Greece and the English: British Diplomacy and the Kings of Greece 9780755625161, 9781350171251

Citation preview

To Yiannis, Dimitra-Mimi and Timos

Abbreviations

ASPIDA Axiomatikoi Sosate Patrida Idanika Dimokratia Axiokratia [Officers Save Country, Ideals, Democracy, Meritocracy] CIA Central Intelligence Agency EAM Ethniko Apeleutherotiko Metopo [National Liberation Front] EDA Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera [United Democratic Left] EDES Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos [‘National Democratic Greek Liaison’] EEC European Economic Community ELAS Ethnikos Laikos Apeleutherotikos Stratos [National Liberation Popular Army] EOKA Ethniki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston [National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters] ERE Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosi [National Radical Union] FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office IDEA Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon [Sacred Bond of Greek Officers] KKE Kommounistiko Koma Ellados [Communist Party of Greece] KYP Kentriki Ypiresia Pliroforion [Central Intelligence Service] MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Greece) MI5 Security Service MoD Ministry of Defence (UK) NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ND Nea Demokratia [New Democracy] PAK Panellinion Agonistiko Kinima [Panhellenic Fighting Movement] PASOK Panellinion Sosialistiko Kinima [Panhellenic Socialist Movement] PLO Palestinian Liberation Organisation SAS Special Air Service SD Sicherheitdienst [Nazi Security Service] SIS Secret Intelligence Service

Acknowledgments

My research into the correspondence of Queen Victoria and the Prince of Wales with King George I of Greece was facilitated by permission of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II. I would like to thank Ms Pamela Clark, the registrar at the Royal Archives, Windsor Castle, for her efforts in helping me with the royal correspondence. I owe special thanks to Dr Sotiris Rizas, of the Centre for the Study of Neo-Hellenic History in the Academy of Athens, for his encouragement and interest in my research. I would like also to thank Dr Joseph Maiolo, of the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, for his interest and advice. The staff of the UK National Archives and of the Academy of Athens helped me in finding valuable archival material for this monograph. Special thanks go to Mrs Olympia Wood, Mr John Wood and to Mr. Peter Barnes for their help in editing. I would also like to thank my editors: Rasna Dhillon, Jenna Steventon and Joanna Godfrey at Tauris Academic Studies for believing in this monograph and working towards its publication. Finally, I owe a great debt to my family, Yiannis Dimitrakis, Dimitra-Mimi Petropoulou-Dimitrakis and Timos Dimitrakis, for their moral and material support, for the insightful foreign-policy and history-oriented conversations we have, and for believing all these years in my work.

Introduction

The personalities of the players in a political system, their perception of and attitudes towards power and prestige, shape our understanding of that system, whether monarchy or republic. Royal dynasties constitute a part of history, and students of history are fascinated by the policies, personalities and attitudes of heads of state. From the classical ages onwards, Greece never had a strong tradition of monarchy (μοναρχία), the ‘rule of one’. It seemed that in city-states where democracy was founded and evolved monarchy was unappealing, even though some military leaders, like Alexander the Great, were themselves kings. In modern Greece, after the War of Independence against the Ottoman Empire, monarchy was introduced by Britain, Russia and France through the signing of the Protocol of London in February 1830; Greece was guaranteed her independence, but her head of state would be a monarch. The problem was that Greeks had decided earlier in favour of a republic, besides which there was no Greek royal dynasty. The great powers selected foreign nobles, of the Bavarian and later of the Danish courts, to be named kings of Greece. As we will show in this book, the royal families never considered themselves wholly Greek, failed to understand their subjects, and on many occasions would lament the latter’s mentality and attitudes. This monograph provides a detailed account of British policy toward the Greek crown during the Second World War, the Cold War, the Cyprus insurgency and the regime of the Greek junta. The author focuses his research and narrative on the period 1922–74 because he believes that the dramatic events of the war, the Nazi occupation of Greece, the Cyprus insurgency and the coming of the junta had a direct impact on the status of the Greek crown in the eyes of the people, as well as on their view of traditional allies like Great Britain. In particular, the anti-colonial struggle in Cyprus put Greece and Britain on a collision course, which royal personages like King Paul and Queen Frederica tried to avoid. Moreover, the memories and perceptions



Greece and the English

of the period under consideration have shaped the views – of today’s Greek politicians, historians, journalists and public – on what monarchy is, on its abuses of power and on its responsibility for the seven-year junta that lasted until 1974.

1 Great Britain and the Greek Monarchy

In 1832, Greece was granted her independence from the Ottoman Empire, with Great Britain, France and Russia as guarantors. The War of Independence that had started against all the odds in March 1821 finally led the Greeks to freedom. Despite the resolutions of the national assemblies during the war favouring the establishment of a republic ; events, and international pressure and influence culminated in the option of a monarchy with a king from a foreign court, since the Greeks had no royals at hand. In February 1830, the British, French and Russian governments signed the Protocol of London that gave Greece her freedom, but also mandated that a monarchy be established.1 The great powers first approached Prince Leopold of Belgium; he declined on realising the precarious state of the economy. Prince Otto of Bavaria, the second son of King Ludwig I of the House of Wittelsbach, accepted the offer and was elected king of Greece by Great Britain, France and Russia. They extracted a pledge from Otto’s father to restrain him from hostile actions against the Ottoman Empire and insisted on his title being that of ‘King of Greece’ instead of ‘King of the Hellenes’. The young prince arrived in Greece with 3,500 Bavarian troops and three Bavarian advisers aboard the British warship HMS Madagascar. The Greeks were soon heavily taxed in order to repay British loans issued during the war. The people hated the Bavarian elite and bureaucracy imposed upon them. King Otto showed little respect for local customs; as a staunch Catholic he was considered a heretic among the Orthodox Greeks, never changing his beliefs since he was guaranteed, under the constitution, that he could remain a Catholic. In 1837, Otto visited Germany, where he married the beautiful Duchess Amélie of Oldenburg. In the political arena, the Greek parties in the Ottonian era were influenced by the activities of the diplomatic representatives of Britain,



Greece and the English

Russia and France, and by the affiliation of Greek political figures with these diplomats. So it was a unique political phenomenon that there existed the ‘Russian party’, ‘French party’ and ‘English party’. A key role in politics would be played by the British Ambassador, Edmund Lyons, who also acted as adviser to the English party. By September 1843, the people’s dissatisfaction with the king had reached crisis proportions, and there were demands for the drafting of a constitution safeguarding their rights. Initially, Otto refused to grant this, but as soon as German troops were withdrawn from the kingdom, a military coup was launched. On 3 September 1843, the infantry led by Colonel Kalergis and the prominent General Ioannis Makrygiannis – a veteran of the War of Independence – assembled in front of the palace in Athens (today’s Parliament). Eventually, joined by much of the population of the small capital, the rebellious forces refused to disperse until King Otto agreed to their demand. Left with no option, Otto gave in to the pressure and agreed to the demands of the army and the people. However, the constitution of 1843 preserved the rights and the inviolability of the king. The British were worried about the developments; Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel emphasised to Lord Aberdeen that ‘another triumph over monarchy may be a fatal one’.2 Ambassador Lyons, a Royal Navy commander, took a passionate interest in Greek affairs and promoted liberal reforms that led to the drafting of the 1843 constitution, after which he believed Russian influence in Greece diminished. Lyons and the French Ambassador Theobald Piscatory aimed for the ‘consolidation of the constitutional monarchy’,3 but soon British and French diplomats found themselves at odds when the pro-British Prime Minister Alexander Mavrokordatos (a protégé of Lyons) resigned and the pro-French Nicholas Colletis took over. Back in London, Lord Aberdeen’s assessment was that they should abstain from intervening directly in Greek politics, which Lyons had been doing for some time. Nonetheless, Aberdeen argued that ‘Her Majesty’s Government still entertain a strong desire to promote the prosperity of monarchical and constitutional Greece and this object they will pursue through all obstacles and intrigues which may obstruct their course.’ Lyons was directed to give his advice to King Otto only at the latter’s request; his stance was be that of ‘dignified reserve’.4 King Otto and Ambassador Lyons did not always agree; bad temper was one of the characteristics of the Royal Navy officer. On one occasion the king complained about the ambassador’s lack of manners: he had apparently left a banquet while Otto was trying to approach him.5 Lord

Great Britain and the Greek Monarchy



Aberdeen admitted to the French Foreign Secretary, Francois Guizot, that ‘Lyons is a sailor of no great capacity and very little discretion’.6 For some time he had been urging Lyons not to continue backing Mavrokordatos. In November 1844 he wrote to the furious ambassador, who had been complaining about Colletis’s governorship, reporting only crime and pillage: ‘You have fallen into the old track from which it has so long been my desire to see you extracted . . . I must repeat my positive injunction that no man shall be considered as the English candidate for office.’7 In the mid-19th century, the British backed the monarchy in Greece and urged that Greek foreign policy not be influenced by irredentism, the ‘Great Idea’ (the ‘Meghali Idea’), of Colletis, who wanted to liberate Greek-inhabited territories within the Ottoman Empire. For their part, the French increased their influence in support of Colletis’s aspirations, though only in diplomatic rather than military terms.8 The king’s prestige, which was based in large part on the backing of the Great Powers, mostly of the British, suffered a setback in 1850. Foreign Secretary Palmerston, employing the ‘gun-boat diplomacy’ for which he became renowned, sent the British fleet to blockade the port of Piraeus to exact reparations for injustice done to a British subject. Meanwhile, the ‘Great Idea’ appealed to Otto who, intent on backing Russia, took the country into the Crimean War against Turkey in 1853. Greek troops defended Sevastopol but their strategy was unsuccessful, and resulted in renewed intervention by the Great Powers and a second blockade of Piraeus. In 1862, while Otto was visiting the Peloponnese, a new coup was staged and this time a provisional government was set up and a national assembly summoned. The ambassadors of France, Britain and Russian urged King Otto not to resist, in order to avoid bloodshed, and the king and queen took refuge on HMS Scylla and returned to Bavaria in the same way they had first come to Greece, ‘aboard a foreign warship’.9 Great Britain, France and Russia now had to find another noble for the throne of Greece. St Petersburg and Paris backed Prince Nicholas of Leuchtenburg, a nephew of the Tsar. Greek leaders were also in favour of monarchy, but asked for Prince Alfred, the Duke of Edinburgh; they had been charmed by his personality during a recent visit to Greece. A plebiscite was organised and 230,066 male Greeks voted in favour of Prince Alfred; only 2,400 backed Prince Nicholas.10 Furthermore, Greek leaders planned to ask London to cede the Ionian islands to Greece, hoping also that the British could avert the taking of Thessaly and Epirus by the Turks. However, by late November 1862 Queen Victoria had made it clear to her government that she did not want her second son to become king of



Greece and the English

the Greeks. She was afraid of future anti-royalist agitation; her blood-line should not suffer similar fate as King Otto. Thus Palmerston, now Prime Minister, who wanted to avoid at all costs Prince Nicholas becoming king of Greece, promoted to his cabinet the plan to cede the Ionian islands. A monarch in Greece supported by Russia and France could only lead to the decline of British influence. Thus British diplomats managed to convince their counterparts in France and Russian that both Prince Nicholas and Prince Alfred were unfit for the Greek throne.11 Prince William, the second son of King Christian IX of the House of Glücksburg, was a 17-year-old boy when elected king by the Greek National Assembly, which had deposed King Otto. His nomination was suggested and supported by Britain, France and Russia; he assumed the name George I. In 1864, Great Britain aligned her policy with the new dynasty by accepting the annexation of the Ionian islands by Greece, as a gift to King George;12 the new monarch also cultivated a close relationship with the Prince of Wales, later King Edward VII. In 1866, the Cretans rebelled against the Turks, seeking their freedom and union with Greece. However, London, Paris and St Petersburg were all unwilling to allow the demise of Ottoman rule on the island. A year later, the royal house of Greece was connected to Russian royalty: in 1867 George I, without informing the Greek government, travelled to Russia and married the 16-year-old Duchess Olga Konstantinova. In 1870, the murder of four diplomats and tourists – three British and one Italian – near Marathon in the district of Attica cast a shadow over Anglo-Greek relations. The king personally apologised in a letter to the Prince of Wales, laying the blame on Soutsos, the Minister of War, for not having good intelligence on safety in the areas around Athens. George’s letter explained the circumstances of the murders. Inter alia, he remarked: I really don’t know how I dare write to you after the terrible and horrible tragedy which happened the day before yesterday. You will excuse me if I do so, but I feel so dreadfully wretched and unhappy that it is impossible for me to do otherwise . . . I can scarcely tell you how indignant I was to hear of their capture [of the British and the Italian] and now they are murdered. I feel as if I was going mad, I am so unhappy, and that is useless now, as these poor fellows are dead . . . Today is the funeral at four o’clock, and I am going there myself in an hour. I assure you, my dear brother, I am the most unhappy man in the world. I shall never get over this all my life . . . I myself believe

Great Britain and the Greek Monarchy



that the Minister of War, Soutzo, has not done his duty. It was his duty to know whether there were brigands or not in the province, and he and he alone ought to know what goes on in this province, as all his property is in it. If only [I] could get him condemned!’13 The wording and argument of the letter were both touching and controversial: George had showed empathy in apologising to the British royal family, but on the other hand he had directly put the blame, without much evidence, on a single minister in his own government. One could argue that a monarch has a moral duty to back his subjects and his ministers in communicating with foreign leaders; but George reasoned otherwise. Relations with the Prince of Wales remained cordial; George wrote to him to express his satisfaction at British backing for Greece in the 1878 Berlin Congress. It was decided that the borders in Thessaly and Epirus should be redrawn in Greece’s favour, but that Crete would not be united with mainland Greece.14 The king was always keen to discuss international affairs and diplomacy with his brother-in-law, the Prince of Wales. Albert Edward, accompanied by the Duke of Edinburgh, was to visit Greece in 1888 on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of George’s accession to the throne.15 In November 1902 King George met Lord Kitchener in Paris, where they discussed the Boer War; he wrote a long letter to King Edward VII about the meeting and his impressions, arguing in parallel that the French wanted to improve relations with Britain, focusing their attention on the Mediterranean.16 George I continued ruling in an authoritarian style similar to that of his predecessor Otto; his reign was characterised by clashes with prominent modernising politicians like Harilaos Trikoupis, by the first modern Olympic Games, in 1896, as well as by the catastrophic Greek war with Ottoman Turkey the following year. On 14 February 1898 the king survived an attempt on his life by two men exasperated by their country’s humiliating defeat in the war.17 Even though the dynasty’s coat of arms proclaimed ‘My Power is the Love of My People’, this did not prove to be the case. The monarch interfered in politics, backed selected party leaders, appointing them premiers or ministers, and generally caused enough controversy to make any royal thoroughly unpopular. The British government, however, believed that George I and the monarchy were a force for stability in Greek politics, and British foreign policy remained pro-monarchy until the Balkan Wars and the coming of World War I. The king exercised a great deal of personal diplomacy, but with little success. By the end of the 19th century, the state was bankrupt, under



Greece and the English

pressure from the British, the French and the Germans, amongst others. In 1893, the Greek government declared that the public debt was so great that it could not meet the country’s obligations to her creditors. By 1898 an international commission controlled state monopolies and commerce within Greece. Later, in 1905, George travelled to London to meet King Edward VII. At George’s request he also met British industrialists, seeking to promote exports of Greek fruit – reportedly this led to a great increase in Greek fruit imported into Britain.18 The crown faced the most serious challenge to its royal authority when on the night of 14 August 1909 military units in Athens revolted, demanding the reorganisation of the military, and that the royals renounce their influence among the senior ranks. For decades, interfering in the promotions of the officer corps had secured George I loyal officers, but also caused resentment among the less privileged rank and file who were also loyal to the crown – they never argued in favour of establishing a republic, but did maintain that the king and the princes should not hold military commissions. George avoided a serious clash with the military, and accepted the appointment to the premiership of the liberal Eleutherios Venizelos, a courageous politician from Crete who would leave his mark in politics until his death in 1936.19 In autumn 1912 the first Balkan war started. Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia fought the Ottoman Turks, who suffered defeats and withdrew from Macedonia. Crown Prince Constantine was appointed supreme Greek commander, and the crown became popular once more. In early 1913, King George I reached the port of Salonika, happy to see so many Greek victories. He was willing to abdicate in favour of his son Constantine, something he planned for the 26th October 1913, the 50th jubilee of his reign.20 Tragically, he was assassinated in Salonika on 5 March 1913 and Constantine, who had married Princess Sofia, the sister of Kaiser Wilhelm II, ascended to the throne. Harry Lamb, the British Consul-General in Salonika telegraphed the Foreign Office that the king had been shot with a revolver at point-blank range. The assassin fired two or three shots and the aide de camp, Colonel Skoumbourdis, had no time to stop him. The monarch was transferred immediately to the nearby Red Cross hospital but died upon arrival. Meanwhile, Skoumbourdis and some Cretan gendarmes hunted and captured the assassin, a 48-year-old former teacher named Alexander Shinas, a Greek subject. The government feared the assassin would turn out to be a Turk, Albanian or Bulgarian taking revenge for the Greek victories in the Balkan wars; but, evidently, Shinas was deranged – he had some grievances toward the king and had repeatedly requested

Great Britain and the Greek Monarchy



financial assistance, but he had never met George.21 The body of the king, accompanied by his son and Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos, was taken to Athens aboard the Greek ship Amphitrite. The European powers paid their respects to the late king, and also signalled their interest in future Greek policy, by dispatching warships to accompany George on his last journey to Athens: the Russian warship Uraletz, the German ironclad Goeben, the Italian cruiser San Giorgio, the Austrian Kaiserin und Koenigin Maria Theresa and, lastly, HMS Yarmouth (at Lamb’s suggestion) escorted the Amphitrite to Piraeus.22 Any assassination is a heinous criminal act; and an assassination of a head of state may also reveal the secret plans of another state to influence foreign policy. The police investigation lasted some six weeks, but no other culprits could be found. Eventually, Shinas committed suicide by jumping out of an interrogation room, catching the officer in charge by surprise. Lamb commented that: This desperate act on the part of the assassin had probably relieved the authorities from a certain embarrassment, for the six week’s investigation has revealed nothing indicating that the assassination of the late King was the outcome of anything but the diseased imagination of an individual.23 After the beginning of the Great War and the clash between Prime Minister Venizelos and King Constantine I, many politicians, officers and journalists argued that George had been assassinated by the German secret services in a bid to put on the throne his pro-German son. This conspiracy theory lasted for decades, but it seems its proponents were far from the truth. At that time, Berlin’s strategy did not include the assassination of kings, and Greece mattered little to Kaiser Wilhelm II. Naturally, the assassination surprised everyone at the Foreign Office, but they were preoccupied with strategy and policy regarding imperial Germany. The antagonism of Britain, France and Russia to Germany would soon lead to the First World War. Greece remained a small country in the south-east Mediterranean, with a new king acclaimed for his victories as commander in chief of the Greek expeditionary force during the Balkan wars. A key insight into King Constantine’s character who was also called Constantine IB (the Twelfth; linking his name with the line of Byzantine Emperors), is presented by the memoirs of his trusted private secretary Georgios Melas, who had served him since he was crown prince. Assessing his character might help in understanding his mentality and what

10

Greece and the English

influenced him most in adopting a confrontational policy towards both his prime minister and Britain. According to Melas, Constantine I was a warm person, always seeking to prevail in discussions. He had a ‘childish easiness to open himself ’ to people he met for the first time and to discuss Greek foreign policy with them. This gave many French, German or British politicians, officials and even journalists the wrong impression that he liked them personally.24 He was, evidently, indiscreet with reference to military matters and on at least one occasion foreign military attachés – British, French, Russian, Austrian and German – were aware of Greek military deployment well in advance because they happened to have had a casual discussion with the king earlier. Melas provides an example of royal leakage of secret information during the campaign against the Turkish occupied town of Janinna in north-west Greece in December 1912. A few days prior to a planned offensive, Greek staff officers became alarmed on realising that the military attachés, who were accompanying them as observers, were informed of their attack plan against the city. Initially, everybody suspected a traitor but soon the colonels and the majors were informed that the king had had a casual conversation with the British, French and Russian military attachés, as well as with a female war correspondent, who admitted to the surprised Melas that she had been informed of the offensive by the crown prince.25 Crown Prince Constantine, together with his son Prince George, serving as an artillery second lieutenant, proved to be risk takers, keen to approach and observe the front line of hostilities. During the siege of Jannina, which lasted until late February 1913, the observation post of the royals and of Prime Minister Venizelos came under fire. Venizelos, George and Constantine remained ‘very calm’ as seven shells exploded around them. The shells injured accompanying soldiers just a few metres from their own positions, as General Paraskeuopoulos, the artillery commander, wrote to his wife.26 Later, the brother of the Turkish commander of the town, Veib Pasha, while in captivity, told the general that ‘had he known that the king was nearby he would not have ordered any shelling’. ‘It was politesse of the Turks,’ commented Paraskeuopoloulos.27 On 22 February 1913 Constantine entered Jannina and was hailed as a royal victor, called ‘the son of the eagle’ by the press. Official portraits depict King Constantine as a calm, gentle, tall man with a little hair and a bushy moustache. He did not look like an authoritarian warlord, as his brother-in-law Kaiser Wilhelm II preferred to be portrayed. However, Constantine admired the Prussian military tradition and mindset, had completed his military education in the Berlin

Great Britain and the Greek Monarchy

11

War Academy and had attended courses at Heidelberg University. Born on 21 July 1868, the king believed that it was his and his family’s prerogative to have a decisive say in politics and in the military. However, his reputation suffered considerably during the war of 1897, when he was appointed commander in chief of the armed forces and his troops sustained embarrassing defeats and many casualties. His connection with the army remained, however, and on the eve of the Balkan wars he was again appointed commander in chief. The royals always wished to exercise operational control over the military, in times of both peace and war, and not merely limit themselves to symbolic appearances in ceremonial functions as the chiefs of the armed forces. This is evident in the cases of King Constantine I, King George II, King Paul and King Constantine II, as will be shown later in this book. Constantine I’s secretary Melas asserts that the king revealed his authoritarian personality only in early 1915, surprising everyone.28 Melas commented sarcastically that: ‘On many occasions I observed that our princes ignored the history of the Great French Revolution of 1789, which should be the basis for the education of all kings.’29 According to de Szilaczy, the Austrian ambassador in Athens, the king was un homme à femmes; on one occasion Queen Sofia did not conceal her anger in public on seeing that the king was approached by ‘a former love’. In their turn, Crown Prince George and Prince Alexander had an affection for Britain, but both were against France and Russia, fearing that Russian strategy included the conquest of the Balkans. By 1914, Prince George was urged by Venizelos to marry Elisabeth, Princess of Romania. The match-making seemed doomed to failure – he complained about her weight, she seemed uninterested – but eventually their engagement was announced.30 In August 1914. on the eve of the Great War, Venizelos urged the king to take Greece to war in support of Serbia, with whom Athens had signed a treaty, and of the Entente Cordiale. He argued that Turkey and especially Bulgaria could threaten Greek territories after the collapse of Serbia. On the contrary, the king was urged by Kaiser Wilhelm II to keep Greece neutral. In fact, in 1913 the German monarch presented the king with the baton of a field marshal in recognition of his leadership during the Balkan wars; this gesture played a part in making Constantine I incline more towards Berlin than London. From the start of the war, the king followed a ‘neutral’ (but essentially pro-German) foreign policy, while intervening in Greek domestic politics. London and Paris were hostile to the crown, and backed Prime Minister Venizelos’s policy that Greece should

12

Greece and the English

enter the war on their side. In 1915 Venizelos was forced to resign because his views on foreign policy differed greatly with those of the monarch. Royalist politicians with no following took it upon themselves to serve the crown’s wishes. Moreover, according to Austrian and German diplomatic archives, Queen Sofia maintained constant confidential communication with Vienna and Berlin, informing them of Greek policy and plans as well as of the king’s thinking. For example, according to a telegram of 15 September 1916 from the Austrian ambassador in Athens: [The queen] always remained a Prussian Princess, [she] always showed a great and heartfelt interest for our case [the case of Germany and Austria and their policy that Greece should not enter the war], she facilitated our work. During some critical periods the fact that the king has taken decisions in favour of us, we owe that to the influence of Her Majesty the Queen . . . she has been a loyal wife and unique adviser of the crown.31 Constantine also had a meeting with Lord Kitchener in November 1915 in Athens. ‘Kitchener was impressed and gratified by Royal audience, in cordial way two soldiers discussed topics of military interest. King Constantine has profound admiration for Earl Kitchener’ but was not convinced to enter the war on the side of the Entente.32 The allies landed at Salonika without Greek government approval, and eventually Constantine ordered the General Staff to issue directives that Greek troops surrender to the Germans advancing in Thrace in August 1916. Constantine believed that the Germans could ‘throw into the sea’ the allied troops in Macedonia, but could not himself fight the British and the French. London wanted the king to abstain from his German bias, and backed the provisional government of Venizelos installed in Salonika in autumn 1916. Greece was divided into two governments; royalists and Venizelists, hating each other, were ready to fight and lead the country into a civil war. Meanwhile, Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour considered that: It will be necessary to treat as alien enemies all Greeks resident in the British Empire who are known to entertain royalist sympathies, but that it would be undesirable, in view of the fact that the majority of Greeks resident abroad are sympathizers with the Government of Monsieur Venizelos . . . it may be possible to arrive at a working arrangement based on a differentiation between Royalists and Venizelists, in consultation with the late Greek Minister and with the late

Great Britain and the Greek Monarchy

13

Consul General in London who have been appointed as representatives of Monsieur Venizelos in this country.33 The allies blockaded southern Greece, and Anglo-French units invaded the Athens district to fight royalists and to put pressure on the king. Constantine, who hoped until the last moment for a dashing German victory in Macedonia, was forced by the allies and the Venizelos government to retire to Switzerland, leaving only Prince Alexander behind (the second in the line of succession after Crown Prince George) to take the oath as king in June 1917. In fact, the French government, considering Crown Prince George to be pro-German, pressed for him not to be crowned.34 In the 1915–16 fight against the king, the republican French took the lead, and their excesses in Salonika and Athens would leave the Greeks with bitter memories.35 Meanwhile, the royalist British diplomats and generals loyal to King George V never hid their dislike for the idea of deposing the Greek king, and did not always agree with French attitudes or policy. Since June 1917, King Alexander had been acting more like a regent rather than a crowned king, and Constantine I had not formally given up his title. Venizelos (who also did not seek to abolish the monarchy, despite the anti-royal feelings of his followers, many senior staff officers and other ranks) returned to power and Greek troops advanced in Macedonia together with British and French divisions. Pro-German and royalist officers, politicians and diplomats were forced to retire or were exiled abroad. King Alexander visited the front and consulted with French and British generals. However, there is no record in the Royal Archives of any correspondence with King George V after Greece entered the war on the Entente side.36 In fact, in 1919 Queen Olga and Prince Christopher, the youngest son of the late King George I, were refused a visa to visit Britain.37 Alexander then caused uproar amongst the royals by marrying in secret the daughter of a Greek palace officer.38 However, on 25 October 1920 he died of sepsis, causing a constitutional crisis that led to general elections. Venizelos asked the young Prince Paul to assume the throne, but he declined. The royalist parties’ coalition won, and King Constantine returned in triumph to the country. He reigned throughout the Greek expedition in Asia Minor and the eventual catastrophe. The Foreign Office backed the Greeks, but did not commit forces to the Anatolian front. Despite his electoral defeat, diplomats had understood at that time that ‘Venizelos [was] morally and physically a more permanent phenomenon than King Constantine.’39 They were right: Venizelos would dominate politics until

14

Greece and the English

the mid-1930s. In September 1922, a coup by Venizelist officers would pave the way for Constantine’s exile. The British government showed an increasing interest in the safe departure of the royal family, while the military and the public demanded revenge for the failed leadership during the Asia Minor campaign. The royal family, except Crown Prince George, who had stayed in Athens, boarded the SS Patris accompanied by Vice-Admiral Aubrey C.H. Smith, the head of the British Naval Mission in Greece, and Vice-Admiral Pappageorgopoulos, acting as an observer, and a guard of 16 sailors. The ship was not deemed suitable for heads of state. Smith commented that: [She] bore the traces of it in the dirty state of her decks, bulkheads, etc. but the cabins were moderately clean. New bedding was provided but this did not prevent members of the party being attacked by bugs...I endeavoured to get the parts reserved for the Royal Family clean. Little could, however, be done with the sanitary arrangements, which were deplorable. On 3 October 1922, the ship reached Palermo, but the authorities did not give the royals permission to land. They remained aboard until October 6, when the Italians allowed them to reside in Italy. At first they were the objects of much interest and were followed by photographers, but the attitude of the populace was very respectful . . . I was much impressed by the bearing of Their Majesties during the time on board. Though obviously very tired and overstrained they showed great dignity and self-control, and made light of the inconveniences with which they had to put up.40 However, Constantine was ill and very weak. He died on 9 January 1923 in Palermo. Meanwhile, in November 1922 the British exerted great pressure on the Venizelist officers who had taken power in September not to condemn to death the prime minister and his cabinet, who were being tried for prolonging the failed Asia Minor campaign of 1921. They also pressed hard for Prince Andrew (the father of Prince Philip, the Duke of Edinburgh who was born in Corfu on 10 June 1921) not to be similarly condemned on charges of refusing orders while serving as a lieutenant-general during the operations. However, the revolutionaries proceeded with the trial and the execution of the politicians, despite Venizelos’s statements to the con-

Great Britain and the Greek Monarchy

15

trary. Ambassador Bentinck remarked that: Ever since his arrival in Athens on Tuesday the 28th November, Mr. Gerald Talbot had concentrated all his efforts on saving Prince Andrew’s life. After repeated and lengthy interviews with the influential members of the Cabinet and with Colonel Plastiras, who though outside the Cabinet, shares at present with General Pangalos the chief power in the country, Mr. Talbot eventually succeeded in extracting a promise that, even if the court should condemn His Royal Highness to death, as seemed probable, Colonel Plastiras would exercise the right which he claimed for himself and commute the sentence to perpetual banishment. He would then hand His Royal Highness over to Mr. Talbot, who should have a warship ready to take him away from Greece immediately. Absolute secrecy was essential for the success of the scheme. Eventually, on 2 December at 02.00 hours, Prince Andrew was safely taken aboard HMS Calypso.41 London suspended diplomatic relations with Greece in protest at the execution of the former prime minister and his cabinet, and initially did not recognise the new king, George II, since relations had already been broken off. Lord Curzon was clear: It would be inopportune at the present moment for His Majesty’s Government to agree to the recognition of a sovereign with whose existing Government they have just been obliged to suspend relations because of a series of atrocious judicial murders.42 However, this stance changed after Venizelos, acting as a plenipotentiary of the revolutionary government, took part in the peace negotiations with the Turks, British, French and Italians in Lausanne. In fact, from August 1923 onwards the French government had taken the lead in recognising King George II.43 The reign of George II would be short, since the majority of the Venizelist officers and other politicians (though not Venizelos himself ) supported the need to abolish the monarchy and to establish the ‘Second Hellenic Republic’ (the ‘First Hellenic Republic’ having been declared by the National Assembly during the War of Independence). He remained on the throne until 1924, after the declaration of the Second Republic, and gradually built a reputation as an Anglophile. The Venizelists had

16

Greece and the English

also been strongly Anglophile since the First World War; in fact, from 1924 onwards Anglo-Greek relations would improve to such a degree that French influence in Greece would be sensibly diminished. George, now married to Princess Elisabeth of Romania, asked to visit England to see Queen Mother Olga, his grandmother, and the Foreign Office allowed him to come, on condition that he did so in a private capacity.44 The ageing Queen Olga’s relations with King George V remained cordial: according to a Buckingham Palace message to Ambassador Bentinck, she asked the king personally to intervene with the British legation in Athens to claim some royal jewels locked in a bank vault there. The final part of the message was rather poignant: ‘His Majesty is full of sympathy for Queen Olga who told me that she would have to rely on these jewels for her existence should her allowance be stopped’ after the abolition of the monarchy in Greece.45 The 1920s were sad times for George. His father had died in exile; he had lost his crown; Queen Olga died in 1926; and a few years later his mother, Queen Sofia, passed away after a painful illness. Both queens were buried together with his father, King Constantine, in Florence. In addition, George’s marriage to Princess Elisabeth did not go well. The couple lived permanently in Bucharest; ‘character differences’ appeared (and in July 1935 George was to learn from the newspapers, to his surprise, that his wife had filed for divorce in a Bucharest court).47 George attempted to escape on regular visits to continental Europe and to England, and on many occasions was invited by King George V to Buckingham Palace and Windsor Castle. He maintained contact with British diplomats, and in 1927 urged the Foreign Office not to give further privileges to the Orthodox Arabs in Palestine, something the Greek Orthodox patriarch was against. In 1930, he had a two-hour meeting with a British diplomat at Brown’s Hotel in London. The former king argued in favour of the rights of the Greek-Cypriots under British colonial rule, and for the island’s need one day to gain its autonomy.46 Meanwhile, George maintained regular communication with royalist politicians and officers in Athens, who were all too eager to abolish the republic and to arrange his return to Greece. In late 1934, he was invited by the viceroy of India, Lord Wellington, to participate in a tiger hunt there.48 It was another gesture that showed that the British believed in the son of King Constantine I, the Kaiser’s brotherin-law – the consistent Foreign Office view being that monarchy would be a stabilising factor in Greek politics, and help to keep the country free of communist or socialist influence.

2 King George II At War

King George, aged 45, eldest son of Constantine I and great-grandson of Queen Victoria, returned to Greece in November 1935, after a manipulated referendum had decided that the monarchy was to be restored.1 He was of medium height, slender, with thinning hair, and calm by temperament. George avoided public gatherings and was interested in books and art. As a young man he had attended the Military Academy of Evelpidon in Athens; his fellow cadets remembered the Crown Prince being reserved, serious and a man of few words, a royal personage aware of the great responsibility that came with wearing the crown. The major political players of the 2nd Hellenic Republic established in 1924 were bogged down in controversies, mutinies and military coups led by either pro-Venizelos elements or royalist officers. In the mid-1920s, the dictatorship of Major-General Theodore Pangalos, a loyal Venizelist, showed that democracy always came second when competing with the ambitions of hard-nosed officers and the politicians associated with them. In 1933 and 1935, two mutinies by Venizelist officers created the political conditions for the restoration of the crown, and increased the influence of the conservative, royalist politicians and officers. A pro-royalist military coup within the General Staff in 1935, under General Alexander Papagos, and the positive stance taken towards the crown by General George Kondilis, a former Venizelist and ever-ambitious Secretary of the Army, paved the way for the return of King George II. Violence, controversies and deep hatred between Venizelists and royalists remained key aspects of the political culture in 1935. George projected himself as king of all the Hellenes, and called for general elections to be held on 26 January 1936. The outcome of the poll was that neither the Venizelist nor the royalist party obtained a majority,

18

Greece and the English

and negotiations had to begin for the formation of a coalition government. Eventually, the monarch appointed the moderate Constantine Demertzis as Premier. Ioannis Metaxas, a pro-German officer and one of the shadowy figures who had advised the royals during the First World War, was named Minister of Defence. The Venizelists did not suspect that Metaxas’s intention was to become a dictator. After the death of the aging Demertzis, Metaxas became Acting Prime Minister pending the elections scheduled for the autumn. Metaxas had been putting together plans for a loyalist coup, with the support of the anti-Venizelist military and the security services. Allegedly, George II had been warned of the impending military coup, set for the coming 4 August, but did not take a position against it and did not challenge the fact that Greece had ceased to be a democracy. Persecution of political figures, especially Venizelists, liberals, communists and unionists, intensified. The press in Great Britain and France did not criticise the stance taken by George II towards the demise of democracy; the British were happy to have George as king, while considering Metaxas’s foreign-policy intentions suspect. The British ambassador in Athens, Sir Reginald Leeper, was not surprised by the coming of the dictatorship. His assessment was that Greece had had many dictators and that Metaxas did not have ‘a lot of patience’ with the politicians, noting their tendency to hyperbole when talking about their hardships and the exiles ordered by the regime. Leeper was not shocked by the fact that George II had implicitly supported Metaxas during the 4 August coup.2 However, this decision of the king’s undermined his legitimacy, and within a few years the ghost of the dictatorship would come to haunt the king and the royal family. Metaxas founded his dictatorship on the Nazi and Fascist models. Parades, propaganda, black-shirted youngsters and Roman salutes were prominent features of the new regime. In 1936, Josef Goebbels, the Nazi Secretary of Propaganda visited Athens and official co-operation on anti-communist intelligence was established between the Gestapo and the Greek Foreign Service Police. In 1937, the Greeks shared a communist code with the Gestapo and in August of the same year high-ranking Greek officials attended a special secret-service conference in Berlin.3 In Metaxas’s eyes George II remained loyal to British foreign policy and interests, and the dictator never hid his fear of ‘royalist plots’ against him. In his personal diary he wrote about such ‘party and palace plots’ in 1938: ‘George was not involved but members of his court were.’ Allegedly, George asked General Papagos, the Chief of the General Staff, if ‘the youngsters of EON [the Metaxas party’s youth wing] had been spying on their parents’.4

King George II

19

George II exercised considerable influence over foreign and defence policy, and practised diplomacy on a personal level. He maintained close contacts with British diplomats in Athens and in 1937 paid an official visit to Britain, staying at Buckingham Palace. The king separated himself from his subjects and did not really believe in Greek sovereignty; in 1936 once told the British minister in Athens that ‘Greece should be taken over by your civil service and run as a colony’! In October 1938 he paid another visit to London to discuss with Lord Halifax the plans of the Greek Royal Air Force to purchase the new Spitfire fighters. George’s leadership style did not only involve aspects of high policy and strategy; especially during the Second World War and after the entry of Greece on the side of the Allies, the monarch’s messages covered operational deployments and tactical issues. While in London, George II was advised by Metaxas to visit Berlin. Athens was anxious to maintain good relations with Nazi Germany and Metaxas thought that the king could contribute towards improving relations with Hitler. However, the monarch was unwilling to shake hands with the Führer. He communicated to Metaxas, via a confidant, that he would not visit Hitler at Berchtesgaden. He, however, agreed to see him, ‘this distasteful human, if he happened to be in Frankfurt’ while the monarch was visiting his aunt. In the end, George did not meet the Führer, and Metaxas realised that he could not influence the monarch in the practice of his diplomacy.5 However, the following year, Goebbels paid another visit to Athens and had an audience with George II, where he emphasised the need for Greek neutrality in the case of an Anglo-German war.6 On the eve of the Second World War and of the Italian invasion of Greece, George’s health deteriorated, a fact that was hidden from British diplomats in Athens. Circulatory and heart problems and psychological frustration affected his mood. In a letter to a confidant in September 1937, George wondered openly: ‘Why do I feel so much melancholy and despair when I am alone? Certainly something must not be well inside me. Perhaps some time I might heal it by myself.’ In October, in another letter he made reference to a nervous breakdown: ‘The only medicine for me is a true change, a bit of cold and vibrant air. An entire year of hard work is straining my vitality. Many people tell me the same.’ Castellani, a noted Italian physician, recommended that the king take a new medicine, eat only light meals and have some injections. The monarch disclosed to a friend that: ‘There is a problem with my liver. He [the physician] told me that I need exercise. It seems that I am too tired because of my hard work.’ In January 1940, another physician from Germany visited George and found him in good shape but needing exercise.7

20

Greece and the English

For quite some time, Greek military intelligence had been anticipating an Italian invasion of Greece’s northern territories. After the hot summer of 1940, with dozens of Italian provocations, culminating in the sinking of the Greek destroyer Elli off the island of Tinos on 28 October, Italian armoured and mountain divisions invaded Epirus. In the early morning hours, George II signed all the royal warrants for general mobilisation and attended all major military councils with the Chief of the General Staff, Alexander Papagos, a trusted royalist officer. The same day, King George VI sent an encouraging letter to the Greek monarch, addressing him as his ‘beloved cousin’; Britain would stand together with Greece until the final victory. George VI finished his message with the words ‘Long live Greece and her leaders. Long live the King of Hellenes’.8 The following day, George II replied to this ‘inspiring message’, commending the ‘heroic people of the British Commonwealth and King George VI’.9 From the beginning, George II was involved in daily communication with Prime Minister Winston Churchill, the Foreign Office and the War Office. The special Anglo-Greek royal connection was maintained mainly by the willingness of George II to exercise personal diplomacy on any issue that might arise. The king asked for war materiel – aircraft, armour, artillery pieces – and discussed his country’s needs with high-ranking operational echelons in the British hierarchy. By early November 1940, the Greek Army had not only counter-attacked successfully but also advanced up to Albania. In Athens, George had been complaining constantly about British delays in delivering aircraft and war materiel to Greece on time. General Gambier Parry visited George and listened to his complaints, the monarch stressing that ‘Greece could not live by promises only’ and arguing in favour of British air raids against the Italians in Albania, something the Imperial General Staff did not wish to contemplate because it would directly involve Britain in the Greek campaign.10 The Greeks urgently needed Hurricane and Gladiator fighters, and two Blenheim squadrons for air support, as well as artillery pieces, but further delays added to George’s frustration. ‘I would really like England to have sent a few more planes’ he wrote to a friend on 16 November 1940. On 7 December, he could not hide his discontent: Our co-operation with the English is perfect but, alas, the military material they promised to us has not arrived as yet. Everything desperately needs a lot of time. Very few have already arrived. It is so terrible of them not to do everything possible to send all the necessities with speed.

King George II

21

On 5 January 1941, the king remarked again that ‘very little of the materiel they promised has arrived. All the time they are promising [war materiel] but nothing arrives.’11 On 17 November, George II sent another message to George VI thanking him for his backing. He emphasised the need for more support, and for the establishment of British air bases in Northern Greece to deter Germany from adventurism in the Balkans. His thinking was that Berlin was afraid of RAF bombing of the oil installations in Romania. However, he made reference to ‘disappointment in Greece’ with the delays in the delivery of war materiel. There were only two squadrons of Blenheims and one of Gladiators on Greek soil.12 George II believed that another front needed to be created in Macedonia (as it had been in the First World War) with abundant supplies and deployments from Britain to counter another Italian or Axis offensive. It seems that he believed he could influence George VI as well as the British war strategy in this regard. George VI waited until the 25 November to congratulate George II on the successful Greek operations against the Italians in Albania.13 Meanwhile, Churchill wrote to Metaxas: Heartfelt congratulations on the great Greek victories on the Albanian front culminating in the capture of Korica. We are all inspired by this feat of Greek valour against an enemy so superior in numbers and equipment. This recalls the classic age. Zeeto ee Ellas.14 George VI replied to the Greek king’s 17 November letter on 13 December, insisting that it was the personal efforts of his cousin that had contributed to a large extent to the Greek victories in Albania. On the issue of aircraft for Greece, the British monarch claimed that London had been planning an attack against the Italians in Libya; aircraft were needed for the desert campaign and thus Athens could not be supplied. An Egypt and a Middle East secure from Axis intrusions would also be in the interests of Greece. By countering the Italians in North Africa, the Italian presence in Albania would be weakened. That would ultimately facilitate the transfer of RAF squadrons and aircraft to Greece. This was a somewhat complicated argument. Moreover, the existing operational squadrons in Greece were deemed to belong to the Middle East war-strategy plans against the Italians; thus they would be under the control of Middle East headquarters and not of a Greek officer – with Greek operational priorities – as the king of Greece had already suggested.15 In a word, the British were more interested in safeguarding Egypt than in helping Greece effectively with troops and war ma-

22

Greece and the English

teriel; George II ought already to have understood that he should not ask for more. London was not interested in creating a new Macedonian front. The Foreign Office agreed that RAF aircraft (of the already assigned squadrons) should be deployed in Northern Greece, provided that the Greek authorities upgraded the bases. That would not present a risk of provoking Germany because during the initial British deployment the aircrews would be dressed in civilian clothes; there would be no attack against Romania without the approval of Athens.16 Meanwhile, British diplomats in Athens thought that both George II and Metaxas were at once powerful and politically unchallenged. The king, due to his many public appearances to boost morale, had been credited with the successes of the Greek Army and his popularity had increased. However, the Greek government expected a German intervention in favour of Fascist Italy; Metaxas therefore became extra cautious, avoiding any move that could provoke Berlin.17 The need to avoid ‘provocations’ was something Metaxas believed in until his death in January 1941. In fact, there were fundamental differences in war strategy between the cautious Metaxas and the pro-British George II. As has already been mentioned, George had attempted to convince London to deploy aircraft in Northern Greece, while Metaxas sought to keep Germany out of the Balkans by avoiding bringing in the British. In January and February 1941 the Greek Army continued advancing successfully in Albania. On 2 March, Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, visited Athens to consult with George II, the new Prime Minister Alexander Korizis and the General Staff. Upon his return to Athens, the British ambassador argued in favour of more aircraft for Greece to counter any Italian or German threat. Already the Germans had been massing mechanised divisions in Bulgaria. By the end of the month, RAF squadrons had made 54 sorties against Italian targets on the Albanian front.18 However, the German invasion of Macedonia was just a few days away, and Hitler could not be deterred. The Greek General Staff disagreed with the British suggestion of withdrawing forces from Albania in order to deploy them in Macedonia against the coming invasion. On 2 April, four days prior to the invasion, George II sent another urgent message to Churchill asking for war materiel and troops.19 There were only two British infantry divisions, one brigade, four artillery regiments, and 16 heavy and 72 light anti-aircraft guns in Greece.20 Meanwhile, the British had very good intelligence of the German deployment near the Bulgarian-Greek border, thanks to the ‘Enigma’ decrypts.21 At 0515 hours on 6 April the Germans launched their first attack

King George II

23

against the Metaxas Line (a Maginot-like line of fortifications) on the Bulgarian-Greek border. The Greek General Staff was not caught by surprise, having already assigned reserve divisions to the area. However, the Greeks lacked artillery, air support and armour for a counter-attack. The resistance along the fortified line was heroic, employing mainly medium artillery pieces and machine guns. The attackers suffered considerable losses, but after three days mechanised divisions managed to take the forts and to bypass them. Salonika was the first destination for the panzers. The Greek units on the Albanian front could not react effectively to the German attack, and Commonwealth infantry and mechanised units deployed in the Salonika area had little prospect of inflicting much damage on the attackers. Soon the panzers reached the city and advanced rapidly further south. Greek divisions on the Greek-Albanian border started retreating; some were encircled, and surrendered despite orders to the contrary by the General Staff, their commanders taking controversial decisions aimed at saving their soldiers from a massacre.22 Back in Athens, the General Staff assessed that there was little prospect of keeping Greece free. By 18 April, George II, General Papagos and General H.M. Wilson had agreed to deploy Commonwealth forces in Thermopylae, to delay the German advance on Athens.23 It would be a doomed rear-guard action in the very place where 300 Spartans had fallen fighting the Persians in 480 BC. The same day Prime Minister Korizis submitted his resignation to George II, who declined to accept it; later, Korizis would commit suicide. George II found himself alone, and took over the office of Prime Minister until 21 April, when he called to this position the Venizelist Emmanuel Tsouderos, Secretary of Finance and Foreign Affairs. Ambassador Leeper suggested that George form a ‘national unity government’. Despite the war and the death of Metaxas, Greece was still a dictatorship, and persecutions continued. George II refused to form a national unity government even though he had the status and influence to counter any pro-dictatorship sympathisers.24 In political terms, George II had missed the opportunity to disengage himself from the 1936–41 dictatorship. Perhaps he was afraid that more Venizelists in the government could challenge the crown and the 1935 referendum. Allegedly, George II did not sleep for three days, attending all consultations with the Greek and British General Staff officers and diplomats and taking all major decisions himself. On 23 April George II, Tsouderos and Ambassador Sir Michael Palairet flew to Crete in an RAF Sunderland: the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee were expecting a German naval and airborne attack against the island.25

24

Greece and the English

The king stayed for a few days in Sir Arthur Evans’s mansion, Ariadnae, in Knossos. While in Crete, the son of US President Roosevelt, Commander James Roosevelt, handed George II a personal letter from his father. The President commended George on his own and his people’s valiant struggle in the cause of freedom and wished it would have been possible to send more humanitarian aid to the Greeks.26 The commander in chief of the island’s defence was Lieutenant-General Bernard Freyberg, a New Zealander who had won the Victoria Cross at the Battle of the Somme. He had the task of co-ordinating forces of the Greek Army, reserves, gendarmes, Cretan civilians (famous for their fighting skills) and Commonwealth infantry, even while the German Green Devil’s Junkers 88s were preparing to invade. Enigma decrypts helped Freyberg to plan his defences in time, but the manpower available to him was inadequate to defend the island. The Foreign Office and the British diplomats in Crete were confronted with a question not easily decided in times of imminent conflict: what to do with George II. The monarch had to be got out of Crete – no-one wanted to see him in the hands of German paratroopers. However, simple problems did not necessarily have simple solutions. George II did not wish to fly to Jerusalem, in Palestine, as was suggested to him. He had no desire to embroil himself in the issues of the Greek-Orthodox Patriarchy there; and in Palestine he would have to take a position as head of state. Ambassador Palairet informed George II that the Egyptian government and King Farouk were not willing to welcome him in Egypt, the Egyptians having declared themselves neutral and thus unable to host the head of a belligerent state. Kenya sounded like a better destination for the monarch, and he seemed to agree with that option.27 Surprising everyone, however, Tsouderos argued in favour of another ‘solution’ to their quest: George could stay in British-occupied Cyprus. In fact, Cyprus could be given as a British ‘present’ to Greece, as London had given his grandfather the Ionian Islands back in 1864. George could become the governor of Cyprus and after the war the administration would be handed to the Greeks. Cyprus had become something of a hot potato for British colonial policy and, as will be explored in the chapter on King Paul, it put to the test the special Anglo-Greek royal relationship. Since the First World War, the Greek Cypriots, the predominant majority, had sought enosis (union) with Greece. In 1931, massive pro-enosis demonstrations instigated by Alexander Kyrou, the Greek Consul-General, had culminated in the burning of the Governor’s house. Having George II in Cyprus could, in political terms, be fatal for British interests. Ambassador Palairet

King George II

25

replied to Tsouderos almost immediately that his suggestion did not sound ‘realistic’. Besides, argued the ambassador, Cyprus was in danger of Axis aggression just as Crete was. George II agreed and did not back Tsouderos’s proposal. With German fighters and bombers menacing Crete the last thing the monarch wanted was to upset London over colonial issues. Tsouderos nonetheless pleaded with Palairet, as a personal favour, to inform London of his proposal.28 Meanwhile, George II decided to stay in Crete until the last minute, to avoid discouraging his troops.29 The issue of ‘what to do with George’ still remained unresolved. The Foreign Office suggested that he come to Great Britain, but that he should come alone. Only if it were absolutely necessary should other members of the royal family accompany him.30 In fact, London was suspicious of Crown Prince Paul and especially of his wife, the German-born Princess Frederica, the future king and queen;31 the German connection was a factor the Foreign Office took very seriously. Meanwhile, on 14 May, Hitler declared George II ‘Germany’s chief enemy in Greece’. After the invasion, the occupation and the formation of the Quisling government, the Germans established the ‘Greek State’ (Elliniki Politeia) abolishing the Kingdom of Greece.32 It was Freyberg who wanted George II out of Crete as soon as possible. Allegedly, he dreaded the king’s being taken prisoner ‘on his watch’. The Foreign Office stressed that Freyberg should decide when it would be necessary for George to leave the island,33 but when he suggested 14 May as the day of departure, George declined. According to Ambassador Pipinelis, Freyberg confessed that: ‘He would rather see the king be wounded or killed for his country, instead of being taken prisoner of war.’34 In Crete the royal party was hosted by an ardent Venizelist who had confronted Constantine I during the Great War; but this time was eager to help George by providing shelter and guides on the mountains.35 The fears of Freyberg materialised on 20 May, the first day of the German airborne attack against the island. At about 0750 hours German paratroopers landed close to the mansion where George was staying at Perivolia, a location outside Freyberg’s defence perimeter. The Germans surrounded the house but George, his cousin Prince Peter and their escort had already escaped, accompanied by a platoon of New Zealanders and some Greek gendarmes, and were attempting to approach the Greek lines. The Junkers dropped paratroopers in their vicinity and an exchange of fire erupted; eventually George escaped unharmed (though shocked) and was able to contact Freyberg that night. The latter suggested the king move as far south as possible to avoid any other airborne raids. In the village of Thesisso, George II shared a farmer’s house with Prince Peter, and

26

Greece and the English

the following night they slept somewhere in the mountains, exhausted from walking all day. As the British military attaché later reported, the royal party, together with the New Zealanders, made a difficult passage over the steep mountain of Mavri. Then the track dropped almost vertically for several thousand feet into the valley of the Potamos River. It can be safely assumed that during these two days of trekking on rough terrain His Majesty, the President of the Council, and their parties were exposed to far more risk of suffering an accident, than they would have incurred had their guides had the courage to take the normal and easier route. Had an accident occurred, the embarkation rendezvous might have been missed.36 Throughout this journey, the monarch remained ‘silent and calm’. Next day, in the night hours, the king’s company reached Aghia Roumeli, where they met with staff from the British embassy. George II rested and slept on the beach waiting for the destroyer HMS Decoy to pick him up, together with Tsouderos and the others. Alexandria in Egypt would be their first destination,37 the Egyptian government having finally accepted that the royals might stay for a short time there instead of Cairo.38 In Alexandria, British diplomats tried to convince George not to make pubic his departure from Crete, on the grounds that the fight was still going on there. However, the king’s argument was that ‘he left in order not to obstruct the operations’!39 This sounded awkward, particularly in time of war: soldiers need to know that their head of state is with them, not that he is leaving to ‘enable them to fight’. Foreign Secretary Eden argued that there had to be a delay in the announcement, and the Foreign Office would see the matter through; this was communicated to the king.40 In the eyes of the present author, George’s argument, during a time of crisis, put his political intellect and his appreciation of the situation in an unflattering light. The monarch was adamant, however, and issued his communiqué the same day. He told the British in Alexandria that in political terms he was the one to decide on the publication and wording of his communiqué.41 For the British diplomats and the Foreign Office this incident would be the first of a number of crises involving George II in exile, until the liberation of Greece and the new referendum in 1946. A few days later, in a private conversation at the British embassy in Cairo, George II blamed the British for his evacuation from Crete. He argued that they had had operational command of the island for six months, but did not organise a systematic defence and lacked air support. However,

King George II

27

he stated that he admired the efforts of Freyberg.42 Later, the British tried to explain to George II that if he had left prior to the start of the German attack, this would have made the attackers suspicious of British success in decoding Enigma signals.43 By the end of May, the Foreign Office had solved the riddle of ‘where to put George’. South Africa and then London would be his destination. The Greek royal family – George II, Crown Prince Paul and Princess Frederica (who in June 1940 had given birth to Prince Constantine) – would reach Cape Town by ship.44 There Frederica would stay, and after a couple of weeks George, Paul and the government-in-exile would go to London. South Africa was the best possible place for a German princess during the Second World War. However, George did not conceal his dislike of the South African excursion.45 It is very important to emphasise the insecurity that George felt. Before leaving for South Africa, he handed the British a list of Greek subjects with anti-monarchy sentiments in Egypt and requested that they be deported by the British authorities. Later, on 18 August 1941, Prime Minister Tsouderos would inform the Greek Minister of the Military and the British of a ‘conspiracy’ against the king.46 George argued in favour for the creation of a joint Anglo-Greek intelligence service and for joint war propaganda; the British military accepted his general plan.47 In addition, he was suspicious of Greek cabinet secretaries in Egypt and the information they were receiving from Greece. He confided to the Foreign Office that the British embassy should be suspicious of intelligence from Greece coming from Greek secretaries and other sources.48 In a word, the head of state was telling foreign diplomats ‘not to trust his cabinet secretaries for intelligence on Greece’. Meanwhile, a personal message from Churchill congratulating him on his stance in Crete reached George II on 1 July, while he was still at sea. The Prime Minister called for a warm welcome for the king when he arrived in London.49 Since the king’s evacuation from Crete many Greek officers, NCOs and soldiers, as well as civilians, had escaped to Egypt in order to serve with the allied forces there. Not all of these people supported the dictatorship of Metaxas – many were Venizelists and liberals who had suffered persecution during his rule, and there were also socialists and communists among them. Before long the British would start receiving reports about the disciplinary problems arising within the newly formed Greek army units. Democratic soldiers and sergeants were unwilling to serve under captains and majors loyal to George II and to the Metaxas regime. By the time Erwin Rommel’s panzers had advanced in North Africa the problems regarding the opera-

28

Greece and the English

tional efficiency of the Greek army had become so serious that the British had to take action, and General Sir Claude Auchinleck sent an assessment of the situation to the War Office. The unrest in the Greek units was caused by uncertainty about the future role of the Greek military, some arguing that the army should undertake internal security missions after liberation and others that it should be exclusively employed in mountain warfare. There were also political intrigues and animosities caused by the failure of George II and Prime Minister Tsouderos to formulate a national policy. General Auchinleck admitted later to ‘our failure to insist on declaration of [Greek] national policy’. Moreover, there was a lack of quality officers, the rumour being that the best men were left back in Greece. Besides, it was entirely possible that some officers had subversive plans: secret intelligence suggested that some were in contact with the enemy.50 Auchinleck had identified the major cause of the Greek military unrest: the failure of Tsouderos and George II to formulate a national policy and to communicate it to the soldiers and politicians who were against Metaxas. King George II, together with the Crown Prince Paul and Princess Alexandra, arrived in London on the night of 22 September 1941. King George VI, Winston Churchill and the entire British royal family attended the welcome ceremony at Victoria station to show that they supported Greece as well as its monarchy.51 British politicians referred to George as a ‘gallant ally’ and a ‘heroic king’ in their speeches. In addition, the British government awarded George the Distinguished Service Order for his leadership and stance during the war.52 The BBC Greek Service’s policy guideline on the ‘King of the Hellenes’ stated that: Full prominence will be given to the work of the King and his government on behalf of Greece. It will be emphasised that in the eyes of Great Britain and the world, the King is now the embodiment of the independence and future liberation of Greece. There will be no mention of the past dissensions [in Greece].’53 A recommendation also to broadcast ‘the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in Greece’ was deleted from the planning drafts. In October, George II accepted an honorary Doctorate of Philosophy from the University of Cambridge.54 London had made its point to the anti-monarchist Greek politicians and officers: the British backed the king for the post-liberation era. However, the Foreign Office had to come up with a strategy for his return to Greece after the end of the German occupation. The British strategy had always been to assess and take into considera-

King George II

29

tion the feelings of the people in occupied Greece, as well as of the many Greek politicians and officers who had been gathering in Egypt. For his part, George II declared himself pro-British, but seemed unwilling to listen to the advice of the Foreign Office on various issues: he suspected everyone who differed with him in his understanding of Greek political developments in Egypt. On 8 October 1941, in a meeting with Eden, George II asked him to take measures against members of the Greek community in Egypt who had behaved disrespectfully towards the crown. He also argued that members of the British services were backing the anti-monarchist Greeks by encouraging their plots. The king told the Foreign Secretary that the British should emphasise to the Greeks in Egypt that they ought to obey their king and their government.55 To put it simply, George wanted the British authorities to support him against Greek subjects who might have different ideas about the crown and the post-liberation Greek constitution. Eden must have realised that the king, in political terms, was acting clumsily, and that the Foreign Office should not become George’s weapon. Great Britain certainly had a policy on Greece, but London was not the king’s agent. George continued complaining about anti-monarchist Greeks in Egypt, and made it clear to George VI’s Private Secretary, Sir Alexander Hardinge, that the British government had taken no steps to expel six influential anti-royalist Greeks from Egypt, while the Greek king himself had been made to leave hastily for London.56 The Foreign Office replied to Tsouderos that after careful consideration there could not be any British intervention on the subject of these antimonarchist Greeks (who also happened to be ‘strongly’ pro-British with ‘considerable support in the Greek community in Egypt’.) The British were afraid of ‘violent and undesirable repercussions’. Besides, British intelligence had access to top secret Greek communications. According to secret information, we know from most secret sources which on no account should be compromised that all the members of the Greek government in the Middle East at one moment recommended that the Greek Prime Minister should not proceed with his attempts to have them expelled . . . the removal of these persons is a matter of internal Greek politics in which we have to treat very warily.’57 By the middle of autumn 1941, British diplomats were assigned their first mission within their grand Greek strategy: to convince George to return

30

Greece and the English

to the Middle East in order to boost the morale of the Greek armed forces there, to influence politicians and military officers and to act as head of state in time of war. This was easier said than done, because the king had no intention of leaving London; he preferred to visit the White House and shake hands with President Roosevelt. Eden urged Prime Minister Tsouderos to recommend that George II return to the Middle East; up to then only Prince Peter had remained in Egypt. The Egyptians could be talked into accepting the king’s return, and the proposed visit would unite the Greeks around their king. In addition, the British authorities undertook to make it clear to the Greek community in Egypt that Britain backed the monarch.58 Eden had made it clear that it was not the right time for George II to go to the United States, and directed British diplomats to repeat this to Prime Minister Tsouderos.59 By 18 November, Tsouderos and George II (who stated that he was not willing to travel by ship to the United States) agreed that it would be better to postpone his journey.60 The Foreign Office had achieved a small victory, but George stayed on in London and expressed no desire to go to the Middle East. The War Office pressed for his return to his troops; British staff officers recommended most emphatically that George II and Tsouderos go to the Middle East in order to defuse the tension within the Greek ranks.61 Meanwhile, General Auchinleck was dissatisfied with the operational status and training of the Greek 1st Brigade. He put the blame on the incompetence of the higher-ranking officers, the root cause of which was their political ideology (e.g. republican/Venizelist/anti-royalist vs. royalists). The commanding officer, Major-General Tzanakakis, had to be replaced and George II had to understand the gravity of the situation and the necessity of making changes, for both political and security reasons.62 Besides, there was a very important issue to be addressed: that of the Greek constitution. From Cairo, Oliver Lyttelton wrote to his department in late October 1941 on the issue of Greek constitutional status. George II had still not disengaged himself from the Metaxas dictatorship, and was identified by many Venizelist officers in the Middle East as aiming to restore it after the liberation of Greece. In addition, the Vice-President of the Greek government in Egypt, royalist Rear-Admiral Sakelariou, was such an authoritarian that even Prime Minister Tsouderos was afraid that he might have dictatorial aspirations.63 Lyttelton started pressing his department to recommend to George that he declare the Greek constitution of 1911 to be the true source of sovereignty, and not the provisions enacted in August 1936 by the Metaxas regime. He was worried about anti-crown sentiments in Greece, because people there also believed that George aimed to bring

King George II

31

back the dictatorship.64 The Greek government replied later that no issue could arise, since the 1911 constitution had never been abolished.65 Still, Eden believed that the king and his government ought to dispel any suspicions among the people about the restoration of the dictatorship after liberation.66 The Foreign Secretary assumed that Lyttelton was influenced by democrats and Venizelists, but a clear British policy on Greece had to be communicated. Key points to be made would be that the British government backed George II and Tsouderos, and that the Greek government had to be convinced to dispel any suspicions of restoring the dictatorship. Finally, George II had to go to the Middle East and stay with his troops.67 The Foreign Office accepted Lyttelton’s argument, urging the king and his Prime Minister to broadcast on the radio that any constitutional amendments would be voted for by the Greek people after liberation,68 and that a referendum would decide the new constitution. This was a major policy decision taken by the British government on Greece; nothing was granted to George even though London gave him continuous backing. In the end, the people were the ones to decide on monarchy. The Foreign Office tried to convince Tsouderos of the positive value a broadcast would have if George II declared the abolition of the Metaxas dictatorship.69 Eventually, on 22 October, a new act was signed that covered the establishment and authority of the Greek government-in-exile. This document was considered the de jure abolition of the Metaxas dictatorship, though it took George until 4 February 1942 to abolish all the provisions of the August 1936 dictatorship. The new act, however, was not strong enough to consolidate public opinion in Greece in his favour. Replying to British positions, Tsouderos argued that since he had been appointed President of the Greek government by royal decree back in April 1941, the dictatorship was in fact already abolished; after liberation, the government would establish a free constitutional regime decided by the people.70 It was a legalistic answer, while what the British wanted was an open declaration that would have disengaged the crown from the ghost of Metaxas. The king was frustrated by the British lack of action against anti-crown dissidents in Egypt. In April 1942, in a conversation with Panagiotis Pipinelis, the Greek ambassador in Moscow, George stated that ‘his position was very difficult in England. The English are treating us cordially and I am sure that they back us, but it is unknown why they are telling us lies and they always want to tell us what to do.’ He felt depressed and wrote to a close friend: ‘I am feeling absolutely desperate. So much time is being wasted. All [British] high-ranking officials and officers are eager to help and all have the

32

Greece and the English

best intentions, but the lower ranks are totally corrupted and ill-willed. They will change only if someone speaks to them rudely.’71 George II and his advisor Pipinelis believed that the British secret services, influenced by British leftists, anti-crown Greek politicians and guerrillas, even communists, were conspiring against the monarch and would sabotage his plans to return to Greece. Their alleged aim was to keep the resistance group EAM-ELAS happy (see below). This belief, and the anxiety it generated, is evident in the writings of Pipinelis and lasted until the actual return of the king in 1946. The ‘secret services effect’ influenced the way the king and his advisors (like Pipinelis, who became head of the king’s political office) interpreted British policy towards the Greek monarchy. Gradually, royalist officers adopted an anti-British line of reasoning that would continue until the 1950s and the Cyprus insurgency. George II and Tsouderos were trying to bring in a high-ranking British officer so that together with Prince Peter they could review the situation of the Greek units in the Middle East. However, the Foreign Office did not wish to get too involved in military controversies, suggesting that Tsouderos and the king should decide on the matter themselves, without any intervention by the senior British military.72 Finally, by the end of March 1942, George II and Prime Minister Tsouderos returned to Egypt. The Foreign Office recommended that they stay there until the normalisation of the situation within the armed forces. The king had to understand that his behaviour during his stay in Egypt was a test in which he had to succeed before eventually returning to Greece after the liberation. He had to convince both the people and the divided military that he did not aim to restore the dictatorship. Moreover, Tsouderos had to accommodate more liberals in his administration.73 Despite the initial reservations of George II and Tsouderos, Panagiotis Canellopoulos was appointed Secretary of National Defence on 25 May. Canellopoulos was a sophisticated and moderate socialist politician, educated at the University of Heidelberg in Germany, who left his mark on Greek politics as a man of high intellect. He was against the return of the monarchy to Greece, and worked towards national unity in the Middle East. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s Canellopoulos remained a right-wing politician and Cabinet Secretary, and was the Prime Minister arrested by the junta colonels on 21 April 1967 (see Chapter Four, on King Constantine II). London was the seat of the Greek government-in-exile. For the Foreign Office, cohabitating with George II was no easy task. In a communication to the British Director of Naval Intelligence, George complained that the Foreign Office was ‘pro-Republican and anti-himself ’, prompting com-

King George II

33

ments that this was ‘absurd’ and ‘ridiculous’. Certainly, Admiral Godfrey ‘knew that all that was nonsense’.74 Dixon, of the Foreign Office Southern Department and from 1943 Eden’s Principal Private Secretary, never forgot the attitude of the king, and later commented in his book that George was not a man who understood big issues or inspiring ideas.75 The well-connected American journalist C.L. Sulzberger also wrote about the impression George II gave. In his diary entry for 27 July 1945 he noted: . . . he was friendly as always and full of gossip. If he were not a king, he would be the kind of fellow people call upon at the last minute to fill up a dinner party or a celebrated gossip columnist in the American press. He was convinced . . . that Stalin spoke perfect French (!), that he, George, was constantly being visited by Communist agents, that American businessmen were vitally interested in developing chromium and lead mines in Greece. Every time I talk to him, he impresses me as an amiable idiot without any feelings for Greece, its people or for politics. He seems to think of Greece as a potential area for exploitation by J.P. Morgan & Company. George is obviously determined to get to Greece at the earliest moment.76 Indeed, the king did not have many admirers within the Foreign Office or Downing Street. John Colville, a young diplomat seconded to the Prime Minister’s office and a close associate of Churchill, wrote in his diary that: ‘It would be hard to find two worse advertisements for hereditary monarchy than George of Greece and Peter of Yugoslavia.’77 A close friend of the monarch commented that in the event George did not return to Greece ‘the blame would very largely attach to the Foreign Office and their agents’. His Majesty’s Government’s policy focused on ‘selling the king to his people but not to impose his return’.78 British diplomats admitted that: There is no doubt that if he [George II] wishes to return to his country, he will have to convince his people of his good faith and intention to rule constitutionally. This is an inescapable fact, which perhaps His Majesty is not prepared to recognise. It is of course ridiculous to assert that the Foreign Office as such are anti-King; on the contrary we have continuously fought His Majesty’s battles.79 It was up to George II and his government to do all they could to make themselves popular in Greece and to accept or at least to give serious consid-

34

Greece and the English

eration to British advice; for example, the king could ‘clarify the constitutional issue’. British policy was to urge the king and Tsouderos to visit the Middle East, to make contact with the Greek forces and communities there and generally show active signs of life in an area near Greece, instead of living in comparative inactivity in Claridges and the Dorchester or rushing off on a visit to America . . . We have always been conscious of the fact that the re-establishment of the King in Greece will depend on what he brings back with him. His Majesty will be judged by results.80 George II and Tsouderos stayed in Egypt until early June 1942, when they departed for their official visit to the United States. British propaganda focused on the improvement in Greek-American relations by covering the king’s visit.81 On 9 July 1942 George, Prime Minister Tsouderos and President Roosevelt issued a joint communiqué on their common problems and interests.82 The American press ‘reported the visit fairly’ but not at length: it was judged of no special importance. However, the British embassy in Washington commented on the attitude of the king towards them: The behaviour of the King does not appear always to have been so correct as that of his Prime Minister. While he did not directly try to play off the United States against Great Britain, he is credited with having developed a gift for telling amusing stories with a sting in the tail. These apparently were not overtly malicious, but they redounded to the detriment of Great Britain and to his own credit . . . His Majesty did not feel that he had wholehearted support personally from His Majesty’s Government . . . It would appear therefore that either the King is not, in fact, wholly aware of the extent to which he is being supported by His Majesty’s Government, or he wishes to take out a double insurance in case HMG should modify its attitude.83 In September George II returned to London, where he consulted with Churchill. However, by late October 1942 the armoured and mechanised divisions of Rommel had to be stopped and Egypt kept safe at any cost. Greek infantry units of the 1st Brigade took part in the British Eighth Army’s offensive. Greek companies successfully attacked the 20th Italian infantry regiment and the defensive positions of a German paratroopers’ battalion. On 1 November Greek troops attacked the positions of the Italian Brescia

King George II

35

Division, suffering heavy casualties from enemy artillery, but by 4 November mechanised battalions of the 1st Brigade had cut off the retreat of Italian forces near the Catara Box.84 Meanwhile, Tsouderos confided to Ambassador Palairet that sometimes George doubted if he would ever return to Greece as king. For his part the Prime Minister pointed out to the king that the future of the dynasty depended on him. Tsouderos admitted that some of George’s advisors were a bad influence;85 he was referring to the royalist ambassador in Moscow, Panagiotis Pipinelis, who in his biography of George II has argued that the king should have been more decisive in taking action against anti-crown officers.86 British strategy on the return of the king to Greece evolved from and was influenced considerably by events in Greece. Gradually, the tactics of the Foreign Office began to make George suspicious of London’s true intentions towards him. By late 1942, British diplomats (but not Churchill) had made a rough draft of their step-by-step strategy. First, it had to be made clear that a referendum on the future constitution of Greece would have to be planned for after the liberation. Second, King George II should possibly not return with Greek and British troops prior to the referendum. Third, during the interim period a viceroy might exercise the powers assigned to the crown. In parallel, the British had to pay attention to the most operationally efficient organisation as far as anti-Nazi sabotage and subversion went – the EAM-ELAS guerrilla army – and to the people that remained opposed to the crown. Naturally, George II would become nervous and angry when he heard words like ‘referendum’, ‘viceroy’ and ‘not to return to Greece with the troops as liberator’. Back in Greece two main resistance organisations had been formed: EAM-ELAS and EDES. EAM (‘National Resistance Front’) was the political organisation and ELAS (‘National Popular Army’) the armed struggle group, with divisions, brigades and companies in urban and rural areas. Democrats, liberals, communists and socialists had all been members of and fighters in these organisations, but gradually EAM-ELAS became predominantly leftist and revolutionary. Meanwhile, the smaller EDES (‘National Democratic Greek Liaison’), headed by former Venizelist Major Napoleon Zervas, initially followed an anti-crown policy similar to that of EAMELAS. Gradually, however, the ever-ambitious but also adaptive ‘political animal’ Zervas assumed that he should approach King George II, as long as the British were backing him and could secure for EDES more arms, supplies and money.87 The British Military Mission in Greece and the Special Operations Executive (SOE) planned and executed together with ELAS and

36

Greece and the English

EDES a major sabotage operation, the blowing-up of the Ghorghopotamos bridge in November 1942, a major supply point on the route linking the Balkans with the German North African troops. While the Foreign Office planned the strategy for the return of George II to Greece, SOE never hid their support of EAM-ELAS, for a simple reason: the guerrillas had some operational successes against the occupation forces. They were more efficient in their missions. Foreign Office diplomats who supported Churchill’s pro-monarchy line were openly hostile to the intelligence they received from SOE and to the operatives’ handling of political issues while on missions with the Greeks. SOE sounded too pro-ELAS. But it was a matter of sources. Operatives risked their lives in the mountains and in sabotage operations, and while doing so they were able to assess the feelings of the Greeks towards the return of the king. Most certainly they could not employ the science of statistics, and there was a lot of empiricism in their judgement of the guerrilla leaders and their attitude. Meanwhile, the diplomats in Cairo and London, away from the cloak and dagger games, were developing their strategy of ‘selling the king and government’ to the Greek people.88 Moreover, the most anti-royalist politicians, officers and people were Venizelists – who happened to be strongly pro-British. Edward Warner, of the Southern Department, of the Foreign Office made an insightful comment on royalists and Venizelists that revealed some of the dark tendencies of the former: It must be remembered that it does not in the least matter if we offend extreme Venizelist opinion by backing the King and giving honour where honour is due to Metaxas. What matters is that we should not offend the Royalist opinion. The Germans can never win over extreme Venizelists; but they may be able to make something out of some of the Royalist (or right wing) elements, as in the last war.89 Warner and Ambassador Leeper were sworn enemies of SOE in Greece. Leeper characterised the head of the SOE mission, Brigadier Myers, as ‘a complete disaster’, ‘a dangerous fool’, a ‘fanatic with a very strong streak of megalomania’. In London, the master spy General Gubbins was considered a ‘very difficult man’.90 Orme Sargent was another opponent of SOE who, as late as January 1944, argued in a minute that the guerrilla movement in Greece was a fiction largely created by SOE, and its resistance to the Germans a complete fake. Douglas Howard, the head of the Southern Department of the Foreign Office, had been following the same line since early

King George II

37

1943; he commented on ‘the disastrous effects of our dual policy’ as well as on the danger of its causing a civil war. However, the Foreign Office backed the king and SOE, and the EAM-ELAS. London could back EDES (as an anti-EAM force) only secretly, together with the Archbishop of Athens and the Greek government-in-exile.91 By March 1943 it had been decided that SOE should support only proroyalist resistance groups in Greece.92 George II himself wrote to Churchill emphasising that the SOE should follow the pro-royalist policy of the Foreign Office: There is still one point I wonder whether I might approach you about to make all matters run quite smoothly. That is whether the Service which comes under Lord Selborne might receive the same definite and precise instructions of policy as the ones sent to Mr. Casey, Secretary of State. I take the liberty of writing to you on these matters in confidence as you very kindly told me I could when we parted at Chequers, when you said I might keep in personal touch with you.93 In the king’s and his advisors’ eyes British spymasters, and especially the special forces officers and their spies in Greece, were suspect. The suspicion was that they were planning to do away with the crown in post-war Greece. By the end of spring SOE had reported something the king did not wish to hear: that ELAS had been the main resistance group, and had carried out hundreds of sabotage operations against railways and other installations of the occupation forces.94 By mid-August 1943, Major David Wallace, an SOE officer and a man ‘of very balanced judgment’ the Foreign Office trusted, estimated that ‘there was practically no support that you can trace anywhere for the immediate return of the King.’ He informed the Foreign Office emphatically that: If the King were to return at once in the face of the very strong public opinion against it, there would certainly be disorder and that disorder would be exploited by EAM, who would greatly increase their influence by being able to rally non-Communist elements against the King.95 As will be shown later in this chapter, in 1944 SOE intelligence on developments in Greece and the strong pressure of republican politicians and guerrilla leaders in Egypt and in Greece made Churchill and Eden redraft their policy. There was similarly strong pressure on George II to accept a

38

Greece and the English

referendum and a viceroy, and not to accompany the troops on their return to Greece after liberation. Secret operatives and intelligence officers may have been criticised for their intelligence product and for their anti-crown attitude, but they were successful in influencing British policy. Late in November 1942, George II decided to stay in London and postponed his visit to the Greek units in the Middle East.96 However, by Christmas the Foreign Office wanted the monarch back in Egypt: If the king values his throne and if His Majesty’s Government attaches any importance to the maintenance of the Greek monarchy, it is essential that His Majesty should return to the Middle East without delay to share the life of his troops and abandon the easy life in London. Meanwhile, it was assessed that Crown Prince Paul was acting ‘positively’ in the affairs of the Middle East and should continue there; the same could not be said, however, for Prince Peter, ‘who is a disturbing element’. The Greek government could be persuaded to send Prince Peter to the United States to keep him away from the troops.97 British diplomats continued to urge George II to return to the Middle East, but taking into consideration the negative stance of the Egyptian government towards the Greek crown proposed that the king stay in Palestine.98 For his part, Churchill stated to Eden that it was necessary that George II go to his troops in Cairo, together with the many ministers of his administration who were also staying in London.99 Eventually, the Egyptians and King Farouk agreed that the Greek king and his government could reside in Cairo for the duration of the war.100 Lord Moyne, the deputy Minister of State residing in Cairo, believed that Canellopoulos ought to remain in the government, and that he could have a positive influence on the course of events despite his anti-monarchist profile.101 However, in March new tensions arose within the Greek brigades. Propaganda by EAM-ELAS from Greece influenced conscripts and non-commissioned officers to take over command; soldiers’ committees maintained discipline and continued supervising training. Richard Casey believed that the mutinies had been planned to coincide with the return of George II and Prime Minister Tsouderos to the Middle East. There were effective propaganda leaflets sent from Greece against the government-inexile. Moreover, many high-ranking royalist officers were suspected of planning the return of the dictatorship after liberation, although the lower ranks would not have obeyed them. Casey recommended that the king reshape his cabinet and announce, when suitable, that there would be a referendum on

King George II

39

the future regime in Greece. British diplomats assumed that the announcement would enhance the popularity of the monarch, and thus contribute to the return of the crown to Greece. Casey said, rather bluntly, that the future of George II would be in jeopardy if he baulked at making such a statement; the king ought to display leadership skills in handling the current crisis.102 In their turn, British staff officers were not willing to react to the mutiny without the presence of the king, recommending to the War Office that George II return to Egypt.103 The Foreign Office pressed Tsouderos to convince the monarch to be with his troops in order to boost their morale; until the coming of Tsouderos and George II, the British command would supervise the situation.104 Defence Secretary Canellopoulos threatened to resign, but the British wanted him to keep his post at least until the return of the king. On 13 March George II and Tsouderos left for Egypt, arriving in Cairo two days later. However, despite Foreign Office recommendations, George II asserted that he did not wish to visit the Greek brigades in Syria, prior to the completion of the findings of the Anglo-Greek special military commission investigating the events that had led to the mutinies.105 In reply, the Foreign Office argued that George II had to be with his troops during the Greek War of Independence ceremonies of 25 March, even if the commission’s findings were incomplete;106 royalists and anti-royalists had to understand that their king was with them. George II wanted British officers to command the Greek brigades, in order to deal with their grievances, but the British had no wish to embroil themselves further in Greek military controversies.107 The Foreign Office maintained that installing British commanding officers in the Greek brigades would have ‘destructive consequences’ for the Greek government and especially for George II. The prestige of the Greek army would be diminished in the eyes of their compatriots.108 It was evident that the king’s proposal was a clumsy political manoeuvre, and unacceptable to experienced diplomats. However, the War Office placed Brigadiers Beak and Orr in command of the 1st and the 2nd Brigades respectively.109 On 25 March George II did eventually review the parade of the 1st Brigade, but due to bad weather could not visit the 2nd Brigade until the following day.110 To alleviate the tension among Greeks in the Middle East, British propaganda showcased the interest of the king in his army, as well as his visit to the El Alamein memorial and to military hospitals.111 George II believed that communist groups were the leaders of the mutinies in his army, and he found it very hard to keep his temper when he saw that nothing was being done by the British to punish the instigators. He wrote to a close friend that

40

Greece and the English

he was not in the mood for seeing people for some time while ‘Ambassador old-Leeper was occasionally anxious about the developments…I feel terribly frustrated with the help and support that they [the British] left me to believe that I would receive. Perhaps I hoped for too much.’ Also, the king was being pressed by the Foreign Office to accept two members of EAM in his government, arguing that in this way the anti-royalist EAM-ELAS could be controlled politically; but the monarch referred to these individuals as ‘snakes in the grass always keen to bite’.112 In March and April, the king’s suspicions of the British intensified upon reading British and American journalists’ accounts of the tension within the Greek armed forces; and now the press were commenting that George II had co-operated with the dictatorship of Metaxas. The journalists seemed close to the Greek anti-monarchist faction in Egypt, and gave publicity to its position on the post-liberation regime in Greece. Prince Peter complained, but British officials argued that tolerance was the way to keep order and avoid trouble within the Greek forces,113 and the British press continued printing anti-crown articles. By the end of 1943 Prime Minister Tsouderos had warned the Foreign Office about their negative influence: ‘people in Greece might assume that this is the view of the British people,’ he wrote.114 In December 1943, British diplomats, conscious of intelligence coming out of Greece, suggested to the king that, after the withdrawal of the German troops, he appoint as regent Damaskinos, the Archbishop of Athens; the monarch would not have to return until after the referendum. The British also pointed out to George II that the proposal not to return to the country actually came from prominent members of the Greek cabinet, and from political figures who had stayed in Athens. By April 1944, the Foreign Office had admitted possessing evidence ‘that 80 per cent of the Greek people do not want the King back at least until a plebiscite … if he returns the moderate elements who could confront EAM will remain divided.’ The diplomats, who always criticised SOE’s reports but eventually accepted them at face value, were apprehensive about the king’s reaction: ‘Nothing the Foreign Office says to the King will convince him since he is deeply suspicious of everything we tell him.’ Lasky of the Southern Department commented that: ‘The King obviously has no conception whatever of the true state of public opinion in Greece or of the strength of the antimonarchical feeling.’115 In addition, the Foreign Office made it clear to the king and his Prime Minister that they ought to form an all-party national unity government while the war continued. Without a serious effort in this direction there would be no support from London.116 This meant that EAM-ELAS and

King George II

41

representatives of suspect communist sympathisers would also have to participate. This was anathema to George II, who grew even more suspicious of British intentions. The king and his advisors assumed that a conspiracy of communists, republicans and political leaders of the government-in-exile, as well as the British secret services, had been put to work to overthrow the monarchy.117 For the time being nothing was decided on the question of a referendum after the liberation of Greece. However, British diplomats had to address another important issue: whether the king would accompany the Anglo-Greek troops on their return to Greece. The Administration of the Balkan Territories Committee replied negatively, taking into consideration the anti-royalist feelings of many Greeks. George II angrily argued that his absence would cause serious damage to the crown; besides, a supreme British commander could lead the troops at the operational level – and George wished to accompany him. For his part, Ambassador Leeper feared that the presence of the king would cause outbreaks of hostility among the guerrillas and the population generally; senior British officers would not know how to react if a civil conflict erupted.118 The government-in-exile’s Committee of Defence in the Middle East consulted with Leeper, and decided to advise the Foreign Office that George II would accompany the troops to Greece; the Foreign Office accepted this decision, and Churchill sent a personal message of encouragement to George.119 Eventually, the plan would fail to materialise, and by the end of 1944 the king would become more wary of British plans regarding him, especially when he was pressed to name Archbishop Damaskinos as regent.120 Meanwhile, the War Office continued to fear new tensions and mutinies within the Greek forces in the Middle East, due to ever-present anti-royalist feelings.121 George II felt ‘deeply disgusted and tired’ of the intrigues against him and of the stance of his allies. His depression became more intense, and the ‘illness had wounded’ him, as Ambassador Pipinelis wrote in the king’s biography without, however, specifying what he meant by the word ‘illness’.122 Pressure from London, and from the Greek Prime Minister and cabinet secretaries, made George II understand the value of a public broadcast to the Greek people; he would explain his position, while in Greece EAM-ELAS, EDES and other smaller resistance groups fought the Germans and grew restless with each other. Finally, on 4 July 1943, George II stated his position on the constitution of Greece: . . . on that day when we have driven the hated invader out of our land and we are masters in our own house, you will be invited to decide by

42

Greece and the English

popular and free vote the institutions with which Greece must endow herself in sympathy with the forward march of democracy throughout the tortured continent of Europe, in order to play her grand part in the Mediterranean world . . . On one point in particular I want to be precise. I refer to the free political life of our country, in which I am interested as much as you are. You will realise that conditions for a free expression of the popular will cannot exist until our country has ceased to be a theatre of war. It has secondly been agreed that as soon as the security of our country is complete and the necessities of military operations allow, free and general elections for a Constituent Assembly will be held, and I declare to you that they will take place within six months, as my government has already decided. I am confident that no Greek, and at least of all myself, will fail to respect the decision of the Constituent Assembly. The Constitution of 1911, which is today valid in all its provisions, will be maintained until the Greek nation has expressed its sovereign will. As soon as the seat of Government can be transferred to Greek soil, the members of the present Government will, as has already been stated by the President of the Council, render their resignations to me in order that a Government fully representative of all parties and all currents of public opinion of the nation may be constituted, a Government composed of personalities whose presence will guarantee the freedom and orderliness of these elections . . . Long Live Greece.123 George II did not address the issue of his actual return with the troops, nor did he refer to a ‘referendum’ as such. It was a well-crafted speech, open to interpretation as well as to misunderstanding and leading to hot debates among those Greek leaders who did not want the king to return until after liberation, the restoration of law and order, and a referendum. The king and several members of the government continued to complain about British support of EAM-ELAS and of the British secret services’ inability to ‘control’ the guerrillas.124 On 8 November, George made another statement to Tsouderos, claiming that he would consider the date of his return to the country in consultation with the government at the time of liberation. This was interpreted by influential Greek political leaders like Georgios Papandreou, who was to be appointed Prime Minister in the spring of 1944, as George’s acceptance that he would not return to Greece until the referendum was over. However, Pipinelis, the king’s adviser, argued that nothing could keep George from returning to the country.125 On 11 August 1943, George II had an unpleasant surprise, which in his

King George II

43

eyes proved that the British had their own secret agenda: they had arranged for four high-ranking EAM members to travel to Egypt and meet the monarch. Ambassador Leeper, himself surprised – he had not been informed of this development – tried to facilitate Greek consultations towards the formation of a national unity administration. He had allegedly known of the return of SOE officers with EAM representatives since 21 July. Although he believed that military and political discussions with the EDES and EAM representatives (all holding anti-monarchist sentiments) would take place, he had not warned George II of their visit.126 Trying his hand at last-minute crisis management, the ambassador invited the four EAM representatives to his residence; the king was already there. They met and at a suitable moment the diplomat departed, leaving them to discuss the issues between them; it was a long conversation between EAM and the king ‘in a quite pleasant atmosphere’. By mutual agreement, no political questions were raised. Later the same day, EAM talked with Prime Minister Tsouderos, but no consensus was reached. EAM wanted George II not to return to Greece until after the referendum, and sought the appointment of pro-EAM secretaries in the ministries of Home Affairs, Military and Justice. Next day, Tsouderos consulted with the deputy chief of EDES and a representative of EKKA, the organisation of Colonel Dimitrios Psaros (later to be killed by EAM guerrillas, thus sparking a new conflict amongst the guerrilla factions).127 The royalist and ever-suspicious Pipinelis assumed that this surprise visit was an initiative of the ‘Ministry of Economic Warfare agents’, always keen to conspire against the monarch.128 As to the manning of the new cabinet of the government-in-exile, the Foreign Office believed that a few leftists in the administration would cause less damage than if they were excluded.129 In addition, the Foreign Office pressed for SOE’s ‘Force 133’ in the Balkans to be put under military control, in order to avoid future political-military controversies like the August surprise visit.130 Finishing his despatch about the king’s meeting with the EAM, Ambassador Leeper commented that: ‘His Majesty’s Government must avoid giving the impression that we have anything else in mind but the unity and well-being of an ally whose devotion to the British is almost a religion today in Greece.’ London should encourage the king, his government, the guerrilla bands and the people to be united.131 George II sought Churchill’s advice on the issue of his return, arguing that it would be necessary for him to come back with his troops even if he had to depart afterwards pending the decision of the plebiscite. He asserted that his absence could affect political developments in other countries, especially in the Balkans.132

44

Greece and the English

The Foreign Office’s assessment was that if George II did not return with his troops, this would amount to abdication on his part. The British, despite their pro-monarchy policy, ‘could not guarantee him’ his crown, because they would have to co-operate with any future government in Greece. If at that time the Greek cabinet were full of republicans, Greeks would seek to abolish the monarchy, even if the king returned for a short period. However, according to SOE officers in Greece, even EAM assumed that: ‘Only a pro-British policy can gain popular support and that they are not strong enough to stand alone [against the king].’ In addition, the United States backed George II, as head of state of an allied country.133 By October 1943, a trusted officer, Colonel Emmanuel Fradelos, had returned from Greece. He informed the British that everybody in the country was against the return of the king prior to the resolution of the constitutional issue.134 The British intention to adapt their short-term policy objectives to the developments in Greece and to the anti-royalist attitude of many Greek politicians and resistance groups was the source of much anguish for George II. However, the British must have been confused by another report delivered to them by Prime Minister Tsouderos in early 1944; this estimated that the people did not take very seriously the constitutional issue, that the prestige of the government-in-exile was high and that EAM’s anti-monarchy propaganda was having little effect. However, Leeper warned the Foreign Office that all British secret-intelligence reports argued the opposite.135 On 15 October, George II met Eden, who listened patiently to his complaints. Once again the king argued that SOE was backing the communist EAM and was against him. In addition, he asked Eden for advice on how to respond to those Greek ministers who had asked him not to return to Greece until after the referendum.136 For his part, the Foreign Secretary proposed to Churchill and George II that a vice-regal council under Damaskinos be named after the German withdrawal. Moreover, forces like EDES which were against EAM-ELAS would have to be supported with war materiel.137 George II wished to hear no mention of viceroys, but he accepted the notion of uniting the government-in-exile, EDES and Damaskinos against EAM, in case the latter attempted a coup d’état after liberation.138 In November, George communicated to Prime Minister Tsouderos that he would not accept a referendum prior to his own return to Greece: I think that the discussion [of my returning to Greece or not] might provoke impressions which will weaken the Royal prestige necessary in this national endeavour [the war against Germany]. We should steadily aim at the preservation of this prestige and that of our strength

King George II

45

through unity . . . I wish you to know that when the long-desired hour of liberation of our motherland will strike, I shall examine anew the question of the time of my return to Greece, in agreement with the Government in the light of the political and military conditions of the time, and with the national interest, which is the guide of all my thoughts, as my counsel.139 For his part, Ambassador Leeper proposed a quid pro quo, hoping to convince George: the British government would cease giving any support to EAM so long as the king would accept the appointment of a viceroy.140 The king’s intransigence, however, meant this offer was doomed to failure: he accepted only that Archbishop Damaskinos would be the ‘representative’ of the Greek government in Athens.141 Only Churchill and Eden could put pressure on him but, for the time being, they chose not to. Besides, the allies had been planning to open a second front, the war was continuing in the Pacific and in Italy, and the ‘George II issue’ could not monopolise their time. In March-April 1944, new mutinies on Royal Hellenic Navy warships and in the Greek infantry units in the Middle East made anti-monarchist feelings more evident. Tsouderos’s assessment was that the mutinies in the navy and army were ‘republican’ and not ‘communist’; many officers and other ranks were dissatisfied with the stance of the king; they were resolute in their refusal to accept his return prior to the referendum. However, their dissatisfaction had been exploited by EAM propaganda and the communists. Since Tsouderos had failed to convince the king to wait for a referendum, he decided to resign the premiership.142 For his part, Ambassador Leeper was upset with George II, and could not hide his anger. He wrote that: ‘I feel I must express myself with some bluntness. The King of Greece is playing with fire. He is endangering not only the interests of the monarchy but these of his country by not realising in time the rapid trend of events.’143 Nor was Churchill able to hide his anger at the mutineers and EAM. He made it clear that he recognised only King George and his government as the legitimate representatives of Greece and that ‘the guerrillas in many cases were indistinguishable from banditti’. While telling Ambassador Leeper that ‘King George is the servant of the people and makes no claim to rule them’, he pointed out that the Greeks, after liberation, could decide in favour of a republic or a monarchy. One thing was certain: he would not tolerate any mutinies in the Middle East.144 Eventually, 9,000 Greek officers and soldiers were detained until the end of the Second World War, and some even later. Eighteen were court-martialled and sentenced to death, though their sen-

46

Greece and the English

tences were commuted. In late May 1944, at the Lebanon conference, Prime Minister Papandreou (a Venizelist who had been made a Commander of the Order of the British Empire for his contribution to the allied cause in the First World War) and Ambassador Leeper prepared the ground for the formation of a national unity government. At the hotel Bois de Boulogne the Greek government-in-exile met with the representatives of EAM-ELAS, KKE (the Greek Communist Party) EDES and EKKA. Influential figures from Greek political parties also attended. Their key task was to convince EAM to participate in the new government as well as to regulate EAM’s political aspirations. Anti-monarchist Venizelists and moderate politicians were afraid of the left’s intention to take power by revolution after liberation. EAM’s goal was to be assigned half of the ministries of the new cabinet, focusing on those of the Defence and Justice; Papandreou was suspicious of the guerrillas’ plan, however, and conducted the negotiations skilfully. Meanwhile, EAM had formed a government in the Greek mountains, ‘inviting’ secretaries from Egypt. In the Lebanon, EAM and KKE representatives were pressed to accept a settlement. Essentially, they were not allowed to communicate with their counterparts in Greece, and later were accused of having exceeded their instructions. In May 1944, however, the EAM representatives felt that they had to reach an agreement. Besides, ELAS remained powerful and no government decision could disarm it. Researchers in Greek political history argue that while ELAS remained powerful and attacked EDES, at the Lebanon conference EAM lost in political terms, accepting a compromise with leaders of Venizelist origins and with liberals, people who wanted to preserve the civic state.145 For his part, George II remained absolutely negative towards the idea of appointing a viceroy, and pressed London for more support. By late spring, Churchill and Eden were informed that almost all Greek administration members, political leaders, and EDES and EAM-ELAS guerrillas, as well as the newly-appointed Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou, were against the return of the king prior to a referendum. The archives reveal that while the Foreign Office was fully convinced that George II should not return to Greece upon liberation, Churchill only came to this conclusion in the autumn, during his consultations with Prime Minister Papandreou in Caserta, Italy. In late September, George II wrote to Churchill about the ‘rapidly worsening situation in the Balkans and . . . the abandonment of Greece by Great Britain!’ Britain should immediately send troops to Greece to protect it from any advance made by the Red Army in the Balkans and from a takeover by EAM, which already controlled

King George II

47

many parts of the country.146 This letter was aimed at scaring Churchill into changing the planned deployments in Greece as well as at convincing him that the monarch should return there at once. However, Churchill’s secret negotiations with Stalin were already under way regarding the spheres of influence in Greece and Romania. From 9 to 11 October 1944 he consulted with Stalin in Moscow, putting forward the following proposal: Let us settle our affairs in the Balkans. Your armies are in Romania and Bulgaria. We have interests, missions and agents there. Don’t let us work at cross-purposes in small ways. So far as Britain and Russia are concerned, how would it do for you to have ninety per cent predominance in Romania, for us to have ninety per cent say in Greece, and go fifty-fifty about Yugoslavia? While this was being translated I wrote out on a half-sheet of paper: Romania, Russia 90 per cent, Greece, Great Britain 90%, the others 10% (in accord with USA) Russia 10%, Yugoslavia 50%, Hungary 50%-50%, Bulgaria Russia 75%, the others 25%. I pushed this across to Stalin, who by then had heard the translation. There was a slight pause. Then he took his blue pencil and made a large tick upon it and passed it back to us. It was all settled in no more time than it takes to sit down.147 In the end the Soviets accepted that ‘90 per cent’ of Greece was to be included in the British sphere. Stalin obtained ‘80 per cent’ of Bulgaria and Hungary, ‘90 per cent’ of Romania and ‘50 per cent’ of Yugoslavia.148 The British had to manage another crisis, the protagonist this time being Crown Prince Paul, who seemed adamant that he should return to Greece as regent. In conversations with British diplomats, he called Prime Minister Papandreou a ‘liar’ and claimed that the king was not bound by any government decision from returning to the country prior to the plebiscite.149 This was a contention typical of the royal family, who rarely heard or respected the cabinet in particular or politicians in general. The royal family pursued their own agenda irrespective of the advice given. Fortunately, by 12 October Prince Paul had accepted that neither he nor the king would return at present, but George II would not appoint a regent. Meanwhile, the Greek government had to telegraph to the king the names of all the secretaries appointed, for his approval.150 Churchill argued that: Nothing must compromise the return of the Greek Government with British military support. It will be impossible even to consider the

48

Greece and the English

return of the King to Greece until Papandreou’s Government is established in Athens . . . the King must be kept out of the way. However, the British Prime Minister had not yet accepted Foreign Office advice for a regency council. That ‘would be too offensive to the King,’ commented Churchill.151 By autumn, Churchill seemed to be the last friend George II had in London. Eden argued that since the king or his brother would not return, a regency council was required until the referendum.152 By 21 December 1944, young diplomat Colville remarked in his diary that: ‘There are signs of an impending quarrel between the P.M. and Eden about the regency in Greece.’153 Back in Greece, throughout September 1944 the Abwehr and the Wehrmacht conducted secret negotiations with Archbishop Damaskinos, EAM and representatives of the Greek government to avoid any last-minute bloodshed and destruction in operations planned by the Sichercheitsdienst (SD), the Gestapo and the SS. During the same period SOE officers, in an operation code-named ‘Balaklava’, were secretly deployed in central Athens to report on all military movements and on Greek politics. In fact, the SD planned to blow up the Marathon dam but eventually they were talked out of it by moderate German army officers.154 Between 24 and 26 September in Caserta, Italy, the Greek cabinet, including six prominent EAM secretaries, consulted with General Henry Wilson, Harold Macmillan, General Sarafis (the ELAS commander) and Zervas (the EDES leader, also proclaimed a ‘general’). Prime Minister Papandreou urged ELAS not to deploy more forces in Athens and Salonika. All agreed that Greek forces (e.g. troops from Egypt and Italy as well as guerrillas) be put under the authority of the Greek government. For its part, the government put these forces under the command of Lieutenant-General Roland Scobie, the commander in chief of the British expeditionary force in Greece. EAM-ELAS accepted this and did not attempt to seize power for themselves, acknowledging the legitimacy of the Greek government as well as the mission of the British forces’ commander.155 On 4 October, Churchill met with George II in Downing Street. He informed the king ‘in the outmost secrecy for himself alone’ that the British were planning to deploy forces in Greece and that the Greek royal government would be immediately reinstated in Athens after the Germans withdrew. The Prime Minister argued that he hoped that the Greek government would ‘invite the king’ prior to the referendum. Churchill ‘would personally press them strongly in this direction’. George accepted the advice to remain in England.156 However, the Prime Minister had created expectations that

King George II

49

he could not fulfil and that would test his relationship with George II. Eventually, Churchill wrote to his Foreign Secretary that: I have met all your views about keeping the King of Greece and the Crown Prince in this country for the time being. I certainly had proposed to tell Papandreou that, as soon as he gets in and established, it is his duty to bring the King back, and that we should certainly use our influence to that end. In fact I shall lose interest in the Greek situation if Papandreou turns traitor to the King, whose first minister he is.157 Churchill sensed the coming storm in Athens and the conflict among the Papandreou government, the Greek armed forces, the British and EAM. He wrote to Eden that ‘we might possibly finish up in Athens ourselves’, anticipating his surprise visit to Athens in December, by which time the battle would already have begun. The Foreign Secretary aimed to consolidate ‘moderate opinion’ within Greece in order to counter the pro-communist EAM. An alliance with the archbishop as the chair of the regency committee, the EDES fighters and the Greek government troops would serve this task.158 Eden was more flexible over tactics than Churchill, who was still bringing up the question of the king’s returning prior to the referendum. George II, as a gesture to a close friend and political ally, asked for Churchill’s ‘approval’ before issuing his message to the Greek people on the occasion of the liberation. The king spoke of the need for national unity, of the triumphs of the Greek troops and people, and of the ‘diplomatic battles’ yet to be fought for Greek interests. He made no mention of the plebiscite.159 Athens was liberated on 12 October. On the Acropolis, the German flag was taken down at 0945 hours. At the same time, the officers of the German high command laid a wreath at the monument to the Unknown Soldier. Gradually the last German vehicles withdrew amidst a delirious crowd, and the Anglo-Greek units entered the city from the western and southern suburbs. Following the plan made for the large-scale Anglo-Greek ‘Operation Manna’, on 14 October SAS jeeps drove into Athens from the west and Greek Sacred Squadron troops together with British commandos entered from the south. EAM forces within the city showed some ‘truculence’. However, since EAM had cabinet ministers in the new administration their reaction could be controlled. Besides, EAM, in consultation with the government-in-exile and the British military, had accepted not to deploy more forces in Athens and Salonika. In addition, once again, all political

50

Greece and the English

leaders of the cabinet were reported to be against the return of the king prior to the plebiscite.160 The SAS staff officers with two battalions arrived on 15 October.161 For Athens, 18 October 1944 was a glorious day. Prime Minister Papandreou raised the Greek flag on the Acropolis, declaring the liberation of the country after three-and-a-half years of occupation, atrocities, mass executions and famine. The German withdrawal on mainland Greece was swift and no rear-guard battles took place. EAM-ELAS, EDES and the AngloGreek forces waited for their own wars to begin and seemed uninterested in destroying the German mechanised and infantry divisions. Salonika was liberated on October 30. Meanwhile, in another part of Europe, in Holland, the bitter conflict continued and the British suffered severe casualties in the battle for Arnhem. The Second World War was still being fought – the Battle of the Bulge was still two months away. The Greek government and the British expected that the ELAS units would be demobilised. Many ELAS commanders opposed the agreements of Lebanon and Caserta, and suspicion quickly led to a political breakdown. On 5 November, Prime Minister Papandreou announced that the demobilisation of ELAS and EDES would be completed by 10 December 1944. With the smaller EDES there were no problems – Zervas did not argue over anything. But with ELAS it was different, because the leadership of the KKE aspired to a social revolution in Greece. With the demobilisation of ELAS they would face their opponents unarmed and would lose any chance of installing a communist regime in Greece. The communist leaders were kept uninformed by Stalin about his ‘percentages’ agreement with Churchill. The Political Bureau of the KKE decided in favour of a confrontation; EAM secretaries resigned and the demobilisation negotiations collapsed on 1 December 1944. EAM called for a demonstration on 3 December in the centre of Athens, but the government banned it in advance.162 Meanwhile, Greek troops and gendarmes as well as paramilitary ultraright-wing teams like those of the ‘Chi Organisation’ of Georgios Grivas (the EOKA leader in the 1950s) were deployed in sniper positions around Syntagma square in downtown Athens. Chi had nothing to do with the resistance against the Germans, and always proclaimed the return of George II to Greece. In the dark period that immediately followed the liberation all anti-ELAS groups were protected and allowed to participate in the hostilities, despite the fact of having also collaborated directly or indirectly with the Germans, as in the case of Chi. In fact, as Lieutenant-Colonel Chris Woodhouse, head of the British Military Mission in Greece, put it: ‘Up until the end of 1945 at least the blame of bloodshed lay primarily on right

King George II

51

wing forces, particularly Grivas’s Chi . . . Grivas’s men were viciously active, especially in the Peloponnese.’163 For his part, George II was accusing the British government of having armed EAM-ELAS over all these years, and of not providing the same support to the Greek government troops. On 13 December, he met with Churchill, who asked him to appoint a viceroy; the discussion became heated and an argument erupted. Allegedly, the servants in 10 Downing Street were alarmed enough to open the door of Churchill’s study to see what was going on.164 George II attempted to link his departure from the throne with a military guarantee from Churchill to further reinforce Greek government forces. But it was just a pretext: he did not wish to see any regent. By the morning of Sunday 3 December, it was war-time. British paratroopers, Greek gendarmes and ultra-rightists were placed in sniper positions at Syntagma Square, where police constables had been trying to maintain order. Dozens of EAM unarmed demonstrators approached Parliament and the nearby avenues, and also the house of Papandreou (6 Vasilisis Sofias Avenue), where one was shot by the police officer on guard there. A few minutes later the demonstrators were gathered at the monument to the Unknown Soldier in front of Parliament. At that moment, a person in military trousers with a sub-machine-gun exited the police building shouting ‘shoot these criminals!’ This was the ‘green light’ everybody was waiting for. The snipers started shooting at the crowd indiscriminately. Men, women and children were shot dead. The demonstrators withdrew, but they came back again to pay tribute to the dead, singing the national anthem. A few minutes later, from another direction, Ermou Street, another large group of demonstrators advanced towards the Parliament building. They held up flags stained with the blood of the dead demonstrators. The violence continued and the casualties increased. According to the Greek government, ten demonstrators died and 66 were wounded; EAM claimed 23 dead and 100 wounded. One police sergeant was killed and three policemen wounded. The Chief of Police, Angelos Evert, admitted that he had ordered the police to disperse the demonstrators. On 4 December, the funeral of the victims turned into another demonstration, which ended in a massacre, with 40 killed and 70 wounded. The following day, another demonstration in front of the police headquarters in downtown Athens resulted in 30 killed and 100 wounded. In their turn, ELAS attacked police stations to seize more weapons.165 The cycle of violence and hatred had returned to Athens; demonstrations were replaced by sniping, frontal attacks against buildings and military depots, and urban warfare, with many civilian casualties.

52

Greece and the English

Papandreou and Churchill came to the conclusion that the long-anticipated threat of ELAS taking power had materialised. Churchill became ‘more and more vehement in his denunciation of Communism, and in particular of ELAS and EAM ... [on 4 December] Mrs Churchill had to send him a note begging him to restrain his comments.’166 The British Prime Minister gave explicit orders to Lieutenant-General Scobie to act ‘as if in an occupied country confronting a local insurgency’.167 It should be stressed that many EAM fighters and sympathisers were not communists, but pro-British. EAM always had a large pool of Venizelists-liberals, socialists and others who fought in the resistance and who had no intention of turning Greece into a communist country. So, many EAM fighters and sympathisers were unjustifiably identified with their communist leaders, who believed that they could turn the tables on the Greek government and on the British. By late December, while the Germans were trying to break the American lines in the Ardennes, Churchill took a personal risk and went to Athens. The Foreign Secretary accompanied him on this mission of showing support for the Papandreou government. However, the KKE leaders wrongly assumed that Churchill’s visit proved his weakness, and not his determination to fight them by all possible means. They believed that they could gain a political as well as a military victory, presuming that Stalin had pressured Churchill to abstain from action – while quite the opposite, bearing in mind the percentages agreement, had in fact occurred.168 During the evening of 26 December, in Athens, Churchill and Eden consulted with Papandreou, cabinet secretaries, other political figures, Archbishop Damaskinos and ELAS leaders in the old Ministry of Foreign Affairs building, by the light of oil lamps. Now and then an exchange of fire and the explosion of rockets would break the night silence. John Colville, a junior diplomat attached to Churchill’s party, described the meeting in his diary: ‘Apart from a yellow glow thrown by the lamps on the faces of those seated around the table, darkness prevailed. It was a scene such as would normally be associated with the meeting of some hunted band of conspirators...’169 The conference was chaired by Damaskinos, who sat at the middle of a large table. Churchill and Eden were seated on his right, on his left Field Marshall Alexander. The British party bowed upon the arrival of the three hard-nosed ELAS representatives, KKE Secretary-General Georgios Siantos, General Emmanuel Mandakas and KKE member Partsalides. Damaskinos spoke first, followed by Churchill and later by Alexander. Churchill’s speech was interrupted by the launching of rockets by some Beaufighters: ‘the sound almost drowned his words’, as Colville put it. Later, an old royalist, Maximos,

King George II

53

spoke, as did Papandreou and Partsalides. After some clarifications from Eden, the British delegation prepared to depart, leaving the Greeks to confer among themselves. The British shook hands with everybody, including the ELAS leaders, ‘whose bows could not have been lower, handshakes warmer nor protestations more friendly had they been ambassadors of a party under the deepest obligation to Great Britain’.170 On the doorstep, while Churchill was entered his Quad armoured vehicle, some politicians together with the old-Venizelist liberal Themistokles Sophoulis (later to become Prime Minister) attempted to leave the conference. Sophoulis had never hidden his distrust of ELAS, as well as of King George II. Last-minute pressure from the British, however, induced Sophoulis to return to the negotiating table.171 At this juncture, the Anglo-Greek forces were isolated in downtown areas next to the Parliament building in Syntagma Square, and around the Acropolis. The British Prime Minister understood that the moment was critical for his strategy on Greece. He found himself, literally, encircled both politically and militarily by two power factors, EAM-ELAS on his left and George II on his right. He decided to fight both ways and to back the Greek government. On the one hand, he unleashed Scobie against the guerrillas and reinforced the British paratrooper and infantry units with M4 Sherman tanks. Civilian casualties in Athens rose; the misery and hardship of war had returned to the city of the Parthenon. In fact, the material damage caused by the Athens battle was greater than that suffered during the German occupation. RAF aircraft bombed houses within the city, and mortars and artillery were also employed. On the other hand, Churchill was convinced that he had to confront George II back in London: the king had to appoint Damaskinos as regent. By doing this, Churchill would isolate EAM-ELAS politically, and secure the backing of moderate anti-royalist political figures like former General Nikolaos Plastiras (strongly anti-royalist since the First World War) as well as others from the Party of Liberals to which the majority of anti-royalist Venizelists belonged. Plastiras was soon to become Prime Minister, after the resignation of Papandreou on 31 December. Churchill returned to London on 29 December ready to confront his friend with an ultimatum. George II was invited for an interview in Downing Street at 2200 hours. The Prime Minister explained to the king that the situation in Athens demanded the appointment of Archbishop Damaskinos as regent. George II had less than four hours to reply, until 0200 hours. In the event that the monarch remained adamant, Great Britain would recognise Damaskinos as the head of state and Ambassador Leeper would be

54

Greece and the English

accredited to him. George II would become a ‘distinguished guest’ on British soil. The depressed king returned to his apartment at Claridges, where he told Ambassador Pipinelis: ‘I went there in one mood, and I return in another. I do not know what you will think of me.’172 At 0200 hours George II and Churchill met again in Downing Street, together with Foreign Secretary Eden. ‘Churchill and Eden looked tired and excited by their Athens journey and left British niceties aside,’ commented Ambassador Pipinelis, who also attended the consultations. They repeated that if George II declined to appoint the viceroy, they would recognise Damaskinos as head of state. Another long discussion took place but eventually George II signed the royal warrant to appoint Damaskinos regent for an indefinite period.173 Next day, Churchill admitted in a letter to President Roosevelt that he had told the king that ‘the issue could be taken care of without him’ if he had not appointed a regent.174 That December night in 1944 would not be forgotten by George II, by Crown Prince Paul or by Crown Princess Frederika. The monarch was afraid of losing his crown, much like this father had been when allied pressure forced him into exile in 1917. It was not just SOE, the Foreign Office or the Foreign Secretary who were against him: it was also the British Prime Minister himself, his last friend in London. Back in Athens, Papandreou resigned and on 3 January 1945 Plastiras formed a cabinet, without EAM’s participation. Eventually, over 4–5 January, ELAS units withdrew from the city. However, their presence was very strong in rural areas in central and northern Greece. By February the government and EAM representatives had worked out an agreement for the guerrillas to hand over their arms. The Treaty of Varkiza was signed on 12 February by KKE Secretary-General Georgios Siantos, other EAM leaders and the Greek government. However, the majority of the weapons turned in were obsolete. The communists had been preparing themselves for another confrontation.175 The British embassy and the British Military Mission in Greece supervised economic assistance and humanitarian aid, as well as the reorganisation of the Greek National Army. The constitutional issue was put aside for a while and Damaskinos proved to be skilful in confronting governmental crises. By late October 1945, he had appointed himself Prime Minister after the inability of the political parties to form a government. Throughout the 1945–46 period, ultra-rightists and royalist armed groups killed and terrorised innocent civilians – former members of EAM-ELAS and their sympathisers who had returned to their villages to resume a peaceful life, people who had nothing to do with the December fighting. For their part,

King George II

55

the communists formed groups for self-defence as well as for a new confrontation with the Greek government. They saw the government and the police tolerate crimes committed by individuals and groups who had collaborated with the Germans. The cycle of violence in rural Greece was back on track. In the public’s eyes anti-royalist leaders and parties were identified with communists, to the delight of George II, who had been waiting impatiently in London and who sincerely despised Archbishop Damaskinos. But the king was not in good health. He constantly complained ‘of being tired and of needing fresh air’. The physicians diagnosed no illness; however, it seems either that he was close to a nervous breakdown or that there was a significant nervous problem. In September 1945, he became very angry when he got wind of an official visit of Damaskinos to London, the British not having kept him informed.176 Anger would turn into panic when he heard of Damaskinos’s proposal for a referendum in three years’ time. The Foreign Office, now under Ernest Bevin, agreed. The Greek government’s stability, the internal security problems as well as major financial ones were much more of a priority than the issue of monarchy. While the Varkiza agreement provided that the plebiscite would precede the general elections to be scheduled for the end of 1945, Damaskinos, political leaders, the communists and the Allies agreed (to the dismay of George II) that it should take place after the general elections and the establishment of law and order.177 Ambassador Pipinelis argued that in three years’ time the royalists would have lost considerable influence; republicans would be the winners. On 20 September 1945, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed that the sequence of events in Greece would be as follows: general elections, the formation of a cabinet and later, ‘in due course’, the organisation of a referendum. This was simply a fait accompli to the anxious king, who had believed that the party that would win the general elections (presumed to be anti-royalist) would also be in a position to decide on the constitutional issue.178 George II wrote to Bevin stressing his disagreement about the plan for having a plebiscite in three years’ time. He linked the regime issue to the pressing political and financial problems in Greece, using somewhat acerbic language: A postponement of the plebiscite for three years at the demand of the British Government would amount in effect to an intervention on the part of an Allied government in order to prevent my return to my country irrespective of the desires of the Greek people in this

56

Greece and the English

matter . . . [it] would also constitute a complete departure from the policy repeatedly proclaimed by successive British Governments, that the Greek people would be left free to choose their future regime. The monarch then made an announcement of his position on the question of his return to Greece, surprising the Foreign Office.179 The Foreign Secretary replied that he would not intervene in Greek politics; he was mainly interested in the restoration of the Greek economy: ‘It is certainly not my desire to intervene in Greek internal political affairs or to dictate to the Greek people on such matters.’180 He was not pressing for a plebiscite in three years’ time in exchange for British financial help, as was rumoured among royalists in Athens. Bevin stated that it was ‘unfortunate that Your Majesty should have issued the declaration without awaiting my reply’. Bevin’s argument was sound: first fix the economy, then establish order and stability, deal with the ‘political difficulties’ (i.e., the civil strife as well as the conflict between royalists and republicans) and then decide on the type of regime. The Foreign Secretary argued that Greece needed a strong government. Up to then all efforts had failed because politicians had been constantly arguing about the date of the general elections and the plebiscite. For his part, Archbishop Damaskinos believed that the delay in reaching a decision on political matters had a direct and negative impact on the speed with which severe financial and economic problems were being tackled. The population, especially in the rural areas, was in need. That was why he backed the option of having a plebiscite in three years’ time. Bevin’s suggestion to the king was that the Archbishop presented to the politicians a three-part proposal: that a general election be held by March 1946 at the latest; that a plebiscite be organised for March 1948; and that immediate measures be taken to restore the Greek economy and to reconstruct the country. Bevin continued, emphatically: I offered no bribes or loans on dealing with the elections or plebiscite. All my proposals were directed towards the urgent problems of economic reconstruction . . . I cannot believe that Your Majesty would wish to oppose any course which is designed to secure the earliest possible reconstruction of Greece and which has some prospect of succeeding.181 However, Bevin feared that the king would pull off a surprise, namely that he would return to Greece without the knowledge of the Foreign Office: that would severely complicate matters, and violence could escalate. The

King George II

57

Foreign Secretary was taking no chances: he convinced the Cabinet to approve special security measures to prevent George II from leaving Britain. Scotland Yard and MI5, as well as the Air Ministry and immigration officers received orders to watch the king and his entourage.182 On 22 November 1945, the Cabinet agreed that: ‘. . . their existing policy in respect to Greece should be maintained, and that it was important that the King of the Hellenes should not return to Greece at this critical stage.’183 Already two Special Branch officers had been serving as both his bodyguards and his ‘watchers’. The Cabinet secretaries concluded that: the best plan would be for the King to be continuously watched by Scotland Yard officers, who should be told to follow him if he travels to any port and to stop him from embarking, preferably, of course, by indirect means, but being prepared in the last resort to use force to prevent him if this should be necessary. [The police officers] will do their best to secure that unexpected obstacles prevent him [George II] from embarking. In the last resort, however, if no other means are effective they will tell him that he cannot be allowed to leave the United Kingdom without the express permission of His Majesty’s Government.184 In effect, George II was a royal prisoner in England. Back in Athens, Sophoulis was sworn in as Prime Minister on 22 November 1945. Archbishop Damaskinos informed the allied countries of his intention to resign, but the ‘personal and friendly urging’ of Foreign Secretary Bevin, Ambassador Leeper and American Ambassador MacVeigh persuaded him to stay on until the forthcoming general elections, set for March 1946.185 The communists did not participate in the general elections of 31 March, and the ‘United Front of Nationalists’ won an absolute majority – 55.1 per cent of the votes and 205 seats (out of 354) in Parliament. British, American and French election observers agreed that the elections were free and fair, though some international correspondents disagreed. However, on the eve of the elections a communist unit (after a decision taken by the KKE Secretary-General) attacked the village of Litohoro on Mount Olympus. Their aim was to arrest a band of ultra-rightists, but public opinion and the political world in Athens – already on tenterhooks about the election procedure and the results – believed that this offensive signalled the beginning of civil war and a communist offensive.186 On 4 April 1946 George II and Bevin had another meeting. The king

58

Greece and the English

emphasised that he would not accept the plebiscite scheduled for 1948. He asserted that the current internal political agitation would inhibit reconstruction efforts in Greece. He believed that the coming September would be a better choice for the plebiscite because the weather would be relatively good in rural areas; snow would not be a problem for communication. Bevin declined to give an answer. London was in favour of a strong coalition government, and argued that an agreement had to be reached on the reconstruction policy (in fact the British had been pressing hard to gain extraordinary influence and authority over Greek finances). Moreover, London had to discuss with Athens the role of British troops in maintaining law and order in the country. Bevin pointed out that he wanted first to receive in full the report of the election observers, and then form an opinion on the proposed plebiscite. The Foreign Secretary also mentioned that Tsaldaris’s Populist Party had acquired a reputation for revenge and retribution, while jailing more people than they released. In Britain many people feared that such a policy could destabilise the Greek political world, and argued in favour of amnesty for many of the political prisoners. According to Bevin’s estimates, 6,000 Greeks languished in prison without a trial. George II should exert his influence and push for a lenient policy towards political opponents.187 On the same day, George II sent Sir Orme Sargent a message regarding his policy position; he claimed that he had not received the resignation of the regent. He argued that there was a ‘clear’ popular mandate: ‘The elections’ true significance has been the condemnation of communism and the preference for the Monarchy’. He gave expression to his bitterest memories, and said that he had always abided by the decisions of the British government. He had been asked not to return to Greece after liberation: he had stayed in London. He had been asked to appoint a regent ‘for the period of the emergency’; he had done so. He had been asked to promise not to return ‘before the free expression of the national will’; he had waited for fifteen months and ‘nobody can be in any doubt now, after the elections, that the free expression of the national will has taken place.’ George II urged a plebiscite in the shortest time possible: The experience of the elections has shown that postponements do not provide any solution, and that the only way to lead the Greeks to a decision is to lay down a straight and just course and to insist on it . . . the continuation of the present form of the Regency is completely unconstitutional and outside the law and furthermore, to my knowledge, it is totally opposed to the wishes of the majority.188

King George II

59

The monarch skilfully linked the general elections and the constitutional issue, and presented himself as a very loyal ally of British policy – but an ally unfairly treated. He raised the stakes by arguing that ‘the Regency was completely unconstitutional’, implying royalist anger in Greece and perhaps hinting at ‘drastic measures’ that might be taken by his supporters. In addition, the monarch had found in the person of the new Prime Minister, Constantine Tsaldaris, a good friend who wanted the return of the monarchy. Tsaldaris was ready to urge anyone, Greek or British, to back the return of the king. The new government sought to schedule the plebiscite as early as June, and had already so informed the American administration. The Americans showed interest in the restoration of the Greek economy, but not in the kind of regime. They wanted the plebiscite postponed, but considered it an internal Greek matter. Eventually, Bevin changed his policy and accepted a plebiscite within six months. Now London wanted to withdraw as soon as possible the British troops engaged in the reorganisation of the new Greek National Army. In his speech on 13 May 1946 Archbishop Damaskinos declared that the plebiscite would take place on 1 September; the referendum was ‘to decide on the return of His Majesty the King’. Tsaldaris argued that he was head of a ‘royal government’ and his duty was to remain loyal to the king. He spoke of ‘King George’s return’, while the real issue was the choice between a constitutional monarchy or the republic for which liberal leaders like Papandreou, Sophoulis, Canellopoulos and Sofokles Venizelos (the son of Eleutherios Venizelos) had been arguing. In political terms, these figures saw themselves sidelined by the new conservative government, as well as by the communists, who were already fighting the Greek National Army in the mountains.189 Throughout the summer of 1946, violence and intimidation against liberals and republicans were widespread. The police and the gendarmerie either condoned or themselves employed violence against republican supporters, local newspapers and public figures. Meanwhile, a spy of the British embassy in Athens uncovered a controversial scheme implicating Crown Prince Paul and the Secretary of Army, Navy and Air Force P. Mavromichalis. One embassy report to the Foreign Office is revealing: News [of violence] coincides with the receipt of a disquieting secret report from a source believed absolutely reliable to the effect that Mavromichalis is personally implicated in plans now in process of execution for large scale arming and financing of Right Wing bands through a financial Committee set up specifically in connection with plebiscite

60

Greece and the English

preparations. The Crown Prince is stated to be amongst those who have contributed funds . . . without compromising our source I cannot charge Mavromichalis directly with complicity . . . 190 Meanwhile, the Anglo-American observers’ assessment was that in Northern Greece and Salonika [t]he plebiscite campaign has been carried on with a certain amount of vigour by the Royalists, who may be reckoned as making full use of their support from the gendarmerie and armed forces, and with considerable less enthusiasm by the Liberals . . . the Royalists are doing their best to condemn the Liberals by accusing them of collaborating with the Communists.191 Moreover, important political figures like Canellopoulos complained to British diplomats about royalist violence and obstruction of their pro-republic campaign.192 On 1 September 1946, 1,700,000 male Greeks voted (at that time women had not yet been granted voting rights). Sixty-nine per cent voted for George II and 31 per cent against. Violence and undue exertion of influence were identified by British and American observers as factors that shaped the results. The Anglo-American report was carefully written, and one has to read between the lines to have a clear view of the conditions that prevailed during the referendum. Besides, the British and the Americans did not want to point an accusing finger at the first elected government in Greece: they wanted stability, and not the resignation of secretaries or of the Prime Minister. The observers stated that: In most cases the conditions established for polling stations appeared to have been carried out satisfactorily, but there were a number of polling stations in which there were irregularities which gave advantage to the supporters of the Government. In some cases the elector was allowed to take only one ballot paper, and the way he voted would therefore be known. There is no doubt in our minds that the party representing the government view exercised undue influence in securing votes in support of the return of the King, but without that influence we are satisfied that a majority of votes for the King’s return could have been obtained. The vote which shows 94% voting we regard as unreal and does not agree with the percentage of votes cast in the polling stations that were covered by our observers.193

King George II

61

In a conversation with Bevin in London, Hugh Dalton, Chancellor of the Exchequer and former head of the Political Warfare Executive, did not hide his dislike of George II: I said that I was very sorry the Greek King had won the plebiscite. A republic would have been better. Bevin said he was sorry too. But he had done his best and had sent a message through Buckingham Palace to impress on the King that he must be a constitutional monarch or he would soon come to grief. The Foreign Secretary added sarcastically that ‘kings are pretty cheap these days’.194 On 13 September 1946, George II informed Bevin ‘in strictest confidence’ about his plans and strategy upon returning to Greece. He was certain that the Greek National Army needed reorganisation as well as war materiel. He pleaded for British arms. He believed that there existed ‘foreign infiltration’ and that the communist guerrillas could be beaten by the gendarmerie and the villagers’ home guard. With reference to the question of amnesty for captured guerrillas, he argued that the executive and the judiciary would review (with his authorisation) the lists for some people to be granted a pardon rather than amnesty. That would be his first step toward national reconciliation, pending the results of which he would take further steps. The king clearly stated: ‘If I were to give a general or partial amnesty at the very outset, the situation would be the same or worse within a fortnight.’ In parallel, he had in mind ‘restoring the parliamentary system’. His programme, as he called it, entailed creating, under Tsaldaris, a coalition government of many parties – with the exception of the communists – until the new elections. The new cabinet would consist of people who could get along with each other and co-operate successfully. In addition, the parties would have to agree in advance (i.e. as soon as possible) on the election date and on the electoral system. A particular phrase used by George II must have worried Bevin: In all these matters I intend to exert all my influence from the very start, appealing to the political leaders and if necessary keeping them locked up in a room until they reach an agreement, which will not be easy! The monarch also argued in favour of putting a new constitution to the

62

Greece and the English

vote. At the end, he mentioned something London did not want to hear: Cyprus. The king asked this question: ‘What can you do? You can well understand what a stabilising effect on the situation in Greece would be provided by any favourable hint on your part [on Cyprus union with Greece] at this moment.’195 Next day the Foreign Secretary (suspicious of the king’s plans) had a meeting with him. He answered that the British had been doing all they could to help the Greek military. He emphasised that the king should ‘stick to constitutional monarchy’ and reminded him of his dark past and his collaboration with the Metaxas dictatorship, pointing out that many Labour supporters remembered this; they did not wish to see another dictatorship in Greece.196 George II and Bevin had their final meeting on 26 September 1946. Again the Foreign Secretary made clear the need for a constitutional monarchy and he agreed with the concept of a coalition government. The king replied that Greek politicians ‘were difficult people . . . it might help if His Majesty’s Government were to indicate their wish for a coalition government.’ Bevin did not like this idea at all: in a message to the embassy in Athens he wrote: I did not encourage His Majesty to suppose that we should be prepared to intervene in any way in Greek internal politics . . . Finally, in wishing His Majesty good luck, I impressed upon him how important it was that he should keep on the constitutional rails.197 The return of George II to Greece marked the beginning of a new phase in British policy towards the Greek royal family. In Athens, King George II, Crown Prince Paul and Princess Frederica were greeted by jubilant crowds, and even by liberal politicians like Sophoulis, ready to accept their authority. As soon as he arrived, the king started intervening in military affairs and had many consultations with leading politicians. He pressed for more financial and material support from the United Kingdom and was evidently shocked on hearing of Bevin’s policy to disengage from Greece. Late in October 1946, American Ambassador MacVeigh showed him a confidential telegram from Washington DC: the Americans intended to increase their aid to Greece, a country now vital to their strategic interests in the region.198 However, George II continued to doubt American plans until the declaration of the Truman doctrine three weeks before his death. For many months the monarch had been complaining about being ‘constantly tired and of needing fresh air’. His eyes were sunken. He was

King George II

63

seen smiling in public appearances next to his brother Crown Prince Paul and the latter’s wife Princess Frederica. Even though he had never been known as a natural orator and was always a bit shy, now it was visible from his posture that he was also depressed and weak. When George returned to Athens, he wrote to a friend that he had suffered ‘a nervous breakdown’, that something was wrong with his nerves and that he could not sleep. On other occasions he raised his voice in anger. Physicians in Athens and in London explained that the origin of his problems lay with his nerves. Later he complained of chest pains, back pains, headaches and dizziness. Anastasopoulos, a noted Greek physician, believed that the king was troubled by exhaustion. George II suffered heart failure and died in his office on the morning of 1 April 1947.199 The royal funeral procession was led by his brother, now King Paul, and his son, Crown Prince Constantine. The last of the king’s paramours, an English woman with whom he had been having an affair since the 1930s, attended discreetly. Curiously, as pointed out by former Air Marshal Arthur Gould Lee: ‘The absence of condolences from two of the British statesmen with whom King George had worked most closely since 1940 was naturally the subject of speculation and comment in court and government circles.’200 He was referring to Churchill and Eden.

3 King Paul and Queen Frederica Cyprus, Crises and Glamour

In April 1947, Crown Prince Paul succeeded his brother George II on the throne. The blue-eyed Paul was third in the line of succession after Princes George and Alexander; neither of whom had a son to become crown prince. Until the death of Alexander in 1920, nobody could have forecast that Paul would one day become king. Taller than his brother, he was a towering, gentle figure with sparse hair, a man who did not hesitate to smile in public or to make a joke; Paul was not as distant as the late king. His wife, Queen Frederica, was a smiling, ambitious, resourceful German princess with dark brown hair; she was determined to leave a mark on the history of the royal family. She could act in his absence as regent under the Constitution of 1911 and also under that of 1952. During one of the first meetings of Frederica with Churchill, on the occasion of the wedding of Princess Elizabeth and Philip Prince of Greece in 1947, he asked her: ‘Wasn’t the Kaiser your grandfather?’ To this Frederica replied, smiling: ‘It depends on how you look at it. The Kaiser certainly was my grandfather, but Queen Victoria was my great-great-grandmother. If you had the Salic Law in England, my father would be your King today.’1 At the royal wedding the Queen of Greece made quite an impression, wearing ‘emeralds the size of pigeon eggs’ as an English lady-in-waiting remarked later. Right from the start, King Paul and his wife showed a different attitude and style to the admittedly shy George II, who had avoided public appearances and gatherings. The royal family projected their image and role as political, and followed a distinctive public-relations strategy with foreign leaders and elites, as well as with the Greek public. They tried ‘to sell them-

66

Greece and the English

selves’ to their subjects, and had no need of British advice, as had George II during the war. Since the Americans were steadily increasing their influence on Greece, and had brought financial aid and modern military hardware to the country, the royal family approached them for help and advice more often. However, amongst the first to be regarded as the personal friends of Paul and Frederica were the British ambassadors and their wives in Athens. Greece of 1947, especially the northern districts, was a place of misery and war. The conflict between the Greek National Army and the communist Democratic Army was in full flow. Communist guerillas attacked villages and towns, maintaining the initiative throughout the year, and the National Army and the gendarmerie suffered severe casualties – they failed to coordinate their operations, or to avoid surprise offensives. Atrocities, arbitrary executions and the abduction of villagers’ children, committed by both rightists and communists, had been the key characteristics of this bitter war. For their part, the American military mission in Greece played a key part in reorganising the army and equipping it with modern weapons. The smaller British mission concentrated on the formation of tactics and on training Greek officers in mountain warfare and special operations. Some SAS officers trained Greek commandos, but British troops were under strict orders not to participate in any engagement with the communists. However, one SAS sergeant named Bennet allegedly undertook reconnaissance missions and deep patrolling, and was awarded the Greek Conspicuous Acts medal.2 On 21 May 1947, Ambassador Sir Clifford Norton presented his Letter of Credence to King Paul. He later commented that ‘the ceremony had a pre-war air about it.’ Officials in full dress, invested with orders and decorations, the ceremonial Evzones, soldiers, officers and courtiers created a nostalgic picture of the past. A military band played the British national anthem on the arrival and exit of the ambassador, who told the king that he would do ‘the utmost to maintain those excellent and friendly relations which have so long existed between our two countries’. Paul replied that he was ‘particularly pleased’ that Norton was the first ambassador to present his credentials after his coronation. The diplomat claimed that it was not planned, but rather an accident since he ‘did not wish it to be thought that we [the Foreign Office] had the motive of changing the present order of precedence in the Corps Diplomatique, of which the American Ambassador is and remains the Doyen’. While dining with the king and queen, Norton realised that Paul ‘[spoke] with the same somewhat disconcerting frankness about Greek affairs as did the late King George’, while Queen Frederica told the ambassador’s wife about her charity work.3 It was obvious during the official ceremonies that the royal couple aimed to project an image of

King Paul and Queen Frederica

67

‘history and tradition’, but that their personal attitudes and views would not be concealed. In fact, as we shall see later, the king and queen had a tendency to speak openly to a degree unprecedented among heads of state. They wanted foreign leaders to understand that they were not just constitutional monarchs, but that they exerted considerable influence on foreign and domestic politics. The royal family believed in personal diplomacy, and Queen Frederica even ended up talking with the Americans about military reorganisation. She wrote: It is very important for the King to have this private channel [with American Secretary of State George Marshall] through which he could express his hopes, his fears and his constructive ideas about the situation in Greece and in the world . . . Greek affairs sometimes seemed so difficult for foreigners to understand, and my husband wished that his views might be privately conveyed. To have written himself would have been to give too official an opinion, upon which action would have had to be taken.4 In fact, while on her visit to England to attend the royal wedding of Princess Elizabeth and Prince Philip, Frederica was encouraged by Churchill to meet American Secretary George Marshall and to ask for military aid. As Churchill put it: ‘You just talk to him as one soldier to another.’5 Queen Frederica, in a letter to the American Secretary of State, emphasised that: ‘There is also complete confidence between my husband and the American and British ambassadors. He always keeps them fully informed of any actions he takes or of any other happenings, so that there should be never any confusion.’6 However, the practice of using private ‘back-channels’ without the knowledge or approval of the elected government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tended to cause controversies. This is where the British and Greek royal families greatly differed, as will be seen later in this chapter. Buckingham Palace consulted Downing Street and the Foreign Office prior to communicating with the Greek royal family, even on engagements and ceremonial issues. King Paul, and especially Queen Frederica, on the contrary, made clear their intention to discuss Greek politics with foreign leaders without always consulting the government. In the eyes of American journalist C.L. Sulzberger who lunched with the royal couple on 12 June 1948, Frederica was ‘attractive, intelligent but somewhat domineering. Has a way with men – from [General] Smuts and Marshall on down’.7 In his dispatch in 1956, the then British ambassador

68

Greece and the English

Sir Charles Peake commented that ‘she takes a lively and unconcealed interest in political matters and her advice is much relied on by her husband.’8 In June 1948, Frederica met with Churchill in London, where he argued that executions of communists in Greece should be avoided because it was bad propaganda for the country. The queen replied that these people had been tried and convicted. She pointed the finger, claiming that: ‘There are two countries in the world which are simply terrible at propaganda. One is yours, Mr. Churchill, and the other is mine’. The queen added that in only two countries in the world could espionage not produce results, in Japan and in Greece; in Japan none speak, while in Greece all speak and ‘it is impossible not to find out everything’.9 The British ambassador had another private dinner with the king and queen on 30 June 1947. Frederica talked about their visits to the countryside and Norton noted: ‘The royal pair showed great indifference to discomfort, which will return dividends even from those who theoretically are still Republicans.’ A prominent Venizelist who did not wish to raise the issue of monarchy again was Themistokles Sophoulis, the leader of the Liberals since 1935.10 Frederica’s personality allowed her to speak with villagers (she learned to speak Greek fluently – even though in private the royal family spoke English), even to dance with them.11 She took it upon herself to try and ensure that the royals were loved by the people. This became more evident when the king fell ill of typhoid fever at the end of 1947.12 Frederica continued her visits to remote villages in Northern Greece – despite the anxiety of royal staff officers afraid for her security. Until the end of the civil war, Frederica showed great resource and vitality in making the dynasty’s motto, ‘My Power is the Love of My People’, come true. Paul’s recovery was slow, and as Frederica admitted in her memoirs, by 1949 and the end of the civil war she had suffered a nervous breakdown: Only very few friends knew of this great inner crisis for outwardly I was not allowed to show it . . . something had to be done to restore my balance and give me a new purpose in life, I had to learn how to think correctly in order to get my disrupted emotions under control, which was not easy as my emotions were in control of my thinking. Psychoanalysts and priests, the two known healers of emotional ills, were then not held in high esteem by me and therefore not consulted, as I felt their thinking had too many gaps and easy slogans.13 It could be inferred that she had had some sort of depression. However, after his illness, Paul was allegedly influenced more by his wife than before.

King Paul and Queen Frederica

69

In July 1948, the king made it clear to the British that he wanted Cyprus to be united with Greece, in exchange for bases on Crete or elsewhere. He ‘authorised’ Sulzberger to write something relevant in an interview. Buckingham Palace and King George VI flatly disliked these ideas, and Ambassador Norton allegedly transmitted a message from George to Paul, asking him ‘why he wanted to take apart his empire ...’ Sulzberger’s impression was that ‘Paul, urged by his able but ambitious wife, wants to assume personal rule of the country instead of remaining a figurehead, constitutional monarch.’14 By the beginning of 1949, General Alexander Papagos, a loyal royalist officer and one of the senior officers who had pressed hard for the return of King George II in 1935, was assigned the supreme command of the Greek army. Papagos undertook this appointment on condition that his decisions would not be questioned by the Secretary of Defence or by Parliament. Necessity Law No. 882 established that: Papagos would be able to decide on the army’s operations, its composition, on the creation or dissolution of its units and on the commission of retired officers without having to previously consult with the government or any other respective ministers. Taking advantage of the emergency acts the Papagos- to be named fieldmarshal- founded the ‘institutional autonomy’ of the Greek armed forces.15 In a private meeting with the British ambassador, King Paul commented that the army was now more disciplined and better organised. The monarch raised the issue of his argument with the American ambassador, Grady, who had claimed that the army ceiling should not be increased; the king wondered if he should take the issue directly to President Truman. Ambassador Norton argued against such a course of action, and supported the idea of cutting defence spending. He explained that the British argument was shaped back in 1946: ‘It was no good the army being victorious in the mountains if the people in the towns and cities had gone bolshy through not having enough to live on.’16 It was a sound argument. In addition, Norton informed the Foreign Office that the relations between the royal family and the American ambassador and his wife were not cordial. This was ‘partly due to frictions in social life’. Mrs Grady organised ‘spiritual and moral uplift’ events for the entertainment of the Greek people, but that attracted publicity; as he put it: ‘Owing to inevitable publicity it does not tend to harmonious relations with the King and Queen.’17 Paul’s relations with Ambassador Grady would reach a serious crisis in

70

Greece and the English

1950. After the general elections in March, the leaders of the centre-liberal parties, Georgios Papandreou, Sofokles Venizelos, Nikolaos Plastiras and Emmanuel Tsouderos, sent a letter to King Paul informing him that since they had together obtained a majority in Parliament they had decided to nominate Plastiras as prime minister. However, Venizelos, in a private consultation with Paul on 22 March, persuaded the king to give him the authorisation needed to form a cabinet. Ambassador Grady had no liking at all for this initiative, believing that the former republican officer Plastiras was the right man for the post – he could deter people from becoming communist sympathisers. The American embassy then intervened directly in Greek internal politics, demanding that Plastiras be appointed prime minister. Venizelos held his office for only three weeks, and Paul was seriously embarrassed by the American initiative. In fact, Paul’s aide de camp, Colonel Aristides Metaxas, in a meeting with a CIA official in Athens, informed him that the king was ‘very much alarmed’ by Athens politics and that he ‘could not trust a government headed by Plastiras’. Metaxas emphasised that: ‘There was no contact with the embassy . . . the king holds the American Embassy directly responsible for the present situation.’ King Paul wanted to speak to Truman himself.18 The king hated the new Prime Minister, and did not hide it. He claimed in a meeting with Sulzberger on 8 March 1950 that Plastiras had been the officer responsible for the failure of the Asia Minor campaign in 1922 and for ‘expelling my father and brother . . . and setting up a false plebiscite . . . and now I have to shake hands with that man’.19 In fact, historical records prove that Plastiras’s leadership during the campaign saved soldiers’ lives, and led to victories which made him legendary among the people (as the ‘Black Rider’). Paul could not understand a very simple proposition: the head of state cannot ‘hate’ an elected Prime Minister and attacking him in public. Plastiras attempted to employ a lenient policy toward ex-communist fighters, something the military, post-civil war public opinion and the elite could not stomach. Moreover, the coming of the Korean War reminded everybody of Cold War antagonism and the ‘threat’ of communist infiltration in Greece. Plastiras’s administration lasted for only four months. By July 1950 the palace and the American embassy were suggesting Papagos as the Prime Minister of a ‘transitional government’, though eventually this scheme was abandoned – Papagos declined to be involved in politics, but one year later he would be accused by the palace of deceiving the king. Liberal parties and conservative coalitions could not form a stable government, while it was evident that Paul wished to keep the political system under his influence.20

King Paul and Queen Frederica

71

He had wanted Papagos as a figurehead, but was evidently frustrated when he realised that the old soldier, having reached the rank of field-marshal, had political ambitions of his own. Papagos had a conservative agenda, was ready to continue with any special measures against communist prisoners of war and communist sympathisers, and had built for himself the image of a soldier, not of a politician. Most significantly, he started speaking openly about the need for Cyprus to become independent. Meanwhile, American diplomats assessed that: ‘The Department [of State] has developed serious reservations concerning the activities of the Plastiras Government and is presently considering alternative solutions.’21 King Paul had been openly fighting with Plastiras, but he needed to keep an eye on his rear. Royalist officers had formed a secret organisation within the armed forces since the mutinies in the Middle East during the Second World War (see chapter above on King George II). This organisation, the ‘Sacred Bond of Greek Officers’(IDEA), was composed of mainly low- and middle-ranking royalists whose influence in the army had increased during the Civil War.22 Employing controversial and irregular practices to fight communists, these officers were tolerated by the General Staff and Papagos – it can be assumed that the latter had known of their existence for quite some time, since one of the top members of the Bond, Colonel Nikolaos Gogousis, was the chief of his office. For their part, the palace did not favour Papagos’s ambition of becoming an independent political figure, and discouraged him from retiring. In May 1951, however, the field-marshal did decide to retire; Bond members now wrongly assumed that he had been pressured to do so by the king. These officers regarded the military as independent of Parliament, the government and the crown, and trusted no one but Papagos. They assumed that with Papagos out of contention the liberal government of Plastiras and Sofokles Venizelos would follow a lenient policy toward the communists and exercise civilian control over the hard-nosed officers who had been fighting the communists for the past four years. Bond members were informed that Papagos had retired on ‘health grounds’, and launched a planned coup, taking by surprise the palace and the government, as well as the American and the British embassies. Indeed, the coup also took British intelligence and diplomats by surprise, and disclosed to the public the existence of the Bond organisation within the armed forces. On 30 May 1951 Papagos announced his decision to retire to senior staff officers. Later the same day, Sacred Bond members holding the ranks of colonel, brigadier and lieutenant-general tried to talk him into staying on, but Papagos insisted that his retirement be announced immediately on the radio, something that happened at 2200 hours on 30 May. The anxiety

72

Greece and the English

of middle-ranking officers grew on hearing of the end of the Papagos era in the army. Everybody assumed that the ‘health reasons’ were a lie, and that the field-marshal had been forced to retire. Brigadiers Alexander Christeas, Stamatis Tavoularis and others took it upon themselves to preserve the institutional autonomy of the armed forces, and at short notice sent infantry and armoured formations to the Athens Radio building, the General Staff headquarters and key locations in the district. Their units moved fast and were well coordinated, showing that planning for the coup had been well developed at the operational level. Among the young Sacred Bond captains who participated in the mutiny were Georgios Papadopoulos and Dimitrios Ioannidis, who were to lead the military coup of 21 April 1967. The army units refused to obey the government or the crown, and declared that only Papagos could make them withdraw. On 31 May, at 0630 hours, he visited the Army General Staff and, in a state of some distress, ordered the mutineers’ commanders to return the units to their barracks and positions, an order with which they complied. In the eyes of the liberal government and of King Paul, Papagos had proved that his influence and authority over the armed forces were unquestionable.23 Moreover, in political terms he showed that he could unite the nationalists under him at the time of an election. According to the account of General Thrasivoulos Tsakalotos, the Chief of the Army General Staff and one of the top officers who had tried to convince the field-marshal not to retire, he had personally received an order from King Paul ‘to arrest Papagos because he deceived them’ and wanted to enter politics. Of course, Tsakalotos did not take the monarch’s demand seriously.24 Indeed, his account clearly illustrates the controversial and irregular relations between the crown and the army during the post-civil-war period. After the end of the mutiny, King Paul suggested to Prime Minister Plastiras that the mutineers be granted amnesty; he agreed, and the rightwing press could present the mutiny as no more than an ‘undisciplined’ incident.25 For Queen Frederica this May coup must have come as a severe blow to her perception of the monarch’s authority in Greece, though strangely enough she does not mention it in her memoirs, A Measure of Understanding. Ambassador Norton had been watching the political and royal intrigue closely on the eve of the 9 September general elections. On 6 August 1951, Papagos founded his conservative party, the Greek Rally, aiming first to prevail amongst the right and then to sideline the Populist Party of conservative Tsaldaris. Norton wrote that:

King Paul and Queen Frederica

73

Many sober people think that the entry of Papagos into politics at this time and in this way is a great blow to normal political development and stability. Some of his friends admit it. It is common talk that the King’s friends will vote for Venizelos! One politician who met Paul claimed that the monarch would abdicate and take the crown prince with him if Papagos was elected prime minister, though Norton did not take this rumour seriously. Others accused Papagos of intending to depose the king. The British ambassador argued that Papagos was loyal to the crown but rather ‘obstinate and touchy, while the King and Queen, especially the latter, are not afraid of a scrap with anyone. “Live dangerously’’, was her grandfather’s phrase, borrowed by Nietzsche’. The diplomat sounded optimistic, arguing that ‘if the King behaves sensibly, this could mean the end of the epoch of Venizelists versus anti-Venizelists and of Republicans versus Monarchists. But nothing in Greek politics is predictable.’26 However, everyone knew that Frederica had influence over Paul and hated Papagos. And there had always been a rumour – never confirmed – that Papagos had a blood connection with the royal family. On the eve of the elections, to the surprise of British diplomats in Athens, King Paul intervened directly, giving a press interview where he made it clear that he did not want Papagos to become a politician because he was still needed in the armed forces. Paul stated to the New York Times correspondent in Athens that he was in favour of elections, but argued that ‘the existence of a large number of parties admittedly makes it difficult, if not impossible, to form a strong Government.’ There was no chance for the new government to follow a different foreign policy, since all political parties agreed on the principle of maintaining good relations with the United States, Great Britain and the Western alliance. His opinion of Greek politicians was that ‘they are just as good and efficient as their colleagues of any country.’ The monarch emphasised his wish for Papagos to remain in the military: I think that the Field Marshal’s place was at the head of the Armed Forces. Of course as a Greek citizen he has the right to participate in politics . . . but he had repeatedly assured me that he would not [enter politics] . . . owing to the existing international tension I believe that the country still needed his services in the Army . . . I never understood the real reasons for his resignation, but whatever they may have been, I do not think they were sufficient to make him resign. When he tendered his resignation, I did everything I could to dissuade him, but

74

Greece and the English

I failed. Anyhow, this decision of the Field Marshal cannot be connected with difficulties in the command of the Armed Forces. In the military field he had full authority, freedom of action and no interference whatever on the part of the Government . . . The Greek Army is in an excellent state of morale, discipline and training. This is largely due to Field Marshal Papagos, who deserves the Nation’s gratitude. Naturally, the Field Marshal was assisted in his task by Governments, by politicians and myself, through the granting to him of authority such as no Greek Commander-in-Chief had ever before. However, the Greek Army does not draw its force from a single man, but from patriotism, the gallantry and the self-sacrifice of the Nation as a whole . . . Finally, let us not forget that the Greek soldier is always present.27 The interview closed with the king’s remark that the accession of Greece to NATO was ‘natural and necessary’ and would be accomplished soon. From the Foreign Office the comment was: ‘The King’s practice of giving these interviews is unfortunate and cannot raise his personal reputation. This one has served only to emphasise that there is no reconciliation between the Palace and Field Marshal Papagos.’28 Paul admitted in public that he himself had told Papagos, a Greek citizen, not to stand as a candidate in the elections. He also stressed the institutional autonomy of the armed forces in Greece; the government did not control the military – an irregular practice in the context of British or American military-civilian relations. The monarch had also shown a degree of arrogance in claiming he ‘could not understand’ the reasons for Papagos’s resignation. Most certainly, the interview was a scoop, but the palace could not deter Papagos from becoming the leader of the right. Ambassador Norton’s assessment was: [Papagos has] shown dignity and prudence in the face of all these attacks [by royalists and leftists in the press]. In private, he has expressed great distress at the attitude of King Paul and Queen Frederica . . . [if elected] he said that he would act within the framework of the Crowned Democracy – a hint, at least, that he expected King Paul to keep his constitutional role.29 The ambassador claimed that the Americans had a legitimate say in Greek reconstruction policy and that the government-to-be would have to take their advice. However, in the event he were elected, Papagos might face difficulties with the Americans as well as with the king, since there were

King Paul and Queen Frederica

75

‘fascist tendencies’ within his party and the government might have to resort to authoritarian measures. Norton favoured a Plastiras-Venizelos coalition victory, arguing that ‘it would probably be better for the development of political life.’30 Surprisingly, he did not mention that Papagos might raise the Cyprus issue; this would in fact become evident in 1952. Archbishop Makarios III had already approached Prime Minister Plastiras, asking him to back the demand of the Cypriots to abolish British colonial rule, and a plebiscite had been held by the Church in Cyprus. Greek-Cypriots favoured union with Greece. However, Plastiras did not want to test Anglo-Greek relations, and in July 1950 he stated to Makarios that as a soldier he would fight for Cypriot independence, but as a prime minister he had to take into consideration the interests of Greece.31 In the September 1951 elections the liberals of the Plastiras-Venizelos coalition secured 132 seats in Parliament (out of 258) and the Greek Rally 114 seats. The other right-wing grouping, the Populist Party, received only 6.7 per cent. Papagos ruled the right, and declined the request of King Paul to participate in a coalition government with Venizelos and Plastiras. By late October, the aging Plastiras had become Prime Minister, again with Venizelos as vice-president and foreign secretary in charge of the negotiations for Greek entry to NATO. Plastiras stayed in office until October 1952, his government passing the revised Constitution of the Kingdom of Greece, which gave more powers to the crown. The monarch held no responsibility whatsoever for the royal warrants, but his ministers were in all cases answerable (Article 29). Moreover, according to Article 31 the king was ‘to appoint and to dismiss his ministers’. The abuse of this latter article led to serious constitutional crises in 1955, 1963, 1965 and 1967, making it clear to British diplomats that the palace constantly attempted to act beyond its constitutional role. In addition, many emergency acts and provisions introduced during the civil war were still in force, essentially creating a ‘parallel constitution’; for example, the right of public employees to strike was prohibited, and civilians could be court-martialed in cases when the ‘security of the armed forces’ was deemed at stake. Moreover, a state of siege and extraordinary measures for public order and security (which abolished citizens’ constitutional rights) could be introduced without the authorisation of Parliament.32 The simultaneous entry of Greece and Turkey to NATO made a brief rapprochement between the two states possible. Venizelos paid a visit to Ankara in his capacity as Foreign Secretary; in their turn Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, his Foreign Secretary Köprülü and the commander-in-chief of land forces, General Kanatli, were welcomed in Athens,

76

Greece and the English

staying there from 26 April to 2 May 1951. British diplomats seemed satisfied with these gestures, but were informed that nothing substantial had transpired and that the Turks and Greeks had not come to a decision on the Cyprus issue. Turkey wanted a return to Turkish rule in the island, but the voices of people in Cyprus and Greece demanding enosis (union) of Cyprus with Greece were loudly heard in Athens. There was no great interest in the Turkish visits; besides, the memories of the 1919–22 Greek-Turkish War were still alive. In fact, ‘considerable trouble was taken by the Greek government to arouse popular interest in the visit,’ as the new British ambassador Sir Charles Peake put it. Placards with printed slogans in Greek and Turkish were installed in the central avenues of Athens, together with Turkish and Greek flags, but public opinion and the press were more interested in the unveiling of the city’s Commonwealth War Memorial. Of course political hyperbole was common practice. Papagos, as the leader of the Greek Rally, stated that the Balkans Little Entente of the 1930s was a ‘mariage de convenance’ in comparison to the ‘mariage d’amour’ of the present rapprochement.33 At the palace, Mederes and Köprülü were invested with the Grand Cross of the Royal Order of King George I. The Turks transmitted to the royal couple an official invitation from their president to visit their country soon. Their delegation also paid a visit to the headquarters of the Third Army Corps in Northern Greece. It was agreed that a joint Greco-Turkish military commission would review plans to counter the threat posed by communist countries in the Balkans. However, Köprülü, speaking to a British diplomat in Salonika, commented that his country could not commit many forces to the defence of Thrace from communist aggression; the Foreign Secretary argued that ‘the material results of such a policy would be more favourable in the short term to the Greeks than to the Turks’.34 In their turn, King Paul and Queen Frederica agreed to pay an official visit to Turkey – a visit, by Greek heads of state, unprecedented since the foundation of the Greek state in 1832. In fact, up to the present day, no head of state, the Greek President of the Republic has ever visited Turkey. King Paul and Queen Frederica were delighted to be the first Greek royal personages to visit Constantinople, where the last Byzantine Emperor Constantine Paleologos VI had fallen during the siege of 1453. Such a visit was for them highly symbolic, and an excellent opportunity to link their royal Danish and Hanoverian courts with the glory of Byzantium in the eyes of Greek public opinion. The Turks were also very happy to have them, but for another reason: they, as a new-born republic, wanted to show they were perfectly capable of entertaining monarchs in grand style. The Turkish elite, however, had plenty of reasons and war memories not to desire the royal

King Paul and Queen Frederica

77

visit. It had been King George I and his son Crown Prince Constantine (the father of Paul) who had led the Greeks to victory during the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, expelling the Ottomans from northern Greece. Later, King Constantine had led the campaign against Ankara in 1921. But this time, the Turks wanted (and offered) only glamour, and made it clear that they did not intend to discuss any matters of substance pertaining to Greek-Turkish relations. However, Peake, the British ambassador in Athens, suspected that the Greeks had a plan to convince the Turks that Cyprus should be united with Greece. He wrote: ‘I have grounds for thinking that Their Majesties may seek to persuade the Turkish Government to withdraw its objections to enosis and that Queen Frederica may take the lead in this.’ King Paul seemed willing to meet with Sir Knox Helm, the British ambassador in Ankara, but Peake’s response was rather cold. He let it be known via the Grand Marshal of the Athens court that the ambassador was in the United States and did not know if he would return in time for the visit. Most importantly, Peake advised the king – in the event he met the diplomat – to have ‘a discreet conversation early in his visit’ and to listen to him carefully.35 Obviously, Peake did not wish to give the Turks the impression of special Anglo-Greek contacts during the visit: Ankara might suspect consultations on the Cyprus question. In the evening of 8 June 1952, the royal couple arrived in Constantinople aboard the Greek Navy cruiser Elli, where they were greeted by the foreign secretary and the governor of the city. On the Asiatic shore, at Haydarpasa station, they boarded Kemal Atatürk’s special train and had a pleasant trip to Ankara. Paul and Frederica arrived in the capital the next morning and were welcomed at the station by Jelal Bayar, the president of the republic, Prime Minister Mederes and other officials. The royals stayed at the Turkish president’s guesthouse at Çankaya. On 9 June, the royal couple lunched privately with the president and later Paul laid a wreath on the provisional tomb of Kemal. The day closed with the president’s reception, where many foreign diplomats were introduced to the king and queen. In his speech, the Turkish head of state argued that: ‘The threat with which the free world is today confronted makes it imperative that there should be close friendship between the two countries . . . Turkish-Greek friendship is henceforth a national policy for both countries.’ King Paul replied that his countrymen felt an equal admiration for the Turks and that he had accepted the president’s invitation in order to be able personally to express their good wishes. ‘[Today] the Turks and the Greeks are working together, sidelining the divisions of the past and have a common security concept based on the Atlantic Alliance.’36 Obviously, hyperbole was common practice in drafting

78

Greece and the English

speeches at that time. Readers and researchers should not forget that in the 1940s the Turkish authorities had imposed severe taxes on people of Greek origin, making it clear that their policy was to consider only those of Turkish origin as Turkish citizens; and only three years after the royal visit to Turkey, in September 1955, the Greek minority in Constantinople was targeted during riots organised by the police and nationalist groups. The destruction of property on a mass scale led many Greeks in Constantinople and on the islands of Imvros and Tenedos to emigrate to Greece.37 On 10 June 1952, the king and queen had lunch with the President of the National Assembly and attended military parade; 14 jets newly arrived from the United States carried out an impressive flypast over the royal guests and their hosts. In the evening, a large reception was held at the Greek embassy; the next day Mederes lunched with Paul and the royal couple were entertained by a gymnastics group from the Turkish Youth League. Paul and Frederica dined with the foreign secretary, and later a gala performance and ball were held to honour the royal guests. The visitors stayed in Ankara until noon on 12 June; after lunch with the mayor of the capital, they boarded the train to Constantinople.38 Paul and Frederica stayed for three days at the Dolmbahçe Palace in Constantinople, visited the Greek-Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarch and lunched with the governor. The president of the republic hosted another reception in their honour at the palace. On 15 June, the monarch and his wife had lunch with the president and his foreign secretary and later boarded the cruiser Elli for Greece. According to the assessment of the British embassy in Ankara, the visit had been a great success; it was claimed that ‘the population was genuinely enthusiastic’ toward the royal couple. There were initial fears ‘of demonstrations of the traditional dislike of the Turks for the Greeks’ but nothing had materialised. A few weeks prior to the visit, a Greek football team had faced outright hostility, but during the royal visit itself the police and the security services kept a close eye on events, cordoning-off roads to vehicular traffic in Constantinople and Ankara for the royal motorcades. Frederica told diplomat Scott-Fox of the British embassy that she had been somewhat apprehensive at the beginning but later ‘was very agreeably surprised by the warmth of the popular reception’. In addition, on the route to Ankara many villagers had gathered at the railway stations to greet the royal family. It seemed ‘entirely spontaneous’, with no government intervention. For their part, Turkish journalists, ‘unanimously enthusiastic about the visit’, noted a long conversation between Paul and the Yugoslav ambassador, but the king confessed later to a British diplomat that they had not discussed anything of significance, and that Greeks and Yugoslavs com-

King Paul and Queen Frederica

79

municated through ‘other channels.’ The Soviet and the Czech ambassadors were invited by the Greek embassy but they did not attend any function. Other states, such as Bulgaria, did not maintain diplomatic relations with Greece at that time. It seemed that during the visit no politics were discussed with the Turks and no agreements were reached, with the exception of fishing rights in Turkish waters, an issue under consideration for some time by a Greek-Turkish committee. Scott-Fox argued that the royal visit was a ‘novelty’ by Turkish standards, and that it had ‘stimulated Turkish national pride’. There was no doubt that the majority of the Turks understood the visit as: a well-merited tribute to the increasing importance of Turkey in the international scene. Most Turks are probably flattered by this proof that their Republican regime is able suitably to entertain Royalty, and flattery is the surest road to Turkish hearts. But apart from this, there is no doubt that the personalities of the King and Queen made a deep impression. The Turks were genuinely delighted with the naturalness and good humour of the Royal couple and particularly with the charm and good looks of the Queen. Both Their Majesties certainly had a great personal success and their handling of the visit was entirely admirable.39 The British consul-general in Constantinople attended the royal functions in the city, mindful of public reactions. In his account, he argued that the Turks considered themselves a master-race: They were determined to impress the Greeks that they are ‘Herrenvolk’ by a maximum display of oriental hospitality and ‘panache’ . . . all Turks (without any exceptions) have an instinctive contempt for the Greeks but will make ‘a go of it’ when they are persuaded (as they will be) that the Greeks can be to them of some material benefit.40 In his memorandum, the diplomat also observed that Turks in Constantinople had been somewhat apathetic about the visit. He mentioned something that showed that even he was a bit confused about the pseudo ‘link’ between King Paul and Byzantium: ‘Could it be that they [the Turks] felt that the Hellenic Royal Family was paying too great an honour to a city from which their forefathers had been evicted five hundred years ago?’ Not so surprisingly, the consul-general wrote that the king and queen were ‘utterly unGreek, they were unaffectedly affable, saluting and waving in a genuinely

80

Greece and the English

friendly manner’. Moreover, the daughters of the elite Turkish families who attended Queen Frederica had really liked her because ‘she was very un-regal and above all so very un-Greek!’41 Queen Frederica wrote about her impressions of the trip in a letter to Secretary Marshall, with whom she wished always to keep in unofficial contact. She wrote (inaccurately) that: The Turkish Prime Minister let our officials understand privately that his Government was sympathetically inclined towards us over the Cyprus question and we would find no great difficulties with them in case the Greek Government was forced to take official steps owing to sheer pressure of public opinion. This attitude of the official Turks is of course for us of the greatest importance, not so much in order to push our claims, but that Cyprus cannot be used by anybody as a spoke in the wheel of Greek-Turkish relations.42 There was gross misunderstanding between Paul, Frederica, Mederes and Evangellos Averof-Tositsas, the Under Secretary in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (one of the few top officials accompanying the royal couple). Probably politeness during the functions overshadowed discussions on national interests and those attending misunderstood one another’s intentions and positions. Turkey wanted always a say in Cyprus affairs and did not agree with the enosis (union) aspirations of Athens. Marshall would continue his correspondence with Frederica, but the Queen could not impress President Eisenhower. They had lunch in Athens in March 1952, and later in November 1953 in Washington DC during the royal visit to the United States. Eisenhower considered that: [Paul] was a nice fellow, but completely controlled by his wife. He [Eisenhower] was convinced the queen is intriguing too much . . . he clearly did not like Queen Frederica and complained that she always whispered to him behind her hand while at the table. He did not like the atmosphere of intrigue, and he felt that the queen was scheming too much.43 Unsuccessfully, Frederica tried to make an impression by telling the President that she was interested in electronics and used to operate a small radio station at the palace in her spare time. Eisenhower replied that ‘this was the last thing he had expected to hear.’44 Meanwhile, Buckingham Palace sought to maintain good relations with

King Paul and Queen Frederica

81

Athens and King Paul. As we will see later in this chapter and in the chapter below on Constantine II, the British royal family always tried to maintain such good personal relations with the royal family in Athens, but that did not imply that these relations had any influence over official British policy towards the monarchy in Greece. On 6 February 1952, Foreign Secretary Eden announced to Ambassador Leonidas Melas in London the death of King George VI. Paul decided to attend the royal funeral, declaring three days of mourning in Greece prior to his departure for London. The royal party would travel to Paris by air and cross the Channel aboard the steamship SS Invicta, accompanied by the warships HMS Contest and HMS Myngs. Later, Invicta would meet the carrier HMS Implacable off Dover where a 21-gun salute would be fired in honour of the king. The royal funeral took place on 15 February; Paul was in the front row of heads of state, together with the president of France and the kings of Sweden and Denmark, followed by President Tito of Yugoslavia, the king of Iraq and the president of Turkey. There was also intrigue: the departure of Paul from London was postponed three times, allegedly after he had, at the Americans’ request, a private meeting with Secretary of State Dean Acheson at Claridges on 21 February. Acheson wanted strict secrecy, but news of the meeting was leaked to the press by officials of the Greek court very close to Paul. Of course, the government of Plastiras and Venizelos was highly displeased with this example of secret diplomacy on the part of the monarch. In the meeting, Paul thanked the Americans for their military aid to Greece, but also made reference to the ‘intervention’ of the American embassy in Athens in Greek internal affairs.45 There was also a rumour that both leading personalities had touched upon a sensitive issue: Cyprus. In January 1953, Queen Elizabeth II proposed to the Admiralty that King Paul be appointed honorary admiral of the fleet. However, protocol demanded that Paul could not visit England as a sovereign prior to the queen’s coronation, scheduled for June 1953.46 Paul’s visit to London was declared ‘unofficial’, but the monarch was nonetheless much delighted by the honour. Back in Athens, Papagos was elected prime minister, securing 247 seats (out of 300) in Parliament, in November 1952. The union of Greece and Cyprus was central to his agenda. London did not wish to hear any mention of decolonisation, and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was apprehensive about Nasser’s plans for the Suez Canal. For British intelligence Cyprus was, as RAF Air Vice-Marshal Peter Philpot put it, ‘an indispensable and irreplaceable centre for providing “Y” service intelligence’ for the USSR and the Middle East.47 Athens proposed a deal involving a British sovereign base

82

Greece and the English

on Greek soil and another in Cyprus, but the Foreign Office was adamant: Cyprus was to remain a Crown Colony. Papagos wanted ‘friendly’ negotiations between the two traditional allies, and on 22 September 1953, in a private meeting with Eden in Athens, he raised the issue of Cyprus. Surprisingly, Eden wondered ‘why Greece is interested in Cyprus . . . I do not see any reason.’ On 28 July, in the House of Commons, Henry Hopkinson of the Colonial Office stated clearly that Cyprus would ‘never’ gain autonomy. Both Archbishop Makarios III of the Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus and public opinion grew restless. Faced with British intransigence, Athens decided to take the issue to the United Nations, and sought American backing for the move. However, Washington had other plans and did not support the Greek initiatives and arguments on the self-determination of peoples. Public opinion and the politicians in Athens felt betrayed by British policy and the demonstrations multiplied. Meanwhile, London was too preoccupied with Egypt, and Eden could not adapt his mindset and policy positions to post-imperial realities. For their part, some officials of American and British intelligence viewed the option of having bases in Greece positively, but they could not influence their country’s foreign policy. Early in January 1954, King Paul and British Ambassador Peake met, and the king expressed his eagerness to accept an invitation for an official state visit to London. The monarch believed that a scheduled plebiscite, even in five years’ time and the transfer of sovereignty in 20 years’ time, could be a solution to the Cyprus issue without hurting Anglo-Greek relations, thus ‘keeping quiet the Ethnarchy [the Church of Cyprus organisation] public opinion and the politicians’. Papagos seemed willing to discuss this with London, but Eden remained intransigent. No change of the status of Cyprus was under consideration.48 In the spring, King Paul and Queen Frederica came face to face with a dilemma: they were invited by Queen Elizabeth II on an official visit to Britain. In early March, Queen Elizabeth had approved the invitation to the king and queen of Greece for a state visit, and Ambassador Peake in Athens was asked to inform the king privately and obtain his confirmation for a summer visit.49 A few days later, on 10 March, Paul met with the ambassador at the palace and ‘expressed himself deeply gratified and was most anxious to accept’, as Peake said in his dispatch to the Foreign Office. However, the king ‘has greatly feared that he would be advised by the prime minister not to go to England at the present juncture’. The reason was of course the Cyprus question, though the king did not admit this. Peake consulted with Ambassador Alexander Kyrou, the secretary-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – accused by the British of inciting the Greek-Cypriot October

King Paul and Queen Frederica

83

1931 riots against the governor there. Kyrou argued that politics would not intervene in the advice the king would be given, but he stated that June 29 was Paul’s name day and he had to be on Greek soil. Moreover, they had planned to have Tito visit them in Corfu in the summer. There was also the Emperor of Abyssinia’s wish to meet the Greek royal family. Kyrou asked for a postponement until the autumn, but the British diplomat would not agree. Peake claimed that: ‘I did not conceal to the Secretary General that a reply on these lines would not be favourably interpreted by my Government.’ Papagos met with the ambassador on 13 March, presenting the same arguments as Kyrou about the need to postpone the visit. Paul would accept if the visit were to be scheduled for October; however, this was something Peake could not agree with. It was clear that the Foreign Office would advise Queen Elizabeth not to have Paul come in October ‘when his visit would be likely to coincide with an embarrassing and acrimonious discussion of the Cyprus issue at the United Nations’. However, it was suggested that the royal visit could take place in the spring of 1955.50 (This would also not materialise, because on April 1 Greek-Cypriots were to launch their anticolonial struggle.) On 16 March 1954 Paul informed the British diplomat that he had accepted his government’s advice about not going to London. Papagos ‘assured’ Peake that Cyprus was not the reason for turning down a June visit. This was the excuse the prime minister used, but ‘it was quite clear that the Cyprus issue is the main reason . . . I warned him [Papagos] that the consequences to Anglo-Greek friendship might be serious.’51 Peake warned the Foreign Office against future Greek intransigence on the issue of Cyprus, and argued that: ‘Papagos is moving towards a more authoritarian state of mind . . . a disquieting internal situation may well arise.’ Therefore, he continued: Monarchy in Greece represents an important element of stability and it is in our interest that it should remain solidly established as a bulwark against political deviations either to the right or to the left. I am concerned therefore, to do nothing that might weaken King Paul’s position. In my opinion, although he is bitterly disappointed at having to refuse Her Majesty’s invitation for June, he behaved wisely and with restraint.52 Moreover, the Duke of Brunswick, Queen Frederica’s brother, confessed to Peake that the royal couple were ‘depressed at the thought of not visiting Queen Elizabeth’. As for Papagos, all those people who supported the union

84

Greece and the English

of Cyprus with Greece had lately found ‘a too willing listener’.53 Athens had locked itself into a policy of bringing the Cyprus question to the United Nations, and Peake was ‘very much afraid that, by their public statements, they have so far committed themselves that they cannot draw back unless something unforeseen occurs’. It was a sound argument, but Papagos (who aimed for ‘friendly’ negotiations with London) had first confronted Eden’s negative replies and then committed himself more deeply to a union of Cyprus with Greece. On 25 March, Greek War of Independence Day, Peake attended the ceremonies with the king and informed him of the possibility of organising a royal visit in the spring of the following year. Paul ‘was much cheered and asked to convey to you [Foreign Secretary Eden] his personal thanks for your helpful and understanding attitude about the difficulties he has been encountering’.54 The 1954 ‘dilemma’ of the London visit is of particular significance for the history of monarchy in Greece, although historians have not addressed it to this day. Paul and Frederica did not wish to test their relationship with Queen Elizabeth, considering her the most important sovereign and a personal friend. Even the demands of public opinion for the union of Cyprus with Greece did not deter Paul; eventually he was made to change his mind by Papagos himself. However, royal personages do not forget easily, and in 1963 the royal couple would again plan to visit London. At that time they were determined to go despite the advice to the contrary of the then-Prime Minister, Constantine Karamanlis. Seeking to avoid refusing the invitation for a second time, they caused a constitutional crisis. With reference to Cyprus, Frederica decided in the late 1940s, on the suggestion of General Smuts, to initiate private diplomacy with Churchill and US Secretary George Marshall. King Paul had already offered to Peake the ‘free use of our harbours and bases on any of our islands’ in the Aegean in exchange for Cyprus.55 The queen argued the Greek positions and rights on Cyprus and repeatedly emphasised traditional Anglo-Greek friendship and the hardships of the Second World War that both countries had endured. It is doubtful that the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Papagos were informed of the content of her messages to the two foreign statesmen. In a letter to Churchill dated 4 March 1954, the queen warned that A very small island called Cyprus seems to become a cause for estrangement between Greece and England . . . Sir Winston, the Greek spirit is really getting hurt owing to the categorical refusal to have any discussions about the future of Cyprus. Love such as our people have always had for England is slowly but surely turning into bitter resent-

King Paul and Queen Frederica

85

ment . . . I appeal to you to help us to keep the door open where an agreement between our two countries could yet be possible.56 Frederica sent this letter on the understanding that she could discuss with Churchill or with anyone else he suggested ‘privately and quite unofficially . . . as long as we can keep it out of the press and away from official documents and reports’. She wanted to keep the ‘door open’ for negotiations between London and Athens, and her letter was to be treated as ‘absolutely and completely confidential, as it is a purely personal letter and expresses our personal feelings and views’.57 Churchill did not seem to like the idea of having secret communications with Queen Frederica, sending a short reply of two paragraphs on 7 April. Opening his letter, he addressed her as ‘Madame’ and not ‘Majesty’. In five lines he argued that Cyprus should not be discussed with Greece since the Cold War and the Western Alliance took priority. He believed that: The island is of vital importance to the defence of the Middle East and of the Mediterranean... if a third world war should come it might well be that British blood would once again be shed to save Greeks from invasion. I can assure Your Majesty that withdrawal from Cyprus would certainly not help to that end and might, indeed, fatally weaken the combination on which the safety of us all depends.58 The following month, the talkative Paul again met the journalist Sulzberger. He still did not hide his dislike of Papagos, Eden and Ambassador Peake: he assumed that on the one hand Papagos ‘had bitten off more that he could chew’, and that on the other the British were too intransigent on Cyprus, stating constantly that it was a Crown Colony, an internal affair. The monarch commented sarcastically: ‘Remember, we started that one, didn’t we? King George of England sent me word that he didn’t want me breaking up his empire.’59 (He was referring to the message handed to him by Ambassador Norton in 1948.) Two years later in 1956, Frederica sent another letter to Marshall (who had ceased to be Secretary of State in 1949) asking him to lobby for American ‘psychological, financial and naval support to Greece’. She argued in favour of the Royal Hellenic Navy’s need to be equipped with modern destroyers, submarines and motor torpedo-boats in order to contribute more to NATO. She commented: ‘We have a desperate feeling that in the vast offices of the State Department and the Pentagon the problems must seem so very small. We consider ourselves a very valuable outpost of the Western

86

Greece and the English

World against the Soviet World.’60 In fact, it was Anglo-American policy that the Greek navy be denied any offensive capabilities, and thus the opportunity to play any major role in the Mediterranean. The same applied to the Greek army; many in the alliance argued at that time in favour of an internal security force, rather than armed forces capable of mounting counter-attacks in the Balkans. However, the summer of 1954 was a happy time for the royal family, always seeking to establish personal bonds with regional leaders like Tito. The Yugoslav president visited the palace in Corfu and Paul and Frederica entertained him without protocol formalities – illustrating the difference between the Greek throne and those of other sovereigns. Frederica wrote of going swimming together and of [driving] all over Corfu in two very small MGs. My husband took Tito in his bright green one and I took his wife in my bright red one. The roads in Corfu are very narrow and so the people would crowd right up to the car. We could see, at first, a certain surprise in the eyes of our visitors, when they found that the crowds were able to come so close without being pushed away by the police. In the evenings, Tito would play chess with young Crown Prince Constantine.61 Later the royal family visited Yugoslavia, and Tito (looking a trifle shy between Paul and Frederica in the official reception photo) was invested with the Grand Cross of the Order of the Redeemer. Still, bad news was on its way. In December 1954 the UN General Assembly declined to examine the application of the Cypriots for self-determination. Greek diplomacy suffered an anticipated defeat. The General Assembly considering that, for the time being, it does not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on the question of Cyprus, Decides not to consider further the item entitled Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination to people in the case of the population of the Island of Cyprus.62 British diplomacy had scored a short-term victory, but Greek-Cypriots were now furious and ready to take up arms. The key figure of the anti-colonial struggle was a royalist officer, Colonel Georgios Grivas, strongly anti-communist and with the reputation of siding with the Germans during the occupation of 1941–44 (see also chapter two above on King George II.) Later,

King Paul and Queen Frederica

87

during the December 1944 Athens battle, Grivas’s men had contributed to the violence by sniping at civilian demonstrators. He founded the EOKA group (‘National Organization of Cypriot Fighters’) with the support of Greek general-staff members like the royalist Admiral Sakelariou. King Paul realised that he himself had to address the nation on the Cyprus question, to keep the balance between the Greeks and the British. In a well-crafted speech on 20 December 1954, he pointed out that the claim for the union of Cyprus with Greece was a just one and he was certain that one day the island would become part of Greece. However, the Greek people should not forget their traditional alliance with Britain: they had to remain ‘loyal’ to their friends and the Western Alliance. A sense of proportion had to be maintained. Foreign Office officials commented in their minutes that this speech was ‘the first sane and moderate public statement by a leading Greek figure’. Ambassador Peake argued that the king had showed courage in annoying the fanatics, and suggested the prime minister or foreign secretary send Paul a friendly personal message, which the Foreign Office agreed to do immediately. The British assumed that Paul could exert a moderating influence on the Cyprus issue, and were keen to encourage him; they therefore decided not to comment in public on the king’s speech, to avoid underlining his differences with the government of Papagos.63 However, in January 1955 a boat transporting explosives to Cyprus was intercepted by the Royal Navy; and on 1 April 1955 EOKA commenced selective bombings of British military and civilian installations in Cyprus. The Greek-Cypriot guerrillas operated in teams in urban centres and in rural areas, and soon paratroopers, Royal Marines and even small groups of SAS were engaging them. Grivas always evaded arrest, and Makarios, who had remained in consultation with the governor, Field-Marshal Harding, was sent into exile in March 1956. After the deportation of the archbishop, violence intensified, and young members of EOKA were hanged, causing many official protests by the Greek government. EOKA had relatively few fighters (it was not a mass anti-colonial force) but hundreds of sympathisers for support, propaganda and intelligence of British movements; Special Branch and MI5 were unable to penetrate the group and arrest Grivas. In addition, the guerrillas did not use radios, and the signals-intelligence technology of GCHQ in Cyprus was thus of no avail. Meanwhile, in Athens and in other towns large anti-British demonstrations were organised, and many Greek veterans returned to the embassy the British medals awarded them for services during World War II. In 1957, Greek counter-intelligence discovered that a private phone line of Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis (who had succeeded Papagos in autumn 1955, after the latter’s death) had

88

Greece and the English

been tapped by SIS officers and the personnel of the Athens embassy. Three British subjects were arrested, but the affair was kept out of the press. Foreign Secretary Averof spoke to the American and British ambassadors about this case of espionage.64 According to other accounts, MI5 had bugged the communications room of the Greek embassy in London, and SIS had an informer close to Makarios until 1959.65 British Ambassador Peake and his service attachés confronted serious obstacles in informing London about the organisation of the Greek armed forces. No one from the general staff – especially the middle ranks – wished to have any contact with them, while a good level of communication was maintained with the American embassy. Eventually, the British air attaché had to ask for American reports of the Greek armed forces in order to keep the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence informed. Depressingly, the naval attaché commented that: Should the Cyprus problem be solved, it is probable that the present hostility to the Royal Navy would diminish. It is most unlikely, however, that the Royal Navy would ever be allowed to reassume its former paternalistic attitude to the Royal Hellenic Navy, even if it wished to do so.66 In autumn 1955, King Paul addressed the nation on the Cyprus question, following his return from the official visit to Yugoslavia. In Constantinople and in Smyrna Turkish right-wing groups, backed by the authorities, damaged Greek property and vandalised cemeteries on a large scale; public opinion in Greece was enraged. The Greek-Turkish ‘honeymoon of 1952’ was over once and for all, and antagonism over Cyprus took centre-stage on the bilateral-relations agenda. Paul cited Greek values and patriotism, but tried to inspire calm and referred only indirectly to Britain: In carrying out the present struggle for the self-determination of the Cypriot people, we Greeks have proved once again our high civilisation and our moral superiority. I wish to stress that under the present international conditions, maybe the decisions and fate of our Nation will have a basic bearing on the fate of the entire mankind. This fact places terrific responsibilities upon us, extending much further than the problem of the present hour . . . Greece has great, powerful and civilised friends who, with a free mind and will, have linked their fate historically to our own.67

King Paul and Queen Frederica

89

With Papagos critically ill, Paul tried to convince the prime minister to resign. Papagos refused, and appointed Secretary Stefanos Stephanopoulos acting prime minister. The field-marshal died on 4 October 1955. The king then sought to appoint the young, ambitious secretary of Public Works, Constantine Karamanlis, to the post of prime minister. However, Karamanlis had not been elected head of his party at the time of the proposed appointment. It was another controversy for the crown, and many accused the palace of favouritism.68 Paul assumed that in the post-Papagos era the young conservative Karamanlis would understand a simple principle: that ‘the palace had a say in politics.’ Frederica was jubilant, writing to George Marshall that: The effect on the country [of appointing Karamanlis prime minister] was like champagne . . . Karamanlis is a man who says what he thinks. He is very direct in all his actions. He will take the responsibility of his own actions as well as his own mistakes. The Army is extremely pleased with the solution and my husband also asked the Prime Minister to keep the Ministry of National Defence for himself as Prime Minister.69 Ambassador Peake found Prime Minister Karamanlis ‘honest and energetic, one of the best of the younger Conservatives . . . he has however little experience of foreign affairs and while not anti-British he is by temperament distrustful and is consequently inclined to be suspicious of our motives.’70 The drama in Cyprus – the hangings of arrested EOKA members, the guerilla attacks, the violence, the inter-communal strife between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots and the raids against Grivas – also influenced public opinion in Britain. It was only a matter of time before Paul was attacked by the British press. A good opportunity arose in 1958 when the king and queen visited Switzerland. After a jubilant welcome by the Swiss people, Paul addressed the federal palace on 11 September. He argued in favour of Greek rights in Cyprus, saying that: Greece finds herself forced today to wage another struggle, a moral struggle. . . My Government, in the wish to restore good relations between Greece and those countries and to forestall any weakening of the Western defence, has reached the farthest limit of concessions. It cannot, however, remain deaf to the great clamour, the imperative claim of 430,000 Greeks who are demanding liberty and the right to self-determination.71

90

Greece and the English

The Swiss deputies were somewhat surprised and, as the Daily Express reported, the applause was ‘feeble’. The Daily Express, Evening Standard and Sunday Express all attacked the king, arguing that he had forgotten British help during World War II, that he had been appointed honorary admiral of the fleet and that he should not back the ‘thugs’ of EOKA. The first secretary for press affairs in the Greek embassy in London addressed the issue with the Foreign Office. He argued that the Greek press had never attacked Queen Elizabeth or the royal family despite the prevalent anti-British sentiment. For their part, British diplomats replied that first they had to see for themselves the text of the king’s speech. They claimed that Queen Elizabeth had never mentioned Cyprus in any of her official speeches and that: ‘If heads of state themselves stepped into the political area, they must be presumed to accept the possibility of political comment being made on their views in the same way as on the views of other public personalities.’ However, one D. Brown of the Foreign Office admitted that it was his personal view that an editorial by John Gordon was ‘distasteful’.72 London was more annoyed by Paul speaking to a foreign audience about Cyprus than by the topic itself. Besides, on other earlier occasions he had referred directly to the right of self-determination. The British populist press referred to Paul by his honorary rank as admiral of the fleet, to cause controversy in Whitehall – though there were already more than enough controversies in the 1955–59 period, especially related to the treatment of prisoners in Cyprus. As a former Intelligence Corps corporal who served there put it, ‘torture was endemic’.73 The royal couple showed great interest on being informed of the diplomacy in Cyprus between the Greek consul-general Aggelos Vlahos and Field-Marshal Harding. A reference in the memoirs of Vlahos on the attitude of Paul gives as an insight into the royal mind-set: the diplomat remarked that whenever he visited Paul, the king asked him afterwards to brief the queen himself. The diplomat was guided into a nearby room, where he had a conversation with the queen. She was ‘smart and quick’; ‘I rarely have seen such a charming face,’ recalled Vlahos. Frederica ‘always asked pointed questions’ but never gave it as her view that any Greek government handling of affairs had been less than good. She believed that ‘if she was in charge she could have lead policy differently.’ Later, in 1957 when Makarios gained fame after being released from his exile and flying to Athens, a rumour circulated that he would become a leader in Greek politics; this genuinely scared both Paul and Frederica, who did not hide their anxiety from Vlahos74 – Makarios could inhibit their influence over politics. Fortunately for the royal couple, the archbishop, who was certainly very ambitious, was interested only in Cyprus.

King Paul and Queen Frederica

91

Greek diplomacy tried to reach an agreement with the Turks and the British over Cyprus, but royalist officers belonging to the Sacred Bond grew restless after the elections of May 1958. EDA (the ‘United Left’) – considered a communist front organisation – had won 24.4 per cent of the vote, though Karamanlis was reelected. The Left was now the main opposition, and the prospect of a future dilemma – the option of ‘the Left or Karamanlis’ – scared many Bond members at the rank of major and colonel. These officers started pressing their brigadiers and lieutenant-generals to proceed once again with a coup, to safeguard Greece from the ‘red menace’. At that time, the commanders of the armed forces – also Bond members – argued that they needed the palace to give the ‘green light’ for a coup, and gradually their juniors understood that in such a case they would have to consider to sideline their superiors.75 Eventually, Karamanlis reached an agreement on Cyprus. London granted independence to a Republic of Cyprus, with Archbishop Makarios as president, a Turkish-Cypriot as vice-president, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom as guarantors. Grivas returned safely to Athens, but public opinion was disappointed at the outcome: the island was not united with Greece, and the agreements of Zurich and London had granted to the Turkish-Cypriot minority (constituting only 18 per cent of the population) disproportionate rights in comparison to the majority of Greek-Cypriots. Bond members did not like the agreement, and Karamanlis was accused by political opponents of having betrayed Cyprus, though he retained the prestige of a prominent conservative politician. For their part, the royal family welcomed the idea of having no more tension with the British over Cyprus. The British military secured sovereign bases on Cyprus and continued their signals-intelligence operations against the Middle East and south-west Russia. Regarding the attitude and the political position of the royal family, it became evident to British diplomats from the mid-1950s onwards that Frederica and Paul were seeking to communicate their views to the United States, via a variety of channels. While London had only its ambassador in Athens to transmit messages to and receive messages from the court, Frederica met with CIA Director Allen Dulles as early as 1955, as she admits in her memoirs.76 In the early 1960s, the State Department made use of two major channels for gathering intelligence on Greek politics: the American ambassador in Athens, and the CIA station chief there. As US declassified documents reveal, the latter, Lock Campbell, ‘was teaching philosophy’ to the nineteen-year-old Crown Prince Constantine and maintained close communication with the ever-talkative queen.77 The CIA had also been dis-

92

Greece and the English

turbed by the rise of the Greek Left after the 1958 elections, and Dulles even considered the legalisation of the KKE (Greek Communist Party) ‘in order to control it better’. In any case, American intelligence officers knew the coup intentions of the Sacred Bond as well as the pressures exerted on Karamanlis by Solon Gikas (a key Sacred Bond member, a former chief of the army general staff and secretary of Public Works in Karamanlis’s cabinet) to ‘deviate from the Constitution’.78 The American diplomats did not approve of the attitude of the royal family, and did not eschew sarcasm. Ambassador Ellis Briggs wrote that having watched the Greek royal family closely for the last 30 months ‘it was not difficult to understand why this country has occasionally been declared a republic . . . the queen is terrified by the possibility of Greek blood entering the royal family’, and the last three years had been trying to find husbands and a wife for her three children from the lists of foreign noble families.79 The ambassador forecast a coming rift between Karamanlis and the royal couple, and claimed that Frederica did not hesitate to comment to him that she had not invited the prime minister to dinner in the preceding four years. On another occasion, the young crown prince insulted Karamanlis while both were awaiting the return of the king and queen from an official visit. The prince told his parents in public on their arrival that: ‘He [Karamanlis] was a good boy while you were absent.’ The diplomat despised the ‘arrogant and irresponsible’ stance of the queen towards ‘one of the best prime ministers Greece ever had’. In the eyes of Briggs, Prince Constantine indulged in state affairs ‘as naively as in sports . . . he is more the son of his mother than of his father’; and he considered that Frederica would have a certain degree of influence over the future king. In conclusion, the ambassador’s assessment was that monarchy did not have deep roots in Greece, and ‘winds’ could easily tear them up; and ‘Greek winds are unpredictable and violent and come without a warning.’80 1961 was a halcyon time for the secret services, but not for democracy. During the general elections the military, the security services, the police and KYP (‘Central Intelligence Service’) under Alexander Natsinas planned and executed the ‘Perikles Plan’; this entailed large-scale manipulation of election procedures, especially in rural Greece. The key aim was to secure a victory for Karamanlis, and for his conservative party ERE (‘National Radical Union’). The Centre Union of Georgios Papandreou, and also, in the main, the Left, suffered from the undercover operations of the security services and their ultra-rightist agents. Key members of the Sacred Bond, like Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos (one of the dictators of the 21 April 1967 junta), served with KYP, attended planning consultations and maintained

King Paul and Queen Frederica

93

good communication with the US embassy.81 The palace did not seem to care about the electoral manipulation, but Frederica did not hide her low opinion of Karamanlis. Neither did she care for Papandreou or for his party, which included many republicans. Karamanlis denied any knowledge of the Perikles Plan, stating that his government was not informed of ‘these silly plans of the secret services’.82 However, it was hard to believe that such a large-scale operation could have been kept secret from the prime minister. In the elections Karamanlis duly secured 50.8 per cent of the vote (176 seats out of 300) and formed a government; Papandreou obtained 33.7 per cent. The leader of the major opposition launched an unprecedented campaign against the government, on many occasions withdrawing his deputies from parliamentary debates. Demonstrations by Centre Union supporters and antagonism between Karamanlis and Papandreou were daily events in the period 1961–63. Karamanlis had to fight on two fronts: first against Papandreou, who declared that the conservative administration was illegal; and second, against the crown. The prime minister planned to introduce changes in the Constitution of 1952, with the key area being the power of the crown to intervene in politics. The man who had been chosen by Paul in 1955 to head the government, now planned in 1962 to limit the king’s power. (No doubt this made Frederica furious.) On the other hand, Papandreou – who had a republican background himself – wanted to establish a personal relationship with the court, and did not back Karamanlis in his attempt to modernise the constitution. On 3 October 1962 the prime minister sent a letter to the king addressing a number of issues related to the crown, from finance to ceremonial. It was clear that Karamanlis’s letter would be controversial, and lead to a strongly defensive posture on the royal couple’s part. The prime minister argued that ‘simplicity and plainness increased the prestige of the crown’; a ‘grandiose’ style of living, extravagant spending, frequent travelling abroad by the king and his son created a negative impression in the eyes of the Greek public. Moreover, it would be advisable for the king to inform the government of his speeches in advance, even though, as Karamanlis put it, it was commendable that they showed the personal touch of the king himself. Generally, the financial burdens that the crown imposed on public spending had to be curtailed. He remarked that: ‘The people are strict towards their rulers and deny them the luxuries and the comfort they allow themselves. In this field much wrong-doing by all of us has lately occurred.’ The crown needed a political advisor, and Paul should appoint one of high standing. The Fund of Northern Greece established by Queen Frederica offered many

94

Greece and the English

valuable services to the nation, but there was a great need for legal reform. Generally, the crown had to avoid pretexts that gave opportunities to opposition political parties to attack the constitutional monarchy.83 Karamanlis had been surprised by the grandiose style of the wedding of Prince Juan Carlos and Princess Sofia in Athens the previous May, though he did not refer to it directly. In mid-October King Paul replied, answering one by one the points raised by the prime minister. He was defensive, refusing to accept the possibility of the crown’s ‘attrition’ in the eyes of public opinion.84 Beside Karamanlis’s plans for constitutional reform, money played a key role in the clash between the crown and the prime minister. Queen Frederica’s foundation raised money by taxing cinema tickets, and in 1962 cinema enterprises pressured Karamanlis to abolish this tax; he decreased it, which angered Frederica. She also declined a proposal from Karamanlis that the money from her fund be used for building houses for farmers. During the same period the palace requested an increase in the Royal Grant (paid by the Ministry of Finance to the royal family), but Karamanlis was against more spending. Another controversy erupted when Princess Sofia of Greece decided to marry Prince Juan Carlos of Spain. The royal family ‘negotiated’, as Karamanlis wrote, a dowry in the amount of $300,000, without informing the government in advance. Later, when they requested payment of the money, Karamanlis told them they needed to reexamine the issue together, because Papandreou would accuse his government and the crown of excessive spending. Karamanlis met Frederica, who allegedly told him plainly: ‘If Plastiras was prime minister he would have done it’ – i.e. given the money without protest. The prime minister replied that if he were in opposition he would not attack the crown as Papandreou would. Eventually, shipping tycoon Aristotle Onassis sent Karamanlis a $300,000 cheque for Princess Sofia, an offer which of course the prime minister declined.85 In the eyes of the royals, Karamanlis’s letter must have looked like a declaration of war rather than the advice of a politician loyal to the crown who wanted to maintain a balance between public finance, public opinion and the crown. It is noteworthy that all the above episodes were leaked to the press; the political atmosphere became very negative toward the crown. The British and American embassies, especially the latter, were kept well informed by the court; for example, on 31 January 1963 the queen confessed to CIA station chief Campbell that Karamanlis ‘is a man of great ability and is completely loyal to the crown but he is becoming increasingly hard to get along with and occasionally shows bad judgment.’ The ‘best solution’, according to her, would be a government with a few members of ERE in it, among

King Paul and Queen Frederica

95

them such as Secretary of Finance Spyridon Theotokis (the person the royal couple would support for the post of prime minister after the resignation of Karamanlis in the summer of 1963). She raised the issue of Karamanlis not backing her in the dowry affair, and commented: ‘Perhaps it is time for elections and for a new government.’ Surprisingly, she did not like Papandreou either: ‘[He is] a fanatic and irresponsible.’ In fact, Frederica openly admitted that she did not hold any politician in high esteem. She hinted that in the event of a crisis, the court would rely on the military ‘to save the monarchy . . . [in that event] the United States had to back the monarchy otherwise there will be complete chaos.’86 With reference to international diplomacy, Frederica argued that the Common Market led by de Gaulle might weaken NATO, and commented that the attitude of the French president towards the British was arrogant: ‘It is high time someone told them [the British] they cannot always have their cake and eat it.’ She sounded anti-de Gaulle as well as anti-British. Campbell took this remark very seriously, signalling to his service that: ‘Her deep-seated animosity toward the British is likely to affect her judgment of any issue where British interests are concerned.’ Perhaps Frederica had commented negatively on British policy during her many meetings with American diplomats and intelligence officials, or the CIA chief simply panicked on hearing another of the queen’s controversial remarks. Later, the station chief ’s assessment was that: She is constantly haunted by vague fears of political upheaval which might destroy the Monarchy, or perhaps more likely of political events which might eventually force the abdication of the sovereign. She has little confidence in the basic stability of the government and believes that only the constant vigilance of the Crown can protect Greek politicians from their own follies and prevent political chaos which, in turn, would be successfully exploited by the Communists. Hence, all of her political judgments are based on the assumption that what is good for the Monarchy is good for Greece.87 On 20 February 1963, the court announced in Athens that the royal couple would accept Queen Elizabeth’s invitation for a state visit to London in July. The alarm went off in the Foreign Office and in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs to start planning the visit, but it was only a matter of time before this affair would lead to a crisis in Greece. Karamanlis had submitted his proposals for constitutional reform, but was meanwhile constantly accused by the opposition of large-scale fraud in the 1961 elections. Frederica was

96

Greece and the English

bitter towards the prime minister, but the London visit would be of great benefit to her: she believed that Buckingham Palace would help to raise the prestige of the monarchy in Greece. The British press did not welcome the visit of Paul and Frederica. On 18 February the Times correspondent detailed the history of the Greek monarchy, and of the confrontation between Karamanlis and Papandreou. The newspaper argued that the court did not have wise enough advisors. In addition, the Royal Grant had reached £202,000 by September 1962, and the dowry affair had had an impact on the crown’s prestige. On 19 February 1963, the Daily Express referred to the steady increase in the anti-royalist ranks in Greece caused by crown intervention in politics and by the king’s responsibility in the 1961 elections. Sarcastically, the editor commented that Paul’s ‘ambition’ was to parade with Queen Elizabeth in the royal carriage through the streets of London ‘to secure British backing for his regime and to attract visits and medals’.88 At that time, Karamanlis was the most prominent right-wing politician in Greece, but no one from the court realised this. Already, Ambassador Peake had described Panayiotis Canellopoulos – one of the leading figures in Karamanlis’s party – as ‘a highly cultured man, but despite his long years in the Chamber he is not fundamentally a politician’. In British eyes, Papandreou was one of the most eloquent of Greek public speakers, with a generous and theatrical personality. He has more understanding of the administrative machine than most Greek politicians and is able on occasion to rise above party politics when circumstances demand.89 It is very important to emphasise that the royal couple, by fighting Karamanlis, split the right; Karamanlis had a large following which continued to support him even in the 1970s. The rest of the conservatives remained either pro-crown, with former Ambassador Panagiotis Pipinelis (former advisor to King George II, and one of the most loyal royalists ever, but with no public backing), and Canellopoulos, a moderate. ‘Glamourising the visit’ was what the Foreign Office wanted; they coordinated press coverage and publicity with the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Greek embassy in London. The new British ambassador in Athens, Sir Ralph Murray, sought to bring to London the senior Greek officers who had fought alongside the British during the war.90 Murray believed that: ‘We should try to get as much benefit as possible from this visit. It could only too easily result in personal satisfaction to the King and

King Paul and Queen Frederica

97

Queen with little effect on our general relations or on public opinion.’ The ‘romantic and indeed heroic associations’ between Greece and the United Kingdom had to be projected. For its part, the British military were to find veterans in the United Kingdom who had served in Greece. The ambassador was very careful to warn that while Field-Marshal Montgomery and Lord Alexander would be figures that could bring memories of the alliance to life, Force 133 veterans and especially retired Lieutenant-General Roland Scobie could appear as well, though ‘we must be wary of awakening too many memories of the ELAS-Zervas imbroglios.’91 Memories of the battle of Athens in 1944 were not welcome on this occasion. (See also chapter two above, on King George II.) The conservative Member of Parliament Chris Woodhouse ranked top in the guest list for receptions: he had served as head of the British Military Mission in Greece during the war, and had continued to maintain contact with Greek political figures. The Queen’s speech would deal ‘mainly with the traditional friendship between the two countries and [would] avoid mention of Cyprus . . . The Queen could also congratulate King Paul and Queen Frederica on the hundredth anniversary of the Greek Dynasty.’92 Meanwhile, the Foreign Office would ‘try to persuade one or more of the serious dailies (Times, Guardian etc.) to publish an editorial’.93 Ambassador Murray assessed that there would be some ‘sniping’ from the Daily Express, but fortunately King Paul had a meeting with Hugh Cudlipp, the managing editor of the Mirror, in Athens on 15 March; positive publicity was expected.94 With reference to medals, Foreign Secretary Averof, who was accompanying Paul and Frederica, would be awarded the Grand Cross of Saint Michael and George, and the grand marshal of the Athens court, Dimitrios Levidis, the Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order. The same applied to Lieutenant-General Constantine Dovas, the chief of the military household. The hairdresser, the chambermaid and the valets of Paul and Frederica would receive nothing – a suggestion that they be awarded the Royal Victorian Medal was overruled.95 An episode in London in April would change Karamanlis’s stance toward the state visit. Frederica, Crown Prince Constantine and Princess Irene had travelled there to attend the wedding of Princess Alexandra. While staying at Claridges they attracted protests from Greeks living abroad who demanded the release of political prisoners – mainly communists held in prisons since the civil war. Somehow, Frederica, Irene and the British police constable escorting them found themselves in a very difficult situation. A group of protestors approached them, led by the wife of an imprisoned communist, a Mrs Ambatiellos (a British subject). Eventually, the constable fell to the

98

Greece and the English

ground, and the two royals followed by the demonstrators ran into a small street that proved to be a blind alley. In a desperate bid to escape they rang two doorbells. As Frederica later told the story: One door opened and we quickly got in and banged it shut. A charming American lady looked at us in surprise. I said to her, ‘I am the Queen of Greece. There are a bunch of men running after me with big sticks. Can we stay for a while?’ Later, the constable managed to find the two fugitives, and Constantine informed his mother of having ‘intelligence on a communist plan to murder her’.96 This was an exaggeration, but the incident with the protestors could well have turned ugly. On hearing the news in Athens, Karamanlis understood that it was again ‘crisis time’. He urged Paul to ask his wife to send a telegram to Greece to stop a royalist rally in her favour, in order to avoid violent incidents. The prime minister feared that a royalist protest could turn anti-British, the Cyprus issue being alive and well in the Greek press. Later, on 3 May, Karamanlis suggested that Paul cancel the July visit for fear that new demonstrations and left-wing political protests could damage the prestige of Greece and the crown. He also feared a cooling in Anglo-Greek relations. The king replied that they needed to re-examine this issue on another occasion; he did not seem to have given consideration to his prime minister’s advice.97 Meanwhile, at Alexandra’s wedding reception: [Frederica] felt how terribly embarrassed everybody was about the incident . . . Lilibet, as we call the Queen of England, was very sweet to me. She was really upset that something like this could have happened in England. Before the official letter [of British apology] was received, I was urged by the Greek Foreign Minister to return to Greece. I told Lilibet I would not leave unless she, herself, threw tomatoes at me! This at least, made her laugh.98 From 16 to 19 May, General de Gaulle paid an official visit to Greece; it was a good opportunity for Karamanlis, who wanted Greece to join the European Economic Community, to express his desire for closer GreekFrench relations. On 22 May, Karamanlis called on Paul, who was ill. That same evening, at a rally in Thessaloniki, the EDA Member of Parliament Grigoris Lambrakis was murdered by ultra-right-wingers, with the backing of some Gendarmerie officers. They had planned an ‘accident’, but very soon it was proved to be a case of cold-blooded murder. Karaman-

King Paul and Queen Frederica

99

lis was once again embarrassed by not being able to control the security services, which operated without political supervision or control. Sacred Bond members (linked to the ultra-right-wing groups) urged their superiors again to go ahead with a coup. Karamanlis was determined that royal visits to London be cancelled. He assumed that after the murder of Lambrakis Greek and Greek-Cypriot left-wingers in London would create serious incidents that could test Anglo-Greek relations. On 8 June, he visited the king and offered his advice; this the monarch seemed inclined to accept, but did not commit himself. He wanted another meeting in a few days, and they met again on 10 and 11 June. During the first of these two meetings, Paul did not initially accept the advice of his prime minister, asserting that he had already declined an invitation by Queen Elizabeth back in 1954; no one in the royal family had forgotten this. He did not want ‘to give the wrong impression’ to Buckingham Palace. For his part, Karamanlis argued that it was not a ‘personal matter’ but an affair of two states, and that the king would be embarrassed in the eyes of Queen Elizabeth if he himself had to resign, and the monarch then paid his visit contrary to the advice of his prime minister. ‘Queen Elizabeth would abide by the advice of the British government’ was Karamanlis’s key argument. Moreover, he emphasised that the difference of views between the prime minister and his king had a constitutional aspect, and a serious crisis could erupt. Eventually, Paul seemed to agree, and discussed writing a personal letter to Queen Elizabeth explaining his reasons for cancelling the visit. They agreed to meet again in the afternoon. Later, the court informed the prime minister that the meeting had been rescheduled for the next day. On June 11, an embarrassed Paul told Karamanlis that he had changed his mind and that he had decided to go ahead with the visit. The prime minister submitted his resignation, and when he was offered the Grand Cross of the Order of the Redeemer he declined, stating with a bitter laugh: ‘The Grand Cross is offered as a comfort to a prime minister who was led to resign.’ He requested the formation of an acting government to commence preparations for general elections.99 King Paul surprised his prime minister again: without Karamanlis’s knowledge and contrary to constitutional practice, he announced to the public the need to go to London, since the British government welcomed the royal family’s visit. The head of state could not be pressured by the protests of ‘a minority, communist or not’ and argued that the cancellation of the visit could have serious effects for Greece’s standing in NATO.100 It was obvious that Frederica had intervened at the last moment and convinced Paul to go to London. To put it bluntly, the only way of avoiding a consti-

100

Greece and the English

tutional crisis would have been to keep Frederica away from Paul for some time. When the news of the resignation broke, the international press hailed Karamanlis as a prime minister who had contributed to the advancement of the Greek economy. The New York Times, the Economist, the Daily Mail, the Times, the Guardian, the Financial Times, the Frankfurter Allgemeine and Le Monde published favourable editorials, and one way or another hinted that the palace had made a big mistake.101 The British embassy in Athens, already preoccupied with the preparations for the state visit, assessed that up to that time the Centre Union opposition had been ‘thoroughly irresponsible and played into the hands of the EDA, a party which is communist in all but name’. Adding to the controversy, after the 1961 elections Papandreou had accused Paul in a letter, now made public, of having ‘identified himself with the illegitimate government of Karamanlis’. The Foreign Office considered that: Monsieur Karamanlis’s’ disagreement with the Palace over the state visit was the occasion rather than the reason for his resignation. The probable explanation for this move is that despite his overall majority in Parliament, Monsieur Karamanlis felt doubtful of his ability to control the effects of the Centre Union’s long campaign particularly in the light of the uproar following an incident in Salonika in May when an EDA deputy, Dr. Lambrakis was run over and killed by a motor cyclist . . . The prospects for future stability, however, are not very encouraging. Both Monsieur Papandreou and Monsieur Markezinis (an ERE royalist) have attacked the government [favoured by King Paul].102 Former Ambassador Pipinelis, one of the old hard-nosed royalists, was sworn in as prime minister. King Paul proceeded with a controversial interpretation of Article 31 of the Constitution, which gave him the right ‘to appoint and to dismiss his ministers’: Pipinelis had not been elected by ERE members as their leader; the crown did not declare general elections; and Paul wanted to form a government with ERE members in order to introduce another electoral system. It was again a pure and simple case of crown intervention in politics; the head of state, a constitutional monarch, pressed hard for a change in the electoral system – to a British reader this may sound unbelievable, but for the Greek royal family of the 1950s and 1960s it was routine. Karamanlis was seriously frustrated, arguing in a conversation with Constantine Hoidas (the head of the crown prince’s private office) that it was contrary to constitutional practice not to listen to the advice of the

King Paul and Queen Frederica

101

prime minister, who had urged the king to proceed with general elections with the electoral system already in place. When Karamanlis asked Hoidas what would happen if the king’s new government did not win a vote of confidence in parliament, Hoidas replied that this might lead to ‘anomaly’, hinting at the possibility of a military coup. Karamanlis admitted that he was surprised by this answer. He strongly believed that the palace aimed to divide the right and to take full control of political life, once having secured the presence of favoured loyalists in the government.103 Despite the serious political crisis in Greece early in the summer of 1963, after the resignation of Karamanlis and the formation of the Pipinelis government, it was ‘glamour time’ for the royal family, who looked forward to flying to London. Eventually, Pipinelis himself accompanied them, Averof having resigned his post after the departure of Karamanlis. For its part, the Foreign Office acknowledged that: ‘What we are doing for the King of Greece will be pretty expensive . . . we are very conscious of the question of the cost and will do our best to keep it within reason.’104 On 9 July at 1010 hours King Paul and Queen Frederica arrived at Gatwick airport aboard a Comet IVB of Olympic Airways, escorted by two RAF fighters.105 The royal couple was received by the Earl of Munster (Her Majesty’s Lieutenant for the County of Surrey), Julian Amery (Minister of Aviation) and General Sir Roderick MacLeod (General Officer Commanding, Eastern Command). A guard of honour from The Queen’s Colour Squadron presented arms. Paul and Frederica boarded a special train to Victoria station, arriving there at 1230 hours. At the station, Queen Elizabeth and the Duke of Edinburgh greeted them. ‘She was dressed in blue and white, the Greek colours, symbolic of her goodwill and friendship towards us and her appreciation of Paul’s steadfastness,’ Frederica wrote in her memoirs. The Queen introduced Prime Minister Macmillan, the Earl of Home (Foreign Secretary), Henry Brook (Home Secretary), Ambassador to Greece Sir Ralph Murray, the Lord Mayor of London, Earl Mountbatten, Sir Caspar John (First Sea Lord), General Sir Richard Hull (Chief of the Imperial General Staff), Air Marshal Sir Thomas Pike (Chief of the Air Staff), Major General John Nelson (General Officer Commanding, London District), Sir Joseph Simpson (Metropolitan Police Commissioner) and the Mayor of the City of Westminster. Meanwhile, the Honorable Artillery Company at the Tower of London and the Royal Horse Artillery in Hyde Park fired a welcome salute. Frederica kissed her cousin Earl Mountbatten: A row of top brass was waiting . . . As it is customary between cousins, I kissed him and, being slightly flustered by all the formality, I then

102

Greece and the English

lifted my face to kiss the next man in the row. Just in time, I realised that he was Field-Marshal Lord Alexander, whose slight look of surprise brought me back to reality and prevented me from going vaguely down the line kissing all the officers.106 King Paul inspected the guard of honour at the invitation of Queen Elizabeth, then boarded the first royal carriage with the queen. The second carriage was for Queen Frederica and the Duke of Edinburgh; the politicians, diplomats and officers followed in the other five. Suddenly, Mrs Ambatiellos ran into the middle of the street outside Victoria station screaming that her husband should be released; moments later she was taken away by police. The carriages headed for Buckingham Palace (where the royal couple were to stay for the duration of their visit) by way of Hudson’s Place, Wilton Road, Neathouse Place, Vauxhall Bridge Road, Victoria Street, Parliament Square, Parliament Street, Whitehall, Admiralty Arch and the Mall. The royal couple stayed at the palace for the duration of their visit, and at 4.30 in the afternoon they visited Westminster Abbey to lay a wreath on the Grave of the Unknown Soldier; later they met the Queen Mother. (Mrs Ambatiellos demanded the right also to lay a wreath at Westminster Abbey on behalf of political prisoners in Greece.) The state banquet at Buckingham palace started at 1810 hours. About 2,000 demonstrators marched from Trafalgar Square to the palace to protest against the visit; the police closed Admiralty Arch, and the demonstration later moved to Whitehall. A few demonstrators passed through St James Park in order to reach Buckingham Palace. Eventually, 94 people were arrested; violent clashes hit the headlines. At the Palace banquet, Queen Elizabeth’s speech focused on traditional Anglo-Greek friendship, on classical Greece, on the British contribution during the Greek War for Independence and on Greek resistance during the Second World War, as well as on the importance of having Greece in the NATO alliance. But there was an indirect mention of Cyprus: Your visit is of great significance. It is a visit which marks the strength and warmth of Anglo-Greek relations. The longstanding and traditional friendship between our two Houses, our two countries, our two peoples, is something which I can assure you we in this country regard as very precious. It is a friendship which had been forged in peace and in war; it is a friendship which can survive temporary disagreements; it is a friendship which I am sure will be enduring.107

King Paul and Queen Frederica

103

Next day, Paul and Frederica boarded the Nore, and accompanied by two warships reached the Tower of London, where they visited the Lord Mayor at the Guildhall, and Paul inspected a guard of honour mounted by the Honorable Artillery Company. The Lord Mayor, in a speech, made reference to ancient Greece and to the royal connection between England and Greece: I beg Your Majesties to extend me the indulgence of Theseus, for it is truly in simpleness and duty that I tender the message of welcome of the City of London to you, and the people of your Country. We here are an ancient nation; we are an ancient City, but not as old as Athens. We have a beautiful City; but we cannot compare with the matchless beauty of the Acropolis – nevertheless, I hope that we can, in our own modest way, make Your Majesties feel at home. This should not be too difficult for your Royal Line has long been connected with our own Royal House, and you yourselves know this country well and something of its way of life.108 The protests continued in various forms and in various locations. In the evening, Queen Elizabeth, the Duke of Edinburgh, King Paul and Queen Frederica went to see A Midsummer Night’s Dream at the Aldwych Theatre. The organisation of this event was meticulous: the theatre’s directors even informed Queen Elizabeth and her ladies in waiting in advance of the colour of the theatre boxes, in order for them ‘to know what will be the background against which they will appear’.109 On arrival, demonstrators waiting outside the theatre called Paul ‘a Fascist swine’ and Queen Elizabeth looked away from the ranks of demonstrators, and forbore to smile. As they were leaving the theatre ‘cheers were drowned by shouts of “Nazis out” and “free the political prisoners”.’ Later, Home Secretary Brook told journalists at a reception that: ‘The Queen of England was booed tonight and I am furious . . . I was shocked and furious. This is the work of a handful of communists and anarchists.’ In sum, nine individuals were arrested, including a 29-yearold American who had concealed a dart in a roll of paper.110 On the evening of 11 July, Queen Elizabeth was entertained at a banquet given by the royal couple at Claridges. Paul and Frederica were scheduled to leave at noon the following day.111 Afterwards, the Foreign Office claimed: ‘The visit has successfully served its purpose of strengthening Anglo-Greek relations, in spite of the demonstrations organised by groups of agitators.’ It was emphasised that the demonstrators never exceeded 2,000 men and women. British ambassadors

104

Greece and the English

were also informed that there was no truth in the claims that the Labour Party had not wanted the visit.112 Reporting from Athens, Ambassador Murray argued that Greek newspapers sought to read an ‘ulterior purpose’ into the visit. Some publishers claimed that the royal visit and the willingness of Paul to go ahead with it were linked to Archbishop Makarios’s controversial decision in Cyprus to change some articles of the Cypriot constitution, without Turkish-Cypriot backing. Greek journalists who read the Times had a tendency to ‘assume that this newspaper represents British Government views’, arguing that the British might be sympathetic to the need to change the constitution, provided that no union with Greece would materialise.113 Back in Greece Karamanlis was losing political momentum. Elections, to be held under the proportional-representation system, were declared in late September, and scheduled for November 3, under an interim government. The CIA had estimated that ERE would be the winner, with up to 48 per cent of the vote. To their surprise Papandreou won 42 per cent, and ERE only 39.7 per cent. The new prime minister, who needed the backing of the leftist EDA to form a government, was sworn in on 7 November. King Paul believed that he could pressure Papandreou to co-operate with ERE in a centre-right coalition, but the prime minister had other plans. He aimed for new elections, hoping for a clear majority that would rid his party of the left. In the elections of 16 February the Centre Union won 52.7 per cent of the vote, and 171 seats in parliament. A few days before this, the queen confided to the American ambassador Henry Labouisse that: ‘There are no fears of a coup. The military would not attempt something without the assent of the king. Only in the event Papandreou wins and includes the communists in his administration is such an anomaly possible.’ In November, the diplomat met with Papandreou to congratulate him. The prime minister told him that Paul was seriously ill, possibly with cancer, and commented that the young crown prince showed signs of maturity and improvement, even though he was still ‘young and prone to the influence of his mother’. Papandreou surprised the ambassador by adding that it was time for the crown to learn its ‘role’. Labouisse wrote to the State Department that if Constantine became king he would be influenced by Frederica, and a confrontation with Papandreou could easily transpire.114 It seemed once again a matter of time before a new constitutional crisis erupted. In late November, the queen represented the king at the funeral of the assassinated President Kennedy, and had a short conversation with Lyndon Johnson at the presidential reception. Her comments about the newly formed Greek administration were simply insulting. She told the new president: ‘The present crowd [the new government] were a little nervous, be-

King Paul and Queen Frederica

105

cause they had attacked us [the royal family] while they were out of office. But they were learning that they could work with us.’ Frederica did not anticipate any serious crisis: ‘She wanted President Johnson and the United States to know as a certainty that as long as her husband was there, the Communists would never gain any power in Greece.’115 Meanwhile, the press had discovered that the king was seriously ill. The Athens palace responded to this by organising surprise casual appearances by the king, but his health deteriorated rapidly. In a gesture of high symbolism the crown prince brought from the island of Tinos the famous sacred icon of the Virgin Mary to help his father. In early February, Queen Elizabeth expressed interest in the king’s health, after being informed that Paul was suffering from lumbago. Via the Greek ambassador in London, Paul ‘expressed his warmest thanks for Her exceedingly kind thought together with His most cordial regards’. However, London prepared for the inevitable.116 By 3 March, the Queen of England had approved the lowering of flags in London to half-mast on the day of Paul’s funeral, and court mourning for one week. Possibly, the Duke of Edinburgh would attend the ceremony in Athens. On 6 March, the Foreign Office, warned of the impending death of the Greek monarch, sought clearance for messages of condolence; Queen Elizabeth’s public as well as private messages and the Foreign Secretary’s telegram to his Greek counterpart were drafted.117 At 2050 hours on 6 March 1964, Queen Elizabeth was handed a personal message from Crown Prince Constantine: ‘It is my sorrowful duty to have to inform Your Majesty that my beloved father passed away quietly. Constantine R.’118 The Duke of Edinburgh attended the funeral in Athens, paying his respects to the late monarch.

4 King Constantine II The Junta and the Demise of Monarchy

In March 1964, 23-year-old Crown Prince Constantine succeeded his father King Paul on the throne. The new monarch was widely considered too young and inexperienced, and too much under the influence of his mother Frederica. He strongly believed in the prerogatives of the crown and in its ‘right’ to intervene in politics. Four years earlier, Constantine had achieved acclaim when, as captain of his team, he had won a gold medal in sailing at the Rome Olympic Games. So proud were the royalists of their prince’s victory that there was talk of erecting a statue in his honour, until they were reminded that statues were dedicated only after the death of the person to be honoured. The young king who was also called Constantine II (The Thirteenth; linking his name with the line of Byzantine Emperors) gained a reputation for hating Prime Minister Karamanlis and for his naive understanding of politics. The young king maintained close communication with the American ambassador as well as with the CIA station chief in Athens, and was a great believer in personal diplomacy. In November 1963, Georgios Papandreou, leader of the Centre Union, was elected prime minister. The picture of a young smiling king next to an old and experienced politician like Papandreou projected to the public a sense of a ‘father and son affair’: the elderly statesman and the young monarch, two generations working together for the advancement of Greece. But soon the first dark clouds would appear in their relationship. King Constantine II and Prime Minister Papandreou had to deal with the Cyprus issue. The decision of Archbishop/President Makarios to change the constitution had led to the resignation of the Turkish vicepresident. Turkish-Cypriots took up arms, and confined themselves to their

108

Greece and the English

own communities. Greek-Cypriot paramilitaries, under the leadership of Grivas and his lieutenants, attacked Turkish-Cypriots; Ankara grew restless and threatened an invasion. Washington attempted to mediate, but Papandreou assumed that the Americans had indirectly been backing the Turks. Cyprus would once again haunt Anglo-Greek relations at various levels, from Buckingham Palace to the British embassy in Athens, from high politics to ceremonial. Meanwhile, State Department officials assessed Papandreou’s leadership as weak, his party as less disciplined than the ERE of Karamanlis, and the prime minister as unable or unwilling to follow a moderate policy on Cyprus. On the contrary, he seemed to deal leniently with the communists and anti-American demonstrators who were attacking the United States stance on Cyprus. Of course the ‘dark officers’, the Sacred Bond members, accused the government of sympathising with the communists and continued making plans for a military coup.1 British Ambassador Murray kept a close eye on Greek-Turkish relations and on communal clashes in Cyprus, but by spring 1964 he and his staff had to deal with another historical issue that would become highly symbolic in the context of Anglo-Greek relations. The centenary celebrations of the transfer of the Ionian islands to Greece were scheduled for 21 May, the name-day of the king. Diplomats were afraid such celebrations would remind people of the Cypriots’ demand for unification with Greece, giving rise once again to anti-British sentiment. Murray warned that: There is some danger that the British act of transfer of the island, in so far as it was a voluntary gesture, may be ignored or distorted during these celebrations and possibly that local enthusiasts may try to strike an anti-British note making speeches recalling the Enosis agitation. He proposed that Queen Elizabeth issue a message, and that the grandson or great-grandson of Gladstone visit Greece.2 At the FCO, a number of officials were not enthusiastic at the prospect of the centenary affair. Rohan Butler, (a librarian), commented: ‘If we are going to make a habit of celebrating our past cessions of territory, we are likely to be kept busy in years to come. This celebration does not fill me personally with much enthusiasm.’3 The idea of Queen Elizabeth sending a message about the Ionian islands was similarly frowned upon. Another official, M. Brown, commented: In view of the delicacy of the Cyprus situation, we need to be more than usually cautious. Depending on developments in Cyprus, a mes-

King Constantine II

109

sage might be criticised in Britain if the Greek-Cypriots were behaving badly at that time; or it might be resented by the Turks who might regard it was implying subtle support for Enosis. As for the Gladstones, one was too old and the other worked as a history teacher and could not go to Greece in mid-term; besides, diplomats argued that Gladstone’s role in the cession of the islands had not been a major one. Some ceremonial could be arranged by sending to Corfu the Chancellor of the Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, established in 1818 and awarded to Britons and Greeks for colonial services. Again, history raised more issues than bureaucrats could handle: it was pointed out that the order had been founded to commemorate the acquisition of the islands, and could not be involved in the celebrations of their cession.4 Ambassador Murray attended all the ceremonies in Athens and Corfu, and reported on the overall atmosphere; in the end, no anti-British agitation occurred. Lord Lytton, a descendant of Lord Byron, was invited at the suggestion of the Greek government, and he and King Constantine attended a meeting of the Historical Society at the Old Parliament. Next to Lord Lytton sat the descendants of Souliote heroes and of General Kolokotronis of the War of Independence. Corfu was the locus of the celebrations, and three receptions were organised, one royal at the stone Palace of Saint Michael and Saint George, one municipal and one governmental (at a prominent hotel). ‘Parades, music and a royal gun salute added to the fun and shortened our sleep,’ commented Murray, who added that the opening by the king of the exhibition of Edward Lear’s paintings was ‘a gesture which played its own modest part in keeping the atmosphere correct’.5 The diplomat tried to assess the real feelings of the people towards Britain. He emphasised that: There seem to be in Corfu faint traces of warmth towards the former Protecting Power . . . Nor had there been the slightest public recognition in the press of this occasion as recalling our basic and historical relationship with Greece. Though I received some private expressions of warmth (particularly from leaders of the moderate opposition) in the newspapers such articles as have been published on the subject have attempted to discredit our motives in transferring the Islands. In the event, the celebrations were not the pretext for any anti-British agitation over Cyprus.6 Still, the protracted Cyprus crisis had made Buckingham Palace very cautious. Constantine II planned to marry his distant cousin Anne-Ma-

110

Greece and the English

rie, Princess of Denmark, sister of the present queen, Margrethe II. On 26 April 1964, Constantine telephoned the Duke of Edinburgh, inviting him, Queen Elizabeth, the Prince of Wales and Princess Anne to his wedding in Athens, scheduled for September. The Duke of Edinburgh did not reply immediately, first discussing the issue with the Queen. Two days later, they communicated to Athens that even though they would have been very happy to attend, it could not be arranged: Feelings are running high in Britain over Cyprus and the public makes little distinction between Greeks and Greek-Cypriots . . . if things do not get worse there is a good chance that all might be able to be present without undue comment, although whatever happens there will be complaints in the papers and among some sections of the public. Though there was a strong possibility the Duke of Edinburgh would attend the wedding, the Athens palace should not make any announcements, and especially not with reference to Queen Elizabeth and Prince Charles.7 In fact: Queen Elizabeth wanted to attend the wedding and by the end of the month had a meeting with Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home at Windsor. The Queen herself took the view that it would be odd if She did not attend since She would be the only Crowned Head in Europe not present . . . the Queen was, of course, quite ready to take advice on this question but the position seemed to be that She wanted to go unless She was advised not to do so by the Government, rather than that She was waiting to go if advised to do so. On his turn, the prime minister believed that: ‘It might be possible to obscure the issue by saying that it was necessary for the Queen to be in this country at that time because of the impending General Election’; moreover, a royal visit to Canada was already planned for 8–12 October.8 Prince Michael, at that time serving with the 11th Hussars in Germany, and Princess Marina also received invitations; in fact Constantine asked the prince to be his crown bearer. Both requested Downing Street advice. Home and his foreign secretary assumed that no issue could arise if they attended: After all he [Prince Michael] was of an age-group which must be regarded as freer to accept invitations of this sort (of a family and social nature) than Prince Philip’s generation, whose conduct was inseparable from general political considerations.9

King Constantine II

111

Throughout the summer, the Cyprus situation remained explosive, and the FCO and the embassy in Athens could not suggest that Queen Elizabeth attend the September wedding. Diplomats argued for an announcement that Buckingham Palace had other commitments and that was why the Queen could not come to Athens. ‘So far as human things are predictable, the present view of the Ambassador [Murray] is that the chances against its being possible to recommend an acceptance by the Queen are as high as 99 out of 100,’ it was remarked in a memo.10 Meanwhile, British and American intelligence had acquired information that the Turks were deploying naval forces off Cyprus and preparing for an invasion. Since January 1964 Greek military intelligence had been warning of Turkish deployment in Iskendarun, and the government proceeded to dispatch an infantry division to the island; the CIA estimated that 5,000 Greek soldiers reached Cyprus, while US military intelligence put the figure at about 4,000.11 The secret deployment of Greek troops in 1964 was based on transfer by passenger ships, the soldiers being dressed as tourists or students. On 4 June 1964, Turkish Prime Minister Inönü openly threatened an invasion. The White House tried to intervene directly. President Johnson sent a letter to the Turkish leader warning him that in the event of Russian intervention in a Greek-Turkish war over Cyprus, he should not be certain of allied support for his country. The Turks, who leaked the letter to the press, were furious, accusing the United States of blackmail. The Pentagon moved an aircraft carrier of the Sixth Fleet and several escorting warships, in case of war, to within eight hours’ sailing time of Cyprus. Prime Minister Papandreou was asked to talk to the Turks, the Americans assuming that Archbishop Makarios was a very difficult character to deal with. The Greek prime minister was still angry that Makarios had not informed him of his plan to revise the constitution in November 1963. Former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson proposed to Athens and Ankara a plan that amounted to a permanent Turkish base on Cyprus, but Athens and Nicosia did not accept, arguing that this amounted to dividing a sovereign republic. On 24 July, Papandreou met with Johnson in the White House, where the president urged him to initiate talks with the Turks. Johnson emphasised again that the United States could not deter an invasion by military means. Later, Papandreou and his son Andreas dined with Defence Secretary McNamara, and told him what he had no wish to hear: that one day Cyprus would be united with Greece. Georgios Papandreou was intransigent, perhaps having confidence in the Greek forces to avert any Turkish landing.12 For his part, the British prime minister had a meeting with Papandreou

112

Greece and the English

at Downing Street on 21 July. Sir Alec Douglas-Home warned that: Unless the Greeks do something, they are on a collision course with Turkey. This would be a tragedy of the first order for our friends and disaster for our allies. They must therefore really call off their buildup in Cyprus and start talking with the Turks. There is no point in mulling over the rights and wrongs of past history; there is no point in making too much of the dangers of a Cuba in the East Mediterranean; or dwelling on the threat of Turkish invasion. The real danger to avoid now is the threat of war between Greece and Turkey and its consequences for the East Mediterranean, in the NATO alliance and for the world.13 The British had no more success than the Americans in convincing Papandreou, and Turkish operations in August raised the stakes further, jet fighters bombing Greek-Cypriot positions in Cyprus. Makarios asked for the Greek air force to fight back, but Papandreou declined to escalate the tension – he merely sent aircraft to fly over the island in order to boost Greek-Cypriot morale. Makarios was frustrated by Athens’s stance.14 As it turned out, the Turks did not invade the island, but Papandreou never forgot the attitude of Makarios in planning to buy weapons from the Warsaw Pact Czechoslovakia. The president of Cyprus was feared as a man who could turn Cyprus into a Mediterranean Cuba, and was disliked by Papandreou. For their part, the Sacred Bond officers grew even more restless, arguing for the union of Cyprus and Greece at any cost, while simultaneously accusing the Papandreou government of pro-communist leanings; meanwhile, they continued their secret preparations for a military coup. King Constantine II commented in a discussion with the American ambassador that Makarios was a ‘bad person’ and that he himself would have liked to ‘frame him’. The monarch had no liking for the prime minister either. He believed that Papandreou could not ‘handle’ the archbishop, and with a dark smile asked the diplomat ‘if he wanted to get rid of Papandreou’. The official replied with a question: ‘Would you get rid of him even if you wanted?’ The king answered carefully that it was not possible.15 Despite the Cyprus crisis and the growing American suspicion of the Papandreou government, September was a glamorous month for Constantine and for those segments of the Greek public who wanted to watch the wedding celebrations and the invited royal families of Europe. The Duke of Edinburgh and Lord Mountbatten attended the grandiose ceremonies in Athens. In fact, Downing Street and the FCO were seriously ruffled on

King Constantine II

113

being informed that Mountbatten had touched on political issues like Cyprus: He exceeded his instructions and somewhat embarrassed the previous administration in the lengths he went to when discussing a political settlement in Cyprus, both with the King and with the Greek Prime Minister. It was all sorted out in the end and no lasting damage was done; but it gave Her Majesty’s Government a difficult twenty-four hours or so.16 On the occasion of the wedding, the American embassy compiled a report on the appeal of the monarchy to the people, and later Thomas Hughes, director of intelligence and research at the State Department, drafted a research memorandum on the subject addressed to Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Hughes argued that since 1833 the Greek monarchy: has not yet developed into the stable and stabilizing institution which the monarchy constitutes in Great Britain . . . there is still a significant portion of the Greek electorate which does not regard the monarchy as an integral part of Greek political life.’ However, reviewing the 1964 developments the chief analyst claimed that ‘a satisfactory working relationship between the King and the government appears to have developed.’ He was right in pointing out that in the future: There will be pressures on the king from various sources to assume a more active role. He knows that the monarchy does not have universal support, and he will need tact and political acumen if he wishes to be more than a figurehead, particularly as the Center Union is in power . . . the dangerous dispute over Cyprus has absorbed much of the energies of the government, and this would clearly not be the time, either for the palace or for the republicans in the Center Union, to bring about a conflict over the form of government that would divide the country.17 Finally: King Constantine has not yet had time to develop his own role. As he feels more secure in his position as a ruler, he might be tempted to take a more active part, particularly if he should feel that the gov-

114

Greece and the English

ernment’s policy was leading Greece into dangerous complications, as could happen in the Cyprus crisis. There will no doubt be pressures on the King as time goes on to assume a more active role, very possibly from the Queen Mother . . . the King will in some ways have an easier role, but he will have to exercise considerable restraint to avoid the impression that he is using the influence and prestige of the Crown to help strengthen the conservative position and weaken the liberal and republican opposition.18 As will be seen later in this chapter, Hughes’ assessment of the monarchy proved accurate. Soon, in mid-1965, Papandreou and Constantine would clash headon over a matter the crown regarded as its prerogative – the military. The Americans maintained more contacts with the palace, the political elite and the military than the British, presumably so they could arrive at more informed opinions. For their part, British diplomats in Athens, like Ambassador Murray, must have sensed that the Americans were ‘too republican’ in their comments on the monarchy, and perhaps avoided sending messages to the FCO similar in content and analysis to those of the Americans. In fact, Murray and other unnamed diplomats blamed Papandreou rather than the king for the constitutional crisis of July 1965, as will be explored later in this chapter.19 In early 1965, King Constantine confided to American Ambassador Lamboisse that: ‘If Papandreou intervenes in the military as he intervened in the gendarmerie [in appointments and retirements] I will ask for his resignation.’20 Papandreou appointed Elias Tsirimokos as home secretary, causing resentment in the palace and among the conservatives, who regarded him as a leftist who had participated in the EAM ‘mountain guerilla government’ during the war. The monarch started changing his attitude towards politics, but it is not clear whether the British were aware of this. Later, in the spring, FCO officials would find themselves in a difficult position: Constantine visited London to attend the funeral of Winston Churchill, and at the invitation of Queen Elizabeth stayed at Buckingham Palace, rather than the scheduled Claridges. Eager to initiate secret royal diplomacy, he asked the Americans to arrange a private meeting with President Johnson; they replied that the president ‘does not have much time for such a meeting’. Later, however, the king met Secretary of State Dean Rusk. No Greek diplomat or other official attended this meeting, and neither side informed the British. Constantine presented a plan to get rid of Makarios by backing him as a candidate for the office of a patriarch’s throne (but Makarios himself wanted to remain in Cyprus). It remains to this day unclear whether Papandreou

King Constantine II

115

endorsed this plan (which did not in the end materialise). However, the episode showed once again the king’s naive understanding of international diplomacy and his predilection for secret meetings and diplomacy.21 By late April, Papandreou had appointed his son Andreas deputy secretary for coordination. For some time the Americans and the crown had suspected the US-educated economist of being a leftist radical who influenced his father to follow a nationalistic policy on Cyprus. Soon the crisis would resurface. Intelligence received from Cyprus revealed that a Greek secret society of officers had been planning to confront the Sacred Bond and the royalists within the armed forces. The organization was known by the acronym ASPIDA (‘Officers Save Country, Ideals, Democracy, Meritocracy’) – the Greek word aspida also means ‘shield’. Captain Aristidis Mpoulokos was considered to be the military head of the group; and Andreas Papandreou had links with it. ERE conservatives and the conservative press accused the Papandreous of anti-crown conspiracy and intrigue; the king demanded a court-martial. The atmosphere of confrontation would intensify in June 1965, when news of alleged sabotage in an artillery unit in Northern Greece hit the headlines. The commander of the unit was Lieutenant Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos, a Sacred Bond member who planned a military coup. He ‘revealed’ that communists had sabotaged some vehicles by inserting sugar in their petrol tanks, but in fact he had staged this. The sugar affair sounds childish today, but at that time provoked royal and military hostility towards the Papandreou administration and put national security on the political agenda. In addition, Constantine was afraid of Papandreou’s appointing senior officers to control the military without consulting the crown. The prime minister (aware of Papadopoulos’ guilt) wanted to dismiss the chief of the army general staff, General Genimatas, and was willing to explain privately to the king the reasons for his decision. In his turn Hoidas, the head of the king’s political office, told Chargé d’Affaires Norbert Anschuetz that King Paul had clashed with former Prime Minister Karamanlis for exactly the same reason.22 In a word, the dynasty did not wish anyone to touch the military. Another confrontation erupted when Papandreou asked for the resignation of Defence Secretary Petros Garoufalias, a politician considered trusted by the crown. Garoufalias refused, and Papandreou had to ask Constantine to sign the act of dismissal; this the king in turn refused, believing the Ministry of Defence was the prerogative of the crown. At that time (early July 1965) the 24-four-year old monarch was residing in the Corfu palace waiting for his wife Anne-Marie to give birth to their first child. Constantine had a number of royal advisors, people keen to

116

Greece and the English

fight the Papandreous and the Centre Union, as well as the conservatives of Karamanlis. Queen Mother Frederica, Hoidas, Major Michael Arnaoutis, the king’s aide de camp, and publisher Panos Kokkas at that time formed the king’s circle of intimates. Meanwhile, the Americans were afraid of a clash between king and prime minister that could lead the Papandreous to organise rallies in Athens and other cities. The Americans assumed that the king would not proceed to any extralegal solution at the present time, despite the strong anti-Papandreou propaganda he is undoubtedly subject to from various rightwing sources . . . Particularly disturbing to the King was implication that Aspida represented essentially an anti-monarchy element in armed forces which might be used at a critical moment by its leaders as an instrument of political and/or military pressure against the throne.23 Georgios Papandreou and Constantine were equally determined to confront each other; the young monarch fearing a loss of control over the military. However, his position was deemed weak. He could not dictate to the elected prime minister changes in the armed forces or in the appointments of ministers. Even Foreign Secretary Costopoulos, described as a ‘strong royalist’ by American diplomats, admitted in an interview with Anschuetz that the king ‘would be in a weak constitutional position’ if he refused Papandreou’s request to appoint himself defence secretary.24 Until 8 July, the Constantine-Papandreou war was an undeclared one; but there was ‘heavy sniping’ from both sides, with the conservative and centrist press taking the lead. Then the king decided to draft an official letter to the prime minister. This letter, and two others later, would be the documents that paved the way for the resignation of the prime minister and for one of the most serious constitutional crises in modern Greek history. However, young Constantine was not alone. The letters were drafted by Hoidas and Panos Kokkas, the publisher of Eleutheria daily, a man close to a leading Centre Union member, Constantine Mitsotakis, who was eager to sideline the Papandreous. In an interview in 2006, Constantine disclosed that Kokkas was involved in the writing of the letter, and hinted that Mitsotakis was aware of or perhaps involved in the drafting.25 A close study of the wording reveals an accusatory tone reminiscent of a passionately involved journalist. In his 8 July letter, the king claimed that Georgios Papandreou had not proceeded with a thorough investigation of the conspiracy in the Central Intelligence Service (on the subject of ASPIDA). He disagreed with the prime minister about halting the investigation

King Constantine II

117

after the report of Lieutenant-General Ioannis Simos, who had found no further evidence of anti-royalist conspiracy within the armed forces. Simos did not believe that it was anything serious, but the king accused Papandreou of interfering in the investigation, implying the involvement of his son Andreas. His tone was commanding: I request you to stop any activity against the founding rules of the function and form of the government that causes political disturbance and shakes the feeling of security of the citizens . . . In this heavy atmosphere, which you allowed to be created, I believe that it is your obligation to put into effect, immediately and without hesitation, what I have asked [further investigation of ASPIDA]. This is my last warning . . .26 In his reply, the prime minister did not hide his surprise at the king’s remarks, and commented that the letter was ‘the work of disastrous advisers’. He accused the right-wing press of painting a bleak picture of Greece and its national security, disagreeing with the view that the intelligence service was a centre of conspiracy, as the king maintained. In fact, according to the Simos inquiry, out of 93 officers investigated only one was found guilty, with two superior officers found merely negligent. It was Lieutenant-General Simos who had requested there be no further investigation, not the prime minister. In fact, Papandreou proceeded with more interrogations of officers. He emphasised that as prime minister he had the right to take over the office of minister of defence himself if he deemed it necessary, and that ‘the king had to accept this’. However, he was informed by Hoidas that Constantine did not wish him also to be secretary for defence. Papandreou countered that the king should understand that ‘the ministry is not an impervious compartment exempted from the powers of the government.’ According to the constitution ‘the king advises but the government decides . . . I enclose for your signature the act of appointing myself Secretary of National Defence.’27 Constantine counterattacked with a second letter on 10 July. This time he accused Papandreou of not abiding by the constitution, and stated that if the prime minister did not change his attitude he would have ‘to denounce his intentions to the Greek people’. He argued that Papandreou already carried a heavy ‘workload’, having assigned himself the ministry of education, and claimed that it was ‘insulting’ to send him the act for signing without any prior consultation. As the ‘guarantor’ of the constitution he had to care especially for the armed forces that safeguarded the nation against ‘foreign

118

Greece and the English

or domestic dangers’, and he did not want politics to interfere in that area. He was not ‘optimistic about having a constructive meeting’ with the prime minister.28 Papandreou replied that ‘according to the king he could be prime minister but not a secretary of state . . . A politician who accepts this kind of humiliation would face the contempt of the people.’ The claim that Papandreou wanted to take the Ministry of Defence so as to intervene in the ASPIDA investigation, was ‘pitiful and ungrounded’. Even ‘if I wanted to do that, I would have to appoint a trusted friend not myself,’ he added. He believed that he ‘should defend his personal honour and the honour of Democracy . . . I can stop being prime minister, but I cannot accept being a humiliated prime minister.’29 In his last letter, the king reiterated that Papandreou should not insist on being assigned the Ministry of Defence. Secretary Garoufalias could go, and the Centre Union could appoint another minister – but not Papandreou.30 On 15 July, the prime minister sent his last letter to the king, arguing again that he could not be prime minister ‘under dictation’. At 1900 hours he met the king at the Athens palace. Allegedly, their dialogue was calm: Papandreou: So Your Majesty, we are in disagreement. Constantine: Unfortunately! And this means that you resign? Papandreou: Surely. Tomorrow, I will submit on paper the resignation of my government. Constantine: It is not necessary, Mr. President. Your verbal resignation is sufficient.31 At 2020 hours the king, invoking again Article 31 of the 1952 Constitution (‘the king appoints and dismisses his ministers’), asked the President of the Chamber, Georgios Athanasiadis-Novas, to form a government. Mitsotakis, Georgios Mpakatselos and a few others from the Centre Union joined the new government, and royalist Stavros Costopoulos was assigned the Ministry of Defence. Papandreou and his son Andreas were furious at the ‘defectors’, and never forgot this July 1965 episode. Even in the 1980s, when Andreas Papandreou was prime minister and Mitsotakis leader of the major opposition, Andreas would refuse to shake hands with the ‘defector’. In 2006 and with the benefit of hindsight, Constantine admitted that it had been a mistake to send these letters and to confront Papandreou; he should have made a greater effort to avert his resignation.32 The resignation of Papandreou caused a ‘chain reaction’ in Greek politics: Mitsotakis, Novas and other leading Centre Union members attempted to form a govern-

King Constantine II

119

ment with the parliamentary backing of the opposition parties, rather than with the majority of the Centre Union that remained loyal to Papandreou. Throughout the summer of 1965, there were massive pro-Papandreou demonstrations, and the crown was no longer accused of ‘favouritism’ but of a ‘royal coup’. The Americans appreciated the gravity of the crisis; Ambassador Anschuetz argued that: The King had directly descended into political area with the result that the ‘regime’ issue has gradually arisen. And this despite repeated denials of Papandreou that there is any ‘question of monarchy’ involved or that the Centre Union would raise it in future elections. Anti-royalist sentiment is being continuously inflamed by such pro-Papandreou publications as powerful Lambrakis syndicate (To Vima and Ta Nea) which daily carry attacks on King. Vima for example recently carried editorial critical of King under heading ‘Crown shown contempt for people.’ Slogans chanted and paraded by leftist-led demonstrators for Papandreou are becoming increasingly bold; although initially antimonarchist slogans concentrated on Queen Mother (i.e., ‘the German woman must go’) in recent days they have included King himself. One banner in August 17 demonstrations read ‘People don’t want you – take your mother and go.’ Thus, regardless of promises of Papandreou camp that they are not raising monarchist issue, in effect it had already been raised.33 To what extent Frederica played an active part in the drafting of the letter or in shaping the palace’s attitude toward the prime minister is undocumented and undisclosed. Constantine has particularly avoided revealing anything about his mother’s stance in the summer of 1965. However, undoubtedly she loved her 24-year-old son, and always believed that the monarchy should prevail over the politicians and that the court had to control the armed forces. She was keen to give her advice. In his 2006 interview, Constantine did not mention his mother at all, and he still seemed to have a ‘selective memory’ of the dramatic events in 1965.34 For their part, the FCO and Ambassador Murray in Athens had a different view of the constitutional crisis caused by the king and of its implications for the political stability of Greece. They assumed that all was the fault of the Papandreous. According to the official line: In July 1965 King Constantine felt obliged to take a stand on the suspected involvement of Andreas Papandreou, the son of the then Prime

120

Greece and the English

Minister George Papandreou, in a clandestine political organization within the armed forces (ASPIDA). A major political crisis ensued. The Papandreous and the communists misrepresented the issue... Although the King handled the crisis with some skill and has to some extent been vindicated by the recently published report on ASPIDA (in 1966), he, nevertheless, lost and has not yet regained some of the popularity which he had previously enjoyed.35 Even the phrasing makes it obvious that this was a biased assessment of the 1965 crisis. In fact, Constantine always lacked political ‘skill’! With reference to plans for a coup supported by the king in 1966, it was reported by the British embassy that: We have recently seen some indications, mostly from secret sources, that pressure in favour of such a solution is being brought to bear on him not only by right wing extremists but also by other more moderate Greeks, possibly including some among his immediate entourage.36 In fact, in parallel with these consultations, the Sacred Bond members Lieutenant-Colonels Georgios Papadopoulos and Dimitrios Ioannidis and Brigadier Stylianos Patakos had been making their own plans without informing the generals closest to the king. Early in November 1966, having put the clash with Papandreou behind him, King Constantine visited London in secret to consult with Prime Minister Wilson on Cyprus. The meeting was facilitated by Lord Mountbatten, who was to play a more active role in mediating between Constantine and Whitehall in the years to come. The young monarch wanted the British to help both sides to reach an agreement on the future regime of Cyprus. He claimed that Greece and Turkey had accepted unification of the island from the first, but that the issue of a Turkish sovereign base remained unresolved. Athens argued for a long lease of 99 years, or for NATO to be assigned the base with Turkish troops. In addition, touching on the issue of Makarios, Constantine believed that he could convince the president of this solution after a discussion they had together during a visit to the Sinai. The king argued that the Turks had to accept one leased base, since the Greeks had accepted a Turkish force on the island. ‘It was immaterial if it was a sovereign base or a lease,’ he remarked. Constantine was aware that the Cypriot government had been discussing the Dhekelia base with London, so he wished to inquire whether this base could

King Constantine II

121

be leased or just given to the Turks. Prime Minister Wilson declined to give a specific answer, claiming that he himself had to be briefed by the FCO on the Anglo-Cypriot discussions; instead, he asked the king about the current political situation in Greece. Constantine sounded optimistic, estimating that he could associate Georgios Papandreou with the Cyprus agreement. As a result, the Papandreous would not be able to say ‘no’ to the union of Cyprus with Greece. In fact, Constantine ‘had been studying the constitutional reforms’ to be implemented after union with Greece, and believed that the American federal system could be of use. Wilson replied that even though he could not advise the king, he believed that the union between Britain and Northern Ireland was a more appropriate constitutional model.37 Of course, for the informed FCO official the remarks of Constantine were premature and purely theoretical. The Turks remained determined to be granted territory on Cyprus, and never abandoned their plans for an invasion. Athens and Ankara could not reach an agreement on the union, while Archbishop/President Makarios wanted Cyprus to follow an independent foreign policy similar to those of Yugoslavia and Egypt. For the time being, Cyprus was defended by the infantry division sent by Papandreou in 1964. The palace, the conservatives, and the British and American ambassadors were anxious about the political agenda of Andreas Papandreou. In their eyes he was a leftist, a communist sympathiser with considerable influence over his aging father. The government of Prime Minister Stephanopoulos was not backed by the majority of the Centre Union, and by mid-1966 political leaders assumed that they had to find a way out of the protracted political crisis over the Papandreous’ denunciations and the mass demonstrations. Only new elections could lead the politicians out of the crisis. The top-ranking military and Constantine started reviewing plans for a coup, an ‘extra-parliamentary solution’ since they were afraid that a Centre Union victory was very possible. The ‘Hawk II’ plan was reviewed by Major-General Spadidakis, the chief of the army general staff, and Constantine was informed of the operational planning. However, he still did not feel sure that this was the right option. The Americans and the British knew of this, as well as of the fact that some Sacred Bond members had been working towards a coup in parallel with the crown and the general staff.38 Georgios Papandreou believed that a ‘junta’ had been formed, with Garoufalias, Pipinelis and retired General Dovas of the royal household, and that their ‘president’ was Frederica. In a conversation with grand marshal Ambassador Dimitrios Bitsios, Papandreou emphasised that:

122

Greece and the English

A dictatorship would be a disaster not only for Greece but also for the monarchy. King Constantine would soon find that he was no longer master of the situation and that, on the contrary, he was a captive of the dictator, just as the King [George II] became captive of Metaxas in the 1930s.39 Still, the Americans did not forecast a generals’ coup; there were no indications of one.40 However, Papandreou proved himself shrewd once again, as will be shown later in this chapter. Constantine was obsessed with Andreas Papandreou, telling US Ambassador Philips Talbot: ‘I cannot afford to risk the destruction of free Greece by permitting Andreas Papandreou to come to power.’41 In the political arena, Georgios Papandreou accepted an acting government under Ioannis Paraskeuopoulos, an Athens University professor, and exerted pressure on his son to back it. The Paraskeuopoulos government would organise the general elections, but the public prosecutor raised the issue of Andreas and the ASPIDA affair. Andreas had immunity from prosecution as long as he remained a member of parliament, and at that time he represented the leftists of the Centre Union. His relations with his moderate father were at a low ebb, but this would soon change. The Centre Union considered extending the immunity of Papandreou during the election period but, failing to reach an agreement, withdrew their support for the Paraskeuopoulos government. By early April, Constantine had given a mandate to form a government to the opposition leader Panagiotis Canellopoulos; now the ERE administration would organise the elections. The Papandreous were incensed on realising that a plan for manipulating the results (similar to that of the 1961 elections) had been drawn up, and accused the king of favouritism. Ambassador Talbot commented that this mandate ‘may prove the worst decision of the king’ since his coming to the throne.42 On the evening of 8 April 1967, Talbot again met the king, who had already asked him if the United States would back him in the event of a coup. The diplomat stated clearly ‘the inability of the United Stated Government to give advance assurances of support to the King and noted our traditional opposition to dictatorial solutions to constitutional crises’.43 On 20 April, at 1851 hours, the American embassy received a directive from Washington DC. The State Department feared violent and massive demonstrations in the event of Andreas Papandreou being arrested and put on trial for the ASPIDA affair. Since the elections were scheduled for May 28, the Americans argued that Georgios Papandreou and the king had to confer, via an intermediary. Thus politicians of ‘mutual confidence’ would

King Constantine II

123

be appointed to the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence in the event of the Centre Union winning a majority of the vote. Moreover, the new government would have to avoid a shake-up of the military and the intelligence service.44 Washington’s directive was a case of ‘too little too late’, and failed to appreciate the fact that relations between Papandreou and Constantine were not such as to allow negotiations, especially since many were forecasting victory for the Centre Union. Back in 1965, the king and the former prime minister had not been able to avert a constitutional crisis over the appointment of the defence minister; this time it was worse. A few hours earlier, Major-General Spadidakis consulted with his inner circle on the plans for a military coup. They agreed to ask the king to authorise a deviation from the constitution. Major-General Zoitakis, head of the Third Army Corps, was informed of Spadidakis’s intentions and plans, and in turn informed the Papadopoulos group – Papadopoulos having supported the coup in discussions with Spadidakis. However, at that time he had assumed that it would only be a matter of time before the generals sidelined the colonels, took power and forced them to retire. Moreover, the colonels were apprehensive about a Centre Union rally in Salonika planned for 22 April. According to their forecasts, it would be massive; if it were peaceful, they could not argue that they had proceeded with the coup to save Greece from ‘communism’; and if it were violent, the security services might not be able to control the situation and the army would be called in, a move that would result in a massacre. Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos, Colonel Nikolaos Makarezos and Brigadier Stylianos Patakos jumped into action to avert the generals’ coup. They wanted to be the ones in power, and not their superiors and King Constantine. The contingencies of mobilising units of the military police, armour, infantry and the cadets of the Military School received the green light. Trusted military personnel were assigned to key buildings like the Ministry of Defence, the telecommunications organisation, the airports and the ports. Prime Minister Canellopoulos was arrested in his house in the early morning. Other mutinous colonels undertook similar operations in rural Greece. Everybody was caught by surprise, and for some time Constantine had no clear picture of what was going on. The American and the British embassies were also in the dark. Georgios Papandreou was arrested, and an officer threatened to kill Andreas’s son, Georgios, if the family did not reveal his father’s whereabouts. Andreas hid for a while in his house, but eventually surrendered to avert the killing of his son. The Papandreous never forgot the dramatic events of the early morning of 21 April.

124

Greece and the English

Constantine had no communication with the American embassy until the afternoon. When he telephoned Talbot, ‘blazingly angry’, he told the diplomat: ‘Neither I nor general staff officers control Greek Army tonight. Incredibly stupid bastards having gained control of tanks, have brought disaster to Greece.’ In their turn, early in the morning, the two colonels and the brigadier appeared in the palace asking to be appointed heads of the government, ‘in order to save Greece from communism’. The monarch had a five-hour session with them, visited the Ministry of Defence and spoke with the arrested Canellopoulos. Eventually, the king persuaded the colonels to accept as prime minister a pro-junta, hard-line public prosecutor, Constantine Kollias. He then signed the royal decree appointing the new government. Constantine also asked the American ambassador for a US helicopter and a marine detail to help with the evacuation of the royal family in case of need. He feared for his family’s safety, the crown no longer having control over the military. Talbot must have been surprised on hearing that Constantine even wanted US marines to help him and his generals to regain control of the armed forces. In addition, the king asked the State Department to issue a strong condemnation of the new regime, emphasising that civilians had to be protected and the military had to follow the king’s orders. Eventually, the frustrated Spadidakis was named vice-prime minister and secretary of defence, but he would be merely a figurehead. The colonels, led by Papadopoulos, were now in power.45 Talbot was against ‘burning bridges’ with the new regime, and believed that the Americans should continue maintaining regular contact with the king. The monarch should be ‘encouraged to support a move towards more viable government’, though the US military-aid shipments to Greece would be suspended for a while. The Americans, in short, accepted the new regime.46 In public, Constantine signed the decree invoking Article 31 of the 1952 Constitution on the appointment of ministers by the king, and was photographed in full military regalia together with the colonels and their front-man prime minister. The king’s expression was reserved (he was later to claim that this had been to convey to the public his disapproval of the coup), but by 25 April his attitude had changed. He had another meeting with Ambassador Talbot, who reported back to the State Department that: He appeared under considerably less strain than I had seen him at any time since the coup . . . he is moving rapidly to adjust his relations with coup government and has moderate expectations of gradually regaining leadership of army and government.47

King Constantine II

125

For their part, the FCO assumed that Constantine had ‘handled the crisis with spirit and good sense’ and succeeded in including civilians in the colonels’ government.48 However, these civilians were no more than front men. Fear can lead people into grave mistakes. Fear of losing the throne and of standing by while Andreas Papandreou turned Greece into a ‘communist’ country dominated the thoughts of the 26-year-old Constantine. He was too young to understand that in democracies there is no ‘black or white’ choice, and that biased perceptions and stereotypes continually shape assessments. Since his boyhood the king had been educated to defend the monarchy, and had always admired his father Paul and his mother Frederica, two royal personages who had never hesitated to confront the politicians. In 1963, Frederica had stood up to Karamanlis, and probably advised her son act in the same way towards Papandreou in 1965. In April 1967, she might have been afraid for her family’s personal safety on seeing the colonels coming to the palace demanding to be appointed heads of government. Frederica wrote about courage in her memoirs, and certainly it was in her character when talking with Churchill or travelling in rural Greece in the 1940s, as has been shown in chapter three on King Paul. But on 21 April 1967 she lost her nerve, together with Constantine, failing to realise that they had more to gain by confronting the authors of the coup or merely by refusing to recognise the new regime. The colonels would have had fewer chances of political survival if the king had simply told them to ‘go home’. They could not possibly arrest the king, and even if they had confined him to the palace international pressure would have broken Papadopoulos. In fact, according to a fanatical captain under Ioannidis, on 21 April noon at the Ministry of Defence Papadopoulos, Makarezos and Patakos ‘seemed a bit embarrassed and shy when asking the king to be appointed to the government’.49 In 1963 and again in 1965, Paul and Frederica had not hesitated to fight elected politicians, and had gradually become used to winning and to mastery of the armed forces. In 1967, Constantine was called upon to fight his own battle, and he blinked. In the first hours and days of the coup, the mutineers were afraid that the Americans would not back their regime, but Washington, on seeing that the king had accepted the colonels, followed the same policy. According to Talbot, Secretary Dean Rusk was influenced by the decision of the king to ‘legitimise’ the new regime.50 Many conservatives, politicians and members of the Centre Union and EDA parties were put in jail. Andreas Papandreou was brutally tortured and only strong American pressure led to his liberation and deportation. His father Georgios Papandreou died in 1968, while under house arrest. King Constantine assumed that he could gain the support of loyal royal-

126

Greece and the English

ist senior commanders in the army, navy and air force. After all, the Royal Hellenic Navy and the Royal Hellenic Air Force were not only ‘royal’ by name and but had always attracted cadets from upper-class, royalist families. In the summer of 1967, the young monarch had been visiting formations in rural Greece, and even though under the surveillance of trusted military policemen and secret agents of the regime, was able to talk with some commanders on the possibility of taking up arms against the colonels. In parallel, he kept Ambassador Talbot well informed, and pressed him for official US advice. In his turn the diplomat was very cautious, and always stressed that only the king could act against the junta; Washington should not be involved in any capacity.51 At that time, Constantine did not have much contact with the British ambassador, and it seems that he did not inform him of his plans to oppose the regime. Meanwhile, Constantine wanted to project an image of an influential regional leader interested in Middle East affairs. On 13 June, during the Arab-Israeli conflict, he telephoned King Hussein of Jordan to discuss any needs the latter’s forces might have for medical supplies, after the preemptive attack by Israel. ‘Majesty, this is your brother, King Constantine’ was his opening to the conversation (though to what extent the scion of a Danish dynasty could claim brotherly relations with an Arab king remained an open question); he went on to promise that a field hospital and medical personnel would be sent to Jordan immediately. Hussein asked for medical supplies, clothing and food, and was very emotional.52 In mid-September, Constantine made a long-anticipated journey to the USA. He visited the White House and discussed the internal Greek situation and the Cyprus question with President Johnson. Grivas (see also chapter three on King Paul) had by then already started hostilities against TurkishCypriot communities. The monarch believed that the time of confrontation would come when the colonels had finished their draft revision of the Greek constitution, or when the junta’s planned plebiscite was due to take place. He returned again to the issue of American military involvement, suggesting that US marines could land somewhere in Greece as a ‘show of force’, or that the Sixth Fleet could approach Greek waters, and Washington could then issue statements of support for the king, backing the return of democracy. Johnson, already facing the headache of the Vietnam war, commented that the military side of Constantine’s plan was ‘not feasible’, though he appeared willing to discuss the possibility of making some public statements supporting Constantine. In addition, the king asked for the resumption of military aid, suspended since 21 April – the colonels had been incensed by the American decision to stop supplying them with modern weaponry. Again,

King Constantine II

127

Johnson replied that he could not commit himself, since legislation would have to be passed in Congress to allow the export of arms to the dictatorship.53 Constantine’s proposals about landing American marines in Greece and threats by the Sixth Fleet were naive and dangerous – his thinking could have led the country into a civil war. By autumn, the new British ambassador in Athens, Sir Michael Stewart, judged that the king was ‘isolated and needed support and encouragement’, though ‘Her Majesty’s Government had better not get involved in the King’s problems.’ The ambassador had to handle with tact an issue that then arose: Constantine wished to attend the November annual meeting of the Olympic Sailing Committee in London, and asked for the advice of the British embassy. Stewart presumed the young monarch would wish to pay a visit to Queen Elizabeth as well as to Prime Minister Wilson and the foreign secretary. However, Stewart was against a meeting with the queen or with the prime minister, and the royal visit to London had to remain on a strictly private basis, as the November 1966 visit had been. In the event Constantine accepted the option of a private visit; a discreet meeting with the prime minister could then be arranged. But still, the king would not be accompanied by the Greek ambassador in London, who reported to the junta.54 As will be seen later in this chapter, London-Constantine relations would create many protocol ‘nightmares’ for the British diplomats, who were always keen to avoid a crisis with the Greek regime. In its turn, the FCO emphasised to the ambassador that Constantine’s visit had to be cancelled; Whitehall expected large anti-junta and anti-royalist demonstrations if the monarch appeared. Besides, there was mounting pressure in the House of Commons regarding Greek affairs, and the press supported an anti-junta British policy. In addition, the British were expecting the Turkish president for a state visit in November and the Archbishop of Canterbury had invited the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople at about the same time. Diplomats – who were already having a difficult time with the Turks, who did not want the visit of the Patriarch – assumed that it would be unfair for Constantine not to be received like the Turkish leader, as a head of state with full honours. Embassy officials in Athens would explain the FCO position to the king; however, this would not be termed ‘the official British government position’. The reply would be based on an ‘unofficial consultation’ of the ambassador with the foreign secretary.55 Lord Mountbatten also sent a message to the king, similar in content to the embassy’s, arguing that the Turkish state visit and the expected demonstrations against Constantine were the key reasons for advising against the latter’s visit. He added that Queen Elizabeth agreed with this reasoning.56

128

Greece and the English

After the cancellation of the visit Constantine must have felt abandoned. He assumed that he should confront the colonels himself, and was seriously worried that the senior royalist military were being forced into retirement by Papadopoulos, who wanted his own contemporaries, the class of 1940 of the army military school, to be in charge. The monarch estimated that a ‘victory’ against the regime would secure him open American and British backing. He was too young and inexperienced to understand what armed conflict, death and violence meant. In contrast, the colonels had fought during the Civil War, and were intransigent and fanatical in character. The king restricted his plans to a few trusted advisers. On 13 December 1967, at 0915 hours, he summoned Ambassador Talbot to the royal estate at Tatoi, in the northern outskirts of Athens, and confided to him that he planned to launch a counter-coup immediately. Soon, he and the royal family together with Prime Minister Kollias would board a plane for northern Greece, where royalist commanders were waiting for them. He would declare himself commander-in-chief of the Greek armed forces and demand the resignation of the government. The king asked the ambassador to inform Foreign Secretary Pipinelis and Defence Secretary Major-General Spadidakis of the counter-coup; both were instructed to join him in Salonika. Constantine also expressed the hope that the Americans would support his actions in their consultations with their NATO allies. In parallel, he once again asked for American support, and for pressure to be exerted on the regime. He assumed that the colonels would not risk a civil war. He had already recorded a message to the nation and asked American radio stations in Greece to broadcast it. The surprised diplomat waited until the royal group had departed from Tatoi airfield, but did not intend to broadcast anything ‘at least until it is clear his [Constantine’s] maneuver has reasonable chance of success’.57 The king sent a letter to Major-General Angelis, chief of the army general staff, dismissing him from his post. Papadopoulos and the rest of the junta government, meanwhile, were aware that the king had probably flown to the north to stage a ‘revolution’. At 1140 hours the royal party, with Queen Mother Frederica and Kollias, reached Kavala. The queen, the two children and Frederica left for a local hotel. (Reportedly, Queen Anne-Marie included her precious Romanov jewelry in the hasty packing at the palace; this collection, possibly inherited from Queen Olga, wife of King George I, was valued at two million pounds sterling.58) Constantine, Kollias and General Dovas drove to the headquarters of the 9th Infantry Division. The commander remained loyal to the king, who telephoned the neighbouring district commanders with orders

King Constantine II

129

to disobey commands from the regime; he was himself in command of the armed forces, together with Major-General Georgios Peridis, another loyal royalist. The king returned to the hotel in Kavala at 15.30 hours and had lunch. His message to the nation was broadcast from some military radio stations, and there was some public jubilation in Kavala. At 1600 hours, Constantine left by helicopter for Komotini (in Greek Thrace) to see more commanders, returning at 1900 hours. At this stage he was informed that the formations in the Salonika district had not joined him, and that Papadopoulos had appointed himself prime minister and Major-General Zoitakis regent. Later, the royal party were informed that Peridis’s force had been encircled by junta armoured units. Papadopoulos was said to be afraid that Constantine would be shot by low-ranking junta fanatics, and hoped that he could escape them.59 As the grand marshal Ambassador Leonidas Papagos remarked, Constantine, on hearing the bad news, lay down on the bed in Papagos’s hotel room and closed his eyes. It was over. At about 0120 hours on 14 December, the king summoned the royal party and announced to them that they would depart for Italy ‘in protest at the regime’ ; the grand marshal and Kollias asked for permission to accompany them. At that juncture some feared that the Kavala military unit would ‘revolt’ and attack the hotel, but at 0320 the aircraft carrying the royal family took off. They reached Ciampino, the military airfield of Rome, at 0600 hours.60 The junta regime had many supporters within the military, and Constantine had ‘blinked’ again in his confrontation with the colonels; he was now in a very difficult situation. Meanwhile, Papadopoulos justified his decision to appoint a regent by telling Talbot that the king had ‘abandoned his duties as monarch and fled to Northern Greece’. At that moment, about 1330 hours on 14 December, Constantine had taken the decision to leave the country, since he was unable to fight the colonels. The furious Angelis intervened in the discussion with Talbot, stating that Constantine ‘had crossed the river and burnt his bridges behind him’. Papadopoulos believed that the junta was now in full control, and that there was no need to negotiate with the king.61 On 14 December 1967, British Prime Minister Wilson made a statement in support of the king in the House of Commons. Washington kept quiet and Secretary Rusk in his 21 December phone conversation with the king would not commit to anything. British diplomats aimed to establish a ‘working relationship’ with the junta, claiming that no legal issue could arise since Constantine remained head of state, with his regent in Athens. However, the FCO avoided any contact with the king, who stayed in Rome and

130

Greece and the English

not until 19 January 1968, when his grand marshal telephoned the British ambassador in Rome to request an audience, could Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh reply confidently: ‘I have now authority to see the king.’62 The king asked again to visit London. The diplomat feared that the monarch sought to discuss Greek affairs with Wilson. Eventually, the FCO decided against Constantine’s coming to London. By May, Constantine would ask again to visit the United Kingdom, for his young son to be examined by an ophthalmologist. This time Downing Street and the FCO agreed that Prime Minister Wilson should have a private meeting with the king. The diplomats’ position was that: ‘Constantine clearly has much respect for the prime minister’s opinion, and, isolated as he is and open to influence from doubtful quarters, he would clearly benefit from sound advice.’63 Shuckburgh had reported that the king ‘lacked any good advisers and was increasingly isolated, was likely to behave foolishly unless a steadying influence could be brought to bear on him.’ The Americans, as the personal diary of Constantine’s grand marshal currently reveals, curtailed their contacts with the king. Shuckburgh considered that the king should not be hostile to the junta as a whole, but should try to deal with ‘moderate’ elements like Papadopoulos and not ‘to allow himself to be fed with illusions by Greek exiles of various kinds’. The ambassador did not at all like Constantine’s idea of forming a shadow cabinet in exile ‘from the most able of the younger economists and politicians’. However, the monarch ‘is probably regarded as being much more of a figure on the fringe of events than he realises’. Meanwhile, the ‘military efficiency of Greece is deplorably low’ in NATO terms.64 Constantine needed an ally and advisor, and since he had lost the Americans’ interest he was willing to talk with Wilson. He stayed at Claridges and when called to visit Downing Street he ‘was tense and obviously slightly nervous’. The private meeting took place on 27 May. At the start he ordered simply a tomato juice; A.M. Palliser, the private secretary to the prime minister commented: His hands were trembling in a way that indicated a certain mixture of nervousness and excitement. He did most of the talking during a conversation that lasted for nearly two hours and conveyed a very real impression of unwinding, both physically and intellectually. He became increasingly relaxed and cheerful and symptomatically switched to whisky and soda about two-thirds of the way . . . He is thoroughly bewildered, probably doubts in his heart of hearts whether he can ever get back on his throne . . .65

King Constantine II

131

Constantine stated clearly that ‘the Greek armed forces were unreliable’ in respect of their contribution to NATO, and that the young captains and majors were ‘almost anarchic in their opposition to their elders’. Papadopoulos – who presumably wanted the king to return – was ‘intelligent, basically shallow and his ambition was to be a new Metaxas’ (see also chapter two on King George II). The king did not like the ‘tolerant’ attitude of the British and Americans (especially of the latter) towards the regime, but argued that the Greek constitution being drafted would be ‘a deplorable document and only after the British and US governments brought really strong pressure to bear on the regime would the latter make any worthwhile concessions’.66 Moreover, he claimed that the communists in Greece had adopted a ‘wait and see strategy’. They were patiently waiting for the junta’s eventual demise, and then they would take over. According to the king’s grand marshal, Ambassador Papagos, while Constantine was speaking on the situation in Greece, Wilson nervously repeated ‘damn, damn, damn’.67 Most certainly Constantine could not hide his communist-phobia, inherited from his mother. The prime minister, concerned about the operational inefficiency of the Greek armed forces, declined to approach the Americans on the subject of the new constitution since they had a ‘somewhat closer relationship with the regime’. He suggested that the king should neither denounce the regime nor associate himself with Andreas Papandreou’s resistance group. Wilson said: If I might earnestly and respectfully advise the King, I would warn him against supporting the wrong people or giving any encouragement to irresponsible or ineffective opposition elements. If he himself appeared in any way to be associated with ‘illegitimacy’, this would certainly be used against him in Greece by the regime.68 Constantine again did not hide his dislike of Andreas Papandreou, claiming that Georgios Papandreou told him once that: ‘Andreas was entirely in the hands of the communists.’ Moreover, the king had discussed Andreas with President Johnson, who ‘strongly advised to have nothing to do with Andreas Papandreou and to try to get him out of the country’. Constantine suggested the return of Andreas to the United States. To that the president replied: ‘No, thank you. I have enough intellectuals here already.’69 Constantine, the FCO and the Americans were biased towards the Papandreous, but research has shown that the 1967 coup cannot be blamed on the Papandreous. The crown’s and the military’s practice and culture of intervening in the country’s politics, since the late 1940s (described in the chapters above

132

Greece and the English

on King George II, King Paul and Queen Frederica), had paved the way for the coming of the junta. While in the United Kingdom, Constantine visited Buckingham Palace and had breakfast with Queen Elizabeth. On 25–26 May he stayed on the estate of Lord Mountbatten at Romsey, and the following day met conservative leaders Lord Home and Lord Harlech. (For their part, the junta tried to scare Constantine off, informing the Greek embassy in London that according to the military intelligence branch of the general staff someone wanted to kill the king and later blame the regime; the key suspect was said to be a French secret agent named ‘Georges Orlowski’, connected to an ‘unofficial French security service’, who operated in Morocco, France and Germany. Allegedly, he had already received the sum of 40,000 Canadian dollars, and would be paid in full after the assassination, scheduled for mid-June 1968.70 ) Constantine returned to the United Kingdom in August to attend the funeral of the Duchess of Kent, and stayed at Balmoral during a visit to Queen Elizabeth.71 In his turn, Lord Mountbatten intervened with Harold Wilson, who was on holiday in the Scilly Isles, for Constantine to talk with the prime minister on the telephone about developments in Greece. At 2215 hours on 29 August, Mountbatten called Wilson, telling the switchboard operator that he did not wish to talk to his private secretary – Mountbatten had with him ‘his young friend’, Constantine, and wished to talk directly to the prime minister. The official next to Wilson, himself surprised, asked Mountbatten not to talk on the telephone because it was deemed insecure. The Earl of Burma then had a guarded conversation with the prime minister, and agreed to talk to Constantine in the morning.72 Next day, Constantine and Mountbatten visited 10 Downing Street and the king had a conversation with Wilson over a secure line. The prime minister stated that in the House of Commons he had made a ‘somewhat favourable remark’ on the draft constitution of Greece, but he did not wish to comment further. With reference to Washington’s stance, he had kept President Johnson informed about his meeting with the king in May, and remarked that: ‘[He felt] that the Americans could be relied upon to exercise restraint and that they would be unlikely to take any action which the King would consider either unwise or unilateral.’ The regime scheduled a ‘plebiscite’ for 29 September, and Wilson believed that they appeared to, at least, be keeping to the time-table. He warned the king that the creation of an opposition organisation abroad (‘without the Papandreous’, as Constantine had made clear) ‘might frighten the regime before the referendum had taken place into thinking that this might herald a reversion to splinter-group politics in Greece’.73 As usual, Wilson advised caution, and attempted to strike a fine balance

King Constantine II

133

between establishing a working relationship with the junta and persuading Constantine to follow a moderate stance towards the regime – London had no desire for another crisis like the one in December 1967. Already, Anglo-junta relations had suffered because London had turned into a centre of opposition to the regime. Beside the human-rights abuses, the lack of democracy, the communal strife in Cyprus and the diminishing Greek contribution to NATO, London was interested in improving Britain’s position in a promising area entailing large amounts of money and many jobs for British workers: the Greek defence-procurement programme. In November 1968, while in London, Constantine was asked by Sir Frederic Mulley, the minister of state at the FCO if he had any objection to Greece’s purchasing British frigates. Of course, the king replied that he had nothing against it but that British diplomacy should continue pressing the regime for a return to democracy. Mulley told the king that Wilson had declined to meet him in order to avoid any questions in the House of Commons:74 the king’s London connection had to be kept discreet. Later, Constantine remained at Windsor for a couple of days, and hunted on the estates of Lord Besborough. The following month, he was to spend Christmas with Lord Mountbatten at Romsey.75 The Ministry of Defence and the FCO submitted a joint memorandum to the cabinet on policy towards Greece. On the one hand London promoted a return to constitutional rule and democracy, and on the other favoured maintaining a working relationship with the junta. Most significantly, commercial interests had to be safeguarded. The British tried to influence the junta with respect to Cyprus and to internal affairs by ‘private and direct approaches’ rather by public protests or pressure in international organisations. The Ministry of Defence and the FCO were anxious about the place of British industries in the Greek arms programmes. Both secretaries of state emphasised that the Americans had resumed their military aid and the Germans were supplying fast patrol boats to the junta. The French and the Italians pursued ‘export orders vigorously’. On their turn, the junta were furious at British press coverage of the dictatorship; the BBC commented: ‘The Greek leaders gave the appearance of being unwilling to do business with Britain and the Greek government was no longer receptive to representations from Her Majesty’s Ambassador on matters which they considered to be of domestic concern.’76 By July 1967, the British cabinet had decided against the export of weapons and equipment that could be used for civilian repression, but the export guidelines favoured defence weapons-systems to be delivered over the long term. Vospers received the green light to enter into negotiations with

134

Greece and the English

the junta for patrol boats and frigates. Moreover, the junta approached the British Aircraft Company to discuss the purchase of 15 Lightning air-defence interceptors and two Lightning trainers. There was also interest in six unarmed SRN6 hovercraft (for coastguard search-and-rescue missions) and six Westland Whirlwind helicopters (for air-sea rescue). The joint memorandum warned that ‘other countries such as the Germans, the French and Italians will be eager to supply any arms that we refuse.’ 77 The secretaries of state for defence and foreign affairs gave notice that ‘we are losing in influence and in money in Greece and we must do something.’ Since the late 1940s, arms purchases from Britain had been minimal: the Greek armed forces relied on American tanks, aircraft and warships. Even after the demise of the junta in 1974, the British Tornado fighter/bomber and Challenger main battle-tank would not find Greek buyers. Meanwhile, the Germans would sell them their new frigates, submarines and the Leopard main battletanks. The purchase of the Lightnings, the helicopters and the hovercraft would not materialise. In the 1970s and 1980s, France supplied the F-1 Mirage and Mirage 2000 fighters, and the Americans the F-4 Phantom and F-16 strike fighters. For the British defence industry, Greece was a very difficult market. The junta organised a manipulated referendum on 29 September 1968, in which ‘92 per cent of the votes’ were in favour of the constitutional reform. The new constitution institutionised the power of the armed forces over the political world by establishing a ‘national security council’ exempt from political oversight. The chief of the armed forces would play a key role. The councils of the general staff of the army, navy and air force were in effect the parliament of the armed forces, deciding without any supervision on promotions and transfers.78 Papadopoulos abstained from committing himself to a general-election date. In Cyprus, the Grivas-led campaign in November against Turkish-Cypriot communities at Cofinou caused another serious Greek-Turkish crisis. Ankara threatened again to invade the island, and the White House intervened. The junta agreed to withdraw from the island the Greek infantry division that had been transferred there in secret back in 1964, and Grivas agreed to return to Greece. Foreign Secretary Pipinelis and diplomats at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, isolated by the colonels, estimated that in the case of future Turkish aggression Cyprus would be doomed; the Royal Hellenic Navy and Air Force would not be able to confront the Turks in time: only the infantry mattered in Cyprus. After the withdrawal of the division, Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots started protracted negotiations, but the atmosphere of crisis persisted. Papadopoulos and his associates wanted enosis – the union of Cyprus with Greece – and

King Constantine II

135

planned to give only a small area to the Turks; their understanding of international diplomacy remained naive and simplistic. However, Makarios was not in favour of such a policy, and soon the junta would plan his downfall: Grivas would return to the island, organise an armed group, the EOKA B, with the goal of toppling Makarios and install a pro-junta government, aiming to unite Cyprus with Greece. As usual, he and the junta colonels had underestimated Turkish plans over Cyprus.79 King Constantine was increasingly anxious about the Americans’ stance towards him; they did not appear to want any contact. On 27 February, he called Queen Elizabeth himself asking her to express interest in Greece, and in him, during her state dinner with President Richard Nixon at Windsor. She agreed, and on 1 March she and the Duke of Edinburgh telephoned the king to inform him of the president’s attitude: Nixon had appeared surprised to learn that the king had been staying in Rome since December 1968. Constantine had already asked for a meeting with Nixon, but was informed that the president’s programme was full. The king’s grand marshal suspected the ‘American services [of ] building walls around Nixon’.80 On the occasion of Eisenhower’s funeral, Constantine tried again to have direct contact with the American president. Ambassador Papagos accompanied him and commented on the attitude of the late president’s family: ‘There was not an atmosphere of sadness. The widow greeted people as if at a reception. His son was wearing a blue suit with a red striped tie. One of the grand-daughters was wearing a short skirt. . .’ At the White House banquet, Constantine paid his respects to Nixon after President de Gaulle. He told him that he was willing to have a discussion about Greek affairs but Nixon ‘seemed surprised and stunned’. The president then had to go to Eisenhower’s interment, and there was no time for a discussion. Eventually, the king had a conversation with Defence Secretary Malvin Laird, who showed himself informed on Greek affairs. In a conversation with Constantine, the Shah of Persia seemed willing to help, and encouraged him to ask the US to exert financial pressure on the junta by withholding aid. Meanwhile, the junta’s Brigadier Patakos, in civilian clothes, represented the Greek government, and later Constantine was informed that the colonel had had a 20-minute discussion with Nixon; this left the young king very incensed.81 Eventually, on 1 April, Constantine met Vice-President Spiro Agnew, who declined to comment further about the king’s position on general elections and a return to constitutional rule. Agnew remarked vaguely: ‘I am still a student in Greek affairs. I have no theory. I agree that a representative government is necessary. We all share your desire. We will encourage the

136

Greece and the English

return of representative government.’ The same afternoon the vice-president had a meeting with Patakos.82 Next day, Constantine met Secretary of State William Rogers and his staff at the State Department. The Americans appeared unwilling to exert pressure on the colonels for a return to democracy. The king favoured defence aid to Greece for NATO purposes, on the understanding that the regime should realise they had to change their stance. Rogers replied that ‘there is a limit to what we can do’, and mentioned that the United States ‘did not interfere in the domestic affairs of other states’. Constantine urged the Americans to pressure the colonels, and referred to the fact that, unlike Patakos, he had had no meeting with Nixon. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs Stuart Rockwell admitted that there were no signs that the colonels would change their stance, but said that the State Department should continue with its policy. Rogers stated that ‘we should do what we consider reasonable’ for the return of democracy in Greece, but Washington did not want a confrontation with the junta. Constantine tried to arrange a meeting with National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, but this was cancelled due to the latter’s workload; they managed only a short telephone conversation.83 The Americans had been moving beyond a ‘working relationship’ with the junta, and in 1971 Vice-President Agnew was to visit Athens. Washington assumed that the junta would have a role to play in the event of another Arab-Israeli conflict. Greece could help with the deployment and support of more US ships in the Southeastern Mediterranean. In June, Constantine returned to London and attended a performance at the Royal Festival Hall together with Queen Elizabeth, the Prince of Wales, the Duke of Edinburgh and Lord Mountbatten. There was a rumour from Athens that the junta aimed to depose the king, and Mountbatten inquired further, but Constantine did not know much. Wilson showed similar interest, and sent one of his officials and a FCO representative to consult with the king on 17 June. ‘I don’t know if the junta wants to name the crown prince king or to declare a republic. I would prefer the second so that I can run for president,’ commented Constantine with a smile.84 Following their policy of ‘not provoking the junta’, the FCO did not want any official to have contacts with Andreas Papandreou when he visited London in June and December 1969, and met with Labour members of the House of Commons Overseas Committee. Declassified files are full of negative comments about Andreas. He had founded the ‘Panhellenic Fighting Movement’ (PAK), a political-resistance organisation that included a military wing; a few of its members were trained in Palestinian camps in Lebanon, and PAK established a link with the Palestine Libera-

King Constantine II

137

tion Organisation (PLO).85 Andreas wrote to Ambassador Stewart asking for a more pro-democracy British stance: ‘We the Greek democrats at home and abroad, have appreciated your disapproval, in principle, of the Greek regime. This however, has not been enough to dislodge the totalitarian rulers of Greece.’ Papandreou wanted London to condemn the junta and Greece to be expelled from the Council of Europe. In December the council would decide on Greek membership, but the FCO did not commit itself openly against the junta until the last moment.86 British diplomats, who characterised Andreas Papandreou as ‘a leading opponent of the Greek Government’, argued that: It is important, on the eve of the Council of Europe meeting, that we should not take any action which might be interpreted by the Greek Government, who are morbidly sensitive about Mr Papandreou’s activities, as indicating that Her Majesty’s Government gave any degree of support to him. The support which the governing Social Democratic Party of Sweden has given Mr Papandreou has resulted in commercial reprisals by the Greek government against Sweden; and earlier this year the Italian Government was involved in a serious row with the Greek Government over the welcome given by Signor Nenni, the then Italian Foreign Minister, to Mr Papandreou when he was visiting Rome. If the Secretary of State (or another senior Minister) were to agree to receive Mr Papandreou, and if Mr Papandreou were to publicise the meeting, this would in no way advance the cause of Greek democracy but would reduce our influence in Athens.87 On his turn King Constantine visited Buckingham Palace on 15 November 1969 to attend the performance by Yehudi Menuhin. He sat on the right of Queen Elizabeth during the performance and the ensuing dinner. At the reception he had a conversation with Edward Heath and Jeremy Thorpe, the Conservative and Liberal leaders respectively; both showed great interest in Greek affairs. Earlier the same day, Constantine had had a one-hour meeting with Prime Minister Wilson. The key subject of their discussion was the Council of Europe meeting in December.88 The young monarch emphasised that if Greece were expelled from the Council of Europe the wording of the resolution should be addressed to the junta and not to the Greek people. In 1967 the European Economic Community had already frozen its agreement with Greece. Constantine argued that the Greeks should not assume that they had been condemned as a whole by Europe. Wilson agreed to this, and suggested the use of the term ‘suspen-

138

Greece and the English

sion’ of membership. Constantine wanted Wilson to tell him the British and American official policy regarding the junta. He ‘felt that the President [Nixon] had leaned too far to the side of the present Greek regime’. Wilson backed the Americans, claiming that they had been preoccupied with Vietnam and their relations with the Russians. However, the Americans seemed not to have reached a decision, and for the time being had adopted a more ‘neutral’ position toward the Greek regime ‘than Her Majesty’s Government would have liked’. Besides, there was an argument in Washington between those who supported the need for NATO unity and supporters of human rights. Wilson and the Permanent Under Secretary of the FCO, Sir Denis Greenhill assumed that Britain would have to vote against the junta in the Council of Europe, since there was no indication of the colonels introducing any liberalising measures. However, the prime minister would not be able to reveal British policy after the voting at Strasbourg because he argued that the Council of Europe vote was a crucial point for Greece and Western Europe: ‘Whatever happens things would not be the same after Strasbourg,’ he commented. Moreover, Wilson urged the king not to be associated with dissident politicians and political groups abroad. Constantine admitted ‘being under pressure from all sides’, but did not intend to identify himself with anyone. He pressed once more for Wilson to tell him his policy on Greece for the coming year, but there was no reply.89 Outside, reporters waited to take a photo of Constantine with Wilson, and later the same day Downing Street announced that the meeting was arranged ‘at the request of the king . . . it was an exchange of views on Greece’. Ambassador Papagos, who attended the meeting, assumed that London was once again afraid of the junta’s reactions: that was why they had made reference to ‘the request of the king’.90 Constantine returned to Rome but soon travelled again to Britain, on 9 December, to attend the funeral of Princess Alice, the mother of the Duke of Edinburgh.91 The Council of Europe meeting was scheduled for 10–12 December, and junta Foreign Secretary Pipinelis strongly believed that he would be ‘victorious’ in his attempt to convince the Europeans not to condemn Greece. However, once he realised that the ‘game was doomed’ he informed Athens, and Papadopoulos ordered Pipinelis to announce that the country was withdrawing from the Council of Europe. The regime tried to portray their action as a national victory; the foreign secretary – who had not kept a scheduled meeting with Constantine in Rome – was welcomed by a guard of honour at Athens airport. Meanwhile, Ambassador Faidon Kavalieratos, Greece’s permanent representative to NATO, warned that the alliance was

King Constantine II

139

aiming to avoid further commitments in Greece. NATO representatives discussed the need to transfer American bases from Libya to another Mediterranean country, Muammar Qadaffi’s coup having upset the regional balance; but no one argued that bases should be located in Greece – only Turkey and Italy were mentioned in the consultations;92 and Kavalieratos showed signs of panicking. Wilson, meanwhile, had no intention whatsoever of linking NATO with anti-junta policy; he instructed the Foreign Secretary to tell Nixon that: ‘Our alliance should show more reflection of our belief in democracy rather than action.’ The FCO ‘should try to persuade the United States in their bilateral dealings with Greece to be more concerned with a return to freedom’.93 Despite the close relations between the British royal family and the Glücksburg dynasty, the FCO advised the Prince of Wales not to attend the baptism of Prince Nikolaos, the third child of Constantine and Anne-Marie. The ceremony took place in Rome on 25 January 1970; Prince Michael of Kent and the Danish royal family attended. According to Ambassador Papagos, the Prince of Wales had wished to attend, but the FCO had advised against it. Lord Mountbatten was also not present; possibly for to the same reason.94 In August 1970, Ambassador Stewart was informed that Queen Mother Frederica was about to publish her memoirs. In a dinner conversation with Ambassador Papagos he argued that it was not the right time for this to take place: ‘After all, he is the king,’ he commented.95 In November, Lord Mountbatten returned from an official visit to the United States, where he had had a meeting with Nixon; the president appeared to favour Constantine’s return to Greece. Later, Secretary of State Rogers claimed that the king should return as soon as possible, but Mountbatten replied that there had to be a plan: Constantine should not return before the general election, to avoid being identified with the regime. He pointed out (prophetically) that ‘with the fall of the regime, the king might also fall.’ However, he claimed that the communists might attempt to seize power, and that the king was the only one who could deter them. Rogers remarked that ‘we are tied down’, with the dictatorship providing the USA with arrangements (i.e. bases) for Middle East security in the event of another war. The Earl of Burma told Constantine that the Americans were not exerting pressure on the junta because of the Middle East situation.96 A day or two later, Constantine asked Queen Elizabeth for her advice as to whether he should attend the funeral of General de Gaulle. She advised that it would be better not to go, since the general had wished for a close family ceremony, despite the fact that 48 foreign dignitaries apparently in-

140

Greece and the English

tended to travel to Paris. Eventually, the king sent his condolences to French President Georges Pompidou and the general’s widow.97 Meanwhile, Mountbatten arranged a meeting between Constantine and Edward Heath, the new prime minister, on 20 November. Heath did not appear to be informed about the latest Greek developments, and Constantine reiterated his difficulties in convincing the Americans to put pressure on the regime. The prime minister expressed his interest in Karamanlis – at that time residing in Paris – and asked if he were ready to lead a new government. Constantine assured him it would be possible. The meeting was not ‘productive’, however, and Heath simply listened without elaborating on his policy on Greece.98 Late in January of the following year, Constantine was invited by the Prince of Wales to a hunt, staying at Sandringham.99 On 11 March Constantine visited Queen Elizabeth for tea; they talked for two hours. The king touched on his idea of drafting a declaration on the 150th anniversary of the Greek War of Independence. Ambassador Stewart had already suggested that Constantine speak with Papadopoulos on the subject, but Queen Elizabeth did not approve of communicating with the dictator.100 Constantine continued to be angry at the Americans’ attitude towards him, despite the fact that Nixon sent him a letter on the occasion of the 150th anniversary. The king described the American stance as ‘hypocritical’ in a conversation with Barbour, counselor at the British embassy in Rome. He emphasised that Henry Tasca, the American ambassador in Athens, had still not visited him, and demanded to know American policy on Greece. Allegedly, Barbour replied that: ‘They [Washington] have no policy. They do not know which way to go.’101 In October 1971, the king requested a meeting with Vice-President Agnew; both visited the Shah of Iran to attend the festivities marking 2,500 years of the Persian monarchy. Agnew argued that NATO played a significant role in American policy on Greece, and that Papadopoulos aimed for improved relations with Turkey. He denied exerting pressure on the regime, claiming as usual that any pressure ‘might stiffen their back’. The junta ‘needed time’ to implement the 1968 Constitution. Besides, he repeated, Washington ‘did not intervene in the domestic affairs of other states’. The vice-president urged the king to return to Greece soon, saying: ‘What is essential is to get you back, and from then on, we can work it out.’102 In February 1972 the junta’s propagandists found a way of attacking the king in person: they circulated news of an impending divorce between Constantine and Anne-Marie. An article was published first in the French France-Dimanche, and later the Athens dailies Acropolis and To Vima repeated the claims. The king was furious, his grand marshal issued a strong

King Constantine II

141

denial, and the newspapers eventually apologised.103 Back in Athens, Papadopoulos sought ascendancy over the other coconspirators of the 21 April 1967 coup. The majority of the top-ranking officers who had organised the coup were made to retire from the armed forces, and appointed cabinet secretaries or director-generals at the ministries. Gradually, they had been losing their influence over the middle ranks – many fanatical captains and majors were loyal to individuals, and not simply to the junta itself. Factionalism prevailed within the armed forces, especially in the army. In the air force and especially in the navy, many royalists and conservatives were frustrated, but unable to react. KYP and the military police safeguarded the regime with hundreds of secret agents and informers, even inside the prisons. At the head of the military police was Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannidis, a conspirator in the coup, utterly ruthless, psychotic, fanatical, narrow-minded. He was one of the few not forced to retire. In August 1971, Papadopoulos appointed the former leading officers in the coup as regional district directors, in effect prefects, with no power over the military, from which, in any case, all of them had already retired. Papadopoulos caused uproar among the ultra-rightists by deciding to abolish ‘Political Beliefs Certificates’, a method used since the civil war to identify communists; no citizen could find a job without such a document. Regent Zoitakis was the first to be expelled from his office by Papadopoulos, due to his opposition to the issue of the certificates. By summer 1972, Papadopoulos was not only prime minister but had also appointed himself regent, secretary for foreign affairs and for defence, and secretary for programming and government policy. Papadopoulos’s agenda aimed to demilitarise the regime and tone down the security services’ methods, but not to abolish the junta – he was powerful, and he enjoyed it. In early 1973 the people, and especially students, started protesting more vigorously at the interference of the regime’s secret agents in university affairs. In February, there were many protesters among Athens Law School students, and this altered the atmosphere in the capital. The public’s ‘apathy’ – as reported in previous years – was transformed into active, open protest. Moreover, the world oil-crisis considerably increased inflation, and gradually the people grew even more restless. Meanwhile, many royalist naval officers planned a counter-coup, aiming to take over the island of Syros. According to Ambassador Papagos, King Constantine was informed of their plot, but tried to dissuade the officers from carrying out their plans: he felt there were few chances of success;104 indeed, the regime’s secret services soon discovered the plot, and in late May 1973 many were arrested. However, the crisis within the navy continued to escalate.

142

Greece and the English

The captain of the cruiser Velos, at that time on NATO exercises south of Italy, decided to reach an Italian port (in the event, Fiumicino) and to ask for political asylum in protest at the regime; his officers and sailors agreed with him. Americans and Europeans were surprised by this initiative, which initially hit the headlines. At first, Constantine assumed that it would be a public-relations coup to be in Fiumicino to greet the ship and its captain, but gradually became concerned at being dragged into politics. On 27 May, in a discussion with the British assistant military attaché in Rome, he admitted that he had been surprised at the Velos mutiny, and had not slept for 48 hours. He was in a dilemma. The king was afraid of the junta’s reactions if he approved of the mutiny. As the attaché commented: ‘At this stage [of their conversation] the queen [Anne-Marie] showed obvious signs of being bored with the discussion of the mutiny and the subject was dropped.’105 The mutiny led to optimism among the pro-democracy politicians and groups at home and abroad, but the FCO assumed that: King Constantine’s prestige and his chance of returning to Athens have declined markedly and continuously since 1967. Whatever the result of the present troubles for the regime . . . King Constantine’s position, though not hopeless, is a weak one . . . There is certainly pressure within the Greek regime for Papadopoulos to end the monarchy or depose King Constantine. And this is reflected in the progovernment press. But it is as yet by no means certain, whether he will do this or, if he does, when or how he will set about it.106 British diplomats had not anticipated Papadopoulos’s panicked reaction to the mutiny. He hit back by accusing the king and his aide de camp Major Arnaoutis of raising money ‘against the revolution of 21 April 1967’. The leader of the junta – a fanatical royalist since his early career in the military – now acted in a decidedly self-contradictory manner: on 1 June he deposed the king and declared the establishment of a Greek ‘Presidential Parliamentary Republic’, with himself as interim president. A plebiscite was organised for 29 July, for the people to ‘decide’ on the new constitution. People had little option but to vote ‘yes’ to Papadopoulos’s republic.107 The regime controlled everything with their propagandists and informers; even so, Constantine was allowed to issue a message to the people. In a passionate statement on the plebiscite, he declared: What else can it mean except an exercise of brutal totalitarianism, when you are offered no alternative solution? When you are given no

King Constantine II

143

choice? When opposition is forbidden? When there is no other candidate? When Greek men and women are being dragged to the polls to vote for a dictatorship? . . . I personally feel compelled at this point to declare in the most categorical terms that, if I am asking you to vote against this deformed monstrosity of a regime, it is not because I am trying to protect the monarchy. I denounce this attempt to introduce totalitarianism in Greece; it is not because I am trying to defend my own position as head of state . . . the result of the plebiscite may well be decided in advance – down to the precise percentage of Yes votes to be announced. No matter. The massive vote of No will reverberate with a crushing moral force which will win through.108 However, his message appeared to have little effect. In early June, London was faced with the dilemma of whether or not to recognise the ‘republic’ of Papadopoulos. Prime Minister Heath had an audience with Queen Elizabeth, and argued that de jure King Constantine was no longer head of state: We naturally much regret the abolition of the Monarchy in Greece and sympathize with the plight of King Constantine and his Queen. Quite apart from personal sentiments, we considered that the Monarchy, as a factor for stability and continuity, could have played a valuable role in the event of a return to constitutional rule. Unfortunately, there is nothing we can do to help the King. The Greek regime seems firmly in control and would reject any representation from us. The abolition of Monarchy requires a decision on recognition. The regime meets in full our criteria for de jure recognition (it is not our normal policy to withhold recognition as a mark of political or moral disapproval). It would not be desirable to delay recognition, as King Constantine has suggested on Panorama [in a BBC television interview]. This could impair Greece’s effectiveness as a NATO ally without producing any compensating benefits . . . De jure recognition will mean that we no longer regard King Constantine as Head of State.109 There is no record of Queen Elizabeth expressing any views on the subject. On 13 June, the United Kingdom officially recognised the ‘republic’ of Papadopoulos. A few days later, the Duke of Edinburgh invited Constantine to visit Windsor in early July, but he responded that he wished to stay in Rome until the plebiscite.110 Queen Anne-Marie, meanwhile, distressed and upset at the deposing of her husband, requested information from her

144

Greece and the English

mother Queen Ingrid on foreign leaders’ attitudes. NATO foreign secretaries dined at the Copenhagen palace, but the Danish royal family failed to mention Greece in their conversations with them. Constantine and AnneMarie were ‘disappointed’, as Ambassador Papagos remarked.111 Meanwhile, Karamanlis in Paris abstained from any contact with the king.112 Eventually, on 7 July, Constantine and the royal family visited Windsor. The Duke of Edinburgh told him that Ambassador Hooper – who had argued in favour of recognition – had suggested that the British warships positioned off Athens should not fire the customary salute on the Queen’s birthday, to avoid confusing Papadopoulos. Constantine seemed willing to immigrate to the United Kingdom, and Prince Philip offered to introduce him to someone who could help him found an estate.113 The FCO and Home Office examined their policy with respect to the permanent residence of Constantine and the royal family in Britain. They agreed that it was ‘an exceptional case’: To treat a former Head of State with close ties with this country as an ordinary immigrant would expose us to embarrassing and avoidable criticism, not least from supporters of Her Majesty’s Government. Sir Alec Douglas Home hopes that Mr Carr will agree that the King and Queen should be allowed to stay here without restriction should they wish to do so.114 From Athens, Ambassador Hooper sent an insightful assessment of the politics and the monarchy in Greece. It was one of the first occasions on which Constantine would be blamed for the political crises of the 1960s as well as for the 1967 military coup. Hooper, as American diplomats a few years earlier had also done, argued that: ‘Constitutional monarchy is not an indigenous tradition in Greece and the Crown has never had the deep traditional roots, not commanded the almost instinctive respect and affection, which it enjoys in Britain.’ He emphasised that: When King Constantine, young, inexperienced, and with few disinterested and competent advisers, succeeded to the throne on his father’s untimely death, the trend [of royal interference in politics] continued . . . he was drawn into political manoeuvering to an extent quite inconsistent with the role of a constitutional monarch as it is envisaged in Western Europe; and while he should be given credit for his efforts, he must share a measure of responsibility for the political situation which led to the coup d’état of 21 April 1967.115

King Constantine II

145

In Greece few people cared about the abolition of the monarchy: The immediate results of the abolition of the monarchy have been minimal. There has been remarkably little public reaction to it and little sympathy for the King, except among those with personal or sentimental attachments to the royal house . . . most people realise that the real issue is not monarchy versus republic, but authoritarian rule versus democracy . . . Besides, many of the most respected figures of the old political world are republicans by tradition and predilection.116 The Greek junta had tried, through the referendum, ‘to gain among the countries of Western Europe at least the acceptance now accorded to the Turkish Government’ (in 1971 a military coup had taken place in Turkey). Hooper estimated that the British influence was minimal in Greece, since the regime’s principal concern was to survive and ‘its concentration is not much affected by outside critics.’117 For their part, NATO should not worry since Greece would not change her foreign or defence policies: The events of recent weeks may well lead to doubts in the minds of more objective observers in Western Europe about the reliability of Greece as a NATO partner under the present government. But it is arguable that the military contribution of the Greek Armed Forces as such has always been limited and that the real importance of Greece to NATO from a strategic point of view depends principally on the denial of its territory to an enemy . . . Britain and Western Europe are more likely to preserve their interests here, and will do no harm to hopes of democracy and liberty in Greece, by a quiet policy of wait-and-see rather than by public expressions of scepticism about the intentions of the Greek Republic and its masters.118 The ambassador judged that: ‘The chief threat to the stability of the regime remains, as it was before, a collapse from within, a falling out of members of the “junta” and to this the royal question is irrelevant.’119 Hooper was right: Papadopoulos’s nemesis would be the ‘dark brigadier’ of the military police, Dimitrios Ioannidis. In the July plebiscite more than 78 per cent of the voters ‘decided’ in favour of the Papadopoulos republic. There is no doubt that it had been another manipulated referendum, even though many people, the quiet

146

Greece and the English

observers of the 1960s crises, no longer favoured the crown. However, by the autumn student protests against the junta had intensified. The key centres of political demonstrations were the Law School and the Polytechnic in central Athens. Students organised themselves, and in November the Polytechnic became the centre of a revolt against the junta, who responded with increasingly repressive measures. Hundreds of students locked themselves into the campus, and from within the building a radio station called on all Greeks to resist the tyrannical regime. The people backed the students by gathering in front of the campus, giving them food and other supplies. On 16 November, the police asked for the military’s help, and Papadopoulos gave the green light to the storming of the campus with a medium battle-tank and other military vehicles. The tank smashed the front gates of the campus in the evening of 16 November, injuring students who had been appealing to the soldiers, until the last moment, to join them. The police and the military attacked the students inside the Polytechnic and in the nearby streets. A thousand were arrested and 23 shot on the spot, either by police officers or army snipers. Up to the present day, the revolt at the Polytechnic is considered the symbol of anti-junta resistance, and is celebrated every 17 November. In the evening of 17 November, Constantine had dinner with British Prime Minister Douglas-Home, who asked for more information on developments in Greece. The king was against any attack on the students, and warned that if Papadopoulos fell, Brigadier Ioannidis would come to power. The prime minister, however, assumed that Papadopoulos was powerful; he knew nothing of Ioannidis. Later, in a telephone conversation between Constantine and Karamanlis, the former prime minister stated that he would not issue a statement on the events. Constantine had initially read him a draft statement urging the junta ‘to stop attacking the students and give up power and allow elections to be organised’, but accepted Karamanlis’s view, being afraid that the event were instigated by ‘ultra-leftist elements’. Again the king had fallen victim of his communist-phobia, and lost another chance of publicly accusing the junta of cruelty.120 Interestingly, royalist officers had for some time kept Constantine informed about Ioannidis and his ambition to become dictator. Papadopoulos was under the impression that after the latest events and the police/military raid on the Polytechnic campus his regime was safe, and he could rest for a while in his country house at Lagonisi (a gift from tycoon Aristotle Onassis). However, early in the morning of 25 November, Ioannidis struck back. The commander of the military police executed another coup, this time against Papadopoulos. Military commanders loyal to

King Constantine II

147

Ioannidis ordered their units to take over key government buildings and to deter any pro-Papadopoulos initiatives by other officers. Papadopoulos was arrested and deposed. No officer or unit reacted. Ioannidis appointed Major-General Faidon Gizikis, the commander of the 1st Army Corps, as ‘president of the republic’, and Adamadios Androutsopoulos, a loyal civilian, and former secretary of state to the junta, as prime minister. Ioannidis would remain powerful in the shadows, later to be called the ‘invisible dictator’. The new dictatorship accused their predecessors of corruption, taking an ultra-rightist and anti-royalist stance but without a well-defined ideology. Purges within the military started all over again; already many royalists had been imprisoned since the failed May counter-coup. The Archbishop of Athens and All Greece, Ieronimos, a pro-Papadopoulos cleric, was deposed; Archbishop Serafim assumed his throne, and accepted the task of swearing in the new government. The military police remained the main policing organisation, but Ioannidis tried to portray the new ‘revolution’ as a concerted effort by the military as a whole, rather than his own initiative.121 In their turn the Americans understood that it would not be easy to deal with Ioannidis and his followers. In early 1974, Ambassador Tasca confided to Carl Barkman, the Dutch ambassador in Athens, that: Contacts between American and Greek military officers are also much less smooth now; the new Greek military leaders are less sophisticated than their predecessors. The negotiations on the second phase of the home-porting for the US Navy are also somewhat harder. The Greeks want to receive more military aid in return for facilities in Eleusis [Athens district] . . . and on Crete.122 Surprisingly, the diary of Ambassador Papagos, Constantine’s grand marshal, contains little on the dramatic period between 25 November 1973 and 22 July 1974, i.e. up to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus; references in diplomatic files are also few. We therefore cannot keep track of the king’s meetings with foreign leaders and his personal views during the Ioannidis dictatorship. Interestingly, however, it is mentioned that from 7 June 1974 Constantine had information that Ioannidis planned a coup in Cyprus, and there were new leaks by 5 July; in fact, former Foreign Secretary Evangellos Averof-Tositsas, of the Karamanlis cabinet, had that day warned the Cypriot embassy in Athens about the impeding operation against Makarios.123 The new dictator believed fanatically in the union of Cyprus with Greece, and planned to topple Makarios, kill him and install a puppet government that would follow his own policy. Since the early 1970s, the police force

148

Greece and the English

in Cyprus loyal to Archbishop/President Makarios had been confronting EOKA-B, led by Grivas until his death in early 1974. The Greek National Guard officers, mainly junta adherents, backed EOKA-B in its mission of subversion. Allegedly, Ioannidis received some sort of assurance from the Americans, via either Under Secretary Joseph Sisco or a CIA official, that in the event of a coup against Makarios the Turks would not react; he thus completely underestimated the Ankara’s intentions.124 Constantine watched the developments, but was powerless to act. On the morning of 15 July, National Guard units attacked the presidential palace of Makarios. His guard resisted heroically and he managed to escape. The coup leaders announced on Cyprus radio that Makarios was dead, but a few hours later the archbishop declared from another station that he was alive. With British help he fled Cyprus and met with Prime Minister Wilson and Foreign Secretary Callaghan in London. Turkish Prime Minister Bulend Ecevit claimed that the coup violated the founding treaty of the Cyprus Republic, and voiced his fear of Turkish-Cypriots being targeted by the new junta. The Turkish generals deployed forces in South Anatolia, and by early on 19 July, outposts of the Greek military signals-intelligence were warning of an impending invasion. However, the Ioannidis junta refused to believe the assessments of an imminent Turkish invasion, and the deputy head of Greek intelligence in Cyprus, Lieutenant-Colonel Georgios Tsoumis, who had warned of the invasion, was recalled.125 On the morning of 20 July, Turkish marines and paratroopers invaded the island, and advanced with armoured and aircraft support. The GreekCypriot and Greek units could not resist for long – the infantry division had been withdrawn in 1967 – and they were already exhausted from the fighting during the 15 July coup attempt. In Greece, a general mobilisation was declared, but no units arrived in Cyprus to fight. Fifteen Noratlas paratroop-transports were dispatched, but one was shot down by Greek-Cypriot anti-aircraft fire by mistake, and two returned to Crete with engine problems. The Noratlas mission was too little, too late. During these days of crisis and war, the only thing Constantine could do was to rent an office at Claridges so as to be available for consultations with Greek politicians and others who might wish to contact him. He also maintained telephone contact with Karamanlis in Paris. British diplomats communicated with the West German ambassador in Athens, gaining some insight into the fall of the junta. The German ambassador was summoned by President Gizikis during the night of 23 July. While waiting to see him, he was told by Vice-Admiral Petros Arapakis, the chief of the navy general staff, that the chiefs of the general staffs had taken

King Constantine II

149

the decision to call on the politicians to form a government. Arapakis said that: ‘The chiefs of staff had believed that they had to eliminate the influence of Ioannidis and his followers who were pressing for a crazy war [between Greece and Turkey] in which defeat was certain.’126 Allegedly, Ioannidis was already persuaded, and on 22 July Greeks and Turks agreed to a cease-fire. In the evening of 23 July, Karamanlis telephoned Constantine to tell him that the junta’s President Gizikis had asked him to return to Greece and form a national coalition government; he asked the king for his advice. He was willing to go to Athens; at that moment, Constantine froze – he had realised that he had been left outside the dramatic political consultations and agreements. It was his last communication with Karamanlis.127 A few minutes later, Constantine telephoned Harold Wilson (now again prime minister) informing him of Karamanlis’s call and stating that he ‘would respond to an invitation from Gizikis or Karamanlis to return’. He argued that Karamanlis ‘should arrest Ioannidis and disband the Military Police immediately’. Wilson estimated that the situation in Greece was critical, even without the king. Karamanlis was a politician, not an army, and nothing was certain with the fanatical officers under Ioannidis. Wilson did not want the return of the monarch in Greece, but could not state this clearly; he therefore ‘advised caution’.128 The king agreed that Karamanlis should go back to Greece; according to another account, however, Karamanlis had already decided to lead the post-junta government, before even talking to the king. He flew back to Athens on board a French jet offered by French President Giscard d’Estaing. At 0415 hours on 24 July Karamanlis arrived in Athens, and was sworn in as prime minister under the watchful eye of Gizikis (as portrayed in a ubiquitous photograph). Georgios Mavros of the Centre Union was appointed vice-president and foreign secretary, Evangellos Averof secretary for defence and Georgios Rallis (another ERE politician and former secretary of state) home secretary. The person responsible for the security and intelligence services, who could control the fanatics who did not agree with the chiefs of staff’s initiative to hand over power, was an old royalist and Sacred Bond member, retired Major-General Solon Gikas. The British embassy commented that: It is clear that the new government consists mainly of members of Karamanlis’s National Radical Union Party [ERE] and of the Centre Union Party . . . As a whole, the new government has a strong proNATO pro-Western Europe bias and has been greeted with relief by supporters of the two major parties . . . the present government is as

150

Greece and the English

good as we are likely to get but it is far from being the ‘ecumenical’ government which some hoped for after the return of Karamanlis.129 Allegedly, when Canellopoulos, the last prime minister before the 1967 junta’s coup, left the conference with Gizikis, the chiefs of staff and the other politicians who had decided to call on Karamanlis to return from Paris, he commented: ‘Unfortunately we could not do anything for our friend [the king].’130 Prime Minister Wilson and President Nixon congratulated Karamanlis, but the British would not increase their influence nor would they win any defence contracts. By 26 July the general staff submitted to Karamanlis the immediate procurement requirements: key defence systems would be 230 French AMX-30 main battle-tanks and 49 Mirage F-1 fighters. The Americans were also happy with the placing of an order for C-130 Hercules transports and Corsair A-7 bombers. British industry was sidelined.131 The Americans adopted the same stance as the British over the king’s return; they believed that Karamanlis already had many difficulties back in Greece, and that they should not raise the issue of the monarchy with him. Many officers in the army as well as politicians were against the crown. Ambassador Henry Tasca emphasised that: ‘Constantine is likely to constitute a divisive factor . . . let the Greeks decide this issue for themselves.’132 Throughout the summer of 1974, Constantine waited in London. On 14 August, the Turks launched another attack on Cyprus, extending the occupation zone which divided the island. Karamanlis surprised NATO by deciding that Greece would withdraw from the military wing of the alliance after its apparent inability to stop this second Turkish aggression. Meanwhile, in Greece, Ioannidis’s followers continued serving in the armed forces. The new government was not in full control of the security services, organisations that had been the key to the junta’s power since 1967. On many occasions Prime Minister Karamanlis would receive intelligence about plans to kill him, but remained calm. On 1 August, the 1952 constitution was put into force again; Gizikis remained president, but Karamanlis as prime minister substituted for him.133 Understandably, the prime minister was walking a tightrope: he had to keep a balance between the military, the politicians, and an anti-royalist public opinion exasperated by the Cyprus situation and the dictatorship. For the time being, Constantine was out of the constitutional picture. Karamanlis and Foreign Secretary Mavros avoided any communication with the king, who had wished to be kept informed of the Greek-Turkish discussions in Geneva. Constantine issued a statement condemning the new

King Constantine II

151

Turkish aggression in Cyprus, adding that he had pleaded with the prime minister to contact him.134 On 17 August, Ambassador Aggelos Vlahos telephoned Papagos to inform him that Karamanlis wanted to avoid any public mention of contacts with the king. Papagos assumed that ‘the bridges were cut.’ Georgios Rallis, the home secretary, also argued in a conversation with Papagos that it would be good not to have any contact with the president (Karamanlis).135 Throughout the summer, British diplomacy remained preoccupied with Cyprus. In the United States, meanwhile, President Nixon resigned his office following the Watergate scandal. Britain, one of the guarantor powers for the Cypriot Republic had not deterred the invasion in July. Ironically, it is claimed that a decade later, in 1982, Argentinian general and dictator Leopoldo Galtieri, when planning the invasion of the Falklands, assumed that the British would again fail to react, given the precedent of Cyprus in 1974.136 Invasions and failure of diplomatic and military deterrence tend to cause new wars. Constantine met with Harold Wilson at Balmoral in September 1974. They discussed Greek affairs, and the king seemed anxious about his return to Athens. The prime minister advised him not to do anything without consulting Karamanlis, and warned him that some senior Greek commanders might approach him in the hope of convincing him to attempt a surprise return under their auspices. Constantine admitted that the chiefs of staff and other leading officers had indeed asked him, in mid-August, to fly back to Greece, and he had specifically requested an invitation by Karamanlis. But up to that day, Wilson had had no communication with the monarch, and in Constantine’s eyes ‘was keeping his counsel very close’.137 In August, after the new Turkish offensive in Cyprus, Constantine sent a message to Karamanlis denouncing ‘the barbarian and shameful attack . . . genocide because its goal is the extermination of human beings and the property destruction of the majority of the Greek population’, and declared that he backed the Greek government.138 It was not just a public declaration. Constantine wanted to remind Karamanlis and the military as well as public opinion that he took a continuing interest in Greek affairs, and thus should be invited back. In his conversation with Wilson, the king asserted that Karamanlis favoured the return of the monarchy. Constantine was afraid that the campaign for the restoration of the crown would suffer if he remained abroad. Once again: [The prime minister] emphasised that he felt that the King would be exceedingly ill-advised to return, even in such a situation, without a

152

Greece and the English

specific invitation from the government to do so. His claim to be a legitimate head of state required him to behave as a head of state, not a private citizen.139 In the free general elections of 17 November, Karamanlis and his newly founded Nea Dimokratia (‘New Democracy’) party won a majority vote (54.3 per cent), and he was elected prime minister. The Centre Union secured 20.4 per cent and the newly founded PASOK of Andreas Papandreou 13.6 per cent. The referendum to decide between a republic and a monarchy was scheduled for 8 December. Constantine remained abroad, and Karamanlis did not publicise his view of the regime issue. The Centre Union, the communist parties (legalised by Karamanlis before the elections) and PASOK were all against the crown, and the royalists seemed unable to cope with the workload and the organisational requirements of campaigning. Most significantly, royal interference in politics remained in people’s memories. Constantine presented his position in a televised message, as well as in interviews, declaring that ‘his movement on 13 December 1967 showed that he believed in democratic institutions and rules.’ He would contribute to the establishment of constitutional monarchy, would be ‘the king of all the Hellenes’ and would not interfere in politics. However, the junta – before their fall – had been claiming for some time that ‘Constantine planned to launch a coup with his generals in April 1967.’ One of PASOK’s leading founders, Costas Simitis (prime minister from 1996 to 2004) has argued that the monarchy had never had deep roots in Greece and had always required foreign backing and protection.140 Ambassador Barkman found Constantine’s appearance on the screen disappointing: ‘Constantine did less well. It was not a strong, convincing or even confident speech, and the King delivered it without any spontaneity; he was looking up (probably reading a text) instead of at the listeners.’141 In the evening of 8 December 1974 the British embassy in Athens informed the FCO of the referendum result: With 98 per cent of the votes so far announced, the result of the referendum is 69.2 per cent for a Republic and 30.8 per cent for Crowned Democracy. Abstentions at 26 per cent were 6 per cent higher than at the November Parliamentary election. The referendum was carried out in a fair and orderly fashion though with some noisy republican enthusiasm in Athens after the result became clear . . . Karamanlis has made a statement emphasising that his party remained outside the referendum campaign, that the conduct of the referendum had

King Constantine II

153

been irreproachable, and that the decision of the people must be accepted without reservation by all Greeks. The other party leaders have all welcomed the result for which indeed they had campaigned. On the possible return of Constantine as a private person to Greece, the Under Secretary to the Prime Minister, Takis Lambrias, stated that Karamanlis did not know the king’s intentions but the prime minister thought it would not be wise for Constantine to return to Greece for some time.142 It was all over for Constantine. However, the restoration of the Hellenic Republic did not automatically mean the end of royal controversies. From 1974 to 1977 the Greek security services would unveil a number of military conspiracies by junta loyalists and royalists to topple Karamanlis, to assassinate him and to continue with a dictatorship. These were hard times for the Greek cabinet and for the prime minister, who avoided making public this intelligence because they wanted to avoid panic and anxiety among the populace. Retired Colonel Arnaoutis, Constantine’s former aide de camp, was directly involved in the royalist conspiracies that were planned in Greece and London. For their part, the British government took an active interest in protecting the Greek government and provided secret intelligence on the conspiracies. This information will not be declassified in the United Kingdom national archives for years to come, but Karamanlis’s edited archive and the memoirs of Ambassador Papagos document British intelligence help in tracking the conspirators. In fact, the British provided information that ‘implicated also the name of the king’. Early in the morning on 24 February 1975, Defence Secretary AverofTositsas and his trusted officers unveiled a conspiracy by army officers to launch a coup. Some 37 active and retired officers were arrested – they planned to topple the government that very evening. Due to the magnitude of the conspiracy, Karamanlis and Averof had to use very careful language in addressing the nation.143 However, conspiracies continued. On 14 October 1976, Ambassador Petros Moliviatis, a close advisor of Karamanlis, was handed intelligence by the British ambassador in Athens that revealed a royalist plot against the government. The phrasing was clear: ‘The initiative of the conspiracy did not rest with the king; however, he is informed on this and does not discourage it . . . the name of the king is implicated.’144 A week later, Karamanlis was informed that a coup was planned to take place soon. The mutineers were officers about to be demobilised and, according to secret intelligence, they planned to kill Karamanlis, while world opin-

154

Greece and the English

ion was preoccupied by the American presidential elections. The Americans were also aware of this intelligence, reassuring Karamanlis that they were against the coup and planned to issue a ‘preemptive démarche’ to Constantine. On 2 November, Moliviatis asked the British government, through the ambassador, to issue a protest to Constantine. Interestingly, a day earlier, at a ministerial conference under the chairmanship of the secretary of Justice, an ‘expert from London’ attended and was consulted on the subject of secret intelligence. Obviously, either an SIS or an MI5 officer was in close contact with the Greek government, in addition to the ambassador in Athens.145 For his part, Constantine was upset about the accusations the Greek government addressed to him, via Home Secretary Rallis. Both governments assumed that he was a co-conspirator. At 2220 hours on 6 November, Constantine telephoned Queen Elizabeth himself, asking for an urgent audience at Windsor, where she was staying with the Duke of Edinburgh. They met an hour or two later. Apparently, Constantine explained the conspiracy controversy to her and asked her to mediate over his wish for an urgent meeting with Prime Minister James Callaghan. On 8 November, at 1030 hours, they met at Downing Street. It would not be a pleasant occasion.146 The prime minister stated that he had twice instructed the ambassador in Athens to inform the Greeks of royalist plots where ‘the name of the king was implicated’. Constantine denied everything, and asked for further evidence. He claimed that a conspirator mentioned by the ambassador, one ‘Vasilios Constantopoulos’, was unknown to him. Then the ‘angry’ Callaghan showed the former king some telegrams he had dispatched to Athens. He remarked that: ‘The British government is an ally and co-operates with Greece in NATO. The same intelligence is available also to the American government even though no Anglo-American intelligence sharing took place on this matter.’ The prime minister asked Constantine not to interfere in such activities (i.e. conspiracies) while on British soil.147 It is hard to argue that Constantine had developed criminal intentions, or that he actively sought the assassination of Karamanlis and the return of a royalist dictatorship. However, he proved once again that he had no control whatsoever over the fanatical royalists close to him. He was in great danger of losing his reputation; it is one thing being a former head of state, and quite another being blamed as a conspirator who had not discouraged an assassination plan.

Conclusion

Though Great Britain has always maintained close and intimate relations with the kings of Greece, many British politicians and diplomats have judged that monarchy has never had deep roots in the country. London had to shape policy on Greece taking this reality into consideration, together with the estimate that Greek kings will not always behave as constitutional monarchs, unlike the British example. On their turn the kings wanted to employ the British as their political agents so as to impose themselves to their subjects. This is evident in the case of King George II and later with King Constantine II. The tendency of the Greek royal family to interfere in foreign and domestic policy was evident during the times of King Otto, King George I and King Constantine I. Britain backed Otto until the coup of 1862, and in general supported the Greek monarchy in political terms, without ever showing any intention of interfering militarily on behalf of the royal family. With the coming of the Glücksburg dynasty the British and the new Greek royal family were drawn closer together. Exceptionally, there was a change in British policy in 1917, when Britain, together with France, pressed for Constantine I to resign and Prince Alexander to become the new king. It was a rare policy decision, and framed within the British strategy during the Great War. King George II, the son of Constantine I, cultivated his relations with the Windsors and the British government during the 1930s. He never showed any intention of inspiring all the Greeks and of gaining their support. In essence, the king acted not as a Greek but as an independent political factor, seeking to exert his influence over events and to preserve his privileged position. Politically, George II lost a large number of opportunities to disengage himself from the dark past of the Metaxas dictatorship and to convince liberals, socialists, even communists that after all he was the king of ‘all the Greeks’.

156

Greece and the English

‘Get the British to deal with my subjects’: in a phrase this had been the attitude of George II from 1941 until his return to Greece in 1946. He assumed that he could always ask for London’s support when confronting political demands and pressures from Greek political figures or from uprisings in the armed forces. On the other hand, British government policy, while remaining pro-monarchy, did not extend to becoming the king’s agent. Skilful tactics had to be employed by Churchill, Eden and the Foreign Office to ‘sell the king to his people’. By the autumn of 1943, SOE operatives and mid-level Foreign Office officials understood the need to keep the king out of Greece until the post-liberation referendum. Later, Eden was also convinced of this, but by December 1944 Churchill remained the only friend of the Greek crown. But eventually he pressed him hard to appoint Archbishop Damaskinos as regent. George II must have felt betrayed by that last friend in London. In his turn, King Paul was influenced considerably by his wife Queen Frederica. As we have shown, Frederica was an indiscreet, intrigue-loving ‘political animal’. She had a passion for her family and for power, and she could have been one of the leading women in politics or business in Greece if she had not been born a princess. In short, her attitude toward politics was: ‘I like no politician: what is good for the monarchy is also good for Greece.’ Taking into consideration the turbulence of Greek politics in the post-war era and her strong character, it was just a matter of time before she would cause the controversy that led to the resignation of the prime minister and thus to a constitutional crisis. Paul did not try to avoid the mistakes of his ancestors. The clash of the royal family with conservatives, the Centre Union of Papandreou and the activities of the Sacred Bond colonels created a dynamic political reality that led to the junta and ultimately to the demise of monarchy. The stance of King George VI and Queen Elizabeth II toward the Greek royal family reminds one of the cordial relations between King George I of Greece and Queen Victoria and King Edward VII. Buckingham Palace did not wish to make political points, especially during the era of the junta, but sought to continue the good relationship with King Paul, Queen Frederica and King Constantine II, despite the Cyprus revolt. For their part, the Americans, who exercised considerable influence over Greek politics during the Cold War, despised Frederica’s stance towards politics. However, the CIA must have been pleased to have regular contact with members of the royal family. British diplomats thought that the intervention of the palace in politics would not bring useful results, but they were not as ‘republican’ in their reports as their American counterparts. There

Conclusion

157

are no clues to suggest that the SIS had any contact with the royal family, which the CIA certainly had; in any event, British influence in Greece had been diminishing since the late 1940s. Reading between the lines of British ambassadorial reports by Norton, Peake and Murray – people loyal to the monarchy and to Queen Elizabeth II – one can conclude that Paul and Frederica had charmed no one with their personalities or attitudes. The Cyprus insurgency tested – but did not damage – King Paul and Queen Frederica’s relations with London. Eventually, the 1963 official visit clearly showed the desire of the British government to improve relations with the Glücksburg dynasty. In short, ‘Frederica wanted glamour and she got it.’ She wanted to safeguard the prestige of the crown as well as her own standing side by side with Queen Elizabeth. As usual, neither Frederica nor Paul understood that by disregarding the advice of their prime minister not to go to London they had caused another constitutional crisis, in addition to their various interventions in politics since 1947. At this point we need to reassess Prime Minister Karamanlis’s thinking prior to his decision to advise King Paul and the royal family not to go ahead with the London visit. He was clever enough for, and since 1955 had had a great deal of experience of, dealing with the royal family and with difficult people like Frederica. He knew the character of the queen and king and how badly they wanted to go to London, especially when in 1954 they were ‘forced’ by Prime Minister Papagos not to do so. In addition he was aware that Frederica and Crown Prince Constantine had been ‘in hostile mood toward him since 1961’.1 The prime minister must have assumed that his advice would be negatively received. He had suggested in May that they cancel their visit, but had received no reply. Later, after the meeting of 10 June 1963, Karamanlis must have sensed something in Paul asking for more time and then still not making up his mind; the monarch had a reputation for often changing his mind. Possibly Karamanlis had been planning to hold general elections (something he requested after his resignation). Being reelected prime minister he could fight with the backing of his followers on two fronts: against the Papandreous and against the crown’s efforts to amend the constitution. However, nothing materialised. He lost political momentum in the summer, and finally, in November 1963, the leader of the Centre Union was elected prime minister. By the time Constantine ascended to the throne he had had a brief military education, and a great deal of ceremonial experience. Like his mother he believed in personal and secret diplomacy, and was therefore doomed to heed her advice and that of the grand marshals, of the royalist aide de camps and other royalist politicians who simply viewed Greek politics and leaders (like the Papandreous) as opponents to confront and not as elected officials

158

Greece and the English

to respect. Particularly after the resignation of Karamanlis in 1963, the segment of public opinion that resented the royals grew even larger. According to the official inquiries, the ASPIDA group was not considered a dangerous organisation in operational terms; however, in political terms they had challenged the crown’s control of the military. In 1965, British diplomats, following a royalist pattern of analysis, failed to understand in time the gravity of the Constantine-Papandreou clash and its impact on the standing of the monarchy in Greece. The April 1967 coup surprised the king, who had allegedly been preparing his own in an attempt to avert the Centre Union’s coming to power. Then he showed he was too young, and afraid to take a stand against the colonels by not signing the royal warrant that legitimised their government. He lost one good opportunity to project, to both the conservatives and the centre, the image of the modern monarch whose role is to safeguard democracy. The colonels, and especially Papadopoulos, would not have mistreated him (or killed him), since they were fanatical royalists themselves. Constantine could have denied them the legitimacy they sought. Eventually, American and British pressure on the regime would have increased, with Constantine a ‘hostage’ in Athens. The coup leaders would have blinked – but eventually it was the king who did. Since his escape from Greece in December 1967, Constantine grew closer to London and the Windsors. The Americans were more interested in the junta, and Constantine was frustrated by their policy of avoiding contact with him. So Anglo-Greek contacts seemed to Constantine his only option. However, London officially recognised the change of regime in 1973, when Papadopoulos deposed the king and declared the ‘Presidential Parliamentary Republic’. Meanwhile, Prime Ministers Wilson and Heath advised caution and restraint. London wanted to have a working relationship with the junta, to exert influence over the Cyprus issue and to safeguard British commercial interests. In addition, Constantine lost a number of opportunities to declare himself in absolute terms against the junta and thus boost his prestige amongst Greeks. By the early 1970s, Downing Street and the FCO assumed that the king no longer had any influence in Greek politics. During the summer of July 1974, with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the return of democracy in Greece, Prime Minister Harold Wilson believed that the king should exercise restraint, and avoid upsetting the delicate post-junta balance in Athens. British attitudes and policy were based on pragmatism and realism, rather than on a sentimental regard for the Glücksburg dynasty. Besides, the FCO understood that since Karamanlis had not wished to have any contact with the king since 23 July 1974, they should act in a similar manner. The refer-

King Constantine II

159

endum of December 1974 marked the end of the monarchy in Greece, of an institution that since 1832 had failed to proved itself a unifying factor beyond politics. Finally, we shall interpret the secret warnings of British intelligence on royalist conspiracies within the British pro-republic policy after 1974.

NOTES

CHAPTER ONE

1

See Papers relating to the Establishment of the Kingdom of Greece, 1826–1832 (London: HMSO, 1878). 2 Peel to Aberdeen, 2 December 1843, quoted in MacLean, D., ‘The Greek Revolution and the Anglo-French Entente, 1843–1844’, English Historical Review, Vol. 96, No. 378, January 1981, p. 119. 3 Lyons to Canning, 20 April 1844, FO 352/28(4). All files to be understood as held at the National Archives in Kew, London, unless otherwise stated. 4 Aberdeen to Lyons, 25 September 1844; Aberdeen to Lyons, 24 October 1844, FO 32/126; MacLean, pp. 117–29. 5 Bower, L. and Bolitho, G. Otho I: King of Greece (London: Royalty Digest 1939, 1995), p. 140. 6 Aberdeen to Guizot, 11 November 1844, quoted in MacLean, p. 125. 7 Aberdeen to Lyons, 11 November 1844, ibid, p. 127. 8 Ibid, p. 129. 9 See Correspondence Respecting the Revolution in Greece: October 1862 (London: Houses of Parliament, 1863); Petropulos, J.A., Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833–1843 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968); Fotiadis, D., Othonas: I Exosi tou

162

10 11 12 13

14

15

Greece and the English

[‘Otto: His Eviction’] (Athens: Melissa, 1964); Saidl, W., Vauaroi stin Ellada: I Gennesi tou Neoellinikou Kratous kai to kathestos tou Othona [‘Bavarians in Greece: the Birth of the Neo-Hellenic State and the Regime of Otto’] (Athens: Elliniki Euroekdotiki, 1984); Skandamis, S., Selides Istorias kai Kritikis: I Triakondaetia tis vasileias tou Othona [‘Pages of History and Critique: the Thirty-year Reign of Otto’] (Athens, 1961); Anastasiadis, G., Politiki kai Syntagmatiki Istoria tis Elladas, 1821–1941 (Athens: Sakoulas, 2001); Dontas, D., Greece and the Great Powers, 1863–1875 (Salonika: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1966). Christmas, W., The Life of King George of Greece (London: Eveleigh Nash, 1914), p. 37. Dontas, p. 4. See Prevelakis, E., British Policy towards the Change of Dynasty in Greece: 1862–1863 (Athens: Gertrude Christou, 1953). The King of the Hellenes to the Prince of Wales, 11/23 April 1870, in Buckle, G.E. (ed.), Letters of Queen Victoria, 1870–1878 (London: Murray, 1926), Vol. II, pp. 15–18; see also Correspondence respecting the capture and murder by brigands of British and Italian subjects in Greece presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty (London: Harrison, 1870); Further correspondence respecting the capture and murder by brigands of British and Italian subjects in Greece in continuation of ‘Greece, No. 19’ (1870) presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty (London: Harrison & Sons, 1871). Copy of an extract from a letter to the Prince of Wales from the King of Greece dated 30th August 1878, RA VIC/Main/T/7/37; Royal Archives, Windsor Castle. The research into this correspondence was facilitated by permission of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II. Christmas, p. 120.

Notes

163

16 Copy of an extract of a letter to the King from the King of the Hellenes, Vienna 2 November 1902, RA VIC/Main/W/43/3a, Royal Archives, Windsor Castle. 17 After the assassination the crown regained popularity, but some journals questioned the assailants’ plan; eventually they were not arrested but gave themselves up. Journalists questioned reports of the attempt, suggesting hunting guns and not ‘French military rifles’ (as stated by the royalist press) had been used used. For references to police intrigues and to the assassins being royalists with connections to the palace, as well as to rumours that they were not sentenced to death but later released in secret, see Kapsalis, G., Oi Sfaires pou Esosan to Vasileia [‘The Bullets that Saved the King’] (Athens: Dorikos, 2006). 18 Christmas, pp. 93–5, 151. 19 See Veremis, T., The Military in Greek Politics: From Independence to Democracy (London: Hurst, 1997); Papacosma, V., The Military in Greek Politics: The 1909 Coup d’Etat (Kent, OH: Kent University Press, 1977). 20 Christmas, p. 403. 21 Lamb to Foreign Office, 18 March 1913, FO 195/2452. 22 Lamb to Lowther, 23 March 1913, FO 195/2452. 23 Lamb to Foreign Office, 6 May 1913, FO 195/2452. 24 Melas, G., Konstantinos: Anamniseis tou proin Grammateos tou [‘Constantine: Memoirs of his Former Secretary’] (Salonica: University Studio Press, 2000, 1920 edn. repr.), p. 18. 25 Ibid, pp. 22–3. 26 Paraskeuopoulos to his wife Koula, 9 February 1913, in Paraskeuopoulos, L., Valkanikoi Polemoi: Epistoles sti Gynaika toy [‘Balkan Wars: Letters to His Wife’] (Athens: Kastaniotis, 1998), p. 163. 27 Paraskeuopoulos to his wife Koula, 23 February 1913, in Paraskeuopoulos, p. 189.

164

Greece and the English

28 Melas, p. 39. 29 Ibid, p. 42. 30 Ambassador Szilaczy (Athens) to Foreign Secretary Berthold (Vienna), 1 May 1914, quoted in Enepekides, P. (ed.), I Doxa kai o Dihasmos Apo ta Mystika Arheia Viennis, Verolinoi kai Vernis, 1908– 1918 [‘Glory and Division from the Secret Archives of Vienna, Berlin and Bern, 1908–1918’] (Athens: Zaharopoulos,1992), pp. 287–95. 31 Szilaczy to Burian, 15 September 1916, in Enepekides, pp. 496–7. 32 Foreign Office to High Commissioner (Cairo), 23 November 1915, FO 141/467/2. 33 Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 27 December 1916, CO 323/716. 34 Lee, A.G., The Royal House of Greece (London: Ward Lock, 1948), p. 44. 35 On King Constantine I and Greece in the First World War, see Dakin, D., ‘The Diplomacy of the Great Powers and the Balkan States, 1908–1914’, Balkan Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1962; Hibben, P., Constantine I and the Greek People (New York: Century, 1920); Thomson, B. The Allied Secret Service in Greece (London: Hutchinson, 1931); Trumpener, N., Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1918 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968); Lewis, B., The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961); Smith, M.L., Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor 1919–1922 (London: Hurst, 2005); Veremis, T., Oi Epenvaseis tou Stratou stin Politiki, 1916–1936 [‘Army Interference in Politics, 1916–1936’] (Athens: Exantas, 1977); Nicholas, Prince of Greece, My Fifty Years (London: Hutchinson, 1926); Political Memoirs, 1914–1917 (London: Hutchinson, 1928); Mackenzie, C., First Aegean Memoirs (London: Chatto & Windus, 1931); Greek Memoirs (London: Chatto & Windus, 1939); Fotakis, Z., Greek Naval Strat-

Notes

165

egy and Policy, 1910–1919 (London: Routledge, 2005). 36 A few references to Alexander’s frustration with the officers and politicians who accused his father of pro-German bias are included in FO 608/38. 37 Foreign Office to Lord Acton (Berne), 28 June 1919, FO 608/38. 38 An interesting account of King Alexander’s relationship with his wife, Aspasia Manou, was provided by journalist Miltiadis Malainos in 1929; his article ‘The Wedding of Alexander with Aspasia Manou’ was reprinted in the monthly Tote: Review of History, Vol. 11, May 2005, pp. 74–84. 39 Foreign Office minute, 20 December 1920, FO 286/732. 40 Smith to Ministry of Marine, 12 October 1922, FO 286/802. 41 Bentinck to Curzon, 3 December 1922, FO 286/802. 42 Curzon to Bentinck, 29 December 1922, FO 286/802. 43 Bentinck to Foreign Office, 24 August 1923, FO 286/850. 44 Lampson to Dering, 22 May 1924, FO 286/903. 45 Buckingham Palace to Bentinck, 15 March 1924, FO 286/903. 46 Pipinelis, P., O Georgios B [‘George II’] (Athens: 1951), p. 69. 47 Ibid, p. 76. 48 Ibid, p. 78. CHAPTER TWO

1 2 3

Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous [‘History of the Greek Nation’], Vol. IE (Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 1980) pp. 371–2. Leeper, R., When Greek Meets Greek (London: Chatto & Windus, 1950) pp. 10, 26–7. Die Teilnehmer an der internationalen Konferenz in Berlin in der Zeit vom 30. August bis 13. September 1936. T120 Roll 386; Lexicon in Geheimschrift aus dem beschlagnahmten Archiv der kommunistischer Partei, Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo), 5 March 1937. T120 Roll

166

Greece and the English

386, US National Archives/Academy of Athens. 4 Entry for 31 December 1938 in Metaxas, I., The Metaxas Diary, Vol. 4 (Athens: Govostis, 2000), pp. 321–2. 5 Kolliopoulos, John S. Greece and the British Connection, 1935-1941 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p.8; Pipinelis, pp. 94–7. 6 Visit of Dr Goebbels to Athens, British embassy (Athens) to Foreign Office, 5 April 1939, FO 371/23779 R2379. 7 All letters quoted in Pipinelis, p. 98. 8 Foreign Office to Palairet (Athens), 28 October 1940, FO 371/24919 R8079. 9 Palairet (Athens) to Foreign Office, 29 October 1940, FO 371/24919 R8079. 10 British Military Mission in Greece to War Office, 2 November 1940, FO 371/24919 R8114. 11 All letters quoted in Pipinelis, p. 101. 12 George II to George VI, 17 November 1940, FO 371/24921 R8933. 13 Foreign Office to Palairet (Athens), 25 November 1940, FO 371/24917 R7299. 14 Churchill to Metaxas, 25 November 1940, FO 371/24917 R7299. 15 George VI to George II, 13 December 1940, FO 371/24921 R8933. 16 Foreign Office to Palairet (Athens), 29 December 1940, FO 371/24921 R8940. 17 Palairet (Athens) to Foreign Office, 3 December 1940, FO 371/24910 R8766. 18 Churchill to Palairet (Athens), 31 March 1941, FO 371/29815 R3381. 19 Palairet (Athens) to Churchill, 2 April 1941, FO 371/29815 R3408. 20 Lampson to British embassy (Belgrade), 6 April 1941, FO

Notes

21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

167

371/29815 R3575. Smith, M., The Spying Game: The Secret History of British Espionage (London: Politicos, 2003), pp. 280–1. Pipinelis, p. 106. Palairet (Athens) to Foreign Office, 18 April 1941, FO 371/29819 R4117. Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous, Vol. IE, p. 448 Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, 27 April 1941, FO 371/29820 R4762. Pipinelis, p. 113. Palairet (Crete) to Foreign Office, 2 May 1941, FO 371/29820 R4787. Palairet to Foreign Office, 3 May 1941, FO 371/29884 R4843. Palairet to Foreign Office, 4 May 1941, FO 371/29884 R4845. Foreign Office to Lampson, 6 May 1941, FO 371/29884 R4842. Princess Frederica of Hanover (1917–81); her father was Duke Ernest Augustus of Brunswick and her mother Victoria Luise of Prussia. Lee, p. 87. Foreign Office to Palairet (Crete), 7 May 1941, FO 371/29884 R4845. Pipinelis, p. 109. Lee, p. 96. Evacuation of H.M. The King of the Hellenes from Crete, Military Attaché to War Office, 29 May 1941, WO 208/693. Pipinelis, pp. 109–11. Lampson to Foreign Office, 24 May 1941, FO 371/29884 R5632. Lampson to Foreign Office, 25 May 1941, FO 371/29884 R5579. Foreign Office to Lampson, 25 May 1941, FO 371/29884 R5579. Lampson to Foreign Office, 26 May 1941, FO 371/29884 R5610. Palairet (Alexandria) to Foreign Office, 30 May 1941, FO

168

Greece and the English

371/29880 R5847. 43 Mallaby (War Office) to Nichols, 13 June 1941, FO 371/29885 R6064. 44 Palairet (Alexandria) to Foreign Office, 11 June 1941, FO 371/29885 R6128. 45 Lampson to Foreign Office, 27 June 1941, FO 371/29885 R6580. 46 Lampson to Foreign Office, 1 September 1941, FO 371/29886 R8114. 47 Palairet to Foreign Office, 5 July 1941, FO 371/29885 R6780. 48 Palairet to Foreign Office, 9 September 1941, FO 371/29887 R8347. 49 Foreign Office to Palairet (on board ship with George II), 1 July 1941, FO 371/29885 R6707. 50 Auchinleck to War Office, 16 September 1941, FO 371/29850 R8508. 51 Pipinelis, p. 112. 52 Ibid, p. 114. 53 The King of the Hellenes, BBC Greek Service Policy, 25 October 1941, FO 371/29854 R9369. 54 Benians, Vice-Principal of Cambridge University, to Eden, 19 October 1941, FO 371/29888 R9523. 55 Foreign Office minute (Dixon), 9 October 1941, FO 371/29887 R9051. 56 Foreign Office minute (Dixon), 23 October 1941, FO 371/29909 R9377. 57 Foreign Office minute (Dixon), 27 October 1941, FO 371/29909 R9461; Foreign Office to Lampson, 5 November 1941, FO 371/29909 R9468; Sargent to Hardinge, 26 October 1941, FO 371/29909 R9377. 58 Eden to Tsouderos, 13 October 1941, FO 371/29887 R9051. 59 Eden, minute, 16 November 1941, FO 371/29888 R10019.

Notes

169

60 Foreign Office minute (Warner), 18 November 1941, FO 371/29888 R10017. 61 Larpent to Dixon, 27 January 1942, FO 371/33171 R445. 62 Auchinleck to Brook (CIGS), 29 January 1942, FO 371/33171 R732. 63 Foreign Office minute (Warner), 18 November 1941, FO 371/29888 R10017. 64 Lampson to Foreign Office, 19 November 1941, FO 371/29910 R9987. 65 S. Dimitrakakis (Secretary of the Military and Justice) to Foreign Office, 7 January 1942, FO 371/33166 R161. 66 Eden to Churchill, 29 October 1941, FO 371/29909 R9467. 67 Eden to Churchill, 2 December 1941, FO 371/29910 R9987. 68 Foreign Office minute (Warner), 19 December 1941, FO 371/29910 R10529. 69 Foreign Office to British embassy (Cairo), 19 January 1942, FO 371/33166 R161. 70 Tsouderos to Eden, 25 January 1942, FO 371/33167 R598. 71 Pipinelis, p. 144. 72 Foreign Office to Tsouderos, 5 March 1942, FO 371/33171 R1253. 73 Foreign Office to Hopkinson (Cairo), 20 March 1942, FO 371/33191 R2020. 74 Foreign Office minute, 9 March 1942, FO 371/33187 R1994. 75 Dixon, P., Double Diploma: The Life of Sir Pierson Dixon, Don and Diplomat, (London: Hutchinson, 1968), p. 228. 76 Sulzeberger, C.L., A Long Row of Candles: Memoirs and Diaries, 1934–1954 (London: MacDonald, 1969), pp. 257–8. 77 Entry for 9 January 1945, Colville, J. The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries 1939–1955 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004), p. 522.

170

Greece and the English

78 Foreign Office minute, March 1942, FO 371/33187 R2887. 79 Foreign Office minute (Dixon), 11 November 1942, FO 371/33187 R1944. 80 Foreign Office minute, March 1942, FO 371/33187 R2887. 81 PWE Weekly Directive, 13–19 June 1942, FO 371/33157 R2936. 82 Roosevelt and George II, joint communiqué, 9 July 1942, FO 371/33205 R4996. 83 Cambell to Eden, 6 August 1942, FO 371/33205 R5176. 84 Brief account of operations of I Greek Brigade while under command of 50th Division, 14 November 1942, FO 371/37216 R253. 85 Palairet to Sargent, 2 October 1942, FO 371/33162 R6535. 86 See Pipinelis, pp. 115–18. 87 Zervas supported the king with a message that was kept secret from many anti-monarchist EDES fighters. On 5 May 1944, he stated to George II: ‘I read with deepest emotion the telegram of your Majesty’s goodwill addressed to us. May I express to Your Majesty my own and our fighting men’s gratitude? With our Allies’ collaboration, your assistance and God’s help we are convinced that the National Cause will be fulfilled.’, Zervas to George II, 5 May 1944, FO 371/43678 R7521. It was typical of Zervas’s behaviour at the end of the occupation to support the king to get British supplies and money and to wait for the confrontation with ELAS. However, by autumn 1944, while Athens celebrated the liberation, in western Greece EDES suffered defeats and many casualties at the hands of ELAS, who were armed with Italian and British weapons. 88 Minute, 18 February 1942, FO 371/33156 R1240. 89 Warner, minute, 29 June 1941, FO 371/29840 R6528. 90 Clogg, R., Anglo-Greek Attitudes: Studies in History (London: St. Antony’s Series/Macmillan, 2000), p. 83. 91 Foreign Office minute (Howard), 8 October 1943, FO 371/37205

Notes

171

R9785; Clogg, p. 84. 92 Sargent to Churchill, 13 March 1943, FO 371/37194 R2325. 93 George II to Churchill, 21 April 1943, FO 371/37196 R4117. 94 Pearson to Dixon, 6 May 1943, FO 371/37202 R4209. 95 Leeper to Foreign Office, 13 August 1943, FO 371/37204 R4884. 96 Foreign Office minute (Dixon), 20 November 1942, FO 371/33191 R7851. 97 Foreign Office minute (Casey), 21 December 1942, FO 371/33163 R9018. 98 Lampson to Foreign Office, 19 January 1943, FO 371/37193 R547. 99 Churchill to Eden, 20 January 1943, FO 371/37193 R743. 100 Lampson to Foreign Office, 2 March 1943, FO 371/37194 R1866. 101 Moyne to Foreign Office, 25 December 1942, FO 371/33163 R8959. 102 Casey to Foreign Office, 7 March 1943, FO 371/37216 R2069. 103 Supreme Military Commander Middle East to War Office, 7 March 1943, FO 371/37216 R2069. 104 Foreign Office minute (Dixon) 9 March 1943, FO 371/37216 R2096. 105 Casey to Foreign Office, 16 March 1943, FO 371/37194 R2371. 106 Foreign Office to Casey, 19 March 1943, FO 371/37194 R2371. 107 General Wilson to CIGS, 22 March 1943, FO 371/37216 R2653; CIGS to Wilson, 26 March 1943, FO 371/37216 R2653. 108 Howard (Foreign Office) to Heard (War Office), 19 March 1943, FO 371/37216 R2653. 109 Wilson to Brooke, 31 March 1943, FO 371/37216 R2911. 110 Spears to Foreign Office, 25 March 1943, FO 371/37216 R2714. 111 Leeper to Foreign Office, 7 April 1943, FO 371/37231 R3223. 112 Pipinelis, p. 146.

172

Greece and the English

113 Ibid, pp. 147–8. 114 Tsouderos to Leeper, 2 November 1943, FO 371/37200 R11548. 115 Draft minute to Prime Minister, 14 April 1944; Foreign Office minute (Lasky), 14 April 1944, FO 371/43685 R6414. 116 Foreign Office to Leeper, 3 May 1943, FO 371/37196 R3875. 117 Pipinelis, p. 151. 118 Minutes of Balkan Committee, Administration of Territories, 20 May 1943, FO 371/37202 R5020; Leeper to Foreign Office, 22 May 1943, FO 371/37202 R4594. 119 Foreign Office to Casey, 31 May 1943, FO 371/37202 R4666; Churchill to George II, 31 August 1943, FO 371/37199 R8239. 120 Damaskinos was elected archbishop in 1938, but Metaxas intervened and exiled him to the island of Salamina. After the German invasion, in June 1941, Damaskinos regained his position but was never accused of being a member of the collaborators’ government. He maintained many links with Greek resistance groups, coordinated the escape of officers, guerillas and Jews under persecution. He established networks of clergy for humanitarian aid, and documented the Bulgarian atrocities in Greek Macedonia. According to a German military intelligence report of September 1944, Damaskinos was ‘extremely cunning and diplomatic. He has the total trust of the EAM-ELAS and exercises great influence.’ Enepekides, P., I Elliniki Antistasi 1941-1944 opos apokalyptetai apo ta mystika arheia tis Wehrmacht [‘The Greek Resistance 1941–1944 as Disclosed by the Secret Archives of the Wehrmacht’] (Athens: Estia, 1964) p. 35; see also Venezis, E., Arhiepiskopos Damaskinos: Oi Hronoi tis Douleias [‘Archbishop Damaskinos: The Years of Slavery’] (Athens: Ekdoseis Skaziki, 1950). 121 Homes (War Office) to Dixon (Foreign Office), 28 June 1943, FO 371/37222 R5683. 122 Pipinelis, pp. 162, 168.

Notes

173

123 Message of George II, 4 July 1943, FO 371/37197 R6370. 124 Leeper to Sargent, 21 July 1943, FO 371/37204 R7217. 125 See Pipinelis, p. 163, n. 1. 126 Leeper, p. 31; Clogg, pp. 90–1. 127 Ethniki kai Koinoniki Apeleutherosi (‘National and Social Liberation’, EKKA). 128 Leeper to Foreign Office, 12 August 1943, FO 371/37198 R7515. 129 Foreign Office to Leeper, 15 September 1943, FO 371/37199 R8647. 130 Clogg, p. 101. 131 Leeper to Foreign Office, 18 August 1943, FO 371/37198 R7758. 132 Leeper to Foreign Office, 18 August 1943, FO 371/37198 R7758. 133 Foreign Office to Leeper, 21 August 1943, FO 371/37198 R7819. 134 Leeper to Eden, 10 October 1943, FO 371/37200 R10452. 135 Leeper to Eden, 16 January 1944, FO 371/43676 R1150. 136 Eden to Churchill, 15 October 1943, FO 371/37206 R10293. 137 Eden to Churchill, 15 October 1943, FO 371/37206 R10295. 138 Leeper to Eden, 20 October 1943, FO 371/37200 R10489. 139 George II to Tsouderos, 9 November 1943, FO 371/43677 R1860. 140 Leeper to Foreign Office, 18 November 1943, FO 371/37208 R11908. 141 Leeper to Foreign Office, 12 December 1943, FO 371/37209 R13126. 142 Leeper to Foreign Office, 5 April 1944, FO 371/43728 R5501. 143 Leeper to Foreign Office, 3 April 1944, FO 371/43728 R5316. 144 Churchill to Leeper, 9 April 1944, FO 371/43728 R5667. 145 Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous [‘History of the Greek Nation’], Vol. IST (Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 2000) pp. 83–5. 146 George II to Churchill, 21 September 1944, FO 371/ 43693 R15413.

174

Greece and the English

147 Churchill, Winston, The Second World War, Vol. 6: Triumph and Tragedy (New York: 1962) pp. 196–7; see also Resis, A., ‘The Churchill-Stalin Secret “Percentages” Agreement on the Balkans: Moscow, October 1944’, American Historical Review, Vol. 83, No. 2, April 1978, pp. 368–87. 148 Istoria toy Ellinikou Ethnous, Vol. STI, p. 100. 149 Leeper to Foreign Office, 18 September 1944, FO 371/43777 R14861. 150 Leeper to Foreign Office, 12 October 1944, FO 371/43717 R16474. 151 Churchill to Eden, 29 September 1944, FO 371/43777 R15649. 152 Eden to Churchill, 4 October 1944, FO 371/43777 PM 44/639. 153 Entry for 21 December 1944, Colville, p. 510. 154 Roland Hampe, the Abwehr officer who took part in the secret negotiations, argued that throughout the summer of 1944 the British seemed uninterested in attacking German planes transporting troops to mainland Greece from the islands. See Hampe, R., I Diasosi tis Athinas ton Oktovrio tou 1944 [‘The Rescue of Athens in October 1944’] (Athens: Ekdoseis Poreia, 1994); on Operation Balaklava, see HS 5/570. 155 Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous, Vol. STI, p. 86. 156 Churchill to Eden, 4 October 1944, FO 371/43717 M1001/4. 157 Churchill to Eden, 6 October 1944, FO 371/43717 PM 44/639. 158 Eden to Churchill, 15 October 1944, FO 371/37206 R10295. 159 Cadogan to Eden, 14 October 1944, FO 371/43783 R16446. 160 Leeper to Eden, 21 October 1944, FO 371/43235 R16928. 161 Foreign Office to Tolstoy, 15/16 October 1944, FO 371/43783 R14345; British embassy (Cairo) to Foreign Office, 10 October 1944, FO 371/43783 R14345. 162 Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous, Vol. STI, pp. 103–4. 163 Woodhouse, C.M., The Struggle for Greece, 1941–1949 (London:

Notes

175

Hart-Davis/MacGibbon, 1976) p. 163. 164 Pipinelis, p. 173. 165 Mparoutas, C., I Kraugi ton Ellinon, 1821–1989 [‘The Cry of the Greeks’] (Athens: Savallas, 1992), pp. 235–6. 166 Entry for 4 December, Colville, p. 506. 167 Churchill, p. 289. 168 Partsalides, M., I Dipli Apokatastasi tis Ethnikis Antistasis [‘The Double Restoration of National Resistance’] (Athens: 1978), p. 124. 169 Colville, p. 515. 170 Ibid, pp. 516–7. 171 Ibid, p. 517. 172 Pipinelis, p. 176. 173 Ibid, p. 178. 174 Istoria Ellinikou Ethnous, Vol. STI, p. 108. 175 Ibid, p. 108. 176 Pipinelis, p.179–180. 177 Extract from Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street on 2nd November 1945, p. 1, HO 45/25635. 178 Pipinelis, p. 183. 179 George II to Bevin, 20 November 1945, FO 800/468. 180 Bevin to George II, 22 November 1945, FO 800/468. 181 Bevin to George II, 22 November 1945, FO 800/468. 182 Foreign Office to Hewison (Home Office), 22 November 1945, HO 45/25635. 183 Extract from Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street on 22nd November 1945, p. 2, HO 45/25635. 184 Cabinet minute of directions to Police Deputy Commissioner Mr Canning, 23 November 1945, pp. 1–2, HO 45/25635. 185 Istoria Ellinikou Ethnous, Vol. STI, p. 113. 186 Ibid, p. 119. 187 Bevin to Norton (Athens), 4 April 1946, FO 800/468 R5388.

176

Greece and the English

188 George II to Sargent, 4 April 1946, FO 800/468 R5388. 189 Istoria Ellinikou Ethnous, Vol. STI, p. 123. 190 British embassy (Athens) to Foreign Office, 14 August 1946, FO 371/58703 R11969. 191 Salonika Situation Report, 24th–30th August 1946, Consul-General (Salonika) to British embassy (Athens), 10 September 1946, FO 371/58751 R13660. 192 Lascelles to Foreign Office, 13 August 1946, FO 371/58702 R11969. 193 Report on the Observation of the Greek Plebiscite, Athens, 7 September 1946, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), Vol. VII, 1946, pp. 205–6. 194 Dalton, H., High Tide and After: Memoirs 1945–1960 (London: Frederick Muller, 1962), p. 156. 195 George II to Bevin, 13 September 1946, FO 371/58709. 196 Bevin to British embassy (Athens), 18 September 1946, FO 371/58709. 197 Bevin to Norton, 26 September 1946, FO 371/58709 R14393. 198 Pipinelis, pp. 198–9. 199 Ibid., pp. 200–5. 200 Lee, p. 199. CHAPTER THREE

1

Queen Frederica, A Measure of Understanding (London: Macmillan, 1971), pp. 241–2. 2 Jones, T., Post-war Counterinsurgency and the SAS, 1945–1952: A Special Type of Warfare (London: Frank Cass, 2000); ‘The British Army and Counter-Guerilla Warfare in Greece, 1945–1949’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 1997. 3 Norton to Bevin, 26 May 1947, FO 371/67124 R7337.

Notes

177

4 Frederica, p. 114. 5 Ibid, p. 113. 6 Frederica to Marshal, 29 January 1949, ibid, p. 121. 7 Sulzberger, p. 353. 8 Leading personalities in Greece, Peake to Lloyd, 2 March 1956, FO 371/123845 RG1012. 9 Sulzberger, p. 354. 10 Norton to Foreign Office, 2 July 1947, FO 371/67124. 11 The royal family usually spoke in English in private. See Leading personalities in Greece, Peake to Lloyd, March 1956, FO 371/123845 RG1012/1. 12 Frederica, p. 107. 13 Ibid, pp. 142–6 . 14 Sulzberger, pp. 363, 382. 15 Roubatis, Y., Tangled Webs: The U.S. in Greece, 1947–1967 (New York: Pella,1987), p. 83. 16 Norton to Foreign Office, 26 February 1949, FO 371/78506. 17 Ibid. 18 CIA memorandum, Hillenkoetter, 17 April 1950, quoted in Roubatis, p. 84. 19 Sulzberger, pp. 437–8. 20 Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous, Vol. STI, p. 175. 21 Memorandum of Conversation by the Officer in Charge of Greek Affairs (Anschuetz), 4 August 1950, FRUS, Vol. 5, 1950, p. 397. 22 Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon (IDEA). 23 For the detailed official inquiry of the May 1951 coup, see Mpouloukos, A., Ypothsi ASPIDA [‘The Aspida Affair’] (Athens: Typos AE, 1989), pp. 60–9. 24 Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous, Vol. STI, p. 177. 25 Mpouloukos, p. 78. 26 Norton to Mason, 15 August 1951, FO 371/95117 RG10114/30.

178

Greece and the English

27 Interview with King Paul, 20 August 1951, FO 371/95118 RG10114/31. 28 Foreign Office minute, 20 August 1951, FO 371/95118 RG10114/31. 29 Political Situation in Greece: the Election of Field-Marshal Papagos’s Newly-inaugurated ‘Greek Rally’ Party, Norton to Foreign Office, 7 September 1951, FO 371/95118 RG10114/39. 30 Ibid. 31 Hajiantoniou, C. Nikolaos Plastiras: Istoriki Viografia [‘Nikolaos Plastiras: Historical Biography’] (Athens: Iolkos, 2006), p. 212. 32 Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous, Vol. STI, p. 179. 33 Peake to Eden, 7 May 1952, FO 371/1018061 G10344/9. 34 Ibid. 35 Peake to Scott-Fox, 24 May 1952, FO 371/101806 G10344. 36 Scott-Fox to Eden, 16 June 1952, FO 371/101806 G10344. 37 See Vryonis Speros Jr, The Mechanism of Catastrophe: The Turkish Pogrom of September 6–7, 1955, and the Destruction of The Greek Community of Istanbul (New York: Greekworks, 2005). 38 Scott-Fox to Eden, 16 June 1952, FO 371/101806 G10344. 39 Ibid. 40 General-General (Istanbul) to Foreign Office, 18 June 1952, FO 371/101806 G10344. 41 Visit of the King and Queen of the Hellenes to Istanbul, 13–15 June 1952, FO 371/101806 G10344. 42 Frederica to Marshall, 26 June 1952, in Frederica, pp. 154–6. 43 Sulzberger, pp. 631, 633. 44 Frederica, p. 161. 45 Eden to Melas, 6 February 1952, in Tomai, F., ‘I Mystiki Synantisi Pavlou-Acheson’ [‘The Secret Meeting of Paul and Acheson’], To Vima, 25 February 2007, p. A29. 46 Browne to Yvonne, 23 February 1953, PREM 11/453.

Notes

179

47 RAF requirements in Cyprus, Philpot to VCAS, 27 April 1959, AIR 20/10328. 48 Peake to Foreign Office, 8 January 1954, FO 371/112843 WG1081. 49 Foreign Office to British Embassy (Athens), 5 March 1954, FO 371/112920 WG1941. 50 Foreign Office to British Embassy (Athens), 22 March 1954, FO 371/112920 WG1941. 51 Peake to Foreign Office, 17 March 1954, FO 371/112920 WG1941. 52 Ibid. 53 Peake to Foreign Office, 20 March 1954, FO 371/112920 WG1941. 54 Peake to Foreign Office, 25 March 1954, FO 371/112920 WG1941. 55 Frederica, p. 188. 56 Frederica to Churchill, 4 March 1954, in Frederica, pp. 185–7. 57 Ibid., p. 187. 58 Churchill to Frederica, 7 April 1954, in Frederica, p. 188. 59 Sulzberger, p. 846. 60 Frederica to Marshall, 28 February 1956, Frederica, pp. 188–90. 61 Ibid, p. 181. 62 United National General Assembly Resolution 292, 20 December 1954, FO 371/117620. 63 The King of Greece and Cyprus, Foreign Office minute, 4 January 1955, FO 371/117620 RG1081. 64 Alexis Papahelas, ‘Pos pagideusan to tilefono tou Karamanli to 1957’ [‘How they tapped Karamanlis’s telephone in 1957’], To Vima tis Kyriakis (‘Athens Weekly’), 28 May 2006. 65 Hastings, S., The Drums of Memory: An Autobiography (London: Leo Cooper, 1993), pp. 186–7; Wright, P., Spycather: The Candid

180

Greece and the English

Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer (New York: Dell, 1987), p. 142. 66 Peake to Foreign Office, 4 January 1957, FO 371/130050 RG1213; Peake to Foreign Office, 15 January 1957, FO 371/130051 RG1221. 67 Text of radio broadcast by King Paul of the Hellenes to the Greek people on September 16, 1955, FO 371/117660. 68 Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous, Vol. STI, p. 190. 69 Frederica to Marshall, 13 October 1955, Frederica, pp. 181–3. 70 Leading personalities in Greece, Peake to Lloyd, 2 March 1956, FO 371/123845 RG1012. 71 News from Greece: Information Office of the Royal Greek Embassy, 16 September 1958, FO 371/136265. 72 Brown to Ross, 16 September 1958, FO 371/136265 RG1672. 73 Walker, A., ‘The Intelligence Way’, at http://www.britains-smallwars. com/cyprus.html. Accessed 20 June 2006. 74 Vlahos, A., Mia Fora kai Enan Kairo enas Diplomatis [‘Once Upon a Time a Diplomat’], Vol. IV (Athens: Estia, 1980), p. 322. 75 Papahelas, A., O Viasmos tis Ellinikis Dimokratias: o Amerikanikos Paragon [‘The Rape of Greek Democracy: The American Factor’] (Athens: Estia, 1998), p. 56. 76 Frederica, pp. 170, 174–5. 77 Papahelas, pp.72–3. 78 Progress Report on Greece, 14 May 1958, quoted in Papahelas, pp. 61, 64. 79 US Embassy (Athens) to State Department, 13 November 1961, quoted in Papahelas, p. 75. 80 Ibid, pp. 75–7. 81 Full minutes of the military and security services planning of the Perikles Project, in Petrides, P., Exousia kai Paraexousia stin Ellada, 1957–1967 [‘Power and Para-power in Greece, 1957–1967’] (Ath-

Notes

181

ens: Proskinio, 2000). 82 Karamanlis Archive, Vol. 7 (Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 2000), p. 222. 83 Karamanlis to Paul, 3 October 1962, Karamanlis Archive, Vol. 5B, pp. 469–70. 84 Paul to Karamanlis, 14 October 1962, ibid, pp. 470–2. 85 Minute dictated by Karamanlis in the mid-1960s in Paris, ibid, pp. 473–4. 86 Memorandum for CIA Director McCone, 8 February 1963, FRUS 1961–63, Vol. XVI; Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. 87 Ibid. 88 Newspaper articles included in Karamanlis Archive, Vol. 5B, pp. 555–6. 89 Leading personalities in Greece, Peake to Lloyd, 2 March 1956, FO 371/123845 RG1012. 90 Foreign Office minute (Malcolm), 28 March 1963, FO 372/7826. 91 Murray to Tomkins, 20 March 1963, FO 372/7826. 92 Ibid. 93 Wyatt to Jamieson, 29 March 1963, FO 372/7826. 94 Murray to Tomkins, 20 March 1963, FO 372/7826. 95 Decorations and medals to be given by the Queen, FO 372/7826. 96 Frederica, p. 240. 97 Karamanlis Archive, Vol. 5B, pp. 613–4. 98 Frederica, p. 241. 99 Karamanlis Archive, Vol. 6, pp. 22–3. 100 Ibid, pp. 15–17, 23. 101 Newspaper articles in Karamanlis Archive, Vol. 6, pp. 24–5. 102 Political Situation in Greece: Briefing for the Greek State Visit, July 9–12, 1963 FO 953/2121. 103 Karamanlis Archive, Vol. 6, pp. 28–32. 104 Foreign Office minute (Malcolm) 29 March 1963, FO 372/7826.

182

Greece and the English

105 Special Instruction regarding the State Visit of the King and Queen of the Hellenes, 2 July 1963, FO 372/7829. 106 Frederica, pp. 243–4. 107 Draft Speech to be made by Her Majesty the Queen at the State Banquet in honour of the King and Queen of the Hellenes on Tuesday, July 9, 1963, FO 372/7829. 108 Lord Mayor’s Speech (2nd draft), T.M. the King and Queen of the Hellenes, 10 July 1963, FO 372/7827. 109 Malcolm to Plinket, 27 June 1963, FO 372/7829 TR017. 110 Press coverage, FO 372/7830. 111 Ceremonial of the State Visit of the King and Queen of the Hellenes, 9th–12th July 1963, Lord Chamberlain’s Office, May 1963, FO 372/7827. 112 Foreign Office to British embassy (Athens), 12 July 1963, FO 953/2121. 113 Murray to Foreign Office, 26 August 1963, FO 953/2121 P1193. 114 US Embassy (Athens) to State Department, 21 February 1964, in Papahelas, p. 110. 115 Her Majesty Queen Frederica of Greece, Memorandum of Conversation, President Johnson and Assistant Secretary of State Phillips Talbot, 25 November 1963, FRUS 1961–63, Vol. XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. 116 Dracoulis to Malcolm, 12 February 1964, FO 372/7925 TR135. 117 Foreign Office minute (Malcolm) 3 March 1964; minute, 6 March 1964, FO 372/7923. 118 Constantine II to Elizabeth II, 6 March 1964, FO 372/7923. CHAPTER FOUR

1 Papahelas, pp. 110–13. 2 Murray to Foreign Office, 18 April 1964, FO 371/174838

Notes

183

CE1961. 3 Foreign Office minute (Butler), 23 April 1964, FO 371/174838 E1961. 4 Foreign Office Minute (Brown), 23 April 1964, FO 371/174838 E1961. 5 Murray to Butler, 25 May 1964, FO 371/174838 E1961. 6 Ibid. 7 Windsor Castle (Adeane) to Murray, 28 April 1964, FO 372/7913. 8 Wedding of the King of Greece, Note for the Record, 27 April 1964, PREM 11/5055. 9 Note for the Record, 3 June 1964, PREM 11/5055. 10 Foreign Office minute, 30 June 1964; Foreign Office minute (Malcolm), 29 June 1964; Foreign Office minute (Brown), 30 June 1964, FO 372/7925. 11 Memorandum for the Record, National Security Council Meeting, 7 July 1964, quoted in Papahelas, p. 123. 12 Memorandum of Conversation, 24 June 1964; interview with George Ball, March 1993, ibid, p. 122. 13 Visit of Mr Papandreou, memorandum to the Prime Minister, 17 July 1964, PREM 11/4841. 14 Mpouloukos, p. 202. 15 Papahelas, p. 135. 16 Memorandum to the Prime Minister, 25 November 1964, PREM 13/45. 17 The Position of the Monarchy in Greece, Hughes to Rusk, 25 September 1964, National Security File/Files of Robert Komer, Greece, December 1964–March 1966, Box 21, L.B. Johnson Presidential Library. 18 Ibid. 19 His Majesty King Constantine II of the Hellenes: Biographical

184

Greece and the English

Note, PREM 13/2139. 20 Papahelas, p. 158. 21 Near East Affairs to Rusk, 9 March 1965, quoted in Papahelas, p. 163. 22 US Embassy to State Department, 23 June 1965, ibid, p. 175 23 US Embassy (Athens) to State Department, 18 June 1965, FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. 24 US Embassy (Athens) to State Department, 30 June 1965, ibid. 25 Interview with Constantine by Papahelas, To Vima, 5 February 2006. 26 Constantine to Papandreou, 8 July 1965, in Petrides (ed.), pp. 388– 90. 27 Papandreou to Constantine, ibid, pp. 390–3. 28 Constantine to Papandreou. 10 July 1965, ibid, pp. 394–8. 29 Papandreou to Constantine, ibid, pp. 398–9. 30 Constantine to Papandreou, 14 July 1965, ibid, pp. 400–1. 31 Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous, Vol. STI, p. 218. 32 Interview with Constantine by Papahelas, 5 February 2006. 33 US Embassy (Athens) to State Department, 20 August 1965, FRUS 1964–68, Vol. XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. 34 Interview with Constantine by Papahelas, 5 February 2006. 35 His Majesty King Constantine II of the Hellenes, Biographical Note, PREM 13/2139. 36 The Greek Political Situation, PREM 13/2139. 37 Palliser to MacLehose, 10 November 1966, PREM 13/2139. 38 CIA Station (Athens) to Langley, 9 March 1967, FRUS 1964– 68,Vol. XVI. 39 Memorandum of Conversation of George Papandreou with Ambassador Phillips Talbot, 17 March 1967, ibid. 40 US Embassy (Athens) to State Department, 24 March 1967, ibid. 41 Talbot to Bracken-Brewster, 30 March 1967, ibid.

Notes

185

42 Talbot to State Department, 9 April 1967, ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 State Department to Talbot, 20 April 1967, ibid. 45 Talbot to State Department, 21 April 1967, ibid. On the lack of warning of the coup, see Klarevas, L. ‘Were the Eagle and the Phoenix Birds of a Feather? The United States and the Greek Coup of 1967’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 30, No. 3, June 2006, pp. 471– 508. 46 Talbot to State Department, 23 April 1967, ibid. 47 Talbot to State Department, 25 April 1967, ibid. 48 Telephone call by the King of Greece, PREM 13/2139. 49 Interview with a retired captain and Ioannidis’s follower in Papahelas, A. The Files, Mega Channel TV, 3 April 2007. 50 Interview with Phillips Talbot by Papahelas, Papahelas, p. 332. 51 Talbot to State Department, 31 July 1967, FRUS 1964–68, Vol. XVI. 52 Entry for 13 June in Papagos, L., Simioseis, 1967–1977 [‘Notes, 1967–1977’] (Athens: Goulandri-Horn Foundation, 1999), p. 9. 53 Your meeting with King Constantine of Greece, Rusk to Johnson, 7 September 1967, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XVI. 54 Stewart to Foreign Office, 26 October 1967, PREM 13/2139. 55 Foreign Office to Stewart, 28 October 1967, PREM 13/2139. 56 Entry for 7 November 1967, Papagos, p. 29. 57 Talbot to Rusk, 13 December 1967, FRUS, Vol. XVI, 1964–68. 58 William Hickey, ‘The queen who rescued a fortune’, Daily Express, 22 June 1973, included in FCO 9/1742. 59 Interview with a retired captain and Ioannidis’s follower in Papahelas, A. The Files, Mega Channel TV, 3 April 2007. 60 Entry for 13 December, Papagos, pp. 47–50. 61 Talbot to State Department, 14 December 1967, FRUS, Vol. XVI, 1964–68.

186

Greece and the English

62 Entries for 21 December 1967 and 18 January 1968, Papagos, pp.54, 65. 63 The King of Greece, 6 May 1968, PREM 13/2139. 64 Telephone call by the King of Greece, PREM 13/2139. 65 Palliser to Maitland, 28 May 1968, PREM 13/2139. 66 Record of a conversation between the Prime Minister and His Majesty the King of the Hellenes at No. 10 Downing Street, at 1830 hours, on Monday, May 27, 1968, PREM 13/2139. 67 Papagos, p. 93. 68 Record of a conversation between the Prime Minister and His Majesty the King of the Hellenes at No.10 Downing Street, at 18.30 hours, on Monday, May 27, 1968, PREM 13/2139. 69 10 Downing Street to Maitland, 28 May 1968, FCO 9/143. 70 Papagos, p. 94. 71 Entry for 30 August 1968, Papagos, p. 122. 72 Note for the Record, 29 August 1968, PREM 13/2139. 73 Record of conversation over the Belgrade telephone to the Scilly Islands between the Prime Minister and His Majesty the King of the Hellenes at 9.50 a.m. on Friday, August 30, 1968, PREM 13/2139. 74 Entry for 28 November 1968, Papagos, p. 140. 75 Entry for 23 December 1968, ibid, p. 144. 76 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 24 January 1969, CAB 148/91/3. 77 Ibid. 78 On the 1968 constitution provisions that favoured the armed forces, see Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous, Vol. STI, p. 273. 79 Svolopoulos, C. Elliniki Eksoteriki Politiki [‘Greek Foreign Policy’], Vol. 2 (Athens: Estia, 2005), pp. 182–90 ; see also Drousiotis, M., EOKA B kai CIA: To Ellinotourkiko Parakratosstin Kypro [‘EOKA

Notes

187

B and the CIA: the Greek-Turkish Para-state in Cyprus’] (Nicosia: Alphadi, 2003). 80 Entries for 27 February–1 March 1969, Papagos, pp. 153–4. 81 Entry for 31 March 1969, ibid, pp. 160–1. 82 Entry for 1 April 1969, ibid, p. 164. 83 Entries for 2–3 April 1969, ibid, pp. 164–7. 84 Entries for 16–17 June 1969, ibid, pp. 177–8. 85 Details of the PAK-PLO relationship are included in the memoirs of Costas Tsimas, a close associate of Andreas Papandreou at that time, and later, in the 1980s, director of the Greek National Intelligence Service. See Tsimas, C., Selides Zois: Agones gia tin Eleutheria kai ti Dimokratia [‘Pages in a Life: Struggles for Freedom and Democracy’], (Athens: Proskinio, 2004). 86 A. Papandreou to Stewart, 27 November 1969, FCO 9/836. 87 Letter from Mr Papandreou, Seconde to Bendall, 3 December 1969, FCO 9/836. 88 Entry for 15 November 1969, Papagos, p. 215. 89 Record of conversation between the Prime Minister and His Majesty, the King of Greece at 3.00 p.m. on November 14 at No. 10 Downing Street, PREM 13/3246. 90 Ambassador Papagos, Constantine’s grand marshal, attended the meeting and his memoirs correspond with the Downing Street report. See Papagos, pp. 214–7. 91 Ibid, p. 221. 92 Entry for 12 December 1969, ibid, p. 222. 93 Memorandum (Graham), 23 January 1970, PREM 13/3246. 94 Entry for 25 January 1970, Papagos, p. 231. 95 Entry for 8 August 1970, ibid, p. 273. 96 Entry for 8 November 1970, ibid, p. 290. 97 Entry for 9 November 1970, ibid, p. 291. 98 Entry for 20 November 1970, ibid, pp. 293–4.

188

Greece and the English

99 Entry for 29 January 1971, ibid, p. 318. 100 Entry for 11 March 1971, ibid, p. 330. 101 Entry for 25 March 1971, ibid, p. 334. 102 Entry for 15 October 1971, ibid, pp. 386–9. 103 Entry for 17 February 1972, ibid, p. 416. 104 Entry for 20 May 1973, ibid, p. 502. 105 Abolition of Greek monarchy, British embassy (Rome) to Foreign Office, FCO 9/1742. 106 Foreign Office to British Embassy (Tehran), 31 May 1973, FCO 9/1742. 107 Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous, Vol. STI, pp. 276–9. 108 Former King’s Message to the Greek People, Athens News, 24 July 1973, included in FCO 9/1742. 109 Prime Minister’s Audience with The Queen, 5 June: Abolition of Greek Monarchy, FCO 9/1713. 110 Entry for 23 June 1973, Papagos, p. 513. 111 Entry for 15 June 1973, ibid, p. 511. 112 Entry for 27 June 1973, ibid, p. 514. 113 Entry for 7 July 1973, ibid, p. 517. 114 The Former King of the Hellenes, 31 July 1973, FCO 9/1742. 115 Hooper to Douglas-Home, 14 June 1973, FCO 9/1713. 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid. 118 Ibid. 119 Ibid. 120 Entry for 17 November 1973, Papagos, p. 525. 121 Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous, Vol. STI, pp. 280–4. 122 Entry for 17 January 1974, Barkman, C., Ambassador in Athens (London: Merlin, 1989), p. 152. 123 Entries for 7 June and 5 July 1974, Papagos, pp. 526–7. 124 Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous, Vol. STI, p. 284.

Notes

189

125 Major-General (ret.) Georgios Tsoumis, interview with the author, 15 March 2006. 126 British Embassy (Athens) to Foreign Office, 25 July 1974, FCO 9/2003. 127 Entry for 23 July 1974, Papagos, p. 528. 128 Foreign Office to British Embassy (Athens), 23 July 1974, FCO 9/2003. 129 Ibid. 130 Papagos, p. 537. 131 General Staff to Karamanlis, 26 July 1974, in Karamanlis Archive, Vol. 8, pp. 33–4. 132 Future of King Constantine, Ambassador Tasca to Secretary of State, 26 July 1974, at http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=101 810&dt+1572&dl=823. Accessed 10 October 2007. 133 Karamanlis Archive, Vol. 8, pp. 48–9. 134 Entry for 15 August 1974, Papagos, pp. 542–3. 135 Entry for 23 August 1974, ibid, p. 544. 136 Cavalini, E., ‘The Malvinas/Falklands Affair: A New Look’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 2, 1988, p. 204. 137 Note for the Record, Constantine-Wilson meeting at Balmoral, 9 September 1974, FCO 9/2253. 138 Ambassador Tasca to Secretary of State, 17 August 1974, at http:// aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=127637&dt=1572&dl=823. Accessed 10 October 2007. 139 Note for the Record, Constantine-Wilson meeting at Balmoral, 9 September 1974, FCO 9/2253. 140 Constantine’s message and Simitis’s arguments, cited in Karamanlis Archive, Vol. 8, p. 252. 141 Entry for 6 December 1974, Barkman, p. 236. 142 British Embassy (Athens) to Foreign Office, 8 December 1974,

190

Greece and the English

FCO9/2253. 143 Announcements by Karamanlis and Averof, Karamanlis Archive, Vol.8, pp. 323–5. 144 Moliviatis to Karamanlis, 14 October 1976 in Karamanlis Archive, Vol. 9, p. 126. 145 Karamanlis Archive, Vol. 9, p. 126. 146 Entry for 6 November 1976, Papagos, pp. 593–5; Karamanlis Archive, Vol. 9, p. 126. 147 Entry for 8 November 1976, Papagos, pp. 595–6; Karamanlis Archive, Vol. 9, p. 126. CONCLUSION

1

Karamanlis Archive, Vol. 6, p. 32.

Bibliography

Archives Unpublished The National Archives, Surrey, Kew. The UK National Archives held at the Academy of Athens.

Files Series AIR 20. Air Ministry files. CAB 148. Cabinet Office Defence and Overseas Policy Committees papers, 1964-1977. CO 323. Colonial Office correspondence, 1689-1952. FO 32. Foreign Office general correspondence before 1906. FO 141. Foreign Office general correspondence, 1815-1973.

192

Greece and the English

FO 195. Foreign Office general correspondence, 1808-1962. FO 286. Foreign Office general correspondence, 1813-1973. FO 352. Stratford Canning papers, 1778-1873. FO 371. Foreign Office general correspondence, 1906-1966. FO 372. Foreign Office general correspondence, 1906-1967. FO 608. Peace Conference, British Delegation papers, 1918-1920. FO 800. Foreign Office private papers, 1825-1968. FO 953. Foreign Office Information Policy Department files, 1947-1966. FCO 9. Foreign and Commonwealth Office Southern European Department files, 1967-1977. HO 45. Home Office files, 1839-1979. PREM 11. Prime Minister’s Office correspondence, 1944-1964. PREM 13. Prime Minister’s Office correspondence, 1964-1970. The Royal Archives, Windsor Castle.

Bibliography

193

Published Correspondence respecting the capture and murder by brigands of British and Italian subjects in Greece presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty (London: Harrison and Sons, 1870). Further correspondence respecting the capture and murder by brigands of British and Italian subjects in Greece in continuation of ‘Greece, No19 (1870)’ presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty (London: Harrison and Sons, 1871). Correspondence respecting the Revolution in Greece: October 1862 (London: House of Parliament, 1863). Papers relating to the Establishment of the Kingdom of Greece, 1826-1832 (London: HMSO, 1878). Enepekides, Polyhronis, I Doxa kai o Dihasmos Apo ta Mystika Arheia Viennis, Verolinoi kai Vernis, 1908-1918 [‘Glory and Division from the Secret Archives of Vienna, Berlin and Bern, 1908-1918’] (Athens: Zaharopoulos Publishers, 1992). Enepekides, Polyhronis, I Elliniki Antistasi 1941-1944 opos apokalyptetai apo ta mystika arheia tis Wehrmacht [‘The Greek Resistance 1941-1944 as it is disclosed by the secret archives of Wehrmacht’] (Athens: Estia, 1964). Iatrides, O. John, Ambassador Mcveagh Reports, 1933-1947 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980).

194

Greece and the English

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1964-1968, Vol.XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. Buckle, George Earl, Letters of Queen Victoria, 1870-1878 (London: John Murray, 1926). Petrides, Pavlos, Exousia kai Paraexousia stin Ellada, 1957-1967 [‘Power and Para-power in Greece, 1957-1967’] (Athens: Proskinio, 2000). Arheio Karamanli [‘The Karamanlis Archives’] (Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon/Kathimerini 2000).

Interviews Major-General (ret.) Georgios Tsoumis interview with the author, 25 April 2006. Former King Constantine II interview with journalist Alexis Papahelas, To Vima (Athens weekly) 5 February 2006. Interview with a retired captain and Ioannidis’s follower in Papahelas, Alexis The Files, Mega Channel TV, 3 April 2007.

Memoirs/Diaries Barkman, Carl, Ambassador in Athens (London: The Merlin Press, 1989). Churchill, Winston, The Second World War- Triumph and Tragedy, Vol.6 (New York, 1962).

Bibliography

195

Colville, John, The Fringes of Power- Downing Street Diaries 1939-1955 (London: Weidenfeld &Nicolson, 2004). Dalton, Hugh, High Tide and After: Memoirs 1945-1960 (London: Frederick Muller, 1962). Hampe, Roland, I Diasosi tis Athinas ton Oktovrio tou 1944 [‘The Rescue of Athens in October 1944’] (Athens: Ekdoseis Poreia, 1994) Hastings, Stephen, The Drums of Memory: An Autobiography (London: Leo Cooper, 1993). Leeper, Reginald Sir, When Greek meets Greek (London: Chatto & Windus, 1950). Mackenzie, C., First Aegean Memoirs (London 1931). Mackenzie C., Greek Memories (London: Chatto & Windus 1939). Mazower, Mark. Inside Hitler’s Greece- The Experience of Occupation 19411944 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001). Melas, Georgios, Konstantinos- Anamniseis tou proin Grammateos tou [‘Constantine- Memoirs of his former Secretary’] (Salonica: University Studio Press, 2000-reprint of the 1920 edition). Metaxas, Ioannis, The Metaxas Diary (Athens: Govostis Publishers, 2000). Mpouloukos, Aris, Ypothsi ASPIDA [‘ASPIDA Affair’] (Athens: Typos AE, 1989).

196

Greece and the English

Nicholas Prince of Greece, My Fifty Years (London: Hutchinson, 1926). Nicholas Prince of Greece, Political Memoirs, 1914-1917 (London: Hutchinson, 1928). Queen Frederica, A Measure of Understanding (London: Mac Millan, 1971). Papagos, Leonidas, Simioseis, 1967-1977 [Notes, 1967-1977] (Athens: Goulandri-Horn Foundation, 1999). Papandreou, Andreas, Democracy at GunpointThe Greek Front (New York: Deutsch, 1970). Paraskeuopoulos, Leonidas, Valkanikoi Polemoi- Epistoles sti Gynaika toy [‘Balkan Wars- Letters to his Wife’] (Athens: Kastaniotis, 1998). Partsalides, Mitsos, I Dipli Apokatastasi tis Ethnikis Antistasis [‘The Double Restoration of National Resistance’] (Athens: 1978). Sulzeberger, C.L., A Long Row of Candles: Memoirs and Diaries, 1934-1954 (London: MacDonald, 1969). Tsimas, Costas, Selides Zois- Agones gia tin Eleutheria kai ti Dimokratia [Life Pages- Struggles for Freedom and Democracy] (Athens: Proskinio, 2004). Vlahos, Aggelos, Mia Fora kai Enan Kairo enas Diplomatis [‘Once Upon a Time a Diplomat’] Vol.IV (Athens: Estia, 1980).

Bibliography

197

Woodhouse, C.M., The Struggle for Greece, 1941-1949 (London: Hart-Davis/MacGibbon, 1976). Wright, Peter, Spycather- The Candid Autobiography of a senior intelligence officer (New York: Dell Publishing, 1987).

Books/Articles Anastasiadis, Giorgos, Politiki kai Syntagmatiki Istoria tis Elladas, 1821-1941 [‘Political and Constitutional History of Greece, 1821-1941’] (Athens: Sakoulas Publishers, 2001). Bower, L. & Bolitho, G., Otho I: King of Greece (London: Royalty Digest 1939,1995). Cavalini, Enrique, ‘The Malvidas/Falklands Affair: A New Look’ International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol.2, 1988. Christmas, Walter, The Life of King George of Greece, (London: Eveleigh Nash, 1914). Clogg, Richard, Anglo-Greek Attitudes- Studies in History (London: St. Antony’s Series/MacMillan Press 2000). Couloumbis, Theodore, Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). Dakin, David, ‘The Diplomacy of the Great Powers and the Balkan States, 1908-1914’ Balkan Studies Vol.3, No.1, 1962.

198

Greece and the English

Dontas, Domna, Greece and the Great Powers, 1863-1875 (Salonica: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1966). Dixon, P., Double diploma: the life of Sir Pierson Dixon, don and diplomat (London: Hutchinson 1968). Drousiotis, Makarios, EOKA B kai CIA- To Ellinotourkiko Parakratosstin Kypro [‘EOKA B and CIA- The Greek-Turkish Parastate in Cyprus’] (Nicosia: Alphadi, 2003). Fotiadis, Dimitris, Othonas- I Exosi tou [‘Otto- His Eviction’] (Athens: Melissa Publishers, 1964). Fotakis, Zisis, Greek Naval Strategy and Policy, 1910-1919 (London: Rutledge, 2005). Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous [‘History of the Greek Nation’] (Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 1980). Hajiantoniou, Costas, Nikolaos Plastiras- Istoriki Viografia [‘Nikolaos Plastiras- Historical Biography’] (Athens: Iolkos, 2006). Hatzivassiliou, Evanthis, ‘Heirs of the King- Makers: The British Embassy in Athens, 1951-1961’ Diplomacy & Statecraft, Volume 18, Issue3, September 2007. Holland, Robert & Markides, Diana, Britain and the Hellenes: struggles for mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1850-1960 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

Bibliography

199

Holland, Robert, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). Holland, Robert, ‘Patterns of Anglo-Hellenism: A “Colonial Connection”?’ Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.36, Issue 3. Hibben, P., Constantine I and the Greek People (New York: The Century Co, 1920). Jones, Tim, Post war Counterinsurgency and the SAS, 1945-1952, A Special Type of Warfare (London: Frank Cass, 2000). Jones, Tim, ‘The British Army and Counter-Guerilla Warfare in Greece, 1945-1949’ Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol.8, No.1, Spring 1997. Klarevas, Louis, ‘Were the Eagle and the Phoenix Birds of a Feather? The United States and the Greek Coup of 1967’Diplomatic History, Vol.30, No.3, June 2006. Kolliopoulos, John S. Greece and the British Connection, 1935-1941 (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Lee, Arthur Gould, The Royal House of Greece (London: Ward Lock & Co, 1948). Lewis, B., The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961). MacLean, David, ‘The Greek Revolution and the Anglo-French entente 1843-1844’ The English Historical Review, Vol.96, No.378, January 1981.

200

Greece and the English

Malainos, Miltiadis, ‘The wedding of Alexander with Aspasia Manou’ Tote- Review of History, Vol.11, May 2005. Mparoutas, Costas, I Kraugi ton Ellinon, 1821-1989 [‘the Cry of the Greeks’] (Athens: Savallas, 1992). Papahelas, Alexis, ‘Pos pagideusan to tilefono tou Karamanli to 1957’ [‘How they tapped the phone of Karamanlis in 1957’] To Vima tis Kyriakis (Athens Weekly), 28 May 2006. Papahelas, Alexis, O Viasmos tis Ellinikis Dimokratias- o Amerikanikos Paragon [‘The Rape of Greek Democracy- The American Factor’] (Athens: Estia, 1998). Papacosma, Victor, The Military in Greek PoliticsThe 1909 Coup d’ Etat (Ohio: Kent University Press, 1977). Petropulos, John Anthony, Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833-1843 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968). Pipinelis, Panagiotis, O Georgios B [George II] (Athens, 1951). Prevelakis, Eleutherios, British Policy towards the Change of dynasty in Greece: 1862-1863 (Athens: Gertrude Christou & Son, 1953). Resis, Albert, ‘The Churchill-Stalin Secret ‘Percentages’ Agreement on the Balkans- Moscow, October 1944’ The American Historical Review, Vol.83, No.2, April. 1978.

Bibliography

201

Roubatis, Yiannis, Tangled Webs- The U.S. in Greece, 1947-1967 (New York: Pella Publishing, 1987). Saidl, Wolf, Vauaroi stin Ellada- I Gennesi tou Neoellinikou Kratout kai to kathestos tou Othona [‘Bavarians in Greece- The Birth of the Neo-Hellenic State and the Regime of Otto’] (Athens: Elliniki Euroekdotiki, 1984). Skandamis, Speros, Selides Istorias kai Kritikis- I Triakondaetia tis vasileias tou Othona [‘Pages of History and Critique- The Thirty Years Reign of Otto’] (Athens, 1961). Smith, Michael, The Spying Game- The Secret History of British Espionage (London: Politico’s Publishing 2003). Smith, M.L., Ionian Vision- Greece in Asia Minor 1919-1922 (London: Hurst, 2005). Svolopoulos, Constantine, Elliniki Eksoteriki Politiki [‘Greek Foreign Policy’] Vol.2 (Athens: Estia, 2005). Tantzos, Nicholas, King Constantine IΓ (Athens: Logos, 1991) pp.288-289. Thomson, Basil, The Allied Secret Service in Greece (London: Hutchinson, 1931). Tomai, Fotini, ‘I Mystiki Synantisi Pavlou-Acheson’ [‘The Secret meeting of Paul and Acheson’] To Vima, 25 February 2007.

202

Greece and the English

Trumpener, N., Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968). Venezis, Elias, Arhiepiskopos Damaskinos- Oi Hronoi tis Douleias [‘Archbishop Damaskinos- The Years of Slavery’] (Ekdoseis Skaziki, Athens, 1950). Veremis, Thanos, Oi Epenvaseis tou Stratou stin Politiki, 1916-1936 [‘The Army Interference in Politics, 1916-1936’] (Athens: Exantas, 1977). Veremis, Thanos, The Military in Greek Politics- From Independence to Democracy (London: Hurst, 1997). Vickers, Hugo, Alice- Princess Andrea of Greece (London: St. Martin’s Press, 2003). Vryonis Speros Jr., The Mechanism of Catastrophe: The Turkish Pogrom Of September 6-7, 1955, and The Destruction Of The Greek Community Of Istanbul (New York: Greekworks, 2005). Xydis, Stephen, Greece and the Great Powers, 1944-1947 (Thessaloniki,1963).

Internet Resources Walker, Adrian, ‘The Intelligence Way’ http://www.britains-smallwars. com/cyprus.html. Accessed 20 June 2006.

Index

Aberdeen, Lord 4-5 Acheson, Dean 81,111 Agnew, Spyros 135-136,140 Air Ministry (UK) 57 Acropolis 49-50,53,103,140 Alexander the Great 1 Alexander, Prince/King of Greece 11,13,155 Alexander, Field Marshal 52,97,102 Alfred, Prince- Duke of Edinburgh 5-6 Alice, Princess of Greece 138 Ambatiellos, Mrs. 97,102 Amery, Julian 101 Amphitrite 9 AMX-30 Main Battle Tank 150 Anastasopoulos, Dr. 63 Androutsopoulos, Adamadios 147

Andrew, Prince of Greece 14-15 Amelié, Queen of Greece 3 Anne-Marie, Queen of Greece 115,128,139-140,142-144 Anschuetz, Norbert 115116,119 Axiomatikoi Sosate Patrida Idanika Dimokratia Axiokratia (ASPIDA) 115118,120,122,158 Arapakis, Dimitrios 148-149 Ariadnae 24 Archbishop of Canterbury 127 Arnaoutis, Michael 116,142,153 Atatürk, Kemal Mustafa 77 Aubrey, Smith CH 14 Auchinleck, Christopher 28,30 Averof-Tositsas, Evangelos 80,88, 97,147,149,153

204

Greece and the English

Balfour, Lord 12 Barkman, Carl 147,152 Bayar, Jelal 77 Beak, British brigadier 39 Bennet , SAS NCO 66 Bentinck 15-16 Besborough, Lord 133 Bevin, Ernest 55-59,61-62 Bitsios, Dimitrios 121 Blenheim 20-21 Briggs, Ellis 92 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 28,133,143 Brown, D. 90 Brown, M. 108 Brook, Henry 101,103 Buckingham Palace 16,19,61, 67,69,80,96,99,102,108109,111,114,132,137,156 Butler, Rohan 108 Byron, Lord 109 Callaghan, James 148,154 Canellopoulos, Panagiotis 32,38-39,59-60,96,122124,150 Carr 144 Casey, Richard 37-39 Caspar, John 101

Castellani, physician 19 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 70,91,9495,104,107, 111,148,156157 Centre Union 9293,100,104,107, 116,118119,121-123,125, 144,152,156-158 Charles, Prince of Wales 110,136, 139-140 Christeas, Alexander 72 Christopher, Prince of Greece 13 Churchill, Winston 20-22,2728, 33-38,41-54,63.65,6768, 84-85,114,125,156 Constantine I, King of Greece 9-11,13,6-7,25,155 Constantine II, King of Greece 32,81,107,109,112-133, 135-140,142-144,146-153, 155-156 Corsair A-7 Bomber 150 Costopoulos, Stavros 116,118 Constantopoulos, Vasilios 154 Constitution of the Kingdom of Greece 3-4,29-31,35,4142, 44,65,75,92-93,99-

Index

100,111, 117-118,123-124,126,131132,140,142,144,150,157 Colletis, Nicholas 4-5 Colville, John 33,48,52 Council of Europe 137-138 Curzon, Lord 15 Daily Express 90,96-97 Daily Mail 100 Dalton, Hugh 61 Damaskinos, Archbishop of Athens 40-41,4445,48,52-57,59,116 Demertzis, Constantine 18 Democratic Army 66 Dovas, Constantine 97,121,128 Douglas-Home, Alec 110,112,146 Duke of Brunswick 83 Dulles, Allen 91-92 Earl of Munster 101 Ecevit, Bulend 148 Economist, The 100 Ecumenical Patriarch 78,127 United Democratic Left (EDA) 91,98,100,104,125 Eden, Anthony 22,26,2931,33, 37-38,44-46,48-

205

49,52-54,63, 81-82,8485,156 Edward VII, King of England 6-8 Eisenhower, Dwight 80,135 Eleutheria (daily) 116 Elli, warship 20 Elisabeth, Princess of Romania 11,16 Elizabeth II, Queen of England 65,67, 81-84,90, 95-96,99, 101-103,105,108,110-111, 114,127,132,135-137,139140,143,154,156-157 Enigma 22,24,27 Entente 11-13 Ethniki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA) 50,87,8990 EOKA B 135,148 Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosi (ERE) 92,94,100,104,108,115, 122,149 Evans, Arthur 24 Evening Standard 90 Evert, Agelos 51 Ellinikos Dimokratios Syndesmos (EDES) 35-37,41, 43-44, 46,48,49-50

206

Greece and the English

Ethnikos Apeleuterotikos Stratos (ELAS) 32,35-38, 40-42, 44,46,48,50-54,97 Ethniko Apeleutherotiko Metopo (EAM) 32,35-38, 40-42,44, 46,48,50-54,97 European Economic Community (EEC) 98,137 Foreign Office/Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 8-9,13,16,20,22,2433,35-41, 4344,46,48,54-56,59,66-67, 69,74,82-83,87-88,90,9597, 100101,103,105,108,111-112, 114,119,121,125,127,129131,133,136-139,142,144, 152,156,158 Farouk, King of Egypt 24,38 Fradelos, Emmanuel 44 France-Dimanche 140 Frankfurter Allgemeine 100 Frederica, Queen of Greece 1,25,27,62-63,6568,72-74, 76-78,80,8286,89-105,107, 116,119,121,125,128,132, 139,156-157

Freyberg, Bernard 24-25,27 Fund of Northern Greece 93 Garoufalias, Petros 115,118,121 Galtieri , Leopoldo 151 Gaulle, Charles de 95,98,135,139 Genimatas , General 115 George I, King of Greece 68,13,15 George II, King of Greece 11,15, 17-51,53-55,5758,60-63, 65-66,69,71,86,96-97,122, 131-132,155-156 George V, King of England 13,16 George VI, King of England 20, 28-29,69,81,156 Gikas, Solon 92,149 Giscard d’ Estaing 149 Gizikis, Phaidon 147-150 Goebbels, Josef 18-19 Goeben, warship 9 Gogousis, Nikolaos 71 Gordon, John 90 Gladiator 20-21 Greek Military Police 123,126,141, 145-147,149

Index

Greek National Army 54,59,61,66 Greek Rally 72,75-76 Greenhill, Sir Denis 138 Grivas, Georgios 50-51,8687,89, 91,108,126,134135,148 Guardian, The 97,100 Guizot, Francois 5 Gubbins, Colin 36 Halifax, Lord 19 Hardinge, Alexander 29 Harding, Field Marshal 29,87,90 Hawk II Plan 121 Heath, Edward 137,140,143,158 Helm, Knox 77 Hercules C-130 150 Hitler, Adolf 19,22,25 Hoidas, Constantine 100-101, 115-117 Hooper, Robin 144-145 Hopkinson, Henry 82 HMS Calypso 15 HMS Contest 81 HMS Decoy 26 HMS Invicta 81 HMS Magadascar 3

207

HMS Myngs 81 HMS Scylla 5 HMS Yarmouth 9 Hull, Richard 101 Hughes-Thomas 113-114 Hurricane 20 Hussein, King of Jordan 126 Ieronimos, Archbishop of Athens 147 Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon (IDEA) 7172, 91-92,99,108,112,115, 120-121,149,156 Ioannidis, Dimitrios 72,120,125, 141,145-150 Irene, Princess of Greece 97 Johnson, Lyndon 104-105,111, 114,126-127,131-132 Junkers 88 24-25 Kalergis, Nicholas 4 Kaiserin und Koenigin Maria Thiresia, warship 9 Kanatli, Turkish general 75 Karamanlis, Constantine 84,87,89, 91101,104,106,108, 115-116,125,140,144,

208

Greece and the English

146-154,157-158 Kavalieratos, Faidon 138-139 Kennedy, John F. 104 Kissinger, Henry 136 Kolokotronis, Georgios 109 Kommunistiko Komma Ellados (KKE) 46,50,52,54,57,92 Kentriki Ypiresia Pliroforion (KYP) 92,141 Kitchener, Lord 7,12 Kokkas, Panos 116 Kollias, Constantine 124,128129 Kondilis, George 17 Köprülü, Turkish secretary 7576 Kyrou, Alexander 24,82-83 Labour 62,104,136 Labouisse, Henry 104 Lamb, Harry 8,9 Lambrakis, Grigoris 98100,119 Lambrias, Takis 153 Laird, Malvin 135 Lasky DS. 40 Lear, Edward 109 Leeper, Reginald 18,23,36, 40-41,43-46,53,57 Le Monde 100

Leopard Main Battle Tank 134 Lighting 134 Lyons, Edmund 4,5 Lyttelton, Oliver 30-31 MacLeod, Roderick 101 MacMillan, Harold 48,101 McNamara, Robert 111 MacVeigh, Lincoln 57,62 Makarios III, Archbishop of Cyprus 75,82,87-88, 90-91,104,107,111112,114, 120121,135,147-148 Makarezos, Nikolaos 123,125 Makrygiannis, Ioannis 4 Mandakas, Emmanuel 52 Mpakatselos, Georgios 118 Markezinis, Spyros 100 Margrethe II, Queen of Denmark 110 Marshall, George 67,80,8485,89 Mavros, George 149-150 Mavrokordatos, Alexander 4-5 Mavromichalis, P. 59-60 Maximos, Dimitrios 52 Melas, Georgios, Constantine I’s secretary 9-11 Menderes, Adnan 75

Index

Menuhin, Yehudi 137 Metaxas, Aristides 70 Metaxas, Ioannis 18-19, 2123,27-28,30-31,36, 40,62, 122,131,155 MI5 57,87-88,154 Michael, Prince of Kent 139 Mitsotakis, Constantine 116,118 Ministry of Defence (Greece) 115, 118,123-125 Ministry of Defence (UK) 88,133 Ministry of Economic Warfare (UK) 43 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Greece) 52,67,80,82,84,95-96,134 Mirror 97 Mirage F-1 134,150 Mirage 2000 134 Moliviatis, Petros 153-154 Montgomery, Sir Bernard 97 Mountbatten, Earl Louis 101, 112-113,120,127,132-133, 136,139-140 Mulley, Frederic 133 Murray, Sir Ralph 96-97,101, 104,108-109,111,114, 119,157

209

Natsinas, Alexander 92 Nea Dimokratia (ND) 152 Nelson, John 101 Nenni, Signor 137 New York Times, The 73,100 Nicholas Prince of Leuchtenburg 5,6 Nixon, Richard 135-136,138140, 150-151 Noratlas 148 Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 74-75, 85,95,102,112,120,128, 130-131,133,136,138-140, 142-145,149-150,154 Norton, Sir Clifford 66,68-69, 72-75,85,157 Olga, Queen of Greece 6,13, 16,128 Olympic Sailing Committee 127 Otto, King of Greece 3-7,155 Onassis, Aristotle 94,146 Orr, British brigadier 39 Orlowski, George 132 Palairet, Sir Michael 23-25,35

210

Greece and the English

Paleologos Constantine VI, Byzantine Emperor 76 Palliser, AM. 130 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 136 Palmerstone, Viscount 5-6 Panellinio Agonistko Kinima (PAK) 136 Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima (PASOK) 152 Panorama 143 Papadopoulos, Georgios 72,92, 115,120,123-125,128-131, 134,138,140-147,158 Papagos, Alexander 1718,20,23, 69-76,81-87,89 Papagos, Leonidas 129,131,135,138-139,141, 144,147,151,153,157 Papandreou, Andreas 111,115, 117,119,122,125,131-132, 136-137,152,157 Papandreou, Georgios 42,46-54,59, 70,9296,100,104,107-108, 111112,114-123,131-132, 156-158 Papandreou, Georgios (son of Andreas) 123 Pangalos, Theodore 15,17

Paraskeuopoulos, Ioannis 122 Paraskeuopoulos, Leonidas 10 Perikles Plan 92-93 Partsalides, Mitsos 52-53 Patakos, Stylianos 120,123, 125,135-136 Peel, Robert 4 Peridis, Georgios 129 Peter, Prince of Greece 25,30,32,38,40 Peter, King of Yugoslavia 33 Phantom F-4 Fighter 134 Philip, Prince of Greece/Duke of Edinburgh 14,65,67, 101-103,105,110,112, 135-136,138,143-144,154 Pipinelis, Panagiotis 25,31-32, 35,41-43,54-55,96,100101, 121,128,134,138 Piscatory, Theobald 4 Pike, Thomas 101 Political Beliefs Certificate 141 Pompidou, Georges 140 Plastiras, Nikolaos 15,53-54, 70-72,75,81,94 Psaros, Dimitrios 43 Rallis, Georgios 149,151,154 Rockwell, Stuart 136

Index

Roosevelt, Franklin Delano 24, 30,34,54 Roosevelt, James 24 Rogers, William 136,139 Rommel, Erwin 27,34 Royal Air Force (RAF) 21-23, 53,81,101 Royal Navy 4,87-88 Royal Hellenic Navy 45,85,88, 126,134 Rusk, Dean 113-114,125,129 Sakelariou 30,87 San Giorgio 9 Sarafis, Georgios 48 Sargent, Sir Orme 36,58 Scobie, Roland 48,52-53,97 Scotland Yard 57 Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) 88 Selborne, Lord 37 Serafim, Archbishop of Athens 147 Sherman M-4 Tank 53 Shah of Iran 135,140 Shinas, Alexander 8,9 Shuckburgh,Sir Evelyn 130 Siantos, Georgios 52,54 Sicherheitdienst (SD) 48 Simitis, Costas 152

211

Simos, Ioannis 117 Simpson, Joseph 101 Sisco, Joseph 148 Sixth Fleet, US 111,126-127 Skoumbourdis, George I’s aide de camp 8 Smuts, Field Marshal 67,84 Sophoulis, Themistokles 53,57, 59,62,68 Social Democratic Party of Sweden 137 Soutsos, Skarlatos 6 SS Patris 14 Stalin, Josef 33,47,50,52 Stephanopoulos, Stefanos 89 Stewart, Michael 127,137, 139-140 Spadidakis, Grigoris 121, 123-124,128 Special Air Service (SAS) 49-50,66,87 Special Branch 57,87 Spitfire 19 SRN6 Hovercraft 134 Sulzberger, CL 33,67,69-70,85 Sunderland 23 Sunday Express 90 Szilaczy, de 11 Talbot, Gerald 15

212

Greece and the English

Talbot, Philips 122,124-126, 128-129 Theotokis, Spyridon 95 Theseus 103 The Times 96,100,104 The Financial Times 100 Thorpe, Jeremy 137 Tito, Jozip- Broz 81,83,86 Tornado 134 Tsakalotos, Thrasivoulos 72 Tsaldaris, Constantine 58-59,61,72 Tsirimokos, Elias 114 Tsouderos, Emmanuel 23-32, 34-35,38-40,42-45,70 Tasca, Henry 140,147,150 Tavoularis, Stamatis 72 To Vima (daily) 119,140 Tsoumis, Georgios 148 Tzanakakis 31 United Nations 82-84,86,150 Uraletz, warship 9 Velos, warship 142 Venizelos, Eleutherios 8-15,17 Venizelos, Sofokles 59,70-71, 73,75,81 Veib Pasha 10 Victoria, Queen of England

5,17,65,156 Vietnam war 126,138 Vlahos, Aggelos 90,151 Vospers 133 Wallace, David 37 Wellington, Viceroy of India 16 Westland Whirlwind 134 Wilson, Harold 120121,127,129-133,136139,148-151,158 Wilson, HM 23,48 Wilhelm II, Kaiser of Germany 8-11 Wittelsbach (Royal House of Greece) 3 Woodhouse, Chris 50,97 Zervas, Napoleon 35,48,50,97 Zoitakis, Georgios 123,129,141