The Patterns of Mass Movements in Arab Revolutionary-Progressive States 9783110901429, 9789027912596

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THE P A T T E R N S OF MASS M O V E M E N T S IN ARAB R E V O L U T I O N A R Y - P R O G R E S S I V E STATES

S T U D I E S I N T H E SOCIAL S C I E N C E S edited by C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze

9

THE PATTERNS OF MASS MOVEMENTS IN ARAB REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE STATES by

ENVER M. K O U R Y University of Maryland

1970

MOUTON T H E H A G U E • PARIS

© Copyright 1970 in The Netherlands. Mouton & Co., N.V., Publishers, The Hague. No part of this book may be translated or reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publishers.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER: 76-110953

Printed in The Netherlands by Mouton & Co., Printers, The Hague.

CONTENTS

Introduction

7

I. Verification and Formation of Arab Revolutionary Mass Movements Means of Verification The Nature of Arab Mass Movements and the Individual's Role The Impact of Modernization What Is, and What Is Not, a Revolution . . . .

13 13 15 18 29

II. The Role of the Individual in Mass Movements . . . Differing Concepts and Evaluations: the Vertical Approach Ruralization Versus Urbanization: the Horizontal Approach The Broad Aspect of the Problem: the Revolt of the Masses

75

III. The Great Men of Knowledge and the Militant-Intellectual: the First Phase of Mass Movement . . . . The Indispensable Saviour of the Great Men . . . The Great Men of Knowledge The Militant Intellectual: a New Class

83 83 90 107

IV. The Men of Revolutionary Action: the Second Phase of Mass Movement Symbiosis: Individualism and Despotism . . . The Arab Legacy and Leadership The Men of Revolutionary Action

117 117 125 133

V. The Struggle For Power: No Compromise

.

.

.

41 41 56

147

6

CONTENTS

The Problem of No Compromise The Colonel Versus the General The Radical Versus the Reactionary The Union: the Uncompromising Fight Between Two Radical Movements The Similarities in the Revolutionary Patterns: The Case of Algeria Tunisia: Another Example VI. The Men of Revolutionary Organization: the Last Phase of Mass Movement Conciliation with the New Order Mass Psychology The Revolutionary Coordinator - the Communications Media The Science of Ideas - Its Dynamism VII. The Omnipotence of the Single-Party The Origins of Totalitarianism The Historical Transformation of the Political Party System The Birth of Tutelary Authority: the Single Party . The Theory of Unionism: the Role of the Government and the Auxiliary Organizations The Law of Probability

147 150 155 161 174 184

189 189 192 201 214 220 220 227 234 242 254

VIII. Revolutionary Changes: Economic Socialization as a New Trend The Utopia of Arab Socialism The Impetus of Nasser's Socialism What Arab Socialism Is The Reasoned Judgment: Is There Any Other Alternative?

260 260 269 278 288

Bibliography

294

Index

305

INTRODUCTION

In a world where national sovereignties are competitive, the political struggles now taking place in the underdeveloped countries are meaningful to the rest of the international community. Developments in these underprivileged countries may prove to be the tinder-box igniting a nuclear holocaust. Among the underdeveloped areas, those countries comprising the Arab Middle East and North Africa are of particular concern. It appears that most of the ingredients conducive to turmoil, both internal and external, abound in the Arab countries. Because of their strategic importance, the political activities of the Arab states are of great concern to the rival camps in the Cold War. Recently, Middle East countries have experienced a phenomenon relatively new to the area - the growth of political activism and the development of revolutionary mass movements. These innovations are proving convulsive and are having profound effects upon the entire political structure and the socio-economic fabric of the area as well as of each individual state. It, therefore, behooves the rest of the world to be aware of these changes and to try to understand the forces at work. Indeed, it is incumbent they do so if a world conflagration is to be avoided. This book is an attempt to attain at least a part of such an understanding. Its theme is the process of change in the Arab World. These changes, wherever found, share a common motivation: to retrieve enlightenment by dispelling the long prevalent forces of ignorance; to transform the impotent traditional society into a viable and progressively oriented social order; and to acquire the strength whereby Arabs are independent masters of their own destinies and thus able to resist foreign machinations. It is stressed that all movements address themselves to the common problem of how best to renovate their proven outmoded traditional society into a social order capable of accepting innovation and thereby initiating progress leading to modernity. The

8

INTRODUCTION

revolutions taking place are directed against a status quo which accurately establishes the Arabs among the near powerless. The movements are efforts to overcome the abjectness and isolation which come from this helplessness and its accompanying humiliations. The Arabs are striving for power to satisfy their yearning to once again become participating and contributing members of a world order in which they were long among the principal actors. To gain a more significant role, they aspire to the better way of life associated with material progress. Their ventures in this regard are attempts to achieve in a short time that which Western society developed during twenty decades under the free enterprise system, and that which Soviet society precipitately wrought in the last four decades under so-called Communism. To be successful in these endeavors, drastic changes in domestic policies are needed that will in turn affect the psychological, political, and socioeconomic structure of the whole society including a change in population trends. Arab mass revolutionary movements have a high incidence of occurrence when a combination of certain "précipitants" or "accelerators" appear within the society. Among the more important of these are: (1) the emergence of a charismatic leader such as Nasser or Bourguiba; (2) the formation of a militant party such as the Socialist Destour or the National Liberation Front, or a secret military organization such as the Free Officers Group of Egypt; and (3) a common cause or purpose such as redress of the humiliations stemming from Arab setbacks in the several confrontations with Israel. The main purpose of this book is to explain why and to show how Arab revolutionary mass movements came into existence, emphasizing the relevancy of the movements to the society's aspiration for a better place in the world order. It is best to begin on the basis that a hypothesis can be useful in guiding analysis. While it is true that vague concepts never fit precise facts, a hypothesis tentatively presupposes a connection between the two sufficient to justify investigation. The investigation then can either refute or support the postulation. If supported, then a theory may be said to be established. Theory then gives a clearer perception of the variables involved, thereby establishing probability factors and making possible rational predictions or valid conclusions. In the social field, a hypothesis is useful in working with conceptualized patterns that have been deduced from the available economic, cultural, political and psychological facts or circumstances. Because the problem of verification increases in complexity as the investigator moves from the apparent

INTRODUCTION

9

into the hidden pattern levels, the use of hypotheses is prudent in helping identify the relationships pertaining in a specific social situation. To illustrate, although it is difficult to determine and then categorize Arab sentiments at the incipience of the present revolutionary political outlook, the author, nevertheless, will hazard some generalizations. First, in times of crises the Arabs collectively view their unhappy circumstances as applicable to all their lands, transcending the borders imposed by their former colonial masters. Second, although some of the elite do profit by a maintenance of the status quo, Arabs of all strata overwhelmingly want a change, particularly to eliminate the outmoded feudal system and to rid themselves of the last remaining vestiges of foreign rule and domination. Finally, there is a broad consensus, especially among the professionals enrolled as civil servants, that salaries and wages must be raised to adequate levels, fringe benefits must be established, and political vendettas must cease. The affinity and the state of reciprocity and mutual dependency between "theory" and "truth" is of keen interest to this analysis. But, what is truth? Peoples and societies have different versions, each according to their particular perspectives. Social science offers no positives or absolutes, for all social theories are susceptible to breakdown because of the uncertainties and unforeseeables stemming from human involvement. Although social theories have their limitations, a social scientist may, through a reasonable application of their "degree of probability" quality, be better able to comprehend the underlying forces motivating a particular society. But for the work to bear the most fruit, the task must be approached rationally rather than idealistically, dynamically rather than statically. T o do otherwise would be to ignore the flux of life and the complexities brought about by human participation. In the field of social science, hypotheses or theories can be tested empirically by checking their validity either through the study of the history of the particular issues or through close observation of developments in a particular situation. If the historical data or the observations do not coincide with the hypotheses, the theory must be either revised or rejected. If, on the other hand, results substantiate the hypotheses, the theory then becomes valid and therefore useful. Historical data and observations compiled to date confirm that the Arab people's recently awakened awareness in conjunction with their concomitant expectancy of a better way of life have stimulated demands for social change which are being responded to by coups d'etat, military revolutions, and the use of mass movements. These three revolutions - rising awareness,

10

INTRODUCTION

rising expectations, and social change - are proving irresistible and have induced a change in the psychological and social settings of the people to which Arab leaders must cater. Were they to do otherwise, the discontentment would be aggravated. Thus abstract "theory" becomes "truth" only when its precepts are realistically tested and found enduringly valid. The "truth" becomes useful to the social scientist as a concrete "fact" of life only when interpreted in the light of the times and the circumstances. And it is only through the perspicacity of the trained analyst that the fact can be assessed its proper significance in the evolution of a social order. To arrive at valid conclusions the analyst must reach beyond the objective determinants of events into the subjective factors which also influence the occurrences. Were the analyst not aware that people vary in their subjective interpretation of "facts", he could be misled in his evaluation. To illustrate, many Arabs do not understand the philosophy, purpose, and objectives behind the military coup of the Egyptian Revolution of 1952. Some support the revolution in the hopes of changing the traditional order of the society. Others, though accepting the fact of the revolution, oppose any change in the Islamic cultural base. In pointing out the differences in outlook, the author is not implying that the revolution is differently considered. Rather, that, although the bulk of the people do share a common outlook in going along with the revolution, they do vary in what they expect the revolution to accomplish. The investigator should be constantly aware that the different expectancies are subjectively determined by the variation of personal experiences and interests and by environmental determinants. Because it is difficult to isolate the particular human factors involved and because it is even more of a task to determine the degrees of involvement, the analyst trying to comprehend the subjective impellents of revolutionary mass movements faces a most complex chore. Since most aspects of man's conduct are relevant to the rise of mass movements, the entire gamut of human emotions and motivations must be considered. Therefore, the political scientist, unlike his fellow researchers in more exact sciences, must, in using statistics and applying principles, allow for factors of human subjectiveness. While these traits are admittedly difficult to measure, they simply cannot be ignored if one Wishes to arrive at the whole "truth". Perhaps the following analogy will make the point clearer. When hunger asserts itself one feels "hunger pains", and one's inability to measure the intensity of the pain stimuli does not change the basic fact that one is hungry. Therefore, the

INTRODUCTION

11

inability to measure adequately does not in any way invalidate the usefulness of the theory previously postulated. The supposition suggests only that motives, subject to cultural determinants, should function, as stimuli do, in more or less similar patterns. This leads to the conclusion that the judgment as to intensities among stimuli are "relative" rather than "absolute". If stimuli are relative in measurement - as set forth in the psychological theory of "motives-stimuli" - then it is established that motives behave in a connectively similar manner. Put differently, the comparative difference in weights between heavy and light objects is easily distinguished whereas the absolute difference is a more difficult matter. Thus it is that in the study of mass movements the keen observer should readily detect the relative relationship of the various factors that motivate and stimulate the rise of mass movements. The main hypothesis of the book is that the various contemporary Arab revolutionary mass movements, regardless of differences in origin or development, have some fundamental underlying characteristics common to all of them. Possession of common sociological, political, historical, and psychological traits does not necessarily mean that the several movements have like qualities. Rather, it means that they are bound together in one broad family affiliation and that these qualities are indicative of a pattern and a trend. Furthermore, the Arab revolutionary mass movements share certain universal traits in common with all other mass movements whose societies likewise are plagued by economic disequilibrium, lack of natural resources, and political instability. In general, whenever a society fails to strike a balance between aspiration and achievement, the cleavage between the real and the ideal is bound to become intolerable, thereby opening the path for revolutionary mass movements. It goes without saying that people reared in the same cultural and institutional milieu tend to conform in their patterns of social behavior. While the pattern is set by the whole society, it is usually sufficiently broad as to allow for minor individual and group differences. Thus the general trend is for the population as a whole to conform, the deviations beyond the permitted tolerances being the exception. Therefore, in determining the "social character" of a society, the focus should be on the "norm" rather than the exception. The "social character" of a society is the synthesis of a multiplicity of traits which make the essential nucleus. The structural character of the nucleus is the development of the basic experiences that are common to that society, constantly conditioned by historical forces of ideological, political, psychological, and

12

INTRODUCTION

socio-economic factors. Psychological "deviants" which make the variations of this nucleus are of the greatest importance to the understanding of the individuals. However, our primary concern here is the understanding of how the various forces of human energy are canalized in a given social order at various periods of history. Motives do vary in intensity and degree, but the understanding of the concept of "social character" is the key to the whole problem of mass movements and social process. All existing Arab revolutionary mass movements have the same kind of basic motivations which help to create a set of stimuli that precipitate action when the circumstances are ripe, an essential which deserves our utmost attention.

I VERIFICATION AND FORMATION OF ARAB REVOLUTIONARY MASS MOVEMENTS

MEANS OF VERIFICATION

In recent years the Arab world has begun a process of change that is having a tremendous impact upon the whole fabric of Islamic society. The underlying motives are everywhere much the same: it is a struggle of ignorance versus enlightenment; acquiescence versus attainment; traditionalism versus modernization. The process of change and the inherent social struggle it induces are giving rise to a relatively new phenomenon in an area traditionally devoid of large-scale, public political activism - the growth of revolutionary mass movements. The force that is impelling the formation of these revolutionary mass movements is not directed so much to common solutions as to the common problem: how to bring about change in a traditional society which is no longer workable in an age of modernization. Some seek the complete destruction of tradition as the only way to reach a satisfactory solution. Others seek salvation in the "glorious past" - the recourse to Islamic purity and solidarity, while others seek a middle ground by rejecting only those traditional ways which fail to satisfy the new demands.1 The variant levels of the socio-economic and political achievements of Arab states do much to explain the difference in the impact modernization has had upon them. This impact can best be measured by using four types of classification:2 (1) "Traditionalism", where people have least changed their traditional way of life; (2) "Modernism", as opposed to traditionalism, where the transformation of the national matrix is most obvious; (3) "Dynamism", where the process is occurring at a rapid pace; and (4) "Stability", where the socio-economic and political cleavages are less salient. 1

S. A. Morrison, "Arab Nationalism and Islam", The Middle East Journal, II (April, 1948), 152-153. These measurements and observations are based on the frequent visits of the author to the area. 2

14

VERIFICATION AND FORMATION

Although classification of this type is useful, it should be noted that the forms used are not rigid and distinct and may be operating simultaneously in a single state. In Lebanon, for example, we find that the attributes of modernism, dynamism and stability tend to overlap. Lebanese society has passed the "take-off' stage of development and is already in a process of self-sustaining growth. She has, as a whole, succeeded in avoiding violent societal eruption as usually manifested in assassinations, riots, coups d'état and revolutions. This is not to imply that Lebanon has solved all her problems, but rather to suggest that she has succeeded, thus far, in transforming her socio-economic and political system without the usually accompanying violence. At the opposite end of the spectrum we find Saudi Arabia, where society is still in the stage of traditionalism and very little affected by modernization. While it is true that the discovery and development of oil deposits in Saudi Arabia have brought some new roads, schools and hospitals, the life of the masses remains largely unchanged. An extensive feudal system is still intact, and Islam continues to provide the basic means of social control. In Saudi Arabia the attributes of traditionalism and stability are conjoined and the process of change has been sufficiently slow to minimize social disturbances. Perhaps, as the impact of modernization is more fully absorbed by Saudi Arabian society, the familiar pattern of violence and social instability will ensue, but for the time being she, like Lebanon, enjoys relative socio-political stability. In contrast to Lebanon and Saudi Arabia are those Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states such as Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Tunisia. These are the nations-in-a-hurry. They are the less modern, the less dynamic and the more volcanic. They seek to bypass the evolutionary process of change by short-cut solutions. These states, still in the "take-off" stage of development, tend to be less stable and less able to cope with the stresses and strains of the transition to modernization. Often the process of change results in violent outbursts, coups d'etat and revolutions. In such states the already inadequate politico-economic organization is further aggravated by the rupture of the traditional social structure. The institution of feudalism and a religion which fosters superstition and unflinching subjugation, though excellent methods of social control, are not compatible to a modern progressive society and must yield. During the period of transition, society and its individual members are subjected to tremendous pressures because they find it difficult to abandon traditional ways for new methods. Despite the apparent difficulties involved, once undertaken, the process of change is

VERIFICATION AND FORMATION

15

rapid and profound; consequently a sense of deprivation, social anomie and alienation result, which cause "multiple-dysfunction". At this stage of development a variety of forces begin to express themselves in revolutionary mass movements and to compete among themselves to fill the motivation-organization vacuum in society. In these Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states, the direction and result of the movement will depend upon what combination and balance of these forces prevail. Usually it is one of a radical or reactionary nature or perhaps a combination of both. It is the mass movements occurring within the Arab REVOLUTIONARYPROGRESSIVE states with which we shall immediately concern ourselves. We shall do so in the belief that the phenomena existing in these states share some common fundamental characteristics, regardless of their origin and the differing circumstances of their development, which will shed some light upon the present political situation in these countries and make their future more nearly predictable. Although absolute differences and variations are difficult to measure, one may detect and isolate the relative relationship of various factors and influences which help to motivate and stimulate the formation of mass movements. In the words of Herbert L. Matthews, "modern social revolutions, ever since the French started them in 1789, have followed certain roughly similar patterns". 8

THE NATURE OF ARAB MASS MOVEMENTS AND THE INDIVIDUAL'S ROLE

The Arabs, through their revolutionary movements, have caught the spirit of change; but more important is their attitude toward change itself. The age that we are witnessing today is not merely a mass movement of a new type of leadership and of rising expectation, but more of a growth of ideas and forces extraneous to the Islamic realm. The traditional social balance is being rent while its connective social skein of "God-man-society" is no longer effective. Contemporary Arab revolutionary mass movements are taking place in an age of transition and in an atmosphere of "power vacuum", be it political, economic, or religio-cultural. They are of various forms and ideologies as manifested in the Moslem Brotherhood, the Ba'ath party, the Communist party, 3 Herbert L. Matthews, The Cuban Story (New York, George Braziller, 1961), p. 98.

16

VERIFICATION AND FORMATION

and the Arab Socialist Union. The "new forces", sometimes too extreme in approach, are still too dynamic to re-establish a new balance with the old pattern or to harmonize the energy of each other in order to plant the roots of a new and equilibristic pattern. The old patterns have lost their essential links and, consequently, their effectiveness and pertinency; yet many of their vital elements are most likely to endure for a long time. Arab revolutionary mass movements are not the sole province of a particular "class" movement even though some have the tendency to recruit a disproportionate number of their followers from one class or another. Arab revolutionary mass movements tend to attract many followers from all social classes, especially those who have become socially alienated and those who possess weak class ties. It is this common collective mass ingredient, rather than a property of the class itself, which exemplifies the similarity between Nasserism and Bourguibism, between Nasserism and the Moslem Brotherhood or between the Moslem Brotherhood and Wahhabism. These circumstances, which facilitate the emergence of mass movements in Arab society, are also the factors that disrupt the social cord between the individual and the society. These factors are the consequence of discontinuities in the social process which are, in turn, attributable to the dynamism of social change. Psychologically, the impact of discontinuities in the social process tends to separate the individual from himself. In contemporary Arab society, the degree of modernization that has been attained is the result of the freeing of the individual from the restraining and stabilizing influence of a feudalistic system, a relatively rigid social caste system and a religious order that previously engendered in him a fatalistic outlook and a disdain for personal political activity. This abrupt change in the prescribed patterns of behavior and the value system creates a sense of isolation in the individual. Gone are the old familiar ways and the security they provided, and in their place are new ways and new values with which the individual has difficulty identifying himself. A person who lacks the opportunity to acquire social usefulness usually fails to construct a positive conception of his worth. His reaction is almost automatic and self-propelling: a lack of selfidentification leads to a lack of self-confidence, which in turn leads to a lack of self-control. Subsequently, the self-estranged person acquires a feeling of alienation which, in time, heightens his anxiety and increases the likelihood of his joining a movement.

VERIFICATION AND FORMATION

17

The individual who feels self-alienated as a result of a low sense of personal accomplishment also feels alienated from society because he "does not experience himself as the active bearer of his own powers and richness, but as an impoverished 'thing' dependent on powers outside of himself, unto whom he has projected his living substance".4 In order to relieve his guilt and the impotence of his political involvement, the individual is forced psychologically to increase his political activity by becoming a participant in a mass movement. His latent discontent is always ready to manifest itself when an opportunity arises. The unifying force of a revolutionary mass movement is generally an ideology which perpetuates fanaticism, enthusiasm, hope, hatred and intolerance within the minds of its individual members. Their thoughts become the slaves of their emotions and sentiments become the controlling factors of their actions. "Like the slum crowd, they can be whipped in a moment from mere noisiness into a frenzy of rage and despair." 5 The psychological and sociological breeding in the mind of the individual brings about unquestioning loyalty, faith and submission to the cause of the movement. This is so, regardless of their goals, because all Arab revolutionary mass movements cultivate in the mass mind not only a desire to fight for the cause but also an inclination for unified action. Without such cultivation and inclination all movements are eventually doomed to failure. At the same time, they promise all things to all people by presenting on Utopian ideal in which social and political equity will be achieved, material abundance will prevail and exploitation will be terminated. The absence of religion as a stabilizing influence and the multiplicity of opposing associations in contemporary Arab society generates a feeling of unrestrained mass behavior which heightens the readiness to destroy on the one hand, and to form hyper-attachment to symbols and leaders on the other hand. Such hyper-attachment and "loyalty can be expected only from the completely isolated human being who . . . derives his sense of having a place in the world only from his belonging to a movement".6 Psychologically, then, widespread atomization and alienation generate total mobilization that readily turns into a mass movement which demands total loyalty and obedience. 4

Erich Fromm, The Sane Society (New York, Rinehart, 1955), p. 124. Elizabeth Monroe, "People on the Move - The Mob", in Grant S. McClellan (ed.), The Middle East in the Cold War (New York, H. W. Wilson Company, 1956), p. 66. 6 Raymond Aron, The Opium of the Intellectuals, translated by Terence Kilmartin (London, Seeker and Warburg, 1957), pp. 316-317. 5

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VERIFICATION AND FORMATION

Not all rewards and deprivations, satisfactions and tensions to which the individual responds are external. The origin of many satisfactions and frustrations is internal - beginning with individual mental conceptions. Because of their very limited psychological capability to visualize the forces of change, the masses are convinced that the idea of revolution is an essential prerequisite to progress. As a consequence, the leaders of the revolutionary movement gain immense strength. The masses are asked to visualize and believe that the crumbling of the old order, irrespective of its total upheaval effect, will give birth to a stable and rewarding order. They are also asked to believe that the revolutionary stage at its minimal demand is an interlude catalyst, or the "energizing myth", which will end the unbalanced static order, conclude its inequities and yield a dynamic but stable new rational and harmonious order. In his book, The Philosophy of the Revolution, Nasser has this concept of revolution in mind when he laments the psychological motivations of the spirit of the revolution out of which discontent and frustration, hope and aspiration are bora. Arab revolutions, whose faith rests in the desire for a radiant future, are born of hope as well as despair. How far the contemporary Arab movements are influenced by the idealistic character of The Philosophy of the Revolution is now, and very likely will continue to be, a matter of controversy, but the psychological origin and mental conceptions among the masses have brought about a wave of popular discontent and an aura of hope and rising expectation. Despite the lack of empirical data concerning the gap between the aspiration of the masses and the accomplishments of Nasser's regime, as well as of other contemporary Arab regimes, we can say that the bulk of the masses endorses the aims and favors the present regimes - if not with passionate zeal. For them, the revolutionary mass movements represent the last human reaction directed toward the alleviation of an inhuman condition.

THE IMPACT OF MODERNIZATION

The advent of the age of modernization has had tremendous impact upon Arab society. Its effect upon the individual and society as a whole has been partially responsible for the emergence of revolutionary mass movements. The transformation of a traditional society into an urbanized-industrialized one is accompanied by an inherent clash of ideas, ideals and practices which aid in the disruption of the social system,

VERIFICATION AND FORMATION

19

the atomization of society into competing factions, and the psychosociological isolation of the individual. Such modernization as has occurred within the Moslem community has been an outgrowth of the influence of Westernization upon the area. As Sir Hamilton Gibb points out, "all social changes [in Arab society] during the past century or so have arisen, directly or indirectly, from the impact of our Western society and the penetration of Western techniques and ideas into what used to be the Ottoman Empire as well as into Egypt . . .".7 A great portion of the Arab society is now engaged in a revolution directed toward achieving quickly that which Western society achieved under the free enterprize system in the last twenty decades 8 and which the Soviet society achieved under socialism (Communism) in the last four decades. Difficulty has arisen in the Arab community because of the original attempts to borrow the best from the West while retaining the best from Arab culture. The desire to borrow Western science, technology and other tools of modernization without adopting complimentary Western values has, in recent years, worsened the dislocations in the social structure. To those of a more practical nature the borrowing of Western technology and its related products was irresistible; however, as they have since discovered, it is not easy to accept the material aspects of Western society without either accepting its values or creating new values that are equally compatible to modernization. At first the adoption of technology was an easy task; it seemed easy to separate Western science from the Western value system, but such a separation proved to be only superficial and momentary. In due time the powerful magnets of technological borrowing forced the Arabs to accept Western values at the expense of their own Islamic culture.9 The superimposing of Western values upon Arab society has created cultural dynamite which has begun to explode erratically. Gibb correlates the "uneven distributions of social changes" to the "variation in the force and duration of the external pressures" and the discord in the Arab's desire to accept changes as well as the differences in his capacity to do 7

Hamilton A. R. Gibb, "Social Change in the Near East", in Philip W. Ireland (ed.), The Near East: Problems and Prospects (Chicago, University of Chicago, 1942), p. 43. 8 Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1958), p. 47. 9 Raphel Patai, "Dynamics of Westernization in the Middle East", The Middle East Journal, IX (Winter, 1955), 4.

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VERIFICATION AND FORMATION

so.10 Various moods in the Arab community reflect the lack of homogeneity and the lack of consensus as to the degree of change considered necessary and desirable. Some groups favor wide-sweeping reform, while others agree that limited change is desirable. More reactionary groups view any change in traditional cultural patterns as inherently evil and to be avoided at all costs. The contrast between the old and the new has been made more obvious as the need to accommodate Islamic values to a technological society has increased. The representation of these various moods has been expressed in extreme ethnocentric movements; sociologically in traditional Islam, politically in an excessive form of nationalism (provincialism, Pan-Arabism), and psychologically in a xenophobia such as the prototype of Pan-Islamism. The total effect of modernization upon Arab society has been to stimulate rapid change which is eroding the foundations of Islamic culture. Technology reaches to the very roots of Western society, as Karl Jaspers has ably pointed out: Technology does not belong to the epidermis of European culture, but is nurtured on its very lifeblood and its most spiritual aspirations, and has so developed that it pervades and conditions all, and being in its mature form an easily appropriable instrument, it takes with it, even if only obliquely and implicitly the most varied impulses, values, and ideals of European life. 11

Thus it was that as Western technology was applied to the Islamic community, it inherently included some Western values which were alien to the Islamic tradition and while modernization provided some benefits it also had its adverse affects. The social order as it was established under the Ottoman rule was destroyed. Traditional loyalty and Islamic legality are no longer the corporate identity of the masses. Instead, social disintegration and political fragmentation prevail. Old values and patterns were either abandoned, destroyed or ridiculed. In their place new ones were imported, but these remain foreign and in many cases irrelevant to the needs and aspirations of the populace. The adverse effect of modernization lies in the fact that awakening has occurred in a landscape strewn with fatalism and stagnation. Furthermore the collapse of the traditional walls by Western penetration has aroused not only the feeling of admiration but the more significant feeling of anti-Westernism.12 This is so because Arab awakening has 10

Gibb, "Social Change in the Near East", op. cit., pp. 36-38. Luis Diez del Carral, The Rape of Europe (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1959), p. 300. 12 Charles D. Cremeans, The Arabs and the World: Nasser's Arab Nationalist Policy (New York, Praeger, 1963), p. 54. 11

VERIFICATION AND FORMATION

21

not come from an accession of strength and self-confidence, but mostly as a result of abandonment and exposure. It has been an awakening which has lacked an abundance of material, moral, and intellectual strength. Westernization has helped to make the Arab a "levantine", an individual who lives "in two worlds or more at once, without belonging to either; to be able to go through the external forms which indicate the possession of a certain nationality, religion or culture, without actually possessing i t . . . . It reveals itself in lostness, pretentiousness, cynicism and despair." 13 The result is a reaction usually in the form of indignation and hatred against outsiders and an uncritical passion of selfglorification. Such feeling of anti-Westernism has become a mental reflection supported by the fact that the Arab way of life is static and medieval in pattern while that of the West is a civilization implemented by a force of "self-confidence and energy".14 Only by understanding the mentality of the weak can the investigator fully appreciate the present temper of contemporary Arab revolutionary mass movements. Anti-Westernism is also partly the doing of the West. The Western idea of enlightenment that no man or people should passively accept its fate, its touchstones of individual freedom, self-determination, and independence, and the right of the individual to think independently are some of the new and troublesome things the West has taught the Arabs. It is because of this that the Arabs have found the oppressor "to be the West itself".15 Unlike the traditionalists who greatly valued Westernization, and who were eager to discover, by study or imitation, the secret of Western greatness, the contemporary militant generation is anti-Western and has felt a sense of Western betrayal and humiliation because its members were taught the dignity of the individual, and then refused it by the West. The mood of admiration that was once valued by the old generation has given way to one of intense spite and envious enmity. In the words of Edward Atiyah, the Arabs have revolted not so much against exploitation, injustice and oppression, but more against the Western "spiritual arrogance, racial haughtiness, social aloofness and paternal authoritarianism. . .".18 This Western attitude has con13 Albert H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay, 3rd ed. (London, Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 70-71. 14 Cremeans, The Arabs and the World: Nasser's Arab Nationalist Policy, op. cit., p. 54. " Ibid. 18 Edward Atiyah, An Arab Tells His Story: A Study in Loyalties (London, John Murray, 1946), p. 165; see also pp. 147-149.

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vinced the members of the new generation to seek their redemption not in Westernization but in a return to Arabism. Today the dramatic crisis in the Arab community is one of "Mecca versus mechanization" as Lerner once aptly referred to it.17 Industrialization and mechanization as symbols of secularization are widening the gulf of attitudes in Arab society. The young generation, especially in the urban areas, is apt to be less loyal to Islam because most religious values no longer seem relevant to the new goals. While they are still sensitive to Islam when it is under attack, they relegate religion to a back seat in practice, especially those who are shaping the destiny of Arab society. From this chaotic crisis a general systematic trend has become fairly obvious: the early trend of importation was procedural, to wit, the apparatus of liberal Western democratic form of government. The old intelligentsia, while it fought the West on military and political levels, did tolerate Western influences on the cultural and intellectual plane.18 This was so because the early nationalists, the traditionalists of today, were affected by the nineteenth century liberal movement. Unlike the early nationalists, the young nationalists of today have been affected and influenced by the SUBSTANCE of Westernized state welfare, economic development and socialization.19 In any case, the various types of doctrines and ideologies propelling the young nationalists are mostly the product of Western culture. Likewise, technology, methods of industrialization, modern administration and law are, also, mostly borrowed from the West. As a consequence there has arisen a total change of outlook. In contrast to the revolutions occurring in Arab society, the WESTERN REVOLUTION took different settings. The changes that took place came mostly from within and were predominantly the making of the Western people with little or no interference from outside forces. "After a process of about a thousand years",20 the WESTERN REVOLUTION began to materialize four centuries ago. Its achievement has been the outcome of the gradual growth of economic, social, and psychological mobility. 17

Daniel Lerner, "Nasser's Officialdom", A review in The New Leader (June 17, 1957), 25. 18 See Hisham Sharabi, "The Crisis of the Intelligentsia in the Middle East", The Muslim World, XLVII (July, 1957), 187-188. 16 William Sands, "Middle East Background", in Georgiana G. Stevens (ed.), The United States and the Middle East (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 28. 20 Erich Fromm, May Men Prevail? (Garden City, New York, Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1964), p. 8.

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23

Thus by the turn of the fifteenth century Western society witnessed a change of process and character by releasing the individual from the bondage of the Church. The velocity and the extent of changes have been basically by evolutionary methods as exemplified by the "Age of Scientific Revolution" of the seventeenth century and the "Age of Enlightenment" of the eighteenth century. "Parallel to the blossoming of hope" after the Exploration, Renaissance, Reformation, Counter-Reformation, the Scientific and Enlightenment eras, "went the explosive economic development of the West." 21 The industrial revolution of the nineteenth century gave rise to a series of political revolutions as manifested by the American Revolution and the French Revolution. The centuries of transformation engendered new hope and gave Western society ample time to indulge in the luxury of change, as circumstances arose. Of course, there have been painful readjustments, and periods of agonizing experimentation which have required a price of suffering and mass exploitation. But with the exception of a few eruptions the WESTERN REVOLUTION has been gradual and stable and has not ever radically cut the roots of the past. It has been an evolutionary move that has been flexible enough to assimilate the changes which it has itself generated. Thus, by a combination of deliberate action and fortuitous circumstances, the vitality of the Western inner force has managed to emancipate the individual from a structural communal society and to provide him with a dynamic and flexible one. The history of Western society has, then, been one of great expectation and fulfillment. Its good fortune and substantive productive capacity have distinguished it from any other civilization. And, until now, it has somehow managed to reassert its vitality and resourcefulness and to retain its primacy above other civilizations. No such exceptional combination of deliberate action and fortuitous circumstances attended the traditional communal life of Arab society. On the contrary, while Western society was steadily rising to greater heights of self-fulfillment and accomplishment, the Arabs were for centuries sinking into a state of decadency. Moreover, their illusion of comfort was shattered by the coming of the bearers of Western material achievements. In the hope of overcoming social lethargy and traditional ossification, the adoption of non-indigenous ingredients has, contrary to expectations, become merely imitation, which is an act of submission; it has brought the disagreeable awareness that the Arabs are weak and poor and the Europeans are powerful and rich, aggressive and confi21

Ibid., p. 9.

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dent. More dangerous today has been the inability or the unwillingness of the Arabs either to perceive or to understand the dynamic changes that have taken place outside their environment. The tendency has not been one of emancipation but rather one of isolation and exposure, for the Arab society has suffered the severe pain of Exploration and Renaissance, of Reformation and Counter-Reformation, of Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution. The readjustment to modernization has been frequently punctuated by the flames of revolutions and coups. The Arab society is living in an AGE OF TELESCOPED REVOLUTIONS and has no patience to accommodate itself to the historical space of natural growth. Instead, it has chosen risky by-passes and has attempted to compress the element of time into a short space. Consequently, the feeling of inferiority, which is the inherent substance of "limitation", has bred an attitude of suspicion and antagonism and a sense of resentment. To a large extent, modernization, Westernization, and imitation have become breeding cells for discontent and the seeds of revolutionary convulsions. In many ways this fateful change has shaken the roots of the Arab society. The urgent desire for rapid progress, advocated by the intelligentsia who are of the conviction that the state can generate more initiative than was possible under the traditional system, and echoed by mass media, has the effect of intensifying popular desires and increasing demands for a better way of life much faster than they can be met by economic and social development. The further desire to eliminate tribalism and agrarian dependence on feudalism by means of "Arab Socialism" as the only solution for difficult problems has in fact created an acute imbalance between desire and demand on the one hand and satisfaction and supply on the other. Such circumstances make it necessary for Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE governments to pacify the masses by shifting their development onto highly visible economic and social benefits - health, education, and similar improvements - that are easily detected by the public eye. As a result, little concern is given to the more basic benefits that are needed to create and sustain adequate economic and social growth. And the complexity of the problem becomes still more acute. As the non-basic improvements become more visible to the masses, there is the common tendency of the various sectors of the society to increase their demands for better recreation, more food and clothing, more equipment for the skilled workers, and more opportunities for newly graduated students and professional people. Unable to meet all these demands of rising expectations at one time, the

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25

Arab governments are constantly faced with a revolution of rising discontent. The urge for rapid processes has compounded uncertainty, and consequently the domain of reasonable human expectation is no longer operative. Subsequently, the form of transformation becomes revolutionary in character, explosive in method, and mostly negative in approach.22 The real question then is how to satisfy this high expectation. This could be accomplished with an even development, a balance between visible improvement and fundamental development; however, few Arab nations are capable of such balance. The other alternative, which is the more likely one, is to reduce or revise these excessive expectations by forcible means - a totalitarian form of government. This is a characteristic of the Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states. In addition to the different levels of material achievement which have distinguished Western and Arab societies, the logical distinctions of Western thought sharply differentiate it from Arab thought. "Ever since the time of the ancient Greeks it [Western thought] has been dominated by the feeling that logic is the basic weapon for the discovery of truth",23 says Frederick Watkins. The "concept of social dualism", that is the dualism of church and state, he asserts, " . . . has done more than anything else to determine the specific character of Western civilization . . . " 2 4 It explains the emergence of that particular Western polity and elucidates the causal relationship among its socio-economic and political institutions. The four odd centuries of Western transformation, i.e., modernization and industrialization, have brought some tangible internal reforms, but the understanding of this Western historical process would be lacking in an essential element unless it took account of a profound spiritual change. While the influence of Christian theological thinking was waning from the seventeenth century onward, the same spiritual reality which was expressed earlier in the concepts of this theology found now a new expression in philosophical, historical, and political formulations.25 The spirit of innovation and reasoning has been kept alive and is ever burning and ready to express itself in a different conceptual framework as conditioned by the historical trend of circumstances. As technical discoveries and industrial development have affected the social structure 22 Harry J. Benda, "Revolution and Nationalism in the Non-Western World", in Warren S. Hunsberger (ed.), New Era in the Non-Western World (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 31. 23 Frederick Watkins, The Political Tradition of the West: A Study in the Development of Modern Liberalism (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 12. 24 Ibid., p. 32. 25 Fromm, May Man Prevail?, op. cit., p. 12.

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of the Western society - more centralization, bigger corporations, and business and governmental bureaucratization - the spirit of humanism, which is basically a Christian one, reacted readily to the changing process of circumstances that brought about extreme poverty for the working class. Pragmatically the internal socio-economic development of the West has moved gradually, though not systematically, from a state of "feudalism" to be followed by "capitalism" into a stage of "state welfarism" constantly accompanied by a rise in the standards of living and by a more equitable distribution of the national wealth. The masses' lot has been visibly improving, while the form of "capitalism" has been expanding and consolidating its position. These more equitable distributions have been variously manifested in social security, unemployment compensation, a graduated income tax, free education to all, and some sort of socialized medicine. These changes to "welfarism" came about by relatively peaceful and gradual methods. Relative to Western society, Islamic society can be characterized as one of "monism" rather than of "social dualism" where, theologically speaking, the state and religion are one and inseparable. To be sure, one could adduce Koranic passages that contradict the spirit of "rigid determinism" 26 and strengthen individual free will: "Whatever good visits thee, it is of God; whatever evil visits thee is of thyself." 27 Deeper analysis of Islam, however, reveals the fact that it is a reconciliation between two outlooks: the balance between the individual's duties to this world (society) and those to the hereafter. G. E. Von Grunebaum authoritatively states that there ". . . is an element of sober reasonableness in Islam which works toward a humane application of its precepts . . . Religion or civilization is meant to supply information likely to smooth the believer's rough road through this and into the next world." 58 Nevertheless, the religious doctrine of determinism does seem to encourage a fatalistic philosophy, even though as Hocking points out, such a fatalistic behavior " . . . is not a question of religious doctrine, but of what one argues from it. It is presumably a late result of political subjugation rather than a purely theoretical declaration turned into a popular habit." 29 The value of the hereafter has been strongly empha26

Reuben Levy, An Introduction to the Sociology of Islam (London, William and Norgate, 1930), II, pp. 35-40. 27 Koran 4:81, Trans. Arberry. 28 Gustave E. Von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam: A Study in Cultural Orientation (Phoenic, Chicago, University of Chicago, 1961), p. 230. 29 William E. Hocking, The Spirit of World Politics ( N e w York, Macmillan, 1932), p. 442.

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sized as promised compensation in the afterlife where, psychologically, the usefulness for the hereafter overcomes the undesirableness of this world-worthlessness. Because of the nefarious influence of economic poverty, social tyranny, and political subjugation, there has been the tendency to select certain Koranic verses that can meet the improvident outlook of life and in which a theological escape can be found for their stagnation. Such a mental attitude is well expressed by Lawrence: that their " . . . profound reaction from matter led them to preach bareness, renunciation, poverty, and the atmosphere of this invention stifled the minds of desert pitilessly".30 Consequently the philosophical approach of "monism", the tradition of quietism, the habit of stoicism, the attitude of fatalism, the permissible extortions, the recognized abuses of long centuries of misrule, and the social stagnation and economic poverty have, until very recently, accounted for the differences between the Arab-Islamic society and the West. The impact of Westernization and modernization has already penetrated Arab society, thus affecting a wide range of socio-economic and political institutions. Traditions are no longer strong enough to overcome the disquieting spirit. "The most important single fact about these people, for the political discussions of the moment, is their rendezvous with Change, the god of 'modernity'. They are in process of growth: and since this is so, they are no longer to be identified with what they were yesterday but rather with what they will be tomorrow." 31 As a result, the nature of the contemporary Arab revolutionary mass movements is sui generis. It is an attempt to industrialize, to raise the standard of living, to give free education to all, to enact better social security and a system of unemployment compensation, and to provide even free medical care. It is a huge task that even advanced nations with an abundance of natural resources have yet to accomplish. The outcome has been obvious: a chaotic situation constantly subject to violent outbursts and coups. The big crisis says Nasser is ". . . between two millstones. One revolution demanded that we should stand in one row and forget the past, while another revolution forced us to restore the lost dignity of moral values and not forget the past." 32 It is also of "one demanding that we should unite together, love one another and strain every nerve to reach our goal; the other forces us, in spite of ourselves, 30

T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (London, Jonathan Cape, 1934), p. 39. William E. Hocking, "Forward", in Nejla Izzeddin, The Arab World: Past, Present, and Future (Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1953), p. vi. 32 Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Buffalo, N e w York, Economica Books, Smith, Keynes and Marshall, 1959), p. 40. 31

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to disperse and give way to hatred . . .",33 New sets of values and modes of thought have to be seeded in the indigenous culture before innovation takes place; yet this urgent demand is antagonistic to the familiar way of life to which the bulk of the people still cling. These, then, are the numerous explosives, but also surprisingly the inhibiting economic, psychological and sociological aspects that influence the political domain of the Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states and in which the origin and effect of the dimension of instability produce a vicious circle of stresses and strains. As a consequence of the above historical-theological-behavioristic determinants, it can be generally agreed that the inception of the Egyptian, the Tunisian, and the Algerian 34 Revolutions is one, unlike the American Revolution which was predominantly political, of economic, political, and social expediencies similar in goal to the French and the Soviet Revolutions, but less drastic in change and process. Too, the Arab revolutionary trends have been the result of less dogmatic or ideologically perceived ideas than those of the American, French, and Soviet Revolutions. They have resulted more from NECESSITY and from a desire to create a stable and new economic, social and political order. Among other things, Arab revolutionary mass movements have created a new elite with a different outlook, whose composition is substantially middle-class. While the traditional family structure and the values that go with it have not been strongly attacked, the aristocratic-feudalistic monopoly has been removed. More pointedly, the economic and political structure has been drastically changed. Economic socialization (Arab Socialism) and political centralization (single-party) have been strengthened, and in due time will most likely accelerate a further breakdown in the traditional social structure. The goals of these revolutionary mass movements are basic attempts at fundamental change in the overall traditional structure. The best that can be said at this juncture of revolutionary development is that Nasser's role, for example, in the search for a new social ideology popularly known as Arab-Democratic-Socialism has yet to emerge fully from its formative stage. The obstacles to the new formation are numerous and the social dislocations have been very costly, but it does give us a true picture of the present trend in the Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states. The stimulus for change, which is 83 M

Ibid., p. 37.

In this sense the Algerian and the Tunisian wars against France were essentially revolutionary wars which brought about profound changes.

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predominantly an external contact, "has been a strange balance between feelings of admiration and hostility".35 Change is wanted but some of the accompaniments of change are not at all desired. While the Arab revolutionary mass movements stand for fundamental change in the traditional social structure, they also stand for the restoration of the glorious past. "Revolution, for many Orientals, means restoration",39 observes Jacques Berque. It is a natural impulse for those who are haunted by their history, as is the case of the contemporary Arab society. It is difficult, therefore, to be sure whether the process of change is a protest against modernization or against traditional social values. Most likely it is an attempt to adjust the traditional social values to the trend of modernization, thus reaching an understanding with the self.

WHAT IS, AND WHAT IS NOT, A REVOLUTION

The understanding of contemporary Arab revolutionary mass movements, coups d'etat, outbursts of extreme violence, and revolutions must be based on the ability to distinguish between the TRAUMATIC and PARETIAN (term derived from the name of the celebrated Italian sociologist, Vilfredo Pareto) tensions. In the former case tension is due to the inadequacy of the social system, which is basically the result of chronic poverty, continual low standard of living, high rate of disease, perpetual unemployment, alienation of the intelligentsia, frustrated popular aspirations and elite estrangement. In the latter case tension results from the conflict between the "matrix" and the "social structure" as a manifestation of lack of social mobility. The "matrix" is a social mold that gives form to spontaneous conditions, usually not susceptible to a MACROSOCIAL observation but capable of receiving due understanding under MICROSOCIAL analysis. For example, the struggle for national independence against the non-indigenous elite in Egypt, as in most other Arab states, illustrates this need for micro-analysis. While TRAUMATIC tensions can be perceived and PARETIAN tensions may be deduced, the product of the interplay of these two précipitants to change cannot always be accurately predicted. This is so because the interaction may be affected by the subjective factor of personal choice. In the case of Arab revolutionary mass movements this is the province 35

Cremeans, op. cit., p. 47. Jacques Berque, Les Arabes d'hier à demain (Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1960), p. 25.

38

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of the REVOLUTIONARY MEN OF ACTION. Despite the subjective factor of personal choice, studies of recent coups d'etat and revolutions in the contemporary Arab world reveal that multiple dysfunction has occurred, often in exacerbated form, when the two "tensions" have joined. The first tension furnished the multiplicity of inadequate causes - transformation of traditional form of economy to a more modern type, dislocation of labor force, and similar causes - and the second tension furnished the directions due to the newly aroused conflict between the privileged elite and the new modern indigenous elite, between the feudal lords and the new business men, between the old upper class and the new middle class. When tensions crystallize into ideas, actions most likely follow. The main propellant force behind these actions has been the people of middle "stratum" who have been subjected to drastic change as a result of the impact of modernization. They have become the "unbalanced", the "misfits" and the "explosive". The drastic change has forced them to take action which is a reaction against loss of social equilibrium and the most obvious way - so they believe - by which to gain self-confidence. Thus drastic change in the social structure is one of the factors which releases individual energies - the ideal ingredients for a revolutionary explosion. When society undergoes a drastic change without abundant opportunities for individual self-betterment, the social atmosphere receptive to all manner of proselytizing, creates a proclivity for fanatical attitudes, and provides manifestations of revolutionary action. Consequently, the idea that revolutions are set in motion to acquire a change in the status quo is partly true. It must also be realized that it is the DRASTIC CHANGE which is responsible for the TRAUMATIC and the PARETIAN tensions which set the mood, the temper, and the stage for revolution. Thus beginning with the 1950's the fusion of the two tensions began to form new syntheses in some Arab countries and consequently one coup d'etat and revolution has been followed by another, as the birth of Ben Bellism, Bourguibism, and Nasserism, would clearly support. But what is a REVOLUTION? In the language of political science, the word "revolution" often means an act of sudden violence by a group to overthrow an incumbent ruling group.37 The broader definition of REVOLUTION is, however, a deep and radical change in the socio-economic and political fabric of a society which reaches into every phase 37

See Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and the Social System (Hoover Institution Studies no. 3) (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1964), passim.

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of life including human emotion and spiritual belief. While it is usually true that REVOLUTION proceeds underneath the wind of violent outbursts and coups d'etat, it would be wrong to suggest that violence is inseparable from the values of the revolution. History has recorded many revolutionary movements without the ingredient of violence. . . . nonviolent anticipatory change has . . . occurred in history. The liberation of the working class from the status of objects of ruthless exploitation to that of influential economic partners in Western industrialized society is an example of nonviolent change in the class relations within societies . . . But these anticipatory solutions have been the exceptions rather than the rule in history so far. 38

In the broad aspect REFORM and REVOLUTION are not so far apart as the words themselves might suggest. This becomes more obvious if REVOLUTION in its wider implication is considered. Even if violence became the necessary instrument for revolution, it could be claimed as a direct instrument to initiate reform, REVOLUTION is neither a vocation nor a predestined end; it is a means. Every revolutionary action is in effect a negation of the given order whose social instability remains nonetheless a sign of sickness. In this sense a REFORM movement is no less a revolutionary action than is a REVOLUTION. Thus the word REVOLUTION is used here in the context of REFORM whether it is accompanied by the ingredient of violence. Revolution is, then, the consecution of social distortion and of long cultural hibernation; it is a nation's denial of its being. The roots of contemporary Arab revolutions lie deep in the long centuries of despotic centralization and submission. While they are most often unrecognized, the methods, purposes, and responses to the contemporary environmental situation are usually affected by the experiences of the past. Today, many Arab individuals have been separated from their old roots. They are confused and restless; they often adopt extreme and desperately destructive methods to break out of this vicious circle. At this stage of development, social intramolecular structure is no longer harmonious; its mobility is sunk to a low level of activities and its parts become divided by habits of petty interests and selfishness. Consequently, Arab revolutions are an opposition to the prevailing motion whose sole purposeful aim is, indeed, but one path: the extraction of the hidden vitality of the society. In the words of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian REVOLUTION 38

Fromm, May Man Prevail?, op. cit., p. 5.

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was not a coup d'etat to remove a ruler. Actually the Revolution has a definite path which must be followed by anyone who assumes the responsibility of leadership. The Revolution will never become a coup d'etat. It will continue to be a Revolution until it fulfills the goals of which we have been dreaming. When the Revolution took place on July 23, 1952, it did not aim at putting any particular person into power. . . . Our Revolution was not, in fact, a new event. It was a continuation of the past, but it was truly representative of the people's aspirations and demands, and of the demands of the Martyrs who were clamouring for freedom and independence while they were being killed. 39

"A revolution is a measure to which peoples resort under compulsion, when all ordinary methods fail to meet their basic demands." 40 However, it is appropriate to pause at this moment in an attempt to make a clear distinction between the ULTIMATE AIM of a REVOLUTION and that of a coup d'etat. Generally, the ultimate aim of a coup d'etat is the seizure of power (the overthrow of the existing regime or government) with NO STRONG INTENT to change the "status quo" of the society - that is to say, there is no real attempt on the part of the new leaders to change radically the economic, political, social or other existing institutions. The new incumbents are inclined to oscillate between resistance and concession rather than make a decisive stand on changes. This was the norm in Syria before its union with Egypt, where coups and attempted coups occurred frequently in the ten-year period, 1948-1958. The explanation behind this Syrian phenomenon of chronic political instability was mainly the dearth of social and economic changes on the part of the Syrian leaders. Some were sincere in their intentions, but their sincerity was incommensurate with the opposing obstacles. Husni Za'im, for example, "proposed a widespread distribution of abandoned state lands to the peasants and the imposition of a limitation upon the size of landholdings". 41 Adib Shishakli was more successful in his reform approach, but, like Husni Za'im, he met strong resistance.42 One frequently suggested explanation behind such failure was that ownership of the principal economic resources was concentrated in the hands of wealthy feudal lords and capitalists. They were a tiny but all38

Gamal Abdel Nasser, President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews, 1959 (Cairo, U.A.R. Information Department, 1961), p. 274. Hereafter volumes in this series will be referred to as Nasser's Speeches. 40 Ibid., p. 569. 41 Gordon H. Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military: 1945-1958 (Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1964), p. 125. 42 Ibid., pp. 212-215.

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powerful elite whose utmost determination was to keep their interests undisturbed. Consequently, the effects of the Syrian coups before 1958 were mere rebellions against the leaders in power without necessarily revolting against the sanctity of the office or the socio-economic institutions. Unlike the coup, a REVOLUTION, sparked by mass movements, does change the existing order. The seizure of power not only leads to the replacement of the former elite by a new one, but it also leads to a major change in the socio-economic and political structure of the society. "The choice was between revolution and a revolt",43 says Anwar El Sadat. Such a distinction was made somewhat more clear by President Nasser: The revolution is a positive radical action designed to change political, economic and social conditions in a nation . . . an attempt to turn a state of affairs from what it actually is into what it should be. . . . As for the adventure of the revolution, it is an attempt to attain the power which would give its holders the chance to carry out the desired radical change. Herein lies the big difference between revolution and coups. A revolution means the assumption of power for the purpose of making a radical change in existing conditions. A coup means the assumption of power for its own sake. The exercise of power in a revolution is only a beginning. The exercise of power in a coup is both a beginning and an end. And while the real aim of the coup is to change the ruler, the real aim of the revolution is to change the foundation of the community. Thus a coup or the adventure of a revolution may be carried out in a matter of hours or a few days, whereas a revolution, by its very nature, takes longer to accomplish, much longer than just hours or days. And now, seven years after the adventure of the revolution on July 23, I ask myself: have we accomplished the revolution itself? Not yet. . . ,44 In a similar manner, but more philosophically, Michel Aflaq posed the same question: "What is revolution? Shall we stop at political definitions . . . or are we to understand by revolution something truer and deeper?" His philosophical approach was that a revolution is a true awakening, . . . . the awakening of the Arab spirit at a decisive stage in human history . . . Revolution, then, before being a political and social program, is the prime 43

Anwar El Sadat, Revolt on the Nile (New York, John Day, 1957), p. 80.

44

Nasser's

Speeches,

1959, p. 568.

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propelling power, that powerful psychic current, that mandatory struggle, without which the reawakening of the nation is not to be understood. This is what we understand by revolution.45 By using Johnson's typology of revolution,46 we could see two types of Arab revolutionary mass movements: (1) the "Conspiratorial Coup d'etat", and (2) the "Militarized Mass Insurrection". In the former instance the Egyptian conspiratorial coup of 1952 is an illustrative case where the move was a sectarian one led by a tiny military elite whose purpose was one of radical change. In the latter instance the war in Algeria and in Tunisia against France is another example where the move was led by militant leaders. The strategy was one of guerrilla warfare designed to gain a political objective, independence, and to initiate radical socio-economic changes. In both cases the revolutions were backed by a mass following heavily saturated with emotionalism and xenophobic nationalism. Revolution is a "powerful psychic current" as a consequence of emotions and realities. In this sense the romantic and the rational components of the powerful psychic current of the revolution are not antagonistic, but to a great measure complementary. In a more practical tone Nasser has said just this about the two revolutions in Egypt. "One is political" and the other "is social".47 The revolution is an endeavor to change radically the various institutions, be they in the economic field, political sphere, or otherwise. It might be said, then, that in the Algerian, the Egyptian and the Tunisian revolutions 48 the intensity of the TRAUMATIC and PARETIAN tensions were strong enough to stimulate a radical change in the social structure of the societies while in Syria the two tensions were not strong enough to overthrow the status quo thus giving rise only to an adventure of revolution, i.e., coups d'etat. There are those who maintain that nationalist "popular slogans", which are used by the demagogic Arab leaders, are merely for mass consumption. The assertion is that social reforms are designed for grandiosity itself rather than for a meaningful attack on the living conditions of the people. In his article, "The Ideology of the Egyptian Revolution", Jean Vigneau lists the following quotations of what the 45 Michel Aflaq, "Nationalism and Revolution", in Sylvia G. Haim (ed.), Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1964), pp. 244-245. 46 Johnson, Revolution and the Social System, passim. 47 Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution, op. cit., p. 36. 48 The Algerian and to a great extent the Tunisian "revolt" against French rule was in intent and purpose similar to the Egyptian Revolution of 1952.

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author of this book considers to be pacifying statements designed mainly for political adventurers, mass consumption and propaganda uses: It is the peoples and the nation as a whole who are the architects of our movement. The army is only one faction of the nations. The Army is of the people and for the People. Our movement was founded from the beginning upon "renunciation". Neither my colleagues nor I have any personal ambitions. We have no intention whatever of filling our own pockets. In that, probably, lies the secret of our success. The Age of charlatans, politicians, and climbers is finished. Such is the will of the army because it is the will of the people. That is your will, O People, and it is in the name of your will that the army is determined to do its duty by pursuing the interest of the nation above all things. 49

All Arab revolutionary leaders have taken the pains to disclaim any personal designs by positively asserting their faithful belief in the principles of democratic institutions, a vague assertion that could be easily used to cover up their real intention. But the task of investigation is not so simple as it sounds. Nationalistic popular slogans and grandiosity must be tested in the light of historical facts. Assembled data and historical investigation furnish the academicians enough indications that men such as Husni Za'im and Adib Shishakli of Syria and Abdul Kassem of Iraq have used Arab nationalism, popular slogans and even social projects for the sake of grandiosity. True, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Habib Bourguiba have also used the same technique to enforce their views, but unlike Za'im, Shishakli, and Kassem, their genuine social base of reformation and sincere desire to improve the status of their people cannot be discredited. Their base of reformation has, in most cases, been limited and ultimately might defeat their goals. But progress, little as it might be, has been made even where the obstacles appear almost insoluble as in the pressure of population, the lack of natural resources, and the limited availability of arable land. The least that can be said in favor of Bourguiba and Nasser is that both promised one kind of REVOLUTION and made another. Theirs was not an intentional betrayal of the original aim of the revolutionary movement for the real criterion lies not so much in the promises that were given before assuming office or at the time of taking over as in what they have actually accomplished. The intention might or might not be genuine and free from hypocrisy, but our interests here lie not so much in the realm of the spirit as in the realm of facts. The dispute 49

Jean Vigneau, "The Ideology of the Egyptian Revolution", in Walter Z. Laqueur (ed.), The Middle East in Transition (New York, Praeger, 1958), p. 131.

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over whether Bourguiba or Nasser has DECEIVED the cause of the movement is, in my judgment, a fruitless one. Of more importance is what they claimed to do and what they have accomplished. Thus it is enlightening to make a comparison between the Egyptian coup d'etat of 1952 and compare its character, objectives and accomplishments with the coups d'etat in Syria in 1949 and 1951. Comparative analysis may serve to establish or refute Nasser's contention that coups seek power for power's sake while revolutions seek power as an essential for the reformation of the society. Most revolutions aimed at social reform and all military revolutions begin overtly in the form of coups. But once power is attained, the difference between a COUP and a REVOLUTION is judged not by promise but by performance. The series of Syrian coups (the Arabic term is inkilab and literally means an upsetting) that brought about the seizure of power from civilian hands and the fall of the Syrian Government in 1949 by General Husni Za'im led in turn to the overthrow of the Za'im Government by a small pro-Hashemite military group. This government lasted for a few months until it was overthrown by Colonel Adib Shishakli.50 These events as well as the ending of the Egyptian monarchy by the military coup of July, 1952 belong to a chain of crises that were partly the making of the previous governments and partly due to unforeseen circumstances, e.g., the War in Palestine, the unstable economies of the two nations and other similar common problems. "Seen from that angle, the Syrian Inkilab of March, 1949 (and 1951), cannot but be related to the Egyptian event of three years later which it foreshadowed." 51 Before the coups took place there had been an intensified series of crises expressed by demonstrations of popular resentment. The best remembered was known as the "Black Saturday" of January 26, 1952. With it came the death of the Egyptian monarchy and the exile of King Farouk. Judged by this evidence it could be stated that the spiritual motives of the Egyptian and Syrian people were the real causes of fermentation, and the armies of both nations which initiated the coups were the material manifestations of this popular unrest. The military seizure of power brought an end to the first phase of "reformed revolution", and it is here where the similarities between the Syrian chain of coups and the Egyptian coup came to an end. The ". . . distinction between military 50

Pierre Rondot, The Changing Patterns of the Middle East (New York, Praeger, 1961), pp. 127-128. 51 Vigneau, op. cit., p. 131.

VERIFICATION AND FORMATION

37

coups and military revolutions must properly rest not upon any difference in the technique by which power is seized but rather upon the scope and success of the reform program which is subsequently enacted".52 In order to fulfill their missions, both the coups d'etat of Syria and of Egypt resulted in a so-called LIBERATION MOVEMENT (Al-Tahrir) designed to create democratic procedures and initiate socio-economic reforms. This matter is discussed in greater depth in the chapters which follow but historical data are now quite sufficient to present the thought that unlike the SYRIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT which was unable to accomplish its goals, the EGYPTIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT has succeeded in initiating substantial changes in the socio-economic and political structure of the Egyptian society. Without deprecating the spirit of the SYRIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT, the task in constructing a democratic form of government is essentially quite different from that involved in the overthrow of a corrupt government. Moreover, democratic principles are a matter of definition and to use Western democracy as a criterion could result in a miscalculation. To Shishakli the LIBERATION MOVEMENT came, in time, to represent another multi-political party system which ultimately weakened his role and led to the overthrow of his regime. Unlike Shishakli, Nasser regarded democratic principles as expressed by his LIBERATION MOVEMENT as something of a higher order. "What mattered to Colonel Nasser and his patriotic military colleagues was not the form of the government but its content." 53 It is in the content that the major differences between the Syrian and the Nasser regimes become very obvious. The one-party system, i.e., one that is ruled by and in the interest of ONE EXCLUSIVE GROUP, says President Nasser, . . . would not represent our hopes; nor would it conform with our objectives. This is because the one-party system means that a small group . . . monopolizes political work . . . This means the exclusion of the great majority of the people. There was also the system of having different political parties. We experienced that system, which was obviously exploited by the powers which wanted to place our country in their zones of influence. 5 4 It was for the purpose of achieving social democracy that the revolution 52

Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Military in the Middle Eastern Society and Politics", in Sydney Nettleton Fisher (ed.), The Military in the Middle East (Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1963), p. 16. 53 R. K. Karanjia, Arab Dawn (New York, International Publishers Press, 1959), p. 36. 54 Nasser's Speeches, 1959, p. 469.

38

VERIFICATION AND FORMATION

was staged in Egypt, despite the political democracy with which they used to deceive us. In the whole of Egypt, the people at that time were not deceived by the political democracy; they felt that his democracy was mobilizing the majority for serving the minority . . . for serving feudalism, capitalism, the domination of capital which we inherited from the past. It was a democracy for serving the supporters of imperialism.55

While rejecting the forms of Western democracy and the concomitant political party system, Nasser's revolutionary democracy has been one of "social democracy", as is illustrated in the following quotations: This National Union (now known as the Arab Socialist Union) is not a party exclusively for capitalists, for workers, for landowners or for farm laborers. Nor is it a party for those who have inherited or their less fortunate fellow countrymen. It is not a party for a special class, a particular group or specific individual. It is an organization for the whole fatherland without any distinction or bias.56 We are now establishing true democracy; a democracy which is totally different from the false democratic systems of the past. Every citizen wished to enjoy democracy in its true and proper sense. The people want a democratic life completely emancipated from political and social exploitation. Actually when we abolished political parties we put an end to all sorts of exploitation and laid the foundation for a sound democratic system.57

Whether Nasser has been able to establish a link between the theory of his "social-democracy" and its application is irrelevant at this stage of analysis. What is of more importance is that his revolution has inaugurated a significant change in the content of Egyptian life. In part his attitude toward the nature of the political party structure and his aim of the LIBERATION MOVEMENT resulted from the careful study of the twentieth century Arab coups d'etat, especially of the Syrian coups.

The liberation movement in Syria became just another political party which in time was overthrown. That much is granted, but it would be a short-sighted academic practice to rest the analysis here. When Nasser seized control in 1952 his possible aim beyond the ousting of the corrupted traditional elite and the correction of major problems through agrarian reform was unclear. Now, it can be said that the Egyptian coup has been more than a mere coup. It was and has continued to be

a revolution with a vague but real ideological element that was lacking in the Syrian coups. Nasser, soon after the overthrow of the old regime, 55 Ibid., 1959, p. 30. 5« Ibid., 1959, p.578. 57

Nasser's Speeches (January-March)

1960), p. 42.

VERIFICATION AND FORMATION

39

initiated the levelling of social positions, the destroying of class privileges and the gradual extending of state control over the national economy. Unquestionably, Nasser alone was the administrator,58 the ideologist, the theoretician, the organizer,59 and with the help of his military associates, the mover of the July Revolution. It is futile to analyze his ideology or to attempt to systematize his PROGRAM or to straightedge his THEORY in such a manner as to identify it with communism, fascism or any other "ism". Such categorizing bears only superficial resemblance which does him no justice and impairs understanding. The natural tendency of the Egyptian Revolution as understood by Nasser is toward a "monolithic party dictatorship".60 This means an Arab Socialist Union (previously known as "National Union") with centralized political power primarily against "all-powerful political parties" 61 in an attempt to end corruption and mass exploitation. Like the Socialist Destour Party (previously known as the Neo Destour party) of Tunisia and the F.L.N, of Algeria, the Arab Socialist Union of Egypt is equally dedicated to end all forms of negativism. On the other hand, the Syrian military regimes of Za'im and Shishakli were mere coalitions, somewhat similar to the Iraqi regime that was led later by Kassem and which had a tendency "towards an alliance of revolutionary groups".62 At his best, Kassem, like Za'im and Shishakli, became the acknowledged adjudicator of the revolutionary groups and political parties in an attempt which "sought to bring all major political forces in balance because he trusted none of them".63 Unlike Egypt before the advent of the 1952 Revolution, the Iraqi Revolution of 1958 was waged against the rule of Nuri El-Said who managed effectively to put down all nationalistic movements and ruled the nation with his "despotic" 44 pasha. Consequently a single-party system similar to that of the Arab Socialist Union, the Socialist Destour Party and the F.L.N, "was a priori incompatible with the revolution".65 However, like Husni Za'im and 58

El Sadat, Revolt on the Nile, op. cit., p. 82. John Gunther, "Biographical Note: Nasser and Neguib", in Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Buffalo, Economica Books, Smith, Keynes and Marshall, Publisher, 1959), p. 87 (appendix). 60 Peter Partner, A Short Political Guide to the Middle East (New York, Praeger, 1960), p. 97. 01 Rondot, The Changing Patterns of the Middle East, op. cit., p. 186. 62 Partner, op. cit., p. 87. 63 Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 187. 64 Rondot, The Changing Patterns of the Middle East, op. cit., p. 186. «5 Ibid. 59

40

VERIFICATION AND FORMATION

Shishakli, Kassem found it politically expedient to incorporate the representatives of the nationalist elements into the new government - a move that forced him later to "divide and rule" 66 - by playing off one faction against another in the futile hope of increasing his centralized power. The analysis will be greatly expanded in the following chapters by using the article of Rex D. Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process",67 as a guide to contemporary Arab revolutionary mass movements. In his article Hopper delineates four stages: the first stage is broadly characterized by mass discontent and unrest - it is an uncoordinated uprising of mass consciousness as a consequence of the recognition that traditional values and systems can no longer satisfy current aspirations and demands.08 The second stage is one of the coalescence of this vague restlessness into organized forces where the intellectual elites, especially the "great men of knowledge", shift their allegiance from the incumbents to the dissidents. At this stage the emergence of the "men of revolutionary action" becomes more definite.69 The third stage is one of conflict between the conservative and the radical; it is one of revolutions and counter-revolutions where motives and aims are in the process of clarification and organizational mass movements are built. It is a stage where most likely the radical (men of revolutionary action) takes over from the liberal and the conservative.70 The last stage is one of legitimacy - the legalization of the revolution. It is the age of the administrators,71 of central government under the tutelage of the single-party (mass party), e.g., the Arab Socialist Union of Egypt, the Ba'ath party of Syria, the Socialist Destour party of Tunisia, and the F.L.N, party of Algeria, of reconstruction, that is of Arab socialism. In this last stage of development, providing it has achieved its goals, the movement is no longer Utopian but becomes one of realism and a New Order.

»«

Ibid. Rex D. Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process", Social Forces, XXVIII 1950), 270-279. 69 See chapter two of this book. 69 See chapter three of this book. 70 See chapters four and five of this book. 71 See chapters six and seven of this book. 67

(March

Il THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN MASS MOVEMENTS

DIFFERING CONCEPTS A N D EVALUATIONS: THE VERTICAL APPROACH

While the author has set forth his evaluation of the effects and consequences of the various Arab revolutionary mass movements, he recognizes that the interpretation of the topic is one of subjective approach. Varying cultures and mores condition other perspectives; therefore, an American looking at an Arab situation with Western CULTURAL LENSES may well arrive at a conclusion at considerable variance with that of an Arab or a Russian viewing the same problem through his particular CULTURAL LENSES. To illustrate, the commonly held Western belief that dictatorship is bad PER SE is not always true inasmuch as a dictatorship may be good or bad depending on its orientation and circumstance. Despite variances in judgments owing to the differences in perspective, there can be some accord regarding the various Arab ISMS. It can be agreed that they, for better or worse, have incited latent forces into dynamic motion. The generated passions are freeing the masses from the fetters of their traditional society and are serving as catalysts in the creations of new social orders. Revolutions in the form of the various ISMS are not only episodes but are also processes in the metamorphoses of any society, processes that release new motivations directed at completely overturning traditional governmental and societal relations. The impact of the new forces for change is tumultous, sporadic, and spasmodic. Adding to the turbulence will be the proclivity of each of the various social segments of the affected society to separately make its own interpretation of the concepts set forth by the changing order. For example, the concept of "freedom" means the right of each individual to live according to his status; that is, within the privileges set for his particular group by the social order as a whole. The conservative mental concep-

42

THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN MASS-MOVEMENTS

tion of "freedom" is "qualitative" in that the society has assigned certain privileges and liberties to peasants that are quite distinct from those allotted to the upper elites. These distinctions are based either on historical precedent or on individual social differentiations. The Arab liberal's conception of "freedom", on the other hand, is "equalitarian", and is an attempt to free the individual from precisely those bondages which the Arab conservative makes the very keystone of his concept of freedom. To the Arab liberal, the conception of "freedom" is that all individuals should have at their disposal relatively similar liberties, privileges, and rights, as well as the prerogative to overthrow all nonequalitarian trends in the social order. Unlike either the conservative or the liberal, the Arab radical, especially the young military elite, thinks primarily in terms of a "national" conception of freedom, the primary consideration being sovereignty conjoined with the right of the people to self-government; that is, government by Arabs rather than by a foreign elite. Thus it is apparent that even in the formulation of a concept of freedom, the perspectives of the Arab conservative, the Arab liberal, and the Arab radical are guided by their separate conceptions of self-interest and are shaped by their particular positions in the cultural structure of their society. Because of these varying perspectives, the process of transforming the Arab society from regressiveness to modernization, from discontent to satisfaction, remains the real problem. Out of the process progressive elements have emerged, but much of the traditional still remains to confound the trend towards modernity. The problem is how an old society, existing in newly born Arab states, can follow the path of progress when poverty and discontent are rampant. In seeking a solution to the dilemma, the Arabs are subject to cross pressures. On the one hand, there are the historical-psychological factors: the superiority complex emanating from a firm belief that the golden age of Islamic civilization and power was superior to that of the West; and the inferiority complex still deeply rooted in the Arab psyche produced by the humiliations of a not-so-distant colonial past. On the other hand, there is the factual presence of mass ignorance and backwardness, social impotence, and abject poverty, all in dire need of alleviation. Under the pressure of tradition and environment, the individual Arab seeks rationalization for his existence through some fulfillment; but, because he aspires beyond his capabilities, he fails, becomes disillusioned, and often turns extremist. The immediate causes of social breakdown are many and include

THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN MASS-MOVEMENTS

43

lack of natural resources, political disintegration, and population pressure. Beneath all these factors, however, there is one common denominator which, in times of crisis, acquires support from the various social strata: the society is faced with new conditions to which it cannot easily adjust. While the need for social change is obvious, the opposition to change still persists and causes turbulence in the patterns of behavior. The idealists, the revolutionaries, the reformers, and the creative artists of the Arab society are particularly affected because their precepts are rejected by the bulk of the traditional Islamic society. Hence, in the hope of gaining recognition and thereby a following, these groups, alienated from the established order, are among the first to manifest discordance by joining the various revolutionary mass movements. The volatile nature of these malcontents makes them ready activists for drastic change. Because they have the fewest ties to the traditional governments, they have the weakest commitments to the propagation of the old order. The psychological processes of these dissidents are most difficult for those not directly affected to comprehend and accept. The net result is conflicts, hidden and open, between the traditionalists and the revisionists. This problem can best be understood if there is a realization that Arab society is in a transitional stage, that the commitment to social progress is still more APPARENT than REAL, and that the process of change will be aborted unless fundamental human attitudes become psychologically congenial. Since most of the expectations of the society have not been met, extreme movements, both to the right and left, have resulted. At their inception, movements of this type have emphasized immediate objectives such as the liberation of the Arab masses from the yoke of imperialism and the tyranny of feudalism. However, with the attainment of original objectives and in frustration at the inability to achieve reforms from within, emphasis has been reduced; and needed changes have been relegated, more and more, to the "future". Consequently, the emphasis of modern Arab revolutionary mass movements has shifted from the hope of immediate expectation to a reliance on "posterity". To what extent the leaders of the contemporary mass movements are ready to immolate tradition and renounce the "present" for the "future" is still to be determined. Unable to fulfill their promises, they use and morally justify violence as being indispensable for the attainment of Utopian goals. Political expediency would dictate that principles yield to pragmatic needs, but power once freed of restraint becomes extremely difficult to control. Consequently, when physical force and violence become

44

THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN MASS-MOVEMENTS

essential requisites for survival, counter-revolutions may well result as history has often demonstrated. There is in existence, however, substantial data and much evidence of economic, political, and socially activistic forces which have opened the way for prognosis. In order to state and explain this prognosis it will be necessary to consider how variations in the character of the Arab individual's vertical structure of social relations induce his receptivity or influence his resistance to the appeal of revolutionary mass movements. The elucidation can best be accomplished by an examination of the philosophical and psychological differences in attitudes toward the "present", the "future", and the "past" as understood by the "conservative", the "liberal", the "skeptic", the "radical", and the "reactionary" aggregate Arab individual. A. The Mental Conception and Roles of the "Conservative" and the "Skeptic" Arab conservatism is the quality which tends to impose static inertia upon an environment. Since the Arab conservative believes in historicaltraditional determinism, he usually fails to understand the enlightenment of the historical process and the essence of innovations. He suspects that the uncertainties of the future will be no better than the certainties of the present and thus tries to perpetuate the status quo by shaping the future according to the patterns of the present. The mental process of the Arab conservative is permeated by traditions which, for the most part, consist of a routine and conventional set of principles. The philosophical outlook is predominantly based on the assumption that society is made up of certain productive forces, environmental factors, ideas, and values, which limit the process of change. Consequently, the advocates of conservatism label all other conceptions of existence as "Utopian", especially those conceptual orders which conservatives believe can never be realized in a primordial social substance. Arab conservatives prove to be incapable of anticipating change because their patterns of behavior are a consequence of the combination of their vested interests and their psychological make-up. They are, therefore, likely to resort to all kinds of romantic actions to distort and conceal the malignancies of the existing order from which they profit. "They tend to be pessimistic or, in their view, realistic, about human capabilities as well as political and social change." 1 One searches in 1

Michael Curtis (ed.), The Great Political tion, Avon Book Division, n.d.), p. 178.

Theories (New York, Hearst Corpora-

THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN MASS-MOVEMENTS

45

vain to find in their viewpoints a sense of public responsibility; they are of the opinion that situations cannot be changed and that the masses are incorrigible, thus they do not attempt to help the masses to better their lot. Because the Arab conservatives are convinced that their lives are well adjusted to the actual situation, they are not in the least disposed to theorize and tend, under the conditions of their existence, to regard the status quo of the environment as a non-problematic natural order. Historical incidents are used as a measure of reassurance to validate the present. This attitude precludes new ideas and negates the value of innovation, does not induce or even permit flexible and independent thinking, nor is it conducive to objective study. Consequently, their myopic vision fails both to understand the inner force of radical nationalism and to make concessions to it in order to attenuate its effects. Historical determinism as the conservative conceives it is closely related to theological interpretations. To begin with, Islam, as revealed through the Koran and the yadith, does, both implicitly and explicitly, encourage independent thinking and the seed for innovation is embodied therein: The messenger of God said: "The quest for knowledge is incumbent upon every Muslim man and every Muslim woman." He also said: "Acquire knowledge, because he who acquires it in the way of the Lord performs an act of piety; . . . who seeks it adores God; who dispenses instruction in it, bestows alms; and who imparts it to its fitting objects, performs an act of devotion to God. Knowledge enables its possessor to distinguish what is forbidden from what is not; . . . [and] it serves as an armor against the enemies. . . . 2

But equally so, TRADITIONAL ISLAM has succeeded in inculcating in the mind the idea that God is in absolute control of all things, including all facets of life: All things were created by Allah by decree (Koran 54:49, 87:2f) and all things in the lives of men and other creatures are set down beforehand in books (Koran 54:52f, 11:8, 9:51). Behind every action is the hand of Allah (Koran 8:17), . . . In the matter of belief and misbelief, "he that wills takes the path of his Lord; but ye shall not will it unless Allah wills it; Allah is knowing and wise" (Koran 75:29-31; cf. 2:99, 81:28f) so that every man's apparent power to choose his own course of action is pre-ordained.5

Because 2 3

TRADITIONAL ISLAM

(to be distinguished from the Koran and

Von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam, op. cit., p. 234. Levy, op. cit., p. 36.

46

THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN MASS-MOVEMENTS

the Hadith) accepts the individual as he is and does not encourage him to develop his potentialities, the Arab society has become less and less humanistic. Salvation, to the traditionalist, is to be obtained chiefly through suppliance - prayer, humility, silence. Traditional Islamic institutions discourage "the acceptance of new interpretations of it". "Such a combination of conservatism and practically induced political quietism" 4 lead to the infusion of the complacency illustrated in the proverb that "an ignorant sultan is better than perpetual civil war or sedition".5 Traditional "Islam never followed the West in changing the purpose of conduct from the static ideal of happiness to the dynamics of the 'pursuit of happiness'." 6 "Still, the Muslim", especially the conservative, the abjectly poor and peasant hates change. The ideal life and the ideal community are static. The West expects change to be for the better; the Muslim knows it to be for the worse . . . By clinging to the ways of the forebears, by upholding and reliving the tradition of the ancients, by eschewing innovation, the standing of his betters who preceded him would be preserved one instant longer. 7

This passivity discourages personal assertion and conditions the individual to acceptance, thereby providing a ready excuse for laziness and negligence. Conservatism and quietism, long supported by the ulema, have implanted a fatalistic attitude conducive to the disavowal of any substantive sense of individual responsibility. Theologically, TRADITIONAL ISLAM has successfuly imbued in the bulk of its followers the belief that stability is the desideratum and that every human creature has his predestined place in society. "If that place were not entirely satisfying, it was God ordained. To attempt to change it was unnatural." 8 Further, the pessimistic outlook of the Arab conservative for the future tends to produce regression, for there is little motivation except to try to hold on to that which is already possessed - it is a bulwark for the maintenance of his own preeminence as well as a defense mechanism for his venal behavior. At most, he considers knowledge a mechanical process of accumulation of the KNOWN rather than a creative impulse reaching out to dispel the unknown. The NEW can be blended in only when it is 4

Berger, The Arab World Today, op. cit., p. 15. John Lewis Burckhardt, Arabic Proverbs, quoted in Berger, The Arab World Today, ibid., p. 15. 0 Von Grunebaum, op. cit., p. 233. 1 Ibid., p. 240. 8 Georgiana G. Stevens (ed.), The United States and the Middle East (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall Inc.. 1964), p. 32. 5

THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN MASS-MOVEMENTS

47

harmonious with what is already approved.9 Thus imaginative questioning of nature, scientific curiosity, and experimental technology remained, until very recently, extrinsic to the Arab traditional society.10 The psychological impact is obvious: individual contentment derives from a resigned and willing submission to things regarded as ordained and bound by traditional values.11 Closely related to the conservative, but somewhat at variance in outlook, is the skeptic. Skepticism refers to one who either rejects or discounts both the popular and so-called "expert" explanation of a phenomenon. An Arab skeptic takes a negative stance regarding an intangible such as a proposition or a statement, which is often a prediction of causal relationship. His views are similar to the conservative, but he differs on the basis that the "present" is no better than the "future"; for him, both present and future are gloomy and unpromising. The fatalistic mind of the Arab skeptic operates on the assumption that nothing astonishing can occur. But if the unforeseen does take place, the skeptic has a rationalization: predestination, traditional attitudes, and pagan practices inculcated into TRADITIONAL ISLAM, have already satisfactorily explained the unknown.12 Within Arab society, the peasant (fellah) and the nomad are typical skeptics. The Arab skeptic rarely builds his judgments on the relation of cause and effect. The quest for the "why" is not part of his analytical process. His struggle for survival has been too severe to permit him the luxury of considering matters beyond those concerning his daily sustenance,13 thereby fostering in him a dogmatic outlook. The impermeability of his viewpoint is manifested by an almost absolutistic approach and is illustrated by the following: T h e y h a v e n o half-tones in their register of vision. T h e y are a people of primary colours, or rather, black and white, w h o see the world always in contour. T h e y are dogmatic people, despising doubt, . . . T h e y k n o w only truth and untruth, belief and unbelief, without any hesitating retinue of finer shades. 1 4 9

H. A. R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 64-65. 10 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 11 Hamed Amer, Growing up in an Egyptian Village (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954), pp. 36, 231. 12 Edward Westermarck, Pagan Survivals in Mohammedan Civilization (London, Macmillan, 1933), pp. 5-10, 21-26. 13 H. H. Ayrout, The Fellaheen, trans. Hilary Wayment (Cairo, R. Shindies, 1945), p. 134. 14 Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, op. cit., p. 38.

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THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN MASS-MOVEMENTS

TRADITIONAL ISLAM has taught him to endure patiently: "Everything has

its remedy in patience but lack of patience has no remedy." 15 TRADITIONAL ISLAM has also taught him that if suffering is inevitable he must find consolation in patience: "If this year passes hope for another." 16 Together with silence, humility, and the remembrance of God, poverty is of great help toward the attainment of salvation. Worldly possessions are dangerous . . . It is not so much poverty that is desirable but freedom from greed, avoidance of the temptations incident to wealth. The rich man is tied to this world with stronger cords than the poor. To be given a share in this world is likely to entail a threat to one's share in the next.17 The Arab skeptic's outlook toward life is formulated according to his experiences. Because misery and lack of opportunity have made him indolent, he reacts to worldly events in utter passivity. God will provide, God distributes His benefits, God protects the crops. God is with the patient. To everyone the fate which God has assigned him. We are from God, and to God we shall return. God is there. God will give in His own good time. Man proposes and God disposes.18 He overcomes the precariousness of his existence by deprecating the significance of his outward circumstances; he integrates insecurity and the anguish it entails into his view of the world by accepting its moral of the worthlessness of this transitory abode. He is inured to sudden turns of the wheel of fortune and is equipped with the philosophical apparatus to master life's every whim.19 The skeptic's outlook of resignation, fatalism and abnegation is not due solely to religious attitudes but is influenced by other consideration as well. His apathy, lethargy and stagnation are further conditioned by dire economic needs. Biologically, passivity is a lack of vitality conditioned by ill-health, malnutrition, disease and labor beyond his physical capacity. Psychologically, a fatalistic attitude of passiveness develops in which the individual is willing to accept or bear the existing harsh situations in order to avoid possibly more severe ones; this is exemplified by the skeptic's proclivity to bend with the wind. Sufism, which is a form of skepticism, has been the only way to salvation: a passive way through humility, prayer, and poverty. Because only insurmountable 15

Michel Feghali, Proverbes et Dictons Syro-Libanais (Paris, Institut d'Ethnologie, 1938), p. 105. 16 17

18 19

Ibid., p. 103. Von Grunebaum, Medieval

Islam, op. cit., p. 127.

Von Grunebaum, Medieval

Islam, op. cit., p. 240.

Ayrout, op. cit., p. 240.

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49

obstacles appear on the horizon, the skeptic takes refuge in apathy and, consequently, he is prone to lethargy. This partly explains why historically the Arab skeptic, e.g., the peasant and the nomad, has rarely rebelled or is likely to be induced to revolt or to innovate. Thus, in summary, the strata of the Arab society that live complacently - the contented Arab intellectuals, the men with achievement, the diffident peasants, the middle-aged and older, and those living within the security of kinship groups - believe that any radical change in their way of life will probably be for the worse, and therefore they reject those new ideas as "unreal" which are not situationally congruous to the status quo. It is not surprising then that, in most cases, the ABJECTLY POOR Arab, the RICH Arab, the VERY STRONG and the VERY WEAK have conservative attitudes and usually are skeptical regarding the value of new ideas and attempt to perpetuate the existing social order and institutions. They rationalize their stand on the basis of a fear and dread of the future in the light of present human limitations and frailties. Psychologically, this kind of human ingredient acts in most cases as a counter force to the contemporary feeling of insecurity by providing the bulwark of tradition as a norm, whereby the "illusion of good" becomes a "reality", and this type is usually the last to join revolutionary mass movements. It is interesting to note that people who live the full life are least ready to protect their own interests or defend their country. Historically, such default occurred in Mecca in the incipient stages of Islam. A t first the conservative ruling class belittled Muhammed's "mission" as maniacal preachments. By the time it was realized that his movement was detrimental to their interests, he was too well established to be dislodged. A recent incident is the Palestine problem. Well-to-do Palestinians as well as many other affluent Arabs did not fight for the cause in Palestine, although they did give verbal support to the Arab cause. As a matter of fact, people under this classification, which included the majority of landlords, businessmen and the various feudalistic elements, were responsible for part of the Jewish ingression to Palestine. Due to their myopia and avarice they hastened to sell lands and grant concessions to the Jewish agencies in Palestine. Their greed blinded them to the realization that the Jewish Zionist movement was aimed at the establishment of an Israeli state, an undertaking which, if successfully concluded, would be catastrophic to their long-term interests. In short, their conservative outlook sanctioned their venality while shrouding their minds to its consequences. In contemplation, it appears that when

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THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN MASS-MOVEMENTS

men already have what is worth fighting for, they will most likely quit fighting.

B. The Mental Conception and the Role of the Liberal Liberalism refers to the tendency to release some human potentiality from restrictions that are "artificially" imposed by society so that these potentialities might better be realized and brought to their "natural" fruition. The Arab liberal believes that history is a series of comprehensible interrelations that can be used as a measuring rod for human action and conduct. To the Arab liberal, and unlike his fellow conservative, history derives its validity from the IDEA OF CHANGE ITSELF: it is the discovery, the enlightenment, and the driving force of the IDEA which shapes history. He is also of the conviction that while history appears to evolve smoothly and harmoniously, in reality it does so spasmodically due to periodic crises. The belief in the factors of choice or chance, i.e., flexibility in resolving the exigencies of a particular or historical situation, is what sets him apart from his fellow conservative and skeptic. Despite the capriciousness of the human actors involved, the Arab liberal is confident that progress can be made provided circumspection is employed. However, this does not imply a blind belief in the inevitability of progress. The Arab liberal's faith grows out of trust in human rationality and human cooperation. He is naturally tolerant of the opinions, actions and ideas of others, but he is adamant in his opposition to any movement which imposes any form of sanctions. In a psychological context the Arab liberals prefer moderate and constructive values rather than blind adherence to traditional or precipitate adaptation of new values. The "present", as he conceives it, is not only a natural evolvement of the "past", but it is the catalyst for a brighter "future". The Arab liberal is of the conviction that flexible opportunities must be created in economic, political, and social structures so that the individual's psychological state becomes stabilized. Such a task demands however a careful but critical judgment of the past and present so that the road to criticism and evaluation becomes functional and hence leads to CORRECTION and a better future. Such prerequisites are of the utmost urgency for, as traditional ties weaken, the individual must have recourse to other opportunities to construct new and meaningful values in the performance of new functions. Corrective measures once instituted will feed

THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN MASS-MOVEMENTS

51

on the propensity of some elements of the society for further change and eventually the entire society will become progressive in outlook. Consequently, to demand the immediate attainment of extreme goals would upset or overthrow the natural course of the "present" and jeopardize the "future". This trust in human rationality and tolerance could also result in a weakness if not shored up by other means. To illustrate: although liberal minded Arabs are numerous, they are undisciplined and disorganized, hence they lack power and are ineffective, and as a group they feel that they belong outside both the ruling traditional elite and its extreme opposition.20 More perilous however, is their EXTREME OPTIMISM which has biased their intellectual processes. Extreme optimism can be readily warped into self-delusion, and, consequently, desire for change may become obsessive. When overly complaisant, the Arab liberal can be enticed into an untenable position, thereby leading to his disillusionment and eventual disgruntlement. Because of such overpermissiveness, early exponents of liberal Arab nationalism, mostly Christian and western educated Arabs, have withered away. As disillusionment grew with Europe's refusal to extend this aid, Arab nationalism itself became "nationalized" - that is, it spread to nativist Moslem groups with less affinity to the West and with fewer economic ties to property. Unmoored from these moderating influences, Arab nationalism drifted from the relatively calm waters of traditional liberalism, into the violent currents of political extremism . . . Arab liberalism, never more than a tender shoot in an uncongenital environment, finally withered just after World War II . . . The liberals were free to fight against foreign but not against native despotism. Consequently they could make no . . . gains in their own political influence, or in promoting democracy or social welfare . . . Instead, Arab liberals were left with only their ideology to embrace. They became weaker and further removed from the growing nationalist spirit. . . ,21

This overly acquiescent attitude can either paralyze the liberal's freedom for action or push him to an extreme and uncompromising position. Ferhat Abbas, at one time an Algerian liberal, illustrated this tendency in L'Entente on the 23rd of February, 1936: If I had discovered the Algerian nation, I should be a nationalist. But I shall not die for the Algerian motherland, because the motherland does not exist. I have not found it. I have interrogated history, I have interrogated the 20

For a detailed discussion of political parties including the ineffectiveness of the liberal group, see Chapter VII. 21 Berger, The Arab World Today, op. cit., pp. 303-305.

52

THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN MASS-MOVEMENTS

living and the dead. I have visited the cemeteries. Nobody has spoken to me of a motherland.22 He stated further that one has to dismiss once and for all, dreams of an independent Algeria. What in fact the Algerian people were really objecting to behind the word "nationalism" was the lack of political and economic equality with the other French citizens. Ferhat Abbas and his fellow Algerian liberals were appealing to France to abandon its COLONIAL COMPLEX and make Algeria an integral and equal part of itself. In retrospect, the approach of Ferhat Abbas seems remarkably moderate 23 even compared to that of Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia. In 1945 Abbas was elected to the second French Constituent Assembly and his party, the Union Democratique

du Manifeste

Algerian,

won eleven out of thirteen seats allotted to the Algerian Moslems. His trust in human rationality was put on trial when in August 1946 he presented the French Assembly with a plan calling for equal suffrage for all inhabitants whether French or Arab. With a popularly elected parliament, New Algeria would be autonomous in its internal affairs but would be associated with France in defense and foreign relations. Because the plan was rejected, the posture and subsequent conduct of Ferhat Abbas and many Arab Algerian liberals became extremist, culminating in their decision to join the various revolutionary mass movements. Besides the disillusionment attributed to France's despotism, snobbishness, and capriciousness, the Algerian liberals were equally disenchanted with their own conservative countrymen for their lack of sense of public responsibility. Eventually, the liberals either withdrew from the political scene, whereupon the moderates were replaced by more radical leaders, or they drifted towards extreme nationalism rationalizing that by so doing they might be able to redirect the course of •events toward liberalism. This coming together of the disillusioned of all political shades, whether reactionary, liberal, or radical, is characteristic of the various modern Arab nationalist movements. The absoluteness of the transformation is illustrated in the case of Ferhat Abbas by the 1954 change in the title of his newspaper from the translated terms of Equality to The Algerian

Republic.

28 "Self Determination in Algeria: Issues for Referendum", The Round Table: A Quarterly Review of the British Commonwealth Affairs, XLIX (December, 1959,) 34. 83 I. William Zartman, Government and Politics in North Africa (New York, Praeger, 1963), pp. 42-43.

THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN MASS-MOVEMENTS

53

C. The Mental Conceptions and the Roles of the "Radical" and the "Reactionary" Extremism, in the form of radicalism or reactionism, holds that the status quo is inimical to the happiness and well-being of society. Unlike the extreme conservatives who reject all forms of utopia,24 both the extreme radicals and reactionaries are of the conviction that only through the excesses of revolution and Utopian measures can society satisfy its ultimate needs. In its early stages the extremist thinking of the radical and the reactionary is purely antithetical and is manifested in the intellectual struggle between the authoritarianism and libertarianism approach. Illustrative of this is Ben Bella's dim-sighted inability to distinguish between the current democratic principles and republican form of government practiced in the Western societies and the policy of imperialism previously attributed to them. To Ben Bella both western style of democracy and imperialism were synonymous and must be rejected and fought on all grounds. Western democracy, as he conceived it, is simply the political ideology of imperialism and that HIS TYPE of ISM ushers in a new era in the history of mankind. Because the extremist fails to comprehend institutional and historical trends, he has no forbearance for evolution as a means of achieving social reform. Because his view of history is so obtuse, he comprehends life as a dialectic struggle: in the course of time, forces contravening the existing order generate an explosion thereby giving birth to a "utopia"; this "utopia" in turn breaks the tie to the traditional order and develops freely according to its own intrinsic dynamisms. In contrast to the conservative, the liberal, and the skeptic, the Arab radical and the Arab reactionary believe in the future and reject the present; both believe in the adaptability of man's nature and they are less amenable to abiding by the established values. Although they have much in common, the radical and the reactionary differ in their respective approaches and methods of operation. To the radical the infinite perfectability of human nature is indisputable; this conviction rests on the belief that man's environment can be changed through the perfection of the individual's inner self thereby bringing about a spontaneous and healthy reaction in society. The reactionary on the other hand believes that the individual is incapable of perceiving and understanding the extent of his potentiality for good. Therefore, to remain healthy and 24

"Utopia" is used here in a relative sense, which from the conservative's point of view who believes in the merits of the existing order, seems to be unrealizable.

54

THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN MASS-MOVEMENTS

vigorous the future of the nation must be patterned in accordance with the proven model of the past. Reaction is an attempt to reimpose a previously existing order in CONTRAVENTION to an existing system. Radical refers to the tendency to extirpate, or to uproot a phenomenon, and implies the total replacement of what he conceives to be outmoded. Thus the radical rejects the present and emphasizes the future, with little or no link to the past, while the reactionary rejects the present, has little faith in the future, and wishes to return to the ways of the past. Reactionary movements, like those of the radicals, are basically countermoves against the unwanted status quo under the aegis of discontented conservatives. Illustrative of this tendency are the militant but traditionalist Wahhabi and Moslem Brotherhood movements, which are the reactionary movements springing from the soil of an Arab nation. Though the militancy of the Moslem Brotherhood has now been suppressed in Egypt, its appeal and activities continue to provide the masses with an aura of passion; even though suppressed in Egypt, it has yet to be buried. As long as the present unwanted status quo prevails in the Arab society, it is likely that the Moslem Brotherhood will continue to be a spiritualizing force in the realm of politics. This is true because the Moslem Brotherhood calls itself simultaneously "a reformist movement, an orthodox path, a mystic reality, a political society, an athletic group, a scientific and cultural organization, an economic corporation, and a social idea".25 In the words of Nabih Faris, "its ideas and ideals continue to represent the innermost aspirations of Muslims from Morocco to Indonesia".26 Unlike the reactionary movements, radical persuasions are not indigenous, having been transplanted into the Arab World from Europe. Yet, radical movements such as the Arab Socialist Union of Egypt, the Socialist Destour Party of Tunisia, the Ba'ath parties of Syria and Iraq, and the FLN of Algeria, do have characteristics closely analogous to the reactionary movements already discussed. All, which are basically militant, nationalist, and Arabist, tend toward Islamic revival and have displayed some propinquity for anti-imperialism, anti-Europeanism, anti-Lordism and, possibly, anti-Christianity. As a somewhat broad nationalistic movement, all profess allegiance to the principle of "la patrie"; that is, regardless of place of birth, of religion, or of race, an Arab is always an Arab. Even though there are some vast differences 25

Ishak Musa Husaini, The Moslem Brethren (Beirut, Khayat, 1956), p. 15. Nabih Amin Faris, "The Islamic Community and Communism", in Walter Z. Laqueur (ed.), The Middle East in Transition (New York, Praeger, 1958), p. 353. 26

THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN MASS-MOVEMENTS

55

in the doctrines and operational modes of the various parties, all, with the possible exception of the Arab Communist parties, seek power either implicitly or explicitly through unification of the Arab society and an adherence to the tenets of Islam. Fundamentally, the sociological analysis of these revolutionary mass movements is a search for uniformities: in process - "natural history", typical sequences, developmental patterns, adjustment, mechanisms, dynamisms; in functional relationships - as causes and effects, conditions and consequences, means and ends; and in structure formation - groups, institutions, social control and centralization. There are latent and overt differences between the various Arab extremist movements; yet, because their zealotries have common turbulent and chaotic outlets, all can be considered as one from a diagnostic viewpoint. As an illustration, although the fanatic Arab Communist and the fanatic Arab fascist fear, hate, and are intolerant of each other, these very features are the common denominators conditioning in both bodies a similar mental viewpoint and outlook. Consequently, all Arab revolutionary mass movements appeal to and obtain adherents from the same discontented portion of society,27 and those who do respond do so more in a search for a sense of identity, and less because of doctrinal conviction or ideological certitude. Because of a lack of doctrinal or ideological convictions, individuals, if unable to satisfy their personal aspirations, are prone to vacillate in membership among the various movements. Thus, all Arab revolutionary mass movements are in constant competition for recruits, particularly among the young; and inasmuch as their respective members are easily proselytized, there is much mobility in membership among them. Because allegiances are so easily transferred, mass movement strengths rise and fall accordingly. While it is difficult to substantiate this fact it is generally believed that with the overthrow of the regime of Nuri el-Sa'id, for instance, Kassemism became increasingly popular and was joined by defectors from Nasserism to the extent that the latter's growth was considerably slowed down in Iraq. As Professor Dwight J. Simpson brings out: President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, the driving force of Pan-Arabism as well as the most truculent Arab opponent of Israel, has suffered a great personal setback . . .The center of gravity in Arab politics is noticeably shifting from the Nile northward to Damascus and Baghdad. Indeed the next bid for leadership in a united Arab world may well come from General Abdel 27

Robert Lindner, Prescription for Rebellion (New York, Rinehart & Co., 1952), pp. 183-184.

56

THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN MASS-MOVEMENTS

Karim Kassim in Baghdad by means of an attempted revival of some variation of the old Fertile Crescent scheme linking Iraq, Syria, and Jordan.28

A further setback for Nasser's movement resulted from his failure to eliminate, the rival Ba'ath party during the short-lived union of Egypt and Syria. Since the dissolution of the union in 1961, the Ba'ath party has grown even stronger and is still one of the more active forces competing with President Nasser in the Arab east. When one movement loses favor in the eyes of an adherent, the latter is quick to join another espousing his particular mundane objectives. Thus despite some predilection, there is no assured common source of converts to any particular Arab ISM, be it Nasserism, Ba'athism or the Moslem Brotherhood, and the fervor of any particular adherent for any cause is no true measure as to his continued participation within that particular movement. RURALIZATION VERSUS URBANIZATION: THE HORIZONTAL APPROACH

Previously we have examined what might be termed the vertical aspect of revolutionary mass movements, that is, the types of individuals conservative, skeptic, liberal, reactionary, and radical - and their proclivity to join these movements. Now, the focus of this section will be on the horizontal aspect, to wit, the pervasive influence of an urban or a rural setting on the formation of revolutionary mass movements. A. The Vulnerability

of Arab Peasantry Mass Movements

to

Revolutionary

Some Middle East specialists emphasize too often the fact that no living culture is static. This is only one side of the coin for change is meaningless unless it is projected against a BASELINE where time and intensity as well as depth and extensiveness are measured. Thus, the difference between the rural and the urban way of life is one of relative differences between STATICISM and DYNAMISM. A community made up of Arab peasantry, in which life approaches staticism, tends to restrict competition of all sorts and to limit social climbing; its sociological outlook becomes more a way of CONTENTMENT and CONTAINMENT. That the emotional discontent of the peasants and farmers, fed by economic 28

Dwight J. Simpson, "Israel: The Continuing Struggle", Current History, (April, 1962), 209.

XLII

THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN MASS-MOVEMENTS

57

distress, could in time be developed as a valuable asset to the rise of revolutionary mass movements cannot be disputed. One must, however, have reservations as to the dynamic role of the peasantry, for careful analysis suggests that the driving forces of contemporary Arab revolutionary mass movements derive their potency from urban radicalism. Peasant REBELLIONS, with few exceptions, have been traditional, localized, and ritualistic rather than political, universal, and revolutionary. "Fatalism in Islam exists only in polarity with rebellion. The constant tension between these two poles indeed explains why fatalism can exhibit itself with dignity and why rebellion has so often been merely momentary, impulsive, or unsure." 29 The awareness that they are being denied the opportunity to advance their self-interest is not a sufficiently strong prerequisite to implant in them the seed of a revolutionary spirit. It is possible that the peasants may become revolutionary rather than simply rebellious in spirit before their minds are fully liberated from the realm of ignorance, fatalism and passivity. Vague awareness of the new way of life may be enough to convince them of its values, but it would not be enough to liberate the self or to enable them to reach a higher level of sophistication. True, outbursts in the nature of peasant rebellions did occur in contemporary Arab history, and this can be best illustrated by a fierce incident that occurred in June 1951 at Buhut, a village on the estates of the Badrawi-Ashur family in the Gharbiya Province of Egypt.30 Such an outburst of peasant rioting, however, is sporadic and local in nature. If the peasants are becoming more restless and no longer satisfied to remain quiescent, this is due less to their independent effort and revolutionary zeal than to the efforts of the political-revolutionary leaders to organize the peasants into collective bodies. In the Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states of Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Tunisia, peasant organizations under the guidance of the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION have been in existence only during the last few years. If they continue to progress, they might close the gap between the urban areas and the countryside so that issues which are vital to the country at large will become the interests of all concerned, including the peasants. The question persists however: to what degree are the Arab peasants who work and die for the society immune to the appeal of revolutionary mass movements? True, they are the traditionally poor, but what counts most is that they live purposeful lives. The peasants "show the same 2

» Halpern, op. cit., pp. 220-221. Al-Ahram, June 24, 1951; also December 30, 1953.

30

58

THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN MASS-MOVEMENTS

humility towards their earthly masters as towards the psychic powers . . . The fellah is never allowed to raise his head, thanks to the urgent work that lies in front of him . . . His behavior has been conditioned by the long habit of slavery . . ,".31 Their daily struggle to earn a meal and go to sleep on a full stomach is a physical accomplishment as well as a psychological self-fulfillment - it is a victory in itself. The rigor of their long hours of hard work is an obstacle to daydreaming, and it allows them little or no time to nurse grievances. True, the peasants most likely will continue to starve, but they are conditioned by disaster and ready to accept and bear any hardship. The intensified struggle for bare subsistence, generally, is a negative rather than a positive influence. It is one of the fundamental reasons for the unrebelliousness of their attitude. Thus, inordinate misery does not always or automatically generate discontent, nor is the intensity of discontent in peasants directly proportionate to the degree of their poverty. "Quite clearly", says Bernard Lewis, "warning of the threat to liberty and property are unlikely to move those who possess neither." 32 To revolt against poverty is not a sufficient cause to wage a revolution, even though the desire for revolutionary means of righting wrongs is obvious and of a burning certainty. There is a general misconception that the peasants are the backbone of recent Arab revolutionary mass movements.33 It is generally agreed that those with simple belief and deep convictions in religious faith (a strong trait of the Arab peasant) are better able to resist a continual barrage upon their minds than are those with inner conflict, doubts, or semi-sophistication, as in the case of the Arab urban dwellers, TRADITIONAL ISLAM, shored up by the family structure, is still of prime importance and forms a coherent pattern for the rural dwellers. Its "extraordinary political and social system of action - mobile in all its parts yet static as a whole - is rare in human annals for its endurance. This resilient system has been one of traditional Islam's greatest, yet least appreciated, achievements."34 Psychologically, 'folk Islam turned its discontent inward and sought a better world through mysticism or dissipated its frustrations through politically innocent exercises . . .".35 It provides peasants with a reasonably stable rationale for their daily 31

Lacouture, Egypt in Transition, op. cit., p. 27. Bernard Lewis, "Communism and Islam", in Walter Z. Laqueur (ed.), The Middle East in Transition ( N e w York, Praeger, 1958), p. 316. 33 N a d a v Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 104-106. 34 Halpern, op. cit., p. 10. 3 5 Ibid., p. 24. 32

THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN MASS-MOVEMENTS

59

conduct, which in turn gives them a degree of security. Despite the theoretical tenet of Islamic equalitarianism, the peasants are subordinate to the will of the ruler, the landlord and the tyrant, and yet, sociologically they see no coercion in this required obedience. The bulk of them do not feel the imposition of despotism, humiliation or discrimination because they have been culturally conditioned for centuries to accept the existing status. So long as they are protected from outside influences and are not aware of a new order and its benefits, it is most likely that they will remain inert in the face of revolutionary movements and oppose any radical changes in their way of life. It is fallacious to believe that poverty alone breeds unhappiness. The peasant, despite his restricted status, is not a perpetually unhappy person. He is naturally reluctant to part with the familiar and embrace the novel, even when it is apparent that the NEW is necessary and possibly even desirable. It would never occur to the orthodox farmer or poor peasant that he should be unhappy or should be pitied because he is unable to move from one status to another. His religion and culture have arranged his life so that he can rationalize his whole social system. TRADITIONAL ISLAM and local environment give him ample provision for his social and emotional needs. "His main concern", says Saliba, "is with his private welfare, and he is egocentric in his family . . . as though any system imposed from outside must be inherently chaotic because it must be composed of the incompatible inclinations, desires and interests of individuals."36 The mass peasantry is not free of phobia, but its persistent insecurity lacks the ambivalence of the intelligentsia or the pulsing activism of the urban mass. The force that causes oscillations in the policy of the Arab government today "is a town proletariat, not a Peasant Jacquerie".37 The "beginning of a revolution is in reality the end of a belief".38 But how can a revolution from within be expected where centuries of economic gouging have been unable to mine his [peasant] character of the rich spiritual heritage which molds his attitude toward his God and his fellow men. He shows an incredible capacity for thrift, for hard work, patience and perseverance . . . And if he is slow to adopt new ideas, it is only because the horizons of his learning have been so limited and he has lived so long on the threshold of famine that he cannot afford to take a chance. 89 36

Jamil Saliba, Trends of Thought in Syria and Lebanon (in Arabic) (Cairo, Institute of Higher Arab Studies, Arab League, 1958), p. 30. 37 Monroe, op. cit., p. 65. 36 Le Bon, op. cit., pp. 142-143. 39 Fryer, op. cit., p. 52.

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THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN MASS-MOVEMENTS

The Arab peasant is apathetic, but such an apathy may well conceal complex feelings. He may harbor aspirations for a better way of life, but he may simultaneously feel reluctance to abandon the familiar - the traditional ways which offer social protection and psychic security in the face of poverty. He is traditionalistic without vitality since the "millenniums of unredeemed oppression, and more recently the debilitating effects of endemic diseases, have produced in him an exceptionally passive and docile mentality".40 Given the fact that the authority of the governments and the impact of modernization are directed toward an acceleration of the disintegration of traditional isolation the success, however, has been very limited and far short of the claim.41 The "impact of these changes should not be exaggerated [for] the rural world to which the majority of Arabs belongs has hardly changed in any fundamental sense".42 This hiatus is more obvious in the urban areas where the velocity of change has proceeded at a much faster rate. Mass communication and transportation media have weakened the isolationist leanings of the rural dwellers, yet traditional institutions remain their mentors and are still influential in directing their minds. Moreover, behind SECULAR APPEARANCES enough religio-traditional fervor still exists that cannot be ignored. They are still shut in by their conservative thinking, their old habits and their environment. They are still bound to their land, confined to their work, and restricted in their social activities to their families, mosques and villages.43 The profound linkage of personal identity is still strong and to "leave one's sect was to leave one's world, and to live without loyalties, the protection of a community, the consciousness of solidarity and the comfort of normality".44 The peculiarity of the peasant's personality cannot be stipulated in psychological terms as either introverted or extroverted. There are, however, ample instances to support the fact that the peasant way of life is still predominantly one of introverted disposition - a fatalistic way of thinking spares the individual from doubt and guarantees him a sense of certainty. The legacy of the past, most particularly Islam, and environmental factors have left a deep impression on the mind of the Arab Moslem, especially the rural dweller. Within the compass of Islam, the peasant 40

Issawi, Egypt: An Economic and Social Analysis, op. cit., p. 156. Patai, op. cit., p. 8. 42 Hisham B. Sharabi, Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World (Princeton, New Jersey, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966), p. 13. 43 Ayrout, op. cit., pp. 21, 110. 44 Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, op. cit., p. 64. 41

IHE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN MASS-MOVEMENTS

61

"can adapt resiliency to the permanent tension between justice and power, and ratify the inescapable with shrewd forebearance".45 But TRADITIONAL ISLAM also induces an acceptance of fatalism, an acceptance which, while common to both urban and rural dweller, is made fuller for the rural dweller by his ignorance of his environment and his deeper belief in the traditional way of life. Likewise, the instinct toward rebellion is ever present, but it is more obvious in an urban dweller because this individual is more subject to suggestions and more aware of the dynamic changes of his environment than his rural fellow-countryman. The difference here is not so much of kind but of degree; still, it is wide enough to discount any notion that the abjectly poor and exploited peasants would rebel as easily as the city dwellers. Given the right leadership there is the probability, however, that the peasantry could become a revolutionary force.46 B. The "in-between": The Semi-Urbanized Ex-Peasants Undoubtedly, the process of sociation which is taking place in the countryside is, according to Georg Simmel, one of a constant interchange of ASSOCIATION and DISSOCIATION.47 However, it is as easy for the casual observer to overstate the change beyond the bounds of reality as it is to overlook both the obvious and the concealed facts related to the matter. The most that could be said is that there are some psychologically uprooted people in the peasant communities who feel insecure because their old, and once highly ordered social structure, has been disrupted. These are what we call, for lack of a better term, the SEMIURBANIZED EX-PEASANTS who, by force of circumstances, turn anxiously to revolutionary mass movements in order to find a new sense of belonging. Under such conditions, the act of participation is neither one of rational linkage between alternative policies nor one of personal preferences and motivations but merely a psychologically motivated move to find new associations in order to escape existing realities. The character of the SEMI-URBANIZED EX-PEASANTS can, however, be best understood when the importance of communicational facilities is taken into consideration. During World War II, the Arab world became a theater of war. The ferment of ideas and the perception of tangible 45

Halpern, op. cit., p. 34. Dorsey, op. cit., pp. 762-763. 47 The Concept of "sociation" was developed by Georg Simmel. See: Kurt H. Wolff (ed. and trans.), The Sociology of Georg Simmel (New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1950). 49

THE ROLE O F THE INDIVIDUAL IN

62

MASS-MOVEMENTS

objects which accompanied the War became a turning-point in the development of the area. For the first time the SEMI-URBANIZED E X PEASANTS were introduced to the bewilderment of modern mass society. Their rate of mobility began to accelerate and with it the process of sociation. Retarding the latter process, however, has been the failure of the urban society fully to reintegrate them into a new and orderly social structure.48 Urban employment, stringent work hours, punctual timing for arrival at work, and other urban disciplinary measures involving new forms of interpersonal relationships, have not been familiar traits to the SEMI-URBANIZED E X - P E A S A N T S . In spite of the fact that they have been able to accommodate themselves to the new forms of city behavior and related sanctions, the problems of this over-all adjustment are still acute. The dilemma is obvious: on the one hand, the retention of rural traditional ties and values restrict such adjustments; and the failure to conform to the traditional ways of life has resulted in severe sanctions, in many instances, because the SEMI-URBANIZED E X - P E A S A N T S are still tied to their villages in many ways. On the other hand, normlessness and insecurity result not only from the absence of behavior-regulating norms, but also as a consequence of attempts to cope with the new anxiety born out of the conflict between the urban and rural ways of life. The alternatives have been limited. The SEMI-URBANIZED E X - P E A S A N T S must either withdraw from the obligations of both systems and thereby become truly alienated or join revolutionary mass movements in the hope of gaining new perspectives, new forms and a much needed sense of belonging. It is no wonder then that all contemporary Arab revolutionary mass movements, and at one time the Moslem Brotherhood also, have a very high proportion of SEMI-URBANIZED E X - P E A S A N T followers. Urbanization, an unfamiliar process to the peasant, has no beginning or end, but takes place continuously at varying speeds. It is politically and socially significant that during the War the demand for workers was unceasing; hence, there was a great increase of peasant migration to the cities. The influx continues unabated, and the urban explosion has reached gigantic proportions, thus initiating a severe social disruption. During the War, the economic conditions of the Arab city dwellers improved, and the SEMI-URBANIZED E X - P E A S A N T S became accustomed 48

The

term

SEMI-URBANIZED EX-PEASANTS i s m e a n t

to

include:

the

vagrants,

the unskilled laborers, taxi drivers, and similar categories whose origin could be traced back to the first generation of peasants and farmers who migrated to the cities and urban centers.

THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN MASS-MOVEMENTS

63

to a better standard of living. After the War and subsequent to the achievement of independence, economic prosperity declined, and slum areas expanded rapidly.19 Rising expectations and resultant pressures compelled leaders to promise the urban dwellers economic improvement, but they failed to adopt policies in fulfillment of this obligation. It is here that discontent has become most acute, because human satisfaction is not judged by one's own existing conditions alone, but is related to the condition of other social groups against which the individual measures his situation. These instances like so many of the contemporary pressing problems of the Arab countries "arise not from traditional isolation but from modern changes".50 Discontent is most intense when misery becomes bearable and an ideal state seems almost within reach.51 The peak of danger does not involve the abject and the starving peasant as is so often stated, but is more prevalent in the aspiring city dwellers - mostly laborers, SEMI-URBANIZED EX-PEASANTS, aimless indolents - who are the main recruits of the various revolutionary mass movements.52 For the last few decades many of these SEMI-URBANIZED EX-PEASANTS, especially those from North Africa, have been forced to cross the sea and to crowd into the industrial areas of Paris, Metz, or Lyons, France and into similar places in Germany, Italy, and England. They were forced into such a situation because of such compelling reasons as the shortage of work at home caused by abnormal increase in population and the collapse of the local economies. Most of them were not true immigrants as were, for instance, the early American settlers. Some have returned to their little rural communities, but the bulk of the returnees have settled in the urban slums, deeply marked by their experiences in Europe. Because of these experiences and their present plight they have often felt deep humiliation. It is safe to say that the SEMI-URBANIZED EX-PEASANTS who came into close contact with Europeans - those who joined the French Army in Algeria,53 Tunisia and Syria, or the British Army in Egypt, Palestine and Iraq, and who fought 49

A. J. Meyer, "Economic Modernization", in Georgiana G. Stevens (ed.), The United States and the Middle East (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964), p. 63. 50 Myint, op. cit., p. 24. 51 Monroe, op. cit., pp. 67-68. 52 Lewis, "Communism and Islam", op. cit., p. 317. 53 According to some estimates there were 94,300 Algerian soldiers who had fought on the side of the Allies in the First World War. See: Ammar Bouhouche, "The Origins of Political Agitation for Independence of Algeria", Arab Journal, II (Fall, 1965), 6.

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in Europe - have provided a large number of recruits in the "wars of liberation" and have supported revolutionary mass movements. It is no coincidence, then, that the nationalist movements first attract this element of the Arab population 54 for they "have probably moved further from a rebellious to a revolutionary spirit than any other peasants" 35 in the entire Arab World. C. The Docility and Upheaval of the Urban Centers The assumption is often made that certain Arab revolutionary mass movements, as for instance the Moslem Brotherhood, recruit a relatively large number of their followers from the rural-agrarian communities. This however obscures the fact that the modern Arab revolutionary mass movements have been predominantly the products of the urbanindustrial areas.56 The significant fact, not at all unique to Arab society, is that revolutionary mass movements, in general, are mostly the result of rapid industrial-urbanization and the concomitant influx of people.57 The Arab urban centers, in the course of this century, have acted in a far more decisive role as, what Toynbee has so aptly called, HUMAN TRANSFORMERS, than the Western urban centers. The impact of modernization in the Arab community has transformed the urban centers into almost non-indigenous oases in a native desert. This explanation is not meant to state categorically that changes and processes are confined to the geographic limits of the urban centers but, rather, to point up the fact that the VELOCITY OF CHANGE is much slower and markedly different in the rural than in the urban areas. This, also, should not be interpreted to mean that the movement is confined to the urban communities because hinterland support is required for the extension of the movement's fundamental principles and its power. One should not be deceived by what appear to be rural uprisings or peasant movements, because once the forces of revolution are carefully examined they will frequently be found to have originated in the urban centers. Sociologically, city life evokes little loyalty. Consequently, the life of the individual is determined by two opposing needs - one requiring individuation and the other conformity to society - both of which op54

Germaine Tillion, "L'Algerie en 1957", reprinted in L'Afrique bascule vers I'avenir, Editions de Minuit (1960), p. 39. 53 Halpern, op. cit., p. 96. 56 Safran, op. cit., pp. 202, 203, 243. 57 Norman Cohen, The Pursuit of the Millennium (Fairlawn, Essential Books, 1957), pp. 21-32.

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erate simultaneously. Under ideal circumstances, the need for conformity is balanced by the need for individuality. Yet equilibrium is extremely hard to achieve in an urbanized community where the majority of the people have long suffered from low standards of living and severe mental depression. The urbanized individual is more bitter and deeply resentful, and thus he more readily accepts the promises of any movement than his rural fellow countryman. "The Arab city", says Hans E. Tutsch, "is always full of tension . . . A l l social action . . . has the city as its center [and it] never really formed a community in the full sense of the word." 5 8 This in part explains "why in times of political upheaval the docility of the urban masses often erupts into startling acts of violence and cruelty." 59 The importance of the Arab urban center lies in its roles as COMMUNICATOR, from which all ideas and lines of communications radiate, and as INNOVATOR where these ideas and values are interpreted, evaluated, modified, and promulgated. More than any city or town in the West, the cities and towns in the Middle East are exchange posts for trade and ideas, centers of worship and governmental institutions.60 The INNOVATORS are the marginal men, the culture brokers, merchants, teachers, government agents, religious men-all of whom constantly move between the urban and rural areas and who carry, distribute and even interpret the new ideas in the rural communities. City activities resemble the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a CENTRAL GENERATOR. F r o m this CENTRAL GENERA-

TOR - government bureaucracies, political parties, mass movements, religious organizations - the power is fed into the grid which switches this current to other sub-stations in the hinterlands where it is transformed into new patterns of behavior. The intensity of the dynamism tends to decrease as the distance from the CENTRAL GENERATOR increases because of the likelihood that the local forces of the rural power grids will attenuate the power of the CENTRAL GENERATOR. The distance between the hinterlands and the CENTRAL GENERATOR explains in part why peasants and villagers are not affected initially by revolutionary mass movements. The role of the city as a CENTRAL GENERATOR has always been of great significance. "Islam", says Morroe Berger, "is an Urban religion that emerged from urban needs and desires . . .".61 From the desert of Hans E. Tutsch, Facets of Arab Nationalism (Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1965), p. 22. 59 Sharabi, Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World, op. cit., p. 12. 60 Partner, op. cit., p. 10. 61 Berger, The Arab World Today, op. cit., pp. 37, 39. 58

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Arabia, Islamic strongholds were first established in the cities of Medina and Mecca, where civilization was more advanced and dynamic. Far from being sleepy towns, both were busy, commercial communities the nerve center of trade between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea areas. Both were ideal for political and social fermentation, and both represented deep class conflicts and resentments. Both cities had atmospheres that induced a constant struggle (although at most times a hidden one) between the underprivileged and the bourgeois oligarchy, and provided rich ground for the seeds of religious, social, political and economic revolution. In Egypt, the spread of Islam occurred first in Cairo and similarly urbanized centers, and in Syria, it was at Damascus that Islam triumphed. "Not until the second and third centuries of the Moslem era did the bulk of the people in Syria, Mesopotamia and Persia profess the religion of Muhammad." 62 Not until then were the majority of the people (mostly from the hinterlands) willing to reject Christianity and become favorably disposed to Islam. It took decades before Islam as a movement was able to convert the whole area, for the physical isolation and the SKEPTICAL-CONSERVATIVE attitude of the peasants held back the spread of Islam in the rural areas. Today too, the people of the cities and big towns are responsible for generating the rise of the various Arab revolutionary mass movements. Even the Moslem Brotherhood, which has been regarded largely as a reactionary movement, did not spring from the rural soil of Egypt, but had its origins in the slums of the cities and suburban areas. Hasan al-Banna (1906-1946) started his movement in Ismaila, a city on the Suez Canal. Soon his oratorical power, his Koranic preaching, his extraordinary talent, his logical simplicity and his audacious courage paid dividends when he, as a teacher, was transferred to Cairo where the atmosphere for political activity was more fruitful. It was here that the activities of the Moslem Brotherhood were transformed into a dynamic political force. Its success was due not only to the distribution of new ideas and other societal factors but also, and more important, to the heterogeneity of the urban population whose relative freedom from the confines of tradition made them more vulnerable to such movements. Rapid urbanization in recent years serves as a barometer of the political intensity of mass unrest. According to the best available estimates, the total population of the Arab society living in urban areas 62 Philip K. Hitti, The Arabs: A Short History Henry Regnery Company, 1956), p. 61.

(Chicago, A Gateway Edition,

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ranges from 23 to 37 per cent 63 and the constant flow into these areas is ever increasing. There is also evidence64 that metropolitan centers, such as Cairo, Baghdad and Tunis, are growing at a faster rate than the smaller cities and towns, e.g., Tripoli in Lebanon, Sfax in Tunisia and Homs in Syria. Cairo is typical of this phenomenon: during World War II the population increase there was greater than that of the next twenty largest Egyptian towns combined.65 This is so because the urban centers contain many enticements - jobs in governmental bureaucracies, public institutions, industries, the trade establishment, and financial concerns.66 Charity for the poor and opportunity for those who are seeking better education are some of the attractions that bring individuals to metropolitan centers and discourage migration to smaller urban centers. This is enough to force any government, for various political reasons, to alleviate urban poverty by means of various economic schemes at the expense of rural development. The youth who flock to the universities and technical schools in an effort to prepare themselves for specialized positions illustrate the point. In Egypt, for example, "some 100,000 Egyptians enrolled in the four state universities of the country, which represents an attendance rate nearly twice that of Britain".67 Events have shattered their hopes. These dissatisfied so-called HALF-EDUCATED young people, who left the village and have no desire to return, have already swelled the ranks of revolutionary movements. They have shown their capacity to convert socioeconomic instability into political crises. For various psychological and sociological reasons, these HALF-EDUCATED young people have, consistently, resisted identification with the workers and have refused to accept jobs on a lower plane. They have regarded their social position as somehow above manual labor and they subscribe to a firm conviction that society owes them the privileges of prestige, respect, and social deference. This excess of high school and university graduates who insist on jobs in government and on living in the city in an unbalanced 63

Morroe Berger (ed.), The New Metropolis in the Arab World (New Delhi, India, Allied Publishers, 1963), p. 5. 64 Economic Bulletin of the National Bank of Egypt, Observations on the Urbanization and Distribution of Agricultural Population in Egypt, Vol. 8 (Cairo, Government Press, 1955), pp. 171-181. 85 U . N . Department of Economic Affairs, Research Memorandum N o . 11, Middle East: Population (March, 1951), p. 10. 66 For more extensive work on population and urbanization see: Berger (ed.), The New Metropolis in the Arab World, passim. 67 Malcolm H. Kerr, "Egypt Under Nasser", Headline Series, N o . 161 (SeptemberOctober, 1963), 33-34.

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economy has created massive pressure upon governments. A. V. Sherman's study shows that before the Egyptian Revolution some "33 per cent of all those with primary education, 50 per cent of those with secondary education, and over 75 per cent of university graduates worked for the government".68 The percentages are believed to be even higher in some other Arab states, and the numbers of young aspirants grow at a much faster rate than the institutions can absorb them. Even those who are employed, through special skills or influence, are usually engaged in positions which do not satisfy them, and consequently they suffer mental anguish. Such people belong to the ranks of the SPIRITUALLY UNEMPLOYED and are very susceptible to the various revolutionary mass movements. Two novel trends account for much of this imbalance. On the one hand, while the industrial capacity of the urban areas has increased, it has been able to absorb but a small percentage of the new surplus manpower. Unlike the Western metropolitan areas, which are highly industrialized and possess a refined division of labor, the Arab metropolitan areas have, on the whole, a weak industrial base and are unable to sustain a broad front of services to absorb the heavy unemployment and to alleviate poverty. Arab metropolitan centers have far more manpower than is warranted by their economic-industrial base which is predominantly based upon cheap labor connected with commerce, handicraft, tourism and governmental services. Hence, this has resulted in a non-economically productive, floating population. On the other hand, the trend of modernization and the increase of mass communication media has had a deep psychological impact. The non-productive population has become an agglutinative body of aimless indolence. Further, the non-productive population has also become familiar with the process of modernization and so their demands and desires for a better way of life have grown. This discrepancy between their desires and the availability of resources to satisfy them has produced an intensification of discontent. The crux of the matter is well expressed in the following: The juxtaposition of the two cities «md the appalling contrast between them accelerated the development of specific class feelings among some of the inhabitants of the ancient town and stirred up in most of them a deep envy and resentment of the new city and its privileged dwellers. This resentment found expression in a massive lower-class movement which . . . proclaimed 68

A. V. Sherman, "Nationalism and Communism in the Arab World: A Reappraisal", in Walter Z. Laqueur (cd.), The Middle East in Transition (New York. Praeger, 1958), p. 449.

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a moral revolt against the pleasures and amenities supplied by the new city that were beyond the reach of the poor.«» D. The Young Arab - a Way of Urban Extremism The traditional Arab way of life is still viable and guides Arabs in the management of their everyday affairs. However, in recent years ArabIslamic culture has shown some fundamental weaknesses; consequently, many Arabs, the young in particular, feel that their lives are without real significance because the values and concepts under which they are living have been outmoded. Because traditional values and concepts consist of conflicting and authoritarian dematids compelling absolute obedience and absolute performance, the young Arabs have become victims to constant and extreme tension. Their way of life, from childhood to maturity, has been directed into servile cultural obligations and submissive attitudes. Imitation and conformity take precedence over creativity and free discussion. This reduces their behavior and thinking into patterns of CONDITIONED REFLEXES and AUTOMATIC ACTIONS. Young people lack opportunity to attain healthy individuality and to develop a balanced formation of their personalities. They have yet to be socially weaned from parental guidance and dependency on the family. Thus they are not self-reliant, are unable to solve their personal problems, are lacking in initiative, are reluctant to assume responsibility for their personal fortunes, and are unwilling to compete for personal accomplishment. Consequently, the young strive to avoid the unconventional in order to avoid punishment; this repression, psychologically, may, to some extent, account for their lack of initiative. As a reaction to this psychological suppression, the young Arabs are usually impassive and they tend to exchange their inherent insecurity for fancied security in mass groups, i.e., mass movements, thereby becoming even more conformist and submissive, though reluctantly so. "When a man is eighteen" writes Thiebault, . . he belongs to any party that will attack.. ,".70 The historical study of the various Arab revolutionary mass movements reveals elements of factual evidence and truth common to them all. The growth of Islam as a religion is illustrative. While it is true that the first converts were from the household and from among the immediate friends of Muhammad - 7 1 Ali, 68

Safran, op. cit., p. 187. Louis Madelin, The French Revolution (London, William Hennemann, 1918), p. 30. 71 Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at Mecca (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1953), pp. 88-89. 70

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Abu Bakr, Umar, Al-Zubayr, Abd al-Rahman, Saad, Tallah, and Uthman - the bulk were, however, mainly from the poor and from the young people.72 In his book, The Middle East, Professor Sydney N. Fisher further elaborates: Some had neither family nor clan ties, and the families of others had ceased for one reason or another to afford them protection . . . To characterize this group the term "young men" . . . [is] the most appropriate. Early Islam was a movement of young people, mostly well under forty years old and from the middle class of Mecca. They were individuals w h o felt their inferior positions when they compared their wealth and influence with the fortunes and power of those at the top. 73

Islam was essentially a dynamic movement of young individuals who were seeking, through the newly emerging religion, to improve their position in their society. As M. Watt pointed out: "It was not so much a struggle between 'haves' and "have nots' as between 'haves' and 'nearly hads.'" 7 4 Furthermore, Islam was, at first, a movement that attracted individuals that belonged mostly to the middle layers of the social scale rather than "of 'down-and-outs', of the scum of the population, of 'hangers-on' with no strong tribal affiliation who had drifted into Mecca";75 neither the contented rich nor the abjectly poor but those who were discontent but NOT QUITE DESTITUTE. One recent example is the "volunteers for the cause of Palestine", better known as the Fedayin. Unlike the conservatives and the skeptics who have proved unwilling to fight, and like the Mouhajerin (emigrants) of Mecca and the Ansar (helpers) of Medina who carried Islam to victory, the Fedayin, while lacking strong organization and discipline, are ready to fight for the cause of Palestine. The spirit of these revolutionary Commandos has emerged as a dynamic social force, a revolutionary group which has voluntarily undertaken a mission envisioned as part of the manifest destiny of the young Arabs. Unlike their parents who fatalistically accept their lot and remain submissively in the ignominious security of refugee camps, the younger generation zealously undertakes to revenge past defeat and regain Arab honor. Their fervent 72

William R. Polk and W. J. Butler, "The Arabs' Past", in Grant S. McClellan (ed.), The Middle East in the Cold War (New York, H. H. Wilson Company, 1956), p. 57. 73 Sydney Nettleton Fisher, The Middle East: A History (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), p. 33. 74 Watt, op. cit., p. 96. 75 Ibid.

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determination and attempts to regain their homeland, as a step in the re-establishment of the once glorious Arab Empire, are vigorous and galvanizing incentives. As a political group the Fedayin are volatile and easily incited to action; however, to paraphrase the words of Le Bon, they lack a capacity for restraint. Once activated, they respond to the most esoteric incitement, thus their behavior is excessively erratic. Under duress their mental faculties vacillate, thus their actions are capricious and unpredictable.76 Like the Mouhajerin and the Ansar, the Fedayin's impulse 77 to fight is ever present, so they are always in the forefront of the Arab unity movement, prepared to die for their cause. Their pugnacity and spirit of sacrifice spring mainly from their chauvinism, their sense of having been treated unjustly and, to a much lesser degree, from the hope for fulfillment of their venal interests. Conditioned in a disciplinary milieu to relieve his repressions by the use of an escapist device, the young adult may react either by developing an ambivalent feeling of love and hate toward all authority whether parents or leaders, or he may seek release by finding a shelter for his recalcitrancies in associations, clubs, sororities, and similar organizations. Either way, docility and rebellion, love and hate, all live side by side within him. The pseudo-ideal of equalitarian values and methods of the peer-groups give him a sense of confidence and security unattainable under family roofs.78 His immaturely analytical mind contrasts parental and academic authoritarian ways with the equalitarian ones of his peer-groups, concluding that the latter are the more promising and rewarding. Young and immature, he lacks the ability to communicate with others. Unable to explore, experiment, or investigate, he can only display his attitudes in reaction to some outside stimulus. At this stage of development where the traditional means are no longer acceptable as a way to the realization of his expectations, the young Arab alleviates his state of confusion and sheds responsibility for personal action by joining radical or reactionary movements thereby gaining a feeling of "belonging". An excellent illustration is Gamal Abdel Nasser, who, in his youth, successively joined the "Muslim Brotherhood, the Wafd, Misr al Fatat, Communist, and Socialist"79 parties of Egypt. As rebels, usually without a cause, the young Arabs reject communi76

Le Bon, op. cit., pp. 36-37. Emil Lengyel, The Changing Middle East (New York, The John Day Company, 1960), pp. 97-99. 78 Adams, op. cit., pp. 229-230. 79 Wynn, op. cit., pp. 30, 24.

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cation which they consider authoritarian in origin, content, or tone. They demand equalitarian proposals, even if traditional values and institutions are thereby threatened. However, this very passion for equality, at a time of turbulence in society, is conducive to an excessive uniformity that might eventually destroy the much sought-after liberty. Massification tends to produce conformity rather than individuality, mediocre rather than well adjusted personalities. At this stage the Arab revolutionary mass movement becomes more portentous. Although devious, one ruse effectively used is to give the young individual the impression that the doctrine of the movement is anti-authoritarian in implication as well as anti-absolutistic in pretension. Systematic integration and logical consistency are not questioned; for the young, however arrived at, GRANDEUR OF MISSION is the absolute premise assuring him a much-needed security. President Nasser is well aware of the value of the young to his movement and therefore constantly encourages their participation: I am glad to meet here the cream of the mother country's youth who represent in their assembly here all parts of homeland . . . Indeed, the responsibility of the individual towards himself vanishes with insignificance when compared with his responsibility toward the whole . . . As I told you before, aloofness, isolation, and separatism are society's deadly enemies. We should fight them with all our might, and this can only be done by union through love, cooperation and true brotherhood.80

For the first time in Arab history, revolutionary mass movements have become the only instruments that give the young individual, regardless of background, social status or family wealth, a common denominator and cementing force which can be summarized by "one for all" and "all for one". To the young Arab this means equality and self-respect. When the young dons his party uniform he identifies himself not as a Moslem or Christian, a peasant or wealthy man, but, rather, an ARAB espousing his Beloved Nation. The impact is tremendous: symbolically and psychologically, the uniform gives him a sense of belonging, an identification with the GRANDEUR OF CAUSE, participation in the noble mission of manifest destiny. To BELONG instills a feeling of enhanced selfhood, substitutes an aura of power and might, magnificence and grandeur for his previous insignificance and personal obscurity. The so-called "private self" becomes "common self" and "self-cause" becomes "collectivecause". Self-transcendence is self-transformation, inferiority transforms into superiority, and the feeling of self-abasement is replaced by self80

Nasser's Speeches,

1959, pp. 380-381.

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aggrandizement. After intense propagandization, the young become antipathetic to the use of reason or logic, fanaticism becomes the new normative foundation, and political expediency substitutes for justice. In the words of Herbert L. Matthews: T h e y lack the understanding to distinguish between t h e desire and the realization of the desire and between feasibility and impossibility. A s a m e m b e r of a movement, the concept of impossible disappears f r o m the faculties of the mind . . . Being impatient, energetic, impulsive a n d inexperienced, they are the least hesitant to destroy the existing order. 8 1

These multiple attitudes and feelings were demonstrated when mobs gathered to parade or to riot in Beirut,82 Damascus, Cairo,83 Baghdad,84 Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, or Amman. The environment of the cities enables the young individuals to transform these psychological feelings into reality.85 Wilton Wynn says: I r e m e m b e r a typical student demonstration . . . the night before the demonstration, the air was electric. Students h a d their tarbushes together in earnest conversation, . . . drawing u p plans f o r the big day . . . T h e Muslim Brothers, the Wafdists, the Misr al Fatat, and various shades of Communists and Socialists h a d their student platoons ready f o r action. All emphasized that it must be a " p e a c e f u l " demonstration . . . By the time the m o b reached downtown Cairo, it swelled till it stretched f o r blocks a n d marchers packed the street f r o m curb to c u r b . . . T h e crowd shouted insults, somebody aimed a rock at the t r u c k [British truck], and the driver panicked. H e stepped o n the gas and charged straight through the m o b , killing or maiming . . . persons as his truck barrelled through that crowded street. T h e m o b went crazy with rage. . . . 86

The violence of the release of the young Arab's pent-up frustrations is most extreme. For example, the celebrated "Black Saturday", a riotous outburst that took place in Cairo on the 26th of January, 1 9 5 2 , " . . . was an orgy of uncontrolled mob violence, motivated by hunger and despair. This does not excuse the episode, but it does account for it".87 In a more recent instance, coinciding with the end of the thirteen-nation Arab summit conference held in Cairo on January 17, 1964, students in Bengazi, Libya demonstrated. In the ensuing riots, the police killed 81

Matthews, op. cit., p. 170. Harry B. Ellis, Heritage of the Desert (New York, Ronald Press Company, 1956), pp. 150-153. 83 El Sadat, Revolt on the Nile, op. cit., p. 125. 84 Waldemar J. Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri: My Recollections of Nuri Al-Said, 1954-1958 (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), pp. 203-204. 85 Monroe, op. cit., pp. 65-69. 80 Wynn, op. cit., pp. 29-30. R7 El Sadat, Revolt on the Nile, op. cit., p. 126. 82

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two young demonstrators. Strong reactions in the form of further demonstrations, culminating in riots, occurred throughout the Arab world. The author witnessed two such incidents in Tripoli, Libya and can personally attest to the virulence of the young Arab's passion during these demonstrations. Demonstrations become, especially to the student, a permit not only for parade, but a license to burn and destroy. With reason gone, he is more pliant to manipulation as one of a mass. In the mass, he collectively reacts in a destructive way as brought out by William Wynn: These young men liked nothing better than a political demonstration, a street riot, a fight with the police. I have taught university students in both Egypt and America and I never cease to marvel at the tremendous difference in extracurricular life. To Egyptian students, [like most Arab students], an impending revolution, an assassination plot, or a mass demonstration offered the kind of thrill American students get from football games and "panty raids." The summer months in Egypt generally were politically calm months, simply because the students were on vacation. 88

Schools, colleges, and universities, whether in Cairo, Damascus, Tripoli, Algiers, or any other town or city, have " . . . a fine record of active political demonstrations, and it was the students . . . who effected the spiritual revolution so necessary to our political revolution".89 The individual world of the rioter becomes circumscribed and confined: the real world is reduced to a microcosm in his newly discovered perceptions. Under such circumstances, thought and behavior are expressed in terms of restrictive values without reference to the external culturally accepted norms. In this state, pseudo-political participation takes over, and the popular will of the street mob becomes the main channel of political expression. Party uniforms, membership cards, propaganda, and identity with cause are used to inculcate in the young individuals the fiction that they follow the way of equalitarianism while, in reality, they become more and more subject to complete authoritarian control. Mobs and violence may capture political power, but seldom can they attain and hold an influential position long enough to correct the evils which brought about the initial overt use of force. Shaikh Hassan al Banna's creation of the Moslem Brotherhood serves as an illustration. In coffee houses all over Egypt young individuals were formed into cells, indoctrinated there, and then organized into "paramilitary organizations and shock batta88 89

Wynn, op. cit., pp. 28-29. El Sadat, Revolt on the Nile, op. cit., p. 76.

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lions".90 On graduation they were required to "swear an oath of absolute allegiance to the Supreme Guide",91 and agree to conform to the religious precepts of the Koran. A prayer, composed by al Banna as a tool of mental manipulation runs as follows: O God, Master of the world, security of the fearful, Humbler of the proud . . . answer our plea, grant us our rights and restore to us our freedom and independence. O God, these British usurpers have occupied our lands, denied us our rights, tyrannized our country, and increased the corruption therein . . . O God, turn against them, visit them with injury, humiliate their state and drive their authority from Thy lands; let them have n o means against any of the believers. 92

The symbol of allegiance was "wispy patches of fuzz on the cheeks of students who had joined the Brotherhood and were trying to grow beards in the best Muslim tradition".03 The youth become uniform products, tailored for the revolutionary mass movement's consumption. In such associations, the perception of truth is replaced by dogma designed for the furtherance of the movement. The curriculum of the young is the doctrine of the movement, and the teacher's aim is to produce obedience, coordination and self-renunciation. Although akin in concept, consistency, and approach to the precepts of equality, justice, freedom, and liberty inherent in the Western prototypes, the ideologies fostered by the Arab ISMS actually are extremely remote from the realities permitted by circumstances.94 THE BROAD ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM: THE REVOLT OF THE MASSES

On the basis of the preceding analyses, and at the risk of repetition which is felt to be essential, some general conclusions relating to the societal structure of the Arab revolutionary mass movements are offered. A society that is well adjusted to its environment is not easily subject to extreme movements. Where maladjustment due to a wide gap between "reality ingredients" and "value ingredients" 95 persists, the people are inclined to seek redress by resorting to the violence espoused by «» Ibid., p. 31. 91 Wynn, op. cit., p. 24. 92 Husaini, op cit., p. 65. 93 Wynn, op. cit., p. 24. 94 Nissim Rejwan, "Arab Nationalism: In Search for an Ideology", in Walter Z. Laqueur (ed.), Middle East in Transition (New York, Praeger, 1958), p. 148. 95 Patai, op. cit., p. 12.

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revolutionary mass movements. Of course, in times of distress all of the various layers of society are represented in the politically active movements. Still, the activities of these people are far more typical and dominant in the urban rather than in the rural area where they represent the backbone of SKEPTICAL-CONSERVATISM. A successful revolutionary mass movement is primarily catalyzed by those members of society whose lot is not improving according to their expectations; it is never initiated by the satisfied or the extremely destitute segments. The skeptics, the conservatives, the abjectly poor, and the satisfied rich are less aware of the hidden currents of dissatisfaction and some will participate only after the movement encompasses the entire community. The reactionaries and the radicals, on the other hand, have been the main breeding grounds for the initiation and growth of such movements. The liberals, who join the various Arab movements in the hope of redirecting radicalist and extremist tendencies, are also inclined to adopt an outlook eventually as extreme and upsetting as that they originally hoped to contravene. In considering the "horizontal" aspect of Arab mass movements one finds that there is now a greater recognition of the fact that "poorer rural communities in the underdeveloped countries where the traditional social structure is more intact seem to be less discontented than richer urban centers with a greater problem of adjustment to new outside forces".96 The urban masses are more restless, volatile and subject to all forms of economic and socio-political bombardments. The mechanism of enculturation, i.e., acceptance and rejection, far stronger in the urban community, operates more effectively and induces change. This change, in turn, allows the individual to recondition himself to new modes of thinking and conduct. Urbanization, in some ways, tends to increase the social value of thought and initiative and to attach higher value to achievements. Social climbing and snobbishness become meaningful and necessary, but they also create more tension, especially where opportunities are not commensurate with the rising demands. Further, more so than the milieu of the peasantry, the cultural milieu of urbanization reveals its heterogeneous and uprooted elements. Friendships cannot be formed because individual interests are in constant clash and always clouded by fear and rivalry. To recall the penetrating remarks of Hans E. Tutsch: 96

H. Myint, The Economics of the Developing Countries University Library, Hutchinson and Co., 1964), p. 19.

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The phenomena of mass psychology are nowhere more evident than in the Arab cities . . . This mass can be manipulated . . . but in many cases there exists no determined leadership; the masses move by their own momentum and are wide open to the influence of agitators.97 No better illustration of the above can be given than the following. During the 1919-1940 inter-war period, the equilibrium between authority and responsibility had been disrupted; the ruling traditional elites were eager to exercise their full authority over the lives of their subjects but failed to shoulder a commensurate responsibility. Such disparity between authority and responsibility upset the social equilibrium, and by the time the postwar Arab generation of World War II reached maturity, the seeds of rebellion had already been implanted. Modernization during this period has created a new class of urban proletariat such as workers, government employees, skilled and semi-skilled laborers and professionals. Because many members of this new class have talents that the traditional society cannot fully employ, discontentment has been intensified.98 Whatever their strata or inclination, the disaffected visualize the present as "unproductive", conceive themselves as the "unwanted", and are easily fomented to mold a "new future" by wrecking the present structure. Of greater significance is the new breed of militant leadership. In their formative years future militant leaders like Gamal Abdel Nasser, Habib Bourguiba and Ahmed Ben Bella had no allegiance to or any vested interest in the propagation of the existing order. They had been imbued with extravagent conceptions of the prospects and potentialities of the future and had usually been unaware of the difficulties and the vast complexity of the task they had been undertaking. They managed to gain the devotion of the masses to the point where, eventually, this new breed of militant leaders became effective counter-elites. For appeal they played on such themes as: the inequitable distribution of income; the inability of the society to satisfy its people with certain basic needs; the latent and overt discontent resulting from economic and political insecurity; and the frustrations emanating from attempting change in a rigid society. Since the programs advocated to alleviate these deplorable conditions gave the only substantial promise for relief from misery and since reverence for the status quo evanesced, revolutionary mass movements sprang into being. Modernization in its broadest term is like a chemical process where 97

Hans E. Tutsch, "Arab Unity and Arab Dissension", in Walter Z. Laqueur (ed.), The Middle East in Transition (New York, Praeger, 1958), p. 20. 98 Stephen P. Dorsey, "Social Discontent in the Near East: A Challenge to Public Responsibility", U.S. State Department Bulletin, XXXII (May 9, 1955), 760-761.

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floating negative and positive electrons, i.e., political polarization, ideological fermentation, and dynamic forces of nationalism, crystallize into powerful forces. Many critics see the rise of revolutionary mass movements as a consequence of industrial-urbanization. Others conceive the quintessence of mass society as the embodiment of individuation, secularization, and the urban way of life." In either case, if the process of change is rapid enough to allow no accommodation a new social form of anomie is created. Modernization in the Arab REVOLUTIONARYPROGRESSIVE states has many positive aspects, but it has also created a process of individuation which manifests itself in the loosening of the ties of the family and the disorganization of the communal life of the people. It has freed the younger generation from traditional institutions, but at the same time it has isolated the young individuals, especially those of the urban centers, and made them powerless. This stage of anomie has caused detrimental effects by creating a marginal individual of rootlessness and antisocial behavior. The result of marginality is oscillation and uncertainty as to where the individual stands, and in most cases he suffers severely under these unfortunate circumstances. Because of a lack of social cohesion, fear penetrates the mind and pushes the marginal person to respond to every rising movement. Applying Newcomb's analysis: "The marginal person's dilemma is that he is motivated toward membership in both more and less favored groups, that each membership carries threats with it, that he cannot have both, and that he cannot give up either." 100 To dissipate the energy of the nascent revolutionary mass movement requires a recognition that psychological alienation as a subsequence of industrial-urbanization cannot be neutralized unless job availability continuously increases, thereby providing the marginal person with opportunities to meet progressive social needs. It is usually during the critical formative period, marked by the excessive gap between aspiration and reality, that the initial stage of revolutionary mass movement begins. Stressing this psychological possibility, Mr. H. Myint realizes that "some of the seemingly most discontented underdeveloped countries are those which are relatively better off and are therefore able to appreciate and resent the gap between themselves and the advanced countries more keenly".101 It can be further postulated that the greater 99

Louis Writh, Community Life and Social Policy (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 110-132. 100 T. Newcomb, Social Psychology (New York, Dryden Press, 1950), p. 544. 101 Myint, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

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the socio-economic disparity between the traditional rural-agrarian and the urban-industrial sectors is, the more likely it is that people will indulge in radical mass activities. It is not by accident, then, that beginning with the outbreak of World War II, the Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states began to undergo rapid industrial-urbanization which eventually turned the social process into chaos and has since hindered harmonization. Unable by any means to further their interests, denied alternative ways of seeking a better way of life, or opportunity to ameliorate their plight, the atomized and alienated individuals are forced to indulge in radical actions. In some cases, it is questionable as to whether the advent of industrialurbanization necessarily generates such movements. In the case of the United States and Great Britain, both rank high in the degree of industrial-urbanization, yet there is a negative relationship between the rise of revolutionary movements and industrial-urbanization. Rapid transformation of a rural-agrarian society into an urban-industrial one is conducive to the rise of alienation and extreme movements, but this is so because rapid changes disrupt the social structure and provide the opportunity for the utilization of total power by a totalitarian regime. The crucial point is not so much the disintegration process as a consequence of industrial-urbanization, but is rather the lack of a constructive and positive system of socio-economic and political values at the time of a prevailing tension. Furthermore, it is not the actual suffering per se, but rather a taste of better things which stimulates individuals to reject the status quo. Thus frustration, alienation and marginality are greater when people have something and demand more than when they have nothing and want something. As a consequence the thinking of such people continuously fluctuates between the force of novel ideas and the impact of traditional ones, moving like a pendulum from the realm of conformity to that of rebellion. During this formative period of industrial-urbanization, with the sudden and large influx of population into the cities, the peril of this rapid increase in the rate and size of such movements becomes imminent; but it may subsequently decrease as the process of socio-economic development becomes more accelerated, especially where the availability of natural resources is sufficient and where the new, rapidly growing working class is allowed to re-incorporate itself into the society.102 To 102 Reinhard Bendix, Work and Authority Sons, 1956), pp. 434-437.

in Industry (New York, John Wiley and

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this we might add another point made by sociologist James C. Davis 103 that the impetus toward revolutionary mass movement and marginality is engendered when economic growth is associated with a rising standard of living, and that the peak of the activity of revolutionary mass movements takes place when the long-term aspect of growth is followed by a short-term run of decline or stagnation. In either case, if the society is capable of developing its natural resources, bringing about an equitable distribution of income and wealth and providing greater opportunity for social mobility, the phenomenon might be a transitional one and could counter the mobilization of radical tendencies and marginality. It is essential, then, that consideration be focused on the twin threats of either too rapid or too slow industrial-urbanization. But the dilemma here is the implication that economic development plans . . . are generally of a long term nature, involving a considerable time-lag before their fruits are ready. In the meantime they may create a considerable amount of dislocation, discomfort and deprivation for the people without producing quick benefits. Contrary to popular belief, the vigorous pursuit of economic development policies designed to raise the level of material income in the future may frequently intensify, rather than reduce, the existing level of discontent in the developing countries. 104

Economic development does diminish the magnitude of alienation but is insufficient by itself to rectify the problem. This can be better understood in the light of another source of discontent - unemployment. Prolonged unemployment and lack of sufficient economic development petrify the individual's position. Without a job, the individual is an outcast. His occupational status, which links him to the society, determines his social prestige and partly forms the basis of his social existence. The lack of steady employment has the forcible impact of isolating the individual from the social ties of his community by denying that individual the basis of the concept of "self-respect". This is particularly true in the Arab society, in which a person is strongly judged by the nature of his provisional contribution. This social consequence can result in a form of radicalism, inertia at best or even explosive nihilism. Thus, "The experiences of unemployment are a preliminary step for the revolutionary mood but . . . they do not lead by themselves to a readiness for mass action . . . [Such experiences] only fertilize the ground 103

James C. Davis, "Toward a Theory of Revolution", American Review, XXVII (February, 1962), 1-19. 104 Myint, op. cit., p. 20.

Sociological

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for revolution." 105 They hardly suffice alone to stimulate a mass psychology, to induce widespread alienation and to create susceptibility to revolutionary mass movements. Economic crises do, however, create social and psychological tendencies which prepare the road for all kinds of movements, but only as an integral part of the complex web. Economic crises are but one part of the total picture; by themselves they are of no great importance. Contrary to the common view, the key problem is one of RELATEDNESS - the individual's conception of his place in the cultural realm and not alone with INSTINCTUAL NEEDS per se, e.g., biological necessities. There are, undoubtedly, certain economic needs for self-preservation that form an indispensable part of human nature, such as hunger, which can overpower all others. Although these needs are basic to all and have certain inherent natural laws, they are not fixed or static in the sense that they are independent of the impact of social process. Likewise, the cultural pattern and the social process of the society are not lifeless shadows. They, too, have their own suppressive and creative functions, their own productive and effective forces in molding the INSTINCTUAL NEEDS of the individuals. Of greater importance, however, is the fact that dissatisfaction with the economic status quo is not related s o m u c h t o ABSOLUTE REALITIES a s it is t o RELATIVE EXPECTATIONS. T h a t

is to say, it is caused by a rise in aspirations that outstrips the rise in income, or by the slower rise of the income of some groups (workers) than that of other groups (the upper elite, the merchants or the businessmen). It is never easy to discover a precise degree of frustration, but it is well recognized that RELATIVE EXPECTATION, which is a psychological aspiration, is of utmost value in understanding the existing framework that gives rise to marginality and mass movements. Thus, any adequate description of the rise of contemporary Arab revolutionary mass movements should emphasize that their spread is not due to any single factor, but to the multiplicity of factors and conditions, and their psychological consequences. The mass-individuals are vulnerable to the appeal of movements which offer them the chance to overcome the pain of alienation. Self-identification is submerged into a process of MASSIFICATION and mass politics permeates the whole national structure. The individuals who lack a strong set of internalized standards are ever ready to seek an external substitute. In the absence of an acceptable self-image, they seek to overcome the anxiety accompanying Bohan Zawadzki and P. Lazarsfelf, "The Psychological Consequences of Unemployment", Journal of Social Psychology, V I (May, 1935), 249.

105

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alienation by becoming either apathetic or activistic in approach. As is generally the case, the withdrawal from activity (a common characteristic of the peasant) and the flight into activity (a common characteristic of the city dweller) are both responses which underlie much of the participation in movements. Activism is a psychological energizer that helps the individual to overcome his feelings of aloofness, helplessness and uselessness by shifting the attention away from the individual and focusing it on the movement. Consequently, the inability of governments to mitigate the prolonged socio-economic crises and wide-spread alienation undoubtedly tends to make violence a means to an end. In conclusion, the competitiveness among the conservative, the liberal, and the extremist groups, in terms of political, psychological and socioeconomic process, will continue to operate in the transitional Arab society. Thus the transitional process is becoming a struggle between the alternatives of a free and healthy society or a new type of totalitarianism. Competition could provide the foundation for a constructive, genuinely pluralistic, open community conducive to promoting individualism. As an option this imposes the adoption of a gamut of economic, social and political endeavors as a means of developing in the polity a wider sense of national loyalty and public responsibility. To foster these endeavors, public and private institutions of all types and descriptions will have to be established at all levels. It is more probable, however, that the existing competition will result in the replacement of the old authoritarian system by a modern type of totalitarianism as exemplified by the militant mass movements. Under the turbulent conditions prevailing in the Arab society and in view of the governmental inexperience in democratic practices, it is hard to visualize how the situation could develop otherwise. Considering the tempo of the transition and the accompanying requirement for a commonality of effort, it appears that strong centralized controls are an absolute essential, if only as the most promising transitory means. In any event, the totalitarian rule will be constantly pressured, as Ortega expresses it, by "the political domination of the masses".106 Unlike the conditions that persisted under the traditional type of authoritarian rule, the "general will" is being formulated, as Le Bon puts it, in that "the voice of the masses has become preponderant".107 108 Jose Ortega Y. Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses (New York, New American Library, A Mentor Book, 1952), p. 12. 107 Le Bon, op. cit., p. 15.

Ill THE GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE MILITANT-INTELLECTUAL: THE FIRST PHASE OF MASS MOVEMENT

THE INDISPENSABLE SAVIOUR OF THE GREAT MEN

Life involves a series of surges in a perpetual struggle for the exercise of power. The life of the individual is periodically activated by some goal, some devotion, some drive, some frustration, some ambition or need. The motives behind any individual's actions are numerous and in some cases are difficult to comprehend. But no matter how enigmatic, the individual involved is always of the conviction that this action and behavior tend to fulfill a conscious purpose and are directed toward a goal. Because these drives are so complex, the forces motivating individuals to join mass movements or to participate in revolutions need examination. This text is devoted to such an analysis. However, the primary purpose of this particular chapter is to determine the role played by the GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE in the social processes of their respective societies. The task which concerns us is to discover the relationship between the leader and the events which accompany either his rise to power or his being forsaken by the revolutionary mass movement. Some historians, philosophers, and social scientists believe that great personalities are predestined to shape the course of events by which society evolves. Others claim that great men are not the creators or the arbitrators of events but, rather, opportunists who are fortuitous enough to correctly utilize a given set of circumstances conducive to CHANGES in the society. A better understanding of the two contradictory theses can be attained if we refer to the fundamental relationship of man to culture. This relationship has been examined by three schools of thought: (1) t h e MENTALIST, ( 2 ) t h e BEHAVIORIST a n d ( 3 ) t h e MODERNIST. T O t h e

school, the individual primarily, if not solely, determines behavior and cultural environment. This school of thought emphasizes the hypothesis that the individual, by introspection and planning, initiates MENTALIST

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a chain of conscious and patterned actions leading to a response. As illustration that culture is determined by man's reactions to a stimulus, the exponents of this school cite the handiwork of charismatic leaders typified by Christ, Mohammed or Moses. "We find the same phenomenon even in the most recent formation of sects."1 That men of such a calling and status are an essential prerequisite for social change, "that the prophetic personality is the original source of the new religious creation",2 and that all social and scientific contributions and discoveries depend upon the presence of creative genius is illustrated by relating social upheavals to those prophets or leaders under whose aegis the movement was initiated. Philosophically, the original pattern of this supposition is expressed by Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881) in the following concept: . . . H e was the "creature of the Time," they say; the Time called him forth, the Time did everything, he nothing - but what we the little critic could have done too. This seems to me but melancholy work. . . . The great man, with his free force direct out of God's own hand, is the lightning. . . . In all epochs of the world's history, we shall find the Great M a n to have been the indispensable saviour of his epoch; - the lightning, without which the fuel never would have burnt. The History of the world, I said already, was the Biography of Great Men. . . . Such a m a n is what we call an original man: he comes to us at first-hand. . . . W e may call him Poet, Prophet, G o d ; - in one way or other, we all feel that the words he utters are as n o other man's words. Direct f r o m the Inner F a c t of things; - he lives, and has to live, in daily communion with that . . . Meanwhile, since it is the spiritual always that determines the material, this Man-of-Letters H e r o must be regarded as our most important modern person. He, such as he may be, is the soul of all. What he teaches, the whole world will do and make. The world's manner of dealing with him is the most significant feature of the world's general position. . . . 3

The BEHAVIORISTS have committed a reverse mistake by a total commitment to the opposite view, claiming culture as the main determinant, and that the study of man is but incidentally contributive to the understanding of his cultural traits and institutions. The idea that societies have their own personality independent of man's influence is set forth by L. White: "Culture is not determined by man, by his wishes, will, hopes, fears, etc. Man is of course prerequisite to culture; he is, so to 1

Tor Andrae, Mohammed: The Man and his Faith (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 10. 2 Ibid., p. 11. 3 Thomas Carlyle, "On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History", in Michael Curtis (ed.), Great Political Theories (New York, Avon Book Division, v-2048, The Hearst Corporation, n.d.), pp. 78, 79, 80, 83.

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speak, the catalyst that makes the interactive process possible. But the cultural process is culturally determined, not biologically or psychologically." 4 White's predication is that all explanations of individual behavior are determined through cultural determinism and through social environment, and that it is to the forces of environment rather than to those of the individual that we must look for an understanding of a particular situation. Disclaiming the MENTALIST school's theory of association of ideas, the BEHAVIORISTS expound that learning is the result of elaborate conditioning and cross-conditioning of specific stimuli and response.5 Stringently applied, the conditioning concept patently errs in that it disregards human creativity 6 and fails to take into account the individual's mental context and standards of judgment, including his derivative frames of reference. The

take the middle way and consider that the MENand the BEHAVIORISTS' approaches each contain some element of truth. Instead of separating the entity of the individual from that of society and then trying to give independent explanation for each, the MODERNISTS consider that social environment, cultural patterns, and traits execute indirect and limited influence on the individual as opposed to engendering a reflex action which the individual is powerless to control. Social environment, cultural patterns, and traits all interact with the ego and are reconciled or conditioned for acceptance according to each individual consciousness in a particular set of circumstances. Furthermore, the MODERNISTS take into consideration the essence of creative experience holding that standards and frames of reference are seldom independent of the ego. MODERNISTS

TALISTS'

Within the framework of environmental conditioning the individual sets a goal for himself and strives to achieve that goal within those disciplines of his society which he recognizes as valid. The MODERNISTS reject the idea that cultural heritage becomes an individual's possession through a profound exudation of MENTAL INTELLECTUALISM, and that his thought and mental capacity have the ability to operate completely divorced from his environment. To establish the natural link between the environmental and psychological determinants, the MODERNISTS turn to social-psychology. 4

R. W. Sellars, V. J. McGill, and M. Farber, Philosophy for the Future (London, Macmillan, 1949), p. 374. 5 For critical discussion see: W. Kohler, Gestalt Psychology (New York, Liveright, 1929), passim, especially chapter two. 6 Cf. E. R. Hilgard and D. G. Marquis, Conditioning and Learning (New York, Appleton-Century, 1940).

86 The at a and into

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studies of Kroeber on genius have shown that geniuses appear . . . not constant or even approximately constant rate in time, . . . but in bursts; that these bursts are related to the state of development of the culture which the potential geniuses are born.

Ogburn and Thomas have demonstrated that the progress of scientific discovery shows a somewhat similar phenomenon . . . Here again the determining factor is the stage and type of culture development. 7 Once a science has reached the stage of having a coherent theoretical basis, it will inevitably proceed . . . to make further discoveries and further extensions of its theory. It becomes, in fact, a quasi-autonomous cultural entity. . . , 8 . . . thoughts and ideas are not the result of the isolated inspiration of great geniuses. Underlying even the profound insight of the genius are the collective historical experiences of a group which the individual takes for granted, but which should under no conditions be hypostatized as 'group mind'. 9

By reconciling the environmental and mentalist concepts and thereby considering both individual and cultural factors, the modernists propound a new basis of correlations which deals with the SUBJECTIVE mental process more objectively and, therefore, gives promise of more precise prediction. It is intellectually inconsequential to consider whether the individual's heredity or cultural environment is the more important. It is equally futile to conjecture where science or society would be if Jesus, Mohammed, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Abraham Lincoln, Gandhi, or Einstein had never lived. We can speculate that Einstein's contributions might have later been made by someone else, and that the delay might have changed or modified the course of modern civilization. However, what is more to the point is recognition that scientific discoveries and mechanical inventions are not solely the creation of individuals, but are the consequence of an historical accumulation of knowledge and enlightenment benefiting the individual making the overt contribution to knowledge. Granted that without the intercession of the protagonist, INDIVIDUAL or COLLECTIVE, there would be delay and to a certain extent the outcome would vary. Nevertheless, the contribution would appear eventually irrespective of the propinquity of the one man historically 7

Allport, Personality: A Psychological Interpretation, op. cit., pp. 151-158. Julian Huxley, Knowledge, Morality and Destiny (New York, A Mentor Book, New American Library, 1960), p. 65. 9 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge, translated by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (New York, A Harvest Book, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936), p. 269. 8

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associated with the development. That this supposition has substance is brought out in the parallel yet separate recent scientific breakthrough achievements in the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. When the supposition just postulated for the scientific is accepted as being equally applicable to the social science fields, the role of the innovator leader becomes more complex and viable. In non-scientific change the individual ego, drives, abilities, and ambitions of the leaders have a tremendous effect on the society involved. ". . . history is often made by energetic men, steadfastly following ideas, mostly wrong, that determine events".10 "In all religious movements whose history we can really survey the awakening power proceeded from an individual personality." 11 But even so, the environmental factors cannot be pushed aside, and as Sylvia G. Haim rightly points out "If al-Afghani had not voiced such sentiments and views it is likely that somebody else would have done so." 12 Factors relating to advancement in the social field are extremely difficult to anticipate or isolate, because social conditions that prevail at a given time cannot be duplicated or repeated. We cannot say what the outcome would have been if, for example, Gamal Abdel Nasser and his junta had not taken the initiative to overthrow King Farouk of Egypt when and as they did. What could be said at most is that it was probable that a revolutionary movement of some kind would have occurred, but that its outcome and result would probably have been different. Regardless, one thing is sure: a change of some kind had to take place. In times of crisis when social structure, cultural values and political institutions are threatened and no longer invite acceptance, people often search for change. Under such circumstances, the search for a hero becomes a certitude. The idea that the given set of historical circumstances in Egypt, for example, would in each case have produced the man they did can neither be proved nor disproved. History gives us enough examples wherein great leaders appear on the scene when most needed. Mohammed's role was played when the internal situations in Mecca and Medina were in a flux of crisis and when the "political situation of the Middle East was dominated . . . by the antagonism be10 Lord Acton, Lectures on Modern History (London, The Fontana Library, 1960), p. 77. 11 Andrae, op. cit., p. 10. 12 Sylvia G. Haim (ed.), Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1964), p. 15.

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tween Persia and the Byzantine Empire".13 The appearance of Abu Muslim,14 the great architect of the Revolution that brought about an end to the Umayyad dynasty and the accession of the Abbasids to power, was made possible by the action of effective revolutionary organization and propagation, expressing and reflecting the discontent of important segments of the people of the Empire.15 The quality of contemporary Arab leadership, as manifested by men such as Nasser or Bourguiba, affects the attitudes and the capacity of the people, as much as did that of the Prophet when he altered the economic, political and social institutions of his time. Revolutionary leadership can disrupt the normal course of a society by shattering old affiliations and forming new ones, thereby altering the patterns of human thinking and behavior. New viewpoints occasion fresh motivations in individuals thereby creating various behavior patterns. A social upheaval so induced must take due consideration of the leaders as well as the events causing the turbulence. But sight should not be lost of the fact that the original and novel contributions of the leadership rarely succeed in totality. By the time the precepts emanating from the leaders come to be widely rooted in the minds of their followers, the substance of the ideas has been profoundly transformed by many adulterating elements. The Koran and the adith provide an example of this. The Prophet clearly disclaimed divinity, asserting that he was but a "simple man". Nevertheless, he has, in time, been elevated by his people to a place of divinity. In. the course of time . . . his life came to be considered the ideal, and his personality the quintessence of perfection, human and super-human. The legends of the ages made of him "the great ascetic, the worker with knowledge of the hidden, the descendant of Adam and heir of his spark of divine substance, the cause of creation, and the hub of the universe." 18

The personal urge to lead and control as well as impersonal factors such as new circumstances, behavioral patterns, environmental determinations and ideologies, influence the development of the minds of great men. In his book "Philosophy of the Revolution",17 President Gamal Abdel Nasser did not once mention the term ARAB NATIONALISM. Any reference to the Arab world was in the sense of its relationship to 13

Von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam, op. cit., p. 64; also Malcolm H. Kerr, "Egypt Under Nasser", op. cit., p. 7. 14 Payne, op. cit., pp. 146-148, 155-156. 15 Lewis, The Arabs in History, op. cit., pp. 80-81. 16 Safran, op. cit., p. 13. 17 See: Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution, passim.

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the policy and the interest of Egypt. Yet a few years later President Nasser became the prime advocate of Arab nationalism.18 On close examination, the original thoughts set forth in his BOOK appear to be viewpoints of a neophyte revolutionary leader, lacking in perspective but anxious to initiate much needed reform. Changes had been taking place in Egypt as occasioned by CIRCUMSTANCES and TIME. The internal problems of Egypt have been extremely complex and are not soluble strictly indigenously as the country's natural resources and situation are inadequate to the task. In these austere circumstances President Nasser has been forced to widen the perimeter of his political and ideological activities, vague as they are, in order to stabilize his power internally and to focus the attention of the Egyptian people on something other than Egypt's ills. The advocacy of Arab nationalism was, to a large extent therefore, impelled by the urgency of the circumstances and the times. The times also compelled President Nasser to negotiate the arms deal with the Iron Curtain Bloc. This in turn led to the internationalization of the Suez Company, ultimately climaxed by the Suez invasion.10 Subsequently, this development helped to speed up the forces of ARAB SOCIALISM, as discussed in chapter eight of this book. The revolutionary drive in some parts of the Arab world has only just begun, and its leaders are not inclined to be swept along without trying to give direction to the momentum. But it must be recognized that the chain of historical circumstances has done more to shape the ideas expounded by leadership such as Nasser's than the leadership has contributed to the tack taken by the changing circumstances. An understanding of this phenomenon is an absolute minimum essential to any meaningful assessments of developments occasioned by the Arab revolutionary mass movements. To properly evaluate any decision or course of action undertaken in the areas where revolutionary mass movements are in ascendancy, proper account must be taken of the myriad of other forces of acculturation affecting the decision of the leadership and often precluding an obviously rational choice. Great men cannot completely control the mind of the masses at all times, for, as has been shown, the masses do develop their own concepts, sometimes independently of the leadership. Nevertheless, any analysis to determine the factors causing change is bound to be more meaningful if based on the realities of the 18

Anwar G. Chejne, "Egyptian Attitudes Toward Pan-Arabism", The Middle East Journal, XI (Summer, 1957), 252-264. 19 George Kirk, Contemporary Arab Politics (New York, Praeger, 1961), pp. 45-90.

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dynamism generated by the Arab revolutionary mass movements than on the hypotheses propounded by those not wielding power. Not to delve into the motivation underlying the unrest of the masses is to blind oneself as to the sources of raw power as it forms within the Arab revolutionary mass movement. To sum up, it is fruitless and unacademic to conjecture as to which of the two formative factors - heredity or environment - dominates. The question itself does not bring us closer to the truth and in most cases is irrelevant. The fact is that both factors are essential and important, but this does not mean that both determine behavior or social changes equally or in the same manner. Also, it is an academic fallacy to insist that each is quite separate and mutually independent from the other. It is more to the point to say that the individual, especially the great man, and his environment are not distinct, nor is one immersed in the other for both are relative and reciprocal to each other. Social changes are an emergence of so many wills, purposes, dynamic assessments and cultural as well as physical factors that no great leader or group of leaders has ever directed the destiny of the society. No one factor has been sovereign and independent.20 The role of leadership in revolutionary mass movements is clearly stated by Le Bon when he says of men such as Mohammed, Gandhi, or Lincoln: "In point of fact, moreover, their real lives are of slight importance to us. Our interest is to know what our great men were as they are presented by popular legend. It is legendary heroes, and not for a moment real heroes, who have impressed the minds of crowds." 21

T H E G R E A T M E N OF K N O W L E D G E

Historical investigation discloses that revolutionary mass movements do not mature until the prevailing over-all order has been discredited. It is the GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE - men of enlightenment, writers, philosophers and theologians - rather than the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION, such as Ben Bella, Nasser or Bourguiba, who play the initial role in undermining the existing social and political institutions of the society. It is these intellectuals who motivate the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION to dare action leading to innovation. It is these GREAT MEN OF 20

Morris Ginsbert, "Social Change", The British Journal of Sociology, tember, 1958), 215-216. 21 Le Bon, op. cit., p. 48.

IX (Sep-

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KNOWLEDGE who enlighten society as to the dire necessity for a new faith and order. In rare cases it is possible for some GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE to originate the idea of change and remain on the scene to work theory into practice. Men of this order fit a psychological classification which Dr. Robert Lindner labelled "the successful rebels":

Among this group are those who have surmounted .. . the barriers that any society erects for the containment of the rebellious. In this group . . . apart from the few rare, soaring souls who are members of the estate from birth forward . . . we must include those who have somehow recovered from a negative condition . .. and re-entered the evolutionary stream in such a manner that they have given it impetus. This subdivision of human beings is very small; but compared with the rest of us its members are . . . supermen because of their ability to express their human potentiality to an extent and in a manner hardly conceivable by the remainder. Mohammed, the Prophet of Islam, could be rightly considered as one of those rare individuals who was a genius, a master practitioner both in postulating ideas and in carrying them out. However, existence of the combination of the visionary and the pragmatic in one personality is the exception rather than the rule for, despite their common purpose, self-realization for the GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE differs from that of MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION. For the former the might of the pen is the core of self-realization and an end in itself, while to the latter the significance of the idea is secondary to its implementation. The rise of Arab nationalism and the revival of Arab self-consciousness have been in essence the ideas of the GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE rather than the work of men such as Muhammad Ali, Arabi Pasha, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Habib Bourguiba or Ahmed Ben Bella. It is an academic fallacy to conclude that the drives of mass movements and revolutions begin with the intellectuals. The GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE do "not create the classical spirit: it was in existence before their time; but they carried it to a greater extreme than any others had done". At most it could be said that the work of the GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE helps to stultify rulers, undermine the privileged elite and guide the rebellious instinct of the young bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia and the like into a revolutionary zeal. Mass movement and revolution are "the outcome of realities: but it cannot be denied that without the help of 'enlightenment,' [they] could not have arisen".23 In the words of Louis Madelin, mass movements and revolutions are "prepared and brought 22 23

Lindner, op. cit., pp. 225-226. Madelin, op. cit., p. 17.

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about by men of intellect" 24 who axe impregnated with varieties of ideas - ideological dogmatic, humanistic, pragmatic, and philosophic. The GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE vary in their philosophical and academic outlook, and range in viewpoint from the extreme conservative right to the radical left. But in any case, and regardless of their differences, they help to inspire the various movements by working for the revival of their society through spiritual progress, economic development and political regeneration; they are ever ready to pass judgment on the existing established order. It would be futile and academically unsound to try to judge and interpret the efforts of these GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE within the narrow framework of isolated historical incidents such as the outcome of Muhammad Ali's revolution, the Arabic revolt, or, to take a recent incident, the Kassem coup d'etat of 1958. Their contributions to innovation and social progress are profound and most likely will endure beyond any particular period of social resurgence. Throughout the saga of Western civilization men of intellect and action have appeared on the historical scene when most needed and, in most cases, have succeeded in infusing new ideas into the cultural environment. This has kept the Western world in a state of flexibility and dynamism unprecedented in any culture. From at least the time of Plato GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE have supplied a drive in Western evolutionary thought which has been filtered down through MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION to the masses. For example, the ideas of previous great thinkers were transmitted into modern times by men of intellect such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Jefferson, de Tocqueville and Bentham. These ideas fostered the prodigious reforms and social revolutions that MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION effected through the American Revolution of 1776, the French Revolution of 1789 and the Bolshevik seizure in 1917. Whether under the name of FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, DEMOCRACY OR LIBERTY, POLITICAL EQUALITY, OR COMMUNISM,

the myriad of interreactions springing from the work of these few great men continue to affect the social structure of millions of people throughout the world making and toppling governments and in countless ways otherwise influencing the daily lives of all mankind. As time has shown, Christianity as it evolved was never able to completely or enduringly dominate other significant concepts of occidental society. The Christian concept was accepted as the Western way of life and incorporated as a cultural trait into already existing institutions, enlarging and giving depth to some, while diminishing others. In fact, the Reformation and 24

Ibid., p. 15.

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the Counter-reformation were major impellents for innovation through revolt against staticism.25 In contrast and because it discourages innovation, the Arab-Islamic society has produced but few GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE, and then only sporadically. "Most of the greater Islamic philosophers, particularly such men as Ibn Sina [Avicenna] . . . were men tainted or connected with heresy." 26 The contributions of Islam's GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE, such as al-Farabi, although remarkable and of great value to world civilization, were never accepted by the Arab-Islamic civilization. Great Arab thinkers' embellishments of original Greek thought and ideas taken from Hellenic culture never took root in Arab society because the religious leaders, the leading intellectual ulema "have always distrusted the intrusion of foreign secular ideas".27 This dereliction occurred perhaps because Islam came in contact with the Greek civilization "only when already a fully formed doctrine. . .",28 where conservatism was deeply rooted and traditionalism was too rigid to be able to absorb new ideas. Conformity, it would appear, had been elevated into something akin to a religion, a circumstance that assumedly was not intended by the Prophet. That this lethargic state of mind pervaded Moslem culture can be illustrated by considering the attitude of one of the greatest formative intellects of Islam. Al-Ghazzali, who lived from 1057-1111, denounced most of the Hellenic ideas and "tried to legitimize power by submitting it symbolically to authority, at the same time that he sought to confirm authority by linking it to power".29 While it is true that by the end of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth century some Arab leaders had attempted to introduce liberalism and democracy, they ostensibly failed largely because of the lack of indigenous awareness of concepts conducive to innovation. It is true that all civilizations are to some extent an imitation of other civilizations; yet, any civilization to be healthy and dynamic has to make some indigenous contribution. Until the twelfth century Arab intellectuals did imitate and embellish the ideas and institutions of other cultures much to their advantage. But because Arab innovation has for so long been dormant, liberalism, democracy or any other social 25 Vera Micheles Dean, The Nature of the Non-Western World (New York, Mentor Book, New American Library, 1962), p. 50. 26 Partner, op. cit., p. 12. 27 Elie Salem, "Problems of Arab Political Behavior", in Philip W. Thayer (ed.), Tensions in the Middle East (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), p. 70. 28 Partner, op. cit., p. 12. 29 Safran, op. cit., p. 22.

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and philosophical movement cannot permeate Arab society unless the native elite energetically participate in the process. Traditional Islam is still strong and is closely identified with politics. This in part explains the fact that: Almost every movement in Islam that started as a religious and reform movement ended in becoming also intensely political. The Shi'is, the Kharijis, the Wahhabis, and the Sanusis are cases in point. Similarly a political movement assumes a certain religious form to ingratiate itself with mass psychology and to engender its legitimacy. On the eve of the Egyptian revolution (1952) the young officers regularly attended mosque prayers and performed at their earliest opportunity the pilgrimage to Makkah. 80

The climate of conformity has inhibited free thinking and experimentation, and the Arab conservatives' sense of isolation from popular values and new thoughts have made them less receptive to acceptance of the new and liberal. Unlike Western polities which have been able to "discern the excesses in their rulers and to restrain them through guidance",31 Arab sovereigns since the ascendancy of Islam, in the main, have governed unfettered by either the high ideals of the Moslem religion or the established intelligentsia. Considerations other than those connected with or stemming purely from the religious or philosophical, such as the inadequacy of natural wealth, may likewise have contributed to the political backwardness of the Islamic nations as it obviously has in some Christian countries of Latin America, Eastern Europe and in Spain and Portugal. In Arab as in other societies there exists a strong element within the intellectual stratum which seeks to justify the particular practices of the ruling regime in the light of the aims and objectives of the society. It goes without saying that the more conservative and reactionary the society, the more hidebound will be this intellectual element. Until the end of the nineteenth century, Arab intellectuals in general were an integral segment of the ruling order and therefore had a vested interest in the propagation of the existing order. Because of this interest and because of the isolation from the man in the street, there has been but little empathy with the common man or sympathy for his dire straits. In practice in traditional and socially stratified Islam, the ulema (religious intellectuals) held a virtual monopoly in the intellectual stratum from which their chief mental preoccupation was the perpetuation of a me30

Elie Salem, "Nationalism and Islam", The Muslim World, LII (October, 1962), 284. 31 Salem, "Problems of Arab Political Behavior", op. cit., p. 72.

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chanical adherence to the outward forms of the religion. Because of this predilection with the prescribed rites and ceremonies and not the essence of Islam, there was but little individual exertion; therefore, there was no original thought from which might have emanated significant philosophical or political ideas leading to innovation. Instead of the novel, the ulema encouraged imitation, a practice which flourished in a society already socially and mentally regimented. Despite the search for alternatives of some great intellects such as Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and Ibn Sina (Avicenna), both of whom were persecuted and physically punished, the ulema continued until recently to focus successfully the public mind on dogmatic matters, thereby preserving their monopoly of the intellectual field. Islam, the great civilizing heritage, was first sustained by intellectual progressives; these intellectuals then became so linked to Islam that they were not only its sustainers but became its chief beneficiaries; therefore, they were no longer solely intellectuals but a class dependent for survival on the maintenance of an intellectual and religious status quo; consequently, they helped to hasten intellectual stagnation and to discourage the spirit of innovation. Where there is empathy and therefore an alliance between intellectuals and those in power, there is less cause for social and political upheaval. As brought out earlier, such an alliance did exist between the ulema and the traditional ruling elite until the modern intellectual stratum of the Arab society began to develop and to assert its influence in the early decades of the nineteenth century in response to Western encroachments into the then Ottoman Empire. From that point on intellectual influences other than the ulema have had an ever increasing impact, leading to intellectual nourishment at a time when the ill-constructed Islamic traditional society had ceased to uphold the principle of Islam. The decisive fact in this modern intellectual movement, in contrast with the AGE OF THE ULEMA, is that the ecclesiastical monopoly has been broken and gradually replaced by a more dynamic group believing in change and rejecting the original traditional idea that individual reasoning and independent self-assertion would jeopardize the revealed Islamic truth. The breach brought about a gradual flowering of varieties of intellectual richness, and its most significant characteristic is that its recruits have been from the various social strata, hungrily searching Western thought and experience for new ideas and solutions. The assimilation of new thoughts was accompanied by a high degree of social turbulence and some chaos because the multiplicity of values has, in many cases, complicated the varied

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choices leading to solutions. But as Wendel Phillips pointed out: nations "exist only on the tenure of being constantly agitated".32 On the basis that the new GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE have managed to awaken Islamic society from its deep sleep, to question the validity of the Koranic law and to oppose the monopolistic role of the ulema, they have made a major contribution to innovation, if not implementation. The earliest contemporary intellectual movement was a religious one led by Mohammed Ibn-al-Wahhab and was significant in that it attempted to shore up Islam at a time when its main proponent, the Ottoman Empire, was in a serious state of decline. The Wahhabi movement attempted to reconstitute Islam by withdrawing its assent to the Sultan's sovereignty and by rejection of the Ottoman supremacy. Though it was not explicitly a move of Arabism it came from the heart of the Arab land and was directed not only against the Christian enemies but also against the predominancy of the Ottoman. The movement rejected the idea of unquestioning obedience to ULEMAIC INTERPRETATION which had persisted through the classical period of Islam and under the monopoly of the ulema, and this was another factor in the decline of the ulema class. The inspiration and resistance was not by military men or ulema but by a movement of popular militant religious leaders who were able to arouse the religious fervor of groups dissatisfied with the orthodox order of the day. Both Wahhab and Sidi Mohammed Ibn-alSenussi, leader of another religious-intellectual fundamentalist reform, supported the concept of Ijtihad as a means of reattaining doctrinal purity. Both leaders preached against innovation and for a return to the original purity and simplicity of Islam. Though these two movements fell short of fulfillment, they helped to stimulate an activist and militant revival which was accelerated by other great reformers, Jamal-ed-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897) and his disciple, Muhammad Abduh of Egypt (1848-1905).33 Al-Afghani was greatly influenced by the French historian Guizot's idea of "active, willed progress", while Abduh was equally affected by the "positivism of Auguste Comte, the French philosopher, and its implications as to the improvability of man".34 Both these reformers advocated freedom and 32

Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (New York, Vintage Books, 1954), p. 138. 33 Francesco Gabrielli, The Arab Revival (New York, Random House, 1961), pp. 45-46. 34 William Sands, "The Middle East Background", in Georgiana G. Stevens (ed.), The United Slates and the Middle East (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, PrenticeHall, Inc., 1964), p. 26.

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proclaimed a struggle against rigid and worn-out beliefs and practices as well as the exertion of jihad to overthrow foreign domination in an attempt to reconcile Islam with the modern progress needed by Islamic nations. Both men attempted to interpret Islam liberally, to encourage self-assertion with an open attitude toward change. To them, Bid'a, meaning innovation and by definition a heresy in the religious sense, and its antonym sunna, that is, the right path of the Prophet's way, had other than the previously orthodox meaning. In the hope of introducing change for the betterment of Islamic society, they offered a distinction between those innovations that were in complete contradiction with the Koran and those that merely lacked precedent. Both reformists sought to base change upon the traditional sources of Islam and to attach new and contemporary meaning to them. Because of their efforts the movement "fired audiences in one Muslim country after another to a reawakened consciousness of how they had once been mighty, but now were weak". 35 The origins of the contemporary perturbation in the Arab-Islamic society reach back to this period, even though in recent decades other causes of a quite different nature and magnitude have arisen. Yet, to al-Afghani, reform meant a return to the true principles of Islam and their interpretation in the light of modern scientific progress. In defense of this he denounced fatalism and passiveness, and the "submission to the authority of the medieval school. . ,".36 His teachings were the result of a new and limited struggle and lacked the coherence and the consistency of a systematic ideology and thought. He wanted to revitalize Islam to its original role as a STATE. AS a reformist, al-Afghani behaved as much like a politician as an agitator and a revolutionist. "In Egypt he supported the Constitutionalists who sought to bring the khedive under the control of an elected assembly; in Persia he had sought to restrict the shah's power through the religious leaders. In both cases he was willing to resort to any other means." 37 As a politician he was ever ready to cooperate with the Islamic governments when political expediencies necessitated his doing so, but he was also ready to pursue the role of the agitator when governments opposed his goals. While it could be stated that he "did not seem to have the philosophic mind, the intellectual equipment, or the temperament necessary for a thorough theo35

Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam in Modern History ( N e w York, Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 49. 36 Safran, op. cit., p. 44. 37 Ibid., p. 46.

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retical reformulation of Islamic doctrine", these deficiencies do not detract "from [his] being a great teacher", and a leader of remarkable charismatic qualities.38 From the very start al-Afghani's writings reveal that he had two objectives in mind: the immediate need to end European domination, and eventual Islamic revival. The first task he believed could best be achieved through imitation or adaptation of selected Western methods; the second, only through intensive and extensive reeducation and renovation. Essentially, his aim was to modernize Islam into a force sufficiently viable and dynamic as to continue serving as the mainspring of the culture, thereby perpetuating its solidarity. The tasks could be effected most expeditiously through the violent action of a politically active polity. But the ingredients which encouraged a participative spirit in the society had long been missing from the amalgam of the now apathetic culture. Therefore to al-Afghani, his antipathy to European avarice and its associated oppression was accompanied by a perception of, an admiration for, and a yearning to emulate the West's admittedly superior scientific knowledge and spirit of free inquiry.39 On the one hand, he "exhibited a partial appreciation of intellectualism" but he also "saw the West as something primarily to be resisted".40 Both the urge to imitate in order to be strong and the fear of losing Islamic identity were ever present in his mind - considerations which made him a complex personality. He was a blending of the intellectual and the fanatic, a realist on one occasion and an idealist on another. His preaching "contributed to the spread of revolutionary temper and a new attitude toward politics".41 His influence in the Arab world is still considerable, and partly explains why modern Arab revolutionary mass movements are frequently occasioned by the discord between the two types of nationalism - Arab romantic and Islamic conservative. His most significant bequest to posterity is, however, the concept that socio-political thought is no longer the exclusive domain of the ulema class. All these facets of his work point up the greatness of al-Afghani as one of the most important personalities contributing to contemporary Arab politics. Whether al-Afghani was a fanatic, a politician, an agitator or simply an intellectual is irrelevant. It is important to note however that, largely 38

Ibid., pp. 44-45. Nejla Izzeddin, The Arab World (Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1953), pp. 63-92. 40 Smith, op. cit., p. 50. 41 Haim (ed.), op. cit., p. 7. 39

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due to his efforts, his era made some progress in relieving oppression by creating Arab-Moslem forms of nationalism. It should be noted that, although Arab society at this period was being barraged by various political sentiments, during al-Afghani's heyday most of the intelligentsia were influenced by his ideas. Although European superiorities had been intruding on the Ottoman world for some time, al-Afghani was the first to take significant notice of their disturbing influence on Islamic culture. The sentiment that the ArabIslamic culture could resist these encroachments only through evolutionare and revolutionary reforms was developed under al-Afghani's aegis, to be picked up and implemented by a later generation of men of action such as Nasser, Bourguiba and Ben Bella. Al-Afghani's charisma and wisdom had an enduring effect for they made their impact at a time when innovation was a matter of concern to society as a whole. Consequently, to the Islamic world in its present turbulence, he is a symbol and often a model for various reforms. The significance of his presence and his works are mainly that he was the inspiration and the leader in time of strife when leaders were few, and that he was the first to make a real attempt to reopen the "door of self exertion" (bab-al-Ijtihad) in a society where individual judgments and criticism had not been permitted for at least nine centuries. In advocating that the "door of self-exertion" be reopened to rational criticism as a means of revitalizing the society and the culture, alAfghani identified two areas of decadence in the Islam of his time: the material situation resulting from ignorance, poverty, and superstition, which taken together prohibited technological innovation, thereby permitting Western dominance; and the intellectual apathy which denied Islam a spiritual evolvement similar to the Christian, thereby keeping the community in a state of moral retardation. Needless to say, this perspective is considered by many as being equally appropriate to modern times. While al-Afghani might be considered to have been a modern nationalist, the essence of his mental force "recalls an older type of political action", the revival of pan-Islamism that requires the "Islamic combination of a religious reformer and a strong ruler". He was modern in his ideas about Islamic reform, but he attached little value to democratic or constitutional principles; that Islam should identify itself with modern trends, and modern civilization is built on "reason and worldly activity aiming at progress",42 which, according to his 42

Albert Hourani, "Near Eastern Nationalism Yesterday and Today", Affairs, XLII (October, 1963), 28.

Foreign

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thinking, coincided with the true principles of Islam. He thus concluded that Moslems could acquire strength in the modern world only by turning back to the truth of Islam. The remedy to all of this, said al-Afghani, is the Koran: "Verily, God changes not what a people has until they change it for themselves." 43 The basic teaching of al-Afghani was summed up in March, 1913, in the Revue du Monde Musulman in the following manner: The Christian world, despite its internal differences of race and nationality, is against the East, especially Islam, and is united for the destruction of all Muslim States. The Crusades still exist, as well as the fanatical spirit of Peter the Hermit. In its heart, Christendom still regards Islam with violent hatred and contempt. This fact is demonstrated in many ways, as in international law, when Muslim nations are not treated as the equal of Christian ones. Christian governments justify the attacks and humiliations inflected upon Muslim states by citing their backward and barbarous conditions; yet these same governments suppress, in a thousand ways, even by war, every attempt and effort toward reform and revival in Muslim lands. Hatred of Islam is common to all Christian peoples, not merely to some. The result of this attitude is a tacit, persistent effort to annihilate Islam. Every Muslim sentiment and aspiration is caricatured and slandered by Christendom. The Europeans call in the Orient "fanaticism" what they call "nationalism" and "patriotism" at home. In the West, they refer to "selfrespect," "pride," and "national honor," but in the East they call it "chauvinism." What they esteem as "national sentiment" in the West, in the East they consider "xenophobia." It is quite evident from all this that the entire Muslim world must unite in a great defensive alliance to safeguard itself from destruction; and in order to accomplish this, it must acquire the techniques of Western progress and learn the secrets of European power.44 Thus the writings of al-Afghani have many facets, and have been subject to many controversial interpretations: by some he is considered a LIBERAL whose main task was to promote liberalism and reforms similar to those of the European Renaissance and Reformation; others see him as a REALIST whose sole purpose was to revise the Islamic doctrine in the light of the then existing conditions in order to restore stability. Still others see him as an EXTREME NATIONALIST and a RADICAL MOSLEM who intended to revive the historical Christian-Islamic enmity and so promote the liberation of the Moslem community from Western influence. Contemporary historians and writers on the Arab-Moslem area, 43

Koran: 13:12. Quoted from: Sedar and Harold J. Greenbert, Behind the Egyptian Sphinx (New York, Clinton Company, Book Division Publisher, 1960), pp. 101-102. 44

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irrespective of which of the above viewpoints they accept, view him in one of the following lights: a dedicated Arab-Moslem whose restless energy was directed to the welfare of his society; an obscure and harmless individual whose intellectual contribution is of no value; or as a fanatic agitator whose ideas - political and religious - were extremely dangerous to the community and world civilization. Aside from all these images, one fact is obvious: his predominant contribution has helped to ignite the spirit of Arabism; he may rightly be considered the father of Arab nationalism. It is not so much because of the profundity of his ideas that he was a remarkable man, but rather because in his ideas the Arab nationalists found a solution to their dilemma. Despite his intellectual short-sightedness, and his fanatical devotion to the Moslem community, academicians must acknowledge al-Afghani as a GREAT MAN OF KNOWLEDGE whose ideas eventually induced the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION of later generations to undertake their respective revolutionary mass movements. Al-Afghani's works are definitely controversial and, to paraphrase the thought of Manfred Halpern, seem to have been the creation of an agitator, a fanatic, a genius, a politician, a teacher and even a saint.45 A less dynamic but more penetrating personality than al-Afghani was Muhammad Abduh who in his formative years while under the influence of al-Afghani was inclined to political radicalism, but he refrained from carrying this to the point where he could be considered a political activist. Nevertheless his teachings did motivate a number of his disciples, among them Muhammad Rashid Rida, to political activism. To a greater extent than his master, Abduh, even though he was less emotionally involved and therefore less extreme, advocated resistance to Christian spiritual influence and a return to the unadulterated faith and pure practice of Islam. Although he was greatly influenced by Wahhabism, the intellectual reforms he favored were rational and liberal. Abduh was also greatly influenced by Ghazali's emphasis on personal experience in religious matters and the right of individual judgment. The basic conviction of his intellectualism was that the Moslem society must respond to the political and intellectual pressures of the European Christian society through education rather than revolt.46 Abduh's approach is believed to be more deliberate in the sense that it represents 15

Halpern, op. cit., p. 284. For a more detailed statement of this fundamental choice see: al-Manir, VIII (Cairo, 1905), p. 893. 46

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a clear departure in impetus and instinct from that of al-Afghani.47 The vision and matured judgment he displayed is partly due to the broadening influence of his travels in Europe. Advocating that in essence there can be no contradiction between the Koranic authoritative views and acquired human knowledge when both are examined with intellectual perception, he convinced many scholars to undertake an open, earnest inquiry into Islamic revival.48 While rejecting some Western concepts, he eagerly accepted others such as science, technology and the modern means of education and thought. The heart of his thesis was that Islam, in the original puritan state freed from later accretions, is congruous with the state of reality within which it occurs and is perfectly harmonious with modern thought and environmental conditions. He summoned the Moslem intellectuals to erect bridges by which the Islamic society could pass from outmoded traditions into a more flexible modern way of life. Accordingly, he considered blind allegiance the chief enemy of Islam and he was of the conviction that receptivity to modern thought could benefit the culture. To dispute the first and demonstrate the other he contested the dogma of taqlid (traditionalism). The substance of his theological thinking is that blind and passive acceptance of authoritative Koranic interpretations perverts Moslem thought and distorts the true meaning of the Holy Koran. Reason and faith should overcome taqlid and its credence: "science is its [the Koran's] true friend and associate",49 and he believed that harmony between sound reason and revealed theology was the only sure and right way. He taught that rational interpretations vary with each generation and cannot be arbitrarily made final in any one generation. His veneration of liberty and rationality was due mainly to his contact with such European philosophers as Herbert Spencer. More than al-Afghani, Abduh understood the impact of modernization. In his mind, modernization was essential and inevitable, and the choice was not whether to modernize, but whether to modernize with or without Islam. He endeavored to facilitate the individual's shift away from 47

Al-Afghani strove to stimulate his fellow Moslems into strong Pan-Islamic passions and action. 48 Safran, op. cit., pp. 69-79. 41

Muhammad Abduh, Al-Islam wa-n-Nasraniyya ma' al-'Ilm wa al-Madaniyya

(Islam and Christianity vis a vis Science and Civilization), 3rd ed. (Cairo, 1923) (originally published in form of articles in Al-Manar, Vol. 4, Cairo, 1901, p. 132); see also, Muhammad Abduh, Risalat at-Tawhid (Treatise on the Unity of God), 5th ed. (Cairo, 1897), pp. 10, 55.

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traditionalism by helping him to accept modernization without developing an inharmonious personality. By linking the struggle for spiritual freedom with political action, Abduh paved the way for the gradual emergence of the various movements, essentially nationalistic in purpose and MIDDLECLASS in composition.50 Although he deviated from the real issues, his writings disclose a remarkably vigorous and courageous mind for a pioneer scholar. In some instances he was too ready to show that reason was incompatible with dogma, and on other occasions he would declare simultaneously both for orthodoxy and modernity. Furthermore, he could have been more scholarly in arguing that science and faith, reasoning and revealed law were congruous. Be that as it may, the nature of REALITY is a problem which belongs to philosophy and theology, and whatever the depth of his scholarly work, his intellectual integrity and his deep faith in Islam cannot be questioned.51 In the words of Sir Hamilton Gibb, " . . . more than any other single man he gave modern Egyptian [and Arab] thought a centre of gravity and created, in place of a mass of disconnected writings, a literature inspired by definite ideas of progress within an Islamic framework". 52 In evaluating Abduh's work it should be remembered that he wrote under the ever-increasing intimidation of an age given over to extreme conservatism. That he was defeated by the ulema in his efforts at practical social reform is overshadowed by the important spiritual reforms he set in motion by even contending with the religious intellectuals. The impact of his presence on the world stage is still felt, and is on a level with al-Afghani's in giving Arab society the lift which makes the "Arabs feel the dignity of their origin, the greatness of their past and the permanent value of the faith".53 Writers, in general, consider his work to be a Moslem's ventures into religio-political speculation. Whether this assessment is true or not, it is fairly well established that his writings have encouraged succeeding dissidents to experiment with non-indigenous innovations in their efforts to revitalize Islamic society. His work, like that of his mentor, al-Afghani, served to stimulate energizing forces long dormant in Arab society. More importantly in the opinion of Manfred Halpern, "the successors of these two reformers", Jamal-ed-Din al-Afghani and Muhammed Abduh, "become 50

Izzeddin, op. cit., pp. 63-92. Lord Cromer, Modern Egypt, Vol. 2 (London, Macmillan, 1908), p. 180. 32 H. A. R. Gibb, "Studies in Contemporary Arabic Literature", Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, University of London, IV, p. 758. 53 Gabrieli, op. cit., p. 46. 51

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increasingly divided among conservatives, extremists, and radicals".54 The historic-political significance of their religious salafiyya reform movement is that it stimulated subsequent revolutionary mass movements. These phenomena, though far removed from Abduh's perceptions, did however occur as a result of an intellectual awakening which he precipitated. This is his legacy to posterity, and to his credit it is still in the process of amplification. Although there is some element of truth to the postulation that the intellectual stratum of Arab society is more or less a homogeneous group, there do exist some significant differences in individual viewpoints. Going back to the early nineteenth century origins of the modern intellectuals, one finds the usual differences resulting from dissimilarities in class, status, and wealth. Despite these variances, education, as in other societies, has served as the cementing bond, particularly in the Age of the Ulema when the religious intellectuals controlled practically all learning. In modern times the viewpoints of the intellectuals are still shaped by their status and environment and, therefore, reflect the political agitation which is present. The clamor for Western reform has been answered by the advocacy of modernization mainly through secular reforms, but it should be noted that the innovations are generally within the intellectual context of Islam. The GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE of al-Afghani's and Abduh's period formulated the embryonic sociological theories which served to instill in the conservative-traditional elites of their times the awareness of their role. These theories later became the bases for the subsequent reform efforts of the liberals, the nationalists and the modern elitists. Through the work then of the great intellectuals, the conflict of interests among the liberal, the conservative, the radical, and the reactionary elements of the society which had long remained dormant, resolved into conflicts significantly affecting the whole order. In short, because intellectuals such as al-Afghani and Abduh did dare to venture into the previously sacrosanct realm of the ulema, the spiritual ideology in time became enmeshed in practical everyday politics. In Egypt, for example, Mustapha Kamel helped to arouse in the Egyptian people a spirit of involvement in the destiny of the country, thereby inculcating a spirit of nationalism. In time his contributions permeated every corner of the Arab hemisphere and influenced other well known progressive intellectual leaders, such as Lutfi al-Sayyid, whose contributions in the fields 54

Halpera, op. cit., p. 122; also Smith, op. cit., pp. 115-116.

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of constitutional patterns and democratic principles have accelerated modernization.55 Another example is Emir Shakib Arslan (18691946),56 a Lebanese by origin, who spread the idea that the Maghreb nations (Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco) were an integral part of the Arab world, and that their struggle for independence arose from and was wedded to the impulses underlying the Arab movements for liberation. In so doing, he influenced the nationalist leaders of North Africa, particularly Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia and Messali Hajj of Algeria. The contributions of the great intellectuals during this period of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries crusade against taqlid were not restricted to religion or politics, but included a host of other subjects fundamental to the rebirth of Arab culture. Among the innovators calling for the modernization of social and political institutions were the well known Christian families of Lebanon, including the Yazigi, al-Koury, Takla, and Jumayyil.57 Other prolific intellectual contributors of the period, to name a few, were: Nasif Yaziju (1800-1871), Butrus al-Bustani (1819-1883),58 Faris al-Shidyaq (1804-1887), Abid Ishaq (1856-1885), Neguib al-Haddad (1867-1899), Abd ur-Rahman alKawakibi (1849-1902),69 Ibrahim Yaziji (1847-1906), Jamil Mudawwar (1862-1907), Qasim Amin (1868-1908),60 Mustafa Kamel (1874-1908), Jurji Zaidan (1861-1914), Wali-ed-Din Yagan (1873-1921), Said Zaghlul (1860-1927), Mustafa Lutfi al-Manfaluti (1876-1924), Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935),61 Ahmad Amin (1886-1954), Mustafa Abd ur-Raziq (1905-1947), Muhammad Husayn Haykal (18891956), Salamah Musa (1887-1959), Doctor Taha Hussien (b. 1889),62 al-Hakim (b. 1899), and Abbas Muhmud al-Aqqad (b. 1899). All, as reflected in their views, had been influenced by the impact of the more progressive Western culture.63 Their writings, while naturally Orientally

55

Izzeddin, op. cit., pp. 75-92. Haim (ed.), op. cit., p. 45. 57 Pierre Rondot, The Changing Patterns of the Middle East, op. cit., pp. 58-59. 58 George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1938), pp. 45-53. 59 Haim (ed.), op. cit., pp. 25-29. 60 Elie Salem, "The Arabs and Westernization", Il Politica (Milano, University of Pavia, XXIX, 1964), pp. 222-223. 81 Haim (ed.), op. cit., pp. 19-21. 62 Ilse Lightenstadter, Islam and the Modern Age (New York, Bookman Associates, 1960), pp. 180-191. 63 Izzeddin, op. cit., pp. 296-313; also Gabrieli, op. cit., p. 46.

58

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THE GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE

flavored, echoed "more or less . . . the voices of Rousseau and Voltaire, Mill and Hugo, Garibaldi and Mazzini".64 Clearly these creative thinkers were not concerned with any particular field except as it pertained to reform in general. In cursorily considering the validity of their works, it suffices to say that their views awakened the masses to the prospect of a better life and, by proffering the promise of that better life, induced widespread discontent. These GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE lived, unlike the present MILITANT-INTELLECTUAL stratum, in an age of relative freedom when FREE THINKING was highly valued and controversy was openly encouraged. Their prime objective was the maintenance, the transmission, and the extension of knowledge in the interest of their society. In retrospect, it appears that by nature these GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE were as revolutionary as the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION. In their time they were the fomentors of revolution for they opposed the conservative-traditonalist elite and gave substance to the existing discontent with the fresh theories and doctrines developed in seeking new understanding. In discrediting the existing order of things, they weakened the people's faith in the institutions of the ruling hierarchy, thereby undermining the prevailing order and paving the way for the emergence of the present revolutionary mass movements. For this if for no other achievement, the presence on the world stage of the GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE has been significant. Their writings, although controversial, effectively broke down the authority of the ulema and created a state of flux in the previously atrophied Arab society. At the same time the intellectual apathy into which many Arabs had fallen was dispelled, and the masses were made ready for change - a mood which in the politically unsophisticated Arabs conditioned the masses into a high state of nondiscriminatory receptivity to outside influences. At this juncture the stage becomes set for the molding of the masses by the fanatics and the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION, because the waging of revolution requires a different caliber of leader than the men of great intellectualism whom we have so far discussed: This is the history of all rebellions, French Revolutions, social explosions in ancient or modern times. You have put the too Unable man at the head of affairs! The too ignoble, unvaliant, fatuous man. You have forgotten that there is any rule, or natural necessity whatever, of putting the Able Man there. . . ,65 64 05

Gabrieli, op. cit., p. 47. Carlyle, op. cit., p. 84.

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THE MILITANT INTELLECTUAL: A NEW CLASS

Although the GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE provided the inspiration which eventually led the long dormant Arab culture to accept innovation, with the exceptions of a few like al-Afghani and Abduh, their contributions had no immediate far-reaching political effects. Because the savants were mainly interested in a cultural renaissance rather than an improvement in social conditions, they were more disposed to protest against rather than to seek solutions for the ills besetting the social order. Corrective political action in the main was left to leaders less isolated from the masses and more inclined to participative political action; consequently, the GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE generally remained aloof from revolutionary mass movements. However, within the current movements there exists a new group of creative MILITANT-INTELLECTUALS who are active participants in mass politics. There exist also some non-creative pseudo-intellectuals whose conceptive impotence motivates them to seek fulfillment through revolt. For a variety of reasons the contemporary MILITANT-INTELLECTUALS differ from the GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE in that the present group is more heterogeneous and less exclusive. It consists mostly of professional people, civil servants and military men who came into prominence following the departure of their former colonial overlords, and who have since been joined by university students. Unlike its Western counterpart this stratum is mainly employed or subsidized by the governing authority, hence it lacks economic power in its own right and is therefore a useful political tool to its master - the state. As an intellectual grouping and a governing bureaucracy par excellence instituted by the revolution, it wields political power as its own naturally won right, and politically it is and is expected to remain radically inclined. Unlike its counterpart in the more progressive countries, the Arab MILITANT-INTELLECTUAL group constitutes an almost independent socio-political class. A transfer of leadership between the military and civilian elements by no means constitutes a power transfer as both groups are part and parcel of the same MILITANT-INTELLECTUAL class. In the Arab world MILITANT-INTELLECTUALS have been and are today the product of the several Western sponsored institutions which exist in the Arab area. Among these are the American Universities in Beirut and Cairo, Saint Joseph University in Beirut, and Aleppo College in Aleppo. These institutions implant in the young Arab minds Western principles of democracy, educating them to where they feel themselves

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THE GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE

apart from and above the indigenous traditional social order.66 Because there is no place in the native hierarchy for the full utilization of their Western-developed special talents and because the tutelary powers denied them positions of trust during the colonial administration, these students, after graduation, have had a difficult time in attaining employment commensurate with the skills they had been taught. Frustrated at being rejected by both the social order and the local administration, and in search of self-realization and self-fulfillment, this disillusioned group of neophyte intellectuals turned their talents in other directions and eventually evolved into cadres for the forthcoming revolutionary movements. As pointed out by Raymond Aron, "The monopolizing of jobs by Frenchmen in Tunisia and Morocco nourished the bitterness of Arab graduates from French universities and swept them irresistibly to revolt." 67 Therefore, it is obvious that Western sponsored schools did serve as the entrepot in which the legacy of the Arab's glorious past was melded with the new ideologies emanating from the Occident and that these schools and the other Western institutions located in the Arab World were the breeding places for the forthcoming revolutions. Today these same institutions are the source of the highly Utopian ideas which add to the frenzy of the movement. Since independence, the spread of education in general has also nurtured a kindling resentment of imperialism, Westernism and feudalism as well as some awareness of the Arab's own backwardness in relation to other cultures. Toward the end of the 1930's the scholars and writers had virtually disappeared and their previous contributions came to be ignored. The intellectuals were replaced by the propagandists, and the popular writers, i.e., journalists, and the publicists came to occupy the chair of the scholars. Those scholars who confined their activities to academic circles have been rare. Even there, however, their highly academic contributions have been stigmatized as being outmoded. While this would, in part, confirm the fact that the recent Arab REAWAKENING is renascent in nature, the fact still remains that the contemporary Arab MILITANTINTELLECTUALS are antagonistically inclined. That recent mass revolutionary movements have been primarily a reaction to external, economic, military and political threats bears this out. The antagonism of the MILITANT-INTELLECTUALS is further aggravated by a guilt complex because they realize that the achievements of the last few centuries do not measure up to the great accomplishments of the first four centuries of the 66 67

L a q u e u r , Communism A r o n , op. cit., p. 218.

and Nationalism

in the Middle

East, op. cit., p. 15.

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109

rise of Islam. In justifying their antagonistic approach, Arab MILITANTclaim that, because modern European civilization is a product of an originally Islamic civilization, when the Arabs borrow or adapt from the West they are no more than reappropriating what was originally theirs. Refusing responsibility, they blame the Ottomans and the West and their imposition of feudalism, colonialism and neo-colonialism for the Arab's present difficulties and previous backwardness. Neither self-criticism nor a genuine system of self-evaluation have been allowed to develop; instead, the age of REAWAKENING has been defensive and negative in nature and apologetic in approach. This antagonistic reaction becomes more apparent as the MATERIAL-VALUES of the West increasingly pressure the Middle East. To the Arabs, the essential aspects of nationalism and modernization have become inextricably intertwined as means and ends. The psychological conditioning of the contemporary Arab MILITANTINTELLECTUAL is characterized by a sense of urgency and a factor of disillusionment from which the GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE were relatively free. Consequently, the intellectual atmosphere is equivocal in that the West is both envied in terms of its science and industry and feared for its power and dynamism. "The Arab 'resents' the West and yet is anxious to emulate it",98 and he and his class of MILITANT-INTELLECTUALS are plagued by ambivalent sets of thoughts wherein they simultaneously admire and negate their own past while both castigating and emulating Western civilization. There is a clear contradiction in mental concepts, but as Han Suyin rightly points out about the Asians (and this could be as easily applied to the Arabs): INTELLECTUALS

These switches from one layer of personal expression to another happen often among us Asians. We have undergone so much revolution within ourselves, as well as in our externals, during the past few decades that we are able to encompass a range of several centuries of behavior and platitudes and rituals of social exchange, depending upon the situations we confront. We have become as stratified as onions in eras of time and layers of culture.69

The quotation just given helps to explain the apparent paradox between the modern contemporary Arab MILITANT-INTELLECTUAL'S effort at nation building and his failure to develop a sense of civic consciousness. They have succeeded in creating the IDEA of the nation but have failed, so far, to create a NATION, mainly because they have been unable to 68 6I>

Elie Salem, "The Arabs and Westernization", op. cit., p. 224. Han Suyin, "The Sparrow Shall Fall", The New Yorker (October 10, 1959).

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THE GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE

establish an affinity with and an empathy for other strata of the social order. T h e atmosphere in which the

MILITANT-INTELLECTUAL

operates

has become pregnant with an intense politicization which is difficult to harmonize with civil responsibility. The incipient civil responsibility that was advocated by the

GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE

suffocated by the contemporary

is about to be

MILITANT-INTELLECTUAL

because the

proper environmental conditions have not been developed owing to the persistence of the primordially hierarchical authoritarian and uncivic traditions. This does not mean that there have been no civic leaders among the intellectuals, but only that they have been in the minority and that the traditional power concepts have not been amenable to the establishment of a strong civic society. Thus, the intense politicization of the contemporary intellectual's outlook, as manifested by the various modern revolutionary mass movements, is best understood if one is aware that historically Islamic culture has been characterized by political insensibility. It was stated previously that the

GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE

usually

give rise to the ideas which undermine a decadent order and eventually lead to its overthrow by revolution. However, it takes a special type of intellectual to participate in the overt aspects of the overthrow. Usually such persons come f r o m the

UNATTACHED

segment of society, from

a position of no clear status or social usefulness. Once acquired, the skills of these intellectuals are use t o legitimize the claim to power of the aspiring revolutionary mass movement. B y modifying the movement's concepts and goals to fit the mentality of the masses, the Utopian offerings become acceptable to the society. But before this can be accomplished, the masses must be conditioned to the point of utter devotion and wholehearted support required by a charismatically led cause. T o establish this rapport, an affinity and an empathy must be established with all segments of the society, particularly the less privileged elements. Thus the unattached

intellectuals seek a link with the under-

privileged, be they vagrants unwanted minorities or dissatisfied students. However, the establishment of a link between the

UNATTACHED

intel-

lectuals and the underprivileged masses does not occur because of sympathy for the plight of the mass-followers, but is due rather to the need for acquiring greater strength through numbers. In short, the formidable combination is based on

POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY

and not neces-

sarily on a true affinity or empathy between the intellectuals and the masses. A n atmosphere impregnated by intense politicization invites partici-

THE GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE

111

pation by members of the MILITANT-INTELLECTUAL class, and many do compete with others for key positions. Although they do this within the circle of the governing regime, to borrow the logic of Manfred Halpern, this "does not inhibit the acquisition of a common historical awareness that each of them suffers from the same burden of the past and the same frustrations of the present".70 As long as these MILITANT-INTELLECTUALS have no common cause with those in power, there is always the possibility that some, even though gainfully employed, will turn their grievances into disaffection and revolt. The willingness to make politics an end-all of their existence has been based, as they logically deduce, on the premise that they have very little to gain from the maintenance of the existing order. Very few are hindered by fear of loss of their means of livelihood, whether they work in government, for private enterprise, or in academic circles. As unattached and therefore socially isolated MILITANT-INTELLECTUALS, they are living in an age of nationalistic fervor which helps to make this dedication to politics possible. Consequently and not surprisingly, the MILITANT-INTELLECTUAL class of Arab society has, in recent years, been forced by a chain of circumstances to monopolize the field of politics, as is demonstrated in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and to a lesser extent in Syria and Iraq. As a consequence of his frequent residences in the Arab world, the author is of the opinion that the UNATTACHED MILITANT-INTELLECTUALS - the free lance writers, the artist, the journalists, the unemployed and under-employed professionals, and a sizeable number of graduate students - are more frequently disposed to participate in movements than are their counterparts who are already integrated into the structure of the society. To emancipate themselves from the stringencies of governmental control, these UNATTACHED MILITANT-INTELLECTUALS seek inclusion in a CONGENIAL COLLECTIVE BODY which would, in all probability, be characterized by a charismatic totalitarian origin similar to the regime they oppose. Among the many reasons for this threat to political stability is the fact that the UNATTACHED MILITANT-INTELLECTUAL class is, in the main, unemployed. This special situation comes about because an overabundance of their particular skills has been developed in relation to the needs of the society. Therefore, only a fraction of the members of the MILITANT-INTELLECTUAL class actually hold jobs that draw adequate pay. In Iraq, for instance, only roughly twelve per cent of university graduates between 1950 and 1955 found jobs either in business or government commensurate with their skills or educational 70

Halpern, op. cit., p. 66.

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THE GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE

level.71 Because the future promises but little relief and because the group is presently relatively free from institutional responsibilities, they are especially susceptible to the appeal of revolutionary mass movements. For those employed, the problem is not so much one of unemployment as one of mal-employment in that full utilization is not made of their skills. Thus, underpaid in relation to their talents and uncertain of their tenure because of the surfeit of qualified aspirants to their posts, this class feels most insecure. To exacerbate their plight, the intellectuals cannot help but contrast the hazards of their existence to the security enjoyed by their counterparts in the more advanced nations. To add to their bitterness, they cannot help but note the high esteem which their own society displays for the cultural achievements of foreign intellectuals. Their quandary steadily worsens as the indigenous academic plant continues to turn out, in large numbers, more highly educated persons than the relatively slowly progressing society can absorb. With time the group becomes more and more isolated from its society and tends increasingly to adopt a revolutionary and messianic outlook. When discontented to the point of seeking the overthrow of the ruling regime, the MILITANT-INTELLECTUALS are attracted to all sorts of abortive movements. There they can indulge in all kinds of theoretical ruminations, disregarding socio-economic and political practicalities. This fact partly explains the amorphous and abstract nature of the ideologies being evolved by the various Arab revolutionary mass movements. In short, many Arab intellectuals seeking fulfillment of their psychological needs for recognition as socially useful persons assert themselves by advocating the unorthodox, even to the extent of risking ridicule and persecution. Through travel and reading, the MILITANT-INTELLECTUALS are knowledgeable and able to contrast the backwardness of their society with the progress in the outside world. Contempt for the outmoded traditions of their own heritage and a somewhat inflated appreciation of their own worth combine to create a state of false pride precluding their employment in other than sophisticated surroundings. Because they would rather be unemployed than work in backward rural communities, they are isolated from the mainstream of life in the Middle East - the peasant society. But refusing work among the peasants is less an expression of righteous indignation than an inability to reconcile their ambivalent feeling towards their heritage. Pride in the traditional values 71

Ibid., p. 65.

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KNOWLEDGE

113

which were the mainstay of their glorious cultural heritage is confounded by repugnance for and rejection of these very same traditional values because they have proved defective in the modern age. Because traditional values and attitudes are so much a part of their upbringing, the young MILITANT-INTELLECTUALS are confused. Thus, they are either fatalist or rebellious in outlook. Their state of mind is further confounded by the new values which they as students have learned from the more progressive and highly industrialized West. Torn between the old and the new, the MILITANT-INTELLECTUALS vacillate between the traditional and the modern and often find themselves isolated from their own society. The new values they have adopted have implanted an awareness of and a desire for a better way of life. Because these aspirations are not fully understood nor readily attainable within the society as presently constituted, the MILITANT-INTELLECTUAL class is isolated and confused. Because the intellectuals are unable to reconcile their ambivalences, they are unable to formulate a basic set of standards or values to which they can readily and constantly relate. With few exceptions, the young Arab MILITANT-INTELLECTUALS inspiring Arab movements are more zealous than their antecedent counterparts. In their zeal for reform, they foster a radical and reactionary form of nationalism.72 In postulating or promulgating their programs, they are less rational and pragmatic than they are fanatical and Utopian. Their politics, usually tempered by religious and socio-economic considerations, ignore the realities of life and inculcate extremism throughout all levels of the social order. Because the programs they advocate still reflect the old values and traditions, they are often expressed in terms of jihad in order to reestablish the past glories. Some members of this class are so mesmerized as to the righteousness of the cause of Arabism, that they are insensitive to outside considerations. For example, consider the claim of Nasser in his youth that "he is not a fatalist in the Muslim sense. [But] he behaves like a fatalist, largely because of that unlimited confidence in the righteousness of his cause". 73 Although some intellectuals have, to some extent, isolated themselves from the traditional values of their society, as a class they still receive much stimulation from the old culture. Some impulses inspiring the modern intellectual can be traced back to the Prophet, to Ibn Rushd, to Ibn Khaldun and to the great Mu'tazilities. "Put directly", says Pro72 See: Leonard Binder, "Radical Reform Nationalism in Syria and Egypt", The Muslim World, XLIX (July, 1959). 75 Wynn, op. cit., p. 63.

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THE GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE

fessor Hisham Sharabi, "the intellectual crisis of the younger Arab generation may be summarized in terms of three main features; psychological uprootedness, loss of moral and religious certainties, and valuational drift." 74 Most young intellectuals, to their frustration and discomfiture, are caught up in all three traits. Even the few liberal intellectuals, such as Taha Hussein, Constantin Zuraiq, Charles Malik,75 Muhammad Dib, Khalid Muhammad Khalid, Katib Yacine, Malik Bennebi and Muhammad Kamel Hussein, have been forced to suppress their thoughts in cultural exile, have been coerced into compromise, or have vegetated in obscurity. Discontent has led them to nihilism and academic inactivism. The degree of alienation varies, but it is much deeper and more drastic than it was before the rise of the modern regimes. The process of rapid change has created profound insecurities, forcing the young intellectuals to conform to the ruling regime in order not to be isolated from the society. The intellectual vanguard has forsaken its traditionally independent and enlightened stance and has degenerated into a propaganda machine serving the governing administration. Young intellectuals find it expedient to serve the movement by either conforming to the wishes of the charismatic leadership or remaining silent. When they choose to speak, despite their articulateness and apparent assurance, they know they are a sham. Because they deplore their unfaithfulness to the heritage of their intellectualism, they compensate by being overly pedantic.74 In the contemporary Arab world, there are but few intellectuals who are creative in that they pursue knowledge purely for the sake of learning. The output to date of those engaged in this vital undertaking is sparse, superficial, deficient, academically confined and socially inapplicable. In truth it can be said that the present intellectual atmosphere "lacks real subjectivity and the capacity for self criticism on any profound level".77 Because most of the contemporary savants are pressured to promote the nationalistic programs fostered by the governing regimes, their thinking vacillates between responding to their own ideals or to their pragmatism. Because these intellectuals crave recognition and a 74

Hisham Sharabi, "Political and Intellectual Attitudes of the Young Arab Generation", in Tibor Kerekes (ed.), The Arab Middle East and Muslim Africa (New York, Praeger, 1961), p. 50. 75 See: Hazem Nuseibeh, The Ideas of Arab Nationalism (Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1956), passim. 76 Sharabi, "Political and Intellectual Attitudes of the Young Arab Generation", op. cit., pp. 47-61. 77 Ibid., p. 51.

THE GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE

115

prestigious status in the society, they too often resolve the dilemma by becoming desperate extemporizers. Yet because this action is inconclusive, they remain torn between conformism and innovation and, therefore, serve neither fully. Assuredly this group does not measure up to the old intellectual GUARD, personified by Taha Hussein, most of whom were inculcated with the European philosophies of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although some of the latter group still write for government newspapers, their mentalities separate them from the contemporary generation in that "advanced age has freed them from wild passions".78 Be that as it may, the intellectual outlook of the old guard belongs neither to the cosmopolitan elite nor to the revolutionary faction, and, in most cases, they have not displayed the capacity to temper the extremism of the changing orders. The term which best describes the contemporary MILITANT-INTELLECTUAL group of Arab society is LEVANTISM. Historically, the term has been applied to the entire Westernized segment of the indigenous population of Syria and Lebanon - The Levant. The pertinency of the term is that it signifies a people going through the process of acculturation. "The Arab", and this applies more so to the MILITANT-INTELLECTUAL group, "changes his identity with little reluctance. With the Asiatics he is an oriental, with people from the West he is an occidental. . .".79 Because Levantines must accommodate to more than one cultural milieu without truly belonging to either, they do not develop their own set of values, but are disposed to imitate those of the cultures to which they are exposed.80 Superficially it appears that the "shift in the definition of what he stands for and to whom he relates himself is made smoothly and naturally, . . . but, outward appearances notwithstanding, a pronounced lag prevails between the behavior of the Arab, especially among the educated, rich and city dwellers, and his system of cherished values".81 This phenomenon explains in part the facility with which shifts in affiliations or allegiances are effected in the Arab world. The malcontents among the MILITANT-INTELLECTUALS are quick to join the various movements as they provide a large and sympathetic arena in which to voice their disaffection and nonconformism. Being erudite and articulate, they thereby gain much attention and respect, often rising to positions of political leadership. Consequently, their role is a 79

Georges Ketman, "The Egyptian Intelligentsia", in Walter Z. Laqueur (ed.), The Middle East in Transition (New York, Praeger, 1958), p. 486. 79 Hamady, op. cit., pp. 67-68. 80 See the work of Albert H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, passim. 81 Hamady, op. cit., p. 69.

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THE GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE

major one, particularly during the incipient periods of the revolt. But once the political stage of the revolution is complete, the new order is interested mainly in stability. To achieve permanence, organization and reorganization become imperative. The need then is for organizers and administrators. At this point, the role of the intellectual class in government per se diminishes. Although there is always room in government for experts in such fields as medicine and civil service, the primary role of policy making is usually reserved to politicians. Thus, for the intellectual, the attractiveness of the revolutionary mass movement is mainly in the incipient and overt stages of the revolt up to the point of takeover. Whether the successful revolutionary government will be able to utilize fully the technological and other skills of the intellectuals will depend in great part on the modernization of the particular presently underdeveloped nation. If the intellectuals continue to be inadequately utilized, or if they are relegated to their former roles, the nation will be the loser. For intellectuals not identifying with the new regime or incorporated into the new social order may, in their search for recognition, become spoilers seeking the overthrow of the government. Signs of this malcontent are already visible in Egypt and Tunisia where the revolutions are about to enter the stability stage. Nonetheless, now and for the near future, the MILITANT-INTELLECTUAL elite are expected to retain their monopoly of political power. Their continued presence seems almost a certainty, as Lucian Pye points out, in that the existing political edifice is a structural establishment with a viable foundation.82 This condition may continue during the transition from the old order to the new.

82

Lucian L. Pye, "The Non-Western Political Process", Journal of Politics, (August, 1958), 469-486.

XX

IV THE MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION: THE SECOND PHASE OF MASS MOVEMENT

SYMBIOSIS: INDIVIDUALISM AND DESPOTISM

It is generally accepted that innovation, either evolutionary or revolutionary, is essential to the growth of society. Because innovation brings into play ideas not in conformity with the prevailing norms it usually proves disruptive to the existing order and is, therefore, difficult to achieve. First, the people must be made aware of the need for change, usually by discrediting the existing order or by convincing them that there is a better and happier way of attaining their objectives. This task is generally accomplished by the GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE, the intellectuals discussed in the previous chapter. The second step involves the transforming of the amorphous ideas of the learned savants into practical courses of action in order to achieve the desired ends. Implementation of this stage is the task of an entirely different type of leadership character, the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION, e.g., Ben Bella, Bourguiba and Nasser. Further discussion of this latter phase follows in this chapter. Leadership may be broadly defined as the exercise of influence and power over others to attain one's purposes or objectives. In general, it may be categorized as democratic or autocratic. Insofar as the Arab world is concerned, leadership usually takes the autocratic form. It is often supposed that this dictatorial power of the Arab leaders is a manifestation of a strong personal desire for status and for power over others which naturally causes them to resort to absolutism in order to fulfill this craving. It can also be emphasized that the attitude and the low LEVEL OF POLITICIZATION of the Arab masses is partly responsible for the making of the character of the leader. At the risk of generalization, it can be safely stated that the Arab societal environment has few stimuli to encourage active participation in politics. The LEVEL OF POLITICIZATION is closely related to the "active-inactive dimension". As

118

THE MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION

is pointed out in previous chapters the cultural crisis exhibits a lack of positive valence and hence anomie, alienation and cynicism are prevalent. This syndrome of traits is, in a sense, the opposite of sociability and competence - a fact that invites an autocratic type of leadership, dominancy and authoritarianism. Relating dictatorial and democratic leadership to the actual situation in the Arab world is not, however, a matter of distinguishing between black and white. The gradations, deviations, exceptions, and variations from any hard-and-fast categories are so common as to make the anomalous no anomaly at all. The problem is better understood, however, when the relationship between individualism and despotism is correlatively analyzed. Individualism and despotism have, for a long time, lived side by side in the Arab-Islamic society. Specialists in contemporary Arab affairs and historians of Islam have produced many explanations of this dichotomy. One explanation is that contemporary Arab society lacks and therefore fails to understand democratic principles and love of liberty. Another is that Islam has been unable to develop a philosophy balancing LIBERTY and ORDER, which would tend to encourage an attitude of resistance to authoritarian rule. This contention is true, since the Islamic postulate of spiritual and secular synthesis (religion and state as two sides of the same coin) 1 is relatively congruous to authoritarianism, allowing few alternatives for rival claims of religion and state. Yet it must be boldly affirmed that the Arabs are passionate individuals who love liberty - an IDEAL LIBERTY OF INDIVIDUALISM, an ancient legacy that at no times has had a legitimate role in an imperfect political world. Is there a real contradiction between two characteristics of Near Eastern political life we have pointed out - individualism, hostility to government, and passion for equality on one side, and despotic governments making broad claims on the other? I think not. Individualism among Arab Moslems is not a political trait; it refers to equality of social status and individual freedom to follow the way of the Prophet. . . . I might go further and insist that the passion for individual equality outside the political realm is not merely compatible with despotic government but may even require it. Individualism that is not controlled and directed by politically oriented and responsible associations makes stable government difficult to achieve. Authority cannot, in such circumstances, be maintained by tacit consent but only by constant repression of recalcitrant wills which are themselves neither organized nor stable. Thus fierce egalitarian individualism defeats itself, because by not permitting government to feel itself legitimate, it impels government to main1

Payne, op. cit., p. 307.

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tain itself by force alone . . . Under such an arrangement it is difficult to see how democracy can emerge and spread. All individuals and groups being equal below the rulers and unconcerned with the political community, power cannot be progessively shared in a responsible manner. This sort of egalitarianism . . . must be given organized political direction before it can become an institutionalized support for a legitimate system of shared governmental authority. There are some signs . . . that such an arrangement is beginning to emerge in the Arab world. Until it dies, individualism and despotism are not merely compatible but symbiotic. 2

Moreover, along with IDEAL LIBERTY is the legacy that the Islamic state, being the perfect state of God, is the ideal one and that therefore the Islamic government should also be the ideal one. The contradiction between the demand for an IDEAL GOVERNMENT and practical necessity allowed the caliph or sultan to govern absolutely. This uncompromising dichotomy between IDEAL LIBERTY (individualism) and IDEAL GOVERNMENT (despotism) is the source of historic conflict in Arab-Islamic society. The Arab mind was never able to balance individual political liberty and social order, and Arab history has seen a perennial shift between two extremes: passionate individualism and libertarianism (revolutionary periods almost negating governmental authority) and governmental despotism (orderly periods almost destroying individual liberty). In offering a brief summary of the above phenomenon, it should be noted that the leaders of Islam, throughout history, over-emphasized the concept of submission to God and the leaders: a value assumption which has become a strong standard of judgment for the mass-individuals. Most heresies in the history of religion have been the result of groups of individuals taking one religious truth or doctrine out of its context and placing emphasis on it to the near or total exclusion of the remaining truth or doctrines. With the realms of the spiritual and the temporal in Islam not kept distinctly separate . . . it has become extremely difficult, especially for the common people, not to obliterate the one when they over-emphasize the other. 3

Consequently, the concept of predestination has negated other Koranic concepts, e.g., FREE WILL, to a point where the mass-individuals have become totally submissive to any form of authority. The individual's environment has, to a great extent, become meaningful to him only through his Islamic culture. If an Arab Moslem firmly believes that God, 2 3

Berger, The Arab World Today, op. cit., pp. 274-275. Faris, "The Islamic Community and Communism", op. cit., p. 357.

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through Islam, directs all the activities of man and nature, that submission to God and the ruler is part of his duty and a prerequisite to salvation, then few things remain to puzzle him. Irrespective of the validity of his standards of judgment, experiences become meaningful to him only so long as he can relate them appropriately to his unique mental context. Not only that, but people who firmly believe in the absolute force of Islam (e.g., the will of God, and the submission to the representative of God) become more rigid in their adjustments, more intolerant and fanatical in their devotion than those who accept the idea of multiple causation, or those who have the critical ability to question the validity of the case. Partly because of this fatalistic, submissive attitude, authoritarianism has been a prevailing characteristic of Arab politics. The belief that the newly imported Western concepts, e.g., nationalism and modern secular education, have contributed to an ending of traditionalism is not in all cases necessarily true. Actually, a new form of despotism has replaced the old, even though there has been some modernization. As the impact of Westernization and new concepts of politics, i.e. MULTI-PARTY system, imposed themselves only superficially on the social structure, an indigenous landed aristocracy became more predominant economically and politically. With the weakening of the traditional monarchy and the increase of parliamentary institutions, the aristocrats were able to wield their influence more autocratically than before. While this was taking place, however, Western influence and modernization also helped the newly emerging middle class and intelligentsia to enter the arena of politics. Through modernization this middle class saw avenues for personal advancement, prestige, and the accumulation of power. By the 1940's the middle class had become substantially less homogeneous in character; that is, it included the educated people of all walks of life, skilled workers, high school and university graduates, miltary men of various ranks and professional individuals. As a class it was no longer dominated by the aristocratic elite. This was so because modern bureaucracy requires specialization which "involves the rise of the professional and business class particularly represented in the Middle East by the army officers".4 Consequently, the historical continuum of struggle between INDIVIDUALISM and DESPOTISM had to assert its dynamism once again. The tragedy here is that the Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states 4

Paul Stirling, "Structural Changes in the Middle East Society", in Philip W. Thayer (ed.), Tension in the Middle East (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), p. 146.

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have long been in a unique situation. Their typical pattern of evolution was one in which personal power and material wealth were not counterbalanced by social controls and social advancement of the masses. Closely related to this is the fact that the Arab society has been composed of small sectionalized communities. Vigorous particularism,5 found in the tribal structure, feudal classes, city clans and the like, were weighty obstacles to the parliamentary structure. Democratic principles were used as tools to guarantee and safeguard the power of the minority. Hence, in due time, the power of the executive was greatly enlarged and strengthened at the expense of the legislative branch. Frequent and arbitrary changes in the various cabinet posts by the heads of states were common. In most cases changes in cabinet positions returned the same personalities in new combinations.0 Thus, neither as a practical way of politics nor as the embodiment of political liberalism was the parliamentary system able to bear fruit by the time the present generation assumed national responsibility. Consequently, the people of the Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states gradually began to reject democratization because their traditional outlook and environmental circumstances prevented them, to some extent, from accepting it. Hence the people experienced an oligarchical type of feudalistic system, protected and supported by the power of democratic forms. Landowners and big businessmen used parliamentary procedures for self-advancement. Dishonesty, political instability, and lack of public responsibility perpetuated themselves.7 In a sense, much as it may surprise some people, the present-day militant Arab dictators reflect both historical determinism and the democratic era of the interwar period. Unlike the pre-democratic Islamic traditional autocracy when the people were dormant, the democratic era awakened the sleepy populace. But the democratic period was also burdened with political and economic crises and deeply imbued with psychological passions. The DICTATED DEMOCRACY did not solve the acute problems but rather resulted in bitter rivalries and xenophobia. These psychological.passions, operating in a politically unsettled society and economic poverty, inflamed the masses and provided additional fuel for later explosive forces. What the inter-war period of DICTATED DEMOCRACY did was to vulgarize these explosive forces. A new 5

Warringer, op. cit., p. 133. Izzeddin, op. cit., p. 390. 7 K. J. Newman, "The New Monarchies of the Middle East", Journal of International Affairs, XIII, No. 2 (1959), 157-164. 6

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militant elite arose; one coup d'etat after another occurred under the guise of meeting the compelling demands of Arab society. Democratic institutions, to be effective, must answer real desires and needs of the people. More often than not, grievances toward the democratic system generated changes. Unfortunately, such a ferment of awareness was characterized less by an intellectual awakening and social rebirth than by an uneasy state of mind, of lassitude, of withdrawal, of radical and reactionary activities, of hesitation and retreat, and of fear and suspicion. Consequently, there arose protest movements and extremist political parties. Though these extremist political parties had little success other than in articulating a negative reaction, such negativism was a reflection of basic crisis elements in Arab democracy. Odd as it seems, the primary appeal of the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION, i.e., modern dictators, lies in their promise of stability. The inflamed masses, at this stage of the crisis longing for rest, were ready to offer their political rights to the revolutionary men in exchange for security. When the imported, but unsuitable, political system becomes questionable, when the economic system is shattered in a period of depression, when religious and social ties are weakened, and when the whole set of values of the society is shaken, the cry for new leadership becomes louder. But the question still remains: how are stability, order, and a change for the better to come about? In the underdeveloped Arab world, pregnant with chaotic situations, responsibility for cultural transformation and economic development suitable to the twentieth century has to fall largely on the shoulders of the governments. 8 The need for strong centralized government becomes an urgent necessity and an essential prerequisite for progress. Even in the West the establishment and the nourishment of democracy historically had to pass "through a prolonged stage of despotic or dictatorial government in which the country was forcibly welded into a coherent whole". 9 Most enlightened contemporary Arab leaders are convinced that their countries must adopt many of the practices of modern civilization if they are to improve their standard of living. There is also the accepted consensus that this can best, or at least most rapidly, be achieved through dictatorial government. "It is possible to argue that a period of strong but reforming dictatorship may be an essential prerequisite for economic modernization and improve8 Charles Issawi, "Economic Foundations of Democracy in the Middle East", in Walter Z. Laqueur (ed.), The Middle East in Transition ( N e w York, Praeger, 1958), p. 50. • Issawi, "Economic Foundations of D e m o c r a c y in the Middle East", op. cit., p. 50.

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ment of social welfare without which democratic institutions would be a sham." 10 In any event, though these MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION differ over the best method of approach they certainly agree that centralized government is best for the Arab society. A point of clarification is necessary. The assumption that the RIGHT FORMS of government are no longer practiced in the Arab society has been used so commonly that its novelty has worn off. The idea that democracy and liberalism are the best ways to bring about tranquillity and order is a TRITE observation when applied to present conditions of Arab society. What is important is to try to distinguish the relationship between the GOAL and the FORM of the government. The FORM of democratic government is used too often as a witness to testify for its soundness. The essential feature of democracy, however, is not so much in its FORM as in the "association of the people with the government at all levels".11 In a balanced type of democracy the main task of the machinery of the government is to formulate and administer the various policies, leaving it generally to non-government sources to "generate ideas . . . when such [new] ideas have gained certain popularity and strength in the country they are reflected in parliament, and finally come to be adopted as official policies".12 This leads to the conclusion that there is something EXTRA and BASIC added to the form of government. It is a set of cultural traits, unwritten sets of values, attitudes, and informalized sets of conventions that characterize the setting of government. It is the GOAL rather than the FORM of government that counts most, and the democratic goal is still unattainable in Arab society. It is these intangible factors that give viability to the form of government. In adapting the system of Western democratic institutions, the moderate Arab thinkers failed to recognize the value of the democratic principle and ideals. They saw only the mere procedural structure of the parliamentary form and failed to comprehend the philosophical tradition and social experience underlying Western political development. The mere transfer of the democratic form of government to Arab society cannot ensure or safeguard democracy and liberalism since the unwritten Arab values, attitudes, and other cultural traits, including the lack of environmental positivism (e.g., natural resources), are not suited for such a purpose. The pattern of the Arab value system rejects demo10 11 12

Dean, op. cit., p. 59. Panikkar, op. cit., p. 21. Ibid., pp. 21-22.

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cratization and liberalization and is more suited to a dictatorial type of government. A thought of Alexis de Tocqueville expresses this: The result has been that the democratic revolution has taken place in the body of society without that concomitant change in the laws, ideas, customs, and morals which was necessary to render such a revolution beneficial. Thus we have a democracy without anything to lessen its vices and bring out its natural advantages.1» What is more urgently needed is a benevolent dictator who is concerned with giving the people a more secure economic life so as to diminish the existing tensions, and to reduce the gap between expectations and desires on the one hand and demands on the other. Another need is to change the value system and bring it into accord with modernization to replace, if possible, the existing outmoded social structure with one more suited to modernity. Ali Baddour, who represents the thinking of the Arab middle class, aptly summarizes this point. 14 The Arab belief in the worth of dictatorial leadership is not based on theoretical interests; its origins and motivations are wrapped up in the need for unity, for social continuity, and cultural stability. Ideology does not spring from the formulation of a clear-cut philosophy but from the existing situations, conditioned by the development of material and non-material factors. The reality of the situation, he maintains, is that the Arab community is suffocating from certain types of negativism, e.g., from excessive numbers of factions with widely differing approaches, each competing for leadership; from the contradictions between political systems currently practiced by the various Arab states; from the differences in social and economic progress among the various Arab states and classes; and from foreign rule, interference and economic control as manifested in oil concessions. The idea that democracy and liberty are identical is not necessarily true. Ali Baddour is of the opinion that in a society such as his, liberty is synonymous with social welfare and better distribution of economic goods, more food, better clothing and shelter, and better hygiene. The Egyptian Revolution, which instituted a planned economy, is a good example of an effort to end these social and economic inequities. One of the first prerequisites in propagating the new order was the establishment of a firm leadership base. On the premise that political 13

Alexis de Tocqueville, "Democracy in America", in Michael Curtis (ed.), The Great Political Theories, Vol. 2 (New York, Hearst Corporation, n.d.), p. 182. 14 See: Ali Budur, "Al-Adab tatawwar al-ijtima'i", (Social Evolution - of the Arab Community - ), Al-Adab (Beirut, March, 1959).

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parties had been the perpetuators of lingering imperialism and feudalism, Nasser firmly abolished all such institutions. Whether the Egyptian people under the rule of Nasser are getting a greater degree of freedom and liberty than under the monarchy and multi-parties political system is questionable, but everything has its price. Why then, Nasser asks, are we frightened of PLANNED DICTATORSHIP? Dictatorial rule is a prerequisite to development, but in the final analysis individual initiative and cooperative efforts of the people are also needed. Centralized government is a necessity but only to a point.13 Beyond this point, public cooperation with the central authority is required. The elite groups and the middle class have to develop a spirit of independence, initiative, and public responsibility in order to provide an adequate measure of leadership. It is here that the matter becomes very discouraging and, as Albert Hourani rightly observed, the regimes in the Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states seem to be reverting to patterns of Ottoman days.16 Although still in the stage of fermentation, dictatorships in one form or another, and very likely military regimes, will remain for some time a common form of government. They at present consist of military oligarchies in whose hands lies the supreme authority; a huge body of governmental officials who carry on the daily work, indifferent and uninterrupted by political change in the upper levels of the hierarchy; and a learned elite, which provides the social and moral character and virtues by which the government is guided.17 This is analogous to the previous historical era during which the caliph was the indisputable power, the officials of the government carried on their daily work undisturbed by the body politic, and the ulema guided public morality, with the masses submissive and apathetic. The issue is still one of SYMBIOSIS, individualism and despotism, and a better understanding of this problem requires an analysis of the legacy and role of the leadership. THE A R A B LEGACY A N D LEADERSHIP

The history of the Arab-Moslem Empire was marked by rapid growth and a flourishing civilization, which left an enduring legacy whose impact 15 Issawi, "Economic Foundations of Democracy in the Middle East", op. cit., p. 50. 18 Albert Hourani, "The Decline of the West in the Middle East", International Affairs, XXDC (April, 1953), 180. 17 Sherman, "Nationalism and Communism: A Re-appraisal", op. cit., p. 455.

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on the twentieth-century Arab mind cannot be lightly dismissed; but there was also a simultaneous political disintegration, in part because of a bitter Islamic familial feud, which dated back to the beginning of Islam. It is only when we extend the investigation beneath the surface of political history and study the subterranean activities of the tribalfamilial character that the existence of the Islamic legacy, which has helped to shape the present Arab political, economic, and social factors, becomes visible. Thus, the "family chronicles of the Koreish [or any other tribe] are therefore of the utmost value for the understanding of Arab politics to this day".58 Because Muhammad died without designating a successor, many of his followers contended that this omission established the democratic principle of succession by election. They argued that the Prophet certainly had the authority and prestige to appoint anyone had he so desired. His failure to do so therefore gave credence to the Koranic authority of succession by election. In any event, in the succession crisis which ensued subsequent to his death, some of Mohammad's trusted counsellors "imposed Abu Bakr on the community as the sole successor of the Prophet",19 despite the efforts of the leaders of Medina to name one of their own as Caliph. For five centuries thereafter, the title to leadership rested with the Koreish tribe of Mecca, exercised first by the Ummayyad family and later by the Abbasid.20 Subsequently, when the Ottomans ruled the Moslem Empire, they followed the Arab principle of tribal succession, thereby keeping the ruling authority within the Osman family for the next six and one-half centuries. Thus it can be seen that the Islamic "Umma [community] supplemented rather than supplanted the social usage of pre-Islamic Arabia", 21 whereby the accepted method of electing a leader rested with the heads of families, clans and tribes. The tribal structure was sufficiently strong to resist a radical innovation in the manner of selecting the leader. While Islam had replaced the blood ties with a social bond, it had, by no means, succeeded in inhibiting the tribal way of life. There are three cardinal precepts of Islamic rulership which, since the beginning of the Abassid Dynasty, have been coordinately germane. Historically, the first of these was CONSENSUS, a pre-Islamic custom of 18

Friedrich Wilhelm Fernau, Moslems on the March (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1954), p. 26. 10 Lewis, The Arabs in History, op. cit., p. 51. 20 Anthony Nutting, The Arabs (New York, A Mentor Book, New American Library, 1964), pp. 202-203. 21 Lewis, The Arabs in History, op. cit., p. 43.

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appointing the sayyid (ruler) by obtaining agreement among the family and tribal heads. As Islam expanded eastward absorbing the Persian culture, its concept of LEGITIMACY of kingdomship, 22 based on succession through the blood line, also had an effect on determining who should rule. In the meantime Moslem THEOCRACY, the third principal precept, had allowed the other two to occupy important positions in the theocratic state in the hope that a spark of the Prophet's divine inspiration might be passed down through his lineage thereby strengthening Islam as a whole. This is explained by the logic that: Since the Lord was not pleased to continue the prophetic office by raising a spiritual successor to Mohammed, either kinship to the deceased Apostle of God might entitle to succession on the ground that a spark of his inspiration, or of the divine substance distinguishing him as Allah's elect, would continue in his lineage. . .

Tied to this problem of succession was another hotly debated issue which was never really resolved, that is, the legitimacy and the function of the caliph. During his reign there seemed to be no disagreement, since God was regarded as the supreme authority, even though not the direct ruler of the community. Through the Prophet, the supreme power was revealed; and legislation, execution, and adjudication were united under one authority. 24 God was the origin of authority, with sovereignty delegated to the Prophet as head of the Islamic government. After the Prophet's death, however, the Islamic community became embroiled in a constant controversy partly because the Islamic concept of the state had an immediate relationship to power politics. The center of this unsettled problem was whether the Islamic umma was based on a single-contract or on a two-contract theory. According to the former theory, once scattered people form a society (state), authority is delegated to a ruler "who is vested at once with exclusive power", 25 the individual members remaining passive and submissive. The two-contract theory is flexible, providing that, once the isolated individuals agree to form a society by one contract, they enthrone a ruler "by another contract to rule in accordance with certain conditions and limitations on his authority". 26 The contract theory was not clear-cut. Some claimed that the death 22

Von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam, op. cit., p. 155. Ibid., p. 156. Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), p. 10. 25 Ibid., p. 9. 2 « Ibid. 2

'

24

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of the Prophet had no direct bearing on the issue, and the community still owed its allegiance to God. The difficulties would be alleviated by the mere selection of a person to succeed to the throne and to execute the Holy Law of the community. This group asserted that the selection of the caliph by the representatives of the community was simply a procedural requirement prescribed by God. There was in no way a social contract between the ruler and the ruled. This was so because (1) sovereignty resides in God alone and not in the people or their representatives, (2) the caliphate was God's creation rather than man's, and (3) the caliph's power derived from God rather than from the people's representatives. The nomads opposed these claims. Their viewpoint was greatly affected by the traditions of the pre-Islamic society. They contended that, since the authority of the Prophet had ended with his death, they were not obliged to submit to the new authority.27 They believed that once the caliph was elected by the representatives of the people, they were obliged to obey him only so long as he was willing and capable of fulfilling his obligations; otherwise the contract lapsed. As a consequence of debate and counter-debate a compromise was finally reached, but only after a series of outbursts had been subdued by the sword during the reign of Abu Bakr.28 A compromise allowed successors of the Prophet to inherit the executive power as head of the community but not to possess the "prophetic function of communicating and promulgating the divine law".29 The role of the caliph became purely administrative; the executive and legislative powers were separated. Thus, as the divine legislative power ended, the power of adjudication was weakened and became mere interpretation, making it extremely difficult to pass new laws. Thus despotism was born. Yet the question of the caliph's responsibility was far from settled. The dispute concerning whether the ruler was responsible to God or to the people continued. According to the accepted two-contract theory, the power to appoint was the right of the people, whereas the power to rule was derived from God and limited to matters of revealed law. Consequently, the ruler's responsibility to the people was judged according to his faithfulness in executing God's law. But, what if the rules violated his obligation or fell short of fulfilling the task of his office? 30 Would the people have the right to dethrone the ruler? Moslem jurists 27

Ibid., p. 10. Payne, op. cit., pp. 89-90. 29 Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, op. cit., pp. 10-11. 3» Ibid., p. 12. 28

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and theologians considered this point. The thought of al-Ash'air (d. 945) and his followers not only denied the right of the people to revolt against the ruler but also supported and upheld the ruler's claim to obedience and submission even if he disregarded and violated his obligations.31 Al-Mawardi (974-1058) on the other hand pointed out, in his Statutes

of Ruler ship (al-ahkam

as-sultaniyya),

that the caliph was ap-

pointed to the throne in order to carry on the defense of the Islamic faith and the execution of the affairs of the community.32 The divine law, as presented by Koranic revelation, enjoined obedience to the caliph 33 since his authority was of divine origin. "Were there more than one God in heaven or on earth both would end in destruction." 34 However, if the ruler did not fulfill his duties, he had no legal claim to power. Al-Mawardi offered no legal way to dethrone the caliph, yet he was emphatically opposed to revolt and violent overthrow of the ruler.35 Once the Moslem Empire began to deteriorate internally, conservatism entrenched itself deeply in the minds of the jurists and theologians. As a result the tendency was to elevate the throne and justify the power of the ruler on the basis that ORDER is better than ANARCHY. The sociological reasoning that influenced the mind of the ulema and jurists was the fear that the elective system would weaken the Islamic community and thereby jeopardize Islam. The justification was that all communities needed a ROYAL AUTHORITY, a caliph, to keep order and peace, even by force if necessary. During the tenure of the first four elected caliphs ROYAL AUTHORITY was not required because the RESTRAINING INFLUENCE of Islam was still strong enough in itself to moderate contentions. However, by the time that Muawiyah became caliph, as a consequence of civil wars the tempering influence of Islam had been weakened. This necessitated the institution of ROYAL AUTHORITY (legacy from the Persians) in order to preserve agreement and promote harmony.36 Some went so far as to support the ruler regardless of his piety or impiety, justice or injustice.37 Only the Khawariji openly advocated the right to revolt and asserted the right to depose or put the caliph to death once the duties of the high office had been violated.38 There is, perhaps, no 31 32

¡bid.

Von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam, op. cit., pp. 156-157. Koran, 4:62. Ibid., 21:22. 35 Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, op. cit., p. 12. 36 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, 3 vols., trans, by Franz Rosenthal (New York, Bollingen Foundation, 1958), Vol. I, p. 284; Vol. II, pp. 432-433. 37 Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, op. cit., p. 13. 38 Ibid., p. 12. 33

34

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better citation marking the utter defeat and sense of resignation to the established political atmosphere than that of Badr al-Din Ibn Jama of Damascus (d. A.D. 1333) who was the chief Qadi (judge) of Cairo: The sovereign has a right to govern until another and stonger one shall oust him from power and rule in his stead. The latter will rule by the same title and will have to be acknowledged on the same grounds; for the government, however objectionable, is better than none at all; and between two evils we must choose the lesser.39 The historical development of the centralization of power is partly attributable to other Islamic theological premises. The question of man's relation to God - of free will and predestination - was, and still is, a subject of heated discussion. "The Qur'an itself is undecided on this point; it contains verses affirming man's free will, and still more numerous verses signifying that he is a helpless tool in the hand of God." 40 Those advocating FREE WILL (the Mu'tazilah) explain the fact that: . .. man is, in fact, the creator of his own actions by means of a contingent power that God originally placed in him. God merely knows these deeds by a contingent knowledge as each action is performed. Similarly, God has implanted in nature its generative and reproductive powers, but has prescribed for them regular and unchanging rules of operation. . . ,41 On the other hand, those advocating predestination (the Ash'arites) found their support in the Koranic verse: "Moreover, had they been desirous to take the field, they would have got ready for that purpose the munitions of war. But God was averse to their marching forth, and made them laggards." 42 While the Holy Book "sways between the conceptions of predestination and free-will",43 the attempt to settle or adjust the differences between these two ideas had failed. Gradually the scale shifted its balance to the side of PREDESTINATION until finally alGhazzali 44 and the bulk of the Moslem jurists and ulema put an end to the controversy, and the idea of PREDESTINATION ruled the minds and lives of the masses everywhere. Consequently, the people of the Moslem community have been obliged to submit to whomever held power. 39

Von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam, op. cit., p. 169; also Lewis, "Communism and Islam", op. cit., p. 319. 40 Safran, op. cit., p. 8. 41 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 42 Koran, 9:46. 43 Gibb, Mohammedanism, op. cit., p. 40. 44 Al-Ghazzali, "Risalat al-Tayr", trans, by Nabih Amin Faris, Muslim World, X X X I V (January, 1944), 46-53.

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Whether the ruler's power was legitimate or arbitrary, de jure or merely de facto, tyrannical or autocratic, the individual has been bound to absolute obedience.45 Since the ulema constructed an ivory tower and used it to escape from political actuality, their ideas were unsound and simply illusory.46 It follows, then, that the evolutionary Islamic political concept did not adjust to the changing political situation and hence remained sterile. The ulema conceived the caliphate, at least from the theoretical angle, as something imaginary. They had bound themselves to the dogma that the PRACTICAL and the NOTIONAL should be ONE; that the acceptable political structure should have to coincide with the supposition of the Dar al-Islam (abode of Islam) that they themselves had formulated. In actuality, however, each institution, i.e., political and religious, went its separate and independent way. "Each had its own functions and rarely overstepped them. The state was concerned with military, administrative, and economic affairs; the religious institution with doctrine, law, education, intellectual life, and social relations." 47 The "fundamental task of the Ulema was to ensure that, no matter what political changes might come about, the religious institution, with all that it stood for, should remain unshaken." 48 By providing separate institutions for matters divine and for mundane concerns the purity of Islam was preserved. Since then, the ideal of Islam has been the watchtower that guided its adherents away from the complex realities of life toward an ideal concept of what the ulema believed to be righteous Islamic living. Since it was a matter of choice, however, and because they feared anarchy more than bad government, the ulema taught political quiescence. Consequently they were able to tame the masses, but at no time could they control the ruling political elite. The emergence of despotism must be seen also in light of the economic and social orders that were evolving in the Moslem community. Economic and social factors had, without any doubt, strengthened the position of the caliphs. These factors developed in the Arab-Moslem Empire because of the people's dependence on the environmental structure of the river-valley society of Iraq and that of Egypt,49 and to a 45

Lewis, "Communism Thomas Arnold and Oxford University Press, 47 Gibb an Bowen, Vol. « Ibid., p. 165. 49 Lewis, "Communism 46

and Islam", op. cit., p. 318. Alfred Guillaume (eds.), The Legacy of Islam (London, 1947), p. 24. 1, op. cit., pp. 79-80. and Islam", op. cit., p. 320.

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lesser extent on the wadi of the Fertile Crescent of Greater Syria. Since the birth of civilization these three areas have had to employ artificial irrigation methods because of shortages in rainfall. Dikes, dams, canals, and other similar projects were constructed in order to maintain the economic life of the community. Tasks of this magnitude required a centralized organization with a strong leader to handle the matter effectively. This paramount requirement had a direct bearing on the whole social structure; it had been an inevitable phenomenon that economic and social breakdowns occur after a political crisis. In a society such as that of the Nile or the Tigris-Euphrates valley the individual has had to look to the government to maintain the economic system intact and has known himself to be at its mercy. This historical circumstance also has compelled individuals to be completely subservient to local and central authority. For centuries governmental authorities were unchallenged and unchallengeable, for they were able to control the economic and social life of the society.50 Consequently, there existed two aspects to the Moslem approach to life. The SPIRITUALLY IDEAL but ACTUALLY UNREAL, and the ACTUAL but ISLAMICALLY invalid. It is the most unbridgeable gap between the ideal and the actual that accounts for the fatalistic outlook. Sociologically, the concept of PREDESTINATION is synonymous with AUTHORITARIANISM. The concept of freedom connoting democratic content is easily traceable in Islam, particularly in its early period. On the whole, however, the Islamic concept tended to be equalitarian rather than democratic in principle and equally achieveable under an authoritarian form of government as under a democratic type. Such a legacy descended from Islamic tradition, partly by theological outlook, partly by environmental deterrents, and partly by domestication of the mental framework of individuals. Its predictable results are cynicism, lack of incentive, and apathy. To this very day the Arabs live under the influence of this historical legacy. Thus, it seems justifiable to conclude that, in time, the so-called sovereign rights, duties, and obedience to God have been transferred to the office of the caliph, the king, the chief of the state, or the single party. This is more a result of mental conditioning than of theological doctrine. Such a legacy is still a strong characteristic of the Arab mind and is of great significance to the contemporary Arab rulers.

50 ¡bid.

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The present-day Arab revolutionary mass movements have had their beginnings not in the deeds of the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION, but in the earlier challenges to authority fostered by the GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE. LeBon notes that "philosophical ideas which resulted in the French Revolution took nearly a century to implant themselves in the mind of the crowd . . . For this reason crowds, as far as ideas are concerned, are always several generations behind learned men and philosophers."51 Likewise, it took the Arab masses decades before they finally caught up with the desires of the Arab intellectuals whose re* awakening began in the 19 th century mainly as a result of the Western impact. Consequently the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION are latecomers who have joined the various movements after they have become established. One might readily accept the account of Anwar el-Sadat, who affirmed that for "ten years we had held back, masking our true feelings, reserving our energies for the task before us",52 i.e., the waging of the Egyptian Revolution of July 22, 1952. One can also readily agree with P. J. Vatikiotis that . . . Between 1941 and 1949 there was no organized group of Free Officers. Rather, many of the Free Officers operated independently of, yet sympathetically to, one another in infiltrating army personnel and spreading their message. Any cohesion among these officers was based until 1949 entirely on their personal relations and contacts . . . One hears and reads about relation between Nasser, el-Sadat, and Zakariyya Muhieddin in Manqabad on their first army post assignment... Naturally, these were strengthened during the Palestine War. But it would be hasty to presume any ideological cohesion between these men in their early contacts, or any collective conspiracy based on neatly organized plans for revolutionary action.53

In a manner similar to that of the Egyptian Revolution, a "member of Qasim's first cabinet" told Waldemar J. Gallman that the Iraqi Revolution "had long been discussed and planned".54 In Algeria and Tunisia a similar trend of political insurgency can be traced back to the early decades of this century. "One of these movements was August 1951, when the Algerian Front for the Defense and Respect of Liberty, brought 51

Le Bon, op. cit., pp. 64-65. El Sadat, Revolt on the Nile, op. cit., p. 138. 53 P. J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1961), pp. 56-57. 54 Gallman, op. cit., p. 205. 52

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together the UDMA, the MTLD, the Algerian Communist party, and the ulemas." 55 Although the birth, and growth of movements rests greatly upon the role of the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION, it must be noted that, despite the extremely significant role of the leader, he cannot create the conditions which make the birth of the movement possible. There are always dynamic leaders, but the rise of revolutionary mass movements is not a mere accident resulting from a few dynamic personalities. The rise and acceptance of such movements is due also to social circumstances. "Muhammed did not so much create a new movement as revive and redirect currents that already existed among the Arabs of his time." 56 It was not Ben Bella, Bourguiba, Kassem, or Nasser, for example, who created the conditions in the Arab world. The success of their revolts is attributable to their abilities to sense the disturbing circumstances at the time. They were able to see clearly the needs and frustrations of their people. They saw as well the political bickerings of the elite and the misguided policies of their governments, and they perceived the desperate need for stronger leadership. The success of the Egyptian Revolution, for example, like so many other Arab revolutions, resulted from an internal and an external factor. In the first case, by the time young Nasser appeared on the scene, the Egyptian struggle for complete unity of the Nile valley and the demand for the withdrawal of the British troops were already fait accompli; these two objectives were sufficient psychological weapons to evoke the aspirations of the people, and they were concrete enough to call for unity and struggle.57 Secondly, what actually took place in international politics was the shift of world power from Western Europe (Great Britain and France) to non-European states (the United States and the Soviet Union); this undermined imperialistic policies of both Great Britain and France. It was at this juncture that Nasser was able to stir up mass emotions and to awaken and direct their previously latent energies in support of his movement. Ideas demand timely leadership for effective implementation. Which available ideas will be selected depends largely upon the calibre of the leader and upon the prevailing circumstances. Before Nasser arrived on the scene, it was the Moslem Brotherhood, especially under the guid55 Richard M. Brace, Morocco-Algeria-Tunisia (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 109. 56 Lewis, The Arabs in History, op. cit., p. 48. 57 Wynn, op. cit., p. 23.

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ance of Shaikh Hassan al Banna, which led a campaign of terror.58 The Brotherhood's threat to the throne became evident in 1948 and led to its being outlawed. In retaliation, Prime Minister Muhummad Nokrashi was assassinated and, within a few weeks, the leader of the Moslem Brotherhood, al-Banna, was in turn assassinated by the followers of Nokrashi.59 It is very probable that, if al-Banna had still been alive in 1952 or if the time had been ripe for revolt in 1948-1949, the Egyptian Revolution might have come under his leadership. But his death eliminated the Brotherhood's chances, for there was nobody else in the organization who was sufficiently dynamic to replace him and guide the movement to success.60 If Nasser had been born a few decades earlier (or later), his ideas and movement would have, most likely, attracted little attention. Likewise, if the conditions had not been ripe during the opening decade of the 1950's Nasser, irrespective of his ability, ambitions, gifted intelligence, and noble character, would, more than likely, have remained without a following. The situations in other parts of the Arab world were not very different. Various Arab leaders attempted to lead the masses against the European imperialists and the indigenous ruling elements. Although some sporadic and scattered outbursts among the various segments of the masses, e.g., the Bakr Sidqi's military coup of 1936 in Iraq, did occur, it was clear that the time was not yet ripe for action on a wider scale. The ideas had been fermenting long before the revolutionary mass movements became fait accompli. By the end of the 1940's the general economy of the various Arab states was in severe straits. Widespread unemployment led to political unrest and agitation. Men of integrity, deeply disillusioned, began to leave the governments and this action tended to contribute to the formation of common front coalitions of various extremist parties. This in turn led to frequent changes in Arab governments, changes which become obvious when studied statistically. From 1945 to 1954 Syria had 24 governments and experienced four military coups. Lacouture submits that there were serious signs of discontent and disturbance before Nasser initiated his coup d'etat. "While in the course of 1951 forty-nine strikes had shown the extent of social unrest, the patient Egyptian peasantry had in turn become restive. Four uprising had broken out in one yearonseveralofthelargestestates...". 61 38 59 60 61

Gabrieli, op. cit., pp. 133-134. Wynn, op. cit., pp. 36-37. Partner, op. cit., p. 60. Lacouture, Egypt in Transition, op. cit., p. 125.

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In the first six months of 1952 instability reached its peak; 92 Egypt had five different governments,63 and the king was no longer able to rule the nation. The records for Jordan and even Lebanon are similar.64 Hence, leaders had only to wait for the propitious moment which seemed to be the last accident in a series of actions. Conditions conducive to revolt came about in the 1940's and 1950's, and the commanders happened to be - partly accidentally and partly through historical inevitability - Zaim and Shishakli of Syria, Nasser of Egypt, Kassem and Arif of Iraq, Ben Bella of Algeria, and Bourguiba of Tunisia. Once the stage is set for action, the success or failure of the revolutionary mass movement depends greatly on the quality of the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION. For a successful movement, an outstanding leader is essential. It is pertinent at this point to note that most of the contemporary Arab revolutionary government leaders have neither been holders of high governmental offices, nor possessors of outstanding socio-political knowledge in the true sense of the word. It should also be noted that no NATURAL LEADER, i.e., recognized expert in governmental affairs, has been able to head a government in time of crisis. In Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria and Yemen the present leaders are young military men while in Tunisia, the leader Habib Bourguiba is a political militant man with an extensive background in military operations. The above tends to demonstrate that leaders, in time of distress, must possess dynamic and unconventional personalities, traits that are not normally possessed by the NATURAL LEADER. Of even greater importance is their sociological affinity with the average individual; the young leaders are more aware of the disaster that their society has suffered; and they are conscious of the "exigences of the modern world, the urgent need for reforms and the importance of personal integrity".65 The MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION are MEN OF DISTRESS; they are the younger Arab generation who grew up in wartime social chaos in which they acquired the conviction that the existing uncertainties and the hopelessness of the future must be altered by bold action. In contrast to the NATURAL LEADERS, the LEADERS OF DISTRESS care very little for bureaucratic organization and routine governmental procedure. These disillusioned young MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION 62

El Sadat, Revolt on the Nile, op. cit., p. 136. Gabriel Baer, "Egyptian Attitudes Towards Land Reform, 1922-1955", in Walter Z. Laqueur (ed.), The Middle East in Transition (New York, Praeger, 1958), p. 95. 64 Karangia, op. cit., p. 135. 65 Rondot, The Changing Patterns of the Middle East, op. cit., p. 127. 63

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have impregnated their heroic ideals with new faith and vitalities. According to their mental conceptions, traditional ideas of justice and equality have lost their spell. Respect for functional jurisdiction is, in most cases, ignored; and, on the whole, their sense of responsibility does not equal their sense of power. This is cogently expressed by Stephen Longrigg. He states that under the Kassem regime removal from office of many of the most efficient and specialized senior civil servants on the sole ground that they had served the government of Nuri al-Said was a heavy blow to the efficient conduct of public affairs. The many delays and restrictions, wholesale political interference in administration, and the natural timidity of the frightened survivors among officialdom, contributed to a marked reduction in operation and deterioration of the governmental machine.66 This type of behavior is not peculiar to Iraq. It is applicable to all the new regimes in the Arab world, but it varies in intensity. Illustrative of this common trait is the observation of Professor Gabrieli: "The spirit counts more than the form, and there is no doubt that the spirit of the new Egyptian regime is authoritarian, unwilling to bind itself by any law, internal or international." 67 The LEADERS OF DISTRESS are mostly directed and controlled by their own decisions and inhibitions; the gap between their promises and their actual performance could be used as a measure of their accomplishment. No procedure of law except the law of obedience counts. If this tendency continues their mission may very well promote an increase of tension which could result in ultimate failure. The social aura that the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION have established is partly the result of their own unique personalities and partly a consequence of inflicted environmental circumstances. Any sober evaluation of the various Arab revolutionary mass movements must be built on the study of the character of the leader and his lieutenants and the structure of their society. Unfortunately, such detailed study is far from complete, and the impact of the environmental circumstances upon the character of the charismatic leaders in relation to their societies must, on many occasions in this work, be taken for granted. To illustrate: the childhood of Nasser had a great bearing on the formulation of his movement. According to Wilton Wynn the family and close relatives of Nasser "were hicks". His family's social standing can be summed up in one world: baladi, which "carries the worst implication of 'provin«6 Brigadier S. H. Longrigg, "Iraq Under Kasim", Current History, XLII (April, 1962), 216. 67 Gabrieli, op. cit., p. 135.

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cial' or 'tacky'". The great humiliations that the young Nasser and his family suffered at Beni Mer village had a deep impact years later when "Nasser's first great reform was the land distribution law limiting land holding to 200 acres. Among the first estates to be broken up were the big holdings around Assuit - and Beni Mer." 68 In his recent visits to the Middle East the author of this book interviewed a number of authorities on matters concerning the childhoods of the various contemporary Arab leaders. It is interesting that most of these dynamic leaders suffered humiliations similar to Nasser's. This circumstance obviously has affected some of their later policy decisions; it bred in them an inferiority complex which is partly responsible for the tremendous drive to rid themselves of the present order and build a new and superior order. Though they may differ in personality, they share and embody the frustrations and hopes of their followers. They are drawn predominantly from the urban and the SEMI-URBANIZED EX-PEASANT classes who feel no loyalty to the ruling traditional elites. "Ignorance is bliss" appears to be a truism insofar as the new leadership is concerned. Had these leaders the EXPERIENCE and NEEDED KNOWLEDGE to understand the complexities of the issues facing them, it is doubtful that they would be as venturesome as they have proven to be. As it is, their very lack of perspicacity permits them "to rush in where angels fear to tread". Thus IGNORANCE seems to be a requisite for a successful revolution. "The men who come to the top in revolutionary movements are never the wisest or the most farsighted of men",69 says Christopher Dawson. A closer look at the quality of the Arab revolutionary leadership of the last two decades, - Nasser, Kassem, and Ben Bella - indicates that at the time they led their revolutionary movements they lacked the needed understanding of the complexities of the local situation. Kassem, says Waldemar J. Gallman, "seized power without having had previous experience in government and without any well thought out philosophy or program of social reform to guide him".70 Similarly, Francis Bertier pressed the point about the officers of the Egyptian junta who had no acquaintance whatsoever with the realities of political life, except mere recollections of political demonstrations during their youthful days.71 This may or may not have been the case; it is, however, only one aspect of the situation and it would be mis68 89 70

Wynn, op. cit., p. 19. Dawson, op. cit., p. 100.

Gallman, op. cit., p. 218. Francis Bertier, "Les forces sociales a l'ceuvre dans le nationalisme egyptien", Orient, II, N o . 5 (Paris, 1958), 82.

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leading to dismiss the vague yet compassionate ideals that these revolutionary men manifested in various political actions. At the time they waged their revolutions they were relatively young men with highly idealistic notions. With the exception of Habib Bourguiba their educational backgrounds were predominantly restricted to military studies, and they had little political or social experience. They carried with them, as Herbert L. Matthews points out, "extraordinary character with extraordinary qualities of courage, leadership, ability, intelligence [but not experience], and popular appeal".72 Their characters reveal an intolerant approach, fanatic belief, and a dedication to their own ideas. In order to reach their goals they had to follow the road of injustice and commit violent and radical acts. It was just this kind of experience and psychological set-up that was needed in the Arab world to initiate coups d'etat, commence revolutions, and lead revolutionary mass movements. It can, however, be safely stated that the survival and the relative stability of these regimes, e.g., of Bourguiba and Nasser, from the beginning and up to the present also give evidence of political shrewdness. That the essence of the Egyptian Revolution is similar to that of Tunisia, and possibly to some other Arab revolutionary movements, is well summed up by Nadav Safran: . . . the young authors of the revolution who have presided over Egypt's destinies for the last eight years came to power with no guiding political philosophy beyond a few generalities, and little in the way of a positive program beyond good intentions. They proceeded to work out philosophy and program in a pragmatic, experimental fashion, fighting at the same time against forces of reaction and counter-revolution and struggling among themselves for predominance in their own councils. The result was many false starts, mistaken courses, abrupt reversals, and a high degree of uncertainty." "The great leaders of crowds of all ages", says LeBon, "and those of the Revolution in particular, have been of lamentably narrow intellects; while it is precisely those whose intelligence has been the most restricted who have exercised the greatest influences." 74 When the contemporary Arab MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION waged their revolutions, they were best described as REBELS WITHOUT DOCTRINES. With a vague philosophical understanding of JUSTICE and HUMANISM, they waged their rebellious fight only against the existing order. No case is more illuminating than that of the Egyptian Revolution, for the program of Nasser 72 73 74

Matthews, op. cit., p. 104. Safran, op. cit., p. 253. Le Bon, op. cit., p. 194.

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has been adopted by the other Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states. Those idealists, says Wynn, rushed to the scene and presented their blueprints of reform. This sweeping advocacy of reform misled many observers to reach the conclusion that at first the aim of the Egyptian Revolution was primarily economic and social. This confusion can be attributed to the mechanical process of the initial moves of the regime, including the dissolving of large estates and land distribution among the landless peasants. But Nasser's real concern with reform in the EARLY STAGE of his movement was to break down the political power of the feudal aristocracy - an internal reform of primarily political expediency. It is my belief, that Nasser has been completely consistent . . . Economic reforms were never an end in themselves. They were means to an end. It was a serious mistake to equate Nasser with the reformers of the West, who think primarily in term of living standards, full employment, production, buying power. In the Middle East, these considerations are secondary, and political and psychological factors predominate. Nasser is no exception to that rule.75

However, after the movement becomes a common concern, it becomes extremely difficult to separate economic and social factors from political ones. The interdependence and integration of these factors become essential to the preservation and the success of the movement. The sense of power, glory, and faith must be either present or in the stage of fermentation before discontent turns into dissatisfaction and dislike. Under these circumstances the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION, who had blind faith in the power of the glory of Arabism, plunged into the fluid situations in an attempt to create a new order. Nasser and leaders like him are indeed men of "great zeal and strong w i l l . . . combined with a sincere dedication . . .".76 Their belief in the justice of their movements, their confidence in themselves, and their sincerity made an indelible impression on the masses. In a time of doubt and uncertainty here were leaders who did not discuss the merits of their programs, did not suggest possible solutions, but actually by their preachings emphasized CERTAINTY. What made them different from other types of leaders was not only the possession of instruments of power, but also their proclamation of faith in the future - a proclamation whose continual reiteration indicates its role in support of the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION. 75

Wynn, op. cit., p. 72. Hourani, "A Decade of Revolution: Political and Social Changes, 1949-1959", op. cit., p. 40. 76

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You are flying the flag of Arab nationalism and of Arab unity . . . Arab nationalism established in the past by Saladin, who hoisted the flag of Arab nationalism. Just as Saladin in the past raised in Syria the banner of Arab nationalism and laid the foundation for Arab unity, freedom and power, the Arab people today are determined to regain the past glories. When I see your unflinching determination and strong faith . . . I feel hopeful for the future because the nation which rallies together and works cooperatively and collectively will inevitably triumph.77 And as Le Bon has so correctly observed: Of all the forces at the disposal of humanity, faith has always been one of the most tremendous, and the Gospel rightly attributes to it the power of moving mountains.78 The search for a hero, that is, for MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION, has historical continuity in the minds of the Arabs. This search demands real courage, but the role has often been histrionic and tragic. Faisel, Nuri el-Said, and Kassem of Iraq; King Abdullah of Jordan; Nahhas, Zaghloul, al-Banna, and Naguib of Egypt; Shishakli of Syria; Krim, Ben Khedda, Farhat Abbas of Algeria; and Ben Youssef of Tunisia all played the roles of tragic heroes who met untimely ends, while Nasser 79 and Bourguiba 80 have, so far, played the role successfully. The study of the latter personalities reveals certain characteristics that were lacking in most of the others. Historical evidence indicates that Nasser and Bourguiba were not extremely fanatic personalities but rather more realistic MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION at the time they commenced their movements, even though they occasionally evidenced traces of idealism. They had a certain breadth and cultivation, a daring ability to risk their lives to mobilize the existing mass attitudes and to gather the drives of the people into a collective body. They had balanced vision to appreciate the ripe situation and to articulate and to justify the deep resentments of dissatisfied individuals. They strengthened the necessary factor of make-believe, which instilled in the hearts of the masses the conviction of sacrifice during the period of transition; they rejected the present, and evoked a common enthusiasm by comparing the glorious past with the promising future. Their backgrounds have shown mainly attitudes of audacity, 77

Nasser's Speeches (January-March, 1960), p. 26. Le Bon, op. cit., p. 119. ™ Zartman, op. cit., p. 106. 80 Jean Lacouture, Cinq hommes et la France (Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1961), passim.

78

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impudence, boldness, militant courage, defiance, iron will, single-minded conviction in the indispensability of revolution, and a passionate hatred for imperialism, Zionism, and feudalism. Both Nasser and Bourguiba have played the romanticist and realist roles simultaneously. They have had no complex philosophy, but have often indulged in romanticism and ideology designed primarily for mass consumption. The dissident Arab masses followed Nasser rather than Naguib, Bourguiba rather than Ben Youssef, and, at one time, Ben Bella rather than Farhat Abbas not only because of the conviction that Nasser, Bourguiba, and Ben Bella were leading them to a promised land, but even more so because the masses believed that these men were leading them away from their own unwanted selves. The failure of Naguib and Farhat Abbas to maintain their leadership in the Arab world was due mainly to the quality of their characters and their attitudes toward revolutionary mass movements. Naguib's "course of action was not regarded as forceful enough by Nasser and his young officers". 81 Naguib and Farhat Abbas manifested a lack of ability to create an effective coterie of loyal lieutenants. Their maturity and intellectual capacities led them to follow the path of compromise. They tried to please all conflicting groups and interests. Naguib's and Abbas's noble characters projected to the masses evidence of a lack of leadership when dealing with foreign powers. Their cautious relationship with the European powers was interpreted, rightly or wrongly, as cowardice. Their moderation in internal reforms was interpreted as a challenge to the cause of the revolution. It is likely that persons of the calibre of Naguib and Abbas belong to a period when the revolutionary mass movement had already become an established institution, i.e., after the movement had accomplished its mission and brought about stability. Both lacked the audacity, impudence, boldness, and militant attitude of the courageous youth. Fanaticism and defiance were not strongly entrenched in them even though they believed in Arab destiny and union. Even their passionate hatred for imperialism, feudalism, and Zionism was moderated by their intellect. Their approach was moderate and careful rather than idealistic and venturesome. It was not surprising that their leadership lasted but a few short months. Again their noble characters and intellectual outlook led them to resign peacefully and go into self-exile. How did these young

MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION

fare among the

populace? If attention is concentrated on the essentials, an over-all 81

Dean, op. cit., p. 60.

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picture emerges. Nasser, Bourguiba, and others like them manifest complex personalities. They symbolize many things to the Arab populace. A dominant element of these personalities is lack of self-interest with regard to enriching themselves, although they do have a desire for power. Another essential element is the capacity for initiative and swift action which is characterized by the use of force when required. They symbolize hope and trust for the average man in the street. To the mass-individuals, these MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION appear as saviors endowed with magical qualities. The contemporary Arab generation feels strongly the need for a ruler, a protecting caliph, a father, or a big brother. Above all, they are considered by the majority of the people as a genuine representative of the people. Nasser, for example, appears to be for the "little man". 82 For the first time in modern Egyptian history, the head of state is an indigenous leader. The fate of Egypt has been taken into the Egyptian hands. The same attitude applies equally to Bourguiba. Unlike the old regimes, whose leaders manifested a mixture of Turkish culture and European backgrounds and who were "chiefly concerned to feather their own nests, and to conserve the interest of their own groups . . .", the members of the new regimes of Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia are men dedicated to a noble cause, even though in some cases they lack the vision and the capacity to cope with the complex problems. Thus, the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION capture the devotion of the majority of the people. The leader's enemies are their enemies; the leader's passions become their passions; the leader's dreams become their dreams and the leader's goal becomes their goal. The dynamic leader is ONE OF THEM, while at the same time t o w e r s ABOVE THEM. A r e B o u r g u i b a a n d N a s s e r MODERNISTS, ISLAMISTS, o r RADICALS? A S

a modernist Nasser has succeeded in eliminating the influence of the Moslem Brotherhood 83 and other fanatical religious movements and has deprived the religious courts of their legitimate role. He has, but with an air of pragmatism, been constantly exposing the debility of the orthodox ulema of the Azhar university, giving suffrage to women, advocating birth control, and questioning the pillar of fasting. But even more dynamic and more successful in his method and approach has been Bourguiba, who has guided his people away from the traditional outmoded Islamic way of life. 82 83

Karanjia, op. cit., p. 26. Rondot, The Changing Patterns of the Middle East, op. cit., p. 27.

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The cause of these obstacles to our progress and of the paralysis of our minds is not the Moslem religion . . . The Moslem religion is not a doctrine of intellectual asphyzia . . . The first leaders of Islam were infinitely bolder and infinitely freer in the application of the principle of their religion, in their creativeness and adaptation to circumstances than our Ulema of the period of decadence. The Prophet's life and history are witness of this. 84

As an Islamist, Nasser, like Bourguiba, has thus far been able to assume the role of an Imam by making Koranic teaching a requisite in schools. He likewise has taken on the role of his opponents - the Moslem Brotherhood - by rebuilding into a new and balanced whole a society over-saturated with Islamic ideas. The modern Arab "isms", be they Bourguibism, or Nasserism, are not indifferent to the value of Islam. Though they profess no theology, they affirm Islamic morality. The MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION consider Islam as one of the essential manifestations of the individual soul. Hence Islam is not only respected but is also defended and protected. Yet there is still another aspect to Nasser 85 and his colleagues in Algeria and Tunisia which this author believes to be more pertinent - they are MODERN-ISLAMISTS. They are neither Kemalists or Sultanists; they are neither extreme right nor extreme left. Somehow they deserve to be called MODERATE-RADICALS. Unlike Kemal Ataturk of Turkey, whose reform was from the outsidein, their policies, generally speaking, are reforms from within. To the Turkish hero, Islam was but an outmoded obstacle to his doctrine and dogma, a trifling hindrance which had to be obliterated, by force if necessary, in order to reshape his beloved country in a Westernized form. The ultimate goal of Nasser 86 and his colleagues of the Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states is not to tear down Islam but to modernize it. Contrary to the atavistic attitudes of the traditional ulema and the anti-traditional outlook of Ataturk, both Nasser 87 and Bourguiba 88 are shaping Islam to help accelerate economic, social and political innovation. They are seeking to find support in Islam for their socialistic programs. They are attempting to overcome the GAP between traditionalism and modernization and to bridge the great gulf between the masses and the elites. Social mobility can overcome this perennial gap only through economic evolution, political interpretation, and above 84

Habib Bourguiba, "The Fast of Ramadan", in Paul E. Sigmund, Jr. (ed.), The Ideologies of the Developing Nations (New York, Praeger, 1963), p. 137. 85 Safran, op. cit., pp. 255-256. 86 Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 241. 87 Zartman, op. cit., p. 112. 88 Ibid., p. 71.

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all through Islamic modernization. A social bridge between classes can become effective only when it is made universal; thus it requires the dispersion of initiative. Hence modern Islam can play a very important role. They still, and rightly so, regard the Holy Book as a useful reference for some of their plans of action, even though it is incapable of providing them with all the answers. Ataturk of Turkey, unlike Nasser or Bourguiba, saw in Islam what the Soviet Communist leaders, Lenin and Stalin, saw in the Christian Orthodoxy of Russia and condemned it outright as the "opiate" of the masses. Nasser and his colleagues have seen in Islam what the Western countries have seen in Christianity, an essential force in the social structure. Ataturk's attitude toward Islam was radical rather then revolutionary, whereas the attitudes of Nasser and his colleagues toward Islam have been more revolutionary than radical. To them, as believers in their faith, the proper way to correct what is wrong with Islam is to discover its internal inadequacies and then rebuild it to meet the existing situations. It is only by renovating Islam in conjunction with other institutions that there can be any hope for the modernization of Arab society. It is possible that the contemporary MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION feel that Islam, rather than secular nationalism, is fitted for the task of instilling a fresh unity in the hearts and the minds of the Arab people. This is true, for at the present time secular nationalism is not strong enough to replace Islam as an active ideology. The place of men like Nasser in the hearts of the Arabs must be credited to the hope they offer the existing turbulent generation. The MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION, especially Nasser, and Bourguiba, have had to prove their worth in an era of rising expectations. Psychologically there is in them a source of energy that calls for action; this source is constantly nourished by historical phenomena, the seeds of corruption, imperialism, and feudalism. Such men "have an acute historical selfawareness, an understanding of their place in the stream of history, and above all a sense of the future, of possibilities that can be attained through effort and daring".89 When they relate their thoughts to history, they feel a sense of injustice, deprivation, annoyance, sorrow, and even guilt, which leads them to the conviction that "they have more to gain 89

Cornelis W. De Kiewiet, "America Proposes, Asia Chooses", in Warren S. Hunsberger (ed.), New Era in the Non- Western World (Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 143.

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than to lose".90 They, rightly or wrongly, feel responsible for curing and correcting malignant social vices. The revolutionary Arab ISMS were born out of expediences and the need for action, and their existence was due more to practical necessities than to theoretical attractiveness. These ISMS stress the Arab nature of the society and seek to define the relation of the individual to the social order and to the state. In advocating their particular ISMS, the leaders have not rejected liberal democracy per se\ rather, based on their limited experience, they have accepted only that portion still believed to be of value. The Arab MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION are convinced that liberal democracy is a system that has now passed into the twilight of history; they anticipate the age of democratic socialism. Such a conviction, aside from its practical approach, appeals to the masses, which for centuries have been plagued by insecurities and crushed by uncertainties. To be meaningful, the performance and actions of the Arab MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION must be judged by the circumstances of poverty rather than abundance, by unrealized expectations rather than by theoretical promises.91 In a very broad sense, Nasser was right when he stated in his book that there is a mission to be accomplished and that the role of the HERO had fallen upon him.92 It is because of these RISING EXPECTATIONS and HISTORICAL CIRCUMSTANCES that the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION can count on the "support of the masses which is the mystic justification of dictatorship".93

»» 91 92 98

Ibid. D e Kiewiet, op. cit., p p . 144-145. N a s s e r , Egypt Liberation: The Philosophy Gabrieli, op. cit., p. 163.

of the Revolution,

op. cit., p p . 86-88.

V THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER: NO COMPROMISE

THE PROBLEM OF N O COMPROMISE

The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the UNCOMPROMISING NATURE of the political struggle taking place in the Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states. Each of the several contemporary Arab revolutionary mass movements, characteristic of its Islamic heritage, is a multi-faceted monolithic totality in which the social, economic, political and religious considerations are all inextricably enmeshed. In this milieu the approach to problems besetting these Arab states must of necessity be CENTRIC, and therefore intolerant of political competition. Nevertheless, in the INITIAL STAGES of the struggle for power, a particular movement may find it temporarily expedient to make an accommodation with a political rival. But it must be stressed that this adjustment when made is purely TACTICAL and, therefore, only a METHOD for getting something essential accomplished. The ULTIMATE GOAL of absolute domination through the total elimination of all opposition remains unchanged. Centricity of approach is characteristic of MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION. The presentday charismatic leaders are "simple [men] with . . . complex mind" 1 imbued with a zealous fervor for change. Unlike most other Arab rulers, they possess real integrity, are resolute and decisive, and, because they are so devoted to their principles, are ardent pleaders for the righteousness of their cause. As Islam before them, all Arab revolutionary mass movements represent struggles among the FUNCTIONAL and the NATURAL groups of the society. Thus to understand the turbulencies prevailing in the Arab World, one must systematically analyze the struggles among the contenders. Since Nasserism is the most comprehensive of all the Arab revolutionary mass movements, this chapter will examine the struggles which that movement waged simultaneously with the FUNCTIONAL 1

Gunther, "Biographical Note: Nasser and Neguib", op. cit., p. 90.

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such as the Moslem Brotherhood and the Ba'ath party, and the such as the Wafd and the traditional elites of the society. A similar methodological evaluation will be applied to the F.L.N, of Algeria and the Socialist Destour of Tunisia. It is hoped that this systematic approach will reveal the problems which are basic to the movements, thereby developing, with minor variation, a pattern applicable to all. The quintessence of the operations of the now defunct Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council (R.C.C.) is that it evolved around a cult of Nasser while ostensibly practicing "collegiate leadership". At the pinnacle of the pyramidal power structure was the Zaim (Chief), Nasser himself, and the members of the R.C.C. satellited about him as a POLITBURO. At the next echelon below the POLITBURO was the Society of Free Officers, a select group of senior army officers. Subsequent to the successful 1952 takeover, a third circle of power was created to manage the governmental bureaucracy. Since then many changes have been effected in Egypt, but the power structure has remained essentially the same. For example, although the R.C.C. was dissolved with the 1957 election of a Legislative Assembly, most of its former members remained in the Executive Council. The trend has been towards increased centralization; therefore, the council is no longer a COLLEGIATE but a COLLECTIVE BODY headed by Nasser. How Nasser attained this position will be covered in the pages which follow. Before continuing, however, it is worthwhile to note that while the organizational structure of the R.C.C. was collegial, there GROUPS

NATURAL GROUPS

. . . were perhaps as many shades of political belief as there were members of Free Officers Executives. Views ranged from extreme rightists, Islamic fundamentalists, and Fascists, the left-wing radical socialist and Communist. Any contention, therefore, that the Society embraced a group of officers with a common ideological or political persuasion is erroneous. 2

During the initial stage of its revolutionary movement, the R.C.C. had the formidable task of articulating the factors creating social discontent and of promising to redress these wrongs through political reform. Although the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION recognized that promises had to be made in order to generate support for the revolution, their tactic in this regard was designed primarily to condition the masses to look to the R.C.C. for new leadership. The objective was complete military and political control of the government - a condition which required not only the R.C.C.'s replacing the ruling regime but also 2

Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 68.

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completely eliminating all political rivals contesting their accession. Consequently, an objective evaluation of R.C.C. accomplishments in the initial phase of the movement should not be assessed in relation to its promises, but only on its success in accomplishing its primary objectives which, stated succinctly, were CONTROL, FLEXIBILITY, and CHOICE. Of the three the last was overriding, a consideration recognized instinctively by Gamal Abdel Nasser as will be brought out later. In elaboration, the Free Officers was but one of the forces contending to overthrow the long-entrenched dynastic order as personified by King Farouk. Of these the Moslem Brotherhood was the largest and the best organized. In contrast, the Free Officers' movement was virtually unknown, its power base dubious, and it offered no program but seemed embarked solely on a campaign of social protest. Further, whatever position it had, it was in jeopardy, for many of its adherents either were conjointly participating in competing political movements or held views at variance with and often in opposition to one another. Rife with ideological ambivalences but still impatient to get on with the revolution, the Free Officers would either have fallen apart or moved prematurely but for the enlightened leadership of Nasser. Of all the Free Officers, he best knew how to CONTROL the members, to maintain FLEXIBILITY as to when to strike, and most importantly, to keep the ideology non-rigid so as to make it a logical CHOICE for a disparate constituency. Wilton Wynn bears this out: Nasser displayed remarkable conspirational skill. He refused to allow minor doctrinal differences to hamper the movement, and it was his patience and restraint which prevented his young colleagues from making a disastrous premature bid for power. Nasser pulled together young officers who represented a wide range of political ideology - Muslim Brothers, Communists, Misr al Fatat, Socialists, Wafdists.3 In sum, Gamal Abdel Nasser alone displayed the instinct to risk revolt on the basis of his convictions and not on the basis of an established doctrine which may have alienated some support from his embryonic movement. Because of the paradox created by the absence of an ideology in the R.C.C., the Wafd and the Moslem Brotherhood were neither able to attack nor to ally or join with it. Similarly the lack of precise goals temporarily nullified mass response until such time as the masses could be favorably conditioned. Because Nasser's followers needed time to learn to operate the machinery of government, Fuad, son of the ousted * Wynn, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

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Farouk, was installed as nominal King, and the 1952-54 period was devoted to stabilization4 and a testing of public reaction. The move was essentially tactical and fitted Nasser's strategy for he "did not reflect any desire of the army to encourage a civilian government to rule the country".5 This was borne out later when the R.C.C. quit the overwatching role to become the actual governing body. The swiftness with which the junta was able to actually effect takeover indicated what was probably an existing plan, and reflected its own strength and determination as opposed to the weakness, dismemberment, and political unawareness of the civilian establishment. The early appointments of Ali Maher as Premier and Behieddin Barakat as Regent were considered by many as a step to reestablish the democratic processes. Actually, Nasser, recognizing that Egypt lacked the economic, political, social, and psychological conditions prerequisite to the establishment of a democratic society, was playing for time to consolidate his position. Nevertheless, Ali Maher attempted some mild political and agrarian reforms. But the implementation of the Agrarian Reform Law," promulgated by the military junta in September, 1952 and calling for severe land reform, was contradictory to a person of Maher's conservative and traditional-elite upbringing. Therefore, he and some similarly oriented cabinet members favored the landowners in carrying out the law.7 Because the bias vented was antithetical to the radical persuasions of the military, the Premier was forced to resign on September 7, 1952.

THE COLONEL VERSUS THE GENERAL

After the ouster of Premier Ali Maher, the Free Officers experienced difficulty in enticing qualified and politically oriented civilians to assist them in the government. They, therefore, abolished the monarchy, promulgated a Constitution and installed military men in high offices. At the behest of the R.C.C., Major General Muhammad Naguib became both President and Prime Minister, while Nasser became Minister of the Interior.8 Through compromise, intra-junta differences were temporarily resolved, for what Nasser needed most were "time and political 4

Partner, op. cit., p. 65. Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 74. « Ibid., pp. 75-76. 7 Partner, op. cit., p. 65. * Wynn, op. cit., pp. 68-69. 5

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tranquility, [and he could not] get the former without the latter".9 In a further attempt to avoid contention, all political parties except the Moslem Brotherhood were dissolved. The Brotherhood was spared because the nature of its activities was religious and, therefore, appeared not to conflict with the interests of the R.C.C. Also many of the Free Officers were members, and they believed that continued existence of the Brotherhood gave promise of enlarging their own base of support in advancement of their own interests.10 With contending political parties eliminated, the political actions of the R.C.C. became absolute. Nasser's autocratic action alienated Naguib who was otherwise inclined, believing in "a persuasive rather than a coercive dictatorship".11 This disaffection precipitated conflict and a non-compromising attitude among the R.C.C. The power struggle between Nasser the ORGANIZER and Naguib the FIGUREHEAD stemmed from a difference in personal convictions and reflected the vague ideological ambivalences of the R.C.C. The variances between the two are in part explained by the differences in their ages and the dissimilarities of their development. Although both were of middle-class origin, Naguib, who was fifty-two at the time of the coup, had advanced in his career to general officer rank, which status identified him with the upper elite. By contrast, Nasser was thirty-five and a lieutenant-colonel who had still not progressed socially above the middle class. Naguib possessed greater maturity and wisdom than Nasser, who was more energetic and less patient.12 The General, being more conservative was "adverse to bold ideas, adventurous solutions and excitement. Nasser, however, was by nature a gambler . . . impatient,13 eager to transform the country quickly and according to his specification".14 Their differences are well summarized in the words of Naguib: It is enough, I think, for m e to say that most of t h e m resolved around what A b d el N a s s e r has called the "philosophy" of the revolution. Perhaps, since neither of us are philosophers, it w o u l d be better to call it the "psychology" of the revolution. A b d el N a s s e r believed, with all the bravado of a m a n of thirty-six, that w e c o u l d afford to alienate every segment of the Egyptian public opinion, if necessary, in order to achieve our goals. I believed, with 9

Gunther, "Biographical Note: Nasser and Naguib", op. cit., p. 90. Richard P. Mitchell, "The Muslim Brotherhood" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Princeton University, December 30, 1959), pp. 356-357. 11 Muhammad Naguib, Egypt Destiny (New York, Doubleday, 1955). 12 Lacouture, Egypt in Transition, op. cit., pp. 180-181. 13 History has supported the fact that while Nasser has been eager on many occasions - a fact that can easily be confused with impatience - he has also proved himself to be quite patient in his approach. 14 Lengyel, op. cit., p. 66. 10

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all the prudence of a man of fifty-three, that we would need as much popular support as we could possibly retain. . . . It remains for the course of history to determine which of us was right. 16

For a man of his relatively tender years, Nasser had had a considerable and strongly pragmatic political tutelage. Among other experiences, he probably was at least a sympathizer if not a participant in the Wafd as well as some secret political organizations. Although he was keenly aware of the shortcomings of his society and the humiliations his country had been subjected to while under foreign domination prior to the July 1952 coup, he evinced no particular political philosophy. "Although intensely political, Nasser must, contrary to the common view, be considered cautious, deliberate, and calculating." 16 While on occasion he did flirt with the unconventional and the radical, often to the point of offending some of his more staid colleagues, it appears, in retrospect, that his attempts were either exploratory or temporary expedients. Thus, by temperament and personality Nasser was better suited than Naguib for venturesome tasks, and the revolution required an adventurous gambler with a shrewd sense of timing "and a realistic use of key forces in the army and trade unions".17 For his part, General Naguib was a genial, guileless personality possessed of a pleasantness with which endeared him to the masses but "was not a practical source of strength . . .".1S Nasser, on the other hand, was a reserved and intricate personality, and because his organizational activities kept him so busy, was less well known to the masses. However, while Naguib was acting as the POPULAR HERO, Nasser was gaining control over the POLITICAL MACHINE, a far more important role for an aspiring politician. Thus, while Naguib was ingratiating himself with the people, Nasser was developing a personal and influentially well placed political entourage. Further, while Nasser displayed an excellent sense of timing, Naguib never seemed to have fully comprehended that a successful movement must move in consonance with the times. In fact, Naguib's political reforms, being mild in nature, served to preserve much of the status quo, thereby alienating not only the social-reformminded military elite but a large segment of the populace as well. The differences in personality and character between the YOUNG MAN and the OLD MAN were reflected in their perspectives of the ills besetting 15

Naguib, op. cit., pp. 215-216. Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 51. 17 Hourani, "A Decade of Revolution: Political and Social Changes, 1949-1959", op. cit., p. 40. 18 Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 90. 18

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the society and in the measures they contemplated using as cures. In 1952 Naguib stated, "our principal aim is to establish a true democratic government in Egypt. If political parties will become perfectly reorganized by February 1953, election will take place at the fixed time, and without undue delay". 19 This showed that he was either politically naive or unaware of the true situation in Egypt. Nasser on the other hand showed that he was both alert and politically astute, for he recognized that democracy could emerge only after Egyptian society had been reorganized, and that the essential economic and social conditions prerequisite to such change were not yet established. "Egypt", he said in 1954, "needs social and economic strengthening by authoritarian methods and political purge . . . before a democratic constitution".20 Besides variances in approaches, the leaders also differed in their concepts of democracy. Naguib adhered to the classical nineteenth century definition, while Nasser's ideas were much more pragmatic and even militant. Although equally sincere in their respective convictions and in dedication to their common cause, they differed markedly as to method. Naguib's approach could be termed moderately conservative and idealistic, while Nasser's bent was pragmatical-radical. Because Naguib considered himself the personification of Egyptian aspirations, the rift between them exacerbated as the OLDER MAN became more and more resentful of taking advice and orders from the YOUNGER MAN. Wary of the dangers inherent in the apparently pending clash between his and Naguib's factions, Nasser surreptitiously placed his key henchmen in strategic political positions.21 He himself became Deputy Prime Minister in addition to continuing on as Minister of the Interior. General Abdel Hakim Amer took over as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces while Abdel Latif al-Boghadi headed the Ministry of War. The appointment of Major Salah Salem as Minister of National Guidance was the most significant move, as this gave the Nasserites tighter control over the Army and the people. By 1953 it became obvious that Nasser, while still remaining in the background, was the true leader of the R.C.C. With the further passage of time, he steadily developed an INNER CIRCLE of personal adherents whose collective influence was greater than the influence of Naguib's disciples, who, in view of the development, became the OUTER CIRCLE of the R.C.C. In the opinion "> K. Wheelock, Nasser's New Egypt (New York, Praeger, I960), p. 19. Ibid., p. 36. 21 Alan W. Horton, "The Last Pasha", American Universities Field Staff, XII (December, 1964), 10-11.

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of the members of the INNER CIRCLE, Naguib's role had not been participative but chiefly symbolic,22 designed to dignify and to make the movement respectable.23 He had been installed as the head of government to appease for a time the opposing segments of the populace, which included the Wafd and the Moslem Brotherhood. "We did not wish to explain he was simply a puppet . . . we raised him to the summit, and then we had to dash him down again." 24 Yet, despite its inner conflicts, all factions of the junta continued publicly to advocate a return to democratic rule, thereby avoiding an open split. Sensing his loss of power, Naguib sought and obtained the support of some of the leaders of the previously dissolved parties. Therefore, the dissension became more widespread and passionate. As the discord further intensified because of differences engendered during the AngloEgyptian negotiations regarding the Suez evacuation, a meeting was held in Naguib's absence during which the "young hot-heads won the day, and the council voted to depose him".25 But Nasser was not disposed to a forcible ouster of Naguib as is borne out by his remark: I have made a careful study of the army and I have concluded that each officer has at least five other officers with him a hundred per cent. And each of those has five others, and so on. If I begin purging the army, I run the risk of alienating big blocs of men in the army. In the end, I would undermine my own position and invite a coup d'etat against my regime.26 Even though Naguib reluctantly chose to resign, his action "produced such a fierce storm" 27 that Major Khaled Mohieddin, heading a group of cavalry officers, "offered to reinstate Naguib as president with himself as prime minister".28 Amazed at Naguib's personal popularity, the junta reinstated him contingent on his acceptance of a position with less authority than before. History shows that he eventually took the political risk of building up his own following and that his failure to be effective ended his political career. Once reinstated Naguib attempted to solidify his position by announcing on February 29, 1954 a return to constitutional government, with elections to be held the following July 23. Although this declaration received much popular support, as evinced by the public outcry 22 2S 24 25 29 27 28

Partner, op. cit., p. 65. Childers, op. cit., p. 91. El Sadat, Revolt on the Nile, op. cit., p. 133. Wynn, op. cit., p. 98. Ibid., p. 61. Gunther, "Biographical Note: Nasser and Neguib", op. cit., p. 88. Wynn, op. cit., p. 99.

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that the Army return to the barracks, 29 the move failed, as political power still stemmed from the armed forces which had successfully concluded the revolution and which could afford to ignore the whim of the masses. Exploiting the Army's increasing disaffection with the reinstated President, Nasser stole a leaf from Naguib's book and counter-attacked his adversaries by having the junta release some political prisoners, and by declaring support for the eventual restoration of Parliamentary government. He sought at the same time to solidify continued junta rule by encouraging student and trade union demonstrations under the Liberation Rally - an organization opposed to a return of Parliamentary government. By his flexibility Nasser was gaining time - time which he badly needed and which, masterfully utilized, proved decisive. Little by little he continued to reshuffle the cabinet; "changes appeared minor and attracted little attention. Yet they were decisive." 30 Strategically placed positions in government increasingly came under his control; for example, trade union activities through appointment of his choice, Major Kamel al Din Hussein, to the post of Minister of Social Affairs. 31 Strengthened, the military junta moved more aggressively under Nasser's able direction, abrogated freedom of the press, postponed scheduled elections, ousted the remaining dissenters in the R.C.C., and by late March, 1954 secured the Presidency for Nasser. THE R A D I C A L VERSUS T H E REACTIONARY

After purging the junta, Nasser sought to offset the troublesome influences of the political parties. In dealing with them he had three alternatives: (1) coexistence; (2) elimination; or (3) compromise. The first choice was anathema to the basic tenet of the revolution: the eradication of the various corrupt elements concealed behind the façade of the democratic forms inherent in Parliamentary government.32 Among these groups were the NATURAL GROUPS such as the Wajd Party and the FUNCTIONAL GROUPS personified by the Moslem Brotherhood. His second alternative, the elimination of all opposition, would require the use of military force, and could as a result increase tension to the breaking point, thereby jeopardizing the movement. This course of action was even more undesirable since both "laicist social reformers and the Moslem Brotherhood seemed to have friends on the Council of the Revolu2

'

30 31

32

Gunther, "Biographical Note: Nasser and Neguib", op. cit., p. 88. Wynn, op. cit., p. 101. Ibid. Lacouture, Egypt in Transition, op. cit., p. 240.

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tion",33 and attempts to eliminate them could have split the movement. The third alternative, compromise, seemed to be the only immediately feasible one open to Nasser; therefore, he ostensibly followed it but, in actuality, he was following his second alternative, the elimination of the opposition. In fact, using a policy based on COMPROMISE, NEGOTIATION, and MEDIATION, he set about his task, and according to Walter Laqueur, the "relations between the Brotherhood and the new regime remained excellent, at least on the surface; members of the junta came to visit the Ikhwan clubs, and appeared, together with Ikhwan members, in the public meetings and demonstrations".31 The Wafd, on the decline for sometime, was no longer significant, however. The Moslem Brotherhood was still most formidable. Drawing on Islam for its ideology, the movement was further strengthened by its pragmatic adherence to the modern type of paramilitary structured organization. As stated by its founder, Hassan al-Banna, the order is "a salafite movement, an orthodox way, a Sufi reality, a political body, an athletic group, a scientific and cultural society, an economic company and a social idea".35 As a NATIVIST movement it combines "extreme nationalist aims with a kind of fundamentalist religious fanaticism".36 After its birth in 1928, the movement spread swiftly over the Arab countries. In Egypt its success was due to the mass acceptance of the ideological solution it proffered a population rent asunder by strife and disaffection. The Brotherhood provided the politically, socially, and economically alienated majority of the people a religious and nationalistically oriented outlet through which to vent their long pent up frustrations. To borrow al-Banna's thought, the Moslem Brotherhood became a "doctrine, worship, homeland, nationality, religion, spirituality, the Koran and the sword".37 Following the chaotic aftermath of World War II, the movement emerged in 1950 as the most powerful political organization in Egypt, with the declared aims of protecting the Islamic traditions and reinstating Islam as a social guide. However, as stated by Albert Hourani, its "object was to generate popular energy in order to seize power rather than to restore the rule of Islamic virtue",38 yet the hypothesis might be advanced that the seizure of power is a prerequisite for the restoration of the Islamic virtue. 33

Fernau, op. cit., p. 134. Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East, op. cit., p. 240. 35 Husaini, op. cit., p. 15. 3 ® Gunther, "Biographical Note: Nasser and Neguib", op. cit., pp. 85-86. 37 Husaini, op. cit., p. 26. S8 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age (London, Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 360. 84

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Once in power, as one step to consolidate its position, the Revolutionary Command Council solicited the goodwill of the Moslem Brotherhood by an invitation to send representatives to the new cabinet, and by passing measures favorable to the order. Among other things, the R.C.C. reopened an inquiry into the events leading to al-Banna's death,39 and granted amnesty to members who had been imprisoned for political reasons. Although many interpreted these conciliatory moves as evidence that the Brotherhood had taken over control of the R.C.C., the Regime from the very beginning lost no sight of its ultimate goal and pursued a policy independent of the Brotherhood,40 as is illustrated by Naguib's words concerning Rashad Muhanna who . . . has gone so far in his relations with the Moslem Brethren that we could not make him a member in the Executive committee. Furthermore, he has opposed our unanimous desire to make Egypt a secular republic. . . . What he wanted, and what most brothers wanted was a return to the past. To the days of Sultan Salah al-Din when Egypt was a theocratic state. . . . We support the application of the Prophet's teachings to modern life; but the birth of the New Egypt, in our opinion, depends upon the process of continuous renewal in its social, political and economic system.41

The independence of the R.C.C. is further attested to by its refusal to accept all three representatives that the Brotherhood had nominated for the new cabinet, a denial which precipitated a struggle between the two centric groups.42 To legitimize the junta's rule, the R.C.C. first dissolved all political parties on January 16, 1953, and a week later inaugurated its own political body, the Liberation Rally. The Moslem Brotherhood, recognizing the threat to its existence, sought and obtained exception from the dissolution order on the grounds that it was a religious order and not a political group. Thereafter, and in direct competition with the Liberation Rally, the Brotherhood tried to attain its objectives by direct pressure on the top command of the Regime. When Nasser refused their overtures, the Brotherhood through its secret cells tried to bring pressure to bear on the Popular Front and even on the Armed Forces. From this point on, the rift between the Brotherhood and the Regime was in the open. Although it appears that by the end of 1953 an understanding probably existed between the Brotherhood and Naguib,43 the allegation 39

See: Al-Ahram (Egyptian Newspaper which published details of the trials in its consecutive issues of May, 1954 and following). 40 Naguib, op. cit., p. 128. 41 Ibid., p. 150. « Al-Ahram, December 8, 1952. 45 See: Al-Ahram, November 14 and 15, 1954.

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has been denied by him. In a book written after his dismissal from the Presidency, Naguib gives the impression that there was no parallelism between the R.C.C.'s political aims and the theocratic aims of the Brotherhood. 44 While there is no hint in his book of a sympathy with the Brotherhood or any indication that he intended to subvert the revolution, it is reasonable to believe that, upon reinstatement after his first ouster, in an attempt to strengthen his position, he probably courted many, factions including the Brotherhood. 45 In considering the objectives of a coup contemplated by the Moslem Brotherhood, it appears that Naguib was intended to be at least the interim President.46 To obtain a wider base of support for the attempted takeover, the Brotherhood sought adherents from among the laborstudent and other youth groups. In the meantime, Nasser, keeping Naguib in the dark, negotiated the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of July, 1954.47 The Brotherhood reacted by publicly denouncing the agreement as an undesirable compromise, 48 and called for a PEOPLE'S WAR 48 to oust the British. Indeed the Brotherhood had a point, as the agreement was a compromise in that important concessions on the use of the Suez Canal were given the British. In addition to opposing the agreement, the Brotherhood adopted a motto of "The Koran is our constitution" 50 and demanded a return to the natural social structure common to Islam, a reinstitution of civil government, and freedom of the press so that public opinion could express itself on matters such as the argument with the British.51 Although openly objecting to compromise or negotiations by others as an indication of weakness,52 the Brotherhood was really not averse to taking such measures on its own as interim steps to its ultimate goals. There is some evidence that while publicly denouncing the AngloEgyptian Agreement, the Brotherhood was carrying on its own clandestine negotiations with the British, and that it was willing to permit a British return to the Canal on condition that the United Nations would 44

Naguib, op. cit., pp. 110, 128, 150, 170, 172, 181, 228, 233, 235-236. Husaini, op. cit., p. 147. 4 « Ibid., p. 148. 47 Ibid. 48 Gunther, "Biographical Note: Nasser and Neguib", op. cit., p. 86. 48 Lacouture, Egypt in Transition, op. cit., pp. 252-253. 50 Ibid., p. 245. 51 For the text of the Brotherhood's criticism of the regime see: Al-Yawm, paper (Beirut), August 13, 1954; also Al-Ahram, October 20, 1954. 52 Husaini, op. cit., pp. 133-134. 45

news-

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determine what constituted a "threat to peace".53 That this situation pertained was brought out in the trial of the Mahkmat al-Sha'b during which Khamis Hamida confessed that, in talks between the Brotherhood and a Mr. Evans, consideration had been given to a secret treaty based on the employment of 4,000 British technicians. In opposing the R.C.C., the Brotherhood, to gain its own political ends, apparently was willing not only to collaborate with the British, but also expressed a willingness to deal with the Communists 54 as well. The Brotherhood, having come into existence in 1930, arrived on the world scene too late to stem the reform tides set in motion by the secularism and material progress of the West. Egyptian society had already progressed too far down the road leading to Western secular reforms to ever return to a purely Islamic way of life. In a desperate effort to counter the Regime's secular-oriented reform programs, the Brotherhood proposed Islamic-oriented reforms in a WHITE PAPER whose contents they hoped to implement through officer sympathizers in the junta, like Colonel Muhanna.55 By pressing its program upon the Regime, the Brotherhood hoped to take over the government.56 However, this grand scheme both overestimated the Brotherhood's influence and underestimated the power of Nasser. Three major developments contributed to the defeat of the Brotherhood's attempt. First, prior to Naguib's final dismissal in December, 1954, Nasser was able to purge the dissident elements from the R.C.C. and the Army, and "the junta now retained Naguib in office as President of the Republic to placate sentiment . . . and . . . simultaneously set out to consolidate its absolute control in the country".57 Second, Nasser's influence within the Liberation Rally permitted that body to systematically purge "trade unions and labor organizations of possible opposition",58 and also to win the student backing. Third, and most vital, an internal struggle took place in the Brotherhood itself, which resulted in the expulsion from its Supreme Council of such key personalities as Salih al-Ashmawi, Muhammad Ghazali, and Abdel Aziz Galal. This "weakened the Brethren's top leadership while the struggle with the ruling army officers was in progress".59 53

Al-Jumhuriyya (Egyptian newspaper), January 15, 1954. Naguib, op. cit., p. 209. 55 El Sadat, Revolt in the Nile, op. cit., pp. 92-94. 58 Lacouture, Egypt in Transition, op. cit., pp. 249-250. 57 Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 92. s» Ibid., p. 83. 58 Ibid., p. 87. 54

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In desperation at the turn of events the Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Nasser on October 26, 1954, but with no success. Nasser then realized that a showdown was unavoidable, for there was no room in Egypt for two revolutionary movements.60 The Brotherhood had left the Regime with no alternative but repression,01 thus arrest and dissolvement of the Brotherhood quickly followed.62 For, although Nasser waged the revolution without a drop of blood, he "has shown that he can be ruthless in dealing with his enemies, if necessary. He was harsh in crushing the Muslim Brotherhood in late 1954 and early 1955".63 Rightly or wrongly, Nasser was convinced of the necessity for such measures. "The man who promises justice for tomorrow employs the cruelest means to attain this end",04 - cruelty with purpose is not brutality. Nasser's GRAND STRATEGY successfully eliminated all opposition by late 1954, an achievement due at least in part to Nasser's diplomatic skill. By reaching an agreement leading to British evacuation of Egypt, he both won popular backing and silenced the critics of his foreign policy. While acting in this vein as an anti-imperialist, he at one and the same time fostered Islamism. By proclaiming to the world at large, through the newly adopted Egyptian Constitution, that Egypt Was "an Islamic state under a republican and democratic form of government",05 he made a declaration close to the heart of the Moslem Brotherhood, thereby neutralizing the opposition of many of its members. Granted that the Brotherhood did cause Nasser to merge "radical and conservative ideas",06 it is apparent that in any event he never intended to forsake the Islamic heritage or institutions. It is obvious that he did not contemplate the complete secularization of the nation at the expense of Islamic institutions, for he continued to adhere to Islamic Arab-Egyptian ethos "as instruments to legitimate their authority and to command the allegiance of all classes in the still undifferentiated public".07 Once the campaign to eliminate all organized political opposition was over, Nasser turned to the primary objectives of his revolution: the reEgyptianization of his country and eventually Pan-Arabism. To accom60

Gunther, "Biographical Note: Nasser and Neguib", op. cit., p. 86. Lacouture, Egypt in Transition, op. cit., pp. 249-250. e2 Wynn, op. cit., pp. 102-104. «' Ibid., p. 62. 84 Aron, op. cit., p. 302. 65 Lengyel, op. cit., pp. 63-73; see also the Egyptian Constitution before the formation of the U.A.R. 68 Partner, op. cit., p. 109. 87 Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp. 190-191. 61

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plish the first, a strong centralized direction was essential, a role he was now ready to play. The second would be attained either through design or chance, a circumstance yet to be determined. During the re-Egyptianization phase which took place between 1953 and 1958, he concentrated on the elimination of the backward aspects of the old order and all its residues, to include the breakup of the archaic feudal system, and the end of capitalism and imperialism. As the reform program reached its apex, Nasser turned his attention outward to the remainder of the Arab World, at first unobtrusively and later directly. The incident which permitted his full intrusion into the Arab World, and which he had been awaiting since 1953, arrived with the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) sponsored Baghdad Pact in 1955. Nasser seized upon this event to ride the "hero's saddle" so vividly portrayed in his book.68 The phase of REVOLUTIONARY EXPORT that he sought came about with the formation of the United Arab Republic in 1958. T H E U N I O N : T H E UNCOMPROMISING FIGHT BETWEEN TWO R A D I C A L MOVEMENTS

"In every revolution", said Anwar El Sadat, "there are two phases. First, men lead the revolution; then the revolution leads the men." 69 This observation leads to the thought that, under certain compelling circumstances, a revolutionary mass movement may become self-generating and no longer responsive to its leadership. Albert Hourani relates this notion to the Middle East when he states that this uncontrollable revolutionary tide has forced some Arab governments to become prisoners of mass enthusiasm, and such an "irresistable wave of feeling may draw them into self-destructive courses".70 It is plausible that two revolutionary mass movements may have similar philosophical approaches and yet repel each other. Two such philosophies exist in the Arab World: Nasserism in Egypt and Ba'athism in Syria. The similarities of the two philosophies and the reasons for their antipathies to each other can best be illustrated by a consideration of the revolutionary forces which brought UNION and then DISSOCIATION between the aforementioned countries. On September 28, 1961 Colonel Nahlawi headed a Syrian coup d'etat 68 89 70

Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution, op. cit., pp. 57-79. El Sadat, Revolt on the Nile, op. cit., p. 27. Hourani, "The Middle East and the Crisis of 1956", op. cit., p. 31.

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that precipitately ended the UNION between Egypt and Syria that had been brought into being by the establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR) on February 4, 1958. To the people of both Syria and Egypt the event was completely unexpected because they were unaware that the forces leading to the dissolution had been building up ever since the first flush of enthusiasm over the merger had worn off.71 To understand their bewilderment, one should be aware that there is a distinction between the OVERT phase and the COVERT phase of any uprising. The OVERT phase becomes readily apparent because of its violent and exposed nature. Much more subtle, however, because of its intangibility is the underlying economic-social-political disintegration which only the discerning can perceive and comprehend. In the case of the UAR, the people simply could not relate the abrupt mechanical aspects of the coup back to failures in the economic-political-social processes. In the case of Syria, as the procedures effecting the union progressed, they proved increasingly restrictive; therefore, the Syrians were less and less inclined to cooperate. This reluctance forced the Egyptian administrators, in turn, to impose even more severe practices and restrictions. The process became dialectic: the harder the Egyptians pressed, the more the Syrians resisted. When the Egyptians could no longer control the disaffection, the Syrians defected. Difficulties in integrating the two regions were caused mainly by the differences in political viewpoints and economic practices within the two geographical areas. With regard to legislative and political integration, the Syrians in comparison to their Egyptian brothers were more sophisticated in their views, more conscious of their individualism, more responsive to issues, and less amenable to centralized authority. Economically, the Egyptian system was socialized to the extent of centralized state control, whereas the Syrian system was one of unregimented free enterprise within a quasi-feudalistic system. Doubtless, one of the very sensitive points was that Egyptian hegemony was superimposed on the Syrian political structure. Further, the establishment of the National Union in the Syrian region in lieu of the previous multi-party system proved unpalatable for the relatively politically sophisticated people of the area. As matters developed, the National Union, hastily and bureaucratically organized, was too monolithic in structure, and too profuse 71

Michel Aflaq, Ma'rakat El-Masir El-Wahid (Battle of the Common Destiny) (Damascus, Dar al-Aadab, 1963), pp. 200-202; also: Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, Ma Illadhi Jara fi Suriya (What Happened in Syria?) (Cairo, Dar El-Qamiyya, 1962), pp. 56, 90-91.

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in substance to articulate properly the society's aspirations. However, it was not strong enough to withstand opposition, especially that of the Ba'ath party. The idea of Arab unity is traceable to the Arab-Islamic Empire which flourished in the distant past. Because of the glories associated with the rule of the Umayyad dynasty and the important role Syria played in Arab history, the modern heirs of these noble traditions have delusions of grandeur. However, because the Empire fell apart and the area was subjected to a long period of dominance first by the Ottomans and then by Western imperialists, the Syrians, like many of their Arab fellowmen, have also developed a chronic feeling of isolation and inferiority. Thus the present-day Arabs, especially the Syrians, are agitated by ambivalent impulses: a psychosis of grandeur based on their Golden Age of historically vibrant cultural connective tissues, accompanied, simultaneously, by a feeling of backwardness because of their long history of subjugations. Although Arab unity has manifested itself on a more practical political level lately, it is still a projection of ideas rather than a structured program. As Fayez Sayegh eloquently explained, most Arab nationalists and advocates of unity have devoted their attention and energies to prove that unity is already a fait accompli, but they have either ignored or forgotten the essential question of how to make unity a workable instrument and a meaningful reality.72 Although a union was finally effected in 1959, the merger of Egypt and Syria was hastily contrived, as it was based not on the usual factors of commonality, but mainly as a consequence of fear. It "was brought about because of sudden political developments in Syria rather than as a carefully planned Egyptian maneuver".73 In fact the political and social institutions of the Arab society have been too weak to handle a unity greater than that which already exists, as, for instance, the Arab League. Syrian apprehensions leading to the union were occasioned by a series of political and economic crises which the country underwent in the 1950's. While the country had a fairly prosperous economy, the need for further economic development necessitated a solicitation for funds from outside sources. Negotiations with the World Bank having fallen through and a request for aid from the United States being domestically impolitic because of the strong anti-American feeling engendered by the unpopular Baghdad Pact and the equally reprehensible Eisenhower 72

Fayez A. Sayegh, Arab Unity: Hope and Fulfillment 1958), p. 81. 73 Badeau, "Introduction", op. cit., p. 17.

(New York, Devin-Adair,

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Doctrine, the Syrian government turned to the Soviet Union, thereby raising the possibility of the country's becoming a "real Soviet satellite".74 Equally disquieting was the strained economic relationship between Lebanon and Syria,75 which had persisted since the breakup of the customs union in 1950. Although several attempts had been made for an economic reconciliation, the talks always turned to politics, where they invariably foundered. In question was Lebanon's lukewarm participation in Pan-Arab practices designed to counter the aforementioned Baghdad Pact and Eisenhower Doctrine. Syria, because she had been victimized by Western imperialistic practices, was intolerant of Lebanon whose policy was "to serve as a link between East and West".76 Relations between the two Levant nations steadily worsened, reaching a violent apex in the 1958 Lebanese civil war in which the United States intervened. Turning to the Syrian political scene, the Ba'ath party, having eliminated its rivals, the Socialist National and the Populist parties,77 was fearful of a Communist take-over. With the Parliamentary elections of 1958 about to take place, there had been many developments which presaged this possibility. In return for having negotiated a Syro-Soviet agreement for aid,78 Khaled el-Azm 79 had been made Deputy Prime Minister in addition to the two portfolios he already held as Minister of Defense and Minister of Finance. With his growth in power he then succeeded in placing his trusted follower and known Communist sympathizer, Afif el-Bizri80 in the highly sensitive post of Army Chief of Staff. To add to the threat of a Communist coup, Salah el-Bizri, Afif's brother, "commanded the Popular Resistance Organization with its thousands of armed civilians, an organization which had been a prime target for the Communist penetration".81 Unconnected to the above, but equally significant was Iraq's attempted overthrow of the Syrian Government as a prelude to a possible incorporation of the country into the Hashemite realm.82 The situation was most tenuous and matters reached a 74

Gabrieli, op. cit., p. 162. Francis Nour, "Particularisme libanais et nationalisme arabe", Orient (Paris), II, No. 7, 1958, pp. 29-42. 76 Rondot, The Changing Patterns of the Middle East, op. cit., p. 31. 77 Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 155. 78 Childers, op. cit., p. 122. 79 Simon Jargy, "La Syrie, province de la République arabe unie", Orient (Paris), II, N o . 8, 1958, pp. 23-24. 80 Childers, op. cit., p. 122. 81 Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945-1958, op. cit., p. 371. 82 Lord Birdwood, Nuri as-Sa'id (London, Cassell & Co., 1959), pp. 246-261. 75

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climax when Turkish troops were massed on the Syrian border, ostensibly to intervene. The most expeditious way out of the dilemma appeared to be union with Egypt. Thus by 1958 politics in Syria seemed centered about two groups in contention over the proposed union. Working for union was a coalition consisting of the Ba'ath, the conservative-style nationalists headed by Shukri al-Kuwatly, and the army secret service headed by the dynamic Colonel Sarraj. Opposed were the followers of Khaled el-Azm, the followers of Afif el-Bizri, and their communist collaborators. Defeat by the communists being imminent, the Ba'ath coalition desperately moved to hand Syria over to Egypt. Proposal for the union met with much popular support because the merger was pictured as a step in the direction of the yearned-for Pan-Arabism. Nasser was visualized as a new type of Caliph, a symbol of a greater Arab nationalism, and the leader against Communist take-over or Hashemite encroachment.83 In short, the union was not considered a surrender of Syrian independence but a triumph of Arab manifest destiny.84 Ideologically, the Ba'ath and Nasserism appeared similar as both advocated Arab unification, a democratic-socialistic society, and a Pan-Arabism directed against foreign intervention, Zionism, feudalism and corruption.85 However, of all the considerable factors contributing to the union of Egypt and Syria, the main one was the SUDDEN VOLCANIC POLITICAL ERUPTION that occurred in a Syrian society, an eruption that "emerged from confusion of bids and overbids".86 Aware of the pitfalls of too precipitate a union with Syria, Nasser was perplexed by the Ba'athist proposal to merge. To Nasser, ARAB UNITY meant SOLIDARITY, a unity on "key policies like neutralism and the kind of political, social, and economic reform that would deny the Great Powers their traditional ancient regime support in the Arab world".87 But a refusal of the Syrian offer by Nasser would not only prejudice any future attempts to unify parts of the Arab World, but would diminish his stature among Arab leaders. Aware that genuine union required popular consent and mindful of the difficulties inherent in the administration of two geographically separate regions, Nasser 83

Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 160. P. Seale, Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1965), last chapter. Also, Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945-1958, op. cit., pp. 345-380. 85 Sands, "Middle East Background", op. cit., pp. 16-17. 86 Rondot, The Changing Patterns of the Middle East, op. cit., p. 172. 87 Childers, op. cit., p. 123. 84

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hesitated. However, he had to consider that, to counter the Communists, either Iraq or the Western powers might intervene. Also, there was the possibility that, in the event of his refusal, the Ba'athists might make the same offer of union to his Hashemite rivals in Iraq.88 Mindful that a union between the two nations would "head off any future union with Iraq, [and that by] taking the Syrians under his wing, Nasser might gain new recruits for his brand of Arab unity",89 the decision was made to accept the offer to unite, but only after certain stipulations were accepted by Syria. Although the process of union moved harmoniously at first, it soon became obvious that Nasser's policies were proving inadequate to the task. The old sayings that "they displayed humility until they established themselves firmly",90 but "once firmly mounted, the rider begins to spur the horse" 91 certainly are applicable to the situation. After the initial stages of the union had been effected, Nasser attempted to rid himself of opposition political parties. The tactics he used were similar to those that had been previously successful in Egypt: he precipitated a struggle between the FUNCTIONAL groups and the NATURAL groups. In the Syrian region this meant: Nasserism against Ba'athism (a Pan-Arabist movement) on the one hand; and Nasserism against both the multi-parties and the sentiments emanating from provincial nationalism on the other. The alternatives open to Nasser were: (1) preservation of the existing Syrian multi-party parliamentary system; (2) elimination of all opposition; and (3) compromise and negotiation. Again, as he had had to face previously in Egypt, Nasser appeared to select the third alternative when actually he was effecting the second - eliminating the opposition. In essence he was donning the trappings of humility until the saddle was tightly cinched. In considering how the Syrian region could best be administered, Nasser decided that centralized direction from Cairo was the best solution. In view of the failure of the Parliamentary system in Syria, the political role of that country's armed forces, and the inadequacies of the socio-economic bases of the two regions, Nasser seemed constrained to make this decision. Therefore, before the union was consummated, Nasser stipulated that all political parties must be dissolved, that the "army must renounce further involvement in politics",92 and that the ^ 88

Ibid.

"Report on Syria", The Atlantic, CCIX (January, 1962), 19. 90 John Lewis Burckhardt, Arab Proverbs (London, Quaritch, 1875), p. 52. °< Ibid., p. 43. 92 Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1964, op. cit., p. 14.

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government must be UNITARY as the Syrian leaders had originally proposed. The constitution which was finally adopted reflected Nasser's stipulations and provided for a president with one or more vice presidents, a cabinet, and two executive councils, one for each region. To placate the Ba'athists and other Syrian elements, 93 the membership of the original National Assembly consisted of equal numbers from the former legislative bodies of each of the two members. The power of legislation was vested in the National Assembly, but the President could arbitrarily convoke or dissolve the body or terminate its sessions, and while the body was not in session, he could legislate as he saw fit. The claim that the Constitution was a farce insofar as separation of powers was concerned and that it, therefore, provided a façade behind which the increased power of Nasserism could operate at the expense of all the NATURAL and the FUNCTIONAL groups in Syria is one side of the question. Conversely, while the strength of the executive branch was apparent, Nasser's insistence on highly centralized authority in Cairo "made good sense inasmuch as it has been the Syrians' despair of governing themselves any longer that had precipitated the union". 94 In any case, the Syrian negotiators passively assented to Nasser's demands, even though in retrospect the agreement was concluded mainly as a matter of expedience and not to further mutual interests. Although Nasser's strategy required elimination of all organized political party opposition, he found it expedient to adopt a temporary tactic of peaceful coexistence with the key members of the dissolved Ba'ath. In so doing his purpose was gradually to erode the power of the Ba'athists rather than risk the turbulencies and disruptions of a direct confrontation. Further, without Ba'athist support, the Syrian army, which was strongly influenced by the party, might defect and the union would thereby be short-lived. In order to placate the Ba'athists, his first action was to appoint some of them to high positions in the regional and national cabinets, a move designed to give the appearance that the internal affairs of Syria were managed by Syrians. However, it should be noted that moving the key leaders up to the national level weakened the Ba'athists in regional affairs. This, consequently, left the real power in the Syrian region in the hands of Colonel Abdel Hamid Sarraj who, as Minister of the Interior and as Director of Propaganda, was charged with subverting the Ba'athists. Nasser also hoped eventually to replace 93 The new "National Assembly" was to include 300 Egyptian and 100 Syrians New York Times (February, 5, 1958). 94 Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1964, op. cit., p. 15.

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the multi-party system with the National Union which was to be the single-party in the union. It should be stressed that permitting the continued participation of the Ba'athists in the government was similar to the accommodation made in 1952-1954 with the Moslem Brotherhood, and that the move, as was true previously, was an expedient adopted while Nasser made sure of his ground before "moving in for the kill". Inexorably, Nasser, using his constitutional powers, replaced Syrians with Egyptians in key military and civil positions.95 To the Syrian leaders who had favored union and who now accepted the abolition of political parties as a requisite for unity, the WATCHFUL POLITICAL CONTROL being instituted was intolerable, REACTION and OPPOSITION set in. Meanwhile, events centering on Iraq were having an impact. The estrangement with Iraq had become sufficiently serious by 1959 to provoke Nasser into a too precipitate speed-up of the Egyptianization of the Syrian region. Consequently, the land reforms had failed, thereby weakening the National Union and correspondingly strengthening the Ba'ath. In Iraq itself, Kassem's resounding successes and the corresponding decline in the power of the pro-UAR Arif had unleashed two possibilities inimical to Nasser: the Ba'ath might ally with Iraq, thereby ending the union and denigrating Nasser; and Communist influence and power in Iraq had grown to intolerably ominous proportions, and were threatening Syria. Because his position was getting weaker in Syria and that of the Ba'athists growing correspondingly stronger, Nasser decided to reverse the trend by enforcing his second alternative: to put an end to all opposition in Syria, especially by eliminating the Ba'ath as a state within a state. Skillfully exploiting differences between Colonel Serraj, the head of army intelligence,96 and Hourani, the Ba'ath leader, Nasser engineered the near-demise of the Ba'ath party by putting Serraj in charge of handling election procedures. The Colonel, with Nasser's blessing, arranged for elections as free as the circumstances would permit. Syrians denied the vote since the UNION, leaders and followers of suppressed political parties, and the like,97 took full advantage of the opportunity to participate. Opponents regrouped their candidates to best oppose the Ba'ath whose leaders were detained in Cairo during the campaign.98 Discommoded by the turn of events, the almost leaderless Ba'athists panicked, withdrawing their candidates from most of the 85 98 97 98

"Report on Syria", The Atlantic, CCIX (January, 1962), 19-21. Jargy, "Le déclin d'un parti", op. cit., p. 32. Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 118. Jargy, "Le déclin d'un parti", op. cit., pp. 32-33.

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electoral districts." The net result was that only 250 Ba'athists were elected out of a total of 9,445 seats.100 Michel Aflaq, the ideologist of the Ba'ath party, considered that his party and the National Union adhered to essentially the same principles.101 Therefore, when the Ba'ath leaders proposed union between Syria and Egypt it was with the expectation that they would be called upon to organize the Syrian Branch of the Union. Further, it was reasonable to believe that the Ba'ath could be useful in carrying out Nasser's ideas. After all, it was the only political party that was effectively organized on a Pan-Arab basis. It had executive branches in the other Arab countries, a systematic ideology reflecting the aspirations of most Arabs, sizeable followings from all strata of the social order, and a leadership considered by many as the "originators of the idea of Arab unity and the most adroit politicians in the Arab world".102 To a PanArabist movement in which Nasser could be the secular arm, the Ba'ath could provide the philosophy and the ideology.103 Therefore, the UAR's decree of March 12, 1958, dissolving their party along with all others in the Syrian region was complacently accepted by the Ba'ath leaders. As they envisioned the situation, they not only could continue their program through the lone legally permitted political party, but that party's standing with Nasser could be useful in eliminating their opposition. Consequently, the party dissolved itself as directed, but the breakup was in FORM only as the SPIRIT of the movement continued to manifest itself. Therefore, the former leaders tried to play a major role in the formulation of the national policy. While it can be conjectured that the subsequent breakup of the union might have been avoided had Nasser been willing to accept the Ba'ath leadership into his revolution, it was inevitable that there would be a clash. No matter how compatible, two centric factions, operating in an entity responsive to direction from one source, will contend until one is eliminated as there is room for one only: two revolutionary movements operating in the same sphere cannot be democratic in character and compromising in approach. Meanwhile, developments in the Arab World had taken a marked turn for the better, causing Syria to have qualms about her merger with Egypt. The civil war in Lebanon had ended in a compromise satisfactory 99

Harry B. Ellis, "U.A.R. Booster Party Somersaults in Syria", The Christian Science Monitor (August, 10, 1959). 100 j a r g y ; "Le déclin d'un parti", Orient (Paris), III, N o . 11, 1959, pp. 32-33. 101 Ibid., p. 29. 102 Cremeans, op. cit., p. 171. 103 Jargy, "Le déclin d'un parti", op. cit., pp. 21-39.

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enough to permit the Syrians to abate their suspicions of the Lebanese, at least for a time. Disaffections with the Iraqi population revolving on Hashemite designs on Syria and the suspicions of that dynasty's Zionist collaborations were eliminated by a revolution in 1958. Abd el Karim el Kassem, who had headed the revolution, after some vacillation had identified with the nationalist movement. His subsequent withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact had revived the idea of the reestablishment of the Fertile Crescent scheme which had always interested Syria. "Thus, the vice in which Syria, rightly or wrongly, had felt herself gripped, was relaxed on [all] sides. Logically, this should have reduced the feeling of compulsion to link with Egypt." 104 With the turnabout in her circumstances, Syria began to consider whether union with Iraq, with whom she was probably more compatible, would have been a better solution. Thus, as the restrictions being enforced upon her by the process of Egyptianization and centralization increased, Syria began to react against direction from Cairo. The UNION became a source of discontent and the very same groups, chiefly the army and the Ba'ath, that had worked so hard to bring about the merger now worked equally hard to tear it apart. In response, Nasser was compelled to tighten his control. With Ba'ath power mounting along with the regional discontent, Nasser was compelled to counter the threat the party constituted to his regime. Drought and economic setbacks forced him to begin in 1959 to purge the officials he felt were responsible for derelictions. Five Ba'athist ministers, including Akram Hourani and Salah Bitar, and several other officials either resigned or were relieved from sensitive posts in the central and regional executive cabinets.105 As part of the political moves, Marshal Abdul Hakim Amer, Nasser's loyal deputy, was sent to Syria to head, appropriately, the "surgical department". He was given carte blanche106 to "extract Syria's political obedience by accelerating economic and political integration, and to ensure the success of the National Union at all costs".107 Colonel Serraj, who was considered to have grown too powerful and who might interfere with Amer, was "kicked upstairs" to the Vice Presidency and moved from Syria to Cairo. The situation had deteriorated to the point where increased political and economic centralization measures became absolutely necessary: Nasser nationalized all banks and insurance companies; 104

Rondot, The Changing Patterns of the Middle East, p. 32. Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military: 1945-1958, op. cit., pp. 397-399. 109 "Report on Syria", The Atlantic, op. cit., 19-21; also Lengyel, The Changing Middle East, op. cit., p. 151. 107 Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 118. 105

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imposed a very heavy income tax; and replaced the regional executive councils with a newly created central executive authority.108 Contrary to expectations the opposition continued to mount after the removal of Serraj and the Ba'ath leaders. With the formation of a coalition among the conservatives, radicals, and an influential element of the army, the straggle to shake off the yoke of Egyptian dominancy intensified. Matters worsened as Nasser countered the disaffections by increasingly relying on Egyptians to administer the Syrian region. Because these officials disagreed with or failed to comprehend the conditions peculiar to the Syrian region, they aggravated the differences by alienating most of the Syrian elite and bourgeoisie. For example, the Syrian autocracy considered that the agrarian reforms were specifically tailored to destroy the base of their power. They argued "that there was much unused State Domain land which could first have been distributed to the benefit of peasant farmers without touching privately owned large estates . . .". l09 In their turn the bourgeoisie felt that they were being discriminated against because the nationalizations of their business were being directed from the central authority in Cairo to whom they had little or no direct access. While there was some justification for the landlords' and the bourgeoisies' grievances, their viewpoints were quite provincial; at least, they appeared so to Nasser. Convinced that national stability and political democracy were inconceivable without socioeconomic democracy, he advocated still further nationalization, practices which were bound to hurt the special interest groups. With this last thought in mind, it is necessary now to evaluate the over-all balance of forces in the two societies. There was a difference of approach in the economy of Egypt as compared to that of Syria. In Egypt, the economy traditionally has been tightly controlled by the government; this facilitates a high degree of compactness110 and encourages the growth of strong centralized leadership. Today the Nasserite economy is characterized by a mixture of both private enterprise and collectivization under the strict control and supervision of the government.111 In these features it reflects the submissive psychological attitude of the people and is, thereby, in accord with the historical trend of Egyptian economies. Historically the Egyptian bour108

Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military: 1945-1958, op. cit., p. 399. Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 171. 110 Lengyel, op. cit., pp. 149-150. 111 Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1957), p. 166. 109

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geois class has been small and, until very recently, has consisted predominantly not of Egyptian Moslems but of European nationals and of Levantines made up from the country's minorities. Because the agrarian economy of Egypt has been dependent on river-irrigation in a land with limited water supply and yet given to seasonal floods, such water as existed had to be controlled through a highly sophisticated irrigation system. This system has been so large, so complex and so meaningful to the people's sustenance that a large central administrative bureaucratic authority was long ago established to see to its proper operation. Thus today's Egyptian is conditioned toward centrally directed authority. In contrast, the Syrian has not been conditioned to respond to centralized control. This occurs because, before the union with Egypt, the Syrian feudalistic-capitalistic agricultural economy was mainly RAIN-FED and thereby an individualistic-type pursuit requiring little or no outside assistance. The government had not played a major role in the farmer's life and, therefore, had not had as much control over the economy as had its Egyptian counterpart. In fact, until recently, the bourgeoisie, because it could operate the economy without a sizable foreign element, played a vigorous role in the country's agriculture, industry and trade. Consequently, those factors which facilitated the establishment of a bureaucratic structure in Egypt did not pertain in Syria. As a result, the efforts to impose bureaucracy met resistance and a "split was triggered by Cairo's attempted application to the northern region of a comprehensive program of socialism",112 which was not yet quite applicable to the environmental culture of the Syrian community. The sense of unity created by the moving spirit of Pan-Arabism dissipated once the forces tending toward separate nationalism vigorously reasserted themselves. That the concept of Arab unity has proved illusory attests not to its infeasibility but to the magnitude of the practical considerations confronting the movement. Pan-Arab nationalism is a composite of autonomous forces, changing both in FORM and SUBSTANCE as the pressures on its political and socio-economic elements vary. It is not an immutable force as some claim it to be. For example, Aflaq reflects that the merger of Egypt and Syria took place for parochial reasons without mutual willingness to bear the burdens of responsibility.113 Most leaders and ardent Pan-Arabists failed to appreciate that Arab 112 Hurewitz, "Regional and International Politics in the Middle East", op. cit., p. 34. 113 Aflaq, Mdrakat El-Masir El-Wahid (The Battle of the Common Destiny), op. cit., pp. 202-203.

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nationalism, while neutral to most socio-political creeds 114 (such as Monarchism, Totalitarianism, Feudalism, Capitalism and Socialism), appears in various forms and has diverse outlets, and therefore does not take consistent form, but chameleon-like changes in accordance with its environment. It is multiple in outlook and purpose and can even be expected to contradict itself. In the case at hand, the reasons for the merger between Egypt and Syria were too shallow to establish the deeprooted solidarity necessary for perpetuation. From the moment of its inception, the move lacked the base necessary for accommodation to the diverse circumstances of its environment. At the time that it was attempted, it had both unifying and divisive tendencies, a Pan-Arabism inclining toward UNION and a provincialism leaning to SEPARATISM. Those persons advocating union underestimated Syrian Nationalism and, even more foolishly, those effecting the merger refused to recognize its later manifestation. In retrospect, it can be said that the feeling of provincialism was so strong among the Syrians that it took the form of a mystique not apparent to the senses. The physical separation of the two regions served to keep the various NATURAL and FUNCTIONAL groups active in the Syrian area. This became more apparent when it was found that there.was no person favorably disposed to the Egyptians to take over as head of the army's security apparatus when Colonel Serraj was promoted and transferred to Cairo. The political vacuum created by his loss gave dissident army officers an opportunity to seize power.115 They considered it inherently their right to make policies as they "had made the politics of the country before the union".116 Nasser and his chief aides failed to understand the psychological factors "of the Syrian temperament and mentality" 117 that were then in vogue. Attempts to correct the situation failed because, although the mass apathy of the Syrians was obvious, the men in Cairo were not aware of its depth, nor did they appreciate that in some instances mass apathy could translate into mass instability. Stemming from social alienation then, there is a definite parallel between mass apathy and mass activism. Both are highly unstable and unpredictable and easily alternate because they equally represent a dissatisfaction with the existing order. Apathetic individuals subjected to prolonged un114

Feudalism, for example, is still strong in Saudi Arabia yet the Saudi people are still as nationalistic as the Egyptians who embrace a socialistic form of government. 115 Hottinger, op. cit., pp. 281-282. 116 Lengyel, op. cit., p. 151. 117 Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military: 1945-1958, op. cit., p. 401.

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certainties affecting their existence may, as indeed the Syrians did, seek personal security by becoming politically active. In such cases, political activism is not a means to an end; rather it is the excitement of participating in the dramatic game of politics and the confidence which comes from belonging to a movement that are significant to the masses. It can be stated that although the "long-anticipated union . . . broke up without any popular outcry",118 the aborted attempt has had great significance. The powerful force of Nasserism was able to overcome the NATURAL and FUNCTIONAL groups as long as it confined itself to its first habitat, Egypt. But once Nasser extended the same strategem into a somewhat different cultural environment, he encountered an opposition which proved overwhelming. Although there is no guarantee, it is possible that Nasserism might have maintained the UNION had its policy of Egyptianization of the Syrians been approached less radically and with more consideration for the people's mood and temper. The significant lesson is that the Cairo regime failed to appreciate that, unless possessed of and willing to use overwhelming force, changes must not be imposed on any society faster than a population can be conditioned to assimilate them. Furthermore, the rupture was due not so much to inadequacies of the constitutional division of power as to the following: (1) the psychological unpreparedness of the Syrians to be assimilated, (2) the uncompromising nature of the revolutionary "isms" - Ba'athism versus Nasserism, and (3) the lack of empathy and the harshness of Nasser's regime. For the Syrians the "opposition to the union was for the most part a matter of injured pride".119 The UNION was, then, an EMOTIONAL JOURNEY that leaders on both sides had deluded themselves into presuming that an unwilling people were prepared to take. "The citizens of a state", said Aristotle, "must know one another's characters",120 and until this axiom of Aristotle becomes a reality Arab unity will not materialize. As the old saying goes: those who do not read history are doomed to repeat it. THE SIMILARITIES IN THE REVOLUTIONARY PATTERNS: THE CASE OF ALGERIA

Power struggles in the Arab Revolutionary progressive states generally have been patterned after the Egyptian. In the case of Algeria the 118

Cremeans, op. cit., p. 177. Ibid. 120 Ernest Barker (trans.), The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1948), p. 341. 119

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political struggle since independence which was achieved in July, 1962, has undergone more rapid metamorphoses than had the Egyptian. Beginning in the 1920's, one finds the first strong assertions of an Algerian Islamic-Nationalist movement beginning to crystallize as the result of the efforts of some outstanding spiritual leader, like Abdul Hamid Ben Badis. During the years between the two World Wars, the intellectual revival he had sparked set in motion the conflicting strains of an awakening Algerian National consciousness. After much agitation this manifestation resolved itself into two endeavors: one, basically extremist, was dedicated to complete Algerian independence; the other, moderate, had as its goal Algerian autonomy within a French union. Because of French resistance to any Algerian autonomy, the moderates formed a coalition with the extremists. Eventually the coalition opted to revolt. On the eve of the uprising, the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (C.R.U.A.) established in Cairo the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.) to direct the war effort. Among its other efforts the F.L.N, undertook the mass ideological indoctrination of the troops and the Algerian populace. This indoctrination was a major factor in conditioning the rebels to withstand all adversities including the drastic French suppressions. Even the capture and imprisonment of Ben Bella in October, 1956 and the formation of a rival Missalist front, the National Algerian Movement (M.N.A.) did not shake the revolutionists.121 In fact, the F.L.N, was later able politically and militarily to isolate the M.N.A. As a result of this isolation, the strength of the Missalists, along with the prestige of Missali Hajj, was, for all purposes, destroyed. By this time most of the leaders of the extremist Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Leaders (M.T.L.D.), including Ben Yousef ben Khedda, Mohammed Yazid, Mohammed Lamine-Debaghine, as well as the leaders of the moderate Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto (U.D.M.A.), chiefly Ferhat Abbas,122 either joined or supported the F.L.N. Still further changes were effected at the Soumman River Valley Congress in August 1956 when leaders of the F.L.N, and the National Liberation Army (A.L.N.) established the proto-parliament, the National Council of the Algerian Revolution (C.N.R.A.), to coordinate matters between the Algerian leaders in Cairo and the MILITANTS IN THE FIELD. Five members of the C.N.R.A. constituted the COORDINATION AND EXECUTION COMMITTEE (C.C.E.). The following guidelines for operations were agreed to: (1) the acceptance of COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP 121 122

Barbour (ed.), op. cit., p. 230. Brace, op. cit., p. 112.

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a n d t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f PERSONAL POWER; ( 2 ) t h e C . N . R . A . w a s t o b e the SUPREME ORGAN OF THE REVOLUTION a n d t h e s o l e b o d y a u t h o r i z e d ,

in the last resort, to make decisions about the country's future; and (3) indigenous affairs were to be given precedence over exterior ones. Through these understandings, agreed to within the C.N.R.A., the F.L.N, subsequently established its legitimacy as the only valid spokesman for Algeria. The Algerian revolutionary movement for independence went through three distinct phases which portrayed the evolution of the executive and legislative power within the Algerian society. The first phase began during the war of Liberation and continued well into the early days of independence. What first emerged from this chaotic background was a Provisional Government of the Algerian Revolution (G.P.R.A.) which succeeded the C.C.E. and was responsible to the C.N.R.A. As was pointed out previously, the Soumman River Valley Congress stressed COLLECTIVE l e a d e r s h i p a t the e x p e n s e o f PERSONAL POWER; this s u g g e s t e d

a coalition of all political forces. However, when the revolution was almost over and independence was about to be achieved, the struggle f o r d o m i n a n c e b e t w e e n t h e a d v o c a t e s o f COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP a n d t h o s e of PERSONAL POWER b e g a n t o i n t e n s i f y . 1 2 3

In a struggle similar to the Egyptian conflict between Naguib's moderate and Nasser's radical groups, the MODERATES in Algeria were, in due time, replaced by RADICAL leaders. In August 1961, the moderate leader Ferhat Abbas was ousted from the premiership and replaced by the radical leader Ben Khedda. During this early period, the G.P.R.A., while dominated by members of the F.L.N., was actually led by Ben Khedda. The C.N.R.A. also was dominated by the F.L.N, whose fiftyseven members represented the six Willayas (local autonomous military districts), the A.L.N., and various exiled contingents. The G.P.R.A. was given wide legal discretion in administrative matters while the C.N.R.A. was given a broad base from which it could legislate. Because of complexities, the ultimate ability to govern depended on factors and powers other than those purely legal in nature. In fact, virtually all effective power and authority at this time rested with the units of the Willayas and exiled groups. The struggle that followed among the various factions manifested a division of loyalties in Algeria. These frictions arose when the C.N.R.A. met in May, 1962, in Tripoli, to create a Political Bureau to govern the 123 Enlightening parallels can be found in Crane Briton, The Anatomy tion (New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952).

of

Revolu-

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internal affairs of the nation. Those members of the G.P.R.A. who were not, for the most part, chosen for the Bureau left the conference before a plenary vote could be taken. However, in June of 1962, when the G.P.R.A. tried to assert its legal authority over the A.L.N, as the sole functionary of the government, Ahmed Ben Bella, with the help of the army, moved in. Consequently the G.P.R.A. was left without power and a COALITION OF RADICALS took over. In a struggle for power within the coalition the pro-Ben Khedda faction was defeated and Ben Bella emerged as Prime Minister of Algeria. Skillfully maneuvering from that position, Ben Bella was then able to win the support of some leaders, among them Ferhat Abbas,124 or to neutralize other patriots such as Hocine Ait Ahmed, the former vice-Premier from the Grand Kabylia. However, there were some such as Ben Khedda, Mohammed Boudiaf and Belqasim Krim, who, refusing to go along with fraternal rule, continued their opposition. In August 1962, in order to insure control of the National Assembly, Ben Bella established the Political Bureau as a centralized body in place of the lesser authoritarian G.P.R.A. agreed to at the Conference of May 1962 in Tripoli. This seven-man board (Ben Bella, Khider, Rabah Bitat, Hajj Ben Alia, Said Mohammedi, Ait Ahmed,125 and Mohammed Boudiaf) 126 was charged with the direction of the nation, the reconversion of the F.L.N, and the A.L.N., and the task of nominating all candidates for public office. With the collapse of the G.P.R.A. and the establishment of the Political Bureau, Ben Bella himself temporarily assumed power. On the basis of a single list that was submitted by the Political Bureau, a 190member national constituent assembly was elected on September 20, 1962. The moderate leader, Ferhat Abbas, was elected President. Subsequently, Ben Bella was elected Premier by a vote of 159 to 1. The remainder of the 190 members indicated opposition by abstaining. The second phase of development - consolidation of power in the Prime Minister - was highlighted by Ben Bella's efforts to dominate the executive branch, and especially the popularly-elected National Assembly, led by Ferhat Abbas, which was still an important organ of 124

Ferhat Abbas joined the side of Ben Bella mainly because of personal grievances against Ben Yousef Ben Khedda. 123 Ait Ahmed, one of the original "historic chiefs", refused nomination as the seventh member of the "Political Bureau" and went into self-imposed exile in Switzerland in July, 1962 but returned to lead the opposition in the National Assembly. 126 Mohammed Boudiaf resigned from the "Political Bureau" in August, 1962 and refused the Assembly seat to which he was elected.

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expression for the opposition. The leading personality of this opposition was Belqasim Krim, one of the surviving six of the nine original "historic chiefs" of the C.R.U.A. 1 2 7 Important leaders such as Ben Khedda, Ben Tobbal and Colonel Ou El Hajj gathered around him. Krim's opposition to Ben Bella was not only personal and political but was also ideological. The OLD Krim, like Naguib was convinced that the future of Algeria's political institutions had to be based on democratic representation rather than on charisma. The YOUNG Ben Bella, like Nasser, was otherwise disposed and equally strong in his conviction that the nation's first needs were for strong central controls. In Algeria's case, Ben Bella believed this could best be achieved by setting up a powerful executive backed by a strong revolutionary Political Bureau made up of key members of the F.L.N. and A.L.N. - democratic representation could come later. Unlike Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, Ahmed Ben Bella was handicapped because his role from the beginning had been that of the "neutralizer" and not that of the undisputed leader of the "historic chiefs" who had started the revolution. The tactical move to eliminate his rivals was based on whether they would accept or reject his direction. Among those responsible for his success were Colonel Houari Boumedienne and Mohammed Khider. Because of his military power, Boumedienne played an important role in the formation and execution of policy, while Mohammed Khider was the political organizer and ideological exponent of the movement. In contrast to Boumedienne, Mohammed Khider was not only one of the "historic chiefs", but also one of the founding fathers of the F.L.N. Although he saw in Ben Bella's scheme the danger of personal power, he was willing temporarily to acquiesce. As Secretary-General of the Bureau Khider hoped to transform the F.L.N, from a semi-military organization into a peacetime political movement, through which he hoped to control such AUXILIARY ORGANIZATIONS as the national labor union (U.G.T.A.), youth organizations, and student unions. With visions of grandeur because the leadership of the revolution was in his hands, Ben Bella assumed that the destiny of the state was inextricably tied to the party. Partisan functions, consequently, were synonymous with those of the government; as had Egypt's R.C.C., so was the Political Bureau of Algeria to become the guardian of the government. In order to accomplish this complex task, ex-sergeant Ben The "Historic Chiefs" were as follows: Ben Bella, Mohammed Khider, Rabah Bitat, Ait Ahmed, Mohammed Boudiaf, and Belqasim Krim. 127

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Bella followed Nasser's political strategy of eliminating the opposition; and, like Nasser, he avoided harsh or sweeping repressions so as to prevent a strong opposition from forming. Those who were politically dispossessed were either exiled or allowed to return to private life. However, unlike Nasser, Ben Bella's personality lacked the charm and magnetism which seem essential for attracting loyal and dedicated lieutenants. Because of political expediency, Khider and Bitat collaborated with Ben Bella, even though they differed with him and with each other on many policies. Behind this shaky COLLABORATION FRONT there was always the disagreement between those who favored a broader democratic party organization and those who wanted a small elite party. The split came into the open in the early spring of 1963, when Khider, then secretarygeneral of the Bureau, provocatively demanded and was refused permission to form a mass political party. Following the resignation of Khider in April, 1963, Ben Bella assumed the post of secretary-general.128 In mid-June 1963, following unrest in eastern Algeria, another contender, Mohammed Boudiaf, together with several officers, was arrested for plotting against Ben Bella. Meanwhile the F.L.N., under the direction of Ben Bella, prepared a constitutional draft establishing the F.L.N, as the state's supreme guide and the only political party. The constitution was approved in a national referendum on September 8, 1963.129 A few days later, Ben Bella, having been elected president by acclamation at a meeting of 3,500 F.L.N, delegates,130 was in control of all the main levers of political power. He was the secretary-general of the F.L.N, and, through Boumedienne, he was also in control of the army. Consequently, as a body with political responsibility, the Political Bureau ceased to function. Since discontent could not be voiced within the Political Bureau, the F.L.N, or the government, it came to be expressed outside. Thus, a major source of opposition to Ben Bella developed from fragments of the revolutionary leadership itself. Moderates, such as Ferhat Abbas, who resigned as President of the Constituent Assembly in August, 1963, predicted that the one-party system as instituted by Ben Bella "will be condemned by the very nature of things to evolve toward Fascist structures".131 An extremist, Mohammed Boudiaf, criticized Ben Bella's re128

On April 16, 1963, Khider resigned as Secretary-General of the Political Bureau and was replaced by Ben Bella; in May Khider resigned from the Bureau. 129 Brace, op. cit., p. 159. 130 Ibid. 131 The New York Times (September 29, 1963), p. 31.

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gime as PSEUDO-SOCIALISTIC 132 and lacking the true doctrinaire approach. Both Abbas and Boudiaf were arrested. Outside Ben Bella's innercircle, the most serious opposition resulted from the personal ambitions of rival leaders such as Hocine Ait Ahmed and Colonel Hohand Ou El Hajj. Ait Ahmed, a dynamic personality whose past revolutionary record equalled Ben Bella's, resigned his post and revived the clandestine Front of Socialist Forces (F.F.S.), thereby attracting many discontented elements among whom was the local Willaya military commander of the Grand Kabylia. Ait Ahmed then refused to accede to the results of the September elections and threatened open revolt unless Ben Bella restored the principle ideas of the revolution. Faced with genuine domestic resistance and with what seemed to be an opportunely scheduled threat from the Moroccan army, Ben Bella acquiesced with Ait Ahmed's conditions. After granting amnesty to all political prisoners, he permitted an all-party Congress wherein all contentions could be freely aired. By this move Ben Bella succeeded in making peace with Colonel El Hajj; consequently Ait Ahmed was isolated.133 It was then an easy matter, the differences with Morocco having been settled, to use Boumedienne's troops to put an end to Ait Ahmed's rivalry. In so doing, however, he also precipitated the first real threat from within his apparatus. That threat was the rising star of Boumedienne. The triumph of Ben Bella over Ait Ahmed did not resolve the crisis, as there were still manifestations of discontent in the populace. Therefore, Ben Bella again attempted conciliation. In the F.L.N. Congress of April of 1964, he enlarged the Political Bureau to seventeen members so as to include some of the opposition. While a democratic aura was thus given, in fact the number of Ben Bella's proteges was increased. In a further attempt to strengthen his position with the populace and with the religious groups, Ben Bella made Islamic instruction compulsory in all public schools. Ben Bella's image was still further enhanced by an article in which he denounced both Communism and anti-Communism and announced that Algeria had adopted "a Marxian economic analysis but has not adopted Marxist ideology because Algerians are Moslems and Arabs".134 In this manner he attempted to give the regime the appearance of an ARABIST ORIENTATION. Another conciliatory step followed in May, 1965 with the release of some of his erstwhile enemies including Ferhat Abbas, lest they become hero-martyrs. Others, among 132 133 134

Ibid. Brace, op. cit., p. 162. The New York Times (January 22, 1965), p. 4.

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them Ait Ahmed, although released from prison, were placed under house arrest. In still another conciliatory move it was hinted that these political defectors would be asked to participate in the government. These gestures of reconciliation not only seemed to strengthen Ben Bella's prestige and position among the Algerian people, but also served to discourage a possible alliance among his enemies, especially between Ait Ahmed and Mohammed Khider. Another aspect of Ben Bella's strategy was to strengthen his position in the party against a possible encroachment by Boumedienne. Therefore, when the outspoken Minister of the Interior, Ahmed Medeghri, resigned in 1964, Ben Bella took over his duties. Of far greater importance to Ben Bella's security, however, was the removal, at his demand, of Boumedienne's close friend and ally, Abdel Aziz Bouteflika, who was serving in the Foreign Minister's post. Rumor had it that Ben Bella planned to bring Belqasim Krim, a long-standing enemy of Colonel Boumedienne,135 back into the government. There were also suspicions that Ben Bella even intended to remove Boumedienne from his posts as first vice-president of the Council and as Minister of Defense. Reacting to these rumors, Boumedienne, in the face of Ben Bella's rapidly growing prestige and power, moved swiftly, and, on the morning of June 19, 1965, placed Ben Bella under arrest. This act marked the beginning of the reign of Boumedienne. Boumedienne's coup had been successful because Ben Bella had, as had General Naguib before him, made the classical error of underestimating the strength of the forces opposing him. He also failed to realize, perhaps through ignorance or a bad sense of timing, the complexities of power. Boumedienne, on the other hand, seemed to have a much better appreciation of its application. Like Gamal Abdel Nasser, Boumedienne showed a fine sense of organization; for, while Ben Bella was zealously pursuing popularity and prestige, Boumedienne was unobtrusively placing his men in strategic posts in the army, the security services, and all through the government. History has frequently demonstrated that victory in power struggles is more often achieved through hard work and organization than through the popularity route. Responsible men in Algerian affairs had finally realized that Boumedienne was a profoundly sincere and dedicated individual. Consequently, they sought him out in airing their complaints against Ben Bella. It must be recognized that, in times of crises and when showdowns are inevitable, the real power is in the hand of the organizer; in this case in the tightly »« Ibid., June 20, 1965, p. 2.

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knit 60,000 man army under the leadership of Boumedienne rather than in the haphazardly organized F.L.N, under the leadership of Ben Bella. Despite the comprehensive organization of the F.L.N., there was no deeply rooted political party operating in the rural areas of Algeria. On the other hand, Boumedienne's army was the real vanguard of the people's revolution and the only group capable of maintaining a sturdy grip over much of the countryside. Most significantly, it was Boumedienne rather than Ben Bella who had the conviction that, if the Algerian type of socialism was to be perpetuated, the Revolution had to be based upon the prevailing Arabic Islamic heritage, an issue designed to gain the support of the Marxist-hating Moslems. That the coup had been so easily achieved was probably due to the depressed state of mind of the Algerian people, resulting from the steady decline of the economy. Had it been improving - or, at least, not deteriorating - the coup might possibly have been avoided. Since independence, the withdrawal of the French from Algeria had left the society without experienced administrators, managers and technicians to operate the economy. Consequently, over-all production had dropped drastically and the disparities between social strata and between the rural and urban dwellers had increased rather than decreased, and this occasioned a widening gap between expectation and availability. Since almost everybody in Algeria was affected negatively by Ben Bella's rule, although the circumstances certainly were beyond his control, and since there was almost no chance for improvement in the foreseeable future, the coup was hardly a surprise. In summary, the political upheaval in Algeria stemmed chiefly from weaknesses within the F.L.N, and the inability of the revolutionary government it sponsored to provide effective administration of the country. Specifically, lacking a strong monolithic organization, the F.L.N, was never able to get a strong grip on the countryside. Before the overthrow of Ben Bella the party had become a rubber stamp, acting as a ratifier of programs rather than as a policy-maker for the nation. The National Assembly had lost its intended role as a legislative body and the cabinet members were mostly proteges of Ben Bella. The Algerian civil service was, on the whole, inexperienced and hence ineffective in administering the nation. An additional reason was, perhaps, the increasing antipathy to the Marxist principles through which Ben Bella hoped to build Algerian socialism. Only the army, through Boumedienne, appeared to exercise any significant influence on the populace. Despite these shortcomings, the F.L.N, is still in power and perhaps

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what it needs most is TIME - time to be able to reorganize and to establish a more solid foundation so that political stability may prevail in Algeria as it does in Tunisia and Egypt. The contention between Ben Bella and Boumedienne began in 1963 and ended in 1965. It was in many ways similar to the struggle that took place in 1952-1954 between General Naguib and Colonel Nasser. Similar to the Egyptian, the Algerian battle was total inasmuch as psychological, political, economic, and personal motivations were involved. Now that the conflict has been settled, the test is whether the new leader, Boumedienne, is flexible and realistic enough, as Nasser has been so far, to effectively handle the situation. No doubt, in considering the ramifications of the existing situation, the task before Boumedienne is complex. Despite early protests against his regime, Boumedienne seems to possess a significant element of stability. The majority of the leadership elite appear to have, at least for the time being, accepted the change without serious objections. In foreign policy the new regime, while still aligned with the Neutral Bloc and specifically its Arab element, is no longer echoing the Moscow or Cairo line.136 Internally, the army is still the most powerful and cohesive force and the "Revolutionary Council appeared to be heading toward collective leadership".137 Boumedienne's official announcement of July 10, 1965, reflects the new regime's antipathy toward ONE-MAN RULE and its desire to resurrect the original F.L.N, principle of COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP. His own power, like that of Nasser, is obviously still great and Boumedienne has lived up to his promises, delegating authority to others on the basis of merit rather than on personal loyalty alone. The announcement that he would share power was followed by another on July 20, 1965, proposing the formation of a five-man F.L.N. Secretariat. Its present members are army and C.N.R.A. veterans who are trying to reorganize the party along the lines of a militia similar to the Socialist Destour party of Tunisia. However, the attempt of collective leadership and democratization in the governmental apparatus and in the party should not be interpreted as an immediate step toward national democratization. Gabriel A. Almond rightly points out that "Whatever their constitutional or legal form may be, the political systems of the new and modernizing nations will have strong centralizing and authoritarian tendencies." 138 136

Ibid., June 30, 1965, p. 7. Ibid. 138 Gabriel A. Almond, "Democracy and the New Nations", Stanford (Autumn, 1964), passim. 137

Today, IV

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TUNISIA: ANOTHER EXAMPLE

The political struggle in which the pattern of conflict calls for neutralization or elimination of the opposition so that power is centralized in a SINGLE PARTY is not to be found only in Egypt and Algeria. As had similarly occurred in all Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states, a Tunisian democratic-liberator, Habib Bourguiba, was forced by circumstances and political expediences to follow much the same pattern in putting an end to his political opponents.139 The modern revolutionary political movement in Tunisia dates from 1907, when the MILITANTINTELLECTUALS, capitalizing on the discontent arising from resentment of French discrimination, formed the Young Tunisians party. In 1920 a new party, the Destour, was formed and, as the rest of the Arab nationalist parties had done, proclaimed the right of the Tunisian people to be free from French rule. However, the Destour party, like the Wafd party of Egypt and Algeria's E.N.A., P.P.A. and U.D.M.A. parties, lacked effective organizational discipline and went into eclipse in the early 1930's. Under the leadership of the young Habib Bourguiba who had been an original member of the Destour, it was replaced by the more viable Neo Destour party which later became the Socialist Destour. From then on the struggle for complete Tunisian independence was waged exclusively between France and the Socialist Destour. Although Bourguiba was young and radical, he was also a realist. Therefore, he permitted his Grand Strategy to be gradually determined by and consistent with the circumstances. Although he advocated decolonialization by stages through peaceful negotiation and compromise, he constantly exerted pressure. Consequently, by July 1954, Tunisia had accomplished its first objective-internal autonomy - but it was not until March 20, 1956, that Tunisia attained complete independence.140 After independence immediate steps were taken to build a new political and economic order, the first step being the installation of a government headed, with Bourguiba's blessing, by Tahar ben Ammar. A constituent assembly of ninety members was elected for a term of five years, a constitution was framed, and the French administrators were gradually replaced by Tunisians. The elected members of the Constituent Assembly were predominantly militant members of the Socialist Destour, but also included some trade unionists and independents.141 139 Hurewitz, "Regional and International Politics in the Middle East", op. cit., p. 91. 140 Barbour (ed.), op. cit., pp. 304-305. 141 Ibid., p. 305.

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Following Nasser's example, Bourguiba's first move was to depose the Bey, Sidi Lamine, from the throne. The Beylical system was quickly abolished and Tunisia was declared a republic. Bourguiba was then unanimously elected president of the new constitutional Islamic republic. Tunisian political stability has, since independence, been due to the charismatic leadership of Bourguiba and the well-organized discipline of the Socialist Destour. However, before tranquility was established, personal rivalries within the party became quite intense. The chief opposition to Bourguiba's leadership came from the one-time Secretary-General of the Socialist Destour, Salah ben Yussef,142 who, while Tunisia was struggling for independence, denounced Bourguiba's policy of gradualism as a sellout to imperialism. After the agreement between France and Tunisia over the internal autonomy of Tunisia was signed on June 3, 1955, the differences became known when ben Yussef openly declared his opposition to the accord. Matters came to a head the following November when the national congress of the party unanimously supported Bourguiba. Ben Yussef, who had chosen not to attend, was dismissed as Secretary-General of the Party. Subsequently, ben Yussef declared actual war on Bourguiba, resorting to terrorism and armed uprisings. Because of the schism, the year 1955-1956 was a critical testing period for the continued hegemony of the Socialist Destour. In addition to ben Yussef's opposition, the party was threatened by an energetic but short-lived resurgence of the Destour party,143 supported by the Bey, the aristocratic elements, and, it was suspected, with ben Yussef's blessing. Although ben Yussef passed from the scene when he was killed in Germany in 1961, the impact of his counter-movement of 1955-1956 is still felt in Tunisian politics. The overall atmosphere of insecurity that ben Yussef generated has increased the Socialist Destour's tendency toward totalitarianism and the general conviction that national unity transcends all other aims.144 Specialists on Tunisia 145 seem to agree that Bourguiba's approach represents a tactical move more than an ideology or even a Grand Strategy. In this respect, Bourguiba's movement, among others, resembles Nasser's. 142

Gabrieli, op. cit., p. 147. The New York Times (January 6 and 9, 1955). 144 Charles A. Micaud, Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization (New York, Praeger, 1964), p. 91. 145 Charles F. Gallagher, Jr., "Tunisia", in Gwendolen Carter (ed.), African OneParty States (Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 11-38. »3

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In his long political career Bourguiba has amply demonstrated skill in anticipating crises and in planning so that crises could be handled one at a time. While it is apparent that his methods of handling his opposition were chiefly conciliatory, it should be noted that this may have been occasioned by the environment and the circumstances. To be specific, he was involved in liberating a homogeneous people of a small country under circumstances which certainly were not permitted by the colonial master, France. It should be noted that when harsh methods were required to get rid of the opposition, as they certainly were in the ben Yussef case, Bourguiba, like Nasser and Boumedienne, did not forego their use. As a negotiator, Bourguiba maneuvered skillfully so as to avoid extremist positions. By being conciliatory he has so far succeeded in preventing the formation of a coalition among his opponents. The maneuver is a difficult one and takes on more meaning when one understands that the facts of political organization in Islamic society seem to tolerate no opposition to the leader. In the resurging Islamic World, opposition has appeared in contemporary Arab politics. But it is significant that when conflict arises, the threat usually stems from one of two sources: rightist, in the form of Neo-Islamism; or leftist, from the Communist or Communist sympathizer groups.146 Despite some of the foregoing, Bourguiba's practice in eliminating opposition, whether personal, to the Socialist Destour Party, or to the Tunisian government, has usually been moderate and disciplined. For example, many whose services in government were no longer desired were allowed the dignity of resigning and were permitted to turn to other endeavors. This was illustrated in the cases of Mohammed Masmoudi and Ahmed ben Salah, important but dissident members of the party. Ben Salah, the young leader of the General Union of Tunisian Workers (U.G.G.T.) had supported Bourguiba during the crisis with ben Yussef. Later, however, wishing to devote full time to his labor interests, he refused to accept a position with the government. Through his brilliant leadership, the U.G.G.T. became politically powerful, second only to the Socialist-Destour. His avowed intention of founding a Socialist party caused Bourguiba, anticipating the danger,147 to sponsor a rival Tunisian Workers Union (U.T.T.), headed by Habib Achour. The U.T.T. then made a mockery of ben Salah's ideological platform by apparently following the pragmatic policy of seeking increased 146

Halpern, op. cit., pp. 134-195. Early indications of differences between Bourguiba and ben Salah appeared in Petit Matin (June 3 and 8, and August 31, 1956). 147

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workers' benefits.148 Since the government continued its support, the U.T.T. prospered to the point where ben Salah felt he was undermined. Therefore, rather than be forced out of office, he agreed to yield his post to Ahmad T'lill, an executive member of the Socialist Destour, in exchange for a government position as Secretary of State for Public Health and Social Affairs. The compromise was accepted and has worked out quite well. In his position with the government, ben Salah has been instrumental in promoting new social security and health programs for the workers. Indeed ben Salah's dedication to the cause of labor has contributed to Bourguiba's conversion to Neo-Destourian Socialism.149 A few months after ben Salah was installed in the Cabinet, the two trade unions joined, reestablishing labor Unity 150 under the aegis of the Socialist Destour party. From today's perspective, it appears that opposition to the Socialist Destour party and the power of Bourguiba is unlikely in the near future. There is always the possibility, however, because scattered opposition groups, led by men such as Tahra ben Ammar, Masmoudi, and ben Yahmed, do exist. The opposition is tolerated by the Socialist Destour party as long as the criticism is in the form of quiet argumentation rather than violent action. This was made clear by Habib Bourguiba in 1961 when he stated that the party would accept criticism, provided that it did not arouse resentment nor plant doubts in the people's minds.151 These opposition groups probably will be tolerated so long as they do not develop into an organized political party and, thereby, constitute a threat to the Socialist Destour and the government. Indeed, within their limited sphere, these critics have been able to exercise a more substantial influence on the government than any other opposition in the Arab world, with the exception of Lebanon. The credit for this farsightedness should be given to Bourguiba and his alert policy of bringing these groups closer to the Socialist Destour's policy. As demonstrated in the Socialist Destour's National Congress in October, 1961, the liberal elements within the party itself have been allowed to voice their opinions and most probably will be content to remain critics and passive monitors. 148

See: Petit Matin (November 10 and December 25, 1956); also The New York Times (December 31, 1956). 149 See: Habib Bourguiba, Neo-Destourian Socialism (Tunis, Government Press, June 21, 1961), pp. 3-31. 150 Anon., "Geopolitique de la Tunisie Syndicaliste", Revue Politique et Parlementair (Paris), 224.679 (June, 1958), 504-510. 151 See: Petit Matin (November 21, 1961).

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In summary, it is hoped that the analyses in this chapter have demonstrated that in all Arab PROGRESSIVE-REVOLUTIONARY movements a general pattern exists and that the similarities certainly have outweighed the differences. This occurs because the problems that these PROGRESSIVE-REVOLUTIONARY states are facing are substantially similar: they have like historical and cultural backgrounds as well as similar socioeconomic and political problems. These similarities become more apparent in the chapters which follow.

VI THE MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION: THE LAST PHASE OF MASS MOVEMENT

CONCILIATION WITH THE NEW ORDER

The previous chapters have presented an insight into the first two phases of the Arab Mass Movements. Chapter Three, the first phase, depicted the role of the GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE who introduced the fresh ideas which nurtured the new order by giving the individual Arab a new set of values with which to judge his society. As a result, men's minds were unfettered from the "old" and prepared to receive the "new". Chapter Four, the second phase, showed that the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION responded to the need for reform and, using their considerable natural capacity for positive action, led the way in effecting innovations. Historically, the logical sequence of the planting of an ideology and its subsequent growth, more often than not, is followed by an organizational phase. In this phase the main role is usually played by the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION. These men exploit what the GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE first conceived and the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION then instituted. The three phases, while all essential to any revolutionary mass movement, need not be consummated by the same person. Although it is possible for a leader to play all three roles, the feat has rarely been performed in the life span of any one man. However, it is not uncommon for exceptional leaders to perform simultaneously in the dual role of the men of revolutionary action and organization. Saint Paul who perverted the spirit of dissent for which Jesus was crucified is one example. With the inception of the Christian Church, he and the other MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION insisted on absolute conformity and submission to the tenets of the Church which, as they established them, then became the only permissable or acceptable way for a Christian to obtain salvation and happiness. The movement of Islam, like Christianity, pursued similar methods. After Muham-

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mad's time, Abu Bekr and Umar became the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTION AND ORGANIZATION performing, by adjustment through submission and conformity, the task of perpetuating the Islamic movement. In contemporary history it is appropriate to include men such as Lenin, Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, and Nehru in this category. With regard to contemporary Arab leaders, it is plausible to claim that both Bourguiba and Nasser have played dual roles in inciting action and in establishing an organization. However, this judgment should be accepted with caution as not enough time has passed to fix accurately their historical position. The appearance of the phase of revolutionary organization usually marks the end of the dynamic and radical social meiosis of the revolutionary mass movement. Hence, it prepares to accommodate itself to the PRESENT in order to stabilize its NEWLY ESTABLISHED ORDER. Looked at from this perspective, the events are of great importance. On the one hand, if a Utopia appears to be or is achievable through the historicalsocial process, the changes for success through peaceful and evolutionary means are increased and the one-time radical or reactionary militant leaders tend to adopt a conservative outlook. On the other hand, if the desired results cannot be obtained through the historical-social process, the same radical or reactionary leaders will, in due course, abandon their UTOPIAN ideas. In this event, as in the previous case, the militant conceptions of the radical and reactionary leaders turn to conservatism in the interest of preserving their power. Considering this fact it is apparent then that some Arab ISMS such as Bourguibism and Nasserism, are already drifting into the realm of conservatism. To maintain momentum, balance and control, they must device systems based on meaningf u l SUBSTANTIVE ACTIONS a n d ORGANIZATIONAL MEANS.

Action has various forms and effects. In the Western world, particularly in a highly developed country such as the United States, action is channelled into economic and social endeavors, thereby keeping the individual busy in a constructive way. Thus the Western World's relative social stability, religious tolerance, and political harmony are due mainly to the abundance of opportunities for the person to earn his living, to have the right to express his thoughts with little or no fear, and to formulate his ideas through SUBSTANTIVE ACTION. The application of individual energy into performance through work serves the American citizen in lieu of an involvement in political mass movements. However, endeavor through economic participation is rather limited in the Arab world and, as an alternative course, it usually takes the form of

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parading and various other outlets which turn men's attention from the real issues. Participation at this level breeds conformity and uniformity in the minds of the followers of the mass movement. Psychologically, then, actions of this type restrict thinking and strip the person of his individuality and occasion self-forgetting. Therefore, such involvement does not lead to self-realization, but it may permit self-justification. Even though participation is important in that it helps the various revolutionary mass movements consolidate mass support, carried to the cAueuie it may react inimically to the ultimate purpose of the movement. To limit and direct the mass movement, some controlling structure is essential to the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION. As soon as the war with the PRESENT is tempered, the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION must find a way to educate the masses to an acceptance of the newly established order. At present there are various indications that Nasserism in Egypt and Bourguibism in Tunisia are undertaking this conditioning process. True, faith in the movement still promotes a ceaseless flow of vigorous action. Propaganda is still an ingredient even though both leaders are relying more and more on the inducement of ARAB SOCIALISM and the politics of the SINGLE-PARTY SYSTEM. However it is to the ORGANIZATION OF rather than to ACTION BY the revolutionary mass movement that the leaders give primacy. This is evident in the concern for order which dominates Tunisian and Egyptian everyday life. As a generally valid observation it appears that the new militant organizers are resolved that their UTOPIAN IDEAS must be fitted into the traditional make-up of their respective societies. This is required, for to precipitately dislodge the traditions of the established society would be intolerantly disruptive to the order which the leaders are trying to maintain. What will most likely evolve is a blending of the old and the new, a synthesis creating a link between the PAST and the FUTURE. The new orders of Bourguibism and Nasserism portray multifaceted images. As a derivative of the conflicts, dissensions, contentions, discords, and differences of the last few stagnant decades of Arab history, the new orders are (1) a patchwork composed of the old and the new; (2) conglomerations of borrowings from friends and enemies, of radicalism and conservatism, of fascism, democracy, and socialism; and (3) to some extent, patterns of the bureaucracy of the Arab-Islamic traditions, and thus they tend to use every means to attain a proliferation of absolute power. At this point absolutism and dictatorship are established in part by design and in part because of the compelling circumstances.

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At this stage of development, if either ISM, Bourguibism or Nasserism, proves incapable of satisfying the demands or needs of the masses, an antithesis or counter-mass movement could emerge, attempting to succeed where the other ISMS failed. Because of its potency this contingency deserves full attention. Consequently, this chapter and the following ones will analyze the third, the ORGANIZATIONAL PHASE, of the Arab revolutionary mass movements. The political aspects of the organizational phase of the Arab revolutionary mass movement will be considered in Chapter Seven while Chapter Eight will be devoted mainly to the socioeconomic facets. This particular chapter will be limited to a brief evaluation of some of the tools most effectively used by the mass organization: mass psychology, propaganda, communication media, slogans and ideas. Although the nature and scope of these techniques are well defined and understood, their specific application to and effect upon Arab masses are worthy of further attention. MASS PSYCHOLOGY

The psychological law of probability dictates that as pressure accumulates the individual at first rebels only internally, but at some point, the impulse to resist openly can no longer be constrained and therefore bursts into revolt. The MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION, in their first efforts at reconciling the masses with the New Order, appear to center their organizational activities around the psychological thesis which follows. In a personality permitted to develop freely, personal drives and ambitions express themselves openly and constructively; but, in an inhibited personality striving toward an objective, unless these same drives are satisfied, absorbed, or positively redirected, they may become negative and therefore destructive. The Arab organizers are well aware that the masses have been repeatedly the victims of countless frustrations. In adapting to this circumstance, their organizational activities have to be geared to and guided by two aims: exploit the mass' present frustration by fixing the blame on and diverting the backlash to an established enemy or to a convenient scapegoat; and propagate complacency by preventing the recurrence of the frustration. In addition to this EVASION or DISPLACED-AGGRESSION DRIVE directed toward a scapegoat, these men of organization resort to the more positive method of sublimation. Through this technique, frustrations and aggressions of the present are transformed into hopes and promises to be fulfilled in the future by the New Regime. In these ways then, the leadership seeks

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to placate frustrations while at the same time reconciling the masses to an acceptance of the New Order. But while a certain degree of psychological manipulation of the masses through behavioral and propagandists techniques seems necessary, an excess or prolonged dosage could prove harmful. At present the use of such behavioral and propagandists techniques is sufficiently extensive as to give the impression that the Arab MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION have adopted this course as the ultimate one to resolve their dilemma. But the indication is that the Arab leaders are well aware that they cannot solve their problems by promises and words alone. So while earnestly seeking a forthright and more durable solution, they are trying to beguile the masses with false promises. Their tactical approaches in this regard are varied and include interpretation and revival of past history, a technique at which most Arab leaders, as will be seen, are masters. The leaders of revolutionary organization are decidedly selective and extremely careful in their manipulation of the PAST and in their interpretation of it to the masses. The PRESENT, deeply disliked, is looked upon as a transitory period; a period of sacrifice which " . . . leads to heroism, for he who sacrifices everything for his people, in defense of its past glory and future welfare, is more elevated in spirit and richer in his life . . Thus, the importance of the PRESENT is deprecated, if not altogether ignored. Mass movement or "Revolution is the opposition to truth of the existing situation", that is, the PRESENT, for in essence . . . "Revolution is the opposition of the future to the present. . ,".2 The Arab-Islamic history is a MAKE-BELIEVE of living reality in the minds of the people; and the " . . . modern trend is to take Arab history, with its various events and heroes, . . . as an inspiration toward better days in which the Arabs will emerge from their miserable [immediate past and] present to a more prosperous future". 3 "The Arabs were and are bound by tradition and precedent; they were and are dominated by the past", says Joseph F. Schacht.4 In the words of Professor N. A. Faris, Arab-Islamic history is strong in the minds of the masses: 5 it arouses emotions, evokes memories and educes visions. Arab mass revolutionary movements, especially Nasserism, in1

Aflaq, "Nationalism and Revolution", in Sylvia G. Haim, Arab Nationalism: An Anthology, op. cit., pp. 242-243. 2 Ibid., p. 246. 3 Faris and Hysayn, The Crescent in Crisis, op. cit., p. 25. 4 Joseph F. Schacht, "The Islamic Background of an Arab Nation", in William Sands (ed.), The Arab Nation: Paths and Obstacles to Fulfillment (Washington, The Middle East Institute, 1960), p. 21. s Faris and Hysayn, The Crescent in Crisis, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

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sure their survival and promote their growth by incessantly bringing up Arab past glories. Historically, the past is separated into two distinct periods: the DISTANT PAST - the glorious period, the "golden age" of the Arab Empire; 6 and the IMMEDIATE PAST - the period of Ottoman rule, Western imperialism, and even further back to the Mongol invasion and the crusades. By so doing they associate the IMMEDIATE PAST with the PRESENT as a sordid period of Arab history, full of betrayals, oppressions, and injustices. Thus to cling to the IMMEDIATE PAST and to perpetuate the unwanted PRESENT is to debase the drives of Arabism by an association with iniquity thereby vitiating its force and threatening the C a u s e . I t is t o the r e a t t a i n m e n t o f the r e p u t e o f t h e DISTANT PAST,

the true Arabism, for which the individual must strive, struggle, and work. Because the long-ago GLORIOUS PAST recalls a period of positive results, it is related to the future and used to spur Arab aspirations. Only through these means can the Arab society be conditioned to accept t h e i n a d e q u a c i e s a n d f a i l u r e s o f the IMMEDIATE PAST a n d the u n w a n t e d

PRESENT. By this simple relationship, tenuous though it may be, the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION h a v e m a n a g e d t o link the g l o rious DISTANT PAST t o a PROMISING FUTURE a n d g i v e it a sense o f l o g i c a l

and systematic continuity. T o their followers, the goal appears as a lodestar beckoning brightly and continuously; the PRESENT is visualized as something not worth preserving but as something to be rejected. This l i n k o f the GOLDEN PAST t o the FUTURE r o b s the PRESENT o f a n y sub-

stance. President Nasser is using this technique very effectively, and to quote Peter Partner, " H e glorifies both pre-Islamic, Pharaonic Egypt, and the medieval Islamic empire - thus enabling himself to claim leadership of Egypt, of Africa, and of Islam." 7 The masses through their mental lenses see not the unwanted PRESENT, but the brilliance of the DISTANT PAST: it is, in fact, a case of marching backward into the FUTURE. This idea is by no means new. The Prophet of Islam recognized its merit and used it effectively in furtherance of his movement. The writings of Professors H. R. Gibb,8 Gustave E. Von Grunebaum,9 and Tor Andrae 10 bring out that the Prophet found it necessary to emphasize the DISTANT PAST. Islam was born in an Arabia, whose historical past provided nothing to commemorate. T o give Islam a greater depth of historical consciousness and to identify his mission as separate from but 6

7 8 8

10

K i r k , Contemporary

Arab Politics, op. cit., p . 18.

Partner, op. cit., p. 108. Gibb, Mohammedanism, op. cit., pp. 46-47. V o n G r u n e b a u m , Medieval

Andrae, op. cit., p. 139.

Islam, op. cit., p . 3.

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of at least equal significance with the religions of the then dominant Jews and Christians, the Prophet reached back behind both faiths to claim Abraham, the Hanif, as the fountainhead of his religion. Abraham, being neither Jew nor Christian, fitted into the Prophet's conception of a monotheistic religion. By claiming that both the Jews and the Christians had perverted this monotheism, the Prophet assumed the task of reestablishing its legitimacy. Moreover, through Ishmael, Abraham was already intimately associated by the scriptural religions with the Arabs through the founding of the Kaaba, in Mecca.11 Muhammad thus extended the historical link back towards the day of Creation thereby giving his followers a spiritually significant tradition to supplement their local ones, a move that contributed to the eventual defeat of the pagan opposition in Mecca. Because the strategem was successful, the Prophet was able to undermine the IMMEDIATE PAST (the rivaling Jewish and Christian religions) as well as the PRESENT (as exemplified by the opposition from the pagans of Arabia). He linked the DISTANT PAST of the Hanif to the FUTURE, by establishing that self-denying and altruistic deeds in the immediate future on earth were the pathway to heavenly rewards after death. While the Prophet's inspirational contribution to theology is of course paramount, the masterful understanding of human behavior and mass psychology he displayed in getting his religion permanently established should also be noted. By linking his revelations to those previously disclosed by the major prophets (Moses and Jesus) who preceded him and by proclaiming himself as the last in the series of these true prophets, he established the credibility of his Message and the legitimacy of "his own advent, thus suggesting the certainty of the 'greater perfection and the finality'" of the Koran and the Islamic Movement.12 Returning to Nasserism, Bourguibism, or any of the other Arab radical or reactionary ISMS, the PRESENT is visualized as an age of decadence and the FUTURE is viewed as the road to a final triumph. "One fears that the younger Arab generation is already learning how to tolerate its humiliation in the name of promise." 13 Self-forgetting leads to a gloomy visualization of the PRESENT; thus there can be no effective devaluation of the PRESENT unless a better FUTURE is assured to the masses. According to President Nasser: 11

Koran: 14:38-40. Von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam, op. cit., p. 72. 13 Sharabi, "Political and Intellectual Attitudes of the Young Arab Generation", op. cit., p. 58. 12

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We are using, brethren, the lessons of the past in the building of the future. This is the first lesson we learned, and today we all feel that we are a united, well integrated people. The National Union is our means of strengthening our unity and consolidating our integrity. Through the National Union no power will ever be able to divide us or to hinder the work we are undertaking. We are a nation that has resolved to work, using every means at its disposal. We shall spare no sweat, no blood, in our all-out effort to establish within this nation of ours a truly prosperous society.14

Self-forgetting for the PRESENT and the demand for self-sacrifice in the name of the FUTURE both require similar feelings and actions. Hope serves as the link between the two - the desire and its fulfillment. The PRESENT offers but limited satisfactions while self-interest activities connote a competition and possible defeat. These limitations do not apply to the FUTURE; it offers fullness to everybody and enables most individuals to forego the limited advantages and risks of the present for transcending benefits later. To illustrate, Nasserism offers the masses an abundance of the material and spiritual - but mostly in the future. Thus, by their own limited logic and deep conviction, individuals especially the dissatisfied ones - can be easily persuaded to give up little things to Nasserism for greater future rewards. For example, to fight for an Arab ISM means to share eventually in the oil wealth of all the Arabs. To get this share, the Arabs must displace Western economic imperialism, as these ISMS advocate. In the case of Algeria, eviction of the French authority resulted in economic betterment for the followers and increased prestige in the World Community for Arabs. Although in this case the benefit to the society is discernible, the essential point is the deep conviction of the masses that all promises will be fulfilled. It should be pointed out that the followers are not in a position to, nor do they attempt to, analyze the situation because they believe that the exercise of independent thinking by the individual members of the movement would jeopardize the movement itself. If, for instance, the followers were able unemotionally to analyze the situation (highly improbable), it is very likely that they would quit the revolutionary mass movement. For this reason the leadership feeds its followers' faith, hope, and illusion while at the same time preaching hatred, discontent, and dissatisfaction. To do this effectively the leaders focus on the future as the common denominator and stereotype of abundance. Although the idea of connecting the remote past with the future is unacceptable to the intellectuals who find the correlation overly subtle, 14

Nasser's Speeches (January-March,

1960), pp. 13-14.

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it is wholeheartedly embraced by the Arab masses, for the relationship, as perceived by the mass-individual, is wrapped in a veil of romanticism which is most beguiling because of the society's attachment to its glorious past. From the outset the Arab MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION have been deeply concerned with the romantic attachment to the past. They have stressed again and again that attainment, accomplishment, and social behavior must be measured against an ideal standard set by the Arab-Moslem traditions. A profound inquiry into this attitude would reveal that sentimental and romantic influences are manifest in every aspect of life because of its infusion into the minds of the people. The ghost of past Arab glory is an ideal world, "an escape from miserable present", 15 which creates an inferiority complex in the personalities of the modern generation. This observation is especially applicable to the extremely sensitive Arab MILITANT-INTELLIGENTSIA who experience alternate feelings of inferiority as a consequence of their actual circumstances, and superiority which is sociologically imposed upon them by their cultural heritage and religious values. Like a pendulum their stereotyped thinking often swings back and forth between the intricacies of their inferiority and those of their superiority.16 Until they are able to free themselves and set the inner-force of the self in motion, the inferiority-superiority complex will remain real. This behavioral complex will continue for as long as the individual tries to vindicate his inferior position through a process of rationalization rather than to expend the effort to attain a superior position through dedicated service and hard work. The emphasis on romanticism and sentimentalism in most cases blinds the individuals to factual reality. For an Arab to engage publicly in a discussion critical of Arab disunity would be considered treasonous. If an outsider were to mention the same subject, an Arab would be offended. Yet, in reality. Arab failures to unite or remain united are attributable to internal weaknesses of the Arab society and much less occasioned by the growing influence or interference of such foreign forces as the Crusaders, Mongols, Persians, and Turks in ancient or medieval times or of the recent British and French actions. The breakup of the early Arab empire, from which the Arabs have never recovered, actually began in the 8th century when the Abbassid dynasty replaced that of the Ummayad's. 17 Thus the reason d'etre of the New 15 16 17

Faris and Husayn, The Crescent in Crisis, op. cit., p. 25. Tutsch, "Arab Unity and Arab Dissensions", op. cit., p. 15. Harold W. Glidden, "Arab Unity: Ideal and Reality", in James Kritzeck and

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Order is founded in the fulfilling of the nobleness of the old Arabism. What is more important, however, is that this interpretation of the historical, with its emphasis on the esoteric and irrelevant, together with the society's political instability and perpetual administrative disorganization, has been an important deterrent factor in the progress of the Arab peoples. In their historic development there is a built-in ambiguity. The contemporary Arab promoters of Pan-Arabism tend to deemphasize the existing and similar historical "realities because they conflict with the modern Ijma [consensus] of the Arab community".18 Yet, this exaggeration of the PAST, without the support of SUBSTANTIVE ACTION, could be detrimental to the anticipations of a healthy FUTURE and could reduce the impetus of the movement. Emulating their predecessors in the conviction that sacrifice for the sake of freedom is the utmost assertion of individuality, the contemporary Arab MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION demand from the people the strict obedience believed by them to be essential to readjustment. The ensuing situation has become tyrannical and, in the words of John Locke, "wherever law ends, tyranny begins" for "tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right.. .".19 This new prescription enjoins the individual to conform to necessity, to adopt a new attitude of passivity and resignation. The individual is required to set aside his hopes and aims, to align his thinking and acting with the values presented to him, and to submit to the existing actuality for the sake of his eventual betterment. The demand to reconcile to the New Order means refraining from all dissension. Implicit in the new prescription is a pessimistic belief in the individual's helplessness in the face of an inimical and adverse environment. Nevertheless, in spite of the implied pessimism, there is the promise that if an individual submits he will almost certainly attain a more amenable situation. Accustomed to conformity and obedience, the masses gradually accept the new prescription. Blindly obedient they become more imitative. They hardly dispute the validity or question the soundness of the New Order. They presuppose its certainty, honor its correctness, and deplore those who refuse to acknowledge its certitude. Being " . . . averse to change, and with a distaste

R. Bayly Winder (eds.), The World of Islam (New York, Macmillan & Co. Ltd., St. Martin's Press, I960), pp. 249-250. " Ibid., p. 250. 19 John Locke, "An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government", in Albert R. Chandler (ed.), The Clash of Political Ideas (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1957), p. 43.

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for adventure, [they] prefer security in a bad and poor livelihood to a good and plentiful life which entails any risk".20 Certainly, there is nothing novel about this prescription; nor is it exclusive to the contemporary Arab revolutionary mass movements. Chronologically, the idea can be traced back to Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Today all organizations, regardless of their ideological and doctrinal approaches, prescribe the same mythological treatment: ADJUSTMENT-CONFORMITY-DOMESTICATION. Philosophies may differ, ideologies may be in conflict and doctrines may be extreme opposites, but they all affirm one major point: conformity and adjustment are the only acceptable ways of life. Nasserist, Bourguibist, Ba'athist or Islamist, political rightist or leftist, all readily agree that any sign of dissent is unacceptable. Adjustment to the order, old or new, and conformity to the movement, old or new, is the common meeting ground for all ISMS. Each advocates freedom and a place of happiness for the individual, but, in actuality, blind obedience and the demand for strict conformity is but a new prescription, in the same old bottle, for enslaving the individual. The Arab common man is so conditioned to conformity and submission that he lacks the spirit of dissension or independent criticism; this is apparent everywhere - at social gatherings, at school, on the professional level, in the home, and at work. This perilous psychological attitude is remarkably noticeable at a time when "national salvation calls for a generation . . . willing to sacrifice personal interests for the public good". 2 1 After thorough indoctrination, the followers of the movement, especially the youth, become convinced that they are participating in the great spectacle of mass demonstrations for the good of society. To separate the masses from their respective individualities thereby masking the realities of life, flags, parades, and music are used and become meaningful and indispensable parts of the mass movement's paraphenalia. Make-believe, romanticism, and sentimentalism play more enduring roles perhaps than any other factors. This is particularly apropos when needs, unconscious desires, or functionally autonomous motives exist precariously in a relatively personal and social vacuum. Makebelieve, romanticism, and sentimentalism are psychological weapons that give the individual ego a recognized value. Used properly by the organizers, and with the right kind of propaganda, they create in the 20

21

Rejwan, "Arab Nationalism: In Search of an Ideology", op. cit., pp. 148-149.

Ibid., p. 148.

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subject a sense of importance and in the following remarks:

SELF-GRANDEUR

as is clearly indicated

The enemies failed to understand that it is the people of the U.A.R. who are leading and not Gamal Abdel Nasser or any other person or group of persons. They failed to realise that Gamal Abdel Nasser is only implementing the will of the people who are determined to continue their drive towards the development and reconstruction of their country and towards the realisation of Arab nationalism and Arab unity.22 At this critical moment the puppets are ready to follow every suggestion with utmost docility. Revolutionary mass movements, with their demands and challenges are almost the only means of expression left to the individual, and he is made to believe that by participating in demonstrations, agitations, and riots, he is performing important deeds. To an outsider, this make-believe appears as a deception to delude the followers concerning the realities and difficulties hindering the movement. In a way it is a device to channel the thoughts and actions of the followers so as to maintain the impetus of the movement. The best that an individual can do in this specious, imaginative state is either to turn his rebellious instinct inward by conjuring the fanciful or to project his natural rebellious forces outward against scapegoats or those with whom he is in conflict. Certainly, this make-believe gives the followers considerable satisfaction. Although only a dream world to the non-participant, the make-believe, the myth, or the illusion is a reality to the participant. "From the dawn of civilization onwards crowds have always undergone the influence of illusions. It is to the creators of illusions that they have raised more temples, statues, and altars than to any other class of men." 23 Even when faith and power to persuade or coerce are gone, the make-believe lingers: that a strong Arab unity will soon reestablish itself may seem fanciful to the outsider or to the realist but to the followers of a mass movement, such as Nasserism, it is a certainty. To them it is authentic even though it is an unsubstantiated pretense. The followers do not stop to think about the various obstacles, but rather believe that the parousia of Arabism, if not already here, will come soon. They believe that they are serving the noble cause by giving themselves over readily to the will of the leader. Arab REVOLUTIONARY MASS MOVEMENTS appear, especially to the youth whose impulses of selfassertion and creativity are at their height, as the only path to follow in their attempt to attain satisfaction of their aspirations. 22

23

Nasser's

Speeches (January-March, cit., p. 108.

Le Bon, op.

1960), p. 51.

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THE REVOLUTIONARY COORDINATOR - THE COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA

Rather than solely exercising power, the leadership is claimed by some to reflect in fact the will of the masses. This observation, if valid, holds only in those instances where people of CRITICAL ABILITY, as opposed to SUGGESTIBILITY, are likely to press their demands on the leaders. This occurs when persons who have developed their own sei of standards or terms of reference become independently capable of questioning, interpreting or evaluating the proposals or efforts of the leadership. The reader should bear in mind, however, that most people are not so qualified, and as a group they are incapable of evaluating or understanding obscure and complex situations. Therefore, while it is true that the perspicacity and alertness of some of the people do on occasion limit and restrict the activities of the leader, it is equally valid that in most cases the modern MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION have been able to condition and control the masses to the point of almost complete mastery. This comes about because in times of stress people respond more readily to strong leadership. The mental process usually goes through three stages or sets of concepts: standard of judgment, frame of reference, and attitude. Moreover, Pavlovian psychology 24 clearly points out the difference between the STIMULI OF THE PRIMARY ORDER such as hunger, thirst and sex, which condition the individual directly, and those STIMULI OF THE SECONDARY ORDER such as speech symbols and propaganda which act reflexively. Paradoxically, the secondary stimuli, even though weaker and more complex, dominate most everyday events. The author is well aware of the complexity of the involvement and that the statement of the relationship of these three concepts, as well as the breakdown of the stimuli of the primary and secondary orders, is an oversimplification. A n objective analysis illustrates that considerable overlap and some integration occurs among the three concepts; however, this is more properly a subject for a psychologist. In furthering the interests of the NEWLY ESTABLISHED ORDER, one of the tasks of the Arab ORGANIZERS is to instill in the mass-individual certain values collectively called standards of judgment. On the basis of these standards, the mass-individual constructs for himself, with the aid of the organizer, an anti-imperialist and anti-feudalist point of view identified as a frame of reference. When the circumstances of a particu24

I. P. Pavlov, Conditioned Reflex and Psychiatry Publishers Company, 1941), passim.

(New York, International

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lar incident, as seen by the mass-individual, have some relationship with his frame of reference, he develops a definite attitude. For instance, The Voice of the Arabs, a useful tool for the NEWLY ESTABLISHED ORDER of President Nasser, pictured Nury El-Said as a disgusting bastard, a stooge of imperialism, and a traitor; the landlord was castigated as a grave-digger, an ally of imperialist powers, and the number one enemy. As another example, Nasser's attack on the Kassem Iraqi regime raged in terms not heard since the ignominious death of the aforementioned Nury: When we listen today to the new mockeries of the new Nury El-Said [meaning Abdel Kassem] in Iraq, we remember the mockeries which used to be played by the old Nury El-Said of Iraq. Nury El-Said used to bargain about the Palestine question. And, today, Abdel Kassem of Iraq is playing with the Palestine question . . ,25

These semantical symbols, new slogans and accusations, which help to formulate the individual's frame of reference, even if disreputably and indiscriminately applied, provoke new attitudes, feelings and reactions in the minds of the mass-individuals. As a tool to condition the mental outlook of the masses, this stereotype has been most effectively used by the Arab MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION to intensify either aggressiveness, anxiety, fear, withdrawal, hatred, conflict, submission, repression, or even collective solidarity, as required by circumstances. A critical situation generally arises when an individual is confronted by an incident which is beyond his comprehension but for which he must have, if not a solution, at least an explanation. In these situations, propaganda, used properly, has an inordinate effect, particularly in those cases where an individual's ego is directly involved. Ordinarily lacking in initiative, the Arab mass-individual is even more inadequate in exercising this quality during a time of general crisis. Rather than take action of any kind, the Arab mass-individual is much more inclined to do nothing until he receives a stimulus from some messiah (leader). This mass psychology of the Arabs is well expressed by Jamil Saliba; he said that they want their governments to do everything for them - to revive the land, to plant their deserts with trees and to guarantee their livelihood.26 Invariably throughout history the Arab masses have waited inertly until men such as Bourguiba, Kassem or Nasser appeared to lead the way. Even then " . . . whenever they are called upon to work in cooperation, they object and each one prefers to do the work individu25 28

Nasser's Speeches (January-March, I960), pp. 38-39. Saliba, Trends of Thought in Syria and Lebanon, op. cit., p. 29.

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ally".27 Because Arabs are characteristically apathetic and unable to cooperate in public endeavor, the traditional Arab society has not developed organizations capable of inculcating a civic spirit in the populace. Because of this, the main task of the contemporary Arab MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION has been to convince their followers that community interests should transcend individual interests. Attitudes creating conflict and passivity must be replaced by frames of mind propitious to cooperative endeavor. In some cases, personal initiative must yield to communal effort so that the objectives of the movement can be fulfilled and the hegemony of the ORGANIZER be established. To achieve this, an intelligent and intensive use of public opinion molding media and propaganda becomes an absolute requisite. Generally the characteristics of the public opinion molding media take shape in accordance with the milieu in which the particular society develops. In the highly centralized Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states, all communication media - private or public - are subjected to governmental control.28 On the whole, therefore, these governments are subject to little criticism. This immunity is achieved through such governmental administrative procedures as licensing and censorship.29 Every form of communication is subject to some type of regulation by a centralized agency of the national government. In Egypt, for example, regional editors are designated by the head of the Communications Department to see that the communication efforts in a particular area are in accordance with or in furtherance of governmental policy. In Egypt, as in Tunisia, there is a high degree of specialization both as to subject content and audience selection. By being selective, the ARAB MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION exploit the psychology of the mass and, despite some confusions, are able to mold mass opinion in furtherance of the goals and objectives of the movement. Additionally, by establishing some taboos and some stereotypes, the suggestive power of the media has been successfully used to implant in the mass-mind an unqualified and unquestioned acceptance of the NEW ORDER. Although mass communication can be used functionally or dysfunctionally, the Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE governments, because of a fear of the consequences of a free and competitive system, stress the dysfunctional approach. Unless controlled, the operation of free media might, for example, give too precipitate a disclosure to the 27 28 29

Ibid. See: Torrey, Syrian Politics and Military: See: Barbour, op. cit., p. 318.

1945-1958,

op. cit., pp. 43, 131.

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masses of the better living conditions of the outside world. To permit the people to be thus aroused could well work to the disadvantage of the ruling regime. While free public opinion molding media are desirable in industrially advanced nations, in the Arab underdeveloped countries dissent could easily become overly disruptive to law and order. Consequently, the news is refined to suit government policy and the mass-individual is encouraged to accept the government version at face value. The Arab MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION are quite aware of the power of public opinion molding, and they do use the appropriate media extensively. For example, it was stated in connection with the Iraqi Revolution of 1958, that: "If the Army and the Ministry of Defense were the mothers of the July 14 Revolution, then the Ministry of Guidance and the . . . Radio were the guardians of the . . . revolution . . .".30 The Press, wrote Gobbels, " . . . does not allow the reader to come to conclusions according to his own tastes. The reader, on the contrary, is to be instructed and trained according to the newspaper's purpose and tendency".31 The Arab organizers see that the NEWS is used to rally the support of the masses in the interest of the movement. Thus he who is able to control communication and speech is able to control the conditioned-reflex functions of the mind. Likewise he who monopolizes the communications is the master of the mind and invites the mass-individual to identify his need with the NEWLY ESTABLISHED ORDER of the movement. Propaganda is an indispensible tool for a revolutionary mass movement. In promoting the homogeneity of the masses, its task is twofold: to spread the faith of the movement and to serve as a listening post. Unlike democratic societies wherein the exercise is competitive and subject to interference by counter-propaganda, the Arab MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION enjoy a monopoly and are little restrained in their efforts to sway the man in the street. Whereas in the revolutionary phase the movement had to compete, in its organizational phase there is no competition and so the movement becomes monolithic and unitary. While in the long run the man in the street is conditioned mainly by discipline and force, the Arab MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION also make use of the propaganda machine to alleviate the grievances of the masses, to keep adherents hewing to the party line, to exhort the 30

Republic of Iraq, The 14th July Revolution (Baghdad, n.p., 1959), p. 255. 31 Quoted by Ross, op. cit., p. 27.

in Its First

Year (in Arabic)

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mass effort as circumstance requires, to promote the ideology, and to inflame a hatred of the competition or the foe. Propaganda is used to create in society a new frame of reference which guarantees the NEWLY ESTABLISHED ORDER a high life expectancy. Its repeated assumptions and suggestions will, in all probability, diminish the opportunity for dissent and opposition, a necessary prerequisite to bring order out of chaos. In this regard, propaganda may be termed as dogmatic and obscurantistic, a deliberate attempt to affect the personalities and to control the behavior of individuals, functions that no mass organizer can neglect. To the organizer, propaganda is a social phenomenon, a means by which to turn the behavior of individuals from independent and digressing actions into a concert of the routine and the ritual. While Arab masses of the REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states are concerned over the disequilibrium which exists in their society, they are, through the skillful use of propaganda, conditioned to set aside their social differences and made collectively responsive to the will of the leader. Edward Atiyah makes the perceptive remark in his book The Arabs, that the Arab mind is characteristically swayed or oscillated least by facts, more by ideas, and even more by mere words.32 By diligently exploiting new propaganda techniques, charismatic Arab leaders have developed the right words by which to exhort the masses, with which to incite their hopes and expectations, and through which to assure command of the mass following. Because the mass society is highly impressionable, propaganda techniques, as used by the Arab MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION, effectively convert the power emanating from the masses into an instrument furthering the movement's goals. It goes without saying that propaganda used in this regard is more effective if the leader is aware of the forces from which the mass is constituted and the drives which excite the mass aspirations.33 To effectively harness and control the spirit of dissent spurring the mass drive, the organizers of the Arab mass revolutionary movements must offer some formula, however obscure, with which to placate mass yearnings. During the organizational phase of revolutionary mass movements, propaganda is not so much concerned with objectivity as it is with advancement of the interests of the NEWLY ESTABLISHED ORDER. Primal instincts and judgments - rational or illogical, fair or unjust - must be 32

Edward Atiyah, The Arabs (Edinburgh, Penguin Books, 1955), p. 96. M. Sherif, "A Study of Some Factors in Perception", Archives of Psychology, XXVII (July, 1935), 47-52.

33

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evoked by thought control. The purpose is to manage the individuals; this is usually accomplished by an appeal to sentiment or through a sophomoric mass reasoning process as the following illustrates; They said, brethren, that we sought to dominate Iraq, or to annex it in order to grab its riches and its petroleum. By so doing, they were using the meanest ways to sow discord between the great Iraqi people and the people of the United Arab Republic. Ours is not a poor state, brethren, but a rich one. Egypt's budget amounts to L.E. 360 million. That is apart from the revenue from three million tons of oil produced by Egypt amounting to L.E. 18 million; the revenue from the Suez Canal amounting to L.E. 45 million, the revenue from cotton amounting to L.E. 120 million, . . . not to mention the revenue from other industries. We are a rich country.... On the other hand, Iraq's revenue from oil amounts to L.E. 75 million, that is, the equivalent to the Suez Canal revenue plus the Egyption oil revenue. Iraq's budget meanwhile is L.E. 45 million only. Which of the two (UAR and Iraq) then would take money from the other? And how come that they allege that we want to establish unity with them so that we might lay our hands on the Iraqi oil revenues? But we tell them today, brethren, that we are rich people. Compared to Iraq's oil revenue from 70 to 75 million pounds, and its budget of 40-45 million pounds, Syria alone has a budget of L.E. 55 million and other revenues exceeding the Iraqi oil revenue, that is, more than N.E. 70; while in Egypt we have a budget of 360 million pounds and a national income of 1,000 million pounds, apart from Suez Canal revenue of the L.E. 45 million and the oil revenue amounting to L.E. 18 million. These are the facts, brethren, which I declare today so that good-hearted Arab people may not be deceived.34 Although these "facts" can easily be discredited by experts, it is still true that the Arab propagandists promoting the various Arab ISMS, especially when harping on anti-imperialist or anti-Zionist themes, can generally and readily obtain a desired mass reaction. Such abominations are accepted as "truths" only by the masses and then only because they are presented on a hate theme of "get rid of the enemy" most satisfying to and quite in keeping with the passions pervading elementary mob logic. The vituperations systematically and repetitiously dwell on neartruths, half-truths, allusions or evasions until the "message" is drummed into the subconscious mass-mind. Dramatized through the passions of revolutionary sentiment, propaganda is most effective in ridiculing opponents and in foiling criticism from any quarter. Because the masses are not interested in "facts" and because they tend to believe that which suits their fancy, it goes without saying that an often repeated lie in34

Nasser's Speeches, 1959, pp. 177-178.

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evitably becomes an acceptable truth, and, if stated incessantly tends to become a cherished delusion. Nasser's effective propaganda machinery, his unique understanding of the Arab mind, and his awareness of the complex sociological factors that constitute the Arab society as well as the psychology of the masses is worthy of study and analysis. Unlike his predecessors or most of his contemporaries, Nasser realizes that, to earn the support of the masses, his program must include something for all facets of the social order. Thus, his propaganda effort is varied in design so as to appeal to different segments in his society. Using different devices to suit the various socio-politico climates, he, for instance, while advocating secularism, relates the unifying bonds of Islam with those of nationalism and, in turn, identifies nationalist objectives as synonymous with those of Nasserism. Through his nationalistic propaganda, he identifies his particular approach with both Islam and nationalism and utilizes their conjunctive appeals and drives to sustain his particular program. In so doing, Nasser's machine blends generalities and specifics into simple forms comprehensible to the crowd's mentality; it pleases and satisfies most of the conflicting groups and diverse human elements. To a large extent Nasser has succeeded in breaking down ego identities; through excitement, the personal identity is being submerged in a common value and cause. His genuine farsightedness stimulates the otherwise apathetic masses into active participation in his revolutionary mass movement. Because of the realities of the existing situation, he has had to rely more on the illusions of hope and future promise than on substantial accomplishment. Thus, mentally the mass is kept in a flexible mental state, for without the hope and promise for the future his movement would have come to an end long ago. "Reason and argument are incapable of combating certain words and formulas."35 This is the secret weapon of Nasser's strength and popularity. Logical representation and argumentative discussion leaves little or no impression on the minds of discontented mass-individuals. By being aware that the masses are not stimulated by rational appeals, Nasser and Bourguiba have been more successful than the other Arab leaders. The average individual is inspired to action when an abstract principle, logical or illogical, is incorporated into his ego structure. Words, formulas, and abstract principles "evoke grandiose and vague images in men's minds, but this very vagueness that wraps them in 35

Le Bon, op. cit., p. 103.

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obscurity augments their mysterious power".36 Because they understand mass psychology Nasser and Bourguiba make effective use of propaganda to tap and channel the nationalist fervor to suit their plans. Aside from coercion by the sword, their most effective weapon is rhetoric - the skillful use of the elegant and highly elocutive Arabic language. The logical junction of WORDS and FACTS, so essential to the scholar's thinking, can be readily discarded in formulating mass thought. As envisioned by the organizer, facts must conform to the floridity of words. The value of this mass psychology is well illustrated in the following quotation. President Nasser claims: Well over 700 years ago fanatic Crusaders attacked us in Syria, Palestine, and Egypt. Arab Moslems and Christians fought side-by-side to defend their Motherland against this aggressive, foreign domination. They all rose as one man; unity being the only means of safety, liberty, and expulsion of the aggressors. Saladin rose in Syria to fight the aggressive Crusaders: the joint forces from Europe which included the kings of England, France and Austria. . . . The people rose under the command of Saladin and battles took place in Syria to expel the colonising Crusaders. . . . These victories were on record but we forgot them, but those who had been defeated had never forgotten their defeat. When Allenby entered Jerusalem during World War I he said: "Today we end the fight of the Crusaders who were defeated 700 years ago." We faced plots by imperialists and their agents and by the exploiting domination from within and the aggressive domination from without to make us forget our history, and our spirit. But they never succeeded in their plans. They were not able to make us forget our victorious past or hope for a new future of freedom and liberty. . . . We emerged victorious from this battle just as our fathers had triumphed over 150 years before, and our grandfather 700 and 800 years a g o . . . . We had the honour of beating Britain and France together after we had beaten each of them separately.37 The spoken word unquestionably reaches a very large audience through the various dissemination media and therefore constitutes a most effective propaganda device. Its main appeal is the face-to-face confrontation with the masses wherein its impressionalism and emotionalism can be brought into full play on the SENSES rather than on the LOGICAL REASONING POWER of the people. While the analysis of a quotation such as the preceding is primarily the task of the social psychologists and the propagandists, it will here 36 37

Ibid. Nasser's

Speeches,

1959, pp. 428-429.

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be delved into briefly. As Hitler observed, the driving force of momentous changes has been credited less to scientific enlightenment than to a fanaticism that pervades the mind and the hysteria that propels the masses forward. 38 Being well aware of this precept, Nasser, by identifying the Crusaders as FANATIC, AGGRESSIVE, and IMPERIALIST, obtained the backing of the masses regardless of their religious differences and backgrounds; the move was also designed to create unity in the Arab umma (nation). "The fanatic Crusaders attacked us in Syria, Palestine and Egypt" actuates the masses into unified action. In these terms Nasser has linked the glorious past with his newly established regime, pointing out that it was Saladin, an Egyptian and an Arab, who fought the imperialists, and it is Gamal Abdel Nasser and his regime that are again fighting the same imperialists. Although Saladin won the battle, it is Nasser who is now consummating the centuries-old war. And while the imperialists "remembered" the former defeat with Allenby's World War I statement, . . . "Today we end the fight of the Crusaders who were defeated 700 years ago . . . " , the Arabs, because they have always been aware that they had been victorious in the past, have never fully accommodated to Western victory. Today, men like Nasser are building new hope for a glorious future: a hope to liberate the people from the evils of imperialism, tyranny, misery, and feudalism. In the same vituperations Nasser inflames the conservative and reactionary Moslems by recalling that the Crusaders had aggressed against the Moslem world, a contention that can easily be construed as identifying the modern Western nations and Christianity as anti-Arab. To his critics, Nasser appears to be an irresponsible, egoistic dictator, and he and other contemporary revolutionary Arab leaders are stereotyped as xenophobic, anti-Western agitators, but to the "restless and frustrated Arab nationalists, he indeed [seems] a second Saladin, turning the tables on Western 'imperalism' ". 39 To endorse a concept on an issue requires the possession of an ability to evaluate the notion in terms of its objective and subjective implications. To gain acceptance of his particular viewpoint on an outstanding issue the organizer of the revolutionary mass movement must first evaluate the impact of his ideas on the various segments of society and then present his views in terms comprehensible to all. To do this effectively he must avoid specifics, for which he can later be held account38 John Chamberlain and S. B. Fay (eds.), Mein Kampf Hitchocock, 1939), p. 468. 39 Badeau, "Introduction", op. cit., p. 14.

(New York, Reynal &

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able, and he must dwell on ambiguities which can be taken to have several but no fixed implications. If these obscurities are to be of any consequence within the movement, the propaganda message which disseminates them must be pitched to the comprehensive level of the lesser educated plurality, and the appeal must be preponderantly to the EMOTIONAL rather than to the LOGICAL. "Propaganda", as Hitler stated, "must appeal to the masses rather than the intelligentsia for the 'great masses' receptive ability is very limited, their understanding is small but their forgetfulness is great." 40 The masses can hardly distinguish between objective and subjective matters. "A crowd thinks in images, and the image itself immediately calls up a series of other images, having no logical connection with the first". 41 The organizer then influences the masses to his viewpoint mainly by cajolery. By harping on the past glories of the society he inflates egos. By promising a reattainment of the former greatness, he gains acceptance and abidance. In doing so, he not only simplifies the issues, but he deliberately creates misconceptions and illusions. Arab governments, especially those advocating particular ISMS, interpret events to suit their respective notions. The periods of crisis which perennially exist in the Arab World provide an ideal climate of endeavor for the zealous propagandist. The clever propagandist will determine the causes for the dissatisfaction, will isolate those being challenged by the society, and will then exploit these in furtherance of the cause of the movement. To the disaffected he will develop a moral rationalization that, in the masses' mental context, will make acceptable that portion of the old which is compatible with the new regime. His rationalizations and explanations must be presented as oversimplifications, for, if too sophisticated, they would be incomprehensible and probably confusing to the masses. Above all the profferings must have an emotional appeal. Therefore, the emphasis is on historical events or contemporary occurrences that appeal to the mass group. High priority is given to such topics as Arabic and Islamic cultures, glorifications of the Arab Empire in the DISTANT PAST, condemnation of the IMMEDIATE PAST and PRESENT as forms of feudalism and imperialism, and the glorification of the future as promised by the sponsoring regime. As an illustration of the foregoing, random quotations taken from Nasser's speeches are offered. When the Crusaders were driven out of Egypt they attacked Syria. Egypt and Syria then united once more under the leadership of Saladin. Troops 40 41

Chamberlain and Fay, op. cit., p. 234. Le Bon, op. cit., p. 41.

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came out to Egypt to the rescue of the Arab peoples in Syria and Saladin defeated the Crusaders at the battle of Hassin. The Syro-Egyptian army then resumed their fight and succeeded in liberating Palestine and Jerusalem from the Crusaders. This was the basis of Arab unity. When the Arab peoples, looking back on their past history, call for unity, they consider it as the realization of all their aspirations and depend on it to ward off any dangers that might beset them. They also regard it as a rebirth of Arab nationalism and a means of defeating imperialistic schemes and ambitions. Almost simultaneously with the Crusaders, the Arab world was assailed by hordes from Central Asia — the Tartars. Under the leadership of Holako their troops occupied Baghdad bringing the rule of the Abbaside dynasty to an end. Resuming their conquests, they attacked Syria while it was fighting the battle of freedom and Arab nationalism. The Tartar troops were intoxicated with success having scored one victory after another and subjugated all the countries through which they had passed until Baghdad. Together the Egyptian and Syrian armies were able to defeat the Tarters at Ein Galout in 1260. Whenever Syria united forces with Egypt they were able to defeat the strongest armies. They defeated the armies of the Crusaders which represented European imperialism, and they defeated armies of the Tarters which till their defeat in the battle of Ein Galout had triumphed in every single battle they fought.42 The national spirit I see today is not a new feeling that started two years ago with the merge; it started hundreds of years ago when the Syrians, Egyptians and Palestinians mixed together and united to liberate the Arab nation and to fly the flag of Arab independence and Arab nationalism.43 When Napoleon came to Egypt with his navy and his land forces, at the time when he had defeated the whole of Europe, one country after another, he marched from Cairo to Upper Egypt to subjugate its people, but the result was that Napoleon's generals suffered a major defeat here in Minia, and Assiout and Kena and everywhere. Napoleon's campaign on Egypt was meant to subjugate us; it succeeded in reaching Cairo after it mobilized its troops, navies and artillery but it was met at every step with the stiffest resistance, determination, faith and solidarity and it was defeated in every city in Upper Egypt. Soon Napoleon's army withdrew from Upper Egypt without scoring a single victory and within three years Napoleon withdrew altogether from Egypt because, instead of defeating Egypt, he was defeated by the unflinching will and faith of the Egyptian people. Today, my brothers, we fight with the same weapons, the same faith, the same resolve and determination, and, God willing, we shall triumph. What was the result? When Anthony Eden launched his aggression on your brothers in Egypt at Port Said, you and your brethren in other Arab countries rose to co-operate with your brethren in Egypt. Arabs everywhere had faith that the battle of Arab nationalism was the battle of life for every Arab citizen and for the entire Arab nation. They regarded it as the battle of the Arab destiny. 42 43

Nasser's Speeches, 1958, pp. 127-128. Ibid. (January-March, 1960), p. 44.

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The result was the defeat of the great powers and their naval forces. The great powers were converted into second-class countries. The result also was the triumph of our people who always had faith in the right to freedom and life, as well as in Arab nationalism and in the Arab sacred march. . . . The imperialist thought of using the new faces in Iraq against you . . . thought of using Kassem as a new face with the object of misleading the Arab people and of crushing Arab nationalism. 44

By assertions similar to the preceding illustration, Bourguiba, Arif, and other Arab organizers have, like Nasser, established that the objectives of their respective movements are but projections of the previously victorious struggles. Even though the historical "facts" are less than clear and the statements describing the contemporary goals are obscure, the link between the glorious past and an equally bright destiny is strengthened by heavy emphasis on the WILL, FAITH, AND GLORY of the Arab tradition. Propaganda also inculcates in the mass-mind feelings of guilt, shame, repentance and the anxiety of repeating past errors, as well as inflaming passions for revenge, achievement, and fulfillment. The expectation is that the MASS CONSCIENCE will be weakened and that the MASS VOLITION will be manageable and in consonance with the dictates of the leader. The techniques have been successful and the masses have been impassioned by speeches, slogans and symbols disseminated through the press, radio and other communications media. Nasser especially has succeeded in establishing his preeminence by equating himself with the archetypes of Arab myths and history. Because he has proved his ability to lead, he has acquired a charismatic aura and is looked upon by most Arabs as a man of destiny. Because he has successfully projected a favorable image and because he has convinced the mass that he stands for Arab dignity, Arab freedom, and Arab progress, his promise to guide the society to a GLORIOUS AGE is commonly accepted. M. Sherif states that people, when highly vulnerable to stereotypes, accept short-cut rationalizations which fire their fanciful ideas. The law of probability holds that "the more correctly and the more objectively a set of slogans expresses the underlying forces in a critical situation, the more vital and lasting they will prove to be".45 In Arab minds, especially in those of the followers, the leader represents more than a symbol of a dream. He signifies a reality. In the author's opinion, the failures and mistakes of such leaders as Nasser will not 44

Ibid., p. 77. M. Sherif, "The Psychology of Slogans", Journal of Abnormal Psychology, XXXII (October-December, 1937), 461. 45

and Social

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diminish the hold on the minds of the masses because their trust is based not so much on reality as on fanciful ideas. Propaganda has its greatest chance for success in fields where there are no established or contradictory views. Most of the cultural patterns and traditions which long sustained Islamic society have broken down or been discredited and have not as yet been replaced by anything substantial. Because there is a yearning and a searching for a new sense of values by which to eliminate the turbulence and sometimes the chaos, properly used propaganda can be most influential. To be effective, propaganda has to be instrumented to the specific issues at hand and orchestrated in direct relation to the peoples' response to the "messages". Properly used it is capable of uniting the huge but widely dispersed audience. A most successful technique for reaching the subconscious and thereby inducing acceptance has been to limit the dissemination to a few but often repeated catchy slogans and stereotypes. By using slogans and stereotypes the Arab organizers divert the individual's attention away from the realities of life and into an erroneous or simplified version of outstanding issues. This occurs because the "ordinary man hates nothing more than two-sidedness, to be called upon to consider this as well as that",46 for the masses do prefer to think primitively. Walter Lippman refers to this type of mental image as " . . . the pictures in our heads, . . . [because] . . . for the most part we do not first see and then define, we define first and then see".47 People, as in the case of the contemporary Arab younger generation, because their alienated individualities lack ego integration, characteristically respond by searching for forms of mass uniformity. Because they feel a need for some directive guidance, they respond to propagandists exhortations, thereby becoming prone to manipulation by the leaders. Propaganda gives authenticity to what in truth is not tangible, real, or valid. Consequently, by interposing a CURTAIN between what is hopefully conceived, even in the face of contradictory evidence, and what actually does exist, propaganda creates a mass delusion, most welcome to a public torn by anxiety, fear, hope and passion. Besides simplifying the propagandizing efforts of the leader by providing ready-made and catchy expositions of most of the issues, the use of slogans and stereotypes makes for consistency of content and facili46

Quoted by Albion Ross, "Gobbels Edits the Popular Mind in Germany", New York Times Magazine (February 14, 1937), 27. 47 Walter Lippman, Public Opinion (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1922), p. 81.

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tates a convergence of effort. Because the appeal is not to logic but to emotion, ready-made clichés serve to dissipate the misgivings of most individuals in the mass. By incessant repetitions of these clichés and slogans and constant harping on the travails of the old order, the mass is conditioned to accept the new. The treatment is so effective that many converts become further harbingers of the ideas that the revolutionary mass movement is seeking to propagate. Although mouthed by these precursors, the ideas that these words express are those of the sponsoring regime. Often the vituperations uttered and many of the actions taken are of a debased character usually associated with passionate mob action. Many members of the masses will perform within the anonymity of the mob actions which as responsible individuals they would ordinarily disdain. This inclination to accept group norms and values in the place of individual appraisal and judgments is a consequence of mass psychology and definitely leads to a weakening of the personality drives. Individuality being weakened, the several egos participating in the mass revolutionary movements are then conditioned to being herded. The individual's taming robs the personality of its initiative, the proper exercise of its faculties and therefore of its abilities for independent judgments. "The disintegration is now ubiquitous and deep; it is not confined to one aspect of Arab life, nor limited to its systems and laws. It is a disease whose symptoms can be traced to weaknesses in the soul of the individual Arab."48 THE SCIENCE OF IDEAS - ITS D Y N A M I S M

In fomenting revolutionary mass movements, new ideas, while important, are mainly symptomatic of lack of equilibrium in the society. Academicians may delve into the various ideologies influencing the Arab PROGRESSIVE REVOLUTIONARY states without determining their legitimacy or their precise prescription. For one thing, the ideologies themselves may change by adapting to new situations. Then, too, other unrelated or incompatible ideologies may creep in to adulterate the original belief. In Arab ideology or the THEORY OF ARABISM the strength of the concept is not to be found in the validity of the idea but rather in its EMOTIONAL FORCE. A S has been shown, mass-individuals are not inspired by truth so much as by wishful thinking taken for fact. In most circumstances mass-individuals are roisterous about matters that are beyond their comprehension or remote and abstract. In other words, 48

Rejwan, "Arab Nationalism: In Search of an Ideology", op. cit., p. 148.

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in promoting an appealing but incomprehensible ideology, the organizers remember that the masses are bigoted, dogmatic, and zealous. Therefore, "the orators . . . always appeal in consequence to their sentiments and never to their reason. The laws of logic have no action on multitude. To bring home conviction to the crowd it is necessary . . . to comprehend thoroughly the sentiments by which they are animated." 49 Consequently, it is the belief in and not the understanding of an ideology that the academicians should investigate if one wishes to give the various ideas a proper place in politics - this occurs because the force of Arab ideology is in its passion. The concern here with ideology is to determine the extent of its impact on the minds of the mass and not to consider its SUBSTANCE or EXACT DEFINITION. Although the Arab MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION may be devoid of any particular political persuasion, they still utilize the concept mainly because an ideology, due to its transcendental qualities, serves to inspire and animate the followers of a movement.50 Consciously or unconsciously, revolutionary mass movements are impelled by an ostensible ideology based on a collection of assumptions, conceptions and misconceptions. Be the mixture simple or complex, artless or illustrious, valid or invalid, an ideology, once fixed and accepted, becomes the lodestar guiding and directing the mass-individual's life. Unhesitatingly and unequivocally, the masses look to its tenets as the main inspiration for all they would endeavor or hope to attain, and as the criterion for all they would evaluate and judge. With incorporation into the movement, the ideology becomes the very kernel of the mass-individual's existence. Because the revolutionary mass movement is part of the political life of a community, its ideology is affected by the forces molding the entire society. The more receptive a society to the aims and objectives of a revolutionary mass movement, the swifter the acceptance and the surer and faster the movement's growth. The more inclined the individuals in the mass are to respond to the ideology, the less the need to resort to a system of force and rewards. Therefore, ideologies in themselves are formulated in reflection of the masses' aspirations and presented to the people as the most promising means of fulfilling the society's objectives. The least costly and most enduring control of the mass-will is by an appeal through individual conscience. To effect this control the Arab MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION strengthen their ideology by 49 50

Le Bon, op. cit., pp. 112-113. Sorel, op. cit., pp. 167 ff.

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incorporating into it those moral norms and cultural traits of the society which are harmonious to the objectives of the movement. By creating a situation wherein the mass-individual in breach of the ideology is also in violation of the accepted social and moral norms and values, the Arab organizers identify the ideology with the culture and thereby facilitate the process of social adjustment. Through this process of culture blending, the concept of GROUP SELF creates and sustains a mass organization most responsive to the will of the revolutionary leader. An ideology bestows upon a revolutionary mass movement a legitimacy whereby its influence and authority are more readily acceptable to the polity. Adoption of the concept implies an affinity between the movement and the society. For some individuals it affords the refuge of the anonymity inherent in conformity; for others, it provides a defense against attack of cherished ideas. Of greater significance, possession of an ideology connotes a belief in something transcendental, something taken on faith and therefore not subject to attack by logic. The ideologies rampant in the Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE countries are difficult to identify. While the various Arab ISMS differ in several philosophical aspects, all are identical in that they attempt to delude the mass-individual about the factual realities of his situation as opposed to the ideal way of life to which he aspires. The several Arab ideologists do not present to their peoples programs based on either the actualities of world power politics or the capabilities of the still backward Middle East social complex. Rather, they stress the ideal of what WAS in the "perfect society" of the distant glorious past and the what OUGHT TO BE in the promised society of the future. In this manner the commonly accepted ideology of Arabism conceals the shortcomings of the present and deludes the masses about the prospects of the future. Although misled as to the present, the Arab mass-individual absorbs from the future-oriented ideology the novel ideas breaking down his predilection to the traditional. From these modern notions he develops new sentiments and attitudes and, even though herded and made to conform, because he identifies himself as part of a worthwhile cause, he gains an entirely new and favorable concept of himself and his worth. An ideology is effective when the movement espousing the belief, in the words of Daniel Bell, " . . . can rouse people when it can do three things: simplify ideas, establish a claim to truth, and, in the union of the two, demand a commitment to action".51 51 Daniel Bell, "The End of Ideology in the West", Columbia III (Winter, 1960), 4-7.

University

Forum,

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"In the war of ideas", says Professor Dawson, "it is the crudest and most simplified ideology that wins."52 Simple people faced with complex problems whose solution is imperative can usually be counted on to come up with simple answers. This condition is especially apropos to the emerging Arab World because people left out of the mainstream of progress for centuries cannot be expected to have developed a degree of sophistication equal to the requirements of modern society. Lacking adequate frames of reference and standards for evaluation, Arab mass-individuals are highly responsive to that which they can understand - the simple. Therefore, an ideology seeking general Arab acceptance must be broad enough to fill the spectrum of the society's desired needs and yet remain uncomplicated enough to be understood by the large majority of the polity. Consequently, the more the men of organization define or interpret the ideology and the more the idea becomes fixed, exposed and imposed, the more difficult it becomes to win over or hold people to the idea. In the instances where some sort of elucidation is required, unless the clarification is kept elementary and general, the movement is bound in the long run to lose some of its strength. Identification of an ideology as progressions of feeling organized into a concept is inadequate to the demands of the general populace. To be effective an ideology must, to some extent, remain ambiguous. To digress from the simple and general to the detailed and precise would prove positively disadvantageous in that it proves to be unduly restrictive on the leader. The extent to which an individual responds to ideologies depends, among other things, upon the degree and extent of his particular frame of reference. Consequently, the more rational and worldly the idea, the greater its attraction to the more sophisticated element of society. Even though somewhat remiss in this regard, the several ideologies of the Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE governments have captured a considerable segment of the intelligentsia. "Exile no longer consists solely of being physically banished from their country; the most bitter kind of exile now assumes the form of domestic acquiescence, of putting the mind under arrest."53 Through propaganda, the intellectuals are pressured to support the movement, and most of them do either tacitly because there is no alternative or overtly with the equivocation that the progressive movement, while inadequate, is still impelling the society in 52

Dawson, op. cit., p. 100. Sharabi, "Political and Intellectual Attitudes of the Young Arab Generation", op. cit., p. 58. 55

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the desired direction of liberalism. Conversely, the more irrational the idea the greater the appeal to the masses. As brought out earlier, because the mass responds more readily to images and stereotypes, crowds are not influenced by reason but by emotion. In the words of Gustave Le Bon: . . . it cannot absolutely be said that crowds do not reason and are not to be influenced by reasoning. . . . However, the arguments . . . which are capable of influencing them are . . . of such an inferior kind that it is only by way of analogy that they can be described as reasoning. . . ," 54

Because of their vagueness and simplicity, irrational ideologies have engendered a greater acceptance than rational ones and, therefore, are of greater value to the Arab MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION. While there will always be contention between the logical and the emotional, it is quite obvious that, in the inflamed Arab World where the passions of the mob are so readily exploitable, reason will not be victorious. This transpires because, where TRUTH is involved, patience and tolerance are required for full understanding, traits which an aroused and impassioned Arab polity are demonstrably unwilling to exercise. The presence of some latitude in an ideology makes the belief less hidebound and therefore more believable and acceptable to greater numbers of people. While the axiom holds in the Arab World, nevertheless the high priests of an Arab ideology find it more propitious in marketing their ideas to give at least the impression, " . . . that they alone have the truth about the right ordering of life - of Ufe as a whole, and not just political l i f e . . .",55 especially when ". . . attempting to expose the views of another . . .".56 By "selling" the ideology as a quasi-religion, the organizers offer "truths" whose main appeal is to the heart and not to the mind and therefore not subject to logical or dispassionate analysis. To systematize the ideology so that it can withstand logical attack would but invite further onslaught by learned dissidents. To categorize the ideology to the point of intelligibility would destroy its mystique and inherent dynamism. By leaving the ideology in a somewhat ambiguous state, the leaders can better present it as an absolute truth. The need to present the ideology as a certitude derives from the zealousness of the leader to get on with a task he considers too complex to be understood by the masses. The claim to infallability, the necessity for disciplined 54

Le Bon, op cit., p. 65. Edward Shils, "Ideology and Civility", The Twentieth Century, CLXVI (July, 1959), 3. 56 Mannheim, op. cit., p. 78.

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behavior, the context of simplicity, and the compulsion of the Arab leaders to promote a particular ideology are, in most cases, mutually dependent and taken together become self-generating. An insight into the process goes a long way toward explaining the mechanics of the Arab revolutionary mass movement and the behavior of the masses of which it is constituted. Therefore, the strength of any Arab ISM is not a question of its profoundness, exaltedness, or validity, but is dependent on the particular ideology's ability to isolate individuals of the masses from self and reality. To achieve this state in the masses, it is necessary that the leaders propagate the belief that their respective ideologies do embody the truth, the absolute truth, and the only truth. While essential in the present frame of mind of a thoroughly disillusioned Arab society, it is hoped that the use does not become an abuse and that the means does not become an end.

VII THE OMNIPOTENCE OF THE SINGLE-PARTY

THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM

Without intending to undermine the value of the Western political system or to discredit those Arabs who still believe in the merits of Western Democracy, the aim of this chapter is to shed some light on the reason for the rejection of Western political institutions, as well as to delineate the future prospects of the SINGLE-PARTY system by examining the conditions that favor political centralization. A review of the contemporary political history of the Arab states may also serve to show how and why the formation of the SINGLE-PARTY system developed as the exclusive type in all of the Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states. In essence, the approach of the single-party, e.g., the Socialist Destour Party, is to combine "an intransigence upon the principles with flexibility in the choice of means to implement them". 1 The course of action has been tactical rather than ideological, a socially, pragmatically oriented type of innovation, rather than a dogmatic one. The trend toward a SINGLE-PARTY is an indication of realism; the leaders are trying to adjust their programs and actions to suit the society's needs while simultaneously attempting to come to terms with themselves. With this in mind the following analysis will endeavor to validate the assumption that all SINGLE-PARTIES of the Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states, despite certain deviations, have basically similar approaches and goals. The fallacious assumption that men like Nasser, Bourguiba, and Ben Bella have gained power over governmental apparatuses through mere cunning and trickery has become apparent. The work of sociopolitical analysts in recent years has shown that the Arab people of the present generation are as willing to surrender their rights to political freedom as their fathers were eager to fight for it. The contemporary crisis of HYPERDEMOCRACY is a recognition of their rejection of democ1

Micaud, op. cit., p. 77.

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racy - an escape from it. The truth of this has been forcefully formulated by Ortega Y. Gasset: Today we are witnessing the triumphs of a hyperdemocracy in which the mass acts directly, outside the law, imposing its aspirations and its desires by means of material pressure. It is a false interpretation of the new situation to say that the mass has grown tired of politics and handed over the exercise of it to specialized persons. 2

This rise of mass society and mass party, i.e., SINGLE-PARTY, is not so much due to the existence of imperialism as to the presence within Arab personal attitudes, environments, and institutions of conditions which have given rise to totalitarian forms of society. The existing Arab mass society, while advocating equalitarianism, is so minimally liberal in approach that its constitutional aura does not limit the use of power. "The characteristic of the hour is that the commonplace mind, knowing itself to be commonplace, has the assurance to proclaim the rights of the commonplace and to impose them wherever it will." 3 The critics of "mass society" are in general agreement that individual freedom is threatened by the rise of revolutionary mass movements and their political organism, i.e., the mass party (SINGLE-PARTY), even though these single parties might differ from each other in ideology and approach. The Arab conservative and democratic-liberal critics both agree that mass society is vulnerable to totalitarianism, rather than to traditional authoritarianism. Here, however, the agreement ends. The Arab conservative critics generally believe that mass society induces a decline in authority and a lack of traditional restraints on the exercise of power; they imply that mass society invites totalitarian leadership based on mass support. They allege that popular democracy disturbs the relative position of society by moving large numbers of formerly passive people to action. They further contend that the tendency on the part of the democratic-liberals to push the idea of equalitarianism has violently propelled formerly quiescent people into a political position which has resulted in the loss of exclusive power for the traditional ruling elite. Further, they assert, an equalitarian society has demolished the value-sustaining function and the creativeness of the prerogatives of the traditional elite. Hence, power has been transferred from its natural habitat, that is, from the exclusive control of the elite, to popular control. The Arab democratic-liberal critics dismiss the conservative's con2 3

Gasset, op. cit., p. 12. Ibid.

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ception that equalitarian courses of action, per se, give rise to mass society; "the coming age of the masses", contrary to the conservative view, "did not result from growing equality of conditions . . .".4 The creation of a mass party is unlikely where circumstances are favorable for individual development. For a clear picture the emergence of mass society must be viewed in the light of, (1) growth of urbanization and (2) bureaucratization. It is generally believed that at a certain point in urbanization and bureaucratization the individual's life becomes so routine that he loses his own individuality. Consequently, the primary factors in undermining the equilibrium between self-governing entities and the society are the atomization of the individual in the ever growing urbanized community and the centralization of decision-making in the hands of the bureaucracy; thus the already isolated individuals are exposed to further ranges of effective control from the top because they "know one another only as fractions in specialized milieux . . . In every major area of life, the loss of a sense of structure and the submergence into powerless milieux is the cardinal f a c t . . . " 5 that causes the birth of mass society and the emergence of the single-party system. Hence the growth of mass parties is partly a reflection of mass behavior - a collective attitude which is predominantly concerned with remote objects and tends to lack a sense of independence, proximate objectivity, capacity for decision, and perception of responsibility.6 Both the Arab conservative and the democratic-liberal critics have valid arguments. However, the conservative's assertions that liberty and equality are incompatible, that liberty depends on stable authority, and that equality undermines legitimate authority, are not necessarily true. They are only true in a narrow sense when the terms "political liberty" and "equality" are used arbitrarily with little or no correlation between the two concepts. This was precisely the way in which the traditional elite acted. The historical rule of the conservative was arbitrary; it was a system that lacked flexibility. The political liberty of the ruling elite (conservative) was strengthened at the expense of the political equality of society. In fact, both political equality and political liberty were kept so far apart that conflict between the upper traditional elite and the other factions of society was inevitable. 4

Arendt, op. cit., p. 310. Wright C. Mills, The Power Elite (New York, Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 320-322. 6 For further extensive review of the literature on mass behavior and related phenomena see: Paul Reiwald, De L'Esprit des Masses (Paris, Delachaux and Niestle, 1949). 5

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Both the Arab conservative and the democratic-liberals have stressed the political side of the issue. What they have failed to realize is that in the equilibrium between LIBERTY and EQUALITY, together with their political implications, there are intrinsically connected, psychological, economic, and social changes that allow the individual to realize his rights and evolve his self-identity. However, the lag in fulfilling these needs resulted in a frustrating situation. Consequently, the blending of resentments and frustration with the whole situation coalesced into an irresistible mass force whose sole immediate goal was the destruction of the social structure. The unwanted social conditions resulted in changes in social character; that is, the new demands and anxieties produced a mass society and the circumstances demanded its guidance and domination by the SINGLE-PARTY. Before proceeding with the analysis of the aims and structures of SINGLE-PARTIES, a few preliminary remarks are in order. At the risk of over-simplification, the Arab world can be roughly divided into three types of societies: (1) the TRADITIONAL society, (2) the PLURALIST society, and (3) the TOTALITARIAN society. There is nothing new about these categories; they can be found in the work of Professor David Riesman.7 The application of these categories is hoped to contribute to the understanding and evaluation of contemporary Arab affairs. In a TRADITIONAL society, such as those in Saudi Arabia and Libya, individuals regulate their affairs by conforming to a set of cultural standards and to the will of the authority. It hardly ever occurs to the individual "that he might shape his own destiny in terms of personal, lifelong goals or that the destiny of his children might be separate from that of the family group". 8 Conformity to tradition, e.g., ethics, honor, and shame, provides one with a way of conduct, not as an independent individual but as a part of a closely knit society. The psychological pattern of conformity is based on the concept of SOCIAL-RELATEDNESS, rather than on self-alienation. Another aspect involves adherence to the traditional way of life. This favors group-centered attitudes because the individual lacks an awareness and conception of himself as an independent and separate being. As long as the social umbilical cord is strong, self-centered orientation plays a very minor role. Finally, the economic life of traditional society is simple; it is predominantly a nomadic and agricultural one under chieftain or feudalistic rule, or a combination of 7

See: David Riesman, The Lonely 1965). 8 Ibid., p. 17.

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(New Haven, Yale University Press,

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the two. Under such conditions, any attempt to introduce any political party system is an unqualified risk, doomed to defeat. At the core of PLURALISTIC society is the individual with his selfcentered orientation. The inner cohesion and the multiple diverse groups, local organizations, political parties, and professional organizations of the PLURALISTIC culture provide a firm social bond for SELF-RELATEDNESS. This culture also allows the individual to preserve his distinctive SELF-IMAGE. Cultural pluralism stimulates social differentiation and the growth of individualism. Individual autonomy, while protected by the pluralistic society, encourages the individual to compare and judge the various models and alternatives that are open to him for self-improvement. Competitive alternatives, which are lacking in both traditional and totalitarian societies, permit the individual to choose his own destiny. Also, in a pluralistic society, urbanization, modernization, and communication are usually highly developed. Consequently, there is a higher literacy rate and standard of living than in traditional and totalitarian societies. Of more importance, however, is the exchange of ideas; communication between the urban and rural centers and among the various classes of the society has helped to build a better understanding and cooperation among the people than is usually achieved in non-pluralist societies. Of all the Arab countries, only the Lebanese society has a social structure that can be loosely identified with a pluralistic system. In short, most Arab society provides little encouragement for a pluralistic way of life. A TOTALITARIAN society produces a characteristic type of submissiveness, fear, and self-alienation. Lacking strength and possessing few personalized ways of conduct, the individual is subordinate to the will of the state. Although self-alienation is not confined to a totalitarian society, it is here that its intensity is usually the greatest. The processes that accelerate the rule of totalitarianism begin with increased personal loneliness. With the introduction of democracy and the western way of life, traditional Arab society, which had offered some form of security and basic unity, fell apart. When democracy was unable to overcome the local environmental obstacles, i.e., economic, social, political, and psychological, and effectively to replace the previous sense of security and unity, the individual became aware of being alone. This separation from the traditional ties without an adequate substitute created a feeling of powerlessness and anxiety. Impulses arose which encouraged people to give up their individuality by giving their support to the rise of revolutionary mass movements. Dispossession of personality began to as-

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sume the character of submission. With the rise of Arab ISMS the selfalienated individuals consciously felt secure again, but failed to realize that they had paid too high a price for this psychological security. While it might be argued that a revolutionary mass movement is not totalitarian, the fact is, nevertheless, that it may easily be so transformed, especially when there is a lack of natural resources, lack of adequate arable land, a low rate of industrialization, and over-population. All indications point to the fact that the Arab society is least receptive to pluralism and democratization, as we know it in the Western world, and most vulnerable to either totalitarianism or authoritarianism. The democratic political system in the Arab world was introduced into a highly traditional society without sufficient cognizance of its potential consequences. In the first place, the ruling group during this transitional period (1920-1950) failed to comprehend the fact that the genius of democracy depends not on the destruction of traditions, but on preserving the integrity of the upper classes and elite groups, while providing an opportunity to others, i.e., the middle and lower classes, to participate in politics. This participation and competition among the various classes could then check the dominance of any one group. Only in such a political atmosphere would the individual feel himself as a part of the society, and therefore no major segment of the society would be alienated. Secondly, the destruction of the traditional authority's legitimacy had left a vacuum. As a result there was a lack of stability; the ruling elite of democracy became vulnerable to sudden displacement by mass-oriented elites. The triumph of Arab ISMS, i.e., Nasserism, Bourguibism, and Ba'athism, are notable examples. The failure of the democratic experiment in the Arab world has demonstrated to the newly ruling elite, according to Barbara Ward, that the "Liberal, humane society in the West has not entirely abandoned its metaphysical beliefs. But the institutions of liberal society have been transplanted to Asia with no links to any great religious tradition." 9 Both Nasser and Bourguiba are aware that Western democracy is a complex instrument, based on the peculiarities of the Western society and that the various institutions of the Arab society must be based on its own existing situation.10 9

Barbara Ward, Interplay of East and West (New York, W. H. Norton & Co., 1957), p. 132. 10 See: Habib Bourguiba, Our Road to Socialism, op. cit., pp. 3-31; Habib Bourguiba, Renewal of Outlook to Avert Disastrous Upheavals (Tunis, Government Press 27th November, 1963), pp. 5-30; Habib Bourguiba, Conscience as the Basis of Society (Tunis, 19th January, 1964), pp. 5-22; Nasser's Speeches, 1959, pp. 28, 29, 31, 331.

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In the Arab world the REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states are increasingly assuming totalitarian forms, but this is not necessarily bad, per se. Totalitarianism is on the increase in the Middle East because the decline of other associations has transferred power to a highly centralized authority, i.e., the SINGLE-PARTY. The distinctive character of the SINGLE-PARTY lies in the fact that totalitarian dominance depends on the availability of discontented masses. From this standpoint the natural inclination of power in the SINGLE-PARTY is totalitarian in approach. It is a gigantic movement which requires atomized masses in order to acquire more strength. During the take-over stage, the task of the SINGLE-PARTY is to keep the people in a state of motion until it becomes a thorough-going concern. However, unattached and unwanted individuals are horrified by loneliness, and the feeling of not belonging is the most terrible kind of loneliness. The fear of isolation is so powerful that it induces individuals to form and maintain hyper-attachments. Consequently the SINGLE-PARTY becomes, for the alienated, psychological sustenance; and once it is able to mobilize the people against the existing order, the stage is set for further activism. Unfortunately, the socio-economic and political soil from which the Arab states have emerged was relatively barren of democratic seeds.11 The smothering of the Islamic institutions began under Western tutelage when the Westernized Arabs called for constitutional and democratic reforms. Western influence was paramount; in one short generation the new institutions had practically replaced the old ones. However, the Westernized Arab leaders adopted the various western forms of government without having been fully prepared to understand their substance. These forms were imposed upon a society where ignorance, illiteracy, poverty, and feudalism were predominant; an atmosphere that is not conducive to the cultivation of the delicate art of democratic government. Professor Grassmuch's remarks about Iraq are equally applicable to the rest of the Middle East; . . . Iraq's political pattern could be termed one of election without representation. It was apparent that the experiment in extending Western parliamentary and electoral institutions to this Middle Eastern state had not prospered as hoped. There was still a two-house Parliament of ceremony and prestige, and there were still eager candidates. But Parliament could hardly be called supreme, or even a check upon the Iraqi executive; the Parliament did not 11

Charles F. Gallagher, The United States and North Africa (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 65.

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represent the varied e c o n o m i c , racial, and sectional interests of the country. 1 2

Thus, in Iraq, as in the rest of the Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE countries, the failure of democratization, of parliamentary forms of government, of liberalism, and of the MULTI-PARTY system is not so much the inadequacy of the political system per se but of its substance, i.e., the values which have stimulated that system and which were never fully comprehended. Thus, the new totalitarian pattern, under the guidance of the SINGLE-PARTY, is in many ways a revision of the old familiar authoritarian type of traditional Islam. However, unlike the traditional system whose authoritarian power was limited and whose aims were to maintain the status quo and to remain aloof from the people,13 the totalitarian SINGLE-PARTY involves total domination, controlled neither by constitutional order and codes nor by a limitation of governmental functions, and aims at becoming an active agent whose goals are political and socio-economic transformations.

T H E HISTORICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM

The present stage of the political party system represents only another phase, and possibly not the last, in a dynamic process of change, the origin of which can be traced back to the last decades of the nineteenth century. The description and the evaluation of the historical growth of the political parties of the twentieth century can be roughly categorized in the following manner: the BOSS (zaim) party system which is basically authoritarian and feudalistic in origin, the MULTI-PARTY system which is predominantly doctrinal in approach, and the totalitarian SINGLEPARTY system (sometimes known as the one-party, mass-party, or nation-party system). Moreover, the creation of these party systems coincided roughly with the birth of three different Arab generations, although the life-span of each system has varied from one country to another in accordance with the existence of varying political and socio-economic conditions. In Lebanon, for example, and to a much lesser extent in Syria, both types, the BOSS and the MULTI-PARTY systems still play important political and socio-economic roles. In Egypt, Tunisia, and 12

George Grassmuch, "The Electoral Process in Iraq, 1952-1958", The Middle East Journal, XIV (Autumn, 1960), 413. 13 There are, to be sure, exceptions to the rule but these do not alter the general pattern.

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Algeria, the SINGLE-PARTY system is in complete control of state affairs and under the guidance of the new elite, i.e., the third generation. Thus, a brief analysis of the political party systems will be of great benefit for a better understanding of the present Arab political forces. The post-Ottoman generation of the Arab political leaders, especially those of Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, conducted themselves in such a manner as to make it almost certain that extremist parties and revolutionary movements would emerge. "Quite inevitably, the period of tutelage began in each country with conservative nationalist leadership." 14 "However passionately nationalist, those leaders were members of a conservative upper class, and for the most part did not believe in social and political change." 1 5 In many cases they responded willingly to the European ideal which the following two generations seemed neither capable nor desirous of doing. This first Arab generation of intelligentsia adhered to the tenets of nineteenth-century European liberalism, which emphasized progress, the perfectability of human nature, and constitutional means of political life. While they upheld freedom of speech and political justice, they did not include economic and social liberalism. On the whole, the available historical data and events have demonstrated that they were against any basic social and economic reform which could require a change in the system of land tenure. Further, they opposed any development of private enterprise which would injure their interests. Even here, FREEDOM came to symbolize not so much individual but national freedom, i.e., political independence from Ottoman domination, and later Western rule. Hence, there arose a natural political reaction, an awakening that symbolized the urge for political freedom, enlightenment, and progress, but these ideas were planted in the soil of Islamic authoritarianism. As a consequence, a conflict between Western humanistic rationalism and Islamic traditionalism burst into the open. As the crisis intensified, the reaction of the intelligentsia of this generation reverted to a more conservative position in an attempt to preserve their authority. Being accepted as the garde du corps of the society and the keeper of traditions, these leaders used all available socio-economic and political means to stay in power. In time, however, this first generation transformed the political party and parliamentary systems bequeathed them by the European powers, into an exclusive BOSS party system; politics developed into an hereditary prerogative. The rights became 14 15

Childers, op. cit., p. 64. Cremeans, op. cit., p. 124.

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exclusive to the conservative elements representing the nobility, landlords, wealthy families, and business magnates. Each individual boss was elected to the parliament through his independent activity by using his peasants and clients as voters. On some occasions, several bosses united to form an alliance, a CAUCUS-TYPE party, to preserve their interests and to pursue a common goal against their opponents. From this union a loose party structure was created, commonly known as the BOSS-PARTY. Such alliances were genuine when individual self-interest rather than ideological conviction was the common unifier. Thus, the individual's shift from one BOSS-PARTY to another was commonly expected. In a truly centralized country, e.g., pre-revolutionary Egypt, where the ruling elite were predominantly landowners, the boss-party was more stable and better organized. Later, however, the game of politics became so difficult and complex that only an expert was able to practice it. No better illustration can be given than the Wafd party. In its early history the Wafd was a nationalistic revolutionary movement. It aimed at the reformulation of society to fit modern conditions, i.e., westernization, but, at the same time, insisted that Egypt should not sell its soul to the West. In the political domain it sought independence and union with Sudan. The realization of this idea, so went the general conviction, depended on British evacuation. However, independence did not materialize and, as the years passed by, the nationalist-revolutionary spirit began to be replaced by a conservative attitude; the leaders of the BOSS-PARTY contented themselves with the status quo. National exploitation for self-enrichment became the goal; bribery, the purchase of votes, and the subversion of clients were the only known tools of the political game; and the head of the BOSS-PARTY, Nahass Pasha, the one time nationalist, assumed the role of spokesman for the feudal lordship. Even though the leaders of the BOSS-PARTY failed to accomplish what they started to do, it is still safe to conclude that they succeeded in evoking national self-consciousness and in reviving the culture which had been allowed to decay under Ottoman rule. Further, they were the forerunners in the struggle which came to be the heart of politics for the second generation. Only in Lebanon has the tree of the BOSS-PARTY system been able to bear fruit. This can be explained by the fact that the composition of the Lebanese community is composed of an amalgamation of minorities which has helped to preserve the balance of power. No one minority is sufficiently strong to dominate the others. By such balancing between

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minorities Lebanon has managed, since its independence, (with the notable exception of the 1958 revolution) to avoid extremely violent tensions. Furthermore, its high rate of literacy and high standard of living in comparison to the rest of the Arab nations, its small geographic size which permits better communication, and the large size of its middle class have helped to preserve this system. Consequently, a political equilibrium under the BOSS-PARTY has been fairly well sustained; the violation of the rules of the game by anyone has immediately brought about an ad hoc opposing coalition to remove the threat. Outside Lebanon, the BOSS-PARTY system broke down with the advent of the second generation of the post-Ottoman period. In the 1930's young men with political ambitions were faced with the alternative of either cooperating with the system or of operating in a political wilderness. At first, to a large degree, most young men outwardly conformed by hiding their bitter inner resentments. However, as the 1930's wore on, the size and the importance of the middle class began to grow; new ideas began to penetrate the minds of the politically conscious, including some of the younger members of the feudal elite, as a result of increased educational opportunities and improved methods of communication. Thus, a new age of politics, the MULTI-PARTY system, was born. T h e origin of the MULTI-PARTY system of the SECOND GENERATION c a n

be traced to the late twenties, although it did not fully germinate until the 1930's and 1940's. This highly extremist generation came onto the scene when the imported Western liberal democracy was being challenged, conceptually and physically, by totalitarian (Communist and Fascist) and fundamentalist (Islamic) ideas. This new generation of politically conscious young men was possessed with a single idea, independence, which had been imbued in the first post-Ottoman generation. This obsession was oriented toward extremism because foreign domination had remained intact and the native ruling elite stood for a highly conservative political and socio-economic structure. Although democratic procedures and some positive virtues accompanied the introduction of the multi-party system, which made its sudden appearance in cities, it was originated chiefly as a means of eradicating the BOSS system; its emergence was also accompanied by a new crucial phenomenon: the rise of the masses. During the inter-war period the masses were only vaguely conscious of themselves as a political force, but as a result of the struggle for power between the leaders of the first and second generations, the masses slowly became aware of their political potential. The mass-individuals are led to free themselves from the

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feeling of nothingness by means of self-effacement and by participating in the GREAT SOCIETY - the movement or the party. Lacking the guidance and restraint of enlightened leadership, however, their political activities exploded in mob violence and demonstrations. The second generation was no longer content with constitutional tactics and procedures. It opposed and denounced the existing order which was, without doubt, imperfect. These new contenders for power who were at the forefront of independence movements received their higher education, by and large, in Western institutions. However, on the whole, they were unable to advance themselves in the traditional society or to acquire a higher social position among their fellow countrymen. True, they gained the educational prerequisites, i.e., they became lawyers, doctors, teachers, but, psychologically speaking, they still found themselves politically subordinate to the Western rulers, and they were treated as social inferiors. While many increased their efforts to gain dignity and respect, they found it difficult to accomplish their desires; hence, personal bitterness and frustration resulted. Even those few who had reached a relatively high status tended to remain bitter and suspicious; these individuals were discontented long before they finished their higher education and they built up perpetually tense mechanisms against the social structure in which they were reared. During the second World War the inner conflict reached its peak; the apex of tension, the urge to gain dignity and equality with others, was combined with a desire for industrialization - a recognized symbol of power. However, weakness soon became obvious; the powerful emotional stimuli directed to catching up with the modern, industrialized nations did not include a corresponding psychological desire to make the sacrifices needed for such purposes. The crystallization of such negativism was quite apparent in the political domain. There exists a definite correlation between the form and the ideology of these MULTI-PARTY organizations. They developed from youth movements heavily influenced by fanatical nationalism and with few exceptions, all modeled their political activities on extreme ideological bases. Of more importance, however, has been their attitude toward westernization, i.e., secularization, on the one hand, and traditionalism, on the other. The leaders of the MULTI-PARTIES were themselves westernized or heavily influenced by western ideas and this created a conflict; westernization manifested itself in an attitude of simultaneous attraction toward and repulsion from western values: an ambivalent reaction of abhorrence and admiration, of contempt and respect, of imitation and

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disdainful rejection. The MULTI-PARTIES' repudiation of traditionalism was also ambivalent; as part of the society and influenced by traditional upbringing they came to admire the Arab way of life but at the same time they rejected it as outmoded and incapable of fulfilling their needs and desires. Inevitably, the inner tension resulting from this conflict, i.e., between westernization and traditionalism, could find escape only outside those two realms. Consequently, some found the mythological answer by reverting to the DISTANT PAST as the only source of guidance for a resurgence, a mythological approach similar to that of European fascism. The psychological problem of the second generation is that though freedom from traditional bonds gave the individual a new feeling of identity, it made him, at the same time, an isolated and lonely individual filled with doubt and anxiety. Furthermore the majority of the second generation that lacked proximate social relations responded either with apathy or violent activism, or shifted from one extreme to the other. This occurred because apathy, like violent activism, is born of social alienation. Yet, psychologically, this change from certainty to doubt, from apathy to violent activism, and from individual freedom to submission, far from being contradictory, has a causal relationship. Despotism and individualism, freedom and tyranny, lived together side by side in this second generation, and were inextricably interwoven. The motive force was dialectical and contradictory. It is difficult to comprehend that two contradictory trends can be born simultaneously from one cause although this phenomenon is, in fact, not uncommon. The tragedy is that the second generation failed to understand fully the implications of their cause. They were unconsciously driven by motives unrelated to reality. Eventually, the whole system of Western democratic imports fell apart, and a totalitarian society was erected in its place. Consequently, the political vibrations of the SECOND GENERATION had deeper chords than those of the FIRST GENERATION; chords with greater impetus and more powerful passions for possession of complete power. Psychologically, the second generation, especially the young educated elite, disclosed diametrically different and contrary mentalities. During their struggle for independence they hated authority with passion; but when they rode in the saddle of power, they attached the regalia of that power to themselves, felt that their authority was identical with that of the state, and that all those who disagreed with them were enemies of the nation. Militant enthusiasm was directed against the BOSS system. These

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new movements were primarily composed of the middle class, schoolboys, university students, junior government officials, and the discontented from all ranks of the society. These groups were organized, (and some died), in the thirties and forties under the most diverse names: the radicals such as the Young Men (Futuwwa) in Iraq,16 the White Shirts and the Steel Shirts in Syria, the Green Shirts of Ahmad Hussein and the Blue Shirts of the Wafd party in Egypt, the Parti Popular Syrien (Syrian National Party, P.P.S.) in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Jordan; 17 and such reactionary groups as the Moslem Brotherhood, which was influenced by foreign ideologies but which grew from the soil of Egypt and was nourished by Islamic beliefs. In time, in one form or another, militant enthusiasm spread throughout the Arab world. The Moslem Brotherhood, which still today advocates a religious polity, and the P.P.S. which advocates complete secularization, although diametrically opposed in their philosophical outlook, doctrines, and ultimate goals, both preach a doctrine stressing the welfare of man and his society. All the groups discussed above had common basic characteristics, i.e., they were militant and totalitarian in approach, radical or revisionist in outlook, skeptical about the existing order, and intolerant toward each other. The failure of the MULTI-PARTY system and the parliamentary structure to function adequately is due to many causes. As a result of centuries of political development, the cultural traditions and the indigenous political attitudes of the Arab society are basically undemocratic. The new system was imported from the West in the form of a PACKAGE DEAL assembled and used in a highly authoritarian society. The package belonged to another civilization, evolved through European experiences and designed to respond to the needs and demands of the European society. It was imposed from above, and installed by autocratic decrees in an Islamic-Arab society life, with strains and stresses; it was a trial experiment that was supported by, and restricted to, only a minority, mainly in the cities. Many of these parties had little desire or capability to cope with necessary socio-economic changes. While the degree of economic, social, and political change varied from one Arab country to another, the system was never far-reaching because it lacked centralization, and, even though the amorphous masses did emerge, they were never effectively indoctrinated. Economic and social develop16

Kerr, "Egypt Under Nasser", op. cit., p. 16. Majid Khadduri, Independent Iraq (London, Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 1960), pp. 357-365; also: George L. Harris, Iraq, Its People, Its Society, Its Culture ( N e w Haven, Hraf Press, 1958), pp. 90-95. 17

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ments proceeded so slowly as to permit the traditional forces of the ARISTOCRATIC-BOURGEOISIE to retain a good deal of political power. The great mass of the people were indifferent and watched with little comprehension. In due course, however, the new system, confronted with political violence, collapsed under the strain of economic inadequacy and demographic explosion. If there had been a long period of tranquility, the system might have succeeded in adjusting its structure to local conditions and needs. The democratic structure, however, proved to be unrelated to the traditional system and basically irrelevant to the needs of Arab society; the machinery fell apart, for it responded to no needs or demands in Arab society. This state of affairs helped to generate another political revolution under the forcible drive of the SINGLE-PARTY. Thus the end of the MULTI-PARTY system and the rise to dominance of the SINGLE-PARTY were due to the crisis in Arab civilization, a wave of hostility reacting against the alien forces of parliamentary processes. The current SINGLE-PARTY system is but a continuation of the Arab nationalist revolution which followed the MULTI-PARTY system's failure to carry out its objectives of socio-economic development. Attention will now be directed to that reaction.

THE BIRTH OF T U T E L A R Y THE

AUTHORITY:

SINGLE-PARTY

The revolutionary Utopia of the present generation is about to become the reigning ideology of tomorrow. The struggle for dominance has not yet been consummated, but we are witnessing a fundamental ideological and structural change in the socio-economic and political systems of Arab society. After the second World War, only a few of these multiparty ideological and political movements continued to exist as substantially active organizations. The present political life in the Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states is definitely under the influence of the SINGLE-PARTY system which came into existence along with the third post-Ottoman Arab generation. Wherever the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION are in command all political parties, except the one which they control, have been outlawed. Such a revolutionary mood was aptly described by Ben Bella: "There is no place in Algeria for an opposition. Every Algerian has the right to criticize me, but the place for that is in the party itself." 18 18

V a t i k i o t i s , op. cit., p. 102.

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The SINGLE-PARTY system synthesized remaining elements of the multi-party system, founded in the 1930's and 40's, and amalgamated the various extreme MULTI-PARTIES under centralized leadership and one-party discipline. This process included a period of screening and sorting out undesirable elements from the organization. The decisive challenge to the traditional elite, although led mostly by the young military groups, came about not from one social group but from a coalition of extreme classes that differed in ideas, composition, and interests. Of primary significance was their general agreement on one basic principle: the desire to put an end to the feudal system and everything related to it. Consequently, the various regimes, i.e., Nasserism, Bourguibism and similar ISMS, could not have survived without the organization of a political movement, a SINGLE-PARTY, for the mobilization of mass support. Hence the Revolutionary Command Council, under the guidance of Nasser, "looked for support first to those political parties which seemed nearest in ideology and most eager to cooperate".19 Other evidence is abundant. The growth of the F.L.N. of Algeria,20 the Socialist Destour party of Tunisia and the Liberation Rally 21 of Egypt 22 began with coalitions of various extreme movements as a COMMON FRONT against common enemies, be they France, Great Britain, internal corruption, or any other. When the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION, i.e., Nasser, Bourguiba, Ben Bella, came to power, their initial ideology, if they had one at all, was vague. They sensed that the people had expected too much from the parliamentary system hastily transplanted into an Arab society which lacked the necessary social and economic base. Consequently, they approached problems with a strong distaste for philosophical theorizing. They opposed the restoration of the Western political system not for dogmatic reasons but because they were convinced that the system had been responsible for a corrupt oligarchy. As time passed they discovered that to remedy the perpetual ills of their societies was an endless task and that they had but two alternatives: either to centralize command of the economic and political institutions in the hope of providing civic responsibility, or to encourage freer institutions, which at that stage of mass disillusionment would most probably have led to political in10

Ziadeh, op. cit., pp. 191-206. Claire Sterling, "One-Man Rule in Algeria", The Reporter, 1963), 35. 21 Halpern, op. cit., p. 308. 22 Zartman, op. cit., p. 56. 20

X X I X (October 19,

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stability, economic disintegration, and social confusion. The obvious choice was political regimentation and economic centralization. While the leaders of all Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states perceived the need to build effective political SINGLE-PARTIES, and they realized that regardless of how impressive the charismatic power of the leader might be, the SINGLE-PARTY is still essential for the maintenance of organizational centralization under adverse conditions. The political SINGLE-PARTY is still a novel instrument and came into existence under the banner of nationalism in an age of uncertainty when individuals, including the leaders, were in need of solidarity and certainty. The psychological significance behind the motivational appeal and acceptance of the political ideas of the SINGLE-PARTY is to be found in the characters of the leaders and the social groups to which they appeal. Aside from personal charisma, a special talent for formulating ideas, and courage for action, the character structures of the leaders are greatly similar to the character structures of the followers even though they are exhibited in a more extreme and clear-cut way. To become a potent force the ideas of the leaders must answer the psychological needs of the followers, and consequently the character structure of the leader and that of his followers must in many ways be significantly similar. The men of revolutionary organization of the third generation represent the emergence of the revolutionary age and the final disintegration of the western political system. Although perhaps theoretically subscribing to the ideals of western political organization, they now see democracy in a new and different light. The dynamics of the new phenomenon centers activity not on democratic philosophy, but on the promotion of social and economic justice, an increase of industrialization, agricultural reforms, and a reduction of corruption. The paramount issue in their minds is: to what extent are the democratic parliamentary system and democratization compatible with rapid industrialization and modernization? These militant leaders can no longer allow democracy, because sharing political power in the Western democratic sense would not only weaken their positions, but, more importantly, would make it extremely difficult to enact socio-economic reforms. The MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION, while stressing industrialization and modernization, have, like their predecessors, insisted that the people are not yet ready to rule themselves democratically. The ideological content of western democracy no longer has the same significance; it is no longer defined in terms of individual freedom and political rights. The new democratic ideological message is conveyed in terms of socio-economic

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justice and political order. Though the parliamentary system and election procedures are not completely renounced, they are under the strict guidance and control of the SINGLE-PARTY; it is a guided democracy where the economy is under the control of the state, subject to strict procedures instituted by the new pragmatic Arab Socialism. SINGLE-PARTIES, as some claim, will not necessarily fulfill the rising expectations of the populace or accomplish more reforms than the MULTI-PARTY system that they have but recently displaced. However, unlike the MULTI-PARTY system of the second generation, the SINGLEPARTIES of the third generation have at their disposal the full governmental apparatus, i.e., all means of communications, the military, the bureaucracy, etc. Hence, for the first time in the history of the Arabs, it is easier to control and reshape the minds of the masses. Furthermore, the leaders of the SINGLE-PARTIES are the first totalitarian chiefs " . . . to share certain basic bonds with the politically active masses. They are not deterred by interests of their own from embarking upon fundamental reforms to improve the daily life of the majority. Hence they can at least purchase time by speaking new thoughts even if they turn out in the end to fail in their new deeds." 23 Authoritarian by birth, monolithic by baptism, and totalitarian by creed, all SINGLE-PARTIES are intolerant of criticism, but for various political and psychological reasons they sometimes permit limited dissenting opinions, i.e., the Ba'ath party in Syria 24 and Iraq, as long as these criticisms are not directed against the government. Adverse criticism can easily be brought to an end by forbidding the opposition the use of the public means of communication. By the efficient use of propaganda, the SINGLE-PARTIES have succeeded in proving their revolutionary aims to be in the interests of the masses; and, by basing the legitimacy of power not on the voting process but on a sort of mystic delegation of authority - symbolizing the voice of the masses - they give the impression of being champions of the common people and scourges of the tyrants, the big businessmen, the merchants, and the landlords. Specialists still hold diverse opinions as to the success or failure of the SINGLE-PARTY system. There is the general conviction that the SINGLE-PARTY, through state propaganda, has succeeded in conditioning the populace to believe falsely that the state has already accomplished a great deal in the field of socio-economic improvement while in actu23 24

Halpern, op. cit., p. 228. Sherman, "Nasser's Decase", op. cit., p. 201.

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ality the conditions have merely remained as before or, in some cases, have even deteriorated slightly. Moreover, state propaganda has managed to paint a rosy stereotyped future, which has already begun, and has attributed it to the realistic planning of the SINGLE-PARTY system. In case of serious failures, the government is in an easy position to create scapegoats by proclaiming these failures to be the results of neo-colonialism.25 Conversely, it is true that though the standard of living remains the same, the aggregate national production, through industrialization, land reform, and social improvement, has increased substantially in comparison to that attained by previous regimes. The success or the failure of the SINGLE-PARTY in the Arab world must not be judged either by western standards or by what is ideally right, but by what is feasible under local circumstances. Only under such conditions is it possible to judge the work of the party. Moreover, succes or failure should not be measured by material progress alone; the enormous popularity of Bourguiba and Nasser, for example, is a manifestation of great achievement, or at least that is what the populace believes. The least that can be said in defense of the SINGLE-PARTY system is that, if there are no actual and tangible successes, the leaders understand that the appearance of success is indispensable to counteract inaction, indifference, and mass lethargy. However, a danger is imminent; the present historical period has demonstrated that most of these new social links are, so far, the result of negative reactions rather than positive actions. The success of the SINGLE-PARTY, i.e., as a political agent of socio-economic transformation, depends upon the construction of an harmonious Arab ideology within the framework of the changing economic, political, and social values. Likewise, the success of the SINGLE-PARTY depends on methods which, under the pressure of modernization, require no definitive cohesiveness or ultimate principles of coherency, but rather absolute flexibility. Considering the scarcity of MEN OF KNOWLEDGE capable of generating such an ideology, it is very likely that the outcome, as a consequence of intense political bargaining, will benefit the interests only of ruling groups and not of the people. The obstacles to success are many and complex. There is serious doubt as to whether the newly formed SINGLE-PARTIES will be able to accomplish their urgent objective, i.e., the rejection of the present status quo, in order to produce a common political culture in the interest of the community as a whole, 25

Halpern, op. cit., p. 228.

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or whether they will be forced by circumstances to revert to the traditional order and become an instrument of certain cliques. Political realities in some cases require the utilization of two aspects of ideology: an emotional myth and a pragmatic utilitarianism directed to action. Ideological success depends upon the use and fusion of these two elements to set up social circumstances where corruption is minimized and where there is enough flexibility so that various autonomous institutions, i.e., religion, secularism, modernism, can be supported and can live harmoniously with each other in the interests of a better society. The SINGLE-PARTY must avoid the pitfalls of becoming either the captive or a mere blind executor of its ideology. So far, only Bourguiba and, to a lesser extent, Nasser, remain relatively free to experiment, learn, and apply their programs. Thus one of the most important and immediate problems is whether the present Arab SINGLE-PARTIES can become a successful means of firmly joining the four cords of forces into a strong social bond: strong but enlightened leadership, a flexible ideology that fuses myth and reality, dedicated membership and centralized party organization, and socio-economic responsibility for the welfare of the masses. The SINGLE-PARTY is based on tutelary authority; its immediate aim is to find ways around the existing puzzle: the absence of national solidarity. The Arabs have, so far, demonstrated a distaste for disciplined and abiding unity. They lack coordinated functional organizations and hence, collective endeavors for national unity. Their activities are restricted to enthusiastic emotional outbursts. It is because basic orientation and, a fortiori, effective leadership are lacking, that many of the attributes of contemporary Arab existence have entrenched themselves so menacingly in the Arab soul: the Arab's apparent incapacity for disciplined and abiding unity; his self-centeredness, manifesting itself in chaos and disorganization; . . . his reluctance to assume responsibility for his personal or national misfortunes, and his inclination to put the entire blame upon the shoulders of "others"; . . . his emotionalism, which is on the whole aimless and formless . . . rather than continuous, constructive, purposeful common endeavour. 26

It is against these negative characteristics that the various Arab SINGLEPARTIES are searching to find remedies - a quest for positive orientation, for effective participation in politics, and for public responsibility. It is in this uncharted Arab soul that the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZA26

Alan W. Horton, "A Note on Syria, the Sudan, and the United Arab Republic", American Universities Field Staff, XII (June, 1965), 9.

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through their SINGLE-PARTIES, hope to find a device for achieving the aims of their revolutions. To their credit, the SINGLE-PARTIES can be described as tutelary democracies, under which the established institutions, the outmoded traditions, and the unworkable social arrangements are to be remade with the sole purpose of securing the individual's natural rights and liberating him from the chains of economic dependence. They are an attempt to destroy extreme inequalities, to sweep away all intermediate centers of power and allegiance, i.e., regional loyalties and feudalism, which have been responsible for the people's bondage. The SINGLE-PARTIES, however, are also totalitarian with principles of monolithic control. Their primary functions include not only control and mobilization, but also political indoctrination. Individualism, as understood by the party leaders, is damned because the emphasis is not on the individual's rights but on sovereign power. The individual personality, his freedom, rights, and duties must be subordinated to the personality of the NATION OF THE PEOPLE. Thus the SINGLE-PARTY emphasizes national power, social equality and welfare, rather than individual political freedom; "the new regimes considered political freedom for dissident classes and individuals a luxury they could not afford". 27 In the same vein, wherever the SINGLE-PARTY is in full control, the potentialities of democratic institutions at the local level are also promising. Hundreds of local branches of the party have been established, thus giving the people an opportunity to manage many of their local affairs. Political participation at the local level has been meaningfully practiced and people are encouraged by the higher echelons to discuss community problems. No better illustration is available than that of the Socialist Destour party of Tunisia where, in the words of Charles A. Micaud, the emphasis is on education in the context of political mobilization. Tunisia, (and to some extent Egypt and Algeria): TION,

. . . has reached a high degree of political integration . . . The party has had a broad popular base, and has succeeded in creating a near consensus on the goals and methods of modernization . . . With this wide base, the party could successfully mobilize the masses in the cities and the countryside, first in the struggle for independence and later in the battle against underdevelopment. . . . allowing a minimum of democracy at the beginning, in fact prepares the way for the more mature phase of democratic role through the competition of organic political forces. 28 27

Cremeans, op. cit., p. 64. Fayez A. Sayegh, Understanding the Arab Mind (New York, The Organization of Arab Students in the United States, June, 1953), p. 28. 28

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It can also be asserted that on the higher level of political organization - National Assembly - the single-parties in control have upheld the principle of national representation with equitable distribution of representatives among the workers, peasants, intelligentsia, etc. Hence, every element of the society has been stimulated or acted upon so that a new system of power integration and distribution prevails. On the whole, the prospects for over-all development where the SINGLE-PARTY prevails seem encouraging in comparison with the situation existing in many of the traditional Arab states. Wherever the SINGLE-PARTY is in full control, e.g., Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria, mob violence and bloodshed have been controlled. This statement has even more force when one compares the latter countries with those Arab countries where the MULTI-PARTY system still exists or where the SINGLEPARTY is still weak, as in Syria. However, as long as the political and socio-economic expectations and aspirations, which are basically a reflection of distinct and often opposite experiences, remain far apart, it is inconceivable that there will be any substantial improvement. Moreover, as long as the forces of particularism, as a consequence of tribal animosities, ethnical divisions, and geographical obstacles, remain, they are bound to be felt in the political and socio-economic structures. "Indeed, in societies with little experience in decentralized authority and little consciousness of national goals", as in the case of the Arab-Islamic societies, "too rapid a delegation of power is a sure route back to repressive authoritarianism."29 In such societies where the population explosion increasingly drains the limited natural resources, where the distance between rising expectations and achievements is growing wider, where opportunities have become fewer, people are not inclined to wait patiently forever. If these societies are left unaided and disgruntled, further coups and military revolutions, as a consequence of chaotic mass disturbances, will most likely result. What is badly needed is a centralized regime to erect flexible social bridges over existing gaps, to strengthen stability in the political realm, and to provide honesty in social matters. Thus it can be seen that the SINGLE-PARTY system is the product of the existing social situation; it is an attempt to remedy the defects. The success of the SINGLE-PARTY, to use the thought of Manfred Halpern, " . . . becomes the touchstone of its genuineness. That is why its success, or its aura of success, implying sanctity, can quickly win adherents to its bandwagon. That is also why failure, or the aura of failure, 29

Berger, The Arab World Today, op. cit., p. 306.

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can bring about disaffection just as sudden." 30 Totalitarian? Yes! But, in the meantime, it appears to be the only political system capable of controlling factionalism and other negative forces.

THE THEORY OF UNIONISM: T H E ROLE OF T H E G O V E R N M E N T A N D T H E A U X I L I A R Y ORGANIZATIONS

The attainment of the offices of presidency and prime ministry by militant men marks the beginning of the end of the MULTI-PARTY system. This move also assures the complete supremacy of the SINGLE-PARTY as the sole legal political party representing all Arab REVOLUTIONARYPROGRESSIVE states. The SINGLE-PARTIES have accomplished this and have generated only a minimum of antagonism; their programs are established on broad political and socio-economic bases to encompass the many political elements and incorporate them into the SINGLE-PARTY system. The Arab Socialist Union of Egypt and Iraq, the Ba'ath party of Syria, the F.L.N. of Algeria and the Socialist Destour of Tunisia all advocate Pan-Arabism, provincial nationalism, socio-economic reform, anti-imperialism, and Islamic reforms. However, those political parties whose ideologies are diametrically opposed to those of the SINGLE-PARTY will, most likely, be eventually repressed. Of those opposition parties, the various local Arab Communist ones are typical: they are banned not only because they are most active, but also because they, like the Arab Socialist Union, the Ba'ath, the F.L.N, and the Socialist Destour, believe in the supremacy of the SINGLE-PARTY system and the eventual suppression of all other parties. With their brands of Arab socialism, pragmatism, and new ideologies, the Arab non-communist SINGLEPARTIES are providing the most effective alternatives to Communism. The liquidation of opposition and the creation of the SINGLE-PARTY system spring not only from political expediency but also, most certainly, from the pattern of basic concepts of traditional Islamic theory. Opposition to the SINGLE-PARTY system has ceased to exist in most Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states. The national single-party (e.g., the Arab Socialist Union of Egypt,31 the F.L.N, of Algeria,32 and the Socialist Destour of Tunisia) alone holds positions in the executive 30

Halpern, op. cit., p. 148. George Vaucher, Gamal Abdel Nasser et son équipe (L'édification de la République Arab Unie), Vol. 2 (Paris, Rene Julliar, 1960), pp. 324, 333, 334. 32 Brace, op. cit., p. 160; see also: article 24 of the Constitution of Algeria in El-Moudjahid (September 7, 1963). 31

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and legislative branches of the governments. In some cases, i.e., Iraq and Syria, opposition parties are reluctantly allowed to exist and compete because of political expediency; here the single-party has been strong enough to stay in power but lacks the strength to suppress the opposition, e.g., the Kurds in Iraq, the feudal-conservative elements and the Communists in both Iraq and Syria. However, what has stabilized the single-party in Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia, but has failed so far to be effective in Iraq and Syria, is the principle of coordination, i.e. bureaucratization, and the assimilation of the political and socio-economic forces into a pattern of conformity. Centralized bureaucracy is a requisite characteristic in view of the unique crises created and exacerbated by the factors of great urgency and limited time. The ARAB CRISES are CAUSATIVE ONES: the inability of the SINGLE-PARTY to solve fundamental

problems leads to further crisis and the eventual loss of its position. The time pressure and the urgency are always present in these causations, and when the cycle is completed a new one starts. Only when fundamental problems are solved satisfactorily will a peaceful transition from the SINGLE-PARTY to a MULTI-PARTY system be possible. Since internal unity is still precarious, the crucial problem for the SINGLE-PARTY seems to be how to maintain political stability under a totalitarian form of government. Consequently, the SINGLE-PARTY must initiate socio-economic developments and yet not resort to tyrannical and harsh methods in the process. The totalitarian nature of the SINGLE-PARTY almost reaches into the realm of the absolute. It has a quasi-spiritual dynamism, instilling it with a semi-ecclesiastical character. It has its zealous and fanatical followers, its militant order and its missionaries - all of whom propagate the faith and help fill the vacuum created by the weakening of the basic Islamic concepts. The leaders perceive that their SINGLE-PARTY represents the widely composite factions of society; thus they are psychologically and politically inclined to conceive of themselves and their parties as the only rightful and valid embodiments of the peoples' will. Consequently, other parties are viewed as illegitimate encroachments on the peoples' will. Loyalty to the state becomes identical with the loyalty to the SINGLEPARTY, and an attempt to separate this identity is a traitorous act and is considered to be treason against the state. Such identity is justified on the ground that party rivalries will lead to national disunity. Further, it is claimed that a plurality of parties at this stage of development generates particular conflicting interests, which very likely will prevent long range positive planning. Thus, according to the identity theory, the

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nation which demands rapid political and socio-economic progress can no longer afford a competitive MULTI-PARTY system. Only a strong, well-organized, and centralized SINGLE-PARTY is able to resist the danger of further coups, is capable of maintaining an efficient bureaucracy with accountable responsibility, and can keep the military establishment subordinate to civilian authority, yet at the same time remain constantly alert to the interests of the society as a whole. These rationalizations in defense of the legitimacy of the SINGLE-PARTY place the opposition parties at a crucial disadvantage. An analysis of the dominant nature of the Arab Socialist Union, the F.L.N, and the Socialist Destour together with the study of their organizational structure reveals the existence of political bodies whose great power allows them to carry out the functions of their national governments. Stated simply, there exists a government within a government; the former is represented by the SINGLE-PARTY which carries out the effective leadership and direction of government while the latter, the constitutionally defined government, acts as little more than a bureaucratic tool and rubber stamp of SINGLE-PARTY directives. This phenomenon is not entirely novel in the politics of the Arab world; historically and theologically33 the principle of unity and order in Islam is personified in Allah: the supreme power acting in the interest of the community. In time, however, the personification of God was genealogically transferred to the LEADER, and more recently, to the leader of the SINGLEPARTY.34 The SINGLE-PARTIES of Bourguiba and Nasser are illustrative. The Arab proclivity for ONE MAN rule, or in modern times, for a SINGLEPARTY, unconsciously asserts itself. The use of the parliamentary structure and procedures are only tactical, and actually, its composition and rules originate not from the populace, but from the leader or the CENTRAL COMMITTEE (Political Bureau, or Supreme Executive Committee) of the party. All present constitutions of the Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states, implicitly or explicitly, sanction only one political party. Only the SINGLE-PARTY is empowered to carry out the objectives of the people, to direct their education, to define the policy of the state and to control the actions of the government. The SINGLE-PARTY state has taken over the official

33

David D e Santillana, "Law and Society", in Thomas Arnold and Alfred Guillaume (eds.), The Legacy of Islam (London, Oxford University Press, 1931), p. 286. 34 See: Yusif Sayigh, "Development: the Visible or the Invisible Hand", World Politics, XIH (July, 1961).

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function of nominating all candidates for responsible public offices,35 thereby insuring complete control of the governmental apparatus. The identification is very obvious: the corresponding state EXECUTIVE and LEGISLATIVE bodies in the SINGLE-PARTY are the CENTRAL COMMITTEE and the NATIONAL CONGRESS. In Tunisia, for example, as in the rest of the Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE government, "all secretaries of state have been party members".36 A similar relationship exists between the legislative branch of the government and the NATIONAL CONGRESS of the SINGLE-PARTY where the CENTRAL COMMITTEE nominates candidates for membership in the National Assembly.37 The president of the government, who is usually the head of the SINGLE-PARTY, has almost unlimited power in initiating and executing the policies of the state and has the power to veto legislation. This veto power is subject to overriding by the usual two thirds vote in the National Assembly, but this is almost impossible to achieve. The right to veto is further strengthened by the president's constitutional power to legislate in times of crisis. Though such legislative power is subject to subsequent ratification by the National Assembly, the president can easily declare a crisis. Consequently, the concentrated executive power, under the control of the CENTRAL COMMITTEE, has brought about changes in the other organs: the legislative and judicial branches of the government have become more consultative rather than decision-making bodies. Organizationally, the SINGLE-PARTY is based on democratic centralism. Factually, it is a totalitarian movement where the party and the state are practically identical. Its militant nature can be seen in its outstanding characteristic: strict hierarchical order. It is pyramidal in structure; at the apex is the Central Committee which is the highest organ 38 and in which the real power resides; at the base are cells whose limited power pertains only to local matters and is subject to the will of the central authority. The primary function of the Secretary General, who is the chairman of the CENTRAL COMMITTEE, is to coordinate and direct the party activities and to define party policy. Directly subordinate to the Secretary General is the CENTRAL COMMITTEE whose real function is to review and nominate all candidates for important public offices and to

35

Elie Salem, "Emerging Government in the Arab World", Orbis, VI (Spring, 1962), 111. 36 Zartman, op. cit., p. 72. 37 Salem, "Emerging Government in the Arab World", op. cit., p. 111. 39 Barbour (éd.), op. cit., pp. 316-317.

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advise on party policies.39 In like manner, the CENTRAL COMMITTEE 4 0 acts as an unofficial cabinet for the head of the state, advising him on a host of matters relating to governmental policies. When his control prevails, the entire body of the CENTRAL COMMITTEE is appointed by the Secretary-General. However, the normal process of attaining such an office is by election. Next in hierarchical order is the NATIONAL COUNCIL, composed of the presidents of the local regional federations who, in turn, are elected by delegates from the various cells of the party. Its primary function is to serve as a link between the lower level of the party structure and the central organization; it also serves as an advisory body when consulted by the CENTRAL COMMITTEE. Just above the base of the pyramidal structure of the party is the NATIONAL CONGRESS which, with the approval of the Secretary-General and the CENTRAL COMMITTEE, releases the principal party directives. The membership of this body is composed of one representative (usually the head) from every cell: 41 it meets once every two or three years but always at the will of the CENTRAL COMMITTEE. The structure and principles of the NATIONAL COUNCIL and the NATIONAL CONGRESS usually adhere closely to the ideals of democratic centralism. In this prolonged struggle for dominance, political expediency has dictated further centralization and the assertion of the theory of "unionism". On the one hand, the success of the SINGLE-PARTY has been its ability to create and/or control the various AUXILIARY ORGANIZATIONS as tools for social mobilization and mass control, which are indispensable in establishing harmonious ties among social classes and reinforcing mass homogeneity. On the other hand, the ascendancy of the SINGLEPARTY in political, military and socio-economic institutions, could, in many aspects, lower the effectiveness of the AUXILIARY ORGANIZATIONS as operative links between government and society. While relationships between the SINGLE-PARTY and AUXILIARY ORGANIZATIONS differ from one Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE state to another, one common trend is obvious: all SINGLE-PARTIES harness AUXILIARY ORGANIZATIONS to their purposes. First, membership in any particular AUXILIARY ORGANIZATION is no longer voluntary but is more or less official and compulsory. All laborers and professional people must join their respective unions and professional associations. Rival organizations are not per39

Salem, "Emerging Government in the Arab World", op. cit., p. 111. The best analysis of the Tunisian single-party (Neo-Destour) is f o u n d in Clement H. Moore, "The Neo-Destour Party: A Structure for Democracy?", World Politics, X I V (April, 1962), 461-482. u Salem, "Emerging Government in the Arab World", op. cit., pp. 110-113. 40

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mitted. In some cases, youth groups and unions are tolerated so long as they do not pose a threat to the revolutionary system. Secondly, all existing AUXILIARY ORGANIZATIONS profess the ideology of the regime under the supervision of the SINGLE-PARTY. Such thoroughness guarantees the final establishment of a highly centralized rule and the eventual destruction of any opposition. Consequently, the individual member is forced, psychologically, to believe that his special interests are identical with those of the regime, a fact that makes any potential revolution seem hopelessly futile. Yet it must be . . . borne in mind that the extent of freedom from domination and control must be measured by very different standards in different conditions. Thus in one comparatively small region, viz. the Middle East, countries are found whose governments are at present engaged in bringing organizations of workers and employers into existence, both by education in trade union practice as well as by legislation. A degree of governmental influence is to be inferred which these organizations are probably powerless to resist. Yet it has to be conceded that it is an influence of a parental character, and the presumption of benevolence must be made in its favour. 42

In Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia, the SINGLE-PARTIES' political integrationist policy has reached out to all AUXILIARY ORGANIZATIONS. In Egypt, for example, when the military men waged their successful coup in 1952, the Revolutionary Command Council began consolidating labor organizations. The first major attempt began in 1955 when the labor section of the Liberation Rally established an "all Egypt Trades Union Congress [reorganized in 1957 into the] Egyptian Confederation of Labor".43 Since then the Labor Department has handled all routine labor matters. However, the more important union problems, i.e., those which involve labor disputes that might affect the political climate, are now handled by the Arab Socialist Union. This has been justified on the ground that the Government is in a better position to extend expert advice 44 and to guide the policy of the labor unions. However, it is more reasonable to conclude that the increased numbers in the Egyptian labor unions 45 (91,600 in 1947 to almost 450,000 in 1956) 4 6 have 42

International Labor Organization, Report of the Committee on Freedom of Employers' and Workers' Organizations (Official Bulletin, 39.9:588, 1956). 43 Al-Jumuhuriyah (Cairo, 22 November, 1958). 44 See: Al-Musawwar (Cairo, February 8, 1957). 45 William J. Handley, "The Labor Movement in Egypt", The Middle East Journal, XIII (Summer, 1959), 279. 46 Egyptian Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, Directorate General of Labor, Census of Labor Unions and Federations in the Republic of Egypt (in Arabic) (Cairo, Government Press, December 1956), p. 24.

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warned the regime of the potential political role of the labor force which could be easily converted into opposition if not officially controlled and politically supervised. Hence, according to Egyptian law, only active members of the SINGLE-PARTY may serve as officers of the trade unions.47 Additional centralization and governmental control have also taken place since 1959 whereby employer-employee relationships, wages, working conditions, and similar issues have been brought under the control of the central government.48 The largest and best organized labor forces in the Arab World are located in the Maghreb, especially in Tunisia and Algeria. In Tunisia the Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (the Tunisian General Union of Labor, U.G.T.T.) is an all embracing labor organization,49 whose membership in 1958 was estimated to run as high as 225,000 members.50 In Algeria, the Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens (the General Union of Algerian Workers, U.G.T.A.) is also an allencompassing labor organization whose membership is estimated to exceed 200,000 members. From the very first, both labor movements have been closely tied to their respective political parties.51 Political and ideological sophistication in both Tunisia and Algeria have been more in evidence than in any other Arab state. This encouraged the U.G.T.T. and U.G.T.A. to play a more active political role than the Egyptian Federation of Labor. Like the labor unions in Egypt, all trade unions in Algeria 52 and Tunisia 53 come under the direct control of the SINGLE-PARTY. In the case of Algeria all members of the U.G.T.A. are automatically members of the F.L.N., but they play a minor role in the government. In Tunisia 54 the bulk of the U.G.T.T. membership, which is "federated unions - government employees, workers in state enterprises, miners, transport and railway workers, etc." 55 hold membership also in the Socialist Destour party. Moreover, in order to strengthen the relationship between the SINGLE-PARTY and the trade unions, the key 47

United Arab Republic, Official Journal, Decree Law N o . 8 (April 3, 1958). Ibid., Decree L a w N o . 91 (April 7, 1959). 49 Cf. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Summary of the Labor Situation in Tunisia (ICA, O f f i c e of Labor Affairs, March, 1958). 50 Cf. U.S. Department of Labor, O f f i c e of International Labor Affairs, Directory of Labor Organizations, Directory of Africa (Washington, 1958). 51 Ibid. 52 Hurewitz, "Regional and International Politics in the Middle East", op. cit., p. 87. 63 Ibid., p. 91. 54 Halpern, op. cit., p. 303. 55 Barbour (éd.), op. cit., pp. 334-335. 48

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figures of these trade unions hold either high governmental offices,58 commanding positions in the Central Committee, or both. The nationalist struggle for liberation from imperialism, feudalism, and corruption brought the labor movements into close alliance with the SINGLE-PARTIES. This does not mean that the common bond between the labor unions and the SINGLE-PARTIES is strong enough to overcome all differences.57 Their interests have not always been identical, as was revealed at one time between the U.G.T.T. and the Socialist Destour in Tunisia.58 However, analysis suggests that political rather than economic expediency has been the primary factor in the formation of trade unions and consequently, they may be aptly described as government-nurtured. The Arab Socialist Union, the Ba'ath, the F.L.N, and the Socialist Destour parties have put higher priorities on economic growth and social innovation than on wage increases. Hence, emphasis has been on economic-cultural changes: the psychological adjustment of the workers to the new industrial environment, increased efficiency for higher productivity, and the discipline of labor forces to meet the demand of the government for planned economy. Of more significance is the activity of the youth. The value of the youth lies in its potentialities: more than half of the population of the Arab states are under the age of twenty. All leaders of the Arab SINGLEPARTIES have realized that the future of their movements is tied to the younger generation. The party that controls the youth may well control the future. This explains in part why the Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE governments have been particularly solicitous and have made systematic attempts at comprehensive political orientation by the establishment of STATE YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS and SPORT CLUBS. The most effective youth organizations are those of Tunisia, known as the Destour Youth Associations59 and those of Egypt, called the General Federation of the U.A.R. Students. Their main purpose is twofold: "the indoctrination of the youth and the formation of social and political 'action groups' ",60 The task is to foster the growth of patriotism among the members of the younger generation and to weld stronger bonds of brotherhood. The goal is to create a nucleus for future leadership, a 56

Ibid., p. 305. Anwar Salamah, the leading protagonist of free trade unionism, resigned from the presidency of the Egyptian Confederation of Labor. 58 Anon., "Geopolitique de la Tunisie Syndicaliste", op. cit. 59 For background of Bourguiba's attitude toward the zeal of the students see his speeches in La Presse (January 19-20, 1963, and April 14, 1963). 60 Barbour (ed.), op. cit., p. 217. 57

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new and vigorous elite whose loyalty will protect and perpetuate the goals of the revolutionary SINGLE-PARTIES. The uncompromising fervor of these organizations, their psychological appeal, and their call for radical action have become natural attractions to the youthful temperament. Thus the bond of UNIONISM between the present ruling elite and the youth of this generation is apt to become stronger. While the revolutionary spirit of the SINGLE-PARTY has cast a captivating spell over the youthful recruits, it does not indicate the end of conflict between the youth and the paternalistic SINGLE-PARTY. Youthful dissension, while not publicized, has been in evidence. In Tunisia,61 as well as in Algeria and Egypt,62 further centralization and governmental supervising of the various non-political organizations, including the youth organizations, may be indicative of such dissension. To overcome some of the difficulties, both Presidents Bourguiba and Nasser have established a "school for training and propaganda (which) was responsible for the formation of leaders" 63 and a Committee on National Education. The elders, i.e., Nasser and Bourguiba, are interested in safeguarding their so-called revolutionary orders against any potential wave of revolutionary spirit that might defy the basic tenets of the SINGLE-PARTY. Thus the essential task of the youth organization is psychologically to take away from the youth the right to doubt the basic tenets, to dissent, or to deny the validity of the movement advocated b y t h e SINGLE-PARTY.

The main weakness of the SINGLE-PARTIES of the Arab REVOLUTIONstates lies in the organizational realm. In Egypt where the masses are controlled by the regime, the SINGLE-PARTY still lacks organizational means. The Egyptian regime's laborious difficulty is not in asserting its power, which seems indisputable, but rather in its inability to create a viable SINGLE-PARTY to organize the masses and to facilitate the establishment of adequate channels of communication between the ruling elite and the public. Unlike Tunisia,64 and to a lesser extent, Algeria, where the reduction of opposition, both actual and potential, has been accomplished, the Egyptian regime lacks strong hierarchical popular organization with an effective network of local party cells to mobilize grass-roots support. The first move in this direction took place in January, 1953, during the so-called Naguib era, ARY-PROGRESSIVE

61 02 63 64

See: The New York Times (December 28, 1963). Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp. I l l , 134. Barbour (ed.), op. cit., p. 317. Halpern, op. cit., p. 310.

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when the regime dissolved all political parties and established the first 85 SINGLE-PARTY, the Liberation Rally. Its objectives were to support the regime in molding a new Egyptian society: united, proud, and productive. Enthusiasm, ardent zeal, and fervor were high; the quasi divinely inspired message of the revolution, UNITY-ORDER-WORK, was carried to all sectors of the society. Self-reliance, self-sacrifice, and love of country were preached; efficiency, economic recovery, and a fight against illiteracy and poverty were demanded.86 However, the Liberation Rally never gained self-momentum and it was scarcely mentioned in the press after 1955. This failure can be explained by the fact that the leaders were young and immature, highly idealistic, and minimally pragmatic in approach; but, above all, the movement was spontaneous, lacked adequate organization and the necessary experience to succeed. Since it was unable to gain public support, Nasser was forced to reorganize his movement; the Liberation Rally was replaced by the National Union, founded in May, 1957. The objective was "to watch over the realization of the aims of the revolution and over the reconstruction of a sound national life".87 Nonetheless, the National Union was shortlived and with the break-up of the union between Egypt and Syria it was replaced in April, 1963, by the Arab Socialist Union. 88 The factors contributing to the failure of the National Union are worth analyzing. As with the Liberation Rally, there was a scarcity of political experience and skill. While the leadership had become more practical in approach, because it lacked disciplined organizers, talent and adequate guidance and control on the lower levels, there were frequent setbacks. Moreover, the ideology of the National Union was so loosely structured that interested individuals could no longer identify themselves apart from the rest of the populace; consequently, the members of the party remained uncommitted and in time lost their ardent zeal. There was also a lack of loyalty and cohesion. Unlike the Socialist Destour and the F.L.N, parties, the political victory in Egypt came as a result of a successful military coup d'etat which was followed immediately by the organization of a mass party, the Liberation Rally or National Union. This mass mobilization occurred too soon; it should have been preceded by the development of a small but effective nucleus. 65 The Program of the Liberation Rally was published in al-Ahram daily newspaper (Cairo, January 16, 1953). •« Al-Ahram (Cairo, July 27, 1953). 67 Zartman, op. cit., p. 113. M The Statute of the Arab Socialist Union came into effect on December 7, 1962.

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In Tunisia 69 and Algeria the struggle for independence, waged for a number of years, helped to build a strong and dedicated core. Later came the move to mobilize the masses behind it. Ultimately Nasser realized that a leader, in order to revolutionize the society, must first solve the problem of political organization and establish a group of responsible supporters before success is possible. Once again, after Syria's secession from the union, President Nasser, for the third time, set out to reorganize the National Union as a force to mobilize popular support for political and socio-economic reconstruction. Disturbed by the indifference of the masses, the high degree of corruption, and the lack of response to his socialistic reforms, he endeavored to organize a nucleus cadre similar to the Socialist Destour's in Tunisia. Reconstruction commenced in 1962-63 with the creation of the Arab Socialist Union. Active participants are welcomed, but official screening of all party nominees is a basic prerequisite. There is abundant evidence that the Arab Socialist Union has been more active and successful than its two predecessors; however, the results have been uneven: favoritism to family and clients, corruption, lack of public responsibility, and similar negative forces are still powerful challenges. The selection of members for the progressive club is far from being solved, for it is estimated that up to 1963, some 4.7 million men and women had been enrolled in the Arab Socialist Union; 70 as a consequence the presence of too many members may be weakening its strength by derogating from its exclusive character. Even in Algeria, where discipline, structural organization, and party centralization are more effective than in Egypt, the opposition to Ben Bella and his F.L.N, party constituted potential threats. The opposition was centered in the troubled Kayline area where Hocine Ait Ahmed led the Socialist Forces Front (F.R.S.) in a guerilla campaign against F.L.N, authority. A less violent but still formidable opposition was the Clandetine Opposition Group, whose membership included Ferhat Abbas, Mohammed Boudiaf and Mohammed Khider. Only in Tunisia is there sufficient evidence to indicate that the single-party, the Socialist Destour, under the leadership of Bourguiba, has made great strides in bringing an end to all opposition.71 This can partly be explained by the fact, apparent in my frequent travels in the Arab world, that Tunisia, 68

Halpern, op. cit., p. 300. Hurewitz, "Regional and International Politics in the Middle East", op. cit., p. 85. 71 Halpern, op. cit., p. 300. 70

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unlike the rest of the Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states, enjoys a large middle class and a high degree of urbanization. Even the villages are semi-urbanized because Tunisia's small geographical size helps to increase contact between the rural and the urban centers. The result is social integration with a minimal social gap between classes. This unique social situation helps the Socialist Destour party control the nation more effectively than any other SINGLE-PARTY in the Arab world.72 Also, Bourguibism has approached very closely the required harmony between leadership, ideological tenets, balance in organizational party structure, and responsible supporters: essentials that are either partly lacking or neglected by the other Arab SINGLE-PARTIES. The dilemma of all the existing Arab SINGLE-PARTY systems is in the choice as to whether (1) to be a genuine mass party and include the entire politically conscious population, as in the case of the Arab Socialist Union of Egypt, (2) to be exclusive in nature so as to restrict membership and ultimately become an elite group as is likely to occur to the F.L.N, in Algeria, or (3) to strike a middle path as in the case of the Socialist Destour party in Tunisia. In the first case there is the danger that the single-party may continue to be only a conciliatory drive for mass deception. In the second, there is the danger of its becoming too dictatorial at the expense of individual benefits. In either case the extent of recruitment becomes an essential problem. The problem is one of evaluation; while the party must attract more than one faction of society, mass mobilization would not be in its interest, as President Nasser has learned from experience. The political disquiet which forced Nasser to re-organize his party twice has illustrated that if most people are members of the party its significance diminishes. This was the case of the Liberation Rally. Yet the problem is equally distressing if recruitment becomes restrictive. There is the risk that the party will turn into an exclusive club resulting in a weakening of patriotic feelings, in a diminution of its inspirational dynamics, in a loss of dedication and in the proliferation of indifference. Only in the third option is there any hope of improvement provided that available resources are adequately exploited in the interest of the society and that cultural traits are conducive to and flexible enough to meet the changing situations. It is too early to predict the future of these countries, for the character of the SINGLE-PARTY is slow in taking shape. However, the following features are already incorporated as part of the basic structure of all the Arab single-parties. Even though these 72

Moore, op. cit., pp. 461-482.

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features vary in DEGREE rather than KIND, they do show some similarities', (a) a pyramidal structure; (b) a tendency toward a cadre rather than mass organization; (c) a bent toward a system of collective leadership under the supervision of a supreme guide, i.e., Nasser, Bourguiba or Boumedienne; (d) a careful screening process for membership, personally supervised by the top hierarchy, and (e) a combination of territorial and corporative system of governmental representation with provisions to include almost all levels of society.

THE LAW OF PROBABILITY

The SINGLE-PARTY remains a means to an end, not an end in itself; it is a way to achieve a dignified life. The Arab society of the REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states is in constant turmoil, hence any prediction is hazardous. "Under the growing pressure for change from below, the bourgeoisie usually allied itself with the landlords who were politically the dominant group . . . until the 1950's. This step was in line with its traditional proclivity to seek greater social status and economic security . . .".73 Further, it is believed that the return of the old political traditional system is highly improbable. This is so because the traditional ARISTOCRATIC-BOURGEOISIE is numerically, economically, and politically too weak and unorganized to challenge the rising strength of the contemporary MILITANT-INTELLIGENTSIA strata whose NUCLEUS is the military elite. There is, generally, no significant stratum of capitalists, of independent middle classes or intellectuals, whose ideological outlook resembles that of the traditional ARISTOCRATIC-BOURGEOISIE and which could therefore join with the latter in making a powerful alliance against the contemporary MILITANTINTELLIGENTSIA. Consequently, the ARISTOCRATIC-BOURGEOISIE leadership will, most likely, never again find a substantial following and will survive only in the most backward peasant type of society, such as Saudi Arabia and Libya. Even here, however, signs of restlessness are on the increase, for the walls of traditions are constantly assailed by the bombardment of modernization and industrialization. Since opposition groups are subject to extra-parliamentary measures, they tend to be weak; they lack the financial and other resources necessary for an effective struggle with the governing elite of the SINGLEPARTY. Furthermore, the SINGLE-PARTY uses governmental power to 73

Halpern, op. cit., p. 47.

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grant civil service posts to its officers and members, employs state funds and other facilities to strengthen its position, and monopolizes the symbols and myths of nationalist legitimacy. Unlike the MULTI-PARTY system, the SINGLE-PARTY aims at rapid industrialization, or at least gives this impression. Thus, its leaders justify the rise of a totalitarian regime to carry out economic development and to subdue opposition that tends to be created as a consequence of industrialization. This POPULISTIC philosophy is a product of the opposition to the corrupt practices of the traditional elites and the leaders of the MULTI-PARTY system. Despite its pre-occupation with the masses, the SINGLE-PARTY does not necessarily lead to intimacy with the masses or to a deep attachment to them. Its POPULISTIC philosophy is compatible with the desires of the masses, but the SINGLE-PARTY does not necessarily require their support. Rather, it treats the masses as means, as instruments, to be used to create changes in the socio-economic order. The paramount question is: what will happen to the movement and the SINGLE-PARTY after the death of the leader? Will the SINGLE-PARTY disintegrate and finally collapse, or will the party machine emerge as the final victor after a short internecine struggle among the lieutenants? There is no single answer; almost anything may take place. However, it must be emphasized that in any case a well-established SINGLE-PARTY is paramount in insuring the continuation of the movement. Where internal cohesion and tight organization of the SINGLE-PARTY are established and its activities transcend the genius of its creator, the law of probability suggests that it is likely to live beyond the lifetime of its creator. The party machine, under the guidance of its lieutenants, becomes a self-perpetuating force: the principal goal of the party is to create a system of power so strong that no single member can overshadow its force. In many Latin American states where the military leaders seized power without the backing of a strong centralized SINGLEPARTY, their movements were doomed to failure. On the other hand, the death of Lenin and Stalin and the overthrow of Malenkov and Khrushchev only led to a struggle within the upper strata of the Communist party and the party machine emerged as the final victor. In the case of contemporary Arab politics, Iraq and Syria have had a struggle similar to that of the military leaders of Latin American states while in Algeria the overthrow of Ahmed Ben Bella by his chief lieutenant, Boumedienne, an incident similar to that of Malenkov and Khrushchev, did not have any serious effect on the F.L.N. Considering all the circumstances, it is not likely that the death of Bourguiba or Nasser will

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seriously affect the structure of their two SINGLE-PARTIES for they are as well organized as the F.L.N. To wage social revolution, the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION need subordinates, i.e., lieutenants, who are loyal to the party and dedicated to the cause of the revolution. Not only are the lieutenants assigned the task of carrying out reforms, but they are the power behind the SINGLE-PARTY throne. Among the creators of the Arab SINGLE-PARTY mass movements only Nasser and Bourguiba have so far proved to possess the unique qualities and the strong characters necessary to win the friendship and hold the utmost loyalty of their immediate collaborators. Likewise, they have realized that the essential organ of the party machine, (the modern version of mass democracy), the structural characteristics of a well-established bureaucracy, and the backbone of their movements demand a constant test of loyal and trusted party lieutenants. Faithful deputies are among the most essential and elusive requirements to enable the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION to put their program through effectively. Both Nasser and Bourguiba long ago recognized the political necessity of delegating responsibility among their key lieutenants and have given them public recognition in order to give the SINGLE-PARTY a natural continuity that would not require the charismatic aura of leadership. Thus, at the core of Socialist Destour para-militants are men like Bahi Ladgham, Ahmed Ben Salah, Habib Bourguiba, Jr., Ahmed Mestiri, and Taib Mehiri, who are identified as the etatistse group of the party,74 and who are acquiring mass popularity.75 In Egypt, Nasser has followed a similar approach in delegating administrative responsibility and decision-making to men such as Abdel Hakim Amer, the Egyptian Commander-in-Chief; Colonel Anwar El Sadat, the President of the National Assembly; Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, the influential editor of the al-Ahram newspaper and the ideologist of the Arab Socialist Union; Ali Sabri, the Secretary-General of the Arab Socialist Union; and Abdel Latif al-Boghdadi. Any one of these is a potential successor but Bahi Ladgham 78 will most likely be the choice in Tunisia and Abdel Latif al-Boghdadi or Zakariya Muhieddin in Egypt." On the whole it is safe to conclude, as Wilton Wynn points out, that Nasser's right-hand men are of high calibre, intelligent leaders with 74

See: Le Monde (January 1, 1959). The best complete account of the role of an etatiste group is in Lorana Hahn, North Africa: Nationalism to Nationhood (Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1960). 76 Brace, op. cit., p. 142. 77 Kerr, "Egypt Under Nasser", op. cit., p. 15. 75

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strong capabilities for directing large-scale organizations, profoundly dedicated to their leader, and strongly submissive to higher authority.78 A similar remark is made by Manfred Halpern that: "Most of the leaders" of the Socialist Destour party "share a similar intellectual and social background. . a n d have known each other for decades under the most trying political, economic and personal pressures." 79 The failure of most former Arab leaders, e.g., Ben Bella and Kassem, is attributed in great part to their lack of, or their inability to collect able and loyal lieutenants who are essential to the party machine. Like Bourguiba, but unlike Kassem and Ben Bella, Nasser in many ways went through a CHARACTER-CHANGE; he has become more practical and realistic yet has continued to communicate his ideas to his people with the visionary language of an idealist. Both Bourguiba and Nasser have, so far, simplified politics and made it more appealing to the masses, while keeping their ideologies flexible enough to allow pragmatic action. This charlatanistic quality is essential for any movement, for the insecure Arab seems to defer more willingly to authority than people who are self-confident and self-secure. To the insecure Arab, freedom from responsibility is more attractive than freedom from restraint. To obey is, then, the only stability in a chaotic day-by-day existence. The pronounced aim of the SINGLE-PARTY is an attempt to free the individual from traditional servitude and pseudo-democracy. Because of this, it has become a symbolic promise of immediate abundance and plenty - a promise which will be difficult to redeem. As the strongest power center, the SINGLE-PARTY may become a major modernizing force, utilizing its discipline, organization, and talent for progressive developmental purposes. This is the hopeful aspect but, in the absence of socioeconomic underpinnings, the SINGLE-PARTY may well be forced to abuse its power and perpetuate its control for its own interests, i.e., all powerful, centralized rule. Hence, there is the possibility that the elite, i.e., the professional men, the military officers, the politicians, like their predecessors of the traditional elites, may become the most immediate beneficiaries of political power, social prestige, and economic betterment. Thus the victory of the SINGLE-PARTY may paradoxically begin, contrary to all expectations, a dangerous trend by widening the gap between the modern ruling elite and the populace. "The social distance among individuals in the Middle East is growing wider under the pres78 79

Wynn, op. cit., pp. 68-72. Halpern, op. cit., p. 301.

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sure of the modern age." 80 The day may come when the gigantic power of the SINGLE-PARTY creates a strong temptation for the few men at the top of the pyramid to become totally indifferent to the demands of the masses. Thus the character of the SINGLE-PARTY is dialectical: on the one hand it is a process for strengthening the individual's reason by using nature positively in the interests of the social solidarity. On the other hand, the attempt to strengthen individualism without solving the socioeconomic problems may lead to isolationism, insecurity, and anxious doubt. Even if doubt and hostility are alleviated, they are only removed from conscious awareness. They ultimately disappear only when the individuals overcome their isolation and the world around them has become meaningful in terms of their needs. Consequently, in the absence of a firm political and socio-economic base, the SINGLE-PARTY may not for long be able to stop the revolutionary spirit, and the leaders of today may be doomed and washed away by the tides of revolutions which they themselves were instrumental in creating. In its drives for socio-economic development, subsumed under the label of nationalistic legitimacy, the SINGLE-PARTY has demanded unity under its own power. In some cases total regimentation, censorship, propaganda, and even suppression, which have been discussed previously, are used as ancillary aids to help the SINGLE-PARTY, especially when the nationalistic legitimacy begins to disintegrate. Such elements generate fear and distrust throughout the society. Under the pressure of fear and suppression an individual is no longer in a position to unite with his fellows to oppose the authority. The advent of SINGLE-PARTY militancy has managed to alter the character of political life; street demonstrations and mob violence, while still frequent, are no longer suitable weapons for domestic political warfare as they formerly were under the reign of the MULTI-PARTY system. With the passing of the MULTI-PARTY era, violence and mobs are chiefly mobilized and directed against foreign governments as a tool in international politics. Consequently, the success of future coups or conspiracies must depend on an in-group faction, i.e., the military establishment. This was the case in Iraq when Colonel Arif's group succeeded in overthrowing the power of General Kassem. Another possibility, still an internal development, is the death of the leader of the SINGLE-PARTY, which can give rise to a split followed at least temporarily by anarchy and civil war. There is the possibility that Nasser and Bourguiba are aware of such circumstances; and, in order to save their party regimes, are inclined to give 80

Ibid., p. 28.

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more power to their trusted friends. There is also, however, the danger that the promotion of trusted friends might be detrimental to them, as it was with Ben Bella in his relationship with Boumedienne. This chapter does not attempt to show the unique but the typical. By the very nature of their existence, the task of the SINGLE-PARTY in the Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states becomes a multiple one. While the SINGLE-PARTY will, most likely, continue to orchestrate its performance, its political process of modernization requires rational cohesion and mobilization and an ability to cope with the rising expectations of the society. An increase in political performance alone, however, is not sufficient to solve the complex problems that the Arab society is presently facing. The process of institutionalization is the central problem; 81 it provides the SINGLE-PARTY with the needed dynamism to generate self-sustaining change which, in turn, helps to integrate the structural legitimacy with that of the charismatic or ideological, i.e., the organization must become infused with value.82 To be nourished the process of institutionalization demands economic mobilization and through ARAB SOCIALISM it is hoped that the societal phenomena of modernization will engender a better way of life.

81

See: Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay", World Politics, XVII (April, 1965), 386-430. 82 See: David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 287 ff.

Vili REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES: ECONOMIC SOCIALIZATION AS A NEW TREND

THE UTOPIA OF ARAB SOCIALISM

In order to avoid semantic pitfalls, ARAB SOCIALISM is here characterized in terms of a maximum amount of government ownership, a medium-tohigh amount of social welfare, and a limited amount of capital for free enterprise, as circumstances permit. Essentially, ARAB SOCIALISM stands somewhere between the American public welfare system and the Soviet Socialistic economy. It is commonly described as an economic, political, and social phenomenon, but the influence it wields over the younger Arab generation must also be conceived in psychological terms. It manifests itself in an increasing momentum of RISING EXPECTATIONS which can no longer be ignored. This interplay of political, psychological, and socio-economic change has released what social scientists call DEMONSTRATION EFFECTS - the growing awareness of and demand for a higher standard of living. However, unlike the advanced societies, where the economy is capable of satisfying these DEMONSTRATION EFFECTS, the economies of the Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states have tended, until very recently, to remain static. Consequently, the PROLIFERATING DEMANDS tend to be explosive and to exacerbate pervasive discontent. This in part explains why ARAB SOCIALISM is gathering momentum. It at least promises to deal with the deep-seated frustrations inherent in Arab society. Hence, ARAB SOCIALISM has become the vehicle for satisfying a whole new series of aspirations and needs. In analyzing its process, one must also remember that psychological changes are partly the precondition for economic socialism and partly its consequences. The problems of ARAB SOCIALISM are as arcs in circles; the process of its very innovative spirit is an intermingling yet seamless web, and the strands that compose its totality are interrelated and interdependent and cannot be effectively treated separately. One should not assume an exclusively materialistic

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motivation - the urge for higher levels of consumption, more clothing and adequate shelter (as against the poor distribution of purchasing power, low income and living standards, the growing economic gap between the upper and the lower classes, the rising unemployment and the growing slum areas) - in concluding that ARAB SOCIALISM has been solely a causative factor in revolutionary changes, ARAB SOCIALISM is also a comprehensive attitude related to non-economic aspects of life, including the achievement of new levels of human respect and dignity, improved educational facilities, and entrance to new skills and professions (as opposed to rigid hierarchical social structures which choke off opportunity for those who are otherwise qualified). While these factors obviously require substantially increased levels of production for their fulfillment, the fact remains that Arab society aspires to something more than mere economic gratification. Consequently, the satisfaction of these needs through ARAB SOCIALISM requires a shift in popular attitudes to make the process of change socially feasible. The basic requirement for modification in these principal areas involves a new frame of mind the attitude of individuals towards permanence and change, toward the traditional way of life and new alternatives. ARAB SOCIALISM, like the Arab political structure of the single-party system, began to emerge and is still emerging in a Utopian fashion, yet the UTOPIA of today may be crystallized into the REALITY of tomorrow. The Arab society, for the last three generations, has undergone a constant struggle between ideological elements and Utopias in which the Utopias of ascendant factions were often permeated with the ideological elements of older, more conservative groups. A s is often the case, the dominant Utopia arises as premature truth or wishful thinking. It does not become an incorporated cultural trait until it is accepted, either as a novel or a reformed idea in relative accord with the cultural order, by the dominant group. The UTOPIAS of the first and second generations of twentieth-century Arab history, e.g. SELF-DETERMINATION, INDEPENDENCE, FREEDOM, INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY, and DEMOCRACY, the origins of which can be traced to the impact of Westernization, were the work of the Arab ascendant bourgeoisie. These UTOPIAS, oriented toward the realization of a new social order, accelerated the disintegration of the already weakened traditional Islamic way of life. To a certain extent some of these UTOPIAS, i.e., SELF-DETERMINATION and INDEPENDENCE, have been realized, but FREEDOM, INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY, and DEMOCRACY have either failed to come into existence or have been modified to meet changing circumstances. That INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY and DEMOCRACY have

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QOt been realized can in part be ascribed to the ascendant bourgeoisie's misinterpretation and misunderstanding of the Western meaning of these terms and to the absence (which still continues) of certain favorable local environmental factors. The once-radical reform leadership of the first and second generations had, during the course of time, become conservative or reactionary in outlook, especially in social and economic policies. While the leaders were somewhat interested in national independence and some social reforms, on the whole they became more concerned with preserving the feudalistic economic system. Consequently, the impetus for economic and social development had to await the coming of the MILITANT-INTELLIGENTSIA of the third (present) generation whose primary aim has been to widen the realm of political activity and socio-economic welfare. Theirs, among others, is a movement toward social liberalism and an economic socialism best suited to local environments. However, in many cases, economic and social matters are subordinated to and shaped by political considerations; indeed, it may be truthfully claimed that politics often take precedence over socio-economics. Today, nevertheless, a clear-cut distinction between socio-economic and political forces is neither feasible nor advisable. The two are mutually dependent and any prolonged attempt to subordinate socio-economics to politics risks disaster. A t this transitional moment, the circumstances are pregnant with promises and prospects, determination and deficiencies, hope and desperation, self-centeredness and disorganization. What the Arab society is witnessing today is not an academic debate, but an historic transformation. The once democratic-liberal age of Westernization has ended and hard political realities have now ushered in a new era of socioeconomic development and action. Because of the populace's increasing demands and expectations for social justice, the laissez-faire and feudalistic systems have given way to radical economic reform, to welfare states, and to socialism. While the new system, thus far, has yielded only the barest possible results and has yet to reach the final stage of its formation, the inescapable conclusion is that it has gained the ascendency. Whether the UTOPIA of Arab socialism will succeed in becoming a reality remains to be seen. The strong wave of ARAB SOCIALISM has raised the question as to whether opposition between the revolutionary-progressive forces (radicals) and the traditional elements (reactionary, conservative or feudalistic) has reached a stand-off. Will the ARAB SOCIALISM of Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia prove to be an irresistible force? Is it possible that

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the business and feudal classes of the REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states, for example Syria, in cooperation with the other conservative groups in the less progressive Arab states, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, are strong enough to resist ARAB SOCIALISM? Will the Ba'ath party in Syria, whose Utopian concepts have spawned revolutionary movements throughout the Arab world, be an asset in spreading the forces of socialism? Is it likely that the middle and lower classes in the less progressive states will be in a position to press social change and modern progressivism on their governments? Finally, is it likely that pragmatic socialization, enforced by Nasser's Egypt, will indue the possibility of Arab cooperation and possible political unification? There are no simple answers for these questions. However, a few tentative conclusions are in order. On the one hand, it is possible that the explicit missionary zeal of certain REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE governments, by forcing their revolutionary activities onto the less progressive states, might sharpen the existing conflict, breed instability, and ultimately lead to the weakening of all concerned. On the other hand, it appears more likely that the REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE regimes, spurred on by demands from the lower and middle classes of the less progressive states, will avoid violent outbursts and gradually spread the unitary, socialist, progressive movement throughout the Arab fatherland. The outcome is hard to foresee precisely because the unpredictable undercurrents are constantly at work. Since the socialist path to new corrective changes will likely appeal to both the MILITANT-INTELLIGENTSIA and the masses and will greatly influence the revolutionary movements, a chronological study of current events in Syria may shed some light on the future of Arab socialism. As mentioned previously, the mass-individuals are too unenlightened to have an effective sense of political and socio-economic construction. However, since Syria's independence, the apolitical ranks seem to be thinning very rapidly and these politically unenlightened are veering either to the RIGHT OR LEFT. Political and economic challenges to Syrian traditionalism came predominantly from alliances between young military officers and the new middle class, especially the extreme intelligentsia. By virtue of their education and relatively modern outlook as well as the lack of opportunities to express their ideas through peaceful means, these men identified their personal frustrations with national grievances so as to produce a chronic behavior that undermined stable government without producing any positive tangible alternatives. This situation was further aggravated by the shortsightedness of the tradi-

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tional ruling elites who were quite reluctant to accommodate to the changing circumstances, what they considered to be their legitimate rights. Consequently, the social setting of the postwar period was politically and economically unstable, resulting in a chain of coups d'etat. The new leadership, after achieving power, had to cope with the perennial political and socio-economic problems in order to maintain control. However, postwar difficulties in Syria were compounded by an underdeveloped economy, the lack of an effective economic program, and the absence of efficient government. This epochal point of departure from the traditional way of life occurred in 1949 when three consecutive coups were waged in order to bring about the changes essential for social stability. Yet not one of these coups was able to reach its publicly stated goals. Even though the series of coups that took place in Syria preceded the Egyptian July Revolution, at no time did the Syrian regimes attempt seriously to initiate socialistic economic programs. "While the Za'im regime was too short-lived to effect actual land reform, a start was made with the formation of a committee to draw up plans for the distribution of state-owned land to small farmers." 1 But Za'im's overthrow by Colonel Hinnawi led only to a further short period of political instability during which no attempt was made to promulgate reform decrees. The Shishakli regime 2 was somewhat more successful than that of Za'im and instituted education, health, and sanitary projects. Shishakli, in an attempt to carry on where Za'im left off, promulgated a number of reform decrees. The two most notable of these, decrees No. 9 6 3 and No. 4 6 4 regulated the ownership of state domain and reorganized the civil service establishment and many other organizations in an attempt to stimulate socio-economic changes. Yet, during this period of successive coups and political unrest, which incapacitated various governmental economic and social programs, economic development continued. This is best noted in the development of the Jazira district between the upper Euphrates and the Tigris area, which "thereby increased the country's cultivated area by a full third in the ten years after the war". 5 However, such a development was primarily due to the modest efforts of private individuals, including the feudalistic ruling 1

Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military: 1945-1958, op. cit., p. 130. Rondot, The Changing Patterns of the Middle East, op. cit., p. 128. 3 Republic of Syria, Official Gazetta (al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya), Decree No. 96 (Damascus, Government Press, January 30, 1952). * Ibid., Decree No. 46 (August 12, 1952). 5 Hottinger, op. cit., p. 255. 2

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elêments, and not to governmental initiative. At no time were the military regimes able to take complete control of the governmental machinery. The cabinets of the regimes were comprised of various coalitions which preserved a stable balance and thus reenforced the status quo with few deviations from the traditional political game. While the new form of Pan-Arabism "had been encouraged in consort", 6 the MULTI-PARTY system "found its reflection in the composition of the cabinets. Whereas the first post-Shishakli cabinets were largely dominated by the People's party, in 1956 they gave place to a 'national unity' cabinet. . .".7 Thus, at no time did the Syrian military regimes install a program contrary to the interest of privileged groups, for example, the landlords, or radical programs that were obviously revolutionary. Thus, these military uprisings were basically coups rather than revolutions. This is further demonstrated by the fact that these coups were the outcome of sudden provocative circumstances rather than long-range planning on the part of the conspirators. 8 Further, these over-all developmental changes were very modest in comparison with what took place in the Syrian Region of the United Arab Republic. There were more radical changes during the short period of union than ever before; in fact, these changes were important factors leading to the breakdown of the UNION. One cause of this breakdown is pointed out by a Moslem and Western-educated Lebanese, Dr. Hassen E. Saab, who comments that "Syria submits to socialism without believing in it". He contends that when Nasser imposed his program on Syria, the party in power first aimed at proclaiming itself as a socialistic revolutionary movement. However, when socialistic means were applied with forceful intensity, forces supposedly dormant emerged to destroy the ruler, the party, and the regime. "Therefore, to many theoreticians, socialism appears in a country like Syria as a doctrine against nature." 9 There is a measure of truth in this analysis, for Nasser's type of socialism was too radical for the Syrians. On the other hand, there is no strong evidence to suggest that socialism in Syria appears to be "against nature". No social structure is static and rigid enough to reject innova8

Rondot, The Changing Patterns of the Middle East, op. cit., p. 128. George Lenczowski, "Syria: A Crisis in Arab Unity", Current History, XLII (April, 1962), 202. 8 According to Anwar El Sadat the Egyptian Secret Revolutionary Society, the forerunner of the Egyptian Council of the Revolution began in 1939 and "in 1942, the society was organized in sections, each composed of separate cells"; see: El Sadat, Revolt on the Nile, op. cit., p. 13. 9 Hassen E. Saab, "Le Syrie Subit le socialism sans le croire", Jeune Afrique. No. 194 (27 juillet, 1964), 19-21. 7

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tion even though history has demonstrated that individuals are ambivalent in their acceptance of change, and are very reluctant to give up old and familiar customs and habits. This is particularly true of individuals living in highly traditional societies. Yet, historical experience also indicates that the same individuals seek to improve themselves through the fruits of modernization. Of course Syrian society, since the 1930's, cannot be described as being completely traditional. Although certain aspects of traditional culture survive in the present situation, Syrian society has undergone drastic alterations. There is no guarantee that the forces of change will win the eventual battle against traditionalism. Neither is there the assurance that impulses for social change, which are in active discord, might force the ferment into constructive channels. This interplay between change, hope, expectation and desire, versus the traditional and outmoded ways, is now yielding to struggles for personal mastery occasioned by incompatible aims. These interacting forces, coupled with the mass frustration fostered by the inevitable looseness of the transitional period, helped the Ba'ath party to seize power by dictatorial methods. The Ba'ath's task is to transform Syrian society in ways which will make it compatible with its philosophical aim, Arab socialism. In a state like Syria, where uprisings and political upheavals have been the rule, the introduction of any radical economic system is, at best, bound to provoke vigorous reaction. Socialism is no exception. Consequently, swings of the economic pendulum between the traditional system and the new form of socialism are to be expected. This trend will continue until internal struggles, currently raging in the minds of the Syrians, are resolved. Philosophically speaking, the existence of Arab socialism in Syria might be considered illusory. But what is realistic today was not necessarily so yesterday, and today's illusion may be tomorrow's fait accompli. After its separation from the union, Syria, under the influence of the Ba'ath party, was ambivalent as to which economic system was better fitted to its society. There was the traditional urge to revert to the combination INDIVIDUALISTIC-FEUDALISTIC economic system. Yet, the legacies of Nasser's type of SOCIALISM left so deep an impression that the new Syrian Government could not ignore it. Psychologically the situation can be described in the following manner: the two values, the traditional and the new, had either to clash with each other or to find some mode of accommodation. However, the pattern of accommodation was difficult to achieve during the transitional stage. Hence it was to be

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expected that, in this period, there would be indecisiveness in reference to the future, and oscillation between hostility and acceptance of socialism. The operation of these thought patterns may differ from one locality to another, i.e., in villages, cities, etc.; but in all cases it is an attempt to overcome individual discontent and helplessness in a discordant environment. The struggle has usually resulted in compromise, but it should also be emphasized that Nasser's legacy has probably facilitated radical change in the socio-economic structure of Syrian society. This was obvious in the tentative approach to the problem outlined by Premier Mahmun el-Khuzbari on October 1, 1961, when he stated that "the members of the cabinet support a genuinely socialist policy . . . which aim at giving the worker his full and unabridged rights . . ,".10 The Syrian Arab Revolutionary Command (SARC) also asserted that true socialism is one of the social pillars of the regime, together with Arabism and democracy. The affirmation of ARAB SOCIALISM was followed, however, by complex amplifications. On December 1, 1961, the voters cast ballots for members of the new parliament. The liberal-conservative coalition won about four-fifths of the parliamentary seats, resulting in a come-back for the People's Party (Populist Party, HizJb al-Sha'b), which had suffered a political defeat before the union because of its pro-Iraqi tendencies. The key figures of the new government were president Nazim al-Qudsi and Prime Minister Dr. Ma'ruf el-Dawalibi, principal leaders of the People's Party. Mahumn el-Khuzbari, first Prime Minister after the end of the union, was named speaker of parliament. The new parliament abolished Nasser's legislative decrees of July, 1961, under which banks, insurance companies, and the most important enterprises had been nationalized. The July, 1961 decrees were replaced by the milder Industrial Organization Law. This act imposed moderate restrictions on the concentration of ownership. In its first statement, on January 8, 1962, the Dawalibi Government proposed a definite liberalization of the economy and the re-affirmation of private ownership. However, the same policy statement made clear that the workers' gains and peasants' rights acquired during the UNION with Egypt would be protected.11 Adnan al-Quwatli, who was the Minister of National Economy in the elDawalibi Government, announced that Gamal Abdel Nasser's July, 1961 decrees were improvised for propaganda purposes - not in the interest of the workers or of the national economy. They were not 10 11

Quoted from: Cremeans, op. cit., p. 175. Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 206.

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aimed at reform but at enabling the rulers (Egyptian) to dominate the people (Syrians), which weakened individual initiative. However, the new law, contrary to Nasser's decrees, was aimed at constructive socialism and genuine social justice.12 The new decrees, which gave concrete FORM to the idea of constructive socialism, were enacted by the Syrian parliament on February 14, 1962, under which enactment . . . c o m p a n i e s taken over by the f o r m e r regime were to be returned to private ownership, but with government control over the size of shareholdings in large enterprises a n d with far-reaching employee benefits retained. Workers were to receive 2 5 % of net profits, as well as a variety of fringe benefits, and to h a v e two representatives on c o m p a n y b o a r d s of directors, which were not to n u m b e r m o r e than seven. 1 3

Amidst these developments, accommodation between divergent interests became more difficult and, consequently, the two patterns of thought the old and the new - again confronted each other. While the new Government, composed mostly of liberal-conservative politicians, made certain concessions in the name of socialism, such concessions, in the opinion of the radicals, especially the leftists in the army corps, were mere gestures to placate the general public and particular factions within the army. Unwilling to tolerate the parliament because of its old fashioned policies, the military group of Colonel Nahlawi staged, on the 28th of March, 1962, another coup. Politicians were either exiled or arrested, parliament was dissolved, and the head of state was detained. Opposition mounted and the pro-union military officers of Aleppo finally forced the Nahlawi group into exile and a more militant, progressive Government was established. The new President, Dr. Nazim alQudsi, was profoundly influenced by the Ba'ath philosophy. The Dawalibi cabinet was replaced by one under Dr. Bashir el-Azma, known for his progressive socialistic outlook, and who had held office under the union with Egypt. Once again ARAB SOCIALISM held the upper hand. This can be illustrated by the fact that the first move of the el-Azma Government was to re-nationalize the largest industrial complex, the Khumasiya Company. Despite unpromising conditions there is still ample time for the liberal-conservative groupings to ponder the lessons learned from their failure. In the contest for control of Syrian politics, guidance of the Syrian economy, and Syrian social reform, the liberal-conservative eleDamascus Radio, Domestic Service (February 15, 1962). Oded Remba, "The Middle East in 1962 - An Economic Survey", Middle Eastern Affairs, X I V (April, 1963), 105. 12

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ments have been defeated, though not disgraced. The major proponent of ARAB SOCIALISM, the Ba'ath party, has so far won a major victory which makes its opponents less willing to compromise. The choices are few and extremely difficult to make. If they continue to oppose ARAB SOCIALISM, the liberal-conservative groupings may commit political suicide because they lack the required strength and organization for a meaningful opposition role. By associating themselves with the Ba'ath party in the name of Arabism and socialism they will either: (1) invite the Ba'ath to exploit them and thereby consolidate its grip on the economic, political and social programs of Syria; or, (2) if they are wise enough in their approach, they may succeed in attenuating extreme ARAB SOCIALISM, thus leaving room for free enterprise. Certainly, considering all circumstantial evidence, the second alternative would be preferable. The choice is no longer whether one can have the whole loaf but rather how to share it with others. It is difficult to predict the outcome. More coups will, no doubt, take place. Yet one thing is fairly clear - the impact of Nasserism and its form of socialism (in addition to that of the Ba'ath) has left a deep impression on the minds of the Syrian people. No future Syrian government will attempt to return to the traditional economy inherent in an INDIVIDUALISTIC-FEUDALISTIC societal structure. Syrian society will probably continue to practice free enterprise within an EQUITABLE SOCIALISTIC type of economy. It is a "steady movement in the direction of Arab nationalist and 'Arab Socialist' formulas".14

T H E IMPETUS OF NASSER'S SOCIALISM

The coup (inkilab) in Egypt was an economic and "social revolution ordered" from above.15 Unlike post-coup developments in Syria, the Egyptians immediately and unhesitatingly instituted radical reforms. The planning and execution of the Egyptian inkilab was the fruit of years of preparation.18 Leaders of the regime, as a whole, were determined individuals bent upon rebuilding the country on new foundations compatible with existing culture. The first change was political - a reform program which swept away the corrupt monarchy and the aristocratic elite. This was followed by a land reform program.17 The properties of 14 13 16 17

Cremeans, op. cit., p. 175. Hottinger, op. cit., pp. 266-267. See: Wynn, op. cit., especially chapters two and three. Rondot, The Changing Patterns of the Middle East, op. cit., p. 128.

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the royal family and landlords were immediately confiscated and distributed among the peasants. In an attempt to eliminate inequitable distribution of wealth, the Agrarian Reform Bill limited land ownership to two hundred acres, adjusted the relationship between landowners and tenants, and provided for the reduction of rent and the raising of agricultural wages by legalizing certain rights of the tenants.18 Some agrarian laws have been difficult to implement and the effect has been the creation of a new type of peasantry - based on a government cooperative network similar to the kibbutz of Israel. In practice, though not so much in theory, land reform and its distribution suggested an approach to future nationalization. It is a policy (in spite of its shortcomings) which attempts to give the Egyptian peasants and farmers an opportunity to better their lives by governmental social action. Nasserism, in its successive phases, the latest known as ARAB SOCIALISM, has been a revolutionary socialistic movement. It was forced upon society by a chain of compelling circumstances in response to the inner urges of the MILITANT-INTELLIGENTSIA (including the military elite) rather than as a result of working-class and popular demands. Nasser's reliance on pragmatism rather than dogma may add new dimensions to his ARAB SOCIALISM. Nasser's type of socialism was spawned in Egyptian soil because of Egypt's unique national experiences. From the outset, the Egyptian Revolution planned to extend economic development beyond land reform. The Egyptian leaders were well aware of the fact that mere agrarian reforms were not of themselves sufficient and that economic productivity must outpace the population increase.19 To remedy some of the difficulties, the first agrarian reform in 1953 instituted the confiscation system. By 1956, confiscation was extended to include the properties of the European and levantine merchants. This was followed by the project of the High Dam which was inaugurated not only to "increase agricultural output by almost 50 percent",20 but also and purposely to orient Egypt toward industrialization. The plan was to utilize the potential electric power of the Dam for heavy industrialization; e.g., fertilizer plants, truck and tractor factories, an oil industry whose by-products could be used to build up other related industries, paper plants, sugar-beet factories, jute plants, etc. These industrial projects were designed primarily to create new indus18 G a m a l Abdel Nasser, "The Egyptian Revolution", Foreign Affairs, XXXIV (January, 1955), 2-3, 2-4. 19 G a m a l Abdel Nasser, "Where I Stand and Why", Life Magazine, X L V I I (July 20, 1959), 9. 20 Nasser, "The Egyptian Revolution", op. cit., pp. 204-205.

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trial jobs in order to lessen the burden on the agricultural economy, decrease unemployment, and, simultaneously, save the needed hard currency which otherwise would have gone for imports.21 The nationalization of the Suez Canal Company was prompted by political motives rather than economic ones. Yet this move established the precedent for massive and radical waves of socialization. Three huge governmental organizations - the Economic Development Organization, the Nasr Organization and the Misr Organization — were already in control of the socialization process. However, only in 1961, was the full program of socialism implemented. The National Charter of Socialist Principle of 1961 provided that " . . . all public utilities, banking and insurance, practically all industries, all import trade and three-quarters of export trade would be owned by the public sector".22 The pharmaceutical industry and the retail sale of drugs were completely under governmental control. Most recently, a quarter of a million acres of land, owned by Moslem religious organizations, was nationalized.23 The state also took over foreign schools and banned ownership of land by foreign nationals. Compensation was made in most cases. Free enterprise was permitted in domestic trade and light industry, provided that it was guided and supervised by the government. Thus, after ten years of radical change in the Egyptian economy, all of the import trade and approximately ninety percent of the industries are in the hands of the state. Practically nothing is left to be nationalized or expropriated. Whether by a process of osmosis or deliberate action, the Egyptian government has become practically the sole entrepreneur and the sole arbiter of the Egyptian economy. Although Nasserism began with the conviction that political and social matters were too delicate to be left to corrupt politicians, in time it also concluded that the economy of the nation was too important to be administered and manipulated by businessmen. Nasser conceives of socialism as an attempt to close the gap between classes. As time has passed, he appears to have become less impulsive and more deliberate in his actions. Most current investment in nonagricultural fields is being made by the PUBLIC SECTION.24 Radical changes in social matters have followed the pattern of political and 21

Nasser, "Where I Stand and Why", op. cit., 9. Remba, op. cit., p. 100. 23 Carl Leiden, "Egypt Drift to the Left - II", Middle Eastern Affairs, XIV (January, 1963), 2. 24 Hurewitz, "Regional and International Politics in the Middle East", op. cit., p. 84. 22

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economic reforms. Medical care and state welfare for all have been promised. Universal free education based on ability and talent has been initiated. Minimum wages for labor and maximum income for all individuals have been established through the tax control structure, and equal opportunity for old-age insurance, housing facilities, vacations, and cultural benefits for employees have been instituted. This can be best summarized by President Nasser's statements: We nationalized heavy industries so that all of them and any future expansion should be the property of the people . . . W e did the same thing with regard to imports and exports so that national production should not be a tool in the hands of speculators aiming only at securing more profits at the expense of the majority and to smuggle their money through foreign banks. We also nationalized banks so that money should be the servant of the people and not the master. As regards professions, arts and crafts, light industries and internal trade, no restrictions have been imposed on them because they cannot exercise monopolization. 25 It was evident f r o m the first day of the Revolution that we would not be able to achieve social justice unless we eliminated the domination of capital. F r o m the first day the Revolution was a political and social one - a political revolution against imperialism and its stooges, and a social revolution against feudalism, monopoly, exploitation and the dictatorship of capital. 26

When the breakdown of the union with Syria occurred, it released Nasser from a number of ponderous commitments which enabled him, for the first time, to promote his program of Arab Socialism as a Pan-Arab revolutionary ideology.27 Nasser revealed the intention of his new policy in a major speech: "Today we are experiencing real economic liberty... True liberty is true democracy. It is economic liberty and social equality." 28 Genuine democracy, as he sees it, does not consist so much in individual freedom, but rather in socio-economic liberation - the only true political equality. Fundamentally, democracy means the establishment of social justice and equity for the oppressed class as against the oppressive class . . . Democracy means that government should not be the monopoly of feudalism and exploiting capital, but should be for the welfare of the whole nation . . . 25

Nasser's Speech quoted from: Leiden, op. cit., p. 2. The Egyptian Gazette (July 23, 1961), p. 2, quoted from: Cremeans, op. cit., p. 220. 27 Malcolm H. Kerr, "The Emergence of a Socialist Ideology in Egypt", The Middle East Journal, XVI (Spring, 1962), 127-144. 28 Cited in Kerr, ibid., p. 142. 26

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Democracy is not created simply by issuing a constitution or setting up a parliament. There is no freedom and no democracy without equality with feudalism and exploitation and domination by capital.29 ARAB SOCIALISM is not only a corrective measure. It is also a design for uniting the divergent Arab societies into a homogeneous economic and social unit. "The socialist solution to the problem of economic and social underdevelopment in Egypt . . . was never a question of free choice. The socialist solution was historical inevitability imposed by reality . . .".30 Arabism, mass political participation, and socio-economic homogenization are, therefore, triune and Nasserism functions simultaneously on all fronts. It is obvious today that his new strategy (as a consequence of the collapse of the Syro-Egyptian union) is to establish ARAB SOCIALISM in Egypt as a base from which it will spread to all corners of the Arab world, ARAB SOCIALISM, as Nasser conceives it, is a popular movement for export and the essential ingredient for attaining Arab objectives. It is so indispensable that Egypt would never sacrifice Arab unity for self-progress. Nasser is convinced, like many other progressive revolutionary leaders, that Arab political unity will be insufficient and ineffectual unless preceded by the acceptance of ARAB SOCIALISM. It is only through the establishment of structured political organizations, i.e., the SINGLE-PARTY system, and similar ideological and program orientations, i.e., ARAB SOCIALISM, among the various Arab political entities, that there can be any real desire for unity. Even if Egypt "is not able to lead the Arab race to its noble and faraway objective, it is able, at least, to advance some steps on this way".31 Thus, Nasser's immediate objective is that ARAB SOCIALISM must take precedence over unification, a maneuver which, if successful, will ultimately create an integrated ARAB NATION.

These, then, are the various projects and schemes installed by the Egyptian MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION. Chronologically, socialism evolved in the 1950's as a chain of improvisations rather than as an ideology. Soon the regime found itself in control of the Egyptian economy and, subsequently, developed a growing taste for state management, planning, and ownership. But shortly before the end of the union with Syria, as a consequence of the socialist decrees of July, 1961, Nasser's pragmatic policy began to be shaped into an ideology. 29

Ibid., pp. 142-143. United A r a b Republic, Draft of the Charter, May 21, 1962 (Cairo, Information Department, n.d.), p. 44. 31 G a m a l Abdel Nasser, The Charter for National Action (Cairo, Information Department, n.d., possibly M a y or J u n e 1962), p. 121. 30

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"Accepting the challenge", as a reaction to the Syrian coup which brought about an end to the union and raised some psychological implications of injured pride, Nasser "pushed ahead even more vigorously with plans for Arab socialism".32 Ultimately the Egyptian Revolution proved to be more than a military and political movement - all classes and economic and social institutions have felt its osmotic impact. It is a radical innovation in every aspect of life; its type of socialism necessarily affects the existence of the present cultural set-up, not only in Egypt, but also in every part of the Arab world. The Egyptian society has been experiencing successive psychological and sociological collisions which have erupted into wide-spread and strong convulsions. While these convulsions have been accompanied by some positive results, they have, in general, been bewildering, painful, and, in many cases, distressing to individual pride. Whether the story of the Egyptian Revolution, like many Arab Revolutions, is fundamentally a search for a new balance between LIBERTY and ORDER or between CAPITALISM and SOCIALISM is a topic subject to controversy. The essence of the matter is simple: the Revolution itself is not as important as the COURSE of its DEMONSTRATION EFFECTS which have influenced the thinking and actions of other Arab leaders. Most Arab progressive revolutionary leaders, in order to meet the existing situations and the high expectations of their populace, have taken a number of leaves from Gamal Abdel Nasser's salvific handbook describing the steady march along the planned path of economic socialism. In Algeria, Syria, and in other Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states, including Bourguiba's Western-leaning government, adherence to the principles of ARAB SOCIALISM is now a fait accompli. It is "widely hoped in Egypt that the five 'liberated' Arab countries would now form a coalition against the remaining conservatives".33 In Algeria, even before independence, experiments in socialism were far-reaching. Socialization went through three violent stages of nationalization, resulting, almost, in the abolition of free enterprise. The first occurred in the summer of 1962 when approximately one third of colon property was abandoned in the rush to leave Algeria. This was the "allocation of the 2.5 million acres of farmland abandoned by colons to peasant collectives"34 under the management of a governmental 32

Cremeans, op. cit., p. 176. Hurewitz, "Regional and International Politics in the Middle East", op. cit., p. 85. 34 Ibid., p. 88.

33

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committee similar to that of Nasser's. The second happened in March, 1963 when the government decreed the nationalization of many other large European estates. This was followed by a third stage, during the Kabyle revolt at the end of September, 1963, when the government issued a decree sequestering the remaining non-Algerian owned land.35 Steps were also taken to transfer Algerian-owned farms larger "than 125 acres to collective management".38 In the field of non-agricultural economy, the Algerian government followed a similar policy. Even before the Kabyle revolt of September, 1963 all major industries, such as the iron mines and railroads, were nationalized. By the end of 1953 many small private enterprises such as restaurants, cinemas, and hotels were also seized. Unfortunately, this rush for nationalization without adequate prior planning inestimably weakened the Algerian economy. However, two factors must be considered in order to understand the underlying reasons for this rapid nationalization. First, the standard of living of the Algerian people under French rule had always been at the subsistence level. Thus the change from FREE ENTERPRISE under French rule to that of COLLECTIVIZATION after independence did not considerably affect the economic level of the people. Secondly, the system of socialization in Algeria, like the rest of the Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states, has a more fundamental base than mere economics: it embraces socio-economic, political and nationalistic dynamics. The Algerian government seeks to establish an indigenous Algerian socialism based on the peasant majority. "We favor a system of agrarian reform under which the land will be collectivized and granted to agricultural cooperatives which will be responsible for its management and exploitation." 37 It is a revolutionary move to direct the populace's participation in a hierarchy of popular assemblies. "We want an Algerian socialism which is based on our own experience and, at the same time, also draws on that of socialist countries." 38 Within the realm of the socialist orientation, however, private enterprise could remain as long as it did not contradict socialism.39 Though Ben Bella's approach to Arab 35

"Algeria: Faith Without Works", The New Republic, CL (March 14, 1964), 11. Hurewitz, "Regional and International Politics in the Middle East", op. cit., p. 88. 37 Ben Bella, "The Future of Algeria", in Paul E. Sigmund Jr. (ed.), The Ideologies of the Developing Nations (New York, Praeger, 1963), p. 146. 38 Ibid. 38 Brace, op. cit., p. 166. 36

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socialism was "empirisme oriente" 40 (directed empiricism) and less pragmatic than that of Nasser's, it was, nevertheless, closer to Nasser's than to Marxist methods. In the words of Ben Bella, "I am neither a Marxist nor an anti-Marxist, but I realize what our liberation owed to Marxist ideas." 41 Furthermore, Algeria's socialism, as so often emphasized by Boumedienne, is an attempt to reach a reconciliation between Islamic tradition and modernization, a search for co-existence or a blending of Arab socialism with Islam. In defense of Arab socialism, the F.L.N, program 42 of April, 1964, proclaimed Algeria as part of the Arab-Moslem world, Islam by faith and Arabic by language. It can thus be assumed that the only feasible means for achieving Arab unity in the near future rests in the strengthening of Pan-Arabism and the acceptance of Arab socialism. This is what Nasser has endeavored to do since the break-up of the UNION. In Tunisia, too, the domestic policy of Bourguiba is a moderate form of pragmatic socialism. In addition to his personal popularity, Bourguiba's policy has been bolstered by the adoption, after careful considerations and compromises, of a flexible DESTOURIAN SOCIALISM. Under his guidance the Neo-Destour party, which was renamed in 1964 as the SOCIALIST DESTOUR party, has matured in its competence. After careful examination as to the choice of Tunisification in terms of foreign aid and investment, the party developed a realistic program to meet the national needs and to benefit all segments of the population. The approach has been a large-scale program of public welfare called the Battle Against Underdevelopment,43 which is designed to substitute, wherever possible, labor power for capital. The aim is to utilize the unemployed on public works projects and to prevent mass migration to urban slums. Another move in the same direction is the Ten Year Perspective for Development44 which was initiated on August 23, 1961. The fundamental objectives of this plan encompass, first, the Tunisification of the nation in order to eliminate the nation's dependence on foreign aid in the financial, agricultural, and industrial sectors of the economy. Hence, gradual nationalization is deemed necessary. Secondly, 40

See: "Avant-Project du Programme du Parti F.L.N.", Revolution Africaine, No. 63 (April 11, 1964). 41 Alexander Werth, "Algerian Crisis", Nation, CXCVII (November 23, 1963), 342. 12 See: "Opening speech of Ben Bella to the Party Congress", Revolution Africaine, No. 64 (April 18, 1964). 43 Micaud, op. cit., p. 174. 44 Ibid., p. 176.

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an increased standard of living and such related components as literacy and public health are aimed at through the attainment of self-sustaining over-all national growth. The main objective of both plans is the blending of private and public economic sectors to reconcile conflicting interests. While these programs may be overly optimistic and ambitious they are pragmatic and flexible - neither final nor doctrinaire. While Bourguiba's policy is to encourage private enterprise and accelerate domestic and foreign investment, the government has committed itself to the development of the economy by both state and private funds or where private funds are not available, of instituting an exclusive state program of investments. Bourguibism is a Tunisian FORM of ARAB SOCIALISM, an attempt to ensure balanced development that responds to the needs of the people, a socio-economic philosophy directed to justice, equality, and the dignity of man. As in Egypt and Algeria, most major industries, e.g., the phosphate, public utilities and transport facilities, have already been nationalized. The major import and export products have come under the direct management of the government. In the words of Bourguiba: The state may intervene to help . . . and improve working conditions. If it decides to confiscate part of the estate, this is not done out of desire for revenge . . . We do nothing with the intention of restricting the freedom of individuals. We do not apply any pressure. We do not impair individual freedom or the right of ownership, except in the general interest. 45

Thus Bourguibism, as interpreted in the spirit of the revolution, is an endeavor to limit - but by no means to abolish - private enterprise and property. This effort is justified under the banner of the COMMON GOAL. This is the path we have chosen in order to achieve socialism . . . Our sole guide is the interest of the country . . . If the state, which is in a position to weigh the situation, decides on measures implying a restriction to . . . the redivision of certain agricultural lands, it is because it has been led to do so for imperative reasons of general interest . . . We must realize this and fully familiarize ourselves with the idea that the individual's interest lies in the progress and well-being of the community 4 8

The trend in contemporary Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states seems to be the support and pursuance of socialism. Some have suggested that the historical movement of ARAB SOCIALISM is not yet fully formed - much less recorded - though there is ever-increasing enthu45

Habib Bourguiba, "The Agricultural Aspect of the Economic Battle", in Paul E Sigmund, Jr. (ed.), The Ideologies of the Developing Nations (New York, A. Praeger, 1963), p. 144. 46 Ibid., pp. 144-145.

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siasm and conviction on the part of the MILITANT-INTELLIGENTSIA for the application of its ideas.47 Since 1963, the model of EGYPTIAN ARAB SOCIALISM has become an integral part of all Arab REVOLUTIONARYPROGRESSIVE states - Algeria, Iraq, Syria; and Tunisia. Different varieties do exist, but there are broad similarities (and in some cases identical characteristics) manifest among these militant regimes. As for actual practice, the implementation of ARAB SOCIALISM has been accomplished in varying degrees; moderate in the case of Tunisia, radical in the case of Algeria. In terms of a developmental process from nebulous ideas to definite practice, Egypt, Tunisia, and, to a lesser extent Algeria, have made substantial progress in the path of socialism, including the elucidation of ideology. In part, this can be explained by the fact that such highly centralized political SINGLE-PARTIES as the Arab Socialist Union of Egypt, the Socialist Destour of Tunisia and the F.L.N, of Algeria have been in a position to implement a good portion of their programs. The Ba'ath party, since 1963, has also made significant progress from the realm of verbal commitments and generalities into actual implementation.

W H A T A R A B SOCIALISM IS

It is very tempting to try to explain ARAB SOCIALISM in terms of imitation of the Soviet and Western forms of socialism. Such analogical description may serve, within limits, for comparative analysis. But if the comparison is over-emphasized, the result can very easily obscure reality. ARAB SOCIALISM, like Soviet and Western socialism, has resulted from similar human vicissitudes and, therefore, similar interpretations cannot be avoided. Indeed, its origin can be traced back to small groups of Arab intellectuals who had deep admiration for the English Fabians and the French socialist school of Jaures. An article in the Middle East Journal, the title of which is "Salamah Musa: Precursor of Arab Socialism", illustrates the point.48 Like so many Arab GREAT MEN OF KNOWLEDGE of the 19th century, e.g., Jamal al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, Salamah Musa in the 20th century was greatly influenced by the European writers. It was in France that Musa became deeply involved with the writings of Karl 47

Gabrieli, op. cit., p. 123. Kamel S. A b u Jaber, "Salamah Musa: Precursor of Arab Socialism", Middle East Journal, X X (Spring, 1966), 196-206. 48

The

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Marx, Sigmund Freud, Herbert Spencer and similar philosophers. In England, he met George Bernard Shaw and developed an admiration for Fabian intellectual society. "Thus, with Darwin in science, Freud in psychology, and Marx in politics and sociology, was his education broadened." 49 These men, and others like them, influenced both his intellectual and political activities. It was his keen observation of differences between the backward and lethargic Eastern society and the progressive flexible Western society that led him in 1920, with the collaboration of others, to form the short-lived Egyptian Socialist Party. Later, he became an extreme nationalist which, in 1947, led to his arrest on the charge of attempting to overthrow the monarchy of Egypt.30 Of greater concern to us here, however, are his ideas, which have greatly influenced the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION. Many of today's Arab socialistic ideas can be traced back to the writings of Salamah Musa, especially to his two books, Superman (1910) and Socialism (1913) wherein the blending of democracy, fascism and socialism is very obvious. Convinced of the failure of the individualistic-capitalistic system in a traditional feudalistic society such as his, Musa sought to lay a foundation for cooperative socialism. His form of socialism was to be achieved through a comprehensive scheme calling for retirement pensions, compensation for unemployment, death or accident, free education and other fringe benefits. Though an admirer of Darwin and Nietzsche (who helped to plant fascist ideas in his mind), Musa never failed to emphasize the fact that socialism and democracy were but two faces of the same coin. He was certain that socialism is the economic aspect of democracy as the parliamentary system is its political aspect. Consequently, reform had to be accomplished through the constitutional-parliamentary system and by gradual means. In addition, his admiration for Marx's writings influenced his mental faculty "to interpret every event in Marxist dialectics". In the case of Musa, like many others, it was a marital attempt; in "thought and philosophy he was a Marxist, in action he would follow the pragmatism of Shaw and the Fabians". 61 He was an intellect who often spoke of democracy, constitutionalism and "due process of law", but occasionally acted according to fascist methods, an ideomotion that characterized the existing atmosphere of the Arab society. More recently, however, the Arab MILITANT INTELLIGENTSIA have also 49 50 51

Ibid., 198, Ibid., 200-201. Ibid., 203.

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been influenced by socialistic movements, (more so by the social-democratic parties of Western Europe) and ARAB SOCIALISM owes much to the famous British economist and political philosopher, Professor Harold Laski. Likewise, the Bolshevik Revolution influenced the emergence of radical socialist activities in various parts of Arab society; hence, some affinity may perhaps be traced to communism. To some radicalidealists the speedy progress of the Soviet Union from a backward country to the status of one of the most advanced industrial nations has been impressive. Soviet socialism, a possible solution to their unhappy situation, harmonizes with their new perceptions and aspirations. It is here that a paradox reveals itself and in part explains the present confusion of the contemporary Arab socialist MILITANT INTELLIGENTSIA. The trend is by no means a novel one for throughout history the Arabs have been subject to bombardments of foreign ideas and, on many occasions, have proved capable of blending foreign elements with their own and creating an Arab synthesis. Consequently, it can be inferred that the differences between the precursors of Arab socialism, e.g., Musa, and today's MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION, e.g., Boumedienne, Nasser, are differences of DEGREE rather than KIND. The precursors were willing to make a distinction between Western ideas and colonialism, a distinction which today's MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION can hardly conceive. This is so because today's Arab nationalism is more radical in approach and outlook. The precursors' nationalistic feelings were, as a whole, more "cool, calculated and selective . . . and did not reach the bitter level of today's nationalists". Further differences lie in approach: the precursors directed their attention "to the minority of intellectuals with whom [they] held a common background of education and mores. Today's socialists direct their call to the masses." Today's Socialist movement is "more political than intellectual", while the precursors of yesteryear were predominantly "humanist and international. Today's Arab socialism is a movement ancillary to nationalism." 52 However even here a distinction in approach among today's nationalists is evident: the Destourian type of socialism is selective, calculated, realistic, and more similar in approach to the precursors of yesteryear than the one-time extreme radical approach of Ben Bella. Between the two extremes various shades of socialism exist; these are exemplified by the Ba'athists and the Nasserites. The blending of foreign elements with indigenous ones is also ob52

Ibid., 205.

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vious in ARAB SOCIALISM. Yet the thesis is put forth that both Islam and socialism are dogmatic in approach, and thus they are incompatible. The same critics affirm that there is nothing in the history of the Arabs, either in their psychology or in their institutions, particularly conducive to socialism. However, there are those Islamic nationalists (mostly moderates) who seek to renovate Islam and render today's socialism relevant to Koranic principles. They maintain that Islam imposes the duty upon its members to rectify (adjust) their economic life on an equitable basis. "According to the rector of Al-Azhar, in a statement published on December 22, 1961, the most perfect, complete, useful and profound socialism is that prescribed by Islam. . . . " 6 3 Muhammad Abdullah ElAraby similarly stressed the point that the Koranic economic principles not only induce individual initiative (an essential pre-requisite for capitalism or any form of economic development) but also emphatically stress co-operation and sharing (community welfare, collectivism, socialism), abhor the evils of exploitation, (feudalism and pseudo-capitalism) and reject the great disparity between rich and poor.54 Some critics have seen in today's Arab struggle a violent clash between secular nationalism and conservative Islamism with Islam having had the worst of it. Hence these critics see that modern leaders like Bourguiba and Nasser, as well as the Ba'athists, long ago decided to push Islam aside because the Koran no longer seemed relevant to modern problems. To some extent, the analysis of these critics have merit. However, a closer look at the situation reveals certain different and significant facts. The attitude of the MEN OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION toward Islam can be basically described as that of modernization rather than defiance. There is broad agreement on the basic relationship between Islamic and socialistic concepts, even though distinct emphases among the various "isms" ,i.e., Ba'athism, Bourguibism, Nasserism, are discernible. In Syria, theoretically, the Ba'ath party can be described as secularist; no reference is made to Islam. According to Article 15 of its Constitution, "The national tie will be the sole bond existing in the Arab s t a t e . . . It will combat all other denominational, factional, tribal, parochial or regional loyalties."55 At the other extreme is the Iraqi type of socialism which emphatically calls for Islam as the 53

Lewis, The Middle East and the West, op. cit., p. 64. Muhammad Abdullah El-Araby, "Economic in the Social Structure of Islam", in Morroe Berger (ed.), The Arab World Today (Garden City, N e w York, Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964), p. 345. 55 For English translation of the constitution of the Ba'ath party see: The Middle East Journal, XIII (Spring, 1959), 195-200. 54

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only source of ARAB SOCIALISM. "Our strength", says President Arif, "is derived from our heritage and from our Islamic laws . . . The type of socialism we seek is one of social justice, non-exploitation and in line of solidarity desired in Islam." 59 "The Characteristic of our socialism stems from our realities and from our faith." 57 Between these two extremes are the attitudes of the Egyptian and Tunisian regimes. Both Bourguiba and Nasser constructively manipulate Islam. Ideologically, both have acknowledged the link between Islam and socialism. In the case of Nasser the pragmatist, he did not hesitate to oppose the doctrine of the Moslem Brotherhood, i.e., the claim to base the Egyptian constitution on the Koran. The abolition of the sharia courts, waqf, and other laws of personal status, points to the readiness of Nasser to modernize his society. In Tunisia, Bourguiba took a bold step, modernizing (secularizing) Islam, e.g., the law of personal status. Apparently, from most existing evidence, it can be safely stated that Tunisian society has, with some reservations, accepted the move. Even the Ba'ath party, despite its completely secularized outlook, cannot ignore Islam. Its leaders are aware that the socio-economic and political fabric of the Arab society is closely interwoven with Islam. According to Aflaq, a Syrian Christian and co-founder of the Ba'ath, Islam is a revival of integral Arabism, and the Prophet of Islam possessed the virtue of the original substance of Arabism.58 Consequently, no authentic ARAB SOCIALISM can divorce itself completely from Islam. All Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states have clearly accepted Islam, either implicitly or explicitly, as part of their heritage, ARAB SOCIALISM, though possessing different forms does not per se oppose Islam. The variety is itself due to differences in local environments, in economic development, in the level of education, and in the degree of Westernization and modernization. The controversy over the ideological lead and the implementation of ARAB SOCIALISM is an endless one. One cannot fail to notice the striking likeness between Ba'athism and Nasserism, although historically, the Ba'ath was the first to take the initiative in formulating the philosophical approach of ARAB SOCIALISM. The Ba'ath was first to theorize and elaborate a socialistic way of life and according to its basic tenet, socialism will lead the Arabs to realize their own potential by causing the genius 56

The Iraq Times (May 5, 1964). Al-Jumhuriyah (Baghdad, April 28, 1964); also: al-Manar (Baghdad, April 28, 1964). 58 Michel Aflaq, Fi Sabil al'Ba'ath (Toward the Ba'ath) (Beirut, Dar al-Tali'ah, 1959), pp. 43-52. 57

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of the people to unfold in its most complete manner. It assures society of a continuous spiritual and material growth and induces trustful fraternization among its members.59 Besides its philosophical tenet, the Ba'ath has a number of specific provisions relating to economic development and social reforms. Article 29 of its Constitution stipulates that "public utilities, extensive natural resources, big industry, and means of transport are the property of the nation. The state will manage them directly and will abolish private companies and foreign concessions." Workers will have some say in management, but wages will be determined by the state. The owners of small-scale industries will be regulated so as to end the exploitation of labor. Article 30 states: "Ownership of agricultural land will be so limited as to be in proportion to the means of the proprietor to exploit all his lands without exploitation of the efforts of others. This will be under the control of the state and in conformity with its over-all economic plan." Consequently, the rights of private property and inheritance are guaranteed. "The state", says Article 26, "will control directly internal and external trade in order to abolish the exploitation of the consumer by the producer." Of equal importance is Article 27 which states: "General planning . . . will be organized so that the Arab fatherland will be industrialized . . .".60 The Ba'ath, until the early 1950's, had the advantage of being the only Arab socialistic movement. The appearance of Nasser, however, provided the Ba'ath with a new dilemma. On the one hand, as a socialist pan-Arab leader, Nasser became a keen competitor and potential threat to the Ba'ath's existence. On the other hand, the Ba'ath saw him as a reform-minded individual who would be a valuable asset to the movement. The Ba'athist leaders were convinced that they could give the Egyptian revolution a sorely needed, socialistic content. However, as later events revealed, the Ba'ath failed in adapting to Nasser's pattern of leadership at the time of the UNION. In either event it can be claimed, with some degree of certitude, that the over-all program of Nasser has followed the Ba'ath philosophy. Yet it can be emphatically asserted that Nasser's economic and social policy did not follow the Ba'ath suggestions per se insofar as the Ba'ath's suggestions "represented the most plausible operative interpretation of the national-social ideal . . . but because the existing situation and the great pressure for development",61 58

See article 4 of the constitution of the Ba'ath party. Quoted from: Sylvia G. Haim (ed.), Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Berkeley & Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1964), p. 235. 60 Ibid., p. 238. 61 Binder, "Arab Socialism", op. cit., p. 222.

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could only be solved by means similar to the Ba'ath's suggested ideas. Over the past few years, Nasser has come to adopt, implement and apply some of the principal ideas of the Ba'ath. Consequently, a balanced comparison 62 between the two movements is difficult because, until 1963, the Ba'ath movement was restricted to the realm of ideas while Nasser, an activist in complete control of the governmental apparatus, was able to institute a series of socialistic reforms. However, one point is certain - whether the Ba'ath philosophy has been responsible for the actual initiation of Nasser's socialist program, or the actual initiation was imposed and then followed by ideological justification - President Nasser has been the first leading Arab figure to implement a socialistic program. In analyzing these socialistic trends one should note certain public pronouncements and official documents of some of the Arab REVOLUTIONARY-PROGRESSIVE states. According to the National Charter of Egypt, ARAB SOCIALISM does not mean the end of free enterprise and private property. "Control over all the tools of production does not mean the nationalization of all the means of production, the abolition of private ownership, or interference with the rights of inheritance . . .".63 It is rather an attempt to end the methods and means of NON-PRODUCTIVE CAPITALISM (as practiced by the Arab traditional economy) EXTRAVAGANCE (luxury, absenteeism) and ECONOMIC INDIVIDUALISM (economic monopoly, cartels), ARAB SOCIALISM is a manifestation of an inner urge to WAGE A WAR ON POVERTY. A similar approach is taken by Bourguiba who states that: excessively individualistic conception, which takes its justification from free enterprise, is no longer permissible . . . This is our socialist conception of life. We can no longer allow each Tunisian to dispose of freedom of enterprise as he thinks fit. Unless selfishness is checked, the individual ruins the community's as well as his own interests, while ignorantly and short-sightedly thinking that he is serving them. So there must be a far-sighted authority at the head of the community responsible for its progress and having the task of working out suitable ways of guiding it.«4 There can be no confusion possible between foreign investments made by 62

Leonard Binder, "Radical Reform Nationalism in Syria and Egypt", Muslim World (a two-part article), XLIX (April, June, 1959), 96-109, 213-231. 63 Al-mithaq, qaddamahu al-rais Jamal Abdel al-Nasser lil-mu'tamar al-Watani lil 'qiwa al-Sha'biyyah (Cairo, May 21, 1962), p. 74. Quoted from: Hisham Sharabi, "The Transformation of Ideology in the Arab World", The Middle East Journal, XIX (Autumn, 1965), 484. 64 Habib Bourguiba, Renewal of Outlook to Avert Disastrous Upheavals, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

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friendly countries and settlers' lands acquired by methods of spoliation. When we decide to recover the latter, we are merely decolonizing our country. On the other hand, we respect and are grateful for investments made by foreigners for the purpose of helping us carry out our development plan, since they represent one of the forms of cooperation we consider most desirable.65 As in Egypt and Tunisia, the Ba'ath party in Syria has articulated a socialistic program: The process of socialization in Syria . . . is to continue on a democratic basis and in cooperation with the masses . . . [The] mass basis for the democratic and revolutionary experiment . . . would reflect the revolution not only in Syria and Iraq, but would also generate repercussions in all the countries of the Arab homeland. . . .66 The program of the F.L.N, is also designed to end exploitation in a systematic revolutionary socialistic fashion; it is directed to help: First, the poverty stricken peasants . . . the agricultural laborers (permanent and seasonal), the share-croppers, the small land agents, and the poorer landholders. Two, the working class, which is relatively small, the 'half-workers' (ansaf al-'ummal), who are more numerous, and the 'near-workers' (shibh al'ummal), who are becoming more numerous in the cities and consist mostly of peasants whose lands were confiscated. . . . Three, a middle social group which includes small manufacturers, professionals, civil servants, small merchants and a segment of those engaged in free enterprise - a social group which can be called the small bourgeoisie. . . .