The Prelude to the Truman Doctrine: British Policy in Greece, 1944-1947 0198226535, 9780198226536

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The Prelude to the Truman Doctrine: British Policy in Greece 1944-1947

TH E PRELUDE TO THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE British Policy in Greece 1944-1947

G. M. ALEXANDER

CLARENDON PRESS • OXFORD 1982

O xford University Press, W alton Street, O xford 0 X 2 6D P London Glasgow N ew York Toronto Delhi Bombay Calcutta M adras Karachi Kuala Lum pur Singapore H ong Kong Tokyo Nairobi D ar es Salaam Cape Town M elbourne A uckland and associates in Beirut Berlin Ibadan M exico City Nicosia

c G. M . Alexander 1982

Published in the U nited States by O xford University Press, N ew York

A ll rights reserved. No p a rt o f this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transm itted, in anyfo rm or by any means. electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, w ithout the prior permission o f O xford University Press

British Library Cataloguing in Publication D ata Alexander, G. Af. The prelude to the Truman Doctrine: B ritish policy in Greece 19 4 4 -1 9 4 7 . /. Greece, M odem —History— 1 9 4 4 -1 9 4 9 l. Title 949. 5*075 D F925 IS B N 0 -1 9 -8 2 2 6 5 3 -1 Library o f Congress Cataloging in Publication D ata Alexander, G. M . (George M artin), 1 9 5 0 The prelude to the Truman doctrine. Bibliography: p . Includes index. 1. W orld W ar, 1 9 3 9 -1 9 4 5 — Diplom atic history. 2. Great B ritain— Foreign relations— Greece. 3 . Greece— Foreign relations— Great B ritain. 4. Greece— Politics and governm ent— 19 3 5 -1 9 6 7 . I. Title. D 750.A 63 940.53*2 8 2 -6 3 8 4 IS B N 0 -1 9 -8 3 3 6 5 3 -5 AACR2

Typeset by V .A .P . L td , Printed in Great B ritain at the University Press O xford by Eric Buckley Printer to the University

,

To My Family

Preface I first became interested in British policy towards Greece while an undergraduate at Amherst College, Massachusetts, where I was instructed in modem Greek history by Dr John Petropulos. My postgraduate studies, conducted in Britain under the supervision of Mr R. R. M. Clogg of the Department of Byzantine and Modem Greek Studies, University of London, coincided with the release to the public of the British State Papers for the period 1945-7. The present work, originally a doctoral thesis, is based on those archives: over 40,000 documents, an invaluable collection of telegrams, minutes, reports, and memoranda. Unfortunately, despite repeated attempts, I was unable to gain access to the archives of the Greek State, which are restricted until 1995. The Foreign Office papers are an utterly reliable source for British perceptions of events in Greece and the manner in which British policy was formulated. They cannot serve as an entirely reliable basis for an account of the motives and actions of the Greeks themselves. Hence, the reader must always bear in mind that this book is essentially a study of how the British interpreted the situation in Greece and what they intended to do about it. What actually happened in Greece can only be surmised. Wherever possible, I have supplemented the British archives with Greek memoirs and documents-; but scholarly and reliable Greek sources are few and far between. I have refrained in all but a few instances from engaging in polemics with other authors. The reader should not gain the impression that, because of this, I regard my work as the last word on the subject. On the contrary, the topic under study is highly controversial and doubtless will forever remain so. For this very reason, I concluded that it would be impracticable and awkward to carry on a running debate in the text or in the footnotes with those with whom I disagree. The reader is urged to consult the outstanding work of Dr Iatrides and the voluminous writings of Dr Richter for interpretations at variance with my own.1

Preface

Vil

I have also avoided any mention of developments in the Greek trade-union movement. The topic is immensely complex and is being researched thoroughly by my colleague and friend Angelos Augoustidis of the Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam. The tortuous progress of the Greek territorial claims in the Council of Foreign Ministers and Paris Peace Conference is touched upon only briefly since it has already been recounted in painstaking detail by Professor Xydis.2 To many I owe heartfelt thanks. First and foremost, I owe an incalculable debt to my wife, my parents, and my brother, without whose encouragement, understanding, and patience I could not have pursued my studies. Mr R. R. M. Clogg provided me with invaluable guidance during my postgraduate years and helped me to overcome many an obstacle during the preparation of this work. I am deeply grateful to him, as I am to Mr C. M. Woodhouse, Elisabeth Barker, and Professor Douglas Dakin, whose incisive criticism of my doctoral thesis showed me the way to make many improvements in the text. A special word of thanks is due to Dr John Campbell and Dr John O. Iatrides. Without their unwavering support, this book might never have come to be. Mr Lars Baerentzen and Mr Hugh Oliffe made many helpful suggestions on points of detail and style. I am indebted to them both. I also wish to thank the staff of the Oxford University Press for their assistance in the preparation of this work. Especial mention must be made of Mr Georgios Papageorgiou, whose dedication to research and scholarly diligence have served as an inspiration to me. Finally, I thank Mr Ronald Chaikan for keeping me in good spirits during many a trying moment. I alone, of course, am responsible for any shortcomings or errors in the text. G.M.A. London July 1981

Contents Acronyms, Foreign Words, and Notes Introduction

xi 1

In Search of National Unity

15

The Road to Revolution

52

Hope and Disillusion

80

A Choice of Evils

109

Sovereignty Restored

140

A Revulsion against all things Greek

188

Full Circle

238

Conclusion

245

Notes

253

Principal characters

283

Bibliography

291

Index

296

XI

Acronyms, Foreign Words, and Notes Anglo-Greek Information Service Allied Forces H eadquarters, Mediterranean Theatre, Caserta Allied Mission for the Observation of the AMFOGE Greek Elections Ethnikon Apeleutherotikon Metopon (National EAM Liberation Front) Ethnikos Dimokratikos EUinikos Syndesmos EDES (National Democratic Hellenic League) Ethniki kai Koinoniki Apeleutherosis (National EKKA and Social Liberation) ELAS Ethnikos Laikos Apeleutherotikos Stratos (National Popular Liberation Army) Enosis Laikis Dimokratias (Union of Popular ELD Democracy, later united with SKE) Enosis Neon Axiomatikon (Union of Young ENA Officers) Ethniki Politophylaki (National Civil Guard) EP Ethniki PoUtiki Enosis (National Political EPE Union) ethnikophrones the ‘nationally-minded’ Foreign Office FO General Headquarters, Middle East, Cairo GHQME IBRD International Bank of Reconstruction and Development IDEA Ieros Desmos ElUnon Axiomatikon (Sacred Bond of Hellenic Officers) ISLD Inter-Services Liaison Division Kommounistikon Komma EUados (Communist KKE Party of Greece) Laiki Dimokratia Popular Democracy Laokratia People’s Rule laokratiki lisi solution by people’s rule Mégalos Dichasmos the Great Division

AIS AFHQ,

Xtl

NO F

Acronyms etc

Narodni Osvoboditelni Front ([Macedonian] Popular Liberation Front) OPLA Omades Prostasias Laikou Agenos (Units for the Protection of the Popular Struggle) PEEA Politiki Epitropi Ethnikis Apeleutherosis (Political Committee o f National Liberation) SKE Sosialistikon Komma EUados (Socialist Party of Greece, later united with ELD) SNOF Slavomakedonski Narodni Osvoboditelni Front (Slavo-Macedonian Popular Liberation Front) UN United Nations Organization UNRRA United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Association War Office WO All documents from the British State Papers are cited by their call-numbers at the Public Record Office, Kew, Surrey. Most of the documents, minutes, and directives cited herein originated in the Southern Department of the Foreign Office, which was responsible for Balkan affairs. However, I have followed the usual practice of employing the term ‘Foreign Office’ to denote collectively the officials involved at all levels in the formulation of policy. Only in instances of the identification of individuals or where it is essential to draw a distinction between the Foreign Office and the Southern Department have I used the latter term. The Greek cabinets during the period under review tended to be quite large, comprised on average of twenty ministers. As a rule, I name only those politicians who held the most important posts, namely, premier, vice-premier, interior, justice, defence, foreign affairs, finance, co-ordination, and public order. (A complete list of all ministers in the Greek governments of the period is provided in Alkiviadis Provatas, Political History of Greece ¡821—1980: Legislative and Executive Bodies, in Greek, Athens, 1980.

Introduction Greece suffered many political upheavals in the first half of the twentieth century: dictatorships, civil wars, and numerous coups d ’état. Many a British diplomat in Athens ascribed the country’s problems to its lack of a ’moderate Centre': an effective body of progressive political parties, sensitive to popular aspirations and respectful of democratic procedures. This work examines Britain’s attempt to establish a stable parliamentary democracy in Greece after the Second World War; the reasons why this attempt failed; and how its failure contributed to the onset of the Cold War. Parliamentary democracy in Greece during the inter-war period was plagued by the Mégalos Dichasmos (the Great Division), an incessant feud between the two dominant political factions of the era, the Liberal Party of Eleutherios Venizelos and the ‘Anti-venizelist’ bloc led by the Populist Party under Panagis Tsaldaris. Neither their social compo­ sition nor ideological issues separated the two camps. Both incorporated elements of all classes, bound by the patron-client relations characteristic of Greek society since the centuries of Ottoman occupadon; and each was decidedly bourgeois in convicdon, even if the Populists sought to portray themselves as champions of the common man. Instead, their mutual antagonism stemmed from bitter memories of the excesses each had perpetrated against the other during, and immediately after, the First World War. At that time, Premier Venizelos, the architect of Greece’s territorial expansion during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, had wished to crown his achievements by annexing provinces on the west coast of Asia Minor centred on the town of Izmir (Smyrna), a region long under Ottoman suzerainty but containing a substantial Greek community and regarded by the Greeks as historically Hellenic. Confident that the Central Powers would be vanquished by the Entente, Venizelos was anxious to earn the latter’s support for his country’s irredendst ambitions by declaring war on the Ottoman Empire. However, King

2

Introduction

Constantine I of the Hellenes, the nominal leader of the predominandy Germanophil Anti-venizelists, believed that the Central Powers would triumph and was determined to prevent Venizelos from aligning Greece with the Entente. Each man was convinced that the other’s policy would condemn the nadon to ruin. The stakes were high and constitudonal legality fell an early victim to their struggle for power. Venizelos enjoyed an overwhelming majority in parliament, but in 1915 the King dissolved the chamber and the subsequent elections were conducted amidst widespread intimidation of the electorate. The Liberals eventually decided to abstain from the vote; the Anti-venizelists took power; and, in the following year, Venizelos founded a rival government in Thessaloniki, the capital of northern Greece. In 1917 Britain and France intervened, forcing the King to abdicate and returning Venizelos to power in Athens. But the Liberals' victory was short-lived. Their tenure in office was marred by such corruption and incompetence that in 1920 the disillusioned electorate recalled the King to his throne. By the time he returned, however, Venizelos had already embroiled Greek troops in hostilities against the Turks in Asia Minor, leaving the monarch no option but to assume command of a venture long deemed foolhardy by his military advisers. By this twist of fate, it was Constantine who was held to blame when Kemal Ataturk’s armies routed the Greeks and hurled them into the sea at Izmir in September 1922. The monarch left the country in disgrace, cursed by the millions of impoverished refugees who inundated Greece from Asia Minor in the ensuing months. A revolutionary committee, composed of republican officers and Venizelist politicians, seized power and executed by firing-squad six leading Anti-venizelist ministers and military leaders. The Execution of the Six, as this outrage came to be known, drenched the Mégalos Dichasmos with blood.1 Colonel Nikolaos Plastiras, the chief of the revolutionary committee, was an ardent follower of Venizelos and wanted to surrender power as quickly as possible to his Liberal mentor. However, not all of his fellow officers were as eager as he to see a return to civilian rule. Some feared that Venizelos’s restoration would perpetuate the Dichasmos and desired an end to political division through the establishment of a supra-party

Introduction

3

regime of national unity. A few military men looked to the army to create such a policy. They were the ethnikophrones, the ‘nationally-minded’. In October 1923 they rebelled against Plastiras, but were suppressed by units loyal to the revolution­ ary committee. Cashiered from the armed forces, they retired into obscurity, a disgruntled minority later to become the driving force of an anti-parliamentary extreme Right. Plastiras proceeded to muzzle the Anti-venizelist press, restrict the activity of royalist parties, and conduct elections under martial law. The Anti-venizelists abstained; the Liberals triumphed; and Greece was proclaimed a republic in 1924. Nine years of Venizelist hegemony ensued, during which adherents of the Populist Party were excluded from the armed forces, the bureaucracy, and the cabinet. This was the heyday of the Liberal Party, when every Venizelist could aspire to power and savour the delights of patronage. But the Great Depression and the manifest corruption of a number of Liberal governments eventually tarnished the Venizelists’ reputation, and in the elections of 5 March 1933 a plurality of the electorate shifted their allegiance to the Populists. The changing of the guard was not without bloodshed. Plastiras staged an abortive coup d ’état on election day itself; a botched attempt was made on Venizelos’s life shortly thereafter; and in March . 1935 Venizelists in the armed forces mutinied and tried to rally the people in defence of the republicans’ waning power and influence. The Populists defeated the rebels, purged Venizelists from the army and civil service, and, taking a leaf from Plastiras’s book, conducted elections in a state of seige. Under pressure from ethnikophron officers, who had meanwhile gained control of the army High Command, the Populists then acquiesced in a fraudulent plebiscite, stage-managed by the army, which recalled George II, the son of Constantine, to Greece. To the surprise of friend and foe, King George made a genuine attempt to reign as a constitutional monarch. At his insistence, new elections were held on 26 January 1936. They resulted in a parliament deadlocked between Venizelists and Anti-venizelists: the former won 142 seats; the latter, 143. Neither bloc, on its own, was able to form a government, and a coalition proved impossible because agreement could not be

4

Introduction

reached on the fate of the Venizelist officers cashiered after the rebellion of the previous year. The Populists and the King were unwilling to accede to the Liberals’ demand that they be reinstated, the Populists for fear of reprisals, the King for fear of offending the ethnikophrones who had secured his return. As the parties wrangled, the foundations of democracy crumbled beneath their feet. Paralysis in parliament bred frustration, anger, and fear in society at large. All classes clamoured for radical action, the poor for social jusdce, the prosperous for law and order. Discontent was rife amongst the peasants: the world recession had depressed trade in their prime cash-crops, tobacco and currants, and their per caput debt, already the largest in the Balkans, was climbing inexorably with every passing season. They demanded guaranteed prices for their produce and salvation from their creditors, and were prepared to support any regime that aided them, whether democratic or not. Equally restive was the country’s small industrial proletariat, comprised of the most unfortunate of the refugees from Asia Minor. The labourers rocked Greece with an unprecedented wave of strikes during the spring and summer of 1936, and, ominously for the conservative parties, elected fifteen members of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) to represent their interests in parliament. Such was the balance of power in the chamber that neither the Venizelists nor the Anti-venizelists could attain a majority without the support of the communist MPs. Hence, each bloc tried to ingratiate itself with the KKE, to the horror of the ethnikophrones in the armed forces. They threatened to seize power rather than permit the extreme Left to influence the composition and policies of any future government, and insisted that the Liberals and Populists collaborate. On 13 April the King appointed General Ioannis Metaxas as premier of a caretaker cabinet. Metaxas was the nominal leader of the ethnikophrones, and the King charged him with restraining them while the parties made another attempt to reconcile their differences. But on 30 April the Populists and Liberals virtually washed their hands of the country’s affairs. The MPs accorded Metaxas a vote of confidence and recessed parliament until October. Only the Left and a small number of progressive bourgeois politicians openly disapproved of the new premier.

Introduction

5

In July the socialists and communists challenged Metaxas by calling a national strike for 5 August. This proved the last straw for the ethnikophrones, and on 4 August, in a lightning coup d'état, Metaxas proclaimed himself dictator. The King, deserted by the politicians and probably fearful that the country was on the brink of a civil war such as that which had erupted in Spain, lent his support to the general’s regime. The irresponsible conduct of the conservative parties had delivered Greece to the authoritarian Right.2 In countless addresses to the people, Metaxas declared that parliamentary democracy was forever-dead. It was not genuine democracy, he claimed. By splintering society into antagonistic factions and classes, it divided the nation and subverted the state, strengthening the enemies of nationhood, the agents of international socialism. True democracy was that which exalted the unity of the nation, and the latter was synonymous with the bourgeois social order. The ‘Regime of 4 August’ would strive to reconcile all classes and mobilize them in the service of the nation. The supreme ideal - a united people working harmoniously in the national interest - would find political expression in a totalitarian corporate state. In this manner, the Greeks would create a ‘Third Civilization’, a worthy successor to the Byzantine Empire and ancient Greece under Alexander the Great. But Metaxas never managed to transform his palace coup into a dynamic mass movement. For all his bombast, he was no activist bent on radically transfiguring Greek society. His aim was retrogressive: to preserve Greece, a predominantly agrarian land, from the throes of rapid modernization and the advent of socialism. His sentiments were thus essentially reactionary rather than counter-revolutionary, and estranged him from all classes but the peasantry. True, he admired the bourgeoisie for their creativity, but he abhorred their materialism, callous individualism, and excessive competitive­ ness. He feared the proletariat, its Marxist doctrine, and the liberal capitalism which had spawned them both; if Greece had to industrialize, he wanted the process to be gradual, closely monitored by the state, and subordinate to the country’s agrarian economy. For above all Metaxas placed his faith in the peasantry, the repository of traditional values. The

6

Introduction

countryside, not the cities, commanded his attention. This proved his regime’s misfortune, for the urban poor was the stratum most likely to have rallied round him had he made a real attempt to give substance to his Fascistic rhetoric. Swiftly, Metaxas lost his enthusiam for innovation. The establishment of a corporate state was relegated to the distant future, and the regime degenerated into a sterile oligarchy brooking no mass participation in political life. ‘Social reconciliation’ was achieved by means of intimidation, censorship, and the emasculation of intermediate institutions. A secret police corps was founded and persecuted dissidents with an effectiveness and ingenuity hitherto unknown in Greece. Nevertheless, it would be an exaggeration to suggest that the Greeks were subjected to a reign of terror. None was ever required to subdue them, for their resistance to Metaxas was simply never very great. The peasants were mollified by debt-relief and subsidized prices for their produce, as were the industrial workers by the introduction of social insurance. House arrest sufficed to silence most conservative critics, and the socialists and communists, who alone genuinely suffered at the hands of the dictatorship, were isolated from the people in prisons and concentration camps. Metaxas was thus un­ challenged but unloved, tolerated but disdained, con­ temptuously endured. His regime limped listlessly from one year to the next, a parody of the government of national salvation once heralded by the ethnikophrones. In the end it was Benito Mussolini, the Italian Fascist, who welded Greece into the organic unity which had eluded Metaxas. The nation rose as one man against the Italian armed forces which invaded the country from Albania on 28 October 1940. The Italians were routed and expelled from Greek soil, an unprecedented humiliation for the Axis powers and one which contributed to Adolf Hitler’s decision to send German troops into Yugoslavia and Greece in the spring of 1941. The Wehrmacht struck on 6 April; Metaxas died shordy before the invasion, leaving the King single-handed to organize and command the country’s defences. Within three weeks the Germans entered Athens. The King and his cabinet, the remnants of the army and navy, and a Commonwealth force which had landed in Greece in early March, took flight to

Introduction

7

Turkey, Crete, and finally to Egypt. In Greece, the major urban centres and communication routes were occupied by the Germans; the countryside, by the Italians; and Thrace, by the dreaded Bulgarians.9 The Greeks now pined for a saviour to lead them to liberation and a post-war society of liberty and social justice. Many soon believed they had found their champions in the Left. Of all the protagonists on the political stage, the KKE was the best able to survive and excel in the harsh conditions of occupation. Conspiratorial activity was nothing new to its leaders, and their experience, when combined with the zeal of communist youth, swifdy propelled the party to the summit of the resistance movement. The largest resistance organization, the National Liberation Front/Nadonal Popular Liberation Army (EAM/ELAS), was founded on the initiative of the KKE. ELAS grew to a force of some 50,000 men and women under arms. EAM, a ’popular front’ composed of the KKE and two small socialist parues, the Socialist Party of Greece (SKE) under Dimitrios Stratis and Ilias Tsirimokos’s Union of Popular Democracy (ELD), boasted at least a million adherents (some fifteen per cent of the population). Disillusioned with both the extreme Right and the conservative parties and impressed by the Western Powers’ alliance with the Soviet Union, most Greeks saw nothing amiss in collaborating with the com­ munists, particularly when the latter demonstrated themselves to be courageous and daring opponents to the Axis. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of the rank and file of EAM/ELAS, as well as the socialists in the EAM central committee, were convinced that the KKE had disavowed Bolshevism for social democracy. Communist propaganda certainly made no mention of the necessity or inevitability of a dictatorship of the proletariat. On the contrary, EAM/ELAS was held to be fighting for Laokratia (People’s Rule) and the Communist Party for Laiki Dimokratia (Popular Democracy), a polity vaguely defined in the KKE's public pronouncements as one in which ’the free Greek people can apply their initiative and activity towards reconstruction and the solution of all political, economic, and social issues.’4 These nebulous formulae came to mean all things to all men and served as a bond between the disparate social classes within EAM/ELAS.

8

Introduction

No such semantic confusion existed in the minds of the communist leaders. To the KKE politburo, Laokratia and Laiki Dimokratia were concepts with precise meaning. Laokratia was derived from the laokratiki lisi (the solution by people’s rule), first defined by the party’s secretary-general, Nikolaos Zachariadis, in 1935, and incorporated with some modi­ fications in the founding charter of EAM by his successor, Georgios Siantos, in 1941.5 It denoted the defeat of Fascism and the establishment of a ‘popular front’ government of the broad Left which would safeguard the country from ‘reac­ tionaries’ and conduct elections for a constituent assembly. According to Siantos, the laokratiki lisi was to pave the way for Laiki Dimokratia, the KKE’s ultimate objective - a communist dictatorship, or, in Zachariadis’s words of 1935, a ‘workers’ and peasants’ government’ under the ‘hegemony of the proletariat’. Laokratia was thus to be the prelude to Laiki Dimokratia: a government of the broad Left would be superseded by a dictatorship of the KKE. If this strategy were to succeed, it was essential that the KKE exercise hegemony during the initial stage of Laokratia. Unless the popular front were dominated by the Communist Party, the transition to a dictatorship of the KKE could not be guaranteed. Hence, the communists took care to consolidate a dominant position within EAM/ELAS. The guerrilla army was monitored by a network of political commissars; key posts in EAM’s administrative apparatus were monopolized by communists, who enjoyed a majority of votes in the EAM central committee; and the secretary of EAM was always a senior member of the KKE. The rank and file of EAM/ELAS were thus correct to believe that their organization’s aim was a pluralist government, but wrong to think that this marked the limit of the KKE’s ambitions. The Communist Party of Greece was not a party of social democracy. Its immediate objective was a multi-party government under communist hegemony; its ultimate aim, a Bolshevist Greece. EAM/ELAS was the instrument with which these objectives were to be attained.6 The British emerged as the KKE’s most formidable opponents.7 They were determined that post-war Greece be non-communist and governed as a parliamentary democracy. Greece was to be non-communist in order to safeguard

Introduction

9

Britain's vital lines of communication through the eastern Mediterranean to Suez and the petroleum of the Middle East. She was to be democratic in order to serve as a stable ally. A nation governed by an unpopular dictatorship, even if friendly to Britain, was judged to be of little long-term value. Moreover, any attempt to restore the quasi-Fascist 'Regime of 4 August' would run contrary to the whole spirit of the struggle against the Axis. Ideally, she would be a constitutional monarchy. Her close relations with Britain would then be guaranteed, for the Greek King, by his unswerving hostility to Italy and Germany, had proved himself a loyal comrade-inarms. That he had associated with Metaxas’s dictatorship was not usually held against him. It was generally felt in British diplomatic circles that the frivolous conduct of the Greek parties had left him no option but to sanction authoritarian rule. If only the parties would co-operate with the King, join the government-in-exile, and abide by democratic principles and procedures upon liberation, constitutional monarchy would be possible in Greece. Emmanuel Tsouderos, who had become premier of the Royal Hellenic government shortly before the fall of Athens, served as a mediator between the monarch and the political world. A former governor of the Bank of Greece and a Liberal by conviction, he was well qualified to win the confidence of the conservative parties. The latter proved willing to join the government-in-exile: by 1943 the last of Metaxas's ministers had been dismissed and replaced by a coterie of Liberals led by Sophocles Venizelos, the son of Eleutherios, who had died in 1936. But Tsouderos was unable to persuade the parties to declare themselves in favour of constitutional monarchy. The politicians distrusted the King and had not forgiven him for collaborating with Metaxas. Republicanism was in the ascendant in the political world, and even a majority of Populist politicians had withdrawn their support from the King. Every substantial resistance organization in the land EAM/ELAS; the National Democratic Hellenic League (EDES), an army of some 4,000 guerrillas operating in Epirus under Colonel Napolean Zervas; and National and Social Liberation (EKKA), a small force based in Thessaly - was founded as a republican movement. Without elections, it was

10

Introduction

impossible to determine with certainty the attitude of the populace at large; but the British military mission in the Greek mountains, established by the British Special Operations Executive in 1943, reported that the opposition to the King was practically universal and stemmed from the people's revulsion against Metaxas’s excesses.* The British Foreign Office were initially inclined to discount reports that the King was disliked by his subjects. Admittedly, the political world was predominandy republican, but the parties had been defunct since 1936, and neither they nor the resistance organizadons were regarded as necessarily representative of the majority of the people. The observations of the British military mission, although interesting, were based primarily on die personal impressions of the officers who comprised it, none of whom were judged to be experts on Greek political affairs.9 But by the summer of 1943, the Foreign Office began to modify their attitude, chiefly at the urging of Reginald Leeper, the British ambassador to the Greek government-in-exile. He arrived in Cairo, the seat of the government, in March, and was impressed by the strength of republican feeling in the cabinet and convinced of the need for the King to make an effort to appease it. Consequently, under British pressure, the King declared on 4 July 1943 that within six months of the liberation of Greece, free elections would be held for a constituent assembly which would determine whether thé country would be a monarchy or a republic. The monarch pledged to abide by the results of the plebiscite. The promise of a plebiscite failed to satisfy the parties and resistance organizations. In August 1943 they demanded that the King absent himself from Greece until after the vote was held. The King's past collusion with Metaxas gave them little confidence that he would abide by democratic procedure in future, and they feared that if he returned to Greece at the time of liberation, he would rig the plebiscite in his favour. Leeper proposed to pressure the King to accede to the republicans' demand, but the Foreign Office refused to permit him to do so. Until elections were held, no one could say for certain what was the attitude of the majority of Greeks towards the King. By liberation, they might favour the monarchy; and if, at that

Introduction

11

time, the King remained abroad while the government in Athens was dominated by republicans, there would be nothing to stop the parties from rigging the plebiscite in their favour. To compel the King to absent himself from Greece might thus be tantamount to forcing his abdication before the will of the people could be ascertained. Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, in particular, was adamant that the King be permitted to return. He believed that the majority of Greeks supported the monarch, and, in any event, the King had stood faithfully by Britain against the Axis and the British were duty bound to ensure that he got a "fair deal’.10 In the Foreign Office’s view, either the King and the republican cabinet must return to Greece together, or, if the King remained abroad, the government must be evenly balanced between royalists and republicans. In this manner, both the King’s and his opponents’ rights would be guaranteed. So far as the communists were concerned, the key issue was not whether the King remained abroad until after the plebiscite, but who was to exercise hegemony over the government which supervised the vote. If EAM dominated the civil bureaucracy, the judiciary, the organs of public security, and the armed forces, it would make little difference when the King chose to return. Conversely, if the government were dominated by royalists or by conservative republicans who, in a crisis, would be inclined to gravitate towards the King rather than the Left, it would be within the monarch’s power to return whenever he liked, no matter how many times he had pledged to remain abroad. Hence, in August 1943 an EAM delegation in Cairo informed Leeper that EAM/ELAS would join the government whatever the King’s decision on the timing of his return, provided that the resistance organizations were awarded the ministries of the interior, justice, and defence, and that these were transferred from Cairo to territories in Greece under the guerrillas’ control." Tsouderos’s cabinet, backed by the conservative parties, declined even to consider this request, which was patently designed to strip the ministers in Cairo of all meaningful authority. EAM/ELAS responded by launching a full-scale military offensive against EDES, the second largest Greek resistance army, in October 1943. Clearly, the communists’

12

Introduction

aim was to achieve a preponderance of armed force in the country by the tíme of liberation in order to present the government with a fait accompli. The outbreak of civil war alarmed the Foreign Office. They feared that if EDES were annihilated nothing would stand in the way of the KKE’s imposing a Bolshevist dictatorship on Greece. The only apparent method of thwarting the com­ munists was to disrupt EAM/ELAS by driving a wedge between the extreme Left and the movement’s non-communist adherents. If the latter could be weaned to the side of the govemment-in-exile, the KKE would be isolated and rendered impotent. But since the rank and file of EAM/ELAS were avowedly republican, there could be no hope of winning their allegiance so long as the government-in-exile appeared to be serving the interests of the King. Even Churchill was obliged to admit that decisive action against the monarch was essential. With his consent, Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, pleaded with the King on 3 December 1943 to announce that he would absent himself from Greece until after the plebiscite. But the monarch was reluctant to issue such a statement. Evidendy, he was convinced that it would amount to his abdication and result in the transfer of power to politicians he deemed irresponsible precisely at the moment when the challenge from the communists was most foreboding. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the President of the United States, lent his support to the King and accused Eden of conspiring to topple the monarch from his throne.12 Roosevelt’s inexplicable intervention, made against the advice of Lincoln MacVeagh, the American ambassador to the Greek govemment-in-exile, encouraged the King to stand firm.13 However, under further pressure from the British, he eventually agreed to address a letter to Tsouderos pledging to consult with the government, at the moment of liberation, on the question of when he should return to Greece. This satisfied Churchill, who interpreted ‘consultation’ to rnean that the King would abide by the advice of the government. But the Greek ministers and parties doubted whether the monarch would heed them, and, unknown to Churchill, the King himself had no intention of doing so. Civil war raged throughout Greece during the winter of

Introduction

13

1943-4. In the south, the Security Battalions, special units raised by the govemment-of-occupation and armed and commanded by German officers, scourged the countryside in their pursuit of EAM/ELAS sympathizers. Although all members of the battalions were doubdess adherents of the Right, only a few were notorious Germanophils and Fascists. Most were inspired purely by hatred of communism and some had been forcibly conscripted. In Epirus, ELAS failed to score a quick victory over EDES. Colonel Zervas secredy arranged a cease-fire with the German occupadon forces,14 turned the whole of his amy against ELAS, and succeeded in repulsing the latter’s offensive after bitter fighdng. Finally, following an appeal for an end to the hosdlides from Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, an uneasy truce was concluded between ELAS and EDES in February 1944. The Russians’ intervendon must have been particularly discouraging to the KKE. So far the Kremlin had evinced no interest in Greek affairs and certainly no desire to promote communism in the country.15 The position thus reached by EAM/ELAS was wholly unsatisfactory to the KKE. ELAS had failed to crush its rivals in Greece, while abroad, the government-in-exile, recognized by the Allied Powers as. the country’s legal government, remained in the hands of the conservative parties. Military action having failed, the communists resumed their offensive on the diplomatic front. On 10 March 1944 the communist and socialist leaders of EAM constituted themselves as the Political Committee of National Liberation (PEEA) with responsibility for administering the territories held by ELAS. They called on Tsouderos to initiate negotiations with the PEEA with a view to broadening his cabinet into a government of national unity. Fearing that, if he refused, the communists would transform the committee into a rival government, Tsouderos agreed to convene a conference of all parties and resistance organizations in Cairo. But he stalled for time in order to make one last attempt to reconcile the King and the conservative parties so that the communists might be confronted at the conference by a united front of the Right. He did not succeed: the parties persisted in demanding that the King pledge to absent himself until after the plebiscite, and this he obdurately refused to do.

14

Introduction

Worse stíll, Themistodes Sophoulis, Eleutherios Venizelos’s successor as leader of the Liberal Party, insisted that EAM be excluded from the government-in-exile, irregardless of what the PEEA said or did.16The cabinet was already dominated by the Liberal clique of Sophocles Venizelos, and Sophoulis had no desire to share power with the Left. Thus, the King was at loggerheads with the conservative parties and both with the KKE when, on 31 March 1944, a mutiny erupted in the Greek naval squadrons and infantry units stationed in the Middle East. Armed by the British and composed chiefly of Greeks who had escaped the German occupation, the forces had initially been firmly under royalist control; but by 1944 the ranks included many republicans and the officer corps had been packed with men loyal to Sophocles Venizelos. The mutiny was launched by communist organiza­ tions in Cairo, apparently in response to the creation of the PEEA but without explicit instructions from the KKE in Greece.17 Most of the mutineers were not communists but simply republicans who had become estranged from the conservative ministers in the government. Greek vessels were immobilized in the harbour of Alexandria and the command of the largest infantry formation, II Infantry Brigade, was seized by the rebels on the eve of the unit’s departure for the Italian front. The declared aim of the communist leaders of the mutiny was a government of national unity with the PEEA as its core. On 1 April Tsouderos tried to appease the mutineers by extending invitations to the parties and resistance organizations to dispatch delegates to Cairo at once for the promised all-party conference. But the mutiny continued to spread and soon engulfed the cabinet itself. On 3 April Venizelos, evidently hoping to profit from the disorder and capture the premiership, demanded that Tsouderos step down. This the latter promptly did, cabling his resignation to the King, who was in London. Venizelos assumed power, but, much to his embarrassment, he was immediately spumed by the mutineers’ leaders, who called for a premier further to the Left. Venizelos then retired, leaving the premiership vacant and the cabinet in a state of panic. The mutineers reigned supreme, while in Greece, the delegates of the PEEA prepared to journey to Cairo and fashion a new government to their liking.

1

In Search of National Unity The mutiny of April 1944 dealt a grave blow to the legitimacy of the Royal Hellenic Government. Hitherto, it had been able to claim that it was representative of the people, and, through its command of the Greek armed forces in the Middle East, a participant in the Allied struggle against the Axis. Now, challenged by thousands of mutineers adhering to the PEEA, and with its armed forces in disarray, it could neither boast of popular support nor contribute effectively to the war effort. A new cabinet had to be formed, and swifdy, for there was a danger that the communists might go so far as to declare the government-in-exile defunct and proclaim the PEEA as its rightful heir. It was well within the communists’ power to take such a step, since the PEEA’s identification with EAM, a mass movement, and ELAS, an impressive guerrilla army, conferred on it precisely the aura of legitimacy the govemment-in-exile now lacked. In the view of the British Foreign Office, there could be no hope of preserving the govemment-in-exile as an institution so long as die Left was excluded from its ranks. Too many Greeks had succumbed to the influence of the PEEA to permit its being ignored. The Greek King and conservative parues would simply have to reach ‘some working agreement’ at the forthcoming all-party conference and permit the PEEA to join the cabinet.1King George appears to have shared this view; but he was naturally worried lest the communists, during the course of the conference, should somehow manage to gain the upper hand over the conservadves and end up dominadng the government. To avert such a calamity he thought it essential that the conservadves be able to deal with the PEEA firom a position of strength. In a confidential memorandum to the Foreign Office he detailed the strategy he intended to pursue. First, he would assemble a government in Cairo incorporating the conservative parties and with the defence ministries allotted

16

In Search o f National Unity

to officers who had abstained from the mutiny. The mutiny would be suppressed in order that the government would not be compelled to parley with the communists under duress. Only then would die government enter into negotiations with the communists; and care would be taken to ensure that the portfolios offered the PEEA would not be such as to allow it to control the government.2 On 11 April the King arrived in Cairo firom London and consulted with Tsouderos. The latter advised him to appoint Sophocles Venizelos as premier, explaining that the accession to power of a prominent republican might yet appease the non-communists amongst the mutineers and put an end to the rebellion.3 The King had a low regard for Venizelos as a politician but nevertheless awarded him the mandate to form a government. On 13 April Venizelos proclaimed himself Premier, minister for foreign affairs, and minister of defence. The mutineers were not impressed by the new premier. They yearned for both a republic and social reform. Venizelos was a republican, but a staunch conservative, who had devoted most of his time in Cairo to the furtherance of Greek shipping interests.4 It was beyond him even to conceive of wooing the mutineers with promises of social justice. Instead, foreign intervention seemed to him the best means of suppressing the mutiny, and he believed that he could embarrass the communist leaders of the revolt and so deflate the rebels’ morale by eliciting an endorsement of his premiership from Nikolai Novikov, the Soviet ambassador to the Royal Hellenic Government. He had every reason to suppose that the Russian would co-operate, for the Soviet Union had hitherto exhibited scant interest in the affairs of EAM/ELAS. But to his surprise, Novikov declined to assist him. Worse still, Tass, the Soviet news agency, began to issue bulletins on the mutiny critical of both him and the British. Bewildered, he complained of the Russians’ attitude to Leeper, the British ambassador, who promptly dispatched an indignant report on the subject to London.5 Without access to the Soviet archives it is impossible to determine with certainty why the Russians evinced such sudden and unprecedented interest in Greece. Eden speculated that they felt obliged to express sympathy for the mutineers and

In Search o f National Unity

17

were merely indulging in propaganda. However, Churchill inclined to a graver view of the matter. Greek communists had subverted armed forces bound for batde against the Axis in order to impose communism on a nation of strategic importance to Britain. If the Russians now chose to encourage the Greek communists in their quest for power, and so profit from Britain’s misfortune at the expense of the Allied war effort, the very fabric of the Anglo-Soviet alliance against Germany would be rent asunder. On 16 April Churchill addressed a sharp warning to Vyascheslav Molotov, the Soviet commissar for foreign affairs. Commenting first on the Greek crisis, he stressed his determination to suppress the mutiny. It was both an act of military indiscipline in time of war and an attempt by political extremists to dictate the composition of the Greek cabinet by undemocratic methods. The nature of the Greek cabinet was for the Greek people alone to decide and upon liberation they would be at liberty to choose by free elections the sort of constitution and government they desired. Turning to Anglo-Soviet relations, he requested an end to Tass’s hostile propaganda. This was *no time for ideological warfare’, he observed. The prosecution of the Allied war effort necessitated the 'temporary subordination’ of ideological rivalry between Great Britain and the Soviet Union. 'In spite of my political views, which you have always known, I allow nothing to stand between British policy and the supreme objective, namely, the defeat of the Hitlerites and their expulsion from the lands they have subjugated.’ He concluded with a pointed reference to Romania, a Balkan nation of strategic importance to the Russians. Britain, he assured Molotov, regarded the Soviet Union as the 'predominating Power’ when it came to Allied relations with Romania and endeavours to end her alliance to Germany.6 ‘As we are giving the Russians the lead in all Romanian matters,’ Churchill then confided to Leeper, ‘I should hope for a favourable reply.’7 Venizelos, meanwhile, had to confront the mutineers without Novikov’s assistance. Not surprisingly, he cut a sorry figure. He failed utterly to inspire the confidence of the non­ communist rebels and wean them away from their extremist leaders. Moderates and communists stood united in revolt and determined to persevere until a government based on the

18

In Search o f National Unity

PEEA was formed. Churchill, Leeper, and the British military authorities in Cairo agreed that the moment had come for an armed clash. They regarded the mutineers’ terms as politically unacceptable and their very intervention in politics as intolerable. Moreover, the rebellion posed an obstruction to the Allied war effort, and, in the case of the Greek navy, a danger to the lives of Allied troops, since British warships normally responsible for the protection of convoys had had to be diverted to Alexandria to blockade the Greeks in the harbour. On 16 April Sir John Cunningham, Commander-inChief of Allied Naval Forces, Levant, met Venizelos in Cairo and insisted that he quell the mutiny in the navy without further delay. Venizelos agreed to do so and instructed Admiral Alexandras Alexandris, Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Hellenic Navy, to muster loyalists for an assault on the mutinous ships during the night of 17/18 April.' However, Alexandris apparendy lost his nerve, for on 17 April he urged Venizelos to cancel the operation. Venizelos faltered and took counsel with the conservative politicians in Cairo. Alexandris then called on Cunningham and suggested that no hostilities be initiated against the mutineers until Venizelos reached an agreement with the PEEA on the composition of the new government. The mutiny might then dissolve peacefully and of its own accord.9 Clearly, this strategy would have delivered the government to the KKE, for Venizelos would doubdess have been compelled to surrender key ministries to the PEEA before the communist leaders of the rebellion pronounced themselves satisfied. Cunningham sus­ pected Alexandris of defeatism. Leeper hastened to the King and levelled the same charge against Venizelos. During the evening of 17 April the King summoned the Premier and insisted that Alexandris be dismissed. His successor, Admiral Petros Voulgaris, a conservative republican, departed the next morning for Alexandria to organize the attack.10 Venizelos’s irresolution forfeited him the confidence of the King. He was ’incompetent and unreliable’, the monarch told Leeper on 19 April, and must be replaced as soon as possible. He proposed that Georgios Papandreou be the new premier. Papandreou, the leader of a tiny Centre faction called the Democratic-Socialist Party, had escaped from Athens and just

In Search o f National Unity

19

arrived in Cairo to attend the all-party conference. The King made a direct appeal to Churchill for assistance in installing Papandreou in office. He feared that if he acted on his own, Papndreou would be branded a 'King’s man’, an unenviable title in the predominandy republican world of Greek polidcs." One can only speculate about why the King was attracted to Papandreou. There was nothing in the latter’s past to endear him to the monarch. He was a republican; until 1935, a Liberal; and had served as minister of the interior under Colonel Plasdras’s revolutionary committee of 1922-3. In April 1935 he had taken a step towards the Left by leaving the Liberals and founding his own party, the Democratic-Socialist Party; and in the chamber, one year later, he had joined with the communists and socialists in voting no confidence in the premiership of Metaxas - an affront which had earned him a term of exile under the Regime of 4 August. However, Papandreou was a staunch anti-communist, a republican who regarded the monarchy as a lesser evil than the extreme Left. Moreover, unlike the Liberals, he seemed genuinely willing to collaborate with the King against their mutual enemy, the KKE. According to Leeper, he believed that the real issue confronting Greece was no longer between monarchists and republicans, but between 'the Nation and the anarchical elements who are seeking to seize the power’.12 He hoped to bring together all non-communists, whether royalist, re­ publican, of the Right, Centre, or Left, in a united front against the KKE. Doubtless the King was pleased by his readiness to co-operate; and it is even possible that Papandreou went so far as to promise the monarch that he would guarantee his return to Greece before the plebiscite. If he did so promise, he lied he was quite capable of lying when it served what he regarded as the national interest. For although he was disposed towards collaboration with the King, he was not his servant; indeed, he was later to prove willing to sacrifice the monarchy itself in the belief that this was necessary to ensure the communists’ defeat. As for the British, they were impressed by his evident capacity for leadership. Leeper applauded his determination to cure the ‘moral paralysis’ of the Greek political world. Churchill pleged whole-hearted support, overruling the Foreign Office, who knew comparatively little about Papandreou and were wary of

20

In Search o f National Unity

identifying British interests too closely with an obscure Greek.IS Within hours of the King’s discussion with Leeper, the need for a new premier became acute. Word reached Cairo from the ELAS-held territories known as ‘Free Greece’ that Alexandras Svolos, a distinguised professor and socialist, had joined the ranks of the PEEA. The communists had quickly agreed to make him president of the committee; but Siantos, the head of the KKE, was named secretary of the interior. In this manner, the PEEA’s image as a coalition of the broad Left was immensely strengthened, while control of its administrative and security organs remained firmly in the communists’ hands. Svolos’s adherence to the PEEA marked a stunning coup for the KKE, but Venizelos, to Leeper’s chagrin, exhibited no understanding of the danger posed to the government-in-exile by the PEEA’s enhanced status. Devoid of initiative, the Premier was content to treat the forthcoming conference with the PEEA as a constituent assembly and submit no political programme in the name of his cabinet. Leeper feared that, under such circumstances, the communists would swiftly overawe Venizelos and proclaim the PEEA the de jure government of Greece. Papandreou shared Leeper’s concern and felt strongly that the Premier of the government-in-exile should take the initiative at the conference from the start.14 Time was of the essence, for the political conference could not be long delayed. Drastic action was in order. On 23 April Admiral Voulgaris led a successful assault on the mutinous ships in the harbour of Alexandria. His victory had a devastating effect on the morale of the rebels in the army, and within twenty-four hours the II Infantry Brigade capitulated to British troops.15 The collapse of the mutiny set the stage for Venizelos’s fall as well. When on 24 April, he called at the British Embassy to protest against Papandreou’s growing influence behind the scenes, Leeper seized the opportunity to strike. Venizelos played into his hands by deriding Papandreou as the leader of an insignificant party. Party politics, Leeper retorted, were insignificant at a moment when Greece’s paramount need was for a strong government. The best man to parley with the EAM at the all-party conference would be someone who had recently arrived from Greece and would thus be able to speak authoritatively about conditions there.16

In Search o f National Unity

21

Taking this scarcely subtle hint, Venizelos resigned and on 25 April Papandreou was awarded the mandate. Papandreou inaugurated his term of office with a broadcast address to the Greek people. On behalf of the govemment-inexile, he propounded a political charter dedicated to liberty and social justice, themes hitherto propagated only by EAM. He declared that the govemment-in-exile would be trans­ formed at the forthcoming conference into a coalition embracing all parties and resistance organizations. The new government - a government of national unity - would reconstitute the Greek armed forces in the Middle East and reorganize the guerrilla armies so as to ensure that they served the nation rather than individual parties. Upon liberation, in conditions of tranquillity, the government would conduct a plebiscite on the future of the monarchy and elections for a constituent assembly. The Greek economy would be re­ constructed on egalitarian lines.17 Papandreou confided to Leeper that his speech was designed to serve as the agenda of the conference and might ‘take the wind out of EAM’s sails’. Leeper observed that it marked the first time that a premier of the govemment-in-exile had put forward anything like a definite programme.1* At last, there seemed a chance that the government would become an effective rival to the com­ munists, by offering the Greeks a progressive democratic alternative to EAM. However, ‘govemment-in-exile’ remained but a synonym for Papandreou, for the Liberals refused to join a cabinet under his leadership. They were piqued by the brusque manner in which Leeper had toppled Venizelos from power and disliked and envied the new premier. Leeper suspected that Bodosakis Athanasiadis, a wealthy industrialist, was the mastermind of the Liberal clique. Nearly every Liberal in Cairo had at some time been employed in his numerous concerns, but Papandreou had always shunned him and was the target of his wrath. For a week Papandreou pleaded with the politicians to join his cabinet in order to strengthen the government’s position at the all-party conference. But the Liberals paid him no heed and he was compelled to form a cabinet o f civil servants, an unlikely match for the PEEA.19 Nor was Papandreou accorded Russian assistance. Britain

22

In Search o f National Unity

and the Soviet Union had yet to square the pursuit of their respective political aims in the Balkans with the need to preserve unity against the Axis. On 28 April Molotov responded to Churchill’s request for a cessation of ideological warfare with an unfriendly cridque of British policy in Greece. It was apparent, he wrote, that Britain ‘controls Greek affairs and the Greek Government in the most direct manner’. The composition and attitude o f the Greek government hardly signified that the ‘legitimate desires’ o f the ‘Greek national movement’ had been taken into consideration. In such circumstances, the Soviet Union could accept no responsibility for the course o f Greek affairs or associate herself with British policy. The Foreign Office were troubled by these remarks. In their view, Molotov’s sympathy for the ‘legitimate desires’ of the PEEA indicated that the Russians were reserving the right to promote communism in Greece. This would pose a real danger to Allied unity: ‘The only common ground is that we and they [the Soviet Union] should promote what is in the best interests of the war effort, but if the Russians think that this aim can be achieved in . . . Greece only by giving out and out support to . . . EAM it is not likely that we can agree with them.*20 Eden saw mounting evidence o f a Soviet plan to dominate south-east Europe. Churchill queried: ‘Are we to acquiesce in the Communization of the Balkans. . . ?’ If not, he felt the Russians should be told as much ‘pretty plainly’ at the earliest suitable moment.21 On 9 May Papandreou arrived at the site o f the political conference: Douhr est Schouier, a village in the mountains of the Lebanon. He was soon joined by a large number of politicians representing nearly every political tendency in Greece. O f the conservatives, the most prominent were Venizelos; Konstantinos Remis, the personal emissary of Sophoulis, the chief of the Liberal Party; Spyros Theotokis and Dimitrios Londos, both republican Populists; and Colonel Konstantinos Ventiris, also a republican and the leader of a small organization of army officers in occupied Athens. Representing the Centre were Papandreou; Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, leader of the minute National Unity Party; and Georgios Kartalis, chief of the political wing of the resistance movement EKKA. EKKA’s military wing no longer existed: it

In Search o f National Unity

23

had been dispersed and its commander, Colonel Dimitrios Psaros, brutally murdered by a unit of ELAS only a few weeks before. Colonel Stavros Metaxas and Komninos Pyromaglou represented EDES. The former was a royalist and the latter a socialist, indicative of the ideological confusion now reigning within the organization. Although founded on republican socialist principles, EDES had veered to the Right through fear o f the communists’ growing strength in EAM/ELAS. The delegation from ‘Free Greece’ was composed of Svolos for the PEEA; Miltiadis Porphyrogenis, the communist secretary of the EAM central committee, and Stratis, leader of the SKE, for EAM; General Stephanos Sarafis, ELAS’s commander-in­ chief, for the guerrillas; and Petros Rousos, a politburo member, for the KKE. All the delegates to the conference were republicans. The royalists - a handful of former Populist MPs organized as the Union o f Political Co-operation - decided not to attend. In an open letter to Papandreou, Petros Mavromichalis, the Union’s representative in Cairo, argued that negotiations with EAM would serve only to bestow a ‘certain appearance o f legality’ on a criminal organization whose single aim was the furtherance of communism. Tactically he thought it a grave error to treat EAM as an equal, and the very idea of sitting at the same table with men guilty of ‘appalling crimes’ was morally objec­ tionable. There could be no compromise with EAM. It must be ‘pitilessly’ combatted by a united bloc of conservative parties and nationally-minded resistance organizations.22 Papandreou shared Mavromichalis’s abhorrence of the communists but differed with him fundamentally over tactics. In the Premier’s view, refusing to negotiate with the PEEA, far from weakening the KKE, would merely alienate the moderates within EAM/ELAS and drive them deeper into the com­ munists’ embrace. He wished instead to build bridges towards the Left and encourage the moderates to cross over to his side. EAM would be disrupted from within; and if ELAS, at the same time, could be reconstituted as a non-political army, the KKE would be isolated and stripped of armed force. He began to sow discord between the socialists and communists on 10 May, within hours of their arrival in the Lebanon. As he later told Leeper, he cornered Svolos and pointed out to him that

24

In Search o f National Unity

the recent mutiny in Egypt had been perpetrated in the name of the PEEA. The political committee, including Svolos, its president, were thus responsible for a grave injury to the Greek war effort. Svolos replied that he had been horrified by the mutiny and insisted that the PEEA had had nothing to do with it. This response pleased Papandreou, for it amounted to a rejection of revolutionary violence and was bound to be at odds with the communists’ views. He confided to Leeper that he might well manage to ’drive a wedge’ through the body of EAM.” Leeper had this objective in mind when Svolos paid him a visit on 13 May. The socialist opened the discussion with an exposition of his reasons for collaborating with the com­ munists. Although convinced that the KKE had disavowed Bolshevism, he did not wish it to dominate the Greek Left. Hence, he had joined the PEEA to offset the communists* influence and to promote a broader unity. He regarded himself as a crusader for ideals more enlightened than those espoused by the conservatives, and hoped to remedy the great malady of Greece, her want of a strong socialist party. Leeper replied that Papandreou’s aspirations were similar to Svolos’s own; but he made it clear that Papandreou did not hold the belief that the communists’ aim was a genuine democracy. In Papandreou’s view, the choice before Greece was between ’Socialism with liberty and Communism without’, with liberty as the ‘first essential’. This remark seemed to impress Svolos, who pledged to assist the Premier in every possible way.24 Such was the impact of these discussions on Svolos that he persuaded his two communist colleagues, Porphyrgenis and Rousos, to join him in a public condemnation of the mutiny. In messages addressed to Churchill and Roosevelt, they expressed sympathy with the rebels’ desire for a reconstruction of the govemment-in-exile but deplored the mutiny itself as an act of madness.25 The messages marked a major success for Papandreou, since the communists had for once been put on the defensive. Evidently anxious to preserve their good relations with the socialists, they had been obliged to close ranks behind the moderate Left and join in a repudiation of revolutionary action. Papandreou’s accomplishment gready enhanced his presage and delegates of the Right, Centre, and

In Search o f National Unity

25

moderate Left quickly mustered at his side. Even the Liberals suppressed their jealousy and agreed to serve in a cabinet under his command. At his and Leeper’s behest, they also consented to waive their objection to EAM’s participation in the government. This im portant concession, which Sophoulis had denied Tsouderos, cleared the way for a compromise with the Left.26 The prospect of a compromise was small consolation for Rousos, the delegate of the KKE. He had come to the Lebanon to dictate, not negotiate, the composition of the new government, bearing a written directive drawn up by his party's politburo to secure the key ministries of the interior and justice and the under-secretariat of defence for the PERA.27 Instead, he found himself outmanoeuvred by Papandreou and in danger of losing influence over his socialist allies. Having lost the initiative, and, with it, all hope of fulfilling the politburo's instructions, he was faced with the choice of abandoning the conference or yielding ground to the Premier. The first option he rejected, fearing that his departure would be exploited by Papandreou to portray EAM as a saboteur of national unity.26 He resolved to remain and make concessions to Papandreou on all issues but the crucial one: the reconstitution of ELAS on a non-political basis. In this manner, the communists would preserve their presdge and their influence over the moderate Left, acquire some posts in the new government, and, above all, conserve their guerrilla army intact, enabling them to resume the offensive when circumstances were more in their favour. This, Rousos later wrote, was a ‘realistic revolutionary policy’.29 Determined to keep Rousos on the defensive, Papandreou opened the proceedings of the conference on 17 May with a blistering attack on the KKE. EAM, the communists’ creation, resembled the Fascists, he declared, in that it defined itself as the state and its rivals as enemies o f the nation who deserved to be terrorized and annihilated. In its pursuit of power it had provoked a civil war and driven its vengeful opponents into collaboration with the Germans. EAM should now renounce violence in favour o f the methods of peaceful persuasion and dissolve its ‘class army’, ELAS. Only then would Greece be guaranteed a post-war democracy in which ‘the party does not

26

In Search o f National Unity

subordinate, but is subordinated to, the State. And the Army does not belong to the party, but to the Nation.’90 Svolos did not rise to the communists’ defence and it was left to Rousos to reply to Papandreou. He insisted that the KKE was a patriotic party dedicated to social democracy. EAM/ELAS had conducted ‘brilliant struggles’ against the Axis and was in no way responsible for obstructing national unity. It was the Nazis who had engineered the recent war between ELAS and ED ES and spawned the Security Battalions; and the bourgeois parties who had fragmented the nation by refusing to associate themselves with EAM’s struggle for liberty and democracy. Like Papandreou, the communists desired a government of national unity, a single national army, and a free plebiscite and elections upon liberation. Their sole wish was to see Greece emerge from the war as a democratic republic.91 A superficial consensus was thus reached on the need for a national government and the tasks it should perform. The delegates then focused their attention on the question of overriding importance: how and when to reorganize the guerrilla armies on a non-political basis. On 19 May the representatives of EDES, Metaxas and Pyromaglou, brought the issue to a head by declaring that their forces could be transformed into a regular army at once. They asked the PEEA to make a similar pledge with regard to ELAS, and were backed by the conservatives, who deemed any agreement with the communists illusory so long as the KKE possessed a private army. But Rousos refused to oblige them, arguing that the existing structure of ELAS was best suited to the prosecution of guerrilla warfare against the Germans. Svolos, in the pivotal position, sided with Rousos. Convinced that the KKE’s aims were democratic, he evidendy did not suspect the communists of ulterior motives for wishing to preserve ELAS intact. His support for Rousos placed Papandreou in an awkward situadon. The Premier explained to Leeper that he was unwilling to allow the conference to break down over the issue of ELAS. Both the socialists and the communists would accuse him of obstructing national unity by lodging unwarranted demands for the dissolution of Greece's largest guerrilla army, and this sort of propaganda would discredit him in the eyes of

In Search o f National Unity

27

the British and American public, who knew little o f the intricacies of Greek domestic politics and tended to regard EAM/ELAS as a democratic movement. Hence, Papandreou put forward a compromise: ELAS would be reorganized at some time in the near future in a manner not harmful to the prosecution of the war effort, to be determined by the new government in consultation with British General Head­ quarters, Middle East (GHQME).32 Rousos accepted this formula, which safeguarded ELAS for the time being and afforded the KKE room to manœuvre. It marked his only noteworthy success at the conference and he owed it to Svolos’s na'ivety. On 20 May the conference ended with the promulgation of a political programme dubbed the ‘national charter’. Its salient clauses stipulated the formation of a government of national unity; the reformation o f the Greek armed forces in the Middle East on strictly ‘national and military criteria’; and, in the near future, the amalgamation o f the guerrilla forces into an army divorced from politics by a procedure to be worked out in agreement with GHQME. Upon liberation and in conditions of tranquillity, the government would conduct a plebiscite on the fate o f the monarchy - the constitutional issue - and hold elections for a constituent assembly to determine Greece’s social regime.” No mention was made o f the manner in which the ministries in the new government were to be distributed amongst the political parues. Presumably it was derided to discuss this question further in Cairo. It remained for Papandreou to address the delicate question of the timing of the King’s return to Greece. The very success of his endeavour to subdue the communists hinged on his resolving the issue. So far, he had managed to extract a commitment from Rousos that the KKE would work for the democratic objectives of the national charter. But during the course of the conference, all the delegates, regardless of their respective political leanings, had insisted that the King be required to absent himself from Greece until after the plebiscite; and Papandreou doubdess realized that if this demand were incorporated in the charter, the King would reject it, nullifying the entíre document and rescuing the communists from their predicament. Papandreou therefore

28

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aimed to avoid a confrontation with the King until long after the formation of the government, in order that the charter could be implemented in the interim to the detriment of the KKE. He took care to ensure that the charter noted merely that the delegates had expressed views on the question of the King’s return, views to be imparted to the monarch after the government was formed. Great store was placed in the King’s pledge of December 1943 to consult with his cabinet at the moment of liberation. Regarding the delegates’ intendon to advise the King to remain abroad, not a word was said.94 The promulgadon of the nadonal charter marked a personal triumph for Papandreou. In scarcely three weeks, by dint of character alone, he had imposed his leadership on a conservative political world which had greeted him with disdain. He liad humbled the communist delegates in the Lebanon by stealing the thunder of their political programme and gaining the respect of their socialist allies. But it remained to be seen whether the leaders of the KKE would submit to him as readily as had Rousos; and whether the King would endorse the national charter without posing troublesome questions about the timing of his return. For the moment, the national charter was but a piece of paper. The fate of Greece still hung in the balance. The British, meanwhile, made some progress towards enlisting Russian aid for Papandreou and eliminating the danger posed to Allied unity by Anglo-Soviet rivalry in the Balkans. Angered by Molotov’s unfriendly reply to Churchill of 28 April, Eden summoned Feodor Gousev, the Soviet ambassador in London, on 5 May, and stated that he was gravely concerned about the Russians’ attitude towards Greece. The British wanted the Greeks to unite in a national coalition and Papandreou, a ‘good democrat’ and republican, seemed the man best able to bring this about; but if the Soviet government encouraged EAM to be intransigent, ‘Papandreou would fail and his failure would be due to lack of unity between the Allies. This would be a serious state of affairs.' Eden hoped the Russians would issue a public declaration of support for Papandreou. He emphasized to Gousev that Greece was in the British theatre of operations ‘and we felt we were therefore entitled to ask for Soviet help for our policies

In Search o f National Unity

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there, as we gave it to them [the Russians] in Roumania, which was in their sphere of military command’.35 The Kremlin interpreted Eden’s remarks as a proposal for a formal AngloSoviet agreement whereby Greece and Romania were to be allocated respectively to British and Soviet spheres of influence.36 On 18 May Gousev informed Eden that the Soviet Union would readily abide by such an arrangement if the Americans consented to it as well.37 The Foreign Office were cheered by the prospect of an end to Russian support for EAM/ELAS, but worried about how the Americans would react to the proposed arrangement. Cordell Hull, the American secretary of state, along with numerous influential congressmen, were known to be vehemently opposed to the whole concept of spheres of influence. In the Foreign Office’s view, the only way the arrangement could be made palatable to the Americans was to limit it stricdy to the duration of the war. Accordingly, Eden instructed the Earl of Halifax, the British ambassador in Washington, to impress on the State Department that a temporary measure was all that was contemplated. The British had ‘no desire to carve up the Balkans into spheres o f influence and still less to exclude the United States Government from the formulation or execution of Allied policy'. The arrangement would lapse at the end of the war and therefore not affect the rights and responsibilities which each o f the three Powers would have to exercise at the peace conference and afterwards in regard to the whole of Europe. It would serve as a ‘useful device’ to prevent a divergence of policy between Britain and the Soviet Union which might prove harmful to the prosecution of the Allied war effort. There had already been disquieting signs o f such a conflict arising over Romania and Greece.33 While the Powers deliberated, the delegates to the Lebanon conference journeyed to Egypt, arriving in Cairo on 22 May. On the following day, Papandreou submitted the text of the national charter to King George. He promptly endorsed it, evidently paying scant attention to its vague clause pertaining to the timing of his return to.Greece. Unknown to the British and Papandreou, neither the monarch nor his political advisers, Petros Metaxas and Panagiotis Pipinelis, took seriously his pledge of December 1943 to consult with his

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cabinet on the question; and it was doubdess their intendon to arrive in Athens at the moment of liberation regardless of what the government said.39 On 24 May Papandreou was awarded the mandate to form a government of national unity, and negotiations on the distribution of portfolios commenced. Svolos, Porphyrogenis, and Rousos dispatched a cable to 'Free Greece’ requesting the PEEA, EAM/ELAS, and the KKE to name their candidates for office. The response from ‘Free Greece’ was decidedly hostile. The KKE’s leaders had been shocked and angered by the national charter. It guaranteed them none of the key ministries in the new cabinet and committed them in principle to dissolving ELAS. In a message received in Cairo on 24 May, Siantos reprimanded Svolos and his fellow delegates for contravening their written instructions.40 Five days later he directed them to address 'as per instructions’ the question of possession of the ministries of the interior and defence.41 Svolos was perturbed and complained to Papandreou that EAM was 'wrong and . . . out of touch with reality’. In talks with Leeper, he pledged to stand by the Premier, who had shown 'real statesmanship’ in the Lebanon.42 Seizing the opportunity to foster a split between the moderate Left and the communists, Papandreou offered the portfolio of the interior to Georgios Sakalis, a progressive Liberal who enjoyed the socialists’ confidence. Svolos was impressed by this gesture, and on 31 May he, Porphyrogenis, and Rousos sent another telegram to Siantos urging him to endorse the national charter without further ado.43 Simul­ taneously, Rousos, evidently alarmed by Svolos’s growing admiration for Papandreou, dispatched a confidential report to the politburo, explaining that he had accepted the national charter in order to preserve EAM’s democratic reputation. He warned his superiors that their belligerent telegrams were making an unfavourable impression.44 In the Foreign Office’s view, so long as Papandreou preserved the broad unity he had forged in the Lebanon, the KKE would eventually be obliged to come to heel. The national charter was certain to be greeted enthusiastically by the Greek people and any party which slighted it risked evoking their disapproval. Hence, if the politicians remained

In Search o f National Unity

31

united, isolating the KKE as the sole dissident, it alone would incur public odium and be reluctant to persevere. But if, on the other hand, the politicians fell to quarrelling amongst themselves, the KKE would be merely one schismatic amongst many. The authority of the national charter would be debased and the communists enabled to repudiate it without requital.45 The Foreign Office were thus somewhat vexed to learn from Leeper that the Liberals were renewing their agitation against Papandreou. Upon their return to Cairo, Venizelos and his colleagues had discovered to their dismay that their wealthy patron, Bodosakis Athanasiadis, had been interned by the British military police on orders from Leeper. They held Papandreou responsible and were complaining to all and sundry that both he and the British were employing high­ handed tactics reminiscent of the dictatorship of Metaxas. This invective stung Leeper to the quick, but he was nevertheless determined to keep Athanasiadis behind bars. He had not forgiven the latter for encouraging the Liberals to boycott Papandreou’s cabinet before the Lebanon conference. In his view, the industrialist was a menace to Papandreou and hence to Greece, for Papandreou was ‘the only man to lead Greece at present, not only because he has a wider vision and a more generous nature than any of his colleagues but because he is genuinely more interested in social reform than in party jealousies and is therefore more likely to work well with a genuine reform movement46 than any of these other represen­ tatives o f the pre-war political world’.47 ‘Why should Bodussakis [sic], the munitioneer, capitalist intriguer . . . be released?’ queried Churchill.46 At his insistence, Athanasiadis was expelled from Egypt and confined in the Lebanon. Papandreou, for his part, lectured Venizelos on the improprie­ ty of politicians’ owing their allegiance to industrialists rather than to their country; and Venizelos, stunned by the turn of events, promised the Premier whole-hearted support.49 Papandreou's rivalry with Venizelos was not the only factor wearing on his relations with the Liberals. Royalism was in the ascendant in the officer corps of the Greek armed forces in the Middle East, a trend which disturbed the republican politicians in Cairo and which they blamed on the policies o f the Premier. Anxious to restore the Royal Hellenic Government as an active

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participant in the Allied war effort, Papandreou was working hard to raise loyal and efficient units to replace those which had disintegrated during the April mutiny. Loyalty dictated that the units’ commanders support him rather than the PEEA; efficiency required that they be acquainted with the methods of modern warfare. He purged a large number of officers who in his view failed to meet these criteria, most of them republicans implicated in the mutiny or excluded from active service since Eleutherios Venizelos’s rebellion of 1935. In many instances, royalists filled the vacant posts, although Papandreou, who personally sympathized with the republican cause, took care to appoint Venizelists to prominent positions whenever he could. Thus, Colonel Vendris was promoted to the rank of general and named Chief of the General Staff; while all the key posts in the largest of the new units, the III ‘Mountain’ Brigade, were awarded to Venizelists.40 Never­ theless, such was the scale of the purge that rumours soon abounded that Papandreou was a crypto-royalist bent on eradicating republicanism from the officer corps. That the Venizelist and royalist officers who served in the new units were willing to coexist and collaborate was in itself remarkable and indicative of a fundamental change in their attitude since the days of the Mégalos Dichasmos. Then, they had regarded each other as the supreme enemy. Now, they faced a common foe in the extreme Left. Like Papandreou, they felt that the traditional rivalry centred on the Dichasmos was outdated and were ready to bury their differences and join forces against the KKE. In the High Command, General Ventiris set an example by appointing Colonel Thrasyvoulos Tsakalotos, a royalist, as commander of the Mountain Brigade. In the junior ranks of the officer corps, a secret cabal dubbed the Union of Young Officers (ENA) actively promoted reconciliation between Venizelists and anti-Venizelists with a view to uniting the army in defence of the nation’s ‘foundation’ (ipostasis), the bourgeois social regime.41 But, unlike Papan­ dreou, who was a politician and a democrat, the officers aspired to a unity unimpaired by political pluralism - unity on the military model, disciplined, tighdy organized, and exalting a single ideal. To Papandreou, national unity denoted a coalition of parties; to the officers, it meant unity without

In Search o f National Unity

33

parties - a supra-party unity. Given this outlook, it followed naturally that many officers in the new units, including even Venizelists, grew into fanatical supporters of the King, deifying him as the living embodiment of the nation, the one Greek figure of national rather than mere party stature. Such officers were the new ethnikophrones, though as yet they did not aspire to dictatorship as had their predecessors under Metaxas. Instead, they chose to await the outcome of Papandreou’s attempt to rally the politicians, hoping against hope that the political world would rally to King George in a crusade against the Bolshevist Left. From the communists' standpoint, it was essential to prevent a reconciliation between the King and the parties. If the conservative forces could be kept in disarray, the Royal Hellenic Government would be wracked by dissension and unable to enforce the national charter. It was probably with this consideration in mind that Siantos dispatched a telegram to Svolos on 3 June informing him that EAM would not join a government of national unity until the King pledged to absent himself from Greece until after the plebiscite.32 In Leeper’s words, the telegram ‘put the cat amongst the pigeons’,53 for on 5 June the Liberals and the Centre-party leaders in Cairo issued an identical statement. They shared the Left’s distrust of the King, and, moreover, were unwilling to allow EAM to pose as the sole champion of the republican movement. Papandreou’s plan to avert a confrontation with the King until long after the establishment of the new government was foiled. The future of the national charter was now imperilled, for if the King rejected the republicans’ demand, as he was almost certain to do, it would prove impossible to transform the government-in-exile into one of national unity. A crisis was fast approaching from which the communists seemed bound to emerge the victors. In desperation, Papandreou pleaded with the republican poli­ ticians to join his cabinet at once, leaving it to him alone to undertake the awesome task of dealing with the King.34 On this understanding, the Liberals, the republican Populists, Kanellopoulos, Kartalis, and Alexandras Mylonas, leader of the Agrarian Democratic Party, a minute Centre faction, accepted posts under his leadership on 11 June:

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Democratic-Socialist Premier, Defence, Foreign Affairs Vice-Premier Sophocles Venizelos Liberal without Portfolio Konstantinos Remis Liberal Justice Themistocles Tsatsos Liberal Dimi trios Londos Populist Social Welfare Relief Spyros Theotokis Populist Finance Panagiotis Kanellopoulos National Unity Press and Information Georgios Kartalis EKKA Alexandras Mylonas Agrarian-Democrat Navy“ Georgios Papandreou

But no sooner had the ministers taken the oath than they were unnerved by yet another telegram from Siantos. This time, the communist chief instructed Svolos to broadcast an address to the Greek people explaining that EAM’s reluctance to enter the government stemmed from the King’s refusal to promise to remain abroad.“ Papandreou warned Leeper that die effect of such a broadcast would be to embarrass the politicians who had already joined the cabinet and to expose the King to the charge of obstrucdng nadonal unity.57 The moment for decisive action had arrived and on 13 June the Premier convened his ministers in an emergency session. In a remarkable speech to the cabinet, Papandreou presented the King with a fa it accompli by interpredng the monarch’s past declaradons and decisions in such a way as to oblige him to absent himself from Greece until after the plebiscite. First, he stated that the King had known from the start that the delegates at the Lebanon conference were unanimously opposed to his return before the vote. He then asserted that he must have realized that a cabinet composed of the self-same delegates would impart this view to him at the time o f liberation, when, in accordance with his pledge to Tsouderos of December 1943, he was required to consult with his cabinet and abide by their advice. Hence, by approving the national charter and by swearing in a cabinet constituted by delegates to the Lebanon conference, the King had in fact already consented not to return to Greece until after the plebiscite. The republicans’ demand had thus already been met and no further declaration by the monarch was necessary.“ In Leeper’s view, Papandreou’s statement offered an ingenious solution to the crisis. The communists could no

In Search o f National Unity

35

longer subject the King to justifiable criticism, since he had been placed in the correct position of heeding the advice of his government. The King, for his part, could take solace in the fact that his early return to Greece had not been entirely ruled out; for, unlike a categorical pledge to remain abroad issued from his own lips, which he could later transgress only on penalty o f being deemed a liar, the advice of his cabinet could freely change at any time - hardly a likely possibility, but a possibility all the same.59 The cabinet prompdy endorsed Papandreou’s declaration and congratulated him on his achievement. But the King summoned Leeper and protested that he had not been privy to Papandreou’s intendons.60 His counsellors, Metaxas and Pipinelis, were furious. Unlike the Bridsh and Papandreou, they had never interpreted the King’s promise to consult with his cabinet to mean that he was duty bound to abide by his ministers’ advice. In their view, sovereignty rested with the King rather than with his government, and should the two disagree, it was the latter which was consdtudonally obliged to yield.61 In this manner, they had evidendy intended to honour the King’s pledge to ‘consult’ with his ministers and overturn any cabinet which opposed his early return. They now pressed the King to renounce Papandreou, who had attempted so impertinendy to dictate to the throne. Papandreou confronted the King during the afternoon of IS June. No minutes of their conversation were kept, but from an account of a subsequent discussion between the monarch and MacVeagh, the American ambassador to the Royal Hellenic Government, it can be surmised that Papandreou threatened to resign if the King repudiated his declaration. The monarch capitulated, evidently realizing that Papandreou’s fall would destroy any chance o f implementing the national charter and in this manner play into the hands of the communists. Papandreou, in turn, taking pity on the victim o f his political acumen, apparently encouraged the King to believe that the cabinet could eventually be persuaded to allow him to return to Greece at the moment of liberation.62 Thus consoled, the King pronounced himself satisfied with Papandreou’s declar­ ation during talks with Leeper on 14June.63Satisfied, too, were Svolos, Rousos, and Porphyrogenis. On 15 June the latter

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departed for ‘Free Greece’ to report to Siantos, confident that EAM would now agree to join the government. Papandreou, meanwhile, had been trying to formulate a procedure whereby ELAS could be superseded by a regular army. Intent on eradicating the communists’ administrative control o f ELAS, he wished to disband the guerrilla units completely and raise a new army by normal methods of conscription. However, he encountered unexpected opposi­ tion from the British military authorities in Cairo, whom he was obliged to consult under the terms o f the national charter. GHQME was chiefly concerned with the prosecution of the Allied war effort and therefore reluctant to acquiesce in the dissolution of ELAS whatever its political complexion. Instead, it proposed to build a new army in Greece using existing ELAS units, whose political allegiance might eventually be ensured by the gradual infiltration of reliable elements.64 It swiftly became apparent that GHQME’s military objectives could not be reconciled with Papandreou’s political goals, and since neither party was disposed towards a compromise, a series of sterile conferences ensued. No such conflict of interests bedevilled the formation o f the Mountain Brigade. The April mutiny had dissolved nearly every Greek unit in Egypt and the brigade had to be created from scratch. Consequendy, in contrast with the case of ELAS, GHQME was not put in the position of having to consider whether to disband units actively engaged in the war effort in order to incorporate their ranks in a new formation. Recruits had merely to be selected from the idle swarm of Greek soldiers confined to their barracks since the rebellion. Nor did contention arise over political issues, for both GHQME and Papandreou were resolved to exclude the mutineers from active service.65 They regarded the rebels as soldiers who had deserted their stations in time of war for political reasons, and who, if included in the new units, would continue to subvert the Allies’ and Papandreou’s respective military and political endeavours. GHQME’s desire to further the war effort by raising a battle-worthy Greek formation thus coincided neatly with Papandreou’s need for loyal troops. Accordingly, 3,500 Greeks who had abstained from the mutiny were selected to serve in the brigade, transported to Syria for training, and then

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dispatched to Italy to fight the Germans. The mutineers, who numbered nearly 6,000, were invited to serve in unarmed labour companies, an offer which only 400 accepted.66 The Foreign Office had inidally not wanted the mutineers to be excluded from the Mountain Brigade. In a letter addressed to the War Office on 21 May they had stressed that their ‘main concern is naturally that the recent mutinies should affect the Greek Forces as litde as possible’; and that they therefore hoped that as many mutineers as was deemed practicable would be returned to active service. However, their reasoning at that time seems to have rested on the assumption that the Lebanon conference would result in a government of national unity incorporating the Left. Under such circumstances, it would have indeed been anomalous for the largest Greek regular unit to be constituted solely by adherents of the Right.67 But in mid-June, with the communists still resisting the national charter and the mutineers truculent, Papandreou and GHQME could not afford to be magnanimous, and the Foreign Office consequently let the matter rest. In this manner, the communists, by their reluctance to adhere to the national charter, unwittingly obstructed an attempt by the Foreign Office to prevent the formation of the KKE’s own worst enemy, a brigade dominated by the Right and commanded by ethnikophrones. In retrospect, however, one must conclude that Siantos was correct to defy the national charter. Revolution was the KKE’s objective, and the prerequisite of revolution was power. Power was precisely what the charter was designed to deny the communists, for it called for the elimination of ELAS and accorded them none of the key ministries of government. Stripped of its armed forces and security organs, the KKE would be unable to ensure that the laokratiki Usi was achieved and that it ushered forth Popular Democracy. Doubtless this was never far from Siantos’s thoughts, and, unlike Rousos, he was prepared to sever his relations with the government-inexile and even risk alienating the socialists to attain his party’s objectives. The die was cast in a message of extraordinary import dispatched from ‘Free Greece’ to Cairo on 2 July. Siantos set forth EAM’s ‘final terms’ for entering Papandreou’s cabinet: ELAS must remain intact until liberation and both it

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and EDES must be commanded by an officer o f ELAS designated chief-of- staff for the guerrillas; an amnesty must be granted to the mutineers, and ‘fifth-columnist fascists’ removed from the Greek armed forces in the Middle East; the under-secretariat of defence and the ministries of the interior and justice must be awarded to the PEEA; and the King must pledge categorically to absent himself from Greece until after the plebiscite. Svolos and his fellow delegates were instructed to return to Greece at once if these terms were not met.6* Papandreou emphatically rejected this ultimatum. In an address to the nation, he explained that if he satisfied Siantos’s demands it would be tantamount to surrendering Greece to the KKE. Armed force within the country and without, as well as the organs of public security and the judiciary, would fall under the control of EAM.69 Further negotiations with the communists were poindess, he told Leeper. Their final terms were unacceptable, a repudiation of everything that had been achieved at the Lebanon conference. He felt that he now had no option but to break off relations with EAM and appealed for the British to follow suit. His entreaty was greeted sympathedcally in London. On 7 July Eden warned Churchill that unless the British aided Papandreou, the latter’s government would disintegrate and the communists would emerge as the dominant element in any new cabinet. Eden recommended that the British sever their ties with EAM/ELAS by recalling the Allied military mission from the Greek mountains. ‘Good’, Churchill replied.70 However, no sooner had Eden made this suggestion than he withdrew it. He changed his mind after discussions with the head of the Allied military mission, Colonel C. M. Woodhouse, who had just arrived in London for consultations. In Woodhouse’s view, a rupture between Britain and EAM/ELAS would merely strengthen the communists and be a tactical error of grave consequence for the future of both democracy and British influence in Greece. A large moderate ‘fifth column’ existed within EAM/ELAS, he observed, but it lacked the courage and the means to overthrow the communists in the event of a renunciation of the resistance organization by the British. At present, the moderates’ safety was guaranteed chiefly by the presence of the Allied military mission, with

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39

whom the KKE was obliged to maintain at least a pretence of collaboration. If the mission were withdrawn, any of the moderates who constituted a serious danger to the extreme Left would be eliminated and the rest would be cowed into submission. Far from intimidating the communists, therefore, a break in relations with EAM/ELAS would enable the KKE to consolidate its hold so firmly over the resistance movement that it might prove impossible to dislodge it upon liberation. Consequently, a wiser strategy would be for Papandreou to continue to parley with the communists, no matter how futile the talks might be, in the hope of preserving the status quo until British troops could enter Greece the moment the Germans departed. The presence of British armed forces would then provide the Greeks with a measure of stability, permitting the moderates to disentangle themselves from their alliance with the KKE. EAM/ELAS would succumb to ‘natural self-disruption’, ending peacefully the communists’ suzerainty over regions o f ‘Free Greece’. Eden was impressed by this analysis and communicated it to Churchill; but the latter was unconvinced and annoyed by the Foreign Secretary’s vacil­ lation. The issue hung tire while the British Chiefs of Staff were asked for their views.71 The timidity which Woodhouse attributed to the moderate Left was amply demonstrated in Cairo when Svolos, abandon­ ing Papandreou, announced his intention to abide by Siantos’s instructions and return to Greece. Perhaps he reckoned that he could better influence the communists as their ally than as their enemy, but a lack of moral courage, to become ever more apparent in the months to come, may have weakened his resolve. He devoted his final days in Cairo to delivering hostile speeches about Papandreou, whom he had acclaimed as a statesman only a few weeks before.72 Leeper suspected that his aim was to ensure himself a good reception upon his return; all the delegates from ‘Free Greece’ seemed ‘extremely nervous about what their masters may say to them’. During a talk with Svolos on the eve of his departure, Leeper chided him for failing to join Papandreou’s cabinet, a step which might have cut the communists adrift and perhaps averted the present crisis. He left the socialist in no doubt that he thought him politically impotent, stating: ‘I could only regard [the] political

40

In Search o f National Unity

Committee as a satellite of the Communist Party if its . . . leading members including its president not only had no independent initiative allowed them but had to subject themselves to the humiliation of being unable to honour their signatures.’75 Svolos’s obeisance to Siantos destroyed what Papandreou had begun to fashion in the Lebanon: a broad front of non­ communists, incorporating the socialist Left, which threatened the KKE with isolation unless it toed a moderate line. The communists were now completely beyond the Premier’s control, and ominously, their propaganda had begun to refer to the PEEA as the ‘sole government’ of Greece.74 His diplomacy in a shambles, Papandreou prepared as best he could to meet the KKE with force. Convinced that its ultimate aim was to seize Athens at the moment of liberation, he began to organize the capital’s defences by secretly naming Colonel Panagiotis Spiliotopoulos, a royalist who had remained in the occupied city and who was trusted by General Ventiris, as military commandant of Attica. Concurrendy, he stepped up his pressure on the Bridsh to sever their relations with EAM/ELAS by persuading the King to communicate directly with Churchill and argue that a breach between the communists and an Allied Power would sow discord in the ranks of the resistance movement. But the Bridsh Chiefs of Staff came down in favour of Woodhouse. They, too, felt that a rupture with EAM would injure the moderates within the organization more than the communists. Moreover, they feared that the war effort would suffer, since the communists would probably devote their attention to eliminating their political rivals rather than killing Germans.75 On 15 July Woodhouse met Churchill and warned him that the lives of the Allied officers in Greece might also be endangered, for the communists might not permit them to leave the country unscathed. This consideration may have weighed heavily on Churchill’s mind. He reluctantly consented to the mission’s continuing its work in Greece.76 Preparations then commenced for the implementation of the second stage of Woodhouse’s strategy: the dispatch of a British expeditionary force to Greece. On 19July Eden advised Churchill that troops should be made available to enter Athens

In Search o f National Unity

41

within hours of the Germans’ departure. The Greek com­ munists had ‘shown their hands’ by defying Papandreou and it was now practically certain that they intended to subjugate their country after the war. In the months remaining before liberation they would portray the continued presence of the Allied military mission in ‘Free Greece’ as evidence that EAM/ELAS enjoyed British support, thus lulling the proBritish majority of Greeks into a false sense of security. In such circumstances, the only means o f preventing a communist coup d’état would be to occupy Athens the moment the Germans withdrew.77 With Churchill’s consent, Eden instructed the Foreign Office to prepare a memorandum on the subject for submission to the War Cabinet. Papandreou would have been much encouraged had he been aware that Churchill and Eden were contemplating an invasion of Athens. But since the matter had yet to be discussed by the War Cabinet, he was not apprised o f their deliberations, and felt deserted and humiliated when word reached Cairo that the British had decided not to sever their relations with EAM/ELAS after all. His standing amongst his colleagues plummeted as rumours spread that he had lost British favour. Tsouderos, the former premier of the govemment-in-exile, seized the opportunity to accuse him publicly of obstructing national unity by adopting an excessively hostile policy towards EAM. Leeper suspected Tsouderos of colluding with the Liberals with a view to recapturing the premiership. On 25 July the ambassador warned the Foreign Office that unless immediate and dramatic support were accorded to Papan­ dreou, he might be toppled from power. This would be a calamity of the first order, for of all the Greeks in Cairo only Papandreou ‘rises above party politics and desires a new deal for his fellow countrymen’. The fractiousness of the con­ servative politicians at such a crucial moment in the struggle with the KKE roused indignation in the Foreign Office. ‘The pettiness and self-seeking of these Greek politicians passes belief,’ wrote Denis Laskey, a clerk in the Southern Department, ‘but I fear there is no hope of their mending their ways. The prospects for democratic and constitutional government in Greece after the war are poor indeed.’7' Eden came to Papandreou’s rescue on 27 July. In an address

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to the House of Commons, he pledged Britain's unwavering support for the Premier’s endeavour to unify the Greeks behind the national charter. He insisted that EAM’s extremist leaders were solely responsible for the present crisis in the country’s affairs. Their exorbitant demands were at odds with the wishes of the ‘overwhelming majority’ o f the people, and unless they recanted they would condemn their country to disunity at the supreme moment o f the common struggle against the Axis.79 He forwarded a copy of his speech to Moscow with the additional observation that Siantos’s desiderata were designed to reduce Papandreou’s cabinet to a ‘mere appendage’ of EAM.*° Doubtless he hoped that the Russians would refrain from voicing sympathy for the KKE, in contrast to their behaviour at the time of the April mutiny. If, by ¿his time, the proposed Anglo-Soviet arrangement regarding Greece and Romania had been formally adopted, Eden could confidendy have expected the Russians to disavow interest in EAM in exchange for British recognition of Soviet supremacy in Bucharest. But in early June the scheme had fallen foul of the Americans, and Anglo-Soviet relations in the Balkans seemed once again to be in the melting-pot. Hull, the American secretary of state, objected to the arrangement, fearing that, even if it were limited to the duration of the war, it would promote the emergence of spheres- of influence. The latter were the very antithesis of the post-war order to which he aspired, in which the Allied Powers, collaborating in a new international organization, were to allow unhindered political and economic intercourse throughout the world.*1 At his request, President Roosevelt advised Churchill on 11 June that tripartite consultation was the best method of resolving conflicts between the Allies.*2 But Churchill categorically rejected this view. He regarded tripartite consultation as an impracticable method of conducting diplomacy. Moreover, he did not expect the Russians to permit the Western Powers to meddle in Romania under any circumstances, and therefore thought it foolhardy to invite them to exercise an independent initiative in Greece. The British might end up losing Greece to the communists and would be excluded from Romania in any event. ‘Action is paralysed if everybody is to consult everybody else about everything’, he wrote to Roosevelt. The British must

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be permitted to take the lead in Greek affairs and the Americans should trust them to work for the interest of both Britain and the United States. Similarly, the Soviet Union should be allowed to take the initiative with regard to Romania. At present, the Russians seemed disposed towards treating the Romanians in a ‘very sensible and even generous’ manner, and the Western Powers could always press them to continue to do so. But since neither Britain nor the United States maintained troops in Romania, whereas the Red Army was about to deluge the country, the Russians, once established in Bucharest, would ‘probably do what they like anyhow*. He appealed to Roosevelt to allow the proposed arrangement to be implemented at least for a trial period of three months.M On 12 June Roosevelt gave his consent but urged Churchill to make it clear to the Russians ‘that we are not establishing any postwar spheres of influence’. The proposal for a trial period proved unacceptable to the Russians. It seems that their aim, much as Churchill suspected, was an exclusive and permanent sphere o f influence in eastern Europe, and they were therefore unwilling to enter into any arrangement of a temporary nature which left the post-war alignment o f Romania in doubt. On 30 July they informed the Foreign Office that the whole question of an Anglo-Soviet agreement now required ‘further consideration’.*5The Foreign Office were dismayed. It appeared that a unique opportunity to ensure Russian neutrality in Greece had been missed. Churchill could not contain his exasperation: Does this mean that all we had setded with the Russians now goes down through the pedantic interference of the US, and that Roumania and Greece are to be condemned to a regime of triangular telegrams in which the US and ourselves are to interfere with the Russian treatment of Roumania, and the Russians are to boost up EAM while the President pursues a personal pro-King policy in regard to Greece, and we have to try to make all things go sweet? If so, it will be a great disaster. We could produce for the President exactly the results he wants in Greece, and the Russians will take all they want in Roumania whatever we say.*6 Precisely the sort of disaster Churchill feared seemed to occur on 29 July. A mere two days after Eden’s censure of EAM

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in the Commons, news reached London of the sudden and unexpected arrival of a Soviet military mission in Tree Greece’. The mission, composed of ten Russian officers under Colonel Gregori Popov, had parachuted into the country and ensconced itself at ELAS General Headquarters. The Foreign Office were outraged by the development, thinking it ‘quite monstrous’ of the Russians to intervene in Greece without prior consultation with London, particularly in view of Britain’s expressed willingness to allow them the lead in Romania.*7 ‘[T]his may be a Russian attempt to complete [the] Communist domination o f the Balkans’, wrote Eden, ‘and I think we should make it pretty plain that we are not standing for it in Greece’.** He summoned Gousev, the Soviet ambassador in London, and lectured him on Britain’s determination to stand by Papandreou against EAM. He stressed that it would be most unfortunate if Soviet policy were to differ from that o f Great Britain.*9 Without access to Soviet archives it is impossible to establish with certainty the Russians’ motives for dispatching a military mission to Greece. However, two Greek communist sources a report to the politburo by Rousos, published in the official archives of the KKE, and the memoirs of the then secondranking member of the Communist Party, Ioannis Ioannidis shed considerable light on the subject and permit one to arrive at a number of speculative conclusions. The chain of events which culminated in the dispatch of the mission appears to have begun in Egypt in mid-June, when Rousos secretly met Daniil Solod, the counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in Cairo, and inquired as to the Russians' opinion of the national charter recently promulgated at the Lebanon conference. Solod, doubtless acting on instructions from Moscow, replied that the charter ‘corresponds to the present state of affairs’. He recommended that the KKE join Papandreou’s government at once and urged Rousos to convey his opinion to Siantos in Greece.90 Clearly, the Russians had the proposed Anglo-Soviet arrangement in mind and were anxious for the Greek communists to co-operate with the British. But Rousos, for reasons unknown, failed to communicate Solod’s advice to his party’s politburo; and Siantos proceeded in early July to break off negotiations with Papandreou and recall the delegates of

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the Left to ‘Free Greece’. Only upon his return to the mountains did Rousos tell his superiors of his discussions with Solod, and by then, of course, it was too late. The Russians, meanwhile, probably unaware of Rousos’s bungle, may have interpreted the KKE’s intransigence towards Papandreou as deliberate insubordination to their ‘advice’. Perhaps it was in this light that they decided to establish direct communication with the KKE by landing a military mission in Greece. Ioannidis, the organizational secretary of the Greek politburo, spoke to the political officer of the Soviet mission, Chernyshev, within hours of the latter’s arrival at ELAS General Headquarters. When he tried to explain to Chernyshev why the KKE had terminated its negotiations with Papandreou, the Russian asked him point-blank whether the Greek communists intended to wage war on Great Britain. Ioannidis replied that if need be, ELAS would engage British troops in batde; whereupon Chernyshev, far from promising Soviet assistance, gave him a derisory look. The effect of this grimace was enormous, Ioannidis later recalled. It left him thoroughly demoralized.91 When coupled with Rousos’s belated report about Solod, it made it abundandy clear to both him and Siantos that the KKE had incurred the Russians’ displeasure by defying Papandreou. Eden’s fear of a Russian plan to communize Greece thus seems to have been wholly unfounded. Although a formal Anglo-Soviet agreement on permanent spheres of influence had been obstructed by the Americans, the Russians were apparendy still willing to acknowledge Greece as a Bridsh preserve. Doubdess they hoped that the British would appreciate their restraining the KKE and reciprocate by respecting Soviet predominance in Romania. If a formal agreement between the two Powers was impossible, there might at least be a tacit understanding. As for the Greek communists, they did not possess sufficient strength of character to ignore the Kremlin’s views. They prompdy withdrew their ultimatum of 2 July and declared their willingness to join Papandreou’s government. However, it emerges clearly from Ioannidis’s memoirs that the KKE’s volte-face was merely a tactical manœuvre and not a renunciation of the party’s ultimate objectives. For although

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the Russians urged the KKE to join Papandreou's cabinet, they did not explicitly instruct it to abandon its pursuit of power. Perhaps they wished to maintain the Greek communists in a state of preparedness. It had yet to be seen whether Britain would abide by a tacit understanding regarding spheres of influence, and they probably thought it wise to keep their options open. The ambivalence of their stance seems to have left Ioannidis and Siantos with the impression that the Russians disapproved not o f the KKE’s pursuit of power per se, but of the provocative manner in which the struggle was being conducted; and that the Russians’ sole concern was that the party should henceforth advance with greater tact, avoiding fracas with Britain which were bound to complicate AngloSoviet relations. The problem thus confronting the Greek communist leaders was how to achieve power without provoking an armed conflict with an ally of the Soviet Union. The solution they arrived at was to join Papandreou’s government and feign co-operation with the British in order to delude the latter into thinking it unnecessary to dispatch an expeditionary force to Greece. ELAS would then be able to seize Athens unopposed at the moment of liberation. According to Ioannidis: We decided that we should and would conduct ourselves in a way that would not oblige the British to enter Greece. . . . That was the whole point of the issue. Aflexible policy to thwart the cowing ofthe British before the liberation. . . . we would have convinced them that we were not intending to seize power by violence in order that they should not bring . . . their troops into Greece and so we would catch them sleeping and not them us.92 Accordingly, even as the announcement was made that EAM was ready to enter the government, instructions were secredy issued to ELAS to concentrate its forces on Attica.99 That Churchill and Eden were already convinced of the need to land Bridsh troops in the capital, the communists (like Papandreou) had no way of knowing. The Russians were not the only party to engage in a secret dialogue with the leaders of ‘Free Greece’. Unknown to Papandreou and the Bridsh, Venizelos, during a talk with Svolos prior to the latter’s departure from Cairo, had

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encouraged the PEEA to demand that Papandreou be replaced as premier.94 Evidendy, Venizelos hoped to enlist the Left’s aid in his obstinate campaign to recapture the premiership. Siantos was no doubt attracted by the idea of toppling Papandreou on the eve o f EAM’s joining the government; but before he could commit the Left to another clash with the Premier, he had to restore the cohesion of the PEEA, which had been strained by his brusque treatment o f Svolos ever since the Lebanon conference. The socialist had yet to receive a plausible explanation for the KKE’s repudiation of the national charter, and seems at last to have begun to suspect the communists o f aspiring to dictatorship. On his return to Greece, he had even mustered up the courage to warn Siantos that he would resign from the PEEA should the KKE embark on a unilateral seizure of power.95 The communists now told him that their intransigence had been entirely due to their personal distrust of Papandreou and promised to abide by the national charter if a new premier were found. They insisted that the Soviet military mission had had nothing to do with their decision to withdraw their ultimatum of 2 July. Svolos was convinced by their exposition;96he had no way o f knowing that their sudden conciliatoriness was designed to pave the way precisely for the coup d'état he had momentarily feared was their aim. On 29 July he joined Siantos in dispatching a telegram to Cairo committing the PEEA to participate in a government of national unity provided that Papandreou resigned.97 Venizelos promptly took up the cudgels for EAM. At a cabinet meeting on 4 August he called on Papandreou to step down ‘in the interest of national unity’. He then told Edward Warner, the Second Secretary of the British Embassy, that a Liberal should accede to the premiership because the Liberals comprised the largest party in Greece. No one knew which was the largest Greek party, Warner retorted. He pleaded with Venizelos to cease taking a ‘narrow party view’ of the situation, but to no avail.9* A crisis engulfed the cabinet, and Warner turned to the Foreign Office for assistance. They referred the matter to Churchill, recommending that Papandreou be retained in office since he seemed the only Greek politician capable of imposing the national charter on the communists.99

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Churchill came down emphatically in Papandreou’s favour. The Premier, he wrote to Eden, should remain in office and ‘defy them all’. EAM was ‘seeking nothing but the communization of Greece during the confusion of war, without allowing the people to decide in any manner understood by Democracy. . . . Either we support Papandreou, if necessary with force as we have agreed, or we disinterest ourselves utterly in Greece.’100 On Eden’s instruction, Warner informed Venizelos that the British could not permit a change of premier. Venizelos capitulated and on 17 August Siantos and Svolos, deserted by their conservative ally, consented to join a cabinet under Papandreou's command. Eden, meanwhile, had requested the War Cabinet to sanction the dispatch o f an expeditionary force to Greece at the moment of liberation. In a memorandum submitted to the Cabinet on 9 August he explained that the ‘traditional connexion’ between Britain and Greece was indispensable to Britain’s strategic position in the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean. The overriding objective of British troops would be to ensure that a ‘friendly’ government was installed in Athens, thus forestalling a communist dictatorship and the eventual alignment of the country with the Soviet Union. A ‘friendly’ government was clearly intended to denote a regime reflecting the pro-British sentiments of the majority of Greeks and not one specifically royalist or republican; for Eden declared that there was ‘no question of our forcing any particular form of government on the G reeks.. . . nor were we in any way committed as regards the position of the King.’ The War Cabinet agreed to the assemblage of an invasion force of 10,000 men. This number fell far short of the 80,000 men estimated by the Chiefs of Staff to be the minimum required to guarantee stability throughout the country, but it was the greatest number of troops that could be diverted from the arduous campaign on the Italian front.101 Papandreou would have been pleased to learn of the War Cabinet’s directive. Distrustful of the KKE, he had been little impressed by its sudden decision to enter his government and regarded the stationing of British troops in Athens as the only real safeguard against a communist uprising. But the proceedings of the War Cabinet were not divulged to him. It

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was feared that he would disclose vital details about the prospective operation to his Greek colleagues, who might inadvertently speak of what they knew to agents of EAM. Kept in the dark, he was soon overcome by fear that the British were losing interest in Greece, and began to bombard London with appeals for an invasion of Athens. He assured the Foreign Office that there would be no danger of a clash between the British and ELAS, since the latter would never dare attack Allied troops. The mere presence of the British in Athens would suffice to precipitate the dissolution of*ELAS and he felt certain that the expeditionary force could be withdrawn from the capital within a m onth.102On 21 August he flew to liberated Rome and met Churchill to plead his case in person. He warned the Prime Minister that the unarmed Greek state was confronted by armed minorities and could not hope to demobilize the guerrillas unless bolstered by British troops. But Churchill, again for reasons of security, deliberately misinformed him, stating that the British were still examining the question o f an invasion and could make no promises nor enter into any obligations. He confined himself to suggesting that Papandreou and his cabinet leave the 'poisonous atmosphere of Greek intrigue’ in Cairo and come to Italy, explaining that their arrival in the vicinity of Allied General Headquarters at Caserta (AFHQ) might serve as a warning to EAM and an encouragement to loyal Greeks. Before parting with Papandreou, Churchill commented on the future of King George. He left Papandreou in no doubt that although he was a proponent of constitutional monarchy, he would allow the Greeks to determine the nature of their post-war regime on their own in a free plebiscite. The King, he observed, had earned Britain's 'friendly and chivalrous feelings’ by his unwavering hostility to the Axis during the Allies’ darkest hours in 1940-1. Nevertheless, neither these sentiments nor Churchill’s own admiration for ‘the type of constitutional monarchy which had been evolved in England’ would induce the British to disregard the democratic rights of the Greek people, and ‘so long as the matter was settled by a fair plebiscite H.M. Government were politically indifferent to the question’. He thought it unnecessary for the King to issue any further declaration on the timing of his return since he had

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already pledged to abide by the Greek government's advice. In conclusion, he urged Papandreou to focus his attention on preparing for his own return to Athens and to do everything possible to augment the authority of his cabinet.103 No sooner did Papandreou return to Cairo than the government was again thrown into turmoil by the Liberals. Venizelos, slighted by Papandreou's failure to invite him on the mission to see Churchill, accused the Premier of transforming the government into a personal dictatorship. He complained that Papandreou had never delegated authority to the Liberals or taken them into his confidence, choosing to ignore the fact that they themselves were litde deserving of his trust, having persistendy conspired against him and even colluded with the communists in an attempt to remove him from office. Venizelos gave nodce that the Liberals would quit the government en bloc unless Papandreou stepped down. But Themistocles Tsatsos, a Liberal who was serving as minister of jusdce, suddenly bolted to the Premier’s side, reproaching Venizelos for allowing his personal ambidon to endanger the unity of the cabinet. Papandreou prompdy declared that Tsatsos’s views were representative of the genuine sentiments of the Liberal party. He rejected Venizelos’s ultimatum, whereupon, on SO August, Venizelos and Rentis resigned.104 They would not be missed, Leeper remarked; Venizelos was a ‘miserable litde twister’, wrote Warner; he was ‘worthless’, Laskey, of the Southern Department, agreed, ‘and neither he nor any other Greek politician outside Greece could adequately replace M. Papandreou’.105 With the resignation of Venizelos, a modicum of stability was finally attained in the cabinet. For the moment, Papandreou reigned supreme, the undisputed leader of the government, dubbed the Government of National Unity on S September when the newly arrived ministers-designate of the PEEA and EAM/ELAS took the,oath: Alexandras Svolos Angelos Angelopoulos Nikolaos Askoutsis Ilias Tsirimokos Miltiadis Porphyrogenis Ioannis Zevgos

PEEA, socialist PEEA, socialist PEEA, Liberal EAM, socialist KKE KKE

Finance Under-Secretary o f Finance Communications National Economy Labour Agriculture10*

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But it remained to be seen how much longer Papandreou could outwit the King and outmanoeuvre the Liberals; and whether he could restore his influence over the socialists and so isolate the KKE. Nor was it certain that his government would ever return to Greece. The communists were intent on dominating Athens at the moment of liberation, and the British, constrained by the need to maintain troops in Italy, were mustering an expeditionary force whose size was but a fraction of that required to countervail ELAS. The extent to which Papandreou could mould a moderate Centre and the degree to which the British could and would intervene in Greek affairs were to determine the destiny of Greece.

2

The Road to Revolution On 7 September 1944 Papandreou, heeding Churchill’s advice, journeyed with his ministers from Egypt to Italy.1 On the following day they arrived at Cava dei Tirreni, a town situated on the outskirts of Salerno, in the vicinity of AFH Q at Caserta. It was hoped that the establishment of the government near AFHQ, would discourage the KKE by reaffirming that Greece lay within the British zone of military operations. But, fortuitously, the move to Italy coincided with the sudden invasion of Bulgaria by the Red Army, whose rapid advance gave rise to speculation that the first Allied troops to enter Greece would be Russian instead of British. Papandreou informed Leeper that the communist ministers, Zevgos and Porphyrogenis, could scarcely conceal their satisfaction. He feared that they might become unmanageable, since whatever influence the socialists exerted over them was bound to diminish the closer the Russians drew to the Greek frontier.2 Alarmed by the prospect of a Russian invasion of Greece, Churchill instructed Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, the British ambassador in Moscow, to call on Iosif Stalin, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, and apprise him of Britain’s plan to send an expeditionary force to Greece. ‘Good, it is high time’, was Stalin's reassuring reply. Clark Kerr was told that Russian troops would not cross from Bulgaria into Greece.3 Doubtless to the intense disappointment of the KKE, the Red Army swung westward and proceeded towards Yugoslavia.4 The impending liberation of 'Yugoslavia threatened to isolate the Germans in Greece. Consequently, they began to evacuate the country, withdrawing first from the Aegean islands and the Peloponnesus. ELAS seized the opportunity to enter the newly freed territories and install local officials of EAM in power. ELAS’s forces in the Peloponnesus, under Aris Velouchiotis, a communist and fearsome guerrilla com­ mander, were particularly active in this way. They set about

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mastering the peninsula irrespective of the wishes of the population. In Kalamata, a town sympathetic to EAM/ELAS, they were welcomed as liberators, and established EAM’s rule with ease. The town of Pyrgos, by contrast, loathed them and was taken by force after a massacre of the Security Battalions and right-wing civilians who had dared to stand in their way.5 Even as word of Velouchiotis’s excesses reached Cava dei Tirreni, the communist ministers tried their best to project a conciliatory image. Evidently in keeping with the strategy expounded by Siantos and Ioannidis after the arrival of the Soviet military mission, they hoped to delude the British into thinking that there was no need to dispatch an expeditionary force to Greece. On 13 September they voted in favour of entrusting General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, the supreme Allied commander of the Mediterranean theatre, with operational command of the Greek guerrilla forces. They further agreed that there should be no amnesty for the ringleaders of the April mudny and acknowledged that the government should be solely responsible for punishing collaborators. On 15 September they went so far as to join the socialists in assuring Papandreou that they wanted him to continue as premier until élections were conducted after liberation.6 But Papandreou was not impressed by their professions of loyalty. He warned Leeper that their co­ operative demeanour was ‘purely opportunist’ and would cease the moment they considered it safe to alter their tactics. As for the socialists, he had by now concluded that they were ‘powerless even if one admitted they had the will to stop EAM in Greece’; but, despite their impotence, he was still anxious to wean them away from the communists and therefore hoped to avoid another bracas with the Left such as that which had occurred in July. In the long term, he explained, what was important was ‘the division between Moderates and Com­ munists inside EAM. This division would increase provided he did not openly foment it but allowed it to develop naturally.’7 In the short term, it was imperative to prevent ELAS from overrunning Greece as the Germans withdrew. Accordingly, General Wilson, at Leeper’s and Papandreou’s bidding, summoned the commanders of ELAS and EDES to Caserta with a view to ensuring that they obeyed both his and the

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government’s instructions in the weeks remaining before liberation. Sarafis and Zervas arrived on 21 September, accompanied by their respective political advisers, the communist Kostas Despotopoulos and Pyromaglou. On 24 September they met General Ronald Scobie, to whom Wilson had delegated the command of the Greek guerrilla armies. Scobie informed them that, as their Commander-in-Chief, his task would be to expel the Axis forces from their country and to ’restore order’ throughout the land. He directed them to foster tranquillity in the newly liberated territories and to facilitate the consolidation of the authority of the legally constituted government. He then told them that he intended to place Athens under the jurisdiction of Colonel Spihotopoulos, who had been appointed military commandant of Attica by Papandreou some months before. Finally, he revealed that British troops were soon to land in southern Greece, though he declined to divulge the timing or magnitude of the operation.8 Zervas readily undertook to abide by Scobie’s orders. But the prospect of a British invasion spurred Despotopoulos to action. During a meeting of the cabinet on 25 September he told Papandreou that British troops were not required to expel the Germans from Greece and that it was therefore unnecessary for British troops to land in the country and for the guerrillas to be subordinated to a British officer. Papandreou retorted that unless Despotopoulos retracted his statement another rupture between the government and EAM would be unavoidable.9 Zevgos, the communist minister, was alarmed and drew Despotopoulos aside for a private discussion. According to Despotopoulos, Zevgos warned him that his agitation against the British would bring about the collapse of the Government of Nadonal Unity. This Zevgos could not permit, for it would run contrary to the directives which had been given him by the politburo at the time of his departure from ‘Free Greece’ to join the government in Cairo.10 At a separate meeting, Svolos also urged Despot­ opoulos to show restraint, explaining that only in this manner would the British come to trust EAM/ELAS and perhaps eventually even allow Svolos himself to become premier." Denied support from the socialist and communist ministers

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alike, Despotopoulos was left with no option but to yield. However, during a conference with Papandreou on 26 September, Despotopoulos tried at least to curtail Scobie’s powers. He argued that it was improper for a British officer to be charged with restoring order in Greece, since law and order was a purely internal affair. This time, Zevgos and Svolos agreed with him12 and Papandreou was forced to retreat. Eventually, they arrived at a compromise: Scobie was not authorized to delve into matters of public security, but Sarafis pledged to him that ELAS would uphold law and order in the territories under its control. The guerrillas would be expressly forbidden to take the law into their own hands and would actively assist the government to establish its authority throughout Greece. Finally, the guerrilla armies’ respective zones of control were defined. EDES would continue to occupy Epirus as would ELAS most o f the rest of the mainland. But operations in Attica were entrusted to Colonel Spiliotopoulos; all ELAS troops residing in Athens were immediately placed under his command; and the infiltration into the capital of further units of ELAS from the hinterland was prohibited. A summary of these terms was then incorporated in a document dubbed the Caserta Agreement and promulgated on 27 September.15 It remained for the KKE’s leaders to ratify the agreement. Ioannidis recalls that he and Siantos were horrified when they learned o f its terms. It obliged them to subordinate ELAS to a British officer and to refrain from engaging in unilateral action in Athens, conditions which posed insurmountable obstacles to their plan to dominate the capital the moment the Germans departed. Nevertheless, they decided that they must accept the agreement without protest and resign themselves to the liberation of Athens by the British. They ruled out an attempt to renegotiate the agreement, fearing that another wrangle with Papandreou over the heads of their accredited representa­ tives, such as that which had followed the Lebanon conference, would create the worst impression in Greece, if not destroy the prestige o f the KKE altogether.14 Nor do they seem for a moment to have considered repudiating the agreement, disavowing the government, and waging war on British troops as they landed. This they had been prepared to do prior to the

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arrival of the Soviet military mission; but since then, it had become a maxim of their policy that their quest for power must not embroil them in hostilities with Allied troops. For the moment, they were off-balance, without a clear notion of how to proceed. According to Ioannidis, they concluded that the most they could do was to strengthen the ELAS forces already in Attica and hope that the British expeditionary force was of limited size. Ioannidis himself hastened to Athens to supervise the reorganization of the local ELAS units. Weapons were smuggled into the capital from the countryside and a wave of arrests was unleashed against EAM’s rivals by the movement’s security police, the Units for the Protection of the Popular Struggle (OPLA).15 In London, meanwhile, the King, aware that liberation was close at hand, began to press urgently for his early return to Athens. In discussions with Eden and George VI, the British monarch, he made it clear that, in his view, he should be allowed to return whatever the views of Papandreou’s cabinet. He did not regard Papandreou’s declaration of 13 June16 as binding and expressed doubts about the Premier’s loyalty to the throne.17 Crown Prince Paul, the King’s brother, was more explicit. Warner reported from Cairo that he was indulging in ‘wild talk’ against the premier. He was openly denouncing Papandreou as a ‘liar’, and rumours were rife that General Ventiris had urged him to force the overthrow of the government.16 Alarmed by these developments, Papandreou summoned Leeper on 25 September and warned him that if the King defied the government, the cabinet would immediate­ ly collapse. He agreed with his fellow ministers that the King must remain abroad until after the plebiscite and felt that the time had come for the British to compel the monarch to reach a ‘clear cut decision’ on his future plans. It would be pointless for the Greeks to take the initiative, he explained, for the King would only listen to the British.19 The Foreign Office thought it essential that the King abide by his ministers’ advice. In their view, his early return would prove disastrous, since it would destroy the Greek government and afford the communists the support of a large segment of the population, the majority of whom did not want the monarch back before the plebiscite. Moreover, it would not be

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in the King’s own interests to be in Athens immediately after the liberation. He would find himself at the epicentre of the inevitable quarrels between the politicians, who would try to burden him with responsibility for their own mistakes and shortcomings, thus rendering it impossible for him to establish himself as ‘a constitutional King, above and outside political parties’.20 The fortunes of the British expeditionary force had also to be considered. Eden feared that British troops would be placed in an impossible position if, at the moment of liberation, the King returned, the Greek government disinte­ grated, and civil war broke out between the rival resistance organizations. Such was the hatred existing between ELAS and ED ES that civil war might well erupt whether or not the King returned; but if he remained abroad, there would at least be a chance of preserving some form of government intact and British troops would not be stranded in the midst of chaos, unaccompanied by any legal Greek civil authority.21 ‘Nothing must compromise the return of the Greek Government with British military support,’ Churchill advised Eden on 29 September. Consequently, it was ‘impossible even to consider’ the King’s going to Greece until Papandreou and his ministers were firmly established in Athens and ‘until they feel they can manage i t . . . . Meanwhile the King must keep out of the way.’22 On 4 October he informed the monarch that the British ‘could not allow’ him to return unless he were recalled by the Greek government. Churchill ‘hoped’ that Papandreou’s cabinet would be able to invite him to return soon after liberation and promised ‘personally [to] press them strongly in this direction if the chances were good*. The King accepted these views, Churchill reported to Eden, ‘as he knows I am his friend and working constandy for his return if that can be done in accordance with the wishes of his people’.28At last, the King’s dogged campaign to return to Greece upon liberation was brought to an end by Churchill’s insistence that he subordinate himself to the will of the Greek government and entrust the fate of his throne to the judgement of the people. But having lectured the King on his constitutional responsibilities, Churchill was intent on urging Papandreou to make a genuine attempt, for his part, to persuade the cabinet to invite the monarch back before the plebiscite. Papandreou

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was the King’s ’first Minister’, Churchill wrote to Eden, and it was ’his duty to bring the King back’ or at least ’to try to manage this’. It was also incumbent on the British to use their influence to this end, for the King was a loyal ally and ’we shall win no credit by deserting our friends’.24Accordingly, during a brief visit to Caserta on 8 October, Churchill summoned Papandreou, and, in the presence of Eden and Harold Macmillan, the British minister resident at AFHQ, harangued him on the merits of constitudonal monarchy. Papandreou was stunned by the encounter, but did not waver in his conviction that the King must remain abroad until after the plebiscite. Subsequently, Macmillan encouraged him to disregard Churchill’s remarks, explaining that the Prime Minister was ‘discharging a moral obligation’.25 By this time the Germans’ evacuation of southern Greece was nearly complete, and, with the exception of small pockets of right-wing resistance, the liberated territories were coming under the control of EAM. Determined to reverse this trend, Papandreou appointed Kanellopoulos, the leader, of the minute National Unity Party, as commissioner for the Peloponnesus, and ordered him to proceed to the peninsula to assume power on behalf of the government. At the Caserta conference Sarafis had promised that ELAS would aid the government’s efforts to establish its àuthority, and it appeared at first as if Kanellopoulos could count on the guerrillas’ support. Velouchiotis, the regional commander of ELAS, agreed to put an end to the summary trial and execution of members of the Security Battalions and to allow them to surrender to representatives of the government;26 and on 2 October the EAM central committee issued instructions to its provincial bureaux to obey the government’s directives and maintain exemplary order, in keeping with the terms of the Caserta Agreement.27 But when, on 5 October, Kanellopoulos and Velouchiotis arrived at Patras, the largest town in the Peloponnesus, it became apparent that the communists intended to deny the government genuine power, irrespective of what Sarafis and the EAM central committee had pledged. A disagreement arose between Kanellopoulos and Velouchiotis over the most crucial issue'of control of the organs of public security. Kanellopoulos wished to command the police in

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Patras and exercise sole responsibility for issuing warrants for arrest. But Velouchiotis insisted that EAM also be entitled to detain individuals, and on 7 October the local EAM committee organized a mass demonstration during which banners were flourished calling for the dissolution of the police. Eventually, Kanellopoulos managed to persuade EAM that he alone was authorized to issue warrants; but he, for his part, was forced to concede that the actual arrests would be made by the National Civil Guard (EP), the police-force of EAM.2* EAM had established a 'State within [a] State’, he complained to Major Anthony Andrewes, the British liaison officer in Patras. 'In spite of ELAS’s official agreement to a policy of concilia­ tion . . . [it was] organized to provoke reprisals against one section of the population.’29 In Caserta, Leeper was quick to draw an ominous lesson from Kanellopoulos’s predicament. He feared that the representatives of the government, isolated in territories controlled by ELAS, would be unable on their own to dislodge EAM from power. If the countryside were to be freed from ELAS’s coercive rule and the communists compelled to co­ operate, Greece would have to be liberated by a British expeditionary force of considerable strength. At present, only a handful of British commandos were to be found in the entire country, and the 10,000 men being mustered for the invasion - the most who could be spared from the Italian front - might well prove too few to ensure success.30 If Papandreou was to receive only meagre military assistance from the British, the KKE was to be afforded none whatsoever from the Soviet Union. During a private meeting with Stalin in Moscow on 9 October, Churchill, out of earshot of the Americans, finally concluded the arrangement with the Russians that he and Eden had sought since the previous May. He opened the discussion by observing that Romania was ‘very much a Russian affair’, whereas the Mediterranean region was of principal concern to the British. He hoped therefore that Stalin would allow Britain the ‘first say’ in Greece in exchange for a Russian ‘lead’ in Bucharest. Significantly, he did not suggest that the arrangement be limited to the period of the war. This evidendy satisfied the Russians, whose obvious aim

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was a permanent sphere of influence in eastern Europe. Stalin acknowledged that it was ‘a serious matter for Britain when the Mediterranean route was not in her hands’ and agreed that the British should have the first say in Greece. The discussion then turned to the fate of the Balkans as a whole; and a decision was eventually reached whereby Britain would enjoy 90 per cent ’interest’ in Greece, 50 per cent interest in Yugoslavia and Hungary, 20 per cent in Bulgaria, and 10 per cent in Romania - with the Soviet Union enjoying the complement in each country. Churchill warned Stalin ’not to use the phrase ’’dividing into spheres” , because the Americans might be shocked’. The Americans, Stalin replied, ‘seemed to demand too many rights for the United States leaving too little for the Soviet Union and Great Britain’. Churchill then-impressed on Stalin that Britain’s objective in Greece was to restore democracy by preventing any Greek political faction from forcibly imposing its views on another. Britain and the Soviet Union ’could not allow a lot of little wars after the Great World War’, he stated, and must therefore seek to reconcile the rival ideological camps in each of the Balkan nations. In Greece, the people should be afforded ’a fair chance of freedom of expression* when selecting their future regime. The fate of the Greek throne should be determined by ‘a free plebiscite in dme of tranquillity’, and the British would under no circumstances,try to force a monarchy on the country.*1 But a corresponding pledge to respect democratic procedure in Romania and Bulgaria was not forthcoming from the Russians. This evidendy concerned Churchill, and, after the conference, he considered coaxing them into making one. He drafted a memorandum to Stalin emphasizing that the broad principle governing Anglo-Soviet policy in the Balkans should be ’to let every country have the form of government which its people desire’.*2 However, on second thoughts, he decided against dispatching the memorandum, perhaps fearing that it would be interpreted by the Russians as British meddling in their sphere of influence at the very moment that they had disavowed any interest in Greece. He probably concluded that this would jeopardize his whole arrangement with Stalin to no useful purpose, since the Russians’ military superiority in Romania and Bulgaria would

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enable them to do whatever they wished there, regardless of what the British said or persuaded Stalin to say. Churchill was still in Moscow when, on 14 October, he received word that the Germans were at last evacuating Athens. Within a day of their departure, British troops arrived to an ecstatic welcome from the capital’s inhabitants. The Russians, too, were pleased by the invasion. Doubtless they hoped that every set-back for EAM/ELAS would provide the British with greater incentive to abide by the percentages agreement. Molotov, the commissar for foreign affairs, congratulated Eden on the success of the operation: it was "of importance’, he remarked.33 On 18 October Papandreou’s cabinet, accom­ panied by Leeper, arrived at the Piraeus aboard the Greek battleship Averof. Before a crowd of nearly 100,000 persons assembled in Syntagma Square, the Premier reaffirmed the national charter as the programme of his government. The cabinet would raise a national army, purge the state of Metaxists and collaborators, and, as quickly as possible and in an atmosphere of tranquillity, conduct a plebiscite on the constitutional question and elections for a constituent assembly. Freedom, order, and social justice were to be the hallmarks o f post-war society.34 The communists tried to transform the occasion into a show of strength by EAM. Their agitators were out in force amidst the crowds, brandishing a host of banners and initially drowning the Premier’s words with their chants. But the danger Papandreou posed to their influence over the populace swiftly became apparent. His oratory earned him the rapt attendon of his audience, who eventually applauded him vociferously.35 The government found Athens in a state of economic collapse and fiscal chaos, the legacy of the exploitative policies adopted by the Germans during the occupation. They had stripped the country of vital commodities, purchasing the goods they required with astronomical sums of newly printed drachma notes levied from the Greek governments-ofoccupadon as ‘occupation-force expenses’. The circulation of vast and ever-increasing quantities of paper currency in the war-ravaged economy had resulted in an astounding rate of inflation, which had obliterated the value of fixed incomes, savings, and securities, and virtually ruined the banking

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system. To avert a collapse of essential services, the govemments-of-occupation had assumed responsibility for meeting the wages of banks’ and utilities’ employees; but since the governments were themselves starved of revenue, they had had to resort to issuing paper currency on their own, above and beyond the quotas demanded by the Germans.36 As a result, between October 1940 and September 1944 the volume of notes in circulation had increased 570,000 times, while the ratio between the drachma and the gold sovereign, which had come to be regarded as the sole repository of real value, rose 27,000,000 times.37 By liberation, the drachma was to all intents and purposes useless as a medium of exchange. Conditions only worsened during the first week of freedom. Papandreou’s government continued to pay the wages of the employees of essential services, who, when combined with civil servants, comprised some forty per cent of the inhabitants of Athens and the Piraeus. Moreover, following a precedent set by the last govemment-of-occupation, wages were increased automatically at the end of every week to compensate for the constant rise in commodity prices.33 To meet these expen­ ditures, new currency was printed, which, when introduced into the capital’s barren markets, only aggravated the monetary crisis by forcing prices ever upwards. The root of the problem was the scarcity of consumer goods: too much money was chasing too few commodities. On 21 October Svolos, in his capacity as minister of finance, urged the British military authorities and the Swedish-directed Greek Relief Commission to deliver at once all relief supplies scheduled for distribution in November and December. In this manner, he explained, wages might be paid in food in lieu of currency. However, General Scobie and A. Emil Sandstrom, the Swedish president of the commission, informed him that the volume o f aid available for Greece was insufficient to meet his requirements. Persons salaried by the government would simply have to accept lower wages and a more meagre standard of living.3’ But Svolos baulked at the suggestion that he reduce the wages of government employees, perhaps through fear that this would forfeit him the public’s goodwill. The printing-press continued to chum out drachma notes, and the inflation-rate rose inexorably.

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Such was the magnitude of the economic crisis, and so unsettling was its impact on the public’s state of mind, that tackling it should have been a matter of top priority for the government. But Papandreou, at this time, was distracted yet again by a skirmish with the Liberal Party. On 21 October Venizelos arrived in Athens from Egypt and closeted himself with Sophoulis, the Liberals’ chief. The following day they issued a joint statement praising Venizelos’s decision to quit the cabinet in August and criticizing Tsatsos, the minister of justice, for having remained at Papandreou’s side. Repudiated by his superiors, Tsatsos resigned, a loss for the government since he had been energetic in pursuing collaborators.40 His successor was Nikolaos Avraam, a Liberal enjoying Sophoulis’s confidence. His appetite whetted, Sophoulis proceeded to insist that the Liberals be awarded the ministry of the interior as well. This demand must have alarmed the communists, who had always coveted the post fpr themselves. Evidently intent on preserving equilibrium in the cabinet, Papandreou entrusted the key portfolio to one of his own adherents, Petros Manouelidis. Another member of his entourage, Lambros Lambrianidis, became under-secretary of defence. As a result of these appointments, Papandreou’s Democratic-Socialists and EAM became the two largest blocs in the government. Sophoulis complained that the Liberals were now inadequately represented, but Papandreou, his patience exhausted, turned a deaf ear. The Liberals, he told Leeper, had an exaggerated opinion of their own importance. They had been the largest single party in the parliament of 1936, but it was now widely accepted that their strength had been gravely eroded during the ensuing years of dictatorship and occupation.41 With the Liberals subdued - at least temporarily - the held was clear for a resumption of the struggle between Papandreou and the KKE. To date, the Premier had managed to deny the communists control of the government and to secure its safe return to Athens. The task that now lay before him was to break the communists’ monopoly of power in the countryside in order that genuinely free elections could be held. If he succeeded, Leeper advised the Foreign Office, the final stage of the contest would be waged at the ballot box, where

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Papandreou’s attempt to enlist the moderates of EAM in a new progressive party would be pitted against the communists’ endeavours to hold EAM together.42 In Leeper’s view, the British, for their part, must exert their influence ’always on the side of moderation’. In this manner, they would foster the growth of the Greek Centre, whose present disarray was the country’s ‘great weakness’.4* The essential prerequisite for Papandreou’s success was the demobilization of ELAS, whose armed forces provided the KKE with the means to dominate the provinces. His negotiations with the communists on the subject got off to a promising start. On 26 October he announced at a press conference in Athens that, on the previous day, he and Siantos had agreed that all ‘volunteer bodies’ of ELAS of EDES, and of the Greek armed forces of the Middle East, would be disbanded.44 However, it soon transpired that the communists’ interpretation of the term ‘volunteer bodies’ differed from that of Papandreou. The communists maintained that the whole of the Greek armed forces of the Middle East was composed of volunteers. Papandreou, by contrast, regarded the Mountain Brigade as a regular military formation. This crucial difference of opinion emerged clearly on 31 October when Radio Athens quoted Papandreou as saying that he and Siantos had agreed that ‘the volunteers who joined ELAS, EDES, and the Middle East Forces will be discharged’.45 This statement implied that formations judged to contain no volunteers would remain intact. On the same day, Kathimerina Nea, a newspaper closely associated with the Premier, drove the point home by observing that, in accordance with the terms formulated by Papandreou and Siantos, the Mountain Brigade would be spared demobilization.46 The communists prompdy retorted that the brigade must be disbanded. They insisted that it was a volunteer body and called for universal demobilization. Papandreou disregarded the communists and on 31 October submitted a detailed plan for the disbandment of ELAS and EDES to General Scobie. He proposed that men drafted into the army in 1936 (the 1915 class) be called up on 24 November and organized into a provisional national guard. The latter, on 1 December, would be deployed throughout the nation, replacing EAM’s police-force, the EP. On 10

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December ELAS and EDES would be demobilized except for guerrillas belonging to the classes of 1916-19, who would comprise the ranks of the new national army. As for the Mountain Brigade, he requested that it be immediately summoned to Athens from the Italian front. General Scobie consented47 and the brigade’s arrival was scheduled for 8 November. Papandreou’s motives for summoning the Mountain Brigade were never made explicit. The communists later claimed that he was preparing to unleash a civil war against the Left, but it is hardly likely that he intended to fire the first shot. His objecdve had consistendy been to disrupt EAM peacefully by winning the respect of its moderate adherents and not to crush the movement by force. Moreover, the brigade itself was to be in no position to engage in offensive manœuvres. Its heavy weapons and vehicles were to be left in Italy because the port facilities of the Piraeus could not accommodate them - a circumstance welcome to General Scobie’s staff, who did not wish the unit’s arrival to excite unrest.4* Instead, it appears that Papandreou’s aim was to augment his defences against ELAS through fear that the communists would take the offensive. O f the 10,000 Bridsh troops in Greece, only some 6,500 were combatants, as opposed to ELAS’s estimated strength of 40,000 guerrillas and 12,000 ‘reservists’ concentrated in Athens.49 Marooned in the capital on an islet of Bridsh troops, it is quite possible that Papandreou deemed himself in need of further military support. He may also have hoped that the presence of the brigade would indmidate the communists, who were flagrandy disregarding both him and his government. With the exception of Epirus, where EDES operated, and Patras and Thessaloniki, where British troops were stationed, practically all of mainland Greece was under the KKE’s undisputed control. Even in Athens the writ of the government was not sacrosanct. Demonstrations, illegal arrests, and premeditated clashes between communists and right-wing extremists were becoming daily occurrences.“ But if Papandreou’s aim was indeed *to indmidate the KKE, his actions had precisely the opposite effect. It is true that the communists feared the Mountain Brigade, for the ethmkophrones’ hatred o f the Left was as great as their own

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intolerance of the Right. But fear did not reduce them to submission. On the contrary, it seems only to have strengthened their resolve, lest by faltering at the eleventh hour they fell defenceless into the hands of their enemies. On 2 November Siantos reiterated that the Mountain Brigade could not be spared from demobilization.51 Incidents of public disorder in Athens increased, undermining the already feeble foundations of Papandreou’s authority. The gravest blow fell on 4 November when detachments of ELAS assisted over 700 detainees to escape from Syngrou Prison. Simultaneously, EAM staged a bellicose demonstration elsewhere in the city, during which three corpses were paraded and purported to be victims of ‘X’, an extreme Right-wing organization. ‘X’ had certainly taken its toll on members of EAM/ELAS, but, in this instance, two of the corpses were identified at the Athens morgue as those of members of the Security Battalions.52 This gave rise to speculation that the demonstration had been deliberately engineered by the communists as a provocation to the government. Leeper warned the Foreign Office that the communists were trying to discredit and perhaps even topple Papandreou before the arrival of the Mountain Brigade. At the time, the Premier was entirely dependent on the protection o f British troops, and Leeper suspected that the KKE was inciting breaches of the peace in order to gauge General Scobie’s readiness to use them. If Scobie proved timid and allowed unrest to spread unchecked, the communists might pluck up courage and instruct ELAS to launch an attack.55At Leeper's request, Scobie summoned Siantos on 6 November and spoke firmly of his determination to defend the legally constituted government.54 His words of warning appear to have had the desired effect. An uncharacteristic calm enveloped Athens; in the cabinet, the communist ministers went so far as to agree to the formation of a provisional national guard and the demobilization of the EP; and on 9 November the Mountain Brigade paraded through Athens to a tumultuous reception from large crowds. EAM maintained a discreet silence, but Churchill, for one, remained suspicious of the communists' intentions. ‘I fully expect a clash with EAM,’ he advised Eden, ‘and we must not shrink from it, provided the ground is well chosen.’55

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Siantos was in fact coming under pressure to launch an offensive from Velouchiotis, the most intrepid of ELAS's commanders. *[W]e a r e . . . anxious', Velouchiotis cabled him on 8 November, the day the Mountain Brigade disembarked at the Piraeus; ‘We await your orders for action. A hundred per cent of the Army and seventy per cent of the people are eagerly awaidng the signal for action against the forces of darkness.'56 Siantos shared Velouchiotis’s concern: he had been deeply perturbed by Papandreou’s decision to summon the brigade, apparendy regarding it as part of an elaborate plot to restore the Right to power. ‘[The] Reacdon aims to create condidons favourable to a coup and dictatorship', he wrote to the KKE’s regional committee in Thessaly on 9 November. Nevertheless he instructed ELAS to remain at its positions.57 Presumably he was reluctant to risk a clash with British troops. He also may have feared that precipitous action by ELAS would be denounced by the socialists, who were becoming increasingly disaffected by the KKE's policies. Their views were set forth on 7 November by Stratis, the leader of the SKE, during talks with an informant of the Inter-Services Liaison Division (ISLD), a British intelligence organization. According to the informant, Stratis still believed that the communists aspired to democracy and regarded their militant actions as purely defensive and designed solely to prevent a coup d’état by the Right. But Stratis acknowledged that their aggressiveness was proving counter­ productive: ‘the danger of a Rightist coup becomes greater by the very excesses . . . of EAM’. To illustrate his point, he cited a report he had received from the Peloponnesus which suggested that the population there was growing impatient with EAM’s draconian rule. The people were ‘likely to go to the other extreme of clamouring for the return of the King, who is presented to them as being the only instrument of imposing order and legality’. To avert such a catastrophe, the socialists wanted EAM to pursue moderate policies, but they were under no illusion about their ability to influence the communists. The latter were ignoring them and undermining their influence: EAM’s whole propaganda machine was ‘aimed at establishing an identification of EAM with the Communist Party to the neglect and detriment of the other parties’ within it. Nevertheless, the socialists were determined to assert their

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independence. They would soon demand an ‘equal footing’ within EAM or ‘part ways with the communists so that they [the socialists] will not share the consequences of policies and actions in which they have had no share’.5* If anxiety about the British and socialists dissuaded Siantos from ordering ELAS into batde, it did so only temporarily and did not induce him to renounce his party’s quest for power altogether. He was determined that EAM should dominate post-war Greece, but preferred to exhaust all peaceful methods of achieving this goal before resorting to force. His success depended wholly on his ability to ensure that EAM controlled the organs of public security. This was the fundamental issue, and, in a telegram of momentous import addressed to the KKE’s regional committee in Thessaly on 9 November, he directed that ELAS must not demobilize until this objective was attained. The guerrillas were to remain under arms until the Mountain Brigade was demobilized and a new army was formed commanded by officers ‘cherishing the confidence of the fighting people’. The EP was to remain intact as well undl a provisional national guard was created ‘corresponding to the people’s will’. He defined these terms as the ‘presuppositions for a normal development of the situation’.59 The selection of the officers who were to comprise the high command of the new national army commenced on 13 November. The cabinet unanimously agreed that General Alexandras Othonaios should be Commander-in-Chief. An aged Venizelist of progressive political views, Othonaios was highly regarded in republican circles and acceptable to both EAM/ELAS and EDES. He at once selected General Sarafis of ELAS as one of three deputy chiefs of staff. But a crisis then erupted over the future of General Ventiris, the existing Chief of Staff. General Scobie advised Othonaios to include him in the High Command as a deputy chief alongside Sarafis. Scobie’s intention was evidently to ensure political equilibrium in the army’s highest echelons. Furthermore, from a professional standpoint, Ventiris was admirably qualified for the job. He had been chiefly responsible for raising the Mountain Brigade, which had fought with distinction against the Axis in Italy. However, Othonaios informed Scobie that he had no use for Ventiris, nor, for the moment, for any other

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senior officer in the Middle East forces. He threatened to resign unless he alone chose the staff officers who were to serve under him.60 A fervent republican, he had doubdess been offended by Ventiris’s willingness to co-operate with royalist officers in Egypt. He did not share the ethnikophrones, passionate fear of communism which had led them to set their differences over the constitutional issue aside. Othonaios’s preference for officers of ELAS threatened to make a mockery of the national charter, which stipulated that the new army be raised on professional criteria. But Papandreou felt unable to permit Othonaios to resign, presumably in view of the general’s high repute in the republican political world and the unanimity with which the cabinet had agreed to his appointment. Instead, he proposed to strike a compromise with Othonaios whereby the High Command would be awarded to the latter in exchange for the inclusion of ethnikophrones in the officer corps. During the afternoon of 13 November, Papandreou called on Leeper and set forth his plan in detail. Othonaios would be required to permit Ventiris to continue as Chief of Staff until 10 December in order that the mobilization and deployment of the provisional national guard might proceed without inter­ ruption. But on 10 December, when the formation of the national army would begin, Othonaios would be granted unlimited power to choose a general staff to his liking. Meanwhile, the army’s officer corps would be selected by a supreme military council chaired by Othonaios but dominated by conservative officers. Their task would be to ensure that officers were selected solely on their military merits, for Greece would know no stability until the army was rendered ‘the instrument of the State and not of one party in the State’.61 That evening, Papandreou persuaded Othonaios to serve as titular Commander- in -Chief until 10 December.62 Shortly thereafter, negotiations on the composition of the supreme military council commenced. Papandreou, meanwhile, had yet to reach an agreement with the KKE on the demobilization of the guerrilla forces. The issue was of crucial importance to the Premier, for, so long as ELAS remained under arms, it was impossible to raise a national army and assert the government’s authority in the

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provinces. The communists still deemed the Mountain Brigade a volunteer body and were adamant that it and ELAS should disband simultaneously. On 14 November Leeper received a report from British intelligence sources that the KKE had gone so far as to make tentative plans for a coup d'état if its demands were not met.6* Leeper was alarmed, but nevertheless insistent that there could be no quesdon of demobilizing the brigade. Why he held this view was never made explicit in his despatches to London; but it seems obvious that he distrusted the communists and did not expect them to disband ELAS endrely on 10 December, and was therefore unwilling to allow Papandreou to dissolve the brigade and rely solely on Bridsh troops for protecdon. He did not believe, as did EAM, that if the Mountain Brigade were preserved intact, it would indulge in acts of terror against the Left after ELAS disbanded. He acknowledged that the ethmkopkrones were as extreme in their political views as were the communists, but was confident that they could be restrained by General Scobie.64 At his request, Scobie summoned Sarafis on 15 November and made it clear to him that Bridsh troops would not hesitate to fire on ELAS if the latter took up arms against the government. He assured Sarafis that the Bridsh would win any such contest: ‘Sarafis knew the power of modem weapons and knew guerrilla forces could not stand up against regulars.’65 Leeper met Svolos and urged him to persuade the communists to cease pressing for the simultaneous disbandment of ELAS and the brigade. There was ‘no parallel’ between the two cases, he maintained. Svolos agreed with him, but argued that it was the Right who were provoking disorder. The British ‘certainly held no brief for the Nationalists’, Leeper replied, but instances of communist lawlessness both in Athens and the provinces were numerous. He warned Svolos that the communists were ‘playing with a fire which might bum not only themselves but Greece. If it came to a struggle between the two opposing sides I was not interested in guessing who would win because I knew in either case Greece would lose.’66 The communists responded neither to warnings nor entreaties and obdurately demanded universal demobilization. Their intransigence seems finally to have convinced Papan­ dreou that if he were to secure ELAS’s dissolution, he would

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have to sacrifice the Mountain Brigade, whatever were Leeper’s opinions on the subject. By 17 November he appears to have concluded that he could dispense with the brigade without endangering the safety of his government. He told Leeper that he now thought it unlikely that the communists would attempt a coup. The ‘aloofness of Russia’ and General Scobie’s readiness to intervene had had a 'most damping effect on them’.6, On 20 November he took the decisive step, presenting Leeper with a fa it accompli. Following a meeting with Siantos, he informed the ambassador that, in exchange for the communist leader’s word that ELAS would disband on 10 December, he had pledged to grant leave ‘generously’ to the brigade’s officers and men, who had been ‘long absent from their homes’.6* This arrangement would have dispersed the brigade’s ranks all over Greece and was interpreted by the communists as tantamount to the unit’s dissolution.69 Papan­ dreou, too, almost certainly regarded it as signifying the end of the brigade,70 and probably cloaked it under the guise of ‘generous leave’ in order to mislead Leeper, whom he knew to be categorically opposed to the unit’s disbandment. Two days later, the Premier acquiesced in a further concession to the communists by dismissing General Ventiris from the army’s High Command. He stood firm only with regard to General Othonaios’s supreme military council: it was to be composed of three conservative republicans, one royalist, and only two generals of ELAS.71 Papandreou’s purpose clearly was to satisfy the Left that it would have nothing to fear from the extreme Right after the demobilization of ELAS. But to his surprise and consternation, the communists were still not appeased. On 23 November Rizospastis, the KKE’s official organ, asserted that ELAS would not disband until ‘fascists’ were expelled from the army and ‘normal democratic development’ was guaranteed. At a meeting with General Scobie that day, Sarafis, presumably acting on the communists’ instructions, refused to initiate preparations for the demobilization of ELAS despite Siantos’s pledge to Papandreou that the guerrillas would disperse on 10 December. That evening, Papandreou complained to Leeper and Scobie that the KKE was raising new difficulties. He asked them point-blank whether he could count on British support if

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EAM defied him and left the cabinet. Leeper promised that the British would stand by him. The Premier, he reported to London, was ‘more worried than I have seen him of late’.72 The situation was indeed far more serious than Papandreou imagined. Unknown to both him and the British, the communists were already taking steps to perpetuate their power even if ELAS disbanded. On 22 November Siantos directed the KKE’s regional committees throughout the country to ensure that members of the party, ELAS, and the EP were the first to join the provisional national guard, whose call-up was scheduled to begin two days hence. ‘Communists and EAM-ites’ were to ‘organize themselves securely’ within the guard’s ranks - an obvious allusion to the formation of subversive cells.73 In the event of ELAS disbanding, it was intended to organize the guerrillas in veterans’ associations ‘formed on a military pattern, but camouflaged’, in order that they would ‘not lose their military cohesion and their fighting value should the occasion arise after the demobilization of active ELAS in accordance with the Party’s policy regarding the evolution of the situation in the immediate future’.74 The disarmament of the Right, the infiltration of the organs of public security at the government’s disposal, and the retention of ELAS’s fighting capability - these were the communists’ presuppositions for ‘normal democratic development’. However, the KKE suffered a reversal at the hands of the British. The Foreign Office were disquieted by Papandreou’s intention to grant the Mountain Brigade generous leave. On 23 November they warned Leeper that the brigade’s disband­ ment would mark ‘a disaster of the first order’ since it was ‘the only solid and apparently trustworthy Greek unit’. It was therefore important that leave should not be granted on such a scale as to impair the brigade’s efficiency.75 Leeper and General Scobie raised this point with Papandreou, who prompdy abandoned the whole scheme and informed the communists that he would be unable to fulfil his pledge of 20 November. Further talks on the vexatious question of the unit’s future then commenced.76 No sooner were the negotiations resumed than a gravely embarrassing incident called into question Papandreou’s ability to retain control of the cabinet. The mobilization of the

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provisional national guard began on 24 November and the ministry of defence published a roster of some 250 officers who were to serve in its ranks. O f fourteen battalion commanders, eight had participated in the Security Battalions.77 In principle, the employment of Security Battalion officers had been approved by the cabinet, but, in this particular instance, it was premature, for they had yet to clear themselves of the charge of voluntary collaboration with the Germans.7' Moreover, their number (was injudiciously large. ‘Inadmissible!’ read the banner headline of Rizospastis. The newspaper alleged that, of the 250 officers, ‘over 90 per cent are of the Security Battalions, fascists, crypto-fascists, and crusaders of 4 August’. Under such circumstances, the disbandment of ELAS would be a ‘national crime’.79 With the Left in an uproar, Papandreou sacked the ministry official responsible for the roster, Colonel Th. Zaimis, and dismissed Lambrianidis, the under-secretary of defence, who had approved it without an adequate perusal. He then selected General Ptolemaios Sariyannis, an officer of ELAS, as Lambrianidis’s successor. Sariyannis at once began to revise the roster in consultation with Zevgos, the communist minister of agriculture.80 The appointment of Sariyannis assuaged the Left but provoked an angry outcry from the conservatives. They accused Papandreou of relinquishing control of the armed forces to EAM. The Populists and Liberals in the cabinet began to speak of resignation, but on 26 November Leeper intervened and persuaded them to remain in office. Leeper then called on Papandreou and sternly reprimanded him for acquiescing in far-reaching concessions to EAM without so much as telling the conservative ministers what he was doing. He warned the Premier that most of the conservatives would leave the cabinet unless a ‘stiffer attitude’ was adopted towards EAM, and warned that the British had no intention of supporting a government dominated by communists. Papan­ dreou promised to take the conservatives into his confidence, but insisted that their criticism of him was unwarranted. He begged Leeper to judge him solely by his success in raising the provisional national guard and a national army. In conclusion, he stated that he would soon be confronting the communists with the draft of a decree ordering ELAS to disband on 10

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December. If the communists affixed their signature to it, all would be well. If they did not, it might mean civil war." Leeper gained the impression that Papandreou would henceforth deal firmly with EAM.*2 But unknown to him, the premier was still willing to tamper with the Mountain Brigade in order to coax the communists into demobilizing ELAS. Apparently Papandreou believed that the KKE would be unable to stage an uprising once ELAS disbanded, and therefore felt that the brigade was not essential to his safety. Naturally, he had no way of knowing that the communists were already infiltrating the provisional national guard and contemplating the formation o f ‘veterans’ associations’. On 26 November he initiated a final round of negotiations with both the conservative parnés and EAM with a view to reaching a definitive agreement on the fate of the brigade. What was said during these discussions has long been a subject of controversy, and doubtless will remain so for some tíme to come. However, using information available in Papandreou’s memoirs, the British archives, and the Greek press of the period, it is possible to present a fairly reliable account of the events which precipitated the December civil war. According to Eleutheria, a Liberal newspaper, Papandreou visited Sophoulis on 26 November and invited him to comment on a proposal understood to be acceptable to EAM. The Mountain Brigade would be reconstituted so as to include 1,500 men of ELAS, and 1,500 men of EDES, ‘so that the tendencies within the Brigade will be “balanced” ’. Sophoulis rejected this scheme, warning that the introduction of guerrillas into the brigade would inevitably lead to armed clashes within its ranks, destroying its value as a fighting unit." Nevertheless, Papandreou reveals in his memoirs that, at a meeting with Svolos and Zevgos during the evening of 27 November, he agreed to terms formulated by EAM which far exceeded those rebuffed by Sophoulis. ‘Greece is saved’, he exclaimed to Leeper that night. According to the ambassador, he was in a ‘somewhat elated state’." EAM’s terms, embodied in a draft decree on demobilization - the details of which Papandreou did not divulge to Leeper - provided for the establishment of an entirely new military formation through the amalgamation of the Mountain Brigade, the Sacred

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Squadron (a commando unit formed in the Middle East of conservative officers), an EDES unit, and an ELAS unit. The ELAS unit would be equal in size and weaponry to the other three components combined. The remainder of ELAS, EDES, and the Middle East forces would disband on 10 December.'5 This arrangement was remarkably favourable to EAM. ELAS was to retain under arms troops equal in strength to those of its rivals, and the Mountain Brigade was to be abolished as an integral unit. When combined with ELAS’s veterans’ associa­ tions and EAM’s cells within the provisional guard, it guaranteed the communists a preponderance of armed strength after demobilization. But on 28 November Papandreou went back on the agreement for reasons that remain obscure. Perhaps he realized that he had conceded too much: he was under considerable strain during this difficult period and was anxious to save Greece from civil war, and he may have accepted EAM’s proposals in a moment of desperation only to regret his decision the following day. It is also possible, however, that he had only pretended to agree to EAM’s terms as the first step in a complex ruse to put the communists on the defensive. During the afternoon of 28 November he presented Leeper, General Scobie, and the conservative parties with the draft of a decree omitting any reference to the amalgamation ■ of the Mountain Brigade and Sacred Squadron with forces of EDES and ELAS. Instead, the brigade, the squadron, an EDES unit, and an ELAS unit were to be maintained under arms but separate from one another. Moreover, the EDES unit was to be equal in size and weaponry to that of the unit of ELAS.*6 Papandreou led the British and the conservatives to believe that the text he had drafted was the one submitted to him by EAM the previous evening. Perhaps he hoped to win their support for his decree in order to present it to the communists as an ultimatum. If the communists rejected it, he would then be in a position to claim that they had disowned their own proposals; and they, not he, would appear responsible for provoking a governmental crisis. Leeper and Scobie approved the decree. Thinking it the work of EAM, they welcomed it as an acceptable compromise. But Papandreou’s scheme, if such it was, went awry that

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evening when Sophoulis withheld his consent. Leeper sum­ moned Sophoulis and requested an explanation. Sophoulis stated that ‘on the whole the text was all right*, but complained that Papandreou had ‘allowed the text to be drafted by [the] EAM Ministers’. Leeper retorted that ‘it would be a matter of indifference to me if it were drafted by Trotsky provided the substance was all right’. At this point, a messenger arrived at the Embassy from Papandreou bearing news that the communists had now put forward entirely new proposals. ‘Greece is not yet saved,’ Leeper reported to London, thoroughly befuddled and exasperated. ‘I understand why King George accepted [the] Metaxas dictatorship.’ ‘So I am sure do most informed persons, having regard for this wayward race or country,’ commented Churchill.87 Evidently the communists had learned of Papandreou’s alterations to the text they had submitted on 27 November. They were unwilling to accept his terms, which would have left the ELAS unit hopelessly outnumbered by the Mountain Brigade, the Sacred Squadron, and EDES. During the evening of 28 November Zevgos informed Papandreou that the KKE had decided to return to its original demand for universal demobilizadon.88 Furthermore, his party did not acknowledge a need for the guerrillas to surrender their weaponry when they disbanded.89 Papandreou rejected these terms; released a copy of his decree to Kathimerina Nea; insisted that it had been drawn up by EAM - and accused the communists of going back on their word.90 Leeper, misled by the Premier, also thought the KKE guilty of duplicity, and, on 1 December, General Scobie, in a sternly worded public announcement, stressed his determinadon to defend the legally consdtuted government.91 It was left for the socialists to decide whether to back Papandreou or the communists. After some procrasdnation, they threw their lot in with the KKE. Like the communists, they feared the ethnikophrones; and even if, by now, some were equally wary of the KKE, a leap to the defence of Papandreou and the Mountain Brigade was one far too broad to take. As a prominent socialist explained to an informant of ISLD, a rupture with the communists in the prevailing circumstances ‘could (and would). . . be construed as an alliance with those wishing to repeat 4 August’.92 Papandreou’s long and dogged

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effort to drive a wedge through EAM thus met a dismal end. Reluctandy compelled to side with the ethnikophrones against the communists, he had alienated the moderate Left. During the early hours o f 2 Decem ber Svolos, Angelopoulos, Askoutsis, Tsirimokos, Porphyrogenis, and Zevgos resigned. That afternoon, the central committee of EAM convened to discuss the emergency. Three decisions were taken: to request Papandreou’s rump cabinet to permit EAM to hold a demonstration in Syntagma Square on the following day; to declare a general strike on 4 December; and, ominously, to transfer the command of ELAS from ELAS General Headquarters in Thessaly to an ‘ELAS central committee’ based in Athens and headed by Siantos.93The latter two decisions were kept secret. Following the conference, EAM issued a declaration asserting the Greeks’ right to selfdetermination and stressing that the British had no authority to intervene in the country’s internal affairs.94The request for permission to hold the demonstration was lodged with Papandreou that evening. The cabinet initially consented, but, later that night, reversed its decision after receiving intelligence reports from the police that EAM intended to declare a general strike. Papandreou instructed the police to prevent all gatherings in central Athens, if need be by force. Tsatsos, now the minister of supply, hastened to Leeper and informed him that the ministers expected ‘some fighting tomorrow b u t . . . were sure that in a few hours [the] situation would be under control’.95 Far more fighting was in store for Greece than the cabinet imagined. The communists disregarded the government’s prohibition of the demonstration, and during the morning of 3 December a multitude of EAM’s supporters converged on central Athens. Outnumbered, the police panicked and opened fire on the demonstrators as they advanced across Syntagma Square in the direction of police headquarters. At least ten people were gunned down and over sixty wounded.96 The communists’ response to the tragedy was swift. Within an hour of the shootings, Dimitrios Partsalidis, the communist secretary of the EAM central committee, appeared on the balcony of the KKE’s offices overlooking the square and proclaimed Papandreou an ‘outlaw’. Henceforth, he declared,

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the people would ‘fight for liberty without counting their sacrifices’.97 That evening, Leeper received reports that EAM was distributing arms to ELAS reservists in the oudying suburbs. He felt certain that ELAS had been given orders to capture the city.9* It is possible that the communists had expected the demonstration to topple Papandreou without bloodshed, and that they ordered ELAS to take the offensive only in response to the outrage perpetrated by the police. On the other hand, their decision to establish the ELAS central committe on 1 December suggests that they had planned all along to resort to violence; and it is perhaps far more likely, as Ioannidis observed in retrospect, that in staging the demonstration they were ‘proceeding with premeditation to give a pretext for the war to begin’.99 During the morning of 4 December EAM formally assumed power in Macedonia and proclaimed Papandreou’s cabinet illegal.100 Throughout the country the newly formed battalions of the provisional national guard disintegrated as recruits deserted their posts. In Attica, ELAS reservists captured the police stations in the Piraeus and all but a few in Athens. With control of the city rapidly slipping from his grasp, General Scobie, in a telegram to ELAS General Headquarters, warned that as of 4 p.m. the British would regard ELAS’s actions as hostile.101 Leeper believed that a striking change in the leadership of the cabinet could still avert a civil war. He hoped that a new government under a premier other than Papandreou would manage to persuade EAM/ELAS to declare a cease-fire and attend an emergency conference. In his view, the Archbishop of Athens, Damaskinos, was the most suitable candidate for the premiership. Damaskinos was a prominent and politically neutral figure, reputed to be trusted by the Left and Right alike. However, the conservative parties informed Leeperthat they would not serve under the Archbishop. Sophoulis insisted on becoming premier himself, arguing that the Liberals were the largest party in Greece. During the evening of 4 December Leeper reluctantly bowed to Sophoulis’s demand and Papan­ dreou indicated that he was ready to resign.102 But Churchill was convinced that the hour of reckoning had arrived: ‘The mob violence by which the communists sought to

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conquer the city and present themselves to the world as the government demanded by the Greek people could only be met by firearms.’10* On 5 December he instructed Leeper to ensure that Papandreou stuck to his duty. ’This is no time to dabble in Greek polines or to imagine that Greek politicians of varying shades can affect the situation.’ The composition of the cabinet was immaterial. ’The matter is one of life and death.’ He directed General Scobie to maintain law and order and neutralize or destroy all ELAS troops entering Attica. ’Do n o t . . . hesitate to act as if you were in a conquered city where a local rebellion was in progress.' It was essential to deny ELAS control of the capital. ’We have to hold and dominate Athens.’104 For eight anxious months the British had endeavoured to preserve Greece within their sphere of influence by aiding Papandreou’s efforts to secure free elections for his fellowcountrymen. They had intervened in the Premier’s defence against the intrigues of the conservative parties, whose factiousness and incompetence were gready responsible for the communists’ strength. They had prevented the King from defying the will of his government and jeopardizing the Greeks’ chances of attaining liberty. They had sought to promote unity and moderation as the best means by which the country might emerge from the chaos of war into democracy. But their efforts had come to nothing amidst the passion, the excesses, and the ill will generated by a decade of parlia­ mentary instability, dictatorship, occupation, and civil strife. With the communists’ quest for power now manifesting itself in armed struggle, the British had no alternative but to commit their troops to war.

3

Hope and Disillusion Churchill expected the battle of Athens to be a brief affair with little impact on his government’s domestic and international standing. He gravely misjudged the situation. The guerrillas of ELAS were not overawed by British regular troops and succeeded in overrunning all of Athens except for Syntagma Square and its immediate vicinity. General Scobie at times compelled them to retreat, but guerrillas in mufti infiltrated and recaptured by night the territories he occupied by day. It swiftly became apparent that the British would be hard put to it to secure the capital and, even if successful, could not hope to subject ELAS’s large and formidable forces in the rest of Greece. For a moment, it seemed doubtful whether Churchill could even prolong the struggle for Athens, such was the outcry against him in Britain and the United States. The correspondents in Greece of The Times, Daily Herald, and Manchester Guardian had been profoundly shocked by the shootings in Syntagma Square on 3 December, and roundly accused Churchill in their dispatches of intervening on the side of the extreme Right. The American public, ignorant of the complexity of Greek polines, regarded EAM/ELAS as a movement governed by progressive democrats and con­ demned British military intervention as an unashamed act of imperialism. The State Department moved swifdy to dissociate itself from British policy, and Roosevelt declined to speak publicly in its defence.1 Only the Russians refrained from criticism, adhering striedy to the percentages agreement of October 1944. Indeed, it is even possible that they welcomed Churchill’s use of force against EAM/ELAS, since it established a convenient precedent for ruthless Soviet intervention in the internal affairs of eastern Europe. Although perturbed by the turn of events, Churchill did not waver in his determination to defeat EAM/ELAS. He was given an opportunity to defend his policy during a spirited debate on

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the Greek crisis in the House o f Commons on 8 December. Seymour Cocks, an MP of the left-wing of the Labour Party, opened the debate by alleging that British troops in Athens were engaged ‘on the side of a Royalist dictatorship, fighting the forces of the Left.’ Sir Richard Acland, leader of the Commonwealth Party, moved an amendment to the King’s address expressing regret that it contained ‘no assurance that His Majesty’s Forces will not be used to disarm the friends of democracy in Greece’. ‘Who are the friends of democracy, and also how is the word “democracy” to be interpreted?’ Churchill retorted. Genuine democracy was pluralist: 'It takes all sorts to make democracy, not only Left Wing, or even Communist.’ It was the product of free elections conducted in time of tranquillity and not of'carefully planned coups d'état by murder gangs and . . . the iron rule of ruffians seeking to climb into the seats of power, without a vote ever having been cast in their favour’. Britain’s desire was that the Greeks be afforded the opportunity to select a government of their choice without fear, victimization, or intimidation.2 Clement Atdee and Ernest Bevin, the leading Labour members of Churchill’s govern­ ment, opposed Acland’s amendment, and it was defeated by a resounding majority. ‘I do not yield to passing clamour,’ Churchill cabled to Leeper on 9 December. ‘In Athens as everywhere our maxim is “ No peace Avithout victory” .’* However, the expulsion of ELAS from Athens could scarcely be regarded as victory if the rest of Greece remained under EAM’s control. If the British were to triumph, ELAS would have to be subdued throughout the country, and since this was clearly beyond Britain’s military capacity, the Foreign Office began to search for a political solution. On 10 December they proposed that EAM/ELAS be invited to a peace conference the moment its forces were expelled from Athens. The guerrillas should be offered ‘extremely generous’ terms in order to encourage them to surrender their arms voluntarily. Leniency towards ELAS would also nourish a spirit of reconciliation amongst the Greeks, vital to the future well-being of their country; for if the civil war were allowed to culminate in the ‘savage repression and elimination’ of the Left, there would be no prospect of establishing a ‘stable and democratic’ government.4

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Leeper still regarded Archbishop Damaskinos as the Greek best qualified to parley with the communists. However, he no longer deemed it sufficient that Damaskinos succeed Papan­ dreou as premier. On 10 December he suggested to the Foreign Office that the Archbishop be named regent. He explained that the crisis in Athens was of such magnitude that someone in the capital must exercise the functions of head of state. In the prevailing circumstances, the King himself could not be permitted to return: hence the need for a substitute.5 Leeper’s proposal was seconded by Macmillan, who arrived in Athens from Caserta on 11 December. He believed that the appointment of a regent would not only afford the Greek state effective leadership but could in itself be an event of such political import as to halt the civil war. The substitution of the Archbishop for the King might pacify moderate republicans within EAM/ELAS, who were collaborating with the com­ munists only because of their hatred of the monarchy.6 On 14 December he impressed on Papandreou the need for a new head of state. He hoped that the regency could be proclaimed by 16 December in order to coincide with the arrival of British reinforcements from Italy.7 General Scobie was by this time in dire need of reinforcements. During the early days of the battle, clashes between his troops and ELAS had been brief and sporadic. Evidently the communists had wished to avoid hostilities with the British and had hoped by swift and decisive action to seize power before Scobie had time to act. On 5 December they had circulated leaflets stating that they would not tolerate a government under Sophoulis* and at dawn on the following day ELAS had attempted to capture key government buildings near Syntagma Square. However, the assault had been aborted when the guerrillas discovered that the area was guarded by British sentries.9 At this point, it must have become apparent to the communists that they could not hope to win without engaging the British in battle. But Siantos was still unable to bring himself to order ELAS to attack.10 On 12 December he dispatched Porphyrogenis to General Scobie’s headquarters to discuss terms for a cease-fire. Scobie insisted that ELAS regular troops withdraw from Attica and that ELAS reservists in Athens surrender their arms." Siantos rejected these terms and

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on 13 December the guerrillas at last advanced in full force. Their offensive was halted in the districts of Kolonaki and Omonoia Square, but the position of the British forces was perilous. General Scobie was gripped by pessimism and on 15 December General John Hawkesworth arrived from Italy to assume operational command. Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, who had succeeded General Wilson as the supreme Allied commander of the Mediterranean theatre, joined Macmillan and Leeper in calling for a political solution to the crisis through the appointment of a regent.12 However, the creation of a regency was obstructed by the republican politicians. Papandreou, Kanellopoulos, Sophoulis, and Stephanos Stephanopoulos, the leader of the republican Populists, feared that the appointment of a regent in the existing circumstances would be interpreted by the communists as a sign of weakness and encourage ELAS to persevere.13 Moreover, Sophoulis and Papandreou objected to Archbishop Damaskinos personally, fearing that he would prove too conciliatory towards EAM. Macmillan rejected the view that the moment was inopportune for a regency. He also thought the politicians’ uncompromising attitude towards EAM unrealistic. It was unlikely that General Hawkesworth could defeat ELAS throughout Greece, and, from the political standpoint, an intransigent policy would violate the ‘principle o f dividing our opponents and winning back the more moderate elements’.14 Leeper believed that the British ‘must try to find a solution which in British eyes will seem reasonable and just, and impose it on the Greeks*.15 On 15 December he and Macmillan met Papandreou and coerced him into agreeing to ask the King to name Damaskinos as regent.16 Accordingly, on 16 December Papandreou sent a telegram to the King advising him to acquiesce in the creation of a regency. But he made it clear that he was acting solely at the behest of the British and warned that a regency would be interpreted by the Greeks as a victory for EAM/ELAS.17 The King protested to Churchill that the politicians were being bullied by Macmillan and Leeper. He refused to transfer his >owers to Damaskinos, whom he suspected of benevolent èelings towards EAM. ‘What would . . . [the] position be if he [the King] were to give his consent to the Regency and a

Î

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satisfactory settlement o f the revolt did not follow?’ the monarch asked. He was being requested to submit to an ‘unconditional surrender’; he would ‘have on his conscience the betrayal of his people when events will reveal the Archbishop for what he is’.1* Eden informed Macmillan that it would be difficult to persuade the King to appoint a regent against the advice of his ministers.19 To compel him to do so would entail an act of ‘constitutional violence’, Churchill observed.20 He had initially favoured the proposal for a regency,21 but was by now ardendy opposed to the idea. He knew nothing about Damaskinos except that the latter was said to be sympathetic to EAM/ELAS and was regarded by the King as an untrustworthy politician who the politicians evidently did not want. He feared that Damaskinos was conspiring to usurp the King’s powers in order to promote the cause of EAM. ‘I won’t install a Dictator,’ he declared to the War Cabinet, ‘a Dictator of the Left’.22 In Athens, meanwhile, General Hawkesworth’s forcés had begun to turn the tide against ELAS. The main road between Athens and the Piraeus was cleared and the guerrillas were hard pressed in the north-western districts of the city. Leeper received word that Svolos had appealed to the communists to cease fighting. The socialist had reportedly pointed to the Labour Party’s support for Churchill as evidence that there was no question of ‘splitting’ the British, and had argued that the presence of Bridsh troops in Greece was the Left’s ‘best guarantee’ against future reprisals from the Right.2* But Siantos was only prepared to agree to a cease-fire on terms favourable to EAM. In a message which arrived at General Scobie’s headquarters on 16 December he stated that he would withdraw ELAS’s regular forces from Attica on three conditions: the Mountain Brigade must also withdraw, the British should pledge never again to intervene militarily in Greek internal affairs, and the political world must be ‘left uninfluenced in the formation as speedily as possible of a Government of real National Unity’. General Scobie rejected this offer with the full support of the Foreign Office. They feared that a new government, bereft of British military support, would be at the mercy of the large number of armed ELAS reservists in the capital and the rest of ELAS hovering on

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the outskirts of Attica.24 The fighting raged on unabated and on 22 December worsened when ELAS units in northern Greece launched a general offensive against EDES, compelling Zervas and the remnants of his forces to take refuge on the Ionian island of Kerkyra. ‘[T]he Greek problem cannot be solved by military measures,’ Field Marshal Alexander urged Churchill. T he answer must be found in the political field.’25 In a further message received by Scobie on 23 December, Siantos again insisted that the British halt their military intervention in Greek internal affairs. He reminded Scobie that the British were not authorized by the Caserta Agreement to involve themselves in matters pertaining to law and order. However, he now proposed both to withdraw ELAS from Attica and to disarm the ELAS reservists in Athens if the Mountain Brigade were removed to an Aegean island and a ‘government of mutual confidence’ were formed. Scobie referred the matter to the Foreign Office for their consider­ ation. They thought Siantos’s terms to be weighted excessively in ELAS’s favour but welcomed his concession regarding the ELAS reservists in Athens as an indication that he was weakening and readying himself to negotiate a truce.26 However, the question had yet to be resolved as to who would parley with him on behalf of the Greek state. Papandreou was by now discredited in left-wing circles and Damaskinos was unwilling to serve as premier rather than regent. Macmillan, Leeper, and Field Marshal Alexander were unanimous in their insistence on a regency, but the King was still adamantly opposed to one. Instead, he wished to supervise the negotiations from London, but Eden doubted whether he could parley with the communists by telegram.27 Decisive action was essential to break the deadlock, and on 24 December Churchill decided to fly to Athens. Churchill and Eden arrived in Athens on Christmas Day and were greeted at Kalamaki aerodrome by Leeper, Macmillan, and Field Marshal Alexander. Alexander reported that it was now virtually certain that General Hawkesworth would win the batde for Athens, but he warned that British troops would be burdened with a ‘very heavy task’ if called upon to eliminate ELAS throughout Greece. Churchill admitted that he had been

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surprised by the scale o f ELAS’s resistance. When, on 5 December, he had directed General Scobie to intervene, he had expected that a mere Volley from British troops’ would suffice to restore order. Britain had no intendon of becoming indefinitely involved in a war in Greece, but could not quit the fight ‘except with honour and with due protecdon for those Greeks who had helped us’. This meant that the Bridsh would have to hold out in Atdca undl a Greek army was formed for the defence of the legal government. Turning to the question of a regency, he observed that the King was decidedly against the idea. Macmillan stated that a regency might have provided a solution to the crisis but acknowledged that that 'no longer seemed so hopeful’. He and Leeper were now considering whether it would be profitable to summon the Greek polidcal leaders and EAM to an emergency conference. Eden noted that such a meedng might provide an opportunity to split the socialists from the communists. Towards this end, he suggested that Svolos should chair the proceedings, but he was told that the socialist was ‘utterly discredited’. The lot fell to Archbishop Damaskinos.2* That evening Damaskinos was introduced to Churchill. He dispelled the Prime Minister’s suspicion that he sympathized with the communists by speaking bitterly about ‘die dark sinister hand behind EAM’. He made a grand impression: ‘he is a magnificent figure’, Churchill observed.29 At Churchill’s request, he presided over an extraordinary conference of die political world at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on 26 December. Amongst those present were Papandreou, Kanellopoulos, Sophoulis, and General Plasdras, the re­ publican revolutionary of 1922; Stephanopoulos and his rival, Konstantinos Tsaldaris, the leader of the royalist Union of Political Co-operation; Georgios Kaphandaris, chief o f the Progressive Party, a faction of progressive Liberals; and Ioannis Sophianopoulos, leader of the Agrarian Party. EAM was represented by Siantos and Partsalidis; none of the socialists attended. Churchill opened the proceedings by assuring the Greeks that Britain had no designs on their country’s sovereignty or territorial integrity. Whether Greece was a monarchy or a republic was for the Greeks alone to decide. What Britain desired was that they should be afforded

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free and fair elections. He then withdrew to allow the politicians to confer amongst themselves.30 Papandreou launched into a long-winded account of events since the Lebanon conference. He was eventually interrupted by Kaphandaris, who upbraided him for forcing a confronta­ tion with the communists over the Mountain Brigade. He pointed out to Papandreou that o f all the issues he could have selected as a casus belli, that o f the brigade was the weakest, since the unit was ‘a formation o f praetorians . . . of 4 August, monarchists’. Papandreou responded angrily to this criticism and the conference seemed in danger of degenerating into a slanging match. Damaskinos intervened and suggested that the discussion be resumed on the following day. Accordingly, the delegates reassembled during the morning of 27 December. By this time, Churchill's high regard for Damaskinos must have been common knowledge, for even Tsaldaris abandoned the King and joined the republicans in calling for a regency. The politicians then turned to Siantos and asked for an explanation of what he meant by a ’government of mutual confidence’. Siantos replied that EAM must possess the ministries of the interior and justice and the under-secretariat of defence. The conference prompdy collapsed in disorder.31 Macmillan and Leeper had hoped that the creation of a regency would sow discord between the moderates and communists of ELAS and perhaps end the civil war. But the socialists’ absence from the conference and Siantos’s demand for the three key ministries indicated that the KKE was in complete control of EAM/ELAS, confident of the guerrillas’ loyalty, and determined to persevere until its hegemony was ensured. Moreover, it is possible, as the Greek conservatives had feared, that the politicians’ acquiescence in a regency (and, for that matter, Churchill’s sudden arrival in Athens) encouraged the KKE to believe that its opponents’ courage was faltering and that victory was close at hand. From a tactical standpoint, the wisdom o f creating a regency was thus cast into doubt. But the practical importance of installing an effective head of state in Athens convinced Churchill that the case for it was decisive. Furthermore, the fact that all Greek politicians now favoured a regency removed any constitutional impedi­ ment to its creation, for in Churchill’s view the King was

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bound to abide by his ministers’ advice. Churchill returned to London on 29 December and informed the War Cabinet that ‘the present state of anarchy in Athens showed how much a strong hand was needed’. He regarded Damaskinos as a shrewd and able man and ‘felt litde doubt that when he [Damaskinos] secured power he would be ready to use it’.32 That evening he and Eden confronted the King with a demand that Damaskinos be appointed regent until a plebiscite on the consdtudonal issue was held. The King refused to co-operate, and an argument raged into the early hours of 30 December. Finally, Churchill stated that Britain would recognize Damaskinos as regent regardless of the King’s opinions.33 The monarch capitulated, but only after receiving a written assurance from Churchill that it was not Damaskinos’s intendon to take arbitrary acdon designed to impose a republican regime on Greece. Churchill recorded that Damaskinos had agreed that the regency should be of short duration and intended to supervise a genuinely free plebiscite: The Archbishop would . . . undertake . . . [his] dudes for the period of the present emergency.. . . It is the Archbishop’s desire to treat the Crown with all consideration and respect and to guide the Nation in these times of unprecedented danger so that order may be restored and the Greek people may have the opportunity to express their will as to their future government in conditions of normal tranquillity.34 In a telegram dispatched to Athens at 5.30 a.m. on 30 December the King proclaimed Damaskinos regent and pledged not to return to Greece unless summoned by a plebiscite.33 The promulgation of the regency had no effect on EAM/ELAS. The battle for Athens continued with the guerrillas fanatically resisting every British foray. Damaskinos immediately set about assembling a new government. His plan was to create a broad coalition of moderates of the Right, Centre, and Left, with a view to assuring EAM/ELAS that it would not fall victim to reprisals if ELAS disarmed.36 As minister of the interior he chose the most progressive figure the Right would tolerate: a- moderate republican Populist, Petros Rallis. Nikolaos Kolyvas, a lawyer without party affiliations, became minister of justice. Sophianopoulos,

Hope arties which had once governed Greece. On 20 November the ollowing politicians assembled for the conference: Tsaldaris, the Populist leader; the Liberals Sophoulis, Venizelos, and Tsouderos; Kaphandaris, chief of the Progressive party; Plastiras; Gonatas, leader o f the National Liberals; Kanellopoulos; and Papandreou. With McNeil’s consent, Damaskinos informed them that their acceptance of Bevin’s programme would ‘ensure H.M. Government’s full support and economic help for the purpose of reconstruction’.

Í

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Tsaldaris was unimpressed: he rejected a postponement of the plebiscite and refused to collaborate with the Liberals. The others, by contrast, undertook to abide by the programme en bloc, whereupon Damaskinos instructed Sophoulis to form a government of the broadest possible nature. Negotiations between the republican politicians continued into the follow­ ing day. By the evening of 21 November, Tsouderos and Kaphandaris had agreed to serve under Sophoulis, but Venizelos and Kanellopoulos had declined. Venizelos pre­ ferred to remain outside the government as acting leader of the Liberal Party; Kanellopoulos’s motives remain obscure. Papandreou was not invited to participate because Tsouderos and Kaphandaris indicated that they would refuse to join a government which included him.2* Sophoulis then requested Damaskinos to begin administer­ ing the oath to the ministers-designate. The regent refused to do so. He accused Sophoulis of deliberately excluding Papandreou in order to ensure that the new government was dominated by Liberals. Leeper intervened and appealed for a compromise, but Damaskinos retired to his villa and declined to see anyone. He was, Leeper reported, in an ‘extremely difficult mood’. Papandreou tried to break the deadlock by announcing that he had no desire to join the government and would support it in any event. But the regent was unyielding. He summoned Kanellopoulos, declared that he had decided to resign, and instructed that the news be transmitted to the King in London. It is impossible to determine with certainty why Damaskinos chose to tender his resignation. The most plausible expla­ nation is that offered by Leeper and McNeil: at the eleventh hour he was overcome by fear of the royalists and wished to reinsure himself with them by making it clear that a republican government was being forced on him against his will.29 If this was his objective, he succeeded. His resignation alarmed McNeil and Leeper, who feared that if the King learned of it, he might seize the opportunity to abolish the regency and appoint a government subservient to the Populists. They persuaded Kanellopoulos not to contact the King and then proceeded to Damaskinos’s home. According to Leeper, they found him in an 'exhausted state nervously’, a mere shadow of

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the man who had led the country immediately after the December civil war. At that tíme, he had been a champion of moderation and demonstrated a capacity for enlightened leadership. Now, he was lacking in decision, estranged from the Centre and moderate Left, and behaving ‘like a suspicious and mulishly obstinate Greek peasant’. An argument raged until the early hours of 22 November. No minutes of the discussion were kept, but doubtless it was under enormous pressure that Damaskinos, at 3.30 a.m., finally agreed to swear Sophoulis in as premier.30 Sophoulis completed the formation of his government on 26 November. Rends, his close associate, became minister of the interior and of justice. Tsouderos was named minister of co­ ordination with responsibility for economic policy. Kaphandaris was selected as deputy premier. Two of his lieutenants, General Theodoros Manetas and Stamatios Merkouris, were appointed minister of defence and minister for public order, respectively. Mylonas, chief of the Agrarian Democratic Party, was named minister of finance. Sophianopoulos again became minister for foreign affairs. At Leeper’s bidding, Georgios Kartalis was named minister of supply. He had led the political wing of EKKA, the wartime resistance movement, and was regarded as a rising star of the Centre-Left. The government was greeted with jubilation by republicans of all persuasions. It was hailed as the strongest combination of bourgeois and progressive republican elements that Greece had known for many years. Celebrations occurred even amongst rank and file communists, though Zachariadis was quick to warn that EAM would tolerate the new regime only if it worked for law and order and genuinely free elections. The Populists were naturally outraged by Sophoulis’s accession to power. They accused Leeper and McNeil of flagrant inter­ ference in Greek internal affairs. Their press claimed that not even the Germans had dared to coerce the Greeks in such a manner, and one royalist newspaper, EUimkon Aima, went so far as to question whether it was fortunate that Britain had won the war.31 In London, King George characterized the postponement of the plebiscite as an attempt to stifle the royalist sentiment of the people. It amounted to a violation of

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the Varkiza Agreement and a repudiation of the terms on which he had agreed to establish a regency.*2 Bevin moved swiftly to check the royalists' offensive. He appealed personally to Damaskinos to withdraw his resig­ nation in order to avert a constitutional crisis. At Leeper’s request, MacVeagh, the American ambassador, also pleaded with Damaskinos to stay on, whereupon the latter undertook to remain in office until elections were held.“ On 23 November, in the House of Commons, Bevin proceeded to defend his decision to agree to a postponement of the plebiscite. He pointed out that the British had never committed themselves to a particular date for the vote. Rather, it had always been understood that the plebiscite could be held only in time of normal tranquillity. After careful consideration he had concluded that a lengthy postponement of the plebiscite was a prerequisite for the restoration of calm.*4 The King was not convinced by Bevin’s argument. In a memorandum to the Foreign Office, he argued that it was futile to hope that Greece could be pacified so long as the constitutional issue remained unresolved. The majority of the people desired the restoration of the monarchy and would never accept a republican government. If tranquillity were to be restored, either the Liberals must subordinate themselves to the Populists, or the Populists must be permitted to govern on their own. During early 1945 it had been possible for the British to foster collaboration between the Liberals and Populists: 'Immediately after the civil war the two main sections of public opinion in Greece - Venizelists and Monarchists - had forgotten their differences through common fear of communism. That was the moment when the political and regime question should have been solved through the co-operation of the parties and early elections.’ Instead, the British had supported Plastiras, a fanatical republican, whose government had pursued policies favourable to the Liberals. The elections had been repeatedly postponed; the rift between Liberals and Populists had widened; and a unique opportunity to consolidate political unity had been missed. Now, co-operation between die parties was out of the question and it was obviously useless to seek it. Nevertheless, Greece could still be stabilized if governed by a strong parliamentary

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majority arising from genuinely free elections. In the prevailing circumstances, this would mean government by the royalists, for they were supported by the majority of the electorate; and once they were elected, it would be absurd to insist that the King should remain abroad until 1948. But the British, instead of aiding the formation of such a ‘normal democratic government drawn from the Greek people", had again favoured the republicans by forcibly imposing on the indignant population a regime led by Sophoulis, who represented a minority of the populace and could not be trusted to conduct elections fairly. Bevin should abandon his present course and heed the wishes of the majority of the people. He should establish a service government in Athens and instruct it to conduct the elections and the plebiscite in an impartial manner at the earliest possible moment.*5 The King’s thesis was viewed unsympathetically by the Foreign Office. They rejected the notion that the plebiscite should have been conducted early in 1945. Given the mood of the people, the issue would have been ‘King vs. KKE’ rather than 'constitutional monarch vs. republicanism", and it would have been fatal for the King to return as champion of the anti­ communists. He would have been reduced to the stature of a party leader and, whatever his intentions, become identified with the repressive measures which the extreme royalists would undoubtedly have carried out. As for the future, McNeil gave short shrift to the idea that early elections under a service government would be conducive to stability. They would result in a victory for the royalists and another civil war, probably within twelve months. In his view, the only hope of averting civil strife lay in supporting a government of the Centre, which would win the allegiance of the electorate by remedying the country’s economic ills. This had been the rationale behind Britain’s decision to intervene in favour of Sophoulis and the republicans.36 McNeil was much impressed with Tsouderos and felt confident that he would act vigorously to improve the state of the economy. Tsouderos readily agreed to give serious consideration to the advice of the British economic mission and promised to curb speculation in gold, balance the budget, and improve the distribution of commodities. However, he

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stressed that Greece was in dire need of Allied assistance for reconstruction. McNeil explained to him that while the British could not offer the Greeks a loan, they would do their best to supply material such as road, rail, and agricultural equip­ ment.37 Sophoulis made an equally favourable impression on Leeper. The Premier pledged that the elections would definitely be held no later than March 1946, and perhaps even sooner, if law and order could be guaranteed.3* However, it soon became apparent that Sophoulis was not in complete control of his cabinet. Three factions emerged: Sophianopoulos and Kartalis, who represented radical views; Kaphandaris and his associates, Manetas and Merkouris; and Sophoulis and Rends. Much to Leeper’s dismay, they at once wrangled over the scheduling of the elections. On 29 November R. C. Windle and Henry F. Grady, the respecdve British and American chiefs of the Allied Mission for the Observation of the Greek Elections (AMFOGE), arrived in Athens and enquired of Sophoulis when he intended to conduct the vote. Sophoulis told them that the elecdons would be held on 31 March 1946, and, without consuldng his cabinet, stated as much to the Athenian press. Kaphandaris and Sophianopoulos immediately protested that Sophoulis had exceeded his authority. They persuaded him to permit Sophianopoulos to dispatch a telegram to Washington and London appealing, on behalf of the government, for a postponement of the elections until mid-April 1946. In the telegram, Sophianopoulos argued that the elections must be delayed since the revision of the voters’ rolls had not begun and there had been ’no change in the internal situation’. Moreover, he alleged that the government had scheduled the elections for 31 March at the insistence of AMFOGE. The cable’s contents were then leaked to the press. The incident angered Windle and Grady, and Foy D. Kohler, a member of Grady’s staff, was instructed to take the matter up with Sophianopoulos. Kohler protested to the minister that it was a misrepresentation of the facts to assert that AMFOGE had brought pressure to bear on the government. Sophianopoulos apologized for suggesting that it had and blamed Sophoulis for giving him that impression. He then asked Kohler for his personal views on the idea of postponing the elections. Kohler

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stated that since the government had four months ahead of it to prepare for voting in March, it seemed ‘absurd’ to ask from now for a delay of fifteen or twenty days. Sophianopoulos opined that the elections should be conducted on 31 March after all. However, he did not subsequendy withdraw his formal request to Washington and London for a post­ ponement.” The cabinet also quarrelled over the issue of an amnesty for the 18,000 persons still in gaol. Tsouderos desired a general amnesty for all those charged with offences during the occupation, but wanted persons suspected of committing crimes during the December revolt to stand trial. But Kaphandaris was against making such a distinction. He insisted that persons guilty of unlawful acts must be punished regardless of when their offences were perpetrated. When Sophoulis sided with Kaphandaris, Sophianopoulos and Kartalis threatened to resign. They maintained that many persons now held on charges of murder had done nothing other than join the resistance movements and slay Greeks collaborating with the Germans. Eventually, Kartalis fashioned a compromise whereby persons charged with killing members of the Security Battalions were to be immune from prosecution. Leeper intervened in his favour and Sophoulis and Kaphandaris were compelled to yield. The amnesty, dubbed the law on 'decongestion of prisons’, was passed by the cabinet on 14 December. All prosecutions were withdrawn and all sentences annulled for the killing of Germans, Bulgarians, Italians, and Greeks in their service between 27 April 1941 and 12 February 1945.40 By this time, the communists had withdrawn their support from the government. In a statement issued by the EAM central committee on 11 December, they accused Sophoulis of betraying the interests of the people. He had failed to grant a general amnesty and to stem the royalists’ reign of terror. He was colluding with the monarchofascists and was bent on conducting an 'electoral farce’. He and his cabinet must now resign and be succeeded by a 'representative government’ with the 'decisive participation’ of EAM. Otherwise, EAM would abstain from the elections.41 The declaration surprised neither Sophoulis nor the British, who had never expected the

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communists to accord the government lasting support. But it evidently came as something of a shock to the socialists of the ELD/SKE. They issued a strongly worded condemnation of the communists, apparendy feeling that since the government had been in office but a fortnight, it should be allowed tíme to find its feet.42 Clearly, Zachariadis wished to discredit any government which excluded the communist party. His objective evidently was to engender such disorder and disillusion amongst republicans that they would come to regard EAM as the only effective alternative to the Populists. He realized that EAM’s accession to power was bound to lead to an armed clash with the royalists, but was confident that they could easily be defeated. In an interview with Sylvia Sprigge, a correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, he stated that ‘there will be civil war for two months. Then everything will be all right.’43 However, his strategy does not seem to have been approved by a number of his colleagues in the politburo. It was rumoured that Ioannidis preferred a less belligerent approach, whereby the party would first attempt to enter the cabinet through collaboration with the Liberals.44 In addition, doubts were apparently expressed as to the wisdom of abstaining from the elections if EAM failed to gain seats in the cabinet. EAM’s declarations on the subject began to waver: on 14 December it urged its adherents not to register as voters but simultaneously offered to co-operate with the government in the verification of the voters’ rolls; and one month later it reaffirmed its decision to abstain but instructed its members to register.45The ambiguous behaviour of the Soviet Union must also have given rise to confusion in the party. On the one hand, Tass accused the Liberals of failing to check royalist terrorism. On the other hand, the Soviet government announced on 28 November that it had decided to dispatch an ambassador to Athens, a gesture widely interpreted to mean that the Russians welcomed the new Greek regime.46 Evidently the Russians hoped that Sophoulis would prove amenable to a Soviet naval presence in Greek waters. They were anxious to gain an outlet to the eastern Mediterranean through the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Aegean Sea. Since March 1945 they had been pressing Turkey to permit

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them to establish military bases in the Dardanelles, and, at the Potsdam conference, Stalin had indicated to Churchill that he desired a naval installation at the Greek Thracian port of Alexandroupolis. The new Russian ambassador to Greece, Konstantin Rodionov, was an admiral in the Red Fleet who had served for many years as naval attaché in the Soviet Embassy in Ankara. Soon after his arrival in Athens he approached Sophoulis with a request for port facilities for Russian ships in the Aegean islands.4* It is also possible that by dispatching an ambassador to Greece, Stalin hoped to coax the Western Powers into according diplomatic recognition to the communist-dominated governments of Romania and Bul­ garia. The vexed question of their status had yet to be resolved and was having a deleterious effect on Allied relations. At the first conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held in London in September 1945, the Americans, backed by the British, had again demanded the implementation of the Yalta declaration. Molotov had rebuffed them and the ill feeling which subsequendy prevailed had contributed to the abrupt collapse of the conference on 1 October.49 The Foreign Office did not need encouragement when it came to advocating diplomatic recognidon of the Romanian and Bulgarian governments. As early as March 1945 they had warned Churchill and Eden that withholding recognidon would damage Anglo-Soviet reladons to no useful purpose. The discord in the Council of Foreign Ministers spurred them to return to the theme. In a memorandum prepared on 12 December, Michael Williams, a clerk in the Southern Department, urged that the dme had come for a change of tacdcs. He argued that it was an 'inescapable fact’ that it was impossible to achieve a meaningful reorganization of the Balkan 'puppet Governments’. Diplomadc pressure on the Kremlin was 'not only doing no good, b u t . . . doing posidve harm’. Henceforth, Britain should set her sights on a more realisdc, if limited, objecdve: 'the gradual creadon over a long period of condidons which may later make possible the eventual emergence of representative Governments’. The first step in this evolutionary process should be to secure the withdrawal from Romania and Bulgaria of Soviet troops, the chief bulwark of the puppet regimes. The best method of

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achieving this aim would be to recognize the communistdominated governments and conclude treaties of peace with them as soon as possible (Romania and Bulgaria having both been Axis satellites). The Russians might then be hard put to it to justify prolonging their military occupation of the countries.50 Bevin was inclined to agree with Williams’s views and communicated them to the Americans. The State Department regarded them as excessively weak and wished to persevere against the Russians; but Byrnes, the secretary of state, apparently acknowledged that it was pointless to keep up the tight. He had tired of arguing with the Russians over the Balkans and seems to have been anxious to dispose of the issue if an arrangement could be worked out which did not involve a loss of American prestige. In mid-December he and Bevin travelled to Moscow to deal directly with Stalin. An agreement was reached whereby the Western Powers would recognize the Romanian and Bulgarian governments in exchange for the inclusion in the cabinets of a few representatives of non­ communist parties. At the Russians’ insistence, the ministries of the interior were to remain in the communists’ hands. Negotiations for treaties of peace would then commence in May 1946.51 In separate discussions with Molotov, Byrnes and Bevin suggested that Allied troops be withdrawn at an early date from all independent countries with the exception of Germany and Japan. Molotov explained that the Red Army was in Bulgaria and Romania because they were ex-enemy states, and in Poland to safeguard the lines of communication to Germany. He observed that the same could not be said of British troops in Greece.52Bevin was quick to take the point. In a telegram to Athens labelled ‘Top Secret’, he warned Leeper that the Russians might refuse to evacuate their troops from Romania and Bulgaria unless the British withdrew from Greece. It was therefore imperative to make every effort to ensure that the organization and training of the Greek army was completed by August or September 1946 so that Britain could end her military commitment there.55 Trouble was brewing between the British military mission and General Manetas, the new minister of defence. On 27 November Manetas informed General Stewart Rawlins, the

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chief of the mission, that he wished to remove two generals and five or six colonels from the general staff. He regarded the officers as militarily competent but suspected them of involvement in subversive organizations. He could provide no evidence to support his allegations, stating that it was ‘impossible to get any evidence when dealing with a secret organization’. He also wished to amend the roster of officers eligible for active service, dubbed ‘List A’, which had been drawn up under Plastiras’s government in accordance with Article V of the Varkiza Agreement. In his view, the military committees appointed by Plastiras had rushed their work and given commands to officers who were not politically acceptable, and who should now be dismissed and replaced by others selected by himself. Rawlins warned the minister that the mission would be unable to collaborate with him in such a venture. If officers were suspected of subversive activity, they should be subjected to intensive investigation by courts martial rather than summarily cashiered. In this manner, the officer corps would gain confidence that appointments and dismissals were to be made in a just and impartial manner, uninfluenced by political prejudice. A healthy morale would develop, coupled with a professional sense of loyalty to the legally constituted government of the day. Otherwise, the morale of the corps would be shattered. Each officer would align himself with a political patron and live in fear and distrust of his comrades-in-arms. Factionalism would breed inefficiency and all attempts to form a non-political army would come to nothing. Manetas listened politely to this exposition but declined to alter his views. ‘[Clhanges which are politically desirable are military necessities,’ he declared. He reminded Rawlins that the mission’s brief was to advise the Greeks; it had no executive powers.54 Rawlins feared that Manetas was scheming to pack the officer corps with political nominees and personal friends. The Embassy shared his disquiet. In their view, it was one thing to purge officers who were proved to be engaged in subversive activity. This was to be applauded and had always been an objective of British policy. But it was quite another matter to dismiss officers merely because they were suspected of unlawful acts or because their private political convictions did not

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accord with those of the minister of defence. Not only would this be unjust, but, in present circumstances, it would destroy the efficiency of the army, for it was the royalists who were most acquainted with the techniques of modem warfare. As Lascelles observed, there was clearly no advantage to be gained from transforming the army into ‘a politically beautiful but militarily useless and expensive toy’. The Embassy also thought it preposterous to suggest that Plastiras’s List A was weighted in favour of the royalists. No one was more fervendy republican than Plastiras, and he had seen to it that republicans formed the majority of officers in the general staff and the higher ranks of the officer corps. Moreover, according to information available to Rawlins, Plastiras’s military committees had shown impartiality in their selection of officers. Two hundred and twenty-eight members of the Security Battalions and 221 officers of ELAS had been cleared of charges of ’criminal or anti-national action’ and in­ corporated in the army. The only plausible explanation for Manetas’s desire to amend the roster thus seemed to be that he hoped to promote men belonging to his personal coterie.55 Leeper decided to raise the issue direcdy with Sophoulis. On 30 November he and Rawlins stressed to the Premier that there must be no political interference in military affairs. Sophoulis agreed and said that the only change his government desired was the removal of General Ventiris as deputy chief of the general staff. Ventiris could be appointed to any other post for which he was qualified, except for that of inspector of the army. Rawlins thought that it would be advantageous from a military point of view and in the interests of Ventiris himself if he were given experience in command. In consultation with the chief of the general staff, General G. Dromazos, a republican and associate of Plastiras, it was decided that Ventiris should assume command of III Corps, which was comprised of all army units in Macedonia. On 5 December the government announced that Ventiris was to be transferred.56 His removal, and the promulgation of the amnesty, evoked furious protests from the royalists. They accused Sophoulis of destroying the foundations of the state and furthering the interests of ‘anarchocommunism’. However, there were signs that the Populist leaders were beginning to lose their grip over

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the party's rank and file. AIS reported that opposition to the government appeared to be diminishing in moderate rightwing circles and that at least one influential conservative newspaper, Kathimerini, had shifted its support from Tsaldaris to Sophoulis.57 On 14 December Kanellopoulos sought to capitalize on this trend by openly declaring himself in favour of a republic. Simultaneously, Papandreou castigated the Popu­ lists for rejecting a postponement of the plebiscite, and called on conservatives and progressives alike to unite against the communists. He and Kanellopoulos proceeded to form a coalition, the National Political Union (EPE), evidendy in the hope of weaning moderates away from both the Liberals and the Populists. The growing rift in the Right, coupled with the socialists' recent condemnation of the KKE, indicated that a moderate Centre was at last coalescing. Meanwhile, the initiative remained with the government: ‘The ship,’ AIS observed, ‘though pitching and rolling badly, continues to keep under way.’58 Encouraging though these developments were, the govern­ ment’s fate hinged less on polines than on its handling of economic affairs. To win the elections, it required the votes of the broad masses, and the chief preoccupation of the common man was with his daily bread rather than the interminable wrangling of the politicians. Kartalis, the minister of supply, made an impressive start, working round the clock to rationalize the distribution of relief goods and raw materials. But Tsouderos, who, as minister of co-ordination, bore responsibility for framing the government’s economic policy, quickly showed signs of faltering. On 30 November he startled Leeper by informing him that he would take no steps to balance the budget or control the market unless the Western Powers granted Greece a loan for reconstruction. He argued that without such a loan the Greeks would have no faith in their future and would resort to hoarding, tax evasion, and speculation on a scale that would wreck any measures the government tried to implement. Leeper warned him that it might make a bad impression on the Foreign Office if the Greeks were seen to be asking for foreign aid without first attempting to put their own house in order. But Tsouderos was unmoved and requested a reply from London within ten days.

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Otherwise, he said, there might be a panic, a collapse of the drachma, and widespread public unrest.59 The Foreign Office readily acknowledged that Greece required a loan for reconstruction, and that an offer of aid would have a stabilizing effect on the morale of the people. But they were equally well aware that they were in no position to advance the country large sums of money. Britain was herself experiencing grave difficulty in finding the funds to pay for essential imports of fuel, raw materials, and food. Most of these goods had to be purchased in North America, and Britain's dollar reserves had been exhausted early in the war. The nation’s ability to earn foreign exchange was a mere fraction of what it had been in 1939. To sustain the war effort, 36 per cent of British capital assets owned abroad had been sold between 1939 and 1945, and 33 per cent of gold reserves expended. The value of exports had fallen to 40 per cent of its pre-war level. By December 1945 Britain’s foreign debt totalled £3,567m., an increase of some 750 per cent since the outbreak of hostilities.60 The position was succinctly described by Sir Wilfred Eady, Joint Second Secretary in the Treasury: ‘The fact is that the Greeks are broke, and so are we when it comes to giving them any more financial help.’61 The only available course of action was to approach the United States for assistance to Greece, and this the Foreign Office did on 4 December.62 Leeper, meanwhile, managed to persuade Tsouderos to take some action of his own. On 7 December a decree was enacted imposing heavy sentences on persons and firms found to be speculating in gold. But Tsouderos still declined to make any effort to balance the budget and baulked even at issuing an announcement detailing his economic strategy. He told Leeper that he wanted first to consult the British economic mission, an advance party of which was scheduled to arrive on 13 December. Hill, Leeper’s financial adviser, suspected that Tsouderos was deliberately stalling. The minister doubtless realized that he would have to take unpopular measures to balance the budget and was afraid to carry them out. He and the cabinet probably hoped that a British loan would solve their problems for them and intended to ‘let things slide . . . and put the blame on us for their troubles if we refuse’.65

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By 12 December the price of the sovereign had reached 80.000 drachmae, an increase of 13,000 drachmae since 22 November, the government’s first day in office. The volume of drachmae in circulation had increased from 72.6 milliards to 82.4 milliards and public expenditure for December was forecast to exceed that of November by 50 per cent. Tension was mounting in the capital. The press was mil of hints that a British loan was impending. The government did nothing to deny these reports; indeed, Hill believed that they originated in the cabinet itself.64 On 13 December two members of the economic mission arrived in Athens: Sir Vyvyan Board and E. T. N. Grove, the industrial and financial advisers respectively. In their initial statements to the press they made no mention of financial assistance, to the intense dismay of the populace. Their arrival coincided with EAM’s sudden decision to withdraw its support from the government. Disappointment and fear combined to produce a panic and on 14 December the flight to gold became a stampede. The sovereign leapt to 120.000 drachmae on 19 December, and on the following day neared 150,000 drachmae. Foodstuffs disappeared from the markets; strikes were declared; and the country reached the brink of economic collapse. On 21 December Kartalis warned Leeper that unless something drastic were done, chaos would prevail and the government would disintegrate. He urged that he and Tsouderos be permitted to travel to London at once. If it could be announced that they were to confer with the British government directly, public confidence might be restored. The Foreign Office promptly consented to see them, but instructed Leeper to ensure that the people were not led to believe that Britain was about to come to their aid. Before there could be any question of extending financial assistance to Greece, the British would have to be satisfied that Sophoulis’s government was taking steps to put its own house in order. Nor must Tsouderos and Kartalis expect immediate results from the proposed discussions. It would be necessary to consult with the Americans and it would take time to ascertain their views.65 Tsouderos and Kartalis departed on 29 December and arrived in London the following day. On 2 January 1946 they submitted a memorandum to the Foreign Office in which they

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sought to demonstrate that there could be no fiscal stability in Greece without massive foreign aid. Fiscal stability depended on a balanced budget, which could be achieved either by increasing revenue or diminishing expenditure. Revenue could not be increased because the national economy had been destroyed by the war and its aftermath. Duties on imports had provided 30 per cent of the government’s income before 1940, but foreign trade was now virtually non-existent. Higher taxes were not feasible because agricultural and industrial pro­ duction was negligible and most Greeks were pauperized and unemployed. Only if the national economy were reconstructed would the country generate sufficient wealth to enable the government to augment its revenue. Since the damage to the country inflicted by the Axis exceeded £2,000m., a five-year plan of Allied assistance was in order. Nor was it possible to reduce public expenditure. The standard of living of public employees was already perilously low. Their salaries had risen 700 per cent since September 1940, whereas the prices of essential foodstuffs had increased by more than 6,000 per cent. Prices were high because commodities were scarce. Prices would fall, and, consequently, salaries could be reduced, if UNRRA made more goods available. In short, revenue could be augmented only if the Allies aided Greece’s reconstruction, and expenditure could be reduced only if they provided her with more relief supplies. However one approached the problem, a balanced budget depended on generous Allied help.“ In Athens, the price of the sovereign had by this time reached 179,000 drachmae, and trading in the markets had ceased. Strikes were widespread, the supply of electricity and water was disrupted, and telephone services were suspended. The government was attacked incessantly by both the Left and Right. The KKE denounced Sophoulis as a servant of the ‘plutocratic oligarchy’ and called for a new cabinet under the leadership of EAM. The royalists derided the Premier as incompetent and demanded that Damaskinos establish a service regime. The Liberal Party itself began to disintegrate when Venizelos, its acting leader, concluded a pact with the Populist Party without prior consultation with Sophoulis. Under the terms of the agreement, the Liberals and Populists

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would joindy contest the elections, and, if they won, the Liberals would acquiesce in an early plebiscite, a coalition between the two parues would be formed, and the premier would be none other than Venizelos.67 The agreement was disowned by Sophoulis and a majority of Liberal politicians, whereupon Venizelos resigned as acting leader and founded his own party, the Venizelist Liberals (dubbed by Sophoulis the ‘Anti-venizelist Venizelists’ !).6* By 11 January conditions were so tumultuous that Leeper and MacVeagh sent a joint message of warning to London and Washington. They stressed that if generous Allied assistance were not accorded to Greece, Sophoulis’s 'Democratic Government’ was bound to fall. It would probably be succeeded by á regime of the extreme Right which in turn could scarcely fail to produce a communist dictatorship. The situation was ‘highly inflammable’; the moment, ‘extremely critical’.69 The State Department re­ sponded by persuading the American Export-Import Bank to announce that it was ready to loan the Greeks $25m. (£6.25m.). But the news was greeted with little enthusiasm in Athens, since it was widely believed that the country’s minimum requirement was ten times that amount. The British Treasury were adamant that they possessed no funds to loan the Greeks for reconstruction. At most, they were prepared to waive repayment of £46m. loaned to Greece at the beginning of the war. But after strenuous appeals from the Foreign Office, they put forward a proposal to loan Sophoulis’s government £10m. for the stabilization of the drachma, on condition, however, that the loan be coupled with some type of arrangement which would stop the Greeks printing banknotes to finance deficit spending. They suggested that a ‘currency control commission' be established with British representation to supervise all future issues of drachmae. In this manner, Britain would be afforded a degree of control over the conduct of fiscal affairs with a minimum interference in Greek sovereignty.70 On 10 January the State Department agreed to the participation of an American citizen in the commission.71 Finally, on 14 January, Hugh Dalton, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, gave his consent to the proposal, though he made it clear to Bevin that he was parting with the money against his better judgement: ‘I have little confidence in

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Tsouderos and Co. and I rely on you to put all possible pressure on them to do their duty so that we shan't have thrown this £10 million down the drain!'72 On 15 January the Foreign Office informed Tsouderos and Kartalis of the Treasury's terms. Britain could not aid the Greeks with reconstruction. Instead, they must approach the newly founded International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).” Britain would gladly support their application for funds, but the ministers must realize that the bank would be reluctant to extend credit to Greece unless her fiscal affairs were first put in order. It was therefore essential to stabilize the drachma. Stabilization could be achieved if the people regained confidence in the currency and if the government balanced its budget. To restore public confidence, the government should deposit £15m. of the £45m. it possessed in foreign exchange and gold in a special account with the Bank of England; the balance of £80m. would remain available for the purchase of essential imports. The British, for their part, would deposit £10m. in the account, making a total of £25m. The drachma - pound sterling exchange rate should then be pegged at 12,000:1. Since 120,000m. drachmae were now estimated to be in circulation, the foreign exchange value of the currency would amount to £10m. In this manner, the funds deposited with the Bank of England would afford the currency 100 per cent cover in pounds sterling, and £15m. would remain to cover future note issues which would become necessary as reconstruction progressed. The Greeks would regain trust in the value of the drachma, knowing that it was backed solidly by British money. It would then be necessary for the government to take drastic steps to balance the budget, for if it inflated the currency by printing new notes to finance deficit spending, nothing would have been gained. It must not look to UNRRA to absorb inflationary drachmae by providing more relief supplies, for the organization could spare no more for Greece. The government must increase its revenue by reviving Varvaresos’s special tax on merchants and industrial­ ists and by increasing the profit margin on the sale of relief supplies. It must reduce expenditure by dismissing superfluous public employees and resisting further wage increases. These measures were bound to evoke much cricitism from the public,

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but hardship was inevitable if the country were to recover. Finally, statutory control over future note issues must be entrusted to a currency control committee composed of the Greek minister of finance, the governor of the Bank of Greece, an American citizen, and a Briton. If the government agreed to implement this programme, Britain would waive repayment of the £46m. loaned to Greece in the early months of tne war.74 Tsouderos and Kartalis accepted these proposals but stressed that it was imperative for UNRRA to channel more food into the country. So long as there were shortages, any stabilization plan would fail, since it would prove impossible to hold down wages.” Details of the stabilization plan were leaked to the Athenian press on 19 January. On the whole, the response was favourable, though hardly enthusiastic. The conservative press acknowledged that the British were themselves beset by grave economic difficulties which limited the amount of aid they could extend to Greece. The socialists gave cautious approval to the plan; only the communists openly condemned it as inadequate. A mood of optimism swept through the capital and the price of the sovereign fell to 133,000 drachmae. But within twenty-four hours a new crisis erupted, this time over the issue of public order. The sequence of events which led to the crisis began on 16 January in the Peloponnesian town of Sparta. A band of communists killed the leader of the local branch of X, the extreme Right-wing organization. His sixyear-old son was murdered at his side, stabbed thirty-seven times to form the letter ‘X’. On 18 January several members of X retaliated by killing two communists in a cafe in Kalamata, a town further to the west. The police arrested four members of X suspected of complicity in the crime. On 19 January the funeral of the murdered communists took place, and the local EAM committee organized a demonstration which led to scuffles between rival extremists. That night, approximately 1,000 members of X from neighbouring villages surrounded Kalamata and set up road-blocks. During the early hours of 20 January a hundred of them, armed with sub-machine-guns and revolvers, infiltrated the town and captured the police station by force. The four X-members were released, along with nineteen other right-wing activists charged with outrages

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against the Left. The band then retreated to the mountains with some eighty hostages, of whom six were subsequendy executed.76 Sophoulis promptly dispatched army units to Kalamata and calm was restored by 22 January. But the damage had already been done: the political world was in an uproar, with royalists and communists blaming each other for the events, while the public’s confidence in the government’s ability to protect them was seriously shaken. The excesses perpetrated in Sparta and Kalamata were symptomatic of a general deterioradon of the state of public order. According to information gathered by Leeper, terrorist acts by the Left and Right had increased sharply in number since the second fortnight of December 1945. Right-wing extremists were predominantly active in the Peloponnesus. For the most part, their victims were ex-members of ELAS freed under the terms of the government’s amnesty. Northern Greece was the preserve of communist terrorists, and, remarkably, for the first time since December 1944 they bore responsibility for more crimes than the royalists: of 221 serious incidents recorded between 20 December 1945 and 13 January 1946, 122 were reported to have been committed by the Left, 41 by the Right, and 58 by persons unknown. Communist bands were now roaming freely in the mountains of Macedonia, raiding villages and striking fear into the hearts of local government officials. By early January over thirty village presidents had fled to the protection of the nearest detachments of British troops, and the mayor of the town of Verroia had taken refuge in Thessaloniki. Leeper surmised that the guerrilla bands were acting under the direct supervision of the KKE, and believed that the party was hoping to profit from the disorder and force its way into office by making it impossible for Sophoulis’s government to consolidate its authority.77 With the benefit of hindsight, one may conclude that he was only partially correct. It appears that he was mistaken to presume that the KKE exercised direct control over the bands. According to communist sources, the party decided to organize the guerrillas under a centralized command only in mid-February 1946.7a It thus seems that the bands operated independently of the KKE during the winter of 1945-6, their ranks swelled by the spontaneous flight of left­

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wing citizens to the hills. On the other hand, even if the KKE did not control the bands, it did nothing to restrain or discourage them; and Leeper was doubdess correct to believe that the party hoped that the guerrillas’ campaign of terror would undermine Sophoulis and usher in a government of EAM. In repeated declarations, the politburo condoned the bands’ excesses, characterizing them as justified acts of ‘popular self-defence’, and insisted that Greece would know no peace until a cabinet was formed with the ‘integral participation’ of EAM.” On 21 January, the day after the incidents in Kalamata, the Soviet Union lodged a formal protest against the presence of British troops in Greece with the newly formed Security Council of the United Nadons Organizadon (UN). They claimed that the presence of Bridsh troops was being exploited by Greek reacdonaries to create a situadon likely to threaten international peace. There was no justification for British troops remaining in the country. The war was over; they had no Axis forces to fight; and they were not defending lines of communication. It was often suggested that they were there to maintain law and order, but if that was their function, they were failing abjecdy. An ‘incredible’ degree of terrorism was raging in Greece; the world was witnessing ‘the extermination of the finest representatives of the Greek people’. It was also sometimes argued that if British troops departed, fascist violence would only increase. But this argument, too, was fallacious, for ‘can there be a situation worse than that existing in Greece at the present time?’ Law and order was an internal affair which should be the responsibility of the Greeks alone. In the interest of peace, the Security Council should call upon Britain to withdraw her troops from the country forthwith.80 The Russians’ action caused a stir in Athens. Sophoulis at once declared that British troops were in Greece with the consent of his government and were collaborating with it fully in the restoration of law and order. His statement was endorsed by the Populists, Papandreou, Kanellopoulos, Plastiras, and Kaphandaris - but Sophianopoulos, the minister for foreign affairs, dissented and was sacked and replaced by Rends81. Sophianopoulos had long hoped to establish friendly relations between his country and the Soviet Union and

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evidently was unwilling to identify Greece too closely with Great Britain. He also regarded himself as a spokesman of the Left and may have feared that he would be branded as a reactionary if he engaged in polemics with the Russians. The communists, for their part, interpreted the Soviet complaint as evidence that the Russians were at last ready to intervene actively in Greek affairs. They denounced Sophoulis as a tool of the Foreign Office and demanded the immediate withdrawal of British troops from the country. Once again, however, the KKE’s hopes were to be frustrated. Clearly, the Soviet complaint was not prompted by concern for the plight of the Greek Left. Rather, it was intended as a riposte to charges levelled against the Soviet Union by the government of Iran. On 19 January, two days before the Soviet complaint, the Iranians, with the support of the British and Americans, had protested to the Security Council against the presence of Russian troops in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan. They had accused the Russians of threatening international peace by aiding and abetting an Azerbaijani secessionist movement. Criticized by the West for their military presence in Iran, the Russians’ natural response was to level counter-criticism against Britain’s activity in Greece. It amounted to a repetition of the tactic employed by Molotov in December 1945 to resist Bevin’s and Byrnes’s pressure for a withdrawal of Russian troops from Romania and Bulgaria. Bevin sought to expose the Russians’ methods during a speech delivered to the Security Council on 1 February. It was significant, he observed, that, in the past, whenever the question of Greece had arisen in any negotiations with the Soviet Union, it had always occurred during discussions about Romania and Bulgaria. ‘If I may talk about cards, Mr Molotov has always pulled the king [Greece! out, face upwards sometimes, and he has said: “Well, that is my trick.” ’ But Britain held the ace: she was trying to build a democracy in Greece. Her mission was not to aid the Right, but to ensure tranquillity and free elections. British troops would withdraw the moment this objective was achieved. In the meantime, it was incorrect and a grave insult to the British people to suggest that their troops were acting in a manner inimical to the United Nations.*2 Andrei Vyshinsky, now a member of the

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Soviet delegation to the Security Council, pointed out that his government had not accused Britain of misdeeds. The Greek reactionaries were the evil-doers and they were taking advantage of a situation created by the presence of British troops. But this distinction failed to appease Bevin, for it implied that the British were indirectly responsible for threatening the peace. He was deeply angered by the Russians’ allegations and demanded that the Security Council repudiate them altogether. The charges were serious, he told E. J. Stettinius, the American delegate to the Council, and he was reluctant to accept anything other than a clear decision by the Council in his favour, ‘regardless of what the circumstances were - even to wrecking the UNO’. Stettinius was alarmed and intervened forcefully in favour of a compromise. On 6 February the Council agreed merely to take note of the views expressed by the Russian and British delegations and dropped the issue from the agenda without taking a vote.” The fracas in the Security Council again brought home to the British the importance of ending their military commit­ ment in Greece as quickly as possible. So long as British forces remained in the country, there seemed little prospect of persuading the Russians to evacuate Romania, Bulgaria, and now Iran. However, the early withdrawal of British troops depended on the speedy organization of the Greek army, and the British military mission in Athens had yet to establish a working relationship with General Manetas, the minister of defence. During the last week of December 1945 Manetas had begun to promote a large number of officers without consulting the mission. Moreover, on 14 January he and General Dromazos, the Chief of Staff, had made known their intendon to revise Plasdras’s List A so as to restore to active service a number of republicans cashiered as long ago as 1926. General Rawlins, the head of the mission, regarded such favouridsm for aged Venizelists as a threat to the army’s efficiency. He protested to Sophoulis, and a stalemate was reached which lasted for the rest of the government’s life. Rawlins’ single success was to persuade Manetas to nominate General Spyridon Georgoulis as Vendris’s successor to the key post of deputy chief of staff. Georgoulis was both a competent officer and a fervent republican fully trusted by Sophoulis. But

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his appointment was obstructed by General Dromazos, who insisted that he alone should be entitled to name the officers who were to serve under him.114 The British police mission, meanwhile, was experiencing similar difficulties in its relations with Merkouris, the minister for public order. Without reference to the mission, Merkouris had by mid-February transferred some 530 officers of the gendarmerie - a quarter of its officer corps - from one part of Greece to another. Presumably, the aim of this curious practice was to disrupt subversive organizations; but, in the police mission’s view, far from eradicating political intrigue, it served as a direct incentive to politics amongst the gendarmes, for no officer or man felt secure, and, consequently, each was tempted to seek protection by ingratiating himself with influential political figures.*5 Manetas and Merkouris were associates of Kaphandaris, the deputy premier, and Leeper suspected them of acting under his influence. An irascible and quarrelsome individual, Kaphan­ daris was a constant source of dissension amongst the ministers, and, in the ambassador’s view, the 'worst element’ in the government.86 On 5 February Sophoulis informed Leeper that he wished to dismiss Kaphandaris and his clique. They were all ‘troublemakers’, he observed. Leeper raised no objections; indeed, he wondered aloud whether Sophoulis should not go even further and attempt an extensive reorganization of the cabinet. The Russians’ diplomatic offensive in the UN, coupled with the KKE’s demands for a new government and the withdrawal of Bridsh troops, had introduced an ‘entirely new atmosphere’ in the political world. There was now a widespread feeling that royalists and republicans should bury their differences over the constitu­ tional issue and unite against their common enemy, the extreme Left. The moment thus seemed opportune to offer ministerial posts to a number of moderate Populists as well as to Papandreou and Kanellopoulos. Hitherto, the KKE and the royalists had been firing at one another ‘over the crouching body of the Centre’, but if the government were broadened towards the Right, the extreme royalists would be reduced to a minority and the cabinet would be in a stronger position to cope with both them and the KKE. Sophoulis replied that he

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would be willing to broaden the government if this was coupled with a postponement of the elections for two months. Elections on 31 March would be ‘disastrous’: it had proved more difficult than he had expected to restore public order, and terrorism by the communists and royalists would produce ‘an unnatural majority for either extreme’. Political division and disorder would be perpetuated and the application of the economic stabilization plan frustrated. But if the elections were postponed, the government would have an opportunity to reform the economy, impose law and order, and establish better contact with the provincial masses. This would swing the balance in favour of the Centre and result in a parliament ‘more in agreement with present trends abroad’. Leeper agreed and requested the Foreign Office to consider delaying the vote. He reminded them that ‘the main object of holding elections is to secure stable Government with economic improvement. Under present conditions we may forfeit [the] chance of getting what we really want by insisting on March elections. *,i The request for a postponement of the elections could scarcely have been made at a worse time. Less than a week had passed since Bevin had come under fire from the Russians in the Security Council over the presence of British troops in Greece. He had assured the Council that British forces would be withdrawn at the earliest possible moment, and any delay of the elections entailed the risk of prolonging their stay in the country, exposing Britain to further Soviet criticism and impeding her efforts to compel the Russians to withdraw from Romania, Bulgaria, and Iran. On 8 February Bevin informed Leeper that he would regard any attempt by Sophoulis to postpone the elections as a ‘breach of faith’ : The Greek Prime Minister has repeatedly stated that he intends to hold elections on 31 March . . . I have defended the Greek Government and our position in Greece before the Security Council on this assumption, and my whole policy would be undermined if elections were now to be postponed. It would at once be suspected that the object of the postponement was to prolong the period for which British troops are to remain in Greece. It would also be said that this delay proved that we were not yet able to maintain law and order in Greece. You should make it plain once and for all that I am

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not and shall never be prepared to give favourable consideration or support to any such proposal, and that 1 hope the matter will not again be raised. Nor could he agree to a reorganization of the cabinet: ‘We have had far too many changes already, and if we tinker with this rather brittle Government it may break up altogether and we may have great difficulty in getting a satisfactory substitute.’ He instructed Leeper to tell Sophoulis that it was his ‘strong opinion’ that the government should continue in office as presently constituted. It should concentrate on ‘pushing through the elections on time’ and work for the economic rehabilitation of the country.'8 Sophoulis readily agreed to abide by Bevin’s views.'9 However, he could not persuade his ministers to do likewise, and pressure from within the cabinet for a postponement of the elections began to mount. The ministers were convinced that they could not win elections on 31 March. It was widely accepted that the government would receive no more than 20 per cent of the vote.90 The economic crisis of December 1945, which the cabinet had done nothing to avert, had cost it dearly in terms of popular support. In addition, the effect of the amnesty was falling far short of the public’s expectations, forfeiting the government much sympathy from the moderate Left. By 1 February 3,058 prisoners had gained their freedom, less than a fifth of the 18,000 initially in gaol. Leeper believed that the chaotic state of the civil administration was partially responsible for this disappointing result, along with the reluctance of many magistrates to implement what they regarded as an inequitable law. The government had tried to remedy these problems by replacing 38 of the country’s 95 appellate judges, 23 of 43 prefects, and every provincial governor-general; but the injection of this new blood had evidently come too late to make an impact on the situation. Leeper also suspected that the KKE had instructed a large number of prisoners not to take advantage of the amnesty in order to keep the grievance of congested prisons alive. Some communists were probably even glad to remain behind bars, judging themselves safer in gaol than in their villages, where they might fall victim to vendettas.91 On 15 February Sophoulis yielded to pressure from the-

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cabinet and made a direct appeal to Bevin to permit him to postpone the elections. His entreaty was conveyed to Bevin by Rentis, who, on Sophianopoulos’s resignation, had proceeded to London to represent Greece in the UN. Sophoulis assured Bevin that he was fully conscious of the need for early elections and of the ‘wider implications of this matter’. He was ‘firmly determined’ to conduct the elections on 31 March if the British so insisted. But it was his duty to inform Bevin that the results of the elections would not reflect a genuine expression of the popular will. Such was the psychological pressure and the physical violence exerted on the populace by .communist and royalist terrorists that the new parliament would be dominated by one of the two extremes. In either case, the outcome would spell disaster for Greece: on the one hand, a communist dictatorship; on the other, a royalist regime which would conduct an early plebiscite and provoke a fresh outbreak of civil war perhaps more dreadful than that of December 1944. He felt tempted to resign rather than preside over elections which would condemn Greece to an awful fate. His resignation would at least preserve the position and influence of the Liberal Party and the democratic Centre. But he feared that if he stepped down, political chaos would engulf the country and leave it no hope of recovery. Instead, he wished to remain in office and make one last effort to impose law and order. Presendy, the gendarmerie was dominated by extreme royalists, since ‘all the democratic elements’ had been cashiered following the December revolt. The government, therefore, proposed to pass a law authorizing the minister for public order to mobilize 3,000 of the cashiered gendarmes, organize them as an independent force, and deploy them in Macedonia and southern Greece to stamp out all forms of terrorism. But three or four months would be required for the force to make its influence felt. The decision was Bevin’s: he could save the country from ruin if he permitted a postponement of the elecdons at least until May.92 Wickham, the chief of the British police mission, immediate­ ly protested against Sophoulis’s plan to re-enlist cashiered gendarmes. He did not dispute that the existing gendarmerie contained undesirable elements. The sergeants, who were the backbone of the force, were ‘bad and everyone knows it and

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complains about it’. It was also beyond question that most gendarmes sympathized with the Right: ‘as a result of the revolution and of the constant provocation and actual attack by the Communists they are harder against those who attack them than against those who do not attack them’. But although nearly all gendarmes were anti-communist, not all were royalist, and the large majority were of good quality and trying to perform their duties honestly. Indeed, before the present minister for public order had arrived on the scene, there had been signs that the force was setding down and if left alone would show a gradual but increasing confidence and efficiency. But Merkouris, by his constant political interference, had arrested this development, and the posidon at present could hardly be worse. If the minister were now given unlimited authority to dismiss gendarmes and select new ones, polidcal patronage would prevail and the effect on the corps would be deplorable. The tíme had come to confront Merkouris and insist that transfers and promotions be made impartially and in consultation with the mission. Hitherto, Merkouris had ignored the mission completely; the proposed law had not even been submitted to Wickham for his perusal.9* The Foreign Office acknowledged that there was much force in Wickham’s argument. They informed Leeper that they were strongly opposed to the dismissal of any gendarme solely on the grounds of his political opinions. But they expressed concern lest Wickham, by his insistence on efficiency and proper procedure, was not making it too difficult for Sophoulis’s government to remove genuine wrongdoers. Rentis, they noted, had raised this point during a conversation with Bevin on 8 February. He had alleged that the police mission was impeding the restoration of law and order by preventing Merkouris from dismissing gendarmes who were refusing to participate in the suppression of right-wing terrorism.94 Leeper assured the Foreign Office that Rentis’s accusation was unfounded. Wickham had never attempted to obstruct the removal of gendarmes against whom reasonable cases on political grounds had been made. Besides, even when Wickham had raised-objections, he had been ‘ostentatiously ignored’ by Merkouris, who had proceeded to do exactly as he pleased. It was not therefore a case of the mission’s impeding

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reforms. On the contrary, Merkouris was interfering with the corps quite freely, incompetently, and behind the mission's back.95 On 17 February Leeper called on Sophoulis to discuss the issue of the gendarmerie, as well as the Premier’s entreaty for a postponement of the elections. He stated that he did not believe that the gendarmerie was as bad as Sophoulis was making it out to be, and even if it were, Merkouris was to blame. The latter had been a minister for three months and should long ago have worked out the best way of reforming the corps. Instead, he had spent his time indulging in political intrigue. Clearly, he had failed and should be replaced. ’There was litde chance of getting the Gendarmerie to play straight if they were convinced that their Minister was playing crooked.’ Sophoulis should himself take over the ministry for public order and exercise his duties in consultation with the British police mission. As for the elections, Leeper thought it doubtful that Bevin would change his mind. He warned Sophoulis that the government would probably have to face up to the fact that voting must take place on 31 March.96 Bevin was engrossed with work in the Security Council and could not spare the tíme to speak to Rentis about Sophoulis’s appeal. He referred the matter to the Foreign Office, where it was discussed by McNeil, Sargent, and Hayter. They concluded that the elections must not be delayed, even though Sophoulis had put forward a ‘strong case’ for doing so. On Bevin’s instructions, Sargent summoned Rentis on 17 February and set forth the reasons for their decision. In the first place, Sargent explained, Bevin had stated on a number of occasions that elections were to take place on 31 March, and he could not possibly disavow at this late stage what he had publicly announced. Second, if he acquiesced in this delay, it might well be followed by a request for another. Sargent pointed out that according to The Times of 16 February, the Athenian newspaper Eleutheria, on whose editorial board Kartalis now figured prominently, was already advocating a delay of the elections until November. Finally, although the state of public order in Greece left something to be desired, there was absolutely no reason to suppose that conditions would be any better in May than in March. In fact, ‘the strongest argument against M.

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Sophoulis is that it is the absence of elections that is largely responsible for the weakness of all Greek Governments and consequently for the present condition of uncertainty and disorder . . . Such disorder as exists is therefore a reason for hastening the elections and not for postponing them.’ Rends readily accepted these views and expressed surprise that Sophoulis had requested a postponement in the first place. He thought that it would be impossible for the government to maintain itself, and very difficult to find another to take its place, if the elecdons were delayed for any length of time.97 Rends apprised Sophoulis of the Foreign Office’s decision on 18 February. The following day, Sophoulis informed Leeper that the elecdons would definitely be held on 31 March. Merkouris was removed from the ministry for public order and his duties were assumed by the Premier. Simultaneously, a law was passed authorizing the government to create a special antiterrorist force of gendarmes. Sophoulis, however, took no steps to put the law into effect. Leeper did not press him to do so: given the Foreign Office’s refusal to postpone the elections, he thought that the law was rather pointless, for the force could not hope to be organized and deployed before the voting commenced. He now felt that it was practically certain that the royalists would win the elections. The prospect tilled him with foreboding and a deep sense of frustration; he confessed to MacVeagh that his efforts to build up a political centre had completely failed.98 On 22 February, in a long dispatch to the Foreign Office, he warned that grave trouble lay ahead for both Greece and Anglo-Greek relations. Since the December civil war, he wrote, ‘I have done everything in my power to prevent political opinion swinging too far to the Right and to encourage and strengthen a moderate Centre.’ His efforts had been thwarted by repeated economic crises, the belligerence of the royalists and communists, and the fear inspired in the public by the increasingly aggressive Russian attitude towards Greek affairs. The nation was now polarized between a revolutionary communist minority and a majority who wanted the communists to be dealt with severely, and if in the forthcoming elections the majority voted for the royalists, severe treatment was what the Left would doubtless receive. The British would probably be unable to restrain the Right.

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The royalists were already distrustful and critical of British policy because they felt that it afforded too much protection to the Left. Nor would the British be able to impose their views, as they had done in February 1945, for their troops were soon to be withdrawn from the country. Inevitably, there would be another civil war: too much blood had already been shed and too much hatred existed between the Left and Right to permit them to coexist peacefully. In such circumstances, the protection of British interests in Greece would become a delicate task indeed. Would HM Government lend support to a royalist regime which, although constitutionally elected, would probably be regarded by the world as ‘fascist’? If they denied it their support, would they not in effect be aiding the communists, whose interest were diametrically opposed to Britain’s own? I foresee . . . that after the elections Anglo-Greek relations will be put to a new and difficult test. By democracy we mean majority rule with fair treatment for minorities. We can get majority rule, but what is fair treatment? Surely this depends on the way the minority behaves. If the minority is revolutionary and looks across the frontier for support, what is fair treatment? This is the kind of problem with which His Majesty’s Government may be presented, especially when the British troops have been withdrawn. If an elected Greek Govern­ ment then takes the law into its own hands acting on the motto Solus popuii suprema lex will Anglo-Greek relations suffer? If they do, how far will British interests suffer in the Mediterranean? Hayter believed that Britain would be compelled to assist a royalist government, no matter how odious its policies. He acknowledged that it now seemed unlikely that the elections would produce ‘the result which would suit us best, namely the Left-Centre with enough strength to hold the balance of power’. The only method of ensuring this result was to postpone the elections and give more financial and economic aid to Sophoulis’s government. This was not ‘practical politics’, and HM Government had therefore opted for elections on 31 March; and ‘we should realize that by committing ourselves to March elections we have also committed ourselves to supporting whatever Government emerges from them’. Probably, this would be a government of the Right, which, although professing great devotion to

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Britain, would implement measures not at all in accord with British wishes. The King would be invited to return, repressive policies would be adopted against the Left, and extravagant territorial claims would be lodged against Greece’s communist neighbours. Nevertheless, so long as Greece was deemed important to Britain’s strategic interests, there could be no question of abandoning her, whatever the nature of her government: If our policy of maintaining Greek independence continues, as I assume it will, we shall be obliged to back the Government that results from elections held under our auspices, even if we do not like such a Government, and to defend it against criticisms in this country. We can, of course, do our best to guide and advise such a Government, but we shall have to recognize that Greek internal polines are in the last resort a matter to be decided by the elected Greek Government and not by H.M. Government, and that we cannot allow such internal politics to affect our own policy of supporting Greek independence. Sargent thought that Hayter was being too pessimistic. No one could foresee the future, and the Centre might surprise everyone and fare well in the elections. Moreover, even if the royalists won, they would be so dependent on British advice and assistance that they would probably not risk embarking on policies likely to alienate British goodwill. But McNeil doubted whether this would be the case. The Centre had ’squandered any chance we gave them’, he complained: ‘I, too, therefore, have found myself wondering what we should do about the emerging Government between the period when they take over and when the banked-up civil war overtakes them.’ The best course would be to offer aid to the government on the condition that it followed a ’semi-liberal’ policy with regard to public order, and to get British troops out of the country by the autumn at the latest.100 The KKE had already initiated preparations for civil war. According to Zachariadis, the Second Plenum of the central committee agreed on 12 February to complete ‘the organiza­ tional and technical military preparations for the progressive strengthening of the armed resistance of the People’. The Right-wing bands were to be singled out for attack but

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skirmishes with the army were to be avoided in order to deprive the British of a pretext for a second military intervention. Not all members of the central committee were pleased with this decision. Zachariadis records that one facdon desired an immediate, rather than progressive, transition to full-scale warfare; another wanted to avoid a clash altogether. The majority, led by Zachariadis, hovered between these two extremes: they wanted to persevere a while longer in their effort to enter the government by political methods, but concurrently to ready the bands for acuon in case they failed.101 Disagreement also arose over the question of whether the party should carry out its threat to abstain from the elections if Sophoulis insisted on conducting them on 31 March. Some politburo members doubted the wisdom of doing so, since it would deny the KKE a voice in the new parliament and render it incapable of mounting an opposition to the royalist deputies. But Zachariadis ruled in favour of abstention and carried the majority of the central committee with him. He argued that a boycott of the polls would cast doubt on the validity of the elections and prevent the British from claiming that democracy had been restored to Greece.102 On 15 February, three days after the Second Plenum, the politburo learned that Zachariadis’s view on abstention was not in accord with that of the Kremlin. The news was conveyed to the communist leaders by Partsalidis, the secretary-general of EAM, on his return to Athens from a visit to Moscow. Partsalidis reported that the international department of the Soviet communist party felt that the KKE should participate in the elections. Moreover, the Russians had demurred when asked whether they would come to the party’s aid in the event of civil war.l0S Doubtless the Russians feared that if the KKE adopted an excessively militant policy it would anger the British and have unfavourable repercussions on Anglo-Soviet relations. Zachariadis seems finally to have realized that it was futile to expect support from the Russians and decided that the KKE must henceforth defend its interests as it saw fit. He ignored the Kremlin’s advice and insisted on abstention; according to Partsalidis, he declared to the politburo: ‘The Comintern no longer exists.’104 In March he visited Belgrade and asked the Yugoslavs whether they would aid the KKE. On

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his return to Athens he informed the politburo that they had said they would.105 On 2 March Sophianopoulos and the ELD/SKE announced that they, too, would abstain if the elections were held at the end of the month. In a communiqué issued jointly with the communists, they demanded a postponement of the elections until May, an improvement in conditions of public order, verification of the accuracy of the voters’ rolls, and the release of more people from prison. Sophoulis refused to delay the vote and pleaded with them to reverse their decision. He warned them that if they boycotted the elections, the royalists would win an absolute majority of seats in the new parliament. The Right could be controlled only if countervailed by the Left. The Centre would then hold the balance and steer a course between the two extremes.10* However, the Left paid him no heed. Nor, for that matter, did most of the members of his own cabinet. On 6 March Tsouderos announced that he would not stand as a candidate in the elections, and five days later Kaphandaris, Mylonas, and Kartalis left the government and declared that they would abstain. Presumably they believed that, given sufficient pressure, Sophoulis, too, would eventually step down rather than lead his party to certain defeat, and that his resignation would provoke a political crisis which would compel the British to postpone the elections. But Sophoulis did not yield : he thought it poindess to agitate any further for a delay and urged the republicans to face up to the situation and campaign as best they could. His resoludon surprised the politicians, and, as the elections drew nearer, some began to regret their decision to abstain. On 20 March Mylonas announced that he would participate in the elections after all, and Sophoulis extended the deadline for the registration of candidates in the hope that others would follow his lead. But in the end, none did, perhaps because they lacked the courage to risk a humiliation at the hands of the electorate. The elections were held on 31 March. According to reports from British officers in the field, public order was exception­ ally good by Greek standards. In the weeks preceding the elections there had been a sharp increase in the number of politically motivated murders (77 in the period 1-30 March, 27 committed by the Left and 50 by the Right, as opposed to 40

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during February, 10 by the Left and 30 by the Right); but on election day itself only one serious breach of the peace occurred, at Litochoron, a village in southern Macedonia, where a communist band armed with grenades, machine-guns, and a mortar, killed eleven gendarmes. Organized repression by the Right seemed to be confined to a few remote regions in the Peloponnesus.107 Two hundred and forty officials of AMFOGE witnessed the proceedings at a selected sample of 813 of the country’s 3398 polling stations. They were satisfied with the accuracy of the voters’ rolls: by their estimates, 93 per cent of those eligible to vote had been registered, and of the 7 per cent who had not, less than half had been prevented from doing so. Of the approximately 1,850,000 persons who were registered, some 1,117,500 cast their votes; 39.6 per cent of the electorate failed to do so. The results of the elections were as follows:

Approximate number Seats in o f votes Chamber ROYALISTS Populists and allied parties National Party (Napoleon Zervas) Nationalist Party (Theodoras Tourkovasilis) Labour Party (Aristidis Dimitratos) REPUBLICANS Liberal Party EPE (Papandreou, Kanellopoulos, Venizelos) Agrarian Party (Mylonas) SPOILT BALLOTS

Approximate percentage o f votes cast (1,117,500 votes)

Approximate percentage o f total electorate (1.850,000 eligible votes)

610,500

206

54.50

33.00

65,000

24

5.80

3.50

32,000

7

2.80

1.70

3,500

1

0.31

0.19

160,000

48

14.30

8.60

213,500

67

19.00

11.50

6,000

1

26,820'°»

0.53

0.32

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As expected, the royalist parties won an absolute majority of parliamentary seats (238 out of 334) as well as of votes cast (711,000 out of 1,117,500, or 63.6 per cent). But they failed to win the support of the majority of die electorate: only 711,000 of the 1,850,000 eligible voters (38.4 per cent) cast ballots in their favour. A fifth (20.4 per cent) of the electorate voted for republican parties. Of the 39.6 per cent of the electorate who failed to vote, AMFOGE estimated that between 37.8 per cent and 50.5 per cent (15-20 per cent of the electorate) were supporters of the Left and had abstained.109 If one accepts the figure of 15 per cent for the Left and adds it to the 20.4 per cent who voted for republican parties, it becomes apparent that 35.4 per cent of the electorate were republican - a mere 3 per cent less than were royalist. The electoral returns thus seem to indicate that Leeper’s long and dogged effort to whittle down the royalists’ popularity had met with considerable success. Furthermore, they are difficult to reconcile with the Left’s subsequent claim that the voting was conducted amidst a wave of royalist terrorism. Sophoulis himself pronounced the elections ‘by and large very fair indeed’.110 It may be postulated that the left-wing parues committed a grave error by abstaining from the elections, for by doing so they enabled the royalists to gain an absolute majority in the new parliament. Had they participated, the chamber would have been nearly equally divided between republicans and royalists and the latter might have been unable on their own to form a government commanding the support of a majority of MPs. Under such circumstances, the Populists might, at long last, have been compelled to conclude an alliance with the conservative republicans, who, perhaps, would have been able to exercise a moderating influence on the extremist fringe of the royalist Right. On the other hand, it is equally possible, and, in fact, more probable, that the royalists would have again declined to collaborate with the republicans. In that case, it is doubtful whether a stable government could have been formed. For it is exceedingly unlikely that either the EPE or the Liberals would have invited the KKE to join a government; and had they allied themselves with the socialists, they would almost certainly have been opposed by both the Populists and the communists, who regarded a successful

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Centre as the greatest menace to the perpetuation of their strength. In short, had the Left participated in the elections, the new parliament would probably have arrived at a stalemate with litde hope of forming a government able to survive. On balance, therefore, one may conclude that the Left’s abstention from the elections litde altered the fortunes of Greece. Their pardcipadon would have rendered the country ungovernable; their abstendon delivered power to extremists who could not govern wisely. Either way, the country was doomed to a resumption of civil war.

6

A Revulsion against all things Greek On 7 March 1946, three weeks before the elections, Leeper’s three years of service as ambassador to Greece came to an end. He was appointed ambassador to the Argentine Republic and departed for Buenos Aires. In his memoirs, he records that he asked to be transferred because the elections were to mark the beginning of a new political era in the country. Perhaps he felt that he would be an unsuitable ambassador for the post­ election period, for his long association with the republican Centre had compromised him in the eyes of the royalists, who seemed bound to triumph at the polls.1 His successor was Sir Clifford Norton, hitherto head of the British Legation in Switzerland. In a dispatch welcoming Norton to Athens, the Foreign Office cautioned him not to attempt to control Greek affairs to the same degree as had his predecessor. The advent of an elected government would radically alter the nature of Anglo-Greek relations: internal policy would in the last resort be the responsibility of the Greek government and not of HM Government, and Britain wished to reduce her interference in the country as much and as quickly as possible. O f course, Britain would continue to enjoy a ‘certain influence’ over the Greeks in view of the latter’s dependence on British advice and assistance. Whenever possible, Norton must exercise this influ­ ence to coax the new government in a moderate direction.2 On 1 April, the day after the elections, Bevin informed Norton that although it was now up to the Greeks to form their own government, he could not let the occasion pass without giving them some advice. He instructed the am­ bassador to summon the leaders of the parliamentary parties and suggest to them that the most suitable regime for their country would be a broad coalition. Such a government should take a ‘progressive view of legislation’ and put behind it the passion and antagonism generated by the occupation and the December civil war. It should concentrate on implement-

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ing the stabilization plan which had been worked out with Tsouderos, since the economic reconstruction of Greece was vital to her internal and external development. In this regard, it would be wise to stick to the agreement to hold the plebiscite in 1948, because an early vote might lead to an upheaval and interrupt the work of reconstruction. Damaskinos should therefore be retained as regent.3 Norton conveyed Bevin’s views to Tsaldaris, the Populist chief, on 2 April. Tsaldaris stated that he, too, desired a broad coalidon and was already trying to forge an alliance with Papandreou, Kanellopoulos, and Venizelos, the leaders of the EPE. But he rebuffed Bevin’s advice regarding the plebiscite, pointing out that the Populists had never agreed to postpone the vote until 1948. They had received a mandate from the people to reach a quick solution to the consdtutional question. ‘Greece would never be at peace until it was solved.’ Norton retorted that the electoral returns did not indicate an overwhelming demand for an early plebiscite. Tsaldaris admitted that there was some truth in this observation, but nevertheless felt that if the majority of MPs in the new parliament wanted an early vote, their wish should be granted. However, he indicated that he might delay the plebiscite if Bevin insisted on it for ‘international reasons’. He was most anxious to work in full agreement with Great Britain.4 That evening, Venizelos and Kanellopoulos called on Norton. They complained that Tsaldaris’s victory had ‘gone slightly to his head*. It was true that he had invited the EPE to participate in the new cabinet, but on conditions they could not possibly accept: the Populist Party was to possess the portfolios of foreign affairs, defence, co-ordination, and the interior; and the plebiscite was to be held within two months. As former premiers, they felt they must be awarded important posts in the cabinet. They would not shoulder responsibility without power. As for the plebiscite, they were determined that it be scheduled in consultation with Britain and the United States. Unless Tsaldaris modified his terms, they would refuse to enter the government.5 On 3 April Damaskinos warned Norton that unless decisive action were taken to restrain the Populists, they might ‘take the bit between their teeth’ and form a one-party government or

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even launch a coup d'état. He urged Norton to speak strongly and clearly to them about the dangers of insisting on an early plebiscite. Norton promised to confer with Tsaldaris but explained to Damaskinos that there were limits to the amount of pressure he could bring to bear. Tsaldaris was the leader of the largest party in an elected parliament.6However, no sooner had Norton concluded his discussion with the regent than he received instructions from London to confront Tsaldaris and throw caution to the winds. The Foreign Office noted that Tsaldaris had hinted that he would delay the plebiscite if Britain deemed this essential for international reasons. He should therefore be told that an early plebiscite would ‘immensely weaken Greece’s position internationally’. It would create dissension and possibly an upheaval which would gravely prejudice the urgent work of reconstruction and prevent the formation of a broad government. Under such circumstances, it would prove difficult for the British to continue their programme of economic and military aid to Greece.7 On 4 April Norton summoned Tsaldaris and informed him of the Foreign Office’s views. To his surprise, Tsaldaris revealed that he, Papandreou, Kanellopoulos, and Venizelos had already reached a compromise over the question of the plebiscite and that the EPE was to join the Populists in a government straight away. The EPE was no longer required to commit itself to a plebiscite within two months as a condition for entering office. Instead, the cabinet would first be formed; the EPE and the Populists would then joindy study the question of when to conduct the vote ‘in the light of the national interest’; and their decision would be announced to the parliament when it convened in early May. Norton was litde pleased with this arrangement. There was nothing in it to prevent the Populists from insisting that the ‘national interest’ dictated an early plebiscite. But on balance he felt that it would be unwise to raise objections. It was essendal that a government be established as soon as possible, he explained to the Foreign Office, and the compromise would at least ensure that the cabinet was a coalition. Furthermore, ‘it would be disastrous if the Populist leaders who have a properly elected majority in the Chamber let it appear that [a] difference with

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HM Government prevented them from forming a govern­ ment’. Norton confined himself to impressing on Tsaldaris the importance of defining the ‘national interest’ correctly, leaving the Populist in no doubt that the Foreign Office would interpret it to mean a lengthy delay of the vote.' That night the swearing-in of the new ministers commenced: (Constantinos Tsaldaris Ioannis Theotokis Spyros Theotokis Panagiotis Hatzipanos Petros Mavromichalis Stephanos Stephanopoulos Dimitrios Chelmis Stylianos Gonatas

Populist Populist Populist Populist Populist Populist Populist National Liberal

Premier, Foreign AfTairs Interior Public Order Justice Defence Co-ordination Finance Public Works and Reconstruction*

Tsaldaris and the EPE were unable to agree on the portfolios to be awarded the latter. Nevertheless, Papandreou, Venizelos, and Kanellopoulos agreed to join the cabinet as ministers without portfolio on the understanding that they would soon be appointed to prominent positions. The leaders of the EPE remained in the cabinet barely a fortnight. On 17 April they resigned in protest against Tsaldaris’s continued failure to allot them important posts and his obdurate insistence on an early plebiscite. The Premier was intent on conducting the vote soon, fearing that if it were long delayed, the King might never manage to return to Greece. According to Lascelles, Tsaldaris thought it inevitable that the Populists would make mistakes in office which would diminish the prestige of the royalist movement. Thus, the longer the plebiscite was put off, the greater the chance of the republicans’ winning. Tsaldaris also felt that in the event of an early plebiscite, conservative republicans would be more likely to cast their ballots for the King rather than vote with the communists for a republic.10In addition, he had to pay heed to the views of the Populist MPs, who began to assemble in Athens in mid-April. They were overwhelmingly in favour of the early return of the King, and there was a real possibility that they would depose Tsaldaris as leader of the party if he obstructed them. Norton repeatedly urged him to stand up to them, but this he was naturally unwilling to do. Under the

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circumstances, Norton began to wonder whether there was any point in pressing further for a delay of the plebiscite. On 18 April he warned the Foreign Office that even if Britain and the United States came down unequivocally in favour of a postponement, it was doubtful whether the Populists would listen to them. *1 am reluctantly driven to the conclusion that our day to day relations with this properly elected Greek government will perpetually be complicated if there is no agreement as to when a plebiscite should be held.’11 Bevin, too, was by now questioning the wisdom of insisting on a delay of the vote. He had discussed the issue with King George in London and been impressed by the latter’s arguments in favour of an early solution to the constitutional controversy. The King maintained that the elections of 31 March had demonstrated that most Greeks detested com­ munism and were devoted to himself. If the British now tried to obstruct his return, in defiance of the wishes of the people, Anglo-Greek relations would deteriorate. Moreover, so long as the plebiscite was delayed, the populace would be preoccupied with the constitutional question and distracted from the urgent tasks of reconstruction. It would thus be in the interests of both Britain and Greece to conduct the plebiscite at the earliest convenient moment. September seemed the most suitable occasion, since it would permit a few months for campaigning and be well before the winter, when voting would be difficult in mountainous areas. The King pledged to work for moderation and reconciliaton if the plebiscite went in his favour. ‘It is my purpose’, he stressed, ‘to strive to establish normality and to secure the loyalty even of those who now oppose me . . . And it is from these efforts that the success of my task will be finally decided, not from the majority at the elections or the plebiscite, however large these may be.’ Bevin acknowledged that a postponement of the plebiscite might prove dangerous for Greece since it would perpetuate a state of uncertainty and impede her economic recovery. He was inclined to accept the King’s view that the time had come to solve the constitutional question once and for all.12 Bevin also realized that there were advantages to be gained from conducting the plebiscite while British troops were still in Greece. He raised this point with Byrnes, ¿he American

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Secretary of State, on 26 April in Paris, where the Council of Foreign Ministers was meeting to draft treaties of peace with the Axis satellites. If the Populists were left to their own devices, he warned, they would probably rig the plebiscite in the same way as the communists were tampering with elections in eastern Europe. They would make it impossible for any effective opposition to the King to be recorded. The result would be an exaggerated majority of votes for the monarch which would not be regarded as genuine by many Greeks and might lead quickly to disturbances and perhaps another civil war. But if British troops were in the country, the Populists might exercise restraint. The plebiscite would be fairer and enjoy a greater chance of being accepted by the people. It would be most unwise to prolong the presence of British troops in Greece into 1947 or 1948, for this would provide the Russians with a pretext to maintain the Red Army in eastern Europe. Hence, the best course of action seemed to be to hold the plebiscite during 1946, perhaps in September, as the King had suggested. According to British records, Byrnes replied that Bevin was in a better position than he to assess the situation in Greece, and if Britain favoured a plebiscite in September, the United States would accept it. Above all, Byrnes said, ‘it was essential that the Communists should not get into power in Greece. This must be avoided at all costs. He did not mind how it was done. We must keep our eye very closely on Greece.’13 On Bevin’s instructions, Norton informed Tsaldaris on 10 May that the British had decided to agree to a plebiscite in the autumn after all. Their only request was that the government undertake a re-examination of the voters’ rolls and permit Damaskinos to continue as regent. Tsaldaris readily acceded to this request. He suggested that AMFOGE remain in Greece to observe the plebiscite as well as to review the electoral rolls.14 On 13 May Damaskinos presided over the first session of parliament and proclaimed the plebiscite for 1 September. The EPE accepted the decision without protest, but the Liberals accused the British of a breach of faith for not insisting on a vote in March 1948. They declared that before a plebiscite could be held, there must be a broader government, a recompilation of the voters’ rolls, and an improvement in

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conditions of law and order. As yet, they made no threat to abstain. The Populists, for their part, immediately began their campaign. Their objective was to win the allegiance of conservadve republicans, who, by supporting the EPE and the Liberals, had denied them an absolute majority of eligible votes in the elections. Their tactic, as before, was to vilify all forms of republicanism as communism; and the opening shots of their campaign were delivered on 12 May in a leading article by the conservative newspaper Kathimerim, entitled ‘A Republic is the antechamber to communist dictatorship’. Now that the Populists had got their way over the plebiscite, Norton hoped they would devote their attention to fiscal and economic affairs. They had inherited a host of problems from Sophoulis’s regime. Neither the British economic mission under General John Clark, nor the currency control committee, in which Sir John Nixon was the British participant, had managed to persuade Tsouderos to imple­ ment the stabilization plan. He and Sophoulis had baulked at every measure likely to lose them votes. Nothing had been done to check deficit spending: between 24 January and 30 March 193 milliard new drachmae were printed. The volume of drachmae in circulation had rocketed from 107 milliard to 300 milliard, reducing the cover provided by the £25m. deposited with the Bank of England from 280 per cent to 100 per cent. Between 1 and 15 February the price of a sovereign had risen from 135,000 drachmae to 153,000 drachmae. With a flight to gold again imminent, the Bank of Greece had intervened to control the market by initiating unrestricted sales of sovereigns to the public at the fixed price of 135,000 drachmae. Over 400,000 of the Bank’s limited reserves of sovereigns had been sold during March to maintain the drachmae-sovereign exchange rate at that level.15 During the Populists’ first month in office, the position had gone from bad to worse. The number of drachmae in circulation increased to 356 milliard, reducing the sterling cover to 84 per cent, while the sale of sovereigns continued unabated. On 18 April Clark addressed a stem letter to Stephanopoulos, the minister of co-ordination, stressing the importance of taking steps to balance the government’s budget in accordance with the stabilization plan. But Stephanopoulos adopted a 'curious-

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195

ly non possumus attitude’ and seemed satisfied to let matters run their course.16 Only in early May did Stephanopoulos begin to show some comprehension of die gravity of the situation, and by then a crisis was practically upon him. The demand for sovereigns grew so large that on 15 May Clark estimated that the reserves of the Bank of Greece would be exhausted within twenty days. Panic would then prevail and the currency would collapse: 'Disaster will follow as surely as night follows day.’ Stephanopoulos pleaded with the British Treasury to sell the Bank of Greece more sovereigns. If the Bank could intervene in the gold market a while longer, he explained, it would afford him a ‘breathing space’ in which to draw up a balanced budget. On 16 May the Treasury agreed to part with 500,000 sovereigns, but warned that no more would be forthcoming and urged Stephanopoulos to take ‘concrete and irrevocable steps’ to put the government’s finances in order. Steph­ anopoulos promised to do so at once, but Clark doubted whether he would.17 The British military mission was equally dissatisfied with Mavromichalis, the minister of defence. Like his predecessors, he was eager to carry out sweeping purges in the armed forces. His first target was the Royal Hellenic Air Force, which had been reorganized and trained by the British in the Middle East after the fall of Greece in 1941. It was known for its republican sympathies and had been left in peace by previous govern­ ments. Mavromichalis told Norton that it was ‘riddled with Bolshevism’, and, without consulting the military mission, dismissed its commanding officers and replaced them with reservists who had remained in Greece during the war. Few had experience of the workings of a modern air force, and the new chief of air staff did not know what was meant by a Mosquito.1* Mavromichalis then set his sights on the army and informed General Rawlins, the head of the mission, that the government wanted to employ a number of ‘our Generals’. Rawlins took this to mean that the cabinet intended to reinstate royalists who had been retired by Plastiras. At the mission’s request, Norton summoned Mavromichalis and demanded an end to political interference in military matters. To the ambassador’s surprise, Mavromichalis backed down; Norton

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suspected that he realized he had put himself in the wrong in his handling of the air force and now hoped to retrieve the Embassy's goodwill by co-operating over the army. Rawlins seized the initiative and persuaded the minister to permit the military mission to conduct a purge of its own. The mission requested General Dromazos, the Chief of Staff and an associate of Plastiras, to draw up a roster of colonels he deemed incompetent and of major-generals he considered fit for promotion to the rank of lieutenant-general. The list was then reviewed by Rawlins. Fifty colonels were retired, and, according to Norton, of the major-generals selected for promotion, none were royalists favoured by Mavromichalis. A law was then passed requiring officers who had remained at the same rank for over a decade to retire. This had the effect of clearing the senior ranks of the officer corps of the many aged republicans appointed by Plastiras. Twenty-eight generals, Dromazos am ongst them, lost their posts. General Spiliotopoulis, a royalist, became the new Chief of Staff; General Georgoulis, a republican, became commander of II Corps in Thessaly; and Ventiris remained in charge of III Corps in Macedonia. The purge was applauded by the EPE, but Manetas, now a Liberal MP, denounced it as a scheme to deliver the army into the hands of the royalists. Rawlins retorted that the roster had been drawn up by Dromazos, who was a republican, and insisted that the changes had been made on the basis of military efficiency and were devoid of political significance.19 In London, meanwhile, Bevin asked the cabinet to examine the possibility of extending further financial assistance to the Greek army. Under the terms of the Anglo-Greek Armed Forces Agreement of 1942, the supply of British rations, uniforms, and weapons had ceased on 1 January 1946. The British economic mission estimated that the drachma cost of domestically produced food and military provisions, com­ bined with the sterling cost of essential weapons from abroad, would total 600 milliard drachmae for the fiscal year April 1946 - March 1947. This would consume the whole year’s projected revenue of 600 milliard drachmae, leaving a deficit of 800 milliard drachmae for the essential needs of government departments and no funds for reconstruction. In the absence

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of British aid, the army would have to be reduced to skeleton strength if the government were to come anywhere near balancing its budget.20 Bevin warned the cabinet that if the army were weakened, the Greeks would be unable to defend themselves against an invasion from the north. He did not expect the Russians to attack, but feared that they might incite the Yugoslavs and Bulgarians to do so if Greece were seen to be feeble after the withdrawal of British troops. In the view of the British Chiefs of Staff, the army’s existing establishment of 100.000 men was the minimum required to deter aggression. Britain should therefore pay the army’s sterling costs, estimated at £15m. annually, until conditions in the Balkans were stabilized.21 On 3 June the cabinet agreed to Bevin’s request, but only after he assured them that he was not contemplating a permanent subsidy. Dalton, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in particular, was reluctant to burden Britain with an open-ended commitment. He appreciated that the Greeks were passing through a difficult period, but pointed out that they were not making efficient use of the funds which had already been given them. It was subsequendy decided that British aid must cease on 31 March 1947, the last day of the Greek fiscal year.22 The Foreign Office had reason to suspect that the Yugoslavs were already promoting disorder in northern Greece. As early as September 1945, the British consulate in Thessaloniki had reported that armed bands of Slavs belonging to the Popular Front of Macedonia (NOF) were operating in the mountainous districts along the Greco-Yugoslav frontier. NOF was the latest in a long succession of organizations which had struggled since the turn of the century for autonomy for the SlavoMacedonians, an ethnic minority distinguished from Serbs and Bulgarians by their unique dialect. The demarcation of the national boundaries between Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece following the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 had arbitrarily divided the Slavo-Macedonians into inhabitants of Bulgarian (Pirin), Serbian (Vardar), and Greek (Aegean) Macedonia. Some 80.000 resided in Greece, chiefly in the vicinity of Fiorina, a town in western Macedonia. Their national allegiance was uncertain: some regarded themselves as Bulgarians; some as Greeks; and others as a distinct nationality deserving

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independent statehood. General Metaxas had tried to assimilate them forcefully into the Greek community by banning their language and closing their schools. But these oppressive measures had succeeded only in alienating them from the Greek state, and during the war of 1940-5 many collaborated with the Bulgarian occupation forces. Others joined the Slavo-Macedonian Popular Liberation Front (SNOF), a Yugoslav-sponsored guerrilla movement, in the hope of winning autonomy from both Bulgaria and Greece. In 1945 Tito (Jossip Broz), the Yugoslav communist leader, acknowledged their claim to statehood, but not independence, by creating a republic of Macedonia, with Skoplje as its capital, as a constituent member of the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.2* Following ELAS’s defeat in January 1945, some 5,000 Greek communists took refuge in the new Macedonian republic. Several thousand Slavo-Macedonians from the region of Fiorina soon followed, fleeing from right-wing extremists of the national guard, who regarded them as agents of Bulgarian expansionism and international communism. Leonard Scopes, the British vice-consul in Skoplje, visited the Slavo-Macedonian refugee camps in September 1945 and reported that the majority of those in the camps seemed willing to return to Greece to live as loyal subjects if right-wing terrorism ceased.24 Others, however, motivated either by a thirst for revenge or dreams of a united Macedonia, constituted themselves as NOF, took up arms, and began launching raids over the GrecoYugoslav frontier against detachments of the Greek army and gendarmerie. Initially, NOF proclaimed that its objective was to win recognition of the national rights of die SlavoMacedonian people ‘within the framework of democratic Greece’. But by October 1945 its official organ, Deltion, printed in both Slavo-Macedonian and Greek, was calling for the incorporation of Aegean Macedonia into the Yugoslav Macedonian republic.25 It is doubtful whether NOF operated initially with any noteworthy encouragement or assistance from the Yugoslav government. With large numbers of British troops in Greece, Tito . could hardly have entertained a serious notion of attempting to annex Greek Macedonia. Admittedly, on a

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number of occasions during 1945 he delivered fiery speeches denouncing the persecution of Slavo-Macedonians in northern Greece; in July 1945 the Yugoslav government lodged a formal protest over the matter with the Greek ministry for foreign affairs; and a near-constant stream of invective against Greece appeared in the Yugoslav press throughout the summer of 1945 and again in early 1946. But this sabre-rattling was probably designed less to frighten the Greeks than to impress the Yugoslav people, particularly in the Macedonian republic, where feeling was running high for the government to do something to aid the Slavo-Macedonians. It is also likely that it was intended as a riposte to the Athenian press’s incessant allegations that the Greek minority in northern Epirus was being maltreated by the Albanians, who looked to the Yugoslavs for support and protection. By March 1946, however, Tito may have begun to examine the possibility of annexing Greek Macedonia with genuine interest. The Russians were pressing for a withdrawal of British troops from Greece; the activity of Greek communist guerrillas was on the increase; and the country seemed doomed to another bout of civil war and chaos from which Yugoslavia could hope to profit. It is perhaps significant that when Zachariadis visited Belgrade in late March, and, by his own account, received a pledge of Yugoslav aid in the event of civil war, he stated to the Yugoslav press that the KKE favoured ‘self-determination’ as a solution to the Macedonian problem.26 Perhaps he and Tito struck a deal whereby the Yugoslavs would accord assistance to the KKE in exchange for the latter’s acquiescence in the absorption of Aegean Macedonia by the Macedonian republic if the Greek communists emerged triumphant. No documen­ tary evidence of such an agreement has come to light, however, and the issue remains shrouded in mystery. The British did not know quite what to make of NOF and of Yugoslav policy on the Macedonian question in general. The Foreign Office at times suspected Tito of coveting the port of Thessaloniki and feared that he would use the SlavoMacedonian issue as a pretext for an invasion of northern Greece. But Tito repeatedly assured them that he had no designs on Greek territory, and the British Embassy in Belgrade was inclined to take him at his word. George Clutton,

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First Secretary of the Embassy, argued that it was only natural that the Yugoslav leaders should feel obliged to make sympathetic noises about their Slav brethren in Greece. It was a ‘platonic’ sympathy which should not be construed as evidence of aggressive intentions. Yugoslavia’s territorial aspirations lay in the north, in Venezia Giulia and Carinthia; Macedonia was of little interest to her.27 However, Tsaldaris’s government, for its part, did not share Clutton’s view. The Populists were convinced that the KKE and the Yugoslavs were jointly conspiring to topple them from office and establish a communist dictatorship which would cede Greek Macedonia to the Macedonian republic. They pointed to the increasing number of disturbances caused in northern Greece by Greek communist and Slavophone guerrillas. Between 1 April and 1 June twenty-eight bands, comprising some 360 armed men, clashed twenty-two times with detachments of the army and gendarmerie; and in early April the gendarmerie claimed to have captured the archives of a Slavophone band which proved indisputably that NOF and the KKE were co-ordinating their military activity.2* Tsaldaris was eager to fight fire with fire. On 3 May he revived a law promulgated during the interwar Republic which authorized the creation of committees of public security throughout the country. The committees were vested with the power to exile to another part of Greece, for a period not exceeding one year, any person suspected of aiding guerrilla bands. On 9 June he introduced in parliament a decree entitled ‘Resolution III: Extraordinary Measures against Persons plotting against Public Order and the Integrity of the Country’. Persons engaged in activities aimed at detaching territory from the state would be punished by banishment, imprisonment, or death. Persons forming or participating in armed bands would be subject to life imprisonment or execution, and those attending assemblies forbidden by law would be imprisoned. Courts martial would be established in northern Greece to try offenders against the decree. There would be no right of appeal, bail, or postponement of penalties. The police and gendarmerie would be authorized to search private dwellings without a warrant. The British protested strongly against both decrees. The

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Embassy warned the Populists that the law on committees of public security smacked of the ‘evil days of Metaxas’ and would be a ‘God-send’ to the royalists’ foreign critics. The British government would be censured as well, since it would be said that their aid to Greece was in effect bolstering an illiberal regime. The Foreign Office complained that Resolution III was patendy biased against the Left, since no provision was made for courts mardal in the Peloponnesus to deal with rightwing terrorists. The latter were nearly as acdve as the communists: according to the British police mission, of 76 polidcally motivated murders in May, 42 were perpetrated by the Left and 34 by the Right. At the Foreign Office’s bidding, Norton impressed on Tsaldaris the importance of acting with absolute impartiality in the administration of justice. Courts martial should be established in both northern and southern Greece or not at all. But Tsaldaris was unmoved, and on 18 June the parliament approved Resolution III as it stood. Nor was the law on committees of public security rescinded. Norton was inclined to let the matter rest. British pleas for moderation were clearly out of step with the mood prevailing in the chamber. ‘[W]e must constantly bear in mind that Greece is not England,’ he advised the Foreign Office, ‘and what may seem to us with our experience and happy constitution unwise is not necessarily wrong or impolitic in the very different circumstances of a Balkan country which has been through various kinds of hell’. Moreover, the British would assume a grave responsibility if they obstructed the Populists’ legislation without suggesting an alternative method of restoring law and order. The government, ‘confronted with opposition ranging from abuse to naked force . . . may find it unreasonable of us to ask them to “be democratic and hope for the best” ’. The Foreign Office acknowledged that there was some truth in these observations, but nevertheless felt that Tsaldaris must be persuaded to exercise restraint. Greece did not exist in a vacuum, they pointed out, and oppressive legislation was bound to provoke international criticism which would make it difficult for Britain to continue her programme of assistance.29 The Foreign Office were soon to have an opportunity to •speak to Tsaldaris in person. He was scheduled to visit Paris

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and London during the first fortnight in July. The chief object of his journey was to promote his country’s territorial claims against Albania and Bulgaria. According to Norton, he was also conscious of the fact that his predecessors had enjoyed frequent contacts with British premiers and foreign secretaries, and was intent on receiving the same attention. Norton encouraged him to make the trip, hoping that it would enhance the Premier’s image as a national leader. In the ambassador’s view, Tsaldaris was fundamentally a ‘decent and well meaning man’ but one lacking personal charm and in need of some heightening of prestige if he were to control the ‘wilder elements’ in the Populist Party.50 On 27 June, three days before his departure for Paris, Tsaldaris received a telegram of extraordinary import from the Greek Embassy in Washington. The Embassy reported that the Americans were ready to accord massive economic assistance to Greece. August Maffry, a vice-president of the ExportImport Bank, had urged the Embassy to submit applications for large-scale loans for reconstruction projects and the purchase of consumer goods.51 Tsaldaris was somewhat perplexed about how to break this news to the British. Apparently, he felt that the influx of American aid would displace Britain as the chief patron of Greece, and feared that the British might obstruct American assistance in order to preserve their predominant influence. It appears that he decided first to convince the British that Greece required economic aid on a scale that Britain could not possibly afford, and only then to inform them of the Americans’ offer in the hope that they would feel morally bound to endorse it. Tsaldaris met Bevin twice in Paris, on 2 and 4 July. On neither occasion did he mention the telegram from Washing­ ton. Instead, he stated that he would soon wish to. discuss frankly with the Foreign Office the question of Greece’s economic relations with the United States. The Greeks were ‘in the position of “an egg between two stones" between Britain and American business interests’, he observed. ‘They did not know whether they should look to Great Britain or to the United States for help in their Economy.’ He gave Bevin a memorandum on the subject of reconstruction which the Foreign Secretary forwarded to London.52 It astounded the

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Foreign Office by requesting foreign aid amounting to $6,000m. (£ 1,500m.) to rebuild the Greek national economy over a period of five years. Tsaldaris argued that funds could not be sought from the IBRD because it was only now beginning to function and would in any event be governed by ‘severe banking principles’. The United States, however, had an annual revenue of S 140,000m. (£35,000m.) of which at least $25,000m. (£6,250m.) would be available for foreign invest­ ment. Any delay in implementing this programme would be detrimental to the Western Powers since it would afford the KKE further opportunity to exploit the people’s misery.” On 10 July, in London, Tsaldaris conferred with Attlee, the British Prime Minister. He opened the discussion by stating that the whole policy of Greece was based on the closest possible co-operation with Great Britain. But he realized that Britain could probably not afford to pay the costs of his country’s reconstruction. Perhaps the British could help with technicians and the Americans with capital. He should like to know whether the British approved of his approaching the Americans for assistance. He was most anxious to have 'something to take back with him’ to Athens.1*4 Later that day he called on Dalton, Chancellor of the Exchequer. He finally revealed that he had received a telegram from Washington suggesting that the Americans were eager to afford Greece maximum aid. He asked whether Dalton had any objections to his sending an economic mission to Washington at once. To his delight, Dalton urged him to do so. The Americans were in a better position to aid Greece than the British, Dalton observed, and the more help they could give, the better Britain would be pleased.” Tsaldaris and Athanasios Aghnidis, the Greek Ambassador in London, proceeded to the American Embassy and were received by the ambassador, William Averell Harriman. Tsaldaris referred to the telegram he had received from Washington and requested permission to dispatch a mission to the United States. Harriman replied that he must await word from the State Department. On 15 July Aghnidis returned to the Embassy and received the most shocking news. Harriman told him that there had evidendy been some mistake. Dean

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Acheson, the Acting Secretary of State, had cabled that the Export-Import Bank had never encouraged the Greek Embassy to believe that aid was available. The Greek ambassador in Washington must have misrepresented the situation. There was litde prospect of any further credits being extended to Greece in the foreseeable future. The Greeks, for that matter, had yet to make use of the $25m. the bank had loaned them in January. If Tsaldaris so wished, he could send an economic mission to Washington to discuss Greece’s general problems, but there could be no question of another loan. Tsaldaris’s grandiose plan for reconstruction had met a dismal end.36 Equally unsuccessful were Tsaldaris’s efforts to win British and American support for the territorial claims against Albania and Bulgaria. Both the Foreign Office and the State Department regarded the claims as unjustifiable on ethnic and strategic grounds, and feared that they would lead to Albanian, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian counter-claims for Greek. Epirus, Macedonia, and Thrace.37 It was felt that the Greeks should be satisfied with the Council of Foreign Ministers’ decision of 27 June to award them the Dodecanese islands, hitherto Italian possessions.3* But the Greeks were not satisfied: the over­ whelming majority of the population was bent on exacting vengeance from Albania and Bulgaria, and Tsaldaris was determined to go down in history as the architect of a greater Greece. In Paris and again in London he pleaded with Byrnes and Bevin to say something in favour of the claims. Byrnes declined to do so and Bevin merely expressed the hope that the Greeks’ case would be given a fair hearing at the peace conference. Both men would have preferred to tell Tsaldaris to withdraw the claims altogether, but the Foreign Office advised against this. They pointed out that the claims were supported by nearly every political party in Greece and whoever opposed them was bound to become an object of the people’s wrath. Since, in the final analysis, it would be the Russians who vetoed the claims, they, and not the Western Powers, should take the blame. Hence it was tactically prudent to make it clear to the Greeks that they could not count on Western support and then let them press their case until they ran headlong into the Russians. In this manner the Russians would incur the

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unpopularity they rightly deserved and the Western Powers would be able to wash their hands of the affair.39 Tsaldaris returned to Athens on 23 July with litde to show for his trip. Hayter wrote to Norton that most people in London had found him ‘not a bad old thing but rather a muddle-head’.40 He was lampooned in Liberal and left-wing newspapers as an incompetent oaf floundering out of his depth in the sea of intemadonal politics. Even the royalist press pronounced itself only moderately sadsfied with his performance. It took a calculated gesture by Norton to restore some of the Premier's self-esteem. He told Tsaldaris that he thought he had done as well as could be expected under the circumstances, and then announced to the press that he had congratulated the Premier on the ‘good results’ of his journey.41 The Foreign Office, meanwhile, had renewed their pressure on Tsaldaris to moderate his approach to the problem of public order.42 Reports from British officers in the field indicated that the government’s oppressive legislation had so far only served to exacerbate the troubled situation. The gendarmerie and committees of public security, invested with extraordinary powers under Resolution III, were indulging in alarming excesses against the Left. In northern Greece the gendarmerie were becoming so injudicious in their arrests that Edward Peck, the British consul in Thessaloniki, feared they would provoke an ‘explosion’. For instance, following the murder of a single right-wing civilian by communists in the Macedonian town of Naousa, the gendarmerie arrested 170 persons, of whom thirty-six were banished by the local committee of public security. Tempers were running high in the district of Fiorina, where some 400 Slavo-Macedonians were languishing in prison. Even the wives and children of communist guerrillas were being interned in an effort to compel the latter to surrender. By contrast, no effort was being made to stamp out royalist terrorism: in July the gendarmerie killed sixty-one communist guerrillas but not one member of a right-wing band. There were widespread reports that the gendarmerie were in fact supplying weapons to royalist civilians from caches in the possession of the army. The latter, too, was growing resdess. In early July forty soldiers descended

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on the KKE’s offices in Thessaloniki and looted them, destroying furniture and documents, without interference from the local police.43 The net effect of the security organs’ misdeeds was to provoke a further flight of left-wing citizens to the hills. The government’s enemies, Norton observed, were choosing not to wait quiedy for their inevitable summons before the security committees or courts martial.44 Communist bands appeared in increasing numbers in Macedonia and Thessaly and matched the Right in their ruthlessness and violence. According to the British police mission, of 163 politically motivated murders in July, 87 were committed by the Left and 76 by the Right. Fifty attacks were launched against the gendarmerie, resulting in the death of fifteen officers. An army company of 100 men was surrounded near the Macedonian village of Pontokerasia; six soldiers defected to the bands, eighteen others were executed, and the rest were disarmed and held capdve until the army organized a counter-offensive. Some of the attacks were launched from across the frontier. On 3 July guerrillas entered Greece from Yugoslavia and fired on an outpost of the gendarmerie. Four days later three border posts in southern Epirus were assaulted by a combined force of Albanians and Greeks.45 Norton speculated that the Yugoslavs and Albanians were aiding the guerrillas in order to discredit the Greek claim to northern Epirus. They probably hoped to convince the peace conference that Tsaldaris’s government was unable to maintain order in Greece and was therefore unfit to be awarded new territory to administer. As for the KKE, he was convinced that it was engaged in a ‘concerted and well-organized attempt to break down the machinery of government [in northern Greecel2. . . and to provoke a violent reaction’.46 Given the scale of the bands’ activity, it was perhaps natural for Norton to have arrived at this conclusion, but in retrospect it seems unlikely that this was the KKE’s objective. A collapse of the government’s authority in northern Greece and a 'violent reaction’ would have heralded a full-scale civil war, and, according to British intelligence reports of late June, the KKE was still unsure whether it wished to commit itself to such a conflagration. The party was said to be split between those who

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wanted to do so, and others, Zachariadis amongst them, who desired a limited guerrilla campaign ‘similar to that in Ireland in 1920’.47 In later years, Zachariadis confirmed that such a split existed, and explained that he hoped to avoid a total confrontation in order to give the British no excuse for a second military intervention.4*According to Dimitrios Vlantas, a member of the central committee in 1946, Zachariadis intended to use the bands not to vanquish the royalists but to frighten them into making political concessions: the armed struggle was to be merely ‘an ancillary method of forceful pressure on the enemy, to make possible a peaceful evolu­ tion’.49 The chief concessions desired by Zachariadis were a general amnesty and the convocation of an all-party conference. The latter, in particular, would have been advantageous to the KKE, for it would have bypassed the elected parliament, diminishing its importance and in effect negating the Populists’ recent victory at the polls. On 12 July the EAM central committee requested the government to grant these concessions, and on 17 July it approached Damaskinos and Sophoulis for support. Riuospastis maintained that EAM’s objective was ‘reconciliation’ based on political equality for every citizen of Greece.50 The communists’ programme of ‘reconciliation’ was ac­ corded a cool reception by the political world. Damaskinos and Sophoulis declined to endorse it and Kanellopoulos opined that, so far from an amnesty being advisable, more vigorous action was required to apprehend terrorists of both extremes. Norton, for his part, thought that it might be ‘statesmanlike’ of Tsaldaris to convene an all-party conference but doubted whether the Populist MPs would permit it. He tended to dismiss the whole campaign for ‘reconciliation’ as an exercise in propaganda. The communists knew full well that their requests would be rejected and were simply trying to make themselves out to be freedom-loving men forced to take up arms in self-defence.51 The government rebuffed EAM without hesitation. In parliament, the Populist MPs demanded not reconciliation, but a sterner application of Resolution III. They shouted down the EPE’s and the Liberals’ calls for the suppression of rightwing terrorism: their aim was the eradication of the Left, not

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of violence per se. Zervas, formerly the chief of EDES and now head of the National Party, emerged as the intransigents' leader. He longed to become minister for public order and was determined to unseat Spyros Theotokis, the Populist holding the post. He accused Theotokis of failing to take courageous steps to stamp out the communist bands, declaring that Greece must act resolutely against ‘Pan-Slavism’, the enemy of all free men.52 At his instigation, twelve right-wing deputies tabled a censure motion against Theotokis on 23 July. Tsaldaris, mindful of the counsels of restraint which had been given him in London, threw his weight behind the minister and announced that the motion would be regarded as a vote of confidence in the entire cabinet. The opposidon parues abstained rather than identify themselves with the government. The motion was rejected, but not decisively: 137 votes were cast in support of Theotokis, and 97 against. Clearly the government was losing its grip over the extreme Right. It had either to yield to the demand for tougher action against the Left or face the prospect of the disintegration of the Populist Party into extremist and relatively moderate camps. Tsaldaris capitulated to the extremists. During the first fortnight in August the security services implemented Resol­ ution III to the full. Military tribunals were established throughout Macedonia, and condemned prisoners were executed within seventy-two hours of judgement. Ten persons were put to death; seventeen were given life sentences; thirtyone were imprisoned for up to twenty years. Nearly all provincial offices of EAM and the KKE were closed and the communist press was censored and otherwise restricted.55 The level of communist guerrilla activity diminished. According to Norton, the Left had been 'sufficiently cowed’ to refrain from creating any disturbances worthy of note.54 But the price of peace was political liberty. With the plebiscite now only two weeks hence, Peck reported from Thessaloniki that the Left were ‘so strangled by mass arrests that their effective participation seems very doubtful’.55The EPE and the Liberals also fell victim to intimidation. Following a tour of Thessaly, Alastair Matthews, the Second Secretary of the Embassy, reported that it was his ‘very strong general impression’ that moderate republicans were being persecuted ‘on an extensive

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scale, with the full cognizance of the authorities and in particular of the prefects and Right Wing deputies*.56 Kanellopoulos protested to the Embassy that it was impossible for him to campaign against the King in his home constituency of Patras. His supporters were afraid they would be beaten up by royalist thugs if they attended his speeches.57 In Sparta, in the southern Peloponnesus, a prominent Liberal was murdered by a group of royalist terrorists led by one Katsareas, a former bodyguard of Mavromichalis, the minister of defence. According to secret sources thought wholly reliable by the Embassy, Mavromichalis was himself actively involved in financing right-wing bands, and had managed to persuade Crown Prince Paul, the King’s brother, to contribute funds to the cause.58 O f a record 84 politically motivated murders during the third week of August alone, 49 were committed by the Right and only 16 by the Left. Not one member of a royalist band was apprehended by the gendarmerie.59 The communists responded to the wave of terror by calling on the Liberals to join them in a ‘pan-democratic front’ and abstain from the plebiscite. But collaboration with the KKE was anathema to Sophoulis. Moreover, he saw no point in abstaining, and, in fact, still held the Left largely responsible for the existing circumstances because of their decision to boycott the elections of 31 March. Instead, he and the EPE pleaded for a postponement of the plebiscite until conditions of public order improved. Their entreaty was rejected by the government and viewed unfavourably by the British. Windle, the British head of AMFOGE, argued that if the plebiscite were delayed, conditions were only likely to get worse.60 The only course deemed practicable by the Foreign Office was to bring pressure to bear on the Populists to refrain from excesses on the day of the vote; and this Bevin did in a message to the government on 29 August.61 In the event, every republican party instructed its supporters to participate in the plebiscite, which was conducted on 1 September. According to the government’s statistics, 1,664,920 votes were cast, of which 1,136,602 (68 per cent) were in favour of the King. In the Peloponnesus, over 90 per cent of the ballots were in support of the monarchy, but in Macedonia the royalists mustered only 67 per cent, and in Thessaloniki, 45 per

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cent. Windle and Leland Morns, Grady’s successor as American chief of AMFOGE, were sceptical of the govern­ ment’s figures. In a confidential repon to London and Washington, they pointed out that the number of votes allegedly cast represented 94 per cent of the electorate, a proportion they considered ‘unreal’. Reports from the field suggested that conditions necessary for a fair plebiscite had not existed in several areas of Greece, and there could be no doubt that the Populists had exened ‘undue influence’ in securing votes. Nevertheless, the observers pronounced themselves satisfied that even without such influence, a majority for the King could have been obtained. This conclusion was greeted with relief by the Foreign Office, who were anxious to put behind them an unsavoury affair for which they bore some guilt by association, but, given the lack of practical alternatives, had been unable to prevent. The Southern Department reasoned that since AMFOGE ‘agrees that the result of the plebiscite is broadly in accordance with the wishes of the majority of the Greek voters . . . we cannot allow our policy towards the new regime to be influenced by the fact that the result of the plebiscite unduly exaggerates the amount of support for the King’. They advised against publishing AMFOGE’s findings; as Ralph Selby, a clerk in the Department, wrote, 'the less said about the report the better’. The Americans, too, wanted the report to remain confidential, but Bevin regarded AMFOGE’s comments as a ‘serious matter’ and instructed that they at least be made known to Tsaldaris and the King.62 The plebiscite coincided with a precipitous deterioration in Greco-Yugoslav relations. On 21 August the Yugoslav minister in Athens, Isidor Cankar, announced that he was being recalled to Belgrade as a protest against the Populist government’s attitude towards his country. On 30 August Ambassador Rodionov of the Soviet Union also departed, though he assured the Greek ministry for foreign affairs that he was going to Moscow merely on ‘official business’.63 It was widely believed that the purpose of the diplomats’ departure was to signal Yugoslav and Russian dislike for the prospect of the return of the King. But on closer examination it seems more likely that the real cause of the break of relations was

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Yugoslavia’s mounting anger over the Greek territorial claim against her satellite, Albania. The Yugoslav leaders appear to have been particularly irked by two letters addressed by the Greeks to the Security Council of the UN, on 5 and 15 August, opposing Albania’s application for membership of the UN General Assembly. The ministry for foreign affairs in Athens explained to Norton’s staff that if Albania were recognized as a member of the UN, her frontiers would be automatically guaranteed, dashing the Greeks’ hopes of annexing northern Epirus.64 In its letters to the Security Council, the Greek delegation to the UN sought to demonstrate that Albania failed to meet the criteria of membership: that she be ’democratic’, ’peace-loving’, and ’competent of fulfilling the obligadons of the Charter of the United Nations’. The government of Enver Hoxha, the Albanian communist leader, was undemocratic, the product of elections held under a ‘regime of terror’, and warlike, in that it had ordered attacks on Greek frontier posts. On numerous occasions in the past, Albania had shown contempt for international organizations. She had pledged to the League of Nations to respect the rights of ethnic minorities but had proceeded to persecute the Greeks of northern Epirus.66 On 24 August, two days after Cankar’s departure from Athens, Dmitry Manuilskiy, the commissar for foreign affairs of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, lodged a complaint against Greece with the Security Council which was a mirror-image of the Greeks’s diatribe against Albania. He and Gromyko, the Soviet delegate to the Council alleged that Tsaldaris’s government was ‘anti-democratic’ and perpetrating a ‘regime of ruthless terror’ in Greece. Furthermore, it was threatening the peace by provoking incidents along the Greco-Albanian frontier, laying claim to the territory of its neighbours, and persecuting an ethnic minority, the Slavo-Macedonians.66 Simultaneously, the Yugoslav press began to agitate about the future of Aegean Macedonia. Borha, the official organ of the Yugoslav communists, declared that ‘Greek imperialists have no right at all to hold Macedonians any longer under their yoke’. Thessaloniki, isolated from Vardar Macedonia, had lost her economic importance. If incorporated in a united Macedonia, she would regain her former splendour.67

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On 29 August Britain and the United States rejected Albania's application for membership of the UN. Gromyko responded by vetoing the applications of Transjordan, Ireland, Portugal, and Siam. The next fortnight was consumed by arguments over Manuilskiy's complaint. There was much truth in both his and the Greeks’ allegations, and most of the Council’s sessions degenerated into slanging-matches between them. Voting on resolutions finally commenced on 19 September. A Soviet resolution calling on the Greeks to cease their ‘provocative activities’ was opposed by the Western Powers. The Americans moved to dispatch a commission of inquiry to Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria to investigate incidents all along the frontier. But this the Russians would not accept. Doubdess they were unwilling to establish a precedent for UN commissions roaming about Soviet-bloc countries. It is also possible that they were eager to wash their hands of the whole affair. The fact that Rodionov, unlike Cankar, left Athens gracefully seems to indicate that they wished to maintain cordial relations with Greece. Probably it had been the Yugoslavs’ idea to complain to the Security Council and the Russians had felt obliged, however reluctantly, to speak on their behalf. A stalemate was reached and it was agreed to pass no resoludon. The issue was dropped from the agenda.“ The Foreign Office were in two minds over Manuilskiy's complaint. On the one hand, Sir Alexander Cadogan, the British delegate to the Security Council, interpreted it purely as a retaliatory manœuvre. Charges having been brought by the Greeks against Albania, it was an obvious move to bring counter-charges of a similar nature against Greece.69 Christopher Warner, the superintending under-secretary of the Southern Department, also thought the Greek territorial claims to be the underlying cause of the Slavs’ anger. Their war of nerves against Greece was probably designed to com­ promise her position at the peace conference.70 But John Colville, a clerk in the Southern Department, suspected the Yugoslavs of aggressive intendons. In his view, their agitadon over Aegean Macedonia presaged an attempt to annex Thessaloniki.71 Bevin, for his part, doubted whether the Slavs would attack Greece for the time being but nevertheless

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expressed alarm over the growing tension between Athens and Belgrade. He believed that the future stability of the whole of the Balkans would henceforth depend to no small extent on the behaviour of the Greek communists and the bearing and policy of the King. The KKE would now step up their provocations with a view to undermining constitutional government and compelling the monarch to proclaim a dictatorship. ‘Extremism will beget extremism and Greece will be in a vortex of violence to the advantage only of the Communists within and without.’ He instructed Sargent to see the King in London and urge him to act as a ‘strictly constitutional Monarch’.72 Sargent called on the King on 3 September, and found him scarcely elated over his victory in the plebiscite. The monarch appreciated that grave problems lay ahead of him, especially now that Greek internal affairs had become ‘the plaything of international politics’. He did not demur when Sargent suggested that he rely on moderate elements to restrain the extremes of Right and Left, except to remark that moderates were ‘difficult to find in modern Greece’.75 On 14 September he conferred with Bevin and presented him with a memoran­ dum detailing the policies he hoped to pursue. He was determined to be a constitutional monarch, though his experience of Greek politicians convinced him that he would have a very difficult task. First, he would endeavour to persuade all parties except the KKE to join in a government which would rule the country until new elections were held. The government must be headed by Tsaldaris, the leader of the parliamentary majority, and consist of persons willing and able to collaborate. ‘Great care is needed on this point, for the Greek character being what it is a coalition government may lead to chaos.’ If he managed to unite the non-communist politicians, the KKE would be isolated and parliamentary democracy consolidated; and with steady economic rehabili­ tation, the country would soon pass the ‘danger mark’. Norton must assist him in persuading die politicians to co-operate: *1 simply must succeed.’ Second, he would try to organize more effective resistance against the communist guerrillas. In this regard, Britain must supply more and heavier war material to the security services, since the bands were being aided by the

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Slavs and Greece could not combat them on her own. In the meantime, he would not be averse to conceding certain measures of appeasement, such as a limited pardon, provided that these were introduced gradually.74 The scale of communist guerrilla activity had increased alarmingly in the fortnight following the plebiscite. Principal roads and bridges between Athens and Thessaloniki had been mined or destroyed, and a broad stretch of territory from Mount Olympus in northern Thessaly due east to the Albanian border was under the bands’ virtual control.75 Their success was probably attributable to the leadership of Markos Vaphiadis, a communist who had been chief of the ELAS guerrilla commanders in Macedonia during the occupation. In early September he had taken to the hills to establish a central command of the guerrilla forces. Whether he did so on instructions from Zachariadis or in defiance of the latter’s strategy o f‘reconciliation’ is unknown.76The army was proving ineffective against the bands’ onslaught. In the view of the British military mission, the officers lacked imagination and experience and maintained insufficient liaison with gen­ darmerie. The general staff was also guilty of dispersing units over excessively wide areas in order to maintain morale in isolated villages, usually at the behest of local Populist MPs.77 Fortuitously, the escalation of the fighting coincided with the first phase of the withdrawal of British troops from Greece. Commencing on 15 September, a division was withdrawn from the Peloponnesus and Attica, leaving a single division in Macedonia and a brigade in the vicinity o f Athens. The effect was to reduce the number of British troops to 31,000, and a complete withdrawal was scheduled for early 1947. The Foreign Office saw many advantages in the departure of the forces. The Russians would be deprived of a pretext for maintaining troops in Bulgaria; the demobilization of the soldiers would help alleviate the acute shortage of manpower afflicting the British economy; and Britain might henceforth be spared criticism for unpalatable measures enacted by the Populists: ‘The presence of British forces in Greece . . . suggests to the world a greater control over Greek affairs than we actually possess and thus we tend to be blamed for any repressive action by the Greek Government.’76 Norton,

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however, was filled with foreboding. On 23 September he warned the Foreign Office that a complete withdrawal of British troops might result in the fall of Greece to the communists. There was litde prospect of the security services eradicating the bands in the foreseeable future. The country’s terrain was ideal for guerrilla warfare and the northern fronder could not be sealed. If the Bridsh withdrew endrely, there would be widespread fear amongst the people, and anything approaching a panic would encourage the extreme Right to seize control of the government. Such a regime would be so despotic as to render it impossible for Britain to defend it internationally. Greece would be isolated and fall victim to Slav aggression, whether overt, with the use o f Yugoslav, Albanian, and Bulgarian regular troops, or covert, through the medium of the KKE. Norton no longer believed that Yugoslav assistance to the bands was meant as retaliation against the Greek territorial claims. It was, he now wrote, part of a grand design to render Greece subservient to the Soviet Union, ‘with [the] consequent outflanking of Turkey’s defences and of the whole British position in the Middle East’. The only method of thwarting this objective was to make it ‘absolutely clear that we will come to Greece’s assistance at once; and . . . the only way of making this absolutely clear to a group of Powers both tough and psychologically crude, is to retain a British force on the spot’.79 The Foreign Office acknowledged that the situation was grave, but wondered whether Britain possessed the means to prolong her assistance to Greece. ‘Can we in fact alone afford to keep the Northern neighbours out of Greece in the next year? Are we prepared to keep British troops in Greece . . . ? Are we prepared to pay the Greeks to keep up forces on their own adequate for the task? . . . If not, what is the alternative to a Communist Greece next year?’90 Bevin pronounced himself against retaining troops in the country. On 23 September he suggested to Dalton that the only practical course of action was for Britain to extend financial aid to the Greek army until December 147.81 Perhaps the Americans could be persuaded to meet Greece’s economic needs and the British could confine themselves to military aid.82 Dalton was little impressed with this proposal, however. On 3 October he informed Bevin that,

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while he was fully alive to the importance o f maintaining Greek independence, he was equally conscious of Britain’s own financial predicament. He declined to commit himself to an extension o f aid beyond 31 March 1947 and requested more dme for deliberation.*3 On 28 September, after an absence of five years and five months, King George returned to Athens. He was tilled with apprehension: the Greeks were expecting too much o f him, he told the Foreign Office, and when it became clear that he had no panacea for their many difficulties, he feared there would be a reaction against him.*4 In discussions with George VI, the British monarch, he had even hinted that he might postpone his return until 1947 and remain abroad as Greece’s delegate to the UN General Assembly.*3 However, he found the atmosphere in Athens more congenial than he had expected. None of the parliamentary parties contested the validity of the plebiscite. The EPE expressed its readiness to serve under him and Sophoulis confided to Norton that he would accept even a royalist dictatorship if it guaranteed Greece against the Slavs and the KKE.*6The King promptly called on the parliamentary leaders to unite in a broad coalition. The moment was propitious for him to do so, for the Russians’ recent offensive against Greece in the Security Council had had the predictable effect of encouraging conservative politicians to close ranks against the Left. Coupled with the Yugoslavs’ propaganda about Aegean Macedonia, Manuilskiy’s complaint had also proved highly embarrassing to the KKE, which was finding it increasingly difficult to avoid being identified in the public mind as a co-conspirator with the Slavs against the territorial integrity of the country. At the King’s behest, the government resigned on 2 October and Tsaldaris invited Sophoulis to join him in a new cabinet. But Sophoulis at once rebuffed him, leaving King George no choice but to administer the oath to the same ministers who had stepped down only hours before. In London, Georgios Mavros, an associate of Sophoulis, explained to Pierson Dixon, Bevin’s private secretary, that the Liberals were opposed to the whole concept of a coalition: ‘a Coalition Government which omitted the Communist Party would be meaningless. On the other hand, the Liberal Party could not

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possibly join a government which included the Communists.’ According to Mavros, Sophoulis preferred the Populists to continue in office until new elections were held, perhaps in early 1947. By then Tsaldaris’s prestige would be diminished; the Populist Party might disintegrate into antagonistic factions; and Venizelos might be persuaded to return to the Liberal fold. Under such circumstances, the Liberal Party would stand a better chance of being elected. Dixon complained to Mavros that the Liberals seemed to be ‘actuated solely by party considerations’. At this critical moment in Greek history, it was surely a mistake to view matters from a ‘narrow party standpoint’. Mavros indicated that if the British instructed the Liberals to co-operate they would probably obey; but Dixon said that it was time for the Greeks to sort out their problems for themselves.'7 On 7 October Norton encouraged the King not to give up hope o f broadening the government. A coalition was clearly to be desired, he explained, since it would serve to isolate both the KKE and the communist guerrillas. It would also be better disposed than Tsaldaris’s cabinet to restrain the right-wing terrorists, who, by ‘confusing Republicans with Communists’, were persecuting normally law-abiding citizens and driving them into the hills." On 11 October MacVeagh, the American ambassador, tendered the King stronger advice. He urged him not to remain in the background and to act decisively and insist that the politicians unite.'9 The forcefulness of his intervention surprised the Foreign Office, for he seemed to be advising the King to assume some of the powers of a dictator. If the King were to remain a constitutional monarch, he had to follow the advice of his ministers and not take it upon himself to instruct them.90 In fact, the Foreign Office were puzzled that MacVeagh had chosen to intervene at all. Despite Byrnes’s comment to Bevin in April that he wished to keep a close eye on Greece, the Americans had shown considerable reluctance to become involved in Greek affairs. They had kept Tsaldaris at arm ’s length, discouraging him from visiting the United States, and had shied away from his appeals for economic assistance. Twice, in April and September, an American warship had docked at the Piraeus as a signal to the Russians that

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Washington took an interest in the eastern Mediterranean. But in neither case had the visit been followed up by an offer of tangible aid to the Greeks. The Americans had seemed satisfied merely to show the flag and to mouth eloquent but empty phrases about the importance of Greco-American friendship.91 However, on 15 October it became apparent to the Foreign Office that the Americans’ atdtude was undergoing a radical transformation. During a meeting in Paris with A. V. Alexander, the British Secretary o f State for Defence, Byrnes indicated that the United States was now ready to take posidve acdon to strengthen'both Greece and Turkey. He thought it likely that the two countries would become ‘outposts of great importance’ against the Soviet Union. Since the Bridsh and the Americans were ‘in together on this’, the United States would consider aiding the Greek and Turkish economies if Britain financed their armed forces. He intended to dispatch an economic mission to Greece as soon as possible to examine the situation.92 On 6 October Waldermar Gallman, the American chargé d ’affaires in London, confided to the Foreign Office that consultations had recently taken place between the White House, the Department of State, and the Department of War, and that a programme of American assistance to Greece had been agreed on.93 The details of the programme had been communicated to MacVeagh the previous day. Greece was to be accorded whole-hearted support in the UN; declarations were to be made in defence of her independence and territorial integrity; her applications for credits for reconstruction projects were to be treated as a matter of priority; and attempts would be made to enlighten the American public on her predicament and need for help. The State Department’s reading of conditions in Greece, set forth in a memorandum o f 21 October, was identical to Norton’s. Parliamentary institu­ tions were being subverted by communist guerrillas, aided and abetted by the Balkan Slavs and ultimately by the Soviet Union, as part of a grand strategy to outflank Turkey and subject the whole of the eastern Mediterranean to communist domination. Greece was the key: she was the only country in the Balkan peninsula which had not fallen under Soviet hegemony, and, together with Turkey, the sole obstacle to Soviet expansionism

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in the region. It was therefore necessary for the United States to assume greater responsibility than hitherto in ensuring her defence, particularly now that British troops had begun to withdraw.94 On the State Department’s instructions, MacVeagh apprised the King of Washington’s eagerness to help but stressed that the Greek government must, as a quid pro quo, strive for a policy of moderation. It was of the utmost importance to curb rightwing excesses and to make an ‘enlightened and patriotic attempt to broaden the cabinet so as to include ‘all decent democratic elements’.95 The King welcomed the Americans’ growing interest in his country, but nevertheless proved reluctant to intervene decisively in favour of a reconstruction of the government. Evidendy, he did not regard it as his proper function to play a commanding role in the political arena. It was left to Norton and MacVeagh to bring pressure to bear on Tsaldaris, and on 20 and 22 October they urged him to broaden his government even if it meant forfeiting the support of the right wing of the Populist Party.96Finally, on 25 October Tsaldaris yielded and extended an invitation to the parlia­ mentary opposition to join the cabinet. The EPE, the Liberals, and Zervas agreed to do so but only on condition that Tsaldaris was removed from the premiership. They argued that since the Populist Party had demonstrated itself incapable of governing on its own, its chief was no longer worthy of leading the country. Tsaldaris refused to step down, protesting that the opposition was ignoring the fact that the Populists comprised the majority in the chamber. On 29 October he called on the Populist MPs to endorse his decision to remain in office. They did so unanimously and delivered a vote of confidence in his leadership.97 On 31 October the King at last decided to take the initiative. He summoned the parliamentary leaders and appealed to them to put the interests of the nation first. Sophoulis was obdurate: he declared that he would decline to enter a government ‘if either Tsaldaris or someone outside parliament were Premier’ - a cryptic formula generally interpreted to mean that he was intent on becoming premier himself. Zervas and the EPE, on the other hand, were moved by the King’s entreaty and expressed willingness to join a cabinet under

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Tsaldaris. But within twenty-four hours their negotiatons with the Premier collapsed owing to the latter’s insistence that the Populists retain the portfolios of co-ordination, foreign affairs, and defence. On 2 November Norton and MacVeagh tried to get the talks restarted, but were unsuccessful, much to the King's dismay. He complained to Norton that Tsaldaris had offered too little too late, and expressed ‘strong feelings over the inability of the leaders to put personal and party ambitions aside’.9* The King also suspected that the opposition parties were frightened to enter office at a moment when the country seemed on the brink of yet another fiscal and economic crisis.99 The economy was still nowhere near stability, despite months of determined effort by the British economic mission. General Clark, the head of the mission, had long since abandoned hope of success and in September had tried to persuade the Foreign Office to permit him to pack his bags and pull out. He cited the abysmal quality of the Greek civil service and the government’s ‘well-known propensity to do nothing’ as the chief reasons for the mission’s failure. No improvement had been made in the distribution of commodities. Large quantities of goods supplied by UNRRA were rotting in the warehouses of the Piraeus. The government seemed incapable of liberating the country from the ‘clogging influence’ of the ministry of supply; a proposal by the mission to use consumer co-operatives as a means of bypassing both it and the merchants had perished of neglect on the desk of the minister of co-ordination. Commodides which somehow escaped the warehouses reached the outskirts of Athens and the provinces only with immense difficulty, for negligible progress had been made in restoring road and rail communicadons. The man responsible for financing improvements in transport, Gonatas, the minister for public works, had squandered the country’s resources by ‘parcelling out his share of the budget vote in penny numbers to his friends’. As for the future, the mission had repeatedly warned the government that UNRRA was scheduled to cease operadng in early 1947 and that the people might starve unless preparations were made to procure foodstuffs from abroad. But the government seemed oblivious to the impending crisis. As a rule, the ministers listened

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attentively to the mission, but, subsequently, inactivity, ‘interminable red herrings’, or even passive sabotage of the mission’s work prevailed.100 In Clark’s view, Greece would long ago have been engulfed by catastrophe had it not been for Nixon, the British member of the currency control committee. By resisting the govern­ ment’s constant requests for issues of new drachmae, he had managed to diminish the rate of inflation by checking the growth of currency in circulation. He had failed to balance the government’s budget, however. In fact, he had found it impossible to keep track of its fiscal affairs. Greek finances were ‘chock-a-block with crudities’, he reported to the British Treasury. Trade within the country was hampered by a plethora of taxes, duties, and archaic imposts, the proceeds of which were for the most part appropriated by local authorities. Such revenue as reached the government in Athens was spent by individual ministers without reference to the ministry of finance. The latter, understaffed and noted for its apathy, had failed to produce monthly accounts of the government’s transactions until September, the sixth month of the fiscal year; and even then, its figures had varied so widely from those of the Bank of Greece that the whole exercise had been brought into disrepute. ‘Nobody in the world really knows the financial position in Greece,’ he lamented, ‘as I can say with confidence after eight months’ attack on the problem .. . . I am sure that in the Greek language the word for “lunatic asylum” and for “ Greece” must be the same.’101 Panic buying of gold sovereigns resumed during the first week of November, largely as a result of the escalation of the guerrilla war, the parties’ failure to broaden the government, and the general disorder in the economy. In order to maintain the drachma-sovereign exchange rate at 135,000 to one, the Bank of Greece sold sovereigns to the public at the volume of 16,000 coins a day. By 7 November the Bank’s stocks had fallen below 140,000 sovereigns and Nixon calculated that its reserves would be exhausted within two weeks. With a collapse of the drachma again at hand, the British Treasury dipped into their limited reserves of gold and sold the bank 250,000 sovereigns.102 Predictably, the flight to gold generated uncer­ tainty amongst the merchants, who began to hoard their stocks

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and raise prices. Vociferous demands were voiced in turn by labourers for an increase in wages, and a twenty-four hour strike was staged by civil servants and bank clerks. Tsaldaris was alarmed, and on 11 November appealed to Clark to persuade Britain and the United States to come to his government’s rescue. But Clark retorted that no amount of foreign aid would save the country if the government neglected to balance its budget. He urged Tsaldaris to resist all claims for higher wages and to raise further revenue by cracking down on the rich, who were becoming ‘more blatant’ in Athens. Evidendy shaken by this discussion, Tsaldaris at once announced that the government was embarking on a new economic policy. The quandty of goods available to the consumer would be increased by a drastic improvement in the procedures of distribution. Co-operadves would be permitted to market commodities supplied to them direcdy by UNRRA, and the hoarded stocks of merchants would be confiscated. As more goods became available, prices were bound to fall. No new taxes were promulgated against the affluent, to Clark’s considerable disappointment. Nevertheless, the announcement seemed a posidve step forward and he hoped for the best.103 MacVeagh, meanwhile, made it clear to Tsaldaris that American economic assistance would not be forthcoming unless the government took a sterner atdtude towards rightwing terrorism. He pointed out to the Premier that it was hardly likely that the United States would rush to Greece’s aid when men like Mavromichalis held important posts in the cabinet.104 Mavromichalis was widely suspected o f financing right-wing bands in the Peloponnesus, and the terrorism perpetrated by his former bodyguard, Katsareas, was appall­ ing. In a single day in October Katsareas’s band murdered thirty-five left-wing peasants in a village near Sparta.105 The King, too, was growing impatient with Tsaldaris’s timidity towards the extreme Right. In a discussion with Norton, he expressed horror over Katsareas’s atrocities and deplored the fact that the Premier had still not denounced the activity of right-wing bands.106On 4 November Tsaldaris at last mustered the courage to dismiss Mavromichalis, who was replaced by Philippos Dragoumis, a moderate royalist. Three days later the Premier shocked the Populist MPs by declaring in the chamber

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that the government would stamp out banditry whether of the Right or the Left. On 11 November he further announced that, as an act of appeasement towards the Left, he was introducing an amnesty for guerrillas who surrendered their arms within a month. However, persons suspected of inciting revolt, leading armed bands, or conspiring with foreigners against the territorial integrity of die nation were to be prosecuted, evidendy with a view to drawing a distinction between the communists and their fellow-travellers.107 Tsaldaris’s initiative against the extreme Right had the immediate effect of improving the lot of left-wing prisoners in Thessaloniki. A ‘wind of leniency’ was blowing from Athens, Georgios Tziridis, the governor-general of central Macedonia, told Peck, the British consul. Tziridis seized the opportunity to release 380 of the 480 persons languishing in the town’s transit prison awaiting exile to remote Aegean islands on orders from the local committee of public security. An obstetrician by profession, Tziridis was particularly concerned about the plight of the women in the prison; a number of them were pregnant, and some, upon their release, were transferred direcdy to maternity hospitals.108 Within days, however, a mood of intransigence again prevailed in Athens, rendering impossible any further acts of mercy. A ferocious attack by a communist band against the Macedonian village of Skra, two miles from the Greco-Yugoslav border, on 13 November, played into the hands of right-wing extremists in parliament. They cited it as evidence of the communists’ ruthlessness and the folly of appeasement, and cried for still harsher measures against the Left. The band had overrun two army companies in Skra and slaughtered seven officers, eleven other ranks, and fifty-five villagers. A counter-attack by units under General Ventiris proved unsuccessful because the guerrillas withdrew across the frontier. General Kenneth Crawford, Scobie’s successor as commander of British forces in Greece, regarded the attack as .conclusive proof that the Yugoslavs were aiding the guerrillas. He reported to Norton that the bands were becoming more organized and appeared to be operating in a co-ordinated fashion with a conscious objective in view: before the onset of winter, NOF would establish a predominantly Macedonian

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area south of the Yugoslav frontier, and the KKE would consolidate its control over a broad zone of territory stretching westwards from Mount Olympus to the Albanian border.109On 18 November Tsaldaris informed Norton that he was considering whether to lodge a complaint with the UN over the Slavs* assistance to the guerrillas. The idea was greeted sympathetically by the Foreign Office. William Beckett, a legal adviser to the Foreign Office, thought that a direct approach to the Security Council would be Tsaldaris’s best course of action. By harbouring and aiding Greek subversives, the Slavs were contravening basic principles of international law, and the Security Council would be in a position to recommend them to stop.110 However, the prospect of yet another international fracas over Greece put Bevin in an exceedingly bad temper. According to Frederick Warner, a member of the British delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers, then meeting in New York, the Foreign Secretary was overcome by ‘a temporary revulsion against all things Greek*. He was in favour of persuading Tsaldaris to steer clear of the UN, and intimated to Aghnidis, now the acting head of the Greek delegation to the General Assembly, that the Premier would do better to devote his attention to the pressing tasks of reconstruction. He doubted whether the Yugoslavs were engaged in anything more than a war of nerves against Tsaldaris, and suggested that the Russians were showing interest in Greece only because they felt obliged to support Tito: ‘most of the trouble on the northern frontier was explained by propaganda moves on the part of the Yugoslavs.. . . there was a definite possibility that the Yugoslavs were now engaged in a policy of blackmailing Moscow.’"' But the Americans were in favour of the Greeks lodging their complaint. Presumably they thought it would provide an excellent opportunity to drive home to the American public that Greece was in need o f assistance. The State Department advised Tsaldaris to raise the issue before the Security Council, and Byrnes went so far as to urge Bevin to delay the withdrawal of further British troops from the country, lest this adversely affect the Premier’s readiness to stand up to the Slavs in the international forum ."2

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By this time the British Chiefs of Staff, too, were advising Bevin to postpone the withdrawal of troops from Greece. A report by the Joint Planning Staff, adopted by the Chiefs of Staff on 13 November, warned that the departure of British forces would lead to a significant increase in the activity of the communist bands. The Slavs would be encouraged to step up their assistance to the guerrillas, and perhaps eventually there would be civil war with large-scale foreign intervention under the general direction of Moscow. The Greek armed forces would be unable to cope with this sort of aggression and the country would fall to the communists. Turkey would subsequently be threatened, Britain’s sea-lanes in the Mediter­ ranean jeopardized, and the whole strategic position in the Middle East altered to the Russians’ advantage. The only way of averting this catastrophe was to maintain British troops in Greece throughout 1947 and to finance, train, and equip the Greek army for the duration of the struggle.1,3 McNeil, now Minister of State, was not endrely convinced by the Chiefs of Staffs thesis. In a memorandum to Sargent on 29 November he argued that, while it was probably true that Greece would fall to the communists if Bridsh troops withdrew, there was no reason to suppose that the country could maintain its independence even if they remained. Conditions in Greece had deteriorated steadily since 1945, notwithstanding the presence of thousands of British troops and advisers: With all our advice, with considerable economic assistance, with the presence of our troops, with the maintenance of a military and police mission, with the flying start given to the Sofoulis Government last November, the position has continued to worsen until today the economic situation is almost as bad as it ever has been, the state of public order is much worse than at any time since immediately after the civil war, and the Communists are exerting apparendy an increasing influence. Clearly, soldiers and weapons were not the answer to the problem. Rather, ‘the only method through which any Greek G overnm ent could contain the Com m unists inside Greece. . . and retain the goodwill of the Greek population, would be substantial economic reconstruction’. The funds required for reconstruction could come only from the United

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States, and so before the British committed themselves to bearing the ‘political stigma’ of occupying Greece another year, it would be wise to ascertain whether the Americans were genuinely prepared to help. If they were not, the continued presence of British forces in Greece, and, for that matter, financial assistance to the ineffectual Greek army, would accomplish nothing that would basically improve the situation. Under such circumstances, it would be perhaps better even from the strategic angle to abandon Greece and concentrate on defending the eastern Mediterranean from bases in the British colony of Cyprus."4 The British had litde reason to believe that the Americans were making significant progress in arranging aid for Greece. Over a month had passed since Byrnes’s discussion with A. V. Alexander and the promised economic mission had yet to appear in Athens. Loy W. Henderson, the director of the State Department’s Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, admitted to the British Embassy in Washington that although it was obvious that Greece required assistance, it was far from apparent how the United States could provide it. One alternative was made to persuade Congress to vote a grant-inaid; another, to offer Greece an interest-bearing loan. In short, protested Williams, Hayter’s successor as head of the Southern Department, despite Byrnes’s ‘airy assurances’, the State Department had no clear idea of what it was doing.115 McNeil was perturbed by the results of the American congressional elections of November."6 After thirteen years of Democratic rule, the Republican Party had captured control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Republicans were traditionally isolationist and there were grounds for supposing that they would resist any move to extend American influence into the eastern Mediterranean. Given the Americans’ indecisiveness, the Prime Minister, Atdee, was irked by Byrnes’s request for a postponement of the withdrawal of British troops from Greece. On 2 December he summoned McNeil and insisted that Bevin must avoid even half promising further support for Greece until the Americans agreed to ‘take up their load’. He noted that even if the Americans came up with the money, Britain would be left to carry the political animus for occupying the country.

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According to McNeil, he was ‘particularly sore’ about this and intended to raise the whole question of Anglo-Greek relations in the cabinet.117 McNeil detected that the mood in the cabinet was inclining in favour of abandoning Greece regardless of what the Americans did. Dalton’s opposition to extending further aid to the country was manifest. Attlee was beginning to wonder whether Greece was really important: he remarked to McNeil that a ‘high military opinion’ had come to his attention that Greece was by no means as essential to British security as had been hitherto assumed.1" McNeil dispatched a telegram to Bevin in New York apprising him of Attlee’s views and warning that there was now a ‘very great reluctance’ in London to contemplate further aid to Greece under any circumstances. Bevin replied that the news came to him not only as a surprise but as a shock. His policy so far had been based on the tenet that Greece was of essential importance to Britain’s strategic position in the world. Was this principle now to be abandoned? ‘I really do not know where I stand.’ McNeil spoke to him on the telephone and assured him that the cabinet would await his return from New York before reaching a decision. The Foreign Secretary was ‘rather grumbly’ and left McNeil in no doubt that he intended to tight vigorously against any change of view.119 Tsaldaris had meanwhile left Athens for New York, against the advice o f friend and foe alike. The parliamentary opposition and reportedly the King had urged him to remain in Athens to deal with the domestic situation, arguing that there was no compelling reason for him to lodge his government’s complaint with the Security Council in person. But the Premier had paid them no heed. Norton suspected that he hoped to return with something in his hands from America which would bolster his flagging prestige.120His mission got off to a bad start. His arrival in New York on 3 December coincided with a decision by the Council of Foreign Ministers to reject the claim for an alteration of the Greco-Bulgarian frontier. The Russians had opposed it and neither the British nor the Americans had felt able to justify it on strategic grounds.121 The claim against Albania was not even scheduled for discussion. Moreover, Tsaldaris could scarcely have caught Bevin at a less propitious moment. Sir Oliver Hardy, a

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member of the British delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers, warned Aghnidis that Bevin was in ‘a bitter and disillusioned frame of mind towards Greece and M. Tsaldaris as Premier’. Despite the lives, money, and effort expended by Britain in the country, nothing satisfactory had been achieved. The political situation merely deteriorated and the Greek politicians had shown themselves quite incapable of col­ laborating.122 Tsaldaris appears to have been disconcerted by these developments, for, in Bevin’s words, he looked ‘somewhat shaken’ when he came to call on 6 December. He opened the discussion with a description of the situation in northern Greece, commenting that it was impossible to manage and that many persons were being murdered every day. He expressed little faith in the Security Council’s ability to deal with the problem, since the Russians would probably wield their veto. Even if it were agreed to dispatch a commission of inquiry to the region, it would take months to assemble and disorder would continue in the interim. He then surprised Bevin by suggesting that the issue be examined jointly by the three Powers outside the Security Council. Britain, the United States, and Russia should ‘fix up a direct solution’ in order that the Russians would ‘call off their satellites’ from Greece. The Greeks, for their part, would be willing to make some concessions to the Slavs, though he neglected to defíne what these might be. Bevin was unimpressed with this proposal. He pointed out that there was no evidence of direct Russian intervention in Greek affairs, and if he asked them to desist they would simply deny being involved. As for the incidents along the northern frontier, they were ‘due to a large extent to the existence of the Greek territorial claim s.. . . now that the claims had been disposed of there was a chance that things would settle down.’ Tsaldaris asked whether he should see Molotov. Bevin urged him to do so and, on second thoughts, decided that there would be no harm in approaching the Russian himself. He requested Tsaldaris to postpone dis­ cussion of the Greek complaint in the Security Concil.123That evening he visited Molotov and stated that he did not wish Greece to be a source of friction between Britain and the Soviet Union. If Molotov would talk to Tsaldaris, this might open the

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way for a meeting of the foreign ministers of the three Powers to discuss the whole position. Molotov was cautious but did not reject the proposal. He indicated that he wished to think the matter over, from which Bevin inferred that he intended to consult with the Kremlin.124 No sooner had Bevin taken leave of Molotov than he began to doubt the wisdom of holding a conference of the foreign ministers. He recalled the interminable wrangling between himself, Byrnes, and Molotov over eastern Europe during the previous year. There seemed no reason to suppose that a parley over Greece would prove any less frustrating than past consultations concerning Romania and Bulgaria. He was also outraged to learn on 7 December that Tsaldaris was making an effort behind his back to drum up support for the cession of Cyprus to Greece. Evidently anxious to bring off a coup to compensate for the failure of the claims against Bulgaria and Albania, Tsaldaris had asked Jan Smuts, the Prime Minister of South Africa, to encourage the British to relinquish the island colony. The idea was preposterous, Bevin told Aghnidis. It would be ‘senseless to hand Cyprus to Greece if that country was on the point of going Communist’. Tsaldaris had come to New York to deal with incidents along the fronder and he should concentrate solely on that. ‘It was impossible to deal with M. Tsaldaris if instead of sucking to his essendal tasks he was always introducing fresh consideradons, designed for his own political presdge at home, and it was time that the Greeks produced a statesman instead of a lot of polidcians.’ According to Frederick Warner, the incident tilled Bevin with distrust for Tsaldaris, and he concluded that it would be unwise to take any further steps to bring the Premier and Molotov together. There was no telling what Tsaldaris might say or do in his present state of m ind.125 On 9 December Molotov informed Bevin that he was in favour of a conference of the foreign ministers and was ‘worried’ about the situation in Greece. But he made it clear that he did not wish to see Tsaldaris. The Premier did not command a following amongst his people and was a weak and incompetent man. Bevin prompdy conferred with Byrnes, who ranged himself against discussions with Molotov. He argued that the Greeks had a real cause for complaint against the Slavs

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and that it was therefore quite proper that they should present their case before the Security Council. Bevin replied that in his view the Greeks had made a mistake in approaching the UN. They should first have tried to setde their differences with their neighbours through normal diplomadc channels. As things stood, however, he agreed that it was better to let them proceed. On his instructions, Dixon informed the Russians on 10 December that the proposal for a tripartite conference had been abandoned.126 Daniel McCarthy, a clerk in the Southern Department, expressed disappointment that an understanding between the three Powers had not been reached. The Security Council* would probably achieve litde of significance, and, as a result of Bevin’s rebuff to Molotov, the Russians would not feel inclined to restrain their satellites.127 Without access to the Soviet archives, it is impossible to determine whether a genuine opportunity to solve the Greek problem was missed. It seems likely that the Russians were as anxious as the British to put an end to the tension prevailing between Greece and her communist neighbours. But they would doubdess have demanded changes in Greek domestic polidcal circumstances as a quid pro quo for their own intervendon against Bulgaria, Albania, and pardcularly Yugoslavia; and what their terms would have been, and whether these would have proved acceptable to the Bridsh and the Americans, cannot now be known. Moreover, it is questionable whether the three Powers could have imposed their views on the Balkan states even if an agreement had been reached. In Greece, both the extreme Right and the KKE had confounded every Bridsh attempt to restrain them since December 1944, and Zachariadis’s decision to abstain from the elections of 31 March 1946 against Russian advice indicates that he no longer stood in awe of Moscow. Bulgaria, occupied by the Red Army and wholly dependent on Russian assistance, would almost certainly have obeyed a directive from the Kremlin to deny the Greek guerrillas support. But whether Tito of Yugoslavia and his Albanian underlings would have done so is a moot point. On 12 December Tsaldaris appeared before the Security Council and charged Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria with promoting sedition and disorder in Greece. He alleged that

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their aim was to dismember his country by annexing the socalled ‘Aegean Macedonia’. They were extending aid to a few Greek ‘pedlars of ideology’ who were bent on establishing a communist dictatorship against the will of the people. The Greek delegation to the UN submitted a document detailing twenty-two instances of collusion between the communist states and guerrilla bands. It requested the Security Council to investigate the situation on the spot, since the mounting tension along the northern frontier was likely to threaten international peace.12' Next to address the Council were the representatives of Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. The most forceful speaker was Sava Kosanovic, the Yugoslav ambassador to the United States. He declared that it was unjust and ‘childish’ of Tsaldaris to try to shift the blame for Greece’s problems on to her ‘peace-loving’ neighbours. The real cause of civil strife was the existence of Tsaldaris’s government, which was contrary to the sentiments of the people. There was no point in investigating conditions along the frontier, since the Greek delegation’s purported evidence of foreign intervention had no basis in fact. Instead, the Security Council should examine the situation within Greece herself, for it was Tsaldaris’s persecution of democratic Greeks and of Yugoslavia’s ‘oppressed brothers in Aegean Macedonia’ which posed the real danger to peace in the region. On 18 December Herschel Johnson, the acting head of the American delegation to the Security Council, suggested that no judgement be reached on the conflicting allegations until a commission of inquiry had investigated the situation. The commission should enjoy freedom of movement in Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, as well as in Greece. To. the astonishment of the American and British delegations, Gromyko, the Soviet representative, agreed in principle to the dispatch of a commission. Perhaps the Russians feared that if they exercised their veto it would be interpreted as a tacit admission that the Greeks’ allegations were true. But Gromyko then tried to turn Johnson’s proposal to his own advantage by moving that the commission investigate conditions throughout Greece and only in such territory in Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria as bordered on the Greek frontier. Evidently he

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hoped to involve the Security Council in a detailed review of the manifest abuses of Tsaldaris’s regime, and, so far as possible, to steer the Council’s attention away from the activities of the northern neighbours. Cadogan, the British delegate, pointed out that Greek internal affairs were the Greek government’s concern. The Security Council had been requested to examine violations of a frontier, not the domestic affairs of the states concerned. But Kosanovic retorted that since Greece’s domesdc affairs were obviously impinging on her foreign relations, the two issues were inextricably interwoven. After considerable debate, the Security Council decided to leave it up to the commission to determine where to conduct its work. It would visit northern Greece and ‘such places in other parts of Greece, in Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia as the commission considers should be included . . . to elucidate the causes and nature of the . . . disturb­ ances’.129The Foreign Office greeted this decision with guarded optimism. They noted that there were ample loopholes in the Council’s directive to enable the Slavs to nullify completely any good effect the commission might otherwise have. But given goodwill on all sides the commission could work effectively and go a long way towards solving the problems bedevilling Greece.1*0 Bevin, meanwhile, urged Tsaldaris to make another attempt to broaden his cabinet. A 'solid and popular’ government would generate confidence in Greece abroad, he explained, and refute the Russians’ contention that the Greek regime was unrepresentative of the people.'*' Norton reported that even in the ranks of the Right, .demands were beginning to be voiced for a broad coalition. A growing number of Populist deputies, conservative newspapers, and at least one ecclesiastical figure, the Bishop of Thessaloniki, had called for a government incorporating all the parliamentary parties.1*2 But the poli­ ticians remained deeply divided. Sophoulis, while acknowledg­ ing that the guerrillas were receiving aid from the Slavs, insisted that the Populists were pardy to blame for civil strife. He had lately taken to propounding the need for a policy of ‘appeasement first’: military operations against the bands should be suspended pending the implementadon of a number of conciliatory measures, whose nature, however, he had yet to

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defíne. The Populists, for their part, refused to admit any responsibility for the disorders. Stephanopoulos, the minister for co-ordination, told Norton that the guerrilla movement was 'a conspiracy nurtured abroad aiming at the dismember­ ment and destruction of Greece as a democratic state*. He felt that it would be impracticable to confíne the army to barracks and pursue a policy of appeasement towards the Left. He himself was in favour of broadening the government, but not on Sophoulis’s terms. Papandreou, Kanellopoulos, and Venizelos were also opposed to the Liberals’ stategy, but nevertheless believed that Sophoulis should be made premier, since he was without question the doyen of the political world.ISS Thus, they differed with Sophoulis over matters of policy and with the Populists over matters of personality. The end product was political stalemate. The Foreign Office enquired of Norton whether the time had not come for him to intervene forcefully in favour of a government including Sophoulis and perhaps even EAM. Such a resurrected government of national unity might then set to work drawing up ‘a new Varkiza agreement*. Norton advised against embarking on such a venture. In the first place, Sophoulis would probably insist on becoming premier and it would be difficult to persuade the King to agree to this. The monarch was opposed in principle to relegating the Populists to a subordinate role in the cabinet, for they formed the majority party in parliament. Even if he yielded, it was by no means certain that the Populist MPs would swallow the pill. They might vote to dissolve parliament, leaving the country in a precarious position. Secondly, there was every reason to believe that Sophoulis would not invite the KKE into the government. The guerrilla war would continue while he experimented with his policy o f ‘appeasement first*. The latter might prove disastrous, for the guerrillas were now reckoned to number 8,000 and it would be extremely dangerous for the government to parley with them without first attaining a position of strength. British intervention on Sophoulis’s behalf might therefore end up benefitting only the communists; and, in so far as it forced the hand of the King and the Populists, it would be ‘incompatible with [the] normal principles of Parliamentary majority rule to [the] realization of which our

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policy has hitherto been directed’. McNeil was persuaded by these arguments: ‘We should not have any part in urging the King to be otherwise than a constitutional Monarch.’ It was agreed to review the situation after Bevin’s return from New York. By that time, Christopher Warner observed, the cabinet might have decided to cease aiding Greece altogether. The British would then have less right to press their views on the Greeks and less interest in what happened to them anyway.134 Pressure for an early end to assistance to Greece was mounting in Whitehall. On 11 December the Chiefs of Staff reversed their decision of the previous month and pronounced themselves in favour of a speedy withdrawal of all British forces. They had been alarmed by a report from Lord Montgomery, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, who had visited Athens in early December. Montgomery had concluded that if the Greek army failed to crush the guerrillas during the spring of 1947, ‘then that will be the end of Greece and the Country will go under’. The Chiefs of Staff reasoned that if the guerrillas were defeated, the presence of British troops would be unnecessary; and if the communists emerged triumphant, the British would have to withdraw hastily in order to avoid becoming engaged in hostilities. Hence, there was litde point in having British troops in the country whatever happened. At most, a brigade could be left to maintain a token presence until 1 April. In order to increase the chances of a victory against the guerrillas, the Chiefs of Staff suggested that the Greek army be reorganized and trained intensively in counter-insurgency warfare during the remaining months of the winter. They asked the cabinet to decide whether to provide the Greeks with the arms and funds required for such a training programme and whether to continue to finance the army after 31 March 1947.'“ The Foreign Office were determined to fight any move to abandon Greece. Their reasons for advocating further aid were set forth in a memorandum prepared by Williams. He speculated that Bevin’s opponents in the cabinet would probably argue that the political complexion and conduct of Tsaldaris’s regime did not warrant support from a Labour government; that assistance to Greece would generate prolonged and unnecessary friction in Anglo-Soviet relations;

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and that the country was in any event not of strategic importance. There was perhaps some truth in a number of these points. But what had to be realized was that if British aid ceased, Tsaldaris’s government would be swiftly overwhelmed by Russian pressure and supplanted not by a moderate socialdemocratic regime, but by a communist dictatorship. Doubt­ less the country’s fall would undermine Turkey’s and Iran’s willingness to resist the Soviet Union, and might have a decisive effect on developments in the western Mediterranean, particularly in Italy. Britain’s stake in Persian oil and her great commercial undertakings throughout the Middle East would be gravely endangered. Furthermore, Britain’s ‘selling-out’ of the Greeks to the communists could compromise her position as a world leader of social democracy. It might be interpreted as ‘the beginnings of a new Munich’, especially by the Americans, who attached great importance to the defence of principles. They might come to regard the British as ‘doubtful supporters of the principle of national independence and integrity’, with serious practical consequences extending into fields where Britain was direcdy dependent on American goodwill.136 However, the Americans had yet to demonstrate that they themselves were prepared to take meaningful steps to defend the Greek government. Tsaldaris, who visited Washington after the debate in the Security Council, managed to obtain from them nothing more than a promise that the long-awaited economic mission would make an exploratory visit to Athens in early 1947. The Premier made a dismal impression on the State Department. According to the British Embassy in Washington, the Americans suspected that he was interested in aid less for what it could do for his country than for his own political prestige. They had been particularly annoyed when he told them that he had used the Greek complaint to the Security Council as an excuse to visit the United States and that the real purpose of his mission was to try to obtain American aid.137 He left Washington virtually empty-handed, but this did not prevent him, upon his return to Athens on 30 December, from announcing that the United States was to extend immediate assistance to Greece. The Foreign Office thought it ‘incredible’ that he could make public utterances apparently so devoid of

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truth; and MacVeagh warned him that the State Department deprecated statements which misled the people into thinking that help was impending. The ambassador explained that the economic mission would first have to conduct a detailed examination of fiscal and economic affairs in order to determine the real needs of the country. Only then would the State Department be in a position to approach Congress for funds, probably not before the Spring of 1947. MacVeagh also urged Tsaldaris to try to broaden his government before the arrival of the UN commission of inquiry. A coalition, coupled with energetic measures against right-wing excesses, would isolate the guerrillas and invalidate many of the charges the KKE was bound to level against the Populists.'** On 10 January 1947 Norton spoke to the Premier along similar lines. Tsaldaris pleaded that it was his earnest desire to broaden the government but pointed out that he had to take the opinions of the Populist MPs into account. So long as Sophoulis insisted on becoming premier with a programme of ‘appeasement first’, progress was out of the question. Sophoulis must be willing to compromise: perhaps a new cabinet could be formed under a premier of common consent with the Populist and Liberal chiefs serving as joint vicepremiers.1*9 On 13 January Tsaldaris conferred with Sophoulis, but the talks ended abruptly with each participant accusing the other of intransigence. According to Tsaldaris, the Liberal leader rejected any compromise, demanded the premiership, and indicated that it would be his intention to dissolve parliament and conduct elections within forty days. Tsaldaris rebuffed him, protesting that his manifest aim was to overthrow the Populists’ majority in the existing parliament. Sophoulis, on the other hand, claimed that Tsaldaris had insisted on retaining the premiership. Sophoulis was to be vice-premier and the cabinet was to enact a programme of appeasement agreed in advance of the government’s forma­ tion. He charged Tsaldaris with seeking both to retain control of the cabinet and to reap the benefits of policies devised by the Liberals.14" The failure of the talks proved the last straw for Papandreou, Kanellopoulos, and Venizelos. On 16 January they offered to join the Populists in a cabinet without Sophoulis provided that

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the premier was a neutral figure. On the following day Gonatas, the leader of the National Liberals, resigned from the cabinet and called for a new government along the lines proposed by the EPE. Tsaldaris issued a public appeal to Sophoulis to serve with him as a joint vice-premier, but the Liberal again declined. The King intervened in a last-ditch effort to persuade the leaders of all the parliamentary parties to collaborate. On 21 January he talked to each of them separately, but without success. Sophoulis demanded the premiership; the Populists, Gonatas, and Zervas refused to serve under the Liberals; and the EPE was ambivalent. The King washed his hands of the crisis and withdrew to his palace. It was ‘like trying to control a lot of jumping fleas’, he told Lascelles. He was determined not to be manoeuvred into imposing a solution of his own: ‘he had been “bitten” for that once and was twice as shy now’.141 Confusion reigned until 23 January when Tsaldaris finally broke under the strain and tendered his resignation. Negotiations promptly commenced with a view to forming a new government, excluding Sophoulis, and under a new premier.

7

Full Circle On 24 January 1947 Dimitrios Máximos, an elderly Populist and ex-governor of the National Bank, took the oath as premier. He was a neutral figure acceptable to the parlia­ mentary parties; as he told Norton, ‘No one imagined that at the age of 73 and after [a] long absence from politics he wanted the job.’1 Tsaldaris became a vice-premier and minister for foreign affairs; Stephanopoulos and Chelmis retained the portfolios of co-ordination and finance respectively; and Georgios Stratos, a Populist, was appointed minister of defence. The EPE were allotted important posts: Papandreou became minister of the interior; Kanellopoulos, minister for public order; and Venizelos, a vice-premier. Apostólos Alexandris, leader of the Reformist Party, a small conservative Venizelist faction which had aligned itself with the Populists in 1945, was appointed minister of justice; and Zervas became a minister without portfolio. The cabinet had wanted to make Zervas minister for public order, but Norton had intervened against him. He was known to advocate extreme measures against the Left, and Norton feared that his appointment would destroy the government’s chances of projecting a moderate image to public opinion both in Greece and abroad.2 On 27 January Máximos announced in the chamber that his government would take action to stamp out banditry of the Right as well as the Left. The military campaign against the guerrillas would be pursued concurrently with the implemen­ tation of a programme of appeasement. Once tranquillity was restored, new elections would be held.3 Kanellopoulos promptly ordered the release of all women and children and of men over the age of sixty who had been exiled by the committees of public security. Papandreou issued a stem warning to provincial officials that partisanship in the execution of their duties would be ruthlessly punished.

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Tsaldaris's amnesty of 11 November 1946 was revised to include persons suspected of leading armed bands and inciting revolt. To date, the amnesty had proved a failure - only 250 of the approximately 8,000 guerrillas had surrendered4 - and it was hoped that the broadening of its terms would encourage more guerrillas to come down from the hills. The KKE disregarded these conciliatory measures and denounced the government as a 'fraudulent product o f British intrigue’ bent on perpetuadng Tsaldaris’s ‘reign of terror’. The virulence of its attack came as no surprise to the Embassy. Lascelles opined that there never had been, and never would be, any possibility of appeasing the communists. In the first place, their aims were totally incompatible with those of every other political party. Second, they doubdess realized that even if they laid down their arms and reached a compromise with the government, the latter would be unable to guarantee their safety against reprisals by the Right. The anti-communist bias of the armed forces and provincial officialdom was obvious and no government could hope to control them completely. Nor could they be purged sufficiendy to render them apolidcal, given the lack of alternative personnel with the necessary qualificadons. A ‘perfectly fair deal’ for the communists was thus out of the question. The most that could be expected of Maximos’s government was that it would drive a wedge between the moderate Left and the 'hard communist core’ of the guerrilla movement: ‘[Thel hope on which we based our recommendadons for [a] broader Government was that this core could be isolated from its accredons of sympathisers (both those who are under arms and those who are not) thus giving the Greek State a better chance of asserting its authority over the residue by force.’5 No sooner had the new ministers taken the oath than the machinery of government ground to a halt, owing to a strike by civil servants for higher pay. Sir Theodore Gregory, Nixon’s successor as British pardcipant in the currency control committee, urged Máximos to stand firm. Concessions to the civil servants would encourage strikes in other sectors of the economy, he argued, resulting in widespread disruption and limidess inflation. But Máximos defied him and gave in to the strikers’ demand. He feared that his government would

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collapse if there was no one to execute its orders, and granting the civil servants more money seemed the only way of persuading them to return to work. The Embassy understood his predicament. ‘Even the soundest arguments about risks of future inflation do not appeal to people with empty stomachs,’ Lascelles observed.6 Indeed, the plight of the working classes was now perilous, for Tsaldaris’s government had done nothing to implement the economic reforms promised on 11 November 1946. Com­ modities were still clogging the warehouses of the Piraeus; the economic mission’s scheme to use consumer co-operatives to distribute goods had been obstructed by the ministry of supply and sabotaged by the merchants; essential foodstuffs were disappearing from the markets amidst higher prices; and the sale of sovereigns continued unabated. Clark, the head of the economic mission, warned the Foreign Office that the prospects for the fiscal year 1947-8 were ‘terrifying’. But in the Foreign Office’s view, the time had long passed when Britain could do anything effective to help. They pointed out that no more money could be spared for the Greeks, nor could the latter be compelled to make intelligent use of the funds already at their disposal. Greece was an independent state and any attempt to compel her government to heed the advice of the economic mission would ‘smack of Cromerism’ and be opposed to the policy of non-intervention which Britain had pursued since April 1946. So long as that policy was in force, we shall have to resign ourselves to the fact that the Greek Government cannot be disciplined in a crisis by advisory Missions . . . [and] put up with the misappropriation of British supplied resources and defection after defection by narrow-minded and egocentric Greek politicians. . . . In choosing between the political odium we incur for dictating to the Greeks and the equally strong odium we incur in supporting them without attempting to dictate to them we have chosen the latter course; and in a situation such as the strike of the civil servants in Greece has provoked . . . we must recognize that there is little we can do about it. .. .7 By this time, Bevin had returned to London from New York. On 30 January he informed the cabinet that, while he agreed that no further aid should be given to the Greek economy, he

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felt that assistance to the armed forces must continue. The army should be provided with the means to make one final attempt to crush the guerrillas during the spring. It required £2m. worth of equipment if the training programme in counter-insurgency warfare and the reorganization deemed necessary by the Chiefs of Staff were to be carried out. He hoped that the cabinet would also consent to meet at least part of the army’s sterling costs after 31 March; the Americans might be persuaded to cover the balance. The cabinet neither accepted nor rejected these proposals. Instead, they instructed the Foreign Office and the Treasury to establish a joint committee to examine the financial implications of providing the army with £2m. worth of equipment and to draw up the text of a message to be sent to Washington asking what financial, economic, and military aid the Americans were prepared to offer Greece. The recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff to reduce British forces in the country to one brigade by 1 April was approved.' The joint committee held its first meeting on 1 February. After considerable discussion, the Treasury agreed to recommend the cabinet to provide the Greeks with the equipment necessary for the army’s re­ organization. The committee then pondered the question of what to say to the Americans. Its task was complicated by the fact that the cabinet had neglected to decide whether or not Britain would meet any of the army’s sterling costs after 31 March whatever the United States did. Eventually, it was agreed to inform the State Department that the cabinet would reach a decision in the light of Washington’s response.9 The committee deliberated on the text of the message to the Americans for the next ten days. The Foreign Office meanwhile enquired of the Embassy in Athens what steps could be taken ' to preserve British influence in Greece if British aid ceased on 31 March and American help was not forthcoming. Norton was at a loss to suggest a course of action. He warned that without military aid, the Greek army could hardly hope to defeat the guerrillas, and, without economic aid, the government would have barely enough funds to keep the people alive. It seemed ‘absolutely certain’ that Britain’s long and dogged effort to maintain Greece as a democratic nation would end in failure. The country would be overrun by the

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communists and incorporated in ‘the Soviet system of buffer police states’. O f the latter, she would be the most destitute, the most dependent on Russian aid, and therefore the most subservient.10 The Southern Department wondered whether Greece could be placed under some form of trusteeship by the UN. The international body might assume control of the country’s economy and guarantee the inviolability o f her frontiers. However, the United Nations Department of the Foreign Office did not regard the idea as technically practicable. In Norton’s view, it was also politically unfeasible. He pointed to the UN commission of inquiry, which had arrived in Athens in early February and was already wracked by dissension between the communist and non-communist delegates. The British and American representatives wanted to visit the northern frontier; the Yugoslavs and Bulgarians insisted that this was unnecessary and demanded an investigation of conditions in southern Greece; and the Russian delegate was reluctant even to transfer the commission’s headquarters to Thessaloniki. Given this precedent, it seemed almost inevitable that a UN organ charged with the supervision of Greek internal affairs would disintegrate into antagonistic factions based on rival ideo­ logies." Nor did it seem likely that the Greeks could arrange a peaceful setdement of the conflict themselves. On 11 February the 'Democratic Army’, as the guerrillas were now known, proposed that a cease-fire be declared throughout the country in order to facilitate the movement and work of the UN commission. The government, backed by Sophoulis, rejected the offer. The parliamentary leaders feared that a cease-fire would amount to a tacit admission that the guerrilla forces were entitled to treat on equal terms with the state. It would also afford the guerrillas a respite in which to consolidate their control over the regions they occupied. Moreover, in Norton’s view, even if the government agreed to a cease-fire, it would be unable to impose it on the right-wing bands. The extreme Right might even revolt and form an army of its own with allegiance to no constitutional authority.12 The Foreign Office concluded that there were three ways in which the situation in Greece could evolve. First, if Britain and

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the United States agreed to aid the country joindy after 31 March or if the Americans undertook to shoulder the entire burden, Maximos’s government could and would fight it out with the guerrillas to the bitter end. Military action against the Democratic Army, followed by a new Varkiza agreement designed to isolate the KKE from the moderate Left, would be the surest course for the government to follow. Secondly, if Britain and the United States decided to abandon the country, the army might still manage to crush the guerrillas during the campaign planned for the spring. This seemed a doubtful prospect, however, for, according to Norton, the Democratic Army was now operating throughout Thrace, Macedonia, Thessaly, and the Peloponnesus with a high standard of organization, discipline, and morale. Thirdly, if Western aid ceased on 31 March and the guerrillas survived the spring campaign, the morale of the army would probably collapse and its units would panic and dissolve. Maximos’s government would then be compelled to negotiate terms with the communists from a disadvantageous, if not hopeless, position. In the final analysis, therefore, the future of Greece depended on the fighting capacity of her armed forces, and, most of all, on decisions soon to be reached in London and Washington. '* On 11 February Dalton addressed a memorandum to Attlee asking for a clear-cut decision to end all British assistance to Greece on 31 March. He pointed out that Britain had spent £39m. on aid to the country since the end of the war, with no lasting results. If Britain herself was to avoid a financial débâcle, it was imperative that she practise ‘the most ruthless economy in overseas expenditure from now on. And I would begin at once by cutting off the Greeks.’ *1 think Mr Dalton is justified,’ Bevin wrote. ‘We get no help from the Greeks.’ On 18 February he and Dalton agreed to discard the message drafted by the joint committee and send a strong telegram to the United States designed to bring matters to a head.14 On 19 February Bevin instructed Lord Inverchapel, the British ambassador to the United States, to deliver a memorandum to the State Department on the situation in Greece. It began by recalling Byrnes’s discussion with A. V. Alexander in November 1946 and expressed the hope that the United States was willing to consider assisting the Greek

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economy and armed forces. The country was on the verge of economic collapse, and her military needs were considerable if she were to defend herself against the guerrillas. It was therefore of the utmost urgency that the United States determine precisely what aid could be made available. As for the British, they had already strained their resources to the limit to help the country. In their present circumstances, they judged it impossible to grant any further assistance what­ soever.'* The State Department was initially shocked by the memorandum. But it quickly resolved not only to advocate assistance to Greece, but to seize the opportunity presented by Britain’s decision to abandon the country to convince Congress and the American people of the need for the United States to assume a greater role in the direction of world affairs. Following a series of top-level discussions with congressional leaders, President Truman addressed a joint session of congress on 12 March and enunciated the principles which collectively came to be known as the ‘Truman doctrine’. The policy of the United States, he declared, must henceforth be directed towards actively assisting ‘free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressure’. In the specific case of Greece, the United States must endeavour, primarily through economic aid, to restore that stability essential to orderly political processes in order that the people might enjoy a way of life distinguished by free institutions, representative government, and individual liberty.16 American aid began to flow into Athens in the autumn of 1947. The fate of Greece now rested with the United States.

245

Conclusion Amid the maze of political manoeuverings, one of the few notions which appears to be grasped as fundamental by the man in the street, is that the British stand behind it all. By those more detached the story is quoted of the American, walking with a Chinese friend by the Yangtze when in flood, seeing a drowning peasant and diving in to save him. ‘You realize, I hope,' remarked the Chinaman, after the peasant had been rescued, ‘that you are now responsible for everything that happens to this man?’1

The objective of British policy in Greece between April 1944 and February 1947 was to establish an independent and non­ communist state ruled as a parliamentary democracy. Greece was to be non-communist in order to safeguard Britain’s strategic interests in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. She was to be governed by a regime accountable to the people, for an ally tyrannized by a dictatorship of the Right, although friendly to Britain, would be more of a liability than an asset. ‘Our aim’, wrote Eden in November 1944, ‘is a Greece - whether royalist or republican - prosperous, our friend, and at peace.’2 Parliamentary democracy was to be achieved by means of an unfettered plebiscite on the future of the monarchy and free elections to a constituent assembly. Prior to 1945, the British were confident that the Greek people’s will, if freely expressed, would accord with British interests, for they believed that the majority of Greeks were devoted to Britain and opposed to authoritarian rule. They hoped that the plebiscite and elections would be conducted by a cabinet composed of genuine democrats and give rise to stable constitutional government under enlightened leaders enjoying broad popular support. Initially, the British looked to the Greek political world to

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shepherd the country away from the chaos of war to democracy. But by 1944 they concluded that the Greeks were not up to the task. There were few politicians in Athens and Cairo who could claim to be genuine champions of parliamentary democracy, and still fewer with a capacity for leadership and parties worthy of the name. On the Right, neither the Liberals nor the Populists could boast of a tradition of sensitivity to popular aspirations or respect for popular sovereignty and orderly parliamentary government. Their hostility to social reform, their incessant quarrels over issues of patronage and personality, and their toleration of, and, at times, collaboration with dictators had long since discredited them in the eyes of the people. The Centre was weak and in disarray. It included many parties and politicians, but the former were little more than personal cliques, and, of the latter - Kanellopoulos, Papandreou, Kartalis, Sophianopoulos, and Svolos - none but Papandreou possessed the attributes of a national leader. Power and influence had devolved to the communists. Large numbers of Greeks were impressed by ELAS’s resistance to the Axis and confident that EAM would fulfil its pledge to guarantee them liberty, independence, and social justice after the war. But in the view of the British, EAM’s adherents had been duped: the communists’ real objective was to monopolize control of the armed forces, the judiciary, and organs of public security in order to falsify the electoral process, establish a dictatorship of the extreme Left, and subjugate Greece to the Soviet Union. Since Greece, on her own, seemed incapable of evolving in the direction of parliamentary democracy, the British tried to compel her to do so by intervening in her internal affairs. Intervention first took the form of sponsoring Papandreou as the leader of a progressive Centre. If moderates could be weaned away from EAM/ELAS and the decrepit conservative parties, the extremes of Left and Right would be isolated and the democratic development of the country guaranteed. But Papandreou’s initiative came too late. The people were too polarized to respond to his appeals for restraint and moderation. Armed force lay in the hands of the communists and the ethnikopkrones. Each camp was determined to annihilate the other; and even if they had somehow been disposed

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towards a compromise, neither believed that Papandreou had sufficient strength o f character and ability to serve as a successful mediator. In December 1944 the KKE lost patience and tried to seize Athens by force. The British intervened militarily and the civil war ended in defeat for the communists and an apparent victory for the forces of moderation. The Varkiza Agreement was promulgated with a view to promoting reconciliation and a return to tranquil conditions, leading, it was hoped, to a free plebiscite and elections and stable constitutional government. For a brief moment the British congratulated themselves: they had afforded the Greeks a chance to repudiate authoritarian doctrines. But to their chagrin, it swiftly became evident that most of the population was either unwilling or unable to take advantage of the opportunity. For it proved impossible for the British to implant in Greece something which Greek social and political conditions could not themselves engender: a willingness on the part of the people to forgive and forget and of the political élite to collaborate and abide by democratic principles and procedures. Instead, by the spring of 1945, the British realized that in the ‘ring’ they held in Greece, all the inveterate maladies of Greek political life were coming to the fore: the incompetence, cantankerousness, and capriciousness of the conservative parties; the paucity of courageous leadership from the moderate Right and Left; and the consequent despair of a sorely tried people who turned again to a political extreme. The threat to parliamentary democracy now came from the extreme Right, and the British were undecided how, and whether indeed it was practicable, to combat it. Intervention against the communists had been a relatively clear-cut and uncomplicated affair: the KKE had resorted to naked aggression and the British had matched force with force. But the royalists’ methods were more insidious. Their terrorists were dispersed throughout the land and acted on individual initiative. Their agents infiltrated the armed forces, the organs of public security, and the civil administration. They directed the machinery of government by ‘remote control’ and therefore never felt the need to make an open bid for power. On the contrary, they called for a free plebiscite and free

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elections, entirely confident that they would win, for so fearful were most Greeks of the communists that they now regarded the King as their only hope of salvation. The British found themselves in a quandary. The only apparent method o f checking the royalists was to exercise executive power over the Greek state and to deny the people the right to vote. But this would mean reducing the country to the status of à colony. How could this be reconciled with Britain’s declared aim of establishing Greece as an independent nation with a government founded on the people’s sovereign will? Leeper strongly advocated further intervention. He felt no qualms about assuming executive power over the Greeks. They were a people for the moment incapable of wise selfgovernment: ‘Greece’, he observed in April 1945, ‘is a small and impoverished member of a civilization to which she desires to belong without as yet the necessary qualifications’.3 Britain must provide her with the enlightened leadership her own politicians could not supply, and until the people regained their senses, they must not be allowed to vote. It was not enough that the plebiscite and elections be free; the voting must result in freedom. But his suggested policy was rejected by the Foreign Office as too patronizing towards the Greeks, who, whatever their faults, were a proud people and jealous of their independence. It was also judged to be at odds with British policy in eastern Europe, which was directed towards dislodging die Russians and upholding the principle of national sovereignty. It was vigorously opposed by Churchill, who perhaps better than any other Briton understood the futility of trying to mould the Greek in the image of an Englishman. He and Eden were anxious to withdraw from the country altogether and leave the people to their fate. They were well aware that Greece might then be engulfed by disorder detrimental to British interests. But in their view, the alternative - to adopt Greece as a dependant - entailed more trouble than the country was worth. The Labour government which came to power in Britain, in July 1945 experimented with a policy precariously balanced between the drastic intervention desired by Leeper and the non-intervention favoured by Churchill. On the one hand, Bevin engaged in various manoeuvres designed to encourage

Conclusion

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the growth o f a moderate Centre. He acquiesced in a postponement of both the plebiscite and the elections and installed in office a republican government which by all accounts was unrepresentative of the majority of the people. On the other hand, he baulked at assuming those executive powers which, though demeaning to the Greeks, would have enabled him, when all else failed, to compel them to act in a manner he thought responsible. This curious combination of toughness and timidity reduced British policy to an exercise in futility, for the Greeks were left in control of their destiny but at the same time pressured to govern in a manner which had repeatedly been shown to be alien to their nature. No amount of coaxing, cabinet-making, and manipulation of the date of the elections sufficed to produce a Centre where there existed neither the will, the mentality, nor the practical ability to sustain one. The politicians merely conducted their affairs in the only way they knew how: quarrelling, intriguing, and indulging in patronage as the nation teetered on the brink of economic collapse and civil war. In the spring of 1946 the British were again confronted with the choice of denying the Greeks their suffrage and prolonging intervention or acquiescing in elections which would confirm the country’s independence but condemn it to rule by the extreme Right. Bevin pronounced himself in favour of elections without further delay, regardless of the consequences. He had despaired of altering conditions in Greece, and in particular, was anxious to withdraw British troops in order to deprive the Russians of a pretext for perpetuating their military occupation of eastern Europe. The elections of 31 March 1946 marked a watershed for British policy. Any thought of forceful intervention in Greek internal affairs was quickly abandoned. Greece was now a sovereign state, with an elected parliament, and so long as her independence was regarded as inviolable, there was little that could be done to influence the behaviour of her government. Civil war followed quickly on the heels of the royalists’ victory. The excesses of both extremes destroyed any semblance of order in the land. The British and soon the Americans pleaded for restraint and broad political unity, but to no avail. The Americans’ growing concern for Greece stemmed from

25 0

Conclusion

their belief that the country was being subjected to Russian aggression, and that, if the communist guerrillas emerged triumphant, Greece would fall under Soviet influence. In retrospect, it appears that they were only partially correct. There is no evidence to support the view that the Russians aided and abetted the guerrilla movement. On the contrary, Stalin seems to have been quite willing to sacrifice the KKE in exchange for a free hand to suppress non-communist elements in eastern Europe. The percentages agreement of October 1944 represented the sort of realpolitik Stalin understood best and was willing to abide by: the West could do what it wished to protect its strategic interests in its sphere of influence and the Soviet Union would do the same in hers. Had Britain stuck to the percentages agreement and persuaded the Americans to do so, Greece would probably not have become an object o f contention between East and West, nor figured prominendy in the origins of the Cold War. But the Western Powers tried to supersede the percentages agreement with the Yalta declar­ ation on liberated Europe, and lodged protests against Soviet acdvity in Romania and Bulgaria. Under such circumstances, it was inevitable that the Russians should lodge counter-protests against British policy in Greece - not to promote communism in the country and expand the Soviet sphere of influence, but to embarrass the Western Powers and parry their attempt to expand their sphere. Inidally, both the British and the Americans recognized that Russian hostility towards Greece was merely a riposte to their own interference in Romania and Bulgaria. However, when Yugoslavia became involved in the civil disturbances in Greece in 1946, their atdtude began to change. The Americans, in particular, took it for granted that the Balkan ‘satellites' were incapable of pursuing a policy independent of the Soviet Union. If Yugoslavia were aiding the Greek guerrillas, the Russians must be doing so as well. But it was almost certainly incorrect to assume that the bloc of communist nations was ‘monolithic’. The Yugoslavs, as Bevin suspected, were prob­ ably acting on their own initiative. Moreover, it may be argued that, in the final analysis, it was the Greeks, and not the Russians, who were responsible for provoking Yugoslav intervention, by their tenacious insistence on territorial

Conclusion

251

aggrandizement at the expense o f Albania. Had the Greeks, either of their own accord or under Western pressure, dropped their territorial claims in 1945 and endeavoured to cultivate good relations with their neighbours, the latter might well have been less favourably disposed towards according assistance to the KKE. The Americans, therefore, appear to have been mistaken in suspecting the Russians of involvement in the Greek civil war. But they were doubtless correct to assume that if the communist guerrillas won the day, Greece would pass under Soviet influence. The Russians were eager to establish a naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean, whether in the Straits of the Dardanelles, Tripolitania, Alexandroupolis, or the Aegean islands. Even if they had done nothing to assist the KKE to victory, they would hardly have hesitated to dominate the country once a communist government was installed in Athens. In this sense, there was a genuine Russian threat to the West in Greece in early 1947, a threat rendered all the more awesome by the fact that the guerrillas seemed bound to win. It was at this point that the British washed their hands of Greece, leaving the country as bitterly divided and in­ capacitated as in 1944, when they had first intervened. Then, their objective had been to produce a friendly, stable, and democratic ally. Now, Greece was friendly but engulfed by chaos, and such a drain on British resources that she had to be jettisoned. At best, it can be argued that Britain’s achievement in Greece was to prevent the communists from attaining power until the Americans decided to take up the load. British interests were served in this manner, for the strategic sea-lanes in the eastern Mediterranean were safeguarded until the region could be consolidated by the United States. It can also be said that British policy benefited Greece - but only if one assumes that parliamentary democracy is a superior form of govern­ ment to communism; and that Greece stood a better chance of evolving into a parliamentary democracy from the right-wing regime which resulted from British intervention than she would have had, had she been ruled by the KKE. However, it is an inescapable fact that had the Americans decided not to assist Greece in 1947, neither Britain nor Greece would have

252

Conclusion

gained any benefit from three years of British intervention. And since Britain exercised no influence over decision-making in Washington, one must conclude that whatever success British policy enjoyed was the product not of design, but of fortune.

2 53

Notes PREFACE 1 J. O. Iatrides, R evolt in Athens: The Greek Communist ‘Second R ound9 ¡9 4 4 -1 9 4 5 (Princeton, 1972). H. Richter, Griechenland zwischen Revolution und Konterrevolution 1 9 3 6 -1 9 4 6 (Frankfurt am Main, 1973). 2 S. G. Xydis, Greece and the Great Powers 1 9 4 4 -1 9 4 7 : Prelude to the T rum an D octrine9 (Thessaloniki, 1963).

INTRODUCTION 1 For a documented account of the origins o f the Mégalos Dichasmos and of the catastrophe in Asia Minor see M. L. Smith, Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia M inor 1 9 1 9 -1 9 2 2 (London, 1973). 2 A fascinating, although undocumented, study of political affairs in Greece between 1922 and 1936 is provided in G. Daphnis, Greece between Two W ars (in Greek, Athens, 1974). For an analysis of the army's role in politics see T. Veremis, The Intervention o f the Army in Greek Politics 1 9 1 6 -3 6 (in Greek, Athens, 1977). A brief account of the events leading up to the coup d 'éta t of 4 August 1936 is presented in J. S. Koliopoulos, Greece and the British Connection ¡9 3 5 -1 9 4 1 (Oxford, 1977). 3 A detailed and scholarly work on Greek domestic affairs between 1936-1941 has yet to be written. For an admirable account of Greco-British relations during this period see Koliopoulos, Greece and the British Connection. For a study of the military operations against the Axis see G. Pantazis, The Two ‘N os9: G reek-Italian W ar - Greek-German W ar 1940-1941 (in Greek, Athens, n.d.). 4 'Political Decision of the Eighth Plenum of the KKE Central Committee’, Feb. 1942, KKE O fficial Documents (in Greek), v (n.p., 1973), 97. 5 Zachariadis was imprisoned by the Metaxas regime and then interned by the Germans at Dachau until 1945. 6 The evolution of communist policy is examined in greater detail in G. M. Alexander and J. C. Loulis, T h e Strategy of the Greek Communist party: An Analysis of Plenary Decisions 1934-1944*, East European Q uarterly, xv (No. 3) (Boulder, Colorado, 1981), 377-89. See also KKE O fficial Documents iv (Athens, 1974), 18-26, and v, 122 f. On the methods by which the communists dominated ELAS and EAM’s administrative apparatus see J. C. Loulis, The Greek Communist Party ¡9 4 0 -1 9 4 4 : Policies, Tactics, O rganization (London, 1981), ch. 2; and L. S. Stavrianos, 'The Greek National Liberation Front (EAM): A Study in Resistance Organization and Administration’, Journal o f M odem H istory, xxiv (No. 1) (Chicago, 1952), 44-54. An alternative interpretation of communist policy, suggesting that the KKE’s < objective was 'bourgeois democracy’, is set forth in Richter, pp. 157-63. 7 The following analysis of British policy is based chiefly on L. Woodwardr British Foreign Policy in the Second W orld W ar%vol. iii (London, 1971), ch. XLIII; and C. M. Woodhouse, Apple o f Discord: A Survey o f Recent Greek Politics in their International Setting (London, 1948). 8 With the subsequent arrival of American officers in Greece the mission was renamed the 'Allied military mission’. For an account o f its operations and its

254

Notes to pages 10 -1 8

dealings with the resistance organizations and the Foreign Office see E. C. W. Myers, Greek Entanglem ent (London, 1955). 9 Bitter rivalry between the Foreign Office and the Special Operations Executive over the conduct of policy in Greece also gave rise to a feeling o f distrust on the p an of British diplomats towards the officers o f the mission. See R. Clogg. ' “ Pearls from Swine": the Foreign Office Papers. SOE and the Greek Resistance*, in P. Auty and R. Clogg (eds.), British Policy towards W artim e Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece (London. 1975), pp. 167-205. 10 'Don't let them pre-judge the issue about the King’. Churchill told Brigadier Eddie Myers, the first head of the British military mission. *1 want to see him have a fair deal.' E. C. W. Myers, T h e Andarte Delegation to Cairo: August I94S', in Auty and Clogg, p. 16S. 11 Clogg, p.192. 12 A. E. Eden, The E den Memoirs, ii (London, 1965), 4S0 f. IS For MacVeagh’s account of the episode see J. O. Iatrides, Ambassador M acVeagh Reports: Greece 1 9 3 3 -1 9 4 7 (Princeton, 1980), pp. 392-408. 14 For a detailed account of Zervas's negotiations with the Germans see J. L. Hondros, The German Occupation o f Greece 1 9 4 1 -1 9 4 4 (Ann Arbor. 197S): and Richter, pp. 356-67. 15 A study o f Russian attitudes towards Greek affairs between 1941-4 is provided in Elisabeth Barker, ‘Greece in the Framework o f Anglo-Soviet Relations 1941-1947', in Marion Sarafis (ed.), Greece: From Resistance to C ivil W ar (Nottingham, 1980). pp. 15-28. 16 For Tsouderos’s account of his tenure as Premier of the govemment-in-exile see E. Tsoudcros, Greek Anomalies in the M iddle East (in Greek, Athens, 1951). 17 See H. Fleischer, 'The “Anomalies’’ in the Greek Middle East Forces 1941-1944’, Journal o f the H ellenic Diaspora, v (No. 3) (New York, 1978), 5-36.

CHAPTER 1 1 FO minutes, 10 Apr. and 11 Apr. 1944 (R 5706, FO 371/43729). 2 Memorandum by King George, undated (delivered to the FO on 12 Apr. 1944, R 6176, FO 371/43729). 3 Tsouderos, p. 166. 4 Venizelos’s wife, née Zervoudakis, of a wealthy Greek family of Alexandria, had most o f her considerable fortune in shipping, and his close associate, Georgios Vasileiadis, was a member o f the family who owned the largest shipyards in the Piraeus. 5 Leeper to FO, 16 Apr. 1944 (R 6100, FO 371/43729); V. P. Papadakis, D iplomatic H istory o f the Greek W ar 1940-1945 (in Greek, Athens, 1957), p. 345. On the subject of Tass reports, see Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British ambassador to the Soviet Union, to FO, 13 Apr. 1944 (R 5926, FO 371/43729). 6 Churchill to Molotov, 16 Apr. 1944 (R 6133, FO 371/43729). In March 1943 the British had suggested that the Russians take the lead in inducing the Romanians to quit the Axis (Woodward, iii. 133). The Americans acquiesced in this arrangement on 5 April 1944 (Cordell Hull, United Sutes secreury o f sute, to United Sutes Embassy, Moscow, 5 Apr. 1944 (740.00119), Foreign Relations o f the U nited States: Diplom atic Papers: 1944, iv (Washington, 1966, 168 f.) 7 Churchill to Leeper. 17 Apr. 1944 (R 6100, FO 371/43729). 8 Churchill to Leeper, 14 Apr. 1944 (R 5849, FO 371/43701); Cunningham to Admiralty, 17 Apr. and 18 Apr. 1944 (R 7316, FO 371/43702). 9 Cunningham to Admiralty, 18 Apr. 1944 (R 7316, FO 371/43702). Alexandris later claimed that he requested only a postponement of the operation for twenty-four

Notes to pages 18-29

2 55

hours (K. A. Alexandria, O ur N avy during the W ar Period (in Greek, Athens). 1952. p. 149). But Venizelos, in a report to the Greek ministry .of the navy of 28 May 1944. wrote that he gained the impression that Alexandris wished to abandon the idea of an assault altogether. G. Daphnis, Sophocles Eleutheriou Venizelos (in Greek, Athens. 1970). p. 61S n. 57. 10 Leeper to FO. 17 Apr. 1944 (R 6155, FO S71/4S729). 11 Leeper to FO. 19 Apr. 1944 (R 6285, FO S71/4S7SO). 12 Leeper to FO. 25 Apr. 1944 (R 6661, FO S71/437SO). IS Leeper to FO. 22 Apr.1944; Churchill to Leeper, 24 Apr. 1944 (R 647S. FO S71/437S0); FO minute, 20 Apr. 1944; Churchill to Leeper. 20 Apr. 1944 (R 6285. FO 371/43730). 14 Leeper to FO, 28 Apr. 1944 (R 6820, FO 371/43730). 15 Seven Greeks lost their lives in Alexandria. The rebels of the II Infantry Brigade suffered no casualties but killed one British officer. 16 Leeper to FO, 24 Apr. 1944 (R 6615, FO 371/43730). 17 Georgios Papandreou, The liberation o f Greece (in Greek, Athens, 1948). pp. 54-6. 18 Leeper to FO, 27 Apr. 1944 (R 6763, FO 371/43730). 19 Leeper to FO, 25 Apr. 1944 (R 6660, FO 371/43730); ibid., 26 Apr. 1944 (R 6720. FO 371/43730). 20 Molotov to Churchill, 28 Apr. 1944; FO minute, 1 May 1944 (R 6897. FO 371/43730). 21 Minute by Eden, 1 May 1944 (R 6897, FO 371/43730); Churchill to Eden. 4 May 1944 (R 7380, FO 371/43636). 22 Mavromichalis to Papandreou, 2 May 1944 (R 7995, FO 371/43731). 23 Leeper to FO, 10 May 1944 (R 7484, FO 371/43730). 24 Leeper to FO, 14 May 1944 (R 7654, FO 371/43731). 25 Texts in R 7649 and R 7650, FO 371/43731. 26 Leeper to FO, 13 May 1944 (R 7652, FO 371/43731). 27 In his memoirs, Rousos maintains that his instructions were dashed off in an informal manner and were to obtain half the ministries for EAM. He asserts that General Sarafis’s memoirs bear out his claim (P. Rousoj, The Great Five Years (in Greek), ii (Athens, 1976), 90). However, Sarafis records that the key ministries were expliridy mentioned in the instructions: ‘we had instructions to ask for 50 per cent and to specify which ministries this would include. . . . The ministries we felt should be established in the mountains were: Home Affairs (Interior], Justice . . . plus a Sub* Ministry for War.’ (S. Sarafis, E LA S: Greek Resistance Arm y (London, 1980). p. SSI.) According to Ioannis Ioannidis, the organizational secretary of the KKE, the instructions were drawn up by Siantos and himself (Giannis Ioannidis, M emoirs: Problems o f the Policy o f the KKE during the N ational Resistance 1940-1 9 4 S (in Greek. Athens, 1979), p. 219). See also Siantos’s telegram to Cairo o f 29 May 1944, below, p. 30. 28 Memorandum by Rousos to the politburo, 26 May 1944, KKE O fficial Documents. v. 213-15 29 Rousos, pp. 189 f. 30 Papandreou, pp. 65-72. 31 Rousos, pp. 120-33. 32 Leeper to FO, IS May 1944 (R 7607, FO 371/43731); ibid., IS May 1944 (R 7608. FO 371/43731); ibid., 18 May 1944 (R 7882, FO 371/43731); ibid., 19 May 1944 (R 7970, FO 371/43731). S3 Papandreou, pp. 73-80. 34 Papandreou, p. 77; Leeper to FO, IS June 1944 (R 9275, FO 371/43746). 35 Eden to British Embassy, Moscow, 5 May 1944 (R 7214, FO 371/43686). 36 In his memoirs, Eden asserts that he recommended such an agreement to

2 56

Notes to pages 2 9 -3 5

Gousev: ‘I . . . suggested to the Soviet Ambassador that our two countries should agree that during the war Britain would take the lead in Greece and the Soviet Union ,in Rumania.* (Eden, p. 459.) However. Eden’s contemporary account of his discussion with Gousev (in his telegram to Moscow) casts some doubt on the accuracy of his recollection. Although it is possible to infer from his remarks that he desired a formal agreement, he did not explicitly suggest one. 37 Eden to Leeper, 25 May 1944 (R 7903. FO 371/43636). 38 FO minutes, 22 May, 23 May, and 24 May 1944: Minute by Eden, undated: Eden to British Embassy, Washington, 25 May 1944 (R 7903, FO 371/43636). On American attitudes towards spheres o f influence see J. L. Gaddis, The U nited Slates and the Origins $ the Cold W ar 1 9 4 1 -1 9 4 7 , (New York, 1972), pp. 149-51. 39 See below, p. 35. 40 This and Siantos’s subsequent cable of. 29 May 1944 were co-signed by Colonel Euripidis Bakirais, the vice-president of the PEEA, and Thanasis Hatzis, a communist and member of the EAM central committee. Text in R 8186, FO 371/43731. 41 Text in R 8429, FO 371/43732. 42 Leeper to FO, 30 May 1944 (R 8486, FO 371/43732). 43 Text in R 8636, FO 371/43732. . 44 Memorandum by Rousos to the politburo, 26 May 1944 (KKE O fficial Documents, v. 212-15). The memorandum was delivered by General Sarafis, who departed from Cairo for Greece on 26 May. 45 FO minute. 31 May 1944. R 8428 FO 371/43732. 46 The text is uncertain at this point. 47 Leeper to FO. 26 May 1944 (R 8331, FO 371/43731). 48 Churchill to Eden. 28 May 1944 (R 8331, FO 371/43731). 49 Leeper to FO. 2 June 1944 (R 8700, FO 371/43732). 50 The Venizelists in the Mountain Brigade were Col. N. Papadopoulos, second-incommand: Lt.-Col. G. Lamaris. Chief of StafT: Major P. Karadimas, chief o f GS (Operations); Major I. Karavias, Major S. Tzannetis, and Major A. Louterakis, the commanders of the brigade's three infantry battalions; and Col. S. Manidakis, commander of its artillery battalion. 1 am indebted to Lt.-Gen. Sophocles Tzannetis for this information. 51 The origins and ideology of ENA are well described in G. Karagiannis, 1 9 4 0 -1 9 5 2 : The Drama o f O reen: Epics and Disgraces (in Greek. Athens, 1963). Karagiannis, a major in the Middle East forces, was one of ENA's founders. 52 Text in R 8789. FO 371/43732. 53 Leeper to FO, 6 June 1944 (R 8886, FO 371/43746). 54 T. Tsatsos, The E ve o f liberation 1944 (in Greek, Athens, 1973), p. 45. 55 The post of minister o f the interior was left vacant, evidently in order not to prejudice future negotiations with the Left. 56 Text in R 9219, FO 371/43732. 57 Leeper to FO. 13 June 1944 (R 9275, FO 371/43746). 58 Papandreou, pp. 92-5. 59 Leeper to FO. 14 June 1944 (R 9408, FO 371/43746). 60 Leeper to FO. 13 June 1944 (R 9275, FO 371/43746). 61 Panagiotis Pipinelis. George I I (in Greek, Athens. 1951), p. 163. Petros Metaxas evidently felt that the monarchy existed by divine right. In a letter to Churchill he complained that Papandreou’s declaration would 'undoubtedly create the impression everywhere that the Royal Regime in Greece exists only under the condition of its future approval by the people*. Metaxas to Churchill, 22 June 1944 (R 12402, FO 371/43754). 62 MacVeagh to Sute Department. 16 June 1944 (868.01/595), Foreign Relations o f the

Notes to pages 3 5 -4 3

257

U nited States: Diplom atic Papers: 1944, v (Washington, 1965), 123; Iatrides, Ambassador M acVeagh, pp. 554 f. ; Pipinelis. p. 163.

63 Leeper to FO, 15June 1944 (R 9499, FO 371/43746). Metaxas, however, resigned in protest against the King's decision. 64 Harold Macmillan, Minister Resident at Allied Forces Headquarters. Algiers, to FO. 10 June 1944 (R 9220, FO 371/43688); Leeper to FO. 13 June 1944 (R 9319. FO 371/43688). 65 Minutes o f conference between General Ventiris and General Sir Bernard Paget. Cominander-in-Chief, Middle East, 17 June 1944 (WO 201/1778). 66 Paget to WO, 19 July 1944 (R 11442. FO 371/43703). The remaining mutineers were interned in detention camps for the duration of the war. 67 FO minutes. IS May, 14 May, and 19 May 1944; FO correspondence with WO. 21 May 1944 (R 7488, FO 371/43702). 68 Text in KKE O fficial Documents, v. 420-2. 69 Papandreou, pp. 106-19. 70 Leeper to FO, 5 July 1944; Eden to Churchill, 7 July 1944; Minute by Churchill, undated (R 10506, FO 371/43689). 71 Memorandum by Woodhouse. undated, text in R 9811, FO 371/43688; FO minutes, 8 July 1944; Eden to Churchill, 8 July 1944; Churchill to Eden. 10 July 1944 (R 10612, FO 371/43689). See also draft of minute from Churchill to Eden. 10 July 1944 (PREM 3. 212/1). 72 Svolos charged that Papandreou had tried ‘by every possible means to create the worst atmosphere o f distrust and prevent understanding and conciliation*. He criticized the Premier for seeking to dissolve ELAS, which was ‘admired all over the world’, aiid characterized EAM’s final terms as a ‘logical and expedient interpretation and clarification o f the agreement signed in [the] Lebanon’. Text of speech in R 13431, FO 371/43734. 73 Leeper to FO, 14 July 1944 (R 11090, FO S7Í/437S3). 74 Declaration by EAM central committee, 11July 1944 (KKE O fficial Documents, v. 427). 75 L. C. Hollis, Ministry of Defence, to Churchill, 19 July 1944 (PREM 3. 212/1). 76 I am indebted to Mr C. M. Woodhouse for providing me with an account o f his talk with Churchill. Churchill to Eden. 15 July 1944 (PREM 3. 212/1). 77 Eden to Churchill, 19 July 1944 (PREM 3. 212/1). 78 Open letter from Tsouderos to Papandreou, 24 July 1944, text in R 13002, FO 371/43734; Leeper to FO, 25 July 1944; FO minute, 26 July 1944 (R 11609, FO 371/43690). 79 Parliamentary Debates, H ouse o f Commons, O fficial Report (H ansard), vol. 402, 1943-4 (Fifth Series, London, 1944), col. 898-9. 80 Eden to British Embassy, Moscow, 26 July 1944 (R 11554, FO 371/43703). 81 Memorandum by Hull, SO May 1944 (870.00/43), Foreign Relations o f the U nited States: 1944, v. 112 f; C. Hull, The Memoirs o f Cordell H u ll, ii (London, 1948). 1455-9, 1467 f; 82 Roosevelt to Churchill, 11 June 1944, Foreign Relations o f the U nited States: 1944, v. 117 f. 83 Churchill to Roosevelt, 11 June 1944 (R 9472, FO 371/43646). 84 Roosevelt to Churchill, 12 June 1944, Foreign Relations o f the U nited States: 1944, v. 121. 85 The text o f the Russian message, addressed by Gousev to Eden, read as follows: ‘Inasmuch as you have now informed me that in regard to the leading role of the USSR in Roumanian matters and that of Great Britain in Greek matters, both the US and the British Governments start from the premise that the British proposal must refer only to war conditions and that the US Government express certain apprehensions lest this

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Notes to pages 4 3 -5 2

plan should go beyond present circumstances and lead to a partition o f the Balkan countries into spheres of influence, and, moreover, that it is proposed to establish a trial period, the Soviet Government consider it necessary to give this question further consideration. It is all the more necessary to do so in order to ascertain whether the realization o j such a proposal w ould introduce any new element into the de facto situation th is created' Gousev to Eden, SOJune 1944 (R 10483, FO S71/4S6S6). Emphasis added. 86 FO minute, 6 July 1944; minute by Eden, undated; Churchill to Eden, 10 July 1944 (R 10483, FO 371/43636). 87 FO minute, SO July 1944; minute by Eden, undated (R 11832. FO 371/43690). 88 Minute by Eden. 3 Aug. 1944 (R 11918, FO 371/43772). 89 Eden to British Embassy, Moscow, 3 Aug. 1944 (R 12090, FO 371/43772). 90 Memorandum by Rousos to the politburo, late July 1944 (KKE O fficial Documents, v. 239). 91 Ioannidis, pp. 237 f., 250 f. 92 Ibid., pp. 250 f., 255 f. 93 Ibid., pp. 266, 282. According to Vasilis Bartziotas, secretary o f the KKE dty committee in Athens, preparations for an armed insurrection in the capital were initiated in August 1944 (D. G. Kousoulas, Revolution and D efeat: The Story e f the Greek Communist Party (Oxford, 1965), p. 194). 94 Daphnis, V eniulos, p. 329. 95 Rousos, p. 178. 96 See the accounts of Svolos’s discussions with Leeper in Leeper to FO, 14 Sept. 1944 (R 13957, FO 371/43691); ibid., 9 Sept. 1944 (R 14348. FO 371/43772). 97 Text in R 12163, FO 371/43733. 98 Warner to FO. 9 Aug. 1944 (R 12437, FO 371/43734). Warner was temporarily in charge o f the Embassy because Leeper had returned to London for medical attention. 99 FO minutes, 5 Aug. 1944 (R 12163, FO 371/43733). 100 Churchill to Eden, 6 Aug. 1944 (R 12782, FO 371/43734). 101 Memorandum by Eden, 8 Aug. 1944 (WP (44) 433. CAB 66 (53)); minutes o f the War Cabinet, 9 Aug. 1944 (WM (44) 103rd Conclusions. CAB 65/43). 102 Memorandum by Athanasios Aghnidis, Greek ambassador in London, to FO, 8 Aug, 1944 (R 12388, FO 371/43733); Papadakis, pp. 368-70; Papandreou, pp. 132 f., 150-5. 103 Minutes o f conference between Churchill and Papandreou, 21 Aug. 1944 (R 13761, FO 371/43778). Leeper travelled from London to Rome to attend the conference and then accompanied Papandreou back to Cairo. 104 Leeper to FO, 31 Aug. 1944 (R 14552, FO 371/43734); Tsatsos, pp. 144, 139-50. Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, D iary J 1 M arch ¡9 4 2 -4 January ¡945 (in Greek, Athens, 1977), pp. 612-17. Mylonas, leader of the Agrarian Democratic Party, also resigned, for obscure reasons. 105 Leeper to FO. 29 Aug. 144 (R 13619, FO 371/43734); Warner to FO. 19 Aug. 1944 (R 13660, FO 371/43734); Veniaelos to Leeper, SO Aug. 1944; FO minute, 15 Sept. 1944 (R 14552. FO 371/43734). 106 Porphyrogenis had by now been replaced as secretary o f the EAM central committee by another communist, Dimitrios Partsalidis. Zevgos was a member of the politburo.

CHAPTER 2 1 Venizelos remained in Cairo and the King went to London. 2 Leeper to FO, 12 Sept. 1944, cited in Eden to Churchill, 13 Sept. 1944 (PREM 3. 210).

Notes to pages 5 2 -61

259

S Clark Kerr to FO, 23 Sept. 1944 (R 15193, FO 371/43692); ibid., 24 Sept. 1944 (PREM 3. 210). 4 ‘We were not asking for much’, Ioannidis recalls. ‘If just one company or one battalion of the Soviet army had entered Greece so that the English would not have dared come, we would have mowed down everything.’ Ioannidis, p. 251. 5 For a detailed account of events in the Peloponnesus on the eve of liberation see L. Baerentzen, T h e Liberation of the Peloponese: September 1944’, in J. O. latrides (ed.), Greece in the 1940s: A N ation in Crisis (Hanover, 1981). 6 Leeper to FO, 15 Sept. 1944 (R 14722, FO 371/43734). 7 Leeper to FO. 20 Sept. 1944 (R 14971, FO 371/43692); ibid., 22 Sept. 1944 (R 15155, FO 371/43692). 8 Address by Scobie to Sarafis and Zervas, undated (WO 204/8834). The British documents do not indicate who authorized Scobie to disclose that British troops were to land in Greece. Churchill was still under the impression that the plan for an invasion was unknown to the Greeks in early October (Churchill to Eden, 4 Oct. 1944, PREM 3. 212/9). 9 Papandreou, p. 159. 10 Statement by Despotopoulos in To Vima (Athenian daily newspaper), 24 Oct. 1964, dted in K. Pyromaglou, Georgias Kartatis and Ms Era 1 9 3 4 -5 7 (in Greek), i (Athens, 1965), 608. 11 Sarafis, p. 384. 12 Ibid., p. 387. 13 HQ,3 Corps (General Scobie’s headquarters) to ELAS ‘A’ Corps (Athens), 4 Nov. 1944 (WO 204/8834); text of Caserta Agreement in R 15394, FO 371/43693. 14 Ioannidis, pp. 288, 296, 302, 304 f. 15 Ibid., pp. 288-90, 296, 305. 16 See above, ch. 1. 17 Eden to Leeper, 14 Sept. 1944 (R 14473, FO 371/43746); Sir Alan Lascelles. private secretary to George VI, to Eden, 14 Sept. 1944 (R 15251, FO 371/43747). 18 Leeper to FO, 18 Sept. 1944 (R 14861, FO 371/43777). 19 Leeper to FO. 25 Sept. 1944 (R 15299, FO 371/43747). 20 Memorandum by the FO, 3 Sept. 1944 (R 14111, FO 371/43746). 21 Eden to Churchill, 27 Sept. 1944 (R 15250, FO 371/43747); ibid., 28 Sept. 1944 (PREM 3. 210). 22 Churchill to Eden, 29 Sept. 1944 (R 15679, FO 371/43777). 23 Churchill to Eden, 4 Oct. 1944 (PREM 3. 212/9). 24 Churchill to Eden, 29 Sept. 1944 (R 15679, FO 371/43777); ibid., 6 Oct. 1944 (PREM 3. 212/9). 25 H. Macmillan, The B last o f W ar: 1939-1945 (London, 1967), pp. 581-3. As late as 20 November 1944 Leeper reported that Papandreou was ‘strongly opposed to the King returning before a plebiscite and would be quite horrified if he thought that His Majesty contemplated such a step'. Leeper to FO, 20 Nov. 1944 (R 18937, FO 371/43747). 26 Kanellopoulos, pp. 647 f. 27 Text in KKE O fficial Documents, v. 473. 28 Andrews to GHQME, 7 Oct. 1944 (R 17120, FO 371/43694); Kanellopoulos, pp. 666 f. 29 Andrewes to GHQME, 8 Oct. 1944 (R 17214, FO 371/43694). 30 Leeper to FO, 11 Oct. 1944 (R FO 371/43694). 31 Minutes o f conference between Churchill and Stalin, 9 Oct. 1944 (FO 800. 414/51). 32 Woodward, p. 151. S3 Minutes of conference between Eden and Molotov, 16 Oct. 1944 (FO 800.

260

Notes to pages 6 1 -6 7

414/5.1 ). By 4 November mainland Greece was cleared o f Germans, and the Bulgarians had withdrawn from eastern Macedonia and Thrace. 34 Papandreou, pp. 185-98. 35 Leeper to FO. 18 Oct. 1944 (R 16917, FO 371/43694); ibid., 20 Oct. 1944 (R 17835, FO 371/43735); Tsatsos, pp. 204-6. 36 D. Delivanis and W. C. Cleveland, Greek M onetary Developments ¡9 3 9 -1 9 4 8 : A Case Study o f the Consequences o f W orld W ar I I fo r the M onetary System o f a Sm all N ation

(Bloomington, Indiana, n.d.), pp. 7, 63, 94 f. On the plight o f the Greek banks see Warner to FO. 15 Aug. 1944 (R 13217, FO 371/43779). 37 A F H Q to WO. 2 Oct. 1944 (R 15995, FO 371/43723). 38 Report by M iliary Liaison, 13 Nov. 1944 (R 21396, FO 371/43726). Military Liaison was an Anglo-American m iliary esablishment atached to General Scobie’s forces and assigned to assist the Greek government with relief and civil administration. 39 Minutes of conference between Svolos, Scobie, and Sandstrem, 21 Oct. 1944 (R 17044, FO 371/43724). 40 Tsatsos, pp. 207-9. In the first three days following liberation, Tsatsos issued 1,300 warrants for the arrest o f collaborators and members of the Security Batalions. By the time o f his resignation, ISO o f the former and 400 o f the latter had been deained (Kathunerma Nea (Athenian daily newspaper), 22 Oct. 1944). Tsatsos subsequently quit the Liberal Party, aligned himself with Papandreou, and was named minister of supply. 41 Leeper to FO. 24 Oct. 1944 (R 17175, FO 371/43735). 42 Leeper to FO. 31 Oct. 1944 (R 16778, FO 371/43735). 43 Leeper to FO. 21 Nov. 1944 (R 18967, FO 371/43735). 44 Eleutheria (Athenian daily newspaper), 26 Oct. and 27 Oct. 1944; Kathunerma N ea, 27 Oct. 1944. Kathunerma N ea is a particularly reliable source for Papandreou’s satements, as it was edited by one of his closest confidants. Loukas Akritas. 45 Broadcast by Radio Athens, transcribed by BBC Monitoring Service, 31 Oct. 1944 (R 17731, FO 371/43695). 46 Kathunerma N ea, 31 Oct. 1944. 47 Minutes of conference between Papandreou and Scobie, 31 Oct. 1944 (WO 204/8842). 48 Annex to minutes o f conference between Papandreou and Scobie (31 Oct. 1944), undated (WO 204/8842). 49 Two British brigades were sationed in Athens: 23 Armoured Brigade (mainly infantry) and 2 Parachute Brigade. Thessaloniki was occupied by 7 Indian Infantry Brigade and one batalion of 139 Brigade; Patras, by 11 Battalion o f 4 Indian Division. (Report by the Supreme A llied Commander M editerranean to the Combined Chiefs o f S ta ff: Greece 1 9 4 4 -I9 4 S (London, 1949), p. 8.)

50 Ioannidis records that the communists provoked clashes with right-wing activists in Athens in order to m ainain the ‘warlike disposition’ o f ELAS (Ioannidis, p. 291). Karagiannis, a founder of ENA, writes that the members of his organization eagerly responded to atucks from the Left with the result that they became ‘aggressive and extremely combative’ (Karagiannis, p. 199). 51 Satement by Siantos to the correspondent o f the D aily H erald (British daily newspaper), 2 Nov. 1944 (KKE O fficial Documents, v. 275). 52 Leeper to FO, 5 Nov. 1944 (R 17966, FO 371/43695); entry in Civil Police Diary by Colonel Sanley Prosser, adviser to H Q 3 Corps on police affairs, 6 Nov. and 23 Nov. 1944 (WO 204/8985). 53 Leeper to FO, 5 Nov. 1944 (R 17961, FO 371/43695). 54 Leeper to FO, 8 Nov. 1944 (R 18155, FO 371/43695). 55 Churchill to Eden, 7 Nov. 1944 (R 17961, FO 371/43695). 56 Velouchiotis to KKE committee o f Athens, 8 Nov. 1944 (WO 204/8903). This

Notes to pages 67—75

261

telegram was discovered in the archives of the KKE committee of Athens when the latter s offices were occupied by British troops during the hostilities of December 1944. Hereafter, such telegrams will be designated as "captured cables*. 57 Siantos to KKE committee of Thessaly-Sterea, 9 Nov. 1944 (WO 204/8903, a captured cable). 58 Report by ISLD, 14 Nov. 1944 (WO 204/8862). The reliability of the informant was "believed good*. 59 Siantos to KKE committee of Thessaly-Sterea, 9 Nov. 1944 (WO 204/8903, a captured cable). 60 Sarafis, pp. 480 f. 61 Leeper to FO, 14 Nov. 1944 (R 18598, FO 371/43704). 62 Sarafis, pp. 481 f. 63 Leeper to FO, 15 Nov. 1944 (R 18600, FO 371/43695). 64 On 14 November Leeper cabled the Foreign Office that he and General Scobie would assist Papandreou in pursuing "the middle line between (the] extremes of nationalism and communism*. Scobie was "satisfied that General Ventiris would co­ operate wholeheartedly and would sink his personal feelings*. Leeper to FO, 14 November. 1944 (R 18598, FO 371/43704). 65 Leeper to FO, 15 Nov. 1944 (R 18644, FO 371/43695). 66 Leeper to FO, 15 Nov. 1944 (R 18580, FO 317/43735). 67 Leeper to FO, 18 Nov. 1944 (R 18789, FO 371/43695). 68 Leeper to FO, 20 Nov. 1944 (R 18941, FO 371/43696). 69 Article in Eleutheri E llada, official organ of EAM, 30 Nov. 1944 (KKE O fficial Documents, v. 476). 70 See below, n. 76. 71 KaM m erina N ea, 23 Nov. 1944. 72 Leeper to FO, 24 Nov. 1944 (R 19286, FO 371/43735). 73 Siantos to KKE committees of the Peloponnesus, Central Greece, Macedonia, and Epirus, 22 Nov. 1944 (WO 204/8902, a captured cable). 74 ELAS GHQ, no destination recorded, no date recorded (WO 204/8902, a captured cable). 75 FO minutes, 21 Nov. and 22 Nov. 1944; FO to Leeper, 23 Nov. 1944 (R 18941, FO 371/43696); Churchill to Eden, 19 Nov. 1944 (R 18580, FO 371/43735). 76 That Papandreou felt obliged to scrap his plan clearly indicates that it had been his intention to disband the brigade and that the concept of "leave* had been introduced to mislead the British. 77 K aM m erina N ea , 25 Nov. 1944. 78 The officers of the Security Battalions were to be reviewed by a military board and pronounced eligible for service if the mitigating circumstances of conscription by compulsion, voluntary desertion, or otherwise "substantial circumstances* could be demonstrated. KaM m erina N ea , 23 Nov. 1944. 79 Rizospastis, 24 Nov. 1944. 80 KaM m erina N ea , 25 Nov and 26 Nov. 1944; Sarafis, p. 494. Zaimis was director o f the staff of Colonel Spiliotopoulos, who had been appointed director-general of the ministry of defence by Papandreou on 24 October. 81 Leeper to FO, 25 Nov. 1944 (R 19306, FO 371/43735); ibid., 26 Nov. 1944 (R 19341, FO 371/43735). 82 Leeper to FO, 26 Nov. 1944 (R 19379, FÖ 371/43735). 83 Eleutheria, 28 Nov. 1944. That the meeting was conducted on 26 November is evident from reports in KaM m erina Nea, 28 Nov. 1944. 84 Leeper to FO, 28 Nov. 1944 (R 19559, FO 371/43696). 85 Papandreou, pp. 209 f. At the political conference held in Athens on 26 December 1944 (see below, ch. 3), Papandreou stated that he had suggested to EAM

262

Notes to pages 7 5 -8 0

that the Mountain Brigade and a unit of ELAS be amalgamated; that the ministers of EAM had insisted that the ELAS unit be of a strength equal to that of its rivals; and that he had agreed to this. See the official minutes of the conference in T. 1. Tsakalotos, 4 0 Years a Soldier o f Greece (in Greek), i (Athens, 1960), 648. 86 A copy of this text translated into English by General Scobie's staff is in WO 204/8842. See also Leeper to FO, 30 Nov. 1944 (R 19718, FO 371/43697). 87 Leeper to FO, 28 Nov. 1944; Churchill to Eden, 29 Nov. 1944 (R 19560, FO 371/43696). 88 Andreas Mountrichas, an ELAS commander, later claimed that the KKE received a telegram during the night of 27/8 November from Tito (Jossip Broz), the Yugoslav communist leader, urging ELAS to resist demobilization and that this played a decisive role in the KKE’s decision to submit new proposals to Papandreou (Kousoulas, pp. 200-4). Such a cable was discovered by the British in the archives of the KKE committee of Athens. Dispatched to the KKE by ‘Stergios’, presumably Andreas Tzimas, ELAS’s representative with the Yugoslav partisans, it read: ‘Saw Bulgarians and Tito. They advise we must insist on not repeat not being disarmed. No repeat no British interference.’ (WO 204/8903.) However, the cable was dated 30 November 1944 and therefore could not have been a factor in the KKE’s deliberations on 28 November. 89 Text of communists’ proposals in KKE O fficial Documents, v. 478 f. Papandreou’s decree stipulated that the guerrillas surrender their arms. The communists omitted any reference to this. 90 Kathimerina N ea , 30 Nov. 1944. 91 Text in R 19720, FO 371/43736. 92 Report by ISLD, 4 Dec. 1944 (date of information: 1 December 1944) (WO 204/8902). The socialist was identified only as a leading member of EAM and evidendy belonged to Tsirimokos’s ELD. 93 EAM, W hite Book: M ay 1944-M arch 194 5 (in Greek, Athens, 1975), pp. 37 f. 94 Article in Eleutheri Ellada , 2 Dec. 1944; KKE O fficial Documents, v. 486 f. 95 Leeper to FO, 2 Dec. 1944 (R 19864, FO 371/43736). 96 For a penetrating study of the events in Syntagma Square see L. Baerentzen, ‘The Demonstration in Syntagma Square on Sunday the 3rd of December 1944’, Scandinavian Studies in M odem Greek, No. 2 (Copenhagen, 1978), pp. 1-52. 97 Ibid., 43. 98 Leeper to FO, 3 Dec. 1944 (R 19864, FO 371/43736). 99 Ioannidis, p. 343. This is merely Ioannidis’s interpretation of events, however. He was convalescing in hospital after an operation and was not involved in the KKE’s deliberations. 100 For an account of EAM’s activities in Thessaloniki see G. M. Alexander, ‘British Perceptions of EAM/ELAS Rule in Thessaloniki 1944-1945’, Balkan Studies , xxi (No. 2) (Thessaloniki, 1980), 203-16. 101 Leeper to FO, 4 Dec. 1944 (R 19939, FO 371/43736), text in WO 204/8837. Sarafis replied that he had no authority over ELAS in Athens and advised Scobie to address himself to the ELAS central committee (Sarafis, p. 499). 102 Leeper to FO, 4 Dec. 1944 (R 19929, FO 371/43736); ibid., 4 Dec. 1944 (R 19932, FO 371/43736); ibid., 4 Dec. 1944 (R 19933, FO 371/43736). 103 W. S. Churchill, The Second W orld W ar, vi (London, 1952), 251. 104 Churchill to Leeper, 5 Dec. 1944 (R 19933, FO 371/43736).

CHAPTER S 1 Memorandum by E. R. Stettinius, jun., United States secretary of state, to Roosevelt, 13 Dec. 1944 (768.00/12-1344); Roosevelt to Churchill, 13 Dec. 1944, Foreign Relations o f the U nited States: 1944 , v. 148-51.

Notes to pages 8 0 -8 8

2 63

2 Commons H ansard: 1 9 4 4 -1 9 4 5 , vol. 406, cols. 909, 915, 925-30. 3 Churchill, p. 296. 4 FO minute, 10 Dec. 1944 (R 20361, FO 371/43697). 5 Leeper to FO, 10 Dec. 1944 (R 20427, FO 371/43737). 6 Macmillan, pp. 608 f. 7 Macmillan to Churchill, 14 Dec. 1944 (R 20933, FO 371/43737). 8 Leeper to FO, 7 Dec. 1944 (R 20216, FO 371/43736). According to the AngloGreek Information Service (AIS), the British Political Warfare Executive's branch in Greece, Sophoulis received a 'slashing attack from the Left’. (Weekly report by AIS, 18-24 Feb. 1945, R 4921 FO 371/48260.) 9 W. H. McNeil, The Greek Dilemma: W ar and Afterm ath (London, 1947), pp. 145 f. 10 The communists’ indecisiveness led to a number o f bizarre incidents. For instance, Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, the supreme Allied commander of the Mediterranean theatre, records that when he landed at Kalamaki aerodrome on 10 December, he discovered that the only method of apprising General Scobie’s headquarters o f his arrival was through a telephone exchange controlled by EAM. The latter obligingly put through his call to HQ, 3 Corps and Scobie sent an armoured car to the aerodrome to carry him safely into Athens. ELAS fired on the vehicle en route. (Report by the Supreme A llied Commander M editerranean, p. 9.) 11 Leeper to FO, 12 Dec. 1944 (R 20661, FO 371/43737). 12 Macmillan to Churchill, 15 Dec. 1944 (R 20998, FO 371/43698). Scobie was retained as nominal Commander-in-Chief. 13 See the cables dispatched to the King from Athens between 14-20 Dec. 1944 in R 21830, FO 371/43700. 14 The text is uncertain regarding the word ‘elements’. Macmillan to Churchill, 15 Dec. 1944 (R 20996. FO 371/43737). 15 Leeper to FO, 15 Dec. 1944 (R 20997, FO 371/43737). 16 ‘I must be frank and say that we exerted considerable pressure on* Papandreou’, wrote Macmillan (Macmillan to Churchill, 15 Dec. 1944, R 20996, FO 371/43737). 17 Papandreou to the King, 16 Dec. 1944 R 21830, FO 371/43700). 18 Memorandum by the King to Churchill, 16 Dec. 1944 (R 21030, FO 371/43698). 19 Eden to Macmillan, 16 Dec. 1944 (R 21030, FO 371/43698). 20 Churchill to Roosevelt, 14 Dec. 1944 (R 21067, FO 371/43699). 21 Churchill to Eden, 11 Dec. 1944 (R 20427, FO 371/43737). 22 A. Cadogan, The Diaries o j S ir Alexander Cadogan, ed. D. Dilks (London, 1971), p. 689. 23 Leeper to FO, 14 Dec. 1944 (R 20908, FO 371/43737). 24 ELAS central committee to Scobie, 14 Dec. 1944; Scobie to ELAS central committee, 16 Dec. 1944; FO minute, 17 Dec. 1944 (R 21045, FO 371/43737). 25 Macmillan, p. 621. 26 ELAS central committee to Scobie. 18 Dec. 1944 (R 21633, FO 371/43699): FO minute. 24 Dec. and 25 Dec. 1944 (R 21632, FO 371/43699). 27 Eden to Churchill, 23 Dec. 1944 (R 22070, FO 371/43739). 28 Minutes of conference between Churchill, Eden, Macmillan, Leeper, and Alexander, 25 Dec. 1944 (FO 800. 414/54); minute by Eden, undated (R 515. FO 371/48233). 29 Churchill to FO. 26 Dec. 1944 (FO 800. 414/54). 30 Eden to FO, 26 Dec. 1944 (FO 800. 414/54). 31 Tsakalotos, pp. 640-50; minutes of conference between political leaders and EAM, 27 Dec. 1944 (R 4183, FO 371/48258). 32 Minutes of the War Cabinet, 29 Dec. 1944 (WM(44) 175th Conclusions, CAB 65/48). S3 Churchill to Roosevelt, 30 Dec. 1944 (R 22062, FO 371/43739).

264

Notes to pages 88-95

34 Minute by Churchill. SO Dec. 1944 (R 112. FO 371/48244). 35 FO to Leeper, 30 Dec. 1944 (R 22062. FO 371/43739). 36 Minutes of conference between Eden and Damaskinos, 27 Dec. 1944 (FO 800. 414/54). 37 Leeper to FO. 1 Jan. 1945 (R 66. FO 371/48244). 38 Text to address in R 502, FO 371/48245. 39 Leeper to FO. 6 Jan. 1945; Churchill to Eden. 7 Jan. 1945 (R 493. FO 317/48245). ‘KAQ1I we want is to get out o f this damned place’. Churchill remarked to MacVeagh, the American ambassador in Athens (MacVeagh to State Department, 27 Dec. 1944 (868.00/12-2744). Foreign Relations o f the U ntied States: 1944, v. 173). 40 Alexander and Macmillan to Churchill, 7 Jan. 1945 (R 510, FO 371/48245). 41 Minutes of truce talks, 11 Jan. 1945 (R 3400, FO 371/48257); text o f truce in R 891 and R 892, FO 371/48246. 42 Leeper to FO, 12 Jan. 1945 (R 893. FO 371/48246). 43 Leeper to FO. 14 Jan. 1945 (R 1148. FO 371/48247). 44 Macmillan to FO, 17 Jan. 1945 (R 1321, FO 371/48248). A second mass' grave was subsequently discovered in the distria of Kokkinia. Richter’s extraordinary contention that the horrors of Peristeri were the work o f right-wing extremists bent on defaming EAM/ELAS cannot warrant serious consideration. It presupposes that the extremists were able to disinter scores of corpses from the Royal Gardens in central Athens, transport them to Peristeri, mutilate them, dig trenches hundreds o f feet long, and then rebury them without being detected by the population of Athens and the nearly 60,000 British troops by then operating in the capital. Moreover, Richter proffers no explanation for the equally gruesome atrocities in Kokkinia. See Richter, pp. 562 f. 45 Leeper to FO. 18 Jan. 1945 (R 1149, FO 371/48248); FO to Leeper. 13 Feb. 1945 (R 2806, FO 371/48254); ibid., 4 May 1945 (R 7878, FO 371/48366); Leeper to FO, 12 May 1945 (R 8285, FO 371/48366). 46 Alexander and Macmillan to Churchill, 7 Jan. 1945 (R 510, FO 371/48245); ibid., 16 Jan. 1945 (R 1216, FO 371/48247); Leeper to FO, 20 Jan. 1945 (R 1575. FO 371/48249). 47 Macmillan to Churchill, 19 Jan. 1945 (R 1575, FO 371/48249). 48 Text of th.eir statements in R 770, FO 371/48246. 49 Leeper to FO, 2 Feb. 1945 (R 2458, FO 371/48252); ibid., 6 Feb. 1945 (R 2714. FO 371/48254). 50 ELAS’s misdeeds were brought home to the British Left in à report compiled by a mission dispatched to Greece on *22 January by the Trades Unión Congress (TUC). See W hat W e Saw in Greece: Report o f the T.U .C . Delegation (London 1945), pp. 16-18. 51 loannidis, p. 536. 52 Leeper to FO, 4 Feb. 1945 (R 2520. FO 371/48252); ibid., 4 Feb. 1945 (R 2458, FO 371/48253); ibid.. 5 Feb. 1945 (R 2578, FO 371/48253); ibid., 7 Feb. 1945 (R 2754, FO 371/48254); ibid., 7 Feb. 1945 (R 3348, FO 371/48256); Macmillan, pp. 655-7. Savvas Papapolitis, a close associate o f Tsirimokos, confided to Leeper that Tsirimokos had agreed to participate in EAM's delegation to Varkiza ’not in order to assist Siantos, but in order to secure an agreement which would weaken KtheQ, KKE’. Leeper to FO. 6 Feb. 1945 (R 2714, FO 371/48254). 53 Leeper to FO. 13 Feb. 1945 (R 3119, FO 371/48255). 54 Text in KKE O fficial Documents, v. 344-9, and R 3056, FO 371/48255. 55 Leeper to FO, 12 Feb. 1945 (R 3053. FO 371/48255). 56 Memorandum by Macmillan. 15 Feb. 1945 (R 3559, FO 371/48257); minutes o f the War Cabinet, 12 Mar. 1945 (WM(45)29th Conclusions, CAB 65/49). 57 Delivanis and Cleveland, p. 113; Waley to FO, 5 Nov. 1944 (R 17924, FO 371/43724); Macmillan to FO. 8 Nov. 1944 (R 18138, FO 371/43724).

Notes to pages 95—103

265

58 Weekly report by AIS, 11-17 Feb. 1945 (R 4187. FO S71/48259). 59 Waley to FO. IS Feb. 1945 (R 3109. FO S7I/48S27); memorandum by Waley. Feb. 1945 (R 3774, FO 371/48257). 60 Letter by Plastiras to Michael Sideris, 18 June 1945 (R 11836, FO 371/48274). Sideris was a resident of London and Plastiras’s letter was intercepted by censors in the British postal service. 61 Karagiannis, pp. 202 f., 209-11. 62 Leeper to FO. 8 Feb. 1945 (R 3399, FO 371/48256); weekly*report by AIS, 11-17 Feb. 1945 (R 4187, FO 371/48259). 63 On Leeper's remonstrance to Plastiras. see Leeper to FO, 17 Jan. 1945 (R 1325, FO 371/48248). 64 Leeper to FO, 12 Jan. 1945 (R 893, FO 371/48246). 65 MacVeagh to State Department, 18 Jan. 1945(868.00/1-1845). Foreign Relations o f the U nited States: Diplom atic Papers: 1945 via (Washington, 1965), 105. 66 Leeper to FO, 19 Feb. 1945 (R 3472, FO 371/48257); ibid., 20 Feb. 1945 (R 3517. FO 371/48257). 67 Leeper to FO, 21 Feb. 1945 (R 3564, FO 371/48257); ibid., 21 Feb. 1945 (R 3565. FO 371/48257). 68 Weekly report by AIS, 18-24 Feb. 1945 (R 4921, FO 371/48260). 69 Leeper to FO. 22 Feb. 1945 (R 3634, FO 371/48257). 70 Briefing Book Paper on liberated countries, undated; Briefing Book Paper on American policy towards spheres of influence, undated ; memorandum by Stettinius to Roosevelt, 18 Jan. 1945, Foreign Relations o f the U nited States: Diplomatic Papers: 1945: The Conferences o f M alta and Yalta (Washington, 1965), pp. 102-6. 71 Text o f the declaration in U 1218, FO 371/50838. 72 Minutes of the Fifth Plenary Session of the Yalta Conference, 9 Feb. 1945 (U 1688, FO 371/50839); minutes of the War Cabinet. 19 Feb. 1945 (WM(45)22nd Conclusions, CAB 65/51). 73 Leeper to FO, 21 Feb. 1945 (R 3564, FO 371/48257). 74 Leeper to FO, 26 Feb. 1945 (R 3095, FO 371/48258). Plastiras’s patronage appears to have extended to the lower ranks of the officer corps as well. AIS noted that the officer appointed as chief artillery instructor at the Coudhi Training School had ‘never seen a gun fired before and certainly knew nothing about artillery’. Weekly report by AIS, 8-14 Apr. 1945 (R 7421, FO 371/48267). A joke popular in Greek military circles during this period told of an army officer who, while walking in central Athens, was astonished to discover that the statue o f General Theodoras Kolokotronis, a hero of the war o f independence against the Turks of 1821-33, was missing from its horse in Kolokotronis Square. The officer was later informed by a colleague that Plastiras had appointed Kolokotronis to the general staff. I am indebted to Lt.-Gen. Sophocles Tzannetis for this information. 75 Leeper to FO, 26 Feb. 1945 (R 3902, FO 371/48258). 76 Macmillan and Leeper to FO, 5 Mar. 1945; FO minutes, 6 Mar. and 7'Mar. 1945 (R 4385, FO 371/48259). Evelyn Baring Cromer was British agent and consul-general in Egypt between 1883 and 1908. 77 Churchill to Eden, 11 Mar. 1945 (R 4562, FO 371/48259). 78 T his is inevitable’, Churchill remarked. Clark Kerr to FO, 7 Mar. 1945; minute by Churchill, 9 Mar. 1945 (R 4568, FO 371/48236). 79 Leeper to FO, 7 Mar. 1945; minute by Eden, undated; minute by Churchill, 8 Mar. 1945 (R 4562, FO 371/48259). 80 Weekly report by Military Liaison, 2-9 Mar. 1945 (R 5616, FO 371/48262); Leeper to FO. 11 Mar. 1945 (R 4769, FO 371/48260). 81 Leeper to FO, 11 Mar. 1945; FO minutes, 14 Mar. 1945 (R 4771, FO 371/48260).

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Notes to pages 103-109

82 It will be recalled that Mavromichalis refused to attend the Lebanon conference. See above, ch. 1. 83 Weekly report by AIS, 7—13 Jan. 1945 (R 2684, FO 371/48254). 84 Leeper to FO. 15 Mar. 1945 (R 5105, FO 371/48261); ibid., 19 Mar. 1945; minute by Sargent, 21 Mar. 1945; minute by Eden, undated (R 5268, FO 371/48261); Leeper to Sargent. 20 Mar. 1945 (R 6160, FO 371/48264). 85 Churchill to Eden, 29 Mar. 1945; minute by Eden, undated (R 5825, FO 371/48263). 86 Eden to Leeper. SO Mar. 1945 (R 5757, FO 371/48263). 87 Eden to Leeper, 29 Mar. 1945 (R 5757, FO 371/48263); ibid., 6 Apr. 1945 (R 5989, FO 371/48263). 88 Leeper to FO. 31 Mar. 1945 (R 5989.FO 371/48263); ibid., 5 Apr. 1945 (R 6244, FO 371/48264). 89 Weekly reports by AIS: 18-24 Feb. 1945 in R 4921. FO 371/48260; 25 Feb.-3 Mar. 1945 in (R 5028, FO 371/48261; 11-17 Mar. 1945 in (R 5860. FO 371/48263. Sir Quintín Hill, financial adviser to British Embassy, Athens, to Waley, 29 Mar. 1945 (R 5939, FO 371/48329); Hill to Waley, 31 Mar. 1945 (R 6005, FO 371/48329). 90 Leeper to FO, 22 Mar. 1945 (R 5498, FO 371/48262); weekly reports by AIS: 18-24 Feb. 1945 in R 4921, FO 371/48260; 19-25 Mar. 1945 in R 6172, FO 371/48264. The British were responsible for Plastiras’s decision not to appoint Go natas as governor-general o f northern Greece. Gonatas had been active in organizing the Security Battalions during the occupation, and was regarded by Leeper as an unsuitable candidate for high office (Leeper to FO, 18 Jan. 1945 R 1373, FO 371/48248). 91 Text in R 6221, FO 371/48264. 92 Weekly report by AIS, 1-7 Apr. 1945 (R 7138, FO 371/48267). 93 Subsequently, it was rumoured that the British had divulged the letter to the royalists. It is true that a transcript of the letter had been in the possession o f the Foreign Office since 1941 and that on 7 March 1945 Warner, the Second Secretary o f the Embassy in Athens, requested the Southern Department to send him a copy. The Department complied but warned him that there would be ‘very great danger’ in his using it in any way against Plastiras, since the British themselves had been involved in bringing the general to power. Warner replied that he had received reports from A1S that loannis Rallis was threatening to disclose it. As for* himself, T am anxious to refresh my memory about the 1941 correspondence in order to see how it fits in with what is coming out at the trials. There is, of course, no intention of using it.’ Warner to FO, 7 Mar. 1945; FO to Warner, 14 Mar. 1945 (R 4563, FO 371/48259); Warner to FO, 19 Mar. 1945 (R 5702, FO 371/48263). 94 Leeper to FO. 5 Apr. 1945 (R 6244, FO 371/48264). 95 Leeper to FO, 6 Apr. 1945 (R 6317, FO 371/48264). 96 Karagiannis, pp. 217 f. 97 Leeper to FO. 6 Apr. 1945 (R 6244, FO 371/48264). 98 Leeper to FO, 6 Apr. 1945 (R 6317, FO 371/48264); ibid., 6 Apr. 1945 (R 6318, FO 371/48264).

CHAPTER 4 1 Tsatsos .was the brother of Themistocles Tsatsos, an ally o f Papandreou. 2 Text in R 6475, FO 371/48264. The idea of a service government may have originated with Macmillan. See Alexander C. Kirk, United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, to State Department, 8 Apr. 1945 (868.01/4-845), Foreign Relations o f the U nited States: 1945, viii. 122. 3 Weekly reports by AIS: 1-7 Apr. 1945 in R 7138, FO 371/48267; 8-14 Apr. 1945 in R 7421, FO 371/48267; Leeper to FO, 14 Apr. 1945 (R 6744, FO 371/48265).

Notes to pages 109-117

267

4 Weekly report by AIS. 25-31 Mar. 1945 (R 6723. FO 371/48266); Leeper to FO. 4 Apr. 1945 (R 6201. FO 371/48264). 5 Rapp to FO. 20 Apr. 1945; Churchill to Leeper. 22 Apr. 1945 (R 7178. FO 371/48267). 6 Minutes o f conference between the chiefs o f British missions, Athens. 24 Apr. 1945 (R 8190. FO 371/48407). 7 Eden to Churchill. 11 Apr. 1945 (R 5989. FO 371/48263). 8 Churchill to Eden. 6 Apr. 1945 (R 6244. FO 371/48264). 9 Churchill to Leeper. 22 Apr. 1945 (R 7055, FO 371/48267). 10 Leeper to Churchill, 25 Apr. 1945; FO minutes, 26 Apr. 1945 (R 7408, FO 371/48267); Churchill to Leeper, 27 Apr. 1945 (R 7457. FO 371/48267). 11 Macmillan to FO, 18 Apr. 1945 (R 6972, FO 371/48266); Athens Embassy to FO, 18 Apr. 1945 (R 7382, FO 371/48267). 12 loannidis, p. 292. IS Decision o f EAM central committee, 25 Apr. 1945. Text in R 8246. FO 371/48269. 14 Velouchiotis was killed by national guardsmen in June. His head was displayed for a week in the main square of Trikala, a town in Thessaly. 15 Decision of the Eleventh Plenum of the KKE central committee. 10 Apr. 1945 (KKE O fficial Documents, v. 373). 16 Stalin to Churchill, 4 May 1945 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Correspondence between the Chairman ofM inisters o fth e U SSR and the Presidents o f the USA and the Prime M inisters o f Great B ritain during the Great Patriotic W ar o f 1 9 4 1 -4 5, i (Moscow,

1957); 347. 17 Rizospastis, 15 Mar. 1945. 18 For an analysis of the effect of Nazi propaganda on the Creeks' perception of Anglo-Soviet relations see weekly report by AIS, 21-7 Jan. 1945 (R 3106, FO 371/48255). 19 FO to Athens. 2 July 1945 (R 10247, FO 371/48344). 20 Zachariadis issued a statement renouncing the claims upon his release from Dachau, but it provoked such a furore in Greece that it was hastily retracted (Leeper to FO, 27 May 1945, R 9216, FO 371/48343). 21 Minute by Sargent, IS Mar. 1945 (R 5063, FO 371/48219); minute by D. L. Stewart, clerk in the General Department of the Foreign Office, 23 Apr.-1945 (R 7333. FO 371/48292); FO minute, 22 May 1945 (R 8767, FO 371/48237). 22 Churchill to Eden, 29 May 1945 (R 9257, FO 371/48192). 23 Truman disregarded the advice o f Henry L. Stimson. the United Sutes Secretary o f War, who urged him not to jeopardize America's alliance with the Soviet Union by interfering in eastern Europe, a region which had never known democracy (Caddis. pp. 200-2). 24 Minutes o f conference of the Secretary o f Sute's Staff Committee, 29 June 1945 (Foreign Relations o f the U nited States: 1945, viii. 29-31). 25 Memorandum by the American delegation, *Yalu Declaration on Liberated Europe’, 17 July 1945 (Foreign Relations o f the U nited States: Diplomatic Papers: 1945: The Cotference i f Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), ii (Washington, 1960), 643 f.). 26 Minutes of conference between Churchill and Sulin, 18 July 1945 (FO 800. 417/64). Earlier in the year, Stalin had been similarly offended by the West's opposition to his plan to make the communist-dominated Lublin Committee the core o f the post-war government o f Poland. On 24 April he had addressed the following message to Churchill: 'Poland is to the security o f the Soviet Union what Belgium and Greece are to the security o f Great Britain. You evidendy do not agree that the Soviet Union is entided to seek in Poland a Government that would be friendly to it, that the Soviet Government cannot agree to the existence in Poland of a Government hostile

268

Notes to pages 117—124

to it. . . . I do not know whether a genuinely representative Government has been established in Greece, or whether the Belgian Government is a genuinely democratic one. The Soviet Union was not consulted when those Governments were being formed, nor did it claim the right to interfere in those matters, because it realizes how important Belgium and Greece are to the security o f Great Britain. 1 cannot understand why in discussing Poland no attempt is made to consider the interests of the Soviet Union in terms of security as well.’ Correspondence between the Chairman o f M inisters o f the U SSR, i. SSI. 27 Memorandum by the Soviet delegation, ‘The Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe*. 20 July 1945 (P(Tenninal)l 1. U 6197. FO S71/50867). 28 Minutes of the Eighth Plenary Session of the Potsdam Conference. 24 July 1945 (U 6197 FO S71/50867). 29 Weekly report by AIS, 3-9 June 1945 (R 10796, FO S71/48272). 50 Leeper to FO. 2 June 1945 (R 95S9, FO 371/48272). 51 FO S71/48S65, FO S71/48S66, and FO 371/48367. passim. 52 Leeper to FO. 8 June 1945 (R 9941, FO 371/48271). 53 Karagiannis, p. 205. General Karagiannis reaffirmed this opinion during an interview with the author in Mati, Attica, on 22 July 1978. 34 IDEA disapproved of the decision o f Colonel Georgios Grivas, the leader o f X, to transform X into a political party. I am indebted to General Karagiannis for this information. 35 I am indebted to General Karagiannis for this information. 36 Leeper to FO. 1June 1945 (R 9511. FO 371/48423). 37 Leeper to FO, 6 June 1945 (R 9797, FO 371/48423). 38 Memorandum by the Foreign Office to the War Cabinet, 8 June 1945 (CP(45)24. CAB 66/66); FO minutes, 5 June 1945 (R 9511, FO 371/48423). 39 Alexander to Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 1945 (R 10402, FO 371/48272). 40 Leeper remained in London on leave until September 1945. 41 Minutes of conference between Scobie and Chiefs of Staff, 12 June 1945 (R 10122, FO 371/48272). 42 Minutes of conference between Leeper, Scobie, and officials of the Foreign Office and War Office, 12 June 1945 (R 10452, FO 371/48272). 43 Sargent to Chiefs of Staff Committee, 14 June 1945 (R 10452, FO 371/48272). 44 Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary o f State for Foreign Affairs, to Churchill, 4 July 1945; minute by Churchill, 6 July 1945; FO to Athens Embassy, 12 July 1945 (R 10199, FO 371/48423). 45 Weekly report by AIS, 17-23 June 1945 (R 11371, FO 371/48273). 46 Minutes of conference o f Chiefs of Staff, 2 July 1945 (R 11473, FO 371/48274); weekly report by AIS, 1-7 July 1945 (R 12219, FO 371/48274). 47 Cacda to FO, 23 July 1945 (R 12397, FO 371/48239); ibid., 24 July 1945 (R 12458, FO 371/48275); ibid., 3 Aug. 1945 (R 13105, FO 371/48276). 48 Details of Mantzavinos’s proposed budget in R 8376 FO 371/48331; Hill to Treasury. 18May 1945 (R 8738, FO 371/48331); weekly reports by AIS; 8-14 Apr. 1945 in R 7421, FO 371/48267; 15-26 Apr. 1945 in R 7816, FO 371/48268; 22-28 Apr. 1945 in R 8082, FO 371/48269; 13-19 May 1945 in R 9355, FO 371/48271; 27 May-2 June 1945 in R 10435, FO 371/48272. 49 Weekly report by AIS, 6-12 May 1945 (R 9190, FO 371/48270). Deuils on distribution of income in R 8508, FO 371/48331 and R 11995, FO 371/48333. Leeper to FO. 30 May 1945 (R 9386, FO 371/48332). 50 Deuils o f Varváresos’s programme in R 9623, FO 371/48332 and R 9723, FO 371/48332. On his discussions with Treasury officials see R 8508, FO 371/48331; R 9115, FO 371/48331; R 9195, FO 371/48331; and R 9208, FO 371/48331. 51 Extract from Dimokratia, EAM’s newspaper in Thessaloniki, in R 11705, FO

Notes to pages 124—136

2 69

871/48238. Ruospasüs likened Varvaresos to Dr Hjalmar Schacht, the president of the Reichsbank under the Nazis (1933-9). R iiospastii. 18 Aug. and 25 Aug. 1945. 52 Weekly reports by AIS: 1-7 July 1945 in R 12219. FO 371/48274: 8-14July 1945 in R 12702. FO 371/48275. 53 Weekly report by AIS. 22-8 July 1945 (R 13678. FO 371/48276). 54 Eleutheria, 29 July 1945. 55 Weekly report by AIS. 5-11 Aug. 1945 (R 14422. FO 371/48278). 56 Caccia to FO. 6 Aug. 1945 (R 13496. FO 371/48276). 57 Rizospaitis, 2 Aug. 1945. 58 Caccia to FO. 6 Aug. 1945 (R 13166, FO 371/48276): ibid.. 8 Aug. 1945 (R 13332. FO 371/48276). 59 Caccia to FO. 3 Aug. 1945 (R 13105, FO 371/48276). 60 FO to Caccia. 8 Aug. 1945 (R 13166. FO 371/48276). 61 Rizospaitis, 8 Aug. 1945. 62 Weekly report by AIS, 12-18 Aug. 1945 (R 14971. FO 371/48279). 63 Caccia to FO, IS Aug. 1945 (R 13649, FO 371/48276): Caccia to Sargent. 14 Aug. 1945 (R 14008, FO 371/48277). 64 Caccia to Sargent. 14 Aug. 1945 (R 14008, FO 371/48277). 65 FO minute, 8 Aug. 1945 (R 13689. FO 371/48276). 66 Memorandum by Bevin to the Cabinet, 11 Aug. 1945 (CP(45)107. CAB 129/1): minutes o f the cabinet. 14 Aug. 1945 (CM(45)21st Conclusions. CAB 128/1). 67 H ow ard: I 9 4 5 -1 9 4 6 , vol. 413. cols. 289-91. 68 Weekly reports by AIS: 12-18 Aug. 1945 in R 14971, FO 371/48279; 19-25 Aug. 1945 in R 15076, FO 371/48279. Rapp to FO, 25 Aug. 1945 (R 14411. FO 371/48419): Riuospastis, 24 Aug. and 25 Aug. 1945. 69 Texts of memoranda to Damaskinos in R 16464, FO 371/48281. 70 Reports on economic conditions in Greece by E. R. Lingeman, Economic Adviser to British Embassy, Athens: 31 July 1945 in R 16104, FO 371/48446; 16 Aug.-10 Oct. 1945 in R 18824, FO 371/48447. Weekly report by Caccia. 5-11 Aug. 1945 (R 13927, FO 371/48277); weekly reports by AIS: 10-16 June 1945 in R 11010. FO 371/48273; 22-8 July 1945 in R 13678, FÖ 371/48276; 29 July-4 Aug. 1945 in R 13868, FO 371/48277; 5-11 Aug. 1945 in R 14422, FO 371/48278; 19-25 Aug. 1945 in R 15076, FO 371/448279. 71 Caccia to FO, 5 Sept. 1945 (R 15066, FO 371/48279). 72 Caccia to FO. 3 Sept. 1945 (R 14862, FO 371/48278). 73 FO minute. 6 Sept. 1945 (R 15279, FO 371/48279). 74 Memoradum by Damaskinos, 10 Sept. 1945 (R 15578, FO 371/48279). Leeper and Colonel Woodhouse, who had joined Leeper’s staff with the rank of temporary second secretary, assisted Damaskinos in the preparation o f the memorandum. 75 Minute by Sargent, 10 Sept. 1944 (R 15578, FO 371/48279). 76 Ibid. 77 Memorandum by Leeper, 14 Sept. 1945 (R 16291, FO 371/48280). 78 Byrnes and Molotov were in London to attend the first conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers, whose task was to draft peace treaties with Germany and the Axis satellites. 79 Memorandum by Pierson Dixon, principal private secretary to Bevin, 16 Sept. 1945 (R 16292, FO 371/48280). Byrnes believed that it would be sufficient to postpone the plebiscite for one year (minute by James Clement Dunn, United States assistant secretary o f sute, 14 Sept. 1945 (CFM Files - Lot M 88, Box 31), Foreign Relations o f the U nited States: 194S, viii. 157). 80 Bevin to Caccia, 17 Sept. 1945 (R 15991, FO 371/48280). 81 Text in R 15991, FO 371/48280. The announcement was also issued in Paris. On

270

Notes to pages ¡3 6 -1 4 6

the Americans' insistence, the French were to participate in the supervision of the Greek elections. 82 Leeper to FO. 23 Sept. 1945 (R 16280. FO 371/48280). 83 On British pressure for a general amnesty see memorandum by Philip NoelBaker, minister o f sute, to Bevin, 19 Sept. 1945. in R 14973, FO 371/48279; FO to Athens. 26 Sept. 1945, in R 16338, FO 371/48281. On Kyriakopoulos's amnesty see Caccia to FO, 28 Aug. 1945 in R 14598, FO 371/48278; minutes o f conference between the chiefs of British missions, Athens, 28 Aug. 1945 in R 15547, FO 371/48409. Barely 1,500 prisoners were released under Kyriakopoulos’s law (Daniel Lascelles. Counsellor. British Embassy, Athens, to FO. 15 Sept. 1945 (R 15768, FO 371/48280). 84 Lascelles to FO. 7 Sept. 1945 (R 15198, FO 371/48279). 85 Leeper to FO. 3 Oct. 1945 (R 16948, FO 371/48282); ibid.. 6 Oct. 1945 (R 17077. FO 371/48282). 86 Lascelles to FO, 19 Sept. 1945 (R 16441, FO 371/48281). For instance, in Kavala. a town in eastern Macedonia, gendarmes dispersed right-wing demonstrators and removed anti-communist posters during a visit by Zachariadis (Rapp to FO. 23 Aug. 1945, R 14318, FO 371/48419). 87 Report by A. G. Ralph, British police mission, IS Sept. 1945 (R 16136. FO 371/48280). 88 Leeper to FO. 7 Oct. 1945 (R 17083, FO 371/48282). 89 Leeper to FO. 8 Oct. 1945 (R 17130, FO 371/48282).

CHAPTER 5 1 Report on economic conditions in Greece by Lingeman. 16 Aug.-10 Oct. 1945 (R 18824, FO 371/48447); Cacda to FO, 6 Sept. 1945 (R 15140, FO 371/48335); Lascelles to FO. 11 Sept. 1945 (R 15433, FO 371/48335); Hill to Treasury. 11 Sept. 1945 (R 16112, FO 371/48335); weekly report by Lascelles, 2-8 Sept. 1945 (R 15829, FO 371/48280). Weekly reports by Leeper: 16-22 Sept. 1945 in R 16632, FO 371/48282; 23-30 Sept. 1945 in R 17133, FO 371/48282; 1-7 Oct. 1945 in R 17396, FO 371/48283. Weekly reports by AIS: 2-8 Sept. 1945 in R 16135, FO 371/48280; 16-22 Sept. 1945 in R 16927, FO 371/48282; 7-13 Oct. 1945 in R 18435, FO 371/48283. 2 Hill to Treasury, II Sept. 1945 (R 16112, FO 371/48335). 3 Leeper to FO. 8 Oct. 1945 (R 17131, FO 371/48282). 4 Bevin to Leeper. 9 O ct. 1945 (R 17131, FO 371/48282). 5 Sargent to Leeper, 10 Oct. 1945 (R 17132, FO 371/48282). 6 Leeper to Sargent, 11 Oct. 1945 (R 17329, FO 371/48283). 7 FO to Leeper, 10 O ct. 1945 (R 16628, FO 371/48282). 8 Hayter to Lascelles, 10 Oct. 1945; Lascelles to Hayter, 18 Oct. 1945 (R 17101, FO 371/48452); Lascelles to Hayter, 11 Nov. 1945 (R 20925, FO 371/48452). 9 Report by Ralph, British police mission, 14 Oct. 1945 (R 18206, FO 371/48283). One of the first acts of the police mission had been to disarm the police in order to prevent a recurrence of the bloodshed of 3 December 1944. 10 Leeper to FO, 22 Oct. 1945 (R 17985, FO 371/48374); weekly report by Leeper, 15-21 Oct. 1945 (R 18327, FO 371/48283). 11 Bevin to Leeper, 20 Oct. 1945 (R 18452, FO 371/48283). 12 Bevin to Damaskinos, 20 Oct. 1945 (R 18452, FO 371/48283). 13 Leeper to FO, 29 Oct. 1945 (R 18391, FO 371/48283); ibid., SO Oct. 1945 (R 18452, FO 371/48283); ibid., 1 Nov. 1945 (R 18571, FO 371/48284). 14 Bevin to Leeper, 1 Nov. 1945 (R 18571, FO 371/48284). 15 Venizelos had made a brief and unsuccessful attempt to form a cabinet (Daphnis, V eniuloi, pp. 361 f.). 16 Weekly reports by Leeper; 23-30 Sept. 1945 in R 17133 FO 371/48282; 5-11

Notes to pages ¡4 6 -1 5 7

271

Nov. 1945 in R 19662, FO 371/48285. Weekly report by AIS, 4-10 Nov. 1945 (R 19827. FO 371/48285); Leeper to FO. 28 Sept. 1945 (R 16628, FO 371/48282). 17 Weekly report by Rapp, 4-12 Nov. 1945 (R 20411, FO 371/48287). 18 Weekly reports by AIS: 7-13 Oct. 1945 in R 18435, FO 371/48283: 28 Oct.-S Nov. 1945 in R 19491. FO 371/48284. 19 Leeper to FO, 3 Nov. 1945 (R 18726, FO 371/48284). 20 Weekly report by Leeper, 5-11 Nov. 1945 (R 19662. FO 371/48285): weekly report by AIS, 4-10 Nov. 1945 (R 19827, FO 371/48285). 21 Memorandum by Bevin to the cabinet, 3 Nov. 1945 (CP(45)266. CAB 129/4); minutes o f the cabinet, 6 Nov. 1945 (CM(45)49th Conclusions. CAB 128/2). 22 Minutes of conference between McNeil, Leeper, and Kanellopoulos. 14 Nov. 1945 (R 19828, FO 371/48285). Minutes of conferences between McNeil, Leeper. Kanellopoulos, and Kasimatis: 15 Nov. 1945 in R 19825, FO 371/48285: 16 Nov. 1945 in R 20280, FO 371/48338. On the Agreement between the Royal Hellenic Government and the Government o f the United Kingdom concerning the Organization and Employment of the Greek Armed Forces see W 3793. FO 371/32206. and R 3439, FO 371/48765. 23 Minutes o f conferences between McNeil and Kanellopoulos: 14 Nov. 1945 in R 19828. FO 371/48285; 15 Nov. 1945 in R 19830. FO 371/48285. 24 Weekly reports by AIS: ll-17N ov. 1945 in R 20487. FO 371/48287: 18-24 Nov. 1945 in R 20706, FO 371/48287. Weekly report by Leeper. 12-18 Nov. 1945 (R 20169. FO 371/48286). 25 McNeil to Bevin, 16 Nov. 1945 (R 19561, FO 371/48337). 26 Bevin to McNeil. 17 Nov. 1945 (R 19561, FO 371/48337); ibid.. 18 Nov. 1945 (R 19555, FO 371/48285). 27 Minutes of conferences between Damaskinos, McNeil, and Leeper, 19 Nov. 1945 (R 20281, FO 371/48286, and R 20282, FO 371/48338). 28 Leeper to FO. 22 Nov. 1945 (R 19793, FO 371/48285); ibid., 28 Nov. 1945 (R 20090, FO 371/48286). Tsouderos and Kaphandaris were both known to dislike Papandreou intensely. According to Leeper, Tsouderos, in particular, had been ‘consumed by jealousy’ of Papandreou following the latter’s accession to the premiership o f the government-in-exile in 1944 (Leeper to FO, 27 July 1944, R 11609. FO 371/43690). 29 McNeil to FO, 22 Nov. 1945 (R 19699, FO 371/48285); McNeil to Bevin. 23 Nov. 1945 (R 19854, FO 371/48285). SO Leeper to FO. 22 Nov. 1945 (R 19793, FO 371/48285). 31 Weekly report by AIS, 18-24 Nov. 1945 (R 20706, FO 371/48287); Ritaspasäs, 22 Nov. 1945. 32 Text o f statement in R 19838, FO 371/48285. S3 Bevin to McNeil. 22 Nov. 1945 (R 19846, FO 371/48285); Leeper to FO. 25 Nov. 1945 (R 19927, FO 371/48286); MacVeagh to State Department. 26 Nov. 1945 (868.00/11-2645), Foreign Relations o f the U nited States: 1945, viii. 183. 34 H ansard: 1 9 4 5 -1 9 4 6 , vol. 416, cols. 767-74. 35 Memorandum by the King, undated (R 20769, FO 371/48287). 36 Draft of letter from Bevin to Churchill, prepared by Laskey, undated (R 20548. FO 371/48287); memorandum by McNeil to Bevin, 10 Dec. 1945 (R 20745. FO 371/48287). 37 Minutes of conferences between McNeil and Tsouderos: 20 Nov. 1945 in R 21248, FO 371/48416; 22 Nov. 1$45 in R 21249, FO 371/48416. McNeil to Bevin. 22 Nov. 1945 (R 20040, FO 371/48338). McNeil departed for London on 23 November. 38 Leeper to FO, 23 Nov. 1945 (R 19867, FO 371/48285). 39 ‘Report on the Preliminary Visit to Greece by the Allied Mission for the Observation of the Greek Elections’, 10 Dec. 1945 (R 21278, FO 371/48288). Kohler

272

Notes to pages 157—167

was assistant chief of the Division of Near Eastern AfTairs of the State Department. 40 Leeper to FO. 10 Dec. 1945 (R 20790. FO 371/48287); ibid.. 11 Dec. 1945