Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab states today: an encyclopedia of life in the Arab states 9780313344428, 9780313344442, 9780313344466, 0313344426, 0313344442, 0313344469

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Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab States Today

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Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab States Today An Encyclopedia of Life in the Arab States VOLUME 1: A-J Edited by Sebastian Maisel and John A. Shoup

GREENWOOD PRESS Westport, Connecticut • London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Maisel, Sebastian, 1970– Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab States today: an encyclopedia of life in the Arab States / Edited by Sebastian Maisel and John A. Shoup. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-313-34442-8 ((set) : alk. paper) – ISBN 978-0-313-34444-2 ((vol. 1): alk. paper) – ISBN 978-0-313-34446-6 ((vol. 2) : alk. paper) 1. Saudi Arabia—Encyclopedias. 2. Saudi Arabia—Social life and customs. 3. Persian Gulf States—Encyclopedias. 4. Persian Gulf States—Social life and customs. I. Shoup, John A. II. Title. DS202.2.M35 2009 953.003—dc22 2008040737 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright
C 2009 by Sebastian Maisel and John A. Shoup All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2008040737 ISBN: 978-0-313-34442-8 (set) 978-0-313-34444-2 (Vol. 1) 978-0-313-34446-6 (Vol. 2) First published in 2009 Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.greenwood.com Printed in the United States of America

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Contents

Alphabetical List of Entries

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Topical List of Entries

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Preface

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Acknowledgments

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Introduction Note on Transliteration Chronology Maps Encyclopedia

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Selected Bibliography

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Index

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About the Editors and Contributors

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Alphabetical List of Entries

‘Abd al-‘Aziz b. Muhammad b. Sa‘ud ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Sa‘ud Abha Abu Dhabi (City) Abu Dhabi (Emirate) Agriculture: Traditional and Commercial ‘Ajman ‘Ajman and Umm al-Quwayn ‘Ali bin Hussein bin ‘Ali ‘Anazah Arabian Gulf Arabian Horses Arabian Peninsula Arabic Language Arab Revolt Aramco Archaeological and Historical Sites and Museums Architecture Asir ‘Awamir Bahla Bahrain Bani Khalid Bani Tamim Bani Yas Banking and Finance Banking, Islamic Al-Batinah Bayt Kathir

Bedouin Culture Buraydah Al Bu Sa‘idi Al Bu Shams Calendar, Islamic Camels Charitable Organizations Citizenship in Kuwait Climate Coffee: Arabic and Turkish Coffeehouses Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice Companies Crime Cuisine Cultural Heritage Customary Law Dammam Dance, Traditional Dates Al-Dawhah Death Rites Deserts Dhafir Dhahirah Dhahran Dhows Dhufar

Alphabetical List of Entries Dhufar Liberation Front Divorce Dress Drugs Dubai Dubai Media City Duru‘ Economic Structures Economies, Traditional Education Emir Ethnic Groups Ethnicity Fahd bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Family Life Faysal bin Abd al-Aziz Festivals in the United Arab Emirates Film Industry Fine Arts Fiqh Flora and Fauna Folklore Foreign Policies Fujayrah Gender and Gender Relations Gulf Cooperation Council 1990–1991 Gulf War 2003 Gulf War Ha’il Handicrafts Harasis Al-Hasa Hashemites Health Care Systems Hijaz Hijaz Railway Holidays and Festivals: Islamic Holidays and Festivals: National Honor Human Rights in Saudi Arabia Huwaytat Ibadi Kharaji Islam Ikhwan Imamate of Nizwa Incense

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Intellectuals, Secular International Relations Internet Iran-Iraq War ‘Isa bin Salman Al Khalifah Islamic Doctrines Islamic Fundamentalism—Salafiyah Islamic Practices Jabal al-Akhdar War Jahiliyah Janadiriyah Heritage Festival Jannabah Al Jazeera Jewelry Jiddah Jihad Jubayl Judicial System Al Khalifah Kuwait Kuwait City Lawrence of Arabia League of Arab States Leisure Literature: Classical and Contemporary Madhhab Madinah Majlis Makkah Al Maktum Al-Manamah Markets, Traditional Marriage Masqat and Suburbs Material Culture Media Military Military Bases Mountains Mubarak al-Sabah al-Sabah Muhammad Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab Al-Muharraq Muntafiq Al Murrah Musalsalat

Alphabetical List of Entries Musandam Music: Traditional and Contemporary Mutawwa Mutayr Nabateans Al Nahyan Najd Najran (City) Najran (Region) Newspapers Nizwa Oases Oil Oil Industry Oman Organization of the Islamic Conference Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Palestine Pastoralism, Nomadism, and Transhumance Pearling Philby, Harry St. John Pilgrimage Political Organization Popular Islam Qabus bin Sa‘id Qahtan Al Qa‘idah Qasim Qasimi Empire Qatar Qatif Quraysh Ra’s al Khaymah Al Rashid Al-Rashid Religions, Non-Islamic Riyadh Al Sabah Sabah Al-Salim Al-Sabah

Sa‘id bin Taymur Al Bu Sa‘idi Salalah Al Sa‘ud Saudi Arabia Saudization Security and Terrorism Sex Trade Shammar Shari‘ah Sharif and Sayyid Sharif Hussein bin ‘Ali Sharqah Shi‘ah Social Organization, Tribal and Non-Tribal Sports Sulubba Sunnah Tabuk Ta’if Television Al Thani Tihamah Tourism Travelers and Explorers ‘Unayzah Unemployment United Arab Emirates United States, Relations with Universities and Higher Education Urbanization Usamah bin Ladin ‘Utaybah Wadis Wahhabism Wahibah Water and Irrigation Women’s Rights Yamani, Ahmad Zaki Yanbu‘ Yemen Yemen, Tribal Confederations in Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahayan

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Topical List of Entries

CULTURE AND TRADITIONS Arabian Horses Arabic Language Archaeological and Historical Sites and Museums Architecture Calendar, Islamic Camels Coffee: Arabic and Turkish Coffeehouses Cuisine Cultural Heritage Dance, Traditional Death Rites Dress Education Festivals in the United Arab Emirates Film Industry Fine Arts Folklore Handicrafts Holidays and Festivals: Islamic Holidays and Festivals: National Incense Janadiriyah Heritage Festival Jewelry Leisure Literature: Classical and Contemporary

Material Culture Music: Traditional and Contemporary Religions, Non-Islamic Sports Universities and Higher Education

ECONOMY Agriculture: Traditional and Commercial Aramco Banking and Finance Banking, Islamic Companies Dates Dhows Economic Structures Economies, Traditional Hijaz Railway Incense Markets, Traditional Oil Oil Industry Pastoralism, Nomadism, and Transhumance Pearling Saudization Tourism

Topical List of Entries Unemployment Urbanization Water and Irrigation

Climate Deserts Flora and Fauna Mountains Oases Wadis Water and Irrigation

Ibadi Kharaji Islam Imamate of Nizwa Islamic Doctrines Islamic Fundamentalism—Salafiyah Islamic Practices Jahiliyah Jihad Madhhab Pilgrimage Popular Islam Shari‘ah Shi’ah Sunnah Wahhabism

EVENTS, ERAS, AND DYNASTIES

LAW

ENVIRONMENT

Arab Revolt 1990–1991 Gulf War 2003 Gulf War Iran-Iraq War Jabal al-Akhdar War Al Khalifah Al Maktum Al Nahyan Al-Rashid Al Sabah Al Sa‘ud Al Thani

Citizenship in Kuwait Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice Crime Customary Law Drugs Fiqh Human Rights in Saudi Arabia Judicial System Madhhab Shari‘ah

GOVERNMENT

MEDIA

Foreign Policies Health Care Systems Imamate of Nizwa International Relations Majlis Military Military Bases Mutawwa Political Organization Security and Terrorism United States, Relations with

Dubai Media City Internet Al Jazeera Media Musalsalat Newspapers Television

ISLAM Holidays and Festivals, Islamic Honor

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ORGANIZATIONS Charitable Organizations Dhufar Liberation Front Gulf Cooperation Council Ikhwan League of Arab States Organization of the Islamic Conference

Topical List of Entries Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Al Qa‘idah

PEOPLE AND TRIBES ‘Abd al-‘Aziz b. Muhammad b. Sa‘ud ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Sa‘ud ‘Ajman ‘Ali bin Hussein bin ‘Ali ‘Anazah ‘Awamir Bani Khalid Bani Tamim Bani Yas Bayt Kathir Bedouin Culture Al Bu Sa’idi Al Bu Shams Dhafir Duru‘ Emir Ethnic Groups Ethnicity Fahd bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Faysal bin Abd al-Aziz Harasis Hashemites Huwaytat Intellectuals, Secular ‘Isa bin Salman Al Khalifah Jannabah Lawrence of Arabia Mubarak al-Sabah al-Sabah Muhammad Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab Muntafiq Mutayr Nabateans Philby, Harry St. John Qabus bin Sa‘id Qahtan Qasimi Empire Quraysh Al Rashid Sabah Al-Salim Al-Sabah Sa‘id bin Taymur Al Bu Sa‘idi Shammar Sharif and Sayyid Sharif Hussein bin ‘Ali

Shi‘ah Social Organization, Tribal and Non-Tribal Sulubba Travelers and Explorers Usamah bin Ladin ‘Utaybah Wahibah Yamani, Ahmad Zaki Yemen, Tribal Confederations in Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahayan

PLACES Abha Abu Dhabi (City) Abu Dhabi (Emirate) ‘Ajman and Umm al-Quwayn Arabian Gulf Arabian Peninsula Asir Bahla Bahrain Al-Batinah Buraydah Dammam Al-Dawhah Dhahirah Dhahran Dhufar Dubai Fujayrah Ha’il Al-Hasa Hijaz Ikhwan Jiddah Jubayl Kuwait Kuwait City Madinah Makkah Al-Manamah Masqat and Suburbs Al-Muharraq Al Murrah Musandam Najd Najran (City) Najran (Region) Nizwa

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Topical List of Entries Oman Palestine Qasim Qatar Qatif Ra’s al Khaymah Riyadh Salalah Saudi Arabia Sharqah Tabuk Ta’if Tihamah ‘Unayzah

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United Arab Emirates Yanbu‘ Yemen

WOMEN Divorce Education Family Life Gender and Gender Relations Marriage Sex Trade Women’s Rights

Preface John A. Shoup Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab States Today: An Encyclopedia of Life in the Arab States contributes to our knowledge of the Arabian Peninsula. The main goal is to provide a reliable resource for those interested in going beyond the sensationalist headlines and who want to know more about the people, culture, traditions, and religions of the region. A team of thirteen academics and researchers from several countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and North America has written entries on a wide range of key topics. Entries are on the countries, peoples, religions, traditions, customs, and events that have shaped the modern map of the Arabian Peninsula. Greater emphasis has been placed on the complexity of the cultures of the region, putting political and economic issues within a cultural context. Histories of the countries that make up the Gulf States (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates) and Saudi Arabia are included in specific country entries with emphasis on the events of the last 100–150 years. For the United Arab Emirates (UAE), each of the seven individual emirates that make up the federation has its own entry in addition to the main country entry for the UAE. Although the region’s history stretches back to the origins of civilization, most of the countries that now occupy the Arabian Peninsula are modern creations. Only Oman has an unbroken historical/ political identity that extends back to the early Islamic period. Saudi Arabia’s oil wealth and regional strength often overshadow its smaller neighbors; thus, the country entries on the Gulf States are more detailed. Countries such as Bahrain have been important centers for trade, agriculture, and pearling for centuries. Entries on several important people have been included. The selection of whom to include was difficult, but in the end we decided to include those who have played a significant role in the region or beyond. Furthermore, any work on the Arabian Peninsula has to include an article on the Prophet Muhammad. His legacy dictates daily life not only for the people of the Peninsula but also for all Muslims.

Preface

Most of the entries included in this encyclopedia focus on the rich cultures of the Arabian Peninsula. Too often works on the region focus on the economics (oil, investments, banking, or real estate schemes) or on the politics without much reference to the culture and traditions that influence the way the region works. Cultural content entries cover such topics as architecture, cuisine, dress, dance, and music, and the authors have attempted to include regional differences as well as note general similarities in all of them. Other entries deal with the geography and environment of the Peninsula, which have greatly influenced many of the traditional cultural expressions and regional economics. Social organization and gender issues are covered, noting the rapid changes since the discovery and exploitation of oil. The Arabian Peninsula is often seen as a region where the tribe is the main form of sociopolitical organization. Several entries discuss individual tribal groups that are or have been significant players in the region’s history. “Tribe” is a controversial concept in social science because the label has been overused to include non-tribal people. The term is used here in its strictly anthropological meaning and where the people refer to themselves in Arabic as a qabilah or ‘ashirah. “Tribe” is a convenience for researchers giving a framework to understand the complex and sometimes bewildering kinship connections between lineages and their perceived obligations to each other. Leadership is usually weak and most tribal “leaders” are unable to give orders but can suggest and lead by example or use the power of rhetoric to convince others to agree with their point of view. A “powerful” tribal leader is one who is seen to be just in his decisions and who puts the welfare of the people before himself and his immediate family. Traditional concepts such as honor have their own entries in this encyclopedia. The authors have attempted to explain gender and gender issues (not only as they pertain to women) through local culture. No attempt is made to excuse attitudes or customs that seem prejudicial to an outsider, but to give a better understanding of local perspectives. Travelers to the region are often confused by the different attitudes encountered between those of Saudis and others in the Gulf, although they may spring from the same forms of Islam. The Gulf Arab States discussed include Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, Oman, and to some degree Yemen. Yemen is part of the Arabian Peninsula, but it can be argued that it has its own special history and culture. Yemen has been as much a part of the Horn of Africa as it has the Arabian Peninsula. Yemen developed a form of Southern Arabic and Southern Arabian script that has been replaced by the Northern Arabian script with the emergence of Islam, although there are still isolated pockets where Southern Arabic is spoken. In a work on the Arabian Peninsula, something about Yemen must be included, but the focus of this volume is on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. It can be argued that Oman is also not really a Gulf State because it does not border the Arabian/Persian Gulf, but it does share a history and culture with the UAE, which used to be included in the general area referred to as Oman, and it is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, unlike Yemen. Readers can find entries of interest quickly in the front matter alphabetical list of entries and topical list of entries. Text that appears in bold type within the entries indicates another entry in the encyclopedia. The entries typically conclude

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with further reading. We have limited these sources to English-language materials, although some are published outside of the United Kingdom and the United States and the contributors certainly consulted non-English sources at times. The selected bibliography is also largely limited to English-language sources for this audience. A note on transliteration from Arabic and a chronology of Arab Gulf history are also found in the front matter.

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Acknowledgments

Without team effort this book would not be possible. I would like to express my greatest thanks and gratitude to the many people who helped shape this book and helped shape me in writing it with their support, knowledge, and criticism. While extending my appreciation to all of them, I would like to thank a few of those in particular. First, I would like to thank Wendi Schnaufer of Greenwood Press for her constant, patient, and cheerful assistance. I wish to thank my colleagues and friends, Professors Majd al-Mallah, Grand Valley State University, and Eckehard Schulz, Leipzig University, for the advice and support they extended to me. David Long, a great friend and mentor, himself a distinguished author and teacher on the Middle East, deserves my sincere thanks for his continuous encouragement and help in numerous ways that significantly influenced my understanding of the people of Arabia. I would like to thank my co-editor John A. Shoup for being a fabulous person to work with on this book. And finally, special thanks go to my wife, Shannon, who has been my unwavering supporter, inspiration, and critic. Without her consistent love and help, and that of my daughters Fiona and Sophia, this project would have been impossible to finish. Sebastian Maisel Grand Valley State University Allendale, Michigan

Acknowledgments

It is difficult to know where to begin in thanking the many people who have contributed to this work. I would like to begin with thanking Wendi Schnaufer of Greenwood Publishing Group, who has been an excellent working partner for the third time, although we have never met except by e-mail. I would also like to thank the other major contributor to this work, Sebastian Maisel, who took on the major share of the writing. I would like to thank all of the people who have contributed articles and shared their expertise, but I would like to add a special word of thanks to Carla Higgins, who has hosted me numerous times in the UAE and Egypt. Carla introduced me to much of the Gulf culture while traveling with me in the UAE and Oman. I would like to thank several of my professors from when I was a student studying Arabic and Middle Eastern courses: the late Dr. ‘Aziz ‘Atiyah, who was a great historian; Dr. Philip Hammond, who is an archeologist and enthusiast of Bedouin culture; and Dr. John Bennett, who is, in my opinion, the expert on development issues. I would like to thank Dr. Donald Cole, whose book Bedouin of the Bedouin greatly influenced my research interests in the Bedouin. I would also like to mention Dr. Soraya Alturki, the first Saudi woman to earn a PhD in anthropology. I assign many of her writings in my classes. I had the great pleasure of knowing them both while at the American University in Cairo. I would like to make special mention of several good friends from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf who shared much of their culture with me while we were all students. I would like to begin by thanking ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Dughaither and Ibrahim ‘Awamir, who introduced me to Saudi music and food. Khalid al-Dughaither forced me to speak Arabic, and I owe my abilities in the language to him. Muhammad al-Bukhari gave me a better insight into the intellectual life of the region. Dawud Khamis, as a friend, helped sponsor my visa for my first visit to a Gulf country (Kuwait) in 1979, shortly after the fall of the Shah of Iran. At that time, many Iranians were trying to escape the Islamic Revolution via Kuwait, and the place had the feel of a spy novel. I would also like to thank ‘Abbas Bafikih, Balqis al-Najjar, ‘Abdallah al-Ghazali, Muhammad Aba Husayn, Khalid Tarrah, Talal al-Fatayhi, and all of the others who invited me into their homes and lives when they were students in the United States. The list is long, and if I have not mentioned a name specifically it is only because I do not have the space here to list you all. I want to thank you all for your kindness—and letting me as a non-Arab be a member of the University of Utah Arab Students’ Association. Special mention must be made of my former student at the American University in Cairo and now good friend Shaykh Ma‘an al Baroudy Al Khalifah. Shaykh Ma‘an took the time to show me around the major sites of modern Bahraini history, including historic homes of the Al Khalifah family. His generosity during my visits to Bahrain is always overwhelming. Shaykh Ma‘an introduced me to Dr. ‘Abdallah Yateem, one of the first anthropologists from the region; Dr. Yateem and I maintain good contact. I invited him to contribute to this encyclopedia, but he was unable to do so because of other commitments. There are many more people I would like to thank for many experiences I have had over the years in the Arab world. Some of the smaller incidents have stuck in my mind, such as the two Bedouin from Saudi Arabia who, seeing me walking in the August heat of Kuwait, refused to let me walk and insisted they

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take me wherever I wanted to go—even to museums. They stopped by the hotel where I was staying every evening to ask if my Kuwaiti friends were coming to pick me up and, if not, I was to spend the evening with them because no one should be alone in a foreign country. Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Mr. and Mrs. John A. Shoup. My mother’s love for Arabian horses began while she was a teenager, and as a result, our house had several books about them. Growing up with Arabian horses was a major influence on my desire to visit the Middle East and to learn Arabic. Both of my parents are now gone. I would also like to thank my youngest sister, Heather, for her constant and unwavering support. John A. Shoup Al Akhawayn University Ifrane, Morocco

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Introduction John A. Shoup The peoples, cultures, religions, and history of the Arabian Peninsula remain greatly unknown to most people in the West despite the long history of interaction between these two parts of the world. Stereotypes of suppressed and veiled women living in secluded harims (harems); religious fundamentalists who want to wage holy war to destroy Western democracy; greedy and corrupt “oil shaykh” (shiekhs) living decadent lives underneath the cover of religious piety; or romanticized images of Bedouin tents and camels are the usual mental images that immediately come to mind when hearing such words as Arabs, Saudi Arabia, or the Persian Gulf. These stereotypes are supported by sensationalist news coverage and by Hollywood films. Conditions in Saudi Arabia are too frequently generalized to not only the other Gulf countries, but also the entire Arab or even Muslim world. Although there sometimes may be some basis for the stereotypes, they are only that, stereotypes, and far from the full picture of the Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia.

ARABIA AND THE BEDOUIN There is a Western fascination with the Bedouin of Arabia, a complex in fact often called the “Lawrence Complex” after the World War I British agent, T. E. Lawrence, the famous Lawrence of Arabia. The romantic image of Bedouin in graceful flowing robes, tents, and camels is hard to dispel, even among some who have actually had the chance to do fieldwork among Bedouin. Part of the appeal is that nomadic pastoralism has gone through massive changes since 1918, including the introduction of trucks, and there is nostalgia for the way it used to be. For many in the West, the Hollywood film Lawrence of Arabia (1962) has had a greater impact than the written work by Lawrence himself, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (first printed in 1935—the year of his death). Lawrence of Arabia was at least filmed in Jordan and Morocco and used authentic Bedouin equipment and

Introduction

Bedouin as extras, but other ethnographic as well as historical detail is far from accurate. The anthropologist Steven Caton’s 1999 publication Lawrence of Arabia: A Film’s Anthropology delves into the appeal of the David Lean epic as well as the lure of the Lawrence Complex. A more recent film, Hidalgo (2004), also filmed in Morocco and supposedly depicting the Arabian Peninsula, continues the same images of the Arab Bedouin: tents, flowing robes, and sand dunes. Hidalgo provides dialog in Arabic (classical) and develops the character of at least one Arab woman even if most of the cultural/ethnographic/historical detail is fictional. The Lawrence Complex is greatly influential and is often cited as the reason why many students became interested in Middle Eastern studies.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE PENINSULA Americans have been deeply involved in the Arabian Peninsula since the first explorations for oil in Saudi Arabia in the 1930s. The United States has been an important political player in the region since the end of World War II and the creation of Israel in 1948. American presidents since Franklin Delano Roosevelt have needed to have Middle Eastern foreign policies that balance good relations with the Arab states with what the United States said was its moral obligation to Israel. Arab leaders such as King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud of Saudi Arabia were confused by the Americans when it seemed to them that the expulsion of Palestinians from their homeland was a moral injustice no different from the moral injustices Jews suffered in Europe. King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s confusion about America’s “moral” responsibilities in the region best characterize the position of Arab Gulf leaders still today. Although the United States seemed to be a “natural” ally against the spread of communism in the 1950s and 1960s, its unconditional support for Israel was difficult to understand. Confusion and misunderstanding seem to continue to characterize the relationships between the Gulf States and the West, especially with the United States. Although American academic institutions have excellent programs in Middle Eastern, Islamic, and Arabic language studies, they have not dispelled the “mystery” of the region or been able to diminish the stereotypes held by the general public. The U.S. government has responded to certain periods of crisis by encouraging Middle Eastern studies, such as immediately after the 1973 oil embargo, the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, and more recently after 9/11, but it has not sustained its interest and properly funded positions in Middle Eastern studies and Arabic language in U.S. universities. More importantly, materials prepared for high school and junior high school instruction contain very little about the region and its people. It is of supreme importance that Americans in particular, but people in the West in general, better understand both Arabs and Islam. Greenwood’s series Culture and Customs of the Middle East, written by experts, is helping to fill the information void with well-rounded texts on specific countries of the region. This encyclopedia helps in a similar way, providing a quick reference not only for the general readership but also for experts in Middle Eastern studies.

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LAND, ENVIRONMENT, AND TRADITIONAL ECONOMICS The Arabian Peninsula is called Jazirat al-‘Arab, or the Island of the Arabs, because the Nafud Desert and Wadi Sirhan effectively separate it from the Syrian Desert and make it an “island.” It is a huge region about half the size of the continental United States, and the Rub‘ al-Khali Desert alone, which occupies about one-third of Saudi Arabia’s southeast, is the size of France. It is often difficult to imagine the immense size of the Peninsula and the fact that there are no permanent streams or lakes even in the high mountains of Yemen. The Peninsula’s arid climate is subject to cold fronts from the Mediterranean and from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia in the winter that bring rain and occasional snow to the northern part, whereas the southern part receives rain in the summer, catching the monsoons as they move across the Indian Ocean from the Ethiopian Highlands to India. Although generally speaking the overall climate is arid, certain coastal regions have high humidity. People have adjusted to the climate by adopting several distinct architectural styles to best deal with specific problems. Water is a major issue for the people living in the Arabian Peninsula. Arabs from the Peninsula often joke that water costs more than gasoline. Water has dictated the traditional economics as well as greatly limited the areas that can be utilized; more than 80% of the Peninsula is desert. Permanent sources of water such as springs have long been owned either by lineages or by individuals, and no settlements are possible without permanent water. Oases have been developed using sophisticated irrigation systems such as underground water channels called aflaj. Until the discovery of oil, date production formed one of the four important economic activities in the Arabian Peninsula, because dates can grow in salty water and high temperatures. The arid nature of the Arabian Peninsula has given rise to the second major economic activity, pastoral nomadism. Domestication of the camel around 1500 BC allowed a greater part of the desert to be used. Camels can go up to twenty-one days without water, whereas other livestock raised in the Peninsula such as sheep, goats, and cattle need water on a daily basis. The camel serves not only as the economic base but also is one of the cultural bases for the Bedouin. Bedouin divide themselves into the “noble, great” tribes who raise camels and “lesser” tribes whose economies have traditionally been based on sheep, goats, and cattle. Bedouins came to dominate much of the region politically and culturally, although they have rarely been more than 10% of the total population of the Peninsula. Cultural ideals of generosity and hospitality are thought of in the context of the sixth-century Bedouin poet Hatim al-Tayy, who as a boy sacrificed his father’s entire herd of camels to feed guests. Hatim’s generosity has become legendary for all Arabs, not only for those in the Arabian Peninsula. Other cultural ideals of proper behavior for both men and women are judged against the Bedouin hero and pre-Islamic poet ‘Antar bin Shadad and his beloved cousin ‘Ablah bint Malik. Even the idea of “proper Arabic” is judged against the “purity” of Bedouin speech, and poetry as an art is still thought of as a Bedouin art. The desert gave rise to two of the main pre-oil types of living in the Peninsula, oasis agriculture and pastoral nomadism, but the Peninsula is surrounded on three sides by the sea. Arabs of the Peninsula not only developed means of

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survival in this hostile desert climate but also developed effective means of utilizing the sea, the third major economic activity. Oman, for example, has a long history of seafaring and was able to establish a large empire in East Africa and along the Gulf coast of what is today Pakistan. Omanis defeated the Portuguese and forced them out of the Indian Ocean in the 17th century. It is held that the inspiration for the story character of Sinbad the Sailor was derived from Omani sea captains from Salalah, who dominated much of the sea trade to the Spice Islands and China in the classical Islamic period. Omani and Gulf merchant families competed with those from Iraq, Iran, and India in the long-distance sea trade connecting the East Indies with East Africa and the Middle East. In the 19th and early 20th centuries pearling became an important part of the Gulf economy, bringing families from India and Iran to the Gulf emirates. Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman still have active shipbuilding yards, although demand for the various types of dhows has decreased. The combination of sea navigation and traveling through the desert helped establish the fourth major part of the Peninsula’s pre-oil economy: trade. Arabs of the Peninsula conveyed expensive commodities from the east to the Mediterranean along with two items grown in Yemen and Oman: coffee and frankincense. Long-distance trade gave rise to several important pre-Islamic kingdoms in SyriaJordan such as the Nabateans of Petra and more importantly for the modern world, the Quraysh of Makkah. The Prophet Muhammad was a member of the Quraysh tribe and worked in the long-distance trade taking merchandise to Syria. It was during these trips to Syria that, according to Muslim sources, two Christian monks recognized him as the last of God’s prophets long before God called him to his service. Islam has a favorable attitude toward commerce, and Islamic law has developed several rules and regulations about ethical business practices.

ISLAM The seventh-century Prophet Muhammad is one of the most influential men who has ever lived. Islam is the religion of more than one-quarter of all mankind. For Muslims, Muhammad’s actions and sayings still hold weight in the everyday actions and sayings of believers. The humility, generosity, and love of man as demonstrated by the Prophet are the model for all Muslims today. Divisions in the Islamic community after the death of the Prophet into what have emerged as Sunni, Shi‘i, and Kharaji forms are found among Muslims living on the Peninsula. Much of the difference has to do with disagreements over legitimacy of succession to the Prophet as head of the Muslim community, which have further divided over issues of law and legal procedures. Nonetheless, basic practices such as prayer, fasting during the month of Ramadan, and pilgrimage to Makkah are all held in common. Western perceptions of Islam and popular stereotyping of the religion are perhaps the most important sources of continued misunderstanding. This is best illustrated when in 2008 the Archbishop of Canterbury suggested that the British parliament legalize aspects of personal law found in the Shari‘ah or Islamic law for the country’s growing Muslim community. What he was referring to are issues of

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Introduction

marriage, divorce, inheritance, and the like that had already been legalized for Britain’s Jews and are de facto practiced by many of the country’s Muslims. The immediate outcry from the press was that Britain would be sanctioning stonings, whippings, and beheadings—not at all what the Archbishop had proposed. Such a response shows how little the general public knows about Islam and Islamic law— and the fear generated by the headlines of sensationalist press coverage of application of certain laws in Saudi Arabia, Taliban Afghanistan, or conservative areas of Pakistan or Nigeria. Such ultraconservative practices are not part of most Muslim countries today and are not that common even in Saudi Arabia. Islam, like the other great world religions, teaches a universalism. In many ways Islam is closer to Judaism because legal codes based on religion regulate the way people are to live. Islam is tolerant of non-Muslims and legalized the interactions between non-Muslim communities with the Islamic state. The expansion of Islam into first the Middle Eastern provinces of the Byzantines and then Sasanid Iran brought large numbers of non-Muslim subjects to the new empire. The seat of government moved from Madinah to Damascus and then to Baghdad, and the Arabs of the Peninsula faded into the background as new Syrian, Egyptian, Berber, Persian, and Turkish dynasties emerged to rule parts of the empire. The Arabs of the Peninsula who had spread Islam from the borders of China in the east and to the Atlantic Ocean in the west lost their importance in the large multi-ethnic empire they had created. Occasionally they would burst forth again, supporting egalitarian reform movements such as the Shi‘ite Qaramitah in the ninth century or the Sunni Wahhabis that emerged in the 18th century and form the legal base for Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates today. Among the main stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims is the seclusion of women, and no one thing seems to annoy Westerners more than the veil. Veiling is an urban phenomenon and as a concept was borrowed from the urban elite of the Byzantine and Sasanid Empires where it had been a means to distinguish women of the higher classes from the poor. It is known that the Prophet’s wives were veiled, but it can be debated what this meant. The Prophet’s wife ‘A’ishah led an army of rebellion against ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib and from atop her camel gave inspiration to her army during battle. Various traditions mention her showing her face to let her men know that she was still commanding. Veiling can mean the complete cover or munaqabah—head to toe—or to wear a scarf or hijab to cover the hair. As such, the Muslim world has a wide variety of traditional garments that have developed to cover women in a “decency” or “modesty” garb. Such garments vary in not only the need to deal with climate but also class—women of the upper classes being able to afford massive amounts of fine-quality cloth with no need to have their hands and faces free for work. For Westerners the veil is the sign of women’s submission and oppression by patriarchal society, and it is believed that women will not be freed until they are unveiled. For many Muslim women the veil is a sign of coming of age—becoming an adult woman and therefore marking a woman’s status in society. The veil expresses the need for respect for women as members of the Muslim community—and certainly is not a sign of their oppression. Studies of veiling among women working in public service offices in Egypt, for example, note that wearing the veil brings respect from men—and gives women a social space. It serves as a

xxvii

Introduction

means to protect women from both verbal and physical harassment. Other anthropologists have noted that veiled women like the anonymity the veil can give them, and perhaps surprising to many in the West, the freedom of movement. A veiled woman is able to move about unrecognized (by men) and interact with strangers without compromising important personal and family honor. Muslim women are often annoyed by the fact that Westerners focus on the garment and what it means in a Western context and do not look at the legal rights women have in Islam. Women have rights to personal property and income husbands cannot touch without a woman’s permission. Women have always been involved in business—Khadijah, the first wife of the Prophet, was herself a wealthy merchant. Women had rights to inheritance when in the West women could only inherit if they had male guarantors (thus the basis for many Jane Austen novels). Muslim women have always had rights to initiate divorce, although is not easy to do. In Saudi Arabia a woman can write the right to divorce her husband (called ‘ismah) into the wedding contract before marriage. Women in Saudi Arabia are not allowed to drive cars but do have the right to buy and own them. Since the 1990s Saudi women—and there are Saudi feminists—have protested this law by occasionally organizing to publicly break it. They can point to the women in all of the rest of the Arab and Islamic world who have been driving since the first importations of cars. They have even been successful in getting a ruling from the ‘ulama’ stating that there is no Islamic reason for women to not be allowed to drive. The law is now more and more described as “cultural” and will be changed once Saudi society is “better able” to deal with women as drivers. The law is not part of the personal status codes, which are based on Islamic law, but is part of tradition. Initially the law was seen by Saudi men as a means of protecting the honor of the woman and her family, but today it is seen more and more as a hindrance to women’s employment. Another issue based in tradition and not supported by Islamic law is honor crime, in which a woman is killed for damaging the honor of the family. Honor crime is not unique to the Arabian Peninsula but is widespread in the Mediterranean region often called the “Patriarchal Belt.” Honor crime is part of tradition, and Islamic law condemns such crimes as murder. However, for many in the region, the act of harming family honor is greater than the rights of any one person, and honor can only be restored by the death of the one who caused the family shame. Jordan is the only country in the Arab world dealing openly with the issue, and recently the Jordanian Parliament passed harsher laws to punish the men who are convicted of an honor crime. Jordan remains unique; no other country in the region is willing to openly talk about honor crimes. Restrictions on women’s rights to hold passports or to travel without the written permission of male relatives are widespread beyond only Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Many Muslim countries have the same laws but exercise a degree of tolerance depending on a particular woman’s economic and social status. Such laws are based on Islamic principles whereby men are held responsible for the women of their family. They are part of the personal status codes that in all Muslim countries are based primarily on Shar‘iah. Differences in how Shar‘iah is applied has to do with the different legal schools or madhahib among Sunnis, Shi‘ites, and Kharajis. According to Westerners, some of these legal schools are

xxviii

Introduction

more “liberal” than others, meaning women may have more defined freedoms in one than in another. Women’s rights to child custody are also part of the personal status codes and are rooted in Shar‘iah. For many Westerners the woman’s limited rights seem unfair, but in the Arab and Islamic world children carry the name and even nationality of their father (not their mother), and thus it is seen as right and proper that the father take care of them. Fathers can give up their right to custody before a judge or a judge may deem him unfit in the role of father and grant custody to the mother. In most cases women’s rights to custody are set by the age and gender of the child—boys needing to be with their fathers earlier than girls who need to learn skills from their mothers. Muslim feminists point to these kinds of issues that touch on women’s legal rights in Islam as being far more important than the issue of veiling or driving a car. The Shar‘iah is not stagnant and unchanging but can be modified given new social, economic, and political conditions. Women have obtained the right to vote in Bahrain and have won similar rights in Kuwait. Women’s political participation can be framed within Islam and does not have to be seen as a challenge to Islamic principles. For many Muslim feminists the issue is not that women do not have rights, but that women do not exercise their rights mainly because they are unaware of them. Women will become more active members of their own society once they are educated and understand what their rights are.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION Social equality as taught by Islam did not alter the social organization of most Arabs in the Peninsula. With few urban centers rarely touched by strong central governments, tribe remained an important means of organization for practical economic as well as political concerns for the Bedouin. A tribe is usually defined as a kin-based sociopolitical organization with weak leadership. Leaders lead by example and persuasion but are not able to force compliance because all members of the same tribe are equal (outsiders, especially non-tribal people, are not seen to be equals). “Nobility” is based on knowledge of descent from an ancestor who lived before the time of the Prophet. For Arab tribes this ancestor either traces to Qahtan, the Biblical Yoktan or Joktan (southern), or to Isma‘il, the Biblical Ishmael (northern). Studies of tribes in much of the Arab world have greatly dispelled the long-held theory referred to as Segmentary Lineage Organization. Tribes are often unpredictable in their actions, which are often exceptions to the rule. Segmentary Lineage Organization does provide a useful tool for researchers in establishing connection between lineages and what should be the obligations or responsibilities of the individual to the group, but it can be argued whether it has further use. In some instances tribal political elite, especially once settled, have frequently tried to maintain political control, adding to their personal wealth by acquiring land or interests in trade. Today, many of the modern Gulf States were established by tribal political elite who maintain themselves by alliances with other tribal political and non-tribal economic elite. Tribal connections can be helpful even today in accessing jobs, especially in government service.

xxix

Introduction

Although the rhetoric of many in the Arabian Peninsula may make use of cultural ideals of tribe, actual practice is often far from the way tribe is supposed to work; the problems between verbalized “ideal” and practiced “real” cause confusion for many Westerners. Many people in the Arabian Peninsula are not organized into tribes, but the extended family is the most important form of social organization. As noted before, the Arabian Peninsula is part of a region referred to in many anthropological texts as the “Patriarchal Belt.” This region includes the entire Mediterranean and the Middle East. The modern Arab family is quickly changing, but the ideal is still centered on the head of household who controls the lives of all others living with him, perhaps best typified in the character of Ahmad ‘Abd alGawad, who is called Si Sayyid (meaning more or less Lord and Master) in the Najib Mahfuz novel Bayn al-Qasrayn, or Palace Walk (1946). The character Si Sayyid was played so skillfully by the Egyptian actor Yahya Shahin in the 1964 film based on the novel that for most Arabs the film’s character is Si Sayyid. The head of the household dictates to the others and most interactions are in the form of orders from him to the others to obey. He is concerned with the honor of the family as a whole and it is his ability to “control” the others that notes whether the family will be judged as “good” or “bad.” Behavior that could damage the good name of the family must be punished quickly, and rules are much harsher for girls than for boys. The inability to control his family is seen as a mark of general poor manners, and even bad morals. Women hold the weakest position in a patriarchal society. Women gain power within the structure by producing sons. Mothers gain greater say and status in a family with the number of sons they have—sons they can count on to even challenge their father if need be. Bonds between mothers and sons are strong, stronger than between fathers and sons where the need to demonstrate manliness may put sons into conflict with fathers. Bonds between brothers and sisters are often the strongest of all. Sisters count on the support of their brothers even after marriage; brothers protect their sisters from abusive husbands, and no husband can prevent his wife from visiting her brothers. The patriarch gives commands, but women can soften or even change them. Women do not generally challenge orders openly but use a time when they can privately appeal to reason. The strongest patriarch is still responsible to his mother, and should she not agree with one of his decisions, he is most likely to change it. Wives, especially mothers of adult sons, are also powerful behind the scenes and are able to effect changes in his decisions. If need be, a woman can involve her sons and brothers in action against her husband, forcing him to change his mind, but rarely does she do this in such a way as to openly challenge his position as head of household. The traditional family structure is feeling the pressure as more and more men and women are university-educated and seeking their own careers away from the family.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS As noted, education in the West in general has not included much information on the Arabs or Islam. It would be hard to find a social science, history, or world

xxx

Introduction

literature textbook with more than a chapter on the region. However, one can say much the same for the lack of much information about the West in the textbooks used by many of the public schools in the Arabian Peninsula. The exception would be the numerous private schools in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. Many Arabs hold stereotypes of the West formed from watching American and European television series, Hollywood films, or music videos. Unless they have been able to travel or study in the West, these are the lasting images of Western society. The problem of poor textbooks is being addressed in countries such as Saudi Arabia, whose government was shocked in 2001 by the lack of knowledge demonstrated by their graduates and the fact that many of their teachers were choosing to not cover materials in the texts they had. The Internet has made access to information much easier, but it has not made it easy to find quality information. The aim here is to provide quality information as well as references for further reading where topics can be explored in greater detail. The contributors to this encyclopedia hope that the information they have provided will help serve to give a better understanding to the peoples, cultures, traditions, and religions of the Arabian Peninsula.

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Note on Transliteration John A. Shoup Transliteration of Arabic into Latin script is difficult, and several different methods have been developed over the years for German, French, English, and other European languages. This volume generally uses the system devised by the U.S. Library of Congress, which is the most accepted method of Arabic transliteration in North America. The Arabic alphabet is composed of twenty-eight consonants and semi-consonants. The Arabic letter ‘ayn is noted as ‘, and the hamzah (or glottal stop) is noted as ’. The letter ghayn is written as gh; kha as kh. Arabic has several “double letters,” a normal letter and an emphatic form. Thus, there is d and emphatic d; dh and emphatic dh, which is frequently written as z; h and emphatic h; s and emphatic s; and t and emphatic t. In the Library of Congress system the emphatic forms have a . underneath them, but this takes a special keyboard and typesetting; therefore, in this volume the distinctions have not been made. In addition, Arabic letters are divided into “sun” or shamsi and “moon” or qamari according to how they are pronounced when the definite article al is placed in front. When the lam or l of the definite article is elided into the first letter of the main word such as ash-shams, the letter is a shamsi letter, and when it is not as in al-qamar, it is a qamari letter. The Library of Congress system does not note pronunciation, and all words and names with the definite article are written al- as in al-shams. Arabic has only three vowels: a, i, and u; the vowels e and o do not exist. Short vowels are marked by harakat or diacritical marks called fathah for a, dammah for u, and kasrah for i. Short vowels are rarely shown in most Arabic texts because the language works on a root system with ten regular means to expand the root into numerous nuances of meaning. In addition, there are three semi-consonants: alif, waw, and yah. These correspond to long a, u, and i when they are used as vowels. When they are consonants, waw corresponds to w and yah to y. An alif can take a hamzah riding above making the sound u; for example, in the name Usamah. It can also take one underneath, changing the sound to i such as in the

Note on Transliteration

word Inglizi, meaning English. There are two other diacritical markers: the sukun, where no vowel is pronounced, and shaddah, which notes the letter is to be doubled. There are two diphthongs in Arabic: ay and aw. The ay is often popularly transliterated as ai, and although this is acceptable, the Library of Congress system uses ay because it is closer to the letters in Arabic. In most cases, people are listed by first names—not by family names—because, in the Middle East, most people refer to others by first names, and family names can be that of a large tribal group and therefore are rather meaningless. Most people, if they need to be more specific, include the father’s names, e.g., Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (Muhammad, son of ‘Abd al-Wahhab). Thus, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab is found under M and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Al Sa‘ud under A. Titles such as Sultan, Khalifah, Amir, and Shaykh are italicized in the text. Sultan means the person who holds real political power, or sultah, and emerged as a political title when the Khalifah began to lose control over the political affairs of state. Khalifah means successor and as a political title emerged following the death of the Prophet Muhammad. The word has come into English as Caliph. The Khalifah held the Khilafah or successor ship to the Prophet. Khilafah refers to the Caliphate. Shaykh has a number of uses. It can be used as a term of respect for an older man, as a title for the leader of a tribe, a proper title for members of ruling families in the Gulf, and a title for a learned man of religion. Amir also has a number of uses meaning a military commander (someone who gives orders or amr) and more frequently today a prince. However, Sultan, Amir, and Khalifah are proper men’s names, and when they are names rather than titles in this encyclopedia (as they are in this sentence), they are not italicized. In some countries, such as Oman, where the head of state has usually been called a Sultan, Sultan is also a common name; thus, it is possible to have Sultan Sultan. Khalifah is not only a man’s first name, but the ruling family of Bahrain is the Al Khalifah. For these reasons it is necessary to distinguish when the word is a proper title and when it is a proper name.

xxxiv

Chronology

ANTIQUITY 5000–3500 BC (Neolithic)

Beginnings of agriculture and settled life

3200–330 BC 3000 BC

Dilmun civilization in Bahrain Magan civilization in Oman supplies Mesopotamia with copper ore

750–115 BC 600–500 BC

Sabaean Kingdom in Yemen Persia establishes authority over much of Oman

400–300 BC

Nabatean Arabs are established in southern Jordan and northwest Saudi Arabia

400–200 BC

Conquest of parts of Ethiopia by Yemenis and rise of Ethiopian Kingdom of Aksum

330 BC–622 AD

Tylos Hellenistic civilization on Bahrain

321 BC

Nabateans defeat Antigonus I Monophtlamus’ attempt to include them in Hellenistic Syria

300 BC–200 AD

Hellenistic civilization on Faylakah Island off Kuwait (Faylakah is called Ikaros in Greek)

115 BC–40 AD

Height of the Nabatean kingdom in Jordan—Petra its capital city

115 BC–300 AD

Himyarite kingdom in Yemen

106 226–640

Nabatean Kingdom annexed by the Roman Emperor, Trajan The Arab Bani Azd tribe gains control over most of Oman, slowly pushing Persians toward the coast

Chronology

200–300 300

Bahrain accepts Christianity and eventually there are five Nestorian bishoprics on the island and the nearby Gulf coast Rise of the second Himyarite kingdom; both Christianity and Judaism spread in the kingdom

330 400–500

King Ezana of Aksum converts to Christianity Rise of Ghassanid Kingdom in Syria, allies of Byzantium; the Lakhamid Kingdom in Iraq, allies of the Persians; Kingdom of Kindah in Central Arabia dominates much of the Peninsula, allies with Byzantium against Persia in 530, but collapses in the second half of the sixth century

522 529

Ethiopia conquers Yemen Lakhamid King Mundhir III kills King Hujr of Kindah and most of the Royal House, ending the Kingdom of Kindah; Prince Imru’ al-Qays begins attempt to avenge his family and take back Kindah Sasanian King Khosrow Anushirvan withdraws from most of Oman, keeping the important port city of Suhar (Sohar)

531–578 538 535

Massacre of the Christians of Najran by Jewish king of Yemen, Dhu Nuwas Ethiopia begins to expand from Yemen into Central Arabia

540

Death of the last Prince of Kindah, the poet Imru’ al-Qays

EARLY ISLAMIC PERIOD 570 572 610 615

First revelation to the Prophet Muhammad The Prophet Muhammad sends a number of Muslims to the safety of the Christian king of Ethiopia

622 629

Hijrah, or migration from Makkah to Madinah Bahrain’s Christian ruler al-Mundhir ibn Sawa al-Tamimi accepts Islam

630

Makkah taken without a fight by Muslim forces; ‘Amr ibn al‘As brings Islam to Oman Death of the Prophet Muhammad

632 632–661 661–750

xxxvi

Approximate date for the birth of the Prophet Muhammad; Ethiopia attempts to conquer the Hijaz The Persian Sasanids expel the Ethiopians from Yemen and briefly rule both Oman and Yemen

Rightly Guided Khalifahs; 632–633 wars of Riddah and final establishment of Islam throughout the Arabian Peninsula Umayyad Dynasty rules from Damascus; expansion of the Islamic empire in North Africa and Spain in the west and into Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia in the east

Chronology

684

Foundation of Ibadi Kharajism in Basrah, Iraq

750

Founding of the ‘Abbasid dynasty replacing the Umayyads. Capital is moved from Syria to Iraq; election of al-Julandi ibn Mas‘ud as first Ibadi Imam in Oman; establishes first independent dynasty of Oman, the Julandah, which lasts until 1435

793

Nizwa’s main mosque first used for the election of the Ibadi Imam; used ever since

874

(?) Rise of the Isma‘ili (Shi‘ite) Qaramitah movement

886 930

Qaramitah established in Bahrain and Gulf coast Qaramitah attack and take Makkah, carrying away the Black Stone1 from the Ka‘abah

951 973

Qaramitah return the Black Stone Fatamids (Isma‘ili) found Cairo as the capital of their rival Caliphate

988

Most of the Qaramitah communities are absorbed into the Fatamid state Sulayhids rule Yemen

1037–1138 1154–1406 1077

Nabahani dynasty rules much of Oman Sunni Saljuq Turkish forces bring a final end to the Qaramitah state in Bahrain

AYYUBID AND MAMLUK PERIODS 1174–1249

Ayyubids of Egypt rule the Hijaz

1181–1229 1182

Ayyubids rule Yemen Crusader leader Renaud de Chatillon organizes a fleet to raid down the Red Sea coast, intent on attacking Makkah

1183 1229–1451

Fleet is caught and destroyed by Muslim fleet, and the survivors are sold into slavery in Egypt Rasulid dynasty rules Yemen

1248–1517

Mamluks of Egypt rule the Hijaz

1258

Fall of ‘Abbasid capital in Baghdad to the Mongols under H€ uleg€ u Khan

1260

Mamluks defeat Mongols at ‘Ayn Jalut in Palestine

1435–1624

Oman ruled by a series of elected Imams who do not establish rule by one family

1

The Black Stone was presented to Ibrahim (Abraham) by the archangel Jabra’il (Gabriel) when the Ka’abah was first built and is placed as a corner stone. It has subsequently been replaced each time the Ka’abah has been rebuilt. It is considered a special sign between man and God.

xxxvii

Chronology

OTTOMANS AND PORTUGUESE 1507 1515 1516 1517

Portuguese occupy Hormuz on the Iranian side of the Straights of Hormuz; Portuguese build forts at Masqat Portuguese occupy Julfar (near present day Ra’s al-Khaymah) Ottomans defeat Mamluks near Aleppo and annex Syria (including today’s Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan) Ottomans defeat Mamluks near Cairo and annex Egypt and the Hijaz

1521

Portuguese occupy Bahrain

1530 1550

First Ottoman occupation of al-Hasa Turkish fleet briefly takes the Portuguese forts in Oman

1581 1591

Turkish fleet again takes the Portuguese forts, but again do not stay Bahrain joined to the Ottoman province based in al-Hasa

1592–1962 1602

Zayidi Imams rule North Yemen Bahrain comes under the Shah of Iran

1622

Portuguese lose Hormuz

1624–1741 1633

Ya‘rubah dynasty established in Oman Local rebellion forces the Portuguese to leave Julfar

1650

Sultan bin Sayf al-Ya‘rubi takes Masqat forts from the Portuguese Oman oust the Portuguese from the Indian Ocean

1654

RISE OF LOCAL RULERS, OTTOMANS, AND THE BRITISH 1700–1800

xxxviii

1701

Arrival of the Qawasim in Ra’s al-Khaymah and Sharjah and Bani Yas in Abu Dhabi; the Qawasim begin attacking British shipping and as a result the coast is labeled “The Pirate Coast” First brief occupation of Bahrain by the Al Khalifah

1720

Al Sabah establish themselves in Kuwait

1744

Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab in Dir‘iyah and allies himself with the Al Sa‘ud

1749 1752

Al Bu Sa‘idi dynasty established in Oman and rule to the present day Al Sabah elect their first amir, who is the founder of Kuwait

1780

Saudi-Wahhabi expansion begins

1783 1797

Al Khalifah firmly established in Bahrain Qatar and Bahrain accept Saudi authority

1801

Saudi-Wahhabi forces attack Karbala’ in southern Iraq

Chronology

1802

Saudi-Wahhabi expansion into the Hijaz

1806–1856

Rule of Sultan Sa‘id bin Sultan bin Ahmad, who extends Oman’s overseas empire to its greatest limits

1811

Beginning of Egyptian-Turkish campaign against the Saudis

1818

Egyptian troops occupy the Saudi capital Dir‘iyah and end first Saudi state

1820

Britain attacks several of the shaykhdoms of the Pirate Coast and forces the shaykhs to sign treaties; these treaties recognize the Gulf shaykhs as separate political entities Turki ibn ‘Abdallah re-establishes the Saudi state with Riyadh as the capital

1824 1831 1835

Ottomans reassert control over Baghdad and Iraq Britain forces Gulf shaykhs to sign treaties of peace between each other; region renamed the Trucial Coast

1836

Al Rashid of the Shammar tribe establish their rule in central Arabia with Ha’il as the capital Britain occupies Aden

1839 1840

1849 1856

1867

Sultan Sa‘id of Oman sends al-Shaykh Ahmad bin Nu‘man alKa‘abi to the United States, first Arab ambassador to Washington, D.C. Ottomans occupy the Red Sea coast of Yemen On the death of Sultan Sa‘id, Oman’s empire is divided between his heirs, one based in Oman and the other in Zanzibar Shaykh Muhammad bin Thani signs a treaty with the British, the first international recognition of Qatar’s independence from Bahrain

1869 1871

Suez Canal opens—vital link for the British to India Ottomans reassert authority in al-Hasa and ‘Asir

1872

Ottomans occupy Sana‘a in Yemen; Shaykh Jasim bin Muhammad Al Thani of Qatar signs treaty with the Turks; Shaykh Jasim begins policy of playing the British and Ottomans against each other

1890

Britain forces the Sultan of Zanzibar to agree to a British protectorate Britain signs exclusive agreements with most of the Gulf shaykhs that accepted British protection

1892 1893

Al Sa‘uds take refuge in Kuwait from the Al Rashid

1896

Mubarak Al Sabah assassinates his kinsman Muhammad and takes control of Kuwait

xxxix

Chronology

1899

1902

Mubarak enters into a treaty with Britain that will establish Kuwait’s independence from the Ottoman Empire when World War I begins ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud retakes Riyadh from the Al Rashid

1903 1904

‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud takes the title of Sultan of the Najd Saudi conquest of Abha

1908

Young Turk Revolution ends effective political control by the Ottoman Sultan; Sharif Hussein ibn ‘Ali declared Sharif of Makkah by the Young Turks Ottoman Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II tries to regain control and is defeated and deposed; a kinsman placed on the throne as Sultan Muhammad V al-Rashad

1909

1911 1912

Treaty between the Turks and Imam Yahya in Yemen Start of the Ikhwan movement by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud

1913

Saudi conquest of al-Hasa; Kuwait separated from the Iraqi province of Basrah; most of the tribes of Oman’s interior refuse to recognize the succession of Taymur bin Faysal as both Sultan and Imam and elect Salim bin Rashid al-Kharusi as Imam, splitting Oman into the Sultanate of Oman and the Imamate of Nizwa

WORLD WAR I 1914–1918

World War I; Turkey sides with Germany

1914 1915

Britain establishes a protectorate over Bahrain Shaykh ‘Abdallah bin Jasim Al Thani oversees the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Qatar

1916–1918 1918

Arab Revolt against the Turks Sultan Muhammad V al-Rashad dies and is replaced by a cousin, Muhammad VI Wahid al-Din, who is eventually deposed by Kamal Ataturk in 1922, ending the Ottoman dynasty and the position of Khalifah, or successor to the Prophet.

BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS

xl

1918–1919 1918–1920

Turkish withdrawal from Yemen Imam Yahya expands area under his control in Yemen

1921

Faysal ibn Hussein made King of Iraq

1924 1925

Ta‘if falls to the Saudis Jiddah falls to the Saudis

1927 1930

Ikhwan Rebellion in Saudi Arabia Final defeat of the Ikhwan in Saudi Arabia

Chronology

1931

Oil discovered in Bahrain

1932

‘Abd al-‘Aziz declares the country to be named the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

1933

First oil concessions in Saudi Arabia

1934

Imam Yahya agrees with British on the border between North and South Yemen; Imam Yahya agrees with Saudis on the border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia

1938

Sultan Taymur dies and is succeeded by his son Sa‘id as Sultan of Oman First oil discovery in Qatar, but not exploited until 1949; first oil concessions in Abu Dhabi, but area is disputed with Saudi Arabia

1939

1945

Meeting of King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz of Saudi Arabia and American President Franklin D. Roosevelt

MODERN OIL STATES 1952

Buraymi Crisis, Saudi Arabia forced to give up its claims to Buraymi Oasis to the Sultan of Oman

1953

King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz dies and his son Sa‘ud is declared King; Abu Dhabi signs oil concessions offshore and begins exports in 1962 Suez Crisis; Yemen joins Saudi Arabia and Egypt in an antiBritish pact

1956 1956–1959 1961 1962 1962–1975

Jabal al-Akhdar War in Oman, eventually the Imam of Nizwa is defeated; Oman unified under the Sultan Kuwait’s independence challenged by Iraq Free Officer’s Movement in North Yemen deposes Imam alBadr and starts civil war Dhufar rebellion in Oman

1963

Zanzibar becomes independent, but one year later a bloody revolution brings the country into union with Tanganyika as Tanzania; many of Zanzibar’s Omani families are either killed or leave for Oman

1964

Sa‘ud forced to abdicate in favor of his brother, Faysal, who becomes the next King of Saudi Arabia

1966

Britain announces departure from South Yemen and Aden by 1968

1967

Britain forced to leave South Yemen because of popular Yemeni revolution

1968

Britain announces it will be leaving the Arab Gulf States in 1971

xli

Chronology

1970 1971

Yemeni civil war in the north ends; Sultan Qabus of Oman stages a palace coup and deposes his father, Sa‘id Independence of Bahrain, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates

1972

War between North and South Yemen

1973

October War between Egypt, Syria, and Israel; King Faysal used the “oil weapon” by embargoing oil sales to countries assisting Israel

1975

A nephew assassinates Faysal; Khalid is made King of Saudi Arabia Saddam Hussein becomes President of Iraq; Mosque in Makkah attacked and briefly held by extremist group calling themselves Ikhwan; second war between North and South Yemen

1979

1980

Expulsion of 40,000 Shi‘ites of Iranian descent from Iraq; start of the Iran-Iraq War

1981

Gulf Cooperation Council established

1982

Khalid dies and another brother, Fahd, is named the next King of Saudi Arabia; stock market crash (suq al-Manakh) crisis in Kuwait

1986

King Fahd takes the title “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques” End of Iran-Iraq War

1988 1990

1991 1992 1994 1996

1998 1999

2000 2001

xlii

Iraq invades Kuwait; North and South Yemen unite to form Republic of Yemen, which sides with Iraq; Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States expel large numbers of Yemenis Gulf War I. United States and allies expel Iraq from Kuwait Usamah bin Ladin expelled from Saudi Arabia by Saudi authorities Saudi authorities revoke Usamah bin Ladin’s citizenship Series of explosions set by terrorists hit the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, eventually linked to al Qa‘idah, Usamah bin Ladin’s group U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania linked to al Qa‘idah. Saudi Arabia’s yearlong centennial celebrations; Shayhk ‘Isa, ruler of Bahrain, dies, and his son, Hamad, becomes the next ruler Attack on U.S.S. Cole in the Aden harbor linked to al Qa‘idah September 11 attacks by al Qa‘idah provoke U.S. invasion of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan; Usamah bin Ladin seeks refuge with tribal people in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region; Bahrain becomes a kingdom and Shaykh Hamad becomes King Hamad

Chronology

2002

Elections in Bahrain—women allowed to vote

2003 2004

Gulf War Death of Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi and President of the United Arab Emirates; succeeded in both positions by his son, Khalifah Kuwait’s National Assembly expands voting to include women

2005 2006

Elections in Bahrain and Shi‘ites win forty percent of the seats in parliament; Shaykh Jabir Al Ahmad Amir of Kuwait dies and is succeeded first by Shaykh Sa‘ad Al ‘Abdallah, who resigns because of poor health, then by Shaykh Sabah Al Ahmad, who becomes the Amir of Kuwait

2008

UAE forgives Iraq’s debt of $7 billion and appoints an ambassador to Baghdad; Bahrain appoints its first woman ambassador, Huda Nonoo—a member of Bahrain’s very small but ancient Jewish community—as its representative to the United States; oil prices rise to record highs of $147 to $150 before stabilizing around $100 a barrel in July over fears of Iran’s nuclear program and continued political unrest in the Middle East; UAE appoints its first female judge, Khalud Ahmad Jawan; during Ramadan Saudi Arabia’s King ’Abdallah hosts an unofficial meeting between representatives of the Taliban and the Afghan government; Saudi, Kuwaiti, Bahraini, Qatari, and Emirati stock markets are all affected by the global credit crisis, and oil prices fall to below $50 a barrel in November; some countries are forces to institute similar bank bailouts as in the West; Oman is the only country in the region to not be greatly affected by credit crisis, stating its $3 billion infrastructure is not at risk

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The Gulf region. Cartography by Bookcomp, Inc.

Bahrain. Cartography by Bookcomp, Inc.

Kuwait. Cartography by Bookcomp, Inc.

Oman. Cartography by Bookcomp, Inc.

Qatar. Cartography by Bookcomp, Inc.

Saudi Arabia. Cartography by Bookcomp, Inc.

United Arab Emirates. Cartography by Bookcomp, Inc.

Yemen. Cartography by Bookcomp, Inc.

Approximate traditional locations of the main tribes of Saudi Arabia. Cartography by Bookcomp, Inc.

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab States Today

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A

‘Abd al-‘Aziz b. Muhammad b. Sa‘ud (1721–1803) Sebastian Maisel ‘Abd al-‘Aziz b. Muhammad b. Sa‘ud (1721–1803) was the son of the founder of the first Saudi state, Muhammad b. Sa‘ud, and amir of an Islamic revival movement since 1766. He was also the son-in-law of the religious leader and initiator of the same movement, Shaykh Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab. His father and father-in-law signed the historic alliance with a marriage between their children, making him the first political leader of the Al Sa‘ud and the religious reformers of the Al al-Shaykh. This pact is still regarded as the legitimization for the current rule of the Al Sa‘ud in Saudi Arabia. With the occupation of large areas in central Arabia, he is considered as the founder of the first state of the Al Sa‘ud dynasty and their historical rule in the Najd. After the death of Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab, he united the political and religious leadership of the movement under his control and took the new title of an imam, a religious leader of the Muslim community. His successful military campaigns added the areas of alHasa and Hijaz to the Saudi realm. The rulers of Ta’if and Asir joined them, and with the occupation of Karbala and Makkah (Mecca) in 1803 the area under Saudi control included almost the entire Peninsula. Everywhere he brought with him a new message of a purified Islam, cleansing the area from innovations such as worshipping saints, trees or tombs. As long as he operated only in Najd, the expansion went largely unnoticed. But after the destruction of Shi‘a shrines in southern Iraq and the Prophet Muhammad’s tomb in Madinah (Medina), the Ottoman Empire forced ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s troops out of the Hijaz and subsequently destroyed the first Saudi state. His legacy is also characterized by his unsuccessful attempts to unify the tribal society of Arabia, thus failing to create a centralized authority to rule the different nomadic and settled tribes in his region; however, he is known for his ability to deal with tribal leaders in the majlis, open meetings where all citizens had open access to the ruler. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz was killed and subsequently succeeded by his son Sa‘ud, who continued the policy of religious purity.

‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Sa‘ud (1876–1953)

FURTHER READING Delong-Bas, Natana J. Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. al-Rasheed, Madawi. A History of Saudi Arabia. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Vassiliev, Alexei. The History of Saudi Arabia. London: Saqi Books, 1998.

‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Sa‘ud (1876–1953) Sebastian Maisel ‘Abd al-‘Aziz was born in 1876 in Riyadh to ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Sa‘ud, then head of the Al Sa‘ud family and ruler over parts of Saudi Arabia, who in the previous century consolidated its hegemony of large parts of central Arabia. However, in 1891 he and his family were forced by their biggest political rivals, the Al Rashid from Ha’il, to leave Riyadh and go into exile in Kuwait, where ‘Abd al-‘Aziz grew up to become a successful politician, warrior, and religious leader. He started his mission to reinstall the power and legacy of the Al Sa‘ud with a bold and surprise attack on Riyadh in 1902, which he took from the Al Rashid, and a tactical maneuver that allowed him to snap al-Hasa from the Turkish control in 1913. As imam (or religious leader) of the Wahhabi reform movement, he became the religious and political leader of Najd. His natural political and military talent helped him to succeed with his mission of conquest in 1932 when he proclaimed the foundation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Several unique political strategies applied by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud were extremely helpful in this quest. On one hand he was able to gain support from Britain without becoming completely dependent upon them. He used the rivalry among other Arab leaders to secure British funding and recognition, while on the other hand he utilized the military force of recently settled Bedouins (Ikhwan) to conquer al-Hasa (1913), Ha’il (1921), the Hijaz (1925), and Yemen (1934), that is, the main and central parts in Arabia. The Ikhwan became a powerful tool in his hand that he used to pacify Arabia and consolidate the control of the Al Sa‘ud. Through the friendship and personal relations with influential foreign politicians, intellectuals, and decision-makers such as Gertrude Bell, Ameen Rihani, Charles R. Crane, and Harry St. John Philby, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz b. ‘Abd al-Rahman was able to gain political recognition and independence in a time period when the rest of the Middle East was split among the mandate powers and turned into semi-colonies. Oil was discovered in Saudi Arabia in 1938, and through his British advisor, Philby, concessions were granted to U.S. companies. This brought the first revenues to the poor and undeveloped country, which ‘Abd al-‘Aziz decided to invest in the development of infrastructure. It also brought rapid social change to Saudi Arabia, particularly to the Eastern Province where most of the oil reserves are

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Abha

located. Although ‘Abd al-‘Aziz used the oil money to enhance his kingdom, for himself he chose a rather simple lifestyle. It became one of his major domestic policies to make Islam and its teaching and requirements compatible with the technological advances by preserving the special character of Saudi Arabia. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz died on November 9, 1953 in Ta’if and was succeeded by his oldest son Sa‘ud.

FURTHER READING McLoughlin, Leslie J. Ibn Saud: Founder of a Kingdom. London: St. Martin’s Press, 1993. al-Rasheed, Madawi. A History of Saudi Arabia. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Rihani, Ameen. Ibn Sa’oud of Arabia. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1928. Vassiliev, Alexie. The History of Saudi Arabia. London: Saqi Books, 1998.

Abha Sebastian Maisel Abha is a medium-size city with roughly 200,000 inhabitants located in the strategically important Asir Mountains in southwestern Saudi Arabia. The population belongs to several, mostly South Arabian, tribes, such as the Ghamid, Zahran, Asir, or Qahtan. The tribal groups in the Abha area originate from the central highlands and are called sarat. Generally, the people belong or are strongly connected to a larger Yemen-oriented culture. Because of its elevation of approximately 7,200 feet (2,194.5 meters), abundant rainfall, and mild climate, it is a center for agriculture and tourism. Abha is also the political and administrative center of the Asir province and the seat of its governor, Prince Khalid Al Faysal. Several academic institutions are located in Abha, such as King Khalid University and Prince Sultan College for Hotel Management. One of the most liberal newspapers in Saudi Arabia, al-Watan, is edited and published in Abha. Agriculture and irrigation played an important part in the city’s development, where farming terraces and irrigation canals dominate the landscape. The traditional buildings in Abha, painted with bright colors, are made of several layers of stone and mud with a slight graduation from one layer to the next preventing the rainwater from saturating the walls. Since the 1990s tourism has become a focal point in domestic diversification strategies with Abha being the capital of the primary tourist area in the kingdom. It offers hotels, amusement parks, cable cars, modern and traditional shopping centers, and other tourist infrastructure to explore the city and its surrounding areas. In 1981, the Asir National Park was established, which served as a catalyst to the booming tourist industry. During the summer, when temperatures are pleasant in comparison to most other areas, the annual Abha Festival with its exhibitions and concerts attracts many Saudi and foreign tourists, mostly from

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Abu Dhabi (City)

the Gulf State. Famous artists from all over the Arab world perform in Abha, and it was here where the “Sound of the Earth,” all time-favorite ‘ud-player Talal Maddah, died on stage in 2000. In history, the medieval Muslim historian al-Hamdani mentioned the name of the city as home to the Asir tribe and a weekly marketplace, and it continues to be a political and economic center for the centuries to come. During the expansion of the first Wahhabi state around 1800, the area subsequently came under the control of the Ottomans and their military leadership from Egypt. The Al Aid, chief clan among the tribes in the area, ruled from Abha until another Turkish attack in 1887. After the end of World War I and the demise of the Ottoman Empire, Yemeni tribes under the Idrisis of Sabya tried to include Abha in their realm. The ruling clan of the Al Aid was finally defeated during several campaigns by the emerging power of King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud, who successfully managed to make Abha a bridgehead for further acquisitions of Idrisi territory and merged Abha and Asir into his newly established Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

FURTHER READING Abdulfattah, Kamal. Mountain Farmer and Fellah in Asir, Southwest Saudi Arabia. Erlangen: Fr€ankische Geographische Gesellschaft, 1981. Philby, Harry St. John. Arabian Highlands. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1952. € Reissner, Johannes. “Die Idrisiden in Asir: Ein historischer Uberblick,” Die Welt des Islams 21, no. 1–4 (1981): 164–192. Saud, Noura bint Muhammad, Al-Jawharah Muhammad ‘Anqari, and Madeha Muhammad Ajroush. Abha, Bilad Asir: South-Western Region of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Riyadh: Antiquariaat Klondyke, 1989.

Abu Dhabi (City) Carla Higgins Abu Dhabi, which means “father of the gazelle” in Arabic, is the capital city of the United Arab Emirates. Abu Dhabi is on a desert island and connected to the mainland via two bridges. In 1761 water was discovered and settlement followed. By 1793 the shaykhs of the Bani Yas tribal confederation had arrived and made it their capital, led by the Al Bu Falah ruling family. Abu Dhabi grew because of pearl fishing and trade made possible by pearl wealth—almost daily caravans arrived from either the Liwa or Buraymi oases. As the pearl industry grew, a stratified society developed that required labor, and slaves were imported to work as domestic servants, to tend date gardens, and to pearl dive. Bedouin tribesmen began to stay in Abu Dhabi rather than migrate to their camel herds or date gardens. Migrants from other Gulf areas as well as Persia arrived to practice trades and crafts (see handicrafts) as the cash economy grew. Persians fared especially well and grew to control most shops in the market, as well as many trades and crafts. The British administration in Bombay took an interest in

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Abu Dhabi (Emirate)

the security of maritime trade, hindered by piracy and regional rivalries, both also the concern of the tribal shayhks. The General Treaty of Peace was signed in January 1820 between the British and each ruler on the Arab coast—Shaykh Shakhbut bin Diyab signed for Abu Dhabi. British involvement in the area was thus codified, setting up Abu Dhabi as a minor ally and dependent of British India, and setting the stage for the British role as chief mediator in regional conflict and development. The pearling industry severely declined by the 1930s, and economic stagnation set in. Within a few decades the newly established oil industry became the source of wealth and employment, far exceeding any single source of revenue. The London-based oil company, Iraq Petroleum Company, signed agreements with Abu Dhabi’s ruler, Shaykh Shakhbut, in 1939 to gain rights to explore the emirate’s onshore and offshore territories, but oil in commercially viable quantities was not discovered until the late 1950s. By 1966 tribal unrest caused by Shakhbut’s reluctance to spend oil revenues led to his deposition by his brother, Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan al Nahyan. Shaykh Zayid soon demonstrated his commitment toward improving the lives Mosque in downtown Abu Dhabi. The of Abu Dhabi residents by investing in social infra- growth of high-rise buildings around the mosque attests to the rapid growth since structure such as mosques, health services, educa1970, when Abu Dhabi was mainly comtion, markets, and housing. posed of barasti or palm frond huts. CourIn 1971, the birth year of the United Arab Emi- tesy of John A. Shoup. rates, Abu Dhabi became the capital of the federation. It is now a highly developed cosmopolitan city with spacious streets, gleaming glass buildings, and a stunning skyline. Because of Shaykh Zayid’s efforts to green the emirates, Abu Dhabi hosts family parks and recreation areas. There is a building boom, and emphasis is upon developing tourism. New hotels, such as the Emirates’ Palace, host film festivals, art exhibits, and international pop stars. Plans to develop the city focus on bringing cultural and arts institutions renowned in the west, such as the Gugenheim Museum and the Louvre.

Abu Dhabi (Emirate) Carla Higgins Abu Dhabi occupies eighty-seven percent of the United Arab Emirates’ territory and is the largest emirate by far. Its area corresponds to the territory of the Bani Yas, a large tribal confederation that inhabited the area for centuries.

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Abu Dhabi (Emirate)

Dozens of islands exist off Abu Dhabi’s north coast and were historically significant for the pearling trade, guano gathering, and camel fodder and today for hydrocarbons. Abu Dhabi’s mainland is largely characterized as desert punctuated by gravel plains. In the north, salty mud flats known as sabkah stretch along the coast. Historically this area could not support vegetation, travel, communications, or settlement. Desert sands begin three to six miles (five to ten kilometers) from shore, extending south and westward into the vast Rub‘al-Khali Desert of Saudi Arabia. There are three population centers: the Liwa Oases, al ‘Ayn town, and Abu Dhabi city. The Liwa Oases are in the west and historically were critical to the economy because of their date gardens. Peoples of the Liwa survived on wells created from dew and occasional rains. The Liwa is the ancestral home of the Bani Yas and thus Abu Dhabi’s ruling clan, the Al Bu Falah. To the east, the Hajar Mountains rise on the Abu Dhabi/Oman border, and provided water via an ancient system of irrigation called aflaj to a cluster of villages, amongst them today’s village of al ‘Ayn. Al ‘Ayn is the second largest population center in the emirate, hosts a huge date palm grove, and became a power base for the ruling family during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Abu Dhabi city is the northernmost settlement, the capital of the emirate, flourishing on wealth from the pearling industry and recently from oil and investments made possible by oil wealth. Abu Dhabi’s economy was based on seasonal activities and migration—the economy was diversified into camel herding, trading, date cultivation, fishing, and pearling. Subsistence and survival were the goals, and all family members cooperated to exploit available resources at different times of the year, and in different areas of Abu Dhabi. Some manufacturing occurred, but all products were consumed locally. The ownership of date groves brought additional security and status, although dates were consumed locally and provided subsistence, not export. Only pearl diving brought revenue, grew the coastal settlement of Abu Dhabi city, created wealth and subsequent stratification, brought foreign traders and laborers to Abu Dhabi, and garnered the interest of foreign businessmen and governments interested in regional trade. The British administration in Bombay was interested in regional maritime trade, hindered by piracy and regional rivalries. Abu Dhabi signed British-sponsored treaties to protect and control trade, such as the General Treaty of Peace (1820), the Maritime Truce (1835), and the Perpetual Maritime Truce (1853). By 1892, British involvement in the area was established, eventually setting up Abu Dhabi as a minor ally of British India and setting the stage for British role as a chief mediator in regional conflict and development. In the 1930s, the pearling industry failed, but Abu Dhabi’s islands also lie over giant oil fields. Exploration by foreign oil companies began in the 1930s, and commercial quantities of oil were discovered in the late 1950s, offshore and onshore. In 1954 Abu Dhabi granted a concession to Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Ltd, who discovered oil on the island of Umm Shaif in 1958, and again on Zakum Island in 1963. Onshore, Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company discovered oil at al Bab in 1958. By the mid-1960s, five super giant fields had been discovered and now, because of hydrocarbon export, Abu Dhabi residents are some of the wealthiest citizens in the world. Today, there are approximately 1,000 producing wells in Abu Dhabi, providing almost unlimited funds for development.

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Agriculture: Traditional and Commercial

In 1968, the British announced their impending withdrawal from the Gulf. In 1971, the federation of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was created from seven independent emirates. Abu Dhabi played a key role in creating the federation, and Abu Dhabi city was made the provisional capital of the UAE, and the permanent capital in 1996. Shaykh Zayid, the Emir of Abu Dhabi, became president of the UAE and was not only the ruler of Abu Dhabi and architect of the UAE, but also directed oil wealth to improve the welfare of the emirates and the Arab world. From the mid-1960s Abu Dhabi has been building infrastructure in the smaller emirates and supporting other Arab and Muslim countries through the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development. Today Abu Dhabi boasts modern roads and housing, a system of schools, modern health care, civil institutions, and a vibrant private sector. The emirate boasts clean, well-maintained, garden-filled, well-lit cities with a growing number of recreational, entertainment, and cultural opportunities for its citizens and the large multinational expatriate population that lives within it. Free education, from the primary levels up through higher education, as well as education abroad, is offered to Emirati nationals. Free housing is supplied to Emiratis. Major highways provide connectivity. Electricity and water are subsidized. Abu Dhabi citizens are primarily employed in government and own buildings and other real estate, cars, and taxis to garner income. The Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) plays a huge role in the economy and is a major employer of Emirati nationals. The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) is tasked with providing for a future without oil—ADIA invests oil revenue overseas and is believed to have built a diverse and substantial portfolio since initiated in 1976. The obvious characteristic that now affects Abu Dhabi’s future is its role as a major oil producer. This tiny emirate is now a world player by virtue of its extreme wealth, and its development now holds world attention. Abu Dhabi is challenged by issues common to other Gulf emirates and countries, such as labor and human rights for its population of relatively poor foreign workers, providing an education for its citizens, creating appropriate health care, building transparent and accountable institutions that provide services, and deciding how and when to adopt models of governance from other communities.

Agriculture: Traditional and Commercial John A. Shoup Agriculture in the Arabian Peninsula began in the Neolithic period (6000–8000 BC) with the domestication of both plants and animals. Archeological excavations in the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia indicate early trade connections in the Persian Gulf, with both Mesopotamia and the Indus civilizations that introduced other domesticated plant and animal species to the region, such as wheat from the north and zebu cattle from India. As the Arabian Peninsula

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Agriculture: Traditional and Commercial

Openings along the line of aflaj or underground water canals are used to maintain the system. This falaj (singular of aflaj) helps irrigate the dense stand of date palms and other crops for the oasis of Adam in Oman. Courtesy of John A. Shoup.

began to dry up in the late Neolithic, the serious lack of permanent water sources concentrated agriculture in oases and encouraged pastoral nomadism.

OASIS AGRICULTURE Most of the traditional agricultural production in the Arabian Peninsula came from the important oases that dot the landscape. The notable exceptions are the better-watered mountains in the Asir of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Oman, where other technologies such as terracing methods were introduced at an early period. Oases function with a highly developed system of irrigation tapping underground water supplies through two major methods: wells and a system of underground canals usually called aflaj in Oman or qanat in Bahrain, which may have been an early borrowing from Iran or Iraq. Wells used several methods to bring up large buckets of water: either with the bucket rope attached to a long pole with a heavy weight on the end to make it easier for a person to handle; or with the bucket rope harnessed to an animal such as a donkey, camel, or bullock and brought to the surface with a system of wooden pulleys. The water can be poured into a delivery ditch or directly onto the plants. The aflaj (singular falaj) or qanat are underground canals that tap either surface water, such as a stream, or groundwater. A series of shafts are dug at intervals and the canals are dug connecting them. The shafts are used to help maintain the canals because they need periodic cleaning. The canals need to be at a constant slope that is not too steep, which would cause quick erosion, or too shallow, which would cause the canals to back up and stop the flow of the water. Aflaj can

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Agriculture: Traditional and Commercial

run for several miles before they open up into the oasis and the water distributed to individual fields by a strict accounting of time. Each field has a designated turn usually marked in number of hours and the whole system is controlled by a person (usually called an ‘Arif—plural ‘Urafa’—in most of the Gulf) who is knowledgeable about every person’s inherited or purchased water rights. The basic plant in the oases is the date palm tree. The date palm is heat- and salt-resistant, being able to thrive where daytime temperatures soar to over 120°F (50°C) and where the water quality is too salty for other plants to survive. The canopy provided by the date palms helps allow other more sensitive plants to grow and produce. Under the shade of the palm canopy the temperatures can be some ten to fifteen degrees cooler than outside of the oasis. A healthy oasis usually has a second layer of trees and shrubs such as olive, citrus, fig, pomegranate, henna, or mango that help keep the ground temperature cool and allow more sensitive vegetables to grow. The date palm is naturally a shrub rather than a tree and takes on the tall, treelike shape only with the interference of man. Trimming off the lower fronds causes the plant to continue to grow upward and careful yearly pruning is needed to produce the shade canopy. In addition, date palms produce more fruit when man helps with the pollination process by collecting the long pollen pods from the male trees and physically pollinating the female trees. Livestock play an important role in traditional oasis production both as a major source of power/energy and of fertilizer. Livestock were kept in pens or stables near their owner’s houses and rarely allowed to graze freely inside the oasis. Livestock were instead fed fodder raised by their owners or purchased from others in the markets. In some instances, oasis farmers contracted their livestock to pastoral nomads especially if they were from the same tribe. A particular tribe may have settled sections producing important products such as dates while other sections were pastoralists producing wool, hair, and milk. Such arrangements helped diversify the economy and minimize risk. Oasis agriculture is by its very nature work-intensive and without the constant care of the farmers the system collapses and the land reverts to desert. Small plots of land are not only highly valuable but also highly productive, making oasis agriculture hectare-by-hectare some of the most productive agricultural land in the world. Nearly all land within an oasis is under cultivation and traditionally land has been privately owned. In addition, water rights are also privately owned and can be separate from land rights through complicated systems of inheritance based on Islamic principals. Land and water rights were strong factors encouraging families to prefer cousin marriages in order to not lose control over these valuable assets. Women were the most vulnerable to family pressures to give up their rights to inheritance in order to keep land and water from going to another family or lineage. Conflict over rights, especially to water, were settled by councils of lineage elders, although armed conflict was all too frequent even in the recent past.

PASTORAL NOMADISM Pastoral nomadism is well adapted for the harsh dry conditions of the Arabian Peninsula. Sheep, goats, cattle, donkeys, horses, and camels are the main types of livestock raised yet today. Sheep, goats, cattle, donkeys, and horses need to

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Agriculture: Traditional and Commercial

drink at least once a day, which in the past limited the area where they could be raised. The need for water meant that they could not utilize the deeper desert areas except in the winter when rainwater forms pools and small lakes. Camels formed the economic and cultural basis for the great Bedouin tribes, whereas horses were important symbols of status and prestige because they were not only expensive to buy but also expensive to maintain. Horses were important in warfare and raiding because they are very fast and the Arabian horse is known for its speed and endurance qualities. Horses were also important to the Bedouin economy and Kuwait and Aleppo served as major markets for horses sold as cavalry mounts until after World War I mechanized army units were introduced. Archeological records indicate that camels were first domesticated in southern Arabia between 3000 and 2500 BC and reached northern Arabia some time after 1100 BC. Camels gave pastoralists a greater range for migration and freed them from dependency on fixed water sources. Camel milk could be substituted for water for both people and horses whereas dates served as basic foodstuff for both. Although the camel gave the Arab Bedouin greater freedom of movement, the harsh desert conditions did not favor large populations; thus, they never formed the majority of people living in the Peninsula. Some Bedouin tribes tried to include areas with better-watered grazing lands in the north in Syria and Iraq and historically there has been a constant pressure by Bedouin from the south to move north. The twentieth century brought rapid changes to many Bedouin, including a shift to more market-oriented production. Camels, although highly valued in Bedouin culture, were less demanded in the markets and many Bedouin began the shift to raising sheep and goats, but mainly sheep. Sheep have a quicker return on investment because they gain full adulthood in a year whereas a camel takes five to six years to mature. Excess male sheep are sold in local markets for meat and hides whereas females produce both milk and wool. Traditional migration patterns were disrupted with the introduction of motorized transportation in the 1950s, which sped up the amount of time needed to move between pastures. Large trucks not only replaced camels in moving people (and livestock), but also opened up the desert to sheep pastoralism. Water can be easily hauled from distant springs and wells in large containers or in specially built tanker trucks, making it possible to water large numbers of livestock on a daily basis. Camel herds are still kept by many Bedouin, even those who have settled, for their hair and milk or are raised as racers. Those Bedouin who lived in the more rugged mountainous regions of the Peninsula or in the northern areas close to Syria and Iraq traditionally raised sheep, goats, and cattle. The goat breed developed over time is usually black in color with long hair. The hair was clipped in the late spring or early summer and was either sold in local markets or kept and spun into yarn used to make tent panels or as the warp for rugs and winter clothing. The sheep breed developed in the region is a fat-tailed variety with long, straight carpet wool. The wool is shorn in late spring or early summer and, like the goat hair, was sold in local markets or spun into yarn to make numerous household items such as bags, rugs, or clothes. Both sheep and goats are milked and a variety of yogurts and cheeses were, and still are, an important part of the Bedouin diet. Cattle were less commonly raised by pastoralists, although they were, and still remain, part of the agro-pastoral production system in parts of Oman and the Asir region of Saudi

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Agriculture: Traditional and Commercial

Arabia. In the Jabal Akhdar of Oman, a dwarf breed of zebu was developed to deal with the environmental conditions and scarcity of fodder. People in the Peninsula developed several land management systems in order to not abuse the limited natural resources. Much of the land outside of the oases was considered to be common or tribal lands open to all to use. Common lands were managed by a system called hima or mahmiyah, meaning protected or reserved under the control of the tribal or lineage elders. Lands were set aside for specific use such as for cattle or horses only or for a specific season of the year. Some lands were not to be grazed except during periods of drought or for the production of honey, which was used in traditional medicine. Both settled communities, and Bedouin improved natural pastures by building dams on seasonal streams that were used to water livestock, and when the water dried up, livestock were allowed to graze the meadow that was left behind.

COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE Following the discovery of oil, several Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia embarked on new agricultural policies in attempts to lessen dependency on imported foodstuffs. Deep wells were drilled to tap fossil water for large irrigation schemes and even desalinated water is used to irrigate new agricultural schemes; for example, in Saudi Arabia desalinated water makes up seventy percent of the total amount of the available potable water. Saudi Arabia established the Directorate of Agriculture in 1948, which began by providing water pumps, building dams and irrigation canals, and providing loans to farmers to improve existing agricultural infrastructure. In 1953 the Directorate was made into a full ministry, the Ministry of Agriculture and Water. In 1964 the Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank was established to assist farmers in financing new agricultural equipment and machinery. The Ministry instituted programs to provide technical advice as well as veterinary services and pest control through local centers. In 1972 Saudi Arabia embarked on an ambitious scheme to produce large amounts of wheat and barley irrigated by large sprinkler networks that make some parts of the kingdom look like the Great Plains states such as Kansas. Almost 3 million hectares of land have been put under grain production and by 1985 the kingdom became selfsufficient, although the actual cost of production makes it among the most expensive grain in the world. During the 1980s and into the 1990s, Saudi Arabia became the sixth largest exporter of wheat. However, by 1996 the government began discouraging large-scale wheat production because it was quickly using up the supply of groundwater. Some sixty percent of the water used to irrigate the fields was lost to evaporation and the water table sank to depths of over 492 feet (150 meters). Saudi Arabian wheat farmers also began to have trouble finding skilled agricultural labor, adding to the production price of Saudi wheat. Saudi Arabia still produces around 2 million tons of wheat per year but production will be phased out by 2015 and the country will once again be dependent upon imported supplies of wheat. Saudi Arabia and most of the Gulf States have embarked upon greenhouse production of fruits, vegetables, and even berries and fresh-cut flowers. Many of these are private investments by locals and are among the most sophisticated greenhouses, using the most up-to-date technologies. Produce is sold fresh in the

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‘Ajman

local markets or is processed in local factories. Cut flowers are shipped by air to markets in Europe on a daily basis and processed fruit juices are sold in markets throughout much of Africa. Commercial livestock production has concentrated on cattle, sheep, and poultry (mainly chickens). Cattle are raised for their meat and hides, although since the 1960s dairy breeds have been introduced from Denmark and the Netherlands to supply fresh and processed milk and milk products. Dairy farms require expensive infrastructure, not only to guarantee quality and cleanliness, but also to maintain high levels of production during the hot months. European breeds of dairy cattle suffer from the heat and milk production is adversely affected by it; therefore, dairy barns need to be air conditioned or cooled with misters or sprinklers. Many of the counties in the region are now able to provide most of their needs for eggs and chicken, but still need to import red meat. Sheep, cattle, and camels are imported from nearby states such as Syria and Sudan or from Australia and the United States. In addition to the newer sectors, commercial practices have also been applied to date production. Date groves have been improved with drip irrigation, which loses little water to evaporation. Tree management has also been improved to increase the level of production, making the Gulf and Saudi Arabia among the highest-producing regions of the world. Saudi Arabia alone has over 13 million date trees in production, producing over 600,000 tons of dates a year. Dates are processed and packaged locally and exported to other countries. There is a high demand for dates throughout the Muslim world, especially during the month of Ramadan when Muslims break their daily fast with dates.

FURTHER READING Hansen, Eric. “Looking for the Khalasah” and “Carrying Dates to Hajar,” Saudi Aramco World 55, no. 4 (2004): 3–8, 9–15. Shoup, John. “Middle Eastern Sheep Pastoralism and the Hima System,” in The World of Pastoralism, edited by John Galaty and Douglas Johnson. New York: Guilford Publications, 1990.

‘Ajman Sebastian Maisel The ‘Ajman is considered one of the most powerful tribes in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Currently, they are mostly living in Saudi Arabia (80,000), but large sections are found in Kuwait (30,000) as well as in Qatar. During the early eighteenth century, the ‘Ajman moved from their original homeland in Najran through the Jabal Tuwayq into al-Hasa, where under the leadership of the shaykhly family, Bin Hithlayn, they replaced the ruling Bani Khalid as the strongest military force in the eastern Arabian Peninsula. Enemies of the ‘Ajman often describe them as Isma‘ilis (i.e., Shi‘ites) and they might have been originally, because Najran, where they originated, is home to the Bani Yam tribe of which the majority are Isma‘ilis although some sections are

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‘Ajman and Umm al-Quwayn

Sunnis. However, there is no evidence that the ‘Ajman have any Isma‘ili connection. Like their closest relatives, the Al Murrah, the ‘Ajman claim descent from Qahtan and share the common descent from Hamdan of the southern Arabs through Yam. The tribal area, or dirah, of the ‘Ajman borders the tribal areas of the Mutayr in the north; the ‘Utaybah, Subay, Bani Hajir, and Bani Khalid in the west; and the Murrah in the south. It includes the famous Samman uplands, which after winter rains becomes excellent grazing land attracting Bedouins of the Mutayr, Bani Khalid, and Subay tribes. The main divisions of the ‘Ajman are the Marzuq and the Wubayr. Among the historical tribal leaders is Rakan bin Falah bin Hithlayn, a well-known poet and leader who inherited the position of shaykh from his uncle and ruled the tribe successfully for 35 years (1859–1892). During the formation state of Saudi Arabia, the ‘Ajman often sided with ‘Abd al‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud but never fully joined his side. In the battle of Kinzan in June 1915, ibn Sa‘ud’s brother Sa‘ad was killed by the ‘Ajman. Their shifting loyalty made them a notorious distrusted enemy to the Al Sa‘ud; however, that did not prevent them from joining the Ikhwan movement from an early time period and from settling in fourteen hijras. During this era, their clients, the ‘Awazim tribe, officially broke away and sided with ibn Sa‘ud. Joining forces with sections from the Mutayr and ‘Utaybah, the ‘Ajman were a leading force in the rebellion of the Ikhwan against ibn Sa‘ud between 1927 and 1929 under Didan bin Fahad bin Hithlayn. In May 1929, Didan was killed, and his cousin Nayif took his place as tribal leader. The ‘Ajman are famous for their camel and horse breeding, but because of the developing oil industry and oil production in their dirah, most of them gave up nomadism and took jobs with Aramco. However, they maintained their superior social position by keeping close marital relations with the royal families in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. There appears to be no connection between the tribe of the ‘Ajman and the emirate of ‘Ajman.

FURTHER READING al-Haddad, Mohammad S. “The Effect of Detribalization and Sedentarization on the Socio-Economic Structure of the Tribes of the Arabian Peninsula: The Ajman Tribe as a Case Study.” PhD dissertation, University of Kansas, 1981. Kostiner, Joseph. “Sa’udi Arabia’s Territorial Expansion: The Case of Kuwayt, 1916– 1921,” Die Welt des Islams 33, no. 2 (1993): 219–234. Raswan, Carl R. “Tribal Areas and Migration Lines among North Arabian Bedouins,” Geographical Review 20, no. 3 (1930): 494–502.

‘Ajman and Umm al-Quwayn John A. Shoup ‘Ajman and Umm al-Quwayn are two of the seven emirates that make up the United Arab Emirates. ‘Ajman is the smallest of the seven emirates with a total area of only 100 square miles (260 square kilometers), most of which is

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‘Ali bin Hussein bin ‘Ali (1879–1935)

immediately located around the capital, ‘Ajman City. It also controls two small but important agricultural inland enclaves of Masfut and al-Manamah. ‘Ajman is ruled by the Al Nu‘aymi lineage of the Nu‘aym tribe, which has been important in the history of the region. The Nu‘aym (Na‘im) tribe dominated much of the oasis of al-‘Ayn/al-Buraymi in the past and were involved in the disputes over the oasis of al-Hatta in the nineteenth century. Part of the Nu‘aym moved to Bahrain, where they were important allies (both Bedouin and Sunni) of the ruling Al Khalifah family. The Nu‘aym were able to establish control over ‘Ajman in the mideighteenth century, although the exact date is not known. There are no known dates for the first shaykh, Rashid ibn Hamid, and only the date of the death in 1816 of the second shaykh, Humayd bin Rashid, is known. ‘Ajman was able to maintain its independence during the nineteenth century and was recognized by the British by a treaty with Shaykh Rashid ibn Humayd al-Nu‘aymi signed in 1820. During the nineteenth and first part of the twentieth centuries, ‘Ajman’s economy was based on pearling, fishing, and oasis agriculture, much like the other emirates. ‘Ajman’s small territory has no oil, and in 1971 the ruling shaykh, Rashid bin Humayd, opted to join the United Arab Emirates, and Abu Dhabi’s massive oil wealth was shared out by its ruling shaykh, Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahyan. ‘Ajman’s population also remained small, with only 36,000 in 1980. Building booms in Dubai, Sharjah, and to a degree Ra’s al-Khaymah have recently affected the emirate. With the rising cost of living in the other nearby emirates combined with ‘Ajman’s close proximity and easy connection to the others, ‘Ajman has become an important “sleeper community.” In 2008 the population is estimated to have grown to over 361,000 people, of whom 347,733 live in ‘Ajman City. ‘Ajman’s ruler Shaykh Humayd bin Rashid has taken Dubai’s recent growth as a model and has opened ‘Ajman to the same type of freehold property development in an attempt to draw investors. There are several developments scheduled, including one that is supposed to help protect the stand of mangrove trees in the shallows just off ‘Ajman City’s coast. Umm al-Quwayn was established in 1775 by the first ruler of the Al Mu‘alla lineage of the Al ‘Ali. Like the other emirates, Umm al-Quwayn was recognized as an independent emirate by treaty with the British in 1820. The emirate is small, but nearly twice the size of ‘Ajman with a total area of 289 square miles (750 square kilometers). Its population is the smallest of the seven emirates making up the United Arab Emirates with a total of only 62,000 people (2003 estimate), most of who live in the main city of Umm al-Quwayn.

‘Ali bin Hussein bin ‘Ali (1879–1935) Sebastian Maisel ‘Ali bin Hussein was the son of Hussein bin ‘Ali, Grand Sharif of Makkah and King of the Hijaz. ‘Ali succeeded his father and ruled the Hijaz for a short period of time. He was born in Makkah in 1879 and was the eldest son. Most of his

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‘Anazah

childhood he spent with his family in exile in Istanbul, but after his father was appointed ruler of Makkah, he returned with his family to the Hijaz. Under his father he served as an army leader in the Arab Revolt. His brothers Faysal and ‘Abdallah were rewarded for their participation in the anti-Turkish campaign with the thrones in Iraq and Transjordan. ‘Ali inherited his father’s throne as King of the Hijaz. In the years following World War I he unsuccessfully tried to stem the advances of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud’s army on Makkah and Jiddah. After his father’s forced abdication, ‘Ali was proclaimed King of Hijaz on October 6, 1924. The Hijaz under his rule became a constitutional monarchy with a national representative council that included the nobility of the Hijaz, such as the Sharifs, religious scholars, and merchants. The area experienced a short renaissance in culture and education with the foundation of schools and newspapers. However, the rule of ‘Ali was contested by ibn Sa‘ud, who tried to expel the Hashemites (see Al Hashim) entirely and incorporate the Hijaz into his realm. After a long siege and realizing that the British were no longer willing to support him, ‘Ali surrendered his last stronghold, the city of Jiddah, and left for Iraq, where his younger brother Faysal was king. ‘Ali was married to Sharifah Nafisah bint ‘Abd al-Ilah and they had five children: four daughters and one son, ‘Abd al-Ilah, who became the regent of Iraq during the minority of King Faysal II. ‘Ali died in Baghdad in 1935.

FURTHER READING De Gaury, Gerald. Rulers of Mecca. London: Harrap, 1951. Vassiliev, Alexei. The History of Saudi Arabia. London: Saqi Books, 1998.

‘Anazah Sebastian Maisel One of the largest tribal confederations in Arabia is the ‘Anazah, who live and migrate over several Middle Eastern countries, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. It is estimated that the confederation numbers around 1 million. Their tribal territory spreads roughly within the area of Aleppo to the north, Damascus to the west, Baghdad to the east, and Taymah in the south, thus covering most of the Syrian Desert, but overlapping with other tribal areas, such as those of the Shammar. The boundaries of tribal areas in Arabia have been loosely fixed since the beginning of the eighteenth century. The ‘Anazah tribe has a long history going back to the pre-Islamic jahiliyah period and the time of the Prophet Muhammad. Originally located in al-Yamamah in southern Najd, their ancestors belonged the Rabi‘a tribe, who was in opposition to the early Muslim community and had their area destroyed by the first Caliph, Abu Bakr. After the Qaramitah war in 1165, they started to move northward to the Harah of Khaybar from where they continued to the north and east in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. From the end of the seventeenth century they pushed to

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‘Anazah

the north into their current territory leaving the sections of the Wuld Sulayman, Fuqarah and Wuld ‘Ali behind in what later became Saudi Arabia. As the most powerful tribe of the region, next to the Shammar, they played an important role in the politics of the nineteenth century, but since the 1870s they fell under Ottoman influence through the system of allocating land and titles to the tribal leadership. In 1917–1918 they joined the British in World War I and submitted to the Mandate powers, and in 1925 to the Sultan of Najd, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. In the past they have been camel nomads, but since the beginning of the twentieth century they have mostly engaged in sheep farming. During the height of the Ikhwan movement, they founded several colonies in the oasis of Khaybar, where the tribe owned land and plantations. They did not participate in the Ikhwan rebellion, but remained loyal to ibn Sa‘ud. After World War II they quickly abandoned nomadism and settled in rural areas. The ruling family of Saudi Arabia, the Al Sa‘ud, and the ruling family in Kuwait, the Al Sabah, both descend from the ‘Anazah tribes; the Al Sa‘ud family descends from the Wuld ‘Ali branch. In 1710, formerly nomadic ‘Anazah groups from central Arabia founded Kuwait City, and ‘Abd al-Rahim of the Sabah lineage became shaykh in 1756, the first of the family that continues to rule Kuwait. The ruling family of Bahrain, the Al Khalifah, also claims descent from the ‘Anazah through the ‘Utub branch. The name ‘Anazah derives from the Arabic word ‘anz (goat), which leads to the assumption that the ‘Anazah in addition to their camel herds also bred goats. In genealogical terms, the ‘Anazah are of ‘Adnan (northern) descent; however, there seems to be confusion regarding their subdivisions and branches about a regional division into a northern and southern branch. One approach defines the northern section, which denotes the groups of northern Syria and Iraq, including the Fid‘an, Saba‘ah, ‘Amarat, and Khursah, and the southern section, which includes the Banu Wahab with the Hasanah and Wuld ‘Ali and the Al Galas with the Ruwalah and Mihlif. A smaller section of the ‘Anazah that remained in alYamamah and settled much earlier is also considered part of the southern branch. They include the Bani Hizzan (al-Hazazinah) and the Jumaylah in Aflaj. However, the latter mainly moved to the east under pressure from the Dawasir. The Ruwalah essentially became an independent unit within the confederation and often fought other clans over the supreme leadership, which was held for many years in the hands of the Al Sha‘lan. Each group is headed by a tribal leader called shaykh, a position that can be inherited within an important family or lineage. The leading shaykhly families in the ‘Anazah tribe are the ibn Hadhal of the ‘Amarat, and the Ibn Sha‘lan from the Ruwalah section, the latter being the fourth most powerful family in Arabia prior to World War II after the Al Sa‘ud, the Hashimites (see Al Hashim), and the Al Rashid. The Ruwalah under Nuri Sha‘lan participated in the Arab Revolt. Through intermarriage with the Saudi royal family, they are considered part of the social and partly the political elite of the kingdom. A member of the Sha‘lan family made headlines in 2007 when he was accused of drug trafficking in France. In general, like many other nomadic groups in the area, the traditional way of life has been severely affected by rapid modernization, urbanization, and industrialization. Although the prospects for the survival of their lifestyle are slim,

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Arabian Gulf

their cultural and social impact on the society because of their sheer number and being the most numerous tribe in Saudi Arabia is still strong.

FURTHER READING Ashkenazi, Touvia. “The ‘Anazah Tribes,” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 4, no. 2 (1948): 222–239. Ashkenazi, Touvia. “Social and Historical Problems of the ‘Anazah Tribes,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 8, no. 1 (1965): 93–100. Lancaster, William. The Rwala Bedouin Today. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland, 1997. Lewis, Norman. Nomads and Settlers in Syria and Jordan, 1800–1980. London: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Musil, Alios. The Manners and Customs of the Rwala Bedouins. New York: American Geographical Society, 1928. Shanklin, William M., “The Anthropology of the Rwala Bedouins,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 65 (1935): 375–390.

Arabian Gulf John A. Shoup The name of this major body of water differs from one shore to the other; it is called the Arabian Gulf or Khalij al-‘Arabi by the Arabs and Khalij al-Farisi or Persian Gulf by the Iranians and most of the rest of the world. The classical Arab geographers called it Bahr Faris, or the Persian Sea, from which its modern name, the Persian Gulf, derives. To avoid any problem over the name, it is frequently called simply “the Gulf.” The Persian Gulf lies between Iran on the north and the Arabian Peninsula on the south and is fed by the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, which flow into its western end through the Shatt al-‘Arab waterway. The Shatt al-‘Arab is shared between Iran and Iraq and is separated from Kuwait by Bubiyan Island. The Gulf stretches about 600 miles (970 kilometers) from the Strait of Hormuz in the east to the Shatt al-‘Arab on the west. The Strait of Hormuz is only thirty to fifty miles (forty-eight to eighty kilometers) wide and includes four islands: Qishm, which belongs to Iran; and Greater and Lesser Tunub and Abu Musa, seized from the United Arab Emirates by Iran in 1971. The dispute over these islands has been unresolved. The Gulf has served as a major means of international transportation since the earliest periods, linking Mesopotamia with ancient Oman and the Indus civilizations. In more recent times it has been the main water route for oil shipments from Iran, Iraq, and all of the Arab Gulf countries. The Gulf coast is shallow and until the twentieth century most of the ports could only accommodate lighter vessels such as light, quick dhows. This fact allowed several pirates to operate in what is today the United Arab Emirates. These pirates preyed on commercial shipping in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. They were able to escape back into the shallow waters of the Gulf coast and avoid capture by the British Navy until 1820, when Britain

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Arabian Horses

imposed peace in the region by landing troops and burning several ships and forts. The Gulf is home to some of the largest pearl banks in the world. The shallow nature of much of the Gulf, along with the relative warm temperature of the water, encourages several sea animals to flourish, including oysters and corals. Pearls were one of the major sectors in the local economy until the discovery of oil in the twentieth century. Coral was used as building material along much of the Gulf coast, where other building materials are scarce. Coral is light but strong, making it an ideal material for walls. The Gulf supports many fish and even today fishing is an important industry, although foreign workers, mainly from Pakistan and India, now do much of the hard labor. The Gulf has several important oil fields, most of which are fully exploited by the countries who claim them. The importance of the region for the world economy is highlighted when there is a regional dispute or threat of war. World prices of oil are linked to events in the Gulf; a threat of war could close shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

FURTHER READING Beaumont, Peter, Gerald Blake, and Malcom Wagstaff. The Middle East. London: John Wiley & Sons, 1976. Fisher, W.B. The Middle East: A Physical, Social, and Regional Geography. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1971.

Arabian Horses John A. Shoup Faras or khayl in Arabic refers to a riding horse and one of asil or “noble” descent. The origin of the Arabian horse is lost in antiquity although among the cuneiform tablets discovered in ancient Mesopotamian sites are pedigrees of horses that note attempts to breed animals with the main characteristics of the Arabian. Popular Arab legend traces the purebred Arabian back to five mares that escaped the destruction of the Ma’rib Dam in Yemen, or from a horse presented to the Azd tribe by King Solomon. Other legends say that the Arabian horse was born from the wind and in popular terminology Arabian mares are still referred to as Banat al-Rih, or Daughters of the Wind. In the pre-Islamic period horses seem to have been rare in much of the Peninsula and held in high esteem for the purity of their bloodlines. Pureblood Arabian horses have very high social value among Arabs and their commercial value has also been very high. Veterinary medicine is among the Islamic sciences advanced in the classical period. Horses were kept by the Bedouin and by the main ruling dynasties in the Peninsula and Gulf. The Al Khalifah of Bahrain remain avid breeders of race horses and developed their own substrain of the Kuhaylan unique to the island called the Jallabi. In the mid-nineteenth century the Al Sa‘ud family owned over 600

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Arabian Horses

purebred horses kept on their farm near Riyadh. Starting in the late eighteenth and during the nineteenth century, Kuwait was one of the major exporters of Arabian horses for the British military in India and horses from Syria and Iraq were brought there for sale. The ‘Anazah and Shammar Bedouin of the Syrian Desert and northern Arabian Peninsula were among the most important sources of purebred horses until the early twentieth century. European and American enthusiasts purchased horses for export back to their own countries, founding many of the main families of purebred Arabians in Europe and North America today. Alarmed by the large number of excellent horses being purchased by Europeans to improve their cavalry mounts, the Ottomans passed a law in the 1890s restricting the numbers of Arabian horses that could be exported and requiring personal written permission called a firman from the Sultan himself. The Arabian horse is divided into five main strains, most of which descend from the Kuhaylan, considered the most noble of the strains, and frequently today the term kuhaylan is used to mean a purebred Arabian horse. The five strains are Kuhaylan, Hadban, Hamdan, Saqlawi, and ‘Abayan. In addition, each of these has several subfamilies and there are three other strains generally accepted as asil by most Bedouin, the Umm al-‘Arkub, Mu‘aniqi, and Khlafah. Each of the five main strains are known for a particular strength but all Arabian horses should have a small nozzle; wide forehead; dish face; thin throat; high head carriage; long, slim neck; short back; long, straight croup; high tail carriage; deep chest; thin but strong legs; and strong hooves. The horse is built to have stamina and run long distances and, although not as fast as its direct descendant the English Thoroughbred, is fast and agile. The qualities of the Arabian horse are such that they were eagerly sought after to improve larger, slower European breeds and the Arabian horse is the originator of all other hot-blood and warm-blood breeds. Arabians are excellent for endurance and dominate endurance racing everywhere in the world. The ruling houses in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia have long interests in breeding fine horses and in recent years the ruling families in the United Arab Emirates have also established horse farms. Unable to draw on local sources for horses, the Emiratis have imported purebred Arabians from Europe, the United States, and Australia. Horses are used in flat racing, where Bahrain dominated for nearly two centuries. The Al-Maktum family in the United Arab Emirates introduced endurance races in the 1990s. Since 1998, they have sponsored and competed in the 125 mile (200 kilometer) World’s Most Preferred Endurance Ride held in Dubai. Abu Dhabi established an endurance racing center at alWathbah to promote the sport and the United Arab Emirates is also promoting endurance races in other Arab countries such as Bahrain, Syria, and Egypt. Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have sponsored festivals centered on the Arabian horse, the first of these being held in Bahrain as one of the yearly cultural festivals sponsored by the National Museum. The festival in Bahrain focused on the importance of the Arabian horse in Arab history and culture. The United Arab Emirates now has a yearly horse festival that includes not only Arabian horse racing, but also the world’s richest Thoroughbred race, the Dubai World Cup, worth $1 million.

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Arabian Peninsula

FURTHER READING Dickson, H.R.P. The Arab of the Desert. London: Allen & Unwin, 1949. Jabbur, Jibra’il S. Bedouins of the Desert: Aspects of Nomadic Life in the Arab East. Translated by Lawrence Conrad. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995. Raswan. Carl. Black Tents of Arabia: My Life among the Bedouin. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1935.

Arabian Peninsula John A. Shoup The Arabian Peninsula is shaped roughly like a quadrilateral, some 1,367 miles (2,200 kilometers) in length and some 746 miles (1,200 kilometers) in width. Its shape is frequently compared to that of the profile of a rhinoceros’ head with the Musandam bulge as the horn and the Qatar Peninsula as the ear. It includes all of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait; the island state of Bahrain is the only Arab Gulf country not physically part of the mainland. The Arabian Peninsula is bound on the north by the Nafud Desert and by the riftlike Wadi Sirhan, which is 186 miles (300 kilometers) long and 31 to 43 miles (50 to 70 kilometers) wide, separating it from historic Syria or Bilad al-Sham and from Sinai by the Gulf of ‘Aqabah; bounded on the southeast by the Red Sea; on the east by the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman; and on the northeast by the Arabian Gulf (Persian Gulf). In Arabic it is called Jazirat al-‘Arab, or Island of the Arabs, and it in many ways is like an island, being separated from Syria by a definite physical division of the Nafud and Wadi Sirhan and making it an “island.” The main physical features include several mountain ranges along the Red Sea coast, Yemen, Oman, and the eastern part of the United Arab Emirates; a narrow subtropical coastal plain along the Red Sea coast; a vast inland plain that slowly descends to the Persian Gulf coast; the Persian Gulf coast, which includes large areas of salt flats and bogs in the south; and several sand deserts, of which the largest are the Great Nafud in the north and the Rub‘ al-Khali in the south. Although there are several valleys cut by water erosion, there are no permanent streams or lakes in the Peninsula. The climate is arid, with an average of only five inches (150 millimeters) of rainfall a year and some areas of the Rub‘ al-Khali not receiving rain for more than ten years at a time. Rain falls during the winter months in the northern and central parts of the Peninsula, but Yemen and parts of Oman receive summer monsoons. When rain does fall it can be torrential, causing flash floods. Summer temperatures frequently are above 100° F (37°C) and temperatures of 120°F (48°C) are not uncommon. The Red Sea coastal plain called the Tihamah is semitropical and the humidity during the summer is very high, making life difficult. Winter months can be cold and in the far north near the borders with Jordan and Syria it is possible to have snow on the higher peaks. The main bodies of water that surround the Peninsula on three sides influence the winds. Although winds tend to be fairly constant from one direction, it is

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Arabian Peninsula

Jabal Kawar in the background is a prominent feature of the Jabal al-Akhdar mountain range in Oman. The large tree is a ghaf tree that is used as fodder for camels, sheep, and goats. The ghaf tree has a wide and deep root system, allowing it to live and flourish where other trees cannot live. Courtesy of John A. Shoup.

possible to have violent shifts in direction that can bring sandstorms. Sandstorms can last from a few hours to several days and can be of such intensity that they can disrupt air traffic. In Yemen and Oman the monsoon winds bring needed rain rather than dust and sand. Winds cause sand dunes to shift and simple but effective technologies have been developed to help prevent dunes from burying oases, or at least to slow the process. Interlocking fences of woven palm fronds trap the sand and fix the dunes in place. Natural vegetation such as the ghaf tree grows on the dunes and may also fix them in place. There are several islands associated with the Arabian Peninsula in the Red Sea, with the Persian Gulf, and off the coasts of Oman and Yemen. Many of these are small and uninhabited coral reefs whereas others have been occupied for millennia. The Persian Gulf country of Bahrain is made up of over thirty islands but only the main islands of Bahrain, Sitra, and Muharraq are inhabited year round. The island of Socotra, located between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, has historically played an important role as a link between Arab culture of the Peninsula and African cultures of the Horn and East Africa and may have played a major role in the introduction of both the camel and zebu cattle to the Horn region some 4,000 years ago. The small islands of Kuria and Muria only a few miles from the Oman coast are important breeding grounds for sea turtles. The Peninsula is separated from Africa by the narrow Bab al-Mandab Straits and from Asia by the equally narrow Strait of Hormuz. Both straits are vital for international shipping and Hormuz controls access to oil terminals for Saudi

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Arabic Language

Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, making it one of the most strategic narrows in the world. The straits are controlled by Oman and Iran although a very narrow international zone lies between them. Bab al-Mandab is shared by Yemen, Djibouti, and Eritrea, and in recent years Eritrea and Yemen have been in open conflict over several small islands in the Red Sea.

Arabic Language Sebastian Maisel Arabic is an ancient Semitic language, as are Hebrew and Aramaic. It is often referred to as Northern Arabic in contrast to Southern Arabic, which nowadays is only spoken among the Mahra tribe in northern Hadramawt as well as on the island of Socotra. Arabic is situated between the southern and northwestern Semitic languages, overlapping both in certain areas. Arabic is the most widespread Semitic language, with over 200 million native speakers and nearly 50 million second-language speakers, which makes Arabic one of the official languages at the United Nations. Arabic is the language of the Qur’an, believed to be God’s divine revelation by almost 1 billion Muslims worldwide, and Muslims all know basic structures, passages, and prayers in this language. The Standard Arabic of today is called Modern Standard Arabic, or fusha, and derives from Classical Arabic, the Arabic of the Qu’ran and literature of the early Islamic empires. Arabs speak a variety of local dialects that differ not only from Modern Standard but also from each other. Even in the pre-Islamic period Arabs spoke a number of dialects, but the language used by poets was considered to be the best. Poets were honored for their abilities in the language. During the preIslamic period all of the arts associated with language, recitation, and calligraphy were highly honored. Starting in 610, the Qur’an was revealed in the same poetic language, but in the dialect of Makkah (Mecca), Muhammad’s birthplace. Later this version came to be known as Classical Arabic. There are few changes in syntax and morphology, but there are more in vocabulary even though Arabic has not borrowed heavily from other languages. Fusha tried to preserve the classical language of the Quran when Muslim linguists established a grammatical system that is still used with certain adaptations and transformations.

HISTORY The history of Arabic is classified in four segments: old (proto) Arabic, early Arabic, middle or Classical Arabic, and Modern Standard Arabic. The oldest mention of Arabic and the Arabs are proper names found in Assyrian inscriptions from the ninth century BC. Aramaic and Assyrian influenced old Arabic. The following period from the third to the sixth century is called early Arabic. From this time the first self-contained scripts stem back from rock graffiti from 400 BC.

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The phenomenon of diglots, in which two forms of the same language exist parallel to each other as colloquial and high language, goes back to that time period when colloquial dialects were competing with the language of the poetry. Classical Arabic evolved at the same time. Hundreds of Aramaic, South Arabian, and Persian loanwords entered the language through contacts between the Arab tribes and Christian and Jewish groups. Most early Arabic inscriptions trace back to Christian missionaries. Christian Arabic continued to develop, slightly deviating from classical Arabic. Jews in the Arabian Penisula helped develop Classical Arabic as well, and it is said that Jews in Yathrib (Madinah) instructed Muslims to write Arabic. At the court of Hira, written Arabic was further standardized. In the sixth century, Arabic fully developed as the lingua franca in tribal Arabia on the basis of script that dates back to Aramaic and later Nabataean structures. Different writing styles developed, and a cursive style using diacritical markers prevailed. The Arabic of poets originated among various tribes in central Arabia and prevailed as a purely literary dialect despite its rather archaic character in phonetics and syntax. Pre-Islamic poetry and the Qur’an are two examples of early Arabic merging with classical trends in its most extended form. Syntax, grammar, vocabulary, and pronunciation were clearly defined and a standard literary language, classical Arabic, was formed. Although Arabs continued speaking in their local dialects, all accepted classical Arabic for purposes of writing. On the basis of the “clear and eloquent Arabic” of the Qur’an, sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, speeches of the caliphs, and poetry samples, linguists and grammarians put together a list of authentic references and collected, studied, and commentated on them. Arabic was heavily influenced by Islam, particularly the literary language. Having the holy book of the Qur’an revealed in God’s own language, Arabic, was evidence and justification to give the language a superior role over others. Muslims strived to memorize, record, and preserve this sacred language as much as possible. Worries over variations in the reading and reciting of the text led to efforts to create a standard copy and final edition of the Qur’an. During the Arabic-Islamic expansion from the seventh until the eleventh century, Arabic came in contact with other languages, cultures, and religions. The local non-Arab and even non-Muslim population adapted Arabic quickly and simplified syntax, word order, and vocabulary, creating a hybrid version that coexisted with the classical Arabic of the Qur’an and the Sunna. Arabic became the lingua franca for the Empire, especially in the field of scholarship, and it superseded Southern Arabic in Yemen. In Syria Arabic replaced Greek and Aramaic, in Egypt Coptic, and in Northern Africa the indigenous Berber languages. The Umayyad Caliph ‘Abd al-Malik, who ruled from 645 to 705, made Arabic the official language for the administration of the Islamic Empire. The everyday language and local dialects as spoken by the different social elements within the Islamic Empire needed some sort of direction before going astray in the large and diverse area. During the eighth and ninth centuries, Arab grammarians laid out the basic grammatical guidelines and rules of classical Arabic, which are still applied today for modern standard Arabic. During the Golden Age of Islam, sciences and arts flourished, as did the use of Arabic among scholars, translators, intellectuals, scientists, and poets. Many of them were non-Arabs; however, it

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was during this time that the diglossia became apparent. On one hand the spoken language was corrupted by vulgarism and foreign infiltration, whereas the literary language became a privilege of the elite and required extensive training. Soon it was superseded by New Persian as the dominant language in the Muslim east. Concurrently, the Islamic Empire began to disintegrate and local, independent dynasties emerged. With the fall of the ‘Abbasid Empire, the focus of classical Arabic shifted to Cairo, where the Mamluks established a new center of culture and literature; however, after the conquest of most of the Middle East by the Turkish-speaking Ottomans, the cultivation of Arabic reached a historic low point. A period of stagnation and decay for almost 300 years witnesses the fostering of the gap between the literary Arabic as the language of a very small elite and the emergence of the vernacular language in all other areas. Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt in 1798 began a long range of European involvement with the affairs of the Arab world. It sparked immediate attempts for political reform and led to an often deliberate adaptation of Western ideas and products. Arabs studied in Europe, and brought back home a sense of longing for identity, which was found in the Arabic language. Thus, schools were opened, an active media was founded, and intellectual ideas were exchanged on the basis of translations of European books into Arabic. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the idea of nationalism based on ethnic lines found its way to the Arab world and led to a revival in studies on the origins of Arabs and Arabic language and heritage. The movement started among Syrian/Lebanese writers like Ibrahim al-Yaziji or Butrus al-Bustani who relied on classical Arabic sources as well as modern European works. New words were created and adapted to the traditional root system, a modern press promoted and spread the new ideas and terms, and dictionaries and encyclopedias were put together. On the advent of a growing educational system and higher literacy rates, the interest of the general public in this movement and the language grew rapidly; particularly the issue of coining new terms was widely discussed and written about. In 1919, it led to the founding of the first scientific academy for Arabic in Damascus devoted to reform and modernizing the Arabic language. Followed by the Egyptian language academy in 1932, various publications wrote about new regulations and expansions. Lughat al-‘Arab, the review of the language academy in Baghdad, became another influential voice for the efforts in developing terminology. However, it remained a major concern of how these new words and rules were accepted by the public. It turned out that some words quickly made it into the daily languages, whereas other creations were completely ignored. During the Nahdah period, Classical Arabic was revived and a new hybrid, Modern Standard Arabic, was developed to address the challenges of modernity. Both continued to be applied among the general educated public, whereas dialects were used alongside for day-to-day communications; however, education became available for the masses, and thus with the opening of schools and implementation of curricula in Arabic countries, both literary forms, the old classical and the newer modern standard form, widely spread in the society. Now a uniform language is taught all over the Arab world, from Morocco to Iraq, and it is regarded by Arab people as a symbol of unity and identity. The vernacular coexists with Modern Standard Arabic, but neither will replace the other.

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DIALECTS Although Classical and Modern Standard Arabic are mainly used in literature and other forms of writing, everyday conversation is held in a vernacular or dialect. Sometimes referred to as colloquial Arabic, it differs from literary Arabic in syntax, morphology, vocabulary, and phonetic structures. A vernacular form of Arabic is spoken in a large, extended region ranging from the Atlantic Ocean and northern Africa to the Fertile Crescent and the Arabian Peninsula. In addition, isolated regions exist, such as Djibouti, Zanzibar, Cyprus, and Malta. Finally, there is a large Arabic Diaspora in North and South America as well as in West Africa. Spoken Arabic emerged from old dialects in central and western Arabia, Najd, and Hijaz. The dialect of the Quraysh, the leading tribe in Makkah, contributed to the evolution of Classical Arabic, but continued to be applied among nomadic groups. Among the most noticeable differences between spoken and Classical Arabic is the absence of case endings; verbal inflexions; and the use of passive, dual, and feminine plurals. Phonetically, dialects offer a greater variety and flexibility in terms of vowel range. Dialects are predominantly oral, and with a few exceptions of proverbs and poetry, are not recorded but rather recited or narrated. Arabic dialects are normally classified by geographical rather than linguistic terms. Other forms of classification look at lifestyle, religion, or education level. Five main dialect groups follow geographical boundaries from the Maghrib, Egypt and Sudan, the Mashriq, the Arabian Peninsula, and Iraq. Because of the well-known and popular Egyptian movie industry, Egyptian Arabic is the most prevailing Arabic dialect and is understood all over the Arab world. The dialect of the Maghrib, which includes Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and parts of Libya, is probably the most difficult to comprehend because it includes significant borrowings from French and Berber, Berber being the indigenous language of the area before the arrival of the Arabs in the seventh century. The Mashriq comprises all of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan, and the former region of Greater Syria, or Bilad al-Sham in Arabic. On the other side of the Syrian Desert, between the Tigris and Euphrates, is the dialect of Iraq, which forms the border to the area of Kurdish and Persian language. On the Arabian Peninsula, one widely understood dialect exists; however, regional versions are recognizable and mutually intelligible. Clear distinctions prevail indicating the origin of the speaker. Therefore, it is possible that a Bedouin from the remote Empty Quarter will have difficulties understanding the urban Arabic of Jiddah, which in addition is influenced by other languages and dialects. Yemeni Arabic is widely used in Somalia, and the Arabic of Oman made it to Zanzibar through extensive trade and religious relations between the two areas. In Arabic-speaking countries, the difficult situation of diglossia prevails. People use Modern Standard Arabic for writing, literature, the news, formal settings, and scholarship, but speak their local dialect. The usage of either language often overlaps; for example, on formal occasions fusha speakers fall back into their home dialect after time and classical or modern standard lexical expressions and phrases are used in daily communication to express more complicated scenarios.

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Native speakers learn the dialect first at home to study fusha at school. When communicating with speakers of other dialects they have difficulties understanding each other because Arabic dialects are not easily mutually intelligible with the exception of the Arabic of Cairo. In those cases, people will revert to fusha as much as they are able to.

SPREAD TO OTHER CULTURES AND RELIGIONS Other languages use the Arabic alphabet with some graphical modifications, such as Persian, Kurdish (Sorani), Pashto, and Urdu, but mostly they rely on Arabic for Islamic worship and education. Other languages of predominantly Muslim people were strongly influenced by Arabia, such as Turkish, Swahili, or Hausa. Many words, especially scientific terms, found their way into European languages. Contact was established during the Arab period in Spain and Sicily long before the First Crusade in 1096, and words such as alcohol, cotton, magazine, and genie were directly borrowed from Arabic. Within the geographical Arabic area, there are non-Arabic languages that have developed mutual and symbiotic relations. In Syria, Aramaic is still spoken (and lately written as well) in three remote villages. Circassians, Sunni Muslims originating from the Caucasus, live in Jordan and Syria. Armenians are found in Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine/Israel. One of the largest linguistic minorities in the Middle East is the Kurds, who speak an Indo-European language close to Persian. In Oman, a small community speaks the Persian dialect of Kumzari, and in the border area between Oman and Yemen modern south Arabian languages survived. Modern Hebrew is spoken in Israel and Palestine. Although Arabic is the official and sacred language of Islam, other faiths use it for their liturgy and prayers. Fifteen million Christians from different denominations, especially Maronites in Lebanon and Cyprus, speak Arabic, whereas the Syrian Orthodox Church uses Karshuni (Arabic with Syriac letters). Some 2 million Jews from Morocco to Turkey speak Yahudi, a distinct form of Arabic. The Yazidi communities of Bashiqa and Bahzani in Iraq, although ethnically Kurds, adopted Arabic as their spoken and religious language.

STRUCTURE Arabic is written from right to the left. The Arabic alphabet contains twentyeight letters consisting of consonants and long vowels, and several diacritical symbols representing short vowels and other pronunciation and grammatical markers. Arabic script evolved from earlier Semitic alphabets such as Aramaic and Phoenician. Fully vocalized texts are rarely found with the exemption of the Qur’an and some poetry. The art of writing, calligraphy, became one of the most venerated forms of artistic expression among Muslims because of the sacred status of Arabic as the language of God and the general discouragement of depicting the human figure. The vowel sounds are a, u, and i, both in a short and long form, in addition to vowel combinations and diphthongs. Stress is bound to the syllabic structure of the word. As a rule of thumb, stress falls on the heavy syllable before the last

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syllable of the word. It never moves beyond the third syllable from the end. The general syntax requires the attribute to follow the noun and to agree with it in gender, number, case, and status. The common word order is verb-subjectobject, but nominal sentences with or without copula exist. The typical feature of all Semitic languages, including Arabic, is the use of a root-and-pattern system. On the basis of a tri-letter root structure, words are formed by using additional markers such as prefixes, suffixes, long and short vowels, and other grammatical or phonological symbols. For example, the Arabic root d-r-s connotes the meaning of study. Adding a specific vocalization, a prefix, or doubling the stress creates other word types such as conjugation pattern, active or passive participles, places, adjectives, and so forth. Darasa means studying, yadrus he studies, dirasah study of, madrasah school, mudarris teacher (masculine), etc. Arabic also borrows foreign words and assimilates them into the language. However, the first option is still to look for a word that can be derived from the existing Arabic root system. Sometimes linguists at the main academies go back to the classical period in their search for new words and meanings; for example, the word jaridah in old Arabic is a stripped palm branch used for writing that is now used to mean newspaper. Other strategies include literal translations (qatala al-waqt—he killed time), using prefixes like in Latin-based languages (la-silki— wireless), or adopting Western translations (miknasah kahraba’iyah—electric broom/ vacuum cleaner).

USE IN ARABIA Arabic is the native language for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. The Arabian Peninsula, covering a vast area and several cultural zones, is the birthplace of Arabic. Its early forms emerged and developed between ancient south Arabian kingdoms and north Arabian empires. In between, poets and merchants of central Arabia contributed to the uniformity the language, witnessed especially with the divine revelations to Muhammad in the very same language. As noted before, the center of language maturity moved away from Arabia into the Fertile Crescent only to return at the beginning of the twentieth century to the Hijaz. Vernaculars, however, remained strongly attached to the early forms. Although one can analyze the dialectical map of Arabia along geographical features, the different lifestyles of its people should also be considered. Hijazi Arabic is a very distinct form, and two separate versions are dominant in the area: the one of the urban settlers in Jiddah, Makkah, and Madinah; and that of the nomadic Bedouins tribes such as the Harb, Billi, and Huwaytat. Other subregions on the Peninsula include Khaliji, Bahraini, Najdi, and Yamani (Yemeni) Arabic. They encounter the same linguistic separation between nomadic and urban groups. Generally, Bedouin varieties are more conservative, whereas urban dialects tend to adopt both classical and modern features. Bedouin dialects have a common origin and are mostly intelligible amongst all Bedouin. Most tribes originating in southern Arabia moved northward to the Hijaz and from there spread into Najd and the Gulf area. Thus, tribes in eastern Arabia usually have no problems conversing with tribes from the western part. The dominant dialect on the Gulf is Khaliji, or Gulf-Arabic, with two main influences coming from the Bedouin tribes who

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moved to the area some centuries ago, as well as Mesopotamia and Iraqi Arabic, which was connected by trade relations and the same authority. A subdialect is Bahraini Arabic, which is considered a more indigenous form although it borrowed many words from Persian and Hindi. The dialect of Oman stretched out into southern Arabia and the Hadramawt as well as to eastern Africa, where close trade and cultural relations between Zanzibar and Oman existed for centuries. In the southern parts of Saudi Arabia, in the Najran and Asir region, Yemeni Arabic influences are easily identifiable.

FURTHER READING Ingham, Bruce. Arabian Diversions: Studies in the Dialects of Arabia. Reading, UK: Garnet Publishing, 1997. Holes, Clive. Modern Arabic: Structures, Functions and Varieties. London: Longman, 1995. Holes, Clive. Dialect, Culture and Society in Eastern Arabia. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2001. Prochazka, Theodore. Saudi Arabian Dialects. New York: Kegan Paul International, 1988. Al-Tajir, Mahdi Abdalla. Language and Linguistic Origins in Bahrain: The Baharnah Dialects of Arabic. London: Kegan Paul International, 1982. Versteegh, Kees. The Arabic Language. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.

Arab Revolt Sebastian Maisel The Arab Revolt began as a rebellion of Bedouin tribes from the Hijaz and neighboring areas in 1916 led by Faysal bin Hussein, the son of the Sharif of Makkah, and Thomas E. Lawrence, a British agent, against the Turkish troops of the Ottoman Empire and their German allies. As the Arab Revolt moved north into the rest of the Arab Middle East, others joined its ranks. The domestic policy of the Ottoman Empire prior to World War I, especially after the takeover of the Young Turks, was characterized by favoring Turks and discrimination against the non-Turkish peoples of the empire, most notably against the Arabs and their quest for political participation or autonomy. With the outbreak of World War I those alienated forces were drawn to the side of the Allies, who in turn were looking for powerful, reliable partners to defeat the Ottomans. In a correspondence between Sharif Hussein, who wanted to break away from the Sublime Porte and create an independent entity in the Hijaz, and the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, the British vaguely approved the formation of an independent Arab kingdom under Hussein’s leadership after the defeat of the Ottomans. In return, the Sharif promised to lead the people of the Hijaz in an open rebellion against the Turkish forces in the area. However, both sides interpreted the long-term obligations differently and the British made additional arrangements with both their French allies (Sykes-PicotAgreement) and the Zionist movement regarding the establishment of a Jewish

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homeland (Balfour Declaration). But the British needed to counter the rising German influence in the Red Sea area and to gain control of the steppes, which was ruled by the Shammar tribe, a close ally of the Ottomans. It should also be mentioned that Britain, at the outbreak of the revolt, suffered several military defeats against the Ottoman army, such as at Gallipoli and Kut al-‘Amarah. Not being aware of the dispositions, Sharif Hussein proclaimed the Arab Revolt and named himself King of Hijaz. Bedouin tribes from the area started the campaign on June 5, 1916 with attacks against Turkish positions along the Hijaz Railway, the main re-supply route for the Ottoman troops. Hussein’s sons Faysal and ‘Abdallah became the military leaders of the revolt, but the Arab Bureau, the British representative in Cairo, sent Lieutenant Lawrence as a liaison officer to Hussein’s army in order to assist their campaign. Lawrence was able to bring financial, military, and intellectual support and quickly advanced to become a peer to Faysal and ‘Abdallah; Faysal was the acknowledged leader of the revolt. Faysal was mostly occupied with internal disputes, but his family served as the undisputed symbol of early Arab nationalism. Lawrence soon became a master of irregular, guerrilla warfare, often identifying himself with his cause by wearing local clothes, speaking Arabic, and learning how to live like the Bedouin. From a military viewpoint, the Arab Revolt was successful because it bound thousands of Turkish troops, who otherwise would be dispatched to fight the British and Russians. They also contributed significantly to the Palestine campaign led by General Allenby and had one of their most important victories at ‘Aqabah in July 1917, which they took by a surprise attack. With large support from the local population in Jordan and Syria and the British army, the Arab army pushed forward to Damascus, which they captured on September 30, 1918 without British support. Shortly afterward, the revolt was disbanded and its leaders became involved in the post-war reshaping and re-mapping of the Middle East. Sharif Hussein maintained his throne in the Hijaz and proclaimed himself the new Khalifah or Caliph, which was challenged by the rising power of ‘Abd al‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud. Faysal and the Arab Nationalists had planned that he would rule the Arab kingdom from Damascus; however, the city and Greater Syria were promised to France, who forced him out after the Battle of Maysalun. Britain made him king in the newly established Iraq. His brother ‘Abdallah was made amir in Transjordan, where the Hashemite still govern. Lawrence published a seminal book of his experiences during the revolt called Seven Pillars of Wisdom based on a more direct account he published earlier called Revolt in the Desert. The Arab Revolt played an important and controversial role in post-war negotiations, and in the decisions taken by Great Britain and France about the territorial divisions of the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

FURTHER READING Fromkin, David. A Peace to End All Peace. New York: Avon Books, 1989. Johnson, Maxwell. “The Arab Bureau and the Arab Revolt: Yanbu’ to Aqaba,” Military Affairs 46, no. 4 (1982): 194–201. Lawrence, T.E. Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph. London: J. Cape, 1935. Thomas, Lowell. With Lawrence in Arabia. London: Hutchinson, 1933.

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Aramco Sebastian Maisel The Saudi Arabian Oil Company, Saudi Aramco, is the most important and largest oil company not only in the Middle East but also in the world. The Arabian American Oil Company, known as Aramco, was founded in 1933 as California Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC), when Standard Oil of California signed a concessionary agreement with King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud over an area of 932,000 square kilometer for a period of sixty-six years. The concession included much of eastern Saudi Arabia as well as other offshore and onshore areas. British advisor, Harry St. John Philby, was vital in helping ibn Sa‘ud to make this decision despite strong British competition. In 1973 the area was reduced to 220,000 square kilometers, including 31,000 square kilometers offshore. Shortly after, the first oil prospectors started to drill for oil and in 1938 well number 7 started to produce approximately 1,500 barrels a day. In 1936, Texaco Inc. joined the company when it bought fifty percent of the shareholdings. The first tanker with Saudi oil exported to the United States left the Gulf port of Ras Tanura in 1939 from a newly constructed pier. By the following year, production rose to 700,000 tons per annum. The company was essential in supporting King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud during the financial hardships of World War II, creating a tight bond between the company, the United States, and the country. The company’s headquarters and main operation terminals are located in Dhahran and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. The current name was chosen in 1944. After two other oil companies, Standard Oil of New Jersey (later Exxon) and SoconyVaccum Oil Company (later Mobil) merged with the company; shareholdings of 1948 were distributed as follows: Exxon thirty percent, Standard Oil of California thirty percent, Texaco thirty percent, and Mobil ten percent. Saudi Arabia began to pressure Aramco in 1950 for better terms and was subsequently awarded with fifty-fifty net-profit sharing. Among the most productive oil fields are Ghawar and Safaniyah (the world’s largest onshore and offshore fields, respectively), Abqaiq, Khursaniyah, Dammam, Marjan, and Khurais. Saudi Arabia is considered the country with the largest oil reserves worldwide, and Saudi Aramco, as the company was renamed later, owns almost all of it, about 260 billion barrels. In addition, Aramco is leading in the production of natural gas liquids, which are partly being used for domestic industry as well as for export. The company was partly nationalized in 1973 and went fully into Saudi custody in 1980. Although government owned, it still functions like a commercial oil company, developing and acquiring new technologies, refineries, and oil fields. It invested in human capital by training and educating thousands of Saudi workers, for example through the well-known King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals in Dhahran, and employs over 50,000 Saudi and international workers. In the early days, the Shi‘a population of Saudi Arabia concentrated mostly in the Eastern Province formed the core of skilled workers for Aramco in addition to a strong presence of American oilmen and their families. The current president, director, and CEO is Abdullah Jumah, and chairman is ‘Ali

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Saudi Aramco exhibition, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Courtesy of Sebastian Maisel.

al-Nu‘aymi, concurrently Saudi Arabian Minister of Oil and Petroleum. The company is a leading global economic player focused on investing in different industrial sectors in order to diversify the dependency on oil.

FURTHER READING Brown, Anthony C. Oil, God, and Gold: The Story of Aramco and the Saudi Kings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999. Hanrahan, Gene Z. Secret History of the Oil Companies in the Middle East. Salisbury, NC: Documentary Publications, 1979. Nawwab, Ismail, Peter C. Speers, and Paul F. Hoye. Aramco and Its World: Arabia and the Middle East. Dhahran, Saudi Arabia: Aramco, 1980. Stegner, Wallace. Discovery! The Search for Arabian Oil. Portola, CA: Selwa Press, 2007. Yergin, Daniel. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991.

Archaeological and Historical Sites and Museums Sebastian Maisel The Arabian Peninsula is replete with historical and archaeological sites bearing evidence of a long history dating back thousands of years and giving the area another important label of a crossroad of civilizations. The people of the Arabian

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Neolithic rock graffiti from the Empty Quarter, Saudi Arabia. Courtesy of Sebastian Maisel.

Peninsula have been vital as middlemen in overland trade along the coasts of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf and with the domestication of the dromedary (camel) encouraged the lucrative spice trade between Southern Arabia and Syria or Egypt. The people of Arabia from early on contributed significantly to the development of early civilizations in Mesopotamia and Egypt. Many rock carvings, statues, and clay tablets depict the lifestyles and economic and social sophistication of the area. Hellenistic influence is found in former commercial centers along the coast of Kuwait and Bahrain, as well as in the oasis town of Thaj in Saudi Arabia. With the rise of Islam, another aspect contributed to the importance of the region. Although being a religion of city people and merchants, Islam spread rapidly throughout the Middle East. Archaeological exploration in Arabia started in the nineteenth century, when European travelers began to study the ruins and inscriptions of places like Mada’in Salih, Taymah, or Ma’rib. In 1914, Jaussen and Savignac conducted the first thorough study of the architecture and epigraphs of the Hijaz. Later in the 1930s, Harry St. John Philby, through his unique position as advisor of King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud, surveyed large areas throughout the entire peninsula and also carried out small excavations at promising sites. Concurrent with his travels was a revived interest among local scholars in ancient antiquities and tribal origins. Hamd al-Jasir and ‘Abd al-Quddus al-Ansari were the leading figures in the documentation of the archaeological heritage of Arabia. Their historic

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consciousness about the Islamic and pre-Islamic eras was a result of the Ottoman and other foreign rule in the area and the subsequent development of an Arabian cultural identity. In the 1950s a new period of archeological research started and produced large results predominantly in the epigraphy and rock art of Arabia. Possible links to the prehistoric cultures of the north were detected in the Negev and Sinai. At the same time an international extensive survey and excavation program began along the coast of the Gulf, including Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Oman, which unearthed material from the fifth to the second millennia BC and reconstructed the historical links of the area to Mesopotamia and India. Although no massive monuments or large cities have been discovered, the study showed the major role of the area in the development of maritime commerce along the Gulf for over 7,500 years. Trade relations with Mesopotamia around 5500 BC and long-distance commercial links with India by 3000 BC indicate the high level of shipbuilding and navigation skills among the people of the Arabian Gulf. The pearl industry looks back at a similar long history. Ra’s al-Khaymah’s archaeological program was conducted mostly by German experts, who first found evidence of settlement in the area dating back to the ‘Ubaid Period (5000–3800 BC). Like the other states, Ra’s al-Khaymah sponsored intensive projects through the Department of Antiquities and Museums, which is also in charge of the country’s National Museum. After half a century of archaeological research many historical and archaeological sites were discovered, restored, and analyzed. A premier location is Qariyat al-Faw in southern Najd, the place of a successful trading post on the frankincense route from south Arabia. For almost 1,500 years, until maritime routes became more prominent, it was a major stop for the caravans from Najran to the northern city of Mada’in Salih. A team of local archaeologists from King Saud University in Riyadh excavated this important site, which provides the main artifacts for the Archaeological Museum in Riyadh. The site shows the continuity of historical and cultural identity of the area. Some decorative and ornamental artifacts from Qariyat al-Faw have been excavated and incorporated into modern design and architecture. Another site in the Eastern Province was accidentally discovered by oil workers, the Jawan Chamber Tomb, which included a variety of objects made of gold, iron, and ivory dating back 2,000 years. In the northern part of the kingdom near the town of Sakakah is the site of fifty groups of standing stone pillars dating back from the Neolithic period. Up to ten feet high (three meters), some of them have Thamudic inscriptions and are aligned to sunrise and sunset. In the 1950s, a Danish archaeological expedition identified the ancient trading post of Dilmun as located in Bahrain, the main port between Mesopotamia and India. Undoubtedly, the most significant archaeological site in the Arabian Peninsula is Mada’in Salih, the Nabataean city near al-‘Ula in Saudi Arabia. Beginning in the third century BC until the second century AD, the Nabataeans ruled over an area that included present-day Jordan and Palestine. Along with the sister city of Petra, Mada’in Salih was the trading and political capital, strategically located on a cross point of several caravan routes. Today almost 100 rock-cut tombs are preserved, depicting the sophisticated achievements of the people who made a

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fortune on taxing the caravans en route to Egypt, Persia, or the Roman Empire. In 1968 a British team began to uncover artifacts and examples of the material culture as well as rock graffiti, some of them now on display in the National Museum in Riyadh. Early Islamic sites were surveyed and studied too; for example, the institution of Darb Zubaidah, the pilgrim caravan route from Mesopotamia to Makkah from the ninth century with its many housing complexes, wells, and artificial pools. A modern historical site is the Hijaz Railroad, which was built by the Ottomans before World War I and successfully damaged during the Arab Revolt under Lawrence of Arabia. Some of the tracks, bridges, and smaller stations are still intact, whereas two main stations, those in al-Ula and Madinah, were partly reconstructed and turned into open-air museums with old engines and buildings on display. The concept of displaying art or artifacts is not alien; however, in correlation with the religious and social traditions, it is rather strange. Islam as the Peninsula’s dominant religion does not prohibit the exhibition of artistic expression or specifically encourage it. Islam in Saudi Arabia and Qatar is connected with the teachings of Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his adherence to the traditional teachings of ibn Hanbal, which refuse all innovations to the religion, including the worship of saints and tombs, as well as the prohibition of portraying human figures. Despite these difficult conditions, the Saudi Arabian museum environment has developed dramatically over the years. In the early 1970s, it took the first protagonists’ patience and efforts to convince the authorities about the necessity to adopt an archaeological and museum-oriented policy. Anything that was related to the jahiliyah period, the pre-Islamic era before the Prophet Muhammad, was suspicious, and the creation of a permanent site to display these artifacts seemed impossible. Thanks to the restless efforts of the Department of Antiquities and Museums and its first director Abdallah Masry, a comprehensive archaeological survey was initiated in 1976 and the results were reported in Atlal, the Journal of Saudi Arabian Archaeology. The survey resulted in the discovery and beginning restoration of many archaeological sites and inscriptions throughout the kingdom, such as the Darb Zubaidah, the pilgrimage road from Baghdad to Makkah with its inns and wells built in the eighth century, or the Dir‘iyah project, being the first capital of the Saudi state. In the mid-1970s, the Department of Antiquities and Museums inaugurated the Museum of Archaeology and Ethnography in Riyadh, where for the first time a coherent chronology for the heritage, history, and archaeology of Saudi Arabia was developed and displayed. Since then other sites of historic importance have been restored, such as the former capital of the first Saudi state, Dir‘iyah, the Qasr al-Murabbah, the Masmak in Riyadh, the Bait Nassif in Jiddah, or the ‘Umar bin al-Khattab Mosque in Dumat al-Jandal. The government funded these preservation projects as well as a network of local museums in each of the five major regions of the kingdom, i.e., Taymah, al-‘Ula, Dammam, Najran, and Buraydah. Each museum reflects the traditional heritage of the area, including numerous objects of the material culture of the nomadic, rural, and urban population as well as invaluable archaeological findings, thus demonstrating the important part Saudi Arabia has played in the development of culture.

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Currently, nineteen museums are licensed in Saudi Arabia, eleven of them officially approved and sponsored by the Higher Council of Antiquities, which highlights the desire of merging history with politics. It is also seen in the future collaboration between governmental agencies such as the Agency for Antiquities and Museums and the Supreme Council for Tourism that aims at promoting the rich archaeological heritage to an increasing number of domestic and international tourists. Each of the kingdom’s thirteen provinces is scheduled to have its own historical/archaeological/anthropological museum. In addition, several important historical sites, such as fortresses, palaces, or complete villages, are renovated and converted into open-air museums. In the late 1990s, the Supreme Commission for Tourism discovered the socalled under-used treasure houses, as they were called by Arab News, the leading English-language Saudi newspaper, in its approach to boost domestic and international tourism, increase academic research, and redefine the image of the kingdom. One strategy is focused on the preservation of the cultural and historical heritage of Saudi Arabia. The council is currently taking over the administrative responsibility of all major public museums in the kingdom, including the National Museum in Riyadh. At present, there are more than sixty public and private museums located throughout the kingdom containing priceless collections ranging from historical tools to artistic masterpieces that capture the history and heritage of the kingdom. The variety of different types of museums includes cultural and heritage museums, history museums, and science museums as well as private collections of various sizes. Similar trends can be observed in the Gulf States. In Kuwait, the Kuwait National Museum and the Tareq Rajab Museum are among the leading institutions, both predominantly focusing on local historical and ethnological material. One of the leaders in the Gulf region is Bahrain, whose National Museum not only serves as a place to display artifacts but also is actively engaged in both archeological excavations and training museum staff in the latest techniques. The Bayt al-Qur’an Museum in al-Manamah displays not only copies of the Qur’an but also includes Arabic calligraphy. Bahrain’s museums also sponsor lecture series, films, and special displays for the National Independence celebrations. In Qatar, in addition to the prominent National Museum, several forts bear evidence of the country’s military history. New museums have been built in the United Arab Emirates from additional oil revenues, including several focusing on local culture and history such as in al-‘Ayn, Dubai, and Sharjah. Striving to make Abu Dhabi a supreme destination for tourism, major Western museums such as the Guggenheim and the Louvre will soon be opening branch museums. However, it is agreed that nothing offensive to the culture and religion of the Emirates, such as nudity or religious artifacts, will be exhibited. Today, thousands of expatriates and locals, particularly the younger generations, visit these museums daily to become better acquainted with their heritage. However, many local ethnographic museums in remote areas suffer from marginalization and stagnation despite their enormous efforts in collecting, preserving, and documenting. Private museums often know little about maintaining and displaying their holdings. Furthermore, no institutional body exists to create a network between the museums and its staff. In the absence of a map detailing the

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location and contents of these places, a comprehensive survey should be conducted to document, manage, and facilitate the museums. Efforts were made by national agencies and museums to return some artifacts that have been stolen from formerly unprotected sites and to prevent the smuggling of valuable artifacts and antiquities in or out of the country. Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar are signatories of the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.

FURTHER READING Bibby, Geoffrey. Looking for Dilmun. New York: Penguin Books, 1970. Bidwell, Robin. Travelers in Arabia. London: Hamlyn, 1976. Healey, John, and Solaiman al-Theeb. The Nabataean Tomb Inscriptions of Mada’in Salih. London: Oxford University Press, 1994. Hoyland, Robert. Arabia and the Arabs: From the Bronze Age to the Coming of Islam. London: Routledge, 2001. Al Khalifa, Shaykah Haya ‘Ali. Bahrain through the Ages: The Archaeology. London: Kegan Paul, 1986. Masry, Abdallah. “Traditions of Archaeological Research in the Near East,” World Archaeology, 13, no. 2 (1981): 222–239. Whalen, Norman. “Early Mankind in Arabia,” Saudi Aramco World, 43, no. 4 (1992): 16–23. Whitcomb, Donald. “The Archaeology of al-Hasa’ Oasis in the Islamic Period,” Atlal 2, (1978): 95–113.

Architecture Sebastian Maisel The architecture of Arabia is unexpectedly contrasting the prevailing image of Bedouin tents in a desert environment. Traditional architecture is by far not as sophisticated as other forms of artistic expression such as calligraphy or poetry; however, throughout the Peninsula distinct styles and various aesthetic features are found and still enjoy popularity. Arabian architecture combines aspects of art with the requirements of everyday living and the constant battle of the people to adapt to a changing environment. Life in the past was much less secure, as the defensive nature of many structures attests. The various forms of housing structures have been limited by several factors: climate, the availability of building material, and cultural/religious requirements; however, this limitation does not prevent a wide array of decoration and artistic details. But, when comparing quantities and qualities of architectural decoration in Arabia with those in other Middle Eastern cities, it shows a remarkable difference that can be attributed to the impact of puritanical religious beliefs. Among the main and distinctive features of buildings in Arabia are different means to control the heat. They include high and thick walls, covered yards, a few small windows, and special devices to channel the wind and keep water cool. A unique feature of the local architectural style is presented in the different ways to control the flow of air; for example,

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Architecture

Wind tower houses in the Bastakiyah District in Dubai are named for the towers called barajil (barjil in singular) that work as air conditioners, funneling even the slightest breeze into the house. Burlap or cloth sheets were wet and hung in the recesses of the towers, cooling hot summer winds as they passed through them. From the 1960s through the 1980s, most of the houses were cleared away to make room for more “modern” buildings. Today the few houses that were left have been restored, and Bastakiyah hosts hotels, restaurants, galleries, and craft shops. Courtesy of John A. Shoup.

through ventilation towers that were incorporated into the roofs of many of these buildings, or roof vents that were operated and controlled from the ground level. Carefully aligned to face the prevailing winds that sweep through the region, these features directed air into the inner recesses of the buildings, creating an airy and comfortable living environment in the hot summer months. Climate control was a major factor in the architectural design of the entire region. The old Arabian architecture flourished during the Sabaeans in the south of the Peninsula as well as among the Nabataeans in the north. Rectangle or ovalshaped cities with massive walls, irrigation systems, sacral buildings, and cemeteries were common, and built from smoothly trimmed limestone blocks with flat, ornamental reliefs for decoration. The Nabataeans were skilled builders and craftsmen and carved amphitheaters, irrigation canals, and large tombs out of mountainsides and large rock outcrops. In central Arabia, the only important architectural evidence was the pagan sanctuary in Makkah, the Ka‘abah, a large cubic structure. The main form of accommodation was either the adobe brick house or the tent for nomadic groups. With the development of Islamic cities, a new era for Arabic architecture began. The oldest Islamic building, Prophet

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Architecture

Restored house in Dir‘iyah, Saudi Arabia, demonstrates Najdi architectural style. The building has two stories around a large central courtyard. It is made of sundried mud brick, and the outer layer is also made of mud. The water spouts are made of date palm trunks that are split into two and hollowed out. They drain water off of the roof and stick out far enough from the walls to keep water from damaging the structure. Courtesy of John A. Shoup.

Muhammad’s house and place of worship in Madinah, introduced a new style of building serving two purposes: the religious and the profane housing needs, a mosque in simple style and first without minarets surrounded by a spacious yard. With the shift of Islamic leadership under the Umayyads and ‘Abbasids to urban centers in the north, the architecture of the area remained unchanged for many centuries. Only in the eighteenth century is Ottoman influence visible in the cities along the Red Sea, and to a lesser degree in the Gulf area. Prior to the discovery of oil in the 1940s, the architectural style in Saudi Arabia and the neighboring countries changed little with simple styles and forms that reflected the harsh conditions and poverty of the area. In the 1950s about forty percent of the population were nomadic and another forty percent settled in rural villages and oases. The remaining twenty percent consisted of the urban population of the few cities, such as Kuwait, al-Manamah, Jiddah, Riyadh, Makkah, Madinah, and Ta’if. However, urbanization did become a more decisive factor in people’s decision where to live. The social distinction between nomadic and settler people was shown in the different forms of housing: the Bedouins, moving in search for pasture and water, preferred black goat-hair tents, whereas the people in the oases built largely with unfired sun-dried brick or pounded earth. In the mountains, mud was used together with stone. Along the coasts of the Red Sea and the Gulf, houses in the towns and cities were

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Architecture

usually built with coral blocks. Other natural building material included wood from tamarisk and palm trees; however, it was only used for structural additions, such as doors, windows, roof beams, or sunscreens. In the hot and humid coastal areas, reeds, palm fronds, and branches were also used to build huts and other temporary shacks in the fields or for the animals. Traditional architecture in Saudi Arabia can be broadly grouped into styles developed in the central Najd plateau, the Arabian Gulf coastal region, the Hijaz region along the Red Sea coast, and the Asir region in the southwest. Although starkly different, these various styles are all functional and simple, and each evolved to take advantage of the available building materials to create a comfortable living environment for the inhabitants, whether they lived in the hot and dry deserts in the central parts of the kingdom or the cool and wet regions of the southwest. After the discovery of oil, the kingdom’s infrastructure and architecture transformed into modern styles using new technologies and building materials; however, more and more people are recognizing the need to preserve the remaining pieces of the kingdom’s traditional architectural heritage.

NOMADIC ARCHITECTURE: THE BEDOUIN TENT The traditional tent of the nomads in Arabia consists of several panels of coarse cloth made from goat hair and sheep wool sewn together. Goat hair is water-resistant and durable, lasting for several years before needing to be replaced with a new panel. The panels are then sewn together and form the roof and sides of the tent, which are supported by at least two poles. Ropes adjust the outside walls, which can be raised to allow air circulation and to provide cover and shade from the heat and wind. Usually, a colorful curtain divides the tent into a larger family section and a smaller men’s section where guests and other visitors are entertained. During migration the tent and all of its contents are loaded on camels although today pickups and larger trucks have replaced camels. When arriving at a new campground, the women erect the tent and set up the site. Even after settling in villages and towns, many Bedouin keep tents next to their permanent houses. During the hot season, it serves as the sleeping room for the entire family. Although it is black, the loosely woven cloth allows heat dispersal and thus lowers the temperature about ten to fifteen degrees. Tents vary in size depending on the status of the owner and size of the family. Important tribal leaders have larger tents with additional poles, and the wealthy shaykhs of the ‘Anazah and Shammar tribes own tents so large that they cannot be transported anymore, but remain at a permanent location and serve representative functions. Currently the more expensive goat-hair tent is becoming rare and has been replaced by industrial cotton/canvas tents, which are less airy and therefore require additional air conditioning. However, because full-scale nomadism has almost completely vanished, tents fulfill more recreational needs with additional comfort.

THE WESTERN REGION: HIJAZ The western region of the Arabian Peninsula, known as Hijaz, includes some of the most important urban centers such as Jiddah, Makkah, Madinah, and Ta’if.

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Architecture

It is known for its long history in human settlement and urban growth. The unique architectural style of this region stands in contrast to other areas because of the appearance of multi-storied houses, sometimes up to five floors, that are built from blocks of cut coral rock and limestone and often reinforced with several layers of timber. The coastal region sits on a vast layer of coral left over from the era when the entire region was below sea level. Coral is not known for its ability to insulate from the heat, but its abundance made it the first choice. Buildings made of coral have to be repaired often because the humid and hot coastal climate destroys the stone rather quickly. Therefore, houses do not have a long lifespan and houses over 200 years old are very rare. The people of this region have been in constant contact with pilgrims from Islamic lands and therefore developed an indigenous architectural style that blended local and foreign elements. These houses show a distinct Ottoman influence that dominated the Middle East and much of North Africa from the sixteenth century to the early twentieth century. Ottoman period homes, such as those in Jiddah and Makkah, were several-story structures and featured decorative elements in plaster both inside and out. Having access to wood imported from India and other sources, the buildings in the Hijaz featured elaborately decorated doors and windows. Screens of carved wood called rushan placed over balconies allowed cooler air to pass as ventilation while at the same time ensuring the privacy of their occupants. These wooden balconies are the distinct mark of coastal architecture. Often highly decorated and sometimes painted, they extended over several floors. The vernacular building style of the Hijaz reflects the areas rich traditional building solutions combined with the impact of foreign styles that are brought in through pilgrimage.

THE CENTRAL REGION: NAJD The most striking feature of Najdi architecture is its simplicity, making the size of a home the only distinction between the rich and the poor. The general image was one of seclusion, defense, and simplicity. The architectural style that emerged was based on the unique demands of life in a hot and dry climate. The principal building material was sun-dried mud brick; mud being collected from usually dry streambeds after the short rainy season. Limestone was not available. The earth was mixed with water, straw, and other items and made into bricks left to dry in the sun and then laid along horizontal layers for walls. The walls were deliberately made thick for added structural integrity. Tree trunks, most often those of the date palm, and palm fronds covered with mud formed the roofs. Windows were small both for privacy and to keep out the elements. The mud plaster was used to cover the buildings with added decorative elements for aesthetic purposes. The result was a structure with excellent insulation characteristics, remaining cool in summer and warm in winter.

ASIR The Asir region is home to two distinct building styles, that of the Tihamah coastal plain with cylindrical huts made from reed and palm fronds (usha in Arabic), and that of the mountainous areas around Abha and Baha, where

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Architecture

multiple-story tower houses are the typical feature. The outside is layered with courses of flat schist stones protecting the mud brick wall from eroding in the rain. Outside walls, rooflines, and frames were often decorated with white gypsum stucco, and doors were painted with bright colors and floral designs. Women painted the interiors in colorful geometric patterns.

THE EASTERN PROVINCE AND THE GULF COAST The traditional architecture of the Eastern Province is identical with the style of the larger Gulf area, which in turn has significant Ottoman and Persian influences. Building material included coral blocks, dry or rubble stone, lime, mud brick, and wood from mangroves and palm trees. Pointed keel arches are a common feature of that style (found throughout the Gulf), and the use of mashrabiyah screens is another. Courtyard houses with separated family and guest areas were surrounded by thick walls for protection from the heat and were made from coral on the coast or limestone in the oases. Wind towers called barajil (barjil in singular, from the Persian word badghir) with openings to catch the breeze were added to the flat roofs. The cool air was then channeled into the lower rooms and provided ventilation. Wood was a rare building material and thus had to be imported. The exterior and interior were covered in plaster to keep out the humidity. The ruling class and wealthy merchants were able to add lavish stucco decorations, the styles of which were similar along the northern shore of the Gulf. More common were highly decorated doors, which by now have all disappeared. Gone too are small palm frond huts called barasti, which were common in the oases along the Gulf. Many traditional houses are still found in the Muharraq district of al-Manamah, such as the palace of Shaykh ‘Isa Al Khalifah built in 1830 as the most prominent. In Oman, the traditional architecture of the Gulf has been preserved the most because of the country’s isolation and resistance to modernization and Westernization.

RELIGIOUS ARCHITECTURE Relatively little is known about religious buildings from the Peninsula, with the exemption of the two Holy Mosques in Makkah and Madinah. Although the birth land of Islam, Peninsula religious architecture cannot compete with the splendor of that from Egypt, Persia, or Turkey. Of the few remaining structures some characteristics emerge; for example, the absence of elaborate decoration and inscriptions. With extra funds available it seems surprising how little was preserved and much was built without looking back. As stated before, the mosques of Makkah and Madinah are different in this regard. Much has been done to rebuild, extend, and sometimes preserve the size and style of the Haramayn, the two Holy Places. In the past, rulers from beyond the Peninsula invested large sums and material to leave a trace in these sacred mosques. However, it was only with the Saudi kings that local interest paid for the extension of the mosques, making them a unique example of Islamic architecture with a Saudi Arabian touch that otherwise is not available in the kingdom. A valuable exemption might be the Umm Farasan mosque, which was built in 1347/1927–1928 and included

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Architecture

many regional styles and techniques. Another fine example of old Islamic architecture is the mosque of ‘Umar bin al-Khattab in Dumat al-Jandal in the northern part of the Saudi Arabia, which is believed to be built by the second caliph and has a very unusual style in its freestanding minaret. This absence is often attributed to the vigorous religious zeal of Wahhabi and/or early Islamic thought, which does not tolerate worshipping anything or anyone but God and is shown in its dislike for ornamental and highly decorative sacral buildings, shrines, or cemeteries. However, things changed drastically with the introduction not of oil but of concrete, which allowed expression of modern features, styles, and decors through the use of better material in mosques all over the area. Outside the Wahhabi-dominated areas more ornate places of worships are found; however, mosques built before the nineteenth century rarely had minarets and simple columns, sometimes cylindrical and sometimes octagonal, supported the roofs. Shrines or tombs of saints and other venerated religious men are found in Yemen and Dhufar.

MILITARY ARCHITECTURE The main cities of Arabia are mostly located on the coast and have served as seaports and trading hubs for centuries, but some bigger settlements in the interior developed into large urban centers. In addition to the economic structures of the ports, stores, and warehouses as well as the administrative and religious buildings, they all had to have defensive structures to provide protection from outside attacks, both seafaring and nomadic. Usually, a thick wall with several gates and watchtowers encircled the traditional Arabian city. Jiddah, for example, was a walled city until 1947 when the wall was demolished to expand the city. By the middle of the twentieth century, cities no longer provided safety from military conflict. In an effort to preserve the architectural heritage, many cities began to rebuild former military constructions, such as Riyadh’s Masmak Fort, the walls of many Omani cities, the many smaller fortresses (husn) of Sharjah, and the watchtowers in the Asir.

MODERN ARCHITECTURE The constantly rising revenues from the oil industry initiated an enormous building boom in the area, when most of the old cities were overtaken by new developments and sometimes rebuilt as completely new cities. At one point the whole population of the region seemed to be urbanizing, most notably the Bedouins, who gave up nomadism to settle in towns and take wage labor. The growing demand for housing was matched by the governments who provided Western-style accommodation, such as villas and apartment blocks at low or no cost to citizens. Open spaces quickly vanished under highways, industrial and housing complexes, airports, or stadiums. Architects and city planners abandoned the traditional setup of Islamic/Arab cities with their walled residential areas, narrow paths, courtyards, and palm gardens. Religious, economical, and administrative buildings used to have a central location around the marketplace, but with Western-inspired planning these have been placed in different areas. However, gender segregation, a dominant feature of Islamic architecture, seems to have survived even in luxurious villas and apartment complexes,

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where two distinct areas—one for guests and one for family members—are still found. Whoever can afford it buys a single-family home with high walls and separate entrances. Only the poorer classes and foreign workers reside in government-built apartment blocks. In recent decades, private contracting companies such as the UAE-based al-Nakheel began building luxury apartment high rises, condominiums, and gated communities that only the wealthy can afford. One common feature that changed in the architecture of the entire region is the method of climate control and replacement of traditional ventilation methods with electric-powered air conditioning. In the 1990s approximately seventy percent of the population of the region lived in the urban centers. In the twentieth century and particularly beginning with the 1970s, contemporary European and American architectural plans have become a dominant feature, often designed by Western architects or Westerneducated local architects. Generously stretched city plans for the fast-growing urban centers rivaled the rapid extension of infrastructure and new housing complexes and industrial, administrative, and cultural buildings. Because of almost unlimited financial means and significant central authority, it was possible to combine modern structures with traditional elements and materials, some examples being the Central Market (also called the Blue Suq) in Sharjah or several governmental buildings in Riyadh. Kuwait’s architectural landmarks include the water towers and the National Assembly building. The pace of change in Arabia over the last half century has been tremendous and is most notable in the modern look of the cities and infrastructure. Extensive building programs and large-scale urbanization gave the area an almost completely new appearance. The introduction of new building material such as glass and cement as well as new techniques in climate control changed the living experience. Government and the private sector now protect the region’s architectural heritage and its influence is readily visible in the contemporary architecture of Saudi Arabia. Thanks to the current extra revenues from high oil prices, some countries in the Gulf region, especially the United Arab Emirates, have experienced an unparalleled architectural boom. The most prominent architects from all over the world are building ultramodern and enormous towers, hotels, and other administrative and business structures, making the area one of the leading global architectural trendsetters. The traditional architecture of the Arabian Peninsula began to disappear in the 1950s. The remaining structures serve only as museums or heritage projects and are no longer inhabited on a regular basis. The modern, international architecture that was brought with oil revenues has changed the appearance of the entire region, although lately a growing awareness of the past should be noted, which is reflected in individual examples of adopting traditional regional or Islamic styles or restoring the few structures that are left.

FURTHER READING Coles, Anne, and Peter Jackson. Windtower. London: Stacey International, 2007. Dostal, Walter. The Traditional Architecture of Ras al-Khaimah (North). Wiesbaden, Germany: Reichert, 1983. Hillenbrand, Robert. “Traditional Architecture in the Arabian Peninsula,” Bulletin British Society for Middle Eastern Studies 16, no. 2 (1989): 186–192.

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Asir Jodidio, Philip. Architecture in the Emirates. New York: Taschen, 2007. Johnson, Warren. “Keeping Cool,” Saudi Aramco World 46, no. 3 (1995): 10–17. Kay, Shirley, and Darius Zandi. Architectural Heritage of the Gulf. Dubai: Motivate Publications, 1991. King, Geoffrey. The Historical Mosques of Saudi Arabia. New York: Longman, 1986. King, Geoffrey. The Traditional Architecture of Saudi Arabia. London: I.B. Tauris, 1998. Lewcock, Ronald, and Zahra Freeth. Traditional Architecture in Kuwait and the Northern Gulf. London: Art and Archaeology Research Papers, 1979. Raswan, Carl. Black Tents of Arabia: My Life among the Bedouin. New York: Creative Age Press, 1947. Talib, Kaizer. Shelter in Saudi Arabia. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984.

Asir Sebastian Maisel Asir (meaning difficult or hard in Arabic) is a region in southwestern Saudi Arabia between the Hijaz Mountains in the north and Yemen to the south and is named after the mostly settled tribes of the area who belong to the Asir confederation. The Asir highland has the most habitable climate in Saudi Arabia; it is cooler and has more rainfall than any other Saudi area. The main mountain range rises to heights over 9,842 feet (3,000 meters) and reaches its highpoint of 10,278 feet. (3,133 meters) at Jabal Sawda’ near the region’s capital, Abha. The rugged western face of the escarpment drops steeply to the coastal plain, the Tihamah lowlands, the width of which averages only forty miles (sixty-five kilometers). Along the seacoast is a salty tidal plain of limited agricultural value, backed by potentially rich alluvial plains. The eastern slope of the mountain range in Asir is gentle, melding into a plateau region that drops gradually into the desert of the Rub‘ al Khali or Empty Quarter. Although rainfall is infrequent in this area, several fertile wadis, of which the most important are the Wadi Bishah and the Wadi Tathlith, make oasis agriculture possible on a relatively large scale. Because of the higher frequency of rain in this region of Arabia, the area at large is very fertile. The heavier and relatively dependable rainfall has allowed the people of this region, for the most part, to live a settled life as farmers and herdsmen and provides for the cultivation of grains and fruits, in some parts coffee, and qat (a mild narcotic). It is mainly an agrarian culture of terraced farms on mountainsides that allows maximum land use. Because of the high level of rainfall, complex irrigation is rarely necessary and rain-fed agriculture is possible. The government has constructed more than forty dams to control the flow of water to farms, and farmers dig wells or build diversion dams in areas where the rain is less dependable. A variety of farming methods is used to grow crops on the terraced plateaus. Short-range, small-scale sheep or goat nomadism is noticeable in the eastern parts of Asir toward the steppes of Najd. The people of Asir have a different appearance, custom, and temperament, which is attributed to the different environment compared with the rest of Saudi

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Asir

Arabia. They are distinctly Yemeni in appearance and dress. The different regions are identified according to the dominant tribal group, their colors, patterns, and animal brands. The indigenous inhabitants are from the Khatham tribe, who were pushed back north from the Azd Sarat confederation that includes the Ghamid and Zahran. The Khatham, and among them the Shahran, maintained their position in northern Asir around Bishah and Turabah. The Asir confederation is a conglomerate of sections from the ‘Anz (Bani Malik, Rufaydah) and Azd (Rijal Alma). Sections from the Qahtan are located in the southeast. These agricultural communities enjoy a high standard of living that so far has not drastically changed their way of life or their traditional homes. The area is noted for its tower houses made from stone and mud that could be use for storage and defense. Exterior and interior sections of the houses as well as local clothing remain very colorful. Silver-making is a major local handicraft, and women traditionally wear a good deal of jewelry, similar to traditions in Yemen. African influences are clearly seen in the western part of Asir in the traditional architecture and very brightly colored clothing, as well as in many different ceremonies inspired from a mixture of traditions from Arabia and the Horn of Africa. However, transformations have already begun because of the inevitable influx of visitors, both Saudis and foreigners, as well as improved means of communication and infrastructure. For centuries the Asir highlands were disunited because of intertribal warfare that was first challenged by Wahhabi expansion under their local leadership of the al-Rufaydah. After their defeat and the Ottoman withdrawal, the Bani Mughayd became the dominant group in the Asir for the next several decades. During most of the nineteenth century, Asir became the subject of heavy fighting between the Ottomans, the Wahhabi rulers of Najd, and local dynasties such as the Idrisis and the Zaydis of Yemen. After 1920, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud started the unification of central Arabia with the occupation of Abha and Asir through negotiations, treaties, and several military campaigns. In the treaty of Ta’if on May 20, 1934, Saudi hegemony over Asir and Najran was finalized. Today, Asir forms an administrative region in Saudi Arabia that is separated from the Tihamah and Najran. The governor is Faysal bin Khalid Al Faysal, who is instrumental in the region’s sustained development, focusing on extending road building and tourism. Saudi Arabia’s first national park, a 1,000 square mile (over 1,600 square kilometers) natural reserve, opened in 1981. The domestic tourism industry in Asir offers great opportunities by providing employment to locals and keeping Saudi tourist riyals in the country. Tourists from Saudi Arabia and other countries enjoy the natural beauty, climate, and traditional hospitality of Asir. Both government and private sector money is being rapidly invested in numerous projects. The population is growing fast; foreign and domestic workers assist in the agricultural expansion.

FURTHER READING Abdulfattah, Kamal. Mountain Farmer and Fellah in Asir, Southwest Saudi Arabia. Erlangen, Germany: Fr€ankische Geographische Gesellschaft, 1981. Cornwallis, Sir Kinahan. Asir before World War One: A Handbook. New York: Oleander Press, 1976.

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‘Awamir Eigeland, Tor. “Back to the Highlands,” Saudi Aramco World, 31, no. 5 (1980): 2–21. Mauger, Thierry. Impressions of Arabia: Architecture and Frescoes of the Asir Region. New York: Flammarion, 1996. Philby, Harry St. John. Arabian Highlands. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1952.

‘Awamir John A. Shoup The ‘Awamir tribe is a large Hinawi (southern) Bedouin tribe inhabiting much of the southern part of Saudi Arabia with sections in Qatar and Oman, whereas other sections live in the United Arab Emirates. The tribe originated in the region north of the Hadramawt of Yemen and at an early period seems to have begun moving to the north and east into central Oman where some sections settled. They had a long-standing quarrel with the Duru‘ tribe, who inhabit the area north of Nizwa, which was settled only in the 1960s. Because of their feud with the Duru‘, many of the ‘Awamir moved with their shaykh to al-Hasa in Saudi Arabia in the 1940s where they eventually stayed. However, the majority moved into territory controlled by Abu Dhabi where they already had good relations with the ruling Al Bu Falah. Today they are split between those who consider themselves to be Saudi citizens and those who consider themselves to be Emirati citizens. The majority of ‘Awamir in the Untied Arab Emirates follow Ibadi Kharaji Islam, as do those still living in Oman, whereas those in Saudi Arabia adhere to the more orthodox Hanbali school of Sunni Islam. Some remain pastoral nomads that depend on camels, but the vast majority have settled in special Bedouin settlements in Saudi Arabia or moved to the major towns in Oman and the Gulf.

FURTHER READING Carter, J.R.L. Tribes in Oman. London: Peninsular Publishing, 1982. Heard-Bey, Frauke. From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates. Dubai: Motivate Publishing, 2004. Miles, S.B. The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf. London: Frank Cass, 1966.

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B

Bahla John A. Shoup Bahla is an ancient city located in the Dakhilah region of Oman. The origin of the city dates back into early antiquity and it served as a major administrative center for the Persians when they conquered the region during the reign of Cyrus the Great (550–530 BC). Bahla’s citadel may have first been built during the Persian period and several of the major aflaj, or underground irrigation canals, date from the same period. Locally, it is held that the Persians introduced aflaj to Oman. Bahla remained a major urban center following the arrival of several major Arab tribes in the region following the collapse of the Ma’rib Dam in Yemen in the third century BC. The Bani Azd tribe was among the more important of them and they eventually threw off Persian rule. Bahla served as a capital city for several Omani dynasties following Oman’s independence from ‘Abbasids in 796 and the establishment of the ‘Ibadi Kharaji Imamate in Oman. It remained important city during the al-Ya‘arbah dynasty (1624–1775). The Dakhilah region was the heart of the state and in 1670 the Imam Bal‘arab bin Sultan built his palace, Husn Jabrin, between Bahla and Nizwa. Today Bahla is a small town of around 30,000 people. Most are engaged in agricultural production in the small oasis that surrounds the town or are skilled craftsmen working in silver, making pottery, or making confections/candies. Bahla is famous throughout Oman for its fine silver jewelry and pottery, and the city has several very active craftsmen still engaged full-time in making items. The town is also a trade center for villages in the mountains that rise up behind it, although with the availability of modern transportation Nizwa has come to dominate local trade. Traditional folklore and legends say that Bahla’s people are well known for magic and sorcery, which perhaps is linked to their high skills in crafts such as in silver.

Bahrain

The fortress of Bahla was first built by the Sasanian Persians in the sixth century and was subsequently rebuilt and expanded. Today it is a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage site. Courtesy of John A. Shoup.

FURTHER READING Richardson, Neil, and Marcia Dorr. The Craft Heritage of Oman. Dubai: Motivate Publishing, 2003.

Bahrain John A. Shoup Bahrain is called al-Bahrayn, or “the Two Seas” in Arabic. The Kingdom of Bahrain is an island country consisting of the two major islands: Bahrain and Muharraq, and some thirty small associated islands, many of which are not permanently inhabited. The country is the only island nation among the Gulf countries and as a result has had a somewhat different history and ethnic composition. Bahrain was the Dilmun mentioned in ancient Mesopotamian texts, a place of eternal life and happiness. Dilmun civilization arose around 3200 BC and lasted throughout much of antiquity. The island came under Greek influence following Alexander the Great’s conquest of the Persian Empire in 330 BC. Bahrain was called Tylos by the Greeks, which most likely was a corruption of Thilwun or Dilmun. The Hellenistic period ended with the arrival of Islam in 629, when the Prophet Muhammad sent a letter to the ruler of the island, al-Mundhir bin Sawa al-Tamimi, asking him to accept Islam. Al-Mundhir accepted Islam, as did many of the island’s people, although some remained Zoroastrian, Christian, or Jewish.

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Bahrain was part of the Shi‘ite Qaramitah movement and the island was more or less marginalized during much of the classical Islamic period. In 1602 the Persian Safavid Shah ‘Abbas I took the island and Iran ruled it for the next 150 years. Iran lost Bahrian to Oman and it was administered by the Governor of Bushir, a major port on the Persian side of the Gulf controlled by Oman. Bahrain’s modern history begins in 1701 with the arrival of the Al Khalifah family at the head of the Bani ‘Utbah or ‘Utub tribe of the ‘Anazah confederation. The Al Khalifah did not gain full control over Bahrain until 1783, when Shaykh Ahmad bin Khalifah (1783–1794) finally drove out the Omani governor Nasr al-Madhkur. The Bani ‘Utbah originally came from the southern Hijaz and first migrated to near Qatar and then moved north to al-Basrah in Iraq in the seventeenth century. The Al Sabah and their related lineages settled in what is now Kuwait, whereas the Al Khalifah and Al Thani migrated back south, taking control of both Bahrain and Qatar in the eighteenth century. The Bani ‘Utbah were Arabic-speaking, Maliki Sunni Muslims, whereas the majority of Bahrain’s people were Persian-speaking 12er Shi‘ites. The Bani ‘Utbah were from pastoral Bedouin background and have maintained the Bedouin speech partially as a means of social distinction. They settled in the central part of the main island and built a fort on the only bit of raised ground called al-Rifa‘a, or “the Heights.” The Shi‘ites were mainly settled villagers and were concentrated in the north of the main island and on Muharraq close to numerous freshwater sources. Bahrain’s rich pearling banks attracted several other mainly Sunni Arab families or Hawali from the Persian side of the Gulf during the rule of Shaykh Salman bin Ahmad (1794–1821). With the help of the Hawali, many of the Bani ‘Utbah became involved with pearling and shipping, which, because of their success, caused the anger of the Sultan of Oman. The Omanis attacked Bahrain in 1801 and the Al Khalifahs were supported by the Al Sa‘ud, then a rising ruling house that was distantly related to them. The Omanis were defeated but attacks between the two continued for several years. In 1820 Bahrain signed an agreement with the British that served as the basis for the Protectorate that was signed into effect in 1914. Bahrain has been different from its Gulf neighbors, being the first in several different fields. It allowed an American Christian mission to be established in 1893, which opened the first Western medical hospital in 1902. Bahrain opened the first post office in 1884, and the first telegraph office in 1916. In 1919 the government established the first public (non-religious) schools for boys and in 1924 opened the first girls’ school. Bahrain also has the first elected representative body. In 1920 the city of Manamah was allowed to have a municipal council and by 1926 half its members were elected whereas the other half were appointed by the Shaykh. Bahrain’s economy was based on pealing and as long as the international demand for pearls was high, the economy did well. Bahrain attracted merchants from India who settled there, making the island unique with the only Hindu minority who are citizens and not guestworkers. In the 1930s cultured pearls began to enter the market and demand for natural pearls declined. In 1931 oil was discovered and Bahrain’s oil industry, Bapco—a subsidiary of Standard Oil—began operation in 1932. Oil was able to replace pearls as the major source of national income.

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Bahrain

Charles Belgrave dominated British involvement in Bahraini affairs during the 1930s to 1950s. Belgrave became the focal point of growing Bahraini anti-British sentiment after World War II and the rise of Arab nationalism embodied in Egyptian President Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir. In 1952 the Higher Executive Committee (composed of both Sunnis and Shi‘ites) pushed for several political reforms and for Belgrave to be fired. The 1956 Suez Crisis brought things to a head and Belgrave “retired” rather than face being forced out of his position. Shaykh ‘Isa bin Salman became the ruler in 1961 and Shaykh ‘Isa moved his country toward independence and a more diversified economy. Bahrain decided to not join the United Arab Emirates and became an independent Emirate called the State of Bahrain in 1971. A Constituent Assembly was elected in 1972 and a constitution was issued in 1973 that authorized the election of a National Assembly. However, the National Assembly was dissolved in 1975 and the Emir ruled by decree. Contemporary Bahraini history has been dominated by three major themes: the demands by the Shi‘ites for a popularly elected government, conflict with Qatar over the Hawali Islands, and relations with the United States. The Shi‘ites, many of Iranian origin, comprise around seventy percent of the population but do not share much of the nation’s wealth. They tend to work in lower-paying jobs and feel marginalized politically. They form a distinct part of the population and are referred to as Baharnah (Bahrani in singular) rather than Bahrainis, which is applied to the Sunni Arabs. Several organizations emerged in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain and Hizballah Bahrain) that were involved in violent actions against the state. Some of the Shi‘ite clerics were arrested for their open anti-government activities, the most important being Shaykh ‘Abd al-Amir al-Jamri, who was arrested several times. In 1999 al-Jamri was sentenced to ten years in prison but the new Emir, Shaykh Hamad bin ‘Isa, pardoned him, which started the progression toward more political openness. Shaykh Hamad bin ‘Isa succeeded his father as Emir in 1999 and in 2000 he appointed women and non-Muslims to the Consultative Council. In 2001 he held a referendum on political reforms that were overwhelmingly approved by the people. Bahrain became a kingdom as a constitutional monarchy and extended political rights to women. In 2002 Bahrain held the first elections and for the first time women were allowed to vote. The same year parliamentary elections were held and despite calls by Islamists to boycott them, more than fifty percent of the people voted. In 2004 the King approved Nada Haffadh as Minister of Health, the first woman minister. In the 2006 elections the Shi‘ites won forty percent of the vote and for the first time a Shi‘ite, Jawad bin Salim alUrayd, was named the Deputy Prime Minister. Bahrain and Qatar have disputed ownership of the Hawali Islands that lie between them. The conflict began in 1939 when Britain decided the islands belong to Bahrain. When both countries did not join the United Arab Emirates in 1971, the dispute became more important. Qatari troops briefly occupied two of the islands in 1986, trying to force the issue, but within a few months evacuated back to Qatar. In 1991 Qatar took the dispute to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, but Bahrain rejected the move stating the islands are legally part of Bahrain. Little was done with the case and in 1995 Britain refused

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to mediate the dispute. In 1999 the Emir of Qatar, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifah al-Thani, visited Bahrain and the monarchs agreed to set up a joint Bahraini/ Qatari commission to settle the issue. Bahrain is a strong pro-Western state and has increasing ties with the United States. Since 1971 Bahrain rented naval and military bases to the United States, some of which had originally been British. In 1991 Bahrain, as part of the Gulf Cooperation Council Peninsula Shield Force, was an active member of the coalition in Operation Desert Storm against Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Bahrain has pursued its relationship with the United States and signed a defense cooperation agreement in 1991 that set up joint military exercises and increased U.S. access to Bahraini port facilities. In 2004 Bahrain and the United States signed a free trade pact that was formalized by the United States in 2006. The free trade pact was not well received by other Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, who sees it as a means to break regional economic cooperation. Since the beginning of King Hamad’s rule, Bahrain has opened up politically to a great extent, although media is still subject to censorship. Nonetheless, MBC chose Bahrain as the location for its satellite channel MBC-2. The press is private; all three major Arabic dailies and the two English dailies are private. The state controls the local television station and radio with the exception of radio station Voice FM, which is aimed at the Indian listener. Bahrain has become a major financial center since the late 1970s, and is called the Singapore of the Gulf. Oil production in Bahrain was never as high as in the other Gulf States and from the beginning Bahrain has tried to not be dependent on oil. Today, the oil sector amounts to close to thirty percent of the national economy. Banking, investments, shipping, oil refining, aluminum, and other such activities have a greater share. Bahrain is the least dependent on foreign workers of any of the Gulf countries and policies of “Bahrainization” have been in effect for decades. Only eight percent of Bahrainis are rural, the majority of which are Shi‘ites and involved in agriculture, fishing, and traditional crafts such as pottery and weaving cloth.

FURTHER READING Cooper, Robert. Bahrain. New York: Marshall Cavendish, 2000. Khouri, Fouad. Tribe and State in Bahrain. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.

Bani Khalid Sebastian Maisel The Bani Khalid is a large Arab tribe who used to rule the eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. To a lesser degree their influence stretched into Najd in Central Arabia. Today, most of the tribal members live in Najd and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. In addition, many of them are found in Kuwait, Bahrain, Iraq, and Syria, and one

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section is found in Jordan. Tribal members are called Khalidi in the singular, and the plural form is Khawalid. They are considered to be ‘Adnani (northern—descendants of Isma‘il), with a long, eventful history. Some scholars and tribal members trace the tribe to the famous Muslim commander Khalid bin al-Walid (592–642). However, not much is recorded about this early time, and they first show up on the written map of history in the fifteenth century, occupying large parts of Eastern Arabia. In 1534 they fell under Ottoman control until a successful rebellion by Barak bin Gharir al-Humayd led to the Ottoman expulsion from al-Hasa and Qatif. By then they ruled over Qatif, al-Ahsa, and Qatar, but not Bahrain. The Al Gharir as the most influential lineage of the tribe divided the area among the various groups and clans of the Bani Khalid. Some groups extended the realm northward to Basrah. They opened up the area that is presently known as Kuwait by building settlements, ports, and fortifications. In Qurayn, the shaykh of the Bani Khalid erected a small fort (al-kut in Arabic), which became the core for the future state and city of al-Kuwait. Under their hegemony, smaller tribes settled in the vicinity of the fortress. One of them, the al‘Utub, quickly emerged as the new rulers and eventually founded the ruling dynasty of the Al Sabah. After internal power struggles, the Bani Khalid lost their influence over the area to the Al Sabah in the middle of the eighteenth century. The Bani Khalid also extended their sphere of influence into al-Yamamah, the area of eastern Najd, where they gained many allies and tributaries such as the Al Mu‘ammar, the rulers of ‘Uyaynah. Here they first came in touch with the teachings of Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his movement to purify Islam that was also directed against Shi‘ite Islam. Because many members of the Bani Khalid were Shi‘ites, the tribe and its leaders challenged his teaching and tried to persuade the ruler of ‘Uyaynah to kill Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab; however, he only expelled him to Dir‘iyah, the capital of the Al Sa‘ud area, in order to avoid unrest among his population. Almost a decade later, the movement grew stronger after signing a pact with the Al Sa‘ud of mutual support and legitimization. After another period of internal power struggle, the Bani Khalid fell under the control of the first Saudi state in 1793 and had to pay the zakat, the Islamic charity tax, to the Al Sa‘ud. With the fall of the Saudi state to the Egyptian troops and anti-Saudi tribes under Ibrahim Pasha, the Bani Khalid were reinstalled as the rulers of al-Hasa until the second Saudi state again conquered this important oasis in the 1830s. The new Saudi rulers encouraged other tribes from Qasim in central Arabia to move into the dirah of the Bani Khalid to create a buffer zone and concurrently to weaken their rule in eastern Arabia by bringing in subjects loyal to the Al Sa‘ud. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the Bani Khalid lost most of its former influence in eastern Arabia to the ‘Ajman, Mutayr, and other tribes associated with the rulers of Kuwait. However, they participate in the Ikhwan movement, but only with insignificant numbers. Only two or three hijrahs, settlements for the Ikhwan, are known between Dammam and Riyadh. The only other time the Bani Khalid made headlines was when King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz married a girl from the shaykhly family, Wadhba bint Muhammad Bin

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al-Uraymir, who gave birth to Sa‘ud bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, the second king of Saudi Arabia. Wadhba outlived her son Sa‘ud and throughout her life worked on reconciliation between the two groups. Among the most prominent sections of the Bani Khalid are the Al Humayd, from which are the Al Gharir and the shaykhly family; the Al Jubur; the al-Mahashir; the Al Janah (in Qasim); the ad-Du‘um in al-Qasab; and the al-‘Umur and al-Qarsha in al-Jawf. Most of the Bani Khalid in Najd have been settled for centuries, whereas those in the eastern provinces only recently gave up nomadism.

FURTHER READING Mandaville, Jon E. “The Ottoman Province of al-Hasa in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 90, no. 3 (1970): 486–513. Vassiliev, Alexei. The History of Saudi Arabia. London: Saqi Books, 1998. Winder, Bailey. Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965.

Bani Tamim Sebastian Maisel The Bani Tamim is a large tribal group with an undisputed ancient descent living in central Arabia. Their progenitor Tamim ibn Murr lived around the first century AD and through him they trace their family tree back to ‘Adnan and Isma‘il. The meaning of tamim in Arabic is strong or solid. In the distant past of pre-Islamic Arabia, the Bani Tamim maintained a dominant position among the Arab tribes because of their number and large territory. However, they never reached any paramount position, which is attributed to the fragmentation of their settlement pattern. They often share their tribal territory with other groups, mainly from the larger Shammar tribe, but through language and manners are distinguished from them. In contrast to the predominantly nomadic Shammar, the Bani Tamim were sedentary farmers who owned the land they cultivated in the oases. Their main product was dates, of which they possessed large plantations. Another economic activity was their participation in the local and regional market system. As settled farmers, they were no longer considered independent and had to acknowledge the authority of the leading Shammar family, the Al Rashid, over their territory. They did not participate in the raids and military expeditions organized by the Shammar, which placed them outside the value system and honor code of the Shammar. In the fifth and sixth centuries, they belonged to the realm of Kindah, making al-Hira their political center. But the Bani Tamim was also closely connected to Makkah, where they helped established the dominant position of this city in tribal Arabia of that time period. Soon they adopted Islam and played an important role in the early conquest of Basrah and eastern Iran. A general move from the southwest to the northeast is noticeable in their history, which also led to the gradual diminishing of the tribe’s importance staring in the ninth century.

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However, they did not vanish from the tribal map of Arabia because they remained attached to the land of their palm groves. The descendants of the Bani Tamim settled in large numbers in central Arabia, particularly in their old domain between Washm and Sudayr. In the southern part, large contingents are found in al-Kharj and Hawta, but as mentioned earlier, a core part of their population lives in Qasim and the Jabal Shammar area. A small elite of educated families arose from the mainly agricultural masses of the tribe. Among them are the founder of the religious reform movement, Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and the ruling ibn Mu‘ammar family of his birthplace, ‘Uyanah. This family served and still serve the Al Sa‘ud in various political, economic, and cultural positions; for example, as the governor of Ta’if or currently the director of the National Dialogue. Another famous family is alBassam, who collaborated through many decades with European travelers, diplomats, and other foreigners. Some sources claim the ruling family of Qatar, Al Thani, also belongs to the Bani Tamim. Other segments of the Bani Tamim include the Nuwasir, Anajir, and Murshid. Today they are mainly located in Najd (Saudi Arabia), Basrah (Iraq), and Khuzistan (Iran).

FURTHER READING Al-Juhany, Uwidah M. Najd before the Salafi Reform Movement. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2002. Al Rasheed, Madawi. Politics in an Arabian Oasis. London: I.B. Tauris, 1992. Vassiliev, Alexei. The History of Saudi Arabia. London: Saqi Books, 1998.

Bani Yas John A. Shoup The Bani Yas is a large tribal confederation of Hinawi (southern) origin that moved into the Gulf region from the Najd. They have no one single common ancestor but are composed of several groups who merged together in the past. They are composed of lineages that used to be fully nomadic pastoralists living in the desert and others who lived along the coast from fishing. Although they cannot point to a single common origin, by the beginning of the twentieth century the British described them as one of the “most compact and powerful tribes” in the Gulf. During the eighteenth century the Al Bu Falah gained more or less the dominant position among the tribes of the confederacy, and their shaykhly family, the Al Nahyan, became the main politically powerful voice. In 1761 water was discovered on Abu Dhabi Island, where the Al Nahyan settled and quickly a village grew up around them. The Bani Yas also took control of Liwa Oasis inland, which was an important source of dates. Although the Bani Yas were able to exercise rights over much of the land that is now the Abu Dhabi emirate, they shared it with several other tribes, including the ‘Awamir, al-Murrah, Manahil,

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and Manasir. The political acumen of the Bani Yas leadership was such that they were able to establish good relations with many of the other tribes, form alliances, and come to dominate others. In the later part of the nineteenth century, the Bani Yas leadership (the Al Bu Falah) were able to gain control over much of al-‘Ayn Oasis by defeating the Dhawahir tribe in a war while establishing a good relationship with the Na‘im tribe that lived in the oasis’ other villages that were under the Sultan of Oman. The end of the nineteenth century and early part of the twentieth century brought the Bani Yas into more conflicts with nomadic tribes, but these conflicts only increased the power of the Bani Yas. The Bani Yas consolidated their position, built forts, and appointed local leaders. Al-‘Ayn became a second administrative center and tribes came to the Bani Yas leadership to help settle disputes. Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan, the first president of the United Arab Emirates, served as the wali or local governor of al-‘Ayn during the 1940s and 1950s before becoming leader of the emirate in 1966.

FURTHER READING Heard-Bey, Frauke. From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates. Dubai: Motivate Publishing, 2004.

Banking and Finance Sebastian Maisel In the Middle East and Arabia, moneylenders and changers existed in medieval times and served as the original model for the banks that arose in northern Italy, which enjoyed close relations with Egypt and Syria. Individual merchants or merchant groups normally owned them. In the mid-nineteenth century, branches of European banks, predominantly British and French or special Orient Banks of those countries, dominated the Arab finance sector. Many of them were located in Jiddah, al-Manamah, and Kuwait, the economic centers of the Peninsula. Currently, all Gulf States have a highly developed and sophisticated banking system with a central banking or other official monetary institutions. In connection with the general economic boom and increasing revenues from exporting oil in the 1970s, many banks were either nationalized or newly established. In the 1980s, the annual growth rate for approving new banks was over thirty percent. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were among the most important banking centers in the Gulf as well as in the entire Middle East, and the National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia and the National Banks of Dubai and Abu Dhabi are counted among the largest Arab banks. More and more Western banks entered the financial market of the Gulf and formed joint ventures through minority stakes such as the Saudi American Bank or the British Bank of the Middle East. In addition to the Western-oriented banks, many banks in the area follow the Quranic prohibition of usury and charging interest, riba in Arabic. They also follow

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the simple principle of sharing profit and loss and give mortgage or car loans that are similar to leasing contracts. Other rules that Islamic banks are trying to implement include the prohibition of gambling, bulling the market, and investments in the following sectors: pornography, prostitution, alcohol, and pork, because they are considered haram (i.e., unlawful and unethical in Islam). Several private Islamic banks have been entering the market successfully, such as Rajih Bank from Saudi Arabia, Dubai Islamic Bank, and Kuwait Finance House. The Islamic Development Bank is a multinational developing bank based on Islamic financial jurisprudence and is owned by the governments of several Arab Gulf and other Islamic states. Generally, the finance system of the Gulf States has been highly centralized from early on. Money sources included different taxes, tributes, foreign subsidies, and revenues from exporting oil and gas. The administration of the finances was in the hands of the government, which in turn was controlled by the ruling family. Therefore, members of the ruling family mostly owned the large national banks. Private financial institutions depended on the official banks to maintain their liquidity. If the government ran into financial difficulties or deficits, it also borrowed from the central banks. Individuals continued relying on the traditional moneychangers, even after modern banks opened in the 1950s. With the growing oil revenues, larger state budgets, and closer affiliation with the Western market system, the introduction of matching standards was required. In Saudi Arabia this took additional time in comparison to other Gulf States because of the resistance of Islamic scholars. The central financial authorities maintain their control over the market even after the founding of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), hoping to regulate the banks and to limit the risk of financial crises and disasters. Therefore they closely supervise the system and work toward matching international standards. The long-lasting debate over the introduction of a common GCC currency has to be viewed in this regard. A common currency binds the member states and their economies closer together while boosting it at the same time. The introduction of a common currency is scheduled for 2010, and once in place, the new currency, which does not have an official name yet, will represent a very strong economic block in which private investments and ownership are encouraged. Private banks began to invest in all major economic sectors. Because of mergers, joint ventures, and other collaborative agreements between central, private, domestic, and international authorities in the financial sector, it is no longer easy to define the status of such institutions.

FURTHER READING El-Gamal, Mahmoud. Islamic Finance: Law, Economics, and Practice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Gause, F. Gregory. Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994. Hussain, Mostaque et al. “Banking Policies and Regulations: Comparative Study of Kuwait, UAW, and Qatar,” International Journal of Financial Services Management 2, no. 3 (2007): 214–234. Ramanathan, Ramakrishnan. “Performance of Banks in Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council,” International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management 56, no. 2 (2007): 137–154.

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Banking, Islamic Jack Kalpakian Islamic banking is banking with interest rates explicitly absent but implicitly present. It is centered on the idea that interest inherently constitutes riba (usury) and that the Qu’ranic prohibitions against riba apply to interest rates charged by conventional banks today. There are some basic issues to consider: the nature of money today versus at the time of the appearance of Islam; the time value of money; and finally the use of devices that veil interest rates behind several terms that include fees, buyback agreements, and profit-sharing arrangements. Money at the time of Islam’s appearance was based on specie—gold, silver, or copper. It could also be in the form of other commodities or resource-use rights. This continued to be the case for nearly all human civilizations until fairly recently. Even when countries and states issued paper notes, they were backed with specie. Paper Ottoman lira could be redeemed for gold or silver as were the monies issued by other Muslim and non-Muslim governments. The direct and indirect use of gold as the basis of money continued until the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system in 1971. Some forms of Islamic jurisprudence have not yet come to terms with the full implications of the delinking of commodities and money, but this is not the case universally. Today’s money has value because of two factors: the government’s compulsion of its use and the interest rate charged for borrowing it. Banking, writ large, is not possible without increasing the money supply by creating loans and charging a price for the money. Even if the money were ultimately backed by specie, banking activities tend to create more money, thereby resulting in slow inflation, which means that a dirham, dollar, or dinar borrowed today and paid back next year will always buy fewer goods than it originally did, and this has implications for investing and lending—the time value of money. Ironically, one of the most traditional Islamic jurisprudential institutions realized this early on, and conventional banks had no opprobrium attached to them at the late nineteenth century when they began to appear in and work in Islamic countries. Indeed, al-Azhar, Egypt’s premiere Islamic seminary and a leading authority on Sunni Islam, has consistently emphasized that interest rates do not equal riba. Azhar scholars have argued that because money today is based on state fiat and because interest is paid to depositors there is no harm and the charge of riba cannot be substantiated. Furthermore they have argued that state bonds and home loans, because they further the good of the community as a whole and because they further family housing, are not expressions of riba. The Azhar continues to argue this perspective today, and it has recently began re-emphasizing the issue given all of the controversy that has surrounded conventional and Islamic banking; under its definition, as long as the bank does not invest in alcohol-related activities, gambling, the pork industry, pornography, or prostitution, its activities are within the spirit and the letter of Islamic law. Other Muslim scholars argue that whenever issues related to the time value of money are invoked, riba is present. This second perspective dominates in Saudi

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Arabia and the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states with the notable exception of Oman; it is the activities of banks catering to the region, peoples, and countries influenced by its culture elsewhere, and to others who accept the idea that interest is usury that have come to dominate the meaning of the term “Islamic banking.” This includes significant numbers of people. It is estimated that the industry is worth about $500 billion, and a closer look reveals a whole set of devices designed to extract profit for the bank; that is, interest with another name. Some of the common ways that this takes place include rent-toown agreements, where the borrower “rents” the assets he or she borrowed the money to buy for a fixed period of time and then makes payments on the principal. Other methods of collecting the equivalent of interest include repurchase agreements that set the price lower than the original cost and depreciation. Other devices include profit sharing, payment in kind, joint venture, insurance purchases, securitization, and forthright charging of processing fees. Also included are the payment of “gifts” to depositors and lenders. These approaches have led to two sorts of criticism. The first came from conventional bankers who first argued that Islamic banking is nothing but a label and an advertising gimmick designed to deprive them of market shares, but have now taken the initiative and are opening Islamic banking units. The second source of criticism came from those who classify its profit-making methods as riba. The first Islamic banks were established in Egypt but reached the apex of success in the GCC states where oil-based cash reserves and piety were in abundant supply. Some experts expect the market to grow by about twenty percent a year for many years to come, and it is indeed likely that Islamic banking and finance will become universal options for devout Muslims who do not wish to be guaranteed interest payments for their deposits. Islamic banking will also be one of the instruments used by governments and firms to tap into the savings of the Gulf region, thereby entangling it further into the global economy.

FURTHER READING Chraibi, Khalid. “Mixed Message on ‘Riba’ Leaves Muslims Trapped between Usurers and Lenders,” ArabLife.org, April 24, 2007. Available at http://www.arablife.org/index. php?option=com_content&task=view&id=727&Itemid=187 (last accessed October 8, 2008). El Diwany, Tarik. The Problem with Interest, 2nd ed. London: Kreatoc Ltd., 2003. Kuran, Timur. Islam and Mammon: The Economic Predicaments of Islamism. Trenton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005. MacLean, Aaron. “Islamic Banking, Is It Really Kosher?” The American, April/March 2007. Available at http://www.american.com/archive/2007/march-april-magazinecontents/islamic-banking-is-it-really-kosher (last accessed October 8, 2008). Wilson, Rodney. The Politics of Islamic Finance. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004.

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Al-Batinah John A. Shoup The al-Batinah region of Oman extends along the coast of the Gulf of Oman between Khatmah Malahah in the north (near the border with the United Arab Emirates) to Ra’s al-Hamra’ in the south and bounded on the west by the Western Hajar Mountains. It is only six to forty-three miles (ten to seventy kilometers) wide. The region is arid, receiving around only four inches (100 millimeters) of rainfall a year along the coast and only one inch (thirty millimeters) in the highlands. The region gets progressively more arid as one proceeds south. The region has eight governates today and three of them have major historic cities: Suhar, Sur, and al-Rustaq. Suhar was a major shipping center in the past, and the ancient city was some three times the size of the modern city. Al-Rustaq served as the capital of Oman in the medieval period and today is best known for its spectacular fort Qala‘at al-Hazm. The region produces agriculture despite the arid climate. Agriculture is fed by a few seasonal streams that flow from the Western Hajar Mountains and from tapping underground water sources using aflaj. The people are able to produce dates, grapes, citrus, and quince as well as raise livestock, including camels, cattle, sheep, and goats. Several of the towns are famous in Oman for their interest in learning, fine manners, and ability in composing poetry. Communities on the coast engage in fishing and shipbuilding.

Bayt Kathir John A. Shoup The Bayt Kathir is a large tribal confederation living mainly within the borders of the modern states of Oman and Yemen. The Bayt Kathir is composed of the Bayt Kathir proper, Al Kathir, the Kathir of Dhufar, Hadramawt, and related or dependent tribes, including the ‘Awamir, Rawashid or al-Rashid, Shanafirah, ‘Afar, and Harasis. Together these tribes are called the Kathir al-Ghathamah. Most of the confederation is composed of Hinawi (southern) lineages, but the Kathir of the Hadramawt are considered Ghafiri (northern) in origin. Each of these major divisions of descent lines have subsections and even sub-subsections, yet there is a strong feeling of “connection” to all who are Kathiri. The Kathir are composed of both settled (Hadar) peoples who farm oases in the Hadramawt and Dhufar and those who were, or still are, pastoral nomads. Both settled and nomads harvested frankincense from the wild boswellia tree that grows almost exclusively in Dhufar and Hadramawt. The Kathir ruled the small state (sultanate) that was based in the city of Say‘un in the Hadramawt until its incorporation into South Yemen in the 1960s. Thus, it is possible to talk about a “Greater Kathiri” population and identity with wider applications than for many of the other tribal groups in the southern Arabian Peninsula.

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The British travelers/explorers Bertram Thomas (1930–1931) and Wilfred Thesiger (1945–1946) were assisted by guides from the Bayt Kathir, but Thesiger found them too “tame” for his liking and in his subsequent trips across the Empty Quarter chose instead guides and companions from the Rashid whom he considered to be the true Bedouin, untouched by the softness of urban life. Since the discovery of oil in the Dhufar region of Oman in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the tribes of the region have mainly settled around the pumping stations and new towns that have sprung up to support the oil fields. Many of the younger men work for the oil companies or the Omani government as drivers, as guides, or on the oilrigs. Pastoralism is still a major source of income for a good many of the Bedouin who sell their livestock or livestock products in Salalah or Nizwa in Oman or in the ancient towns of the Hadramawt in Yemen. See also Travelers and Explorers.

FURTHER READING Carter, J.R.L. Tribes in Oman. London: Peninsular Publishing, 1982. Thesiger, Wilfred. Arabian Sands. London: Readers Union Longmans, Green & Co., 1960.

Bedouin Culture Sebastian Maisel Bedouins are Arab, tribally organized, nomadic groups that live in the deserts and steppes of the Arabian Peninsula and adjunct areas. The Arabic word badu describes pastoral nomads who share a common sense of tribal origin, values, and qualities. Among the most important Bedouin tribes in the Peninsula are the Shammar, ‘Amarat, Ruwalah, Huwaytat, Mutayr, ‘Ajman, al-Murrah, ‘Utaybah, Dawasir, Qahtan, and Manahil. During the 1960s, when the area began to undergo significant social and economical changes, the nomadic population of Saudi Arabia was twenty percent, in Kuwait was thirteen percent, and was less in the other Arabian Gulf States. Since that time, a constant decrease in numbers is noted, partly initiated by government settlement programs and partly by the irreversible degrading of their living areas. In addition to camels, Bedouins raised sheep and goats and lived off of their meat and milk products. During long periods of drought, they lost many animals, but usually managed to survive. Their annual migrations in search of optimal grazing grounds and water were done in seasonal moves. Ownership of wells and pasture was often contested and constant fighting led to the expulsions or invasions of entire tribes. However, since the late eighteenth century, most tribal territories (dirah in Arabic) were clearly established with recognized summer and winter grazing grounds. Water and pasture were in the collective property of the tribe, whereas the animals belonged to the individual families. The system of

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Murrah Bedouins, Saudi Arabia. Courtesy of Sebastian Maisel.

tribal territories was abolished by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud, who turned them into state land without privileges for any tribe. A distinct classification or hierarchy within the tribal group distinguished between the tribe (qabilah), tribal section (‘ashirah), clan (fakhd), lineage (hamulah), and extended family (bayt). Every section claimed descent from a common ancestor and shared a defined territory with pasture, water, and other resources. Each group was headed by the most prominent and reputable member (shaykh), and very large tribal confederations were led by a supreme shaykh called the shaykh al-shuyukh. The title can be hereditary; however, in theory, the shaykh is selected for his ability as a first among equals with limited authority. Only certain Bedouin groups enjoyed status as asil or noble tribes. Others are considered inferior because they were unable to trace their origins back to the two main ancestors, ‘Adnan and Qahtan, and they were engaged in less noble professions, such as sheep breeding or farming. The tribes of noble descent used to marry only among themselves. Among the noble tribes are the Shammar, ‘Anazah, Dhafir, and Harb. Less noble tribes had to pay tribute and were excluded from many acts and deeds. Among them are the Shararat, Hawazim, and Hutaym. Traditionally, the powerful camel herders imposed such payments on the weaker tribes, which in return guaranteed several rights such as grazing and camping privileges, water rights, and protection and defense. The tribute was paid in cash or kind. At the bottom end of the Bedouin society were the Salubah, hunters and artisans without a tribal origin. They were considered too inferior to mix with; therefore, no true Bedouin would marry with them. They did not participate in tribal warfare and raids and their possessions remained untouched. Raiding other Bedouin and settled groups in order to steal their herds is often described as an important economic exchange among tribal groups. This method

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of weakening neighboring groups and enhancing personal wealth and reputation was an honorable, social institution in pre-Islamic Arabia. Every raid (ghazu in Arabic) was organized and headed by a special leader, qa’id, who received the biggest share after the successful campaign. Customary law prohibited raids from turning into massacres, and the adherence to those rules was strongly enforced by all tribes. Because every raid was cause for retaliation by the injured party, travelers noted a constant state of warfare in the Bedouin territories. After the introduction of firearms, raids often turned into violent tribal wars and were subsequently suppressed by the central governments when possible. Other activities included hunting with falcons and special hunting dogs or collecting desert truffles in the spring. Women, on the other hand, were always busy with chores around the camp such as making food, making clothes, and weaving. Children were spared from work until they reached the age of five or six, when their male relatives began to teach young boys the important intellectual features and material aspects of Bedouin culture: proper behavior, respect, honor, tribal history, and poetry. Boys were allowed to sit with the elders in the majlis and listen to the stories and discussions of the news. Bedouin girls supported their mothers and female relatives with daily chores, but they also received lessons on honorable and proper behavior and respect of the elders. The material possession of Bedouins was traditionally limited to a minimum of durable and easy-to-transport items. The ideal type of accommodation was a tent made from camel and goat hair. It was divided into two sections, one for the family and the other for guests. The family section was reserved for the women and children, whereas the men of the family spent most of their time in the guest section where they entertained guests or chatted with friends and relatives while drinking tea and coffee. The tent was a sleeping room, kitchen, and workshop in one; however, most of the time, the inhabitants were busy working away from it. The tent was always open for visitors and guests because hospitality was a major feature of Bedouin culture and an important survival tool in this harsh environment. Guests have almost unlimited rights and the Bedouin host did everything to provide a comfortable, safe stay. Even if the guest was an enemy or someone who committed a crime against the host, he still received the same splendid reception. Their main form of artistic expression was poetry and tribal poets still enjoy a high reputation. Islam influenced moral values; however, many are of pre-Islamic origin, such as the concept of honor and shame, and became part of the current identity of the people of Arabia, Bedouin or not. Prior to their Islamization, they believed in demons and spirits as well as in tribal deities, which were worshipped through idols, sacred rocks, and trees. Some tribes converted to Christianity and Judaism. The legal system was transmitted orally and based on tribal norms of collective responsibility and reconciliation. Professional judges held courts and passed judgments according to the unwritten customary law or ‘urf of the tribes. Public opinion and pressure helped enforcing punishments. Among the most important aspects of customary law were regulations for hospitality, raids, mutual protection, collective punishment, and honor crimes. Although blood revenge and retaliation were common, they were not the main forms of conflict resolution. Mediation and reconciliation between the two parties was more important.

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Pastoralism developed with the domestication of the camel around 1500 BC. With the introduction of the horse, the Bedouin gained military supremacy in the area. They usually lived in small camping units of closely related families called khamsah, but merged with other lineages for political, economical, and military purposes. Bedouins distinguished themselves from the sedentary population, stressing the different identities of Badu versus Hadar. This distinction was embedded in the notion of inequality with regard to status, origin, and power, maintaining that Bedouin were in a superior position to that of the Hadar. Bedouin were always in close contact with the settled population of the oases and neighboring cultural areas. During raids, long migrations, or military campaigns they penetrated urban areas and sometimes settled. In the past, Bedouin from Arabia invaded the Fertile Crescent and Yemen, where they established local dynasties, for example, the Ghassanids and Nabateans. To be protected from Bedouin raids, villagers and those living in oases often paid tribute and taxes, similar to caravans traveling in tribal territory. During the Islamic conquest and expansion, Bedouin often formed the core of the Muslim armies, which brought them to Central Asia and North Africa. Until modern times, Bedouin took over large settled areas and subjected farming populations to their rule. In central Arabia, they formed the military forces of the Wahhabi movement and helped to expand the first and second Saudi states. At the beginning of the twentieth century, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud used Bedouin to create a standing army of loyal subjects called the Ikhwan based on settlements called hijrah. The Ikhwan were required to give up their nomadic life and settled in small, agricultural hamlets where they were taught Wahhabi ideology and used as the main military in ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud’s cause of unifying the country. Bedouin contributed most of the fighters for the Arab Revolt from 1916 to 1918. Neither attempt was successful from the Bedouin point of view, which in the end had to submit to the superior force of central authority represented by King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz and other rulers from the Gulf. After a revolt the Ikhwan were disbanded, and the Arab Revolt was betrayed by European colonial ambitions. Today, Bedouin culture faces enormous challenges to their lifestyle and values. The entire area has undergone substantial economic, political, and cultural change. For the Bedouin this meant the end of their age-old way of life of annual migrations and practicing their customs and traditions. The introduction of motor vehicles and the drawing of permanent political borders were arguably the two most influential aspects that irrevocably changed their world. All governments of the Gulf States undertook large measures to subdue and control their nomadic population. A nomadic way of life was incompatible with nation states, modern societies, and economies. Today Bedouin are incorporated into the modern global economy, but they often maintain aspects of their traditional way of life as insurance against an uncertain future. Bedouin are able to adapt to extreme conditions, but they willingly accepted the improvements in their life such as access to health care, education, and religion. The price they had to pay for this was the detribalization of their society. What remains untouched is the impact that Bedouin culture has on the formation of national identity. Moral values, traditions, and customs of the Bedouin are now increasingly promoted and largely accepted in the entire society of the Gulf and Saudi Arabia. Kin-affiliated networks still exist and

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provide an arena in which Bedouin culture with all of its linguistic and cultural markers, customs, traditions, and different concepts of central rule are continuously practiced. They no longer represent an economic lifestyle, but rather function as the social conscious of the greater Arabian society.

FURTHER READING Chatty, Dawn (ed.). Nomadic Societies in the Middle East and North Africa Entering the 21st Century. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2006. Ingham, Bruce. Bedouin of Northern Arabia: Traditions of the Al-Dhafir. London: KPI, 1986. Kurpershoek, Marcel. Arabia of the Bedouins. London: Saqi Books, 2001. Mauger, Thierry. The Bedouins of Arabia. Paris: Souffles, 1987.

Buraydah Sebastian Maisel Buraydah is a medium-size provincial city with approximately 500,000 inhabitants in the Saudi Arabian district of al-Qasim. Although physically separated throughout history, Buraydah is also known as the twin city of neighboring rival ‘Unayzah. They are both located in the Wadi Rimmah on the route from Basrah to Madinah, and therefore have always been major trading centers. The cities in Najd have often been described as autonomous from central state control, but as areas of settled farmers and merchants, they have also attracted outside powers to plunder or control. As such, Buraydah was attacked since the beginning of the formation of Saudi states, but soon the newly created religious movement of the Wahhabis, combined with the military might of the Al Sa‘ud, included the city into their realm. The city and its rulers remained loyal to the Saudis even after their expulsion by Egyptian troops under Ibrahim Pasha and the following occupation. During the time of Saudi internal power struggle, they sided with Faysal against Mishari. With the Al Rashid of the Shammar tribe, they were engaged in a long-lasting battle over the caravan routes that crossed central Arabia and their protection. During that time period, the population of Buraydah, which numbered some 10,000, lived mainly by farming their date groves and from camel caravans. Until the mid-nineteenth century, the Al ‘Ulayyan, one of the most potent families in the region, ruled the city. However, local feuds over power and resources prevailed for almost half a century. Most prominent was the rivalry between the Al ‘Ulayyan and the Al Muhanna, which both were able to gain power for limited periods. Rebellions against the local and regional leadership were common, but they have to be evaluated in the shadow of a larger struggle over hegemony of central Arabia between the Al Rashid and the Al Sa‘ud, who sought out allies from both ends and often change these alliances on the basis of tactical and political reasons. In June 1904, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud captured Buraydah with the help of local population from the Shammar. Again, the local emir from the Al Muhanna tried to eliminate all foreign influence and sided with the Turkish army. Subsequently, the area depended administratively on

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Basrah, but ibn Sa‘ud returned two years later and took control of the city. Over the next decade with the constant weakening of the Al Rashid, he was able to consolidate his power in Qasim and added it to its stronghold in Najd. After the unification of Saudi Arabia, King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz invested largely in religious and formal education. In the 1930s, new schools were founded in all major towns of the kingdom, and so in Buraydah. First, only classes for boys were offered, but starting during the reign of King Faysal, female education gained support and influence. With the rise of pan-Arabism under Egyptian president Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir and radio propaganda from Cairo, people began to organize themselves in labor and student associations, such as the school student’s organization of ‘Unayzah, Buraydah, and Shaqra in 1956. One of their main demands was to decrease the influence of the League of Public Morality, a religious-motivated police force. In the following clashes between the two parties in Buraydah, dozens were arrested and whipped. But the government opened additional schools, university branches, and vocational schools. Students, who formerly had to move to Riyadh or Jiddah to complete their higher education, can attend local branches to continue with their education. In the early 1960s, agricultural cooperatives were created in Buraydah and other cities, which led to a significant increase in the agricultural production; particularly, poultry farms and date plantations produced large quantities for the market, both local and regional. Until World War II, most of the local trade between Buraydah and the surrounding cities was carried out by camels. The people engaged in this kind of transportation and trade were called jammamil, and became famous all over the Arabian Peninsula and even in Syria and Egypt. Another large-scale operation, the buying and selling animals, mostly camels throughout Arabia, was performed by the ‘Uqaylat (people from the Qasim area and particularly from Buraydah). Today, agriculture is still one of the prominent areas of employment and provides enough food to export the surplus to other areas. Traditional crops such as dates and fruits are still grown, but after the introduction of irrigation systems using fossil water wheat became the cash crop of the region and helped to make the kingdom free from international food imports, although because of the depletion of the water sources this wheat production is scheduled to end by 2015. With the development of infrastructure, paved roads, airports, schools, hospitals, and mosques, life in Buraydah started to change in the 1960s. It also initiated bilateral labor migration (locals moving to other parts of the kingdom); for example, the Eastern Province to work in the oil sector, and foreign guestworkers coming to work in the service sector of Buraydah.

FURTHER READING Altorki, Soraya and Donald P. Cole. Arabian Oasis City: The Transformation of ‘Unayzah. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989. Al Rasheed, Madawi. Politics in an Arabian Oasis. London: I.B. Tauris, 1992. Vassiliev, Alexei. The History of Saudi Arabia. London: Saqi Books, 1998.

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Al Bu Sa‘idi John A. Shoup The Al Bu Sa‘idi family gained control of Oman in 1749 when Ahmad bin Sa‘id was elected Imam. The Al Bu Sa‘idi was a prominent family from the oasis of Adam located near Nizwa. The current ruler of Oman, Sultan Qabus bin Sa‘id, is the twelfth of the dynasty to rule the country. Under the Al Bu Sa‘idi dynasty Oman was able to expand into the Indian Ocean and the African mainland occupying the Island of Lamu and the city of Mombasa in the last decades of the eighteenth century. The Al Bu Sa‘idi were challenged by the growing power of the Wahhabi movement in the Najd, and Wahhabi forces composed of mainly Bedouin tribesmen took the oasis of al-Buraymi from Oman in 1800. The Wahhabi presence and Saudi claims to the oasis lasted until 1952. During the nineteenth century Oman’s power in the region grew, and the Sultan Sa‘id bin Sultan bin Ahmad, the fourth ruler of the dynasty (1806–1856), ruled over a vast empire that included much of the Gulf coast of southern Iran, Baluchistan (Pakistan), and much of the coast of East Africa. In 1840 Sultan Sa‘id sent al-Shaykh Ahmad bin Nu‘man al-Ka‘abi to the United States, where he became the first Arab ambassador to Washington, D.C. For administrative reasons, Zanzibar was made a second capital of the empire shortly before the death of Sultan Sa‘id. The Omanis introduced clove production and expanded agricultural areas on Zanzibar, Lamu, and Pemba. Following the death of Sultan Sa‘id in 1856 the Omani empire broke up into two parts: Zanzibar and the African coast under his son Majid, and the Omani mainland and the Gulf regions under his son Thuwayni. European colonial interests, mainly British and German, undermined Omani influence in the Indian Ocean, and the Al Bu Sa‘idi lost control of most of its African mainland possessions. In 1890 the Sultan signed an agreement with the British that made the Zanzibar Sultanate a British Protectorate, mainly to thwart the Germans in Tanganyika. Zanzibar remained a British Protectorate until 1963, and in 1964, after a bloody revolution, the Al Bu Sa‘idi ruler was overthrown and the islands joined the recently independent country of Tanganyika as the new state of Tanzania. The Al Bu Sa‘idi dynasty in Oman also lost most of their overseas possessions mainly to the British and during the second half of the nineteenth century lost much of their control over the inland parts of Oman as well. When Sultan Faysal bin Turki died in 1913, many of the tribes in the interior of the country refused to recognize his son and heir Taymur as the Imam. In 1920 Taymur signed an agreement with the Imam of Nizwa at Sib, which split the country effectively into two: the Sultanate, which ruled the coastal regions; and Dhufar and the Imamate, which controlled much of the interior around Nizwa. When Taymur died in 1938 the state income had dropped to £50,000 a year and the state was in deep debt. Taymur’s successor, Sa‘id, began a policy of isolation in order to reduce the state’s debt and reduce the country’s dependence on British advisors. Starting in the 1940s Sa‘id began trying to extend his authority among the tribes in the interior, which eventually brought him into conflict with the Imam. The discovery of

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oil fields in areas under the Imam brought the conflict to a head and sparked the Jabal al-Akhdar War (1954–1959), which ended with Sa‘id’s defeat of the Imam Ghalib bin ‘Ali al-Hina’i. He was also able to force the Saudis to withdraw from al-Buraymi Oasis in 1952. Following the conclusion of the Jabal al-Akhdar War, Sa‘id became more and more withdrawn and cut Oman off from the outside world. Sa’d personally approved entry visas for the few foreigners that were allowed into Oman. In 1970 his son, Qabus, led a palace coup to replace Sa‘id. Qabus was faced by a number of major problems, including the festering war in Dhufar, where the Dhufar Liberation Front (DLF) was battling government control. Qabus brought in Iranian and British military, which defeated the DLF by 1976. He also opened the country up to economic and educational reforms which were paid for by the growing income from oil exports. Qabus is a charismatic leader who has been successful in combining the qualities of a traditional ruler with those of an astute modern politician. He has brought his country through several international crises and has been able to remain on good terms with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United States, and the Europeans. His brief marriage ended with no children, and succession will fall to the children of his uncles (the children of his uncle, Tariq, being thought to be the most likely candidates) to be selected by the Ruling Family Council within three days of his death. See also Oases.

FURTHER READING Allen, Calvin, Jr., and W. Lynne Rigsbee II. Oman under Qaboos: From Coup to Constitution, 1970–1996. London: Frank Cass, 2000. Carter, J.R.L. Tribes in Oman. London: Peninsular Publishing, 1982.

Al Bu Shams John A. Shoup The Al Bu Shams is an Arab, Sunni, Ghafari (northern) tribe inhabiting the region between the town of Dhank in Oman and the oasis (see oases) of al‘Ayn/al-Buraymi, which today is shared between the United Arab Emirates and Oman. Until the late nineteenth century the Al Bu Shams were considered to be the pastoral nomadic section of the Na‘im tribe, which still today makes up the largest portion of the population inhabiting the separate villages that comprise the al-‘Ayn/al-Buraymi and are found in the coastal towns such as Dubai. The Na’im, including the Al Bu Shams, adopted the Wahhabi doctrine in the early part of the nineteenth century but assisted the Al Bu Falah of Abu Dhabi in gaining firm control over al-Buraymi in the first part of the nineteenth century by pushing out Wahhabi forces loyal to the Al Sa‘ud family.

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Several of the Al Bu Shams tribe still remain pastoral nomads today, but many have settled in the villages of Hafit, Qabil, and Sanaynah, which are associated with al-Buraymi where they farm dates. The Al Bu Shams have been able to exercise greater independence from the Na‘im leadership for the past fifty years, but still consider themselves ultimately to be responsible to the Na‘im shaykhs. During the conflict between the United Arab Emirates (then the Trucial States), Oman, and Saudi Arabia over al-Buraymi in the 1950s (the dispute ended in 1955), several of the leading families from the Al Bu Shams sided with Saudi Arabia and subsequently have left for Dammam, but the majority of the tribe sided with the Trucial States and have maintained good relations with the ruling family of Abu Dhabi. The Al Bu Shams continue to move away from the Na‘im leadership and are emerging as their own tribal entity. Both Oman and the United Arab Emirates treat them as a separate, independent tribal group.

FURTHER READING Heard-Bey, Frauke. From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates. Dubai: Motivate Publishing, 2004.

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C

Calendar, Islamic Sebastian Maisel The recorded history of the Arabian Peninsula is riddled with large gaps, but from an Islamic perspective it is clearly divided into two periods. With striking similarity to the way the Christian calendar divides history into the age before Christ and the age after Christ, the Islamic, or hijrah, calendar divides it into the period before the birth of Islam, called Jahiliyah (the age of ignorance), and the period after the birth of Islam. In 622 AD, Muhammad and his followers emigrated from Makkah to Madinah because of the ongoing persecution of the young Muslim community. The journey is called the Hijrah (the migration) and marks the beginning of the lunar Hijrah calendar. The Islamic calendar is a lunar calendar based on the cycles of the moon phase. The Islamic year has twelve months: Muharram, Safar, Rabi‘ al-Awal, Rab‘i al-Thani, Jumada al-Awal, Jumada al-Thani, Rajab, Sha‘aban, Ramadan, Shawwal, Dhu al-Qa‘idah, and Dhu al-Hijjah. The months begin when the first crescent of a new moon is sighted. Each month consists of twenty-nine to thirty days, which makes the Islamic year eleven to twelve days shorter than the solar year. Islamic dates migrate through the year. Like solar calendars, it follows the seven-day week concept. All Islamic celebrations, such as the Hajj, or Great Pilgrimage to Makkah, and the month of Ramadan are determined by the Islamic calendar. Ramadan is the ninth and Dhu al-Hijja the twelfth month of this calendar. On the tenth of Dhu alHijja, Muslims celebrate their most important holiday, the ‘Id al-Adha. The other major holiday is ‘Id al-Fitr at the end of Ramadan. The feast is actually celebrated on the first day of Shawwal. Most Islamic countries observe Mawlid al-Nabi, the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, on the twelfth day of Rabi‘ al-Awal as a state holiday; however, conservative/puritanical interpretations, such as that of Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia, consider this idolatrous and heretical. Shi‘ite Muslims consider the tenth of Muharram equally important, when they commemorate ‘Ashurah, the death of Hussein bin ‘Ali in 680 at the Battle of Karbala, Iraq. In pre-Islamic Arabia, an intercalary system based on seasons, particularly the rainy season, was in use that later was prohibited by Muhammad on the basis of a divine revelation. He introduced a new model that was very similar to the previous one; for example, it continued the rule of four “holy” months in which fighting was prohibited, but he discontinued the tradition of inserting an additional month when needed. According to historical Islamic sources, it was the

Camels

second caliph ‘Umar bin al-Khattab who introduced the new calendar in 638, the year 16 AH, anno Hegirae, or Year of the Hijrah. What continued in local tradition was naming a year after an important event that happened during this time, for example, the Year of the Floods or the Year of the Locusts. In addition, especially among the rural and nomadic population, the calendar did not prevail because of its impracticality for agriculture. Saudi Arabia is currently the only country that uses the Islamic calendar as the official calendar for governmental and business affairs. The country is also unique for the creation of official institutions to sight the lunar crescent, hilal, which determine the beginning of the new month. In the past the individual observation of the hilal led to confusion over the dates to begin or end the pilgrimage or fasting. Other Muslim countries only observe the moon, and still others use different astronomical techniques to mark the dates of the calendar in advance. Conversion tables between the Hijri and the Gregorian dates are available on the Internet, which replaced the former research tool of the W€ ustenfeld’schen tables. To get a rough estimate, multiply the Hijri date by 0.97, then add 622 to get the Gregorian year.

FURTHER READING Birashk, Ahmad. A Comparative Calendar of the Iranian, Muslim Lunar, and Christian Eras for Three Thousand Years: 1260 B.H.-2000 A.H./639 B.C.-2621 A.D. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 1993. Al-Gailani, Noorah, and Chris Smith. The Islamic Year: Surahs, Stories and Celebrations. Stroud, UK: Hawthorn Press, 2002.

Camels Sebastian Maisel The camel has a unique position and importance for the cultural, historical, and economical development of Arabia. The dromedary, Camelus dromedarius, is a one-humped and even-toed ungulate. Its hair color ranges from dark brown to almost white. It is adapted to life in a desert environment and manages to live without water for several days. Their body temperature can fluctuate six degrees Celsius. Special body functions help cool down the body temperature, such as enlarged mucous membranes, blood vessels, and a thick fur. They usually do not pant and perspire very little. During sand storms, they are able to cover their nostrils. Thick calluses on the soles and knees allow them to walk and lay on hot and stony grounds. Full-grown male camels weigh around 1,100 pounds (500 kilograms), females less. Depending on how much water they have digested (up to thirty percent of their body weight), they can drink a maximum of fifty gallons (190 liters), storing fat and other energy sources, but not water, in the hump. As the most important livestock of the Bedouins, it gives milk (up to three gallons, or eleven liters, a day), hair, meat, skins, and dung for campfires. The

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Camel in the old camel market in al-‘Ayn (the market has been moved due to urban growth). This is a riding camel and is in full riding harness, showing the Fulani or Omani riding saddle behind the hump. Courtesy of John A. Shoup.

urine is occasionally used for medical and cosmetic purposes (e.g., against body lice). First and foremost, the camel is used for transport and fieldwork, distinguishing the smaller and faster riding camels and large and heavy working type. Riding camels can cover distances up to seventy-five miles (120 kilometers) per day; those carrying goods up to 440 pounds (200 kilograms) and go thirty-one miles (fifty kilometers) a day. The normal lifespan for camels is forty to fifty years. Reproduction age is three years for females and five for males. They are kept in gender-segregated herds, with the bulls often fighting over leadership. The different breeds of camels are named after tribal groups famous for their camels or the area of origin; for example, the Mahriyah, ‘Umaniyah, and Hutaymiyah are known for their speed. In all Gulf States camel racing declined after the introduction of motor vehicles and planes in the beginning of the twentieth century, but they have become popular again. Breeding and trading camels continued to be a major occupation and large camel markets are frequented in all major cities of Arabia. Because of the popularity of the races and Bedouin lifestyle in general, enormous sums are paid for some racing camels. The races are seen as a form of re-distributing wealth to the Bedouin, a component in the formation of national identities, as well as an expression of preserving traditional heritage and cultural identity in the wake of globalization. Camels are still used for farming, pulling ploughs, or turning water wheels to irrigate the fields, but mostly they are kept for racing, hair, meat, and milk as well as prestige. In pre-Islamic poetry, camels were described as the most valuable possession of the Bedouin. The image of camels was used for praise, love, and other

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Charitable Organizations

metaphors. A rich vocabulary with several hundred words is associated with the camel to describe gender, color, age, and body shape. Two types of riding saddles are common in Arabia: the shaddad in northern Arabia and the hawlani in the south. The hawdaj is a special riding litter for women and children as well as ceremonial purposes. The ownership of a camel is marked with specific brands or wasm, of which each tribal group has a unique pattern. Camels were given away as a dowry or to solve conflicts, with exact amounts of camels to be paid for every crime. The domestication of the camel was an important prerequisite for the inhabitation of Arabia and the emergence of the Bedouins. Archaeological evidence suggests that Arab nomadic groups first domesticated the camels around 1500 BC, and with the invention of the saddle camels were used for riding. They are mentioned in the Old Testament and later were used by Assyrian, Persian, and Roman troops during their campaigns on the Peninsula. Among the camelherding Bedouins of Arabia, the animals were considered the most valuable asset. To own large camel herds meant having enough food as well as reputation and power. Bedouin raided each other to steal camels. For special occasions, weddings, births, or peace settlements, camels would be slaughtered and served to the guests. Camels are reared for their milk, which is very nutritious and normally drunk fresh. The hair was used to make tents, rugs, robes, and other garments; the dung was collected to light the campfire.

FURTHER READING Agius, Dionisius A. In the Wake of the Dhow: The Arabian Gulf and Oman. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2002. Bulliet, Richard W. The Camel and the Wheel. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. Khalaf, Sulaiman, “Camel Racing in the Gulf: Notes on the Evolution of a Traditional Cultural Sport,” Anthropos 94, no. 1–3 (1999): 85–106. Saltin, Bengt. The Racing Camel (Camelus Dromedarius): Physiology, Metabolic Functions, and Adaptations. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.

Charitable Organizations Sebastian Maisel To support those who are in need and less fortunate is one of the main doctrines of Islam. One of the five pillars of Islam, zakaat, requires Muslims to give alms to the poor. Thus, philanthropy has a high status and long tradition in Islam. For this reason, each Muslim is obliged to give a percentage of his possession to institutions that are specialized in this field. Usually zakaat is 2.5% for a Sunni Muslim and ten percent for a Shi‘a and is donated to the local mosque or directly to charitable organizations. However, larger nongovernmental institutions are set up to deal with issues of the global Muslim community and international Islamic relief. Those agencies

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distribute food, water, medical supplies, medicine, and other financial and infrastructural assets to communities in need. Charitable organizations in the Gulf States focus on social and economical issues and support all disadvantaged groups, such as children, orphans, women, the blind and disabled, and senior citizens. Even occupational support organizations exist, which are similar to unions and provide service and welfare to specific workers. In addition, they provide financial, legal, and other economic help in times of national or international disasters such as earthquakes, cyclones, tsunamis, or plane crashes. In times of war, some organizations provide food, water, and medical supplies to the people of Kosovo, Chechnya, Palestine, and several African countries. However, there are Islamic charitable organizations that favor helping Muslim communities. At home, help is provided with housing, education, health care, and administrative support. Special centers for orphans and the handicapped are built. In Saudi Arabia, one of the largest charitable foundations is the Prince Sultan ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Charity Foundation. In addition to their domestic programs to construct housing units for the needy, they support humanitarian efforts worldwide, such as a school for orphans in Pakistan, Islamic centers in Japan and Germany, a hospital in India, and a disease center in Morocco. In Qatar, the Khayriyah Foundation is the oldest and largest voluntary organization and focuses on three main projects: education and culture; family, women, and children; and religious endowments (which are to be used to support the needy). The Muhammad Bin Rashid Al Maktum Foundation from Dubai specializes in education, entrepreneurship, and cultural exchange and grants billions of dollars every year to schools, universities, and other educational institutions as well as scholarships. They are affiliated with major international relief institutions such as UNICEF, WHO, and the U.N. High Committee for Refugees. As such they support displaced refugees in international conflict zones such as Palestine, Somalia, Lebanon, or Sudan. However, raising money and investing it properly is something that Arab Gulf States look at differently from the West. In recent years after the attacks of 9/11, funds from some institutions have been transferred and used by radical Islamic organizations to finance activities that often include violent attacks against Western nations or administrations in Islamic countries that are considered illegitimate. Since 2004, the government of Saudi Arabia has stepped up to monitor the activities of almost 300 charitable organizations, setting up regulations of conduct and supervision. Some notoriously suspicious organizations, such as the alHaramayn Foundation, were largely dismantled and a new official entity, the Saudi National Commission for Relief and Charity Work Abroad, was established. The strive for transparency and control goes as far as banning schools from collecting donations for aid projects because of fears that the money might support unlawful activities. Other Gulf States followed suit and through new legislations began to regulate the financial activities of selected organizations.

FURTHER READING Alterman, Jon, and Karin Von Hippel. Understanding Islamic Charities. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007.

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Citizenship in Kuwait Burr, J. Millard, and Robert Collins. Alms for Jihad: Charity and Terrorism in the Islamic World. London: Cambridge University Press, 2006. McChesney, R.D. Charity and Philanthropy in Islam: Institutionalizing the Call to Do Good. Indianapolis: Indiana University Center on Philanthropy, 1995.

Citizenship in Kuwait Adnan Al-Ghunaim Kuwaiti citizenship stemmed from the 1959 Nationality Law, which differentiated between Kuwaitis by origin (“by origin” or bil-asl) and Kuwaitis by naturalization (“by naturalization” or bil-tajanus). Among the former are the ruling Al-Sabah family and those whose ancestors lived in the country before 1920. The latter comprise mainly Shi‘a, Sunni, and Christian Arabs from states surrounding Kuwait, and non-Arabs who came to the country before its independence in 1961. Since the mid-1960s the government has used article 5 of the Nationality Law, which allows it to grant citizenship by decree to those who render particular services to the country. As a result, many Bedouin tribes from Saudi Arabia and other parts of the Arabian Peninsula who traditionally conveyed loyalty toward the ruling family have been granted Kuwaiti citizenship through mass naturalization. Also used as a political motive, the naturalization of pro-Al-Sabah tribal groups secured a higher turnout in favor of pro-Al-Sabah candidates in different parliamentary terms. Many Bedouin of Kuwaiti background serve as royal guards and form a large part of the Kuwaiti military. Until 1996, the Kuwaiti citizenry was divided into two groups. The “by origin” or bil-asl Kuwaitis were an exclusive category whose members were given substantial economic and social rights, but political rights prior to 2005 were given to males only. However, “by naturalization” citizens who could not prove ancestry in Kuwait before 1920 as required by the Nationality Law enjoyed most of the rights as the “by origin” Kuwaiti group and its benefits, except that “by naturalization” males were not allowed to vote. Despite their division, which no longer exists, as will be discussed below, all Kuwaiti citizens enjoyed the privileges of a generous “cradle-to-grave” welfare system offered by the state. Political change in regard to citizenship status in Kuwait has been slow. From the first elections in 1920 (involving a few dozen notables), suffrage was gradually extended, until by 1996, following internal demands for equal citizenship, most adult males were allowed to vote in the 1996 parliamentary elections, but women were still excluded from having political rights because of Kuwait’s electoral law. On May 16, 2005, the parliament, after a long and complicated fight, voted to amend Kuwait’s electoral law to give women suffrage and the right to run for Parliament for the first time in the 2006 elections. However, certain groups such as recently naturalized citizens and the stateless inhabitants of Kuwait known in Arabic as the Bidun (“without citizenship”) are still excluded. The case of the “stateless” bidun has historical foundations. Today they number approximately 125,000, approximately half the number of the period prior to the

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1990/91 Gulf War. Prior to 1986, the bidun population had been included as part of the Kuwaiti citizenry population in the government’s official statistical figures. The origins of the bidun are disputed. Some observers claim that they remained itinerant for both traditional and tax reasons and, because they did not register in the 1957 census, they were rendered stateless. Others argue that their numbers included unofficial pre-war immigrants from neighboring countries (mainly Iraq) that wished to take advantage of the country’s abundant welfare services. Today, despite their substantial contribution to Kuwait’s military effort in 1990–1991, they are still regarded as illegal residents. The status of the bidun in Kuwait was imprecise: they were separate, being recognized as Kuwaiti subjects but not as Kuwaiti citizens. Before 1986, they enjoyed similar citizenship rights to Kuwaitis except suffrage. The bidun problems increased during the Iran-Iraq war, when restrictions allowed their detention without charge for six months for “state security” reasons. In late 1985, following claims of an attempt by a small group of bidun to overthrow the government, it was decided that there would be no group called bidun; its members would be either Kuwaitis or non-Kuwaitis. The claims and their consequences had a serious effect on the lives and affairs of the bidun. Subsequently, bidun rights further deteriorated. Educational and employment restrictions aimed at compelling them to reveal and prove their official identity were imposed. Travel restrictions were imposed in 1986, and in the same year the production of valid passports was made compulsory for both government and private sector employees. However, many insisted that their families, being nomads, had neither nationality nor documents. In the following two years, bidun were prevented from renewing their driving licenses and were prohibited from attending Kuwait University. Only those bidun serving in the army and the police were issued with residency papers. Such employment proved particularly attractive because it offered one of the only means of political, social, and economic stability available to bidun in Kuwait. On the eve of the Iraqi invasion, bidun made up approximately threefourths of Kuwait’s total army force. Despite their persecution, most bidun actively resisted the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. In many cases they were subjected to pressure from both sides. Conscripted to the occupying army under the threat of death or imprisonment, they faced the possibility of being charged with collaboration after the war. Others were dismissed from government employment, deported, or not allowed to return. After the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, their number dropped to about 117,000 because many of them either left the country or declared another nationality. The courage of those who opposed the occupation went unrecognized for a decade. Recently some of the restrictions on the bidun, such as those on education and movement, have been eased, and some of them have been granted citizenship. In May 2000, the parliament approved a law to grant citizenship to 2,000 adults and their families every year. According to the law, approximately 35,000 bidun have qualified for Kuwaiti citizenship, albeit granted only after exhaustive tests. There is also an increasing public awareness of their situation. However, many still do not have Kuwaiti citizenship. Unfair official practices

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and lack of influence and finances have ensured that even the children of the martyrs who fought for Kuwait in previous wars prior to and during the invasion are still deprived of this basic human right.

FURTHER READING Bencomo, C. “Kuwait: Promises Betrayed: Denial of Rights of Bidun, Women, and Freedom of Expression.” Human Rights Watch Report 12, no. 2E (2000). Available at http:// www.hrw.org/reports/2000/kuwait/#P58_1426 (last accessed October 8, 2008). Boghardt, L.P. Kuwait amid War, Peace and Revolution: 1979–1991 and New Challenges. (St. Anthony’s). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Crystal, J. “Public Order and Authority: Policing Kuwait,” in Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf, edited by P. Dresch and J. Piscatori. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. Longva, A. “Nationalism in Pre-Modern Guise: The Discourse on Hadhar and Badu in Kuwait,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 38 (2006): 171–187. Maktabi, R. “The Politics of Citizenship in Kuwait—Membership and Participation in a Rentier State.” Paper presented at the 13th Annual National Political Science Conference, Hurdalsj
en, Oslo, Norway, January 5–7, 2005. Available at http://www.statsvitenskap. uio.no/konferanser/nfkis/kp/Maktabi.pdf (last accessed October 8, 2008). Al-Najjar, G. “Human Rights in a Crisis Situation: The Case of Kuwait after Occupation,” Human Rights Quarterly 23 (2001): 188–209. Salem, P. “Kuwait: Politics in a Participatory Emirate,” Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Carnegie Middle East Center, no. 3 (2007). Available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org (last accessed October 8, 2008). Tetreault, M., and H. al-Mughni. “Gender, Citizenship and Nationalism in Kuwait,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 22, no. 1–2 (1995): 64–80.

Climate John A. Shoup The climate of the Arabian Peninsula is arid, receiving on average around five inches (150 millimeters) of rainfall a year, and it has no permanent river systems or lakes. Most rain falls in the winter, which lasts from November to March. The Peninsula is affected by the same weather systems that emerge first in the Atlantic and move eastward across the Mediterranean. The northern part of the Peninsula receives more moisture than the central regions, where more than ten years can pass without more than a trace of rainfall. Winters are cold and higher elevations can have moisture fall as snow; in the central region nighttime temperatures can hover close to freezing. In the Asir region of Saudi Arabia it is not uncommon for the nights to be below freezing and morning fogs so thick that all traffic comes to a halt. Cold fronts originating in continental Europe can drop as far south as the Peninsula, either moving across the Black Sea and then into Anatolia or from Russia and moving across Iran or Afghanistan and Pakistan, affecting even the Gulf coastal cities such as Dubai, al-Dawhah, al-Manamah, and Kuwait City. The Hajar Mountains help shield Musqat and other Omani cities, which also receive the warmer sea breezes from the Indian Ocean and the

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Arabian Sea. The winter rains cause the desert to turn green, and this is when pastoral nomads can disperse to their widest range of grazing areas for their livestock. The southwestern corner of the Peninsula is affected by the summer monsoons, which begin in the Ethiopian Highlands and then pick up moisture as they head across the Indian Ocean to the Indian Subcontinent. The highlands of Yemen and the southwestern corner of Oman are able to get some of this moisture and the Qarah Mountains in Oman become lush gardens with rushing water in September, whereas the rest of Oman still suffers from summer heat. Some of the monsoon’s moisture is able to move further north and can cause late summer thunderstorms with brief and localized heavy rainfall. The summers last from April to October and most of the Peninsula is hot and dry with daytime temperatures well above 100°F (37°C). In many places daytime averages are over 104°F (40°C) for months on end. Hot winds blow off the deserts, creating sand storms that can last several days. These winds have several different names in the Peninsula, some denoting main direction where they come from and others about their stifling nature. The sand and dust can be so thick as to cause airports and sea harbors to close. Along the Gulf and Red Sea coasts summers are humid as well as hot, making it difficult to breathe for those not used to the conditions. Spring and autumn are both short seasons, so short that they can pass by hardly noticed by the people; each can last for literally a few weeks at most. Traditional architecture in the Peninsula is built to deal with the extremes of summer heat and winter cold, although it is more important to deal with the heat. Because rainfall is rarely a serious concern, many of the regional architectural styles use thick mud walls as a means to create a cool, shady environment for the people. Light is diffused through small openings that also allow air to circulate. Other styles make uses of palm fronds as the main building material, which again allows people to create a cool living space. Barajil (barjil in singular) or wind towers, an invention on the Iranian side of the Gulf, were introduced to several Gulf cities and these provide a form of air conditioning that helps with the heat and humidity of the coastal summers.

FURTHER READING Beaumont, Peter, Gerald Blake, and Malcom Wagstaff. The Middle East. London: John Wiley & Sons, 1976. Coles, Anne, and Peter Jackson. Windtower. London: Stacey International, 2007. Fisher, W.B. The Middle East: A Physical, Social, and Regional Geography. London: Methuen, 1971.

Coffee: Arabic and Turkish John A. Shoup Coffee (Qahwah in Arabic) is the bean of the madder tree that grows naturally in the Ethiopian Highlands. Its narcotic properties were discovered by chance according to popular legend when a goat herder noticed the energetic activities of his animals after they had eaten the beans. Coffee was first spread in the Arab world by members of the Shadhili Sufi order and was drunk to allow them to stay

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Arabic coffee is the coffee of the Bedouin. Here coffee is being prepared over an open fire in expectation of the arrival of guests in Abu Dhabi. Courtesy of John A. Shoup.

up all night for their dhikrs (dhikr means literally “remembrance” and refers to the gatherings of religious mystical groups in Islam). Coffee was banned by some Muslim religious authorities and was not accepted as a legal drink until the late sixteenth century. Yemen became the main producer of coffee beans, and its port Mukha lent its name to the drink as mocha. By the nineteenth century coffee had been introduced as cash crops in the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), Colombia, and Ecuador and in the early twentieth century to British East Africa (Kenya and Uganda). Coffee is still one of the major export crops from Yemen. In the Arabian Peninsula two main types of coffee are prepared: Turkish and Arabic. Turkish coffee, or qahwa Turkiyah, is strong, thick, and bitter unless large amounts of sugar are added. Generally speaking Turkish coffee is the drink of the coffeehouses and urban people. Turkish coffee is prepared in a special brass pot called a kanakah. It is made by measuring one demitasse cup of water per cup of coffee plus one heaping teaspoon of finely ground coffee beans and one equally heaping teaspoon of sugar per cup. The coffee is allowed to come to a boil several times before it is poured into a demitasse cup and served. Arabic coffee, or qahwa ‘Arabiyah, is prepared differently and is lighter in color, although perhaps as strong as Turkish coffee. Proper preparation of Arabic coffee begins with roasting the coffee beans over an open flame. The beans are allowed to cool in a special wooden dish called a mabrad or mubarrad and then once cooled are poured into a large wooden mortar called a mihbaj, where they are ground into a fine powder with a long wooden pestle. The person grinding the beans uses the pestle to beat out known rhythms that tell neighbors coffee is being made. The ground beans are then put in a brass pot made specifically for

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making coffee called a dallah along with several cardamom pods for added flavor and aroma. The coffee is served in small handleless cups called finjan. According to custom, it is proper to take three cups of Arabic coffee and no more. A person signals to the host or the person serving that enough has been served by shaking the cup from side to side and saying da’iman, meaning to remain blessed.

Coffeehouses John A. Shoup Coffeehouses (Maqha in Arabic) in the Arabian Peninsula serve several important social functions, and many are seen as male clubs where the same customers come every day. Coffeehouses were first established in Cairo during the first part of the sixteenth century and spread to Syria by the middle of the century. The first coffeehouses were established in Istanbul by the end of the same century. Muslim religious authorities debated the legality of coffee because it has obvious narcotic properties, including addiction. In the end, most Islamic jurists ruled in favor of the drink and coffeehouses were established in much of the Islamic world. Coffeehouses were built near places of business and even today real business may be conducted from a coffeehouse and not in an official office. Early in the history of the institution, coffeehouses offered entertainment such as recitations of epic tales by professional storytellers who accompanied themselves on a oneor two-string fiddle and a chorus playing percussion instruments. Coffeehouses also offered a place where one could smoke and many offered a variety of flavored tobaccos that were smoked in a water pipe called narjilah or shishah. Coffeehouses are urban institutions but they are popular enough that even small villages may have one. They remain a male space and very few allow women to sit; however, this is changing in several of the Gulf States where “faux” coffeehouses have become part of Ramadan celebrations. These faux coffeehouses offer traditional coffees, teas, and water pipes, but also several special drinks such as sahlab (made with arrowroot, nuts, coconut, and hot milk) and karkadah (made from boiled hibiscus flowers) that have been introduced from Egypt and Syria. In these coffeehouses, women and even families come to relax after breaking the day’s Ramadan fast and enjoy traditional entertainment such as classical Arabic music and poetry recitations, or watch game shows on large-screen televisions.

Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice Sebastian Maisel Some Islamic countries employ a special control force that deals with the implementation of the rules and rituals according to Islamic law. According to the Qur’an, their main, general objective is to promote the virtue among the faithful

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and prevent vice, in Arabic: al-amr bi’l-ma‘ruf wa’ l-nahi ‘an al-munkar. Their local name is mutawwa, or volunteer, and they are considered a Shari‘ah law enforcement institution to control the public and private sphere of residents in Saudi Arabia. The “sixth” pillar of Islam, jihad, refers to this concept, in which the individual and the society are obliged to encourage virtues and resist evil, by force if necessary. The modern interpretation of jihad in Saudi Arabia is strongly connected to the idea of members of the committee enforcing their understanding of Islam on others, as their way of jihad. The nonmilitary manifestation of this force is a large group of volunteers, some of them being organized in the committee and often addressed as the religious or morality police of Saudi Arabia. Most volunteers have an educational background in some aspects of Islamic law and studied at one of the Islamic universities of the country. Similar to Islamic teachers, judges, and scholars, they are considered a fundamental part of maintaining the Islamic character of the whole society; therefore the government, who has the same goal, funds them. However, with the current population growth and rising unemployment it becomes more difficult for the government to provide jobs for university graduates in general. Those graduates from Islamic universities usually join the committees and help to force the population to conform to Islamic social norms. Approximately 5,000 members are employed and the director, Shaykh Ibrahim al-Ghayth, reports directly to the Minister of Interior, Prince Nayef bin ‘Abd al‘Aziz. They usually patrol the streets together with members of the regular police force in order to inspect public behavior and appearance. An internal department deals with cases related to alcohol and drugs. During Valentine’s Day, members of the committee enforce the restraint order not to sell red roses, toys, or presents in order to prevent the population from performing pagan rituals. In addition, between 2006 and 2007, they arrested more than 100 “sorcerers and witches,” people who provide love potions and fertility amulets. Other tasks include tracking and persecuting homosexuals, prostitutes, and violations of prayer times. They also crack down on non-Islamic worship and the display of non-Islamic religious signs. The committee and its actions are viewed controversially in present-day Saudi society. They added to their often negative image in March 2002 when they prevented schoolgirls from escaping their burning school building because they were not properly covered, which led to the death of several girls in the building. Smallscale corrections were implemented, but the overall attitude and behavior have not changed, and it is often viewed as anti-modern, conservative, and zealous.

FURTHER READING Cook, Michael. Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Vogel, Frank. “The Public and Private in Saudi Arabia: Restrictions on the Powers of Committees for Ordering the Good and Forbidding the Evil,” Social Research: An International Quarterly of Social Sciences 70, no. 3 (2003): 749–768.

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Companies Sebastian Maisel The economy of the countries in the area of the Arabian Gulf is mainly oilbased with the governments controlling most of the sector. The dominance of the state-owned oil sector has often led to the private sector being overlooked. But the area is home to many national and multinational companies in different industrial sectors. Most of them are related to the oil and petrochemical industry, but because of efforts to diversify the economical base of the countries, more and more non-oil-related companies emerge. However, as a major aspect of globalization, many of those companies are no longer recognized as individual entities specialized in a specific area, but they are part of larger international consortiums operating all over the Gulf or even on a global level. The trend goes to companies, which can offer a variety of services and products under one brand name. Joint ventures in the form of multinational companies are the most common form of business ownership. They are popular because the economic climate in the Gulf encourages their formation and operation. The private sector is rapidly growing, while at the same time the dependency on the oil-dominated public sector is lessened. Entrepreneurs no longer simply look for government contracts, but for investment opportunities for their own private capital. As such they enter the global economy with its pros and cons, but this new trend still is regarded as one of the most positive stimulants in the Gulf economy. All major companies are listed on the various stock exchange markets, with the Saudi Tadawul being the largest and most influential for the region.

SAUDI ARABIA The government of Saudi Arabia owns Saudi Aramco, the largest company in the kingdom, which concurrently is the largest oil company in the world. The company is headquartered in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and produces large amounts of crude oil and natural gas as well as manages over 100 oil fields in Saudi Arabia. In addition, the company is involved in other activities around the oil production, such as exploration, drilling, refining, and distribution. The other gigantic public company in Saudi Arabia is SABIC (Saudi Basic Industries Corporation) with its headquarters in Riyadh. Most of the operations are managed from Jubayl. SABIC is a diversified manufacturing company with additional holdings in hydrocarbon-based industries. They are a leading producer of chemicals, industrial polymers, fertilizers, and metals. Saudi Oger is a construction company with knowledge and expertise in prestigious and complex building, operations and maintenance, real estate development, utilities, IT services, and power and telecommunication projects throughout the Middle East. The company’s original paid-up capital of SR 1 million has now grown to almost SR 1 billion. Rafik Hariri’s family owns the company. Hariri was the former Lebanese prime minister who lived in exile in Saudi Arabia during much of the Lebanese Civil War (1975–2000) and who was

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assassinated in 2005. The company enjoys close relations with leading governmental and private institutions and individuals from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which in return provides them with lucrative contracts. The founder of Olayan Group, Sulaiman Olaiyan from ‘Unayzah, is considered one of the most successful Saudi businessmen with private assets worth some $8 billion. He started his company in 1950 with early investments in and representations of foreign companies. He is a major stockholder at Chase, Occidental, Saudi British Bank, and Credit Suisse First Boston. He is also the most important Saudi partner for Coca-Cola. His four children, including his two daughters Hutham and Lubna, are all in leading managing positions. In addition, he maintains business relations with Khalid Bin ‘Abdallah Al Sa‘ud. The Saudi Bin Ladin Group is an old, large construction and holding company based in Jiddah. Founded by Yemeni Muhammad bin Ladin, the company expanded through lucrative government contracts in infrastructure construction, including the expansion of the Holy Mosque in Makkah and in 2005 the building of King Abdallah Economic City. Kingdom is a semi-public holding and investment company founded in 1980 and currently controlled by Prince Walid bin al-Talal, the chairman and CEO. The company’s headquarters is the Kingdom Tower, a landmark in Riyadh. Among the diverse areas of investment are banking, computer technology, tourism, retailing, entertainment, telecommunication, and real estate. The company invested in international corporations such as eBay, Ford, Apple, and Pepsi. Founded in 1948 by Shaykh Ahmad Juffali, the Juffali Company established itself as a leading business corporation in the region. They started in electric appliances, construction, telecommunications, and joint ventures with international partners such as Siemens, Daimler-Benz, and IBM. Juffali’s sons and cousins currently run the private company. Dallah al-Barakah is one of the largest private companies in the Middle East and is owned by Shaykh Salih ‘Abdallah Kamil. It started as a maintenance and service company before becoming specialized in construction, especially airports. They won several major contracts with the Ministry of Defense. Lately, the company started to invest in different areas, such as media, real estate, and tourism. Almarai is the largest dairy company in Saudi Arabia and the wider Middle East. The word al-mara‘i in Arabic means green pasture and represents the policy of the company of turning the desert into pasture. It employs approximately 10,000 people and is headquartered near the city of al-Kharj. This is also the site of the main manufacturing and central processing plants. The company operates three farms producing feed crops and five high-tech dairy farms housing about 33,000 Saudibred American Holsteins. Among the main products that are freshly produced daily are milk, laban (yogurt), labanah (sour cream), cheese, fruit yogurts, juices, and other desserts. Almarai operates its own fleet of refrigerated trucks that deliver to all countries of the GCC. The company started its operations in 1976 under the leadership of HRH Prince Sultan bin Muhammad bin Sa‘ud Al-Kabir. Saudia Airlines is owned by the Saudi government and was founded in 1945. By 2007, the first steps were made to turn Saudia into a privatized corporation with plans that ground services, cargo, catering, and the Prince Sultan Aviation Academy become part of a holding company. The airline operates over seventy

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destinations worldwide with their peak season around the time of the Muslim pilgrimage to Makkah and Madinah.

KUWAIT Kuwait’s economy is dependent on the oil industry. The main public oil company is Kuwait Petroleum Company, founded in 1980 with several large subsidiaries. Since the Iraqi occupation, important steps have been taken to strengthen the private sector and diversify the industry. Especially in the telecommunications sector, competition between private and semi-private companies is noted. Zain Group, formerly known as MTC, is specialized in mobile telecommunications, broadband, and Internet services. Headquartered in Kuwait, it has branches in twenty-one countries in the Middle East and Africa. The Sultan Center was founded 1976 by Jamil Sultan and is a leading company in selfservice retail, groceries, and catering. Al-Mulla Group is an old and prominent business group specializing in various sectors, such as manufacturing, trading, and financing services. It held several dealerships and was the main distributor for Chrysler. Today it is successful because of its diversified trading opportunities.

BAHRAIN In contrast to other Gulf States, Bahrain has few revenues from oil and gas and therefore transformed its economy toward other sectors, such as banking, heavy industry, telecommunications, and retail. Among the largest industrial projects were Aluminum Bahrain, the Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard, and the Arab Iron and Steel Company. Bahrain Telecommunications Company (Batelco) is the leading provider for telecommunications and information services in Bahrain. The shareholding company was established in 1982. Investcorp is a globally renowned company that provides and manages investments for both private and institutional clients. They deal in private equity, hedge funds, real estate, and technology. Recently, they launched a regional business line for investments primarily in the GCC area. Yusuf bin Ahmad Kanoo is the oldest pan-Gulf transportation and shipping company, as well as the leading travel agent. The company’s background and policies are viewed in contrast to the large state-owned corporations.

QATAR The economy of Qatar is heavily based on oil and even more on natural gas. The country has the world’s third largest reserves and the state-owned Qatar Petroleum exploits the resources and manages the facilities. Modest plans were made to diversify the economy, and joint ventures for foreign investment in heavy industry projects are being formed. The government built chemical plants for fertilizers, steel, and cement and recently expanded the fishing industry focusing on shrimp.

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OMAN Petroleum Development Oman represents another example of a company in the Gulf region with joint ownership between the Omani government (sixty percent) and foreign capital (Royal Dutch Shell, Total). It is the main exploration and production company of the country, which depends heavily on the oil industry for its gross domestic product. Oman Telecommunication Company (Omantel) is the country’s largest Internet and mobile phone provider. The government owns seventy percent of Omantel.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES The United Arab Emirates have been working on diversifying their industry for the last two decades, especially in the field of light industry, food processing, and some heavy industry, with Dubai Aluminum Smelter being the largest single investment. DUBAL is a conglomerate that includes the smelter, power plants, and desalination plants. The government owns some of the largest companies that have been founded during an ambitious phase of economical development turning the Emirates into a banking, media, and tourism center for the region. Among these companies are giants like Arab Media Group, Dubai Media City, Dubai World, or the Jabal ‘Ali Free Zone. One of the largest public corporations not only in the Emirates but also on the global level is Etisalat, the country’s main telecommunication and Internet provider. Although the market is highly restricted, a major competitor, Du Telecommunication, entered the market in 2007, breaking the monopoly of Etisalat. The United Arab Emirates’ government is a major shareholder in both companies.

FURTHER READING Gause, Gregory F. Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States. New York: CFRP, 1993. Field, Michael. The Merchants: The Big Business Families of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 1985. Mababaya, Mamarinta. The Role of Multinational Companies in the Middle East: The Case of Saudi Arabia. Westminster, UK: University of Westminster, 2002. Marcel, Valerie and John Mitchell. Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East. London: Chatham House, 2006.

Crime Sebastian Maisel Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States have a very low crime level, considerably lower than in many Western countries. Street crimes are rare and used to be unknown. This was mainly attributed to two factors. First, the area is the birthplace of Islam and the aspect of pure faith is significant for the application of right or

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wrong. Saudi Arabia in particular has adopted many legal measurements from the Qur’an and the code of law strongly relies on Islamic Law as it is codified in the Shari‘ah. It can be suggested that the prevalence of Islamic values among the people of Arabia contributes to the respect and adherence to law and order in these nations. With Shari‘ah comes a straightforward code of penalties with clear regulations and little room to appeal. Penalties are rigidly enforced, often in public in order to make an example and deter other future criminals. The occasional enforcement of harsh penalties for a variety of crimes contributes much to what is referred to as a high standard of public safety. Prior to the unification of Saudi Arabia, crimes such as robbery or raids were so common that people felt relieved after King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud began to enforce Islamic law in all newly incorporated territories. Crimes rates dropped dramatically because of a prompt and harsh enforcement of penalties, which then were regarded as offenses not only against human law but also against the divine will. Another aspect was the homogeneity of the population, a tribally organized society with strict rules and penalties. This type of social organization, in which everyone knows everyone else and is somehow dependent on each other, encourages noninvolvement in criminal activities. This traditional system has been weakened with the opening of the countries to foreign companies, workers, and visitors. Therefore, in local statistics, the rise of petty crimes is often attributed to unemployed foreign guestworkers and residents who are excluded from social solidarity. On the other hand, public institutions such as schools, mosques, security forces, police, and mutawwas in Saudi Arabia are busy with teaching legal and behavioral aspects of Islam, allowing maximal and constant indoctrination with all necessary rules of living together in a Muslim society. They combine informal (family), semi-formal (religion), and formal (school) social control over the population. The most common crimes in Saudi Arabia are theft, offenses related to alcohol (production, sale, and consumption), altercations, and moral/honor crimes. Penalties are classified into tazir (prevention or correction)–penalties that are up to the discretion of the judge; hadd–penalties that are regulated by Shari‘ah; and qisas (retribution), or fixed compensations for murder and battery. Most serious are the hadd (limit)-penalties for Islamic capital crimes such as adultery, false accusation of adultery, theft, highway robbery, and alcohol-related cases. Some legal/religious scholars add apostasy to the list. Penalties include flogging, amputations, and executions. In same case, capital punishment is applied for rape and armed robbery. The four main schools of Islamic law differ on the number of crimes and the execution of penalties. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates follow the Hanbali School, whereas in Kuwait the dominant school is Maliki; Bahrain is Maliki for the Sunnis and Ja‘afari for its Shi‘ite population, and Oman is mainly Ibadi Kharaji. Newer charges include corruption and drug-related cases, in which the latter are punished severely in all Gulf States, some of them applying capital punishment for drug trafficking. These harsh laws help keep the number of drug addicts and drugrelated crimes very low. Combating cyber crimes and software piracy is an issue that is discussed on the regional level of the Gulf Cooperation Council, where a common law is drafted based on experiences from the United Arab Emirates.

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However, the picture of a peaceful, harmonic country is changing. Official reports stated that between 1990 and 1996 the crime rate among young unemployed Saudi rose some 320% and forecasted an additional 136% by 2005. The link between economic and social problems with an increase in crimes is possible and if correctly applied raises concerns about the safety of the country in the near future. Saudi Arabia has the highest car theft rate in the Middle East. To work with crime statistics in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States is difficult because many cases are not brought to court but are instead dealt with internally on the family/tribal level. See also Madhhab.

FURTHER READING Crystal, Jill. “Criminal Justice in the Middle East,” Journal of Criminal Justice 29, no. 6 (2001): 469–482. Hamzeh, Nizar. “Qatar: The Duality of the Legal System,” Middle Eastern Studies 30, no. 1 (1994): 79–90. Helal, A., and C. Coston. “Low Crime Rates in Bahrain: Islamic Social Control,” International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 5, nos. 1 and 2 (1991): 125–144. Souryal, Sam. “The Role of Shariah Law in Deterring Criminality in Saudi Arabia,” International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 12, no. 1 (1988): 1–25. Vogel, Frank E. Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2000. Wardak, Ali. “Crime and Social Control in Saudi Arabia,” in Transnational and Comparative Criminology, edited by James Sheptycki and Ali Wardak. London: Glasshouse, 2005.

Cuisine Sebastian Maisel Arabs in pre-Islamic times were either nomads, who lived off the products of their camels, particularly the milk and its byproducts; or farmers in the oases, who harvested dates, which could be preserved for a long time and therefore were also popular among the Bedouin. Coastal people lived mainly off fish and seafood, whereas bread and other dishes made from grain were hardly found. With the rise of Islam, several dietary taboos were introduced, such as pork and alcohol. Islam classifies all food into halal (permitted) and haram (prohibited). Other requirements were made with regard to butchering animals. However, with the integration of different ethnic groups into the Muslim community, new eating and dietary habits were adopted. This became primarily visible during the Hajj (pilgrimage), when different people came together for an entire month and shared their traditions and customs with each other and the local population of the Hijaz. It is remarkable that despite the homogeneity of Arabian culture, specific local and regional tastes and cuisines exist. In Saudi Arabia, dishes that shape the

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Kabsah, a popular dish of meat (lamb or chicken) and rice in central Arabia, is served. Courtesy of Sebastian Maisel.

national cuisine most were those from the Hijaz. The sophisticated merchant families adapted many foreign dishes that came to the area with the pilgrimage and assimilated them so completely that it is hard to imagine these dishes are actually foreign. Except for a few areas in southwest Arabia in the mountains of Asir and in the oases along the Gulf, water is scarce and the annual precipitation did not allow rain-based farming. It was therefore necessary to irrigate the fields with ancient techniques. Despite irrigation, the quantity and variety of produce were limited. Traditional produce included grain (wheat and barley), vegetables (tomatoes, cucumbers, onions), and of course dates, which is the fruit that is most suitable to this climate. The Bedouins and sedentary animal breeders provided meat. In the coastal region fish and other seafood were an important part of the daily diet. Since ancient times, the people of Arabia traded with India, East Africa, Europe, and East Asia and imported spices and tea from those areas. During the last two centuries, coffee and rice were added to the list of purchased items. Local beekeepers produced honey, the natural sweetener, but sugar was frequently used and therefore was bought from the market. Almost everywhere on the Arabian Peninsula grain products were the main staple. Unleavened bread, pies, and sweets were made from wheat, whereas barley was used to make burghul and jarish. Milk continued to be another important staple. Butter, yogurts, laban, and a variety of cheeses were made from goat, sheep, or camel milk. Vegetables were always more important than meat. People ate them raw, steamed, fried, and pickled or as salads. Common vegetables and

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legumes were onions, garlic, carrots, cucumber, tomato, pepper, lettuce, parsley, lentils, chickpeas, eggplants, zucchini, and okra. Meat, especially mutton, goat, chicken, and camel, was eaten less frequently. The meat was either ground up or cut into small pieces, but usually not served as steak, and then grilled over charcoal. It was common to spice the meat with salt, pepper, garlic, thyme, and coriander or to marinate it in vinegar, oil, or rose water. Popular fish dishes included tuna, shark, mackerel, bass, and mahi mahi. They were often fried, baked, or grilled. In addition, shrimp, crabs, lobster, turtles, and dolphins were eaten. Very important for the preparation as well as the preservation of food were oils, spices, and fat. Olive oil was the most common, followed by sesame oil and coconut oil. Spices and seasonings were used in abundance. Standard choices included salt, pepper, onion, paprika, and garlic. Garlic was considered helpful for general health and virility. In addition, thyme, coriander, cumin, sumaq, anise, fennel, cardamom, cinnamon, cloves, and peppermint were used frequently. Saffron was popular more for its coloring effect than its taste. Fruit was served at almost every meal. Local fruits included dates, oranges, melons, figs, grapes, lemons, pomegranates, peaches, apricots, and apples, whereas in some areas with a more tropical climate bananas, mangos, and papayas were grown. Most fruits were eaten fresh, except for dates and figs, which were usually dried. Some fruits such as dates, figs, apricots, and grapes were used for pie filling and jams. The date was probably the most versatile staple with large varieties in size, taste, and preservability. The Arabic preference for sweets was shown in the substantial use of sugar in hot beverages and for baking. In addition to small cookies and other pastries, the people of Arabia loved to chew on nuts and other seeds such as almonds, hazelnuts, pistachios and melon, sunflower, and pumpkin seeds. Milk and water were traditionally the most common beverages. During the Ottoman rule, coffee and tea were introduced and quickly became popular. Wine and Arak, although prohibited by Islam, have a limited importance. People used to eat three times a day and continue to do that today. Mealtimes are coordinated around prayer times. The traditional social stratification of the society in urban, rural, and nomadic groups was also recognizable at the dinner table. People from the countryside ate different things than those in the city and those on the move. For breakfast in the city, the obligatory bread was accompanied by yogurt, laban, olives, eggs, and sometimes jams, whereas in the countryside people ate clarified butter, dates, and goat cheese with their bread. Bedouins had only dates and camel milk. In the settlement, tea was very common for breakfast. For lunch, on ordinary days main courses with variations of rice dishes with some kind of meat were common, whereas in the cities rice was replaced with cracked wheat in addition to fresh salads of tomatoes, cucumber, and parsley. In the evening, the entire family gathered for a light snack, often the leftovers from lunch. Usually, people in Arabia did not eat from a table but preferred to sit on the floor and share the food. They ate from the same bowl and instead of silverware used flat bread or the fingers of the right hand. Traditionally, men ate first, separate from the women and children of the family. On special occasions, such as birth, circumcision, or a wedding, a sheep or young camel was slaughtered and served on large trays with rice and different

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spices such as saffron, coriander, and pinenuts. After dinner, tea and coffee were served in an exactly prescribed ceremony. Visitors were first served tea and coffee upon leaving; however, the coffee was not the Turkish kind (i.e., strong and sweet), but the Arabian brew (i.e., bitter, brown, and spiced with cardamom and cloves). Because of the commonness and frequency of the ceremony, every family had several sets of coffee and teapots and cups available. It was difficult to label a recipe a traditional recipe from Arabia because of the constant influx of new trends and tastes and the mixture of lifestyles. Arguably the dish that was considered the national dish of Saudi Arabia and its neighbors was kabsah, a rice casserole with roasted lamb or chicken. Often associated with the central region, today it is found all over the Peninsula. Basic ingredients included rice with saffron, tomatoes, onions, spices, and the meat. In some northern areas, the dish was known as mansaf. For a long time, chicken was considered a delicacy until modern technologies enabled the establishment of large poultry farms throughout the area. Mataziz is another popular dish from Najd and is made from lamb and vegetable dumplings and served with white rice. In the Eastern Province and along the Gulf shore, muhashshah, a traditional rice dish, was served with fried fish. Fried mackerel with rice and salad was called hubul. Popular dishes that were of non-Arabian origin, but nevertheless Arabic, included falafal (deep-fried chickpea balls) and shawarmah (sliced lamb or chicken sandwiches). Saudis in the Eastern Province called rice caysh (life in Arabic), indicating the importance of this staple for the region; usually ‘aysh is used to refer to bread. Some dishes were only made for certain occasions such as religious holidays; for example, the holy month of Ramadan, during which Muslims were not permitted to eat, drink, and smoke during the daytime. Nighttime, however, was a time to celebrate the accomplishment and this was done with special food such as ful madammas, fava beans in a sauce of clarified butter, cumin, and lemon juice; minazzalah, pieces of lamb, chopped tomatoes, and tahinah; and qatayif, small turnovers fried on one side and stuffed with nuts, fruits, and sweet spices and dipped in sugar syrup. People ate only twice a day during Ramadan: the iftar-meal after sunset and the suhur-meal before sunrise when fasting begins. For the ‘Id al-Adha feast, immediately following the conclusion of the pilgrimage another special dish was prepared in Najd called baydiyah, a dish of wheat cooked in lamb broth and topped with onions. The whole dish was wrapped in dough that was topped with saffron, rose water, and lamb and garnished with eggs and additional vegetables. For the preparation of this dish, neighbors and relatives got together to help each other. Changes in the eating habits did not start with the oil boom, but were noticeable before, particularly in the Hijaz during the pilgrimage. Because most of the oil industry with its many foreign workers and customs was located in the Eastern Province along the Gulf coast, stronger influences by other mostly Western cultures were observed. Only in the interior of the Peninsula, in Najd, Najran, or the mountains did the old dietary customs prevail due to the isolation of the area. Thanks to modern technology different methods to preserve, store, transport, and freeze food were available and led to an increasing consumption of meat and fish. Traditional food preservatives such as vinegar were now only used for the taste. Arabic and other international cuisines (e.g., Lebanese, Egyptian, Indian, or Thai) entered the food market of the Gulf countries through migration and

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guestworkers. Particularly, influences by Indo-Malayan cuisine and their frequent use of soy and curry were seen along the Gulf. However, the biggest change came with the acceptance of Western eating habits. Today, large supermarkets and fast-food restaurants shape the picture of virtually every large city. Jiddah, Dubai, Kuwait, Masqat, and cities in the Peninsula are now Westernized, and international restaurants are found in each of them. They opened in the 1970s when oil revenues increased and were invested in the local infrastructure. Urbanization, the trend to move to the cities in search of better living conditions, increased rapidly during this time period and the old ways of providing for the local population were no longer sufficient. Traditional markets for vegetables or meat were pushed aside or began to offer imported processed goods. Those new products were in high demand, especially in the urban setting. The younger generation, comprising more than half of the entire population, was attracted to Western eating habits and products, and they adopted hamburgers, sodas, and french fries as the main staple. Coffee shops, offering Western coffee and pastries, became even more popular, because drinking coffee together while communicating had always been an important aspect of the daily lifestyle. Another way of adjusting traditions to the new way of life was to provide segregated eating areas for families and women in restaurants. Although ingredients and dishes have changed, other traditions remained intact. Where, when, and how one eats were still the same—only what one ate was different. Because foreign food items were usually not separated from local products, they were quickly accepted by the consumers. Although it was fair to speak of an Arabic cuisine of the Gulf area, each country had its unique and traditional recipes and dishes. The small island of Bahrain lived off wheat, dates, and seafood that were seasoned with spices from India and Iran. The national dish of Kuwait was kuzi (roasted lamb stuffed with rice, eggs, and chicken). The cuisine of Kuwait combined traditional aspects of Bedouin lifestyle with that of a settled population and international guestworkers. Most people in Qatar lived off seafood, fish, as well as rice, dates, and sheep. However, in Oman, fish and rice were the most important staples. The country enjoyed close relations with eastern Africa, particularly Zanzibar, a center for the spice trade. Many spices were brought from there to Oman and then made into a special blend of cloves, coriander, nutmeg, pepper, cardamom, and cinnamon called baharat.

FURTHER READING Long, David, Cultures and Customs of Saudi Arabia. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005. Nawwab, Nimah Ismail. “The Culinary Kingdom,” Saudi Aramco World 50, no. 1 (1999): 88–97. Riolo, Amy. Arabian Delights: Recipes and Princely Entertaining Ideas from the Arabian Peninsula. Herndon, VA: Capital Books, 2008. Al-Zayani, A.R. A Taste of the Arabian Gulf. Bahrain: Ministry of Culture, 1988. Zubaida, Sami, and Richard Tapper (eds.). Taste of Thyme: Culinary Cultures of the Middle East. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000.

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Cultural Heritage Sebastian Maisel The culture of the Arabian Peninsula is homogenous and multifaceted at the same time. It emerged over a period of several thousand years. For a long time, nomadism, oases farming, long-distance trade, and different forms of worship characterized life in Arabia. With the revelation of Islam a new layer was added that significantly influenced all aspects of daily life. Islam in Arabia both expanded into other cultural areas, often assimilating with local cultures, and received foreign influences from Muslim pilgrims coming to perform the pilgrimage to Makkah and Madinah. The interaction with different ethnicities and cultures certainly enriched the culture of the Arabs and remains a source of inspiration and identity in modern times. Focusing on specific aspects of this heritage such as clothing, language, and core values added a sense of stability to the historically young states along the Gulf coast. Globalization has had a strong impact on the societies of those states since the middle of the twentieth century. Since that time the area underwent rapid modernization and development that almost led to the extinction of traditional customs, crafts, and objects. Recognizing this threat and starting to preserve and protect what was left comprise a process that evolved slowly, and only in recent years, Saudi Arabia and the Arab States of the Gulf began to recognize the importance of their rich cultural heritage as part of their manifestation of national and regional identities. Cultural heritage is also needed as a form of legitimization for the ruling families as well as a source to promote tourism. The attention given to cultural heritage is not limited to tangible items such as material culture or historical sites; it included intangible assets like language (see Arabic Language), poetry, and traditional customs. Other sectors include antiquities, archaeological sites, museums, architecture, and handicrafts. The preservation and promotion of cultural heritage is a major objective of the countries’ domestic and regional policies. Several governmental organizations and institutions are working in the sector; for example, in Saudi Arabia they are as diverse as the Supreme Council for Tourism, the Deputy Ministry of Antiquities and Museums, or the National Guard. These stakeholders do not often cooperate in a successful manner. However, they are all sponsors of major heritage institutions and events. In addition, the media, both print and broadcast, discovered the topic of discussing the situation of cultural heritage as a favorite theme to report critically on local affairs. The mass media is actually the leading agent in promoting the recent heritage revival in the societies along the Gulf. The public cultural reawakening is manifested in art galleries, dance and music groups, large-scale festivals, open-air museums, and other state-sponsored activities; poetry as the main form of literary expression is outselling prose on the book market; heritage is celebrated for and by the local population. In Saudi Arabia the main event is the two-week long Janadiriyah Heritage Festival, in which artists and artisans from all regions of the kingdom exhibit and perform their arts and crafts. Traditional folk music, camel races, and Qur’an and poetry

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Emirati women prepare traditional wafer-thin bread at the Heritage Village in Dubai. Older women have been left out of much of the rapid development since 1970 in the United Arab Emirates, and their knowledge and skills have been devalued. The Heritage Village is an attempt to reconnect the younger generation with life before oil. Courtesy of John A. Shoup.

recitals attract hundreds of thousands of visitors every year. On certain days only women and families are permitted entrance and various events focus on women’s culture. This is also the place where national cultural heritage is shaped into a homogenous form that sometimes omits or excludes regional varieties. In Dubai, a special heritage center was built to depict the story of pearling, which was once the main source of income in the area. In Kuwait, the National Council for Culture, Arts, and Letters is a good example of governmental interest in the encouragement of cultural heritage. The council sponsors literary and historical publications; hosts art exhibitions; restores old architectural structures; and organizes an annual cultural festival, al-Qurayn. In Abu Dhabi, a special authority for culture and heritage was established that sponsors cultural and intellectual activities. On an international level, Saudi Arabia is applying for its major archaeological site of Mada’in Salih to be added to the World Heritage List.

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Most Gulf States are member states in UNESCO’s program to protect intangible cultural heritage. However, in general there is little legal protection for those assets. Some regulations have been passed for antiquities, but few have been passed to protect historical buildings, traditional crafts, and customs. All of these areas are under enormous pressure from the current trend of modernization. Although the countries began to realize the importance of ancient artifacts, the situation for traditional crafts and the practice of many customs is deteriorating. Another threatening aspect for some areas of cultural heritage, particularly architecture, is the unfavorable view of it by some religious scholars in Saudi Arabia who are afraid that these sites could be used for idolatry or the veneration for other worldly things such as tombs, shrines, or locations related to famous Muslims of the past. The very puritanical Wahhabi ideology led the destruction of several historical religious sites in the Hijaz. As early as the beginning of the eighteenth century, Wahhabi conquerors demolished such sites as the grave of Eve, or the houses of Muhammad’s mother Aminah and wife Khadijah. Initially, conservative scholars had issues with displaying artifacts in museums, especially those objects that depict human figures or were related to pre-Islamic times. But today, public and private museums have emerged all over the area with large collections of material culture and other ethnographic and archaeological evidence. Riyadh has a state-of-the-art National Museum; similar places were built in al-Manamah, Kuwait, and al-Dawhah. An active schedule of finding, preserving, and analyzing historical sites provides additional evidence of the region’s cultural heritage. Regarding intangible items, oral history and nabati poetry are among the most popular areas of preserving the heritage for future generations. Narratives from the older generations are recorded, and poems are collected. The ongoing struggle of what is considered part of the official heritage prevents the massive collections from being researched thoroughly because they might contain material that indicates a different regional opinion. With all of the funds devoted to the heritage preservation industry, it is still their main objective to create a national identity conforming to the ruling elite’s understanding of history and legitimacy. Societies in the Gulf counter modernization and Westernization not only by attending closely to religion, but also to their heritage that lies in the tribal Bedouin tradition as well as in Islam. Processes of globalization and preserving heritage in the Gulf area are now inseparable. Although the economy is booming, the states put large funds aside to invest in heritage industry, large theme parks, festivals, or museums, which are frequented by locals and foreign residents alike. This all contributes to the building of an environment that is an image of what the ruling elites want it to be.

FURTHER READING Cernea, Michael. Cultural Heritage and Development: A Framework for Action in the Middle East and North Africa. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2001. Gugolz, Alessandro. “The Protection of Cultural Heritage in the Sultanate of Oman,” International Journal of Cultural Property 5, no. 2 (1996): 291–309. Khalaf, Sulayman. “Poetics and Politics of Newly Invented Traditions in the Gulf: Camel Racing in the United Arab Emirates,” Ethnology 39, no. 3 (2000): 243–261.

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Customary Law Sebastian Maisel Customary law is considered an integral part of the social order of tribal groups. In the past, tribes formed an important part of the population in Arabia, and today they still enjoy a disproportionate reputation in the larger society. Blood and kinship ties create close relations among tribal members. They are furthered by ritual interaction, marriage, housing pattern, and a common legal system that is based on the concepts of solidarity and loyalty. Tribal groups survive and exist based on notions of togetherness that often overrule the rights of the individual. However, if an individual is treated badly, the entire group is affected by this and reacts. If an individual commits a crime, then the entire group is likewise responsible for the deeds of the single member. The interactions within the group as well as with members of other tribal units or non-tribal members are regulated by a codex of law, which in its entirety originated many hundreds if not thousands of years ago. However, because of constant interaction and coexistence with other lifestyles and legal systems, this codex has been adapted to new circumstances. In Arabic, the law that was prescribed by local traditions and customs is called curf. It goes back to pre-Islamic times but today covers areas that are under the jurisdiction of other legal systems, most notably Islamic law. The main source of customary law is embodied in a set of “texts” or poems and narratives that were mostly transmitted orally and rarely written. This customary law was applied by tribal groups that followed a nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle, but it was also found among sedentarized groups. As such it was often in contrast to the prevailing religious or state law, because both legal systems (nomadic and sedentary) stood for different social and legal rubrics when evaluating right from wrong. The opposition to another legal system was therefore connected to conflicting ethical and moral perceptions. At large, those tribal moral values still enjoy a large popularity among the people on the Arabian Peninsula, although they are officially eradicated in states such as Saudi Arabia or at least seen as outdated and “ignorant.” However, up to this day, many prefer to use customary law to the other legal system when regulating conflicts because of its simplicity, flexibility, and decency. Another often heard argument in favor of customary law is the fact that it intends to reconcile between parties rather than punish one party. Moral convictions and common actions by the whole unit thus form the basis for conflict regulation and not sheer force or violence. In theory, customary law is strictly directed to peaceful reconciliation and avoiding further bloodshed. The enforcement of customary law requires the acceptance by the tribal group and not the power of a central tribal authority. Several driving forces within the group such as public opinion, reputation, rationality, solidarity, and mutual responsibility constitute the acceptance. The bottom line is the collective legal responsibility of the khamsah, the kin group over five (khamsah in Arabic) generations. Customary law is applied for the following crimes: murder, rape, battery, manslaughter, adultery, kidnapping, theft, trespassing, and cases on land, water,

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and pasture, as well as honor crimes. Cases follow a strict and detailed code of procedure that includes judges, witnesses, evidence, investigations, rulings, appeals, and enforcement of the ruling. Judges are normally well-respected and trained members of the tribal community who apply analogies and consensus to find their judgment. Tribal judges are classified according to their special area of expertise; some deal with capital crimes and others with property cases. Arguments, evidence, and witnesses are brought up in front of the panels of judges. Oath and confessions are important means of reasoning between the parties, but the judge has additional ways of fact-finding if there were no witnesses (e.g., the ordeal). The accused is asked to prove his innocence by licking a hot metal spoon or stick several times. Afterward he clears his mouth, which is then inspected by the mubashi‘, the tribal official that performs and analyzes the ordeal. If the tongue was not scratched, he declares the accused innocent. The bisha‘ ceremony is illegal in religious and state law in Saudi Arabia; however, it is still practiced among tribal groups and considered an effective investigative tool in customary law and is legal in other Arab states such as Egypt. Other regulations provide protection and safety for those involved in legal disputes. Immediate safety is granted to everyone, and it is demanded by touching the tent, cloths, or head cover of the protector. Guest and neighbors enjoy similar rights. Any offense against a protegee is punished twice, because it affects the protector as well, whose honor was blackened by attacking someone under his protection. Generally, the concept of honor and shame contributes much to the application of customary law. Every individual and group has honor; they can lose it or increase it. Crimes usually are considered shameful, not just because something was stolen or someone was hurt, but also because the victim’s honor was discredited. In addition to the punishment for the crime, the guilty party must “clean” or “whiten” the face of the injured party from any shame by whatever additional measures are imposed by the judges. Reconciliation is the mother of all judgments. This ancient proverb highlights the importance of tribal conflict resolution by applying customary law. Most legal cases end with the reconciliation of the parties involved. Arbitration is carried out by the notables of both parties, usually elder and well-respected tribal members, and sometimes by members of the ruling families who negotiate the final ruling and compensation. Afterward a hug banquet is given and white flags are raised indicating that the honor is restored and the case is closed. In the present-day society of the Arab Gulf States, customary law is still applied in rural areas. Some aspects have been incorporated into religious law, and even political rulers occasionally refer to it when solving tribal conflicts in their areas. However, the trend goes toward a joint application and parallel existence of customary with other legal systems.

FURTHER READING Meeker, M. Literature and Violence in North Arabia. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Serjeant, Robert. Customary and Shari‘ah Law in Arabian Society. Brookfield, VT: Variorum, 1991.

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Customary Law Serjeant, Robert, and G. Rex Smith. Farmers and Fishermen in Arabia: Studies in Customary Law and Practice. Brookfield, VT: Variorum, 1995. Sowayan, Saad. “Customary Law in Arabia: An Ethno-Historical Perspective.” Paper presented to the Conference on Customary Law in the Middle East and North Africa, Princeton University, May 13–14, 2006. Sowayan, Saad. The Arabian Oral Historical Narrative. Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrasowitz, 1992. Stewart, Frank. “Tribal Law in the Arab World: A Review of the Literature,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 19 (1987): 473–490. Stewart, Frank. Honor. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. Stewart, Frank. “Customary Law among the Bedouins of the Middle East and North Africa,” in Nomadic Societies in the Middle East and North Africa, edited by Dawn Chatty. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2006.

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D

Dammam Sebastian Maisel Al-Dammam is a large Saudi Arabian seaport city on the southern rim of the Tarut Bay on the Persian Gulf. Two separate meanings for the origin of the name are recorded. One is the onomatopoeic sound of an alarm drum that produces a melody called damdamah, whereas the other relates to the Arabic word dawwama, or whirlpool, indicating the nearby waterway that ships had to avoid. Historically, the area belonged to the oasis of al-Qatif. In 1923, some Bedouin of the Dawasir tribe coming from Bahrain settled here and founded a small fishing and pearling village. With the discovery of oil in large quantities in 1938, the city developed and grew into an important regional industrial, educational, and administrative center. Today, the city limits cover some ten square miles (fifteen square kilometers) with overlapping borders to neighboring cities of Dhahran and Khobar. Approximately 1 million people live in Dammam, which also is the capital of the Eastern Province. However, since the mid-1980s the three cities were formally connected to form the tri-city area, but they have maintained their functional independence. As a comparatively young city, most of the population recently moved to the city, which indicates the absence of a traditional elite and a large amount of foreigners among the inhabitants. The new image of Dammam is also visible in the layout of the city with its rectangular setup that contradicts the traditional layout of a traditional Islamic city. Most of the city’s inhabitants work for Aramco and the oil industry continues to be a major factor in the development of the master plan of the city. The development of the city is closely related to the growth of the oil industry. When the first concessions for oil exploration in Saudi Arabia were granted, they started to drill in what is today the city of Dammam. In 1936, well Dammam number 7 was the first to produce oil in commercial quantities. For this reason, the area was selected as company headquarters for Aramco, the main oil company in Saudi Arabia. After a period of stagnation during World War II, the area began to grow quickly in the 1950s. Between 1946 and 1950 the ten-kilometerlong pier in Dammam was built in order to land supplies and equipment. In 1962, the facilities were enlarged with the construction of the King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Port that consists of four additional piers. Around the port area, several industrial complexes (e.g., Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Company, the first petrochemical concern) and military installations were built.

Dance, Traditional

The growing importance of Dammam was symbolized by transferring the province’s capital from Hufuf to Dammam in 1963. King Faysal University has a large campus for medical studies and engineering in Dammam. Since 1952, Saudi Arabia’s only railway links Dammam with the capital Riyadh.

FURTHER READING al-Doussari, Mohammad Hasan. Evolution of Urban System in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, 1900 to 1970. Al-Ahsa, Saudi Arabia: King Faisal University, 1999. Facey, William. The Story of the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. London: Stacey International, 1994. Moody, Burnett. “A Boys-Eye View of Dammam Port,” Saudi Aramco World 14, no. 2 (1963): 3–7.

Dance, Traditional Sebastian Maisel The people of the Arabian Peninsula, both townspeople and nomadic, possess a rich history in performing arts. One of the most authentic and popular features of traditional musical artistic expression is traditional dance, which blends together unique movements with songs and poetry. The origin goes back to preIslamic times and derives from various ethnic traditions, mainly Arab and Persian. It existed and developed in the tribal setting of Arabia as a form of entertainment and to celebrate major events in the rites of passage. Dances are usually interactive, allowing the audiences to attend and participate. Generally, similar to the folk music of the area, dances are rather monotonous and include simple and repetitive movements; however, they do occur in a variety of settings, both formal and informal. Formal venues include those occasions that are connected to rites of passage (e.g., births, circumcisions, weddings, and religious holidays), whereas informal dances are performed at home, in the fields and campsites, or even at sea, as in the case of the pearl divers in the Gulf. Lately, dances are also performed at official gatherings such as national celebrations, state visits, or sporting events. On the other hand, a conservative attitude discouraging dancing is found among people with a traditional religious focus who are concerned about the possible immorality of the dances. However, dances are seen as communal performances associated with certain religious, social, or national occasions and utilize several folklore genres. Moreover, traditional dances are considered as modes of communication for both the conservative and the innovative parts of the Gulf’s societies. Dance is also a process that includes producers, performers, and sometimes musicians and depends on acceptance or rejection from the audience. Some dances enjoy prominent status, whereas others are considered of lower status. Among the dances with a high reputation are those involving weapons, such as rifles, swords, and daggers that are spun and thrown above the heads of the dancers. The ‘ardhah sword dance is perhaps the

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Among the traditional dances of the Gulf, the Liwa brings the audience to its feet to participate, as at this performance at a festival in Dubai. Courtesy of John A. Shoup.

singlemost important dance of the Peninsula and performed by men holding up their weapons and moving slowly to the beat of drums. Originally performed before going to war, it is now considered the national dance of most Gulf States and as such is performed by political leaders at all major public occasions. The traditional society of the Gulf State requires gender segregation in public and private spheres. In some states, particularly Saudi Arabia, the separation of men and women is almost considered a national and religious obligation, at least in the way it is enforced by some authorities. Most other Gulf States follow a more liberal approach, yet within their clearly defined limits both genders can practice and perform music and dance. Probably the most common arena for dances is the traditional wedding party, which is also celebrated separately. Female musicians perform for a female-only audience, some of which actively participate in dance and song. During the wedding party hired musicians play popular songs and younger women usually perform the traditional dances of their area, oftentimes wearing traditional dresses called thawb nashal. Most of the movements are from the shoulders and the head. There is a little shimmying in the shoulders, small drops with the hips, and gliding of the feet. One distinct movement is called na‘ish, or tossing the hair, in which women loosen their waist-long hair and swing it in circles, which is considered a higher and more enthusiastic level of performance. Na‘ish is said to have originated from the Bedouin tribes and is performed along the Gulf coast. Slowly other women join the dance; and it is expected that all guests at one point participate in the dances. Another occasion of extensive dancing is laylat al-hanna, the henna night prior to the wedding. Here, family members and friends dance to entertain the bride,

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who has to sit patiently in order for the henna dye to dry. At the groom party, young men and teenagers often get excited and start to dance on their own, imitating popular moves and steps, some of them clearly labeled as female movements. Unlike in other Middle Eastern cultures, men in the Gulf States in urban settings are much less attracted to communal dances during weddings. Nevertheless, dances have their proper place, for example, at tribal gatherings or weddings in the countryside. The governments of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States generously support traditional folk arts such as music and dances as long as they are performed in accordance with the requirements of public morality. Performances of music and dance draw large audiences at regional or national festivals for folklore and traditional culture. Women are encouraged to participate in these state-sponsored activities, but they have to present their shows at separate events. For example, at the National Janadiriyah Heritage Festival, selected occasions deal with music and dance from the women’s point of view. Performances by female groups in front of female-only audiences are held to portray the regional dance tradition. Every region in the Arabian Peninsula has its unique dances with its own steps and movements. Some are more graceful, whereas others imitate male dances holding a dagger and stamping on the ground. The most popular dance in the United Arab Emirates is ‘ayalah, which derives from the Arabic word meaning “to attack.” ‘Ayalah migrated to the Emirates during the nineteenth century from central Arabia as a version of the ‘ardhah. The entire atmosphere, its steps, and the name indicate that this used to be a war dance and as such it simulates battles scenes. Sometimes up to 200 male dancers form two rows that are accompanied by musicians with the drummers and sword dancers in their midst. The dancing movements go back and forth until the “invading” party admits defeat. Sometimes in the middle of the dance a group of young women called na‘ashat perform a hair dance, exhibiting and swirling their hair around to motivate the men to protect them. Because it is clearly a male dance, it can be performed without the na‘ashat segment. No private or public event is celebrated in the United Arab Emirates without the ‘ayalah dance. Emirati soccer players sometimes perform it spontaneously as a victory dance. As a national dance it contains steps symbolizing social and tribal aspects of life in addition to lyrics and songs that glorify the nation’s identity and values. A very reserved and dignified version of ‘ayalah in Ra’s al-Khaymah and Fujayrah is called wahhabiyah. Here too men dance in two lines holding weapons or sticks indicating their readiness to defend. No musical instruments are used; the dance lives by the lyrics of its songs. The name wahhabiyah suggests a link to the dominant religious belief in Wahhabi, which in fact might be true. Wahhabi Islam as a religious practice spread quickly in much of Arabia, and several other states in addition to Saudi Arabia have adopted Wahhabism as the official form of Islam. A different war dance is called harbiyah and it is performed without musical instruments but includes both singing and dancing. The lyrics of the song control the movement of the dancers. The theme of the dance also reflects notions of war, defense, and military parades. Often, na‘ashat dancers perform in harbiyah dances to encourage and motivate the male dancers. Another popular dance along the southern Gulf coast is called malid, a derivative from the Arabic word mawlid, which is a term used to refer to the observance

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of the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad. It consists of two parts, the first being a reciting of the sirah (story of life) of Muhammad, whereas in the second part (sama‘a—hearing), the participants respond by forming two rows facing each other and exchange and repeating phrases to the beat of tambourines. In Bahrain and all other Gulf States, the very popular ‘ardhah sword dance represents the folkloristic dance tradition. Accompanied by songs and drums, male Bahrainis often perform this dance during public events. Only members of the pearl diving community perform a special form of ‘ardhah that is called fijiri. Belly dancing, raqs sharqi in Arabic, although very popular is not considered a traditional dance of the region but was imported from Egypt for cabaret performances. Because of conservative and spatial constraints, this type of dance takes place only in separated and private settings. Talented dancers started to include traditional dance moves from the Gulf into their belly-dancing performance in order to please their predominantly Gulf audience. A new type of female dance is called ma’layah or daqni. Arabs claim that it originated in Iran, and it is very similar to a folk dance from southern Iran called Bandari, meaning “port” or “harbor dance.” The reason why they do not want to be associated with it is the obvious sensual character of the movements, including fast and vibrant shaking of the buttocks and backside. Along with a small band and a singer, two or more women entertain a mostly male crowd by swinging their backs up and down individually or as a group right in front of their faces. In the past, it was traditionally part of the wedding celebrations and customs but recently has turned into a popular trend among the younger generation. In Oman, the heritage of dance is cultivated through many performances on the local and regional level with distinct themes and moves. Omani dances include sword dances; religious dances (resembling Sufi practices); specific dances on the coast and in the desert; and dances for social events and other occasions, such as the dan, the Omani dance of death. During this ritual lamentation, mostly women dancers move around slowly to a seven-unit rhythm to reach an ecstatic stage and symbolically throw off an article of clothing, expressing their grief and sadness. Dances follow the rhythm of the accompanying music. Whereas Arabian folk music is usually monorhythmic, local dances are sometimes performed on a polyrhythmic base. For example, the rawah dance from the Musandam Peninsula combines the two-unit rhythm for the body movement with the three-unit rhythm for the drums. The sawt silam dance from Dhufar requires skills and concentration to perform the polyrhythmic moves. In Dhufar in another unusual dance form, the shubbaniyah, male and female dancers perform together but along different cycles and rhythms. Dancers can perform the dance and simultaneously produce sounds and music using bells, small drums, and other rhythmic instruments. A necklace or string of whistles and bells wrapped around the dancer’s body produces idiophone sounds that do not accentuate the basic rhythm of the dance. The unity of dance and music is also shown in some musicians that dance while playing their instrument. The area’s rapid modernization is often seen as a threat to traditional arts, particularly to music and dance. However, because folk dances are deeply embedded into the cultural heritage, and the heritage is strongly supported by officials and the local population, the traditional dances of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States

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will be continuously performed and preserved. Every country of the area sponsors national dance troops to represent the heritage of the country both locally and internationally. In addition to national support of the preservation of traditional dances, local dance groups also enjoy a great popularity as an essential means to express tribal and regional identity.

FURTHER READING Campbell, Kay Hardy. “Folk Music and Dance in the Arabian Gulf and Saudi Arabia,” in Images of Enchantment: Visual and Performing Arts of the Middle East, edited by Sherifa Zuhur. Cairo: American University of Cairo Press, 1998. Campbell, Kay Hardy. “Saudi Arabian Folk Music Alive and Well,” Saudi Aramco World 58, no. 2 (2007): 2–13. Corona, Vicky. Women’s Dances of Kuwait: Beginner Steps, Thobe Actions, Choreography. Video recording. North Hollywood, CA: Dance Fantasy Productions, 1989. Hurreiz, Sayyid H. Folklore and Folklife in the United Arab Emirates. London: Routledge, 2002. Kaisha, N.B., and K.M. Hakubutsukan. The JVC Video Anthology of World Music and Dance. Book V, Middle East and Africa. Video recording. Tokyo: JVC Victor Co. of Japan, 1988–1990. Mahmood, Reem. “Folk Dances of the United Arab Emirates,” al-Shindagah Magazine (1997). Available at http://www.alshindagah.com/may/dances.htm (last accessed 2008).

Dates John A. Shoup A date (tamr or balah in Arabic) is a small, dark, oval fruit with a pit, and is an important part of Arab social customs. Dates are served to guests as part of the required hospitality and display of generosity as well as part of the traditional practices to break the Ramadan fast. The Prophet Muhammad established the tradition of breaking the Ramadan fast with dates and milk. In Arabia and the Gulf region, dates and date products are not only an important part of the diet, but also until the discovery of oil one of the most important domestic products. Dates are sold as the whole fruit (tamr or balah), as a sweet, thick syrup or molasses (dibs), or as a paste (‘ajwah). The palm tree (nakhlah) can be tapped for its sweet sap, which can be drunk as is or allowed to ferment into an alcohol (labqi). Dates were domesticated during the Neolithic in Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, and people began to understand that assisting with pollination between the male and female trees could enhance fruit production. An Akkadian cuneiform text dated 2500 BC is one of the oldest to specifically mention the cultivation of dates, and archeological evidence from al-Hasa indicates it has been an established oasis for the cultivation of dates for more than 4,000 years. Dates are drought resistant, actually liking the heat, and can grow where the water supply is brackish. Intensive date-farming methods improve productivity and include innovative systems of irrigation, pruning, and spacing of the trees, in addition to assisting fertilization of female trees.

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Many varieties of dates are grown in the Middle East and North Africa and still form an important part of agricultural production. Date varieties are distinguished by the amount of sugar and the size, moistness, and color. There are 600 varieties grown in the Arab countries, and Arab countries account for 64 million of the 90 million trees in the world. Al-Hasa oasis in eastern Saudi Arabia is one of the largest date producers in the Peninsula, covering some 50,000 acres (20,000 hectares) with over 3 million date palms. The Arab world produces 3 million tons of dates per year, most of which come from Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, with Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco being the major other producers. Although it is a matter of personal taste which is the best, in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf most people agree that the khalasah from al-Hasa oasis is the best, although in the Hijaz the ‘anbarah is considered superior, and in the Najd nubut al-sayf and sukkari are considered the best from their region. Most date markets offer between 200 and 300 varieties as well as different stages of ripening from balah, or fully grown; rutab, or partially grown and ripe; tamr, or fully sugared; and tamr yabis, or dried and much of its sugar lost. Hawhil refers to the dates from a previous year that have become rough and have cracked skin, which, although edible, are most often fed to livestock.

Dates, coffee, and tea are elements of traditional hospitality in the Arab world. The host has spread a mat made from palm leaves outdoors in front of a traditional barasti house in Dubai. Courtesy of John A. Shoup.

FURTHER READING Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. The Date Palm: From Traditional Resource to Green Wealth. London: I.B.Tauris, 2004. Hansen, Eric. “Carrying Dates to Hajar,” Saudi Aramco World 55, no. 4 (2004): 9–15. Hansen, Eric. “Looking for the Khalasah,” Saudi Aramco World 55, no. 4 (2004): 2–8.

Al-Dawhah John A. Shoup Al-Dawhah (Doha) is the capital of Qatar and is located on the eastern side of the small peninsula that forms the country. The city has a population of 400,051 (based on 2005 census), which not only makes it the largest city in Qatar, but

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nearly eighty percent of the entire population of the country lives in it or in the immediate surrounding suburbs. Al-Dawhah is a fairly “modern” city being founded in 1850 (the Al Khalifah and Al Thani families used the port/fort at Zubarah since they arrived in the eighteenth century). Dawhah was a small fishing village called al-Bida before it was renamed al-Dawhah, which means a tall tree with wide, spreading branches; local legend says the town was named for such a large tree that used to be at the heart of the original site. The town grew after Shyakh Qasim led local forces to victory over the Ottomans in 1883 and Al-Thani signed a treaty with the British that led to a protectorate status for the country—al-Dahwah was made the capital of the protectorate in 1916. Al-Dawhah remained the capital after Qatar gained its independence in 1971. Qatar has embarked on an ambitious plan to make al-Dawhah rival its neighbor Dubai on the basis of the country’s oil income. Al-Dawhah has some of the best medical centers and hospitals in the Arabian Peninsula, and the current ruler, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifah, had invited six major American universities, including Georgetown and Northwestern, to open branch campuses as part of a development project called University City. In addition, al-Dawhah has branch campuses for two Canadian and one Dutch university as well as Qatari institutions of higher learning. Al-Dawhah has several housing and commercial developments, and the skyline is dotted with a growing number of skyscrapers. Qatar allows non-nationals to buy and own property, which allows them to have renewable residency and work permits. The housing and development projects have caused land prices to increase and by 2007 land in al-Dawhah was the most expensive in the entire region. Qatari nationals are a minority of the city’s population, whereas expatriates form the vast majority. The largest numbers come from other Arab countries such as Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, and more recently Morocco. Others come from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, and smaller numbers of Europeans and North Americans live in al-Dawhah. The number of Christians in the city prompted Shaykh Hamad to allow the building of a Catholic church, which opened in March 2008 without any incident. Shaykh Hamad has allowed five more churches that will all be open soon.

Death Rites Sebastian Maisel For Muslims, death is considered the return of the soul to the creator. Death is inevitable, and life in the hereafter is something that is near and sought after. Therefore, the faithful keep their life and deeds in perspective and are prepared for the time to come and hopefully eternal life. According to the more puritanical or conservative religious views in Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States, mourning should not be exaggerated, because the departed might join paradise soon.

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In pre-Islamic Arabia as well as in Islam, Arabs believed in life after death. Therefore, distinctive rituals, or janazah, were practiced to worship the ancestors and their gravesites. The simplest form of a grave was a hollow in the ground with a marker or cairn on top. Among the Bedouin, special stones with cultic significance and sacred areas for the dead were found. The settled population used to bury their dead in caves, rock tombs, or cubic structures with several chambers. Grave goods were added, such as jewelry, amulets, ceramics, and figurines in addition to food and water. Like their ancestors, Muslim Arabs bury the dead in the ground, rejecting other forms of funerals like cremations. According to general Islamic rules, the body is washed and sometimes scented with rose water, cedar tree oil, and camphor. After the washing, the body is wrapped in a seamless white cloth for burial called kafan. It is about fifteen meters long and made of soft cotton. Women can then be draped with an extra cover, usually a green cloth. Relatives, friends, and others carry the bier to the mosque and later to the cemetery. It is considered a good deed to accompany the deceased on his last journey on earth. In front of the mosque or inside of it, the Imam will recite several funeral prayers. Only men escort the body to the cemetery, where the body is laid in a grave facing the Ka’bah in Makkah. In Najd, the grave is simply a hole in the ground, whereas in other areas small stone structures are erected. Because of hot and sometimes humid weather, it is recommended to bury the dead as soon as possible. At the gravesite, people are not allowed to erect elaborate grave markers, tombstones, or mausoleums or even put out flowers or candles. The best grave is one that can be washed away with one hand, according to the traditions of the Bedouin; this should also discourage relatives from excessive mourning or wailing. One of the most important doctrines of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s reform movement was to eradicate those practices, which apparently had existed in Arabia at one point. Worshipping the dead distracts the faithful from concentrating on the one task of his short life on earth, worshipping God. It is also seen as showing discontent with God’s wishes. Therefore, he should rather remember and pray to God and thank him for his mercy to take the deceased up to heaven. After the burial, a three-day mourning period, ‘azzah in Arabic, is observed during which regular visits are paid to the family of the deceased. Between the two evening prayers, guests are received to offer condolences to the family. Typically, a senior family member meets the mourners, who then sit quietly together commemorating the deceased. In Hijaz and other areas, religious sheikhs read verses from the Qur’an. Public display of grief is, however, strongly discouraged, and in non-Wahhabi countries so is any display of decorative clothing or jewelry. Among Shi‘ite communities in Arabia other forms of mourning are noted, for example, longer and multiple mourning periods, more elaborate tombstones, and additional readings and prayers. For widows, the mourning period, ‘iddah in Arabic, is extended to four months and ten days in accordance with Qur’anic rules. During this time she is not allowed to remarry or move from her home. The same clothing restrictions apply. The burial of the late King Fahd of Saudi Arabia is seen as a typical example of how death rites are practiced in Saudi Arabia. Although Fahd was one of the

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wealthiest men in the world, his grave is very simple and unspectacular. The ceremony was very austere in contrast to the lifestyle of the former monarch. Members of the Al Sa‘ud family carried the body wrapped in a brown robe, the last ‘abayah (cloak) that he wore, on a wooden stretcher to the local mosque, where a simple and short prayer was held in his name before he was carried to the public cemetery and laid in an unmarked grave. Family members then began covering the body with soil brought to the site in wheelbarrows.

FURTHER READING Hurreiz, Sayyid Hamid. Folklore and Folklife in the United Arab Emirates. London: Routledge, 2002. Long, David. Culture and Customs of Saudi Arabia. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005. Yamani, Mai. “The Rites of Passage III: Death—the Final Vindication,” in Cradle of Islam: The Hijaz and the Quest for an Arabian Identity, edited by Mai Yamani. London: I.B. Tauris, 2006.

Deserts John A. Shoup The Arabian Peninsula is one of the most arid regions in the world, and by definition nearly the whole peninsula is “desert.” However, within the peninsula are several sand deserts stretching from Wadi Sirhan in the north to the Arabian Sea in the south. These are among the driest places on earth, with yearly rainfalls of less than four inches (100 millimeters), and it is not unusual for as many as ten years to pass with no rainfall at all. The Nafud sands are 280 miles (450 kilometers) at the widest and some 260 miles (418 kilometers) at the longest point lying between the cities of al-Jawf and Sakakah on the north and Ha’il in the south; the volcanic mountain ranges of Harrat al-‘Uwayrid and Harrat Hutaym mark its western limits; and its eastern limit is the al-Labbah plateau, which extends toward the Saudi Arabian border with Iraq. The Nafud is an area of shifting dunes, and although a formidable barrier, it was crossed regularly by Bedouin in the past. The Dahna’ is a long finger of sand desert that connects the Nafud in the north with the Rub‘ al-Khali in the south. It runs much of the length of Saudi Arabia in a narrow arch some twenty miles (thirty-two kilometers) wide and 400 miles (643 kilometers) long between the central plateau of the Najd and the Gulf coast. The Rub‘ al-Khali is the largest of the sand deserts in the Arabian Peninsula and can easily be called a sand sea. It stretches from the highlands of Yemen in the west to the salt flats of the Gulf coast in the east, covering nearly 500,000 square miles and taking up nearly one half of the total area of Saudi Arabia. It is nearly 900 miles (1,448 kilometers) wide and 500 miles (804 kilometers) long, or approximately the size of France. It was a major barrier to the movements of

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Sunrise over the Empty Quarter, Saudi Arabia. Courtesy of Sebastian Maisel.

people and goods until recently, in the past being mainly crossed by Bedouin raiders who did not want to be seen. No Bedouin used it as part of their grazing lands, although the Al Murrah, ‘Awamir, Bani Yas, and Rashid included the fringe areas as part of their seasonal grazing lands. Although none of the Bedouin live in the Rub‘ al-Khali, it is well-known, and individual chains of dunes are named, such as the ‘Uruq al-Shayba’, which averages over 600 feet (180 meters) high. Different parts of the Rub‘ al-Khali are composed of recognizable different types of sand noted for color and grain size. The slopes along the northeastern edge of the great sand sea give rise to the small oasis of Liwa, where springs allow date cultivation in a scattered collection of small groves able to support a relatively small population even today. The eastern edge receives several small seasonal streams from the Western Hajar Mountains, which flow into the dangerous quicksands called Umm al-Samim. The far western side of the Rub‘ alKhali is less forbidding; chains of sand dunes are not as high and there are broad stretches of flat gravel plains between them. It is also possible to find grazing for camels as well as for wild herds of oryx, a large desert antelope; in the recent past, even ostriches were found there until hunted to extinction at the turn of the twentieth century. The first known European to cross the Rub‘ al-Khali was the British explorer Bertram Thomas, who in 1930–1931 was able to make the south-to-north journey with a group of Bedouin guides from the Bayt Kathir tribe. He was followed a year later by the British convert to Islam and advisor to King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud, Harry St. John Philby, who took a north-to-south route. Perhaps best known is the Englishman Wilfred Thesiger, who with Bedouin guides from the Bayt Kathir and Rashid tribes crossed it twice between 1946 and 1948. The Wahibah Sands are not connected to the other great sand deserts and are located in Oman between the coastal plains and the uplands of Bani Bu ‘Ali.

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They are also much smaller than the other sand deserts, being less than 100 miles (160 kilometers) wide and about 100 miles (160 kilometers) long. They are named for the Bedouin Wahibah tribe, whose traditional grazing territories lie between the sands and the oasis cities of Adam and Nizwa to the north. The Jiddat al-Harasis is the only desert noted here that is not composed of mainly sand, but of pebbles. It is a wide-open plain between the western slopes of Jabal al-Akhdar and Dhufar, stretching over 200 miles (320 kilometers) in length. The Jiddat takes its name from the Bedouin al-Harasis tribe, who are the only people to live year-round in the plains. Summer temperatures soar over 110°F (forty-three degrees Celsius) and with little seasonal rain the Jiddat has little natural pasture. It seems that the Harasis tribe was pushed out onto the plain as a result of conflicts with others in Dhufar and until their occupation the plains had no permanent population. It is perhaps because of this that the Jiddat was also home to the last wild herds of oryx. These large desert-dwelling antelope once inhabited the whole Arabian Peninsula into Jordan and Syria, and a hunting party in the Jiddat slaughtered the last wild herd in Oman in 1972. In 1979 the Omani government approved a project to reintroduce oryx to the Jiddat as an integrated project that included Harasis camel pastoralism. However, since 2003 hunting parties have again endangered the oryx. See also Oases; Travelers and Explorers.

FURTHER READING Beaumont, Peter, Gerald Blake, and Malcom Wagstaff. The Middle East. London: John Wiley & Sons, 1976. Chatty, Dawn. Mobile Pastoralists: Development Planning and Social Change in Oman. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. Fisher, W.B. The Middle East: A Physical, Social, and Regional Geography. London: Methuen, 1971. Thesiger, Wilfred. Arabian Sands. London: Readers Union Longmans, Green and Co., 1960.

Dhafir Sebastian Maisel Dhafir is a tribal confederation in Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. As a component tribe, it includes elements of different origin; for example, some groups claim sharif (descendant of the Prophet Muhammad) ancestry or some originating from other tribal groups such as the ‘Anazah, Bani Tamim, or Subay. Today, the Dhafir claim a territory that stretches from al-Hajara to al-Zubayr in Iraq. The tribe lived originally in the Hijaz Mountains under the loose leadership of the Al Suwayt. First mentioned in Washm and Sudayr in Najd at the end of the seventeenth century, the Dhafir fled the area to the north after heavy losses in the fighting with the rising Wahhabi power into the Ottoman-controlled Basrah Province. They merged with the Fudul tribe, another victim of the Wahhabi

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expansion. Caught between the powerful Muntafiq to the north and the expanding Shammar in the south, they were required to establish good relations with both of them; however, this created constant strife with the ‘Anazah, the archenemy of the Shammar. The long-lasting dependency on the Shammar and Muntafiq was thrown off in 1911 by Hamud bin Suwayt, who managed to significantly weaken the influence of the Muntafiq. After World War I, the tribe split into pro-Iraqi and pro-Saudi fractions. The entire tribe was sucked into the quarrels between the Hashemite Kingdom in Iraq and the Al Sa‘ud state in Najd. Both countries claimed that the Dhafir belonged to them and therefore had to pay taxes to them. In the treaty of Muhammara in 1922, they were declared Iraqi citizens, but part of their tribal territory was converted into a neutral zone. However, this did not prevent the Ikhwan from occasionally raiding their camps. The pro-Wahhabi party settled in Najd in the hijrah (agricultural colony) al-Shu‘aybah. The Al Sa‘id began to move to Kuwait in the 1930s. A split in the supreme leadership of the tribe occurred during that period between ‘Ajami ibn Suwayt, who swore allegiance to ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud, and Jad‘an ibn Suwayt, who led the Iraqi and Kuwaiti fractions. As shown above, the two main segments of the Dhafir, the Butun and the Samadah, are in permanent contrast to each other in terms of allegiance. The Butun include the Al Suwayt, Al Sa‘id, and Bani Hussein, whereas the Samadah group was made of the ‘Askar, Dhir‘an, Zuwasim, ‘Urayf, Ilijanat, and Ma‘alim. In addition, the origin of both shaykhly families is somehow nebulous. It is believed that the ibn Suwayt of the Butun were of Sulubi origin (as tinkers, hunters, and gatherers, the Salubah are on the bottom end of the social hierarchy) and the Aba Dra‘ are descendants of slaves. For themselves, they claim to be ashraf (singular sharif), or of Qahtan origin. Despite all this, contacts with relatives in Kuwait and Iraq were maintained as were transnational grazing and pasture search. Most tribe members gave up nomadism and camel breeding and switched to sheep because of market demand and convenience. With the help of trucks they were able to move the animals over a wider area than before.

FURTHER READING Ingham, Bruce. “Notes on the Dialect of the Dhafir of North-Eastern Arabia,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 45, no. 2 (1982): 245–259. Ingham, Bruce. Bedouin of Northern Arabia: Traditions of the Al-Dhafir. New York: KPI, 1986.

Dhahirah John A. Shoup The Dhahirah is a region in Oman encompassing the area between the Hajar Mountains and the Rub’ al-Khali and from the oasis of al-Buraymi on the north to Jabal al-Kawar on the south and is the home region of the Duru‘ tribe. There are two major dry streams along which most of the settled population live, Wadi

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Dhank and Wadi al-‘Ayn. Along Wadi Dhank lie the towns of Dhank, ‘Ibri, and Yanqil, whereas Wadi al-‘Ayn flows north into the United Arab Emirates, where the main settlements of al-Buraymi/al-‘Ayn are located. The region is a desert and has an average annual rainfall of between one inch (thirty millimeters) in the west and nearly fourteen inches (350 millimeters) in the east along the slopes of the Hajar Mountains. The Dhahirah region has been identified as the home of the ancient Majan culture referred to in Sumerian texts as an important source of copper although copper is not mined today. In the recent past sulfur and salt were mined by the Duru‘ and sold in market centers such as Nizwa. Duru‘ and other Bedouin tribes in the region raised sheep, goats, and camels and today the famous Duru‘ camels are primarily raised for racing. In addition, the many settlements along the main wadis support extensive cultivation of date palms, lemons, barley, corn, and even sugar cane. Many of these oases are fed by aflaj systems tapping water sources some distance from the fields. Al-Dhahirah is a natural corridor between Oman and the Gulf coast formed by the Hajar Mountains and the Rub‘ al-Khali. As a result, there are many historical forts and walled towns in the region. Among the most spectacular is Qala‘at al-Salif, which was built by Sultan ibn Sayf al-Ya‘arubi in 1724 AD but is now abandoned. Other historical forts are Husn ‘Ibri in ‘Ibri and the numerous forts in al-Buraymi and al-‘Ayn. See also Deserts.

Dhahran Sebastian Maisel Dhahran is a large city in eastern Saudi Arabia and is headquarters of Saudi Aramco, one of the most important locations for the Saudi Arabian oil industry. As such it is part of the metropolitan area in the Eastern Province that includes Dammam and Khobar. Until the late 1980s the city was still recognizable, but since then has significantly grown closer toward the other two. The distance between Dhahran and Dammam is less than twelve miles (twenty kilometers). The size of the greater Dammam area, which includes Dhahran, is approximately 434 square miles (700 square kilometers), and the population exceeds 2 million. Dhahran also hosts King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, founded in 1963 by Aramco, King Faysal University, and the new Dhahran International Airport, making it one of the busiest and fastest-growing communities in the kingdom. With the current presence of two public and several private universities and colleges, as well as private and public schools, Dhahran is also seen as an educational and cultural center of the region. In addition to schools, two museums attract large crowds of local and international visitors. In the early 1930s, Standard Oil of California, now Chevron Texaco, began exploring the area around Dhahran Rock, the only notable hill in the area. The city developed on the site of an exploration camp of Aramco in 1935 and quickly

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witnessed the building of industrial facilities, administrative buildings, and housing complexes for the employees of the oil company. During World War II, after Italian planes bombed Dhahran on October 19, 1940, an American airbase was built where the first oil facilities had been. For a long time Dhahran was a gated community surrounded by fences and walls and guarded by checkpoints, sharply contrasting the “real” city of Khobar, which was built free from security and economical concerns. In between the two centers, the country’s second largest airport and a university connected the cities. Generally, Dhahran has one of the best infrastructures in the country because of the oil industry. Highways, airports, and trains connect the city domestically and internationally. The city made headlines in recent years as the target of several terror attacks against foreigners and Saudi nationals, both civilians and military, and oil industry facilities. Saudi author ‘Abd al-Rahman Munif depicted the drastic changes in the life of the population since the discovery of oil in his classic 1989 novel Cities of Salt, in which the fictitious oil camp of Darran is widely believed to be Dhahran. In 1950, only 5,000 inhabitants, mostly foreigners working for Aramco, lived in the city.

FURTHER READING Facey, William. The Story of the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. London: Stacey International, 1994. Munif, Abd al-Rahman. Cities of Salt. New York: Vintage Books, 1989. Parssinen, Jon, and Kaizir Talib. “A Traditional Community and Modernization: Saudi Camp, Dhahran,” Journal of Architectural Education 35, no. 3 (1982): 14–17. Stegner, Wallace. Discovery! The Search for Arabian Oil. Portola, CA: Selwa Press, 2007. Symonds, Walter. Jebel Dhahran and the New Saudi Generation: A Personal Encounter. Houston: Brockton, 1993.

Dhows John A. Shoup The term dhow is not used in Arabic but seems to have been borrowed into English from the Persian/Indian term daw. The general term in Arabic for a sailing ship is markab or safinah, and generally speaking no one in the region uses the term dhow unless speaking in English. Instead, people refer to specific types of ships such as bum or baghalah. There are some thirty terms used for specific types of sailing vessels depending on size, number of sails, and purpose. Among the sleekest of crafts is the sambuq used primarily in the past for pearling. It is built for quick maneuvering required in the pearl banks and has both sails (it has two masts) and oars. The upper deck runs the whole length of the ship, which provides the sailors and pearlers with an easy working space. The lower deck is used for storage. Similar to the sambuq is the smaller shu‘ai, which lacks a carved stern and the stem is longer and more elegant, although not painted like that of a sambuq. Although the sambuq was only

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A baghalah on the corniche in Sharjah. Dhows can pull up right next to the shore to off- and on-load their cargos. Most of the dhows working in and out of Sharjah are Iranian, whereas in Dubai ships from Somalia make up the majority. Courtesy of John A. Shoup.

used for pearling activities, the shu‘ai is still used for fishing and in the past for pearling. A smaller craft used mainly for coastal fishing is called a badan, which is still the most common craft along the Omani coast, and those used in Musandam have highly decorated prows. There are several other small vessels; for example, the jalbut, which shows a good deal of European influence in its shape with a rather short, upright prow that was used in pearling and also coastal shipping. The shashah is a small fishing vessel made of palm fronds propelled by oars and one sail and is really not in the same category as those ships generally referred to as dhows. The batil is larger than the sambuq, with fine lines making it the fastest of all large sailing vessels in the Gulf. Its speed made it the favorite for military use in the past, and its shallow draft allowed it to escape into shoals and the shallow waters of the Gulf coast. It was also the choice of the admiral of pearling fleets, being a large vessel that stood out among the others. A batil has several unusual characteristics. Its bow piece is made of a flat fiddle-shaped piece of wood, which British explorer Wilfred Thesiger noted he saw some in Dubai that had the Latin letters “IHS” carved on them, no doubt in imitation of Portuguese ships from the past. Its stern is a carved horse head with a wooden horse’s tail that extends from the rudder just above the waterline. The batil, although large, has little storage space below deck and was not used for hauling cargo.

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More common cargo vessels today are the baghalah (called shahuf in Oman) and the bum. The word baghalah means mule in Arabic, and the ship is the largest cargo ship built in the Gulf. It has a square stem and the stern has a cabinlike room lined with a row of windows that extends over the rudder. The rudder is connected to the steering wheel by a rope that runs through the room. Similar to the baghalah is the ghanjah, which has recently been motorized. The main difference between them is the decoration on the prow: ghanjah have a trefoil decoration. The bum is smaller but is considered the better vessel because its longer and pointed stem makes it a faster ship and better able to deal with open seas. Some argue the bum’s shape allows it to take on more cargo and today it is the main sailing vessel built in the Gulf. Dhows play a major role transporting cargo around the Gulf region and there are still several places with active dhow-building harbors in Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and India in addition to Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait. Dhows are also used for cargo shipments between the Gulf region and East Africa. In addition to sails (most crafts have two masts) and oars, most of the ocean-going dhows have had diesel engines installed. With the added speed the engines give them and with their shallow drafts allowing them to use natural harbors that are too shallow for other vessels, dhows are still used by pirates along the Somali coast. See also Travelers and Explorers.

FURTHER READING Aguis, Dionisius. In the Wake of the Dhow: The Arabian Gulf Region. London: Garnet Publishing, 2002. Aguis, Dionisius. Seafaring in the Arabian Gulf and Oman. London: Kegan Paul, 2005. Dickson, H.R.P. The Arab of the Desert. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1949. Richardson, Neil, and Marcia Dorr. Craft Heritage of Oman. Dubai: Motivate Press, 2003. Thesiger, Wilfred. Arabian Sands. London: Readers Union Longmans, Green & Co., 1960.

Dhufar John A. Shoup Dhufar is the southern region of Oman located some 285 miles (460 kilometers) from the capital Masqat. It is the single largest region in Oman, occupying 120,000 square kilometers or about one-third of the total area of the country. Today the area called Dhufar includes the coastal plain around the city of Salalah, which is the administrative capital of the whole region; the Qarah Mountains, which are home to the South Arabian Qarah and Mahrah people; and the Najd, or the desert plateau that stretches into Yemen and north to the Rub‘ alKhali and Saudi Arabia, which is inhabited primarily by Bedouin. Dhufar differs from the rest of Oman by receiving summer monsoon rains starting in June and lasting into September. Rainfalls vary between five inches

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(127 millimeters) on the coast to over fifteen inches (381 mm) in the mountains turning the countryside green. Although the rest of the Arabian Peninsula suffers from the extreme heat of the summer, most of Dhufar receives mild southern breezes off of the Indian Ocean. Because of the summer monsoons, Dhufar supports forests that include the frankincense tree (luban), which has been exploited for its fragrant resins since ancient times. Dhufar is the home of two of the Southern Arabic-speaking peoples generally called Ahl al-Hadarah by most Omanis: the Mahrah and the Qarah, who have maintained their own customs and languages. The Ahl al-Hadarah also include the Harasis, who live to the east of Dhufar on the Jiddat al-Harasis, and the Shihuh of the Musandam Peninsula. The differences between the Ahl al-Hadarah and other Omanis in custom and language have given rise to several popular folk beliefs about them, many of which center around their different eating habits. In addition, it seems that some of them also keep the pre-Islamic practice of animal totems. The Mahrah consider the Somalis to be closely related to them, and in the recent past a Mahrah family owned the Kuria and Muria Islands. Tribal lore states that one of the early Mahrah leaders escaped the massacre of his family and sought refuge with the leader of Socotra Island, possibly indicating connections to East Africa as well. The economy in Dhufar traditionally rested on fishing, farming, and pastoralism, with each of the three areas providing different products. The discovery of oil in the Najd of Dhufar greatly changed local conditions after the Dhufar Rebellion ended. The Rebellion caused a good deal of the population to flee the fighting, with some seeking refuge in Yemen (then Marxist-led Southern Yemen) and others with the Harasis in Oman. See also Dhufar Liberation Front.

FURTHER READING Carter, J.R.L. Tribes in Oman. London: Peninsular Publishing, 1982.

Dhufar Liberation Front Christopher Danbeck The Dhufar Liberation Front (DLF—later the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf) was originally organized to challenge the central government of Oman’s control over the Dhufar region. Oman had annexed the region in 1879, but it was never fully integrated into the Sultanate because the people of Dhufar generally had greater historical ties to Northern Yemen rather than Oman. In 1962, Dhufari tribesmen started a rebellion against the control of the Omani Sultan, Sa‘id bin Taymur. The rebel’s main grievances revolved around the lack of attention paid to Dhufar by the central government in terms of infrastructural development and revenue sharing from oil profits. In 1964, three main rebel organizations (the Dhufar Benevolent Society, the Dhufar Soldiers Organization, and the local branch of the Arab Nationalists Movement) formed the DLF.

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The Sultan’s response to the DLF, however, was arguably weak because no military units were stationed in the Dhufar region and there were no local Dhufaris in the military forces. By 1965 the DLF held de facto control over most of the Dhufari countryside and issued a manifesto calling for the overthrow of the Sultan and the end to foreign influence (British) in Oman. Two years later, the DLF’s efforts were aided by external support provided by the recently formed People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). The PDRY government provided logistic support and safe havens inside Yemen to the DLF that eventually aided the DLF’s ability to launch a major offensive in June 1970. This offensive resulted in the retreat of the Sultan’s forces to several key coastal cities. Great Britain, which had long supported the Sultan because of vital British holdings, became frustrated at his inability to combat the DLF. As a result, the British instigated a coup and successfully replaced the Sultan with his son, Qabus bin Sa‘id Al Bu Sa‘id, on July 23, 1970. The newly emplaced Sultan Qabus and his British backers developed a new counterinsurgency plan centered on resolving rebel grievances through reforms rather than relying solely on military force. Between 1971 and 1975, the government allocated twenty-five percent of the nation’s development funds to Dhufar (a significant increase from previous years), which was aimed at improving the region’s transportation, education, rural health, and religious facilities. The government also used propaganda to encourage defection of DLF forces and their subsequent reintegration into the Sultan’s armed forces. Administratively, the government established networks along preexisting tribal structures with the Sultan paying tribal shaykhs a financial allowance in exchange for their loyalty. In 1972, the DLF found itself pressured by two factors: the Sultan’s counterinsurgency strategy had proved moderately successful in weakening the DLF’s support base, and the demise of Arab nationalism in the region in the wake of Israel’s victory over Nasir’s Egypt in the 1967 Suez War. These factors forced the DLF to look elsewhere for support, and in February 1972 the group officially changed its ideology from nationalist to Marxist. Additionally, the DLF changed its name to the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG) and expanded its goal from overthrowing the Sultan to ending the entire post-colonial structure established by the British in the region. Despite this change, the Sultan’s strategy was still successful and in 1974 the PFLOAG split into the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the People’s Front in Bahrain. This final split is widely recognized as the end of the DLF’s original movement.

Divorce Sebastian Maisel Divorce, talaq in Arabic, is an important aspect of rights of passage and family affairs in the societies of the Arab Gulf States. Although some alterations and modifications are observed, generally Islamic and cultural traditions govern the application of divorce.

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Marriage is a legal institution in Islam; therefore, to annul that bond is strongly discouraged. However, quite paradoxically, divorce in the Arab Gulf States is common and simple, going back to pre-Islamic times when tribal societies made divorce an easy, straightforward act. With the implementation of Shari‘ah guidelines, divorce was made more difficult in order to strengthen the position of women. Shari‘ah law and the application of a specific legal school give explicit details of how to end a marital relationship and what to do with child custody, property claims, and the aspect of re-marrying. Repudiation, as a one-sided form of divorce by the husband, is an essential principle of Islamic family law, which is maintained in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. It is recommended for a man to state three times to his wife, “I repudiate you.” After the first two announcements, he should wait and reflect before issuing his third and final statement, after which a divorce is irreconcilable. Women can seek divorce also; however, the process is much more complicated and often requires sufficient funds. She needs the support of her legal guardian and on the basis of the agreements of the wedding contract can file for divorce in court if the husband did not fulfill his marital obligations. Another method for a woman to divorce her husband is to buy her way out of the wedding contract. This can be done by returning the dowry or paying him a certain amount of money. Otherwise, she can file for divorce in case the husband is impotent, insane, abusive, or negligent. In these cases, she has to go to court and there has to rely on the verdict of the judge. No unilateral provisions for alimony are made in Islam; however, it is custom that the woman can keep the dowry, but will not receive any other compensation. She also has to return to her father’s family. Custody over the children is split; boys to the age of six or seven and girls to the age of nine are supposed to live with their father. Oftentimes, girls remain with the mother. After the official divorce, women are required to wait for a specific period of time before getting re-married in order to find out if she is pregnant from the previous marriage. Recently, concerns are growing over the increase of the divorce rate in the Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia, particularly on the basis of incompatibility. In the past, families selected the spouses and marriages were arranged by carefully choosing a matching partner. With the area’s rapid modernization and urbanization, these practices tend to be less frequent. Nowadays, spouses are better educated, more worldly, and often from different regional and tribal backgrounds. The divorce rate in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States is rising to an unprecedented fifty percent. In Bahrain the divorce rate is around twenty percent, and in Qatar it is around thirty percent. The highest number of divorces is recorded in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia and the capital Riyadh. Local experts explain this trend by pointing to changing attitudes toward marriage, the unwillingness to compromise (e.g., over the issue of working spouses), or not understanding the meaning of marriage. Women are also savvier about their rights and responsibilities, and many traditional men are unable to deal with modern women. The government of Qatar supports divorced women by giving a monthly allowance in addition to the grant of a house.

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FURTHER READING An-Na‘im, Abdullahi A. Islamic Family Law in a Changing World: A Global Resource Book. New York: Palgrave, 2002. El Alami, Dawoud. Islamic Marriage and Divorce Laws of the Arab World. London: Springer, 1996. Long, David. Culture and Customs of Saudi Arabia. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005. Vogel, Frank. Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2000.

Dress Sebastian Maisel Clothing protects the human body from the elements of the environment, such as weather, harmful animals, and hazardous materials or actions. However, clothing is not only worn for safety, but also to convey a message to the outside world about the status of the wearer. From what a person is wearing, society can place him in a social hierarchy or position and knows how to interact. Simply looking at what a person is wearing can help identify marital and social status, religious affiliation, or profession. Although often taken for granted, the process of making clothing used to be and still is in many parts of the world a substantial aspect of social origin and development. The hot summer days and frosty winter nights of Arab countries require special attire that insulate from the cold and chilling winds, but in the summer let the air and cool breeze circulate underneath. Loose-fitting items seem to be most comfortable in these kinds of weather conditions, and not surprising long garments that loosely cover the body shape most traditional clothing in Arabia. This feature is considered the optimal adaptation to the climate as well as to Islamic morals and values, which require both sexes, but especially women, to hide their bodies in public. However, despite a uniform appearance, differentiations in style, color, pattern, or application can be noted. Clothing often gives away the social status of the wearer and information regarding the social, lifestyle, ethnic, confessional, or occupational group to which he belongs. Most clothing is worn by both sexes, but differences remain in the type of material used or in the pattern. From a functional point of view, five main components of Arabian clothing can be recognized.

UNDERGARMENTS Because of the wide tailor, Arab undergarments are very different from Western styles, although they are worn directly on the body. They usually consist of pants, sirwal, and a type of shirt with openings for the head and on the front. A sirwal has a drawstring to secure the pants at the waist or hip level. A long type and a short type of sirwal are common in Arabia, whereas the short type is worn in the eastern and the long sirwal in the western parts of the peninsula. The

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original form of underwear was a simple rectangle loincloth, izar, which is wrapped around the waist. Some farmers in the Tihamah, Asir, Yemen, and Oman still wear the izar as their main piece of dress, whereas others prefer the izar to wear at night to modern types of pajamas.

OVERGARMENTS The ankle-long dress that allows air to circulate freely, thawb, is a common piece worn by men and women alike. Sometimes it is held together by a belt or can be buttoned up; then it is called qumbaz. They are cut in a way that several dresses can be worn on top of each other. Women thawbs have distinct regional and tribal variations, including colored fabric appliques, silk, or metal thread embroidery, or have silver coins sewn on to them. In areas of higher altitude, women wear thawbs with narrow sleeves and semi-fitted yokes to keep the body warm. The closer one gets to the warm areas of the desert and coast, the wider the sleeves and looser the garment gets. However, they all have in common the use of brightly colored embroidery to decorate them, which is in sharp contrast to the monochrome appearance of the stark environment.

OUTERGARMENTS Both sexes wear obligatory outergarments, which are considered part of the traditional clothing. Worn outside the house in public, they should cover the entire body and therefore are very wide and reach down to the ankles. Two basic forms are the simple wrapper made from one piece and often not sewn together and a cloak with arms or at least armholes, ‘abayah or bisht. Another type is the knee-long, fur-lined jacket or farwa worn in the winter. An important accessory is the belt, which holds the overgarment in place and serves as decoration and storage for weapons and money. Made from leather, cotton, or wool, belts show a variety of forms.

HEADGEAR Headgear in Arabia is rated higher than in Western societies, because modesty and custom require covering the head. For this reason, headgear throughout the Middle East has resisted change and Western influences. Type, form, and color of the headgear indicate social and ethnic affiliation. In addition to different types of caps, various forms of scarves are seen and wrapped around the head. In some areas with a more tropical and arid climate, straw hats are worn in the fields. A separate issue and distinct part of women’s clothing is the facecover, which is connected to Islamic understandings of morals. Sometimes women wear larger wrappers not just over the shoulder, but also over the head as part of their headgear. A range of regional terms is used to describe veiling, which for most women in the area is not considered a burden but rather is seen to beautify the face by covering. The hijab is an ordinary headscarf that covers the head but leaves the face exposed, whereas the bukhnuq is a highly decorated hood worn by

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young girls. The niqab is a face veil that covers the entire face except the eyes and is worn with a headscarf. In Oman and the United Arab Emirates the burqa‘ is a piece of cloth worn like a mask that usually reaches to just below the nose and leaves the mouth free, whereas in Pakistan and Afghanistan it covers the entire face and body, leaving only a mesh screen to see through. Shaylah is a long, rectangular scarf popular in the Gulf region. It is wrapped around the head and tucked or pinned in place at the shoulders. The chador is a full-body cloak worn by Iranian women. Although there are few Iranians in the Gulf, the chador is seen in some places among the Persian population.

FOOTWEAR Shoes are only considered a necessary accessory in the cities, but Bedouin and many people in the countryside go barefoot or only wear shoes on special occasions. Leather shoes are much less common than footwear or sandals made from palm fronds. Leather or wooden sandals (na‘l) and slippers (qabqab) are common at home and in public. Because shoes are in direct contact with dirt and filth, they are regarded as a lower, despicable object in custom, traditions, and proverbs. For that reason, people have to take them off before entering a house or mosque. In pre-Islamic times, Arabs of the peninsula were mostly Bedouin, farmers, or merchants with a common preference for loose wraps, with urban people wearing wraps of finer quality and decoration. Many objects that are still worn in Arabia, such as the izar or shamlah, have been mentioned in the poetry of the Jahiliyah. The fashion of dress among the early Muslim community was certainly an extension of the preceding Jahiliyah period; however, new religious components were added or restrictions imposed. Standard articles of clothing at the time of the Prophet Muhammad included underwear, a body shirt, a long overdress, a gown or tunic, and a coat or wrap in addition to head and footwear. Islam has a significant dress code with special rules for pilgrims and non-Muslims. The ritual dress for those making the pilgrimage to Makkah and Madinah was very similar to the dress of this time period, two sheets of unhemmed cloth wrapped around their waist and another draped over the shoulder. Women wear their regular modest dress, including a headscarf that covers their hair. Today, this is regarded as a sign of submission to God’s message and a symbol of unity and equality among all pilgrims regardless of their place of origin and social status. But the most important innovation was the transformation of the veil, which was commonly worn, and now turned into an obligatory part of women’s clothing. Men were supposed to wear some type of headgear also, and the most popular form was the ‘imamah or turban, a strip of cloth wrapped around the head. Some religious reform movements such as the Wahhabis felt it necessary to clamp down on the urban elite, who wore luxurious clothes based on the Hadith of Muhammad, which forbade seven things: silver vessels, gold rings, silk, brocade, qassi (a striped fabric from Egypt containing silk), satin, and tanned hides. With the expansion of Islam, Arabs encountered a wide range of clothing styles from the Byzantine and Persian empires. Urban dress in the Umayyad and ‘Abbasid capitals of Damascus and Baghdad showed the blending of cultures.

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The Arabian Peninsula was marginalized, and its traditional dress changed little from that of the time of Muhammad. During the tenth and eleventh centuries, styles from Iran and Central Asia penetrated the Penisula when shirt styles and the sirwal were adopted. The Turkish Saljuqs and Ottomans introduced elements of Central Asian dress that were adopted mainly by the urban populations of the Hijaz. Special colors were chosen to express grief and mourning—among the Shi‘ites white, and Sunnis often wore dark blue. Because of different historical developments and influences, regional differences in clothing appeared. The Arabian Gulf region experienced Persian and Indo-Malayan influences, whereas the western region was exposed to Ottoman styles and many other international styles, which were introduced during the pilgrimage. With the beginning of the nineteenth century, far-reaching changes in the social life affected the entire Middle East. The Ottoman administration and particularly the urban population were now exposed to European fashion, and Western tailored clothes replaced gradually traditional loose-floating garments. With the increasing economical and political control, European and Indian manufactured goods and products were inundating the local market. New types of cheaper clothing were available. Market economy and textile industry became part of a new understanding of what to wear and where to buy. No longer was it necessary to make your own clothing; now everyone was able to buy the desired dress at the market. This led to the decline of an entire local industry, for example, in al-Hasa, where many families had produced thawbs and bishts for the entire region. Technological progress helped change the pace and quality of tailoring. Machine stitching replaced traditional hand embroidery and sewing machines became the first signs of modernization in Arabia. Today Western fashion is very common in many Arab countries, except in the Arabian Peninsula, where people from all social classes prefer to wear an indigenous style that includes thawb and abayas as well as traditional headgear. This traditional attire is considered the national dress in many Arabian Gulf States; wearing Western clothing on the other hand is seen as a statement of modernization and belonging to the non-native section of the population. For example, in Kuwait or the Emirates it is possible to see that women dress more in Western ways than men. In the Gulf States with their high percentage of guestworkers from Southeast Asia, Indo-Malayan trends and fashions, like the sari or sarong, became common.

REGIONAL FORMS The Hijaz used to be the most cosmopolitan area in the Arabian Peninsula because of the influx of international pilgrims during the Hajj. It also has been a center for trade and commerce with contacts to many other cultures. The long presence of Ottoman officials was also reflected. The typical dress for Hijazi women was the highly embellished sidriyah (vests) and sirwal, which are covered by elaborate thawbs. In public, women wore the ‘abayah to cover the body, and a long cloth called jamah. The traditional headgear had three parts of fabric wrapped around the head in a distinct cloud shape and had multiple holes to see

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through and allow ventilation. Rural women in the Hijaz used to wear thawbs heavily embroidered with distinct tribal motifs. In the past, Hijazi men were recognized by their traditional headgear: a high, brimless cap (taqiyya), around which a turban (usbah) was wrapped in a very specific way indicating a religious scholar, merchant, or even resident of a particular town. Today, however, most people prefer to wear the kufiyah usually called ghutrah, the red-checkered headscarf. As outer garments they wore the usual thawb tailored in bright, striped materials with embroidered front edges and two front pockets, called jubbah. In Najd, the central region, the dress code resembled much of the Bedouin and early Islamic clothing with its simple forms and modest appearances. Najd was isolated from the rest of the peninsula for long times, and therefore was able to preserve its unique dress. Men usually wore the thawb, white in the summer and brown in the winter, over which they put a long-sleeved cloak as an outer garment. Women too wore the thawb as their basic garment with narrow sleeves and embroidered cuffs. As overdress they chose another thawb with an embroidered neckline cut in the center. The scarf or hood to cover their hair and neck was also embroidered and called bukhnuq. To protect the face, a black veil with slits to see through was worn over the face. Finally, an ‘abayah covered the entire body. Along the Gulf coast, men wore a similar dress to those in Najd, but theirs had wider sleeves and was called dishdashah. In Kuwait, men of high status wore an additional section of gold braid on their outer cloak or bisht. Women’s dresses from early on were imported, reflecting the extensive trade relations with India, Persia, and East Africa. Manufactured dresses and synthetic materials were common long before the oil era and bartered for local seed pearls. ‘Abayahs and bukhnuqs were worn as outergarments and when in public. Men in Bahrain commonly wore a simple garment called awzar (izar) over their dishdashahs, especially when working. The main Bahraini women’s article is the dirah gawan, a waisted, scooped-neck, short-puffed-sleeve garment, and the thawb nashal, a gown with enormous sleeve openings. Although the national dress of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates is very similar to the Saudi fashion, a remarkable difference is noted in Oman with regard to the national headgear. The Omani turban, the masar, was for a long time exclusively made and imported from Kashmir. It is wrapped in a significant shape, which allows one to recognize Omanis from a distance. Yemeni dress is distinctive from that of the rest of the Peninsula, and although there are numerous local variations, the styles from the capital Sana‘a are the most influential. As a symbol of the natural abundance, men adorned their hair with aromatic herbs. A leather headband decorated with silver and colored ribbons held them in place. In addition, a long cotton cloth was wrapped around the head with a portion falling over the shoulders. Tribal chiefs and wealthy members of society wore decorated headbands. Other headwear included straw hats, ghutrah (the checkered headscarf), and the ‘iqal, which holds the ghutrah in place and is made from goat hair. Important men had their ‘iqal embroidered with metal threads. Undergarments included a cotton vest (sidriyyah), a sirwal, and the wizrah, the rectangular sarong wrapped around the waist. Over the

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ordinary thawb a cover or shawl was worn made from colored and striped cotton. In the winter, which sees occasional snowfall, long, wide, and heavy cloaks (farwa, shamlah) with tanned sheepskin on the inside and embroidery on the outside were thrown over the thawb. If shoes were worn, they were made either of leather or palm fronds. Women’s headgear included a colorful scarf worn underneath a straw hat. They usually placed herbs and flowers under this scarf. Other shawls and scarves were used to cover hair and rarely the face. Sirwal and sidriyyah were the common types of underwear. The dress is the most special item of Asir clothing because of distinct cuts, shapes, and patterns that indicate the tribal and regional affiliation of the wearer. It was custom to wear an izar over the dress to protect it while working. Capes covered the shoulders and back and provided protection from the elements. Belts and sandals made from leather were also commonly worn. Special clothes were made for occasions such as weddings or mourning. Wedding dresses usually were tailored from the best fabric and heavily decorated with embroidery and jewelry. During the mourning period, women normally wore a white dress with a black head cover and white headband.

RELIGIOUS/ISLAMIC CLOTHING Performing the pilgrimage to Makkah and Madinah requires wearing specific ritual garments to reflect on the spiritual status of ihram and declaring the intention of making the pilgrimage. The pilgrim takes a bath and puts on two clean, unstitched, and seamless pieces of white cloth. The upper cloth (rida) is draped over the left shoulder leaving the right shoulder bare, and the lower one (izar) is wrapped around the waist. No headgear is permitted, except an umbrella. All male Muslims are required to wear the same and no other outfit during the Hajj. Only when the weather becomes very cold are the pilgrims allowed to cover up with a blanket. Women can dress in their regular clothes, but should not cover their faces. This type of religious dress has not changed since the implementation of the first pilgrimage rules by the Prophet Muhammad. The Arabian Peninsula maintained the traditional clothing style successfully even in times of dramatic social and economical change. They still were very much the same clothes that people wore in pre-Islamic and early Islamic times. Only Westernized people gave up the old styles. Sophisticated urban women also wear Western fashion, but when they leave the house to go in public they have to cover their bodies under the common black ‘abayah and their faces under veil (burqa‘, bukhnuq, niqab). The same law does not apply to foreign women, although they are required to dress modestly. Non-Saudi Muslim women usually wear a cloak and headscarf, but do not cover their faces, whereas non-Muslim women wear the ‘abayah and carry a headscarf in case they are approached by the religious police. Expatriates are not encouraged to dress in the distinct Arabian attire; however, they should wear professional clothes without exposing too much skin (i.e., shorts and t-shirts are not recommended). But very slowly, especially among the young generation, a shift is noticeably changing the traditional outfit for more Western clothing, such as t-shirts, baseball caps, and sweat pants.

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FURTHER READING Al-Bassam, Laila Saleh. “Traditional Costumes of Asir,” al-Ma’thurat al-Sha‘biyah 67 (2003): 8–29. Lindisfame, Nancy, and Bruce Ingham. Languages of Dress in the Middle East. Surrey, UK: Curzon, 1997. Long, David. Culture and Customs of Saudi Arabia. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005. Scarce, Jennifer. Women’s Costume of the Near and Middle East. London: Routledge, 2003. Stillman, Yedida Kalfon. Arab Dress: A Short History, from the Dawn of Islam to Modern Times. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2003. Topham, John. Traditional Crafts of Saudi Arabia. London: Stacey International, 1981. Yamani, Mai. Cradle of Islam: The Hijaz and the Quest for an Arabian Identity. London: I.B. Tauris, 2004.

Drugs Sebastian Maisel According to the teachings of Islam, any substance that alters the state of mind of the faithful or blurs his judgment is prohibited, as are those substances that create health problems. Saudi Arabia applies strict interpretations to the Islamic rule of banning alcohol and drugs. The other Gulf States follow different directions, allowing limited alcohol sale at hotels or licensed stores. However, drugs are officially banned, and their sale, production, and possession penalized. The countries signed all three international drug control treaties and are members of the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP). Its drug enforcement personnel regularly participate in international training programs. Currently no significant drug production is reported for Saudi Arabia. Since 1988, the Saudi government has imposed the death penalty for drug smuggling. High numbers of executions for drug trafficking suggest the existence of a drug abuse problem. Because of the lack of official data, it can only be assumed that the issue is not at an alarming level. Cultural and religious norms and restrictions, particularly the application of the harsh Saudi Islamic legal code, contribute to a low level of drug abuse. However, drugs are available and addicted people are treated in the country’s four hospitals specialized for curing drug-related cases in Riyadh, Jiddah, Dammam, and Buraydah. No such institutions exist to treat female addicts. Foreign nationals, on the other hand, are usually deported. Free counseling is available, but most drug abusers do not seek treatment, often because they are afraid of being treated in a psychiatric hospital as mentally ill. The Ministry of Interior is the leading agency in the nationwide effort to fight drugs. Special training programs, units, and drug-control officers help prevent extensive drug abuse. They collaborate with the Presidency of Youth Welfare to raise early awareness among teenagers and to educate them about the dangers of illegal drugs. The country works closely on a bilateral level with countries from the Gulf Cooperation Council as well as neighboring states like Jordan and

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Syria and lately with U.S. Customs advisory teams. In 2003, Saudi Arabia was rated third in the world in terms of its measures to combat drug trafficking and abuse according to the United Nations Office for Drug and Crime. Among the most heavily consumed drugs in Saudi Arabia are hashish, heroin, cocaine, and amphetamines. Paint or glue inhalation and prescription drug abuse are also noted. In the southern regions of Najran, Asir, and Jizan, qat, a stimulant plant from Yemen, is often chewed. This traditional drug plant is very popular in Yemen, but illegal in Saudi Arabia. The culture of the region is very similar to Yemeni culture, and therefore, the plant and the custom of chewing it during the afternoon break became part of local tradition. An increase of drugs coming from Yemen, but also from Bahrain and Iraq, is a growing concern for the government. Although not a drug-producing country, the United Arab Emirates are believed to be a major trans-shipment center for marijuana and opium from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran. The country’s laissez-faire policy of free ports and a heterogeneous population with large numbers of nationals from those countries contribute to a growing drug-related problem. The government battles this with harsh punishments for smuggling. However, capital punishment, although existent, was usually not applied. Other efforts include bilateral counternarcotics agreements with neighboring Iran and a crackdown on organized crime. Recently, the country has taken a tougher stand on illegal narcotics, which is reflected in imposing harsher punishment for possession of drugs, usually four years in prison, and a subsequently higher number of drug-related arrests. The explanation for the growing number of arrests, confiscations, and addicts is usually the changing demographic structure of the countries. The population in all countries of the area is getting younger every year; in some cases over fifty percent are younger than eighteen years of age. Economically, they are well off or at least they have most of their needs provided for free. Because alcohol is not available, some affluent youth that are bored and feel disconnected from the traditional conservative and religious heritage of their parents turn to drugs as a way to pass their time. Frustration with current economic, social, and political developments adds to the willingness to take drugs in order to escape daily routine. Consumers and dealers are both nationals and foreigners, whereas couriers are easily found among the thousands of underpaid and underprivileged guestworkers. Clearly overrepresented, most of the arrested and convicted drug smugglers are from this social group.

FURTHER READING Isralowitz, Richard, and Mohammed Afifi. Drug Problems: Cross-Cultural Policy and Program Development. Westport, CT: Auburn House, 2002. Al-Mennaa, Fahad Nasser. “The Causes of Drug Usage, Distribution, and Smuggling in Saudi Arabia.” PhD dissertation, Washington State University, 1995. Sarhan, Hashim. “Drug Abuse in the United Arab Emirates.” PhD dissertation, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 1995. United Nations. Laws and Regulations Promulgated to Give Effect to the Provisions of the International Treaties on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Qatar. Vienna: United Nations, 1995.

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Dubai Carla Higgins Dubai is a small emirate of approximately 3,900 square kilometers of desert, sea, and the enclave of Hatta, a mountainous area on the border of Oman. Dubai has an estimated population of 1,204,000 (2003 estimate). The emirate is primarily comprised of Dubai city and is a city-state. Dubai is characterized by sea and desert but with a somewhat unique geography—it straddles a creek that extends a considerable distance inland, providing a natural harbor and offering the opportunity of maritime trade. It is thought that Dubai began as a small fishing village in the eighteenth century by members of the Bani Yas confederation, who were under Abu Dhabi rulers. Members of the Al Bu Falasah subsection of the Bani Yas settled in Dubai and seceded from Abu Dhabi in 1833. Maktum bin Buti, one of the co-rulers of Dubai at that time, established the Al Maktums as the ruling family. Pearling and trade created wealth and connections to an outside world, and made Dubai an attractive destination for immigrants. By the turn of the twentieth century Dubai had approximately 10,000 residents that were divided into three quarters. The quarter of Shindaghah was probably the original fishing village and was to the west of the creek. The quarter of Dubai proper, now known as Bur Dubai, was further inland to the west of the creek and housed Al Fahidi Fort, the main mosque, and was the home of government. The quarter of Deira is located to the east of the creek and was home to Arabs, Persians, and Baluchis as well as the biggest suq (market) on the Trucial Coast. The population of Dubai was more multinational than any other on the Gulf coast at the beginning of the twentieth century. Pearling was the major economic activity, and Dubai had a greater share of its population engaged in pearling than in any other emirate, although unlike Abu Dhabi, the population engaged in pearling were permanent residents—they did not leave Dubai when the pearling season was over. Pearling in Dubai brought in less revenue because the ruler exempted many boats from taxation, and this reluctance to tax most likely encouraged entrepreneurship; however, after the 1920s pearling declined. Trade became a key component of the Dubai economy, and grew rapidly after a 1902 increase in customs dues on trade through Persian ports; entrepot trade then moved from the Persian coast to Dubai. Persians involved in entrepot trade also moved to Dubai, eventually with their families, along with craftsmen and other workers, although prominent merchants remained largely of Arab origin. Many Persians arrived from the Bastak region, settled in what is known today as the Bastakiyah district of Bur Dubai, and were Sunni Muslims from Arab tribes. All of Dubai was organized into different tribal groups well into the 1960s, and because of this organization, neighborhoods had spokesmen or headmen to settle conflicts and bring problems to the ruler’s attention. There was no state police, no government-sponsored educational system, no authority over land use, and little to no contact with the ruling shaykhs. The government was, however,

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engaged with business, worked to improve commerce on the banks of the creek, and contracted a merchant to collect customs duties. By 1955, however, customs duties for larger vessels were collected by the British Bank of the Middle East. Dubai’s prosperity was firmly based in trade abroad by the 1930s, as well as the international community that maintained it. When pearling failed, in conjunction with World War II and the resulting disruption of additional trade, many residents of Dubai became destitute and oral histories indicate that some Dubai residents starved. Local products such as dates and milk were not available to many without local tribal connections. Food supplied by the British was rationed. A black market trade also arose, but by the end of the war it was also depleted. Many former workmen on pearling boats became porters and indispensable to the movement of goods, and a small reform movement began to focus on their labor rights. When plans were being formulated to deepen the creek, prominent merchants sugNew high-rise buildings in Dubai’s newly planned gested to the ruler that local labor should be business district are the world’s largest collection of used, thus furthering the idea that the needs postmodern buildings in the world. Courtesy of John of locals should be addressed as a priority in A. Shoup. Dubai’s multinational environment. As the pearling industry and trade failed, the oil concessions and rents paid by the British for exploration and landing facilities began, going directly to the ruler and dramatically increasing his wealth. Persian merchants also had some means to fall back on. The ruler’s cousins, who were merchants, suffered substantial loss and in 1938 were among those merchants calling for reform, as well as efforts to depose Shaykh Sa‘id bin Maktum. Shaykh Sa‘id was supported by the British, who valued him as a moderating force in the region. Dubai became divided into two armed camps. In this environment, an advisory majlis was set up with the stated power to veto decisions of the ruler, to set up budgets for the city and allocate resources, and whose members were proposed by leaders in the community. A Council of Merchants was set up as well as a municipal council that made proposals, initiated schools, and began attempting to run the city-state until disbanded in 1939 by tribesmen loyal to the ruler. This brief attempt to run an organized city, however, was appreciated by many, among them the ruler’s son. When Shaykh Rashid became ruler in 1958, he initiated a Municipal Council, as well as the beginnings of a police force under a British police officer. Improvements to the creek also increased sustained traffic into the port, and the Dubai Port Committee was initiated by this time.

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A system began by the late 1950s to offer community services by private companies, such as electricity and telephone, and the ruler owned substantial shares in each. In the late 1950s an airstrip was built, soon to be an airport in 1965. A bridge connecting Deira to Bur Dubai was built. Both of these projects were built for the future—they were far beyond immediate needs at the time. The ambition to develop Dubai rapidly was shown to be a success with the rapid influx of foreign companies and the growth of trade in later years. Mention of Dubai’s development must include the role of the British beyond that of signing truces in the nineteenth century. In 1954, the British created a political agency in Dubai, from which limited development and social services were organized, garnering the attention of rulers from other areas of the Trucial States, who replaced it in 1965 with the Development Office of the Trucial States Council, located in Dubai. The British sent foreign specialists, and Dubai residents observed changes in community services. Medical facilities and health services were initiated. Schools, began by the British in Sharjah in 1953, were built in the northern states by Kuwait from 1954, and expanded into Dubai in the 1960s. Emphasis was on technical education. In 1969, the first oil exports left Dubai. Although oil wealth was to play a role in Dubai’s development, it did not have near the impact of Abu Dhabi’s mass reserves. Immediately after Dubai first began exporting oil, it began planning for a future without it and utilized its revenues toward building ports and in building trade and business opportunities. Economic and population growth accelerated, as did determination to build a business community and attract new businesses with appropriate facilities and support. With the discovery and impending export of oil from the offshore field of Fath, efforts were made to create a deep-water harbor in 1967; by 1972 Port Rashid was opened and the population of Dubai had doubled to 120,000—and it doubled again by 1981. Port Rashid had been expanded from nine berths to thirty-five, and dray docks had been constructed. After the 1973 October war, and using rising oil revenues, Dubai began to industrialize and established Jabal ‘Ali as its center. Another harbor was built with sixty-seven berths, and Jabal ‘Ali became the Jabal ‘Ali Free Zone with an initial clientele of 650 enterprises, including the aluminum smelter DUBAL, the largest in the Middle East. Dubai’s experiments have paid off, creating a city-state known worldwide for the fast pace of development, wealth, and cosmopolitan character. It has remained true to its roots, and is more a multinational city than ever. Business reigns supreme. The free zone experiment began at Jabal ‘Ali has expanded into over twenty-four free zones in Dubai alone. Dubai is the leader in a $3-billion-ayear exhibit/conference industry. Housing has exploded and huge projects with luxury accommodations are visible features of the skyline, as are huge malls with high-end consumer goods. The world’s tallest building is being built there, the Burj Dubai. A new metro system is underway. Sports arenas host a variety of sporting events, including horse racing, motor racing, tennis, rugby, cricket, sailing, soccer, and golf to attract tourists. Major international music/pop stars perform in Dubai. Efforts to build the arts and promote cultural events abound, beginning with the Heritage Village that features historical homes in Shindaghah. New developments, such as The World and Palm Island, offer luxury

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housing and entertainment venues. Concurrent to such development, Dubai leaders struggle to address issues of human and labor rights among its poor, imported laborers; the issue of how to provide social services to its huge expatriate population; and how to meet the high standards of its national citizens.

Dubai Media City Carla Higgins Dubai Media City (DMC) is one of the many free zones in Dubai. A free zone is an area, and usually a group of facilities, where national and international investors can locate and build businesses with 100% foreign ownership, with a corporate tax holiday, freedom to repatriate capital and profits, and no import duties. It is a widely held belief in Dubai that free zones bring jobs and expertise and boost the national economy, and free zones have now proliferated. The first free zone was that of Jabal ‘Ali and was established in 1985. Currently, there appear to be approximately thirty free zones spread throughout the United Arab Emirates, and seventeen are in Dubai alone, two in Sharjah, one in ‘Ajman, one in Umm al-Quwayn, one in Ra’s al-Khaymah, and one in Fujayrah; two are proposed for Abu Dhabi. These free zones host more than 3,000 companies. DMC states in its mission statement the intent “to create and market world class enabling services for the media industry.” Its vision is “to become an efficient and leading provider of services to foster the growth of Dubai’s knowledge based economy.” DMC, in large part because of its free zone status, has developed into a media community without equal, hosting advertising agencies, broadcasting, film, leisure and entertainment, news agencies, printing and publishing, online media and marketing services, and production and information agencies. Companies such as the Associated Press, Bertelsmann, BMG, CNBC, CNN, the international headquarters of Middle East Broadcasting Company (MBC), McGraw-Hill, Reuters, and Sony now occupy Media City, as do individual freelancers. Importantly, the Arabic news channel Al-‘Arabiyah is also located at DMC. The Showtime network opened its headquarters there in 2004, and BMG MENA is now there, controlling a large music production library that is used by production companies and advertising agencies. The Voice of America is also based in DMC. DMC promises that all businesses are given the freedom to create. It has initiated Dubai Studio City, which offers a single location to shoot a film from beginning to end. DMC has presented and organized the Dubai International Film Festival since 2004 to showcase excellence in Arab cinema and contribute to the development of the regional industry. A new International Media Production Zone (IMPZ), the first in the region, has created an “environment for media production companies … to interact and collaborate effectively.” DMC launched the Ibda‘a Media Student Awards to recognize and foster young media talent from the Arab world. Other emirates have launched alternatives to DMC. The emirate of Fujayrah has launched Creative City with the intent to attract international broadcast

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television and radio providers to Fujayrah through providing a similar set of services as DMC. Ra’s al-Khaymah Media Free Zone and Film City were initiated in January 2006 to compete with DMC, with the expectation that the high cost of living in Dubai will push media companies to the less expensive emirate.

FURTHER READING “Dubai Media City.” Available at http://www.dubaimediacity.com (last accessed October 8, 2008). “UAE Free Zones.” Available at http://www.uaefreezones.com (last accessed October 8, 2008).

Duru‘ John A. Shoup The Duru‘ tribe is one of the most important in Oman, being located in the desert to the west of Nizwa and Adam, the original home of the ruling Al Bu Sa‘idi dynasty. The Duru‘ tribe belongs to the Ghafiri (northern) faction and had long-standing feuds with ‘Awamir and the Wahibah tribes that ended in the 1960s. The Duru‘ controlled the salt mines at Qarn al-Milh and also extracted salt from Wadi Umm al-Samim, which they marketed in Nizwa and ‘Ibri. They also gained control over the sulfur mines at Qarn al-Kibrit, although this was contested by the Wahibah and the cause for their long conflict. The Duru‘ had good relations for the most part with the Al Bu Sa‘idi sultans and frequently provided tribal troops when necessary. The tribe supported the Imam of Nizwa in the first part of the twentieth century, and Wilfred Thesiger noted that he and his companions were threatened by them during his last trip into Oman in 1949–1950. He was saved only by the protection extended by a shaykh of the Wahibah tribe. The Duru‘ formally submitted to the Omani Sultan Sa‘id bin Taymur in 1954. The first discovery of oil in Oman was within the traditional grazing area of the Duru‘ and the Sultan used this as a means to break the power of the tribe. He organized the labor supply so that rival shaykhs took their turn, which had the intended effect. The tribe was weakened and divided to such an extent that in the 1970s some 800 tribesmen left Oman for Abu Dhabi and Dubai, where it was easy for them to become citizens. This was a major loss of manpower when the total number of the tribe was estimated to be around 2,500. Those who remain in Oman are still important to the government although much of the corporate action of the tribe has been minimized. Although their economy based on trade in salt and sulfur has suffered since the 1960s because of the improvements in transportation of goods from the coastal cities, some Duru‘ remain pastoral nomads and raise camels, sheep, and goats that they market in Nizwa. Duru‘ own the date groves at Tana‘am as well as up to one half of the groves at ‘Ibri and Adam. The Bedouin come in for the harvest in the summer;

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otherwise, the date groves are left in the care of settled sections of the tribe, who are called “servants.” The Duru‘, along with the Wahibah, own the best camels in Oman, which are famous for their speed and endurance. Camels bred for racing sell for hundreds of thousands of dollars each and are sought after by avid breeders and racers from the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Bahrain. See also Travelers and Explorers.

FURTHER READING Carter, J.R.L. Tribes in Oman. London: Peninsular Publishing, 1982. Chatty, Dawn. Mobile Pastoralists: Development Planning and Social Change in Oman. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. Thesiger, Wilfred. Arabian Sands. London: Readers Union Longmans, Green & Co., 1960.

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Economic Structures Jack Kalpakian The economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states reflect the dynamics of oil-dependent development. Governments in the region used their vast oil reserves to fund the construction of modern economies that engage in international trade, finance, and manufacturing. Oil and gas are the central aspects of GCC economics, but it is what has been done outside the petroleum industry that deserves special attention, particularly since oil and gas represent limited, albeit vast, endowments. The GCC states have followed economic development strategies. These include moving into basic industries, manufacturing, finance, technology, entertainment, and services. All of these strategies represent state involvement in the economy at a level not experienced in other capitalist, free market economies. The key to understanding the economic structures of the GCC states is the proper appreciation of the role of the state in fostering local enterprises through contracting, special projects, and political facilitation. Aside from the state, commercial agencies, vast petrochemical outfits, and statesponsored/owned industries dominate the region’s economies. Sometimes, these operations are associated with international firms as a part of offsets programs linked to defense spending. In short, the state structures the economic game to benefit its backers, often the same persons as the local rulers, their families, and their clients. There have been three broad routes taken by the Arab Gulf state in its pursuit of a post-oil future. The first method was pioneered by Kuwait through its Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA). Under this strategy, Kuwait invests in overseas economies, especially in profitable businesses and cash cows. The dividend stream generated by these investments is expected to replace oil revenues, if only partially, to enable Kuwait to enjoy a developed economy long after oil revenues have disappeared. A similar approach is also used by all of the other Gulf States, with significant variations in emphasis and application. The creation of sovereign wealth funds in the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar has its roots in the Kuwaiti experience. The GCC sovereign wealth funds represent a very vast reserve of cash and investment—the Abu Dhabi Sovereign wealth fund is slowly approaching $1 trillion. Other holding companies are controlled by leading individuals whose wealth cannot be said to be independent of the state, such as AlWalid ibn Talal, a member of the Saudi Royal family and the key shareholder in the “Kingdom” Holding Company. Although these are not sovereign wealth funds

Economic Structures

per se, they share many features in common with them, including vast overseas investments and substantial revenue streams in dividends and capital appreciation. The second approach was pioneered by Saudi Arabia through its Saudi Arabic Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC). Funded and owned by Saudi Arabia, SABIC represents an economic strategy that has sought to add value to petroleum products upstream rather than downstream. SABIC processes oil and gas into fertilizers, plastics, chemicals, and other economically useful substances in Saudi Arabia, thereby replacing expensive imports and moving a great deal of production of basic substances to the kingdom. Yanbu‘ and Jubayl owe their economic genesis to SABIC. Other firms producing steel, cement, construction materials, and supplies have also been established and capitalized by the Saudi government and its leading princes. There has also been a significant emphasis on consumer product production and replacement. There are Saudi companies producing milk, tomato paste, soap, shampoo, detergent, and all manner of consumer sundries. These firms are often allowed to function as monopolies or near-monopolies with substantial legal and political cover provided by the state. To the extent that the GCC states still import many of their products, imports are handled by commercial agencies. Indeed, one of the main reasons that membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) was initially feared by many local interests is the threat that many believed the WTO posed to the agency system. To sell products in the Gulf, foreign firms need to have local agents representing them, and this need is generally created by law. The agency system guarantees local importers substantial profits and bargaining power vis-a-vis their foreign suppliers and mentors. The agency system has survived the entry of these economies into the WTO and it shows no signs of abetting except in Dubai to some extent. Associated with the agency system are rules governing foreign investment and ownership in the GCC. Although actual practice varies in detail, all GCC members require the inclusion of a domestic partner for all foreign investors in the region, except in the economic free zones. Although the partnership percentage varies, it often represents fifty or fifty-one percent of the initial investment, thereby curtailing foreign access to the local economies and insuring a large degree of local control on foreign economic activities. Naturally, foreign firms prefer to work with well-connected individuals close to the centers of power in these countries to safeguard their interests, and this dynamic further cements the economic control of the ruling elites. The third approach was implementing economic liberalization policies within specific areas and zones. For the UAE as a whole, this meant using Dubai as a liberal zone, especially the Jabal ‘Ali Economic Free Zone, which entailed attracting manufacturing, services, and entertainment companies to the region. It also meant forays into high-skill, high-input services like higher education, banking, and health care. The policy was essentially to duplicate all of the amenities found in the industrialized world in Dubai. The policy was extremely successful, and oil accounts for only three percent of the Emirate’s income today. Its success has led to attempts to duplicate it across the region in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait. In Bahrain, some elements of the policy were already in place with regard to attracting corporate headquarters and banks. Although the airline, Emirates, appears to be a very different kind of company than SABIC, the two

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companies share state involvement and the idea of “adding value” to oil by moving processing upstream. The two firms stem from an economic philosophy that combines the market with the state and attempts to move as much as possible of the value-addition process upstream on the oil and gas supply system. All of the GCC states depend on foreign labor to some extent. At the lower end of the dependence are states like Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain, where foreign labor accounts for less than one-third of the population. At the higher levels of dependency, the Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait have populations that are mostly composed of noncitizens. In all of the states, except Bahrain, citizens have generally been shying away from jobs and professions that require physical labor or contact with substances like grease, fertilizer, soil, and so forth. Many young GCC citizens aspire to white-collar work. As a result, there is unemployment among young men, even as these states import large numbers of workers. Instead of viewing these tasks as stepping stones toward better careers, or a transitional phase in life, they are often seen as demeaning and beneath the dignity of GCC citizens. Many foreign workers are also mistreated by their employers, who often withhold wages or fail to pay the salaries or wages they promise. In some cases, foreign workers can be caught in a legal limbo, particularly because their employers often confiscate their passports upon arrival and refuse to return them after the contract expires or upon firing. As long as countries like the Philippines, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan suffered poverty, the workers often bore these indignities with little complaint. But as the Asian economies developed, labor supplies dwindled and strikes took place in 2006–2007 in the UAE. The UAE was taking steps such as publicizing the names of abusive firms and fining them, but it took a hard line toward the strike leaders, promising to deport them. The crisis outlined the squalid conditions of the vast majority of foreign workers and their grievances. It is now clear that the rapid development of Asia will lead to fewer and fewer workers willing to work in the GCC states, but there is no current policy to educate local citizens about the need to accept what are seen as menial jobs. The focus is on replacing white-collar foreign workers with indigenous employees in Saudi Arabia under the Saudization policy. In practice, this meant the departure of Western, Palestinian, and Egyptian professionals from Saudi Arabia and their replacement with local personnel. Although that policy does make sense, it cannot by itself solve the problem of unemployment among local Saudis. The policy may increase friction within Saudi society for the better jobs and also may create further strains at the international level. Compounding the problem is the emphasis placed on Islamic studies at the university level in Saudi Arabia. There are many unemployed graduates of Islamic universities vying for a relatively limited number of positions as judges and clerics. Many of these young men find themselves without the technical, communicative, or linguistic skills demanded by the job market. Although they are certainly learned and literate, their training and expectations render their experiences on the employment circuit difficult and harsh. Under their circumstances, militant Islamism can become a rather attractive alternative because it promises to replace the existing religious establishment—meaning that it promises to lead to changed circumstances under which they are more likely to be employed. The availability

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of oil revenues allows the state to pay these young men social and political rents, thereby probably restricting complete alienation to a minority. Although petroleum wealth has been generally beneficial to these countries, it has come with a significant price—it has enabled the state to dominate the economic and social sphere while introducing a social form of the Dutch disease problem of international political economy. The vast availability of oil funds allowed the state to shape the economic structure of the region; development was not a bottom-up process—it came with Bechtel and its local equivalents. The funds also meant that other industries did not develop independently of oil, even when the latter became less important in some cases. Even independent, truly private local firms developed in the shadow of the state, feeding on contracts and depending on cheap, imported labor. Consequently, the local labor force did not develop in the familiar patterns seen in the developed world; employers simply did not employ locals in many of the manual and menial tasks, and thereby a form of misery-bringing growth took place. Although jobs were created, they did not, for a wide variety of reasons including the vast availability of oil funds, go to locals—at least not in the main. The Saudization program was an attempt to correct this problem, but it has not been as successful as its promoters hoped, because the Saudi educational system has not been producing the cadres needed to replace the foreign professionals. A more thoughtful approach is being followed in the UAE and Qatar with the development of new universities. The state dominates the economic structures of the GCC states. Private firms as well as the attempts to diversify the local economies have been defined by state policies to that effect. Private industry and markets have not been independent. Economic development is often defined in terms of planning for a post-oil world in which the region will have to depend on other industries and investments— again under plans generated and implemented by the various states. Labor is largely imported with dramatic social, political, and economic consequences, and attempts to break free from foreign labor have been thwarted by the abundance of oil and powerful local preferences for white-collar work instead of manual labor. In the classic descriptions of Dutch Disease, the Netherlands experienced growth when it began to sell gas on the world market. As a result of these sales, the guilder gained in value and the Netherlands was able to import many products more cheaply than they could produce; the imports damaged Dutch industry and joblessness grew. In the case of the GCC, the oil wealth simply facilitated the importation of labor, which damaged the bargaining position of local labor and delayed its development. See also Education.

FURTHER READING Kapiszewski, Andrzej. “Arab versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries.” Paper presented at the United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat, Beirut, Lebanon, May 15– 17, 2006.

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Economies, Traditional Kingdom Holding Company. “About Us, Executive Chairman.” Available at http://www. kingdom.com.sa/index.asp?id=40 (last accessed February 27, 2008). Kuwait Investment Authority. “Objectives and Strategy.” Available at http://www.kia.gov. kw/KIA/AboutþKIA/ObjectiveþandþStrategy/ObjectivesandStrategy.htm (last accessed February 20, 2008). Looney, Robert. “Saudization and Sound Economic Reforms: Are the Two Compatible?” Strategic Insights 3, no. 2 (2004). Available at http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/feb/ looneyFeb04.asp (last accessed February 28, 2008). Metz, Helen Chapin (ed.). Persian Gulf States: A Country Study. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office for the Library of Congress, 1993. Pepper, William. “Foreign Capital Investment in Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council: Considerations, Issues and Concerns for Investors, Part 1,” Arab Law Quarterly 6, no. 3 (1991): 231–266. Pepper, William. “Foreign Capital Investment in Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council: Considerations, Issues and Concerns for Investors, Part 2,” Arab Law Quarterly 6, no. 4 (1991): 331–343. Pepper, William. “Foreign Capital Investment in Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council: Considerations, Issues and Concerns for Investors, Part 3,” Arab Law Quarterly 7, no. 1 (1991): 33–63. Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation. “Corporate Profile.” Available at http://www. sabic.com/corporate/en/ourcompany/corporateprofile/default.aspx (last accessed February 27, 2008). “Sovereign Wealth Funds: Asset Backed Insecurity,” The Economist, January 17, 2008. Available at http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10533428 (last accessed February 28, 2008). Walters, Timothy N., Alma Kadragic, and Lynne M. Walters. “Miracle or Mirage: Is Development Sustainable in the United Arab Emirates,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 10, no. 3 (2006): 71–99.

Economies, Traditional John A. Shoup The Arabs of the Peninsula have been engaged in a wide range of economic activities since ancient times. As the Arabian Peninsula slowly dried up toward the end of the Neolithic period, farming was concentrated near water sources and pastoralism became more developed. Long-distance trade with its neighbors in Asia and Africa was also developed, and mercantile states emerged at an early period. Other forms of economic activity were also encouraged including mining, fishing, shipbuilding, pearling, sailing/navigation, and fine craftsmanship. Certain cities in Yemen, Oman, and Bahrain became well-known for fine crafts in silver, copper, brass, wood, cloth, and clay.

HUNTING AND GATHERING Hunting and gathering did not play a major role in the overall economy of the Peninsula but was supplemental to both settled agriculturalists and pastoral

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nomads. Bedouin hunted gazelles, oryx, and wild goats as well as a wide variety of local birds such as ostrich, bustard, grouse, and quail. In the northern part of the Peninsula, near Iraq and Syria waterfowl such as ducks and geese arrived in large numbers migrating from Europe to Africa. The introduction of the gun spelled the doom of many of the wild species that used to inhabit the Peninsula. Hunting is still an important sport for the elite using trained falcons and the Arabian greyhound or Saluki, and although falconing is still done, there is little to no game to hunt today. Oman developed a project for integrated use of the Jaddat al-Harasis by Bedouin pastoralists and the last wild herds of oryx, but unlimited hunting was allowed by the government and the herds have been greatly decimated. Gathering activities included collecting a range of seasonal plants such as mushrooms and truffles that emerge in the winter. Women collected aromatic plants and wild spices, including sage, which are used in cooking and in traditional medicines. Wild honey is also used in traditional medicine and as a sweetener for pastries. Honey is also collected from domesticated bees kept in the oases. Salt and sulfur were mined from natural sources particularly by the Duru‘ tribe, whose area includes both Qarn al-Milh and Qarn al-Kabrit near Wadi Umm al-Samim. The Wahibah tribe especially contested control over the salt mines at Qarn al-Milh and the two fought a long conflict over the control. The Duru‘ were eventually able to establish firm control over these sources in the 1940s.

PASTORALISM Pastoralism has been one of the most important economic activities in the Arabian Peninsula for millennia. Domestication of small stock began during the Neolithic era, with goats being first domesticated some 10,000 years ago in the Zagros Mountains of Iran and sheep being domesticated between 9,000 and 11,000 years ago in Iraq. With the growing desertification of the Peninsula some 5,800 years ago, pastoralism was concentrated in areas where water sources were available. Use of the deep desert was not possible except for during the winter season when rains made it possible to move flocks into it. The domestication of the camel in southern Arabia sometime between 2000 and 1500 BC allowed greater mobility, and pastoralists were able to use the desert even in the summer months. Domestication of the camel also allowed for more trade between the northern and southern parts of the Peninsula because of the camel’s ability to go up to twenty-one days without water and its ability to carry heavy loads of 440 pounds (200 kilograms)—twice the weight a bull cart can carry. Improved camel saddles and harnessing developed in north Arabia some time after 500 BC allowed camels to carry heavy loads over long distances and gave the Arab Bedouin both military and economic dominance. A fully loaded camel can walk at a speed of three miles an hour (four to five kilometers an hour), whereas a camel carrying only a rider can cover up to 100 miles in a day (150 kilometers). Domestication of the camel gave rise to the Bedouin culture, which by the time of the Prophet emerged as one of the most dominant cultures of the

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Peninsula. Camel pastoralists took the top position in social ranking, considering themselves to be the most “noble” of Arabs or asil. Those who raised small stock, mainly sheep and goats, and thus had restricted migration patterns were referred to as shawiyah or “small,” and those who combined some agriculture with raising livestock were referred to as ru‘a’ or simply “herders.” Until the early twentieth century the asil tribes were able to militarily dominate much of the Arabian Peninsula because of the high mobility camel pastoralism gave them. Camels also gave the important means to play influential roles in the economy, providing both transport and skilled guides for commercial and pilgrimage caravans. Pastoralism provided both settled and pastoral populations with important items. Sheep, goats, and camels were all milked and even today many people prefer the taste of sheep or camel milk to cow’s milk. Milk and milk products such as sour milk, butter, cheese, and yogurt were traded or sold in the towns and cities for nonpastoral products. Pastoralists did not consume much meat but sold unwanted male sheep, goats, and even camels in urban markets. Pastoralists also sold wool and hair (goat and camel) in urban markets where they were processed into numerous finished products. Goat hair was woven by Bedouin women to make the black tents they lived in.

AGRICULTURE Traditional agriculture was confined to mainly the oases and occasional use of seasonal streams. Intensive production systems based on irrigation technologies made even small oases highly productive. Multilayering of plant species and multicropping allowed a small plot of land to not only support a family but also provide surplus for sale. Many of the settled communities had long-term contacts with pastoralists and in many instances pastoralists owned property in oases. Various types of agreements were worked out whereby pastoralists took care of livestock owned by settled people whereas settled farmers took care of farms owned by pastoralists. The date harvest was one of the few times many pastoralists would come into the oases. Seasonal streams were dammed by both pastoralists and settled farmers, and water collected behind them during the wet season could be used to water livestock or for irrigation. As the water dried up, the newly exposed land was green with grasses and other natural plants—or could be farmed as small plots of dryland wheat and barley. Control mechanisms such as hima, or protected status, were used to ensure that the crops or meadows were for those who have usufruct rights to them. The main traditional system of irrigation in most of the Peninsula was underground canals or aflaj. Aflaj tapped both groundwater and surface water sources depending on which was available, and in some places both sources were used. Water distribution was managed by a person called an ‘arif (plural ‘urafa’), meaning someone with knowledge. The ‘arif knew how many shares any one farmer owned, which translates into the number of hours water can flow into a particular field. Shares were inherited and could be bought and sold. Those who gave money for the upkeep and repair of the aflaj were entitled to a larger share of the water. This money, called masha, in most of the region was collected by the ‘arif, who along with his helpers were entitled to a share of the sum as salaries.

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Among the most important agricultural crops were dates. Some 600 date varieties are grown in the Arab world, and most are found in the Peninsula. In the recent past, dates were among the most important agricultural products of the Peninsula, and even today the Arab world exports over 3 million tons of dates a year. Other agricultural products include wheat, barley, citrus fruits, pomegranates, figs, and vegetables.

SHIPBUILDING AND PEARLING The Gulf States and Oman have long histories of shipbuilding, sailing, and pearling. Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman have shipbuilding yards that still turn out dhows. Much of the wood is imported from the mangrove stands along the East African coast or from India. Dhows also were (and still are) made in southern Iraq and in Iranian port cities. Dhow building made little use of nails but planks were lashed together by ropes, making the ship better able to take rough weather. The inside surface was sealed with layers of tar. Little was made from locally available materials, and even the ropes were often made in East Africa. The canvas for the sails was made mainly in Bahrain (which has an active cloth industry) or Kuwait. Dhow-building yards did not turn out many new ships per year; yards in the United Arab Emirates produced from ten to twenty ships a year. Then the only craft made from local palm wood was the small, one-man fishing craft called a shashah. Pearling was one of the most important traditional sources of income for much of the Gulf and the eastern part of Saudi Arabia. Pearling supplemented both agricultural and pastoral production, and both settled farmer and pastoral nomads participated in the major pearling season. Pearls became more important in the world market in the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century before the invention of cultured pearls in Japan. The main pearling season was in the summer, from June to September, when other forms of income were not as viable. Pearls were marketed through brokers located in the Gulf cities, and during the nineteenth century many brokers moved from Iranian ports to those along the Arab side of the Gulf to escape high taxes. As the Iranian government tried to impose more control and taxes on the merchants, the rulers of the Arab states offered better conditions, including land. Most of the pearl merchants were ethnic Arabs and Sunnis and many moved, sparking much of the subsequent development of the Gulf. Bahrain controlled large pearl banks where the conditions were best for the oysters and Bahrain also attracted several Indian merchants, mainly from Bombay. Bombay was the largest market for pearls, supplying the British Empire and via London most of Europe. New York was the second largest market for Gulf pearls, and some of the large jewelry houses had agents in al-Manamah.

FISHING Fishing was restricted to the coastal communities, and many of the Peninsula communities located away from the coast did not eat fish. In the northern desert, Bedouin dislike those who eat fish, and to be called an eater of fish, or samamkah,

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is an insult. Fish are eaten from Iraq to Oman and today fishing is an important activity, although most of the fishermen are Pakistani or Indian. Fishing in the Gulf was and for the most part still is done by setting large wire traps or nets. Nets are both small-cast or are large and require crews from several ships to lay them and then bring them inland, where women with baskets wait to catch the fish. Dried fish is an important part of the diet in much of the southern region of the Peninsula, especially in Oman. Dried fish is eaten by humans and is fed as a fodder to livestock, even to camels. Dried sardines are used as fertilizer and in the pre-oil period dried sardines were among the yearly exports from the United Arab Emirates (then called the Trucial States). When possible, fishing was often combined with other activities such as date farming and/or pastoralism; for example, groups of the Bani Yas settled along the coast from Abu Dhabi to Dubai and relied on multiple sources of income, including fishing.

TRADE Trade has been an important economic activity in the Arabian Peninsula for millennia. Trade along land routes was greatly improved with the domestication of the camel, and ancient states such as those of Yemen, the Nabateans in the Hijaz and Jordan, and Palmyra or Tadmur in the Syrian Desert were built on controlling the trade between the Indian Ocean and India on one side and the Mediterranean on the other. The Quraysh tribe of Makkah became wealthy because of their control of water between Yemen and Syria and their contacts with Bedouin tribes that provided camels. With the rise of Islam many of the Bedouin in the northern desert provided camels, guides, and/or protection for the pilgrims. Governments paid tribal leaders subsidies to make sure pilgrims arrived safely and continued to do so even after the Hijaz Railway was completed in 1908. Long-distance ocean trade also predates the rise of Islam. Bahrain figures in Sumerian texts as the Land of Dilmun, and Oman’s Musandam and Dhahirah were called Majan. Both were sources of items such as copper traded to Mesopotamia. People from the Arabian Peninsula established colonies and trading posts along the East African coast, in India and Indonesia, and as far east as China. Basrah in Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Suhar, Salalah, and other ports along the coast of Yemen were heavily involved in sea trade. Today many families in Kuwait and Bahrain have close ties with India and Pakistan, whereas Omanis have ties to Zanzibar and coastal cities such as Mombassa.

CRAFTS Traditional crafts include working in metal, jewelry making, pottery, and weaving. Towns such as Bahla and Nizwa in Oman have long traditions of fine copper work and many items have become collector or museum pieces. Trays, coffee pots, spice containers, and other kitchen utensils from Nizwa were exported to the Gulf coast. In the northern part of the Peninsula, copper and brass were often imported from Syria and Iraq. Oman and Yemen in particular are famous for the high quality of their silver work not only in fine jewelry for women but also

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in making silver-mounted weapons such as swords, daggers, and even rifles. Smiths from Nizwa and Bahla were the best known and produced distinctive items with embossed floral designs. Silversmiths in other parts of the Peninsula such as in the Hijaz often made items for Bedouin women in the interior. Weaving was a village craft in Bahrain and al-Hasa, where men wove cloth for clothes and for trade. In Bahrain certain Shi‘ite villages still carry on the craft and make cotton cloth worn as an undergarment or as an apron by agriculturalists. Bedouin women weave a wide variety of useful items from tents to bags from wool and hair. In most of the Peninsula Bedouin weaving is being lost, but in Kuwait the government has opened a special center called al-Sadu to keep the art alive, and Oman has attempted to encourage weaving as a national heritage. In Oman men as well as women weave bags and other items associated with Bedouin life. In the United Arab Emirates various women’s associations are trying to keep the art alive, but they have begun to use industrial cotton yarn rather than wool. An important craft that is not in danger is the fine metal thread embroidery called talli. Women in many of the Gulf countries still make metal thread by hand. The thread is then used to embroider traditional dresses worn at weddings and other celebrations and national holidays. Young girls wear an embroidered hood called a bakhnuq, whereas older girls and women wear huge heavily embroidered dresses and cloaks.

FURTHER READING Agius, Dionisius. In the Wake of the Dhow: The Arabian Gulf and Oman. London: Garnet, 2002. Altorki, Soraya, and Donald Cole. Arabian Oasis City: Transformation of ‘Unayzah. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989. Bulliet, Richard. The Camel and the Wheel. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. Chatty, Dawn. Mobile Pastoralists: Development Planning and Social Change in Oman. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. Ferdinand, Klaus, and Ida Nicolaisen. Bedouins of Qatar. London: Thames and Hudson, 1993. Heard-Bey, Frauke. From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates. Dubai: Motivate Publishing, 2004. Insoll, Timothy. Land of Enki in the Islamic Era: Pearls, Palms, and Religious Identity in Bahrain. London: Kegan Paul International, 2005. Al-Shamlan, Saif Marzooq. Pearling in the Arabian Gulf: A Kuwaiti Memoir. Translated by Peter Clark. London: London Center of Arab Studies, 2001.

Education Rachel Sondheimer Education has long been an integral part of the society and culture of the Gulf States, albeit in various forms. For centuries, the mainstay of traditional schooling took place in the kuttab, where children met in mosques or private houses to learn recitations of the Qur’an. Despite some efforts by missionaries and others,

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modern forms of education did not take hold in the Gulf States until the middle of the twentieth century. Vast government resources, the result of increases in oil revenues, encouraged the expansion of state-sponsored educational systems across the region. As a result, education is dominated by state-financed and -operated institutions with low to no tuition fees. The past six decades witnessed a proliferation of all types of schooling, ranging from pre-primary classes to institutions of higher learning, across the Gulf States. Concurrent to the spread of formal schooling is the commensurate increase in the adult literacy rate, which averages approximately eighty percent across the region. No modern colleges or universities existed in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, or the United Arab Emirates (UAE) before 1950; as of 2003, there were twenty-three across the region, including at least one in each nation. Quantitative data on education rates in the Gulf region are compiled by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Recent data suggest a wide disparity in education rates across age groups and nations. Pre-primary education for children older than three is not compulsory in any of the Gulf States, prompting wide variations in enrollment rates across the region. In 2004, less than ten percent of pre-primary-aged children attended formal schooling in Oman and Saudi Arabia, whereas over half of similarly aged children attended in Kuwait and the UAE. In most of the region, primary education is compulsory, resulting in markedly higher enrollment rates. Despite these requirements, differences in enrollment rates persist, with Bahrain and Qatar approaching nearuniversal primary school attendance and Saudi Arabia posting enrollment of only fifty-nine percent in 2004. This trend continues into secondary education with Bahrain and Qatar posting enrollment rates over ninety percent and Saudi Arabia posting a sixty-six percent enrollment rate. A steep dropoff occurs when progressing to levels of higher education with Qatar posting the highest gross enrollment rate of nearly seventeen percent in 1996. Oman maintains the lowest rates of higher education with a gross enrollment of just eight percent in the same year. The number of children exposed to formal education is on the rise in the region, but questions relating to the quality of education students are receiving in the Gulf States are increasing in salience. Like other facets of society in the region, educational administrators, faculty, and students face difficulties in reconciling the move toward modernization with the region’s traditional Islamic values. This tension is evident in three main areas: curriculum development, pedagogical methods, and gender parity of the student population. Traditional culture permeates throughout the primary and secondary schooling experience in the region because of the dominance of Arabic and Islamic studies. The salience of these subjects undercuts the time available to provide students with a strong core of vocational training. Many outside observers argue that the traditional emphasis on language, religion, and regional history fails to prepare students for the realities of joining the modern workforce. As such, some suggest increased focus on science, technical, and English and/or French language instruction. The tension between traditional and modern cultures exhibits itself in pedagogical methods as well. As an extension of the kuttab, there is a tendency to focus on rote memorization as a means of learning material. This method results in students with a strong knowledge base but few skills applicable to the modern

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work environment. Educational reformers call for more emphasis on the development of critical-thinking and communication skills through problem-solving and reasoning activities rather than rote memorization. Another concern fostered by the tension between traditional and modern cultures centers on the education of women in the Gulf States. Although girls learned the Qu’ran through the kuttab, additional forms of education for women were not encouraged until recently. Views toward the role of women within contemporary Gulf society are changing, accompanied by and allowing for increasing female access to formal schooling at all levels. Expansion of educational opportunities for girls is evident in the gender parity of enrollment ratios in primary schools throughout the Gulf region. Most of the Gulf States also maintain gender parity in secondary schooling, except for Saudi Arabia where approximately eighty-eight females attended for every 100 males in 2004. Somewhat surprisingly, female enrollment outstrips male enrollment in postsecondary educational institutions in many countries in the region. Discussions concerning the core curricula and methods of instruction represent a shift in the designation of key problems confronting education in the Gulf States. In past decades, concerns are centered on providing education for all children in the region. Although work remains to be done in this area, recent emphasis is shifting to improving the quality of education to produce graduates competitive in the global marketplace. See also Universities and Higher Education.

FURTHER READING Bahgat, Gawdat. “Education in the Gulf Monarchies: Retrospect and Prospect,” International Review of Education 45, no. 2 (1999): 127–136. Bashshur, Munir. Higher Education in the Arab States. Beirut: UNESCO Regional Bureau for Education in the Arab States, 2004. Education for All Global Monitoring Report. Regional Overview: Arab States. Paris: UNESCO, 2007. Mazawi, Andre Elias. “The Contested Terrains of Education in the Arab States: An Appraisal of Major Research Trends,” Comparative Economics Review 43, no. 3 (1999): 332–352. Rugh, William A. “Arab Education: Tradition, Growth and Reform,” The Middle East Journal 56, no. 3 (2002): 396–414. Rugh, William A. “Education in Saudi Arabia: Choices and Constraints.” Middle East Policy 9, no. 2 (2002): 40–55.

Emir Sebastian Maisel The word emir (amir) is derived from Arabic, translating as commander, governor, or prince, and describes an honorary or hereditary title of an independent tribal leader. During the early Islamic period, the same title was used for the commander-in-chief and the provincial governors. The Prophet Muhammad

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was named amir, as were his successors, the khulifa’ or caliphs, who were called amir al-mu’minin (commander of the faithful). Today, amir is used as the title of the head of state among several ruling families in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. The area governed by an amir is called imarah (emirate), and some emirates are sovereign, independent countries, such as Kuwait or the United Arab Emirates. In Saudi Arabia, the title amir is also used to describe different political and social positions. The rulers of the second Saudi state elected the title amir over the title imam (religious leader of the Muslim community), which was used by their predecessors. Other Arab tribal “dynasties” such as the Al Rashid of the Shammar tribe adopted the same title. Only ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin ‘Abd al-Rahman, the founder of the third Saudi state, chose the more secular title sultan and later king. In the newly established kingdom, and until today, the title of amir is bestowed on the governors of the fifteen provinces. In addition, members of the royal Saudi family are called amir, indicating the male and female (amirah) offspring of the Saudi king. An amir belonging to the immediate lineage of a Saudi king is referred to as His Royal Highness, whereas others are addressed with His Highness.

FURTHER READING Long, David E. Culture and Customs of Saudi Arabia. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005.

Ethnic Groups John A. Shoup Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States are mainly inhabited by Arabs but there are significant numbers of non-Arabs who have lived in the Arabian Peninsula for centuries if not millennia. These populations have not assimilated fully into Arab culture, but have retained aspects of their original identity including language. These are not to be confused with those non-Arab populations who have been attracted to the region as a result of the oil economies, who usually cannot become citizens and who are considered to be guest workers. The older ethnic minorities have citizenship and in some instances represent an older, indigenous population such as the Baharnah of Bahrain. The Baharnah in Bahrain are Indo-European, Persian-speaking, and represent some seventy percent of the islands’ population. They consider themselves to be the original people of the island and the descendants of the ancient civilization of Dilmun, although most likely they are a mix of Arab, Persian, and Indian peoples who have lived on the island since the pre-Islamic period. The Baharnah are concentrated in the agricultural villages in the north of the main island of Bahrain and in Muharraq where they still engage in date cultivation as well as in fishing, weaving, and pottery production. They are nearly 100% Shi‘ites, belonging to

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the 12er Shi‘ite rite dominant in Iran. Their Persian differs somewhat from that spoken in Iran and although they consider themselves to be Persians, they do not necessarily consider themselves to be Iranian. Although they are the majority of the population in Bahrain, they were politically and economically marginalized, which gave rise to several acts of violence and support for radical Shi‘ite organizations such as the Bahrain Hizballah. King Hamad bin ‘Isa Al Khalifah has included them in his new political and economic reforms, and they are now represented in the country’s elected parliament. Farasis, or ‘Ajam, or Persians are the second Indo-European Persian-speaking group in the Gulf, and like the Baharnah are one of the oldest in the region. Iran borders the northern limit of the Persian Gulf, and historically states based in Iran have exercised a good deal of influence and even direct control over the whole Gulf. Persian speakers have had a long presence in Gulf towns on the southern shore and in Iraq, often being important urban merchants. In the recent past, some of the Gulf’s Arab emirates have included both shores of the Gulf, and as a result Iranians were encouraged to settle in their towns such as Dubai and Sharjah. The Iranians brought with them several technologies including the barjil, or wind tower, a traditional form of air conditioning that has become a symbol of the Gulf. Dubai’s historic Bastakiyah District is the Iranian quarter of the town that was built in the early twentieth century. Like the Baharnah, they tend to be 12er Shi‘ites for the most part and have preserved not only their language, but also several customs that differ from those of their Arab neighbors. Nonetheless, the Farasis have been able to integrate into mainstream Gulf society, especially in the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, where many have risen to important positions in business. The Baluch originally are from Baluchistan, a large region that lies mostly inside the modern state of Pakistan though the western part is in Iran. Baluchistan touches the northern shore of the Gulf and several of its port cities were under Arab control until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Omani control of some ports ended only in the 1950s. Baluch are Indo-Europeans and their language is a distant relative of Persian (classified as East Iranian, whereas Persian is a West Iranian language). Baluch are Sunni Muslims who are both tribally and non-tribally organized. They have been heavily recruited into the militaries by several Arab Gulf rulers for the past several centuries. In many instances the Baluch served in the militaries and as palace guards and then returned to Baluchistan to live out their lives. Others have stayed, particularly in Oman and in the United Arab Emirates where they have brought wives from Baluchistan, although some have married local women. Baluch form an important yet small Sunni bloc in Bahrain where they have forged close ties to the ruling family through both military and household service. Oman’s overseas empire included not only parts of Pakistan and India, but also much of the East African coast from Somalia to Tanzania. The coastal area had been part of an Arab and Islamic sphere of influence for centuries. Arab, Persian, and Indian Muslims established trade centers as far south as Mozambique, and from this contact the Swahili culture and language emerged. By the time of Oman’s expansion in the early nineteenth century, much of the coastal areas and the islands of Lamu, Pemba, and Zanzibar were Muslim and greatly Arabized. African slaves had been sent to the Arabian Peninsula and beyond since the first contacts, and it must be remembered that among the close companions of the

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Prophet Muhammad was the former slave Bilal. Many of African descent in the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf, and beyond in the Islamic world identify with Bilal (often called Sidna Bilal or Our Master Bilal) as their direct ancestor. Africans in the Peninsula and Gulf are mainly Arabized today and some have been brought into the families of their former owners, although often as a second lineage and not considered to be of equal status with the full Arab lineage. In nearly all instances, they have Arabized to the degree that they no longer consider themselves or are considered by others to be Africans, but are Arabs. Close connections are often maintained with former owners, and in many of the Gulf States such as Bahrain former slaves are an important core in both the military and the police. In the past freed slaves found work on pearling ships or other such occupations. Swahili is still spoken by both Africans and Arabs in many places in Oman. Some of the Swahili speakers are from families who escaped the bloody uprising in Zanzibar in 1964. Others are descendants of African slaves who although greatly Arabized have preserved their language. Swahili is the language of certain types of music in the Gulf region such as al-Liwa and is used in some popular religious practices performed mainly by former slave families such as al-Riwa (a trance dance for curing illnesses that is rarely done today). Swahili remains an important second or third language for many Omanis, and Omani investment in Zanzibar is beginning to return. The Hawalah are another of the ethnic groups in the Gulf region and take their name from the fact that over the centuries they have switched back and forth between the southern and northern shores of the Gulf. Although many have Persian origins they have greatly Arabized, which is helped by the fact that they are Sunnis usually following the Shafi‘i school of law. Most of them came back to the southern shore of the Gulf in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when the center of the pearl trade also moved to places such as Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, whereas others arrived after the discovery of oil in the twentieth century. They are a thoroughly urban population and are an important economic bloc, often very supportive of the Sunni leaders in Gulf States. They are easily recognized as most have family names that connect them to places in southern Iran such as Kanu, Fakhru, and Khunji. The Bukhari are Turkish-speaking people, most of whom are Uzbeks from Central Asia. The general term Bukhari comes from the fact that many carry alBukhari as a last name although al-Andajani and al-Samarqandi are also common last names. The Bukhari are Sunni Muslims, and most of them came following the 1918 Bolshevik Revolution when Muslim religious leaders and scholars began being persecuted. As a result of repressive measures by the Bolsheviks, those who could escaped, and many found final refuge in Saudi Arabia. They have settled in several towns and cities in Saudi Arabia, although Makkah and Madinah were where most wanted to live. They have been able to maintain use of their own language at home, and some younger people have been able to study at universities in Turkey as a result. They are an educated urban population and are active in business as well as in fine crafts such as making the gold thread embroidery pieces for the kiswah or cover for the Ka‘abah in Makkah. There are several other very small ethnic minorities in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, some numbering only in the hundreds. The Khojah are a very small

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population living in several Gulf port cities who are descendants of Hindu merchants who converted to Islam. The word Khojah is Turkish and means “a gentleman” or “an educated man” and perhaps was used originally because the community was (and still is) composed of merchants. The largest Khojah population lives in Musqat in Oman, although they are found in nearly every port city of the Gulf. In addition to the Khojah are small numbers of Indian Hindus whose ancestors arrived in the pre-oil days and have citizenship. The largest of this Hindu population are in Bahrain where they are an important part of the local economy. Their ancestors moved from cities such as Bombay to Bahrain, where they set up shops dealing with international pearl buyers. See also Madhhab.

FURTHER READING Coles, Anne, and Peter Jackson. Windtower. London: Stacey International, 2007. Dubai Municipality. Folk Songs and Dances. The United Arab Emirates. Dubai: Dubai Municipality, 1996. Heard-Bey, Frauke. From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates. Dubai: Motivate Publishing, 2004. Insoll, Timothy. The Archaeology of Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Khuri, Fuad. “From Tribe to State in Bahrain,” in Arab Society. Social Science Perspective, edited by Nicholas Hopkins and Saad Eddin Ibrahim. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1987.

Ethnicity Sebastian Maisel The ethnic composition of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States is heterogenic and includes a variety of ethnic elements, both indigenous and foreign. Citizenship of those states is based on the concept of ethnicity. A major criterion for defining citizenship is for the individual to prove belonging to or descent from one of the recognized ethnic groups. Originally, the population of the Arabian Peninsula was Arab with small Persian, Turkish, and Indian communities. With the establishment of nation states and the area’s transformation in the wake of the oil boom, new ethnic groups migrated to the region and a selection had to be made on who is considered a citizen and who is only a resident. Only citizens fully enjoy all of the social and economic benefits. However, with the exception of Saudi Arabia and Oman, in all other Gulf States, citizens are in the minority, in some cases as little as twenty-five percent. The influential notion of pan-Arabism under Egyptian president Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir in the 1950s and 1960s never really picked up in the Gulf area, mainly because of the closeness of the tribal society and its efforts to maintain the

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homogenous character and access to resources as well as because of the rivalries between the Egyptian and Saudi ruler over the leadership of the pan-Arab movement. As Arabs, all of the countries support the struggle of the Palestinians with military, economic, and financial help. Of particular importance was the issue of refugees. Gulf States willingly accepted and welcomed them. Many of the Palestinians had higher education levels than most of the nationals, but rarely were they granted citizenship. The Iranian Revolution also had a tremendous impact on the development of ethnic identities in the area. Although primarily a religious movement, it also represented an Iranian element in conjunction with Shi‘ite Islam, a combination that all of the rulers of the Gulf States, and all those who were Sunni Arabs, were very concerned with. To maintain stability and to legitimize their rule of the countries and resources, a fragile network of ethnic interaction was formed. Under the leadership of a ruling family, all citizens participated in and benefited from the oil boom. The status quo was to be maintained in order to guarantee stable oil production. Unfortunately for the local rulers, most of the people living in the area of the oil fields (although of Arab origin) were Shi‘ites, and flags were raised over alleged collaboration between them and their brothers in religion from Iran. Tensions were high, and Shi‘ite uprisings in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia and demonstrations and clashes in Makkah during the pilgrimage clearly showed the necessity of finding an ethnic and religious middle ground. The governments, however, chose to side with Iraq in its war with Iran, supplying unlimited amounts of money and weapons to the Iraqi (Sunni and Arab) government in order to be protected from Iranian exports of revolution and destabilization. During the following 1990–1991 war between Iraq and an international alliance of troops over the occupation of Kuwait, Palestinians expressed their support for Saddam Hussein, which in return led to the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from the Gulf States. The same happened in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States to the Yemeni community when political leaders and the public cheered for the occupier of Kuwait and possible aggressor against Saudi Arabia. Only in this case was the number of expelled Yemeni guestworkers much higher, reaching almost 1 million. Less than half of Kuwait’s population, according to the status of citizenship, is actually indigenous (i.e., was granted citizenship). They are mostly Arabs. Arabs from other Arabic countries, such as Palestine, Egypt and Iraq, form another important block in the Arab identity of the country; but most people in Kuwait are expatriates, coming mainly from Southeast Asian countries such as India, Pakistan, and the Philippines. A large Persian community is found because of the proximity of Iran. Kurds from Iraq who fled from Saddam Hussein’s regime add to the Indo-European feature of Kuwait, and so do several thousand Europeans and Americans. Bahrain faces a similar problem, where a small religious minority rules over a majority that is different in terms of their religious and often ethnic background. The ruling Sunni group is of Arab descent, whereas the Shi‘ites are split between ethnic Arabs (Baharnah) and Persians (‘Ajam). Still two-thirds of the population are Bahraini nationals, but the other third are again from Southeast Asia. Some Indian families (Bunyan) have lived in Bahrain for many generations and have

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been nationalized and distinguished from recent guestworkers. Among the Bahraini citizens, the majority is Shi‘ite and usually underrepresented and less privileged than Sunnis in Bahrain. Saudi Arabia has a very homogenous population excluding the guestworkers that make up twenty percent of the overall population. Almost all Saudis are Arabs. A small ethnic minority are black Saudis, descendants of former slaves from Africa. Another ethnic group comes from central Asia: families of pilgrims who decided to stay in the Hijaz. Other Arabs come from Egypt, Yemen, and Sudan, but they do not have citizenship. People from Southeast Asia, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines form the largest non-Arab community. A rather controversial division is seen in Qatar, where forty percent of the population is Arab, followed by a combined thirty-five percent of Pakistanis, Indians, and others from Southeast Asia, as well as a significant ten percent Iranian minority. Qatari natives originated from tribes that migrated to the area from Najd and al-Hasa, whereas others descended from Omani tribes. The United Arab Emirates are predominantly Sunni Arab, but have a fifteen percent Shi‘ite minority, many of them of Iranian or Baluchi descent. Dubai established good business relations with neighboring Iran. They earned big revenues from the first Gulf War but maintained their contacts with Iran, even allowing local Persians to participate in Iranian presidential elections. More than fifty percent of the population in the Emirates comes from South and Southeast Asia (India, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, etc.). National Emiratis form only twenty-five percent of the country’s population. Sultan Qabus of Oman follows a moderate and successful political attempt to control the ethnic and religious pluralism of his country. The majority of the population are ethnic Arabs, but of mixed background. Still many southern Arabs live in the Dhufar region, which unsuccessfully tried to break away from the central government in Musqat. Although northern and southern Arabs are both Semitic, they speak distinct variants of Arabic. The diverse religious setup of the country helps to stabilize ethnic conflicts. Most people in Oman are Ibadi Kharaji, but because of the presence of many Sunni Arabs and non-Muslims from India and Pakistan as well as Shi‘ites, a balance of co-existence is maintained by the government.

FURTHER READING Brand, Laurie. Citizens Abroad: Emigration and the State in the Middle East and North Africa. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Kapiszewski, Andrzej. Nationals and Expatriates: Population and Labour Dilemmas of the Gulf Cooperation Council States. Reading, UK: Garnet, 2001. Metz, Helen (ed.). Persian Gulf States: Country Studies. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1994. Al-Ostad, Ameer. “An Ethnic Geography of Kuwait: A Study of Eight Ethnic Groups.” PhD dissertation, Kent State University, 1986. Yamani, Mai. Cradle of Islam: The Hijaz and the Quest for an Arabian Identity. London: I.B. Tauris, 2004.

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Fahd bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (1922–2005) Sebastian Maisel The fifth king of Saudi Arabia, Fahd bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Al Sa‘ud, was born in 1922. Following the regular succession to the throne, he became king in 1982 after his half-brother Khalid died. Fahd is one of the Sudayri Seven, a sibling group of seven full brothers, sons of Hussa al-Sudayri, who maintain crucial positions within the inner circle of power. They include current crown Prince Sultan, minister of interior Prince Nayif, and governor of Riyadh Prince Salman. Before his enthronement, Fahd held various political posts including Minister of Education (1953), Minister of Interior (1962–1975), second Deputy Prime Minister (1968–1975), first Deputy Prime Minister (1975–1982), and Crown Prince (1975–1982). As King of Saudi Arabia he automatically resumed the title of Prime Minister in 1982. Because of King Khalid’s poor health, Fahd was unofficially acting prime minister and regent. Fahd continued the same foreign policies of his predecessors that included close ties with the United States, suspicion of Shi‘ite Iran, and support of the Palestinians. He showed his commitment to Islam by adopting the title “Custodian of the Two Holy Places” instead of “His Majesty the King,” and spent large amounts on extending the mosques in Makkah and Madinah as well as other religious institutions abroad. Saddam Hussein challenged his authority during the Gulf War; and after stationing American and other foreign troops in Saudi Arabia to protect the country, Islamic militant opposition groups objected to the fact that infidels defend the Holy Places. However, in the early 1990s he initiated political reforms culminating in the introduction of a codified system of governance or basic law of Saudi Arabia in 1992. Other domestic policies were concerned with economical change after the country suffered massive losses and huge budget deficits with the fall of oil prices in the 1980s. His development plans called for diversification, foreign investment, and adjustments to the global economy. In 1995 he suffered a stroke that forced him to delegate most of the official business to his half-brother and Crown Prince ‘Abdallah; however, ‘Abdallah was still restricted by Fahd in his decision-making for over a decade, thus creating a long period of stagnation. This era was further shattered by an increase in violence and fighting with militant Islamic opposition groups, including al-Qa‘idah, who has attacked government institutions, citizens, foreigners, Muslims, and nonMuslims alike since 2003 in their struggle to bring down the Al Sa‘ud government.

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Fahd reacted with strong security measurements and crackdowns on opposition groups in general.

FURTHER READING Farsy, Fouad. Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz. Guernsey, UK: Knight Communications, 2001. Reed, Jennifer. The Saudi Royal Family. New York: Chelsea House, 2006. Reich, Bernard (ed.). Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990.

Family Life Sebastian Maisel The extended family is the most important social unit in Arabia. Every Arab in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States belongs to this extended group of close relatives, which provides the core layer of identification and loyalty. Some families are larger than others, whereas other families choose to live in alliance with other related families and form tribes. This concept has not changed for more than 2,000 years despite the rapid modernization and upheaval in society and culture. Families in Arabia have been described as patriarchal, patrilinear, patrilocal, endogamous, and occasionally polygamous. Patriarchal refers to the authority within the family being in the hands of the elder male members. Patrilinear alludes to the origin and descent of the group through the male bloodline. Patrilocal means that adult sons and their families live with their father. Endogamous refers to the preference of marrying within the same kin group, which can be polygamous, although Islamic law has injunctions on the degree of closeness of kin for related co-wives. The living and working conditions in Arabia required families to work and stick together. This sense of togetherness or solidarity has survived among all tribally organized groups. The extended family is kept together by sharing the same morals and values as well as material interests. Single family members usually remained with the family, and couples live with the husband’s family. If they choose to live in their own house, they would not give up their ties to the extended family. Widows can return to their families and bring back children up to a certain age. Divorcees are taken in under the premise that they remarry quickly. If family members visit each other, the rules of hospitality apply: relatives are always protected and receive special treatment. In addition to the intellectual strengthening of the family, they also work on the material improvement and view children as the best investment in the future, because sons and even single daughters can take care of their parents. Social acceptance and reputation increase with the number of children, especially boys, in a family. A large number of children can prevent a divorce, because of the moral standards of the community. Family planning is very uncommon in Arabia,

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although governments of some Gulf States promote family planning through sex education programs or prescription of contraceptives. For birth control, Islam allows the method of ‘azl, coitus interuptus but specifically prohibits the killing of female infants, which was custom in pre-Islamic Arabia because of concerns for the economy and reputation. Abortion is permitted until the fourth month and only if the pregnancy is a risk for the mother. Islam requires parents to treat all children fairly and justly. Equality is required in polygamous relationships, which occur very rarely. The husband is allowed to marry four women at the same time, if he can provide for them equally. He is responsible for their living and expenses (i.e., not only for his wife and children, but also for other family members without income such as unmarried siblings or old relatives, uncles, aunts, etc.). He is also concerned about the reputation of his family and represents them in legal matters. His honor and the honor of his family depend upon the moral behavior of the female members of the group. He expects faithfulness from his wife, chastity from his unmarried female siblings, and a reclusive life of widows in the family. Sons, brothers, and cousins protect the honor and morality of their female relatives. They are allowed to check on them and force them to obey. Men are usually busy with all of the things around the house, whereas women take care of the housework. Their shares include taking care of the children, taking care of the house, and helping with agriculture. Women with jobs outside the house normally get support with taking care of the children from other members of the tribal network. Girls are usually tied to the house, just like their mothers and aunts. They have to help with the chores such as cooking, cleaning, or childcare. Boys are subordinated to the authority of the father and often play and work outside the house. The structure of an extended family is shown through a variety of legal norms such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance as well as through a certain dress code. According to the Qur’an, men do have authority over women, and in reality fathers, brothers, uncles, or cousins exercise their power. Despite the separation of sexes as required in some countries, mothers always had a highly esteemed position and reputation in Arab society. Mothers exercise their influence in the family and contribute to the decision-making process at home. According to tradition, elder people are highly respected and enjoy a hierarchical eminence. It is them who ultimately decide the fate of the family and are in charge of most customs and traditions, such as circumcision, marriage, games, socialization, and death.

FURTHER READING Bowen, Donna Lee, and Evelyn A. Early. Everyday Life in the Muslim Middle East. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002. Ismael, Jacqueline S., and Nancy Walstrom. Turbulent Times and Family Life in the Contemporary Middle East. Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2004. Long, David E. Culture and Customs of Saudi Arabia. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005. Shechter, Relli. Transitions in Domestic Consumption and Family Life. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003.

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Faysal bin Abd al-Aziz (1905–1975) Sebastian Maisel The third king of Saudi Arabia, Faysal bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Al Sa‘ud, was born in 1905. He began ruling the kingdom as king in 1964; concurrently as Imam he led the Wahhabi authority. His father was the founder of the kingdom, and through his mother Tarfah he is related to the other influential family, the Al alShaykh, who trace their origin back to the founder of the reform movement in the eighteenth century, Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab. If ‘Abd al-‘Aziz is considered the creator of the kingdom, Faysal was beyond a doubt the architect of the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. From 1926 until 1960 he was Vice Regent for the Hijaz. Other important positions in the leadership and government of Saudi Arabia included Crown Prince (1953–1964), Prime Minister (1958–1960, 1960, and 1962–1975), and Foreign Minister (1953–1960 and 1962–1975). After a long power struggle with his brother, King Sa‘ud bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, he finally succeeded in forcing his abdication in 1964, and Faysal was chosen as king by the Al Sa‘ud family council. In both his domestic and foreign policy, he followed pan-Islamic principles and enforced an opening of the country and the society toward the West. The growing oil revenues were used to modernize the kingdom gradually while maintaining its Islamic character and values. During his rule, many universities and schools, including those for girls, were founded. He abolished slavery by royal decree and introduced television in the late 1960s. In order to extend central rule of all social groups in the country, he announced a national policy to settle the remaining nomadic Bedouin. During the Yemeni civil war, he supported the Royalists against his main regional political rival, Egypt’s president Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir. His pan-Islamic policies were seen as an attempt to counter Nasr’s pan-Arabism. Although a close ally of the United States and an anti-communist, he strongly supported the Palestinian struggle for independence and in 1973 during the October War he proclaimed an oil embargo against several Western nations who supported Israel financially and militarily against previous declarations and agreements. On March 25, 1975, he was killed during a public meeting by his nephew Faysal bin Musa‘id bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, an act that is widely believed to be in retaliation for the shooting of Faysal bin Musa‘id’s brother Khalid in a demonstration against the introduction of television. Faysal was succeeded by his half-brother Khalid bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. Many of his sons, including Sa‘ud, Khalid, and Turki, hold high-ranking positions in the Saudi government. See also Education.

FURTHER READING de Gaury, Gerald. Faysal: King of Saudi Arabia. New York: Praeger, 1966. “King Faisal: Oil, Wealth and Power,” Time, April 7, 1975.

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Festivals in the United Arab Emirates Reich, Bernard (ed.). Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990.

Festivals in the United Arab Emirates Carla Higgins Festivals and conferences play a key role in the efforts of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to raise its profile as a tourist destination, promote itself as a business hub, encourage commerce, and create public discourse about local issues. This $3.27 billion industry is being consolidated into a corporation, the UAE Exhibitions and Conferences Authority, and organized under the UAE Ministry of Economy and Planning, as well as the Chambers of Commerce from each emirate. Sharjah initiated conferences in 1977 when it opened its Expo Center. Since 1982, it has hosted an international book fair designed to promote reading among youth, as well as to make a variety of books available and affordable to Emirati citizens. The Sharjah World Book Fair is a direct result of the ruler, Shaykh Dr. Sultan bin Muhammad al Qasimi, and his vision of promoting education within Sharjah and beyond. The National Careers Exhibition is another annual education-related event aimed at Emirati citizens interested in banking and finance. Sharjah also hosts TEXPO, an international exhibition for trade in the garments industry; Mideast Watch and Jewelry Shows; and an Arab Asia Trade Fair. In 2002 it inaugurated Expo City, a multipurpose facility with four exhibition halls. Dubai has become the leader in the conference/exhibitions industry. In the 1980s, Dubai built the Dubai World Trade Center as part of a huge exhibition complex and began hosting a wide array of exhibitions—early examples focus on electronics, fashion, health, and engineering. Dubai launched the concept of festivals in 1996 with the Dubai Shopping Festival, now an international hit that brings citizens from all over the Middle East to shop. Dubai Summer Surprises emerged in 2003 as the second annual shopping festival, with an emphasis on entertaining children while school is out. Examples of conferences that Dubai hosts now include the Gulf Information Technology Exhibition, known as GITEX; the Arabian Travel Market; Gulfood; the Bride Show, Cable, Satellite; Careers UAE; Dubai 200 (Aerospace Exhibition); Dubai: The City That Cares; Leaders in Dubai; the WOIBEX Forum on Women; the Dubai International Film Festival; the Dubai International Music Festival; and the Philips Dubai International Jazz Festival. Abu Dhabi is becoming a player in event hosting. In 1998 it created the General Exhibitions Corporation (GEC), which later became the Abu Dhabi National Exhibition Company in 2005. Abu Dhabi boasts a new Abu Dhabi

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International Exhibitions Center (ADIEC), a 500,000 square meter conference facility. The new the Emirates Palace hotel provides luxurious and state-of-theart facilities needed to host any and all conferences. Future plans are to build an Abu Dhabi World Trade Center. Examples of Abu Dhabi conferences include the Abu Dhabi International Petroleum Exhibition & Conference (ADIPEC), the International Defense Exhibition and Conference (IDEX), and the Festival of Thinkers. The three Emirates of ‘Ajman, Ra’s al-Khaymah, and Fujayrah have all developed exhibition facilities to host seasonal fairs for the general public, such as Summer Festivals, Back to School Exhibits, and Ramadan festivals.

FURTHER READING “Exhibitions and Events,” in United Arab Emirates Yearbook. Abu Dhabi: United Arab Emirates Ministry of Information and Culture, 2006.

Film Industry Sebastian Maisel In comparison to other Middle Eastern areas, particularly Egypt and the Maghrib, the film industry of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States is less vibrant and developed. However, when the industry in Egypt experienced serious funding issues starting in the 1970s because of governmental budget cutbacks, sponsors from the Arabian Gulf helped produce and finance many film projects, including The Message (1976 by Mustafa Akkad) and Rana’s Wedding (2002 by Hany Abu Assad). The film industry of the Gulf States started in the 1930s with short documentaries about social life in the Gulf area, but it took nearly four decades before the first feature film, The Storm, was made in Kuwait and the entire Arabian Gulf in 1965 by Muhammad al-Sanusi. Other short films (e.g., by Khalid al-Sadiq) and documentaries followed soon afterward. Sadiq’s first feature film, Bas Ya Bahr (Dangerous Sea) from 1972, was also the first film to cast exclusively Kuwaiti actors and staff. The experiment worked, and the film enjoyed Arab and international success. His second feature film, The Wedding of Zain (1977), was based on the novel of the same name by Sudanese author al-Tayib Salih. For his 1995 short film Shahin, he used for the first time an international work of literature as a model for his film. Sadiq was both producer and director and managed to get international support from India and Italy. Unfortunately, the film has not been shown yet because some reels went missing. Although small in number, all Kuwaiti films are described by their sense of realism with themes of life before the discovery of oil in Kuwait. They help to bridge the gap between the past and present, where the traditional reality has vanished and lives on in the memory of the film director. Newer productions include Cool Youth (2004) by Muhammad al-Shammari and Midnight (2005) by Abdallah al-Salman.

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In Bahrain, the origins of the film industry go back to the mid-1970s, when the first attempts were made to produce a local feature film. In 1975, Bassam alThawadi introduced first his short documentary and then the feature film alHajiz (The Barrier). It took until 2003 to come up with his second film, Visitor, which turned out to be successful mostly because Thawadi chose topics that were popular in the audience. Another film by Thawadi was made in 2006 called A Bahraini Tale. More films are likely to come out of Bahrain after the establishment of the Bahrain Film Production Company. Movie theaters are found all over the country showing Western and Indian productions. During the annual film festival, feature films from other Arab countries are shown. Although public movie theaters are banned in Saudi Arabia, in recent years it has witnessed small steps to bring back films to the audience. It started in the more liberal areas of the kingdom, the Eastern Province and Jiddah, with private and semi-private viewings and film festivals in 2005 and continued with the country’s first feature film Kayf al-Hal? (How are you?), which was produced by Ayman al-Halawani and directed by Palestinian-Canadian Izidore Mussalam and shown at the Cannes Film Festival. The film is almost entirely in Saudi Arabic dialect and aims at discussing cultural issues in the kingdom, particularly women’s rights. Prince al-Walid bin Talal, owner of market leader Rotana, produced the film, which cannot be shown in the kingdom. However, it reaches the audience through DVDs, pay-per-view TV, and the Rotana movie channel. In the feature-length documentary Cinema 500km, the story of a young Saudi cinema lover is told, who travels all the way to Bahrain to watch his first movie in a cinema. The Ministry of Culture and Information granted permission to produce the film in the kingdom, although it cannot be shown there. The film directed by ‘Abdallah al-Iyaf premiered at the Emirates Film Competition in 2006. The film industry in Saudi Arabia lacks professional schools and training, production companies, and usually official support. But individuals like al-Iyaf or filmmaker Haifa Mansoor with her 2006 award-winning documentary Nissa bila dhill (Women without Shadows) began challenging those difficulties and developing a small sector of both feature and documentary films. The supportive role of Prince al-Walid cannot be underestimated, especially for future projects. Although there are many movie theaters in the United Arab Emirates, they predominantly show Western and Indian films. Only on rare occasions, such as the annual Dubai Film Festival or the Emirates Film Competition, are local and regional productions shown. Only one feature film, al-Hilm (The Dream), came out from the Emirates in 2007; however, there is an active scene of short filmmakers called the Emerging Emirates that produced some twenty short films over the last few years that includes Nayla Al Khaja (the first female director), ‘Abdullah Ahmad, and Jasim al-Salty. They cover issues of social conflict and problems between the generations. As part of official investments in the media and arts, Dubai Studio City was created to provide for the various film production needs. The film industry in Oman is almost nonexistent with only one feature film released by 2007, called al-Bum (type of dhow), directed by Khalid al-Zajali. The drama talks about a personal conflict between a modernist and a traditionalist placed in the setting of an old fishing village. Although there is an annual film

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festival, the local market is not developed and relies mainly on Indian films. Very few cinemas exist.

FURTHER READING Leaman, Oliver. The Companion Encyclopedia of Middle Eastern and North African Films. New York: Routledge, 2001. Shafik, Viola. Arab History: History and Culture. Cairo: American University of Cairo Press, 2007.

Fine Arts Sebastian Maisel Plastic arts in Arabia have never been able to step out of the overwhelming shadow of the various forms of literary expression. The dictum of not depicting human forms was upheld in the Peninsula in contrast to other Muslim areas such as Persia or India. However, economic development brought rapid and distinct cultural change, which is reflected in the evolution of vibrant modern arts scenes throughout the Gulf area. Concurrently with the development of a modern and post-modern art scene, Islamic art continued growing. Some artists combined religious tradition with modern techniques. The first modern art exhibit in the Arabian Gulf was opened in 1959 in Kuwait. A year later, the Free Atelier began offering art courses, supplies, and venues. This model, which also includes state-funded full-time artists, was introduced in Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. Saudi Arabia was the first Gulf State to offer art education for male students at the university level since 1965. In 1969, the Modern Art Society of Bahrain was founded as the first of its kind in the area. With the growing development of the countries, additional outlets for the arts and artists became necessary and resulted in the formation of the Kuwaiti National Council for Culture, Arts, and Letters and the Saudi Arabian Society for Culture and Arts, with the goal to channel, supervise, and support the fast-growing art scene. Additional free ateliers and art societies throughout the peninsula were established, which all enjoyed financial support from oil revenues. This support is extended in Oman to the country’s contemporary art movement, where the Atelier for Fine Arts in Masqat was established to provide art education and patronage. From this institution, the Omani sisters Nadira bint Mahmud and Rabha bint Mahmud emerged as the region’s most prolific abstractionists. Today, the contemporary art scene is slowly attempting to introduce new mediums and venues to move beyond the label of national art. Since 2000 the gallery Bayt Muzna has been a pioneer in bringing in Omani and international artists who push the boundaries of modern art. However, the art scene of the area not only drew from petrol-related sources, it also relied on the long tradition and history of civilization and interaction with

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other cultures. In particular, the small but active art scene in Bahrain draws from the ancient heritage of Dilmun, and today three leading galleries exhibit national and international artists who reflect on these themes. The goals of the Bahraini Art Society, established in 1982, were to create an independent, non-for-profit institution that enabled its members to participate in the development of the art scene in the Arabian Gulf. The Ministry of Information in Bahrain became a major patron of the local arts, organizing solo and group exhibitions and granting awards to successful artists. The annual art exhibition of fine arts in conjunction with the National Museum is the culminating event of the Bahraini art scene. Over the years, the government of Kuwait has sponsored the development of fine art through scholarships, funds, and educational institutions. In 1960, the “Free Studio” was founded to encourage art students and to provide professional instruction and technical help. Several galleries exhibit the works of local and foreign artists. In 1983 the Kuwait National Museum opened to the public, exhibiting among other things contemporary Kuwaiti art from the Al Sabah collection. In the Shariqah (Sharjah) Emirate, the Art Museum was inaugurated to house artwork from the Sharjah International Art Biennial, which opened in 1993 and by 2003 started to bring international artists to the Gulf. With bold and controversial themes, it stands out and attracts large crowds of participants and spectators every year. Sharjah is also home to the oldest art association in the Emirates, which started around 1987. Its rich and huge catalogues indicate how the art scene has matured and diversified over the last three decades. Although Qatar promotes its artistic scene as predominantly Islamic, there are nevertheless significant contributions to the field of art education, especially through the School of Arts at Virginia Commonwealth University in Qatar, which was founded in 2001. The Fine Arts Society of Qatar focuses on exhibiting local artists in some galleries in the capital Doha. The governmental National Council for Culture, Arts, and Heritage sponsors and organizes art-related events in order to promote tourism. In the region’s fastest-growing city, Dubai, more than twenty art galleries help to create and preserve the city’s multicultural identity on the basis of a combination of creativity and economical development that attracts foreign and local visitors alike. In neighboring Abu Dhabi, the former slower pace of growth has caught up and competes with Dubai. It began with the opening of the Abu Dhabi Culture and Heritage Authority and its Cultural Foundation, the main concern of which was to offer space and support for artists and collectors. In addition, they worked on bringing world-class museums to the Emirate, including the Guggenheim, which is scheduled to open in 2012. The art scene in Saudi Arabia is a reflection of the country’s cultural development, which is based on modernization and preservation of Islamic and traditional forms and values. Although modern and contemporary art needs artists, it also requires an educated class of art lovers and space to exhibit. The kingdom is gradually offering more room for artists to express themselves in public galleries and art shows. Talented young artists are now able to create and exhibit art as long as they follow the country’s strict moral guidelines. The Mansouriyah

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Foundation in Jiddah facilitates the growing bond between artist and audience with exhibitions, publications, and the kingdom’s first collection of contemporary Saudi art. Other patrons of the arts include Prince Khalid bin Faysal, himself a renowned artist and painter, and the city of Jiddah, which commissioned sculptors to create some 300 large plastics and statues along the roundabouts on the Corniche representing aspects of modern technology and traditional cultural heritage. They represent the city’s strife for civic beauty in a hostile, arid environment. Jiddah stands out among the Saudi cities as a patron of the arts with its many galleries, artists, and art centers. The Darah Binzagr, home, studio, and gallery of one of Saudi Arabia’s most prolific and acclaimed painters, Safeya Binzagr, is only one of them. The government maintains its influence over the art scene through the Saudi Arabian Society for Culture and Arts, which sponsors and supports artists, facilitates exhibitions, and raises the level of artistic awareness in the society.

FURTHER READING Ball-Lechgar, Lisa. “Fresh Gulf Currents,” Saudi Aramco World 58, no. 6 (2007): 2–13. Fullerton, Arlene, and Geza Fehervari. Kuwait: Arts and Architecture. Kuwait: No publisher stated, 1995. Long, David. Culture and Customs of Saudi Arabia. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005. Rajab, Tareq Sayid. Tareq Sayid Rajab and the Development of Fine Art in Kuwait. Kuwait: No publisher stated, 2001. Al-Salem, Mohammad, and Saad al-Obaied. Fine Arts: Exhibition of Riyadh Yesterday and Today. Riyadh: Saudi Arabian Cultural and Arts Society, 1986.

Fiqh Sebastian Maisel The Arabic meaning of fiqh is knowledge or comprehension and it is defined as Islamic jurisprudence. It combines the doctrines of the sources (usul al-fiqh, i.e., the Qur’an and Hadith), and the doctrine of its practical regulations (furu‘ alfiqh). Both are part of a wide array of literature; however, a codified and comprehensive set of rules that applies to all Islamic groups does not exist. In contrast to the Shari‘ah, which is part of the divine Islamic law, fiqh is based on human interpretation of the sources. The legal scholars, faqih (plural fuqaha’) in Arabic, refer in their ruling to selected sources and books, which are interpreted in a way to find legal “tricks,” hiyal, to avoid the harsh regulations of Islamic law. These tricks are often used in trade and property law, but are also found in the area of ritual regulations. Important bases for all Sunni scholars are adjudications by scholars from al-Azhar University in Cairo, where all four schools of law are present. Shi‘ite scholars prefer adjudications from the Islamic university in Najaf in Iraq and Qum in Iran. For example, Islam prohibits earning interest; however, the rule can be

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avoided by purchasing shares and earning a dividend (i.e., part of the overall profit), which is legal. In this way, an entire banking system evolved that did not violate Shari‘ah. Prior to Muhammad’s revelations, law was a matter of knowledge of local traditions; however, experts had no authority, and law was enforced through oath and bails or other means of guaranties. Muhammad became the first Islamic arbitrator, and was succeeded by the caliphs. Under the Umayyads, for the first time independent judges were appointed who used reasoning and local customs to come to their conclusions. Formal schools of legal thought were established after the eighth century under the rule of ‘Abbasid. Until the tenth century, Islamic law was codified by using ijtihad, or independent reasoning; however, later the more dogmatic trend of taqlid, or imitation, gained importance within the Sunni schools of law. With the establishment and consolidation of contemporary Islamic countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, legal norms based on Western concepts of jurisprudence began to limit the spheres of Islamic regulations. In addition, calls for updating and abolishing outdated regulations became louder. However, in the 1970s during a time of Islamic revival, some Arab countries tried to re-establish the older ethic and moral values expressed in the Islamic law. Islamic jurisprudence is based on four sources. The first source is the Qur’an, which has approximately 500 verses relating to legal issues. The second is the sunnah, or traditions, which describe the sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad that were narrated in the Hadith. The Hadith have been collected and cited since the early decades of Islam. Six Hadith collections are considered to be authentic, that is, containing sayings that can be verified through an unbroken isnad, or chain of narrators of undisputed good authority. The two most influential of these collections are by al-Bukhari and ibn Muslim. The third source is ijma‘ or consensus of the Muslim community (although this can be interpreted as the community of scholars rather than all Muslims). The fourth main source is qiyas or reasoned analogy although Hanbali jurists usually reject both qiyas and ijma‘ because they depend on man rather than on the divine word of God. Other secondary sources generally not included in decisions today include ‘urf (custom), ra’i (opinion), and ijtihad (reasoning) although ijtihad is still used by Kharaji and Shi’i scholars. Ijtihad has been replaced by taqlid for the four major schools of Sunni Islam. Four main schools of interpreting Islamic law and applying Islamic jurisprudence developed over time: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi‘i, and Hanbali, each named for their founders. Saudi Arabia’s dominant school is Hanbali and the teachings of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab are based on this school. In the Hijaz, the Shafi‘i School prevailed until the region was incorporated into Saudi Arabia in the 1920s. In the eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula, particularly in Kuwait and Bahrain, the Maliki School is the most widespread. Shi‘ites in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States follow the Ja’afari School, whereas the Ibadis of Oman have their own school, but both are often regarded as semi-official by the Sunni schools. The practical application of Islamic Law is called furu‘ al-fiqh, or branches of the jurisdiction, which is based on a collection of cases and rules. Every scholar can give a legal opinion in any given case called a fatwa. A fatwa requires the use

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of all of the accepted sources of Islamic law to solve a case or give a ruling on an issue. Fatwas are usually binding when given by a mufti in service of a state, but are not binding on individuals and can be contradicted by a ruling by another religious scholar. Human actions are usually classified as obligatory, commendable, indifferent, objectionable, and forbidden, and punishments for infractions are given out accordingly. The regulation of individual cases is described in thematic books by authors from all different schools of law. They usually start with their interpretations of the rituals followed by marital, criminal, political, procedural, and economical cases and finish with regulations for inheritance. Most of the schools of law emphasize reconciliation between the parties before taking a suit to court. In most of the Arab Gulf States, the ruler is the final court of appeal; however, his interpretation and ruling must be consistent with the usual legal consensus of the leading Islamic legal scholars. For this, the ruler is subject to the law and can be sued in court and punished. Most Islamic countries experienced transitional periods in their legal system over the last century, usually at the instigation of colonial powers. This led to restricting application of Islamic law to mainly family law. In contrast, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States continue to regard Shari‘ah as the main source of law and apply fiqh for all types of law. See also Education; Madhhab.

FURTHER READING Ballantyne, William M. Essays and Addresses on Arab Laws. Richmond, Surrey, UK: Curzon, 2000. Heer, Nicholas (ed.). Islamic Law and Jurisprudence. Studies in Honor of Farhat J. Ziadeh. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1990. Motzki, Harald. The Origins of Islamic Jurisprudence: Meccan Fiqh before the Classical Schools. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2002. Nafisa, Motleb Abdullah. “Law and Social Change in Muslim Countries: The Concept of Islamic Law Held by the Hanbali School and the Saudi Arabian Legal System,” SJD thesis, Harvard Law School, 1975. Shoup, John. Culture and Customs of Syria. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2008. Vogel, Frank. Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2000.

Flora and Fauna Sebastian Maisel The arid climate and desert appearance of many parts of the Arabian Peninsula belie the existence of a rich biodiversity in all geographical areas ranging from the mountaintops of Asir via the large sand desert of the Empty Quarter to the shallow waters of the Gulf. Everywhere life is abundant, and many plants and

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Dhub, a spiny-tailed lizard (uromastix), Saudi Arabia. Courtesy of Sebastian Maisel.

animals continue to live in their natural habitat. However, human development, especially the industry and urban sector, infringes on the wildlife, which in turn has to retreat or will become extinct if it cannot adapt to the new conditions. In the ancient past, the Arabian Peninsula was connected to Africa, creating a land bridge that facilitated biological exchange. Only after the formation of the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf was the Peninsula isolated from the other landmasses. Climatic change during and after the Ice Age also left its mark on the flora and fauna. The Arabian Peninsula was much more fertile with permanent rivers and lakes, thus it had a greater diversity than it can support today. An arid climate has since been the characteristic condition with subsequent large deserts and steppes. The types of animals and plants in Arabia today are a direct reflection of the changing terrain and climate. Generally, vegetation is sparse because of climate and soil conditions. Some trees and bushes are better fit to live in this kind of weather, such as the tamarisk, the date palm, acacias, and mangroves along the coastal wetlands. Forests are rare and only found in higher altitudes such as the Asir and Hijaz Mountains in Saudi Arabia or the Jabal al-Akhdar in Oman. The most common varieties, including acacia, juniper, sidr, and tamarind supply firewood and fencing material for rural communities. Special varieties in Oman include coconut palms and frankincense trees. Large state-run projects to reforest the more mountainous areas of Saudi Arabia help stem ongoing desertification. After the rainy season in the northern and central parts of the Peninsula (from December to March), most plants blossom and produce seeds. Annuals have larger leaves and no sharp thorns, whereas perennials are larger in size and have deep, extensive root systems. Sometimes, leaves are hispid or covered with felt to prevent transpiration. Seeds can survive long periods of drought and wait years before sprouting. Plants

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develop other survival strategies. Some appear to die off completely but start to grow with the first rain. Others have green leaves in the spring and hard, prickly ones in the summer. Many perennials are poisonous to animals; acacia seeds can destroy other seedlings by excreting a substance. All plants of Arabia have adapted in one way or another to the harsh conditions of their environment. Animals have also found ways to live in areas with sparse water and an abundance of direct sunlight and little nourishment. Similar to plants, they developed specific skills or features that enable them to survive in Arabia’s arid climate and desert terrain. In the oases of the Gulf, many insects, caterpillars, dragonflies, beetles, ants, and grasshoppers are found. Small permanent water sources are sufficient for their survival. Dragonflies are fast, long-distance flyers and eat mosquito larvae. Grasshoppers are found in nearly all areas of the Peninsula. They have the ability to jump farther than any other insect. After good rain, the local grasshopper populations can explode and swarms of locust cover the countryside, destroying crops and other plants. Today swarms can be controlled with modern technology. Some Bedouin consider locust a delicacy and eat them either by quick-frying them in a bit of butter or oil or after they have been left to sun dry. Dried locusts were fed to livestock in the past. A very large variety of beetles are found in the desert. In addition, scorpions are common, both the large black and yellow types, as are spiders. The shabath, or camel spider, is the most “notorious” because local belief is that its bite is fatal. However, it is not poisonous, but its size gives it the bad reputation. Snakes live in every type of terrain, even in the sea. Poisonous varieties of sea snakes are very common in the shallow, warm waters along the coast of the Arabian Gulf. Many different members of the lizard family are found in Arabia, including geckos, skinks (sand fish), agamas, warals (desert monitor), chameleons, and the spiny-tailed lizard called dhub in Arabic. Bedouin eat the dhub and it seems that its consumption is legal in the Shari‘ah. The Caspian Pond Turtle frequently inhabits irrigation channels of the eastern part of the Peninsula, as do types of small fish. Fish, snakes, turtles, and other maritime reptiles are found in abundance in the waters of the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the Gulf. Sea life is more plentiful and varied, with coral reefs and deep-sea fish, such as sharks, groupers, and swordfish. Offshore, whales and dolphins can be spotted. It is believed that the waters of the Gulf were heavily polluted and their wildlife was almost completely destroyed. Indeed, the 1991 Gulf War significantly polluted the Gulf environment. Crude oil flowed from damaged wells and entered marine ecosystems of the Northern Arabian Gulf, killing many plants and animals. Military construction and minefields furthered the destruction of the already fragile ecosystem. Particularly damaged were the maritime wildlife and coral reefs, although they have began to regenerate recently. Marine turtles, virtually extinct after the war, started to show up again and began nesting. Other areas in the south near the United Arab Emirates and Qatar remained untouched, and many species survived. Jerboas with their long and powerful hind-legs are common in the stony desert with pockets of sandy soil. Gerbils and mice inhabit all parts of the Peninsula.

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The hedgehog is adapted to living in the desert with large ears to detect movements from far distances. Its ears are also wide and round to dissipate heat. It does not need water because it has the ability to extract liquids from food such as insects and plants. Two types of mongoose live in Arabia, the Indian Grey Mongoose in the eastern part and the white-tailed African species in the coastal plain of the southwest. The wabar, or rock hyrax, is a shy shrewmouse in the rocky terrain in the Hijaz and Asir Mountains. Arabia’s largest rodent is the Arabian Porcupine, which lives in the Asir Mountains and is almost three feet (one meter) in length. Its distinct black and white quills are used in Bedouin ornaments. The honey badger, or ratil, belongs to the weasel family; similar to skunks, it can produce a nauseating secretion from its anal glands. It receives its name from its passion for honey, and its thick hide prevents bee stings and even snakebites. However, the honey badger has a bad reputation because Bedouin claim it digs up graves and eats the dead. More than fifteen species of bat have been recorded in the Peninsula. Among them is the large pallid desert big-eared bat. Bats are more common in tropical areas but are still abundant in most parts of Arabia. The striped type of hyena is found in the mountainous area of the west and southwest. Because it preys on livestock, Bedouin and farmers have hunted the animal almost to extinction. The same region is also home to the only baboon species of Arabia, the Arabian or sacred baboon. They live and travel in troops of fifty or more members. They are omnivorous and often live close to human settlements. They are frequently seen along the streets and outskirts of villages and towns. Foxes are well known throughout Arabia as a popular game. The desert fox of central and eastern Arabia is smaller and slighter than those living in the mountains of Hijaz and Asir. The desert fox has larger ears and has the ability to go without water for long periods of time. Wolves used to be found all over the Peninsula with the exception of the Empty Quarter and Nafud Desert. Wolves rely on small permanent springs and pools of water, which also attract prey. Many folk tales are attached to the wolf, and Bedouin believe in his ability to cure persons possessed by the devil. Live wolves were captured to frighten away evil spirits that can cause women to be infertile. Because wolves prefer the easy prey of domesticated livestock to trying to pursue wild animals, Bedouin shoot them when possible. The Arabian caracal lives in the remotest areas of the southwestern mountains, but its numbers are greatly reduced, and it is rarely seen. In the past, local hunters trained young caracals to hunt other animals. In central and eastern Arabia the secretive sand cat is found. Its existence was discovered only some fifty years ago by the British desert traveler Wilfred Thesiger. It is closely related to the equally shy wild cat. The largest cat of Arabia, the Arabian leopard, used to live in the mountains of western Arabia from Asir to al-‘Ulah and preyed on baboons, birds, and gazelles. Today the species is critically endangered because of pest control and hunting. Gazelles and oryx antelopes have been common in the past, but became extinct in the wild after the introduction of modern firearms and excessive hunting. The Arabian Peninsula is also home to several domesticated animals such as camels, horses, sheep, goats, cattle, and donkeys. None of these animals exist in the wild today, although there are still small herds of wild ibex in some of the

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mountains. Camels are one of the few species of domesticated livestock that are indigenous to the Peninsula, whereas horses were first domesticated in Central Asia. The Arabian horse was developed in the Peninsula and the northern deserts of Syria, but cannot exist in the wild in the desert. It, like most of the domesticated species, is heavily dependent on man for its survival. Cattle were imported from India, and although the variety of zebu found in Oman is a hardy animal, cattle require water at least once a day. The abundance of numerous insect species, shade, seeds, and occasional water sustain the life of many birds. Most are found in the oases, wadis, and other vegetated areas, but some birds live in the desert, steppes, and mountains. The geographical position of the Peninsula makes it a four-way bridge with African birds present in the southwest, Asian birds in the southeast, European birds in the northwest, and two major migratory routes in the east. In addition, along the entire coastline, large varieties of gulls, terns, and waders are found, and cormorants and flamingoes can be seen. Common birds in Arabia are sparrows, pigeons, warblers, and wagtails. In the desert areas larks, hoopoes, and hawks are common. Weaverbirds nest in the Asir where there are also large eagles and vultures. Cultivation and irrigation provide additional food and shelter and attract more birds, some of which breed while in the Peninsula. The houbara bustard is the most important quarry for falcons, a traditional type of sport that almost led to the extinction of the former. At the National Avian Research Center in Abu Dhabi, houbaras are bred to reintroduce them into the wild and to reconcile with the age-old tradition of falconry. Another successful example of reintroducing species after many decades of extinction is the Arabian oryx antelope. In the past often hunted by Bedouin and the upper class, it vanished shortly after World War II. The same people who contributed to its original loss are now working on preserving the remaining animals and protecting their grazing grounds through fenced-off and patrolled nature reserves. Other species were less fortunate and are now considered endangered, threatened, or already extinct because of a rapid process of habitat degradation in the entire Peninsula. See also Travelers and Explorers.

FURTHER READING Larsen, Torben. Butterflies of Saudi Arabia and its Neighbors. London: Stacey International, 1984. Miller, Anthony, Thomas A. Cope, and J.A. Nyberg (eds.). Flora of the Arabian Peninsula and Socotra. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996. Silsby, Jill. Inland Birds of Saudi Arabia. London: Immel Publishing, 1980. Vincett, Betty. Animal Life in Saudi Arabia. Cernusco, Italy: Garzanti Editore, 1982. Vincett, Betty. Wild Flowers of Central Saudi Arabia. Milan: PIME Editrice, 1977. Vine, Peter. Natural Emirates: Wildlife and Environment of the United Arab Emirates. Bangor, Australia: Trident Press, 1996. Wittmer, Walter, and Willi Buettiker (eds.). Fauna of Saudi Arabia. Basel, Switzerland: Pro Entomogogia, 1979–1999.

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Folklore Sebastian Maisel Within the cultures of the Arabian Peninsula all forms of folklore are existent and enjoy popularity. Today folklore in the form of songs, dance, stories, and such is connected to the period before the oil boom and has become part of the local cultural heritage that was in danger of being totally lost. Local cultural heritage has found a new political and social platform to combat the effects of modernization and Westernization, although more often than not it is through a nostalgic glimpse with a strong sense of national pride. Because so much of daily life has changed, people cling to the few remnants that connect them with previous generations. The material culture of the Arabian Peninsula is classified along regional lines and according to the lifestyle of the people who used the object: city dwellers, oasis farmers, or Bedouin. Significant items include dress and textiles, jewelry, tools and household equipment, and architecture. Only a few artifacts have survived the extensive transition that region has undergone since the 1950s. Arguably the most profound changes have occurred in the field of material objects, things that have been replaced with modern equipment and no one thought then worthy of preservation except for a few museums and private collections, many of which are outside of the region. Old things were associated with the past of poverty and backwardness, and anything new was in high demand. The only resistance was over items that might interfere with religion such as radios or television. People were quick to adapt to new technologies and innovations that made life easier for them. Perhaps the one area of material culture that successfully withstood a good deal of transformation is clothing. What is called the “national dress” of Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Gulf States is much the same as it was although still impacted by the fashion tastes of each generation. It is easy to guess the decade if not the year from the specific forms of national dress. Although most material objects are gone, stories and other oral traditions have been preserved and they are an active feature of Arab culture. The oral character of Arab society gives the spoken word superiority over the written one. Folkloristic study of the oral traditions of the region includes poetry, especially Nabati, which is used for the narratives of tribal history; folktales; songs; and most other artistic forms or oral expression. Even the young generations are able to recite popular phrases, poems, and stories. Furthermore, much of what is known about the history of Arabia has been recorded orally, thus making the oral narratives and stories a valuable source. The legal traditions and practices, although generally written, may also be part of the oral heritage. Folk practices may be difficult to classify into specific categories because they are often very close to public standards and orthodox norms. Such aspects as language, religion, medicine, and artistic expression (literature, music) may exist in written forms and only vary slightly from accepted norms of “high culture.” These may be codified and regulated by official Islam and classical Arabic literary

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and grammatical forms. They can include “folk” expressions as popular Islam or by using local dialect. Today it is difficult to find forms of popular Islamic practices because of the efforts of the reformer Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab. However, popular Islam was once spread throughout the Peninsula. From his writings and those of casual observers it is clear that many people in the Peninsula followed folk customs such as venerating saints and their tombs, trees, or rocks. Sufi Turuq (singular Tariqah) had followers in the cities and towns but they lost popularity not only because of the anti-Sufi stance of Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab, but also because of the forces of modernization. Shi‘ite practices are considered heretical to Wahhabis and were subject to official disfavor, but the revival of Shi‘ite identity and power over the past several decades allows them to be openly observed. The same can be said about the use of local dialects of Arabic. The Qur’an was revealed in a perfect form of Arabic. Although Classical Arabic is promoted as the language of God and religion, nobody uses it for daily interactions. Local dialects such as Khaliji, Hijazi, and Najdi are the main means of normal communication, although television and radio promote the use of Classical Arabic as much as they can. Folk medicine has been almost completely eradicated because it is associated with magic and sorcery. Pre-Islamic religion in the Arabian Peninsula made use of soothsayers and sorcery, which are condemned in the Qur’an. In Saudi Arabia practicing folk medicine is considered a crime and can be brought to court. However, this is different from what is called al-Tibb al-Nabawi, or the Prophet’s medicine, which makes use of herbal-based medicines. It is somewhat like homeopathic medicine and includes proper diet and preventative practices. Folklore is also expressed through certain types of behavior. How an Arab from the Peninsula acts and reacts depends on his cultural background, and the values that he considers important. A very specific code of behavior is expressed in the social values of tribes. Virtually every Arab belongs to an extended group of relatives, sometimes as big as a tribe with up to 1 million members. The social interaction between tribal members is regulated by ancient rules often transmitted through oral narratives. Their main characteristic is the common responsibility and solidarity within the kin group. Relatives should stick together. Added to that is the concept of right or wrong, honor, and shame, which also reflects on non-tribal members. Other values such as hospitality, chivalry, bravery, and generosity are integral parts of what broadly is defined as the area’s behavior pattern. Behavior is furthermore exhibited through rituals and customs; for example, the rites of passage, holidays, the majlis, or the pilgrimage. They all combine traditional folkloristic aspects with regulations from the authorities. Although folklore developed from the bottom of the society, heritage has been prescribed from above. This is shown in fine detail by domestic policies of all Arabian Gulf States that are concerned with the preservation of a national heritage or what the authorities consider of national importance. Projects and programs are funded to collect, preserve, and demonstrate an official look of what is worth saving from the past. Open-air museums, restored buildings, and heritage festivals are used to convey this message to the people. With the ongoing and increasing centralization of power and unification of culture, some aspects of the

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rich and diverse folklore of Arabia will disappear or assimilate into a larger, national folklore.

FURTHER READING Hariri-Rifai, Wahbi, and Mokhless Hariri-Rifai. The Heritage of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Washington, D.C.: GDG Publications, 1990. Hurreiz, Sayyid H. Folklore and Folklife in the United Arab Emirates. London: Routledge, Curzon, 2002. Jenner, Michael. Bahrain, Gulf Heritage in Transition. New York: Longman, 1984. Kurpershoek, P. Marcel. Oral Poetry and Narratives from Central Arabia, 5 vols. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1993–2005. al-Mutawa, Mohammed, John W. Fox, and Nada Mourtada-Sabbah (eds.). Globalization and the Gulf. London: Routledge, 2006.

Foreign Policies Tom Landsford The foreign policies of the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia reflect the history and traditions of the individual countries. Their diplomacy has also been shaped by the region’s colonial legacy and the lingering impact of the Cold War, as well as the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iran-Iraq conflicts, and the global War on Terror of the United States. In general, the states have pursued moderate, proWestern foreign policies and endeavored to contain both Iraq and Iran from becoming regional hegemons.

BAHRAIN Bahrain is one of only two of the Arab Gulf states with a representative assembly. However, the conduct of the nation’s foreign policy remains the domain of the monarchy. Bahrain’s foreign policy can best be described as one of engagement, both regionally and globally. The country has sought to integrate itself into international bodies and develop close relations with neighboring states, including Iran. However, a failed Iranian-backed coup in 1981 continues to affect relations between the two states, and tensions have increased since the 1990s, when Iran was discovered to be supporting radical, anti-government elements in the country. In 1986, a causeway was constructed from the island nation to Saudi Arabia. A long-standing border dispute between Bahrain and Qatar was settled by the International Court of Justice in 2001, with both countries receiving some areas that were in dispute. The settlement removed the country’s main source of tension with surrounding states. The country has had close relations with the United States since independence in 1971 and has been used as an American naval base since 1947. During the

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Cold War, ties to the United States were perceived as the optimum means to counter Soviet influence in the region. After the end of the Cold War, Bahrain continued a close military relationship with the United States to counter potential Iranian or Iraqi influence and ensure regional stability. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Bahrain joined the U.S.-led coalition of nations that opposed the regime of Saddam Hussein. The country also became a major hub for coalition operations, and Bahraini air units participated in the liberation of Kuwait in 1991. After the war, the United States pre-positioned military equipment in Bahrain, and the UN-sponsored naval patrols used the countries facilities to enforce the weapons and economic sanctions against the Saddam Hussein government. U.S. basing rights were guaranteed through a 1991 accord between the two countries. Bahrain subsequently provided the use of bases and airspace during the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. It also increased intelligence and law enforcement cooperation with the United States in the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. In 2001, the administration of George W. Bush designated Bahrain a major nonNATO ally. This allowed the sale and transfer of more sophisticated weaponry and increased intelligence collaboration. From 2000 to 2007, U.S. military sales to Bahrain totaled $608.9 million. Bahrain’s monarch, King Hamad, has made three visits to the United States since ascending the throne in 1999. Bahrain also has strong economic ties to the United States, and the 2004 U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement took effect in 2006. Trade between the two countries exceeded $1 billion in 2006. Bahrain joined the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981. The following year, the organization provided the country with $1.7 billion to modernize its military and security infrastructure. Bahrain has advocated expanded economic and security cooperation within the GCC and stronger commercial ties with the European Union (EU), including a proposed free trade agreement between the GCC and the EU. In 1994, Bahrain, along with the other GCC states, ended some boycotts of Israel. In 2005, the government eliminated its official economic embargo on Israel, a move that was strongly opposed by the nation’s parliament, but was a condition of the country’s free trade accord with the United States.

KUWAIT Kuwait’s foreign policy remains profoundly affected by the country’s 1990 conquest by Iraq. Since its independence in 1961, Kuwait was subject to territorial claims by Iraq that argued that the country had been artificially separated from Baghdad by the colonial powers. Relations between the United States and Iraq improved significantly in 1987 when the United States began to re-flag Kuwaiti oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq war to ensure their safety. In 1990, the regime of Saddam Hussein invaded and quickly overran Kuwait. A U.S.-led multinational coalition was formed under the auspices of a UN Security Council resolution. Coalition forces liberated Kuwait in 1991. Kuwait’s post-liberation foreign policy has sought to expand security alliances and bolster relations with countries that supported the anti-Saddam coalition.

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Tensions remained high with countries that did not join the coalition or that supported Iraq during the conflict, including Cuba, Jordan, Sudan, and Yemen. However, in 1999, Kuwait launched a diplomatic initiative to improve relations with Jordan and Yemen. Kuwait was one of the main financial backers of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), but the group’s support for the Saddam regime reduced Kuwaiti backing of the PLO leadership. In 1993, the government ended some aspects of its embargo on Israel. Kuwait has the world’s fifth largest proven oil reserves and it provides substantial foreign aid for states such as Egypt and Syria. The government also gave Lebanon $800 million following the 2006 war in south Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah. Established in 1961, the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) now also disburses aid to non-Arab states. KFAED has granted more than $37 billion in economic development and humanitarian grants and loans, including a $50 million grant to the United States following Hurricane Katrina. Following the war, Kuwait signed a series of bilateral defense agreements with France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In 1994, Iraq agreed to a UN-mandated border settlement with Kuwait; however, the maritime boundary between the two states remains in dispute. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia also dispute control of the Qaruh and Umm al Maradim islands in the Persian Gulf. Kuwait was a founding member of the GCC in 1981. It supported greater defense capabilities for the member states, and Kuwait’s GCC partners participated in the 1990–1991 anti-Saddam coalition. After the war, Kuwait endorsed greater economic integration and a common market among the GCC countries. The alliance with the United States emerged as the cornerstone of Kuwaiti foreign policy. Kuwait purchased $81 million in U.S. military equipment in the first year following the invasion and signed a ten-year security agreement in which the United States guaranteed Kuwaiti sovereignty in exchange for prepositioning equipment and providing funding for joint military exercises. From 2003 to 2007, the country’s currency, the dinar, was pegged to the U.S. dollar. By 2007, Kuwait had purchased more than $8.1 billion in arms and weaponry. Furthermore, American firms were given priority in Kuwait’s reconstruction projects and energy development programs. The country imports more than $2.1 billion in U.S. goods each year, not including military sales. Kuwait was one of the staunchest supporters of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. The country served as the base for the campaign and provided technical and logistical support for the U.S.-led coalition government. In 2003, Kuwait pledged $1.5 billion in economic assistance for the Iraqi government and has supported the political reconciliation process, including the country’s elections in 2005. The result has been dramatic improvement in relations between the two countries.

OMAN Since independence, Oman has sought to improve relations with neighboring states and ensure regional stability. After Sultan Qabus bin Sa‘id Al Bu Sa‘id came to power in 1970, he undertook an aggressive foreign policy to end the

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nation’s relative isolation and become integrated into international relations. More than any other Gulf State, Oman has pursued relations with a wide range of countries. Although it was a member of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War, the country has strengthened ties with the United States, although not to the degree of Bahrain or Kuwait. Instead, Oman has pursued close ties with the EU, its main trade partner, and Asian countries such as China, India, and Pakistan. It has also been involved in Central Asia and initiated joint economic projects with several countries in the region, including a pipeline project with Kazakhstan. The United Kingdom remains Oman’s closest Western ally and continues to provide economic, technical, and security assistance to the sultanate. This relationship is based on the long-standing historical connection between the two countries and a series of treaties. The country is a member of a range of international organizations and was a founding member of the GCC in 1981 and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) in 1997. Oman supported a more robust GCC and in 1991 unsuccessfully called for the organization’s military component to be expanded to 100,000 troops. It was one of the driving forces in the GCC for the creation of a common market and the initiation of discussions with the EU to establish a free trade agreement between the two organizations. Oman perceived the IORA as a means to attract more investment into the Gulf region from Asia and to enhance trade relations. It supported the expansion of the IORA from its original fourteen countries to nineteen members in 2001. Oman joined the World Trade Organization in 2000, and in 2005, Oman and the United States concluded a free trade agreement. In the 1980s, Oman endeavored unsuccessfully to mediate the Iran-Iraq War. It maintains better relations with Iran than any of the other Gulf States, with the possible exception of Qatar. Throughout the 1990s, Oman concentrated on settling several outstanding border disputes with neighboring states. In 1990, Oman and Saudi Arabia finalized a series of border agreements that resolved their mutual boundary questions. The accords went into effect two years later. In 1995, Oman settled its remaining border issues with Yemen. The two countries subsequently agreed to construct a major highway from southern Yemen to Oman and initiate negotiations on a bilateral free trade agreement. Finally, in 1999, Oman and the United Arab Emirates signed an accord to finalize their borders. Oman has officially supported the Arab-Israeli peace process and participated in several rounds of negotiations. In addition, the Sultan invited Israeli participation in a regional water desalination conference in 1994, when the other GCC states still did not have official relations with Israel, and he invited Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin to come to Oman in the first visit of an Israeli leader to a Gulf state. The government opened reciprocal trade offices with Israel in 1996, but was forced to close the Israeli office in 2000 because of public demonstrations in support of the second intifadah. Oman endorsed the creation of a Palestinian state and provided funding for the Palestinian Authority. The government condemned the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and Omani troops were part of the coalition of nations that liberated Kuwait. This marked the first time that Oman abandoned its non-aligned principle, and the Sultan renewed and expanded a 1980 facilities agreement with the United States that

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allowed the pre-positioning of military equipment and the American use of Omani military facilities. However, Oman subsequently condemned the UNsponsored economic sanctions against Iraq. It asserted that the sanctions had little impact on the regime and instead unfairly hurt the Iraqi people. Oman also opposed the 1998 Anglo-American airstrikes on Iraq that were undertaken after Saddam forced UN weapons inspectors to leave the country. Oman offered intelligence and financial cooperation to the United States and the EU in the wake of the 2001 terrorist strikes. Although it opposed military action against Iraq in 2003, Oman did allow the United States to use its airspace and military facilities to support the invasion and the subsequent occupation. Omani officials did criticize the U.S. response to the Iraqi insurgency and contend that the ongoing violence has increased radical Islamic terrorism. Oman did provide aid and technical support for the post-Saddam Iraqi government.

QATAR Like Oman, Qatar has maintained close relations with the United Kingdom since it gained full independence in 1971. Qatar has generally pursued a moderate, pro-Western foreign policy and was a founding member of the GCC. Its relations with neighboring states have been complicated by a series of border disputes. For instance, a boundary dispute with Saudi Arabia turned bloody in 1992 when troops from both countries engaged in a series of border skirmishes. Since then, the two countries have engaged in continued negotiations over the contested area, but have been unable to finalize a settlement. In 1995, Qatar even boycotted the GCC in response to the selection of a Saudi citizen as the organization’s secretary-general. Qatar also had a long-standing dispute with Bahrain over the Hawar island chain in the Persian Gulf. In 1986, when Bahrain attempted to construct a coast guard facility on one of the islets, Qatari forces took the Bahraini workers prisoner. They were later released. In 1994, the conflict was submitted to the International Court of Justice for arbitration. The Court ruled in 2001 that the main islands belonged to Bahrain, but other areas of the disputed territory were restored to Qatar. During the Gulf War, Qatari troops participated in the liberation of Kuwait along with other GCC forces. In 1992, Qatar signed a bilateral security accord with the United States and then similar agreements with France and the United Kingdom. Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani seized power in Qatar in 1995 from his father. The United States quickly granted recognition to the new regime, and in return, Hamad drew Qatar even closer to the United States. As part of a broader liberalization program, Hamad ordered elections in 1999 for a municipal council. The United States and other Western powers provided technical assistance for the balloting, and the American Congress enacted a resolution congratulating Qatar for its democratic progress and advancement in women’s rights. After the September 2001 terrorist attacks, Qatar offered closer cooperation with the administration of George W. Bush, including use of bases and facilities during the invasion of Afghanistan. The U.S. Central Command established a forward headquarters at Camp Al Sayliyah prior to the invasion of Iraq. The

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command oversaw the 2003 invasion of Iraq. When the United States withdrew from Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, it moved its main airbase in the region to the al-‘Udayd air field in Qatar, which has the longest runway in the region (15,000 ft.). The base also became home to some 5,000 U.S. service personnel who transferred from Saudi Arabia. Bush visited Qatar in 2003, and Hamad reciprocated with a trip to Washington, D.C. the following year and again in 2005. One area of tension, both with the United States and with surrounding states, is the presence of the Al Jazeera (“the Peninsula”) satellite television network in Qatar. Considered the freest news source in the Arab world, Al Jazeera has been critical of Western nations and the neighboring Gulf countries. For instance, Bahrain banned the network from 2002 to 2004 because of charges of bias against the country and Israel.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES The foreign policy of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is based on global engagement and Arab unity. Leaders have repeated called for closer cooperation and collaboration among Arab states, and supported efforts to strengthen organizations such as the Arab League and the GCC. It has participated in a variety of international bodies, and, like neighboring Gulf States, the UAE has used its energy wealth to support humanitarian causes. The Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD) was created in 1971 to provide loans, grants, and technical assistance to Muslim and developing nations. The ADFD also coordinates the aid programs of the UAE government. The UAE has provided significant aid to the Palestinian Authority, and granted Lebanon $50 million for demining programs. In 1974, the UAE and Saudi Arabia negotiated a border accord, but the Emirates later refused to ratify the agreement and called for it to be renegotiated. The dispute remains unresolved. The UAE and Oman signed a framework agreement in 1999 to delineate their border. There are also territorial disputes with Iran. The UAE claims two islands, the Lesser and Greater Tunbs, that are controlled by Tehran. In addition, both countries claim the island of Abu Musa. In 1992, Iran deployed military forces to ensure control of the territory. The GCC is one of the cornerstones of UAE foreign policy. The UAE has been one of the staunchest supporters of the organization and endorsed proposals to strengthen the GCC and enhance its military capabilities. For instance, the Emirates established the UAE Air Warfare Center, the largest air training facility in the Gulf, to provide joint training and exercise means for the GCC states and allies. The UAE was part of the anti-Saddam coalition following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Like other Gulf nations, the UAE endeavored to increase its security through stronger bilateral ties with countries such as the United Kingdom. The UAE became the site of the second largest deployment of British forces outside of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO; the UAE is also the United Kingdom’s main trade partner in the region). The UAE supported the NATO-led campaign against Serbia in Kosovo in 1999. The Emirates provided troops for the NATO-sponsored peacekeeping

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force in Kosovo. The UAE was one of the few countries with diplomatic ties to the Taliban, but the Emirates’ government condemned the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and broke off relations with the Afghan regime. It also offered a range of support to the United States. It worked closely with the Bush administration to reduce terrorist financing networks by enacting new legislation and increasing cooperation with international bodies. The UAE further provided logistical and military support for Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. The UAE was the first country to join the U.S. Container Security Initiative, in which American customs officials are stationed in host nations to provide pre-inspection of seaborne goods delivered to the United States. It also became part of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Megaports Initiative, which implements programs designed to reduce the potential for smuggling nuclear materials. The Emirates donated $100 million to the United States in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. However, relations between the two countries were strained in 2006 when it emerged that a company owned by the UAE government, Dubai Ports World, was going to take over the management of commercial operations at American ports. Of particular concern to many congressional leaders was the continuing support of the UAE for groups linked to Hamas and other Palestinian groups with ties to terrorist activity. Domestic opposition in the United States caused the UAE government to withdraw from the agreement. The UAE supported efforts to strengthen international law, including the creation of the International Criminal Court. The Emirates have also called for debt relief for developing African nations and international efforts to increase development on the continent. To promote regional stability, the UAE has supported the post-Saddam government in Iraq and provided more than $215 million between 2004 and 2007.

SAUDI ARABIA Saudi Arabia has pursued a moderate foreign policy based primarily on the promotion of regional stability. It has further endeavored to maintain and project a role as the leading Sunni power in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia has also used its wealth to support a range of Arab and Islamic causes while generally favoring multilateralism. Saudi Arabia was a founding member of the Arab League, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the GCC. Within the Arab League, the kingdom has backed a range of Arab and Islamic causes, including support for Israel’s withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders and the creation of a Palestinian state. Saudi Arabia has long been a dominant member within OPEC and often been able to forge consensus on production levels and output in line with the broad goal of maintaining a stable global energy market. However, it has resisted calls to develop the GCC into a more robust collective security organization, and the kingdom has specifically rejected efforts to give the organization a domestic mandate. Saudi Arabia continues to have several border disputes with neighboring states, including Kuwait, the UAE, and Yemen. Although generally considered to be pro-Western, the kingdom has pursued policies in line with its strategic interests, often placing it at odds with the United

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States and Europe. For instance, Saudi Arabia condemned the 1978 Camp David Accords (it also broke diplomatic relations with Egypt until 1987) and maintained a boycott on Israel. Although Saudi Arabia did not participate in U.S.-sponsored efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict in the 1990s, the kingdom did exert diplomatic pressure on Syria to take part in the peace initiatives. This support marked a change in Saudi policy as a result of the Palestinian refusal to support the antiSaddam coalition during the Persian Gulf War. By the late 1990s, Saudi support for the Palestinian Authority was restored to previous levels. Saudi Arabia has allied itself with Western powers when it was necessary or convenient in its pursuit of national interests. Saudi Arabia worked with U.S. intelligence services to provide funding for the anti-Soviet Mujahidin in Afghanistan. The kingdom and the United States also worked to support the Bosnians during the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia. When Kuwait was invaded, the kingdom strengthened ties with the United States and other European countries. Riyadh provided the United States some $15 billion to defray the costs of the war, and the kingdom provided another $40 billion to other allies and to provide humanitarian support for refugees. Saudi Arabia served as the main base for the coalition strike to liberate Kuwait, and it allowed the United States to build several military facilities. The largest would become Prince Sultan Air Base. Following terrorist strikes on American military personnel in 1995, the majority of U.S. forces were moved to Prince Sultan Air Base. The base served as the main air facility during the operations to enforce the UN-mandated no-fly zones over Iraq. Following the 2001 terrorist attacks, the base also played an important role in Operation Enduring Freedom. About 5,000 American service personnel remained at the base until 2003 when relations between Riyadh and Washington D.C. deteriorated because of the Iraq War. The main U.S. air facility in the region was subsequently relocated to Qatar. In 1997, Saudi Arabia became one of three countries to offer diplomatic recognition to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The kingdom officially provided $2 million per year in assistance, whereas private Saudi sources donated substantially larger funds for the regime. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Saudi government broke off diplomatic relations with the Taliban and provided intelligence and logistics support to the U.S.-led Coalition that overthrew the regime. Because fifteen of the nineteen hijackers involved in the terrorist strikes were Saudi, the regime launched an expensive and multifaceted public relations campaign to emphasize its ties with the United States. The kingdom’s foreign policy has also adroitly changed alliances and relationships in response to external factors. When the U.S. Congress blocked sales of advanced aircraft to Saudi Arabia, the kingdom turned to the United Kingdom and negotiated a series of arms deals known collectively as Al-Yamamah. The first arms sales and weapons transfers were sold in 1985, and new contracts were signed as recently as 2006. The deals represented the largest arms sales in the history of the United Kingdom, worth more than $80 billion (Saudi Arabia paid for the purchases through oil exports). The multibillion-dollar sales were demonstrative of the kingdom’s efforts to counter regional threats from Iraq or Iran with advanced weaponry. The ability of Saudi Arabia to shift alliances underscores the interest-driven nature of the kingdom’s foreign policy and underscores Riyadh’s continuing efforts toward regional stability and Arab leadership.

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FURTHER READING Cordesman, Anthony. Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003. Korany, Bahgar, and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (eds.). The Foreign Policies of Arab States. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984. Long, David E., and Christian Koch (eds.). Gulf Security in the Twenty-First Century. New York: British Academic Press, 1997. Owen, Roger. State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2000. Peterson, Erik R. The Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988. Peterson, J.E. Saudi Arabia and the Illusion of Security. London: Oxford University Press, 2002. Rubin, Barry (ed.). Crises in the Contemporary Persian Gulf. London: Frank Cass, 2002. Zahlan, Rosemary Said. The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1998.

Fujayrah John A. Shoup Fujayrah is the youngest of the states that make up the United Arab Emirates, and the region was ruled mainly by Sharjah (al-Shariqah) until the nineteenth century. In 1879 the tribal leader Hamad ibn ‘Abdallah of the Hafaytat lineage of the Sharqiyin tribe was able to assert his independent authority over a good part of the eastern shore. The British did not recognize Fujayrah as its own entity until 1952 but considered it to still be under the Qawasim rulers of Sharjah. Fujayrah separates the Musandam Peninsula of Oman from the main body of the country. The Arabian Sea coast is a patchwork of different ownerships with several small enclaves (oases) being part of Oman, other regions belonging to Sharjah, and Sharjah and Fujayrah jointly administering some of the others. This patchwork is mainly due to the tribal nature of the coast and to whom tribal peoples gave allegiance during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Some of the communities are Ibadi Kharaji and support the Sultan of Oman, whereas others are Sunni and give their allegiance to one of the Gulf shaykhs. The region was relatively poor with pearling, agriculture, and pastoralism the mainstay of the economy into the 1970s. Because the economic conditions are difficult, many of the people were pastoral nomads and moved part of the year out of Fujayrah into Oman, Sharjah, or other shayhkdoms to make a living. Fujayrah is greatly supported by the oil wealth of its neighbors, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, and has little oil of its own. Fujayrah’s shaykhs have tried to improve the conditions for their people by building new residential quarters, but it remains a pale shadow of the massive building projects in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, or Sharjah. See also Al Qasimi.

FURTHER READING Heard-Bey, Frauke. From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates. Dubai: Motivate Publishing, 2004.

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Gender and Gender Relations John A. Shoup Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States are part of a wide region of the world referred to as the Patriarchal Belt that includes the Mediterranean and the Middle East stretching into Central and Southeast Asia. It is called the Patriarchal Belt because of the power men have over women, especially in the public sphere; in the private sphere women exercise a good deal of power. It is also a region where concepts of honor and shame are important in the relationships between men and women. Individual behavior, especially of a woman, is a measure of the honor (or shame) for an entire family. There is an Arabic saying that states that “honor rides on the skirts of women,” and women are held more responsible for upholding family honor than men. Unni Wikan quotes the Omani, saying “the bride should be a virgin, the groom should be a man” to indicate the high importance women’s honor holds for the region as a whole. Men and women in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States live greatly segregated lives, Saudi Arabia being the most extreme case. As a symbol of this segregation, women wear both an outer modesty garb (it is not the same garment throughout the Peninsula), which is worn whenever she leaves the confines of the home, and often a face veil (again, it varies greatly in the Peninsula). In Oman the modesty garment can be highly colorful cotton prints woven locally or imported from India made for the East African trade. In most of the region the garment is dark in color, usually black, and worn over the top of the head, hanging down to below the ankles. In some regions it is often an adapted form of the large outer cloak worn by men called a bisht or ‘abayah. Until recently many of the Bedouin women from the northern part of the Peninsula wore the same black crepe cloth called a shambar that is worn by Bedouin women in Jordan and Syria. The shambar covers the hair and neck and is held in place by a brocade or flower print headband. The face is uncovered for ease of work but the cloth can be quickly brought up over the nose and mouth should a strange man approach. Since the 1950s this form of dress has been changed to the full-face veil, or burqa‘, worn by urban women in Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf States. Girls in much of the Gulf region wore a heavily embroidered headpiece or hood called a bukhnuq that allowed the face to be seen but covered the head, hair, neck, and shoulders. In the northern Hijaz and some of the other areas closer to Jordan and Syria, Bedouin girls wore an embroidered hood with a long tail that

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ends in silk floss tassels “to wipe away her steps.” In other parts of the Hijaz and in the Tihamah girls wore heavily beaded hoods. Girls were allowed to interact and play with boys until they reached near puberty, when they were withdrawn from male company outside of the house. Starting to wear the face veil marked a girl’s transition to womanhood. In much of the Gulf region the face veil is more of a visor made of stiffened material worn as a mask. In the United Arab Emirates some of them have openings for the eyes and cover the nose but expose the mouth and chin, making it a far more practical piece to wear. Depending on the region, women have had a wide range of individual freedoms, with Bedouin women able to exercise the most freedom and urban women the least. Bedouin women own and often manage their own property (flocks and herds) independent of their husbands, including marketing them to urban merchants. Today in Nizwa it is possible to interact with Bedouin women from the Wahibah, Duru‘, and Harasis tribes at the weekly livestock market. Honor is maintained by discreet distances between the parties or the presence of a male, even if he is a small child. Women in the Gulf have a wide range of job possibilities today and in Bahrain have a wide range of political rights as well. Women are interested in pursuing careers as professionals and are well able to compete with men in the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait. In Saudi Arabia restrictions on driving and the requirement of total separation from men have made it more difficult for women, but there are more and more all-female companies and even banks where all of the employees are women catering only to women clients. Total separation of the genders in the Peninsula has given rise to a “third” gender called khanith, although only Oman allows any form of public recognition of them. Khanith are usually young unmarried men who for a time take on the “role” of women, establishing relationships with other young unmarried men; they are considered transsexual rather than transvestites because they rarely wear women’s clothes. Most of the men who belong to the third gender affect feminine behavior, mannerisms, and gestures and are allowed access to the otherwise closed women’s part of segregated activities. They are often sexually active as male prostitutes, although prostitution is illegal and homosexual prostitution is considered a major sin in Islam. Their activities are generally tolerated (a blind eye to the activities of young unmarried men), and they are expected to eventually become “men” again and marry a woman, although researchers have noted that they never behave fully masculine. Third-gender behavior is expected of any male servant and of former slaves. The British traveler Wilfred Thesiger noted that in his many journeys with Omani Bedouin such behavior was never practiced, and his companions drew it to his attention when they pointed out two well-known khanith in Dubai, one a former slave. Wikan noted that transvestism and the recognition of a third gender were also found among the Marsh Arabs of southern Iraq. See also Sex Trade; Travelers and Explorers.

FURTHER READING Dickson, H.R.P. Arab of the Desert. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983. Haddad, Yvonne Yazbek, and John Esposito. Islam, Gender, and Social Change. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

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Gulf Cooperation Council Thesiger, Wilfred. Arabian Sands. London: Readers Union Longmans, Green & Co., 1960. Wikan, Unni. Behind the Veil in Arabia: Women in Oman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.

Gulf Cooperation Council Tom Lansford The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, commonly known as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), is a regional security and economic organization that was formed as a collective defense body in 1981. Concerned over the potential spillover of the Iran-Iraq War, especially an increase in Iranianbacked Shi‘a fundamentalist groups, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates created the GCC on May 25, 1981 during a summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The six countries proclaimed that the new organization would reflect their shared values and interests. Saudi Arabia emerged as the principle force behind the creation of the body, and the GCC headquarters was established in Riyadh. The presidency of the GCC rotates annually among the member states in alphabetical order. A secretary general of the organization is appointed for a three-year term by the Supreme Council, made up of the heads of state of the members. The Supreme Council is the highest decision-making body in the GCC. Yemen has sought membership in the organization on several occasions, but its bids have been rejected because of its weak economy. After the GCC was established, defense ministers from its member states met to initiate plans for collective defense plans, including the creation of a joint command system and integrated military units. One operational problem the GCC members confronted was that the six countries had different weapons systems purchased from the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Russia. Consequently, their armaments and communications systems often were not interoperational. The more wealthy states of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait began to provide military aid to the other GCC states so they could enhance their capabilities. Bahrain received funding to purchase new fighter aircraft and to modernize its main airbase. Oman also secured military support. Efforts were undertaken to integrate command-and-control structures, standardize equipment, and ensure that early warning systems and communications were standardized. In 1984, the GCC approved the creation of integrated military unit, Peninsula Shield Force. The proposed structure consisted of two brigades of 5,000 troops each with forces from all six GCC members. One brigade would serve on a permanent basis, whereas the other could be activated in response to a specific crisis. The permanent force was stationed in Saudi Arabia, under the command of a Saudi officer. The GCC states held a series of regular military exercises, dubbed Peninsula Shield. GCC units also participated in exercises with the United States and the United Kingdom.

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In 1991, during the Persian Gulf War, the Peninsula Shield force was reinforced; however, the unit did not take part in the combat operations in the conflict. Instead it remained as a reserve force. Following the War, the GCC members pledged to expand security cooperation and further increase military capabilities. It initially offered to station a joint deterrent force in Kuwait, but members were unable to agree on the size and funding of that mission. Nonetheless, the United States supported the enhanced GCC with additional arms sales and weapons transfers (there were also increases in defense procurements from other states such as France and the United Kingdom). The United States also pre-positioned some military equipment in the GCC members in case of future conflict in the region. In 1997, the GCC launched a new initiative to improve communications between the militaries of the member states to link the early warning systems of the respective states. One continuing contentious issue among GCC members was the role and size of the joint military unit. Originally envisioned as a collective defense force, there were unsuccessful calls throughout the 1990s to expand the size of the unit. For instance, in 1991, Oman made a failed proposal that the force be increased to 100,000. In addition, some member states advocated that the unit should be authorized to operate against domestic groups, something opposed by the majority of members. In 2004, the GCC states did sign a new intelligence cooperation agreement that was designed to counter domestic terrorist groups and suppress financing of international terrorist organizations. Meanwhile, the GCC also endeavored to enhance economic integration. In November 1982, the GCC established the Gulf Standards Organization in an effort to coordinate standardization in data and measurements. Subsequently, in 1984, the GCC created Gulf Investment Corporation as a vehicle to support economic development and fund multilateral projects in the region. The GCC members also pledged themselves to the creation of a common market through the removal of tariffs and other trade barriers. In 1988, the organization signed a cooperation agreement with the European Community, now the European Union (EU). The goals of the accord were expanded economic interaction and strengthened political ties between the two bodies. Under the agreement, ministers from the GCC and the EU meet at an annual summit and there is a standing joint committee comprised of representatives from both organizations. There are also working groups on energy and environmental issues. A range of technical and cooperative programs has been undertaken in areas such as finance, agriculture, fisheries, and technological development. One result was an increase in direct investment by the GCC states in the EU. Between 2001 and 2006, GCC investments in the EU member states increased from $150 million to $1.3 billion. In 1990, the GCC and the EU launched negotiations over a free trade agreement. However, the EU sought the formation of a GCC customs union before substantial agreements were finalized. This led to a halt in negotiations, which were resumed in 2002 after the GCC announced its intention to finalize its customs union. The customs agreement came into force in 2003 and removed the major remaining trade barriers amongst the nations. The GCC has also held talks with China and Turkey over free trade agreements. Further negotiations among the GCC states were then started on the possible creation of a common

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market, and 2010 was set as the initial deadline for the establishment of a monetary union. Decisions by Bahrain and Oman to seek bilateral free trade accords with the United States have slowed the process of integration. See also War on Terror.

FURTHER READING Korany, Bahgar, and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (eds.). The Foreign Policies of Arab States. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984. Long, David E., and Christian Koch (eds.). Gulf Security in the Twenty-First Century. New York: British Academic Press, 1997. Nakhleh, Emile A. The Gulf Cooperation Council: Policies, Problems, and Prospects. New York: Praeger, 1986. Owen, Roger. State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2000. Peterson, Erik R. The Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988. Sandwick, John A. (ed.). The Gulf Cooperation Council: Moderation and Stability in an Interdependent World. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987. Zahlan, Rosemary Said. The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1998.

1990–1991 Gulf War Audra Grant On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait, touching off an international crisis that would escalate into the Gulf War. The invasion of Kuwait caught many observers by surprise. Iraq had just emerged from an eight-year war with Iran from 1980 to 1988, exhausted from the near-decade long conflagration. The conflict meant for some that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein would have to limit his more pan-Arab ambitions to more nationalist aims. However, Saddam Hussein’s bold aggression against Kuwait suggested that the authoritarian leader had aspirations that could potentially alter the strategic configuration of the Middle East.

BACKGROUND TO THE WAR: THE KUWAIT CRISIS The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was the culmination of a long-standing conflict and grievance between the countries. Several political and economic factors fueled arguments for Iraqi invasion. To begin, Iraq was convinced that Kuwait was nothing more than a product of boundaries created by the British during the Mandate period (1920–1932). The two countries had been engaged in territorial dispute since 1938. Iraq argued that Kuwait originally was a part of Iraq and

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existed as a former district located in the province of Basrah. In addition, the shaykhdom of Kuwait was anathema to Saddam Hussein’s goal to create an Arab nation. Kuwait and its elites were criticized for their wealth and passivity. Historic claims to land notwithstanding, economic factors are the more likely reason for the invasion. With an economy crippled by the war with Iran and burdened by ensuing debt and plunging oil prices during the 1980s, Saddam Hussein was desperate for revenue to rebuild his state and resuscitate the Iraqi economy that was also beleaguered by inflation. So he began a series of assertive moves to force Arab and particularly Gulf countries to compensate Iraq for its economic losses. First, in 1990 Hussein asked Gulf States to forgive his debt and provide a substantial grant amounting to $30 billion. Second, in an apparent effort to galvanize Arab support and justify potential future aggression against Kuwait, Hussein accused Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of exceeding their Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quotas, thereby causing the price of oil to drop at the expense of the Iraqi economy. He also said Kuwait was siphoning oil from Iraqi fields and demanded financial compensation. Each of these moves evoked outrage and intransigence from Kuwait. Iraq, perceiving this continued course of “economic sabotage” as an act of war, used Kuwait’s refusal to cooperate as grounds for aggression. Facing a discontented, restive public, the Iraqi solution to its domestic ills laid with invading Kuwait, its neighbor to the east—a strategy intended to divert public attention away from problems at home while accessing critical oil reserves. Iraq began to assemble troops in the vicinity of the Kuwaiti border around July 1990, starting a flurry of crisis negotiations involving the United States, Egypt, and the Arab League. Although efforts to dissuade Hussein from withdrawing his troops proved futile, few observers expected Hussein to invade beyond Kuwait’s northern border. Hussein, however, defied those expectations with a full invasion of the country, heightening fears that Iraq would not only control Kuwait—and twenty percent of the world’s oil production—but also push south toward Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf, putting the region’s vast oil reserves and financial resources in the hands of Hussein. Iraq was also suspected of having aspirations to produce nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Thus, the potential impact on the geopolitics of the region was far-reaching. The international community, with the United States at the helm, responded with several political and economic measures intended to isolate Iraq. The United States looked to the United Nations to condemn the invasion of Kuwait, and also invoked a full battery of sanctions that included the freezing of Iraqi assets abroad. UN Resolution 678, passed in 1990, gave Iraq until January 15, 1991 to withdraw from Kuwaiti soil and authorized members to use whatever means necessary to uphold UN resolution 660, which condemned the invasion of Kuwait, and called for immediate troop withdrawal to be followed by a peaceful resolution of the dispute. With Hussein still undeterred, the United States prepared for a military response to the crisis. To stop Hussein and force Iraq’s retreat in Kuwait, the cooperation of the United States with key European, and even more critically, Arab allies was essential. In the spirit of UN Resolution 660, fourteen of twenty-one states in the Arab League passed a similar resolution condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. If, however, a U.S.-led Coalition was

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to take effective military action, the use of Saudi Arabian bases was required for military deployment. With grave concerns about the imminent threat from Iraq widespread in the kingdom, Saudi Arabia’s Fahd bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz gave the United States access to Saudi soil. Efforts to build an Arab coalition against Iraq revealed deep fissures between countries. Jordan, with its large Palestinian population resentful of the U.S. role in the Middle East, sided against the United States, as did the Palestine Liberation Organization and Algeria. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and a host of other Arab states joined the anti-Saddam Coalition. On January 17, 1991, U.S.-led military action against Iraq began supported by UN resolutions authorizing the use of force and an international coalition of thirty-four countries. In addition to the United States, the following countries were involved: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Hungary, Kuwait, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Syria, UAE, and the United Kingdom. In addition to resolving the Kuwait crisis, however, the United States declared on August 4, 1990 that a broader aim of the crisis resolution was to create a stable Middle East, a proclamation reinforced at the Helsinki Summit in 1990, just before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Gulf War was followed by domestic upheaval in Iraq. Saddam Hussein quickly crushed Shi’a revolts in the south, and to the north the Kurds established a local self-governing administration that was supported by the West. No-fly zones were created in northern and southern Iraq to protect these populations. Furthermore, Iraq was subjected to UN weapons inspections to eliminate the threat it posed to the region. See also 2003 Gulf War; Iran-Iraq War.

FURTHER READING Pimlott, John, and Stephen Badsey (eds). The Gulf War Assessed. London: Arms and Amour Press, 1992.

2003 Gulf War Audra Grant The 2003 Gulf War was brief, lasting twenty-one days from March 20 to April 9, 2003. Perhaps the greatest controversy leading up to the war was determining the legal justification for military action against Iraq. Supporters of military action against Iraq cited Saddam Hussein’s refusal to cooperate with the UN weapons inspectors after more than a decade-long suspension of monitoring mandated after the 1990–1991 Gulf War. As in that conflict, Saddam Hussein was suspected of trying to produce nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

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What was striking was that Saddam Hussein, backed by an army of 400,000, went to battle confronting a Coalition force half its size, yet Iraqi forces barely demonstrated any response. The bellicose Iraqi leader did not defend any frontiers, and despite an eleventh-hour effort to hold Baghdad, the move did not culminate in significant street warfare at that time, an outcome that was expected by many observers. Even more striking, however, is the difficulty with bringing stability and democracy to Iraq, a Coalition goal that has been both elusive and costly.

BACKGROUND TO THE WAR: CRISIS IN 2002–2003 The September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. triggered a significant redirection of U.S. foreign policy as the United States began to identify enemies that lay outside of the traditional lens of the Cold War, which came to an end about a decade before. This new U.S. strategy culminated in the War on Terror, which sought to eliminate terrorist threats to American and global security. Thus, with the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan soon after the 9/11 attacks, the United States turned its attention toward Iraq, long seen as a threat to the Middle East because of its attempts to acquire and produce weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Saddam Hussein, after all, used chemical weapons against Iran during the Iraq-Iran War (1980–1988), and against Iraq’s own Kurdish population. Human rights abuses also continued, and Saddam Hussein is also believed to have orchestrated an assassination attempt against former U.S. President George Bush, who created the Gulf War Coalition against Saddam in 1990–1991. Furthermore and more controversially, the Iraqi leader was allegedly linked to the global terrorist group, Al-Qa‘idah, held responsible for the 9/11 attacks. The U.S. ability to build a broad international coalition supported by the full force of the United Nations as in the 1990–1991 Gulf War proved elusive for efforts to launch military action against Iraq in the aftermath of the 9/11 assault. The impressive Arab support evident in the war just ten years earlier virtually evaporated against the backdrop of weak justification for military action against Saddam Hussein and the subsequent elimination of his oppressive regime. The signs, in fact, were ominous, beginning with Saudi Arabia’s refusal to allow the United States access to its bases to deploy troops. Turkey was also uncooperative, and Jordan went with the tide of Arab opinion on the matter as well. In sharp contrast, Kuwait, risking isolation, agreed to allow the United States access to its bases. Aside from more solid support from Britain, a U.S. ally in 1990–1991, and Spain and Australia, the United States had a dearth of allies. Even the United States’ European partners balked at the prospects of war against Iraq. France, usually more supportive of Arab causes, opposed a military solution to the Iraqi threat, as did Germany. The Coalition that prevailed in 2003 was a mere shadow of the one that dominated the 1990–1991 Gulf conflict. To strengthen its position, the United States sought to build support within the United Nations. The United States set about at proving that Saddam Hussein was in violation of UN resolution 678, required Iraq to prove that it was not producing WMDs, and threatened serious consequences if Iraq resisted. The prospect of military measures under these circumstances evoked protest and

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opposition from many European capitals and their publics. Perhaps of greatest consternation to Washington D.C. was the opposition among two of its historically strongest allies, France and Germany. Anti-war movements soon emerged as publics launched large-scale demonstrations. Countries questioned the legal casus belli for the conflict, which rested on dubious supporting intelligence. In fact, the credibility of the intelligence was widely criticized. The coalition that emerged was dubbed “the Coalition of the Willing,” and in addition to the United States it included the following countries: United Kingdom, Australia, Poland, South Korea, Romania, El Salvador, Czech Republic, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Denmark, Albania, Mongolia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ukraine, Estonia, Macedonia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Bulgaria, Armenia, Latvia, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Japan, Thailand, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Hungary, Nicaragua, Singapore, Norway, Portugal, New Zealand, Philippines, Tonga, and Iceland. The United States and the United Kingdom ultimately accounted for the vast majority of the deployed troops. Iraq, responding to UN demands, submitted papers to UNMOVIC, although there were U.S. doubts that inspections would produce any tangible evidence either way. U.S. President George W. Bush accused Iraq of violating UN requirements, paving the way for a military confrontation despite lack of international consensus. On March 20, 2003, a U.S.-led military force invaded Iraq, marking the beginning of “Operation Iraqi Freedom.” As in 1990–1991, Coalition forces were met with little Iraqi resistance. The Republican Guard numbering 60,000, the regular army numbering between 150,000 and 200,000, and irregular units were no match for the smaller but well-equipped invasion force. Iraqi forces were also saddled with poor equipment that was in low supply, further hampering their defensive capability. On April 9, 2003, the United States declared victory in Iraq. Saddam Hussein was captured in December 2003 and later executed in 2006. As the invasion transitioned to occupation, the victory appeared hollow, for the U.S.-led coalition quickly found the goals of establishing a stable democracy in Iraq challenged by a formidable insurgency. Sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shi‘a groups, Al-Qa‘idah terrorism, multifaceted violent opposition forces, and Iranian-supported Shi‘a militias have created an environment of violence and instability. With the death tolls ranging from 150,000 to 1 million amid continued insurgency, Coalition support has substantially waned.

FURTHER READING Graham-Brown, Sarah. Sanctioning Saddam Hussein: The Politics of International Intervention. London: Tauris Books, 1999. Keegan, John. The Iraq War. New York: Knopf, 2004.

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Ha’il Sebastian Maisel Ha’il is a large oasis settlement in northern Saudi Arabia with approximately 400,000 inhabitants located on the southern edge of the Nafud Desert and the old pilgrimage route from Baghdad via Kufah to Makkah. It is surrounded by several mountain ranges, including the Jabal Shammar, Jabal Aja, and Jabal Salma. For over five decades from the middle of the nineteenth century, Ha’il was the center and capital of the Al Rashid Emirate, who governed and taxed most of central Arabia from here. However, during World War I and the concurrent political and economical changes it lost its status and independence to the Riyadh-based Al Sa‘ud. With British help, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud defeated the Al Rashid and conquered Ha’il in 1921, incorporating the area into his newly established realm. The population of Ha’il belongs to two main tribes, the Shammar and Bani Tamim. Although the Shammar claim the entire region as their territory, including the city, the Bani Tamim are settled farmers and city dwellers who have coexisted with the Shammar for centuries. Today the city’s demographics have changed and Saudi nationals of different tribal origins as well as foreign guestworkers populate the city. Although in the past most people in Ha’il lived off of some form of agriculture, either farming or animal husbandry, today Ha’il is a developed and industrialized city. It serves as the administrative capital of the Ha’il province, which largely overlaps with the traditional territory of the Shammar tribe. The province is 125,000 square kilometers large and has approximately 500,000 inhabitants. Historically, Ha’il became an important settlement of the region in the early nineteenth century when it superseded the former center of Fayd. The leading families of the Shammar tribe, the Al ‘Ali and Al Rashid, made Ha’il their tribal capital, which attracted other social and economic groups to settle, including merchants and artisans. In the middle of the city is a large fortress, Barzan Palace, and the city itself was fortified with walls and towers. At the height of Al Rashid power between 1873 and 1902, Ha’il was the capital of an area that covered most of central Arabia, including Riyadh, parts of Kuwait, al-Jawf, Tabuk, and Tayma. However, the main power base of the Al Rashid were nomadic groups belonging to the Shammar confederation, who were a less reliable fighting force than those from settled forces loyal to the Al Sa‘ud. With continuing

Handicrafts

European involvement and the construction of the Hijaz Railroad, the dominant economic activities of Ha’il began to decline, most notably the caravan trade. After World War I, Ibn Sa‘ud amassed sufficient support, including some rival Shammar groups, and took Ha’il after a short siege. Most members of the Al Rashid were exiled to Riyadh, and a loyal Saudi governor was installed in their place. The city fell into decline. The fortifications and central buildings were torn down and many loyal followers of the Al Rashid left to neighboring Iraq, where other Shammar groups were well established. Many European travelers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries visited the city because of its less rigid attitude toward foreigners than the Wahhabi capital of Riyadh. Among those who left detailed accounts about the life in Ha’il at this time period were Georg Wallin (1854), William Palgrave (1865), Lady Anne Blunt (1881), Charles Doughty (1888), Julius Euting (1896), Gertrude Bell (1907), and Eldon Rutter (1931). Today Ha’il is surrounded by large irrigation projects, making the area one of the Saudi Arabian breadbaskets. The Saudi government invests in and subsidizes large-scale agricultural projects as well as initial investments to establish a tourist industry.

FURTHER READING Al Rasheed, Madawi. Politics in an Arabian Oasis. The Rashidis of Saudi Arabia. New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991. Al Rasheed, Madawi. “Durable and Non-Durable Dynasties: The Rashidies and Sa’udis in Central Arabia,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 19, no. 2 (1992): 144–158. Vassiliev, Alexei. The History of Saudi Arabia. London: Saqi Books, 1998. Ward, Philip. Ha’il—Oasis City of Saudi Arabia. New York: Oleander Press, 1983.

Handicrafts Sebastian Maisel Prior to the oil boom, the Arabian Peninsula had little industry other than traditional crafts that have a long tradition in the suq (market) economy. Craft producers and sellers were always an integral part of the local economy, with many of the skills going back to the earliest craft of the late Neolithic period. People used the local resources available to them, such as leather, stone, hair, or plants. Other materials were obtained through trade relations with other areas, for example, wood and metals. Specific patterns, shapes, and colors were applied to give an object a distinct regional identity. The traditional organization and function of crafts have changed very little since the Classical Islamic period until the oil boom of the 1950s. Crafts provided needed items, tools, and equipment for the population, settled or nomadic. However, in addition to useful tools, some objects were produced to be sold to outside markets such as spices and fragrances. Extensive trade routes emerged to

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Traditional women’s clothes in the Gulf and Oman make liberal use of embroidery in metal threads called talli. Talli is made by first braiding metal and silk or cotton thread to make a strip. The strips are embroidered onto cuffs, sleeves, collars, and other parts of clothes. Courtesy of John A. Shoup.

bring these items to international markets. Artisans depended on the macroeconomics of international trade and were able to compete effectively because their products were of higher quality. During the rapid and drastic economic transformations in Arabia during the mid-twentieth century, much of the local microeconomy of the craft industry was shattered. The traditional structures of organizing artisans and small-scale businesses were very different from those of today. In larger trade centers of the larger cities and towns, wholesale dealers controlled the market and prices. Individual artisans were often organized into guilds. Most of the local producers were self-employed such as tinkers, tanners, goldsmiths, carpenters, weavers, builders, or woodworkers. They usually belonged to settled, non-tribal populations. Their clients included Bedouin, who although they despised the artisans needed their products. All of their metal and most of their wooden equipment were purchased from the market, such as coffee pots, tools, weapons, and saddles. The craft industry of Arabia also produced boats for fishing and pearling, rugs, tents, cooking utensils, jewelry, and clothes.

STONE AND CLAY PRODUCTS Pottery is an ancient craft of Arabia, where clay objects date back to the end of the Neolithic period. Pottery is still alive, particularly in the oases along the

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Few traditional handicrafts are still practiced in the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia following the exploitation of oil. In recent years, the governments in most of the Gulf States have tried to keep the traditions alive by bringing craftsmen such as this blacksmith to Heritage Villages such as this one in Dubai, where they are a living museum of the country’s past. The craftsmen can sell their wares to locals trying to reconnect with their past and to tourists. This blacksmith makes a variety of tools and daggers for sale. Courtesy of John A. Shoup.

Gulf coast, Bahrain, and Oman. The techniques and styles have not changed much. Pots and jars were usually thrown on a wheel, often unglazed, and had little decoration. They were used for storing and refrigerating water and other produce. In addition, stones and adobe bricks were used as a building material for houses, towers, and storages. Sometimes theses buildings were covered with mud plaster and had their walls decorated or painted.

GRASS, LEAVES, AND WOOD Palm fronds and some types of grass were woven into a variety of baskets, mats, and other products. Mats of different sizes formed simple huts called barasti or could be woven finer into types of food trays or mats to sit on. Baskets were used by farmers for storage containers or for winnowing wheat. In Oman Bedouin women of the Wahibah tribe still weave baskets that are so tight they can be used as milk bowls. Other palm frond or grass products included hand fans and wide-brimmed hats. Because of its scarcity, wood was collected for heating; tamarisk and acacia trees were the most common. Only a few items were manufactured from it, such as small bowls, looms, saddles, and litters. Wood as

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a building material was usually imported from India. Sometimes it was supplemented with the wood from palm trees, which could only be used for construction.

WEAVING Weaving was a popular craft among sedentary as well as nomadic people, with several techniques applied such as twill weaving or pile weaving. Pile weaving is a recent development that required further skills such as extra warp twining. Often, many techniques were in a single item. It indicates the high technical and esthetic level of weaving in Arabia, but also influences from the outside brought to the area via pilgrimage or as gifts from rulers such as the Ottomans. Both settled and nomadic peoples used similar designs; however, the woven products of settled areas were produced on more complex looms. Bedouin weavers use a ground loom with no movable parts that allows for it to be moved during migrations. Tribal and regional affiliations were shown in distinct symbols or colors. A predominantly geometrical pattern symbolized the typical Arabian weaving. In addition, tribal brands/markers called wasm were sometimes included. Colors are usually bright, and synthetic dyes became widely popular following their introduction in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Natural dyes made from indigo, onions, pomegranates, iron, and copper ores were used, but the colors are muted in comparison to the synthetic dyes. Undyed wool from sheep or hair from camels and goats is used to provide brown, black, gray, and white tones. Typical weaving products included tents, rugs, curtains, blankets, saddlebags, and other camel and horse equipment. Today much of the local weaving has been greatly affected by the importation of inexpensive manufactured textiles.

LEATHER Skins from camels, goats, and sheep were transformed into bags to carry water or milk as well as footwear such as sandals. Bedouins made large watering troughs from a wooden frame and a leather basin. As experienced tanners they were able to shape leather into various useful objects, such as water pulleys, udder bags, saddlebags, butter churners, or baby cradles.

JEWELRY Silver jewelry is an important adornment for women all over Arabia. As part of their wedding dowry or simple adornment, jewelry shows a woman’s social status and is worn every day. Certain pieces carry protective charms and are considered amulets and talismans against misfortune and the evil eye. Men usually do not wear jewelry, but use metal decoration on their weapons and sometimes their animals. One of the original centers of silversmithing was Najran—the other was Yemen. Clear distinctions in style, quality, and design can be made between jewelry worn by urban, rural, or nomadic women. City-women wear gold jewelry with more sophisticated designs. Blue and red semiprecious stones, such as turquoise and coral, amber, and glass insets are frequently found in urban jewelry. A woman’s wealth was in her jewelry, personal property her husband had no right

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to touch and reflected her own status. Women adorn themselves with jewelry ranging from headpieces to necklaces, bracelets, anklets, earrings, nose rings, fingerings, toe rings, and belts. During the past several decades, most rural women have sold off their silver jewelry and replaced it with gold items that were imported from India and Italy. Other metalwork included vessels, bowls, and pots that made of copper, brass, and tin. Manufactures for these items were found all over Arabia, but despite their importance and skills, tinkers belong to the lowest social class according to most Bedouins. They make even coffee pots, or dallah, an important symbol of Arab culture. Every family has a set of multiple pots that are used in the formal coffee ceremony. One of the main areas to manufacture those hourglass-shaped coffee pots is al-Hasa. Other places such as Nizwa in Oman are well-known for the quality of their metal work. In the southern area of the Peninsula, and predominantly in Yemen, highly decorated daggers and swords were locally produced and maintained their ceremonial importance as a symbol of status and virility. The curved daggers were normally made from embossed metal and ornamented with silver work. Special handles were made from imported or smuggled rhinoceros horns. Today little of the local handicrafts are still found, although some effort is being made to keep aspects of them alive. Saddu House in Kuwait attempts to keep the art of Bedouin weaving alive by offering a place where the craft can be learned as well as items sold. Bahrain’s potters and cloth weavers still have a ready market for the items they make, and in Oman the government policy is to provide both a pride in local crafts as well as a guaranteed market for craft items. Traditional handicrafts such as embroidery or woven items for camels are part of the growing sense of the need for a local identity. See also Dress.

FURTHER READING Faroqhi, Suraiya, and Randi Deguilhem (eds.). Crafts and Craftsmen of the Middle East. Fashioning the Individual in the Muslim Mediterranean. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. Richardson, Neil, and Marcia Dorr. The Craft Heritage of Oman. London: Motivate Publishing, 2003. Topham, John, Anthony N. Landreau, and William E. Mulligan. Traditional Crafts of Saudi Arabia. London: Stacey International, 1981. Topham, John. “Skilled Hands, Designing Hearts,” Saudi Aramco World 38, no. 5 (1987): 30–36.

Harasis John A. Shoup The Harasis tribe is one of the groups that make up the Southern Arabian-speaking peoples generally referred to as the Ahl al-Hadarah in Oman. The Harasis occupy the Jiddat al-Harasis, a large pebble plain that separates Dhufar in the

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south from northern Oman. The Jiddat is a harsh region that historically was not permanently occupied until the arrival of the Harasis tribe, perhaps in the late nineteenth century. The tribes’ right to use the Jiddat was recognized in the 1930s by Sultan Sa‘id bin Taymur. The Harasis are Hinawi (southern) and claim to have originated in the Hadaramawt. Unlike nearly all other tribal peoples in the Arabian Peninsula, the Harasis have maintained the pre-Islamic custom of a tribal totem of a fox. Despite being linguistically close to the Qarah and Mahrah peoples in Dhufar, the Harasis speak a dialect of Mahrah; they belong to the Arab Bedouin suff or confederation of the ‘Awamir, Wahibah, and Bayt Kathir; and until recently they considered both the Qarah and Mahrah as enemies. There seems to have been a degree of integration between the Bayt Kathir and the Harasis, and some of the Harasis lineages seem to be of Kathiri origin. When Sultan Sa‘id ended tribal raiding in the 1950s, the Harasis and the Mahrah developed friendships, and during the Dhufar Rebellion several Mahrah families sought refuge with them. The Harasis along with the Duru‘ and Wahibah are famous for their excellent camels. Their camels are sought after by racing enthusiasts, and individual animals can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. Some of the Harasis are still pastoral nomads, and the government development plan instituted for the Jiddat included integrated usage for pastoral nomads and herds of oryx. The plan brought Bedouin into the scheme by making them responsible for protecting the oryx. Although some of the Harasis have opted to remain pastoral nomads, others have settled in the new towns and settlements that have grown up as a result of oil exploration such as Haima, Yaluni, and al-Ajaiz. Men found work with the oil companies as drivers and guides, whereas others have used new wealth from jobs to open shops and buy pickup trucks to bring supplies from Adam or Nizwa. They also help ship camels and small stock to northern markets, especially to Nizwa. Dawn Chatty notes that some families have been able to take advantage of a wide range of economic strategies with different brothers specializing in different fields. See also Dhufar Liberation Front.

FURTHER READING Carter, J.R.L. Tribes in Oman. London: Peninsular Publishing, 1982. Chatty, Dawn. Mobile Pastoralists: Development Planning and Social Change in Oman. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

Al-Hasa Sebastian Maisel Al-Hasa (or al-Ahsa) is a region and administrative province in the eastern part of Saudi Arabia along the Persian Gulf that stretches over 60,000 square kilometers and includes more than 1 million inhabitants, many of them being Shi‘ite

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Large palm grove in al-Hasa oasis near Jabal Qara. Courtesy of Sebastian Maisel.

in contrast to the country’s majority that is predominantly Sunni Hanbali. Major tribal groups in the region include the Bani Khalid, al-Murrah, ‘Ajman, Manasir, Bani Hajir, and ‘Awamir. Often al-Hasa is equated with the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, but one has to dissociate the two. Historically, alHasa and al-Qatif formed a cultural and political unit. After administrative reforms, the newly created governorate of the Eastern Province includes not only them but also other areas and cities that developed later. The two main urban centers are Hufuf and Mubarraz, both agricultural and administrative centers and home for many oil workers. Al-Hasa is also considered among the largest oases in the world with more than 200 square kilometers of farmland and over 2 million date palms surrounded by dunes and salt marshes. To the southeast, the sand desert al-Jafurah borders the region, and to the west are the Summan plateau and the Dahna desert. Sand is blown into the oasis from the deserts, which covers and sometimes damages the irrigation system. To counter this problem, a large windbreak of trees was planted. The oasis is supplied by several karsts springs that provide warm groundwater that is distributed through pipelines and canals to the settlements and fields. The word Ahsa means the sound of underground water in Arabic. Caves made from sandstone are found throughout the area. Al-Hasa is the ancient al-Hajar, an independent kingdom that originated around 1800 BC. Old Semitic inscriptions dating back to 300 BC have been discovered in the region. Al-Hasa was on the caravan route connecting Yemen with Mesopotamia, and the radical Shi‘ite sect of the Qaramitah founded a settlement in the oasis. From their base in the Eastern Peninsula, they launched an attack on Makkah in 930 and stole the Black Stone of the Ka’abah, which they kept for

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twenty-two years in the Jawathah Mosque, which some believe to be the second oldest mosque in Islam. Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries several attempts were made by the Ottoman Empire to incorporate the area, but the local Bani Khalid tribe successfully drove them out. In 1793, the Al Sa‘ud and their Wahhabi movement from central Arabia occupied it for the first time. After the first Saudi State was crushed by Muhammad ‘Ali of Egypt, the area fell back under Ottoman control until ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud finally subjugated the area to Wahhabi control in 1913. He annexed it to his realm of Najd and dependencies. The fortress Qasr Ibrahim in Hufuf is the most important remain of the Turkish period in eastern Arabia. The Bin Jiluwi branch of the ruling Al Sa‘ud family was made governors of the area and virtually turned it into their own domain that they still rule today. The current governor, Badr bin Muhammad bin Jiluwi, is a member of the region’s ruling family. In 1932, al-Hasa was officially incorporated into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In the late 1930s huge oil deposits were discovered. The world’s largest oil field, the Ghawar field, is located in al-Hasa. Aramco, the main exploring company, invested largely in the area’s infrastructure and oil facilities, providing jobs, education, and other services to the population without discriminating between different religious groups. However, many Shi‘ites were eager to work in the oil industry and received training. Unlike most of the Bedouin, they were willing to work with their hands and therefore became the core of the workforce in the oil industry. The entire area boomed when oil was found in sufficient quantities and revenues were invested in the infrastructure. Roads, schools, mosques, hospitals, and other facilities were built, including a railroad in 1953 that connected the Damman and al-Hasa with the capital Riyadh. In November 1979, the Shi‘ite minority rioted, demanding religious and political concessions similar to those in neighboring Iran after the Islamic Revolution. King Faysal University has its largest campus in Hufuf as well as a campus for female students. The private Arab Open University also opened a campus in Hufuf.

FURTHER READING Burkholder, Grace. An Arabian Collection: Artifacts from the Eastern Province. Boulder City, NV: GB Publications, 1984. Facey, William J. The Story of the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. London: Stacey International, 1994. Mandaville, Jon E. “The Ottoman Province of al-Hasa in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 90, no. 3 (1970): 486–513. Nicholson, Eleanor. In the Footsteps of the Camel: A Portrait of the Bedouins of Eastern Saudi Arabia in Mid-Century. Riyadh: Transworld Arabian Library, 1983. Vidal, Federico. “Date Culture in the Oasis of al-Hasa,” Middle East Journal 8 (1954): 417–428. Vidal, Federico. The Oasis of al-Hasa. Dhahran, Saudi Arabia: Arabian American Oil Co., Local Government Relations, Arabian Research Division, 1956.

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Hashemites Sebastian Maisel The Banu Hashim, or Hashemites, are the ruling dynasty of Jordan but previously controlled much of northern Arabia, including the Hijaz and Iraq. They take their name from the great-grandfather of the Prophet Muhammad, Hashim bin ‘Abd al-Manaf, who died around 540. The Banu Hashim is a clan of the Quraysh tribe of Makkah and gave Muhammad protection when the main ruling familes of the city were persecuting the young Muslim community. The Banu Hashim faced economic sanctions but did not give Muhammad up to the others. Muhammad’s parents died when he was still very young, and it was his uncle Abu Talib and the extended Hashemite family that raised and protected him. The leadership of the Bani Hashim fell to ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, the cousin of the Prophet, and then to his two sons Hassan and Hussein. Claims for the Bani Hashim as the clan of the Prophet to rule the ummah, or entire Islamic community, were pressed by the followers of what is called the ‘Alid cause until the ‘Abbasids led a successful revolt against the Umayyads, establishing a ruling family of Hashemite origin (the ‘Abbasids took their name from al-‘Abbas, another uncle of the Prophet). The dynasty of the Sharifs of Makkah who governed the Holy City from the tenth century to 1924 traces its origin back to the Bani Hashim. Because of their close descent from the family of the Prophet, they became masters of the two holiest places in Islam. The descendants of Hussein governed in Madinah, and those of Hassan in Makkah. The chief of the Hassanides in Makkah was known as the Grand Sharif of Makkah and was in charge of organizing the annual pilgrimage and the protection of caravans. After the collapse of the ‘Abbasids in 1258 they had to acknowledge the sovereignty of other governments, but they never lost their privileged position in the Hijaz. The last Grand Sharif of Makkah was Hussein bin ‘Ali (1916–1924). He was influenced by the growing Arab nationalist sentiment even while under house arrest in Istanbul. He was released after the Young Turks seized power from the Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II, but resented the Young Turks’ policy favoring Turks over other peoples of the empire. He entered into an exchange of letters with the British in Egypt even before World War I began, and once hostilities began he pressed the British to promise the creation of an independent Arab kingdom in exchange for his support. In 1916 he declared the Arab Revolt, which was supported by tribal fighters initially from the Hijaz. His son Faysal led the Arab Revolt against the Turks, and after World War I he tried to establish a Hashemite kingdom in Syria. Faysal was defeated by the French in 1920 at the Battle of Maysalun outside of Damascus and was forced to retreat into British Mandate territory. Later he was awarded with the throne of Iraq by Britain. Hashemite rule in Iraq ended on July 14, 1958 with the revolution and abolition of the monarchy. Some members escaped the subsequent massacres to Jordan, where another son of Hussein, ‘Abdallah, was able to build a separate country. In 1922 Jordan was detached from the British Mandate of Palestine and ‘Abdallah was given the region, then

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called the Transjordan. Jordan became fully independent in 1948 as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which is ruled today by King ‘Abdallah II. In the Hijaz, the Hashemites remained in power after World War I, first under Sharif Hussein bin ‘Ali and then under his son, ‘Ali ibn Hussein. They gradually lost the support of Great Britain. In 1924 Kamal Attaturk abolished the position of khalifah, or caliph, and Sharif Hussein bin ‘Ali tried to seize the opportunity to claim the title for himself. This provocative move created immediate tensions with his biggest regional rival, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Al Sa‘ud, Sultan of Najd, who started a military campaign with the goal to incorporate the Hijaz into his realm. Although highly ambitions, without military and financial backing of Great Britain his attempt was short lived. To save the Hijaz for his family, he abdicated in 1924 for his oldest son ‘Ali and renounced his claims to the caliphate. However, ‘Ali was quickly defeated and lost all major cities in the Hijaz, including Ta’if, Makkah, and finally Jiddah. The heartland of Bani Hashim was lost to the Al Sa‘ud and became an integral part of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Bani Hashim remained the most dangerous opponent to the Al Sa‘ud in the Middle East and continued challenging Saudi hegemony by supporting Hijazi opposition groups such as the Hijazi Liberal Party and the Ibn Rifada rebellion in 1931. It took another twenty-five years before the two hostile dynasties reconciled in 1957 in the wake of the creation of the Baghdad Pact, the propagation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, and a common anti-Nasrist policy. Today, the ruling Hashemite family of Jordan is well respected in the Middle East and enjoys good relations with the West.

FURTHER READING Paris, Timothy. Britain the Hashemites and Arab Rule, 1920–1925. London: Routledge, 2003. Susser, Asher, and Aryeh Shmuelevitz (eds.). The Hashemites in the Modern Arab World. Essays in Honor of the Late Professor Uriel Dann. London: Frank Cass, 1995. Teitelbaum, Joshua. The Rise and Fall of the Hashemite Kingdom of Arabia. New York: New York University Press, 2001. Wilson, Mary C. King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Wilson, Mary C. “The Hashemites, the Arab Revolt, and Arab Nationalism,” in The Origins of Arab Nationalism, edited by Rashid Khalidi et al. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.

Health Care Systems Sebastian Maisel The Arab Gulf States enjoy one of the best and sophisticated medical systems in the Middle East. With the revenues from the oil industry, large-scale medical complexes and hospitals have been built in the region providing the most up-todate, state-of-the-art technologies and practices. Most of these services are available at low or no cost at all.

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Health care is the domain of the government, usually the Ministry of Health, which provides preventative, curative, and rehabilitative care through a network of medical institutions such as local health care centers, regular hospitals, and specialized clinics. Care is also provided by other state agencies such as the military and public companies that have their own medical centers. Citizens and expatriates working in the public sector receive free health care. There is a growing sector of private health care providers with state-of-the-art hospitals who provide extensive treatment for a fee. Many prefer this to public health care, which, although free, does not have the same quality of care. Additionally, the Red Crescent provides emergency care through ambulances and first aid centers. The Red Crescent plays a pivotal role for maintaining health care and first aid to millions of pilgrims during the Hajj season. Modern health care and hygiene systems were introduced to Saudi Arabia in the late nineteenth century to improve the sanitation needs of the pilgrimage to Makkah. The Hajj brought together several hundreds of thousands pilgrims from all over the world and diseases spread quickly, particularly cholera. The first quarantine stations were built in Jiddah in the 1880s. In 1913, the Saudi ruler ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud invited missionary doctors from the American Mission in Bahrain to provide medical service for his people. Their services were initially rejected by the local population, which relied on traditional medical practices. However, soon the service proved to be successful and was extended to various communities in central Arabia as well as along the Gulf coast from Kuwait to Oman. The American Mission contributed enormously to the improvement of medical and hygiene conditions in Arabia. The American Mission was financed and staffed by members of the Reformed Church of America, and their services were greatly appreciated despite the fact that it was a Christian mission. The doctors and nurses made progressive changes to the understanding and application of modern medicine. Another major contributor to improving medical and health conditions in eastern Arabia was Aramco. From its beginning in the 1930s, they provided Western medical facilities not only to their Western workers, but also to the local staff and population. However, it took until the 1970s for adequate service to reach more remote areas of the kingdom. The new medical services replaced the more traditional profession of healers, who often relied on amulets to cure diseases. Another traditional practice was the exhortation of evil spirits, which required the services of an experienced specialist in spirit possession. Elder, experienced women in the family usually treated simple illnesses. The benefits of the new state-supported health care can be observed in a very low rate of infant mortality as well as an extended life span of the older generation. Both issues contribute much to a significant demographic change in the Gulf society. Arab Gulf States have a higher birth rate as well as longer lifespans than most other Middle Eastern countries. There is substantial variation in the quality of Saudi primary care services. To improve quality, there is a need to improve the management and organization of primary care services. Professional development strategies are also needed to improve the knowledge and skills of staff. Until recently, almost the entire medical staff were expatriates, with doctors mostly coming from Western nations and

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nurses from the Philippines and the West. Although it is one of the few permissible occupations for local women, their percentage in the medical workforce is marginal because of constant interaction with unrelated men. Only a few Saudi and Gulf women proceed with medical careers; however, Saudi and Gulf doctors are more common. Population growth and longer life expectations have created a major demand for change in the health care system of Qatar, where Hamad Medical Corporation (HMC), the public provider, is trying to cope and the private sector is not yet ready to step in. Since 1979 HMC has provided free services to Qataris, but it is largely inefficient. With the formation of the National Health Authority in 2005, the government is attempting to reform the system by investing in new infrastructure, health awareness campaigns, and modern technology. In Bahrain, similar policies have been introduced. The country’s largest hospital, Salmaniyah Medical Complex, carries the maximum load of patients, which should be shifted to primary health care centers or the private sector. In addition, it is hoped that modernization in the health care sector will bring in medical tourists and keep Bahrainis from going abroad for critical operations. Kuwait is facing the same demographic problems in which higher birth rates and a larger number of elderly people require more services. Lifestyle and eating habits of most Gulf people have changed and demand additional health care to deal with new problems such as obesity. The public health sector needs to expand, whereas the private sector needs to be more involved. To address the shortage in medical personnel, the government of Saudi Arabia expects to hire more non-nationals. However, hiring more non-foreigners will negatively affect the country’s policy of nationalizing the workforce. Although other Gulf States talk about modernizing their health sector, the Emirates started with it and invested large sums in a concept of unifying health care policies across the country. All nationals and residents are compelled to have medical insurance. Before 1970 Oman had only one hospital run by American missionaries. After Sultan Qabus came to power, he invested largely in health care and hygiene. Today, the country has several modern hospitals; however, most of the professional staff is still foreign. The government encourages health care workers to move to the countryside to help improve the low standards of living and to improve the general health care standards. Mass immunization campaigns helped to significantly decrease infant mortality and raised the life expectancy.

FURTHER READING al-Ahmadi, Hanan, and Martin Roland. “Quality of Primary Health Care in Saudi Arabia: A Comprehensive Review,” International Journal for Quality in Health Care 17, no. 4 (2005): 1–16. Amerding, Paul L. Doctors for the Kingdom: The Work of the American Mission Hospital in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1913–1955. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003. Conrad, Peter, and Eugene Gallagher. Health and Health Care in Developing Countries. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993. Doumato, Eleanor Abdella. Getting God’s Ear: Women, Islam, and Healing in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.

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Hijaz Mufti, Muhammad H. Health Care Development Strategies in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. New York: Kluwer Publisher, 2000. Pierre-Louis, Anne Maryse, Francisca A. Akala, and Hadia S. Karam. Public Health in the Middle East and North Africa: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2004.

Hijaz Sebastian Maisel The Hijaz (“barrier” in English) is a mountainous region in northwest Saudi Arabia between the Midian Mountains in the north and the Asir Mountains to the south, stretching over an area of more than 500,000 square kilometers and including 2.5 million inhabitants. It separates the heartland of Arabia, Najd, from the coastal plains of the Tihamah. Important urban centers in the Hijaz include Jiddah, Makkah, Madinah, Ta’if, Yanbu‘, and Tabuk. The Hijaz consists of an arid, desert-like highland that reaches an altitude of over 8,202 feet (2,500 meters) south of Ta’if. In the west it sharply drops in an escarpment to Tihamah. Steep wadis run toward the Red Sea coast and cut the escarpment. The largest of these is Wadi al-Hamdh, which reaches the Tihamah south of al-Wajh. Basaltic volcanic fields called harrah in Arabic cover large areas of the Hijaz. The mountains receive higher amounts of precipitation, making the area attractive for farming. Intensive agriculture and caravan trade were the two most important sources of income until after World War II. In pre-Islamic times, the area was inhabited by Arab tribes, some of which settled along the caravan routes and established centers for trade and commerce. During the early Islamic period under the Prophet Muhammad and his immediate successors, the Hijaz was the core of the Islamic Empire. Makkah and Madinah as holy sanctuaries were closed to non-Muslims. After the rise of the Umayyad dynasty, the center of the empire shifted to Damascus, and under the ‘Abbasids to Baghdad. However, Makkah and Madinah remained the focal point of Muslim worship and the yearly pilgrimage. Some of the Bedouin tribes from other parts of the Peninsula migrated into the Hijaz during the early Islamic period, such as the Banu Harb. Despite the Hijaz’s peripherial position in the politics and economics of the Islamic empires, control over the two Holy Cities and the Hijaz in general was an important asset in legitimizing Islamic rule. The Ayyubids, the Mamluks, and later the Ottomans all strove to include the area within their areas of control. The Ottomans created a new administrative province with Makkah as its capital. Three sanjaks, or administrative subdivisions, were formed around the cities of Makkah, Madinah, and Jiddah. Nonetheless, the Ottomans did not disturb the local forms of self-government that remained intact. The religious reform movement of Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab that started in central Arabia spread quickly through the Hijaz, and several times the two Holy Places were occupied by Wahhabi forces. Their strict interpretation of Islamic law was considered offensive to the cosmopolitan people of the Hijaz as

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well as for the Ottoman Sultan. The Sultan sent his vassal Muhammad ‘Ali of Egypt to expel the Wahhabis and reinstate the authority of the Sharifs of Makkah. The Hashemites sided with Great Britain and in 1916 declared the Arab Revolt. Bedouin tribes from the Hijaz joined the fight for an independent Arab kingdom to be established in the former Arab provinces of the empire. The Hashemites continued to govern the Hijaz until 1924, when Wahhabi Saudis finally overthrew them. The last King of the Hijaz, ‘Ali ibn Hussein, surrendered to ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Al Sa‘ud, who declared the Hijaz part of his realm but granted special political privileges to the Bani Hashim. Faysal ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz was made viceroy, who consulted with a body of local representatives in political matters. In 1932 the Hijaz was officially incorporated into the newly established Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Hijaz at this time was economically the most advanced region of country with an economy based on the yearly pilgrimage and subsequent trade. Not only did the Saudi state depend on Hajj revenues, but also many local merchant families were wealthy and influential due to providing Hajj services. Until the beginning of the oil-based economy, the Hijaz continued to dictate the country’s development and progress. Today, some of the old rivalries between the Hijaz and other regions, particularly Najd, are still present with complaints about discrimination against the former Hijazi elite.

FURTHER READING Baker, Randall. King Husain and the Kingdom of Hejaz. New York: Oleander Press, 1979. Hogarth, David. Hejaz before World War One. Cambridge, UK: Oleander Press, 1978. Ochsenwald, William. Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz under Ottoman Control, 1840–1908. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1984. Rotter, Eldon. “The Hejaz,” The Geographical Journal 77, no. 2 (1931): 97–108. Yamani, Mai. Cradle of Islam: The Hijaz and the Quest for an Arabian Identity. London: I.B. Tauris, 2004.

Hijaz Railway Sebastian Maisel The Hijaz Railway, built between 1900 and 1908, was one of the most important railroads of the Ottoman Empire. Commissioned by Sultan Abd al-Hamid II, the German engineer Heinrich August Meissner Pasha supervised the construction. The railway was initially planned to connect Damascus with Makkah to facilitate the pilgrimage to the Holy Places in the Hijaz. Meissner, who previously participated in the construction of the Baghdad Railway, was charged with the planning of the railway. Over 800 miles (1,300 kilometers) of narrow-gauge (41 inch or 1,050 millimeter) monotracks were built by Turkish workers and soldiers with German assistance. The completed railway included 1,532 bridges, two tunnels, and ninety-six stations. However, the final destination was Madinah rather than

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Makkah. A side branch was added to connect Dara‘ah in Syria with the Mediterranean port of Haifa to bring in building materials and other supplies. Engines, wagons, and specialized staff were brought in from Germany. The stations were built with a German-like style following the tastes of what is called Ottoman rococo. Officially aimed to transport pilgrims, the construction was mainly financed by donations from Muslims from all over the world. The Hijaz Railway had strategic importance for the Ottoman state to enable better economic control of Syria and Palestine, which then included Lebanon and Jordan, as well as for improved military control of the Arab provinces. Regular service was provided for seven years. During the Arab Revolt in World War I, the Arab army under Lawrence of Arabia made great efforts to cut and destroy the railway by blowing up tracks, stations, and bridges. The Hijaz Railway was a vital tool to bring in reinforcements. After its destruction, Turkish forces were no longer able to keep the area under their control. Attempts were made to revive the railway after the war, but the last regular train was recorded in 1924. After the conquest of the Hijaz by Saudi Arabia and several destructive heavy rains, the section between Ma‘an in Jordan and Madinah was closed. According to the Locarno Treaties in 1925, the fleet engines and other equipment were split between Syria and Transjordan. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to repair the tracks and get the trains running again. In 1935, during the Conference of Haifa, a restart of the service was discussed; however, the plan was dismissed because of financial problems. The destruction of the Yarmuk Bridge in 1946 finally ended the direct connection between Damascus and Haifa. Only those sections in Syria and Jordan (307 miles, or 495 kilometers) were fixed and kept operational. In the 1950s the last pilgrim trains brought Muslim pilgrims from Damascus to Ra’s al-Naqab in Jordan, from where they had to change to buses. Occasionally, plans are drawn to open up the section from Ma‘an to Madinah and eventually extend the network all the way to Jiddah or Riyadh, from where a connection to Dammam on the Persian Gulf exists. In 1977, after Jordan and Syria purchased new engines, new talks with Saudi Arabia began to reconstruct the entire railway; however, because of strained bilateral relations they were abandoned in 1983. In 1999 passenger trains started to run again between Damascus and ‘Amman.

FURTHER READING Nicolson, James. The Hijaz Railway. London: Stacey International Publishers, 2005. Ochsenwald, William. The Hijaz Railroad. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1980. Tourret, R. The Hedjaz Railway. Abingdon, UK: Tourret Publishing, 1989.

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Holidays and Festivals: Islamic

Holidays and Festivals: Islamic John A. Shoup There are two major festivals celebrated by all Muslims: ‘Id al-Adha, or Feast of Sacrifice, on the tenth of Dhu al-Hajj toward the end of the Haj or pilgrimage to Makkah, and ‘Id al-Fitr, or Feast of Breaking Fast, which marks the end of the month of Ramadan and is celebrated during the first three days of Shawwal. These are the only two religious festivals fully sanctioned in Islam; however, there are other festivals that have arisen over the centuries that are seen by many in the Islamic world as religious. These include ‘Ashurah on the tenth day of Muharram, which marks the death of Imam Hussein ibn ‘Ali at the hands of the Umayyads; al-Isra’ wa al-Mi‘raj on the twenty-seventh of Rajab, which is the night the Prophet Muhammad had his mystical journey to Jerusalem and then to heaven; and Mawlid al-Nabi, or the Birthday of the Prophet Muhammad on the twelfth of Rabi‘ al-Awwal. ‘Id al-Fitr is also referred to as the al-‘Id al-Saghir, or the Lesser Festival. It marks the end of the month of Ramadan when all Muslims of a certain age are to fast: not eating, drinking, smoking, or allowing anything to pass the lips from dawn to dusk. When the new moon of the next Islamic month is sighted, an official announcement is made (today using television and radio) stating that the ‘Id has begun. The Islamic calendar, similar to the Jewish calendar, starts the day at dusk and runs to the following dusk. A special type of cake/cookie called ka‘k is prepared and forms an important part of the breakfast eaten the next morning. In many of the Gulf States families used to give the musahir, or the person who walked the neighborhood beating a drum to make sure all are awake for the predawn meal (suhur), gifts of money, rice, and wheat. Children are given new clothes to wear. In Bahrain on the first day of the ‘Id, women of the house perform a special dance called muraddah, which is accompanied only by clapping and stamping. In Bahrain, Qatar, and other central Gulf areas the ‘Id includes performances of other dances in public with men wearing horse costumes. The dancers’ upper body is dressed as a rider, and from the waist down they wear horse costumes. The dancers imitate the gaits of horses, prancing and parading to the beat of a chorus of drums. Traditionally in much of the Gulf, the ‘Id lasted a full week, with people visiting each other and bringing gifts of sweets and dried fruits, but today the ‘Id normally lasts three days. A unique part of Ramadan in the Gulf was the custom that on the night of the fourteenth and fifteenth of the month, children went from house to house with large cloth collection bags playing drums. They were given coins, sweets, and a mix of dried figs and nuts called girga‘. Older children formed into groups that also went from house to house but performed dances to the beat of drums. They too were given girga‘ as a reward. Such customs are rarely practiced anywhere in the Gulf today. The pilgrimage to Makkah is an obligation of all Muslims who can afford to make the journey, and the ninth day of the pilgrimage is marked by prayer at ‘Arafat. On the same day children in Bahrain and Qatar celebrate what is called

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hiya biya. Children collect green sprouts of wheat, wheat or barley grain, and sweets in a basket called a nanun that they take to the sea singing the hiya biya song. When they reach the shore the baskets are thrown into the sea. A similar custom used to be done to mark the stages of a child’s life, including the first step, first tooth, and so forth. Today this is rarely done. The tenth day of the pilgrimage is marked by ‘Id al-Adha, which is also called al-‘Id al-Kabir or the Great Festival. In the morning a lamb or sheep is slaughtered in imitation of both the Prophet Ibrahim (Abraham), whose hand was stayed by an angel when he was about to sacrifice his son Isma‘il (Ishmael in the Muslim tradition), and of the Prophet Muhammad, who first sacrificed a lamb on that day. The Prophet Muhammad gave the meat to the poor, and following his example part of the animal killed that morning is to be distributed to those who are in need, the family consumes a portion, and part is dried to eat at other times of the year. The ‘Id usually lasts two to three days depending on the country. An important part of both holidays are the ‘Id prayers. For both ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha, the morning prayer is an important time for all males of the community to pray together, and although this can be held in a local mosque, the numbers may be too great to accommodate everyone. As a result, a large outdoor place marked with the direction of prayer called a musallah is used instead. Men wear their best or new clothes to attend the prayer, and fathers bring their sons as an important part of being socialized into the community of believers. ‘Ashurah is celebrated mainly by Shi‘ites as a day of intense mourning for the death of Imam Hussein ibn ‘Ali at Karbala in Iraq in 680. Some Shi‘ite practices such as self-mutilation are highly discouraged by the Sunni governments in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia to the point that in some countries the celebration is banned. Where the Shi‘ites form a large minority (Kuwait) or the majority (Bahrain), governments have been willing to turn a blind eye to much of the outpouring of grief. The day is not an official holiday in any of the Gulf countries. ‘Ashurah is not generally a celebration for Sunnis in the Gulf, although in much of the rest of the Sunni world it is a children’s holiday: a cross between trick-ortreating and Christmas caroling. Children dress up and in the evening go from door to door singing and in return are given money, sweets, and dried fruit or nuts. The Mawlid al-Nabi is not an official holiday in many of the Gulf States or in Saudi Arabia. The celebration of the Prophet’s birthday is seen by many conservative Islamic scholars as bid‘, or innovation, and therefore not legal. Historically the celebration appears to have started in Egypt under the Shi‘ite Fatamids and was accepted by the subsequent Sunni dynasties of Egypt and Syria. The Sunni Ottoman Turks embraced it and made it an official holiday. In the Gulf region it was a day when religious poems in praise of the Prophet were read or sung, but little is done for it today. Kuwait, with its long historical connection to Iraq, does include the Prophet’s birthday as an official holiday, as do Oman and the United Arab Emirates. The Isra’ wa al-Mi‘raj celebrates the mystical journey of the Prophet to Jerusalem and then to the seven spheres of heaven. It is not officially recognized as a holiday in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia except in Kuwait.

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Holidays and Festivals: National John A. Shoup Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States have several national days and celebrations that are not part of the Islamic practice. Some of these are official holidays and all government offices are closed, whereas others, although there is official recognition of them, are not days when government offices close. New Year’s Day, both for the Western calendar and the Islamic calendar, is a holiday in several Gulf States and is considered to be a secular, nonreligious holiday. Islamic practice has not made any special difference for the first day of the Islamic year, and it is not a holiday in Saudi Arabia. Qatar includes only Islamic New Year as an official holiday, whereas Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates all close government offices for both Western and Islamic New Year. Although nothing is done for the New Year’s celebrations, expatriates from the countries where Western New Year’s is a holiday organize parties as do many of the large hotels. Most of the Gulf States allow hotels and shops to display Christmas decorations as well, although none give Christmas any official recognition. All of the countries have official National Days at different times of the year. For many the day celebrates the country’s full independence from Britain, as is the case for Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. In Oman the National Day and the Sultan’s birthday are only one day apart, November 18 and 19, and both are celebrated. National Days throughout the region are celebrated with displays of national culture, music, dance, and foods. In some countries such as Oman and Saudi Arabia, massive parades and pageants are staged in large outdoor stadiums with military and civilian participation. National and satellite television channels carry the events live. In Saudi Arabia the National Day has taken on greater importance after the celebration of 100 years after the founding of the current state (2002 marking the century of the state according to the Hijari calendar) and after recent terrorist activities. National Day has come to be a means by which the Saudi government is trying to instill feelings of greater integration of the different regions of the country. Bahrain’s National Day each year has had special themes and frequently the National Museum sets the theme. Each year a different part of the culture is the focal point for cultural and book displays as well as activities, including performances of traditional music and dance. These have included the social importance of the Arabian horse, for example, as well as on pearling, dates, and the art of Arabic calligraphy. Bahrain’s National Day has served as the launching idea for several subsequent festivals in other Gulf countries, especially in the United Arab Emirates. See also Holidays and Festivals: Islamic.

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Honor

Honor Sebastian Maisel Honor has an important meaning in the culture of the Arabian Peninsula. A person who demonstrates bravery, hospitality, generosity and respect for others and is helpful has “honor” and is a prominent member of society. Living according to these attributes brings both a good reputation and honor. It is possible to lose both good reputation and honor through what is deemed publicly as “bad” behavior. To win them back a person may have to submit to socially sanctioned punishment. Reputation and status, both good and bad, are linked to wider considerations of family and can be passed on to the next generations. Neither honor nor reputation is measured by material possessions, and a person’s wealth does not bring honor; respectable behavior of the individual brings honor. The concept of honor is closely related to shame, ‘ayb in Arabic or haram in a religious context. Honor is found in interpersonal relations between relatives as well as other members of society, pointing to the existence of individual and collective forms of honor. The honor of the group is called sharaf, whereas for the individual honor is called wajh, meaning face in Arabic. Special attention is given to the honor of women with regard to their sexual conduct and reputation. According to the tribal concept of collective responsibility, honor of the entire group is dependent on the chastity of its female members of childbearing age. Misconduct affects not only the woman, but also her male relatives. The honor of women is called ‘irdh in Arabic and it plays an important part in the definition of sharaf. To keep good reputations and maintain honor, women should avoid contact with men other than relatives and show restraint when this cannot be avoided; that is, dress modestly; avoid eye contact, and not make what would be judged as unnecessary communications and improper movements. Honor must be defended when it is questioned or violated. It is not possible to live in Arab society with a damaged reputation or tainted honor. A person who cannot or will not protect his personal honor and the honor of his kin group is considered weak, and others avoid contact with him and his group. The main focus of identity within Arab society is still on the extended family and the code of personal and collective honor. The code can be seen as a guideline of how to interact on personal, communal, and even economic levels. It is most imperative to guarantee that everyone involved with the group respects the code and makes sure that no one will “lose face.” In the Gulf societies these values are often mixed with religious values, although other Muslim societies interpret them more liberally. For example, modest dress is required for Muslim women, which usually includes covering the body and hair. In Saudi Arabia women are also required to cover their faces and sometimes their hands. This is explained with religious arguments, but is mainly an extension of the concept of female honor and the social rule of not bringing shame to the family. The traditional custom of gender segregation and its application to virtually every aspect of public life have to be seen in the same light.

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Because of the strict application of Islamic law, which embedded many preIslamic legal norms of honor and shame, crimes related to honor cases are very rare. Honor killings are not usually noted in the legal system in Saudi Arabia, although they are for some of the other countries in the Middle East such as Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. However, issues related to honor such as personal offenses and more serious crimes do exist and are often dealt with by the families rather than furthering the family shame by bringing them to court. There are two ways to harm someone’s honor. The first is sexual violation, that is, adultery or rape. However, because every woman is a member of a larger extended kin group, the honor of the group is also violated and therefore requires legal actions to restore honor to all. The second is when a person is harmed and therefore is seen to have lost face—honor must be restored. In Arabic such an action has “blackened” the face, meaning it has been shamed. Should this matter be brought to a court, rulings often include two penalties: a compensation for any material loss, and another one for the restoration of the victim’s honor. The victim’s face has again been “whitened.” See also Crime.

FURTHER READING Abu Lughod, Lila. Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. Bowen, Donna Lee, and Evelyn Early. Everyday Life in the Muslim Middle East. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000. Meeker, Michael E. Literature and Violence in North Arabia. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Stewart, Frank Henderson. Honor. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

Human Rights in Saudi Arabia James Sater Human rights are commonly understood as being protected if the legal framework in a given country protects basic rights of the individual, such as the freedom of speech and religion. A mechanism through which this is achieved connects these civic rights with basic political rights on the basis of choosing political representatives, and establishing a system of political accountability checks and balances. Some of these legal principles have been enshrined as the rule of law (i.e., a judicial system based on guaranteeing rights of the accused by minimizing arbitrary legal procedures). In international relations, some of these principles have been codified in the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights (ICPCR). Although many mostly liberal democratic states are signatories to the ICPCR, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies have not signed it, thereby officially stating their resistance

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to the normative dimension of human rights as understood by the ICPCR. Numerous human rights violations comprise inhuman capital punishments such as stoning, public beheadings, and mutilations; the absence of defense lawyers in secret trials; the widespread use of torture and intimidation by unchecked police forces; the lack of religious rights of the country’s large Shi‘a minority (five to fifteen percent depending on sources); and especially the complete social and legal disenfranchisement of women. Saudi human rights activists tried to take Saudi Arabia’s particular tribal-religious ethos into account: after all, Saudi Arabia was created by the tribal expansion of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Al Sa‘ud supported by the particularly orthodox Wahhabi sect founded by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab in the eighteenth century. Thereby a tribal state was created based on the promise to establish the Wahhabi vision of Islam. The only human rights group that was ever created on Saudi territory (in May 1993) was named (in English) Committee for the Defense of Shari‘ah Law. Its charter stated that “all men are brothers in Islam” and “it is an obligation upon Muslims to support the oppressed, eliminate injustices, and defend the rights prescribed by the Shari‘ah for man.” One signatory to the charter of the committee, ‘Abdallah ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Jabrin, declared that “legitimate rights” are not rights applied to everybody, but rather are to be allocated according to religious (i.e., Wahhabi) criteria. Despite the committee’s “tamed” and religious character, the government dismissed four of the committee’s founding members from their university positions; it closed the offices of two lawyers; and the spokesman for the committee, Muhammad al Mas’ari, was arrested and detained without charges before being imprisoned for six months. The history of the committee not only illustrates how severely basic civil liberties are restricted, but also how the Saudi state uses Islam to counter attempts that try to carve out political space with reference to the legitimacy of Islam. The head of the government-financed Council of Senior Muslim Scholars, Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Baz, called the committee “illegitimate” and “superfluous,” “because the kingdom is already ruled by the shari‘ah and therefore the rights of everybody is already protected by the law.” Given that the Saudi family controls all political decisions and institutions and relies on the country’s orthodox ‘ulama’ for legitimacy and support, no real changes have occurred in recent years. One notable exception is the controlled electoral process in 2006 to the country’s formerly uniquely appointed consultative shura council, in which only men were allowed to participate. The council has no power to hold the government accountable for its actions. As long as critics are banned from publicly expressing themselves, such as King Saud University Professor Khalid al-Dakhil’s frequent calls for more reform, these changes will remain cosmetic and only respond to the country’s increasing subjection, especially to U.S. criticism. See also Education.

FURTHER READING Doumato, Eleanor Abdella Doumato. “The Ambiguity of Shari’a and the Politics of ‘Rights’ in Saudi Arabia,” in Faith and Freedom; Women’s Human Rights in the Muslim World, edited by Mahnaz Afkhami. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995.

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Huwaytat Niblock, Tim. Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitmacy, Survival. New York: Routledge, 2007. Simons, Geoff. Saudi Arabia: The Shape of a Client Feudalism. London: Basingstoke, 1998. Al Rajhi, Ahmed et al. Economic Development in Saudi Arabia. New York: Routledge, 2003.

Huwaytat Sebastian Maisel The Huwaytat are a former nomadic but now mostly settled Bedouin tribe spread over several countries, but predominantly in southern Jordan, northwest Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Two main branches dominated the northern division of the Huwaytat: Abu Tayy and ibn Jazi. During the last decades of the nineteenth and first decades of the twentieth century, their two main shaykhs, ‘Awadah Abu Tayy and Hamad ibn Jazi, fought over leadership of the entire tribe. ‘Awdah sided with the Arab Revolt and fought alongside the legendary Lawrence of Arabia and Amir Faysal ibn Hussein ibn ‘Ali, but after ‘Awdah’s death, leadership has reverted to the ibn Jazi. Most of the Huwaytat were nomadic camel and sheep herders, although a few lived in the scattered villages of southern Jordan, where they engaged in agriculture and animal husbandry. The origin of the Huwaytat is controversial. During the sixteenth century they belonged to the Bani ‘Atiyah Confederation in the area of the Gulf of ‘Aqabah, but they split off a century later. The Huwaytat expanded north and east, establishing their tribal area or dirah from Wadi Sirhan to Karak south to the Gulf of ‘Aqabah. In the nineteenth century the ibn Jazi Huwaytat emerged as tribal leaders in southern Jordan. The Huwaytat became one of the most powerful of Jordanian tribes, and under the leadership of ‘Awdah Abu Tayy the Huwaytat provided fighters during the Arab Revolt. They participated in the capture of ‘Aqabah in 1917 as well as major battles near Petra, Tafilah, Irbid, and the capture of Damascus. After World War I, some sections of the ibn Jazi gave their allegiance to ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Al Sa‘ud, and some even joined the Ikhwan. However, most of the tribe chose to continue their close support for Amir ‘Abdallah ibn Hussein and raided their traditional enemies both inside Jordan and across the border into what would become Saudi Arabia until Jordanian military forces stopped all raiding in the 1920s. The Huwaytat on the Jordanian side were often raided by the Ikhwan, which was also compounded by the issue of tribal territory that existed on both sides of the borders drawn up by British colonial officials in 1920 in Cairo. In 1925 Saudi Arabia and Jordan signed the Hadda Agreement over a dispute related to the Wadi Sirhan, which was an important grazing area for several Jordanian Bedouin, including the Huwaytat. Despite the treaty, raiding continued into the 1930s. Saudi officials often tried to entice tribal groups from the Jordanian side of the border to settle in Saudi Arabia. An example of this is the close contacts between the Saudi king and Shaykh Muhammad Abu Tayy, son of ‘Awdah. To prevent him from switching his loyalty to the Al Sa‘ud, the Jordanians decided to offer him

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financial support. Today many Jordanian Bedouin have numerous passports, and it is a common feature for Jordanian Bedouin to serve in the National Guard in Saudi Arabia and the regular Jordanian military at the same time. Jordanian Bedouin often serve in the palace guard or other branches of the military in many Gulf States. Since the 1950s, many of the sections of the tribe in Jordan have given up camel nomadism and switched to seminomadic animal husbandry with sheep and goats. Since the 1960s, there has been a growing trend to move to governmentbuilt settlement projects or to migrate to urban centers in search of wage labor. The Jordanian government encourages eventual settlement of Bedouin, and Shaykh Faysal ibn Jazi built the settlement of al-Husayniyah on the main ‘Amman to ‘Aqabah road, which now houses over 100,000 Huwaytat tribesmen. During drought years the move is more pronounced but studies by the University of Jordan have shown that the trend is reversed when the rains return. Most still invest in livestock when at all possible. The Huwaytat were among the first to be enlisted in the newly created Jordanian Desert Patrol Force, or Quwwat alBadiyah, created in 1930 by Major John B. Glubb, known as Glubb Pasha. The military has proven to be one of the most important employers for Jordanian Bedouin. The Huwaytat al-Tihamah live in northwestern Saudi Arabia on the coast of the Red Sea between Dub and Muwailih. They participated in an anti-Saudi rebellion in 1932 together with the Hashemites and the Billi tribe. They are mainly seminomadic or completely settled but maintain agriculture through farming and animal husbandry. The current leader of this tribal group is Shaykh ‘Awn ‘Abdallah Abu Takikah.

FURTHER READING Abu Athera, Said Salman. Tribal Poetry of the Tarabin and Huwaytat Tribes and Its Relationship to That of Neighboring Tribes. PhD dissertation, University of Glasgow, 1995. Abu Jabir, Kamil, and Fawzi Gharaibeh. Bedouins of Jordan: A People in Transition. Amman, Jordan: Royal Scientific Society Press, 1978. Alon, Yoav. “The Tribal System in the Face of the State Formation Process: Mandatory Transjordan, 1921–46,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 37, no. 2 (2005): 213–240. Rutter, Eldon. “The Hejaz,” The Geographical Journal 77, no. 2 (1931): 97–108. Shoup, John. Culture and Customs of Jordan. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2007. Trench, R. (ed.). Gazetteer of Arabian Tribes. Slough, UK: Archive Editions, 1996.

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Ibadi Kharaji Islam John A. Shoup Oman is the only country in the Arabian Peninsula where the majority of the people follow Kharaji Islam. Kharaji Islam developed as a result of the conflict between ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib and Mu‘awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan over succession to the position of Khalifah, or Caliph, following the assassination of ‘Uthman in 656. The Khawarij (plural of Kharaji) were originally adherents of ‘Ali but when he agreed to negotiations with Mu‘awiyah they left, thus their designation from the Arabic verb kharaja for those who left or withdrew from the main body of Muslims. The Khawarij saw themselves as the only ones maintaining the purity of the religion as taught by the Prophet Muhammad, whereas the rest of the Muslims had departed from the real spirit and meaning of Islam and thus are referred to as kuffar, or infidels. Several different groups of Khawarij emerged shortly after their break with ‘Ali, but among the most successful of them is the Idadiyah, named for Abu ‘Abdallah ibn Ibad al-Murri al-Tamimi, who is credited for founding the Idabiyah around 684 in Basrah, Iraq. Ibadi scholars were well-known and attracted a good number of students even from among the Sunnis, and for a time had good relations with the Umayyads in Damascus. However, they eventually fell out with the Umayyads and with their successors, the ‘Abbasids. Nonetheless, under the leadership of Abu ‘Ubaydah Muslim ibn Abi Karim al-Tamimi, Ibadi missionaries reached a wide area within the Islamic world, including Oman, where Kharaji doctrines had already taken root. In Oman, the town of Nizwa emerged as the main center for the sect, and since the year 793 elections of Imams have been held in Nizwa’s main mosque. Oman was able to become independent from the central government in 750, when al-Julanda ibn Mas‘ud was elected the first Imam for Oman. The ‘Abbasids attempted to assert their authority over Oman, but starting in the 800s the Ibadi were able to shake off their control and defeated every attempt to force them back under the ‘Abbasid Khilafah (Caliphate). Oman remains independent and the only place where the majority of people adhere to Kharajism of any kind. Ibadi Kharajism remains the dominant religion in Oman, but there are Ibadi communities scattered in India, the Gulf States, Yemen, East Africa, and North Africa. Ibadi doctrines are moderate and are close to those of the Sunni Maliki madhhab. It is because of its moderate stance on many issues that Ibadism has been able to survive whereas other more radical versions of Kharajism have died away.

Ibadi Kharaji Islam

The mihrab of the mosque at Jabrin in Oman dates from the seventeenth century and was restored in the late twentieth century. Courtesy of John A. Shoup.

Although the Ibadi believe that the most qualified person is the one who should be elected as the Imam, they recognize that the position can be held by more than one tribe or even by one family. Because from an early time the Ibadi community was scattered over a wide area from North Africa to India, they allowed there to be more than one Imam at the same time. Unlike the more radical versions of Kharajism, the Ibadi also refer to their Imam as Amir or Prince and give him other titles such as Amir al-Mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful) and Amir al-Muslimin (Commander of the Muslims), titles associated with kings and monarchies that are condemned by most Khawarij. For the Ibadi the Imam is an absolute ruler, a leader in times of war, and the ultimate judge. He must be an authority on religion, well versed in the Qur’an, the sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad, and the examples set by the early Imams. Ibadi doctrines are tolerant of non-Kharajis and allow marriage with non-Kharaji Muslims, although they refer to non-Kharaji Muslims as kuffar, or unbelievers, Ibadi doctrine allows for members of the community to live secretly among non-Kharajis pretending to belong to the Sunni Maliki madhahb.

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Ikhwan Sebastian Maisel Ikhwan is a short designation for the organization of mainly Bedouin, who starting in 1910 formed the military force for the ruler of central Arabia, ‘Abd al‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud. The Ikhwan settled in newly established settlements and were encouraged to take up farming to replace pastoral nomadism. Preachers and scholars were sent to instruct them in the teaching of Muhammad bin ‘Abd alWahhab of the Wahhabi movement, a puritanical reform movement of the mideighteenth century. The goal of the movement was to purify Islam and return to the lifestyle of the ideal Islamic community, that of the Prophet Muhammad and his early followers. Following the example of the hijrah of the Prophet, the Ikhwan had to leave their tribal affiliation behind and immigrate to a new settlement. This was an enormous step because they were giving up their social and economical network, but the incentives were big enough to attract them. For Ibn Sa‘ud, this meant a significant improvement and strengthening of his position. Concurrently, the power and cohesion of nomadic tribes in Arabia were weakened, and through his powerful army, he was able to conquer large areas on the Peninsula. Members from all major tribes joined the Ikhwan, sometimes as entire sections. By 1912, over 11,000 Ikhwan were listed and lived in the newly established agricultural settlements. Farming was hard in the arid conditions, and most were unsuccessful; therefore, they had to rely on subsidies from ibn Sa‘ud. Within the settlements, members of the different tribes did not like to mingle with those from other tribes. As a result, each settlement was assigned to a specific tribe. The Ikhwan participated in all major battles during the war of unification, starting with the conquest of al-Hasa in 1913. The Ikhawan defeated the Al Rashid and the Shammar in 1921 and the Hashemites of the Hijaz, taking the cities of Ta’if, Makkah, and Jiddah in 1924–1925 and participating in the various smaller campaigns against Yemen. For many years, the alliances between the Ikhwan, Ibn Sa‘ud, and the religious establishment were excellent. Success was achieved through raiding the area of the enemy, a well-known strategy for the Ikhwan, who practiced this in their nomadic days. However, with the establishment of permanent borders, restrictions were imposed on them. The Ikhwan grew more and more belligerent and objected to ibn Sa‘ud’s growing good relations with the British, who they considered infidels and possible colonizers. They could not comprehend ibn Sa‘ud’s political pragmatism to ensure the survival of his realm. Some sections of the Ikhwan under Faysal al-Duwaysh, Ibn Bijad, and Ibn Hithlayn openly revolted against ibn Sa’ud and in 1929 were finally defeated in the Battle of Sibilla. Their rebellion was not only a religious rebellion against someone they considered to be a corrupted Muslim leader, but also an expression of tribal opposition to the claims of hegemony by the Al Sa‘ud. Defeating the Ikhwan was a major step in the formation of a centralized state in 1932 with the foundation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Ikhwan did not cease to exist, but as an official organization it was disbanded. They continued living in agricultural communities and took wage jobs

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and positions in the new administration, especially the military. In 1956, tribal forces were again organized into a para-military unit called the Saudi Arabian National Guard. Tribal groups who seized the Grand Mosque in Makkah in 1979 claimed to be descendants of the first Ikhwan movement.

FURTHER READING Al-Azma, Talal. “The Role of the Ikhwan under Abdul Aziz Al Saud, 1916–34.” PhD dissertation, University of Durham, 1999. Habib, John S. Ibn Saud’s Warriors of Islam: The Ikhwan and Their Role in the Creation of the Sa’udi Kingdom, 1910–1930. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1978. Kostiner, Joseph. “On Instruments and Their Designers: The Ikhwan of Najd and the Emergence of the Saudi State,” Middle Eastern Studies 21, no. 3 (1985): 298–323. Al Rasheed, Madawi. A History of Saudi Arabia. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Vassiliev, Alexei. The History of Saudi Arabia. London: Saqi Books, 1998. Zaid, Abdulla S. “The Ikhwan Movement of Najd, Saudi Arabia, 1908–1930.” PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 1989.

Imamate of Nizwa John A. Shoup Selection of the Imam, or religious head of the Ibadi Kharaji community, traditionally takes place in the main mosque of Nizwa, and generally the Imamate and the Sultanate have been in the hands of the same person throughout most of Oman’s history. However, the split between the two positions of Sultan and Imam began in 1913, when most of the tribes from the interior of Oman refused to recognize the succession of Taymur bin Faysal of the Al Bu Sa‘idi family to both positions. Instead they recognized Salim bin Rashid al-Kharusi as the Imam of the Ibadi Kharaji community and refused to acknowledge Taymur’s authority over them. In 1915 a tribal army tried to take Masqat, the Sultan’s capital, but were defeated and pushed back with British assistance. In 1920 Salim bin Rashid was killed and Muhammad ibn ‘Abdallah al-Khalili was elected as the new Imam. In the same year, 1920, a truce was signed at Sib (Seeb) where the new Imam recognized the Sultan’s “authority,” whereas the Sultan recognized the spiritual and temporal authority of the Imam over most of the interior centered on Rustaq and Nizwa, which became the capital of the Imamate. When Taymur resigned as Sultan in 1932, his son and successor Sa‘id was not content to let matters lie as they were and was determined, with British assistance, to regain his position of both Imam and Sultan. Sa‘id began laying the foundations for his renewed attempt to bring the whole of Oman under his control by trying to win over support from individual tribal leaders, particularly from the important Harith tribe of Izki, a major community that protects the entrance to Nizwa from Masqat. Sa‘id was not successful in winning over support from the Harith, but had some success with other tribal groups in the Dhahirah region because of his success in forcing the Saudis to withdraw from al-Buraymi in 1952.

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The Imamate had passed to Ghalib bin ‘Ali al-Hina’i, who realized that Sa‘id had been able to outmaneuver him and had successfully regained the loyalty of several tribes in the Dhahirah. The Imam decided to try to outwit the Sultan at his own game and in 1954 applied to the Arab League to be admitted as an independent state. He sent the able leader of the Harith to negotiate and had strong support from both Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In 1955 Sultan Sa‘id marched with Omani and British troops to Nizwa, which he was able to occupy, and forced Imam Ghalib into internal exile in his home village outside of Nizwa. Ghalib’s brother Talib was able to escape and briefly took refuge in Cairo. A little over a year later he came back to lead an armed rebellion against the Sultan. Ghalib joined his brother and from their bases in Jabal al-Akhdar among the Bani Riyam tribe who had not yet submitted to Sa‘id put up a stiff resistance to the Sultan’s army. The conflict is referred to as the Jabal War, and the rebels were defeated only after Sa‘id called in support from the British Royal Air Force, which bombed several towns and villages to rubble. Tanuf and Birkat al-Mawz, both located a short distance from Nizwa, were destroyed, and Tanuf remains a ruin today. Unable to get material support from either the Arab nationalists in Cairo or from Saudi Arabia, the rebels acknowledged defeat and the Imamate ended in 1959. From that time on, the two offices of Sultan and Imam have again been held in the hands of Oman’s head of state.

Incense Carla Higgins Aesthetics are of high value in the Gulf. Gulf citizens are well dressed and groomed and smell nice. Traditionally they incensed their clothes and hair. Good grooming and fragrance are considered essential to well-being, to the maintenance of social roles, and to health. Both women and men use incense. Incense refers to a variety of substances used to perfume the body, clothes, and home, and is used in both private and public social and religious ritual. The primary types of incense are aloewood, dukhun, and frankincense. Aloewood (‘ud) is a dark, fragrant wood from India and is just one of many products that made up the economic and cultural relationship between the Gulf and India. It is considered the most important and valuable of the incenses. Dukhun refers to a mixture of perfumed incense that may be created in the home or purchased in the market. It is sold as small, round, dense disks of compacted granules. Frankincense (luban) is a gold tree resin produced in Oman and Yemen and has had a profound historical and economic impact on the region as a prized commodity in ancient and contemporary trade. The Gulf played a central role in an ancient global economy because of the production of frankincense and the control of trade routes that distributed it as far as India. Till the sixth century AD, the Gulf was home to sophisticated civilizations that flourished as a result of this trade. Both frankincense and myrrh were used in court and temple ceremonies and in the spice markets and perfume industries of the Near East and Mediterranean worlds.

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The inside of a traditional house made of barasti in Dubai shows the use of space in the one-room building. Most items are stored away by being hung on the wall or on rods. The stand in the right-hand corner is used to incense clothes. The burner is placed underneath and the clothes are placed over the frame, or alternatively, the person stands over the frame, allowing the smoke to circulate inside. Courtesy of John A. Shoup.

Frankincense is sold in small, hard drops and nodules. Unlike aloewood and dukhun, frankincense is used mainly for religious purposes, after the daily evening prayer and during religious occasions and holidays—traditionally it was used to counter bad spirits and the evil eye. This is an example of using scent for protection. Appropriate social rituals for women may include offering perfumes/incense to guests, and good guests use scent liberally. Incense is used liberally during major public events such as weddings. Public areas of buildings may be scented with incense. Regardless of whether one is in a traditional market or a modern mall with high-end retailers, there are incense and perfume shops in abundance. Shops may burn incense to display their products, to attract customers, and to offer wonderful scent.

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Intellectuals, Secular

Intellectuals, Secular Sebastian Maisel The ancient culture of Arabia, embedded with Islam and transformed over centuries, has produced scores of people who contributed to social, political, and economic development of the area. While recognizing there are different fields of expertise, several individuals stand out in Gulf States. They can be distinguished by their education and/or achievements for the greater good of society. Because of the late start of secular education in most of the countries in the Arabian Peninsula, the number of those who obtained higher degrees is remarkably lower than in the rest of the Middle East. Those who have continued their education often go on to become social, economic, and political leaders. However, there are examples of bright, self-educated individuals who have huge influence on public opinion such as the late ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Tuwaijri or Hamad al-Jasir. These two men greatly influenced the scholarly and intellectual life of central Arabia outside the religious arena. Saudi Arabia emphasizes combining modernity with tradition and produces representatives of both genres in the arts as well as in public discourse. Among those intellectuals turned politicians are Ghazi Qosaibi, poet and labor minister, and Faysal bin Mu’ammar, director of the King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Public Library and Secretary General of the National Dialogue series. Recently tribal values have become part of a larger national identity that has given tribal intellectuals a strong push into the spotlight. Tribal poets, just like in the days of the Jahiliyah and early Islam, still are highly respected and considered the living memory of Saudi tribal identity. Scholars on the history and culture of the kingdom find their position on the stage of public recognition; for example, Fahd al-Semmari, the director of the King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Historical Center, and Sa‘ad Sowayan, eminent authority on Bedouin poetry and customs. Novelists, however, find it is harder to get public recognition in Saudi Arabia. First, because the literary scene is still small, most of them write on sociopolitical affairs. This forces them to position themselves on a fine line between mainstream acceptance and elite criticism. Writers like ‘Abd al-Rahman Munif or Turki al-Hamad paid for their critical remarks with continual repressions by state and religious authorities. Other authors faced death threats issued as fatwas or physical violence, a fate that they share with other Saudi intellectuals in the fields of media and religion. However, when seriously threatened many of Saudi Arabia’s intellectuals unite and act together to support colleagues or to defend/denounce government policies on civil liberties. Bound by religious and traditional limitations, Saudi women are increasingly finding their way into the public domain, creating extraordinary pieces of artwork, inventions, or other contributions. The famous painter and intellectual Safia bin Zagr from Jiddah pioneered the role of other women writers such as Raja Alam, Raja’a al-Sanee, or Ni‘mah Isma‘il Nawwab. Private salons are the main venues for intellectual exchange and debate as well as for literature clubs. Attending majlis sessions and publishing in the mass media are other outlets for

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dialog and constructive criticism that are frequently used by activists and intellectuals throughout the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi intellectuals are involved with local and international events, which they struggle to influence against the power of the Saudi political and religious establishment. Joining forces with other groups such as women, Shi‘ites, and reformists, they challenge the status quo by constantly sharing ideas that cross religious, ethnic, and gender borders. Occasionally they do achieve recognition and change. However, more often they face tremendous public pressure and sometimes persecution or legal prosecution. The role of the intellectual as a symbol of the country’s moral elite is still in its early stages. In the other Arab Gulf States, intellectuals are similarly engaged in the public debate over politics, culture, and identity. In Kuwait, both secular and religious intellectuals joined forces in their struggle to return to parliamentary representation. Another field of action is defending the Arabic nature of those countries that are under threat of being assimilated by foreign cultures because of the large number of guestworkers. Protecting and promoting the Arabic language is one tool being exploited by Gulf intellectuals. Because of their continual pressure, the government of the United Arab Emirates endorsed Arabic as the country’s official language. Gulf intellectuals often link the issues of Arabic culture and language with the area’s lack of cultural development, particularly the inability to create a culture of knowledge or innovation like the Muslim world had been in the past during the Golden Age. Today, intellectuals, scholars, researchers, and other educated people leave the area to find work abroad. The “brain drain” became a serious issue that has been discussed largely in academic circles in the Gulf region. Khalaf al-Habtur, one of the world’s 500 leading intellectuals, stands as a counterexample to this trend. A self-made businessman, he started his company, Al-Habtoor Group, and concurrently continued to invest in public and private education, founding international schools throughout the Emirates. Intellectuals in the Gulf States have an easier life than do their counterparts in Saudi Arabia. Although they face opposition and occasional discrimination, very rarely are they attacked based on religion, although they experience difficulties when debating political and social issues. Recently Gulf intellectuals recognized globalization as the main threat to Arab identity, which is based on the state (dawlah), the nation (ummah), and the fatherland (watan). On the other hand, they realize that globalization can help reform their regimes by setting up international standards and values.

FURTHER READING Abul, Ahmed Jafar. “The Participation of Kuwaiti Intellectuals in the Development Process, 1961–1985.” PhD dissertation, University of Essex, 1992. Anonymous. Letter to the West: A Saudi View. Riyadh: Ghainaa Publications, 2005. Blankenhorn, David (ed.). The Islam/West Debate: Documents from a Global Debate on Terrorism, US Policy, and the Middle East. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. Perthes, Volker (ed.). Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004.

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International Relations

International Relations Tom Landsford Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf continue to be among the most important regions in international relations. The area’s strategic importance is based on its geographic location on major trade routes and its abundance of energy resources. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates) have also successfully managed to develop alliances with powerful outside actors, such as the United States or the United Kingdom, as a means to protect their national interests and prevent domination by regional states such as Iran or Iraq. However, those alliances with Western powers have undermined the standing of the regimes among domestic audiences and other Muslim states and reduced the influence of the countries in the Arab world. The energy resources of the region attracted outside interest even before World War II; for instance, the United States signed a commerce treaty with Oman in 1833. Nonetheless, it was the conclusion of that global conflict that elevated the geostrategic value of the area amid the escalating Cold War. Tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union over the latter’s occupation of northern Iran contributed to the onset of the superpower conflict and reinforced the centrality of the Persian Gulf in the superpower conflict. U.S., British, and other European national interests in the region, through the early days of the Cold War, were based on the maintenance of regional stability, access to inexpensive oil, and the protection of Israel. In 1951, the United States implemented the Mutual Security Doctrine, which was designed to provide weapons and training to anti-communist regimes in the Middle East. In 1956, the Baghdad Pact was created in an effort to develop a broad, anti-Soviet alliance in the region. Meanwhile, the Soviets endeavored to gain influence through support for Arab nationalism. With independence and the withdrawal of British military forces in the 1970s, the United States assumed an increasingly significant role, despite animosity generated by Washington, D.C.’s support for Israel. That relationship with Israel was counterbalanced for the Gulf States by the threat to the existing monarchial systems posed by communism or even Arab socialism. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States demonstrated their economic might during the 1973 oil embargo when along with other Arab states they stopped supplying oil to states that supported Israel during the October War. This caused the price of oil to quadruple, but it also led Western nations to adopt a variety of conservation efforts, including the use of alternative energy sources, especially in the aftermath of the subsequent 1979 energy crisis. One result was a global oil glut in the 1980s and serious economic problems for the region. In response, the countries of the region endeavored, with mixed success, to diversify their economies and invest the proceeds of their energy wealth. On the other hand, the embargo is generally credited with leading European states to adopt increasingly pro-Arab policies in place of their former pro-Israel stance. At the time, western Europe imported eighty percent of its oil from the Middle East, whereas the region only supplied the United States with twelve percent of its imported oil.

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The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 prompted closer relations with the West, including a series of military cooperation agreements between the Gulf States and the United States and United Kingdom. Saudi Arabia led the region in funding the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan. During the Iran-Iraq War, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors further increased ties with the United States and other world powers in an effort to secure regional stability and to protect their borders and interests. By the early 1980s, Saudi Arabia had become the largest purchaser of U.S. arms and weaponry outside of western Europe, and it annually acquired more than five times the American arms and weapons systems that Israel received. Kuwait approached both the United States and the Soviet Union to re-flag the country’s oil tankers in an effort to protect them from attacks in the Persian Gulf. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end of the Cold War reinforced relations between the states of the Gulf and the United States. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the subsequent liberation of the country by the U.S.-led Coalition, further accelerated the increasingly close relations with Washington, D.C. In the aftermath of the conflict, the Gulf nations signed new military cooperation agreements with the United States, increased weapons purchases, and welcomed an expanded U.S. military presence in the region. The regimes also supported, overtly or tacitly, the dual containment policy of the United States, which was designed to restrain both Iran and Iraq. However, domestic opinion increasingly opposed the UN economic sanctions on Iraq. The patterns of official cooperation continued following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States undertook a range of efforts to increase intelligence and law enforcement cooperation with the West and to suppress radical, anti-Western Islamists (who were also seen as a threat to the regimes). The governments also faced pressure from Washington, D.C. to liberalize domestic regimes, including enacting democratic reforms. Relations with the United States began to deteriorate as Washington, D.C. moved closer to war with Iraq in 2003. Gulf leaders, with the notable exception of the emir of Kuwait, warned that any war with Iraq could destabilize the Persian Gulf and remove an effective counterbalance to Iran. The U.S.-led occupation of Iraq was roundly criticized for its failure to deal with the postinvasion insurgency and the impact of the conflict in Iraq on regional stability. Gulf States also continued to criticize the U.S.-Israeli relationship, especially during the 2006 war in south Lebanon. Nonetheless, the Iranian nuclear program and Tehran’s efforts to increase its regional influence combined to prompt the Gulf States to continue their security relationships with the United States as outside interest in the area continued to reflect the region’s significance. See also Foreign Relations.

FURTHER READING Korany, Bahgar, and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (eds.). The Foreign Policies of Arab States. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984.

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Internet Long, David E., and Christian Koch (eds.). Gulf Security in the Twenty-First Century. New York: British Academic Press, 1997. Owen, Roger. State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2000. Peterson, Erik R. The Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988. Rubin, Barry (ed.). Crises in the Contemporary Persian Gulf. London: Frank Cass, 2002.

Internet Sebastian Maisel Modernization brought drastic and rapid changes to the societies of the Arabian Peninsula. The introduction of new technologies, such as radio, television, mobile phones, and the Internet, transformed and broadened the means of personal and mass communication. The Internet is seen as a useful tool to maintain interpersonal communication with other family members, but it also offers for the first time free access to information and entertainment. Although limited and censored, access to the Internet is now a basic technological asset. Internet access has been available at Saudi universities and other research institutions since 1994, and individuals were allowed to purchase hardware and modems to access the Net through foreign providers. Because the Internet was greatly demanded, in 1999 Saudi Arabia began registration of the first public providers. However, before the entire population was allowed to go online, specific guidelines were required in order to protect religion, nation, and culture from negative and immoral sites such as those with pornography, gambling, or anything that threatened the social, political, and religious values of the people. Local Internet providers are connected to a single, government-controlled proxy housed in Riyadh at the King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz City for Science and Technology (KAACST). It controls and blocks inappropriate and undesired Web content. For example, access to Yahoo and other sites offering private clubs was banned by the authorities. Saudi authorities, like those in other Gulf States, try to censor everything that seems offensive to the country’s values or security. Banned sites and topics include pornography, political opposition groups, Israel, homosexuality, drugs, alcohol, or women’s rights. They maintain an updated and sophisticated control system to block these sites; however, ways to surpass the system exist and are exploited by sophisticated computer users. For a higher charge, individual users can have unrestricted Web access by calling an Internet service provider outside of the kingdom, for example, in Bahrain. The Internet was introduced in the Gulf States at an earlier stage with Kuwait pioneering in the early 1990s. Following the Iraqi occupation of 1990–1991, Kuwait was assisted by U.S. institutions to access the Internet, and by 1993 Kuwait University and the National Science Foundation were connected, making Kuwait one of the first countries in the Middle East with Internet. Shortly after Internet service was transferred to the private sector, which offered access to the public. Oman joined the Internet community in 1997. The official General Telecommunications

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Organization provides Internet access. Currently, the government of Oman is establishing the Information Technology Authority, an online government e-service that digitizes many administrative functions and forms. The United Arab Emirates claim to be the most wired country in the area. Through the country’s official and sole provider, Etisalat, censorship is maintained mostly on pornographic sites. Bahrain, on the other hand, is trying to become the telecommunications hub of the Gulf region, thus investing largely in information technology and mass communication. Nonetheless, control of access and information is still blocked to some sites, especially those belonging to groups in opposition to the ruling Al Khalifah family. Particularly popular in the Gulf are Internet blogs, which allow free expression of political and cultural ideas and opinions away from government and social control. Contesting the strong grip on official media, bloggers from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States often discuss issues of social and political taboos, such as the role of women in society, political participation, or the religious police in Saudi Arabia. Although the authorities constantly work on shutting down these sites, and even arresting bloggers, Internet activities develop so rapidly that they can easily challenge technological and administrative hurdles. Governments also began to use the Internet for their purposes. In Saudi Arabia, where the authorities currently struggle with Islamic opposition groups who use the Internet to attack the ruling family, the government launched their own Islamic websites where religious authorities explain and interpret Islamic law and doctrine and issue fatwas regarding important religious questions about Jihad and Islamic values. The Gulf States experience a rising demand from the public for computers and Internet access. Polls suggest that Internet use and computer ownership have grown tenfold over the last four years. A ration of 121 users per 100 computers is one of the highest in the Middle East and indicates a high level of computer literacy. More than forty percent of all Internet users in the Arab world are from the Gulf Cooperation Council region, although it accounts for only eleven percent of the total Arab population. Internet cafes enjoy great popularity for several reasons. In Saudi Arabia, unrelated men and women are not allowed to mingle in public places; therefore, special Internet cafes for women only were introduced, similar to women-only restaurants, banks, and shops. The majority of Internet users are young people; for example, in Kuwait they constitute sixty-three percent of all Internet users. Their use of and interest in the Internet will stimulate significant social change in the future. See also Education.

FURTHER READING Al-Zubaidi, Abeer. “Critical Assessment of the Internet Development in Oman.” Undergraduate research paper, University of Leeds, 2001. Hafez, Kai. Mass Media, Politics, and Society in the Middle East. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 2001. Rugh, William. Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio, and Television in Arab Politics. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004. Wheeler, Deborah. The Internet in the Middle East: Global Expectations and Local Imaginations in Kuwait. New York: State University of New York Press, 2005.

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Iran-Iraq War James Sater On September 22, 1980, Iraqi troops crossed the Iranian border in a front from near Baghdad to the Shatt al-‘Arab. A month later, Iraq controlled much of the Iranian oil-rich and ethnically Arab province of Khuzistan, which borders the Persian Gulf and Iraq. Because of the Islamic revolution in Iran the year earlier, Iran was in turmoil and many observers predicted a swift victory for Iraqi troops. They were proven wrong, and the eight-year-long Iran-Iraq war became one of the longest conventional wars of the twentieth century, destroying much of the economy in both countries while keeping both political systems and territory intact. Conflicts between these two countries existed since the early 1970s, when both struggled with their heterogeneous population and border control—a legacy of British colonialism and oil interests in the Middle East. Iraqi Kurds in the north of the country sought support from Iran in their struggle against the central government for autonomy or full independence. In turn, Iran supported this movement in an attempt to gain a stronger position in Iran’s border dispute with Iraq over the Shatt al-‘Arab—a strategic water access to the Persian Gulf. Although the Algiers Agreement was signed in 1975 and officially ended the border dispute and Iran’s support for the Kurds, tensions resurfaced with Iran’s 1979 revolution, which saw the rise of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902– 1989) in the same year as Saddam Hussein’s (1937–2006) rise to power in Iraq. Tensions between both rulers were due to ideological differences, which had led to Khomeini’s expulsion from Iraq—the Shah of Iran exiled him there—the previous year by Hussein, who was then in charge of Iraq’s Ministry of Interior. With Ayatollah Khomeini in power, the new revolutionary Islamic Republic of Iran aimed at exporting its Shi’a revolution to neighboring Iraq in an attempt to liberate Iraq’s sixty percent Shi’a population from Iraq’s secular and Sunni-dominated regime. Partly responding to this threat, and partly attempting to claim a swift military victory over Iran, thereby creating Iraq’s regional, pan-Arab leadership after Egypt’s expulsion from the Arab League in 1979 in the Baghdad Summit, Hussein invaded Iran, hoping to rally the ethnic Arab majority of Khuzistan to Arab Iraq rather than to Persian Iran. The Shatt al-‘Arab agreement of 1975, which officially shared Iraqi and Iranian access to the Persian Gulf, served Saddam Hussein as a pretext. After the Iranian army’s successful defense, the initial Iraqi attack was stopped, and starting in 1982, the Iraqi army retreated into Iraqi territory where the main remaining battles were fought. Iranian military advances were paid with a very high human toll and caused increasing international concern that Iran may be able to inflict a military defeat on Iraq and install a second Shi’a-dominated Islamic republic on Iraqi territory. Because of the Iranian leadership’s anti-Western rhetoric and ideology, Hussein’s turning to the West for aid fell on receptive ears, especially in the United States. As other conservative Gulf monarchies also feared an Iranian victory and its implications for its own heterogeneous populations

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(especially Saudi Arabia, with its own very important Shi’a minority), Gulf countries poured billions of U.S. dollars in aid into Iraq to prevent an Iranian victory and potential political instability in their own countries. The war itself included attacking oil tankers; rocket attacks on civilian targets in Tehran and Baghdad; and decisively, the Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces, which outnumbered Iraqi troops. Iraq thereby breached the 1925 Geneva agreement banning the use of these weapons. Although the international community condemned the use of chemical weapons by Iraq, it did not stop its aid to the Iraqi leadership because of the threat that Iran posed to Western geopolitical interests, especially its continued access to oil in the Arabian Gulf area. With no party gaining military superiority—Iran profited from higher troop numbers and strong ideological commitment, whereas Iraq benefited from superior technology and the ruthless use of chemical weapons—both warring parties found it increasingly in their interest to look for a peaceful settlement. On August 20, 1988, the final ceasefire took effect. The war left both economies in shambles, led to an increased U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf to protect oil tankers, and led a heavily indebted Iraq to further seek financial compensation from other Gulf countries in return for its protecting them from the Iranian threat. Whereas Iran was able to change its revolutionary foreign policy with the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, under Hussein Iraq continued its expansionist foreign policy in August 1990 with the occupation and annexation of Kuwait.

‘Isa bin Salman Al Khalifah (1933–1999) John A. Shoup Shaykh ‘Isa bin Salman Al Khalifah (1933–1999) was the first independent ruler of the modern state of Bahrain and ruled as Emir from 1961 to 1999. He was educated by a series of private British and Arab tutors and first entered the political arena in 1956 when he became President of the al-Manamah Municipal Council. The 1950s were a stormy period in Bahraini history because of the interference of the British Resident Charles Belgrave, who was forced to retire in 1956. The rise of Arab nationalism and Egypt’s challenge to the old colonial powers of Britain and France not only caused a degree of anti-British feelings in Bahrain, but also split the Bahrainis with many of the Shi‘ites and other lowerincome groups supporting Arab nationalism and the mainly Sunni more affluent groups supporting more a conservative stance. In 1958 there were open elections for the al-Manamah Municipal Council and Shaykh ‘Isa was also named the heir to the throne. He headed the Bahraini side in negotiations with Saudi Arabia to set the maritime boundaries and settle the claims to offshore oil fields. In 1961 ‘Isa became the Shaykh following his father’s death. ‘Isa proved to be a vigorous leader and spent a good deal of effort in improving the infrastructure of

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the country, including schools. He also gained Iranian recognition and in 1970 Iran renounced any claims to the islands that comprise Bahrain. In 1971 Bahrain and Qatar decided to not join the United Arab Emirates when Britain pulled out and ‘Isa was declared the first Emir. He allowed a constitution in 1973 as well as an elected parliament, which sat till 1975 when he decided to dissolve it on the grounds that it was not dealing with the issues of the country but only engaged in political grandstanding. The last decades of his life were difficult as he faced a growing opposition from the Shi‘ite majority. In 1994 there were street protests calling for the restoration of parliament. Things came to a head in 1996 when he ordered the arrests of several prominent Shi‘ite leaders. A low-level rebellion began that simmered until after Shaykh ‘Isa’s death in 1999. His son, Shaykh Hamad, who has been able to solve many of the political problems inherited from his father, succeeded him.

Islamic Doctrines John A. Shoup Islam’s doctrines are based on a specific set of legal practices and sources of legal knowledge. These include first and foremost the Qur’an as the revealed word of God; the Sunnah, or actions of the Prophet Muhammad as passed on by reliable sources back to the lifetime of the Prophet; the Hadith, or sayings of the Prophet that have also been passed on by reliable sources back to his lifetime; ijma‘, or consensus of Muslim scholars on the basis of texts; and qiyas, or analogy using a similar (but not the same) incident from the time of the Prophet and looking at his judgment. For the Shi‘ites there are two other sources not generally recognized by Sunnis. The first are the sayings of ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib that, like those of the Prophet Muhammad, have been passed down by reliable sources. The second is what is called ijtihad, or individual analysis based on close readings of legal and religious texts. For Sunnis “the gate of ijtihad” was closed by the scholar ibn Taymiyah, whose texts have strong influence over mainly Hanbali jurists, including Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, founder of what in the West is called Wahhabi Islam. Many Sunnis in the Gulf belong to the Maliki School of Islam (see madhhab), which was founded by the jurist Malik ibn Anas (716–796). Malik produced the first written text of Islamic law following the traditions of his native Madinah. He drew heavily on the local traditions and precedents set by the Prophet and the first Caliphs as well as on Qur’anic texts. He nonetheless gave highest priority to the use of consensus of the local community; reasoning could override traditions and practices, even those of the Prophet. Malik’s major work did not cover a wide range of legal issues and did not address the different legal practices that continued in the former Roman and Persian provinces of the empire. Nonetheless, those who have followed the works of Malik have generally taken a moderate path, making it easy for the Khawarij to adopt Maliki identity when politically necessary.

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The Shafi‘i School is not widely practiced in the Gulf or the Arabian Peninsula, although it is the main Islamic school in Syria and Jordan. Shafi‘i legal thought and the methods established by the founder Muhammad al-Shafi‘i have greatly influenced all of the Sunni schools of law. Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi‘i (767–820) incorporated the legal traditions in the main centers of Islamic law during the eighth century, drawing upon Roman, Persian, and Arab sources; a synthesis of the two main poles of his day, Kufah and the legal traditions of Abu Hanifa (700–796), and Madinah and Malik ibn Anas. Al-Shafi‘i helped standardize legal methods, set the four main sources noted above, and gave first importance to the Qur’an as the word of God. The second source was the Prophet’s actions and words following the Qur’anic injunction to “obey God and His Prophet.” Any contradictions are to be settled by the Qur’an for the Qur’an and the sunnah for the sunnah; that is, the later revelation or tradition supersedes the earlier one and all contradictions are satisfied by either a Qur’anic verse or a sunnah. Consensus is the third source of law, and in Shafi‘i legal texts consensus would come to mean a consensus of legal scholars, not the community itself. The fourth source is analogy, but in a limited format, trying to reduce the possibility of too many varied opinions by scholars. Analogy cannot contradict any rule established by any of the first three principles. The Hanbali School of law was established as the main school in much of the Arabian Peninsula as a result of the Wahhabi reforming movement of the eighteenth century. Hanbali Islam was founded by the jurist Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780– 855), who rejected any form of human reasoning as a source of law. Only the Qur’an and the sunnah of the Prophet could serve as the basis for Islamic legal decisions. The Syrian Hanbali jurist ibn Taymiyah (1263–1328) has been one of the most influential figures for Islamic doctrine in the much of the Sunni world. Ibn Taymiyah wrote at a time when Syria was under threat from both the Mongols in the east (who had recently converted to Islam) and the Christian Crusaders from the west. He took a more militant stance and divided the world into two main parts: Dar al-Islam, or the “Abode of Islam,” and the Dar al-Kufr, or “Abode of Unbelief.” For him, these two were in a hostile relationship. Ibn Taymiyah differed from the other jurists of his day and sought legal precedent in the writings of the more militant Kharaji scholars. Ibn Taymiyah stated that a bad Muslim ruler (he was referring to the Mongols in Iran) was as bad as a non-Muslim ruler and should be resisted. Words and actions of a good Muslim leader must be consistent with Islamic principles, and it was the duty of a good Muslim ruler to combat unbelief wherever it was found whether inside Dar al-Islam or in Dar al-Kufr. Thus he legitimized the conflict between the Mamluks of Egypt and Syria with both the Crusaders and the Mongols and gave it the status of Jihad. He advocated it as a duty to overthrow bad Muslim governments rather than to follow the opinion of other Muslim scholars of his day that a bad Muslim ruler was at least a Muslim and his rule should be obeyed. Ibn Taymiyah should be seen in his own historical circumstances, but he had a strong influence on Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and contemporary Muslim thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb and even men such as Usamah bin Ladin. See also Madhhab.

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FURTHER READING Coulson, N.J. A History of Islamic Law. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999. Delong-Bas, Natana. Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. London: I.B. Tauris, 2004.

Islamic Fundamentalism— Salafiyah Sebastian Maisel Secular trends in Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries in the late nineteenth century caused Islamic reformist movements to emerge with the objective to end the degeneration of Islamic societies, which resulted in their “backwardness” and dependency on non-Muslim countries. For them Islam itself was not the reason for their “backwardness,” but deviation from the true spirit and meaning of Islam and the power of traditions rather than understanding the true message of the religion were the causes. They advocated returning to the origins of Islam, the Islam of the “pious ancestors” or al-salaf al-salih, to first reform and then strengthen Islam. The way of living and thinking of the early Muslim community under the Prophet Muhammad and the four rightly guided caliphs was declared the only historical realization of Islam, and any deviation from this model led to degeneration. The movement takes its name, salafiyah, from looking back at the ancestors. They were greatly influenced by earlier fundamentalist movements and thinkers, such as ibn Taymiyah and Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and discouraged traditions such as venerating saints and visiting shrines and tombs. They also rejected taqlid, or imitation of former rulings, which is an important part of Sunni legal rulings yet today. In political and economical terms, Salafis consider the Islamic system superior to capitalism and communism. If understood correctly, Islam can be the base for the building of modern, prosperous, and progressive nations. True Islam, therefore, is different than the form of Islam that is represented by traditional Islamic law and current governments. Prominent thinkers who developed the Salafi reformist movement were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh, and Rashid Rida, who all lived at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. The first organizations that followed the doctrines of salafi Islam were the Ikhawan al-Muslimin, or Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1929 by Hasan al-Banna’ in Egypt. Today, many movements and organizations use the idea of cultural self-assertion as laid out by the salafi thinkers for their inspiration and ideology. The main religious movement in Saudi Arabia, called Wahhabiyah after its founder, has often been equated with salafi Islam. However, the salafi movement originated some 150 years later but both refer to the first community of Islam as a period of near perfection. Although the salafiyah is a general Islamic reform movement, the Wahhabiyah is the reform movement in Saudi Arabia and adjunct areas. The Wahhabi movement originated in the mid-eighteenth century in

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central Arabia with the teachings of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. He was frustrated with the state of Islam and the moral decline of the population that he believed had deviated significantly from the “straight path” of the forefathers. He began preaching to return to the fundamentals of Islam as embodied in the Qur’an and Sunnah. When the political leader of the area, Muhammad bin Sa‘ud, started to use his teachings to legitimize his rule, a pact of mutual support and recognition was made between the two sides, thus combining religious with political authority and providing the means to create a pure Islamic state. The partnership lasts up to this day, and the Wahhabi version of the Hanbali School is the official form of Islam in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Wahhabis show no tolerance toward what they consider to be deviations, including celebrating the Prophet’s birthday, Sufi mysticism, and certain modern technologies. Cultural expressions of this fundamental interpretation of Islam as practiced in Saudi Arabia include strongly enforced gender segregation, the prohibition of alcohol and drugs (and sometimes cigarettes), and a ban on women driving cars. It is also reflected in strained relations with non-Wahhabi groups, in particular Shi‘ites and Christians. Many Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia prefer to call themselves salafis or muwahhidi (Unitarians) because they believe they follow the Prophet’s example as staunch monotheists. They insist on the inerrancy of the scripture (Qur’an) and interpret it literally. Among the features that are applied is the prohibition of rebellion against an Islamic ruler, even in the case that he is corrupt or unjust. The Al Sa‘ud, as the ruling family of Saudi Arabia, still receive support and recognition from the mainstream religious establishment of the country. On the basis of the historical pact between the two groups, salafi scholars and authorities like Muhammad bin Salih al-‘Uthaymin and ‘Abd al‘Aziz bin Baz support the Saudi government as custodians of the “Two Holy Places” and promoters of Islam worldwide. Religious institutions such as the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice and the Grand Mufti of the Kingdom are used in a similar fashion. There are other, smaller groups of salafi scholars in Saudi Arabia who disagree with the mainstream interpretation and accuse the Al Sa‘ud of being corrupt. Following the injunctions of ibn Taymiyah, who advocated rebellion against unjust and corrupt Muslim rulers, they call for an end of Saudi rule. The reform salafis openly denounce the state’s failures, including the violation of Islamic values and the subservience to foreign powers. They focus on broad social and political issues that touch the everyday lives of all Muslims, not only Saudis. A rejectionist group called neo-salafis focus more on individual faith, morals, and practices. They withdrew from society to live a puritan lifestyle. They also claim that the Saudi state is illegitimate. In 1979, a group under the leadership of Juhayman al-‘Utaybi seized the Great Mosque in Makkah. Another group of salafis in Saudi Arabia called the Jihadists emerged in the global holy war against the West beginning in 1980 in Afghanistan and continuing in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, and Iraq. Their resistance to the Saudi establishment is further shaped by the presence of foreign troops on sacred Islamic ground. During the 1990–1991 Gulf War, American troops were stationed in Saudi Arabia to protect the country from a possible Iraqi attack. Using “infidel” troops to protect the Holy Places is another

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complaint and example of deviation in the eyes of many salafis. Following the stationing of non-Muslim troops in Saudi Arabia, some went further in their opposition and started to openly attack the representatives of “deviated” regimes. Among these new Jihadist organizations is Al-Qa‘idah. Today the debate over the use of violence is probably the most significant sign of diversity within the salafi movement. Although Al Qa‘idah and other groups advocate the overthrow of un-Islamic regimes, many salafis believe that violence should be the last resort. Mainstream Wahhabi and salafi groups are currently under attack by the more violent form of interpretation. See also Holidays and Festivals: Islamic; Islamic Doctrines; Madhhab.

FURTHER READING Al Rasheed, Madawi. Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Commins, David. The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. DeLong-Bas, Natana J. Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Hegghammer, Thomas, and Stephan Lacroix. “Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-Utaybi Revisited,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 39, no. 1 (2007): 103–122. Kerr, Malcolm H. Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966.

Islamic Practices John A. Shoup Islam requires that all believers perform five major acts that demonstrate belonging to the community. These Five Pillars of Faith are: (1) Declaration of Faith, or the shahadah; (2) Prayer, or salat, at five prescribed times during the day; (3) Fasting, or siyam, from dawn to dusk during the month of Ramadan; (4) Giving Alms, or zakat, usually at the end of Ramadan; and (5) Pilgrimage, or haj, to Makkah once during a lifetime, if it is possible. These are required of all Muslims no matter if they are Sunni, Shi‘ite, or Kharaji. The Declaration of Faith is a requirement of all Muslims and it is by saying it that a non-Muslim enters the community of believers. The Declaration states that there is no god but God and that Muhammad is the Messenger of God. To say this simple phrase in front of witnesses is to declare allegiance to Islam, and in this short, simple phrase two the most fundamental elements of Islam are stated. The unity of God is a fundamental point in Islam and in Surat al-Ikhlas it is clarified that for Muslims God has no partner and is eternal; neither begotten nor does he beget. When Muslims make the pilgrimage to Makkah they recite a line that says there is no god but God and he has no partners (la Sharika lak).

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Old mosque in Shandaghah District of Dubai shows the traditional minaret design in the Gulf region. Gulf mosques tended to be small and modest until the arrival of oil monies, when more elaborate styles from Egypt or India became popular. Courtesy of John A. Shoup.

The second part of the Declaration of Faith is to acknowledge that Muhammad is the Prophet of God. Muhammad is referred to as the Seal of the Prophets or Khatam al-Anbiya’, meaning that there is no prophet after him; he is the last in the long line of prophets God has sent to guide man. Shi‘ites add another line to the Declaration of Faith, stating the ‘Ali is the friend of God, or wa ‘Ali Wali Allah. This addition separates Shi‘ites from Sunnis because for Sunnis ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib is one of the Rightly Guided Khalifahs elected by the council of Muslims and an exemplary man but no more than this. ‘Ali was one of the closest companions of the Prophet and among the first converts to Islam; he was also the Prophet’s cousin and his son-in-law. ‘Ali married the Prophet’s daughter, Fatimah Zahirah, and by her fathered Hasan and Hussein, who for the Shi‘ites are the rightful heirs of the Prophet’s political and religious authority. ‘Ali was willing to give his life in place of the Prophet when the Quraysh plotted Muhammad’s death prior to the Hijrah to Madinah. For some Shi‘ites ‘Ali takes on a greater role than that of even Muhammad with popular tales about the angel Gabriel mistaking Muhammad for ‘Ali when the first Surah of the Qur’an was revealed. Muslims are expected to pray five times a day in the direction of Makkah. Originally Muhammad told his followers to pray facing Jerusalem, but in a revelation found in Surat al-Baqarah the direction was changed to Makkah and the

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Ka‘abah. It is believed that the first Ka‘abah was built by Ibrahim (Abraham) and his son Isma‘il (Ishmael) following God’s command to sacrifice Isma‘il. God sent an angel to stop Ibrahim’s hand, and a lamb was substituted for the boy. Following the sacrifice of the lamb, the two men set about building the first house of worship to the one God. Muslims believe that God set the five times for prayer: dawn, or fajar; noon, or dhuhur; mid-afternoon, or ‘asr; dusk, or maghrib; and nighttime, or ‘ishiyah. Prayer time is announced by the adhan, called out by the mu’adhdhin from a minaret or from the roof of the mosque. It is held that once the first mosque in Madinah was completed, it was debated how to announce prayer times. Different suggestions were made—a drum (but it was associated too much with war), a horn (like the Jews), and a bell (like the Christians)—but all were rejected. It was then suggested the human voice should be used as was in a dream by the companion of the Prophet, ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab, and Bilal, one of the first companions of the Prophet, was asked to use his beautiful voice to announce prayer time. Bilal devised the words of the adhan. The call to prayer states “God is Great. I witness that there is no god but God and I witness that Muhammad is the Messenger of God. Come to prayer. Come to success. God is Great. I witness there is no god but God.” Each of the prayers is composed of several prostrations or ruka‘, which vary according to the time of day. Each of these is composed of nine attitudes of prayer: from standing straight with the arms usually folded across the chest, bending at the waist, kneeling on the ground, placing the forehead on the ground with the palms of the hands flat, rising back up to the kneeling position with the feet folded underneath, and standing again. The different schools in Sunni Islam teach slightly different ways of doing these movements, and Shi‘ites place their foreheads on a round, flat ceramic disk that contains dirt from Najaf or Karbala, where Imams ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib and his son Hussein are buried. When prayer is completed the angels sitting on the right and left shoulders are greeted and then people shake hands and greet each other in brotherhood in a public display of what the Prophet said: “All people are like the teeth of a comb before God.” Fasting is done during the month of Ramadan from dawn to dusk by all Muslims that have reached a certain age and who are able. Pregnant women, the sick, injured, travelers, and others are exempted from fasting although many fast anyway. During the daytime it is not lawful to eat, drink, smoke, or allow anything to pass the lips. In Saudi Arabia the fast is imposed on everyone in all public places, whereas in much of the Gulf fasting is not required of non-Muslims, but anyone not fasting must find a secluded place where no Muslims can see them breaking the fast. The fast is traditionally broken at the maghrib call to prayer with milk and dates or a drink made of water, dates, dried fruit, and nuts. Most Muslims then pray the maghrib prayer before eating. In some parts of the Gulf and Saudi Arabia this first meal is small following the sunnah of the Prophet and a larger meal is eaten after the ‘ishiyah prayer. However, today most people indulge in a major feast shortly after the maghrib prayer. A last meal called suhur is eaten before the fajar prayer. In the past a person called a masharti or musahir was hired to walk around playing a drum to wake people up for the meal, although this is rarely done today. Suhur needs to be finished some fifteen to twenty minutes before the

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call to prayer and this time is called msak, meaning to grab up and put away anything that is still uneaten. At the end of Ramadan those who can are expected to give one-tenth of their wealth to the poor, called zakat. This is to be done in such a way as to not know who specifically is giving or who is receiving in order to preserve the honor and dignity of all. Those giving should not become proud and boastful of their actions, and those receiving should not be made to feel indebted. Today, in many countries, companies or governments include a monthly deduction from employees’ salaries that is given to a division within the Ministries of Religious Affairs. The last required practice is the pilgrimage to Makkah. This is an obligation but with the stipulation for those who can, meaning both financially and physically. There are two different types of pilgrimage. The ‘umrah, or small pilgrimage, can be done at any time of year, and the person performing it does not do all of the steps required in the haj, or main pilgrimage that is to be done over the first ten days of the month of Dhu al-Hijjah, or the Month of Pilgrimage, which is the last month of the Muslim calendar. Most of the steps in the haj take place during the first nine days and follow those first set out by the Prophet Muhammad. On the tenth day, the main Islamic holiday ‘Id al-Adha, or Feast of Sacrifice, takes place where Muslims follow the example of Ibrahim and sacrifice a sheep. All Muslim males are circumcised following the example of Ibrahim and the Abrahamic traditions. Circumcision is considered an act of purification, and although khitan is the Arabic word for circumcision, the word mudhahir, or purified, is often used instead. It is held that for a male to open and read the Qur’an, he should already be circumcised. As a result, the general practice is that boys should be circumcised while they are still very young. Female circumcision seems to have been introduced to the Arabian Peninsula from the Horn of Africa or the Sudan, where the practice is widespread among all religions. Female circumcision is not part of Islamic practice and is not endorsed by Islamic scholars, yet it remains a practice perpetuated by women in some parts of the Peninsula. See also Holidays and Festivals: Islamic.

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Jabal al-Akhdar War John A. Shoup The Jabal al-Akhdar War, or Jabal War, was fought between the Sultan of Oman, Sa‘id bin Taymur, and the Imam of Nizwa, Ghalib bin ‘Ali al-Hina’i, from 1954 to 1959. The Imamate based in Nizwa had been able to exercise independent authority over much of the Omani interior starting in 1913, when most of the tribes refused to recognize Sultan Taymur bin Faysal and elected Salim bin Rashid al-Kharusi as the Imam. In 1920, an agreement was signed that established a modus vivendi between the two. When Sa‘id bin Taymur became Sultan in 1932 he began trying to re-establish ties with tribes in the interior, and following his successful bid to oust the Saudis from al-Buraymi in 1952 he was able win over several of the major tribes that had been loyal to the Imam. Feeling increasingly under pressure from the Sultan, the Imam tried to establish ties with the Arab League and be recognized as an independent state in 1954. The Imam had strong support from both the Saudis and the Arab nationalists who viewed the Sultan as a puppet of the British. Despite strong political support, neither the Saudis nor the Arab nationalists were able to send much material support to the Imam. The bid to be recognized as an independent state prompted the Sultan to march with his forces and occupy Nizwa, the Imam’s capital, in 1955. The Imam’s brother, Talib, fled to Cairo, where he was able to obtain a degree of help from the Arab nationalists, whereas the Imam himself was sent to internal exile in his home village. The feelings of anger against the Sultan continued, especially among the Bani Riyam tribe whose traditional lands are in Jabal al-Akhdar, which rises up behind Nizwa. Talib returned in 1957 and with his brother Ghalib escaped into the mountains. The leaders of the Bani Riyam tribe took the side of the Imam, as did several other tribes from Jabal alAkhdar. The Imam’s troops were able to hold out against attacks by the Sultan’s army and inflicted several defeats on it as well. When the Sultan’s army would try to attack rebel positions the tribesmen would disappear into the mountains, making them nearly impossible to fight. The situation was stalemated until reluctantly the Sultan called on British assistance (Sa‘id had been trying to distance himself from the British as much as possible). The British ground troops and artillery were equally ineffective in fighting tribesmen loyal to the Imam. In the end Royal Air Force squads were called in to bomb rebel towns and villages. Several were

Jahiliyah

destroyed, including the Bani Riyam tribal capitals of Birkat al-Mawz and Tanuf. As a result of the aerial bombings, the Imam, his brother, and the Bani Riyam shaykhs surrendered, ending the war in 1959.

FURTHER READING Owtran, Francis. Modern History of Oman: Formation of the State since 1920. London: I.B. Tauris, 2004. Peterson, J.E. Oman at War: The Sultanate’s Struggle for Supremacy. London: Saqi Books, 2008. Rabi, Uzi. The Emergence of State in a Tribal Society: Oman under Sa‘id bin Taymur, 1932– 1970. London: Sussex Academic Press, 2005.

Jahiliyah Sebastian Maisel According to Islamic historiography, the time of ignorance, in Arabic jahiliyah, is the period between the creation of the world and the proclamation of Islam by Muhammad. During the time of the jahiliyah, people did not accept divine revelations or only partly accepted those and therefore must be considered ignorant toward the true and final message of Islam. Generally, Muslims evaluate the culture and life of their predecessors negatively, except with regard to literature and some legal customs. In pre-Islamic Arabia, poetry was considered the highest form of artistic expression, a status that was preserved during the early years of Islamic development. The works of poets of the jahiliyah, such as ‘Antarah ibn Shaddad, Imru’ al-Qays, or Tarafah ibn al-‘Abd, still maintain a superior position in Arabic literature. Collections of their poems in the famous mu‘allaqat, or suspended odes, are fine examples of pre-Islamic poetry that are still revered today. Much can be identified from the knowledge of pre-Islamic poetry, for example, detailed information on customs and the lifestyle of the people. Other jahiliyah qualities of the people of Arabia before Islam that are still held in high esteem include honor, bravery, hospitality, and chivalry. Poets traveled around the land reciting famous poems of tribal war and love and also served as messengers of political news and rainfall. Every year at the marketplace al-‘Ukaz near Makkah, the best poets competed in a contest for the best poem, which was then stitched on the cover of the Ka‘abah and hung onto it, visible for all, mu‘allaq in Arabic. For many Islamic historians jahiliyah was a time period to ignore. The distinct culture of Arabia developed many centuries ago and continued to influence even the Prophet Muhammad. Constant tribal warfare and raids between settled farmers in the oases and nomadic groups in the adjunct areas characterized life in Arabia before Islam. Although central Arabia did not develop states, Arabs in Syria, Iraq, the Gulf coast, Oman, and Yemen have long histories of kingdoms in the pre-Islamic period. These kingdoms were prosperous and attracted foreign invaders such as the Romans, Abyssinians, and Persians. In central Arabia, settled

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life centered on the oases of Khaybar, Yathrib (later called al-Madinah), and Makkah. In those settlements, Jewish and Christian groups gained strong support and eventually the majority. Ethnically, the inhabitants were Arabs speaking more or less the same language with dialect varieties. Their society was organized along tribal lines with collective rights and duties. Loyalty to the kin-group was imperative, because the extended family provided protection and access to the resources. The economy was based on small-scale farming, usually tending the date palm groves, animal husbandry, crafts, or trade. Makkah enjoyed special privileges as the place of the annual pilgrimage to worship their polytheistic idols in the Ka‘abah. Since it was also an important trading point on the caravan route, it soon turned into the main urban center in central Arabia. Masters of Makkah were the Quraysh, who monopolized control of the Ka‘abah and many trading privileges. When Muhammad brought Islam, he abolished many jahiliyah practices, such as the custom to bury infant girls or the lawlessness regarding women, but most importantly he cleansed the Ka‘abah from objects of worship other than to God. Other customs he continued; however, the polytheistic, tribal society reached its end and was actively transformed and incorporated into the new Islamic community. See also Arabic Language; Madinah.

FURTHER READING Hitti, Philip. History of the Arabs: From the Earliest Times to the Present. London: Macmillan, 1956. Hoyland, Robert. Arabia and the Arabs: From the Bronze Age to the Coming of Islam. London: Routledge, 2001. Peters, F.E. The Arabs and Arabia on the Eve of Islam. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1999. Philby, Harry St. John Bridger. The Background of Islam: Being a Sketch of Arabian History in Pre-Islamic Times. London: Whitehead, Morris, 1947. Shahid, Irfan. “Pre-Islamic Arabia,” in The Cambridge History of Islam, edited by P.M. Holt et al. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Janadiriyah Heritage Festival Sebastian Maisel The various activities to preserve the traditional Saudi Arabian culture culminate in the annual Janadiriyah Festival, which is organized by the Saudi Arabian National Guard under the direct leadership of King ‘Abdallah. The venue is an open-air museum and arena with pavilions and showcases for every region in the kingdom, where cultural exhibits are shown. During the two-week-long event, every region introduces its cultural treasures, including dance and music shows, readings, poetry competitions, traditional markets for crafts and artifacts, food displays, and the like.

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Visitors to the Janadiriyah Festival, Saudi Arabia. Courtesy of Sebastian Maisel.

Some decades ago, Janadiriyah was a small, quiet village in the Qasim province and the proximity of Riyadh, which was visited occasionally by some Bedouin tribes during the dry summer season. Today, the same place has turned into a magnet for thousands of visitors of the festival. One of the main attractions is the annual camel race, with more than 2,000 participating camels and jockeys. Even the King and Crown Prince attend the races and dedicate valuable cash and other prizes for the winners. It was the initiative of the then Crown Prince and now King ‘Abdallah, who as the commander of the National Guard, a military unit based on tribal forces, to extend the small-scale event and turn it into a national event with the objective to depict and preserve the changing culture of the kingdom. Among the festival’s other goals are the confirmation of the country’s religious and social values, the reactivation of customs and traditions, the combination of the country’s cultural heritage with the achievements of a modern society, and the showing of the rapid change of daily life. In the meantime, the festival became a spectacle of significant size that required adequate organization and financing. Over 1 million visitors attended in 2006 and 2007, and the number is predicted to grow. New exhibitions, products, and ideas were added to the program; for example, a musical (a huge innovation for a country that does not have any theaters, operas, or other public showplaces), art and book exhibits, a competition to recite the Qur’an, international workshops, and special events for women only and families. In 2008, for the first time, a foreign country (Turkey) was presented as one of the festival’s themes in order to reach out to international and domestic tourists. Janadariyah became the space in Saudi Arabia where local and regional aspects blend into a national Saudi culture, a process that is not always smooth and stirs

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some controversy given the attempts of Najd, the central province, to homogenize culture and tradition. But despite occasional complaints about unfair treatment of non-Najdi participants from the Asir, Hijaz, or the Eastern Province, the festival has secured a solid position in the process of preserving Saudi heritage. The festival attracts a large number of Saudis, including the youth, because of the wide variety of entertainment, exhibits, food stalls, etc. The wide appeal of the festival to Saudi nationals should not be a surprise given the usual lack of public entertainment or activities other than going to shopping malls. The festival is broadcasted on Saudi television and local newspapers, providing a rare platform to discuss cultural development in public.

FURTHER READING Campbell, Kay L. “Folk Music and Dance in the Arabian Gulf and Saudi Arabia,” in Images of Enchantment: Visual and Performing Arts of the Middle East, edited by Sherifa Zuhur, 57–69. Cairo: American University of Cairo Press, 1998. Clark, Arthur. “A Festival at Janadriyah,” Saudi Aramco World 36, no. 5 (1985): 2–7. Long, David. Culture and Customs of Saudi Arabia. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005.

Jannabah John A. Shoup The Jannabah tribe is one of the largest and most important in the Sharqiyah or eastern region of Oman, numbering over 5,000 people. The tribe has historically supported the Ghafiri (northern) bloc politically but does not have a Ghafiri origin itself. In the past they dominated the town of Sur and the whole coast stretching far to the south. They played an important role in Oman’s overseas empire and made Sur the major port for the importation of slaves from East Africa. Jannabah were important in the Omani settlements in East Africa, and many are bilingual in Arabic and Swahili. During the height of the East African trade most of the shaykhs of the various lineages that compose the Jannabah established residences along the coast. Following the end of the slave trade by the British in the second half of the nineteenth century and Oman’s split into Zanzibar and mainland Oman, the Jannabah turned their attention inland and moved their tribal capital from Sur to ‘Izz. Pastoral nomadism and oasis date production replaced ocean trade as the main activities of the tribesmen. The Jannabah did not have exclusive control over much of the inland areas used for pastoralism but shared them with both the Wahibah and the Duru‘. Conflict over grazing lands claimed by the different tribes was a frequent occurrence well into the twentieth century, and tribal warfare ended only with the unification of the entire country in the 1950s under Sultan Sa‘id. The Jannabah are known for absorbing numerous other tribes and lineages into their tribal organization through adoption. Not only have they brought in Arabs from the Harith and Al Bu ‘Ali tribes, but many Baluch have also been fully absorbed into

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Jannabah lineages. The process is swift, and within a few generations those absorbed have been fully incorporated into the Jannabah with no distinctions being made with those of “pure” Jannabah origin. This may help explain why the tribe follows the general politics of the Ghafiri bloc yet is of Hinawi origin. The Jannabah have maintained several customs, perhaps pre-Islamic, that are unique to them. Jannabah brides run away from their grooms and it is the responsibility of the groom to find her and bring her back. There are stories of this hide-and-seek game between brides and grooms taking months, and even of grooms coming back empty-handed in disgust and frustration. Through hiding from the groom, Jannabah women demonstrate their abilities to manage camels and live in the desert unassisted by a man, perhaps as a warning to her potential husband of her independence. Similar customs around kidnapping or capturing brides were recorded in other parts of pre-Islamic Arabia. The other custom is that the Jannabah lineages near Jazir along the coast hold the sea turtle in special regard, what some have called a tribal totem. They are among the few tribal people in Arabia that still hold to totemism. See also Jahiliyah.

FURTHER READING Carter, J.R.L. Tribes in Oman. London: Peninsular Publishing, 1982. Richardson, Niel, and Marcia Dorr. The Craft Heritage of Oman. Dubai: Motivate Publishing, 2003. Thesiger, Wilfred. Crossing the Sands. Dubai: Motivate Publishing, 2006.

Al Jazeera Bouziane Zaid Al Jazeera, initially an international 24-hour Arab-language news and current affairs channel, was launched in 1996. Headquartered in al-Dawhah, Qatar, Al Jazeera started with a $150 million grant from the Emir of Qatar, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifah. It has since then expanded into a network that includes the Internet and specialty television channels with broadcasting centers based in major world capitals. Al Jazeera’s Web-based English and Arabic news services are editorially independent, with their own selection of news and commentary. Al Jazeera television network includes two Arabic-language sports channels, Al Jazeera Sports þ1 and Al Jazeera Sports þ2, launched respectively in 2003 and 2004; Al Jazeera Mubashir, modeled after C-Span and BBC Parliament, was launched in 2005 and broadcasts conferences in real time without editing or commentary; Al Jazeera Children’s Channel was launched in 2005; Al Jazeera English was launched in 2006 and is a 24-hour English-language global news channel; and Al Jazeera Documentary Channel is an Arabic-language documentary channel that was launched in 2007. The stations’ major sources of income

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include advertising, cable subscription fees, broadcasting deals with other companies, and sales of footage. When launched in 1996, the Al Jazeera Arabic news channel was said to have changed the television landscape of the Middle East. Unlike the state-owned and state-censored national television stations of the Middle East, Al Jazeera presented controversial views about the governments of many Arab states. Al Jazeera exposed unethical, immoral, and illegal behavior by individuals, businesses, and governments in the Middle East. This level of freedom and independence in news reporting was previously unheard of in many of these countries. For the first time, people in the region had access to a free and independent source of news and comment that was neither under the control of dictatorial regimes nor Western states or corporations. The main slogans that Al Jazeera uses are “al-Rai wa rai al akhar” (the opinion and the other opinion) and “minbaru man la minbara lah” (the platform of whoever does not have a platform). Al Jazeera gave an Arab world hungry for information and debate the means to talk to itself and possibly shape its future. Al Jazeera’s broadcasts have therefore resulted in controversies involving many countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Bahrain, and Algeria. For example, on January 27, 1999, the Algerian government cut the electricity supplies to large parts of its capital to prevent television audiences from watching Al Jazeera’s program al-Itijah al-Muakass (“The Opposite Direction”), in which critics of the Algerian government were speaking live. In general, since Al Jazeera started broadcasting in 1996, Arab countries have imposed and lifted bans on the station because it had aired a program that was deemed insulting to the Arab regimes. When Al Jazeera was launched in 1996, it was praised by the United States as a brave step toward liberalization of the Middle Eastern media, but that all changed after September 2001 and the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The station first gained widespread attention following the September 11, 2001 attacks when it broadcasted videos in which Usamah bin Ladin and other Al Qa’idah members defended and justified the attacks. This led the U.S. government to accuse Al Jazeera of engaging in propaganda on behalf of terrorists. Al Jazeera responded by stating that the station was merely sharing information and that they did not comment on the footage. Al Jazeera’s coverage of the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 invasion of Iraq also triggered strong protests from U.K. and U.S. officials. They both claimed that Al Jazeera’s news coverage was biased against the United States and the West. Al Jazeera’s response was that their coverage of the war made it more difficult for the United States and the United Kingdom to control the way the war was being reported. Al Jazeera’s offices in Kabul and Baghdad were bombed by the United States; its Baghdad correspondent, Tariq Ayyub, was killed, and its Kabul correspondent, Taysir Alluni, was arrested in Spain in 2003 and charged with terrorism. Al Jazeera cameraman Sami Al Hajj has been imprisoned as an “enemy combatant” at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for five years. Pakistani police arrested him in December 2001 while he was on his way to a news assignment in Afghanistan.

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Critics and scholars accuse Al Jazeera of sensationalism, and they use the notion of contextual objectivity to describe the station’s controversial yet popular news approach. Critics claim that Al Jazeera aims to increase its audience share by striking a balance between audience appeal and objectivity. See also Jiddah.

Jewelry Carla Higgins Traditionally, almost all jewelry in the Gulf was made of silver. Jewelry was frequently worn as an amulet to protect against the evil eye and misfortune. A common amulet throughout the Gulf was the hirz, a small, decorated, rectangular or cylindrical silver container that held verses of the Qur’an, or sometimes a spell, and was worn around the neck as a pendant on a leather cloth or string cord. Jewelry may include stones of red or blue, because these two colors have protective qualities, regardless of whether they are of glass, a stone such as carnelian, a discarded bead, or a red reflector—the color of the object was important, not the material. Another example of an amuletic use of jewelry was a beltlike silver chain (manjad in Oman) worn under clothing, draped from one shoulder across the chest. Jewelry is a sign of wealth, security, and status. Jewelry is gifted to women as part of the marriage price (mahr), women receive jewelry throughout their lives, and jewelry is a wearable investment. Jewelry is and was women’s currency. In the case of divorce, women keep all jewelry. When women have extra cash, they purchase jewelry for themselves. When a husband shows his regard, he gifts his wife with jewelry. Jewelry is worn as personal adornment, and in a society that places a high value on aesthetics and traditionally had few material possessions, jewelry is and was an important component of the female aesthetic. Women wore jewelry all of the time and everywhere. They might wear toe rings, rings on every finger, bracelets, necklaces, and hair ornaments, and this jewelry could be attached to their clothing, under their clothing, and on headdresses and hats. On special occasions they wear more as a status display and to celebrate. Women also wear jewelry while performing ordinary daily tasks. Sources of silver were primarily the Maria Theresa dollar or thaler and other coinage. Because custom is that a woman’s jewelry upon her death is melted down and recast or reworked, much of the silver in use today has been used and re-used for many, many years and may represent, in some cases, ancient silver. Silversmithing is done by men and women—this varies from region to region. Silversmiths were located in many larger towns, especially those with ports. Yemen is known for its superb silverwork prior to the 1950s, when silversmiths, who were primarily Jewish, left for Israel. Oman is known for the quality of its silver jewelry in terms of workmanship and high silver content. Craft centers such as Nizwa and Bahla provided a great deal of jewelry for the Gulf region.

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Silversmith in the Omani town of Bahla works on a new piece of jewelry. Bahla is well-known for a number of crafts, including pottery, weaving, and silver work. The smith here makes use of older, traditional methods of making jewelry and more modern elements such as a gas torch. Courtesy of John A. Shoup.

Today gold is preferred and is easily affordable. Gold jewelry is available in traditional, Gulf, and Middle Eastern styles, and a considerable amount of jewelry from India is available. Huge amounts of gold are purchased in the Gulf; for example, shoppers in the United Arab Emirates spend thirty times more on gold than the rest of the world, and Dubai imported 522 tons of gold in 2005.

FURTHER READING Richardson, Neil, and Marcia Dorr. The Craft Heritage of Oman. Dubai: Motivate Publishing, 2003. Ross, Heather Colyer. Bedouin Jewelry of Saudi Arabia. London: Stacey International, 1983. Topham, John et al. Traditional Crafts of Saudi Arabia. London: Stacey International, 2005.

Jiddah Sebastian Maisel Jiddah (Jeddah), a seaport on the Red Sea, is the largest city in western Arabia and the Hijaz. The coastline of the Red Sea is filled with coral reefs, and only at

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the location of Jiddah is it possible to find a natural harbor. From this the city benefited in pre-Islamic times, and over time the city developed a distinct urban culture similar to those in Makkah and Madinah. In 646, the third caliph, ‘Uthman, developed Jiddah to become the seaport for pilgrims from Egypt and other places of the Islamic Empire. Later other ruling dynasties of the Islamic Empire took control of the city, such as the Ayyubids and Mamluks. After the conquest of large territories in Yemen, the Ottoman Empire took over the city in 1532 and fortified it with walls and towers; however, continual resistance of local tribes forced the Ottomans out a century later, and the city enjoyed semi-independence. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, Jiddah was drawn into the conflict between Muhammad ‘Ali, the ruler of Egypt, and the Wahhabis of central Arabia, who at one point extended their emirate all the way to Makkah and Jiddah. Until its destruction by Wahhabis, a huge shrine for Eve existed outside of the city walls. The name Jiddah comes from the Arabic for grandmother, referring to Eve’s grave, which was a regional shrine and place of worship and pilgrimage. But because Wahhabism denounces worshipping saints and tombs, the place was destroyed. In 1840, the city once again was occupied by Ottoman and Egyptian forces and remained under nominal Ottoman control until World War I. The real rulers of Jiddah were the Grand Sharifs of Makkah, whose main occupation was to ensure a safe and smooth Hajj-season every year. The city was visited and frequented by Europeans, and Western banks and trade houses were well established. In 1916 it was incorporated into the Kingdom of Hijaz, and in 1925 it was conquered by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud, Sultan of Najd and later King of Saudi Arabia. Because the Hijaz in general and Jiddah in particular were accustomed to foreigners, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz made Jiddah the seat of the government and foreign embassies, starting a long-lasting rivalry with the official capital, Riyadh. In 1970, Jiddah was still larger in population than Riyadh with approximately 250,000 inhabitants. Today the city is part of a triangle conglomerate that connects with the Holy City of Makkah and the resort town Ta’if in the mountains. The city alone has a population of 3.5 million. As the largest and most open city in the Hijaz, Jiddah developed a special cosmopolitan taste and style with regard to architecture, food, and clothing. In addition, the lifestyle of people in Jiddah was faster and more Western-oriented than of those in the central region. As such, the first newspapers (1946) and radio station (1948) of Saudi Arabia were introduced in Jiddah. An active and vibrant art scene in painting, sculpture, and literature make the city an intellectual center in the kingdom. Most visible is a series of open-air sculptures depicting features of modern and traditional life along the corniche road. The traditional architecture of Jiddah is represented by large multistory buildings made of coral rock or stone and decorated with enclosed wooden balconies. More than 500 of those houses are currently under reconstruction in order to preserve the ambience of the old city. Several wadis from the Hijaz Mountains drain out into the plains of Jiddah, most important among them the Wadi Fatimah, which in the past provided potable water to the city until desalination plants were built in the 1960s. Jiddah is the most important center for trade and transportation in the western region of Saudi Arabia and a notable industrial location that includes refineries, power

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plants, assembly plants, and steel and cement factories. The port of Jiddah is the largest in the kingdom. The international airport built in 1981 has a special terminal for pilgrims that during Hajj season is the busiest in the world and frequented annually by several million passengers who arrive in Jiddah by plane, ferry, or bus. From Jiddah to Makkah, their ultimate destination spans a multilane highway connecting the two major cities in a relatively short time. Jiddah is home to the King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Al Sa’ud al-‘Aziz University with some 80,000 students, several colleges (Prince Sultan College for Tourism, Effat College, Dar al-Hikmah), and newspapers (Arab News, al-Madinah, al-Bilad), but it has no library of national significance. Other significant international organizations headquartering in Jiddah are the Organization of Islamic Countries and the International Association of Islamic Banks. Domestic companies and institutions include Saudi Arabian Airlines and the Jiddah Economic Forum.

FURTHER READING Buchan, James. Jeddah—Old and New. London: Stacey International, 1982. Farsi, Hani M.S. Jeddah, City of Art: The Sculptures and Monuments. London: Stacey International, 1991. Pesce, Angelo. Jiddah—Portrait of an Arabian City. London: Falcon Press, 1976. Tarabulsi, Mohammed Yosuf. Jeddah: A Story of a City. Riyadh: King Fahd National Library, 2006.

Jihad Jack Kalpakian Jihad has become one of the most hotly contested and controversial words in international affairs. In traditional forms of Islam, both Sunni and Shi‘ite, there have been at least two forms of Jihad: the inner or greater, and the outer or lesser. The inner form of Jihad concerns the resistance believers have to put up within themselves against the temptations of life and the forces of evil. It is primarily focused on self-restraint rather than the projection of force outward. The lesser or outer forms of Jihad are not necessarily violent. Under Sunni classification schemes, the lesser Jihad is divided into three forms: tongue, hand, and sword. The Jihad of the tongue is to speak out against evil and take a clear stance in confrontation to it. The Jihad of the hand concerns taking action against evil, and this need not be violent. The final form, the Jihad of the sword, is the form that has been most recently identified as Jihad writ large. Under this last form, the believer is exhorted to engage in combat to defend his religious community or country against an external attack. This military action is governed by an Islamic law of war that strictly limited the targets of military action and the consequences for civilian noncombatants, but it did allow for slavetaking. The rise of Islamism as a political force in the twentieth century led to renewed emphasis on this small part of the tradition of Jihad. For some Islamist thinkers like Sayyid Qutb, Jihad was seen as warfare to establish global Muslim

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hegemony. Restraint for him came only as a result of tactical necessity and not principle. The Jihad of the sword came to contain the whole meaning of the word with the other forms ignored or forgotten. Within the context of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council states, this last form of Jihad historically took place between the Wahhabi community and other Muslim communities in the Arabian Peninsula, but it also was used to justify wars within the Wahhabi community. The raids conducted by Saudi forces against Ottoman-controlled cities in the Hijaz during the nineteenth century were justified as Jihad, as were the wars that gave the Saudi family control over most of the Arabian Peninsula in the twentieth century, concluding with the conquest of the Hijaz in 1925. The Ikhwan movement used by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud to conquer the vast majority of the Arabian Peninsula believed itself to be fighting a Jihad to purify Islam from negative and pagan influences. Many of the people involved with violent movements like Al Qa‘idah believe themselves to be on a Jihad to protect Islam against the encroachment of infidels and against the defilement of Muslim lands by nonbelievers. Although the interpretation of Jihad as warfare is currently dominant, Islamic history has shown that the word has many different meanings and it could morph back to its “greater” definition again, perhaps as the futility of warfare begins to be felt more strongly by the Jihadists themselves. See also Islamic Fundamentalism—Salafiyah; Al Sa‘ud.

FURTHER READING Ahmed, Irfan. “The Destruction of the Holy Places,” Islamica Magazine 15, (2006). Available at http://www.islamicamagazine.com/Issue-15/The-Destruction-of-Holy-Sites-inMecca-and-Medina.html (last accessed October 13, 2008). Esposito, John. Islam: The Straight Path. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998. Lewis, Bernard. The Crisis of Islam. New York: Random House, 2004. Metz, Helen Chapin (ed.). Saudi Arabia: A Country Study. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office for the Library of Congress, 1992. Qutb, Sayyid. Milestones. Kazi Press, 1964. Available at http://www.kalamullah.com/ Books/MILESTONES.pdf (last accessed October 13, 2008).

Jubayl Sebastian Maisel Jubayl, or Jubayl al-Bahri, is a port city in eastern Saudi Arabia on the Arabian Gulf. It is located sixty-two miles (100 kilometers) to the north of the urban center and tri-cities of Dammam, Dhahran, and Khobar, and has some 250,000 inhabitants. The climate is characterized by high humidity and occasional fog and mist. Winter weather is mildly cold, but the summer days are humid and hot. The area has less extensive oases and gardens than neighboring Qatif and al-Hasa. Historically, the area was long inhabited and maintained sea trade relations with the maritime center in Dilmun. People live mostly of fishing, trading,

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and pearling, their port being the port of entry for the capital city in Riyadh. The Bani Khalid tribe was the most influential in the city’s vicinity. In 1933, the city became the landing spot for the first foreign oil exploration team. In the late 1960s Jubayl was a quiet fishing town with a small harbor and a base for the Royal Saudi Navy as the only outside employer. In 1974, the former stretch of barren land, sand dunes, and salt flats was turned into a planned twin industrial city with Yanbu‘ on the Red Sea, and as such is part of an ambitious industrial development project with refineries, petrochemical, and other heavy industrial manufacturing, such as a steel mill, based on using excessive natural gas. Most of the city’s traditional architecture, including several historical mosques, was demolished. A newly planned city in Western style and layout was to replace the old fishing village. According to the master plan of 1973, over the next three decades more than twenty industrial complexes, two deep-sea ports, and an international airport were supposed to be built. The project is coordinated by the Royal Commission for Yanbu‘ and Jubayl. A pipeline brings freshwater from the world’s largest desalination plant to the capital in Riyadh. In 1982, a 727 mile (1,170 kilometer) long east-west double pipeline was constructed connecting Jubayl with Yanbu‘ and supplying energy for the many industrial projects in the twin city. Saudi Arabia Basic Industry Cooperation (SABIC) supervises most of the industrial facilities. The King Fahd Industrial Port of Jubayl is one of the biggest and busiest in the kingdom. An international consortium plans on building the first polysilicon plant using solar energy in Jubayl. In 1990, over 22,000 people were employed in the different industries, fifty-two percent of which were foreign guestworkers. An additional 15,000 people worked in the service and construction sector. The number of inhabitants grew subsequently, as did the infrastructural network of roads, housing, and industrial areas. The spread of urbanization will soon connect Jubayl with the already existing strip of urban settlement along the coastline stretching all the way down to Khobar.

FURTHER READING Al-Shayeb, Abdallah A. Al-Jubail: Saudi Village (Architectural Survey). Doha, Qatar: Arab Gulf States Folklore Center, 1985. “Foundations,” Saudi Aramco World 33, no. 6 (1982): 30–40. King, Geoffrey. “Notes on Some Mosques in Eastern and Western Saudi Arabia,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 43, no. 2 (1980): 251–276. Pampanini, Andrea H. Cities from the Arabian Desert: The Building of Jubail and Yanbu in Saudi Arabia. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997.

Judicial System Sebastian Maisel The judicial system of Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf States is based on the assumption that Islam and the Holy Qur’an are the primary source for the judiciary. Four major schools of interpreting the legal aspects of the Qur’an and the

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other legal sources in Islamic Law are the Maliki, Hanafi, Shafi‘i, and Hanbali. The different branches of Shi‘ism have their own schools of law, with the Ja ‘afari School being the most widespread. In Saudi Arabia, before the unification of the country under King ‘Abd al‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud, individual judges derived their rulings from the school to which they belonged. In the western Hijaz Region, the Shafi‘i and Hanafi Schools were dominant, whereas the central region saw the Hanbali School as the only major form of legal interpretation. The very personal way of dealing with legal issues gave religious legal scholars special importance, because the outcome of a trial was very much dependent on the individual’s training and opinion. Another legal system existed far away from the urban settlements among the nomadic tribes, which applied their ancient code of customary law in front of tribal judges and notables. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Al Sa‘ud combined the different judicial systems (tribal, Hijazi, and Najdi) and created a new form of judiciary that bases its rulings solemnly on the Qur’an and Sunnah without being limited to a specific school of thought or law. In 1927, a Royal decree was issued reorganizing the judicial system in three levels, expeditious courts, Shari‘ah courts, and the High Commission of Judicial Supervision as the highest legal authority in the kingdom. Shari‘ah courts have jurisdiction over any case that has no special assignment. The four levels of Shari‘ah courts include minor, general, and cassation courts as well as the Supreme Judicial Council. The final appellate tribunal is the Board of Grievances under direct responsibility of the King. However, in reality, room for judicial interpretation is still given, and considering the dominance of scholars and judges from central Arabia, in Najd a tendency to apply Hanbali law can still be observed. Although slightly modified and extended, this original classification still exists. Because the country has no official constitution, in 1992 King Fahd decreed the Basic Law of Government, which defined the role of Islamic Law as well as the relationship between the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches. The legal system is administered by the Ministry of Justice; however, judges are most and foremost bound by the Shari‘ah. Kuwait has a constitution and after gaining independence in 1961 went on to codify its laws and regulations. Islam is the state religion and Shari‘ah is the main source of legislation. This process continued in the 1980s with the codification of the Civil Code and Kuwaiti Code of Personal Status. The main Islamic school of law in Kuwait is the Maliki School, although the significant Shi‘ite minority follows the Ja‘afari interpretation. Three levels of courts hear all of the cases related to personal, civil, and criminal matters: the courts of first instance, high courts, and the Supreme Court. Bahrain has long been exposed to the British legal tradition and therefore has a mixed system that includes important aspects of Islamic law. In the country’s constitution, it is stated that Bahrain is an Arab Islamic State and Shari‘ah is the main source of legislation. However, some differences with neighboring countries can be observed; for example, the country has a Ja‘afari majority, but is governed by a Maliki minority. In addition, both secular and Shari‘ah courts exist, the latter being divided in Sunni and Shi‘a departments. Three levels of Shari‘ah courts are found: junior and senior Shari‘ah courts and the High Shari‘ah Court of Appeal.

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Qatar has a predominantly Wahhabi population but has strong British influences in the judicial system. It is an Islamic country with Shari‘ah as the fundamental source of legislation. No permanent constitution exists; however, basic regulations define the status of executive and judiciary. The court system is also two-pronged with civil and religious Shari‘ah courts, the latter being restricted to family law and some criminal matters. Judges at the two levels of Shari‘ah courts (First Instance and Appeal) apply Hanbali law. The United Arab Emirates adopted a permanent constitution in 1996 with Islam as the official state religion and Shari‘ah as a primary source of legislation. The majority of the Emiratis are Sunnis, whereas a large minority are Shi‘a. Most of the people in the country, however, are foreign nationals. The legal system of the seven emirates remains mostly uncodified with very few national regulations and many local exceptions. Only Abu Dhabi and Sharjah have some type of regulations for the otherwise independent Shari‘ah courts. After its independence in 1970, Oman issued limited codes on commercial, criminal, and tax law, but not in the personal status. A Basic Law similar to a constitution adopted in 1996 claims that Islam is the official state religion and the Shari‘ah is the basis for legislation. The majority of the population follows the Ibadi branch of Kharajism with only small minorities of Sunnis and Shi‘as. The judiciary is comprised of three levels of courts: Shari‘ah courts, Magistrate Courts, and Specialized Courts. The highest level and court of appeal is the Complaints Committee. Shari‘ah courts in general are increasingly limited in handling family law and a few criminal cases. The 1996 Basic Law introduced a new additional legal system comprising primary courts, appeals courts, and the Supreme Court, affirming the independence of the country’s judiciary. See also Madhhab.

FURTHER READING Amin, S.H. Middle East Legal Systems. Glasgow, Scotland: Royston, 1985. Al-Ghadyan, Ahmed A. “The Judiciary in Saudi Arabia,” Arab Law Quarterly 13, no. 3 (1998): 235–251. Mallat, Chibli. Introduction to Middle Eastern Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Al-Muhairi, Butti Sultan. “The Development of the UAE Legal System and Unification with the Judicial System,” Arab Law Quarterly 11, no. 2 (1996): 116–160. Redden, Kenneth. Modern Legal Systems Encyclopedia. Middle East. Buffalo, NY: W.S. Hein, 1984. al-Suwaidi, Ahmed, “Developments of the Legal Systems of the Gulf Arab States,”Arab Law Quarterly 8, no. 4 (1993): 289–301. Vogel, Frank. Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2000.

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Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab States Today

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Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab States Today An Encyclopedia of Life in the Arab States VOLUME 2: K-Z Edited by Sebastian Maisel and John A. Shoup

GREENWOOD PRESS Westport, Connecticut • London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Maisel, Sebastian, 1970– Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab States today: an encyclopedia of life in the Arab States / Edited by Sebastian Maisel and John A. Shoup. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-313-34442-8 ((set) : alk. paper) – ISBN 978-0-313-34444-2 ((vol. 1): alk. paper) – ISBN 978-0-313-34446-6 ((vol. 2) : alk. paper) 1. Saudi Arabia—Encyclopedias. 2. Saudi Arabia—Social life and customs. 3. Persian Gulf States—Encyclopedias. 4. Persian Gulf States—Social life and customs. I. Shoup, John A. II. Title. DS202.2.M35 2009 953.003—dc22 2008040737 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright
C 2009 by Sebastian Maisel and John A. Shoup All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2008040737 ISBN: 978-0-313-34442-8 (set) 978-0-313-34444-2 (Vol. 1) 978-0-313-34446-6 (Vol. 2) First published in 2009 Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.greenwood.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984). 10

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Contents

Alphabetical List of Entries

vii

Topical List of Entries

xi

Maps

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Encyclopedia

249

Selected Bibliography

477

Index

499

About the Editors and Contributors

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Alphabetical List of Entries

‘Abd al-‘Aziz b. Muhammad b. Sa‘ud ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Sa‘ud Abha Abu Dhabi (City) Abu Dhabi (Emirate) Agriculture: Traditional and Commercial ‘Ajman ‘Ajman and Umm al-Quwayn ‘Ali bin Hussein bin ‘Ali ‘Anazah Arabian Gulf Arabian Horses Arabian Peninsula Arabic Language Arab Revolt Aramco Archaeological and Historical Sites and Museums Architecture Asir ‘Awamir Bahla Bahrain Bani Khalid Bani Tamim Bani Yas Banking and Finance Banking, Islamic Al-Batinah Bayt Kathir

Bedouin Culture Buraydah Al Bu Sa‘idi Al Bu Shams Calendar, Islamic Camels Charitable Organizations Citizenship in Kuwait Climate Coffee: Arabic and Turkish Coffeehouses Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice Companies Crime Cuisine Cultural Heritage Customary Law Dammam Dance, Traditional Dates Al-Dawhah Death Rites Deserts Dhafir Dhahirah Dhahran Dhows Dhufar

Alphabetical List of Entries Dhufar Liberation Front Divorce Dress Drugs Dubai Dubai Media City Duru‘ Economic Structures Economies, Traditional Education Emir Ethnic Groups Ethnicity Fahd bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Family Life Faysal bin Abd al-Aziz Festivals in the United Arab Emirates Film Industry Fine Arts Fiqh Flora and Fauna Folklore Foreign Policies Fujayrah Gender and Gender Relations Gulf Cooperation Council 1990–1991 Gulf War 2003 Gulf War Ha’il Handicrafts Harasis Al-Hasa Hashemites Health Care Systems Hijaz Hijaz Railway Holidays and Festivals: Islamic Holidays and Festivals: National Honor Human Rights in Saudi Arabia Huwaytat Ibadi Kharaji Islam Ikhwan Imamate of Nizwa Incense

viii

Intellectuals, Secular International Relations Internet Iran-Iraq War ‘Isa bin Salman Al Khalifah Islamic Doctrines Islamic Fundamentalism—Salafiyah Islamic Practices Jabal al-Akhdar War Jahiliyah Janadiriyah Heritage Festival Jannabah Al Jazeera Jewelry Jiddah Jihad Jubayl Judicial System Al Khalifah Kuwait Kuwait City Lawrence of Arabia League of Arab States Leisure Literature: Classical and Contemporary Madhhab Madinah Majlis Makkah Al Maktum Al-Manamah Markets, Traditional Marriage Masqat and Suburbs Material Culture Media Military Military Bases Mountains Mubarak al-Sabah al-Sabah Muhammad Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab Al-Muharraq Muntafiq Al Murrah Musalsalat

Alphabetical List of Entries Musandam Music: Traditional and Contemporary Mutawwa Mutayr Nabateans Al Nahyan Najd Najran (City) Najran (Region) Newspapers Nizwa Oases Oil Oil Industry Oman Organization of the Islamic Conference Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Palestine Pastoralism, Nomadism, and Transhumance Pearling Philby, Harry St. John Pilgrimage Political Organization Popular Islam Qabus bin Sa‘id Qahtan Al Qa‘idah Qasim Qasimi Empire Qatar Qatif Quraysh Ra’s al Khaymah Al Rashid Al-Rashid Religions, Non-Islamic Riyadh Al Sabah Sabah Al-Salim Al-Sabah

Sa‘id bin Taymur Al Bu Sa‘idi Salalah Al Sa‘ud Saudi Arabia Saudization Security and Terrorism Sex Trade Shammar Shari‘ah Sharif and Sayyid Sharif Hussein bin ‘Ali Sharqah Shi‘ah Social Organization, Tribal and Non-Tribal Sports Sulubba Sunnah Tabuk Ta’if Television Al Thani Tihamah Tourism Travelers and Explorers ‘Unayzah Unemployment United Arab Emirates United States, Relations with Universities and Higher Education Urbanization Usamah bin Ladin ‘Utaybah Wadis Wahhabism Wahibah Water and Irrigation Women’s Rights Yamani, Ahmad Zaki Yanbu‘ Yemen Yemen, Tribal Confederations in Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahayan

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Topical List of Entries

CULTURE AND TRADITIONS Arabian Horses Arabic Language Archaeological and Historical Sites and Museums Architecture Calendar, Islamic Camels Coffee: Arabic and Turkish Coffeehouses Cuisine Cultural Heritage Dance, Traditional Death Rites Dress Education Festivals in the United Arab Emirates Film Industry Fine Arts Folklore Handicrafts Holidays and Festivals: Islamic Holidays and Festivals: National Incense Janadiriyah Heritage Festival Jewelry Leisure Literature: Classical and Contemporary

Material Culture Music: Traditional and Contemporary Religions, Non-Islamic Sports Universities and Higher Education

ECONOMY Agriculture: Traditional and Commercial Aramco Banking and Finance Banking, Islamic Companies Dates Dhows Economic Structures Economies, Traditional Hijaz Railway Incense Markets, Traditional Oil Oil Industry Pastoralism, Nomadism, and Transhumance Pearling Saudization Tourism

Topical List of Entries Unemployment Urbanization Water and Irrigation

Climate Deserts Flora and Fauna Mountains Oases Wadis Water and Irrigation

Ibadi Kharaji Islam Imamate of Nizwa Islamic Doctrines Islamic Fundamentalism—Salafiyah Islamic Practices Jahiliyah Jihad Madhhab Pilgrimage Popular Islam Shari‘ah Shi’ah Sunnah Wahhabism

EVENTS, ERAS, AND DYNASTIES

LAW

ENVIRONMENT

Arab Revolt 1990–1991 Gulf War 2003 Gulf War Iran-Iraq War Jabal al-Akhdar War Al Khalifah Al Maktum Al Nahyan Al-Rashid Al Sabah Al Sa‘ud Al Thani

Citizenship in Kuwait Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice Crime Customary Law Drugs Fiqh Human Rights in Saudi Arabia Judicial System Madhhab Shari‘ah

GOVERNMENT

MEDIA

Foreign Policies Health Care Systems Imamate of Nizwa International Relations Majlis Military Military Bases Mutawwa Political Organization Security and Terrorism United States, Relations with

Dubai Media City Internet Al Jazeera Media Musalsalat Newspapers Television

ISLAM Holidays and Festivals, Islamic Honor

xii

ORGANIZATIONS Charitable Organizations Dhufar Liberation Front Gulf Cooperation Council Ikhwan League of Arab States Organization of the Islamic Conference

Topical List of Entries Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Al Qa‘idah

PEOPLE AND TRIBES ‘Abd al-‘Aziz b. Muhammad b. Sa‘ud ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Sa‘ud ‘Ajman ‘Ali bin Hussein bin ‘Ali ‘Anazah ‘Awamir Bani Khalid Bani Tamim Bani Yas Bayt Kathir Bedouin Culture Al Bu Sa’idi Al Bu Shams Dhafir Duru‘ Emir Ethnic Groups Ethnicity Fahd bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Faysal bin Abd al-Aziz Harasis Hashemites Huwaytat Intellectuals, Secular ‘Isa bin Salman Al Khalifah Jannabah Lawrence of Arabia Mubarak al-Sabah al-Sabah Muhammad Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab Muntafiq Mutayr Nabateans Philby, Harry St. John Qabus bin Sa‘id Qahtan Qasimi Empire Quraysh Al Rashid Sabah Al-Salim Al-Sabah Sa‘id bin Taymur Al Bu Sa‘idi Shammar Sharif and Sayyid Sharif Hussein bin ‘Ali

Shi‘ah Social Organization, Tribal and Non-Tribal Sulubba Travelers and Explorers Usamah bin Ladin ‘Utaybah Wahibah Yamani, Ahmad Zaki Yemen, Tribal Confederations in Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahayan

PLACES Abha Abu Dhabi (City) Abu Dhabi (Emirate) ‘Ajman and Umm al-Quwayn Arabian Gulf Arabian Peninsula Asir Bahla Bahrain Al-Batinah Buraydah Dammam Al-Dawhah Dhahirah Dhahran Dhufar Dubai Fujayrah Ha’il Al-Hasa Hijaz Ikhwan Jiddah Jubayl Kuwait Kuwait City Madinah Makkah Al-Manamah Masqat and Suburbs Al-Muharraq Al Murrah Musandam Najd Najran (City) Najran (Region) Nizwa

xiii

Topical List of Entries Oman Palestine Qasim Qatar Qatif Ra’s al Khaymah Riyadh Salalah Saudi Arabia Sharqah Tabuk Ta’if Tihamah ‘Unayzah

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United Arab Emirates Yanbu‘ Yemen

WOMEN Divorce Education Family Life Gender and Gender Relations Marriage Sex Trade Women’s Rights

The Gulf region. Cartography by Bookcomp, Inc.

Bahrain. Cartography by Bookcomp, Inc.

Kuwait. Cartography by Bookcomp, Inc.

Oman. Cartography by Bookcomp, Inc.

Qatar. Cartography by Bookcomp, Inc.

Saudi Arabia. Cartography by Bookcomp, Inc.

United Arab Emirates. Cartography by Bookcomp, Inc.

Yemen. Cartography by Bookcomp, Inc.

Approximate traditional locations of the main tribes of Saudi Arabia. Cartography by Bookcomp, Inc.

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab States Today

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K

Al Khalifah John A. Shoup The Al Khalifah family is the ruling family of the island nation of Bahrain. They belong to the Bani ‘Utbah or ‘Utub confederation of Arab tribes, which originated in the Najd and migrated to the Persian Gulf during the seventeenth century. They occupied areas near Qatar and first arrived in Bahrain in 1701, but then moved on to Kuwait. They moved back to Qatar after their shaykh Khalifah died in 1708. His son Muhammad preferred Zubarah in Qatar over Kuwait and moved most of his lineage back, leaving the related Al Sabah and their lineage in control of Kuwait. Zubarah became a trading center and grew in wealth because of its close proximity to the pearl banks. The increased wealth brought with it competition with the Omani-controlled Bahrain and port of Bushir on the Iranian side of the Gulf. The local Omani governor headed a military expedition against the Al Khalifah at Zabarah. The expedition was soundly defeated in 1783 and the Al Khalifah capitalized on the defeat to take control of the islands. Shaykh Ahmad bin Muhammad Al Khalifah took up residence on Bahrain and died there in 1795. His son, Salman, succeeded him. The Al Khalifah established their power base at al-Rifa‘a, meaning the heights, located to the south of the main Shi‘ite settlements on the main island in 1812. As Sunni Muslims the Al Khalifah relied heavily on their fellow ‘Utub tribesmen, who have maintained their Bedouin dialect of Arabic as a distinguishing feature. They encouraged the Hawali Arabs, who are also Sunnis, to move from the Iranian port cities to Bahrain, where they helped develop the local pearling industry. Starting around 1840 Bahrain entered into a period of dispute between members of the Al Khalifah family over succession of shaykh following the death of Khalifah bin Salman. His son, Muhammad bin Khalifah, challenged the authority of the elected shaykh ‘Abdallah who was his paternal uncle. Muhammad set himself up on Muharraq Island as a co-ruler and rival to his uncle. In 1843 he took the fortress at Zubarah in Qatar and deposed his uncle ‘Abdallah as shaykh. Muhammad’s authority in turn was challenged by Muhammad bin ‘Abdallah, his cousin and son of the ousted shaykh. Muhammad bin ‘Abdallah organized a fleet and began to raid Bahrain from Qatar. War broke out between Bahrain and Qatar, which eventually caused Muhammad bin Khalifah to flee to relatives in Qatar and his brother, ‘Ali bin Khalifah, was named shaykh. From his new base in Qatar, Muhammad bin Khalifah built his own fleet and in 1869 invaded

Kuwait

Bahrain. His brother ‘Ali was killed in the battle and Muhammad bin Khalifah felt secure enough to try to reconcile with his cousin Muhammad bin ‘Abdallah. Muhammad bin ‘Abdallah took advantage of his cousin’s lowered guard and organized a successful coup to overthrow the shaykh. He had Muhammad bin Khalifah imprisoned. The British were very nervous about the happenings in Bahrain and in 1869 the Royal Navy sailed into Bahrain and deposed Muhammad bin ‘Abdallah and installed ‘Ali’s young son, ‘Isa, as the new shaykh/amir of Bahrain. Both Muhammads were exiled to India, where they lived out their lives. ‘Isa bin ‘Ali ruled from 1869 to 1932 (although his son Hamad would take over the dayto-day management of government starting in 1923), and Bahrain entered a period of calm stability and economic prosperity. Under the leadership of the Al Khalifah the island prospered despite the dynastic dispute in first half of the nineteenth century. The family encouraged the development of the pearling industry, shipping, and business enterprises. Bahrain has been the first in many fields in the Gulf, being the first to have a post office, telegraph, bank, secular schools, schools for girls, and a modern hospital. It was the first to have a popularly elected parliament (although it was suspended in 1975 along with workers’ unions by the Amir ‘Isa bin Salman), to have political parties, and to allow women to vote. The current ruler, Hamad bin ‘Isa, has reinstated political reforms and there is again an elected parliament. The Al Khalifah are closely related to the ruling families of Kuwait and Qatar, all being from the same al-‘Utub tribal confederation. The Al Khalifah and the Al Thani of Qatar are even more closely related, coming from the same family lineage. These two branches fell out over control of the Hawali Islands following independence in the 1970s, but the dispute was settled in favor of Bahrain in 1999 during a personal meeting of the two rulers. The Al Khalifah have had a somewhat troubled history with the island’s Sh‘iite majority. The Shah of Iran, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, claimed Bahrain was part of historical Iran and did not recognize it officially until 1970 just before full Bahraini independence from Britain. Following the Iranian Revolution in 1979 that swept in Ayatollah Khomaini to replace the Shah, Bahrain’s Shi‘ite majority began agitation for greater rights and share in the government. A low-level civil war broke out that ended when Hamad succeeded his father as ruler and embarked on his plans for political reform in the country. Hamad is the fourteenth Al Khalifah to rule Bahrain.

Kuwait John A. Shoup The modern state of Kuwait (Dawlat al-Kuwayt) is located between two large neighbors, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. It comprises 6,680 square miles (17,818 square kilometers) of territory, including Bubiyan Island near the mouth of the Shatt al-‘Arab waterway and Faylakah Island located in the Bay of Kuwait. Most of Kuwait is desert that was used as seasonal grazing by Bedouin herds and it

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has few natural resources, most groundwater being too brackish to be used for any purpose. Oil exploration began in the 1930s but real development of the oil industry began following World War II. Kuwait’s recorded history begins in early antiquity, although the region did not support a large population or have a major settlement. The mainland has few resources that can support a settlement of any size, and the earliest populations lived on Faylakah Island located only around six miles (ten kilometers) from the mainland. Archeological excavations on Faylakah began in 1958 and have uncovered an extensive site dating from before 300 BC to the second century AD. The Greeks named the island Ikaros, and the local people quickly absorbed Hellenistic culture. After the fall of the Greek state in Iraq established after the death of Alexander the Great to the Persian Parthians, Faylakah remained more or less Hellenistic in its culture. With the arrival of eastern Christian missionaries during the Sassanian period, Faylakah remained prosperous until the Islamic period, when it declined into a small fishing and pearling village because it could not rival the main port city of Basrah in Iraq or the ports along the Iranian coast. The modern history of the country began with the arrival of the al-‘Utub tribe and the Al Sabah family in the eighteenth century. Dates vary for this from as early as the mid-1600s to the early-1700s. By 1720 the Al Sabah lineage of the al-‘Utub had established themselves around what would become Kuwait City. They were able to take over the small fort or storage house (called a kut) belonging to the Bani Khalid tribe called Kut Bani Khalid, pushing most of the Bani Khalid south along the Gulf coast by 1750; kuwayt is the diminutive of the word kut. In 1752 the Al Sabah elected Sabah bin Jabir Al Sabah as the amir, or ruler, and the family has held the position ever since. The Al Sabah were able to extend their authority over the area from near the mouth of the Shatt al-‘Arab waterway north among the Bedouin of southern Iraq and west into what is today Saudi Arabia. Water remained a serious problem to the growth of the city they established at Kut Bani Khalid, which took the name of al-Kuwayt, usually written as Kuwait. Local water sources were scarce and brackish, and freshwater had to be shipped in from the Shatt al-‘Arab and Bubiyan Island. Water arrived on dhows in large leather bags that were then off-loaded and sold to local people; this method of water delivery existed well into the twentieth century, when it was replaced by desalinated water. The Danish explorer Carsten Neibuhr visited Kuwait in 1765 and noted the city had 10,000 inhabitants but that during the pearling season some seventy percent of the people left to work on the pearl ships, leaving the city looking more like a ghost town. He also noted that the Bani Khalid and al-‘Utub tribes continued to fight for control of the region and that those not involved in the tribal conflict fled to Faylakah, where they were allowed to live untouched by either side. The Al Sabah cultivated good relations with the British in India and took full advantage of the excellent harbor formed by the Bay of Kuwait, perhaps the best natural harbor in the entire Gulf region. By 1800 Kuwait was involved in trade with India and served as the main port exporting horses from Syria and Iraq for the British army in India. The British East India Company used Kuwait for their regional headquarters whenever the Ottomans and Iranians clashed over claims in Iraq forced them to close their Basrah office. The Al Sabah shaykhs

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encouraged the growth of commerce in Kuwait, inviting important merchant Arab families from Iran’s Gulf port cities to move to Kuwait. Pearling and commerce with India were the most important part of the economy, but the Al Sabah leaders cultivated good relations with many Bedouin tribes in southern Iraq and northern Arabia. Bedouin used Kuwait as an important market to sell their goods such as wool, hair, and milk products as well as to buy items such as tea, coffee, sugar, cloth, and weapons. As a result, the Al Sabah leadership extended their economic and political power over a wide area by the end of the nineteenth century. The Al Sabah became adept in playing the main powers—the Ottomans, the Iranians, and the British—off against each other and maintaining autonomy if not full independence from all of them. When the Ottomans began to reaffirm their control in the Gulf region in the late nineteenth century, the Al Sabah family split into pro-Ottoman and pro-British factions. When Shaykh Muhammad Al Sabah (1892–1896) became too close to the Ottoman governor of Basrah, he was assassinated by his pro-British brother Mubarak Al Sabah in 1896, who took control backed by the power of Britain. He had another pro-Ottoman brother named Jarrah killed and thus eliminated any real rivals and established himself and his direct descendants as the ruler of Kuwait. Mubarak entered into an uncomfortable accommodation with the Turkish governor of Basrah, who recognized the autonomy of the region called Qadat alKuwayt in 1913 but still within the general region under the governor’s control. In 1899 Mubarak signed a treaty with Britain motivated by Britain’s desire to keep Germany out of the Gulf and Mubarak’s wish for full independence. In 1913 Britain recognized the autonomy of Kuwait and delineated the borders of the new qadah with the Ottoman government in Basrah. This border was reluctantly recognized by Iraq’s Hashimite monarchy in 1932, when it became fully independent from Britain, but it was renounced in 1958, when the monarchy was overthrown. Iraq pressed its claims to Kuwait numerous times during the 1950s leading up to Kuwait’s independence in 1961. Iraq sent troops to the border within hours of Kuwait’s independence, forcing the Kuwaiti government to ask for British troops to be sent to protect it. Iraq pressed its claims again in 1973, which was mediated by the Arab League led by Egypt. Subsequent Iraqi governments have pressed their historical claim to Kuwait, the last attempt being that of Saddam Hussein in 1990. Following the 1990–1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War, Iraq’s government has once again been forced to recognize the border and Kuwait’s full independence. Mubarak has been called “The Great” because of his astute political acumen. He was able to get British protection and Kuwait emerged at the end of World War I as a fully “independent” Arab state, although one under British protection. He gave the Al Sa‘ud family refuge from their Al Rashid rivals and in 1902 allowed the young ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Al Sa‘ud to leave Kuwait to try to restore the Al Sa‘ud family in the Najd. Mubarak was very pleased to be able to support the Al Sa‘ud against the pro-Ottoman Al Rashid’s of the Shammar tribe, who from their base at Ha’il in northern Arabia were a potential threat to Mubarak’s ambitions for independence. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz was first successful at recovering the Al Sa‘ud capital of al-Riyadh in 1902. By 1906 ‘Abd al-‘Aziz and his forces were on the

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offensive, defeating the Al Rashid and their Turkish allies time and again. ‘Abd al‘Aziz founded a special movement composed of mainly tribal soldiers he called alIkhwan, or the Brotherhood, which he based in special camps/settlements. The Ikhwan quickly became a highly disciplined military, although not always fully obedient to ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. With his Ikhwan, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz embarked on the conquest of most of Arabia. Mubarak died in 1915 and was succeeded by one of his sons, Jabir, who ruled for only two years. When he died in 1917 he was succeeded by his younger brother Salim, who ruled until 1921. Although Kuwait had provided refuge for the Al Sa‘ud family, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s ambition to conquer all of Arabia did not spare the country. More than the political ambitions of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, the Ikhwan viewed Kuwait as too lax in its Islamic practices and in 1922 Kuwait was threatened by an invasion by the Ikhwan. The population responded by building a wall around the town, the first such wall ever built. A truce was negotiated between the Saudi leader ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, Kuwait, and the British in 1923, by which ‘Abd al-‘Aziz recognized the independence of Kuwait, but the Kuwaiti amir Ahmad Al Jabir Al Sabah (1921–1950) had to give up claim to more than two-thirds of the region it had once controlled. The British convinced Kuwait’s ruler that independence was worth the loss in lands. The treaty established the borders with Saudi Arabia, including the neutral zone of some 5,180 square kilometers controlled by both countries. Kuwait, like the other Gulf States, suffered economically when the pearl trade was affected by the introduction of cultured pearls by the Japanese. Kuwait’s population was also engaged in other international trade, mainly with Iran and India, but the loss of the pearl trade had a serious impact on the people and the economy. Oil exploration began in the 1930s. The first productive wells were sunk in 1936, and it was soon obvious that the reserves under the small emirate were immense. World War II forced a suspension in the oil business in the entire Gulf region, but soon after the end of hostilities production was begun again. Kuwait’s first major oil income came in 1951, partially due to the problems in Iran’s oil field because of the rise of Prime Minister Muhammad Musadiq, who nationalized the AngloIranian Oil Company. As a result, the British increased production from other oil countries where they had contracts, including Kuwait. Kuwait’s oil production increased from 800,000 barrels in 1946 to 54 million barrels in 1956. Shaykh ‘Abdallah Al Salim Al Sabah (1921–1950) became the first “oil shaykh” of Kuwait. Under Shaykh ‘Abdallah Kuwait embarked on a rather enlightened policy for development. The society was already rather open, accepting many people from Iran, Iraq, and other countries such as India. Kuwait had one of the better standards of living in the region and oil monies were spent to improve education, health, and other basic services. In addition, Shaykh ‘Abdallah welcomed newcomers to the country, making it easy especially for those from other Arab countries to come to work. Egyptians, Palestinians, Lebanese, and Syrians came filling many of the professional positions. Many of these Arabs were very influenced by the growing feelings of Arab Nationalism and joined protests over the 1956 Suez Crisis. In 1957 the wall built to protect the old city from Saudi attack was torn down to make room for urban growth fed by oil money. Shaykh ‘Abdallah officially became the Amir in 1961 when Kuwait gained its full independence from Britain. Almost immediately Kuwait’s future was in

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danger when the Iraqi government sent troops to the border and threatened annexation. The amir was forced to call on British support and the crisis was not resolved until 1963 when reluctantly Iraq agreed to the border with Kuwait and officially recognized the independence and sovereignty of Kuwait. Kuwait’s rulers have had a stormy relationship with its parliament. The first attempt at a representative council in 1921 ended quickly when Shaykh Ahmad dissolved the council and returned government to the more traditional method of family rule. In 1961, just prior to independence, Kuwait’s Constituent Council was charged with drafting a new constitution, including an elected parliament. The constitution was approved in 1962 and elections for the National Assembly were held in 1963. Even in these first elections, more “radical” members were elected; those who represented a more leftist orientation. They demanded greater social change for all segments of the population. Kuwait’s political scene was considered one of the freest in the Arab world despite the polarization between more conservative parties and the left-leaning ones. Kuwait’s press was also considered one of the freest in the region—only Lebanon’s and Israel’s are considered free. In 1976 the cabinet resigned, saying that it was impossible to work with the National Assembly. The Amir Sabah Al Salim Al Sabah (1965–1977) suspended the constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, and requested the Crown Prince/Prime Minister to form a new government. The Crown Prince Jabir Al Ahmad Al Sabah became the next Amir in 1977, when Amir Sabah died, and continued to rule without elections. Kuwait became one of the ten world producers of oil, and the decade of the 1970s was one of great prosperity and massive development. In 1982 Kuwait’s economy was severely affected by the crash of the Suq al-Manakh. Suq al-Manakh had operated speculating on the price of oil. The market operated without any form of controls and when some investors became panicky and wanted to recover their money, they discovered the money was not there. The market crashed, leaving a debt of $90 billion for the government to deal with. In 1985–1986, the international oil market collapsed, causing even further economic problems for the country. In 1980 Iraq invaded Iran and was heavily supported by Kuwait, other Arab Gulf States, and Saudi Arabia. Since the collapse of the Shah’s regime in 1979, Kuwait had received a growing number of Iranians trying to flee the new Islamic regime. Some thirty percent of Kuwaitis are Shi‘ite, and many of them Iranian in origin. Kuwait, like the other Gulf States, had little confidence in the new Iranian regime and feared the spread of Islamic political activities. In 1981 new elections were called for the National Assembly with new election laws in the hopes to keep the political left and other such parties out of the Assembly. The Assembly consists of fifty members elected every four years and in addition up to sixteen government ministers serve in the Assembly. Restrictions on who can vote are such that only fifteen percent of Kuwaiti citizens had the right to vote. Once seen as a light of democracy in the Gulf, the new Kuwaiti National Assembly became the tool for a few old, powerful families. In 1990 Iran and Iraq fought each other to a standstill and signed a treaty to end the hostilities. Iraq wanted to have its massive debts to other Arab countries forgiven, and although many were willing to do so, Kuwait, which was owed $65 billion, refused to forgive the amount owed to it. In addition, Kuwait decided to

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increase its oil production by forty percent, which was directly opposed to Iraq’s request that oil production be cut back to raise the price and allow its war-battered economy to recover. Tensions increased between the two countries, with Iraq accusing Kuwait of stealing oil from the Rumaylah oil fields by drilling under the border between the two countries. In August, Iraq invaded and quickly overcame the Kuwaiti military and police. Negotiations with Iraq failed, and eventually a coalition of some thirty-four countries joined to push Iraq out of Kuwait. Based in Saudi Arabia, the coalition forces launched massive air attacks on Iraqi positions. Iraq’s retreat from Kuwait was highly destructive, and 600 of its 700 oil wells were set ablaze. Before all of the fires were extinguished, several massive oil lakes covering five percent of the country had formed, and some 11 million barrels of oil were lost into the Persian Gulf, endangering the local environment. It took two years to finally put out the fires and return to production. Damage to Kuwait’s infrastructure and the cost of rebuilding cost $50 billion. In addition, Kuwait paid the coalition $17 billion to help cover the cost of its liberation. The Kuwait crisis brought to light how unpopular the oil-rich Gulf States are with many Arabs. There was little sympathy for Kuwaitis by most people, even in countries that joined the coalition and none at all in others such as Jordan or among Palestinians under Israeli occupation. Once the war was over and Kuwait had been liberated, Arab nationals from countries seen as pro-Iraq were fired from their jobs and obligated to return to their home countries. It took several years before hard feelings between Kuwait and countries such as Jordan began to soften. In 2003 Kuwait played a major role as the main base for the invasion of Iraq by the United States and Britain, and it still serves as a major base and supply center for allied troops in Iraq. There have been growing tensions among younger Kuwaitis about the presence of foreign troops in their country, and some have been attracted to Islamist ideologies. The National Assembly reformed election laws in 2005 to include more Kuwaiti citizens and women for the first time. Nonetheless, the National Assembly also passed new laws restricting freedom of speech, including for the media, making it very hard to openly criticize the government and its policies. Kuwait, like some of the other Gulf States, must face the fact that its nationals represent only one-third of the total population (3–3.5 million people, of which 2 million are non-nationals). Kuwaitis are a minority in their own country, and the treatment of non-nationals, especially other Arabs, was the main reason many in the Arab world did not sympathize with Kuwaitis during the Iraqi occupation. Amir Shaykh Jabir Al Ahmad Al Sabah died in 2006, and his successor, the Crown Prince Shaykh Sa‘ad Al ‘Abdallah Al Salim Al Sabah, abdicated only months after becoming the ruler because of poor health. He was succeeded by Shaykh Sabah Al Ahmad Al Jabir Al Sabah, who is the current ruler. Members of the Al Sabah family dominate most of the major posts in the government: Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Minister of Defense, Director of National Security, Chief of the National Guard, and Minister of the Interior. See also Iran-Iraq War; Islamic Fundamentalism—Salafiyah.

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FURTHER READING Anscombe, Frederick Fallowfield. The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987. Casey, Micheal. The History of Kuwait. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2007. Crystal, Jill et al. Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Human Rights Watch. Kuwait, the Bedouins of Kuwait: “Citizens without Citizenship.” Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, Middle East Staff, 1995. Al-Mughni, Haya. Women in Kuwait: The Policy of Gender. London: Saqi Books, 2006. Rush, Alan. Al-Sabah: History and Genealogy of Kuwait’s Ruling Family, 1752–1986. London: Garnet, 1987.

Kuwait City John A. Shoup Kuwait City is the capital of the State of Kuwait and is located along the southern shore of the Bay of Kuwait. The State of Kuwait is divided into six governorates, or muhafidhat (singular muhafidhah), and Kuwait City is in the Muhafidhat al-‘Asimah, or Governorate of the Capital (the others are al-Ahmadi, al-Farwaniyah, al-Jahrah, Hawalli, and Mubarak al-Kabir). The majority of Kuwait’s estimated 3–3.5 million people live in the capital city and its suburbs; al-Jahrah, located a short distance to the north of the capital, is the only other major population center in the country. Kuwait City was founded in the mid-eighteenth century precisely where the Bani Khalid tribe had built a small fort or storage house. The Al Sabah lineage of the al-‘Utub tribe was able to gain control of the fort, beginning the city’s growth. Taking advantage of the natural harbor provided by the Bay of Kuwait, they encouraged commercial traffic with British India and the pearl trade establishing good relations with the British East India Company. By the 1760s it had a population of 10,000 people. During the nineteenth century Kuwait became an important port, pearling center, and trading partner for Bedouin from both southern Iraq and northern Arabia. It became prosperous and because of its good relations with British India was able to have a steady improvement in its basic standard of living. Shaykh Mubarak Al Sabah (1896–1915) established several important facilities such as a modern hospital. His sons, Jabir (1915–1917) and Salim (1917–1921), furthered his policy of good relations with the British, obtaining from them improved facilities, including modern schools. Kuwaitis today have one of the highest literacy rates in the Middle East, with 82.9% literacy in 2007. Kuwait’s level in the Human Development Index is 0.871, which is the second highest in the Middle East and the highest in the Arab world. Kuwait City grew especially after World War II when its vast oil reserves began to be exploited. Oil money fueled massive development projects from commercial centers, banks, and public administration buildings to large urban

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housing schemes. By 1957 the city had outgrown the original area enclosed by the wall built in 1922 to protect the city from Saudi attack. The wall was torn down to make way for highways and commercial developments. Only a few of the old gates still remain decorating traffic circles. Most of the older part of the city was torn down for new housing, leaving only a few traditional houses that serve as museums. In the rush to modernize, Kuwait lost nearly its entire architectural heritage. During the 1960s and 1970s, much of the city’s urban planning was based on modernist ideas of zoning separating business areas from residential areas. New suburbs were built mainly toward the south, including Salimiyah, Hawalli, and Shuwaykh. Salimiyah is one of the major residential areas; Hawalli, which is its own governorate as well, is the main business zone; and Shuwaykh is an important industrial zone. Although not included in the al-‘Asimah governorate, the modern port of al-Ahmadi is really an extension of Kuwait City’s urban sprawl. Architecture in the new developments has been dictated by current styles, thus Kuwait City has several 1960s and 1970s modernist buildings and a growing number of post-modernist ones following the introduction of this style in the 1980s. For many years the space needle, Kuwait Towers (water towers), along the city’s waterfront, was a distinct feature of Kuwait City. The urban landscape is constantly changing because many of the buildings dating from the 1950s and 1960s are torn down for newer, more modern buildings to replace them. The Kuwait Infrastructure Maintenance Management System is responsible for making sure all buildings meet required standards. Although Kuwait has a growing number of skyscrapers, the city’s skyline does not compete with the massive new constructions in Dubai. A real estate development called Madinat al-Harir, or City of Silk, is planned; costing more then $77 billion it will be the largest such development in the Middle East. It is planned to be the biggest seafront project in the world, with the world’s tallest tower (rivaling Burj Dubai, currently under construction in Dubai), and residential, business, education, and tourism centers all part of the whole project. See also Architecture; Cultural Heritage.

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Lawrence of Arabia (1888–1935) Sebastian Maisel Thomas Edward Lawrence, better known as Lawrence of Arabia, was a British archaeologist, diplomat, soldier, and writer. As a gifted student of languages, he became fluent in six languages. He studied archaeology and Semitic languages at Oxford University. After his graduation he joined an archeological expedition and lived in Syria and Mesopotamia for almost five years, during which he mastered local Arabic dialects. In 1914 he was part of the British team that surveyed the area between Gaza and al-Aqabah for the Palestine Exploration Fund; however, the scientific task was merely a disguise for the preparation for war of the British High Commissioner in Egypt. Because of his knowledge of Arabic and experiences with the people and the country, he advanced quickly through the ranks of the British secret service and was appointed Chief of Reconnaissance in Egypt with expertise for areas under Turkish control. He assisted Faysal bin Hussein in the armed revolt of Arab Bedouin tribes in the Hijaz and Greater Syria against the combined Turkish and German troops. He promised his government’s support for the creation of a unified, independent Arab kingdom, and with charisma and military and financial support he brought the rivaling Arab tribes under his command. During the one-and-a half-year campaign he developed and mastered new psychological and guerilla warfare tactics that helped to defeat the Turks in Jordan and Syria. After the war, he tried unsuccessfully to secure his promises to the Arabs, but failed to convince his superiors to support an Arab kingdom based in Syria. It was more in the interest of British foreign policy to have smaller, weaker kingdoms, especially because they had to keep other wartime promises made to France (Sykes-Picot Agreement 1916) and the Zionist Movement (Balfour Declaration 1917). Because of what he saw as Britain’s betrayal of its promises to its Arab allies, he withdrew from public view in 1922, although Winston Churchill offered him the post of Director of Oriental Affairs. He wrote his most famous account of the Arab Revolt, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom (1926). Avoiding the public spotlight, he enlisted in the Royal Air Force under a pseudonym and served in India as an ordinary soldier. He died in a road accident with his beloved motorcycle. See also Arabic Language.

League of Arab States

FURTHER READING Lawrence, Thomas E. Seven Pillars of Wisdom, a Triumph. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1925, reissued 1935. Musa, Sulayman. T.E. Lawrence: An Arab View. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966. Wilson, Jeremy. Lawrence of Arabia: The Authorized Biography of T.E. Lawrence. New York: Atheneum, 1989.

League of Arab States Jack Kalpakian The League of Arab States was established in May 1945. Its leading proponent was the United Kingdom, which hoped to fold all of the Arab states into a single anti-communist block led by its leading client, Egypt. The Egyptians themselves did not wish to see the League emerge as a pan-Arab Federative structure at the time because of the relative wealth of Egypt at the time relative to other states. They also had deeper objections, because the leading party in Egypt at the time, the Wafd party, held an Egyptian Nationalist position that was at odds with the League’s purpose and orientation. Consequently, Egypt lobbied for and secured an article in the League’s covenant that took away its ability to legislate for its members. The Egyptians wanted to foreclose the possibility that the League would become a vehicle for using Egypt’s relative wealth of the time to help develop countries like Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Jordan. In resisting British appeals for Egypt’s membership in and leadership of the League, Mustapha Pasha al-Nahhas, Egypt’s Prime Minister at the time, openly argued that he was an Egyptian and not an Arab. The League almost immediately morphed into an organization that bore little resemblance to what its founders intended. It became an Arab Nationalist entity. This dramatic transformation took place for three sets of associated reasons. First, there were the problems of Palestine, the associated but separate issue of Lebanon, and the Syrian claims on the countries. The second set of problems involved the dramatic decline of British and French power, and the reverberations of that decline in the Middle East and North Africa. Finally, there was the problem of decolonization and the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the time of its establishment, only seven of its twenty-two current members were independent states. The remaining fifteen were protectorates or colonies. As Arab states became independent, they were targeted for membership in the two blocks. The newly independent Arab states soon found themselves at odds on how to address these problems. On only one issue was there any consensus—the question of Palestine and how to relate to the presence of Israel. The Arab League did not acknowledge Israel’s right to exist until the 1990s. After the defeat of the Arab states in the 1967 war, the Khartoum summit of the Arab League issued a document flatly rejecting a peaceful settlement. The League also promoted the economic boycott of Israel and encouraged policies that prevented Palestinian refugees from integrating in their Arab host societies in the name of “preserving

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the Palestinian cause.” Some Arab states—namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Tunisia, Morocco, and at earlier times Lebanon and Iraq—sided with the Western camp, whereas others such as Syria, Egypt, Libya, and South Yemen firmly embedded themselves into the Socialist camp during most of the Cold War, especially before detente. These states also began to support dissidents within each other’s borders and engage in attempts to destabilize each other. Even with regard to Palestine and Israel, the Arab states soon found profound divisions that have yet to heal. Egypt’s decision to sign a separate peace with Israel led to its temporary expulsion from the organization in 1979; for a while, the League headquarters were also moved from Egypt to Tunisia. Later, the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty did not draw the same ire. As the decades went by, the organization has come to accept the reality of Israel’s presence and has been offering the country recognition in return for the transfer of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Arab section of Jerusalem to a Palestinian sovereign state. The Beirut summit offered Israel recognition and peace in return for land. The Saudi initiative represents a qualitative transformation of the discourse concerning Israel in the Arab League and by the Arab states if not by the larger societies they represent. The Saudi initiative and the League’s decision to stand against Saddam Hussein during the 1990–1991 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait represent the appearance of more positive League approaches to regional problems. And although it may be easy to point out the League’s shortcomings, the League was able to avert several inter-Arab wars and has served as a forum for legitimating discourses that were until fairly recently completely unacceptable. Further development of the League may be accomplished by emphasizing practical things such as economic integration, open markets among members, the free movement of labor among Arab states, and exploration of the possibility of reducing the number of currencies, or at least implementing common monetary and banking policies. Indeed, the economic aspect of international relations has been what is missing in the League’s activities, and the Arab world is currently paying a heavy price for the placement of politics and identity above all else during the Cold War.

FURTHER READING Haseeb, Khair el-Din et al. The Future of the Arab Nation: Challenges and Options. New York: Routledge and the Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1991. Hasou, Tawfig Y. The Struggle for the Arab World: Egypt’s Nasser and the Arab League. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985. McDonald, Robert W. The Arab League: A Study in the Dynamics of Regional Organization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965. Salafy, Ali. The League of Arab States: Role and Objectives. Washington, D.C.: Arab Information Office, 1988.

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Leisure Sebastian Maisel The culture of the people in Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf States is very homogenous, which applies to the way leisure time and recreation is organized. Similar trends for different social classes, teenagers, women, or men can be observed. Some activities are gender and age segregated, whereas others include the entire family. Men spend the time after work often with their peers. They go to coffeehouses or public resorts (istirahah in Arabic) to drink coffee and tea; smoke water pipes; chat; or play card games, chess, and backgammon. Leisure time is used to maintain networks and to socialize. Visiting friends, colleagues, and family members is a social requirement for everyone, men and women alike. Arguably, women are more involved in mutual visits because of the lack of other leisure opportunities. After finishing their chores at home or work, female relatives pay visits to each other, drink tea, and exchange the latest gossip. They also go to playgrounds with the children or are engaged in voluntary work. Young teenagers are encouraged to participate in these visits. Women are usually less involved in physical leisure activities. They do, however, enjoy occasional walks around the neighborhood or along the boulevards and corniches (seacoast walkways or streets). Most large cities in Saudi Arabia offer private sport facilities for women only, and on the coast secluded beaches are also available. Strolling around shopping malls and spending time at Internet cafes surfing the Internet and chatting have become favorite pastimes for women. To avoid harassment in public, they go out in groups of several friends or relatives. Individual men’s leisure activities include traditional sports, such as falconry, horse and camel races, and hunting. Hunting is now restricted to protect the wildlife; however, in the countryside many still use special hunting dogs (salukis) and falcons to hunt small game such as rabbits, bustards, or lizards. Races attract large crowds of almost exclusively male spectators. At the annual camel races in Riyadh or the Dubai World Cup horse race, enormous prizes and prestige are awarded to the winners; However, betting is illegal. In the Emirates and Oman, traditional bullfights are still very popular, where two bulls push and battle each other until one backs down. Besides watching the races or fights, it is a favorite activity to breed and keep animals. Many Arabs have hobby farms for both breeding animals and small-scale farming or gardening. Over the weekend, they go with their families to spend some time outside of the city to relax and enjoy age-old work and skills. Families also spend many evenings or weekend days camping and picnicking at parks, beaches, or desert locations away from the city. If they stay home, they might go to a nearby amusement park, museum, or shopping mall. In Kuwait, one of the biggest attractions is Entertainment City, which houses recreational and educational facilities as well as exhibits. At home, they rent and watch movies or listen to music. The television is constantly running, and some programs, especially during Ramadan, bring the entire family together to watch. Reading is less popular, although many pick up the Qur’an frequently as well as newspapers, books on local history, or contemporary Arabic fiction.

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It is difficult for the young generation to find unrestricted access to their favorite leisure time activities. Both male and female teens and young people have to respect local customs and traditions of gender segregation. Although young women and girls usually are busy at home, young men have to find their recreational outlet away from home in the public sphere. Going to Internet cafes has become one of the most frequent activities. The most popular sport is football, or soccer. Even remote areas have some sort of sporting facilities. All governments promote and sponsor sport programs and provide the necessary framework through leagues, clubs, and administrations. For example, in Saudi Arabia, the General Presidency of Youth Welfare organizes local and international tournaments, sporting events, and even a wide range of cultural and artistic activities. The interest of the government can be seen as a visible sign of national identity, which is often expressed during football matches. Therefore, leagues for football, basketball, or volleyball are highly organized and important for showing regional pride as well as national identity. If the local club wins, hundreds of young Falconry is a traditional sport in Arabia. fans crowd the streets cheering and sometimes Courtesy of Sebastian Maisel. vandalizing. Because of the long coastline and many beaches, water sports such as sailing, waterskiing, fishing, swimming, and diving are extremely popular in all Gulf States. Although some enjoy boat races with dhows, the younger generation is very fond of speedboats and jet skis. The love for speed is also shown during the Formula One auto race in Bahrain, the only event of that type in the Middle East. For the ordinary young Arab, cruising around town or drifting with their cars in dangerous maneuvers became another popular pastime. Foreigners and especially those from southeast Asia play cricket or rugby. The larger companies often have amateur teams. In some countries, large recreational facilities have been built because of increased oil revenues, including ice skating rinks in the Emirates or oversized golf courts in Saudi Arabia. World-class tournaments are held and attract international and local spectators and participants. Movie theaters emerged in some Gulf States, but are still banned in Saudi Arabia over fears of gender mixture and social misconduct. Other official bans such as on television in the 1960s or satellite dishes in the 1990s have been lifted because of public pressure and demand. Nobody will ever be able to take away the most important current communication tool, the mobile phone, although attempts have been made to restrict them. But people all over the Peninsula love to communicate with each other and are on the phone much of the time.

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FURTHER READING Long, David. Culture and Customs of Saudi Arabia. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005. Mahdi, Ali Akbar (ed.). Teen Life in the Middle East. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003. Tomlinson, Alan. Sport and Leisure Cultures. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005. Yamani, Mai. Changed Identities. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000.

Literature: Classical and Contemporary Sebastian Maisel Arabic language is the main medium of communication. More than that, it is also the language of religious and artistic expression. Before Arabic became a literary language, it was already widely used in its oral form in poetic expression. In pre-Islamic times around 500 AD, the earliest form of poetry emerged, which was recited aloud around campfires (majlis) or when arriving at a well. For nomadic Bedouin tribes in Arabia, poetry was the ultimate and most sophisticated form of artistic expression and generally focused on themes of chivalry, love, beauty, or praise. Poets retained a high reputation and position, not just because of their knowledge but also for their ability to communicate information. Those poets born between 440 and 530 can be associated with distinct schools of poetry and recitations. Still, before 500 AD the older form of rhyme-prose developed into the classical Arabic metric, with rajaz as the oldest meter. Arabic poetry found its typical form of expression in the ode (qasidah in Arabic), which consists of up to 100 pairs of half-lines in different meters. The most famous qasidahs in early Arabia were known as the mu’allaqat (“suspended” in English) because they were hung on the walls of the Ka‘abah in Makkah for their perfection and beauty. In addition to the rhythm, the exact depiction of daily life and events played an important role in the creation of a poem. Weaponry, clothing, jewelry, saddles, food, and animals were described with a rich, differentiating vocabulary, and the themes of the old Arabian poetry covered everything: love; nomadic life; dangerous travels; nature; battles, including praise, mockery, and vilifications of enemies; rank competition; etc. Poetry was not only used for entertainment but also in war times during tribal fighting as a tool to encourage one’s own tribe and to blast the enemy. Songs and poems about the heroes of the Ayyam al-‘Arab (the good old days) and Bedouin life were recited at public events such as famous fairs and markets (e.g., in al’Ukaz near Makkah, al-Mushaqqar in Bahrain, or at al-Jawf in the northern part of the Peninsula). Every year regular competitions for poets were held, and the best poems were collected. However, because the written recording of these poems did not start until 200 years later, some contest their authenticity. Women were also among the famous poets of Arabia; however, they were mostly limited

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to lamentations. Prose, in comparison to the lyrical expression, played only a minor role and combined narratives, legends about tribal warfare, proverbs, riddles, sayings, and maledictions of the tribal soothsayer. The book of Islamic revelation, the Qur’an, had a sustainable effect on the development of Arabic literature. From then on, poets and writers were evaluated according to their relation with Islam and were classified into three categories: those who lived entirely in pre-Islamic times, the jahiliyah period; those who were born in the jahiliyah and later experienced Islam, mukhadramun in Arabic; and finally those who lived exclusively in Islamic times, muwalladun. The Qur’an, the Prophet Muhammad’s biography, and the entire religious tradition (hadith) became important impulses for literary works, particularly prose. The Arabic of the Qur’an formed the basis of “correct Arabic,” which from then on was used as the lingua franca but also as the language of literature in the Islamic empire. With the political power shift from Arabia to Syria and Mesopotamia, the urban, intellectual centers of Arabia fell into decline and did not contribute much to the rich Arabic literature tradition. Between 1258 (fall of Baghdad to the Mongols) and 1798 (Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt), a period of general decline of Arabic literature (inhitat, or “decadence” in English), Arabia’s literature scene was also almost nonexistent. Only with the so-called Arabic renaissance, nahdah, initiated by European cultural influence, did Arabic literature begin a new intellectual era and shake off the centuries-old lethargy. Schools and universities were opened, printing presses and publishing houses emerged, foreign literature was translated into Arabic and introduced Western thoughts to the Arabs, newspapers were founded, and a modern Arabic language of literature originated. Dictionaries and encyclopedias were written, and cultural associations and literary societies were founded. Although the heart of the nahdah was in Syria and Egypt, its ideas made their way into the sophisticated urban class of the Hijaz by means of the new media and publications and through direct contact between poets and writers from Syria, such as Fu’ad al-Khatib, ‘Umar Shakir, and Amin Rihani, who were extremely influential to the development of an indigenous literature in the Hijaz. The most popular genres were short stories and poetry. Prose was less popular. The Literature of Hijaz (1926) was the first result of this awakening, edited by Muhammad Surur al-Sabban, and one of the most popular poets from the area. The book included poems by al-Sabban, Muhammad Sa‘id al-‘Amudi, and others. The writers of the Arabic renaissance still heavily influenced the writings. Two types of poetry are prominent in Arabia: classical and nabati poetry. Classical poetry is an extension of the formal qasidah with its strict rules in meter and rhyme. Both new and old classical poetry can be heard throughout Arabia, mostly on special occasions, such as rites of passage or the national holiday. Nabati poetry, on the other hand, is considered the poetry of the people, produced in the local dialect or colloquial Arabic and free from many of the formal rules of classical Arabic poetry; for example, it often uses two rhymes per line instead of one. A vivid discussion over the origin and authenticity of nabati poetry is currently going through the majlis of Arabia. As the name suggests, nabati poetry relates to a pre-Islamic form of Arabic from the jahiliyah time period. In the eyes of many Islamic scholars and thinkers, the jahiliyah was not enlightened with

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Muhammad’s message and therefore nabati poetry is more ignorant and of less value. However, the good old days of the Arabs and Bedouins play an important part in the identity of tribal groups, who maintain the values and morals of their ancestors. The argument between classical and nabati poetry can thus be described as an argument between tribal, former nomadic people and settled people who are more concerned about the religious appearance of the poetry. However, in general, Arabic poetry, classical or nabati, is one of the few cultural items of Arabia that withstood modernization. It remains a lively artistic form of expression for Bedouin and city folks alike, and many are able to recite lengthy chapters and entire poems. Poets are again considered outstanding members of the society, and no official occasion is passed without several poems recited. A third form of Arabic poetry, the so-called “free verse,” was developed during the 1960s and the peak of pan-Arabism but was not accepted in the more traditional and conservative literary society of Arabia. The two most prominent traditional poets of Saudi Arabia were probably Muhammad bin ‘Abdallah ‘Uthaimin and Ahmad Ibrahim al-Ghazzawi, whereas Muhammad Hassan ‘Awwad represented the school of free verse, prose poetry, and romanticism. Other free verse poets from the older generation were ‘Ali alDumayni, Muhammad al-Thubayti, Khadijah al-‘Umari, Fatimah al-Qarni, ‘Abdallah al-Rashid, and ‘Abdallah al-Khashrami. Current prose poets include Fawziyah Abu Khalid, Muhammad al-Dumayni, Ghassan al-Khunayzi, and Huda al-Daghfaq. Prose with its focus on religious and other nonfictional subjects started to emerge over the last decades, but local fiction writers encounter large competition from poets, the religious establishment, and authorities because of suspicions about the depiction of life in Arabia and possible criticism of governments and Islam. To get a larger audience, some writers decide to publish in other countries, sometimes in neighboring Bahrain or the Emirates, and sometimes as far away as Beirut or London. The short story and the novel both emerged in the Hijaz, the intellectual center of Arabia, between World War I and II. They were first published by one of the many newly founded newspapers and magazines and were strongly influenced by the translated works of Edgar Allen Poe, Guy de Maupassant, and Nicolai Gogol. The authors were publishers, educators, or journalists who learned their profession “on the job.” They explored new ways of artistic expression in order to express their personal view. Among the first short story writers were Ahmad Rida Huhu and Muhammad ‘Alim al-Afghani, both non-native Hijazis that were attracted to the works of Poe and Chekhov. The literature magazine al-Manbal was founded in 1937 and played a pivotal role in creating awareness and making this new genre appealing to readers. The editor of al-Manbal, ‘Abd al-Quddus alAnsari, was himself a prolific short story writer. The storywriters of the 1960s benefited greatly from the advances in other parts of the Arab world. New Saudi writers like Ibrahim al-Nasr, Sa‘ad al-Bawaridi, Luqman Yunis, or Najjat Khayyat now oriented themselves near the works of their Egyptian colleagues Yusuf Idris, Yahya Haqqi, or Nagib Mahfuz. The modern generation that is no longer influenced by anyone began to write as they were and expressed their own intellectual and artistic visions; among them are ‘Abdallah Bakhashwan and Jarallah al-Hamid.

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Four main styles can be recognized among these Saudi storywriters: the didactic realistic narrative, lyricism, stream of consciousness, and the multipledialogue. The art of novel writing is more introverted and distinguished than other literary genres. It is also a modern genre with little precedent in classical Arabic literature. The Twins (1930) by ‘Abd al-Quddus al-Ansari is considered the first Saudi novel, followed by Muhammad al-Jawhari’s The Temperamental Revenge (1935), Ahmad Rida Huhu’s Mecca’s Maiden (1947), and The Resurrection (1948) by Muhammad ‘Ali Maghribi. Their fiction was not regarded as beautiful enlightenment but rather as didactic attempts to write about social matters. In the 1950s and 1960s, along with the country’s economic boom and educational reforms, the novel in Arabia emerged with the creation of new social classes, particularly what can be called a “middle class.” The Price of Sacrifice (1959) by Hamid Damanhuri was the first of this period to describe the businessmen of Makkah. Another novel published right afterward was A Slit in the Night’s Attire by Ibrahim al-Nasr. Two notions symbolized the new trend of writing: either to reconcile with modernity or to rebel against it. In the modernist phase of Saudi novel writing, the new genre of autobiographies connected to a specific setting became popular, such as in the works of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Mishri, ‘Abdu Khal, or recently Turki al-Hamad and Raja’ al-‘Alim. However, real autobiographies remain a rare genre, particularly those written by female authors because of concerns about their approach to society, religion, and country. Those few examples available usually lack passion, criticism, and evidence. One of the most prolific Saudi fiction writers was ‘Abd al-Rahman Munif, who was stripped of his Saudi citizenship for his vivid fictional depiction of how oil changed life in the kingdom. In his quintet Cities of Salt (1984–1989), he openly criticizes the ruling elite of his country, who in return banned his books and forced him out of the country. Female writers in Saudi Arabia began to appear in newspapers and magazines in the mid-1950s. The first article by a woman was published in al-Manbal in 1956. Women from the Hijaz were again in the forefront, among them Fatna Shakir, Thuraya Qabil, ‘Abdiyah Khayyat, and Huda Dabbagh, but soon women from the central region followed, including Hissa al-Fadhl or Sultanah alSudayri. In addition to newspaper articles, women authors wrote poetry, short stories, and novels, the latter being represented by Samirah Khashoggi, Amal Shata, Huda al-Rashid, and Hind Baghaffar. Short stories are much more popular, and the first collection was published by Najat Khayyat. Thuraya Qabil published the first female diwan (a collection of poetry) in 1963. In 2005, Raja’a al-Sanea published the novel Girls of Riyadh, which openly discusses young adulthood in Saudi Arabia, a sensitive topic that easily conflicts with religious and social norms and taboos. After its first steps in the Hijaz in the 1920s and 1930s, a new period of literary development in Saudi Arabia began during the 1960s when the country invested large sums from the oil revenues in education. This also included investments in other areas of cultural and intellectual life such as literature and art. The Muslim World League, with its headquarters in Makkah, significantly influenced the literary scene. In 1963, a commission to support science, literature, and the arts

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was founded and in 1974 was upgraded to the High Council for Arts and Literature. It was supposed to encourage and activate cultural and artistic works throughout the country. In November 1973, Saudi writers founded a national association and held their first congress in Riyadh. They profited from the development of mass media, both published (books and newspapers) and technological (radio, television). The Ministry of Culture and Information oversees many cultural and artistic institutions; for example, the many literary clubs in all major cities and towns. These clubs are extremely active in terms of providing space, financial support, publishing, and other services to the country’s writers and readers. They hold competitions, lectures, readings, and other literary outreach activities. The overall motto of artistic expression was the Islamic religion and the promotion of Arabic. Therefore, language and religion form the core subjects in schools and universities, and religious scholars guard, censor, and influence all publications. Those intellectuals who disagree with this type of tight control and supervision have to leave the country and work from abroad.

KUWAIT The literature of Kuwait is an organic entity with individual variations. Like the rest of the Gulf area, it was cut off from the development of modern Arabic literature in Egypt and Syria until the 1950s, when the country’s oil wealth produced some revenues that were invested in economical and social projects, thus raising the living and educational standard of the population. Cultural links with other countries, such as Iraq and India, did however exist, and the pioneers of Kuwaiti literature were usually educated abroad and published there before coming back to Kuwait. With the declaration of independence in 1961, additional steps were taken to overcome intellectual backwardness and propagate national cultural traditions. An important institution in this regard was the Kuwait Library, founded in 1923 and declared Kuwait Central Library in 1936. It has since been enlarged, and six branches are now open all over the country. With the introduction of radio and television as well as the opening of Kuwait University and the Kuwait Museum, new tools and media became available for the emerging middle class. Similarly important were the first publications of the prestigious al-Arabi magazine by the Ministry of Information in 1958, which published a wide array of articles and stories by Arab writers and intellectuals, and the foundation of the Association of Literates in 1965. Similar to neighboring Saudi Arabia, Kuwaiti literature focused predominantly on two main sources: the Islamic tradition and Arabic language. The founding father of Kuwaiti prose literature is Khalid al-Faraj, who represents the main phases in Kuwaiti literature development. He studied in Bombay and in 1928 published the first Kuwaiti short story, Munirah, in Iraq. Another important figure in the literary development of Kuwait was ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Rashid, writer and author of historical nonfiction and co-founder of the Literary Club. Compared to poetry, Kuwaiti prose has found only a small niche in the national literature scene. Until 1990, it was closely linked to Iraq; for example, the most original contemporary Kuwaiti writer of novels and short stories, Isma‘il Fahd Isma‘il, was born in Iraq to Kuwaiti parents. For his work, he was awarded the Kuwaiti Prize for Recognition

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and Encouragement for Literary Critique in 2002 and for Literature (novels) in 2004. His stories are full of social criticism, especially of the inequalities of his own society. After the liberation in 1991, he published a multivolume novel on the background and events of the Iraqi occupation. The liberation has sparked the development of a national literature with a distinct identity and clear reflection on the heritage. Thuraya Baqsami is only one of many new authors who reflect on this trend through stories of personal experiences during the occupation. The novel The Multiple Man (1992) by the Kuwaiti writer Tibah Ahmad al-Ibrahim, who went on to write two additional books, was the first work of science fiction by a female Arabic writer. Female writers in Kuwait face similar problems, limitations, and oppression as those in other Middle Eastern countries. However, the development of contemporary Kuwaiti women’s short stories is seen as a positive example of the social struggle toward liberation and equality. Most notably here is Layla ‘Uthman, an author of pan-Arab reputation. Her short stories and novels deal with social themes and criticism. Fatmah Yusif al-‘Ali was born in 1953 in Kuwait. She is a journalist and short story writer. She has a BA in Arabic literature from Cairo University and an MA in literary criticism on “the movement of society in the Kuwaiti short story.” She was the first Kuwaiti woman to write a novel (published 1971), has published four collections of short stories, and in 1996 won the Kuwaiti short story prize. She is a member of the Kuwaiti Literary Association. Poetry is still the most popular form of literary expression, with most Kuwaiti poets following the classical form of Arabic meter and content. The beginnings of Kuwaiti poetry are connected with the works of ‘Abd al-Jalil al-Tabatiba‘i. He inspired many young writers, such as ‘Abdallah al-Faraj, Khalid al-Faraj, and Ahmad al-‘Udwani. Among those poets who highlight the heroes of the past, the tribes, and their values were Fadil Khalaf and Fahd Bursali. Popular folklore poets were Ibrahim al-Mutayri, Saqr bin Salim al-Shabib, and Fa’iq ‘Abd al-Jalil, whereas ‘Abdallah ‘Abd al-‘Aziz and Saqr al-Nafasi wrote poems in the local dialect. A well-known poetess is Su‘ad al-Sabah. In 2006, the first library specializing in Arabic poetry was opened in Kuwait.

BAHRAIN The father of Bahraini literature, Ibrahim al-‘Urayyid, was educated abroad in Bombay because of the lack of educational and intellectual resources until the 1960s and has written poetry in Urdu and English before coming back to Bahrain to publish in Arabic. The literature of Bahrain was quickly touched by the ideas of pan-Arabism and nationalism and propagated a social and intellectual emancipation and liberation of the homeland. This was depicted in gushing descriptions of the country’s romantic coasts and palms. Pioneers of modern Bahraini literature, such as Salman al-Tajir or ‘Abdallah al-Zayid, promoted their understanding of progress and social reforms first in Bahraini newspapers. Others founded private schools in order to spread their national ideas. In 1969, the Union of Bahraini Writers was founded. Poets are also committed to the cause of Arab nationalism, language, and heritage, some of them writing in the local dialect to express their connectivity with the people. The most famous poet of

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Bahrain is arguably Qasim Haddad, a self-educated writer on political subjects dealing with freedom and progress. He is currently the head of the Union of Bahraini writers. Throughout his long career, he frequently changed his poetic style and themes. The most important transition was from leftist-committed poetry in the 1970s toward a modernist poetry in the 1980s and 1990s and being strongly influenced by the Syrian poet Adonis, the key modern Arab poet. His innovative style and low-key tone helped him successfully draw the reader’s attention. Fawziyah al-Sindi is a Bahraini poetess. Since 1982 she has published five collections of poetry. Prose in Bahrain is still in its infancy.

QATAR The literature scene in Qatar is small and has just recently begun to break away from the traditional frame of folklore literature. Su‘ad al-Kawari is a poet from Qatar, where she lives and works. She has published two collections of poetry. Jamal Fayiz is a successful short story writer, journalist, and playwright who published two collections of poetry and won the Rashid Ibn Hameed Prize 1994 in ‘Ajman. Widad ‘Abd al-Latif al-Kawwari is a writer from Qatar with three published collections of short stories and two novellas.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES Young Gulf writers of today have not only been able to absorb modern literature from other parts of the Arab world but are also able to enjoy Western literature in Arabic translation. However, many writers seem to have developed an aversion for modernity and therefore make efforts to reshape romantic and realistic topics and search for an independent Arabic literature style that reflects local heritage. This new trend of magical Gulf realism is represented by the two Emirati short-story writers ‘Abd al-Hamid Ahmad and Salma Matar Saif. Their stories are set in the global, urban contexts of the metropolis that have recently emerged in the Gulf. At the same time, they are local in the textual domain, which is replete with Arabic folktale imagery, magical powers, and myths. Themes, motifs, and images from the more than 1,000-year-old Arabic literary heritage are being put to work. These stories exemplify some ways in which the rapid process of modernization and the subsequent globalization trend help to produce literary styles in which the modern and traditional exist side by side in the form of global heroes and local characters in modern short stories from the United Arab Emirates. Nass al-Dhahiri is a writer and journalist and was born in 1960 in Al-‘Ayn. He has published three collections of short stories, one novel, and co-edited with Badr ‘Abd al-Malik a two-volume anthology of short stories from the Gulf. Poetry, especially nabati poetry, is still very popular. Many intellectuals, including those from the ruling families, write verses about love, the meaning of life, meditation, or praise for the country and its tribal leaders. Well-known nabati poets are Ruba‘i Bin Yaqut, Hamad Khalifah Bin Shihab, and Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nahayan, the late president and founding father of the Emirates. Classical poetry is represented by the Hirah group—three poets who all grew up

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in the village of Hirah in Sharjah and include Khalfan Musabah, Shaykh Saqr AlQasimi, and Sultan bin ‘Ali al-‘Uways. The latter established the prestigious Al ‘Uways Cultural Award. The Apollo and romantic poets influenced the group stylistically. A contemporary poet is Man’a Sa‘id al-‘Utaybah, who was born in Abu Dhabi in 1946. He was Petroleum Minister for the United Arab Emirates and has published thirty-two collections of classical poetry and one novel, Karimha. Another current poet is Thani al-Suwaydi, born in 1966 in Ras alKhayma. He has published two collections of poetry and one novel. He works as a journalist for the Emirates’ newspaper Al-Ittihad. There are several poetesses, and most write in modern or prose styles. Among the better known are Salihah Dhayban, Amina Dhayban, Shaykhah Maysun Al Qasimi, Nujum al-Ghanim, and ‘A’ishah Busumayt. Nujum al-Ghanim is arguably one of the strongest modern poets from the Gulf region. She has published five collections of poetry. Shaykhah Maysun Saqr al-Qasimi is a poet and painter born in Abu Dhabi. From 1989 to 1995 she was Director of the Department of Culture in the Ministry of Information and Culture and has published ten collections of poetry, the latest in Cairo in 2001.

OMAN Shaykh ‘Abdallah bin ‘Ali Al-Khalil, born 1922 in Samail, was considered a literary giant in Oman, and wrote and published for nearly sixty years. He published six collections of poems along with several essays and novels. His poetry centered on various topics such as religion, eulogies, history, wisdom, patriotism, and nationalism. Although a loyal classicist, he acknowledged new forms of poetry as constructive criticism. Later, pioneer poets such as Nazik al-Malaykah and Badr Shakir al-Sayab were the first to rebel against classical forms of poetry and introduced free verses to Oman in the early 1960s. Today, this is picked up by contemporary writers such as Muhammad al-Harithi, who was born in 1962 and published four collections of poetry since 1992, and ‘Abdullah al-Riyami, born in 1965 and currently under pressure for his speaking out on civil rights. Poets of the older generation usually follow classical norms of Arabic poetry, which are meshed with a topical conglomerate of Arabic language, heritage, and Islam. It is worth mentioning here Khallfan Ibn Masbah or Muhammad al-Warith al-Sufi. Younger poets, on the other hand, were already exposed to modern movements and trends in poetry and criticized social problems using free verse; the main representative is ‘Abd al-Wahid al-Muhamidi. Contemporary poets include Zahir al-Ghafri, who was born in 1956 in Oman and is part of the avantgarde prose poetry movement in Oman. Following studies in Baghdad and Rabat, al-Ghafri published several volumes of verse between 1985 and 2000. Saif al-Rahbi, born in 1956 in Srur, is a poet and prose writer. He traveled abroad, living and working in Cairo, Damascus, Algeria, Paris, London, and other Arab and European cities. Currently, he is editor-in-chief of Nizwa, Oman’s quarterly cultural magazine. He has published several volumes of poetry, prose, and essays. In 2006 he received the Sultan Qabus Prize for Cultural Innovation in Poetry. Ghalyah al-Sa‘id is a poetess and writer from Oman, living and working in London. She published a poetry collection in 2001, and her debut novel, Days of

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Heaven, came out in 2005. The novelist Numair Bin Salim al-Sa‘id has experience with fantasy literature, whereas Yunis al-Akhzami is a short story writer who published two collections in 1992. Mohammed al-Balushi is another Omani short story writer who was born in Qurayat in 1970. His short stories have appeared in several Arabic newspapers and literary magazines. He has published one collection, Maryam (1992).

FURTHER READING Akers, Deborah S., and Abu Bakr Ahman Baqadir. Oranges in the Sun: Short Stories from the Arabian Gulf. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008. Arebi, Saddeka. Women and Words in Saudi Arabia: The Politics of Literary Discourse. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. Ghanem, Shihab M. “Poetry in the UAE,” in United Arab Emirates: A New Perspective, edited by Ibrahim Abed and Peter Hellyer. London: Trident Press, 2001. al-Hazimi, Mansour, Salma Khadra Jayyusi, and Ezzat Khattab (eds.). Beyond the Dunes: An Anthology of Modern Saudi Literature. London: I.B. Tauris, 2006. Michalak-Pikulska, Barbara. Modern Poetry and Prose of Oman, 1970–2000. Krakow, Poland: Enigma Press, 2002. Ramsay, Gail. “Global Heroes and Local Characters in Short Stories from the United Arab Emirates and the Sultanate of Oman,” Middle Eastern Literature 9, no. 2 (2006): 211–216.

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Madhhab John A. Shoup Sunni, Shi‘ite, and Kharaji Islam have several schools, or madhahab, of jurisprudence or fiqh, which set the rules for just about every act of a Muslim both in religious practice and in daily life. Sunni Islam has four schools today, all of which were founded during the eighth century when there was an attempt to standardize decisions in the wide Arab Islamic empire and to find ways to accommodate the older Roman, Persian, and Arab legal systems with Islam. The four Sunni schools are the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi‘i, and the Hanbali named for their founders. The Shafi‘i school set much of the methods used by all four schools, and the Hanafi, Maliki, and Shafi‘i all use four major sources of law: the Qur’an, the Sunnah of the Prophet (which includes his sayings or hadith), consensus of the Muslim community, and analogy using reasoning to deal with issues with no legal precedents in the Qur’an or Sunnah. The Hanbali school, however, rejected all sources of legal decisions other than the Qur’an and the Sunnah, taking the stand that independent human reasoning is flawed. The Hanbali school became the most dominant in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as a result of the eighteenth century reforming movement known as the Wahhabi, after its founder Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. Maliki, Hanafi, and Shafi‘i schools are found in the other Gulf States of Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar. Kharaji Islam has not developed such well-defined schools of thought but the writings of Kharaji scholars have served as important sources for the Sunni schools, especially that of the Hanbali. The form of Kharaji Islam that has best survived time and persecution is Ibadi Kharajism, which has communities in North Africa, East Africa, India, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. Oman is the only country in the Islamic world where Kharaji Islam is the official state religion. Ibadi fiqh differs little in many of the main points with the Maliki school, making it easy for Ibadi to survive under Maliki rulers and take on public identities as Maliki Muslims. Hanbalis were attracted to the more militant stance the Kharajis have usually taken in dividing the world into two definite spheres: Dar al-Islam, or the Abode of Islam; and Dar al-Kafr, or the Abode of the Unbelievers. For Kharaji scholars Muslim rulers who did not themselves follow both the word and practices of Islam were no different from non-Muslims and subject to attack by those who “correctly” follow the religion. The more hard line form

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of Jihadist Islam has taken this to a degree not generally followed by Kharaji Muslims since the early days of the religion. Shi‘ite Islam has several schools of its own that have taken a very different course than that of the Sunni schools. Most of the Sunni schools have tried to find ways of legalizing the events of their day and find accommodation between Islamic texts and the actions of their governments. Shi‘ite jurisprudence grew out of the more rebellious movements in support of the ‘Alids, the descendants of ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib. There are two main schools of Shi‘ite law, the more dominant 12er or Imamis, and the less numerous 7ers or Isma‘ilis. The 5ers or Zaydis are mainly found in northern Yemen and have not been greatly influential in the development of Shi‘ite legal traditions. The numbers attached to the schools have to do with the line of succession to the Imamate following the death of ‘Ali passing to his sons and their heirs. Splits occurred over recognizing the legitimate succession of sons based on age or competence. Shi‘ites differ from Sunni and Kharaji schools of law on several issues, but the most important is the role of the Imam as the head of the entire Muslim community and the near divine nature of the Imams. The last of the Imams, according to the 12ers, was the young man Muhammad al-Muntazar (the Awaited), who disappeared in 878, most likely killed by agents of the ‘Abbasid Khalifah al-Mu‘atamid. For the Shi‘ites all Islamic governments that have existed since that time are only caretakers awaiting his return to once again take over the role of Imam. The only traditions of the Prophet that are accepted by Shi‘ite scholars are those passed on by the Imams and all others have no legal status. In addition, the sayings attributed to ‘Ali collected in the Nahaj al-Balaghah are also used as sources for law. For Shi‘ite jurists the role of reason is given a central place in any legal decision since the disappearance of the last Imam and this is placed in the hands of competent, trained scholars called mujtahids, who exercise ijtihad, or independent reasoning. Ijtihad is favored over what is called taqlid, or imitation, which is favored by the Sunnis.

FURTHER READING Coulson, N.J. A History of Islamic Law. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1999.

Madinah Sebastian Maisel Madinah (Medina) is a large oasis city in western Saudi Arabia. Its full name is al-Madinah al-Munawwarah, or the Radiant City, referencing to the special status of the city in Islam. Another name, Madinat al-Nabi, or City of the Prophet (Muhammad), is used as well. Almost 1 million people live in the city, which concurrently is the capital of al-Madinah Province. Muslims regard Madinah as the second most Holy City in Islam after Makkah. Similar provisions are made

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as in Makkah of preventing non-Muslims from entering the city and its sacred district. Historically, the place was known as Lathrippa by Ptolemy. First inhabited by three Jewish tribes, the city also included two Arab tribes coming from Yemen, which were clients of the Jews. However, in the fifth century, the Arab tribes took control over the city, which at this time was known as Yathrib, but concurrently started a civic strife against each other, a conflict that was finally resolved with the arrival of the Prophet Muhammad during his emigration from Makkah in 622. Yathrib then became the center of Islam, and the different social groups—Muslims from Makkah, converts from Yathrib, and local Arab and Jewish tribes—had to sort out their relations and co-exist. Eventually, the Jewish tribes had to convert or were expelled or destroyed. Over the next decade, Yathrib became the center of the Islamic community, and during several campaigns it fought with Makkah over regional hegemony. After the conquest of Makkah, Yathrib/Madinah remained the capital of the growing and expanding empire. Only after Mu‘awiyah became the fifth caliph did he move the capital from Madinah to Damascus, and with that the city started to decline in its political and economical influence. However, the city continued to be a religious and intellectual center as the second most important place of pilgrimage until the present day, and various Islamic dynasties sought to control of this prestigious and important Islamic city. In 1517, the Ottomans conquered Madinah and Makkah, and following the conquest of Egypt convinced the last of the ‘Abbasids who had been under the control of the Mamluks to sign over the title of Khalifah, or Caliph, to the Ottoman Sultan. Local authority was represented by the Sharifs of Makkah (who were nominally subjugated to the Ottomans), who appointed a governor for the area residing in Jiddah; however, the region retained semi-autonomy. In return, the Sharifs had to provide for a safe and undisrupted Hajj. The city regained some political importance in the nineteenth century, when the Ottoman Sultans took more interest in Islamic and pilgrims affairs. They constructed a telegraph line to Madinah, and the city became the final destination of the Hijaz Railroad, which was completed in 1908. Originally designed to go Makkah, it still became a major tool of transportation of pilgrims and extended Turkish control over the area. Concurrently, restoration and expansion projects on the Holy Shrine were carried out. In 1916 the Grand Sharif Hussein bin ‘Ali decided to join the British against the Turks. He sparked the Arab Revolt in order to gain independence for the Hijaz and all of the Arab provinces in the Middle East. During World War I, almost all of the Hijaz was liberated except for the city of Madinah. The city remained under Turkish control and was besieged for almost three years. The Ottoman governor of Madinah, Fakhri Pasha, defended the city after having a vision in which the Prophet Muhammad appeared to him. Some seventy days after the end of the war, he was finally forced to surrender the city to the Sharifs, who belonged to the Hashemite family. After the war, the city became part of the short-lived Kingdom of Hijaz under Hussein bin ‘Ali, who proclaimed himself king and caliph, but in 1925 after losing British support was defeated by his main rival in Arabia, ’Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Al Sa‘ud, who took the city without much resistance amid fears of possible destruction of sacred sites in the city by Wahhabis, who denounce the cult of worshipping saints and tombs. However,

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although some places were destroyed, in general, the Al Sa‘ud contributed much to the extension of buildings and facilitated the annual pilgrimage. The urban elite of Madinah, like their contemporaries from other Hijazi cities, retained its superior position in the newly created Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and until the 1960s dominated government and administration. Today, Madinah is a large and modern city with some industrial facilities, but most of its economy is centered around the pilgrimage or related to agriculture. The government wants to turn the city into an intellectual hub with the establishment of the Madinah Knowledge Economic City project, focusing on knowledge-based industries, schools, universities, publishing companies, research centers, etc., and connect this to the city’s religious importance. The King Fahd Qur’an Printing Complex is located here, where millions of official copies are printed and distributed worldwide.

FURTHER READING Burton, Richard F. A Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah (1855). New York: Dover Publications, 1964. Nomachi, Ali Kazuyoshi, and Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Mecca the Blessed, Medina the Radiant: The Holiest Cities of Islam. New York: Aperture, 1997. Ochsenwald, William. Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz under Ottoman Control, 1840–1908. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1984. Peters, F.E. Hajj. The Muslim Pilgrimage to Mecca and the Holy Places. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Majlis Sebastian Maisel Majlis is an Arabic word literally referring to a place of sitting. In a social sense, it describes a private place of getting together in the private houses of Arabia or a tribal council under the leadership of an experienced mediator. Compared to the sitting room, formal and informal sessions are held by family members, friends, and guests in order to discuss important business and events. They are usually gender-segregated; that is, women hold their own majlis. In some parts of the Gulf region, for example in Kuwait and Bahrain, the majlis is called diwan. People of public importance such as mayors, tribal leaders, religious scholars, and businessmen hold meetings in majlises that are open to the public. As a place to make decisions in a segmented society, the majlis provides access to the leaders’ and rulers’ audience room. Although very ceremonial, in theory it gives every citizen the chance to bring their grievances directly to the highest authorities. During a short one-on-one situation, a guest greets the host by kissing or touching the head rope or ‘aqal of the host and then the shoulder, or by kissing the top of the head or touching noses depending of the social status of the guest. The guest provides a short oral report and a longer written one, which is handed

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Reception for participants at a conference in the majlis of the Governor of Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Amir Salman bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. The Prince greets every member of the group one by one and then requests that all be seated. His servants quickly serve Arabic coffee to all while the Prince converses with those present. Such receptions are handled by his staff, and although not long, they are important means of keeping in touch with what is happening in the city. Courtesy of John A. Shoup.

down to officials who will look into the case. During the weekly majlis of the king of Saudi Arabia, he receives hundreds of citizens, and through his administration he can look into some of their cases favorably. It is also a great source for the ruler to get some kind of feedback from his people about their concerns, worries, and problems. It was during one of the public hearings when King Faysal of Saudi Arabia was killed by his own nephew, who most likely carried out a blood revenge for his brother, who was killed in demonstrations and riots against the introduction of television in Saudi Arabia. Normally, because of high-security risks, no one can move close to the king; however, during the majlis no one can be rejected. Some parliamentarian institutions or legislative bodies in the Gulf States (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Oman) are named majlis al-shura, or consultative council; however, traditional rulers in the area used elected councils to discuss political and social matters with distinctive members of society. Among the Shi‘ite population, the word majlis refers to a special gathering commemorating Hussein bin ‘Ali, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad. Sometimes the Arab Gulf society is described as a “majlis society” because for every issue a majlis is called together by a reputable person to talk, consult, and find the best solution.

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FURTHER READING Aarts, Paul, and Gerd Nonneman. Saudi Arabia in the Balance: The Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs. Washington Square, NY: New York University Press, 2005. Hopkins, Nicholas, and Saad Eddin Ibrahim. Arab Society: Class, Gender, Power, and Development. Cairo: AUC Press, 1997. Long, David E. Culture and Customs of Saudi Arabia. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005. Niblock, Tim. Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf. London: Croom Helm, 1980.

Makkah Sebastian Maisel Mecca (or Makkah al-Mukarramah, Makkah the Blessed, Umm al-Qura, or Mother of Cities) is located in western Saudi Arabia and has almost 2 million inhabitants as of 2008. It is located in the Hijaz Mountains some fifty miles (eighty kilometers) from the Red Sea and its seaport, Jiddah. Makkah is also the administrative seat of the Makkah Province. The Prophet Muhammad was born here and received his first revelations in a cave outside of the city. Muslims consider the city the holiest and most sacred place on earth, and every year over 2.5 million pilgrims perform the pilgrimage to visit this place. Historically, Makkah had be a trading point on the main caravan route between Syria and Yemen. In addition, Makkah had a religious significance to the pagan tribes of the area. A cubic shrine, called the Ka‘abah, was built here and became the center of polytheistic worship of over 300 idols and deities. During the pilgrimage to the shrine, the otherwise violent tribes suspended their quarrels and came together in Makkah for trade and worship. The local inhabitants, predominantly members of the Arab tribe of the Quraysh, grew rich and influential over the trade and pilgrimage. Makkah was known to Ptolemy as Macoraba. According to Islamic sources, Makkah was settled by the Prophet Ibrahim (Abraham), who built the Ka‘abah together with his son Isma‘il (Ishmael). The Angel Gabriel gave the black stone at the southeastern corner of the Ka’abah to Ibrahim. Since this time period, Makkah had been a central shrine for the Arab tribes. In 570, Muhammad was born in Makkah, later became a merchant, and married a wealthy businesswoman, Khadijah. As a member of the Hashim clan, a minor branch of the Quraysh, he was part of the economic and social establishment; however, after receiving revelations calling to abandon the old polytheistic faith of his people and to worship only one God, his position and that of his followers became increasingly intolerable and he had to leave in 622 for neighboring Yathrib, which later was renamed Madinah. Over the next decade constant warfare between the two cities left Makkah economically and politically weakened, and in 630 Muhammad returned to his hometown victorious. The city was not destroyed and its people not killed or sold into slavery, but Muhammad embraced Makkah and the Quraysh in the new Islamic community. He cleansed the Ka‘abah from idols and declared it the shrine of Ibrahim.

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Although other cities became the capitals of Islamic Empires, Makkah retained its economic position as well as its notion of being the center of Islamic belief. It is considered holy ground because God’s word in the form of the Qur’an descended here. Therefore, the sacred area around the Ka‘abah, the haram al-sharif, is off limits to non-Muslims. Today this rule is enforced by street blocks and checkpoints around the city. In the past, foreign non-Muslim travelers have successfully entered the Holy City to get a glimpse of the way of life and worship. Among the early accounts are those by Richard Burton, an English traveler who entered Makkah disguised as an Afghan/Indian pilgrim, and the Swiss explorer Johann Burckhardt, who was believed to have converted to Islam and called himself shaykh Ibrahim. One of the most detailed accounts was provided by the Dutch scholar Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, who managed to live for several months in the city using a fake identity. Although the Islamic Empire moved the capital to Damascus, Baghdad, or other places, control of the Holy Cities of Makkah and Madinah was considered crucial. Dynasties such as the Ayyubids, the Mamluks, and the Ottomans undertook large efforts to include Makkah into their realm. Many newly appointed rulers took great pride to extend the holy places in Makkah, particularly the religious center around the Ka‘abah. Since 1517, the city was under nominal rule by the Ottoman Sultan. Local administration was provided the Sharifs of Makkah. The Grand Sharif Hussein bin ‘Ali, who later proclaimed himself King of the Hijaz, ended Ottoman rule over Makkah when in 1916 he sided with the British in World War I and started the Arab Revolt in order to form an independent Arab kingdom. His pan-Islamic claims were shattered by ’Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Al Sa‘ud, then Sultan of Najd, who conquered the Hijaz and Makkah in 1924 and incorporated the city into the future Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Here it was one of the few urban centers besides Jiddah and Madinah, and maintained its spiritual, sophisticated, and cosmopolitan character. The first newspaper, Umm al-Qura, was printed here in 1926, which later became the official Saudi government gazette. The better-educated leading merchant families of the city had influential positions in the early administrative system of the Hijaz and Saudi Arabia. Today, Makkah is a fast-growing municipality and provincial capital with its economy almost entirely built around the annual pilgrimage. The importance of the Hajj is also seen by the city’s rapid expansion in infrastructure, the building sector, and population. Control over the city and their sacred place is now in the hands of the Saudi Arabian government, led by the Al Sa‘ud family. The King of Saudi Arabia humbly calls himself “Custodian of the Two Holy Places.” However, this legitimacy and the Al Sa‘ud hegemony over Makkah were contested several times; for example, during the two-week-long siege of the mosque in 1979 by Islamic radicals, and by frequent demonstrations and riots by Shi‘ite pilgrims mostly from Iran.

FURTHER READING Bogary, Hamza. The Sheltered Quarter: A Tale of a Boyhood in Mecca. Austin, TX: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1991. Burton, Richard. Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al Madinah and Meccah (1855). London: Tylston & Edwards, 1893.

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Al Maktum de Gaury, Gerald. Rulers of Mecca. London: Harrap, 1951. Nomachi, Kazuyosi, and Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Mecca the Blessed, Medina the Radiant: The Holiest Cities of Islam. New York: Aperture, 1997. Peters, F.E. Mecca: A Literary History of the Muslim Holy Land. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Al Maktum John A. Shoup The Al Maktum family is the ruling house of Dubai Emirate. The Maktum belong to the Al Bu Falasah section of the Bani Yas tribe. Under the leadership of ‘Ubayd bin Sa‘id and Maktum bin Buti, the Al Bu Falasah broke away from the Bani Yas of Abu Dhabi and established themselves in the small fishing village of Dubai in the early 1830s. ‘Ubayd and Maktum ruled together until 1836 when the leadership fell to Maktum after ‘Ubayd’s death. Maktum is the founder of the Al Maktum and he ruled Dubai until his death in 1852. The Al Maktum had difficulties maintaining their independence from the Al Bu Falah shaykhs of Abu Dhabi and the Qawasim shaykhs who ruled Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaymah. As a result, the Al Maktum cultivated good relations with the British who helped them keep their independence. Shaykh Maktum bin Hashar began Dubai’s rise to the commercial center that it has become. He is often described as “far-sighted” and “liberal” in his outlook and policies, and it was he who encouraged the pearl merchants from the Iranian port cities to relocate in Dubai. In 1902 heavy duties were imposed on merchants by the Iranian government, which resulted in widespread discontent. Several of the Arab shaykhdoms invited the merchants to move to their cities. This also coincided with a growth in the pearling industry along the Arab side of the Persian Gulf. Most of these merchants were of Arab origin, followed Sunni Islam, and found it easy to adjust to life in Dubai. Several other craftsmen, pearl divers, and others followed suit and Dubai grew as a trade hub for the import and export of goods from and to India. This open policy was continued by Shaykh Sa‘id bin Maktum, who in the 1920s invited a further large number of Arab Sunni merchants from the Iranian ports of Bandar ‘Abbas, Lingah, and Charak to move to Dubai. They were given land near the shaykh’s fort, Fort Fahidi, founding the al-Bastakiyah district of the town with its distinctive barjil, or wind tower architecture. In the 1930s the pearl trade suffered as a result of cheaper cultured pearls from Japan and Dubai, and like most of the pearling centers in the Gulf, fell on difficult times. Several members of the ruling family owned businesses that collapsed, causing a good deal of discontent among the Al Bu Falasah, and there was some talk of removing Sa‘id bin Maktum as shaykh. It has been asserted that the British did not want the moderate Sa‘id to be removed because he was seen as a moderating influence on the other shaykhs of the region and a counter to the re-emerging power of the House of Sa‘ud in Saudi Arabia. As a result a short-lived reform movement was born in 1938 headed by Mani‘ bin Rashid, a cousin of the

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shaykh. Shaykh Sa‘id was able to regain his political role within a year and managed to have the reform council dissolved. However, he placed Dubai’s domestic affairs in the hands of his able son Rashid bin Sa‘id, who was sympathetic to many of the reform movement issues such as better schools and improved health services. Shaykh Sa‘id died in 1958, and his place was taken by his son Rashid, who had a good deal of practical political experience working hand in hand with his father since the later 1930s. Rather than depend on the state to provide many of the public services, Shaykh Sa‘id had encouraged private enterprises to provide them. This policy was enhanced by the new shaykh Rashid, and this has served as much of the basis for the liberal economic policies that have led to Dubai’s success. Shaykh Rashid oversaw the massive and rapid development of Dubai and since the 1980s involved his three sons Maktum, Hamdan, and Ahmad in government and economics. In 1990 Shaykh Rashid died, and his place was taken by his son Maktum, who became not only the leader of Dubai but also the Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates. He relies on his brothers, and in 1995 his brother Muhammad bin Rashid, who served as the Minister of Defense for the United Arab Emirates since 1990, was proclaimed the Crown Prince. Other members of the family occupy important positions in the Dubai government such as Hamdan bin Rashid, who is the Minister of Finance. See also Al Sa‘ud.

FURTHER READING Coles, Anne and Peter Jackson. Wind Tower. London: Stacey International, 2007. Heard-Bey, Frauke. From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates. Dubai: Motivate Publishing, 2004.

Al-Manamah John A. Shoup Al-Manamah is the capital city of Bahrain located on the northeastern tip of the main island. According to the 2001 census it has a total population of 163,696 inhabitants, of which the vast majority is non-Bahraini; only some 55,230 were listed as Bahraini citizens in the census. Al-Manamah seems to be a relatively old site and was the place of residence for some of the island’s rulers during the later Islamic periods. Muqrin bin Adjwad built a defensive wall at al-Manamah as part of his resistance to a Portuguese invasion in 1521. Several forts (Abu Mahir, ‘Arad, al-Diwan, and Bilad al-Qadim) built between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries protected Al-Manamah. Al-Manamah became the capital of the island under the Al Khalifah dynasty, replacing the older Qala‘at al-Bahrayn that had served on and off as the capital since the early Dilmun period (2200–1600 BC).

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Al-Manamah has been the capital during most of the modern period under the Al Khalifah family, and Shaykh Ahmad al-Fatih (the conqueror) was buried in alManamah in 1794. Al-Manamah has a good harbor and is close to the two islands of al-Muharraq and Sitra. Between 1878 and 1898 several important infrastructures were built in the city, including a new pier. In 1920 al-Manamah was declared its own municipality and by 1926 half of the twenty members were elected whereas the amir appointed the other half. By 1941 the city was linked to al-Muharraq by a causeway. A causeway to Sitra was completed in 1977 and since 1986 Bahrain has been linked by a causeway to Saudi Arabia. The city continues to grow and suburbs have been built at ‘Isa Town in 1968 and Hamad Town in 1985. Many of the older village communities, particularly in the region called Jidd al-Hafs, have been built into by the expansion, making it hard to know when one has actually left al-Manamah. Nonetheless, these older communities have not lost their special characteristics and many remain farming communities although most of the inhabitants no longer work in agriculture. AlManamah was its own municipality until 2002, and in 2006 its status was changed to that of the Capital Governorate. Al-Manamah has often been a first in the Gulf with new architecture such as post-modernism being introduced to the region there. There are plans for a new skyscraper designed by a Danish architect that if built will be the world’s tallest building, challenging Burj Dubai in Dubai city. Other major new projects include a complete re-doing of the corniche on reclaimed land from the Gulf for both high-rise residential and commercial buildings. Although nearly all of the old pre-oil buildings have been replaced by newer structures, there is a desire to preserve what is left. As a result it is not uncommon in al-Manamah to chance upon an older building squeezed between massive new skyscrapers. Many of the older buildings now serve as museums or other public services such as Bab al-Bahrayn, which serves as a visitors center operated by the Ministry of Tourism.

FURTHER READING Cooper, Robert. Bahrain. New York: Marshall Cavendish, 2000.

Markets, Traditional Sebastian Maisel The traditional market is called suq in Arabic. Until recently, suqs have been the economic and social center of towns and villages on the Arabian Peninsula. Often centrally located near the mosque, suqs form a separate quarter without permanent residents. The stalls are open toward the road with workshops and storage in the back. Alleys are sometimes covered and may have public water fountains where they intersect. Mosques, madrasahs (schools), coffee houses, restaurants, and public baths also belong to the suq area as well as banks, police stations, municipal

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The Central or Blue Suq in Sharjah combines a number of regional architectural elements, including the use of barajil or wind towers, although they are only decorative in this case. The market gets its well-known nickname of the Blue Suq from the use of blue-glazed tiles from Iran. Courtesy of John A. Shoup.

buildings, or medical offices. The suq is usually organized along branches of business and trade depending on customer preferences as well as noises and smells. Some sectors that cater to women’s needs while others have seeds for farmers, and still others have shops for tourists to buy local crafts. The more prestigious and high-value items are sold along main through fares, important squares, and closer to the mosque. Crafts that include smelly or dirty processing such as tanners, dyers, butchers, and potters’ kilns are located away from the busy central areas. The classical concept of markets originated in pre-Islamic times, where market places served as centers of commerce and reconciliation. During market time conflicts had to pause and often weapons were not allowed in the market area. A muhtasib, or market supervisor, controlled the public morality and welfare. His functions included monitoring fair business practices, such as accurate weights and measures, relationships between merchants, and in some places, making shops close or halting business during prayer times. He monitored local commerce and trade and accredited the heads of guilds. Structural changes occurred with the rising Western influence over the economy in Arabia. New, manufactured products were sold alongside the traditional locally produced goods. Modern suqs in the growing urban centers along the Arabian Gulf followed the Western concept of a mall, but even here the traditional branch disposition was continuously applied. Periodical and permanent markets were the sole center for the marketing of agricultural products. The markets are located in tribal areas in easily accessible places, such as valleys or trade routes. They catered to the needs of the nomadic population as well as the settled farmers and townspeople. The Bedouin

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The livestock market at Nizwa, Oman brings together Bedouin, villagers, and urbanites. Cattle, sheep, and goats form the largest share of livestock sold, and the method is open auction. Owners walk around the sales ring and shout out prices, and perspective buyers shout out bids. Once the owner and a bidder have agreed upon a price, the transaction is recorded and witnessed. The market has become a major tourist attraction. Courtesy of John A. Shoup.

purchase their needs in food, tools, and clothing, while selling livestock and some homemade products such as baskets or woven textiles. The markets are held on a certain day of the week, except Fridays, and often named after that day, such as Ahad al-Rufaydah (Sunday) or Khamis al-Mushayyit (Thursday). Because of the expansion of traffic routes and infrastructure, smaller local weekly markets lost influence and became secondary for the supply of the population. Larger and centralized markets emerged, and it is here where people do most of their shopping for everyday necessities, where conflicts are settled and contracts are signed. Here, the latest news about politics, the weather, and current events are exchanged. Markets therefore have a significant political and social function in addition to their economic position. With the development of traffic, additional shops opened along the market street offering a variety of goods, such as vegetables, clothing, or building material. With the decline of small local markets the importance of the main regional markets grew and soon they will expand to become major trading hubs where large quantities of goods are traded on a daily basis. Additional storage space, workshops for cars, gas stations, and other services are available, turning the market place into a bigger emporium. This is followed by the establishment of administrative offices and public services, such as schools, medical centers, and religious institutions. Transportation services help bringing customers and goods

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to the market. Only in some rural areas do farmers use camels and donkeys to bring their things to the market. Fruits, vegetables, and sometimes meats are sold fresh. Wheat and dates are usually sold to middlemen. Some markets specialize in livestock and fodder. Most transactions are done with money, although in the past exchange in kind was common. The old market system is diminishing, with most of the once popular weekly markets making room for new commercial centers and malls in the larger cities. Nevertheless, even there the concept of selling goods in large, covered, open-air areas on certain days of the week prevails. Around the market, new retail stores specializing in different products are opened. Here large quantities of imported consumer durables are sold, such as electric equipment, Western-style clothing, household appliances, and pharmaceuticals. The customers are mostly expatriates, but locals also shop here. One can only see a predominantly local clientele at the vegetable or meat market. Among the few crafts that are still found at the markets are tailoring and goldsmithing, but both will be gone soon because of the rapid income of manufactured goods from abroad. In the past, almost all salesmen and -women at the market were locals; however, now the majority are foreign guestworkers. Only in a very few places do special women sections survive.

FURTHER READING Altorki, Soraya, and Donald P. Cole. Arabian Oasis City: The Transformation of ‘Unayzah. Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1989. Nawwab, Ni’mah Ismail. “The Suqs of Asir,” Saudi Aramco World 49, no. 4 (1998): 2–9. Simarski, Lynn T. “The Desert Meets the Sown,” Saudi Aramco World 46, no. 2 (1995): 2–9. Weiss, Walter M., and Kurt-Michael Westermann. The Bazaar: Markets and Merchants of the Islamic World. New York: Thames and Hudson, 1998. al-Yousef, Mohammed T.H. “The Spatial Patterns of Sellers’ Movement in the Weekly Markets of al-Hasa Oasis,” Journal of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 26, no. 99 (2000).

Marriage Sebastian Maisel Islamic law and local custom regulate marriage as another integral part of the rites of passage. Traditionally marriages in the Arab Gulf region are endogamous, that is, between cousins, close relatives, or at least members from the same tribe, region, or town. However, because of urbanization, a higher mobility, and the ongoing population growth, marriages between unrelated spouses occur more frequently. In the past, marriages were usually arranged by the two families, who sought to find a good match, but did not worry much about compatibility because of the division of labor and space of the couple. Today, because of higher standards of education and additional leisure time to spend, compatible spouses are more desired. This issue also contributed to the almost complete eradication

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of polygamy in Gulf. Although permitted under Islam, the custom even in the past was rarely practiced. Often women include specific paragraphs in their marriage contract prohibiting the husband from taking a second wife. Marriage is considered a legal pact between the spouses. For Muslims, this means the completion of the individual’s life and the empowerment of one’s family. Both husband and wife have certain obligations, responsibilities, and rights. In pre-Islamic times, women were the property of their men and had almost no legal rights. These attitudes change with Islam, when Muhammad revealed tremendous improvements of the women’s status. She now had specific rights to choose her partner, whereas men were limited to four wives. Spouses are supposed to complement each other, giving each one an area of expertise and control. The men had to provide security and material means, whereas the women were in charge of the house and children. The responsibilities of men are greater than those of women according to the Qur’an. This status difference is also reflected in the marriage contract, in which husband and wife are not considered fully equal. The bride can be represented by her legal guardian, often her father, who negotiates and signs the contract. In more traditional and rural societies this custom sometimes led to forced marriages, in which the father married his daughter off to a husband of his choice. Other limitations for women while choosing their husbands include religion, nationality, and sometimes his origin or descent. Although Muslim men are allowed to marry non-Muslim women (i.e., Christians and Jews), Muslim women can only marry Muslims. The Gulf States extended that principle to the field of citizenship, restricting female nationals to marrying other nationals in order to avoid disadvantages regarding inheritance or nationality. In some cases, the issue of adequate origin was used to determine the right to marry or reason for divorce. A Shari‘ah court in Saudi Arabia forcibly divorced a couple over allegations that the husband was of a lower tribal descent than his wife. Usually, the women of both families got together to pick the right match. Others prefer the service of a marriage broker. Blood ties and family interests were more important than the individual’s preference. This ancient concept was not disputed and found its climax in the institution of the bint ‘amm marriage, marrying the first cousin, as a symbol of family unity. Traditionally, the ibn ‘amm or cousin from the father’s side of the family had right of first refusal; that is, unless he withdrew his first claim to his bint ‘amm, the girl was not free to marry someone else. To get him to withdraw his claim, his uncle might have to pay him whatever sum demanded. In any case, the groom and the legal guardian of the bride laid out the terms of the contract, defining the dowry and other details. However, the bride must consent to the marriage and cannot be married against her will. Finally, the contract is executed and witnessed by an Islamic official (often a judge) and two male or one male and two female relatives. After that it is recorded by an Islamic judge. The amount of the dowry is subject to long negotiations and it still is custom to ask for large sums in addition to jewelry, accommodation, and sometimes a car. Therefore, only men over the age of twenty-five are usually able to come up with the sum, explaining the typical age difference of approximately ten years between the spouses.

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The traditional rites and customs related to marriage culminate in the wedding celebration, zaffaf in Arabic, for both men and women. Although separated, relatives, friends, and guests of honor come together to witness the new relationship. Attendance is often seen as a duty within tribal society, therefore large crowds are expected and hosted in special venues built for this purpose. On the men’s side, the party consists of a large meal, usually lamb or camel over rice, after which the immediate family retires to the women’s section. Here a more lively and elaborate party is celebrated with hired musicians to provide entertainment. Food and dance are other important aspects of the party. Often, two successive parties are given, hosted by both sides of the new family. After the celebration, the couple withdraws to their new home, which actually is often in the same building, house, or camp of the groom’s father. Among the Shi‘ites a temporary marriage called mut’ah is still practiced although discouraged in countries with strong Sunni majorities. A similar concept, misyar, or traveler’s marriage, prevails in Sunni communities and is sanctioned by the highest religious authorities in Saudi Arabia. Both refer to the custom of getting married for a period of time without obligations on both sides. The wife gives up her right to be supported and receives her husband whenever he desires. For that she is entitled to a new status as well as financial compensation as laid out in the contract. No dowry or large wedding parties are necessary. However, most of these agreements end in quick divorce, highlighting the fact that it was considered a temporary solution with the intent of divorce and not a lifelong commitment. See also Music: Traditional and Contemporary.

FURTHER READING Long, David E. Culture and Customs of Saudi Arabia, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005. Mohammed, Nadeya Sayed Ali. Population and Development of the Arab Gulf States: The Case of Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003. Monger, George. Marriage Customs of the World: From Henna to Honeymoons. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2004. Smith, William Robertson. Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia. London: Black, 1903. Wikan, Unni. Behind the Veil in Arabia: Women in Oman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

Masqat and Suburbs John A. Shoup Masqat (Muscat) is the capital and the largest city of the Sultanate of Oman, with an estimated population of 600,000 in 2005. The area of Greater Masqat covers a large area and is divided into three major areas: West Masqat, Central Masqat, and East Masqat each with several subdivisions. The Maqsat Governorate, or Muhafizah, is divided into six administrative districts or wilayahs: Masqat (City), Muttrah, Bushir, Sib, Qurayat, and al-Amirat.

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Masqat is one of the ancient towns of Oman, although it often was second to Suhar, Nizwa, and Salalah. It became important when the Portuguese captured it in 1507. Masqat’s landmark forts al-Mirani and al-Jalali that protect the harbor were built during 1580s, although little of the Portuguese construction is left. It remained under Portuguese control until 1649 when Imam Sultan bin Sayf alYa‘aribi retook the city and drove the Portuguese to Goa in India. Imam Sultan expanded Omani control over Gwadar in present day Pakistan and imported slaves from Baluchistan and East Africa. In 1737 the Persians captured Masqat but they were defeated and forced to leave by Imam Ahmad bin Sa‘id, first ruler of the Al Bu Sa‘idi dynasty that rules Oman today. Imam Ahmad bin Sa‘id made Masqat the capital of Oman rather than Nizwa. From Masqat, the Al Bu Sa‘idi rulers embarked on their overseas empire and in 1853 the Sultan Sa‘id bin Sultan bin Ahmad transferred the capital to Zanzibar. Following his death in 1856 the empire split into two parts, one in Oman and the other based in Zanzibar. Masqat retreated into poverty as the Omani empire was weakened by Britain in the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1913 the Sultan was challenged by the Imam of Nizwa and the country was renamed the Sultanate of Masqat and Oman, with the Sultan’s power restricted to the coast. Sultan Sa‘id bin Taymur unified the country and once again Masqat became the sole capital of the country. Since the palace coup that brought in Sultan Qabus bin Sa‘id in 1970, Masqat and its suburbs have flourished. Masqat remains the administrative center with many government offices located in the city proper. Nearby communities such as Mattrah have also flourished but have been able to preserve more of their traditional neighborhoods. The Mattrah market is one of the two main traditional suqs left in Oman. The homes near the harbor are built in the nineteenth-century style of Indian traders and are an important cultural heritage of the country. The city’s suburbs spread north and east to Ruwi, the new business district and then on to Sib some 15.5 miles (twenty-five kilometers) from Ruwi, where the international airport and the Sultan Qabus University are located. Because of Oman’s policy of trying to not depend on foreign workers the population of Masqat is about sixty percent Omani with minorities of Indians, Baluchis, and other Arabs. Masqat has had an Indian population for centuries and there are two Hindu temples and a Christian church (mainly for Christian Indians) although the only officially recognized religion is Islam. Because of Oman’s long history of trade in the Indian Ocean, Swahili, Urdu, Baluchi, Malayalam, and Hindi are widely spoken by Omanis as well as by expatriates.

Material Culture Sebastian Maisel Material culture of today includes two things: technology (including the tools, skills, and experiences) in the process of production; and products themselves as objects of use, value, and distribution, in addition to the context in which these

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things are used. However, one cannot look at these objects and understand daily life without the context of their usage. The main question to answer is the role of material culture in the wake of globalization, which affects the area of the Arab Gulf States and also creates changes. Since the oil boom of the 1970s, global processes heavily influenced the area. Traditional skills and tools have been replaced overnight with “modern” equipment and technology. The implications of such a rapid upheaval and turning away from social norms were clearly visible in the public as well as in the private sphere. Technological change in a one-way direction (i.e., without including traditional forms and values) increases the risk of alienation, to which the culture of the Arabian Peninsula is currently exposed. The countries on the Gulf are very young states with a very old history and culture. Saudi Arabia was officially proclaimed in 1932, whereas the other Gulf States gained their independence in the 1960s and 1970s. However, the region was inhabited over a period of thousands of years by a population that combined nomadic with settled lifestyles and the distinct culture developed from the relations with each other and their environment. The arid climate and living conditions of Arabia are nothing special if one does not connect them to the other important feature of Arab culture: the penetration of Islamic values since the seventh century. Saudi Arabia and the adjunct areas are considered the homeland of Islam, and basic Islamic values in combination with pre-Islamic tribal traditions are the two most important components of the culture. Despite the long history, the countries of the Gulf underwent a more significant change over the last decades than in their entire previous history. With immense revenues from the oil industry, the economic and social development was prescribed and expedited. Technical innovations in transportation and communication helped to connect with the global sphere and ended the long-lasting isolation on the periphery of the Middle East. On the other hand, it also brought into Arabia the rest of the world with all of its assets and drawbacks, which initiated changed and brought gigantic upheaval. The culture of Arabia is often equated with the culture of the Bedouin. Although large parts of the society are organized along tribal lines, the culture of the nomadic tribal groups plays only a minor role in the development of a national and regional culture. The main part of traditional Arab Gulf culture is connected with the settled people of the oases and small towns, who on the other hand are closely related to the nomads through symbiotic trade and exchange relations. The settlers provide food and other services and in return get protection from raids by other Bedouin tribes. Today, the people of the Arab Gulf embody a closed and conservative society, which is dissociated physically (climate and nature) and psychically (religion and society) from the adjunct areas of Yemen in the south and the Fertile Crescent in the north. Since the introduction of Islam, very little changes have been observed in the traditional tribal social structure. However, since the 1960s the effects of the oil wealth are noticeable in the social and economical infrastructure of the countries. For many, it is impossible to imagine how their fathers lived some decades ago. Some look at it from an angle of romanticism and nostalgia, whereas others connect this to an era of underdevelopment. The rapid social and

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economical change continued during the 1970s and reached its climax during the oil crises of 1973. It brought with it a demographic change: the population exploded, the elder generations lived longer, infant mortality decreased, and the population became younger and younger. Today more than fifty percent of the population is under the age of eighteen. People started to become socially mobile and migrated in and out of the countries. Urbanization was another infrastructural challenge. The evolution of traditional material culture began with the people’s adaptation to their environment. The hot, arid climate limited the selection of dress, food, tools, and required products that worked under such harsh conditions. At the same time local and regional variants emerged, which is attributed to the area’s size and diversity. Comparing household lists from the Tihamah, where fishing in the Red Sea is the main economical factor, with the camel breeders of the Empty Quarter, one can easily detect necessary changes. As in the social sector, Islam has influenced the material culture of Arabia. With the spread of the religion into other cultural areas (e.g., in Southeast Asia or Sub-Saharan Africa) new objects were introduced by pilgrims and quickly used by the local population. Trade relations with East Africa and India brought similar innovations and artifacts, predominantly in the food and tool sector. Tradition and religion have been the pillars of cultural identity in the Gulf. However, the process of transformation in all aspects of daily life had different effects on the generations. Particularly among the young people, a trend toward global products and modern technology can be observed. This trend is furthermore connected with rising demands for changes in the social structure. The material culture, just like the society as a whole, undergoes a process of change, which is characterized by two features. First, because of the financial assets, a high demand for Western products is noted. Because all countries of the area are committed to the free market system, they have to deal with the pros and cons of globalization. Second is an increasing reference to and preservation of the cultural heritage, which is aimed to contradict globalization. One can find objects of traditional material culture in today’s society in private collections and public museums, and there are still families in rural areas that use tools and other traditional equipment for breeding camels or running hobby farms. Otherwise, a sophisticated and ambitious museum environment collects and exhibits ethnographical material, indicative of the countries’ willingness to preserve and strengthen the cultural heritage. See also Makkah.

FURTHER READING Long, David. Culture and Customs of Saudi Arabia. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005. Tapper, Richard, and Keith McLachlan. Technology, Tradition and Survival: Material Cultures in the Middle East. London: Frank Cass, 2002. Topham, John. Traditional Crafts of Saudi Arabia. London: Stacey International, 1982.

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Media Sebastian Maisel Media, or mass media, are considered tools to hold data and facilitate communication. They can include newspapers, television, computer (Internet), radios, and other published sources. Some of them are broadcasted, other printed, but they all shape the public opinion and help pass news, views, and ideas. Governments, public institutions and individuals therefore heavily contest control over the media to provide information that is tolerated by the ruling class. This struggle leads to both imposed censorship and self-censorship, but also opens new directions for spreading information and allowing communication between all social groups. Particularly in the age of mass communications media, it has become difficult for those in power to extend control over the entire media sector. Because of rapid technological progress, people found new ways that enabled them to store and transmit data and information. Although in the past, printed media only reached the literate few, broadcasted media can be absorbed by everyone, just by listening to the radio, watching the television, or if available, by surfing the Internet. For centuries, Arabic used to be the main language of communication, both in its oral and written form. Today, English is an important supplement in the business sector and among the young generation. Because of the high number of foreign residents in the Arab Gulf States who do not speak Arabic, English will be found in other areas of interaction; however, Arabic was the first medium of communication in the Peninsula. Already in pre-Islamic times, poetry was honored among the tribal population as the primary mode of expression. The first media of mass communication was the press. Around World War I, the earliest Arabic newspapers appeared in the Hijaz, published by educated merchant families. Today, many daily and weekly newspapers are published in Arabic and English throughout the Gulf. Although newspapers and periodicals are mostly privately owned, editors frequently practice self-censorship. Criticism of governments and royal families is frowned upon, and tight press laws are enforced upon the print media. On occasion journalists have been dismissed and newspapers have been shut down for statements seen as anti-governmental or against religion. Governments heavily subsidize the publishing industry, including periodical and academic presses, and therefore like to use them to promote official policies and information. Gradually, leaders of the Gulf States began to realize the need for a more liberal and attractive press. Otherwise, the audience would move to other sources of information and entertainment, which are easily available online. However, they are aware of the difficulty of promoting national identity while at the same time combating Western social and cultural influences. Both arguments are used to justify censorship and to maintain control over news coverage with occasional suppression of unpleasant incidents or anti-governmental activities. The newspapers in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates enjoy greater freedom than the press in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or Oman. However, in all Gulf States, the need for independent media coverage and press freedom is continuously

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stressed. Saudi Arabian money is financing some of the most open and critical daily newspapers, al-Hayat and al-Sharq al-Awsat, both published in London. They are considered among the top multinational newspapers in the area and often cover controversial social and political issues in the Gulf. Electronic and broadcast media appeared much later in the Peninsula, mostly because of the high costs and few qualified people to operate them. Because of oil revenues, the governments of the Arab Gulf States owned and controlled the first radio and television stations and ran them by their Ministries of Information. They quickly realized the power of the new medium and learned to use it in order to reach out to large numbers of the still illiterate population and spread official doctrine and religious programs. The question of controlling broadcasts became more and more important. Criticism of the government, religion, or tradition is hardly found. State-owned broadcast stations rather focus on entertainment as well as educational and religious content. With the introduction of satellite technology and computer, mass media has changed profoundly. Through satellite dishes, cell-phones, and the Internet, a new level of communication and information exchange has been reached, a level that is difficult to control by central authorities. Global and local news are now quickly available, and censorship is hard to maintain. In the early 1990s after the Gulf War there was a fundamental change in the media evolution of the Gulf States: Along with the economic opening of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries came a transformation of the media sector into an economical category similar to other commodities and companies. However, government control remained tight for another decade until satellite and online media started to take over the entire sector. Increasing political liberalism and the subsequent opening of national territories for foreign stations made the introduction of multinational broadcasting possible. Arabic television and radio stations, such as the revolutionary Al Jazeera, as well as newspapers and journals such as al-Sharq al-Awsat or al-Majallah, started to compete over a regionally defined market on the Peninsula. Over the last decade, significant developments of the mass media sector and national telecommunications have been made, most notably the introduction of satellite broadcasting and the Internet. The Arab countries of the Gulf have one of the highest ratios of access to satellite television and Internet in the Middle East. They even developed their own broadcast stations. The new media and their liberating effects on the population posed a challenge to the authorities who still battle to control them; and when they fail to control them, they try to own them. Despite the availability of nearly everything on the information market, the societies of the Gulf are working on finding a balance between their traditional approach and the new technological opportunities. As for the people, communication was never as easy as it is right now, and they are in constant touch with each other. See also Madinah.

FURTHER READING Ayish, Muhammad I., and Ali Qassim. “Direct Satellite Broadcasting in the Arab Gulf Region: Trends and Policies,” International Communication Gazette 56, no. 1 (1996): 19–36.

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Military Fandy, Mamoun. (Un)civil War of Words: Media and Politics in the Arab World. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2007. Hafez, Kai and David Paletz. Mass Media, Politics, and Society in the Middle East. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 2001. Kazan, Fayad E. Mass Media, Modernity, and Development: Arab States of the Gulf. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993. Khalil, Joe. “New Televisions in the Gulf: Period of Transitions,” Global Media Journal 5, no. 8 (2006). Rugh, William. Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio and Television in Arab Politics. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2004.

Military Christopher Danbeck Saudi Arabia’s military consists of 224,500 active personnel serving in the Army, Navy, Air Force, Air Defense, and National Guard. There are an additional 15,500 personnel in the paramilitary forces. Saudi Arabia’s defense budget was $25.4 billion (U.S.) in 2005. Saudi Arabia’s Army (75,000 personnel) is organized into armored, mechanized infantry, airborne, artillery and aviation brigade, and battalion-sized units. The Navy (15,500) consists of seven frigates and four corvettes each capable of deploying ship-to-ship missiles, sixty-five coastal patrol boats, a mine warfare unit, and one Marine infantry regiment. The Air Force (18,000) is organized into twelve fighter and fighter/ground attack squadrons, three transport squadrons, and two rotary wing squadrons. The Air Defense branch (16,000) controls four battalions. The Saudi National Guard (75,000 active with 25,000 tribal levies) has three mechanized and five infantry brigades. Paramilitary forces include the Frontier Force (10,500) and the Coast Guard (4,500). The Kuwaiti military has an active strength of 15,500 personnel, which is augmented by an active paramilitary force of 6,600 and a reserve force of 23,700. Kuwait’s defense budget was $4.5 billion (U.S.) in 2006. The Army (7,300) consists of armored, reconnaissance, mechanized infantry, artillery and engineer brigades and they form one Special Forces battalion. The Navy (2,000) includes a Coast Guard (500) with ten coastal patrol ships armed with ship-to-ship missiles. The Kuwaiti Air Force (2,500) is centered on two squadrons of fighter/ground attack aircraft and includes two helicopter attack and rotary transport squadrons. The paramilitary force is composed of National Guard, Special Forces, Military Police, and armored car battalions. Bahraini military capabilities are divided between the active military force (11,200) and a paramilitary security force (11, 260). Bahrain’s defense budget was $478 million (U.S.) in 2006. The Bahrain Army (8,500) consists of armored, infantry, and artillery brigades as well as Special Forces and Air Defense battalions. The Navy (1,200) is built around three surface combat ships all equipped with ship-to-ship missiles. These deep-water craft are augmented by eight patrol and coastal combatant ships. The Bahraini Air Force (1,500) consists of two

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fighter squadrons and an attack helicopter unit. The paramilitary force is composed of the National Police (9,000), National Guard (2,000), and the Coast Guard (260). The National Police and Coast Guard are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior. The Qatari military has an active strength of 12,400 and consists of an Army, Navy, and Air Force. Qatar’s defense budget was $2.33 billion (U.S.) in 2006. The Army (8,500) is organized into mechanized infantry, armored, Special Forces, anti-tank and mortar battalions, and a regiment each of field artillery and the Royal Guard. The Navy (1,800) includes seven coastal patrol vessels, four of which are capable of deploying the Exocet ship-to-ship missile, as well as fourteen patrol boats operated by the Qatari Marine Police. The Air Force (2,100) operates one fighter squadron, one fighter/ground attack squadron, and an attack helicopter squadron. Qatar is home to the U.S. Central Command Headquarters. The United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) military, controlled by the General Headquarters in Abu Dhabi, consists of 50,500 personnel in the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Some of the emirates, including Dubai, maintain independent military forces. UAE’s defense budget was $2.58 billion (U.S.) in 2006. Army forces total 44,000 and can be expanded by 15,000 with the inclusion of Dubai’s forces. The forces are arrayed in armored, mechanized infantry, infantry, and artillery brigades and one brigade of the Royal Guard. (The Dubai Independent Forces consists of two mechanized infantry brigades.) The Navy (2,500) has four surface combat vessels as well as two corvettes all armed with ship-to-ship missiles. UAE also fields fourteen coastal patrol vessels, ten of which deploy the Exocet. The Air Force (4,000) has seven fighter/ground attack squadrons and two attack helicopter squadrons. The Air Force also controls the Air Defense forces. The Omani military consists of 41,700 personnel divided into an Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Royal Household. A paramilitary force of 4,400 augments the active military. Oman’s defense budget was $3.27 billion (U.S.) in 2006. The Army (25,000) consists of armored and infantry brigades as well as armored reconnaissance, airborne, infantry reconnaissance, artillery, air defense, and engineer battalions. The Navy (4,200) has two corvettes armed with the Exocet, as well as eleven coastal patrol ships, four of which deploy the Exocet missile. The Air Force (4,100) consists of three fighter squadrons as well as two squadrons of helicopter transports.

Military Bases William Bundy SAUDI ARABIA The United States, which up until mid-2003 had a significant presence in Saudi Arabia, scaled back their footprint in the kingdom when they handed over control of Prince Sultan Air Base in Al Kharj (fifty miles, or eighty kilometers, south of Riyadh) to the Saudi military and redeployed the base’s 4,500 troops to other

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countries in the region. The only remaining U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia is the Office of the Program Manager-Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM-SANG), a small military group that assists the Saudi National Guard in training and modernization programs. The United States no longer has an independently operated military base inside of Saudi Arabia.

OMAN Although Oman is an important staging base for strategic U.S. and U.K. forces, there are no independent foreign bases in Oman or permanently stationed garrisons of troops. The United States has a formal agreement with Oman, which allows them access to Omani peacetime and contingency facilities. The United States has used Omani airbases such as Masirah, Sib, and Thumrayt extensively as forward-staging bases for troops and aircraft in support of their global War on Terror, particularly between 2001 and 2005. The United Kingdom similarly has no bases in Oman, but has a close working relationship with the Omani military, often loaning them military personnel for training, conducting joint training with the Omani military, and using Omani bases for staging aircraft.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES Although there are no foreign military bases in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the United States and France both have close relationships with the Emirates, formalized by defense cooperation agreements. The United States has had such an arrangement with the UAE since 1992, which allows the United States to use UAE air and naval installations. They maintain an Air Force presence at AlDhafrah Airbase in Abu Dhabi, which mainly consists of noncombat, reconnaissance, and refueling aircraft. The U.S. Navy also maintains a small presence at Jabal ‘Ali and Fujayrah, which are frequently used as ports of call for naval vessels in the region. The French have also used Al-Dhafrah as a staging base for reconnaissance and refueling missions in support of the war in Afghanistan.

QATAR Qatar has defense agreements with the United States, United Kingdom, and France, all of which maintain forces in the region. The United States established Camp Al Sayliyah near Dawhah in 1996, which is home to the forward headquarters of the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and previously served as a staging base for large quantities of pre-positioned equipment. USCENTCOM may soon move to the nearby airbase at Al ‘Udayd, which currently houses the U.S. Combined Aerospace Operation Center. Al ‘Udayd is a $1.4 billion base equipped with two 14,000 foot runways, hanger space for forty aircraft, a tarmac for an additional 100 aircraft, and billeting for 10,000 troops. It is used for staging attacks, surveillance, and refueling aircraft. The United Kingdom shares the United States’ facilities at Al ‘Udayd Airbase for the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) strike and support aircraft.

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France maintains no military bases or permanent garrisons in Qatar, but does conduct exercises with the Qatari military and has deployed a few Gendarmerie officers to train and liaise with Qatar’s security forces. In 2011, France anticipates opening a Qatari satellite of their military academy, St. Cyr, to strengthen ties in the Gulf region.

KUWAIT The United States has approximately 15,000 troops stationed at military bases around Kuwait. The headquarters of Coalition Forces Land Component Command, as well as the majority of the troops, are stationed at Camp Arifian near Kuwait City. Camp Arifian provides logistical support and an intermediate staging base for U.S. troops bound for Iraq. The U.S. Air Force used the airbases at Ahmed al-Jabir, ‘Ali al-Salim, and the Kuwaiti airbase at ‘Abdullah Al-Mubarak in preparation for the 2003 Gulf War, but has since withdrawn from Ahmed alJabir. Other U.S. military facilities still used for intermediate staging and support for the Iraq War include Camps Buehring, Doha, Fox, Navistar, New York, Patriot, Spearhead, Victory, Virginia, and Wolf. The United Kingdom used Kuwaiti air bases to support the RAF until 2004, at which time they relocated their staging bases to Qatar. The British do, at the behest of the Kuwaitis, run the Mubarak Al-‘Abdullah Joint Command and Staff College, which educates senior Kuwaiti officers.

BAHRAIN Bahrain is an important hub for the U.S. Navy, which stations its Fifth Fleet Headquarters at al-Manamah, and the United States maintains pre-positioned equipment in Bahrain as part of a formal security agreement between the two nations. The U.S. Navy uses the military portion of Bahrain International Airport at al-Muharraq for its aviation assets. The U.S. Air Force also has a presence in Bahrain, occasionally using the airbase at Shaykh ‘Isa for its aircraft and equipment.

FURTHER READING “Jane’s World Armies, Jane’s World Navies, Jane’s World Air Forces.” Available at http:// www.globalsecurity.com (last accessed October 14, 2008).

Mountains John A. Shoup The Arabian Peninsula has several mountain ranges stretching along the Red Sea coast from the Gulf of ‘Aqabah to the Gulf of Aden. There are several other ranges such as the Qarah Mountains that separate the coastal region around

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Western Hajar Mountains near the border between Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Courtesy of John A. Shoup.

Salalah and Dhufar; the Jabal al-Akhdar in northern Oman; and the Hajar Mountains in the eastern United Arab Emirates, northern Oman, and the Musandam Peninsula. In addition there are several volcanic peaks in the central areas of the Arabian Peninsula. The coastal range along the Red Sea rises to a height of 12,000 feet (3,700 meters) in the south and includes the Asir region of Saudi Arabia and much of western Yemen. The region is able to receive some of the monsoon moisture, and the mountains have an alpine look being covered in evergreen forests. The forests are able to support a fairly wide variety of wildlife, including monkeys. Seasonal streams such as Wadi Bishah and Wadi Tathlith support oasis agriculture on a large scale. The range becomes lower and narrower as it goes north and the climate becomes much more arid. In the Hijaz the mountains rarely exceed 6,890 feet (2,100 meters) in elevation and near Makkah the peaks are only 1,968 feet (600 meters). North of Ta’if the mountains are generally bare rock with little vegetation other than along the bottoms of seasonal streams. The Red Sea is part of the Great Rift Valley that begins in southern Turkey and ends in the Indian Ocean off the coast of Madagascar. The mountains that line the Red Sea were formed when the Great Rift first became a huge uplift in the Earth’s crust, which eventually collapsed forming the Rift Valley. The mountains are generally volcanic in nature, composed of basalt and other igneous rocks. There are also outcrops of granite, including the famous pink granite also found in Egypt, Sinai, and southern Jordan, which was a favorite building material for the Egyptian Pharaohs. The mountains rise steeply along the coast but on the inland side the slope is gentle with a series of low foothills before merging into the central plateau, or Najd. There are several associated lava fields called

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harrat. These are still active and the eruption of lava of the Harrat Rahat in the year 1256 came within a few miles of Madinah. The harrat cover a large amount of the Hijaz; Harrat Rahat is the size of Lebanon. There are numerous volcanic cones, some of which rise to over 1,000 feet (322 meters). The Qarah or Dhufar Mountains run east to west approximately 400 miles. In the west they merge with the Jibal al-Khadra’ of Yemen. The mountains rise to 2,000 feet (609 meters) and are able to catch the summer monsoon rains, which make them green and mild whereas much of the rest of the Peninsula suffers from extreme heat. Even in the winter the Qarah mountains catch a good deal of moisture, which keeps them humid being only nine to twelve miles (fifteen to twenty kilometers) from the coast. The climate allows the valuable frankincense or luban tree to grow. Several small seasonal streams flow from the mountains and water is diverted to terraced fields. The Qarah Mountains are the home of the Southern Arabian-speaking Qarah and Mahra tribes, who until recently maintained a transhumance existence, moving their cattle, sheep, and goats to the coastal lowlands in the dry winter season and back to the highlands in the wet summer season. The Jabal al-Akhdar, or Green Mountain, is a massif that rises up to an elevation of 10,089 feet (3,075 meters) at Jabal Shams, its highest peak, and the highest in Oman [official height of Jabal Shams has yet to be determined—elevations vary between 9,777 feet (2,980 meters) to 10,089 feet (3,075 meters)]. The mountain can be traversed but it has traditionally separated the al-Batinah coastal plains from the al-Dhahirah interior region. Jabal al-Akhdar is a part of the Hajar Mountain system. The Hajars are divided into two main ranges: the Eastern Hajars, or Hajar al-Sharqi; and the Western Hajars, or Hajar al-Gharbi; and Jabal al-Akhdar and the smaller Jabal Nakhl form the central part of the range. The Western Hajars (also referred to in English-language literature as the Northern Hajars, although in Arabic they are called the Western range) include Musandam Peninsula and run southeast, moving further from the coast as they go south. The extreme broken nature of the Hajars has complicated the political divisions within the individual emirates of the United Arab Emirates and between the United Arab Emirates and Oman. Several oasis villages dot the mountains with allegiance to one of the emirates or to Oman. Only Abu Dhabi has no territory in the Hajars. The lone mountain called Jabal Hafit located near the oasis of al-‘Ayn/al-Buraymi is shared between the United Arab Emirates and Oman, with the highest elevation of 3,658 feet (1,115 meters) mainly within the United Arab Emirates. The Eastern Hajars run closer to the coast as they proceed east until they meet the sea at the Omani town of Sur. There are several other mountain ranges in the Arabian Peninsula, including Jabal Shammar in the north near the oasis of Ha’il and the Nafud Desert, and Jabal Tuwayq in the southern Najd. Jabal Shammar is composed to two main ranges: Jabal Aja’, which is mainly composed of granite; and Jabal Salma, which is made of volcanic basalt. Jabal Shammar takes its name from the powerful Shammar tribe who took control of the main oasis of Ha’il in the sixteenth or seventeenth century. Jabal Tuwayq forms a long arc beginning north of the Saudi capital al-Riyadh and swings inward skirting the northwestern edge of the Rub‘ al-Khali. Its tallest peaks are over 3,000 feet (900 meters) above sea level.

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Bahrain has one central mountain called Jabal Dukhan, or Mountain of Smoke, which rises to a height of 439 feet (134 meters). The name comes from the fact that its top is often covered with mist that from a distance looks like smoke. Jabal Dukhan is important because Bahrain’s main oil fields are located near the mountain. To the south of the mountain is the central depression, which is marked by a single massive tree known as the Tree of Life: an ancient prosopis julifera (a type of mesquite), which stands on what may be an ancient tell. In recent years Hindu migrant laborers from India who have heard the tree described as the Tree of Life have begun to bring offerings and hang prayer ribbons from its lower branches.

FURTHER READING Beaumont, Peter, Gerlad Blake, and Malcom Wagstaff. The Middle East. London: John Wiley & Sons, 1976. Fisher, W.B. The Middle East: A Physical, Social, and Regional Geography. London: Methuen, 1971. Harrigan, Peter. “Volcanic Arabia,” Saudi Aramco World 57, no. 2 (2006): 2–13.

Mubarak al-Sabah al-Sabah (–1915) John A. Shoup Mubarak bin Sabah Al Sabah is known as “the Great” and ruled Kuwait from 1896 till his death in 1915. Mubarak was the seventh of the Al Sabah family to rule Kuwait and he is the only one who came to power by violence. He assassinated his older brother and ruling amir of Kuwait, Muhammad bin Sabah, to take the reigns of government. It is said that he was prompted into this course of action by his brother’s growing close ties with the Ottoman Turks in Iraq. One of Mubarak’s sons was also involved in the murder of another brother of Mubarak’s, Jarrah, who had been the closest advisor to the assassinated Muhammad. Mubarak set the path that Kuwait was to take during the twentieth century by siding with the British—seeing the British as the protectors of Kuwait from stronger neighbors. Mubarak gave refuge to the Al Sa‘ud family, and ‘Abd al‘Aziz Al Sa‘ud launched his bid to retake Riyadh with Mubarak’s full knowledge and blessing. Mubarak was willing to support the house of Al Sa‘ud against the Al Rashid shaykhs of the Shammar tribe because they had been allies of his dead brother Muhammad and were pro-Turkish. In 1902 the British came to Mubarak’s aid against a force headed by two of his nephews who wanted to take revenge for their father’s murder. In 1905 the Ottomans gave up their attempts to bring Kuwait under the Turkish governor of Basrah but in 1913, just before World War I, the British and Turks reached a separate agreement whereby Kuwait became a qadha (or

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autonomous province) of the Turkish Empire. However, with Turkey’s declaration of war in 1914 on the side of Germany the agreement was repudiated and was never put into place. In 1990 Iraqi President Saddam Hussein would bring this agreement back to life as one of his justifications for invading Kuwait. Mubarak died one year later but the British, true to their word to him, agreed to support his sons in the succession to the leadership of Kuwait rather than the sons of his dead brother Muhammad, breaking with the usual practice among tribal elites. Mubarak was succeeded by his son Jabir, who ruled from 1915 to 1917, and then his second son Salim, who ruled from 1917 to 1921. Mubarak’s two sons Jabir and Salim founded the two main lineages that have ruled Kuwait since that time.

FURTHER READING Alghanim, Salwa. The Reign of Mubarak Al Sabah Shaykh of Kuwait 1896–1915. London: I.B. Tauris, 1998. Slot, Ben. Mubarak Al Sabah: Founder of Modern Kuwait 1896–1915. London: Arabian Publishing, 2005.

Muhammad (ca. 570–632) John A. Shoup Muhammad ibn ‘Abdallah, the Prophet of Islam, was born in Makkah sometime around the year 570 AD. His father, ‘Abdallah, died before his birth and his mother, Aminah, died while he was a young child, leaving him to be raised among his father’s relatives of the Bani Hashim branch of Makkah’s ruling Quraysh tribe. Muhammad worked for his uncle ‘Abd Manaf, known as Abu Talib, who was a merchant and made several trips to Syria with him. It is during these trips that Muhammad was recognized as a prophet by two Christian Syrian monks, Bahirah and Nastur. Muhammad worked for the wealthy older widow, Khadijah, whom he eventually married when he was twenty-five years old. She bore him several daughters who would play important roles in early Islam, but none of the sons born to Khadijah (or of the wives he would marry after Khadijah’s death) lived beyond infancy. Muhammad was troubled by the religion practiced by most of the Arabs of his time and had contact with Jews, Christians, and Arab ascetics called Hanif, who believed in the unity of God. Muhammad took to deep meditation in the seclusion of a cave on Mount Hirah just outside of Makkah, and it was there during the last days of Ramadan in 610 that he had his first revelation (Surat al‘Alaq). Muhammad was either forty or forty-three years old, depending on different Arabic sources. Muhammad’s mission as Prophet has two major stages: the first in Makkah, where he called people to redemption before the last day of judgment; and the second in Madinah, where he was the head of a new political and religious

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community. Muhammad’s revelations disturbed the social order of the day and he incurred the wrath of the Quraysh leadership who began to persecute his followers. In 615 Muhammad encouraged several his followers to move to Ethiopia where the Christian king protected them. During this period of persecution both his uncle Abu Talib and his wife Khadijah died. Muhammad tried to relocate to Ta’if in 619 but was turned away. In 621 a delegation from Yathrib sought him out during the annual pilgrimage to the gods of the Ka‘abah. In 622 they returned and asked Muhammad to come to Yathrib to settle the destructive feud between the oasis’ main tribes, Khazraj and ‘Aws. Muhammad agreed and first sent those of his followers still in Makkah to Yathrib. He, Abu Bakr, Abu Bakr’s servant, and ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib were the last to leave in what is called the hijrah, from which Muslims date their calendar. In Yathrib (afterward called al-Madinah al-Munawwarah, the Enlightened City, or simply Madinah), Muhammad became the leader of the new Muslim community that rose to challenge Makkah’s place in Arabia. The Quraysh tried to contest Muhammad’s growing power and militarily were able to defeat the Muslims outside of Madinah at the Battle of Uhud in 625. Their victory was short-lived and more and more tribes gave their loyalty to Muhammad, as did many of the leading figures of Makkah following the Quraysh defeat (it was a stalemate but subsequently gave Muhammad the advantage) at the Battle of the Ditch in 627. In 630 Muhammad marched on Makkah and was able to take the city without a fight. He cleansed the Ka‘abah of over 300 images and statues of tribal gods and re-established the Ka‘abah as the focus of worship of the one God as first built by Ibrahim (Abraham) and his son Isma‘il (Ishmael). Some of the traditions state that Muhammad left a fresco of the Virgin Mary and infant Jesus that had been painted by a Christian Arab on one of the inside walls of the Ka‘abah. Muhammad lived only a short time after the conquest of Makkah and died in 632 in his house in Madinah. He set out the steps now followed by all Muslims in the annual pilgrimage during his last pilgrimage to Makkah and gave his famous last sermon from Mount ‘Arafat. When Muhammad died his close companion Abu Bakr is said to have told the people, “Those of you who worshipped Muhammad know that he is dead, but those of you who worshipped God know that he is alive.” This tradition has set the fully human dimension of Muhammad as the greatest and last of the Prophets of God, but not a divine or semi-divine person. Muhammad is called Khatim al-Anbiya’, or Seal of the Prophets. Muhammad is one of the most influential men in human history. His actions, sunnah, and sayings, hadith, have been collected into massive tomes that form one of the four major sources of Islamic law and practice (madhhab). The community he founded in Madinah serves as the example for all other governments who claim to have Islamic legitimacy. Islam quickly took its place among world religions and today nearly one-fourth of all people are Muslims.

FURTHER READING Rodinson, Maxime. Muhammad, translated by Anne Carter. New York: The New Press, 2002.

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Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) Watt, Montgomery. Muhammad at Mecca. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953. Watt, Montgomery. Muhammad at Madinah. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956. Watt, Montgomery, and William Watt. Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974.

Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) Sebastian Maisel Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was a religious teacher and preacher in Najd who founded an Islamic revivalist movement, which is often named after him; however, the name Wahhabiyah is only used by his opponents. His followers simply prefer to name themselves Muslims. Other synonyms are Ahl al-Sunnah, Salafis, or Muwahhidun (Unitarians). Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab was born in 1703 as the son of a local judge into the Bani Sinan tribe of the Bani Tamim. Already at a very young age, he memorized the Qur’an and served as Imam. Soon he went on his first pilgrimage, followed by additional travels to the centers of religious studies in Madinah, Baghdad, and Basrah. His preachings were strongly influenced by the teaching of the Hanbali school of thought that rejects the worship of rocks, trees, tombs, or saints and call for the renewal of the worship of God alone. He went on to condemn wine, tobacco, music, and other luxury items as being obstacles for worshipping the one God. His austere attitudes were unpopular in Basrah and he was forced to leave the city. He went back to his hometown ‘Uyaynah, where he continued preaching his reformist messages, but received a similar unfriendly welcome when the local ruler had to banish him because of the pressure of the ruling tribe, the Bani Khalid. In 1745 he found shelter in neighboring Diri‘yah, where the ruling family of the Al Sa‘ud under Muhammad bin Sa‘ud promised to protect him and his message. In return, Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab offered religious legitimacy for the Al Sa‘ud, binding together the two traditional strains of Islamic leadership: family and religion. The pact was further strengthened by marital relations between the two families, when Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab married a daughter of Muhammad bin Sa‘ud. In the following years, he provided the spiritual and political support in several campaigns of the Al Sa‘ud against their political rivals in central Arabia. The movement’s opposition often referred to religious arguments, similar to Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s policy of takfir, accusations of infidelity, as the main argument to launch raids and attacks on neighboring emirates. Many local tribes submitted to the emerging power and were rewarded with equal shares of the booty. Although many provisions of the new doctrine were difficult to accept for the tribes, the notion of Jihad, by then raiding other tribes under the banner of Islam, was very attractive. By the late 1780s all of central Arabia, the nomadic and settled population alike, was united under the banner of Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s new teaching.

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He authored many books, pamphlets, and other writings on the origins and essences of his teachings, but also commentaries on his opponents. His most influential book on his doctrines is called Kitab al-Tawhid, or the Book of the Unity of God. On July 20, 1792, Shaykh Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab died, being remembered as prominent scholar with a clear vision of how Islam had to change. His bold and passionate character help him survive severe setbacks and ultimately to create a religious legacy and political success. His descendants became known as the Al al-Shaykh, the House of the Shaykh, and are still considered the religious elite of the kingdom. See also Madhhab.

FURTHER READING Algar, Hamid. Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International, 2002. Commins, David. The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. DeLong-Bas, Natana. Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Rentz, George, and William Facey. The Birth of the Islamic Reform Movement in Saudi Arabia: Muhammad Ibn ’Abd al-Wahhab (1703/4–1792) and the Beginnings of Unitarian Empire in Arabia. London: Arabian Publishers, 2004.

Al-Muharraq John A. Shoup Al-Muharraq refers to both the island and the community located to the north of al-Manamah in Bahrain. In the recent past, al-Muharraq was governed as a municipality but in the reorganization of the country into twelve governorates in 2006 al-Muharraq is now its own governorate, covering the cities of al-Muharraq and the nearby small community of al-Hadd. Al-Muharraq is connected to alManamah by a causeway and a bridge, but traffic to the island is often congested because the international airport of Bahrain is located on the island. Al-Muharraq has been able to maintain more of the pre-oil character of Bahrain and many of the neighborhoods are densely packed. Several of the important monuments in the city of al-Muharraq have been preserved and restored, including the house of the Shaykh ‘Isa bin ‘Ali, who ruled the country from al-Muharraq, Siyadi House, and al-‘Arad fort. The city of al-Muharraq still preserves one of the oldest used mosques in the country, which was built in the distinctive Gulf style with a small cone shaped minaret rarely found today. Local officials have continued to complain that although al-Muharraq contains much of the country’s cultural heritage, little has been done to properly preserve it or to capitalize on it for tourism. Nonetheless, al-Muharraq remains an important source of Bahraini arts and music, the country’s most popular singer ‘Ali Bahar being from alMuharraq.

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Al-Muharraq‘s heritage is also under threat by the fact that many homeowners rent out their houses to large numbers of migrant and immigrant workers. Living conditions are crowded, making it difficult to care for the historic houses. Most of the owners are less interested in the historic nature of the buildings than in the rent they can collect; thus, these houses are often neglected and run down. As noted, Bahrain’s international airport is located on al-Muharraq and is a constant issue of contention between the local officials and the state. The local officials have petitioned several times to have the airport moved to a less populated area. The noise and fumes from the airport with planes landing and taking off are a constant source of local complaint. So far the complaints have fallen on deaf ears, but with the new reforms put forth by the current ruler, King Hamad bin ‘Isa, local officials are hopeful their complaints placed before the national parliament will have a better result.

FURTHER READING Cooper, Robert. Bahrain. New York: Marshall Cavendish, 2000.

Muntafiq Sebastian Maisel Muntafiq was formerly the most powerful tribal confederation in southern Iraq, Kuwait, and northeastern Saudi Arabia, which traces its origin back to the North Arabian (‘Adnan) Bani ‘Uqayl. In the eleventh century the Muntafiq migrated from eastern Arabia into the lower Jazirah between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. Under the leadership of the Al Sa‘dun, the confederation became the strongest military force in the region. In the sixteenth century they expanded southward into al-Hasa until they were pushed back by the emerging power of the Bani Khalid. The Al Sa‘dun formed the aristocracy, largely segregated from the rest of the tribe. They also followed a different branch of Islam. Although most of the ordinary tribesmen are Shi‘ites, the Al Sa ‘dun are Sunnis. Furthermore, they distinguished themselves from the rest of the tribe by a different lifestyle. As camel herders they enjoyed a higher reputation than the mostly sheep- and cattleherding tribal members. Generally, the Muntafiq tribe was more seminomadic, combining sheep breeding with agriculture. Because of their economic strength and strategic skills in the Ottoman-Persian rivalry over the Shatt al-‘Arab region, they achieved semi-independence under the nominal rule of the Ottoman Sultans, who relied on them to protect southern Iraq from the expanding Saudi forces. The Muntafiq successfully resisted attempts to extend central government and to restrict their autonomy until 1871, when the able Ottoman governor Midhat Pasha enforced direct Ottoman rule over the area. After World War I, the confederation dissolved and the different branches fell under the jurisdiction of the

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newly established states of Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Branches of the Muntafiq participated in the tribal warfare over the rule in northeastern Arabia, sometimes siding with the Mutayr or the Shammar, but mostly fighting the Dhafir. The relations with the latter were the subtlest because of the common border of their tribal territories. As customary in segmented societies, some branches of the two tribes lived together, whereas others were engaged in raids and blood feuds. In several conferences and treaties between the British powers and Ibn Sa‘ud, the ruler of Saudi Arabia, official borderlines were drawn that put the Muntafiq under Iraqi jurisdiction; however, they continued to migrate to some southern areas of their territory in the Neutral Zone, which was established to protect the pasturing rights of the tribes. Along with around 300,000 other members, the current Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki belongs to the Bani Malik branch of the Muntafiq. Other prominent branches include the Ajwad and the Bani Sa‘id. See also ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud.

FURTHER READING Dickson, H.R.P. The Arab of the Desert: A Glimpse into Badawin Life in Kuwait and Sau’di Arabia. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1951. Hope, Stanton. Arabian Adventurer: The Story of Hajj Williamson. London: Robert Hale, 1951. Ingham, Bruce. Bedouin of Northern Arabia: Traditions of the Al-Dhafir. London: KPI, 1986. Nakash, Yitzhak. “The Conversion of Iraq’s Tribes to Shiism,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 26, no. 3 (1994): 443–463.

Al Murrah Sebastian Maisel The Al Murrah is a large tribe in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates that lives in and around the Rub‘ al-Khali Desert. The ruling family, Al Shuraym, belongs to the subtribe of Al Fuhaydah. Other groups, including the Al Jabir and the Al Athba, recognize the paramount leadership of the Al Shuraym since the beginning of the twentieth century. However, they all are linked to the ruling families of countries of the Gulf through marital relations. Estimates of their numbers vary greatly, but it is fair to label the Al Murrah a medium-sized tribe of the Arabian Peninsula. The territory they claim is, although only densely populated, the largest of any Arab tribe. It extends from Najran northeastward via Jabrin into al-Hasa. During their winter migration they move through the Dahna as far north as Kuwait and even southern Iraq. To the west is al-Haradh and the Persian Gulf is to the east. As descendants of the Bani Yam and Qahtan (southern), they originally lived in the Najran area before they spread after long and heavy fighting with the

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Dawasir, Manasir, and Banu Hajir, through the Empty Quarter into al-Hasa. Around 1790, they allied with the Al Sa‘ud, and during their exile in 1891 offered refuge to ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Sa‘ud, his son ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, and their family. It was in their camps where ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Al Sa‘ud, the future king of Saudi Arabia, was educated in the values, skills, and life of the Bedouin. During the Saudi expansion under ‘Abd al-‘Aziz toward al-Hasa, they supported him, for which they were later granted many privileges. Unlike other former Bedouin tribes, the Al Murrah remained largely nomadic, or at least in the camel-breeding business. Neither the Ikhwan movement nor public settlement projects such as the King Faisal Settlement Project of 1964 in Haradh contributed much to the tribe’s sedentarization. However, many younger male members of the tribe found employment in the oil industry of the Eastern Province. Others joined the paramilitary forces of the Saudi Arabian National Guard or the Qatari Police and Army. As such they strongly supported the ruling families and political system, which in return offered them many economical and financial incentives. Modernization, social change, and sedentarization have clearly changed the lifestyle and brought with them many changes in their daily life and belongings; however, they have not yet eliminated the cohesion of the tribal group. Close kinship relations, primarily expressed through marriages and housing pattern, remain strong, even across political borders. During the 1995 coup d’etat in Qatar, the Al Murrah showed their loyalty to the old system by organizing a counterattack in support of the previous emir, which was quickly subdued. Many tribal members and their families, all from the Al Ghafran branch, were put in jail, deported, or striped of their nationality. Some of them fled to neighboring Saudi Arabia, where they enjoyed support and refuge from tribal relatives. Today, modern technologies, paved roads, easy access to health care centers, and educational institutions shape the current life of the Al Murrah. Economically, they changed from being nomadic camel herders to commercial farmers and livestock breeders. Socially, they integrated into the greater society; however, they prefer the seclusion of the desert fringes.

FURTHER READING Alshawi, Ali Hadi. “The Al-Murrah Tribe in Qatar: Political Impact.” MA thesis, Western Michigan University, 1994. Cole, Donald P. Nomads of the Nomads: The Al Murrah Bedouin of the Empty Quarter. Chicago: Aldine Publishers, 1975. Cole, Donald P. “Where Have the Bedouin Gone?” Anthropological Quarterly 76, no. 2 (2003): 235–267. Cole, Donald P. “New Homes, New Occupations, New Pastoralism: Al Murrah Bedouin, 1968–2003,” in Nomadic Societies in the Middle East and North Africa Entering the 21st Century, edited by Dawn Chatty. Leiden: Brill, 2006. Dickson, H.R.P. The Arab of the Desert: A Glimpse into Badawin Life in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. London: Allen, 1951.

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Musalsalat Sebastian Maisel Musalsalat means series and refers generally to dramatic or comedic series made especially for television. Musalsalat first developed in counteries such as Egypt in the early days of radio where historical and contemporary issues, events, and persons were presented in fictional or semi-fictional stories. Those with strong religious content or those about distant periods of history used and still use classical Arabic while those about social issues and more contemporary themes are more often in local dialects. Egypt still dominates series made for television but since the 1980s Jordan and Syria have become major rivals. Collaborative efforts between Gulf States, Jordan, and Syria have been able to gain the major share of programming for Arab satellite stations seriously challenging the Egyptians. Musalsalat are made for yearround viewing, but those made to be first released during Ramadan often have large budgets and cast major actors/actresses and can get important commercial sponsors. Families all over Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and other Middle Eastern countries gather in front of the television to watch the newest television series. In contrast to the regular program, often controlled and censored by state authorities, Ramadan series address several critical topics such as extremism, religious intolerance, and terrorism. Social criticism is drawn from shows on ineffective bureaucracy, the treatment of women and foreign workers, national institutions like the national soccer team, and the influence of the religious leaders over education. Although first aired during Ramadan, these series are extremely popular, widely discussed at all social levels, and analyzed in the media. Over 100 series only for this occasion were usually produced all over the Middle East; each of them plays one hour every night. In 2005, the program al-Hur al-‘Ayn (The Beautiful Virgin) drew the most attention. The plot is based on the events of May 2003 and the bombing of a housing compound in Riyadh where eighteen people, all Arabs, died. The scriptwriter was a former member of Al Qa‘idah and he tells the story of a young, ordinary Saudi who is influenced by two rival clerics, one promoting a militant, and the other promoting a moderate view of Islam. The show was directed by Najdat Anzour for MBC, a Saudi-owned, Dubai-based satellite station. Shown during primetime, after Iftar, this series and others reach a huge audience of about fifty percent of the viewers. MBC is also the producer of one of the most successful and popular Ramadan comedy series, Tash ma Tash. In its fifteenth season, the satirical show is the area’s pioneer in depicting social deficiencies, problems, and misunderstandings in a Saudi Arabian setting. It also leads in attracting both large support and criticism. The latter often comes from the religious establishment, who cannot tolerate mocking Islamic religion, culture, or its representatives, such as teachers or members of the religious police force. The producers and main actors, ‘Abdullah Al Sadhan and Nasr Kasabi, received death threats and several episodes had been banned from screening in Saudi Arabia. So strong is the show’s influence on the public morale that even King ‘Abdullah asked them not to upset the country’s clerics and to avoid tribal issues.

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Another controversial musalsal in 2006 was al-Marikhun (Deviants), produced by LBC from Lebanon, which focused on the issue of terrorism and its negative effect on social, political, and economical development. Once again, director Najdat Anzour reflects on this current and sensitive topic, traveling back and forth between the Middle East and Europe in order to show the series objective that Islam is a not religion of terror and cannot be blamed for all of the recent violence in the world. He hopes that it will open the debate within the Arab society and abroad. Abu Dhabi television produced another successful series, al-Tariq al-Wair (The Rocky Road), on Arab mujahidin in Afghanistan who committed terror attacks in Jordan after their return. The inclusion of real life incidents and controversial topics plus the timing of the showing during Ramadan primetime helped to draw a huge audience and sparked intensive public debates. Other popular themes used in Ramadan series are family relations, questioning authority and social hierarchies, social and behavioral matter, gender and generation conflicts, corruption and inefficiency in the government, bureaucracy, and historical subjects. This provides a great chance for producers and directors to tackle difficult social issues and taboos and introduce them to a large audience, which in return will pick up the issue and further debate it in various circles and media.

FURTHER READING Dresch, Paul, and James Piscatori. Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. Meyer, Birgit, and Annelies Moors. Religion, Media, and the Public Sphere. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005. Sakr, Naomi. Arab Television Today. London: I.B. Tauris, 2008.

Musandam John A. Shoup The Musandam Peninsula is Omani territory, although it is separated from most of the country by the United Arab Emirates; Fujayrah emirate and part of Sharjah lie in between. Ra’s al-Khaymah lies to the south and west of the Peninsula. Musandam juts out nearly cutting the Persian Gulf off from the Indian Ocean at the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait of Hormuz is important to the global economy because ninety percent of the oil from the Middle East passes through it. The Strait is only thirty-seven miles (sixty kilometers) wide and 197 feet (sixty meters) deep. The Musandam has spectacular scenery with mountains of well over 4,900 feet (1,500 meters) plunging into the sea. Mountains make up the majority of the Peninsula, and the highest peak is the Ru’us al-Jabal, reaching a height of 5,905 feet (1800 meters). The mountain range is shaped like a large arc and runs some 400 miles (644 kilometers) in total length from Ra’s Musandam to Ra’s al-Hadd.

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Because of the mountains, the Musandam receives between 5.9 to 8.2 inches (150 to 210 millimeters) of rain a year, and because it is sandwiched between two bodies of water it has a high yearly humidity, reaching to eighty percent during the summer months. The Peninsula is inhabited by the Shihuh and Dhahuriyin, who are linguistically different from their neighbors in both Oman and in the United Arab Emirates. The Shihuh form the largest tribal confederation in the Musandam and seem to be mainly of South Arabian origin; their language bearing close resemblance to the other Southern Arabian dialects still spoken in southern Oman. Anthropological work in the area has noted that the Shihuh are also composed of Iranian and Baluch elements, and at least one section of the Bani Hadiyah tribe still speaks a dialect of Baluchi among each other. The Shihuh is divided into two main sections: the Bani Hidiyah and the Bani Shatayr. The Dhahuriyah share many of the same characteristics with the Shihuh but claim a different Arab origin. They claim to be related to the Dhawhir, who live in the area around al-‘Ayn/Buraymi oasis. The Peninsula is entirely mountainous and living conditions are harsh. Its population developed a multifaceted subsistence economy based on seasonal fishing, farming, and raising livestock. In the past whole villages would move from their mountain homes to the seashore and back, leaving their stone-built homes locked while they were gone. This seasonal migration of the population was called tahwil, meaning transfer, and it has been shown by anthropological studies that no section of the Shihuh were purely nomadic herders. The stone houses are used during the winter when the people farm the mountain uplands. They are unique in the Gulf region, being built into the ground for warmth. Each house contains one extended family, and the villages are composed of a small number of closely related households. In recent years antique collectors in the Gulf States and Europe have paid high prices for the wooden doors and locks made by Shihuh craftsmen. Now agents working for antique shops mainly from the United Arab Emirates have raided abandoned villages for doors. Traditionally Shihuh men carry a combination walking stick and fighting ax with a small but often highly decorated head called a jirz. They are similar in shape and size with those discovered in archeological excavations in the region dating back to the third millennium BC. Today Shihuh jirz are sold as a tourist item in the United Arab Emirates and Oman. The Shihuh resisted the attempts by the Qawasim shaykhs of Ra’s al-Khayamah to extend their authority over them. The Shihuh preferred to accept the authority of the Sultan of Oman because the Qawasim were Ghafari (northern), whereas the Shihuh identify themselves as Hinawi (southern). The Shihuh also gave their support to the Sharqiyin in Fujayrah when they split from the Qawasim of Sharjah in the nineteenth century. Despite the long history of conflict between the Shihuh and the Qawasim of Ra’s al-Khaymah, there have also been long economic ties. Shihuh have needed to trade in the villages and towns controlled by both Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaymah, and since the discovery of oil in the middle twentieth century many Shihuh from the Musandam have moved to nearby towns in the United Arab Emirates where they can find work. See also Masqat and Suburbs.

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FURTHER READING Heard-Bey, Frauke. From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates. Dubai: Motivate Publishing, 2004.

Music: Traditional and Contemporary John A. Shoup Music in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia includes several different traditions: urban and rural, Bedouin and settled villagers, sophisticated court traditions of the Gulf port cities, and folk music. Music of the region has been influenced by several different sources: India, Iran, East African coast, Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. As a result the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf have some of the most interesting music traditions in the Arab world. People have synthesized all of these various elements and have developed distinctive local styles that in recent years have gained popularity throughout the Arab world and beyond. Today, Khaliji, or Gulf music, is one of the powerhouses of modern Arabic popular music.

INSTRUMENTS Gulf and Saudi music make use of several instruments. Many are common to all Middle Eastern music, whereas some are unique to the Peninsula. The instruments fall into three major categories: string, wind, and percussion. Few brass instruments are used other than long brass horns that were used primarily as a military instrument and are still used in a few of the dances from the Gulf coast. String instruments include the ‘ud, or lute; the qanun, or plucked zither; rababah, or one-stringed fiddle; Kaman, or three-string fiddle, now often replaced with a modern violin; and tanburah, also called simsimiyah or lyre. The wind instruments include the nay, or end-blown reed flute; mizmar, a single-reed instrument; surnai, or double-reed instrument; and habban, or bagpipe. Percussion instruments include the darabukah, or single-headed hour-glass drum; the tar, or large, circular, single-headed drum; riq, or tambourine; mirwas, or a small, double-headed drum; mesondo, or a tall, one-headed drum of East African origin; manyur, or a wide cloth belt covered in dry goat hooves that is worn and shaken by the hips; and batu, also called bib, or a metal bowl placed upside-down on a metal tray and the bowl is struck by two sticks. There are many double-headed drums of different sizes, most of which are worn suspended over the shoulder that are generally called tabl. The tabl include the shaqwah, kasir, sif tabl, and tabl ‘ud, which is the largest of them. The different types of tabl are struck either by a pair of sticks or by various parts of the hands of the player—fingers or open palm. Other percussion instruments include various sizes of sajat, or cymbals, from small ones that

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are played with the fingers to large hand-held ones; and jihal, which is a ceramic jar that produces a hollow sound. Rhythmic handclapping called tasfiq is often part of the percussion ensemble for Gulf and Saudi music. Tasfiq takes a good deal of practice because it produces a staccato effect by participants clapping at different speeds and rhythms at the same time.

TRADITIONAL MUSIC Traditional music in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf can be classified into five main types: music associated with the Bedouin, music associated with pearling and the sea, agricultural work songs, wedding songs, and the more complex sawt or sammrah music from the urban areas. Sawt is one of the main types of traditional music found in the Gulf region from Iraq to Bahrain and Qatar and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. Sawt means voice, and the singer is fundamental to the music. The origins of sawt are a matter of debate, but it is generally believed that it began as court music in Baghdad during the ‘Abbasid period. This assumption is based on the type of poetry used and although no early compendium of Arabic music refers to sawt as a type of music, there are references to sawt in conjunction with what seems to be sung poetry. The well-known authority on sawt, ‘Abdallah al-Faraj (1836–1903), contended that the first person to refer to sawt music was ‘Aliyah bint al-Mahdi, the sister of the Khalifah Harun al-Rashid (786–809). The court origins are further supported by the fact that sawt uses instruments such as the ‘ud, qanun, and kaman not generally found in other traditional music of the area. Sawt is performed in a large hall usually called a diwan, or majlis found in many Iraqi and Gulf homes. The singer and main musicians are seated at the head of the hall and the percussionists and the audience take their place in rows along the two long sides of the room. Sawt begins with an ‘ud solo, which sets the maqam (musical mode of the piece) and the melody, which is followed by the rest of the instrumentalists. The singer begins once all of the instruments are playing. Several men playing mirwas drums, which are then taken up by the audience clapping a tasfiq, set the rhythm. The rhythms inspire members of the audience to get up and dance, usually in pairs down and back the two long rows. Such musical parties are called sammrah or sammari. In the past such parties were generally held during the months of February and March when the weather was mild. Most of the Gulf countries have well-known sawt groups, but Kuwait has dominated this form of music since at least the 1920s. The period between 1900 and 1920 seems to have been an important one for the development of sawt, although there is very little written material from that time. The great sawt singer and composer ‘Abdallah al-Faraj (1836–1903) is greatly responsible for the renewal of the art form in Kuwait and subsequently the whole Gulf region. It is said that he introduced using the ‘ud from Syria and the small mirwas drums from India. The music itself seems to have been passed on more as an oral form than as a written one, yet it is the time of the acknowledged masters of sawt, including Muhammad bin Faris, Dhahi bin al-Walid, ‘Abd al-Latif al-Kuwayti, Yusuf Baqar, Muhammad al-Zuwayid, and Sa‘ud al-Rashid. During the 1950s

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and 1960s the greatest sawt star was the Kuwaiti singer ‘Awdh Dukhi. Although performances of sawt take place regularly, including television broadcasts from Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, there are currently no singers that have reached the same level as these stars of the past.

PEARLING AND SEAFARING MUSIC Music related to pearling and seafaring is part of the traditional music the Gulf and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. One of the types of seafaring music is called Hasawi, named for the major oasis al-Hasa in Saudi Arabia, but Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates in particular have strong music traditions related to both pearling and seafaring in general. There are songs for work while building the ships, moving the ships from the dockyards to the sea, for launching a craft, and for the operation of a sailing ship (raising and lowering sails, using oars, raising the anchor, and other duties). Each of these has a specific name, such as al-khatifah for raising a sail and al-rafi‘ah for lowering a sail. Al-Nahim are songs of the pearl divers that express hope and encouragement for the divers because in the past diving was a dangerous occupation. The most important of the pearling songs is the type called al-fajari, which includes specific subtypes called al-‘adsani, al-bahri, al-hadadi, al-makhlufi, and al-Hasawi. There is little difference between them except for the rhythms used, whether a 16/8, 12/8, or 6/8 beat. Al-fajari gets its name from the Arabic word fajar, or dawn, because many sea activities begin at dawn. Al-fajari allows for a large number of participants in the chorus, in essence all of a ship’s crew. The songs are lead by a main singer who begins with a mawwal, or voice solo, which displays his vocal range. The mawwal is followed by the tanzilah when the percussion begins. The percussion includes two medium-sized, double-headed drums called taws that set the main rhythms. They are joined by four or five smaller mirwas, around ten tar, and four or five jihal, which are a type of large jar struck on the top by the open palm to produce a loud hollow sound.

AGRICULTURAL WORK SONGS Many of the agricultural work songs are connected with date cultivation, and because of the importance of date agriculture in Bahrain the major share of these songs are from the island nation. Bahrain differs from the other Gulf States in the fact that the Persian-speaking Baharnah were engaged primarily in intensive agriculture, whereas for most of the rest of the region dates were part of a wider set of economic activities that included seasonal pearling and raising livestock. As a result a majority of the songs that deal with agriculture and agricultural labor are from Bahrain. The Baharnah are Shi‘ites and their songs for harvest and threshing are dominated by themes of deep sorrow for the death of Shi‘ism’s martyred Imams ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, and more especially for his son Hussein. There is little that differs between these songs and those that are specifically religious are generally referred to as maddah. The two main types from Bahrain, tarinbu and jalwah, contain frequent mention of the sad conditions of contemporary

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life for Shi‘ites and regrets for not being able to come to the aid of Imam Hussein. The radhah is sung by women accompanied by tasfiq and again generally expresses sadness. The majalisi originated in the Rifa‘a region of central Bahrain but is found in Qatar and Kuwait among seamen and pearl divers. Ethnomusicologists have noted that although this type of song is from the region in Bahrain where the Bani ‘Utbah settled in large numbers, the music is not of Bedouin origin. Majalisi songs can be sung by an individual or by a group and are sung in situations where men and women are allowed to mingle together. Several tabl and tar players who provide the beat for several dancers who wave a freshly cut piece of cane in their hands accompany the singing. The song and dance are performed only in areas where agriculture is also an important economic activity. Other songs related to the agricultural cycles are those connected to harvests and threshing cereal crops. Many of these are work songs to help with the rhythm of cutting and stacking bundles of wheat shafts, in the actions of threshing and winnowing wheat and other cereals, in cutting bunches of dates, and other work situations. The songs help with the passing of time for hard and tedious work as well as keeping the work going at a regular pace. Other harvest songs are those connected to dances performed by men, and only men, to celebrate the end of the harvest season. For many in the Gulf region, the harvest season occurred just before the hot weather began and the start of the pearling season. There are also women’s songs that accompany such work activities as pounding and grinding wheat and other cereals. The main beat is the fall of the heavy wooden pestle into a large wooden mortar. In the past women cracked and ground large amounts of wheat in preparation for the month of Ramadan when several meals were made with harisah, or cracked wheat. For around eight days following the middle of Sha‘aban women would gather to be sure each family had enough harisah to last the month of Ramadan. The work was accompanied by a good deal of joy and men joined in performing dances to the beat of the pestles.

WEDDING MUSIC Traditional weddings last over five to six days in preparation for the final wedding day. Each of the steps in the preparation is accompanied by songs and dances performed at separate parties for the bride and the groom, although traditionally they were more for the bride than for the groom. Each day or night was marked by parties and gatherings separated by gender with all-female music groups hired to perform at the women’s parties and all-male groups for the men’s parties. In the Hijaz two types of wedding song styles were performed mainly by men that are still part of Hijazi weddings: majas and danah. The majas is sung by a professional male singer called a jassis who improvises praise poems for the groom and congratulates both families on the marriage. The danah songs are not improvised but are part of a large corpus of old songs passed on from generation to generation that are characterized by the intricate movement up and down the different maqamat, or modes.

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Women’s groups are still often asked to perform on the wedding night at a special party for the bride and the female guests called haflat al-zafaf. During their performance a wide range of songs are sung, including sammari and the Hijazi majrur, which make use of instruments such as the ‘ud and a large number of tar. In the Gulf region many of the professional all-female music groups were composed mainly of women from freed slave origins because music and dance were among the professions open to them. Wedding parties in the United Arab Emirates and some of the other Gulf States include performances of music and dance more associated with Bedouin traditions. These include dances such as al-‘Ayalah and al-Razif. These dances are accompanied by a group of drummers playing various tabl and tar who walk up and down between two rows of men facing each other. The two rows of men link arms or stand shoulder to shoulder with the right hand free to hold a camel stick or sword. The lines sway from side to side, moving the stick or sword to the beat of the music. In the past these dances were part of the military display of a tribe and the poems even today often refer to the honor of the tribe and past glories. In Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait such dances are often called al-‘Ardhah, which means display, and have become are part of most celebrations, including weddings.

BEDOUIN MUSIC Bedouin music plays an important role in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf States, although Bedouin have never been a majority of the region’s population. Bedouin music generally has been more vocal than instrumental and even today Bedouin use few instruments. The main Bedouin instrument is the one-string fiddle or rababah, sometimes called rabab. The rababah has a wide, flat, square body for the sound box and is made of wood covered in goat leather and a short, unfretted neck. The string is often made of horsehair although it can be made from gut as well. The string is played with a large horsehair bow. The instrument is placed on the player’s knee and held upright. The rababah has a doleful sound and is used as background for sung poetry. The rababah is the instrument of a shaykh’s tent and accompanies traditional hospitality. The poet, always a man, demonstrates his skills of improvisation as well as may be asked to sing familiar old pieces of poetry describing past events or tribal genealogies. Tribal poets are the historians of their people and their songs are used to settle arguments over water and grazing rights as well as for entertainment. Drumming is another element of Bedouin music. In the Najd, Qasim, and the Eastern Province large drum groups of up to fifty men are traditional. Such drum groups were and remain an important part of tribal honor and display of valor. Drum groups accompany all of the main dances such as al-‘Ardhah, al-‘Ayalah, and al-Razif noted above. Certain styles of drumming have become more widespread such as the style from Ta’if called majrur, in which twelve small tar play together. Drum styles from the Najd and Qasim have come to dominate in many public performances of al-‘Ardhah to such an extent that many now call the dance al-‘Ardhah al-Najdiyah. The most beautiful of these to watch are from the Qasim

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and Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia where the drums are decorated with large, colorful, woolen tassels and the drummers sway them up and down and back and forth in unison as they play them and sing.

CONTEMPORARY MUSIC Contemporary music in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia began in the 1950s. King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz of Saudi Arabia (1902–1953) had enforced the Wahhabi ban on most music and dance in public places, but in much of the country music continued to be played in private settings. When King Sa‘ud ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz succeeded his father, the ban was lifted and Saudi singers were able to have their music heard on the radio and to sold in the market. Much of the early recordings were of short songs noted for their lilting sound and singers such as Talal Maddah (1940–2000) became known to a wide audience in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Many of his early songs have remained popular for nearly five decades. Kuwaiti and Bahraini singers faced no official disapproval from the side of the ruling families and were the first in the region to record with local companies. Records of local music, especially of sawt, were available as early as the 1930s and local music was broadcast by Gulf radio stations along with the more widely distributed singers from Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Kuwaiti and Bahraini singers were influenced by songs in Egyptian musical films and those broadcast from Cairo’s powerful radio station Sawt al-‘Arab, or Voice of the Arabs, as well as popular Indian musical films. The first Gulf-style song to become a hit in the Arab world outside of the Gulf region was in 1976 with Maqadir by the Saudi singer Talal Maddah. The song’s tempo and rhythmic patterns were so different from the usual ones in most Egyptian and Lebanese songs that it immediately appealed to the listener. The use of different types of drums beating out their own rhythms created a complicated, syncopated sound. As a result there was an eager audience for more music from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region. In a televised interview in 1996, the Saudi singer ‘Abd al-Majid ‘Abdallah said that among the main reasons why Gulf and Saudi music has become popular throughout the Arab world is that there are over twenty different rhythmic patterns in their music, whereas Egyptian and Lebanese popular music use less than ten. Other Arabs who had dismissed the region as a backwater of Arab culture were surprised to hear such sophisticated music. In addition, many in the Arab world had grown tired of the formulaic Egyptian and Lebanese “Ya Habibi” pop songs with unimaginative words. Songs from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf used poems of recognized high quality, which attracted Arab listeners. There cooperation began between local poets (some of them princes of the ruling houses such as the Saudi Amir Khalid al-Faysal and Emirati Amir Muhammad bin Rashid al Maktum) and singers that continues today. Other singers from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait such as Muhammad ‘Abduh and Nabil Sha‘il became well known to the wider Arab audience and their music was not only available in the markets but were heard on radio and television. Muhammad ‘Abduh is from the Hijaz, and many of his songs have a definite “Hijazi” sound, but he has made several albums, including a multivolume series

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of Saudi folksongs from many different regions of the country. Muhammad ‘Abduh remains one of the best-known singers from Saudi Arabia. He carefully chooses the poems he will sing and each of his new albums is guaranteed to have lyrics of the highest literary quality. Nabil Sha‘il is the gentle giant from Kuwait. His soprano voice belies his huge size and height. Standing over six feet tall and weighing well over 200 pounds, his light, lilting voice seems to be coming out of the wrong mouth. Nabil Sha‘il’s album Ana Mansak became an instant hit in 1987. The title song, Ana Mansak, was quickly adopted by Jordanian Television as theme music during major evening announcements. Other singers from Kuwait became well known during the 1980s and 1990s, such as ‘Abdallah al-Ruwayshid. Al-Ruwayshid sang several songs that fell generally into the category of sammari and found great popularity with the growing Gulf and Saudi market as well as in countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. His popularity in Egypt began as a direct result of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which caught many Kuwaitis outside of the country. Kuwaiti singers held concerts on behalf of Kuwait’s cause in Arab capitals such as Cairo, and also sang at local parties and concerts for New Year’s and other holidays exposing more Arab listeners to their music. Following the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, Cairo briefly became a center for Gulf music. The 1990s saw several Saudi and Gulf singers rise to major stardom as had never happened before. The Saudis ‘Abd al-Majid ‘Abdallah and Rashid al-Majid are not only stars in the whole Arab world, but have large sales of their albums in Europe, North America, and Asia. In North Africa their albums rival the popularity of such Algerian Rai stars as Shab Khalid and Shab Mami. The famous Tunisian singer Lutfi Bushnaq released an album of all Gulf-style music called Layla fi al-‘Iraq in 1997, as has the Lebanese singer Diana Hadad. The Kuwaiti singers Muhammad al-Balushi and Asalah have been able to capitalize on the growing popularity of the Gulf sound among Arab listeners and they have a wide following. Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have several well-known international stars. The Bahraini female singer Ahlam became an instant star with her first album, Ahabak Mawt, released in 1997. Ahlam takes her inspiration mainly from the folk traditions of the Gulf, and her deep, powerful voice could do justice to any American blues or jazz song. Samar is a member of the al-Nahyan ruling house of Abu Dhabi, and her first album simply called Samar 2000 in 2000 was also a major hit, but perhaps not to the same degree as Ahlam. Samar seems to take more of her inspiration from the general sound of Gulf pop rather than her own Bedouin roots. The United Arab Emirates has several other singers whose music has been able to find popularity outside of the Gulf region—Muhammad al-Mazim, Muhayid Hamad, and ‘Abdallah Bilkhayr. Muhammad al-Mazim has experimented with combining the Gulf sound with other styles of Arabic music, especially Moroccan. He noted the similarities between traditional Moroccan clapping called al-daqqah al-Marrakshiyah with Gulf tasfiq and has used both of them in his music. One song, Mizyan Bizaff, even takes its name from the Moroccan phrase mizyan bizaff, meaning things are good. Muhayid Hamad celebrates his Bedouin origins and that of the Abu Dhabi emirate in his music. It has a strong folk element that appeals even to the most sophisticated urbanite.

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‘Abdallah Bilkhayr clearly has fun when he sings and his music is full of merriment. His musical videos are lively and even contain parodies of himself by wellknown Arab comedians such as the Kuwaiti Dawud Hussein. Bilkhayr takes a good deal of his musical inspiration from the traditions around pearling and seafaring, especially for his ablum Bilkayr wa 200,000 released in 2007. Even some of the dance routines in his videos are based on the traditional sailors’ dances. In recent decades another type of Emirati music has gained a good deal of popularity. These are the male choruses called firqat al-harbiyah. Firqah harbiyah refers to the fact these were originally songs about war and war deeds. They were to inspire warriors to valor or to celebrate their return from a successful raid. Today most of the harbiyah songs are about unrequited love; a young man who is unable to tell a girl of his love. He watches from afar as she goes about her life often unaware of how her very glance pierces his heart. Harbiyah are often accompanied by dances such as al-‘Ayalah and most harbiyah groups perform such dances while singing. Oman has its own popular musical scene that is overshadowed by that of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. Omani music has a somewhat different set of rhythms with a strong influence from East Africa. Swahili music called tarab from Zanzibar and the coastal regions of Kenya and Tanzania can be considered part of Omani music not only in instrumentation, but also in modes used and even the use of Arabic lyrics. Omani popular music is less well known than that of Saudi Arabia or Kuwait outside of the region, but within the region it has a well-established place. Omani singers such as Salim bin ‘Ali, Mubarak al‘Asiri, ‘Ali al-Hakmani, and Muhammad al-Barakat are well known in the United Arab Emirates and are popular with the Emiratis. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates have set up sound studios and produce their own labels. Kuwait was among the first and its major company al-Nazir is one of the largest distributors of Gulf music. Saudi Arabia’s Stallion and Rotana are also major producers of not only Gulf and Saudi music but of record singers from several Arab countries as well. The United Arab Emirates has several companies, including Vanilla that records and re-records Hindi film and pop music. See also Calendar; Ethnic Groups; Literature: Classical and Contemporary.

FURTHER READING Dubai Municipality. Folk Songs and Dances: The United Arab Emirates. Dubai: Archeology and Museum Section, 1996. Matar, Bulus. Khalij Aghani. Beirut: Dar al-Muthallath, n.d. Olsen, Poul Rovsing. Music in Bahrain. Moesgaard, Denmark: Jutland Historical Society, 2002. Touma, Habib. The Music of the Arabs. New York: Hal Leonard, 1996.

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Mutawwa Sebastian Maisel A mutawwa is a special police force in Saudi Arabia that enforces the moral aspects of Shari‘ah law under the authority of the Saudi government. The formation of this special force is justified by the Qur’anic rule to promote virtue and prevent vice. A special commission under the same title controls public moral and behavior. They see themselves in compliance with the Islamic requirement of the hisbah authority, a market inspector and upholder of public morals. The members of the commission are called mutawwiyun, volunteers in Arabic, because they voluntarily join the organization in order to protect the Islamic character of the society. They are authorized to arrest suspects, but not to prosecute them. Among their tasks is to observe the Islamic rule of ikhtilat, the unlawful mixing of men and women who are not married or closely related. Therefore, they check on couples in public places to verify their legal status. They ban and confiscate products that are considered un-Islamic, such as Barbie dolls, some Western music and films, and merchandise for non-Islamic holidays such as Christmas or Valentine’s Day. The mutawwiyun also pay attention to the compliance with Islamic dietary regulations, such as the prohibition of pork and alcohol sales, consumption, and production, and more commonly today, drug trafficking. Other tasks include the prevention of irtidad (apostasy), which is considered a crime punishable with death for the convert and the missionary, the prosecution of homosexuality and prostitution, and ensuring shop closures during prayer time. They also report success in combating popular religious expressions such as witchcraft, sorcery, or the production and sale of traditional medicine (e.g., aphrodisiacs or other fertility enhancers). Although they are supposed to patrol with members of the regular police force, the mutawwiyun often act on their on accord. The committee and it 3,500 members are exempt from public control and follow direct orders from the Saudi king. Traditionally, the Islamic ruler appointed the muhtasib, or market inspector. On March 11, 2002, fifteen girls died during a fire in a school in Makkah; fifty others were severely injured. Members of the Committee prevented the girls from leaving the burning building and the rescue teams from entering it. Their reason was that the girls were not wearing the mandatory body and face cover and would be exposed to unrelated men. In 2007, two detainees died in custody of the committee. These and other incidents led to public criticism and sometimes violence against the committee and its members. The Saudi government reacted by announcing an administrative reform of the committee. From then on, the mutawwiyun can still arrest suspects but have to deliver them immediately to the next police station, where it will be determined if they are to be prosecuted. In addition, a new department of rules and regulations was created within the committee to ensure that the mutawwiyun act within the framework of Saudi law. Volunteer missionaries that are not connected with the committee continue to be active propagators of the religious doctrine in daily life. They first appeared in the 1910s, when ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud sent them to the nomadic tribes in

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order to teach them Islam and stimulate them to give up nomadism. Because of their efforts, the powerful force of the Ikhwan movement was established. Those missionaries or mutawwiyun follow a more subtle approach for spreading the message of Islam in its Hanbali/Wahhabi form. See also Madhhab.

FURTHER READING Cook, Michael. Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Al Rasheed, Madawi. A History of Saudi Arabia. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Vogel, Frank. “The Public and Private in Saudi Arabia: Restrictions on the Powers of Committees for Ordering the Good and Forbidding the Evil,” Social Research: An International Quarterly of Social Sciences 70, no. 3 (2003): 749–768.

Mutayr Sebastian Maisel The Mutayr are a large tribal confederation in northeastern Saudi Arabia between Qasim and Kuwait with concentrations around Hafr al-Batin, the Tapline, and al-‘Artawiyah. Until World War II the Mutayr were mostly nomadic, but most segments of the tribe became settled with the consolidation of Saudi power and the economic transformation of the country on the basis of the oil discoveries. Particularly in the area around Buraydah and ‘Unayzah, many Mutayri families gave up nomadism and switched to a settled agricultural life both farming and breeding livestock. The tribe consists of different sections, some of them being of ‘Adnan (northern) and some of them being of Qahtan (southern) origin. Some associate the tribe with the pre-Islamic ‘Adnan tribe of Ghatban, which fought against the Prophet Muhammad in the Battle of al-Khandaq or the Trench in 627. The main sections of the Mutayr are the Alwah and Bureyh. Along with the Harb, ‘Utaybah, and ‘Ajman they are part of the Ahl al-Janub, (people of the south), those Bedouin groups who mainly graze their flocks in Najd and al-Hasa, in contrast to the Ahl al-Shimal, (people of the north, including the ‘Anazah, Shammar, and Dhafir), who are primarily focused on pastures in Syrian Steppes. Mentioned first at the beginning of the fourteenth century in eastern Hijaz, they were long depended from the Sharifs of Makkah. Under pressure from other tribes moving northward such as the Qahtan and ‘Utaybah, and escaping the upheaval in the area between Egyptian, Sharifian, and Wahhabi troops, they left the Hijaz and moved to the east. They reached their current territory during the wars with the Wahhabis in the second half of the nineteenth century only to be subjugated to the Al Rashid and Shammar tribe, who collected taxes and

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tributes from them. After constantly switching sides in the powerstruggle between the Al Sa‘ud and the Al Rashid, the Mutayr finally joined Ibn Sa‘ud’s forces (see ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud). In 1912 the first Ikhwan colony at al-Artaqiyah near Zilfi was founded on their territory and by 1928 had several thousand inhabitants. Here they received religious indoctrination by Wahhabi scholars and volunteers and concurrently were forced into giving up nomadism and taking on farming. The Mutayr established a total of twenty-eight hijrah settlements, such as Awdakh near ‘Unayzah and Qaryat al-‘Ulya’. For more than 200 years the Dushan (Singular Duwaysh) family were the paramount shaykhs of the Mutayr. Faysal al-Duwaysh was one of the most powerful and influential leaders of the Ikhwan; however, he also started their rebellion against Ibn Sa‘ud in 1927 after claims that the latter had abandoned and betrayed the movement by signing border agreements with the British, restricting cross-border raids and recognizing non-Wahhabi authorities. The rebellion was ultimatively crushed at the Battle of Sibilla in 1929, and Faysal al-Duwaysh died in Saudi custody. Ibn Sa‘ud took several notables of the tribe hostage to ensure the obedience of the rest of the tribe, a situation that lasted until 1945. A large section of the tribe also settled in Kuwait and constitutes an important segment of the Kuwaiti population. The tribe has historically been mostly Bedouin, with only a few represantitives among the settled families of Najd and Qasim. One of the most prominent members of the tribe was Shaykh ‘Abd al‘Aziz al-Tuwayjri, military and administrative leader but also well-known scholar and intellectual. Other Mutayris participated in the 1979 occupation of the Great Mosque in Makkah under Juhayman al-‘Utaybi and his rejectionist opposition group. In Kuwait, Hillal al-Mutayri gained fame and fortune through the pearling industry and became the richest merchant of Kuwait of his time. Fatimah alMutayri was the first female tribal member to win a seat in the Kuwaiti parliament.

FURTHER READING Dickson, H.R.P. A Glimpse into Badawin Life in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1951. Hunter, David E., and Philip Whitten. “Mutayr: A Tribe of Saudi Arabian Pastoral Nomads,” in The Study of Anthropology, edited by David Hunter and Philip Whitten. New York: Harper and Row, 1979. Khoury, Philip S., and Joseph Kostiner. Tribes and State-Formation in the Middle East. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990. Kostiner, Joseph. “Saudi Arabia’s Territorial Expansion: The Case of Kuwayt, 1916– 1921,” Die Welt des Islams, New Series 33, no. 2 (1993): 219–234. Rentz, George. “Notes on Oppenheim’s “Die Beduinen,” Oriens 10, no. 1 (1957): 77–89.

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Nabateans Sebastian Maisel The Nabateans were an ancient people in the northwest of the Arabian Peninsula. Originally, they were nomads in the Hijaz but migrated in the third century BC to the north and started to settle. Their political strength was based on their role as middlemen in the trans-Arabian caravan trade. Since the end of the second century BC, they formed an independent kingdom with their capital at Petra in present day Jordan. Nabatean pottery is distinctive in both its extreme thin body and the use of mainly stylized floral patterns. Archeologists can trace the extent of both their kingdom and their trade network by the spread of their pottery. Under Aretas the Third, the Nabatean Kingdom reached from the Sinai Peninsula via the East Bank of the Jordan River to Damascus. Bosra in southern Syria became their northern metropolis, and Mada’in Salih in Saudi Arabia the one in the south. The Nabateans became allies of Rome in 63 BC and supported Rome’s military expeditions into Arabia and in 70 AD supplied troops for the Roman siege of Jerusalem. In 106, the kingdom was incorporated into the Roman Empire as the province of Arabia Petrea, and its inhabitants finally changed from their nomadic habits to people who were predominantly engaged in trade and agriculture. Starting in the second century AD, other Arab tribes began to challenge the rule of the Nabateans; however, they were able to maintain their position in al-Hijr until the fourth century. Then they converted to Christianity and their land was split among the newly emerging Arab powers of the Ghassanids and Himyarites. The Nabateans were farmers, artisans, and merchants. As trading people, they controlled the frankincense, myrrh, and spice trade along the northern part of the caravan route that passed through their main cities; these items were used for Roman rituals. Those commodities were rare and expensive, some of which came from India and China. They levied taxes and minted their own coins. As farmers, they developed sophisticated irrigation techniques. The Nabateans’ language, a dialect of Aramaic, was the lingua franca of northern Arabia until Arabic superseded it. The alphabet, the Northern Arabic script, later evolved into the modern Arabic script. In their religion, the Nabateans combined Hellenistic and Syrian doctrines, such as the worship of Zeus and Atargatis with Arabic ideas. Their main deity was Dusares, the Lord of the Mountains, associated with Dionysus and Zeus, and whose

Nabateans

Nabataen tombs at Madain Salih, Saudi Arabia. Courtesy of Sebastian Maisel.

sanctuary was a large cubic rock shrine in Petra. The female deities Allat and ‘Uzzah (both mentioned in the Qur’an) were also worshipped. The Nabatean state collapsed after a series of devastating earthquakes in the third century and the movement of the main trade routes to the northern oasis city of Tadmur/Palmyra in the Syrian Desert. The city of Petra was finally abandoned in the fourth century after the Emperor Constantine declared Christianity the official region of the empire. Remnants of Nabateans’ culture are common in northern Arabia. In addition to the main centers of Petra and Bosra located in present-day Jordan and Syria, there are a number of Nabatean sites in Saudi Arabia, such as Mada’in Salih (the historical al-Hijr), al-‘Ula’, and al-Bada‘. The Nabateans used outcrops of soft sandstone and literally carved important buildings out of the living stone, creating elaborate facades of columns, statues, and inscriptions. In Saudi Arabia, many of the facades have been defaced as a result of more fundamentalist interpretations about artistic depictions of living things. However, the Saudi government is concerned about the protection of Mada’in Salih as a historical, archaeological, and tourist site and contributes to the protection, restoration, and exploration of the area. See also Arabic Language; Incense.

FURTHER READING Bowersock, G.W. Roman Arabia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994. Glueck, Nelson. Deities and Dolphins: The Story of the Nabataeans. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1965.

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Al Nahyan Healey, John F. The Nabataean Tomb Inscriptions of Mada’in Salih. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1993. Lawlor, John I. The Nabataeans in Historical Perspective. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1974. Shoup, John. Culture and Customs of Jordan. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2007. Taylor, Jane. Petra and the Lost Kingdom of the Nabataeans. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.

Al Nahyan John A. Shoup The Al Nahyan are the ruling family of Abu Dahbi emirate. They are a branch of the Al Bu Falah tribe of the Bani Yas confederation, and although they have been a small section of the tribe, the Al Nahyan have traditionally provided the paramount shaykh for the Bani Yas confederation. The Bani Yas moved toward the Gulf coast during the eighteenth century after first establishing themselves in the two oases of al-‘Ayn and al-Liwa. The Al Nahyan shaykhs first ruled from the oasis of al-Liwa and most of their economy was based on date production and camel pastoralism. Sections of the Bani Yas settled the island of Abu Dhabi after water was discovered there in 1761, but the Al Nahyan did not move there from al-Liwa until 1795 after the death of Shaykh Diyab bin ‘Isa Al Bu Falah. The move was prompted by the increasing interest in pearling and fishing by sections of the Bani Yas that began to settle along the coast. The Al Bu Falah section and the Al Nahyan shaykhs developed a system of seasonal movements to the coast for pearling during the summer and inland to the deserts around the oases of al-‘Ayn and al-Liwa in the winter. As al-‘Ayn developed into the more important oasis for the Al Nahyan, the governorship of the oasis was entrusted in the hands of a close relative of the paramount shaykh on several occasions. The Al Nahyan are related to the Al Maktum. The Al Maktum belong to the Al Bu Falasah section of the Bani Yas, whereas the Al Nahyan belong to the Al Bu Falah of the Bani Yas tribe. The two sections split in the 1830s when the Al Bu Falasah moved further up the coast and took control of Dubai. Al Nahyan grew in power during the nineteenth century starting with Shaykh Tahnun ibn Shakhbut, who ruled from 1818 to 1833. He was assassinated by his brother, Khalifah ibn Shakhbut, who ruled until his death in 1845. He was succeeded by his nephew, Sa‘id, son of the murdered Tahnun. When Sa‘id died in 1855 he was succeeded by his cousin Zayid, the remarkable and able son of Khalifah. Zayid ibn Khalifah was able to bring several difficult and rebellious tribal groups under his control and his willingness to support allied tribes in their disputes gained him reputation. He was also well-known for his abilities to balance Abu Dhabi’s relations with neighboring states, and in many ways he is the true founder of modern Abu Dhabi. He ruled until 1909 and was succeeded by four of his sons as shaykh. His sons were not as able and Abu Dhabi suffered a period of decline

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until Shakhbut bin Sultan succeeded as shaykh in 1928. Shakhbut was not a strong ruler himself, but his brother Zayid was appointed as the governor of al‘Ayn in 1946 and he quickly gained a reputation as strong and just. When Abu Dhabi began receiving oil revenues, Shakhbut was unable to deal with the wealth and was replaced by a family coup by his more able brother, Zayid. Zayid ibn Sultan ruled both as Shaykh of Abu Dhabi and then as President of the United Arab Emirates until his death in 2004. He oversaw the economic boom brought by oil and transformed Abu Dhabi from a poor backwater dependent on dates as the main export to the present. He was succeeded by his son Khalifah ibn Zayid, who took his father’s place as the leader of Abu Dhabi and as President of the United Arab Emirates.

Najd Sebastian Maisel Najd in Arabic is a highland and is the central part of the Arabian Peninsula. As one of the five main regions of Saudi Arabia it is borders the Hijaz with the main religious centers in the west, the Nafud Desert to the north, al-Hasa and the oil fields in the east, and the Empty Quarter in the south. Najd consists of sedimentary plateaus occasionally interrupted by sand deserts and isolated mountains or escarpments, such as the Jabal Shammar or Jabal Tuwaiq, which collect the seasonal rain and drain it through several wadis and oases. Life concentrates around this string of oases in dried riverbeds where irrigation and farming are possible. Geographically, Najd is divided into two parts: Upper Najd is drier and more flat and mostly grazing land, whereas Lower Najd with its escarpment and wadis is the center of oases farming and date groves. Hot and dry summers and cold winters further describe the arid climate of the region with their significant differences in temperature. Summer (samun) and winter (shimal) winds cause sandstorms and dust. Rainfall is scarce and irregular; however, through wells and other irrigation techniques agriculture is possible. Problematic are the rare spring floods in the wadis that destroyed unprotected farmland and settlements, and long-lasting droughts. Topography and weather conditions dictate the life of the population in Najd. The harsh climate and isolated position added to the unique attitude and image of people from Najd. Although Najd is a broad geographical term describing all of central Arabia, the settled area is subdivided into small political entities and enclaves, such as Jabal Shammar, Qasim, al-Washm, al-Arid (Wadi Hanifah), and al-Kharj, which are more meaningful for the individual’s identity. Major towns in Najd include Riyadh (the national capital) Buraydah, Ha’il, ‘Unayzah, Dawadimi, and alKharj. A part of the Najdi population was and to some extent still is nomadic, whereas another large segment is settled. The contradictive lifestyle between the Bedouin and farmers shaped the social development until the unification of the

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third Saudi state under King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud. Prior to that the two lived in a symbiotic relationship where the Bedouin provided protection from the raids of other tribes and used the local market system, and the settled farmers paid tribute to the ruling tribes and sold their produce to the Bedouin. In pre-Islamic times, nomadic tribes populated central Arabia. During the rise of Islam, Najd was known as Yamamah, a kingdom that played an important role in the wars of apostasy under the Caliph Abu Bakr. Since the middle of the seventeenth century, Najd has been home to the emergence of a religious revivalist movement founded by Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab and concurrently the political leadership of the Al Sa‘ud, who made al-Arid and its main settlements Diri‘yah and Riyadh the center of their realm. After the conquest of the Hijaz in 1925 Ibn Sa‘ud was proclaimed King of the Hijaz and Najd and its dependencies. This kingdom was the core of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is what it was called after 1932. After 1970, when the Saudi capital was moved from Jiddah to Riyadh, the region began to push for unifying policies, religious doctrines, and even dress and food regulations according to the standards set by Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab and in contrast to prevailing socioreligious systems in the Hijaz or the Eastern Province. The former capital of the Saudi state, Diri‘yah, was now turned into an open-air museum aimed to preserve the times and styles of life before the oil boom.

FURTHER READING Al-Juhany, Uwidah Meraireek. Najd before the Salafi Reform Movement: Social, Political, and Religious Conditions during the Three Centuries preceding the Rise of the Saudi State. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2002. King, Geoffrey. “Traditional Najdi Mosques,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 41, no. 3 (1978): 464–498. Musil, Alois. Northern Negd, a Topographical Itinerary. New York: American Geographical Society, 1928. Al Rasheed, Madawi. A History of Saudi Arabia. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Philby, Harry St. John B. “Southern Najd,” The Geographical Journal 55, no. 3 (1920): 161–185. Vassiliev, Alexei. The History of Saudi Arabia. London: Saqi Books, 1998.

Najran (City) Sebastian Maisel The city of Najran is located in a fertile wadi in the Saudi-Yemeni border area and is surrounded by the slopes of the Asir Mountains in the west and the edge of the Empty Quarter in the east. The population of Najran rose from 50,000 in the 1970s to 250,000 in 2004. The main urban center is a cluster of smaller

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towns and villages spread over the fertile valley between plantations, orchards, and fields that are watered by the Wadi Najran stream. The area is considered a separate cultural region connecting Yemen with central Arabia. This is mostly visible in the architecture. Traditional mud brick and adobe houses reflect on the desert climate, whereas stylistic and decorative influences link the area to Asir and Yemen. The common architectural pattern—tall, multistoried towers— indicate that the houses were built for defense purposes because of the area’s constant political unrest. The main source of income was agriculture, both farming and animal husbandry. In current times, agrarian production has increased, especially wheat, barley, sorghum, and corn, but less in comparison to the central region, where the government invested the most. In the past the city was also known for its textiles. Because of its water sources and fertile grounds, Najran was settled long before Islam. Mentioned first in the seventh century BC in relation to the Sabaean Kingdom, the city flourished alongside the expanding South Arabian culture and frankincense and myrrh trade routes (see incense). From Najran, the ancient Ragma went on a caravan route via Hagar and Dilmun all the way to Mesopotamia. It was destroyed by the Roman expedition of 24 BC, which tried but failed to reach the incense-producing regions of southern Arabia. The city recovered from the Roman destruction and in the fifth and sixth centuries had a sizable Christian community. King Dhu Nawas, who wanted to convert the population to Judaism, massacred most of them. The bodies were afterward thrown into a ditch, for what the event became known in Islamic history as the Day of the Ditch, Yawm al-Ukhdud. The main remnant of the ancient fortification of Najran is still referred to as Ukhdud. The stone masonry used to build these impressive walls and towers indicates the great skills and sophistication of Najrani craftsmen. The end of the Christian-Himyarite era began in the beginning of the seventh century when many tribes and rulers converted to Islam. Najran was occupied in 631 without resistance. The Bishop negotiated a treaty with Muhammad in which the population of Najran had to pay an annual tribute but was allowed to practice their religion. In the following centuries, most people converted to Islam. Today, a significant Shi‘ite community, belonging to the Isma‘ili or Sevener branch of Shi‘ism, lives in and around the city. In 1935, the city was incorporated into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia according to the Treaty of Ta’if. Prior to this the area was contested between the Al Sa‘ud and the Imam of Yemen. Only after the unification of Saudi Arabia did Najran experience change and development similar to other areas in the kingdom. The government invested largely in the city’s infrastructure; for example, they built a dam over the wadi in order to control flooding and conserve water. Highways connect Najran with Asir and Riyadh and an airport was built. The Faysaliyah quarter became the new administrative center of Najran; however, the old city around the emir’s palace, known as Qasr al-Imarah, remained the economical heart of the city with the markets, shops, and mosques. The former palace of the governor, built around the time of the Saudi takeover, has been restored and turned into an open-air heritage and history museum. The castle represents Najran’s traditional architecture; it was built of overlapping slanted mud courses, which was meant to withstand earthquakes. The interior is divided

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into areas for the family, servants, guests and contains a public meeting room (majlis). All window frames, doorways, and the entire roofline are decorated with white gypsum to retard erosion. Traditional houses and the archaeological sites at Ukhdud are considered the tourist highlights of the city, and thus receive funding from the government. See also Najran (Region)

FURTHER READING Hamza, Fuad. “Najran,” Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 22 (1935): 631–640. Minosa, Tchekof. Najra—Desert Garden of Arabia. Paris: Scorpio Editeur, 1983.

Najran (Region) Sebastian Maisel Najran is a region in southwestern Saudi Arabia where a large fertile oasis is located in a valley and dried riverbed that rises in the western border to form the Asir Mountains, and floats on its eastern side into the sand desert of the Empty Quarter. The area is identical with the administrative region/province of Najran and its capital, the city of Najran. With a total area of 58,000 square miles, Najran is a medium-size province in Saudi Arabia and has the longest borderline with neighboring Yemen. The region has a population of less than half a million people. Most of them (seventy percent) work in the agricultural sector. The soil in the wadis is very fertile because of its high concentration of sediments. It allows for growing barley, millet, and extensive date groves. Many still live a seminomadic lifestyle that includes animal husbandry, specifically sheep and goat herding. Additional water sources became available with the construction of the second largest dam in Saudi Arabia, the al-Madik Dam. Since ancient times, Najran was an important trading place and mentioned first in the seventh century BC, when it was under the influence of the Sabaeans of Marib and other south-Arabian kingdoms. It was an important section of the incense route, bringing spices, frankincense, and myrrh to the worship places in the Middle East. Roman troops under Aellius Gallus reached Najran in 24 AD and initiated political and cultural changes. In the fifth and sixth century AD, a large Christian community lived in Najran, but was largely massacred in 524 by the Yemeni Jewish King Dhu Nawas. Some 20,000 Christians under the leadership of their bishop, Arethas, refused to convert and were subsequently killed and thrown in a ditch, ukhdud in Arabic. The local name for the area is still Ukhdud. The region has impressive pre-Islamic ruins that are indicative of the sophisticated level of craftsmanship from that time. They also contain a variety of inscriptions, many of them in Thamudic language. The Prophet Muhammad sent official letters to the religious communities of his world, among them two

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letters to the Christians of Najran. They responded with sending their own delegation to Madinah in order to discuss the two religions and to find common ground. Although the Christians did not accept Muhammad’s message, they signed a treaty that regulated the relations between the two communities. On the basis of the payment of a head tax, the Christians were considered a protected minority with regard to life, religion, and property. After some fighting in the eighteenth century, the local tribes joined forces with the Wahhabi movement and swore allegiance to the Al Sa‘ud. But, only in 1934 in the conclusion of the Saudi-Yemeni War did the Najran area finally come under Saudi jurisdiction. One reason for the quick Saudi victory in this campaign was the local support of Isma‘ili groups that resented the Zaydi Imam, himself a member of the competing Shi‘a group. The Isma‘ilis of Yemen belong to the Makarimah group, which does not follow the main stream Isma‘ilis, who generally follow the Agha Khan. In early 1960s, the area was drawn into the Yemen civil war when Saudi Arabia supported the Imam of Yemen against the republican forces. In response, the Egyptian Air Force, which supported the government, attacked and bombed the Saudi city of Najran several times, an important hub to supply the royalists with weapons and other equipment. By now, Najran has several ethnic and religious groups living together in one area. The Sunni Arabs still form the majority, but Shi‘ites, belonging to the Isma‘ili sect, count for a significant minority. Intensive migration since the oilboom has changed the demographic landscape; however, the closeness and similarity to Yemeni culture is obvious. More than 50,000 followers on the Saudi side of the border and an additional 30,000 on the Yemeni side make the Isma‘ilis, who mostly belong the al-Yam tribe, an influential group. Their rituals and doctrines often do not confirm with mainstream Wahhabi beliefs; for example, they celebrate ‘Ashurah, the commemoration of the death of Imam Hussein ibn ‘Ali, a Shi‘a ceremony that is illegal in Saudi Arabia to celebrate. In the recent past, the Saudi government tried to persuade the Isma‘ilis to keep a low profile with their religious expressions by offering financial incentives and political representation to one of their tribal leaders, Shaykh ‘Ali bin Musallam; however, the money might not have reached all tribal members and allegations of corruption were heard. Generally, the Isma‘ilis of Najran feel that they are entitled to the same legal and religious improvements as their fellow Shi‘ites in the Eastern Province. Until then, tensions remain high and violence erupts occasionally, such as in April 2000. See also Holidays and Festivals: Islamic.

FURTHER READING Hamza, Fuad. “Najran,” Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 22 (1935): 631–640. Minosa, Tchekof. Najran—Desert Garden of Arabia. Paris: Scorpio Editeur, 1983. Philby, Harry St. John B. Arabian Highland. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1952. Shahid, Irfan. The Martyrs of Najran. New Documents. Bruxelles: Soc. Des Bollandistes, 1971.

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Newspapers Sebastian Maisel Before the introduction of print media, oral communication was the main tool for disseminating information. Public debate did not occur in the media, but in the weekly meetings of social and political leaders, the so-called majlis. The first newspapers were published around World War I in the Hijaz around the time when it became independent from the Ottomans. Mostly family owned, they were more interested in conveying political and cultural news and opinions than in making profit. The prominent Umm al-Qura newspaper was initially a weekly literary journal until it turned into the official announcer of Royal decrees and other legal and political events. Two other newspapers from that time reached a larger audience in the Hijaz, Sawt al-Hijaz and al-Madinah al-Munauwarah, both of which reappeared after a break during World War II, during which only Umm al-Qura continued to be published. In the early days of Saudi Arabia, daily newspapers came out of Jiddah, until the discovery and profitable production of oil changed the demographics and the economic and political setup of the kingdom. Since then schools have been built and the level of illiterate Saudi has dropped sharply. Advanced publishing and distribution technologies also led to a major growth in demand and supply of newspapers. In the Eastern Province and the capital Riyadh new dailies emerged, turning the print media into a nationwide operation. Saudi newspapers have always been privately owned; usually influential business families published their newspaper, until in 1963 a new press law called for multiple ownerships and professional management. Today, two major publishing companies, al-Yamamah and Saudi Research and Marketing Group (SRMG), own most of the domestic newspapers and some Middle Eastern newspapers, like al-Sharq al-Awsat and al-Hayat. After the 1960s began an era in which newspapers were actually read, trusted, and used as a primary source of information. Problematic was the high percentage of foreigners among the journalists, mostly from other Arab countries. Qualified local journalists were hard to find, which explains the lack of coverage of domestic affairs (besides the fact that investigative journalism with critical reports on local issues was not promoted). The boosting economy and market economy used newspapers for advertisement and promotions. Although privately owned, newspapers in the Gulf region were still subject to official control and censorship, particularly those from Saudi Arabia. The government appoints and dismisses publishers and editors. Furthermore, members of the ruling family bought out some newspapers and maintained the majority in the large publishing companies. Thus, from the beginning, Saudi newspapers were less critical of the government than Western newspapers, because the coverage reflected official opinions and served the better good of the society (i.e., critical voices on religious or administrative shortcomings were not encouraged in order to keep up the public moral). In 1991, with the threat of a military attack by Saddam Hussein, the Saudi government did not inform the population about the ongoing crisis; however,

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most Saudis were listening to foreign stations, newspapers, or other sources of information. This was a turning point in the Saudi approach of media strategies and led to an active agenda to become the Middle East leader in the media market and control. On the other hand, it led to an increasing outreach to other media sources, such as electronic and broadcasted media. Today, newspapers generally reach only certain social groups, mainly intellectuals, politicians, and other journalists, whereas the masses in the street either watch a satellite program or used old fashion oral communication (of course through the new medium of the mobile phone) to get the desired information. Ownership of a newspaper can lead to the newspaper success or failure. When a newspaper is owned by a member of the royal family or someone who is like to them, the paper is then regarded as an official paper and thus less frequently bought. Public opinion on official outlets, such as television stations, newspapers, or radio programs, is rather low. Often the only page that readers look at is the scoreboard of the local football teams. Readers know not to expect critical or objective reports on hot topics such as religion, the ruling family, or domestic politics. Too often newspapers have been banned, closed down, or an editor fired over the coverage of one of those topics. The newspapers, as other media outlets do also, enforced a high level of self-censorship. Whatever is left will still be read by official censors and if needed blackened out. In summary, newspapers in the Gulf are characterized as very loyal press.

MAIN NEWSPAPERS The main newspapers from Saudi Arabia include: al-Sharq al-Awsat, al-Hayat, al-Riyadh, al-‘Ukaz, al-Watan, al-Yawm, al-Jazirah, Arab News, and Saudi Gazette. In Kuwait, al-Watan, al-Qabas, al-Ra’i al-‘Aam, Arab Times, and Kuwait Times are the leading newspapers. Major daily newspapers from Bahrain are Akhbar alKalij, al-Ayam, al-Wasat, Bahrain Tribune, and Gulf Daily News. Qatar is home to al-Watan, al-Rayah, al-Sharq, Gulf Times, and Qatar Tribune. Al-Bayan is the leading Arabic daily from Dubai. Gulf News from Dubai and Khaleej Times from Abu Dhabi are the leading English newspapers from the United Arab Emirates. Among the popular dailies from Oman are al-Watan, Oman Observer, and Times of Oman.

FURTHER READING Al-Haqeel, Abdallah. “A Comparative Analysis of International News in a Kuwait and Saudi Arabian Newspaper.” MA Thesis, Ball State University, 1986. Al-Heezan, Mohammed. “Foreign News in the Saudi Newspapers.” MA Thesis, Ball State University, 1987. Hafez, Kai, and David L. Paletz. Mass Media, Politics, and Society in the Middle East. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 2003. Miller, Brett A., Shannon E. Martin, and David A. Copeland. The Function of Newspapers in Society: A Global Perspective. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2003. Rugh, William. Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio, and Television in Arab Politics. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004.

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Nizwa John A. Shoup Nizwa is one of the ancient cities of Oman located in the al-Dakhiliyah Region at the foot of Jabal al-Akhdar. It is located about eighty-six miles (140 kilometers) inland from the modern capital of Masqat. Nizwa’s population is estimated to be around 70,000, which includes the population of some forty-three villages and towns of Birkat al-Mawz and Jabal al-Akhdar. Nizwa is among the oldest and most important cities in Oman. It served as the capital of the country for several ruling dynasties and since 793 its main mosque was where the Ibadi Imams were elected. There are several important mosques in the city such as the Su’al Mosque built in 629, the al-Shawathinah Mosque built sometime before 724, and the Sharjah Mosque built in 727. The main mosque located just outside of the main market was completely rebuilt in the 1970s by Sultan Qabus in a quasi-Indian style and is one of the main landmarks in the city today. Nizwa’s old city is dominated by the fort built by Imam Sultan bin Sayf bin Malik al-Ya‘arubi in the 1650s. The site chosen was next to an older fort that dates back to the ninth century, parts of which were incorporated into the one built by Imam Sultan bin Malik. The fort took some twelve years to complete and is the largest fort in Oman, standing 114 feet (thirty-five meters) high with a foundation that extends ninety-eight feet (thirty meters) into the ground. The great central round tower has a diameter of 147 feet (forty-five meters) with a full 360° view of the countyside. It was originally armed with over 400 cannons and until the Jabal al-Akhdar War was deemed impregnable. In the 1950s the tower was bombed by the British Royal Air Force in support of Sultan Sa‘id bin Taymur’s conquest of the city. The fort, along with other parts of old Nizwa’s core, was rebuilt in the 1990s. Nizwa is famous for its markets and for several handicrafts. The market is one of the two most important (the other being Muttrah) in Oman, bringing in villagers and Bedouin from a wide area. The livestock market and auction is held nearly every day but Friday morning is the main day. Cattle, sheep, and goats are the main animals offered for sale. Nizwa’s crafts in silver, copper, swords, daggers, weaving, and leather are sought after in Oman and the United Arab Emirates and its silver and copper crafts have a ready international market among collectors. Nizwa made daggers or khanjars and silver mounted rifles are among the local specialties. Nizwa sits within a massive date grove supported by three major aflaj. The oldest of these is called Falaj Daris, which has been declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site. It is the largest falaj in Oman, and local history says it was built during the Persian occupation of Oman and is named for the Persian Shah Darius. The other two aflaj are Falaj al-Ghantuq and Falaj Dhut, both of which date from later Islamic periods. The oasis around Nizwa stretches five miles (eight kilometers) along the courses of two dry streambeds, Wadi Kalbuh and Wadi al-Abyadh. Nizwa’s farmers grow over forty varieties of dates and are able to harvest different kinds between early summer and December.

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Since the 1970s Nizwa has seen a boom. It is now connected to the capital by a major highway and it is a major crossroads connecting the southern region of Dhufar with the north and with Buraymi Oasis and the United Arab Emirates. It has two technical colleges, a private university, and a police academy. Since the 1990s Nizwa has successfully promoted itself as a tourist destination—an easy one-and-a-half hour drive from Masqat.

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Oases John A. Shoup The Arabian Peninsula has no permanent streams or lakes, and with low annual rainfall over the vast portion of the landmass, agriculture has been restricted to the small areas of the southwest where rain-fed agriculture is possible and the numerous oases located throughout the Peninsula. The major oases in the Peninsula are Ha’il, al-Hasa, Hufuf, Yathrib/Madinah, Makkah, Dar‘iyah, Liwa, al‘Ayn/al-Buraymi, Nizwa, and Adam. The northern part of the main island of Bahrain is a series of separate oases that have contributed to the prosperity of the island since early antiquity. Humans build all oases; that is, there are no natural oases. Without the interference of humans, oases are no more than small clusters of grasses, a few bushes such as oleander, and a few trees such as tamarisk around a natural spring. Oleanders and tamarisks also grow in wadi bottoms where in some places water may be only a few inches under the surface even during dry times of the year. In the Arabian Peninsula most oases are built around natural springs. The quality of the water varies greatly and a good number have low-quality water with high concentrations of minerals making the water brackish, sometimes too brackish to serve as a source of drinking water. Brackish water can be used for irrigation should there be a good system of drainage canals, but there is always the risk of turning good farmlands into useless fields of salt. Local springs can be supplemented by using underground canals called aflaj or qanat, which can bring a better supply of water from either underground or surface sources. Underground sources are often tapped into at the foot of hills or mountains, whereas surface sources usually tap into seasonal streambeds. In addition to using aflaj, many oases also rely on wells and storage systems. Most homes in oases communities have traditional wells that are deep enough to find cleaner, less brackish water than maybe in the natural springs. In some of the oases deep wells have also been dug next to farm plots and can be used for irrigation using bucket and pulley technologies. Another technique found in some of the oases are storage systems built to catch the runoff from occasional rains using a series of dams along streambeds and/or diversion canals that take the water to large storage tanks that can be used when needed. The pre-Islamic state of Ma’rib in northern Yemen was based on such a system of dams and storage tanks. Irrigation systems require several different layers of canals with those bringing water to the fields at a level

Oases

above the fields and those draining water away lower than the fields. Most oases make use of flood irrigation techniques, but in recent years drip irrigation has been introduced. The soils of oases are also the product of human effort. The natural soils are often shallow, rocky, salty, and/or lacking nutrients. The soils in oases are constantly being made and improved by spreading the fields with straw and manure from animal pens and by using human waste. Both animal and human waste are periodically collected and taken out to the fields where they are worked into the soil along with whatever plant remains there may be from previous crops and/or burned palm fronds. Human waste comes from the traditional toilet, which uses a dry toilet technique. Ash and charcoal from household fires are dumped into the toilet, which reduces odor, acts to dry the fecal material, and causes it to become a fine powder consistency. Soils must be rebuilt between each planting to keep oases among the most productive agricultural lands in the Middle East. A healthy oasis is easy to identify by the layering of its trees and bushes. A healthy oasis has three layers; the loss of the middle layer is a quick indication that an oasis is under stress. The top layer of a healthy oasis is made of a fairly thick canopy of date palms. Dates are a very hardy tree able to survive and even thrive in heat and brackish water. The canopy formed by the fronds of the date palms forms an important cover for the other trees, shrubs, and ground crops. Without the protection provided by the canopy, other more heat-sensitive crops cannot survive. The second layer is made up of trees and bushes such as citrus fruit, nuts, figs, olives, pomegranates, grapes, and henna. The second layer helps protect the ground crops and along with the date palm canopy can reduce the air and ground temperature within the oasis by up to fifteen degrees Fahrenheit. The third layer is composed of ground crops that include wheat and heatsensitive vegetables. Clover or alfalfa is grown as livestock fodder because animals are not allowed to graze freely in an oasis. Some of the oases communities developed close relationships with pastoral nomads who will take care of villagers’ livestock for a share of the date and/or wheat crop. Some of the more powerful Bedouin tribes such as the Shammar, ‘Utub, Bani Yas, and Duru‘ were able to exercise authority over oases communities by taking much of the agricultural production as tax. Historically oases have been prone to conflict over water and land rights. Many of the large oases are composed of numerous small, settled communities each with specific claims to water sources and farmlands. The oasis of al-‘Ayn/alBuraymi is such an example; different communities sought protection of powerful outside forces to guarantee control over their resources. The Dhawahir tribal communities of al-‘Ayn, Jimi, Hili, al-Qattarah, and Mu‘trid gave their allegiance to Shaykh Zayid bin Khalifah of the Bedouin Bani Yas and the shaykh of Abu Dhabi in the late nineteenth century. The Na‘im tribal communities centered on al-Buraymi generally recognized the authority of the Sultan of Oman, although briefly leaders of two of the communities recognized the authority of the Al Sa‘ud family. Similarly, the oasis of Hatta in the Hajar Mountains was claimed by both the Bani Qitab and the Na‘im tribes, who had allegiances to different shaykhdoms (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Umm al-Quwayn) but eventually fell to the shaykhs of Dubai who supported the Na‘im. Oases communities built extensive

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fortifications and until the early twentieth century frequently attacked each other. Such continual conflict among the numerous small oases in the Hajar Mountains caused British interference to impose a final peace in the 1950s. Several of the oases have served as power bases for tribally organized states to emerge. Ha’il was the center of the Al Rashid lineage of the Shammar tribe in northern Arabia. The Al Rashid were able to expand in the nineteenth century, taking the Najd from the rival Al Sa‘ud lineage of the ‘Anayzah and ruling much of the Arabian Peninsula as allies of the Ottoman Turks. The large oasis of Dar‘iyah in the central Najd was the base for the Al Sa‘ud lineage, and the present day capital of Saudi Arabia, al-Riyadh, takes its name from the gardens that used to be there. Adam in Oman was the original home of the ruling Al Bu Sa‘idi family, Nizwa was the capital of the Ibadi Imamate since the eighth century, and nearby Tanuf was the “capital” of the Bani Riyam tribal shaykhs. Liwa was the power base for the Al Bu Falah lineage of the Bani Yas tribe, and their power was greatly enhanced when they were asked to provide protection for the Dhawahir villages of al-‘Ayn. The Al Khalifah lineage of the ‘Utub tribe conquered the Shi‘ite villages scattered through several small oases in the northern part of the island, which helped establish them as the rulers of Bahrain.

FURTHER READING Heard-Bey, Frauke. From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates. Dubai: Motivate Publishing, 2004. Al-Rasheed, Madawi. Politics in an Arabian Oasis: The Rashidis of Saudi Arabia. London: I.B. Tauris, 1997.

Oil Jack Kalpakian Oil, its byproducts, and its refined form are the primary exports of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. It is found in abundance there, and although the region’s exact proportion of world reserves remains uncertain, it is clear that the region contains the vast majority of the easily accessed reserves in the world that are easy to refine. With nearly 260 billion barrels, Saudi Arabia claims for have about twenty-two of the world’s oil reserves; Iraq, 9.7%; Kuwait, 8.3%; the United Arab Emirates 4.65%, Qatar 0.92%; and Oman, 0.27%. All of this oil is by no means a uniform substance. Its chemical composition varies from field to field, and it has to be standardized to a welldefined mixture of substances before it can be further refined and processed into useful fuels, lubricants, and materials like kerosene and gasoline. These standard mixtures themselves vary. Oil is normally a mixture of hydrocarbons, sulfur, nitrogen, and traces of heavy metals, and its value relative to other oils tends to be defined in terms of its American Petroleum Institute (API) specific gravity number (the higher the better, oils with a number lower than ten are heavier than

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water; lighter oils are easier to process) and its sulfur content (the lower the sulfur content, the “sweeter” and more valuable the oil). The crude oils extracted from the ground are not sold on spot and futures markets without being standardized, in terms of content, to resemble a benchmark crude. There are three main standardized crude oils that are sold in sport and futures markets: West Texas, North Sea Brent, and Dubai. The Dubai benchmark crude is delivered at the refinery in Dubai at the United Arab Emirates and is a light, sour crude oil. There have been other traded benchmark crude oils, mainly from Southeast Asia. The lightest and most expensive traded crude is West Texas Intermediate, whose value is further boasted by its low transport costs to consumption centers. There are also dozens of other crude oils, but these tend to be sold by contract by national oil companies at oil terminals. They include the Saudi Arabian light, medium and heavy crude oils, as well as Saudi Berri oil. Saudi Arabian and Gulf States’ oils tend to be light but sulfur rich. Although they tend to need refining, the main obstacle facing the refiner with them is sulfur removal. They tend to generate significantly higher yields of useful fuels than heavier oils. Oils that yield less than half of their weight in fuel tend to be classified as “tars” or bitumen. Saudi Arabia and the Arab members of OPEC use the OPEC reference basket of crude oils to define what constitutes a barrel of oil. As oil prices rose, the definition of what constitutes oil started to change. Tar sands, bitumen reserves, and oil shale began to be classified as potential sources of “unconventional oil.” The classification of these substances as oil would dramatically reduce the importance of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States in terms of their overall reserves. The tar sand fields in Alberta are currently being used to produce oil, and the prospective value of Venezuela’s reserves of Orinoco tar sands has increased in worth to the point where the government there has decided to exclude foreign firms from participating in the commercialization of these resources. If oil shale were to be utilized for a fuel, the United States would have the largest reserves of hydrocarbons. The high oil prices and the relative absence of the discovery of giant or elephant oil fields have meant that oil companies and countries have began to turn to these unconventional alternatives. However, Saudi and Gulf oil reserves are likely to remain important for a long time, precisely because they are relatively easier to get out of the ground. Saudi and GCC declared or “official” reserve figures have been the target of criticism, particularly in the United States. According to Mathew Simmons (the founder of Simmons and Company International—an oil-oriented investment bank), the Ghawar field, which contains more than half of Saudi Arabia’s declared reserves, cannot possibly contain the 125 billion barrels currently claimed for it by Saudi Aramco—the country’s national oil company. Simmons and Company argues that the reserves were last surveyed by Western firms in the 1970s, when Ghawar was said to contain about 60 billion barrels of oil. Since then, the field has produced about 55 billion barrels of oil, so the numbers claimed for the field cannot possibly be accurate, even if an allowance were made for the improvements in recovery and survey technology. Furthermore, none of the Gulf countries have provided field-specific data since 1979. Arab reserves tend to jump upward or remain constant in the face of immense production. These anomalies led to the arguments raised by Simmons and denials by Saudi Arabia, whose

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Aramco executives flew to Washington, D.C. to deny Simmons claims. Nevertheless, the oil industry’s newsletter, the Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, suggested in 2006 that Kuwait’s actual reserves are about half of what it claims. The reluctance of the GCC states to provide actual field-by-field data to outside engineers and consultants lies within their sovereign rights, but the dependence of the world on oil means that there is a community of outside stakeholders who pay for this oil, and they are currently paying over $100 per barrel, which is a historically high price; inevitably, the outside stakeholders are beginning to question the reporting system on reserves. Although price increases are a natural response to increases in demand, especially Chinese and Indian demand, they could also be caused by the GCC states’ inability to supply the world market simply because their fields cannot handle any additional demand. As a result of this uncertainty, Canadian and Venezuelan tar sands are currently the focus of public and private sector attention. If tar sands were counted as “oil,” then one of the dominant sovereignties with regard to oil would be Alberta, a prospect that would be welcomed, no doubt, by most if not all Western powers. But the inclusion of tar sands in the category of “oil” reserves would mean that the locus of global energy policy would shift from Saudi Arabia to not only Alberta but also Venezuela—whose current government has been a source of concern for the United States. Thus, the definition of oil is slowly changing to include unconventional sources whose rise is bound to alter the position of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries. See also Oil Industry.

FURTHER READING Grant, Kenneth, David Ownby, and Steven R. Peterson. Understanding Today’s Crude Oil and Product Markets. A Policy Analysis Study by Lexecon—an FTI Company—for the American Petroleum Institute, 2006. Institute for the Analysis of Global Security. “New Study Raises Doubts about Saudi Oil Reserves,” March 31, 2004. Available at http://www.iags.org/n0331043.htm (last accessed January 28, 2008). Simmons, Mathew R. “Will the Proved Reserve Scandal Open the Door to Genuine Data Reform?” Reserve Reporting Conference, The Energy Forum, Houston, TX, April 14, 2004. Available at http://www.simmonsco-intl.com/files/Reserves%20Reporting.pdf (last accessed January 28, 2008). “Kuwait Oil Reserves Only Half Official Estimates—PIW,” Reuters, January 20, 2006. Available at http://today.reuters.com (last accessed October 14, 2008).

Oil Industry Jack Kalpakian The oil industry in Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries dates to the first half of the twentieth century. Oil was first discovered and developed in Bahrain. Discoveries followed in Iran, Iraq, Kuwait,

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and Saudi Arabia. The first Western firm to develop a relationship with Saudi Arabia was Standard Oil of California (SOCAL), the forerunner of Chevron. SOCAL organized the California-Arabian Oil Company, which became the Arabian American Oil Company, when SOCAL invited other firms to take shares in the enterprise. Eventually, Exxon, Chevron, and Texaco owned thirty percent of Aramco and Mobil held the remaining ten percent in 1933. The Saudi government was allotted sixteen percent of the profits during this early stage. Aramco was incorporated in Delaware as a U.S. company, so it was initially liable to U.S. taxation, although not Saudi taxes, because the kingdom did not have income taxes on corporations or individuals. After World War II, Saudi Arabia bargained with the United States over the oil revenues, and reached an agreement that divided Aramco revenues fifty-fifty between its founders and the Saudi government. The U.S. government agreed to count the Saudi share as “foreign taxes” and thereby ended all Aramco contributions to the U.S. treasury; the cost at the time was about $37 million a year. Saudi Arabia gradually increased its share of Aramco holdings and finally nationalized the firm outright by the late 1980s. Along with nationalizing Aramco, Saudi Arabia began a policy of Saudization of all of its important and decision-making structures. This meant that the company’s American management was gradually replaced by Saudis. The process of transition has not been smooth, and it is very clear the policy has not been completed in the sense that there are many jobs, particularly at the oilrig level, that are still being carried out by foreign workers. Aramco has not only served as the largest firm in Saudi Arabia, but for a long time, it also functioned as the country’s de facto development agency, providing services like roads, pipelines, health care, and schools both for its foreign and Saudi employees. From time to time, there are suggestions of additional subcontracting to the founding firms, but these do not usually bear out. Saudi Aramco has been a great beneficiary, like the state oil firms of other Gulf States, of the obsolescing bargain. As the current firm’s American founders trained local cadres in first operating, then maintaining, then developing, and finally managing local oil fields, they were simply becoming increasingly unnecessary and disposable. Toward the end of the process, they were pushed out. Only in fields that require a more highly developed knowledge infrastructure, such as deep-sea oil operations, do the American firms retain any significant technological advantages. Unlike the past, they are now happy not to share these advantages with the host states, and in Exxon’s case, preferring to leave countries where the price of participation in terms of mandated knowledge and technology transfer is too high. Departure also forces the host country to spend the funds necessary to develop or license technologies it does not possess. Processes that were once a normal part of the business and technology cycles are now subject to negotiation and bargaining, such as the oil fields that are their focus. Aramco is now under complete Saudi control, but even before it became so, the firm was under Saudi authority. It carried out government orders not to ship oil to the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands during the Arab Oil embargo of 1973. In other words, the ownership structure did not matter; as long as the firm operated in Saudi Arabia, it had to obey the Saudi state.

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Aramco was and is the most important oil company in the region, if not the world, but in terms of the Gulf its history is typical. The other GCC states discovered smaller quantities of oil, but they also had far lower populations, which meant their oil wealth allowed them a greater wealth than could be enjoyed in Saudi Arabia. Unlike Saudi Arabia, they were British protectorates, and the history of their respective oil industries shows an attachment to Great Britain as well as to the United States. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company (today’s British Petroleum) founded the Kuwait Oil Company and Gulf Oil (since purchased by Chevron). The company was partially nationalized in 1974 and then completely nationalized in 1975. As with Aramco, nationalism and pan-Arabist sentiment played a role in the politics of nationalization and its aftermath. In Qatar, the local branch of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was the direct forerunner of Qatar Petroleum, with Shell Oil working in the offshore fields. Qatar completely nationalized its oil sector by 1977. In sharp contrast to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States, Oman and Bahrain continue to allow significant foreign minority ownership in their oil fields. Unlike other Gulf States, which turned initially to Western firms, Oman invited the Iraq Petroleum Company in 1925. Oman’s oil company, Petroleum Development Oman, is still partially owned by Shell (thirty-four percent), Total, and Partex (the oil arm of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation), but the Omani state owns a sixty percent controlling interest. Among the seven United Arab Emirates (UAE), only Abu Dhabi and Dubai produce oil in significant amounts. Dubai’s oil is currently important only as an internationally traded benchmark crude, and the emirate’s economy has moved beyond its traditional reliance on the oil industry. In contrast, Abu Dhabi remains greatly dependent on the oil industry, precisely because it has the greatest reserves of oil among all of the members of the UAE with about eighty to ninety percent of the reserves and production. The oil industry there bloomed only after independence, so the colonial or quasi-colonial role was less pronounced there. The oil industry in the Gulf States was largely the product of Western interests and investment. To the extent that the oil belongs to the states there, nationalization was certainly within their rights. Yet, this is a move that will inevitably have consequences in terms of the ownership of property and distribution networks “downstream” (i.e., in the consuming states). It is very difficult to envision circumstances under which the GCC states will be allowed to own downstream facilities after nationalization and the events of September 11, 2001.

FURTHER READING The Bahrain Petroleum Company. “Key Dates.” Available at http://www.bapco.com.bh/ default.asp?action=article&id=37# (last accessed February 20, 2008). Korbin, Stephen J. “Diffusion as an Explanation of Oil Nationalization,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 29, no. 1 (1985): 3–32. Kuwait Petroleum Corporation. “History of Oil in Kuwait.” Available at http://www.kpc. com.kw/index2.htm (last accessed February 20, 2008). Metz, Helen Chapin (ed.). Persian Gulf States: A Country Study. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office for the Library of Congress, 1993.

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Oman Mohamedi, Fareed. “Oil, Gas and the Future of Arab Gulf Countries,” Middle East Report no. 204 (1997): 2–6. Saudi Aramco. “Our Story.” Available at http://www.saudiaramco.com/irj/portal/ anonymous (last accessed February 20, 2008).

Oman Carla Higgins The Sultanate of Oman borders the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. The Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman create its eastern border. Its western border is protected by vast desert plains and the Rub‘ al-Khali desert, which isolates it from much of the Arabian Peninsula. The al Hajar Mountains run north-south and split the west’s desert from the east’s coast, down to the coastal city of Sur. The three natural barriers of desert, mountains, and sea have had a profound effect on the history and development of Oman. Until relatively recently, Oman was divided and known as Masqat (coastal area) and Oman (interior). Oman’s contacts with the world were via the sea on the east, and the coastal area experienced several occupiers. During Oman’s history, power has switched between the interior and coast. In ancient times, Oman had settled populations with industries such as copper mining and frankincense export. In pre-Islamic times, the Persians shaped the entire region, and Oman’s economy was developed by the Persians, who built the qanat or falaj system upon which cultivation depended and settlements grew. In the second century AD, Arab tribal migrations into Oman began in the interior. Among them, the Azd from the Yamamah (Najd), specifically the Azd Shanuah, developed special relationships with the Persian rulers and gained roles of leadership. After the arrival of Islam, the Persians were expelled and power was transferred to the Arabs, specifically, the al-Julanda tribe, in about 630 AD. In about AD 657, Kharijites from West Persia fled to Oman, found new followers, and the tenets of their faith became modified into the Ibadi form, now Oman’s majority religion. By 749 AD the first Ibadi Imamate was established, with Nizwa as its capital. The Imamate successfully unified Oman, promoted trade, and decentralized authority. However, the temporal power of the Imams often led to power struggles among various tribes, and such struggles compelled one or more parties to call for outside assistance—when local tribes called for the assistance of the ‘Abbasids in the ninth century, the ‘Abbasids invaded and ruled till the eleventh century. The Portuguese occupied Masqat from 1507 to 1650 to protect their sea routes and trade. The Ya‘ribah expelled the occupiers and ushered in a period of expansion. Oman’s coast and interior became united under Ya‘ribah imams and an empire developed that included East Africa and portions of India and Pakistan. In 1743 the Persians again occupied Masqat and Sohar, but were expelled by a new leader, Ahmad bin Sa‘id, whose small tribe, the Al Bu Sa‘id, became Oman’s ruling family. Imam Ahmad unified Oman and made Masqat the leading entrepot in the Gulf. Imam Ahmad’s grandson, Hamad, moved the capital from

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Rustaq to Muscat (1786), and began using the title Sultan (Sayyid). Sultan Sa‘id bin Sultan ruled from 1804 to 1856, and expanded the empire, adding Dhufar as well as more of the East African coast. By the 1800s an imam ruled the interior and a sultan ruled the coast. The sultan had British advisors, and British officers ran the army. By the early twentieth century, the imams held greater power, and the sultan held sway only to the extent the tribes respected him. In a 1920 treaty at Sib, the sultan recognized the imam as a spiritual leader with limited jurisdiction over the interior, but did not concede his own sovereignty. In 1938 Sa‘id Bin Taymur became sultan, and by the early 1950s wanted to extend his sovereignty into the interior. The British backed him, as well as the Imam—the goal was to establish borders and to eject the Saudis out of the Buraimi Oasis; they succeeded. Over time, however, the Saudis’ continued claims to the area made the sultan decide they were receiving support from the imam. To challenge the imam, the sultan occupied Ibri, then Nizwa, Rustaq, and annexed the interior on the grounds that the imam had violated the Sib treaty. The imam went into exile, and despite the efforts of his brother Talib to maintain a civil war, the sultan prevailed, and the interior and coast were united. In 1970 the sultan was deposed by his son Qabus because he refused to use the national wealth and kept Oman isolated. Sultan Qabus repealed repressive social restrictions and spent oil resources quickly to begin development. Qabus quickly established an Interim Council to oversee development, and a government was created. Defense was the strongest government department, because the army was engaged in a war in Dhufar and was a major employer. Once oil revenues rose in 1973–1974, the social service ministries of education, health, and public works were created. The war in Dhufar abated as it became clear that the new government would bring a better life to Omanis. In the 1980s government departments became more established and focus was on the development of Masqat and Dhufar. By the 1990s most social services were available in the remotest areas. Although oil income remained critical, efforts were made to diversify into natural gas. In 1990 the Majlis al-Shura was formed to review social and economic policies. Members were selected from each of the sultanate’s fifty-nine districts. Women in the Masqat Governorate participated in the elections and two women were appointed. The Council of Oman was established to provide advice on social and economic affairs. In 1996 Qabus issued the Basic Law of the State, the first written expression of constitutional law in Oman’s history. It enshrined leadership in the sultan, provided for a prime minister, stipulated a free economy, declared all citizens equal, and guaranteed freedom of religion, expression, and the independent judiciary. Oman now has a population of approximately 3.2 million. The Sultan has made gradual political liberalization a continued priority. In 2002 voting rights were extended to all citizens over twenty-one years of age. Women now constitute about thirty percent of the workforce and are also appointed to the judiciary—in 2004 Qabus appointed five women, of a total of twenty-nine appointees, to the public prosecutors’ office. See also Incense; Jabal al-Akhdar War; Women’s Rights.

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Organization of the Islamic Conference Sebastian Maisel The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) is the premier international organization serving the Muslim world and was founded in 1971 following a decision by the foreign ministers of Islamic countries. Its foundation was seen as a reaction of the global Islamic community to the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem in the June War in 1967 and to the arson attack on the al-Aqsa Mosque in August 1969 by a Zionist extremist. However, this was not the first time that Muslims from all over the world worked on a body that represented Islamic unity after the abolishment of the caliphate by Kemal Atat€ urk. A predecessor of the OIC was the first Islamic Conference held 1926 in Makkah, Saudi Arabia, and Muslims held subsequent conferences mostly encouraged from the Indian subcontinent. The establishment of the Muslim World League should also be viewed in this light of combating nationalistic and secular ideas. The crisis after the defeat in 1967, the occupation of Jerusalem, and the destruction of the sacred shrine ended up being the final circumstances to bring Muslims countries together despite their political opposition. The inauguration meeting in Jiddah was attended by twenty-three delegations that also established the General Secretariat of the OIC under Saudi Arabian patronage. Among the organization’s objectives are to promote cooperation among Islamic states, to promote peace on the basis of justice, to protect Islamic sacred places, and to establish institutional bases for pan-Islamism and support Palestine. Currently, the issue of terrorism and extremism is frequently discussed and (nonbinding) resolutions have been passed condemning and fighting terror. In addition, an international Islamic news agency and Islamic cultural centers around the world were established. Again, Saudi Arabia provided most of the necessary funds and therefore was able to use the organization for their own political and religious agenda, mainly to add religious legitimacy and reputation to the Al Sa‘ud, who promoted their status as Guardians of the Two Holy Places and as such leaders of the wider Muslim world. At this time period, this was a supportive backup against secular and pan-Arabic movements in many parts of the Middle East. Through taking a leadership role in the OIC, Saudi Arabia was able to significantly improve their global position. The organization’s system is headed by the Islamic Summit, a meeting of the heads of member states every three years. An annual meeting of the foreign minister is held in order to discuss progress reports, consider international developments, and to implement decisions. The Permanent Secretariat is the executive body. It is temporarily located in Jiddah pending the liberation of Jerusalem, which then would become the permanent headquarters. The organization has observer status at the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. OIC maintains several special institutions or standing committees, such as the Islamic Development Bank in Jiddah, the Islamic Solidarity Fund, and the

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Islamic Committee for economical, cultural, and social affairs. A Fund for the Holy War against Israel was created in 1972 denouncing the annexation of East Jerusalem by Israel. Other affiliated institutions include the Islamic Chamber of Commerce, the World Islamic Economic Forum, the Sports Federation of Islamic Solidarity Games, as well as several academic institutions such as the Islamic University of Niger or the Islamic Fiqh Academy in Jiddah. Another primary institution within the OIC is the Islamic Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (ISESCO), which was created modeling on UNESCO. ISESCO focuses on advancing education in Muslim societies and protecting Islamic culture in the wake of global distortion and Western invasion. The OIC has fifty-seven member states, including all Arab Gulf States but with Saudi Arabia being the prime mover and financier. Theoretically, every Muslim state is eligible to become a member, but in reality this status is given to those countries with a significant Muslim majority. For example, India and the Philippines have been denied membership. Generally, OIC has been successful in implementing cultural and educational progress and unity, but still works on establishing a cohesive, unified institution. Regional and ethnic conflicts between member states, such as the IranIraq War, continue to be problematic for the legacy of the organization; however, the organization has accomplished much toward a unified ummah. See also Banking, Islamic: Education; Jihad.

FURTHER READING al-Ahsan, Abdallah. OIC: The Organization of the Islamic Conference. Herndon, VA: Virginia Institute of Islamic Thought, 1988. Kramer, Martin. Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. Moinuddin, Hasan. The Charter of the Islamic Conference: The Legal and Economic Framework. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Sebastian Maisel The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is the most influential international organization of oil producers. It was founded 1960 in Baghdad by Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. Today the organization’s headquarters is in Vienna, Austria and has thirteen members. Other Arab member states are Algeria (since 1969), Qatar (since 1961), Libya (since 1962), and the United Arab Emirates (since 1967). The highest executive bodies are the council of governors, the general conference, the economic commission, and the secretariat. OPEC has its own news agency and publishes a

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variety of scientific, academic, and other series. A special discretionary fund, the OPEC Fund for International Development, helps to balance payment deficits as well as financing development projects. OPEC loans are usually long-term and interest-free. Since the 1970s, OPEC members enforced several price increases. OPEC was founded during the oil glut after World War II, when oil prices went down and subsequently oil producers received fewer revenues. To avoid a complete breakdown of the industry, the main oil companies decided to reduce production. This move also hurt the oil-producing countries whose economy was often based solemnly on exporting oil. OPEC’s role was to stabilize the market and influence the price of oil; however, they initially failed because many member states did not have full control over their natural resources on the basis of previous agreements and concessions with the oil companies. In the following years, OPEC thus became a tool in the hands of the oil companies. It took the countries of the Gulf area almost two decades until they took full control over the oil industries. OPEC’s role in determining the oil price has been questioned because of recent discoveries of oil in other areasand increasing internal differences over production quotas and price cuts. The loss of unity became apparent in the early 1980s after the revolution in Iran when another oil glut led to the dramatic price drop. Many oil-producing countries that adjusted their budget to the previous higher revenues went into a recession that lasted for over a decade. Several OPEC members, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, broke ranks with other member states and continued with a national price and production policy. The 1990-1991 Gulf War between Iraq and Kuwait was sparked over allegation of Kuwaiti overproduction. However, OPEC members still control about two-thirds of the global oil reserves and account for one-third of the world’s production. During the ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan the price for oil, and thus the revenues for OPEC members, skyrocketed. Some member states with smaller production quotas and large populations (e.g., Nigeria or Venezuela) are in favor of the beneficial development, whereas the Arab Gulf States with large reserves and smaller population are worried about the long-term effects of high prices. The concurrent fall of the value of the dollar made some countries think about switching their reserves to the Euro.

ORGANIZATION OF ARAB PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) is the Arab consortium of oil-producing nations. Founded in 1968 after the June War between Israel and several Arab nations by Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, the organization has its seat in Kuwait. Its highest executive body is the Council of Ministers, which meets twice a year to coordinate and set guidelines of a joint energy policy. The head of the executive is the general secretary. Member states include Egypt, Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. OAPEC is not associated with OPEC, but pursues their own objectives through the founding of banks and corporations. Revenues from oil exports shall be used for an increased regional industrialization. During the October War in 1973, OAPEC initiated a temporary five

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percent reduction of oil production and an oil embargo against the United States, the Netherlands, South Africa, and Portugal for their pro-Israeli position in the conflict that lasted for half of a year. For the first time, oil was successfully used as leverage and a political weapon. Economically underdeveloped Arab countries receive long-term and interest-free loans from a special fund that was financed primarily by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar. The current focus of the organization is primarily on regional development and integration. See also Usamah bin Ladin.

FURTHER READING Amuzegar, Jahangir. Managing the Oil Wealth: OPEC’s Windfalls and Pitfalls. London: I.B. Tauris, 2001. Citino, Nathan. From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Sa’ud, and the Making of U.S.-Saudi Relations. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002. Maachou, Abdelkader. OAPEC: An International Organization for Economic Cooperation and an Instrument for Regional Integration. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983. Robinson, Jeffrey. Yamani: The Inside Story. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1988. Tetreault, Mary Ann. The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries: History, Policies, and Prospects. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981. Yergin, Daniel. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991.

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Palestine Sebastian Maisel The issue of Palestine was a major factor in shaping the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. During the re-mapping of the Middle East at the end of World War I, Sharif Hussein, the Grand Sharif of the Hijaz, sought to include Palestine into the realm that was designated for the future kingdom he believed the British promised him for his participation in the war. With the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its policies toward Palestine and Israel became both consistent and pragmatic. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud believed that the Palestinians should take care of the problem on their own. In a famous quote he said, “The people of Palestine know their valleys best.” In 1937, he was convinced that the Zionist Movement wanted to gain control over a larger area than just Palestine. However, the Zionists tried to persuade the king to accept the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine and in return offered him financial compensation. When it became obvious that King ‘Abdallah of Jordan had territorial ambitions in Palestine, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz started to worry about the issue. However, most important for Saudi Arabia were good relations with the United States, which was crucial for the economic and financial survival of the kingdom. Although it was hard to accept, U.S. support for Israel became a bitter issue that the kingdom had to live with, considering all of the financial aid that the kingdom received from the United States during this time. In 1947, the United Nations decided to partition Palestine into two separate states, which was supported by the U.S. and European states but rejected by the Arab states. The United States, which earlier under Roosevelt promised to consult with the Saudis over future developments in Palestine, became a major supporter of Israel. King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz was surprised by what seemed to be a different policy and his son Faysal bin Abd al-Aziz, then Foreign Minister, demanded cutting the diplomatic ties with the United States. Saudi Arabia essentially did not participate in the first Arab-Israeli War, although they did send a military unit to fight under Egyptian command. This was more as a symbolic than real participation in the war. King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s prediction about Israeli ambitions came true and he was relieved to know that his country did not have a common border with Israel. After the war and the expulsion of hundreds of thousands Palestinians, he ordered Aramco to employ 1,000 Palestinian refugees.

Palestine

Currently over 500,000 Palestinians live in the kingdom, but they are not allowed, unlike other foreigners, to apply for citizenship in accordance with an Arab League resolution not to give citizenship to Palestinians in order for them to not lose their identity and to protect their right to return. The issue of land led to a long-lasting conflict with the Hashemite dynasties that influenced Saudi foreign policy in Palestine. They openly rejected the Hashemite’s plan to annex parts of Palestine and pushed for Jordan to be expelled from the Arab League; however, King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s successor, Sa‘ud, later reconciled with them in order to fight Nasr’s pan-Arabism. When in 1973 Egypt and Syria jointly attacked Israel, Saudi Arabia once again positioned itself in line with the pan-Arabian support. King Faysal felt that the U.S. administration under Nixon broke a promise that was once made to his father, King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, by President Roosevelt that the United States would not pursue the issue without further consultations. Nixon’s open support for Israel during the October War was seen as another disappointment after Truman forced the partitioning of Palestine and the creation of Israel in 1948. In 1948 Faysal wanted to cut the diplomatic relations with the United States, and in 1973 he initiated the oil embargo. Prior to that, he assembled the member states of the Organization of Islamic Countries, and backed by their support he created an Islamic agenda of support for the Palestinian cause. The oil embargo itself failed to resurrect Palestine; however, it was a successful campaign to hail the image and reputation in the Arab and Islamic world. Until today, Saudi Arabia has no diplomatic relation with Israel and maintains a tight ban on any bilateral activities. On the other hand, for decades, officials and individuals from the Gulf have supported the Palestinians financially. For example, in Saudi Arabia, the Popular Committee for Assisting Palestinian Mujahidin and the Al-Aqsa Fund provided funds to families, organizations, and institutions in the occupied territories and in exile. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the Palestinian leadership under Yassir Arafat supported him because he promised to use his military and the oil wealth of Kuwait to “free Palestine.” GCC states cut off financial aid to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and after the liberation of the country, several hundred thousand Palestinians were subsequently expelled from Kuwait, creating serious strains for the Palestinian economy. In 2004, the PLO issued an official apology and the number of Palestinians working in Kuwait is now slowly increasing. As allies of the West, Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states usually support American foreign policy, but as the home to the Two Holy Places and the third holiest place still under occupation, they continue denouncing Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians and call for the liberation of the al-Aqsa Mosque. Saudi kings have always been involved in finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both King Fahd and King ‘Abdallah proposed plans that called for a gradual recognition of Israel and installation of all Palestinian rights. Particularly, the Beirut proposal of 2002, commonly known as the ‘Abdullah Peace Plan, offered a just solution to both parties. It was recognized as a possible common ground even by Israeli politicians and favored over the Road Map to Peace, which was initiated by an international consortium of power players such as the United Nations, the European Union, Russia, and the United States. Internal clashes between the

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main Palestinian fractions, Hamas and Fatah, broke out in 2007 after the international community pushed the Palestinians to create a government of unity. The Saudi government facilitated bringing the two rivals together, who later signed the Makkah Accord on Power Sharing, which lasted for some months and brought a period of peace and stability to the area. Today, the GCC states support a fair solution based on existing UN resolutions and on establishing two viable and equal states that coexist and live side by side.

FURTHER READING Abu ‘Aliyya, ‘Abdul-Fattah H., and Rafiq Shaker Al-Natsheh. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian Cause. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2005. Al-Angari, Abdal-Rahman Ibn Nasir. “The Palestine Issue in Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy.” PhD dissertation, University of Exeter, 1989. Ghabra, Shafeeq. Palestinians in Kuwait: The Family and the Politics of Survival. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987. Hinnebusch, Raymond, and Anoushiravan Ehteshami. The Foreign Policy of Middle Eastern States. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. Thompson, Jerald. “H. St. John Philby, Ibn Saud, and Palestine.” MA thesis, University of Kansas, 1981.

Pastoralism, Nomadism, and Transhumance Sebastian Maisel Animal husbandry or raising domestic livestock is a major economic activity in the Arabian Peninsula and other parts of the Middle East. People used the livestock for food, wool, hair, transporting goods, and riding (among other needs). Pastoralists are able to use a wide variety of environments and in the Arabian Peninsula they have been able to survive and even thrive based on the types of livestock they keep. The camel allows people to utilize deserts that cannot support other forms of economic activities. Camels can exist on the scanty, rough forage found in arid climates, being able to eat and digest woody, thorny plants. Other livestock raised in the peninsula such as sheep, goats, and cattle need water on a daily basis, limiting where they can be raised. A key component to the success of any pastoralist is to identify the optimal combination of diverse economic activities, taking advantage of the different environmental conditions and their relationship with nonpastoral peoples of the oases and towns. Pastoralism is a mobile activity. The animals move or have to be moved in search of water and pasture, sometimes over long distances, and in the past through possible hostile areas. The animals need herdsmen to protect, guide, and tend them on a daily basis. Milk forms the major part of pastoralists’ diet and lactating females must be milked daily. Settled people who own livestock

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often entrusted their herders and flocks to hired herders to take care of them on a daily basis, bringing the animals home at sundown or for extended periods that could be up to several weeks. Settled communities in the mountain regions of the Peninsula often made use of seasonal pastures, and herders moved the livestock between summer and winter ranges. Such a movement is referred to as transhumance, meaning literally “over different soil types.” Pastoral nomadism refers to the movement of entire populations with their livestock, which in Arabic is called badawah, and those engaged in this are called Badw, or Bedouin. The people carry their belongings with them, including their housing, which in the Arabian Peninsula is the black goat-hair tent. They graze their herds and flocks on recognized seasonal pastures that usually follow an elliptical pattern. In most of the Peninsula Bedouin migrate in the summer to areas with permanent water supply, whereas during the winter they utilize much larger areas where winter rains bring an abundance of grazing and water. In the southwestern part of the Peninsula where summer monsoon rains fall, the movement is reversed. “True Bedouin,” those who depend primarily on camels, make the greatest use of the desert. Those who raise small stock such as sheep and goats cannot utilize large areas for grazing and have more limited ranges and shorter migration seasons. Few pastoralists raise only one type of livestock, but normally raise both large and small stock. Such diversity provides security in case of diseases, droughts, or other harmful events. Small stock reproduces faster and can be sold quickly for cash. In addition, pastoralists are usually engaged in other economic activities and production modes, such as trading, farming, and in the past, raiding. Thus, diversified economies help to lower the risk of failure and starvation. Among those engaged in transhumance production, not all families are equally engaged in animal husbandry. Often, some families or individual family members tend the animals whereas others work in the fields. Division of labor, sometimes along gender lines, is therefore another key aspect of pastoralism. The animals are considered an important capital asset in pastoral societies. People try to expand the size of their herds and flocks by selecting mostly young males and nonproductive females to sell in the market for cash or for items not produced by pastoralists themselves. Pastoralists live off milk, yogurt, and cheese, and eat meat from their herds for important festivals and celebrations. Important resources for pastoralists are land and water. Both of these are seen as belonging to the group and communal efforts are used to develop and maintain them. In the Bedouin society, most pastures and wells were part of the tribal collective property. A system called hima or mahmiyah, meaning protected or reserved, helped make sure that even communal lands were not overexploited by individuals. Regulations were part of ‘urf, or customary law, enforced by the tribal leadership. Private ownership was recognized especially of water resources. Should an individual, family, or even a lineage develop a water source with its own funds, the source was seen as theirs and anyone else using it was expected to pay for it. Pastoral production is only partly for subsistence, but they have always produced for market, providing meat and other products for settled populations. In return, they obtained those things that they did not make such as special

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foodstuff, clothing, tools, and weapons. Pastoralists have never lived in but have always been integrated into the regional market system. The social organization of pastoral communities is based on collective responsibilities and mutual support. This type of togetherness is best seen in the notion of a tribe. Members of a tribe are usually related and share the belief in a common ancestor. They have a common history. Society is organized along specific guidelines that must be accepted by the entire community. These guidelines or rules are imposed on the individual as well as the whole kin group. Through horizontal family ties, groups and individuals are connected in a network of social hierarchy, which consists of sections and subsections and even smaller sections bound together by kinship (real and fictive). Membership in a tribe means, theoretically, unconditional support between members and loyalty to the kin group. When one prospers the group prospers, providing home, food, and protection to those in need. When there is a problem for one member the entire kin group has a problem and helps carry the burden of responsibility and punishment. In the recent past pastoralists in the Peninsula were often at odds with other pastoralists and settled peoples over land and water rights. Conflicts between pastoralists and settled farmers over land and water were common. The Bedouin developed means to subjugate others through raids and a form of tribute called khawah, usually translated as a brotherhood tax. Relations between the Bedouin were characterized by recognition of equality and alliance in what was called hilf, or dependence of a weaker group on the stronger in what was called tabi‘, or belonging. Relations with states in the past were often distant because Bedouin lived in more marginal areas. In the nineteenth century, state authorities were able to expand their direct control and gained the upper hand over the political independence of the tribes. Today pastoralists in Arabia face several challenges. States want to control them and their resources. Changes began in the 1920s with the imposition of settlement first introduced in Saudi Arabia in the form of the Ikhwan and the agricultural hijrah settlements. Saudi Arabia has tried to prohibit open ranges and collective tribal ownership, and banned application of ‘urf. Commercial agriculture has expanded further, limiting pasture and water resources. Governments such as the United Arab Emirates and Qatar have encouraged settlement in towns and cities through incentives such as free housing, better access to education, and health facilities. The military has been a major employer and it also offers a wide range of services to its personnel. Since the 1960s most of the pastoralists in the Peninsula have opted for settled life and the younger generations are Bedouin in language only.

FURTHER READING Chatty, Dawn (ed.). Nomadic Societies in the Middle East and North Africa Entering the 21st Century. Leiden: Brill, 2006. Khazanov, Anatoly. Nomads and the Outside World. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994. Lancaster, William. The Rwala Bedouin Today. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1970.

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Pearling Salzman, Philip C. Pastoralists: Equality, Hierarchy and the State. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2004. Salzman, P.C. and J.G. Galaty (eds.). Nomads in a Changing World. Naples, Italy: Dipartimento di Studi Asiatici, Instituto Universitario Orientale, 1990. Shoup, John. “Hima: A Traditional Land-Use System in Contemporary Syria and Jordan.” PhD dissertation, Washington University in St. Louis, 1990. Shoup, John. Culture and Customs of Jordan. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2007.

Pearling Sebastian Maisel Pearling was the one of the main economic activities in the Arabian Gulf area before oil was found. Historical evidence dates pearling back to the time of the Gilgamesh Epic in the seventh century BC. Classical Roman and Islamic sources described in detail the industry and the high value of pearls. Along the Gulf coast from Kuwait to Ras Tanura, Dubai and further south to Masqat in Oman, main pearl banks were harvested during the season that lasted from April to September. The industry peaked between the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and abruptly declined in the 1930s. The socioeconomic development of the Persian Gulf region during this time period had a strong impact on pearling. Other forms of income and trade became available; for example, arms trade or employment in the oil industry. An official ban on pearl imports by the Government of India in 1947 and the introduction of new technology added to the quick demise of the industry. But most important was the introduction of cultured pearls, which immediately made the labor-intensive pearling of the Persian Gulf obsolete. Arabic has many words to describe pearls; for example, lu’lu’, danah, hasbah, or gumashah. Other words describe shape or color, such as sujani (the pear-shaped), sufri (the yellow one), or sinjabasi (the finest black pearl). Jiwan is the name for a perfectly shaped, round, and rose-tinted young pearl. The technical and operating aspects differed in some details from area to area, but followed a general pattern. In early spring, the pearling captains (nakhudah) recruited migrant workers from the inland areas. Thousands of local men were employed, indicating the importance of pearling for the livelihood of the area. Some of them came all the way from Qasim to sign up for the pearling fleets that consisted of several thousand ships. The local amir, or governor, usually appointed the nakhudah. The boats (see dhow) then left for the banks, which in some cases were two hundred miles offshore. The banks were communal property of the coastal communities. On site, divers would collect the oysters in large bags or baskets, which were hauled on board by a rope tender, the other important profession. The Gulf waters are rather shallow, and divers would descend a maximum of eight fathoms, or forty-nine feet (fifteen meters). Onboard, the oysters were left overnight before being opened the next morning. The industry was mostly interested in pearls, but sometimes collected mother-of-pearl as well. At the beginning of the twentieth century, half of the world’s supply of pearls came from the Gulf. From here, they were sold to Indian merchants who shipped

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them to Bombay to be drilled by hand. Finally, they were sold to the European markets. The annual local revenues from the pearl sales reached $4 million toward the end of the nineteenth century. Prices for the European markets were significantly higher. The working conditions and terms of labor agreement were considerably hard for the divers, who often became completely dependent on the nakhudah. They had to take a loan from their wage prior to departure in order to buy food for the journey. But, if the trip was unsuccessful, they could not pay back their debts and were forced to work for free part of the next season. The British authorities in the Gulf criticized this modern type of slavery after popular riots broke out in 1932 in Bahrain. The divers complained about the living conditions and terms of employment. Eventually, their demands were acknowledged and the recruitment system was reformed. Specific diving rules and methods of accounting were established, the nakhudahs had to register their boats, and living conditions onboard were improved. In 1928, a special diving court was created to mediate in legal disputes between the owners, captains, and divers.

CULTURED PEARLS The Japanese pearl farmer and merchant Mikimoto Kokichi invented a new process to produce pearls by implanting semiglobular mother-of-pearl particles into pearl oysters, encouraging the formation of a new pearl. This allowed a more predictable production. Mikimoto then successfully introduced the commercial production, exhibition, and sale of so-called cultured pearls. After World War II, the industry tried to recover from the tremendous losses in market share, influence, and sheer numbers, but only assembled a fleet of some fifty boats. Clearly by then the market was destroyed, and other commercial venues opened up. Only recently can one notice a trend favoring natural pearls over cultured ones. However, the old industry is now gone, and the governments of the Gulf States restrict pearl diving in order to protect national territories and to revitalize the pearl banks. See also Arabian Gulf.

FURTHER READING Carter, Robert. “The History and Prehistory of Pearling in the Persian Gulf,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 48, no. 2 (2005): 139–209. Khoury, Eileen. “Servants of the Pearl,” Saudi Aramco World 41, no. 5 (1990): 24–31. Rentz, George. Pearling in the Persian Gulf: Semitic and Oriental Studies. A volume presented to William Popper (ed.) by W. Fischel (1951): 397–403. Shamlan, Sayf M. Pearling in the Arabian Gulf: A Kuwaiti Memoir. London: London Center for Arabic Studies, 2000.

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Philby, Harry St. John (1885–1960) Sebastian Maisel Harry St. John Bridger Philby was born in 1885 in Ceylon and was a British officer, explorer, and traveler in Arabia. He was educated at Westminster and Trinity College, Cambridge, and soon afterward joined the Indian Civil Service, where he served in Punjab. In 1910 he married Dora Johnson, and together they had four children, three daughters, and one son, the famous spy Kim Philby. Harry Philby mastered the several oriental languages, including Arabic, Urdu, and Persian, which helped him switch to the region, the Middle East, where Sir Percy Cox enlisted him. From 1915 until 1924 he was appointed political resident in Iraq, Najd, and Transjordan, during which time he developed a strong bond with Arab and Islamic cultures. Although he had many influential supporters, such as Gertrude Bell and Cox, he was caught up in competition with Arnold Wilson, Cox’s deputy. Therefore, he took on a difficult mission to meet ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud, which ended up becoming the first crossing of the Arabian Peninsula from ‘Uqayr to Jiddah, and fostered a lifelong admiration and friendship with Ibn Sa‘ud. After quarrels with the British Foreign Service, he retired in 1925 and started his own company, Sharqiya Ltd., for import and export to Jiddah. As advisor to ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud, he was in a unique position and arranged the awarding of oil concessions for American companies. In 1930 he converted to Islam and became Shaykh ‘Abdallah, the trusted advisor to King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, who rewarded him with gifts and in 1945 with a second wife, Ruzy ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, with whom he had two sons. He continued to explore the newly created Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. His extensive travels contributed significantly to the geographical, geological, and anthropological exploration of the Arabian Peninsula. In the following year he thoroughly surveyed southern Najd. He raced with Bertram Thomas to be the first who crossed the Empty Quarter in 1932, followed by travels through Asir and Najran, mapping the highlands. After World War II and an unsuccessful bid for a seat in the British Parliament, he returned to the kingdom in 1945; however, he had lost his supreme position close to the King. He went on for a final extensive exploration tour through Northern Hijaz, but after the King’s death in 1953 he was exiled to Beirut, Lebanon, where he remained until he died on September 30, 1960. During his lifetime, he wrote many books on the geography, history, and culture of Arabia that became classics in the small genre of literature on Arabia. See also Travelers and Explorers.

FURTHER READING Goldberg, Jacob. “Philby as a Source for Early Twentieth-Century Saudi History: A Critical Examination,” Middle Eastern Studies 21, no. 2 (1985): 223–243.

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Pilgrimage Monroe, Elizabeth. Philby of Arabia. London: Farber and Farber, 1973. Philby, H. St. J. B. A Pilgrim in Arabia. London: R. Hale, 1946. Philby, H. St. J. B. Arabian Days. London: R. Hale, 1948. Philby, H. St. J. B. Forty Years in the Wilderness. London: R. Hale, 1957.

Pilgrimage John A. Shoup The pilgrimage, or hajj, to Makkah is one of the five main obligations of all Muslims. The hajj takes place annually during the first weeks of Dhu al-Hijjah, the twelfth month of the Islamic calendar. The form of today’s pilgrimage was set in 630 by the Prophet Muhammad and revolves around several events and acts of Ibrahim (Abraham), his son Isma‘il (Ishmael), and his bondswoman Hajar (Hagar). When the pilgrims approach the haram, or sacred precinct of Makkah, they need to be in a state of ritual purity, which is marked by bathing, trimming their nails and hair, and removing all jewelry and other signs of economic or class differences. They then change into a two-piece plain, white, seamless garb called an ihram. One piece is wrapped around the waist and the second covers the upper body. Once this is done the pilgrims announce their intention to make the pilgrimage by declaring the talbiyah, which says labayk Allahuma labayk or “God, I am at your service.” They then proceed to the city of Makkah and the Great Mosque that contains the Ka‘abah. Muslims believe that Ibrahim and his son Isma’il built the Ka’abah as the first place of worship for the one God following Ibrahim’s sacrifice. Muslims circumambulate the Ka‘abah seven times in a counterclockwise motion, which is called tawaf. Following this they then run between al-Safa and al-Marwa in what is called the sa’y, or running in imitation of Hajar as she ran between the two low hills looking for water for her young son Isma‘il. Hajar was forced to leave Ibrahim by his wife Sarah when Isma‘il was still a small child. Hajar and Isma‘il were near death from thirst and in her anxiety she ran between the two hills until an angel came to her and opened up the spring Zamzam to save them. The hajj or actual act of pilgrimage begins on the eighth day of the month when all of the people proceed from Makkah to Mina following the practice of the Prophet. The pilgrims spend the night at Mina in meditation and the next day en mass move to ‘Arafat, located nine miles (fifteen kilometers) outside of Makkah. Here they perform what is called the wuquf, or standing at the foot of Jabal Rahmah (the Mount of Mercy) where the Prophet gave his farewell sermon. The pilgrims remain at ‘Arafat from noon until sunset in prayer following the hadith of the Prophet, which says “The best prayers are those said on the day of ‘Arafat.” Many are overcome by the deep spiritual feelings they have while at ‘Arafat. After sundown, they proceed on to Muzdalifah, which is four miles (seven kilometers) back along the way to Makkah where they spend the night. The following day they continue their way back to Mina, passing by the three columns that represent evil. Pilgrims throw seven stones at each of the pillars, renouncing the Devil and evil with each throw.

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Once back at Mina, the Feast of the Sacrifice, or ‘Id al-Adha, begins with killing of animals such as camels, sheep, and goats to commemorate Ibrahim’s sacrifice of a ram in place of his son Isma‘il in Muslim traditions. Only one-third of the animal is consumed on the day and the rest is given away to the poor who cannot afford to buy an animal. Those pilgrims who have not yet performed the tawaf and sa’y return to Makkah and complete the required actions of the pilgrimage. Pilgrims can remove the ihram and again dress in their usual street clothes, and men usually have their heads shaved and women have a lock of hair cut as a sign they are no longer in the state of purity. Organization of the annual hajj is a massive undertaking requiring the mobilization and management of literally around 2 million people. In the past, before mass transportation, the number of pilgrims was limited by the fact that the journey was long and hazardous. For those who could not afford the long journey to Makkah local pilgrimages emerged to take the place of the official hajj. With the availability of mass transportation the number of pilgrims exploded beyond the means of the local authorities. Prompted by the need to better manage services and to reduce the accidents that still plague the hajj, the Saudi authorities have put into place several changes. The number of hajj visas has been set for each country where there are numbers of Muslims, with a total of nearly 2 million visas per year (in 2002 there were 1.8 million pilgrims). Visas restrict the length of time a pilgrim can stay in the kingdom and the number of places where the visa is valid; mainly the port of entry, Makkah, and Madinah, allowing for the large numbers who want to conclude their pilgrimage with a visit to the Prophet’s tomb in Madinah. The Saudi authorities have set up massive tent cities—40,000 permanent, fireproof tents housing forty persons per tent—to house the pilgrims, and for the distribution of 10 million free bottles of water. In addition, there is a crew of 14,000 people keeping the living areas clean. There are 56,000 public telephones for the pilgrims to use. The Saudis have rebuilt and expanded many of the places visited by the pilgrims and have even provided air conditioning. Places where there have been incidents in the past have been given special attention to try to reduce possible accidents. This is especially so of places where bottlenecks have occurred and people have subsequently been killed in panics. Overpasses, underpasses, and other means of moving the vast crowds have been built. The Jamarat Bridge between Mina and Makkah, for example, was widened to 192 feet (sixty meters) in two levels to improve the flow of foot traffic. Pilgrims are encouraged to stay in national groups so that issues of language can better be addressed. The Saudis provide 2,100 skilled guides who speak the numerous national languages and help the pilgrims through each of the steps of a successful pilgrimage, in addition to 26,500 crowd-control officers. Those who are elderly or infirm have special services to make sure they can participate in all of the steps. Many of the elderly come with the hope to die in the Holy Precinct, and in 2002 526 died of natural causes while performing the pilgrimage. There are fourteen hospitals dedicated to serving the pilgrims, and in 2002 217,673 individuals received emergency treatment. In recent years the Saudi authorities have become more sensitive to possible fundamentalist activities. In response to an incident between Iranian Shi‘ites and

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Arab Sunnis shortly after the Iranian Revolution, the number of hajj visas issued to Iranians was restricted for several years. See also Holidays and Festivals: Islamic.

FURTHER READING Dewey, Frederick. An Introduction to Islam. New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1994. Esposito, John. Islam. The Straight Path. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Lunde, Paul. Islam: Faith, Culture, History. New York: DK Publishing, Inc., 2002. Stewart, P.J. Unfolding Islam. London: Garnet Publishing, 1997.

Political Organization Jack Kalpakian The states of the Gulf region have been described as absolute monarchies, rentier states, or dictatorships. Although it is hard to describe any of these states as liberal democracies along the Western model, terms like absolute monarchy or oil autocracy do not convey an accurate picture of the internal political structures of these states. These states are built on alliances between tribal communities, merchants, and religious elites. Far from being arbitrary in terms of government and law, they can rely on longstanding Islamic legal systems (shari‘ah) as well as relatively modern administrative structures. Like all responsible states, they are keen on improving the well being of their populations, but their efforts at this tended to attract the charge that they rent their legitimacy. This charge is not without some basis, but it tends to obscure the noneconomic bases these states support among their respective peoples. Although sharing many features in common, each of these states conducted the state-constructing bargain differently. The states that emerged from under British protection differ in some ways from Saudi Arabia, which did not have an immediate colonial experience before its emergence in the early 1920s, except for Hijaz, which had a period of independence after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Saudi Arabia is a bargain between its religious establishment and its Royal Family. The Sa‘uds conduct the statecraft and the economic management of the state, whereas the Al-Shaykh (the descendants of Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhab) family tends the religious sphere. Power resides in the Saudi family collectively and not in the person of the King. The religious establishment informs policy on social, educational, and legal matters. They also help enforce Islamic law as established in the country’s only official form of Islam, Muwahidi Islam, which is called Wahbabism outside of the Gulf. Saudi Arabian religious scholars argue that there is only one Islam, and that deviations from their own version constitute that which is outside the faith. Although Wahhabism is within the Sunni Hanbali tradition, Saudi Arabia discourages the propagation of all other forms of Islam domestically. Consequently, it is safe to say that the Saudi state does not extend

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the full benefits of citizenship to its Shi‘ite and non-Wahhabi Sunni communities. On a territorial level, Saudi Arabia is divided into provinces, each led by an Emir, who is a member of the royal family. Unlike the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Saudi Arabia has thus far refrained from experimentation with any form of enfranchisement, save at the municipal government level. Officially, Saudi Arabia has declared that democracy is not compatible with Islam and has not indicated interest in a written constitution or an organic law document. Nevertheless, there are institutions that allow the population access to power, including a relatively independent judiciary, meditative services provided by leading citizens and princes, and finally Saudis have the right to appeal directly to their rulers in person. The Saudi bureaucracy is, for all intents and purposes, a modern, rules-driven, self-duplicating system. Saudi Arabia has a complex system of administrative laws governing real estate, economic activities, travel, and residency. These laws are administered and enforced through the use of passport, residency, and title deed controls as with any advanced modern society that has access to information technology and database management systems. That there are assumptions in this system that contradict the Qur’anic division of the world into believers, people of the book, and unbelievers, instead of citizens and foreigners, does not seem to be of concern in Saudi Arabia. Of greater concern is the Islamic dissident movement inside of the country and in exile in London. The opposition in Saudi Arabia is trying to use Islam against the state with some success. The lack of representation with the Saudi state is helping to feed resentment and anger against the Al-Shaykh and Al-Sa‘ud families. The other members of the GCC, with the exception of the United Arab Emirates, have experimented with constitutions, elections, and parliaments. Kuwait has had the oldest experiment in representation in the region, and its parliament has the power to hold cabinet ministers accountable for their actions. The Kuwaiti parliament has been active, with some interruptions, since the country’s independence, but the franchise did not until recently extend to women. In addition, the parliament of Kuwait does not control the executive in the traditional Westminster pattern. The executive authority in Kuwait rests with the Al-Sabah family, although the parliament was involved in the recent struggle between the two branches of the family that enjoy succession rights to the emirate’s throne. Given the small size of Kuwait and the concentration of its population in Kuwait City, the country is generally administered as a single unit, but there are municipal governments below the national level. Like Saudi Arabia, most of Kuwait’s citizens are Wahhabi, and political life in Kuwait tends to reflect this, with Shi‘ite (about fifteen percent of the population) and Christian Kuwaitis (two large families) feeling excluded and reduced to second-class citizenship. Parliamentary elections feature three distinct social movements in competition and cooperation with each other. There is a liberal movement in Kuwait that has generally advocated social, economic, and political reform to move Kuwait toward a more liberal democratic pattern. There is a very large Islamist movement in Kuwait that advocates a “return” to a more Islamic Kuwait. The Kuwaiti Islamists are critical of the liberalizing trends they believe to be advocated by

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some members of the Royal Family, including female suffrage and the country’s alliance with the United States. Finally, Kuwaiti politics also features a very powerful tribal conservative faction. Given the election rules in the country, tribes play an important role in aggregating local interests for representation in parliament. More often than not, tribal politicians have found that they have much in common with the Islamist movement. At present, the political game in Kuwait pits the government and the liberals against the Islamists and the tribal representatives. The game is not only one of conflict by also co-optation and cooperation—with the tribal politicians holding the balance of power in many of the struggles concerning specific issues. In Bahrain, the primary problem is about the division of power between the ruling Sunni community, as represented by the Al-Khalifah family, and the majority Shi‘ite community (about sixty-five to seventy-five percent of the population). Bahrain is a small Island state connected to its main patron, Saudi Arabia by a long causeway. Bahrain oil reserves have long been depleted and the country has successfully transitioned into a post-oil economic structure emphasizing manufacturing, services, and finance. Its social structures include a predominantly Sunni merchant class and the descendants of slaves brought from Africa. Its experiment with representative government began after the 1999 death of its ruling Shaykh, ‘Isa Al-Khalifah, and the ascent of his son, Shaykh Hamad, to power. In 2002, Shaykh Hamad declared Bahrain a kingdom and granted a constitution that set up a bicameral elected parliament. The new Bahraini parliament includes many appointed members and its powers are significantly less than those of the monarch, but it was regarded as the first major step toward power sharing on the island between the two communities, and it represents the first time that Shi‘ites formally held political rights in the country. Qatar has duplicated some of Bahrain’s experiment. As with Bahrain, political change came from the ruling family. The 1995 coup by Shaykh Hamad al-Thani ousting his father from power led to profound and dramatic changes in the country. In stark contrast to other Gulf States, Qatar enfranchised some long-term Arab and Iranian residents, including Syrian, Lebanese, and Coptic Christians as well as Bahais. It now enjoys a fairly representative parliament along the lines seen in Bahrain. The country’s citizen body represents about twenty percent of the population, and the vast majority of people in the country are migrants from elsewhere. Unlike other Gulf States, Qatar has generally tolerated divergent religious practices among its foreign residents. In its foreign policy, Qater has combined support for the United States in the Gulf with equally fervent support for Al Jazeera, which often strikes observers as contradictory. In terms of social freedoms, the United Arab Emirates has often been seen as the most liberal of the Gulf States, but this sense of freedom does not extend to the political sphere. The UAE is unique in terms of being a federative Arab state. Although led by Abu Dhabi, the UAE’s six other emirates enjoy significant local autonomy in terms of law enforcement, education, and social policy. There is no elected or partially representative body in the UAE, and there are no elections for offices. There is an appointed Federal National Council that reviews laws, and a council of rulers of the UAE that appoints the president (always the Emir of Abu Dhabi) and the prime minister (always the Emir of Dubai). Although

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social freedoms are significantly higher than those found in other Gulf States, Emirati politics remains substantially less representative than the processes in place in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar. The recent death of Shaykh Zayid AlNahayan, the founding president of the UAE, has not led to the radical changes that have accompanied the generational transitions in Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait—at least not thus far. Like Qatar, the UAE has a large and unenfranchised foreign resident population exceeding three-quarters of the population. It also has an indigenous Shi‘ite minority. Like many other Gulf States, Oman has been experimenting with representative government since Sultan Qabus Al-Sa‘id deposed his father in 1970. Unlike Saudi Arabia, where power resides in the Royal family collectively, Oman’s monarchic system vests power in the person of the monarch himself. Oman has a partially elected parliament with limited consultative powers, but women have been allowed to participate in the selection process. The political systems of the Gulf States represent the persistence of the personel in politics. Significant political change accompanied generational change within the ruling families. In Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, the transition of power from fathers to sons led to dramatic changes in policy, especially with regard to liberalization and relations with the outside world. In general, the trend has been toward more openness and freedom rather than otherwise. In Saudi Arabia, it appears that the extraordinarily large number of sons left by the founding king delayed this process, but the question must remain for how long.

FURTHER READING Byman, Daniel L., and Jerrold D. Green. “The Enigma of Stability in the Persian Gulf Monarchies,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 3 no. 3 (1999): 20–37. Metz, Helen Chapin (ed.). Persian Gulf States: A Country Study. Washington, D.C.: Governmental Printing Office for the Library of Congress, 1993. Al-Rasheed, Madawi. Contesting the Saudi State. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Al-Rasheed, Madawi. A History of Saudi Arabia. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Tetreault, Mary Ann. Stories of Democracy: Politics and Society in Contemporary Kuwait. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Wright, Steven. “Generational Change and Elite-Driven Reforms in the Kingdom of Bahrain,” The Sir William Luce Fellowship Paper, Middle East and Islamic Studies, University of Durham, no. 7 (2006).

Popular Islam John A. Shoup Expressions of popular Islam were greatly discouraged by the orthodox Wahhabi movement founded by reformer Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1702/3– 1791/2). As a result, little remains of the popular forms condemned in his

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writings and those of the subsequent reformers. Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab wrote treatises against popular traditions such as the veneration of sacred trees and visitation to tombs. Much of the practices of popular Islam were labeled by ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab as shirk (association with God) or jahil (ignorance), both of which contributed to kuffar (unbelief). The success of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn al-Sa‘ud in firmly establishing the Wahhabi version of Hanbali orthodoxy throughout Saudi Arabia in the first decades of the twentieth century ended many popular practices, at least in the kingdom. However, more popular expressions of Islam are still found in the Gulf States from Kuwait to Oman. Zar is one of the more widespread forms of popular religion in the region. Zar is the name generally used to identify belief in possession by spirits, or jinn. Zar is found in Egypt, Sudan, and parts of East Africa as well as in Yemen, Oman, and the Gulf, and seems to be of Sudanese origin. The term zar comes from the Arabic word meaning “to visit” and is in reference to the belief that particular spirits may decide to “visit” or possess a person. Women are more susceptible to possession by jinn or other spirits because many of these spirits are believed to inhabit or linger around water and water sources. Women are more engaged in work activities that require fetching or disposing of water, which may provoke or anger one of the spirits into possessing her. A sudden change in a woman’s behavior such as in her lack of concern for housework, in her attitude toward her husband, or unprovoked irritability may signify that she has been possessed. In order to know what has caused the change, the woman will seek the advice of a specialist, usually another woman who is a medium and can find ways to speak to the spirit. Should the woman be found to be possessed, the medium finds out which spirit it is and why the spirit decided to live in her body and then recommends treatment or therapy. The medium usually has her own group of assistants; women who play musical instruments and sing at the gathering to help the possessed woman go into a trance. While in a trance the spirit will respond to certain items such as gifts of cloth, perfume, or incense, which the medium notices. When the woman comes out of the trance the medium will inform the possessed woman what attracted the attention of the spirit; gifts she can then demand from her husband. Should her husband not provide the required gifts, the woman will become more ill. Many zar spirits cannot be exorcised and instead the possessed woman will need to attend zar meetings on a regular basis in order to appease the spirit. Recent scholarship in Kuwait has noted that many women seem to be turning to zar as a way of dealing with stress caused by the rapid changes in society. Zar therapy gives local explanations to the feelings of alienation and loss caused by the breakdown of traditional family structures. Zar also serves as a way for women to deal with stress of bad marriages and legitimizes women’s attempts to gain greater freedom within the narrow confines of the home. It has been argued that because middle-class women in the Gulf have more free time, but are still restricted in what they can do outside of the home, unhappiness may be expressed through behavior associated with zar possession. Related to zar is another trance-induced therapy called riwa. Riwa is a dance still performed in the United Arab Emirates and Oman, more as folklore than as popular religion. Similar to zar its origin is in Africa and was more common

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among slaves from East Africa in the Gulf. Like zar, during a riwa gathering those attending are encouraged to dance and those possessed fall into a trance in which the spirit may be contacted. Unlike zar, which is primarily for women, riwa is open to both men and women and frequently those playing the instruments are men. Belief in the evil eye, or ‘ayn al-hasud (literally “the eye of envy”), is widespread among Sunnis, Shi‘ites, and Kharajis throughout the Peninsula. There are several ways to deal with the eye of envy, but among the most common is the use of charms. Children are often protected by charms and in Oman silver- and goldsmiths from Nizwa and Bahla are known for the fine quality of theirs. Charms are often made with a piece of red coral, colored glass, or the canine tooth of an animal such as a wolf; set in a cylinder of finely worked silver or gold; and suspended on a chain or sewn onto the child’s clothes. Ostrich feathers, cowries shell, blue beads, small beaded triangles, and other such items were traditionally sewn onto clothes, suspended on cradles, or on chains to protect children from harm. A custom among the Bedouin in the northern parts of the Peninsula near Jordan, Syria, and Iraq was to nurse babies while seated on a special round leather rug called a nata‘, which has a central star design. In the past charms were also placed on valuable animals such as horses or racing camels and on their equipment, and today this has been transferred onto cars, buses, and trucks. The evil eye can be deflected by uttering the name of God and even today it is considered impolite to praise some one or some thing without first evoking the name of God. Visitations to tombs of pious men is another practice greatly discouraged by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. He considered such practices to be associationism; the need to seek the assistance of an intercessor between man and God associates the power of God to a man. The tombs of the Prophet and his companions suffered when the Wahhabis first gained power in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The Wahhabi forces destroyed several tombs of venerated men when they invaded Iraq and Syria, as well as in the Peninsula. Even today religious police are placed near the Prophet’s tomb in Madinah to discourage veneration of the Prophet rather than of God. Nonetheless, outside of Saudi Arabia there is still some practice of visiting tombs of pious men who during their lifetime were believed to have the blessing of God or barakah, which they were able to pass on to others. Bahrain’s large Shi‘ite community continues such practices, although most of the Sunni do not. Sacred trees or rocks are also aspects of popular religion and were condemned by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab as shirk, or associationism. Women have been more involved with such practices and this may be because formal Islam is a more male space. Women have used trees or rocks as a focus for practices such as vows. Women tie strips of cloth or ribbons on a branch or leave a piece of clothing, a bit of food, cooking oil, water, a candle, or a handful of henna leaves at the base of a tree as a material sign of a promise or vow to God, although oftentimes asking for the intercession of a pious man or woman who may be buried nearby. Although this practice is disappearing in much of the region, British explorer Wilfred Thesiger noted that in the late 1940s the Bedouin in Oman not only had sacred trees, but sacred groves where no one cut or harmed a tree for

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fear of the spirits who lived among them. An interesting recent occurrence is the veneration by Hindu migrant workers of a large solitary mesquite tree popularly called the Tree of Life located south of Jabal Dukhan in Bahrain. The tree was not the focus of any local activity but following archeological excavations in Bahrain and confirmation of the island’s identity with ancient Dilmun, Europeans dubbed the tree the “Tree of Life.” Hearing of this, Hindu laborers from India began coming to the tree and leaving offerings. The Bahraini authorities are mildly tolerant of the practice but occasionally remove the offerings. See also Madhhab; Travelers and Explorers.

FURTHER READING Delong-Bas, Natana. Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. London: I.B. Tauris, 2004. Dickson, H.R.P. The Arab of the Desert. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983. Doughty, Charles. Travels in Arabia Deserts (2 vols.) London: Cambridge University Press, 1888. Dumato, Eleanor Abdella. Getting God’s Ear: Women, Islam, and Healing in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Lewis, I.M., Ahmed al-Safi, and Sayyid Hurreiz (eds.). Women’s Medicine: The Zar Bori Cult in Africa and Beyond. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991. Al Rasheed, Madawi. Politics in an Arabian Oasis: The Rashidis of Saudi Arabia. London: I.B. Tauris, 1997.

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Q

Qabus bin Sa‘id (1940– ) John A. Shoup Qabus bin Sa‘id was born in 1940 in Salalah and is the fourteenth ruler of the Al Bu Sa‘idi dynasty. His father, Sultan Sa‘id bin Taymur, brought unity to the country by defeating the Imam of Nizwa, and then tried to break Oman’s dependency on Britain through a policy of near total isolationism. Qabus was Sultan Sa‘id’s only son, and he had Qabus educated first in Salalah and then in India. At age sixteen Qabus was sent to Britain, where he completed his secondary education and then entered the military college at Sandhurst. He served as an infantryman with the Cameronians in Germany for one year before returning to Oman, where he finished his studies in Islam and Omani history. During his long absence from the country, his father had become more and more isolated and distrustful. Upon the return of his son, the Sultan had Qabus placed under virtual house arrest in Salalah. Qabus remained under house arrest for six years until in 1970 troops loyal to Qabus clashed with those loyal to his father and deposed Sa‘id. Qabus moved from Salalah to Masqat and officially changed the name of the country from the Sultanate of Masqat and Oman to the Sultanate of Oman. Qabus was faced with a serious rebellion in Dhufar, which was supported by the Marxist government in South Yemen. Qabus was supported by Britain and was able to bring an end to the conflict by 1975. Oman’s oil wealth is moderate and Qabus initiated a policy of “Omanization” to lessen dependency on foreign laborers. He has also initiated several political and economic reforms, including establishing a parliament. Women have the right to vote and to stand for elections. Despite his many initiatives that have greatly improved the life of Omanis, he is an absolute monarch. Unlike the other monarchies in the region in which members of the ruling family have a say in policies, Qabus’ decisions are not subject to modification. In 1976 Qabus married his cousin, Kamilah, called Sayyidah Nawwal bin Tariq, daughter of his uncle Tariq bin Taymur, but the marriage quickly ended in divorce with no children. Qabus has not remarried and has no heir, although it is generally believed that the children of his uncle Majid bin Taymur will inherit the throne. See also Al Qa‘idah.

Qahtan

FURTHER READING Allen Jr., Calvin, and W. Lynn Rigsbee. Oman under Qaboos: From Coup to Constitution, 1970–1996. London: Frank Cass, 2000.

Qahtan Sebastian Maisel The predominantly nomadic Qahtan tribe lives in the region that connects central with southern Arabia. The territory of the Qahtan stretches from its original location east of the Asir Mountains into southern Najd. Beginning in the Wadi Raniya it continues eastward along the Tuwaiq Mountains and the Wadi Tathlith and reaches into the area between Dawadimi and Shaqra. Their tribal name of Qahtan seems to not be connected to the Qahtan held to be the founder of the south Arabian tribes. Since the late seventeenth century, they were in loose alliance with the Sharifs of Makkah. But after one of their leading shaykhs converted to the Wahhabi doctrine and became one of the most successful military leaders, other segments of the tribe joined the movement and quickly the whole tribe became one of their strongest allies in the region. The Al Sa‘ud relied on their military support during the campaign against Asir in 1802. In the following century, they sometimes lived independently, sometimes paid tribute to the ruling family of central Arabia, the Al Rashid or the Al Sa‘ud. During the Al Sa‘ud civil war between ‘Abdallah and Sa‘ud, the Qahtan supported the former, who occasionally sought refuge within their territory. When the ‘Utaybah tribe emerged as a strong force toward the middle of the nineteenth century, they were pushed out of upper Najd. In the meantime, they continued to raid (while being raided by other tribal groups) until the early twentieth century, when they were incorporated into the Ikhwan movement. Unlike more fanatical tribes, the Qahtan remained loyal to ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud and often fought on the western fringes of the new Saudi state (e.g., in the campaigns in Asir, Khurma, and Ta’if). During the conquest of Ta’if in September 1924, Qahtani Ikhwan participated in the massacres against the local population. However, the main Qahtan tribe remained loyal to the Al Sa‘ud and did not participate in the Ikhwan revolt of 1929, although some smaller sections might have defected from this policy. Although they founded several hijrah villages, some of them near al-Kharj, many families kept their herds and continued migrating within their tribal domain. After World War II, two-thirds of the tribe was still nomadic or semi-nomadic. Along with the ‘Utaybah and Mutayr, they are considered the most powerful tribes of central Arabia, and the age-old rivalry between them is still alive. A tribe by the same name lives in the southeastern slopes of the Asir Mountains. Although a common descent is likely, the two groups developed very differently. The southern Qahtan became mountain farmers and semi-nomads with sheep, camels, and horses. In the beginning of the twentieth century they were staunch supporters of the Idrisi Dynasty in Yemen, the Sharifs of Makkah, and even the Imams from Sana‘a. They form a confederation of six autonomous

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tribes: the ‘Abida, Rufaidat al-Yaman, Bani Bishr, Sanha al-Hibab, Shurayf, and Wida’a. The Qahtan in the Wadi Tathlith region include the following sections: Al Mas‘ud, Al Sa‘d, al-Masha‘ilah, Al Suwaydan, Al Shabwah, al-Masarida, al-Jubab, and Al Atif. In Najd, their two main lineages are al-Jahadir and Janb.

FURTHER READING Kurpershoek, Marcel. Arabia of the Bedouins. London: Saqi Books, 2001.

Al Qa‘idah Jack Kalpakian Few movements have generated as much fear, controversy, and passion as Al Qa‘idah (Al Qaeda). Its name means “the base” in Arabic. Its was established in 1998 in Saudi Arabia as the “World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders.” According to the World Islamic Front, its core agenda includes “killing Americans and their allies, civilian and military, is an individual duty for every Muslim … This is in accordance with the words of Almighty Allah.” The organization was led, at the start, by Usamah bin Ladin (Osama bin Laden), a wealthy Saudi veteran of the 1979 anti-Soviet Jihad in Afghanistan. Bin Ladin had developed links with other Islamist opposition movements in the Arab and Islamic worlds, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which provided the backbone of Al Qa‘idah, including its ideologist and second-in-command, Ayman alZawahiri. The organization’s first activities against the United States took place in Somalia, where it participated in insuring the failure of the United States’ intervention there. It followed up its perceived successes there with attacks against the United States embassies in East Africa and the U.S.S. Cole in the port of Aden in Yemen. These attacks elicited Tomahawk missile attacks by the Clinton administration. Al Qa‘idah had taken shelter in Taliban-governed Afghanistan, and the Pakistani government had refused to cooperate with the United States with regard to apprehending or punishing Al Qa‘idah in a more serious fashion. The missile attacks did not seriously damage the organization, and it proceeded with the attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States. Nearly 3,000 United States citizens died in the attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. The attacks led to an openly acknowledged U.S. ultimatum to Pakistan, which led to cooperation by Pakistan. The attacks also brought home the hostility felt by many Muslims and Arabs toward the United States, especially in countries often presented as allies to the Americans. The immediate aftermath of the attacks was chaos in the United States, with air traffic and travel basically shut down. A commonly asked question was “why do you hate us?” but those asking the question seem to have not read Al Qa‘idah’s materials, which were freely available in the original and in generally good translations online. The United States invaded Afghanistan in the aftermath

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of 9/11 and quickly deposed its Taliban government by coordinating its actions with the Northern Alliance, and the emergence of a new Afghan government deprived Al Qa‘idah of many training camps and bases. The organization survived nevertheless by decentralizing many of its functions and spreading itself throughout the Islamic world. Even after losing its Afghan bases and facing pressure from the Pakistani army in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, according to the Washington Post, Al Qa’idah was able to create an intranet system called “Obelisk” using servers in Malaysia. The organization continues to show remarkable sophistication. The organization has been described as a “venture capitalist” entity, with elements of leadership and MBA program courses. Although Al Qa‘idah is an unusual organization, it is certainly not an unprecedented one. There were movements with similar structures that have also faded into the warehouses of history, including the violent anarchists, the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries, and others. Its primary weaknesses have been seen to be universalistic demands, political inflexibility, and the current impossibility of it conducting negotiations with any of its opponents. Its goals include the reestablishment of the Caliphate to rule the Islamic world and the wholesale expulsion of non-Muslims from Muslim countries. Its propaganda has also called for the reconquest of Spain and the elimination of the Israeli and Armenian states. It has also expressed profound hostility to Shi‘ites and other heterodox, from a fundamentalist Sunni perspective, Muslim movements. Its suspected involvement in the murder of a leading Shi‘ite politician in Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto, is almost certain to earn it near-universal hatred among Pakistan’s 30 million Shi‘ites. Because it operates from a purely ideological perspective, it has also conducted operations against or endorsed the actions of other movements directed at Russia, China, and India. By doing so, it has managed to alienate the main rivals of its primary enemies in the West. This suggests that the organization is far from accomplishing its goals, but its internal vitality and creativity are likely to persist for decades, perhaps outliving its founder. Defeating it will require enforcement, suppression, coordination, changes in attitudes and values, as well as a deeper understanding of the societies that have spawned it. This last piece of the puzzle is the most difficult element in any successful strategy against the organization, because it will require introspection about the role played by the United States in these societies. Using the Islamist movement as counterweight to the Left during the 1970s and 1980s helped create the current problem, and even if the United States played no direct role in helping bin Ladin, it certainly intervened in the Soviet war in Afghanistan by backing the Afghan mujahidin.

FURTHER READING Cronin, Audrey Kruth. “How Al Qaeda Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups?” International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 7–48. Hoffman, Bruce. “The Leadership Secrets of Osama bin Laden: The Terrorist as CEO,” The Atlantic Monthly, April 3, 2003, 23. Warrick, Joby. “Leak Severed a Link to Al-Qaeda’s Secrets,” The Washington Post, October 9, 2007. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/

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Qasim 09/AR2007100900791.html?hpid=topnews&sid=ST2007100901226 (last accessed October 10, 2007). World Islamic Front. “Jihad against Jews and Crusaders,” February 23, 1998. Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm (last accessed October 10, 2007).

Qasim Sebastian Maisel Al-Qasim is an administrative region in central Saudi Arabia in between the Ha’il Province and the Riyadh Province. The Qasim province is densely populated and has a population of approximately 1 million people. The capital is Buraydah, and other significant cities include ‘Unayzah, al-Rass, and al-Bukayriyah. As in other Saudi provinces, the governor of Qasim is a high-ranking member of the ruling Al Sa‘ud family, Amir Faysal bin Bandar. Historically part of the Najd region, Qasim always maintained a semi-independent position with regards to its political leadership. In addition, Qasim is distinguished from its southern neighbor through different lifestyles and identity. Although the towns and oases of southern Najd were greatly influenced by their nomadic population, so were the settlements of Qasim from its predominantly settled relatives. The inhabitants of Qasim and Najd share many cultural similarities, but it is noticeable that the people in Qasim possess a distinct urban autonomous identity, which is different from the Najdi identity based on agricultural farming. For example, the city of ‘Unayzah, twin city and long-term rival of Buraydah, is known as “Paris of the Najd.” Although the area has large and fertile pastures, what makes Qasim so special are strings of small villages and towns mostly located in the Wadi al-Rimmah, where the high level of groundwater allowed extensive agriculture for centuries and made Qasim one of the largest date producers in the world. Every year in September, a special festival celebrates the date and people from all over the Peninsula come to purchase large quantities of Qasimi dates. Qasim is also home to the biggest camel market in the region because of the long-lasting history of caravan trade with other regions. The region also is known for other modes of livelihood, in particular its handicrafts, labor migration, and long-distance trade, the latter two connecting Qasim with the wider area. Contacts with the outside world also seem to have encouraged special attention to education. The persistence of this trend is due partly to the region’s independence from the two rival families, the Al Sa‘ud and the Al Rashid, and partly to their connections with other communities through trade and kinship. Many famous Islamic scholars, writers, and intellectuals are from Qasim, among them Shaykh Ibn Uthaymin, Hamd al-Jasir, and ‘Abd al‘Aziz al-Tuwayjiri. Being next to the homeland of the Wahhabi movement, Qasim was a natural early target of their missionaries and attempts for political hegemony. By 1792, most of Qasim was under Al Sa‘ud control, but in the following decades, the

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appointed governors of Buraydah and ‘Unayzah established a semi-autonomous rule by switching sides in the ongoing struggle over the hegemony in central Arabia. In 1906, however, Qasim became the battleground once again for the armies of the Al Sa‘ud and the Al Rashid, this time with a close involvement of the Ottomans, and in several battles, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud gained ultimate control over Qasim and included it into his realm. The rule of the Al Sa‘ud over the new territory was fostered by the appointment of junior members from the ruling family, the Al Jiluwi, as governors of Qasim. Today, many well-known Qusmani families are included in the official patronage network rewarding them with influential positions in the military, economy, or administration for their loyalty. Sometimes this dominance is mistaken for a dominance of Najdi groups; however, as noted earlier, a clear distinction between Najd and Qasim with regard to their historical, economical, and political developments has to be made. Furthermore, the region became the breadbasket of Saudi Arabia because of its growing number of large-scale irrigation projects, where, with government subsidies, grain is produced in quantities that allow export. Cuts in the subsidies will significantly impact the farming economy of Qasim.

FURTHER READING Altorki, Soraya, and Donald P. Cole. Arabian Oasis City. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989. Al-Juhany, Uwidah Metaireek. Najd before the Salafi Reform Movement: Social, Political, and Religious Conditions during the Three Centuries preceding the Rise of the Saudi State. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2002. Shamekh, Ahmed A. “Spatial Patterns of Bedouin Settlement in Al-Qasim Region, Saudi Arabia.” PhD dissertation, University of Kentucky, 1975.

Qasimi Empire Carla Higgins The Qawasim is the name of a ruling clan from the Huwaylah tribe that successfully imposed its authority over a wide range of tribes and territories, on both the northern (Iran) and southern coasts (Ra’s al Khaymah and Sharqah) of the Arabian Gulf, beginning in the mid-eighteenth century. The Qawasim fleet was the power that controlled the Gulf, and at one time extended their control to regions in the Indian subcontinent and East Africa. The economy of this empire was built upon maritime trade, including pearling, and was centered in the ports of Qishim and Lingah in today’s Iran, as well as the Qasimi capital in Julfar, now Ra’s al Khaymah, the northernmost emirate in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). On the southern coast (now the UAE), Qawasim territory was not confined to coastal areas, but extended into the Hajar Mountains and along both coasts of the Musandam, bringing the Qawasim into conflict with the Sultans of

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Masqat. Continued conflict between the Qawasim and the Masqat rulers meant that there was no single dominant power in the Gulf, and trade deteriorated. From approximately 1778 to 1835, notably in Qasimi territory, maritime raiding became common. The British described this as piracy, and the Arab coast was dubbed “The Pirate Coast.” In 1809, to protect their trade interests in the Gulf, the British sought to curtail the trading activities of the Qawasim by destroying the Qawasim fleet; however, it did not take the Qawasim long to regain their sea power. In 1819, a British naval expedition attacked, burned the Qasimi fleet, and captured the city. A general peace treaty was signed in 1820, and it appears that the Arab rulers were ready to oblige, possibly because continued conflict at sea was costly to the economy of the shaykhdoms—communications needed for trade had become increasingly dangerous and the movement of essential trade goods had stopped. Maritime peace was formally agreed to in 1835, renewed periodically, and in May 1853 a treaty was signed, the “Perpetual Treaty of Peace.” At one time, Qawasim territory in the UAE began just north of Sharqah, and went due east to Khor Kalbah. By 1850, a compromise had been reached between the Sultan of Masqat and Qasimi ruler Shaykh Sultan—Masqat’s Sultan would rule the inaccessible mountain regions, known as the Musandam peninsula (with its Shihuh population), leaving the rest to the Qawasim. Qawasim territory was further reduced to administering only those areas on the Arab side of the Gulf. There were fairly continuous power struggles between the Qawasim rulers and the Abu Dhabi Shaykhs, and the area was one of regular dispute as tribal members changed alliances and switched sides. The first Qawasim ruler was Rashid bin Mattar (1720–1777). The major Qawasim patriarch was Shaykh Sultan bin Saqr (1803–1866), who moved around Qasimi territory, delegating administration to brothers and sons, and thus his immediate family remained in control for decades after his death. Qawasim rulers continue to rule both Ra’s al Khaymah and Sharqah.

Qatar Carla Higgins Qatar occupies a flat, rocky, and sandy plain on a narrow peninsula that extends into the Arabian Gulf, approximately 100 miles (161 kilometers) from its southern border with Saudi Arabia. Its northwest coast is about nineteen miles (thirty kilometers) from that of Bahrain. Nomads from the Najd and al-Hasa regions in Saudi Arabia historically used this barren land as rangeland. The lack of water and the harsh climate ensured that settlements were temporal and frequently seasonal. Most settlements were found on the east coast, and pearling, fishing, and trade provided primary sources of income. Early populations were comprised of nomadic and settled Arabs and slaves from the East Coast of Africa. Qatar has been influenced by the same great powers that wielded control in the larger region. During the ‘Abbasid era (750–1258) several settlements, such as Murwab, were founded. The Portuguese ruled from 1517 to 1538, but were

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usurped by the Ottomans, who remained nominally in control until 1913. The British were the most influential foreign power from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, because they sought to control trade routes to India, and the security of East India ships lead to the need to impose a British brand of order in the Gulf. The British did not have influence entirely on their own, however, but worked with and through local tribes. Powerful indigenous families were the Al Khalifah and Al Jalahimah sections of the Bani ‘Utub tribe, who migrated from Kuwait to Qatar in the 1760s and became prominent in Qatar. The Al Khalifah family, in conjunction with other Qatari tribes, captured Bahrain in 1783 and eventually resettled there, with only a nominal presence left in Qatar. The British played a major role in the creation of an independent Qatari state. The General Treaty of Peace in 1820 between British India and the Gulf Shaykhs was an assertion of British authority, and when entered into, Bahrain was a party to it, and Qatar as a Bahraini dependency was considered a party to it. However, when a Bahraini force attacked Qatari towns in 1867, the British political agent imposed a peace treaty that recognized Qatar as distinct from Bahrain and acknowledged Muhammad ibn Thani ibn Muhammad as a leader in Qatar—thus the Al Thani became recognized as a ruling family. By 1872 Muhammad Ibn Thani’s son, Qasim ibn Muhammad, accepted Ottoman rule in the hopes of using Ottoman power and influence to dominate the whole of Qatar, but by 1893 Qasim bin Muhammad’s supporters drove the Ottomans out of Qatar, and the Ottomans shortly renounced sovereignty. By 1916, Qasim bin Muhammad’s son, ‘Abd Allah ibn Qasim, signed a treaty with Britain bringing Qatar into the trucial system, and thereby gave up autonomy in foreign and certain domestic affairs in hopes of getting support needed to secure his position as leader. It was not till 1935, when the British wanted a concession for oil exploration, that support was forthcoming. Oil was discovered in Qatar in 1939, but World War II brought a halt to its exploitation until 1949 when payments for offshore rights initiated a much-needed transformation after the pearling traded had collapsed earlier. ‘Ali ibn ‘Abd Allah was became ruler in 1949 as part of an agreement with the British, who began developing government and public services. By 1953, a British adviser had drawn up a budget, and by 1954 there were forty-two Qatari government employees, but public services developed slowly. As oil revenues declined in the 1950s, discontent among the Al Thani family increased, but ‘Ali ibn ‘Abd Allah abdicated in 1960, and the new ruler left the deputy ruler, Khalifah ibn Hamad, to run the country. Khalifah ibn Hamad developed infrastructure and bureaucracy. In the 1960s, the economy became more diversified, with small-scale agriculture, a fishing company, and a cement factory. Britain’s announcement of its impending withdrawal by 1971 led Qatar to discuss the possibility of creating a federation with Bahrain and other Trucial States, but refused when Bahrain’s intent of becoming the senior partner became evident. Ahmad ibn ‘Ali offered a provisional constitution in April 1970. After being appointed prime minister, a Council of Ministers was sworn in on January 1, 1970 and Qatar became independent on September 3, 1971, and by February 22, 1972 Khalifah ibn Hamad had deposed Ahmad ibn ‘Ali. Khalifah ibn Hamad cut allowances paid to members of the Al Thani, increased spending on social

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programs, and filled government with al Thani members. By 1993, Khalifah ibn Hamad’s son, Hamad Ibn Khalifah, was running most of the country. In 1995, Hamad Ibn Khalifah deposed his father with the consent of the al Thani family, but the two are now reconciled. Since 1995, reforms have been noticeable; Shaykh Hamad represents a new generation of Gulf leader. One of the first steps taken to liberalize Qatar was the founding of Al Jazeera, the first all-news satellite television network in the Arab world. A gradual program of political reform has been evident, and in 1999 Qatar became the first Arab Gulf country to enfranchise its indigenous Qatari population (male and female) in an election for a Municipal Council. In April 2003, national elections for this same Municipal Council resulted in a victory for the first Qatari female candidate. That same year, Qatari voters approved a new constitution that officially and explicitly gave women the right to vote and run for office. Shaykhah Bint Ahmad al Mahmud was appointed as the Minister of Education in 2003, the first female cabinet minister in the Arabian Gulf. Shaykhah Muza Bint Nasr Al Missnad, Shaykh Hamad’s second wife, was instrumental in launching Qatar’s new Education City, a campus complex that offers degrees from several prestigious American universities. Oil and natural gas are the mainstay of Qatar’s economy. Qatari nationals enjoy the highest per capita income of any Gulf resident. With oil reserves predicted to be exhausted by 2026, Qatar is now exploiting its natural gas reserves, which are the third largest in the world. Qatar’s future appears financially secure.

FURTHER READING Blanchard, Christopher M. CRS Report for Congress. Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 24, 2008. Library of Congress. “January 1993. Library of Congress Country Studies: Qatar.” Available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/qatoc.html (last accessed March 14, 2008).

Qatif Sebastian Maisel Qatif is a large oasis and settlement in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia located on the coast of the Persian Gulf between the industrial complex of Jubayl and the port of Ras Tanura. The area includes several smaller villages and towns, among them Qatif City, Tarut Island, Saihat, and Safwa with a total population of approximately half a million. Most of them are Ja‘afari or 12er Shi‘ites as are most Shi‘ite communities in the Gulf. In the time period before the oil boom, subsistence irrigation farming, fishing, and pearl diving were the main economical activities. Some families became affluent through maritime trade along the Gulf coast. The settled, agricultural population grew date palms and rice in small, irrigated gardens, which were split among several owners because of the regulations of Islamic inheritance law and

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included alfalfa and vegetables. Many of Qatif’s inhabitants found employment with Aramco, where religious discrimination was not tolerated. Oil revenues also helped to improve the infrastructure of the oases. The Qatif oasis was an area of early settlement with archaeological evidence dating back to 3500 BC. In pre-Islamic times it was recognized as an important port and trading post, a position it maintained until the twentieth century. Because of the distance to the Islamic centers of power, Qatif attracted dissident Islamic groups, such as the Qaramitah, who made the area around Qatif and Bahrain their headquarters from where they launched attacks on areas controlled by the ‘Abbasids. The area was also exposed to the imperial rivalry between major powers, the Portuguese and the Ottomans, who battled over the oasis for several decades. At the end of the seventeenth century, the local tribe of the Bani Khalid ousted the Ottomans for some time. After the first Saudi State consolidated with the immersion of Qasim, the Wahhabi rulers started to campaign against al-Hasa and Qatif, the two main oases under the control of the Bani Khalid, mostly because they were inhabited by Shi‘ites, who were regarded as “infidels” by Wahhabi doctrine. In 1780, they took control over Qatif and large parts of the Gulf coast. However, Ottoman power was restored and in 1871 direct control was installed, making the oasis part of the Vilayet (governorate) of Basrah until 1913, when ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud occupied al-Hasa again, making Saudi hegemony over the area permanent. In 1940, Qatif lost its status as provincial capital to al-Khobar and Dammam, the area where two years earlier oil was discovered. Today, a large oil field bears the name of the oasis, and many inhabitants found employment there. Oil revenues began to transform the economic and social life of Qatif, but the palm groves with their supplement agricultural production still shape the life of the people and their city. The Shi‘ite population of Qatif remains generally opposed to Saudi/Wahhabi dominance, which occasionally leads to civil unrest and upheaval. This becomes noticeable during the celebration of ‘Ashurah, the most important Shi‘ite religious holiday commemorating the death of Imam Hussein. Regularly, clashes with security forces have been reported; for example, in 1979 during the concurrent siege of the Grand Mosque in Makkah, and in the aftermath of the Islamic revolution in Iran. Shi‘ites from Qatif demanded more shares in the oil revenues, but their opposition was quickly suppressed, leaving behind many arrested and some killed.

FURTHER READING Al Rasheed, Madawi. “The Shia of Saudi Arabia: A Minority in Search of Cultural Authenticity,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 25, no. 1 (1998): 121–138. Clark, Arthur (ed.). A Land Transformed: The Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Aramco. Dhahran: Saudi Aramco, 2006. Cordesman, Anthony H., and Nawaf E. Obaid. National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses, and Challenges. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005. Ebert, Charles. “Water Resources and Land Use in the Qatif Oasis of Saudi Arabia,” Geographical Review 55, no. 4 (1965): 496–509.

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Quraysh Sebastian Maisel Quraysh is an ancient Arab tribe who live in and around the city of Makkah. They claim descendence from Ibrahim (Abraham) through Isma‘il (Ishmael) and ‘Adnan. Since the end of the sixth century, the Quraysh played a leading role in the long distance caravan trade across the Arabian Peninsula, particularly between southern Arabia and Greater Syria. Since the days of their ancestor Qusay, the Quraysh were the protectors of the Ka‘abah, the ancient temple and center of pilgrimage in Makkah, where each family of the clan was given specific religious and political responsibilities. Here they worshipped a variety of deities and idols, among them Hubal. They profited from the pilgrims and the business and trade they brought with them. The tribe consisted of several extended families; for example, the Hashim, Umayya, Makhzum, and Taim. During the beginning of the seventh century, the Umayya and Makhzum gained power and wealth and dominated other tribal groups in the area, who in return sought to break the monopoly of the Makhzum by creating alliances with other Quraysh families. The Prophet Muhammad belonged to the Hashim family, which was part of the alliance, but because of the persisting persecution of Muhammad’s new Islamic community, was expelled from it in 616. Muhammad’s first followers were members of the Quraysh and so were his first opponents; however, after Muhammad conquered Makkah in 630 he pardoned his Quraysh enemies and incorporated them into the community. During the following Islamic conquest and formation of the Islamic Empire, members of the Quraysh took leading positions. It became customary that the leader of the Islamic community had to be from the Quraysh, and Abu Bakr as the first caliph or successor, was a prominent member. Later, the ruling dynasties of the empire, the Umayyads (616–750), the ‘Abbasids (750–1258), and Fatimids (909–1171), emerged from Quraysh families. Today, members of the Quraysh tribe still concentrate in the triangle between Jiddah, Ta’if, and Makkah. Some of them are engaged in farming or rent farmland to others, but generally speaking they live and work together with other tribal groups in a similar environment. On a social level, however, they are separate from other tribal groups of lower descent. The Quraysh, like other “noble” tribes, consider themselves superior to those elements and would not intermarry with them. In addition, they still proudly wear the honorary title ashraf (singular sharif meaning noble, high-born, distinguished: related to the family of the Prophet Muhammad), and interact only with people of equal status. Many left the rural areas in order to live in Makkah and return only on the weekend to maintain and enjoy their farms. The Qurayshi family of Shayba still keeps the key of the Ka‘abah. In the Quran, surah 106 (and arguably surah 105 as well) is dedicated to the Quraysh and calls upon them to worship God, who had always protected and supported them. Furthermore, their dialect is considered the purest type in

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Arabia because of the proximity of the people to Muhammad’s message and therefore was used to as the base model to explain Classical Arabic. The symbol of the Hawk of the Quraysh is used in many Arab national flags and coat of arms. See also Arabic Language.

FURTHER READING Crone, Patricia. Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam. Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2004. Ibrahim, Mahmood. “Social and Economic Conditions in Pre-Islamic Mecca,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 14, no. 3 (1982): 343–358. Katakura, Motoko. Bedouin Village: A Study of a Saudi Arabian People in Transition. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977. Peters, Francis E. Muhammad and the Origins of Islam. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. Yazigi, Maya R. “The Politics of Kinship: The Family of Abu Bakr during the First Century of Islam.” PhD dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 2001.

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Ra’s al Khaymah Carla Higgins Ra’s al Khaymah, an emirate, means “Head of the Tent.” Like each of the emirates, geographical assets have played a substantive role in the development of communities in the harsh environment of the Arabian Peninsula. Ra’s al Khaymah (RAK) is the most northernly of the emirates, it borders an enclave of Oman, and owes much of its history to its natural harbor, the peninsula on which it is built, the fertile plain on the mainland, and the presence of steep mountains. Its territory extends over the Hajar Mountains, which provide runoff water to support agriculture. Its economy was traditionally based on agriculture (especially date farming), fishing, and pearling, as well as trade through its port—unlike other emirates; however, historically almost all merchants were Arab. Many residents practiced pastoralism, moving from lower to higher elevations throughout the year, moving livestock, and taking advantage of the availability of seasonal resources. Such movements added complexity to efforts to administer and control the area, politically and economically. Ra’s al Khaymah city is near the ancient city of Julfar. Julfar district is mentioned in texts as early as the eight century AD, and the port of the same name in tenth century documents. The city of Julfar became the capital of the Qawasim empire and a large settlement between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries. Julfar residents were heavily involved in trade, judging from archaeological excavations, which yielded Chinese porcelain, ‘Abbasid pottery from Iraq, and coffee beans and seeds from distant countries. Ahmed ibn Majid, one of the most famous Arab navigators in history, was born in Julfar in approximately 1432. Ibn Majid was also known for his poetry and prose, much of which was filled with navigational theory and principles. Three hundred years later, the Qawasim clan, known for its navel prowess, had established itself in Ra’s al Khaymah. A larger branch of the Qawasim clan also controlled Sharqah, and the two cities are linked in history as a result. The city is divided by a creek, the western side known as old Ra’s al Khaymah and the eastern banks as al Nakhil, and the two sides are linked by a bridge. In 1869 RAK was fully independent from Sharqah, then from 1900 to 1921 was re-incorporated into Sharqah, whose rulers appointed a governor who eventually became the independent ruler of RAK in 1921. After the announcement of the federation of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1971, Ra’s al Khaymah

Al Rashid

lost two islands, the Greater Tumb and Lesser Tumb, to Iran and to date has not reached a settlement. It joined the federation of the United Arab Emirates on February 24, 1972 after receiving assurances that UAE leaders would not give up the two islands. RAK’s market (suq) has always been a trading center for populations in the mountains, known as the Shihuh. RAK has traditionally produced such local ceramic products such as the pottery incense burners known and still used throughout the UAE, and now has an impressive ceramic industry—the company RAK Ceramics is described as one of the top three ceramic manufacturers in the world. RAK traditionally produced the well known and loved khanajir, whose blades were imported from India and Iran. Weavers were also once found in Ra’s al Khaymah. Today, stone quarries and cement factories are important local industries. Pharmaceuticals are produced by Gulf Pharmaceutical Industries (known locally as Julfar), an international drug major that exports medicine to over forty countries. Fresh fish are a major export. Most exports go to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman, and many exports exit through one of three ports. Saqr Port has eight deep-water berths, with specialized berths for handling bulk cement and aggregates. Ras al Khaymah Sea Port hosts mediumsized and small vessels and many types of wooden ships, dhows, and launches. It is active in re-export and export with neighboring countries. Al Jazeerah Port handles the growing demand for bulk shipments of aggregates and rocks for construction elsewhere in the UAE. A fourth port is planned near the border of Oman. It will include a passenger terminal to facilitate ferry services. Today, Ra’s al Khaymah emirate has an area of 656 square miles, a population of about 195,000 residents (2003), and the vast majority of residents reside in RAK city. It has been ruled by Shaykh Saqr bin Muhammad Al Qasimi since 1948, and his son Shaykh Sa‘ud bin Saqr Al Qasimi is Crown Prince and Deputy Ruler. Shaykh Sa‘ud now serves as the de facto ruler. RAK boasts of a Free Trade Zone, a Media Free Zone, an Exhibition Center, an IT Park, and an international airport that hosts approximately twenty-seven airlines in addition to its own, Ra’s al Khaymah Airways. RAK has at least six universities.

Al Rashid Sebastian Maisel The Al Rashid were the ruling family of the Shammar tribe in northern Arabia between 1836 and 1921 when they surrendered to ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud. As such they were the biggest rivals of the Al Sa‘ud over the hegemony in central Arabia. Originally located in Ha’il in the Jabal Shammar region, their emirate included most of central Arabia with the exception of the Hijaz, al-Hasa, and the Empty Quarter. However, they had no political influence over the other Shammar sections living in Syria and Iraq. The Al Rashid belonged to the ‘Abdah section of the Shammar tribe, which is the largest of the four sections. Within the ‘Abdah, the Al Rashid came from the

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Rabi‘a lineage and the Ja‘afar branch, and here they were part of the al-Khalil household like their first internal rivals and former rulers of Ha’il, the Al ‘Ali. This level of segmentation is critical in order to understand the supremacy and legitimacy of the Al Rashid over other segments of the Shammar tribe. The Al Rashid rose to power in the 1830s under Amir (ruler) ‘Abdallah, a grandson of the name-giver Rashid, and his brother ‘Ubayd by eliminating their cousins from the Ibn ‘Ali family. During the rule of their sons, Muhammad (1869–1897) as amir and Hamud as advisor and military leader, the Rashidis gained control over much of Najd and part of Eastern Arabia. During this time period they shook off Saudi rule and subjugated the Al Sa‘ud so they had to accept a Rashidi governor in their hometown Riyadh. To maintain the hegemony over this vast area, they cooperated with neighboring powers, signed treaties with them, or fought them if necessary. Among those who the Al Rashid considered allies for certain times were the Ottoman, the rulers of Kuwait, the Al Sa‘ud, and most major tribes in northern Arabia. What contributed to their fall in 1921 was the rapid political and economical change around the end of World War I; a change, that was brought by a new world order after the fall of the Ottomans. Unable to compromise with the new powers, they choose to fight them. In addition, the Al Rashid were internally unable to provide a strong and central leader who could unite the large segmented tribal forces and use them as an asset in the upcoming power struggle. Instead the Al Rashid were entangled in a brutal fight over succession to the position of the amir, which weakened the authority and influence of the position significantly. In a very short time period, relatives who tried to ascend to power killed several Rashidi princes and the last Rashidi ruler, Muhammad bin Talal (1921), was left in a vulnerable position, unable to defend his divided realm against ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud. After the fall of Ha’il to the Al Sa‘ud, most members of the ruling family went into exile; however, some leading members were also taken hostage to the court of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud and only released on the condition that they abandon politics. Most did and became successful businessmen. Other female members were married to Ibn Sa‘ud or some of his close relatives. Those family members of the Al Rashid who were related to the royal family by marriage received monthly allowances. However, until now, it is a political taboo to mention the name of the Al Rashid. This is also illustrated by the fact that in 2006 a son of the last Rashidi ruler, Talal bin Muhammad bin Talal Al Rashid, founded a political party in opposition to the Al Sa‘ud that draws most of its support from members of the Shammar tribe.

FURTHER READING Al Rasheed, Madawi. “Durable and Non-Durable Dynasties: The Rashidies and Sa’udis in Central Arabia,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 19, no. 2 (1992): 144–158. Al Rasheed, Madawi. Politics in an Arabian Oasis: The Rashidis of Saudi Arabia. London: I.B. Tauris, 1992. Al Rasheed, Madawi. “The Rashidi Dynasty: Political Centralization among the Shammar in North Arabia,” New Arabian Studies II, (1993): 140–152.

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Al-Rashid Al Rasheed, Madawi. A History of Saudi Arabia. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Raswan, Carl R. “Tribal Areas and Migration Lines of the North Arabian Bedouins,” Geographical Review 20, no. 3 (1930): 494–502.

Al-Rashid John A. Shoup The al-Rashid or Rawashid is a Hinawi (southern) tribe and seems to have been part of the Bayt Kathir tribe in the past. The Rawashid were among the most isolated of tribes in Oman, living in the far reaches of Dhufar with little interaction with the outside world until the second half of the twentieth century. They are still considered to be one of the few “pure Bedouin,” existing primarily on camels on the fringes of the Rub‘ al-Khali, although subsections of the Bayt Imani live among the Bayt Kathir and are not distinguishable in any way. Other al-Rashid families live among the Harasis. The Rawashid are divided into three main subdivisions: Bayt Imani (or Yamani), Bayt Barakat, and Bayt Masayifah. The Rawashid remain allied to the Bayt Kathir The British traveler Wilfred Thesiger was attracted to the Rashid and considered them to be “true Arabs” and trusted their knowledge of the deep desert more than his guides from the Bayt Kathir. He chose as his main companions for his major crossings of the Rub‘ al-Khali men of the Rashid, Salim bin Kabinah, Salim bin Ghabayshah, Musallim bin al-Kamam, and Muhammad al-‘Awf. He wrote in Arabian Sands (44): They were small, deft men, alert and watchful. Their bodies were lean and hard, tempered in the furnace of the desert and trained to unbelievable endurance. Looking at them I realized they were very much alive, tense with nervous energy, vigorously controlled. They had been bred from the purist race in the world and lived in conditions where only the hardiest and the best could survive. They were as finedrawn and as highly-strung as thoroughbreds. Beside them the Beit Kathir seemed uncouth and assertive, lacking the final polish of the inner desert.

Thesiger’s opinion of the Bayt Kathir seems rather harsh, as he also notes the Bayt Kathir and the Rawashid are related tribes closely intertwined economically. Even today most of the Bayt Imani Rashid (the section to which his two young companions, Salim bin Kabinah and Salim bin Ghabayshah, belonged) live among the Bayt Kathir. Thesiger estimated that in the 1940s the Rashid numbered around 300 individuals and the nearby Bayt Kathir only around 600 individuals, whereas in the 1980s it was estimated that in Oman the Rashid numbered only around 200 individuals. After South Yemen established a Marxist government in 1967, many of the Rashid migrated to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. During the Dhufar conflict in Oman others migrated to other places in Oman as well as to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, where it is possible for the Bedouin to obtain citizenship. It is difficult to get an accurate number of the tribe when members move back and forth between countries.

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FURTHER READING Asher, Michael. Thesiger. New York: Penguin Books, 1995. Carter, J.R.L. Tribes in Oman. London: Peninsular Publishing, 1982. Thesiger, Wilfred. Arabian Sands. London: Readers Union Longmans, Green & Co., 1960. Thesiger, Wilfred. Desert, Marsh, and Mountain. London: Flamingo, 1995.

Religions, Non-Islamic John A. Shoup Islam is the dominant religion in the Arabian Peninsula and has been since its inception in the seventh century. No country in the region is less than eighty-five percent Muslim, and in many the non-Muslims are migrant workers. There are, however, small populations of religious communities that pre-date Islam. Yemen, for example, has a long shared history with Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, and at times Yemen has ruled much of Ethiopia and vise versa. Yemen and Ethiopia have had Christian kingdoms, and Yemen has also had a Jewish kingdom in the pre-Islamic period. The Gulf has long historical ties to Iraq and there is evidence of an indigenous Christian community along the Gulf coast and on Bahrain; Bahrain is still the home of the Nestorian bishopric for both the island and the mainland. Judaism was the largest single non-Muslim religion in the Peninsula until the twentieth century and was concentrated mainly in Yemen. In the centuries before Islam Jews were scattered in many of the oases in the Hijaz as well as in the urban centers of Najran and Yemen. Yemen had the highest concentration of Jewish communities and several of the pre-Islamic Himiyar rulers of Yemen converted to Judaism. As late as 1930 the number of Jews in Yemen (including the British-controlled Aden) was estimated to be around 60,000. Although some worked as gold- and silversmiths in Yemen’s main cities, Paul Dresch notes that most of them were rural farmers no different from their Muslim neighbors. Jewish messianic movements were influenced by similar ones among Yemen’s Zaidi Shi‘ites. Following the establishment of Israel in 1948 special airplane flights were organized called Operation Magic Carpet to bring as many of Yemen’s Jews to Israel as possible. A small number elected to stay, and in 2000 around 1,500 Jews remained in Yemen. In 2002 about three percent of Yemen’s total population was listed as non-Muslim, including Jews and others. Jewish communities that had existed in the Hijaz well into the thirteenth century eventually moved to more important locations on the trade routes, such as Cairo or Damascus, so that by the start of the twentieth century none remained. Bahrain has a small indigenous Jewish community, and in 2008 Houda Nonoo was appointed Bahrain’s ambassador to the United States. Her appointment highlighted the long history of Bahrain’s Jewish population. Christianity was never widespread in the Arabian Peninsula and was concentrated near Syria and Iraq in the north, along the Gulf coast, and in Yemen.

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Christianity in Yemen was reinforced by the close relationship between Yemen and Ethiopia where the Egyptian Coptic Church established itself by the fourth century. Yemen was ruled briefly by the Christian king of Ethiopia who attempted to invade the Hijaz just prior to the Prophet Muhammad’s birth. Christianity along the Gulf coast was mainly brought by the Nestorians, a branch of the church that had been persecuted by the Byzantine Emperors but found protection under the Zoroastrian Persian Kings in the fourth century. There were five Nestorian bishoprics in the Gulf by the end of the fourth century. Archeological excavations in 1986 in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia have uncovered the ruins of a church near Jubayl that dates from this period. With the arrival of Islam, most of the people converted to the new faith although officially there is still a Nestorian bishopric for Bahrain. There is little information about the Bahraini Nestorians or whether there are any left today. Kuwait has an indigenous Christian population mainly of Iraqi origin. Kuwait’s Christians make up a very small minority, barely noticeable among the Muslim majority. Together with all other non-Muslims in Kuwait, including a small Hindu population, they make up no more than fifteen percent of the total. The Christians are composed of several of the Iraqi churches such as the Assyrian Church, or they belong to Iraq’s small Roman Catholic community. No other country in the region has an indigenous Christian population but have many foreign workers who belong to several different Christian denominations. Some of the countries have tolerant attitudes toward them and allow them to build places of worship, although Sunday is not an official day off from work and Christian religious holidays are not officially recognized. Several of the countries in the Gulf have indigenous populations of Hindus, descendants of merchant families that established themselves in the region centuries or decades ago. Those who have been in the region for generations are generally referred to as Khojas and are found today in Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. In Bahrain and Kuwait some of the Hindu families arrived after 1900 when the pearl trade was at its height. Both Bahrain and Kuwait had strong commercial ties to India and what is today Pakistan. In Bahrain many Arabs also speak at least one of the many languages of the subcontinent. Bahrain’s ruling elite allowed non-Arabs and non-Muslims to sit on municipal councils starting in the 1920s. Most of the Gulf countries have extended citizenship to these long established Hindu communities and there is little pressure on them to convert to Islam, although through long contact with Muslim neighbors some have, especially in Oman and the United Arab Emirates. In Oman the Khojas count for less than five percent of the population, whereas in the United Arab Emirates they number less than three percent of the total.

FURTHER READING De Lange, Nicholas. Atlas of the Jewish World. New York: Facts on File Publications, 1988. Dresch, Paul. A History of Modern Yemen. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

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Riyadh Heard-Bey, Frauke. From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates. London: Motivate Publishing, 2004. Lunde, Paul. Islam: Faith, Culture, History. New York: DK Publishing, 2002.

Riyadh Sebastian Maisel Meaning “the gardens,” al-Riyadh is the capital of Saudi Arabia. Located in the center of the Arabian Peninsula, it has some 4–5 million inhabitants. Topographically, Riyadh is on a high plateau that is intersected by valleys such the Wadi Hanifa and escarpments of the Jabal Tuwaiq. The north-south axis of the city runs along a former dry riverbed, the Wadi Batha, but is now transformed into the main innercity highway. With sometimes no precipitation at all, the annual rainfall is less than five inches (120 millimeters). The arid continental desert climate with hot summers, cold winters, low humidity, and seasonal sand storms is common for the rest of Najd. The popular water demand is covered by sufficient underground water, a reason for the long history of settlement in the area. Long before the rise of Islam, the city was known as al-Hajar and served as the capital of the Yamamah province. Both names continued to appear in the oral tradition, although the city itself fell in decline until the seventeenth century when Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab joined forces with Muhammad Al Sa‘ud, the ruler of neighboring Dir‘iyah, and set out to unify the area in the name of a new religious movement. After long resistance, the Al Sa‘ud finally succeeded and made Dir‘iyah headquarters of the Wahhabi movement. After initial success, the Ottoman Sultan sent forces from Egypt to put an end to it, and to destroy the first Saudi state. The Al Sa‘ud under Turki bin ‘Abdallah Al Sa‘ud were able to recover and to launch a second campaign to establish a new Saudi state in central Arabia. This time they made Riyadh the new capital of the emirate. However, the second Saudi state was brought down by internal rivalries and power struggles, which led to the conquest of their territory by the Al Rashid and the Shammar tribe. In the following years, geopolitical changes brought by outside powers, such as the Ottomans or the British, resulted in a coup when ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud took Riyadh back from the Rashidi governor in a surprise attack in 1902. Ibn Sa‘ud went on to permanently establish a third Saudi state that included the Hijaz, Asir, al-Hasa, the northern deserts, and of course Najd with its capital, Riyadh. In 1932 the status became official with the proclamation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Since then, the population of Riyadh grew from 30,000 to almost 5 million people today. It became the economical and administrative center of the kingdom, where many industrial complexes, companies, factories, and banks are located. Travel and trade are important sectors of development and so are education and culture. Two large public universities (King Saud University and Imam Muhammad bin Saud University), libraries, and several private colleges and

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academies shape the intellectual picture of the city. Administrative buildings dominate the public sector, and they often incorporate aspects of traditional architecture. Mosques and palaces of the royal family are numerous; the number of skyscrapers, however, is very low. Riyadh is the endpoint of the country’s only railway that links the capital with the Eastern Province, and its international airport is the second largest in the country. Because of the rapid population growth, the transportation system has almost reached its limit. Private cars dominate the crowded streets of Riyadh, pointing out to the nonexistence of public transportation. Riyadh is also the capital of the Riyadh Province. The city itself consists of fifteen districts. The area around Batha and Dirah is the traditional center, where remnants of old Riyadh are still visible, such as the Masmak Fortress, the former King’s palace, and the old markets. The vicinity of ‘Ulaya’ and Sulaymaniyah are the new commercial centers of Riyadh, where most of the banks, shops, restaurants, and malls are concentrated. The Faysaliyah Center and the Kingdom Tower, as Riyadh’s landmarks, are also found here. Newer additions to the city’s master plan are the campus of the King Saud University and the Diplomatic Quarter, and other residential areas are added annually to facilitate the growing demand for more housing opportunities. Urban growth is still channeled horizontally and not vertically, because of the abundance of building space and material. In the near future, Riyadh and the former Saudi capital Dir‘iyah will grow together, thus expanding the city limits even further. The population of Riyadh has changed with the expansion of the city. The indigenous people from the Wadi Hanifa have long blended with people from the outside who moved to Riyadh for a variety of reasons. Many foreign guestworkers, mainly from Southeast Asia, other Arab countries, and some Western nations, complete the new type of resident in Riyadh.

FURTHER READING Arab Urban Development Institute. Riyadh: The City of the Future. Riyadh: al-Mahad al-Arabi li-Inma al-Mudun, 1984. Al-Askar, Abdullah. al-Yamama in the Early Islamic Era. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2002. Daghistani, Abdal-Majeed Ismail. Al-Riyadh: Urban Development and Planning. Jeddah: Ministry of Information, Interior Information, 1985. Facey, William. Riyadh, the Old City: From Its Origins until the 1950s. London: Immel, 1992. Sani, Raja Abd Allah, and Marilyn Booth. Girls of Riyadh. New York: Penguin Press, 2007.

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Al Sabah Carla Higgins Kuwait is ruled by the Al Sabah family. Like the ruling families of Bahrain (the Al Khalifah) and Qatar (the Al Thani), the Al Sabah originate from central Arabia, and like the Al Khalifah belong to the ‘Anazah tribe. The Al Sabah migrated from their homeland of Hadar because of famine in the mid-seventeenth century. During migration they fell under the umbrella of the Bani ‘Utbah tribe and came to be known as one of the leading ‘Utbi families (“wanderers”). They settled in Qatar and engaged in pearling when ousted by the Bahraini rulers in 1701. After briefly settling in Basrah, they arrived in Kuwait in 1746, lead by Sabah bin Jabir, from which the family is named. At that time, they shared control with other ‘Utbi families, dividing up and controlling local administration, such as the courts and foreign affairs, leaving administration of the pearling industry and commerce to the Al Khalifah, and maritime affairs to the Al-Jalahimah. The latter two ‘Utbi families left by the 1760s, leaving the Al Sabah family in control. Early in the Al Sabah’s rule, Sabah’s son, ‘Abd Allah, then his grandson, Jabir, became the successors. The Al Sabah ruling family established the tone of their rule at this time by selecting leaders through family council, and always in consultation with leading merchant families and tribal elites. By 1775, the Al Sabah controlled trade and settlement and maintained armslength contacts with the British East India Company, the Wahhabbis, and the Ottomas. During ‘Abd Allah’s rule (1866–1892), closer ties were sought with the Ottomans, and he became provincial governor in 1871. During Muhammad al Sabah’s rule (1892–1896) and Mubarak the Great’s rule (1896–1915), change was eminent, because Mubarak needed British assistance to oust the Ottomans, who supported allies of Mubarak’s brothers whom Mubarak had killed in 1896. The British signed a treaty (1899) and gained control of Kuwait’s foreign and economic policy. Mubarak the Great established today’s line of succession—only his descendants would rule Kuwait thereafter, alternating between his son Jabir’s (1915–1917) lineage, or his other son, Salim’s (1917–1921) lineage. Ahmad al Jabir al Sabah (1921–1950) ruled for three decades, placing new constraints on the ruling family, witnessing the collapse of pearling, and the Majlis rebellion of 1938. When oil was struck and with the arrival of concessions, the merchant class petitioned the ruler for reforms and held elections for a legislative assembly to initiate the requested reforms. The Legislative Assembly lasted six months before its closure by the ruler, but represented Kuwait’s first pro-democracy effort.

Sabah Al-Salim Al-Sabah (1915–1977)

‘Abd Allah al Salim Al Sabah (1950–1965) lead Kuwait’s transformation into a wealthy oil-producing state. He built a large bureaucracy to distribute oil revenues. In 1961, he ushered in Kuwait’s independence, replacing the treaty of 1899 with the Treaty of Independence. The 1962 constitution formalized the relationship between the ruling family and Kuwaiti citizens when it vested legislative power in a national assembly and defined the executive branch as one headed by the emir. ‘Abd Allah institutionalized political participation by creating the National Assembly, which held elections in 1963. Sabah al Salim Al Sabah (1965–1977) continued ‘Abd Allah’s policies, although he abolished the National Assembly in 1976. Shaykh Jabir’s reign (1977–2006) was dominated by external events that increased tensions in Kuwait society. The Iran-Iraq War of 1980 increased violence, in 1983 the U.S. Embassy was bombed, and 1985 witnessed a dramatic and public attempt to assassinate Shaykh Jabir. In 1986 the National Assembly was again shut down, and civil rights curtailed. The opposition formed the Constitutional Movement of 1989–1990, calling for the restoration of the National Assembly. The Iraq invasion in August 1990 placed Kuwait under foreign domination for the first time until liberated in February 1991. The ruling family received criticism because they left the country for Saudi Arabia, returning when Kuwait was secure. Shaykh Jabir proposed an amendment to the election law that would give women full suffrage in 1999, but the National Assembly rejected it. The parliament did eventually grant women the right to vote and hold office in 2005. Shaykh Jabir’s death in January 2006 lead to a political crisis, because Shaykh Sa‘ad, the crown prince, was understood to be too ill to become Emir. Shaykh Sa‘ad was Emir for eight days before abdicating, but not before Kuwait’s parliament voted him out of office and nominated Shaykh Sabah Al Ahmad as Emir. Although Shaykh Sabah was also the ruling family’s choice, the fact that the parliament took the lead was an assertion of its role over that of the ruling family. Emir Shaykh Sabah began his reign in January 2006. During his first two years, he repealed the law against public gatherings and has initiated a new media law that is one of the strongest press freedom laws in the region.

Sabah Al-Salim Al-Sabah (1915–1977) Adnan Al-Ghunaim Sabah Al-Salim Al-Sabah is the twelfth Ruler of Kuwait and was born in 1915. His upbringing and education were on strictly traditional lines. In 1936, he married Munirah Fahd Al-‘Adwani, who was to bear him four children. She was followed in 1943 by second wife, his first cousin Shaykah Nuriyyah. Appointed to a top position in the police force, he proved himself a responsible and able organizer and was by the 1940s considered one of the more important members of the ruling family. After a government reshuffle in 1959, he took a post in the

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health department, showing his management and personnel skills and leaving it after three years a much more efficient organization. In October 1961 Al-Salim was appointed as the president of the newly created Department of Foreign Affairs. When he took over, he was faced with two tasks: first, that of organizing the Ministry, in which he was successful; secondly, that of addressing the external problems facing Kuwait, particularly the one of securing its international recognition as an independent state in the face of Iraq’s claims to the country. By 1963, following the country’s admission to the United Nations and largely as a result of Al-Salim’s promptings, Iraq recognized Kuwait’s borders and its independence. His star was now rising fast. He was appointed Crown Prince of Kuwait by Amiri decree on October 30, 1962, the first person to hold this position. He was made Prime Minister the following year, and two years later, on November 24, 1965, he became the Amir of the State of Kuwait. He held this post until his death in 1977. Unity, both of the ruling family and of the country as a whole, was Al-Salim’s watchword. In domestic affairs his personal initiatives included individual welfare schemes, such as subsidizing building projects for the poor from his own pocket, and the encouragement of education. His impact in foreign affairs was felt most strongly in the difficult relations with Iraq and also with the Gulf countries. His political management of the Iran-Bahrain impasse in 1968 led to the independence of the latter in 1970 and enabled the Trucial States to unite as the United Arab Emirates. He was also instrumental in paving the way for the foundation of the Gulf Cooperation Council in the 1980s and in maintaining strong links with Britain after the colonial era. Perhaps Sabah Al-Salim’s greatest achievement was the fostering of relations with the United States, links that were so vital during the 1990s.

FURTHER READING Baaklini, A.I. “Legislatures in the Gulf Area: The Experience of Kuwait, 1961–1976,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 14, no. 3 (1982): 359–379. Jarman, R.L. Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah, Amir of Kuwait, 1965–1977: A Political Biography. London: London Centre of Arab Studies, 2002. Rush, A. Al-Sabah: History & Genealogy of Kuwait’s Ruling Family, 1752–1987. London: Ithaca, 1987. Smith, S.C. Kuwait, 1950–1965: Britain, the al-Sabah, and Oil. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Sa‘id bin Taymur Al Bu Sa‘idi (1910–1972) John A. Shoup Sa‘id bin Taymur was born in 1910 and ruled as the thirteenth sultan of the Al Bu Sa‘idi dynasty in Oman. He became sultan in 1932 at one of he weakest periods of its history. His father, Taymur bin Faysal, was not recognized as Imam of

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the Ibadi community and as a result much of the country followed the Imam of Nizwa. Taymur was recognized as the Sultan of Masqat and was able to rule only the coastal regions, Dhufar, and the remaining overseas possession of Oman, Gwadar, which was ceded to Pakistan in 1958. Sa‘id’s power was further threatened by Saudi claims to parts of Buraymi oasis. Sa‘id began a policy of winning over Bedouin tribes loyal to the Imam, such as the Duru‘, and with British help eventually defeated the Imam and his supporters in 1957 in what is called the Jabal al-Akhdar War. He was able to push the Saudis out of Buraymi with British help. Oman had been placed under Britain as a protectorate by a treaty between the two countries in 1891 and Sa‘id was able to get full independence for Oman in 1951. Sa‘id allowed foreign companies to explore for oil starting in the 1930s, and proven fields were discovered in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Despite oil production, Sa‘id did little to develop his country in his attempt to remain free of international debt and out of foreign (British) control. He closed Oman to the outside and personally signed all visas both of Omanis wanting to go abroad and of foreigners seeking entry. In 1965 the province of Dhufar revolted with support of some of the Arab nationalist states such as then newly independent South Yemen. An assassination attempt on Sa‘id’s life in 1966 further drove him into isolation, distrust, and erratic behavior, including placing his one and only son Qabus under house arrest. Sa‘id was replaced by his son Qabus in a palace coup in 1970. Shortly after the coup, Sa‘id was sent in exile to England, where he took up residence in London’s Dorchester Hotel. He died in 1972 and was buried in England. See also Dhufar Liberation Front.

FURTHER READING Allen Jr., Calvin, and W. Lynn Rigsbee. Oman under Qabus: From Coup to Constitution, 1970–1996. London: Frank Cass, 2000. Asher, Michael. Thesiger. London: Penguin Books, 1994. Rabi, Uzi. The Emergence of States in a Tribal Society: Oman under Sa‘id bin Taymur, 1932– 1970. London: Sussex Academic Press, 2005. Thesiger, Wilfred. Arabian Sands. London: Readers Union Longmans, Green & Co., 1960.

Salalah John A. Shoup Salalah is the capital of the southern region of Oman and has served as a capital of the country in the past. According to the 2005 estimate, Salalah and its surrounding areas have a population of 178,469 people, making it the second largest city in the country. Salalah has a long history and may have been one of the ports

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under the control of the Sabean kingdom of ancient Yemen. The ruins of the medieval city al-Badil are located on the east of the city and those of the Rasyut are nine miles (fifteen kilometers) southwest on the opposite side of the bay that serves as a natural harbor. Salalah receives the yearly summer monsoons (June to September) that rise in the Ethiopian Highlands and blow across the Indian Ocean to the subcontinent. Because of this, Salalah and the nearby Qarah Mountains have mild temperatures during the hottest part of the year for most of the Peninsula. The mild temperatures are now being exploited for tourism, and many Omanis and others come to the city to enjoy the pleasant weather. The monsoon rains green the countryside and because of the moisture frankincense trees grow along the wadis and in the highlands. Trade in frankincense resin for incense is still important to the local economy and Salalah is called the perfume capital of Arabia. The mild climate supports wildlife similar to that of East Africa, including leopards, and much of the local pastoralism is based on a small variety of zebu cattle rather than camels. Salalah has a rich agricultural hinterland that produces grain, papayas, bananas, and coconuts (there are no date palms) because of the ready availability of water from numerous springs, wells, and seasonal rains.

Al Sa‘ud Sebastian Maisel The Al Sa‘ud are the ruling family of Saudi Arabia. Their origins go back to the fifteenth century. Mani al-Muraydi from Qatif was awarded two villages in Najd where he founded the city of Dir‘iyah in 1446. Soon after, they gained control over Wadi Hanifah. They reappeared in the early seventeenth century still controlling the city and vicinity of Dir‘iyah. The name Al Sa‘ud derives from the father of the dynasty’s founder, ‘Abd al’Aziz bin Muhammad bin Sa‘ud, who died in 1725. In 1744, Muhammad bin Sa‘ud signed a treaty with Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab, a religious scholar and reformer. By collaborating with the newly emerged Islamic revivalist movement led by Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab, the Al Sa‘ud gained the religious legitimacy to conquer the surrounding areas. In return they promised to support his interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah, which is based on the teachings of the Hanbali school of thought and their most influential scholar, Ibn Taymiyah. Their first emirate/state was eliminated in 1818 by Egyptian forces sent by the Ottomans after the Al Sa‘ud became too successful and threatened the Ottoman hegemony over the area, including the two Holy Cities of Makkah and Madinah. In the following decades, the Al Sa‘ud under Turki bin ‘Abdallah Al Sa‘ud were able to reorganize and found yet another state that covered a similar area, but this time moved the capital from the razed Dir‘iyah to Riyadh. However, another tribal dynasty and their allies, the Al Rashid and the Shammar tribe, ousted them from power after the Al Sa‘ud got into an internal struggle over power and leadership in the second Saudi

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state. For the next ten years, the Al Sa‘ud had to flee from their hometown and live in exile in Kuwait and other places. In 1902, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud reconquered Riyadh and later Najd. After the British recognized his rule, he was able to subject many tribal groups, both sedentary and nomadic, under his rule. In 1921 he defeated the Al Rashid in the Jabal Shammar region and in 1925 the Hashemites in the Hijaz. Additional campaigns led to the inclusion of Asir and Najran in the south. On September 23, 1932 he proclaimed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the only country in the world that is named after its ruling family. After the discovery of oil in 1938, Ibn Sa‘ud started to develop his country economically. His successor and oldest son, Sa‘ud bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Al Sa‘ud, was lacking the same visionary style of leadership and succumbed to his more able brother Faysal, who started to modernize the kingdom without secularizing it. In the 1960s, the country was drawn in the regional conflicts over pan-Arabism when Saudi Arabia and Egypt supported different sides in the Yemeni civil war. The Al Sa‘ud considered themselves as guardians of a country that includes the holiest places in Islam and the largest reserves in oil. As such, they joined international organizations, such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to stabilize both worlds. This led to the 1973 oil embargo against Western nations who supported Israel. After Faysal’s assassination, his half-brother Khalid took over, until in 1982 Fahd bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz became the new Saudi king. During his tenure, new economic processes were started, including closer ties with Western nations and attempts to diversify the economy. After several strokes in the mid-1990s, his half-brother ‘Abdallah managed day-to-day affairs, until in 2005 after Fahd’s death, he was made king. The Al Sa‘ud rule over central Arabia for over 250 years brings a sense of political stability and continuity to the region. The system of succession is simple: the oldest brother of Ibn Sa‘ud’s male offspring is always selected as the new crown prince. However, in present times younger generations of Al Sa‘ud princes argue for a change and more room for their participation. Often labeled a state within the state, the Al Sa‘ud still maintain the dominant position in all aspects of life in the kingdom. Politically, they control the central government and local administration with over 150 members in high-ranking positions, such as ministers, provincial governors, or in the Army/National Guard. The family is divided into several branches: the Al Thunayan; Ibn Jiluwi; Sa‘ud al-Kabir; and the dominating branch, Faysal bin Turki. Important decisions are made in the family council or if necessary, the inner circle of the family council, which includes only senior members of the Al Sa‘ud. Reforms are underway and sometimes introduced by Al Sa‘ud themselves, but the survival of the kingdom in its current form without the Al Sa‘ud seems impossible.

FURTHER READING Aburish, Said K. The Rise, Corruption, and Coming Fall of the House of Saud. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995. Bligh, Alexander. From Prince to King: Royal Succession in the House of Saud in the Twentieth Century. New York: New York University Press, 1984.

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Saudi Arabia Holden, David, and Richard Johns. The House of Saud. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1981. Lees, Brain M. A Handbook of the Al Saud Ruling Family of Saudi Arabia. London: Royal Genealogies, 1980. Reich, Bernard. Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa: A Biographical Dictionary. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990. Simpson, William. The Prince: The Secret Story of the World’s Most Intriguing Royal, Prince Bandar bin Sultan. New York: Regan Books, 2006.

Saudi Arabia Sebastian Maisel The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established in 1932 and has since played a significant role in the Muslim world as the birthplace of Islam and the current guardian of the Two Holy Places. With regard to its economic and strategic importance, the country has the world’s largest oil reserves and occupies more than eighty percent of the Arabian Peninsula. After the explosion of oil prices in the 1970s, enormous sums of revenues became available to the previously underdeveloped and poor country. With these revenues, the kingdom became one of the richest nations on the planet. Saudi Arabia and its predecessors have been ruled by the Al Sa‘ud dynasty, which relies on Islam to legitimize their position in the Islamic and global world. With the oil revenues, they started large-scale development programs. All areas experienced an incomparable building boom. International investors, guestworkers, and businessmen poured into the country that until then had been sealed off. Urban centers and ports changed the picture and became business hubs with modern buildings, factories, administrative offices, housing areas, and royal palaces. The most profound changes were observed in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia; Dammam, the center of the oil industry; and Jiddah, the main port and gateway to the world. However, despite these radical changes, Saudi Arabia remained a conservative Islamic country with strong ties to its heritage and history. Waters and Arab neighbors surround Saudi Arabia. To the north are Jordan, Iraq, and Kuwait. The eastern shore borders smaller Arab Gulf States such as Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, whereas to the south more or less unmarked borders connect the kingdom with Oman and Yemen. To the west is the strategic waterway of the Red Sea. The country is only sparsely populated because of the harsh climate and living conditions. To the north is the Nafud Desert that stretches deep into neighboring Jordan and Iraq. The core of the Arabian Peninsula is a high plateau that merges over several steps into the Dahna Desert. To the west it rises to the Hijaz and Asir Mountains, with peaks above 8,202 feet (2500 meters) before dropping sharply to the Tihamah plain on the Red Sea. To the southeast it connects to the largest sand desert, the Empty Quarter, a well-chosen name considering the uninhabitable conditions that are only mastered by some Bedouin tribes. Four

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Masmak Fort in the heart of old Riyadh was the stronghold of the Al Rashid when they controlled much of Saudi Arabia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In 1902, the young ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Sa‘ud took the fort in a surprise attack. The wooden door of the fort still has the deeply embedded spearhead thrown by ‘Abdallah ibn Jiluwi. This throw prevented the Rashidi governor ‘Ajlan from being able to retreat inside the fort and allowed the Saudi forces to take it. The fort’s walls are 4-feet (1.25 meters) thick, and the round watch tower is 59-feet (18 meters) high. Courtesy of John A. Shoup.

distinct geographical regions are noticeable. The Hijaz or western region includes the Hijaz Mountains as well as the Holy Cities of Makkah and Madinah. Jiddah, the most cosmopolitan city of the kingdom and gateway of the pilgrimage, is also included. To the south is Asir with Najran, a predominantly agricultural area that connects the kingdom with Yemen. The central part of the Peninsula is called Najd and is surrounded and cut off from the rest of the country by large deserts. It includes the city of Riyadh, capital and hometown of the Al Sa‘ud. The eastern part of the kingdom is historically known as al-Hasa. It is one of the most fertile areas and one of the largest oases in the world. In addition, this is the area where most of the oil reserves are found; it is also home to the Shi‘ite minority. The population of Saudi Arabia exceeds 25 million. The absolute majority of the population is Sunni-Arab, but the country has significant ethnic minorities, with ten percent African, mostly descendants of former slaves, as well as a strong religious minority, mostly consisting of Shi‘ite Muslims. 12er Shi‘ites live in the Eastern Province and 7er Shi‘ites or Isma‘ilis are concentrated in the Najran area. The annual population growth of 3.8% is one of the highest in the world. Over fifty percent of the population is younger than eighteen. Three fourths of

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the people live in cities. More than 5 million foreigners reside in Saudi Arabia for work and religious reasons. One million mostly unskilled workers alone come from Yemen. Many other Arabs from Palestine, Sudan, or Egypt work in the educational sector. Cheap laborers from Southeast Asia are employed in manual labor, construction, and service industries. Westerners often take management and technical positions. During the annual Muslim pilgrimage another 2–3 million pilgrims visit the western area, where the most important and sacred Islamic places are located. Islam continues to play a dominant role in private and public life. Islam is a key component of national identity, the country’s society, and its legal and political system. During prayer times (five times a day), all activities in the country stop, and stores and official institutions are closed. The early history of the area is not very well-known because of the lack of archaeological evidence; however, other sources, inscriptions, and oral narratives show that nomadic tribes inhabited the area alongside farmers, cultivating dates in the oases. A third mode of living revolved around trade on long-distant caravan routes that connected the frankincense centers of South Arabia with the Mediterranean Sea. Occasionally, the Arab tribes formed larger political entities like the Nabatean or Kinda. During the sixth century, the area was drawn in the conflict between the Byzantine and Sassanid Empires. The situation changed substantially with the formation of an Islamic state under the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad. He united the tribes of Arabia and mobilized them during the Arab-Islamic expansion. Madinah was the center of the caliphate until 656, but afterward the area lost much of its political importance. Only the Two Holy Cities preserved their religious significance as the destination for the Muslim pilgrimage. To the east of the Peninsula, the Qaramitah state existed from 894 to 1078, a radical Shi‘ite movement that threatened the religious authority of Makkah. The Hijaz was mostly under control by dynasties based in Syria and Egypt until the Ottomans conquered Egypt and in 1517 made the Hijaz a province in their empire. The following three centuries were characterized by constant power struggles between the Ottoman governor and the local dynasty of the Sharifs. The latter were able to establish semi-independence by formally recognizing the Ottoman suzerainty. The northern parts of the Arabian Gulf were drawn into the controversy between the Ottomans and Persians, with the Ottomans occasionally making territorial advances. Only in central Arabia was an autonomous development implemented, during which continuous tribal battles raged. Raid on neighboring areas led to the destruction of wells, palm groves, and irrigation systems, and attacks by nomadic Bedouin disrupted the caravan trade. Central authority administered by local and Ottoman rulers prevailed only in the port cities, where increasingly European powers sought to expand their markets. In the middle of the eighteenth century, a puritanical reform movement originated in central Arabia, the Wahhabiyah. Founded by Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab and politically endorsed by the Muhammad Al Sa‘ud, they rejected religious innovations such as the veneration of saints as practiced by Sufis and Shi‘ites and promoted the return to the origins of Islam, worshipping only one God. The movement took over Najd and founded the first Saudi state. Their area of control in the early 1800s included most of the Arabian Peninsula,

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including the Holy Sites. By order of the Ottomans, Egyptian troops conquered the area and destroyed the capital of the Wahhabi state at Dir‘iyah. Faysal bin Turki Al Sa‘ud succeeded in the 1840s in gaining back most of the area, but internal fighting over succession allowed the rival dynasty of the Al Rashid to take over central Arabia. Finally, in 1902, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud captured Riyadh from the Al Rashid and re-established the third Saudi state. He went on to unify the rest of the Peninsula under Al Sa‘ud rule. In 1913 he ousted the Ottomans from al-Hasa. Great Britain recognized the independence of his emirate in 1915, which was extended six years later after the final defeat of the Al Rashid and the incorporation of the Jabal Shammar into the Saudi state. To recruit new troops and loyal citizens, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud encouraged Bedouin nomads to settle in agrarian communities, study Islam, and raid enemy territory for him. The Ikhwan (brotherhood) became a radical and fierceful military force, which strictly observed the religious revival as initiated by the Wahhabis. One of their largest campaigns was against the Sharif of Makkah, who proclaimed himself caliph and King of Hijaz in 1924. After the expulsion of his family, the area became part of the Kingdom of Hijaz, Najd, and adjunct areas in 1926, with ‘Abd al-‘Aziz as the new king. In another treaty in 1927, Great Britain again accepted the sovereignty of Ibn Sa‘ud, who in turn recognized British interests in the south and east of the Peninsula. He concentrated the entire political, military, judicial, and religious power in his and his allies’ hands through a series of administrative and legal reforms; for example, he limited the authority of tribal sheikhs and introduced several technical innovations (automobile, wireless). On September 23, 1932, the formation of a central state was finalized with the proclamation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Border agreements with neighboring countries were signed, and a political system based on the Qur’an and Shari‘ah was established and administered with the help of religious scholars. The king was the head of state, and he governed with a cabinet that included many of his immediate relatives. During the Great Depression, which also affected the Saudi economy, he tried to improve the country’s condition by granting concessions to search for oil, for which he exploited the British-American rivalry. Standard Oil of California, which later merged with other American oil companies to form Aramco, received a concession in 1933, and five years later oil in profitable quantities was found. When ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud died in 1953, his country took a considerable step from isolated desert emirate to leading supplier of crude oil. His oldest son Sa‘ud ascended to the throne but led the country into a recession because of his lavish lifestyle. He was forced to abdicate in 1964, and his brother Faysal became king. He began to modernize the economy and opened the country to the West without giving up its Islamic character. For this he had to find a compromise that would appease the religious elite enough to support his revolutionary ideas. After his assassination in 1975, his successors Khalid and Fahd bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz continued his policies and maintained close relations with the United States. However, they also sparked controversy over Islamic issues, such as the occupation of the Great Mosque in Makkah in 1979 by a group of radical Muslims, or the decision to invite non-Muslim armies to protect the Holy Places from a possible Iraqi attack in 1990. Particularly difficult were the relations with Iran after the

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Islamic Revolution in 1979, which culminated in various clashes with Iranian pilgrims during the Hajj and uprisings among the Shi‘ite population in the Eastern Province. Saudi Arabia has used its political and financial power to support Islam domestically with the organization of the Hajj and the expansion of the Two Holy Sites and internationally by providing welfare and religious support to Muslims abroad. The two main international Muslim organizations, the Muslim World League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, were both founded in Saudi Arabia, and the latter still has its headquarters in Jiddah. Its carefully established neutrality in foreign affairs was given up toward the end of the Cold War when it supported the West in its global struggle against communism. Saudi Arabia supported anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan with money and manpower. During the 1990–1991 Gulf War and its aftermath, the country faced international attention and pressure to reform the political system. In 1992, King Fahd issued a royal decree on the introduction of a “Basic Law of Government,” which included a consultative council and a legal and administrative reform. When Fahd had a stroke in 1995, his brother Crown Prince ‘Abdallah took over daily government operations until 2005, when he became king after Fahd’s death. He had to face a series of terror attacks contesting the legitimacy of the Al Sa‘ud rule and targeting Westerners and officials. Other pressuring issues are unemployment, women’s rights, overpopulation, and the fluctuating oil price; however, his country remains one of the leaders of the Islamic world, attracting millions of pilgrims every year. See also Holidays and Festivals: Islamic.

FURTHER READING Aarts, Paul, and Gerd Nonneman. Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs. New York: New York University Press, 2005. Clark, Arthur P., et al. A Land Transformed: The Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Aramco. Dhahran: Saudi Arabian Oil Company, 2006. Long, David E. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1997. Al Rasheed, Madawi. A History of Saudi Arabia. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Vassiliev, Alexei. The History of Saudi Arabia. London: Saqi Books, 1998.

Saudization Sebastian Maisel The official policy to replace foreign workers with nationals in the private sector of Saudi Arabia is called Saudization. Currently, some 6 million expatriates live in the kingdom, and private companies employ many of them. At the same time,

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only 500,000 Saudi nationals are working in the private sector, which places the level of Saudis in that sector around eight percent. The government is working on reaching a target of thirty percent. Another reason to promote Saudization is the increasing rate of unemployment among Saudis, which goes along with the rapid population growth. Every year the number of high school and university graduates increases, and as part of the Saudi mindset, those graduates expect to find decent employment. Decent employment in a Saudi sense usually excludes menial labor, handicrafts, or service jobs, which are considered demeaning or a least do not conform with Saudi tradition. What is mostly desired is a well-paid white-collar job in the public sector with regular work hours. On the other hand, unattractive jobs such as construction or sales do not earn enough money to support an extended family. However, the public sector can no longer absorb so many jobseekers. And companies, stores, and factories in the private sector are hesitant to hire Saudis because of their work ethic and qualifications that are different than those of the guestworkers, which come to Saudi Arabia with one goal, to work. Many Saudis are of course hard workers, but some prefer a rather quiet work style that permits time to socialize, pray, and take care of family business during work hours. Unemployment is an estimated twenty-five percent. Many Saudis are in urgent need of a job even if underpaid. The Ministry of Labor issued guidelines and deadlines specifying the time frame for when Saudization has to be completed and which industry goes first; for example, within three years it was planned to Saudize most of the sales sector, creating over 30,000 new job opportunities for Saudis. A three-fold agenda was set in motion with the objectives to cut the number of labor visas, to train and educate Saudi workers, and to strengthen the role of the private sector to hire more Saudis. The latter is particularly hard to come by given to lack of governmental control and influence. However, quotas have been set, although they often sound impossible to reach. Providing quality vocational training is another area of concern, because it goes back further to discussing the educational sector, its curriculum, and standards. Many Saudis demand a reform of the traditional school system with a strong emphasis on religious studies and very little on the sciences. Some areas, however, show that Saudization can work. For example, Aramco restricts it cooperation with contractors that fulfill official Saudization ratios. Saudi Airlines is up to almost 100% Saudis in their ground and sales operations. In the banking sector and travel agencies, high rates of Saudi employment are achieved. Other countries in the region that are based on a similar economy and social structure face similar employment problems. They have also adopted programs to enforce the employment of nationals over foreigners. See also Education.

FURTHER READING Al-Dosary, Adel S., and Syed M. Rahman. “Saudization (Localization)—A Critical Review,” Human Resource Development International 8, no. 4 (2005): 495–502.

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Security and Terrorism Kapiszewski, Andrzej. Nationals and Expatriates: Population and Labour Dilemmas of the Gulf Cooperation States. Reading, UK: Garnet Publishing, 2001. Looney, Robert. “Saudization and Sound Economic Reforms: Are the Two Compatible?” Strategic Insights 3, no. 2 (February 2004): 1–10. Mahdi, Salah. “Saudization and the Structure of the Labour Market in Saudi Arabia,” The University of Hertfordshire Business School, Working Paper Series, Economics Paper 24, University of Hertfordshire Business School (2000).

Security and Terrorism Jack Kalpakian “Terrorism” is an imprecise term, because terrorism is a relative concept. The old adage that “one’s man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter” still largely holds. In the context here, terrorism is defined as an attack on civilians and/or civilian infrastructure to accomplish religious or political purposes. In the context of Saudi Arabia, the idea that God enjoins violence for its own sake first emerged into the twentieth century when it was first articulated by Juhayman Al-‘Utaybi, who seized the Great Mosque in Makkah in 1978 before being arrested and executed. It now finds support in the violent Al Qa‘idah uprising in Saudi Arabia. To a large extent, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are held hostage by the close union of religion and politics. The governments can justify authoritarian rule by using religious legitimacy, but that in terms renders the opposition by definition to be religious, and in the case of opposition movements that choose violence, there will attempts to justify the violence by using religion. Although the absence of legitimate channels for dissent undoubtedly played a major role in fostering violent opposition, there are deeper ideological causes. Put simply, these groups would like to “restore” the dominance of Islam in the world system, evict all non-Muslims, purify culture from non-Muslim influences, and “return” to the commission of carrying the message to infidels by the force of arms. For these groups, Saudi Arabia is simply a tool to be used for the greater glory of Islam, and they wish to remove the Saudi Royal Family because it has pursued foreign and domestic policies that they find religiously unacceptable, such as alliances with infidels, fiat money, and the presence of residential compounds housing the “unclean” non-Muslims whose presence defiles the sanctity of the Arabian Peninsula. The current violent Al Qai‘dah uprising in Saudi Arabia resembles and is linked with the violence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the first half of the twentieth century. During the 1960s, the Muslim Brotherhood was forced to abandon terrorism, but many of its members and sympathizers did not agree with the “closure of the gate of Jihad” and began to form movements and organizations independent of the Brotherhood. By the 1970s, Egypt’s Islamists had formed several organizations, including Islamic Jihad, Repentance and Flight, and the Islamic Group. These movements attacked other Egyptians, especially Copts, foreign tourists, and the infrastructure of the Egyptian state. The

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government responded with an iron fist, and these groups started to look outside of Egypt for support networks and alliances. It is at this stage that the Egyptian groups began to work and coordinate with Saudi dissidents, including the social movements that evolved into Al Qa‘idah. Terrorism does not represent an immediate significant threat to the security of Saudi Arabia or any of its associated allies because it contains no means of deposing the state. It can be a prelude to a revolution, a coup, and may induce an intimidated population to move its supporters into power; but by itself, terrorism does not constitute a serious threat to the existence of Middle Eastern or other states. That being said, terrorism can cost the targeted state immense sums of money. It can also retard economic, social, and political development and encourage the rise of reactionary forces to use the chaotic conditions brought about by terrorist activity to consolidate their own power and roll back the meager freedoms that are enjoyed by the population. In the GCC states, this is less of a concern, but it is precisely these states whose infrastructure is more vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Refineries, oil wells, and pipelines make attractive targets for terrorists because they damage both the local economy and the economies of the countries purchasing oil and its byproducts. Pipelines and refineries have been persistent targets for terrorist activity in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Other targets have included foreign civilians, Western military personnel, and housing compounds for noncitizens. The aim of these terrorist activities has been to drive out the “infidels” out of what the terrorists believe is a sacred space in Arabia. Saudi Arabia also faces the contesting of its legitimacy through the use of religious discourse in opposition to the authorities. There is a price to be paid in terms of legitimacy when the opposition, terrorist or otherwise, accuses a government of not being Islamic enough. Yet, the Arab Gulf States have shown themselves to be resourceful and flexible. Saudi Arabia is reasserting its hegemony over the religious field, and it is busy co-opting some of the dissident scholars who have opposed it in the past. It is also attempting to remove some of the grievances that have fueled the rise of terrorist movements; in that context, U.S. forces left Saudi Arabia after the invasion of Iraq. Unlike other movements that use or have historically used terrorism, including the Palestinian and Israeli independence movements, the terrorists targeting the Gulf States are motivated by existential and religious ideas that leave no room for politics. This means that the GCC states will continue to repress terrorist movements in order to pressure them along a more peaceful course. Some see the key to be that the governments of the Gulf must avoid transforming the repression of these terrorist movements into increased repression of the societies as a whole. They must also provide for opportunities for expressing dissent and opposition in a peaceful way. Terrorism may not be defeated by repression alone; sources of support, funding, recruits, and ideological justification are to be denied as well. Some believe that a mixture of policies, including cooption, needs to be applied to ensure that terrorism will decline in the Gulf region, and it is in this context that education must play an important role—accepting the right of the other to exist must be part of the ordinary discourse of the region. See also War on Terror.

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FURTHER READING Cronin, Audrey Kruth. “How Al Qaeda Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups?” International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 7–48. Hoffman, Bruce. “The Leadership Secrets of Osama bin Laden: The Terrorist as CEO,” The Atlantic Monthly, April 3, 2003, 23. “Jihad against Jews and Crusaders,” World Islamic Front, February 23, 1998. Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm (last accessed October 10, 2007). Al-Rasheed, Madawi. Contesting the Saudi State. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Warrick, Joby. “Leak Severed a Link to Al-Qaeda’s Secrets,” The Washington Post, October 9, 2007. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/ 09/AR2007100900791.html?hpid=topnews&sid=ST2007100901226 (last accessed October 10, 2007).

Sex Trade Coeli Fitzpatrick The problem of human trafficking, including trafficking for sexual exploitation, is one that affects virtually every country in the world today. Human trafficking for sexual exploitation is often called sexual slavery because the traffickers force victims (through violence and coercion) to work against their wills. Persian Gulf countries serve mainly as countries of destination for trafficking, although to some limited extent they may also be used as countries of transit. Watchdog groups and human rights organizations have declared that in recent decades human trafficking, including the trafficking of humans for forced prostitution or sexual slavery, has reached epidemic proportions. Although it is impossible to know exactly how many victims of sexual slavery are in a given country at any time, worldwide estimates are in the tens of thousands, and Europol estimates that human trafficking in general generates several billion dollars per year for perpetrators. Persian Gulf countries are heavily reliant on migrant labor, and millions of workers, predominantly from South and Southeast Asia, seek employment in the Gulf. Although migrant workers are very often successful in finding legitimate employment, opportunities exist for exploitation. Women who find themselves enslaved are at times victims of kidnapping, other times duped by offers for legitimate employment in Gulf countries. At times, desperately poor parents will sell their children, believing that the child will be educated or given work, allowing both the child and the parents some small escape from bitter poverty. Forced prostitution is thought to be most prominent in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, and is less widespread in Qatar. The U.S. State Department issues an annual Trafficking in Persons Report documenting the extent of human trafficking, including trafficking for sexual exploitation, around the world. In 2007, five of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

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countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia) are listed as “Tier 3” countries. Tier 3 countries are defined as those countries that fail to comply with the minimum standards outlined in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) for the elimination of trafficking. The United Arab Emirates is listed as a Tier 2 watch country. Ranking on the list is not specifically done according to sexual slavery. Therefore, a country’s designation as a Tier 3 country is not necessarily indicative of its level of sexual exploitation, but of human trafficking in general. The Trafficking in Persons Report is updated annually, and there have been changes in the rating system for each Gulf country. Bahrain was listed in 2003– 2004 as a Tier 2 country. Saudi Arabia has been listed as a Tier 3 country since 2005. Organizations that attempt to gauge the number of women in sexual slavery document cases of Iraqi girls being kidnapped and sent to Gulf countries. When instances of sexual slavery/sexual exploitation are revealed, the most common response of Gulf countries is detention and deportation. Because Gulf countries have such high numbers of migrant workers, immigration violations are not uncommon. However, migrant rights groups and anti-trafficking watchdog groups object that often the governments do not make efforts to distinguish between migrant workers who may be in violation of immigration laws and victims of trafficking who have no immigration status in the country because of having been kidnapped into or otherwise coerced into prostitution or sexual exploitation. Systematic deportation can lead to further troubles for the victims of forced prostitution once they are returned to their countries of origin. There is some evidence that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has at times offered help to women who face persecution in their home countries, but most Gulf countries are criticized for not making more efforts to protect victims from further victimization. Often, the governments do not provide shelter or medical aid for victims of sexual slavery, and do not provide funding for locally based nongovernmental organizations that provide shelter and aid for women victims. One exception to this is the United Arab Emirates, which does offer shelter, medical care, and repatriation aid to victims of sexual trafficking, but does not offer asylum or other legal alternatives to deportation, even if the victim faces persecution in her home country. Some Gulf countries do have laws against human trafficking or sexual exploitation. Article 201 of Kuwait’s criminal code prohibits forced prostitution. Both slavery and coerced prostitution are forbidden under Omani law. In 2006 the United Arab Emirates passed a comprehensive anti-trafficking law (prohibiting all forms of human trafficking). Qatar criminalizes slavery and forced prostitution under its criminal law. Saudi Arabia has no laws prohibiting human trafficking for forced prostitution. However, in all countries, punishment for violations of the law is not sufficiently stringent enough to act as a deterrent for the practice. Frequently there are few or no criminal investigations, prosecutions, or convictions for trafficking for prostitution despite reports of widespread abuse. With respect to some forms of human trafficking some GCC countries have made efforts to raise awareness of the practice among state police and security agents, including sponsoring media awareness campaigns highlighting the

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responsibilities of sponsors of migrant workers. Such was the case in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. In December 2007 Saudi Arabia funded a panel of anti-trafficking experts for a law enforcement training session. Critics are quick to point out that such events do little to prevent trafficking without real political will and law enforcement of existing laws. Also subject to criticism are the “sponsorship laws” present in many GCC countries that tie the foreign worker to the national sponsor. If the sponsor is abusive, the worker has little or no recourse to the law.

FURTHER READING Bales, Kevin. Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. “Human Trafficking.” Available at http://www.theworldrevolution.org (website inactive at time of publication). “U.S. Department of State 2007 Trafficking in Persons Report.” Available at http://usinfo. state.gov/gi/global_issues/human_trafficking/traffick_report.html (website inactive at time of publication).

Shammar Sebastian Maisel Shammar is a confederation of tribal groups concentrated in the northern part of the Arabian Peninsula as well as in Mesopotamia and Syria. Like many other tribes, they see their origin in Yemen and claim to descend from Qahtan. At one point they left south Arabia and moved northward, reaching their current territory in the sixteenth century. The area was formerly known as Jabal Tayy after the dominant tribe from which the Shammar claim descent, but soon afterward it became known as Jabal Shammar. The Shammar dirah tribal territory in Saudi Arabia covers most of the northern territory and Ha’il province from Wadi ‘Ar‘ar in the west, Ha’il in the south, and Hafr al-Batn in the east. Starting in the late eighteenth century, some sections migrated from Jabal Shammar northward into Iraq and Syria, escaping the pressure mounted on them by the Al Sa‘ud and their allies, the powerful ‘Anazah confederation. Those Shammar in Iraq and Syria are referred to as the Northern Shammar, whereas those who remained in the Jabal area are called Southern Shammar. After the demarcation of political borders between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, two separate historical and religious developments can be observed. The main clans of the Northern Shammar include the Jarbah, Tuqah, and Zagharit, with some sections of the tribe converting to Shi‘ism. The Shammar in Saudi Arabia belong to four main clans: ‘Abdah, Sinjarah, Aslam, and Tuman. The ‘Abdah under the Al ‘Ali and Al Rashid families claimed the political leadership of the tribe until the latter were forced to abdicate in 1921 after their defeat by the Al Sa‘ud. In the previous century, often in alliance with the Ottomans, they were involved in the power struggle over hegemony in central Arabia

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with the Wahhabi movement, which toward the end was supported by Britain. Some segments of the tribe submitted to the Wahhabi call and were later integrated into the Saudi state. During the climax of their rule over central Arabia, the tribe and its ruling family of the Al Rashid attracted many Western travelers, who wrote detailed accounts of their visits describing the social, religious, and political affairs of the Southern Shammar. Among those travelers are Wallin, Guarmani, Blunt, Doughty, Euting, Musil, and Bell. The Shammar emirate at this time period controlled Jabal Shammar, Qasim, and most of Najd. Even areas in Hijaz (Tayma and Tabuk) were tributary to them. The leadership of the emirate, the Al Rashid, successfully incorporated other tribal segments into their policy of expansion and control. Because of the egalitarian character of the tribal society, clan or family leaders could choose to whom they were loyal. By sharing the booty of raids, tributes, and other gifts and subsidies, the Al Rashid ensured the loyalty of their tribal subjects. Economically, the emirate relied on nomadic animal husbandry from the nomadic tribal sections, which was supplement by agriculture, trade, and taxes. Large sedentary tribes lived in the Shammar territory (e.g., the Bani Tamim) and developed a symbiotic relationship on the basis of exchange of tribute for protection. Ha’il was a major stop on the caravan route from Persia and Iraq to Makkah, and the pilgrims had to pay for safe passage. Trade flourished because merchants avoided the areas of Wahhabi control. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Shammar and Al Rashid were the dominant political force in Arabia, but their supremacy was challenged by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud, who in 1902 began his campaign of regaining the realm of the Al Sa‘ud. In World War I, the Shammar sided with the Ottoman Empire and Ibn Sa‘ud with the British. Losing their main ally and supplier, the Al Rashid were easily defeated by Ibn Sa‘ud. In 1921, after a series of battles, he conquered Ha’il and imprisoned the last Rashidi amir. Foreign intervention was not the only reason for the defeat of the Shammar emirate. An everlasting internal power struggle over succession led to instability in the leadership and to often multiple rulers within a short period of time. After the defeat, many Shammaris fled to their brothers in Iraq, other gave up nomadism and were loosely integrated into the new Saudi kingdom. Some even adopted the message of the Ikhwan and established several agricultural settlements, where they were indoctrinated in Wahhabism and farming. The Shammar tribe as a unified unit lost its material status with the abolishment of the tribal territory in 1925. Nomadic groups were encouraged, sometimes forced to settle and give up their tribal allegiance. Once settled, the Shammar quickly accepted modern administration and innovations; however, they had to give up all political aspirations. They joined in large numbers the Saudi Arabian National Guard, which is regarded as a place that upholds tribal ideals and serves to protect the Royal Family. Fahda bint ‘Asi Al Shuraim, the mother of the current king of Saudi Arabia, was from the Shammar tribe, as was his first wife, Tadi Al Jarbah.

FURTHER READING Kurpershoek, Marcel. Arabia of the Bedouins. London: Saqi Books, 2001. Al Rasheed, Madawi. Politics in an Arabian Oasis. London: I.B. Tauris, 1991.

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Shari‘ah Al Rasheed, Madawi. “The Rashidi Dynasty: Political Centralization among the Shammar in Northern Arabia,” New Arabian Studies II 2 (1993): 140–152. Al Rasheed, Madawi, and Loulouwa Al Rasheed. “The Politics of Encapsulation: Saudi Policy towards Tribal and Religious Opposition,” Middle Eastern Studies 32, no. 1 (1996): 96–119. Sowayan, Saad. The Arabian Oral Historical Narrative: An Ethnographic and Linguistic Analysis. Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz, 1992.

Shari‘ah Sebastian Maisel Shari‘ah is the Arabic word for the Islamic legal system. Literally, it means pathway to the water source. It consists of the five pillars of worship, ethical norms, and the different judicial branches such as the law of inheritance, family law, criminal law, or court procedure. Because Islamic societies are not secular, Islam is both state and religion. Therefore, what is considered a legal aspect is interpreted by the Shari‘ah as a religious aspect, and vice versa religion becomes law. Shari‘ah is a framework of guidelines for Muslims for all aspects of their public and private life. The Shari‘ah is not a canon of law, but it includes judicial postulations that resulted from the conditions in Arabia during the life of the Prophet Muhammad. Previous legal ideas from the Byzantines, Romans, Sasanids, Jews, or the Arabs before Islam were picked up and combined with the new religious-legal system of Islam. This was not a linear, uniform process, and it took several centuries to complete. Until the tenth century, several legal schools of thought emerged that differed in the judicial detail and interpretation. Their growing authority among Sunnis prevented the individual finding of legal decision, ijtihad, and stressed the traditional way of imitating previous decisions, taqlid. Islamic jurisprudence, fiqh, is divided in the sources of law, which is based on the legal provisions in the Qur’an and Hadith, analogies, and consensus of the community as well as individual provisions of the Shari‘ah and the branches of law; that is, all areas of legal regulation from criminal law to family law, from constitutional law to public international law. On a day-to-day basis, Shari‘ah regulates financial transactions, social customs marriage, divorce, food and drink, war and peace, and law and order. Human acts are divided into categories: obligatory (wajib or fard), commendable (mandub), permitted (ja’iz), objectionable (makruh), and sanctioned (haram). Acts that cross a moral border (hadd) must be punished by penalties called hadd penalties. Haad penalties are imposed for adultery (stoning); theft (amputation); consuming, producing, or selling alcohol (flogging); false accusation of adultery (flogging); and robbery (depending on severity, but could include execution). Apostasy is also punished with death. Other fixed penalties in Islamic law are qisas, or retaliation for murder and battery, and ta’zir, or punishments at the discretion of the judge. When passing a ruling, the Islamic judge can rely on legal opinion from a religious scholar.

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In the course of Islamic history, the full realization of Shari‘ah was always the center of interest. At all times other legal systems and courts competed with Shari‘ah; for example, the customary or state law in many Middle Eastern countries, which gradually superseded Islamic law to a degree so that today it only applies in marital, inheritance, and family law. However, the basic law of the Gulf States does recognize Shari‘ah as a principle source of legislation. Only in Oman and Saudi Arabia does Shari‘ah apply for all aspects of law, with exemptions for example in trade, financial law, and tribal criminal law (in Oman). Before the nineteenth century, law was the domain of religious legal scholars. European codified law was introduced at the end of the nineteenth century. The most important codex was the Mecelle, the civil code of the Ottoman Empire based on the Hanafi school of thought. This codex outlived the Empire and some Gulf States, which did not fully codify their civil code yet, still apply it occasionally. The legal system of an Islamic country is usually based on the teachings of a specific school of law. Sunni Muslims follow one of the four recognized schools: the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi‘i, or Hanbali. The dominant, but not exclusive school of Saudi Arabia is the Hanbali school, which was reintroduced with the revivalist movement of Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab in the mid-eighteenth century. In the western part of the kingdom, the Hijaz, the Shafi‘i school was the official school until ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud incorporated the area into his realm, but still many religious scholars and judges adhere to it. In the larger cities of the area that were under direct control of the Ottomans, the Hanafi school as the official Ottoman school prevails. And in the eastern part along the Gulf coast, the Ja‘afari school of law is dominant among the Shi‘ite minority. Kuwait and Bahrain follow the Maliki School, whereas Qatar because of its Wahhabi belief applies Hanbali law. Oman is the only country where the Ibadi Kharaji school of jurisprudence is officially adhered. Many modern economical, financial, and sometimes personal practices are not discussed or even mentioned in the primary sources of Islamic law. This created the need for legislative bodies to legally control these areas, and in reality often led to the establishment of a judicial system parallel to the Shari‘ah courts. Religious scholars then created a new framework of combining the old and the new. See also Islamic Doctrines; Islamic Practices; Madhaab.

FURTHER READING Bakhtiar, Laleh, and Kevin Reinhart. Encyclopedia of Islamic Law: A Compendium of the Major Schools. Chicago: Kazi Publications, 2005. Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck, and Barbara Freyer Stowasser (eds.). Islamic Law and the Challenges of Modernity. Walnut Creek, CA: Alta Mira Press, 2004. Hallaq, Wael. The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Khadduri, Majid, and Herbert Liebesny (eds.). Origin and Development of Islamic Law. Clark, NJ: Lawbook Exchange, 1955, 2008. Schacht, Joseph. An Introduction to Islamic Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964.

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Sharif and Sayyid

Sharif and Sayyid Sebastian Maisel The title sharif in pre-Islamic times among the nomadic and settled population of Arabia was given to people of noble descent and disposition, particularly tribal leaders. Still today, some leading tribal families are called sharif/ashraf in addition to their name. Sharif stems from the Arabic word sharafa, or noble, to be highborn, and is usually related to an honorable, well-respected man. During the reign of the caliphs the title became honorary for members of the Hashemite family, among the Fatimid Dynasty starting in the tenth century, and for descendants of Hasan bin ‘Ali, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad. In contrast, those descending from his brother Hussein were called Sayyid. Occasionally, all offspring from Muhammad were labeled Sharif, forming an elite social group that was headed by the naqib, or supervisor of the pedigree, stipends, and moral behavior of the group. With the increasing number of sharifs, sometimes several naqibs worked in bigger cities and were subordinated to the head naqib. From the beginning of the fourteenth century, the sharifs were recognized by wearing a green turban, but everywhere they were well respected and revered in the communities. Although they had a high social status, this does not mean that they were automatically wealthy. In some Islamic regions, families of sharifs or sayyids gained power; for example, the King of Morocco and the Grand Sharif of Makkah. Descendants of the latter ruled over Syria, Iraq, and currently Jordan, which takes the name Hashemite kingdom, indicating their close relation to the Quraysh and the Prophet Muhammad. The Sharifs of Makkah were governors of the Hijaz and stewards of the Two Holy Cities, Makkah and Madinah, since the tenth century. Under various Muslim rulers, including the Ayyubids, Mamluks, and Ottomans, it was their obligation to protect those important places and guarantee the safety of the annual pilgrimage to them. After Ibn Sa‘ud conquered Makkah in 1925 and exiled the Grand Sharifs, he was considered the custodian of the mosques.

FURTHER READING Baker, Randall. King Husain and the Kingdom of Hejaz. New York: Oleander Press, 1979. De Gaury, Gerald. Rulers of Mecca. London: Harrap, 1951. Ochsenwald, William. Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz under Ottoman Control, 1840–1908. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1984. Teitelbaum, Joshua. The Rise and Fall of the Hashimite Kingdom of Arabia. New York: New York University Press, 2001. Wheeler, Brannon. Mecca and Eden: Ritual, Relics and Territory in Islam. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2006.

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Sharif Hussein bin ‘Ali (1856–1931)

Sharif Hussein bin ‘Ali (1856–1931) Sebastian Maisel Sharif Hussein bin ‘Ali of the ‘Awn branch of the Hashemite family in Hijaz was born 1856 in Istanbul and died 1931 in ‘Amman, Jordan. He was the Grand Sharif of Makkah between 1908 and 1916, when he proclaimed himself King of Hijaz, a title he assumed until 1924. In the same year he named himself caliph (successor of the Prophet Muhammad) of all Muslims. During World War I, he first supported the Ottoman Sultan, his superior, but after learning of his possible deposition after the war, he joined the allies on the British side and called upon the Bedouin tribes of Arabia to revolt against the Turkish and German troops in the Middle East. He exchanged letters with British High Commissioner Henry McMahon, which made him believe that for his support he would be rewarded with the crown of an independent Arab kingdom after the war. However, Britain committed most of this land to France in the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916, which eventually was realized through a system of mandate territories awarded to France and Britain. Hussein’s son Faysal, who played a major role in the Arab Revolt alongside British officer Thomas Lawrence (known as Lawrence of Arabia), claimed the throne in Syria, an attempt that was quickly rebuked by the French Army. Britain then gave him the throne in the newly created country of Iraq, where his successors ruled until 1958. Hussein’s other son ‘Abdallah was rewarded with the throne in Transjordan, later called Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Hussein called himself King of the Arabs, a claim that initiated a long-lasting rivalry with ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud, the emerging powerhouse in central Arabia. When in 1924 the Turkish Parliament decided to abolish the caliphate, two days later Hussein named himself the new caliph, ruler over all Muslims. But Muslims from all over the Middle East challenged this claim, and particularly Ibn Sa‘ud was unable to accept this bold move and started a military campaign against him, which ended with the ultimate defeat of Hussein and his Hashemite family in the Hijaz. Hussein abdicated from his secular titles and went into exile first to Cyprus, then in ‘Amman. His oldest son ‘Ali continued the legacy of the Grand Sharifs of Makkah and Kings of Hijaz for another year until he had to surrender to Ibn Sa‘ud.

FURTHER READING Baker, Randall. King Husain and the Kingdom of Hejaz. New York: Oleander Press, 1979. Dawn, Ernest C. “The Amir of Mecca Al-Husayn Ibn-Ali and the Origin of the Arab Revolt,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 104, no. 1 (1960): 11–34. Ochsenwald, William. Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz under Ottoman Control, 1840–1908. Columbus: Ohio State University, 1984. Teitelbaum, Joshua. The Rise and Fall of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Hijaz. London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 2001.

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Sharqah Carla Higgins Sharqah (locally pronounced Sharjah—the letter “qaf” being changed to “jim” in the Gulf dialect of Arabic) emirate occupies approximately 2,600 square kilometers, 3.3% of the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) total area, and enjoys a similar geography to Dubai and other coastal states in which the desert and sea dominate, and a creek exists that has facilitated trade and opened Sharqah to a wider world. The population of Sharqah City is approximately 519,000 and that of the emirate is 636,000 (2003). Sharqah also has enclaves in the mountains and the east coast’s Gulf of Oman, such as Khor Fakkan, Kalbah, and Dibah on the northeastern coast. Sharqah also owns two islands in the Gulf: Sir Abu Nu‘ayr and Abu Musa, the later of which is occupied by Iran under protest by the UAE. The offshore Mubarak oilfield was discovered in 1972, and although no more commercially viable oilfields have been discovered, substantial reserves of natural gas were found in 1980 and in 1992. Sharqah City rests on an ancient settlement thought to be 6,000 years old—its ancient name is believed to be Sarcoa. In the eighteenth century, Sharqah was one of the centers of the Qasimi Empire, was wealthy, and was settled by a huge array of different tribes. In 1727 Sharqah was declared independent. Sharqah and Ra’s al Khaymah were sometimes united into one empire, but more often than not were split between competing rulers of the Qasimi family. During the nineteenth century, Sharqah was second only to Dubai in the number of trading vessels carrying imports. Historically, Sharqah was one of only two customs posts, the other being at Ra’s al Khaymah. In the 1930s, a time of decline for the pearling industry, Sharqah had the good fortune to become a stagingpost for Imperial Airways’ flying boats going to India and provided the first airport in the area. Sharqah was also the base for the British Royal Air Force and Trucial Oman Scouts until 1971 when the British presence ended. In 1953, Sharqah opened the first school in the UAE and has become known as the cultural capital of the UAE. In fact, Sharqah was declared the cultural capital of the Arab world for 1998 by UNESCO. In the 1990s, the Al Shuwayhiyin area was restored, and five architecturally acclaimed heritage buildings and a mosque house the Sharqah Art Museum, the Sharqah Art Center, Sharqah Art Galleries, the Emirates Fine Arts Society, and the Very Special Arts House for disabled artists. Sharqah is home to over twenty museums, and many occupy historical buildings that have been restored using traditional methods, such as those at the Sharqah Heritage Museum, which includes the Suq al ‘Arsah, built of coral, as well as a heritage museum housed in the Al Naboodah family house, the Al Midfaa family house, and the Al Hisan fort, which is now a museum. Education is a clear priority for the ruler, who built University City, which boasts six universities and colleges.

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New high-rise buildings rise up from the once-barren salt flats that separate Sharjah from Dubai. Sharjah is trying to match the urban growth of Dubai but in a more restrained way. Courtesy of John A. Shoup.

Since February 1972 Sharqah has been ruled by Shaykh Sultan bin Muhammad al Qasimi, who is largely credited with the unique development emphasis of Sharqah. See also Cultural Heritage.

Shi‘ah John A. Shoup Shi‘ism takes its name from the Arabic phrase Shi‘itu ‘Ali, or Partisans of ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib—those who supported ‘Ali, the Prophet Muhammad’s cousin and sonin-law to the political succession of the Prophet. ‘Ali was one of the first converts to Islam and played a major role in the development of the new community both in Makkah and later in Madinah. He married Fatimah Zahra, daughter of the Prophet, by whom he had two sons, al-Hasan and al-Hussein. ‘Ali was elected by the shura council composed of the companions of the Prophet as the fourth Khalifah (Caliph) or successor in 656, but his election was

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challenged by Mu‘awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan, the governor of Syria and a member of the old pre-Islamic ruling elite of Makkah. Mu‘awiyah accused ‘Ali of being an accomplice in the assassination of his kinsman and third Khalifah ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan and refused to recognize ‘Ali’s election. The conflict escalated and the two parties met in battle but eventually agreed to mediation. ‘Ali’s supporters split into two main groups: those who agreed to the mediation efforts, and those who felt ‘Ali gave up any right to the Khilafah (Caliphate) when he agreed to the negotiations. The later group formed the early core of the Kharaji movement, whereas those who stayed with ‘Ali formed the core from which Shi‘ism eventually emerged. Both ‘Ali and Mu‘awiyah ruled as rival leaders from different capitals for seven years. ‘Ali moved his capital from Madinah to Kufah in Iraq where he was closer to his main base of support, and Mu‘awiyah governed from Damascus in Syria. In 661 ‘Ali was assassinated by a Kharaji and was buried in nearby Najaf, Shi‘ites make up a fairly large minority in much whereas the assassination attempt on Mu‘a- of the Gulf region and in Bahrain are the majorwiayh failed, leaving him the sole ruler of the ity. Many of the Shi‘ites in places such as Sharjah new Islamic empire and founding the are of Persian origin, and this Shi‘ite mosque in Umayyad dynasty (661–750). Pro-‘Alid feelings Sharjah has been built in an Iranian style with were strong in Iraq, and following Mu‘awiyah’s use of extensive tile work and the onion-top mindeath in 680 the people of Kufa asked ‘Ali’s arets. Courtesy of John A. Shoup. son al-Hussein to come from Makkah to Iraq to lead a rebellion against the Umayyads. Al-Hussein came with a small party of relatives and supporters, expecting the people of Iraq to rise with him. The Umayyads were well aware of al-Hussein’s activities and Yazid ibn Mu‘awiyah’s governor in Iraq was able to prevent the uprising. When al-Hussein arrived in Iraq, the people did not rise. They not only abandoned al-Hussein—some even joined Yazid’s army sent to stop him. At Karbala’ Yazid’s forces surrounded alHussein and killed him along with nearly all of the males in his party. The death of the Prophet’s grandson and most of the male members of ahl al-Bayt shocked all Muslims and established martyrdom as an important Shi‘ite characteristic. Pro-‘Alid sentiment grew among the non-Arab Muslim converts in Iran and North Africa during the Umayyad period. The surviving sons of al-Hasan and al-Hussein tried to stay above political plots and rebellions. It was not until alHussein’s son ‘Ali Zayn al-‘Abadin died in 712 that his son Muhammad al-Baqir became active, although not in politics but in theology. Muhammad helped begin the process of codifying the legal principles that would eventually become Shi‘ite

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law. Among the claims put forth was that the Prophet had personally designated ‘Ali as his successor and that the Bani Hashim, the Prophet’s lineage, had recognized this. The ‘Abbasids (750–1258), another branch of the Bani Hashim, used this claim to gather ‘Alid support in their attempt to overthrow the Umayyads, which they were able to do in 750. The ‘Abbasids once in power began actively persecuting the ‘Alids and their supporters, forcing many to flee to the outer extremities of the empire. Shi‘ism did not develop into an organized system of belief until the ‘Abbasid period but several of its main principles were already established. The main one was that the legitimate leader of the Muslim community needed to be from the family of the Prophet. The Prophet had no living sons, but his daughter Fatima Zahra and her husband ‘Ali did have sons who married and had children. The line passed from the Prophet to ‘Ali and from ‘Ali to his eldest son al-Hasan, who died in 669 most likely the victim of Mu‘awiayh’s agents, leaving the younger brother al-Hussein as head of the family. The line of succession then passed from father to son down al-Hussein’s line. It became popularly held that the Prophet died in ‘Ali’s arms and not in those of his wife ‘A’ishah, thus passing the mantel of leadership to ‘Ali. Shi‘ism differs from Sunni Islam in the position of the leader of the Muslim community. For Shi‘ites, the leader must be a direct descendant of the Prophet, as noted above, and takes the title of Imam rather than Khalifah. As Imam he is the sole source of religious and secular authority based on that of the Prophet and the Qur’an; the Prophet broke all connections to any pre-Islamic system of legitimacy or succession principles. The Imam, although not divine himself, rules through application of divine law, which is infallible. The Imamate passed down to the final twelfth Imam Muhammad al-Muntazir, who disappeared in 878, most likely the victim of an ‘Abbasid plot. Shi‘ites believe he is in a state of suspended occultation and will return one day to reclaim his rightful place as head of the Muslim community, much like a messianic figure. Since the last Imam no government is fully legitimate because it rules in his place and will be fully replaced when the Imam returns. As such, all governments need to be well advised by doctors of religious law to make sure the community does not stray too far from divine law during the Imam’s absence. As Shi‘ism developed in the eighth and ninth centuries, three major branches emerged. The first of these is the Zaydi, which follows the line of succession to the fifth Imam. The Zaydi believe that the succession fell to ‘Ali Zayn al-‘Abadin’s younger son Zayid rather than to Muhammad al-Baqir. According to the Zaydi belief, the Imamate falls only to the leader willing to take up the sword to defend the community of believers, thus neither ‘Ali Zayn al-‘Abadin nor Muhammad al-Baqir were Imams and the only Imam after the death of al-Hussein was Zayid. Zayid headed a revolt in Iraq but was killed in battle in 740. Zayid lost a good deal of his initial support because he refused to condemn the first two Khalifahs, Abu Bakr and ‘Umar, because, as he stated, they were both recognized by the Muslim community and although not Imams were nonetheless legitimate. Zayid was succeeded by his son Yahya, who sought refuge in Khurasan in eastern Iran but was killed in 743 by Umayyad agents. The Zaydi community survived and eventually became the main form of Islam in northern Yemen.

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The second split within Shi‘ism followed the death of the sixth Imam, Ja‘afar al-Sadiq, in 765. Ja‘afar al-Sadiq spent much of his time setting the legal code for Shi‘ism and the main Shi‘ite madhhab, or school of law, is named for him. Ja‘afar’s successor for the mainstream 12er or Imami Shi‘ites was his son Musa al-Kadhim. However, some of the Shi‘ites felt that the legitimate heir was the elder son Isma‘il even though he had died in 760 some five years before his father. Isma‘il’s followers denied that he died but believe that he has gone into state of suspended animation and one day will return. They believe that to recognize Musa is to deny Isma‘il his rightful place as head of the community. Isma‘ili Shi‘ism became popular in much of the Islamic world because of its active missionary activities and its strong egalitarian principles. It appealed to those who felt weak and exploited, a popular means of expressing political and social discontent during the ‘Abbasid period. Following the collapse of the Fatamid dynasty (909–1171) in Egypt in 1171, Isma‘ili Shi‘ism declined although there are still communities in Syria, Turkey, Pakistan, India, and East Africa. The majority of Shi‘ites belong to the 12er or Imami branch that follows the succession of Imams to Muhammad al-Muntazir. Following his disappearance the Muslim community is to be governed by religious judges who can interpret law and make sure that it falls within acceptable bounds. In addition to the Qur’an, hadith of the Prophet, Nahaj al-Balaghah, or the collected sayings of ‘Ali, Shi‘ite judges can exercise ijtihad, or human reason, and those who are capable of doing so are called mujtahids. When a mujtahid becomes well known for his abilities, people give him the title of ayatallah, or sign of God. Shi‘ism has no problem with different mujtahids arriving at different conclusions because once the Imam returns all will be put right but until that time man is to endeavor to do his best. Shi‘ite judges reject the principle of taqlid, or imitation, used by Sunni legal scholars. 12er Shi‘ism became the state religion of Iran in the sixteenth century with the Safavid dynasty (1501–1786), but Shi‘ism in the Arabian Peninsula predates this. The radical Isma‘ili Qaramitah movement was widely supported in the ninth century and Bahrain served as its main base. 12er Shi‘ism spread in the eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain from Iraq as well as Iran before the rise of the Safavids. Zaydi Islam became well established in Yemen before the rise of the Qasimi Imams in the sixteenth century.

FURTHER READING Coulson, N.J. A History of Islamic Law. Edinburgh: Edinburgh at the University Press, 1999. Halm, Heinz. The Shi‘ites: A Short History. New York: Markus Wiener Publishing, 2007. Jabar, Faleh. The Shi‘ite Movement in Iraq. London: Saqi Books, 2003. Lunde, Paul. Islam: Faith, Culture, History. New York: DK Publishing, 2002. Stewart, P.J. Unfolding Islam. London: Garnet Publishing, 1997.

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Social Organization, Tribal and Non-Tribal

Social Organization, Tribal and Non-Tribal Sebastian Maisel The most important form of social organization in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States is the extended family. Extended families are connected through a common belief in the same ancestry. They may form into a strong unit with specific functions, responsibilities, and rights, usually referred to as “tribe” in the literature. Tribal units can be aligned within a particular area, if not a whole region. Kinship-oriented society is defined by a set of rules that can center around concepts of honor and shame. Honor and shame form the basis for many of the daily interactions between all parts of the society that are regulated by customary law or ‘uf, and traditions, or ‘adadat. In the model of the extended family, every member of the group is related with each other through an ancient patriarch. Social practice sets the obligations but the most important is the solidarity between members and a strong sense of group loyalty. The extended family in the Arab context is patriarchal (authority is with the elder male family members), patrilocal (relatives live closely together), patrilineal (descent is measured along the father’s side of the family), and endogamous (marital relations are maintained within the group). Relations with matrilineal relatives are maintained, but they are clearly considered secondary. The issue of “pure and noble” descent is still considered crucial for daily interaction and long-term behavior with other groups. Among the population of Saudi Arabia and to a lesser degree in the Gulf States are two traces of descent: either through ‘Adnan (north Arabian tribes) or Qahtan (south Arabian tribes). ‘Adnani Arabs trace their origin back to Isma‘il (Ishmael), son of Ibrahim (Abraham). Among the tribes descending from ‘Adnan are the Hudayl, Bani Tamim, Qays, Rabi’a, Bakr, Taghlib, and the Quraysh of Makkah. Today many of the large formerly nomadic tribes claim ‘Adnani descent, such as the Bani Khalid, ‘Anazah, Bani Tamim, and Mutayr. On the other hand, Qahtan, the biblical Joktan, grandson of Shem, son of Noah, is the forefather for many tribes in the mountains of Southern Arabia. Some of these tribes moved north and there became prominent and superior in the social hierarchy. Among the tribes of Qahtani origin are the ‘Ajman, al-Murrah, Harb, Dawasir, and Shammar. Being able to trace one’s ancestry back to either ‘Adnan or Qahtan is essential for finding a high-ranking place in the social hierarchy of Saudi Arabia. Those who cannot produce a clear and pure pedigree were in the past and often still are considered inferior, although they might be financially well off and politically well connected. In the past, different social status was also attributed to different occupations. The lifestyle of the Bedouin, nomadic pastoralism, was regarded the most noble. But, although all Bedouin are tribal, not all tribal members are Bedouin. There is, however, still a notion of descent between nomadic Bedouin, badw, and sedentary people, hadar, which is manifested in the social hierarchy of the kingdom.

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On the top are the noble tribes of pure descent, and next to them are those who cannot claim membership in one of those tribes. However, they are organized in extended families and share the belief in a similar system of values. Therefore, no marital relations are possible. Even if the non-tribal family lives in the area for several generations and is otherwise well respected and deeply involved in the community, they still would not marry a member from the pure tribes. On the bottom of the social ladder are those elements with no kinship ties, former inferior tribes, slaves, and foreigners. What most of the local population in Arabia has in common is the belief in a system of social norms and values that circle around two key issues: loyalty and family honor. A patronage network of clients and masters, who are often tribal leaders or members of the royal family, nowadays reflects loyalty to one’s kin. The essential concept of family honor is usually combined with a set of rules and responsibilities for both the individual and the group. In the past and under the new economical and social conditions it is hard for the individual to survive without the help of his network. For that same reason, relatives work to strengthen the bond between the members through constant visitations, consultations, and marriages. It times of hardship the network can provide work, money, or other material support. However, only members are eligible to those benefits. Leadership in kinship networks is exercised by strong, influential, and reputable individuals, who in the past were considered “first among equals;” they still rule by consensus and need to consult with the rest of the group. The ruling families of the Arab Gulf States are good examples of hereditary leadership within a tribal society. They all maintain their rule over the area for sometimes more than two centuries. Through mutual relations with foreign powers and the discovery of oil in their territories, they managed to preserve their superior role in the current Gulf society and continue to resist unlimited political participation. Members of the ruling families hold key positions, and posts granted to others, usually allies, require their allegiance and loyalty. Today more than ever does the static concept of social organization represent the ongoing struggle between traditional and modern forces in the Gulf societies.

FURTHER READING Crystal, Jill. “Civil Society in the Arabian Gulf,” in Civil Society in the Middle East, edited by A. Richard Norton, 259–286. Leiden: Brill, 1996. Khuri, Fuad I. Tribe and State in Bahrain: The Transformation of Social and Political Authority in an Arab State. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980. Long, David E. Culture and Customs of Saudi Arabia. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005. Niblock, Tim. Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf. London: Croom Helm, 1980. Sweet, Louise Elizabeth. Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East: An Anthropological Reader. Garden City, NY: Natural History Press, 1970.

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Sports

Sports Sebastian Maisel Islam encourages healthy bodies and minds, and therefore sports and other physical exercise are very popular in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Even praying and prostration are regarded as exercises that are good and healthy for the Muslim. The Prophet Muhammad encouraged the community to be active and practice horseback riding, swimming, and archery, which were important for the physical survival of the faithful. Watching others performing sports was another activity sanctioned by the Prophet. Climate conditions restrict the variety of sports and the place and time of practice. Until recently, people in the Arabian Peninsula had to work hard in order to make ends meet. Today, in most jobs and educational facilities, physical activities are limited. New eating habits and massive urbanization add to the decreasing physical fitness and inactivity of the many Gulf Arabs. Physical education and training in the Western way were introduced through British colonial officers and educational institutions. Today, the school curriculum of all countries in the area includes some types of training and physical activities during recess. Official sport federations are responsible for organizing and developing their particular sports (basketball, soccer, volleyball, handball, gymnastics, swimming, judo, tennis, fencing, and others), which includes the preparation of national teams for international competition. In addition, the General Presidency of Youth Welfare in Saudi Arabia oversees and supervises all developments and concurrently functions as the official supervisor and link to the government. All countries participate regularly in the Olympics, and some athletes have won titles and medals. The only gold medal was awarded to Ahmad Al Maktum, who won in trap shooting in the 2004 games in Athens. Qatar and Bahrain are trying to boost their squads by giving citizenship to foreign athletes, who then compete for their host country. Other countries, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman have not sent female competitors to the games, something Kuwait and Bahrain started to do. Generally, more athletes are sent to regional games (i.e., Pan-Arab or Asian Games) than to the Olympics. During the 2006 Asian Games, which were held in al-Dawhah, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States have sent larger delegations, including female athletes from all countries except Saudi Arabia. Certain types of sport are considered a national obsession, and, in absence of other unifying factors, seem to function as a source of identity that unify the countries. This counts mostly for the patriotism regarding the national football teams. Football or soccer is the most popular sport; among the more affluent classes, it is replaced by horseracing. In the late 1920s, soccer fans in Jiddah founded al-Ittihad Club, making it the oldest soccer club in Arabia. It took until 1975 for the first official Saudi league to be founded. In 1990 it was turned into a professional league and today includes twelve teams from the main regions of the kingdom. The league is known for its focus on national players and has a restricted number of foreign players. On the international level, the Saudi

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Arabian national soccer team participated regularly at the World Cup but with little success on the global level. They have been more successful in the Asian Cup, where the Saudi team won three titles and came in second another three times, indicative of the high level of Saudi soccer in the regional context. Of significance for the national identity as Saudis and the ethnic identity as Arabs is the 2007 Asian Cup loss to Iraq, where players, fans, and officials were unsure whether to be upset over the loss or excited for the Iraqi team that managed to achieve great success despite their difficult situation at home. Some soccer players become famous idols to the young generation. Arguably, the most popular player is Sami al-Jabir, who played for Al-Hillal Club of Jiddah and scored at all four Saudi Arabian World Cup appearances. In 2006, at the Soccer World Championship for the Disabled, the Saudi team won the title by beating the Netherlands. Today, the Gulf States provide a large variety of sporting facilities of which the population is making full use, both on the professional as well as on the individual level. Public sporting complexes are competing with large private sport clubs. These clubs participate in competitive leagues for football, basketball, tennis, swimming, or volleyball, but also provide sporting facilities for their members, including pools, recreational centers, and indoor and outdoor fields. Other sponsors for sport activities are private companies and public institutions. Here employees can use the facilities provided by their employers and often run semiprofessional leagues with teams wearing the name of the company. Because of gender segregation requirements, Arab women from the Gulf rarely participate in public sport events. If they do, they prefer to be secluded and avoid the presence of men. Although sport is very popular and heavily funded by governments throughout the Gulf, almost no public funding goes into female sports. Currently, Saudi Arabia offers physical education for girls at the high-school level. In addition to healthy food they also focus on health movements in what is called health classes. In the past, female physical education was not available at public schools. Activities for women were possible only through membership in one of the many private fitness clubs. However, at an historical groundbreaking event in 2008, the first-ever women’s football match was played in Dammam between two university teams.

FURTHER READING Al-Hazzaa, H.M. “Prevalence of Physical Inactivity in Saudi Arabia: A Brief Review,” Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal 10, nos. 4–5 (2004): 663–670. Rosendich, T.J. “Sports in Society: The Persian Gulf Countries,” Journal of the International Council for Health, Physical Education, and Recreation 27, no. 3 (1991): 26–30. Safeir, Leila. “The Status of Muslim Women in Sport: Conflict between Cultural Tradition and Modernization,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 20, no. 4 (1985): 283–306. Tomlinson, Alan. Sport and Leisure Cultures. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.

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Sulubba

Sulubba Sebastian Maisel The Sulubba (other spellings include Sulubah, Soluba, Sulaib, and Sleb) are an ethnic group of former hunters and gatherers that lives throughout northern Arabia but is considered a pariah group and ranks on the bottom of the traditional social hierarchy. In their appearance they differ substantially from the remaining population, who regard them as strangers and being outside the general social order, although the Sulubba speak a dialect of Arabic language. No hard evidence about their origin and ancient history is available, which subsequently led to spreading of discriminating misinterpretations on their descent. Many consider them related to the crusaders of the eleventh century or gypsy groups. Others rumors, even oral poetry, report on famous relationships between Sulubba women and tribal men. Their social structure is similar to the tribes; however, their family clans live autonomously and are usually not related to each other. In the past they led a nomadic life based on donkey and sheep breeding. They were skilled hunters and trackers, but also worked as craftsmen, artisans, entertainers, or simple wage laborers. Those occupations were greatly despised by the main tribal society. They tried to live close to the large tribes in order to benefit from their protection. In return they produced the artifacts that the nomadic tribes could not make on their own, like tools that were important for most economic activities. They also have to pay a tribute, khuwah, to enjoy shelter and protection. The tribes of noble descent avoided close contact with the Sulubba and never intermarried with them. To call someone by the name Sulubba was a serious offense. Islamic religion was practiced on the surface, but remnants of pre-Islamic pagan cults can still be found in their rituals and doctrines. What makes the Sulubba society different than other Arabian societies is the elevated position of women, who can freely choose their spouse, participate in social events, and socialize with other men. World War II and the increasing sedentarization have not changed the social status of the Sulubba. The stigma of low descent and ritual uncleanness are conditions for the continuing marginalization of non-stock holders like the Sulubba on the periphery of herding societies or formerly herding/nomadic societies like the Bedouin of Arabia. After the elimination of all hunting game, the Sulubba started to settle in small semipermanent hamlets on the border to the pastureland of the larger tribes. After World War II, they were allowed to enroll in the Kuwaiti Army and Police because of their high reputation as trackers. Today, they work as shepherds for other Bedouin or in the oil industry, which usually provides a less racist work environment. Here they are employed in administration, security, and education. Recently, the term Sulayb was formally abandoned in Saudi Arabia, which allowed the Sulubba to join the tribes that they have been associated with; however, ancient prejudices against them still prevail.

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FURTHER READING Betts, Alison. “The Solubba: Nonpastoral Nomads in Arabia,” Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research, no. 274 (1989): 61–69. Simpson, J. “Gazelle-Hunters and Salt-Collectors: A Further Note on the Solubba,” Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research no. 293 (1994): 79–81.

Sunnah John A. Shoup Sunnah refers to the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad and the majority of Muslims belong to the mainstream division of Islam called ahl al-sunnah, meaning people of the sunnah, or Sunni Islam. The majority of Arabs and the majority of Muslims in the Arabian Peninsula are Sunnis following one of the four main legal schools: Hanafi, Shafi‘i, Maliki, or Hanbali. Hanbali Islam is the majority in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, whereas Maliki is the majority school in Bahrain and Qatar. Sunnis in Yemen, Oman, and Kuwait tend to be mainly Shafi‘i. Each of the four schools differ on several legal points and even on the sources of Islamic law, but historically they have been part of the general mainstream of the religion with their scholars in agreement about important aspects of government. When the first split in Islam happened, the nascent Sunni community agreed to the arbitration between Mu‘awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan and ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib over claims to the Khilafah or Caliphate. Sunnis accept as valid the succession of the first four Khalifahs called the Rightly Guided Caliphs to the Prophet, including ‘Ali, and do not recognize Mu‘awiyah as the Khalifah until after ‘Ali’s death in 661 because the arbitration efforts were not conclusive. Once Mu‘awiyah was able to secure the sole leadership for himself, Sunnis did not dispute the legality of his claim. Sunnis accept the succession within the Umayyad family and agree to the dynasty change from the Umayyads to the ‘Abbasids in 760 as legal, whereas Shi‘ites do not. Sunni jurisprudence did not really emerge until the first century of the ‘Abbasids. During the first centuries of Islam, there was no organized or standardized approach to law, particularly as long as Companions of the Prophet were still alive to serve as sources of information about what the Prophet said or did. The Qur’an as the word of God was seen as the only needed source of law. Individual jurists made decisions based on the Qur’an and on individual reasoning once the Companions were no longer alive to be consulted. The Umayyad Khalifahs supported debates between Muslims and Christians over matters of faith but had not encouraged a standardized collection of judicial decisions. Muslims in Iran, Syria, and Egypt encountered centuries-old legal traditions that needed to be reconciled with Islam and the practices of Arabia. Starting in the 770s two major centers of Islamic jurisprudence became established: Kufah in Iraq, and Madinah in the Peninsula. Scholars in Kufa attempted to reconcile legal procedures of the former Persian and Roman Empires with the divine revelations of the Qur’an when possible, but the Qur’an did not have clear

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legal decisions on all matters. The hadith (or sayings) and sunnah (or actions) of the Prophet also did not cover all possibilities, and authoritative collections of them were not made until the ninth century by al-Bukhari (d. 870) and ibn Muslim (821–875). Two other forms of legal procedures emerged, qiyas (or analogy) and ijma‘ (or consensus). Ijtihad (or individual reasoning) remained a practice in Sunni Islam until the thirteenth century when it was decided that any further use of reasoning ran the risk of diverging too much from the divine word of God and that all possibilities had already been exhausted. Following the example of the Syrian Hanbali scholar ibn Taymiyah (1263–1328), ijtihad was replaced by taqlid, or imitation of previous scholars. Sunni Islam was nearly swamped by a wave of popular support for Isma‘ili Shi‘ism from the tenth to the eleventh centuries. The power of the ‘Abbasids weakened by the middle of the ninth century, allowing for several local dynasties to emerge. In North Africa the Isma‘ili were able to first take Tunisia and then Egypt, establishing the Fatamids (909–1171) as a rival Caliphate. The ‘Abbasids themselves became hostage to the Persian Shi‘ite Buwayhids from 932 to 1062. Sunni scholars dealt with the political weakness of the Caliphate by recognizing a division of power and authority between the Khalifah as head of the Islamic community and the Sultan who wielded actual power or sultah. Sunni jurists wrote that it was proper to obey the Sultan, no matter who he was, because he ruled in the name of the Khalifah and for the eventual good of the Muslim community. They argued that a bad Muslim Sultan was better than to be ruled by a non-Muslim; stability was better than rebellion. Sunni scholars took a very realistic and pragmatic approach to government and when Kamal Atat€ urk finally abolished the office of the Khalifah in 1924 there was little reaction from Sunnis anywhere. The recognition of sultah and the division of political power from the religious leadership of Islam in the ninth century allow Sunnis to adjust to new political realities. Sunni Islam was revived with the arrival of the Saljuq Turks (1037–1157), recent converts to Sunni Islam who defeated the Buwayhids and placed the ‘Abbasid Khalifah under their protection. They proceeded on into Syria and Anatolia, defeating both the Shi‘ite Fatamids and the Christian Byzantines. The Saljuqs and their successors, the Zangids (1127–1181) and the Ayyubids (1169–1260) began establishing madrasahs, or religious colleges, where Sunni jurisprudence could be taught. In North Africa the al-Murabatin (1040–1146) movement firmly established Maliki Sunni Islam, ending centuries of Kharaji and Shi‘ite states. The madrasah system was imported from the east to help with teaching Sunni jurisprudence. Main centers of Sunni Islamic learning developed in Egypt, Syria, and North Africa and in the twentieth century. Saudi Arabia established its own center in Madinah. See also Madhhab.

FURTHER READING Coulson, N.J. A History of Islamic Law. Edinburgh: Edinburgh at the University Press, 1999. Schacht, J. The Origins of Muhammadan Jurispridence. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1950.

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Tabuk Sebastian Maisel Tabuk is an oasis city in the northwestern part of Saudi Arabia with some 350,000 inhabitants. Tabuk is also the capital of the Tabuk Province with approximately 700,000 inhabitants. The city is located in a forty-three-mile (seventykilometer) long oasis amid large palm groves on the ancient caravan route connecting Madinah with Damascus. The area enjoys a different climate from most other parts of Arabia; it has a Mediterranean climate with hot, dry summers and cold, wet winters. Rainfall is more frequent than in central Arabia, and occasionally the area experiences snowfall and frost. Historically, Tabuk is an old area of settlement. Didan took its name from its founder and, according to traditional genealogies, he traced his descent from Ham, the son of Noah. Archaeological evidence shows that the area of Tabuk was inhabited since early times, but the most evidence dates from the Nabatean period. The Nabateans built several sites in the vicinity, of which al-Bid‘a is the most impressive. During the early era of Islam, a decisive campaign was led by Muhammad to Tabuk in 630 in order to challenge the Byzantines. Although no battle was fought, the expedition of some 30,000 helped to demonstrate the power of the Muslims, subjugate the local tribes, and include them into the Islamic realm. During the late Ottoman period, a railway station on the Hijaz Railroad was built connecting the city with the political and economical centers of the region. Another reminder of the Ottoman period is the ruins of a fort built in 1684 on top of earlier fortifications. Similar to other forts along the pilgrimage route, it has a large water reservoir to accommodate the garrison and pilgrims. Other important buildings were added in recent times, after revenues from the oil export enabled the Saudi government to invest in the infrastructure of the peripheral places; for example, the largest mosque of Tabuk, the Mosque of the Prophet, was built in the 1960s on the spot where Muhammad prayed during the battle of Tabuk in 630/631. Formerly a rich oasis where traditional farming and small-scale animal husbandry prevailed, the Tabuk of today turned into a center for mechanized and irrigated agriculture. The area is the largest producer of wheat, olives, and grapes in the kingdom, averaging about 200,000 tons of wheat every year. Other

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crops, flowers, fruits, and vegetables are grown for export to the Middle East and Europe. Because of its expanding industry and military complexes, Tabuk is one of the fastest growing cities in the kingdom. Tabuk is home to the King Faysal Airbase. During the war in Iraq in 2003, the United States sold Saudi Arabia several F-16 aircrafts, which were stationed in Tabuk. This raised diplomatic concerns with Israel, which feels threatened by the deployment of these planes because of the proximity of Tabuk to the northern neighbors. King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Military City is one of the largest military facilities in Saudi Arabia, which also is home to a number of U.S. training personnel. Tabuk made headlines in 2007 when a civilian was arrested by the country’s religious police, the mutawwas, and subsequently died in custody. In the following public debate, allegations of abuse and arbitrary discrimination were brought up against the organization, which led to a change in the supervision of the religious police force. See also Military Bases; Oases.

FURTHER READING Khan, Majeed. Prehistoric Rock Art of Northern Saudi Arabia: A Synthetic Approach to the Study of Rock Art from Wadi Damm, Northwest of Tabuk. Riyadh: Ministry of Education, Department of Antiquities and Museums, 1993. King, Geoffrey. “Notes on Some Mosques in Eastern and Western Saudi Arabia,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 43, no. 2 (1980): 251–276. Al-Rasheed, Madawi. A History of Saudi Arabia. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Nowshirvani, Vahid, “The Yellow Brick Road: Self-Sufficiency or Self-Enrichment in Saudi Agriculture?” MERIP Middle East Report no. 145 (1987): 7–13. Vassieliev, Alexei. The History of Saudi Arabia. London: Saqi Books, 1998.

Ta’if Sebastian Maisel Ta’if is a large city in the western part of Saudi Arabia, the Hijaz, with approximately 500,000 inhabitants. The city is located in a relative high altitude of 5,300 feet (1,615 meters) above sea level. It is a summer retreat for many Saudis, among them the Royal Family. Wells and an eighty-mile mile (129 kilometer) long pipeline supply water. The area around Ta’if is known for its gardens, where grapes, fruits, wheat, vegetables, and roses are grown. Special products include honey and rose water. Rulers of the Hijaz, such as the Sharif of Makkah and the Al Sa‘ud, owned large amounts of farmland in and around Ta’if. In the sixth century, the Thaqif tribe inhabited Ta’if. After their defeat at the Battle of Hunayn against the Muslim army, Ta’if lost its important position; a

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process that continued with the capital of the Islamic Empire moving to Damascus and later to Baghdad. The city was always dependent or affiliated to Makkah. In 1802, troops from the first Saudi state conquered the city and massacred the population. During the subsequent Egyptian campaign, Ta’if was then occupied by the troops of Ibrahim Pasha. At the beginning of the Arab Revolt, a decisive battle between the Ottoman garrison and the army of the Sharif was fought in which the Turks were defeated. This defeat led to the British conviction that the Grand Sharif of Makkah, Hussein ibn ‘Ali, was a suitable candidate for their support. After World War I, the demise of the Ottoman Empire, and the British withdrawal from supporting the Hashemites, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud’s Ikhwan army marched into the city on September 7, 1924, which at that time was defended by the Sharif of Makkah. Once again large parts of the population were massacred. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz was deeply embarrassed and outraged by the event, but in the end it served his purpose, because the word of the massacre spread quickly and led to the almost immediate surrender of Jiddah and abdication of the Sharif. Subsequently, the city became part of the Saudi realm. Soon after, Ibn Sa‘ud opened a military academy, and Ta’if was also seat of the Ministry of Defense. After the 1930 pilgrimage over 3,000 Muslims from Bukhara in Soviet Union Central Asia remained in the area and settled in Ta’if, thus changing the ethnic diversity of the city dramatically. Four years later, on May 20, 1934, Saudi Arabia and Yemen signed the Treaty of Ta’if, which ended the decade of hostilities over the border between the two countries. It was also here where the founder of Saudi Arabia, King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud, died on November 14, 1953. In 1988, negotiations between the Soviet Union and representatives of the Afghani rebels met to discus a Russian pullout, and in 1989 a truce between the warring Lebanese groups was signed here. From 1990 until 1991, Ta’if was selected by the government of Kuwait to be the seat of the government in exile during the country’s occupation by Iraq. Because of its popularity as a summer retreat, Ta’if is well connected to other areas in Saudi Arabia and has greatly benefited from the extensive road-building program in the 1960s and 1970s. Breathtaking highways through the Hijaz Mountains connect Ta’if with Makkah. Hospitals, airports, and schools followed soon afterward.

FURTHER READING Daghestani, Abdal-Majeed. At-Taif: A City in Transition. Riyadh: Foreign Information Department, Ministry of Information, 1981. King, Geoffrey. “Notes on Some Mosques in Eastern and Western Saudi Arabia,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 43, no. 2 (1980): 251–276. Pesce, Angelo, and Khalid Khidr. Taif: The Summer Capital of Saudi Arabia. Jeddah: Immel, 1984. Thesiger, W. “A Journey through the Tihama, the Asir and the Hijaz Mountains,” The Geographical Journal 110, nos. 4-6 (1947): 188–200.

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Television Sebastian Maisel Because of social restrictions that prevent mixing of genders in public, many Arabs in the Gulf socialize at home. As a result, television became a main outlet for entertainment and is one of the most popular leisure time activities, particularly since the introduction of satellite television. Television broadcasting in Saudi Arabia started in 1965 when the late King Faysal commissioned the American National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) to construct a national television network, but unofficial broadcast services were initiated in 1955. EGLTV went on the air in Dhahran, in the Eastern Province, and was operated by the U.S. Air Force. A second station started in Dhahran in 1957, whereas another broadcast from the Aramco compound served the employees of the American companies. Saudi Arabia became the second Middle Eastern country after Iraq to introduce television; however, the signal from Aramco, for example, could only be received in the Eastern Province. With the help of American president John F. Kennedy and some enthusiastic pioneers, the first programming included readings and lessons from the Qur’an, the news, and the cartoon Mighty Mouse. The country’s conservative religious establishment opposed the introduction of television, as they did with the telegraph, the radio, and the telephone before. King Faysal and the Minister of Information were quickly convincing most of them of the benefits of the new medium; that they could reach out to a much bigger audience. However, some radical opponents sought to destroy the “work of the devil,” as they called the new invention. Among them was Prince Khalid Bin Musa‘id, who was killed in a subsequent quarrel with the police. Ten years later, his brother Faysal bin Musa‘id avenged the death of his brother by killing the one who introduced television to Saudi Arabia, King Faysal bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. Saudi Arabia initially operated two national television channels, the first being a conservative, mostly Arabic-speaking channel, whereas the second channel broadcasted in English for the expatriate community. Color television made its entry to Saudi Arabia in 1976. Since 1970, the country operates without foreign assistance, and the programs are still conservative. Particularly the news broadcasts tend to be rather plain and not controversial. Other more popular programs include poetry recitals, coverage of the pilgrimage, and special television series during Ramadan. Sports and music shows follow suit. Television programming is similar to radio in the sense that Saudi Arabia is the heart of the Islamic world; therefore, religious programming has a special importance in Saudi television. Despite this, conservative religious groups have always been opposed to television. In the spring of 1994, pressure from religious groups eventually led to the temporary banning of satellite dishes in the kingdom. Today, the state-run Broadcasting Service of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (BSKSA) is responsible for all broadcasting. It operates four television networks, including the news channel al-Ikhbariyah. The Minister of Culture and Information chairs the body, which oversees radio and television operations. Private radio

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and television stations cannot operate from Saudi soil, but the country is a key market for pan-Arab satellite and pay-TV broadcasters. Saudi investors are behind several major networks, including Dubai-based Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC), Bahrain-based Orbit, and Arab Radio and Television (ART) from Cairo. Viewers in the east can pick up television stations from more liberal Gulf neighbors. The first Arabic language satellite television station, MBC, was launched in 1991. Most of the money comes from Saudi investors. Other Saudi financed, owned, or otherwise influenced television networks include ART from Cairo and Orbit, which is owned by the well-known business man Prince Khalid bin ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Sa‘ud. The most dramatic change in satellite broadcasting was brought by the Arabic all-news station Al Jazeera, which focuses entirely on news coverage and current events from an Arab point of view that often contradicts Western views. Other news stations with similar concepts followed, including al-‘Arabiyah and al-Hurrah.

KUWAIT Television in Kuwait started in 1957. After the independence large steps were taken by the government to ensure general authority over the broadcasting sector. Kuwait television was subsequently transferred to the Ministry of Information and the official transmission station in Muhaia started to broadcast over the entire country. Programs were in black and white until 1974, when PAL signals were used to broadcast color programs. A new Information Complex founded in 1979 offered high-end technology and enabled the showing of a variety of programs, such as religious and educational programs, Western and local series, as well as news and political programs. Kuwait has four official (i.e., state-run) television channels with special channels in English for sports and entertainment.

BAHRAIN Bahrain’s television is run by a state-controlled agency, Bahrain Radio and Television Corporation (BRTC), which operates several Arabic and English-speaking terrestrial channels. The operating signal is strong enough for viewers in eastern Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates to watch popular programs. Officially, satellite television is banned, but currently almost all homes in Bahrain have access to it. Over fifty percent of the population owns a television.

OMAN The Ministry of Information oversees television in Oman, and the government, which does not allow advertisement, funds the entire program. Generally, the signal of Omani state television reaches the majority of the households, which are mostly equipped with a television and currently with satellite dishes. The official program is more focused on local news, events, social life, and politics than other Gulf States, which is reflected in the lower number of imported

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Western programs. However, competition with home videos and satellite television started to rise in recent years.

QATAR Television in Qatar started with a single, black and white channel in 1970. Later, color transmissions and a second English-speaking channel were added. The Qatari satellite channel started to operate in 1998. All channels are owned by the government with the exemption of Al Jazeera, which went on the air in 1996. Although financed by the Emir of Qatar, the station is considered a private entity that provides news and information from an Arab point of view and had an immediate impact on the viewers from the Gulf.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES Most television stations in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), such as Dubai TV, Abu Dhabi TV, or Sharjah TV, are owned by the government, except those that are located in a broadcast free zone created in 2001 in Dubai. Within the zone the otherwise strict laws to control the media do not apply, and stations are able to work free from regulations. For example MBC, a private Saudi-owned organization, operates its successful news channel al-‘Arabiyah from Dubai Media City. Satellite television first changed daily life in Arabia and today life cannot be imagined without it. Free permanent access to Western programs, news, and entertainment had a liberating effect on the general public and on official television, which had to respond and adapt to the changes, and indeed they became more topical and informative. Satellite dishes are widespread in the peninsula with almost ninety-five percent of the households owning a dish. Approximately thirty percent of the urban households use pay-TV services. Although in 1984 watching television was popular among the young generation, with males preferring Western programs and females preferring Arab programs, today it has become a social custom, with separate viewer preferences according to gender and age. See also Media.

FURTHER READING Atassi, Mohammad Ali. “Gulf Capital and Arab Satellite Television,” Al-Jadid 10, no. 48 (2004). El-Nawawy, M., and A. Iskander. Al-Jazeera: How the Free Arab News Network Scooped the World and Changed the Middle East. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002. Rugh, William A. Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio and Television in Arab Politics. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004. Sakr, Naomi. Arab Television Today: Advancement via TV? London: I.B. Tauris, 2007.

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Al Thani Carla Higgins The Al Thani family is the ruling family of Qatar and is a branch of the Bani Tamim tribe. Their ancestral home is in the Gabrin oasis, in the southern area of the Najd. They migrated to the Qatar peninsula in the eighteenth century. Shaykh Muhammad bin Thani was the first member of the al Thani to rule Qatar (1850–1878). From the nineteenth century, Qatar became a center of the pearl trade. Shaykh Muhammad bin Thani established his capital at Al Bidda, the modern city of alDawhah. He was succeeded by Shaykh Jassim bin Muhammad Al Thani (1878– 1913), who is known as one of the most influential and powerful rulers of that era. By the time of Ottoman withdrawal from al-Dawhah in 1915, power had passed to Shaykh Jassim’s son, Shaykh ‘Abdallah bin Jassim (1913–1949). Qatar, like the other emirates in the area, became a British protectorate when Shaykh ‘Abdallah signed a treaty with Britain in 1916. Rulers ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdallah (1949–1960) and his son, Ahmad ibn ‘Ali (19601972), demonstrated no active interest in the running of Qatar. Beginning in the 1950s, Shaykh Khalifah Bin Hamad, a cousin of Ahmad, became heir apparent and assumed power immediately after Qatar’s independence in 1972. Shaykh Khalifah was effectively the first modern ruler of Qatar, managing all aspects of the government and development of Qatar; however, in later years he spent more and more time out of the country. Shaykh Khalifah was replaced by the eldest of his five sons, H.H. Shaykh Hamad Bin Khalifah in 1995, as a result of a coup. A counter-coup was staged in February 1996, but failed. Shaykh Hamad quickly froze funds that his father had taken from the national reserve, ceded some of his power to a broader authority, and constitutionally safeguarded the role of Prime Minister. At the age of fortyfour, Shaykh Hamad was the youngest ruler in the Gulf, with a political team of young, Western-educated technocrats to support him. The Emir privatized many institutions such as the postal service. He provides explanations for policies and ideas to the press. He does not engage in exaggerated ceremony and pomp. He has utilized the wealth from Qatar’s huge natural gas reserves to create a modern, developing state. The Emir has also introduced democratic elections and has created an elected national body, the Municipal Council. Shaykh Hamad is responsible for the launching and support of the Al Jazeera (1996) news network. This uncensored network has had a substantive impact on public discourse in the Arab world, openly criticizing Arab leaders and discussing ideas never before discussed openly in the Arab region. The Emir has supported Al Jazeera’s when Arab leaders complained of its negative coverage. The Emir is also known for the visible role that his second wife, Shaykhah Muza bint Nasir al-Missned, has in the nation’s affairs, one of the few visible first ladies in the Gulf region. Shaykhah Muza has had a profound effect on the status of women in Qatar.

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FURTHER READING Miles, Hugh. “Al-Jazeera: The Inside Story of the Arab News Channel That Is Challenging the West,” Denver Post, October 2, 2006. Available at http://www.denverpost.com/ excerpts/ci_0002706197 (last accessed February 23, 2008). “Ruling Family.” Available at http://www.qatar-info.com/general/ruling.htm (last accessed October 22, 2008).

Tihamah Sebastian Maisel The Tihamah is a narrow, arid, barren, and desert-like coastal plain in Southwestern Arabia. Generally it refers to the eastern shore of the Red Sea from the Gulf of Aqaba in the north to the Bab al-Mandab Strait on the Arabian Sea, but locally it describes the coastline from Yanbu‘ to Qunfudhah (northern Tihamah or Tihamat al-Hijaz) and from Qunfudhah to Jizan (southern Tihamah or Tihamat Asir). It continues into Yemen (Tihamat al-Yaman). Important cities in the Saudi Tihamah include Jiddah, Qunfudhah, Layth, and Jizan. The average width is about thirty-seven miles (sixty kilometers). The Tihamah forelands then rise up to an elevation of 500 feet (152 meters) and then give way to the escarpment range of the Hijaz and Asir Mountains. Constant high temperatures, averaging eighty-six degrees Fahrenheit (thirty degrees Celsius), and high humidity with low precipitation makes the Tihamah among the most difficult places for people to live in the Peninsula. The desolate plains, salt marshes, and scarce vegetation do not allow agriculture, which is why most of the population lives of animal husbandry and small-scale nomadism. Only in the coastal plain where in small riverbeds sediments enrich the soil irrigation farming is possible. Several places along the coast use salines. People in the Tihamah differ significantly from the surrounding ethnic groups in their physical type, social structure, and lifestyle. Strong character traits that resemble those from Ethiopia and East Africa confirm an Afro-Arabian crossroad, and long-lasting relations between the two areas indicate a long migrating history in both directions that goes back to pre-Islamic times. People of the Tihamah also dress differently from the rest of the country; fishermen and workers wear sarongs (wizras). Parts of the population have been settled for a long time. They pursue farming (sorghum, sesame, cotton, sugar cane, and bananas) or livestock breeding (sheep, goats, cattle, and camels). In southern Tihamah in the deltas of the Wadi Baysh and Wadi Jizan, dams and barrages are built into the wadi to collect floodwater caused by occasional rains and to channel them into small parches of land along the wadi. If enough water is available, an additional harvest of sorghum can be obtained. Several villages were built near the dams and thus have unusual constructions to deal with both the issues of water drainage and naturally steep terrain. People in these villages live in cylindrical huts from reed and palm frond, called usha, which in the forelands are also made from stone and mud. A larger

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and several smaller huts form a hamlet, which is surrounded by a wall of thorny bushes. The ancient huts were also found in Jiddah and Najran, but after the oil money allowed the makeover of houses and infrastructure, they have disappeared. As an area that long enjoyed agricultural development, it was attacked and occupied many times throughout history. The Wahhabis of the first Saudi state during the campaign against Yemen in 1806–1908, used the rivalry between rulers from the Tihamah and those from Sana‘a to lure the Tihamis on their side; however, they were concerned about the Saudi dominance over the areas and their allies; thus they remained independent and the Saudis were never able to consolidate their power. On the other hand, Saudi hegemony brought stability and safety to the region; trade and local fairs flourished. Under the third and final Saudi state, new attempts were made to include the Tihamah and neighboring Asir into the Saudi realm, which aggravated the relations with Yemen, where Imam Yahya had similar ambitions and annexed parts of the Tihamah in the early 1920s. In the following war between the two nations, the Tihamah became a battleground and subsequently part of the Saudi territory.

FURTHER READING El-Demerdash, M. “The Vegetation of the Farasan Islands, Red Sea, Saudi Arabia,” Journal of Vegetation Science 7, no. 1 (1996): 81–88. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Saudi Arabia, Land and Water Surveys in the Wadi Jizan, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Final Report. Rome: United Nations Development Programme, 1966. Habib, Mohammed A. “Development of Agriculture in Tihama: Regional Growth and Development in the Jizan Region, Saudi Arabia.” PhD dissertation, University of Arizona, 1988. Hillenbrand, Robert. “Traditional Architecture in the Arabian Peninsula,” Bulletin British Society for Middle Eastern Studies 16, no. 2 (1989): 186–192. Meigs, Peveril. Geography of Coastal Deserts, Paris: U.N. Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1966. Stone, Francine. Studies on the Tihamah: The Report of the Tihamah Expedition 1982 and Related Papers. Harlow, UK: Longman, 1985. Stone, Francine. Tihamah Gazetteer: The Southern Red Sea Coast of Arabia to AH 923/AD 1517. London: Routledge, 2005.

Tourism Sebastian Maisel There are several misconceptions about traveling and being a tourist in the Arab Gulf region. Many think the area is not accessible, too expensive, boring, or too dangerous. Presently, it is very easy to obtain tourist visas to all Gulf States except Saudi Arabia. All of the countries actively promote tourism, including Saudi Arabia. Gulf countries are among the richest in the world and have some of the highest gross domestic products. They offer a variety of levels for traveling

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from high-end to affordable solutions. The rich and diverse nature and culture provides the visitor with astonishing features, customs, and sights ranging from desert and coral reefs to ancient cities and fortresses. The modern side of the Gulf with luxurious hotels, beaches, shopping centers, and many leisure activities attracts hundreds of thousands visitors from all over the world who want to relax and explore. Finally, religious tourists find the holiest Islamic sites in Makkah and Madinah. Regarding security, after a period of domestic violence in Saudi Arabia between militant groups and the government, the situation has calmed down and people have begun to return to the kingdom. The other Gulf countries continue to be safe and hospitable, two dominant features of many Middle Eastern nations.

SAUDI ARABIA Saudi Arabia has long intrigued foreign travelers as the cradle of Islam, the Arabic language, and as a wealthy oil nation. The kingdom has many incredible places to see and exciting things to do, and it offers the open-minded visitor a rare chance to see a country that is able to combine traditional aspects with modernity. Although is it rather difficult to visit for the ordinary traveler, every year over six million people come to Saudi Arabia. The majority, some 2.5 million, come as pilgrims to the Holy Places of Islam. Other tourists include local Saudis, citizens of the Gulf Cooperation Council, other Arab nationals, foreigners, and businessmen. Individual non-Muslim visitors usually do not obtain a tourist entry visa; however, since 1998 the Saudi government has allowed foreign travel organizations to send small groups of Western tourists to Saudi Arabia. Opening up the country to non-pilgrim visitors will contribute to a greater understanding by outsiders. On restricted routes and programs, they rush through the touristy highlights of the country. Some 5,000 visitors from Europe, Japan, the United States, and Australia now come every year on tour groups under the Saudi Arabian Airlines’ “Discover Saudi Arabia” package. However, the underdeveloped infrastructure shows that the country is not ready to receive large numbers of foreign tourists. A lack of training institutions in the hospitality and tourism industry is now being tackled by the first openings in Abha and Jiddah; for example, the Prince Sultan College for Tourist and Hotel Management was built in 2001. A special program, “Ya Hala” (welcome), was launched to train those who will be in direct contact with tourists, namely customs officials, policemen, drivers, and travel agents, in dealing with tourists in a friendly and professional manner. Regional councils are established to promote tourism in conjunction with the government agency, the Supreme Commission for Tourism (SCT). SCT was founded in 2000 to promote, enhance, and develop tourism in Saudi Arabia, and since then the government has become the leading investor in the industry, but tries to accommodate and encourage private investment as well, especially tour operators, airlines, and hotels. In addition, they work on easing the visa and travel restrictions in order to develop tourism. Apart from religious and business tourists, they want to increase the amount of leisure travel for both religious tourists and for those who come for leisure only. This leads to higher demand in the

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accommodation and transportation sector (i.e., more hotels, airplanes, and rentals cars are necessary). Economically, tourism is already very important to the kingdom, comprising six to ten percent of the annual gross domestic product and approximately 650,000 jobs. Nearly ninety percent of those are held by guestworkers, which in the future could open up a new market for Saudi national job seekers. International tourism is still an experiment that can be stopped at any time. On the other hand, this sector offers enormous employment opportunities to young Saudis. The tourism industry is regarded as a vital sector in the fight against unemployment and for nationalization of the workforce. The plan to market the kingdom to foreign visitors is intended to create 1.5–2.3 million jobs by 2020. Construction of the Prince Sultan College for Tourist and Hotel Management began in 2001, and there are plans for 50,000 new hotel rooms. Saudi Arabia is also leading in investing in the tourism industry of other Arab countries such as Egypt and Jordan. Certain areas of the kingdom receive special attention regarding the establishment of resorts and large-scale accommodation and entertainment projects. The most favorable domestic destinations include Abha and the Asir Mountains, the historic and modern city of Jiddah, the Nabatean ruins at Mada’in Salih, and beach resorts on the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Abha alone earns some $50 million in revenues from the tourism industry and receives about 500,000 visitors annually, although most of these visitors are Saudis. In Saudi Arabia, there is a growing amount of extra money and free time to spend on several forms of tourism, both domestic and international, and by expatriates and locals. The oil boom and revenues enabled Saudis to spend their annual holidays away from home. Although many go abroad, some seventy percent of the population prefers to spend their holidays within the kingdom. Although the recreational opportunities and facilities are limited, other venues, most private through family and tribal links, are visited. Another major factor in the domestic tourist industry is business travelers, who like to discover a country with a modern infrastructure, traditional way of living, and natural beauty. Among the main areas of domestic tourism one can choose religious and cultural tourism to Makkah and Madinah with their historical sites, libraries, and mosques. Many cities actually have attractive centers; for example, Hufuf with the old wall and the Ibrahim fortress, Dumat al-Jandal with the ancient ‘Umar bin al-Khattab mosque, Ha’il with the old castle in the Barzan area, the old city center of Riyadh with the Masmak fortress and the Murabba‘ Palace, the old Saudi capital Dir‘iyah, and Najran with the old Emir’s palace and traditional living towers. For those who want recreation in a beautiful natural setting, there are Ta’if, the summer retreat of the Royal Family and many other Saudis; Abha and Baha in the Asir Mountains; and also the escarpment area and sand dunes between Riyadh and Burayda. Swimming, diving, snorkeling, and beaches are available north of Jiddah and south of the al-Khubar. The hotels in Saudi Arabia cater to the business and pilgrimage communities. The sector is heavily expanding to accommodate the higher demand. Hotels usually belong to international chains and are run by foreigners. The highest concentration of hotels is found in Abha, Khamis Mushayit, and Nimas, all located in the Asir.

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Summer festivals organized throughout the kingdom became a new magnet for domestic tourists, offering a combination of cultural entertainment, shopping, and relaxation. The Abha Summer Festival, the largest and longest (eight weeks), is again the leading entity in this booming touristy sector. Other cities, including Buraydah, Madinah, Jiddah, and the entire Eastern Province, now also organize this type of event with a variety of cultural, sporting, and shopping activities. Local domestic tourism has existed since Saudis were able to afford spending time away from work. In the past and still today they enjoy going to the desert for weekend camping. From all major urban areas, families go during the warm spring evenings and weekends to the desert areas near the cities. This kind of family activity combines their desire to live like their forefathers with the ability to spend time with the family when all members can run around and play. Ordinary families just rest a few miles outside of the city, going off-road for a mile or two. More affluent rent or own a small tent or camp ground, where during the week poor relatives or guestworkers take care of the property. These tents provide all modern comforts, including air conditioning and satellite television. People are active, riding camels or motorbikes or cruising along the dunes. They also communicate and socialize with each other. Prayers are usually observed. Particularly in the summer during the school vacations, many Saudis travel abroad. Depending on their financial abilities they either go to Egypt and Lebanon, or if they have more money to spend to Europe (Marbella and the Cote d’Azur) and the United States. Every year, they spend $15 million during that time of the year. Shopping and sightseeing trips to European capitals (London, Paris, Rome) and far eastern hubs (Hong Kong, Singapore) are very popular. Locally, many Saudis like to cross into Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates for a weekend of entertainment and shopping away from the many restrictions at home.

OTHER ARAB GULF STATES Bahrain is one of the most popular destinations in the Gulf with over 2 million visitors each year, especially Saudis who enjoy the more liberal atmosphere and fewer prohibitions. The government is increasingly investing in the tourism sector and hopes to diversify the number of tourists. To do that they host the only Formula One motor race, which is a huge draw for international tourists, and built a string of beach resorts, including several artificial islands. A wide range of hotels is available as well as amenities such as restaurants, cinemas, or shopping malls. Although a small island nation, Bahrain has a long history and museums, historical and archaeological sites, and old forts can be visited. The largest mosque, al-Fatih Mosque, is open for non-Muslims and so is the Bait al-Qur’an, which has a large collection of Islamic artifacts and manuscripts. Concerns are raised over the dominance of Saudi tourists who flock in the island on Wednesday night via the King Fahd Causeway, when it is the weekend in Saudi Arabia, and leave Friday after an intensive schedule of things to do that they are not allowed to do at home. Others feel intimidated because the events sometimes get out of hand. In Kuwait, an attractive infrastructure has been built for locals and foreign visitors. Several hotels and resorts as well as restaurants and recreational parks offer

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the domestic traveler a break from daily life. Activities are usually related to the water, such as pearl diving, fishing, sailing, or other water sports. Some historical buildings have been preserved and museums and other cultural institutions provide a first glimpse into the country’s cultural heritage and traditions. Oman is the second largest Gulf State and has a diverse natural environment, population, and culture. The country offers the Empty Quarter, monsoon rain, green mountains, and long beaches alongside historical and archaeological sites. Oman is not known as a major shopping destination. Water sports such as diving, whale watching, and swimming are popular. Inland activities such as desert safaris, trekking, or rock climbing bring in enthusiasts from all over the world. Many ancient and medieval sites have been restored; some of them are on the list of world heritage sites. Finally, traditional customs and sports such as bull fights or camel races draw large crowds of local visitors. Although international travelers normally come on a booked tour, individual tourists from the United Arab Emirates travel around the country on their own. Local tourists prefer the comfortable amenities of resorts or attend one of the major cultural and shopping festivals. The private sector is the main investor in the tourist industry. Qatar is a relatively small country. In the past, traveling to Qatar was mostly related to business, but lately the government is focusing on diversifying the economy previously dependent on gas and oil and investing heavily in the tourism sector. The Qatar Tourism Authority promotes those activities to make the country a popular destination that can compete with Dubai and Oman. Leisure and sport are the two areas where Qatar hopes to attract more visitors than the annual 700,000. Hosting the 2006 Doha (al-Dawhah) Asian Games was a kickstart into this direction. Under a new $15 billion master plan, additional hotels, restaurants, and tourist attractions are being built in order to receive 1.4 million tourists by 2010.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES The United Arab Emirates (UAE) are one of the fastest growing tourist destinations with more than 4 million visitors each year and an ultramodern infrastructure that offers everything that a tourist can ask for and more. The market leader is Dubai, which through immense investments and efforts became the premier holiday destination as well as the major trade center of the Gulf. Dubai started a new trend among other Gulf States to change the oil-based economy to tourism and trade. Beaches, luxurious hotels, and all imaginable leisure activities are available. In neighboring Abu Dhabi the same features are offered; however, the emirate invests less into this sector because of larger oil and gas reserves than Dubai. Sharjah found a niche as the cultural center, whereas Fujayrah on the Indian Ocean offers a diverse environment with beaches, deserts, and mountains. The UAE enjoy a positive image and high reputation in the area and beyond for being a hospitable, open-minded country with a laissez-faire economy that does everything to satisfy the visitor. Among the events and attractions to bring in tourists are the Dubai Shopping Festival, the highest tower, the most luxurious hotel in world, artificial islands, racetracks, international sport events, theme parks, nightclubs, and so forth. The UAE are counted among the winners in the

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growth of the tourism sector after the events of September 11, 2001. Although many other Middle Eastern destinations saw a decline in tourism, the UAE experienced another boom period and within a few years, tourism will account for at least twenty percent of the country’s gross domestic product. Negative aspects of the tourism boom in the Arab Gulf include mass tourism, deterioration of traditional morals and values, and the questionable treatment of guestworkers. However, these are consequences that the public and private tourist sectors are willing to live with. See also Holidays and Festivals: National.

FURTHER READING Bogari, Naima. “Motivation for Domestic Tourism: A Case Study of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” in Consumer Psychology of Tourism, Hospitality, and Leisure, edited by Arch G. Woodside. Oxford, UK: CABI Publishing, 2004. Harrigan, Peter. “New Doors to the Kingdom,” Saudi Aramco World 52, no. 2 (2001): 2–17. Henderson, Joan C. “Tourism in Dubai: Overcoming Barriers to Destination Development,” International Journal of Tourism Research 8, no. 2 (2006): 87–99. Sharpley, Richard. “The Challenges of Economic Diversification through Tourism: The Case of Abu Dhabi,” International Journal of Tourism Research 4, no. 3 (2002): 221–235. Al-Thagafy, Sultan Ahmad. “Tourism Patterns and Behaviour in Saudi Arabia with Special Reference to the Emirate of Makkah al-Mukarramah Province: A Geographical Study.” PhD dissertation, University of Southampton, 1991. World Tourism Organization. Outbound Tourism from Saudi Arabia. Madrid: World Tourism Organization, 2003.

Travelers and Explorers Sebastian Maisel Western travelers have long been intrigued by the desert of Arabia and its inhabitants, the Bedouin, and by the forbidden cities of Makkah and Madinah, places non-Muslims could not visit. The Arabian Peninsula gained strategic importance during World War I and with the discovery of oil became a major destination for scholars, explorers, and otherwise interested travelers. The Danish explorer and scientist Carsten Niebuhr headed the first large-scale expedition to Arabia in 1762. The team of Danish scientists, painters, doctors, and other specialists was almost completely annihilated. Indeed, only Niebuhr survived, and he left us with one of the most objective and detailed accounts of Arabia south of Jiddah. Almost fifty years later the next important journeys followed—those of the Swiss Johann Ludwig Burckhardt to Makkah and Madinah, which at that time were occupied by the Wahhabis from Najd. The Englishman George Foster Sadlier crossed central Arabia from the Persian Gulf to

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Madinah in 1818/19 to get in touch with the Wahhabi ruler. Northern Arabia was explored during the mid-nineteenth century by Georg August Wallin (1845), Carlo Guarmani (1864), and Lewis Pelly (1863–1865). Wallin, a Finnish orientalist, traveled under the authority of the Khedive of Egypt to Jabal Shammar and performed the pilgrimage to Makkah and Madinah. He was one of the first Westerners in Najd and thus opened the northern part of the Arabian Peninsula for further geographical explorations. Guarmani, an Italian traveler, was the first European to reach Khaybar. He sojourned in the Jabal Shammar for some time and after his return became the founding father of the cartography of central Arabia. Pelly, a British traveler and political resident on the Gulf, helped to extend British influence in the area. His journey from Kuwait to Riyadh to negotiate with the Saudi ruler Faysal ibn Turki in 1865 and his precise description of people and places helped with further understanding and opening of the Peninsula. Due to inconsistencies and errors in his description, many doubts were raised regarding the travels of the British explorer William Gifford Palgrave, particularly by Harry St. John Philby and Hermann von Wissmann. Apparently Palgrave crossed the Peninsula from Ghazah via Ha’il and Riyadh to Qatif on the Gulf. Richard Burton’s travel account of his trip from Cairo to Makkah in 1853 on the other hand is a valuable addition to Burckhardt’s description of the pilgrimage and life in the two holy cities. By order of the Egyptian Khedive Isma’il, he traveled to the northwestern part of the Peninsula to prospect for ancient gold mines. Between 1876 and 1878, the British explorer Charles Doughty traveled through the northwestern and central part of Arabia and reached ‘Unayzah. He did not go to the holy places, but his accounts are detailed depictions of life in Arabia at that time. Although he never denied his religion, as many other explorers in the past did by dressing up like locals and imitating their customs and traditions, he wandered around as a poor doctor surrounded by often hostile locals who were offended by the presence of a Christian among them. The deserts of northern Arabia were further explored by the German Julius Euting and the Frenchman Charles Huber (1884). From Damascus they traveled to Mada’in Salih, Taymah and Ha’il, where they mostly conducted archaeological and epigraphical research. However, Euting’s ethnographic and sociopolitical information on the Shammar tribe and their ruling family the Al Rashid constituted much of the Western knowledge of that time. Makkah was the destination for C. Snouck Hurgronje, the famous Dutch orientalist, who spent significant time in the holy city describing Muslim rituals, traditions, and the local material culture. In the decade prior to World War I, European specialists began coming in larger numbers to the area with the help of improved infrastructure. The Hijaz Railroad built in 1908 facilitated the travels of Antonin Jaussen and Rapha€el Savignac from France, who spent three years crossing through northern Hijaz. During the war, the Czechoslovakian scholar, politician, and adventurer Alois Musil discovered the part of northern Najd that was not yet subjugated to ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud. During this time, Britain sent emissaries to the local rulers, Thomas Edward Lawrence to the Sharif of Makkah and first William Shakespeare, then Harry St. John Philby, to advise the Sultan of Najd and map the country. Shakespeare died rather unexpectedly, but Philby became one of the

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leading experts on Saudi affairs due to his conversion to Islam and close contacts with the king and his sons. Philby also explored large territories of Arabia; for example, he crossed the Peninsula from east to west, the area south of Riyadh along the escarpment down to Wadi Dawasir. Among the few notable Arab travelers is Amin Rihani, the famous Lebanese writer who became engaged in the local politics and visited many places and politicians in Arabia. He also became instrumental in Saudi Arabia’s attempts to gain international political recognition as an independent state. The Gulf States, particularly Kuwait, were by then under the tutelage of the British colonial interests; however, Britain’s representatives, similar to Pelly in the mid-nineteenth century, were proactive, openminded observers, who, as in the case of the political agent H.R.P. Dickson, managed to gain the trust of the local population and obtained detailed knowledge of their customs, language, and politics. The twentieth century brought a new drive to eradicate remaining unknown places on the map. In Arabia, the only remaining unknown quarter was the Empty Quarter, a desert within a desert. The first to explore the region was Bertram Thomas, an experienced traveler and British official, who crossed the largest sand desert from Salalah in the south to al-Dawhah in the north in 1931. His main rival for the crossing was Philby, who was really disappointed to find out that Thomas had won the race. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud was displeased with Thomas’s journey too because he crossed territories of tribes belonging to the realm of the Al Sa‘ud without his permission. Soon afterward, Philby quickly convinced most of them of the benefits of starting another expedition to map the Empty Quarter, and this time Philby led this successful mission in 1932. Four years later he started what is still regarded as one of the most important trips of the decade, his trip by automobile from Jiddah via Najran to the Wadi Hadhramaut in Yemen and back through the Tihamah Asir. This trip was only possible because Philby traveled as the official representative of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, for whom he mapped large areas and surveyed the Saudi-Yemeni border. His last journey brought him again to Najran, but this time he turned north toward the Jabal Tuwaiq and Riyadh. As usual, many inscriptions, petroglyphs, historical sketches, and a detailed map of the areas were the results of this long adventure. The travels of Arabia’s greatest explorer, as it is written on his gravestone, ended with the death of his patron, King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, in 1953. The last white spots on the map of Arabia were cleared by the travels of Wilfred Thesiger, the last and most thorough of the big three British explorers of the Empty Quarter, who spent three years in Asir, Oman, Hadhramawt, and the desert. After his travels in the late1940s, the traditional life of Arabia changed drastically and inadvertently due mainly to the discovery and exploitation of oil.

FURTHER READING Bidwell, Robin. Travellers in Arabia. Reading, UK: Garnet Publishing, 1994. Burckhardt, Johann Ludwig. Travels in Arabia: Comprehending an Account of Those Territories in Hejaz, 2 vols. London: H. Colburn 1829. Burckhardt, Johann Ludwig. Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, 2 vols. London: H. Colburn and R. Bentley, 1831.

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Travelers and Explorers Burton, Richard F. Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to El-Medinah and Meccah, 3 vols. London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1855–1856. Dickson, H.R.P. The Arab of the Desert: A Glimpse into Badawin Life in Kuwait and Sa’udi Arabia. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1951. Musil, Alois. Northern Negd. New York: American Geographical Society, 1928. Niebuhr, Carsten. Reisebeschreibung nach Arabien und anderen umliegenden L€andern, 3 vols. Copenhagen, 1774–1837. Palgrave, William Gifford. A Narrative of a Year’s Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia, 2 vols. London: Macmillan and Co., 1865. Philby, H. St. John B. The Heart of Arabia, 2 vols. London: Constable, 1922. Philby, H. St. John B. Arabia of the Wahabis. London: Constable, 1928. Philby, H. St. John B. The Empty Quarter. London: Holt, 1933. Philby, H. St. John B. Sheba’s Daughters. London: Methuen & Co. 1939. Philby, H. St. John B. Arabian Highlands. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952. Thesiger, Wilfred. Arabian Sands. New York: Dutton, 1959. Thomas, Bertram. Arabia Felix: Across the Empty Quarter of Arabia. New York: Scribner, 1932. Wallin, Georg August. “Narrative of a Journey from Cairo to Medina and Mecca in 1845,” Journal of the Royal Geographic Society, vol. 24 (1854): 115–207.

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‘Unayzah Sebastian Maisel ‘Unayzah is one of the main cities in the Qasim province and is often mentioned together with its twin city, Buraydah. It is situated on the southern side of the Wadi al-Rimah and is surrounded by fertile gardens, date palm groves, and farmland. ‘Unayzah developed simultaneously with Buraydah and the two were for extended times political and economical rivals over the trade routes that crossed central Arabia. Many foreign travelers, such as Charles Doughty, Harry St. John Philby, and Amin Rihani, have documented the importance of ‘Unayzah regarding commerce, trade, and urban sophistication. Before World War II, approximately 10,000 people lived in the city. The population grew in the 1970s to 25,000, and in 2007 it reached an estimated 135,000. ‘Unayzah is an old settlement with records dating back to the thirteenth century, when the Al Jarah of the al-Ribab tribe settled there and developed the city. Already in the fifteenth century, ‘Unayzah has been mentioned as an important stop on the road from southern Iraq to Makkah. By the seventeenth century, the city expanded and increased in number and size. The Al Jarah provided leadership that maintained political independence and economical growth, particularly toward the end of that century, indicating that organized political and economical structures existed prior to the establishment of the Saudi state. The city fell under the rule of the Al Rashid, the main rivals of the Al Sa‘ud, until 1904, when Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud was able to conquer the city in a surprise attack. Ibn Saud brought the city into his territory by allowing the old ruling class of the Al Sulaim to remain in power and govern the city on his behalf. By this, he created a strong bond of loyalty, although he also moved the seat of the Qasim province to Buraydah. Around the city, many settlements of the Mutayr, ‘Utaybah, Subay, and Harb Bedouin were established. The Bedouin used to migrate with their herds of sheep, goats, and camels, but modernization also brought a change in their lifestyle, predominantly with regard to water supply. Now they were able to water their animals without moving from one well to the next. Soon after they began to settle near the city in satellite towns and look for wage labor and access to health and education services. The area belongs to a large oasis with a special microclimate that enables well-irrigated agriculture. Traditionally, palm trees were planted and harvested

Unemployment

with additional layers of fruit trees and bushes, such as bananas, grapes, pomegranates, and lemons. On the bottom level alfalfa, onions, and sorghum are grown. Every two to three years, those lower crops are exchanged to avoid exhaustion of the soil. The produce is usually sold at the local markets, and surplus is sent to the larger cities. With the beginning of the economic transformation of Saudi Arabia, the amount of farmland has been increased. Particularly in the area between ‘Unayzah and Buraydah, new farms and fields have been established using fossil water to irrigate the wheat and alfalfa fields. The introduction of mechanical water pumps as early as 1925 marked the beginning of the new epoch of gradual modernization. ‘Unayzah was also a city of trade, markets, and commerce. Long-distance trade of camels and horses from the local Bedouin to the markets in Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad generated a large surplus that was used to import other luxury goods and produce. Surprisingly, the city is also home to several large fish farms that produce over 1,000 tons of fresh fish every year. The ‘Unayzah of today has changed dramatically. Although in the old days farming, animal husbandry, and handicrafts were the dominating forms of work, today they have been replaced by white-collar administrative jobs. The laborers in the fields and farms are now guestworkers from Pakistan, Sudan, or Bangladesh. The farming industry is also dependent on financial assistance and subsidies from the government. The infrastructure of ‘Unayzah is well developed, and the city is easily accessible by road, bus, and plane. Multilane highways connect ‘Unayzah with Riyadh, Buraydah, Ha’il, and Madinah.

FURTHER READING Alohali, Yousef N. “Urban Dwelling Environments in Rapidly Growing Cities: Case Study, Unayzah, Saudi Arabia.” MS thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1983. Altorki, Soraya, and Donald P. Cole. Arabian Oasis City: The Transformation of ‘Unayzah. University of Texas Press: Austin, 1989. Cole, Donald P., and Soraya Altorki. “Production and Trade in North Central Arabia: Change and Development in ‘Unayzah,” in The Transformation of Nomadic Societies in the Arab East, edited by Martha Mundy and Basim Musallam. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Al-Juhany, Uwidah Metaireek. Najd before the Salafi Reform Movement. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2002.

Unemployment Sebastian Maisel The countries of the Persian Gulf all produce and export oil and natural gas, and with the current high prices, they earn large revenues. However, money alone does not solve the problem of rising unemployment, particularly among the

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younger generations. Every year more and more unemployed and underemployed graduates join the job market with high expectations from the government to provide for adequate well-paid jobs. In the past, the governments did that by offering jobs in administration or in government-owned companies, but today the public sector can no longer accommodate all unemployed locals because it is already overstaffed, and bloated, inefficient bureaucracies have also become obstacles for the countries’ development. In addition, all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries show similar trends in their demographic development with a high population growth, low infant mortality, and high life expectancy. This created a serious conflict between the high unemployment rate and the concurrent population growth. The official rate of unemployment in Saudi Arabia is at nine percent for males and twenty-three percent for females; however, they are those who voluntarily registered with the Ministry of Labor as jobless. The number leaves out those who decided not to register for whatever reason. Although in other countries registration entitles one to unemployment compensation, this is not the case in Saudi Arabia, where compensation is paid only after ten years of employment. Therefore, there is no incentive to register as unemployed, and the number of jobless Saudis should be considered much higher. In Bahrain the unemployment rate in 2001 was at 5.5%. But here, like in other GCC countries, one has to include the number of unemployed expatriates of 0.4%. Because of strict labor laws, expatriates are usually not allowed to stay in the country. The percentage of unemployed Bahraini nationals was at 12.7%, significantly higher. Alarmingly, all GCC countries have a high rate for unemployed youth, reaching the absolute high of thirty-eight percent in Bahrain and thirty-seven percent in Saudi Arabia. This leaves these countries with a higher rate than underdeveloped countries such as Palestine or Algeria. Putting the rate together with the accelerated growth of the labor market indicates the seriousness of the problem. Among the main reasons for unemployment in the GCC countries is the high number of foreign workers in the private sector. In Saudi Arabia they make up one-fourth of the population; in other countries such as the United Arab Emirates they form the majority of the entire population at eighty-five percent. The simple idea is to replace these expatriates with local, national workers. The absolute majority of foreign workers are employed in the private sector working at everything from construction, education, and service industry to health care. These are jobs that nationals normally are not willing to do. Other expatriates are working in highly technologized areas; again, locals cannot take these jobs, but this is because of a lack in education. This shows that there is no immediate connection between youth unemployment and the presence of foreign workers. They actually compete, but not against each other. Further statistics from the World Bank show that Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have among the highest rate of expatriates and the lowest rate in youth unemployment, in contrast to Saudi Arabia where the reverse can be observed. Simply decreasing the number of foreigners does not decrease the number of unemployed locals. Young nationals from the GCC countries need governmental strategies and economic policies that encourage them to learn the skills necessary to do the job of the expatriate, especially in fields with

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sufficient labor demand. However, even high-ranking officials such as the Saudi Minister of Labor Ghazi al-Ghusaybi complain about the attitude of young GCC nationals about working in blue-collar professions. In the past and up to this day, lower-class people with inferior social status performed those jobs. Tradition and customs still prevail in the societies of the Gulf. The idea of a hands-on profession is just one of them, but it persists and subsequently prevents young Arabs from the Gulf from doing this work. The social stigma and dislike connected with those jobs are too great and not openly addressed or discussed. The attempts to replace foreign workers with nationals are therefore doomed to fail because they do not address the core of the issue. Other issues preventing nationals from being hired in the private sector are allegations of having the wrong work ethic. Nationals are considered less productive than foreigners and more expensive. Although some still think that they deserve more pay simply because of their nationality, many came to the understanding that foreigners are working for much less than nationals can. Wages paid in the service industry of the private sector are too low to support a family. A one-income family cannot provide for housing, driving, and eventually help in the house. Two-income families, on the other hand, are not the norm. Although women in the GCC countries comprise more than half of school and university graduates, they only represent five to ten percent of the workforce. Many choose not to work, some are prevented from work because of traditional restrictions, and some simply cannot find a job because job opportunities for women are very few and restricted to certain sectors (e.g., health and education). Therefore, the official number of twenty-three percent unemployment among women in Saudi Arabia seems blurry. Finally, dysfunctional educational systems are blamed for creating masses of graduates without sufficient training for the job market. The standards of local curricula are often inappropriate, do not reflect the demands of an increasingly specialized workplace, and do not provide the skills to be successful in the modern economy. Often graduates choose to study “conservative” subjects such as history or religion, whereas sciences or technical skills are not taught comprehensively. Two possible areas that are targeted by officials are more technical, vocational schools and better training programs for teachers. Then, through an advanced and current educational system, national graduates would be better prepared to enter the job market and to compete with each other and foreign workers. Recently opened private universities and colleges seem to fill the gap with curricula that are more adjusted to the needs of the students and the private sector.

FURTHER READING Albuainain, Reem. “Unemployment Rate in the United Arab Emirates: The Case of Abu Dhabi.” Working Paper no. 0404. Economic Research Forum, 2004. Kabbani, Nader, and Ekta Kothari. “Youth Employment in the MENA Region: A Situational Assessment,” Social Protection Discussion Paper, no. 0534. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2005. Shaban, Radwan, et al. “The Challenge of Unemployment in the Arab Region,” International Labour Review 134 (1995): 65–81.

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United Arab Emirates Shahin, Wassim, and Ghassan Dibeh. Earnings Inequality, Unemployment, and Poverty in the Middle East and North Africa. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000. Sirageldin, Ismail. Human Capital: Population Economics in the Middle East. London: I.B. Tauris, 2002.

United Arab Emirates Carla Higgins The United Arab Emirates (UAE) was inaugurated on December 2, 1971 as a federation of six independent Arab emirates, the only federation in the Arab world. The six initial emirates were Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, ‘Ajman, Umm al-Quwayn, and Fujayrah. Ra’s al Khaymah joined in 1972. The UAE became a member of the United Nations and the Arab League in 1971, and in 1981 the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was initiated. Geographically, the UAE is on the north and northeastern shores of the Arabian Peninsula, with the Arabian Gulf to the north, the Indian Ocean on its northeast, the Hajar Mountains on the east, and the south and west is desert. The UAE is in a strategic area that also includes the Strait of Hormuz and neighbors Iran, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. More distant neighbors are Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. India has had an impact on the UAE, historically and today. The citizens of the UAE are Arab Muslims and are members of their respective tribes, around which society is still organized. Emirati citizens make up approximately fifteen to twenty percent of the population. The UAE is a multinational society, a community where foreigners are the vast majority. Each emirate has a capital city by the same name. The UAE capital city is Abu Dhabi. Dubai is considered the “commercial city” and has long been a critical port for re-export. Sharjah has for many years been considered the cultural capital of the UAE. An emir who controls internal political and economic affairs rules each of the seven emirates. Traditional forms of local government, such as the institution of the majlis, operate side by side with new institutions, allowing individual citizens direct access to rulers. The federal government controls foreign affairs, defense, nationality, education, public health, currency, mail, telecommunications, and air traffic. It also plays a large role in economic and social development. The Supreme Council of Rulers is comprised of the seven emirs, and elects the president (Shaykh Khalifah of Abu Dhabi), who appoints the prime minister (Skaykh Maktum of Dubai) and a Council of Ministers that supervises the government. The Federal National Council (FNC) is comprised of forty members, has a legislative and supervisory role, and must examine all proposed federal legislation and oversee ministry performance and the annual budget. Traditionally, the economy was a diversified one appropriate to a harsh environment with little rainfall. Tribes moved from place to place as the seasons

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The small, unusual mosque at Badiyah on the Indian Ocean coast of the United Arab Emirates is the oldest mosque still in use in the area. The date of its construction and reason for its unusual style are not known for certain, but it certainly predates the 1700s. There are a number of watchtowers in the area surrounding the mosque, and archeological excavations have found evidence of a settlement that dates back to the third millennium BC. Courtesy of John A. Shoup.

made resources available. Resources were camels, date gardens, agriculture, fishing, and pearling, as well as natural harbors (ports) and entrepot trade. Camel herding provided continuous fodder for animals that provided a critical food source, milk, and occasionally meat, as well as hair for housing, tents, and tent furnishings. Date gardens were critical for survival, and were found in oases fed by irrigation (aflaj) or wells. Pearling was the sole export and source of currency, and just about the only item of value in trade beyond the local economy. Pearling created cities such as Abu Dhabi and was critical in the early development of Dubai and other port cities on the shores of the Arabian Gulf. Natural ports, primarily those of Dubai, Sharjah, and Ra’s al Khaymah, led to opportunities for trade, especially entrepot trade. Today’s economy is considered the most open and integrated of the Arab economies. It is based on oil and natural gas production, industry, trade, construction, and most recently real estate services. In addition to oil, the country exports natural gas and small amounts of dates and fish. Leading imports are building supplies, clothing, food, household goods, and machinery. Tourism is now a focus of development. Dubai continues to lead trade through its ports, although important ports exist in Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, and Fujayrah. Abu Dhabi and Dubai are, by far, the wealthiest emirates. One of the biggest concerns is emiratization—to fully employ Emirati citizens and to reduce the need for foreign laborers.

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Abu Dhabi had 1,591,000 residents as of 2003, of which 552,000 were in Abu Dhabi City and 348,000 were in Al-‘Ayn. It is ruled by Shaykh Khalifah bin Zayid Al Nahyan. Dubai had 1,204,000 residents as of 2003, of which 1,171,000 were in Dubai City. It is ruled by Shaykh Maktum bin Rashid Al Maktum. Sharqah had an estimated 636,000 residents as of 2003, 519,000 of which are in Sharqah City. Sharqah is ruled by Shaykh Sultan bin Muhammad al Qasimi. It is located in a 2,600 square kilometer area on the shores of the Arabian Gulf and includes several enclaves: on the east coast, the fishing port of Khor Fakkan, and Khor Kalbah and Dibah. Sharqah was also another center for the Qawasim rulers. In Umm al-Quwayn, a total of 770 square kilometers housed 62,000 residents in 2003, of which 38,000 are in Umm al-Quwayn City. It is ruled by Shaykh Rashid bin Ahmed Al Mu’alla. Historically it was a center for boat building. ‘Ajman takes up 260 square kilometers, including the enclave of Masfut. It had 235,000 residents in 2003, of which 225,000 were in ‘Ajman city. It is ruled by Shaykh Humayd bin Rashid al Nu‘aimi. Ra’s al Khaymah (RAK) had 195,000 residents in 2003, 102,000 of which were in Ra’s Al Khaymah City. It is ruled by Shaykh Saqr bin Muhammad Al Qasimi. It has a natural harbor, as well as a long, narrow peninsula next to the mainland that hosts the town of Ra’s al Khaymah. It extends into the Hajar Mountains. RAK was the early capital (1700s) of the Qawasim Empire, in the area of old Julfar, and controlled trade throughout the Gulf. Today, RAK has stone quarries and fisheries. Fujayrah comprised 118,000 residents in 2003, of which 54,000 were in Fujayrah City. It is ruled by Shaykh Hamad bin Muhammad Al Sharqi. Unlike the other emirates, Fujayrah is found entirely on the east coast of the UAE. A new port with a container terminal (1983) is now widely used by shipping lines eager to avoid entering the Gulf.

United States, Relations with Jack Kalpakian The United States came to the Persian Gulf region in the 1930s through the ties that bound its leading oil companies to Saudi Arabia. The rest of the Gulf States remained under British influence until the 1970s. At the earliest stages of the relationship, the United States approached Saudi Arabia as a distant trading partner whose natural resources its firms needed for the global market. It did not view the relationship in geostrategic terms until World War II. Before the war, all of Saudi Arabia’s neighbors, except North Yemen, were under British influence, including the nominally independent states of Iraq and Egypt. Consequently, Saudi Arabia was in search of allies throughout the 1930s, and had initially developed relations with Germany. Although the United States remained neutral in the early stages in the war, it was a partner that could be helpful in

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terms of economic development while being distant enough so as not to constitute a threat to Saudi independence. The United States used Saudi oil for its war against Germany in Europe, and the relationship was raised to the political level toward the end of the war with the meeting of King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud with President Franklin D. Roosevelt abroad a ship in the Suez Canal. The meeting marked the transformation of the relationship, and it initiated a bargain between these two very different states. Saudi Arabia, as the holder of the world’s largest reserves, was to guarantee the flow of oil to the world at market prices in return for U.S. military protection. What was once a commercial relationship conducted for and sometimes by the oil industry because a politicaleconomic alliance. Although politics does make for strange bedfellow, there are few dyads of states that are as different as the United States and Saudi Arabia. The cultural, social, political, and religious differences were de-emphasized to secure the economic and strategic relationship. Yet, as both states eventually discovered, these differences were not properly managed or addressed. Saudi Arabia indicated deep reservations concerning Israel and the support Israel received from inside the United States, but the arrival of the Cold War within the Arab World and the Palestine Liberation Organization’s alliance with Nasserist Egypt led Saudi Arabia to cling to its relationship with the United States despite the widespread pro-Palestinian sentiments of its population. In North Yemen during the early 1960s, Saudi Arabia faced an Egyptian attempt to set up a satellite state and responded by supporting the Royalist factions and directly confronting Egypt. The overthrow of the monarchies in Iraq, Libya, Egypt, and Yemen, sometimes with immense violence, and their replacement with radical, sometimes secular regimes, drove Saudi Arabia further into the circle of the United States’ allies and friends. The independence of Oman, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait between 1960 and 1972 gave Saudi Arabia a family of countries with which it had intimate tribal, familial, and in most cases deep religious ties. Despite stylistic differences and occasional divergence on specific issues, these newly independent Gulf States broadly adhered to Saudi foreign policy. They also provided the United States with alternatives to Saudi Arabia for basing purposes as well as more liberal alternatives for economic platforms and headquarters. Their independence made them more vulnerable to pressure from more powerful regional states. The Emirates have an ongoing dispute with Iran concerning a small archipelago in the Persian Gulf, and Kuwait’s right to exist has been challenged repeatedly by Iraq. Oman, for its part, saw attempts by South Yemen to sustain a Marxist insurgency in the Dhufar province during the 1970s. As a result of these threats, the small Arab emirates of the Persian Gulf adhered to Saudi Arabia and the United States. In 1981, inspired by the peaceful unification of the seven emirates of the UAE, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which coordinates a range of policies from economics to defense. Yet the differences on Israel and Palestine remained. Saudi Arabia and the Arab States of the Persian Gulf embargoed oil shipments to the United States and the Netherlands in the aftermath of the 1973 war in an effort to force the United States to distance itself from Israel. The oil embargo led to a dramatic increase

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in oil prices and oil shortages in the United States. The primary results of these economic gestures were the alienation of most of the American population from Arab culture and the appearance of negative Arab stereotypes in venues as diverse as the motion picture industry and professional wrestling. However, the overall relationship survived the oil embargo and continued throughout the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States seemed secure. It was built on an objective and largely mutually beneficial bargain, but it was not a bargain that all elements of either society approved. In the case of the United States, feminists and Christian conservatives opposed Saudi Arabia’s policies on women and religious minorities. In Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf, the relationship between the GCC states and the United States became an object of political struggle between the government and an emerging Islamist opposition that saw in the West, as exemplified by the United States, the sum of all evil in this world. Political instability in the Gulf, combined with increasing demand for oil in China and India, has led to a dramatic increase in the price of oil since 2006. As a result, household budgets are feeling a pinch in the United States. One of the buzz words of the 2008 U.S. election was “energy independence.” To foster it, the United States now subsidizes ethanol, which does little to replace oil, but it does have the effect of dramatically increasing the cost of food worldwide, because most of the U.S. crop is already being using to feed food animals. For food importers like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, the higher prices paid for vital imports provide a reminder of the interdependent relationships they constructed with the United States. The spirit of the Hank Williams Jr. song “cheaper crude or no more food” is now U.S. policy.

FURTHER READING Cordesman, Anthony. Western Strategic Interests in Saudi Arabia. Wolfeboro, NH: Croom Helm, 1987. Gold, Fern Racine and Melvin A. Conant. Access to Oil: The United States Relationships with Saudi Arabia and Iran. A study prepared at the request of Henry M. Jackson, Chairman Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Publication No. 95-70. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. Hahn, Peter L. Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (Issues in the History of American Foreign Relations). Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005.

Universities and Higher Education Sebastian Maisel The Arab Gulf States have a highly educated population because of conscious investments of oil revenues made by their government in this sector. Before the oil boom virtually no institutions of higher education existed; therefore, affluent merchant and ruling families sent their children to Cairo and Beirut, the two

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leading educational centers at this time. Today, all Gulf States are ranked high in comparison to other Middle Eastern countries; however, because of admission restrictions, public universities sometimes do not permit foreign students. Some graduate and undergraduates are delegated with a government stipend or choose to study abroad; since 2005, their number is growing and has reached 20,000. Only a very small number of mostly Muslim international students are accepted to study in Saudi Arabia.

SAUDI ARABIA Higher education in Saudi Arabia plays an extremely important role, although it looks back to a short but successful history. When King Faysal bin Abd alAziz served as the country’s prime minister in 1962, only a dozen people in the entire kingdom had a doctorate degree. With almost any kind of degree one was qualified for high-ranking positions. Today the situation is quite the opposite; many Saudis graduate from universities but cannot find appropriate jobs. The Saudi government acknowledged the importance of education with twenty-seven percent of its budget allocated to education, which in 2004 equaled SR 76.3 billion. Unfortunately, only 8 billion, roughly twenty percent, goes to the sector of higher education. The rest is dispatched to primary and secondary education. Over the last four decades, the Saudi Arabian higher educational system has largely expanded, and with the growing population every year hundreds of thousands of high school graduates seek to enter one of the fifteen public universities and few private universities (see Table 1). The Saudi student population has grown from 33,000 in 1953 to 2.65 million at present, among them 1.16 million female students, with more students always on their way. In 2003, over half a million students studied at Saudi universities. Admission is granted based on the results of the General Secondary Education Certificate Examination, a nationwide simultaneous test. Students with the highest score can express preferences for certain disciplines to study, with architecture, medicine, and computer sciences being the most popular. Until 2003, all universities were public schools. Since then some private colleges and universities were accredited or are in the accreditation process. The largest and most important is the Prince Sultan College for Tourism and Hotel Management, which already had its first year of graduates. The public university sector is twofold. A secular branch includes the King Fahd University for Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM), founded by Aramco in 1963 in Dhahran; the King Sa‘ud University (KSU), the oldest university, which was founded in 1957; King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz University (KAU) in Jiddah; and the King Faysal University in Hufuf and Dammam. These institutions are fully funded by the government; no tuition is charged and students receive a monthly allowance of $260. The language of instruction is Arabic, except at KFUPM, where English prevails. Three faith-based universities focus primarily on religious subjects, such as Islamic law, Qur’anic studies, and Arabic and social sciences. These include the Islamic University in Madinah, the Imam Muhammad Bin Sa‘ud University in Riyadh, and Makkah’s Umm al-Qura University. Of the

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Table 1 Name

Year Founded

Number of Students

King Sa‘ud University

1957

50,000

King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz University

1967

48,000

Imam Muhammad Bin Sa‘ud University Riyadh

1974

38,000

Umm al-Qura University Makkah

1981

28,000

Al-Qasim University

2004

12,000

King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals

1970

10,000

King Faysal University

1975

10,000

Taibah University

2004

6,500

Ta’if University

2004

6,400

Islamic University of Madinah

1961

5,000

seven, the Ministry of Higher Education operates six, whereas the Islamic University in Madinah is controlled by the Council of Ministers. Structure and degrees of higher education in the Gulf follow the Anglo-American model in which degrees are awarded in a three-stage process. In the first undergraduate stage, the student works toward the equivalent of a Bachelor of Arts (BA), which usually takes four to five years to accomplish. After that, the Masters of Arts (MA) is awarded for two additional years of studying and writing a thesis. For a minimum of three years of independent research and the submitting of a dissertation, students earn a doctoral degree. However, not all universities and disciplines offer that degree. In 2003, eighty percent of the students studied at the undergraduate level, thirteen percent at the preparatory level, and only two percent in graduate courses. Female higher education is separate, both physically and administratively. At all stages in the educational system, classes and schools are segregated with different buildings in different areas and different curricula for boys and girls. This continues at the university level, where eleven women’s colleges were founded to offer undergraduate education and bachelor degrees. Until 2002, the General Presidency for Girl’s Education administered those institutions; since then they report to the Ministry of Education. Masters degrees can only be obtained in humanities, and doctorates can only be obtained in education. This is also the most popular discipline with regard to the number of students. Female students are prevented from conducting research at the public research center at KACST. Nevertheless, more than half of the student population is female, indicating a high demand and, according to test scores, higher quality. Alongside traditional university higher education is a net of postsecondary technical and vocational schools at the college level where students study finance,

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King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (main entrance). Courtesy of Sebastian Maisel.

business, and commercial sciences and earn a secondary diploma after two to three years of classes. Public education is free in Saudi Arabia for all levels; only very recently did private universities open up in the kingdom and begin challenging the state educational monopoly. Although students have to pay tuition, the level of education is often considered higher. Among the future challenges for the higher education system in Saudi Arabia is the rising demand, the importance of creating an educated class that can substitute foreign workers in the Saudization program, the issue of tuition versus monthly stipends that most Saudi students still receive, and the drive to meet international standards.

KUWAIT As is in other Gulf States, Kuwait offers free postsecondary education. Kuwait University is the oldest and largest public university in the country, with an enrollment of approximately 20,000 students. Some Kuwaitis receive scholarships to study abroad, especially in subjects that are not covered at home. At Kuwait University, the number of female students is higher than that of male students, because the latter are favor studying abroad. The Ministry of Higher Education accredits several private universities, such as the American University of Kuwait or the Box-Hill College for Girls. For technical and vocational training, students are referred to the Public Authority for Applied Education and Training. Other institutions of higher education include the Musical Academy, a teacher’s college, and religious schools.

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BAHRAIN Two major universities are located in Bahrain: Bahrain University, chartered in 1968; and the Arabian Gulf University, founded in 1979 as a multinational institution of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Additionally, the Bahrain Training Institute and the College of Health Services provide training in technical occupations such as engineering, business and computer science, and nursing.

QATAR Qatar University was founded in 1973 with a focus on teacher training. Today, seven colleges offer bachelor and master degrees in all major subjects. Higher education in Qatar is gender segregated. Recently, large American universities opened campuses in Qatar’s Education City to enter the rapidly growing education market in the Gulf area. Almost completely funded by the Qatar Foundation, Education City selects high-end academic institutions for this ambitious program to prepare the population for life after oil. Fifty percent of the students are from Qatar—the others are mostly from other Middle Eastern countries.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES Higher education in the UAE started with the founding of UAE University in al-‘Ayn in 1976. Since then tremendous progress has been made with expanded opportunities for national and foreign students. The government invested in the education sector to ensure that Emiratis can maintain their leading role in the country despite being only a numeral minority. It is the goal to provide high-quality education for all Emiratis. From the current additional oil revenues funds have been allocated to invest in the UAE University and Zayid University. Several emirates began to develop their own higher education strategy and established independent universities such as the American University of Sharjah.

OMAN In 1986 opened Sultan Qabus University, the first institution of higher education in the country. In addition, technical and education colleges offer degrees in various vocational skills. The increasing number of high school graduates is now channeled into supplemental private colleges, which often have an affiliation with an American or British university. Oman is the leading GCC country in the field of online education.

FURTHER READING Al-Khazim, M.A. “Higher Education in Saudi Arabia: Challenges, Solutions, and Opportunities Missed,” Higher Education Policy 16, no. 4 (2003): 479–486. Al-Lamki, S. “Higher Education in the Sultanate of Oman: The Challenge of Access, Equity and Privatization,” Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management 24, no. 1 (2002): 75–86.

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Urbanization El-Sanabary, Nagat. Education in the Arab Gulf States and the Arab World: An Annotated Bibliography. New York: Garland Publishing, 1992. Fox, Warren. “The United Arab Emirates: Policy Choices Shaping the Future of Public Higher Education,” Research and Occasional Paper Series, SCHE.13.07, Berkeley, CA: Center for Studies in Higher Education, University of California–Berkeley, 2007. Madany, Ismail, S. Ali, and M. Akhter. “Note on the Expansion of Higher Education in Bahrain,” Higher Education 17, no. 4 (1988): 411–415. Yamani, Sarah. “Toward a National Education Development Paradigm in the Arab World: A Comparative Study of Saudi Arabia and Qatar,” al-Nakhlah—The Fletcher School Online Journal for Issues Related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization (2006).

Urbanization Sebastian Maisel On the Arabian Peninsula, several urban centers date back to the pre-industrial time, such as Jiddah, Riyadh, Makkah, Madinah, Kuwait, and Masqat. The usually include markets, religious centers, housing quarters, and sometimes special areas for trade, commerce, handicrafts, and ports. Trade routes, both maritime and caravans, defined their location. After the discovery of oil in the Persian Gulf area, new urban centers were founded and quickly attracted more people to settle. Here, new employment opportunities in health care and educational services were available. Both nomadic groups and foreign workers moved into these newly established cities. The development of the oil industry from the 1950s to 1970s was the main factor for urbanization in that area and cities such as Dammam, Khobar, Dubai, and alDawhah. Today the main urban centers in Saudi Arabia are the western triangle with Jiddah, Ta’if, and Makkah; the capital Riyadh in central Arabia; Abha and Khamis Mushayit in the Asir Mountains; and the eastern triangle with Dammam, Khobar, and Dhahran. Along the Gulf coast, major cities are Kuwait, al-Manamah, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, al-Dawhah, and Masqat. Generally, growth of towns is characteristic for all countries of the Peninsula in the second half of the twentieth century, but the oil cities of the Persian Gulf developed in a different, nontraditional way from their sister cities elsewhere in Arabia. This was a rapid and sudden process of urbanization within a short amount of time. Cultural clashes between the old and the new, the traditional and modern way of life, were the obvious result. Within a few decades, the population of the area transformed their life and work style without much chance to acquaint. Family ties, gender roles, social hierarchy, personal interaction, dietary customs, and patterns of residence changed almost overnight and required the local population to adapt quickly. After the initial investments in the oil cities of the east, the government of Saudi Arabia established planning commissions to oversee the development of other cities to become administrative and economical centers. Revenues from the oil industry enabled the governments to invest in prestigious building projects,

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such as governmental and ministerial seats, company headquarters, and public institutions such as hospitals, universities, or supermarkets. Housing projects for government employees were built and Western concepts of city planning changed the layout of many formerly Islamic/oriental cities. However, the preference of extended families to live near each other if not together survived, and even in the new urban setting they choose to live in the same apartment building or residential compound. Some of those apartment blocks were named after the tribal group or family that lived here. These notions of social interaction and cohesion persisted among the urban population. In some cases the governments and municipalities have been able to direct the urban growth by applying concepts of city planning. Broad avenues, walkways along the coastline, museums, public parks, and other more recreational facilities became important features of the new city. Since the mid-1980s a new trend in governmental investment in city development can be observed. The initial stage of infrastructural build up is now a process of consolidating these projects with increasing investments from the private sector. Urbanization has been much more rapid in the states of the Persian Gulf than in other comparable areas of the Middle East. The percentage of urban population grew from twenty-five percent in the 1940s to fifty percent in the 1970s and some eighty percent after the year 2000. Almost all of the population of Kuwait now lives in cities, with similar trends in Bahrain. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have an eighty-three percent ratio of urbanization. However, the extremely rapid growth between 1970 and 1990 because of the concurrent economical growth has now slowed down to almost the same level as in other Middle Eastern countries. Nevertheless, high rates of urbanization are predicted for the coming years. The cities of the Arabian Peninsula have grown both in number and size; for example, the area of Riyadh increased from 110 square kilometers in 1968 to 1,600 square kilometers in 1990. At the same time the population grew from 160,000 to over 2 million. Urbanization is visible in two different styles: progressively through new municipal and government buildings, schools, roads, parks and health care institutions; and negatively through shantytowns in the city’s periphery. The demographic development of Saudi Arabia and the neighboring countries supports the trend of urbanization. All countries in the area have very high birth rates, estimated at more than three percent per year. That brought the average age of the population down to fifteen to eighteen years of age. The population could easily double in the next two to three decades. People are not only younger—they also live longer because of access to modern medicines and health care. Infant mortality is at an historic low rate for the same reason. Every year more people look for jobs and housing, and their first option is still the city. Agricultural development has been named one way of retarding urbanization; therefore large investments in rural residential and industrial development have been made. However, no significant impact in reversing the common trend of urbanization is recognizable. Although people invest in farms and often keep a home in the place of origin, no one permanently settles there, and foreign laborers do the work on the farms.

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FURTHER READING Al-Ankary, Khalid, and El-Sayed El-Bushra (eds.). Urban and Rural Profiles in Saudi Arabia. Berlin: Borntrager, 1989. Grill, N.C. Urbanization in the Arabian Peninsula. Durham, UK: University of Durham, Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, 1984. Al-Hathloul, Saleh Ali, and Narayanan Edadan. Urban Development in Saudi Arabia. Riyadh: Dar al-Sahan, 1995. Qutub, Ishaq. “Urbanization in Contemporary Arab Gulf States,” Ekistics 50, no. 300 (1983): 170–182. United Nations. Urbanization and the Changing Character of the Arab City. New York: United Nations, 2005.

Usamah bin Ladin (1957– ) Bouziane Zaid Usamah bin Muhammad bin ’Awad bin Ladin was born in March 10, 1957 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to the prestigious and wealthy bin Ladin family and is believed to be the founder of Al Qa’idah (the base), a self-proclaimed Islamic Jihadist organization. He is the most significant figure of Islamic extremist activities in the world today and is on the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation’s ten most wanted fugitives list. After leaving college in 1979, bin Ladin left Saudi Arabia to support the mujahidin, the Muslim fighters combating the Soviet Union in Afghanistan following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Because of his wealth, bin Ladin was able to establish Maktab al-Khadamat (Services Bureau) to raise money and funnel arms and Muslim fighters from around the Arab world into the Afghan war. Maktab al-Khadamat is believed to be the forerunner to Al Qa’idah. In 1990, bin Ladin returned to Saudi Arabia as a hero, acclaimed by the local press as a pious and courageous warrior. However, following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, bin Ladin opposed the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, home to Islam’s holiest places—Makkah and Madinah—and waged a campaign against the Saudi Royal Family. The Saudi regime subsequently deported bin Ladin in 1992 and revoked his citizenship in 1994. In 1992, bin Ladin moved to Sudan, where he spent the following five years. U.S. and Saudi pressures prompted the Sudanese government to expel him. Bin Ladin returned to Afghanistan in 1996, where he forged a close relationship with the Taliban regime and its leader Mullah Muhammed ‘Umar. In 1998, bin Ladin was indicted on charges of killing five Americans and two Indians in the 1995 truck bombing in Riyadh. In the same year, he was indicted on charges of murdering U.S. nationals in the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. He is also believed to have been involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Bin Ladin has not yet been indicted for the September 11, 2001 attacks. Bin Ladin’s Al Qa’idah is believed to ideologically inspire and financially assist jihadist organizations in many parts of the world. Bin Ladin has often been

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reported to be in poor health. Reports alleging Usamah bin Ladin’s death have circulated since late 2001.

FURTHER READING Bergh, Peter. The Osama bin Laden I Know: The Oral History of al-Qaeda’s Leader. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006. bin Laden, Osama. Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden, translated by James Howrath and edited by Bruce Lawrence. New York: Verso, 2005. Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Penguin, 2005. Coll, Steve. The bin Laden’s: An Arabian Family in the American Century. New York: Penguin, 2008. Randall, Jonathan. Osama: The Making of a Terrorist. New York: Random House, 2005.

‘Utaybah Sebastian Maisel ‘Utaybah is a tribal confederation in central Arabia consisting of two separate groups of different origin: the Ruqa and Barqah. Documented since the fifteenth century in Wadi Fatimah in the eastern Hijaz, they began advancing eastward during the wars with the Wahhabis and expelled other tribes, such as the Qahtan, Mutayr, and Subay from the area of High Najd, which is known for it good air and fertile pastures. They reached their current destination in the middle of the nineteenth century and covered the large area between Makkah and Riyadh. The Ruqah under the Shaykhly family ibn Rubayan settled around the city of Nifi, the Barqah under ibn Humayd to the south of it. First as allies of ‘Abd al‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud, they contributed much to the defeat of the Hashemites in the battle of Turabah in 1919 and the seizure of Ta’if in 1924, but during the Ikhwan rebellion between 1927 and 1929 they were among the leading tribes with the Mutayr and ‘Ajman in the battle against Ibn Sa‘ud. The Harb to the north and the Qahtan to the south are their main rivals, whereas they enjoyed good relations with the Mutayr. The ‘Utaybah in the Hijaz are mostly settled or seminomadic sheepherders. Those groups in Najd occupy some of the best pastures in Arabia, monsoon rains sometimes reach the area, and therefore those groups are mostly nomadic camel herders. The ‘Utaybah are among those Arabian tribes that are considered of pure blood (i.e., tracing their noble origin back to the forefather Qahtan). In the early nineteenth century they numbered some 40,000 people, but with the strengthening of central authority, after fierce resistance they too had to pay zakat, or charity taxes, to a superior ruler, often the Al Saud. When the Saudi state was defeated by Egyptian troops in 1818, they were among the first to split off the Wahhabis and joined forces with Ibrahim Pasha. Later during the Al Sa‘ud power battle, they backed ‘Abdallah Bin Faysal. When ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud

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started the process of unification, the ‘Utaybah often supported him whenever they saw the benefit; for example, in the battle of Tarafiyah in 1907. This might have been the reason for some of the ‘Utaybah groups to join the Ikhwan. Under Ibn Bijad, they founded the hijrah settlement of al-Ghatghat and fifteen other villages, such as Afif and Sajir. They participated in major military campaigns under Ibn Sa‘ud, particularly in the Hijaz. With the political settlement policy of Ibn Sa‘ud, the Ikhwan felt betrayed and chose to continue their warfare against unbelievers, with the ‘Utaybah under Sultan Bin Bijad as one of their leaders. In 1926, Ikhwan rebels met in Ghatghat to discuss their complaints and plans of actions against Ibn Sa‘ud. However, the segmented nature of the tribe became apparent when the two main fractions were fighting against each other during the rebellion, some supporting Ibn Sa‘ud, others Ibn Bijad. After the crush of the rebellion, the governor of al-Arid province put the tribe under administrative control. In 1979, a group of religious zealots protesting the corrupt government under the Al Sa‘ud were led by Juhaiman al-‘Utaybi and seized the mosque in Makkah. It took the government tremendous effort and international support to bring down this new wave of tribally supported rebellion. Many other tribal members joined the National Guard and other military institutions, and because of the size of the tribe, ‘Itban (collective of plural of tribal members) hold many local and regional positions.

FURTHER READING Alruwais, Bader A. “The Tent and Its Contents: A Study of the Traditional Arts of Weaving by the Otaibah Tribe in Saudi Arabia.” PhD dissertation, University of North Texas, 1998. Kindermann, H. “Utayba,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, edited by P. Bearman et al. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2007. Kurpershoek, P. Marcel. Arabia of the Bedouins. London: Saqi Books, 2001. Kurpershoek, P. Marcel. “Between ad-Dakhul and Afif: Oral Traditions of the ‘Utaybah Tribe in Central Najd,” Zeitschrift f€ ur Arabische Linguistik 26 (1993): 28–65.

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Wadis John A. Shoup The Arabian Peninsula has no permanent watercourses; however, many dry riverbeds and deep canyons serve not only as seasonal streams but also as important sources for water tapped for irrigation and as important routes for trade and communication. Others help mark transitions or borders from one geographic area to another. Wadi Sirhan marks the northern limit of the Arabian Peninsula, effectively dividing the Syrian Desert to the north from the Nafud Desert to the south. Wadi Sirhan was formed by the collapse of a central dome—the same way the Rift Valley in Syria and Jordan was formed. Unlike the Rift, the sides of Wadi Sirhan are not as steep and it has become an important winter grazing ground for pastoral nomads. The wadi floor is relatively broad and although water will flow through its center, most rainfall collects in shallow pools. Meadows of grasses, wild flowers, and low, ground-hugging plants spring up with the first rains and can support large herds of camels and flocks of sheep and goats. Control of the wadi’s resources sparked occasional warfare between tribal groups pushing up from the south and those already established in the Syrian Desert. The mountains and highlands of Hijaz and ‘Asir are cut with several major wadis. These include Wadi al-Himdh, Wadi Yanbu‘, Wadi Fatimah, Wadi alLith, and Wadi Najran. Most of these wadis served as important links between the Red Sea coast and the inland regions. Wadi Fatimah serves as the main route between the port city of Jiddah with Makkah, and Wadi Yanbu‘ links Yanbu‘ alBahr with Madinah. Wadi Najran served as the historical border between Najran and Yemen and unlike the others mentioned runs from the highlands out into the desert, ending before it reaches the Rub‘ al-Khali. Wadi Najran and Wadi Dawasir, like Wadi Sirhan, have been important to pastoral nomads, providing seasonal water and grazing for herds of camels. Wadi Dawasir begins in the ‘Asir highlands and runs east, serving to separate the sand deserts of the Rub‘ al-Khali in the south from the stone deserts of the Najd to the north. Wadi al-Hadramawt lies between Jabal Habshiyah and Jabal Wahidi, which provide enough water for a series of important cities to have emerged during antiquity. The cities of Shibam, Tarim, and Say‘un are located along the banks of the wadi and have been important centers of trade for centuries. These cities developed their own cultural area, which extended their influence east to the

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Dhufar in Oman and maintained close ties with the Island of Soqotra. Tribes from the Dhufar, such as the Bayt Kathir, settled in the Hadramawt and eventually gained control over some of the cities, whereas others were ruled by descendants of mercenaries originally hired in India by local rulers to protect the trade routes. These cities were strong enough to be recognized as independent states by the British who entered into treaties with them during the first part of the twentieth century. Wadi Umm al-Hayyat runs along the south and east of the Rub‘ al-Khali and effectively marks its southern border. The wadi takes its name, Mother of Life, from the fact that it has stands of ghaf trees and water sources—although mainly brackish—that can sustain life for pastoral nomads. Ghaf is a hardy, drought-resistant variety of tree that grows naturally in the region, even among dunes. Its leaves are important natural forage for camels as well as sheep and goats. Wilfred Thesiger noted in the 1940s that the Bedouin who frequented Wadi Umm al-Hayyat set aside certain stands of trees that could not be cut or in any way damaged. He related this to the pre-Islamic practice of imposing a haram, or protected area, around certain springs, wells, and stands of trees where no one and no thing could be killed or injured. A similar concept to haram is that called hima or mahmiyah, which is a protected area that can be only used for specific purposes and/ or by specific lineages. Hima was widely used among both settled villagers and pastoral nomads in the Arabian Peninsula until the twentieth century, when generally it was replaced by national legal codes. Farther to the east is Wadi Umm al-Samim, or Mother of Poison. Here the sands from the Rub‘ al-Khali meet the wadi, forming dangerous quicksand and saltpans. Pastoral nomads generally avoided the wadi for grazing, but it was an important source of salt and sulfur sold in Nizwa and other towns in Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Wadi Sama’il connects Masqat and the Indian Ocean coast with inland oases and the cities of Nizwa, Adam, and Bahla. Wadi Sama’il runs from Izki to al-Sib, just to the north of Masqat. The wadi has many settled communities each protected by watch towers and fortifications. Many of these date to the sixteenth century (when the Portuguese controlled the coast) and were built to prevent European expansion. They also were important bases when the Omanis launched their drive to expel the Portuguese in the seventeeth century. Wadi al-Jizzi, similar to Wadi Sama’il, connects the oasis of al-Buraymi on the northern side of the Hajar Mountains with the Indian Ocean coastal plain and the important port city of Suhar. Wadi Hatta also begins in the Hajar Mountains and flows to the Indian Ocean. The oasis of al-Hatta located about halfway along the wadi was the site of a good deal of conflict in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries between tribal groups who tried to dominate it, eventually involving the rulers of Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, and Oman.

FURTHER READING Beaumont, Peter, Gerald Blake, and Malcom Wagstaff. The Middle East. London: John Wiley & Sons, 1976. Fisher, W.B. The Middle East: A Physical, Social, and Regional Geography. London: Metheun, 1971. Thesiger, Wilfred. Arabian Sands. London: Readers Union Longmans, Green & Co., 1960.

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Wahhabism Sebastian Maisel Wahhabism is a revivalist and reformist movement founded in central Arabia in the middle of the seventeenth century that is based on the teaching of Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab. Opponents of Wahhabism pejoratively use the term “Wahhabism” for those following his teaching; however, they prefer to call themselves muwahhidun, Unitarians, or Salafis. The founder of the movement, ‘Abd al-Wahhab, was a teacher and preacher from a family of scholars in Najd, and his call for inner-Islamic reform was based on the Hanbali school of thought, which is uncompromisingly directed against innovations, bid‘a, and the worship of anything but God (i.e., saints, trees, or tombs). Consuming coffee, wine, and tobacco is prohibited, and Shari‘ah is interpreted in an often literal and conservative way. Many Wahhabis consider Shi‘ite Islam very close to heresy. An important Wahhabi dogma is to consider everyone who does not follow the strict monotheistic principle an unbeliever, kafir in Arabic, who has to be fought. Kufr, deliberate unbelief, was regarded as worse than polytheism, or shirk, which occurred out of ignorance. Because many of these practices were part of the popular religion of Arabia, the Wahhabis had to fight basically everyone until their understanding of monotheism prevailed and people accepted the rule of the Al Sa‘ud. Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab was influenced by the thoughts of Ahmad ibn Taymiyah, a thirteenth-century Hanbali scholar who agitated against false practices, particularly Sufism, and called on a return to worship of the early Islamic community and the example of the Prophet Muhammad. The main focus of worship was the doctrine of the oneness of God, tawhid. Communion with God can only be reached through unconditional submission to the will of God, and not through mysticism, rationalism, or worshipping mediators; for example, saints, Sufis, or Shi‘ite Imams. Muslims therefore live in a constant state of Jihad to live up to the example through good deeds, both individual and as a group. Tawhid had two implications, on one hand the acceptance of God as the creator, and on the other the awareness of God as the only legitimate object of worship and veneration. Therefore, one of the main areas of confrontation with other sects arose over the question of whether humans, dead or alive, could serve as mediators for others with God, and if it is permitted for a Muslim to visit a grave to have the dead arbitrate with God for him. According to Wahhabism and its understanding of Islamic jurisprudence, it is necessary to follow Qur’an and Sunna. Although they are Hanbalis, they do not follow the doctrine that the gates of ijtihad are closed. Scholars with appropriate knowledge and experience are still permitted to interpret Qur’an and Hadith. However, this is only a limited application of ijtihad, usually ijtihad mixed with taqlid, accepting and following the earlier decision. This implies that scholars can choose from opinions and rulings of other schools of law. It is not mandatory to follow only one school. In reality, however, Wahhabi scholars and judges apply Hanbali law. In some cases they differ from mainstream Hanbali interpretation; for example, they associate

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smoking with alcohol, and thus make it punishable. Shaving and the use of the Islamic rosary are in contradiction to the Prophet’s tradition and therefore have to be prohibited. Participating in the Friday prayer is obligatory for the entire community. The most important event in the early history of the movement was the pact with the ruler of Dir‘iyah, Muhammad Bin Sa‘ud in 1744/1745, creating a bond of mutual legitimization that lasts until the present. However, it is surprising to see how quickly the message took off among the tribal groups of Arabia, both nomadic and settled. In other areas of the Islamic world, the message created anxiety and fear of being run over by what they called a deviant form of Islam. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Wahhabism influenced other contemporary Islamic movements, such as that of Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi and his movement in Sudan, the Sanusiyah Sufi Brotherhood in Libya, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and modern Islamic reformists such as Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida. However, in return, these groups and individuals helped shape a modern approach to Wahhabism, often called neo-Wahhabism, which combined the requirements of nation-states with the obligations of the ideals of the noble ancestors of Islam, salafis. This direction can be regarded as the semi-official religious doctrine of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, such as Qatar and Sharjah. Traces of strict adherence to the teachings of the forefathers, as ordered by Wahhabism, shaped society in Saudi Arabia until recently. The most obvious sign is the existence of a special institution to control the moral behavior and religious obedience of the society, the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. Often called religious police, they guard over the compliance with the religious regulation according to Wahhabi interpretation. Because of the large leeway for interpretation, Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia has different trends and followers, ranging from liberal reformers over the traditional majority to the extreme advocates of militant conservatism. Because of generous financial support from the Saudi government, Wahhabism started to gain footholds in several sub-Saharan countries as well as in the Northern Caucasus and Afghanistan.

FURTHER READING Algar, Hamid. Wahhabis: A Critical Essay. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International, 2002. Commins, David. The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. London: I.B. Tauris, 2006. DeLong-Bas, Natana. Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Hegghammer, Thomas, and Stephanie Lacroix, “Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-Utaybi Revisited,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 39, no. 1 (2007): 103–122. Rentz, George. The Birth of the Islamic Reform Movement in Saudi Arabia: Muhammad Bin Abd al-Wahhab (1703/4–1792) and the Beginnings of Unitarian Empire in Arabia. London: Arabian Publishing, 2005. Wahba, Hafiz. “Wahhabism in Arabia: Past and Present,” Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 16, no. 4 (1929): 458–467.

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Wahibah John A. Shoup The Wahibah is a large and important tribe inhabiting the region south and east of Nizwa and Adam who has given their name to a stretch of sand desert called the Wahibah Sands. The Wahibah is a Ghafari (northern) tribe and have allied themselves with the Harith of Izki, one of the more important of Oman’s settled tribal people. The Jahahif section of the Wahibah seems to have some connection to the Al Bu Sa‘idi of Adam and according to some were once the Bedouin section of the Al Bu Sa‘idis; however, the Al Bu Sa‘idis deny this story. The Wahibah are divided into two major descent groups, the Al Ghufaylah and the Jahahif. The Al Ghufaylah section takes its name from two brothers from the Ghuffalah Al Bu Falah of the Bani Yas, who arrived around 1700, and the then shaykh turned over his political powers to them. This section of the tribe subsequently took their name, Ghuffalah (Ghufaylah being a plural), as that of the whole section. There is no overall tribal leadership, and frequently the leadership of the Jahahif is more powerful than that of the Al Ghufaylah. The Wahibah were the main rivals of the Duru‘, and the two tribes engaged in feuds that lasted well into the twentieth century. The Wahibah’s grazing areas were not explored for oil and thus the Wahibah tribe was not greatly affected by the presence of the company as were the Duru‘ and others further north. The Wahibah have remained mainly pastoralists moving between summer and winter ranges. Their camels are famous throughout Arabia and traditionally each lineage has its own special of family camels that carry the name of the Wahibah lineage. Wahibah camels are prized for their speed and are sought after by racing stables in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. In addition to pastoralism, the Wahibah have engaged in fishing along the coast and today, with truck transportation, they take fresh fish to inland markets. The presence of schools has induced some to settle near oases and towns, where many women have found a ready market for their traditional weavings. Some women have sold their silver jewelry, which has become collectors’ items.

FURTHER READING Carter, J.R.L. Tribes in Oman. London: Peninsular Publishing, 1982.

Water and Irrigation John A. Shoup The Arabian Peninsula has no permanent streams or lakes, and all agriculture, including nomadic pastoralism, requires several water management strategies. Water sources include tapping and developing natural springs, catchments

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technologies on seasonal streams, digging wells, constructing underground canals, and even transporting water over long distances. Kuwait was supplied with drinking water in large leather bags brought by ship from the Shatt al-‘Arab waterway until the middle of the twentieth century. Agriculture in the Peninsula was, and to a great extent still is, dependent on oases where irrigation techniques maintain high levels of production. There are many natural springs in the Peninsula and on the island of Bahrain. In Bahrain these springs bubble up to the surface, not only onshore, but also from under the floor of the Persian Gulf. Pearl divers used to refill their drinking water by placing empty water skins over the fissures in the Gulf floor where fresh water emerged. The mountain ranges have numerous natural springs, particularly where harder rock layers force water to the surface. The flow varies greatly by season. Most springs have been developed by either settled agriculturalists or pastoral nomads by building reinforced walls, collection pools, places for animals to drink, or different channels to bring water to separate fields. One of the main techniques found in many parts of the Arabian Peninsula is a system of underground canals called aflaj or qanat. It seems this technology was introduced to the region from Iran in the pre-Islamic era. Aflaj tap either surface (springs or seasonal streams) or underground sources of water. The main canal is built underground, which reduces the amount of water lost to evaporation but requires high skills in engineering in both construction and maintenance. Specialized knowledge was, and is, required to keep them functioning; the slope needs to be maintained at the correct angle for the water to flow at the right speed so as to prevent buildup of silt or erode the canal. Vertical shafts are sunk at regular intervals during the construction and for maintenance purposes. The underground canal emerges at the surface near the fields, where it is channeled into storage tanks that can be used for drinking water as well as to irrigate fields. In oases, several main canals may run along the surface with occasional small buildings constructed over them where women come to do the household washing. Some of the buildings have double entrances, one where men may come and bathe and the other for the women. Springs developed by pastoral nomads are generally treated as a communal resource, and any member of the tribe may use the water without payment. In some instances, springs may be developed by a particular lineage that will be considered the “owners” because they spent time, energy, and money to improve the facilities. Others may use the water but are required to pay for the privilege. Payments may differ according to the year; payment is higher when there is a drought and water is scarce. Conflicts between pastoral nomads over water have been a common occurrence in the past. Wells are considered to be private property by both settled and nomadic people. Traditional wells are rather shallow and oftentimes the water is brackish— some too brackish to be used other than by camels or date palms. Camels are able to survive on water that is too brackish for humans or other livestock such as sheep, goats, horses, or cattle. Date palms are able to survive and even thrive on brackish water where no other plants can. In oases, wells are used for irrigation as an alternate source of water. Large wells provide irrigation water with a system of buckets and pulleys using animal power. A camel, bullock, or donkey is

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harnessed to a rope that brings the full bucket to the surface, where it is dumped into a trough and then flows out into the fields. Another means of raising the water is a long arm that has a heavy weight on the bottom called shaduf that helps bring up heavy buckets that are dumped into a trough. Seasonal streams are often dammed by both settled and nomadic people. Runoff from winter or summer rains is collected behind the dams and used for irrigation and for watering livestock. Like wells, dams and the water they collect are considered private property and belong to the person, family, or lineage that built and maintains them. For pastoral nomads, dams may have dual usages; livestock can be watered and as the water levels retreat grasses and other plants emerge in small meadows that can be grazed or cut as fodder. Many of the dams were part of a reserve system called hima with several well-known rules and laws about usage administered by tribal courts. Since the discovery of oil in the Peninsula, governments such as Saudi Arabia have invested large sums of money in large irrigation schemes based on those in the central United States. Deep wells have been dug that tap fossil waters that are pumped to the surface by electric or diesel pumps attached to automatic sprinkler systems mounted on wheels. Sprinklers shoot out water to great distances, irrigating fields of wheat and other such crops. More effective has been the introduction of drip irrigation technologies in the oases. Drip irrigation brings water to each plant and saves on the amount of water traditional flood irrigation systems lose to evaporation. With drip irrigation, the amount of water can be regulated as well as making sure that all of the plants receive the right amount of moisture. It also helps solve problems such as salination of the soil. Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have developed new hydroponics, hothouse agriculture, in which crops from milder climates such as strawberries can be grown. Many of these facilities make use of desalinated seawater either pumped in through pipelines or trucked in by transport trucks. Desalination provides much of the drinking water in the region and is a very costly way of irrigating crops, even expensive hothouse crops. Kuwait buys water from Iraq’s Shatt al-‘Arab, which is the only permanent water source near the Peninsula.

FURTHER READING Dickson, H.R.P. The Arab of the Desert. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983.

Women’s Rights James Sater Women’s rights and human rights are invariably connected. The social, cultural, and political rights enjoyed by women as citizens of a state involve the same universal rights as that of men, especially as one of the core principles enshrined in Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the UN

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General Assembly on December 20, 1948, which states that “everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Although by virtue of being a UN member state, all Gulf States accepted this declaration, the subsequent International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights (ICPCR), which clarifies that all signatories should “ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights … without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,” was signed by none of the Gulf States. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia signed the UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in 2000, arguing that Shari’ah law provided for such a basis. The Gulf States’ and especially Saudi Arabia’s refusal to sign the ICPC needs to be understood with reference to Saudi Arabia’s state formation process, based on both tribal and particular religious values and ideas. First, the Saudi state was created by a symbiosis between the Saudi tribe at home in the central Arabian region, the Najd around Riyadh, and the ideas of a particularly orthodox Islamic reformer of the late eighteenth century, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. Through this symbiosis, the expansion of the Saudi warriors under the leadership of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud into other regions of what now constitutes the country’s borders, starting in 1902, was legitimized by the expansion of Wahhabism, a sect derived from the Hanbali school of Sunni Islam. The Saudi family thereby made itself the protector of Islam as understood by Wahhabism, which emphasized a literal interpretation of the Qur’an and the Sunna as the basis for the Saudi state. Hanbalism gives little room for the Islamic principle of independent reasoning, ijtihad, as a way to interpret Islamic law to the contemporary world. It emphasizes ijma‘, consensus among religious scholars, who in Saudi Arabia are invariably Wahhabi scholars, ‘ulama’, and linked to the Saudi state. Second, an alliance between Wahhabism and Ibn Sa‘ud, founder of the modern Saudi state, proved crucial for continued tribal rule of the Al Sa‘ud family over the rest of society. The idea central to all Islamic reformers of the nineteenth century, including Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, was that of recreating the Islamic community of Madinah, the ummah, under the Prophet Muhammad and the four Rightly Guided Caliphs, with its particular rules and obligations that corresponded to tribal society. Tribalism together with authoritarianism of the modern state emphasizes the particularism of tribal (Saudi) male rights and duties over universal rights of women. As a result, a universal conception of human rights has been rejected, not only because it may lead to the end of authoritarian rule, but more importantly because it seems unauthentic to the tribal ethos that emphasizes group rights that underlies Gulf societies. Within these two major ideological pillars of the Saudi state, economic modernization and affluence as well as recent political development had a disastrous impact. Saudi Arabia in particular is faced with a type of economic development, oil wealth and modernization, that have been accompanied by widespread corruption and alcohol consumption among Saudi princes, and especially by an extremely unequal distribution of wealth. An ostentatiously wealthy class has

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developed, but so has a poor class with high rates of unemployment, especially among the younger generation. Saudi Arabia has been one of the few countries where the gross national product per capita almost halved between 1980 and 1997, from $14,000 to nearly $7,000 (U.S.), largely due to falling oil prices in this period. It can be argued that to the extent that oil wealth and modernization— together with the Gulf crisis of 1991 that saw non-Muslim men and women soldiers protect Saudi Arabia from the threat of Iraq—have undermined the state’s legitimacy based on religious tribalism, the question of women’s rights, and men’s social and political control over women, has become the last bastion for the ruling elite’s legitimacy. In other words, the less the Saudi elite has been able to convincingly legitimize itself with reference to Islam, the more has the question of women’s rights become a core battleground for the imposition of Islamic norms and values—confining women to the private sphere under the supervision of their male relatives. The main discriminatory principle that has been abolished by many other Arab states is that of guardianship—women can only obtain a passport, travel, marry, seek employment, pursue higher education, or even call an ambulance if their male guardian (father, husband, or brothers) agrees to it. This gives men nearly unlimited power over their female relatives. This does not mean that women do not enjoy greater economic rights than in the past, most visible through their controlled access to higher education. However, to preserve women’s “dignity,” women are not allowed to mingle with men at the workplace or elsewhere, with a few exceptions in higher education. For the same reason, women are prohibited from driving cars and from freely interacting with other men—facing strict legal punishments if they choose to do so. This was cruelly illustrated in 2007 when a woman was condemned to corporal punishment by lashes because she had been raped by a group of men in a car parking lot where she had met a male friend. The most prominent public demonstration of Saudi women’s discontent with their situation was on November 6, 1990 when women drove cars to protest against the ban on women driving. The protest was violently dispersed by the police and the participating women were persecuted. See also Madhhab.

FURTHER READING Doumato, Eleanor Abdella. “The Ambiguity of Shari’a and the Politics of ‘Rights in Saudi Arabia,” in Faith and Freedom: Women’s Human Rights in the Muslim World, edited by Mahnaz Afkhami. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995. Niblock, Tim. Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitmacy, Survival. New York: Routledge, 2007. Al Rajhi, Ahmed et al. Economic Development in Saudi Arabia. New York: Routledge, 2003.

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Yamani, Ahmad Zaki (1930– ) Sebastian Maisel Ahmad Zaki Yamani was appointed minister of petroleum and mineral resources in March 1962 by King Faysal. Born in Mecca in 1930, Yamani studied law at Cairo University, New York University, and Harvard University. A prominent and able technocrat, he oversaw the development of Saudi Arabia into a major oil player. When many oil-producing countries in the 1960s called for the nationalization of the industry, Yamani introduced a new concept of participation that allowed the oil companies to maintain limited equity for a period of time. This concept also decreased the risk of market collapses and negative political associations. In June 1968, OPEC endorsed the idea and three years later began implementing it. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates started negotiations with major companies, which led to the purchase of twenty-five percent ownership of Aramco by the Saudi government. This gradual buyout continued over the next several years, and by 1980, Aramco became completely Saudi. Yamani’s mentor, King Faysal, was assassinated in 1975 in the presence of Yamani, and Yamani was kidnapped ten months later by the international terrorist Carlos the Jackal in Vienna during an OPEC summit. Yamani and his Iranian colleague Jamshid Amuzegar, singled out as representatives of the richest oilproducing countries, were about to be executed, when a last-minute deal with the Algerian government might have saved their lives. These stories and others added to the controversial position he took up with his job and innovative ideas. One writer considered Yamani the most unpopular man in his country for his moderate views of oil prize and production quotas. It is also believed that Yamani was behind the 1973 oil embargo against Western nations, which supported Israel during the October War. Yamani was among the first to openly call for a reform of the Saudi judicial system, which no longer satisfied the needs of the growing economy and modernized society. Additionally, he admitted in the early 1980s that a low extraction of oil was sufficient to guarantee a stable global economy, thus denying Western pressure to increase oil production. Finally, in October 1986, Hisham Nazir, in a move that was interpreted as a sign of economic and personal difficulties, replaced him as minister of oil and petroleum. It was also argued that Yamani was a “man of King Faysal” and from the Hijaz. Under the new King Fahd, who had a strained relationship with Yamani, Yamani had to make way for new faces and constituency from the heartland, Najd.

Yanbu‘

After Yamani’s dismissal, he established private equity companies, an Islamic heritage center, and a London-based think tank, the Centre for Global Energy Studies. Yamani also continues to work for his law firm, which he founded in the late 1950s, one of the first of its kind in Saudi Arabia.

FURTHER READING Falola, Toyin, and Ann Genova. The Politics of the Global Oil Industry: An Introduction. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005. Niblock, Tim. Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy and Survival. New York: Routledge, 2006. Robinson, Jeffrey. Yamani: The Inside Story. London: Simon & Schuster, 1988. Yamani, Ahmad Zaki. Islamic Law and Contemporary Issues. Jiddah: Saudi Publishing House, 1968. Yamani, Ahmad Zaki, “Energy for Peace, or Peace for Energy?” Arab Oil and Gas Journal 23, no. 558 (1994): 43–50.

Yanbu‘ Sebastian Maisel Yanbu‘ is an old port city in Saudi Arabia on the Red Sea where small but long and deep bayous provide great natural harbors. The full name of the city is Yanbu‘ al-Bahr, or “spring on the sea.” The Jabal Radwa Mountain marks the eastern border of the Wadi Yanbu‘, which brings seasonal waters from the Hijaz. A high level of groundwater, which enables agriculture if rainfall is sufficient, usually characterizes the wadi system. The most fertile area around Yanbu‘ is the Wadi al-Farah, where the ancient falaj irrigation system supplements the wells. Yanbu‘ is a very old port city on the coastal caravan route. It also served as the port for the sister city of Yanbu‘ al-Nakhl up on the high plateau, from where dates and other produce was shipped to Egypt and Sudan as well as to the city of Yathrib/Madinah. The Nabateans already used this place to disembark their troops. Later, Yanbu‘ gained fame as the hometown of Qatadah bin Idris, who in the twelfth century moved from Yanbu‘ to Makkah to usurp power and establish an independent state in the Hijaz. Qatadah was a sharif and consolidated the rule of the ahsraf over the area and their nominal independence from the superpowers in Cairo or Damascus. When the Wahhabis occupied the Hijaz for the first time in 1802 the Ottomans and the Egyptian Viceroy Muhammad ‘Ali decided to expel them by force. The first bridgehead for the operation was the port of Yanbu‘. A similar campaign, this time to drive out the Ottomans during World War I during the Arab Revolt, was inaugurated by Sharif Hussein with British help, and again Yanbu‘ was the place where it all began. Until the late 1970s, Yanbu‘ was a quite provincial town with very few foreigners. The city is the main settlement for the Juhaynah tribe. During the height of the oil boom, a burst of construction was underway all over the country. Vast industrial complexes were built in Jubayl on the Persian

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Gulf, and in Yanbu‘ on the other side of the country on the Red Sea. This included the construction of a pipeline across the Peninsula to connect both centers and to ship oil from the Red Sea, which is much closer to European destinations. The idea of a pipeline evolved with the success of the trans-Arabian oil pipeline, connecting the eastern Arabian oilfields with ports and refineries in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. The new location, some fifteen miles (twenty-four kilometers) south of the old city of Yanbu‘, was much closer and more important, a domestic location far away from the politically unstable Lebanon or Persian Gulf. Eventually two parallel pipelines, one for oil and the other for gas, were built. Then on September 21, 1975, a Royal decree established the Royal Commission for Jubayl and Yanbu, the administrative body that supervised the planning, developing, and managing of this gigantic industrial project, the building of Yanbu‘ Industrial City. In general, the hydrocarbon-based site in Yanbu‘ was built by some 20,000 foreign workers and included refineries, storage tanks, piers for tankers, and other petrochemical plants. It was designed as a location of heavy industry, using natural gas as the main energy source. Today it is the largest port for exporting crude oil, with facilities of more than 3 million barrels a day. In July 2005, a second industrial city was opened, which includes propylene projects and other petrochemical industries. The industrial city helped to diversify the Saudi economy into an industrialized nation. Furthermore, when it was built it also became a market for the vast resources of natural gas that the country possesses. The decrease in the dependency on oil and natural gas is also illustrated by additional natural resources, such as gold or copper. Mines for both minerals are located in the hinterland of Yanbu‘. One of the largest cement factories is located within the city limits, as well as several desalination plants. The port is also the third busiest in the country after Jiddah and Dammam on the basis of the amount of goods that are handled and discharged here. To a lesser degree, the port also received some Muslim pilgrims performing the Hajj (pilgrimage) to Makkah and Madinah. Approximately 80,000 inhabitants lived in Yanbu‘ in the year 2000. In May 2004, a refinery was targeted by gunmen, who killed several local and international workers at the plant before they were shot dead by security forces. The incident was part of a string of attacks by militants loyal to al Qa‘idah against Westerners in the kingdom.

FURTHER READING Al-Harbi, Abdullah. “The Impact of New Towns in Saudi Arabia: A Case Study of Yanbu.” PhD dissertation, University of Lancaster, 1991. Hashem, A.R. “Soil Analysis and Mycoflora of the Industrial Yanbu City, Saudi Arabia,” Arab Gulf Journal of Scientific Research 11 (1993): 93–119. Johnson, Maxwell. “The Arab Bureau and the Arab Revolt: Yanbu to Aqaba,” Military Affairs 46, no. 4 (1982): 194–201. Mogassabi, Khalil S. “Modernity and Tradition in the Design of New Towns: Sadat City, Egypt and Yanbu, Saudi Arabia.” MCP thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1990. Pampanini, Andrea. Cities in the Arabian Desert: The Building of Jubail and Yanbu in Saudi Arabia. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997.

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Yemen John A. Shoup Yemen is its own cultural area, and although part of the Arabian Peninsula, it is often discussed separately. Historical Yemen includes most of the southwest corner of the Peninsula, which is cut off from the rest of the region by mountains. Najran and the ‘Asir areas of today’s Saudi Arabia have occasionally been included with Yemen, as has the Hadramawt that lies between Oman’s Dhufar and the Yemeni Highlands. Yemen was home to several ancient kingdoms that had strong ties with Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa. The Ethiopian Kingdom of Aksum occupied Yemen in 520, and in 570 the Sasanian Persians briefly occupied the country. Ancient Yemen developed its own alphabet, and its economic power gave rise to stories of the Queen of Sheba and “Arabia Felix” or “Happy Arabia” as the Romans called it. The Emperor Augustus unsuccessfully tried to conquer ancient Yemen. Yemen is the original home of one of the two major divisions of Arab tribes called the ‘Arab al-‘Arabah or the true Arabs— descendants of Qahtan (the biblical Joktan), who is the ancestor of all of the southern Arab tribes referred to as Yamani or Hinawi. Yemen was converted to Islam during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad, and several its tribes participated in the expansion of the religion and the Islamic Empire. Since the ninth century, North Yemen has been the home of Zayidi Shi‘ite Imams who for most of Yemen’s history ruled the north alongside important tribal confederations such as the Hashid and Bakil. The Qasimi line of Zayidi Imams took control of the north starting in 1592 and ruled until 1962 when a popular revolution supported by Egypt overthrew them. The modern history of Yemen begins in the nineteenth century when in 1839 the British East India Company seized the port of Aden (‘Adan). The port was not immediately important other than as a means to stop the conquests of Egypt’s vigorous ruler Muhammad ‘Ali, who had occupied the Hijaz and crushed the first Wahhabi-Saudi state in the Najd. However, following the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 Aden became an important station on the route to India and East Africa. Also, following the opening of the Canal the Ottoman Turks made their last attempt to control the Peninsula, and they were able to occupy much of the central highlands, taking Sana‘a in 1872. The Imam withdrew into the highlands where most of the tribes followed Zayidi Shi‘ism, whereas the Ottomans were generally welcomed by the mainly Sunni (Shafi‘i) population of lower Yemen. The Turks established a border between the northern part of Yemen under their control and the southern part under the British in 1905 and eventually were able to establish good relations with Imam Yahya Mahmud al-Mutawakkil ‘ala Allah, who became the Imam of the Zayidis in 1904. A treaty was signed between the Imam and the Ottomans in 1911. Much of South Yemen was composed of small states based in the Hadramawt that were established by either tribal groups such as the Bayt Kathir or by former mercenaries recruited in India, usually referred to as Yafi‘i families. The generally agreed upon border between them and the Sultanate of Oman was the

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Mahrah region of the Qarah Mountains and Dhufar, both recognized as belonging to the Sultan. Before World War I, the British established various types of relations with these small states, generally recognizing their independence from the Sultan of Oman and the Imam of Yemen. During World War I, the Ottoman Turks were able to move south and threatened British-held Aden, moving within sight of the port city itself. The Ottomans fostered good relations with several local leaders, the most important being Imam Yahya. The Ottomans were able to hold out in Yemen until 1918–1919 where in the rest of the former Arab provinces the local people had risen with the arrival of the army of the Arab Revolt. With the withdrawal of Turkish forces, Imam Yahya slowly expanded his power base to include most of the north. He was able to bring the Hashid tribal confederation under his control by 1928, and by 1930 he moved into the area around Ma’rib. He was more successful with the tribal groups living to the south of Sana‘a who recognized his authority between 1918 and 1920. Between 1927 and 1929 Imam Yahya’s son, Ahmad, brought the Yemeni Tihamah under this father’s rule. In 1932 the ‘Asir was conquered by Saudi forces and brought the expanding Saudi state to the borders of the Imam’s growing power. In 1934 the Imam signed treaties with both Britain and Saudi Arabia establishing the borders of North Yemen; Saudi control of the ‘Asir and British control of South Yemen were confirmed. The international community recognized North Yemen as early as 1926 when Imam Yahya, referred to as the King of Yemen, signed a treaty with Italy. Britain extended its authority over South Yemen and the Hadramawt through several agreements with local leaders, creating protectorates following pacification efforts between 1936 and 1937. Aden and its immediate hinterland saw the development of Arab nationalist politics; the first Communist Party formed in the 1940s and the Ba‘ath Party appeared in the 1950s. The British responded by establishing the Federation of Arab Emirates in the Hadramawt in 1959 to stop the spread of popular nationalism. Britain suffered a great loss of prestige by being a member of the alliance with France and Israel that invaded Egypt following nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt’s President Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir in 1956. In the same year North Yemen joined Saudi Arabia and Egypt in the Jiddah Pact to stand against the British action, and in 1958 North Yemen joined Egypt and Syria in the Union of Arab States. Imam Yahya was assassinated in 1948 and was succeeded by his son and heir, Ahmad, as Imam and leader of North Yemen. Imam Ahmad was oppressive and was not well liked by his people. There was an unsuccessful coup against him in 1955, and he was confronted by a tribal revolt in 1960. Imam Ahmad died in 1962, and his successor, Muhammad al-Badr, was quickly overthrown in a coup in 1962 staged by North Yemen’s Free Officers, who took their inspiration from Egypt’s Free Officers who overthrew King Faruq in 1952. Imam Muhammad al-Badr withdrew into the highlands above Sana‘a where he called together tribal soldiers to fight on his behalf in what was called the Royalist Cause. The conflict drew in other Arab states that used the civil war in Yemen as a proxy war particularly between Saudi Arabia, which supported the Imam, and Egypt, who supported the Republican side. The civil war continued until 1970 when a

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reconciliation process was begun between the Royalists who had supported the Imam, and the Republicans. The Imam and his family retired to Ta’if in Saudi Arabia. During the 1960s, South Yemen’s population became more and more radicalized because of Britain’s refusal to leave Aden. In 1963 Aden was officially joined to the hinterland in what Britain called the Federation of South Arabia, but this did not stop the move toward South Yemen’s independence. Acts of resistance began in the same year and escalated especially in the port city itself. By 1966 Britain announced that it would leave Aden in 1968, but continued fighting forced them to leave in 1967. Shortly after Britain’s departure South Yemen officially declared itself to be a Marxist state, the only Marxist state ever in the Arab world, calling itself the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. South Yemen supported the Marxist insurrection in Oman’s Dhufar, although it can be argued that the Dhufar Liberation Front had little local support for its Marxist ideology, and more from tribal loyalties. The two Yemens did not establish good relations and fought their first war in 1972 and a second war in 1979. The South also clashed with Saudi troops along the border. South Yemen became more and more unstable because it was unable to bring about the social and economic reforms its leadership had promised. Islamic responses to Marxist ideology became more widespread as the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s took their toll on the people. In 1986 South Yemen experienced both a coup and the start of a civil war. In 1990 the North interfered and in a brief war took control of the south, uniting Yemen as the Yemen Republic. Since unity and the end of the Marxist Party, President ‘Ali’ Abdallah Salih has ruled South Yemen. ‘Ali ‘Abdallah Salih was first elected president of North Yemen in 1978 and of unified Yemen in 1990. He was re-elected president in 1999 and again most recently in 2006. A team of international observers as judged the 2006 election as “generally free and fair.” According to the law, President ‘Ali Salih can run for election one more time. Yemen is still wracked with problems of instability, with large areas under the control of tribal groups rather than the central government. Most of the government is in the hands of two major tribal groups: the Hashid and the Bakil. President ‘Ali Salih is a member of the Hashid. Tribal leaders at odds with the central government have used the kidnapping of foreign tourists as a means to both embarrass the government and to force it to make local concessions. Yemen was one of the few Arab states that voted against using force against Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait and refused to join the American-led coalition. Following the 1991 Gulf War, Yemen maintained close relations with Iraq although Saudi Arabia and many of the Gulf countries forced some 850,000 Yemenis to return home. Many Arab and Western countries cancelled or substantially reduced aid programs for Yemen as a result. There is evidence that some of the Gulf countries provided equipment for a brief civil war in Yemen in 1994. In recent years Yemen has proven to be a recruiting ground for al Qa‘idah, and several acts of terror have been committed in the country by al Qa‘idah operatives, including the bombing of an American naval ship in the port of Aden and at the archeological site at Ma’rib. Yemen and Saudi Arabia finally settled their border dispute in 2000 as part of Yemen’s diplomatic offensive to restore its place with

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the Gulf States. Yemen’s government has tried to steer a more pro-West policy, although internally many Yemenis are not convinced of the move given the continued American and Coalition occupation of both Iraq and Afghanistan. See also Yemen, Tribal Confederations in.

FURTHER READING Caton, Steven. Peaks of Yemen I Summon—Poetry as Cultural Practice in a North Yemeni Tribe. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993. Caton, Steven. Yemen Chronicle: An Anthropology of War and Mediation. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005. Dresch, Paul. Tribes, Government, and History of Yemen. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994. Dresch, Paul. A History of Modern Yemen. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Halliday, Fred, Edmund Burke, and Michael Hudson (eds.). Revolution and Foreign Policy: The Case of South Yemen, 1967–1982. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Al-Rasheed, Madawi, and Robert Vitalis (eds.). Counter-Narratives: History, Contemporary Society, and Politics in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. London: Palgrave and McMillan, 2004. Weir, Shelagh. Tribal Order: Politics and Law in the Mountains of Yemen. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002.

Yemen, Tribal Confederations in John A. Shoup Yemen is the original home of many Arab tribes who claim Qahtan as their ancestor and who are generally called the ‘Arab al-‘Arabah or the “true, pure Arabs.” The descendants of Qahtan comprise the southern division of Arab tribes who are usually referred to as Yamani or Hinawi depending on where they are in the Arab world. The northern division claim common descent from Isma‘il, who was the son of Ibrahim and the Egyptian serving girl, Hajar, and are called the ‘Arab al-Musta‘arabah meaning the “Arabized Arabs.” The northern division is more frequently called Qaysi, ‘Adnani, or Ghafiri. The historical rivalry between the two main divisions pre-dates the Islamic period. Problems between the two caused several clashes in the past and eventually the ‘Abbasids decided to not depend on tribal levies, replacing them with Turkish slave soldiers. Both divisions are widespread throughout the Arab world today, from Mauritania to the Gulf and into Central Asia. Yemen has several important tribal groups, some of which are strong enough to challenge government authority in their local areas. The Bakil, Madhhij, and Hashid confederations are the most important in northern Yemen. They tend to be settled agriculturalists living in fortified villages in the mountains north

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and east of Sana‘a and are not heavily dependent on pastoralism; however, as the geography changes further toward the northeast and east, they begin to overlap with more pastoral peoples of Hadramawt and the southern deserts. Although living in settled villages, they have retained the tribe as an important social and political form of organization. Tribal leaders have little authority over individual tribesmen, and both confederations are broken up into many autonomous tribes each with its own leaders and recognized territory. Corporate action is possible only in the most extreme of cases in which the entire confederation is threatened. Studies have shed a good deal of light on how segmentary lineage organization often does not operate as social scientists have theorized. Tribesmen tend to own their own fields and are not in a semi-feudal or feudal arrangement with the leadership. The mountains are terraced and divided into small plots where they grow a variety of crops; however, today production of the mild drug called qat is far more profitable than growing food. The growing importance of qat in the local economy means that fewer and fewer families grow food crops. Incomes are supplemented by occasional kidnappings of foreign tourists. Such kidnappings are usually done for two main reasons: first, to embarrass the Yemeni authorities, thus forcing them to spend on developing local infrastructure; and second, to raise funds for a specific tribal leader to dispense to his people. In general, such kidnappings end peacefully with local tribesmen benefiting, but occasionally they have gone very badly, ending with the deaths of kidnapped victims. The Bakil and Hashid have played important roles in contemporary Yemeni history, generally siding with the Imam during the civil war in the 1960s. Tribesmen have proven themselves in battle, and even today most are well armed. Codes of behavior in war times have kept intertribal warfare to a minimum, but outsiders not protected by tribal laws about retribution and revenge can be treated harshly. The shaykh of the Hashid confederation, Shaykh ‘Abdallah bin Hussein al-Ahmar, continues to play a major role in contemporary Yemeni politics, including Islamic reform movements. Several tribal groups live in South Yemen, notably the Qutaybi and Yafi‘. The northern tribes tend to be Zayidi Shi‘ites, but the southerners tend to be Sunnis and are often independent of the Zayidi Imams. Since the British installed themselves in Aden, the shaykhs of the southern tribes were forced to deal with them. The southern region around Aden was more and more drawn into Arab nationalism, and the older, independent city-states of the Hadramawt, controlled by tribal elite, eventually collapsed. Although tribe remained a strong personal identity for many, the political authority of tribes was greatly weakened to the point that few people discuss tribe. Those tribes where pastoral nomadism is still the major mode of economic production in the far eastern areas such as the Bayt Kathir, Rawashid, ‘Awamir, al-Manahil, Sa‘ar, and Dahm can be seen as the southerners for whom tribe matters. They were greatly affected by the Dhufar Rebellion in Oman as their traditional migration movements were interrupted, and many of their relatives in Oman moved away from the conflict zone. Since the end of the rebellion there has been some revival of their pastoral activities.

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FURTHER READING Dresch, Paul. Tribes, Government, and History in Yemen. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994. Al-Rasheed, Madawi. Counter-Narratives: History, Contemporary Society, and Politics in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004. Von Bruch, Gabriele. Islam, Honor, and Morality in Yemen: Ruling Families in Transition. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005. Weir, Shelagh. Tribal Order: Politics and Law in the Mountains of Yemen. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007.

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Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahayan (1918–2004) Carla Higgins Shaykh Zayid was born into the ruling family of the Bani Yas tribal confederation, known as the Al Bu Falah. He was appointed Ruler’s Representative in the eastern region of Abu Dhabi from 1946 until 1966. He became the ruler of Abu Dhabi (1966–2004) and the first president of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (1971–2004). He presided over the creation of the first and only federal state in the Arab world. He was a key player in the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council, established in 1981. Shaykh Zayid exemplified qualities of good leadership valued in both tribal and democratic communities. He earned the respect of Emiratis as he sought to improve their lives through vigorous spending on infrastructure, with an emphasis on housing, health, and education. Shaykh Zayid moved the UAE from a community largely based on subsistence into a more modern, wealthy state, and encouraged the participation of all Emiratis in building a state that could sustain itself. Although he did not receive a formal education, he funded the first school in the Abu Dhabi Emiratein Al-‘Ayn, and gave salaries to students who attended, encouraging families to enroll their children. He quickly moved to provide higher education to Emirati youth—the first university opened just six years after the UAE was formed, the University of the United Arab Emirates, in Al-‘Ayn, Abu Dhabi. He encouraged Emirati women to pursue an education and participate in public life, and many local universities have a majority of female students, some exclusively female. Although each emirate is autonomous, Shaykh Zayid shared the oil wealth of the Abu Dhabi emirate with the other six emirates as well as over forty countries in the Arab world and beyond—indeed, his generosity legitimized his role as both UAE and regional leader. His leadership style, whether maintaining relationships with local tribes or through foreign policy in the region or globally, was considered conservative, cautious, and favoring conciliation and diplomacy over force. Shaykh Zayid was a tolerant leader—although personally conservative and desiring to preserve certain traditions, he valued the achievements of vastly different cultures and welcomed the presence of foreign professionals into the UAE. He was a moderate Muslim who believed that Islam is a religion of tolerance and forgiveness.

Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahayan (1918–2004)

Shaykh Zayid is remembered as the Father of the Nation and is deeply venerated in the Abu Dhabi Emirate.

FURTHER READING Rugh, William B. “UAE Foreign Policy,” in Perspectives on the United Arab Emirates. London: Trident Press, 1997.

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Selected Bibliography

Aarts, Paul, and Gerd Nonneman. Saudi Arabia in the Balance: The Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs. New York: New York University Press, 2005. Abdulfattah, Kamal. Mountain Farmer and Fellah in Asir, Southwest Saudi Arabia. Erlangen, Germany: Fr€ankische Geographische Gesellschaft, 1981. Abu ‘Aliyya, ‘Abdul-Fattah H., and Rafiq Shaker Al-Natsheh. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian Cause. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2005. Abu Athera, Said Salman. “Tribal Poetry of the Tarabin and Huwaytat Tribes and its Relationship to that of Neighbouring Tribes.” PhD dissertation, University of Glasgow, 1995. Abu Jabir, Kamil, and Fawzi Gharaibeh. Bedouins of Jordan: A People in Transition. Amman, Jordan: Royal Scientific Society Press, 1978. Abu Lughod, Lila. Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. Abul, Ahmed Jafar. “The Participation of Kuwaiti Intellectuals in the Development Process, 1961–1985.” PhD dissertation, University of Essex, 1992. Aburish, Said K. The Rise, Corruption, and Coming Fall of the House of Saud. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995. Agius, Dionisius A. In the Wake of the Dhow, The Arabian Gulf and Oman. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2002. ———. Seafaring in the Arabian Gulf and Oman. London: Kegan Paul, 2005. Al-Ahmadi, Hanan, and Martin Roland. “Quality of Primary Health Care in Saudi Arabia: A Comprehensive Review,” International Journal for Quality in Health Care 17, no. 4 (2005): 1–16. Ahmed, Irfan. “The Destruction of the Holy Places,” Islamica Magazine 15 (2006). Available at http://www.islamicamagazine.com/Issue-15/The-Destruction-of-Holy-Sites-inMecca-and-Medina.html (last accessed October 22, 2008). Al-Ahsan, Abdallah. OIC: The Organization of the Islamic Conference. Herndon: Virginia Institute of Islamic Thought, 1988. Akers, Deborah S., and Abu Bakr Ahman Baqadir. Oranges in the Sun: Short Stories from the Arabian Gulf. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008. el Alami, Dawoud. Islamic Marriage and Divorce Laws of the Arab World. London: Springer, 1996.

Selected Bibliography Albuainain, Reem. “Unemployment Rate in the United Arab Emirates: The Case of Abu Dhabi.” Working paper no. 0404. Economic Research Forum, 2004. Algar, Hamid. Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International, 2002. Alghanim, Salwa. The Reign of Mubarak Al Sabah Shaykh of Kuwait 1896–1915. London: I.B. Tauris, 1998. Allen Jr., Calvin, and W. Lynne Rigsbee II. Oman under Qaboos: From Coup to Constitution, 1970–1996. London: Frank Cass, 2000. Alpher, Joseph (ed.). Encyclopedia of Jewish History: Events and Eras of the Jewish People. New York: Facts on File, 1986. Alohali, Yousef N. “Urban Dwelling Environments in Rapidly Growing Cities: Case Study, Unayzah, Saudi Arabia,” M.S. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1983. Alon, Yoav. “The Tribal System in the Face of the State-Formation Process: Mandatory Transjordan, 1921–46,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 37, no. 2 (2005): 213–240. Alruwais, Bader A. “The Tent and Its Contents: A Study of the Traditional Arts of Weaving by the Otaibah Tribe in Saudi Arabia.” PhD dissertation, University of North Texas, 1998. Alshawi, Ali Hadi. “The al-Murrah Tribe in Qatar: Political Impact.” MA thesis, Western Michigan University, 1994. Alterman, Jon, and Karin Von Hippel. Understanding Islamic Charities. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007. Altorki, Soraya, and Donald P. Cole. Arabian Oasis City: The Transformation of ‘Unayzah. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989. Amerding, Paul L. Doctors for the Kingdom: The Work of the American Mission Hospital in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1913–1955. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003. Amin, S.H. Middle East Legal Systems. Glasgow: Royston, 1985. Amuzegar, Jahangir. Managing the Oil Wealth: OPEC’s Windfalls and Pitfalls. London: I.B. Tauris, 2001. Al-Angari, Abdal-Rahman Ibn Nasir. “The Palestine Issue in Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy.” PhD dissertation, University of Exeter, 1989. Al-Ankary, Khalid, and El-Sayed El-Bushra (eds.). Urban and Rural Profiles in Saudi Arabia. Berlin: Borntrager, 1989. Anscombe, Frederick Fallowfield. The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987. Arab Urban Development Institute. Riyadh, the City of the Future. Riyadh: al-Mahad al-Arabi li-Inma al-Mudun, 1984. Arebi, Saddeka. Women and Words in Saudi Arabia: The Politics of Literary Discourse. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. Asher, Michael. Thesiger. London: Penguin Books, 1995. Ashkenazi, Touvia. “The ‘Anazah Tribes,” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 4, no. 2 (1948): 222–239. ———. “Social and Historical Problems of the ‘Anazah Tribes,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 8, no. 1 (1965): 93–100. Al-Askar, Abdullah. Al-Yamama in the Early Islamic Era. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2002. Atassi, Mohammad Ali. “Gulf Capital and Arab Satellite Television,” Al-Jadid 10, no. 48 (2004): 6–10. Ayish, Muhammad I., and Ali Qassim. “Direct Satellite Broadcasting in the Arab Gulf Region: Trends and Policies,” International Communication Gazette 56, no. 1 (1996): 19–36.

478

Selected Bibliography Al-Azma, Talal. “The Role of the Ikhwan under Abdul Aziz Al Saud, 1916–34.” PhD dissertation, University of Durham, 1999. Baaklini, A.I. “Legislatures in the Gulf Area: The Experience of Kuwait, 1961–1976,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 14, no. 3 (1982): 359–379. Bahgat, Gawdat. “Education in the Gulf Monarchies: Retrospect and Prospect,” International Review of Education 45 no. 2 (1999): 127–136. The Bahrain Petroleum Company. “Key Dates.” Available at http://www.bapco.com.bh/ default.asp?action=article&id=37# (last accessed February 20, 2008). Baker, Randall. King Husain and the Kingdom of Hejaz. New York: Oleander Press, 1979. Bakhtiar, Laleh, and Kevin Reinhart. Encyclopedia of Islamic Law: A Compendium of the Major Schools. Chicago: Kazi Publications, 2005. Bales, Kevin. Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. Ball-Lechgar, Lisa. “Fresh Gulf Currents,” Saudi Aramco World 58, no. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 2007): 2–13. Ballantyne, William M. Essays and Addresses on Arab Laws. Richmond, UK: Curzon, 2000. Bashshur, Munir. Higher Education in the Arab States. Beirut, Lebanon: UNESCO Regional Bureau for Education in the Arab States, 2004. Al-Bassam, Laila Saleh. “Traditional Costumes of Asir,” al-Ma’thurat al-Sha‘biyah 67 (2003): 8–29. Beaumont, Peter, Gerald Blake, and Malcom Wagstaff. The Middle East. London: John Wiley & Sons, 1976. Bencomo, C. “Kuwait: Promises Betrayed: Denial of Rights of Bidun, Women, and Freedom of Expression,” Human Rights Watch 12, no. 2E (2000). Available at http://www. hrw.org/reports/2000/kuwait/#P58_1426 (last accessed October 22, 2008). Bergh, Peter. The Osama bin Laden I Know: The Oral History of al-Qaeda’s Leader. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006. Betts, Alison. “The Solubba: Nonpastoral Nomads in Arabia,” Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research 274 (1989): 61–69. Bibby, G. Looking for Dilmun. New York: Penguin Books 1970. Bidwell, Robin. Travellers in Arabia. Reading, UK: Garnet Publishing, 1994. Bin Laden, Osama. Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden, translated by James Howrath and edited by Bruce Lawrence. New York: Verso, 2005. Birashk, Ahmad. A Comparative Calendar of the Iranian, Muslim Lunar, and Christian Eras for Three Thousand Years: 1260 B.H.-2000 A.H./639 B.C.-2621 A.D. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 1993. Blanchard, Christopher M. CRS Report for Congress. Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 24, 2008. Blankenhorn, David (ed.). The Islam/West Debate: Documents from a Global Debate on Terrorism, US Policy, and the Middle East. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. Bligh, Alexander. From Prince to King: Royal Succession in the House of Saud in the Twentieth Century. New York: New York University Press, 1984. Bogari, Naima, “Motivation for Domestic Tourism: A Case Study of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” in Consumer Psychology of Tourism, Hospitality, and Leisure, edited by Arch G. Woodside. Oxfordshire, UK: CABI Publishing, 2004. Bogary, Hamza. The Sheltered Quarter: A Tale of a Boyhood in Mecca. Austin, TX: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1991. Boghardt, L.P. Kuwait amid War, Peace and Revolution: 1979–1991 and New Challenges. Basingstoke, UK: New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

479

Selected Bibliography Bowen, Donna Lee, and Evelyn A. Early. Everyday Life in the Muslim Middle East. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002. Bowersock, G.W. Roman Arabia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994. Brand, Laurie. Citizens Abroad: Emigration and the State in the Middle East and North Africa. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Brown, Anthony Cave. Oil, God, and Gold: The Story of Aramco and the Saudi Kings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999. Buchan, James. Jeddah—Old and New. London: Stacey International, 1982. Bulliet, Richard W. The Camel and the Wheel. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. Burckhardt, Johann Ludwig. Travels in Arabia, Comprehending an Account of Those Territories in Hejaz, 2 vols. London: H. Colburn, 1829. ———. Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, 2 vols. London: H. Colburn and R. Bentley, 1831. Burkholder, Grace. An Arabian Collection: Artifacts from the Eastern Province. Boulder City, NV: GB Publications, 1984. Burr, J. Millard, and Robert Collins. Alms for Jihad: Charity and Terrorism in the Islamic World. London: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Burton, Richard F. A Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to al-Madinah and Meccah (1855). New York: Dover Publications, 1964. Byman, Daniel L., and Jerrold D. Green. “The Enigma of Stability in the Persian Gulf Monarchies,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 3, no. 3 (1999): 20–37. Campbell, Kay Hardy. “Folk Music and Dance in the Arabian Gulf and Saudi Arabia,” in Images of Enchantment: Visual and Performing Arts of the Middle East, edited by Sherifa Zuhur. Cairo: American University of Cairo Press, 1998. ———. “Saudi Arabian Folk Music Alive and Well,” Saudi Aramco World 58, no. 2 (2007): 2–13. Carter, J.R.L. Tribes in Oman. London: Peninsular Publishing, 1982. Carter, Robert. “The History and Prehistory of Pearling in the Persian Gulf,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 48, no. 2 (2005): 139–209. Casey, Michael. The History of Kuwait. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2007. Caton, Steven. Peaks of Yemen I Summon—Poetry as Cultural Practice in a North Yemeni Tribe. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993. Caton, Steven. Yemen Chronicle: An Anthropology of War and Mediation. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005. Cernea, Michael. Cultural Heritage and Development: A Framework for Action in the Middle East and North Africa. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2001. Chatty, Dawn. Mobile Pastoralists: Development Planning and Social Change in Oman. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. ———. (ed.). Nomadic Societies in the Middle East and North Africa Entering the 21st Century. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2006. Chraibi, Khalid. “Mixed Message on ‘Riba’ Leaves Muslims Trapped between Usurers and Lenders.” Available at http://www.arablife.org/index.php?option=com_content& task=view&id=727&Itemid=187 (last accessed April 18, 2007). Citino, Nathan. From Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Sa’ud, and the Making of U.S.-Saudi Relations. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002. Clark, Arthur. “A Festival at Janadriyah,” Saudi Aramco World 36, no. 5 (1985): 2–7. ———. (ed.). A Land Transformed: The Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Aramco. Dhahran: Saudi Aramco, 2006. Cole, Donald P. Nomads of the Nomads: The Al Murrah Bedouin of the Empty Quarter. Chicago: Aldine Publishers, 1975.

480

Selected Bibliography ———. “Where Have the Bedouin Gone?” Anthropological Quarterly 76, no. 2 (2003): 235–267. ———. “New Homes, New Occupations, New Pastoralism: Al Murrah Bedouin, 1968– 2003,” in Nomadic Societies in the Middle East and North Africa Entering the 21st Century, edited by Dawn Chatty. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2006. Cole, Donald P., and Soraya Altorki. “Production and Trade in North Central Arabia: Change and Development in ‘Unayzah,” in The Transformation of Nomadic Societies in the Arab East, edited by Martha Mundy and Basim Musallam. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Coles, Anne, and Peter Jackson. Wind Tower. London: Stacey International, 2007. Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Penguin, 2005. ———. The bin Laden’s: An Arabian Family in the American Century. New York: Penguin, 2008. Commins, David. The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. Conrad, Peter, and Eugene Gallagher. Health and Health Care in Developing Countries. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993. Cook, Michael. Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Cooper, Robert. Bahrain. New York: Marshall Cavendish, 2000. Cordesman, Anthony. Western Strategic Interests in Saudi Arabia. Wolfeboro, NH: Croom Helm, 1987. ———. Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003. Cordesman, Anthony H., and Nawaf E. Obaid. National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses, and Challenges. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005. Cornwallis, Sir Kinahan. Asir before World War One: A Handbook. New York: Oleander Press, 1976. Corona, Vicky. Women’s Dances of Kuwait: Beginner Steps, Thobe Actions, Choreography. North Hollywood, CA: Dance Fantasy Productions, 1989. Coulson, N.J. A History of Islamic Law. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999. Crone, Patricia. Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam. Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2004. Cronin, Audrey Kruth. “How Al Qaeda Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups?” International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 7–48. Crystal, Jill. “Civil Society in the Arabian Gulf,” in Civil Society in the Middle East, edited by A. Richard Norton. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1996. ———. “Criminal Justice in the Middle East.” Journal of Criminal Justice 29, no. 6 (2001): 469–482. ———. “Public Order and Authority: Policing Kuwait,” in Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf, edited by P. Dresch and J. Piscatori. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. Crystal, Jill et al. Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Daghestani, Abdal-Majeed Ismail. At-Taif: A City in Transition. Riyadh: Foreign Information Department, Ministry of Information, 1981. ———. Ar-Riyadh: Urban Development and Planning. Jeddah: Ministry of Information, Interior Information, 1985. Dawn, Ernest C. “The Amir of Mecca Al-Husayn Ibn-Ali and the Origin of the Arab Revolt,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 104, no. 1 (1960): 11–34. De Gaury, Gerald. Rulers of Mecca. London: Harrap, 1951. ———. Faysal: King of Saudi Arabia. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1966. De Lange, Nicholas. Atlas of the Jewish World. New York: Facts on File, 1988.

481

Selected Bibliography Delong-Bas, Natana J. Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. el-Demerdash, M. “The Vegetation of the Farasan Islands, Red Sea, Saudi Arabia,” Journal of Vegetation Science 7, no. 1 (1996): 81–88. Dewey, Frederick. An Introduction to Islam. New York: Macmillan, 1994. Dickson, H.R.P. The Arab of the Desert. London: Allen & Unwin, 1949. el Diwany, Tarik. The Problem with Interest, 2nd ed. London: Kreatoc Ltd., 2003. Al-Dosary, Adel S., and Syed M. Rahman. “Saudization (Localization)—a Critical Review.” Human Resource Development International 8, no. 4 (2005): 495–502. Al-Doussari, Mohammad Hasan. Evolution of Urban System in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, 1900 to 1970. Al-Ahsa: King Faisal University, 1999. Dostal, Walter. The Traditional Architecture of Ras Al-Khaimah (North). Wiesbaden, Germany: Reichert, 1983. Doughty, Charles. Travels in Arabia Deserta, 2 vols. London: Cambridge University Press, 1888. Doumato, Eleanor Abdella. “The Ambiguity of Shari’a and the Politics of ‘Rights’ in Saudi Arabia,” in Faith and Freedom: Women’s Human Rights in the Muslim World, edited by Mahnaz Afkhami. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995. Doumato, Eleanor Abdella. Getting God’s Ear: Women, Islam, and Healing in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. Dresch, Paul. Tribes, Government, and History of Yemen. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994. ———. A History of Modern Yemen. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Dresch, Paul, and James Piscatori. Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. “Dubai Media City.” Available at http://www.dubaimediacity.com (last accessed January 18, 2008). Dubai Municipality. Folk Songs and Dances. The United Arab Emirates. Dubai: Dubai Municipality, 1996. Ebert, Charles. “Water Resources and Land Use in the Qatif Oasis of Saudi Arabia,” Geographical Review 55, no. 4 (1965): 496–509. Education for All Global Monitoring Report. Regional Overview: Arab States. Paris: UNESCO, 2007. Eigeland, Tor. “Back to the Highlands,” Saudi Aramco World 31, no. 5 (1980): 2–21. Esposito, John. Islam: The Straight Path. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998. Facey, William. Riyadh, the Old City: From Its Origins until the 1950’s. London: Immel, 1992. ———. The Story of the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. London: Stacey International, 1994. Fandy, Mamoun. (Un)civil War of Words: Media and Politics in the Arab World. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2007. Faroqhi, Suraiya, and Randi Deguilhem (eds.). Crafts and Craftsmen of the Middle East. Fashioning the Individual in the Muslim Mediterranean. London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. Farsi, Hani M. S. Jeddah, City of Art: The Sculptures and Monuments. London: Stacey International, 1991. Farsy, Fouad. Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz. Guernsey, UK: Knight Communications, 2001. Ferdinand, Klaus, and Ida Nicolaisen. Bedouins of Qatar. London: Thames and Hudson, 1993. Field, Michael. The Merchants: The Big Business Families of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 1985.

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Selected Bibliography Fisher, W.B. The Middle East: A Physical, Social, and Regional Geography. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1971. “Foundations,” Saudi Aramco World 33, no. 6 (1982): 30–40. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Saudi Arabia, Land and Water Surveys in the Wadi Jizan, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Final Report. Rome: United Nations Development Programme, 1966. Fox, Warren. “The United Arab Emirates: Policy Choices Shaping the Future of Public Higher Education,” Research and Occasional Paper Series, SCHE.13.07. Berkeley, CA: Center for Studies in Higher Education, University of California–Berkeley, 2007. Fromkin, David. A Peace to End All Peace. New York: Avon Books, 1989. Fullerton, Arlene, and Geza Fehervari, Kuwait: Arts and Architecture, a Collection of Essays. Kuwait: n.p., 1995. Al-Gailani, Noorah, and Chris Smith. The Islamic Year: Surahs, Stories and Celebrations. Stroud, UK: Hawthorn Press, 2002. Gause, F. Gregory. Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States. New York: CFRP, 1993. Ghabra, Shafeeq. Palestinians in Kuwait: the Family and the Politics of Survival. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987. Al-Ghadyan, Ahmed A. “The Judiciary in Saudi Arabia,” Arab Law Quarterly 13, no. 3 (1998): 235–251. Ghanem, Shihab M. “Poetry in the UAE,” in United Arab Emirates: A New Perspective, edited by Ibrahim Abed and Peter Hellyer, London: Trident Press, 2001. Glueck, Nelson. Deities and Dolphins: The Story of the Nabataeans. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1965. Gold, Fern Racine, and Melvin A. Conant. Access to Oil: The United States Relationships with Saudi Arabia and Iran. A study prepared at the request of Henry M. Jackson, Chairman Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Publication No. 95–70. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. Goldberg, Jacob. “Philby as a Source for Early Twentieth-Century Saudi History: A Critical Examination,” Middle Eastern Studies 21, no. 2 (1985): 223–243. Graham-Brown, Sarah. Sanctioning Saddam Hussein: The Politics of International Intervention. London: Tauris Books, 1999. Grant, Kenneth, David Ownby, and Steven R. Peterson. Understanding Today’s Crude Oil and Product Markets. A policy analysis study by Lexecon—an FTI Company—for the American Petroleum Institute, 2006. Grill, N.C. Urbanization in the Arabian Peninsula. Durham, UK: University of Durham, Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, 1984. Gugolz, Alessandro. “The Protection of Cultural Heritage in the Sultanate of Oman,” International Journal of Cultural Property 5, no. 2 (1996): 291–309. Habib, John S. Ibn Saud’s Warriors of Islam: The Ikhwan and Their Role in the Creation of the Sa’udi Kingdom, 1910–1930. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1978. Habib, Mohammed A. “Development of Agriculture in Tihama: Regional Growth and Development in the Jizan Region, Saudi Arabia.” PhD dissertation, University of Arizona, 1988. al-Haddad, Mohammad S. “The Effect of Detribalization and Sedentarization on the Socio-Economic Structure of the Tribes of the Arabian Peninsula: The Ajman Tribe as a Case Study.” PhD dissertation, University of Kansas, 1981. Haddad, Yvonne Yazbek, and John Esposito. Islam, Gender, and Social Change. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck, and Barbara Freyer Stowasser (eds.). Islamic Law and the Challenges of Modernity. Walnut Creek, CA: Alta Mira Press, 2004.

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Selected Bibliography Hafez, Kai, and David Paletz. Mass Media, Politics, and Society in the Middle East. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 2001. Hahn, Peter L. Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (Issues in the History of American Foreign Relations). Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005. Hallaq, Wael. The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Halliday, Fred, Edmund Burke, and Michael Hudson (eds.). Revolution and Foreign Policy: The Case of South Yemen, 1967–1982. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Halm, Heinz. The Shi‘ites: A Short History. New York: Markus Wiener Publishing, 2007. Hamzah, Fuad. “Najran,” Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 22 (1935): 631–640. ———. Fi Bilad Asir. Riyadh: Maktabat al-Nasr al-Hadithah, 1968. Hamzeh, Nizar. “Qatar: The Duality of the Legal System,” Middle Eastern Studies 30, no. 1 (1994): 79–90. Hanrahan, Gene Z. Secret History of the Oil Companies in the Middle East. Salisbury, NC: Documentary Publications, 1979. Hansen, Eric. “Looking for the Khalasah,” Saudi Aramco World 55, no. 4 (2004): 3–8. ———. “Carrying Dates to Hajar.” Saudi Aramco World 55, no. 4 (2004): 9–15. Al-Haqeel, Abdallah. “A Comparative Analysis of International News in a Kuwait and Saudi Arabian Newspaper.” M.A. thesis, Ball State University, 1986. Al-Harbi, Abdullah. “The Impact of New Towns in Saudi Arabia: A Case Study of Yanbu.” PhD dissertation, University of Lancaster, 1991. Hariri-Rifai, Wahbi, and Mokhless Hariri-Rifai. The Heritage of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Washington, D.C.: GDG Publications, 1990. Harrigan, Peter, “New Doors to the Kingdom,” Saudi Aramco World 52, no. 2 (2001): 2–17. ———. “Volcanic Arabia,” Saudi Aramco World 57, no. 2 (2006): 2–13. Haseeb, Khair el-Din, et al. The Future of the Arab Nation: Challenges and Options. New York: Routledge and the Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1991. Hashem, A.R. “Soil Analysis and Mycoflora of the Industrial Yanbu City, Saudi Arabia,” Arab Gulf Journal of Scientific Research 11 (1993): 93–119. Hasou, Tawfig Y. The Struggle for the Arab World: Egypt’s Nasser and the Arab League. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985. Al-Hathloul, Saleh Ali, and Narayanan Edadan. Urban Development in Saudi Arabia. Riyadh: Dar al-Sahan, 1995. Al-Hazimi, Mansour, Salma Khadra Jayyusi, and Ezzat Khattab (eds.). Beyond the Dunes: An Anthology of Modern Saudi Literature. London: I.B. Tauris, 2006. Al-Hazzaa, H.M. “Prevalence of Physical Inactivity in Saudi Arabia: A Brief Review.” Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal 10, no. 4–5 (2004): 663–670. Healey, John, and Solaiman al-Theeb. The Nabataean Tomb Inscriptions of Mada’in Salih. London: Oxford University Press, 1994. Heard-Bey, Frauke. From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates. Dubai: Motivate Publishing, 2004. Heer, Nicholas (ed.). Islamic Law and Jurisprudence. Studies in Honor of Farhat J. Ziadeh. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1990. Al-Heezan, Mohammed. “Foreign News in the Saudi Newspapers.” MA thesis, Ball State University, 1987. Hegghammer, Thomas, and Stephan Lacroix. “Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-Utaybi Revisited.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 39, no. 1 (2007): 103–122.

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Selected Bibliography Helal, A., and C. Coston. “Low Crime Rates in Bahrain: Islamic Social Control,” International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 5, no. 1 and 2 (1991): 125–144. Henderson, Joan C. “Tourism in Dubai: Overcoming Barriers to Destination Development,” International Journal of Tourism Research 8, no. 2 (2006): 87–99. Hillenbrand, Robert. “Traditional Architecture in the Arabian Peninsula,” Bulletin British Society for Middle Eastern Studies 16, no. 2 (1989): 186–192. Hinnebusch, Raymond, and Anoushiravan Ehteshami. The Foreign Policy of Middle Eastern States. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. Hitti, Philip. History of the Arabs: From the Earliest Times to the Present. London: Macmillan, 1956. Hoffman, Bruce. “The Leadership Secrets of Osama bin Laden: The Terrorist as CEO,” The Atlantic Monthly 291, no. 3 (2003): 26–27. Hogarth, David. Hejaz before World War One. Cambridge, UK: Oleander Press, 1978. Holden, David, and Richard Johns. The House of Saud. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1981. Holes, Clive. Modern Arabic: Structures, Functions and Varieties. London: Longman, 1995. ———. Dialect, Culture and Society in Eastern Arabia. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2001. Hope, Stanton. Arabian Adventurer: The Story of Hajj Williamson. London: Robert Hale, 1951. Hopkins, Nicholas, and Saad Eddin Ibrahim. Arab Society: Class, Gender, Power, and Development. Cairo: AUC Press, 1997. Hoyland, Robert. Arabia and the Arabs: From the Bronze Age to the Coming of Islam. London: Routledge, 2001. Human Rights Watch. Kuwait, the Bedouins of Kuwait: “Citizens without Citizenship.” Washington, D.C.: Human Rights Watch, Middle East Staff, 1995. Hunter, David E., and Philip Whitten. “Mutayr: A Tribe of Saudi Arabian Pastoral Nomads,” in The Study of Anthropology, edited by David Hunter and Philip Whitten. New York: Harper and Row, 1979. Hurreiz, Sayyid H. Folklore and Folklife in the United Arab Emirates. London: Routledge, 2002. Ibrahim, Mahmood. “Social and Economic Conditions in Pre-Islamic Mecca.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 14, no. 3 (1982): 343–358. Ingham, Bruce. “Notes on the Dialect of the Dhafir of North-Eastern Arabia,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 45, no. 2 (1982): 245–259. ———. Bedouin of Northern Arabia: Traditions of the Al-Dhafir. London: KPI, 1986. Insoll, Timothy. The Archaeology of Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003. ———. Land of Enki in the Islamic Era: Pearls, Palms, and Religious Identity in Bahrain. London: Kegan Paul International, Ltd., 2005. Ismael, Jacqueline S., and Nancy Walstrom. Turbulent Times and Family Life in the Contemporary Middle East. Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2004. Isralowitz, Richard, and Mohammed Afifi. Drug Problems: Cross-Cultural Policy and Program Development. Westport, CT: Auburn House, 2002. Jabar, Faleh. The Shi‘ite Movement in Iraq. London: Saqi Books, 2003. Jabbur, Jibra’il S. Bedouins of the Desert: Aspects of Nomadic Life in the Arab East, translated by Lawrence Conrad. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995. “Jane’s World Armies, Jane’s World Navies, Jane’s World Air Forces.” Available at http://www. globalsecurity.com (last accessed October 22, 2008). Jarman, R.L. Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah, Amir of Kuwait, 1965–77: A Political Biography. London: London Centre of Arab Studies, 2002.

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Selected Bibliography Jenner, Michael. Bahrain: Gulf Heritage in Transition. London: Longman, 1984. Jodidio, Philip. Architecture in the Emirates. New York: Taschen, 2007. Johnson, Maxwell. “The Arab Bureau and the Arab Revolt: Yanbu’ to Aqaba,” Military Affairs 46, no. 4 (1982): 194–201. Johnson, Warren. “Keeping Cool,” Saudi Aramco World 46, no. 3 (1995): 10–17. Joseph, Suad, and Afsaneh Najmbadi. Encyclopedia of Women and Islamic Cultures. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2003. Al-Juhany, Uwidah Meraireek. Najd before the Salafi Reform Movement: Social, Political, and Religious Conditions during the Three Centuries Preceding the Rise of the Saudi State. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2002. Kabbani, Nader, and Ekta Kothari. “Youth Employment in the MENA Region: A Situational Assessment,” Social Protection Discussion Paper, no. 0534. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2005. Kaisha, N.B., and K.M. Hakubutsukan. The JVC Video Anthology of World Music and Dance. Book V, Middle East and Africa. Tokyo: JVC Victor Co. of Japan, 1988–1990. Kapiszewski, Andrzej. Nationals and Expatriates: Population and Labour Dilemmas of the Gulf Cooperation Council States. Reading, UK: Garnet, 2001. ———. “Arab versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries.” Paper presented at the United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat, Beirut, Lebanon, May 15–17, 2006. Katakura, Motoko. Bedouin Village: A Study of a Saudi Arabian People in Transition. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977. Kay, Shirley, and Darius Zandi. Architectural Heritage of the Gulf. Dubai: Motivate Publications, 1991. Kazan, Fayad E. Mass Media, Modernity, and Development: Arab States of the Gulf. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993. Keegan, John. The Iraq War. New York: Knopf, 2004. Kerr, Malcolm H. Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1966. Khadduri, Majid, and Herbert Liebesny (eds.). Origin and Development of Islamic Law. Clark, NJ: Lawbook Exchange, 1955, 2008. Khalaf, Sulaiman, “Camel Racing in the Gulf: Notes on the Evolution of a Traditional Cultural Sport,” Anthropos 94, nos. 1-3 (1999): 85–106. ———. “Poetics and Politics of Newly Invented Traditions in the Gulf: Camel Racing in the United Arab Emirates,” Ethnology 39, no. 3 (2000): 243–261. Al Khalifa, Shaykah Haya Ali. Bahrain through the Ages: The Archaeology. London: Kegan Paul, 1986. Khalil, Joe. “New Televisions in the Arabian Gulf: Period of Transitions,” Global Media Journal 5, no. 8 (2006). Available at http://lass.calumet.purdue.edu/cca/gmj/sp06/ graduatesp06/gmj-sp06gradinv-khalil.htm (last accessed October 23, 2008). Khan, Majeed. Prehistoric Rock Art of Northern Saudi Arabia: A Synthetic Approach to the Study of Rock Art from Wadi Damm, Northwest of Tabuk. Riyadh: Ministry of Education, Department of Antiquities and Museums, 1993. Khazanov, Anatoly. Nomads and the Outside World. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994. Al-Khazim, M.A. “Higher Education in Saudi Arabia: Challenges, Solutions, and Opportunities Missed,” Higher Education Policy 16, no. 4 (2003): 479–486. Khouri, Fouad. Tribe and State in Bahrain. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.

486

Selected Bibliography ———. “From Tribe to State in Bahrain,” in Arab Society. Social Science Perspective, edited by Nicholas Hopkins and Saad Eddin Ibrahim. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1987. Khoury, Eileen. “Servants of the Pearl,” Saudi Aramco World 41, no. 5 (1990): 24–31. Khoury, Philip S., and Joseph Kostiner. Tribes and State-Formation in the Middle East. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990. Kindermann, H. “Utayba,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, edited by P. Bearman et al. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2007. “King Faisal: Oil, Wealth and Power,” Time Magazine, April 7, 1975. King, Geoffrey. “Traditional Najdi Mosques,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 41, no. 3 (1978): 464–498. ———. “Notes on Some Mosques in Eastern and Western Saudi Arabia,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 43, no. 2 (1980): 251–276. ———. The Historical Mosques of Saudi Arabia. New York: Longman, 1986. ———. The Traditional Architecture of Saudi Arabia. London: I.B. Tauris, 1998. Korany, Bahgar, and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (eds.). The Foreign Policies of Arab States. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984. Korbin, Stephen J. “Diffusion as an Explanation of Oil Nationalization,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 29, no. 1 (1985): 3–32. Kostiner, Joseph. “On Instruments and Their Designers: The Ikhwan of Najd and the Emergence of the Saudi State,” Middle Eastern Studies 21, no. 3 (1985): 298–323. ———. “Saudi Arabia’s Territorial Expansion: The Case of Kuwayt, 1916–1921,” Die Welt des Islams 33, no. 2 (1993): 219–234. Kramer, Martin. Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. Kuran, Timur. Islam and Mammon: The Economic Predicaments of Islamism. Trenton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005. Kurpershoek, Marcel. “Between ad-Dakhul and Afif: Oral Traditions of the ‘Utaybah Tribe in Central Najd,” Zeitschrift f€ ur Arabische Linguistik 26 (1993): 28–65. ———. Arabia of the Bedouins. London: Saqi Books, 2001. ———. Oral Poetry and Narratives from Central Arabia, 5 vols. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1993–2005. Kuwait Investment Authority. “Objectives and Strategy.” Available at http://www.kia.gov. kw/KIA/AboutþKIA/ObjectiveþandþStrategy/ObjectivesandStrategy.htm (last accessed February 20, 2008). “Kuwait Oil Reserves Only Half Official Estimates—PIW,” Reuters, January 20, 2006. Available at http://today.reuters.com (last accessed October 23, 2008). Kuwait Petroleum Corporation. “History of Oil in Kuwait.” Available at http://www.kpc. com.kw/index2.htm (last accessed February 20, 2008). Al-Lamki, S. “Higher Education in the Sultanate of Oman: The Challenge of Access, Equity and Privatization,” Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management 24, no. 1 (2002): 75–86. Lancaster, William. The Rwala Bedouin Today. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland, 1997. Larsen, Torben. Butterflies of Saudi Arabia and Its Neighbors. London: Stacey International, 1984. Lawlor, John I. The Nabataeans in Historical Perspective. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1974. Lawrence, T.E. Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph. London: J. Cape, 1935. Leaman, Oliver. The Companion Encyclopedia of Middle Eastern and North African Films. New York: Routledge, 2001.

487

Selected Bibliography Lees, Brain M. A Handbook of the Al Saud Ruling Family of Saudi Arabia. London: Royal Genealogies, 1980. Letter to the West: A Saudi View. Prepared by a group of Saudi scholars and intellectuals. Riyadh: Ghainaa Publications, 2005. Lewcock, Ronald, and Zahra Freeth. Traditional Architecture in Kuwait and the Northern Gulf. London: Art and Archaeology Research Papers, 1979. Lewis, Bernard. The Crisis of Islam. New York: Random House, 2004. Lewis, I.M., Ahmed al-Safi, and Sayyid Hurreiz (eds.). Women’s Medicine: The Zar Bori Cult in Africa and Beyond. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991. Lewis, Norman. Nomads and Settlers in Syria and Jordan, 1800–1980. London: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Lindisfame, Nancy, and Bruce Ingham. Languages of Dress in the Middle East. Surrey, UK: Curzon, 1997. Long, David E. Culture and Customs of Saudi Arabia. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005. Long, David E., and Christian Koch (eds.). Gulf Security in the Twenty-First Century. New York: British Academic Press, 1997. Longva, A. “Nationalism in Pre-Modern Guise: The Discourse on Hadhar and Badu in Kuwait,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 38 (2006): 171–187. Looney, Robert. “Saudization and Sound Economic Reforms: Are the Two Compatible?” Strategic Insights 3, no. 2 (2004): 1–10. Available at http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/ 2004/feb/looneyFeb04.asp (last accessed February 28, 2008). Lunde, Paul. Islam: Faith, Culture, History. New York: DK Publishing, 2002. Maachou, Abdelkader. OAPEC: An International Organization for Economic Cooperation and an Instrument for Regional Integration. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983. Mababaya, Mamarinta. The Role of Multinational Companies in the Middle East: The Case of Saudi Arabia. London: University of Westminster, 2002. MacLean, Aaron. “Islamic Banking, Is It Really Kosher?” The American, April/March 2007. Madany, Ismail, S. Ali, and M. Akhter. “Note on the Expansion of Higher Education in Bahrain,” Higher Education 17, no. 4 (1988): 411–415. Mahdi, Ali Akbar (ed.). Teen Life in the Middle East. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003. Mahdi, Salah. “Saudization and the Structure of the Labour Market in Saudi Arabia,” University of Hertfordshire Business School, Working Paper Series, Economics Paper no. 24. Hatfield, UK: University of Hertfordshire Business School, 2000. Mahmood, Reem. “Folk Dances of the United Arab Emirates,” al-Shindagah, May-June 1997. Available at http://www.alshindagah.com/may/dances.htm (last accessed October 22, 2008). Maktabi, R. “The Politics of Citizenship in Kuwait—Membership and Participation in a Rentier State.” Paper presented at 13th Annual National Political Science Conference, Hurdalsj
en, Oslo, Norway, January 5–7, 2005. Available at http://www.statsvitenskap. uio.no/konferanser/nfkis/kp/Maktabi.pdf (last accessed October 22, 2008). Mallat, Chibli. Introduction to Middle Eastern Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Mandaville, Jon E. “The Ottoman Province of al-Hasa in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 90, no. 3 (1970): 486–513. Marcel, Valerie, and John Mitchell. Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East. London: Chatham House, 2006. Masry, Abdallah. “Traditions of Archaeological Research in the Near East,” World Archaeology 13, no. 2 (1981): 222–239.

488

Selected Bibliography Mauger, Thierry. The Bedouins of Arabia. Paris: Souffles, 1987. ———. Impressions of Arabia: Architecture and Frescoes of the Asir Region. New York: Flammarion, 1996. Mazawi, Andre Elias. “The Contested Terrains of Education in the Arab States: An Appraisal of Major Research Trends,” Comparative Economics Review 43, no. 3 (1999): 332–352. McChesney, R. Charity and Philanthropy in Islam: Institutionalizing the Call to Do Good. Indianapolis: Indiana University Center on Philanthropy, 1995. McDonald, Robert W. The Arab League: A Study in the Dynamics of Regional Organization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965. McLoughlin, Leslie J. Ibn Saud: Founder of a Kingdom. London: St. Martin’s Press, 1993. Meeker, M. Literature and Violence in North Arabia. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Meigs, Peveril. Geography of Coastal Deserts. Paris: UNESCO Publications in Arid Zone Research 28, 1966. Al-Mennaa, Fahad Nasser. “The Causes of Drug Usage, Distribution, and Smuggling in Saudi Arabia.” PhD dissertation, Washington State University, 1995. Metz, Helen Chapin (ed.). Saudi Arabia: A Country Study. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office for the Library of Congress, 1992. ———. Persian Gulf States: Country Studies. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1994. Meyer, Birgit, and Annelies Moors. Religion, Media, and the Public Sphere. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005. Michalak-Pikulska, Barbara. Modern Poetry and Prose of Oman, 1970–2000. Krakow, Poland: Enigma Press, 2002. Miles, Hugh. “Al-Jazeera: The Inside Story of the Arab News Channel That Is Challenging the West,” Denver Post, October 2, 2006. Available at http://www.denverpost.com/ excerpts/ci_0002706197 (last accessed February 23, 2008). Miles, S.B. The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf. London: Frank Cass, 1966. Miller, Anthony, Thomas A. Cope, and J.A. Nyberg (eds.). Flora of the Arabian Peninsula and Socotra. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996. Miller, Brett A., Shannon E. Martin, and David A. Copeland. The Function of Newspapers in Society: A Global Perspective. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2003. Minosa, Tchekof. Najran—Desert Garden of Arabia. Paris: Scorpio Editeur, 1983. Mogassabi, Khalil S. “Modernity and Tradition in the Design of New Towns: Sadat City, Egypt and Yanbu, Saudi Arabia.” MCP thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1990. Mohamedi, Fareed, “Oil, Gas and the Future of Arab Gulf Countries,” Middle East Report 204 (1997): 2–6. Mohammed, Nadeya Sayed Ali. Population and Development of the Arab Gulf States: The Case of Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003. Moinuddin, Hasan. The Charter of the Islamic Conference: The Legal and Economic Framework. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1987. Monger, George. Marriage Customs of the World: From Henna to Honeymoons. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2004. Monroe, Elizabeth. Philby of Arabia. London: Farber and Farber, 1973. Moody, Burnett. “A Boys-Eye View of Dammam Port,” Saudi Aramco World 14, no. 2 (1963): 3–7. Motzki, Harald. The Origins of Islamic Jurisprudence: Meccan Fiqh before the Classical Schools. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2002.

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Selected Bibliography Mufti, Muhammad H. Health Care Development Strategies in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. New York: Kluwer Publishing, 2000. Al-Mughni, Haya. Women in Kuwait: The Policy of Gender. London: Saqi Books, 2006. Al-Muhairi, Butti Sultan. “The Development of the UAE Legal System and Unification with the Judicial System,” Arab Law Quarterly 11, no. 2 (1996): 116–160. Munif, Abd al-Rahman. Cities of Salt. New York: Vintage Books, 1989. Musa, Sulayman. T.E. Lawrence: An Arab View. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966. Musil, Alios. The Manners and Customs of the Rwala Bedouins. New York: American Geographical Society, 1928. ———. Northern Negd, a Topographical Itinerary. New York: American Geographical Society, 1928. al-Mutawa, Mohammed, John W. Fox, and Nada Mourtada-Sabbah (eds.). Globalization and the Gulf. London: Routledge, 2006. Nafisa, Motleb Abdullah. “Law and Social Change in Muslim Countries: The Concept of Islamic Law Held by the Hanbali School and the Saudi Arabian Legal System.” SJD thesis, Harvard Law School, 1975. An-Na‘im, Abdullahi A. Islamic Family Law in a Changing World: A Global Resource Book. New York: Palgrave, 2002. Al-Najjar, G. “Human Rights in a Crisis Situation: The Case of Kuwait after Occupation,” Human Rights Quarterly 23 (2001): 188–209. Nakash, Yitzhak. “The Conversion of Iraq’s Tribes to Shiism,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 26, no. 3 (1994): 443–463. Nakhleh, Emile A. The Gulf Cooperation Council: Policies, Problems, and Prospects. New York: Praeger, 1986. al-Nawawy, M., and A. Iskander. Al-Jazeera: How the Free Arab News Network Scooped the World and Changed the Middle East. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002. Nawwab, Ismail, Peter C. Speers, and Paul F. Hoye. Aramco and Its World: Arabia and the Middle East. Dhahran: Aramco, 1980. Nawwab, Nimah Ismail. “The Suqs of Asir,” Saudi Aramco World 49, no. 4 (1998): 2–9. ———. “The Culinary Kingdom,” Saudi Aramco World 50, no. 1 (1999): 88–97. “New Study Raises Doubts about Saudi Oil Reserves.” Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, March 31, 2004. Available at http://www.iags.org/n0331043.htm (last accessed January 28, 2008). Niblock, Tim. Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf. London: Croom Helm, 1980. ———. Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy, Survival. New York: Routledge, 2007. Nicholson, Eleanor. In the Footsteps of the Camel: A Portrait of the Bedouins of Eastern Saudi Arabia in Mid-Century. Riyadh: Transworld Arabian Library, 1983. Nicolson, James. The Hijaz Railway. London: Stacey International Publishers, 2005. Niebuhr, Carsten. Reisebeschreibung nach Arabien und anderen umliegenden L€andern, 3 vols. Copenhagen: Kaempfer and Persepolis, 1774–1837. Nomachi, Ali Kazuyoshi, and Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Mecca the Blessed, Medina the Radiant: The Holiest Cities of Islam. New York: Aperture, 1997. Nowshirvani, Vahid. “The Yellow Brick Road: Self-Sufficiency or Self-Enrichment in Saudi Agriculture?” MERIP Middle East Report, The Struggle for Food 145 (1987): 7–13. Ochsenwald, William. The Hijaz Railroad. Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1980. ———. Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz under Ottoman Control, 1840– 1908. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1984. Olsen, Poul Rovsing. Music in Bahrain. Moesgaard, Denmark: Jutland Historical Society, 2002.

490

Selected Bibliography al-Ostad, Ameer. “An Ethnic Geography of Kuwait: A Study of Eight Ethnic Groups.” PhD dissertation, Kent State University, 1986. Owen, Roger. State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2000. Owtran, Francis. Modern History of Oman: Formation of the State since 1920. London: I.B. Tauris, 2004. Palgrave, William Gifford. A Narrative of a Year’s Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia, 2 vols. London: Macmillan and Co., 1865. Pampanini, Andrea H. Cities from the Arabian Desert: The Building of Jubail and Yanbu in Saudi Arabia. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997. Paris, Timothy. Britain the Hashemites and Arab Rule, 1920–1925. London: Routledge, 2003. Parssinen, Jon, and Kaizir Talib. “A Traditional Community and Modernization: Saudi Camp, Dhahran,” Journal of Architectural Education 35, no. 3 (1982): 14–17. Pepper, William. “Foreign Capital Investment in Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council: Considerations, Issues and Concerns for Investors, Part 1,” Arab Law Quarterly 6, no. 3 (1991): 231–266. ———. “Foreign Capital Investment in Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council: Considerations, Issues and Concerns for Investors, Part 2,” Arab Law Quarterly 6, no. 4 (1991): 331–343. ———. “Foreign Capital Investment in Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council: Considerations, Issues and Concerns for Investors, Part 3,” Arab Law Quarterly 7, no. 1 (1991): 33–63. Perthes, Volker (ed.). Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004. Peters, Francis E. Muhammad and the Origins of Islam. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. ———. Hajj. The Muslim Pilgrimage to Mecca and the Holy Places. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. ———. Mecca: A Literary History of the Muslim Holy Land. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. ———. The Arabs and Arabia on the Eve of Islam. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1999. Peterson, Erik R. The Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988. Peterson, J.E. Saudi Arabia and the Illusion of Security. London: Oxford University Press, 2002. ———. Oman at War: The Sultanate’s Struggle for Supremacy. London: Saqi Books, 2008. Pesce, Angelo. Jiddah—Portrait of an Arabian City. Cambridge, UK: Falcon Press, 1976. Pesce, Angelo, and Khalid Khidr. Taif: The Summer Capital of Saudi Arabia. Jeddah: Immel, 1984. Philby, Harry St. John Bridger. “Southern Najd,” The Geographical Journal 55, no. 3 (1920): 161–185. ———. The Heart of Arabia, 2 vols. London: Constable, 1922. ———. Arabia of the Wahabis. London: Constable, 1928. ———. The Empty Quarter. London: Holt, 1933. ———. Sheba’s Daughters. London: Methuen & Co. 1939. ———. A Pilgrim in Arabia. London: R. Hale, 1946. ———. The Background of Islam: Being a Sketch of Arabian History in Pre-Islamic Times. London: Whitehead, Morris, 1947. ———. Arabian Days. London: R. Hale, 1948. ———. Arabian Highlands. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1952.

491

Selected Bibliography ———. Forty Years in the Wilderness. London: R. Hale, 1957. Pierre-Louis, Anne Maryse, Francisca A. Akala, and Hadia S. Karam. Public Health in the Middle East and North Africa: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2004. Pimlott, John, and Stephen Badsey (eds.). The Gulf War Assessed. London: Arms and Amour Press, 1992. Prochazka, Theodore. Saudi Arabian Dialects. New York: Kegan Paul International, 1988. Qutb, Sayyid. Milestones. Cairo: Kazi Press, 1964. Available at http://www.kalamullah. com/Books/MILESTONES.pdf (last accessed October 22, 2008). Qutub, Ishaq. “Urbanization in Contemporary Arab Gulf States,” Ekistics 50, no. 300 (1983): 170–182. Rabi, Uzi. The Emergence of State in a Tribal Society: Oman under Sa‘id bin Taymur, 1932– 1970. London: Sussex Academic Press, 2005. Rajab, Tareq Sayid. Tareq Sayid Rajab and the Development of Fine Art in Kuwait. Kuwait: Tareq Rajab Museum, 2001. Al Rajhi, Ahmed, et al. Economic Development in Saudi Arabia. New York: Routledge, 2003. Ramsay, Gail. “Global Heroes and Local Characters in Short Stories from the United Arab Emirates and the Sultanate of Oman.” Middle Eastern Literature 9, no. 2 (August 2006): 211–216. Randall, Jonathan. Osama: The Making of a Terrorist. New York: Random House, 2005. Al Rasheed, Madawi. “Durable and Non-Durable Dynasties: The Rashidies and Sa’udis in Central Arabia,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 19, no. 2 (1992): 144–158. ———. Politics in an Arabian Oasis: The Rashids of Saudi Arabia. London: I.B. Tauris, 1992. ———. “The Rashidi Dynasty: Political Centralization among the Shammar in North Arabia,” New Arabian Studies II (1993): 140–152. ———. “The Shia of Saudi Arabia: A Minority in Search of Cultural Authenticity.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 25, no. 1 (1998): 121–138. ———. A History of Saudi Arabia. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. ———. Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Al Rasheed, Madawi, and Loulouwa Al Rasheed. “The Politics of Encapsulation: Saudi Policy toward Tribal and Religious Opposition,” Middle Eastern Studies 32, no. 1 (January 1996): 96–119. Al Rasheed, Madawi, and Robert Vitalis (eds.). Counter-Narratives: History, Contemporary Society, and Politics in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. London: Palgrave and McMillan, 2004. Raswan, Carl R. “Tribal Areas and Migration Lines among North Arabian Bedouins,” Geographical Review 20, no. 3 (July 1930): 494–502. ———. Black Tents of Arabia: My Life among the Bedouin. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1935. Redden, Kenneth. Modern Legal Systems Encyclopedia. Middle East. Buffalo, NY: W.S. Hein, 1984. Reed, Jennifer. The Saudi Royal Family. New York: Chelsea House, 2006. Reich, Bernard (ed.). Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa: A Biographical Dictionary. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990. Rentz, George. Pearling in the Persian Gulf. Semitic and Oriental Studies: A volume presented to William Popper, edited by W. Fischel. (1951): 397–403. ———. “Notes on Oppenheim’s ’Die Beduinen,” Oriens 10, no. 1 (1957): 77–89. Rentz, George and William Facey. The Birth of the Islamic Reform Movement in Saudi Arabia: Muhammad Ibn ’Abd al-Wahhab (1703/4–1792) and the Beginnings of Unitarian Empire in Arabia. London: Arabian Publishers, 2004.

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Selected Bibliography Richardson, Neil, and Marcia Dorr. The Craft Heritage of Oman. Dubai: Motivate Publishing, 2003. Rihani, Ameen. Ibn Sa’oud of Arabia. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1928. Riolo, Amy. Arabian Delights: Recipes and Princely Entertaining Ideas from the Arabian Peninsula. Herndon, VA: Capital Books, 2008. Robinson, Jeffrey. Yamani: The Inside Story. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1988. Rodinson, Maxime. Muhammad, translated by Anne Carter. New York: The New Press, 2002. Rosendich, T.J. “Sports in Society: The Persian Gulf Countries,” Journal of the International Council for Health, Physical Education, and Recreation 27, no. 3 (1991): 26–30. Ross, Heather Colyer. Bedouin Jewelry of Saudi Arabia. London: Stacey International, 1983. Rotter, Eldon. “The Hejaz,” The Geographical Journal 77, no. 2 (1931): 97–108. Rubin, Barry (ed.). Crises in the Contemporary Persian Gulf. London: Frank Cass, 2002. Rugh, William A. “Arab Education: Tradition, Growth and Reform,” The Middle East Journal 56, no. 3 (2002): 396–414. ———. “Education in Saudi Arabia: Choices and Constraints,” Middle East Policy 9, no. 2 (2002): 40–55. ———. Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio, and Television in Arab Politics. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004. Rugh, William B. “UAE Foreign Policy,” in Perspectives on the United Arab Emirates. London: Trident Press, 1997. “Ruling Family.” Available at http://www.qatar-info.com/general/ruling.htm (last accessed October 22, 2008). Rush, Alan. Al-Sabah: History and Genealogy of Kuwait’s Ruling Family, 1752–1986. London: Garnet, 1987. Safeir, Leila. “The Status of Muslim Women in Sport: Conflict between Cultural Tradition and Modernization,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 20, no. 4 (1985): 283–306. Sakr, Naomi. Arab Television Today: Advancement via TV? London: I.B. Tauris, 2007. Salafy, Ali. The League of Arab States: Role and Objectives. Washington, D.C.: Arab Information Office, 1988. Al-Salem, Mohammad, and Saad al-Obaied. Fine Arts: Exhibition of Riyadh Yesterday and Today. Riyadh: Saudi Arabian Cultural and Arts Society, 1986. Salem, P. “Kuwait: Politics in a Participatory Emirate,” Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Carnegie Middle East Center, no. 3 (2007). Available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org (last accessed October 22, 2008). Saltin, Bengt. The Racing Camel (Camelus Dromedarius): Physiology, Metabolic Functions, and Adaptations. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1994. Salzman, Philip C. Pastoralists: Equality, Hierarchy and the State. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2004. Salzman, Philip C., and J. G. Galaty (eds.). Nomads in a Changing World. Naples, Italy: Dipartimento di Studi Asiatici, Instituto Universitario Orientale, 1990. al-Sanabary, Nagat. Education in the Arab Gulf States and the Arab World: An Annotated Bibliographic. New York: Garland Publishing, 1992. Sandwick, John A. (ed.). The Gulf Cooperation Council: Moderation and Stability in an Interdependent World. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987. Sani, Raja Abd Allah, and Marilyn Booth. Girls of Riyadh. New York: Penguin Press, 2007. Sarhan, Hashim. “Drug Abuse in the United Arab Emirates.” PhD dissertation, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 1995.

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Selected Bibliography Saud, Noura bint Muhammad, Al-Jawharah Muhammad ‘Anqari, and Madeha Muhammad Ajroush. Abha, Bilad Asir: South-Western Region of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Riyadh: M. al-Ajroush, 1989. Scarce, Jennifer. Women’s Costume of the Near and Middle East. London: Routledge, 2003. Schacht, Joseph. The Origins of Muhammadan Jurispridence. London: Oxford University Press, 1950. ———. An Introduction to Islamic Law. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1964. Serjeant, Robert. Customary and Shari‘ah Law in Arabian Society. Brookfield, VT: Variorum, 1991. Serjeant, Robert, and G. Rex Smith. Farmers and Fishermen in Arabia: Studies in Customary Law and Practice. Brookfield, VT: Variorum, 1995. Shafik, Viola. Arab Cinema: History and Culture. Cairo: American University of Cairo Press, 2007. Shahid, Irfan. The Martyrs of Najran. New Documents. Bruxelles: Soc. Des Bollandistes, 1971. ———. “Pre-Islamic Arabia,” in The Cambridge History of Islam, edited by P. M. Holt et al. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1978. Shahin, Wassim, and Ghassan Dibeh. Earnings Inequality, Unemployment, and Poverty in the Middle East and North Africa. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000. Shamekh, Ahmed A. “Spatial Patterns of Bedouin Settlement in Al-Qasim Region, Saudi Arabia.” PhD dissertation, University of Kentucky, 1975. Al-Shamlan, Saif Marzooq. Pearling in the Arabian Gulf: A Kuwaiti Memoir, translated by Peter Clark. London: London Center of Arab Studies, 2001. Shanklin, William M. “The Anthropology of the Rwala Bedouins,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 65 (1935): 375–390. Sharpley, Richard. “The Challenges of Economic Diversification through Tourism: The Case of Abu Dhabi,” International Journal of Tourism Research 4, no. 3 (2002): 221–235. Al-Shayeb, Abdallah A. Al-Jubail: Saudi Village (Architectural Survey). Doha, Qatar: Arab Gulf States Folklore Center, 1985. Shechter, Relli. Transitions in Domestic Consumption and Family Life. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003. Shoup, John A. “Hima: A Traditional Land-Use System in Contemporary Syria and Jordan.” PhD dissertation, Washington University in St. Louis, 1990. ———. “Middle Eastern Sheep Pastoralism and the Hima System,” in The World of Pastoralism, edited by John Galaty and Douglas Johnson. New York: Guilford Publications, 1990. ———. Culture and Customs of Jordan. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2007. ———. Culture and Customs of Syria. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2008. Silsby, Jill. Inland Birds of Saudi Arabia. London: Immel Publishing, 1980. Simarski, Lynn T. “The Desert Meets the Sown,” Saudi Aramco World 46, no. 2 (1995): 2–9. Simmons, Mathew R. “Will the Proved Reserve Scandal Open the Door to Genuine Data Reform?” Paper presented at the Reserve Reporting Conference, The Energy Forum, Houston, TX, April 14, 2004. Available at http://www.simmonsco-intl.com/files/ Reserves%20Reporting.pdf (last accessed January 28, 2008). Simons, Geoff. Saudi Arabia: The Shape of a Client Feudalism. London: Basingstoke, 1998. Simpson, St. J. “Gazelle-Hunters and Salt-Collectors: A Further Note on the Solubba,” Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research 293 (1994): 79–81. Simpson, William. The Prince: The Secret Story of the World’s Most Intriguing Royal, Prince Bandar bin Sultan. New York: Regan Books, 2006.

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Selected Bibliography Vine, Peter. Natural Emirates: Wildlife and Environment of the United Arab Emirates. London: Trident Press, 1996. Vogel, Frank. Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2000. ———. “The Public and Private in Saudi Arabia: Restrictions on the Powers of Committees for Ordering the Good and Forbidding the Evil,” Social Research: An International Quarterly of Social Sciences 70, no. 3 (2003): 749–768. Von Bruch, Gabriele. Islam, Honor, and Morality in Yemen: Ruling Families in Transition. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005. Wahba, Hafiz. “Wahhabism in Arabia: Past and Present,” Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 16, no. 4 (1929): 458–467. Wallin, Georg August. “Narrative of a Journey from Cairo to Medina and Mecca in 1845,” Journal of the Royal Geographic Society 24 (1854): 115–207. Walters, Timothy N., Alma Kadragic, and Lynne M. Walters, “Miracle or Mirage: Is Development Sustainable in the United Arab Emirates?” Middle East Review of International Affairs 10, no. 3 (2006): 77–91. Ward, Philip. Ha’il: Oasis City of Saudi Arabia. New York: Oleander Press, 1983. Wardak, Ali. “Crime and Social Control in Saudi Arabia,” in Transnational and Comparative Criminology, edited by James Sheptycki and Ali Wardak. London: Glasshouse, 2005. Warrick, Joby. “Leak Severed a Link to Al-Qaeda’s Secrets.” The Washington Post, October 9, 2007. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/ 09/AR2007100900791.html?hpid=topnews&sid=ST2007100901226 (last accessed October 10, 2007). Watt, Montgomery. Muhammad at Mecca. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1953. ———. Muhammad at Madinah. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1956. Watt, Montgomery and William Watt. Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1974 Weir, Shelagh. Tribal Order: Politics and Law in the Mountains of Yemen. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002. Weiss, Walter M., and Kurt-Michael Westermann. The Bazaar: Markets and Merchants of the Islamic World. New York: Thames and Hudson, 1998. Whalen, Norman. “Early Mankind in Arabia,” Saudi Aramco World 43, no. 4 (1992): 16–23. Wheeler, Brannon. Mecca and Eden: Ritual, Relics and Territory in Islam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. Wheeler, Deborah. The Internet in the Middle East: Global Expectations and Local Imaginations in Kuwait. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005. Whitcomb, D. “The Archaeology of al-Hasa’ Oasis in the Islamic Period,” Atlal, Journal of Saudi Arabian Studies 2 (1978): 95–113. Wikan, Unni. Behind the Veil in Arabia: Women in Oman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. Wilson, Jeremy. Lawrence of Arabia: The Authorized Biography of T.E. Lawrence. New York: Atheneum, 1989. Wilson, Mary C. King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987. ———. “The Hashemites, the Arab Revolt, and Arab Nationalism,” in The Origins of Arab Nationalism, edited by Rashid Khalidi et al. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991. Wilson, Rodney. The Politics of Islamic Finance. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004.

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Selected Bibliography Winder, Bailey. Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965. Wissmann, Heinrich. “Abdallah H. St. J. B. Philby (1885–1960), sein Leben und Wirken,” Die Welt des Islams 7, no. 1-4 (1964): 100–141. Wittmer, Walter, and Willi Buettiker (eds.). Fauna of Saudi Arabia. Basel: Pro Entomogogia, 1979–1999. World Islamic Front. “Jihad against Jews and Crusaders.” February 23, 1998. Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm (last accessed October 10, 2007). The World Revolution. “Human Trafficking.” Available at http://www.worldrevolution. org/guide/humantrafficking (last accessed October 22, 2008). World Tourism Organization. Outbound Tourism from Saudi Arabia. Madrid: World Tourism Organization, 2003. Wright, Steven. “Generational Change and Elite-Driven Reforms in the Kingdom of Bahrain.” The Sir William Luce Fellowship Paper no. 7. Durham, UK: University of Durham Middle East and Islamic Studies, 2006. Yamani, Mai. Changed Identities. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000. ———. Cradle of Islam: The Hijaz and the Quest for an Arabian Identity. London: I.B. Tauris, 2004. ———. “The Rites of Passage III: Death—the Final Vindication,” in Cradle of Islam: The Hijaz and the Quest for an Arabian Identity. London: I.B. Tauris, 2006. Yamani, Sarah, “Toward a National Education Development Paradigm in the Arab World: A Comparative Study of Saudi Arabia and Qatar,” al-Nakhlah—The Fletcher School Online Journal for Issues Related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization, 2006. Yazigi, Maya R. “The Politics of Kinship: The Family of Abu Bakr during the First Century of Islam.” PhD dissertation, University of California–Los Angeles, 2001. Yergin, Daniel. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991. al-Yousef, Mohammed T.H. “The Spatial Patterns of Sellers’ Movement in the Weekly Markets of al-Hasa Oasis,” Journal of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 26, no. 99 (2000). Available at http://pubcouncil.kuniv.edu.kw/JGAPS/english/showarticle.asp? id=1490 (last accessed October 23, 2008). Zahlan, Rosemary Said. The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1998. Zaid, Abdulla S. “The Ikhwan Movement of Najd, Saudi Arabia, 1908–1930.” PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 1989. Al-Zayani, A.R. A Taste of the Arabian Gulf. Bahrain: Ministry of Culture, 1988. Zubaida, Sami, and Richard Tapper (eds.). Taste of Thyme: Culinary Cultures of the Middle East. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000. Al-Zubaidi, Abeer. Critical Assessment of the Internet Development in Oman. Leeds, UK: University of Leeds, 2001.

498

Index

Page numbers for main entries appear in bold type. ‘Abbasids, 24, 38, 47, 119, 196, 211, 275, 340, 371, 374, 410, 417 ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Tuwaijri, 217 ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Sa‘ud, 2–3, 390, 394, 406; Abha territory, 4; al-Hasa, 195; ‘Ali bin Hussein bin ‘Ali, 15; allies, 453; Arab Revolt, 29; Bani Khalid, 52–53; Bedouin, 63, 325; Buraydah, 64–65; crime rates, 85; death, 421; Ha’il oasis, 187; Hijaz victory, 201; Ikhwan, 13, 209, 213, 306, 320; Jiddah, 242; jihad, 244; Kuwait, 252–53; Madinah, 275–76; medical service, 198; Mubarak al-Sabah al-Sabah, 299; music ban, 315; mutawwa, 318–19; oil industry, 30; Palestine, 347; Philby, Harry St. John, 32, 354, 434; Qahtan tribe, 366; Al Rashid family, 378–79; Riyadh, 383; Roosevelt, Franklin D., 444; Shammar tribe, 402; Shari‘ah law, 404; Ta’if massacre, 421; tribal areas abolition, 61; ‘Unayzah city, 437; unification of Arabia, 45; Wahhabi reforms, 361 ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin Baz, 228 ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin Muhammad bin Sa‘ud, 1, 383, 389 ‘Abdallah al Salim Al Sabah, 253, 386 ‘Abdallah bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud, 149, 196–97, 236, 390, 395 ‘Abdallah bin al-Hussein, 15, 29, 197, 209, 347

‘Abd al-Majid ‘Abdallah, 315, 316 ‘Abd al-Quddus al-Ansari, 32–33 ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Sa‘ud, 306 ‘Abd al-Rahman Munif, 111, 217 Abha (city), 3–4, 429 Abortion, 151 Abu Bakr, 15, 301, 410 Abu Dhabi, 359–60, 441, 443; ‘Ajaman, 14; arts in, 157; ‘Awamir tribe, 46; Bani Yas, 127, 139, 280, 323, 476; banking, 55; Al Bu Shams, 67, 68; City, 4–5; city, 441; cultural, 92–93; Duru‘ tribe, 46, 129; Emirate, 5–7; event hosting, 153–54; foreign aid, 172; free trade zones, 128; Fujayrah, 175; geography, 298; horse racing, 19; Al Maktum family, 280; Al Nahyan family, 54–55, 323–24; oases tribal loyalties, 334; oil industry, 339; poets, 271; Qawasim, 371; Samar, 316; Shari‘ah courts, 247; sovereign wealth fund, 132; television, 308; tourism, 35, 431; United Arab Emirates, 294, 295, 359–60, 441–43, 476; urbanization, 450; Wadi Hatta, 456; water, 54; wildlife conservation, 164; Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahayan, 475–76 Aden, 468, 470 ‘Adnan (northern tribes), 52, 53, 319, 412, 471 Adoption/lineage absorption, 237–38

Index Afghanistan, 119, 168, 171, 173, 174, 184, 220, 228–29, 239, 308, 344, 367–68, 395, 421, 452, 458 Aflaj (underground irrigation canals), 8–9, 460 Africa, 21, 25, 28, 66, 73, 90, 144, 211, 237, 341, 361, 370, 389, 458 Africans, 145, 148, 371, 426–27 Agency system, 132 Agriculture, 7–12; Abha area, 3; Asir, 44; Buraydah, 65; cooperatives, 65; dates, 102–3, 331; Ha’il oasis, 187; Hijaz, 200; Najran, 327; Qasim province, 369; Ra’s al Khaymah, 337; settlements, 351; Shammar tribe, 402; Tihamah, 426–27; traditional economy, 135, 137–38; ‘Unayzah city area, 437–38; urbanization, 451; water and cuisine, 87; work songs, 312–13 Ahl al-Hadarah (ethnic group), 114 Ahmad Al Jabir Al Sabah, 253 Ahmad al Jabir al Sabah, 385 Ahmad ibn ‘Ali al Thani, 372–73, 425 ‘Ajami Ibn Suwayt, 109 ‘Ajman, 12–13, 52, 128, 144, 319, 441, 453; Umm al-Quwayn, 13–14 Al-Badil (city), 389 Al Bu Sa‘id (dynasty), 365 Alcohol consumption, 123 Algeria, 239, 465 Algiers Agreement, 223–24 Al ‘Ali (family), 14, 187, 401–2 ‘Ali Bahar, 303 ‘Ali bin Khalifah, 249–50 ‘Ali bin Musallam, 328 ‘Ali ibn ‘Abdallah al Thani, 372, 425 ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, 196, 197, 201, 211, 225, 230, 274, 301, 312, 408–10, 417 ‘Ali Zayn al-‘Abadin, 409, 410 Allenby, Edmund, 29 Alwah (tribal group), 319 American Mission, 49, 198 ‘Anazah (tribal confederation), 15–17, 39, 49, 61, 108, 109, 319, 335, 401–2; ruling families, 385 Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 338 Animal husbandry, 60, 262, 349 Antiquities, 31–36, 91, 93

500

Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco). See Aramco (Arabian American Oil Company) Arabian Gulf, 17–18, 219–20; General Treaty of Peace, 5, 6, 372; Perpetual Treaty of Peace, 371 Arabian horses, 10, 18–19, 164 Arabian Peninsula, 20–22, 432; climate, 76–77; crossing, 354, 375; deserts, 106–8; ethnic composition, 146; explorers, 432–34; fauna/flora, 160–64; mountains, 296–99; oases, 333–35; sanctity, 397; wadis, 455–56; water/ irrigation, 459–61. See also Hijaz (region); Najd (region) Arabic (language), 22–28, 166, 218, 416; broadcasting, 238–40, 423; communications media, 291; dialects, 249, 309, 374–75; literature, 264–72 Arabic Diaspora, 25 Arabic renaissance (nahdah), 265–66 Arab-Israeli conflict, 174, 342, 345, 347 Arab League, 173, 182, 215, 223, 233, 252, 348 Arab nationalism, 115, 260; Bahrain, 50; British policies, 469; ‘Isa bin Salman Al Khalifah, 224; Jabal al-Akhdar War, 233; Nizwa imamate, 215; Oman, 365; poets, 269–70; Saddam Hussein, 182. See also Pan-Arabism movement Arab Revolt, 15, 16, 28–29, 466; Bedouin, 63; Hashemites, 196–97, 201; Hijaz Railway, 202; Hussein bin ‘Ali, 275, 279, 406; Huwaytat Bedouin, 209; Lawrence of Arabia, 34, 259; Madinah, 275; Ta’if massacre, 421; Yemen, 468, 469 Arabs, 60, 147, 148, 471; cultural identity, 33–34, 146–47, 234–35, 289–90; pan-Arabism movement, 65, 146–47, 339, 348, 390 Aramco (Arabian American Oil Company), 13, 30–31, 97, 110, 195, 198, 338–39, 347, 394, 422, 465. See also Saudi Aramco Archaeological sites, 31–36, 102, 322, 393, 419, 442 Architecture, 36–43, 242, 257, 283, 326; Al-Manamah, 282; climate, 77; Dubai wind tower, 280; protection, 93; religion, 41–42 Armenians, 26, 368 Art, 34, 156–58

Index ‘Ashurah, 69, 203, 204, 374 Asir (region), 40, 44–45; ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin Muhammad control, 1; agriculture, 8; Bedouin, 10–11; mountains, 297; Al Sa‘ud control, 390; tourism, 429; women’s dress, 120 Assyrians, 22, 72 Atat€ urk, Kamal, 197, 342, 418 Athletics, 414–15 ‘Awamir (tribal confederation), 46, 59, 129, 193 ‘Awdh Dukhi, 312 ‘Awn ‘Abdallah Abu Takikan, 210 Ayatallah, 411 Al ‘Ayn/al-Buraymi (oasis), 6, 35, 110, 270, 298, 333, 335; Al Bu Falah control, 55; Al Bu Shams, 67; Dhawahir tribe, 309, 334; Al Nahyan family, 323–24; university, 449, 475 Ayyubids, 200, 242, 279, 405, 418 Ba‘ath Party (South Yemen), 469 Bab al-Bahrayn, 203, 282 Bab al-Mandab Straits, 21–22 Baghdad Pact, 197, 219 Baharnah (ethnic group), 50, 143–44, 147, 312–13 Bahla, 47–48, 140, 240–41, 362, 456 Bahrain, 21, 32, 48–51, 135, 139, 172, 299; agriculture, 461; ‘Ajman, 14; American Mission medical services, 198; Arabic dialect, 28; archeology, 33, 35; art scene, 156, 157; Bani Khalid, 51–52; broadcasting, 423; clothing, 121; companies, 83; crime control/enforcement, 85; cuisine, 90; dancing, 101, 314; divorce rate, 116; drug trafficking, 124; economic policies, 132–33; education/ schooling, 141; ethnic groups, 143–48; film industry, 155; foreign relations, 167–68, 219–20, 444; Gulf Cooperation Council, 179; Hawar islands dispute, 171; health services, 199; hiya biya custom, 203–4; Hundu/Pakistani population, 382; Internet services, 221, 222; Iranian territorial claims, 50, 225, 250, 387; irrigation, 8; ‘Isa bin Salman Al Khalifah, 224–25; Islamic law, 159; Al Jazeera ban, 172; judicial system, 246; Al Khalifah family, 16, 18, 19, 249–50; literature, 269–70; Al-Manamah (city),

281–82; military, 293–94, 296; AlMuharraq, 303–4; musical traditions, 311, 312, 313, 315; Nestorian Christians, 381; oases, 333, 335; observances, 203, 204; oil industry, 337, 339; Olympic team, 414; pearling, 138, 353; poetry traditions, 264; political organization, 359; pottery, 190, 192; press freedom, 291; Qatar, 171, 372; Qatif oasis, 374; racing, 18, 19, 263; Al Sabah family, 385; sex trade, 400; Shari‘ah law, 404; Shi‘ites, 204, 362, 409, 411; shipbuilding, 138; singers, 316; sovereign wealth funds, 131; television, 423; textile industry, 140; tourism, 430; Tree of Life, 363; unemployment, 439; university/ higher education, 449; urbanization, 451; US free trade, 181; water resources, 460, 461; women’s rights, 178 Bahrainization policy, 51 Bakil (tribal confederation), 470, 471–72 Baluch (ethnic group), 144, 148, 237–38, 288, 309 Baluchistan, 66 Bani Khalid (tribe), 12, 51–53, 195, 251, 302, 374; Jubayl al-Bahri, 245; Kuwait, 255, 256; Muntafiq tribe, 304 Bani Riyam (tribe), 215, 233–34, 335 Bani Tamim (tribe), 53–54, 108, 187, 302, 402, 425 Bani ‘Utbah (tribal confederation), 49, 249, 313, 372, 385 Bani Yam (tribe), 305–6 Bani Yas (tribal confederation), 5–6, 54–55, 334, 335; Abu Dhabi, 4, 323; Al Bu Falasah, 323; Dubai, 127; Ghuffalah Al Bu Falah, 459; Al Maktum family, 280; Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahayan, 475 Banking, 55–56; Islamic, 57–58 Banu Hashim. See Hashemites Barajil (wind tower houses), 37, 41 Al-Batinah (region), 59 Bayt Kathir (tribal confederation), 59–60, 107, 193, 380, 468 Bedouins (Badw), 60, 152; ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Sa‘ud, 2; Arabian horses, 18–19; camels, 70–72; citizenship, 74; cuisine, 87, 162; culture, 10–11, 60–64, 289; dialects, 25, 27–28; evil eye, 362; fish-eaters, 138–39; footwear, 119; graves, 104; handicrafts,

501

Index Bedouins (Badw) (Continued) 189, 192; hunting/gathering economy, 136; Ikhwan designation, 213–14; Kuwait City, 256; Lawrence, T. E., 259; literature, 266; markets, 283–84; music, 314–15; oases communities, 334; pastoralism, 60, 350–51; pastoral nomadism, 349–50; popular religious practices, 362–63; Rawashid/al-Rashid lifestyle, 380; Rub‘ al-Khali Desert, 107; social status, 412–13; tents, 39; textile industry, 140; trade role, 139; weaving, 190, 191; women, 177, 178 Belgrave, Charles, 50, 224 Bell, Gerturde, 2, 354 Bertram, Thomas, 354 Bin Ladin, Osama. See Usamah bin Muhammad bin ’Awad bin Ladin Binzagr, Darah, 158 Birth control, 150–51 Borders: Abu Dhabi/Oman, 6; ‘Ajman tribal, 12; Arabic/Kurdish/Persian language, 25; Bahrain-Qatar dispute, 167; Bedouin culture, 63–64; Ikhwan, 213; Iran-Iraq, 223; Iraq-Kuwait dispute, 169, 182, 252, 254–55, 387; Iraq-Saudi Arabia, 106, 305; Jordanian-Saudi Arabian, 209–10; Kuwait-Saudi Arabia dispute, 253, 305; Oman disputes, 170; Oman-Saudi Arabia dispute, 341; OmanYemen, 25, 170; Qatar disputes, 171; Saudi Arabia, 173, 220, 394; Saudi Arabia-Yemen, 328, 421, 470; United Arab Emirates, 172 Borsa, 322 Boys, 62, 65, 151, 178 British East India Company, 251, 256, 385, 468 British government: ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Sa‘ud, 2, 187; Abu Dhabi, 4–5, 6, 7; Aden and South Yemen, 470; ‘Ajman recognition, 14; ‘Anazah tribe, 16; Arab Revolt, 28–29; Aramco formation, 30; Bahrain, 49, 50, 250; Al-Dawhah, 104; Dubai, 126, 127; Fujayrah, 175; Gulf maritime trade security, 4–6, 371; Hashemites, 15, 196–97, 201; Hawali Islands dispute, 50; Hussein bin ‘Ali, 278, 406; Huwaytat tribe, 209; Ibn Sa‘ud, 320; Ikhwan movement, 213; Iraqi-Saudi Arabian board, 305;

502

Iraq-Kuwait territorial dispute, 181–82; judicial system, 247; Kuwait, 251, 255, 299–300; Madinah, 275–76; Mubarak bin Sabah Al Sabah, 299; North Yemen, 469; Oman, 66–67, 288, 341; pearling, 353; pearl trade, 138; Qatar, 372; regional relations, 443; Sa‘id bin Maktum, 280; slave trade, 237 British Mandate of Palestine, 196–97 Broadcast media, 292 Al Bu Falah (family lineage), 4, 6, 46, 54, 55, 67, 335, 475 Al Bu Falasah (tribe), 280, 323 Bukhari (ethnic group), 145, 421 Buraydah (city), 64–65, 437 Burckhardt, Johann Ludwig, 279, 432 Bureyh (tribal group), 319 Burton, Richard, 279, 433 Al Bu Sa‘idi (family), 66–67, 129, 214, 288, 335, 340, 459 Bush, George W., 168, 172, 174, 184, 185 Al Bu Shams (tribe), 67–68 Byzantine Empire, 393, 418, 419 Calendar, 69–70, 205 Camels, 10, 21, 65, 70–72, 191; ‘Ajman, 13; animal husbandry, 349; domestication/ pastoralism, 136–37; Duru‘ tribe, 130; Harasis tribe, 193; Al Murrah, 306; racing, 236, 459; water resources, 460–61; women in Jannabah wedding customs, 238 Canada, 336, 337 Capital punishment, 85–86, 208 Cemeteries, 105 Censorship, 221, 222, 291, 329–30 Central region. See Najd (region) Ceramics, 377, 378 Charitable organizations, 72–73 Charms, 191, 362 Chechnya, 73, 228 Children, 116, 141–42, 203–4, 362, 399–401 China, 181, 336, 377, 445 Christianity, 321, 322, 381–82; Arabic pre-Islamic inscriptions, 23; Bahrain, 49; Bedouin culture, 62; calendar, 69; Islamic doctrine, 226; Kuwait, 251; Najran, 326, 327–28; Sunni Islam, 418 Christians, 48, 288, 445; Arabic language use, 26; Kuwaiti families, 358;

Index missionaries, 198; Muhammad, the Prophet, 300–301; Wahhabi Islam, 228 Cities, 450–51; Qasim province, 369; Tihamah, 426–27; wadis, 455–56. See also Names of specific city Citizenship: ‘Awamir tribe, 46; Bahrain ethnic group, 147–48; Dhafir tribe, 109; ethnicity, 146; females, 286; Kuwait, 74– 76, 147; labor policy, 133; Palestinian, 147, 348; al-Rashid tribe, 381; Saudi Arabia, 148; Saudi Arabia Shi‘ite population, 358; sports teams, 414; stateless persons (bidun), 74–75; women in Oman, 341 Climate, 76–77; Asir, 44; Al-Batinah, 59; desert, 108; flora/fauna, 160–61; Jubayl al-Bahri, 244–45; Najd, 324; ‘Unayzah city area, 437–38 Clothing, 117–22; handicrafts, 189; industry, 120; textile production, 140; women traditional dance, 99; Yemeni headgear, 122 Coffee, 44, 77–79 Coffeehouses (maqha), 79, 262 Cold War, 219–20, 260, 261, 395, 445 Committee for the Defense of Shari‘a Law, 208 Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, 79–80, 228, 458 Communist parties, 469 Companies, 81–84 Controlled substances (drugs), 123–24 Coral, 18, 39, 40, 41 Corruption, 85, 308, 328, 462 Courts, 245–47 Cox, Percy, 354 Crafts. See Handicrafts Crane, Charles R., 2 Crime, 84–86; Bedouin culture, 62; customary law, 94–95; drug trafficking, 123–24; slavery and sex trafficking, 400–401 Crops, 11–12, 65, 78, 82, 162, 313, 445; export, 420; farming methods, 44; oases, 334, 373–74, 419–20; Tihamah, 426; traditional, 65, 137, 138; ‘Unayzah city area, 437–38. See also Dates Cuisine, 86–90 Culture: Bedouin, 60–64; folklore, 165–67; heritage, 91–93; identity, 33–34, 146–47, 234–35, 289–90; Janadiriyah festival,

235–37; leisure, 262–63; literature, 264– 72; material, 288–90; United Arab Emirate festivals, 153–54 Currencies, 56, 57 Customary law, 94–95; judicial system, 245–47; pastoralist land/water ownership, 350; Shari‘ah law, 404; social organizing principle, 41l; tribal raiding, 62; water resource access, 456 Dakhiliyah (region), 47, 331 Dammam (city), 97–98, 391 Dance, 98–102, 145, 203, 361–62; wedding, 287, 314 Dates, 9, 102–3, 138, 161; commercial production, 12; Duru‘ tribe, 129–30; Liwa Oases, 6; Nizwa city, 331; oases, 334; oasis agriculture, 9; Qasim province, 369; water resources, 460 Al-Dawhah (Doha, city), 103–4 Day of the Ditch (Yawm al-Ukhdud), 326, 327 Death penalty, 123 Death rites, 101, 104–6, 122 Defense agreements: Gulf Cooperation Council, 179; Kuwait, 169 Democracy, 184, 185, 254, 358, 385 Demographics: ‘Anazah, 17; Arabic language non-Arab use, 26; change, 290; Al-Dawhah, 104; drug trafficking, 124 Desalination plants, 242, 245, 467 Deserts, 20, 106–8, 109–10, 340, 391–92; animal husbandry, 349; Bedouin culture, 10; camels, 70; flora/fauna, 160–64; wadis, 455 Detribalization, 63 Dhafir (tribal confederation), 61, 106–8, 305, 319 Dhahi bin al-Walid, 311 Dhahirah (region), 109–10, 139, 214–15 Dhahran (city), 110–11 Dhahuriyin (tribe), 309 Dhawahir (tribe), 55, 309, 334, 335 Dhows (sailing vessels), 17, 111–13, 138, 263, 352 Dhufar (region), 66, 67, 113–14, 341; rebellion, 114–15, 193, 365; shrines, 42; Taymur bin Faysal, 388 Dhufar Liberation Front (DLF), 67, 114–15 Dickson, H. R. P., 434

503

Index Didan bin Fahad bin Hithlayn, 13 Dilmun, 33, 48, 139, 143, 244–45, 281, 363 Diri‘yah, 34, 302, 325, 384, 389, 458 Diri‘yah (oasis), 335 Divorce (talaq), 115–16, 150–51, 240, 286, 287 Diwan. See Majlis Diyab bin ‘Isa Al Bu Falah, 323 Djibouti, 22, 25 Doha (city). See Al–Dawhah Doughty, Charles, 433, 437 Dowries, 116, 191, 240, 286 Dress, 45, 117–22, 165, 426–27; gender, 177–78; honor, 206; women dance, 99 Drugs, 16, 85, 123–24 Drumming, 314–15 Dubai, 125–28, 441, 443; ‘Ajman tribe, 14; architecture, 37; art, 157; banking, 55; broadcasting, 423; charitable organizations, 73; culture, 92; Al-Dawhah, 104; fairs and festivals, 153; Fujayrah, 175; horse racing, 19; leisure, 262; Al Maktum family, 280–81; oil industry, 339; pearling, 280, 352; Persian population, 144; Wadi Hatta, 456 Duru‘ (tribe), 46, 109, 110, 129–30, 136, 193, 237–38, 459 Dushan (family), 320 Dutch Disease problem, 134 Economic development, 81–84; Arab League, 261; Bahrain, 250; Bedouin culture, 63–64; fine arts, 156; Fujayrah, 175; Gulf Cooperation Council, 180–81; Kuwait city, 257; nationalization policies, 338–39; oil-dependent, 131; oil prices and Iraq, 182; oil production nationalization, 338; Oman, 341; post-oil world planning, 131–34; Saudi Arabia, 394–95, 462–63; Saudization, 395–96; skilled workers, 132; terrorism/security, 398; ‘Unayzah city area, 438; United Arab Emirate trade fairs, 153–54; women’s rights, 462–63 Economics, 131–34; Abu Dhabi, 6; agriculture, 137–38; ‘Ajman tribe, 14; crafts, 139–40; fishing, 138–39; hunting/ gathering, 135–36; pastoralism, 136–37; pearling, 138; shipbuilding, 138; trade, 139 Education, 140–42; intellectuals, 217–18; job skills, 439–40; modernization,

504

140–42; Palestinians, 147; Qasim province, 369; Saudi Arabia, 65, 396; Sharqah, 407; terrorism, 398; United Arab Emirates, 475. See also Universities Egypt, 25, 65, 79, 204, 223, 227, 307, 315, 347, 361, 390, 444; Arabic language, 23; Arabic renaissance (nahdah), 265; Arab League, 260–61; interest/time value of money, 57; Jiddah, 242; pan-Arabism movement, 146–47; ‘Utaybah tribe confederation, 453; Yemen, 328, 468 Elections: ‘Ali, 408–9; Imams, 211, 214; legislative, 385–86; muncipal, 171; national bodies, 254, 386, 425; parliamentary, 50, 74, 341, 358–59; presidential, 470; reform, 255, 358, 360; successor to throne, 224; support for, 148, 169; United States, 445; women, 365, 373 Elites: Al al-Shaykh (family), 303; Madinah, 276; Saudi Arabia, 16; secular intellectuals, 218; sharif/sayyid, 405; Tamim ibn Murr, 54 Emir, 142–43 Emiratization policy, 442 Employment, 438–40; Bahrainization, 51; education relevance, 133–34; Emiratization, 442; Omanization, 365; professional development, 198–99; Saudization, 133–34, 199, 338, 395–96, 448; tourism industry, 429; vocation education, 449 Empty Quarter, 44, 107, 354, 391; archaeology, 32; crossing, 354; exploration of, 434; tourism, 431 Energy, 219, 344; oil reserve estimates, 336–37; supplies, 445 Eritrea, 22 Ethiopia, 77, 301, 381–82 Ethnic groups, 143–46, 147, 328, 416, 421, 426–27 Ethnicity, 146–48 European Union, 180–81 Euting, Julius, 433 Expatriates, 147–48, 439–40 Explorers, 380, 432–34; Philby, Harry St. John, 354 Face covering, 118–19 Fahda bint ‘Asi Al Shuraim, 402 Fahd bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Al Sa‘ud, 149–50, 348, 390, 394; death rites, 105–6

Index Families, 150–51, 411–12; Bedouin culture, 62; customary law, 94–95; endogamous marriages, 285; folklore, 166; honor, 177, 206, 413; house design, 43; income, 440; land/water rights inheritance, 9; pre-Islamic period, 235; sharif/sayyid, 405; television series, 308; tents, 39 Family planning, 150–51 Faqih (legal scholars), 158–60 Farasis (ethnic group), 144 Farmers, 53, 351; Buraydah, 64; camel use, 71; incentive payments, 11; markets, 283; pastsoralists, 137, 351; Qahtan, 351; tribute payment, 325 Farming, 3, 12, 65, 135, 262, 282, 290, 420; Asir, 87; Bani Tamim, 53, 187; Bedouin, 63; commercial, 82, 306; date, 102, 139, 235; Dhufar, 114; Hijaz, 200; Ikhwan, 213, 393; irrigation, 438; Musandam Peninsula, 309; Mutayr, 319, 320; Najd, 324; Najran, 326; oases, 9, 59, 86, 91, 165, 187, 234, 333–34, 393, 419; pastoralists, 350; Qasim, 369; Qatif, 373; Quraysh, 375; social status, 61; Ta’if, 420; Tihamah, 426–27; ‘Unayzah, 437; urbanization, 451 Fasting practices, 231–32 Fatah (Palestinian political party), 349 Fatamid dynasty, 204, 405, 411, 418 Fatimah al-Mutayri, 320 Fatimah Zahirah, 230, 408, 410 Fatwas, 159–60 Faysal al-Duwaysh, 213, 320 Faysal bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Al Sa‘ud, 152, 196–97, 201, 277, 347, 348, 390, 394, 422, 446 Faysal bin Hussein bin Ali El-Hashemi, 15, 28–29, 259 Faysal bin Khalid Al Faysal, 45 Faysal bin Musa‘id bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 152, 467 Faysal bin Turki, 66, 390, 394 Female circumcision, 323 Feminists, 445 Festivals: Arabian horse, 19; ‘Ashurah, 69, 203, 204, 374; Islamic, 203–4; Janadiriyah Heritage, 235–37; national, 205; United Arab Emirates, 153–54. See also Ramadan Film industry, 128, 154–56, 315 Finance, 51, 55–56, 58

Fine art, 156–58 Fiqh (knowledge/jurisprudence), 158–60, 273–74, 403 Fishing, 18, 112, 138–39, 459 Five Pillars of Faith, 229–32 Flora and fauna, 136, 160–64 Flowers (fresh cut), 11–12 Folklore, 98, 165–67 Folk music, 98 Food, 86–90, 445; Bedouin, 10; wedding customs, 287 Footwear, 119–20 Foreign guestworkers, 133; Abu Dhabi, 4, 7; Bahrain, 51; crime/law enforcement, 85; cuisine, 89–90; Al-Dawhah, 104; ethnicity, 147–48; expulsion, 147; Ha’il oasis, 187; Hindu, 362–63; Jubayl industrial, 245; medical personnel, 198–99; oil industry, 338, 467; Oman, 288, 365; Palestinians, 347–48; Saudi Arabia, 30–31, 393, 429; sex trade, 399–401; ‘Unayzah city, 438; unemployment, 133–34, 439–40 Foreign policies: Bahrain, 167–68; Great Britain, 259; international relations, 219– 20; Iran-Iraq War, 223–24; Kuwait, 168– 69; Lawrence, T. E., 259; Oman, 169– 71; Palestine, 347–49; Qatar, 171–72, 359; Sabah al-Salim Al-Sabah, 387; Saudi Arabia, 149, 152, 173–74, 395; terrorism, 184; United Arab Emirates, 172–73 Foreign students, 449 Foreign trade, Gulf Cooperation Council, 132 Forts, 42, 110, 392, 407; Al-Dawhah city, 104; Bani ‘Utbah, 49; Dubai, 125; Kuwait, 52, 251; Nizwa city, 331; Oman, 59; Ottoman period, 419 France, 28, 196, 406; banking/finance sector, 55 Frankincense (luban), 59, 215–16, 389 Freedom: Internet access, 222; press, 238– 40, 254, 291–92, 329–30; speech, 207; United Arab Emirates, 359–60; women, 461–63 Free trade agreements, 51, 168, 170 Free trade zones, 127, 128–29, 132, 180–81 Fudul (tribe), 108 Al Fuhaydah (subtribe), 305 Fujayrah, 128, 175, 441, 443

505

Index Gender and gender relations, 177–78; education, 141–42; family life, 150–51; honor, 206; marriage, 286; Sulubba society, 416; television preferences, 424; US-Saudi/Gulf state relations, 445; wedding customs, 238; women athletes, 415. See also Boys; Girls; Men; Women; Women’s rights Gender segregation, 228, 422; architecture, 42–43; camels, 71; dancing, 99–100; education, 447; Internet access, 222; leisure, 262, 263; majlis, 276; medical personnel, 199; Wahhabi Islam, 228 General Telecommunications Organization, 221–22 General Treaty of Peace, 5, 6, 372 Ghafiri (northern descent), 59, 67, 237, 459, 471 Ghalib bin ‘Ali al-Hina’i, 67, 215, 233 Al Gharir (family), 52, 53 Ghassanids, 63, 322 Ghazi al-Ghusaybi, 440 Ghazi Qosaibi, 217 Ghuffalah Al Bu Falah (tribe), 459 Girls, 62, 151, 177–78, 235, 318; education, 65, 141–42, 415; sexual slavery, 400 Globalization, 81–84, 132, 142, 218, 270, 289–90 Glubb, John B., 210 Gold, 57, 240–41 Government: Bahrain, 359; Bahrainization, 51; Bedouin controls, 63; cultural heritage protection, 93; detribalization, 63; education policies, 141–42; Emiratization, 442; health care services, 197–99; Islam, 226, 228–29; judicial/legal systems, 245–47; Kuwait, 255; majlis, 276– 77; nationalization, 337, 338, 469; oil-dependent development, 131; Oman, 341, 360; Omanization, 365; post-oil investment policies, 131–32; Qatar, 359, 372–73; Saudi Arabia, 357–58; Saudization, 133–34, 199, 338, 395–96, 448; traditional crafts, 91; unemployment, 439; United Arab Emirates, 358–59, 441; urbanization, 450–51; Yemeni Marxist, 470. See also Foreign policies Grand Sharifs, 196, 347, 405, 406

506

Great Britain, 174; Dhufar Liberation Front, 115; Gulf states oil, 338; Ibn Sa‘ud, 394; international relations, 219–20; ‘Isa bin Salman Al Khalifah, 224; Jabal al-Akhdar War, 215, 233–34; Lawrence, T. E., 259; League of Arab States, 260; objectives, 259; Oman, 170; Palestine, 347; peace treaty, 17–18; Qatar, 171, 425; Al Sa‘ud family, 390; United Arab Emirates, 7, 172. See also British government Guarmani, Carlo, 433 The Gulf. See Arabian Gulf Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 168, 170, 171, 172, 173, 179–81, 444; Bahrain, 51; banking/finance industry, 56; communication media, 292; crime control/enforcement, 85; drug trafficking, 123–24; economic policies, 131–34; higher education, 449; interest/ time value of money, 58; jihad, 244; oil, 335; Palestine, 347–49; Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah, 387; Saudi Arabia, 358; security/terrorism, 397–98; sex trade, 399–401; unemployment, 439–40; United Arab Emirates, 441; Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahayan, 475 Gulf-style music, 310, 315–17 Gulf War (1990-1991), 149, 171, 181–83, 344; endangered species, 162; Jihadists, 228–29; Kuwait citizenship, 74–75; new media, 292; Yemen, 470 Gulf War (2003), 183–85 Hadda Agreement, 209 Hadith, 225, 301, 418 Hadramawt (tribe), 59 Ha’il (oasis), 187–88, 379 Al-Hajar kingdom, 194–95 Hajj. See Pilgrimage (Hajj) Hamad bin ‘Isa Al Khalifah Al Thani, 50, 51, 144, 171, 238, 250, 304, 359, 425 Hamas (Palestinian movement), 349 Hanafi school, 159, 246, 273, 404 Hanbali school, 46, 85, 226, 246, 273; archaeological artifact displays, 34; ijtihad closure, 225; Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 302, 389. See also Wahhabi movement Handicrafts, 139–40, 188–92; Abu Dhabi, 4; Bahrain, 32; globalization, 91; market

Index system, 285; Nizwa, 331; pre-Islamic, 235, 327; Qasim, 369; Saudi Arabian work status, 396; tourism, 283; ‘Unayzah, 396; woodworking, 40, 190–91, 309 Haram, 456 Harasis (tribe), 59, 108, 192–93 Harb (tribe), 61, 319, 453 Hariri, Rafik, 81–82 Harith (tribe), 214–15, 237 Al-Hasa (oasis/region), 1, 52, 102, 103, 193–95 Hasan al-Banna’, 227 Hasan bin ‘Ali, 405 Hasan ibn ‘Ali, 230, 408, 410 Hashemites, 196–97, 213, 278, 410; ‘Abbasid revolt, 196; Arab Revolt, 28–29; expulsion from Hijaz, 15; Hussein bin ‘Ali, 406; Madinah, 275; Quraysh tribe, 374–75; rule of Hijaz, 201; Al Sa‘ud family, 390; Saudi Arabian Palestinian policy, 348; sayyid title, 405 Hashid (tribal confederation), 470, 472 Hashim bin ‘Abd al-Manaf, 196 Hawalah (ethnic group), 49, 50, 145 Hawk of the Quraysh, 376 Headgear, 118–19, 122, 177–78 Health care systems, 197–99; American Mission, 198 Hereditary leadership, 409–10, 413 Higher education, 445–49; Bahrain, 449; Kuwait, 448; Oman, 449; Qatar, 449; Saudi Arabia, 446–48; United Arab Emirates, 449 Hijaz (region), 200–201; ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin Muhammad control, 1; ’Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Al Sa‘ud, 279; ‘Ali bin Hussein bin ‘Ali, 15; Arabic, 25, 27; Arabic renaissance (nahdah), 265; Arab revolt, 28–29; architecture, 39–40; clothing styles, 120–21; dates, 103; dress, 120–21; Hashemites, 197; Ikhwan movement, 213; Jewish population, 381; Jiddah, 242; jihad, 244; Kingdom, 275; literature, 266–67; mountains, 297; mourning rituals, 105; Muhammad ‘Abduh folk songs, 315; Nabateans, 321–22; Al Sa‘ud control, 390; Saudi conquest, 244; ‘Utaybah tribe confederation, 453; wedding music, 313–14 Hijaz Liberal Party, 197

Hijaz Railway, 29, 34, 139, 188, 201–2, 275, 419 Hillal al-Mutayri, 320 Hima/mahimiyah, 456 Himyarites, 322, 326 Hinawi (southern descent), 54, 59, 193; Jannabah tribe, 237–38; al-Rashid (tribe), 380–81 Hindus, 28, 49, 145–46, 288, 362–63, 382 Hisham Nazir, 465 Historical sites, 31–36; Bahrain, 430; cultural heritage, 91; Oman, 431; tourism, 427; Wahhabi ideology, 93 Hizballah Bahrain, 50 Holidays, 69, 203–4, 205 Homosexuality, 318 Homosexual prostitution, 178 Honor, 206–7, 314, 413; alms giving, 323; Bedouin, 62; customary law, 95; family, 151; social principle, 411–12; women/ family, 177, 178, 463 Horses, 10; ‘Ajman, 13; Bedouins, 10; racing, 19 Houses, 37, 38–39; architectural styles, 40–41, 42–43; Al-Dawhah, 104 Huber, Charles, 433 Hufuf (ancient site), 195 Human rights: Abu Dhabi, 7; Oman, 341; Saddam Hussein, 184; Saudi Arabia, 207–8; universality, 462; women, 461–63 Human trafficking, sex trade, 399–401 Al Humayd (family), 53, 453 Humayd bin Rashid, 14 Hunting, 62, 135–36 Hurgronje, Christiaan Snouck, 279, 433 Hussa al-Sudayri, 149 Hussein bin ‘Ali, 14, 28–29, 197, 204, 230, 275, 279, 312, 313, 328, 406, 408, 409; Palestine, 347; Sharif, 406; Ta’if campaign, 421 Huwaytat (tribe), 209–10 Ibadi Kharaji Islam, 46, 47, 148, 175, 211–12, 273–74, 404; imamate, 214–15, 335, 340; Taymur bin Faysal, 388 Ibadi school, 85 Ibn Bijad, 213, 454 Ibn Hithlayn, 213 Ibn Mu‘ammar (family), 54 Ibn Rifada rebellion, 197

507

Index Ibn Sa‘ud. See ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Sa‘ud Ibn Taymiyah, 225, 226, 228, 389 Ibrahim al-Ghayth, 80 Ibrahim al-‘Urayyid, 269 Ibrahim al-Yaziji, 24 Ibrahim Pasha, 52, 64, 421, 453 Idrisis (dynasty), 4, 45, 366 Ijtihad. See Reason (ijtihad) Ikhwan (brotherhood) movement, 2, 213–14, 318–19, 394; ‘Ajman tribes, 13; ‘Anazah, 16; Arab Revolt, 63; Bani Khalid, 52; Bedouin fighters, 63; Huwaytat, 209; jihad, 244; Al Murrah, 306; Mutayr tribe, 320; Qahtan tribe, 366; rebellion, 453, 454; settlements, 351; Shammar tribe, 402 Illiteracy, 292 Imams, 211–12, 274, 410, 411 Incense, 215–16 India, 33, 138, 139, 211, 241, 251, 256, 311, 315, 336, 371, 445 Indian Ocean, 139 Indian Ocean Rim Association, 170 Indians, 147, 148, 288, 352–53 Industrial development, 132; Jubayl al-Bahri, 245; oil industry, 338–39, 339; oil revenues, 344–45 Information technology, 358 Infrastructure development, Abu Dhabi, 7 Inheritance, 9, 373–74 Intellectuals, 217–18 Interest charges, 55, 57 International Association of Islamic Banks, 243 International Court of Justice, 50 International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights, 207–8 International economics, 134 International relations, 219–20; foreign policies, 167–74; Oman, 67. See also Foreign policies Internet, 83, 221–22, 238, 262, 263, 292 Iran, 22, 25, 66, 119, 220; Arabian Gulf, 17; Bahrain territorial claims, 50, 167, 225, 250, 387; Bani Tamim, 54; drug trafficking, 124; expatriate guestworkers from, 148; Hajj incidents, 356–57; Hawalah origins, 145; Kuwait, 253, 254; Oman, 67; OPEC, 344; pearl trade, 138; Saudi Arabia, 149, 394–95; Shi‘ah, 409,

508

411; United Arab Emirates, 172; War with Iran, 223–24. See also Persia Iranian Revolution, 147, 195, 250, 374 Iranians, 144, 309 Iran-Iraq War, 147, 168, 170, 179, 184, 220, 223–24, 254, 386 Iraq, 15, 25, 139, 220, 239; Bani Tamim, 54; Bedouin culture, 10; Dhafir tribe, 108, 109; Great Mosque attack, 394–95; Gulf War (1990–1991), 181–83; invasion, 169–73; Jihadists, 228; Kuwait, 51, 168–69, 252, 254–55, 261, 300, 348, 386, 387, 452; Muntafiq tribe, 304; Saudi Arab, 305; stateless persons, 75; US in, 171; Yemen, 470 Iraq Petroleum Company, 5, 339 Irrigation, 87, 137, 459–61; Abha area, 3; al-Hasa, 194; Ha’il, 188; oasis, 333–34; underground canals, 8–9, 460; wheat production, 11 ‘Isa Al Khalifah, 41 ‘Isa bin ‘Ali, 250, 303 ‘Isa bin Salman Al Khalifah, 50, 224–25, 250 Islam: architecture, 41–42; banks, 56, 57–58; calendar, 69–70, 203–4, 205, 301, 355; clothing, 122; culture, 289, 343; death in, 104; dietary regulations, 318; Five Pillars of Faith, 229–32; fundamentalism (salafiyah), 227–29; government, 273–74; holidays/festivals, 203–4; Ibadi Kharaji, 211–12; leadership, 302, 417, 418; militant, 133, 171, 273–74; popular, 360–63; practices, 229–32; revivalism, 1, 302; Shi‘ite/Sunni/Kharaji differences, 274; television programing, 307. See also Shi‘ah Islam; Sunni Islam; Wahhabi movement Islamic Development Bank, 56 Islamic doctrines, 225–26; art/artifact display, 34; death rites, 104–6; fiqh, 158–59; Ibadi Kharaji Islam, 211–12; jihad, 243–44; Kharaji Islam, 273–74; Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 302–3; Shi‘ite Islam, 274; Sunnah, 417–18; Sunni Islam, 273, 274; Wahhabism, 457–58. See also Madhhab Islamic Empire, 23–24, 200, 242 Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, 50 Islamic law and jurisprudence, 301; alcohol/drugs, 123; banking/finance sector, 55–56; clothing, 119; coffee, 79;

Index criminal law, 84–86; divorce practices, 116; enforcement, 79–80, 318–19; faqih, 158–60; honor, 207; human rights, 208; inheritance, 373–74; judicial system, 245–47; marriage, 285–87; schools (madhhab), 273–74; Shari‘ah, 403–4; Sunnah, 417–18; time value of money, 57–58; Wahhabism, 457–58; war and jihad, 243–44; women’s rights, 462–63 Islamic universities (fiqh), 158–59 Islamist movements, 397–98; Bahrain, 50; feminists, 445; Jihadism, 243–44; Kuwait, 358–59; Al Qa‘idah, 367–68; September 11, 2001 attack, 220 Isma‘ili Qaramitah movement, 411 Isma‘ili Shi‘ism, 12–13, 274, 326, 328, 392–93, 411, 418 Israel, 115, 169, 170, 219, 260–61, 342–43, 345, 347–49, 368, 381, 398, 444–45 Ja‘afar al-Sadiq, 411 Ja‘afari school, 159, 246, 404, 411 Jabal al-Akhdar War, 67, 215, 233–34 Jabal ‘Ali Free Zone, 84 Jabir al Ahmad Al Sabah, 254 Jabir al Salim Al Sabah, 386 Jabir bin Mubarak Al Sabah, 255, 256, 300 Jahiliyah period. See Pre-Islamic period (Jahiliyah) Janadiriyah Heritage Festival, 91–92, 100, 235–37 Jannabah (tribe), 237–38 Jassim bin Muhammad Al Thani, 425 Jaussen, Antonin, 32, 433 Al Jazeera (news service), 172, 238–40, 292, 359, 373, 423, 424, 425 Jerusalem, 342–43 Jewelry, 45, 139, 191–92, 240–41 Jews, 48, 300; Arabic pre-Islamic writing, 23; Arab revolt, 28–29; Yahudi Arabic use, 26; Yathrib/Madinah, 275; Yemeni, 240, 327 Jiddah (Jeddah), 213, 241–43, 275, 391, 429 Jiddah Pact, 469 Jihad, 80, 243–44, 302, 397–98; Wahhabi Islam, 457 Jihadist Islam, 228–29, 274, 367–68, 452 Jobs creation, 133–34 Job skills, 439–40; education relevance, 133–34, 141–42; professional

development, 198–99; vocation education, 449 Joint ventures, 81 Jordan, 15, 25, 29, 169, 183, 202, 455; Hashemites, 196, 197; Huwaytat Bedouin, 209–10; Saudi Arabian Palestinian policy, 348; Shafi‘i school, 226; terrorist attack, 308 Journalists, 239, 269, 329 Jubayl al-Bahri (city), 244–45, 466–67 Judaism, 62, 326, 381 Judicial independence, 246, 247 Judicial system, 245–47 Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, 320, 397, 454 Al-Julanda ibn Mas‘ud, 211 Julfar (city), 377 June War (1967), 342, 344 Ka‘abah, 37, 231, 278, 279, 301, 355, 374; pre-Islamic period, 234, 235 Kennedy, John F., 422 Kenya, 452 Khailid bin ‘Abd al-Aziz, 152 Khalid bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Al Sa‘ud, 390, 394 Khalid bin ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Sa‘ud, 423 Al Khalifah, 410, 417 Al Khalifah (family lineage), 16, 49, 103–4, 249–50, 335, 359, 372, 385; Arabian horses, 18; ‘Isa bin Salman, 224–25; Al-Manamah, 281, 282 Khalifah bin Hamad al Thani, 372–73, 425 Kharaji Islam, 211–12, 225, 273–74, 340 Khobar (city), 97, 111 Khojah (ethnic group), 145–46, 382 Khomeini, Ruhollah, 223, 250 Kingdom of the Hijaz, 14–15, 29, 242, 394, 406 Kinship relations: Bedouin culture, 63–64; customary law, 94–95; leadership and honor, 413; Al Murrah tribe, 306; preIslamic period, 235; social organizing principle, 411–12; women’s honor, 206 Knowledge (fiqh), 158–60 Knowledge-based industries, 276 Kurds, 147, 183, 184; language, 25, 26 Kuttab (traditional schools), 140–42

509

Index Kuwait, 20, 32, 139, 250–55, 358–59; ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Sa‘ud, 2; agriculture, 461; ‘Ajman tribe, 12, 13; Al Sa‘ud, 390; American Mission medical services, 198; ‘Anazah, 16; Arabian horses, 10; archeology, 33; architecture, 43; art scene, 156, 157; Bani Khalid tribe, 52; banking/finance sector, 55; Christians, 382; citizenship, 74–76; clothing style, 121; companies, 83; crime control/enforcement, 85; cuisine, 90; cultural heritage, 92; Dhafir tribe, 108; dress, 121; education, 141; ethnic diversity, 147; Farasis population, 144; film industry, 154; foreign policies, 168–69; government in exile, 421; Gulf Cooperation Council, 179; Gulf War (1990–1991), 181–83; handicraft industry, 192; health services, 199; Hindus, 382; international relations, 219–20; Internet services, 221; invasion, 261; Iraq invasion, 220, 300; Islamic law, 159; judicial system, 246; Al Khalifah family, 249–50; leisure, 262; literature, 268–69; military, 293, 296; Muntafiq tribe, 304; museums, 35; music, 311–12, 315, 316, 317; Mutayr tribe, 320; oil, 335, 336; Palestine and Iraqi invasion, 348; pearling, 352; post-oil investment, 131; press freedom, 291; Al Rashid family, 379; religious minorities, 382; Sabah al-Salim Al-Sabah, 386–87; Al Sabah family, 385; Saudi Arabia, 444; secular intellectuals, 218; sex trade, 400; Shari‘ah law, 404; Shi‘ites, 204; shipbuilding, 138; singers, 316; television, 423; tourism, 430–31; university/higher education, 448; urbanization, 451; water sources, 460, 461; wedding dances, 314; Zar popular religion, 361 Kuwait City, 256–57 Labor policy: Abu Dhabi, 7; Bahrainization, 51; citizen/foreign labor use, 133; Emiratization, 442; foreign worker programs, 133–34; job skills/development, 439–40; Omanization, 365; Saudization, 395–96, 448. See also Foreign guestworkers Land ownership, 9, 11

510

Law: codes, 245–47; customary, 94–95; divorce, 115–16; judicial system, 245–47; water resource access, 456 Law enforcement, 84–86; Bedouin culture, 62; customary law, 94–95; judicial system, 245–47; slavery/sex trafficking, 400–401 Lawrence, Thomas Edward (of Arabia), 28–29, 34, 202, 209, 259, 406, 433 League of Arab States, 260–61 Lebanon, 25, 172, 220, 260, 315 Legal scholars, 158–60; Sunnah, 417–18 Legal systems, 207–8, 245–47 Leisure, 262–63; Qatar tourism, 431; television, 422 Lifestyles: ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Sa‘ud, 3; Al Murrah, 306; Arabic literary style, 270; Bedouin, 63; Bedouin Ikhwan designation, 213–14; cuisine, 89; folklore, 165; health care/public health, 199; Jiddah, 242; material culture, 289; pastoralism, 349–50; pastoral nomadism, 349–50; Qasim province, 369 Literacy rates, 24, 141, 222, 256 Literature, 264–72; pre-Islamic, 234 Livestock, 9–10, 12, 70–72, 349, 350; pastoralism, 136–37 Liwa Oases, 6 Locarno Treaties, 202 Mada’in Salih (archaeological site), 33–34, 322, 429 Madhhab (schools of jurisprudence), 273–74, 301, 411 Madinah (Medina), 38, 200, 201, 274–76, 278, 298; Hashemites, 196; Muhammad, 300–301 Madrasah system, 418 Maghrib, 25 Magic and sorcery, 47, 166, 207 Mahrah (tribe), 22, 113, 114, 193, 298, 469 Majan culture, 110 Majlis, 1, 276–77 Makkah (Mecca), 34, 200, 213, 278–79; architecture, 37–38, 41–42; Great Mosque occupation, 394–95, 397; Hashemites, 196; Muhammad, 300–301; pilgrimage to, 355; prayer practices, 230–31; pre-Islamic period, 235; Tamim ibn Murr, 53; Yathrib/Madinah, 275 Al Maktum (family), 19, 280–81, 323

Index Maktum bin Buti, 280 Maktum bin Hashar, 280 Maktum bin Rashid, 281 Male circumcision, 323 Malik ibn Anas, 225 Maliki school, 85, 159, 225, 246, 273, 404; Bani ‘Utbah tribe, 49 Mamluks, 24, 200, 226, 242, 275, 279, 405 Al-Manamah (city), 41, 281–82 Ma’rib water storage, 47, 333–34 Maritime boundaries, 169, 224 Maritime trade, 17–18, 113, 139; Dilmun, 244; Dubai, 125; Gulf, 33; Qatif, 373; Qawasim, 370–71; security, 4–5 Markets (suq), 188; dates, 103; food/ cuisine, 89–90; Mattrah, 288; Nizwa city, 331; pastoralists, 351; pre-Islamic, 234; Ra’al Khaymah, 378; traditional, 282–85 Market system, Tamim ibn Murr, 53 Marriage, 285–87; alliances, 1, 15, 52–53, 61, 300, 302, 305, 379, 386, 389, 402, 408; descent, 413; family life, 150, 151; jewelry, 240; land/water rights, 9; repudiation/divorce, 116; wedding dresses, 122 Martyrdom, 409 Marxism, 115, 365, 444, 470 Mashirq, 25 Masqat (Muscat), 340–41, 371; city, 113, 287–88, 388 Mass media. See Media Material culture, 288–90 McMahon, Henry, 28–29, 406 Media, 291–92; Dubai center, 128; newspapers, 329–30 Medicine: facilities, 49, 104, 123, 127, 197– 99; folk tradition/homeopathic, 166; personnel, 198–99 Men, 150, 177–78, 204; burial rites, 105; clothing, 119, 121, 122; dancing, 98–100; divorce, 116; family life, 151; incense use, 215; Kuwait citizenship, 74; leisure, 262; religious space, 362–63; spousal obligations, 286; television preferences, 424; tents, 39; women, 463 Military, 293–94; architecture, 42; bases, 51, 97, 111, 162, 171, 174, 294–96; Bedouin forces, 63; Gulf Cooperation Council, 179–80; Gulf War, 2003, 183–85 Modern Art Society of Bahrain, 156

Modernism: Arabic literary style, 270; Islamic fundamentalism, 227–29; women’s rights, 462–63 Modernization, 91, 93; ‘Anazah tribe, 16; architecture, 41, 42–43; arts, 157; Bedouin, 437; clothing styles, 120, 122; dance traditions, 101–2; divorce rate, 116; education policies, 141–42; families, 150–51; folklore, 165, 166; health care, 199; Internet, 221–22; literature, 266, 270; Al Murrah tribe, 306; Saudi Arabia, 394–95, 462–63; ‘Unayzah city, 438 Monarchy, 357, 360 Money, 57, 181 Moneychangers, 56 Morals: Bedouin culture, 63; customary law, 94–95; enforcement, 79–80; fine arts, 157; gender, 177–78; headgear, 118; Internet access, 221, 222; market supervisors, 283; police, 318–19; Wahhabi Islam, 228, 457–58. See also Honor Mosques, 41–42, 140, 303, 331 Motor vehicles, 10, 63 Mountains, 20, 296–99; climate, 76–77; Musandam area, 308–9; wadis, 455; watered areas, 8; Yemen southern descent groups, 472 Mourning rituals, 105, 122 Movie industry. See Film industry Al Mu‘alla (lineage), 14 Al Mu‘ammar (family), 52 Mu‘awiayah ibn Abi Sufyan, 211, 409, 410, 417 Mubarak bin Sabah Al Sabah, 252, 255, 256, 299–300, 385 Muhammad al-Baqir, 409–10 Muhammad al-Muntazir, 410, 411 Muhammad Al Sabah, 252 Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 54, 213, 325, 383 Muhammad bin Khalifah, 249–50 Muhammad bin Rashid al Maktum, 281, 315 Muhammad bin Sabah, 299 Muhammad bin Sa‘ud, 1, 458; Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 302, 389, 393; Wahhabi Islam, 458 Muhammad bin Thani bin Muhammad, 372, 425

511

Index Muhammad ibn ‘Abdallah (Prophet of Islam), 225, 227, 229, 230, 278, 286, 300–301, 326, 327–28, 355, 393, 402, 410, 411, 419; ‘Adnan tribe, 319; birthday, 100–101, 204; Hashemites, 196; Quraysh tribe, 374; Sunnah, 417–18; tomb, 1, 356, 362 Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 1, 34, 52, 105, 152, 159, 225, 227, 228, 273, 302–3, 357–58, 360–61, 362, 389, 393, 404, 457 Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi‘i, 226 Al Muhanna (family), 64 Al-Muharraq (island), 21, 41, 48, 282, 303–4 Mujahidin, 348, 452 Mujtahids (Shi‘ite judges), 274, 411 Muntafiq (tribal confederation), 109, 304–5 Al Murrah (tribe), 13, 305–6 Musadiq, Muhammad, 253 Musalsalat, 307–8 Musandam Peninsula, 139, 308–9 Museums, 407; archaeological/historical, 31–36; Bahrain, 429–30; fine arts scene, 156–58; folklore, 166–67; Kuwait, 430; Saudi Arabia network, 34–35 Music, 145, 310–17 Musil, Alois, 433 Muslim Brotherhood, 227, 397–98, 458 Muslim World League, 267–68, 342 Musqat, 76, 145–46, 214, 352 Mutawwa (morals police), 79–80, 85, 318–19 Mutayr (tribal confederation), 13, 52, 305, 319–20, 366, 453 Muwahhidun, 302 Muwahidi Islam, 357–58 Muza bint Nasir al-Missned, 425 Nabateans, 37, 63, 321–22, 419, 429, 466 Nabil Sha‘il, 316 Nada Haffadh, 50 Nadira bint Mahmud, 156 Nafisah bint ‘Abd al-Ilah, 15 Al Nahyan (family), 54, 323–24 Na‘im (tribe), 14, 67, 68, 334 Najd (region), 297, 324–25; ’Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Al Sa‘ud, 279; ‘Ajman tribe, 12; Al Sa‘ud, 1, 389; Arabic language, 25; archaeology, 33; architecture, 38, 40;

512

Bani Khalid tribe, 51, 52; Bani Yas tribe, 54–55; clothing style, 121; dates, 103; Dhafir tribe, 109; dress, 121; Janadiriyah festival, 237; Jewish population, 381; Al Khalifah family, 249; Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 302; Al Murrah tribe, 305–6; oases, 335; Qasim province, 369; Al Thani family, 425 Najdat Anzour, 307, 308 Najran, 33; Al Sa‘ud control, 390; city, 325–27; jewelry industry, 191; region, 327–28; Saudi hegemony, 45 Naqib (supervisor of pedigree), 405 Al-Nasr, Gamal ’Abd, 50, 65, 146–47, 469 Nasr Kasabi, 307 National holidays/festivals, 205 National identity, 63, 93, 291 Nationalization policies, 337, 338; Suez Canal, 469 National parks, Asir region, 45 Nation states, Bedouin life, 63 Nayef bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 80 Nayif bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 149 Nayla Al Khaja, 155 Neibuhr, Carsten, 251, 432 News agencies, 128, 238 Newspapers, 291–92, 329–30 Ni‘mah Isma‘il Nawwab, 217 Nixon, Richard M., 348 Nizwa (city), 47, 66, 211, 233–34, 288, 329–30, 331–32, 335; Al Bu Sa‘idi, 66; Duru‘ tribe, 129; imamate, 214–15; silversmithing, 240 Noble tribes, 374–75, 413 Nomadism, 349–51; Al Murrah, 306; ‘Anazah, 16–17; Bedouin controls, 63; Bedouin Ikhwan designation, 213–14; Huwaytat tribe, 209–10; Mutayr tribe, 319; pastoral, 9–11; Shammar tribe, 402; tents, 39 Nomads: ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin Muhammad, 1; architecture, 39; Qahtan tribe, 365; Saudi Arabia, 393; water resources, 460 Non-Aligned Movement, 170 North Africa, 409, 418 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 172–73 Northern (‘Adnan) descent, 16, 412 North Yemen, 114, 443, 468; civil war, 469–70 Nuri al-Maliki, 305

Index Oases, 333–35; of Adam, 66; agriculture, 8–9; architecture, 41; Bayt Kathir, 59; Bedouin culture, 63; flora/fauna, 162; Ha’il, 187; al-Hasa, 194, 393; Madinah, 274; Nu‘aym (tribe), 14; pottery industry, 189–90; Qatif, 373–74; Tabuk city, 419; Tamim ibn Murr, 53; ‘Unayzah city area, 437–38 October War, 219, 348 Oil, 18, 335–37; British interests, 372; fields, 30, 195, 407; Iraq-Kuwait dispute, 182; Saudi Arabia, 2–3, 391; shale, 336; wealth/economic development, 134 Oil embargo, 219, 338, 345, 348, 444–45, 465 Oil industry, 337–39; Abu Dhabi, 6; Abu Dhabi city, 5; ‘Ajman, 13; Al Sa‘ud, 390; Aramco, 30–31; architectural influence, 42–43; Bahrain, 49, 51; banking/finance sector, 55; Bayt Kathir tribe, 60; companies, 81–84; cuisine, 89; Dammam, 97; Dhahran area, 110–11; Dhurfar, 114; Kuwait, 169; Najran, 328; OAPEC, 344–45; Oman, 67, 129; OPEC, 343–44; Saudi Arabia, 394–95; terminals, 21–22, 30; terrorism/security, 398; transportation facilities, 466–67; unemployment, 438–39; United Arab Emirates, 442; US regional relations, 443–44; Yamani, Ahmad Zaki, 465 Oil wealth, 152, 338; ‘Abd al-Rahman Munif, 111; Abu Dhabi, 6; architecture, 39; dependent development, 131; ethnic identity, 147; health care systems, 197; Islamic culture/values, 289–90; Kuwait, 253, 256–57, 386; Oman, 341, 365; Qatar, 372, 425; Qatif oasis, 374; Saudi Arabia, 391, 429; United Arab Emirates, 475; urbanization, 450 Olympic Games, 414 Oman, 20, 21–22, 139, 340–41; Al Bu Sa‘id dynasty, 66–67, 387–88; al-Rashid tribe, 380; American Mission medical services, 198; Arabic dialects, 25, 28, 309; archeology, 33; architecture, 41; art, 156; ‘Awamir tribe, 46; Bahla, 47; Bahrain, 49; Al-Batinah, 58; Bayt Kathir, 59; Bedouin, 10; Britain, 365; Buluchi, 144; Al Bu Shams tribe, 67; city walls, 42; clothing, 121; companies, 84; crime

control/enforcement, 85; cuisine, 90; Dhahirah, 109–10; Dhufar, 113–14; Dhufar Liberation Front, 114; Duru‘ tribe, 129–30; education, 141; empire of, 144–45; ethnic diversity, 148; ethnicity, 146; film industry, 155–56; fishing, 139; folk dancing, 101; foreign labor, 133; foreign policies, 169–71; frankincense, 215; Gulf Cooperation Council, 179; handicrafts, 192; Harasis tribe, 192–93; Hundu/Pakistani population, 382; hunting/gathering economy, 136; Ibadi Kharaji Islam, 211; interest/time value of money, 58; international relations, 219–20; Internet services, 221–22; Islamic law, 159; Jabal al-Akhdar War, 233–34; Jannabah tribe, 237–38; judicial system, 247; Khojah (ethnic group), 145–46; leisure, 262; literature, 271–72; Masqat, 287–88; military bases, 295; minority population, 288; Musandam Peninsula, 308–9; music, 317; national day, 204; Nizwa (city), 331–32; Nizwa imamate, 214–15; North Yemen, 468–69; oases tribal loyalties, 334–35; oil, 335, 339; pearling, 352; pottery, 190, 192; press freedom, 291; riwa popular religion, 361–62; Salalah (city), 388–89; Saudi Arabia foreign relations, 444; Shari‘ah law, 404; silversmithing, 240–41; television, 423–24; tourism, 431; underground irrigation canals, 8; university/higher education, 449; US free trade accord, 181; Wadi Hatta, 456; Wahibah Sands, 107–8; weaving industry, 140, 190–91; women dress, 177; women face covering, 119; women’s rights, 178; Yemeni tribes, 472; Zar popular religion, 361 Omanization policy, 365 Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), 173, 336, 344–45, 390 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 182, 343–45, 465 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 243, 342–43, 348, 390, 395 Osama bin Ladin. See Usamah bin Muhammad bin ’Awad bin Ladin

513

Index Ottomans, 24, 195, 196, 279, 374, 468–69; ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin Muhammad, 1; Al Sa‘ud, 389–90; ‘Anazah tribe, 16; Arab revolt, 28–29; architecture, 40, 41; Asir highland tribal warfare, 45; Bani Khalid tribe, 52; Al-Dawhah, 104; Hashemites, 196; Hijaz, 200–201; Hijaz Railway, 201–2; Hussein bin ‘Ali, 406; Islamic clothing proscriptions, 120; Jiddah, 242; jihad, 244; Kuwait, 251–53, 299–300; Madinah, 275; Makkah, 278; Mubarak Al Sabah Al Sabah, 385; Muntafiq tribe, 304; North Yemen, 469; Qasim province, 369–70; Qatar, 372, 425; Al Rashid family, 379; Al Rashid lineage, 335; Saudi Arabia, 393–94; Shammar tribe, 401–2; Shari‘ah law, 404; South Yemen, 468; Tabuk city, 419; Ta’if defeat, 421; Yanbu‘ port, 466; Yemen, 469 Pakistan, 119, 144, 288, 367–68 Pakistanis, 147, 148 Palestine, 25, 73, 196–97, 260–61, 342, 347–49, 444–45 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 169, 348, 444 Palestinian Authority, 170, 174 Palestinian independence movement, 398 Palestinians, 147, 183 Pan-Arabism movement, 65, 146–47, 339, 348, 390 Pan-Islamic movements, 152, 278, 342–43 Parliaments, 276; Bahrain, 144, 168, 250, 304; Kuwait, 74, 75, 254, 320, 358–59, 386; Oman, 360, 365; Qatar, 225; United Arab Emirates, 358–59 Pastoralism, 136–37, 349–51; Bayt Kathir tribe, 59–60; Bedouin culture, 63; Wahibah tribe, 459 Pastoral nomadism, 9–11; Bedouin culture, 60; oases communities, 334; Yemen southern descent groups, 472 Pasture land, 11 Peace treaties: Dubai, 127; General Treaty of Peace, 5, 6, 372; Perpetual Treaty of Peace, 371 Pearling, 33, 111–12, 138, 352–53; Abu Dhabi, 4, 5, 6; Bahrain, 49, 249, 250; Bani Yas, 323; Dammam city, 97; Dubai, 125, 280; Fujayrah, 175; Hindu families,

514

382; Kuwait, 251, 253, 255, 256; music, 312; Qasimi Empire, 370; Qatar, 425; Al Sabah family, 385; United Arab Emirates, 441–42 Pearls, 18, 353 Pelly, Lewis, 433, 434 People’s Front (Bahrain), 115 Perpetual Maritime Truce, 6 Perpetual Treaty of Peace, 371 Persia, 393, 418; architecture, 41; Bahla, 47; Bahrain, 49; Dilmun civilization, 48; Dubai, 125; Hawalah origins, 145; Oman, 331, 340; Shi‘ah, 411. See also Iran Persian Gulf. See Arabian Gulf Persian language, 24, 26, 28; Baharnah, 143–44 Persians, 4, 147, 148, 249 Petra (ancient shrine), 322 Petroleum. See Oil Pharmaceuticals, Ra’s al Khaymah, 378 Philby, Harry St. John, 2, 30, 32, 107, 354, 433–34, 437 Philippines, 147, 148, 199 Pilgrimage (Hajj), 200, 203–4, 355–57, 405; clothing, 122; clothing requirements, 119; cuisine, 86; cultural heritage, 91; Darb Zubaidah, 34; descriptions by travelers, 433; economic importance, 139; ethnic identity, 147; Ha’il oasis, 187–88; Hashemites, 196; Hijaz economy, 201; Hijaz Railway, 201–2; Islamic calendar, 69; Jiddah, 243; Madinah’s importance, 275; Makkah, 279; Muhammad founding, 301; performance requirement, 323; Shi‘ite uprisings, 395 Pirates, 17–18 Poetry, 13, 62, 93, 217, 291, 416; Arabic, 22; Arabic pre-Islamic, 22; Bahrain, 269–70; classical, 264–66; customary law, 94; Oman, 271; pre-Islamic, 234; singing, 316; United Arab Emirates, 270–71 Police, mutawwa (morals), 318–19 Political organization, 357–60; Al Sa‘ud succession, 390; oases, 334–35; Saudi Arabia, 394–95 Political power, 2 Political reform: Bahrain, 50; human rights, 208; Kuwait, 74–76, 254; Napoleon, 24;

Index Oman, 67, 341, 360, 365; Qatar Al Thani rule, 372–73, 425; Saudi Arabia, 358; September 11, 2001 attack, 220; Wahhabi Islam, 393–94; Yamani, Ahmad Zaki, 465; Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahayan, 475 Political rights, 207–8 Politics, 273–74; leadership, 1 Polytheism, 278, 301 Popular Committee for Assisting Palestine Mujahidin, 348 Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf, 114–15 Popular Islam, 166, 360–63 Popular religion, 318 Population: ethnic groups, 143–46; ethnicity, 146–48; growth, 199; health care system, 199; non-Islamic, 381–82; urbanization, 451; virtue promotion, 80. See also Under name of specific city, region, or area Ports, 173; Aden, 367, 468; Bahrain, 49, 51, 250; Baluchistan, 144; Dammam, 97; dhow construction, 138; Dubai, 126, 127, 280, 442; ethnic groups in, 145; Iraq-Kuwait, 250–53; Jiddah, 243, 391; Jubayl, 244; Kuwait, 257; music of, 310; Oman, 237; Qatif, 374; Ra’al Khaymah, 377–78; Ras Tanura oil, 30; Riyadh, 245; United Arab Emirates, 173, 441; Yanbu‘, 468–70; Yemen, 78; Zubarah, 104 Portuguese, 112, 281, 288, 340, 371–72, 374, 456 Post-oil investment policies, 131–32 Pre-Islamic period (Jahiliyah), 69, 119, 166, 234–35; Ahl al-Hadarah, 114; ‘Anazah tribe, 15; Arabian horses, 18; archaeological display policies, 34; Bahla, 47; calary systems, 69–70; customary law, 94; date cultivation, 102; death rites, 105; Dilmun/Bahrain, 48; divorce practices, 116; economies, 135; ethnic groups from, 143–44; footwear, 119; Hellenism, 32; Hijaz, 200; Jannabah tribe weddings, 238; Kuwait, 251; literature, 264; Majan culture, 110; Makkah, 278; Ma’rib oases, 333–34; maritime trade, 139; markets (suq), 283; Nabateans, 321–22; Najd, 325; Najran, 327–28; Najran city, 326; Oman, 340; pastoralists, 136–37;

pearling, 352; Qatif oasis, 374; Quraysh tribe, 374; Ra’al Khaymah, 377; Ra’s al Khaymah, 337; religions, 381; Saudi Arabia, 166; Shari‘a legal system, 403; sharif title in, 405; Shi‘ism, 410; Tabuk site, 419; Tamim ibn Murr, 53; tribal raiding, 62; wadis, 456; water storage, 333–34; women’s status in marriage, 286; Yanbu‘ port, 466; Yemen, 468 Press, freedom of, 238–40, 254, 291–92, 329–30 Private ownership, 350 Property, 350 Prostitution, 178, 318, 399–401. See also Sex trade Public buildings, 282–83 Public health, 198, 199 Public opinion, 329–30 Public schools, 446–47 Publishing, 276 Qabus bin Sa‘id, 365 Qabus bin Sa‘id Al Bu Sa‘id, 66, 67, 115, 169–70, 288, 341, 360 Qahtan (southern tribes), 412, 468 Qahtan (tribal confederation), 109, 305, 366–67, 401, 453 Qahtar tribes (southern descent), 471–72 Al Qa‘idah, 149, 229, 239, 244, 307, 367–68, 397–98, 452, 470 Qala‘at al-Bahrayn, 281 Qanat (irrigation canals), 8, 460 Qarah (tribe), 113, 114, 193, 298 Qaramitah: movement, 49, 374; state, 393 Qasim (province), 369–70, 437 Qasim bin Muhammad ibn Thani, 372 Qasimi (family), 407 Qasimi Empire, 370–71, 407 Qat (drug plant), 44, 124 Qatadah bin Idris, 466 Qatar, 20, 225, 371–73; ‘Ajman tribe, 12; Al Sabah family, 385; archeology, 33; arts scene, 157; ‘Awamir tribe, 46; Bani Khalid, 52; Bani ‘Utbah tribe, 49; charitable organizations, 73; clothing style, 121; companies, 83; crime control, 85; cuisine, 90; al-Dawhah, 103–4; divorce, 116; dress, 121; Duru‘ camel breeding, 130; education, 141; ethnic diversity, 148; foreign population, 104;

515

Index Qatar (Continued) foreign relations, 171–72, 219–20, 444; Gulf Cooperation Council, 179; Hawali Islands, 50; health services, 199; hiya biya custom, 203–4; ‘Id al-Fitr observance, 203; Iran-Iraq war, 170; judicial system, 247; Al Khalifah family, 249–50; literature, 270; military, 294, 295–96; Al Murrah tribe, 305; museums, 35; musical traditions, 311, 313; oil, 335; Olympic team, 414; pastoralist settlement policies, 351; political organization, 359; press freedom, 291; sex trade, 399; Shari‘ah law, 404; television, 424; Al Thani family, 425; tourism, 431; unemployment, 439; university/higher education, 449; Wahhabi Islam, 228; women’s rights, 178 Qatif, 194, 373–74, 389 Qawasim, 280, 377 Qiyas (analogy), 418 Qur’an, 22, 225, 273 Quraysh (tribe), 25, 139, 235, 278, 301, 375–76 Qutaybi (tribal confederation), 472 Rabha bint Mahmud, 156 Rabin, Yitzak, 170 Racing, 262, 263; camels, 71 Railroads, 98, 195, 384. See also Hijaz Railway Rainfall, 44, 76–77, 106, 113–14; monsoons, 20, 21, 297, 298, 350, 389, 431, 453 Raja’a al-Sanee, 217 Raja Alam, 217 Rakan bin Falah bin Hithlayn, 13 Ramadan, 69, 79, 203, 229, 231–32, 300; coffeehouses, 79; cuisine, 89; dates, 12, 102; family life, 262; television programming, 307, 308, 422; work songs, 313 Ra’s al Khaymah (RAK), 33, 280, 377–78, 407, 441, 443; ‘Ajman tribe, 14; free trade zones, 128 Al Rashid (family lineage), 16, 64, 187, 213, 299, 335, 378–79, 383, 394, 401–2; ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Sa‘ud, 2; Al Sa‘ud, 389, 390; Bayt Kathir tribe, 59; Kuwait, 252; Mutayr tribe,

516

319–20; Qahtan tribe, 366; Qasim province, 369–70; ‘Unayzah city, 437 Al-Rashid (tribe), 380–81 Rashid ibn Humayd al-Nu‘aymi, 14 Ras Tanura, pearling, 352 Rasyut (city), 389 Rawashid (tribe), 59, 380–81 Reason (ijtihad), 225, 274, 411, 418; Shi‘ism, 274; Wahhabi Islam, 457 Rebellions: Dhufar, 193, 365; Dhufar Liberation Front, 114–15; against ibn Sa‘ud, 13; Ikhwan (brotherhood) movement, 453, 454 Reconciliation, 95, 160 Red Crescent, 198 Red Sea, 21, 22, 241–42, 296–97, 467 Reform movements: ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin Muhammad, 1; Arabic language, 24; Bahrain, 304; Dubai, 280; Ikhwan movement, 318–19; Islamic fundamentalism, 227; Kuwait, 385–86; Muhammad ‘Abd al Wahha, 200–201; Saudi Arabia, 390, 395; Saudi education/workforce, 396; Saudi workplace, 396; violent religious movements, 397–98; Wahhabi, 226, 273, 457–58. See also Political reform Regional security, 219–20; economic development, 398; Gulf Cooperation Council, 179; Gulf maritime trade, 4–6, 371, 372 Religion, 147–48; non-Islamic, 381–82; pre-Islamic, 166, 321–22 Religious broadcasting, 422, 423 Religious leadership, ‘Abd al ‘Aziz bin Muhammad bin Sa‘ud, 1 Religious police, 458 Religious practices: African, 145; Islamic jurisprudence, 273–74 Reza Pahlavi, Muhammad, 250 Al-Ribab (tribe), 437 Rightly Guided Khalifahs, 227, 230, 417, 462 Rites: dancing, 98; death, 104–6; marriage customs, 286–87 Rituals: ceremonial greeting, 276; dance in riwa popular religion, 361–62; incense use, 215–16; Isma‘ili Shi‘a, 328; pilgrimage, 355; Zar spirit possession, 361 Riyadh (city), 2, 242, 325, 335, 383, 383–84, 391; Al Sa‘ud family control,

Index 389, 390; Jubayl al-Bahri, 245; Masmak Fort, 42; Al Rashid family, 379 Rock graffiti, 22, 32, 33–34 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 347, 444 Rub‘ al-Khali Desert, 6, 106–7, 110, 305 Ruqah (tribe), 453 Ru ’us al-Jabal, 308 Ruwalah (tribal confederation), 16 Ruzy ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 354 Sa‘ad al ‘Abdallah al Salim Al Sabah, 255 Al Sabah (family), 16, 49, 74, 249, 251, 358, 385–86; Bani Khalid tribe, 52; Kuwait, 255, 256 Sabah al Ahmad al Jabir al Sabah, 255, 386 Sabah al-Salim Al-Sabah, 254, 386–87 Sabah bin Jabir Al Sabah, 251 Saddam Hussein, 147, 149, 168, 171, 223, 261, 300, 329, 348; Gulf War (1990–1991), 181–83; Gulf War (2003), 183–85 Sadlier, George Foster, 432–33 Safavids, 49, 411 Sa‘id bin Maktum, 280–81 Sa‘id bin Sultan bin Ahmad, 66, 288, 341 Sa‘id bin Taymur Al Bu Sa‘idi, 114–15, 129, 193, 233, 288, 331, 341, 365, 387–88 Sa‘id ibn Maktum, 126 Sa‘id ibn Tahnun, 323 Salalah (city), 113, 388–89; Al Bu Sa‘id (dynasty), 365 Salfi Islam, 227–29; Saudi Arabia, 228 Salih ‘Abdallah Kamil, 82 Salim al Sabah, 385 Salim bin Mubarak Al Sabah, 255, 256, 300 Salim bin Rashid al-Kharusi, 214, 233 Saljuq Turks, 120, 418 Salman bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Al Sa‘ud, 149, 276 Salt trade, 136 Salubah (family), 61, 109 Sanusiyah Sufi Brotherhood, 458 Sassanid Empire, 251, 393 Satellite communications technology, 292; television broadcasting, 422–24 Al Sa‘ud (family lineage), 1, 64, 195, 228, 335, 389–90; ‘Ajman tribe, 13; al-Qa‘idah, 149; ‘Anazah, 16; Bani Khalid tribe, 52; British opposition, 280; Hashemites, 197; horses, 18–19; Islamic

fundamentalism, 228; Kuwait, 252; Madinah control, 275–76; Makkah control, 278; Mubarak bin Sabah Al Sabah, 299; Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 302; Al Murrah tribe, 306; political organization, 357–58; Qahtan tribe, 366; Qasim province, 369–70; Shammar tribe, 401–2; ‘Unayzah city, 437; Usamah bin Ladin, 452; Wahhabism, 469 Sa‘ud al-Rashid, 311 Sa‘ud bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Al Sa‘ud, 53, 390, 394 Saudi Arabia, 1, 20, 358, 391–95; Abha, 3–4; agriculture, 11–12; American Mission medical services, 198; Arab League, 261; archaeology, 32–36; architecture, 38, 39; art, 157–58; Bahrain offshore oil claims, 224; banking/finance, 55, 56; Bukhari (ethnic group), 145; charitable organizations, 73; climate, 76–77; clothing, 122; companies, 81–83; crime, 84–85; cuisine, 86–87; culture, 91–92, 289; dancing/folk arts, 100; dates, 103; divorce rates, 116; domestic tourism, 429–30; drugs trafficking, 123–24; education, 65, 141; employment/labor policies, 133; ethnic composition, 146; ethnic diversity, 148; fasting, 231; film industry, 154, 155; flora/fauna, 161; folklore, 165–66; foreign policy, 173–74; foreign women, 122; Gulf Cooperation Council, 179; Ha’il, 187–88; Hajj management, 356–57; health services, 198, 199; horse breeding, 19; human rights, 207–8; Ikhwan movement, 213–14; interest/time value of money, 58; international relations, 219–20; Internet, 221; Islamic calendar, 70; Islamic law, 159, 404; Jabal al-Akhdar War, 233; Janadiriyah festival, 235–37; jihad, 244; Jubayl al-Bahri, 244–45; judicial system, 246; law, 94; leisure, 262; literature, 266–68; majlis, 276; military, 293, 294–95; mountains, 297; music, 315, 317; mutawwa morals enforcement, 79–80, 85, 318–19; Najd, 324–25; national day, 204; newspapers, 329–30; oil, 2–3, 30–31, 335, 336–37; oil facilities, 467; oil industry, 337–39; Organization of the Islamic Conference,

517

Index Saudi Arabia (Continued) 342; Palestine, 347; pastoralist settlement policies, 351; pearling, 138; Philby, Harry St. John, 354; poetry, 265; political organization, 357–58; post-oil economic policies, 132; press freedom, 291–92; Qatar, 171; religious movements in, 227–29; Saddam Hussein, 182; secular intellectuals, 217–18; sex trade, 399–401; social organization, 411–12; sports, 415–15; Tamim ibn Murr, 53–54; television, 422–23; terrorism, 397–98; tourism, 428–30; unemployment, 133–34, 439, 463; United Arab Emirates, 172; university/higher education, 446–48; urbanization, 451; US relations, 443–44; wadis, 455–56; Wahhabi movement, 273, 458; wedding dances, 314; women’s rights, 178, 462–63; youth, 263. See also Asir (region); Empty Quarter; Hijaz (region); Najran; Names of specific cities, places, or tribal entity; Qasim (province) Saudi Aramco, 81, 110, 336, 338. See also Aramco (Arabian American Oil Company) Saudi-Yemeni War, 328 Saudization policy, 133–34, 199, 338, 395–96, 448 Savignac, Raphael, 32, 433 Sawt singing, 311–12, 315 Sayyid, 405 Sayyid Qutb, 226, 243–44 Scholarship: secular intellectuals, 217–18; Shi‘ism, 274; Sunnah, 417–18 Secular intellectuals, 217–18 Security: Internet, 221, 222; terrorism, 397–98 Segregation of genders. See Gender segregation September 11, 2001 attack, 73, 184, 220, 339, 367–68, 452 Sex trade, 399–401 Shadhili Sufi order, 77 Shafi‘i school, 226, 246, 273, 404 Shakhbut bin Diyab, 5 Shakhbut bin Sultan, 324 Shammar (tribal confederation), 15, 16, 29, 61, 64, 109, 213, 298, 305, 319, 335, 383, 401–2; Al Sa‘ud, 389; Ha’il oasis,

518

187; Al Rashid family, 378–79; tents of, 39 Shanafirah, Bayt Kathir tribal confederation, 59 Shari‘ah, 403–4; courts, 247; enforcement, 80, 85; judicial system, 246; mutawwa police enforcement, 318; political organization, 357–60; Wahhabi Islam, 457–58 Sharif, 405; ancestry, 108 Sharif of Makkah, 14, 28–29, 196, 275, 279, 319, 366, 394, 405, 406 Sharqah (Sharjah), 42, 43, 280, 407–8, 441, 443; ‘Ajman tribe, 14; arts scene, 157; fairs/festivals, 153; free trade zones, 128; Fujayrah, 175; Persian population, 144; Ra’al Khaymah, 377–78; Shari‘ah courts, 247; Wadi Hatta, 456 Shatt al-‘Arab (waterway), 17, 223–24, 304 Al Shaykh (family), 1, 303, 357–58 Shaykhah bint Ahmad al Mahmud, 373 Shaykhah bint Nasr Al Missnad, 373 Shaykhs (tribal leaders), 16 Shi‘ah Islam, 159, 404, 408–11; doctrine sources, 225; faith declaration, 230; fiqh, 158–59; Fiver, 274, 410; folklore, 166; Iran-Iraq War, 223; jihad, 243–44; jurisprudence, 274; pious observances, 362; Shammar tribe, 401; Twelver, 144, 274; Wahhabi Islam, 457. See also Isma‘ili Shi‘ism Shihuh (tribal confederation), 309 Shi‘ites: al-Hasa, 194; Al Qa‘idah, 368; Bahrain, 49, 50, 225, 250; death rites, 105; economic/social status, 224; ethnic identity, 147; Hajj incidents, 356–57; Islamic clothing proscriptions, 120; Kuwait, 74, 254; majlis meaning for, 276; Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 52; music, 312–13; musical traditions, 312–13; Najran city, 326; Qatif, 373, 374; religious observances, 204; Saudi Arabia, 358; Saudi Arabian petroleum industry, 30; shrines, 1; temporary marriage, 287; United Arab Emirates, 148; uprising in Iraq, 183; Wahhabi Islam, 228 Shipbuilding, traditional economy, 138 Shipping, 17–18 Ships, dhows, 111–13 Shoes, 119–20 Shrines, 42, 242

Index Silver, 57, 240–41 Simmons, Mathew, 336, 337 Singers, 315 Sitra (island), 21, 282 Skilled craftsmen: Nabateans, 37; Oman, 47; stone masonry, 326; Sulubba, 416; traditional, 188, 191, 192, 289 Skilled workers: agricultural, 11; economic liberalization, 132; irrigation system engineers, 460; oil industry, 30; pilgrimage, 356 Slaves, 144–45, 362, 371; former, 178; pearl diving, 353; sex trade, 399–401 Slave trade, 152, 237, 359 Soccer, 414–15 Social change: Al Murrah, 306; Bedouin tribes, 60; education policies, 141–42; ethnic identity, 147; Internet access, 222; Islamic fundamentalism, 227–29; Janadiriyah festival, 236; oil wealth, 289–90; Qatar, 425; Saudi Arabia, 2–3; television, 422, 424; ‘Unayzah city, 438; urbanization, 450–51 Social criticism, television programming, 307–8 Social organization, 412–13; crime/law enforcement, 85; pastoralist communities, 351; pre-Islamic period, 235 Social status: among herding tribes, 304; Arabian horses, 18–19; camel pastoralism, 137; “emir” title, 142–43; honor, 207; jewelry, 240; Najd architecture, 40; Quraysh tribe, 374–75; Sulubba society, 416; tribal descent, 412–13; tribe hierarchy, 61; women in Qatar, 425; women’s jewelry, 191–92 Soils of oases, 334 Somalia, 114, 144 South Yemen, 114, 365, 380, 468–70; People’s Republic, 470 Sovereign wealth funds, 131–32 Soviet Union, 219–20, 421 Spice trade, 87, 90 Sports, 414–15, 422; Qatar tourism, 431 Stateless persons (bidun), 74–75 Stone and clay products, 189–90 Strait of Hormuz, 17, 21–22, 308 Student associations, 65 Sudan, 25, 361, 452 Suez Canal, 468; crisis, 115, 469 Suffrage, Kuwait citizenship, 74

Sufism, 166, 228; Wahhabi Islam, 457–58 Sulaiman Olaiyan, 82 Sultan bin ‘Abd al ‘Aziz Al Sa‘ud, 149 Sultan bin Muhammad al Qasimi, 408 Sultan bin Saq, 371 Sultan bin Sayf al-Ya‘aribi, 288 Sultan bin Sayf bin Malik al-Ya‘arubi, 331 Sultans, 143, 214, 418 Sulubba (ethnic group), 416 Sunnah, 225, 301, 417–18; Islamic schools of jurisprudence, 273; schools, 273–74; Shafi‘i school, 226 Sunni Islam, 74, 417–18; ‘Ashurah, 204; ethnic identity, 147; Ibadi Kharaji Islam, 211, 212; jihad, 243–44; Saudi Arabia, 173; schools (madhhab), 273; Shari‘ah law, 404; Wahhabism, 357–58. See also Ibadi Kharaji Islam; Wahhabi movement Supreme Commission on Tourism (Saudi Arabia), 428 Suq, 282–85; Mattrah, 288 Sur, 237 Swahili culture, 144–45 Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), 28–29, 259, 406 Syria, 25, 29, 79, 139, 202, 418, 455; Arabic language, 23; Arabic renaissance (nahdah), 265; Bedouin culture, 10; Lawrence, T. E., 259; Muhammad, the Prophet, 300; Shafi‘i school, 226; Shammar tribe, 401 Tabuk (city), 419–20 Tadi Al Jarbah, 402 Tahnun ibn Shakhbut, 323 Ta’if (city), 1, 45, 213, 301, 420–21 Talal bin Muhammad bin Talal Al Rashid, 379 Talal Maddah, 4, 315 Talaq. See Divorce (talaq) Taliban, 173, 174, 184, 367, 452 Tanzania, 452 Taqlid (imitation), 227, 274, 411, 418 Tariq Ayyub, 239 Taxes, 338, 351 Taymur bin Faysal, 66, 214–15, 233, 387–88 Taysir Alluni, 239 Technological change, 289, 290, 439; communications media, 221–22, 268, 291–92, 423; economic development, 180; Islamic culture, 3, 228; pearling, 352

519

Index Technology, 82, 83, 131; agricultural, 8, 11–12, 21; clothing, 165; construction, 39; food, 89; healthcare, 197–99; irrigation, 137, 333, 459–61; locust control, 162; oil industry, 30–31, 336, 338; textile industry, 120; transfer, 338 Telephones, 263 Television, 128–29, 152, 238–40, 262, 422–24; musalsalat programming, 307–8; sawt broadcasts, 312 Tents, 39, 62, 377–78 Territorial disputes: Gulf islands, 17; IranBahrain, 50, 167, 225, 250, 387; IranKuwait, 168; Iran-United Arab Emirates, 172; Iraq-Kuwait, 181–82; Tihamah, 427 Terrorism: Gulf Cooperation Council, 180; Islamic charitable organizations, 73; Al Qa‘idah, 367–68; security, 397–98; United Arab Emirates, 173; Usamah bin Ladin, 452; US war on, 184 Textiles, 39, 140 Al Thani (family), 49, 54, 103–4, 250, 372–73, 385, 425 Thaqif (tribe), 420 Thesiger, Wilfred, 60, 107, 112, 129, 362, 380, 434, 456 Thomas, Bertram, 60, 107, 354, 434 Tihamah (region), 20, 40, 44, 426–27 Tombs, 33–34, 42, 166, 302, 322; death rites, 105; Muhammad’s, 1, 356, 362 Totemism, 238 Tourism, 427–32; Abha area, 3; antiquities and historical museums, 35–36; Asir, 45; cultural heritage, 91; environmental, 431; handicrafts, 190; Janadiriyah festival, 236; Nizwa city, 331 Trade, 139; Bahrain-US, 168; Dubai, 125, 126; free trade accords with US, 181; handicrafts, 188–89; Jubayl al-Bahri, 244–45; Nabateans, 321, 322; Shammar tribal territory, 402; wadis role, 455–56 Trade fairs, 153–54 Traditional crafts, 188–92 Traditional culture, 289–90 Traditional dance, 98–102 Traditional economies, 135–40 Traditional music, 311–12 Trafficking in Persons Report (US State Dept.), 399–400 Transjordan. See Jordan

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Transportation: Buraydah, 65; markets, 284–85 Travelers, 432–34; al-Bassam family, 54; Bayt Kathir guides, 60; Ha’il, 188; Philby, Harry St. John, 354; Saudi Arabia, 428–30; Shammar tribe accounts, 402 Treaty of Ta’if, 45, 326, 421 Trees, 21 Trials, 95, 245–47 Tribal areas: Abha area, 3; al-Hasa, 193–94; ‘Anazah, 15–16; Bedouins, 60–61, 350; common lands, 11; Dubai, 125; Fujayrah, 175; Harasis, 192–93; markets in, 283–84; Muntafiq, 304; Tamim ibn Murr, 53. See also Names of specific tribes and tribal confederations Tribal conflicts, 61–62; Abu Dhabi city, 5; Asir highlands, 45; Ikhwan rebellion, 453, 454; Jabal al-Akhdar War, 233–34; jihad, 302; Al Murrah, 305–6; oases allegiances, 334–35; pre-Islamic, 234; Qahtan tribe, 366; Saudi Arabia, 393; wadi resources, 455 Tribalism, 462–63; Arab culture, 289; crime/law enforcement, 85; social organizing principle, 411–12 Tribal law, 94–95 Tribal society, 351, 412–13; ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin Muhammad, 1; Bedouins, 60; classification and group hierarchies, 61; hereditary leadership, 413; honor of women, 206; human rights, 208; Islam/ oil wealth, 289–90; marriage duties, 286–87; pan-Arabism movement, 146–47; political organization, 357–60; women’s rights, 462 Tribes: adoption/lineage absorption, 237– 38; Asir, 45; Bedouin, 60; camels, 71–72; citizenship, 74; councils, 276; customary law, 94–95; descent groups, 471; “emir” title, 142–43; folklore, 166; Hanbali/ Wahhabi indoctrination, 318–19; Kuwait political reform, 358–59; Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 302; non-Bedouin, 412–13; oases, 334–35; pastoral nomad, 349–51; sharif, 108, 405; Sulubba, 416; trade/pilgrimage routes, 139; United Arab Emirates, 441–42; Yemen, 471–72. See also Bedouins (Badw); Names of specific tribes

Index Trucial States, 68, 127, 372, 385. See also United Arab Emirates Truman, Harry S., 348 Turkey, 181. See also Ottomans Turks. See Ottomans; Saljuq Turks ‘Ubayd bin Sa‘id, 280 ‘Umar bin al-Khattab, 70, 231, 410 Umayyad Dynasty, 23, 211, 409, 410, 417; ‘Abbasid revolt, 196; Islamic clothing proscriptions, 119 Ummah (people of Islam): globalization as threat to, 218; Hashemite rule, 196; unification, 342–43, 343; Wahhabism, 462 Umm al-Quwayn, 13–14, 441, 443; free trade zones, 128 ‘Unayzah (city), 64, 437–38 Underground canals, 8–9, 333–34 Unemployment, 86, 133, 396, 438–40 United Arab Emirates, 7, 20, 172–73, 225, 441–43; agriculture, 461; al-Rashid, 380; architecture, 43; ‘Awamir tribe, 46; al-‘Ayn/al-Buraymi oasis, 67, 110; Bahrain, 50, 225; clothing style, 121; companies, 84; crime, 85; dancing and folk arts, 100; drug trafficking, 124; Duru‘ camel breeding, 130; economic policies, 132–33; ethnic groups, 144, 148, 382; festivals in, 153–54; film industry, 155; fishing, 139; free trade zones, 128; Gulf Cooperation Council, 179; Gulf islands dispute, 17; Hanbali school, 273; horse breeding, 19; intellectuals, 218; international relations, 219–20; Internet, 222; judicial system, 247; leisure, 262; literature, 270–71; Al Maktum family, 281; military bases, 295; military forces, 294; Al Murrah tribe, 305; museums, 35; music scene, 316–17; oil, 335; oil industry, 339; Oman, 170; pastoralist settlement, 351; political organization, 359–60; press freedom, 291; riwa popular religion, 361–62; Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah, 387; Saudi Arabia, 444; sex trade, 400–401; television, 424; textile industry, 140; tourism, 430, 431–32; unemployment, 439; university/higher education, 449; urbanization, 451; Wahhabi Islam, 228; water sources, 461; wedding music, 314; women, 119, 178; Zayid bin Sultan

al-Nahayan, 54, 475. See also Abu Dhabi; ‘Ajman; Dubai; Fujayrah; Ra’s al Khaymah (RAK); Sharqah; Umm al-Quwayn United Kingdom. See Great Britain United Nations, 22, 182, 184–85, 342, 347–49, 387, 441 United States, 443–45; Al Qa‘idah, 367–68; Aramco, 30, 338; Bahrain, 50, 51, 167–68; Dhahran airbase, 111; free trade with, 181; Gulf Cooperation Council, 179–81; Gulf War (1990–1991), 181–83; Gulf War (2003), 183–85; international relations, 219–20; Iran-Iraq War, 223–24; Al Jazeera broadcasts, 239; Jihadists, 228–29; Kuwait, 169, 255; military presence in Saudi Arabia, 419, 452; oil industry technology, 338; oil reserve claims, 336; Oman Empire, 66; Palestine, 347–48; Qatar, 171–72; Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah, 387; Saudi Arabia, 2–3, 149, 152, 173–74, 347; United Arab Emirates, 172–73 Universities, 445–49; Dhahran city, 110; employment opportunities, 133–34; fiqh, 158; foreign inAl-Dawhah, 104; Islamic, 80; Sharqah, 407; virtue promotion, 80 Urbanization, 290, 450–51; Al-Manamah, 282; ‘Anazah, 16–17; architecture, 38–39, 42–43; divorce rates, 116; Dubai, 127; food/cuisine, 90; Islamic clothing, 119–20; marriage, 285; planning/zoning, 257; Qasim province, 369; Riyadh, 383–84 Usamah bin Muhammad bin ’Awad bin Ladin, 226, 239, 367, 452–53 ‘Utaybah (tribal confederation), 13, 319, 366, 453–54 ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan, 211, 242, 409 Al-‘Utub (tribal confederation), 251, 255, 335 ‘Uyaynah (town), 52, 54, 302 Uzbeks, 145 Value-add industry, 132, 133 Vegetation, 21, 160–64; oases, 333, 334. See also Flora and fauna Veils, 118–19, 177–78 Venezuela, 336, 337 Violence, 243–44, 397–98, 427 Visas, 356, 427, 428

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Index Wadhba bint Muhammad Bin al-Uraymir, 52–53 Wadis, 455–56 Wages and salaries, 440 Wahhabi movement, 1, 225, 226, 302, 457–58; ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Sa‘ud, 2; al-Hasa, 195; Asir highland tribal warfare, 45; Bedouin military service, 63; Buraydah city, 64; Al Bu Sa‘idi family, 66; Al Bu Shams tribe, 67; cultural heritage protection, 93; Dhafir tribe, 108–9; Faysal bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Al Sa‘ud, 152; grave site visitation, 362; Hanbali school, 228, 273, 357–58, 457–58; Hijaz, 200–201; human rights, 462; Ikhwan movement, 394; Islamic clothing proscriptions, 119; Jiddah, 242; jihad, 244; mosque architecture, 42; music/dance ban, 315; Mutayr tribe, 319–20; Najran, 328; political reform, 393–94; popular Islam, 360–61; sacred site destruction, 275–76; salafiyah, 227–28; Al Sa‘ud family, 389; Saudi Arabia, 227–28; Saudi Arabia political organization, 357–58; Shammar tribe, 402; Shi‘ites, 374; Tihamah, 427; war dances, 100 Wahibah (tribe confederation), 129, 136, 190–91, 193, 237–38, 459 Walid bin al-Talal, 82, 155 Wallin, Georg August, 433 War dances, 99, 100 Warfare, 243–44 War on Terror, 184 Warrior love songs, 317 Water, 459–61 Water resources: Kuwait, 251; Najran city, 326; oases, 333–34; pastoralist land/ water ownership, 350, 351; Qasim province, 369; Ta’if area, 420; Tihamah, 426–27; wadis, 455–56; wells, 461 Water rights, 9 Water supply: agriculture and cuisine, 87; Jiddah, 242; Jubayl al-Bahri, 245; Riyadh (city), 383; wheat production, 11 Weaving, 137, 190, 191, 378 Weddings (zaffaf), 238, 287; dance, 99–100, 287, 314; dresses, 122, 140; music, 313–14 Westernization, 41, 42–43, 93, 165, 343

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Western region. See Hijaz (region) Wildlife, 21, 136, 160–64; oryx, 108, 164, 193; zebu (dwarf), 11, 389 Wind tower houses, 37, 41 Wissmann, Hermann von, 433 Women, 177–78, 195; athletes, 414, 415; Bahrain, 50; Bedouin culture, 62; clothing, 118–19, 120–22; dancing, 99–100, 101; divorce, 116; employment, 440; family life, 150–51; honor of, 206; hunting/gathering economy, 136; incense use, 215, 216; intellectuals, 217–18; interior design, 41; Internet access, 222; Islamic clothing proscriptions, 119; jewelry, 191–92, 240; land/water rights, 9; leisure, 262; marriage, 286; medical personnel, 199; Oman, 341; pastoralism, 137; pilgrimage garments, 122; poets, 264–65; political leaders, 373; popular religion/piety, 362–63; pre-Islamic period, 235; Qatar, 425; sex trade, 399–401; singers, 316; social role/ education, 142; Sulubba society, 416; television programming, 307, 424; tents, 39; textile industry, 140; United Arab Emirates, 475; US-Saudi/Gulf foreign relations, 445; Wahibah tribe, 459; wedding customs, 238, 314; work songs, 313; writers, 267, 269, 270, 271 Women’s education, 65, 447, 448, 463, 475 Women’s rights, 178, 341, 365, 373, 461–63; suffrage, 50, 74, 171, 358, 365, 373 Wood crafts, 40, 190–91, 309 Wool, 10, 39, 137, 140, 191 Working conditions, 133, 353 Work songs, 312–13 World heritage sites, 48, 92, 331, 431 World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders, 367–68 World Trade Organization, 132, 170 World War I, 16, 109, 197, 209, 304–5, 347, 379, 469. See also Arab Revolt World War II, 30, 111, 219–20, 319, 443–44 Al-Ya‘arbah dynasty, 47 Yafi‘ (tribal confederation), 472 Al-Yam (tribe), 328 Yamamah (region), 16, 52, 174, 383 Yamani, Ahmad Zaki, 465–66

Index Yanbu‘ (city), 245, 466–67 Ya‘ribah (tribe), 340 Yassir Arafat, 348 Yathrib (Madinah), 23, 275, 278, 301 Yazidi (ethnic group), 26 Yazid ibn Mu‘awiyah, 409 Yemen, 20, 22, 114, 169, 468–71; agriculture, 8; al-Hasa, 194; Al Sa‘ud, 390; Arabian horses, 18; Arabic of, 23, 25; Bayt Kathir, 59; Christianity, 381–82; civil war, 390, 469–70; climate, 77; coffee, 79; dress, 121–22; drug use, 124; frankincense, 215; Ibadi Kharaji Islam, 211; Ikhwan movement, 213; jewelry industry, 191; Jewish population, 381; mountains, 297; Najran, 325–27, 328; Oman, 170; Peoples Democratic Republic, 115; Rub‘ al-Khali Desert, 106–7; Salalah, 389; Saudi Arabia, 152, 444; Shammar tribe, 401; shrines, 42; silversmithing, 240; Tihamah, 426–27;

trade relationships, 139; Treaty of Ta’if, 326, 421; tribes, 471–72; wadis, 455; Zar popular religion, 361; Zaydi Shi‘ism, 274, 410, 411 Yemeni, 3, 4, 45, 147 Youth, 123, 124, 263, 290, 439–40 Yusuf bin Ahmad Kanoo, 83

Zanzibar, 25, 28, 66, 90, 139, 144–45, 237, 288 Zar (popular religion), 361 Al Zawahiri, Ayman, 367 Zaydis (dynasty), 45 Zaydi Shi‘ism, 410–11, 468 Zayid al-Nahayan, 359–60 Zayid bin Khalifah, 323, 334 Zayid bin Sultan Al Nahayan, 5, 7, 14, 54, 324, 475–76 Zionist movement, 28–29, 259, 347 Zoroastrians, 48, 382

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About the Editors and Contributors

Sebastian Maisel is Assistant Professor of Arabic and Middle Eastern Studies at Grand Valley State University in Allendale, Michigan. He has taught at universities in Germany, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. He has researched and written extensively, including books and essays on social, political, and religious issues of Arabia and his other field of expertise, the ethnoreligious minority of the Yezidis. Among his books are The Customary Law of the Bedouins in Northern Arabia (2006), Yezidism–Religion and Life (co-author, 2008), and The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (co-author, forthcoming). John A. Shoup teaches at Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane, Morocco. He has conducted field work in Lesotho, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Senegal, and most recently in Mauritania on topics related to pastoralism, the impact of tourism on local communities, traditional land use systems, trans-Saharan trade, and popular culture. He has authored and co-authored several articles and book chapters and published Culture and Customs of Jordan (2007) and Culture and Customs of Syria (2008). William Bundy teaches Political Philosophy at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York. He has served in the U.S. Army in the Middle East, including deployments to Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Afghanistan, Tunisia, and Morocco. Christopher Danbeck teaches International Politics at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York. He is a career Army officer with service in tactical units, including a deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2003 to 2004. Coeli Fitzpatrick is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Grand Valley State University in Allendale, Michigan, where she teaches in the Philosophy and Middle East Studies departments. Her research focuses on both medieval Islamic

About the Editors and Contributors

philosophy and contemporary Arab and Islamic intellectual culture. She has published articles on al-Kindi and al-Farabi and is co-editor of a forthcoming encyclopedia on twentieth-century Arab intellectuals. Adnan Al-Ghunaim is from Kuwait City, Kuwait and recently earned a Master of Arts in Gulf Studies from the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter. Audra Grant is a Middle East analyst at the RAND Corporation in Washington, D.C. Her research areas concern the evolution of domestic politics of Iraq, Middle East democratization and governance, political Islam, societies in transition, and public opinion research. Grant is a former Middle East analyst at the U.S. Department of State. She has published working papers and journal articles on political party dynamics in Algeria and Morocco; peace and reconciliation processes in Algeria; attitudes among Arab-Israelis; identifying support for democratization among Palestinians; gender as a determinant of support for political Islam; hard-line foreign policies in Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco; and patterns of illicit trade in Africa south of the Sahara. Carla Higgins worked in the Arabian Gulf as an academic librarian and now works for the U.S. Department of State as a Foreign Service Specialist in the United Arab Emirates. Jack Kalpakian teaches at Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane, Morocco. He specializes in Security Studies, International Political Economy, and the Middle East/North Africa Region. Tom Lansford is Associate Dean of the College of Arts and Letters and a Professor of Political Science at the University of Southern Mississippi. He is an associate editor for the journal White House Studies and an associate editor for Politics and Ethics Review. He has published articles in journals such as Defense Analysis, The Journal of Conflict Studies, European Security, International Studies, Security Dialogue, and Strategic Studies. He is the author, co-author, editor, or coeditor of twenty-seven books. His books include, most recently, The Lords of Foggy Bottom: The American Secretaries of State and the World They Shaped (2001), All for One: NATO, Terrorism and the United States (2002), A Bitter Harvest: U.S. Foreign Policy and Afghanistan (2003), Strategic Preemption: US Foreign Policy and the Second War in Iraq (2004), To Protect and Defend: US Homeland Security Policy (2006), and the Historical Dictionary of U.S. Diplomacy since the Cold War (2007). His more recent edited collections include America’s War on Terror (2003), George W. Bush: A Political and Ethical Assessment at Midterm (2004), Transatlantic Security Dilemmas: Old Europe, New Europe and the US (2005), and Strategic Interests in the Middle East: Opposition or Support for US Foreign Policy (2007). James Sater is Assistant Professor at the American University of Sharjah (UAE). He is the author of Civil Society and Political Change in Morocco (2007). He has

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About the Editors and Contributors

worked on state-society relations, human rights, and civil society in the Arab world. Rachel Sondheimer is part of a research team investigating institutional adaptation as related to integration and diversity in the Army. Her primary research interests include isolating the relationships among educational attainment, family background, and political and civic participation. Bouziane Zaid is a lecturer in the Communication Studies Program within the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane, Morocco. His research interests include critical media studies, media theory, and development communication.

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