other two elements when the subject is the role of communication and the media in the actions of defense of human and citizen rights. First, the need to challenge educational processes, especially in Universities, in courses of journalism, to train professionals to take pluralism, diversity and responsibility into account. Second, RIRVB needs to be a source for challenging news producers (media owners, publishers, journalists) to take responsibility for handling such content. Another important indicator from the case study is the need to focus more attention on independent, alternative media, which has played a significant role in building journalism committed to human and citizen rights, in actions around freedom of expression and belief, by guaranteeing visibility and voice for minorities (Peruzzo 2009). A forth aspect that is relevant to this area of studies is the increasing number of actions, institutionalized or not, that face the challenge around religious intolerance and violence in Brazil. The progress of the number of cases of violence and religious intolerance in the country in recent years, as shown in RIRVB, has motivated movements of civil society such as marches and periodic events against intolerance and for religious freedom. These events were launched in Rio de Janeiro in 2008, and have been amplified throughout the country. In the field of institutional politics, the creation of the Parliamentary Front in Defense of Traditional Peoples African-Brazilian Religions in 2014 is a significant action. The institution of public policies on human rights through organs linked to the Federal Government of Brazil began in the period of re-democratization after the military dictatorship (1964–1985), with the creation of the Secretariat of Human Rights of the Presidency of the Republic. In the 2000s, the secretariat gained the status of Federal Ministry, and the Human Rights Ombudsman Office was created, responsible for receiving reports of violations related to intolerance. 308

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Both the expressions of greater awareness of the Brazilian population and the consolidation of public policies in the face of this serious social and political conflict reflected in this chapter impact academic studies. The survey in the Catalog of Theses and Dissertations by CAPES Foundation shows 14 researches developed on the theme from 2002 to 2018, and indicates a significant increase in number of studies from the year 2009, when the periodic activist actions were intensified: There are 11 studies from that year. Brazilian academy is clearly challenged to pay more attention to the subject of religious intolerance, communication and journalism both in researches and in courses to be offered. This handbook represents a significant contribution.

Further readings Cunha, M. N., 2012. Latin American Religion in the News. In: Winston, D., ed. The Oxford Handbook on Religion and the American News Media. New York: Oxford Press, 439–452. This chapter is part of a book that explores how the news media shape and reflect what the public knows about religion. A look on how American press covers Latin-American religion offers content to deepen the notion of an exclusivist approach on religion through news media that is a source for religious intolerance and violence. Levine, D., 2000. The news about religion in Latin America. In: Silk, M., ed. Religion in the International News Agenda. Hartford: The Leonard E. Greenberg Center for the Study of Religion in Public Life, 120–142. This chapter deepen the approach on the mosaic formed by the religions in Latin America through a critical observation on how the news media treat the subject insufficiently or make invisible the religious diversity that shapes the continent.

References Alsina, M. R., 2005. La construction social de la noticia. Barcelona: Paidos Iberica. Bednarek, M. and Caple, H., 2017. The Discourse of News Values: How News Organizations Create Newsworthiness. New York: Oxford University Press. Brandão, C. R., 2004. Fronteira da fé – alguns sistemas de sentido, crenças e religiões no Brasil de hoje. Estudos Avançados, [e-journal] 18(52). Available at Universidade de São Paulo website http://www. revistas.usp.br/eav/article/view/10035, accessed 12 October 2018. Castoriadis, C., 1987. The Imaginary Institution of Society. Cambridge: MIT Press. Cicero, M. T., 1994. De Natura Deorum. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Cunha, M. N., 2018. Religious Exclusivism and Roman Catholicism in the Brazilian News Media. In: Cohen, Y., ed. Spiritual News. Reporting Religion around the World. New York: Peter Lang, 141–164. Derrida, J., 1998. Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits of the Reason Alone. In: Derrida, J. and Vattimo, G., eds. Religion. Cultural Memory in the Present Series. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1–78. Derrida, J., 2002. Acts of Religion. London and New York: Routledge. Dubuisson, D., 2003. The Western Construction of Religion: Myths, Knowledge, and Ideology. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Fonseca, A. B. and Adad, C. J. C., 2016. Relatório sobre intolerância e violência religiosa no Brasil (2011–2015): resultados preliminares. Ministério das Mulheres, da Igualdade Racial, da Juventude e dos Direitos Humanos. Brasília: Secretaria Especial de Direitos Humanos. Available at http://www.sdh.gov.br/ sobre/participacao-social/cnrdr/pdfs/relatorio-de-intolerancia-e-violencia-religiosa-rivir-2015, accessed 15 October 2018. Franklin, B., Hamer, M., Hanna, M., Kinsey, M. and Richardson, J. E., 2005. Key Concepts in Journalism Studies. London: Sage. Freud, S., 1964. Why War? In: Strachey, J. and Freud, A., eds. The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, vol XXII. London: Hogarth Press, 197–218. Gasbarro, N., 2006. Missões: A Civilização Cristã em Ação. In: Montero, P., ed. Deus na Aldeia: missionários, índios e mediação cultural. São Paulo: Globo.

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Magali do Nascimento Cunha Gieber, W., 1964. News is what newspapermen make it. In: Lewis, A. D. and White, D. M., eds. People, Society and Mass Communication. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 172–182. Gonçalves, A. B., 2012. Da intolerância religiosa aos direitos humanos. Ciências da Religião - História e Sociedade, [e-journal] 10(1). Available at Universidade Mackenzie website http://editorarevistas. mackenzie.br/index.php/cr/article/view/3765, accessed 12 October 2018. Gramsci, A., 1998. Selections from the Prison. Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Reprint 1971. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Ianni, O., 2000. Tendências do pensamento brasileiro. Tempo Social, [e-journal] 2(12). Available at Univesidade de São Paulo website http://www.revistas.usp.br/ts/article/view/12334, accessed 12 October 2018. Kunsch, M. M. K. and Fischmann, R., 2002. Mídia e Tolerância. A ciência construindo caminhos de liberdade. São Paulo: Edusp. Levine, D. H., 2000. The News about Religion in Latin America. In: Silk, M., ed. Religion in the International News Agenda. Hartford: The Leonard E. Greenberg Center for the Study of Religion in Public Life. Maduro, O., 1982. Religion and Social Conflicts. Eugene: Wipf and Stock. Pace, E., 2011. Religion as Communication: God’s Talk. Farnham: Ashgate. Peruzzo, C. M. K., 2009. Aproximações entre a comunicação popular e comunitária e a imprensa alternativa no Brasil na era do ciberespaço. Galáxia, [e-journal] 17. Available through Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo website https://revistas.pucsp.br/galaxia/article/view/2108, accessed 12 October 2018. Scholosser, L. Z., 2003. Christian Privilege: Breaking a Sacred Taboo. Journal of Multicultural Counseling and Development, [e-journal] 31(1). Available through University of Iowa website https://wiki.uiowa. edu/download/attachments/39006632/Christian+Privilege.pdf, accessed 16 September 2018. Shaull, R. and Cesar, W., 2000. Pentecostalism and the Future of the Christian Churches: Promises, Limitations, Challenges. Cambridge: Eerdmans. Teixeira, F. and Menezes, R., 2013. Religiões em movimento – o censo de 2010. Petrópolis: Vozes. Williams, R., 1976. Key Words: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. New York: Oxford University Press. Wiznitzer, A., 1960. Os judeus no Brasil colonial. São Paulo: Edusp.

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21 REPORTING RELIGIONS WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS Sinicizing religious faith, securitizing news media Wai-Yip Ho Introduction Independent movements swept over Asia since the mid-20th century and the birth of nation-states was often along the rise of modern press. In many cases in Asia, the emergence of print press and journalism was part of the modernization project, which was brought mainly by Western Christian missionaries – that is, modern Chinese journalism largely originated influenced by Western Christian missionary activities. That Christian missionaries initiated the printing press not only played a critical role in nation building and the formation of the modern state, but also liberated public voices from the control of the Imperial government. However, in some countries after independence, postcolonial governments tightly controlled both newspapers and religious bodies. In the current case of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the leadership of President Xi Jinping launched a national campaign of sinicizing religions (e.g., Global Times 2018a) and tightening the usage of social media including religious dissemination. Securitizing religion and controlling journalism are two sides of the same coin. In particular, Islam and Christianity are specifically targeted as foreign threats against the sovereign power of PRC. While Uyghur Muslims have been accused of propagating ethno-nationalism to split Xinjiang from PRC, Christian churches have been perceived as the alliance of Western colonialism since the late Qing era. Whether the present religious persecutions in China are unprecedentedly the worst is still under debate and observation, differences between the foreign journalists and state-run media covering religions in China clearly indicate that the global rise of China does not lead to a path of Western liberalism, secularization and free press. The current case of China’s lack of free press is leading to another path of authoritarianism that is especially enforced through religious Sinicization and censoring news report in social media. Rather than exploring how Chinese society is inherently suppressing religion or how China is moving to another period of Cultural Revolution that is hostile to freedom of press, this chapter explores China’s emerging trend of securitizing media and co-opting religion which are perhaps the consequence of a state-led national campaign of Sinicization. The deprivation of free press and lack of citizen journalism explains why these forms of journalism cannot play an impartial role to report news. In addition, state control not only incapacitates inter-religious dialogue, but the suspicion of religions as foreign threat or even terror also disables religious endeavors of peacebuilding. 311

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Understanding religion and journalism in China How Chinese understand religion: teaching, ideology, revival and Sinicization In pre-modern China, there is no equivalent Western conception of religion. The notion of jiao perhaps is the closest terminology that is compatible to religion. Jiao refers to the instruction and teaching, in which three ways or teachings (sanjiao) of Confucius (rujiao), Laozi (daojiao) and Buddha ( fojiao) are the core institutional legacy in Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism. After the fall of the last China’s Imperial Qing Dynasty in 1911, the newly born modern China repudiated the feudal past and stood up embracing liberal spirits of science, democracy, progress, etc. To many young avant-gardes in the 1919 May-Fourth movement upholding modern notions of democracy and science, religion was equivalent to superstitious, feudal and anti-modern. Hu Shih, the leading public intellectual in the republican period of the 1920s, even claimed that “China is a country without religion and the Chinese are a people who are not bound by religious superstitions” (Hu 1928, 91) and it seems that the importance of religion in China was insignificant (Robson 2018, 199). While religion in the Republican period was viewed as anti-modern or backward, religious groups were generally tolerated. In the period of PRC-ruled China, the Chinese communist party (CCP), empowered by the Marxist ideology, criticized religion as the opium of the people as well as imperial residue of feudal superstition. Viewing religion of ideology that unmasks the exploitative nature of capitalism, the Maoist party-state aimed to reveal the falsehood of religious clergies and eradicate the religious powers and infrastructure (Chau 2011). In the peak of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), many churches, mosques and temples were damaged and even demolished by the Red Guards, a mass student-led anti-feudal movement. It was not until 1982 that the CCP revisioned the policy and declared a more tolerate stance and that the party’s policy is to protect citizens’ religious rights and the freedom of religious belief. By then and from 1980s onwards, the destroyed temples, churches and mosques were restored and rebuilt, leading to a religious revival over all parts of PRC (Lai 2005). It should also be noted that the religious revival is an aspect of greater social freedom that has accompanied the economic development (Overmyer 2003). Nowadays five world religions (Buddhism, Daoism, Catholicism, Protestantism and Islam) are legally recognized and formally protected in Mainland China. Among the major religions in modern China, Confucianism and Daoism are considered as native religions to China. Although Chinese society also consists of a large population of believers in Buddhism, Christianity (Catholicism and Protestantism) and Islam, they are considered as foreign faiths, brought from the outside to China. In the post-Mao Chinese governance, freedom of religious belief and worship is permitted. However, religion is largely subjected to regulation and restrictions in various forms, when the Chinese Communist Party viewed religious activities pose challenges to the political orthodoxy and ruling legitimacy of the state (Potter 2003). Since the rule of Xi, the control of religion has been tightening through the new policy of religious Sincization. The control is not only on the physical setting of religious sites but also on the digital dissemination of religious ideas.

Journalism in China: awakenings of the Chinese public To trace the rise of modern journalism in China it is necessary to look at religious proselytism of Western Christian missionaries. At the same time, the introduction of modern

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journalism to China in the 19th century is also part of the Western modernity project. As Clart and Scott (2015) argue that without the means of modern press of journalism to embody religious message, the dissemination of religious ideas in China would not be possible. In tracing China’s modern history of journalism and communication, Zhao and Sun (2018) argue that after the Opium War in 1840, Western missionaries and businessmen inaugurated modern newspapers and periodicals, which brought the birth of China’s modern journalism industry. While the Western missionaries’ interest lay in spreading the religious message and Christian Gospel to the Chinese public, Chinese intellectuals later appropriated the printing press to educate the Chinese public about Western ideas of democracy, modernization and science. Although far from well-established, the birth of the printing press and modern journalism in China empowered private citizens to have a sense of individuality, rights of citizenship and most importantly a public voice participating in and shaping national affairs (Wagner 2009). It is not surprising that many newspapers were launched by the reformists. In tracing the origin of Chinese newspaper, the printing press first appeared due to the movable lead Chinese character printing device which was brought from Malacca to Hong Kong by Western missionaries. Then the printing machinery was subsequently procured by the reformist Wang Tao (1828–1908) who launched the first newspaper Tsuen Wan Yat Po/Xunhuan Ribao in 1874 (Chou 2018). Chen Siu Pak set up similar reform-minded newspapers like China Daily in 1899, instructed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, to provide propaganda against the Imperial Qing government, and the first issue of China Daily was published in 1900. Those revolutionary newspapers provided ideological platforms for spreading the idea of democracy and educated the Chinese public about urgent needs of revolution and finally contributed to the success of the 1911 Republican Revolution and the collapse of the Imperial Qing Dynasty. After CCP took power in 1949, journalism has been under the leadership of CCP in the 1950s at every level (Yao and Liu 2018). It has been the mouthpiece of the Party to consolidate and justify the rule of CCP until now. Religious groups were severely persecuted, missionaries expelled and temples and religious properties ruthlessly attacked in the periods of the Anti-Rightist Movement (1967–1959) and the Great Leap Forward (1958–1962) – although Chinese nationals by constitution were allowed the freedom of worship. Among various political campaigns, the ideological-driven Cultural Revolution affected negatively in restricting the liberal development of journalism. At the same time, religions were suppressed. Because of the historical baggage of Western imperialism and foreign missionaries in the late Qing period, plus the national leadership of the Chinese Communist Party since 1949, religion in the period of modern China has been viewed as an ideological construct and foreign intervention in destabilizing the Chinese society. CCP has been hostile to Christianity and Islam and maintained that such foreign religion must be controlled. Therefore, religion and journalism in China rarely enjoy an autonomous status beyond state control. In addition, the issue of reporting religious freedom in China has been a contested realm between international coverage and state propaganda.

China since the Open Door Policy. Religious dialogue and peacebuilding in an iron cage? In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attack, inter-religious relations focused intensively on the conflict between civilizations (e.g., Huntington’s notion of clash of civilizations in 1993), in particular on the enmity between Islam and the so-called West. In this vein, former Iranian President Khatami called for the urgency of dialogue between civilizations,

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so that sustainable peace between civilizations and religions can be guaranteed. Different from the fear of religious conflicts between Islam and the West, some scholars observed that the inter-religious relations in Asia are seemingly characterized by a model of mutual integration and coexistence rather than clash and conflict (Chen 2015). There are already Muslim voices of dialogue in history (Esposito and Voll 2000), for example, in Indonesia, the late first elected President Abdurrahman Wahid proposed the notion of cosmopolitan Islam and global diversity, denouncing the narrow Islamic version of Jihadist thought. In Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahmin suggests the need of having a new global paradigm through our understanding of the need of including indigenous Asian values, but not exclusively Islamic. For example, also inclusionary sub-traditions in some Asian cultures emerged, such as in the cases of Gandhi in India and Ueshiba in Japan (Levine 2011). For a long time in pre-modern China, Confucianism and Islam co-existed peacefully and shaped the coherent worldview of Chinese Muslims (Bakar and Cheng 1997). In terms of intellectual and cross-cultural encounters, recent scholarly discussions of Chinese language Islamic literature or Han Kitab (Sino-Islamic texts) opened up an unprecedented horizon to understand how Islamic ideas from Arabian-Persian texts were transmitted and embodied in the Confucian Chinese cultural system (Aubin 2017). Recognizing that Muslims in China were losing their religious heritage, Chinese Muslims understood that a good way of passing Islamic tradition to the young Muslim generation of monolingual Chinese is through writing and transmitting Islamic thought in Chinese language. Such Chinese Muslim writings are dialogically synthesized and identify themselves simultaneously as Chinese and Muslim, the harmonious dual-identification to both Chinese and Muslim (Chittick and Murata 2013), which means a double consciousness and loyalty to both the Imperial Chinese empire and transnational Islamic faith. It is, however, since the founding of PRC in 1949 under the reign of Chairman Mao Zedong, that Marxism threatened such tolerant traditions and inter-religious dialogue. Series of political turmoil, natural disasters and religious persecutions happened in the formative period of modern China, including the Great Leap Forward (1958–1962), Great Chinese Famine (1959–1961) and Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). It was not until the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1977 and subsequently the seize of power by the reformist Deng Xiaoping in 1978 that the Open Door Policy of China re-entering the international community was possible. Since 1978, China’s economy began reintegrating into the global economy and has been remarkably growing over four decades. Without being intimidated by the global tide of trade protectionism, China’s open door to the global business and market reform seemingly continues. Accompanied by economic growth over the past four decades, spiritual awakening and resurgence of faiths at the same time happened in all walks of lives. Unlike the rise of the middle class and the liberal democracy which resulted in secularization and freedom of press in the West, China’s path of marketization and the subsequent global rise peculiarly leads to a different path of religious development and journalism. Recently, there has been an international coverage of China’s new national policy of Sinicization that profoundly influenced religious freedom in China (Bowie and Gitter 2018). Under the shadow of Sinicization, Chinese state-run media discourse emphasizes that religious groups in China must operate independently from foreign intervention, that Chinese nationals with religious believers must follow the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and that religious teachings must be rendered compatible with “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Lam 2018). As a result of the new national 5-year plan (2018–2022) of Sinicization (Cervellera 2018a), overseas journalism reports, there is an unprecedented wave of religious intolerance or even persecution, targeting all religions but specifically the so-called foreign religions Islam and Christianity. While this new move seemingly targets foreign religions of 314

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Christianity or Islam, Pastor Jin Mingri of Beijing’s Zion church observed that the CCP has waged comprehensive war against religion: The Communist Party has begun to see religion as a competitor. It’s not just [Protestant] Christianity, but also Catholicism, Buddhism and Islam. They all want us to pledge out loyalty to the party. (The Washington Post 2018) Under the trend of religious Sinicization, foreign journalists increasingly report on a crackdown of religious infrastructures and new security measures related to religious practices in China (The Guardian 2018). Securitizing the use of new social media in relation to religious teachings and mobilization, for example, foreigners’ online preaching in China has been banned and ideological control over religious contents in social media has been tightened (South China Morning Post 2018a). Under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, a trend of Sinicization of religious faith and securitization of social media impacted on the reporting of religions in the PRC. Foreign journalism and Chinese state-run media differ in covering Chinese citizens’ practicing faith and freedom to worship. In the case study of reporting Christianity and Islam in China, a divide between foreign journalism and Chinese staterun media apparently reveals the resurgence of Chinese nationalism through Sinicization of religious bodies and surveillance of media reports. Unlike US President Donald Trump’s doctrine of patriotism (America First) over globalism plus his criticism of so-called fake news, the case of China’s peculiar program of sinicizing religion expressing an anti-foreign intervention is part of a global resurgence of nationalism. To explain: rather than simply taking modern Chinese society as inherently hostile to religion or being against liberal practice of journalism, the recent tough measure of restricting religious rights and press freedom from foreign influence (Earp 2013) has been the consequence of legitimizing sovereign power, securitizing social stability and co-opting religious bodies in the post-reform period of PRC ( Johnson 2019). In the trend of China’s authoritarianism and global rise, China’s deprivation of free press and lack of citizen journalism explain why a mediating role in dialogue and peacebuilding within religions in contemporary China is amiss.

Religion and journalism: catalysts of modernity, victims of nationalism However, the inauguration of market reform and open-door policy over the past four decades lead to the fact that liberalization did not only occur in economic spheres. Ideological control over foreign ideas and religions and journalism have been relaxed since 1978. Marketization liberalized journalism, news no longer functioned exclusively for the propaganda of the Party and journalism diversified to report non-political matters in everyday life and economic reporting. Besides commercial media, other non-printing media and Internet news emerged, though the Party still holds tight control of journalism (Chen and Wang 2013). Countless confiscated churches, temples and mosques re-opened and others were newly established. Under the rule of CCP, religion did not become extinct. On the contrary, spiritual revival occurs side by side with economic development. In China, five officially recognized religions, namely Buddhism, Daoism, Catholicism, Christianity and Islam, plus popular religions and so-called sects, have been flourishing since the reform period. In his widely acclaimed book The Souls of China: The Return of Religion after Mao (2017), Pullitzer Prize-winning journalist Ian Johnson, who spent over three decades in the Greater 315

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China region observing various religious groups including underground family churches, Daoist believers and Buddhist pilgrims, witnessed that China has been undergoing one of the greatest spiritual revivals in the world. To approach the relationship between religion and journalism in Socialist China, covering news and reporting religion has not been away from the communist ideological apparatus of the PRC. In other words, religious faith in China is rarely regarded as a private issue or purely a personal devotion. Living under the present regime of the PRC, individual or religious body cannot enjoy full autonomy from the intervention of state power. Reporting on religion in China, therefore, must be consistent to the official propaganda and covering religion reflects the Party’s media principles (Repnikova 2017). However, different religions in China are under varying degrees of ideological control and constraints of reporting religion are also diachronically different in various phases of the People’s Republic. Nevertheless, after four decades of economic reform, ideological control over liberal thoughts tightened and religious proliferation was banned. Crackdown on religious infrastructures and widening control of social media and religious websites happen side by side (The Guardian 2018). While the Western liberal model contends that the marketization of media brings the democratization of political order, Stockmann (2013) shows that the case of China has been counter-intuitive. The Chinese government does not only survive through the flourishing use of new media platforms but also consolidates its legitimacy by means of responding to public demands and reinforcing state-propaganda by tightly controlling the media by the state power. The following sections will present the case study of how the Chinese government specifically targets Christianity (both Catholicism and Protestant Churches) and Islam before other religious groups, how these two faith communities have been reported on by the foreign journalism and how these two faith communities have been reported on by the foreign journalism and the China state-run media.

Sinicizing religion and securitizing online: crackdown or management? In recent years, so-called Western journalism reported that the Chinese local government has been increasingly cracking down religious infrastructures (e.g., Christian churches and Muslim mosques) and installing surveillance overseeing faith communities. In defense, the Chinese state media, Global Times, criticized overseas media as solely highlighting the ideal of religious freedom but ignoring the practical needs of managing religious affairs in China: Western media, organizations and politicians have frequently slandered China’s religious affairs, accusing some of China’s local government of cracking down on Christianity. They also constantly attack China’s governance in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, threatening to impose sanctions against China…. What we should do is to resolutely reject any interference from external forces and abide by the law so as to realize harmonious and orderly religious affairs throughout the country. (Global Times 2018b) In this section, Christianity and Islam are selected as two concrete case studies to illustrate how two major foreign religions are covered in the Chinese-stated run media in defense of foreign reports. The reason of selecting Christianity and Islam is that the Chinese government in recent years has been escalating pressure against these two religions. They are allegedly viewed for their foreign ties and social activism (The New York Times 2018b). Regarding Christianity, it includes the prolonged Sino-Vatican’s controversy over the appointment of 316

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bishops in the local Catholic churches and the recent heavy-handed policy in abolition of church buildings of the Protestant Underground churches. Regarding Islam, the following section discusses the Chinese government’s response to the Hui Muslims’ protest against demolishing mosques and against the management of re-educating Uyghur Muslims. In both cases, new measures of Sinicization through online control on religious dissemination were imposed.

Evangelical churches and Vatican-led Catholicism: a case study on Christianity Tracing the intellectual origin of modern culture of journalism and publishing in China, one could not ignore the indispensable role of Western missionaries in bringing the modern press to the Chinese. It is found that the beginning of the modern Chinese press was the direct consequence of the Christian missionaries’ strategic interest disseminating the Christian Gospel to Chinese through deployment and development of journalism and printing press as a tool of evangelism (Zhang 2015, 67–68). However, the Protestant missions arrived in China in the 19th century along with the military aggression and the unequal treaties of the Western colonial invasion. Since then, Christianity unfortunately earned a bad name of foreign religion that Chinese people rejected against the foreign Western political invasion and missionary activities simultaneously, as if the colonial aggression and the arrival of Christianity are two sides of the same coin. In the case of Protestant churches in China, family or house churches have been widely reported as targeted by the Chinese government which specifically targets illegal underground house churches. Family or house churches are those churches not formally registered under the umbrella of the state-supervised system. Moreover, most importantly, their unregistered status and religious activity was viewed suspiciously as having perceived foreign ties. Cracking down the Early Rain Covenant Church in Chengdu in the Sichuan Province is one of the prominent cases widely covered by the international media. Reported by the Financial Times (2018), Wang Yi, a prominent pastor leading the Early Rain Covenant Church, and the Christian believers in the same church had been detained for allegedly prompting subversion of state power. In 2006, Pastor Wang was one of three Chinese Christian activists meeting US President George W. Bush in the White House. From the printing press to the Internet, Christianity has been spreading online rapidly all over China. While the religious awakening in China is now unstoppable, new measures of control of online religious activities and discussion have been imposed. The control of religious groups and the management of online religious dissemination are inseparable from each other. Live streaming of religious ceremonies, prayer, preaching and burning incense is banned and religious websites have to be officially approved to make sure the material are “morally healthy and political reliable” (Cervellera 2018b). For the Catholic churches, the Vatican over years insisted that the ordination of bishops is beyond the power of the secular state and that the Chinese government should not intervene with the church authority in appointing bishops. However, PRC has been reluctant to the Holy See intervening with the sovereign power in ordaining the Chinese priests. In September 2018, with the approval of the Vatican, the Chinese government accepted seven Catholic bishops appointed by the Chinese government’s Catholic Patriotic Association (Global Times 2018d). However, some interpret it as the Vatican’s compromise with the Chinese state power and as a betrayal of the millions of Chinese Catholic believers. Nevertheless, it means that the global rise of China reinstates the re-emergence of nationalism along the anti-foreign movements, especially in terms of religious affairs. 317

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Hui Muslims and Uyghur Muslims: a case study on Islam In many cases, religion and ethnicity (minzu) are closely related to each other, as in the cases of Tibetan Buddhism among Tibetans and Islam among Muslim minorities. In the case of Tibet, the Dalai Lama-exiled government has been accused of inciting separatism from the sovereign rule of PRC and therefore Tibetan Buddhism has never been simply viewed as a religion, but the Tibetans as a religious group were viewed as needing guidance under the leadership of PRC. In the case of Islam, PRC has fifty-six officially recognized minorities or ‘nationalities’ (minzu) and ten ethnic minority groups predominantly are Muslim believers. Among ten ethnic Muslim groups, Hui and Uyghur are the largest Muslim minorities in the PRC. In the name of fighting against religious radicalism, ethno-separatism from PRC and most importantly upholding ethnic solidarity in Xinjiang (Global Times 2018c), some current reports revealed that the Chinese government’s heavy-handed policy has been persistently suppressing the Xinjiang region and the Uyghur people. The Chinese government denied the validity of such news reports (The New York Times 2018a). Internally, strict measures of counter-terrorism extend to prohibit Uyghur children from attending religious schools, men from growing so-called abnormal beards and women from wearing the veil (Aljazeera 2017). News reports revealed that the Chinese government restricted Uyghur Muslims from fasting and praying (The Economist 2017), even forcing them to eat and humiliating Muslims to drink by holding a beer festival in the annual month of Ramadan (Patience 2014, Reuters 2015). Externally, the Chinese government has been alerted to contain transnational threats posed by Uyghur separatists. In 2015, suspected Uyghur extremists targeted Chinese tourists at a famous Hindu shrine at Bangkok. Since then, the Chinese government has diplomatically requested Thailand to repatriate more than 90 Uyghurs in exile (Lipes 2015) and Egypt to deport more than 20 Uyghur students, studying at Al-Azhar, back to China (The New York Times 2017). Out of overwhelming international concerns about human rights and the religious freedom of Uyghur Muslims at Xinjiang, the issues may continue attracting ongoing scholarly attention and research on political Islam in China in the future. However, it should be noted that Xinjiang has been a highly politicized and sensitive target of Beijing for a while. Scholars often run high risks in researching the topic, as the field of studying ethnicity and Islam in China is getting more politicized. For example, Starr’s edited book (2004) was heavily criticized to incite separatist movements in Xinjiang by PRC, and, as a result of this, thirteen contributors were barred from entering China (The Washington Post 2011). For the sake of securitizing Uyghur people and possible rebellion, foreign news reported that Chinese border police are secretly installing surveillance mobile phone apps on foreign visitors so as to intensify the scrutiny in Xinjiang (The Guardian 2019). Since 2018, numerous foreign reports stated that strict measures were imposed on China’s Hui Muslims by shutting down Islamic religious schools and tightening public usage of social media (South China Morning Post 2018b). A shocking news report revealed that at least 1 million Uyghur Muslims were sent to be re-educated in highly secure training centers in Xinjiang. However, the Chinese authority argues that they voluntarily attended ‘re-education’ training programs, so as to have their thoughts transformed from extremism (Sudworth 2019).

Conclusion: ‘Sing Hallelujah to the Lord’, religion on the front of journalism This chapter presented the deteriorating measure against religious bodies in China covered by foreign journalists and the defense of China-state run media. While the foreign 318

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correspondence reports that religious freedom and rights of Chinese believers have been at risk, the Chinese-state run media do not simply deny them as fake news but emphasize a new measure – to sinicize religion from the destabilizing influence of the so-called foreign powers. The divergence of reporting religion in China has to be understood within the context of the Chinese government in managing the overwhelming religious growth from foreign influence. Like Trump’s America First policy, the case of reporting on religion in China prioritizes state sovereignty over transnational connection. National interest supersedes cosmopolitan values. In short, China’s policy of Sinicization of religion is to stamp out so-called Western thinking, suppressing potential social forces of Inciting Subversion led by the foreign religions, in particular, Christianity Churches and Muslim separatists, so as to legitimize the CCP leadership and maintain social stability. In such, foreign religions such as Christianity and Islam, rather than indigenous religious groups like Buddhism, Daoism or Confucianism, have to be managed by means of sinicizing religions to Chinese culture and the religious online activities have to be securitized. Consequently, non-independent journalism plus the state-securitization of religions only sows fear in the civil society, without providing soil for trustworthy inter-religious dialogue or positive input of peace-building endeavors. While foreign journalists portrayed the Chinese government as violating human rights by suppressing various religious groups, including Christians and Muslims in China, Chinese state-run media present Sinicization of religion as a means of governance to maintain the overall social stability in the secular world (Global Times 2019e). One may wonder which report genuinely represents the religious situation in China? Instead of judging which version of reports is the accurate representation of religious reality in China, foreign journalists and Chinese state-run media do similarly cover the vibrant religious revival happened in China. No matter how Chinese state-run media criticizes the foreign journalism, it is undeniable that the Chinese government is increasingly aware of the needs to manage religious groups and report religious matter in the state-media press. For instance, Ian Johnson (2017) compared China’s recent religious revival with the American’s Great Awakenings of the 19th century, which was a soul-searching period of social dislocation and unrest. Unlike the segregation of faith and politics plus journalism as an autonomous realm in the West, PRC, a country nominally governed by atheist communist ideology, has been censoring social forces of the civil society, including religion and journalism: Most recently, the censoring includes the coverage of religious issues in social media. In the case of reporting on Islam, the Chinese government has been tightening the media coverage of Islamic issues and the Muslim community, in order to prevent Muslim youths from the negative impacts of religious radicalism. In addition, tightening the control of media coverage of Islam is to avoid the ethnic frictions between the Han majority and Muslim minority. Having said that, it is mainly because of the Belt and Road Initiative that the Chinese government has been branding its own image to the Muslim world, conveying the message that Muslims in China are well treated. In the case of reporting on Christianity, the Chinese government has been alerted to the foreign intervention of Chinese churches. In the case of negotiating with the Vatican, China is determined to reject the Vatican and defend the sovereign state power in ordaining its own Bishops. Related to the return of authoritarian rule and the shrinking of freedom of speech, it is to conclude that the challenges of reporting on religion in China continue, for instance, for Chinese journalists the liberty of press remains an unrealized aspiration (Zhang 2015, 76). On the one hand, some are pessimistic to the centralization of state power and strong man’s governance, as it suppresses the freedom of reporting and fear of speaking up is strongly felt by most of the citizens in China. On the other hand, some do believe that the growing usage of social media and citizen journalism has been empowering Chinese civil 319

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society to fight back top-down propaganda. In June 2019, the awakenings of Hong Kong civil society in anti-extradition protest has been spearheaded by the Christian hymn singing of ‘Sing Hallelujah to the Lord’ as well as series of peaceful prayer of Christian protestors outside the Legislative Council Building. The pacifist spirit of a Christian hymn not only sung by believers and non-believers in Hong Kong demonstration, but the power of the peaceful demonstration crystallized in this Christian song was also covered in the headlines to world press. If securitizing religion and controlling journalism are two sides of the same coin in the Chinese context, the case of Hong Kong of the Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China indicates that contemporary religious idea serves powerful peace-building resource igniting ordinary people’s mind and heart in quest of social justice and reform (Leung 2019; Zhao and Lai, 2019). In parallel, the role of journalism covering the Hong Kong protests, through the platform of new social media, is then to connect, inspire and leaven the global community in deeper mutual understanding and dialogue.

Further readings Earp, M., 2013. Disdain for Foreign Press Undercuts China’s Global Ambition. In: Committee to Protect Journalists. Attacks on the Press: Journalism on the World’s Front lines. New Jersey: Wiley, 113–121. This book chapter explores how journalism, especially foreign press, has been facing restrictive measures in accessing information under the shadow of anti-foreign popular sentiment. Though, the chapter does not address directly how reporting religious issues restricted in China, the chapter however gives a clear picture under the current Chinese leadership in control of state propaganda, sensitive issues like human rights and religion are under strong censorship. Yao, Q. and Liu, Z., 2018. Media and Religion in China: Publicizing Gods under Atheistic Governance. In: Cohen, Y., ed. Spiritual News: Reporting Religion around the World. New York: Peter Lang, 179–198. This chapter provides a general overview of how religions are covered by the media under the tight control of government national policy since Communist Party took the power since 1949. Instead of holding a popular impression that religion is harshly portrayed by the atheistic regime, the authors interestingly provide an optimistic picture where state-run media is forbidden to attack religion, but to ensure the harmonious co-existence of religions.

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Wai-Yip Ho Robson, J., 2018. How Important is Religion in China? In: Rudolph, J. M. and Szonyi, M., eds. The China Questions: Critical Insights into a Rising Power. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 199–205. South China Morning Post, 2018a. China to Ban Foreigners from Preaching Religion Online. South China Morning Post, [online] 13 September. Available at https://www.scmp.com/news/china/ politics/article/2163961/china-ban-foreigners-preaching-religion-online, accessed 3 July 2019. South China Morning Post, 2018b. Chinese Authorities Close Three Hui Muslim Mosques for ‘Illegal Religious Education’. South China Morning Post, [online] 31 December. Available at https://www. scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2180142/chinese-authorities-close-three-hui- muslimmosques-illegal, accessed 3 July 2019. Starr, S. F., ed., 2004. Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. Stockmann, D., 2013. Media Commercialization and Authoritarian Rule in China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sudworth, J., 2019. Searching for Truth in China’s Uighur ‘Re-education’ Camps. BBC, [online] 21 June. Available at https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-china-blog-48700786, accessed 3 July 2019. The Economist, 2017. An American Agency Denounces the Treatment of Muslims in China. The Economist, [online] 7 July. Available at https://www.economist.com/erasmus/2017/07/07/anamerican-agency-denounces-the-treatment-of-muslims-in-china, accessed 3 July 2019. The Guardian, 2018. China Cracks Down on ‘Chaotic’ Religious Information Online. The Guardian, [online] 11 September. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/11/chinacracks-down-on-chaotic-religious-information-online, accessed 3 July 2019. The Guardian, 2019. Chinese Border Guards Put Secret Surveillance App on Tourists’ Phones. The Guardian, [online] 13 November. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/02/ chinese-border-guards-surveillance-app-tourists-phones, accessed 3 July 2019. The New York Times, 2017. Egyptian Police Detain Uighurs and Deport them to China. The New York Times, [online] 6 July. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/world/asia/egyptmuslims-uighurs-deportations-xinjiang-china.html, accessed 3 July 2019. The New York Times, 2018a. U.N. Rights Officials Criticize China over Muslim Internments. The New York Times, [online] 13 November. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/13/ world/asia/un-china-xinjiang-muslim-internments.html, accessed 3 July 2019. The New York Times, 2018b. Pastor Charged with ‘Inciting Subversion’ as China Cracks Down on Churches. The New York Times, [online] 13 December. Available at https://www.nytimes. com/2018/12/13/world/asia/china-religion-crackdown.html, accessed 3 July 2019. The Washington Post, 2011. U.S. Scholars Say Their Book on China Led to Travel Ban. The Washington Post, [online] 20 August. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/usscholars-say-their-book-on-china-led-to-travel-ban/2011/08/17/gIQAN3C9SJ_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.66fe6bdf2a7d, accessed 3 July 2019. The Washington Post, 2018. With Wider Crackdowns on Religion, Xi’s China Seeks to Put State Stamp on Faith. The Washington Post, [online] 16 September. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/with-wider-crackdowns-on-religion-xis-china-seeks-to-put-statestamp-on-faith/2018/09/15/b035e704-b7f0-11e8-b79f-f6e31e555258_story.html?utm_term=. a6b4143be851, accessed 4 December 2018. Wagner, R. G., 2009. Journalism. In: Pong, D., ed. Encyclopedia in Modern China. Volume 2. New York: Charles Scribners Sons/Reference, 398–400. Yao, Q. and Liu, Z., 2018. Media and Religion in China: Publicizing Gods under Atheistic Governance. In: Cohen, Y., ed. Spiritual News: Reporting Religion around the World. New York: Peter Lang, 179–198. Zhang, Y., 2015. Western Missionaries and Origins of the Modern Chinese Press. In: Rawnsley, G. D. and Rawnsley, M. T., eds. Routledge Handbook of Chinese Media. London: Routledge, 67–78. Zhao, Y. and Lai, C., 2019. Sing Hallelujah to the Lord’: Religion on the Front of Hong Kong’s Protests. Hong Kong Free Press, [online] 30 June. Available at https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/06/30/ sing-hallelujah-lord-religion-forefront-hong-kongs-protests/, accessed 31 October 2019. Zhao, Y. and Sun, P., 2018. A History of Journalism and Communication in China. Oxon: Routledge.

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22 RELIGIOUS PEACEBUILDING IN ZIMBABWE The role of the printing press Joram Tarusarira and Admire Mare Introduction It is now a truism that the definition of religion is contested. One approach has been the attempt to provide substantive or functional definitions of religion (see Cavanaugh 2009). A substantive definition of religion defines religion based on its substance by referring to spirits, gods and such entities (Bourdillon 1991). The functional definition defines it in respect of what it is deployed to do or realize, that is to say religion is defined in terms of its function. The debate regarding the relationship between religion and peace or conflict has centered on religion as inherently violent or inherently peaceful (see Alger 2002, Appleby, Omer and Little 2015, The British Academy 2015). These studies (Berling 2004, Coward and Smith 2004) are mainly based on such substantive or functional definitions of religion.

General research discourse A significant body of literature (Boulding 1986, Alger 2002, Berling 2004, Coward and Smith 2004, Appleby, Omer and Little 2015) exists, which teases out the dual role of religion in terms of escalating conflict and peacebuilding globally. Scholars have also examined the extent to which religion may indirectly foster or tolerate violence. On the one hand, there are scholars (Galtung 2014) who foreground the positive role of religion with regard to conflict and peacebuilding and on the other hand are those researchers (see Huntington 1998) who put emphasis on the negative attributes of religion in terms of fermenting divisions, conflict and intolerance. Focusing on the positive role of religion to conflict resolution, Galtung (2014) posits that it can be used to maintain or build peace. He acknowledges that different religions have different degrees of potential to promote peace. Galtung (2014, 32) rejects the notion of religious conflicts, as conflicts are multi-dimensional and complex and cannot usually be reduced to only one causal factor. Scholars who focus on the negative role of religion in conflict and peacebuilding overemphasize its influence in causing structural violence through discrimination and exclusions (The British Academy 2015). In other words, religious identities are viewed as having the potential to erect potent boundaries and provoke fierce confrontation within a group when there is excessive emphasis on claims by some that they belong and adhere to or are protecting a set of absolute truths. Moreover, the 323

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distinction between an in-group and an out-group can lead to structural violence (Galtung 1969) within societies. Religion is also seen as the source of cultural violence, a form of violence that is used to legitimize other forms of violence (Galtung 1969). Extending this view further, Huntington (1993) argues that religious and cultural identities are the main drivers of international conflict (between the Muslim and non-Muslim world) in the new world order following the end of the Cold War. However, this argument has been criticized for being based on weak history and for underestimating or ignoring deep fault lines that have existed within and among denominations of the same religious family (The British Academy 2015). In view of the above debate, there is equally limited literature on religion, journalism, dialogue and peacebuilding. Extant studies (Marsden and Savigny 2009, Loo 2011) look at the coverage of religious conflict and peacebuilding by the media. In this regard, Marsden and Savigny examine the political discourse surrounding religion and conflict and the ways in which these are played out in media agendas. They argue that the media are not neutral actors but play a role in constructing these political discourses (Marsden and Savigny 2009). The media can positively influence reconciliation in the aftermath of violent religious conflict just as the negative use of the media magnifies and promotes conflict (Yamshon and Yamshon 2006). Journalism cannot only help to distribute information but also counter hate speech and create an environment of balanced opinions, an “information equilibrium” (Koven 2004). In their recent study, Demarest and Langer (2018) investigate to what extent Nigerian newspapers practice peace journalism by emphasizing the underlying causes of conflict in their reporting rather than stressing ethnic and religious divisions. They found that Nigerian newspapers do not explicitly use divisive language when discussing conflicts, but they rarely stress underlying structural causes either. While there is a willingness among Nigerian journalists to avoid potentially escalatory language, a dearth of resources and capacities impedes independent and in-depth analysis concerning the underlying drivers of conflicts (Demarest and Langer 2018). Notwithstanding these studies, Hackett (2009) argues that there has been a lack of attention to issues of conflict in this emergent research on the intersections of religion, media, and culture, specifically in Africa but also in the field more generally. Departing from aforementioned highly charged debate, our point of departure is that religion is neither inherently violent nor peaceful because of the plurality of interpretations. We assert that the human factor is key in this discourse: People identify particular scriptures or religious tenets, which they deploy for peace or conflict depending on their motivation. To communicate their standpoints, various media is resorted to. To say that religion is instrumentalized for specific expediencies is not to intimate that it is something that is out there that people can grasp and deploy. We depart from the point that definitions of and approaches to religion are intrinsically linked to the discourse of the time. They are linked to discourse and field. Rather than looking for a better definition of religion, it might be fruitful to focus on describing, analyzing and demarcating the religious fields of discourse (Von Stuckrad 2010). Religion is a constructed category that emerged out of a specific socio-economic, political and cultural context, thus is not transcultural and transhistorical (Asad 1993). In this chapter, we resort to describing, analyzing and demarcating the religious fields of discourse in Zimbabwe. Characterizing the religious landscape of Zimbabwe as a field helps us identify the differences and alliances built or broken between the different religious groups and political actors with respect to peacebuilding. In doing so we acknowledge that Zimbabwe is not religiously monolithic and thus, regarding peacebuilding, different religious actors have promoted or undermined peace and reconciliation via various media including print media. This is influenced by the socio-economic and political objectives at particular given times. For specificity, we will focus on one religio-political organization 324

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called Zimbabwe Christian Alliance, whose interest is in pursuing broader political objectives. We are interested in how it has been presented in state print media and how it has also presented itself via a similar type of media and how that form of mediatization has influenced the discourse of religious peacebuilding.

The Zimbabwean religio-political landscape The Zimbabwean religio-political landscape has been filled with contestation over what religious peacebuilding is, how to contribute to it and who is the legitimate actor to facilitate it, including from the religious realm. The landscape thus has been a discourse in the Foucauldian sense and a field in the Bordieuan sense (Thompson 1977). Discourse refers to the totality of thought-systems that interact with societal systems in manifold ways (Foucault 1980). The field is defined as a social arena within which struggles or maneuvers take place over specific resources and the access to them. The field is a space of action or struggle; the struggle is over forms of capital on the field (Thompson 1977). Religious groups in Zimbabwe have developed a particular discourse regarding peace and reconciliation, as well as competed over forms of capital with the state in relation to peace and reconciliation (Munemo and Nciizah 2014). The state has perceived what religio-political actors in pursuit of peace and reconciliation call the theology of liberation, as bent on facilitating regime change and instigating violence in the country. In this case, religion tends to be perceived as generating violent responses. However, religio-political organizations understand their faith and theology as aimed at facilitating peace and justice in the country (Tarusarira 2016). Based on these two perspectives, one can argue that that religion has a Janus face that is double sided. This constellation resonates with debates that have ensued in the broader discourse of religious peacebuilding, including that of the “ambivalence of the sacred” (Appleby 2000, 30). Religion has the capacity to generate a range of responses ranging from violent to non-violent militancy, ability to generate as well as contain violence (Girard 1977) and is like a knife, which one can use to stab someone in the back or cut bread, just as one can use fire to burn someone or cook tasty food. Religious peacebuilding focuses on the positive contribution of religious actors to peace and reconciliation. It is defined as peacebuilding motivated and strengthened by religious and spiritual resources and with access to religious communities and institutions (Dubois 2008). It recognizes religion as a valuable dimension of peacebuilding and conflict transformation, despite it succumbing to the modernist dichotomization of the religious and the secular. The modernist approach to governing public affairs prioritizes the secular at the expense of the religious, notwithstanding that the problem that the distinction between the two is difficult to sustain. Secularism perceives religion as irrational, absolutist and divisive to be resorted to for peace and social cohesion. For these reasons, religious peacebuilding has been pushed to the realm of soft power (Haynes 2012). Against the backdrop of these challenges, religious peacebuilding should therefore be critical of assumptions surrounding and undergirding it. It should also engage with the interpretations of religion and other themes connected to or pitted against it such as ethnicity, culture and politics. How this has played out in Zimbabwe, mediated by print media, is the focus of this chapter. This chapter describes, analyzes and demarcates the religious field and discourse in Zimbabwe in respect of peace and reconciliation and discusses the role of print media (i.e., with the print media constructing narratives, ideas and ideologies about religion and peacebuilding), in service of or against religious peacebuilding. It is first important to do an appraisal of the historical trajectory of print media in Zimbabwe. Of focus is how that, which is described as religion, 325

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has been packaged and communicated via print media and how the form of packaging has influenced peacebuilding in Zimbabwe.

Journalism, religion and print media in Zimbabwe: an historical appraisal The relationship between religion and journalism in Zimbabwe cannot be understood outside the influence of missionaries who played an instrumental role in the development of education and printing presses (see Saunders 2000, Mukasa 2003). The emergence of African newspapers in Zimbabwe (formerly Southern Rhodesia) can be traced to the second decade of the 20th century and owes much to the role played by the missionaries, in promoting literacy and cultural notions of public participation. As Dombo (2014a) observes, the missionaries laid a strong foundation for the birth of an African press by encouraging Africans to attend schools, which they had founded. The process of evangelization led to the emergence of Africans who were eager to read and write and to consume and disseminate information about what was happening in a racially divided but nationalizing geographical space (Bourdillon 1991). Furthermore, the missionaries in collaboration with the government in the late 1920s started a newspaper specifically for Africans (Dombo 2014b). The government offered an annual subsidy that contributed to expenses met by the missionaries in producing the newspaper. Churches like Dutch Reformed Church, Roman Catholic and Methodist were key in the early development of newspaper culture in Zimbabwe. The main news published by the newspapers were predominantly Christian teachings and moral instruction aimed at civilizing Africans (Bourdillon 1991, Dombo 2014a). It was from these humble beginnings that African newspapers became prominent and an important feature of African politics up to the mid-1960s. These missionary newspapers latter metamorphosed into semi-secular press with the likes of the Rhodesia Native Quarterly and Native Mirror coming into the fold (Dombo 2014b). The papers were printed in the local languages such as Karanga, Zezuru and isiNdebele, together with English. As Dombo (2014b) observes, the main purpose of these newspapers was to provide reading material for converts, but more importantly, to help missions move toward a standardization of the vernaculars. It was only in the mid-1930s that an autonomous press owned by private, white capital took shape with the sole aim of advancing white minority interests (Bourdillon 1991, Dombo 2014a). This was followed by the rise of the African press in the 1960s, which contested the narrative of white colonial settlers and played a pivotal role in the mediation of armed liberation struggle (see Dombo 2014b). In 1980, Zimbabwe inherited a fairly diversified media landscape characterized by a vibrant state-owned media and a blossoming private press reflective of the existing economy, which was dominated by private white capital (Chuma 2010). Unlike in other jurisdictions, the mainstream public press adopted a developmental journalism approach, which emphasized supporting the ruling elite rather than blowing the whistle for offside situations. Besides introducing significant ownership and editorial changes in the public print and broadcasting sector, the ZANU-PF government maintained the state monopoly in broadcasting as well as the repressive legal infrastructure used by the colonial regime (Saunders 2000, Ndlela 2009, Chuma 2010). As Rønning and Kupe (2000) argue, this resulted in a dynamic tension between a democratic (as reflected in the Lancaster Constitution) and an authoritarian impetus (in-built inherited restrictive laws), which undermined the diversity and pluralism of political opinion in the Zimbabwean mainstream public sphere. Because of these “legacies of the past” (Voltmer 2013, 115), the resultant new values and practices adopted in the course of transition led to hybrid forms of journalism and political communication in Zimbabwe. The 326

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net effect has been a failure to democratize participation in the mediated public sphere by groups or interests other than those sanctioned by the powerful elite (Mare 2016). The public press continues to exhibit editorial policies and practices that reflected the ideological and socio-political environment of the country (Mukasa 2003). Scholars (Saunders 1991, Mukasa 2003) concur that despite the fact that the ZANU PF led government has always argued that the press was free after independence, it soon became clear that the government regarded the media as an important apparatus in extending and maintaining its political legitimacy. It was only during the second decade of independence (1990–1999), which is often touted as the golden age of the Zimbabwean press (see Chari 2009), that the country experienced a phenomenal quantitative growth of new private newspapers and magazines. The launch of private newspapers (like the Financial Gazette) and magazines (like Moto magazine) provided a formidable counter-hegemonic challenge to the ruling government’s hegemonyconstruction project (Saunders 2000, Willems 2011), although most of them found it difficult to survive in a contracting economy. However, it was the launch of the Daily News by the Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe (ANZ) at a time when the country was experiencing an economic maelstrom, which completely changed the face of the Zimbabwean media landscape (Chari 2009, Moyo 2009). Practicing a normative approach to news reporting that became known as “oppositional journalism” (Chuma 2010, 21), the paper became a strategic conduit for venting popular discontent against the oppression, lack of freedoms and violence that was obtaining and threatening peace in Zimbabwe. Under a new broadcasting act, both personnel and content of the broadcast media must rigidly conform to the policies dictated by the Minister. This blatant control of the press is a defining characteristic of the legacy of colonialism in the post-colonial state in Africa (Mare 2016). The journalistic ethos of those times was to promote European cultural standards while denigrating African culture and political agitation as the nemesis of Western civilization and Christianity (Dombo 2014a). Stories about Africans were largely, if not exclusively, negative and demeaning. In a bid to counter oppositional journalism, which exposed its violence and oppression, the ZANU-PF government attempted to monopolize the public sphere (by shutting down private newspapers) through forcing the state-owned media to practice patriotic journalism (Chuma 2010, 21). This normative approach to news reporting manifested itself through the narrativization and dissemination of a highly selective discourse Zimbabwean nation, which was deliberately calculated to interpellate the people of Zimbabwe (Ranger 2004, Willems 2011). It was also intended to whip up Pan-African sentiment across the continent in the fight against Western enemies seeking to overthrow the country’s hard-won independence. The state-owned media became a political player in its own right privileging the hegemonic discourse of the ruling party over others (Mare 2016). Between 2001 and 2005, the ZANU-PF government fearing that oppositional journalism would mobilize people into the streets passed a series of legal and extra-legal restrictions (see Moyo 2009, Mare 2016) meant to curtail freedom of speech, assembly, political association and expression and access to information (Moyo 2009, Willems 2011, Mare 2016). This was accompanied by a serious clampdown on journalists (foreign and local) and activists who were blacklisted as anti-ZANU-PF. Newspapers which refused to comply with the provisions of AIPPA (including the Daily News) were forced to close down (see Moyo 2009). The state broadcaster, ZBC, was forced to introduce seismic changes in radio and television programming. These included the removal of critical foreign news bulletins as well as the virtual banning of radio airplay of locally produced songs that were critical of government (Willems 2011). In the end, the state-owned media offered a magnified image of the ruling elite through churning out patriotic media content. 327

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With the systematic colonization of the mainstream press by the political elite, citizens were left with fewer spaces of civic engagement and public debate meant to challenge violence, oppression and repression and advance peace and social cohesion (Moyo 2009, Mare 2016). Empirical research (Moyo 2009, Mare 2016) suggests that citizens had to turn to diasporic newspapers like NewZimbabwe.com, the Zimbabwe Daily, the Zimbabwe Situation and other news websites that served as alternative voices on Zimbabwe. These constituted the “parallel markets of information” (Moyo 2009, 551), platforms through which most of these subaltern or anti-state discourses articulated and exerted themselves. These sites provided citizens inside the country as well as the diaspora with as much information and news on political and social developments. Communicative channels (like popular cultural forms such as music and tabloid newspapers) allowed citizens and activists to produce, disseminate news and to counter state propaganda churned out via the mainstream public press in Zimbabwe (see Ndlela 2009, Willems 2011, Mare 2016). Despite the consummation of the inclusive government between 2009 and 2013 as well as the military takeover in November 2017, the press in Zimbabwe has seen varying amounts of state control.

The case of Zimbabwe Christian Alliance and print media in Zimbabwe Religious organizations interested in contributing to Zimbabwe’s political landscape, especially democratization and peacebuilding founded on their religious faith, faced demonization and negative criticism from the state (Tarusarira 2016). What religious organizations perceived as religious peacebuilding was perceived as part of the regime change agenda and a cause of violence and instability in the country. The definitional challenge we highlighted earlier, as well as the ambivalence of the sacred, reared their ugly head when it came to how to define religion and its role in the public sphere including the pursuit for peace. The state had its own definition of what religion is and how religious actors should act in the public sphere. If anything, theirs (religious groups) is to do social and humanitarian work and avoid what politicians called meddling in politics (Kastfelt 2003, Tarusarira 2016). The state resorted to various mechanisms, including its print media to denigrate religio-political organizations, thus, indirectly thwarting their efforts for religious peacebuilding. Print media is an effective tool in Zimbabwe because of the country’s high literacy rate. As we alluded to earlier, we refer to a religious organization called Zimbabwe Christian Alliance (ZCA), which asserts that its mission is to be a prophetic voice in pursuit of peace in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean state deployed its print media to counterattack the efforts of the ZCA. The way The Herald, a government sponsored and controlled newspaper, reported about ZCA, is based or determined by the newspaper’s relationship with the ZANU PF government, which has its own self-serving interpretation of what it means to be a religious organization and what religious actors should do in the political realm. The Herald thus, plays the role of disseminating the rhetoric of the state. In an interview, a university professor of religious studies presented the perspective of the Zimbabwean state regarding religio-political organizations as follows: The politicians would say: You church people; you have no business with what we do with people here on earth, because your interest is in heaven. Robert Mugabe in particular has been very shrewd in terms of defining religion and politics, because he says the church is a key player, spiritually and socially, in terms of building schools, but the church has no business in politics, because that is their terrain. So, when he talks of state-church partnership the spheres of influence and the lines of communication are very clear in his mind. The church is spiritual, politicians are earthly and practical. Then 328

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he says please, church people do what you know best while we do what we know best, let not these categories mix, because when there is a confusion of categories the following happens and I want to quote him: ‘This is a soccer match and we politicians know how to play our football and you people of the cloth when you come to our terrain, because we also do crude tackles here let nobody cry, that’s how we play, so our rules are different from yours and let those who dare cross over to us be willing to suffer the consequence. (interview with a University Professor of Religious Studies by the authors in 2012) The Herald has been key in creating narratives that vilify the ZCA and promoting a certain perspective of the organization. By being an outlet of the ruling party and state actors, it compromised peacebuilding by being inflammatory regarding anyone perceived to be against the state. It labelled ZCA “a quasi-political group” and an ally of the opposition political party, the MDC (Murwira 2012). The police refused to grant ZCA permission to carry out the events on the basis that the activities would disturb public order and security and used The Herald to label it illegal. A spokesperson of the police speaking via The Herald following an application by ZCA to carry out a public activity, which the police turned down, responded: “I am not aware of a … clear notice. If they don’t follow the law, then the gathering is illegal” (Shawa 2007). The same police spokesperson told The Herald newspaper “the Save Zimbabwe Campaign is a political gathering and not a prayer meeting” (see Gonda 2007). The Herald further described the Save Zimbabwe Campaign as “an organization bent on seeking political attention through illegal means” (Murwira 2012). Through The Herald, the police accused the ZCA of “seeking political attention and relevance” (Murwira 2012). The remarks of the then Minister of Home Affairs in the Herald regarding the ZCA’s Save Zimbabwe Campaign meeting which was violently disrupted by police prove the point that the Herald served to promote a particular identity of the ZCA by providing space to state agents who wanted to denigrate the ZCA. The Minister said: last weekend’s planned gathering was not a prayer meeting as the opposition had claimed under the so-called Save Zimbabwe Campaign coordinated by the MDC’s purported Democratic Resistance Committees (DRC) and other anti-Government civic organizations. It was not a prayer meeting because there are flyers which said it was an MDC defiance campaign and they were coercing people to attend the rally. (The Herald 2007) What we see here is an alliance between the state organs and The Herald. The Herald has, therefore, framed the ZCA as an organization that identifies itself as religious, yet it is quasi-political, an ally of the opposition. The dominant frame in The Herald has been that of constructing the ZCA as a disruptive organization as well as a threat to public order and security. This bastardized identity has been repeated to the point that being a quasi-political, an ally of the opposition as well as a disruptive organization has been taken as an inherent character of the ZCA. This identity invites treatment, not as a religious organization pursuing peace and democratization, but a political actor advancing a regime change agenda. The mantra of regime change has been used by ZANU-PF to delegitimize and justify attacks on organizations viewed as working with foreign nations to promote democratic ideas. Describing it as such transforms its identity from a religious to political organization. The ZCA had to find a way out to express itself and pursue its agenda of peace and democratization in Zimbabwe. Thus, it resorted to alternative media. As Ndlela (2009) argues the 329

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relentlessly critical civil society, opposition parties, and other prodemocracy movements, not happy with the suppression of their voices and the restricted access to the public sphere, are increasingly turning to the alternative communicative spaces. We therefore focus on one newspaper that sympathized with its cause called The Zimbabwean and ZCA’s own newsletter called The Christian Voice. It is important to note that The Zimbabwean is an example of a diasporic media outlet. It published newspapers from the United Kingdom. The Zimbabwean positively reported ZCA’s launch. It interviewed an official of ZCA at the launch who said: We are here to serve the people and will not focus on the symptoms. Poverty, hunger, these are symptoms; we will engage government in dialogue concerning the root cause of these social ills which is bad governance (…) After years of silence the church has finally awoken to pursue justice and peace and if necessary, to defy unjust laws. (Special Correspondent 2006) The members of ZCA say they are united by similar themes, how to address them and the thinking behind the formation of the organization. The preceding quote spells out some of the themes of concern around which ZCA members converge, which the organization publicizes with the help of print media. These include poverty, hunger, violence, governance and the alleged silence of mainstream churches. In connecting ZCA with these themes, The Zimbabwean frames ZCA as a fighter and defender of the weak and oppressed. It presents it as a religious organization that is not only restricted to dealing with spiritual issues but one that believes that the religious and the secular are intertwined. All the concerns outlined above fall under the gamut of peacebuilding directly or indirectly, because as long as they are not addressed only negative, that is the absence of direct violence, will exist in Zimbabwe and there will be no real peace. ZCA members also agree on how (approach) to address the themes raised above within the context of a violent political environment. In describing the modus operandi of ZCA, The Zimbabwean reported that the organization would “give form and action to our goal of mobilizing Christians to give witness to the life of Christ as defined by his core mission statement on earth; “I have come that you may have life and have it to the full” ( John 10:10) (Special Correspondent 2006) Fullness of life is understood as or includes prosperity and health for the total human being, including the body, mind, emotions, relationships, material needs, concern for human worth in the areas of oppression, poverty, disease, hunger, injustice inter alia. By presenting this picture, The Zimbabwean is justifying ZCA’s pursuit of the abovementioned concerns. This gives ZCA a particular identity that is different from that of other religious entities that seem not to challenge an unsatisfactory socio-economic and political order. This approach includes using radical strategies meant to “apply pressure on the regime until it capitulates and accepts the will of the people of Zimbabwe. The Campaign needs to engage in more rather than less incidents of confrontation with the dictator” (Makumbe 2007). ZCA also confronted mainstream church leadership, whom it accuses of co-option by the ruling elites and inaction in the face of human suffering. To justify their criticism of dominant religious and political leaders, the ZCA members identify themselves with Old Testament prophets especially the prophets who spoke against the persecution of the people by kings. (Special Correspondent 2006) 330

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The reference to Old Testament prophets can be understood symbolically. With respect to political parties, Spencer (2006, 359–360) notes that the ability of a political party to set an agenda through the media is reinforced by symbolism and presentation. Likewise, the Old Testament prophets can be viewed symbolically, because they are known to emerge in times of crises to challenge political systems such as the one articulated above. Using the media to identify with charismatic Old Testament prophets creates an appealing identity for ZCA, but attracts the label agents of the regime change agenda in support of a particular political party. ZCA maintains that it is neither for regime change nor for a partisan organization. In an opinion piece published by The Zimbabwean, a member of ZCA, writing about the Save Zimbabwe Campaign (SZC), one of the key activities of the ZCA, stated that those in power use SZC as a convenient tool for their own political interests. Through its own newsletter, The Christian Voice, ZCA sought to legitimize its identity and to justify its actions by claiming to derive its mandate from the bible. They made reference to Psalm 82:1–4 where the mandate of the religious actors is to defend the weak and the fatherless, maintain the rights of the weak and oppressed, rescue the weak and the needy and deliver them from the hand of the wicked. Such a citation serves numerous objectives. In addition to showing that the organization is Biblical (Zimbabweans respect the bible as pointed out earlier, hence the bible is a credible source of legitimacy), the preceding quote spells out wherefrom ZCA takes as its mandate. This mandate: “Rescue the weak and needy. Deliver them from the hand of the wicked” (The Christian Voice 2008, 4) is also an expression of its identity. The quote as well provides the rationale of the activities of ZCA that is if it is a Christian organization concerned about the total human being, then it is has to defend the cause of the weak and fatherless, translated in the context of this chapter to mean the victims of socio-economic and political collapse in Zimbabwe. The members of ZCA agreed on this rationale. The newsletter therefore presents and promotes ZCA whose identity and subsequent actions are biblically based. Despite its claim that it is a biblically based organization as we have already seen, the state machinery has refused to acknowledge it as such. As a result, ZCA has not only suffered media vilification, but also physical attacks. Its newsletter, The Christian Voice, publicized its negative experiences, thereby presenting it as a victim of state machinery. It reported the raiding of ZCA offices by armed police, as well as the harassment, arrest and detention, in filthy cells, of its leadership in August 2006 and January 2007, the raiding of its Harare offices by the military intelligence Support Unit and Criminal Investigation Department (CID) on 9 June 2008, armed with AK 47s. Each time the members were arrested they were not found guilty of any wrongdoing by a court of law (The Christian Voice 2008, 3). To juxtapose the media presentations and representation with the interviews to see the extent to which that tallies with how they were reported about in the newspapers, we interviewed some members of ZCA who outlined their motivation to participate in ZCA activities as follows: I believe that my decision to participate in ZCA is not a question of choice to be involved or not to be involved. But I understand that my faith places on me certain obligations and one of those obligations is to be involved in acts that safeguard rights. For me it is therefore my understanding of God at work through Jesus Christ in society. (Interview with a member of the ZCA by the authors) 331

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Another said: The word of God is very clear about the role of the church in politics. Rulers of Israel were first of all spiritual leaders, Moses was a spiritual leader. Spiritual leaders were given the task of ruling the people of Israel. We are not saying pastors should abandon the church buildings and go to Parliament, but they should question whatever goes on in Parliament, as the government passes laws which will disadvantage or oppress the people. The Bible speaks very strongly against oppression. If you oppress the people you incur the wrath of God. But the mainline churches have largely paid a blind eye to the repressive measures that were being implemented by the ruling regime and we said no, that is not the totality of the Christian life. (Interview with a member of the ZCA by the authors) A Pentecostal Bishop who is a member of ZCA, on the other hand, referred to the New Testament: We are of the opinion that Jesus on earth responded to issues of his time in a manner that was holistic. He did not just over-spiritualise issues: he really was relevant; he ridiculed and made a parade of the Pharisees for their hypocrisy. He was quite keen to deal with issues regarding justice, rebuking them for selective application of the law. (Interview with a Pentecostal bishop by the authors) The preceding quotes concur with the identity of ZCA as can be abstracted from The Zimbabwean, as well as how ZCA has presented itself through its newsletter The Christian Voice. In the final analysis from these two print media outlets the ZCA has presented itself and has been presented as the church and subsequently the voice of the church, a believer in the unity of the religious and the secular, non-partisan defender of peace, justice and freedom, radical and fearless, prophetic, but biblically based hence legitimate. What we also see from The Zimbabwean and The Christian Voice is that ZCA emphasizes its collective identity. Members do not speak as individuals but in the name of the organization. While they do have individual motives and individual identity, the newspaper and the newsletter mainly accentuated its collective identity. Members do not separate themselves from the institution. The identity of the institution is sustained by the convergence of its members on themes, approaches and rationale guiding its being and operations. The language of factions does not therefore apply. The members share the same interpretation of the bible with regard to the role of religion in politics. The organization is one faction, glued together by possessed knowledge (in this case biblical knowledge), its interpretation and application (including the normative interpretation of false and true), and opinions and worldview based upon the knowledge. No wonder collective terms such as a network, the church, alliance, joint-initiative, nation-wide coalition feature in how it presents itself and is presented in the newspapers.

Conclusion This chapter succinctly confirms that the relationship between religion and peacebuilding which is mediated by the print media can be conceptualized as a discourse as well as a field. This discursive space and field are characterized by contradictions and constructions. In the Zimbabwean context, the print media has played a role in framing the 332

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ZCA with some meaning for instrumental purposes. The Zimbabwean newspaper and The Christian Voice identified the ZCA with radical Old Testament prophets who are known for speaking truth power (to both political and religious leaders of their time). This makes it more radical in action through direct condemnation of political and religious leaders. Because charismatic prophets (like Amos, Jeremiah and Isaiah) are linked to criticizing power holders and demand peace and justice, just as ZCA does, their relationship with the power-holders is often sour. As this chapter has shown, the ZCA and other religious leaders have resorted to using alternative communication spaces in order to articulate issues, which are silenced and censored in the mainstream public media. On the other hand, the state-owned newspaper The Herald constructed the same organization as an agent of imperialist forces and therefore not fit-for-purpose to be referred to as a religious organization championing issues of social justice and democracy. As already pointed out, the conflict over the identity is a contest for hegemony and power, which are key coordinates at the center of a discourse. The attempt to control ZCA through The Herald, by labelling it a quasi-political organization justifies subjecting it to state vilification, demonization and violence. It also paves way for domination and hegemony over the meaning of what it means to be a religious organization. One can conclude that the identity imposed on ZCA by The Herald can easily be used by political actors to justify deployment of violence and intimidation against genuine religious leaders in an autocratic regime. This dovetails with the African proverb that “If a hyena wants to eat its children, it first accuses them of smelling like a goat.” The net effect of this de-legitimization exercise is that religious peacebuilding undertaken by religio-political organizations like the ZCA has been undermined in the mainstream public media. The identity of ZCA has been constructed with particular meanings by The Zimbabwean, The Christian Voice and The Herald, which have amplified and extended the motives of ZCA and the state. This means that print media became a tool to frame particular entities and their actions for particular interests. Print media is thus a communicative tool that can be deployed to advance or even undermine peacebuilding depending on the societal balance of forces. The chapter has also demonstrated clearly that the media can be used by different actors (for instance, a religious organization and the state) to advance certain causes. The print media is a powerful tool to promote both religious and political ideas and discourses, which influence readers’ actions. It has the capacity to create hostility and hatred on one hand and peace and reconciliation on the other. This chapter has broadened our understanding of the complex relationship between religion, journalism and peacebuilding in Africa. It has examined how the print media can become a discursive site for contestations around religion and peacebuilding. In future, the entrance of digital media platforms, which provide alternative spaces for organizations like ZCA, which are muscled out of the mainstream public sphere, will provide an important space to tease out the interrelationship between religion, media and peacebuilding in Africa. There are already many Pentecostal organizations in Africa with a huge following on social media platforms. Like the print media, digital media platforms can also be conceptualized as Janus-faced. One the one hand, they can be used to foster peace and reconciliation but on the other hand can be harnessed for conflict escalation, fostering structural and cultural violence as well as sowing seeds of religious intolerance. Future research, however, needs to focus on how to counter the current challenge of fake news, hate speech and religious intolerance fueled through digital media platforms. Research also needs to unpack the framing of some religious traditions as better than others as well as presenting secular violence as justifiable against so-called religious violence. 333

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Further readings Hackett, R. I. J., 2009. Examining the Nexus of Religion, Media, and Conflict in Africa. African Communication Research, 2(1), 117–130. The article observes that there has been a lack of attention paid to issues of conflict in the emergent research on the intersections of religion, media, and culture, specifically in Africa but also in the field more generally. It argues that the religious factor is absent from recent publications that investigate the relationship between media and conflict in Africa, yet Africa’s new media revolution is replicating, if not intensifying, old polarities, as well as generating new forms of religious intolerance and conflict. Ihejirika, W. C., 2009. Research on Media, Religion and Culture in Africa: Current Trends and Debates. African Communication Research, 2(1), 1–60. This article sketches a general overview of the media, religion and culture research in Africa. The presents the scholars that are involved in the field of religion and media in Africa, their major findings, the theoretical grounds for the study of media and religion within the African landscape, and a road map for future areas of study of the interface between media, religion and culture in Africa. White, R., 2009. New Research Methodologies in Media and Religion: An International Survey. African Communication Research, 2(1), 167–203. The article reviews increasingly sophisticated research methodologies in the field of media and religion available for studying a wide variety of questions and issues: assessing the audience impact of religious broadcasting; verifying the claims of religious broadcasters; evaluating religious reporting in the press; the application of the uses and gratifications methods to religious media; using life-story methods in religious audience research; analyzing how audiences use general TV programming to reaffirm personal religious identity; analyzing personal construction of meaning in religious media; using methods of political-economy for critical examination of social power operating in religious media; and assessing the role of religious media in non-Western countries in the globalization process. Winston, D., 2012. The Oxford Handbook of Religion and the American News Media. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Emphasizing the importance of religious literacy for journalists, this handbook examines the role religion has played in the growth of mass media, how major media formats such as print, broadcast and online media deal with religion, how journalists cover major religious traditions, the religious press and how the American press covers the world.

References Alger, C. F., 2002. Religion as a Peace Tool. Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 1(4), 94–109. Appleby, R. S., 2000. The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Appleby, R. S., Omer, S. and Little, D., eds., 2015. The Oxford Handbook of Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Asad, T., 1993. Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Berling, J., 2004. Confucianism and Peacebuilding. In: Coward, H. and Smith, G., eds. Religion and Peacebuilding. New York: SUNY Press, 93–110. Boulding, E., 1986. Two Cultures of Religion as Obstacles to Peace. Zygon, 21, 501–518. Bourdillon, M. F. C., 1991. Religion and Society: A Text for Africa. Gweru: Mambo Press. Cavanaugh, W., 2009. The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chari, T., 2009. Ethical Challenges Facing Zimbabwean Media in the Context of the Internet. Global Media Journal African Edition, 3(1), 46–79. Chuma, W., 2010. Reforming the Media in Zimbabwe: Critical Reflections. In: Moyo, D. and Chuma, W., eds. Media Policy in a Changing Southern Africa: Critical Reflections on Media Reforms in the Global Age. Pretoria: Unisa Press, 90–109. Coward, H. and Smith, G. S., 2004. Religion and Peacebuilding. Albany: SUNY Press. Demarest, L. and Langer, A., 2018. Peace Journalism on a Shoestring? Conflict Reporting in Nigeria’s National News Media. Journalism, [e-journal Available through University of Groningen website, http://rug.on.worldcat.org, accessed 3 November 2019.

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Religious peacebuilding in Zimbabwe Dombo, S., 2014a. Daily Struggles: Private Print Media, the State and Democratic Governance in Zimbabwe in the Case of the African Daily News (1956–1964) and the Daily News (1999–2003). A PhD thesis in African History. School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal. Dombo, S., 2014b. Refusing to be Co-opted? The Role of Church Organizations in Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation in Zimbabwe with Special Reference to the Christian Alliance of Zimbabwe since 2005. Journal for the Study of Religion, 27(2), 137–171. Dubois, H., 2008. Religion and Peace Building: An Ambivalent Yet Vital Relationship. Available at http:// www.religionconflictpeace.org/volume-1-issue-2-spring-2008/religion-and-peacebuilding, accessed 24 August 2018. Foucault, M., 1980. The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Volume 1. New York: Vintage House. Galtung, J., 1969. Violence, Peace and Peace Research. Journal of Peace Research, 6(3), 167–191. Galtung, J. (2014) ‘Peace, Conflict and Violence’. In Hintjens, H. and Zarkov, D. (eds.). Conflict, Peace, Security and Development: Theories and Methodologies. London: Routledge. Girard, R., 1977. Violence and the Sacred. Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press. Gonda, V., 2007. Police ‘Allow’ Prayer Meeting But Ban Political Speakers. The ZIMBABWE Situation, [online] 12 April. Available at https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/old/apr14_2007.html, accessed 20 August 2018. Hackett, R. I. J., 2009. Charismatic/Pentecostal Appropriation of Media Technologies in Nigeria and Ghana. Journal of Religion in Africa, 28(3), 258–277. Haynes, J., 2012. Religious Transnational Actors and Soft Power. Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate. Huntington, S., 1993. The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 22–49. Huntington, S., 1998. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. London: Touchstone Books. Kastfelt, N., 2003. Scriptural Politics: The Bible and Koran as Political Models in Africa and the Middle East. London: Hurst. Koven, R., 2004. An Antidote to Hate Speech: Journalism, Pure and Simple. Available at www.amarc. org/ documents/books/media_conflict_prevention_EN.pdf, accessed 20 August 2018. Loo, E., 2011. Reporting Religion beyond the Conflict Frame. Middle East Media Educator, 1(1), 82–91. Makumbe, J., 2007. Save Zimbabwe Campaign More Relevant than Ever. The Zimbabwean, [online] 9 August. Available at http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2007/08/save-zimbabwe-campaign-morerelevant-than-ever/, accessed 19 August 2018. Mare, A., 2016. Facebook, Youth and Political Action: A Comparative Study of Zimbabwe and South Africa. An unpublished PhD Thesis submitted to the Department of Journalism and Media Studies, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa. Marsden, L. and Savigny, H. 2009. Media, Religion and Conflict. London: Routledge. Moyo, D., 2009. Citizen Journalism and the Parallel Market of Information in Zimbabwe’s 2008 Election. Journalism Studies, 10(4), 551–567. Mukasa, S. D., 2003. Press and Politics in Zimbabwe. African Studies Quarterly, 7(2 & 3), 171–183. Munemo, D. and Nciizah, E., 2014. The Church in Zimbabwe’s Peace and Reconciliation Process under the Government of National Unity. Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS), 19(10), 63–70. Murwira, Z., 2012. Save Zimbabwe Campaign Seeks Political Mileage. The Herald, [online] 12 April. Available at http://www.herald.co.zw/save-zimbabwe-campaign-seeks-political-mileage/, accessed 02 January 2015. Ndlela, M. N., 2009. Alternative Media and the Political Public Sphere in Zimbabwe. In: Howley, K., ed. Understanding Community Media. London: Sage. Ranger, T., 2004. Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation. Journal of Southern African Studies, 30(2), 215–34. Rønning, H. and Kupe, T., 2000. The Dual Legacy of Democracy and Authoritarianism: The Media and the State in Zimbabwe. In: Curran, J. and Park, M., eds. De-Westernising Media Studies. London and New York: Routledge, 138–156. Saunders, R., 1991. Information in the Interregnum: The Press, State and Civil Society in Struggles for Hegemony, Zimbabwe, 1980–1990. Unpublished PhD thesis, Carleton University. Saunders, R., 2000. Never the Same Again: Zimbabwe’s Growth Towards Democracy. Harare: Edwina Spicer Productions. Shawa, A., 2007. Police in Zimbabwe Threaten to Stop Planned Weekend Prayer Meeting Planned by Opposition. Available at http://legacy.utsandiego.com/news/world/20070413-1351-zimbabwe. htm, accessed 23 September 2014.

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Joram Tarusarira and Admire Mare Special Correspondent, 2006. Zimbabwe Christian Alliance Launched. The Zimbabwean, [online] 8 February. Available at http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2006/02/zimbabwe-christian-alliance-launched/, accessed 24 August 2018. Spencer, G., 2006. Sinn Fein and the Media in Northern Ireland: The New Terrain of Policy Articulation. Irish Political Studies, 21(3), 355–382. Tarusarira, J., 2016. Reconciliation and Religio-Political Non-Conformism in Zimbabwe. London: Routledge/ Taylor and Francis. The British Academy, 2015. The Role of Religion in Conflict and Peacebuilding. London: The British Academy. The Christian Voice, 2008. (Issue No. 8). [newsletter]. Harare: Zimbabwe Christian Alliance. The Herald, 2007. Zimbabwe: State Warns MDC Against Lawlessness. [online] Available at http://raceandhistory.com/selfnews/viewnews.cgi?newsid1173799825,80485,.shtml, accessed 03 November 2019. Thompson, J. B., ed., 1977/2010. Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press. Voltmer, K., 2013. The Media in Transitional Democracies. Cambridge: Polity Press. Von Stuckrad, K., 2010. Reflections on the Limits of Reflection: An Invitation to the Discursive Study of Religion. Method & Theory in the Study of Religion, 22(2–3), 156–169. Willems, W., 2011. Comic Strips and “the Crisis”: Postcolonial Laughter and Coping with Everyday Life in Zimbabwe. Popular Communication, 9(2), 126–45. Yamshon E. and Yamshon, D., 2006. Comics Media in Conflicts Resolution Programs: Are They Effective in Promoting and Sustaining Peace? Harvard Negotiation Law Review, 11, 421–425.

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23 (DE-)DIFFERENTIATION AND RELIGION IN DIGITAL NEWS Johanna M. Sumiala

Introduction: theorizing differentiation The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines differentiation as a development “from the one to the many, the simple to the complex, or the homogeneous to the heterogeneous” (MerriamWebster 2019). In social theory, differentiation is typically connected with the process of modernization in which different spheres of society become separated (Giddens 1992, 633–634). In other words, modern society involves increased structural specialization and growing independence among societal spheres, through which religion, economics, politics and culture are seen as separate and independent spheres of modern society (Alexander and Colomy 1990, Juteau 2003, 4). With respect to the study of religion, the idea of differentiation has radical consequences, as differentiation considers religion to not only be a separate category of society but also a category that belongs to the private domain rather than the public sphere (see also Lövheim 2017, Sumiala 2017). The idea of differentiation in modern society is thus intimately connected with the process of secularization, a decrease in the role of religion in society and a normative idea of the secular public sphere free from religious influences (Habermas 1989, Casanova 1994). The idea of differentiation has also left its mark in the study of modern journalistic media, which is typically called mass media (e.g., Morley 2007). Newspapers are a common example of this. Throughout the history of print media (Nerone 2015), newspapers have been perceived as a modern institution for discussing and debating different spheres of society across diverse topics (e.g., foreign news, domestic news, economics) (see also Sumiala et al. 2017). Thus, differentiation in newspapers (as well as elsewhere in mainstream news media) is an important concept under which different news topics are seen according to news criteria and how those news topics shape the idea of the public sphere (Nerone 2015). While the concept of differentiation is considered highly influential in both social theory and media theory, it has also faced explicit criticism. The idea of separating social reality into different spheres (in news media and in society) has been critiqued for its tendency to universalize certain European historical developments and generalize these processes into a universal and normative theory of the modernization and secularization of society (Meyer and Moors 2006). Another critique is based on the theory’s inability to recognize the hybrid nature of social and cultural phenomena (belonging to and crossing over different spheres). 337

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In his book We Have Never Been Modern, Bruno Latour describes this modern compulsion to compartmentalize life as follows: Headings like Economy, Politics, Science, Books, Culture, Religion and Local Events remain in place as if there were nothing odd going on. The smallest AIDS virus takes you from sex to the unconscious, then to Africa, tissue cultures, DNA and San Francisco, but the analysts, thinkers, journalists and decision-makers will slice the delicate network traced by the virus for you into tidy compartments where you will find only science, only economy, only social phenomena, only local news, only sentiment, only sex. (Latour 1993, 2) In the study of news media, I argue that this type of classification has also resulted in a failure to recognize the complex and many-sided ways in which religion is, in fact, embedded in the culture, politics and economics that surround us (Sumiala et al. 2017). Perhaps the most profound critique of differentiation involves the changes brought about by the digitalization of the media environment (Berglez 2013). With the advent of the Internet, media scholars have begun to rethink the idea of differentiation and related media logic in new ways. One key element here involves the blurring of categories and related hierarchies across the different actors ( journalists and amateur media users) and platforms (professional news media and social media) capable of making and sharing news today. Research on the remediation, convergence and hybridization of digital communication all point in this direction. Many studies have also argued that while the media environment has become more and more diverse due to the Internet and social mediarelated news-making, professional news journalism has started to lose some of its power as a gatekeeper and agenda setter in today’s digital public sphere (e.g., Jenkins 2006, Meikle and Sherman 2012, Meikle 2016, Friedrichsen and Kamalipour 2017). Additionally, emerging concerns about the reliability of news making have been voiced, as new social media actors have entered the field of news-making and news sharing (Sumiala and Tikka 2013). One example of the changing dynamics in the public sphere and related institutional actors was provided by anthropologists Dale Eickelman and Jon Anderson (1999). They argue for the relevance of new emerging Muslim publics (and related actors) in the digital sphere. They discuss a process that is called de-differentiation (see also Herbert 2011). In this process, not only are conventional ideas of differentiation into independent sections in professional news media challenged, but the power relationship between the state and its control over institutional journalism is also questioned. The authors describe this change and its implications in the larger cultural and societal context as follows: “Situated outside formal state control, this distinctly Muslim public sphere exists at the intersections of religious, political, and social life. Facilitated by the proliferation of media in the modern world, the Muslim public can challenge or limit state and conventional religious authorities and contribute to the creation of civil society. With access to contemporary forms of communication that range from the press and broadcast media to fax machines and audio- and videocassettes…to the Internet, Muslims, like members of Christian coalitions, Hindu revivalists ( Juergensmeyer 1993), Jewish activists, Sikh militants and protagonists of Asian and African values, have more rapid and flexible ways of building and sustaining contact with constituencies than was available in earlier 338

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decades. The asymmetries of the earlier mass media revolution are being reversed by new media in new hands. This combination of new media and new contributors to religious and political debates fosters an awareness on the part of all actors of the diverse ways in which Islam and Islamic values can be created and feeds into new sense of a public space that is discursive, performative, and participate, and not confined to formal institutions recognized by state authorities. (Eickelman and Anderson 1999, 1–2) Eickelman and Anderson’s take on theorizing these new publics is rather optimistic. Their postulation concerning emerging new voices and related publics is certainly worth acknowledging. However, more recent research on state control of Internet communication in societies such as China or Turkey, as well as such developments as hate speech, echo chambers, cyber propaganda, fake news and trolling in the USA and the UK, which are often discussed under the umbrella concept of post-truth, have begun to seriously question such optimistic interpretations of the Internet’s de-differentiating and liberating potentiality (Davis 2017, Phillips and Milner 2017). These types of critical studies allow religion and news journalism scholars to better recognize ongoing tensions among the articulations of different voices on religious issues, their truth-value, and the contradictory ways such articulations can be used to serve various religious and political ambitions and objectives in today’s digital public sphere.

Religion as a minor topic in the news In order to analyze in more detail the ways in which differentiation as a theory, idea and process has shaped the study of religion and news in the past, two key developments should be identified. The first pertains to the perception of religion as a minor topic, namely in Western news media. The second points to the growing presence of Islam (compared to other religions) as a topic in Western news journalism. During the last 30 years, many studies that discussed the role and place of religion in contemporary, secular Western news media and related journalism had considered religion to be unimportant topic for modern secular news (Hoover 1998). Simply, religion was not hard news, but a soft story (see Gower and Mitchell 2012, 1). This argument aligns with the idea of differentiation discussed above. As an issue and a topic categorized in modern secular society as a private matter, religion needs not be given notable attention as a news subject in the public sphere. It can be argued that the tendency of minimizing religion as a news subject is the most explicit example of differentiation in the study of religion and news media. However, the idea of differentiation influences not only the place of religion in news media and journalism but also the ways in which religion is covered and reported in the news when it is given attention. As a scholar of religion and news, Diane Winston (2012, 5) reminds us that “news is current and consequential information on matters that affect and interest its consumers.” The defining features of news criteria – impact, timeliness, prominence, proximity, bizarreness, conflict and currency – are indirectly related to differentiation. Thus, if and when religion makes the news in secular media, it must meet these criteria. This explicitly influences the conditions under which religion makes news (when it does!) in secular news media (Winston 2012, 5). In accordance with the vocabulary of Jolyon Mitchell (2012, 20), we may call this perspective on differentiation a journalist-centered approach, as it focuses on the conditions of news production and when and how religion can be considered a suitable topic for secular news. 339

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Winston (2012) offers further explanations for the workings of secular news journalism and its impact on the presence of religion in the news. According to Winston (2012, 14), news outlets often define religion in rather conventional and institutional terms. For example, Judaism is perceived as a religion in the news, but extreme suffering is not, though they both share aspects of community, ritual and transcendence (Winston 2012). News on religion, thus, has a tendency to focus on prominent religious institutions (e.g., large churches) and powerful people (e.g., the pope and the Dalai Lama) instead of small, marginal religious groups and their followers. This is, of course, with the exception of violent religious movements and curiosities concerning religious practices considered bizarre, such as polygamy in the Mormon religion or celebrity-driven scandals in Scientology, which also make headlines in secular news media. Taking Winston’s (2012, 14) argument a bit further, news criteria and the very journalistic practice of news gathering can be perceived as implicitly or explicitly embedded in the idea of differentiation and can be thought to openly shape what is publicly considered religion in the news. In other words, decisions about sourcing, reporting and framing stories on religion do much more than simply convey information about the religion in question. Furthermore, the categorization and mainstreaming of certain issues, ideas and personalities as religious while marginalizing, ignoring or even silencing others powerfully influences what is perceived as religion and religious and what the place and role of religion should be in any given social context (Winston 2012, 14).

The Islamification of religion in the news The journalistic convention to simultaneously view religion as a private matter but also show interest in religion when it meets news criteria (e.g., when it affects society in a way that is considered curious, unexpected or controversial) has had profound implications for the public presence of religion in Western news media. Many scholars of religion, news and journalism (Taira, Knott and Poole 2012, Lundby et al. 2017, Sumiala et al. 2017) argue that, in recent decades, this tendency has most explicitly increased the presence of Islam as a news topic in Western news media. This phenomenon has been described as the Islamification of religion in the news (Sumiala 2017, 361–365) and can be considered yet another consequence of differentiation. To explain the reasons for the Islamification of news on religion, scholars have referred to a variety of media-related processes. One of these processes has to do with the volume of news pertaining to religion. Recent empirical studies have shown that in many European news media sources, more space in journalism has been given to Islam than Christianity, the most commonly practiced religion in Europe (e.g., Kassaye, Ashur and Heelsum 2016, Sumiala et al. 2017). Another aspect has to do with the framework applied to news regarding Islam. Islam in the news is frequently associated with conflict, violence and controversy. This enforces the idea of Islam as a societal threat and a social problem (see also Hjelm 2011). Moreover, even when Islam is reported in the news for a reason other than violence and conflict, very little communication exists between different news sections (such as foreign news, domestic news and current affairs). This leads to a highly fragmented perception of religion (primarily Islam) in the news and, consequently, in society (Sumiala et al. 2017). That being said, the space given to Islam in Western news media cannot be explained solely by the number of Muslims (a minority religion in the studied European countries, which include the UK, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland) or the number of victims of radical Islamists in these societies (Taira, Knott and Poole 2012, Kassaye, Ashur and Heelsum 2016, Lundby et al. 2017, Sumiala et al. 2017). Instead, to 340

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establish empirical explanations (in terms of quantity), we must determine other factors to explain this recent phenomenon. Knut Lundby and colleagues (2017, 440) argue that the strong inclination in Western societies to connect Islam with violence, conflict and controversy contributes to the politicization of Islam in the news (e.g., in Scandinavia) and, consequently, in society. In Lundby’s view, the politicization of Islam and the mediatization of religion serve mutually reinforcing functions. While the politicization of Islam makes Islam more newsworthy and thus visible in the public sphere, the authors argue that the mediatization of religion involves the news media’s construction of Islam as such a conflict-ridden topic that less attention is paid to the other dimensions of this religion (Lundby et al. 2017, 455). Thus, we may recognize politics of repetition in action in Islam-related news, which has become a self-enforcing concept in news media reports on religion (Sumiala et al. 2017, 414–436). In addition, when we look at the issue of the Islamification of religion in the news from the perspective of religious institutions and actors, the journalistic tendency to emphasize exceptionality and conflict over everyday life is often critiqued as unjust among the religious public (see also Gower and Mitchell 2012). Religious actors feel that news media portrayals do not match how they see themselves (Taira, Knott and Poole 2012, 31). Although the goal of news journalism is not to develop portrayals that please a religion’s advocates, it is problematic for journalism and its legacy if so-called in-group members do not even recognize religions in news reports as their own. This ongoing tension between journalistic and in-group perceptions of religion in the news is one of the topics under continuous debate between journalism and its religious audiences (Gower and Mitchell 2012). In the next section of this chapter, I will examine more closely how religion, namely Islam, was constructed in a particular news event and how the idea of differentiation shaped the social construction of religion in the interplay between the online and social media news. I will provide a reading of the media material that demonstrates how certain social media actors were able to shape the news making and sharing of the Charlie Hebdo attacks and the related interpretation of Islam immediately after these attacks. This reading is based on empirical research of online (namely Western) news media and social media (namely Twitter, Facebook and YouTube) news coverage of the killings in the immediate aftermath of the massacre. Its purpose is to illustrate the significance of social media-related actors in influencing news making in professional news media and, eventually, the social construction of Islam in this violent, heavily mediatized event of global appeal (Sumiala et al. 2018). Two important points need to be added here. First, in my discussion of journalism in news media, I refer mainly to what is called online journalism in that field (Golan and MisholShauli 2018). Online journalism includes both professional online news media and social media. The taxonomy of the field (Benkler 2011) distinguishes among Internet editions of print newspapers and television networks (e.g., The New York Times, The Guardian, CNN, the BBC and Aljazeera English), non-profit media and information organizations (e.g., Wikileaks) and individual (or amateur) news producers in social media (e.g., Twitterers, YouTubers and bloggers). Second, my approach to religion follows Stewart Hoover’s (2009) conception of religion as a process of meaning making. Hoover (2009, cited in Lövheim 2011, 154) maintains that we can only define what religion is by studying (in this case) how social media and professional news media producers and users construct religion in actual situations and practices. Thus, I do not wish to make any claims about the true essence of Islam, what it is or what it should be. Instead, I will attempt to analyze the ways in which Islam was constructed in the news in a particular case and what this type of construction may imply in the context of differentiation. 341

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News on Islam after the Charlie Hebdo attacks As a brief description of this newsworthy event, the Charlie Hebdo massacre was initiated by French-Algerian brothers Saïd and Chérif Kouachi. The attacks took place in Paris on Wednesday, 7 January 2015, when the perpetrators killed 12 people at the Charlie Hebdo news office. Afterward, the brothers claimed in public that their attack had been an act of a jihadist terrorism (Roy 2016, Kepel 2017). Their rationale for attacking Charlie Hebdo was the newspaper’s reputation as a publication of blasphemous motivations. The Kouachi brothers justified their actions by claiming to have been levying revenge in the name of the prophet Muhammad. In recent decades, Charlie Hebdo published several satirical pictures of the prophet Muhammad. Although its journalistic policy had defenders, Charlie Hebdo was also known to have offended large Muslim publics in France and elsewhere in the world (Titley 2017, Sumiala et al. 2018). The attacks were followed by a massive, three-day police manhunt. This manhunt attracted considerable media attention, not only in national and international news media but also on social media, including Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. As the events unfolded, another perpetrator, Amedy Coulibaly, appeared on the news scene when he linked his assault of a kosher supermarket to the Kouachi brothers’ terrorist mission. The manhunt ended on 9 January when French police killed all three perpetrators following two deadly hostage situations. During this time of intensive news coverage, international news media and social media published several news stories related to Islam. One of the underlying storylines had to do with Islam as a bad religion. The stories around bad Islam first condensed in the news narratives that surrounded the killing of police officer Ahmed Merabet, as well as other similar incidents (Sumiala et al. 2018). Another concept, which is associated with the bad Islam viewpoint, is called the mediating Islam framework. It, too, was first created within social media and then taken up by professional news media, travelling back and forth between the two. In the remaining part of this chapter, I wish to discuss two empirical examples in which social media and ordinary media users played a key role in shaping both bad Islam and mediating Islam news frameworks in the attacks. I will also discuss how professional news media applied these frameworks in their news-making, again providing material for social media news circulation. Interestingly, in the creation of both frameworks, the role of an ordinary media user, Jordi Mir, became significant. Mir accidently filmed the killing of a police officer, Ahmed Merabet, on his mobile phone and put the video into circulation on Facebook.

Bad Islam Jordi Mir was an ordinary French citizen who lived in the same neighborhood as the Charlie Hebdo office. He happened to be working at home at the time of the attacks. Suddenly, he heard a loud noise coming from the street and looked out of the window to see what was happening. What he witnessed was the killing of a man on the street. Mir filmed the murder on his mobile phone and put the video – which he later interpreted to be a gut reaction – on Facebook. After some 15 minutes, Mir began to have second thoughts about publishing the video and removed it from his Facebook feed. However, the video had already gone viral (the video was first leaked to YouTube, Satter 2015), and

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at that point, it became impossible for Mir to erase his video from international social media and professional news circulation. The video quickly became breaking news in news outlets such as The New York Times, CNN, the BBC and The Guardian and it was constantly referred to in the following days along with the news coverage of the Charlie Hebdo attacks and related stories. In addition to the shock value, the video also provided one of the few pieces of authentic visual evidence of the attacks. It gave faces to the perpetrators and one of their victims and it also provided evidence to interpret and explain the nature of the violence as radical Islamist terrorism. The witnessing value of Mir’s video in news circulation (both in social media and professional news media) became even greater since no other visual evidence was provided of the actual massacre at the Charlie Hebdo office. The video was described in professional news media such as The Associated Press as “shocking” and “sickening” (Sumiala et al. 2018, 79). Consequently, the bad Islam viewpoint began to emerge after the attacks, alongside the circulation of Mir’s video. As soon as the professional news media had established bad Islam as the reason for the violence, new news stories on the killers as radical Islamists began to emerge across different international news media platforms. One important journalistic story discussed news stories about the perpetrators and their path to radicalization as well as their assumed connections with such radical and organized terrorist groups as Al Qaeda. It was reported that the killers had grown up in poor suburban Paris in the margins of French society. They were described as ghetto Muslims, marginalized and poor. According to some news outlets, they had become radicalized jihadists because they wanted to belong and to have the identity of being people worth recognizing (Graham-Harrison 2015, Todd 2015). Another journalistic story that kept the bad religion idea alive in professional news media was created regarding the polarized performances of solidarity between those good, westernized, liberal victims and the bad, religious killers (Titley 2017, 1–30). Again, the significance of social media became visible. The slogan and hashtag #jesuischarlie, first created by journalist Joachim Roncin, began to circulate on Twitter and was soon remediated to other social media and professional online news media platforms. As a result, #jesuischarlie became the most tweeted token in the history of Twitter (Sumiala et al. 2018). In a digital wave of solidarity, symbolic boundaries were created between those who supported Charlie Hebdo and the values it defended and those who refused (for a variety of reasons) to identify with the slogan jesuischarlie and what it stood for. One of the underlying news debates was articulated around secular versus religious (in this case, Muslim) values (see also Titley 2017). In the international news media coverage, these debates enforced boundaries between the so-called us – namely the secular West – and the so-called them, the religious Orient. The idea of bad religion was further enforced by international news media such as CBS News, The New York Times, The Guardian and Aljazeera English reports that covered demonstrations in such countries as Yemen, Pakistan and Chechnya in which people marched against those who showed solidarity for the Charlie Hebdo victims. An additional element of bad religion came about in response to other stories connected to the supporters of the perpetrators. One of the hashtags that was given public visibility in the media was #jesuiskouachi. However, this hashtag was soon hijacked by Twitter users who wished to mock the killers and their supporters. Thus, while #jesuiskouachi kept circulating, its meaning(s) changed radically from idolizing the killers to shaming and disgracing them and their supporters: yet another way that Islam was framed as a bad religion.

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When we interpret the news’ idea of Islam as a bad religion through the lens of differentiation, we recognize a standard news logic on religion in action. As unexpected attacks of enormous symbolic value, the Charlie Hebdo attacks became breaking news. Islam as a bad religion provided an explanatory framework for the attacks, which was repeated across several news outlets and multiple stories. As global news, the idea of Islam as a bad religion rapidly spread from one media platform to the next. This progression resonated with the idea of differentiation among different media; however, at the same time, the elements of de-differentiation (Herbert 2011) were at play through the convergence of similar logic between different media platforms. The dissemination of Islam as a bad religion was shared by a multitude of platforms and actors, but it is important to understand that it was first triggered in social media.

Mediating Islam The framing of Islam as a bad religion, though it was perhaps one of the most explicit, was not the only frame constructed by the news reports of the Charlie Hebdo attacks. Interestingly, Mir’s video also played an important role in creating a more moderate framework to represent Islam in both social media and professional news media in association with the attacks. The victim in the video was a Muslim police officer, Ahmed Merabet. When the video of Merabet’s killing went viral, social and news media were interested not only in the perpetrators but also the victim himself. There were many aspects that social media and professional news media picked up on in making and sharing the news on Merabet. The most important element had to do with Merabet’s Muslim background. The news media released to the public several facts about Merabet’s life. It stated that he had grown up in Livry-Gargan in the northeastern suburbs of Paris and graduated from the local lycée in 1995. Paris Match (Lallement 2015) reported that Merabet’s father, Kaddour, had migrated to France in 1955 and his mother, Houria, in 1962. Merabet was said to have fulfilled his responsibility as the family’s eldest son after his father’s death by looking after his mother and siblings. Like many other newspapers, Le Figaro (De Mareschal 2015) portrayed Merabet and his family as good, hard-working citizens. Merabet was praised as a devoted officer who worked hard to gain a promotion in the police force (Graham-Harrison 2015). In many news stories published in newspapers like The Guardian, Merabet was portrayed as a hero: a well-assimilated Muslim citizen living in France who died defending French values. This story was confirmed by Merabet’s family, who gave interviews on the incident in different news media. Their message was peace rather than violence. In the words of Malek, Ahmed’s brother, who became a prominent public witness to his brother’s character as a good Muslim and French citizen in international news media: ‘My brother was Muslim and he was killed by two terrorists, by two false Muslims,’ he said. ‘Islam is a religion of peace and love. As far as my brother’s death is concerned, it was a waste. He was very proud of the name Ahmed Merabet, proud to represent the police and of defending the values of the Republic—liberty, equality, fraternity.’ (Graham-Harrison 2015) A tragic additional layer was brought to Merabet’s story by his partner, Morgane Ahmad, who told BBC News (2015) that she had first learned about Merabet’s death on television. 344

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I was in a restaurant and a television was on […] I didn’t recognise him, I only saw the picture of a man on the pavement. I tried to call him, sent messages. I went back to work, and then his sister called me. (BBC News 2015) The family expressed in public their strong disapproval for publishing and circulating Merabet’s death online, blaming Mir for his actions. Mir, again, had become a public celebrity and had given several interviews claiming that he regretted posting the video. Additionally, he publically apologized to the Merabet family. All these different phases were carefully reported in professional international news media as reported by Associated Press (Satter 2015). In addition to Merabet’s family, his colleagues in the police force and French politicians, including President Hollande and Prime Minister Manuel Valls, publicly recognized Merabet and honored him for giving his life in the service of French society. Both Hollande and Valls praised Merabet as an exemplary Muslim and French citizen. In an official ceremony, Merabet was awarded the Légion d’Honneur, the highest order of recognition in France. In addition to giving public speeches in which they highlighted Merabet’s exemplary actions, Hollande and Valls took an active part in the public mourning of Merabet. Hollande also paid a visit to Merabet’s family in Seine-Saint-Denis, a symbolic act that also received attention from professional news media (e.g., Le Parisien 2015). Merabet’s funeral also made the news in social media. On YouTube, several videos and related commentaries on this event can still be found. All in all, the news stories surrounding Merabet in both social and professional news media provided a framework that described Islam not as violent, but as a mediating religion, thus encouraging common understanding between the secular and religious perceptions of the event. In addition to Merabet’s story, other moderate views on Islam were given public visibility in the news coverage of the attacks. Several reports were made about ordinary Muslims living in France and elsewhere in Europe. In these stories, people who practiced Islam voiced their concerns about the polarization of public opinion, the rise of right-wing populist politics and the demonization of Islam and its followers as carriers of terrorism. In social media, many Muslims wished to publicly show their colors and claim that, while they did not wish to be Charlie (referring to the slogan #jesuischarlie), they also refused to be seen as terrorists. In this context, the slogan #jesuisahmed (referring to Ahmed Merabet) was used to portray Islam as a mediating religion that sought solidarity and peace instead of conflict and polarization between the different parties of the digital public sphere. One particularly influential tweet that circulated on different platforms of social media as well as professional news media said: I am not Charlie, I am Ahmed the dead cop. Charlie ridiculed my faith and culture and I died defending his right to do so #JesuisAhmed. (Sumiala et al. 2018, 84) To put it briefly, when we look at Islam as a mediating religion through the lens of differentiation, we may recognize similar dynamics between the construction of the bad religion and the mediating religion ideas. Both were created through a complex network of communication across different media platforms and actors and both were initially triggered in social media. Only in the latter case did the differentiation of platforms and actors provide a new, contradictory framework to represent and discuss the role of Islam in the attacks. This suggests that we should view differentiation not as a deterministic process, but as a process that is: 345

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open to the creation of a variety of frameworks that depend on often rather unexpected and random dynamics triggered by the types of evidence available for circulation (such as Mir’s video); activated by different types of media users and activated by both ordinary and professional news-making actors who may well aim to achieve divergent goals and proposals through their newsworthy actions.

Conclusion: rethinking differentiation in terms of religion in digital news When we examine the news coverage of Islam in the Charlie Hebdo attacks and analyze it through the lens of differentiation, we can pinpoint at least three key aspects. First, the combination of differentiation (which has resulted in religion being a rare news topic) and news criteria (which focuses on unexpected violence) provides one explanation for why Islam has been given such a significant position in recent religion-based news in Western news media. Extreme violence – such as the Charlie Hebdo attacks – has the power to break through the structure of differentiation. The other side of the coin of this development is the heavy emphasis placed on the social construction of religion as a threat and problem in society such that religion (in this case, Islam) begins to equal violence in the public sphere. Second, the Charlie Hebdo attacks demonstrated how changes in the media environment shape differentiation. We can recognize a trend in the pluralization of frameworks that discuss religion. Although the bad religion portrayal played a fairly visible role in the news reports on the Charlie Hebdo attacks, counter-voices were also articulated. The mediating religion framework, for instance, became particularly influential in bringing new voices to the news coverage of Islam in the attacks. The role of social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube was central in this pluralization process pertaining to Islam. This can be explained by thinking of differentiation in terms of specialization not only in news media but also across different media, namely amateur media and professional news media (see also Allan and Thorsen 2014). Furthermore, instead of seeing differentiation among different media as a process of separation, we should also see it, perhaps even more so, as a process of creating new connections and intersections among different platforms and actors (see Meikle 2016). Third, in the Charlie Hebdo case, differentiation brought about a Janus-faced dilemma. Both the pluralization (of news platforms, actors and frames) and the polarization of views connected with religion (e.g., religion being seen as a bad or mediating force in society) can exist simultaneously in the digital public sphere. Thus, what we can see here is a process of de-differentiation (Herbert 2011), in which news on religion, as well as the platforms and actors that circulate it, converge and remediate among one another, producing new types of hybrid connections and intersections that all shape the social construction of religion in the digital sphere (Meikle and Sherman 2012, Meikle 2016). This shift in focus also raises important questions for future research. What happens to the truth-value of news on religion in this new de-differentiated and converged media environment ( Jenkins 2006)? How can we judge the authenticity of amateur and vernacular actors who make and share news on religion (Chouliaraki 2015)? How should future research on religion in news address the issues of fake news and trolling? The ways in which these complex de-differentiation processes shape the position of religion in the news and the

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broader relationship between religion and society is both a theoretical and empirical challenge to be addressed by future research on digital religion (Campbell 2012). As Katherine Fry puts it: “Social networking and video sharing sites such as… Facebook and YouTube, no matter the level of accuracy, are prominent venues for information of all sorts, from the internationally consequential to the most personal. These sources are changing where and how some people are getting their news. They are also changing news.” (Fry 2008, 546) Finally, if and when a shift occurs in the public presence of religion in the news in today’s digital sphere, we must begin to seriously revise our theoretical ideas about secularization (see Habermas 2008) in the present de-differentiated digital condition.

Further readings Lundby, K., ed., 2018. Contesting Religion. The Media Dynamics of Cultural Conflicts in Scandinavia. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. This book examines mediatization of conflicts related to religion as they play out in public broadcasting media and social media. Empirical focus is given to religion in Scandinavian media. Steensen, S. and Ahva, L., 2019. Theories of Journalism in a Digital Age. London and New York: Routledge.

References Alexander, J. and Colomy, P., eds., 1990. Differentiation Theory and Social Change: Comparative and Historical Perspectives. New York: Columbia University Press. Allan, S. and Thorsen, E., eds., 2014. Citizen Journalism: Global Perspectives. Global Crises and the Media. New York: Peter Lang. BBC News, 2015. Charlie Hebdo Attack: Ahmed Merabet’s Family Speak Out. BBC News, [online] 10 January. Available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30761229, accessed 28 January. Benkler, Y., 2011. A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate. Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, 46, 311. Berglez, P., 2013. Global Journalism: Theory and Practice. New York: Peter Lang. Campbell, H., 2012. Digital Religion: Understanding Religious Practice in New Media Worlds. Oxon: Routledge. Casanova, H., 1994. Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chouliaraki, L., 2015. Digital Witnessing in Conflict Zones: The Politics of Remediation. Information, Communication & Society, 18(11), 1362–77. Davis, E., 2017. Post-Truth: Why We Have Reached Peak Bullshit and What We Can Do about It. London: Little, Brown. De Mareschal, E., 2015. Musulmans, juifs et policiers pleurant Ahmed Merabet. Le Figaro, [online] 13 January. Available at http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2015/01/13/01016-20150113ARTFIG00418-musulmans-juifs-et-policiers-pleurent-ahmed-merabet.php, accessed 28 February 2019. Eickelman, D. E. and Anderson, J. W., 1999. Redefining Muslim Publics. In: Eickelman, D. F. and Anderson, J. W., eds. New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere. 2nd ed. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1–18. Friedrichsen, M. and Kamalipour, Y., eds., 2017. Digital Transformation in Journalism and News Media. New York: Springer. Fry, K., 2008. News as Subject: What Is It? Where Is It? Whose Is It? Journalism Studies, 9(4), 545–560. Giddens, A., 1992. Sociology. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

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Johanna M. Sumiala Golan, O. and Mishol-Shauli, N., 2018. Fundamentalist Web Journalism: Walking a Fine Line between Religious Ultra-Orthodoxy and the New Media Ethos. European Journal of Communication, 33(3), 304–320. Gower, O. and Mitchell, J., 2012. Introduction. In: Mitchell, J. and Gower, O., eds., Religion and the News. Farnham: Ashgate, 1–3. Graham-Harrison, E., 2015. Paris Policeman’s Brother: ‘Islam Is a Religion of Love. My Brother Was Killed by Terrorists, by False Muslims’. The Guardian, [online] 10 January. Available at https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/10/charlie-hebdo-policeman-murder-ahmed-merabet, accessed 28 February 2019. Habermas, J., 1989. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge: The MIT Press. Habermas, J., 2008. Notes on Post-Secular Society. Signandsight.com, [online] 18 June. Available at http://www.signandsight.com/features/1714.html, accessed 23 November 2018. Herbert, D., 2011. Theorizing Religion and Media in Contemporary Societies: An Account of Religious ‘Publicization’. European Journal of Cultural Studies, 14(6), 626–648. Hjelm, T., ed., 2011. Religion and Social Problem. New York: Routledge. Hoover, S., 1998. Religion in the News: Faith and Journalism in American Public Discourse. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Hoover, S., 2009. Complexities: The Case of Religious Cultures. In: Lundby, K., ed. Mediatization: Concept, Changes, Consequences. New York: Peter Lang, 123–138. Jenkins, H., 2006. Convergence Culture: When Old and New Media Collide. New York: New York University Press. Juergensmeyer, M., 1993. The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Modern State. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Juteau, D., ed., 2003. Social Differentiation: Patterns and Processes. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Kassaye, A., Ashur, I. and Heelsum, A. Van, 2016. The Relationship between Media Discourses and Experiences of Belonging: Dutch Somali Perspectives. Ethnicities, 16(6), 773–797. Kepel, G., 2017. Terror in France. The Rise of Jihad in the West. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Lallement, P., 2015. L’itinéraire exemplaire d’Ahmed Merabet. Paris Match, [online] 23 January. Available at https://www.parismatch.com/Actu/Societe/Son-itineraire-exemplaire-Ahmed-Merabet-695190, accessed 28 February 2019. Latour, B., 1993. We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Le Parisien, 2015. François Hollande rend visite à la famille du policier Ahmed Merabet. Le Parisien, [online] 11 January. Available at http://www.leparisien.fr/livry-gargan-93190/francoishollande-rend-visite-a-la-famille-du-policier-ahmed-merabet-11-01-2015-4437653.php, accessed 28 February 2019. Lövheim, M., 2011. Mediatisation of Religion: A Critical Appraisal. Culture & Religion, 12(2), 153–166. Lövheim, M., 2017. Religion, Mediatization, and ‘Complementary Learning Processes’ in Swedish Editorials. Journal of Religion in Europe, 10(4), 366–383. Lundby, K., Hjarvard, S., Lövheim, M. and Jernsletten, H. H., 2017. Religion between Politics and Media: Conflicting Attitudes towards Islam in Scandinavia. Journal of Religion in Europe, 10(4), 437–456. Meikle, G., 2016. Social Media, Communication, Sharing and Visibility. New York: Routledge. Meikle, G. and Sherman, Y., 2012. Media Convergence: Networked Digital Media in Everyday Life. Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan. Merriam-Webster, 2019. Merriam-Webster Dictionary. [online] Springfield: Merriam-Webster Inc. Available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/differentiation, accessed 28 February 2019. Meyer, B. and Moors, A., eds., 2006. Religion, Media, and the Public Sphere. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Morley, D., 2007. Media, Modernity and Technology: The Geography of the New. London: Routledge. Nerone, J., 2015. The Media and Public Life: A History. Cambridge: Polity Press. Phillips, W. and Milner, R. M., 2017. The Ambivalent Internet: Mischief, Oddity, and Antagonism Online. Cambridge: Polity Press. Roy, O., 2016. Jihad and Death: The Global Appeal of Islamic State. London: Hurst & Company. Satter, R., 2015. AP Exclusive: Witness to Paris Officer’s Death Regrets Video. AP News, [online] 11 January. Available at https://www.apnews.com/5e1ee93021b941629186882f03f1bb79, accessed 28 February 2019.

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(De-)differentiation and religion in digital news Sumiala, J., 2017. Introduction: Mediatization in Post-Secular Society – New Perspectives in the Study of Media, Religion and Politics. Journal of Religion in Europe, 10(4), 361–365. Sumiala, J. and Tikka, M., 2013. Broadcast Yourself – Global News! A Netnography of the “Flotilla” News on YouTube. Communication, Culture and Critique, 6(2), 201–352. Sumiala, J., Hokka, J., Valaskivi, K. and Laakso, S., 2017. The Politics of Space in News Media: Mapping Religion in Four Finnish Newspapers (2007–2011). Journal of Religion in Europe, 10(4), 414–436. Sumiala, J., Valaskivi, K., Tikka, M. and Huhtamäki, J., 2018. Hybrid Media Events: The Charlie Hebdo Attacks and Circulation of Terrorist Violence. Bingley: Emerald. Taira, T., Knott, K. and Poole, E., 2012. Religion in the British media today. In: Mitchell, J. and Gower, O., eds. Religion and the News. Farnham: Ashgate, 31–44. Titley, G., 2017. Becoming symbolic: From Charlie Hebdo to ‘Charlie Hebdo’. In: Titley, G., Freedman, D., Khiabany, D. and Mondon, A., eds. After Charlie Hebdo: Terror, Racism and Free Speech. London: Zed Books, 1–30. Todd, E., 2015. Who Is Charlie? Xenophobia and the New Middle Class. Cambridge: Polity Press. Winston, D. H., 2012. Introduction: Mapping the Royal Road. In: Winston, D. H., ed. The Oxford Handbook of Religion and the American News Media. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 3–22.

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PART 5

Trends

24 DIFFERENTIATION When more sometimes means less Joyce Smith

Introduction In this chapter, I will discuss differentiation as it relates specifically to the practice of reporting concerning religion. While I will include ideas and currents, which are widespread, my own experience and many of the examples I will use center on the Canadian media and religious landscapes. In order to shed light on theories, which involve different concepts of differentiation, I will also concentrate on the nuts-and-bolts issues involved in the professional practice of journalism about religion, particularly by mainstream, established, legacy news outlets. This will also be somewhat limited in that one can only speak with some confidence about journalism as it has been and is currently done; today, the speed of technological and economic change is so rapid that the timelines involved in publication of a book make this a dangerous enterprise! However, as historians of journalism have suggested (e.g., Pavlik 2000), there are patterns to the way in which journalism has adapted to technological changes which may suggest paradigms with future value.

What are we talking about when we talk about differentiation in the realm of reporting on religion? For the purposes of this chapter, I will discuss differentiation in the following ways: as an evolution of media platforms, as a diversity of points of view, as a change in the definition of religion and finally, as a personalization of news consumption. To state the obvious, reporting on religion exists differently around the world, and even within the same nation, it may differ between privately-owned and publicly-funded news outlets. Therefore, at the outset, I note that I write as one who is familiar primarily with the systems in place in North America, Western Europe and parts of Africa. These are all, to some extent, influenced by colonial histories of publishing and broadcasting, as well as the transnational reach of large media corporations and religious institutions. Another self-evident but sometimes forgotten issue is the speed at which the differentiation of media platforms has taken place. The current multitude of forms has arrived in one quick blink as compared with the introduction of previous mediated systems used for journalism. For instance, this is the time between Gutenberg’s press and the telegraph: 1440–1832 353

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(over 390 years). From the telegraph to radio: 1832 to Marconi in 1894 (62 years). From radio to television: 1894 to 1936 (42 years). From television to the Web: 1989 (53 years). From Web to Facebook (2004) (15 years), to Twitter (2006) (17 years). However, it is also important to remember that none of these technologies (with the exception of the telegraph) has ceased to be used for the purpose of journalism. No matter how many times we are told that print is dead, books, newspapers and magazines all continue to exist, despite alterations in form and content. The same is true of radio, which has been given new life via the shift from analog to digital, podcasts and now through smart speakers like Amazon’s Echo and Alexa and Google’s Home devices. Each platform introduction has modified its antecedent forms to some extent. Worried about an audience entranced with television screens, the National Enquirer tabloid rounded off the corners of their photographs, hoping to emulate those early screens (Calder 1993). Printed newspapers had to change their focus from breaking news long before the Internet, but rather with the advent of radio and particularly with the creation of 24-hour cable television news outlets. However, the idea of the newspaper as a compendium of many different types of information, organized by theme within a collection of pages has not, for the most part, changed. Even in legacy newspapers’ online editions, similar organizing principles of sections, for example, are used. Religion reporting has found its place within these printed compendiums, although not to anywhere near the same extent in the broadcast platforms. Differentiation as it pertains to religion reporting also includes a diversity of points of view among those who disseminate the news. Returning to the specifically Canadian context, there were never a large number of journalists who specialized in reporting on religion. Before large-scale cuts to newsrooms, perhaps ten journalists at newspapers across Canada specialized in religion. Today that count is at about one. The public broadcaster has retained one radio program (Tapestry), which deals with religious/spiritual issues (McNair 2018). This dearth of specialization would suggest that there is a lack of diversity in the dissemination of news about religion. However, the converse can be argued. While religion coverage in a traditional, beat sense has all but disappeared, it continues to appear all over other news spaces, in reporting about politics, health and science, justice and education systems and arts and entertainment coverage. In this fashion, the portrayal of religion can and often does suffer from a reporter’s lack of context and knowledge. However, the way in which religion is discussed, described and framed is often novel. Someone who is fluent in political science may deal with religious behaviors and communities in a significantly different way than a cultural critic addresses the same issues as they emerge in a theatrical production. Untethered from a traditional religion beat, these representations of religion do not conform to the traditions of a weekly religion page featuring a profile of the local Presbyterian minister, a synopsis of the most recent Anglican sermon from the presiding bishop and a report on fundraising done by the Hadassah group at the synagogue. Many religion stories in the past were tied to institutional forms of religion, so while I continue to advocate for the inclusion of journalists who can specialize in religion reporting, I also see the potential benefit of having religion freed in a differentiated media universe. In addition to the representation of religion throughout a plethora of subject categories, there is the surge in those who are disseminating news without the training and credentials of a professional journalist. A number of members of religious groups leapfrog journalists by using Twitter and other platforms to communicate news and ideas to audiences without an intermediary reporter. Some of this is done in order to communicate directly, but in other cases, it may simply be because there are no journalists left who work on news about religion to respond to a press release. 354

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Differentiation on the religious side begins much more slowly (and obviously started long before Gutenberg’s invention), but there is a somewhat similar trajectory in terms of increasing schisms and appearances of new denominations and movements. Then suddenly, in some corners of the world, a relatively quick emergence of – if not secularism – then the nones who defy easy categorization. In the Canadian situation, between 1985 and 2010 the percentage of individuals declaring no religion as part of the Canadian General Social Surveys went from 10.5% to 23.8%, an increase of 126.7% over 25 years (Wilkins-Laflamme 2015, 478). At first glance, this may look like consolidation, but sociologists have been quick to point out that the statistical groupings hide deep differences between atheists and those who believe in God, describe themselves as spiritual and/or have some form of ritual practice (Pew Research Center 2013, Bibby 2017). This phenomenon has itself provided many occasions for reporting, as journalists try to communicate the latest demographics of belief to Canadians. Also in the Canadian case, there has been an increase in those who identify as having some form of Indigenous spiritual belief and/or practice. Albeit a relatively small number – 5% of Indigenous people identified using this category in the 2011 National Household Survey – this is still a significant portion given the attempted eradication of such spirituality by colonial governments (Statistics Canada n.d.). It too is a type of differentiation of religion in the form of reclamation. With the erosion of traditional collections of news – the newspaper, the evening television newscast – individual pieces of news float in a sea of other kinds of information, including entertainment of all kinds. News pieces about religion may bob to the surface of an individual’s personalized pond of information where it might otherwise not have appeared. However, it can also mean that unless there is some serendipitous event, the chances of it being seen on someone’s Facebook timeline could be less than had it appeared in a specifically constructed newspaper section. Unlike the guarantee of a specific section for religion news, few may see one-off stories, unless given popular metatags, or having some other attribute, which will make it go viral. This personalization of news is yet another form of differentiation.

What are the implications/consequences of differentiation or journalism about religion? In 1996, a freelance journalist named Heather Robertson launched what became a class action suit against the owners of The Globe and Mail, one of Canada’s national newspapers. While the suit dealt with the issue of freelance contracts, an interesting aspect became a ruling on whether the collection of stories, which we call a newspaper, is a thing in and of itself – more than the simple sum of its parts. The case eventually ended up in Canada’s Supreme Court, with a 2006 ruling which gave Robertson and her freelance colleagues most of what they asked for in terms of contracts recognizing subsequent uses of their work in databases. The element that is of particular interest for this chapter, however, is the concept of collective work. This issue was also at the heart of a similar American case, known as the New York Times Co. versus Tasini. Here is the relevant passage from the Canadian Supreme Court ruling: (…) a substantial part of a newspaper may consist only of the original selection so long as the essence of the newspaper is preserved. The task of determining whether this essence has been reproduced is largely a question of degree but, at a minimum, the editorial content of the newspaper — the true essence of its originality — must be preserved and 355

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presented in the context of that newspaper. Here, in (two databases), the originality of the freelance articles is reproduced, but the originality of the newspapers is not. The newspaper articles are decontextualized to the point that they are no longer presented in a manner that maintains their intimate connection with the rest of that newspaper. Viewed “globally”, these databases are compilations of individual articles presented outside of the context of the original collective work from where they originated. The resulting collective work presented to the public is not simply each of the collective works joined together — it is a collective work of a different nature. The references to the newspaper where the articles were published, the date they were published and the page number where they appeared merely provide historical information. (Robertson v. Thomson Corp 2006) The judges agreed with Robertson that the newspaper’s claim to copyright was based on the collection of all the news articles, as well as the layout of the illustrations, and even the accompanying advertisements and classifieds. Once the individual pieces of journalism were digitized and collected in a database, unmoored from the specific collective context of the newspaper, this copyright ceased to have legal power. In other words, the differentiation of the individual pieces from the original collection was crucial to understanding ownership under the contract. This concept of collective work is also, I would argue, key to understanding the way in which differentiation of reporting on religion matters. What difference does it make to have a piece of reporting appear on a specific page? Moreover, what difference does it make to have it appear as part and parcel of a panoply of news from a given community on a given day? There are obvious issues of legitimation given by the inclusion of religion reporting into a collective work of news. The first is simply that religious ideas, beliefs, practices and communities are newsworthy. There are almost as many ways of defining news, as there are ways of defining religion, but among the key ingredients to recognizing something as newsworthy are: relevance, novelty, public interest, conflict, timeliness and proximity. With perhaps the exception of novelty and conflict, these are all traits, which most religious communities would like to have associated with themselves. To be included, then, in mainstream media, signifies membership to some extent in the hegemonic structure of the larger community served by the news outlet. Also important is the editorial decision-making involved in situating a religion story. As recognized by the Canadian Supreme Court ruling, a key component to the essence of the newspaper is the conscious choice to place a story in a particular spot, with specific space allotment, in conjunction or disjunction with other information and advertisements. The same is true of a traditional radio or television news broadcast: Choices are made about the order in which stories will appear, and about the language the news presenter/anchor will use to introduce and segue between one story and another. All of these choices can serve to elevate or even be dismissive of a representation of religion. In North American news broadcasts, for example, there is often a story identified as a kicker, which ends the show. These kickers are selected often because they are humorous, surprising, or somehow uplifting. To have a subject involving religion appear in this slot is to give the audience a cue as to how to interpret the story. So, for example, stories like one which closed a CTV newscast in January 2007 on the celebration of Orthodox Christmas in Moscow served as an interesting tidbit and somewhat exotic look at traditions from far away as well as a discussion of Orthodox traditions among atheists (Pinchuk 2007). How this might influence a viewer’s thinking about their 356

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Canadian neighbors who also celebrate according to the Orthodox calendar is unknown, but its placement at the end of the newscast of 13 stories made it clear that it was not a hard news story demanding attention. This example illustrates another important fact about religion reporting within a collective work. In printed form, a reader would have had the opportunity to page through other news, which would provide tangible context to a story. This could be as simple – and important – as considering what else was happening that day which was considered as newsworthy. This deep-seated connection is even more the case in a traditional newscast, where the listener has no option but to experience the stories as they appear in the consecutive order created by producers. Such decisions create specific groupings of content (sports, for instance), as well as prominence (the most important at the beginning), as well as implied as well as stated connections between one story and another (to give an example: a news report might say: ‘…and here at home, Canadian Hindus are also celebrating Diwali…’). In an age of platform differentiation, journalists are being trained to think about audience analytics, about search engine optimization (SEO) and about social media engagement and community interaction. Some of this is based on legacy categories (beats or specialty reporting), which may well leave out religion altogether, given the disappearance of this beat prior to the careers of many of those now working in newsrooms. Not only are we in a post-institutional religious age, but in a time when religion beats (at least in Canada) are remembered only by the middle-aged in a newsroom. Some of these measures (like engagement and community interaction) may be considered linked to the collective work of a news outlet in post-2005 journalistic practice. But in large part, they emphasize individual pieces of journalism and how each can attract views which may be monetized. With few religion specialists (at least at mainstream outlets), columnists who write often on religious topics may succeed in having social media followings. However, this is religion as seen through an opinion-editorial lens, not straight-ahead reporting. With shrinking resources (human and financial) in newsrooms, there is a heavy reliance on wire service reporting (material coming from the likes of Reuters, Agence France Press, Associated Press, etc.). In Canadian news, this result in a lot of representations of religion, but most originate from outside Canada, and most fit frames of war, conflict and exotic travel. The wire services also supply the bulk of visuals used in news reporting. This results in the same images (still and moving) showing up in multiple and global news sources. This replication can sometimes be dangerous in the way it amplifies incorrect or less than context-rich reporting about religion. Apart from the ubiquity of these stories across platforms, the services’ use of meta data to classify stories is also powerful. Stories are disseminated with accompanying keywords and classifications, including religious ones. If journalists are required to perform a taxonomy when creating news, it is crucial to have them understand the nuances of spiritual and religious aspects of life (Smith 2018). There are also many more opportunities for stories to be incorrect, or at least, poorly re-interpreted. A long story written for print or long-form online text may be advertised via a Tweet re-written to include hashtags. Each time the story is touched by an editorial worker, there is a chance of getting the gist as well as the details wrong, not to mention the introduction of sensationalism. Bielsa and Bassnett (2009) describe the chain of production involved in getting a story from the originating reporter, through a wire service, to a variety of subscribing news outlets and finally, to the news consumer. Add in language translations and the pressures of deadlines and the odds of mistakes being made are increased. The concerns noted above are particularly important for international news about religion. It is important to acknowledge the hollowing out of local news in much of the 357

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world (Long 2017). Where once the collective work approach would signal the paucity of local reporting about religion (if for no other reason than noting the thick foreign news section versus the thin local pages), the differentiated digital story bits make that less obvious. Unless one is looking for such reporting, one may not even notice its absence. Traditionally, the daily local newscast and newspaper are where stories about the local performance and simple presence of religion as it intersects with public life are found. However, increasingly, local newspapers as well as regional broadcasters are disappearing, taking with them the church pages, the news about charitable work and the obituaries/wedding/birth notices that often included mentions of religious communities. In the early part of this century, much hope was placed in the ability of news to become hyperlocal, as well as in the rise of citizen journalists. Both of these could be seen as methods of differentiation. Nevertheless, although the technological ability for anyone to create such content online was made available, the promise goes mostly unfulfilled. Monetization has remained a challenge and often it is all-too-late that there is the recognition of the amount of work, time and skill necessary to make a hyperlocal and/or citizen journalism project succeed. Religious groups and movements have been able to create their own online presence, but this has not proven to have the same widespread reach as information written about them by enquiring, professional journalists. On a more positive note, there is now true potential for freelancers to report without the need for or constrictions of a beat. Some reporters can carve out a niche for themselves online by developing expertise on a religious theme or community. Whether or not they can also make enough money to stay afloat is another question. Another positive stemming from digital differentiation is the opportunity for news about religion to exist and be consumed by anyone anywhere. However, as we have seen from the circulation of fake news, it also is easy for misinformation and outright hate to proliferate. Niche forms of religion journalism continue to be launched, some with longer shelf lives than others. In 2014, the Boston Globe started Crux, a website devoted to reporting on Roman Catholicism. Eighteen months later, it ended its involvement, turning the site over to Editor John Allen (it now runs with support from Catholic organizations, which leaves questions about its editorial independence) (Green 2016). However, print publications devoted to religion continue to survive if not thrive, among them Geez magazine, which describes itself as: Christian (or post-Christian, depends how narrow your categories are) but not in a way that offends those who are overdosed on Sunday School simplifications. We answer ideology with mischief rather than with more ideology. (Geez n.d.) A quarterly, the magazine is over five years old, which is a significant accomplishment, particularly for one published within Canada, and outside of the supports of an institutional religious organization.

Examples of differentiated journalism about religion In giving specific form to these ideas, I will use reporting on Indigenous spirituality in Canada to provide some examples. As noted earlier in this chapter, the number of people who identify in this way is relatively small. However, I will also include stories about Christianity as practiced by Indigenous people. Such stories are particularly newsworthy in the 358

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Canadian context, following two major federal public inquiries. The first is known as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission or TRC and dealt with the residential school system, in which thousands of children were taken away from their families and educated in institutions run mainly by Christian denominations at the behest of the federal government. Serious physical, emotional, sexual and spiritual abuse occurred at the individual level, including deaths among the children. At the systemic level, the residential schools aimed to destroy cultural, linguistic and spiritual Indigeneity, forcing assimilation into a Christian, euro- centric style of life. The resulting intergenerational trauma continues to plague many Indigenous peoples. The second inquiry focuses on Indigenous girls and women who have been murdered or remain missing (known as the MMIW inquiry). Much of this coverage also is related to the residential school system, as well as other systemic racism, which has characterized the relationship between the Canadian government, non-Indigenous Canadians and Indigenous peoples. The stories coming out of the public hearings have been covered, and the inquiries themselves have pushed Canadian news outlets (and journalism schools) to give more and better attention to Indigenous issues. Given this environment, I will look at how reporting about religious and spiritual practices among Indigenous peoples are covered in a differentiated news universe. The first form of differentiation I will discuss in this context is that one among media platforms. There were several longer features, particularly dealing with the justice issues of the murdered and missing women inquiry and the TRC, but a lot of the news has also come through visual storytelling. For example, at times when the commissions were engaged in public hearings, digital photo galleries would feature pictures of people in regalia, or those testifying, often in tears, holding an eagle feather. These photographs are disseminated online, with only a caption describing the place and giving the person’s name. Seldom would there be any description of the importance of the eagle feather. Many different First Nations recognize eagle feathers as important spiritual objects, which may signal the person who holds them as being connected to the Creator or having the status of a warrior, for example. But although these photos were ubiquitous, appearing within photo galleries, or accompanying a longer story (many of them originating from only a few photographers, circulated by The Canadian Press wire service), there was almost never any mention of such symbols’ use or spiritual meaning. Captions like this are common: PAIN AND PASSION – Terry Ladue holds an eagle feather to his face Thursday after speaking of the murder of his mother, Jane Dick, at the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls in Whitehorse. Photo by the Canadian Press/Jonathan Hayward. (Cohen 2017) While Ladue is the central character in the story written by Sidney Cohen, nowhere in the text does it give more information about why he might be photographed clutching the feather. Part of this is due to yet another form of differentiation; many mainstream newsrooms have cut in-house photographers, which results in a disconnect between the visuals and the texts, unless the reporters contribute both. Visual journalism as it pertains to religion has unfortunately often been limited to representations of the exotic (full-color photos of Hindu firewalking festivals for a travel feature story) or shorthand (the anonymous woman in hijab to illustrate a story about Islam, even if no women appear in the report itself ). This is often also the case when applied to reporting 359

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about Indigenous peoples. Journalist Duncan McCue has described the stereotypical tropes as the W (warrior) and 4Ds: drumming, dancing, drunk or dead (McCue n.d.). Given the ignorance of most Canadians about spiritual practices among Indigenous peoples, including basic information to correspond with visuals would be a significant step forward for better understanding and certainly aid in the project of reconciliation. The various forms of differentiation I earlier identified are often intertwined. The multiplicity of media platforms is also an opportunity for the differentiation of points of view. For example, one might look at the way in which the Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls issue is covered via Instagram. Searching for the #mmiwg hashtag at the time of this writing brings up 5,743 posts on the site. Immediately a number of aspects are apparent: The content straddles American and Canadian stories and movements (the Canadian news coverage seldom considers MMIW issues elsewhere) which makes sense, particularly since many Indigenous peoples do not recognize the national borders in North America as taking precedence over traditional lands. The other is the variety of artistic postings, many of which include spiritual content. For example, an image of red paint including the words “No More Stolen Sisters #MMIWG” was posted on 17 May 2018 by bunkhaus, who identifies as Pawnee from Oklahoma. He posts: My studio is special to me. I approach my time here with a great deal of reverence, often praying and smudging before getting to work. Tonight, while waiting for paint to dry on a canvas, I created an impromptu work on paper. The reality of violence against Native women has been weighing on my thoughts quite a bit. I hope and pray for equity in this life time, so that we may move beyond the atrocities and loss in our history (and in this era) and heal...to not just survive, but to thrive. (Echo-Hawk 2018) The visual nature of Instagram and the use of related hashtags is a good example of the differentiation of points of view, which are made possible by differentiated media platforms. Some mainstream news outlets are using this social media vehicle to tell stories, but more often, it is non-journalists who (in addition to posting upcoming events) are using it to disseminate their own information. Moreover, in the case of Indigenous spiritual practice, it does not take much browsing of the #MMIWG Instagrams to reveal a number of examples. Instagram, like other forms of social media, has become not only a means of storytelling for journalists and non-journalists, but also a resource for journalists to get story ideas and sources for their work. The recursive nature of social media both serves to differentiate as well as in some sense democratize the representation of religious practices and belief in and out of mainstream news media. As mentioned earlier, there is a single Canadian newspaper reporter who still specializes in religion reporting, although Douglas Todd’s current bio notes that he “specializes in migration, ethics, diversity, spirituality and psychology, while remaining curious about most everything else” (Vancouver Sun 2018). What is also notable is that he both reports on issues as well as serves as a columnist, blurring the lines (at least for some readers) between balanced reporting and opinionated writing. But it is only someone like Todd, with long expertise in writing about religion, who would even see the value in a story about Indigenous people who are members of the Baha’i community (Todd 2018). He also has written about the majority of Indigenous people who continue to identify as Christians, despite the residential school legacy. In a 2016 piece, he featured a number of deacons and clerics of Indigenous heritage (Todd 2016). 360

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To complete this short consideration of the differentiation of voices and perspectives possible because of the differentiation of media platforms, I will turn to the format used to mediate the stories of suffering from residential school survivors and those of family members who testified at the MMIW inquiry. Many of these people have had their stories relayed in public settings, as well as broadcast and reported on. Here is one description of an April 2013 Montreal hearing: Despite the sensitive nature of [Mary Shecapio] Blacksmith’s testimonial, the sharing circle where she gave her statement was a public and highly mediated affair. The hotel salon in which she spoke was packed with approximately one hundred onlookers, including news reporters typing hurriedly on laptops and academics pointing voice recorders at the speakers and feverishly taking field notes. The audience also included Indigenous attendees, other residential school survivors, and interested members of the public. Camera technicians weaved in and out of the audience with hand-held devices and rolled around larger equipment on wheels. During Blacksmith’s talk, five cameras slowly orbited around the circle as their operators attempted to capture the best angle. (Brady and Kelly 2017, 32) The demands of the TRC itself, trying to squeeze in as many testimonials as possible while still keeping to a timetable and deadline for conclusion also meant a change in the nature of the testimonies. The time constraints were not appreciated by everyone: Mary Shecapio Blacksmith stated, ‘But since I have only ten minutes, I’ll just make my story shorter than I usually do.’ TRC commissioners themselves expressed frustration at the time limit. During his opening remarks one morning in Montreal, Chief Wilton Littlechild commented, ‘We always seem to be running after time. We always seem to be in a hurry to get nowhere. We’re starting to pick up the habits of our white brothers.’ (Brady and Kelly 2017, 45) In their work, Brady and her colleagues contrast this approach to that adopted by Isuma TV, an Inuit media project co-founded by Zacharias Kunuk, known for making Atanarjuat: The Fast Runner, a 2001 Canadian film. Isuma TV featured school survivors sitting for as much as an hour at a time; interviewed by Peter Irniq, who included questions about non-Christian culture and traditions. Isuma TV testimonials were created in part as a vehicle for demonstrating the importance of Inuit-specific experiences in the TRC and of conducting Inuit testimonials in their own languages and communities. At one point, because of the TRC’s rocky start, and the uncertainty about whether Inuit experiences would be fully included, Irniq believed that Inuit would ‘have to tell their stories through another media [sic].’ The resulting archive provided a window into what Inuit residential school testimonials could look like if they operated outside of the state apparatus. (Brady and Kelly 2017, 77) This differentiation from the state-sponsored form of inquiry, via a non-state media project is particularly powerful, given that the residential schools were a state project themselves. Changing the definition of religion is yet another form of differentiation. While some of this originates in the kind of citizen journalism found on Instagram and via media projects 361

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like Isuma TV, some of the most nuanced comes from those journalists who are skilled and experienced in reporting on spirituality. Tapestry, a long-running weekly CBC radio show, once dealt specifically with religion as institutionally understood, but now it advertises itself as: Tapestry exists to go deep. We investigate the messy, complicated, and sometimes absurd nature of life, through the lenses of psychology, philosophy, religion and spirituality. (CBC 2018a) This broadening of definition gives the producers and host latitude to include a variety of non-institutional versions of religion or spirituality. Continuing the focus on Indigenous issues, consider the episode named “Lacrosse: The Creator’s Game,” which aired in February 2018 (CBC 2018b). Part of the episode discusses the healing power of lacrosse. The idea of healing shows up several times in reporting of all types about the TRC and MMIW inquiries, but it is seldom elaborated upon. As a concept, the word healing in English can suggest multiple aspects: the physical, the emotional, the communal and the spiritual. How it operates for Indigenous peoples, whose traditional spirituality does not operate along a secular/sacred, physical/ spiritual divide, is not always well articulated in reporting. This results, I would suggest, in some misunderstandings when Indigenous people use the term healing when speaking with journalists. It is a good example of the benefits of having a reporter who specializes in religion, who might interrogate and probe further when this word is used, to make certain that they convey the full meaning of the term as best they can. In the lacrosse episode, Tapestry host Mary Hynes gives her guests ample time to describe and discuss the healing aspects of the sport. She interviews scholar and lacrosse player, Allan Downey and Amy Lazore and Terri Swamp. All three are Indigenous people. In this 54 minutes of radio, the idea of Indigenous spirituality as a form of religion is given credence, despite the fact that it does not fit the institutional definition. As a type of longform journalism, there is ample time for a discussion of ideas, which are not dependent on SEO or snappy visuals. The journalists involved ensure that the majority of the time features the Indigenous interviewees who tell their own stories, share their own scholarship and their own understandings of spirituality. Finally, the program facilitates this through serious consideration of a sport, something, which would seldom have found a spot in the traditional church pages of a newspaper’s religion section.1 The final form of differentiation considered here is personalization of news about religion. The mysterious and yet powerful Facebook algorithms are one important mechanism of personalization. Recent to this writing, Facebook announced a return to a family/friends emphasis rather than posts from news and other organizations. What will this mean for religion news? Will there be even more entrenchment to the filter bubbles of religion as well as politics and class? What of the suggestion that this change may make even more space for fake news and conspiracy theories, many of which paint religious adherents in the worst light (Ingram 2018)? The identification of Facebook and Twitter as news platforms is problematic. The companies themselves refuse to take up this mantle, in so doing avoiding many of the responsibilities placed on journalists and news organizations, even as they have become key conduits of this type of information. The erosion of transparent fact-checking and gatekeeping functions has been exacerbated by social media platforms. Yet, digital dissemination of news about religion has meant a simultaneous rise of accountability and non-accountability. 362

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Theoretically, no piece of reporting can go without being fact-checked by people around the world. Comments sections under stories are often much longer than the journalism which occasions them. Sadly, they are often not particularly useful or helpful in terms of information dissemination. Indeed, in 2015 the CBC decided to remove the comment function from any pages dealing with Indigenous news because of the constant appearance of racist responses (CBC 2015). But simultaneously, the differentiation and splintering of the modes of communication has also resulted in widespread errors and complete fabrications.

Conclusion: how might differentiation continue/change and how will this challenge journalism about religion in the future? The universe may expand forever, but can social media and other digital forms? As noted in the opening of this chapter, we have witnessed an exponential surge in technological advances, but at some point, will this slow to more minor advances as our physical and mental senses fall short of adapting to new media platforms? Or as has happened with search engines and the primacy of Google, will we revert to some kind of aggregator to simplify/curate/ gatekeep the tides of info? Note that already individual stories, including those involving religion, often combine a multitude of staff and wire and social media sources (see examples of the Charlie Hebdo shooting in Smith 2018). What may happen if the legacy media brands continue to erode, and there is a continued rise of freelancers? What does this mean in terms of beat journalism and specialty reporting? One of the biggest challenges to reporting on religion is the opposite of differentiation: Despite the plethora of platforms, the original reporting is shrinking. There are an increasing number of sources using the same materials (text, video and audio) from the Associated Press and Reuters (Paterson 2011). Fewer people are creating fewer stories that are being distributed to many more platforms than previously. At what point do (paying) consumers return to an appreciation of the content and its creators? And can news about religion be part of this return? As someone who is devoted to journalism and particularly religion reporting, I sincerely hope so, but given the current prevalence of apathy and distrust of excellent journalism, it is difficult to chart out a route to such a return. In discussing the reporting of Indigenous spirituality in Canada, there is no doubt that having more journalists who are themselves Indigenous is benefiting the reporting of such content. Canada’s public broadcaster as well as private media outlets are all making Indigenous issues a priority; it remains to be seen if this attention will be sustained in the decades to come. However, I would argue that the ability to report on the way Indigenous spirituality exists in Canada could be an intrinsic and important part of the reconciliation process. In addition, excellent reporting of this reclamation of spirituality could suggest ways for journalists to report on the most differentiated religious phenomenon: the nones. Learning to listen to people’s experiences, histories and stories as they exist outside (and/or in reaction to) institutional religions should result in diverse, interesting journalism. It may be precisely because the religion beat has dissolved that such reporting can and will take on more nuance and accuracy. No longer bound by the concepts of religion as developed by colonists in large part to facilitate and justify racist and genocidal colonial projects (Chidester 1996), including those leading to what is today Canada, stories about Indigenous spirituality can be disseminated outside of the conceptual and literal confines of the religion page. No longer can an assigning editor decide what gets to be printed within that section of the newspaper and in so doing, decide what gets covered overall. The monopoly mainstream news outlets had on gatekeeping and agenda setting, including for religious issues, ended 363

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with the creation of the Web. Now, so long as the all-important SEO needs and metatags are included, a report can thrive on its own merits. Finally, and crucially, the trust factor will need to be resurrected if reporting about religion is to survive. Perhaps in parallel with attempts to revive local news and so restore trust at the ground level, so too may coverage of religion aid in the renewal of the social contract between citizens and journalists. One need only think of the importance placed on the watchdog role of reporters in the investigative work uncovering clerical abuse celebrated in a film like Spotlight to see that there is still an appetite for journalism on religion and religious institutions. An increased interest in authenticity of all types cannot but make room for religious and spiritual experiences as well.

Note 1 I note here that Mary Hynes may have been a particularly sympathetic journalist to this approach as she spent many years as a sports reporter.

Further readings Mason, D., 2012. Chapter 10: Religion News Online. In: Winston, D., ed. The Oxford Handbook of Religion and the American News Media. New York: Oxford University Press, 157–168. Mason includes a number of approaches to reporting on religion news to investigate the ways in which such journalism operates when dealing with American content. Even keeping within the concept of online journalism, she demonstrates differentiation of content. Plesner, U., 2009. An Actor-Network Perspective on Changing Work Practices: Communication Technologies as Actants in Newswork. Journalism, 1(5), 604–626. Plesner outlined an Actor-network theory as a means, by which to consider many of the components, which contribute to various types of differentiation. Rasmussen, T., 2008. Panel Discussion II: Culture and Media Technology. The Internet and Differentiation in the Political Public Sphere. Nordicom Review, 29(2), 73–83. As journalism operates within and in many ways still facilitates the public sphere, this discussion of differentiation helps to situate reporting within political discourse.

References Bielsa, E. and Bassnett, S., 2009. Translation in Global News. London: Routledge. Bibby, R., 2017. Resilient Gods: Being Pro-Religious, Low Religious, or No Religious in Canada. Vancouver: UBC Press. Brady, M. J. and Kelly, J. M. H., 2017. We Interrupt This Program: Indigenous Media Tactics in Canadian Culture. Vancouver: UBC Press. Calder, I., 1993. Clissold lecture to Graduate School of Journalism, Lecture notes, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario. CBC, 2015. CBC Indigenous Staff Read Real Comments from CBCNews.ca. CBC, [online] 4 December. Available at https://www.cbc.ca/news/indigenous/cbc-indigenous-staff-read-realcomments-1.3351635, accessed 8 March 2019. CBC, 2018a. About Tapestry. Produced by Noel E. and Fernandez R. [radio] CBC radio 1, 19 January. Available at http://www.cbc.ca/radio/tapestry/about-tapestry-1.4348385, accessed 8 March 2019. CBC, 2018b. Reclaiming the Indigenous Roots of Lacrosse. Anon. [radio] CBC radio, 17 February. Available at http://www.cbc.ca/radio/tapestry/lacrosse-the-creator-s-game-1.4536936/reclaimingthe-indigenous-roots-of-lacrosse-1.4539693, accessed 8 March 2019. Chidester, D., 1996. Savage Systems. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. Cohen, S., 2017. ‘You Could Have Seen a Little Boy Scrubbing His Skin’. Whitehorse Daily Star, [online] 2 June. Available at https://www.whitehorsestar.com/News/you-could-have-seen-a-little-boyscrubbing-his-skin, accessed 8 March 2019.

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Differentiation: when more sometimes means less Crux, n.d. CRUX: Taking the Catholic Pulse. Available at https://cruxnow.com/, accessed 8 March 2019. Echo-Hawk, B., 2018. My Studio Is Special to Me, [Instagram], 17 May 2018. Available at https://www. instagram.com/p/Bi3rZdJFKGx/, accessed 8 March 2019. Geez, n.d. About Us. Geez, [online] n.d. Available at https://geezmagazine.org/about/, accessed 8 March 2019. Green, E., 2016. The Boston Globe Bails on Crux. The Atlantic, [online] 11 March. Available at https:// www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/the-boston-globe-bails-on-cruxemdashandreligion-journalism/473421/, accessed 8 March 2019. Ingram, M., 2018. Facebook Changes Could Help the Media Kick Its Algorithm Addiction. Columbia Journalism Review, [online] 12 January. Available at https://www.cjr.org/innovations/facebookchanges-news-feed.php, accessed 8 March 2019. Long, A., 2017. The Power of Place: When “Local” Is More than a Catchphrase. Ryerson Journalism Research Centre, [online] n.d. Available at http://ryersonjournalism.ca/2017/09/19/the-power- ofplace-when-local-is-more-than-a-catchphrase/, accessed 8 March 2019. McCue, D., n.d. News Stereotypes of Aboriginal Peoples. Reporting in Indigenous Communities, [online] n.d. Available at http://riic.ca/the-guide/at-the-desk/news-stereotypes-of-aboriginal-peoples/, accessed 8 March 2019. McNair, J., 2018. A Spiritual Journey. Ryerson Review of Journalism. Ryerson University: Toronto, 111–16. Paterson, C. A., 2011. The International Television News Agencies: The World from London. New York: Peter Lang. Pavlik, J., 2000. The Impact of Technology on Journalism. Journalism Studies, 1(2), 229–237. Pew Research Center: Religion & Public Life, 2013. Canada’s Changing Religious Landscape. Pew Research Center: Religion & Public Life, [online] 27 June. Available at http://www.pewforum. org/2013/06/27/canadas-changing-religious-landscape/, accessed 8 March 2019. Pinchuk, E., 2007 Orthodox Christmas. [News] CTV Evening News, 7 January 2007. Robertson v. Thomson Corp., 2006. 2006 SCC 43. Smith, J., 2018. Foreign News: The ‘Religion Story’. In: Cohen, Y., ed. Spiritual News: Reporting Religion around the World. New York: Peter Lang, 33–52. Statistics Canada, n.d. National Household Survey 2011. Government of Canada. Available at https:// www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/dp-pd/prof/index.cfm?Lang=E, accessed 8 March 2019. Todd, D., 2016. Canadian Aboriginals Joining Christian Clergy Despite Residential-School Legacy. The Vancouver Sun, [online] 5 February. Available at https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/ douglas-todd-canadian-aboriginals-joining-christian-clergy-despite-residential-school-legacy, accessed 8 March 2019. Todd, D., 2018. The Rise of Indigenous Members of the Baha’i Faith. The Vancouver Sun, [online] 31 January. Available at https://vancouversun.com/news/staff-blogs/the-rise-of-indigenousmembers-of-the-bahai-faith, accessed 8 March 2019. Vancouver Sun, 2018. Douglas Todd’s Curriculum Vitae (2018). The Vancouver Sun [online] 7 April. Available at https://vancouversun.com/news/staff-blogs/douglas-todds-curriculum-vitae, accessed 8 March 2019. Wilkins-Laflamme, S., 2015. How Unreligious Are the Religious “Nones”? Religious Dynamics of the Unaffiliated in Canada. Canadian Journal of Sociology, 40(4), 477–500.

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25 GLOBALIZATION AS A TREND FOR JOURNALISM Researchers’ perspectives1 Liane Rothenberger and Cornelius B. Pratt Among the components of the religious media theory, the phenomenon of globalization is also relevant. Globalization should be clearly separated from universalism or what has sometimes been called “globalism.” Universalism is a process which depends on mutual communication among the nations, while globalization violates the concept of the nations and the boundaries among them. (Hosseini 2008, 66)

Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the interplay among three concepts – g lobalization, journalism, religion – strictly within the context of global journalism research guided by micro-, meso- and macro-level considerations. It is organized into six sections. The first provides an overview of globalization and global journalism and analyzes 21st-century journalism challenges that emanate from globalization. The second section analyzes the intersection of journalism and religion. The third focuses on environmental and ideological influences against which globalization theories and global paradigms are examined. The fourth examines religious content distributed through the news media, based on the premise that religion is as much an influence on journalism as are globalizing forces. The fifth explains theoretical approaches that focus on the actor level (micro), the organizational level (meso) and the societal level (macro). Finally, it presents two case studies – Hosseini’s (2008) and Brink-Danan’s (2015) – as coda to the evolving landscape of the interplay among globalization, journalism and religion in research inquiries. To conclude this chapter, we briefly present our suggestions for the way forward in light of evolving influences of globalization on journalism and religion.

Globalization and global journalism Globalization in its various forms is both pervasive and ubiquitous. Its global impact is a foregone conclusion, as we observe firsthand increasing economic and trade interdependence among nations and growing multilateral agreements on the global scene.

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As journalists gather and report the news from far-flung locations, they avail themselves continually of opportunities to contribute to their audiences’ worldviews. In an era in which concerns over the authenticity of news are rife, one’s global perspectives could be the outcome of the coalescence of the journalist’s political ideology, professional practices and religious fervor. Globalization also affords all parties to the communication experience avenues to expand and rejigger their intercultural sensitivities. For audiences at the receiving end of the global news flow, there is a wellspring of news and feature stories, information, entertainment and lifestyles, also in the field of religious content, from which to choose. In an investigation of web reporters’ perceptions of their work in religious-cum-insular communities, journalists, as social actors, tend to forgo scoops and internalize their religious values and communal ideals (Golan and Mishol-Shauli 2018). This journalistic reality is fraught with challenges of, and prospects for, both the practice of and the research in global journalism. Featherstone and Lash (2002, 1) write about globalization as “an increasingly influential paradigm in the human sciences”. Our article presents globalization-related approaches such as modernization and imperialism theories and analyzes them in terms of their applicability to journalism research and to the specific issue of religion. Further, neo-institutionalist, systems-theoretical and action-theoretical approaches are related to the globalization of journalism and (dominant Western) religion and considered with regard to their benefits for empirical research. A distinction is made between religious content distributed through non-religious and religious mass media and religion and media as two interacting systems. Global journalism is, as Reese (2008, 242) notes, a global news arena “where it is not expected that shared national or community citizenship is the common reference uniting newsmakers, journalists, and audience.” Wars, the Olympics, natural disasters, pope coronations and religiously motivated terrorist attacks are classified as world media events, global crises and challenges such as climate change, pandemics, famines and stock market crashes easily find their way onto the global news agenda. Some of these crises are constructed and provided with a global frame by the news media; primarily, however, they are communicated via the media (Cottle 2009). Evolvi (2018) describes Pope Francis’ election in 2013 as a global religious media event. In her analysis of Italian newspaper articles and television broadcasts about both the Popes Josef Ratzinger and Jorge Mario Bergoglio, she discovers three prominent patterns in the coverage of the papal election: “personalization, popularization, and globalization” (Evolvi 2018, 220) – Pope Francis being the first pope from a non-European country. The papal elections as global pre-planned media events stand in contrast to unplanned events like killings and disasters. Counter-forces within the social media world, providing unedited information, may deal with events that are repressed by traditional media. This religious transnationalism blends into the conception of global connectivity and shared online identity discourses. Berglez (2008, 848) introduces the concept of global journalism that “concerns the journalistic representation of complex relations”. Instead of focusing on particular identities, spaces or political, religious and cultural contexts, he argues that global journalism represents these concepts as “something transnational and ultimately global” (Berglez 2008, 850), in that it sheds an outlook, e.g., on global power relationships and the interrelatedness of processes in different parts of the world. Instead, a “national outlook puts the nation-state at the center of things when framing social reality” (Berglez 2008, 847–848) and within it religion.

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According to Cottle (2009), globalization arises not primarily from reports on transnational humanity and global social rapprochement, but from the globalization of crises – that is, from global threats that we must face together. Further planned major events such as sports competitions and World Church Days correspond to the type of world events, which are also important in the context of systems theory, since they can be understood as certain artificial, repeatable, planned and deliberately established events as a form of structural formation in social systems. And if these events are ‘world events’, then world society seems to be the social system that uses the establishment of world events as a form of structural formation in itself. (Stichweh 2008, 20, translated by the first author) The journalism system embraces and incorporates these world events. In contrast to natural world events such as natural disasters it is no longer up to the journalism system itself to declare an event as global, because most planned, often cyclical world events, already bear such an identification in their names: World Cup, World Exhibition, Winter Olympics. Journalism, as a social system, then, includes a truly global audience (Stichweh 2008, 24). Thus, we see here the interplay between journalism and globalization, which can be located at different levels and structures: in media content; in selection, production and reception processes; in historical sequence; in local, regional, national and global circles; in different social classes and cultural contexts. To find a suitable structure for a cultural practice, for example, religion, we adopt a three-part analysis: the actor (micro), the organization (meso), the society (macro).

Journalism and religion The realms of both ʿreligionʾ and ʿthe mediaʾ are themselves transforming and are being transformed. Religion today is much more a public, commodified, therapeutic, and personalized set of practices than it had been in the past. At the same time, the media (movies, radio, television, print and electronic media and more) are collectively constituting a realm in which important projects of ʻthe self ʼ occur. (Hoover 2002, 2) Religious institutions benefit from widespread strategic communication (Wiesenberg 2019). They use ample possibilities such as social media, like the pope’s twitter account, and they have their own institutional body, e.g., the Vatican PR agencies like Vatican Radio, Vatican TV, Vatican Internet and the Holy See Press Office (Cohen 2018b, 3). Thus, religion and media, in this respect, are converging, constructing and shaping the identities of individuals, societies and peer groups – and even, as Keegan and Morris (2018) note, fomenting religious divides. The fields intersect in different respects and these mutual impacts and effects of religion and journalism on each other have an influencing context, that is globalization. Even though, in general, journalists try to separate between the public and the private – and religious convictions are counted among the private – the media transport the public face of religion and transmit information about religious institutions and personnel. Above all, global digital media offer enormous distribution possibilities for religious messages. Ayatollahy (2008, 35) even notes that “globalization, defined broadly, cannot be fully understood by researchers without attention to religion”, e.g., because of the globalized 368

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media’s ability to spread fundamentalist content. Local and global spheres get blurred. Cohen argues that … if in the past, a person’s religious beliefs were regarded as a private matter and, therefore, shunned by reporters – this has moved 180 degrees in the opposite direction. Not only is religion covered by traditional media, but audiences share their religious beliefs online no less than other areas of social identity. It certainly brings religion—as well as the way the media themselves cover it—onto the public sphere. So if the media map of religion is being transformed, it also raises ethical questions about participatory journalism like online religion, as well as social media’s role in the process of the construction of religious identity. (Cohen 2018a, 11–12) In Europe and the Anglo American world region, many countries broadcast (Christian) religious services. At the very beginning, Protestant magazines such as Christian Century condemned television in general as something detrimental to society’s value system (Rosenthal 2002). In any event, religious broadcasts such as the so-called “televangelism” (Hoover 2002, 1) came onto the scene in the 1970s. Thus, public services are made available in private settings. The luxury of not having to be present in church allows a combination of religious service and private action such as drinking beverages while watching televised services (Linderman 2002). Saeidabadi identifies three major developments that … have furthered the process of globalization in communications and, in turn, contributed to the globalization of electronic media. These are digitization, convergence, and deregulation. (Saeidabadi 2008, 85) Saeidabadi (2008) explains that digital techniques had an impact on every step of the production process, that converged newsrooms and more exchange with the audience were new developments and that no cross-border common regulation policies had been established. This leads to the question of whether the media and within these religious programs are dominated primarily by market forces or by ethical norms and values. If the latter, media producers might view religious content as symbolism in global media that “might be used as a resource in the shaping of identity within local groups” (Lundby 2002, 328). When transmitting religious content, it can be done, on the one hand, as simply mediated religion, which is media as a mere tool for transmitting religious teachings. Alternatively, as religious media per se, they can apply the unique characteristics of the media “to achieve religious objectives, ultimate goals, and divine aspirations, rather than monopolistic teachings and beliefs of religion” (Hosseini 2008, 67). In this regard, then, it does not matter whether the media are publicly or privately owned or owned by religious institutions; the important consideration, however, is the way they create and disseminate religious content.

Globalization theories: diversity, not unity; nation versus culture It is not surprising that a single, exclusive globalization theory does not exist. The many different definitions of globalization have a small common core: There is a certain banal agreement that globalization means greater interconnectedness and action at a distance, but beyond such generalities theories differ in fundamental 369

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ways. To take one egregious example, the leading theorists are divided over the relation between globalization and that other central contemporary concept in social theory, namely modernity. (Sparks 2007, 126) This modernity refers to the economic-capitalist, social, political and cultural realms. At present, and this is the main criticism of debates to date, globalization is seen primarily from a Western point of departure. Such debates were in part fueled by globalization theorists, some of whom assumed the role of dissidents of nation-state sociology that views critically the pivoting of analyses of global society to the nation-state as a principle of order: As a ‘container’, the state provides a territorial unit in which statistics on economic and social processes and situations are systematically collected. In this way, the categories of state self-observation become the categories of empirical social sciences. (Beck 1997, 50–51, translated by the first author) This refers as well to central categories of observation and analysis of journalism. Global journalism, on the other hand, does not operate only within national borders. Such journalistic preference – or bias – also affects journalism research: Not only are most theories from the West, but to answer questions of globalization, typical research subjects such as CNN or BBC are often used. Not only is power seen as emanating from the West to the rest but so too is cultural influence, with media seen as the conduit for Western notions of fashion, taste, politics, and modernity. (Curtin and Shah 2010, 3) In addition, Islam, as a quite dominant religion in Western media now, is seen from almost purely Western and Christian perspectives: as the other. Global (Western) media companies are presented as innovation factories that challenge local, regional and national competitors to adapt in terms of formats, content and even administrative structures. The origin of these views lies in the modernization theory of the 1950s and the 1960s … when it was suggested that exposure to mass media from the West would democratize nations and modernize the economies of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. (Curtin and Shah 2010, 3) Figure 25.1 illustrates this trajectory of globalization theories and shows the sequence in which further approaches have developed. These are systematically described below. In contradistinction to modernization theory is that on media imperialism, which, as Curtin and Shah assert, is … an approach that grew influential during the 1970s by positing that Western media subject populations around the world to an increasingly homogenized set of values that serve the interests of Western capitalist institutions. According to this critique,

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Global Dominance Paradigm

Global Public Sphere Paradigm

Modernization theory

Media imperialism

Hybridization/ Glocalization

1950s and 1960s

1970s

1990s

Figure 25.1

Interconnectivity/ Participation 2000s

Phase model illustrating (periodical) apogees and paradigm affiliations of globalization theories.

subordinate countries come to embrace Western media and the values they promote, such as individualism, consumerism, and commodity exchange. Rather than uniting people for positive social change, media imperialism fosters an exploitative global system that offers few opportunities for genuine advancement. (Curtin and Shah 2010, 3–4) Following Kuhn’s (1976, 32) paradigm concept, this old school can also be called an imperialist paradigm: The (Western-led) media know what is good for recipients in developing countries and communicate their standards, worldviews, expertise and religion. According to Curtin and Shah (2010), the participatory paradigm, on the other hand, sees the possibility of giving emerging societies a voice in the media and finding their own way. Rahimi (2018, 367) uses the example of the Shia online news agency Shafaqna to point to “an increasingly participatory culture within religious institutions.” He sees this agency still in line with the long tradition of education and public service to a transnational audience by Islamic news agencies. Yet, as an evolution, he sees that the agency for Islamic online news is … integrating network strategies with the employment of new technologies so as to consolidate transnational associational ties within a long tradition of religious networks revolving around clerical authority. (Rahimi 2018, 367) In view of globalization, the media are not assumed to have a direct influence, but an indirect one, in that developing societies open up to the content available through the so-called world media and, e.g., get motivated to strive for liberation and to turn against overdue authoritarian regimes. The approaches are based on the transfer of Western ideas and see globalization as dominated by Western democracies. Cottle distinguishes between the Global Dominance paradigm and the Global Public Sphere paradigm: Studies within the “global dominance” paradigm generally work within and update the critical tradition of political economy while those conducted under the global public sphere paradigm represent a more diffuse grouping of recent disciplinary infusions from cultural studies, anthropology and approaches to the global “network society”. (Cottle 2009, 28)

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The Global Dominance paradigm (e.g., Boyd-Barrett 1997, Thussu 2019) approaches global power issues from the perspective of determining geopolitical and (market) economic structures and interests. The Global Public Sphere paradigm (representatives are, e.g., Appadurai 1996, Volkmer 2003), on the other hand, focuses on the emergence of cosmopolitan citizenship, transnational cultural flows and assignments of meaning, mobility and networks. CNN International, for instance, is able to promote cosmopolitanism through its international approach and new journalistic forms. Nederveen Pieterse (1998) views globalization as neither unification and standardization nor as Westernization of the world in modernity; he argues that globalization should be seen as a process of hybridization that creates a global mélange. It is advancing in a wide variety of fields, such as politics, religion, economics and communication, since there are as many types of globalization as there are agents, dynamics and impulses that drive it forward (Nederveen Pieterse 1998). Similarly, Hepp (2006, 10) asserts that such (transcultural) networks have a specific “communicative connectivity.” The term globalization by no means refers exclusively to something large comprehensive at the macro-level, but can also take place on a small, local and micro-level: … ‘globalization’ asserts the global- in-the-local, that is to say that the local is suffused and pervaded by a global which simultaneously extracts and selectively disseminates the local. (Boyd-Barrett 1997, 15) That is one reason Robertson (2002) introduced the term glocalization, which links the poles global and local. Glocalization means, for example, that companies operate globally, but adapt and market their products (trans)locally. Globalization is not considered a loss of cultural, religious or local identity, but can be described in this alternative view as hybridization, which means the active process of mixing resources of different cultural contexts (Hepp 2006, 76). Hybridization can thus be understood as the nourishment of identity from elements of different cultural origins, which is also visible in the field of religion and religious practices. Most researchers view globalization as oscillating between different poles; however, … (t)he binary logic which seeks to comprehend culture via the mutually exclusive terms of homogeneity/heterogeneity, integration/disintegration, unity/diversity, must be discarded. (Featherstone 1990, 2) The global media world should no longer be divided into dichotomies such as “globallocal, West-rest, elite-ordinary” (Cottle 2009, 166) – and, one might add to those divides, Christianity-Islam. A news-distribution system that historically places Europe and the USA at the center and the recipient countries at the periphery is inconsistent with the current situation, even though the concept of the nation state cannot be entirely refuted (Sparks 2007).

Religion in the media The media are a conduit for assembling congregants, for expanding the number of adherents, for undermining contrary faiths, and for expressing and projecting one’s religious beliefs. On the heels of televangelism as a global practice, news and social media sites became a veritable force for contributing, through religion, to unity, tolerance and national culture 372

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(Potts 2018) and even to the polarization, the disruption to secularism and to cultural reality (Abubakre 2018, Sommier 2018). In this way, cross-border journalism, user-generated content, satellite television and above all the Internet offer new opportunities for an increase in the number of contents dealing with religious issues and for a better mutual understanding. The religion-media nexus is, thus, an enduring, even if an occasional, barometer of sorts of public sentiment, more so in a global context. In the following sections, we distinguish between religious content distributed through non-religious and religious media; thereafter, we analyze religion and the media as two interacting systems.

Religion in non-religious media The first issue that is apparent in a discussion of media and religion is ownership of news media by non-religious institutions. Religious content does not have a significant presence in today’s (Western) programs; in predominantly Muslim countries, however, it is a staple of daily news feeds. In Indonesia, for example, national television stations broadcast Islamic programs one to two hours daily and allot up to one hour to other religions (Birowo 2003). The religious groups who produce these programs do not have to pay for airtime, only production costs. In this regard, we already have a hybrid form of religion in the media as it is not religious information produced by independent broadcasters but by religious institutions that use the independent media as transmitters but do not own a channel themselves. Most programs are in talk show and interview formats or in a monologue format (Birowo 2003). Birowo presents the Penyejuk Imani Katolik (PIK) program, produced by the Catholic institution Studio Audio Visual (SAV) Puskat in Yogyakarta, as a case study. Since 1995, this program has been aired by Indosiar TV twice monthly, on Sunday afternoons. Before that, starting in 1969, SAV Puskat produced religious content through other media forms such as audiocassettes, comics or photo novellas (Birowo 2003). The first television activities were educational: promoting “justice, peace, and the integrity of creation, based on and inspired by Christian traditions, without ignoring what people of other religions have to say” (Birowo 2003, 88). The Studio, for instance, invited a Muslim scholar (Ulama) to present his opinions on certain social problems (Birowo 2003). The problems caused by globalization may lead to a renewal of religion(s): The global problems of modernity along with the inability to create a better life has led many to rebuff secular attitudes and approaches. This, in turn, may lead to a reestablishment of religion. (Ayatollahy 2008, 40) If that were the case, the amount of religious content in (non-religious) media will become apparent.

Religion in religious media The difference between secular and religious media is also visible as the latter can use their own outlets strictly for educational purposes without borders. Religious scholars and clerics can get in touch with parishioners and interested people worldwide and vice versa. Because global media enable encounters of geographically dispersed people, identity construction no longer is limited to on the spot experiences. For instance, in Africa, transnational influence of former colonial church structures is enriched by “American electronic-church ‘televangelism’ ” (Lundby 2002, 329). Television broadcasts such as the Christian Broadcasting 373

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Network’s The International 700 Club are watched, for example, by local communities in Zimbabwe as a modern way for constructing identity and for obtaining a feeling of belonging, “an offering of global interconnectedness” (Lundby 2002, 338), because “they experience that their problems in handling modern life are somewhat similar to those portrayed in the program” (Lundby 2002, 338). This is especially important as Africans were forced by colonialism into adopting hybrid identities and supporting cultural fragmentation. Beyond Christians, Buddhists and all other religious factions, it is now possible to operate one’s own media and communication channels, but, as Ayatollahy (2008, 40) stresses, Muslims attach importance to the possibility of disseminating unfiltered information into and within powerful Western countries. “Petitions and publicity, such as the boycott of anti-Muslim American companies, are examples of such activities” (Ayatollahy 2008, 40). Other influences of globalization include the change of roles (formerly shaped and dominated by religious laws and beliefs). For example, the first newspaper by an Iranian woman was published in 1910. Today, there are “hundreds of women […] working on dozens of female-oriented periodicals as well as on other newspapers” (Shahidi 2002, 70). If, in the beginning, a female publisher on receiving a publishing license averred not to cover political topics, globalization has engendered more interest in global politics and urbanization, an increase in literacy and in participation of women in various sectors of the economy (Shahidi 2002). This suggests that globalization of journalism is dependent and will always be dependent on openness of a certain (religious) regime. However, global networks are growing stronger and more expansive and may not be controlled easily. Thus, communication that is relatively impersonal – that is, without robust opportunities for face-to-face engagement – contributes to disseminating thoughts and information and to building interpretive communities that are no longer limited to borders, making them also vulnerable to influence by media owned by religious institutions.

Religion and the media as two intersecting systems Media and religious systems separately and collaboratively seek to provide solutions to social problems. Audiences and congregations seek the support of both systems in managing life’s daily challenges, resulting in a mutual influence of the two systems. Cultural and, within them, religious practices no longer belong to a certain territory but are re-territorialized in other environments. According to Ayatollahy (2008), mass media distribute and enhance values; but religious values, he says, often contrast with those of neo-liberalism and globalization, which promote individualism, pleasure seeking and goal attainment. Westerners, due to their secular state systems, often neglect religion as an important part of social life that exerts influence on the media; and journalists sometimes experience ethical dilemmas over decisions of their media companies whose foci are on the next clickbait. Because of the domination of the West or the Global North and a USA media industry that places the influence of media content above the influence of religion, some scholars criticize a loss of identity in Western societies (e.g., Ayatollahy 2008). In times of global mobility and interconnections, media can serve populism or they can promote global diversity. With kebhinekaan, the cultural diversity in Indonesia, in mind, Dzuhayatin opines that … global media have a huge impact on Muslim communities that are marginalized in terms of the relationship of world power as well as in the accesses to capital and technology. (Dzuhayatin 2003, 75) 374

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Media are dominated by certain worldviews because media staffers have their own values, religions, beliefs and norms that – consciously or unconsciously – affect their behaviors. Journalistic mass media tell us about the sociopolitical order, about social life, culture, figures of identity, as religion does, too. That the media system distributes religious content and that the religious institutions use the media to fulfil their missions are additional substantiations for the interconnectedness of these two systems. The next three subsections will now address the influence of globalization on the media system on the three societal levels: micro, meso, macro.

Micro-level: journalists and recipients as actors in the globalization process Mobile life and a strong activism, as characteristics of modernity (Stichweh 2008), are consistent with a view of globalization aligned with an actor-theoretical perspective, because globalization is now often described as a process and the outcome of interactions. Global theories of action support the assumption that all social action takes place within an overarching framework: the capitalist world system (Beck 1997). Transnational spheres of action arise from actors who produce and maintain them. At the same time, Beck (1997) continues, the actors are also the starting point of a new cosmopolitanism, which manifests itself in fragmented identities and transnational morality, thinking, for example, of the reactions to the prophet Muhammad caricatures. When audiences are exposed to the same images, contents and mind sets, arguably a homogenization of cultures occurs. The influence of the media on global culture and the global public sphere continues to be at the heart of the sociological debate on communication (Volkmer 2003). In this regard, we also have to consider the digital divide (Hafez 2005, Thussu 2019). This divide engenders inequality of actors (communicators and recipients alike) in different living environments, which require different levels of globalization and cosmopolitan actions. Moreover, we must remember that the technical infrastructure, language skills and legal accessibility are prerequisites for the reception of global media offerings. Cultural studies emphasize the context of the reception of journalistic content and the recipients’ own experiences that are linked to the local place and to its prevalent traditions and habits; this would lead to a re-localization of the products of the global cultural industry (Wagner 2001). These transnational social spaces (Beck 1997), wafting between the global and the local, are well suited to the micro-level of research on religion and media, as they place equal emphases on the mobility and glocal living circumstances of both recipients and producers of religious contents. Hepp (2006), however, states that prime time on television is rather equipped with national or culturally close products than with foreign ones. Program decisions are the responsibility of individual actors, who are certainly involved in institutional structures and overarching horizons of orientation. Working in a primarily national or rather global company has an impact on the journalists’ work. However, it should not be forgotten that journalists live in their own cultural milieus through their socialization and through other factors that cannot be ignored in everyday workplace.

Meso-level: globalization of media companies Most globalization processes are analyzed at the level of media organizations (Hafez 2005, Thussu 2019). Many media companies are jumping on the globalization bandwagon because they expect this to improve their revenues. This aspect makes economic theories seem suitable for understanding globalization phenomena at the meso-level. Economic theories 375

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explain globalization primarily from a market-economy perspective: Here, the market is conceived as the only reliable mechanism that promotes prosperity and any segmentation or isolation is interpreted as a loss of prosperity (Prisching 2007). In terms of journalism, this means that only global market structures could solve the current problems of the media. In this context, then, the economy is conceived as an engine of globalization. Further, if religiously active and committed people own publishing houses, this might have an influence on news-selection and content-framing processes adopted by corporate journalists.

Macro-level: influence of the systems Globalization processes can be understood at the macro-level from a systems-theory perspective. A global political system, a global economic system or a global scientific system exists; however, it is often subject to fluctuations that point again in the direction of regionality (Luhmann 1997). Whether a global religious system exists is still a bone of contention. Rühl (1995) applies this perspective to journalism and describes it as a structured social system and a differentiated subsystem of world society. However, system theoreticians do not satisfactorily explain the previously raised antagonism that journalism, in addition to its global characteristics, operates structurally and functionally clearly on a national or at least culturally or linguistically limited level. Because journalism still remains bound to national publics, national journalistic standards and national topics (Scholl and Weischenberg 1998), the benefits of a priori modelling journalism as a global system are questionable. The Internet makes global journalism possible and changes it. Laws and regulations enacted by states follow the rapidly developing global market. Globalization can therefore mean an impairment of national sovereignty or its altiloquent projection of that sovereignty by a nation-state, even as the latter no longer has absolute power over certain networks (in terms of technology and content). The field of technology should once again be emphasized here as a very decisive prerequisite and determinant of globalization in journalism in the field of religion. “In many ways, technological change is the most important factor in the extensity and intensity of transnational communication” (Thussu 2019, xiv). Technological innovations made it possible to release the communication process territorially and to create channels that are no longer bound to face-to-face communication within parishes.

Two case studies: Hosseini (2008) and Brink-Danan (2015) Instead of presenting a single case study in this penultimate section, we introduce Hosseini’s three-part approach to religion and media. Hosseini contends that studies range from total acceptance to total rejection of the media: Total acceptance in this regard … considers the nature of the media as a mere tool and instrument of religion; total rejection considers the nature of the media, television in particular, as contradictory to the nature and ultimate objective of religion and religious inclination. (Hosseini 2008, 57) To consider the media as a functional tool for the dissemination of religious ideas is propagated by functionalist approaches (Hosseini 2008, 57); according to this, religious institutions should avail themselves of the media. Essentialist approaches, on the other hand, state the independent cultural and historical nature (or essence) of the media (independent of the development and 376

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essence of sacred religion and not serving as a tool for mankind), but they admit that there can be mutual interactions even though in general, the two seem incompatible (Hosseini 2008, 59). An interactive approach calls for interaction between the social institutions of religion and media (Hosseini 2008, 62) as both belong to the wider concept of culture. As a solution and an alternative to these contradicting approaches, Hosseini recommends religious pluralism through the media: Based on this religious pluralism theory, the way the media interacts with religion is based on the acceptance of all religions as divine manifestations of oneness. Thus, in religious media, instead of paying attention to the exclusive teachings of religion, their ultimate objectives, goals, and meanings have to be taken into consideration. This sort of attention to religious media could even take place through non-religious and irreligious programs. For instance, if a fully entertaining program, piece of music, or video clip is aimed to fulfill the main objectives of religion (bestowing the meaning and direction to human life), such programs are included in the general category of religious media, even though explicit religious teaching is not distributed. (Hosseini 2008, 68) Even though this is a broad approach to describing the goals of religion, it might be a useful starting point. Similar to Hosseini, Abdullah (2003) writes about peaceful co-existence and intercultural dialogue that should be promoted by the media through different actions such as training of journalists to obtain a better sensitivity to the other; exchange visits of journalists, writers, filmmakers, artists; and filmmaking with both Muslim and non-Muslim actors and actresses. Whether the role of the media in stimulating and constructing an interreligious dialogue will increase, remains to be seen. Brink-Danan (2015, 247) views “lived cosmopolitanism” of journalists also in the “awareness of multiple audiences, some of whom might be antipathetic ones.” He builds his opinion on a case study of the Jewish diaspora in Turkey. Religious communities of the diaspora are a phenomenon of increasing mobility and globalization, entailing a global media ecology. The parallel to religious communities of the diaspora developing minority newspapers are somehow an anti-trend of coming to a cosmopolitan worldwide-shared meaning and media culture. However, despite their smallness and link to the local environment, they reflect global issues and challenges. The Jewish press flourished in the Ottoman Empire as Jews were more deeply integrated into the Turkish society. Today, there remains only Şalom as a Jewish newspaper in Turkey. Published in Turkish, it runs a weekly page in Ladino ( Judeo-Spanish). There are few Jews living in Turkey today. Their number stands at about 18,500 ( Jewish Virtual Library 1998), making them a minority in a nation of nearly 80 million inhabitants. According to the World Zionist Organization, 75% of Turkey’s Jews subscribe to Şalom (Brink-Danan 2015) and the Şalom Gazetesi Twitter feed has around 24,000 followers. As in some cases, Turkey’s political dissents were silenced and free speech was not guaranteed, “Turkish Jewish practice of self-censorship is, frankly, taken for granted” (Brink-Danan 2015, 249). Brink Danan’s (2015) study analyzes news articles of Şalom, directed at a minority of diaspora Jews in Istanbul but also at “a surprising diversity of audiences in mind, including advertisers, politicians, and even (or especially) anti-minority readerships” (Brink-Danan 2015, 246), keeping in mind that they might interpret pieces of the article out of context in a negative (anti-Semitic) framing – which happened in the past. It is because of that fear of an antipathetic audience that Şalom often publishes articles without authors’ bylines. The editors and 377

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journalists are mostly female volunteers, some of whom hold other jobs. An important finding of Brink-Danan’s (2015) study is that the small newspaper directed at a minority religious diaspora community takes the global flows and system’s perspective such as clash of the religions of Islam and Judaism into consideration. Thus, the global sphere intrudes into the local religious community, again enunciating the presence of the key concept of glocalization. Up to now, there is no major multi-country empirical study on the influences on journalism and religion (for comparative studies without a focus on religion, see Weaver and Willnat 2012, Hanitzsch et al. 2018). It is questionable whether one should examine nation states comparatively in an empirical analysis or rather use transcultural semantics of comparison (Hepp 2006, 78–80). Examples worthy of investigating in the context of journalism, religion and globalization are the diverse diaspora communities that are created today by the increasing mobility of recipients. Fact is, global communication channels in general and journalism in particular create cross-border common spaces of ethnic diasporas, religious communities and alternative social movements.

Conclusions and the way forward Globalization theories of journalism have been dissociated from ideas of the nation state and have adopted a glocalization or network approach. In this field of research, … the assumption of linearity and the ʻeither/orʼ underlying the axiomatics of the nation-state would be replaced by assumptions of ʻboth-as-wellʼ: globalization and regionalization, attachment and fragmentation, centralisation and decentralisation are thus dynamics that belong together as two sides of the same coin. (Beck 1997, 54, translated by the first author) Despite increased transnational and transcultural communication, a dissolution of local ties – both of recipients and producers – is not in sight. Even though Cohen (2018a, 5) asserts that “religion news has become a bigger story because the world is more compact and has become a wired global village”, his anthology of religious news in various countries across the globe shows that – even though globalization has had a significant influence – there are specifics in reporting about religion in every single nation (Cohen 2018b). Religion has become more relevant a topic that people wear more “outwardly” (Cohen 2018a, 4). In addition, religious institutions now employ former journalists to bring organizational communication to perfection (Cohen 2018b, Wiesenberg 2019). On the other side, editorial offices have experts on the beat religion. There are media that aggressively dissipate religious messages, focusing on church personalities, conflicts and religio-political decisions – topics that are in line with the journalists’ fact checking working routine (Cohen 2018a). Media are both a prerequisite and part of globalization (Krotz 2005). It is important to accept them as a phenomenon and as a central object of analysis in journalism research. Differences between Western and non-Western influences on (non-)religious programs, questions of morality, ethics and religion in journalism must now be investigated on a global level. It will be useful for future research to continue to distinguish between religion in (nonreligious) media, religious media and religion and media as two interacting, converging and perhaps sometimes conflicting systems. Finally, the two case studies present implications for journalism research in an increasingly globalizing world. On the one hand, it points to the merit of Hosseini’s (2008) pluralist 378

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thinking as encapsulated in the concept of religious pluralism in an age in which disparate voices, perspectives, worldviews and perceptions are the hallmark of vibrant, engaging communities. It, therefore, stands to reason that such pluralist theory can, at the ground level, serve to assuage conflicting views that have led to a world torn apart by centrifugal stresses. Hanson (2016, 14) describes religious pluralism as lived and experienced, that is, as “the range of responses to living in a diverse religious community, or the state of living in such a community.” The way forward, then, in our understanding is this: If reflected in the news media, that will open doors to interfaith communications and understanding and to knock-on effects on community engagement and relationships, as well to an expansive range of research options. On the other hand, it raises the stakes of Brink-Danan’s (2015, 247) “lived cosmopolitanism” as a driver of globalization that expects accommodating, tolerating and bridging constituencies that are repositories of global issues and challenges. Journalism research can appropriately extend its reach into the ecology of the interface among news, religion and globalization geared toward constructing a society that embraces and projects “oneness” (Hosseini 2008, 68). Such journalistic research can pivot journalism as a practice to its roots, espousing its mission through religion: the media’s social and civic responsibility – in a very normative sense – is to serve as both agent of change and of social cohesion (oneness), with a diminution of raging societal conflicts.

Note 1 This article, to a great extent, is based on Rothenberger (2016).

Further readings Berglez, P., 2008. What Is Global Journalism? Journalism Studies, 9(6), 845–858. Berglez takes a fresh and to a certain extent normative attitude in describing and demanding new global journalism (research). Hosseini, S. H., 2008. Religion and Media, Religious Media, or Media Religion: Theoretical Studies. Journal of Media and Religion, 7(5), 56–69. Taking into account various studies, Hosseini develops her threefold categories of the relationship between media and religion before introducing her own concept of religious pluralism. Reese, S. D., 2008. Theorizing a Globalized Journalism. In: Löffelholz, M. and Weaver, D., eds. Global Journalism Research. Theories, Methods, Findings, Future. Malden: Blackwell, 240–252. Theory work on global journalism is rare. This is one of the first articles that conceptualizes globalized journalism in depth.

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Liane Rothenberger and Cornelius B. Pratt Berglez, P., 2008. What Is Global Journalism? Journalism Studies, 9(6), 845–858. Birowo, M. A., 2003. Television and Interreligious Dialogue. A Case Study of “Penyejuk Imani Katolik”, Indosiar Television. In: Tridiatno, Y. A., ed. Proceedings of the International Seminar “Globalization, Religion, and Media in the Islamic World: Intercultural Dialogue”. Yogyakarta: Atma Jaya Yogyakarta University, 83–99. Boyd-Barrett, O., 1997. International Communication and Globalization. Contradictions and Directions. In: Mohammadi, A., ed. International Communication and Globalization. A Critical Introduction. London: Sage, 11–26. Brink-Danan, M., 2015. Turkish Jewish Journalism and its Audiences. In: Roth, L. and Valman, N., eds. The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Jewish Cultures. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 246–258. Cohen, Y., 2018a. Introduction: Religion News in the Twenty-First Century. In: Cohen, Y., ed. Spiritual News. Reporting Religion around the World. New York: Peter Lang, 3–14. Cohen, Y., ed., 2018b. Spiritual News. Reporting Religion around the World. New York: Peter Lang. Cottle, S., 2009. Global Crisis Reporting. Journalism in the Global Age. Maidenhead: Open University Press. Curtin, M. and Shah, H., eds., 2010. Reorienting Global Communication. Indian and Chinese Media Beyond Borders. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Dzuhayatin, S. R., 2003. Globalization through the Media: Impact on Indonesia’s Part of the Moslem World. In: Tridiatno, Y. A., ed. Proceedings of the International Seminar “Globalization, Religion, and Media in the Islamic World: Intercultural Dialogue”. Yogyakarta: Atma Jaya Yogyakarta University, 75–81. Evolvi, G., 2018. Habemus Papas: Pope Francis’ Election as a Religious Media Event. In: Cohen, Y., ed. Spiritual News. Reporting Religion around the World. New York: Peter Lang, 219–236. Featherstone, M., 1990. Global Culture. Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity. A Theory, Culture & Society Special Issue. London: Sage. Featherstone, M. and Lash, S., 2002[1995]. Globalization, Modernity and the Spatialization of Social Theory: An Introduction. In: Featherstone, M., Lash, S. and Robertson, R., eds. Global Modernities. London: Sage, 1–24. Golan, O. and Mishol-Shauli, N., 2018. Fundamentalist Web Journalism: Walking a Fine Line between Religious Ultra-Orthodoxy and the New Media Ethos. European Journal of Communication, 33, 304–320. Hafez, K., 2005. Mythos Globalisierung. Warum die Medien nicht grenzenlos sind. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. Hanitzsch, T., Hanusch, F., Ramaprasad, T. and de Beer, A. S., eds., 2018. Worlds of Journalism: Journalistic Cultures around the Globe. New York: Columbia University Press. Hanson, R. S., 2016. City of Gods: Religious Freedom, Immigration, and Pluralism in Flushing, Queens. New York: Empire State Editions. Hepp, A., 2006. Transkulturelle Kommunikation. Konstanz: UVK. Hoover, S. M., 2002. Introduction. The Cultural Construction of Religion in the Media Age. In: Hoover, S. M. and Clark, L. S., eds. Practicing Religion in the Age of the Media. Explorations in Media, Religion, and Culture. New York: Columbia University Press, 1–6. Hosseini, S. H., 2008. Religion and Media, Religious Media, or Media Religion: Theoretical Studies. Journal of Media and Religion, 7(5), 56–69. Jewish Virtual Library, 1998. Jewish Virtual Library: Anything You Need to Know from Anti-Semitism to Zionism. Available at https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/, accessed 30 October 2019. Keegan, K. and Morris, W. L., 2018. Mass Murder in the News: How Religion Influences Perception of Terrorism. Psi Chi Journal of Psychological Research, 23, 354–363. Krotz, F., 2005. Von Modernisierungs- über Dependenz- zu Globalisierungstheorien. In: Hepp, A., Krotz, F. and Winter, C., eds. Globalisierung der Medienkommunikation. Eine Einführung. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 21–43. Kuhn, T. S., 1976. Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen. Zweite revidierte und um das Postskriptum von 1969 ergänzte Auflage. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Linderman, A., 2002. Religious Television in Sweden: Toward a More Balanced View of Its Reception. In: Hoover, S. M. and Clark, L. S., eds. Practicing Religion in the Age of the Media. Explorations in Media, Religion, and Culture. New York: Columbia University Press, 295–304. Luhmann, N., 1997. Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Lundby, K., 2002. Between American Televangelism and African Anglicanism. In: Hoover, S. M. and Clark, L. S., eds. Practicing Religion in the Age of the Media. Explorations in Media, Religion, and Culture. New York: Columbia University Press, 328–344.

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Globalization as a trend for journalism Nederveen Pieterse, J., 1998. Der Melange-Effekt. Globalisierung im Plural. In: Beck, U., ed. Perspektiven der Weltgesellschaft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 87–124. Potts, J., 2018. The “Radio Service”: Religion and ABC National Radio. Radio Journal: International Service in Broadcast & Audio Media, 16(2), 159–171. Prisching, M., 2007. Globalismus und Weltgesellschaft. In: Bemerburg, I. and Niederbacher, A., eds. Die Globalisierung und ihre Kritik(er). Zum Stand der aktuellen Globalisierungsdebatte. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 19–39. Rahimi, B., 2018. Internet News, Media Technologies, and Islam: The Case of Shafaqna. In: Cohen, Y., ed. Spiritual News. Reporting Religion around the World. New York: Peter Lang, 367–381. Reese, S. D., 2008. Theorizing a Globalized Journalism. In: Löffelholz, M. and Weaver, D., eds. Global Journalism Research. Theories, Methods, Findings, Future. Malden: Blackwell, 240–252. Robertson, R., 2002 [1995]. Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity. In: Featherstone, M., Lash, S. and Robertson, R., eds. Global Modernities. London: Sage, 25–44. Rosenthal, M., 2002. “Turn It Off!”: TV Criticism in the Christian Century Magazine, 1946–1960. In: Hoover, S. M. and Clark, L. S., eds. Practicing Religion in the Age of the Media. Explorations in Media, Religion, and Culture. New York: Columbia University Press, 138–162. Rothenberger, L., 2016. Globalisierung des Journalismus. In: Löffelholz, M. and Rothenberger, L., eds. Handbuch Journalismustheorien. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 585–599. Rühl, M., 1995. Theorie des Journalismus. In: Burkart, R. and Hömberg, W., eds. Kommunikationstheorien. Ein Textbuch zur Einführung. Wien: Braumüller, 117–133. Saeidabadi, M. R., 2008. Globalization of the Electronic Media and Universality of Religion: Convergence or Divergence. Journal of Media and Religion, 7(7), 84–91. Scholl, A. and Weischenberg, S., 1998. Journalismus in der Gesellschaft. Theorie, Methodologie und Empirie. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag. Shahidi, H., 2002. Women and Journalism in Iran. In: Ansari, S. and Martin, V., eds. Women, Religion and Culture in Iran. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 70–87. Sommier, M., 2018. “Culture” as a Discursive Resource in Newspaper Articles from Le Monde about Secularism: Constructing “Us” through Strategic Oppositions with Religion. Journal of Multicultural Discourses, 13(3), 283–299. Sparks, C., 2007. Globalization, Development and the Mass Media. London: Sage. Stichweh, R., 2008. Zur Soziologie des Weltereignisses. In: Nacke, S., Unkelbach, R. and Werron, T., eds. Weltereignisse. Theoretische und empirische Perspektiven. Wiesbaden: VS, 17–40. Thussu, D. K., 2019. International Communication. Continuity and Change. 3rd edition. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Volkmer, I., 2003. The Global Network Society and the Global Public Sphere. Development, 46(1), 9–16. Wagner, B., 2001. Kulturelle Globalisierung: Weltkultur, Glokalität und Hybridisierung. In: Wagner, B., ed. Kulturelle Globalisierung – Zwischen Weltkultur und kulturelle Fragmentierung. Essen: Klartext, 9–38. Weaver, D. H. and Willnat, L., 2012. The Global Journalist in the 21st Century. London, New York: Routledge. Wiesenberg, M., 2019. Strategische Kommunikation deutscher Großkirchen. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

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26 RELIGION AND JOURNALISM IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD A journalist’s perspective Paul Chaffee Introduction What does it mean to be a religion journalist in an increasingly globalized world? What constitutes religious or spiritual news, how is it packaged and circulated and for whom? How have interfaith and intrafaith issues been changing religion and news about religion in the world? These questions, my subject here, should tantalize anyone who writes about religion or wants to. This chapter begins with a brief survey of humankind’s relationship with news and how sharing the news evolved into journalism, a universe of multiple venues mirroring the world in which we live. We then consider the global influence of two new tools – the computer and the World Wide Web. The digital revolution has upended everything we know about news and journalism, including news about religion by both religious and secular writers. What does the journalist writing about religion need to know in this brave new world? The second half of this chapter profiles two interfaith projects and how they handle news about religion – United Religions Initiative (URI) and The Interfaith Observer (TIO).

All the news that is fit to print Hearing that this handbook on religion and journalism with a section on globalization would include perspectives from journalists as well as from academics was a happy surprise. My appreciation was tempered as I began wrestling with what I mean with words like news and journalism. This is a fluid environment, wrapped in layers of cultural differences and morphing technologies. Precise definitions can get fuzzy, particularly if you want to know what it actually means to be a journalist writing about religion, what qualifies as faith and interfaith news in our globalized world and how to establish your voice in the midst of the cacophony.

News The Oxford Living Dictionary-English on the Internet starts exploring news with this definition: “Newly received or noteworthy information, especially about recent events” (Oxford University Press 2018a). It is an epistemological kind of word insofar as it focuses 382

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on the act of learning, of knowing – what we know and how and when we know it. Know about what, though? News today can be about anything from the smallest electron to the next election or whatever subject your heart desires. What is worth pointing out at the start is that developing technologies from pen and ink to the printing press to digital platforms and the Internet have radically magnified our access to what we know. Go back 700 years, and almost no one but the very wealthy and powerful had access to any news except the stories travelers told. Today web browsers push us to the opposite end of the spectrum. Now not only is news about almost everything accessible, but so much is available – the good, the bad and the ugly, often all at once. It can be hard to get your bearings in this maelstrom of knowing. In philosophical lingo, in less than a millennium, humankind has gone from epistemological famine to epistemological cornucopia. With news, the only real boundary, historically, is fiction. News is nonfiction, period. What does nonfiction include? In the newspaper I read every morning, you will find local and international news, feature stories (on food, gardening, travel, the arts and more), financial stories and stats, sports stories and stats, opinion pages, obituaries, cartoons and advertisements. As is widely reported, fewer and fewer publications can support so rich a daily diet, especially in print. The advent of radio in the 1920s was a body blow to print journalism, with television and the Internet even mightier foes. Prior to television, it is reported that the average US American read several newspapers a day. No more. Around the world, most people are getting their news from their most important device, a smartphone, which potentially offers much more than the morning paper I love, if you go look for it.

Journalism and technology If news comes with philosophical connotations, journalism is something fat and saucy, a powerful sector in our civil life serving for both good and ill, working on behalf of the truth and for another dollar. Journalism’s power is fed by the personal and public need to know what we do not know. One of the first systematic attempts to share news in the public square surfaced in 130 BCE in Rome. Called Acta Diurna (daily events or daily record), these acta were carved in stone or metal and posted in public places. Government news and births, obituaries and weddings were reported. Starting in the second and third centuries CE, in China, news sheets called tipao were circulated among court officials. Chinese characters telling the story were carved onto wooden blocks, inked and pressed against paper sheets. Gutenberg’s printing press emerged around 1439, a technological breakthrough that gave birth to journalism and exponentially multiplied our ability to circulate the news. For the next 300 years a profusion of broadsides, pamphlets, posters, journals, gazettes, newspapers, magazines and book appeared. By the 18th century, Europe and the USA boasted major newspapers, sending daily news to hundreds of thousands. The linotype (or hot type) machine was invented in 1886 by Ottmar Mergenthaler and supercharged newspaper printing. Reporting the news took off in all sorts of directions with these tools. The political journalist is always a player. Investigative journalists have been called muckrakers for their exposés about political, corporate and union corruption. Publishers like William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer found great success through sensationalism, but were dubbed the socalled yellow press for their points of view. The New York Times was founded in 1851 on the principle of balanced reporting, high-quality writing and an aversion to sensation, providing journalists everywhere with a professional standard that garners respect to this day. 383

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The difference between religious journalism and religion journalism The oldest and still most robust form of journalism about religion comes from within religious institutions and/or traditions in what we might call religious journalism. Today most faith communities, large and small, enjoy fancy digital printers and gleaming websites. They publish and circulate newsletters, bulletins and more all through the month. Here you find a community’s storytellers, its communications crowd and the news purveyors, whose roots can go back for generations, using available technology and answering to the tradition’s authorities. By comparison, when unaffiliated writers and secular news organizations take on religion, the writer’s frame of reference is quite different. The Religion Communicators Council (USA) each year makes two sets of awards, one for religious writers and the other for religion writers. The DeRose-Hinkhouse Memorial Awards go to active members who demonstrate excellence in religious communications and public relations for their respective communities. On a separate evening, the Wilbur Awards recognize excellence in the communication of religious issues, values and themes in secular media. On one side, religious news generated from within; on the other, religion news generated independent of religious traditions or institutions. Journalism’s coverage of religion by the secular media was pioneered by James Gordon Bennett. A Roman Catholic Scottish immigrant in New York City, he founded the New York Herald in 1835. Within ten years, it was the most popular newspaper in the country. Bennett was the first American editor to pay close attention to religion and its institutions. The Herald published worship calendars, denominational reports and interreligious stories focused, for instance, on women’s rights, temperance and the abolition of slavery. By being independent, outside of any religious institution, Bennett felt free to criticize a congregation’s lavish Christmas decorations, conservative pronouncements from Rome or the passionate judgments of itinerant pastors. Bennett created a new voice that could go where the typical religious journalist, answering to a bishop or a board of trustees, might fear to tread. The nation followed in Bennett’s footsteps. For decades local news sources across the country published church (if not synagogue) schedules, featured weekly opinion pieces from local clergy and wrote about church-community relations. By the middle of the 20th century, local interest in religion started a slow decline. After the 1960s, religion almost disappeared in the secular American press. The pendulum began tipping the other way in the 1990s. This rebirth in interest came just as high technology was transforming the world and how we deliver news, including news about religion.

From whose point of view? Before diving into the complexities of globalization, religion and journalism today, we need to consider the point-of-view of the writer, whether religious or secular, whenever a news story about religion is assigned. The well-intended journalistic quest for balanced reporting can run amuck and distort rather than balance the news. Balancing can connote fair and accurate coverage, as exemplified in high quality journalism. Too often, though, balance sloppily presupposes that whenever you have two or more conflicting narratives, witnesses or evidence, you simply give equal time to every possibility. Or, worse, you give up balance altogether to favor your editor’s preference or an advertiser’s point of view. Bad reporting; distorted news. Best practice suggests a passion for accuracy, fairness, perspective and perseverance. 384

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Traditionally, the professional journalist sought to go the next step, setting aside all personal prejudice, allegiances and assumptions, to record the bare facts as clearly and accurately as possible. The journalist, to ensure objectivity, needs to stay out of the story. Mastering these conditions guarantees a true story, an accurate narrative, an omniscient narrator we should trust, went the argument. As many have pointed out in recent postmodern decades, that is way too easy a path to the truth. Every writer comes with assumptions and values, with life-shaping experiences, with a personal point of view. To think you can abandon your perspective, walk in on a story like the one a blank slate rid of all cultural judgments and tell an accurate story seems utterly misguided. That said, most journalists, including religion journalists, would agree on the need to be as fair-minded and accurate with their content as possible. Fairness and accuracy are a journalist’s most important traits, whether or not you are working to be objective. If you are making up stories, call it fiction. Addressing fake news as an accusation and as a serious problem is beyond the scope of this chapter, but clearly, it is a nasty complication thrown into the complex workings of daily, digital journalism and a dramatic reminder of how important fairness and accuracy remain in our communications.

Literary journalism and religion The most important challenge to traditional journalistic standards concerns allowing the author, implicitly or explicitly, into the text. Is it mandatory for journalists to remain invisible, out of the story, as they strive to be as objective as possible? Professional journalists, reporting the daily news, probably will say yes, for which morning paper readers can be thankful. Yet a multitude of gifted nonfiction writers chooses to demur. Is there a place where authors can share stories where they are deeply engaged themselves, using the first person (or not), using symbolism, clearly bringing values and a personal vision to the writing? And still call it journalism? Starting back in the 1980s, journalists who enter into a story, telling it from a particular point of view, came to be called literary journalists in a movement also called creative nonfiction and New Journalism. This approach combines factual reporting with the narrative techniques and stylistic language traditionally found in fiction. In 1984, Norman Sims published The Literary Journalists, where he notes in the introduction: Literary journalists follow their own set of rules. Unlike standard journalism, literary journalism demands immersion in complex, difficult subjects. The voice of the writer surfaces to show readers that an author is at work. (Sims 1984) Sometimes the writer becomes an explicit actor in the story, sometimes not. Sims (1984) suggests that while this new genre changes the traditional rules, it embodies principles that give the writing its accountability: “Literary journalism draws on immersion, voice, accuracy, and symbolism as essential forces.” Alissa Wilkinson notes how well literary journalism can work for religion writers: Literary religion journalism … operates mostly outside any plausibility structures guided by one particular faith, but it also does not actively reject religion or ignore the existence of things beyond the writer. Both secular and religious reporters have been freed from the need to be ‘objective’, freed to be involved with the subject matter, one way or 385

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another, while reporting the ‘news’. Permission has been given to work from a variety of viewpoints instead of being ruled by religious authorities or ‘objective’ anonymity. It does not presume that a ‘scientific’ approach to the world – one which deals only in empirically verifiable ‘realities’ – is the legitimate one for grown-ups, while considering religion as a nice hobby for some people to mess around with at home and on weekends. (Wilkinson 2014) Therefore, new kinds of freedom for writers emerge. Of course, both secular and sacred institutions usually generate the checks that keep journalists working and will have considerable say regarding which religion stories to write.

Technology, globalization and writing about religion Sixty years ago, the English-speaking Sunday worship hour at Bangkok’s International Church let out at 6:00 in the evening. Teenagers in Sunday school, released at the same time, raced past the sanctuary, through the courtyard and out to our family cars. Jumping in, we turned on the radio and listened to that week’s update of the Top 40 from the USA, 12,000 miles away. If Elvis Presley’s Heartbreak Hotel captured me, I had to wait a week to hear it again and hope it kept its rank. Today, by contrast, I googled the song and 1.52 million responses surfaced in under a second. The Oxford English Dictionary says globalization is “the process by which businesses or other organizations develop international influence or start operating on an international scale” (Oxford University Press 2018b). Historically, operating on an international scale was a long-term project enjoyed by a privileged few. Starting in 1600, the East India Company spent a century in commerce on the way to establishing a colony that lasted until 1947, binding together England and India, the East and the West. By contrast, Facebook was created in 2004 and at this writing, 14 years later, has 2.19 billion followers, a bit under a third of humankind. I remember seeing Evan Golder at a Northern California Nevada United Church of Christ (UCC) annual conference in 1982 unpacking his new Osborne 1, the first truly portable computer. Golder went on to edit the denomination’s national newspaper, United Church News. It won journalism awards until the costs of paper-and-ink distribution forced it onto the web, where it faded away. Today a robust set of digital communication tools keeps the UCC connected to its members. The task, however, is increasingly difficult because vital religious communities these days tend to promote grassroots relationships (and stories) at the expense of national or international affiliations. Digital technology has changed everything, starting with the computer, evolving into the World Wide Web and now beginning to encompass every corner of our daily lives. Meanwhile the compulsive need for new news is inexorable. Once upon a time powerful sermons could generate wide public attention. They could be newsworthy then, though rarely today, when a Tweet can attract millions and anyone can assume a pulpit-voice. The tools themselves represent unparalleled resources and a gigantic increase in the capacity to reach multitudes, but they have a leveling effect as well. Reaching 100,000 readers may be thrilling, but others are out there are doing just as well and maintaining your constituency is a daily challenge. Social media adds a new arena that creates virtual communities within the digital community, gatherings that were impossible until now. Communication within and among these groups is rich territory for any writer with a gift of words who wants to explore faith and 386

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spirituality. Anyone who wants to enter the arena can do so, but this incredibly egalitarian access is no free ticket to fame. Quality will out, in this case by the number of folks who are sufficiently engaged in your story after its first sentence to keep reading. Thousands of blogs float in the ether; a few capture our attention in droves. Globalization has been empowered and propelled by the new technology – high tech has provided capacity-building tools, transformed interpersonal, international and interreligious relationships and opened up new avenues for collaboration. Interactivity has become the norm on many platforms. Comment windows come at the bottom of most web-based news and opinion articles. Both rich and poor have access, liberal and conservative, radical and reactionary, the reasoned and the ranters as well as criminals. Thus do multiple threads of communication, often interactive, weave themselves into our perception of the news, including religion and inter-religion news. Keeping up with daily change and what it means for religion is an ongoing challenge for religion journalists.

The new terrain In short, religious and interreligious activists in this new world and the people who write about them enjoy a challenging technological banquet. Recently a colleague and I spent 90 minutes with three young women, leaders of a small group of interfaith religion journalists in northwestern India and Afghanistan. We connected via Zoom, an inexpensive web-based platform with clear video and audio feeds from each participant. Our conversation was the beginning of what should be a growing relationship, a collaborative opportunity none of us could have imagined 25 years ago. The Interfaith Observer (TIO), profiled below, has already published a story by one of their writers about the tepid global religious response to refugees today. Local and global connections, equally easy electronically these days, create an ever-changing, constantly evolving network of relationships and new resources. The English-speaking writer about religion today can take advantage of the Pluralism Project, a pioneering electronic node of multifaith information and activity, housed at Harvard University. A journalist can get daily or weekly updates from Religion News Service and Pew Research, two of the best sources of daily religious opinion and news. Newspapers like the New York Times, Washington Post, the Guardian and Jerusalem Post are publishing engaging religious and interreligious articles. So are CNN, CBS, BBC and other international multimedia platforms. Religion Online has gathered more than 6,000 digital resources plumbing religion/religious issues, engaging articles with dependably sound scholarship. Students and journalists focused on spirituality can access thousands of resources freely available on Spirituality and Practice. The American Academy of Religion and numerous public and private universities around the world are taking interreligious issues much more seriously than a generation ago. In short, the stories are everywhere, waiting to be told, probably on multiple platforms. For professionals, the Religion Communicators Council is a splendid group of peers that support religion journalism. The Religion Stylebook, a supplement to the Associated Press Stylebook, is a free, easy-to-use online resource, created for journalists who report on religion in the mainstream media. In the midst of all these resources and the ubiquity of publishing today, those who wish to write about religion need to look to religious institutions, which fund communication teams. Additionally, they need to be willing to define the arena you want to inhabit, the kind of stories you want to share and the discipline to know and do what you need to do to succeed, journalistically and financially. The economic realities can be daunting. Huge cost savings accrue when you cease mailing out a paper-and-ink magazine and begin sending it electronically. But doing the hard 387

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work of journalism still needs a budget to pay people, along with the rent and overhead and so much more in a world where generating income streams is difficult. There is a small pantheon of writers, who write magnificently regarding religion. For instance, Nicholas Kristoff at the New York Times, Sarah Pulliam Bailey at the Washington Post and Duane Elgin, who weaves science, future studies and root values into extraordinary books, are three who have the capability of attracting huge numbers of readers over a long period of time. Entering that arena takes remarkable talent, perseverance and good fortune. Religion journalists often live through penury, have day-jobs, tent ministries or fortunate circumstances and do much of the work for the love of it. Another challenge deserves mention – the growing cultural attachment to images and diminishing writing skills. Journalists need to know what good prose is made of, but even more, we need to make words interesting, engaging, funny and poignant, evocative and precise, skills not easily mastered. Electronic translation is taking leaps and bounds. However, your personal facility with language will be the final qualifier in a business where news, however glorified with graphics, is grounded in words. The best component of my own education was the requirement during my last two years of high school to write two 500-word essays every week. What I learned was priceless.

Personal, local and networked So, what makes a good religion journalist? An inclusive, non-judgmental point of view – knowing the right questions – a passion for your subject matter – an incessant curiosity – the gift of gab – keeping up with new tools – a mastery of language … for starters. Very few are skilled in all of this, but many, many do amazing work, sharing important religious information, opinion and story-telling, particularly if they have a good editor, a requirement that comes with the territory. Take advantage of technological advances to develop and serve your followers. Make wise use of that most important invention, the web browser, along with multiple opportunities to train and learn more about your subject matter. Develop trustworthy relationships with people who know what you need to know to write your story, people you want to share with the world. These folks often are simpler to approach than you imagined and will enrich your work. Be courteous but not shy. One unsettling issue writers run into with religion is differentiation, or as faith and interfaith activists have noted, the problem of preaching to the choir. Does your work change any minds? Do proponents on both or multiple sides of an issue read your work? This is not just a religious issue: It is a reality that plagues the digital universe and only recently is being looked at seriously. Another tough issue is understanding how to respond to the cultural ground moving beneath us and the unexpected consequences. In particular, how do we deal with the diminution of language itself, where news and fake news, images and fake images intermingle, corrupting understanding and the trust between writer and reader? Rather than despairing over these realities, however, imaginative journalists will seize remarkable opportunities and go to work, even in tough circumstances. Ruth Broyde Sharone, whose stories appear each month in The Interfaith Observer (TIO), recently wrote about Naveed Hameed, a young Christian Pakistani who grew up in a predominantly Muslim village (Sharone 2018). He suffered the slings and arrows of prejudice from his own family as well as the community and emerged as a teacher of interfaith peace

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activists, particularly young people. Naveed’s miracle? The fact that Pakistan has 140 million cellular subscribers, 67% of them young people. Moreover, that he understood and could teach the technology behind iPhone and Android devices that makes their users able to film, edit and produce videos. He raised funds and taught a team of teenagers who produced eight films about youth and women empowerment. As Naveed puts it: “It’s time to seize future technology as a means to create crucial and innovative alternative media to help shape public opinion” (Sharone 2018). However tough the environment, we live in a wonderland of religious journalistic opportunity. We enjoy an inclusivity that was never imagined before. Everything and everyone is here; we need tags and markers to navigate the terrain. Women, young adults, LGBTQ, indigenous, non-English-speaking and neglected voices are stepping forward with excellent contributions. As the realm of pure journalism decreases, attention to communications is burgeoning and grassroots interfaith activists and organizations are paying attention. We enjoy a largely level playing field, though that is shifting as digital giants continue to increase their influence over our every moment. An encouraging development in recent years is the felt sense of nearly everyone in religious, interreligious arenas, that we cannot do what has to be done by ourselves, in short, that we need each other in addressing a deeply troubled world. That need opens up new newsworthy arenas. More and more communities, organizations, religious traditions and individuals are taking advantage of new opportunities to work together. Their stories, their achievements and wisdom need to be shared. Such is the task of religious and religion journalists, though they are likely to be called communications specialists.

New ways to share religious news The word interfaith in our globalized world is a slippery piece of language sporting various meanings. Many have bemoaned this complexity, along with the fact that a coherent, unified interfaith movement, which seemed like a possibility at the 1993 Parliament of the World’s Religions, has not emerged. Meanwhile, today most towns and cities in the world are demographically multifaith. Communities that are even more homogeneous bump into multicultural, multifaith diversity every day on their smartphones, computers and television. Another change since 1993 is that the religion stories which now salt and pepper major media, mostly address interfaith issues and some sort of conflict. Stories that are not interfaith tend to be about intrafaith issues (those within a congregation, denomination or whole tradition). Witness the passionate, protracted struggle within the global United Methodist Church over same-sex marriage or the struggles between Sunni and Shia Muslims. Interfaith and intrafaith overlap much of the time. Years ago, when the Church of South India came close to breaking in half, United Religions Initiative (URI) leaders in India shared the social technology they use to heal and mitigate interfaith differences and conflict. The Church stayed whole. Both of the profiles, which follow are thoroughly interfaith stories. In the first case, the focus is the development and remarkable success of URI’s evolving communications strategy. The second profile is of The Interfaith Observer (TIO), a free, monthly, independent digital publication addressing all things interfaith, circulated to more than 10,000 readers. Full disclosure: I have been closely involved in these two efforts, as the founder of TIO and, with URI, going back a quarter century.

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United Religions Initiative: a brief profile URI would never have been created without the vision and commitment of William E. Swing, Episcopal Bishop of California. In his words: I began a long and inward journey in February 1993. During a twenty-four hour period in my life, I moved from being a person totally uninterested in interfaith matters to a person totally committed to being a catalyst for the creation of a United Religions. (Swing 1998, 12) In 2000 the United Religions Initiative Charter was signed, a document thousands of participants had helped define and ratify. The Purpose statement at the heart of the Charter reads: To promote enduring, daily interfaith cooperation, to end religiously motivated violence, and to create cultures of peace, justice, and healing for the Earth and all living beings. (United Religions Initiative n.d.) Interfaith groups everywhere are qualified to join URI as Cooperation Circles (CCs) if they have at least seven members, represent at least three religions and embrace the URI Charter, captured succinctly in its Purpose statement. CCs do not pay dues to URI. They raise their own funds, choose their own themes, concerns and projects, are networked with each other and enjoy leadership resources and support from a global staff. At this writing URI has 985 Cooperation Circles in 108 countries, with more joining every month. It is estimated that so far 2 million people around the world benefit from these affiliated interfaith programs. A multi-million dollar endowment campaign to sustain and continue developing the network is nearly complete, and enthusiasm among URI followers is palpable. Where does the excitement come from and how is it sustained? Developing large religiously based NGOs is a high-risk enterprise, exponentially higher for interreligious NGOs. Being able to raise significant funds and secure great leaders is critical but not enough to explain URI’s kind of growth. How have they done it? URI enjoys some natural advantages. Being in San Francisco, having a visionary who has also been gifted in fundraising, depending on an invisible body of San Francisco supporters, enjoying a committed team of local religious leaders from numerous traditions – all this was useful in forming a dynamic global organization. Bill Swing talked about building an airplane while flying it, and URI is still very airborne. When I interviewed their current director of Global Communications and Strategic Planning on June 7, 2018, Isabelle Ortega-Lockwood, she said “At the start URI was relationship-dependent. Communication was grassroots, word-of-mouth. It was all about a bold, exciting, seemingly impossible vision.” Ramping up communications was not easy. URI’s decision-making board comes from around the world, and its early attempts at telephone conference calls are painful to remember. Some early newsletters were printed, mailed and discontinued; too little bang for the buck. Slowly, step-by-step the electronic efforts bore fruit. URI websites and digital programming became more attractive and effective. Local CCs began using communication tools never before available. The long, widely dispersed planning that preceded the Charter-signing seeded countries around the world with committed leaders, many of them gifted communicators. 390

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“By 2000, when the URI Charter was signed, there was talk about how we were going to virtualize or digitize this community into a networked system,” continues Ortega-Lockwood. “Branding URI took place in 2010, an opportunity to set a standard for digital interfaith dialogue and action.” URI.org now is a large, integrated digital arena supplemented with regional websites in Europe, Latin America, North America and the Multiregion. The primary site is able to translate digital text into 103 languages. URI.org’s built-in database can instantly tell you, for instance, that 254 Circles of the 960 Circles in the network have identified the environment and climate change as a primary focus of their work. This environmental community within the URI community has its own communication tools. Peacemaking, leadership training, medical services, empowering women and many other categories are similarly connected. Moreover, of course, URI Facebook pages abound. These robust communications systems still cannot account for the fact that in a typical month 15 or 20 interfaith groups from around the world ask to join the network. Welcomes are made, relationships begun and the stories multiply. Remarkably, the secret sauce comes from social technology, rather than digital technology, and represents a huge shift in religion/ religious storytelling, journalism and communications, however you characterize it. Early in URI’s development, David Cooperrider, the founder of Appreciative Inquiry (AI) and a global pioneer in organizational development, read about a prospective United Religions in a brief item in the Cleveland Plain Dealer, a distinguished Ohio newspaper. Cooperrider contacted San Francisco saying his work focused on getting conflicted communities with shared values to work together happily. Within a few short weeks, a partnership joined URI and Cooperrider’s team of doctoral candidates, along with his colleague Diana Whitney. The task they shared – to design and engender the kind of global interfaith entity its founders envisioned. Appreciative Inquiry sets problem solving on the shelf and essentially focuses on what a group most desires. It approaches a community’s highest aspirations with the same rigor and discipline that problem solvers bring to their solutions and it naturally develops participant enthusiasm in the process. Instead of fixing what is wrong, it seeks to create what is right, right in the eyes of the participants (for an extended discussion on Appreciative Inquiry and worshiping communities, see Chaffee 2005). AI sessions, long or short, typically start with one-on-one conversations utilizing questions that participants appreciate exploring. For example, Could you tell me something about your religious tradition that you find particularly meaning ful and important? Back in a circle of eight an hour or two later, you tell each other’s stories. By the end of the morning, you know quite a bit about everyone in the circle. Meanwhile, everyone in the room has become a storyteller, a communicator being taken seriously about things he or she cares about. That personal sense of engagement is embedded in the URI Charter’s 21 principles. The freedom to be self-directing includes giving affiliates the freedom to organize, program and raise funds without permission from headquarters, an unheard-of freedom in most nonprofits, NGOs and religious communities. To the point here, empowered by digital technology, social technology has left its footprint on the quality and quantity of URI communications. Several factors helped this happen, starting with how the organization describes itself: URI is “a global grassroots interfaith network that cultivates peace and justice by engaging people to bridge religious and cultural differences and work together for the good of their communities and the world” (United Religions Initiative n.d.). In a deeply conflicted world, this is a beacon of hope for many seeking ways to serve. 391

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From the start, everyone is respected and heard in this network, a frequent organizational promise that is rarely met in most institutions. At URI the notion extends throughout the establishment, including the expectation that everyone in the network is welcome to take on particular activities they volunteer for, rather than being assigned. Participants explore where their enthusiasm is centered and are encouraged to get engaged at that level. The self-interest of each affiliated Cooperation Circle and its particular goals is also recognized and respected by the network, with freedoms rarely granted to affiliates in most hierarchical organizations. The network has no fees. Your group is expected to pay its own bills. Leadership training and networking provided by the hub improves local philanthropic possibilities for everyone. The Charter encourages hospitality, gender equity, institutional learning and evolving as an organization.

In terms of interreligious journalism, for years URI has promoted stories from its Circles more than itself. As a result, a grassroots media feast has been set, particularly in Africa and South Asia. Now, though, Isabelle Ortega-Lockwood says, more attention will be paid to introducing URI as a global interfaith stakeholder, exploring what the network itself is all about, what it offers and how it operates. If by religion journalism we mean being supported for covering interfaith and intrafaith news, we are talking about a relatively few authors enjoying a rarified environment where the competition is fierce. However, if we talk about modern communications technology and all the opportunities it provides, the arena is wide-open and, if you are good, you will be in demand. Sharing religion news, circulating opinion, comparing spiritual practices and providing resources like event calendars is all as important as ever before. Last May, URI’s Multiregion (a grouping of Circles, which address international constituencies) held a two-hour Zoom session. Eighty-eight participants from 60 Cooperation Circles in 19 countries participated in a two-hour video summit. Each Circle took up to two minutes to tell their story to the rest. Not too much detail in such brief introductions, not much more than the newspaper article that captured David Cooperrider’s attention a quarter century earlier. The summit was a strong beginning, creating a new sense of solidarity and connection among like-minded interfaith activists around the world, most not having met before. URI is a remarkable example of what is possible in this new world where both digital and social technologies are reshaping what it means to share the news and get to know what we need to know.

The Interfaith Observer (TIO): a brief profile The decision to found The Interfaith Observer (TIO) came while shrugging off the weariness of more than 30 years in grassroots interfaith program administration and pastoral responsibilities. As retirement approached, free time emerged like a sunrise to read and read more, a rare pleasure for executive directors. Years spent on interfaith programming had kept me relatively ignorant about my specialty, interfaith relations. So for months I immersed myself in interfaith content on the Internet. Two observations surfaced and changed my life. First, without any central direction, without databases or lists or shared agendas, interfaith activity was spontaneously showing up all over the world – in rural Arizona as well as Chicago, in Antarctica as well as India. 392

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A massive cultural shift, empowered by technology and globalization, was and is happening all around us. Second, I noticed how little attention was being paid to this global religious shift. Ten years after 9/11, major media was mostly bypassing interreligious, multifaith news and opinion. A library of fascinating stories were not being told. In 1999, Beliefnet was an early adapter in posting digital multi-religious content. Patheos followed in 2008. These two high-volume digital platforms have given voice to dozens of traditions that had next to no national/international attention. However, neither B eliefnet nor Patheos has a driving vision, either religious or journalistic, except to grow big. Neither has much news coverage, though they have featured some extraordinary contributors. They are equal opportunity sites, not a venue for interfaith dialogue, much less action. An interreligious-communications-as-a-business model left them prey to those who buy and sell digital platforms. The machinations of corporate ownership have made them more conservative. Today both are owned by BN Media, LLC, a corporate conglomerate associated with, among others, the National Rifle Association, the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association and Focus on the Family (Halsted 2018). Meanwhile, information and resources keep multiplying. Leonard Swidler, champion of the Global Ethic and promoter of the Golden Rule, started the Journal of Ecumenical Studies with his wife Arlene Swidler in 1964. According to its website, it was “the first peerreviewed journal in the field of interreligious dialogue,” a distinguished publication that is still publishing. The Pluralism Project was initiated by Diana Eck at Harvard in 1991 and continues to be one of the most vibrant, informative interfaith sites on the Internet. The Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs was founded in 2006 at Georgetown University and offers an ongoing flow of programming and publication that enriches interfaith relations around the world. These organizations, though, pay more attention to their programs than to current events and this month’s news. They offer enriching content but not today’s headlines. An exception is the Pluralism Project’s Religion Diversity News, an excellent aggregator of headlines and links to significant news about religion from around the world. Religion News Service fills what would otherwise be a vacuum with a staff of reporters, columnists and aggregators posting religious stories five days a week. Furthermore, the Pew Research Center publishes a list of important religion stories throughout the week, garnish for the major reports they regularly publish about religion in the world. Mainstream media, though, has little use for religion except covering dramatic interfaith conflict and even then, stories are at the mercy of a brief window of exposure before disappearing from sight. Looking at this state of affairs, I wondered What next? Over a series of extended conversations, a plan emerged: the notion of a monthly magazine or journal that published or republished 10 or 15 articles about a particular theme drawn from the multitude of interfaith issues worth pursuing. It would also aggregate inter/intrafaith content from around the world, with links to 15–20 news stories that readers may not have seen. All would be written for the general reader. That was the vision an interfaith advisory board cooked up in early 2011, knowing that it would have to be done with an unusual business plan. A name was chosen: The Interfaith Observer (TIO). A nearby, like-minded nonprofit, the Interfaith Peace Project, signed on to be fiscal agent, thereby empowering fundraising efforts. TIO became a Cooperation Circle in URI’s Multiregion group, which provided an immediate open-ended international network. Anna Arphan, who had done web design for the Nevada Interfaith Council, became TIO’s first webmaster and, in close dialogue with a team of about a dozen, created the TIO logo. 393

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TIO’s first issue was posted on the Internet on 15 September 2011 to 305 addresses. Today it is posted to more than 10,000 addresses and growing. It goes largely to faith and interfaith leaders and activists and to students. In seven years, 77 issues have been posted for free and are available on TIO’s website, which archives the articles by subject. Megan Anderson was a junior in college when she asked to contribute an article. She went on to become an intern, then webmaster (where she designed and formatted a new digital platform and archive), social media director and now serves as associate editor and webmaster. Numerous interns have helped the cause, but her participation has made everything about TIO better. August is a vacation month, which pegs us at 11 issues a year. In major media, of course, TIO is not even a blip. It is, however, a first step taken by people who want to see a diversity of stories of faith and practice, as well as the challenges raised by the Global Ethic, shared among us all for the sake of us all. In short, the journal was created as a counter-cultural experiment in communications: All the contributions have come freely from more than 400 writers representing several dozen traditions, ranging from teenagers to seniors, including clerics, distinguished academics and practitioners, professionals and volunteers, along with numerous artists. For its first four years, TIO’s monthly expenditures were under a thousand dollars, a figure, which eventually doubled when we created a new website and began providing some minimal financial support editorially. Otherwise, we paid a bit of rent, paid our Internet service venders and little else. Being first with a story is not a TIO priority – getting the word out as widely as possible is the goal. We republish numerous stories and encourage others to republish TIO stories. In terms of interfaith journalism, we believe redundancy is a gift, not a pitfall. We spent our time and energy on the quality of the content rather than marketing and building distribution, assuming that if TIO was worth keeping, there are those who would step forward to provide the institutional superstructure needed for sustainability. That seems to have happened, as noted below. A particular element of TIO’s development needs special attention. From the start, the founders had a shared vision and set of goals that has been recorded and occasionally revised. Here is the statement as it stands today:

Core values and goals of The Interfaith Observer (TIO) TIO is an independent publication, affiliated with many faith and interfaith groups, and managed by the Tri-Faith Initiative in Omaha, Nebraska. The editor and associate editor oversee publishing decisions and are aided by a diverse advisory committee. The values and goals below, which are periodically updated, are not presented as static abstractions but are actualized in how TIO delivers its services. • • •

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Promote diversity, inclusivity, and respectful relationships within and among religious and spiritual traditions. Fairly report religious and interreligious news, particularly stories that are ignored by major media. Address interfaith history, issues, goals, education, and religious literacy, explore and highlight interdisciplinary issues relevant to advancing interfaith cooperation and provide an enduring record of the emerging interfaith movement in its various forms and expressions, including photography and video. Promote interfaith dialogue; transform strangers into friends; respect the other; engender trust. 394

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Address and sometimes support interfaith activities around issues such as climate change, religious bigotry, immigration policy and marginalized people – all for the sake of engendering a vital, healthy, just interfaith global culture. Report news and activities of the world’s major interfaith stakeholders along with covering the most important national, regional and local interfaith activities everywhere and foster networking and communication amongst actors in the interfaith movement except where it impinges on the rights of others. Publish stories from 500 to 3,000 words for the general reader, with appropriate links for those who want to dig deeper. Explore how interfaith cooperation contributes meaningfully to interdisciplinary and intersectional efforts.

From this has flowed more than 1,500 stories for the general reader about every interfaithrelated subject, we could imagine and the list is hardly exhausted. Along with the website and monthly postings, TIO is active on Facebook and Twitter. TIO is a modest experiment in promoting faith and interfaith news and stories with people around the world who have shared values and hopes and want to do something about it. It is full of what journalism began with – the concept of news, information that you feel you need to know. It is not clear how TIO relates to the rest of media in the world, except as one experiment among many. The dream that an organization would adopt TIO, allow it to keep its editorial freedom and assume the responsibilities of ownership, has come true. Therefore, we were delighted to announce that Tri-Faith Initiative (TFI) of Omaha, Nebraska stepped forward to assume the ownership responsibilities for The Interfaith Observer as of 1 August 2018, when we signed papers. TFI developed in 2005 as the expression of three Abrahamic congregations – Jewish, Christian and Muslim – who are now completing and sharing a new 38-acre, $65+ million campus. While holding to its core three-faith focus, TFI is committed to becoming a major interfaith stakeholder, like TIO, engaging people of all religious and spiritual traditions, as well of those who ascribe to none. TIO will maintain its editorial independence as a project of an institution, which shares TIO’s vision and goals. Will it survive and thrive in the boiling pot of global religion and journalism? Not a good question. Are there people, local and global interfaith leaders who share the vision and are dedicating their time, talents and treasure to the cause? Absolutely. You will read about it!

Conclusion More than once in the modern era it has been suggested that God is dead, that religion is over and will fade away – it just never happened. Twentieth century Russia and China both failed spectacularly in banishing religion. Meanwhile, for good and for bad, it is clearly as important to human civilization as ever. In most countries it is not monolithic, which is good. Both within and between traditions we find conflict, though tools and resources are being created to mitigate conflict. More and more are realizing that stoking conflict harms us all and that the time has arrived to shelve our differences and work together for the sake of everyone and the earth. Every step of this journey is rife with informative, empowering stories, exemplars to profile, important opinion and news of the day. We need storytellers. I have tried to be clear about the difficulties you face as a religious/religion journalist in our helter-skelter culture. 395

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For those with the energy and gumption, though, it can be a spectacular vocation where you can make a difference sharing the news.

Further readings Religion News Service, n.d. Religion News Service. Available at https://religionnews.com/, accessed 21 February 2019. Though a modest venture surrounded by media giants, RNS is the best religion news site in English. The Interfaith Observer, n.d. The Interfaith Observer. Available at http://www.theinterfaithobserver. org/, accessed 21 February 2019. As noted above, TIO is a monthly digital journal dedicated to interfaith story-telling and religion and interfaith news. The Pluralism Project, n.d. The Pluralism Project. Available at http://pluralism.org/, accessed 21 February 2019. This a large portal for all sorts of faith and interfaith information and news. United Religions Initiative, n.d. United Religions Initiative. Available at https://www.uri.org/, accessed 21 February 2019. URI is an excellent source of stories and news regarding nearly a thousand interfaith groups in 107 countries.

References Chaffee, P., 2005. Claiming the Light: Appreciative Inquiry and Congregational Transformation. In: Bass, R., ed. A Guide to Resources for Building Congregational Vitalilty. Herndon: Alban Institute, 67–106. Halsted, J., 2018. Why Did over a Dozen Bloggers Leave Patheos? Huffington Post, [online] 6 February. Available at https://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-halstead/why-did-over-a-dozen-writers_b_14603506. html, accessed 25 August 2018. Oxford University Press, 2018a. Oxford Living Dictionaries-English. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/news, accessed 20 July 2018. Oxford University Press, 2018b. Oxford Living Dictionaries-English. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/globalization, accessed 12 July 2018. Sharone, R. B., 2018. Digital Storytelling to Advance Peace in Pakistan. The Interfaith Observer, [online] 15 July. Available at http://www.theinterfaithobserver.org/journal-articles/2018/7/11/ digital-storytelling-to-advance-peace-in-pakistan, accessed 15 July 2018. Sims, N., 1984. The Literary Journalists. New York: Ballantine Books. Available at http://normansims. com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/The-Literary-Journalists.pdf, accessed 10 August 2018. Swing, W., 1998. The Coming United Religions. San Francisco: United Religions Initiative. Wilkinson, A., 2014. Is Religious Journalism Haunted? Books & Culture, [online] August. Available at https://www.booksandculture.com/articles/webexclusives/2014/august/is-religious-journalismhaunted.html, accessed 1 July 2018.

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27 RELIGIOUS DATAFICATION Platforms, practices and power Pauline Hope Cheong

Introduction and theoretical background In many societies where digital computing and Internet access is available, and even ubiquitous, the age of big data has dawned and is purportedly mounting at a startling rate. Total worldwide data is estimated to swell to 163 zettabytes (a zettabyte is 1 trillion g igabytes) by 2025, which translates to approximately ten times the amount today (Reinsel, Gantz and Rydning, 2017). Indeed, in many ways, the dramatic growth of datafication and the associated Internet of Things (IoT) has pervaded aspects of everyday life in mediated contexts worldwide, including varied dimensions in the religious and spiritual domains. With the nature of Internet use briskly changing, the Internet is no longer confined to our computers or our smartphones as data flows through our apps, digital wearables and cloud storage services, devices in our homes, networks in our workplaces and sensors in our neighborhoods and cities. In light of the exponential growth of data in the global ecosystem of technologies, the term big data is used to describe extremely vast masses of structured, semi-structured and unstructured data, which can be analyzed computationally (Chen, Mao and Liu 2014, 171). In parallel, datafication refers to the “ability to render into data many aspects of the world that have never been quantified before” (Cukier and Mayer-Schoenberger 2013, 29), thereby allowing for real-time tracking and predictive analyses today. What does a data approach to religion mean? In what ways have religious and interdisciplinary scholars studied large data sets? How do religious actors interact through and with data? What are the implications of big data for religious leaders, followers, workers and journalists working in an era of intensifying datafication, surveillance and the IoT? Given that, many proprietary algorithms and devices operate in the background, unseen or in black boxes (Pasquale 2015), this new wave of Internet development promises greater innovation but also raise new privileges, disadvantages and risks to religious adherents, seekers and reporters. This chapter has been tasked to provide an overview of datafication and the implications of digital data for religion and journalism. Given these contested terms and the literal and metaphorically big nature of the topic, the remit here is to highlight key trends and implications of growing digital data for the evolving nature of religious knowledge, leadership and community. Understanding the historical and contemporary data-related practices in the religious milieu is important for the advancement of critical understanding and engagement 397

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with data, including the work of religious storytelling and data journalism. The discussion here will thus first examine past and present practices of religious datafication and then proceed to highlight the relevance of datafication for journalism and journalists covering the religion beat. Accordingly, I will advance and unpack in this article the three key points below related to the development of big data and religion, the latter here meaning, broadly, the individual and institutionalized practices, values, symbols and beliefs that make up specific religious traditions (Woodhead 2011), including the discourse and practice constituted by mediated communication (Cheong 2017). First, although data has recently surfaced as a prominent term and asset, contemporary datafication has a history. While voluminous quantitative and text-based data related to religion is being accumulated and exchanged today, the impulses to archive, quantify, classify and assess based on data is not new in religious contexts and has historical parallels. Given the recent popularity of the term datafication, past scholarship has occluded referencing the concept of big data and the explicit discussion of taking a data approach to religion. Nonetheless, various documented examples of religious datafication provide striking illustrations of its functionalist operations and power dynamics, as discussed in the next section. Second, over the years, new forms of technologies have facilitated new forms of datafication, constituted by different practices and operant in varied contexts, for example, the application of online algorithms to capture and classify data (Cheney-Lippold 2017). Thus, beyond abstract visions of a datafied society, it is significant to examine how data related to religion is being produced, shared and archived on local and global scales, alongside the emergence of the latest information sharing and communication platforms. Interdisciplinary and religious scholarship have empirically examined various forms of datafication facilitated by a growing range of digital technologies in different settings to make sense of and derive value from digital information. Third, far from being straightforward, religious datafication is a complex and contested practice. While some forms of data capture are mechanized and programmed to function independently nowadays, for instance, using so-called simple natural language processing algorithms for textual analysis, attention to interpretation and context remains important for the study of digital corpora (Shahin 2016). Data processing algorithms and applications are not objective or neutral but are relational, contingent and performative in nature. This chapter proposes that in spite of its celestial affiliations, religious data is not pure. The emerging contours of bigger data sets and flows contribute insights into the dialectics of digital religion, as they intertwine with emergent tensions in the contested areas of religious identity, authority and community (Cheong and Ess 2012, Cheong and Arasa 2015).

Taking a data approach to religion: historical forms and parallels While the rise of big data has sparked much interest and debate particularly in the last two decades, the archival and application of data, including data-driven processes, are not wholly new to religion. Put in another way, datafication today has a history and has a history in religious hosts and contexts. Over the centuries, religious personnel have advocated for the quantification of different forms of socio-demographic, behavioral and economic data via numeric record keeping and accounting procedures for statistical analyses and strategic planning. As this section will highlight and illustrate, while past studies on religious actors utilizing quantifiable data may not have fully acknowledged the emergence and contested implications of large-scale data sets, datafication practices have long been operant in religious 398

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contexts, before the introduction of modern-day digital technologies. These historical forms of datafication were assembled to connect to particular audiences and publics, and as such, data rich practices were purposeful, socially embedded, and influenced by church leadership and goals. The functionalist application of statistical analyses to church behavioral data is, for example, reflected in the records of the early modern Reformed churches in Europe. Judith Pollmann (2002) highlighted how a proposal for a systematic examination of records of Geneva’s Reformed consistory, the body of ministers and elders overseeing church d iscipline, was proposed by Robert Kindon in 1972. He advocated for a person “able to develop statistics on the various kinds of moral aberrations…and establish which aberrations were most prevalent” (Pollmann 2002, 423). This person could structure data to help scholars understand patterns of how these moral transgressions were evaluated and handled as well as “measure how all these statistics changed over the years” (Pollmann 2002, 423). This proposal to order and analyze quantified social data statistically illustrates the significant role that datafication was conceived within the context of the Calvinist church. The personnel, whom we might term a data analyst today, was charged with what appears to be a data-driven process to track the discipline of moral offenders and tasked to produce what might be understood as a longitudinal analysis of trends in church discipline over time. And yet, it is noteworthy that the assumptions about the corpus of church data in this case and the proposed datafication practices were far from perfect, according to Pollmann’s analysis of a journal from a church elder in Utrecht, Netherlands in the 1620s. There were different methods of defining, counting and recording individual disciplinary occurrences between different churches. This prevented meaningful data comparisons between churches as well as over time comparisons in the church. Furthermore, multiple missing cases from the official consistory records existed as large divergences between formal records and individual journal entries about disciplinary cases were found. Public displays of deviant conduct and dishonorable behavior of church leaders and prominent family members were not logged in church records, although other historical documents bore them out. In this regard, it is particularly striking that Pollmann (2002, 430) reported, it is unmistakable that the consistory was reluctant to record information that conceived members of Utrecht’s elite, the ministers of the church, and the families from which it recruited its own members. (italics mine) In other words, it is significant here to note how church power and authorities appeared to have historically influenced their data entries and these selective records render any ensuing data analyses skewed. The historical practice of classification and analyses of quantifiable data is also evident, for instance, in the context of the growing significance of financial reporting in various churches, including the Protestant Episcopal Church where statistics were first compiled on the number of church activities in the diocese at their 1808 convention. Swanson and Gardner’s (1986) study showed how the Episcopal Church engaged in detailed accounting of financial and socio-demographic data, as well as internal and external audits. These changes were implemented in order to ensure its viability as it moved away from being a state sponsored entity to an ecclesiastical enterprise within the USA capitalistic society in the 1800s. Datafication supported the Episcopacy as top-down influence and bottom up 399

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practices emerged in many local dioceses, such that by 1860 “almost all of the dioceses required the reporting of a wide variety of financial and demographic data” (Swanson and Gardner 1986, 61). Here, it is pertinent to point out how technological innovations (e.g., the then novel use of balance sheets) facilitated new forms of datafication within the church, which was reflective of changes in church governance and structures in response to economic and constitutional changes. Consequently, Swanson and Gardner (1986) noted that there was an increase in the centralization of control, encompassing the formalization of church reports at the national level. The importance of recorded transactions and events is also evident in the extensive use of bookkeeping and accounting practices among the United Society of Believers, known as the Shakers, who functioned as a religious community from 1747 to 1923. Faircloth (1988)’s examination of historical archives uncovered the presence of detailed financial records of each household unit living in the Shaker community at Pleasantville, Kentucky, documented in day books, cash books and ledgers. The importance of careful accounting was underscored in key textbooks written by church elders, which stressed the creation of quantified records as a virtuous practice of accountability. In this way, the extensive use of numbers in budgets and the promotion of accounting practices was promoted and viewed as a “manifestation of holistic stewardship,” to assist religious actors in accomplishing their spiritual goals (Irvine 2005, 212). Moreover, while religious beliefs can conflict with the secular data approach of accounting, Irvine’s study (2005) of a budgetary system in an Australian diocese showed there was little resistance in the community as church goals were captured within the budget and the church’s progress was measured against its financial targets monthly. Notably, it was argued that the budget was actually used as a surrogate for the spiritual goals of the church, to objectify, legitimate and justify certain actions, and to monitor the success and accountability of the church in achieving its stated goals. (Irvine 2005, 233–234) In a similar vein, the study by Rixon and Faseruk (2012) on Anglican priests’ adoption of secular accounting management practices in Canada highlighted their pragmatic reliance on quantified data for strategic planning in their organization. Priests were found to be generally supportive of the work of professional accountants and relied on budget information and reports in their long-term capital planning to achieve their church mission. In this regard, while accounting practices record numbers and rely on the quantification of data extensively, it is “not merely an objective inert technique, but a social craft dependent on the outplaying of an almost infinite array of organizational variables” (Irvine 2005, 234, italics mine). In sum, I discussed in this section multiple cases in history that illustrated how datafication was introduced and developed as part of the modus operandi in different religious settings. Although past studies did not reference the concept of datafication, their documentation illustrated how various dimensions of religiously related behaviors (and aberrations) were defined, recorded and compared. And yet, this rendering of various forms of religious practices into coded data and quantifiable metrics was not simply a perfunctory undertaking to meet church needs. Attempts to archive and analyze data statistically were aligned with the fulfilment of spiritual visions and church growth. Moreover, the construction of formal records and official bigger data sets involved religious authority and in some cases, changes 400

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in church governance as the selective sampling of data, censorship of data, interpretation and compliance with new data practices unfolded over the years. The capacity to record, archive and process religious data has expanded with the use of new technologies. The next section discusses how the more recent proliferation of computing and digital technologies have facilitated more expansive forms of online capture and coding, while supporting new scholarship on the archival and analysis of religiously affiliated conduct.

Religious datafication in the digital age With the emergence of computerization, digitalization, social media and networked applications, the scale of big data has increased exponentially. Datafication is nowadays more commonly associated with a vast and wide variety of data sets and the swift velocity at which data is captured and processed. Among other significant concerns, this has reinvigorated a debate on what kinds of data are being shaped, tracked by religious institutions and actors, and in turn how big data is used to constitute religious authority and community. The constitution of big data takes on wider implications alongside the application of digital tools with a potential global reach. New mediated platforms for engaging religious content and interactions have helped to generate new troves of online data through web retrieval, weblogs, content and link analyses. For example, in the earlier stage of development on the World Wide Web, websites of religious groups and individual blogs generated large-scale data that could be archived and analyzed. The diversity of publicly accessible data included textual and audio discourses, images on web pages, tags, hits, comments and incoming and outgoing hyperlinks of websites. Online and log data enable extraction of user statistics and online search behaviors, including the duration and frequency of page views, personal information and sociodemographic data and Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. In tandem, growing web content provided scholars interested in religious communication new avenues and bigger datasets to mine, classify and analyze from various producer and individual standpoints. In what follows, key examples of studying religion with a big data approach to online and log content will be discussed. While space limitations do not permit this review to be exhaustive, collectively examples here illustrate the diversity in research paradigms and methods that have been applied to the analysis and comprehension of large quantities of religious data. Viewing churches as emerging mediated organizations, Sturgill (2004) examined a random subset (N = 251) out of more than a thousand Southern Baptist church web sites. The sites were coded in four categories for the presence or absence of evangelical material (e.g., presence of a pastor’s sermons), organization information (e.g., church address, Church staff listing), interactive features (e.g., email address and online donations) and affiliations with a larger community (e.g., denominated information). Statistical tabs were run to calculate an index, weighted by the number of features in each category, to allow for comparative analyses between the categories. Results reported that for the sample of churches analyzed, the index value for promoting the church as an organization was significantly higher than the index value for other categories coded, suggesting that church websites were primarily used to further organizational goals. It was also noted that churches’ lack of links to non-church sites made it harder for web users to locate evangelistic materials. In another large-scale study, Jansen, Tapia and Spink (2010) examined more than a million queries related to religious information seeking from transaction logs of web search engines from 1997 to 2005. Each record within the transaction logs contained data in three 401

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fields, namely time of day, user identification/IP address and query terms of online religious information seekers from their longitudinal analyses. The authors reported the following: • • •

Religious information seeking was persistent over the time frame examined and compared favorably with other forms of web searching like commerce or entertainment. Mainstream religious adherents, not just those of new religious movements, are engaged in online religious seeking. The core set of high user terms like Christian, Bible and Church was fairly stable with much of online seeking behaviors utilizing mainstream religious terms.

Overall, the authors concluded that their examination of the big data that tracked religious information seeking over time did not support the predominant claim that the American religious landscape was becoming increasingly secularized or factionalized. Another query log analysis related to religious online big data identified 124,422 religious queries from 15 million queries that were part of 60,759 user sessions in May 2006 (Wan-Chik, Clough and Sanderson 2013). This paper also explored differences in user search patterns between five major world religions: Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism. Results showed that compared to all queries, religious related queries were almost double in session length, had greater query length and a higher number of unique URLs clicked. Within religious-related queries, Christianity-related searches were the most frequent and had the longest length of queries. Subjects being searched among various religions also varied, for example, Buddhism-related queries related to lifestyle and culture, while Hinduism-related queries were predominantly about spiritual practices and observances. The authors concluded that while query log analysis was a method to study user behavior, it did not provide information on user intent and why searches are conducted in particular ways, the information needs of religious users and their satisfaction with the search results. A pioneering study that examined blogging as a religious practice triangulated quantitative and qualitative research methods which combined a content and hyperlink analysis of 200 blogs (789 individual posts and close to 20,000 hyperlinks) with interviews with a subset of those bloggers (Cheong, Halavais and Kwon 2008). Blog pages were archived and content analyzed, utilizing a coding frame of eight blog level variables and 99 entry level variables for the first four blog entries listed on the index page that were over 50 words in length. Results illustrated the different types of religious content in blogs, including news, everyday personal descriptions of religious experiences, didactic content, theological criticism and social issues. Extraction of hyperlinks from the blogs for analyses showed that bloggers connected to mainstream new sites, religious views outlets, other popular non-religious and religious bloggers, Wikipedia, etc. In sum, given the rising popularity of weblogs, the study examined both the structural and descriptive concerns of religion online by drawing upon the big data assessable via blog entries and blog links and contextualizing this data by interviewing bloggers who write about religion. Alongside the development and widespread adoption of spatial applications like Google Earth, interdisciplinary scholars have attended to the study of web content associated with a particular location and discovered links between religious online and offline activities through geotagged, georeferenced or geocoded data from the Internet. Cheong et al. (2009) highlighted how new forms of religious multiscalar and multimedia data like spatial narratives, videos, photographs, architectural visualization, mental maps and digital applications can help build situated spatial knowledge. The archival of these multiscalar data for geographic information systems representation and use can advance understanding of the evolving constitution of religious identity, authority and community. Drawing on an examination 402

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of 177 websites and spatial analysis of hyperlinks (using connectivity indices composed of in links and out links), the authors reported how religious organizations assemble and (re)present sacred place and religious community with a variety of hypertextual and spatial information associated with mental and physical maps. For this reason, instead of merely presenting their religious organizations in cyberspace, in varying degrees, religious leaders are involved in the (re)presentation or framing of religious experiences and ecclesiastical information to develop networked communities and changing time-space instantiations. (Cheong et al. 2009, 294) Specifically, the authors noted how [i]n this sense, websites may also be conceived as imagined spaces that reflect the codified representations of the spiritual vision of religious leaders. Religious leaders may ontologically map elements of cyberspace to control, engage, and build the religious community, and websites may thereby be seen as expressions of their power. (Cheong et al. 2009, 294) Hence, while burgeoning web content, online traffic and hyperlinks provide growing sources for datafication of religious phenomenon, it is also important to recognize how these digital and dynamic data are strategically configured. As part of a large-scale multimedia public relations operation, Chen (2011) examined how the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (or the Mormon Church) employed marketing strategies, specifically search engine optimization (SEO) techniques to promote its web ranking and influence online search results. Drawing upon what Chen (2011, 190) recognized as a “solid ground-level support structure as well as well-organized campaign from the top,” the Mormon Church started its SEO efforts in 1996 and then Church leaders encouraged their followers to share their faith through social media. A variety of ethical SEO tactics were employed, including the creation of attractive content like pro-Mormon videos, use of diverse keywords and the construction of millions of external links to official church web sites (LDS.org and Mormon.org) (Chen 2011, 189). An “online missionary program” became an official Church mission in 2009 where missionaries proselytize through social media, help build links and direct traffic to official church web sites (Chen 2011, 191). In the above ways, I highlight how Church leadership direct online attention and assemble a multitude of digital data to advance proactive marketing campaigns and influence online search behaviors. Accordingly, the dialectics of digital religion exists, observed in the emergent tensions between the use and exploitation of big data for religious identity and group promotion. Drawing upon the examples above, it is significant to note how bold concerted efforts to construct appealing content and influence online traffic are interlaced with practices to overshadow competing ideas and silence critics in the religious marketplace of ideas. Correspondingly, the intersection of big data, religion and the marketplace highlights how mega churches and well-resourced religious groups can embed different mediated relations and outputs in their sacred spaces and outreach activities for further reproduction and reconsumption, in order to boost their visibility and presence in the information economy (Poon, Huang and Cheong 2012). For the same reason, Shelton, Zook and Graham (2012) noted the dialectics of religion at work in both the gains and drawbacks of the dynamic spatialization of religion using digital 403

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and web-based applications. The mapping and interpretation of extensive geocoded data is mingled with complexity, given that “online representations are simultaneously products and producers of offline social practices” (Shelton, Zook and Graham 2012, 603). Their study used a bespoke software program to tally the references to particular religious keywords that were geotagged to particular locations and indexed in Google Maps in February and July 2010, to produce global, metropolitan and regional level visualizations of religious cyberscapes (e.g., 7,519 geotagged references containing the term Catholic near Chicago, Illinois). They argued that geotagged web content and references by Internet users and the politics of representation of religious groups online are contested processes. Compared to the demographics of their devotees in certain regions, it was reported that some religious groups “seem to possess a disproportionately powerful voice in the Web 2.0 world of Google Maps” (Shelton, Zook and Graham 2012, 612) with user-generated content being “subject to same uneven power relations at work in the material world” (Shelton, Zook and Graham 2012, 606). As can be seen in this section, the earlier development of web technologies that are still used today dovetail emergent tensions, prospects and problems for religious data science and study. As online sources and content enable new forms of datafication related to religion, significant challenges like understanding platform bias and interface affordances that mold and frame data input and query for our records and analyses remain. In this regard, insights about and from earlier studies of religious datafication echo recent empirical investigations as well as growing critical scholarship related to platform power and data selection bias in other socio-cultural domains (e.g., Bucher 2012, Helmond 2015). The next section further discusses the operations and dialectics of big data religion set in contemporary digital applications.

Data streams and deluge: religious apps and platform power At the present time, in tandem with the latest growth of social media and digital applications on so-called smart devices, the tracking of religious data has grown with new data generating and sharing activities online on a day to day, moment to moment basis. For some, this presents an opportunity for rethinking how spirituality can be constituted in light of new big data-centric practices. For example, there are multiple data points that parishioners bring to a religious community in the 21st century, including attendance, personal information, personal giving, and personal development; all of which could be tracked and analyzed toward fulfilling a “higher calling to data analysis” (Gutzler 2014, 25). To augment the prevailing understanding of datafication in the religious context, this section discusses one of the most prominent and striking examples of religious big data that is being collected internationally via YouVersion today. Its popular mobile Bible app offers a free Bible experience in more than one thousand languages, for online access and via smartphones, tablets and other digital devices. With over 300 million installs worldwide, YouVersion data is a compelling illustration of how big data is being collected in the routine and quotidian ways people use their app to read and share the Bible. Drawing from user interactions or what has been termed Bible engagement online, YouVersion is able to report a variety of user statistics, including the number of bookmarks created, Bible reading plans (offering a selection of passages with accompanying reflections) completed, verses shared, audio chapters accessed and chapters read. The data set here is considerably large and is also a dynamic data stream, as its app allows for real time tracking of religious data. Its most updated report, at the time of this chapter’s preparation, showed that in 2017, there were 16.7 billion chapters read, 3 billion audio chapters accessed, 1.4 billion highlights and bookmarks created, 39 million reading plans completed and 222 million verses shared (Youversion 2017). 404

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Beyond descriptive data analyses, this form of religious big data collection allows for comparative analyses at the aggregate and possibly other fine-grained levels. Although user statistics regarding age, sex or religious affiliation are not recorded, Youversion does record the location of users, and reported that in 2013, the Bible App had been installed in every country in the world (Anon 2013). Its 2017 report pinpointed Joshua 1:9 as the verse of the year; the Bible verse that was shared, bookmarked and highlighted most often by its global users. National level analyses using geocoded data collected from users in different countries offered cross national comparisons between the top verses around the world, for instance, in the United States (Romans 8:28), South Korean (Proverbs 16:9), Australia (Romans 12:2) and India ( John 3:16). In these ways, the upside potential of this application is twofold. Religious big data collected by and analyzed by YouVersion facilitate innovative insights into how millions of people practice their religion and interact with sacred texts. This data can also serve as a timely channel of feedback to enhance the way this religious app functions to enable people to accomplish their Bible reading goals. Yet while its blog title reads “engage in Scripture like never before” (YouVersion), emergent tensions for the construction of religious identity, community and authority exists with this application. Here, it is important to recognize how the Bible app is designed to encourage particular forms of engagement and prevailing notions of sharing, which are in turn, categorized and tracked to illustrate its growing use and impact. In Hooked: How to form habit-forming products, Nir Eyal (2014) discussed the Bible App as an exemplar by drawing upon his own user experiences and an interview that he conducted with Bobby Gruenewald, Founder of the YouVersion Bible App. His account highlights the immense scope of Youversion’s data collection via its Bible App as well as the potency of apps writ large to facilitate specific guided and habitual user interactions. The relevant excerpt below illustrates these big data dynamics and scale: Gruenewald’s team sifts through behavioral data collected from millions of readers to better understand what users want from the Bible app. “We just have so much data flowing through our system,” Gruenewald says. The data reveals some important insights on what drives user retention. (Eyal 2014, 186) Eyal (2013) also noted that because the Bible App was generating so much data, Google contacted them, and Youversion had completed work with Google engineers to help with their data storage and analyses. Markedly, an examination of user data showed how users could be motivated to complete reading plans. Eyal (2014, 186) argues that the Bible app was designed to facilitate various forms of expedient and habitual interaction, “to make absorbing the Word as frictionless as possible.” He notes that “Gruenewald says his data also revealed that changing the order of the Bible, placing the more interesting sections up-front and saving the boring bits for later increased completion rates” (Eyal 2014, 187). In another analysis of the YouVersion app, Hutchings (2014) stressed how the Bible App functions persuasively to influence distinctive user behaviors and social interaction, including the use of gamification and incentives like the awarding of badges to those recognized as successful Bible readers. In addition, it was proposed that the Bible app allows users to access the Bible “through an interface designed to visually and procedurally emphasize sharing… when we look at the actual choice of texts to share…very specific categories of Bible text 405

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flourish while others attract less attention” (Hutchings 2014, 25). According to CheneyLippold (2017), in our highly surveilled and mediated environments, algorithms help construct subjective notions of identity, including who we are, how we know each other, and who we can be to affect social participation and citizenship. Online activities generate data streams from which algorithms aggregate data, create categories and extract patterns that guide the action of institutions and states. Consequently, as algorithms in the Bible app function to create and recreate pious selves using digital data to mark and reinforce specific types of religious engagement, datafication here also facilitates the construction of particular religious identities that can be organized and cultivated for multiple purposes, including fueling further app interactions and developments. As shown above, digital and social media applications have facilitated new religiously affiliated data generating activities in recent years, resulting in massive tomes of data, tracked in real time on a global scale. In turn, a complex and paradoxical phenomenon emerges whereby the analysis of this latest form of big data can be applied to reformatting the digital platforms and interfaces themselves, which simultaneously also collecting data. Indeed, a deliberate pun of the ostensible religious roots of the Bible App has been issued, traced to the irony of its apparent success. According to Eyal (2013), as seen in the title of his article posted online that was initially submitted on the Bible App to the publication The Altantic, “getting 100 Million downloads in more psychology than miracles.” Pointedly, he proposed that the Youversion company is a “case study of how technology can change behavior by marrying the principles of consumer psychology with the latest in big data analytics” (Eyal 2014, 181). Hence, it follows that the Bible App represents and exemplifies historical and larger trends that have emerged with digital platforms designed to maximize dataflow and turn personal and social activities into algorithmic relations, to optimize particular kinds of work performances and engagement (e.g., Lupton 2016). Correspondingly, it is significant to note how contemporary datafication is closely linked to managing communications and the meticulous construction of identity, thus increasing the possibility of greater control by religious elites and/or entrepreneurs.

Conclusion: big data provocations and implications for religious investigations The rise of big data today is ostensibly tornadic and profoundly provoking. Although datafication has intensified with mounting forms of data capture and real time analyses with networked digital technologies, this chapter has underscored how the proclivity to quantify aspects of religious behaviors and the application of statistics to support religious goals is not merely a novel occurrence. In addition, while data is now a prominent term, religious datafication is by no means a set of unified practices. This chapter has provided a review of multiple forms of religious datafication, which have emerged with newer technologies and examined by interdisciplinary scholars over the years. As with other new media, dialectical tensions are intertwined with technology use that capture and archive religious data, engendering new privileges and disadvantages for religious actors in their construction of religious identity, community and authority (Cheong and Ess 2012, Cheong and Arasa 2015). As far as these dialectics hold, then, this chapter highlights how different forms of religious datafication are not neutral acts but are distinctive social crafts cultivated in diverse contexts and fused with power. As such, datafication can be understood as a complex and contested process, co-constituted by religious leaders and adherents in opportune as well as daily communication and interactions. 406

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With this in mind, it is worth considering how practices of religious journalism are shaped and negotiated in this age of massive datafication facilitated by computational applications and devices. Most broadly, the use and reliance of big data and data-centric practices, including the use of automation and robo-journalism, to help generate stories can be expedient, yet also problematic as it poses ethical dilemmas and challenges for news content creation (Carlson 2015). Of particular relevance to religious representation and community is the uneven resources and power exercised by well-resourced groups and individuals over data production and archival, particularly data inequalities reflected in the asymmetries between those who capture and store data and whom data mining targets (Andrejevic 2014). As highlighted in this chapter, those enacting authority, competence and resources have influenced the rules and norms of how aspects of religious practice are quantified and rendered into data. In turn, the datafication of personal religious behaviors has been used to shape digital platforms and online searches for spiritual information. In this sense, data are not facts and can be erroneous, incomplete and insufficient (Gitelman 2013). As Bulkeley (2015) points out, the use of big data like Google search data numbers “to draw conclusions about religion remains on shaky ground.” This is in part because “while the results of analyzing these data seem admirably clear and quantitative… they do not easily map onto the actual beliefs, feelings and attitudes of the general population.” Therefore, future investigation and accounts of religious data related practices should attend to the concentrations of power with respect to religious data ownership, data geographies and routine experiences of datafication. Achieving this goal may necessitate a multidisciplinary storytelling approach in the era of big data (Howard 2014), where religious news reporters, analysts and designers build collaborative practices to offer new insights to the world. Additionally, media coverage and public discourse have historically fixated upon the novelty of big data, and/or its utopian and dystopian extremes. Contemporary moral panics over the loss of privacy and surveillance through online data tracking have been expressed. Yet at the same time, harvesting big data linked to and generated by religious practices have been promoted as the key to understanding religious publics, increasing access to sacred scriptures and the building of pious communities globally. In light of this phenomenon, it is worthwhile for journalists covering the religion beat to acknowledge the complex and historical significance of so-called naturally occurring data and religious datafication in specific religious communities. Aside from attending to growing data (e.g., how big is big data in numbers), there is a need for wider critical reflection in news coverage that is not merely data-driven. Within the recently developed field of data journalism, multiple commentators have stressed the importance of understanding how to critically engage with data beyond how it is used, to attending to the social and cultural contexts in which data related practices are conceived and at work (e.g., see Gray and Bounegru forthcoming). In the context of religion, it is important to explicate the axiology of big data, including the religious philosophies and missions which informs us how and what kinds of data are of value, to whom. Here, understanding how religious big data operates in context with small data within specific sites is helpful for understanding the contours and contradictions of increasingly datafied publics. News that address the intersection of religion and big data should therefore examine alternative and more nuanced ways to describe datafication processes and outcomes, including how data is mined and matched with other data to make inferences about religious practice and community. As a leading voice in registering critical concerns over datafication, Van Dijck (2014) argues that datafication is rooted in the widespread secular belief of dataism as people place their faith in large corporations and public institutions while they trade their 407

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personal data in exchange for free services. Thus, instead of normalizing datafication as an objective and legitimate means to monitor and comprehend people’s religious behaviors, attitudes including religious beliefs toward datafication need to be closely reexamined to advance a more robust and ethical approach to big data. Last but not least, while this chapter has briefly discussed the growth of big data, storytelling related to the tracking and archival of voluminous religious data flows should also touch upon instances of missing data or data gaps. It is pertinent to consider the role of what might be termed as ex-data, or the data cleansing processes and data that is struck off the record for our understanding of how datafication, religion and power work, particularly in contexts where data availability and accessibility is challenging and entails high costs to journalists (e.g., Ma forthcoming, Carmona, Cruz and Guerra forthcoming). In line with the proliferation of cutting-edge technologies that have become more commonplace in many cities, apps, which generate and track mass and individual activities, can be employed with facial recognition technologies to detect, monitor as well as expunge religious data. The case in the mainland Chinese context serves as an example of such innovation in religious datafication and its complications. According to a report by Grigg and Murray (2017), local authorities in Wenzhou have ordered all churches in a city known as little Jerusalem to install surveillance cameras, which enable the recording of church services, as well as of the conveners and those in attendance. In the name of addressing religious extremism, authorities in Xinjiang have also required the Uyghurs, China’s ethnic Muslim minority, to install an app in their smartphones that can detect and block religious videos, images and documents, while keeping logs of their online and social media communicators. These recent surveillance developments regenerate critical questions concerning the datafication of religious practices and the implications of such active monitoring and strategic management of spiritual interactions with the latest ecosystem of digital platforms and facial recognition technologies. It is hoped that future research and journalism continue to document the adjoining of religion and big data, as well as to register its diverse international practices and concerns as a profoundly impelling practice.

Further readings Cheney-Lippold, J., 2017. We Are Data: Algorithms and the Making of Our Digital Selves. New York: NYU Press. As part of the ongoing scholarly discussion on datafication, this book unpacks how contemporary algorithms organize everyday life drawing upon big data derived from online activities and the application of data analysis and visualization tools. Compelling examples in this book illustrate how algorithmically assisted processes create and assign social categories of gender, race, sexuality and citizenship in the present day increasingly surveilled and mediated environments. Although religion is not the foci here, the book provides a lens to think about the social creation of religious realities in light of new datafication processes. As highlighted in this book chapter, there are interesting implications for the creation and maintenance of algorithmic identities in the religious realm, including the cultivation of particular forms of pious selves and distinctive patterns of religious engagements via digital applications. Gitelman, L., ed., 2013. Raw Data is an Oxymoron. Cambridge: MIT Press. Collectively the articles in this book articulated by scholars grounded in the humanistic disciplines confront the popular notion that raw data is available, accessible and neutral. Instead, the veneer of data objectively is interrogated to reveal significant characteristics of the social construction of data, including how data is cooked and consumed in their collection, application, visualization, and projection, in multiple historical and contemporary settings. As pointed out here in this article, religious governance and beliefs are in less obvious ways baked into data. Historical and contemporary data collection activities are generated and interpreted by particular religious audiences and publics within distinctive circumstances of their emergence, storage and transmission.

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Religious datafication Gray, J. and Bounegru, L. eds., forthcoming. The Data Journalism Handbook: Towards a Critical Data Practice. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Available at https://datajournalismhandbook. org/handbook/two, accessed 1 February 2019. This newly edited book of chapters from data journalists and practitioners in various parts of the world addresses the recently developed and institutionalized practice of data journalism. As reflected in the sub-title, this corpus of work advocates for the advancement of critical data reflection and engagement as journalists hone their craft in collaborative and innovative ways. For example, the third section of the book focuses on how journalists procure and organize data in contexts where data availability and accessibility are limited, and where journalists face significant risks in investigative data gathering and attempts to produce data-rich reports. Multiple challenges for critical data practice as well as practical information about various data landscapes are presented, which helps deepen understanding of evolving and alternative data practices, with implications for religious data journalism.

References Andrejevic, M., 2014. Big Data, Big Questions| the Big Data Divide. International Journal of Communication, 8, 1673–1689. Anon, 2013. The Bible App around the World: Over 600 Versions, 375 Languages. Youversion, [blog] 14 May. Available at http://blog.youversion.com/2013/08/the-bible-app-around-the-world/, accessed 20 December 2013. Bucher, T., 2012. Want to Be on the Top? Algorithmic Power and the Threat of Invisibility on Facebook. New Media & Society, 14(7), 1164–1180. Bulkeley, K., 2015. Big Data and the Study of Religion: Can Google Lead to God? Huffington Post, [online] 24 September. Available at https://www.huffingtonpost.com/kelly-bulkeley-phd/bigdata-and-the-study-of_b_8186222.html, accessed 3 June 2017. Carlson, M., 2015. The Robotic Reporter. Automated Journalism and the Redefinition of Labor, Compositional Forms and Journalistic Authority. Digital Journalism, 3(3), 416–431. Carmona, S. R., Cruz, Y. A. and Guerra, E., 2020. Reassembling Public Data in Cuba: How Journalists, Researchers and Students Collaborate When Information Is Missing, Outdated or Scarce. In: Gray, J. and Bounegru, L., eds. The Data Journalism Handbook: Towards a Critical Data Practice. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Chen, C. H., 2011. Marketing Religion Online: The LDS Church’s SEO Efforts. Journal of Media and Religion, 10(4), 185–205. Chen, M., Mao, S. and Liu, Y., 2014. Big Data: A Survey. Mobile Networks and Applications, 19(2), 171–209. Cheney-Lippold, J., 2017. We Are Data: Algorithms and the Making of Our Digital Selves. New York: NYU Press. Cheong, P. H., 2017. The Vitality of New Media and Religion: Communicative Perspectives, Practices and Authority in Spiritual Organization. New Media & Society, 19(1), 25–33. Cheong, P. H. and Arasa, D., 2015. Religion. In: Cantoni, L. and Danowski J., eds. Handbooks of Communication Science. Vol 5. Communication and Technology. Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 455–466. Cheong, P. H. and Ess, C., 2012. Religion 2.0? Relational and Hybridizing Pathways in Religion, Social Media and Culture. In: Cheong, P. H., Fischer-Nielsen, P., Gelfgren, S. and Ess, C. eds. Digital Religion, Social Media and Culture: Perspectives, Practices, Futures. New York: Peter Lang, 1–21. Cheong, P. H., Halavais, A. and Kwon, K., 2008. The Chronicles of Me: Understanding Blogging as a Religious Practice. Journal of Media and Religion, 7(3), 107–131. Cheong, P. H., Poon, J. P., Huang, S. and Casas, I., 2009. The Internet Highway and Religious Communities: Mapping and Contesting Spaces in Religion-Online. The Information Society, 25(5), 291–302. Cukier, K. and Mayer-Schoenberger, V., 2013. The Rise of Big Data: How It’s Changing the Way We Think about the World. Foreign Affairs, 92(3), 28–40. Eyal, N., 2013. Bible App: Getting 100 Million Downloads Is More Psychology Than Miracles. [online] 1 July. Available at https://www.nirandfar.com/2013/07/the-app-of-god-getting-100million-downloads-is-more-psychology-than-miracles.html, accessed 10 March 2018. Eyal, N., 2014. Hooked: How to Build Habit-Forming Products. New York: Penguin.

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Pauline Hope Cheong Faircloth, A., 1988. The Importance of Accounting to the Shakers. Accounting Historians Journal, 15(2), 99–129. Gitelman, L., ed., 2013. Raw Data Is an Oxymoron. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Gray, J. and Bounegru, L., 2020. Introduction. In: Gray, J. and Bounegru, L., eds. The Data Journalism Handbook: Towards a Critical Data Practice. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Grigg, A. and Murray, L., 2017. In Xi Jinping’s Scary New China, Big Brother Meets Big Data. Financial Review, [online] 10 December. Available at https://www.afr.com/technology/web/security/ big-brother-meets-big-data-in-xi-jinpings-scary-new-china-20171009-gyxdil, accessed 5 January 2018. Gutzler, M.D., 2014. Big data and the 21st century church. Dialog, 53(1), pp.23-29. Helmond, A., 2015. The Platformization of the Web: Making Web Data Platform Ready. Social Media + Society, 1(2), 1–11. Howard, A. B., 2014. The Art and Science of Data-Driven Journalism. Available at https://academiccommons. columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8Q531V1, accessed 5 June 2018. Hutchings, T., 2014. Now the Bible Is an App: Digital Media and Changing Patterns of Religious Authority. In: Granholm, K, Moberg, M. and Sjo, S, eds. Religion, Media, and Social Change. London: Routledge, 151–169. Irvine, H., 2005. Balancing Money and Mission in a Local Church Budget. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 18(2), 211–237. Jansen, B. J., Tapia, A. and Spink, A., 2010. Searching for Salvation: An Analysis of US Religious Searching on the World Wide Web. Religion, 40(1), 39–52. Lupton, D., 2016. The Quantified Self. Cambridge: Polity. Ma, Y., 2020. Alternative Data Practices in China. In Gray, J. and Bounegru, L., eds. The Data Journalism Handbook: Towards a Critical Data Practice. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Pasquale, F., 2015. The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control Money and Information. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Pollmann, J., 2002. Off the Record: Problems in the Quantification of Calvinist Church Discipline. Sixteenth Century Journal, 33(2), 423–438. Poon, J. P., Huang, S. and Cheong, P. H., 2012. Media, Religion and the Marketplace in the Information Economy: Evidence from SINGAPORE. Environment and Planning A, 44(8), 969–1985. Reinsel, D., Gantz, J. and Rydning, J., 2017. Data Age 2025: The Evolution of Data to Life-Critical. International Data Corporation. Available at https://www.seagate.com/www-content/our-story/ trends/files/Seagate-WP-DataAge2025-March-2017.pdf, accessed 5 March 2018. Rixon, D. and Faseruk, A., 2012. Secular Tools and Sacred Goals: A Case Study of How Anglican Priests Are Embracing Management Accounting and Strategic Planning. Journal of Business Diversity, 12(1), 19–32. Shahin, S., 2016. When Scale Meets Depth: Integrating Natural Language Processing and Textual Analysis for Studying Digital Corpora. Communication Methods and Measures, 10(1), 28–50. Shelton, T., Zook, M. and Graham, M., 2012. The Technology of Religion: Mapping Religious Cyberscapes. The Professional Geographer, 64(4), 602–617. Sturgill, A., 2004. Scope and Purposes of Church Web Sites. Journal of Media and Religion, 3(3), 165–176. Swanson, G. A. and Gardner, J. C., 1986. The Inception and Evolution of Financial Reporting in the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America. Accounting Historians Journal, 13(2), 55–63. Van Dijck, J., 2014. Datafication, Dataism and Dataveillance: Big Data between Scientific Paradigm and Ideology. Surveillance & Society, 12(2), 197–208. Wan-Chik, R., Clough, P. and Sanderson, M., 2013. Investigating Religious Information Searching through Analysis of a Search Engine Log. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 64(12), 2492–2506. Woodhead, L., 2011. Five Concepts of Religion. International review of Sociology, 21(1), 121–143. Youversion, 2017. 2017 Year in Review. Available at http://installs.youversion.com/2017-year-inreview/index.html, accessed 5 March 2018.

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28 DATAFICATION AS A TREND FOR JOURNALISM A journalist’s perspective Andreas Mattsson Introduction Writing, live reporting, producing videos and podcasts, chatting, blogging and constructing datasets. The digitalization of media has had a huge impact on the demands and the requirements of the skills of journalists. The concept of a multi-tasking reporter is widely used in curriculums when teaching future journalists. In today’s data driven world the nature of multi-tasking has taken on greater urgency and requires journalists to adapt a savvier way of negotiating digital opportunities. This chapter will explore how datafication has made its impact on journalism and how data-driven journalism interplays with the datafication of the society as a whole. In this chapter, datafication is not only used to understand the digital transition of media, but also to explore how data has become present in a fundamental way in how journalism is being produced (van Dijck 2014). In my capacity as program director at School of Journalism at Lund University, the multi-tasking my colleagues and I are constantly juggling has created a huge impact on how the teaching shall be developed. Skills such as social media management, online video reporting, breaking news reporting and fact checking in real-time have made major changes in how journalists divide their everyday work life. Selfie-sticks, smartphones and Google Spreadsheets are now as important as the typewriter once was. In Sweden, there was already a decreasing amount of special assigned reporters in the daily newspaper’s newsroom before the digitalization generated a revolution in the news production. The amount and the proportion of special assigned reporters decreased 15% from 1990 to 2010. Around 2005, analogue newsrooms began the transformation into digital online newsrooms. Content Management Systems (CMS) was introduced as a supplement to the editorial systems. This allowed online editors to copy-paste the content from the print version during the evening before it was delivered to the subscribers in the morning. The articles were often scheduled to be published on the website in the morning the day after. This was several years before paywalls happened; the purpose was to increase the digital presence and the digital range of the stories that was created. This also created a situation where most content was available for free (Von Krogh 2011, 79–112). Today, things are different. The copy pasting of print content is almost gone. The online editing is embedded into the editorial systems, which means that every journalist is her own 411

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online editor. Websites are based on algorithms and traffic hits, and the work tasks of an online editor have become more similar those of a data analyst. Every newsroom has a division of reporters focusing entirely on breaking news that mainly reports for online platforms (Mattsson and Isaksson 2017). This does not mean that every journalist needs to be able to write, live tweet, photograph and analyze data, but everyone needs to be able to adjust to a dynamic environment where work tasks and technical development goes hand in hand. Between 2008 and 2010, while I was working at the online desk at Sydsvenskan, one of the largest newspapers in Sweden, I identified how much digitalization changed people’s reading habits related to their interests for news. Sydsvenskan attracted more readers than ever before since this newspaper was founded in 1848. Despite this, Sydsvenskan’s financial situation and that of many other newspapers in the country was in turmoil. The decrease in people paying their subscription fees for the printed newspaper and the commercial factors by providing a platform with cheap advertising banners and a whole lot of editorial content for free, was – let’s put it like this – not so good. Between 2010 and 2012, I was working strategically to communicate the new business models at Sydsvenskan. In the role of a communication officer, with responsibility for the intranet and strategic communication, I could follow several projects such as e-commerce websites, market activities, loyalty clubs, staffing agencies and innovation projects. In fact, none of them was enough to change the financial development of the company. Instead, the company had to dismiss a large number of journalists: Some were leaving for early retirement, some positions became vacant and some positions was manned by colleagues from the internal staffing agency. The digitalization creates a datafication, not only of journalism, but also of societies. When authorities and company organizations are handling the digitalization, the potentials of publishing data on digital platforms (rather than collect them in dusty books and printed reports) are obvious (van Dijck 2014). One of the aspects that caught my attention when I changed my work tasks from online editing to strategic communication was how much the newspaper industry was dependent on data in all forms; data in terms of data from the readers that made the company profitable for partners and customers, data as a tool to monitor the digital development and public data as a vital tool in the editorial development. Despite all the dark headlines of the media businesses in crises and newspapers being shut down, there is no evidence saying that the need for journalism will decrease. On contrary, in an era where discussion about fake news are widely (and globally), fact checking and being able to analyze enormous amounts of data – the need for journalists will increase. Starting in 2012, I have worked part-time as a lecturer in journalism studies at the Department of Communication and Media at Lund University and as a freelance reporter for various newspapers and magazines. Since 2016, I have also served the program director for School of Journalism. I am greatly interested in, and also enjoy, influencing the media landscape that surrounds me by connecting my two areas of expertise: education and practice. In this capacity, I have also had the opportunity to build platforms for knowledge exchange and experiences between journalists and media researchers in Sweden, India and Vietnam. India, which are emergent media landscapes, have given me an understanding about how the datafication of journalism impacts societies with other constitutions, media cultures and political systems. Part of this understanding is based on the insights on our mutual digital challenges. The datafication of media also brings hate and harassment to the mainstream and social media. In Sweden and India, similar patterns of online hate against women and minority groups are evident. This hate comes with patronizing the other which is exemplified by growing number of islamophobia in the comments sections on Indian and Swedish news websites 412

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(Mattsson and Rajagopal 2017). There has also been a growing number of Islamophobic comments and social media posts related to articles and reports dealing with the Muslim minority in India (Amnesty International India 2018) and similar patterns against minority groups and female Internet users in Vietnam (Hoang 2017). This chapter will deal with the development of datafication from a journalist’s perspective. It is based on my own experiences as a journalist working for 15–20 different news outlets and from my interactions with journalist students in Sweden, India and Vietnam.

The importance of data for journalism The profession of being a journalist is under constant development. The influx of data into the newsrooms has been one of the major challenges facing journalists over the past decade and will continue to be into the future. Spreadsheets and databases have become part of everyday life in business, public administration, entertainment and sports. Data tends to be a vague term, used by industries and academic researchers to describe – what? In journalism, it could be defined as information that can be analyzed with the help from computers. It is indeed a very broad definition, ranging from texts that analyze the most common used words or terms to behavioral data from social media platforms that analyze tweets and activities. In short, when information gets digitalized, new opportunities occurs. In the 21st century, the development has moved on from databases – that was private and not so accessible – to data that is public and accessible (Bradshaw and Rohumaa 2011). This phenomenon could be seen as big data (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2014). In the digitalized world, logs and data are created in so many aspects of life and can be analyzed in so many different ways. Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier believe it will reshape the way life and businesses are organized: Big data is a resource and a tool. It is meant to inform, rather than explain; it points us toward understanding, but it can still lead to misunderstanding, depending on how well or poorly it is wielded. And however dazzling we find the power of big data to be, we must never let its seductive glimmer blind us to its inherent imperfections. (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2014, 197) One can also put it as Bruns does in The Sage Handbook of Digital Journalism (2016): Big data is immediately valuable in journalism, but in journalist practices, big data within journalism provides new insights for the news industry. In order for big data to be relevant, it is critical to know what questions are being asked and what role big data can play in answering them (Bruns 2016).

Working with news and data How do you evaluate news? That is one of the most common questions in the beginning of the introduction course at School of Journalism at Lund University. For many years, the role of being a news editor has been to have the perfect gut feeling. The gut feeling of one or two news editors, sometimes in combination with the publisher’s gut feeling of the publisher, dominated the editorial work for the whole newsroom, including reporters, editors and subeditors (Olai 2016). Understanding and analyzing data has become part of the work task that a news editor has to deal with on an everyday basis. With help from data, we know what the readers want to 413

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read about, what kind of attention they pay to our articles and we find ideas what to report about next. Data is also what the sales department are making their best to profit on, when they sell banners and other commercial areas of the website. In other words, data provides instant feedback to the newspaper, but data should not replace the idea that journalism comes from journalistic ideas (Schori 2016). In his book “Online Only,” the Swedish journalist Schori (2016) presents a few examples of data that is very easy to access. In fact, anyone who administrates a website can find out this with assistance from Google Analytics or from the hosting web hotel: • • • • • • •

Clickbait: what hyperlinks are people clicking on? Visitors: when does people visit the website in question? What do they read? Do their reading habits change throughout the day? Behavior: how long do people spend on the website? Do they read the full story or watch the full video clip? What do they do next? Referrals: where do they come from? Social media? Search engines? URL? Social media shares: how many times have the article been shared and where? Trending topics: what topics are trending on Twitter and Facebook right now? Revenues for paywall: how profitable is the content behind the paywall?

During my days at the news desk, I recall many times when my colleagues and I became surprised about how readers consumed our articles. With the impact from social media, we could observe a trend where popular short articles about events and incidents (mainly crimes and sports) were replaced by long read stories about identity, ethnicity and culture. When you dig a bit deeper into the data, you can find viral aspects such as the number of times a certain story has been shared on social media platforms and how many seconds, or minutes, people actually allowed themselves to read the story. Armed with this data, we learned that people were interested in more than simple click-bait articles and were able to respond to reader interest more successfully and publish more stories that were in long-read format that addressed identity, ethnicity and culture.

The significant impact of algorithms on media consumption Everyone’s presence on the Internet generates data. This includes our web cache, our e-mails and our locations. Algorithms are automatically analyzing the collected information for different purposes. This development impacts our experience of the web; it has changed our way of searching for information and how to listen to music. It has also changed the strategies and routines for online editing in the newsroom. The central part of most online news websites is the landing page. In different formats, with different design, all around the globe readers access a newspaper website and find similar features. The landing page comes with teasers, headlines and pictures combined with online-TV-players, blog teasers and a header with article categories and other information. Even though social media often plays a significant role in driving traffic to a site, landing pages remain an important vehicle for readers of a website. When several Swedish newspapers relaunched their websites in 2014 and 2015, the biggest changes were not the new headlines nor layouts that were most obvious to the readers; it was the algorithms behind them. The algorithms make the front face of the website individualized by using small components and APIs (Application Programming Interface, a specification of how a certain software can communicate with other software, for instance, to specify 414

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and read certain information from a database) that communicates with the interface that the users and readers are seeing. Using this technology, the programmers have been able to build a website that is scalable and flexible. Algorithms enable newspapers to sell advertisement based on the information they receive about their visitors. For the newsroom, algorithms should allow editors more time to work and develop editorial content rather than moving headlines up and down in a list. Since the algorithms have become embedded into the editorial work, it is not only editors who have to spend a certain amount of their workdays with data. As the journalist students Hjelmstedt and Sellfors argues in their thesis Robotjournalistikens nya utmaningar (2016), algorithms are not unique to the media landscape. They are also being used in a wide range of industries, from grocery stores that can personalize their discounts to Netflix which knows what types of series you like to watch and come up with new suggestions (Hjelmstedt and Sellfors 2017). The Swedish news agency Siren uses robots to collect court protocols, court decisions and other government documents. Its service is subscription based and a majority of all Swedish newsrooms are among the subscribers. By providing data to the algorithm, the robot can write simplified articles about the content. United Robots has developed the robot Rosalinda, which collects data from game results in different sports in order to make simple reports about the result. Several local newspaper groups have tried it out and are using it for sports coverage. The Danish news agency Ritzau has developed a robot that can identify ratio from companies’ annual reports and publish news flashes. Swedish online website Robosport.net publishes reports from soccer matches from all around the globe with a robot. Citizen reporters make interviews in order to complement the material from the robot. The editorial strategy is to allow robots to do more and more simple reports, while the journalists can focus on the analytical work (Hjelmstedt and Sellfors 2017). The impact of algorithms on editorial work is without doubt, a very significant one. In the development process, it is important that journalists are working closely with the programmers in order to create algorithms that fit within the ethical framework that surrounds journalism.

Data journalism – a new skill or not? Data journalism (or database journalism, data supported journalism or Computer Assisted Reporting (CAR)) can be seen as journalism’s response to the datafication of the society. It has initiated a discussion within the profession about what skills future journalists need to be equipped with. In listings for new journalist jobs, media companies (not only newsrooms) are searching for candidates with data handling experience, that are familiar with Excel and knows how to find news in data set. This trend is also obvious when looking at the winners of the Swedish Association for Investigating Journalists’ award Guldspaden (lit., The Golden Shovel). Among the winners from 2017 are Joachim Dyfvermark and Sven Bergman, two Swedish contributors to the worldwide investigation Panama papers. The jury also gave an honorary prize to the data journalist Kristoffer Örstadius for “bringing investigative reporting to higher levels with data journalism” (TT 2017). The development of data journalism has had an impact on the way journalism is being taught. At the Lund University School of Journalism, an annual workshop has been developed with the award-winner Örstadius where students learn how to create journalism and draw conclusions from datasets. Swedish data journalist Bengtsson argues that it is obvious that all journalists should use available tools in order to improve journalism. It has always 415

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been so. She also argues that journalism must come first and technical skills secondary. In other words, data is not more important than journalism in data journalism. The knowledge and the basics of journalism are the guiding force when analyzing data or evaluating a table (Bengtsson 2013). But is data journalism really new? Loosen, Reimer, and De Silva-Schmidt (2017) have analyzed the projects that were nominated for the Data Journalism Awards from 2013 to 2016. Their conclusion is that the impact of data journalism is not as groundbreaking as it might seem. For instance, they show that data journalism still requires a lot of labor and is more likely to complement traditional reporting rather “than replace it on a broad scale” (Loosen, Reimer and De Silva-Schmidt 2017). Data journalism could be seen as a new name for a work task that journalists have been handling for many decades: digging into statistics and interpreting the numbers into an understandable context.

Visualizing data to engage the audiences The datafication of journalism provides new opportunities to explain complex stories to an audience in a more visual way. Data visualization can be used both as a tool to find patterns in huge collections of data and to illustrate stories. There are also many illustrative examples in how data visualizations can increase the interaction with the audience and contribute to the journalistic aim: to set the agenda (Figure 28.1). In 2013, a division at the Swedish public service broadcaster SVT collaborated with an in-house meteorologist to collect weather data from 50 years to visualize how the temperature changed over 50 years from 1961 to 2011 in 37 different locations in Sweden. The result became an impressive interactive infographic showing how the annual average temperature has increased in all locations. With assistance from all local stations within the SVT network, the project was able to make several news reports with different local angles (Nosti and Sjöholm 2013). The SVT climate example illustrates one way of interpreting data journalism: to find potentials of data visualizations as a complement or a new way of making relevant infographics.

Figure 28.1

Screenshot from the TED talk with Hans Rosling entitled “Religion and Babies” (2012).

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Traditionally, journalism has been very good in reproducing charts in bars, pies or histograms. Two increasingly popular forms of digital visualizations are maps and bubble charts which make it possible to visualize different aspects of the data. Bubble-charts were popular with the respected Swedish professor Hans Rosling. In his Ted Talk entitled Religions and Babies (Rosling 2012), he used visualizations and demonstrations in order to present complex information in a very accessible way. What he actually did was to use data visualization to debunk the myths about the correlation between religions and population growth. By looking at world religions, average income and family planning, he related these figures to birth rates and population growth. His conclusion: Religion has very little to do with the birth rates of children around the globe. The fact that we will become 2–3 billion more people on the planet is unavoidable. There are many more ways to do data visualizations (maps, word clouds, timelines etc.) but nevertheless, the most important question to raise is: Are the comparisons meaningful and do they contribute to the story? Data visualizations should be seen as a graphic illustration that together with the text, headlines and pictures aims to attract the readers. It is generally also a good idea to publish the raw data together with the visualization. This allows the readers to check the data with the visualization, but also to draw their own conclusions from it. In addition, data journalism should not only be seen as a way to present data, but also as a way that allow different people to reflect at it in different ways. If more journalists seize the opportunity to invite them to contribute, there are many potentials to develop journalism in a transparent, visually appealing and interactive way.

Data and religions in Sweden as a source to misinformation Since the 1930s it has been forbidden by law to register people by their religious beliefs in Sweden, in accordance with the chapter about religious freedom in the constitution. For that reason, there is no data on how many people in Sweden have joined various religions. However, there is data from different religious communities that have a presence in Sweden are available. In 2000, the Church of Sweden (Svenska kyrkan) and the state separated from each other, meaning that Sweden no longer has an official state church. Before this time, nearly 100% of the Swedish population were members of the Church because all children born in Sweden automatically enrolled. Since 2000, however, this has not been the case. Around 60% (roughly 5.5 million) of the Swedish population (which totals roughly 9.9 million) are members of the Church and people have been leaving the Church in recent years (Swedish Institute 2014). There is no available data on how many Jewish people live in Sweden. The Official Council of Swedish Jewish Communities estimates that around 20,000 Jewish people live in Sweden and out of them, 6,000 are members of a Jewish assembly. The Swedish Institute estimates that around 130,000 people are Muslims in Sweden (around 1.5% of the population). The Pentecostal communities and the Catholic Church each have around 100,000 members (Myndigheten för stöd till trossamfund 2018). Several researchers predict that the diversity among religions in Sweden will increase following the recent surge of immigrants and refugees entering Sweden in recent years. Nevertheless, it is difficult – or impossible – to predict any remarkable increase of religious communities in the country because Sweden registers neither people’s religious beliefs nor whether they practice any particular religion (Swedish Institute 2014). One recent attempt of making a prediction was made by the American think tank organization Pew Research Institute (PEW) who released the report Europe’s Growing Muslim 417

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Population in 2018. In the report, PEW estimated the numbers of Muslims in Sweden in 2050 to be 30% of the population. This report was widely quoted in Swedish media, became viral and re-published on several alt right websites. During the following days, several Swedish researchers questioned the conclusions based on facts and research methods (Sörbring 2018). The newspaper Expressen, for example, asked Bi Puranen, Associate Professor in economic history at the Institute of Future Studies, to comment on the report from PEW. Her views of the study are negative: Surveys of this kind doesn’t need to be wrong, even though the conclusions might be. Studies like this can be used as ammunition when someone wants to run their own agendas. For that reason, it is important that we as established researchers dare to debate it. I question why Pew Research Center doesn’t consider the declining birth rates among migrants and in Muslim countries when they are conducting their calculations. Also, what is a Muslim, who counts as that? A Swedish-born person with parents with roots in Muslim countries? Do they want to lump together everyone who eventually has relationships to Islam with a few fundamentalists? (Sörbring 2018, translated by the author) In the same article, Ann-Zofie Duvander, Professor in demographics at Stockholm University, comments: Statistically, it is most likely that people continues to move, and sometimes to other countries such as United Kingdom. Some also return, and these aspects are not considered in the study. As demographic researchers, we can make valid predictions for a few years ahead, if nothing unexpected happens. Thereafter, it is all estimations which are based on assumptions. (Sörbring 2018, translated by the author) In June 2018, The Swedish Agency for Support to Faith Communities published a report that concluded that one mosque in Sweden was attacked per week during 2017. The survey was conducted between March and May 2018 and was constructed on a questionnaire distributed to 173 Muslim communities in Sweden, out of whom 106 responded. Thirty-eight of them responded that they have been physically attacked during 2017, some of them as many as ten times. The results were highlighted in several Swedish news media who produced stories about Muslim communities and interviewed Imams. In 2017, the Swedish magazine Judisk krönika ( Jewish chronicle) published an article written by the editor-in-chief Anneli Rådestad where she claimed that Swedish Jews do not dare to go public with their religious identity. She wrote that the leadership is failing when condemning hate, threats and harassments, both in school management, municipalities and on the governmental level (Rådestad 2017). The Swedish journalist Niklas Orrenius has written several articles on how antisemitism and expressions of antisemitism in our hometown Malmö is closely linked to the politics of Israel. A manifestation to support Israel during the bombings of Gaza in 2009 was interrupted by bottles, eggs, fireworks and hateful slogans against Jews. The problems with antisemitism in Malmö have been highlighted in media several times during the past years. It became world news when President Barack Obama in 2015 sent Ira Forman, the USA Special Envoy of the Office to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism, to Malmö to investigate the problem further (Orrenius 2017). 418

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Based on the data available on religion in Sweden: The complexity that comes with a multi-religious society and constitutional religious freedom must not be forgotten. Journalists aim to illustrate the contemporary society as it is. When doing so, they must remember to pose the questions, illustrate the complexity and use statistics when the data is valid.

False data enabling hate When journalists use data in order to create infographics, graphs or stories come with a significant responsibility because the results could have a tremendous impact on people’s views. In the upcoming days before the Swedish elections on 9 September 2018, I was part of a team who constructed a pop-up newsroom involving journalist students from three different universities in Sweden, fact-checkers and academic researchers from various countries. The project’s mission was to fact-check and debunk myths and rumors and to correct dis- and misinformation published on social media during the intensive election run-up (Bell 2018). One of the examples that the project participants found was a viral graph posted on Twitter showing a correlation between Muslim immigration and sexually abused women in Sweden. The data on the viral graph showed a casual relationship between male Muslim migrants in Sweden between 2000 and 2016 and the percentage of women in Sweden who are victims of sexual abuse (Williams 2018). Project participants examined data from Swedish Migration Agency and other relevant authorities and successfully debunking of the graph’s veracity showed that the numbers on asylum applicants from all countries were wrong and that there was no documentation to support the claim of number, according to the Swedish Migration Agency nor any other Swedish authority. In June 2018, the extreme-right-wing Swedish newspaper Nya Tider (lit., The New Times) published an article (later deleted) saying that the Pope Francis has demanded “Christian woman to get pregnant with Muslim men from the Middle East and Africa” (Nya Tider 2018). The whole story is built on quotes from the website Your News Wire who first published this. The statement was debunked by the Swedish website Vi ralgranskaren (lit., The Viral Checker) which referred to the original script the Pope used in the speech where he argued for the importance of European countries to integrate migrants, not specifically Muslims, rather than isolate them in segregated areas. The Pope also said that this issue is more important today, due to the decreasing birth rates in Europe (Wikén 2018). On a regular basis, Viralgranskaren also debunks viral posts on social media. In 2018, a post showing young girls with hijabs praying in a Swedish school went viral together with a text saying In more and more schools, Swedish school children are now forced to knee and pray to Allah. Löfven’s (the current Swedish Prime Minister) aim is crystal clear: Sweden shall be a Muslim nation and the stupid bastard thinks he can rule by himself. (Peterson and Joelsson, 2018, translated by the author) The debunk showed that the picture was first published in a local newspaper showing something completely different (Peterson and Joelsson 2018). Globally, fact-checking organizations are now growing rapidly following the trend of fake news, the development of media literacy and dis- and misinformation campaigns. What started as a temporary political fact-checking unit within many newsrooms has now developed into a permanent field of its own. Lucas Graves (2016) concludes in his book Deciding 419

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What’s True: The Rise of Political Fact-Checking in American Journalism that this has led to a major change in the profession. This new style of journalism offers a window onto changes in the newsroom and the wider news ecosystem. Fact-checking combines traditional reporting tools and a commitment to objectivity with the annotative, critical style first associated with bloggers. Fact-checkers practice journalism in the network mode. (Graves 2016) In Räkna med Nyheter (2013), the Swedish journalist Martin Wicklin writes about his experiences from investigating the newsrooms’ lack of knowledge about the impact of selection, non-responses and tolerance number of defects. This also showcases that skills that are necessary when working with data journalism: The journalist must be able to understand and evaluate methods in order to be able to explain, describe and provide a nuanced picture. In other words, there are several similarities between a news journalist and a researcher within social sciences. Wicklin concludes by saying that many Swedish journalists – before publishing – forgets to ask themselves the (very relevant) question: Is it reasonable? (Wicklin cited in Bengtsson 2013). The significant responsibility of handling data in journalism is important to keep in mind. Moreover, if the presented data is not reasonable, a good advice is to always check it up before publishing. During the debunking, the journalist could sometimes find even more juicy news.

Open data as a public and political issue The digitalization of media opens up for new potential to produce journalism from public data. The Swedish constitutional principle of public access to information (the first version of which dates back to 1666) has until today built up a system of archives, registration and distribution of public documents. Swedish citizens have gotten used to the fact that most information is available online which also includes forms and applications for different services. It is vital that governmental and state authorities adjust to this digital agenda, as it also is specified in the PSI- directive and the Inspire directive from the EU, which both have been implemented in Swedish law. PSI stands for Public Sector Information and is published in the European Parliament and the Council of Europe directive 2013/37/EU. Inspire stands for Infrastructure for spatial information in Europe. Several studies also show the democratic and economic benefits that e-governance provides (Regeringskansliet 2016). The Swedish public sector has yet to fully adjusted to this reality. According to a governmental report, one out of five authorities does not understand the aim and the implication of the PSI directive. It is rather easy to find information and submit application forms online, but the decision or the reply will mostly be done in hard copy through the postal service. The current Swedish Minister for Public Administration, Ardalan Shekarabi, announced in in May 2017 political actions to enhance open data to increase innovations within public sector and create new effective and smart solutions. The Swedish Agency for Public Management and the Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth were given mandates in order to improve the situation for open data. The result of their efforts is – at the time of writing – not yet published (Regeringskansliet 2016). What does this mean? On one hand, there is a lot of available data for anyone to analyze with the support from the Swedish principle of public access to information. On another 420

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hand, there needs to be much more integration to create a truly functioning digital society with full implementation of E-governance.

The impact of datafication on the profession The ongoing datafication of media has made an impact on journalistic production and the way journalism is being consumed. It offers a broad range of opportunities for newsrooms and can be seen as one of the real benefits of the digitalization process: The news organization can identify its audience’s behaviors and combine it with its own data on how to produce news. Could data be the solution for a financially unstable newspaper industry that is struggling in building its digital business models? A data-driven approach to staffing and funding decision is necessary, but will not in itself generate better quality in the journalist product. Several examples of reorganizing Swedish newsrooms show that more and more journalists have the everyday duty to read and analyze data. Social media managers and the online desks have new tools in order to analyze data in real-time. This has also been seen as an entry to the labor market for many of our students at the School of Journalism, who have emphasized their digital knowledge when applying for jobs within newsroom organizations in Sweden. In that sense, the datafication of media has also contributed to an alternation of generations within journalism. However, what does this say about the development of the profession of being a journalist? During 2009 until 2011, the researcher Jannie Møller Hartley conducted ethnographic fieldwork in Danish newsrooms to explore the development of the online journalist profession. Her analysis shows that the journalist profession still is deeply embedded into old forms of journalism, which includes specialist knowledge and technical skills. Her research also concludes by her interviewees stating that old journalism is seen as better journalism: The transformations of the field of journalism, following the increased importance of online journalism, create a gap in the online journalistic self-perception, not a new gap, but the gap between the experienced ideal and practice is more substantial for them due to increased and more present constraints on their autonomy. (Hartley 2013, 584) Considering the development investigative reporting, a trend emerges where the influx of data into the online field of journalism creates opportunities for a professionalization of the online field of journalism, which reduces the gap Møller Hartley describes. In other words, what data driven journalism stands for is a combination between what is described as old ideals and new technology. However, there is a risk that the focus on business decision-making on what can be measured by data, in concrete terms: article clicks and social media shares, creates a situation where it is not so lucrative to invest in activities such as investigating journalism and in-depth reporting. An increased focus on so-called clickbait also challenges one of the traditional values of journalism: to inform its audience about things they did not know, they were interested in or about beforehand. The American viral website BuzzFeed might be mostly famous for clickbait articles about Netflix dramas, relation advices and tasty recipes, but has a strategy to use these kinds of content to draw attention on more in-depth journalism. Whether it is a successful strategy – or not, remains to be evaluated (Tran 2014). 421

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The Swedish media landscape has adapted, and struggled with, the development of easily digested click-bait stories. The online news website Nyheter24 (lit., News24) could be seen as a Swedish attempt of doing what TMZ is doing globally: producing easy news in an almost symbiotic relation with reality-TV with an attempt to follow the young readers’ interests in order to create a business. On the other hand, one can also determine how several traditional media organizations (with a traditional digital news websites) have launched websites aiming to attract traffic through social media using clickbait strategies. The newspaper Expressen launched Omtalat (lit., spoken about) in 2014 which was entirely based on viral clips, pictures and gossips and inspired by the American website Upworthy. A few months later, their competitor Schibsted (that owns the tabloid newspaper Aftonbladet) launched their similar website Lajkat (lit., liked) (Thomsen 2014). The same year Newsner.com was launched by the content agency News365. Newsner outnumbered the two other Swedish viral websites in shares and engagement on social media platforms. In the Swedish media landscape, it was described as a David versus Goliath competition when the small content agency in 2016 passed the two major media groups attempt of making a profit of viral media (Mackhé 2017). The digital transition of journalism has just started and the datafication plays a significant role in the process of finding financial models, stories and news. The journalist profession is also undergoing a transition when the work skills are changing because of datafication.

Conclusion The development of journalism over time can be seen as an ever-evolving and dynamic process rather than the consequences of deliberate changes to industry. At the School of Journalism at Lund University, it is evident that the transformation stems from a generation of journalists who (like myself ) have grown up with computers and know how to use them in order to improve journalism. As this chapter has discussed datafication influences journalism in two different ways: • •

Data can contribute to journalists’ stories and reports and can provide digital opportunities in research and presentation. Data also provides measurement tools to develop the business models in the media industry, which is vital for any newspaper company in order to develop commercial tracking of its products.

In a world with constant information overload, data-driven journalism provides an opportunity to use previously inaccessible information and tools to find the stories and people behind the numbers. Data can also be used to create more significant engagement with the audience. The datafication of media offers opportunities to engage users into the news to a much larger extent then was possible before digitalization. The last decade has brought significant challenges for those working in the field of journalism, some of which have been exacerbated by the datafication of media. In Sweden, many news reporters lost their jobs since 2010 due to the lack of new sustainable business models in the digital era. A shift in demographics in the newsroom has led to many of the new editorial positions such as breaking news reporter, online editor, desk editor etc., being moved the fields to desks inside the newsrooms. This shift is a result of journalists’ increased time pressure and creates an environment with more generalists than specialists (Palm and Bjellert 2012). How can these challenges be leveraged to change? Embracing the development of algorithms and robot journalism, I do believe it could benefit the work inside the newsrooms. 422

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Instead of doing monotonous work, updating tables and writing news from the stock market or the weather forecast, journalists can focus on more in-depth, analytical and reflecting journalism. This in turn should also create new financial benefits for the media companies involved. In an era where we discuss fake news, alternative facts and evaluation of information are lively topics of debate, a more responsible and strategic use of data within news reporting is needed. Fact checkers and viral observers are spreading across the global media landscapes and some of these digital toolboxes will soon be embedded into our editorial systems. Looking into the future, it is fair to say that the datafication of journalism will have a major impact on how the field develops. One can identify how journalism adjusts to readers’ interests, in the democratic aspects of data-driven journalism and allows the media industry to develop a more diverse production of journalism. Embracing and emphasizing the diversity within journalism also justifies the diversity in the world – no matter if your coverage is based on a (hyper)local, regional, national or global level. It is fair to say that the influx of data has provided us with a new set of tools. Why not start by thinking twice about what questions we should ask?

Further readings Graves, L., 2016. Deciding What’s True: The Rise of Political Fact-Checking in American Journalism. New York and Chichester: Columbia University Press. This book is based on the author’s access to American outlets who are leading the movement of political fact checking in the United States. The author reflects on their remaking of journalistic ethics and practice and the professional change it has created. Hartley, J. M., 2013. The Online Journalist between Ideals and Audiences. Journalism Practice, [e-­journal] 7(5). Available at https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2012.755386, accessed 12 August 2018. This paper focus on how the journalist profession has adjusted or not adjusted to the digitalization of the media industry. It shows how the online field has created new ideals and norms on how journalists view themselves. Loosen, W., Reimer, J. and De Silva-Schmidt, F., 2017. Data-Driven Reporting: An on Going (R) evolution? An Analysis of Projects Nominated for the Data Journalism Awards 2013–2016. Journalism, [e-journal]. Available at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1464884917735691, accessed July 21 2018. This article is analyzing projects that was nominated for Data Journalism Awards 2013–2016 and is analyzing the innovative approach and the potentials of the methods on creating impact and improvement. Mayer-Schönberger, V. and Cukier, K., 2014. Big Data: A Revolution that Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think. Boston: Eamon Dolan/Mariner Books. This book introduces the readers to big data and how it is reshaping our lives: or as the authors state: “[Big Data] is the oil of the information economy” (p. 14). It also deals with privacy issues where big data has made it more difficult to protect people’s integrity. Swedish Institute, 2014. Religion in Sweden. sweden.se, [online] 8 February. Available at https://­ sweden.se/society/10-fundamentals-of-religion-in-sweden/, accessed 7 June 2018. This information pamphlet is a great start for anyone who is interested in knowing more about religions and its presence in Sweden.

References Amnesty International India, 2018. Why We Need to Talk about Online Violence against Women in ­India. Available at https://amnesty.org.in/need-talk-online-violence-women-india-2/, accessed 10 March 2018. Bell, F., 2018. Announcing Pop-Up Newsroom: Riksdagsvalet 2018. Pop-Up Newsroom, [online] 28 ­August. Available at https://medium.com/popupnews/announcing-pop-up-newsroom-­r iksdagsvalet2018-cc219b6f6464, accessed 23 April 2018.

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Andreas Mattsson Bengtsson, H., 2013. Räkna med nyheter: journalisters (ibland obesvarade) förkärlek för siffror och statistik. Stockholm: Stiftelsen Institutet för mediestudier (Simo). Bradshaw, P. and Rohumaa, L., 2011. The Online Journalism Handbook: Skills to Survive and Thrive in the Digital Age. Harlow: Longman. Bruns, A., 2016. Big Data Analysis. In: Wutschge, T., Anderson, C. W., Domingo, D. and Hermida, A., eds. The SAGE Handbook of Digital Journalism. London: Sage Publications. Graves, L., 2016. Deciding What’s True: The Rise of Political Fact-Checking in American Journalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Hartley, J. M., 2013. The Online Journalist between Ideals and Audiences. Journalism Practice, [e-journal] 7(5). Available at https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2012.755386, accessed 3 February 2018. Hjelmstedt, O. and Sellfors, M., 2017. Robotjournalistikens nya utmaningar. Available through Lund University Libraries website https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/search/publication/8901427, accessed 5 March 2018. Hoang, P., 2017. Social Networks Serving as Platform for Public Trashing in Vietnam – National University. VnExpress International, [online] 12 April. Available at https://e.vnexpress.net/news/ news/social-networks-serving-as-platform-for-public-trashing-in-vietnam-national-university-3569447.html, accessed 10 September 2018. Loosen, W., Reimer, J. and De Silva-Schmidt, F., 2017. Data-Driven Reporting: An On-going (R) evolution? An Analysis of Projects Nominated for the Data Journalism Awards 2013–2016. Journalism, [e-journal]. Available at https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884917735691, accessed 28 November 2017. Mackhé, P., 2017. Newsner växte mest på Facebook. Dagensanalys.se, [online]. Available at https:// www.dagensanalys.se/2017/01/newsner-storst-pa-facebook-2016/, accessed 30 October 2017. Mattsson, A. and Isaksson, O., 2017. Redaktionellt arbete i förändring. In: Olsson, T., ed. Sociala Medier Vetenskapliga Perspekt. Malmö: Gleerups Utbildning AB. Mattsson, A. and Rajagopal, D., 2017. Digital Do’s and Dont’s – The Indian Perspective. Journalistutbildningen, [online] 2 March. Available at https://www.journalistik.lu.se/article/digital-dos-anddonts-the-indian-perspective, accessed 10 March 2018. Mayer-Schönberger, V. and Cukier, K., 2014. Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think. Reprint edition. Boston: Eamon Dolan/Mariner Books. Myndigheten för stöd till trossamfund, 2018. TROSSAMFUND I SVERIGE []. Available at https:// www.myndighetensst.se/kunskap/statistik-om-trossamfund.html, accessed 6 July 2018. Nosti, H. and Sjöholm, K., 2013. Så mycket har temperaturen ökat. SVT Nyheter, [online] 18 September. Available at https://www.svt.se/pejl/se-hur-mycket-varmare-det-har-blivit-nara-dig, accessed 30 October 2017. Nya Tider, 2018. Nya Tider beklagar felaktig artikel. Nya Tider, [online] 23 June. Available at https://www.nyatider.nu/pave-franciscus-uppmanar-europeiska-kvinnor-att-skaffa-barn-medmuslimska-man-for-integrationens-skull/, accessed 23 January 2018. Olai, L., 2016. “Det sitter i ryggraden” : en studie om den journalistiska magkänslan. Available through Lund University Libraries website https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/search/publication/8595482, accessed 3 March 2018. Orrenius, N., 2017. Brandattacken är fruktansvärd – men borde inte komma som en överraskning. DN.SE, [online]. Available at https://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/niklas-orrenius-brandattackenar-fruktansvard-men-borde-inte-komma-som-en-overraskning/, accessed 6 July 2018. Palm, G. and Bjellert, P., 2012. En trygg polis i ett otryggt samhälle. Available through Linnaeus University website http://lnu.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf ?pid=diva2%3A588325&dswid=-6369, accessed 5 April 2018. Peterson, D. and Joelsson, F., 2018. Nej, barn tvingades inte be till Allah i svensk skola. Metro, [online] 14 June. Available at https://www.metro.se/artikel/nej-barn-tvingades-inte-be-till-allah-isvensk-skola, accessed 21 September 2018. Rådestad, A., 2017. Sverige 2017. Ska vi placera chanukian i fönstret eller på bordet? Judisk Krönika, [online] 8 December. Available at http://judiskkronika.se/att-placera-en-atta-armad-ljusstake/, accessed 6 July 2018. Regeringskansliet, 2016. Digitalisering av offentlig sektor. Regeringskansliet, [online] 9 October. Available at http://www.regeringen.se/regeringens-politik/digitaliseringspolitik/digital-forvaltning/, accessed 30 October 2017. Religions and Babies. 2012. [Youtube video] Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ezVk1ahRF78, accessed 6 March 2019.

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Datafication as a trend for journalism Schori, M., 2016. Online Only: allt du behöver veta för att bli morgondagens Journalist. Stockholm: Carlsson. Sörbring, K., 2018. Omstridd studie: Kan bli 30 procent muslimer i Sverige. EXPRESSEN, [online] 30 June. Available at https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/omstridd-studie-kan-bli-30-procentmuslimer-i-sverige/, accessed 13 June 2018. Swedish Institute, 2014. Religion in Sweden. sweden.se, [online] 16 April. Available at https://sweden. se/society/10-fundamentals-of-religion-in-sweden/, accessed 6 July 2018. Thomsen, D., 2014. Här är Schibsteds nya viralsajt. Dagens Media., [online] Available at https://www. dagensmedia.se/medier/digitalt/har-ar-schibsteds-nya-viralsajt-6099441, accessed 30 October 2017. Tran, M., 2014. The Business Behind BuzzFeed’s Growth and Expansion: 8 Good Questions with BuzzFeed’s Eric Harris. Am. Press Inst., [online] 4 September. Available at https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/publications/good-questions/business-behind-buzzfeeds-growth-expansion-8good-questions-buzzfeeds-eric-harris/, accessed 30 October 2017. TT, 2017. Årets Guldspadar är utdelade. Sydsvenskan, [online] 8 April. Available at https://www.sydsvenskan.se/2017-04-08/arets-guldspadar-ar-utdelade, accessed 30 October 2017. van Dijck, J., 2014. Datafiction, dataism and dataveillance: Big Data between Scientific Paradigm and Secular Belief. Surveillance and Society, 12(2), 197–208. Von Krogh, T., ed., 2011. Specialreportern: framväxt, funktion, framtid. Stockholm: Stiftelsen Institutet för mediestudier (Simo). Wikén, J., 2018. Nej, påven uppmanade inte “europeiska kvinnor att skaffa barn med muslimska män”. Metro, [online] 25 June. Available at https://www.metro.se/artikel/nej-p%C3%A5ven-uppmanade-inte-europeiska-kvinnor-att-skaffa-barn-med-muslimska-m%C3%A4n, accessed 21 September 2018. Williams, H., 2018. MISLEADING: Graph Uses Unidentifiable Data to Compare Male Muslim Immigration and Sexual Abuse of Women in Sweden. Pop-Up Newsroom Riksdagsvalet 2018, [online] 9 September. Available at http://riksdagsvalet18.popup.news/2018/09/09/misleading-graph-usesunidentifiable-data-to-compare-male-muslim-immigration-and-sexual-abuse-of-women- insweden/, accessed 4 July 2018. Your News Wire, 2018. Pope Francis Orders White Women to “Breed” with Muslims. archive.li., [online] 3 June. Available at http://archive.li/jXt1l, accessed 2 April 2019.

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INDEX

Note: Bold page numbers refer to tables; italic page numbers refer to figures and page numbers followed by “n” denote endnotes. Acta Diurna (daily events or daily record) 383 Action Chapel International (ACI) 137, 140, 144 Afghanistan: and Iraq, invasions of 19; Taliban regime in Afghanistan 2001 68 Africa: Benny Samba (online Animatrices in Kinshasa) 158–161; Boko Haram 162; Catholic missions 154; digital innovations 162; gender 152; griotte 152; intersections of religion and news 153; journalism 152; news media 151–152; Nkhani Zam’maboma 153; occult powers, role of 161–162; programs of Radio Vatican 153; radio and television 153; religion 162; religious and non-religious media 154; religious gatherings 154; religious media 153, 154; religious ownership 153; studying religion, news journalism and women 153–154; suspicion of kindoki 151; weddings and baptisms 163n1; West Africa’s Griottes 156–158; women and news media in Sub-Saharan Africa 154–156 African journalism: Boko Haram 246; Christianity 246–247, 248–249; Habermasian notion of public sphere 248; Islam 248–249; New Media and Religious Transformations in Africa 248; Pentecostalism 136; political renaissance 245–247; religious explosion 136; religious fervor 247–248; scholarship on media 249, 256 African news media and Islam: benevolent acts for Muslim communities 253–254; Boko Haram and frame of terror 250–251; conflict, crime and danger 254–255; Ghanaian Muslims and frame of national piety 251–253; messages from Muslim and non-Muslim

authorities 254; Muslim holy days and events 253; preliminary conclusions 255–256 “agenda-driven journalism” 58 Agrawal, B. C. 122–123, 131 Akufo-Addo: Zongo Development Fund 254 Alexa 354 Al Qaeda 250, 343 American Academy of Religion 387 American civil religion 8, 170–172, 176–179 American Council of Churches (ACC) 173 American culture 40, 263, 275 American democracy 50 “American electronic-church ‘televangelism’” 373 American exceptionalism 170 American journalism: history context 32; idea of balance 272; muckrakers 273, 274; The New York Times 273, 275; party press era 272–273; penny press newspapers 273; Pilgrim’s Progress 274; reform vs. objective/commercial tradition 272–274; 20th century 273–274 The American Newspaper 266 American politics: media coverage of religion 169; religion and politics, relationship between 169–170 Anderson, J. W. 123, 338 animatrices (Kinshasa’s digital sphere) 7 “anti-American” 176 anti-black/brown racism 287 anti-fascist Never Again Association 283 anti-migrants 17 Anti-Muslim prejudice 282 anti-refugee rhetoric 17 Application Programming Interface (APIs) 414

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Index Appreciative Inquiry (AI) 391 Arab journalism 127 Arab media 123, 127 Arab press: Seventies (1987) 123 archaic religion 32; cosmological monism 32; sacred/profane 33; social collective 43 Areopagitica 271–272 Asian mass media: India, religious authority and journalism (case study) 131–132; Islamic countries, religious authority and journalism (case study) 125–128; Israel, religious authority and journalism (case study) 128–131; journalism and religious authority 123–124, 125; religious authority, definition 122; Worlds of Journalism Study (2019) 123–124, 125 Associated Press 363, 387 audience: beliefs and anxieties 23; centered approaches 26; channels for public expression 27; European 23; portal 21; role of 26 authentic Hinduism 241 authority 110–113; African 254; Brazilian 111, 118; Britain 98–100; European 95–96; Indian 131–132; Islamic countries and journalism 125–128; Israel 128–131; journalism 7; power and dialogue and peacebuilding 5 authorized knowers 49–50 automation 275; and foreign competition 85; and robo-journalism 407 Axial Age 32, 33 Axner, M. 67, 102 Ayatollahy, H. 368, 374 Ayish, M. I. 123, 125 Ayodhya: Babri Masjid mosque 234, 239 Ayurveda 238 bad Islam 342–344 Baha’i community 360 balanced reporting 240, 360, 383, 384 Bangladesh 123–127 Basic Ecclesial Communities (BECs) 217–218 BBC 21–22, 50, 52, 58, 341, 343, 370, 387 BBC News 344–345 Beliefnet 393 Bellah, R. 31, 32, 38, 42, 170–171, 178, 274; modern post-enlightenment religion 6; theory of religion in human evolution 6 Benedict XVI, Pope 99, 192 Bengaluru 235, 236 Benny Samba (online animatrices in Kinshasa) 158–161; b-star concept 160; chroniqueur and animateur 159; digital chroniqueurs or animateurs 158–159; female influencers 159; Kinois community 160; personal social and spiritual world 160; polémique 160, 161; relevance 161 Berger, P. 31, 33, 38

Bharitya Janata Party (BJP) 232 Bhushan, S. 240; Power of Social Media 240 Bhutan 123–124 black men: Brazil’s 222; race 219; “threatening and violent” 81 black woman: black achievement 85; black mothers, “immoral and neglectful” 81; concept of gender 221; Foucauldian notion 221; gender symbology 220–221; intersectionality 219–220, 220 Boko Haram: ahistorical depictions 251; to establish Islamic caliphate 250; and frame of terror 250–251; media representations 246; in Nigeria 9, 245, 246, 250; radical religious developments 162 Bolter, J. D. 191, 193 Brahmanic Hinduism 240 Brazil: Casa da Mulher Brasileira, creation of 204; cases of harassment 225; conservative political-religious digital activism 207; demographic census 224; exclusivist journalistic coverage 203; female voices in journalism 224; feminazi, establishment of gay dictatorship 204; Folha de Sao Paulo and the Jornal Nacional 203; freedom of expression 207; gender ideology 206; Globo Television 206; Internet 2.0 or participatory Internet 207; Jornal da Record 203; Journalism in 221–224; journalistic coverage and interlacing of religion and gender issues (case study) 202–207; journalists 222, 223, 224; life story of Christian black Woman journalist (case study) 225–228; Maria da Penha 204; Massacre of Eldorado dos Carajas 229n3; online petition 205; plural religious landscape 202–203; political-religious reconfiguration 229; Portuguese Royal Family 302; profile of media professionals 221–222; Record channel 203–204; religious media 204; secular media 204; social-digital networks 206; women’s rights in society and LGBTI population 204 Brazilian journalism: black magic practices 306; Brazilian Federal Constitution 303; CAPES Foundation 309; Catalog of Theses and Dissertations by CAPES Foundation 304; Christianity and Iberian Catholicism 296; cultural and imaginary construction 301; description 299–301; dominant religion 297, 307; dominant religion or predominant religion 301; “editorial line” of the media channels 306–307; freedoms of expression and worship 303; Iberian Roman Catholicism 296; imaginary significations 300; intolerance, religious 298, 303–304, 304–307; journalistic statement of impartiality, notion of 300; lack of knowledge or ignorance 306; learning and perspectives for future studies

428

Index 308–309; low incidence of news 305–306; natural order of things 301; neutrality 300; news, religions in 296–298, 307; news-value in journalism, notion of 299; Ombudsman Office of the Ministry of Human Rights 304; Pentecostalism 296; predominance of Christianity 297; Preliminary Results 303; Protestant missionaries 302–303; public policies on human rights 308; relegere-religio: religare, religion, devotion 298; religions 298–299; religious freedom 303; RIRVB (case study) 303, 304, 305, 305, 307, 308; ritual practices in public spaces 306, 306; true and valid religion 301; Universal Declaration of Human Rights 303; violence, religious 298, 302–303, 304–307 Brazilian news media: Folha de S. Paulo (FSP) 297; Globo Network 297; Jornal Nacional ( JN) 297; religious intolerance 298; theme religion 297; TV news production 297 Brazilian religious scenario 7; challenges for religion, authority and journalism 118; definition of religion 110; Evangelicals in news (1990s–2010s), case study 113–115; good press and fake news, case study 115–118; mediatizing religion, religion, authority and journalism 110–113 Breitbart News 268 Brink-Danan, M. (2015) (case study) 366, 376–378; influences on journalism and religion 378; Jewish diaspora in Turkey 377–378; “lived cosmopolitanism” of journalists 377; Şalom 377–378 Britain: acceptable diversity 99–100; activist atheism and secularism 100; atheism and secularism 101; negotiations of authority 98–100; representations of Islam 99–100; secular news journalism 100; seekership approach 100 British media: Islamophobia 100; Muslim Council 47; newspapers 99 Buddhism 110; inspired mindful journalism 32; journalism 42 Bunte 192 Bush, G. W. 80, 281 BuzzFeed 421 Canada: General Social Surveys 355; indigenous spirituality in 358; non-Indigenous and Indigenous peoples 359; public hearings 359 capitalism 42–43, 273, 312; spirit 35–36; world system 375 Caravan 233, 239 Carneiro, S. 219, 227 Carter, Jimmy 174; Christian good works, 1980 268 Catholic Church 41, 118; sex abuse scandal 186

Catholic doctrine 50 Catholicism 8, 67; Sagrada Familia 8; with sexual abuse 53 charisma 139 Charlie Hebdo attacks: news on Islam after 342, 346 Chaves, M. 38–39 Cheong, P. M. 104, 402 Chicago Tribune 79, 88, 90 Chinese characteristics: aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attack 313–314; believers in Buddhism 311; China Daily 313; Chinese communist party (CCP) 311, 313, 314; Christianity and Islam, as foreign faiths 311, 313, 314–316; Confucianism and Daoism 311; Cultural Revolution 311, 314; Evangelical churches and Vatican-led Catholicism (case study on Christianity) 317; fake news 319; feudal superstition 311; foreign powers 319; foreign threats 311; Global Times 316; Great Chinese Famine 314; Great Leap Forward 314; Han Kitab (Sino-Islamic texts) 314; Hong Kong of the Special Administrative Region (SAR) 319; Hui Muslims and Uyghur Muslims (case study on Islam) 318; jiao, notion of 312; lack of free press 311; marketization liberalized journalism 315; 1919 May-Fourth movement 312; modern journalism, rise of 312–313; Muslims in China 314; Open Door Policy 313–315, 314; path of marketization 314; People’s Republic of China (PRC) 311, 316; printing machinery 313; religion and journalism 315–316; religious dialogue and peacebuilding 313–315; securitization of social media 315; ‘Sing Hallelujah to the Lord’ 318–320; Sinicization of religious faith 311, 315, 319; sinicizing religion and securitizing online 316–317; social media, usage of 311; Tsuen Wan Yat Po/ Xunhuan Ribao newspaper 313; understanding religion and journalism 312–313; Western Christian missionaries 311, 313 Christianity 9, 22; African journalism 248–249; Bible and 271; Christian Action Faith Ministry 140; Christian Century 369; Christian Coalition 175; Christian Right 169; “Christian West” 4; Church of England, Journalism and (case study) 47, 53–55; as civilizational identity 63; denominations 47; evangelical 80; God’s punishment 271; inerrancy of Bible 80; insularity 8; Jesus as a personal savior 80; marginalization of 99; Old Testament 144; Orthodox 281; “performative utterances” 144; power of Holy Spirit 143–144; problem of politics 34; reality of Heaven and Hell 80; in regional contexts 4–5; Roman Catholic Church 271; selfsecularizing religion 31

429

Index citizen journalism 9, 24, 361–362; rise of 358 civic journalism 42 Civil Rights movement 81, 83 classic secularization thesis 97; decline of religion 97; deprivatization of religion 97; diasporic intensification 97–98; differentiation of society 97; privatized religion 97 CNN 267, 370 CNN International 372 collective work 355–357 colonialism and industrialization 42 Committee for Propagating Virtue and Preventing Vice 126 Communalism Combat 233 communication, religion and: archaic religion 32; Axial Age 32, 33; in Catholic Church in Germany 48; diffusion of news paradigm 36–37; early modern religion 32; historical religion 32; immanent/transcendent 32; institutional differentiation, rationalization and worldliness 38; modern stage 32; oral, written, print, electronic, and digital media societies 33; religious and enlightenment roots of journalism and secularization 33–36; religious/secular 32; right to free expression 35; rise of science and secularization 37; sacred/profane 33; secularization paradigm 38–40; social reality 39; specialists 389; tribal religion 32–33; vicarious religion 39–40 community: Baha’i 360; benevolent acts for Muslim 253–254; Islamic 9; Kinois 160; Muslim 251–252, 255–256; Sikh 233 Computer Assisted Reporting (CAR) 415 conflict journalism: definition 186; qualities of 9; radicalization and populism 8; religion and (see religious conflicts, digital age) Congress Party 239 contemporary India, contexts of journalism in: all-pervasive truth, establishment of an 232; vernacular journalism, rise of 232–233 Content Management Systems (CMS) 411 Coptic Orthodox Church: Archbishop Angaelos of 47, 59; Journalism and (case study) 55–56 coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2): Urbi et Orbi 3 Cottle, S 368, 371 covenant thinking 270 critical discourse analysis (CDA) 283 cross-border journalism 370 culture wars 172, 174 Curtin, M 370, 371 cyber publics, India 239 The Daily Mail 17, 24 Danbury Baptist Church 179n1 data-driven approach 421 datafication 11; algorithms on media consumption 414–415; data and religions,

Sweden 417–419; data for journalism, importance of 413; data journalism 415–416; false data enabling hate 419–420; impact on profession 421–422; of journalism 423; open data as public and political issue 420–421; religious (see religious datafication); visualizing data to engage audiences 416–417; working with news and data 413–414 data handling experience 415 dataism 407 data journalism 398, 415–416 data visualization 416–417; bubble-charts 417; SVT network 416; Ted talk 416, 417 Davie, G 39, 95 Dawkins, R. 99, 267 deep mediatization 10 Democracy in America 171 democratic deliberation: role of media 6 Denmark 62, 124, 340; cartoon controversy in 3 deprivatization of religion 97 DeRose-Hinkhouse Memorial Awards 384 developmental journalism approach 246, 326 diasporic intensification 97–98 differentiated journalism: about religion, examples of 358–363 differentiation 10; continue/change, challenging journalism about religion in future 363–364; examples of differentiated journalism about religion 358–363; implications/consequences about religion 355–358; in realm of reporting on religion 353–355; trust factor 364 (de-)differentiation and religion in digital news 10; advent of the Internet 338; Bad Islam 342–344; description 338; differentiation, definition 337; explicit criticism 337; Islamification of religion in the news 340–341; “a journalist-centered approach” 339; mass media 337; mediating Islam 344–346; modern compulsion to compartmentalize life 338; new publics 338–339; news on Islam after Charlie Hebdo attacks 342; post-truth, concept of 339; religion as a minor topic in the news 339–340; rethinking differentiation in terms of religion in digital news 346–347; social and cultural phenomena 337–338; theorizing differentiation 337–339 digital age: hyperpictures and religious conflicts 192–193; making religious conflicts visible in print magazines (case study) 191–192; religious content and interactions 401; religious datafication 401–404; research on journalism, religion and conflict 187–191; visual journalism, religion and conflict 194–195 Digital India initiative, launch of 240 digitalization 4; and media 8

430

Index digital media 25; automation 194; modularity 194; numerical representation 194; transcoding 194; variability 194 digital story 358 digital technologies 386, 398 The Diplomat 236 Dobbelaere: dimensions of secularization 39 Doordarshan 237 dramatic news stories 20 Duda, Andrzej 284 Duncan-Williams, N. (Archbishop, Ghana): of Action Chapel International 137; prayer over Ghana’s currency 140–144 Durkheim, E. 31, 38 Durkheimian sense 42

illegitimate religious subjects 114; mainstream media coverage 114; newspaper Folha de Sao Paulo 113; religious scholars 113–114 Evangelical vote 172, 173, 174, 175, 176 Evangelical vs. Evangelical 172–173 ex-data or data cleansing processes 408 experientialist or practice-based approaches 25 Extremism: Babri Masjid mosque in Ayodhya 239; Hindu (see Hindu Extremism); Islamic 22, 67; reporting religion 238–239; threats against key actors 239

Edamaruku, Sanal 237 East India Company 386 echo chambers 21 Economic and Political Weekly 236 editorial decision-making 356 education: and culture, Brazilian 115; free 146; role of media, Poland 290 Eickleman, D. E. 123, 338 electronic translation 388 Enlightenment 35, 270 Erdogan era 126 ethics: African journalism 245–248; Christianity and Islam in African public spheres 248–249; contribution 256; coverage in 2017 21; future of field 256; journalism 266–268; media and religious pluralism 249–250; modern separation 270–272; relativism 235; virtues and values 264–265 Eurobarometer surveys 41 Europe: attack on Berlin Christmas Market in 2016 186; as bulwark of Christianity 282; Islamophobic nation 287 European Enlightenment context 32 European journalism: authority 95–96; boundaries of 96; implications 102–105; liberal (case of Finland) 100–102; mediation of religion 98; mediatization of religion 96–97; negotiations of authority 98–100; publicization of religion 97–98; religion and authority 95–96, 96; religion and media 95–96 European media discourse 64 European Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality 64 ‘Evangelical’ and ‘conservative Protestant’ 180n2 Evangelical Christianity 148 Evangelicals in news, Brazil (1990s–2010s), case study 113; Afro-Brazilian religions 114; bankrupt television network, Rede Record 113; Brazilian education and culture 115; decline of Catholicism 114; kick of the saint episode 113–114; legitimate religious agents and

Facebook 362 face-to-face communication 376 fairness issue 85; culture of poverty 88; problem of black Americans 88 faith: decline and secularity of journalists-to-be (case study) 274–275; foreign, Christianity and Islam 311, 313, 314–316; Muslim 127; sinicization of religious 311, 315, 319 fake news 24, 41, 44, 115–116, 264, 286, 315, 319, 333, 362, 385, 388, 412 fake religion 41 Falwell, J. 172, 173–175 family as nuclear entity, Latin America: complexities of gender, religion and new media 201–202; emergence of social movements 200; gender, notions of 201; marianismo 201; mononuclear family model 200–201; religion and gender 202; Sagrada Familia 201; telenovelas or advertising or marketing 201 far-right groups 17, 23 Fatwa On-line and dar Alifta 127 feature journalism 66 The Federalist 268 feminist movements 8 filter bubbles 21; of religion 362 Finland 7; Finnish Orthodox Church 101–102; Helsingin Sanomat 100; liberal not antireligious - journalism, case study 100–102; media coverage of religion 101 Finneman, N. 33, 43 Flory, R. 37, 41 Folha de Sao Paulo 112, 113 “the Fourth Estate” see watchdog theory of journalism FOX News 267 framing, Scandinavian context 65; humaninterest frame 70–71, 72; media logic and shared themes and stories 68–69; of religion, women and equality in Swedish editorials 67–68 Francis, Pope 111, 282, 367, 419 Franklin, B. 263, 272 freedom of expression 62, 205, 207, 291, 300, 303, 308

431

Index freedom of religion 6, 70, 72, 238 freedom of speech 6, 68, 319, 327 Freston, P. 113, 199 Frias family 112 Frontline 233, 239 Gardner, J. C. 399, 400 Gauri Lankesh 236; Gauri Lankesh Patrike 236; murder of 8, 237 Gaza: Islamist movement Hamas in Gaza 2006 68 Gazeta Prawna 284 Geez magazine 358 gender 81, 116–117; Africa 152; balance in media 155–156; black woman 221; Brazil 206; complexities of 201–202; ideology 116–117, 206; issues 5, 207; notions of 201; overlapping race 215–216; in poverty 81; in press 63–65; religion and 202; roles 200–202; symbology 220–221 gender equality 6, 8, 62–64, 67–68, 71–72, 115, 200, 202, 204, 206, 209, 281 Germany 186–192 Ghana: African economy 7; Daily Graphic 141, 251–252, 255; daily graphic coverage 252, 252–253; Daily Guide 252; and frame of national piety 251–253; Ghana News Agency 251; Graphic Online 252; Islamic communities 9, 245; Muslim communities 251–252, 255–256; religious landscape 7 Ghanaian news media: Babalawo (Father of secrets) 139; cartooning a charismatic prophetic prayer 141–142; computer-mediated communication 137–138; defining journalism 137–138; Duncan-Williams, Nicholas 137, 140–144; interrogating prayer for the cedi’s resurrection 143–144; media 138; Otabil, Mensa 137, 144–148; Pentecostal/charismatic power, media and journalism 139–140; religion 138–139; religion, journalism and the future in Africa 148–149; spirit and economics 142–143 global dominance-paradigm 371–372 globalization 10–11; Brink-Danan (2015) (case study) 366, 376–378; definition 368–370; diversity, not unity; nation versus culture 369–372; globalization theories 369–372; for global journalism, challenges of 366–368; Hosseini (2008) (case study) 366, 376–378; influence of systems 376; journalism and religion 368–369; journalists and recipients as actors 375; of media companies 375–376; phase model 371; religion in media 372–376 globalized world: journalism and technology 383; journalist writing about religion 382; literary journalism and religion 385–386; news 382–383; new terrain 387–388; new

ways to share religious news 389; personal, local and networked 388–389; religious and religion journalism, difference between 384; technology, globalization and writing about religion 386–387; TIO (see The Interfaith Observer (TIO)); United religions initiative 390–392 global journalism 367, 370 Global Public Sphere paradigm 371–372 Globo network 112, 113 glocalization 372, 378 God men and women 237 Golden Rule 270 good press and fake news: Afro-Brazilian culture 117; Afro-Brazilian religions and leftwing celebrities 117; “the gay kit” 116; Gospel Prime and Gospel+ accuse Globo’s telenovelas 115, 116, 117; ideology of gender 116–117; left-wing administrations, rise of 115; “new right,” right-wing agents, rise of 115–116; print media 115; right-wing mobilization 115–116; via social media 117–118 Google Analytics 414 Google’s Home devices 354 Google Spreadsheets 411 Gower, O. 19, 47, 65 Graves, L.: Deciding What’s True: The Rise of Political Fact-Checking in American Journalism 419–420 Great Britain 7 Great War 24 griottes (West Africa) 7 guard dog theory of journalism 47, 51, 52, 53, 59 The Guardian 57, 344, 387 Gunaratne, S. 42, 43 Guttenberg, J.: in Germany 125 Hackett, R. I. J. 249, 324 halakhah ( Jewish religious law) 128 Haredi daily newspapers 129 Haredi rabbis 129–130 hashtags 205, 343, 357, 360 Hassidic Haredi stream 128 Hearst, W. R. 266, 383 Hebrew Scriptures 270 The Hindu 131 Hindu Extremism: in contemporary India 232–234; contested religion and assaults on journalism 236–237; context of religious extremism 238–239; journalism in time of trolls and twitter 239–241; religion and media 237–238; split publics, religion and journalism 234–235 Hinduism 122, 131; Aastha TV channel 132; authentic traditions 238; dharma, belief in 132; spirituality 131 Hindu nationalism 235; and Modi 240; rise of 233

432

Index The Hindu newspaper 237, 239 Hindustan Times 236 Hindutva (the Hindu Nation) 232, 234 HinduUnity.org 241 historical religion 32; immanent/ transcendent 32 Hjarvard, S. 96–97, 102; journalism on religion 66 Hobbes, T. 34, 271; Leviathan 34 Hollande, François 345 holy days, Muslim: Eid-ul-Adha 253; Eid-ulFitr 253 The Hoot 233, 239 Hoover, S. 4, 19, 40, 114, 130, 216, 341; process of meaning making 341 Hosseini, S. H. (2008) (case study) 366; essentialist approaches 376–377; functionalist approaches 376; interactive approach 377; peaceful co-existence and intercultural dialogue 377; religious pluralism through media 377 HuffPost 268 Hui Muslims’ protest 317 hunger and election year: poverty 89, 90; unemployment 90 “Hunger in America” 90 hunting dog theory of journalism 47, 52–53, 59 Huntington, S. 324; notion of clash of civilizations 313 Hussein, M. H. (India’s best known painter) 237 hybridization 372 hypermediacy 191, 192, 193, 194, 195 hyperpictures: after 9/11 192; certainties and distinctions 193; conflicts between religions 193; immediacy and hypermediacy 192, 193; pictorial elements 192–193; and religious conflicts, digital age 192–193 identity: Brazil 111–112; Christianity 63; religious 124, 125; Shukura 226 “immoral acts” 175 Independence March: All-Polish Youth 283; analysis of journalistic reporting 282–283; Arab Muslim 287; black people 286; daily Gazeta Wyborcza 283; National Board of Radio and Television 283; NationalistRadical Camp 283; Nazi slogans, “Sieg Heil” and “Jude Raus” 284; Newsweek Poland 283; Polish criminal law 284; principles of critical discourse analysis (CDA) 283; 2017, refugees as Trojan Horse 286–287; “We Want God,” 2017 theme 284; “xenophobic and fascist” march 284 Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) 57 in-depth journalism 421 India 7, 123; Aastha 238; contexts of journalism in 232–234; coverage of religion and

spirituality 122; Hindu and Muslim television 123; Hinduism 131; Indian Constitution 233; Indian Express 232, 236; India TV 237; online hate against women and minority groups 412; religious authority and journalism (case study) 131–132; religious programming 123; research on Journalism and digital media 122, 123; satellite broadcasting 123; truth 232–234; as the world’s largest democracy 235 Indiafacts.org threatening secular writers 240–241 individualism 42, 43, 371, 374 individual journalists 4, 11, 24, 66 Indonesia 123–125, 127, 314, 373–374; trust in religious leaders 124 InfoWars 268 in-group members 341 Instagram 158, 159, 228, 360, 361 interfaith issues 99, 389, 393 interfaith journalism 394 Interfaith Peace Project 393 International Central Gospel Church (ICGC) 144 The International 700 Club 374 international, global developments 5 Internet: news 4; political events, attacks of 11 September 2001 3 Internet of Things (IoT) 397 Internet Protocol (IP) addresses 401 intolerance: against Afro-Brazilian religions and LGBTQ+ and feminist groups 7; and religious violence 9 intrafaith issues 11, 382, 389 Iranian Revolution 19, 68 Ireland 124; child sex abuse in 51 ISIS 250 Islamic countries: in aftermath of 9/11 123; authority 125; charity 127; fatwas (or Islamic legal decrees) 127; Hadith (the collection of sayings of the Islamic oral tradition) 127; halal food products and banking 127; ‘ilm (transfer of knowledge) 125; journalistic media 7; journalists’ trust 126–127; Koran and Sumah (or Way of the Prophet) 127; Muslim faith 127; principles of Islamic communication 125; professional journalists 127; religion and religious authority figures, role of 126; religious authority and journalism (case study) 125–128; Sunni Islam 126; Wakf or family trusts 127 Islamic extremism, rise of 22 Islamic voices 127–128 Islamification 10, 340–341 Islamism 110 Islam/Muslim 9, 22; African journalism 248–249; and/or refugees 9; Bad Islam 342–344; bad Muslims 101; as bad religion 342; ghetto Muslims 343; good Muslims 101; Imam 141; mediating Islam 344–346; news

433

Index media and 250–256; orientalist representation of Muslims 249; pejorative representations of 4; Polish scholarship 281–282; political Islam, impact on representation of 80; Prophet Muhammad 270; public anxieties and confusion 19; and refugees, digital vitriol (case study) 17; as religion of violence 281; Sunni and Shia Muslims 389; with terrorism 53; terrorism, violence and conflicts 3, 281; Uyghur Muslims 311 Islamophobia 20, 413; abuse 287; British media’s 100; in Europe 290; platonic 9; Polish 285, 291 Israel 123; daily newspaper, Hamodia 129; digital media 130; Haredi rabbinical leadership 129–130; Jewish character 7; Jewish State 128; Judaism in 128; Kikar Shabbat and B’Hadrei Haredim 130; Knesset (Israel Parliament) members 129; religious authority and journalism (case study) 128–131; spirituality in 131; Torah values 129, 130; Worlds of Journalism Study 128 Isuma TV 361–362

372; genres 4; Ghanaian journalists 256; in globalization process 375, 376; identifying obstacles to 23–24; Indian journalists 128, 131, 240; investigative journalists 383; Israeli journalists 128; journalist-centered approach 339; journalistic coverage 19, 187, 200, 202–207, 209, 279, 301, 305, 306; media 3, 7, 8, 122, 123, 127, 132, 137, 145, 202–207, 209, 280, 337; Muslim countries 126, 127; Nigerian journalists 324; overcoming obstacles to 24–25; Pakistani journalists 127; progressive journalistic responses 287–289; religion journalists 11, 19, 20, 24, 26, 27, 56, 170, 176, 207, 382, 385, 387, 388, 389, 395; Saudi journalists 126; sources 48–50; Swedish journalist 414, 415, 418, 420; Turkish journalists 128 Judaism 67, 110, 270; in Israel 128; and modernity 130; prohibition in social gossip 128; Ultra-Orthodox or Haredi Judaism 128 Judeo-Christian: country 263–264; culture 270; values 42 Jumhuri Islami (Pakistani daily) 126

Japan 123, 314 Jefferson, T. 34, 171 Jerusalem Post 387 #jesuischarlie 343 #jesuiskouachi 343 John Paul II, Pope 19, 111 Jonson, L. B. 81, 83; Great Society 84; War on Poverty 83 Jornal Nacional ( JN) 112, 116 Jorge Mario Bergoglio, Pope 367 Josef Ratzinger, Pope 99, 367 journalism of attachment 41 journalist 6, 8, 19–20, 35–37, 40–43, 50–58, 80, 82, 91, 99, 101–105, 113, 122, 123, 131, 137, 138, 140, 148, 151, 152, 169, 179, 191, 208, 237, 238, 240, 241, 245–247, 279–283, 290, 299–301, 340–343, 354, 355, 357, 362–364, 366–368, 374, 377–379, 384, 385, 387, 407, 411–413, 415–417, 419, 421–423; African journalists 136, 156, 158; American journalists 9, 50, 263–267, 269–274; Arab journalists 127; Asian journalists 124, 125, 132; authority 194, 195; Beti journalists 156; Brazilian journalists 112, 222, 223, 224; British journalists 100; Canadian journalists 265; Christian black woman 8, 214, 221, 225–228; content 4; deep mediatization 4; development of religious literacy 6, 21–23, 46, 59; English language journalists 235, 236; European journalists 95; faith decline and the secularity of 274–275; female journalists 151, 158, 162; foreign journalists 9, 239, 311, 315, 318, 319; form of 193,

Kannada: bhasha sensibility 235; English language journalist 236 Kant 32, 34–35 Kassel, S. 64, 68–69 Kayhan (Iranian daily) 126 kebhinekaan 374 Kennedy, J. F.: Roman Catholicism 171 Khatami 313 kicker 356 kindoki 151 King Jr., M. L.: Poor People’s Campaign 83 Klaus, E. 64, 68–69 Knott, K. 47, 98 Korte, A. -M. 214, 215 Landau, C. 51, 52 literacy 6, 47, 48, 52, 326, 328, 374; media literacy 52, 155, 419; see also religious literacy lapdog theory of journalism 47, 51, 53, 59 Latin America: affiliations 200; Brazil, journalistic coverage and interlacing of religion and gender issues (case study) 202–207; and Caribbean journalists 221–222, 222; Catholics and evangelicals 199; definition of religion 199; family as nuclear entity 200–202; financial and cultural capital 205; mainstream media in creating moral panic 204–207; ONGanization of religious institutions 209; Patrícia Galvão news agency, secular media 207–208; plural religious landscape and exclusivist journalistic coverage 202–204; public policies, religion and gender 204–207; religion and gender roles 200–202;

434

Index religious bricolage 200; religious landscapes 199–200; Shukura on religion, journalism, gender and blackness 216–219 Latour, B.: We Have Never Been Modern 338 legitimation, issues of 356 LGBTI movements 8 LGBTQ organization Campaign Against Homophobia 283 liberal theology 32 Liberation Theology: and Basic Ecclesial Communities (BECs) 217–218 Linderman, A. 101, 102 Lippmann, W. 263–264 literary journalists 385 Lithuanian Haredi stream 128 Lobo, Marisa 116–117 Locke, J.: Biblical criticism 34; Letter of Toleration and the Unity of God 34; optimism 271 London: bombings in 2005 186; terrorist attacks 19 Los Angeles Times 79 love Jihadis 238 Luckmann, T. 38 Lundby, K. 5, 341 Machiavelli 147 McLuhan, M. 25 Maduro, O. 299; definition of religions 299 Mahama, J. D. 146, 147 mainstream journalism 43, 51, 101, 103–104, 232, 234–235, 241 mainstream newspapers 98, 102 Make America Great Again era 179 Malaysia 123; trust in religious leaders 124 Mali: Islamic bookshops 248; Islamic religiosity 248; study of religious pamphlets 249 Marsden, L. 186, 324 media 4, 170–171; coverage of religion 170; culture war narrative 175–176; intersecting systems 374–375; intolerance and religious violence 9; “lived religion” methodological movement 170; macro-level 376; meso-level 375–376; micro-level 375; Moral Majority or Billy Graham 170; non-religious media 373; as religion 4; religion, definition, Religion News Association 170; religious media 373–374; representation and religious literacy 47–48; televangelism 372–373 media communication 3, 4, 188 media coverage 23; and public discourse 407 media framing 66, 174–175, 233 media imperialism 370–371 mediating Islam 342, 344–346 mediation of religion 7, 98, 103–104 mediatization 7, 65–66, 96–97, 102–104; advent of electronic media 113; banal religion 111; charismatic 111; concept of media logic 72;

concept of religion 110; ideal of impartiality 112; journalism on religion 111, 112; legal or bureaucratic 111; mass audience 112; notion of identity 111–112; religious media 111–112; traditional 111 media usage 175; and production of actors 4 Medicare 89 Methodists 47, 53, 246, 326 Meyer, B. 249 Meyrowitz, J. 33 Middle East: conflicts in 186 migrants: into Europe 18; importance of welcoming 17; negative attitudes 18; and refugees 17–18 migrations: into Europe 22; voluntary 17 militant Islamic group see Boko Haram Milton, J.: self-righting principle 271–272, 273 mindful journalism approach 6, 42–43 Minneapolis Star Tribune 266 Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (MMIWG) issue 360–361, 362 MMIW inquiry 359 modernist vote 174 modern stage 32; religious/secular 32 Modi, Narendra (Indian PM) 240 monetization 358 mononuclear family model 200 Montesquieu 34 Moore, Russell 172, 175 Moral Majority 173–174 MSNBC 267 Muhammad, prophet: caricatures 375 Munnik, M. 48, 49 Murdoch press 232 Muslim Council of Britain, Journalism and (case study) 57–58 Muslim men: scholar (Ulama) 373; violent perpetrators 65; women were oppressed by 69 see also Islam/Muslim Muslim women: as active agents 71; female headscarf (hijab) 126; in German foreign news 68; headscarves, use of 63, 64, 69; hijab or niqab or burqa 64; misrepresentation by news media 65; as mute victims of oppression 65; veiling of women 69; victims of patriarchal Islam 189 see also Islam/Muslim Nandy, A. 233, 234 National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) 173 National Democratic Alliance 232 National Football League’s (NFL): #TakeAKnee protest 8, 170 National Household Survey, 2011 355 National Public Radio (NPR) 173 Netflix 421 New Deal 83 new entrant groups 49–50

435

Index The New Evangelicalism 173 New Journalism 385 New Patriotic Party 143 New Religious Movements 110 news 382–383 news-distribution system 372 NewsLaundry 239 news media 169, 170, 175; in Brazil 112; history of 4; in UK 18 newspapers: Swedish 6 news stories: hard and soft 64; influx of refugees 23 New York Herald 384 The New York Times 17, 79, 267, 383, 387 New York World 266 NGOs: “conspiracy of neglect” 17 Nigeria: Boko Haram 9, 245 Nixon, Richard 264 “No More Stolen Sisters #MMIWG” 360 Nordic countries 7 Nordic journalism 102 NOREL project 73n1 Northern California Nevada United Church of Christ (UCC) 386 Norway: Islam in 279 nouveau riche pastors 140 November Paris attacks 23 NPR 175 Obama, B. 418; religion and religious beliefs, 2008 campaign 268 On Islam 48, 52 online editing 411–412 online journalism 341, 421 “online training in religious literacy” 21 opinion journalism 66 “oppositional journalism” 327 Organization of Ibero-American States (OEI) 304 Ortega-Lockwood, Isabelle 390, 391, 392 Otabil, M. (Pastor, Ghana): The Daily Guide newspaper 147; electronic forms 146, 148; free education 146; of International Central Gospel Church 137, 144; media messages 145; political events 145–146; religion, journalism and Machiavellian politics 144–148; television programs, Living Word 145; voice in political game 146–148 Padmaavat (Bollywood film) 238, 239–240 paid news 232 Pankowski, R. 284–285 paper-and-ink magazine 387 Paris Match 344 Parker, G. C. 199, 200 Patheos 393 Patrícia Galvão news agency, secular media: domestic violence 208; gender issues 207;

religiao (religion) 208; scientification of religious discourses 208 patriotic journalism 327 patriotism 279 peacebuilding 10; authority power and dialogue 5; conflict and 323, 325; dialogue and 9; religious 328; religious dialogue and 313–315 peace journalism theory 279, 289 peacemaking process 267–268 pedagogic and conversational approaches 22 Peleg, S. 280, 285, 289 Pentecostal fraternity 148; World Christianity 150 Penyejuk Imani Katolik (PIK) program 370 People’s Republic of China (PRC) 9 petites journalists or mamans 155 Pew Forum 179 Pew Research 387 Pew Research Center 186, 393 Philippines 123 Pintak, L. 123, 127 pivot journalism 379 Pluralism Project 387, 393; Religion Diversity News 393 Poland, peace- vs. conflict-journalism: Catholic values 282; Civic Platform 282; civilized Christian Europe 291; condemned fascism 288; conflict journalism 280; educational role of media 290; far-right organizations 279, 287–288; Gazeta Wyborcza 287, 288; immediacy 280; independence day march 2017 (refugees as Trojan Horse) 286–287; independence day march (case study) 283–284; intersections of religion, dialogue and peacebuilding 279; Islam and refugees 290–291; Newsweek 288; parliamentary elections 282; peacebuilding 280; peace journalism theory 279, 289; Polish farright 291; progressive journalistic responses 287–289; real-life stories of refugees 290; refugee crisis 282; regimes of visibility 290; responses to refugees crisis 281–283; rightwing independence day march narratives and progressive responses 284–286; role of journalism in covering minority religions 280–281; role of media 280–281; Roman Catholic Church 282; scarcity of media coverage 281; Stopping Islamisation 291; Tajik Muslim family 289; truth-oriented peace journalism 289–290; TVN24 article 289 Polish Protestantism 281 politicization of Islam 80, 341 politics 171–172; American 169–170; Christianity 34; of repetition 341; reporting on religion and 171–172; of Trump, Farage and Le Pen 234; US 171 populism 6, 8, 374

436

Index Portuguese colonization 110 post-colonial scholars 234 poverty 81 practitioners’ ( journalists’) perspectives 5 Presley, E.: Heartbreak Hotel 386 presumed Muslims 67 print journalism 58, 245 print magazines, religious conflicts (case study): concept of visibility 191; German print media 191; immediacy and hypermediacy 191, 194–195; older media 191; Spiegel, Stern and Bunte 192 print media: German 191; good press and fake news 115; ZCA7 328; Zimbabwe 326–328 print newspapers 3, 341 priori modelling journalism 376 professional journalists 385 protectors of the cow (gau rakshaks) 238 Protestant Episcopal Church 399 Protestantism 40, 281 Protestant Oliver Cromwell’s Interregnum government 272 Protestant sects 113 public and media transparency 48 public institutions, religion in 42 publicization of religion 7, 97–98, 103, 104 Public Journalism movement, rise of 266 public religion, studies of 42 Pulitzer, J. 266, 383 Pune: Dabholkar, Narendra, murder of 237 Punjab, crisis in 233 puppy dog theory of journalism 47, 52, 53, 59 The Quint 239 race: hunger and election year 89–92; media matters 81–82; race and fairness 86–89; Reagan’s economic plans 82–83; reforming welfare 83–86 racism, rise of 24–25 Radde-Antweiler, K. 3–4, 5, 48 radio 4; advent of 383; program (Tapestry) 354 Raspberry, W. 90; rise of “pocketbook selfishness” 91 Ratzinger, J. 99, 367 readership 62 Reagan, R. 79; “ambitious domestic agenda” 85; approval ratings 85; arguments about welfare’s deleterious impact 91–92; attitudes and policies on hunger and poverty 6; “average citizens” 86; budget program 84; culture of dependency, blacks 87; economic plans 82–83; election of 174; hunger and election year 89–92; importance of family 80; International Monetary Fund 85; justification for tax cuts 89; Los Angeles Times poll 85; New York Times-CBS poll 84; “permanent

underclass” 88; personal religiosity 80; problem of personal choice 81; role of race and gender in poverty 81; “spiritual conversion” 80; tax cuts 84 Reformation of journalism 44 refugees: Afghanistan 17; crisis 18–19; as dangerous Muslims 18; in Europe 24; hatred against 20; lives, role of religion 20–21; Middle Eastern and North African 18; negative attitudes 18; news stories 19; November 2015 Paris attacks 20; as scroungers or criminals 18; silent actors 18–19; South Sudan 17; as strangers, foreigners 18; Syria 17; as terrorists 18; voices of 17 Religion and the News 47, 48, 50 Religion Communicators Council (USA) 384, 387 Religion Dispatches 179 religion journalism: approaches to 187–188; as “a ‘soft’ story” 19; Christianity 188, 189, 190; and communication (see communication, religion and); criticism of Orientalism 189; and ethics coverage in 2017 21; in Germany 187, 191; globalization and digitalization 5; hyperpicture 190; Islam and Muslims 188–190, 191; Judaism 190; as media 4; niche forms of 358; own Christian culture 194; power and authority and dialogue and peacebuilding 5; research on 4–5; secular perspective 186; Theoretical reflections 5–6; theories and gender issues 5 Religion Media Centre 48 Religion News Service 179, 387 religion on television: Israel ( Jewish content) 123; Turkey (slamic content) 123; USA (Christian content on television) 123 Religion Stylebook 387 religious conflicts, digital age: German case 186–187; and hyperpictures 192–193; in print magazines (case study) 191–192; research on journalism 187–191; visualization of 194; visual journalism 194–195 religious data 401 religious datafication 398; adoption of spatial applications 402–403; Bible engagement online 404–406; big data provocations and implications 406–408; blog level variables 402; Church leadership direct online attention 403; data streams and deluge 404–406; definition 397; in digital age 401–404; digital and web-based applications 403–404; geotagged web content and references; historical forms and parallels 398–401; Internet use 397; introduction and theoretical background 397–398; mediated organizations 401; multimedia public relations operation 403; religious apps and

437

Index platform power 404–406; religious online big data 402; taking data approach to religion 398–401; transaction logs 401–402 religious figures 3, 138, 149, 237 religious institutions 33, 39, 48–50, 95–98, 102–103, 110, 122, 128, 208–209, 340, 341, 353, 364 religious literacy 46; among journalists (see journalist); definition, Moore’s 20; need for 18–21 religious news 19, 22, 50, 51, 153, 241, 378, 384, 389 religious organizations 6, 48; media representation and religious literacy 47–48 religious Orient 343 religious pluralism 249, 372, 379 religious rituals: funeral service of the death of Nelson Mandela 3; wedding of Prince Harry and Meghan Markle 3 religious scholars 113, 373, 398 religious storytelling 11, 391, 398 religious topics 3–4, 19, 187, 357 religious vote 169, 172 reporting divided soul of nation: Evangelical vs. Evangelical 172–176; journalism fake news and social media 179; media and scholarly understandings of religion 170–171; reporting on religion and politics 171–172; #TakeAKnee 176–178 reporting refugees see religious literacy Report on Intolerance and Religious Violence in Brazil (2011–2015): Preliminary Results (RIRVB) 304 representation process 65 Republicans’ divide-and-conquer strategy 90 Reuters 363 Revolutionary War 170 right-wing Hindu sensibilities, rise of 235 right-wing independence day march: All-Polish Youth 284; Constitution Day celebrations 285; Daily Mail Online 285; MP Robert Winnicki 284; narratives and progressive responses 284–286; Oko Press team 285; Pew Research Center 285; Polish Islamophobia 285–286; Radical National Camp 285; 1944 Warsaw Uprising 285 Ritzau (Danish news agency) 415 Robertson, H. 355–356, 372 robo-journalism 407 Roman Catholic Church (RCC) 281 Roman Catholicism 296; official religion 199 Romney, M.: Mormonism 169, 171 Roosevelt, T. 274 Rousseau, J. J. 34, 271; civil religion and for exchange of opinion 34; elaboration of social contract 34 Rousseff, Dilma 115

The Sage Handbook of Digital Journalism 413 Sagrada Familia 201 Said, E.: Covering Islam 280–281; criticism of Orientalism 189 Salon 268 Salt and Light 246 Sandford St Martin Trust 48 Sangh Parivar 239 Saudi Arabia 126 Scandinavian context: contribution and challenge of religion and journalism 72–73; framing of religion, women and equality 67–68; increasing diversity and contestation 63; media, gender and religion 62–63; media logic and shared themes and stories 68–69; mediatization, religion and gender 71–72; religion and gender in press 63–65; religion and women’s agency 69–71; representation, framing and mediatization 65–66; Swedish press 66–67 scholarship: on religion and journalism in Brazil 118 Schudson, M. 36, 37 Scopes Trial of 1925 172, 173 Scripps, E. W. 269; posting of Ten Commandments 263 Scroll 233, 239 search engine optimization (SEO) 357, 403 sects 301, 315 secularism 233 secularization 9; definition 33; de-secularizing religion and journalism 42–44; of journalism and decline of authority 41–42; moral appropriation and vicarious critics 40–41; reclaiming authority 42–44; religion and communication in human history 32–40; theory 171–172 secular journalism 97 secular media 207–208 Selfie-sticks 411 Shafaqna, Shia online news agency 371 Sharia law 127 Shukura: active presence in media 228; Black Woman 219–221; conceptualizing in interdisciplinarity 214–215; gender 215–216; identification and identity 226; Journalism in Brazil and South/Latin America 221–224; Latin America, BECs and liberation 217–218; Latin-American perspective 216–219; life story of Christian black Woman journalist in Brazil (case study) 225–228; modern, theoretical-practical 215; multiplicity of conceptualizations of journalism 218; race, analytical and discursive category 218–219; religion and secularization 216–218; on religion, journalism, gender and blackness 216–219; Rio de Janeiro 225; university career 226–227

438

Index Sikh community: as violent and pre-modern 233 Silk, M. 133, 171, 266 simple natural language processing algorithms 398 Singapore 123 Single Jump cartoon 141 Sinicization, state-led national campaign of 9 Sjovaag, H. 34, 41; modern press 35 smartphones 411 Smith, J. 64; Differentiation: when more sometimes means less argues 10 social collective 43 social media 386–387; growth of 24 Social Security 89 societal levels 10–11 society 18, 24, 35, 36, 43, 46, 68–69, 97, 101, 128, 152, 174, 176, 178, 201, 216, 301, 304, 337, 339, 369, 370, 376, 379, 398, 399, 419, 421; Brazilian society 117, 118, 204, 206, 208; Chinese society 311, 312, 313, 315, 319–320;civil society 149, 155, 169, 247, 249, 253, 319, 330, 338; datafication of 411, 415; French society 343, 345;German society 187, 189; Great Society 81, 83, 84, 87, 88; Hong Kong civil society 320; human society 32, 33; Islamic society 125, 126; journalism 31, 37, 40, 41, 42; Kinois society 161; Mande society 156, 157, 158; network society 371; Nigerian society 251; Polish society 281, 282; political administration of 34; pre-modern society 38; public sectors of 64; religion in 3, 37, 63, 66, 103, 172, 179, 337; Swedish society 66, 71, 72; Turkish society 377; Universal Society of Hinduism 49; Western society 132 Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) 266 South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) 251 Southern Baptist Convention 173 South Korea 123 South/Latin America: Global Media Monitoring Project 221; Journalism in 221–224 Speaking for the Chief 156 Spiegel 192, 193 Spiritism 110, 297 Spirituality and Practice 387 split publics: citizen journalism 234–235; English media 234; ethical relativism 235; mainstream journalism in India 234; politics of Trump, Farage and Le Pen 234; religion and journalism 234–235; rise of new publics 234 split publics in India 241 Steffens, L. 266, 269 Stensaas, H. 36, 37 Stern 192, 193 Stockman, D. 87, 316 “stop-watch culture” of news 22

structure and content, religion and journalism 5–11 Stuart Hall 218–219 Studio Audio Visual (SAV) Puskat 370 Sub-Saharan Africa: AFEM-SK 155; gender balance in media 155–156; media portrayal of women 155; new political order 155; news media, religion and gender 151; opportunities for women 155; religious broadcasters 156; rise of mass media 154; women and news media 154–156 Sumiala, J. M. 5, 10 Sunday magazine 232 Swami program 132 Swanson, G.A. 399, 400 Sweden: challenges 422–423; Church of Sweden (Svenska kyrkan) 417; digitalization 411; diversity among religions 417; Expressen 422; fact-checking organizations 419–420; immigration, Muslim 419; Lajkat 422; magazine Judisk krönika 418; Muslims in 418; newspapers 414; Nya Tider (newspaper) 419; Nyheter24 (online news website) 422; online hate against women and minority groups 412; Siren (news agency) 415; Sydsvenskan 412; United Robots 415 Swedish editorials: clusters of connections between religion and gender 67–68; Dagens Nyheter 68, 70; framing of religion, women and equality in 67–68; Malala, portrayal of (case study) 71; Miriam, portrayal of (case study) 70–71 Swedish newspapers 102 Swedish press: Christianity and Islam 66–67; daily newspapers 66–67; Islam 66; representations of religion and women in 66–67 Sydsvenska Dagbladet 69 symbolic annihilation, concept of 64 Syria: refugees 17; violence in (case study) 18 #TakeAKnee protest 170, 172, 176–178; American civil religion 177–179; “Americans and Their Flag” 177; fundamentalist-modernist culture wars 179; news coverage 176–177; news stories and opinion columns 176; police violence and racial inequality 176; supporters of 177 Tapestry 362 Tehelka 232 The Telegraph 17 telenovelas 112 televangelism 139, 369, 372–373 television 4 Ten Commandments 270 terrorism: and Islam 67; refugees 18 Thakur, K. 123, 132

439

Index The Interfaith Observer (TIO) 11, 382, 388, 389; brief profile 392–394; core values and goals of 394–395; website 394 theories of journalism: guard dog 47, 51, 53, 59; hunting dog 47, 52–53, 59; lapdog 47, 51, 53, 59; puppy dog 47, 52, 53, 59; watchdog 47, 50–51, 53, 59; working dog 47, 52, 53, 59 The Times of India 24, 131, 233, 235 tipao 383 Tocqueville, A. 46, 171 traditional media 104 tribal religion 32–33 Tri-Faith Initiative 394–395 Trump, D. 169, 172, 284; America First policy 319; Christianity of 171; doctrine of patriotism (America First), fake news 315; election, in 2016 264; fake news 264; role of moralists and righteous scolds 264 Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 359, 362 Turkey 123; Islamic leaders 126; Turkish television 126 Twain, M.: The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn 269; barometer of true morality 269; bitterness at hypocrisy of Christian teachings 263; Letters from the Earth 269 Twitter 362

USA-based Universal Society of Hinduism 48 US democratic principles 172 US journalism 51 US politics, media coverage of religion 171 Vaggione, J. M. 200, 202 Valls, Manuel 345 values voter 175 Varadarajan, S. 233, 240 Vatican Internet 368 Vatican Press Office 50 Vatican Radio 368 Vatican TV 368 vernacular journalism, rise of 232–233 vicarious critics: moral appropriation and 40–41 vicarious religion 39–40 violence 324; black men 81; Braziliian journalism 298, 302–303, 304–307; Islam/ Muslim 67, 281; religious 9; Sikh community 233; Syria 18; Zimbabwe 324 visions of journalism 6 visual journalism 186–187, 194–195, 359–360; exotic 359; shorthand 359 voluntary migration 17 Vox 173, 174, 175, 268

Udupa, S. 233, 235 Uganda: homosexuality in 249 UK: news media 18 ulama, off-line 127 Underwood, D. 35, 36, 133, 170 UN High Commissioner for Refugees 28n1 United Arab Emirates (UAE) 123 United Nations World Conference on Women 154 United Religions Initiative (URI) 11, 382; brief profile 390–392; Charter 390–391; communications 391–392; leaders 389; Multiregion 392 United Religions Initiative Charter 390 UN World Conference on Women 154 USA: broadcasting, de-regulation of 268; cultural and political developments 267; digital networks 268; faith decline and secularity of journalists-to-be (case study) 274–275; historical background 268–270; historical fusion 270–272; journalism ethics 266–268; modern separation, of religion and ethics 270–272; newspaper staffs 179; peacemaking process 267–268; political dialogue 266–267; reform vs. objective/commercial tradition 272–274; rise of religious right 19; spiritual practice/worship of and belief 265; variety of themes 265; virtues, values and ethics 264–265; Wild West 275

Wahid, Abdurrahman 314 Wall Street Journal 141 Wariboko, N. 142 Warsaw: 2017 Independence March (case study) 9; Warsaw Uprising, 1944 285 Washington, G. 170 The Washington Post 79, 85, 87, 88, 91, 173, 175, 267, 387; “Democracy Dies in Darkness” 179 watchdog theory of journalism 47, 50–51, 52, 53, 55, 59, 172 Weber, M. 38, 104; capitalist spirit 35–36 West Africa’s Griottes: akyeame (spokespersons) 156–157; griots (praise-singers) 156; jelimusow (the female griot) 156–158; ngaraa 156, 157 Western journalism 316 Western liberalism 9 WhatsApp, use of 233 white evangelical vote 176 Winter Olympics 368 The Wire 233, 239, 241 wire services 357 women: Der Spiegel and Focus 64–65; in Germany 64–65; or family issues 64; and religion in news media, underrepresentation of 64; Strike and the Citizens of Republic of Poland initiatives 283 working dog theory of journalism 47, 52, 53, 59 World Association for Christian Communication (WACC) 221 World Church Days 368 World Cup 368

440

Index World Exhibition 368 “worldly goods” 34 World Peace Day 282 Worlds of Journalism Study (2019) 123–124, 125; complete trust 123, 125; a great deal of trust 123, 125; level of trust in religious leaders 124; little trust 123–124, 125; no trust at all 124, 125; religious identity and Asian journalists 124, 125; some trust 123, 125; survey data 123–124 World Values Survey 62 World Wide Web 11, 382, 386 Wulff, Christian 189 Xi Jinping 311, 315 Yankah, K. 156, 157 yellow journalism 266 Yoga 238 YouTube: religious elites on 42 YouVersion 404–405 Zappa, F.: examination of Islamic bookshops in Mali 248; study of religious pamphlets in Mali 249 Zeiler, X. 3–5, 48, 49, 52

Zimbabwe 327; Bordieuan sense 325; The Christian Voice 330; conflict and peacebuilding 323, 325; developmental journalism approach 326; development of newspaper culture 326; diasporic newspapers 328; discourse and field 324; emergence of African newspapers 326; golden age 327; “information equilibrium” 324; The International 700 Club 374; international conflict 324; as Janus-faced 333; journalism, religion and print media 326–328; Old Testament 330, 331; “oppositional journalism” 327; patriotic journalism 327; positive role of religion 323, 325; religion, cultural violence 324; religio-political landscape 325–326; religious groups 325; religious landscape 324–325; ZANU PF led government 327; The Zimbabwean 330, 331, 333 Zimbabwe Christian Alliance (ZCA) 10; activities 331–332; The Christian Voice 331, 333; The Herald 329, 333; print media 328; and print media (case study) 328–332; “a quasi-political group” 329; religiopolitical organizations 328–329; religious peacebuilding 328; Save Zimbabwe Campaign (SZC) 331; ZANU PF government 328

441